ASSESSING U.S. POLICY ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

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CONTENTS

WITNESSES

The Honorable Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................................................................. 5
The Honorable Esther Brimmer, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................................. 20

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

The Honorable Johnnie Carson: Prepared statement ........................................... 8
The Honorable Esther Brimmer: Prepared statement ....................................... 23
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights:
  Report to Congress on United Nations Efforts to Prevent Trafficking in Persons and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions ................................................................. 60
  Sexual Exploitation and Abuse ........................................................................ 68

APPENDIX

Hearing notice ........................................................................................................ 72
Hearing minutes ................................................................................................... 73
Written response from the Honorable Esther Brimmer to question submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H. Smith ................................. 74
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 o'clock p.m., in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will come to order, and good afternoon. And let me first apologize for being a bit late. We did have votes and then all of us had a little trouble getting back because there is so much going on the floor, so again I apologize to you.

Good afternoon. Today's hearing will examine U.S. policy on international peacekeeping operations in Africa, our material support, and other support for peacekeeping operations in African countries.

The U.S. Government contributes more than $1 billion annually for African peacekeeping, most recently dedicating $1.6 billion for Fiscal Year 2012. Today's hearing offers an opportunity to look at how we evaluate the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations that we support in Africa.

There are several current peacekeeping operations in Africa encouraged and/or supported by the U.S. Government, and others are being planned even now. The effectiveness of peacekeeping operations have been called into question in terms of planning and execution. This is critical at a time when important peacekeeping operations in Mali are in the planning stage. Eventually the length of peacekeeping operations often run into decades, and new models of peacekeeping operations such as hybrids will be discussed.

Finally, but also of significant importance, we will be inquiring as to how well the United Nations is implementing its zero tolerance policy with respect to human trafficking and other forms of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel. I personally have chaired seven hearings—that is seven—that highlighted that issue and other peacekeeping issues in this, the 112th Congress, alone, most recently a June 29, 2012, hearing on Mali. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act that I sponsored in 2000, and its reauthorizations, also contain provisions related to peacekeeping operations including the prevention of human trafficking by peacekeeping personnel as part of the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons.
Peacekeeping refers to activities that create conditions favoring lasting peace. However, it is often associated with other related concepts, peacemaking and peacebuilding. Peacemaking involves dealing with conflicts in progress and focuses on diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated settlement. Peacebuilding describes outside interventions designed to prevent the start or resumption of violent conflict within a nation by creating a sustainable peace. As the concept of peacekeeping has evolved, it now includes all three elements.

The first U.N. peacekeeping mission was in 1948, when a small, armed observer force was sent to monitor a buffer zone between Arabs and Israelis in the Middle East. Between then and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, there were 18 U.N. peacekeeping missions. Since 1990, however, the U.N. peacekeeping has risen to more than 50 missions and the number of peacekeepers worldwide has grown to nearly 100,000. The record of success of U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa has been mixed. A few of them have been credited as qualified successes, such as the U.N. mission in Sierra Leone. The U.N. operation in Cote d'Ivoire also was considered successful but remains incomplete.

Unfortunately other U.N. operations have not been as successful. For example, the U.N. mission in Somalia which operated from 1992 to 1993 is clearly seen as such a failure. We all remember the infamous Black Hawk Down incident in which 18 U.S. soldiers were killed following the shooting down of an American helicopter. The repercussions of that disaster have affected the subsequent, I believe, unwillingness of the U.S. Government to commit U.S. troops to peacekeeping operations in Africa. And I remember so well, personally, when Les Aspin came before the Hill and was asked in a pointed way, why weren't the recommendations by the commanders on the ground for more capabilities given credence? And he said he didn't think it would fly in the Congress. We weren't asked. And I think it would have flown and it would have been supported robustly, but regrettably it was not. And we now have regional organizations developing and managing peacekeeping operations, sometimes in concert with U.N. or sometimes on their own. The African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, and even NATO have engaged in peacekeeping operations on the African continent. The changes in peacekeeping operations in Africa will have a profound impact on U.S. policy and financial and other support for such operations.

As I mentioned earlier, sex trafficking and other forms of sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeeping personnel are issues of serious concern. U.N. peacekeeping missions have been subject to repeated accusations of sexual exploitation and abuse of local women and young girls by foreign peacekeepers since at least 2001. The U.N. claims it has effectively addressed this problem, but we need to ensure that the blue helmets that are supposed to instill hope that peace is at hand don't create fear, abuse, and exploitation by the very protectors sent to help.

And finally I would say parenthetically to that, we have held in this subcommittee, three hearings on what was going on in Democratic Republic of the Congo. I went there and met with peacekeepers as well many of the women who had been exploited, and
young girls in shelters, and was shocked, frankly, how for $1 or a loaf of bread, young 13- and 14-year-olds were being abused by U.N. peacekeepers. I am happy to say that at the time, Jane Holl Lute, who was then working for the U.N. and who had pushed hard within the U.N. system for the zero tolerance policy, made a major difference, and she is now as we all know, number two over at Department of Homeland Security. So U.S. leadership there was very robust and very, I think, effective, but there still is a persistent problem. Kofi Annan, to his credit, announced a zero tolerance policy, just like George Bush did for our military and deployments overseas, NATO did the same thing. But at the time we weren't talking about zero tolerance, but zero compliance, and perhaps you might want to speak whether or not there have been real gains made in ensuring that U.N. and AU peacekeepers are not complicit in any way.

I would like to yield to my good friend and colleague, Ms. Bass, the ranking member, for any comments she might have.

Ms. Bass. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and once again of course, thank you for holding this hearing and for your leadership on this issue.

I wanted to just take a moment, of course, to offer my deepest sympathies to our friends from the State Department. I am sure that both of you knew the Ambassador, and all of us have been shocked by what occurred, but also what is occurring. And I know it is not the subject of this hearing, but if there is some update that you could provide about the status of our Embassies in Yemen and Tunisia and Egypt, that would be appreciated.

Today's hearing on peacekeeping operations is timely as we continue to see a serious need for these missions across the continent, especially in the Sudans, the Great Lakes region and in West Africa. It is my hope that today's hearing will not merely bring to the surface how we further strengthen these peacekeeping commitments and coordination but that we can acknowledge the tremendous benefit that peacekeepers play in preventing and addressing conflict in rapidly changing environments where there is clearly a need to promote and sustain peace, stability and security.

I want to offer my appreciation to Ambassador Carson and Assistant Secretary Brimmer for participating in today's hearing, and for your steadfast efforts on this and many other areas that are bettered in no small part to your leadership and your vision.

The United Nations reports that in 2012 and 2013, the U.N. peacekeeping operations budget, which just began, is estimated at $7.23 billion. As we will hear from the witnesses today, I would appreciate greater clarity on the success of U.S. funds in supporting peacekeeping efforts across Africa, and in what ways the Global Peace Operations Initiative, peacekeeping operations and the contributions for international peacekeeping account budget requests are coordinated. As we make tough budget decisions while at the same time see protracted conflicts across the continent, I certainly don't believe that now is the time to turn our backs on peacekeeping, particularly as tensions grow in places like Mali. I am interested in making sure that with limited resources we spend them effectively to protect populations in harm's way and promote security toward greater freedom and lasting peace.
Let me add that U.N. peacekeeping has a long history as was described by my colleague. The benefits of peacekeeping have definitely been clear. I will just give one example. A GAO report notes that U.N. peacekeeping is eight times less expensive than funding U.S. forces with a similar mandate. These benefits have also long been recognized by both political parties. Over the last decade the U.N. Security Council, with support from both the Bush and Obama administrations, authorized a nearly three-fold increase in the number of peacekeeping personnel serving in the field. And the reason for this of course is clear. U.N. peacekeeping operations are firmly in America’s interest. Countries undergoing conflict threaten the national and economic security of the U.S., risk becoming safe havens for terrorists and criminals and often feature serious problems of human rights abuses and human deprivation. By allowing the U.S. to share the burden for addressing these issues it is clear that the success of these missions is in our long-term interest.

I also wanted to raise, as my colleague did, the sexual exploitation that we of course believe must continue to be prioritized, and wanted to know if you would comment on the assessment of training programs of military and police personnel, the compliance that Congressman Smith was talking about. Are the peacekeepers that perpetuate and exploit those that are charged, actually are they charged and held accountable? With the implementation of the relatively new global field support strategy, reforms appear to be underway to more effectively address the management of global inventories and logistics. Are you satisfied with these reforms? Are they hitting their benchmarks? Are the various missions getting the resources they need to credibly fulfill their mandate?

I also wanted to raise Mali. We talked about Mali before, but also next week we are going to look at developments and growing tensions between the DRC and Rwanda, and both of these provide serious concerns for us. The Mali situation calls for a peacekeeping force. And secondarily, in the DRC, do you believe a neutral force to monitor the DRC/Rwanda border is needed, and would the U.N. mission in DRC be the appropriate force to undertake such a mission?

Thank you, and I look forward to your testimony.

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass, thank you very much.

Mr. TURNER?

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to offer my condolences to the members of State for the loss of your colleague and some American heroes. I am interested in hearing what you have to say. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner.

I would like to now introduce our very distinguished panel, beginning first with Ambassador Johnnie Carson, who serves as Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of African Affairs, a position he has held since May 2009. Ambassador Carson has a long and distinguished career in public policy. Over 37 years in the Foreign Service including time as our Ambassador to Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Ambassador Carson has also served as the staff director of this subcommittee, so it is always great to have you here, anytime you want go back to the other side of the dais—and as a Peace Corps volunteer in Tanzania. Ambassador Carson is a recipi-
ent of numerous prestigious awards for his service from the U.S. Department of State.

Then we will hear from Dr. Esther Brimmer. She currently serves as the Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, a position she has held since April 2009. Dr. Brimmer previously worked in the State Department in the Office of Policy Planning, and for the Undersecretary of Political Affairs where her portfolio included peacekeeping. Dr. Brimmer has also worked for the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, here in the House of Representatives, and with McKinsey & Company, a global management consulting firm.

Ambassador Carson, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. CARSON. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Congresswoman Bass, Congressman Turner, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to talk about peacekeeping in Africa. As members of the committee are aware, President Obama’s recent presidential policy directive identified our efforts to advance peace and security on the continent as one of the four pillars of the administration’s new Africa strategy. This is an area where we have witnessed both significant progress and major challenges over the past decade. Angola, Mozambique, Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have progressed from periods of prolonged civil conflict to new eras of relative peace and stability. Nonetheless, this progress remains fragile in many countries, and all too many states are mired still in serious conflict including Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and South Sudan.

Moreover, as illustrated by the ongoing situation in Mali, the fragile nature of democratic institutions on the continent means that even relatively stable countries can quickly unravel and fall back into conflict.

If we are to assist our African partners in achieving a more democratic, prosperous and stable Africa, we must address these conflicts. Conflict destabilizes states and borders, stifles economic growth and investment and robs young Africans of opportunity for an education and better life. To address these conflicts we need well resourced U.N., African Union, and regional peacekeeping operations.

My colleague, Assistant Secretary Brimmer, will be focusing on the U.N. element of peacekeeping in Africa, and therefore I would like to focus my testimony on the efforts of the African Union and the subregional organizations to develop their own peacekeeping capacities and to conduct operations in support of peace and security objectives on the continent. I also want to discuss U.S. Government efforts to strengthen African peacekeeping capacity at the regional, subregional, and national levels.

The founding of the African Union, or AU, in 2002, brought with it the promise of a more robust African regional architecture that would one day be capable of addressing and coordinating responses to the myriad challenges facing the continent. This newfound prom-
ise extended to the area of peace and security, where the AU set forth a vision for an African Peace and Security Architecture. Partially modeled after the United Nations and other regional organizations, this architecture is designed to enable the African Union to act as an active and dynamic adjunct to the work of the United Nations in its mission to maintain international peace and security including in Africa. The centerpiece of this architecture is the AU’s African Standby Force, which is comprised of five regional standby brigades ready to respond to a range of contingencies from providing support to political missions, to robust military interventions to prevent genocide. The five brigades are the Economic Community of West African States Standby Force, the Eastern African Standby Force, the Southern African Development Community Brigade, the Central African Multinational Force, and the North African Standby Brigade.

All four sub-Saharan African brigades have taken initial steps toward becoming operational including setting up headquarters and identifying pledged units from member states. They have also participated in a number of multinational exercises. The North African Standby Brigade has made considerably less progress than the other four sub-Saharan brigades. However, none of the brigades is currently capable of conducting the range of operations contained within the African Standby Forces mandate without significant and ongoing external support.

Although the African Standby Force remains a work in progress, the AU and the subregional organizations like ECOWAS have not stood idly by in the face of persistent conflict. In fact, in many cases the African Union and the subregional organizations have proven to be more responsive than the broader international community in attempting to address serious conflicts in Africa quickly. The African Union deployed its first peacekeeping operation to Burundi in 2003, in support of the international effort to end the long-running civil war there. In 2004, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was deployed in response to the horrific conflict gripping Darfur. Despite the immense challenges and obstructions that faced the troop contributors in the mission area, AMIS helped to set the conditions and prepare the ground for the deployment for a larger and more complex U.N./AU hybrid operation called UNAMID, which remains deployed in Darfur to this day. The AU authorized, Tanzanian-led intervention, in the Comoros in 2008 was another example of the region stepping up quickly in response to a regional security challenge.

Somalia best demonstrates the valuable role that the African Union can play in terms of regional peacekeeping. The African Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, has now been operating for 5 years in what has been one of the most volatile conflict environments in Africa. Over those 5 years, AMISOM, comprised of troops from Uganda, Burundi, and Kenya, has gradually extended its area of operations from a small enclave near the international airport in Mogadishu to encompass all of Mogadishu and the surrounding towns. It has done so with the support of the United Nations in the form of a logistic support package provided through the U.N.

Support Office for AMISOM. AMISOM is now in the process of deploying to additional regions in southwestern Somalia, and the
recent incorporation of Kenyan forces into AMISOM has further extended the mission's reach.

We think AMISOM has been a relatively strong success story, and as many of you know, on Monday of this week the Transitional Federal Government effectively went out of business in Mogadishu. And over the past year as a result of the gains that have been made militarily by AMISOM, we have seen a new Constitution written and approved. We have seen the election of a new Parliament of approximately 250 members, half the size of the old Parliament. We have seen the election of a new speaker of Parliament, and on Monday we saw the election of a new President. We expect a prime minister and a cabinet to be named shortly. None of this would have been possible without the work of AMISOM.

African subregional organizations have also played an important role in responding to armed conflicts on the continent. ECOWAS responded to the crisis in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and set the stage for the subsequent U.N. action.

The examples I have cited reflect the commitment of the African Union, the subregional organizations and member states to undertake and participate in peacekeeping missions across the continent. However, their participation exposes the enormous challenges that many African states face. These challenges are a lack of resources. The African Union and subregional organizations remain dependent on support from the donor community for specialized training for transport and equipment, for logistics, for medical facilities, and even in some cases for salaries. Sometimes, AU member states also lack the capacity to undertake the complex mission planning and management that is required to execute complex multinational and multiunit operations.

While these challenges are significant and in some instances systemic, I can assure the committee that we in Washington and the administration are committed to helping our African partners to overcome them. Our peacekeeping assistance programs, which are primarily funded through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, sometimes called GPOI, and the broader Account, PKO, focus on addressing the capability gaps of our African partners as well as strengthening the ability of our African partners to plan, to train and to deploy and sustain peacekeeping operations on their own. These deployment support and capacity-building activities are executed through a close partnership between the Department of State and the Department of Defense. We continue to build on these programs and to expand them out. Should we falter in our commitment to developing African peacekeeping capacity, the consequences will be heavier burdens on the international community as a whole, on the United States and our partners whether through deployment of more U.N. blue helmet operations or even direct military interventions in the cases where our own national security is at stake.

It is clearly in our interest to support U.N. peacekeeping programs across Africa. It is in our interest to support the AU’s capacity building in this area, and it is in our interest to support the subregional efforts which are designed to maintain the peace and prevent greater crises from occurring.
I want to thank the committee again for the opportunity to address you on this important issue. I have a longer written statement that has been given to you. I welcome the opportunity to be here and to take your questions after my colleague speaks.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carson follows:]

Testimony of
Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson
The Bureau of African Affairs
U.S. Department of State
before
The House Foreign Affairs Committee
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights
September 13, 2012
“Peacekeeping in Africa”

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak about peacekeeping in Africa today. As members of the Committee are aware, President Obama’s recent Presidential Policy Directive identified our efforts to advance peace and security on the continent as one of the four pillars of the Administration’s Africa strategy. This is an area where we have witnessed both significant progress and major challenges over the past decade. Angola, Mozambique, Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have progressed from periods of prolonged civil conflict to new eras of relative peace and stability. Nonetheless, this progress remains fragile in many countries, and all too many states are still mired in serious conflict, including Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and South Sudan. Moreover, as illustrated by the ongoing situation in Mali, the fragile nature of democratic institutions on the continent means that even relatively stable countries can quickly unravel into conflict.
If we are to assist our African partners in achieving a more democratic, prosperous, stable, and secure Africa, we must address these conflicts. Conflict destabilizes states and borders, stifles economic growth and investment, and robs young Africans of the opportunity for an education and a better life. To address these conflicts, we need well-resourced UN, African Union (AU), and regional peacekeeping operations. That is why the topic of this hearing is so vitally important.

My colleague, Assistant Secretary Brimmer, will be focusing on the UN element of peacekeeping in Africa, and therefore I want to focus my testimony on the efforts of the African Union and sub-regional organizations to develop their own peacekeeping capacities and conduct operations in support of peace and security objectives on the continent. I also want to discuss U.S. Government efforts to strengthen African peacekeeping capacity at the regional, sub-regional, and national levels.

**The African Peace and Security Architecture**

The founding of the African Union or “AU” in 2002 brought with it the promise of a more robust African regional architecture that would one day be capable of addressing and coordinating responses to the myriad challenges facing the continent. This newfound promise extended to the area of peace and security,
where the AU set forth a vision for an African Peace and Security Architecture. Partially modeled after the UN and other regional organizations, this architecture is designed to enable the AU to act as an active and dynamic adjunct to the work of the UN in its mission to maintain international peace and security. The centerpiece of this architecture is the AU’s African Standby Force (ASF), which is composed of five regional standby brigades ready to respond to a range of contingencies, from providing support to political missions, to robust military interventions to prevent genocide. The five brigades are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force, the Eastern African Standby Force, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Brigade, the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC), and the North African Standby Brigade Capability (NARC).

All four sub-Saharan African brigades have taken initial steps towards becoming operational, including setting up headquarters, identifying pledged units from member states, and conducting multinational exercises. The North African Standby Brigade has made considerably less progress towards achieving full operational capability, and progress may be further delayed by the events of the Arab Spring.

The ASF remains a work in progress. The five brigades are in varying stages of readiness. None of the brigades is currently capable of conducting the
range of operations contained within the ASF’s mandate without significant external support in the form of financial resources, training, logistical assistance, and equipment. While most of the brigades have identified sites for their mandated logistics depots, they either have made no progress in establishing the depots themselves, or have not fully stocked their depots to address the range of contingencies. Capacity at the level of AU headquarters, specifically the Peace Support Operations Division, to manage and direct the force remains limited due to resource and staffing constraints.

AU and Regional Operations

Although the ASF remains a work in progress, the AU and sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS have not stood idly by in the face of persistent conflict. In fact, in many cases, the AU and the sub-regional organizations have proven to be more responsive than the broader international community in terms of addressing conflict quickly. The AU deployed its first peacekeeping operation to Burundi in 2003 in support of the international effort to end the long-running civil war there, and this helped set the stage for a successful follow-on UN operation in 2004. In 2004, a larger and more ambitious mission, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), was deployed in response to the horrific conflict gripping Darfur. Despite the immense challenges and obstructions that faced the troop contributors in the mission area, AMIS helped to set the conditions and prepare the ground for
the deployment of a larger and more complex UN-AU hybrid operation, UNAMID, which remains deployed in Darfur to this day. The AU-authorized, Tanzanian-led intervention in Comoros in 2008 was another example of the region stepping up quickly in response to a regional security challenge.

Somalia best demonstrates the valuable role the AU can play in terms of regional peacekeeping. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has now been operating for more than five years in the most volatile conflict environment on the continent. The AU troop contributors, including Uganda, Burundi, and Kenya, have paid a high price in terms of lives and national treasure. But the progress AMISOM has achieved since its modest beginning in 2007 is remarkable.

Over the past five years, AMISOM has gradually extended its area of operations from a small enclave near the international airport in Mogadishu to encompass all of Mogadishu and the surrounding towns. It has done so with support from the UN in the form of the logistics support package provided through the UN Support Office for AMISOM. AMISOM is now in the process of deploying to additional regions in southwestern Somalia, and the recent incorporation of Kenyan forces into AMISOM has further extended the mission’s reach. The UN Monitoring Group reported in June 2012 that the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab “has suffered dramatic reverses over the past year, experiencing
military defeats, the loss of territory and the erosion of its revenue base, setbacks that have exacerbated rifts within the group’s senior leadership.” This is directly attributable to the success of the African-led AMISOM. It is no exaggeration to say that through AMISOM, the AU has given Somalia and its long-suffering people their best chance for sustained peace and stability in over a generation.

African sub-regional organizations have also played an important role in responding to armed conflicts on the continent. In particular, ECOWAS has repeatedly shown that it can help to reestablish stability and set the stage for follow-on UN peacekeeping operations within West Africa, as it did in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The Economic Community of Central African States – usually referred to by its French acronym CEEAC – has also made a small but notable contribution to regional peace and security by deploying the mission known as MICOPAX to the Central African Republic under the auspices Central African brigade of the ASF - FOMAC - since 2008. The Eastern Africa Standby Force, which is supported by 10 East African countries, is currently supporting AMISOM through the deployment of staff officers to AMISOM’s headquarters in Mogadishu.

Challenges Facing AU Peacekeeping
These examples demonstrate the level of political will that underlies the commitment of the AU, the sub-regional organizations, and member states to peacekeeping on the continent. These experiences also demonstrate the immense array of challenges facing African peacekeepers. These challenges include increasingly dangerous and complex conflict environments in which African peacekeepers are serving, and systemic weaknesses within African militaries and the regional organizations themselves.

AMISOM best exemplifies the danger and complexity of mission environments. In no other mission on the continent are peacekeepers facing such a challenging operational environment. While the mission has succeeded in driving al-Shabaab further from Mogadishu and surrounding towns, al-Shabaab remains a dangerous enemy that possesses the will and the capability to wreak havoc across southern and central Somalia. In confronting AMISOM, al-Shabaab has utilized an array of tactics that mirror those facing U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, including increasingly sophisticated improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, and sniper fire.

With respect to systemic weaknesses, a lack of resources has proven to be the most significant obstacle to effective African peacekeeping missions. The AU and sub-regional organizations remain dependent on support from the donor community for a broad range of mission requirements, including training,
equipment, logistics support, and salaries. Oftentimes, AU member states lack the trained personnel or equipment required to conduct specialized tasks, such as combat engineering, logistics resupply, medical support, and vehicle maintenance. The limited mission planning and management capabilities at AU headquarters can sometimes reinforce the tendency of individual country contingents to plan and execute operations with only minimal or ad-hoc coordination with the contingents from other troop contributors.

**How the United States is Helping to Address these Challenges**

While these challenges are significant, I can assure the Committee that we are committed to helping our African partners overcome them. Our peacekeeping assistance programs, which are primarily funded through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and the broader Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Account, focus on addressing the capability gaps of our African partners, as well as strengthening the ability of our African partners to plan, train for, deploy, and sustain peacekeeping operations on their own. These deployment support and capacity-building activities are executed through a close partnership between the Department of State and the Department of Defense.

This whole-of-government commitment is most evident in the case of AMISOM. Since 2007, the U.S. Government has provided more than $355 million
for equipment, training, and logistical support to AMISOM troop contributors, to help AMISOM overcome the threat of al-Shabaab and safeguard the Somali political process. We have tailored this support to meet the unique challenges of the AMISOM mission. For instance, the peacekeeping training provided through the Department of State’s Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program has been expanded and lengthened for AMISOM troop contributors, and covers topics such as protection of civilians, human rights, countering improvised explosive devices, maritime security, and mechanized infantry operations. The Department of Defense is contributing complementary, specialized counterterrorism training and equipment under Section 1206 authority, including combat engineering training and equipment, Raven unmanned aerial vehicles, and secure communications.

Our joint support is not restricted to just AMISOM, however. We are heavily engaged in building African peacekeeping capacity at three different levels: at the level of the AU’s headquarters, at the level of sub-regional organizations, and at the level of individual member states. Through GPO!, we have provided a peace and security advisor to the AU’s Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) since 2005 to assist the AU in its effort to develop the ASF, as well as office equipment to support daily operations at the PSOD. The Department of Defense has provided training to AU staff on managing defense resources, and
is helping the AU to develop a communications network that links the headquarters to the regional brigades.

We are also providing targeted assistance at the level of sub-regional organizations and the ASF brigades designed to help bring those brigades closer to full operational capability. Through GPOI, we have provided extensive support to ECOWAS and its standby brigade, to include advisory assistance, communications equipment, logistics training, support for ECOWAS multinational exercises, and assistance to ECOWAS' regional training centers. In East Africa, ACOTA offers staff officer training for member states that comprise the East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), and U.S. Africa Command provided support for the EASBRIG's first major exercise in Djibouti. Our engagement has been more limited with the other three brigades, but we are still supporting their development through bilateral train-and-equip initiatives in their respective member states.

The military units of African member states that receive U.S. training and equipment participate in ongoing operations and can contribute to the success of the ASF. These units have the greatest positive impact on African peacekeeping. ACOTA is the centerpiece of our effort to build capacity and self-sufficiency in partner countries by training and equipping battalions and other units that are deploying to active peace support operations. ACOTA, which is funded primarily through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, succeeded the earlier Africa Crisis
Response Initiative in 2004. Sixteen member states from across the continent are active partners in the ACOTA program, and the program has directly trained over 229,000 African peacekeepers just since 2005. More importantly, ACOTA conducts a “train-the-trainer” program building a cadre of host nation trainers/instructors who are taking a leading role in conducting pre-deployment training for their own contingents. U.S. Africa Command is also making a significant contribution at the bilateral level, not only through the course of normal military-to-military engagement, but also by participating in ACOTA events through the provision of military mentors and trainers, and conducting specialized logistics training activities through programs such as the Africa Deployment Assistance Partnership Team (ADAPT).

Conclusion

We will continue to work closely with our partners on the continent and in the donor community to build the capacity of the AU, sub-regional organizations, and individual member states to conduct peacekeeping operations more effectively and thereby contribute to global efforts to address fragility. Should we falter in our commitment to developing African peacekeeping capacity, the consequence will be heavier burdens on the international community as a whole, whether through the deployment of more UN “blue-helmet” operations, or even direct military intervention in cases where national security is at stake. We strongly believe that
the only way to achieve sustainable, long-term stability on the continent is to provide our African partners with the tools needed to bring about that stability themselves.

I want to thank the Committee again for the opportunity to address this important issue.
Mr. SMITH. Ambassador Carson, thank you very much.
Dr. Brimmer?

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ESTHER BRIMMER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ms. BRIMMER. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, members of the subcommittee, thank you for convening this hearing on United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa. I appreciate the subcommittee's attention to these important issues, and I am pleased to discuss the Obama administration's commitment to promoting peace and security across Africa through multilateral action and shared responsibility.

Mr. Chairman, U.N. peacekeeping missions are a key tool to help bring stability to countries emerging from violent conflict, and to prevent conflict's return. This administration's support for U.N. peacekeeping is deep, and builds on a strong, decades long bipartisan effort to improve these operations' effectiveness. That support is rooted in the fact that peacekeeping is not a policy in itself. It is a key tool to deliver on U.S. policy goals. U.N. missions deploy to promote lasting political settlements that can in turn bring a durable peace. They provide backing for those who agree to put down their guns and to support the rule of law.

Assistant Secretary Carson has laid out an approach to some of these very peace and security issues in Africa. In my brief comments this afternoon, I will note a few highlights of the seven U.N. peacekeeping operations in sub-Saharan Africa. And I appreciate the committee's consideration of my longer submitted testimony which includes a more expansive discussion of these missions, their objectives and the priorities that they reflect. These peacekeeping missions serve critical purposes: Supporting new country such as South Sudan; helping run elections in Liberia; promoting stability in Cote d'Ivoire; and trying to stem renewed violence in Eastern Congo. These missions are challenging and risky, but they unquestionably contribute to peace and stability across the continent.

They are also cost effective, and in this era of increasing fiscal restraint that fact is worth noting. Over 70 percent of the annual cost of U.N. peacekeeping operations is paid by the rest of the world. Clearly the cost of any unilateral action would be far greater, and because U.N. peacekeeping takes advantage of collective action that leverages the unique expertise of the U.N., we ensure the efficient use of taxpayers' dollars while significantly advancing U.S. national interests.

These missions are often the international community's last resort, and we know they face acute challenges especially in Africa. As you know, currently, roughly half of all U.N. peacekeeping operations are in Africa, comprising over 71,000 peacekeepers, thus approximately three-quarters of the people, the blue helmets, are now serving.

But these are not your father's or your mother's peacekeeping missions. Instead of simply observing a ceasefire or some political settlement under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter as was often the case in decades past, and still is the case in several of the older missions, today's operations frequently have complex mandates. To-
day's operations have a range of tasks and operate, at least in the case of all the missions in sub-Saharan Africa, under Chapter VII authority. These articles of the U.N. Charter authorize the use of force as part of the mission's primary responsibility to restore and maintain peace and security, including the protection of civilians. These missions often operate in difficult environments where state authority is weak and peacekeepers are themselves the targets of violence. Yet in spite of these enhanced responsibilities and great challenges, U.N. peacekeeping missions have played pivotal roles across Africa.

I will briefly touch on the missions and begin with Sudan and South Sudan. U.N. peacekeepers were instrumental in supporting South Sudan's independence under the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and UNMISS is working with the new government to assist with strengthening its government institutions and its security sector. Also in Sudan, as with South Sudan, in Darfur the U.N./African Union hybrid operation, UNAMID, continues to play a critical role in the safety and security of Darfuris, taking a leading role in supporting the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace and helping ensure that humanitarian conditions don't deteriorate further.

And then Abyei, along the tense Sudan/South Sudan border, UNISFA has been critical to maintaining the stability despite aerial bombardments by the Sudanis' armed forces, militia activities and ground attacks that have plagued the border area. There are also critical peacekeeping missions in West Africa, including Liberia where the UNMIL mission has assisted the government in strengthening its security sector and promoting the rule of law following years of devastating civil war. UNMIL has helped disarm over 100,000 ex-combatants including some 11,000 child soldiers, providing training for thousands of police officers and delivering critical support to the 2011 national elections which brought President Johnson Sirleaf a second term.

UNMIL also boasts the first U.S. flag officer in a U.N. peacekeeping mission in nearly 20 years. U.S. Army Brigadier General Hugh Van Roosen is serving as the chief of staff, and he is one of 28 U.S. personnel currently serving in U.N. peacekeeping missions worldwide. And today with our support UNMIL is evolving as needs change. It is beginning to shift in personnel from a focus on military to more police and civilian personnel as it works to complete its task and transition responsibility for security to the Government of Liberia. In another operation, in Cote d'Ivoire, UNOCI peacekeepers assist government efforts on security sector reform. They lead on demobilization, disarmament and rehabilitation of former combatants, an effort that has been successful enough to allow the mission to gradually reduce its military component.

Turning to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUSCO, the second largest U.N. peacekeeping operation in the world, pursues an ambitious mandate to protect civilians and to support stability in a highly volatile, conflict-prone region. Renewed fighting in the eastern province of North Kivu has undermined the progress of the past few years, and reminds us that much work remains to be done to eliminate the threat to civilians posed by armed groups, and to take enduring action to provide effective governance in that
region to address the legitimate grievances of stakeholders and arrive at a durable political agreement.

And finally, as my colleague has already noted, in Somalia the United Nations provides a critical administrative support to the African Union through UNSOA, the support office to AMISOM and its field office. And this relationship demonstrates how multilateral engagement in conjunction with bilateral partners can assist regional partners in their efforts to support Somali authorities to effectively eliminate the threat from al-Shabaab.

Mr. Chairman, no two missions are the same, but across the missions we see both best practices and critical challenges that deserve attention, and we need to continue to work to improve operations and to enhance their effectiveness. We need to continue work on the protection of civilians. It is a core task for all peacekeepers, military, police and civilian throughout the life of a mission. We need to work crucially on dealing with sexual and gender-based violence. And in the question and answer I would go into more detail about how we are addressing this incredibly important issue and how to further work to enforce the U.N.’s zero tolerance policy on exploitation. It is extremely important. We also need to work to support the rule of law and policing to ensure successful transition back to governments. We need experienced leadership. It is crucial to these operations to carry out their mandates. And we think more women need to be included in missions.

And finally, we need to maintain fiscal discipline in peacekeeping budgets particularly in the current economic climate. The United States has led this charge, and overall budgets this year are approximately $500 million less than they were last year, saving the United States taxpayer nearly $141 million.

I thank the committee for their support over the years in helping ensure the United Nations peacekeeping operations remain a useful and cost effective tool that serves U.S. foreign policy goals throughout Africa and the world, and I look forward to discussing these issues further and welcome any questions you may have. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Brimmer follows:]
Testimony by Dr. Esther D. Brimmer,
Assistant Secretary of State for International Affairs
Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Africa Subcommittee,
On “Peacekeeping in Africa”

Thursday, September 13, 2012

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for convening this hearing on United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa. I appreciate the Committee’s attention to these important issues, and am pleased to discuss the Obama Administration’s commitment to promoting peace and security across Africa through multilateral action and shared responsibility.

As President Obama has said, “UN peacekeeping can deliver important results by protecting civilians, helping to rebuild society, and advancing peace around the world. From Sudan to Liberia to Haiti, peacekeeping operations are a cost-effective means for the United States and all nations to share the burden of promoting peace and security.” UN peacekeeping missions are a key tool to help bring stability to countries emerging from violent conflict – and to prevent a return to such violence. This Administration’s support for UN peacekeeping operations is deep, and builds on a strong, decades-long, bipartisan effort to improve its effectiveness.
My colleague, Assistant Secretary Carson, has laid out our approach to peace and security in Africa, and to the regional, sub-regional and national efforts for peacekeeping capacity. I will focus on the role of missions led by the United Nations – today, the seven UN-led or supported peacekeeping missions in sub-Saharan Africa – and our work to back effective peacekeeping. We have seen the recent – and critical – role of peacekeepers across Africa. Supporting a new country in South Sudan. Helping run elections in Liberia. Promoting stability in Cote d’Ivoire. Trying to stem renewed violence in eastern Congo. These missions are challenging and risky, but we recognize their contributions to peace and stability throughout the continent.

In this era of increasing fiscal restraint, I would also like to highlight the cost-effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. Over 70 percent of the annual cost of UN peacekeeping operations is paid by the rest of the world. Perhaps more importantly, the cost of any unilateral action would be far greater. According to a 2007 Government Accountability Office study, the cost of deploying one U.S. soldier in Haiti would cost us eight times more than deploying a UN peacekeeper.

As the largest financial contributor to the UN system, we are conscious that we must ensure U.S. taxpayer dollars are used efficiently, transparently and accountably. For example, the U.S. was instrumental in gaining General Assembly
approval for the Global Field Support Strategy, a five-year project to turn the UN’s previous piecemeal administrative and logistical operations support system into a tightly and comprehensively integrated one. The U.S. continues to strongly support its implementation, and, to date, this initiative has resulted in savings of $62 million. By taking advantage of collective action and leveraging the unique expertise of the United Nations we ensure the efficient use of taxpayer dollars while significantly advancing U.S. national interests.

CORE GOALS, MAJOR CHALLENGES

First, let’s be clear that peacekeeping is not a policy in itself, but rather a key tool to deliver on policy goals. UN missions deploy to reinforce efforts to create the conditions for lasting political settlements that can bring a durable peace, working in places that have faced—or are still facing—violent conflict and war. They provide backing for those who agree to put down their guns and to support the rule of law.

Our approach starts with strong resolutions in the Security Council, but it doesn’t stop there. We look deeply at what will happen next—to make sure that missions can carry out their mandates, that they have the capacity, leadership, and
support needed to succeed. We look at the challenges that face each mission, and what is common across operations.

These missions are often the international community’s last resort to bring the parties to a peace that will work, and succeed, at preventing a return to conflict. Their mandates range from the protection of civilians to electoral assistance, from police training to observing ceasefires. None of this is easy, but they are critical tasks. We know, from the beginning, that missions will face tough challenges. Our job is to help them succeed and to keep focused on the larger political aim that each mission deploys to support.

Indeed, since the first UN peacekeeping operation was authorized in 1948, the UN has deployed 67 missions worldwide, including 22 in Africa, to assist countries as they transition from periods of conflict to times of peace. UN peacekeepers have worked in some of the most remote regions of the world, with documented successes across five continents helping countries emerge from protracted conflict and insecurity to build a foundation for longer-term peace, stability, and development.

In Africa, UN peacekeepers have faced particularly acute challenges. Currently, roughly half of all UN peacekeeping operations are in Africa,
comprising over 71,000 peacekeepers – approximately three-quarters of all “blue helmets” currently serving. They have complex mandates, including the protection of civilians from active threats. They often operate in environments with weak state authority – or worse, are targeted by noncompliant states or their proxies. They are tasked with patrolling enormous expanses of desert, dense jungle, and mountainous terrain, regions often without much infrastructure such as roads, communications, even electricity.

As you know, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the United States plays a pivotal role in the establishment of any peacekeeping operation. Launching a peacekeeping operation requires our consent, the agreement of the UN Security Council, and the backing of the parties to the peace. Once we decide to authorize a peacekeeping mission, it is in our national interest to see it succeed.

Over the past 60 years, we’ve seen both the potential and the shortcomings of multilateral peacekeeping operations. We’ve learned critical lessons about the effectiveness and limits of peacekeeping. We’ve seen the results when the mandate isn’t appropriate to the need, or when violence escalates and UN peacekeeping missions either aren’t able to or don’t respond effectively. We know the problem when peacekeepers themselves abuse others. In short, we know
that each mission must have the leadership, resources, personnel, and capacities to act effectively.

As we confront the specific challenges faced by these missions, we recall the lessons learned from operations and are mindful of the goal for every mission we authorize: the successful completion of the mission, the responsible drawdown of forces, and the transition of mission responsibilities to the host government. And we work continually with our Security Council partners to improve mission mandates, identify cost savings, and close missions which have achieved their intended goals. In Mozambique, for example, a United Nations operation in the 1990s helped implement the general peace agreement and monitor a fragile ceasefire following 17 years of civil war. UN peacekeepers provided the necessary political space for former enemies to begin a dialogue and build trust among each other, with the result that Mozambique today is on a path of sustained peace. Since 2000, UN peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone and Burundi have also transitioned to peace-building or political offices, respectively. Sierra Leone, which as recently as 2005 was host to a UN peacekeeping mission, is now prepared to send troops of its own to support AMISOM operations in Somalia.

KEY UN MISSIONS IN AFRICA
Let me touch on the seven UN-led or supported peacekeeping operations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Each plays a critical role and supports the peace and security of the continent.

I will start with Sudan – and now, South Sudan – where UN missions have been pivotal. UN peacekeepers were instrumental in supporting implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which, just over one year ago, led to the creation of South Sudan as the world’s newest country. After a lengthy civil war that left an estimated two million South Sudanese dead, the international community supported this peace agreement, which the United States helped broker. Last year, with the independence of South Sudan, the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was established to work with the new government to assist with strengthening its government institutions and its security sector. The mission is implementing this ambitious mandate, under incredibly difficult circumstances, including an ongoing economic crisis in South Sudan, renewed inter-communal violence in remote areas of the country, and increased tensions between the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan along their shared border. Significant numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs), widespread food insecurity, and other humanitarian crises present additional challenges in a country lacking the most basic infrastructure, such as
roads. Yet with our full support, UNMISS continues to support humanitarian work, monitor and investigate human rights violations, and protect civilians through an early warning system and a civilian and military presence in the country’s most volatile areas.

More needs to be done to ensure UNMISS’s success going forward. We will continue to work with the UN and other member states to ensure that the mission has sufficient military helicopters and waterborne craft to get troops, police, and relief workers to security and humanitarian hotspots as quickly as possible.

Let me turn now to Darfur, where the United States has been a strong supporter of a robust UN peacekeeping presence.

UNAMID – a hybrid UN/African Union operation – has faced significant obstacles to fulfilling its ambitious mandate focused on the protection of civilians. Despite its authorized force strength of nearly 21,000, Sudanese authorities and, to a lesser extent, rebel groups have regularly denied UNAMID access to areas where it needs to go, limiting the mission’s ability to fully implement its mandate. Direct attacks on the mission by armed elements in the region have resulted in the deaths of 37 UNAMID-affiliated personnel since 2008.
Yet even in this insecure environment where the Government of Sudan fails to ensure the conditions for true peace and Darfuri armed movements remain outside the peace process, UNAMID forces continue to play a critical role in the safety and security of Darfur’s inhabitants. UNAMID has taken a leading role in supporting the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, and UNAMID is working to prevent humanitarian conditions from deteriorating further.

For example, UNAMID provides protection to humanitarian actors operating in Darfur, advocates for the provision of greater humanitarian access by the Sudanese government, and, in some cases, assists with the delivery of critical supplies to the region. Of equal importance, UNAMID provides security to approximately 1.7 million displaced persons living in camps, who are especially vulnerable to attacks. UNAMID has a special focus on women's political participation and safety, with particular attention to addressing sexual and gender-based violence.

Yet the future of Darfur remains uncertain, and, as recent incidents have demonstrated, UNAMID is not equipped or able to be everywhere at once. A third UN peacekeeping mission in the region – the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei – is mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat in this contested border.
The presence of approximately 4,000 uniformed UNISFA personnel has been critical to maintaining stability despite the aerial bombardments from the Sudanese Armed Forces, militia activities, and ground attacks that have plagued the border area writ large. UNISFA is actively supporting demining efforts along the border in the Abyei area, and has been instrumental in preparing for deployment of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, which will see Sudanese, South Sudanese, and international monitors monitoring a demilitarized border. This support will prove critical as the two countries continue with negotiations and confidence-building measures.

Moving from the Sudans to West Africa, several UN peacekeeping missions provide critical bulwarks against a return to the broader armed conflicts and instability that plagued the region over the past two decades.

These post-conflict operations include the UN Mission in Liberia, UNMIL, which is tasked with helping Liberia strengthen its security sector and promote the rule of law following years of devastating civil war. It boasts about 9,000 uniformed personnel, including U.S. Army Brigadier General Hugh Van Roosen, who is serving as the mission Chief of Staff. He is the first U.S. flag officer to
serve in a UN peacekeeping mission in nearly 20 years, and one of 28 U.S. military personnel serving in UN peacekeeping missions worldwide.

Today, with our support, UNMIL is beginning a shift in its personnel, from a focus on military to more police and civilian personnel, as it works to complete its tasks and transition responsibility for security to the government of Liberia. Its successes to date include helping disarm over 100,000 ex-combatants including some 11,000 child soldiers, providing training to thousands of police officers, and delivering critical support to the 2011 national elections which brought President Johnson-Sirleaf a second term.

Missions can experience sudden change, however, as the UNOCI mission in neighboring Cote d’Ivoire did in late 2010 and early 2011. Post-electoral violence required UNOCI, a peacekeeping mission first deployed in 2004 to assist in implementing a 2003 peace agreement, to help ensure that power was ultimately ceded to the democratically elected president, Alasanne Ouattara, and to robustly implement its protection of civilians mandate. Today, with about 11,000 uniformed personnel, UNOCI is tasked with assisting government efforts on security sector reform and leading efforts at demobilization, disarmament, and rehabilitation of former combatants. Regional stability was threatened during the Cote d’Ivoire crisis, when an estimated 190,000 refugees flowed into Liberia,
straining recipient communities. Due to increased stability in Cote d’Ivoire, and with the support of its neighboring UN peacekeeping mission, approximately 169,000 of those refugees have now voluntarily returned.

So UNOCI is adjusting to the improved security situation, and we recently supported the UN Security Council reduction of one battalion from the Abidjan area. Today, we urge that UNOCI remains focused on the security situation, as it begins a transition to a reduction in its military component.

As with UNOCI, UNMIL also is on a path for eventual completion of its mandate. Our expectation is that UN forces will draw down over the next few years, and hand over their security responsibilities to the Liberian government. Concerns remain, however, including over instability along the Liberian-Cote d’Ivoire border, where the two missions are intensifying their cooperation with their host governments.

Let me turn next to the Democratic Republic of Congo. With an authorized force strength of over 19,000, the UN operation – called MONUSCO – is today the second largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world. The mission is tasked with an ambitious mandate to protect civilians and support stability in a highly volatile, conflict-prone region. It is worth noting that the eastern DRC alone is
twice the size of California, with little infrastructure. The country has faced intractable conflict and violence, and hosts more than a million internally displaced persons, along with hundreds of thousands of refugees from neighboring countries.

Despite its challenges, MONUSCO has advanced peace and security in the DRC, pioneering innovative measures to understand the threats and vulnerabilities facing the population, and putting together teams to try and support communities that face violence. MONUSCO has for several years used joint protection teams – including military, police and civilian members – to build relationships with local communities, provide their leaders with mobile phones to notify the UN of possible threats, and enable peacekeepers to respond quickly with both deterrent force and medical and other support as needed. To address some of the sources of illicit funding that help fuel the ongoing conflict, MONUSCO is partnering with the Government of the DRC to establish several mineral trading centers to help regulate and control the industry, particularly in North and South Kivu. This work is in addition to MONUSCO’s more traditional tasks: to support DDR – disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration – of former combatants, to train police officers, and to help the Government of the DRC promote stability and rule of law.
Today, however, renewed fighting in the eastern province of North Kivu has undermined the progress of the past few years. The principal challenge there is now one of physical security, as the mutineers who make up the M23 militia have chased out DRC armed forces in a swath of the province, taking towns by force and committing gross human rights violations. Ongoing violence is precipitating a humanitarian crisis that the DRC Government and MONUSCO are hard-pressed to address alone, as they were already contending with other criminal armed groups posing a threat to civilians in the area, such as the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) and Mai Mai rebel groups. Until the current crisis is alleviated, it will be difficult to pursue longer term security sector reform and governance to ensure the Government can protect its population and establish State authority throughout the DRC. These are necessary predicates for any kind of MONUSCO reconfiguration or drawdown.

Members of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region – which includes the DRC and Rwanda – have called for creation of a “neutral international force” that will “eradicate” the M23 and other “negative forces” in eastern DRC. How to accomplish this goal and build an enduring peace is a huge challenge, and it is not at all clear from where the resources or authority for such a force would come.
What is clear is that the DRC – with support from MONUSCO – must continue its work to eliminate the threat to civilians posed by the M23 and other armed groups, and to take enduring action to provide effective governance in the eastern DRC, address the legitimate grievances of stakeholders, and arrive at a durable political agreement with its neighbors. As Secretary Clinton has said, “we support the efforts of the DRC, and we urge all the states in the region, including Rwanda, to work together to cut off support for the rebels in the M-23, to disarm them and to bring their leaders to justice.” These challenges require the parties to the conflict to address underlying causes, while in the interim ensure clear support to MONUSCO.

Finally, let me turn to Somalia, where the United Nations provides critical administrative support to the African Union peacekeeping mission there through a field support office known as UNSOA. Peace and stability in Somalia has been a vexing challenge for more than 20 years now, and one that with the rise of al-Shabaab has grown to include direct threats to U.S. national security interests. That is why we have supported both AMISOM and the UN role backstopping African Union efforts to reform the Somali state.

UNSOA provides dedicated support to AMISOM as part of the UN’s Global Field Support Strategy, aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness in the
delivery of support services to missions. UNSOA, in coordination with the UN Political Office for Somalia, directs logistical support from Nairobi, Kenya, and Entebbe, Uganda, due to the particularly difficult nature of the AMISOM mission. We believe that UNSOA, however, highlights how multilateral engagement, in conjunction with bilateral partners, can assist regional partners in their efforts to support the Somali authorities and mitigate the threat from al-Shabaab. This support office is an excellent example of how burden sharing through the UN can directly contribute to our collective national security interests.

CORE CHALLENGES

No two missions are the same. But across missions, we see both best practices and critical challenges that deserve attention to improve operations, and enhance their effectiveness.

First, protection of civilians is a core task for all peacekeepers – military, police, and civilian – throughout the life of a mission. This is true even when it is not a specifically mandated task – in the sense that civilians expect, rightly, that the UN’s arrival means they will be safer. Anything less damages a mission’s credibility and effectiveness. That is easy to say. In practice, peacekeeping operations need more than the authorization to take action, they need a strategy
based on reliable information and analysis of the local situation, member states to contribute troops, capacity—which includes funding, equipment, training, and information—as well as effective leadership to operationalize the mandate of the mission.

So we are working to support mission-wide strategies for the protection of civilians, including support for standardized training for peacekeepers on the protection of civilians, to improve the ability of missions to anticipate, prevent and mitigate violence. We have also made substantial progress in providing peacekeepers with the tools they need to respond swiftly and effectively to sexual and gender-based violence. UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 were fundamental international agreements that enabled and empowered UN and regional peacekeeping missions and the humanitarian community to combat the imminent threat of sexual violence within the context of conflict. The protection of civilians is one of the toughest jobs for missions. To be successful, we must reduce the space between the Security Council’s intentions and the ability of missions to protect civilians in the field, whether in the DRC or Cote d’Ivoire, Darfur or South Sudan. The United States has funded the UN to support better analysis of what missions are doing, and together with others, to improve the missions’ ability to protect vulnerable groups. Also, through the Global Peace
Operations Initiative (GPOI), we are further undertaking initiatives to build UN training capacity on the protection of civilians. And we are deepening the focus on civilian protection in the peacekeeping training we provide to partner countries.

Second, we are focused on missions succeeding and transitioning out of a job – and handing over the reins to governments. That means operations need to get right a core task – the support to the rule of law and policing, a challenging prospect in countries emerging from conflict or where the rule of law previously did not exist. We continue to support efforts to increase civilian and policing capacities for UN missions. To date, more skilled corrections, judicial, police, and civilian experts are needed. We have worked with our colleagues in the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) to increase U.S. support to policing in peacekeeping missions and to build partner countries’ policing capacity through the International Police Peacekeeping Operations Support (IPPOS) program. Today, we have more than 155 American police officers and corrections and justice advisors serving in Liberia and South Sudan (as well as in Haiti). IPPOS training and equipment have enhanced the ability of Togo, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Nepal to contribute effective formed police units and individual police officers to UN peacekeeping operations. In addition, IPPOS helps train trainers in police-contributing countries.
Third, a core principle across all missions is the effective implementation of the UN’s policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). This must be upheld by all categories of UN personnel – military, police and civilian. The United States has pressed hard to develop procedures and programs on training and guidance, oversight, investigation, accountability and assistance to victims of sexual misconduct. This is an important issue, and efforts continue to deal with it. We have seen progress over the past few years in reducing the incidence of SEA, along with some commendable, swift and appropriate responses by governments whose peacekeepers have committed such offenses – including the actions of the governments of Uruguay and Pakistan to put their personnel on trial for egregious misconduct. The UN itself is revising its internal procedures for tracking cases, and actively exploring ways to improve both its screening process and its ability to follow-up on actions taken by governments. We also successfully have pressed the UN to implement measures that withhold reimbursement to TCCs for troops who have engaged in sexual exploitation and abuse—the first time that a direct linkage has been made between performance and reimbursement in UN peacekeeping.

Fourth, we recognize that leadership of these missions is vital. Both in New York and in the field, effective, experienced leadership is a determining factor in
whether UN operations can carry out their mandates, and the lack of such leadership can undermine a mission. For example, strong leadership in the DRC has made it possible for peacekeepers to better prevent and respond to violence against civilians. The United Nations has increased its focus over the past two or three years on building leadership capacity among military, police and civilian staff through both specific and integrated training.

In addition, we are encouraging more women to be included in missions. As Secretary Clinton has said, “We recognize that when we think about peacemaking, which is, after all, one of the critical tasks of any of us in international security, that something is missing. And that is women. There are not enough women at the table, not enough women’s voices being heard.” The UN encourages nomination of women for peacekeeping operations, which can lay a foundation for their later service in leadership roles, and now ensures that the short lists of candidates for senior positions include women with peacekeeping experience.

Fifth, we believe that peacekeeping needs to be managed in a manner that reflects the current economic climate. We have led the charge in the General Assembly on landmark reforms to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of how peacekeeping missions are supported, and we have consistently advocated fiscal discipline in peacekeeping budgets. Due in large part to these efforts, the overall
budgets this year are approximately $500 million less than they were last year, which will save U.S. taxpayers nearly $140 million.

CONCLUSION

UN peacekeeping missions in Africa also provide important opportunities for military partnerships with African governments. Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal, for example, as well as those that once benefitted from international peacekeeping missions like Ethiopia and Burundi, now contribute troops and police to help other states pursue their path to peace and security, both in Africa and beyond. We appreciate this Committee’s support for critical funding, including for programs like the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) – funded through the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Account – which the United States uses to develop the capacity of these peacekeeping partners. Building this capacity will help ensure the UN is able to draw from a more well-trained and professional pool of troops, who are better able to carry out the challenging mandates the Security Council asks them to achieve.

Despite the incredible challenges faced by these missions, UN peacekeeping operations can deliver results in even the most challenging environments and
conflict zones, in Africa and elsewhere. We support these missions not only because they advance U.S. national interests, but because they are a reflection of critical American values. These missions prevent further conflict, protect vulnerable civilians, and defend basic human rights. They provide critical support during fragile political transitions and to fledgling state institutions. We are all familiar with the devastating effects an unstable country far from our borders can pose to our national security. Where governments fail to meet the basic needs of their citizens or their responsibilities to protect civilians and provide security within their borders, the consequences can be far-reaching, including to the American people.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your support for our broader multilateral engagement across the United Nations system, including the strong support you and this Committee have given over the years to U.S. leadership on UN peacekeeping missions. As I said before, this Administration’s support for UN peacekeeping builds on an effort that has grown since the deep challenges of the 1990s, and the failures in Rwanda and Bosnia, and the U.S. effort to prevent such horrors again. Our reform agenda builds on that common goal – to support peacekeeping missions’ success, but never lose sight of the larger risk. Like Members of this Committee, we recognize the high cost of these missions and will
continue our efforts to ensure that we are careful stewards of taxpayer resources throughout the UN system.

I look forward to continuing to work with the Committee to ensure UN peacekeeping operations remain a useful and cost-effective tool that serves U.S. foreign policy goals throughout Africa and around the world. I look forward to discussing these issues further, and welcome any questions you may have.
Mr. Smith. Dr. Brimmer, thank you so very much, and for your and Ambassador Carson’s service to our country and to the world, especially Africa.

Let me just ask a couple of questions and then yield to my distinguished colleagues. Again, both of you, especially you, highlighted the issue of a budget and what is being spent and what is not. I wonder if you could provide, and this might be better for the record, but for the current peacekeeping operations, the unmet needs for each of them, I know we get fact sheets all the time from the U.N. about troop strength and how much is being spent, but we don’t always get the information about what the real needs are. That way, we know where the gaps are and whether or not a more robust effort could be made with the other donors, but as well as ourselves, to ensure that adequate funds are there so that those peacekeeping strengths are not less effective due to insufficient personnel. That would be a very helpful, where the unmet need is. And it is a question I always ask of UNHCR and others so that we really have a guide. The numbers don’t mean as much if you don’t know what is not being done because of lack of resources. So if you could provide that for us or maybe speak to it now that would be very, very helpful on that unmet need.

And secondly, Ambassador Carson, thank you for underscoring in your testimony that the U.N. monitoring group reported in June of this year that Somali terrorists, al-Shabaab, and you quoted them, quoted the monitoring group, “has suffered dramatic reverses over the past year, experiencing military defeats, the loss of territory,” and we have all been applauding as that has been happening, “and the erosion of its revenue base, setbacks that have exacerbated risk within the group’s leadership,” and as you point out, this is directly attributable to the success of African-led AMISOM. It is no exaggeration, you point out, that through the peacekeeping efforts the AU has given Somalia and its long-suffering people their best chance for sustained peace. And I mean that is a success story that this committee and members of this committee follow closely, but from the press point of view and so many others it is hard pressed to accept that all Africa and perhaps a few other places to find that really highlighted and underscored.

We limited the defects and the failures. We all remember UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia and the utter disaster that was, what happened in Rwanda when key triggers and red flags were ignored, but here you have a great success story, and perhaps we should all bring much more attention to that and I hope the press will likewise amplify peacekeeping works. And it has saved many, many lives for the long-suffering people of Somalia, so you might want to just elaborate a little bit on that.

And next if I could on the very critical issue of rules of engagement, it is always a key question of protection of civilians, which you both emphasize, which sometimes is less than stellar, and it is not the troops in the field but it is the people that write the rules of engagement. If you might want to speak to how robust those efforts are so that those civilians can indeed be protected.

And I would ask you, Dr. Brimmer, maybe you wanted to touch on this, to get further into the trafficking side. Where was it? There was a U.N. report that made it very clear that last month U.N.
says that it withholds payments for peacekeepers involved in sexual abuse or trafficking of persons. That was put out last month. If you can tell us how well that appears to working, and if you could also just speak to the issue of what kinds of training packets, what kind of training are peacekeepers actually given?

Everywhere I go I ask to meet with leaders in various countries to find out exactly what their country does when a peacekeeper or any member of their armed forces is complicit in human trafficking. I wrote the Trafficking Victims Protection Act and in 2005, the minimum standards update said that we will assess, for purposes of assigning tier ratings, how well or poorly a country’s military is doing. That is a very important part of it if they are deployed soldiers. So if you could give us a real insight into what are they telling peacekeepers they must do to ensure that they get the right human rights training in general and human trafficking part in particular.

And then finally, if you could speak, Ambassador Carson perhaps, to the African Standby Force, the ASF, as you talked about. You mentioned various stages of readiness or lack of. What does that really mean; how deployable are they; when will they be deployable for missions?

I yield to my very distinguished friends for answers.

Mr. CARSON. I think the first question, I think, was clearly for Dr. Brimmer, and that is with respect to broad, ummet needs, and she can do that one. I will be glad to take the second issue that you raised with respect to the Somalia AMISOM peacekeeping operation and really what that signifies and means. Dr. Brimmer, maybe trafficking and then finally, trafficking and sexual exploitation. And the last one, African Standby Force, I will be glad to talk to.

Ms. BRIMMER. Certainly.

Mr. CARSON. Good division of labor?

Ms. BRIMMER. That sounds very good. All right, Chairman, with your permission I will jump in on the response.

The first off is as you say, it is very important to try to understand what are the needs of the different operations to make sure that we are continuing to tailor the operations to what the actual needs on the ground are, as I said earlier that peacekeeping is a tool to accomplish other activities. And so what we do in addition to working with the U.N. itself is we are also now ourselves trying to look at what is needed in these operations, to look what is actually happening. And I can share with you that even from the State Department’s point of view, my own deputies actually travel to look at peacekeeping operations, to look under the hood to see what is actually happening. So I had my deputy travel to West Africa to look at key operations. And actually now as we speak, Ambassador Torsella, who covers the administrative and budget issues at our mission in New York, is actually en route and actually flying now and he will be going out to look at both at UNAMID and at UNISFA, again to understand what is happening and what needs may not be covered so that we stay current. Because indeed, we have to make sure that we are tailoring the operations to address what is actually going to benefit people on the ground.

Mr. SMITH. As that analysis is done——
Ms. BRIMMER. Yes.

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. I know having been in office 32 years that very often you find real needs and then get conveyed at OMB, a redlined number of what is doable or not doable. We need to know, frankly, to be real partners in this effort, what really is the unmet need? So as much of that raw information that you can convey to the committee, it would be very helpful.

Ms. BRIMMER. Mr. Chairman, we very much appreciate that opportunity and we look forward to working with you and your staff on putting that material together. Thank you.

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE ESTHER BRIMMER TO QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

Every peacekeeping operation is different, but there are common challenges across missions that could benefit from greater support. Some cross-cutting issues are systemic in UN peacekeeping missions. First, there is an urgent need for expanded access to relatively scarce “niche” capabilities—in particular in aviation, engineering, and medical capacity—in many missions. Second, there is an ongoing need for mission-specific and scenario-based training, particularly in new missions like the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), to help missions implement their goals. This is especially needed for missions mandated to protect civilians under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Third, there is a need for dialogue with both the UN and troop and police contributing countries on the operational readiness, performance, and evaluation of troops and police, to help ensure that the personnel deploying to missions are fully prepared and fully briefed on human rights and the requirements for appropriate conduct, particularly with regard to sexual exploitation and abuse. Fourth, there must be measures in place for the safety and security of UN personnel and strategies for risk management, especially when operating environments are non-permissive, such as in Darfur. Fifth, there must be increased integration between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, so that the gains that the missions achieve in the field are made sustainable through the strengthening of institutions that promote the rule of law, human rights, and good governance, elements which are key to establishing a stable peace. And finally, there is a strategic need for effective transitions, so that the UN can retain best practices and lessons learned. We are working to help missions and the UN address these issues, and are prepared to brief on any of these elements.

Mr. CARSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you for highlighting the success that has been achieved in Somalia and in Mogadishu. As I noted in my initial comments, we believe that a great deal of progress has been achieved in Somalia over the last 3½ years. For the first time in 2 decades and 2 years, we now have in place in Mogadishu, a government which has a firmer foundation and greater legitimacy than at any time since the late 1990s.

I myself had an opportunity about 6 weeks ago to travel to Mogadishu. I was the highest ranking U.S. official from the State Department to visit Somalia and that part of Somalia in close to two decades, since the Black Hawk Down scenario event that you mentioned.

As I said, a great deal of progress has been achieved. We have a new Constitution, a new Parliament, a new speaker and a new President. And we have for the first time in two decades a real opportunity for greater stability, and all of this has been achieved in part due to the efforts of AMISOM, primarily the troops from Uganda, Burundi, now Kenya, and troops from Djibouti. We expect by mid-October they will be joined by troops from Sierra Leone. Almost all of these troops have benefited from training and funding and equipping from the United States through our GPOI program.
and through our ACOTA program, which is a part of that. We, in
doing this, have been able to degrade and to effectively disperse
and make significantly less effective a fighting force, al-Shabaab,
and this is clearly in our interest. We have been able to achieve
this with Africans and African governments and African troops in
the lead. We have been a consistent and a strong supporter of their
efforts, but it has been the Africans who have recognized that the
instability in Somalia constitutes a threat to them as well as the
region and the international community. And they have taken the
lead in defeating this threat with us in the lead. We have contrib-
uted a substantial amount financially to this effort, but we haven’t
lost a soldier or a man or a woman in the process. And I think we
are all better off for this operation.

Moreover, I might add that we have been the largest, single, bi-
lateral contributor to the AMISOM effort. Although the European
Union and the U.N. through its AMISOM support program have
been strong partners in the effort, we have helped to resource what
is a collective achievement led by Africans on the ground to re-
pond to a crisis in their region and one that impacts them. It is
a real success out there because it helps to stabilize that country.
Helps to defeat al-Shabaab, who has had some of its top leadership
associated and affiliated with al-Qaeda. It has led to the deaths of
the top leadership in al-Qaeda, East African individuals who were
associated with the bombing of our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar
es Salaam in 1998. And this is quite a significant achievement. We
hope that we can build on it, but it does show what can be done
in a strong collaborative effort with us working with Africans and
African institutions supporting a hybrid peacekeeping operation.

So we are very pleased by what has happened. It is not the end
of the book, it is just the end of one of the early chapters in a book
that will have many other chapters of recovery and rehabilitation
associated with it. But this is serious and significant progress that
has been achieved.

Mr. Smith. Several questions that I asked, if I could just get
back to them. The ASF, varying degrees of readiness, if you could
just touch on that. And this issue of, what exactly does the human
rights training look like? And I mentioned the U.N. policy of with-
holding payments. Is that working? Mali also, if you could touch on
that.

And one last thing you mentioned, Ambassador Carson, the Dar
es Salaam and the Nairobi bombings. For the record, I held all the
hearings, in the House at least, that followed that terrible, terrible
loss of life especially in Kenya and Tanzania. And I will never for-
get when Admiral Crowe sat where you sit and talked about the
lack of readiness on the part—even though we had al-Qaeda doing
some horrific things before that we didn’t think transnational ter-
rorism, as Secretary Carpenter testified at the time, would go after
what were thought of as more secure U.S. missions or outposts.
And from that I actually wrote what is called the Admiral James
W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Act, Fiscal Years
2000 and 2001, which had a heavy emphasis on setbacks and Em-
bassy security.

And one of the questions I am going to be asking and you might
want to do something for the record on this, I mean we still have
deficiencies no matter how much we try to shore up, review setbacks, protect our ambassadors, and we are all heartbroken over the loss of our Ambassador to Libya as well as the other three individuals who are heroes, all four, but we really have to get to the bottom of what can we do better to ensure that no one else is hurt. It is why we have danger pay, because we know that divisions worth of people called the Foreign Service who are in absolutely hazardous places all over the world. But we might be able to do a better job in Congress to ensure that those threats are further mitigated. But you might want to get back to us on that. I am thinking of a hearing itself focused more on what do we do, what are we missing? But anything you can suggest to us, if there are law changes, something that needs to be done, and I know the administration is looking very seriously into what did happen. But if you could speak on those issues, ASF, the training packets.

And then I will go to my colleague.

Ms. BRIMMER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I thought I would take up the question on the rules of engagement.

Mr. SMITH. Please.

Ms. BRIMMER. And then I will turn to the trafficking issues and then maybe just touch on the training issues, to many of those questions, and respond to some of the points that you both made in your opening statements.

Just in terms of the rules of engagement, one thing to notice as I say that over the past generation looking at peacekeeping issues is that we see a more robust use of the use of force by peacekeepers. They are of course authorized to use the use of force to protect themselves and their mission, and now most crucially to try to protect civilians. That is a huge job. And we recognize that there is so much more to try to do. They are often working in countries that are very large. But I thought I might highlight some of the efforts in this area in particular. That we notice that they are I say engaged in more difficult places. We even note that even in the case of Somalia in the hybrid mission that most recently there was an attempt on the life of the new President, but it was the African Union troops that actually helped defend him. One was actually killed in that point. But they were using robust use of force.

But I think we should also note that there have been efforts in important areas, for example, like, I will just take MONUSCO in particular in the Congo that has also used, has had independent military operations to work on dealing with sexual violence in that country. They have also tried to be much more robust in their efforts of trying to free children from armed groups. There is a much greater understanding of the efforts to try to use the tools of the peacekeeping operations in what is still an extremely difficult and extreme situation. But again it is kind of the creative use of understanding appropriate use of force for peacekeeping operations.

If I may turn to the trafficking and sexual exploitation and abuse issues and just take a few minutes to maybe to develop this. This is such an extremely important area. As you noted that this year for the very first time we have been able to get into on the funding side of peacekeeping, a link, that does withhold funds from troop-contributing countries based on if there is misbehavior by particular troops. That is the first time we have actually been able to
get passed through in the U.N. system. That is a new mechanism. And that is what demonstrates we are trying to look at every tool we can use to try to combat this particular scourge. Will this build on our efforts in other areas as well? And we start all the way upstream. How do we work on improving the training for the peacekeepers that are actually being deployed in the field? And as my colleague has already outlined that of course there is important training provided by the United States. Other things we do are we also talk to other countries that are providing training for peacekeepers. We visit peacekeeping training centers. We see the curriculum. Myself and my colleagues have been briefed on the curriculum, how sexual exploitation is being dealt with and explained in key troop training centers around the world.

We also raise this issue bilaterally in our regular conversations with other countries. So if I just take the example of Uruguay. Now with Uruguay as you know that there was an incident with their troops, and I say no country is perfect here, but I will note that they did bring their troops home and try them. Because ultimately, the United Nations can’t enforce the behavior of individual militaries. National governments have to do that. So we make sure we raise that to, as the United States. So when I was actually in Uruguay talking to them because they are important troop contributors, I raised this issue. It is something my colleagues and I do on a regular basis. We also look at how well the U.N. as well works the troop contributing countries, and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has a package of materials that they provide to countries when they are going to contribute troops that also contains these materials. So these are important steps upstream.

But then we also think it is important to look at what actually happens when we unfortunately have incidents. And there again the question is what national governments do is extremely important, and they have to work both with all of the peacekeeping personnel. Military personnel, police personnel and civilians, and there are slightly different rules for those. Most importantly that the military personnel are usually governed by the rules that govern their own national military, so it is important that they in their national systems use those mechanisms. Civilians, depending on whether or not they have diplomatic immunity, may be subject to the laws of the country. So in each of these we are trying to look at what are all the tools we can deal with in the address of this, it is still extremely serious. There is still a lot more work to do. We are still trying to see what else we can do to continue to work on this issue, but we take it extremely seriously.

Mr. CARSON. Mr. Chairman, just a quick sentence on the five brigades. As I said in my testimony, none of the brigades are fully operational. The weakest of the five standby brigades is in North Africa, and because of the developments of the Arab Spring over the last year, year and a half, they are focused inward and not on the standby force. The Eastern African Standby Force is probably the most robust and capable. It has some of Africa’s better armies, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya. It has provided the command and staff headquarters for the AMISOM operations in Mogadishu, and it has been able to carry out both field and headquarters exercises.
The Economic Community of West Africa also has a number of large armies. They have shown some capabilities, but they too would require enormous outside assistance to be able to effectively mobilize as an operational brigade. The central African multilateral, multinational force would probably rank just above the North African force in terms of its limited capabilities and operational capacities. And the Southern African Development Community does also have a number of very capable armies, South Africa and Botswana, that could be drawn upon to carry out peacekeeping operations. They have engaged in joint training and some training operations and exercises.

Ms. Bass. Yes, thank you very much for your testimony, and many of the questions I asked in the beginning you did touch upon. I wanted to follow up though on the individuals that are peacekeepers that might have committed crimes, especially sexually oriented crimes. So when they are caught, what happens? Are they sent back home? Are they incarcerated? And I understand in part it depends on the country that they are in, but maybe you could give a few examples.

Ms. Brimmer. Thank you, Ranking Member Bass. I will give some examples and we can also follow up with a sort of fuller, if I may, fuller treatment or fuller examples as well. That indeed as I mentioned that you, in a sense, have to look at peacekeepers in three groups. The military, the police and the civilians, and that the question is when they are caught that they go back to their national contingent. Some countries at that point then will ship them home, some may then have their own national procedures. But it goes back to the military command for those particular individuals. The police, in some cases the police have their own separate command. In some cases the police are then under with the military, again depending by country. And then for civilians that depends who the civilian is and who they are working for. Is this a civilian who is working directly for the United Nations? Then that is a direct issue it it is their own staff member. If it is a civilian working in some other capacity, there again it may be possible to prosecute them under the individual laws.

What I would like to do is be able to, I can actually just spell out in greater detail, if you would like me to do a follow-up, with some of the examples of what has happened in different cases. And it really has varied by country, I mentioned Uruguay. In a different case, Pakistan actually flew out a judge from Pakistan to Haiti. Different region, but there was an issue in Haiti, and they then sent their own judge out to then conduct the legal proceedings in Haiti even before they sent them back with the peacekeepers. So different countries have followed different models, and those are some countries where countries actually took on board the issue and tried to address it. Other countries have not had that same strong record. We will be happy to follow up on greater detail and send that to you.

[The information referred to follows:]
First, we share your deep concern about this problem, and are working to support needed reforms. Second, as you know, disposition of serious cases depends on the category of the individual. Military personnel are subject to discipline by their own chain of command. The UN Office of Internal Oversight Services investigates allegations of misconduct against police personnel. Civilian staff may be dismissed and, depending on circumstances, tried locally or in their country of residence or nationality. The results can vary due to a number of factors. Actions illegal in one country may not be illegal in another; alternatively the host country or country of residence may choose not to pursue a case, and so on. The UN regularly requests updates from sending countries on their disposition of cases, but does not have the authority to enforce reporting.

We are concerned that proper action be taken in such cases, and we follow up bilaterally whenever we are aware of a serious violation of the code of conduct. In one example, our Embassy in Rabat communicated with the Government of Morocco after learning that members of a Moroccan military contingent serving in Cote d'Ivoire were accused of patronizing prostitutes. In response to our communications, Morocco informed the Embassy that it had withdrawn and replaced the whole contingent, reviewed the case under military procedures, and disciplined those individuals found to be guilty of misconduct.

There was also a very troubling case involving an American citizen serving as a UN international civilian employee in Liberia who was charged with molesting underage girls. The Liberian government, the UN mission, and the U.S. Embassy cooperated during the investigation. The UN was prepared to waive his immunity, if any; the U.S. Government made arrangements to fly him home for prosecution under Federal law; and the Liberian government placed him under house arrest pending the transfer to U.S. authorities. Regrettably, the individual committed suicide while in custody in Monrovia. The UN offered medical and legal assistance to the girls he had molested, which was accepted in one case. Although the circumstances of the whole case were distressing, in fact the system worked—the allegations were made and investigated, the perpetrator taken into custody and facing trial, and the victims given appropriate support.

Ms. Bass. Do you have situations of countries where that is not viewed in the same way we would view it, where they make light of it or send the person to another country or another division or cover it up? And if that happens what can be done?

Ms. Brimmer. Well, I think first, I mean no country wants to have a reputation for particularly problematic units. I think some countries have had more innovative approaches, who have actually thought about how to do it. As I mentioned, some countries have brought them home and had a process, others have said, no, we will deal with it right in this situation. So it is varied. And what we try to look at is particularly those who have taken it seriously, which might be models for others, and as I say, we also try to follow up in the bilateral context to stress that the United States takes this very seriously. So this is something that we raise regularly with our interlocutors when we are talking about peacekeeping and on making it better.

Ms. Bass. I appreciate that. Well, on another subject, I wanted to know if either one of you could talk to me about the cap that Congress actually has on U.S. contributions to U.N. peacekeeping that some describe as arbitrary, because I don't understand very much about it. If you could explain that I would like to know why it is considered arbitrary. And then also if it isn't, I understand it isn't a new issue, but that it also causes us problems, compromises how we are viewed in other parts of the world.

Ms. Brimmer. If I may I will jump in on this question. Ranking Member Bass, as you know that the United Nations budget is di-
vided into the regular budget and the peacekeeping budget. At the regular budget the United States pays 22 percent of all costs.

On the peacekeeping side, the five countries that are permanent members of the Security Council pay an additional amount, in a sense, an additional premium. They have additional rights and responsibilities for international peace and security. Under that there is then a formula that is set every few years about what the rate will be for all the members that contribute, but we will actually focus particularly on ours and what is happening with that. It is based on the calculation of relative economic strength of the actual U.N. member states. So that calculation is then raised by, is recommended by the secretariat, it then goes to the General Assembly that then approves the whole process with that.

But ultimately it is an allocation that looks at the actual cost for peacekeeping and actually looks at the actual strength, economic strength of the different countries. So under that we pay over 27 percent currently. It is currently under discussion about what will be the next rate. The challenge of having a line set for the peacekeeping rate is that that is below the rate which was actually set for the United States. It means that operations are not fully or properly funded, and it doesn’t directly relate to what is actually the relative strength, economic strength of different countries.

So I note that while the issue is now currently under discussion for the next 2 years about what will be the rate for the next 2 years, it is important to note that one of the conversations is the relative strength. So one of the things that we would expect is that the rates for Russia and especially China will increase, because obviously they are in a different economic situation even than 3 years ago when we last looked at it, and we think it is important that their rates do increase, as we expect they will. But the challenge here is that if we set a rate below what is actually mandated it means there will be a gap and key operations would not be funded. And there will be key operations in areas that we think are important.

Ms. BRASS. So you are saying we set that.

Ms. BRIMMER. Oh, the United States plays——

Ms. BASS. I know you are talking about the formula, but you are also saying then that the U.S. comes in and sets a level that is——

Ms. BRIMMER. Well, I am saying that if there were to be legislation that were to set a level below the level which is actually where the United Nations has set for the United States, there would be a gap between what the real cost of the operation is——

Ms. BASS. Right.

Ms. BRIMMER [continuing]. And what we are saying we are willing to pay. If we don’t meet our actual legal commitment to the right level, key operations won’t be funded. And we try to make sure that of course that rate be as appropriate as possible, but we recognize it is based on, what are the costs of these actual operations, and what are the relative economic health of the different countries that contribute to the United Nations system?

Ms. BASS. Okay. And then finally, I just can’t sit here and not ask you to comment on the current situation. And I don’t know if that is appropriate for you, Ambassador Carson, but what can you
share about what is going on? And I mean again it is just really hard to believe that some wacky YouTube video——

Mr. CARSON. Let me say that, first of all, I am not focused on a day-to-day basis on the events in the Middle East, and the Maghreb which is a part of Africa falls under the jurisdiction of the Middle Eastern bureau at the Department of State. But I can say that we are, as a department and a nation, deeply troubled by any attacks that are undertaken against our Embassies and our personnel abroad, our American citizens as well as host country nationals who work with us in those countries. And we don’t think that any political or regional or religious justification exists for attacking American diplomats.

In the case of what we are seeing across the Middle East, we believe that there are probably different and complex reasons for the kinds of reactions that we are seeing in different countries. We see, first of all, a region that is in transition, a region that is troubled, a region that is moving toward greater openness and democracy. We see fragile new governments that are trying to establish authority, and trying to put in place institutions and have weak control over their security services.

The second thing I would say broadly is that in some of the countries, particularly in what we have seen in Egypt, we are clearly seeing the population there react to a couple of videos which have been released here. One by a religious figure in this country, another quite frankly, by unknown individuals. These videos have mocked and degraded the life of the Prophet Muhammad, and it has led to reactions and street demonstrations and violence against U.S. institutions. It is deeply unfortunate that people would use this as a reason for attacking our facilities or our people. And certainly in Egypt that is the case. But I would say that there are probably underlying reasons too of transition, weakness of government authorities and frustration on the street about other elements of society.

In Libya, the situation is far more complex. And increasingly it appears that the attack against our facilities there may have been motivated by political considerations and that it was not these degradations of the Prophet Muhammad that led to these. There is a thorough investigation underway, but these might turn out to be terrorist attacks that were well planned and well orchestrated and therefore resulted in the very tragic and unfortunate deaths of our colleagues in the State Department.

I think from country to country there is a difference, as to say Egypt and Libya present two different kinds of situations, just as the situation in Yemen and in other places in the Maghreb have different causes for concern. But we are going through a period of turbulence there as we see authoritarian and autocratic governments being replaced by new institutions, some stronger in their democratic adherence and commitment than others. But many are not only weak but new, and grappling with the ability to control the fast-moving events of their societies.

Ms. BASS. All I have had a chance to do is catch the news coverage, and especially today in between hearings. And I guess a few things that were very disturbing to me were in Egypt, apparently the President didn’t come out and really condemn the violence. And
then there was some question about whether or not the Muslim Brotherhood was going to take the lead in organizing a protest. Again, the problem with up-to-the-minute news is that it might have been a fictitious report, but that is what I heard last. And then the concern about Libya just makes me wonder about Mali in terms of what happened with the folks leaving from Libya going into Mali. Is this going to have implications for problems that are already happening there? And I don’t know if there has been any report of that.

Ms. BRIMMER. If I may just add particularly as well that just the outpouring support that we have seen, as well as the Security Council immediately took up this issue yesterday and immediately condemned the attacks. So I think it is important to note that all 15 combined consensus immediately understood the import of the issue. And as you mentioned already, the leadership in Libya has spoken out rejecting the violence.

I think it is also important to note that how we honor the fallen by remembering their mission. So in this also we are recalling, and I am just looking back at the President’s words yesterday where he talked about the legacy of the Ambassador “will endure wherever human beings search for liberty and justice.” I think as also we have seen in the outpouring at least from our colleagues at the U.N. that we hear from who are remembering the work we are still doing in Libya. There is an important political mission in Libya, a U.N. political mission there, and recommitting to the goals that they are working on. So I think as part of the both condolences, we are hearing also is again support for the very mission that our governments are working on from many of our colleagues. I know that Ambassador Carson is seeing the same thing in his post where we are seeing in all the multilateral posts, condolences coming, but again committing to the values of the Libyan people and trying to reject those who are turning to violence. I think that is an important component of the global reaction to the tragedy.

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask a few final questions, and beginning first with, maybe it is you, Ambassador Carson, or either of you, Dr. Brimmer.

Is there a peacekeeping mission not yet constituted that needs to be established?

Mr. CARSON. Speaking from the African perspective, we believe that the current peacekeeping missions that exist, plus those that are being led by the Africans themselves are addressing the key and fundamental issues that Africa faces. Clearly the one area where there is a possibility of African countries on a subregional basis coming together to work is in Mali. ECOWAS has indicated a desire to be supportive and helpful in putting together a force that would go in and assist the Malian Government. But at this point, this is only in the very, very early planning stages, and like other subregional peacekeeping regions that are in existence and that I have spoken about would have to be well resourced and well planned in order for it to be effective.

Mr. SMITH. [Inaudible.]

Mr. CARSON. Pardon me? No specific region. And I just focus on what ECOWAS is discussing preliminarily about Mali. They at this
point have not approached the AU nor the U.N. for the kind of detail of support resources that would be necessary to get this underway. Still in its very, very initial stages.

Mr. SMITH. Let me just say a word or two—or did you, Dr. Brimmer? I don't want to—please.

Ms. BRIMMER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. You had asked both about Mali, and of course Ambassador Carson has talked particularly about the early stages that we are looking at. And I would just say that it perhaps includes insights into some of the thinking about peacekeeping operations that as I mentioned earlier we think about how you fit the right tool to the situation. And as we look at the questions, what is the right tool? That we look at, of course there is a humanitarian crisis and there is important engagement by both the United States that is providing humanitarian assistance, but also even through the U.N. we are providing much assistance on the humanitarian side. There are both counterterrorism issues as well as security issues. So trying to fit the tool to the situation is so important, and that is why we are looking at, what are all the different arrangements? A peacekeeping operation may or may not be the right one. Maybe a political operation is the right one. Maybe it is another tool. And so we are trying to think about what are the global tools, the regional tools, the bilateral, what is the right mix? Because there is no one model that fits everything and we try to figure out, see what is appropriate. And that is where it came back.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. As we all know, U.N. peacekeeping is hazardous. And the blue helmets, a few years back, were rightly cited for the Nobel Peace Prize, for the bravery which often goes unheralded, and the deficiencies obviously focused upon to the detriment of all the good that they accomplish.

And I am wondering, since there are deaths, we know how hazardous it is, there are wounded peacekeepers, could you perhaps for the record, or if you have it available now, give us a sense of how many peacekeepers have been injured, whether or not there is a PTSD component as we have had with every war we have been engaged in, and there has to be, I think. There are peacekeepers, just like any deployed man or a woman service member, who see things that no one should see.

And just for the record, I chaired the Veterans’ Affairs Committee for a number of years, and wrote a number of laws on the health care side including the establishment of polytrauma centers. And the closest one to here in Washington is in Richmond. And I have been amazed as those polytrauma centers deal as DoD hands off to the VA, men and women who have deep brain injuries, loss of limbs, where otherwise they might have died in the past, are brought back by the coordination of the treatment of their injuries by a group of doctors, nurses, and highly skilled personnel to ensure the greatest possibility of a life with less handicap going forward. And I really don’t know this, what do we do to assist those men and women who are injured who might be PTSD? Our VA, as you know, has written the book on how to deal with that issue, and it goes back obviously to the work to help our Vietnam veterans when it really burst onto the scene in the early ’80s, if not before. But polytrauma, do we do any sharing through our personnel?
And I would just say parenthetically, I will never forget in the early 1980s, making trips down to El Salvador during the years that the FMLN, when mines were being used, foot taker-offer mines that they called them, that the FMLN was using, and it was right here in Washington that our military hospitals provided and helped with prosthetic devices, especially to the children who were losing limbs.

So do we help these peacekeepers? Saying nothing detrimental whatsoever to health care that might be provided in various African countries, but again when it comes to dealing with battlefield injuries no one does it better, in my humble opinion, than the VA.

Ms. BRIMMER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for that question. If I may provide some information at this point and then follow up for the record with additional information. That just a data point is that the total number of fatalities from peacekeeping operations since 1948 is 3,017. But of course we will respond with a fuller discussion of that.

Mr. SMITH. With a break out to Africa and especially the recent ones that would be very helpful.

Ms. BRIMMER. We would be happy to give you more detail broken out by region.

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE ESTHER BRIMMER TO QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

Thank you for asking this question. Peacekeepers do face challenges in the field that require greater attention. The UN has kept statistics since 1948 on deaths in peacekeeping missions, broken out in various configurations. The total number of fatalities in UN peacekeeping missions from 1948 through August 31, 2012 (the most recent compilation), is 3,025. The total number of fatalities for all UN peace operations in Africa since 1948 is 1,477. Of the current missions in Africa, the totals since their date of creation are: UNMIS/UNMISS (Sudan/South Sudan): 61; UNOCI (Cote d’Ivoire): 98; UNMIL (Liberia): 168; MONUC/MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of Congo): 208; UNAMID (Darfur): 124; UNISPA (Abyei) 7; and MINURSO (Western Sahara): 15. These figures include deaths by accident, illness, malicious intent and other causes.

Additionally, we note significant gaps in health care and medical treatment for troops from various countries and in missions while in active service. The UN has consistently asked troop contributors to provide field hospitals for the missions in more challenging environments, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Assuming that local medical facilities do not meet UN standards, contingent-deployed medical facilities provide care to all categories of personnel, including UN civilian staff; arrangements are generally made with a nearby country to provide more specialized medical care, as required. The Medical Services Division of the UN’s Office of Human Resource Management plays a coordinating role and performs periodic on-site assessments of field medical capabilities.

Civilian staff are covered under health insurance plans, whereas uniformed personnel qualify for payments for death and disability incurred as a result of UN service (up to $70,000 USD, paid to troop-contributing countries in the case of military contingent personnel and to individuals or their beneficiaries in the case of UNPOL and military observers).

Ms. BRIMMER. If I may also note that it does remind us of some of the capacity gaps, and you raised an important point. What happens to the peacekeeping veterans? That reminds us that even when they are serving there are significant gaps. One of them is in some of the medical care. One of the things we think which would actually strengthen peacekeeping are more medical units. These are often something that, for example, countries with very advanced militaries can supply are the medical units, to make sure
people at the time of critical injury are getting the best care available. Because often the medical units may not be at the same standard that we associate obviously with our U.S. military. Being able to be sure that we are able to strengthen the police units, even as you know there is a long issue of getting the right helicopters to allow for the transport of peacekeepers. We think these are the sort of capacity gaps we would like to improve. We would even like to make sure that we are bringing in more women who would be able to work, particularly since they are working with civilian groups, thinking about what are the real capacity gaps for dealing with peacekeeping.

We also think that there are resource gaps. And one of our concerns with the idea of a cap on peacekeeping, which has been raised before, is we think we need to—and we have been able to benefit from Congress lifting the cap at 25 percent each year recognizing we need to meet our treaty obligations. So as we think about the capacity gaps that we recognize it affects the abilities of peacekeepers to do their job on the ground and to follow up. So we will follow up for the record to those questions again as we try to work to strengthen peacekeeping.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. Smith. And I would just conclude, unless my friend and colleague has anything.

That without objection I would like to put into our record the report to Congress on U.N. efforts to prevent trafficking in persons.

[The information referred to follows:]
Report to Congress
on United Nations Efforts to Prevent Trafficking in Persons
and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions

Submission
to
The Committee on Foreign Relations
of the United States Senate
and to
The Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the United States House of Representatives
United Nations Efforts to Prevent Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA)

And Trafficking in Persons (TIP) in UN Peacekeeping Missions

This report, consistent with Section 104(e) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-164), covers UN peacekeeping missions whose mandates are likely to be renewed or reauthorized between September 1, 2012 and February 1, 2013: UNISFA (Abyei), UNFICYP (Cyprus), MINUSTAH (Haiti), UNMIL (Liberia), UNDOF (Syria), and UNMIT (Timor-Leste).

| Measures Taken by the UN to Prevent SEA and TIP |

The United States is a leader in international efforts to address violence against women and trafficking in persons. We have long supported the United Nations in creating and implementing its zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse of vulnerable populations by UN peacekeeping personnel, including the adoption of the measures described below. In late 2011, the UN launched an internal review of current practices and procedures in peacekeeping missions to ensure all peacekeeping missions are complying with the regulations and procedures recommended in the 2005 report by Prince Zeid of Jordan, the UN Secretary-General’s Adviser on SEA. In addition, this past June the General Assembly mandated that payments he withheld for those troops who are repatriated due to allegations of SEA. The United States is encouraging a rigorous and transparent approach to this persistent problem.

The UN uses a three-pronged strategy to combat SEA and TIP that consists of prevention, enforcement, and remedial action. Peacekeeping personnel in all categories (civilian, police, and military) sign a code of conduct on SEA that forbids sex with minors regardless of the local age of consent, sex with prostitutes, and offering favors or goods in exchange for sex. Furthermore, the UN strongly discourages sexual relationships between UN staff and beneficiaries of assistance. Such relationships are based on inherently unequal power dynamics and can undermine the integrity and credibility of the peacekeeping mission within the community. A number of peacekeeping missions have strict no-fraternization policies forbidding sexual relationships with host country nationals.

The UN supplies troop- and police-contributing countries with instructional material on preventing exploitation and abuse to use in pre-deployment training. International civilian staff receive this training under direct UN auspices before deploying. All categories of peacekeepers are required to receive mandatory
training on SEA upon arrival at their post, including specific briefings on the UN Code of Conduct, the Secretary-General's 2003 Bulletin, and mission-specific rules (such as prohibited areas). Following this initial training, the Conduct and Discipline Team (CDT) in each mission is required to provide ongoing training and refresher courses in addition to mission-specific training. Peacekeeping missions must also conduct periodic information campaigns to raise public awareness of the standards of conduct and procedures for reporting abuse. Common methods of community outreach include a range of techniques, such as senior mission leadership addresses, newsletters, brochures, radio broadcasts, and interaction with community groups.

In addition, the UN's induction training program for CDT members, which provides instruction on their responsibilities, is now linked to an advisory document for conduct and discipline personnel. This document provides step-by-step guidance for conduct and discipline practitioners in the field and is being transformed into official guidelines to be shared with all stakeholders. The document's purpose is to enhance leadership, managerial, and individual understanding of this process.

The seriousness of SEA and TIP requires specific policies to enforce compliance with the guidelines. UN policies include establishing curfews, requiring soldiers and police to wear uniforms when outside barracks, and designating places frequented by prostitutes as off-limits. Further, all UN staff members are required to report any concerns or suspicions they have regarding potential SEA by a fellow worker to the CDT for their mission. CDTs refer these allegations to UN internal bodies or to the member state contributing troops or police, as appropriate. For UN civilian staff, the disciplinary process takes place within the context of the new UN system of Administration of Justice, in which the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) investigates allegations of serious offenses. For formed police units, OIOS is responsible for investigation, though the police-contributing country retains authority for discipline. For military contingents, the troop-contributing country retains both primary jurisdiction and disciplinary authority. SEA are considered acts of grave misconduct and are grounds for prompt disciplinary action, up to and including summary dismissal for civilian staff and repatriation for uniformed personnel. Therefore, when allegations of misconduct involving military and police personnel are substantiated, the UN can send the individuals home. Repatriation can also occur before allegations are substantiated on the basis of bilateral consultations between the UN and the troop/police-contributing country in question. The UN requests, but has no ability to compel, reports from member
states on action taken to discipline those uniformed personnel sent home for misconduct.

The UN established a Misconduct Tracking System in 2007, which tracks cases of misconduct, including SEA, for all categories of personnel in peacekeeping, including civilians, individual police, members of formed police units, and members of military contingents. The system also facilitates the banning of offenders from assignment to subsequent missions, though for military contingent personnel the UN is largely reliant upon member states for such screening. This is due largely to the size of military deployments, the responsibility of member states for disciplining military personnel, and the absence of biometric identifiers by which the UN can track personnel deployed. Statistics are maintained and published by the Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) in the Department of Field Support in New York. Peacekeeping missions, where SEA allegations have been more prevalent, have conducted campaigns to combat prostitution and transactional sex involving UN personnel. They have also implemented victim assistance programs.

Over the past year, the UN has undertaken a more strategic approach to conduct and discipline as functions of global management goals to strengthen accountability and ensure continued efficient and transparent management of personnel conduct. This framework is comprised of four strategic pillars: (1) _integration_ — roles and responsibilities in the discharge of conduct and discipline and how to work more efficiently and effectively at mission, regional, and headquarters levels; (2) _capacity building_ — strengthening conduct and discipline in field missions in order to respond and address prevention, enforcement, and remedial matters; (3) _performance-based accountability_ — leadership, managerial, and individual responsibility, how this is assessed and measured, and how challenges and risks are identified, monitored, and evaluated; and finally (4) _outreach, information dissemination, and communication_ — enhancing the understanding by staff, leaders, and the public at large on matters of conduct and discipline.

In June 2012, these pillars were endorsed in a Conduct and Discipline Workshop which included Chiefs and Senior Officers from the 12 CDT’s in peacekeeping missions. The strategic plan is currently being finalized. Initiatives already taking place under this global approach include a program to improve the quality and standardize investigations.

The CDU in New York is actively engaged in efforts to strengthen its own accountability for the management of cases of misconduct. The CDU has
introduced a correspondence intake and case assignment workflow system, with specific timelines, key performance indicators, and a time sheet system, to allow greater oversight of productivity and the investment of time and effort. There is a prioritization system in place, with SEA cases having the highest priority.

The UN is also updating existing guidelines on SEA-related communications, and putting in place a strategic plan for disseminating information to field mission stakeholders.

<table>
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<th>Effectiveness of Measures Taken by UN Peacekeeping Missions to Prevent SEA and TIP</th>
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The numbers of SEA violation allegations per year, in all missions, are the following: 127 (2007), 83 (2008), 112 (2009), 85 (2010), and 74 (2011). In 2012, 30 cases have been reported through July 12. Allegations of SEA cases involving minors (under the age of 18) have decreased each year since 2009. In 2008 there were 34 cases, followed by 51 in 2009, 30 in 2010, and 22 in 2011. In 2012, there have been 10 cases of SEA involving minors reported through July 12.

The UN Secretariat has been working to strengthen the overall zero tolerance framework through increased and more targeted training, community outreach, and effective leadership. There is also work to be done to foster greater understanding of UN SEA and TIP policy, procedures, and reporting mechanisms within local communities. UN and NGO partners continue to recognize the problem of underreporting in cases of SEA. Particularly in places where discussions of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) are taboo or politically contentious, more efforts must be made to normalize and encourage frank dialogue among peacekeepers and the local population regarding expectations and consequences of misconduct.

More progress is needed in CDU’s investigations; in general, the total number of investigations concluded has decreased while the number of cumulatively backlogged cases has increased. In 2008, 138 investigations were completed while 44 remained pending; in 2009, 124 investigations were completed while 43 remained pending; in 2010, 74 investigations were completed while 57 remained pending; and in 2011, 33 investigations were completed while 51 remained pending. One reason for this trend is the continued difficulty the CDU experiences in obtaining information on the results of investigations by troop-contributing countries (TCCs) of allegations related to their military personnel, as the TCC has exclusive jurisdiction over its soldiers.
The following details with respect to the peacekeeping missions covered by this report are based on reporting from the respective U.S. embassies and missions, as well as statistics covering the period since the previous report on those UN missions. The statistics in the chart at the end of this report are from CDU. The report uses May 2012 UN figures for troop and police strengths. Since we have summarized required procedures above, discussion of individual missions will note only exceptions and measures that have proved particularly successful. The six missions covered by this report received a total of 40 allegations of SEA as of December 31, 2011.

United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) (120 military observers and 3,813 contingent troops): UNISFA, a relatively new mission established in June 2011, reported no cases of sexual exploitation or abuse (SEA) or trafficking in persons (TIP) violations by UNISFA mission staff. NGOs operating in close coordination with UNISFA did not know of any complaints against the mission and assessed the mission's personnel as professional and competent. UNISFA has not yet established clear mission-specific policies for addressing and preventing any SEA or TIP violations, including establishing out-of-bounds areas. UNISFA leadership attributes the mission's lack of violations both to officers' limited interaction with the host population, as Abyei town was, until recently, entirely deserted, and the intense nature of the operation that keeps the mission's staff busy and focused.

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) (858 military personnel and 698 police): There have been no allegations of any SEA involving UNFICYP personnel from Cypriot authorities, NGOs, or local media during the reporting period.

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (7,340 military personnel and 3,126 police): MINUSTAH's Conduct and Discipline Team (CDT) reports 27 allegations of SEA for MINUSTAH in 2011, of which five were substantiated, seven are unsubstantiated, and 15 are still pending investigation. Their reporting shows four allegations in 2012, only one of which is pending investigation. There were two major cases of sexual exploitation involving MINUSTAH soldiers and police between July 2011 and July 2012. In September 2011, five members of a Uruguayan MINUSTAH contingent stationed in the southern town of Port Salut were accused of sexually assaulting a young Haitian boy; a cell phone video of the incident was circulated internationally. Uruguay promptly repatriated its personnel to begin military and civilian judicial
proceedings. The complainant and his attorney were recently flown at Uruguayan expense to testify in the trial of the accused soldiers. The civil case remains open. In January 2012, three FPU personnel from the Pakistani contingent in the central coast town of Gonaives were accused of sexually assaulting a Haitian teenager. Pakistani authorities flew a Pakistani judge to Haiti and conducted an immediate trial. All three personnel were convicted, dishonorably discharged, and flown back to Pakistan to serve prison sentences. Embassy Port-au-Prince reports that MINUSTAH appears to have tightened its discipline in the wake of these incidents.

United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (7,750 military personnel and 1,313 police): Eleven cases involving 12 allegations of SEA were reported from July 2011 to June 2012, up from 10 cases reported the previous year. Of the 11 cases, two were unsubstantiated and two were substantiated, while the remaining seven cases are pending investigation. The majority of the cases involve transactional sex, while two cases involved sex with minors. UNMIL management believes that internal reporting processes, including a database that maintains records of misconduct, continue to discourage UNMIL personnel from engaging in SEA. Liberian government and non-governmental sources were not aware of UNMIL-related SEA or TIP allegations over the past year. Embassy Monrovia reports sources saying that UNMIL has strengthened its implementation of the zero-tolerance policy since the 2005 and 2006 reports of widespread misconduct. UNMIL is seeking to assess the effectiveness of its procedures and public information programs. The CDU created a competition among schools in two UNMIL sectors to develop dramatizations that illustrated the meaning of SEA. The CDU also used the activity to determine if the local populations truly understood the zero-tolerance policy. The winning team was awarded dictionaries while other participants received T-shirts. The program was so popular and instructive that the CDU is replicating the competition in other areas. The CDU is also looking to engage community radio more frequently, especially in more remote areas. Public reporting mechanisms currently include walk-in reporting, a telephone hotline, and complaint boxes at UNMIL sites; the CDU recently added complaint box locations in hospitals. Most complaints continue to come through the telephone hotline. CDU-posted messages are visible throughout Liberia, including at UNMIL guesthouses in the interior.

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) (1,055 military personnel): There have been no allegations of SEA involving UNDOF peacekeepers for the last five years.
United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) (1,242 police and 33 military liaison officers): There are no confirmed cases of sexual exploitation or abuse perpetrated by members of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) in the first half of 2012. One previous allegation of SEA by an UN Police officer is still being internally investigated. The UN’s internal investigation of the alleged rape of a UN Volunteer by a UN contractor in 2011 did not uncover sufficient evidence to substantiate the claim; the case is still with the Timor-Leste Government’s Office of the Prosecutor General. At least once per month, the CDU visits all off-limits bars, discotheques, and brothels in Dili to ensure that no UN personnel are frequenting the sites, with immediate disciplinary sanctions in place for anyone caught violating the policies. These visits also include discussions with local security guards and other staff to discover if UNMIT personnel have been seen on the premises. The CDU also regularly meets with local organizations to provide training on the prevention and identification of TIP and to ask if they have heard of or seen any alleged misconduct by UN personnel. In addition, every week the CDU travels to a different district to ensure compliance with rules and regulations and to demonstrate its presence to UN personnel. The CDU meets with UN staff and local representatives to see if there are any complaints against UNMIT personnel in that district, and to reiterate the importance of rules regarding SEA to UN staff. Two dedicated mobile phone hotlines are available to receive information on any complaint in Tetum, English, or Portuguese. Complaints may also be sent via text message (SMS) or email to the CDU.

The complete report can be accessed on the Web site of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov

Mr. SMITH. And also a very brief, but very good, sexual exploitation and abuse prevention and accountability with the prevention enforcement and remedial action. Without objection it will be made a part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]
**Sexual Exploitation and Abuse**

**Prevention and accountability are key**

In 2011, 74 allegations of SEA were received from 8 peacekeeping missions and none from special political missions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>This figure represents a steady decline: from 340 instances in 2005 to 74 in 2011. In 2011 the number of allegations decreased by 34% from 2009.</th>
<th>Member States’ response rate to requests made by the Secretariat to investigate allegations and take disciplinary actions continued to increase in 2011, with an overall response rate of 88%, as compared with 26 per cent in 2010, 17 per cent in 2009 and 11 per cent in 2008.</th>
<th>For the first time in 2011, less than half (42%) of the allegations concerned the most egregious forms of sexual exploitation and abuse; the remaining 58% concerned prohibited consensual activities (transactional or exploitative sexual relations) or assistance in the procurement of sexual favours.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Between 2008 and 2011, after investigation, 54% of allegations were reported to be substantiated.</td>
<td>In 2011, 63% of the instances involved uniformed personnel; 34% involved civilian personnel.</td>
<td>To address SEA, 12 Conduct and Discipline Teams (CDT) are covering 19 peacekeeping and special political missions.</td>
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So far in 2012, 30 allegations of SEA were received from 7 peacekeeping missions, 1 was received from a special political mission.

DPKO and DFS continue to implement their three-pronged strategy

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Prevention of misconduct</th>
<th>Enforcement of UN standards of conduct</th>
<th>Remedial actions</th>
</tr>
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</table>

**Prevention**

**Training**
- Mandatory since 2005 for all personnel before deploying and upon arrival to a UN peacekeeping mission.

**Awareness raising**
- Designed to explain the rights, obligations and the standards of conduct as well as mechanisms to address misconduct.

**Preventive measures**
- Restriction of movement
- Curfews
- Off-limit areas
- Non-fraternization policies
- Increased patrols around high risk areas
- Decentralization of CDT personnel into locations with high risk of misconduct
- Mandatory signature of code of conduct for all UN personnel including experts, volunteers, consultants, and contractors
Mr. SMITH. And I want to thank you again for your leadership. I look forward to working with you going forward. And with some of the information, if you can convey it as soon as possible, that way we can work together to work on these issues.
And so thank you. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:41 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD
SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515-0128

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), Chairman

September 6, 2012

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, to be held in Room 2209 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live via the Committee website at http://www.house.gov):

DATE: Thursday, September 13, 2012
TIME: 3:00 p.m.
SUBJECT: Assessing U.S. Policy on Peacekeeping Operations in Africa
WITNESSES:

The Honorable Johnnie Carson
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of African Affairs
U.S. Department of State

The Honorable Esther Brimmer
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of International Organization Affairs
U.S. Department of State

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you need special accommodations, please call 202-225-9021 at least five business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general or regarding availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistance hearing devices may be directed to the Committee.
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights HEARING

Day Thursday Date September 13, 2012 Room 2200 Rayburn

Starting Time 3:18 p.m. Ending Time 4:41 p.m.

Recesses

Presiding Member(s)
Rep. Chris Smith

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session [ ] Executive (closed) Session [ ]

Electronically Recorded (taped) [ ] Stenographic Record [ ]

Televised [ ]

TITHE OF HEARING:
Assessing U.S. Policy on Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an * if they are not members of full committee.)
Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee*

HEARING WITNESSES: Sumo on meeting notice attached? Yes [ ] No [ ]

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)
Report to Congress on United Nations Efforts to Prevent Trafficking Persons and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions

Document on Sexual Exploitation and Abuses and UN Peacekeepers

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ________

TIME ADJOURNED 4:41 p.m. ____________________________

Subcommittee Staff Director
Question

MINURSO, the UN mission for Western Sahara, has been deployed since 1991 to allow for the resolution of the dispute over the former Spanish colony between Morocco and the Saharawi people, as represented by the Polisario Front. More than 20 years later, MINURSO is still in place, and the referendum supported by the United Nations continues to be frustrated by Morocco’s refusal to allow that vote. African nations have supported Polisario’s call for the referendum. Why has the UN continued to prolong this peacekeeping mission without insisting on its goal being met?

Answer

The United States fully supports current efforts by the UN Secretary General and his Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Ambassador Christopher Ross, to find a peaceful, sustainable, and mutually agreed solution on the Western Sahara conflict. The United States considers the Moroccan autonomy proposal for Western Sahara to be a serious, credible, and realistic proposal—a potential option for the way forward to resolve the conflict. The United States has consistently encouraged the parties to work with the United Nations and with each other, in a spirit of flexibility and compromise, to find a mutually acceptable settlement.

The UN continues to play an important role in addressing the situation in Western Sahara. The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has made significant contributions toward stabilizing the situation in Western Sahara. MINURSO is mandated to monitor the ceasefire; verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in Western Sahara; monitor the confinement of Moroccan and Frente POLISARIO troops in designated locations; take steps with the parties to ensure the release of all Western Sahara political prisoners or detainees; oversee the exchange of prisoners of war (ICRC); implement the repatriation program (UNHCR); identify and register all qualified voters; and organize and ensure a free and fair referendum and proclaim the results. UNHCR’s confidence-building measures program to facilitate Sahrawi family visits via air resumed last year and to date has benefited 13,560 people. The United States continues to urge the parties to make progress on additional confidence-building measures, including agreeing on an overland route for family visits. By monitoring the ceasefire, MINURSO maintains the environment that allows the UN-facilitated negotiations between the parties to take place.