[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
DOT'S TRUCK AND BUS SAFETY PROGRAM
=======================================================================
(112-104)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
HIGHWAYS AND TRANSIT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
----------
SEPTEMBER 13, 2012
----------
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
DOT'S TRUCK AND BUS SAFETY PROGRAM
EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
DOT'S TRUCK AND BUS SAFETY PROGRAM
=======================================================================
(112-104)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
HIGHWAYS AND TRANSIT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 13, 2012
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/
committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
75-852 PDF WASHINGTON : 2013
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey Columbia
GARY G. MILLER, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois CORRINE BROWN, Florida
SAM GRAVES, Missouri BOB FILNER, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
DUNCAN HUNTER, California RICK LARSEN, Washington
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania
BILLY LONG, Missouri TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
BOB GIBBS, Ohio HEATH SHULER, North Carolina
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
RICHARD L. HANNA, New York LAURA RICHARDSON, California
JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
JEFF DENHAM, California
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN,
Tennessee
VACANCY
(ii)
Subcommittee on Highways and Transit
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin JERROLD NADLER, New York
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina BOB FILNER, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
GARY G. MILLER, California TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
SAM GRAVES, Missouri MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland HEATH SHULER, North Carolina
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington LAURA RICHARDSON, California
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
BILLY LONG, Missouri ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
BOB GIBBS, Ohio NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
RICHARD L. HANNA, New York, Vice (Ex Officio)
Chair
STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida
JOHN L. MICA, Florida (Ex Officio)
VACANCY
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vii
TESTIMONY
Anne Ferro, Administrator, Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration................................................. 5
Steve Owings, President and Cofounder, Road Safe America (RSA)... 5
David L. Palmer, Assistant Chief, Texas Department of Public
Safety, on behalf of the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance
(CVSA)......................................................... 5
Scott A. Mugno, Vice President of Safety, Fedex Ground Package
System, Inc., on behalf of the American Trucking Associations
(ATA).......................................................... 5
Ruby L. McBride, Vice President of Corporate Systems, Colonial
Freight Systems, Inc., on behalf of the Alliance for Safe,
Efficient and Competitive Truck Transportation (ASECTT)........ 5
Bruce Johnson, Director of Carrier Services, C.H. Robinson, on
behalf of the Transportation Intermediaries Association (TIA).. 5
William Gentry, President, Gentry Trailways, on behalf of the
American Bus Association and United Motorcoach Association..... 5
PREPARED STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY MEMBER OF CONGRESS
Hon. Nick J. Rahall II, of West Virginia......................... 49
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Anne Ferro....................................................... 51
Steve Owings..................................................... 69
David L. Palmer.................................................. 76
Scott A. Mugno................................................... 88
Ruby L. McBride, including ASECTT's position paper and appendices
A-G............................................................ 98
Bruce Johnson.................................................... 202
William Gentry, including supplemental material provided by the
United Motorcoach Association.................................. 214
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Hon. Nick J. Rahall II, a Representative in Congress from the
State of West Virginia, request to submit statement for the
record of Todd Spencer, Executive Vice President, Owner-
Operator Independent Drivers Association....................... 23
Anne Ferro, Administrator, Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, responses to questions from:
Hon. John J. Duncan, Jr., a Representative in Congress
from the State of Tennessee............................ 65
Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Missouri...................................... 67
Hon. Bill Shuster, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Pennsylvania.................................. 67
Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA), statement for the
record......................................................... 233
Ruby L. McBride, Vice President of Corporate Systems, Colonial
Freight Systems, Inc., on behalf of the Alliance for Safe,
Efficient and Competitive Truck Transportation (ASECTT),
request to submit:
Additional information................................... 238
Irwin Shires, Panther Expedited Services, Inc.,
``Position Paper on Percentile Scoring in SMS
Methodology,'' September 26, 2012...................... 245
Chart of actual groupings of carriers in the unsafe
driving category of BASIC.............................. 247
ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD
Cynthia Hilton, Executive Vice President, Institute of Makers of
Explosives, letter to Hon. John J. Duncan, Jr., and Hon. Peter
A. DeFazio, September 10, 2012................................. 250
John Lannen, Executive Director, Truck Safety Coalition, letter
to Hon. John J. Duncan, Jr., and Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, October
3, 2012, and five case studies which provide examples of
incorrect and incomplete Police Accident Reports............... 257
Lee Brown, Executive Director, California Construction Trucking
Association and its interstate conference, Western Trucking
Alliance, statement for the record............................. 288
National Association of Small Trucking Companies, statement for
the record..................................................... 292
Roy Crawford, P.E., Fellow of the National Academy of Forensic
Engineers; and Kentucky and West Virginia Volunteer
Coordinator, Truck Safety Coalition; and Administrator,
Underride Network, request to submit:
Letter to Hon. John J. Duncan, Jr., and Hon. Peter A.
DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Oregon, October 1, 2012................................ 297
Police Accident Report from the fatal truck collision of
Mr. Crawford's son, Guy................................ 300
Roy Crawford, P.E., National Academy of Forensic
Engineers, ``The Reconstruction of Eastern Kentucky
Rear Coal Truck Crashes,'' June 1999................... 302
Snack Food Association, statement for the record................. 313
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
DOT'S TRUCK AND BUS SAFETY PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2012
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Highways and Transit,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in
room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John J. Duncan,
Jr. (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Duncan. We are going to go ahead and call this hearing
to order today. The subcommittee is convening to receive
testimony from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration,
the trucking and bus industry, law enforcement officials, and
safety advocates on the Administration's Compliance, Safety,
Accountability program, or what is commonly referred to as CSA.
I think everyone will agree that decreasing fatalities and
injuries resulting from truck and bus crashes is the most
important goal the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
is charged with.
With this goal in mind, FMCSA implemented CSA in December
of 2010. CSA was designed to maximize the agency's resources by
compiling carrier violations from inspections and crash reports
in order to determine the future crash risk of a truck or bus
company. This data is used to create a type of safety profile
for truck and bus companies so consumers can make educated
choices when selecting companies.
However, in July of last year, I spoke to a group that is a
member of the Alliance for Safe, Efficient and Competitive
Truck Transportation, and I heard numerous people from around
the Nation who raised concerns related to the methodology used
in CSA, specifically in the Safety Measurement System, or what
is referred to as SMS. Some of these concerns arise from the
fact that 40 percent of the 500,000 active truck and bus
companies generate a score in at least 1 of the 7 SMS
categories, which are called ``BASICs.'' The number of
companies that generate a score in all BASICs is unknown. A
comprehensive understanding of a carrier's safety is difficult
to achieve with this lack of data.
In addition, not all States report every violation to
FMCSA, so the SMS methodology is only as good as the data
flowing into the system. These data problems present a
significant challenge for small trucking companies, in
particular, which make up the majority of commercial motor
vehicles. Since many of these small companies generate little
or no data into the SMS, their scores can fluctuate
dramatically. And the small companies that generate no score
are misconceived sometimes as being unsafe.
Questions have also been raised over the relationship of
some violations and whether they are indicators of future crash
risk. Scores generated in certain BASICs may not have the core
relation to future crash risk, and may inadvertently focus
FMCSA's enforcement measures on the wrong carriers. Problems
also sometimes result in companies becoming more vulnerable to
lawsuits than they should be.
Shippers and brokers are also left wondering how to
evaluate the safety fitness of carriers with a score in only
one BASIC, or no score at all. Recent court rulings have
established duty of reasonable care requirements that brokers
and shippers must meet when hiring a carrier in order to avoid
negligent hiring lawsuits. Brokers and shippers are now in the
position to determine whether a carrier is sufficiently safe to
hire, based on incomplete or misleading scores. And this
sometimes results in wrong or unfair decisions in that regard.
The intentions behind CSA are good, but it is not a perfect
system. We are holding this hearing today to identify where we
can improve CSA and how we can reduce fatalities and injuries
while keeping the engine of our economy moving. This country
could be booming beyond belief today if we would allow it to do
so. But in many ways we are holding it back through over-
regulation of different types.
I hope this hearing will help Members and interested
parties better understand these concerns that have been raised
from around the country, and generate proposals to make CSA a
more effective tool.
I want to thank all of the witnesses for taking time out of
their busy schedules to be here with us today. I want to say on
a personal note that in my 24 years in Congress I think I have
participated probably in maybe 1,000 hearings, congressional
hearings. In only a very small number of those have we had one
witness from Tennessee. In this--and only about five or six
witnesses have ever been from my particular district. But on
this very distinguished panel of seven people I have two
witnesses here not only from Tennessee, but two of whom are
from my district, and both of whom happen to be personal
friends of mine: Ruby McBride and Bill Gentry. And they are
both very active in our community and are very respected
people, not only in business, but in civic and cultural
affairs. And it is certainly an honor and a privilege for me to
have two of my most distinguished constituents here. I tell
people all the time I have 750,000 bosses. I have got two of my
main bosses here today.
With that, we are--I am very pleased and honored--we also
have the ranking member of the full committee, my friend
Congressman Rahall from West Virginia, here. And I would like
to turn to him for any comments he wishes to make at this time.
Mr. Rahall. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for conducting this oversight hearing on the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration's motor carrier safety program.
Certainly advancing safety on our highways is a paramount
concern of all involved, from those who get behind the wheel,
to local law enforcement, to Federal regulators.
In this regard, a decision was made during the George W.
Bush administration to move away from the resource-intensive
and ultimately inadequate strategy of relying on compliance
reviews to the development of the compliance, safety, and
accountability system--in essence, a technological leap similar
to the move away from the corded wall phone to the smart phone.
Today, however, 8 years after CSA started to emerge as a
new enforcement and compliance model, the question remains just
how smart is GSA--CSA, sorry. While the old adage of ``garbage
in, garbage out'' does not completely apply here, there are
questions about the reliability and integrity of the data
utilized under CSA's safety management system and the effect of
the scores that it assigns to trucking companies and
independent truckers with respect to their relationship with
freight brokers, shippers, and insurers.
I would also note, in conclusion, that this entire system
has been and continues to be developed without formal
rulemakings. Collaborative efforts are to be applauded,
certainly. But there are some issues which more properly lend
themselves to a rulemaking process so that the public has the
opportunity to formally comment.
Again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. And I
look forward to the witnesses' testimony today.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much. I understand Mr. Crawford
does not wish to make an opening statement. Mr. Holden doesn't,
either. Ms. Richardson, do you want to? Mr.--well, thank you
very much. Mr. Cummings, I understand, wants to make a
statement----
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be
brief. Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member DeFazio, for convening--
I want to thank you for convening this hearing to examine the
safety of commercial vehicles on our Nation's roadways.
Deaths from accidents involving large commercial vehicles
have fallen. Administrator Ferro's testimony records the
decline as 26 percent from 2006 to 2010. That said,
approximately 100,000 people are still injured annually in
crashes involving commercial vehicles, while thousands more die
in such accidents. Any death or injury is one too many. And,
therefore, I look forward to learning today what more can be
done to reduce these numbers.
Our hearing will focus on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration's new compliance, safety, and accountability
system, which is intended to give the FMCSA a wide and deep
overview of safety in the commercial vehicle industry to enable
it to identify firms that are not compliant with regulations
and that pose a safety risk. This system relies on assessments
of a firm's performance in seven categories called the Behavior
Analysis and Safety Improvement Categories, or the BASICs.
There appears to be ongoing debate about how data is collecting
to populate the BASIC assessments, and on how certain data is
weighed and scored.
I look forward to the hearing from--I look forward to
hearing from today's witnesses on the data collection process
can be improved, and how we can ensure that the assessments
made through the BASIC process more accurately identify the
risks posed by individual carriers. That said, any refinements
must be informed by objective studies and analysis, and must
not be allowed to undermine what appear to be the clear
benefits of the use of the CSA system, which has demonstrably
expanded the FMCSA's reach over the commercial vehicle
industry, as well as the extent of the data it is able to
assess.
After implementation of the CSA system, violations
identified through roadside inspections have fallen, and
studies have found that carriers that have unacceptable scores
in BASIC assessments such as unsafe driving and fatigued
driving have higher crash risks, a finding that confirms the
system is able to properly identify those carriers that pose
high risks on our Nation's highways.
I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses,
particularly Mr. Ferro--Ms. Ferro, the former administrator of
the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration. And with that, I
yield back.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much. Mr. Shuster, would you
like to--all right. Mr. Boswell, you wish to make an opening
statement?
Mr. Boswell. I do want to participate when we get the panel
going.
Mr. Duncan. All right.
Mr. Boswell. But I think I will hold on that so we can move
forward.
Mr. Duncan. We will be joined by other Members. But we will
not have any other opening statements, except for I understand
that the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. DeFazio, is on
his way.
We have a very distinguished panel, and we have Ms. Anne
Ferro, who is the administrator of the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration; Mr. Steve Owings, who is the cofounder
of Road Safe America; Mr. David Palmer, who is assistant chief
of the Texas Department of Public Safety; Mr. Scott A. Mugno,
who is the vice president of safety for FedEx Ground; Ms. Ruby
McBride, who is vice president of corporate systems for
Colonial Freight Systems on behalf of the Alliance for Safe,
Efficient and Competitive Truck Transportation; Mr. Bruce
Johnson, director of carrier services for C.H. Robinson; and
Mr. Bill Gentry, who is president of Gentry Trailways,
testifying on behalf of the American Bus Association and the
United Motorcoach Association.
We appreciate all of you being here, and your full
statements will be placed in the record. We do ask that you try
to limit your opening statements to 5 minutes. If you run a
little bit over, that is all right, but roughly that amount of
time.
And we will now be pleased to hear from Administrator
Ferro.
TESTIMONY OF ANNE FERRO, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER
SAFETY ADMINISTRATION; STEVE OWINGS, PRESIDENT AND COFOUNDER,
ROAD SAFE AMERICA (RSA); DAVID L. PALMER, ASSISTANT CHIEF,
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, ON BEHALF OF THE COMMERCIAL
VEHICLE SAFETY ALLIANCE (CVSA); SCOTT A. MUGNO, VICE PRESIDENT
OF SAFETY, FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEM, INC., ON BEHALF OF THE
AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS (ATA); RUBY L. MCBRIDE, VICE
PRESIDENT OF CORPORATE SYSTEMS, COLONIAL FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC.,
ON BEHALF OF THE ALLIANCE FOR SAFE, EFFICIENT AND COMPETITIVE
TRUCK TRANSPORTATION (ASECTT); BRUCE JOHNSON, DIRECTOR OF
CARRIER SERVICES, C.H. ROBINSON, ON BEHALF OF THE
TRANSPORTATION INTERMEDIARIES ASSOCIATION (TIA); AND WILLIAM
GENTRY, PRESIDENT, GENTRY TRAILWAYS, ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN
BUS ASSOCIATION AND UNITED MOTORCOACH ASSOCIATION
Ms. Ferro. Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Rahall, members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity today to
discuss how the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's
improved compliance and enforcement model is furthering highway
safety. That model is known as Compliance, Safety,
Accountability, or CSA, for short, as the chairman indicated.
America's roads and highways are safer today than they have
ever been. In fact, as Congressman Cummings indicated, truck-
related deaths were reduced 26 percent between 2006 and 2010.
And this is good news. It is the result of very deliberate
action and hard work by a number of stakeholders on this issue,
some of whom are here in this room today.
But the fact is our roads can, and they must, be safer.
Almost 4,000 people die, and over 100,000 people are injured in
large truck and bus crashes each year. While trucks make up 5
percent of all registered vehicles, 10 percent of all vehicle
miles traveled, they account for 12 percent of all fatal
crashes.
CSA is FMCSA's safety enforcement platform designed to
improve compliance and safety in truck and bus operations so
crashes can be prevented. It is a safety performance
measurement system that analyzes inspection and crash data to
help us identify and focus our resources on the higher risk
carriers. The purpose of the program is to improve our ability
to help all stakeholders prevent crashes and save lives.
CSA is a three-part program. It is a system, a process, and
a rule. The system is the safety measurement system that most
everybody sees today on our Web site, which uses all inspection
and crash data to give priority to high-risk and noncomplying
carriers for inspection and investigation. The process element
of the program refers to the range of intervention tools we use
once we have analyzed and applied the data, so that we can
engage more carriers in understanding their compliance and
safety performance. It is a process that helps us and carriers
get at why a pattern of violations is occurring--not just what
is happening--but why it is happening.
And finally, the rule refers to the safety fitness
determination rule that we will be proposing early next year
that would replace today's compliance review, which is the only
way we have today of establishing an official safety rating.
The safety fitness rating proposal will incorporate the
analysis that is in the SMS today, again, and apply it in a
proposed rulemaking standard using certain threshold analyses.
CSA enables FMCSA and its State safety enforcement partners
to identify and address compliance and safety deficiencies of a
larger segment of carriers. The SMS system, which is, again,
the first component of the CSA program, has sufficient data to
assess nearly 200,000 companies out of the 525,000 active motor
carriers operating on our highways on an interstate basis
today. And even more importantly, those 200,000 carriers are
involved in 90 percent of all fatal crashes. It is the right
group to be looking at.
Since carrying out the first two components of CSA--that is
the system and the process--we have seen improvements in truck
and bus safety operations. A component of the program known as
warning letters, which have been sent to tens of thousands of
carriers who have first begun to first show signs of safety
problems, are a critical element of the program. It allows a
company to take action on their performance matters before any
sort of situation gets worse.
Preliminary crash estimates for 2011 show a 4-percent
reduction in fatalities in truck and bus crashes over 2010.
Also in 2011, as Congressman Cummings indicated, roadside
violation rates have decreased dramatically. Eight percent in
driver violation rates, and--8 percent for all carriers, 10
percent for driver violation rates. These are unprecedented
drops in violation patterns, something we haven't seen in a
decade.
Our agency initiated this program over 6 years ago through
demonstrating a commitment to listening to stakeholders and
building the improved process, to responding to that and being
very transparent in our analysis. Just last month we announced
modifications based on analysis and testing of recommendations
that came from all these various stakeholders: carriers,
drivers, the general highway public, brokers, law enforcement,
and other stakeholders of this program.
This is a program that we are driven and committed to
routinely seek feedback about, and routinely fine tune. But it
is a program that is working. It is a program that is here at
the right time, doing the right things, and elevating the
discussion about safety in commercial vehicle operations like
nothing anyone has seen before. And it is a program that
carries through on our commitment to be transparent and
responsive, all the while driving towards putting safety first
in CMV operations on our Nation's highways.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks, and I thank you
for the time.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much.
Mr. Owings.
Mr. Owings. Good morning, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member
DeFazio, and members of the subcommittee. I am Steve Owings, a
businessman who became concerned about truck safety through a
tragedy. So I am here as president and cofounder, with my wife,
Susan, of Road Safe America. I am speaking today on behalf of
RSA, the Truck Safety Coalition, Parents Against Tired
Truckers, and Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways. We all
work together on behalf of the tens of thousands of people who
have become victims of preventable truck crashes each year, and
are committed to improving truck safety and making America's
roads safer. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before
you today on FMCSA's Compliance, Safety, Accountability, or
CSA, program.
The CSA program is a significant improvement over the
previous SAFESTAT program, and is enabling the FMCSA to make
more efficient and effective use of its very limited resources.
It has been credited as inspiring ``the start of a cultural
change in the industry by forcing carriers to focus on the
details of safety management.''
As changes continue to be made to improve the CSA program,
it is essential that the program continues to be efficient,
cost effective, and fair. My testimony will comment on changes
being considered to the Crash BASIC, and the need to preserve
public access to CSA information.
My family's introduction to our Nation's truck safety
challenges began on December 1, 2002, the Sunday after
Thanksgiving that year, when our sons, Cullum and Pierce, were
hit from behind while stopped in holiday congestion by a
tractor trailer truck that was speeding 8 miles per hour over
the posted speed limit using cruise control. That evening,
Susan and I were waiting to get the call that the boys were
safely back at school. But instead, got the call from Pierce,
in an ambulance, telling us that his big brother and hero had
just died in his arms.
That night Pierce was too upset to speak with the State
trooper in charge of the scene, so the trooper spoke only to
the truck driver. The truck driver lied about the circumstances
leading to the crash, and the trooper took the driver's word,
of course. And that is the version of the crash reflected on
the police accident report, or PAR. Since Pierce miraculously
survived, thank God, the truth was quickly discovered. However,
in order to prove Pierce's account of the crash, Susan and I
had to hire a private investigator to find other eye witnesses,
all of whom verified our son's version. If we had been limited
to the PAR, the truth would not have been discovered or proven.
Now, the FMCSA is considering changes to the way the CSA
Crash BASIC treats crash data. Currently, all crashes are
counted in the crash data because truck crashes, in and of
themselves, and regardless of fault, are very effective
predictors of future crashes. Studies confirm this, noting that
a past truck crash increased the likelihood of a future truck
crash by 87 percent.
The change being considered would classify crashes as
preventable or nonpreventable, based solely on the PAR. Crashes
deemed nonpreventable would then be removed from the carrier's
Crash BASIC score. Not only are these changes completely
unnecessary to predicting crash risk, they have the potential
to corrupt existing crash data. Furthermore, it is disingenuous
to say that the current system is unfair and that some trucking
companies are being blamed for crashes that they did not cause.
Fault is not and never has been a part of this process, a
process intended to predict future crash risk, enabling FMCSA
to intervene and prevent another crash from ever happening.
It is also a critical mistake to consider classifying
crashes based solely on the PAR. PARs do not even include
information on crash preventability. My own family's crash is
just one of many examples of how PARs may lack complete and
accurate information. A recent Illinois DOT study found that
more than 70 percent of crash reports filled out by Chicago
police were missing data, and 30 percent had errors.
Now, our police officers do a tremendous job at the scene
of crashes. But they are limited in their ability to
investigate beyond the BASIC information. Should FMCSA pursue
changes to classify crash data as default in spite of all these
issues, cost and inefficiency would quickly overwhelm them. The
FMCSA simply does not have the resources to develop and
maintain a reliable system to do this. My written testimony
explains this in more detail.
Finally, continued public access to CSA program information
and improvements is essential to maintaining a fair,
transparent process. This information is disseminated by public
agencies, relates to crashes that occur on public roads, is
paid for by taxpayer dollars, and ultimately affects public
health and safety. Public access has already resulted--and
perhaps CSA's greatest influence. The trucking industry and its
safety record have the highest public visibility ever.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning, and
thank you for your part in passing the truck safety
improvements included in MAP-21, the best legislation for truck
safety in the past 30 years.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much.
Mr. Palmer.
Mr. Palmer. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Rahall, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for holding this
important hearing, and for inviting me to testify. I am
Assistant Chief David Palmer of the Texas Department of Public
Safety, and the president of the Commercial Vehicle Safety
Alliance.
The Alliance represents State, provincial, and local
agencies tasked with enforcing motor carrier safety and
hazardous material regulations. At the outset I think it is
important to say, from the enforcement community's perspective,
that CSA program is working much more effectively than the
previous approach. Overall, inspectors and investigators are
pleased with their experience and, most importantly, the
results.
Quite frankly, CSA has brought commercial vehicle safety to
the forefront of industry and enforcement like no other program
in my time before it. And I would like to commend Administrator
Ferro and her team at FMCSA for their transparent and
collaborative approach.
CSA is meeting its goals of improved targeting of high-risk
operators and increased contact with carriers, which ultimately
allows enforcement to leverage its limited resources. The
improvement is partly due to the new intervention process,
which is comprised of a suite of tools giving enforcement
increased flexibility to focus specifically on carrier
compliance issues, as well as behaviors that are factors in
crashes, making their contacts with carriers and drivers more
effective.
However, we have a few recommendations for improvement.
First, CVSA members see a need for additional training and
outreach, both for enforcement and industry. It is critical
that those using CSA and those being evaluated fully understand
how the system functions. Otherwise, it won't matter whether or
not CSA works. If people cannot understand and implement it
effectively or appropriately, it cannot realize its fully
potential.
In Texas, since the CSA launch, we have seen a dramatic
increase in phone calls, emails, and questions, as well as
requests for our troopers to visit safety meetings to talk
about CSA and regulatory compliance. Carriers want to learn
more about what CSA means, what the scores indicate, and how to
improve them. As a result, we are doing more outreach than ever
before. And that is a good thing. It means people are focusing
more closely on regulatory compliance and safety, which can
only benefit industry and the general public.
All this additional outreach, however, draws on already
strained resources. As FMCSA continues to implement CSA, States
need the resources to meet the increasing demand for
information, not just externally with the regulated community,
but internally, as well, so their enforcement personnel have
the most current and complete information.
We encourage you to work with your colleagues in Congress
and with FMCSA to ensure that the agency has enough funding to
create and maintain comprehensive training and outreach
programs for inspectors, investigators, drivers, and carriers.
Second, data is the foundation of CSA. And for it to
function effectively, that data must be accurate, timely, and
complete. Compliance and safety performance data is used to
determine where the enforcement community should focus its
limited resources. While it is important to note that overall
commercial vehicle data quality has improved significantly
since 2004, it is imperative that the data entering the system
be as accurate as possible.
Our third recommendation deals with the DataQ system, which
is the process by which the carrier can challenge a violation
they believe is inaccurate. One issue with the DataQ process is
the lack of uniformity from State to State in how challenges
are reviewed. FMCSA has provided some guidance, but the final
process is left up to each State. We believe that feedback from
FMCSA on how the DataQ program is working from a national
perspective, along with information on best practices, should
provide for a more uniform and equitable system.
States are also seeing a high number of incomplete or
inappropriate DataQ submissions. FMCSA should provide carriers
and drivers with comprehensive, ongoing education about DataQs,
focusing on when a challenge is appropriate, and what
information should be included.
Third, as CSA is evaluated and improved, it is critical to
make sure that regulatory compliance remains a cornerstone of
the program. The focus of CSA is to reduce crashes and save
lives. And therefore, behaviors that can be linked to crash
risks must take precedence. However, CVSA members strongly
believe that regulatory compliance is also a critical factor.
Those in industry who choose to ignore regulations, or perhaps
are not in compliance because they do not understand them, pose
a risk to highway safety, and CSA must continue to monitor and
factor in motor carriers' level of regulatory compliance.
Finally, I would like to mention the issue of crash
accountability. Currently, CSA incorporates all crashes that a
motor carrier is involved in, regardless of fault. In order to
ensure that the scores are most closely tied to high-risk and
unsafe operators, CVSA believes it is critical for FMCSA to
address the crash accountability issue as quickly and
comprehensively as possible.
Again, thank you for holding this hearing and for inviting
me to participate, and I am very happy to answer questions.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much.
Mr. Mugno.
Mr. Mugno. Good morning, Chairman Duncan, members of the
subcommittee. I am Scott Mugno, vice president of safety at
FedEx Ground Package System of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Though
I am testifying today on behalf of the American Trucking
Associations, I would like to note that FedEx Ground currently
holds the highest DOT safety rating a company can achieve and
maintains an exceptionally favorable crash history.
However, despite FedEx Ground's high safety rating,
favorable crash history, and longstanding commitment to safety,
our CSA score in the driver fitness category is above FMCSA's
set threshold. Many ATA member carriers with excellent safety
records and low crash rates, like FedEx Ground, find themselves
singled out due to high CSA scores that erroneously reflect
unsafe performance. FMCSA's own analysis confirms that scores
in certain CSA measurement categories, including the driver
fitness category, do not reliably identify those carriers that
are more likely to have future crashes.
ATA has been supportive of the objective of CSA, to reduce
commercial motor vehicle crashes, injuries, and fatalities,
since the program's inception. However, ATA has significant
concerns with the program in its current form. ATA is
frustrated by Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's
unwillingness to acknowledge the program's weaknesses and
correct them.
Since the release of FMCSA's analysis, a growing number of
researchers and credible organizations, including analysts from
Wells Fargo and a researcher from the University of Maryland,
have cast further doubt on the relationship between carriers'
CSA scores and crash risk. These analyses have led ATA to
believe the system creates flawed carrier safety measurement
scores that undermine the efficient use of Federal resources to
identify and impact unsafe carriers and drive third parties to
make improper safety-related business decisions.
The limitations that impact CSA fall into two distinct
categories: one, problems with the underlying data that feed
the system; and two, problems with the system's methodology
used to assign scores.
The principal data weakness is the lack of information upon
which to measure carrier safety performance. FMCSA only has
adequate data to score 40 percent of active motor carriers in
at least one of the measurement categories, but does not report
how few carriers are scored in all or even most categories.
CSA scores are also impacted by a number of methodology
problems. Perhaps the single biggest problem is that CSA
measures motor carriers on all crashes they are involved in,
regardless of fault. In other words, a carrier that is rear
ended while stopped at a red light is perceived as being just
as unsafe as one that rear ends another motorist. FMCSA should
direct its limited resources where they would be most effective
in preventing future crashes by focusing on unsafe carriers
that are causing them. Doing so would help better meet the
objective of CSA, which is to reduce crashes, injuries, and
fatalities.
ATA has become increasingly concerned with CSA's serious
flaws like this one, and by FMCSA's unwillingness to
acknowledge and fix them. Rather than acknowledging that scores
often don't relate to crash risk, the agency points to the
importance of highlighting compliance with regulations, even
those that do not have a statistical relationship to safety.
There is no doubt that FMCSA's intent in designing the CSA
system was to identify carriers that are less safe.
The current program does not meet that intent. ATA
questions the merits of assigning a higher priority to carriers
with compliance issues than those that are actually less safe.
Since the intent of the system is to prioritize carriers for
Government oversight, less safe carriers should be assigned
higher scores than safe carriers that have paperwork-related
violations that are not safety-related.
While ATA takes issue with certain specific elements of
CSA, there is an overarching theme: CSA scores must reflect
future crash risk. If they did, ATA would support the system,
since it would provide a means for responsible fleets to
distinguish themselves from those that do not share their
commitment to safety, to properly leverage third parties to
drive carriers to invest in safety, and to make better use of
Federal enforcement resources.
To achieve these benefits, FMCSA must take three very
specific steps. First, FMCSA must acknowledge that CSA scores
are often not a reliable predictor of future crash risk.
Second, the agency must confirm that CSA's highest priority
should be to focus on the least safe carriers. And finally,
FMCSA must establish a specific plan to develop and implement
the changes necessary to ensure that the system functions as
intended.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the invitation. Thank you for
the time today.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much. We have now been joined by
the ranking member, Mr. DeFazio. I earlier announced we would
stop and allow him to give an opening statement, if he wished,
but he wants to proceed with the panel.
But we also have been joined by several other Members: Mr.
Walz, Mrs. Capito, and Mr. Coble. So, we will go ahead with the
panel at this time, and Mrs. McBride.
And I earlier said you were here for the American Trucking
Association. Mr. Mugno is here for the trucking association.
You are here testifying on behalf of the Alliance for Safe,
Efficient and Competitive Truck Transportation. Thank you very
much.
Mrs. McBride. Good morning, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member
DeFazio, Congressman Rahall, and members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to speak on behalf of ASECTT, the
Alliance for Safe, Efficient and Competitive Truck
Transportation.
ASECTT is a coalition of more than 600 carriers, brokers,
shippers, and others concerned about the effect of compliance,
safety, and accountability program is having on the trucking
industry. We believe FMCSA must afford regulated carriers due
process, and the shipping public needs certainty that certified
carriers can be chosen based upon routes, rates, and service
alone, without vicarious liability concerns.
Colonial is a private, family-owned business based in
Knoxville, Tennessee. My father-in-law, C.E. McBride, founded
Colonial in 1943. We currently run between 250 and 280 power
units, primarily owner-operators, in 48 States. Many of our
contractors have been with us for more than a decade. Some more
than 30 years. Many of them have logged over 1 million miles
without a single chargeable accident. Some over 3 million
miles. Colonial is self-insured, and has been for more than 25
years. We were one of the first motor carriers in the industry
to become self-insured. Colonial has an excellent safety
record.
Current regulations require a carrier, after accounting for
nonpreventable accidents, to have fewer than 1.5 accidents per
million miles driven in order to keep a satisfactory rating.
Colonial travels about 40 million miles per year. Our reported
crash ratio, including nonpreventable accidents, is 0.4 per
million miles, less than 28 percent of the regulatory limit.
When nonpreventability is considered, our accident ratio drops
to 0.2 per million. Based on Colonial's experience, I am
convinced the CSA program, one, doesn't accurately measure
carrier safety performance and, two, its progressive
intervention goals aren't being realized.
The FMCSA says its goal is to reduce crashes, injuries, and
fatalities. We agree. However, CSA's methodology is flawed.
Also, the data used to label motor carriers includes factors
having absolutely nothing to do with actual safety risk.
Among CSA's numerous systemic flaws, the one that affects
us the most is the so-called fatigued driving BASIC. Colonial's
percentile ranking in this BASIC hovers around 80 percent, 15
percentage points above the agency's artificial threshold. This
high percentile ranking has nothing to do with fatigue. CSA
groups carriers who use paper logs with local carriers and
others exempt from that requirement. Over half of the points
that feed the percentile ranking in the fatigued driving BASIC
come from paperwork violations. These violations have no actual
effect on fatigue, much less crash risk.
Notwithstanding the agency's sole obligation to certify
carriers as safe to use, and our satisfactory safety rating,
published CSA rankings mislead some shippers into believing
that carriers like Colonial are unsafe. Some feel they cannot
rely on the agency's safety fitness determination to trump
negligent selection lawsuits. Our firsthand knowledge of how
the CSA program actually works differs from the progressive
monitoring the agency purports.
When the CSA program was launched in December of 2010,
FMCSA told the industry the intervention process would occur in
steps. First, a warning letter would notify a motor carrier of
any identified deficiency in a particular BASIC. The motor
carrier would then have an opportunity to address the
deficiency prior to an on-site audit. This is not what happened
with Colonial. The FMCSA Nashville field office called on
Thursday afternoon, August 11, 2011, saying they would be in
our office on Monday morning, August 15th, to begin a focused
audit. There was no warning letter or opportunity to address
the concern.
The first week, the investigator spent 4 days in our
corporate office requesting multiple documents on 19 drivers.
On August 29th, the investigator returned with a second
investigator. They remained at Colonial until the audit was
completed on September 2nd. The final report dated September
26, 2011, left Colonial's satisfactory rating unchanged. And
the report was labeled, ``This review is not rated.'' To
justify its methodology, the agency has said that focused
audits are less time consuming than compliance reviews, which
result in safety ratings and require an average of 3 to 4 days.
Well, the agency spent 9 work days auditing Colonial. However,
we are still branded as a high-risk carrier in the fatigued
driving BASIC. We are losing opportunities to transport
shipments because some shippers are frightened by agency
pronouncements implying that they can be sued if they don't
self-credential each carrier using SMS rankings.
Had Colonial received a conditional or unsatisfactory
rating, our 25-year self-insurance program would have been in
jeopardy. We would likely have been faced with closing our
doors after almost 70 years of running one of the safest
companies in the industry. Yet we are thankful this didn't
happen. Yet we hear this has happened at countless other
trucking companies throughout the country. We have firsthand
experience of CSA's anticompetitive effects. We ask Congress to
stop FMCSA from publishing the misleading SMS scores, and
urging shippers and brokers to rely on them.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for inviting me today. I am
happy to answer questions.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much, Mrs. McBride.
Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member
DeFazio, and members of the Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee, thank you for the invitation and the opportunity to
testify at today's oversight hearing. My name is Bruce Johnson,
I am the director of carrier services for C.H. Robinson and a
member of the TIA board of directors. My remarks today are
geared towards the significant impact the CSA initiative is
having on the carrier eligibility process that freight brokers
and shippers conduct to ensure the hiring of safe, legally
registered, and properly insured motor carriers.
As one of the Nation's largest freight transportation
brokerages, C.H. Robinson has seen the risk of negligent hiring
lawsuits based on carrier selection grow significantly since
2004. I am here to communicate to you the tremendous confusion
exists in the industry about the risks of carrier eligibility
and selection, and what the BASIC data and safety ratings mean
for those hiring motor carriers. This confusion has added cost
to the brokers and the industry. In addition, it has added
legal risk to any entity that hires a motor carrier.
While the BASIC data is used as a compass to guide
enforcement actions by FMCSA, safety rating is widely seen as
the safety seal of approval for those who hire trucks.
Currently, the BASIC data is not directly linked to the safety
rating, and the agency is waiting for a rulemaking to draw
clear lines and correlations between the two.
When FMCSA implemented the BASICs in December 2010, many in
the industry anticipated that a rulemaking linking BASIC data
directly to the safety rating would occur quickly. What was
supposed to be temporary, however, continues to be delayed by
the agency, and every day that goes by without a fair and
accurate safety fitness determination, the transportation
industry will continue to be negatively impacted.
We encourage FMCSA to be clear and consistent with shippers
and brokers on which carriers and which information should be
used to select motor carriers to haul Freight. What the
industry needs is a bright line differentiation of which
carriers are unsafe.
Since 2004, a series of court cases have established a new
interpretation of responsibility for shippers and brokers known
as the Duty of Reasonable Care. Subsequent court cases expanded
and redefined the responsibilities of parties engaging
independent contractors, and settlement and/or jury awards have
grown substantially. In almost every case, the motor carrier's
public liability insurance is exhausted, the carrier has filed
bankruptcy, and brokers or shippers are sought to fill the loss
and make the injured person or family whole.
A common theme used by plaintiffs' lawyers is--in most
negligent hire cases--is that brokers and shippers should
second-guess the FMCSA's decision of which carriers are safe to
operate by examining the detailed safety record of each carrier
before use. This second-guessing scenario is why the
conflicting interpretations of BASIC data and safety rating are
of such great importance to freight brokers.
Until FMCSA provides firm guidance on what BASIC thresholds
constitute a safe carrier, differing opinions will proliferate,
and the courts will arbitrate those opinions. There can be no
question that the brokerage industry seeks to promote higher
safety standards for our Nation's highways. That being said,
the brokerage industry is displeased with the current state of
affairs, with the courts holding brokers and shippers to an
ever-changing standard in carrier selection.
Congress and the FMCSA can reset this standard to one that
is more reasonable and static. It should not be the
responsibility of industry stakeholders without having access
to all of the information to determine which carriers are safe
to operate on American highways. It should be the sole
responsibility of the agency charged with issuing licenses to
carriers and making sure those carriers adhere to safety
standards established by the agency to tell the public which
carriers are safe to use and which carriers are not.
The only way to accomplish this task is for the FMCSA to
complete the new safety fitness determination rulemaking and
fully link the BASIC data to the safety rating. However, we do
not want the FMCSA to develop a safety fitness determination
prior to addressing industry concerns regarding the methodology
used to evaluate carriers' BASIC scores and percentages.
Until this safety fitness determination rulemaking is
developed for public comment and ultimately developed into a
final rule, we would recommend the following.
One, that FMCSA should immediately add the current
compliance review-based safety rating to all screen shots that
display a carrier's BASIC data, so there is no confusion about
the two systems.
Two, that FMCSA should remove any language from its Web
site and outreach that encourages shippers, brokers, or the
public to use the BASIC data for their own purposes.
And, three, that Congress develops legislation that would
create a uniform standard against liability without fault by
preempting State vicarious liability laws imposing liability on
non-negligent transportation brokers and shippers.
In conclusion, we fully support FMCSA and its mission to
improve motor carrier safety on the Nation's roadways. TIA and
C.H. Robinson look forward to productively working with
industry participants, FMCSA, and Congress to ensure that FMCSA
publishes a safety fitness determination for all motor carriers
that is based on accurate and fair data, and that does not
discriminate based on carrier, size, or type. Thank you.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much.
Mr. Gentry.
Mr. Gentry. Good morning, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member
DeFazio, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for this
opportunity to testify on behalf of the members of the
American----
Mr. Coble. Mr. Chairman, I am still having difficulty----
Mr. Duncan. We are still having trouble hearing some of the
witnesses. I guess you will have to put that real close to you,
and maybe it will work better.
Mr. Gentry. Test.
Mr. Duncan. Real close. OK.
Mr. Gentry. All right. Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member
DeFazio, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to testify on behalf of the members of the American
Bus Association and the United Motorcoach Association. My name
is Bill Gentry, and I operate Gentry Trailways in Knoxville,
Tennessee. We have operated school bus service for Knox County
schools since 1953, and provide charter and tour service with
over-the-road motorcoaches. We take great pride in serving our
community safely and economically for nearly 60 years.
When CVSA launched, hopes were high that it would afford
new tools to better predict the likelihood of the commercial
motor vehicle crashes. Unfortunately, at this point, evidence
suggests that CSA may fall severely short of its intended
goals. We do not believe the current data fed into the CSA
program and the current prioritization scheme will result in a
significant reduction in crashes.
Studies indicate that vehicle defects are responsible for
less than 2 percent of commercial motor vehicle accidents,
while driver error is responsible for over 95 percent of the
commercial motor vehicle accidents. All of the highest
indicators of an increased propensity for an accident relate to
basic traffic law enforcement. The industry has urged the
enforcement community to issue citations when drivers violate
basic traffic laws, and insist that courts avoid reducing or
modifying the original charges.
Another issue with CSA is that it does not account for
carriers that terminate drivers for poor driving records, as
good companies do. CSA scores do not reflect the elimination of
the risk when that driver is dismissed. The carrier must endure
the punitive scores associated with this violation for 2 years.
Meanwhile, the dismissed driver simply finds another carrier
that is more tolerant for his traffic infractions. And there is
no effect on that carrier's score.
Perhaps CSA's most controversial subject is to issue--is
the issue of crashes. Simply stated, all crashes, regardless of
accountability, are the number one indicator that a commercial
motor vehicle company and/or driver will incur another crash.
However, the CSA system contains no information regarding the
severity or the accountability of a crash. Unfiltered, this
information cannot serve as credible consumer information upon
which a carrier selection can be made.
While we believe the crash data serves a critical role in
the predicting of carriers' propensity for an accident, the
information in its current form is inappropriate and--for
consumers, and should be restricted to enforcement in motor
carrier views only.
Congress recently passed legislation that would require
FMCSA to develop an easy-to-understand writing system for
consumers of passenger carrier services. We feel the
development of this system should be the highest priority by
FMCSA. CSA also fails to recognize the vast differences in the
level of State participation for inspection activity. We also
have a concern that FMCSA advising States that inspections can
occur at the weight stations, where there is not any safe
accommodations for the passengers.
The leadership at FMCSA has been responsive to our
recommendations on improving CSA, and we applaud their
leadership for willingness to listen to the industry. We have
two final recommendations for the--improving CSA.
First, we recommend that the GAO encourage the services--or
engage the services of the American Academy of Actuaries in an
effort to move--effectively explore the links between the most
significant causes of motor vehicle crashes and the CSA safety
measurement system.
Second, under CSA, carriers are inappropriately placed into
peer groups with carriers such as long-haul truckers. Passenger
carriers should be rated with other passenger carriers, oranges
to oranges, to more readily identify those that need the
interventions.
In conclusion, we believe that CSA is well-intended, but
has room for significant improvement. And we look forward to
working with the committee and FMCSA to achieve its intended
goals. On behalf of the members of the American Bus Association
and United Motorcoach Association, I appreciate this
opportunity to express our views, and am pleased to answer any
questions at this time.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much, Mr. Gentry. And thanks to
all the witnesses for their very helpful testimony. And since
he was not here to give an opening statement because he had to
be on the floor, I am going to turn now to Ranking Member
DeFazio for any statement or questions that he wishes to make
at this time.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is just a
little bit more than 2 years since, prior to implementation, we
held a hearing in this subcommittee regarding this new system.
And at that time we expressed a number of concerns that still
endure. The system was implemented before results of a study
and concerns about, in particular, the crash issue was raised
at that time, and they seem to still be outstanding.
I will probably have a couple of rounds of questions. But
first, I want to get to a couple of things.
Mr. Johnson, you raised the issues about TIA and wanting a
bright line. I am going to ask Ms. Ferro about that in a
moment. But I heard another concern which is that, you know,
basically, only about 40 percent of the carriers have some sort
of a rating. Sixty percent haven't had a violation or roadside
inspection or anything. And I have heard that some of your
members are reluctant to utilize people--those people, because
they are essentially unknown. I mean--we do know they haven't
had a violation, but we don't know much else about them. Is
that true?
Mr. Johnson. Yes, I believe that is true.
Mr. DeFazio. So 60 percent of the carriers out there are,
at this point, somewhat disadvantaged by this system because
they are not in the system because they haven't had a violation
or roadside inspection.
Mr. Johnson. Yes. I don't know the exact number or the
percentage, but I know there is a significant amount. And it is
the smaller carriers that aren't getting any inspection data.
So then it is left to the broker or the shipper around how much
fare they have, or tolerance for risk in what a court may do to
them if someone like that were to have an accident and they
would know that they had no data. So there is fear around using
those, for sure.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. Ms. Ferro, we talked about this the other
day, and I suggested some ideas about how we might get people
into the system in a benign way. And we sort of speculated--he
is saying it is a real problem. And this is 60 percent of the
industry. I mean how are we going to deal with this? I mean
this is--I mean there are many problems we need to discuss
today, but this is one that was new to me.
Ms. Ferro. Well, let me--let's talk real quickly about the
database of active carriers. We are all using the standard of a
525,000 active carriers in operation today. About 60 percent of
those are private carriers. So there is really--so, right off
the bat--now, what I don't have is the breakout on the 200,000.
But I do want to clarify that all 325,000 carriers that you
just identified as having insufficient data to actually be
analyzed within those BASICs, many of those, very many of
those, are private carriers. So they wouldn't be in competition
for some of the shipping services that Mr. Johnson is speaking
about. Because, again, they are moving their own products.
Now, that aside, when it comes to ensuring that as many
carriers as possible are touched in some way by an inspector or
an investigator to be sure we do have adequate data to monitor
their safety performance, we are taking a couple different
approaches. One you and I discussed: Is it feasible to allow
carriers to go through weigh stations in a cooperative way, as
we see happens periodically in Oregon, to get additional
inspections?
More importantly, the process that we have been working
with the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance on is ensuring that
when a carrier goes through a weigh station or is inspected at
roadside, and the inspector chooses to wave the carrier on
because everything looks good, to be sure that we are turning
that into an inspection, recorded inspection that is uploaded
into the system. Today, out of 3.5 million inspections that are
carried out each year, one-third are clean inspections. It is
very important that we touch all carriers that are operating on
our highways.
Keep in mind one last piece, as well. Of those carriers
that are not within the CSA analysis today, they haven't come
on our radar because they haven't had a crash, as well. So
there are a number of factors indicating that those carriers
may be doing very well. Many of them are private carriers. But
we also are increasing both the inspection strategies to ensure
we are touching everybody, and randomizing some of the
automated bypass systems to ensure those with no data are being
pulled in for an inspection.
Mr. DeFazio. And then the crash which was an issue 2 years
ago----
Ms. Ferro. Yes.
Mr. DeFazio [continuing]. And still is an issue today, we
also discussed that. And it is my understanding that the agency
is moving towards some sort of a crash weighting system
because--what I still find extraordinary about the data, and I
don't know whether the study--you know, what their sample had
and, you know, and whether they drilled down to at fault, not
at fault, or anything, they just said any kind of a crash is an
88 percent indicator of future problem.
I still find it hard to believe if, you know, one person or
one company had one incident where they were legally, properly,
you know, stopped, and someone crashed into them, by their
entire negligence, that that is an indicator that somehow that
person is going to be involved in a future crash. I mean I am
still having trouble with that, you know, the validity of that
conclusion from that study.
But my understanding, in part, you are going to deal with
that with crash weighting. Do you want to address that?
Ms. Ferro. I will. Thank you, thank you, Ranking Member
DeFazio.
We are all familiar with instances like you describe, where
there seems to be clear evidence that the crash was not
preventable on the part of the commercial vehicle operator. But
all of our analysis and the American Transportation Research
Institute analysis indicates that past crash experience is a
strong predictor of future crash risk.
We recognize some of the--that the aggregate number is--
includes data such as the example that you just described. And
so, in the first phase of this program, we have kept the crash
indicator, which, again, is an indicator for us of potential
crash risk, which we need to take into consideration. But we
have kept it available to enforcement in the motor carrier
community, or the individual motor carrier themselves, not
available to the public, again, just on the basis of fairness.
At the same time, we initiated a process to figure out how
we could determine whether a crash was or was not preventable,
what data could we use to use it, how valuable or valid or
uniform and consistent are police accident reports that would
provide the foundation of that inquiry, and then how do we set
up a process that looks at all 100,000-plus reportable crashes
in a fair way, so that we are not doing this on onesies and
twosies, and skewing the data outcome and the comparative
nature of this program, but actually doing it comprehensively.
So, we did a preliminary analysis of a police accident
record report, and how well it can be used to determine
preventability, and we are now analyzing the question of how to
set up a process that could manage all reportable crashes,
analyze preventability in a fair manner. And, at the end of
that process, does it, in fact, make CSA a sharper and more
focused tool in examining who we need to be looking at? Our
premise is that it could, and that it does, but we need to
prove it out.
So, we expect to have the results of this study by early
summer of next year, 2013. We have got the schedule for the
study and the basis and elements for the analysis on our Web
site, so it is available to everybody to look at. And, frankly,
we look forward to reporting out on the results of that
analysis and identifying what our next steps would be with
regard to crash weighting. The underlying premise is that a
nonpreventable crash would have a very low weighting, a
completely preventable crash would have the highest weighting.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. You said not available to the public. But
do brokers ask shippers to provide--or not shippers--ask the
carriers to provide that data sometimes?
Mr. Johnson. My company does not ask motor carriers for
that. But maybe some of the motor carriers could use their
experiences to see if they have been asked that before.
Mr. DeFazio. Yes, OK. Anybody--I mean since--I am just
wondering. Just because it doesn't appear on the screen or on
the rating system as exists, is it being utilized by some of
the shippers? Anybody have any experience with that?
Mrs. McBride. I did speak with someone----
Mr. DeFazio. Mrs. McBride, we are still--try the other one,
there.
Mrs. McBride. Is this one on?
Mr. DeFazio. Be personal with the microphone.
Mrs. McBride. OK. I apologize.
Mr. DeFazio. Yes.
Mrs. McBride. I spoke with a carrier last week in my area
who did tell me that he had been refused freight because the
broker asked for a copy of his crash history.
Mr. DeFazio. OK.
Mr. Mugno. Yes. I can confirm that ATA members have been
asked that question by brokers on occasion, without a doubt.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. And that is--but that is just now the raw
data, where we can't attribute fault or no fault.
Mr. Mugno. Correct.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. All right. Thank you. I will have another
round of questions.
Mr. Duncan. All right, thank you very much, Mr. DeFazio. We
will go first on our side to Mr. Coble.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good hearing, good
panel. You put together a good----
Mr. Duncan. Thank you.
Mr. Coble [continuing]. [Inaudible] today. Ms. Ferro, I am
told that there is no impartial appeals process for DataQs
challenges. And, if so, that is different from any other
administrative penalty system within the Government, where
motorists could be hit with a violation, to have the ability to
appeal that to an administrative law judge. Why does not the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration have such a process
in place?
Ms. Ferro. Let me just put it in the context of the
population of violations we are talking about. So I mentioned
earlier that, through our State law enforcement partners and
our commercial vehicle safety grant program, 3\1/2\ million
commercial vehicle inspections are carried out each year. The
number of appeals, as you described, which we call DataQs,
number 34,000.
Mr. Coble. And you call them what?
Ms. Ferro. They are called a data query.
Mr. Coble. OK.
Ms. Ferro. In effect, an appeal of a violation----
Mr. Coble. Got you.
Ms. Ferro [continuing]. Or of an inspection. So it is just
1 percent of the total body of inspections that are carried out
each year. And that is under the new CSA program. This is not
counting prior to CSA, when very few data queries were made.
So, out of those 34,000 queries, there--we have established
guidelines. We were very sensitive to the concern that you
raised, because these are the result of a sort of a record of
inspection of a carrier, they are not taking away a right of
any kind. And so they are not in that adjudication process that
you described on an appeals--sort of an administrative
adjudication appeals process.
But we did set up a DataQs process whereby, when a carrier
requests a specific inspection be reviewed, the carrier appeals
either the data in that inspection or the validity of the
inspection results. It is put through the DataQ process very
quickly, reassigned to the State where the inspection was
carried out, and the State commercial vehicle enforcement team
reviews the inquiry and determines what action needs to be
taken, whether to grant it, to correct data, if in fact it was
a violation applied to the wrong carrier, or actually remove
the violation because of the information and the substance that
the carrier reported.
Out of the 34,000 data queries that occurred in 2011,
roughly half were actually acted upon. Either data was updated
and corrected or removed. But it--so, in fact, what we have
provided is a clear set of guidelines for States to follow, to
take into account all information the carrier presents, and be
both respectful of the process, respectful of the inspector's
work, and give it a fair analysis and make a determination.
Mr. Coble. I thank you. I thank you for your response.
Mr. Johnson, as a business owner who is obviously concerned
about safety, what information could the FMCSA provide that
would help you to make good decisions, decisions good for
safety, good for your customers, good for the economy in
general?
Mr. Johnson. What we really need, we just need a clear
picture of who is not safe. If FMCSA was able to tell us who is
not safe, our industry would not use those motor carriers, and
they would fail at that point. But by having very much--many
gray areas--and if you ask FMCSA to tell you who is a safe
carrier and who is not, they can't really tell you that today,
based on their own data. And also, much of the data is not made
public.
So, just clear up the confusion. Give us a clear
distinction of who is unsafe. And our industry will stop using
those carriers.
Mr. Coble. I thank you, sir. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much, Mr. Coble. And I will save
all my questions until everybody else has a chance. But I did
want to clear up one thing when you responded to Mr. Coble.
Does the--when it--something is appealed, does it go back to
the same officer who issued the violation?
Ms. Ferro. It generally goes to that officer's commander,
and whatever team or individual the commander has established
to analyze those data queries. And that individual generally
does ask the officer their perspective. That is absolutely
correct.
And we will say we use this process as an improvement
process, because there are times--as I said, about half--are
acted upon. The other half are preserved, as they----
Mr. Duncan. So my staff was wrong when they said it goes
back to--the appeal goes back to the same person who issued the
violation.
Ms. Ferro. No, your staff is right to the extent that,
invariably, the team or the individual officer assigned to
handle the data inquiry in the State does ask the officer----
Mr. Duncan. But that officer doesn't decide the--make the
decision. It goes to--the commander makes the decision, or
somebody--is that correct?
Ms. Ferro. If I may suggest that Chief Palmer address that
for the specific operation in Texas--in our--in many cases that
we see, it goes back to the person responsible for managing the
DataQ process, which may be the commander, it may be a staff
support person. But not the officers, per se, not the
individual officer.
Mr. Palmer. Mr. Chairman, it--in some cases it--in Texas,
for example, which is, I think, fairly consistent across the
enforcement community, as a general rule in Texas, when we get
that DataQ from a motor carrier, then what we do is we put it
together and we send that, all the information, the supporting
documents, to the--in our case, the captain of that particular
district in the State. And then it is that captain's
responsibility to look into that DataQ and then make a decision
as to what to do. They do speak with the original officer, in
case there is additional information that is not included on
the inspection report, or, especially in the cases of a crash
report, which can be very complex, then they do speak with
them. But the final decision rests with that officer's
immediate supervisor.
Mr. Duncan. All right, all right. We will go next to
Ranking Member Rahall.
Mr. Rahall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I have a
statement from Mr. Todd Spencer, the executive vice president,
the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, and I ask
unanimous consent it be made part of the record.
[No response.]
Mr. Duncan. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Rahall. Then, quoting from that testimony, I have a
question for Administrator Ferro. According to Mr. Spencer's
testimony--and I quote--``Small carriers are less likely to be
inspected as often as a carrier who has hundreds, if not
thousands, of trucks, so it is difficult for them to show a
score, much less the positive scores demanded by shippers and
brokers.''
And this question follows up on concerns raised earlier by
Mr. DeFazio, and that is it almost seems like one must commit a
crime and then receive a full pardon just to get into the
system. Your thoughts on that?
Ms. Ferro. My immediate response would be that is not the
case, that is not correct. Let me again walk through the
numbers.
Out of the 525,000 active carriers, 85 percent are 5 trucks
or fewer. We have such a significant impact on small business,
we are very sensitive to it. That is about 425,000 to 450,000
carriers out of the 525,000. Those numbers are well represented
within the 200,000 carriers on whom we have data, because there
is only 75,000 others with 6 or more trucks in that mix, and
actually, a far fewer number of really large carriers.
The reason large carriers have a high number of inspections
is they generally are operating far more equipment and have a
higher exposure rate on our highways. We do work very hard to
ensure that we are also inspecting--law enforcement across the
country works on inspecting all vehicles that identify a risk
to them that come their way, for one reason or another, either
there is a weight issue or they have pulled it in through some
of the randomized systems that we have identified through the
inspection selection process.
So, while--do all small or owner-operators--have all of
them had an inspection? Maybe not in the past 2 years. Probably
yes, some time in the past several years, if they are
operating. But this system works off of 2 years of data.
Mr. Rahall. OK. Let me ask you another question, another
concern expressed by OOIDA. They have expressed concerns over
alleged--how alleged violations are handled under CSA. A
citation issued at roadside is reflected in CSA, even though it
may be challenged and overturned in court. How does CSA handle
these type of situations?
Ms. Ferro. In our guidance to the States on the DataQ
process, we identify the matter of a State charge along with a
violation and the State charge being dropped, and to again
recommend to the commanding officer or the DataQ contact in
that State that they take into account whatever information the
individual driver or company owner presented to the court that
resulted in the decision of dismissing the particular case, and
to use their best judgment in making their final decision. We
do not today direct States to drop a violation if, in fact, a
State charge was dropped.
This is a matter that continues to be of real importance to
the carrier community and the enforcement community. And one of
the ways we have ensured that we are going to have an ongoing
forum to have these kinds of discussions and address these kind
of issues is we created a CSA subcommittee within the Motor
Carrier Safety Advisory Committee, just created last month when
the Motor Carrier Safety Advisory Committee met. And I feel
fairly certain that the CSA subcommittee is going to have
this--actually, I know that it is already on their list of
issues that they want to discuss, this matter of how do you
handle a violation in the DataQ process if the State conviction
has been dropped, or the State charge. So that one I think will
continue to get some attention, and probably some additional
recommendations.
Mr. Rahall. Any other member of the panel wish to comment
on either question?
[No response.]
Mr. Rahall. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much. We are always honored to
have a former chairman of the full committee. And, Mr. Young, I
don't know whether you want a few minutes to catch your breath,
or do you have something you wish to say at this point, or--you
just got here, so----
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, I never have to catch my breath.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, first let me say I appreciate
having this hearing, because--and for the chairman, Ms. Ferro,
and the rest of you at this table, the reason we have these
hearings--we are beginning to get complaints. And my biggest
concern, Mr. Chairman, is I have watched over the years
agencies that lose contact with what they are trying to do
through--I call it gobbledygook. I love that word,
gobbledygook.
Bureaucrats that have a paycheck which really don't
understand why they get it, but they are doing it because they
can, and that disturbs me. And I just--that is my comment.
Now, questions. And, by the way, Mr. Chairman, I do believe
I will ask you respectfully to have an audit of the CSA and see
where they arrived at the decisions they have arisen at. You
know, the formula--let me give you an example. The formula they
used in CSA was written by the FMCSA. And is that correct, that
is what was--that is the formula, right?
Ms. Ferro. The analysis----
Mr. Young. I can't hear you, by the way.
Ms. Ferro. Pardon me. Yes.
Mr. Young. Oh, it was written--so that means the chicken
was telling the fox what they are supposed to do. Or vice
versa. It is my understanding that these formulas mean that
scores were reduced based on time passed since the violation,
the number of clean inspections since that violation. Is that
correct?
Ms. Ferro. Could you repeat that question? I am not
understanding----
Mr. Young. It was the--it is my understanding that the
formula means that scores are reduced based on time passed
since the violation and a number of clean inspections since the
violation was--the violation. Is that correct?
Ms. Ferro. Well, let me clarify. This is not a scoring
system. It is a set of algorithms and analysis that was
developed with the assistance of the Volpe Transportation
Center and with input from all of these stakeholders here over
the course of 6 years.
Mr. Young. Was their input listened to?
Ms. Ferro. Absolutely.
Mr. Young. Oh, absolutely.
Ms. Ferro. Absolutely.
Mr. Young. There may be difference of opinion on that. So,
let's say a large carrier has hundreds of trucks, and we will
see their score go down faster than a small carrier with one or
two trucks. Simply by nature, they are going to see more
inspections. Is that correct?
Ms. Ferro. That is not correct. Again, the system uses
clean inspections, as well as inspections with violations over
the course of a 2-year period.
Mr. Young. So you think your formula is good?
Ms. Ferro. We have a very sound system. Is it perfect? No,
and I----
Mr. Young. Then why are we having this hearing if it is so
sound? Someone doesn't think it is sound. Mr. Chairman, is that
correct?
Mr. Duncan. There is a lot I can say about that, Mr.
Chairman--I mean we have been getting a lot of complaints
around the Nation. And I was going to get into this later, but
you----
Mr. Young. Well, that is what I am saying. Madam Chairman--
and just cool it for a while, OK? I am not hostile yet. I can
get hostile. I guarantee you that. But I am--as I mentioned in
my opening statement, there are complaints. I have complaints.
And there is a reason those complaints are coming forth.
Now, you may not be hearing it. It may be just from your
staff alone. That is why I do think, Mr. Chairman, if you don't
do it, I will ask for a GAO report, just to make sure that
there is some understanding where we are going in this program.
I think that, you know, this is supposed to be a working
program, work together. And I have always been one to try to
make sure you understand just because you get a paycheck, that
you have a responsibility to those you are serving, to make
sure it works correctly, not because you have an illusion on
how it should work. You have to listen to those that you serve
on the bureaucratic system.
That is wrong with our Government today, Mr. Chairman. We
are not being run by a legislative process. We are being run by
bureaucrats. The President. Not just this President, all
Presidents. And it is our responsibility to review, find out if
there is a problem. And if there is a problem, you will fix it.
If you don't, we will. That is very simple.
Mr. Chairman, I have no other questions at this time. I may
have some later on.
Mr. Duncan. All right. Thank you very much. Mr. Holden.
Mr. Holden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Administrator Ferro,
in addition to the CSA program, your agency administers the
HMSP program, which covers less than a half percent of the
estimated 525,000 active carriers on the agency's roll. And
this program operates as a fitness determination standard for
this universe of motor carriers.
Congress included provisions in MAP-21 to prompt rulemaking
addressing flaws in the CSA program. It is my understanding
that your agency has stated that the HMSP rulemaking must wait
publication of the CSA safety fitness determination final rule.
I believe that lessons learned from the hazmat safety
program would be helpful to your goal to transition CSA into
the agency safety fitness determination standard. Would it not
be a better course of action to perfect the hazmat safety
program with its smaller client base first, then use that to--
template to anticipate the larger CSA population?
Ms. Ferro. It very well could, just as you describe,
because again, the hazardous material operators in many ways
already demonstrate, by virtue of their obligations and their
cargo, a high degree of safety in operations.
There is a challenge within our rules themselves that sets
the safety fitness determination as driven by, today, a
compliance review. That element of the rules that we operate
under needs to be changed first, before we can incorporate
these performance elements in the CSA program into a safety
fitness rating. But we will go back and again examine if there
is a way that we can carve out a smaller piece. In the meantime
we are pressing forward. We understand the importance of
putting a safety fitness determination rule on the street, and
we are very eager to have a proposed rule published early next
year. But we will absolutely go back and examine the approach
that you described.
Mr. Holden. OK. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you. Mr. Boswell?
Mr. Boswell. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and for having
this hearing.
I guess I would first like to start off with a compliment.
It is a good panel, good discussion. The time is right we need
to be doing this. And I thank all of you for participating. I
think you came with a desire to participate and appreciate
that. The criticism is I would like to see somebody on the
panel in the future from the--as Mr. Rahall just made a comment
about the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association. If
they represent 90 percent of the carriers out there, those 1,
2, 3-truck owners, I would like to have one on the panel. And I
would just like to leave that for your consideration.
I took some interest in the comments made by some of the
panel--well, all of you, in fact--but some of the comments made
by Mr. Mugno about the small trucking firms. I thought a very
good point was made by Mr. Rahall. In order for that individual
trucker to receive a score, he must first receive a violation.
And in order to receive a violation, you must be inspected. And
to--a bad score, obtaining as many clean scores as possible is
the objective. Small carriers are off the radar, and those who
have negative scores have little opportunity to cure. I think
it points out a problem. And we ought to really try to do
something about it. And I trust that is what we will try to do.
So I am going to encourage we do that.
I think it has been brought out--it would be redundant for
me to repeat what Mr. DeFazio said, and Mr. Rahall, or others.
And we see a need. And I ask that, one, we put members of the
Owner-Operators on panels in the future, if we possibly can. I
wouldn't know why not. I would like to be able to ask him or
her that is out there trying to make a living and do something
you like to do and something I used to do a little bit. And I
have a lot of small operators, one or two rigs, in my district
that haul grain and farm supplies and all those things that go
with it. And I would like to include them in the process more.
I appreciate the fact that, Mr. Mugno, that you kind of
referred to those folks, and thank you for doing that.
Appreciate it, Mr. Johnson and others. And they are very part
of our economy and we need to take them into mind.
So, with that, I will just yield back and anticipate what
we can do to, as you said, Ms. Ferro, make it better. That is
what we are all about. I don't know why we didn't have
opportunities when we went through the process to have a little
more time, but I think we are doing the right thing. But we got
to do it right, and I think we have opportunity to do it
better. And I will encourage that. I yield back.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much. Mr. Walz?
Mr. Walz. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, I want
to thank all of you for being here. It is obvious that
everybody here's goal is the same of working toward zero deaths
and safety amongst all, and making sure our operators are able
to do what they need to do to create those jobs that are so
important. So I am very grateful for that.
I spent August at several carriers, got out in preparation
to talk about this issue, went out and talked to our folks. I
represent a rural agricultural district. This time of year it
gets pretty busy on our roads. Lots of things moving. And
people are very cognizant of this. And I can tell you, in every
one of those carriers, safety is the top concern for them.
Their families are on the road. Their kids are going to school
in the morning. They understand this probably more so than
those of us who might be blissfully ignorant of some of the
gaps that are there. So, I think it is there, and I have no
doubt that the Administration wants to do everything possible
to this.
I just had several questions. I mean it seems like it
always comes down to this. The vast majority of our good actors
end up getting caught up for what the bad actors do, and
everybody gets caught in that same net. And we are not
necessarily doing what we all want to do, is to reduce
specifically where those problems are.
And I think Mr. Gentry brought up a really good point that
we have to focus on. The issue many times comes down to
drivers. It is not necessarily equipment. We have done much on
that. We had many hearings in here on wetlines, on the
transport of fuel and flammable materials, and how some of that
happens.
I just had a question on this. This is one of the things--
this is for you, Mr. Ferro--that my carriers ask me if it is
possible to do. They want to hire the best drivers, but they
believe--they don't have access--and I am very cognizant of
personal privacy and everything else, but they want access to
that driver safety record, including access to drug/alcohol
testing, and the driver's accident history. They believe if
that could be maintained by you, accessed by them prior to
hiring practices, they would be better off.
I know this is a big can of worms. But they are convinced
that, if all the things we do, if they have that opportunity--
they are being accountable for the liability of that driver. If
that knowledge is out there, someone has it, and it impacts
their performance, can you explain to me maybe the legal--or
the concerns with that? And I say that because they are very
honest about this. They want to follow the rules, but they
think the biggest thing stopping them is that they don't have
that.
Ms. Ferro. Yes. Well, so, quick things. It is all about the
driver. And 9 out of 10 crashes are the result of something a
driver did or didn't do. Consequently, out of the seven BASICs,
really, four of them are very specific to driver behavior:
unsafe driving, driver fitness, drug and alcohol compliance,
and hours of service compliance. That is CSA. Your constituents
are right on target. They need a tool to prescreen before they
make a hiring decision.
We have a program that we rolled out about the same time as
CSA that was mandated by Congress called the pre-employment
screening program, or PSP. And it provides employers access to
a driver's violation history for 5 years, a 5-year period--
actually, 3 years on violations, 5 years on crashes. And an
employer, with the sign-off from a perspective employee, can
access the system, obtain that violation history record, and
use it in their pre-employment decisionmaking. And many
employers are using that today. It has been a very----
Mr. Walz. And the thought is if the person didn't allow
them to sign off, that there was a reason they weren't allowing
them to sign off?
Ms. Ferro. That would be an indicator. And I think most
drivers who are applying for a job with a company will sign off
on that acknowledgment. It is not a new acknowledgment
requirement on any kind of a record access. So that is one
important piece.
The second piece you mentioned: drug and alcohol
compliance. And we are proceeding with a proposed rule on--to
establish a drug and alcohol clearinghouse that would allow
employers to determine if a driver-applicant or a current
driver, actually, has tested positive somewhere else, either
with another job they had applied for, or while they were
working part-time somewhere else while under that individual's
employ.
We are fairly close in completing a proposed rule, in terms
of it still has to go over to OMB. But--and at the same time--
again, Steve Owings mentioned MAP-21. MAP-21 includes a mandate
for us to put forward a drug and alcohol clearinghouse rule and
system. And so we are very excited about that. We are pressing
forward on it.
Mr. Walz. For some of the carriers I have just a little bit
of time left. Is this a legitimate concern they are talking
about--that help you, if there is more access to those records
before you make hiring decisions? I don't know if anybody wants
to tackle that. Mr. Gentry?
Mr. Gentry. Yes, sir. Absolutely. It is almost like it
would be good if you had a eligibility roster on the Federal
level to where somebody comes in my door and they are asking
for a job, I can go online, I can look and see if they are
eligible. Because if they have been fired from another
position, from another job, if they had failed drug screens or
if they had accidents and they were fired, see, there is
nothing that protects----
Mr. Walz. Right.
Mr. Gentry. Well, let me put it this way. They can leave my
company and, as bad as the need is for drivers, somebody is
going to hire that person if they are breathing and they have
got their CDL.
Mr. Walz. Yes.
Mr. Gentry. As long as they pass their pre-employment drug
screen, they pass their background check. But it doesn't tell
us that they were just involved in, you know, three crashes
that were last week or----
Mr. Walz. Yes, I feel very strongly about that. I think
that is right, because they want to make the right decision.
And I would have to say, Ms. Ferro--and I certainly know the
commandment to getting this right--but I think Mr. Young is
right. I am certainly hearing this out there. And it is not
done in a combative manner, it is done in a ``We want to be
your partners in making this safe, but please listen to us when
we tell you some of the things that aren't working.'' So I am
very appreciative of all of you here expressing that. And I
yield back.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much. I didn't know Mr. Barletta
had come back a few minutes ago. But Mr. Barletta?
Mr. Barletta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Ferro, could you
please explain to me the connection that exists between crash
risk and violations like having an inoperative license plate
light or the sleeper berth not having a blanket?
Ms. Ferro. The--let's walk through the BASICs. The seven
elements of analysis in the CSA system are not all highly
correlated to crash risk. The ones that are the strongest are
unsafe driving, which would not incorporate the two items that
you identified, the crash indicator, and hours of service
compliance--today known as the fatigue BASIC, but will soon be
the hours of service compliance BASIC.
The others are all indicators of compliance, and compliance
is a core component of ensuring not just that you are following
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, but that you are
demonstrating the behaviors to be a safe carrier. That is why
those rules are in place and established through Federal
mandate and the rulemaking process.
What we have found, and what our analysis shows, is that on
those BASICs that are compliance-specific, say in some of the
vehicle maintenance areas, there is a--generally, three out of
four carriers that are high in one of the compliance BASICs,
specifically the driver fitness--three out of four of those
carriers are going to have another BASIC where they are
exceeding a threshold and is an indicator that we need to go
and look at them.
But each of those violations, those violations you
mentioned, probably have lower weights than others, because
they are an indicator of compliance or lack of compliance, but
not necessarily that safety risk that you identified. The
system together is what we utilize for making decisions.
Mr. Barletta. Do you think, for example, not wearing a seat
belt gets a weight of seven, but following too close or
improper lane change is a five. How do you justify that?
Ms. Ferro. Not wearing a seat belt is a high indicator of a
problem, if you are in a crash, not just for that driver--seat
belts save lives--but the fact that a seat belt also keeps you
in place if that--if you start losing control of that vehicle
and you are not belted.
Mr. Barletta. How about improper lane change, though? If
you are driving on the mountains of Pennsylvania, I could tell
you if I had to choose between somebody not wearing a seat
belt, a truck driver, or an improper lane change, 10 out of 10
of us are going to say an improper lane change is a much more
severe violation than not wearing a seat belt, or following too
close.
You know, I am all for truck safety. My family was in the
trucking business and construction business. But, you know, I
think if we look at this practically, I don't know if there is
anybody here would say that an improper lane change is less
severe than not wearing a seat belt.
Ms. Ferro. Well, if I could just--I mean your point is very
well taken. And the whole concept of listening to the concerns
that have come forward is very relevant to us. We had the Motor
Carrier Safety Advisory Committee last year look at the
weightings for this very reason, because, again, the concerns
came up early in the process. We want to address them.
So, it is part of the analysis that we have undertaken. The
Advisory Committee recommended some changes to the weighting
system. And we just announced in August, when we rolled out
some of the changes, that the next round of changes we are
analyzing include the weights and the relationship of weights
to----
Mr. Barletta. I just think it makes more sense to----
Ms. Ferro. Yes.
Mr. Barletta [continuing]. Really focus on driver error and
driver abuse.
Mr. Mugno, what are the biggest problems FedEx has
experienced with CSA, and how do you recommend fixing the
problem?
Mr. Mugno. As I indicated in my statement, it is the lack
of a relationship between the carrier's CSA score and crash
risk. It is the underlying data that we have a concern with,
and its inconsistency. And then it is the system's methodology.
Almost got through today without pronouncing that word
correctly.
Mr. Barletta. Sorry about that.
Mr. Mugno. What happens with those, then, it creates these
symptoms that result from those. And it is an inefficient use
of resources, not just for the agencies, State or Federal, but,
quite frankly, for in-house safety programs of ATA carriers, as
well. We too have to prioritize, we too have resources that we
have to try to maximize as much as possible.
And, obviously, we would like to put them where the
priorities are. And, as we stated today, we think the priority
ought to be on future crash risks, and reducing those as best
we can. It is the use of the flawed scores by either the
agencies--even ourselves--and focusing on that to change that,
because that is what everybody is focused on, and/or these
third parties that we are talking about, as well.
And then, finally, one of the other symptoms that really
bothers us--and it was talked about here today--is the DataQ
system, the appeal process, and the amount of time and
resources and efforts that go on there, the lack of consistency
that is going on with those.
I do want to also, though, say that there is--we want to
end on a high note and good note here on this. We are very much
in favor and positive on the CSA principle, in and of itself.
Again, carriers are very supportive of that. We like the
additional focus that has been put on this. We like the
additional dialogue that we are having with law enforcement
agencies, the agency itself, others, drivers, carriers, and all
that. That is working. That is what attracted ATA and its
members--for me, personally, when I went to my very first CSA
2010 stakeholder meeting about 6-plus years ago, I guess it
was, now. And doing that. So, I mean, all those things remain
positive.
The problem, obviously now, is that the new channel of
dialogue is more focused, unfortunately, on these issues that
we are talking about today, as opposed to, in our opinion,
getting--taking care of the future crash risk that we really
want to get to.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much. Ms. Ferro, Administrator
Ferro, the Wells Fargo study said there is no meaningful
statistical correlation between BASIC scores and actual
accident incidents. And Dr. Gimpel of the University of
Maryland said for many carriers, the association between crash
risk and the BASIC scores is so low as to be irrelevant. And
Mr. Mugno earlier said scores don't relate to crash risk.
Now, what do you say about those three different--that is
coming at you from three different directions, all saying the
same thing.
Ms. Ferro. The analysis approach on CSA differs among the
different parties doing the analysis. Our analysis that, again,
validates this model, this model which uses inspection data--
folks have been carrying out inspections for 30 years, but much
improved inspection data in the past 5 and 6 years--utilizing
current inspection data to analyze and help us determine a
company's performance so we can prioritize our resources. That
is the underlying principle. And we have analyzed it across the
entire body of carriers and inspection data.
The two studies you mentioned use smaller populations of
data, smaller populations of carriers, and not necessarily the
full database that included smaller companies, as well. We have
found--because we met with the Wells Fargo analyst--that we are
coming at the analysis from different directions, which is OK,
because if we keep talking we can continue to challenge
ourselves in understanding how this model works, and
reinforcing where it is working and how it is working well.
So, in terms of our analysis on crash risk and compliance
risk, we go back in time. We look forward at carriers that have
had crashes, and go back in time with their compliance and
inspection history, and determine where there is a corollary or
a correlation in outcomes. In terms of the studies that you
just described, they are using today's data to determine
today's crash date, which is not one and the same. The whole
focus of our work is to make sure we are intervening with
carriers, where carriers are looking at their own information
and taking the right actions before a crash occurs.
So, from this perspective that it is both--it is a relative
system but it is all driven on a preventative concept, that the
warning letter concept, the focused review that Mrs. McBride
mentioned, are all geared to have the conversation with the
carrier where trends are going the wrong way to avoid something
happening down the road, so that they can take the actions,
understand the why, and perhaps modify their behavior.
Mr. Duncan. What do you say to Mr. Gentry when he says he
thinks it is unfair to keep on a Web site a violation by a
company where they have fired a driver, and it is still on
there 2 years later? What do you say about that?
Ms. Ferro. I say that has been an ongoing discussion for
all of us.
Number one, we don't know when a company has or has not
fired a driver, because we don't have drivers recorded with
company. We can only tell after an inspection has happened
through our PSP database what company they might be with on the
day of that inspection. So we don't know when you have hired or
fired a driver, to begin with.
But also, the whole focus is on patterns. It is not a
single violation that is going to put you in a threshold or
above a threshold. It is patterns of violations. And firing a
single driver may not be an indication that the company is
changing its hiring practices. And that is why the data stays
on for 2 years. It ages over time.
And if it is of the severity or a pattern that prompts us
to actually do a review with the company, it is going to result
in a discussion as to what is the company doing, or what has
the company done to modify its overall hiring practice, if
there was a pattern. If it was a unique instance with that
driver and they fired him and we are doing a safety rating
review, it will probably be reflected in the safety rating.
But again, it stays in the data because it is an element of
looking for patterns. And those do age over time, if that--when
that company--if, in fact, that was a unique or stand-alone
instance.
Mr. Duncan. What about his suggestion that you have an
actuarial study done on this?
Ms. Ferro. I like that. I wrote that one down. That is
the--I think a very valuable discussion.
Mr. Duncan. I want--before Chairman Young has to leave, I
want Mrs. McBride to--we were having a little trouble with your
microphone and he wasn't here, but you--your company, you said,
started 70 years ago. And it has operated all that time, and
has been one of the most respected, successful companies in the
industry. And you said you have an accident rate of--was it--
that was your fault, was it .02 of--per million? Would you
repeat that, exactly what that was?
Mrs. McBride. 0.2, yes, sir. Basically----
Mr. Duncan. We are having a lot of trouble with your
particular microphones. I do not understand why. But anyway----
Mrs. McBride. I apologize.
Mr. Duncan. That--now we can hear you.
Mrs. McBride. Much better, much better. Yes, sir. It is
0.2. Wow.
Mr. Duncan. Per million?
Mrs. McBride. Per million miles.
Mr. Duncan. And yet they came in with two inspectors who
spent 9 days, is that correct?
Mrs. McBride. That is correct.
Mr. Duncan. And they were there full-time in all that time.
Mrs. McBride. They spent 9 business days at----
Mr. Duncan. Nine business days.
Mrs. McBride [continuing]. At our office. Yes, sir.
Mr. Duncan. And what--and tell Chairman Young about that.
Mrs. McBride. They conducted a focused audit, and at the
end of the time Colonial's satisfactory rating remained
unchanged.
I would like to, if I could, get into----
Mr. Duncan. But before you go on, though--but you said that
you would have--you came close to--you would have had to shut
down, though, or almost. Explain that part, about your self-
insurance and so forth, what you said a while ago.
Mrs. McBride. Colonial is self-insured, and has been for
the past 25 years. And it is our understanding from the FMCSA,
had we received a conditional or unsatisfactory rating, that
our self-insurance program would have been in jeopardy. And
this could have caused us to have to close our doors.
Mr. Duncan. After 70 years.
Mrs. McBride. After 70 years.
Mr. Duncan. Anyway----
Mrs. McBride. That is correct.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, if I may just follow through on
that.
Madam Chairman, where do these guys come from? They go in
to an outfit that has gone that long and spend 9 days. Did
someone complain about them?
Ms. Ferro. It is actually a great example of how the
process works. The data showed that this company in particular
had a very high rate of noncompliance relative to companies
that had a similar number of inspections.
Mr. Young. After 70 years? And what was the percentage,
Mrs. McBride, .02?
Mrs. McBride. Yes.
Mr. Young. Of a million miles? Now, there is people that do
better than that?
Ms. Ferro. So, again, it was hours of service. Hours-of-
service violations have a high correlation to crash risk. But
here is where our investigators went in, they--the company
data, their own records, their own performance, demonstrated
their strong safety practices. It was an unrated review. They
have got their satisfactory rating and we move on. But again,
it was--we hope that the result of that discussion is that the
company also is looking more closely at driver violations on
their log books.
Mr. Young. Again, if I can say, this is a classic example
of an agency that doesn't answer to anyone.
Mr. Chairman, again, this is what is wrong with our
country. I want to ask all of you here. Let's say you are the
trucking companies and I am a CDL holder. I drive a truck once
in a while. I have to haul the nonsense out I create all the
time. But having said that, I do not create the accident for
the company I work for. Someone else creates it. Does that
affect your rating?
Mrs. McBride. Yes.
Mr. Young. It does affect--even though the driver is not at
fault, but it goes on their record and stays as an accident of
your company?
Mrs. McBride. Yes, sir. It does.
Mr. Young. Now, even in the insurance company that doesn't
happen. How come you can do that?
Ms. Ferro. Well, to clarify, the accident--the crash
actually does not affect her company's safety rating.
Mr. Young. But it is registered. It is on the record.
Ms. Ferro. It absolutely is on the system and the
database----
Mr. Young. Why?
Ms. Ferro [continuing]. As a recordable crash.
Mr. Young. Why?
Ms. Ferro. Well, that is part of transparency in
Government----
Mr. Young. Transparency? When it is not their fault? And
yet someone sees that record?
Ms. Ferro. Well, down the road we are looking at this whole
concept of preventability and nonpreventability. But that
answer isn't with us today. But the crash event itself, the
crash report, is on our database, and has been for many years.
Mr. Young. Again, I go back. I drive a truck. It is not my
accident. Some idiot is on a cell phone, drives under my truck,
which has happened, and it is my fault? And it is my company's
fault? Now, where is the rhyme behind that? Where is the logic?
See, I have got a new idea, Mr. Chairman. I am a quasi-
inventor. I am going to invent a logic pill. And I am going to
require every bureaucrat--and even every congressman; I will
fit us in there--to take one logic pill a day or they can't
serve. Logic. Solves problems, not adversarial position.
Mr. Chairman, I have had enough of this. Thank you.
Mr. Duncan. All right. Let me ask this. Mr. Palmer, if a
carrier has a dismissed violation, I am told that that
continues to be listed on the SMS as a violation. Is that
correct?
Mr. Palmer. When they have received a citation and it was
dismissed, sir?
Mr. Duncan. Yes.
Mr. Palmer. In some cases it could. It is typically--and it
is the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance's position and--
typically enforcements that--what we do is just because a
violation is dismissed, we don't automatically say that it
needs to come off. What we do is we still look at it, and we
determine whether, based on its merit, whether or not it should
still remain on that inspection report. If there is supporting
documentation, if there is support to show that it should be
off, then we absolutely take it off.
But what we try to avoid is taking a violation off of an
inspection report solely because of a technicality or some
other reason. So we try to use--to Mr. Young's point, we try to
use logic in that process.
Mr. Duncan. All right. Let me ask this, and I will go back
to Mr. DeFazio.
Mr. Johnson, you all came and met with me, and you said
that your company had the--was it $25 million in a lawsuit
where you had hired a truck or something? Tell me about that.
Mr. Johnson. Correct.
Mr. Duncan. We didn't get into details about that in our
meeting.
Mr. Johnson. Correct. We had a juried judgment against us a
couple of years ago for $25 million for a motor carrier
accident with some passenger vehicles. And C.H. Robinson was
found to be liable for the excess amounts beyond the carrier's
insurance limit, and their ability to pay, just because it was
the vicarious liability argument. So because we had hired the
truck, or the motor carrier, we were found that they acted as
an agent of ours. So it changed the whole independent
contractor scenario for motor property brokers like ourselves.
If you think about it, it is kind of similar to if you get
in a taxi cab and you ask him to take you somewhere, if he hits
a pedestrian along the way, should you, as the passenger, be
found liable for those damages? Because you were the one that
was telling him where to go. So----
Mr. Duncan. Right. Mr. DeFazio?
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Administrator Ferro,
let me see if I can--because Congressman Young raised the same
concerns I raised earlier about at-fault crashes. And we
discussed--I think he wasn't here at that point--that you are
looking at working toward a rating system for fault, at fault.
I think if you, you know, got from Congressman Young, there
is a lot of focus and concern around this. And, you know, I
raised it 2 years ago. And I mean it is not going to go away.
You know, I think we have got to find that there is going to be
a system that will work, that will attribute fault, no fault,
and that--you know, otherwise it really is an unfair burden, I
think, even though there may be some study that says there is a
correlation when your truck is parked and, you know, you are
sleeping, and someone crashes into it, that you are more likely
to have a crash in the future, I just don't--I would question
the basis for that.
Anyway, so when--it is my understanding you are developing
a--you know, there is going to be a final conclusion here. Mr.
Johnson talked about they want a bright line. Are we going to
have a bright line, or are we going to have the existing
system, which is a--three part, which is, you know,
satisfactory, conditional, unsatisfactory? What are we going to
end up with? Are we going to end up with a safe, unsafe? What
are you finally looking at? And you are going to go through a
rulemaking when you come to that final point. Is that correct?
Ms. Ferro. That is correct.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. Could you tell us--is it going to be--are
we going to get a bright line, or are we going to get, you
know, two lines and a gray area? Or what are we going to get?
And I guess three-part question, because I--you know, the--
there is--I am having--you know, I mean, obviously ending
fatalities and deaths and unsafe driving is our ultimate
objective, which I think is shared, despite some differences
here. But is this ultimately a program whose objective is to
really try and move people towards safer practices and
companies towards safer practices, a self-help system? Or is it
ultimately just going to be a rating system? Or is it going to
be all things, somehow?
Ms. Ferro. Well, let me go back to the question about the
safety fitness determination process and rule, the proposal
itself.
Number one, absolutely. For us to change the way we
establish a safety rating, we must go through a rulemaking
process. Today the safe--the satisfactory--conditional,
unsatisfactory are tied to an on-site compliance review. A full
compliance review, not the focused, as was described by Mrs.
McBride. That rulemaking is what we call a safety fitness
determination rule. It should be--we expect it to be an NPRM on
the streets for extensive comment next year, really in the
first quarter of next year.
Without going too far--I am a little bit in that cone of
silence period with the rulemaking--but I can say one of the
aspects of the rule will be that it will establish thresholds.
Today, the SMS system which we use to prioritize our work, law
enforcement uses to prioritize inspection work, is a relative
measure. You are compared to others in your same grouping, and
you are relatively good or bad or above or below, depending on
it.
Under the safety fitness determination rule concept, there
will be thresholds, so a company really knows. Am I above or
below? In terms of the actual ratings, that is the part that I
won't move on to today, because that is still part of the rule
under development.
Mr. DeFazio. And that goes to another concern that has been
expressed about how today you can have a static record. You
know, you have been rated. But other people's performance
changed. And then you move. You know, I mean it seems to me
that somehow we ought to be able to--and I think you just
addressed that, you said it is--now it is relative, i.e., you
know, you can move up and down, you can end up below the
threshold all of a sudden, even though you didn't have any
further violations--that this will have something that is more
stable.
I mean I know you said you can't be specific, but will it
be more stable, or are we still going to be rating everybody
against everybody?
Ms. Ferro. The safety rating itself----
Mr. DeFazio. Within category.
Ms. Ferro [continuing]. Will have a set threshold. And we
think, yes, there will be that stability that comes along with
am I in the right spot or am I not in the right spot. That we
absolutely----
Mr. DeFazio. Right.
Ms. Ferro. Keep in mind where we came from. We are tied to
a compliance review process today that allows us to do about
16,000 safety ratings a year. We probably have only about
50,000 carriers out of the 525,000 today that have a safety
rating--satisfactory, conditional, unsatisfactory--because
resources are so limited. And it is the very reason why
Congress, over the years, has--and GAO--has said, ``Use the
data you are collecting, performance data''--stakeholders have
said the same--``to really hone in on where your resources can
best be applied, and try and utilize that data to establish a
broader method of rating carriers.''
So, that is what that safety fitness determination rating
capability will do, it will take us from rating 16,000
companies a year to rating 200,000 companies in a year. And we
need to be sure it is a very fair process, that the NPRM gets
lots of room for comment, and that there are some clear
thresholds for carriers, so they know--because that is a big
change from what we are doing today.
Mr. DeFazio. We did hear some testimony about--I mean we
are focusing on how you are going to use the data that you
receive. We have also discussed a little bit about the quality
of that data. But in Mr. Mugno's testimony he said that 15
percent of States report less than 75 percent of their crashes.
Is that--Mr.--do you want to give us a citation on that,
or--I mean where you are--and then I could ask her to--is that
accurate? That is what I believe was in your testimony.
Mr. Mugno. I can't----
Mr. DeFazio. Yes, can't find it right now. I know. Whenever
you----
Mr. Mugno. I am sorry, I can't put my fingers on it right
now, but we will certainly submit that----
Mr. DeFazio. But does that sound right?
Mr. Mugno. It does.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. All right. How are we dealing with that?
Ms. Ferro. We are dealing with it--through--actually, I
think the number is much higher now. That is an older number.
And we will provide a followup, for the record, to the--access
to the data, which is on our Web site today.
The safety data improvement process was started because of
a number of concerns over the timeliness and accuracy of data
that States were reporting on inspection reports, on crash
reports. The process was started--the grant program was started
under SAFETEA-LU, and it provides $3 million a year for States
to apply for money to improve their reporting systems and their
training for their reporting systems.
And over the course of the 6 years that the program has
been in place, we have seen a significant improvement in the
quality of data and the timeliness of data, including fatal
crash reporting. Injury crash reporting is still an area where
there are some gaps, and that is why we have highlighted it in
this past year for States, in terms of kind of, again, raising
the bar on the quality and integrity and timeliness of the
data. So, again, we--Mr. Mugno will also provide kind of the
source of the data, and the distinctions that we are drawing.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. That would be helpful. And then, the--that
sort of basic question, because we did discuss a little bit
about now we are finally getting the--you know, we are moving
toward the drug, alcohol testing clearinghouse. We apparently
now have an integrated database so someone who has had their
license suspended or revoked in one State can't go to another
without--you know, that these--we now are--we have--basically
dealing with those problems.
So the question becomes why wouldn't we be looking at a
system that rates drivers individually, as opposed to aggregate
companies? I mean maybe you need to do both.
Ms. Ferro. And we have discussed doing both. We want to get
the carrier measurement system in place before we take the next
step in rating drivers. We have an internal mechanism we use
when we are going out to look at a company that does give us--
one of the indicators may be a highlight, a driver measurement
system using, again, the violation data I discussed earlier.
But there is no project today, or plan today, to put a driver
safety measurement system in place. It is absolutely something
that we are very interested in.
There was some component in our technical assistance that
requested some clarification in our authorizing language to be
sure we had the authority to do that. It wasn't adopted. But
again, we will be pleased to report back as we move forward.
But our first and primary goal is to put the carrier safety
determination rating system in place on the heels of the SMS
system.
Mr. Duncan. OK----
Mr. DeFazio. Well, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
the generous amount of time.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. DeFazio. We were joined a few
minutes ago by Mr. Hanna. And I certainly want to give him a
chance to make any statement or ask any questions.
Mr. Hanna. How can you do one without the other? In a State
like I live in, in New York--and I was in heavy equipment
business for many years--how can you separate, when we have
third-party liability rules that are directly related to acts
of an individual?
I suggest to you that it is more important to do the
individual than the trucking company, that you ought to think
about that. And I don't think you can do one without the other.
I mean every person that ever fell off a ladder knew what he
was doing when he went up that ladder. And everybody who gets
into a truck that has had drug--or has a drug or alcohol
problem puts himself out there at a risk to the owner of the
company, yet the company accepts the liability for that.
So, I just throw this out as a comment, that I think you
can't do one, even nearly correctly, without doing the other at
the same time.
Ms. Ferro. And if I may, I absolutely respect that point of
view, and it is built into the CSA program today. It is why the
majority of the analysis groups that we call BASICs are
actually reflective of driver behavior.
Companies have a very clear influence on what a driver can
or can't do. They--and the level of support a driver has to do
things the right way. And so, the first component of the system
is moving towards how a carrier is handling the violations that
drivers are incurring. But we absolutely incorporate driver
behavior through the unsafe driving BASIC, again, the driver
fitness BASIC, whether they have a license, proper medical
qualifications, the drug and alcohol compliance BASIC. All of
those do really reflect on how much a driver impacts that
carrier's business.
Mr. Hanna. No, I appreciate that. I would say, just from my
own experience, the problem was always enforcement. All the
liability and all the expenses and all the responsibility falls
back on the owner of the vehicle. And there is precious little
opportunity, other than threat of loss of your job, to control
what individuals do, so that the information that you might
accumulate over time--I suggest to you that can drive the
outcome more for the company than how they actually do what
they have control over. It is just a thought.
But thank you, Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Owings. Mr. Chairman, may I jump in and say a couple of
things on behalf of the safety community?
Mr. Duncan. Sure.
Mr. Owings. We heard a lot of talk about a couple of
things. First of all, this whole fault issue. Again, the Crash
BASIC is intended to be predictive of future crashes. The
science says that if you count all of the crashes, they are
predictive. And we have talked about fault versus
nonpreventable. Those are two different things. They are not
synonymous. We have civil courts that do a lot of work to try
to figure out fault. Figuring out nonpreventable, which means
the driver couldn't have made a reasonable decision or move to
possibly prevent the crash, is a whole higher level of
scrutiny. And the FMCSA does not have the resources to address
that.
Now, the second thing I would like to address is there has
been a lot of discussion in here about the small businessmen
who have trucking companies. I am a small businessman. And let
me suggest that the most important thing that could be done to
improve road safety in this country where trucks are concerned
is to pay truck drivers like the professionals they are
expected to be. They should not be paid by the hour, which
incentivizes dangerous behavior. It is common sense, or--and
the way they should be paid is an hourly wage or a salary for
every hour they work, whether or not their truck is moving, and
regardless at what speed.
Mr. Hanna. Ma'am----
Mr. Duncan. Mr. Hanna? Go ahead.
Mr. Hanna. Thank you, Chairman. The way you work things is
basically a bell curve, right?
Ms. Ferro. That is correct.
Mr. Hanna. I would suggest to you that you ought to be
dealing with something that looks more like an algorithm. The
whole process is much more complicated, and there are much
more--many more factors, and many of them that people are
graded on a bell curve, like the truckers, don't have control
over. But I know you know that, it is just----
Ms. Ferro. Well, and I appreciate that perspective. And we
would be pleased to come and brief you. There are a host of
algorithms underlying this system, and I think there are some
opportunities to peer review it, so more extensively, again,
following the discussion today. And we will be happy to brief
you on it, if you have some time----
Mr. Hanna. Thank you, ma'am. I yield back.
Ms. Ferro. Thank you.
Mr. Duncan. All right. Well, thank you very much. Let me
see if I can sum up on a couple things.
Number one, there is nobody who wants less to have a crash
or an accident than the owners of the trucking and bus
companies, because, first of all, they wouldn't have some goal
to go out and hurt people, because there would be much easier,
less expensive ways to do it than to crash trucks or buses into
them. Secondly, they don't want to ruin their equipment. They
don't want to unintentionally harm anybody. And above all, they
know that they are likely to be sued.
But, having said all that, we do need to have an agency
like Administrator Ferro's. And I can tell you while there has
been--I have been pleased that there have been four Members
here today--Chairman Young and Mr. Rahall, Mr. DeFazio, and Mr.
Coble, all of whom are more senior than me--I have been on this
committee for 24 years. I can tell you that whether it has been
led by Republicans or Democrats, while we have been concerned
about the industry and various things that go on in this
country, our number one concern for this committee has always
been safety.
Now, we have two witnesses, as I mentioned at the start--
very unusual--from my home town of Knoxville. And I am pleased
to have them here. But if I thought this was just a Knoxville
problem or a Tennessee problem, I would have never even agreed
to have this hearing. I would have thought there was some other
way to settle this thing. But I heard about this--I started
hearing complaints from people all over the Nation before I
heard about anybody from Tennessee having a problem with this.
In fact, I still haven't met with Mr. Gentry about problems
that he has had. I did have a meeting with Mrs. McBride and
some other trucking company people, and they told me about some
problems.
We have got these studies saying there is problems with it.
We have heard people testify here today there is problems with
it. Nothing is perfect. It is not all bad. But it seems to me
that there needs to be a little more flexibility in this
program, Administrator Ferro, and there needs to be a quicker,
easier, simpler way for a company to tell their side. If they
get put on--listed as an unsafe company, there needs to be a
quicker, easier, simpler way for them to defend themselves with
you and your agency.
So, I hope that over these next few months--I hope you
won't punish--number one, most of all, I hope you won't try and
do something to Mrs. McBride's wonderful company--because I can
tell you they are a great company--because they have had the
guts to come here and testify. We run into that sometimes. Some
companies, they don't want to come testify, because they are
afraid that they will get hit harder by these administrative
agencies. But there needs to be a way for these companies to
get delisted if they have been listed unfairly.
And then too, you know, these violations--Mr. Barletta said
something about a violation because a blanket wasn't in a cab.
We need to not have things like that.
But I thank everybody for coming. You want to kind of close
out, Mr. DeFazio?
Mr. DeFazio. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, a
specific random question, again, on our data is only as, you
know, so good. And this is from another hearing I held. I am
pleased to see we are moving toward a drug-alcohol
clearinghouse. But have we done anything to clean up the abuses
in the testing system? And we had ample testimony on that, a
Web site that we found that would sell you Whizzinators and
things so you could cheat on the tests. And I mean, you know,
it--there was no controls over the testing system, whatsoever.
Have we done anything to improve the testing system?
Because if we establish a database, you know, there is a
question of the validity of the data that is in it.
Ms. Ferro. I would like to respond as a followup on that
one.
Mr. DeFazio. OK.
Ms. Ferro. I do not have specifics for you today.
Mr. DeFazio. Sure, OK.
Ms. Ferro. I will have to respond for the record.
Mr. DeFazio. That was the----
Ms. Ferro. Thank you.
Mr. DeFazio [continuing]. Subject of another hearing. Well,
I would just like to observe that, I mean, I think that the one
common ground here is we have a common objective, and that is
we want to improve the safety of the system, of the traveling
public. And we--there is some questions about, you know,
particulars of this approach. And I can only hope that, you
know, some of the concerns that have been raised here will be
taken to heart as you move into an actual rulemaking, where
people will be able to formally comment, and there will be
other additional scrutiny applied to how we finally establish
the criteria, and how we apply the criteria, and then,
hopefully, how the criteria might or might not be used.
But also dealing with, you know, the issues of if we have
only captured a part of the universe, that--you know, which I
raised early on--that has to be thoughtfully approached, also.
Because if you are going to establish a rating system that
ultimately, through a rulemaking, people feel is valid and will
be routinely used to determine who gets carriage and who
doesn't, we have got to have a way to include everybody in it.
And there was--you know, at one point you said that they were
including clean inspections, but at another point you said we
have got to make sure that they send along the data of clean
inspections. Because many times they don't bother.
And so, I mean, we--there is, I think, a lot yet to be done
here. So that is--thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing.
Mr. Duncan. Well, thank you. I guess just to put in a
plain, down-to-earth kind of way, east Tennessee way, we want
the bad companies acted on, but we don't want good companies
treated like they are bad companies. And most of the trucking
and bus companies out there are good companies and doing good
things for this country.
Thank you very much. That will conclude this hearing. And I
would like to ask unanimous consent that the record of today's
hearing remain open until such time as our witnesses have
provided answers to any questions that may be submitted to them
in writing, and unanimous consent that the record remain open
for 15 days for any additional comments and information
submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in the record
of today's hearing.
[No response.]
Mr. Duncan. Without objection, so ordered.
Thank you again to all the members of the panel. That will
conclude this hearing.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]