[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TSA OVERSIGHT PART III: EFFECTIVE SECURITY OR SECURITY THEATER?
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
and the
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION
AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 26, 2012
__________
Printed for the use of the Committees on Government Reform and
Transportation and Infrastructure
Serial No. 112-174
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Serial No. 112-78
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
_____
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
JOHN L. MICA, Florida Ranking Minority Member
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
JIM JORDAN, Ohio Columbia
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
CONNIE MACK, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TIM WALBERG, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan JIM COOPER, Tennessee
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
RAUL R. LABRADOR, Idaho DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee PETER WELCH, Vermont
JOE WALSH, Illinois JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida JACKIE SPEIER, California
FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania
Lawrence J. Brady, Staff Director
John D. Cuaderes, Deputy Staff Director
Robert Borden, General Counsel
Linda A. Good, Chief Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey Columbia
GARY G. MILLER, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois CORRINE BROWN, Florida
SAM GRAVES, Missouri BOB FILNER, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
DUNCAN HUNTER, California RICK LARSEN, Washington
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
BILLY LONG, Missouri HEATH SHULER, North Carolina
BOB GIBBS, Ohio STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania LAURA RICHARDSON, California
RICHARD L. HANNA, New York ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida
JEFF DENHAM, California
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN,
Tennessee
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on March 26, 2012................................... 1
WITNESSES
Mr. Christopher L. McLaughlin, Assistant Administrator for
Security Operations, Transportation Security Administration
Oral statement............................................... 5
Written statement............................................ 8
Mr. Stephen Sadler, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence and
Analysis, Transportation Security Administration
Oral statement............................................... 6
Written statement............................................ 8
Mr. Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Oral statement............................................... 17
Written statement............................................ 00
Rear Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, Assistant Commandant for Marine
Safety, Security, and Stewardship, U.S. Coast Guard
Oral statement............................................... 19
APPENDIX
The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings, a Member of Congress from the
State of Maryland, Opening Statement........................... 62
Facebook Questions & Comments for TSA............................ 64
Questions for The Honorable John S. Pistole, Administrator,
Transportation Security Administration from The Chairman of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, The Honorable
John L. Mica, a Member of Congress from the State of Florida... 67
Submitted for the Record by The Honorable Blake Farenthold, a
Member of Congress from the State of Texas..................... 69
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Member of Congress from the
State Virginia, Opening Statement.............................. 70
Questions and Responses.......................................... 71
TSA OVERSIGHT PART III: EFFECTIVE SECURITY OR SECURITY THEATER?
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Monday, March 26, 2012
House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, joint
with the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, D.C.
The committees met, pursuant to call, at 1:32 p.m., in Room
2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Darrell E. Issa
[chairman of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform]
presiding.
Present from the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform: Representatives Issa, Mica, Farenthold,
Cummings, Norton, and Connolly.
Present from the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure: Representatives Mica, Petri, Coble, Cravaack,
Farenthold, Norton, Cummings, Boswell, and Cohen.
Also Present: Representative Blackburn.
Staff Present from the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform: Thomas A. Alexander, Senior Counsel; Michael
R. Bebeau, Assistant Clerk; Molly Boyl, Parliamentarian; Gwen
D'Luzansky, Assistant Clerk; Adam P. Fromm, Director of Member
Services and Committee Operations; Linda Good, Chief Clerk;
Mitchell S. Kominsky, Counsel; Mark D. Marin, Director of
Oversight; Jeff Solsby, Senior Communications Advisor; Rebecca
Watkins, Press Secretary; Kevin Corbin, Minority Deputy Clerk;
Jennifer Hoffman, Minority Press Secretary; Carla Hultberg,
Minority Chief Clerk; Peter Kenny, Minority Counsel; Lucinda
Lessley, Minority Policy Director; and Carlos Uriarte, Minority
Counsel.
Staff Present from the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure: Gil Macklin, Professional Staff Member; Sean
McMaster, Professional Staff Member; and Shant Boyajian,
Professional Staff Member.
Chairman Issa. The committee will come to order.
The Oversight Committee exists to secure two fundamental
principles: First, Americans have a right to know that money
Washington takes from them is well-spent; and, second,
Americans deserve an efficient, effective government that works
for them. Our duty on the Oversight and Government Reform
Committee is to protect these rights.
Our solemn responsibility is to hold government accountable
to taxpayers, because taxpayers have a right to know what they
get from their government. We will work tirelessly, in
partnership with citizen watchdogs, to deliver the facts to the
American people and bring genuine reform to the Federal
bureaucracy.
This is our mission statement.
Today, we are calling the third hearing conducted by the
Oversight Committee, today a joint hearing, where we plan to
hold at least two additional TSA oversight hearings in April
and May.
There is no question that the TSA serves a vital role. The
question is, in a post-9/11 period, are we getting value for
our money? Do we in fact have a system which is thorough and
complete, that in fact takes care of all of us? Or do we have a
fairly expensive, labor-intensive system that in fact is not
making us appreciably safer? In a time of budget limitations,
TSA, although essential, must in fact deliver value to the
American people.
With more than 65,000 men and women working for TSA, it is
not a small agency. This is more men and women working for an
aviation-based safety organization than build all the Ford
automobiles in America combined. Only one-quarter of the funds
used by TSA come from aviation fees. Three-quarters come
directly from the American people, meaning those of us who do
not fly are paying a heavy price for those who do.
But even the billion-and-a-half-plus dollars paid for out
of landing fees and other collections, ticket fees, to run our
airports, in fact, is a high price to pay--a burden, if you
will, on our efficiency. So whether the dollars come from
ticket fees or come from the taxpayer directly, it is essential
that we review TSA's effectiveness.
By 2013, TSA will arguably, by its own accounting, have
wasted more than $500 million of taxpayer money developing
advanced imaging technology, or AIT, machines. In addition to
public outrage over privacy violations, classified GAO reports
paint a dire picture of ineffectiveness. GAO believes Screening
of Passengers by Observation Techniques, or SPOT, program,
which has already cost taxpayers $800 million, is ineffective
and that Congress should consider limiting funds for this
program. GAO, as a nonpartisan organization, claims that TSA
deployed SPOT before having solid scientific basis for its
effectiveness and that when it worked, it was only an accident.
Despite a potential $3.2 billion cost to the Federal
Government and industry, GAO continues to find that TSA is
failing to properly administer TWIC, the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential. I have seen this failure myself. I
have seen a mandated bio ID simply waived. Showing a picture ID
is not, in fact, what Congress mandated. Deploying these and
deploying them in a way in which they are quick and effective
is essential. Let's remember, it cost a lot of money to produce
the card; simply using it as a high-price ID card is not
acceptable.
Without creating a plan to upgrade its explosive detection
system, or EDS, which will cost $964 million or more to the
taxpayer, TSA cannot ensure updating EDS will be feasible or
cost-effective. Now, let me just reiterate. EDS is an important
system. Whether it is the inadvertent touching of fertilizer or
the real operational use of explosives, we need to know. We
need to screen. It is an effective tool if it works. If it
doesn't work and work 100 percent of the time, we have the
biggest problem we could possibly have.
Lastly, the VIPR program, Visual Intermodal Prevention and
Response, faces serious questions from both security experts
and legal scholars about the effectiveness and
constitutionality of this initiative. TSA is not performing or
taking into serious consideration the cost-benefits, and that
is a big part of what this committee is here to ask questions
on today. Not, is it nice to have; not, might it work; not, do
we must do something; but, in fact, have we done a cost-benefit
analysis? Have we screened through many choices, developed,
researched, but only deployed those which work?
In fact, what we do know here at this committee and at the
Transportation Committee is that we have fielded products that
don't work, in the past. And when it becomes known by the
public that a product has a gaping flaw, that product becomes
essentially useless. Sadly, what we discover is, even when it
becomes public, there is no other tool. So, in fact, we
continue screening people, knowing that screening alone is not
enough and that the public knows that.
And, with that, I now recognize the chairman of the
Subcommittee on Aviation Infrastructure, Mr. Petri, for his
opening statement.
Mr. Petri. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
organizing this important hearing and doing so with the
Transportation Committee.
After 9/11, the Transportation Committee held a number of
hearings to attempt to determine what happened and what needed
to be done. And it became very clear at those hearings that the
then-existing Federal policy of requiring easy access to the
cockpit in case there was a medical emergency or something of
that sort was not the most secure way to go. That policy was
changed, and now our cockpits are hardened; that is to say, it
is very difficult for a passenger to take over an airplane and
turn it into a weapon, as happened on 9/11.
That, in my opinion, is the most significant security
change since that time. Beyond that, of course, people can go
on airplanes and possibly take a plane down, can create
mischief, become a hara-kiri person, as they could if they were
to go to a football stadium or on a cruise liner or any other
sort of--a train--other modes of transportation. We do have a
security problem, but it is not restricted to airlines. And the
major part of the danger of airlines, I think, was dealt with
when it became impossible for people to take over the airplane
and turn it into a weapon, as happened on 9/11.
That said, of course, we have this regime that all of us
experience who serve in Congress, if you live any distance at
all, on a weekly basis practically, if not more often. We are
inspecting millions of travelers, hundreds of thousands, every
month, the same people over and over and over again. And that
has to be wasteful and intrusive. And this has been going on
now for 10 years. If it is going to go on for another 10 years,
it behooves us to come up with a more efficient, less
intrusive, more sensible program so that we concentrate on
where there might be a risk, rather than inspecting the same
people over and over and over again.
When we had hearings back at the time of 9/11, experts came
in, testified before the Transportation Committee, from Israel
and a number of other countries that certainly have for many
years faced very, very heightened security threats. Hardening
the cockpit was one of the things that they advised and which
we did. Other things that they have advised we have not done:
trying to track people when they buy tickets and working on the
intelligence side of things to see if there is some sort of a
likelihood that that person might be a risk; put ways of
inspecting people and how they behave not just at the airport,
looking through their drawers and socks and looking at their
shoes, but looking at how they interact with ticket agents, how
they generally behave, not just at the airport but as they go
about their business of preparing possibly to do things of
risk.
It seems to me that there are a lot more strategic and
intelligent ways to go about it than spending hundreds of
millions of dollars, impeding the growth of the transportation
sector, aviation sector, and basically changing the psychology
of Americans to have them starting to feel that they somehow
have done something wrong and they are being subjected to pat-
down and shakedown, as we do when we are worrying about someone
who has committed a crime or--we are assuming everyone is
guilty and treating them practically like prisoners when they
are American taxpaying citizens.
So I feel that we have a lot to do to straighten this whole
mess out. It is not a cost-effective or very disciplined
approach. And after 10 years, we owe more to the American
people.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
Chairman Issa. The gentleman yields back.
I now ask unanimous consent that our colleague from
Tennessee, Mrs. Blackburn, be allowed to participate in today's
hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
I will now note that the ranking members of each of the
committees are driving in and have been delayed. It is not a
flight, as far as I know. So they will make their opening
statements after our witnesses make theirs. I am assured they
will be here by then.
With that, I would like to now introduce our first panel.
Mr. Christopher L. McLaughlin is the Assistant Administrator
for Security Operations at the Transportation Security
Administration. Mr. Stephen Sadler is the Assistant
Administrator for Intelligence and Analysis at the
Transportation Security Administration. Mr. Stephen Lord is
director for homeland security at the U.S. Government
Accountability Office--our wing, if you will. And Rear Admiral
Zukunft, with the U.S. Coast Guard, is an Assistant Commandant
for Marine Safety, Security, and Stewardship, and I might
mention, without a doubt the best jewel ever given to homeland
security, in my opinion and in the ranking member's opinion.
Pursuant to the rules of this committee, would you all
please rise to take the oath? Raise your right hand.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are
about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth?
Let the record indicate that--please have a seat--all
witnesses answered in the affirmative.
Now, my predecessor, whose portrait is up there, Mr. Towns,
began a tradition of explaining the obvious, but he did it
every time, and I appreciated it. Your entire opening
statements will be placed in the record. In front of you you
have a countdown clock. And like so many things that you look
at, you say, does it really matter? The answer is, please
summarize if you run out of time. We would like to get through
all of you and get you out of here with full questions and
answers in a timely fashion. And remember, your opening
statements will be available in their entirety.
Mr. McLaughlin, you are first. You have 5 minutes.
WITNESS STATEMENTS
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER L. MCLAUGHLIN
Mr. McLaughlin. Good afternoon, Chairman Issa and
distinguished members of the committees. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today.
TSA has made significant strides in our deployment and
utilization of AIT over the past year. Automatic Target
Recognition software, recently installed in the majority of our
machines, enhanced passenger privacy by eliminating passenger-
specific images, while improving throughput capabilities and
streamlining the checkpoint screening process.
In the fall of 2011, my office began to further develop
operational performance targets, including a new AIT
utilization goal that is consistent with the DHS, OIG, and GAO
recommendations. Tied to this, we implemented an action plan to
increase AIT utilization across the Nation. As a result of
these efforts, our utilization performance between February
2011 and February 2012 improved by 200 percent.
In addition to AIT, we are employing CAT/BPSS technology to
automatically verify passenger documents. CAT/BPSS will
eventually replace the current procedures used to detect
fraudulent or altered documents. We will deploy this technology
for operational testing at a few airports beginning next month.
Technology is only one mechanism to identify potential
threats. The SPOT program uses behavior observation and
analysis to identify potentially high-risk individuals who may
pose a threat to transportation security. SPOT was
scientifically validated in 2011 by the DHS Science and
Technology Division, representing the most thorough analysis of
any behavioral screening program to date. No other
counterterrorism or similar security program is known to have
been subjected to such a rigorous, systematic evaluation. This
study revealed that SPOT was significantly more effective at
identifying high-risk passengers than random screening
protocols. That said, TSA continues working with DHS S&T and
the broader research community to increase the effectiveness
and the efficiency of this behavior-based screening process.
Subsequent to the validation study, TSA took steps last
fall to enhance the program. Under a new pilot, behavior
detection officers employ a specialized interview technique to
determine if a traveller should be referred for additional
screening at the checkpoint. This additional interaction, used
by security agencies worldwide, enables officers to better
verify or dispel concerns about suspicious behavior and
anomalies. Preliminary analysis shows an increase in the rate
of detection of high-risk passengers. And TSA is currently
conducting analysis with the DHS Science and Technology
Directorate to inform a validation process for future rollout.
Complementing these program developments, TSA has begun
teaching a tactical communications course for our frontline
workforce. This training focuses on active listening, empathy,
and verbal communication techniques and will be complete by the
end of 2012.
These initiatives are some of the key aspects of TSA's
security infrastructure that provide the backbone for our
overall risk-based strategy. This strategy demonstrates our
commitment to move away from a one-size-fits-all security
model. While this approach was necessary after 9/11 and has
been effective over the past decade, key enablers now allow TSA
to move toward a more intuitive solution.
Perhaps the most widely known RBS initiative is TSA
PreCheck. To date, approximately 600,000 passengers have
experienced an expedited screening through TSA PreCheck. By the
end of 2012, we expect to offer to passengers in 35 of our
busiest airports the benefits of TSA PreCheck. In addition to
eligible frequent fliers and members of CBP's Trusted Traveler
programs, we just expanded PreCheck to include active-duty U.S.
military traveling out of Reagan National Airport.
In addition to PreCheck, last fall we implemented new
screening procedures for children 12 and under, allowing them
to leave their shoes on and go through a less intrusive
security screening process. And just last Monday, at a few
airports we began testing similar modified procedures for
passengers 75 and older.
Finally, we are also supporting efforts to test identity-
based screening for airline pilots. So far, over 470,000
uniformed pilots have cleared security through the Known
Crewmember program.
These initiatives have allowed us to expedite the screening
process for children, our military, many frequent fliers, and,
now in testing, the elderly. They have resulted in fewer
divestiture requirements and a significant reduction in pat-
downs, while allowing us more time to focus on travelers we
believe are likely to pose a risk to our transportation
network, including those on terrorist watchlists.
By enhancing the effectiveness of our current programs and
layering in our risk-based security initiatives, TSA continues
to work toward our goal of providing the most effective
security in the most efficient way.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify.
At this time, I would like to introduce my colleague, Mr.
Stephen Sadler, Assistant Administrator for TSA's Office of
Intelligence and Analysis.
Chairman Issa. The gentleman is recognized.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN SADLER
Mr. Sadler. Good afternoon, Chairman Issa and distinguished
members of the committees. I appreciate the opportunity to
testify on some of the work we are doing in coordination with
the United States Coast Guard to strengthen security throughout
our Nation's maritime transportation system.
The Transportation Worker Identification Credential
program, or TWIC, is an important security measure designed to
ensure that individuals who pose a threat to security do not
gain unescorted access to secure areas of certain maritime
facilities and vessels. Prior to the TWIC program, there was no
standard identity verification or background check policy for
entrance to a port. Today, facility owners and operators can
look for one standard identification document issued after the
successful completion of a thorough security threat assessment.
The identity verification and threat assessment
requirements of the TWIC program support the DHS multilayered
approach to protecting the Nation's transportation system and
enhance security at our ports. Several key objectives, included
in the SAFE Port Act of 2006, were met during the initial
rollout of the program in October 2007. These include
milestones for implementing TWIC enrollment sites, conducting
security threat assessments, and issuing TWICs.
On April 15, 2009, U.S. Coast Guard regulation implemented
the requirement for all unescorted workers in secure areas and
all mariners to possess a valid TWIC. As of this month, almost
2 million transportation workers, including longshoremen,
truckers, and port employees, have received a TWIC.
This past February, TSA deployed changes to allow TWIC
holders to receive comparability for the security threat
assessment when applying for a hazardous materials endorsement
under a State-issued commercial driver's license. Under
comparability, hazmat applicants with a valid TWIC can pay a
reduced fee and do not need to go to an enrollment center; they
can go directly to their State licensing agency to apply for
this endorsement. Currently, 11 States and the District of
Columbia have availed themselves of this capability.
TSA also recently awarded its Universal Enrollment Services
contract. This new capability will allow individuals to apply
for multiple programs such as TWIC and HME at the same
location, provide enrollment centers across a broader
geographic range, and allow enrollment for new or future
programs serviced by TSA.
On May 31st, 2011, TSA completed the required data
collection phase of the TWIC Reader Pilot. TSA gathered
information from 7 ports, 13 facilities, and 4 vessel
operations that collectively installed 156 readers of various
types and models best suited to their business needs. These
sites provided data regarding reader performance and
reliability as well as throughput data of vehicle and
pedestrian access points.
The final report was submitted to Congress February 27th,
2012. This data provides a clearer picture of the likely
impacts of using readers at maritime facilities and on vessel
operations. The TWIC Reader Pilot concludes that TWIC reader
systems function properly when they are designed, installed,
and operated in a manner consistent with the characteristics
and business needs of the facility or the vessel operation.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
[Prepared statement of Mr. McLaughlin and Mr. Sadler
follows:]
Chairman Issa. Mr. Lord?
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD
Mr. Lord. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other members of the
committee. Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss
TSA's progress and related challenges in deploying three key
security programs. My observations are based on a large body of
work the GAO has completed over the last few years.
I would first like to note that DHS and TSA have made some
notable achievements since the 9/11 attacks in securing our
Nation's ports and airports. And as the TSA witnesses noted
today, some remaining challenges still exist.
The first program I would like to discuss today is TSA's
behavior detection program, also called SPOT. This program
consists of over 3,000 behavior detection officers that are
deployed to over 160 U.S. airports. This program is a key part
of TSA's efforts to focus more attention on dangerous people
versus dangerous items, which I support.
Bottom line on the program is, while TSA has taken some
steps to validate the science behind the program, much more
work remains to fully validate it, establish sound performance
metrics, and assess costs and benefits. And as we noted in our
prior work, all these additional steps could take several more
years to complete.
And as we noted in our report on the program, TSA deployed
SPOT nationwide before determining whether it had a valid
scientific basis. The good news is, DHS did complete an initial
validation study in April 2011, which concluded that the
program was more effective than random screening. However, as
the study itself noted, it was not designed to fully answer the
very important question of whether you can use behavior
detection principles for counterterrorism purposes in the
airport environment. A scientific consensus on this issue
simply does not exist.
Another key report recommendation was to develop better
performance measures. The importance of this is underscored by
looking at the arrests made under the program. For example, 27
percent of the 300 SPOT arrests made in 2010 were illegal
aliens, raising questions about mission focus.
The second TSA program I would like to discuss today is
TSA's body scanner program, commonly referred to as advanced
imaging technology or AITs. As you know, these scanners were
deployed in response to the attempted Christmas Day attack of a
Northwest Airlines flight. About 640 of these units are now in
place at over 160 airports. According to TSA, these machines
provide superior benefits over walk-through metal detectors
since they are capable of detecting non-metallic threat
objects.
Earlier this year, we issued a classified report on AIT.
While most of the details are still classified, TSA agreed to
allow us to note some of the details regarding the utilization
rates of these units for today's hearing. We found that some of
these units had been used less than 30 percent of the day since
their installation. And the good news is, in response to our
report, TSA agreed to take steps to address these low
utilization rates.
The last program I would like to briefly discuss today is
TSA's maritime biometric credential program called TWIC. In
terms of progress, TSA has now enrolled over two million
maritime workers in the program. However, our 2011 report
identified a number of significant internal control weaknesses
in card enrollment, background checking, and use that we
believe have limited the security benefits of the program. In
fact, these weaknesses may have contributed to the breach of
selected U.S. facilities during covert tests we conducted as
part of this review.
We recommended that DHS and TSA strengthen program controls
as well as complete an effectiveness study to clarify the
current program's contributions to enhancing maritime security.
DHS has established a working group with executive oversight to
address our important TWIC report recommendations. We look
forward to seeing the results of this committee's work.
In closing, TSA has established a number of security layers
and programs to thwart potential terrorist attacks. However,
our past work has identified a number of ways these efforts
could be strengthened to help ensure American taxpayers receive
a good return on their considerable investment. I am hoping
that today's hearing can provide some additional insights on
how these programs can be strengthened and be made more cost-
effective.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement, and I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Lord follows:]
Chairman Issa. Admiral?
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL PAUL F. ZUKUNFT
Admiral Zukunft. Good afternoon, Chairman Issa and
distinguished members of the committees. I am honored to appear
before you today to speak about the Coast Guard's role in
enforcing compliance with the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential, or TWIC, program within the maritime
transportation system.
The TWIC program, as envisioned under the Maritime
Transportation Security Act, or MTSA, of 2002 and strengthened
by the SAFE Port Act of 2006, requires that all credentialed
merchant mariners and transportation workers seeking unescorted
access to secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels
undergo a security check and receive a TWIC. The TWIC is
currently required for unescorted access to approximately 2,700
regulatory facilities, 12,000 regulated vessels, and 50
regulated Outer Continental Shelf facilities.
While the Transportation Security Administration has
primary responsibility for the issuance of TWICs, the Coast
Guard has primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with
the TWIC regulations. All of the approximately 2,700 maritime
facilities impacted by the TWIC regulations are and have been
in compliance since the April 15th, 2009, implementation date.
The Coast Guard continues to conduct both unannounced and
announced inspections to ensure compliance. Additionally, the
Coast Guard has verified more than 213,000 TWICs through a
combination of visual and electronic means.
In accordance with the SAFE Port Act, a pilot program was
conducted by TSA to evaluate the feasibility and technical and
operational impacts of implementing a TWIC reader system.
Electronic readers add another layer of security associated
with the TWIC by providing biometric confirmation of the TWIC
holder's identity. TSA's report on the pilot program was
delivered to Congress on February 27th, and the Coast Guard is
now incorporating the results of the pilot in our rulemaking
for electronic readers in the maritime environment. This
rulemaking will apply requirements in a risk-based fashion to
leverage security benefits and capabilities.
Additionally, Section 809 of the Coast Guard Authorization
Act of 2010 amended the original TWIC requirements to include
only those mariners allowed unescorted access to a secure area
designated in a vessel security plan. As elements of the Coast
Guard merchant mariner credential issuance process relies upon
data received through TWIC enrollment, the provision was
neither self-executing or easily implemented. Noting such, the
Coast Guard issued a policy letter in December 2011 to remove
the requirement to hold a TWIC for mariners currently inactive
or those serving on vessels that do not require a vessel
security plan. The Coast Guard continues to work toward
codification of this change through a rulemaking process.
A GAO report on TWIC in May 2011 identified a weakness in
verification of TWICs in the field. In response, we issued
policy to our field units directing thorough verification of
TWICs at checkpoints, highlighting that a quick flash of the
TWIC was not acceptable. The electronic readers deployed at our
units ensure each person attempting to enter a facility is
carrying a TWIC. And, to date, we have implemented over 275
readers to our field units.
We continue to work with our DHS partners and particularly
with TSA, as well as State and local agencies, to continue to
improve the TWIC program for seafarers and other maritime
transportation workers by balancing a steadfast commitment to
security while facilitating commerce.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
will be pleased to answer your questions.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
Chairman Issa. And as earlier announced, we will now
recognize the gentleman from Maryland for his opening
statement.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Today, the Oversight Committee and the Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee convene to examine measures TSA
utilizes to secure our Nation's transportation networks.
In the realm of aviation security, the TSA must achieve a
delicate balance. TSA must be effective in meeting the evolving
threats posed by terrorists. We also expect it to be responsive
to the needs of the public and the demands of commerce.
Since the terrible events of September 11th, 2001, several
attacks have been attempted against commercial planes,
including the attempted bombing on Christmas Day 2009 of
Northwest Airlines Flight 253 and the attempted bombing in 2010
of a cargo jet using a bomb disguised as an inkjet cartridge.
These incidents demonstrate the constantly evolving threats TSA
must counter.
TSA's 43,000 transportation security officers must screen
more than 2 million passengers every day in our Nation's 450
airports. Although the vast majority of passengers pose no
risk, these officers must find the equivalent of a needle in a
haystack.
In response to the Christmas Day bombing attempt, TSA
increased its deployment of advanced imagining technology
systems to screen passengers for both metallic and non-metallic
threats. More recently, TSA has developed the PreCheck program
to expedite screening for low-risk travellers, such as members
of the military.
I welcome TSA's efforts to develop a more intelligent,
risk-based approach to transportation security. Recognizing the
enormity of the challenge TSA faces, as the agency develops new
screening techniques we must ensure that it strikes the
appropriate balance between moving too quickly to deploy
untested or unreliable technologies or techniques and moving
too slowly to address new threats.
Today's hearing will also review the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential. When I served as chairman of the
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, I
convened hearings in 2007 and 2008 to review the rollout of
TWIC. And I thank the Coast Guard for joining us today.
Unlike many screening techniques TSA uses in the aviation
realm, Congress mandated what became the TWIC program and
required that this program be funded by fees collected from
enrollees. There are now more than 2.1 million enrollees, and,
by our estimate, these enrollees have paid approximately $280
million to implement this program.
To close the security perimeter that TWIC is intended to
create, we must finally implement the use of readers so that
these cards are no longer just expensive flash passes. TSA must
also ensure that TWICs are not issued to ineligible applicants.
However, we must also view TWIC in the broader maritime
security context. TWIC is meant to control land-side access to
secure areas of U.S. ports and secure areas of U.S. vessels.
There are many risks that approach our ports, particularly from
the water side, that TWIC was never intended to address. None
of the individuals on the estimated 17 million small boats
operating in our waters are required to carry TWICs, and none
of the foreign mariners on the more than 9,000 foreign-flagged
vessels calling on U.S. ports carry TWICs.
Our first and most critical line of maritime defense, our
thin blue line at sea, is the Coast Guard, which must defend
our coasts, rescue thousands at sea, respond to marine
casualties and oil spills, intercept drugs and migrants, and
enforce security requirements at 2,500 facilities and on nearly
13,000 vessels regulated by the Maritime Transportation
Security Act.
This service of 42,000 active-duty officers and members do
all of this on a budget of less than $10 billion per year, less
than 2 percent of the DOD's base budget. And they now face
additional cuts and the loss of up to 1,000 active-duty slots
in next year's budget.
The Coast Guard does all that we ask of them to do.
However, we cannot continue to stretch the service and assume
that it will never break or that gaps will not open in our
maritime security.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back, and I want to thank
you for your courtesy.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
Chairman Issa. We have also been joined by the chairman of
the full Transportation Committee, and I now recognize him.
Mr. Mica. First of all, thank you so much, Chairman Issa,
and to your committee, Government Reform and Oversight. I am
honored to co-chair this hearing with you. I am sorry there was
a little bit of a delay getting back here today, but pleased to
be with you. And I thank you for your leadership on this.
This is a very important agency that we have joint
responsibility over. Our committee has some limited oversight
responsibility. Under Transportation, as you may recall,
historically, TSA was created. I happened to chair the
Subcommittee on Aviation in 2001 after the horrific terrorist
attacks.
Since that time, TSA has grown from 16,500 screeners and a
small cadre of different transportation security activities
which we joined together. It was a much smaller beginning, and,
unfortunately, TSA has mushroomed to 65,000 employees, of which
there are 14,000 administrative personnel--4,000 in Washington
and 10,000 out in the field.
We never intended it to mushroom to this size. And, as you
know, I have been critical particularly of the administrative
cost. Even with the administrative cost, we might be able to
endure that kind of expenditure, which has now grown to $8
billion, if it meant we were secure. But instead, as this
committee report today reviews, we have a number of programs
that are so far behind.
One that I would like to talk about is the TWIC program,
Transportation Worker Identification Card. We have spent
hundreds of millions of dollars, and it is still in limbo. Some
of the equipment that has been purchased does not do the job. I
know we can't talk about all of it here in this open setting.
But the deployment and acquisition of expensive equipment that
is supposed to protect us, which wasn't properly tested,
vetted, and the deployment could have probably have been done
better by a high school class project.
TSA has had five Administrators in 9 years. We had a period
under the Obama administration in which we had no Administrator
for almost a year. It is difficult enough with an agency like
TSA or any other Federal agency to operate with an
Administrator in Washington, let alone not having an
Administrator for that period of time.
I have other concerns, having monitored this as closely as
anyone in Congress. We are still at risk; the Nation is still
at risk. Unfortunately, even the layered system--and TSA will
talk to you about a layered system. Almost every layer is just
flawed. The behavior detection, which I worked with previous
Administrators to put in--when we had equipment that didn't
work, TSA again bought equipment that didn't work. Just
following that equipment, the puffers--and I have had my
investigative staff follow that--they sat and we were paying
rent on them on a vacant--I am sorry, in a warehouse that then
they spent $600, I think, per piece of equipment. They told us
that DOD had them destroyed, but only after we prompted the
action.
Sent investigators down to look at another--jointly, we
sent them down to look at another warehouse we had gotten
information that was full of equipment, some of it purchased,
some of it should have been deployed, some of it sitting there
at great taxpayer expense for a long time paying rent on it.
And then the nerve to cause us to delay--and I might even
ask if we can't get the information to subpoena it--when we
were informing TSA that we were sending our investigative staff
there, to delay our staff and investigation by a week so trucks
could come up and haul this stuff away, even some as our
investigators were appearing on the scene.
It is just a very expensive and disappointing operation. I
have had faith in Administrator Pistole. He promised reform. He
has told the committee he would reform the agency. And I don't
see that happening, unfortunately.
But that is just the highlights, Mr. Chairman. It is just
important that we get to the bottom of this. There is a lot of
hard-earned taxpayer money going for, unfortunately, theater
security, not real security. And we have to stop paying that
price before we pay a huge price with another successful attack
by terrorists.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
I have the advantage of knowing your bios. You may not know
mine, but I spent nearly 3 decades in security. And the one
thing I know about security is, there are two types. There is
the type that convince people that your target is harder than
somebody else's. In other words, I can't protect all cars, but
I can make the crook choose to steal the car next to the one
protected by Viper. That is what I would say you have as a
system here today.
You, in fact, have a series of hardenings. They work
sometimes. And I am speaking particularly about in the
aviation. These programs certainly seem to be good programs.
And in every case, as the wind blows through the screen, those
spots clearly will at times stop targets. But targets,
particularly terrorist targets, are in fact exactly like you
would expect: They are mobile, they are responsive.
If we do not have a layered security system that has a
sufficient force to at least be like the hull of a ship,
Admiral, one in which we know there will be a few leaks that
you have to pump out but for the most part it is watertight--
our security system today is clearly not watertight.
The accidental catching of the bad guys belabors two
points: one, the many people who in fact find themselves, like
most of us on the dais, going through security and sometimes
they have us pull something out, sometimes they don't;
sometimes they do a secondary, sometimes they don't.
I am going to give you just a couple. We opened up this
hearing to Facebook. I am just giving you anecdotal ones, but I
will supply all of them. I will place them in the record, and I
will also supply all of them to you so you can respond to the
individuals in their entirety.
But, for example, Joe Carica. He is a U.S. Marine. He was
flying in his Dress Blues ``D'' uniform. He was forced to
remove his trousers in full view of passengers because his
shirt-stays beneath them were scaring a TSA employee. It didn't
matter that he explained what it was, and it didn't matter that
they were something that he undoubtedly had seen many times
before if he were a veteran. Of course, you and I all know that
the turnover at TSA is high and the training is seemingly
perpetual.
The next one is from Reagan Shea, who says, ``I am a
disabled person and have been targeted for groping. My wife
travels with a portable oxygen concentrator, and her use of the
machine means she get pawed by hand every time we travel.''
Julia Rachiele: ``The TSA has taken away my freedom to
travel because I wear a medical device and cannot go through
the amount of radiation I would be subjected to. As a result, I
get an enhanced pat-down procedure every time.''
Lastly--and there are plenty more; there are over 350--``I
am Wendy. I have worn an artificial leg since I was 4. I am now
61. I used to travel a lot for my work but gave up traveling
after being assaulted by TSA constantly, even to the point of
having my breasts checked instead of my leg prosthesis.''
First question I have for the panel, and particularly for
the aviation side: There are 65,000 to 67,000 TSA workers, men
and women who are trying to do a good job. A quarter of them
are employed in administration.
First question for you is, do you think that is a fair
ratio of administration? Or do you think you are, in fact, a
bloated, bureaucratic organization that has a lot of people
working on a lot of systems that ultimately, after procurement,
don't work?
Mr. McLaughlin?
Mr. McLaughlin. Sir, I will respond to that. First of all,
thank you for recognizing the very hardworking men and women of
TSA. Our folks in the field are working hard every day to keep
all of us safe as we travel.
I will have to take for the record the ratio for
administrative to frontline personnel. I think it might be
different from that, but I will get back to you.
Chairman Issa. Well, I will give you one--I travel,
obviously, to a number of places--Houston, Sacramento--but San
Diego and Dulles are my two majors. I can tell you that I
periodically count, and for 4 active checkpoints in San Diego
there will be as many as 35 people in blue standing there.
So even if your administrative count were not one in four,
wouldn't you agree, based on your own observations, that the
amount of people directly at a checkpoint versus the total
number would seem to be extremely high? In other words, you
haven't created any efficiency in the 10 years of your
existence.
Mr. McLaughlin. Well, certainly, I don't agree with that.
TSA is working hard to provide the most effective----
Chairman Issa. Well, let's go through the numbers, though,
quickly. Because I am really on overtime, and I will make it up
to the ranking member.
There are four times as many TSA employees as there was 7
or 8 years ago, correct?
Mr. McLaughlin. Again, I don't believe----
Chairman Issa. In 2002, 16,000 in your initial
authorization, so you had less than that. By 2005, you were
still below 35,000. You are now over 65,000. In the last, let's
say, 5 years, when you have more than doubled in numbers, have
the American people seen shorter lines? Yes or no?
Mr. McLaughlin. I do believe that the American people have
seen shorter lines in the last 4 or 5 years.
Chairman Issa. Yeah. Well, with that, I would like you to
check your figures. The fact is, they haven't seen shorter
lines. I fly to enough airports to tell you that, in fact, you
are not giving shorter lines. You are taking longer for each
one and using more people.
With that, I would recognize the ranking member for his
questions.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
TSA recently completed the reader pilot test required by
the SAFE Port Act. And as I mentioned in my opening statement,
I believe that to maximize the security TWIC can provide, we
must move to implement the use of the readers.
Assistant Secretary Sadler, TSA was responsible for the
recent reader pilot test. And, Admiral Zukunft, the Coast Guard
is responsible for promulgating the final reader rule. Let me
ask both of you this: Will it be technically feasible for
facilities to install readers that can quickly and reliably
read TWIC cards without impeding the flow of workers into ports
and to the secure areas of vessels? And by what date do you
think the installation of the readers can realistically be
achieved?
And I think we have been--it seems like we ought to be able
to get this done, gentlemen, some kind of way. We have been
messing around with this for a while.
Oh, come on, some of you, one of you. Admiral?
Admiral Zukunft. Ranking Member, I would be pleased to
answer that.
As you know, we have embarked upon the rulemaking process.
Getting to a final rule, before we do that we really need to
adjudicate the comments. So that would be very informative to
answer that very question, with the objective of not impeding
commerce.
There are over 32 recognized commercial-off-the-shelf TWIC
readers. We expect one of the concerns will be, you know,
whether you use a mobile system or whether it is a fixed system
that would be at a container terminal. But we would envision
approximately a 2-year period of time from the time a final
rule was on the street to full implementation across industry.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Sadler, do you have a response?
Mr. Sadler. Yes. I think, sir, during the pilot we did show
that when the readers were installed properly, the people who
worked in the facilities were trained properly, and the workers
were assimilated to the cards and the use of the cards with
those readers, that they did work properly. They did not impede
the flow of commerce in those particular ports.
But it does depend on the installation, it does depend on
the training, and it does depend on whether the facility has
picked the right reader for its business need.
Mr. Cummings. Okay.
Admiral Zukunft, the GAO reported that its employees were
successful in accessing ports using counterfeit TWICs--
authentic TWICs acquired through fraudulent means in false
business cases.
Let me ask you this. I want you to clarify that individual
ports still have the authority, and indeed the responsibility,
to deny admission even to those who have valid and authentic
TWICs if they have no business on the port property. Is that
correct?
Admiral Zukunft. That is correct.
Mr. Cummings. And, that said, what steps has the Coast
Guard taken to address the GAO's findings? And, additionally,
do you think the use of readers will help close these security
gaps?
Admiral Zukunft. Ranking Member, I do. We have issued
policy guidance to our field units. To date, they have been out
in the field screening, doing spot checks. We have done over
200,000 of these spot checks. In a 2-day period alone last
week, we ran over 450 spot checks. And out of those 450, we did
find 58 members who had no rightful business being at those
particular facilities.
We engage extensively with our stakeholders through our
security committees and certainly the facility owners. They are
interested, first of all, in those who may have criminal
intent, which is one of the slices of information that TWIC
provides. And on a steady basis, that pool of 2 million TWIC
card holders are being screened against the terrorist screening
database. So there is realtime information but also a benefit
to the facility owners as well.
Mr. Cummings. Yeah, TWIC is the only part of our maritime
security regime that--and that is very significant. The Coast
Guard is and will remain the most important element of that
regime, but the strains of budget cuts on the service are
obvious. For example, in 2010, 10 of the 12 cutters deployed to
respond to the earthquake in Haiti suffered significant
problems, and 2 had to be taken out of service and sent in for
major repairs. Is that right?
Admiral Zukunft. I was intimately involved with that
response, Ranking Member, and that is true.
Mr. Cummings. And in February of this year, the GAO issued
a new report finding that, in part due to a lack of funding,
the Coast Guard does not have any fully operating interagency
operating centers, though these were required by the SAFE Port
Act to be established by October 2009.
Similar to the GAO, the DHS inspector general and others
have noted the Coast Guard's inability to meet safety and
security mission requirements in the Arctic as the ice cover
opens to allow more shipping operations in those latitudes.
Nonetheless, the President's budget proposes extensive cuts
both to the Coast Guard's end strength and its capital account.
No funding was requested for the acquisition of the National
Security Cutter 7 or 8. And this budget will conclude the
acquisition of the Fast Response Cutter at a number
substantially below the approved program of record.
Finally, this is my last question. While I know that the
Coast Guard strives to meet every mission requirement, can you
comment on the challenges the service is facing in balancing
its competing mission needs, particularly in the maritime
security arena, in light of the significant budget constraints?
I have always complained about the Coast Guard not having
enough money. I am just trying to figure out how you are going
to do all the things you have to do, particularly since 9/11,
with regard to the budget cuts.
Admiral Zukunft. I would be pleased to, Ranking Member
Cummings.
I was involved in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. I was
the Federal on-scene coordinator for over 7 months. And the
President directed that we triple our response effort.
The Coast Guard has no force in garrison; we are constantly
doing frontline operations. And so we had the good fortune, if
you want to call it that, where we didn't have another
contingency occurring at the same time as Deepwater Horizon, so
I was able to redeploy buoy tenders from Cordova, Alaska, to
Honolulu and marshal all of those resources into the Gulf of
Mexico. We were able to do the same during the earthquake in
Haiti, even though some of those ships did have maintenance
challenges, and we did the same during Hurricane Katrina.
So the challenge we face in the maritime security domain
is, what if we have multiple threats? What if we have a
hurricane and then we have a threat to national security taking
place concurrently? And that is where we really run into
resource challenges, because we have to reallocate resources
from one mission to another. And we are at risk because we
don't have the resources to do both.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr.
Mica, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Mica. Well, first of all, my friends at TSA and other
witnesses, since my last hearing, which was with the
Appropriations subcommittee--I am not a member of that
subcommittee but was allowed to ask questions, as we have
extended to others who are not on our committee. And----
Chairman Issa. We recommend that system to all committees.
Mr. Mica. Well, yes. And the funny thing about that is, Mr.
Chairman--and I won't allow this to take away from my time, but
I have to put this caveat in. TSA found out that I would be a
witness, so they sent Mr. Pistole an email. The email said,
``Mr. Mica is going to be there, so when he asks a question,
Mr. Pistole, take a long time answering it so you eat up his
time.'' The problem is that they--again, sometimes you think it
is the gang that can't shoot straight, but they shot the email
to CQ. I think that was the publication.
So, again, reserving my time, if you would answer fairly
briefly and not use the directive of that memo. One of my
concerns, of course, is the Transportation Worker
Identification Card. We have spent over a half a billion
dollars, is that correct? Yes or no? Mr. McLaughlin? Mr.
Sadler?
Mr. Sadler. I will take that one, sir. To date----
Mr. Mica. I have $511 million spent.
Mr. Sadler. To date, on the program itself, we have
expended approximately $374 million.
Mr. Mica. But I have $511 million.
Mr. Sadler. You may be including grants in that. I would
have to go back and check that number.
Mr. Mica. Well, we wouldn't want to leave any--I mean, I
consider that as an expenditure, money spent. All right, well,
we will say in the neighborhood of a half a billion.
And the card is supposed to allow us to identify who goes
into our ports. We passed the law setting that requirement up
back after 2001, right, Mr. Sadler? Who wants to answer?
Mr. Sadler. I believe that was required by the MTSA of
2002.
Mr. Mica. 2002, after 2001. Thank you.
They have produced--1.9 million of the cards are active,
printed 2.1 million of them. We still do not have all of the
components that were required under the law, including iris and
thumbprint, as far as biometric capability, do we, Mr. Sadler?
Mr. Sadler. We have the capability to include an iris on
the chip of the card.
Mr. Mica. But you do not have a standard for iris, right?
Mr. Sadler. That is correct. NIST has just put out a
proposed change to the standard to include iris.
Mr. Mica. Again, I just have to go back because this is not
going to be Groundhog Day, but I had a hearing April 14th,
almost a year ago, and the director of the NIST Information
Technology Lab testified. And I have the questions here. ``When
will you finish the iris capability?'' ``Draft publication will
be''--this is last year--``hopefully before next week.'' ``And
when will you finish the final standard?'' ``By the end of the
year.'' That was last year.
Now, I was told at the beginning of the year it might be,
what? This summer? Is that what you have heard?
Mr. Sadler. No, sir, I haven't gotten a time for when the--
--
Mr. Mica. So don't have a time. They told us this summer.
So we are now going into our ninth year.
Now, it is great that we produced these TWIC cards at great
public expense, a half a billion, but then I read that you are
still in a pilot reader program. So, basically, we have 1
million of these cards and we don't have readers; is that
correct?
Mr. Sadler. Well, just to go----
Mr. Mica. Do the ports have readers?
Mr. Sadler. --just to go back a second----
Mr. Mica. Do the ports have readers?
Mr. Sadler. --there is a fingerprint template on the chip
of the card.
Mr. Mica. Do the ports have readers?
Mr. Sadler. Certain ports do have readers. And we have 35
readers that are----
Mr. Mica. Do we have----
Mr. Sadler. --on our approved products list that the ports
can use.
Mr. Mica. How many of the ports would have readers, and how
many of these cards are able to be read?
Mr. Sadler. Well, we know----
Mr. Mica. As a percentage.
Mr. Sadler.--we know that the pilot ports have readers. I
don't know the number of ports outside of the pilot ports that
have readers. I do know the Coast Guard has----
Mr. Mica. Staff, can we insert in the record at this time
the very small number of ports that in fact have readers? And
we don't----
Chairman Issa. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
Behavior detection, let me go into this. And I am just
going to take 1 more minute, because I had to----
Chairman Issa. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Mica. Behavior detection program, we have spent a
billion dollars on it. Can someone--can someone say that that
is correct?
Mr. McLaughlin. Sir, I believe that number is slightly
below that, but we will get back to you for the record.
Mr. Mica. Okay. All right.
And I also--I asked--when I knew that the puffers didn't
work, that they had bought and told me that they would work,
and actually went up and had them tested, went through, every
time it didn't detect some trace elements that were put on me,
I was told it was just a technical problem. And we just
destroyed those; is that correct? We paid $600 a piece to
destroy the puffers; is that correct?
Mr. McLaughlin. I believe that is correct.
Mr. Mica. I don't even want to know how long they sat in
the warehouse, and then they had DOD destroy them. But getting
something else in place because the technology didn't work, and
you all have seen the classified reports on the performance of
the advanced imaging technology equipment, have you not?
Mr. McLaughlin. Yes.
Mr. Mica. So we know by that performance and the lack of
performance of what we have seen with the puffers, that
behavior detection is very important and others use it
successfully. The problem is GAO reviewed the performance and
said that 24 times, 17 known terrorists went through airports,
passed TSA, and they have yet to detect one terrorist. And that
was actually a question that was submitted by one of the
Floridians we had open question online that we allowed people.
Can you name any terrorists that you have actually stopped in
the program?
Mr. McLaughlin. We are not aware of any terrorists
transiting a checkpoint where BDOs were actively working. While
we accept GAO's comments that there were 24 instances in SPOT
airports, we do not know that BDOs were working at the time
that those individuals came through, number one. And number
two, we know, in hindsight, they were not operational, so they
were not exhibiting signs of stress, fear, or deception.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
Mr. Lord. May I comment on that?
Chairman Issa. Yes. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Lord. I am the GAO representative. I think our point in
the report was to study the travel patterns that people
associate with terrorists to see if they were exhibiting any
SPOT behaviors. At this time, I don't believe it is known
whether they were exhibiting behaviors or not. And we made that
recommendation in the spirit of improving the program to
develop better performance measures. We suggested reviewing the
videotapes; we thought that would be a rich source of
information to help refine the program.
Mr. Mica. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I will also ask
unanimous consent to put in the record, we went up and looked
in Boston of where they have a demonstration project, and I
think there is still one in Detroit, and we saw unbelievable
configuration.
Chairman Issa. Without objection.
Mr. Mica. And we want to detail our findings, which we also
passed on to the administration.
Chairman Issa. Without objection that will be placed in the
record.
And I now go to Mr. Boswell, a gentleman who I served with
on the Select Intelligence Committee, who more than anybody
here on the dais today knows what the special skills are
necessary to read somebody who may be a terrorist. And the
gentleman is recognized.
Mr. Boswell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You may have
overstated that a little bit but nevertheless.
Chairman Issa. No, I remember our times behind closed doors
very, very well, and you were truly the senior statesman there
on that issue.
Mr. Boswell. Very, very kind, and I appreciate it. First
off, I want to start with a positive remark. We stood up what
we do, Mr. Chairman, is going to be a pretty humongous agency,
as we started out with the need we had and the situation that
caused it. And I would like to compliment the courtesy and the
efforts that people starting new careers, if you will, have
demonstrated.
The one thing that amazes me, and it is not rocket science,
and I have been waiting and waiting and waiting; I was really
pleased to see we could realize we could push the air crews
through a little quicker and not delay things. There are a
number of us here, myself included, that held probably as high
a clearance as one can get for years, but I still am checked as
if I were suspect of walking through the same airport, time and
time and time and time again.
I know there are some people that have a malady because of
things happened in the service. And there seems to be no effort
to recognize that, my gosh, they have had a background check,
top secret, top secret crypto, so on and so on. Do you have any
intention to ever try and take advantage of that and expedite
things a little bit, or are you going to keep on doing it like
you have been doing it?
Mr. McLaughlin. Sir, actually, the answer to that question
is we are actively engaged with a number of different groups to
try to expand our PreCheck population. Again, PreCheck is the
program that is allowing expedited screening for individuals
that are qualified, either today in pilot phase because they
are part of frequent flier program or they have opted in
through CBP's Global Entry.
We extended the program to active duty military traveling
out of Reagan National airport. That started last week.
And we are exploring other groups that we can work with.
Mr. Boswell. Well, I understand the active military, and
you know, people like Mr. Issa and myself and others, you know,
took off the uniform one day and did work the next, but the
history is still there.
Mr. McLaughlin. We are actively looking at that.
Mr. Boswell. What is your timeline for active on this?
Seems like simple, straightforward; the record is either there
or it is not. The case that I know of, at least I can speak for
myself, I know the record is there.
Mr. McLaughlin. There are two aspects, really, that we
focus on.
One is, to your point, if the record is there, and then two
is our ability to reconcile that at the checkpoint. So there is
a technology piece that allows us to verify that someone is who
we believe they are.
We started this process in the fall of last year, and
already, in just March, we are up over 600,000 participants in
the program. So I think we are working quickly to expand the
program, but we are doing it also cautiously to make sure that
we are maintaining security every step along the way.
Mr. Boswell. I appreciate that, but I still just don't
understand why you can't take--it is like discovering the wheel
all over or passing up the fact that we have spent a lot of
money in the past on doing background checks on a number of
people, and it is just like it never happened.
How many years have been going on now that we have been
doing this? And it seems like you have had time to proceed a
little bit further along the way. But, again, I want to leave
and stop on a positive note. I think that the personnel are
courteous, work hard and are sincere and are following the
rules that the administrators gave them to operate by.
I just think we could do a little bit better. I do
appreciate the fact we don't have to leave pilots and air crews
standing in line as we did for some time. I thought that would
probably get solved, but we are leaving a lot of other people.
It takes up time. It clogs up the process when it could be a
pretty simple identification. Most of us that have spent time
in the service have even got a printed ID card that says we
served 20-plus years, and a lot of information on there, seems
like it could be used.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
Mr. Farenthold. [Presiding.] I see I am up next. So I will
yield myself 5 minutes.
First off, I would like to thank you all for taking the
opportunity to be here. I think I am in the unique position of
being the one Member of Congress who actually serves on all
three committees that has jurisdiction over the TSA: Government
& Oversight Reform Committee; the Transportation Committee; and
Homeland Security. So I actually spend a whole lot of time with
this issue, as well as quite a bit of time traveling and
experiencing the service of the TSA.
I would like to say the vast majority, I would say almost
without exception, but there are exceptions, the TSA employees
that I have encountered in my travels have all been courteous
and professional in nature.
However, as part of preparing for this, just like Chairman
Issa, I opened up my social media sites to comments with
respect to experiences with the TSA, and I received quite a few
negative comments as well.
And without objection, I would like to get those entered
into the record as well. So ordered.
Mr. Farenthold. I do want to talk about some of the
problems that people have reported with the TSA. I understand
we are in a situation where it is a stressful environment for
many people traveling. The TSA is squeezed into spaces in
airports not designed for the level of screening, but if you
look at some of these instances, and we had one in the news
just last week of the gentleman in the wheelchair being patted,
it seems like at some point if we could just use some common
sense and slow down a little bit and offer to do some of these
screenings in a private area or in a screened-off area. And
maybe it is worth spinning a little effort on creating spaces
that are a more friendly to that; we might be able to do better
there. I just encourage both the TSA and the traveling public
not to get worked up. I think there are some better ways to do
this.
I did want to talk a little bit about the SPOT program. I
am concerned how effective behavioral detection program is with
the limited amount interaction there is between the TSA agents
and the general public. About 6 months ago, I think I commented
in one of these hearings that I could get through the entire
airport without uttering a word other than ``thank you'' to
anybody: Check in at a kiosk; hand my stuff to the TSA; hand my
stuff to the gate agent. Now at least the TSA is at least
asking me for my full name.
It seems like SPOT would be better off if there was a
little bit more engagement.
Mr. McLaughlin and Mr. Sadler, would you like to comment on
that.
Mr. McLaughlin. Thank you. First, if I could, just for
everyone's awareness, every passenger that travels through
checkpoint is entitled to private screening upon request. We
want to make sure that we honor that commitment.
Mr. Farenthold. It might be something you consider
offering, especially to the elderly and disabled and children.
Mr. McLaughlin. Sure. And with regard to the video from
last week, that was actually a video that was over 2 years old.
And with the policy changes that we put in place last fall,
again, we have seen a traumatic decline in the number of times
where we have had to pat down children and now the elderly with
our new program.
With regard to SPOT and your question, sir, I agree with
you that our SPOT program in its current form is largely an
observation program where our officers are trained to observe
signs of fear, of deception, and of stress that are different
than the general traveling public----
Mr. Farenthold. And Mr. Lord, there is no way to really
test that, because you can't imitate those behaviors. Is that
correct?
Mr. Lord. While the behaviors can be imitated, as in any
deterrence program, it's effectiveness is difficult to
evaluate.
Mr. Farenthold. I apologize, I am going quickly because of
time. What is the roll out schedule nationwide for TSA? I
dusted off my Global Entry card because I am looking real
forward to being able to use that.
Mr. McLaughlin. We have, the administrator and the
Secretary announced I think in February that we intend to roll
out to the 35 busiest airports by the end of this calendar
year. And so far, we are on target for that. As of last week,
we are at 11 airports, and we continue to roll out a couple
airports a week and will begin adding additional airlines as
well.
Mr. Farenthold. Mr. Lord, I know you spend a fair amount of
time studying what the TSA does, and I have also had access to
some of these classified reports to a level that I am a little
bit concerned. But I wanted to ask you, do you see some things
that we are not doing that we should be doing to increase
security? I know that really isn't something specifically you
study, but you all spend a lot of time looking at what they are
doing and how.
Mr. Lord. I can't think of anything off the top of my head.
We completed a large body of work on various layers of TSA's
security programs. All of our reports include recommendations
to improve things, so we think we are having a positive impact
on the programs, and TSA has been very receptive to most of our
recommendations.
Mr. Farenthold. I see I am out of time. Hopefully, we will
get to a second round of questions. I will now recognize Mr.
Connolly, the gentleman from Virginia, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all
for being here today.
I think we need to start, as our colleague Mr. Boswell did,
positively recognizing the extraordinary difficulty of the
mission here. In a free society, how do we graft on to that
protective and necessarily often intrusive measures to protect
the public, after tragedy of 9/11 especially? In a democracy,
frankly, it seems to me we ought to be arguing about this all
the time, because I don't think we should ever get complacent
about either side of this, my right to privacy and my right to
be protected, and the role of government in fulfilling that
mission.
So I think it is a natural tension and not necessarily
always a reflection on the men and women who are trying to
fulfill this mission.
And my observation thoroughly is that the men and women who
have been recruited to fulfill this mission are actually doing
on balance, a very good job. And many of them are very
professional in their approach to the public. But as the
chairman indicated and Mr. Issa indicated, our committee chair,
there are, however, occasions where that is not the case.
And one thing I just commend you, Mr. McLaughlin, and you,
Mr. Sadler, a simple training in ``please'' and ``thank you''
would really go a long way with the public. I wish I could say
everybody remembers that, but we are not cattle, and we are
citizens, and we are not to be presumed guilty of anything. And
barking orders like people are cattle is not appropriate. And I
would urge you strongly to make sure--I know it seems simple,
but it gets on the traveling public's nerves, and it undoes a
lot of the wonderful work otherwise being done by the employees
of TSA.
So, once in a while, there are people who just, I don't
know, they don't feel they need to do that or they are giving
orders. And what we are really trying do here in a free society
is to get compliance. And most of the public I think actually
understands that and is willing to tolerate the fair amount of
intrusiveness, more than I would have guessed actually, but
they do expect to be treated with respect.
So I think so long as we can do that in the training of our
men and women, I think we would also go a long way to enhancing
the compliance, understanding we are all in this together.
Mr. Lord, last year, TSA ranked 232 out of 241 Federal
agencies and entities in the Partnership of Public Services
Best Places to Work. In other words, it was in the bottom 5
percent of Federal agencies as, yeah, I would love to work
there. And it ranked second to last for pay, family-friendly
management policies and performance-based incentives. Would you
comment?
Mr. Lord. I am aware of that survey. First, I would like to
comment that GAO consistently ranked near the top. I believe,
last year, we were second.
I saw the scores for DHS and TSA. I think some of that
reflects, they have a very large screening workforce that does
a somewhat stressful job. They are interacting with the public
on a day-to-day basis, and sometimes that is stressful. It
wasn't clear to me, though, what the department was doing about
it on an organizational wide basis.
Mr. Connolly. We are going to give them an opportunity to
comment on that. But are you familiar with the turnover rate
last year?
Mr. Lord. Not specifically.
Mr. Connolly. Would it surprise you for me to tell you that
it was 13 percent?
Mr. Lord. If that is accurate, that would not surprise me,
no.
Mr. Connolly. And it has been 10 percent for at least the
last 5 years and that that is significantly higher than the
average of Federal agencies?
Mr. Lord. Any time any organization experiences that type
of turnover, obviously, you are dealing with some--it imposes
certainly challenges----
Mr. Connolly. Given the sensitive nature of the mission,
the security mission, should it concern us, in your opinion,
that we have low morale and high turn over, and that that
actually could--in theory, could affect the performance of the
mission?
Mr. Lord. I am not sure what the root causes are.
Mr. Connolly. Well, putting aside causes, just those facts,
would that not suggest it could compromise the mission, that we
are less than enthusiastic about carrying out the mission or
less than caring about it because I don't even like being here.
I don't like my boss or I don't like the policies of the
agency. What I am worried about is, in addition to the men and
women who are suffering that low morale, what is the impact on
the traveling public in terms of their carrying out their
mission?
Mr. Lord. That would concern me as a TSA executive.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, I won't ask any more, but if
you would wouldn't mind allowing Mr. McLaughlin and Mr. Sadler
to respond.
Mr. Farenthold. Without objection.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair.
Mr. McLaughlin. Thank you.
First of all, to your comment about training, I am pleased
to let you know that earlier this year, we began a training
initiative that we are referring to as PACOM. And that
initiative is a training that all TSA frontline employees and
their managers in the field will go through, which focuses
specifically on active listening skills, on empathy, as well as
on a communication technique that hopefully will improve that
experience; the caveat being that airports are very busy and
loud places, and sometimes it is hard to balance the need to
communicate in a way that is heard without being overheard, so
to speak.
My numbers with regard to attrition----
Mr. Connolly. If I could interrupt you. There is a
difference between, ``please put your hands up,'' you know, in
the machine versus ``put your hands up.''
Mr. McLaughlin. Agreed and that is what this training
addresses specifically.
Again, we are on target to get that training complete for
managers and supervisors by June of this and for the entire
frontline staff by December of this year.
The numbers that I have for attrition are 6.1 percent for
full timers and then 18 percent for part-timers. So while we
are concerned about the part time number, the overall number
that I think you have might be skewed somewhat by that data.
With regard to what we are doing to improve our standing in
the best places to work, and I can tell you from personal
experience, first of all, being an employer in both the private
sector and now in Federal service, having worked with thousands
and thousands of employees, I will tell you that I am very
proud of the dedication of my workforce and their commitment to
the mission.
I think, overall, their focus on the mission is not
consistent with the rating that we received in the best places
to work. That being said, we have a number of initiatives as we
move forward to improve the overall morale. We have national
advisory councils. We have trainings, like the ones that I
described, where feedback from officers are--literally one
officer described it as life-changing event for her in terms of
her understanding of her role and how she could interact better
with customers, which has an impact on morale.
And then I would also say some of it just comes with the
newness with our agencies, an agency that is less than 10 years
old or just now 10 years old is going to have a different
growth curve than a Federal agency that has been around for 50,
100 or even 200 years.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much. We will now proceed to
another expert in the field, the gentleman from Minnesota,
former airline pilot himself, recognize Mr. Cravaack for 5
minutes.
Mr. Cravaack. Expert? I don't now about that. End user,
yes, definitely.
I just have a couple of questions. And I thank everybody
for coming here today because I think everybody wants the same
issue, wants safety in the air, and make sure our people that
are working with us are happy and do their job efficiently and
effectively.
And thank you for the Coast Guard and all the things your
men and women do for you, Admiral.
I would just like to talk about a couple of things. Joe
passenger walking through my first level of security; I am
going to go through SPOT. I see SPOT developing probably into
something more of what we see in Amsterdam, Israel, going
through more proactive challenge-reply, taking a look at
behaviors. So I see that developing. Right now, it is not a
totally effective tool, but let's just deal with the now if we
may.
So we hit SPOT as we head on to the screening area. Go to
the screening area, and Mr. Lord, you said 30 percent are used
by AIT machines; is that correct, 30 percent of the passengers
going through?
Mr. Lord. It is--yeah, according to Mr. McLaughlin, that is
correct.
Mr. Cravaack. We found that some AITs were used less than
30 percent of the time, as highlighted in my prepared
statement. So 30 percent of the passengers are going through
the newer, more improved AIT machines. Would you consider, as
much as you can within this arena, are the AITs 100 percent
absolute? Are they foolproof?
Mr. Lord. I can't discuss any of the details, but in
general, any technology has limitations.
Mr. Cravaack. We all have limitations, any technology is
going to have some type of limitations. Now, of course, through
the metal detectors, those are a little bit less advantageous.
So only 30 percent of those people have gone through the first
phase of SPOT, now going through 30 percent will even say they
go through an AIT machine, where the other 70 percent have gone
through metal detectors, which are basically less--I don't want
to say less safe, but not as good as the AIT machines.
Okay, then we get to the gate, and we have the gate agent
making sure you get on the right aircraft. We have gone through
some security, but there is a possibility that something could
have slipped through.
Let's talk about the aircraft itself. The aircraft is
sitting on the tarmac, and around the aircraft, we have nearly
a million airport workers working around that aircraft are
credentialed. These credentialed airport works have direct
access to nonpublic areas and sanitized areas SIDAs, so here
they are working in the shadow of the air plane, close to a
million workers. Could you tell me how these workers, these
million workers, are credentialed?
Mr. Lord. There is a--they all are required to wear secure
identification display badges, and they are essentially vetted
against terrorist watchlists, immigration databases and
criminal records.
Mr. Cravaack. We have all seen most recently with all of
the--we have seen drugs being smuggled on board aircraft; we
have seen numerous theft rings that have been working in and
around the aircraft. And it would be safe to say that there are
also holes within this program as well. Would you be correct in
that?
Mr. Lord. There are various vulnerabilities in the layers
based on the work we completed to date.
Mr. Cravaack. So we have a potential going to the aircraft,
some passengers being screened, even having a very good
possibility of getting through SPOT and also screening
techniques. And we have just as equal opportunity for the
potential of items being given--put on board the aircraft on
the shadow of the aircraft through credentialed workers. So my
question to you, and I am going to give you a very good one,
Mr. McLaughlin, if you don't mind, sir, and I say this with all
due respect, so with the potential of having a person that has
malintent coming on board the aircraft, linking up with a
device that is on board the aircraft through a credentialed
person in the shadow of that aircraft, that aircraft gets
underway and is in the air, what are the line of defenses
capable in the air at that time? Who is the last line of
defense, Mr. McLaughlin? And don't say the cockpit door, the
armed cockpit door.
Mr. McLaughlin. That wasn't even my answer.
With the multiple layers in place, there are on a number of
flights, we do have Federal Air Marshals. But the layer of
security that is in place, that is an important layer today,
and we talk about it from time to time and we know it when we
fly, is the actual passenger. That individual that learned as
many lessons on 9/11 as the rest us have learned.
Mr. Cravaack. True, no truer words are spoken. If I may
have indulgence, Mr. Chair, but if a professional terrorist has
done this routine a hundred times, they know when that cockpit
door is going to be open. They know when it is going to be
closed. They know a lot of things about the aircraft that your
average traveling public does not know. So my question to you,
sir, is there are really not that many FAMs available per
flight, and that is a classified number, but why in God's green
Earth would we cut in half a volunteer program that protects
the aircraft for $15 a flight? Why would we do that?
Mr. McLaughlin. Sir, I can't really discuss that topic
because it is really outside my area of responsibility at TSA.
I can reinforce some of the other layers that are on the
ground, including the work that we do in and around the
airport, and we can take that question for the record in terms
of----
Mr. Cravaack. I would appreciate that. This program, the
Federal Flight Deck Officer program, is being cut in half, a
$15-per-flight program that was the last line of defense for
many potential terrorists wishing to take that aircraft and use
it as a weapon of mass destruction. So with that, sir, I would
appreciate your information on that.
And with that, sir, I thank the chair's indulgence, and I
yield back.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much.
We will now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr.
Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would like to incorporate by reference all the
nice things said about TSA personnel in my home community in
Memphis, particularly, for they be voters, but also in
Washington, where they are not, have all been courteous and
nice folk. They have got a tough job, having to do kind of a
monotonous gig, and they are not the most popular people to see
when you have to go through that. It is not like Customs and
checkpoint Charlie, but still, it is something you don't look
forward to and relish.
The other is about the TWIC cards, and I reiterate the
concerns we have got in Memphis with the TWIC cards and they
are important, but there seems like there could be a better way
to allow the people that receive them to pick them up, rather
than have to do it personally; they could be done through the
mail like driver's licenses and other licenses are. An
improvement in that system would be helpful in my community.
Who is the expert here on the process we go through at the
airport?
Mr. McLaughlin. The airport would be myself.
Mr. Cohen. Let me ask you this, today, for the first time,
I was asked to take off my watch. Why?
Mr. McLaughlin. While I clearly wasn't there with you, it
is possible that our divest officer, the individual who is
working to facilitate the travel of customers, might have felt
that it would alarm and that you might have had an easier
experience by removing it, but you are not required to remove
your watch.
Mr. Cohen. Well, they made it like everybody was; she was
announcing, take off your watch. And just like with the very
flawed systems that they have for onboard diagnostics and the
check engine light and folks being able to get their car
inspected, if the light is on, even if the car doesn't emit any
type of carbon vapors over and above what is expected, they
won't pass you. And they say, well, it will save you problems
in the future. That is not EPA's job; nor is it your job to
make it less likely.
I don't get it. It made no sense to me at all. And she
said, you have got to take it off. I mean, it is just like, the
rules need to be consistent. For a while, we didn't do shoes,
and then the guy had the shoe, and then some places had shoes
and some didn't. Now, today, I notice shoes must not be in a
bin, but they must be laid flat on the conveyer belt. Is that a
uniform rule?
Mr. McLaughlin. That is not a rule in place today. At one
point, we actually changed our procedure with shoes and have
subsequently some time ago changed that back to allow them to
be placed in a bin or on the belt. However----
Mr. Cohen. In Memphis, they have got a sign that says they
must be placed flat on the conveyer belt, which is not a big
deal, but sometimes your shoes can get crushed between two
bags. And if you care about your shoes, that is not wonderful.
The watch thing just seems it is the inconsistency of
everything gets you. I am comfortable in my manhood, and so the
guy was fine, didn't have a problem. But I got out, and he
wanted to pat me down, and he patted down my chest. The same
soap I use every day. Never been patted down before on my
chest. The machine must have messed up is all I can figure.
Mr. McLaughlin. Again, I can't speak to your specific
situation, but I can look into it for you.
Mr. Cohen. I am not terribly concerned. It just seems like
there should be some consistency. And the machines sometimes
may be set at different levels or something, because sometimes
you go through and they want to look at your arm or look at
this or that. And I mean, I am not the Bionic Man in any--well,
whatever. I don't have any parts that are new or metallic, so
it makes no sense.
Mr. McLaughlin. So our goal is to be uniform and
consistent, and at the same time, we also want to be random and
unpredictable at times because we find that is helpful in terms
of our work in security, but we are looking for a uniform and
consistent experience for travelers as they come through, and
as I said, I am happy to follow up on that.
Mr. Cohen. I agree with Mr. Boswell that there probably
should be some type of system where you have your most likely
people that you know that are frequent fliers and are safe and
going to do any--one day, there was this lady there who has got
the richest husband in town almost. And she has got a place in
Aspen, and she has got a place in France. And they were going
through all of her--if anybody wants to stay alive, it is her.
I mean, she has got it all. And they were going through all of
her stuff. When they saw all of that, they should have
realized, this woman wants to live. Sometimes it is a little
common sense.
How much did the puffers cost us? The whole puffer process?
Mr. McLaughlin. So the puffers predate my time at TSA, I
can take that question for the record and get back to you. We
talked earlier about the disposal fee for the puffers.
Mr. Cohen. And they are history, I know that, but that was
a loser from jump street, too. I mean, here in Washington, one
line had a puffer, and one line didn't. So if you are a
terrorist, you would go through the line that didn't have the
puffer, thinking the puffer worked. The fact that the puffer
doesn't work, the terrorist could have chosen either line. But
they said, well, extra security was given on the other line if
there was some problem; they looked at you even closer. Well,
if they looked at you closer in the other line, why didn't they
look at you closer in the puffer line? I mean, the puffer thing
was really bad.
But otherwise, all the TSA people are great. You have a
tough job. I know you will make it better.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you, Mr. Cohen.
And the staff informs me that the puffers were around $30
million. If that is incorrect, please let us know.
I think the same situation exists today. I fly home
sometimes on American, sometimes on United. If you go on United
at DCA, you go through a full body scanner. If you on American,
you go through a metal detector. It doesn't take a rocket
scientists to figure out there is a potential issue there.
We now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Coble.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I arrived a bit delayed. For that, I apologize; I had a
conflicted schedule. And maybe these questions may have already
been pursued.
Mr. Sadler, what has been the total cost of the TWIC
program to the Federal Government and the private sector?
Mr. Sadler. To date, the program costs are approximately
$374 million. That would include $100 million in appropriations
and about $274 million in user fees for individuals who have
paid for the TWIC card.
Mr. Coble. The Federal Government and the private sector,
both?
Mr. Sadler. Yes, sir. That is the appropriated money to
start the program, the $100 million, and then the $274 million
was the user fees when you enroll and get a TWIC card issued to
you.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, sir.
Admiral, what is the amount of money that you allocate for
TWIC administration each year?
Admiral Zukunft. Ours is very minimal. We have expended
about $2 million looking at mostly commercial off-the-shelf
technology.
Mr. Coble. That is $2 million annually?
Admiral Zukunft. To date. That does not include the day-to-
day expenses of our personnel. I do a number of missions, one
of those is validating TWICs at these facilities, but that is
part of our mission set already.
Mr. Coble. And how many Coast Guard personnel are dedicated
to oversight of the TWIC program?
Admiral Zukunft. They are not dedicated solely to TWIC, but
they do facility inspections. And TWIC is just one element of
that. So they are looking at everything from what
infrastructure is in place and so those exist at all of our
sectors, all of our ports throughout the United States.
And one example of that is we recently shut down a facility
in Miami because it didn't have the appropriate safeguards,
unrelated to TWIC, but there were literally holes in the fence
line that would allow people with no business to enter into
those facilities.
Mr. Coble. How long has TWIC been online?
Admiral Zukunft. TWIC was implemented in 2009, on April
15th, and that is when 2,700 facilities were required to have
TWIC. And on that milestone date, all facilities were in
compliance. The TWIC reader is going to be critical as we go
forward, because that will be the next enabling mechanism
because that biometric chip is really what provides the next
level of security, beyond the visual recognition that is on the
existing TWICs.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, gentlemen.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much.
Seeing no one else on the other side, I will go to Mrs.
Blackburn from Tennessee for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
committee for allowing me to participate today.
This is an issue, TSA and their participation and their
conduct is something is that is important to my constituents.
And Mr. Lord and Mr. McLaughlin have both mentioned constituent
satisfaction, customer satisfaction, as a goal.
I would just commend to you looking at The Economist
magazine's online poll, which they have up right now. And the
question they are asking is whether or not changes made to
airport security since 9/11 have done more harm than good. And
at last check, as I checked, it was 87 percent of the readers
agree that changes that airport security have done more harm
than good.
So, gentlemen, I would contend that we are not doing our
best at customer service, and I think, Mr. Connolly, my
colleague from the other side of the aisle, spoke well to that.
I want to talk with you a little about the VIPR teams,
because on October 20th, 2011, my home State of Tennessee
became the first State in the country to deploy VIPR teams
simultaneously at five weigh stations and two bus stations. The
teams included your TSOs, BDOs, explosive detection, canine
teams.
My office was informed by TSA that the point of operation
was for TSA agents to recruit truck drivers into the First
Observer Highway Security Program. The TSOs and the BDOs
involved in the operation were only supposed to be handing out
recruitment brochures since neither position has actual Federal
law enforcement training. However, I have got a couple posters
here; you can see back here. If you look at these posters, and
I will call that one Exhibit A, and if you were watching the
video of this transaction, you would see that this individual,
who is designated as a TSA employee, is walking around and
inspecting the truck. So if they were supposed to be handing
out brochures, what were they doing inspecting the truck? And
what type training do the TSOs and the BDOs receive to detect
abnormalities or potential threats in semi trucks, Mr.
McLaughlin?
Mr. McLaughlin. Thank you.
First, the exercise--or I should say, the VIPR that you
reference in your State of Tennessee was, it is important to
note, a joint training exercise with 23 different agencies,
both Federal, State and local, where TSA was invited to
participate. And by all accounts, the 2- or 3-day exercise went
off very well. It was an important opportunity for us to build
relationships to ensure that in the event of a real national
security emergency, we have the types of relationships----
Mrs. Blackburn. Sir, you are using my time. But I would
just ask what type training do they have to actually do these
inspections and to detect the abnormalities that would be there
on our Nation's highways? Because they have no Federal law
enforcement training, correct?
Mr. McLaughlin. During this exercise, the officers did not
conduct any screening of any vehicles, nor----
Mrs. Blackburn. Okay, let me put up poster number two. Then
why did they ask to open the top of this--open this truck and
look? Was there a specific threat to Tennessee highways on
October 20th, 2011? And was there any intelligence suggesting
that a suspected terrorist may be driving a semi truck across
Tennessee? And were there specific threats that were deterred
by conducting this operation?
Mr. McLaughlin. Well, I can't talk about threats that might
have been deterred. I can tell you, again, that this was a
training exercise, not an exercise based on active intelligence
in the State.
Mrs. Blackburn. Okay.
Mr. Sadler, do you have anything to add to that?
Mr. Sadler. No, ma'am.
Mrs. Blackburn. You don't. Well, there, again, I want to go
back to this question, what kind of specific training do they
have to be on the Nation's highways conducting these kinds of
searches?
Mr. McLaughlin. TSOs and BDOs do not receive specific
training with regard to screening vehicles in the highway mode
of transportation. The canine team that I believe that I see up
there, although it is from a distance appears, to be a multi
modal dog that is trained in that mode of transportation.
Mrs. Blackburn. So, even though our TSOs have no Federal
law enforcement training, you are pleased that they you are
participating in these type exercises?
Mr. McLaughlin. Again, the VIPR program is set up to
provide a visual deterrent and to work in conjunction with our
State and local partners and all modes of transportation. And
part of that, again, is to build relationships in terms of an
exercise----
Mrs. Blackburn. So these TSOs, who have been
administratively reclassified from being screeners and
processors and given no Federal law enforcement training, are
going to be out on our Nation's highways and our seaports and
participating in this type of activity?
Mr. McLaughlin. I am not sure I understood that as a
question.
Mrs. Blackburn. Okay. Well, let me ask you this, based on
the performance that you have seen with the VIPR teams and
their ability to prevent specific terrorist threats, what kind
of grade would you give them?
Mr. McLaughlin. I think that our VIPR teams do a very good
job in a mode of transportation where we have very limited
resources. I think our VIPR teams working in conjunction with
State and local agencies do a very good job of providing a
visible deterrent to people that might be attempting to do
something bad.
Mrs. Blackburn. A to F, what kind of grade would you give
them?
Mr. McLaughlin. I don't know that I have the experience to
say specifically. Based on the experience I do have, I would
give them a grade B plus to A minus, and that largely just
based on the length of time that the program has been in place.
It is a program that is only 5 years old in totality.
Mrs. Blackburn. I would just remind you that your agency
has agreed that performance measures need to be developed for
the VIPR teams, so that there can be some measured results and
some quantifiable data, and we will follow that as we move
forward.
One last question that I would have for you, have the VIPR
teams ever pulled over cars, SUVs or vans?
Mr. McLaughlin. I am not aware of a TSA asset on a VIPR
team pulling over a car or van, but I can take that question
for the record.
Mrs. Blackburn. I would love to have that answer, because,
to my knowledge, there is no terrorist that has ever driven a
semi truck. So we find is very curious, the method that was
being employed with the VIPR teams and their presence. And you
can go look at the Zazi example or Shahzad example, and those
were car cars and SUVs. They were not semi trucks.
I yield back.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much. We will now start our
second round of questioning, and I will give it a go for 5
minutes, and then we will go to Mr. Cummings.
As we talk about the SPOT program for a minute, if a BDO
SPOT agent were able to see something that they considered to
be suspicious behavior, what is the follow up there? What can
they do? Do they engage the person in conversation? What is the
procedure when a SPOT agent detects something? Is there
something they can do? And if so, can you tell me what that is?
Mr. McLaughlin. So, in our SPOT program, our officers are
trained to observe behavior and engage in casual conversations
with individuals. If the circumstances warrant, they can engage
local law enforcement for further follow up.
Mr. Farenthold. And so if they detected something
suspicious, can they stop them from boarding the plane?
Mr. McLaughlin. If you are asking can they physically
detain an individual, SPOT officers are not trained nor do we
want them to physically detain an individual.
Mr. Farenthold. I set a SPOT officer off for some reason,
and I can just walk on and get on my plane; they can't stop me.
Mr. McLaughlin. I apologize. I misunderstood your question.
I thought you speaking physically.
A SPOT officer, if they have reason to believe that you are
suspicious, can engage a local law enforcement officer, who
will interview you and either send you on your way or ask you
additional questions.
Mr. Farenthold. Has a SPOT officer ever stopped somebody
from boarding a plane?
Mr. McLaughlin. Not to my knowledge. Again, there are times
when a SPOT officer will engage in conversation, but I cannot--
I don't know of a time when an officer has stopped someone from
getting an airplane.
Mr. Farenthold. How much are we paying these guys to chat
up passengers?
Mr. McLaughlin. So our SPOT officers are paid in the same
range as our Federal officers, beginning at the F band and
topping G band, somewhere between $37,000 and $50,000.
Mr. Farenthold. Last year, in TSA oversight, part one,
hearing by the OGR committee, Chairman Mica asked some panels
about the effectiveness of the full body scanners and whether
or not they could detect body cavity inserts or surgically
implanted explosive devices. And the unanimous answer to that
question was no.
On July 6th of 2011, the TSA released a notice to airlines
warning them of the increased threat caused by explosive
implant methods. And earlier this month, someone posted a video
on the Internet demonstrating how to defeat these machines. Why
are we continuing to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on
technology with such obvious vulnerabilities? And what have you
done with respect to the hearing last month and the revelation
that they can't detect some these things?
Mr. McLaughlin. First of all, I would point out that
recently, our administrator testified with regard to AIT
effectiveness. And there is a follow-up hearing, as I
understand it, in the month of April in a classified setting
where he will be able to get into more details. So I will tell
you that we, obviously, on a daily basis review vulnerabilities
in our system and ensure that we have mitigations in place,
including AIT, which is our best deterrent or our best
detection against metallic and nonmetallic threats----
Mr. Farenthold. And is it your plan to replace all the
magnetometers with AITs?
Mr. McLaughlin. That is not our current plan. Based on sort
of our evolution with the risk-based security, we are looking
at the best way to deploy the best assets we have in
configurations that makes sense across the system.
Mr. Farenthold. And as they are purchased, are they getting
deployed in a timely manner. I know there are some warehouses
that a lot of this equipment sits in as it gets deployed, and
the last I had heard, we weren't using modern deployment
techniques, like drop-shipping them to airports.
Mr. McLaughlin. To my knowledge there are no AITs in the
warehouse that you refer to. The AITs are being deployed
readily, and our utilization numbers are improving dramatically
on a daily basis.
Mr. Farenthold. And where are we with getting a peer-
reviewed safety evaluation of these machines, specifically four
TSA agents that are nearby and operating them and frequent
screenees, be they frequent fliers or--I realize now the
airline staffs are typically are diverted through
magnetometers, but I saw a pregnant female TSA officer right by
one of those machines and was concerned, because I understand
there are no peer-reviewed safety checks there.
Mr. McLaughlin. So with regard to the backscatter
technology, which is the one that uses radiation, there have
been three, as I understand it, independent studies, including
one from NIST, one from the Food and Drug Administration, and
one from the U.S. Army.
In addition to that, the machines are subjected to regular
dosimeter testing to ensure that they fall within safe limits.
And with every test that has been conducted, the units are well
below established limits. All of the tests that I just referred
to, both NIST and the Food and Drug, as well as the Army, and
as well as the surveys with dosimeter surveys, are available on
TSA's public Web site at tsa.gov.
Mr. Farenthold. Mr. Lord, are you comfortable with those?
Mr. Lord. The IG recently reported on that and repeated
much of the same information Mr. McLaughlin just provided. I am
comfortable with what I heard, but if you are interested in
having us conduct follow up, I can certainly talk to your staff
after----
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much. We will be in touch.
Now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Assistant Secretary Sadler, the GAO reported that its audit
found that TSA had inadequate screening systems in place to
identify applicants ineligible for TWICs and to deny the
issuance of TWICs to them. What steps has TSA taken to address
these findings?
Mr. Sadler. Well, the first thing we did was we created an
executive level oversight board coordination with DHS to map
out our short-term, medium-term and long-term strategy to
address these recommendations. Immediately after receiving the
report and the recommendations, we retrained the trusted
agents; those are the individuals who collect the information
at the enrollment sites, their ability to identify fraudulent
documentation.
We also made system modifications that allow to us collect
more information on the documents that are collected, pass that
to our adjudicators so they could be reviewed more thoroughly.
The mid-term and longer-term plan, we are making arrangements
with the U.S. IDENT system, U.S. VISIT, so we can send our
fingerprints into that repository and check our fingerprints
that we have against the fingerprints in their repository to
see if anybody is applying under multiple names or identities.
The other long-term project that we are working on is to
wrap that capability with the FBI, and what that means is,
currently, we are required to submit fingerprints, a new set of
fingerprints each time we want a criminal history records
check. What we are working towards is seeing if we can submit
the fingerprints we have on file to the FBI to get a criminal
history records check without hauling someone in to submit a
new set of prints, and also that capability will tell us if the
individual has committed some type of criminal offense in
between the applications that they make every 5 years.
So there are a number of things we are doing. We took the
recommendations very seriously, and we are doing the best we
can with the program. We want to make it the best that it can
be.
Mr. Cummings. Now, during a hearing on TWIC held by the
Senate Commerce Committee in May of 2011, Mr. Lord indicated in
response to a question from Senator Boozman that a normal
driver's license is at least as secure, probably in many cases
more secure, than a TWIC. Is a TWIC more or less secure than a
normal driver's license?
Mr. Sadler. I would have to defer to Mr. Lord on how he
came to that conclusion. But for the TWIC, we think that TWIC
is a secure credential, because you have to remember prior to
TWIC, you could go to a port and gain access to a port with
multiple credentials, possibly a credit card, a union card, any
number of credentials.
So the first thing I would say about the TWIC is, it is the
first time a common credential has been issued in a maritime
environment, which means we can train to that credential. The
second thing I would say is we developed many security features
to put on that card, and we did that in coordination with other
agencies, including the forensics document lab at ICE. So we
did the best we could do make that card secure.
And then you also need to keep in mind it has a biometric
on it, and although the readers aren't in place at the Coast
Guard does have portable handheld readers that they can use to
do random checks and security checks, as well as do checks as
far as for port security inspections and vessel security
inspections each year.
Mr. Cummings. Admiral Zukunft, Section 809 of the Coast
Guard Authorization Act of 2010 exempts mariners who do not
need access to a secure area of a vessel from the requirement
that they obtain a TWIC. Coast Guard Policy Letter 1115
implements Section 809 but still requires those seeking their
first mariner credential to visit a TWIC enrollment center,
essentially, to complete the TWIC enrollment process and pay
the enrollment fee.
Admiral, I understand that the TWIC exemption has been
estimated by the Coast Guard to apply to potentially 60,000 of
the 210,000 licensed mariners in the United States. Is that
correct?
Admiral Zukunft. That is correct. And to date, we have only
had approximately only 68 take advantage of the 809 provision.
Mr. Cummings. And why do you think that is?
Admiral Zukunft. For some, they see that TWIC as an
employment opportunity. So if an employer would ask, why do you
not have a TWIC, in this competitive environment, they see that
as advantageous to have that credential and an up-to-date
background check.
Mr. Cummings. I see my time has expired. I yield back.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much. There are quite a few
other questions, and some of the other members that had to
leave did want to ask some additional questions, so with that
in mind, we will be submitting additional questions in writing
to complete the record as we finish this up.
Also, without objection, I would like to leave 7 days open
for members to submit both those questions and opening
statements.
I would like to thank each and every member of the panel
for being with us, commend you for your service to this
country, and urge you to continue to look for ways to improve
what you and your agencies are able to do to better serve and
better spend--more efficiently spend and use the taxpayers
money to provide a safe transportation environment for all of
us. Thank you for being here.
We are done.
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the committees were adjourned.]