    [House Hearing, 112 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                       THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S CENTER FOR
                           STRATEGIC COUNTERTERRORISM
                      COMMUNICATIONS: MISSION, OPERATIONS
                                   AND IMPACT

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

             SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 AUGUST 2, 2012

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 112-164

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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                                     ______

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
    ELTON GALLEGLY, California           ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California             Samoa
    DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois         DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey--
    EDWARD R. ROYCE, California              deceased 3/6/12 deg.
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   BRAD SHERMAN, California
    RON PAUL, Texas                      ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    MIKE PENCE, Indiana                  GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
    CONNIE MACK, Florida                 ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TED POE, Texas                       DENNIS CARDOZA, California
    GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida            BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
    JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio                   BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    BILL JOHNSON, Ohio                   ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
    DAVID RIVERA, Florida                CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
    MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania             FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
    TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas                KAREN BASS, California
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
    RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
    ROBERT TURNER, New York
                       Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
                 Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

             Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    TED POE, Texas                       BRAD SHERMAN, California
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    BILL JOHNSON, Ohio                   GERALD E. CONNOLLY,
    TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas                    Virginia
    ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York          BRIAN HIGGINS, New YorkRemoved 6/
    RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina            19/12 deg.
                                         ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                    WITNESS

    The Honorable Alberto Fernandez, Coordinator, Center for
      Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, U.S. Department of
      State..........................................................     6

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from
      the State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on
      Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade: Prepared statement.....     3
    The Honorable Alberto Fernandez: Prepared statement..............     9

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    28
    Hearing minutes..................................................    29
    The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
      from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement..........    31
    The Honorable Edward R. Royce:
      Letter from the Honorable Edward R. Royce to the Honorable
        Alberto Fernandez dated August 14, 2012......................    32
      Letter from the United States Department of State to the
        Honorable Edward R. Royce received August 30, 2012...........    34
    Written responses from the Honorable Alberto Fernandez to
      questions submitted for the record by:.........................
      The Honorable Edward R. Royce..................................    36
      The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress from
        the State of South Carolina..................................    44

         THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S CENTER FOR STRATEGIC COUNTERTERRORISM
                 COMMUNICATIONS: MISSION, OPERATIONS AND IMPACT

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 2012

                  House of Representatives,
                         Subcommittee on Terrorism,
                               Nonproliferation, and Trade,
                                  Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Royce. This hearing of the subcommittee will come to
    order. Today we examine the State Department's Center for
    Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. Terrorist
    organizations, as we know, use the Internet. They use it to
    propagandize, and they use it to recruit, and they use it all
    over the globe. So prevalent are these extremist Web sites
    today that they have been described as a ``virtual caliphate''
    in cyberspace. Several witnesses appearing before this
    subcommittee in the past have urged a more vigorous U.S. effort
    to combat terrorist use of the Internet.
        And to go back to recent hearings on this, one cited ``the
    absence of an effective campaign to counter al-Qaeda's
    extremist ideology'' and made the point that that is a central
    challenge, an ongoing challenge. Another witness said that our
    efforts up until now have been ``anemic.'' Stepping into this
    void is the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
    Communications, which was established by executive order last
    fall.
        While other U.S. agencies may hack into extremist chat
    rooms to sew confusion or to render them useless, or for the
    purpose of collecting intelligence, CSCC's mission is a very
    straightforward one. Its mission is to identify, confront, and
    undermine al-Qaeda or, as the Ambassador likes to say, ``get in
    their heads.''
        Arabic, Urdu, and Somali speakers ``contest'' in these
    online chat rooms and media Web sites and these forums that are
    set up where al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda affiliates operate. As we
    will hear, the aim of its ``digital outreach team'' is to
    expose the inherent contradictions in al-Qaeda propaganda and
    bring to light al-Qaeda's atrocities. One recent effort caught
    headlines after the al-Qaeda affiliate in Yemen posted photos
    of coffins. And in these pictures, they had coffins draped in
    American flags. The center produced a counter ad that replaced
    the flags with the flag of Yemen, conveying, of course, that
    most of the victims of the attacks in Yemen have been local
    people. And these videos, of course, got a quick reaction. And
    they were applauded by analysts for the use of the ``out-of-
    the-box'' thinking. And the use of ridicule is pretty common
    here in terms of this interaction that goes on with al-Qaeda on
    these Web sites.
        So this is new. And there are issues for us to consider in
    this. Can the center keep from becoming just another office
    that is bureaucratic? Can we make sure the innovation isn't
    beaten out of it, you know, keep it fresh? Is it responding to
    events on the ground with what I think you call the appropriate
    ``counternarratives'' for those situations? And the digital
    outreach team, which includes many contract personnel, have
    also got to master here some pretty sensitive and complicated
    issues, or they could do harm in this situation.
        So how does the State Department oversee their work? How do
    you avoid some of the quality control issues that have plagued
    some of the U.S. international broadcasting efforts over the
    years? I am thinking about some of the problems we have had
    with respect to Iran, for example. So those are the issues. And
    should it go beyond al-Qaeda as a target? Does the center face
    legal constraints is another issue.
        But an overriding question facing the center is the ability
    to measure its impact. Terrorist propagandists have felt
    compelled to react to the center's work with vitriolic attacks.
    We have anecdotal evidence in terms of the effectiveness. In
    December, a top al-Qaeda Web site began discussing ways to
    counter the videos posted by the digital outreach teams that
    are reaching their audience. State Department officials take
    the attitude that it is better to be hated than ignored when it
    comes to al-Qaeda's watchers. But at the end of the day, we
    need a measure of effectiveness. We need to know, are opinions
    changing? And if so, is the center a significant influence, or
    is it just a commendable but ultimately futile attempt to empty
    an ocean of militancy with a spoon?
        Those are the issues we are going to be discussing today.
    And we look forward to hearing from our witness. And I will
    turn now to Ranking Member Sherman for his opening statement.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Chairman, for holding these
    hearings.
        Back in September 2010, I was sitting there. You were
    sitting immediately to the right, and this same subcommittee
    held hearings called U.S. Strategy for Countering Jihadist Web
    Sites, in which we focused on the efforts to counter the
    radical messages online. And while I know our focus here is
    going to be online, television and radio continue to be even
    more important communications media in most of the world that
    we are trying to reach.
        The State Department Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
    Communications, CSCC, has as its mission to identify, confront,
    and undermine the communications of al-Qaeda affiliates. A
    principal focus is digital outreach. The staff of the center is
    about 45 by the end of this year, I understand, with about 20
    native speakers of Arabic, Urdu, and Somali, and I hope other
    languages as well. And perhaps in your statement you can
    indicate all the languages that you have native speakers
    communicating in. And they are battling on forums and other
    sites where al-Qaeda and its affiliates spread propaganda and
    recruit followers. They expose the work of hate,
    contradictions, false and empty ideology of al-Qaeda.
        And I hope that you are working hand in hand, and maybe you
    will tell us in your opening statement, with the CIA and others
    to identify who the bad guys are, rather than just to argue
    against them. There are some we are not going to be able to
    convince.
        These are open Web sites, forums where vulnerable minds can
    be swayed by al-Qaeda recruiters. According to the State
    Department, the center focuses on two themes in
    counterterrorism communications, that al-Qaeda-inspired
    violence kills disproportionately Muslims, and then violence is
    not necessary for political change. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed
    Islamic state on the front line of several conflicts. With so
    many extremist groups, Pakistan is a pressing international
    problem for us. My hope is that you are reaching out to the
    Pakistani people, not just in Urdu, which is the politically
    correct language that the government and the ISI in Pakistan
    would have you use, but also in the other languages,
    particularly Sindhi. The people of Sindh, who predominantly
    speak Sindhi, have been under attack by governmental bodies.
    And that is why the Government of Pakistan would just assume
    you not use that language. They are so helpful in so many ways,
    that perhaps you might want to ignore their advice. The U.S.
    must reach out to Sindh, when of course the Sindhi language is
    spoken by more people than Urdu, even though I know you have
    native Urdu speakers. So I hope you will be discussing your
    efforts to outreach to southern Pakistan. I would point out
    that this committee passed an amendment stating that at least
    $1.5 million be spent on radio broadcasts, preferably AM,
    perhaps based in the Emirates, to reach out in the Sindhi
    language.
        The terrorist organizations use the Internet to get their
    message across and spread propaganda. We are told that we
    should simply compete with them by posting things where they
    post things. The more aggressive thing to do is just take down
    their sites. And we invented the Internet, and we ought to
    perhaps be aggressive, either by serving notice on certain
    servers in certain countries or through more surreptitious
    means. Are you so sure that you are going to outdebate them
    that you want them to have the run of the Internet?
        Another issue is the budget. You have had some belt
    tightening, a 2011 budget of $6.8 million. In 2012, it was $5
    million. The request now is for $5.15 million. I would just
    point out that even if your work is 100th of 1 percent as
    important as our military, you are a real bargain. And it has
    the additional advantage of not having to pay in both blood and
    treasure for our anti-terrorism efforts.
        So I look forward to hearing from you as to what we can do
    to block terrorist communications as well as to answer them. I
    yield back.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
        Now we go to Mr. Duncan from South Carolina.
        Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        You know, I am grateful for the work that the State
    Department Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications
    is seeking to do. In addition to serving on this subcommittee,
    my work on the Homeland Security Committee has enabled me to
    study this issue in depth. And I believe strategic
    communications is crucial.
        This issue is really an issue about the war of ideas. How
    do we achieve victory on a battleground for the hearts and
    minds of individuals who not only commit violent actions, but
    who seek to destroy America, our values, our freedoms, and
    ultimately our Constitution? So what do we do with a war that
    involves conflicting visions of the world; western
    civilization, which values freedom, versus a totalitarian
    political ideology of Islamists espoused by al-Qaeda and other
    terrorist organizations, including the imposition of a rigid
    form of sharia? Radical Islamist clerics and terrorist
    organizations have become masters at using social media.
    Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Internet chat rooms, and al-Qaeda's
    Inspire allow the publication of religious commentary and
    religious opinions to large audiences instantaneously.
        In the course of this hearing, I would like know to know to
    what extent social media plays in the role of the center's
    identification of current and emerging trends of extremist
    communication. Does the center have an alternative or
    counternarrative to al-Qaeda's Inspire? Additionally, I want to
    understand how the center defines strategic counterterrorism
    communications. What is so strategic about what the center is
    doing? In other words, by strategic, does the center mean
    coordination of communications all across government channels?
    More a bureaucratic messaging strategy? Or does it mean that
    the U.S. Government communications will have a strategic
    effect? I believe the center is on the right path in seeking to
    steer individuals away from violence.
        However, I believe that we can take it further by, one,
    understanding the ideology of Islamists; number two, directly
    countering the ideology by attacking Islamists' authenticity,
    delegitimizing groups, individuals, and movements that support
    Islamist discourse and power; and number three, neutralizing
    Islamist propaganda by showing the parallels between Islamism
    and other forms of political ideology, like totalitarianism and
    fascism and other things. And so Ambassador Fernandez, thank
    you for being here today to testify. I look forward to your
    testimony.
        And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Duncan.
        Today we are joined by Ambassador Alberto Fernandez, the
    State Department's Coordinator for the Center for Strategic
    Counterterrorism Communication.
        Previously, Ambassador Fernandez served as U.S. Ambassador
    to Equatorial Guinea. He served as director for Near East
    Public Diplomacy from 2005 to 2007 and held senior diplomacy
    positions at the U.S. Embassies in Afghanistan, Jordan, and
    Syria.
        I think you were stationed in Sudan for a while.
        A career member of the Foreign Service, Ambassador
    Fernandez has received the Presidential Meritorious Service
    Award and the Edward R. Murrow Award for Excellence in Public
    Diplomacy, among others. He is fluent in Arabic and in Spanish.
        We welcome you to the committee.
        And I would like to acknowledge that the Ambassador
    submitted his testimony to the committee well in advance of
    this afternoon's hearing, a first I think. It is much
    appreciated, obviously, by the members of the committee.
        Your complete written statement, of course, will appear in
    the record. What we are going to suggest is a shorter 5-minute
    opening statement, and then we will proceed with questions.
        And again, Ambassador, thank you for joining us.

      STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, COORDINATOR,
      CENTER FOR STRATEGIC COUNTERTERRORISM COMMUNICATIONS, U.S.
                          DEPARTMENT OF STATE

        Ambassador Fernandez. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sherman, and Mr. Duncan, thank
    you for the opportunity to be here today. I am pleased to be
    with you this afternoon to discuss the interagency Center for
    Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. I will make brief
    remarks drawing on my formal testimony.
        CSCC was established at the direction of the President and
    the Secretary of State to coordinate, orient, and inform
    government-wide foreign communications activities targeted
    against terrorism and violent extremism, particularly al-Qaeda
    and its allies. We are housed in the Department of State with
    the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. I
    report directly to Under Secretary Sonenshine and work very
    closely with the Bureau of Counterterrorism, other department
    bureaus, and other agencies.
        We have a steering committee chaired by Under Secretary
    Sonenshine with CT Bureau Coordinator Ambassador Benjamin as
    vice chair. The committee comprises nine agencies, including
    NCTC, the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Justice, Homeland
    Security, CIA, and USAID. We target a specific audience
    overseas through our products for U.S. Government
    communicators, projects, and the online engagement of our
    Digital Outreach Team.
        As many of you know, al-Qaeda has repeatedly made clear the
    high importance it attaches to the media struggle. Ayman al-
    Zawahiri has described the communications space as more than
    half of the battle. And one scholar noted recently that al-
    Qaeda has transformed from a global terrorist organization that
    used the media into a global media organization that uses
    terrorism. So our goal is to move quickly, to respond
    effectively and to contest the space which had been for too
    long monopolized by our adversaries.
        For example, very recently as troubling developments in
    Timbuktu unfolded last month, we were writing a preliminary
    media strategy and producing new digital material specifically
    focused on al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its allies'
    destructive activities in northern Mali. To achieve our goals,
    CSCC is divided into three distinct areas of operation,
    intelligence and analysis, plans and operations, and the
    Digital Outreach Team, or DOT.
        The intelligence and analysis section gathers analytic
    support from the intelligence community, academia, and other
    sources of relevant expertise that is essential to our mission
    to counter violent extremism.
        We subscribe to two guiding principles for the center's
    operation: That counterterrorism communications should be
    guided by the best intelligence and academic analysis of the
    audience, the adversary, and the appropriate communications
    themes and techniques; and that this must be an interagency
    effort, drawing on analytical and operational skills across
    U.S. Government agencies. The detail to CSCC of intelligence
    community and U.S. military personnel make this goal a feasible
    one.
        The second part is the plans and operations team, which
    designs and implements nondigital CVE communications
    strategies, tools, and programs to counter al-Qaeda's ability
    to recruit and win support. This section focuses on undermining
    the efforts of al-Qaeda and its affiliates in and emanating
    from five priority areas using nondigital means. The five
    priority areas being Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa; al-Qaeda
    senior leadership and its affiliates and allies in Pakistan;
    AQIM and its associates across the Sahel through Northern and
    Western Africa; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; and al-Qaeda
    in Iraq and its offshoots in that general area of the Fertile
    Crescent.
        These plans and ops teams provide CVE communications
    material for use by all U.S. Government communicators with
    foreign audiences. These tools include CSCC communications
    templates on topics such as highlighting Al-Shabaab's actions
    against Somalis and shorter Quick Thoughts documents, such as
    the recent, ``A Plague of Locusts: CT Messaging Against AQIM
    and Ansar al-Din.''
        CSCC's third section is the Digital Outreach Team, or DOT,
    which directly counters the al-Qaeda narrative in the
    interactive digital environment. Most of this team's
    engagements, which number more than 7,000 since joining CSCC,
    consist of written text posted to online forums, Facebook, or
    the comments sections of media Web sites. But they also use
    video. They also use poster art, and other means. Engagements
    are branded. Writer analysts identify themselves as members of
    the Digital Outreach Team at the U.S. Department of State. This
    is overt communication in this digital space.
        Three basic principles animate this team's activities:
    Contest the space, redirect the conversation, and confound the
    adversary. An early measure of effectiveness has been the irate
    responses from online extremists who fulminate on various
    occasions, expressing a desire to hack the Digital Outreach
    Team's YouTube channel, warning their followers to be wary of
    providing fodder for the team, and even discussing the
    possibility of setting up their own radical Digital Outreach
    Team to conquer what we are doing. The digital environment is
    rapidly changing, as are al-Qaeda's efforts to exploit them.
    CSCC is committed to keeping pace and innovating. The rise of
    hand-held devices provides an opportunity to do so. And we have
    already deployed video with mobile platforms in one of our
    highest priority areas. A recent Yemen-focused clip garnered 15
    to 20 percent of views on mobile devices.
        Future plans include establishing a presence on mobile-
    based interactive environments, distributing audio and visual
    files over mobile devices, and finding new ways to deliver
    digital content to the physical environment through hand-held
    devices. As an example of our work, we recently have a campaign
    that just included a focus in the Urdu language in Pakistan for
    a 30-month period in June-July 2012, pushing back against
    extremist narratives in Pakistan with examples of U.S.-funded
    aid projects. For more than 30 days, the team carried out 255
    engagements using 10 videos and 10 still images on 29 online
    platforms, reaching nearly 50,000 people through Facebook and
    forums, and generating over 400 comments. That was one very
    targeted, narrowly focused campaign on a very specific subject.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your interest and your continued
    support, and I look forward to answering your questions and
    getting into greater detail. But thank you very much. And it is
    a real pleasure to be here.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you, Ambassador.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Fernandez follows:]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Royce. We appreciate your testimony.
        Let me ask you a question that goes to your strategy. I can
    readily understand the video that you did, stressing al-Qaeda's
    willingness to kill fellow Muslims, and especially the concept
    of destroying the indigenous culture, which we saw in Mali,
    which we saw in Timbuktu, which we saw on the attacks on the
    Sufi mosques in Pakistan and the destruction there.
        But moving to the issue of your team stressing the USAID
    projects in Pakistan, I have never seen our efforts win any
    points in Pakistan. We are about as unpopular as can be there.
    My last three trips there I saw that the Deobandi schools were
    still in full throttle. But why this particular message, as
    opposed to a message of what is being done to traditional
    Pakistani culture by this radical change, you know, on the
    order of what we saw in the Cultural Revolution in Mao's China?
    It is an attempt to destroy the past evidence of the culture.
    You saw that in Afghanistan. The destruction of art, of Muslim
    art as well as Buddhist. And so I think that that is probably a
    more powerful argument, but I wanted to see why we were going
    with this approach.
        Ambassador Fernandez. That is a very good question, sir. We
    use a variety of themes at different times. The theme you
    identify of the radical extreme, unusually extreme nature of
    al-Qaeda and its allies, its virulence, its alien nature from
    the mainstream of Muslims everywhere is one that we stress
    traditionally. So we do stress that in Pakistan and in the
    other areas we work. This specific campaign, as I said, we
    often try to highlight a specific campaign at a specific time.
    So we wanted to use AID's programs as a push back for this
    specific campaign that we did in the month of July. But the
    image, the thrust of what you described is our daily bread and
    butter. It is something that we do all the time.
        Mr. Royce. Let me ask you this. The center is beneath the
    Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy. One of the things I
    thought about here is we have got this new counterterrorism
    bureau, which the department would like to empower. And given
    your specific mission, it would seem to me that it should be
    placed right there. I wanted to ask you about that.
        Ambassador Fernandez. Well, we are literally a stone's
    throw from the CT bureau. They are our next door neighbors, and
    we meet with them on a daily basis.
        Mr. Royce. I understand that. But in terms of strategy and
    tactics, the Under Secretary is more focused, really, on
    cultural and educational exchanges and this type of thing. And
    I think the head of the counterterrorism bureau, given where we
    are trying to drive this policy, would be a lot better equipped
    to deal specifically with your mission. So I understand your
    argument that you talk with them. But I really think it is one
    and the same in terms of the strategy here. And there should be
    consideration in terms of readjusting that mission. Give me
    your response to that if you would.
        Ambassador Fernandez. Certainly. I can see value in both
    approaches. I mean, obviously, we are working in a
    communications field. So that is very germane to the work of
    the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.
    And this is, as Mr. Duncan noted, this is an ideological
    question, this is a question of messages and narratives. So I
    can see that it has a public dimension.
        On the other hand, we have to work very closely with our
    counterterrorism colleagues not only in the CT bureau, but
    across the interagency with NCTC, with CIA, and others. And so
    I can see the value of both of those arguments.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you, Ambassador Fernandez.
        Mr. Sherman.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you. You have native speakers in Arabic
    and Urdu and Somali. What other languages do you have native
    speakers in?
        Mr. Royce. Ambassador, bring your mic a little closer when
    you answer, please.
        Ambassador Fernandez. Thank you, sir.
        Generally, those are the three languages we focus on.
    Obviously, we have native speakers, for example some of our
    Urdu speakers speak more than Urdu. But our messaging has been
    in those three languages. But even that is new. We added Somali
    only recently. So we are certainly open to adding other
    languages. And we are certainly open in exploring the option
    that you discussed.
        Mr. Sherman. I would hope very much that you would focus on
    Pakistan, which is the only nuclear state of interest to your
    organization, and that you would focus on the different
    languages of Pakistan, since Urdu is spoken by only 8 percent
    of the population and the Sindhi language is spoken by 12
    percent. I am glad to see you are part of the overall public
    diplomacy effort.
        But in the communications world, there is a tendency to
    just create some separate Web people, when in reality our overt
    communications on the Web are directly tied to what we do at
    Voice of America, radio and television, what we do under false
    flag Web postings, which I guess is another department,
    probably should be the same department. And how closely do you
    work with Voice of America to make sure that you are making the
    same points, especially when you are posting video, and they
    are making TV shows?
        Ambassador Fernandez. We certainly, they are colleagues,
    and as a public diplomacy officer, I know them. We see them
    frequently. We have staff that came from the BBG.
        Mr. Sherman. Do you promote their programs?
        Ambassador Fernandez. Not really.
        Mr. Sherman. Do you take their tape and put it up on
    YouTube?
        Ambassador Fernandez. That is not something that we have
    done. The reason I would say is our focus has been that there
    is a great deal out there that the U.S. Government is doing
    which is supportive, sending a positive message. What we are
    trying to do is attack the enemy.
        Mr. Sherman. I would hope that the Voice of America is
    doing that, too. If you are the only one countering the
    terrorist message directly, and we decided to do it only on the
    Web, and not radio and television, a lot of us are here in the
    communications business, some of us have been involved in
    campaigns, none of us would dream of getting our message
    exclusively out on the Web and ignoring radio and television.
    And I guess these days none of us would think of doing the
    exact opposite of that either.
        And then I pointed out in my opening statement, how closely
    do you work with those who could either take down a terrorist
    site or identify terrorist individuals by looking at what is
    going on on the Web?
        Ambassador Fernandez. We work very closely with those who
    are identifying the appropriate recipients or individuals.
    Since we have an intelligence community component within CSCC,
    we have CIA officers working within CSCC. We have reach back
    into the intelligence community.
        Mr. Sherman. You don't have to tell me what we have done,
    but has anybody taken down a major terrorist Web site, whether
    we did it or maybe, you know, some act of God did it?
        Ambassador Fernandez. That is of course a related but
    different field, which is called cyber warfare. And I think
    there have been some very big successes there.
        Mr. Sherman. Have you noticed any of these sites that you
    are trying to oppose disappearing, which is a very good way to
    oppose them?
        Ambassador Fernandez. They seem to come and go and come
    back.
        Mr. Sherman. Now, you have experts in the culture and
    language that you are trying to reach out to. But many of these
    arguments get down to the details of Islamic law and the
    Hadith, the Koran. Do you have people there who have read 1,000
    fatwas from various respected clerics who can tell you what is
    a good Hadith and a bad Hadith? How good are you at having
    people that can argue on Islamic terms?
        Ambassador Fernandez. That is a very good question. What we
    try do is focus not so much on abstract questions of Islamic
    law, but on the enemy's actions and point to the internal
    contradictions, the incoherence and dissonance that exist in
    the enemy's own discourse.
        Mr. Sherman. So you show that they are not--that they are
    hypocritical vis-a-vis their own statements, not that they are
    unIslamic because their actions contradict parts of the Koran.
        Ambassador Fernandez. That is exactly right.
        Mr. Sherman. I don't know if Congress will give you enough
    money to do it, but I hope that you would go beyond showing
    that they clash with their own statements and show that they
    clash with the best in Islam. And I believe my time has
    expired. Do get back to me on your efforts to go into those
    other languages. Thank you.
        Ambassador Fernandez. Thank you.
        Mr. Royce. We are going to go now to Mr. Duncan from South
    Carolina.
        Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ambassador, what is the center doing to neutralize the
    communications of state sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran,
    especially in the areas of immediate importance to the U.S.,
    like Iraq and Afghanistan, where the Iranian Government is
    really seeking to fill the political vacuum the U.S. is leaving
    in its rapid withdrawal?
        Ambassador Fernandez. Sir, since our focus has been mostly
    on al-Qaeda, we are so new, Iran----
        Mr. Duncan. I think you need to start focusing on Iran.
    Just a word of caution.
        Ambassador Fernandez. I can see the value of that. That
    goes to a question that several of you have asked. Obviously,
    we have our main focus, which is guided from the National
    Counterterrorism Strategy, which focuses mostly, principally on
    al-Qaeda. But under the direction of the interagency, we are
    ready and willing to take up new tasks, whether it be new
    specific areas, new languages, or new adversaries.
        Mr. Duncan. Okay. Define how the center views the long-term
    strategic goals of Islamist extremist groups that presently do
    not wage terrorism against the U.S., specifically the Muslim
    Brotherhood. How have you all addressed that?
        Ambassador Fernandez. Well, there is incredible hatred for
    the Muslim Brotherhood among al-Qaeda. You know, we see daily
    the daily vitriol, propaganda that al-Qaeda puts out every
    single day. And they call the Muslim Brotherhood traitors. They
    call them renegades. They call them people that are
    collaborating with this disgusting western thing which is
    called democracy and elections. Because they believe there
    should be no democracy, there should be no elections.
        The idea that a Muslim, even a conservative Muslim, like
    the Muslim Brotherhood, would be elected is anathema to al-
    Qaeda. Because for them if you are elected one day, as you
    yourselves know, one day you are elected, one day you can be
    chosen not to be elected. And the way al-Qaeda sees it, that is
    not the role of the people. The people have no role in that.
        So any Muslim, whether they be the most conservative, you
    know, anti-Western Muslim who participates in the political
    process, even Salafis, are seen as anathema by al-Qaeda. One of
    the most fascinating things which has happened over the last
    year, which I am sure you are well aware of, is that we have
    had the most dramatic, incredible political events in the Arab
    world in decades, maybe in centuries that have happened over
    the past year, and al-Qaeda had nothing do with it. Absolutely
    nothing. You had governments falling. You had people in the
    streets. You had millions marching, and al-Qaeda was not part
    of that conversation. This drives them crazy. This drives them
    crazy in the propaganda, that basically the most important
    thing that is happening in the Arab world, and al-Qaeda is
    basically an Arab organization, and they are completely
    irrelevant to that issue.
        Mr. Duncan. That is kind of an interesting answer. I
    appreciate you bringing that up. That is something I want to
    chew on a little longer.
        Just on a different line of questioning in my remaining
    time, reportedly the Fort Hood shooter, Major Hasan, was
    influenced over the Web. Has the center studied this
    indoctrination? And how has it influenced the way the center
    operates?
        Ambassador Fernandez. That is a very good point, and it
    goes to a point that the chairman mentioned as well when he
    talked about the virtual caliphate. And that is that one of the
    unfortunate things or one of the realities that we face on the
    Internet is that over time, you have a base of stuff that is
    out there. And so there is a you can say a hill or a mountain
    of poisonous stuff that has been spewed out by the extremists,
    whether photos, or videos, or words, and it is there. And even
    if the terrorists are eliminated, that material is still there,
    and it can infect, it can poison young minds, impressionable
    minds, anywhere in the world.
        Mr. Duncan. Are you also looking--you are looking at what
    al-Qaeda and the extremists are posting on their Web sites, but
    you are also in the chat rooms, so you are seeing what possibly
    a Major Hasan would post himself in a chat room and engaging in
    conversation. Are you all monitoring that? Are you sharing that
    with other intelligence agencies?
        Ambassador Fernandez. Since we have a relationship with the
    intelligence community, we get information from them, and we
    also, when we see things, we share that with them if
    appropriate, yes.
        Mr. Duncan. I think that is important. You know, I am
    frustrated on Homeland Security when I hear some of the
    agencies aren't talking, aren't sharing information, especially
    when it comes to immigration issues. But I want to make sure
    that we don't have this stovepipe effect that we experienced
    after the 9/11, and what the commission report put out.
        So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Duncan.
        We will go now to Mr. Poe from Texas.
        Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        On Friday, a journalist who was angry with NBC's tape
    delay, which we are not going to discuss, of the Olympics,
    spoke out over Twitter. NBC complained to Twitter. By Sunday,
    Twitter had shut down the journalist's account. Twitter
    wouldn't restore that for 2 days.
        But when it comes to a terrorist using Twitter, Twitter has
    not shut down or suspended a single account. According to
    Twitter's terms of policy, any ``person barred from receiving
    services under the laws of the U.S. may not own a Twitter
    account.'' Terrorist organizations using Twitter, to me, is a
    violation of U.S. law.
        Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act states
    that it is unlawful to provide a designated FTO with
    ``material, support, or resources, including any property,
    tangible or intangible, or services.''
        Among those, communication equipment and facilities.
    Terrorists are using Twitter. Twitter is a communication
    service. It seems like it is a violation of the law.
        One example is the Somali al-Qaeda affiliate Al-Shabaab.
    Shabaab is an officially recognized foreign terrorist
    organization. Killed 74 people in a series of suicide bombings
    in Uganda during the 2010 World Cup. Shabaab has its own
    Twitter account. On December 7, interesting date, 2011, it
    tweeted, ``The jihad being waged here in Somalia shall continue
    until the country is purified of all the invaders.'' Two more
    officially recognized foreign terrorist organizations, Hamas
    and Hezbollah, started tweeting in 2009 and 2011 respectfully.
    The Taliban, which the U.S. Government held accountable for the
    attacks on 9/11, has two official Twitter accounts. August 8,
    2011, the Taliban tweeted, ``Four American cowards killed, six
    wounded in battle, two tanks destroyed.'' I could go on with
    more and more, but I won't.
        Twitter says it can't verify these accounts are really used
    by terrorist groups or someone claiming to be these groups. So
    Twitter relies on the United States Government to verify
    accounts. Twitter says it will comply if the government asks
    them to shut down an account.
        To my knowledge, not one terrorist Twitter account has ever
    been shut down by our Government.
        And I want you to correct me if I am wrong on that, Mr.
    Fernandez.
        There is a reason why Hezbollah tweeted an average of about
    250 tweets a day since it opened its account in November.
    Twitter is a great way to spread propaganda and get new
    recruits and promote crimes against Americans.
        My question is NBC was able to get the Twitter folks to
    close it down because some civilian complained about their news
    service or about the Olympics. Not saying that is right or
    wrong, but that did occur.
        So my question really is, can you describe the terrorists'
    use of Twitter and what we are actively doing about it?
        Ambassador Fernandez. I would say, sir, that is mostly a
    law enforcement question. So it is not my area of
    responsibility in the sense that we are dealing with
    communications.
        From what I see in Twitter, it is certainly in the
    languages that we are working, it is not a major issue in the
    vernacular languages. In other words, it is often used in
    English to communicate with English language constituencies.
    For example, Al-Shabaab using Twitter was in English, not in
    Somali.
        So since we are focused on the vernacular languages,
    Arabic, Urdu, Somali, and potentially others, that is not our
    main area of focus.
        But I certainly understand your concern. But I think that
    is a question for law enforcement authorities, both here and
    internationally, rather than a communications entity.
        Mr. Poe. Does the State Department have a policy regarding
    FTOs using Twitter? Do you have a policy about what the State
    Department is going to do or not going do? Any policy at all
    about Twitter? Or is that just somebody else's responsibility?
        Ambassador Fernandez. Twitter, obviously, is an American
    entity, and so it is all our responsibility.
        But as I said, since we are focused overseas in foreign
    languages and not in English and not in something like Twitter,
    which is very narrowly defined; that is not an area where we
    work on on a regular basis. Al-Qaeda doesn't use Twitter.
        Mr. Poe. You would agree, would you not, that some foreign
    terrorist organizations do?
        Ambassador Fernandez. Definitely. Definitely.
        Mr. Poe. It works. They get recruits, and they spread
    propaganda. At least they claim to do things that have occurred
    throughout the world. And so I am just concerned about what the
    United States' position on that is and what we can do about it,
    if anything. Do you have a recommendation?
        Ambassador Fernandez. You know, since it is not something
    that we are working on in the Twitter field, it is not an area
    which I am very well versed.
        Certainly we need to look at all the tools in the toolbox.
    And CSCC's view has always been that the area where the enemy
    focuses on, that is where we should go. The main focus, for
    example, of al-Qaeda's social media communications is video and
    text on Web sites, on media fora. For them, Twitter is not
    something that they look at.
        As you mentioned very rightly, some other terrorist groups
    do use it, especially to communicate with sympathizers in the
    West. So to me, that seems that that is a very legitimate
    question for law enforcement individuals in the State
    Department and outside of the State Department.
        Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you. We are going to go through another
    round of questions.
        Let me ask you this, Ambassador Fernandez. The State
    Department has a reputation, in terms of the clearance process,
    that a lot of times could hinder a rapid response, right? And
    the one thing you need to be effective is the ability to
    respond quickly. Is this a fair criticism, and how we can
    ensure that what you do isn't weighed down by a process which
    becomes very cumbersome, very bureaucratic in nature?
        Ambassador Fernandez. Well, sir, anyone who has worked in
    Washington in government knows the clearance process can be
    very cumbersome. It is not just in the State Department. That
    is true anywhere in government.
        We are fortunate in CSCC in that the people that started
    this about 1\1/2\ years ago realized that this was going to be
    an issue. So when it comes to our digital operations, the
    clearance process is internal to CSCC.
        Mr. Royce. I see.
        Ambassador Fernandez. Which means we are able to respond
    within minutes to an opportunity.
        Mr. Royce. Very good. I wonder if you could just give us an
    example or two of the success beyond what we have talked about
    today in terms of what you do, how it works. Just share it with
    the committee.
        Ambassador Fernandez. Well, there are many. I would say
    that it is not an easy thing. It is a difficult thing. One day
    you feel you have made a success, and another day you feel like
    you are starting all over again. The one that garnered a lot of
    attention is an important one in that, as you know, al-Qaeda in
    the Arabian Peninsula tried to establish a foothold in south
    Yemen. We focused on that. We used all our tools and did, over
    a very short period, 600 engagements. We put out videos. We put
    out poster art like the one that you referred to. It received a
    very positive response by basically people adopting the
    rhetoric that we were using against the terrorists.
        So, for example, one thing we did, al-Qaeda doesn't like to
    call itself al-Qaeda in Yemen. They are ashamed of that. And so
    they use a pseudonym. They call themselves Ansar al-Shariah.
    Because sharia in some Muslim circles is like, you know, mom
    and apple pie. And so we began in our messaging to call them
    Ansar al-Sharr, which means Partisans of Evil. And we noticed
    other people writing digitally adopting the nickname that we
    had given to them. And this organization, al-Qaeda in the
    Arabian Peninsula, in its last newsletter before it had to head
    for the hills when the Yemeni army drove them out of their safe
    havens, devoted an entire page to our operation, attacking what
    we were doing.
        Mr. Royce. That was clever, and it was quick. I remember
    the 9/11 Commission, when they did their thorough study of our
    national security agencies, said we just lacked imagination.
    And the other concern is just that imagination can get quashed
    or destroyed by bureaucracy. So you have got a situation where
    everything is pre-cleared, you can basically use your best
    judgment to keep up with the terrorist networks.
        But let me ask you this. The other thing we are really
    interested in is how to quickly close down these sites. Now, I
    know as fast as these sites move and spring up and you try to
    stay abreast of them, that that is a difficult process. But
    tell us how you work in conjunction to make sure that we do all
    we can do to get these things off the Web.
        Ambassador Fernandez. That is a good question. I mean,
    there are two issues here. There are terrorist sites where
    terrorists communicate to each other. And those are often
    password protected sites, those are basically terrorists have
    to sign in, you know, this is terrorist so and so from--known
    by somebody. Those are the object of cyber operations. Where we
    focus on is a slightly larger but more dangerous pool, which
    is, as I was telling Mr. Duncan, the terrorists want to go from
    the margins to the mainstream. They want to metastasize. They
    want to infect a larger population. So where we focus with our
    overt work are these--the middle ground of the contested space,
    which are sites that often are very political sites where
    people in the Muslim world are concerned about politics and
    reading about politics. And al-Qaeda trolls for people to
    radicalize them, to make them from maybe people who are unhappy
    with the United States or even angry at the United States to go
    that extra mile from being angry to being a terrorist. So that
    is the area where we are working.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you, Ambassador Fernandez.
        Mr. Sherman.
        Mr. Sherman. One of the important things in protecting the
    American homeland is to prevent the radicalization of those who
    are fluent in English and could be the most effective
    terrorists operating here. Do you operate in English? And if
    not, who does?
        Ambassador Fernandez. Sir, we do not operate in English.
    Obviously, since our being with the State Department, our focus
    being overseas, our main focus is of course in those vernacular
    languages which I mentioned. A lot of what you are talking
    about of course is extremely important. It falls in the area of
    domestic radicalization, would be DHS and others.
        Mr. Sherman. There is an international component to
    everything I am talking about.
        Ambassador Fernandez. Yes.
        Mr. Sherman. U.S.-based sites don't say how to build a bomb
    in the kitchen of your mom. So all of this is international.
    The English language is international. And preventing someone
    fluent in English from becoming radicalized may be many times
    more important than preventing someone else from being
    radicalized in the sense of protecting the districts we
    represent. It is hard to criticize you for not doing more,
    because your budget is I believe the smallest of any government
    entity that has come before this subcommittee, let alone the
    full committee.
        And so let me continue my efforts to get you to do more
    without necessarily being part of getting you any more
    resources. You seem to be focused on Sunni terrorism. What
    about the Shiite extremist groups and the Farsi language?
        Ambassador Fernandez. Farsi has not been our focus at all.
    We focus on those three languages. There are obviously other
    terrorist groups, like Hezbollah, which are of great concern to
    all of us. That has not been a task that we have taken on yet.
    But if we are directed to do so through the interagency, we are
    very happy to engage on that issue with the same alacrity and
    the same tools that we have engaged in Arabic against al-Qaeda.
        Mr. Sherman. Congress never said limit yourself to the
    Sunnis or limit yourself to the three languages you are doing.
    We would like you to do it all. And you may have to be larger.
    And I would hope that those a pay grade or two above you will
    indicate how we can make your operation larger without
    necessarily increasing the entire State Department budget.
        I would like to get back to the idea of taking down the bad
    sites. You have indicated these sites come and go. Have any of
    them gone in the sense of the plug was pulled on them? And has
    there been traffic where people complain that there was a
    popular terrorist Web site, and it looks like the damn
    Americans or somebody else has taken it down?
        Ambassador Fernandez. That certainly has been things that
    have been said at times by terrorist groups and their
    sympathizers. But given the nature of the Internet, and given
    its very fluid nature, these things do tend to pop up. You
    know, when they are taken down, they pop up in a different--or
    a similar organization takes its place.
        Mr. Sherman. The disadvantage to the terrorists there is
    that, you know, a lot of American companies spend a fortune to
    get you on their, you know, bookmarked, et cetera. And to the
    extent that you can have people say, oh, that site is not
    there, I got to go search, maybe they will end up at a
    reasonable site.
        Ambassador Fernandez. Make it more difficult.
        Mr. Sherman. Yes, exactly.
        Ambassador Fernandez. Or put a cupcake on the picture, as I
    think I read on Congressman Royce's blog.
        Mr. Sherman. You are searching the Internet more than I am.
    I have not read Congressman Royce's blog. I am sure he will
    tell me about it on the floor.
        With that, I yield back.
        Mr. Royce. I will do it on your time right now. Foreign
    Intrigue Blog, if you would like to access the Web site. The
    Foreign Intrigue Blog.
        Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
        Mr. Duncan.
        Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        As I have been sitting here listening, I keep going back to
    a couple of things. I want to blend some of the things I asked
    earlier with what Congressman Poe had mentioned. You know,
    Twitter is used abroad. And I think the center's jurisdiction
    is focused on abroad, communications abroad, the foreign
    audience, communicating with a foreign audience. So I disagree
    with one thing you said. I don't believe this is a DHS or an
    FBI law enforcement jurisdiction area. I do think the
    Department of State and your center does have some jurisdiction
    in this as regard to what foreign nationals do use Twitter for.
    And they are absolutely using Twitter. That is not a question.
    That is just a statement. If you want to respond to that in
    just a minute, I don't mind that.
        But you keep going back to al-Qaeda. Is it the State
    Department and this administration's policy that al-Qaeda is
    our only threat?
        Ambassador Fernandez. We are guided by the National
    Counterterrorism Strategy.
        Mr. Duncan. Would you pull the microphone up a little bit?
        Ambassador Fernandez. We are governed by the National
    Counterterrorism Strategy. The main focus of the National
    Counterterrorism Strategy is al-Qaeda. It also refers to other
    terrorist threats throughout the world. Given the sheer volume
    of poison that they put out in the digital world and in the
    communications world, it made sense for this organization,
    which is such a new organization, to focus on them. Certainly
    we are open to direction to do new tasks. But you have seen the
    threat information, as we have, and you have seen just the
    sheer volume of stuff that is put out there.
        Mr. Duncan. And it is amazing. It is overwhelming. I agree
    with you there. We have had this conversation.
        Ambassador Fernandez. We are certainly willing to look at
    other opportunities.
        Mr. Duncan. I just don't want the agency, the State
    Department or any agency, to get tunnel vision, to be so
    focused on what you perceive as the threat coming from al-Qaeda
    that we get blindsided. Now, I hope you have looked at the
    foreign terrorist organization list on the State Department Web
    site.
        Ambassador Fernandez. Yes.
        Mr. Duncan. I glanced as it just now. And I see Hezbollah,
    Abu Sayyaf, Hamas, Palestinian Liberation Front, Al-Shabaab,
    Haqqani, Boko Haram, FARC. There are a lot of threats to this
    Nation. And we look at what has happened just in the Western
    Hemisphere with Iran coming over and the Saudi Ambassador
    assassination attempt that was thwarted. There are so many
    things, I do not want you to get tunnel vision. I think America
    is threatened more by the State Department focusing solely on
    al-Qaeda.
        And so as you are monitoring these sites, you know, you
    better monitor Hamas. You better monitor Hezbollah. You better
    monitor Abu Sayyaf, which is limited, but there are a number of
    others. I just want to raise awareness to that and ask you to
    respond to what is being done.
        Ambassador Fernandez. We are certainly very open-minded
    about the threat. Obviously, there is a lot the U.S.
    Government, including the State Department, does on
    counterterrorism aside from the communications field, a whole
    range of policies directed at all of those groups. But we are
    open to looking at those threats. We certainly aim not to have
    tunnel vision.
        I think maybe because we have a small budget, we want to be
    nimble. We want to be agile. We want to be creative. And we
    have been. So we will continue to be that way and monitor and
    look at the threat and go wherever the threat takes us.
        Mr. Duncan. Was your area within the State Department
    created post-9/11?
        Ambassador Fernandez. Yes, very much so.
        Mr. Duncan. Okay. We have seen that created. We have seen
    the Department of Homeland Security created, 15,000 employees,
    $3.4 billion complex out on the Potomac. We are spending a heck
    of a lot of money in this country to bring assets online. And I
    can go on and on, National Counterterrorism Center and other
    things. I want to make sure that you guys are all talking. I
    think there is--you know, State is looking foreign, but I think
    there is a tie in and a need to make sure that NCTC, and your
    group there at State, and Homeland Security, and everyone else
    are communicating, sharing information. As overwhelming as it
    is, there are ways to assimilate and tie that information
    together. Are you doing that?
        Ambassador Fernandez. Absolutely.
        Mr. Duncan. Are there shared systems? Are there platforms,
    Google-based, where this information is all pulled together if
    you search one search word?
        Ambassador Fernandez. Absolutely. We think one of our
    distinctive features is our connection to the intelligence
    community. So that we are able to leverage the best analysis
    and thought of the intelligence community in our work. And it
    goes both ways. We sometimes find things that are of great use
    or interest to them, and they also help us in the whole
    question of collection of data, whether they be images,
    information, material that we can use to disparage and
    discredit the enemy. So, yes, I think there is an excellent
    relationship, excellent communication with CIA, with NCTC, and
    with others.
        Mr. Duncan. Ambassador, you have a challenge. And so thank
    you for sharing this. It is something I think we, as Congress,
    and the administration needs to work on to protect America. I
    appreciate your efforts.
        Ambassador Fernandez. Thank you.
        Mr. Royce. I thank you. I think the members are supportive
    of your efforts here. You are taking on a very difficult
    mission. We will want to keep the conversation on this going. I
    wouldn't be surprised if at some point you run into some of the
    same quality control issues that we have had with VOA and RFA
    on the Persian Service with respect to some of the Farsi
    speakers. It just seems to go with the territory. But as long
    as you are attuned to it, I think that would be important. As I
    mentioned, we will have some specific questions for you on the
    record. And again, we appreciate all your efforts. We stand
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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