    [House Hearing, 112 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

              THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                             COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
                             AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                               DECEMBER 14, 2011

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 112-152

                                   __________

       Printed for the use of the Committees on Oversight and Government
                                     Reform

             Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
                          http://www.house.gov/reform

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                  COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

                     DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                    Ranking Minority Member
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina   ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
    JIM JORDAN, Ohio                         Columbia
    JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah                 DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    CONNIE MACK, Florida                 JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
    TIM WALBERG, Michigan                WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
    JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan               JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York          GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona               MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
    RAUL R. LABRADOR, Idaho              DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania         BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          PETER WELCH, Vermont
    JOE WALSH, Illinois                  JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky
    TREY GOWDY, South Carolina           CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
    DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida              JACKIE SPEIER, California
    FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire
    BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas
    MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania

                       Lawrence J. Brady, Staff Director
                    John D. Cuaderes, Deputy Staff Director
                         Robert Borden, General Counsel
                           Linda A. Good, Chief Clerk
                     David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on December 14, 2011................................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Mr. Gregory B. Jaczko, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
        Oral Statement...............................................     7
        Written Statement............................................    10
    Ms. Kristine L. Svinicki, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory
      Commission
        Oral Statement...............................................    19
        Written Statement............................................    21
    Mr. William D. Magwood IV, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory
      Commission
        Oral Statement...............................................    23
        Written Statement............................................    25
    Mr. William C. Ostendorff, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory
      Commission
        Oral Statement...............................................    29
        Written Statement............................................    31
    Mr. George Apostolakis, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory
      Commission
        Oral Statement...............................................    33
        Written Statement............................................    35
    Mr. William Borchardt
        Oral Statement...............................................    71
    Mr. Stephen Burns
        Oral Statement...............................................    73

                                    APPENDIX

    The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings, a Member of Congress from the
      State of Maryland, opening statement...........................    83
    Davis-Besse Atomic Reactor: 20 MORE Years of Radioactive Russian
      Roulette on the Great Lakes Shore?!............................    86
    Regulatory Meltdown..............................................    96
    Letters and Questions sent to Witnesses provided by Chairman
      Darrell Issa...................................................   141

              THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

                                  ----------

                          WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 14, 2011

                      House of Representatives,
                  Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
                                                       Washington, D.C.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in Room
    2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Darrell E. Issa
    [chairman of the committee] presiding.
        Present: Representatives Issa, Platts, Jordan, Chaffetz,
    Walberg, Lankford, Buerkle, Labrador, DesJarlais, Gowdy, Ross,
    Guinta, Kelly, Cummings, Towns, Kucinich, Tierney, Cooper,
    Connolly, Davis, Welch, and Murphy.
        Staff Present: Ali Ahmad, Communications Advisor; Kurt
    Bardella, Senior Policy Advisor; Michael R. Bebeau, Assistant
    Clerk; Robert Borden, General Counsel; Will L. Boyington, Staff
    Assistant; Molly Boyl, Parliamentarian; Lawrence J. Brady,
    Staff Director; John Cuaderes, Deputy Staff Director; Adam P.
    Fromm, Director of Member Services and Committee Operations;
    Linda Good, Chief Clerk; Peter Haller, Senior Counsel;
    Christopher Hixon, Deputy Chief Counsel, Oversight; Justin
    LoFranco, Deputy Director of Digital Strategy; John Ohly,
    Professional Staff Member; Ashok M. Pinto, Deputy Chief
    Counsel, Investigations; Laura L. Rush, Deputy Chief Clerk;
    Jonathan J. Skladany, Counsel; Cheyenne Steel, Press Assistant;
    Rebecca Watkins, Press Secretary; Nadia A. Zahran, Staff
    Assistant; Erin Alexander, Fellow; Krista Boyd, Minority
    Counsel; Beverly Britton Fraser, Minority Counsel; Lisa Cody,
    Minority Investigator; Kevin Corbin, Minority Deputy Clerk;
    Ashley Etienne, Minority Director of Communications; Carla
    Hultberg, Minority Chief Clerk; Peter Kenny, Minority Counsel;
    Paul Kincaid, Minority Press Secretary; and Chris Knauer,
    Minority Senior Investigator.
        Chairman Issa. Good morning. The committee will come to
    order.
        The Oversight Committee exists to secure two fundamental
    principles: First, Americans have a right to know what they get
    from the money Washington takes from them and that it is well
    spent. And, second, Americans deserve an efficient, effective
    government that works for them.
        Our duty on the Oversight and Government Reform committee
    is to protect these rights. Our solemn responsibility is to
    hold government accountable to taxpayers, because taxpayers
    have a right to know what they get from their government. We
    will work tirelessly, in partnership with citizen watchdogs, to
    deliver the facts to the American people and bring genuine
    reform to the U.S. Government bureaucracy.
        Today we have a distinguished panel, and today we will hear
    from five commissioners in what I believe will be an
    extraordinary hearing, one in which an independent Commission
    that Americans rely on to ensure that we have safe and reliable
    nuclear power--and, particularly, safe nuclear power. It has
    become a concern to this committee that, in fact, the
    Commission is not operating in a way that can continue.
        I will not prejudge anyone's motives. I will not prejudge,
    here today, anyone's testimony. But I am deeply concerned. A
    Commission is not, in fact, an autocratic agency; it is not, in
    fact, the office of any one person. For a Commission to work
    successfully or any agency that has a board, whether it is the
    National Transportation Safety Board or a host of others that
    we rely on for safety particularly, it has to lead by
    consensus. Doing the basic arithmetic, this is a three-
    Democrat, two-Republican Commission. If it were three and two
    the other way or any combination, it should work, and work by
    consensus.
        The history of this agency, of this Commission, has been
    generally to work by consensus or near-consensus. The committee
    will examine today whether, in fact, under current
    Commissioners and current structure, this Commission can get
    back to working on a consensus-like basis. Ultimately, all five
    of you are charged with the same level of responsibility and
    the same obligation to sound science and sound safety.
        On a personal note, I have two active reactors in my
    district. Like anyone who has nuclear power in their district,
    every day we ask, ``Is it safe?'' and we are answered, ``Yes.''
    And every day we ask, ``Could it by safer and more reliable?''
    We want that answer always to be increasingly ``Yes.''
        So as we hear from Members on the dais and then hear from
    our witnesses, I think you will hear that all of us have the
    same concern. One of the ranking members, Mr. Kucinich, has
    been actively involved in his nuclear power plant for many
    years. But whether you have nuclear power in your district or
    not, we all understand that if all our nuclear power plants
    went down in America, the lights would go out. There is not
    sufficient replacement power today or in the foreseeable future
    to live without the highly reliable baseload that comes from
    nuclear energy.
        So, as we hear from all of you, I intend to allow each of
    you to deliver your full opening statements and a reasonable
    amount of additional remarks if they are beyond what your
    opening statement is. I then intend to be very, very, very,
    very willing to hear you give a complete answer to any
    question. That is not to say that Members on the dais can go to
    4 minutes and 59 seconds and then somehow find a question, but
    I want to hear from each of you.
        This is not one in which anyone on the dais here today, to
    the best of my knowledge, has the capability of taking the
    seats you occupy. We have to rely on what we learn here today
    to know whether or not this Commission can operate at the level
    that is essential if we are going to have safe nuclear power in
    this country.
        And, with that, I recognize the ranking member for his
    opening statement.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        In March of this year, a massive earthquake and subsequent
    tsunami killed more than 20,000 people and devastated northern
    Japan. It caused catastrophic damage at four of the nuclear
    reactors at the Fukushima power station. This was the worst
    nuclear disaster since Chernobyl 25 years earlier. Our number-
    one priority on this committee must be ensuring that we learn
    the lessons of the Fukushima disaster and take appropriate
    action to improve the safety of nuclear power plants in this
    country.
        Yesterday, the Union of Concerned Scientists issued a
    statement imploring our committee to focus today's hearing
    squarely on these safety issues. Dr. Lisbeth Gronlund, a
    physicist and co-director of global security program at UCS,
    urged the committee to focus on the safety issues facing the
    U.S. reactor fleet rather than on NRC's internal squabbling.
        And let me say this on behalf of the American people. I ask
    that you, Chairman Jaczko, and to the other Commissioners, I
    ask that you not allow your disagreements to become the enemy
    of the destiny of this great organization. I also ask that you
    not allow your squabbling to have the effect of being a weapon
    of mass distraction. That is so important.
        I strongly agree with the statements of Ms. Gronlund. The
    single most critical issue facing the NRC today is how it will
    respond to the Fukushima crisis. Five months ago, a task force
    of career NRC staff issued 12 recommendations intended to make
    U.S. nuclear power plants safer. In October, the staff
    prioritized eight of these recommendations. According to the
    staff, these recommendations have the greatest potential for
    safety improvement in the near term and should be started
    without delay.
        For example, one of the key problems in the Fukushima
    disaster was that the tsunami knocked out the station's backup
    power, causing temperatures to rise in four reactors and
    resulting in the substantial release of radiation. NRC staff
    has recommended that all existing and new reactors in the
    United States strengthen their capabilities to mitigate these
    types of blackouts. I look forward to hearing the views of all
    the Commissioners today on how we can implement this and other
    reforms as soon as possible.
        With respect to the allegations of mismanagement, let me
    say this. I agree that it is a serious matter when four
    Commissioners write a letter to the White House criticizing the
    chairman for creating a chilled work environment. These
    allegations should be taken seriously, which the White House
    has done. And I don't plan to be a referee; I believe that you
    should be able to work out these disputes among yourselves.
        Based on my review of this issue, however, I also believe
    that the current chairman has exhibited one of the strongest
    safety records of any previous NRC chairman. I would urge
    anybody interested in this issue to read the harrowing
    transcripts of the recordings from the emergency operations
    center stood up by the chairman to help the people of Japan and
    United States citizens in close proximity to the Fukushima
    danger zone. You will be impressed by the skill and courage of
    those who worked around the clock to prevent this disaster from
    becoming far worse. As a result, I am struggling to determine
    how much of this squabbling relates to personality conflicts
    and how much relates to a fundamental disagreement about the
    statutory structure of the Commission itself.
        The inspector general, after interviewing all five
    Commissioners and senior NRC staff, concluded that the chairman
    acted within his authority. The general counsel of the NRC
    agreed. After examining the chairman's actions relating to
    Fukushima, he wrote in an opinion that the chairman's actions
    fit within his authorities. Similarly, our committee's own
    investigation, which has included transcribed interviews of 15
    senior NRC staff and the review of thousands of documents, has
    uncovered no violations of law or instances in which the safety
    of U.S. nuclear facilities have been placed in jeopardy.
        The truth is that when Congress reorganized the NRC in
    1980, it created a structure with a very strong chairman. As
    President Carter said at the time, the experience of Three Mile
    Island demonstrated that the Commission as a whole cannot deal
    expeditiously with emergencies.
        Moreover, this is not the first time there has been
    conflict between the NRC chairman and the other Commissioners.
    A 1999 report by the inspector general described a very similar
    situation that found that the statutory structure of the NRC
    leads to tensions between the chairman and other Commissioners.
        Finally, the natural question is, where do we go from here?
    Based on the letters all five Commissioners have sent to the
    committee in preparation for today's hearing, I believe they
    are all willing to fulfill the fundamental mission of the NRC.
    I sincerely hope that we can use today's hearing as an
    opportunity to get beyond past differences and refocus our
    energies on the goal of nuclear safety.
        And I remind the Commissioners, when the hearing is over,
    when the lights are down and the cameras are out and the
    reporters are gone, you all still have to return to your
    workplace and work together to protect the safety of all
    Americans.
        And, with that, I yield back.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
        I now recognize the chairman of the Subcommittee on
    Regulatory Affairs, the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Jordan, for 5
    minutes for an opening statement.
        Mr. Jordan. I thank the chairman, and I will be very brief.
        I just want to thank the chairman for having this important
    hearing today and remind the committee that this is in no way a
    partisan issue. This is about an important Commission who seems
    to be, based on some of the things we have said, not
    functioning the way we would want, maybe even use the term
    ``dysfunctional.'' And I think it is important to hear from all
    of them, ask the appropriate questions and get to the bottom of
    this.
        This is a Commission charged with making sure nuclear power
    plants are safe, and that is an important task. That is all
    about good government, and this is the appropriate venue to
    have this discussion and this hearing.
        So I just want to thank the chairman and would yield back
    the balance of my time. I know the ranking member of our
    committee wants to make an opening statement, as well.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
        We now recognize the ranking member of that same
    subcommittee, the other gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Kucinich, for
    5 minutes.
        Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
    calling this hearing.
        Safety is the issue. I take it personally. This affects my
    State and my area. In February 2001, the NRC began
    investigating an aging mechanism that often caused cracking in
    reactors. As a result of these findings in late September 2001,
    the NRC determined that the Davis-Besse plant was at risk and
    should shut down by December 31st, 2001.
        FirstEnergy, the owner the of Davis-Besse plant, which is
    in Port Clinton, Ohio, resisted the order, claiming that it
    could stay open without incident until March 2002. FirstEnergy
    argued that a shutdown would cause an unnecessary financial
    burden. Rather than following its own safety procedures and
    shutting down Davis-Besse, the NRC relented and allowed the
    plant to operate until February 2002.
        After the plant had been shut down, workers repairing one
    of the five cracked control rod nozzles discovered extensive
    damage to the reactor vessel head. The workers found a large
    corroded crater the size of a football in the reactor vessel
    head next to one of the nozzles. Only \3/16\ of an inch of
    steel remained intact at the bottom. That began to bulge and
    crack.
        The NRC later found that the plant might have been as close
    as 60 days from bursting. If it did, they would have had a
    major release of radio activity that would have jeopardized the
    immediate and long-term safety of millions of Americans, not to
    mention the single biggest source of freshwater in the world
    being jeopardized in the Great Lakes.
        The Government Accountability Office later weighed in on
    this, calling it, quote, ``the most serious safety issue
    confronting the Nation's commercial nuclear industry since
    Three Mile Island.'' The Department of Justice said that
    FirstEnergy admitted that they knowingly, quote, ``knowingly
    made false representations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    in the course of attempting to persuade the NRC that its Davis-
    Besse nuclear power station was safe to operate beyond December
    31st, 2001,'' unquote.
        FirstEnergy's insurance company became worried and
    commissioned an independent study to analyze the data from the
    incident. The study, which was released in April 2007, painted
    an even darker picture than the regulatory rebukes that came
    before it. The report found that the corrosion of the steel
    plate happened at a faster rate than was reported by
    FirstEnergy, bringing the reactor closer to a catastrophe
    incident than had previously been reported.
        Now, despite the finding of these three bodies, just a few
    weeks before that study was released FirstEnergy asked the NRC
    to remove the requirement for independent assessments of Davis-
    Besse's operation. They asked for less oversight.
        The NRC's 2004 confirmatory order modifying license lists
    some of FirstEnergy's malfeasant policies and actions that led
    to the 2002 incident, providing more evidence that profits were
    prioritized over safety. It specifically lists the key reasons
    the leak was allowed to persist and grow. FirstEnergy's self-
    policing mechanisms failed. Worse, FirstEnergy tried to
    convince the NRC the problems were solved, when in fact they
    were not.
        FirstEnergy continues to try to prioritize profits over
    safety. Since I don't have time here to cover in detail the
    full history of FirstEnergy's bad decisions, near-misses, and
    safety lapses, I ask unanimous consent to place into the record
    a document prepared by Beyond Nuclear which does that, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Issa. Without objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Kucinich. Several weeks ago, FirstEnergy had to shut
    down Davis-Besse to replace yet another reactor head because
    its design has flaws which creates leaking problems. In doing
    so, they found cracks in a building designed to protect the
    core from external missiles like planes, but also to prevent
    the release of radioactive air and steam in the event of a
    problem with the reactor. The latter scenario is what almost
    happened in 2001 at Davis-Besse and is exactly what happened at
    Fukushima when the containment buildings blew up from the steam
    buildup. A structurally compromised building affords less
    protection to protect the public.
        True to form, there were important differences between the
    story FirstEnergy told the public and the real story, which I
    only uncovered because of my own investigation and because of
    my staff. Specifically, FirstEnergy tried to convince the
    public that the cracks were only cosmetic in nature, were few
    in number, and were not widely distributed. None of the above
    was accurate. And yet, FirstEnergy was eager to restart Davis-
    Besse, even though they will not know the cause of the cracking
    until February.
        We should be looking at this. The corporations that run
    nuclear power plants are fundamentally no different than the
    corporations that drove our economy off a cliff. They will cut
    corners to maintain or increase profits in the absence of
    sufficient incentives to act differently. They must be
    sufficiently and carefully regulated. The consequences of the
    failing to do so are unthinkable.
        I hope we will reflect on the NRC's position here and help
    to achieve a culture of independence, objectivity, and public
    interest over corporate interest, and that we will have
    complete dedication to safety.
        I thank the chair for calling this hearing and for your
    attention to this critical matter at this time.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman. And I look back
    fondly on the years we have worked on this issue together on
    the committee, with each of us at different times being a
    subcommittee chairman.
        Mr. Kucinich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Issa. We now recognize our panel of witnesses.
        Mr. Gregory Jaczko is the chairman of the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission. The chairman is, I think, a particle
    physicist, to be more accurate----
        Mr. Jaczko. Yes.
        Chairman Issa. --and an experienced policy advisor who has
    served on the Commission since 2005 and has served on both
    sides of the dome, both in the House and Senate, in the past.
        Commissioner Kristine--I am going to try this again--
    Svinicki?
        Ms. Svinicki. Svinicki.
        Chairman Issa. Okay. And I grew up near Slavic Village, and
    I should be able to do these names better--is an experienced
    nuclear engineer, a policy advisor who came to the Commission
    in 2008.
        Commissioner William Magwood IV--Commissioner Magwood
    joined the Commission just in 2010. He previously served 7
    years as director of nuclear energy at the Department of
    Energy.
        Commissioner William Ostendorff--Commissioner Ostendorff
    came to the Commission last year after a distinguished career
    in the nuclear navy and much time also with the Department of
    Energy.
        And then, Commissioner George Apostolakis. Thank you for
    being understanding. The Commissioner is an expert in risk
    assessment and came to the Commission in 2010 after many years
    as a professor at MIT.
        Gentlemen and lady, pursuant to the rules of the committee,
    all witnesses here will be sworn. Would you please rise to take
    the oath and raise your right hands?
        Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are
    about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
    but the truth?
        Let the record indicate all witnesses answered in the
    affirmative.
        Please be seated.
        As I said earlier, nobody on the dais here knows anything
    other than what we have heard. You are here today so we hear
    all of you. So I will ask you to try to come close to 5
    minutes. I am not going to gavel people if they are going
    through with their statements. And I am likely also going to be
    very generous in your response times so that we can fully hear
    from all of you here today.
        Chairman Jaczko, would you please go first?

                           WITNESS STATEMENTS

                     STATEMENT OF GREGORY B. JACZKO

        Mr. Jaczko. Well, thank you, Chairman Issa and Ranking
    Member Cummings and members of the committee.
        We have been asked to appear before you today to discuss
    the management and operations of the United States Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission.
        This year, 2011, has been an exceptionally challenging and
    productive year for the NRC. And, as usual, the NRC staff has
    done an outstanding job over the past year. And the agency once
    again scored among the top tier of Federal agencies in the 2011
    Best Places to Work in the Federal Government rankings, scoring
    number one in all four major indices.
        At the NRC, we anticipated that 2011 would be a busy year,
    but unexpected issues, most notably the Fukushima Daiichi
    accident and multiple natural disasters, including flooding in
    the Midwest in June, the earthquake on the east coast in
    August, and other serious threats, such as hurricanes and
    tornadoes, created additional pressures for the staff at NRC's
    headquarters and regional offices.
        In spite of those challenges, the staff and the Commission
    remained focused on our critical safety mission. During the
    past fiscal year, we have performed thousands of hours of
    inspections at nuclear power plants and materials sites, took
    hundreds of enforcements actions, reviewed more than 1,000
    licensing actions and tasks, and issued a number of new
    regulations. And we completed a very important final safety
    culture policy statement.
        The NRC has conducted a greater number of special
    inspections in the past year--21 to date--than at any point in
    recent memory. During the past year, we completed the safety
    and environmental reviews of the first two new reactor combined
    license applications and held mandatory hearings on both of
    these applications. And these were both historic actions by the
    Commission.
        We issued final safety evaluation reports for the AP1000
    and ESBWR design certifications and issued eight reactor
    license renewals. We also successfully completed two pilot
    applications for transition to our new risk-informed,
    performance-based approach to fire protection. And we held a
    meeting yesterday to talk about the progress that is being made
    on that issue.
        We issued three new uranium recovery licenses, authorized
    the restart of one uranium recovery facility, and issued the
    license for the AREVA Eagle Rock centrifuge enrichment facility
    to be built in Idaho. We also completed the orderly closeout of
    our Yucca Mountain activities and preserved the technical work
    in 3 technical reports, more than 40 other reports, and in
    videotaped staff interviews.
        We have also approved cybersecurity plans for all nuclear
    power plants, published approximately 30 new guidance
    documents, and hosted the first integrated regulatory review
    service mission to the United States. And that is an
    international, peer-reviewed mission that is done under the
    auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
        Now, the Commission itself was also incredibly productive
    in 2011. My colleagues and I held 38 public Commission
    meetings, 10 closed meetings, and issued 92 staff requirements
    memoranda on substantive Commission voting matters. This was 30
    more substantive Commission decisions than we completed in
    fiscal year 2010. And in line with our commitment to
    transparency and openness, we noticed more than 1,030 public
    meetings and improved and expanded our public outreach.
    Construction of our new third headquarters building is also on
    schedule and on budget for opening in late 2012.
        And, of course, the NRC undertook tremendous efforts in
    response to the March 11th earthquake and tsunami in Japan and
    the nuclear emergency at Fukushima Daiichi. In addition to
    monitoring the crisis and providing on-the-ground support in
    Japan, the Commission established a task force to review the
    accident and make recommendations to the Commission for
    enhancing reactor safety. This task force reported back with a
    comprehensive set of 12 safety recommendations addressing a
    broad range of issues. These recommendations have undergone
    additional reviews by the NRC staff, our Advisory Committee on
    Reactor Safeguards, and we have benefited from the insights of
    a broad range of stakeholders. The Commission has directed the
    staff to begin immediately implementing, partially or fully,
    five of the safety recommendations from the task force and set
    goals of completing station blackout rulemaking within 24 to 30
    months and has encouraged completion of all actions within 5
    years.
        Chairman Issa, Ranking Member Cummings, and members of the
    committee, this concludes my formal testimony today, and I
    would be pleased to respond to questions you may have. Thank
    you.
        [Prepared statement of Mr. Jaczko follows:]

        Chairman Issa. Thank you, Chairman.
        Commissioner Svinicki? I will get it eventually.

                   STATEMENT OF KRISTINE L. SVINICKI

        Ms. Svinicki. Thank you, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member
    Cummings, and members of the committee, for the opportunity to
    appear before you today.
        You have requested that members of this Commission address
    the topic of management and leadership issues at the NRC.
        I have been privileged to serve as a Commissioner of the
    NRC for over 3-1/2 years. During this time, the agency's
    approximately 4,000 technical, legal, and administrative staff
    members have impressed me with their professionalism and their
    unyielding commitment to the NRC's important missions of
    nuclear safety and nuclear security. Their efforts are led by a
    skilled group of senior executive service managers, most of
    whom have decades of experience, not just in Federal service
    but specifically at the NRC. I have confidence in the work they
    do and believe the Nation is well served by their constant
    vigilance on matters of nuclear safety and security.
        I appear before you today, however, to address topics
    related to the current functioning the Commission itself and
    the engagement between the Commission and the agency staff.
        I have served as a Commissioner with six other
    individuals--four currently serving and two whose service on
    the Commission has ended--and under the tenure of two different
    chairmen. Although some amount of tension is expected in any
    deliberative body, I believe the level of tension among the
    currently serving members of this Commission is impeding the
    collegial processes of the NRC and is obstructing the
    functioning of key processes between the Commission and the
    agency staff. These tensions are rooted in an interpretation of
    the NRC chairman's statutory authorities as well as his conduct
    toward his Commissioner colleagues and the NRC staff.
        Despite these problems, I believe it is likely that the
    Commission would have continued its tug of war over these
    issues, to the extent possible, out of the public spotlight.
    Events of the past few months, however, pushed the Commission
    beyond its tolerance for current circumstances and led us to
    communicate our concerns beyond the Commission.
        As a result of interpretations of the NRC chairman's
    authorities that grant the chairman the authority to decide
    which issues appropriately involve any of the Commission's
    statutory functions and to interpret for the agency staff the
    meaning of direction issuing from Commission decisions, the
    situation at the NRC has, in my view, become increasingly
    unworkable and threatens the viability of a functioning
    Commission structure.
        While the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980 certain
    administrative responsibilities in the hands of the chairman,
    the legislative history makes clear that it was not intended to
    displace the ultimate authority of the full Commission over the
    affairs of the agency. The plan itself includes a provision
    that the Commission may decide by majority vote in any area of
    doubt whether any matter pertains to one of the Commission's
    statutory functions. In its deliberations on the plan, Congress
    also emphasized that the Commission shall have full access to
    all information within the agency, including that in existence
    and that which requires development by the staff. The chairman
    may not withhold or delay providing information requested by
    the Commission. In both of these critical areas, however, I do
    not believe that the processes under the current chairman
    satisfy the intent of the law.
        Over the past year and a half, the Commission has engaged
    in a protracted effort to resolve its disagreements over its
    respective roles and responsibilities through a comprehensive
    revision of its internal operating procedures. This effort
    proved ultimately unfruitful, however, in resolving the
    underlying disagreements.
        Exacerbating these longstanding disagreements are recent
    events of concern that have come to the Commission's attention.
    In October of this year, the chairman appeared at an annual
    retreat held by the agency's executive director for operations
    and senior agency staff. Within days of this event, a number of
    attendees from the retreat sought me out to express their
    strong reaction to the chairman's statements. They described
    the content of his remarks as an expression of contempt for the
    Commission. It was described to me that the chairman instructed
    those present to advance his agenda and that this must come at
    the price of having their own independent assessments and
    recommendations. The executive director for operations
    described it to me by saying, ``We were pretty much instructed
    to leave our brains at home.''
        Hearing of this event was a formative moment in leading me
    to conclude that the points of tension between the chairman and
    the Commission were no longer isolated to the Commission
    itself. Interference in the flow of information coming to the
    Commission was occurring to such a pervasive extent and was
    being conducted so brazenly that the Commission needed to take
    additional action.
        Another circumstance that I believe caused the Commission
    to bring these issues forward is the chairman's continued
    outbursts of abusive rage directed at subordinates within the
    agency staff. All members of the Commission, including me, have
    been on the receiving end of this conduct, which was also
    acknowledged by the NRC inspector general in his testimony
    before the House Energy and Commerce Committee's Subcommittee
    on Environment and the Economy earlier this year.
        These incidents appear to have grown more frequent,
    however, and I am now aware of this conduct being directed
    against staff at various levels in the agency. Some of these
    employees have spoken to me privately of the embarrassment and
    humiliation of being made to lose their composure in front of
    their colleagues or to be seen exiting the chairman's office in
    a state of obvious upset.
        I regret that we have come to this point, but our agency,
    one whose fundamental mission is to ensure the health, safety,
    and security of the American public, is premised on the
    variability of individuals to speak out. It is my hope that a
    positive lesson about the willingness to speak out will be
    drawn by not just the NRC staff listening to this hearing but
    by all those responsible for safety and security across our
    government.
        Thank you.
        [Prepared statement of Ms. Svinicki follows:]

        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        Commissioner Magwood? If you could pull the mic just a
    little closer. They are not very good from a distance. Thank
    you.

                   STATEMENT OF WILLIAM D. MAGWOOD IV

        Mr. Magwood. Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman Issa. Even better when they are turned on.
        Mr. Magwood. Yes.
        Chairman Issa, Ranking Member Cummings, and members of the
    committee, it is with considerable disappointment that I appear
    before you today to share my concerns regarding the management
    and leadership issues facing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
        I provided a written statement and ask that it be included
    in the record. So I will try and summarize my comments.
        Chairman Issa. Without objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Magwood. Let me begin by reassuring the public that the
    NRC staff has and continues to work diligently to carry out its
    responsibilities to protect the health, safety, and security of
    the American people. They are led by an excellent cadre of
    senior career managers who have done a fantastic job of
    insulating most of the staff from the serious problems that are
    the subject of this hearing.
        My colleagues and I have endured a rather distasteful and
    dishonest media campaign over the last week. We have seen a
    wide range of misleading and untrue reports about our
    motivations, our characters, and our commitment to safety. It
    is quite clear that this campaign is intended to divert the
    attention of Congress and the public from the very real
    concerns we have about the leadership of our agency. I do not
    intend to allow this tactic to succeed.
        However, one item I feel I must address concerns this
    Commission's commitment to safety. After 20 months of working
    with the people at this table, I can promise you that we all
    place the safety and security of the public we serve at the
    very top of our considerations. We do not always agree on how
    to achieve the goal of safety and we always do not view issues
    the same way, but I believe we are all equally committed to the
    same goal. To impugn the motivations of members of the
    Commission because of disagreements on strategy or approaches
    is irresponsible.
        Now, as I discuss the real concerns facing us, I feel my
    true role before you today is to give voice to the dedicated
    men and women who serve the NRC, many of whom have come to me
    to discuss their concerns.
        First, I am most concerned that the chairman has made a
    regular practice of interfering with the ability of the
    Commission to obtain information from the NRC staff. He has
    asserted the authority to decide what information is provided
    to the Commission, when it is provided, and, increasingly, what
    the information contains when it reaches the Commission. This
    behavior is contrary to both the letter and intent of the
    organization plan, and no Commissioner could confidently carry
    out his legal obligations under these conditions.
        In my written statement, I outline a specific example in
    which the chairman prevented the staff from providing the
    Commission a voting paper regarding our program for fire
    protection in nuclear power plants. He went as far as to send
    someone to break up a staff briefing being held for myself and
    another Commissioner. For the record, we did not allow the
    briefing to end.
        It has become routine for individual members of the staff
    to come to Commissioners to alert us about issues they believe
    require Commission attention but that staff can't get through
    the chairman. That the Commission has come to rely on the
    personal bravery of individuals on the staff to keep us
    informed is a very sad statement. But what worries me most is
    the fact that we don't know what we don't know.
        The second concern I raise is a growing cancer of a chilled
    work environment at the agency. As I outline in my written
    statement, I have observed the effects of this chilled
    environment firsthand, and I believe the situation is actually
    worse in recent months. And I think Commissioner Svinicki
    mentioned some of that.
        I would like to move on to my final concern, however, which
    I raised, concerning the chairman's abusive behavior toward the
    staff. To understand this matter, I spoke with three of the
    women who have had personal experience with the chairman's
    extreme behavior. These women remain very disturbed by these
    experiences. A common reflection they all shared with me was,
    ``I didn't deserve this.'' One woman said she felt the chairman
    was actually irritated with someone else but took it out on
    her. Another told me she was angry at herself for being brought
    to tears in front of male colleagues. A third described how she
    couldn't stop shaking after the experience. She sat, talking
    through what had happened to her, with a supervisor until she
    could calm down enough to drive home.
        Senior female staff in an agency like the NRC are tough,
    smart women who have succeeded in a male-dominated environment.
    Enduring this type of abuse and being reduced to tears in front
    of colleagues and subordinates is a profoundly painful
    experience for them. The word one woman used was
    ``humiliating.'' I must note that none of these women want to
    have their names used publicly. As another woman told me, ``It
    is embarrassing enough that I went through this. I don't want
    to be dragged through the mud before some congressional
    committee.''
        These are major concerns facing the agency today: blocking
    staff from providing information to the Commission, the
    creation of a chilled work environment, and the abuse of NRC
    staff. I do not believe that fear, intimidation, and
    humiliation are acceptable leadership tactics in any
    organization, least of all in the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission.
        Thank you for your attention, and I stand ready to answer
    any of your questions.
        [Prepared statement of Mr. Magwood follows:]

        Chairman Issa. I thank you.
        Commissioner?

                   STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. OSTENDORFF

        Mr. Ostendorff. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member
    Cummings, members of the committee, for the chance to be here
    before you today.
        I have served on this independent commission since April
    2010. During that time, I have come to better appreciate the
    reputation the NRC has historically enjoyed as a competent
    regulator and a leader in nuclear safety not only in the United
    States but also in the international community. The reputation
    can be attributed to the employees of the NRC, who have shown
    dedication to the safety mission and the NRC's organizational
    values of integrity, service, openness, commitment,
    cooperation, excellence, and respect.
        For decades, these values have served as a guide for the
    operations of the NRC staff as well as for the Commission.
    These values have also historically fostered an open and
    collaborative workplace that brings out the best regulatory and
    technical judgments of the NRC staff without undue influence or
    pressure.
        Unfortunately, we find ourselves today in an environment
    where those historical values have been compromised and the
    agency's reputation placed at great risk. Left uncorrected,
    this trend damages the ability of the NRC staff and the
    Commission to carry out its nuclear safety mission for this
    country.
        I have over 30 years of service to this country. As a
    Rickover-era nuclear-trained submarine officer, I served on six
    submarines, I commanded a nuclear attack submarine for 3 years,
    had subsequent command of an attack submarine squadron of eight
    submarines. I have been personally accountable to the United
    States Government--the White House, Department of Defense--for
    ensuring the safety of nuclear-powered warships. I take great
    pride in that service and in my own decision-making with
    respect to those principles that best ensure reactor safety.
        After retiring from the Navy in 2002, I worked upstairs in
    the House Armed Services Committee as a counsel with oversight
    responsibility for atomic energy activities at the Department
    of Energy. Subsequent to that, I spent 2 years as a senior
    official at the Department of Energy and now with the NRC.
        With significant experience in leadership positions dealing
    with nuclear oversight, whether it be nuclear weapons or
    nuclear power, I can honestly say to this committee that I have
    never seen an environment where the highest level of the
    organization does not reflect the values shared by the whole.
        Along with the three of my Commissioner colleagues who
    signed the letter of October 13th, who took the same oath to,
    quote, ``well and faithfully discharge the duties,'' unquote,
    of our office, I refused to be silent while damage was being
    done to the NRC's work environment.
        It is important to comment briefly on what I will label as
    an unprecedented action--the four of us writing a letter to the
    White House. That is the letter this committee received last
    Thursday evening.
        This letter is not about politics. It was signed by two
    Democratic and two Republican members of this Commission. I
    regret that that letter has been portrayed by many in Congress
    over the last 3 or 4 days as being politically motivated. I
    assure this committee, it is not. It is not Yucca Mountain, it
    is not about other policy disagreements. It is not about
    internal conflict between Commissioners, though that is one
    element of our concerns. With great respect for the White
    House, I must take strong exception to White House Chief of
    Staff Daley's letter from Monday night that I believe
    mischaracterized the situation of the Commission.
        What is this letter about? This letter is about management
    actions that have significantly eroded the prized open and
    collaborative working environment of the NRC, our Nation's
    nuclear safety agency. These actions have served to prevent the
    Commission from being fully informed of the NRC staff's views
    and recommendations.
        It is about behavior that if exhibited by one of our NRC's
    regulated licensees would be subject to investigation and
    potential enforcement action for a chilled work environment. It
    is about bullying and intimidating behavior toward NRC career
    staff that should not and cannot be tolerated.
        In light of our unanimous agreement that these actions
    cannot continue, the four of us fulfilled our oath of office
    and took what we viewed as appropriate action and wrote the
    White House. That letter clearly states our grave concerns.
        I appreciate this committee's oversight role and look
    forward to your questions.
        [Prepared statement of Mr. Ostendorff follows:]

        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        Commissioner?

                    STATEMENT OF GEORGE APOSTOLAKIS

        Mr. Apostolakis. Chairman Issa, Ranking Member Cummings,
    and members of the committee, good morning.
        Management and operation of the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission is an important subject. My perspective is grounded
    in my experience and observations as a member of the Commission
    since being sworn in on April 23, 2010, and my former role as a
    15-year member and chairman for 2 years of the Advisory
    Committee on Reactor Safeguards, a statutory committee of
    technical experts.
        Management and operation of the Commission are carried out
    within an overall structure of law and policy. The Commission's
    independent and multimember character, with staggered terms for
    its members, is designed to insulate regulatory decisions from
    political consideration and to provide stability for regulatory
    policy. Nuclear safety matters are technically complex. This
    Commission structure allows for a diversity of insights to be
    brought to bear in the Commission's decision-making.
        Under Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980, the Commission as
    a whole formulates policy and regulations, issues orders, and
    conducts adjudication. Policy formulation includes major
    administrative decisions with policy implications. The
    Commission has ultimate authority to determine by a majority
    vote in an area of doubt whether any matter, action, question,
    or area of inquiry pertains to one of these functions. The
    Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, in reporting on the
    reorganization plan, declared that, quote, ``The committee also
    intends the Commission to exercise the authority to interpret
    the plan,'' end quote.
        The legislative history of the plan and the Presidential
    messages to Congress in submitting the plan emphasize that the
    chairman is subject to the policies of the Commission and the
    oversight authority of the Commission. As principal executive
    officer of the Commission, the chairman has the ultimate
    responsibility to the Commission and the public for the proper
    day-to-day management and administration of the agency.
    However, the chairman is statutorily responsible to the
    Commission for assuring that the executive director of
    operations and the staff are responsive to the requirements of
    the Commission in the performance of its functions.
        The 1980 reorganization plan also provides that the heads
    of the offices of the general counsel, the Secretary of the
    Commission, and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
    shall continue to report directly to the Commission.
        The chairman and the executive director, through the
    chairman, are responsible for ensuring that the Commission is
    fully and currently informed about matters within the
    Commission's functions. The reporting relationship of the
    executive director to the chairman is not intended to interfere
    with the ability of the EDO to make independent recommendations
    on matters that the Commission has delegated to him. While the
    chairman has special responsibility for policy planning and
    development for the Commission, the Commission could not
    function in any satisfactory way if the executive director or
    other senior managers were required to misrepresent or suppress
    their views or analyses.
        The Commission is well served by its dedicated staff, with
    many senior managers who bring long experience and advanced
    technical expertise. Their technical evaluations essential to
    informed Commission decision-making. The transmission of
    adequate information and unbiased perspectives to the
    Commission for its decision-making and oversight is essential
    to the agency's mission of protecting public health and safety.
        I joined my fellow Commissioners to formally express our
    serious concerns regarding the chairman's leadership. I regret
    that partisan or other ill motives have been ascribed to the
    action that we have taken. This could not be further from the
    truth.
        Thank you very much.
        [Prepared statement of Mr. Apostolakis follows:]

        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        I would like to thank all of you for staying well under the
    5 minutes. And, again, all of your full written statements are,
    by committee rule, going to be in the record.
        I will recognize myself for 5 minutes.
        Chairman, who is your board of directors? For the people
    out there in, sort of--you know, they don't know government
    necessarily, what is the equivalent of your board of directors?
    Who do you report to?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, I would say it is--I am responsible, as
    the chairman of the Commission, to carrying out the policies
    that the Commission as a whole----
        Chairman Issa. Well, no, I appreciate that, but are you the
    CEO, in your opinion?
        Mr. Jaczko. I believe the statute describes the chairman as
    a principal executive. So that would probably be the closest--
    --
        Chairman Issa. So you view yourself as the chief executive
    officer----
        Mr. Jaczko. Right.
        Chairman Issa. --the chairman. Who is your board of
    directors?
        Mr. Jaczko. I would say it is probably a combination of the
    Commission but the Congress, as well, I think serves a role in
    its oversight capacity to oversee the operation----
        Chairman Issa. Do these gentlemen and lady sitting next to
    you, are they your board?
        Mr. Jaczko. I think, yeah, that is certainly one way to
    characterize the Commission as a structure that way, that they
    are responsible for establishing the policies of the agency, as
    I am a member of that as well.
        Chairman Issa. Right, but if one of these four other
    members asks for a vote on something and four of them vote that
    what you are doing is wrong, do you consider that to be
    persuasive, interesting, or obligatory?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, certainly, if the Commission takes an
    action--and we have formal procedures to carry on our actions--
    then, of course, those are actions that I would follow.
        Chairman Issa. So, if they ask to vote, not to be locked
    out of getting information, as has been alleged under oath
    here, would you consider that that was your responsibility, to
    ensure that they had full access to information and never again
    were in any way denied any information that you had?
        Mr. Jaczko. Yeah, I believe the Commission has provided a
    tremendous amount of information----
        Chairman Issa. No, no, no. Chairman, we are real funny
    about this here; we want the answer exactly to the question we
    asked.
        Is it true that any information that you had has ever been
    withheld from any of these people on your request?
        Mr. Jaczko. Not that I am aware of.
        Chairman Issa. So you have never asked to have any
    information--so, basically, one of the Commissioners just lied
    under oath is what you are saying.
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, I work every day to ensure that the
    Commission has the information it needs to carry out its
    responsibilities----
        Chairman Issa. No, no, no, not what it needs. If I
    understand the statute, they have full and unfettered, just as
    you do, rights to everything because they determine, as I
    understand it, as any Commission would--and we produce
    commissions here all the time--they have to have everything or
    at least everything they think they have. And what they don't
    know they have a right to ask and know whether they really need
    to know it. Isn't that true?
        Mr. Jaczko. Absolutely. And the Commission routinely asks
    for information, and that information is provided.
        Chairman Issa. Okay. Well, obviously, they disagree with
    you a little bit.
        You have a background--you are a physicist, not in nuclear
    but in interesting stuff that I don't know anything about, so I
    will just figure you are smarter than me on anything related to
    the science. But have you ever run an organization of 4,000
    people?
        Mr. Jaczko. No. This is the first time that I have done
    that.
        Chairman Issa. What is the largest organization in which
    you were the CEO of in your career?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, I was responsible for managing my
    personal staff as a Commissioner, and prior to that I served in
    policy capacities.
        Chairman Issa. So, half a dozen or something like that.
        Mr. Jaczko. Yeah.
        Chairman Issa. Okay.
        Commissioner Ostendorff, as a Navy captain, how many people
    worked for you?
        Mr. Ostendorff. Chairman, I had several different jobs in
    the Navy. As a commanding officer of a submarine, I had 150
    people; as the commanding officer of a nuclear attack submarine
    squadron, 1,200. As principal deputy administrator at NSA, I
    was a chief operating officer for 2,500 personnel who were Feds
    and 32,000 people who were management and operating
    contractors.
        Chairman Issa. And from your leadership training over 30
    years, from your years in the Navy, an autocratic organization,
    an organization in which you can go to jail for not obeying the
    lawful order of the ship's captain, you have said, signing on
    with the other Commissioners, that this chairman has exceeded
    any semblance of the kind of authority that you believe he
    should have in his conduct; that he has had conduct, if I
    understand correctly, that does--and I know there is some
    debate about this--that does endanger safety because it is
    conduct that is demoralizing to an organization that, in fact,
    if my nuclear power plants in my district, if they had somebody
    like Chairman Jaczko is alleged to be, you would shut down that
    site. You would view them as dysfunctional enough to be unsafe.
        Isn't that true?
        Mr. Ostendorff. I would say, Chairman, that I think, if I
    understand your question correctly, that I do not believe that
    we have been kept fully informed of our staff's views, their
    technical analysis, their recommendations on more than one
    issue here in the last few months that directly could impact
    how we proceed with respect to the Fukushima reactor accident.
        Chairman Issa. And I would ask unanimous consent for 30
    more seconds to have Commissioner Magwood, who I think talked
    on the same subject, if he has anything to say.
        Mr. Magwood. No, I think I would just simply add that there
    are clearly cases where my office has asked for information and
    been told we couldn't have it. And it is just very black and
    white to me.
        Chairman Issa. So the chairman was less than truthful in
    saying that he has provided you information you requested
    always.
        Mr. Magwood. Well, I don't want to sit here and say that
    someone is not telling the truth. I just simply will tell what
    you my experience has been.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        The gentleman from Maryland, the ranking member, is
    recognized for 5 minutes--or, actually, make that 6, please.
        Mr. Cummings. Thanks.
        Commissioner Svinicki, first of all, I want to thank you
    for--I want to thank all of you for your testimony.
        You know, I am just sitting here and I am just wondering
    what is going to happen after you go back. You know, we have
    no--we are not experts up here on, you know, dysfunction. The
    country, at 80 percent, says the Congress isn't functioning
    very well at all. So I don't want to sit here and tell you how
    to conduct your business.
        But I am concerned about some of the statements that have
    been made, particularly, Chairman Jaczko, with women feeling
    intimidated. That alarms me, as the father of two daughters. It
    does concern me.
        I want you to address that, please.
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, I----
        Mr. Cummings. And how do you feel about that? Is it true? I
    mean, do you think that is true?
        Mr. Jaczko. I am very passionate about safety, and all the
    things that I do at the agency are directed toward doing what I
    think is the right thing for safety.
        I--when I heard the incident--about the incident that I
    believe Commissioner Svinicki is referring to, I tried to think
    through all the many meetings we had together where we had had
    very good discussions, sometimes disagreements about policy
    issues, and I believe there is one meeting that she may have
    been referring to. As I recall the meeting, I went to her
    office to speak with her about a letter, I believe it was. At a
    certain point, we were discussing it, and she became concerned.
    And I--as I recall, I simply motioned, I said, just sit down,
    let's just calm down and let's just work through it. We
    continued to discuss it, and then at some point I left.
        Mr. Cummings. Is this a situation, when you all go back--I
    mean, you have apologized, have you not?
        Mr. Jaczko. Certainly, if any--many of these instances, I--
    this is the first time I have heard many of these accusations.
    And, certainly, if there has ever been a time when I have made
    someone feel uncomfortable, I always like to know so that I can
    take whatever action is necessary to remedy that.
        Mr. Cummings. Yeah.
        Commissioner Svinicki, you testified before the Senate
    Committee on Environment and Public Works that you were never
    told that the chairman was operating under his emergency
    authority until the NRC Office of Congressional Affairs
    informed the Senate.
        Do you remember exactly when that was? And how far after
    the earthquake and the tsunami did you find out?
        Ms. Svinicki. I--I don't recall the specific time period.
        If I recall the question that was posed before the Senate
    committee, I think it was, was I informed that the chairman had
    invoked his emergency authorities under Section 3(a), so it was
    a very specific question about invocation of a provision of
    law. And I indicated that I learned of that when the Office of
    Congressional Affairs responded to a committee request.
        I don't recall how many months after the Fukushima event
    that was, sir.
        Mr. Cummings. Well, our committee staff conducted a
    transcribed interview with the NRC general counsel, who took a
    different view, and this is what he said. He said, ``I have
    heard testimony that they were not informed that the chairman
    was exercising his emergency power. However, the Commissioners
    all were informed that the operations center had gone into this
    monitoring mode soon after the Fukushima earthquake--and,
    actually, the beginning concerns for the reactors--Fukushima
    reactors that had occurred. That Saturday, March 12th, I sat in
    on a conference call in which the chairman told each of the
    Commissioners--I believe each one of them was on the conference
    call--was explaining what was going on with respect to the
    reactor.''
        Commissioner, were you on that call?
        Ms. Svinicki. I was, sir. And if I may say that the general
    counsel's response indicated that we were informed the agency
    was in the monitoring mode. The difference or the
    misunderstanding is that, in my view, that does not correlate
    directly to invocation of emergency authorities. The agency
    going into the monitoring mode does not necessarily invoke
    those emergency authorities under law.
        Mr. Cummings. And it seems fairly obvious that if the
    Commission was operating an emergency operations center, the
    Commission was responding to an emergency. That is not--do you
    disagree with that?
        Ms. Svinicki. The agency has numerous times gone into the
    monitoring mode where the chairman of the agency has not
    invoked the emergency authorities. So I do not correlate being
    notified of being in the monitoring mode as an immediate
    invocation of those authorities, sir.
        Mr. Cummings. Okay. But you are--but there was an emergency
    operation; is that right? I know that I am----
        Ms. Svinicki. Yes. And other than the term being the same,
    again--and I apologize if my answer is complicated--it is
    simply that the agency going into a monitoring mode does not
    necessarily correlate or immediately invoke those emergency
    authorities.
        Mr. Cummings. So is your main objection that you did not
    receive some sort of a paper stating explicitly, ``Oh, by the
    way, we are having an emergency''? Is that a fair statement?
        Ms. Svinicki. The significance to me of the invocation of
    the emergency authorities is that, under the reorganization
    plan, at that point the chairman has taken the authorities of
    the Commission as a whole, and then in an emergency he is able
    to exercise singularly the authorities of the Commission as a
    body. So I do see a distinction.
        Mr. Cummings. Well, perhaps, Chairman Jaczko, could you
    clear that up? When did you inform them that we were operating
    under the emergency provisions?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, the first action was very early on on
    March 11th at about 9:43 in the morning. I believe one of my
    staff members indicated to their staff that we were entering
    monitoring mode. About 20 minutes later, a formal agency email
    went out.
        I then, later that evening--and this is all on the first
    day, March 11th--sent an email to my colleagues informing them
    that we were in monitoring mode and talked about our response
    and what we were doing to the accident.
        From that point on, we had meetings at least three times a
    day, where their staff were briefed by members of the
    operations center about our activities and our status. I held,
    approximately once a day and starting on March 12th, briefing
    phone calls with them to describe our actions and indicate what
    we were doing as an agency to respond to the emergency.
        Mr. Cummings. I see my time has expired. Thank you.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
        We will now go to the chairman of the subcommittee, Mr.
    Jordan, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Jordan. I thank the chairman.
        Let me start with Mr. Ostendorff. On October 13th, you all
    sent a letter to the White House chief of staff. That seems
    pretty unprecedented to me, that you would have two Democrats,
    two Republicans on a commission send a letter to the chief of
    staff of the White House about the activities of the chairman
    of this Commission.
        Do you know if there are any other examples of that
    happening, other commissions where the same kind of action was
    taken, a letter sent to the White House chief of staff?
        Mr. Ostendorff. Mr. Jordan, I agree it is an unprecedented
    action. I am not aware of any other similar situation.
        Mr. Jordan. So you guys knew that this was something that
    had not been done before, this was pretty unprecedented.
        Mr. Ostendorff. I think the four of us were not aware of
    any circumstance in which a similar action was taken by
    independent regulatory commission members.
        Mr. Jordan. And my guess is you had several discussions
    amongst the four of you about taking this unprecedented action.
    Can you elaborate on that? Was there a time frame where over a
    period of months, maybe even longer, where weeks or months or
    longer you talked about taking this unprecedented action?
        Mr. Ostendorff. We've had significant concerns for a number
    of months, and this was the committee's report that's in our
    letter to the White House concern on withdrawal of the SECY
    paper back in July, associated with staff recommendations on
    how the Fukushima report should be evaluated and prioritized by
    our staff.
        That paper was withdrawn by the chairman. It caused
    significant concern among the four of us. We discussed our
    concerns with the chairman. We saw attempts to remove the
    executive director for operations, the EDO, which is a
    significant personnel step to remove the senior career person
    in the agency.
        Mr. Jordan. Yes.
        Mr. Ostendorff. We saw the October 5 meeting that
    Commissioner Svinicki referred to where the chairman made
    statements to senior executives in our agency that appeared to
    undermine the commission. That was the crossing line for, at
    least from my own standpoint, and I think my colleagues, and I
    asked them agreed and that was what----
        Mr. Jordan. Safe to say, well thought out, over a period of
    time, discussed thoroughly, and you said that the situation
    warrants us taking this unprecedented action?
        Mr. Ostendorff. We had seen that our attempts to talk to
    the chairman about our concerns on various matters had not
    yielded any difference in behavior or actions on his part. We
    felt that as a commission, we had an obligation to the United
    States to do this.
        Mr. Jordan. And can I go down the line, Commissioner, with
    each of you? Would you agree with the assessment given by Mr.
    Ostendorff?
        Ms. Svinicki. Yes, sir, I would. And I would add that we
    had engaged, as I said, in protracted efforts to attempt,
    through our own procedures, to try to resolve some of these
    issues that had not borne any fruit.
        Mr. Jordan. Commissioner Magwood, accurate?
        Mr. Magwood. Yes, very accurate.
        Mr. Jordan. And Commissioner Apostolakis?
        Mr. Apostolakis. Yes, it is accurate.
        Mr. Jordan. And, Mr. Ostendorff, we have a chart here in
    our material of the five Commissioners, the professional staff,
    this chart here was, I'm guessing, maybe 30 different folks
    here, and obviously you can't testify for them, but is it fair
    to say that the staff that's on this page had real concerns
    about the leadership style of Mr. Jaczko? This was part of your
    assessment and the evaluation before you sent the
    correspondence, the letter to the chief of staff?
        Mr. Ostendorff. Mr. Jordan, I can tell that you that prior
    to signing the letter, I think, I will speak for myself, but I
    think my other three colleagues would say the same thing, that
    we had significant feedback from the senior career leadership
    of the agency expressing great concerns on there being a
    chilled environment, a lack of open and collaborative work
    environment in their interface with the chairman.
        Mr. Jordan. Okay, and just one question for you and the
    same question of the other Commissioners.
        You stated in your testimony that it bothers you that some
    are alleging that the action that the four of you have taken
    are somehow politically motivated. I think it's certainly a
    stretch in the fact that it's two Democrats to a Republican,
    but I want to ask, do you think the actions of the chairman
    have been politically motivated, his style of leadership, what
    he is doing, do you think those are politically driven?
        Mr. Ostendorff. That's a difficult question, Mr. Jordan. I
    personally can't tell that you I think his actions are
    politically motivated. I have no evidence that they are. I will
    just tell that you we have seen significant issues under his
    leadership and management that we think are unacceptable.
        Mr. Jordan. Commissioner Svinicki, I'm sorry. I think I did
    a better job on the name than the chairman, but I'm sure I got
    it wrong. Go ahead.
        Ms. Svinicki. I will not testify to political motivations
    of Chairman Jaczko. I would describe my motivation in signing
    that letter was more on the basic conduct issues.
        Mr. Jordan. Okay, okay, fair enough. Mr. Magwood.
        Mr. Magwood. I think I would answer the question the same
    way and would not describe political motivations.
        Mr. Jordan. Okay.
        Mr. Apostolakis. My motivation was not political.
        Mr. Jordan. I understand that. Do you think the chairman's
    was.
        Mr. Apostolakis. I have no evidence that it was. I think
    it's more his interpretation of his role as a chairman that was
    driving his actions.
        Mr. Jordan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you. We now recognize the ranking
    member of the subcommittee, Mr. Kucinich, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of
    the committee, I want to quote from an article on Politico
    today on their front page. It says, ``Behind closed doors, they
    snipe at each other. In public, they question each other's
    motives. And in front of Congress they hang each other out to
    dry.''
        That's life on the Federal Election Commission, not the
    NRC, but the FEC.
        I would imagine that if we called up one Commission after
    another in front of this Congress, you'd probably have some
    complaints that may not be dissimilar than what we have here.
    The difference is, though, that 104 nuclear power plants in
    various stages of relicensing, some of which have some
    questions related to safety, post-Fukushima 7 months ago, March
    11, 2011, or May 11, 2011. I'm, frankly, you know, wondering
    why you're here. I appreciate the chairman calling the hearing,
    this is all very interesting.
        Mr. Jordan. Will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Kucinich. I would certainly yield.
        Mr. Jordan. Well, I would just make one point that I made
    in my remarks, the one big difference is, I'm sure you have
    some of those actions taking place inside the FEC, but no
    Commission has taken the unprecedented action of having four
    members sign a letter and send it to the White House chief of
    staff. That's the difference and that's why the chairman has
    called this hearing.
        Mr. Kucinich. Well, you know, I thank the chairman for
    calling the hearing and I thank my friend for pointing that
    out. But I also think that it's important for us to look beyond
    what we see and consider that, you know, we have an industry
    that's in trouble. Wall Street won't invest in nuclear power.
    The nuclear industry came to this government and looked for a
    $60 billion-plus loan guarantee. The industry's in trouble.
        So the Commissioners are going to reflect what's going on
    in the industry. I mean, I would expect that's what's happening
    here, and that's why we need to look deeper into what we're
    hearing about the NRC and ask what's going on with the
    industry, what do the titans of the industry have to say about
    the chairman?
        Now, Mr. Jaczko, an Associated Press story reported that
    you were worried that the U.S. nuclear plant operators may have
    become complacent following the disaster in Japan. And
    according to a press account, you said that recent instances of
    human error and other problems have threatened the safety of
    some of the Nation's nuclear facilities. It was reported, for
    example, that incidents at nuclear plants in Ohio and Nebraska,
    ``almost led to workers getting very, very significant doses''
    of radiation.
        The article also reports that in addition to these events,
    three other plants were shut down for safety reasons. This
    apparently marks the first time in more than a decade that
    several plants in the U.S. have been shut down at the same
    time.
        Can you elaborate, Mr. Chairman, on some of these specific
    events that have occurred recently and which ones trouble you
    the most and why?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, Congressman, the events in particular
    with the potential worker exposures were, in my mind, very
    significant events because they appear to indicate a lack of
    adherence to procedures. And after I made those comments, I
    heard from industry officials, and while they may have not
    necessarily agreed with my assessment of complacency, they did
    acknowledge that there is a change in the workforce right now
    in the nuclear industry, there is new workers, and we are
    seeing some of these incidents in which the new workers may not
    have a full appreciation of the procedures and the need for
    adherence to certain processes that ultimately ensure safety.
        So it's an important signal. It's not clear yet that we're
    seeing a true decline in safety, but it's an important signal
    that we need to make sure we keep a close eye on as the year
    goes on and as we continue our oversight of these plants.
        Mr. Kucinich. Is safety your top concern?
        Mr. Jaczko. Safety has been my number one priority since I
    came to the Commission.
        Mr. Kucinich. And after Fukushima, what went on in your
    mind about safety and nuclear power plants in this country?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, first and foremost, I was proud of the
    staff at the NRC, that we have worked very hard for a long time
    to be focused on safety, but that accident, I think, really
    reminded us that there is no way to rule out accidents, there
    is no way to prevent, ultimately, all kinds of serious
    incidents, so we have to be even more vigilant and dedicated to
    safety than we've ever been.
        Mr. Kucinich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.
    I ask unanimous consent to place in the record a staff report
    called Regulatory Meltdown.
        Chairman Issa. Whose staff report?
        Mr. Kucinich. A staff report by Mr. Markey.
        Chairman Issa. I'll reserve, but only for a very short
    period of time, because it is another committee's report.
        Mr. Kucinich. Well, I would appreciate your----
        Chairman Issa. It will only take a couple of minutes for
    staff to review it.
        Mr. Kucinich. Thank you.
        Chairman Issa. We recognize the gentleman from Utah, a
    State that gives us uranium, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
    holding this hearing.
        Chairman Jaczko, you are undoubtedly aware of the letter
    that was sent to the White House to the Chief of Staff dated
    October 13, 2011. There's five very serious charges in there.
    Number one, intimidating and bullying senior career staff. True
    or false?
        Mr. Jaczko. I have not bullied and intimidated career
    staff.
        Mr. Chaffetz. True or false, ordered staff to withhold
    their modified policy information and recommendations intended
    for transmission to the Commission?
        Mr. Jaczko. There is one occasion which I discussed with a
    very senior manager, a recommendation that he wanted to make on
    an issue.
        Mr. Chaffetz. So only one time in the history of your time
    there?
        Mr. Jaczko. Correct. And I have----
        Mr. Chaffetz. Next one, true or false, attempted to
    intimidate the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, a
    legislative--anyway, it goes on, true or false?
        Mr. Jaczko. False.
        Mr. Chaffetz. True or false, ignored the will of the
    majority of the Commission contrary to the statutory functions
    of the Commission?
        Mr. Jaczko. I have never ignored the will of the Commission
    in an area that is a commission----
        Mr. Chaffetz. I will take that as a false. True or false,
    interacted with us, his fellow Commissioners, with such
    intemperance and disrespect that the Commission no longer
    functions as effectively as it should?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, I'm--I'm a very passionate person about
    safety. And I often engage my colleagues in discussions about
    safety. And that's been my style and my practice.
        Mr. Chaffetz. So, in other words, in other words, they're
    all wrong, and you're exactly right.
        Mr. Jaczko. I've listened very carefully to the concerns of
    my colleagues.
        Mr. Chaffetz. And you've done nothing wrong?
        Mr. Jaczko. I have listened very carefully to the concerns
    of my colleagues, and I'm certainly very interested in
    continuing the dialogue with them to better understand how we
    are not communicating effectively.
        And, in fact, as I believe Mr.----
        Mr. Chaffetz. Let me continue, my time is short and I
    appreciate that, but it doesn't seem like any sort of
    repentance or concern for this.
        Now, are you telling me that the--there was an Office of
    the Inspector General did a report dated June 6, 2011, page 44,
    and I'm extracting a quote out of it a portion of a sentence,
    ``He strategically provided three of the four Commissioners
    with varying amounts of information.''
        Would you disagree with that?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, the Inspector General found ultimately
    that my actions were consistent with the law, they were
    consistent with Commission policy.
        Mr. Chaffetz. But do you agree or disagree with the
    Inspector General, who is an independent person, who came in
    and looked at this and said you gave people varying amounts of
    information?
        Mr. Jaczko. I disagree with that assessment.
        Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Chairman, I've got to tell you, and to my
    colleagues on the other side, we talk about the safety, the
    security of this Nation, the importance of the nuclear
    situation in this country, this should be bipartisan. The
    Commission is bipartisan. We've got people who are suffering
    under this gentleman right here. He is not living up to the
    duties.
        I don't believe you. I think the safety and security of
    this Nation is too important. I think you should resign. I
    believe in these Commissioners, and God bless you for the job
    that you're doing and for stepping up and telling it like it
    is.
        Mr. Tierney. Will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Chaffetz. I will not, I will not. It is too important
    to get this right. I find it very hard to believe that the
    distinguished careers of two Democrats, two Republicans, the
    host of staff that stands behind it and an the Inspector
    General that goes out and looks at this, and you're telling me,
    they're all wrong and you're right. That, to me, is a lack of
    leadership, and I hope--I hope that there's some sort of
    change, and if you're going to do the right thing for your
    country and for this Commission, you should step down. I yield
    back.
        Mr. Tierney. Will about the gentleman yield?
        Chairman Issa. Will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Chaffetz. Yes.
        Chairman Issa. I recognize that there could be disagreement
    on this, but I do have the basic question for you: In light of
    this accusation, do you believe, chairman, that you need to
    make changes in your management and style and how you deal with
    your Commissioners and how you keep them informed?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, certainly, I'm very interested in
    improving the communication among the five of us.
        Chairman Issa. And if you had to do it again, would you
    have invoked emergency powers without consultation with this
    Commission?
        Mr. Jaczko. All the actions that I took in regard to the 50
    mile, or the Japan response in general, I'm very comfortable
    with.
        Chairman Issa. Okay, so you're comfortable with an event on
    the other side of the world, taking away these people's rights
    to have full and complete access and a vote, you're comfortable
    doing that without consultation even though, in fact, it was no
    direct threat to the United States, and they were available?
    You're comfortable with not consulting with them?
        Mr. Jaczko. The----
        Chairman Issa. Okay, that says it all.
        Mr. Tierney. Will the gentleman yield?
        Chairman Issa. Actually the time has expired.
        Mr. Tierney. Isn't that interesting?
        Chairman Issa. The time has expired. No, no. Did you finish
    answering? No, no, no, no, I didn't cut him off. If you have
    further to answer you are welcome.
        Mr. Jaczko. I wasn't sure if you were asking me a question
    or if you wanted a response.
        Chairman Issa. Well, I asked you if you were comfortable,
    on the gentleman's time, I asked you if were comfortable with
    not consulting, and you said you were comfortable with not
    consulting. You were comfortable with what you did when, in
    fact, it was pretty extraordinary and it was an event on the
    other side of the world and these lady and gentlemen were
    available, and yet they didn't even seem to know that their
    powers had been usurped so that you could run the show even
    though none--you're not a nuclear engineer and several of these
    people are.
        So are you still comfortable with that?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, I am very comfortable with the actions
    that we took as an agency, and I did provide tremendous amounts
    of information to my colleagues, including personally briefing
    them about the status of our response and the issues that we
    were looking at. Their staff was fully aware in multiple
    briefings that they were provided, sometimes up to four times a
    day, on all of the issues that we were looking at. And, again,
    when we're in an emergency situation like this, the authorities
    are transferred to the chairman in order to assure effective
    and timely decisionmaking. And the events in Japan, I think,
    demonstrated that that was the appropriate way to respond.
        Chairman Issa. I now recognize the gentleman from
    Massachusetts for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you. And just a comment to my colleague
    from Utah who, we generally get along pretty well. When there's
    a minute and 28 seconds left on the clock and somebody has
    asked you to yield and you deny the yield but give it to
    somebody in your own party, it doesn't really speak to
    bipartisanship approach on a hearing like this.
        And I was going to ask you whether or not you totally
    disregard the Inspector General's findings and wish us to.
    Since there was going to be a bipartisan hearing, then I would
    think we would put some weight on the Inspector General's
    report and conclusions, which are contrary to your
    recommendations
        Mr. Chaffetz. Will the gentleman yield? Will the gentleman
    yield?
        Mr. Tierney. Yes, I will yield.
        Mr. Chaffetz. The chairman said he disagreed with the
    Inspector General, the Inspector General was wrong.
        Mr. Tierney. I think, I would reclaim my time, and I note
    that he disagreed with him on one quote of that report but
    agreed with him quite fully on the conclusions of the final
    report itself.
        But from what I am reading in statute on this section 3, it
    says, notwithstanding sections 1 and 2 of this reorganization
    plan, there are hereby transferred to the chairman all the
    functions vested in the Commission pertaining to an emergency
    concerning a particular facility or materials licensed or
    regulated by the Commission, including the functions of
    declaring, responding, issuing orders, determining specific
    policies, advising the civil authorities and the public,
    directing and coordinating actions relative to such emergency
    incident.
        Chairman Issa. Would the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Tierney. At the end I will if I have time.
        In 1980, Congress enacted legislation on this and said the
    chairman will be the official spokesman of the Commission.
    There are hereby transferred to the chairman all those
    functions that I read. To the maximum extent possible under the
    emergency conditions, the chairman or other member of the
    Commission delegated authority under the subsection B shall
    inform the Commission of actions taken relative to the
    emergency, and following the conclusion of the emergency the
    chairman or a member of the Commission delegated to the
    emergency functions shall render a complete and timely report.
        Mr. Chairman, did you do those things that the statute set
    out?
        Mr. Jaczko. I did and I believe I did much more.
        Mr. Tierney. Okay. Now I am concerned that what's probably
    going on in large part here is a disagreement in the
    interpretation of what powers the chairman has under the
    statute. That seems to be the underlying fact here, and that's
    not a new disagreement.
        I go all the way back to a 1999 report, a 1998 report on
    this ambiguity regarding the chairman's role and the
    Commissioners' role continues. And it goes on in that basis. It
    lays a less than harmonious interaction. It seems that members
    of the Commission always think they have more responsibility,
    chair people, particularly new ones always think they have an
    enlarged role, and that policy resides with the full Commission
    and management resides with the chairman. It seems to me the
    same thing's going on here.
        I look at a report done by our colleague over on the Energy
    and Commerce Committee, Mr. Markey, and I'm troubled, I'm
    troubled by the fact that his conclusion in that report draws
    some very concerning points. He says that after reviewing all
    of the records that he asked for, voting records, reports,
    emails, correspondence, memoranda, phone or meeting minutes or
    other materials related to the events at Fukushima or the NRC's
    response to it, he says that four NRC Commissioners attempted
    to delay or otherwise impede the creation of the NRC near-term
    task force on Fukushima.
        He says that four NRC Commissioners conspired with each
    other and with senior NRC staff to delay the release of and
    alter the NRC near-term task force report on Fukushima. He says
    that the other NRC Commissioners attempted to slow down, or
    otherwise impede the adoption of the safety recommendations
    made by the NRC near-term task force on Fukushima.
        He says the NRC chairman, Greg Jaczko, kept the other four
    NRC Commissioners fully informed regarding the Japanese
    Emergency Commissioners, despite claims to the contrary made by
    these commissioners. He said that a review of emails and other
    documents indicates high levels of suspicion and hostility
    directed at the chairman.
        He said the consideration of Fukushima safety upgrades is
    not the only safety-related issue that the other NRC
    Commissioners have opposed. That concerns me. It concerns me
    when four members have findings like this by another member on
    his committee with his staff, and we come in here and sort of
    bear up on one, it seems to we've got a problem with everybody
    here. You know, people have to work together in some respect.
    It is unprecedented that a Commission would send a letter to
    the White House chief of staff. I'm not sure it's a good
    precedent to set as opposed to trying to work things out.
        Mr. Chairman, do any of those six items that I just read,
    do they seem to you to be accurate?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, it has been challenging, I think, to move
    forward on some of the task force recommendations. And again, I
    wouldn't want to assign motives or any other ill intention to
    my colleagues, but I think we have had some challenges.
        Mr. Tierney. Did you feel that the things, that there was
    an attempt to slow down the release of that report on
    Fukushima?
        Mr. Jaczko. There was definitely an attempt to prevent the
    release of the report.
        Mr. Tierney. So do you think it was an attempt to make
    things more transparent and to provide to the public and
    Congress information that was important for them to have?
        Mr. Jaczko. There was certainly a disagreement on the
    Commission about providing it, transparently, to the public. In
    the end, the majority of the Commission wound up providing the
    report, but there was a lot of internal disagreement about that
    on the Commission.
        Mr. Tierney. I yield to the chairman.
        Chairman Issa. Now, your time--the time is expired, you
    didn't give me any, and I understand how important your
    questioning was.
        With that, we go to the gentleman from Oklahoma.
        Mr. Lankford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, thanks for
    being here. And as others have mentioned before, Mr. Cummings,
    this is a tough spot to be able to come to be able to talk
    about trying to work out functioning conversations, because we
    have a tough time within Congress ourselves.
        The issue still remains though, the day-to-day operation of
    nuclear safety, and the decisions that you make are significant
    in this. And I want you to know we appreciate the work that you
    do from day to day, keeping us safe, but this has got to be
    worked out, as you know well. And it is an unprecedented action
    to say this could affect safety long term if we don't work this
    out, and so thanks for coming forward on it, thanks for working
    together and let's try to resolve this.
        With that, Mr. Magwood, let me ask you a question, you made
    a statement that safety is the top concern. Some of your
    nuclear background, and just a brief statement on it. I have
    your bio but make a brief statement about your nuclear
    background.
        Mr. Magwood. Well, most of my nuclear background is in
    government. I worked at the Department of Energy for 11 years
    as a political appointee. I was in charge of the nuclear
    infrastructure associated with the civilian nuclear technology
    program, which includes the Idaho National Laboratory and, I
    guess 2,500-odd contractors. I was responsible for overseeing
    the management of reactor operations----
        Mr. Lankford. Okay. In any of those operations, any of
    those environments, I assume you've got very competent people
    around you that are all well-studied, all well-researched and
    you have disagreements on things. Has something like this
    occurred in other groups that you've worked with in other
    places to say we have four or five colleagues, we disagree and
    it breaks out in something like this? So have you seen
    something like this in the past?
        Mr. Magwood. No, I have not seen that.
        Mr. Lankford. My concern is this is not just a disagreement
    on colleagues that are all competent on the issue. My concern
    is this becomes a management conversation to say how are things
    led by one individual or another, and how do we come to
    conclusions because, Mr. Jaczko, I appreciate your statement
    saying you're passionate about safety and that all of these
    arguments and these disagreements and lack of communication
    breaks down to the fact that you're passionate about safety,
    but that definitely alludes to the fact that you're more
    passionate about safety than everyone else is, and so it just
    becomes more heated to you or more significant.
        And my concern is, is there an impression in your mind that
    you're more competent and more passionate about safety than the
    other Commissioners?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, Congressman, I'm committed to safety.
        Mr. Lankford. Are you more competent and more passionate
    about safety in these areas than the other Commissioners?
        Mr. Jaczko. That's certainly not a judgment that I would
    make, but I am passionate about safety.
        Mr. Lankford. That's more so than the others around you, so
    there's five of you, and you look at and you know the meetings
    that you are in, and you look at them and you say, well,
    they're not--they're a little more, they lean in other
    directions besides safety, but I'm more passionate about
    safety. Is that your concern?
        Mr. Jaczko. I would leave it to others to judge the
    various----
        Mr. Lankford. I'm asking your opinion because it affects
    your management style.
        Mr. Jaczko. I treat all of my colleagues as equal members
    and equal----
        Mr. Lankford. Do you consider yourself more passionate
    about safety than your colleagues, yes or no?
        Mr. Jaczko. I'm not sure how I would describe more or less
    passionate, but I am passionate about safety and I think that's
    the best I can tell you.
        Mr. Lankford. That's a nice safe answer. I'm just asking a
    direct question because it affects--the reason I say that is,
    is because if in the back of your mind you're thinking if this
    is really going to be done right, I'm going to have to do it,
    because they're not as passionate as I am, because I'm am
    trying to figure out why some people get some information and
    some people don't, and why recommendations come from staff, and
    they get filtered through to try to determine what gets out to
    different people.
        Because if you have in the back of your mind, I'm concerned
    for our nuclear safety, so I need to make sure our filter, what
    gets to them, because it may not be right, I just wanted to
    know, because that does affect your own record.
        So yes or no, are you more passionate about safety than
    others, or do you have a concern that some other Commissioner
    is not as passionate about safety as you are?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, I--in regard to the information coming to
    the Commission, I think that's the basis for your question, the
    Commission gets policy matters that come to the Commission for
    voting, information is provided as part of those, and I am
    rarely, if ever, involved in the provision of that information.
        Mr. Lankford. Let me ask you a quick question separate from
    that and there's also a concern, there's a statement that's
    been made that you reportedly at one moment said about the two
    different other Democrat appointees that we Democrats have to
    stick together on a vote. Was that a statement that you've
    made?
        Mr. Jaczko. I don't recall making that statement.
        Mr. Lankford. Okay. My time has expired.
        Chairman Issa. Would the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Lankford. Yes, I would.
        Chairman Issa. Do you have sourcing for that statement?
        Mr. Lankford. My time has expired on that one. I would be
    glad to be able to take it----
        Chairman Issa. Okay. If you would provide it, I would
    appreciate it.
        Chairman, a piece of administrative business for a moment.
    The gentleman from Ohio has asked to have an individual
    Member's report from Ed Markey placed in the record. I have no
    objections. I do have a request that goes with it.
        In reviewing it, you delivered to an individual Member, to
    Ed Markey, one of your former employers, you delivered him
    unredacted information and additional information beyond what
    this committee received through our request.
        Would you pledge today to deliver us in the same unredacted
    form everything, I repeat, everything that was responsive to
    Mr. Markey?
        Mr. Jaczko. Absolutely. And, Mr. Chairman, I think, as you
    know, we've provided a large number of documents to your staff.
        Chairman Issa. I appreciate that, but discovering that he
    received documents less redacted than we did, as an individual
    Member, and produced a report, I have no problem with this
    being placed in the record. But in order to make the record
    complete, we would need to have the same information, which we
    do not have today, and, quite frankly, we expect, normally,
    that what is redacted is redacted for good and proper reasons,
    and there should be no difference whatsoever unless, in fact, a
    committee demands unredaction, not an individual Member.
        So if you agree to that, I withdraw my reserve and we now
    recognize----
        Mr. Kucinich. I want to thank the chair for including that
    in the record, and I agree with him that we should be able to
    receive this additional information.
        Chairman Issa. I think members on both sides would like to
    see it. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Jaczko. I would just note that I can only speak for the
    documents that were in my possession. Some of those other
    documents may have been provided by other members of the
    Commission, so I am certainly not aware of any documents that
    were redacted any differently. But, again, I can only speak for
    those that are in mine.
        Chairman Issa. Well, and the good news is that one thing I
    know about the executive branch is you guys authenticate very
    carefully what you give to people. So I'm sure we won't have a
    problem in getting the same information. And sometimes people
    interpret what somebody wants differently than somebody else.
    In this case, we want everything that Mr. Markey wanted for the
    same reason of doing our job.
        With that, we recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
    Connolly, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to say it
    is quite a spectacle to have five members of the Commission
    arguing about management style before a committee of Congress.
    That, in and of itself, in some ways, erodes confidence and the
    function of the Commission.
        One does not know who did what to whom and how important it
    is. The suggestion, obviously, by having a hearing of such
    prominence has the potential effect of undermining that
    confidence and obviously the chairman of the Commission is the
    target.
        I regret that because I think we are at risk, perhaps, of
    trivializing your mission. The real conversation that ought to
    be taking place here may be less about management style,
    although that can be important, and more about mission and how
    well or poorly historically the NRC has carried out that
    mission; its cozy relationship with industry; its ability to
    cogently take lessons learned from tragedies such as Fukushima;
    its ability to reassure the public of safety and safety
    standards at nuclear power plants; and its ability to show
    demonstrable clear independence from the industry it regulates.
        It is just as viable to posit that what's going on here is
    that we have a chairman who takes the mission seriously as it
    is to say we have a chairman who bullies his fellow
    Commissioners in a voice. I don't know what the truth is, but I
    do think this hearing ought to get at it.
        Chairman Jaczko, do you see a philosophical difference
    between yourself and your fellow Commissioners with respect to
    the mission of the NRC and how to go about it?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, but we do have different approaches to
    what we believe is safe and how we define safety. I think
    that's clear in the different votes that we cast and the
    positions that we take as Commissioners.
        Mr. Connolly. Well, specifically, hone in on Fukushima. You
    answered a question about Fukushima just a little while ago to
    one of my colleagues and you confirmed that, in fact, there was
    an attempt by four fellow Commissioners to perhaps bury some of
    the findings of that study and/or to aggressively look at
    lessons learned from the single worst nuclear disaster in world
    history.
        Mr. Jaczko. We did have a disagreement----
        Mr. Connolly. You did?
        Mr. Jaczko. --on the release of----
        Mr. Connolly. You did; is that what you said?
        Mr. Jaczko. That's correct.
        Mr. Connolly. Okay, go ahead.
        Mr. Jaczko. About the release of the report and whether or
    not it should be reviewed by the Commission prior to ever being
    released publicly.
        Mr. Connolly. What was the nature of that dispute?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, it was simply, I believed the report,
    once it was completed, should be made publicly available and so
    the public could see what the views of----
        Mr. Connolly. Your Commissioners disagreed with that?
        Mr. Jaczko. There were some who did disagree and wanted the
    report to be reviewed, and perhaps, acted on by the Commission
    and changed before it was released publicly.
        Mr. Connolly. On August 23, we had a major earthquake here
    in the east coast, surprised everybody, including in my home
    State of Virginia. We had a close call at the North Anna
    nuclear power plant as a result of that earthquake, which did
    generally cosmetic, some minor structural damage up and down
    the east coast. But it was a reminder that nuclear power can be
    vulnerable to seismic activity.
        That plant was deemed as exceeding its design basis. Could
    you explain what that means to us, Chairman Jaczko, and what
    was the nature of the concern at the time after the August 23
    earthquake?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, when plants are originally built and
    designed, they pick out the characteristics of an earthquake,
    and they build all of the structures in the plant to be able to
    withstand that type of an event. And the earthquake, in fact,
    was bigger than the earthquake that was hypothesized in the
    original design of the facility, so there were some shaking of
    the building that was larger than what originally in the--in
    the original analysis for the plant.
        Mr. Connolly. Potentially compromising safety?
        Mr. Jaczko. Certainly it had the potential to compromise
    safety.
        Mr. Connolly. Were there other power plants in the east
    coast that were similarly affected or could have been?
        Mr. Jaczko. We didn't see any that were directly impacted
    because that plant was very close to the center of the
    earthquake. But it was certainly possible that other plants
    could have experience effects from the earthquake.
        Mr. Connolly. Post August 23 earthquake, what action did
    the NRC take and was the Commission in agreement, or also in
    disagreement about those actions?
        Mr. Jaczko. The Commission now, or the agency really,
    reviewed the safety of the facility. Ultimately it was a staff
    decision to determine whether or not the facility should
    restart, and I was very clear with the staff that they needed
    to do what they felt was appropriate for safety and, in fact,
    the Commission held an information briefing because there was
    interest among my colleagues in hearing and understanding what
    we were doing, and I think it was a very productive meeting and
    a very strong show, I think, of the Commission working and
    functioning as a body.
        Mr. Connolly. Consensually.
        Mr. Jaczko. Yes.
        Mr. Connolly. My time has expired. I hope we get a chance
    to explore that some more. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Gowdy. [presiding.] I thank the gentleman. I will now
    recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
        I'm going to ask the non-chairman Commissioners a series of
    what I hope are quick questions and expectation hopefully of
    quick answer.
        Ms. Svinicki, is the chairman's behavior affecting your
    ability to discharge the duties for which you took an oath to
    discharge?
        Ms. Svinicki. To this point, I believe that I have had
    access to what I need to faithfully execute my duties. However,
    I'm concerned that we're at the point where that is being
    compromised.
        Mr. Gowdy. Have you lost confidence in his ability to lead?
        Ms. Svinicki. Yes, on the basis of his interpersonal
    conduct, I have.
        Mr. Gowdy. Commissioner Magwood, same two questions to you,
    do you believe his behavior is impacting your ability to do
    your job, and have you lost confidence in his ability to lead?
        Mr. Magwood. It's a very complicated question. It's hard to
    answer yes or no. Let me answer it this way. I think that--I'm
    sorry--I think that over the time I have been a Commissioner, I
    have been able to get information that gives me enough
    confidence to make votes and to make decisions.
        There have been times when getting the information has been
    more difficult than I think it should have been. My biggest
    concern is there are always, is the chance that there's some
    piece of information I just didn't even know existed that never
    got to me.
        So as far as I know, I have had the ability to make
    decisions, fully informed. I have questions, I have doubts, and
    I have concerns.
        Mr. Gowdy. Commissioner Ostendorff?
        Mr. Ostendorff. My concerns with respect to the chairman's
    style have been primarily that his interface with our NRC staff
    has been abrasive, he uses the term ``passionate.'' I'd say it
    has prevented staff from feeling comfortable they can bring
    forth their best views and recommendations to the Commission.
    From that standpoint, I think it's a grave concern.
        Mr. Gowdy. Have you lost confidence in his ability to lead?
        Mr. Ostendorff. At this stage, I have, yes.
        Mr. Gowdy. Commissioner Apostolakis?
        Mr. Apostolakis. So far, my votes could mean--have not been
    affected adversely by any actions by the chairman. In fact, in
    the letter to the chief of staff, we said that there may, there
    may be some harm in the future if this continues.
        I believe if the chairman lets the staff send us their true
    views when various issues come before the Commission, and if he
    also controls his temper a little bit, he can continue to lead
    the Commission.
        Mr. Gowdy. Chairman, there was an apology issued, I don't
    whether you drafted it or the White House drafted it. Who
    drafted your apology?
        Mr. Jaczko. I prepared a letter that I sent to Mr. Daley.
    I'm not sure if that's the letter you are referring to.
        Mr. Gowdy. Have you apologized more than once?
        Mr. Jaczko. I have indicated to Mr. Daley in that letter
    that I was sorry for the distraction that this has caused.
        Mr. Gowdy. Is that the only thing you're sorry for is the
    distraction? Do you admit any of the conduct that's been
    alleged this morning?
        Mr. Jaczko. If--again, many of these accusations I'm
    hearing for the first time.
        Mr. Gowdy. Well, that doesn't impact whether they're true
    or not. The fact that you haven't heard them yet doesn't mean
    they're not true. My question is simple, are they true?
        Mr. Jaczko. I don't believe that they are true.
        Mr. Gowdy. What does that mean, I don't believe that they
    are true? Have you been verbally abusive to female staff.
        Mr. Jaczko. No, I have not.
        Mr. Gowdy. Have you withheld information from your fellow
    Commissioners?
        Mr. Jaczko. I have not.
        Mr. Gowdy. Have you asked anyone are they on your team?
        Mr. Jaczko. I have never said something like that.
        Mr. Gowdy. Chairman, let me tell you what it looks likes
    from my vantage point, which my background is not in nuclear
    science. When you have four eyewitnesses that testify to
    something under oath, you know what they call the defendant
    after that? An inmate. Four eyewitnesses to the conduct.
        It is unprecedented to me to have colleagues criticize one
    another privately. To do it publicly and to have to sit on
    either side of you to do it before a committee of Congress to
    me is unprecedented.
        None of the allegations they have made are accurate. Is
    that your testimony?
        Mr. Jaczko. I believe that on many of these instances that
    they are referring to have been misconstrued. And as I have
    indicated, that there are issues where I think we can improve
    our communication.
        Mr. Gowdy. Well, what did you apologize for?
        Mr. Jaczko. I apologize, as I indicated, for the
    distractions this caused.
        Mr. Gowdy. For their misunderstanding? Did you apologize
    because they misunderstood what you did?
        Mr. Jaczko. I have offered to my colleagues that we sit
    down with a third party, someone that we all could agree on to
    talk about these issues.
        Mr. Gowdy. We really need a counselor for the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission? We need a counselor for that?
        Mr. Jaczko. I'm very interested in improving the
    communication because I think it's vital.
        Mr. Gowdy. Does it matter to you that the four of them
    either have or are either rapidly losing confidence in your
    leadership? Does that matter to you?
        Mr. Jaczko. That's very important to me, and it's something
    that I am very interested in working on.
        Mr. Gowdy. But you deny the allegations that they testified
    to under oath?
        Mr. Jaczko. Congressman, I believe I have answered this
    question.
        Mr. Gowdy. Well, do it again for me. Do you deny them?
        Mr. Jaczko. As I said, I believe I have answered this
    question very well to the best of my ability here.
        Mr. Gowdy. I would recognize the gentleman from Illinois,
    Mr. Davis.
        Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like
    to yield 30 seconds to my colleague from Ohio, Mr. Kucinich.
        Mr. Kucinich. With all due respect to my good friend, the
    chair, these allegations are not allegations of criminal
    misconduct or anything like that, they are allegations that he
    doesn't get along with his Commissioners. That's not a basis
    for either imprisonment or for having the chairman resign.
        So I think that we have to put this in perspective and
    continue to insist that the Commission focus on safety, and I
    want to take this opportunity to wish all of the members of the
    Commission a Happy New Year.
        Mr. Davis. Reclaiming my time, thank you very much, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Let me first of all thank the witnesses for appearing, I'm
    going to shift gears a little bit.
        In July, the Union of Concerned Scientists issued a report
    entitled ``U.S. Nuclear Power After Fukushima, Commonsense
    Recommendations for Safety and Security.''
        This report includes recommendations for changes that the
    NRC should make to improve the safety and security of U.S.
    nuclear plants. One recommendation made by UCS was that NRC
    regulations should be extended to cover severe accidents. This
    is what the UCS report states.
        The NRC defines severe accidents as those more serious than
    the so-called design basis accidents that U.S. reactors are
    designed to withstand. While unlikely severe accidents can
    occur, as in Fukushima, and cause substantial damage to the
    reactor core and failure of the containment building, leading
    to large releases of radiation, for example, the agency does
    not evaluate or test the severe accident management guidelines
    that reactor owners voluntarily develop, so neither the NRC nor
    the public can be confident these guidelines would be
    effective.
        Mr. Chairman, I understand that there has to be a
    reasonable limit on what licensees are required to do and that
    every plant can't be fully prepared for every imaginable worst-
    case scenario.
        However, Fukushima should provide a wake-up call that
    severe accidents can and do happen. The Gulf oil spill is a
    prime example. That was the worst-case scenario, industry
    wasn't prepared, and it resulted in the worst environmental
    disaster in our Nation's history; would you agree with that
    statement?
        Mr. Jaczko. Yes, it's a very fair statement.
        Chairman Issa. [Presiding.] Would the gentleman suspend for
    just a moment. We have stopped the clock.
        We're going to have a minority hearing in a few moments,
    because that's a right. And I want to make sure that everyone
    understands, I have been very tolerant, but this hearing is not
    on nuclear safety, and we are not a committee with nuclear
    safety as a direct oversight.
        This is on the leadership of the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission, and although I will allow anything you want to do
    with your 5 minutes, I've always been very understanding, I
    would caution all members on both sides of the aisle that this
    is about a concern that has been legitimately raised all the
    way to the White House, that the committee believes is well
    within our unique jurisdiction as the Oversight Committee.
    We're not the Energy and Commerce Committee, we're not some of
    the Science Committee and so on.
        So I just, the gentleman can continue, the chairman can
    answer, but if we're going to make this about nuclear safety,
    then we've essentially hijacked a legitimate issue and anyone
    who does it, shame on you. The ranking member.
        Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, just a clarification, I didn't
    hear the question that the gentleman asked, but part of this
    hearing goes to safety and whether this Commission can function
    and carry out its safety responsibilities. As a matter of fact,
    there has been, the majority report that came out, talked about
    a catastrophe, and I use that word, because of what was said at
    the Commission and that they would not be able to function
    properly. So I don't whether that question goes to safety and
    whether or not they are able to periodically----
        Chairman Issa. Would the gentleman yield, and I thank the
    ranking member.
        I was cautioning members because Mr. Davis was probably the
    best example of I know he was well intentioned, but nothing in
    his comment and nothing in his questions seem to go to the
    management and the questions of the management and capability
    to manage.
        Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Issa. Hold on. The fact is I respect every member
    of this committee. I have always said--and I wasn't that way
    when we were in the minority in a couple of cases. Mr. McHenry
    vividly remembers being shut up because he was, quote, off
    subject. Use your 5 minutes any way you want, but I would
    caution members that, in fact, our jurisdiction, our legitimate
    jurisdiction is not over directly second guessing safety but,
    in fact, our oversight of the entire Federal workforce, all
    commissions, all agencies.
        And so I only would ask that we do as much as we can to
    recognize that if there's an additional hearing, and if we
    legitimately can hold a hearing on the safety of our nuclear
    facilities more broadly, that's a legitimate hearing to ask
    for.
        This hearing was very narrow, and it had to do exactly with
    why these five Commissioners are here today. The ranking
    member.
        Mr. Kucinich. Just briefly, just briefly, there's two
    points I want to make briefly. First of all, thank you for
    holding this hearing. I think it's important at this time and
    place that we have the hearing.
        And the second thing that relates to Mr. Davis' concerns,
    if, for example, the industry is upset with this chairman and
    they would go through the members of the Commission to try to
    get at the chairman, the industry might be upset because they
    are concerned of pressure on safety. This is just a
    hypothetical, so I think that there might be a connection here
    is what I'm saying.
        Chairman Issa. And, Mr. Kucinich, I completely agree with
    you that if, in fact, the line of questioning goes toward,
    quite frankly, the intent and the reason behind two Democratic
    and two Republican appointees, somehow, making an objection
    that is not based on the failure of, you know, the allegation
    of mismanagement or particularly of outbursts and erratic
    behavior, you're absolutely right. Those kinds of questions
    certainly fall within the question of management at the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission and would be in order.
        And, Mr. Davis, I apologize. If you want to take additional
    time to restate your question.
        Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the
    manner in which you have conducted this hearing, I appreciate
    it, and I'm very grateful.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you. Mr. Davis.
        Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and with all
    due respect, and the comments of the ranking member, those of
    the ranking member of the subcommittee.
        Understanding in any way shape form or fashion and quite
    frankly, we haven't gotten to my question yet, his comment is
    second; the mission of the regulatory agency is very important
    to me, the mission, and the outcome of the decisions that are
    made.
        No matter how much you may disagree or bicker, or have
    difficulty with management style and with personality
    differences, in the end, the bottom line is do we make the best
    and most effective decisions for the people of this country and
    all the environments that are impacted and affected by those
    decisions?
        And so, Mr. Chairman, my question is, do you feel that the
    interaction between yourself and other Commissioners have had
    any negative impact relative to decisions that the Commission
    has made?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, no, I don't think it has. I think
    certainly I want to work to improve the communication but, for
    example, since this letter was worked on, the Commission has
    held nine meetings where we've gotten together and been briefed
    on a variety of different issues.
        We have held one of our significant hearings related to new
    reactor licensing. We have held three of our formal voting-type
    sessions where we formalized legal opinions of the Commission.
    And as I said, yesterday we held a meeting on a very important
    safety issue related to fire protection.
        The Commission has also held at least two agenda sessions,
    which I had held routinely every month, and that was, in
    particular, one of the suggestions and recommendations from
    that 1999 Inspector General report that the Commission have
    regular sessions to talk about agenda, and that's something
    that I have instituted.
        Mr. Davis. Well, your answer is no. Let me just, Mr.
    Chairman, with your indulgence, could I ask if the other
    Commissioners would just respond quickly to that?
        Chairman Issa. I would ask unanimous consent for an
    additional 30 seconds for the gentleman, without objection.
        Mr. Apostolakis. The decisions have not been affected by
    the management issues that we have raised. I believe all the
    decisions that have been made, having in mind the safety and
    the adequate protection of the American public, and I am
    personally very offended by the suggestion that I am an
    instrument of the industry in its efforts to overthrow the
    chairman.
        Mr. Ostendorff. I agree with Mr. Apostolakis. I am also
    offended by the implication of Mr. Kucinich's statement. I
    assure this committee----
        Mr. Kucinich. I want to respond.
        Chairman Issa. Please continue, sir.
        Mr. Ostendorff. With respect to Mr. Davis' statement, I
    could not more wholeheartedly agree with your emphasis on
    nuclear safety.
        I agree with my colleague, Commissioner Apostolakis, that
    we have done our very best. We are making good decisions. That
    said, we are still operating under a very difficult environment
    that does not give me confidence that our staff feels free to
    bring us the best information uninfluenced.
        Mr. Kucinich. A point of personal privilege.
        Chairman Issa. The gentleman may continue. The gentleman is
    trying to get answers from each of the Commissioners, and I
    would like to have that in order first.
        Mr. Magwood. I agree with my colleagues, I think that we've
    been able to continue the people's business very well under the
    circumstances. I think the senior staff has managed to keep the
    agency focused during whatever conflicts have been occurring.
    The staff of the NRC has been focused on their mission of
    safety. I believe that the agency is functioning at the bottom
    line protecting health and safety as well as it ever has. That
    doesn't mean it's been easy.
        Ms. Svinicki. I agree with Commissioner Magwood's response.
        Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate
    that.
        Chairman Issa. Would you yield to the gentleman from Ohio
    for a second.
        Mr. Davis. Yes.
        Mr. Kucinich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Commissioner
    Ostendorff, I didn't call your name, I gave a hypothetical
    about the potential influence of the industry on members of the
    Commission. But since you objected to that, I find that very
    instructive. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Davis. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman. We now go to the
    gentleman from Michigan--oh, I'm sorry, I now go to the
    gentleman from Florida, Mr. Ross, the Republican on the
    Democratic side. Mr. Ross.
        Mr. Ross. Thank you Mr. Chairman, Commissioner Magwood, I
    am very impressed with your experience, not only in the nuclear
    industry, but also as an administrator. And I read your
    testimony, opening testimony, and you talk about some incidents
    involving some abusive behavior with female employees that you
    had encountered and, in fact, I think you indicated that
    nevertheless I found their misogynistic behavior entirely
    unacceptable and personally offensive and you immediately let
    these supervisors go. That behavior that those people that you
    let go, does that compare in any way to the behavior expressed
    by Chairman Jaczko?
        Mr. Magwood. It was similar in the fact that it was verbal
    abuse. It was, it involved screaming and, you know, just a lot
    of pointed language that the women involved found very, very
    emotionally straining.
        Mr. Ross. And when you let go in your previous situation,
    when you let those supervisors go that were being the abusers,
    that changed, didn't it? It improved the situation?
        Mr. Magwood. Well, let me emphasize that it was within the
    Federal government, so I didn't have the ability to simply fire
    these people. I would have liked to have fired them.
        Mr. Ross. But you eliminated the distraction?
        Mr. Magwood. Absolutely. I immediately, the very day I
    found out, they were removed from their supervisory
    responsibilities and geographically relocated.
        Mr. Ross. And do you believe that removing Chairman Jaczko
    may be appropriate to protect any further abuse to the female
    members of the NRC?
        Mr. Magwood. I suspected that a question like that might
    come up. I have decided to simply present the facts as I
    understand them and let others make that decision. It's not
    within my power to appoint or remove a chairman, but I think
    that these are--this is information that people----
        Mr. Ross. But it rose to the level of abuse that you had
    seen in the past?
        Mr. Magwood. It was very similar. The stories I heard were
    very similar to what I heard in the past.
        Mr. Ross. And removing that abuse corrected the problem?
        Mr. Magwood. Yes, it did.
        Mr. Ross. Okay, and that has been your experience.
        Ms. Svinicki, you talked about lack of confidence. Do you
    feel there's any way to repair the confidence in this chairman?
        Ms. Svinicki. If the conduct were to be completely changed,
    there is always the potential to rehabilitate relationships.
        Mr. Ross. Commissioner Ostendorff, how do you feel? Do you
    feel that your lack of confidence at this point is reparable or
    do you feel that it's just lost?
        Mr. Ostendorff. Sorry--I would have to agree with
    Commissioner Svinicki that it's been severely damaged, and once
    there's an erosion of trust, it's extraordinarily difficult to
    regain that trust. I'm not going to say it's going to be
    impossible or would be impossible, but it would be
    extraordinary difficult to regain.
        Mr. Ross. Thank you. And, chairman, I can't help but sit
    here and think of the kids watching the movie ``The Caine
    Mutiny'' contain with Humphrey Bogart and him being put on
    trial, and by his crew members in a very serious situation. So,
    I mean, it begs the question, Captain--I mean, Chairman Jaczko,
    how has the crew--the voyage been so far?
        We're at a point now where you have made an apology. And
    specifically what I am asking is what did you apologize for?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, as I've indicated in a letter to Mr.
    Daley, I apologized for the distraction, and I look forward to
    discussions with my colleagues about ways that we can further
    enhance and improve our communication and trust.
        Mr. Ross. And one of those suggestions is that you have a
    third party, I would assume a facilitator, to try to reopen
    lines of communications with your fellow Commissioners. My
    concern is, is that if the issue becomes more of maintaining
    your position, as opposed to restoring the integrity of the
    NRC, what is your course of action? Are you considering a
    resignation?
        Mr. Jaczko. I have no plans to resign.
        Mr. Ross. Okay, even if it means more to focus on keeping
    your job than to restoring the NRC?
        Mr. Jaczko. I have no plans to resign because I continue to
    believe that under my leadership the agency has performed very
    well. We have committed ourselves to safety, and I believe my
    record shows that.
        Mr. Ross. But it's unprecedented where we are today when
    you have the four Commissioners who have made these
    allegations. And as a student of management myself, I can only
    suggest to you that management by intimidation may have some
    short-term goals, but some long-term effects, that are very
    adverse. Management by motivation is probably the only way you
    are going to restore the integrity of this organization.
        So I implore you, I beg of you, if it is your position you
    seek to keep, then it is the integrity of this organization
    that must be foremost, and it must be done so through not only
    a facilitator--if that's what you believe--but more
    importantly, through motivating these people to be the best
    that they have been able to be, for what is at stake here is
    not only the 4,000 employees, but the nuclear safety of this
    entire country.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Issa. Will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Ross. I'll yield.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, wouldn't you agree that what's going on here
    today and what's been going on for months now clearly hurts
    your ability to retain, recruit, retain many of those 4,000
    people and to motivate them to do their best job?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, I have, I have not seen any drop-off in
    any of those areas.
        Chairman Issa. Okay. So none of this has any effect on
    4,000 people.
        Mr. Jaczko. As I've indicated, I think it's unfortunate
    that we have this distraction, but the men and women at the NRC
    are professionals and they'll will continue to do their jobs
    effectively.
        Chairman Issa. Okay. We now go to the gentleman, Mr. Welch.
        Mr. Welch.
        Mr. Welch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling
    this hearing, a couple of points. Number one, I regret,
    obviously, that we're here. This is not a personnel committee,
    and it is regrettable that there is this conflict at the senior
    level of the Commissioners.
        Number two, I don't think that Congress is the place to go
    to resolve this.
        Number three, I assume that each one of the members of the
    Commission is professional and makes decisions based on each of
    your own independent best judgments. The obstacles and the
    challenges that you face, professional and personal,
    notwithstanding, and I think we all owe you that debt of
    gratitude.
        The concerns I have are less about trying to resolve
    something that I don't believe is within the capacity of a
    congressional committee to resolve, it has to do with the
    safety and the focus on safety, and I say that as a
    representative from the State of Vermont where we have had an
    ongoing, and somewhat contentious situation involving our local
    nuclear reactor.
        When things like a cooling tower fall down and the reaction
    on the part of the company that runs it is that it's not really
    a big deal, that doesn't provide great assurance to the people
    of Vermont. When there is discovered leaking underground,
    reactive material and the response of the nuclear power company
    is that they don't have underground pipes, and it turns out, in
    fact, they do have underground pipes, that posits significant
    concerns, a concern by Vermonters.
        There is litigation now, and we understand that this body
    voted between the State of Vermont and Entergy about its
    future, and we understand that the Commission voted by a 3-2
    margin to come in as a friend on the side of Entergy against
    this litigation.
        Mr. Welch. That causes us some concern. So safety is my
    concern. And I know that safety is your concern, but I just
    have a few questions that caused me some concern about how
    active and aggressive the Commission is on coming to a
    conclusion about some safety standards. The most recent NRC
    fire protection standards were promulgated in 2004. Earlier
    standards that applied had not been met for 25 years. And as I
    understand it currently, 47 nuclear power plants are still not
    in compliance and they are requesting yet another 12-year
    delay. And my understanding is the Commission is basically
    accommodating a 12-year delay on top of a 25-year delay.
    Commissioner Apostolakis, can you address that.
        Mr. Apostolakis. Yes. The reason why the new regulation was
    promulgated in the 2000's is that because of the large number
    of exemptions of requests for exemptions that we received
    regarding the area, we decided that stuff--we decided this was
    not working very well. But I would like to point out when we
    say 47 plants or units do not comply, they have been--they have
    implemented compensatory measures. They don't comply with some
    provisions of the original rule, but they have done something
    else to meet the intent of their rule. So it's not that they
    are unsafe or anything, and this new rule now----
        Mr. Welch. Thank you, I only have a few minutes. I
    appreciate your response. I guess what I will have it do
    because I can't ask a whole lot of questions is to express to
    each of you the concern about what appears to be a very slow
    turnaround on the implementation of safety standards. And you
    know full well that if you're living in shadow the of a nuclear
    plant, the closer you are, the more anxious you are. But we
    have examples, and this is what's so profoundly important about
    the safety focus is that if something can go wrong, even when
    we think it won't, it probably at some point will go wrong and
    that's what we saw in Japan.
        And if something goes wrong the consequences of an event
    are so catastrophic, and I'm preaching to the choir here, I
    know. But I'm doing it because this is the anxiety we live with
    in Vermont. And when we have a nuclear power plant that the
    cooling tower collapses and we're told not to worry about it,
    that's hard to be comfortable. And when there is leaking pipes
    and we are told there are no pipes, and upon investigation
    there is. We really need to see a sense of urgency. In some
    cases, some penalties associated with wrong information being
    provided and failure to comply with safety standards, because
    some of these things that happen in the beginning that
    fortunately don't cause harm give you some apprehension that an
    event will occur that does cause harm. So thank you very much.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you. We now go to the gentleman from
    Michigan, Mr. Walberg, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
    panel for being here. This is truly not a hearing that I ever
    expected to be a part of as a Member of Congress, and certainly
    not with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. But I think it's a
    hearing that apparently is very well positioned and important
    to have. When I read through the letter that was sent to Chief
    of Staff Daley, and I read bullet points in that letter, and
    I'd like any Commissioners that would be willing to comment.
    The question that I will have from this, where it says that the
    chairman intimidated and bullied senior career staff, that he
    interacted with us, his fellow Commissioners, with such
    intemperance and disrespect that the Commission no longer
    functions as effectively as it should.
        That's strong language in a letter, an unprecedented letter
    that has been sent to this administration. And I would--I would
    surmise that if this administration, from this hearing,
    understands the gravity of this situation and how that, with no
    pun, intended this could blow up still further to a regulatory
    agency of an amazing importance to us. That strong language is
    telling. Can you, any of the Commissioners, explain to me why
    this language was included with specific illustrations? I don't
    want to pick on a University of Michigan grad, but Commissioner
    Svincki, why was the language included and what are the some of
    the key illustrations that you'd give for its importance?
        Ms. Svinicki. I would state that I realize the significance
    of putting my hand to that language. I did not do so lightly. I
    would characterize that I did it very reluctantly, candid and
    candidly I would state realizing that ultimately it could bring
    us the kind of event that we're holding this morning. And I
    regret that, but that language at that time I supported that, I
    was comfortable in support of it, but realized the significance
    of my action.
        Mr. Walberg. Any significant illustrations of what you put
    in that language, examples?
        Ms. Svinicki. I think a number of the events have already
    been testified to this morning regarding interactions between
    the chairman and the professional staff of the agency. There
    also have been very tense interactions in meetings between the
    chairman and members, other members of the Commission. And
    again, I think people can be passionate about issues without
    fundamentally the kind of conduct that I've observed.
        Mr. Walberg. Any other Commissioners' response to that?
        Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir, I will comment specifically that
    senior staff has complained to me personally about the chairman
    taking an approach that led them to believe that they were not
    in a free environment to bring forth their best views with
    respect to how SECY paper 11-0093 the near-term task force
    report from Japan where there is a paper that was acknowledged
    to have been withdrawn back in July. There's also staff
    complained to me about how the chairman's office and chairman
    responded to their content of the 21-day report with respect to
    short-term actions to be taken as a result of Fukushima.
        Mr. Walberg. So this goes to safety?
        Mr. Ostendorff. Those two reports dealt with how the
    Commission would take actions in response to the Fukushima
    event.
        Mr. Walberg. Any other Commissioner's response to that? Mr.
    Chairman, I want to yield to you some time, but I do have one
    final question so would be glad to yield this if you will then
    allow me to finish with one----
        Chairman Issa. I will be very brief. For each of the
    Commissioners, do you believe that employees, professional
    staff of the NRC have experienced intimidation, hostile or
    offensive conduct on behalf of the--by the chairman, anything
    that would be considered to be intimidating, hostile or
    offensive by the chairman, any professional staff experience
    that?
        Ms. Svinicki. Yes.
        Mr. Magwood. Yes.
        Mr. Ostendorff. Yes.
        Mr. Apostolakis. Yes.
        Chairman Issa. Ladies and gentlemen, that's the definition
    of harassment. I hope that we can all agree that that's why we
    put it in the statute. I yield back.
        Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Recently Dale Klein,
    former commissioner and colleague suggested that the chairman
    does not need to be removed from the panel, but could instead
    be demoted by the President. A new chairman be chosen from
    among the existing members. Would anyone on the panel like to
    comment on this potential solution?
        Chairman Issa. I don't think you will get someone who wants
    to say they want to be chairman here today. I ask unanimous
    consent the gentleman have an additional 30 seconds.
        Mr. Walberg. I guess that's my point, Mr. Chairman. I
    probably didn't expect someone to answer and say, yeah, I would
    like to be the chairman. Or I will appoint that or I will
    suggest someone. But I think this certainly indicates a very
    significant problem with this Commission being able to function
    together for the best interest of this country, the citizens it
    serves, the regulatory responsibility they have. And that
    indeed, if this is the problem, to this extent and the
    administration's willing to let it go on, we in America have
    concerns beyond simple management styles, but the function of
    this regulatory agency and the responsibility to the American
    people. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Jaczko. Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman. If the gentleman
    would like to respond.
        Mr. Jaczko. Yeah, could I make a comment please? I
    appreciate the opportunity. My colleague mentioned a meeting or
    a phone conversation I'd had on the development of the so-
    called 21-day paper. I believe the committee has an audio
    recording of that conversation. And I'm certainly comfortable
    with that audio being made publicly available. I believe it
    characterizes my passion and demonstrates my commitment to open
    discussions among members of the staff, and my strong interest
    in them providing me with their candid views. So that if
    nothing else, I can ensure that the Commission is informed with
    the information it needs.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman. Can I get a nodding
    of heads by all the Commissioners that the release of audio
    that has been recorded can be made available to the committee?
    Hearing no objections, I assume they will be delivered to us.
    With that, we recognize the gentleman from Idaho, Mr. Labrador,
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Labrador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I especially want to
    welcome Commissioner Magwood who worked diligently at the Idaho
    National Laboratory. And I believe Commissioner Svinicki worked
    for one of our senators, so thank you for being here.
        This has been truly one of the most frustrating hearings
    I've ever participated in, because I've never seen such self
    deluded behavior by any individual in probably my entire life.
    The lack of awareness of what's happening here in the
    Commission is truly astounding to me. To watch an individual
    sit here and say that the only thing he is responsible for, and
    he's sorry about is that the distraction that has been caused
    by your behavior. It is truly just embarrassing just to watch
    you this entire time that I've been here.
        So let's really just get down to what's happening here. You
    believe, and you did not answer this question when my good
    colleague over here asked you the question. But you believe
    that you are more passionate than the other four individuals
    sitting here about nuclear safety; is that not true?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, I----
        Mr. Labrador. Just answer the question yes or no, you can
    say yes, you can say no. Are you more passionate, are you less
    passionate or are you equally passionate? It's a simple
    question.
        Mr. Jaczko. My voting record, I think, shows that I have
    taken positions on safety----
        Mr. Labrador. So are you more passionate, is that what you
    believe?
        Mr. Jaczko. I would say my position----
        Mr. Labrador. And you also believe you have better judgment
    than these four individuals, is that not true?
        Mr. Jaczko. I believe that I----
        Mr. Labrador. Yes or no, simple question.
        Mr. Jaczko. I believe I have very good judgment as a
    safety----
        Mr. Labrador. And your judgment is better than the four
    individuals here combined, isn't that true, according to your
    own opinion?
        Mr. Jaczko. It's up to others to determine----
        Mr. Labrador. No, it's up to you because you're the one
    who's making decisions that is making their life a living hell.
    So you tell me do you have more passion, do you have better
    judgment, yes or no?
        Mr. Jaczko. I feel very strongly that I have an appropriate
    judgment----
        Mr. Labrador. You have better judgment than the other four
    individuals sitting here correct according to you?
        Mr. Jaczko. Congressman, as I said many times, I'm----
        Mr. Labrador. Okay, you're not going to answer the question
    when it is clearly from your statement, from your actions that
    you believe that your judgment and your passion surpasses the
    four of them combined.
        So your distraction that's being caused--it is interesting
    to me, I have managed an organization, I had a law firm for a
    while. Now I have to manage my congressional office. Your
    management style is bringing some problems that are being
    brought here to the fore, and you're saying that you're willing
    to work with them, but you're not willing to admit that you
    have done anything wrong, that's what I cannot understand. The
    only way you're going to be able to work with these individuals
    and actually change your management style is by admitting that
    you actually screwed up, that you actually did something wrong.
        Are you not willing to admit that there is something in
    your management style that has brought us to a congressional
    hearing that is unprecedented in American history?
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, Congressman, I take responsibility----
        Mr. Labrador. Yes or no.
        Mr. Jaczko. --for this agency. And as I've indicated, I'm
    willing to discuss these issues with my colleagues and figure
    out how we can better communicate.
        Mr. Labrador. But you haven't done anything wrong. What are
    you going to discuss that they are wrong and you're right,
    correct?
        Mr. Jaczko. I would like to discuss these communication
    issues and some of the misunderstanding.
        Mr. Labrador. Have you done anything wrong in your
    management of this agency?
        Mr. Jaczko. Congressman, as I said, I take full
    responsibility.
        Mr. Labrador. For what?
        Mr. Jaczko. For this organization.
        Mr. Labrador. No. For what in your behavior are you taking
    responsibility for? Just name one thing, just one thing that
    you admit that you have done wrong because I don't believe
    these four individuals would come here if you haven't done a
    single thing wrong. Just name one thing that you've done wrong.
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, Congressman as I said, I'm very
    passionate about safety and----
        Mr. Labrador. So it is wrong for you to be passionate about
    safety is that what you're telling the American people right
    now?
        Mr. Jaczko. Congressman----
        Mr. Labrador. Is that wrong to be passionate about safety
    and they are not passionate about safety, right?
        Mr. Jaczko. Congressman, as I said, I'm very passionate
    about safety, if that's ever been misconstrued by my
    colleagues, that's something I would like to discuss.
        Mr. Labrador. But what is in your passion, in your
    passionate statements, what's wrong would bring us to a moment
    that we have to have these four individuals, these four
    Commissioners who have dedicated their entire life to the
    public safety of our Nation, what in your behavior is wrong?
    Just name one thing, that's all I'm asking. I can name 20
    things that I have done wrong in my life if somebody asked me
    the question. You can't name one thing.
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, Congressman, as indicated, it's a
    conversation I think I would like to have with my colleagues to
    better understand----
        Mr. Labrador. This is ridiculous. Your answers today have
    been totally ridiculous. Because there's no way that these
    individuals who have the same passion, the same commitment to
    the safety of the United States would be sitting here
    complaining about you, complaining about the staff unless you
    had done something wrong. And it's absolutely ridiculous for us
    to think that under any circumstance, you're going to change
    your behavior because you're not even willing to admit that you
    did one thing wrong. That's just incredulous to anybody who is
    watching this meeting.
        Mr. Chairman, I've run out of time.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman. We now go to the
    gentleman from New Hampshire, Mr. Guinta, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Guinta. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just have
    a couple of quick questions. For anyone on the panel other than
    the chairman, can anybody talk to me about the first IG report
    and what conclusions it made relative to this issue?
        Ms. Svinicki. I--sir, I will attempt just broadly. The NRC
    inspector general has testified, I believe, before the House
    Energy and Commerce Committee earlier this year on the content
    and conclusions of his report. That report focused--it covered
    a number of issues, but it spent much of its content on the
    decisionmaking around the Yucca Mountain related activities at
    NRC. There were some other more broad findings about the
    relationship on the Commission and I would like to reacquaint
    myself with those findings rather than testify then generally.
        Mr. Guinta. Okay. To the chairman, I see a letter hear
    dated December 12th from the President's Chief of Staff, and
    it's issued to Chairman Issa. And in it, it says, the fourth
    paragraph down, ``He has indicated his intention to reach out
    to his fellow Commission colleagues for that purpose,'' he's--
    referring to you. On the back of the letter he talks about the
    development of any recommendations to improve the circumstance.
    So it sounds like what he's saying here is that the President's
    not going to take action, that he'd prefer these issues be
    resolved by you and the Commission. Is that your understanding
    of----
        Mr. Jaczko. Well, I don't want to speak for--certainly for
    the administration, but as I read the letter what I saw was
    that the Chief of Staff would be looking at the situation and
    would be looking to inspector general's report to get some
    guidance on ways to improve the organization.
        Mr. Guinta. Would you agree with the assessment in this
    letter that the disagreements amongst the Commission are over
    policy matters?
        Mr. Jaczko. I certainly think we have policy disagreements,
    but I think there are also, I believe, organizational
    miscommunications and misunderstandings about roles and
    responsibilities.
        Mr. Guinta. To me, it appears that the IG's report has
    really not improved things. As a matter of fact, from what I
    read and heard, you can make an argument of things further
    deteriorating. So I appreciate your interest in wanting to work
    with your colleagues, but it seems like that point has come and
    gone. And as stated by other members of this committee, I think
    there is growing frustration that we're at this level of
    inquiry.
        So I would prefer that this be handled in one of two ways,
    but have you yourself, you say you take full responsibility for
    actions of the committee. Would you consider stepping down as
    chairman.
        Mr. Jaczko. I have no intention to resign.
        Mr. Guinta. I would yield back the remainder of my time.
        Chairman Issa. The gentleman yields. Thank you. I think it
    is clear, the chairman is making no apologies for misconduct,
    only for the lack of harmonious life among the five of you. I
    asked the chairman who his Board of Directors is. I asked him
    about collaborative and normally consensus-type activity. For
    each of the Commissioners, when the chairman was not the
    chairman, do any of you believe that he would have accepted one
    of you treating him the way he is now treating you?
        Ms. Svinicki. Sir----
        Chairman Issa. No?
        Ms. Svinicki. I believe I'm the only member of the
    Commission who served with Chairman Jaczko when he was then a
    Commissioner, we were both Commissioners when I began my
    service on the Commission. And I would characterize that I
    actually, when I was new to the Commission, found very helpful
    that he tutored me in many of the ways of insisting upon the
    role of individual Commissioners that they have an important
    contribution to make. I considered that I learned many of those
    points from him.
        Chairman Issa. So when he was a Commissioner, life was
    collaborative, he got it, he was a former staffer to House and
    Senate people, he kind of got the idea that you all had to work
    together and reach, at least the 3-2 vote, and hopefully 4-1 or
    a 5-0 whenever possible. So this is a very capable
    Commissioner, just not a good chairman in your opinion, a
    terrible chairman in your opinion.
        Ms. Svinicki. I would characterize that during that period
    it really was limited to policy differences at times and not
    the differences we see now.
        Chairman Issa. I ask unanimous consent for just 30 more
    seconds for a single question because one half of this has been
    asked repeatedly. For each of the Commissioners, now I'm not
    looking at you as Republicans or Democrats, Democratic members,
    because as far as I can tell, none of you are partisans in your
    background, certainly career Navy officers and so on. So you've
    been accused sort of, of being lapdogs for industry, not caring
    enough about safety. There has been some insinuation that that
    could be the case. Would each of you just briefly tell me about
    your view, your passion about safety and how that brings you to
    each of your votes when you are given an opportunity, please?
        Ms. Svinicki. My sole motivation in serving on the NRC is
    to work on issues of advanced nuclear safety and security for
    the country. I have many family members in Wisconsin and
    Michigan that live near nuclear power plants, and so I'm
    concerned for all Americans and think and am motivated even my
    own family in their protection and safety.
        Chairman Issa. Commissioner Magwood.
        Mr. Magwood. Mr. Chairman, as someone who's spent really my
    entire professional career working in the nuclear field, I have
    a very deep appreciation for the hazards presented by handling
    of nuclear materials, I've overseen it for many years at DOE.
    As a result, I view any nuclear activity as a matter of great
    responsibility. I think that anyone who is involved in that
    activity should be held to a very, very, very high standard,
    and I expect the best of everyone involved. Thank you.
        Mr. Ostendorff. Mr. Chairman, I have a record going back to
    1976 for being involved in nuclear power issues, nuclear
    weapons issues. I assure you that having operated and trained
    others to operate, supervise and maintain nuclear power plants
    and submarines that I have a very rigid sense of safety and am
    very concerned on safety issues. And I welcome anybody to
    examine and discuss my voting record with me on safety issues
    at NRC.
        Chairman Issa. Commissioner?
        Mr. Apostolakis. Mr. Chairman, I have spent my entire
    professional career working on nuclear safety issues and I was
    elected to the National Academy of Engineering on the basis of
    my contributions.
        Chairman Issa. I will yield the same amount of time to the
    ranking member as I'm going over so I will be very brief.
    Commissioner Ostendorff, as a former Navy officer, from your
    experience, not just within your commands, but within your
    military service, which is much longer than mine, don't you
    have countless examples you've seen of fine officers who were
    competent, technically capable who were relieved because, in
    fact, they exhibited behavior that lost the confidence of the
    men and women that worked for them?
        Mr. Ostendorff. Yes.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you. I yield to the ranking member.
        Mr. Cummings. I'm sitting here and I'm listening to all of
    this and I swear to God, this is incredible to me. We are
    better than this, and, you know, I feel like I'm sitting here
    trying to referee a fight. And I said from the beginning, I'm
    not a referee, I haven't done that since my kids were tiny and
    now they are adults.
        Chairman Jaczko, let me tell you. I do appreciate the fact
    that you're willing to sit down with your colleagues. I don't
    want you to quit. I do not want to you quit. I want you to
    continue to fight for the American people and do what's right
    for them. And I don't think your passion and your commitment
    and your expertise is any greater than the other Commissioners.
    I think all of you are very wonderful, strong Americans, very
    committed to our safety. And I believe you've given everything,
    you've giving everything you've got to make things work. But
    we've got to do better than this.
        There is no reason, I think, why this should have risen to
    this level. And Commissioner, I know people have been trying to
    get you to admit you that you've done things wrong. I would
    imagine that people up here would have a difficulty admitting
    that they were wrong when they've got opinions saying they
    operated within the law and what have you. I don't know what
    they would say to be frank with you. But I do know one thing,
    that--and I--after 61 years on this earth I have come to
    realize something that's very significant, one of the best ways
    not to achieve a goal is to be distracted. I mean, if you look
    at people who have not achieved the things that they tried to
    achieve in life, a lot of times, it is because they got
    distracted.
        I have not come to ask you--all five of you, I've come to
    beg you to work this thing out. I mean, to sit down like
    reasonable people and work it out. The American people are
    tired of dysfunction. They are really tired of us. And we--what
    you all are doing is so very, very important. I listen to
    everybody and Commissioner Apostolakis, I'm getting there.
        Chairman Issa. When you get to know him better, his name is
    George.
        Mr. Cummings. You know, I heard what you said. I think you
    summarized it better than anybody else. When asked whether you
    lost confidence, did this Commissioner, Mr. Jaczko, could do
    the job, you said, you know, I think he can do it, but he's got
    to change his attitude a little bit. Is that pretty much--I
    don't want to take words out of your mouth. That's pretty much
    what you said, is that right? Come on, talk to me.
        Mr. Apostolakis. That's a summary of what I said.
        Mr. Cummings. Say it, tell me. I don't want to misstate
    you.
        Mr. Apostolakis. He should control his temper and let the
    staff send us their frank views.
        Mr. Cummings. Stop doing what?
        Mr. Apostolakis. Frank views, opinions, the staff. The
    staff should communicate to the Commissioners their candid
    opinions.
        Mr. Cummings. Can you live with that, Mr. Chairman?
        Mr. Jaczko. Absolutely.
        Mr. Cummings. Yeah. I mean I keep thinking, you know, you
    guys have to go back. You know, all the press, you see all them
    press people? They are loaded up over there, they are typing
    away, look at them. You know why, because they like
    controversy. They want to make--they are Tweeting and twitting
    and doing all kinds of things right now so that--and you all
    have been elevated, all of you, now everybody knows your names.
    But I'm telling you, when all of this is over, you've got to go
    back. The President is not going to get rid of you. You're
    doing a great job. It may not be attitude--I think you need to
    change some of these attitudinal things that you're dealing
    with, but you have to do that.
        So I beg you for the sake of the American people to please
    sit down, work this thing out. I mean, sharing information with
    your fellow Commissioners, do what you've got to do, but make
    it work. That's all I have to say.
        Chairman Issa. I thank the ranking member. As I close the
    first panel, I would like to make it very clear that if this
    does not get resolved, this is not the last time this committee
    will come to a full committee hearing to review the status of
    management at the NRC. Additionally, we are the personnel
    committee of the Congress to a great extent. We do look at the
    management structure. We do so like a Board of Directors, it is
    not ours to tell you what to do. It is ours to find out whether
    it is being done as is prescribed by law and as the executive
    branches said they want to do.
        We will retain continuing jurisdiction, we will expect all
    of the promises made here today of material to be added to our
    discovery. We will, in fact, also remind everyone, we're the
    whistleblower committee, people come to us on our lines, on the
    Internet by the hundreds per week. Those people expect that if
    they give us information, there will be no retaliation within
    any agency of government. We will strictly enforce and protect
    anyone who comes before this committee at any time, and I know
    in the opening statement that was mentioned. People who come
    before us come protected from the moment they come to tell us
    something. The only time they are not protected is if they are
    not telling the truth, to use a double negative.
        We will continue to look. We will not tolerate harassment,
    we will not tolerate retribution. Now the ranking member said
    it more eloquently than I could, we want you to resolve this.
    It is not the kind of thing that comes before Congress, and it
    is not particularly good other than fodder for the press. So as
    we continue to retain jurisdiction and oversight, bear in mind
    we will be looking at every action of all of you. We want you
    to do everything you can to live up to your oaths.
        And Chairman, I would hope that as you work with Chief of
    Staff Daley, that you recognize that this is an extraordinary
    opportunity if the President retains confidence in you to
    change dramatically how these four men and women believe you
    are working. And I think certainly at least one Commissioner
    has said very well that he believes that change can happen, and
    the others, to a certain extent, did too.
        We're not your CEO. We are ultimately America, the American
    stockholders, Board of Directors and we will assert our rights
    and obligations if we do not see this resolved, and that's
    something that I'm positive will come from both sides of the
    aisle. So I thank you, we are going to break briefly for a
    second panel. We thank you for your testimony and we stand in
    recess.
        [Recess.]
        Chairman Issa. The committee will come to order. I'd now
    like to recognize our second panel of witnesses. Mr. William
    Borchardt, Executive Director of operations at the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission, and Mr. Steven Burns is general counsel
    for the NRC.
        Chairman Issa. Gentlemen, I know you have been sitting
    through the first panel so pursuant to our rules, would you
    please rise to take the oath?
        Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you will
    give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
    truth?
        Let the record indicate both answered in the affirmative,
    and Mr. Borchardt, is that correct pronunciation?
        Mr. Borchardt. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Issa. One of my best friends is Bob Borchardt
    formerly of New York of Recoton company, so it is the only
    reason I didn't mess your name up. You're recognized to give
    your opening statement.

                     STATEMENT OF WILLIAM BORCHARDT

        Mr. Borchardt. Thank you very much, Chairman Issa, good
    afternoon. As you mentioned, my name is Bill Borchardt, I have
    served as the executive director for operations at the NRC
    since May of 2008. I began my NRC career in 1983 after serving
    5 years in the U.S. submarine force. As the executive director
    for operations, I am the senior staff member responsible for
    the operational and administrative functions necessary for the
    day-to-day operations of the agency. This includes supervising
    and coordinating agency operational activities, policy proposal
    development, and implementation of Commission policy
    directives. Approximately 3,500 of the 4,000 staff members of
    the NRC report through the EDO.
        The staff of the NRC is fully committed to the agency's
    mission to protect public health and safety as well as
    protection of the environment. This is a 24-7 responsibility.
    Accomplishment of this mission requires the dedicated and
    interdependent efforts of every employee. For more than 35
    years, NRC experts have had a singular focus on our safety and
    security mission. We strive to be tough, but fair and reliable
    regulators, and to be an organization that continues to learn
    from experience.
        Learning from operating experience is frequently resulted
    in the imposition of new regulatory requirements and
    corresponding safety improvements at the facilities we
    regulate, as well as improvements to our own operations. The
    events at Fukushima are providing to us today a new opportunity
    to learn from operating experience and to improve our
    regulatory structure. Our safety and security mission has been
    and will always remain our top priorities.
        In addition to a clear mission, I believe any organization
    involved in nuclear safety, especially the safety regulator
    must have a robust safety culture, the NRC staff safety culture
    embodies the principles of an open and collaborative work
    environment, the agency's principles of good regulation which
    are independence, openness, sufficiency, clarity, and
    reliability, and a commitment to live by a set of
    organizational values, and at the NRC, they integrity, service,
    openness, commitment, cooperation, excellence and respect.
        These principles are critically important to the success of
    our safety mission. They continue to guide our interactions
    within the staff, and with our regulated community, and with
    all other stakeholders. They are part of the staff's daily life
    at the NRC and promote mutual support, open communications, and
    a fully-engaged staff. I believe an open and collaborative work
    environment encourages interdependence among the staff and
    promotes open discussion to help us make good decisions and
    provide the Commission with our best recommendations, and to
    best serve the American public.
        The NRC has a long tradition of valuing diversity of ideas,
    different opinions and questioning the status quo. In fact, we
    have a number of formal and informal programs that encourage
    the staff to raise differing views so that those views can be
    addressed in an open and transparent manner. We have
    demonstrated the differences of opinion within the staff can be
    addressed in a respectful and constructive manner. These
    differing views are frequently provided to the Commission for
    their consideration. It is through this open discussion that we
    most effectively execute our nuclear safety responsibilities.
        The staff is responsible for keeping the Commission
    completely and currently informed on all relevant matters. We
    accomplish this through a series of formal and informal
    mechanisms, including memoranda to the Commission, Commission
    papers, status reports and oral briefings. The Commission
    provides direction to the staff through budget decisions and
    staff memoranda.
        You have already been made aware of the results of the 2011
    Office of Personnel Management Federal employees viewpoint
    survey. This survey measured employees' perceptions of whether
    and to what extent their organizations have the type of
    characteristics typically associated with high-performing
    successful organizations. The fact that the NRC ranked first in
    all four categories examined by the survey is a result of the
    collective efforts of the entire staff to adhere to the
    principles that I just mentioned.
        I am extremely proud of the skilled and contentious staff
    with whom I work at the NRC. They have maintained their focus
    on our mission, and the fundamentals essential to doing an
    excellent job. It is because of our dedicated technical and
    administrative staff that we are the preeminent nuclear
    regulator in the world. And through our combined efforts, we
    strive to serve the American public in the best way we can.
    This concludes my testimony, thank you.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        Chairman Issa. Mr. Burns.

                       STATEMENT OF STEPHEN BURNS

        Mr. Burns. Thank you, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member
    Cummings. I'm pleased to be here before you today as the
    committee examines the management structure of the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission. As general counsel, I supervise the
    staff of approximately 110 people. My office reports to the
    full Commission and provides a full range of legal services,
    including counsel and representation to both the Commission and
    to the offices that report to the Commission or NRC chairman,
    and to the offices that report to Mr. Borchardt the executive
    director for operations, often referred to as the NRC staff.
        As general counsel, I'm responsible for providing legal
    counsel to the chairman and the other Commissioners as well as
    the senior agency staff. I often interact with the chairman and
    with the other Commissioners, and I strive to be fully
    responsive to the needs of all Commissioners in carrying out
    these responsibilities.
        I've been a career employee with the NRC since 1978. I
    began my legal career as an attorney in what was then called
    the Office of Executive Legal Director where my initial duties
    primarily involved enforcement and oversight.
        I then served as a legal assistant and then executive
    assistant to vice admiral retired Kenneth M. Carr, who is a
    Commissioner and then later chairman of the agency from 1989 to
    1991. Upon conclusion of Chairman Carr's term, I became the
    director of the Commission's Office of Appellate Adjudication,
    the office that drafts the Commission's adjudicatory orders.
    Subsequently, I served for more than a decade as the agency's
    deputy general counsel where my responsibilities included
    overseeing legal representation of the staff and NRC
    administrative proceedings.
        In April 2009, former Chairman Klein initiated my
    appointment to serve as general counsel, which was subsequently
    approved by the Commission. These diverse positions have given
    me substantial understanding of the legal framework governing
    Commission operations, particularly the Atomic Energy Act, the
    Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and the Reorganization Plan
    Number 1 of 1980.
        The Energy Reorganization Act, of course, establishes the
    Commission and with respect to its members, provides that each
    shall have equal responsibility and authority in all decisions
    and actions of the Commission, shall have full access to
    information relating to the performance of the duties or
    responsibilities, and shall have one vote.
        The chairman is granted particular duties as the official
    spokesperson of the agency, and as the principal executive
    officer with respect to the agency's executive and
    administrative functions and as reflected in the reorganization
    plan.
        In carrying out these duties, the Energy Reorganization Act
    instructs the chairman to see that the faithful execution of
    the policies and decisions of the Commission and that he shall
    be governed by the general policies of the Commission and by
    such regulatory decisions, findings and determinations as the
    Commission may be, by law, be authorized to make.
        As I have advised the Commission, the NRC's enabling
    legislation reflects that the structure of the agency is framed
    around two core principles, the rule of the majority, and the
    delegation of executive leadership to the chairman, which
    includes carrying out the Commission's policies. In providing
    legal advice and counsel to the Commission, I'm ever mindful of
    these principles and believe they were intended to work in
    harmony to ensure the effective operation of the NRC. I'd be
    pleased to answer any questions that the committee may have.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you, and I will recognize myself for
    the first round for 5 minutes. Mr. Borchardt, the--earlier
    testimony, I'm going to follow up on that quickly, have you
    ever been asked to withhold, limit, edit any information given
    to the other four Commissioners that the chairman has?
        Mr. Borchardt. There have been Commission papers and some
    budget proposal documents that have been altered under the
    chairman's direction, yes, sir.
        Chairman Issa. Were those alterations in detail, made
    available so that the Commissioners could understand that or
    were they withheld?
        Mr. Borchardt. The original staff proposal you're asking
    about?
        Chairman Issa. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Borchardt. Eventually I believe it was made available
    to the Commission.
        Chairman Issa. Eventually doesn't quite get it. Were they
    initially denied?
        Mr. Borchardt. Some of these documents were draft documents
    that the chairman's office had seen and provided direction on
    how the final document should be prepared.
        Chairman Issa. So the chairman spoon feeds the
    Commissioners what he wants them to see, is that maybe a little
    excess, but basically a direction?
        Mr. Borchardt. I would describe it as the chairman
    influences the information and the timing of the information
    that is provided to the Commission on occasion.
        Chairman Issa. So he lied to us, he told us that he never
    did that, he told us he didn't withhold information and he said
    they had full and complete, although he used some interesting
    words a couple of times, but I held him back and you were both
    here, to make sure that he said that. But you're telling me
    here today is that the Commissioners, the four Commissioners do
    not have equal and unfettered access to the same information,
    even though they are asked to make decisions based on the
    information they receive; is that correct?
        Mr. Borchardt. I would say the chairman influences the
    timing of the information that's provided.
        Chairman Issa. Oh, so he knows about it sooner and they
    know about it when he's ready for them to know about it.
        Mr. Borchardt. On occasion, yes.
        Chairman Issa. Okay. Is that open and collaborative? Is
    that consistent with the 3,500 people that you fall under you
    and the way things work?
        Mr. Borchardt. It is not a practice we use within the
    staff, no, sir.
        Chairman Issa. And there's been allegations of what under
    the definition that the Federal Government uses of
    intimidation, harassment--intimidation and a hostile
    environment existed at the NRC. In one or more cases, has that
    been exhibited by the chairman?
        Mr. Borchardt. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Issa. But he doesn't have--never mind, I won't go
    into it, he doesn't have anything to apologize. Mr. Burns, you
    did a very good job in your opening statement of explaining
    that for whatever reason, Congress gave incredible authority to
    ignore the other four Commissioners to the chairman, right?
        Mr. Burns. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. What?
        Chairman Issa. That the powers, the executive powers are
    virtually everything for the chairman. You know, that is
    basically what you said in your opening statement.
        Mr. Burns. I don't think that is what I said. I said that
    there are two principles at play. The one principle, majority
    rules; and the other one, that executive leadership has been
    focused through the reorganization plan in the chairman. Now,
    in doing that----
        Chairman Issa. But executive leadership in a normal company
    is anything that the majority of the board thinks is wrong by
    the executive is, in fact, second-guessable by the board. In
    this case, you are saying that is not the case.
        Mr. Burns. I don't believe I said that at all. And if I----
        Chairman Issa. Well, but you are the legal definer. If
    three of the Commissioners think the chairman is dead-wrong in
    administration, executive, or other activities--in this case,
    four of them think he is wrong on many occasions--shouldn't
    that, in fact, be determinative of his behavior? Or are you
    saying that he has the authority to ignore them in his dealing
    with ordering staff, you know, some 4,000 staff around?
        Mr. Burns. I am not going to comment on the chairman's
    behavior----
        Chairman Issa. No, no, I am not asking for the behavior. I
    am asking about authority.
        Mr. Burns. With respect to his authority, a majority of the
    Commission, particularly in policy matters, adjudications, and
    rulemaking, set the policy of the agency, and the chairman is
    honor-bound to carry that out.
        With respect to administrative matters, for the most part
    administrative matters are delegated to the chairman. There are
    some specific examples or exceptions within the reorg plan.
    Appointments, for example Mr. Borchardt's appointment and my
    appointment, he initiates but the full Commission approves----
        Chairman Issa. Okay. So there are a few times in which he
    has to go to his board. The rest of the time, he runs the show.
        Mr. Burns. And that is the contemplation under the
    reorganization plan.
        Chairman Issa. Okay.
        Clearly, today, we were mostly talking about his management
    failures, at least relative to the 4,000 staff members and the
    four commissioners. But one very quick question.
        I heard Mr. Tierney read verbatim the law that allowed this
    emergency powers. Was Japan under the regulation of this
    Commission?
        Mr. Burns. No. And I don't think----
        Chairman Issa. So you issued an opinion that everything he
    did was legal and within his jurisdiction. And I heard the
    verbatim--now, I am a layperson, so I want to be told why I
    didn't understand. But I heard, I think, the complete phrase of
    authority. And we are talking about halfway around the world a
    nuclear power plant and, actually, several reactors were in
    distress, and he asserted unilateral rights to completely
    dismiss any participation by his Commission.
        That power, under what was read to us today--and I am not
    an expert on it; you are--that power was limited to the 102
    sites in the U.S. Nowhere did it appear--and I guess some other
    sites--but nowhere did it appear to have anything to do with a
    foreign, sovereign nation and their reactors, did it? The
    intent of that statute, that right.
        Mr. Burns. Mr. Chairman, the interpretation I gave to that
    statute and to those provisions in the reorg plan were not that
    the chairman was suddenly the nuclear regulator of the country
    of Japan. What it had to do with is that the question I was
    asked during the course of the accident was, when the emergency
    center was stood up and the chairman was in the ops center and
    the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission was asked for
    information regarding recommendations to protect U.S. citizens
    in Japan and U.S. servicemen through the Ambassador and through
    the administration, he asked me--what the question was, was it
    within his purview to communicate that information? I gave him
    the opinion that, yes, it was. This was not an usurpation of
    all the powers----
        Chairman Issa. Okay. And my time has long expired. I wanted
    to just make clear that you gave him an opinion, so it is not
    him asserting some unilateral--but you are telling him that
    that phrase, that part of the law, gave him the authority to
    lock out his four Commissioners?
        That wasn't the main reason--today we were talking about
    management. So it is important for me to understand that,
    because that action, which was not the focus of this hearing,
    if there is a mistake, it is yours, not his.
        Mr. Burns. Yes. And there was no mistake on my part.
        Chairman Issa. Well, I think there was a big damn mistake,
    but that is----
        Mr. Burns. Well, I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, there was not.
        Chairman Issa. But that is a judgment call, not a legal
    call. And----
        Mr. Burns. That is right. That is a legal judgment call. In
    my legal judgment, given the intention of the President of the
    United States in 1980 in issuing the plan and providing for the
    concentration under emergency circumstances of power into the
    chairman, that the chairman acted reasonably.
        I have had no Commissioner tell me that my view is wrong. I
    followed the opinion of my predecessor advising Chairman
    Meserve after 9/11, when there was not a particular threat to a
    U.S. power plant or facility.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        The ranking member is recognized.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much. May I have 8 minutes,
    Mr. Chairman? Thank you very much.
        Following the Fukushima disaster, the NRC took a number of
    actions related to the emergency, including ensuring that two
    U.S. west coast nuclear plants would remain safe from possible
    tsunami effects and standing up an emergency operations center
    at the NRC to monitor events as they unfolded in Japan. The
    operations center remained in monitoring mode to assist Japan
    and the multitude of U.S. citizens in that country and to deal
    with the ongoing emergency at the Fukushima plant.
        Mr. Burns, as the NRC general counsel, you wrote a memo on
    March 17, 2011, and your memo concludes that the chairman had
    the legal authority under his emergency powers to issue the
    press release that provided the 50-mile protective guidance for
    United States residents and other interests in Japan.
        In that memo, you said this, and I quote: ``The chairman's
    actions fit within his authorities under Section 3 of the
    reorganization plan, under which all authorities vested in the
    Commission pertaining to an emergency are transferred to the
    chairman.''
        Mr. Burns, is that correct?
        Mr. Burns. That is correct. That is in my memorandum.
        Mr. Cummings. And can you tell us simply how the chairman's
    actions were proper under current law?
        Mr. Burns. Yes. And, Ranking Member Cummings, the other
    things I would emphasize, it was not only, I think, a
    reasonable representation of the emergency powers, but as the
    official spokesperson of the agency, he had information that
    was developed by the staff and communicated that. So even if
    you disagree with respect to emergency powers, I think as a
    spokesman he could do that.
        The point I made--and I actually think you read the quote
    from President Carter during the testimony of the
    Commissioners--is that the purpose of the plan in Section 3 was
    to focus the emergency response responsibility into a single
    person, the chairman. That was a finding coming out of the
    Three Mile Island accident.
        And that is--and looking at that and, again, looking at the
    memo of my predecessor to Chairman Meserve, I felt, though it
    was a novel question, which I acknowledge in the memo, I
    thought that was a reasonable judgment.
        Mr. Cummings. And you were using your legal judgment, your
    legal expertise; is that correct?
        Mr. Burns. Yes, I was, sir.
        Mr. Cummings. Some have alleged that the chairman should
    not have used his emergency authorities to respond to the
    Fukushima crisis because the incident did not--and I think this
    is what Chairman Issa was going to--did not involve a U.S.
    nuclear facility or materials licensed or regulated by the
    Commission.
        But in your memo you obviously disagree. You said that you
    do not view the language of the reorganization act of 1980 as--
    and I quote, I am quoting you--``limiting the scope of the
    chairman's emergency response authority only to incidents
    involving particular NRC-licensed facilities,'' end of quote.
    Is that right?
        Mr. Burns. That is correct.
        Mr. Cummings. And in your memo you pointed to an opinion by
    the former NRC general counsel following the attacks on 9/11.
    Here is what you said, and I quote: ``I know that former
    General Counsel Cyr gave a similar opinion in the context of an
    agency response to the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks in
    determining that the absence of an actual event or damage to a
    nuclear facility or materials did not limit the chairman's
    authority to exercise his emergency powers.''
        Mr. Burns, can you explain what that 2001 opinion said and
    why it is useful for understanding how the chairman exercised
    his authorities during the Fukushima crisis?
        Mr. Burns. Certainly.
        Briefly stated, after the 9/11 attacks, the NRC again stood
    up its emergency center I think primarily in a monitoring mode
    or an enhanced monitoring mode. There was, again, no specific
    threat to a particular U.S. facility. It kept in that operation
    for a few months.
        And the chairman, Meserve at the time, I think some of his
    Commissioners wondered, well, how long is this going to go on?
    And I think he asked the general counsel, General Counsel Cyr,
    to give an opinion. And her opinion--again, she said, we
    understand what--you know, in terms of the text in the reorg
    plans. But, she said, looking at it again at President Carter's
    transmittal statement and looking at the general purpose is to
    focus the emergency response responsibility into a single
    official, that that was a reasonable action on her part to do--
    I mean, it was a reasonable action on the part of Chairman
    Meserve in the 9/11 context to do. And I adapted that.
        And, again, you know, I concede, it was a novel question.
        Mr. Cummings. Now, Mr. Burns, it has been alleged that the
    chairman, in violation of his statutory responsibilities, does
    not keep the Commission properly informed. In your transcribed
    interview with the committee staff, however, you stated that
    the individual Commissioners have a wide variety of ways to get
    information they need to do their jobs. For example, any
    Commissioner can ask agency staff for information, and each
    Commissioner holds regular meetings with senior NRC staff. Is
    that correct?
        Mr. Burns. That is correct.
        Mr. Cummings. In your interview, you said this, and I
    quote: ``The Commission can ask for information within its
    functions, and it is not restricted to asking for the
    information that the chairman thinks that the Commissioners
    ought to have. They could ask for anything within those
    functions. There is some balancing, again, about potential
    burdens and all that, but essentially that is a fairly powerful
    tool,'' end of quote.
        Is it fair to say that each Commissioner has tools at his
    or her disposal to keep themselves informed?
        Mr. Burns. I think it is. And I think that is what both the
    Energy Reorganization Act and the reorganization plan provide.
        Could I make----
        Mr. Cummings. Please do.
        Mr. Burns. Just one footnote I would add to that, Mr.
    Cummings, and that is this. In matters involving the budget,
    the chairman is responsible for budget presentation and budget
    development. And so, actually, the view that we have is that,
    in terms of the timing, there is some influence in terms of the
    timing. It doesn't mean that the Commission can't get the
    information, but it is not realtime because, again, the
    contemplation of the reorg plan is that the chairman presents a
    budget. Once it is presented, then information is fair game to
    the Commissioner.
        Mr. Cummings. Now, did you also say that--did you inform
    committee staff during your transcribed interview that you were
    unaware of any instances in which the chairman withheld
    information or failed to inform the Commission, in breach of
    his statutory responsibilities?
        Mr. Burns. Yes, I am not aware of any.
        Mr. Cummings. All right. Is it fair to say that each
    Commissioner--Mr. Burns, can you describe to the committee what
    you believe the statute requires of the chairman in terms of
    keeping the Commission informed?
        Mr. Burns. I think the reorganization plan in Section 2,
    2(c) or 2(d), talks about the chairman's responsibility and the
    EDO through the chairman. It defines or outlines that
    responsibility. And with respect to that, that can be
    implemented through the Commission's internal procedures, in
    terms of information flow and the like. And as you describe
    from my interview, is that Commissioners can ask staff for
    information.
        The last thing I would note is that the statute also
    provides, in effect, a safety valve; that if any employee or
    officer of the Commission believes that there is critical
    safety information or security information the Commission
    should be aware of, it can communicate with the Commission.
        Mr. Cummings. Finally, do you believe that individual
    Commissioners have any obligation to seek out information they
    believe they need?
        Mr. Burns. Well, I think that each Commissioner has to
    decide for themselves what information they need in carrying
    out their responsibilities. And I think just as a matter of
    their functioning, they have an obligation and, I think, an
    ability to do that.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
        Mr. Platts. [presiding.] I thank the gentleman.
        I yield myself 5 minutes for the purpose of questions.
        I thank both of you for your service at the NRC and your
    testimony here today.
        Mr. Borchardt, the issue of information-sharing certainly
    is critical for the Commission doing its job well; if the
    Commission is going to take a vote, that they all have the
    ability to make informed decisions and all have the same
    information.
        In your opinion as the senior staff member, do you feel
    that the staff feels comfortable sharing information? Because
    it has been made a point that all of the Commissioners have the
    right to ask for information. But do the staff subordinate to
    you feel comfortable in sharing information with the other
    Commissioners if it is contrary to a view they know that the
    chairman holds?
        Mr. Borchardt. Well, I think there has been a longstanding
    practice that the staff is responsive to individual
    Commissioners' requests for information through oral
    conversations. That continues.
        There is a higher degree of apprehension, though, today
    under the current environment, as the first panel discussed,
    that has, at least for me, a concern that there could possibly
    be some reluctance to provide information as timely and as
    candidly.
        Mr. Platts. And with that, you reference in response to a
    request for information. And I guess if there is not a request
    for information from a Commissioner but staff has information
    they think is relevant, do they feel like they, one, have to
    wait to be asked about it and even then are hesitant? Or do
    they, you know, feel free to share what they know, even if it
    has not been asked, because it is relevant to something that is
    going to come before the Commission?
        Mr. Borchardt. Well, I think, you know, it is informative
    to separate these discussions into two different types.
        There is an informal conversation that occurs between an
    individual Commissioner and perhaps an individual office
    director that reports to me. That is a casual conversation that
    has a free flow of information. Normally, both parties would
    raise topics of interest.
        The other methods of communication are far more formal.
    Those are documents that are typically signed out either by
    myself or by the office director to provide the status of an
    activity or perhaps to raise a potential policy issue to the
    Commission. Those discussions are much more formalized into
    written correspondence.
        Mr. Platts. And in both there is a chilling aspect today
    because of the current environment of the staff sharing
    information, whether it is informal or formal?
        Mr. Borchardt. There is a change in practice, I think, that
    goes to the discussion from the earlier panel. And that is, the
    historical practice, as I understood it through my 28 years at
    the NRC, is that if the staff felt that there was information
    that would be of interest to the Commission, that the staff
    would fault to the side of providing that information in some
    kind of a written document so the Commission could decide
    whether or not it was of interest to them and whether or not
    they wanted to adopt it as a policy issue for their
    consideration.
        Now what has happened more on occasion is that the
    chairman's office has made a decision as to the timing of when
    that information would go forward. So that was a fairly
    significant, from the staff's perspective, change in practice.
        Mr. Platts. And, clearly, then, an intent to control the
    information that is provided to the other Commissioners?
        Mr. Borchardt. Or to control, as the chairman has described
    it in the past, control the agenda of the Commission so that he
    could monitor the Commission's activities. And by Commission, I
    mean the five Commissioners that were at the first panel, not
    the staff, technical staff's activities.
        Mr. Platts. And when you say monitor the Commission, do you
    think there is precedent for the chairman having the
    appropriateness of monitoring the efforts of the other
    Commissioners versus just setting the agenda?
        Mr. Borchardt. Well, I think perhaps my choice of words,
    saying ``monitoring,'' was not quite right. What I meant to say
    is probably better to use your words, which was to set the
    agenda, to have the Commission agree as to what topics would be
    raised, when the Commission would issue directions to the staff
    on which topics.
        At any given time, we may have quite a few documents and
    decisions before the Commission that we are waiting for
    guidance on.
        Mr. Platts. In your own capacity, have you been reprimanded
    or in any way had action taken against you by the chairman for
    sharing information with other Commission members?
        Mr. Borchardt. Well, I would put myself in the same
    category as a number of the other senior managers within the
    staff that have, you know, received, you know, a form of verbal
    direction and verbal counseling that, at least in my view, was
    not consistent with the NRC values that we endeavor to perform
    our own behavior with.
        Mr. Platts. And that was where your intent was to share
    what you thought was relevant information with the other
    Commissioners and the chairman took exception to that?
        Mr. Borchardt. Yes, I mean, that would be an example.
    Another would be just on the development of a staff position, a
    recommendation that we would provide to the Commission.
        Mr. Platts. In your role as senior staff, would you
    tolerate that type of conduct from a subordinate of yours?
        Mr. Borchardt. No. And in my testimony that is the point I
    was trying to make, that the organizational values that we
    endeavor to live by that I think are the reason the NRC has
    been such a strong regulator and such a good place to work for
    our employees, that that kind of behavior is inconsistent with
    what we expect from the staff.
        Mr. Platts. Thank you again for your testimony.
        My time has expired. I yield to the chairman.
        Chairman Issa. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman.
        I thank you both for being here today. As often happens
    with a second panel, people burn themselves on the first panel.
    I would ask if both of you would be willing to take additional
    questions from Members in writing.
        Mr. Borchardt. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Burns. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Issa. Thank you.
        Then, without exception, that will be allowed for--Mr.
    Cummings, can we leave the record open for 2 weeks to allow
    Members to put in questions and have them respond?
        Okay. Without objection, the record will be held for that
    purpose for 2 weeks.
        Chairman Issa. I thank you again for your testimony.
        And we stand adjourned on this hearing.
        And I would just announce that we have votes imminent, so
    immediately following this set of votes, we will begin the
    minority hearing.
        Thank you. We stand adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]