    [House Hearing, 112 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                          A REVIEW OF AVIATION SAFETY
                              IN THE UNITED STATES

    =======================================================================

                                    (112-83)

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                                    AVIATION

                                     OF THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                       TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 APRIL 25, 2012

                                   __________

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                 COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

                        JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman
    DON YOUNG, Alaska                    NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
    THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin           PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
    HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina         JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey            Columbia
    GARY G. MILLER, California           JERROLD NADLER, New York
    TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois         CORRINE BROWN, Florida
    SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 BOB FILNER, California
    BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania           EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
    SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio                   LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
    CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan          TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
    DUNCAN HUNTER, California            RICK LARSEN, Washington
    ANDY HARRIS, Maryland                MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
    ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas  TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
    JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington    MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
    FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire       RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
    RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois             GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
    LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania           DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
    CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota             MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas              JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania
    LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana               TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
    BILLY LONG, Missouri                 HEATH SHULER, North Carolina
    BOB GIBBS, Ohio                      STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
    PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania         LAURA RICHARDSON, California
    RICHARD L. HANNA, New York           ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana         DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
    STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida
    JEFF DENHAM, California
    JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
    CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN,
        Tennessee
                                    ------                                7

                            Subcommittee on Aviation

                      THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Chairman
    HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina         JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
    SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
    JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio                   BOB FILNER, California
    FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire       EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
    RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois             LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
    CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota, Vice       TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
        Chair                            MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
    BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas              MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    BILLY LONG, Missouri                 STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
    PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania         ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
    STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida            Columbia
    JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida (Ex Officio)     (Ex Officio)
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
    CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN,
        Tennessee

                                    CONTENTS

                                                                       Page

    Summary of Subject Matter........................................    iv

                                   TESTIMONY
                                   Panel One

    Hon. Margaret Gilligan, Associate Administrator for Aviation
      Safety, Federal Aviation Administration........................    12
    Hon. David Grizzle, Chief Operating Officer for Air Traffic,
      Federal Aviation Administration................................    12
    Jeffrey B. Guzzetti, Assistant Inspector General for Aviation and
      Special Programs, U.S. Department of Transportation............    12
    Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., Director, Physical Infrastructure
      Issues, Government Accountability Office.......................    12

                                   Panel Two

    Thomas L. Hendricks, Senior Vice President for Safety, Security
      and Operations, Airlines for America...........................    29
    Scott Foose, Senior Vice President, Operations and Safety,
      Regional Airline Association...................................    29
    Captain Sean Cassidy, First Vice President, Air Line Pilots
      Association, International.....................................    29
    Gary M. Fortner, Vice President of Quality Control and
      Engineering, Fortner Engineering and Manufacturing, Inc., on
      behalf of the Aeronautical Repair Station Association..........    29

              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson, of Texas.............................    55

                   PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

    Hon. Margaret Gilligan and Hon. David Grizzle, joint statement...    57
    Jeffrey B. Guzzetti..............................................    68
    Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.......................................    84
    Thomas L. Hendricks..............................................   104
    Scott Foose......................................................   106
    Captain Sean Cassidy.............................................   114
    Gary M. Fortner..................................................   122

                           SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

    Families of Continental Flight 3407, written statement...........     2
    Scott Foose, Senior Vice President, Operations and Safety,
      Regional Airline Association (RAA), May 4, 2012, letter to
      chairman and ranking member of the Subcommittee on Aviation
      clarifying information presented during the hearing, and RAA
      member list....................................................    39
    Hon. Margaret Gilligan, Associate Administrator for Aviation
      Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, responses to questions
      from Hon. Jerry F. Costello, a Representative in Congress from
      the State of Illinois..........................................    65

                          A REVIEW OF AVIATION SAFETY
                              IN THE UNITED STATES

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, APRIL 25, 2012

                      House of Representatives,
                              Subcommittee on Aviation,
                Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:00 a.m., in
    Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas Petri
    (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Petri. The subcommittee will come to order.
        Although the United States aviation system is very safe,
    when it comes to aviation safety there is always room for
    improvement. The top priority for our subcommittee is safety,
    and I know that the FAA, aviation operators industry, and
    passenger advocate groups share that priority.
        With this in mind, today we will review the FAA's safety
    oversight activities, covering a broad range of issues.
        As we have noted many times in the past, the United States
    aviation system is the safest in the world. On any given day
    the FAA's air traffic controllers will handle over 28,500
    commercial flights. In 2011, there were no commercial passenger
    airline fatalities. Over the past 5 years, roughly 52 million
    passenger flights were operated safely. This high level of
    safety is the result of collaborative efforts by the FAA,
    Congress, industry and by other stakeholders.
        But we must not forget the one tragic fatal commercial
    accident during those 5 years. We have taken steps with the
    passage of the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation
    Administration Act of 2010 to address the identified weaknesses
    that contributed to that tragedy, and we are accepting a
    statement for the record from the relatives of some of the
    victims of that airline disaster.
        [The Families of Continental Flight 3407's prepared
    statement follows:]

        Mr. Petri. While the U.S. aviation system enjoys a high
    level of safety, there are areas in which safety can be
    improved. The General Accounting Office and the Inspector
    General of the Department of Transportation have conducted
    audits and studies to assess the FAA's safety oversight role in
    a variety of areas, including terminal area safety, operational
    errors, safety management system, oversight of repair stations,
    and rulemakings required by the Airline Safety and FAA
    Extension Act of 2010.
        Today the subcommittee will hear testimony from
    representatives of the Government, industry, and labor on these
    and other safety oversight issues. As we hear testimony from
    today's witnesses, I would like to highlight two areas of
    safety oversight.
        First, we will look at the requirements included in the
    bipartisan 2010 Safety Act. As stated previously, this law was
    enacted in response to the findings of the National
    Transportation Safety Board and other investigations of the
    tragic Colgan crash in February of 2009. The reforms directed
    the FAA to, among other things, set new requirements for pilot
    flight and duty time and pilot training and directed the FAA to
    develop and maintain a pilot records database.
        We recognize the Colgan family members for their continued
    oversight and attention to ensuring that these requirements are
    put in place.
        I understand that the FAA has made progress on several of
    the required rules, but that significant challenges remain in
    terms of implementing other requirements. We look forward to
    discussing the steps that have been taken and what remains to
    be addressed to successfully implement the law.
        The second area that I would like to highlight is the
    increase in operational errors in recent years. According to
    the Inspector General, operational errors where there is a loss
    in required separation between aircraft have increased, but the
    FAA is not able to fully explain the reason for the increase.
    Operational errors pose a safety risk to the aviation system
    and need to be mitigated.
        According to the FAA, the increase in operational errors is
    the result of increased reporting through the voluntary and
    nonpunitive air traffic safety action program. Following the
    audit, the IG found no evidence to support this assertion. The
    Inspector General concluded that the exact cause for the rise
    in operational errors is unclear. Given this, we are interested
    in exploring this with the FAA so that we can understand the
    true cause of the increase in operational errors and fully
    address the safety issue.
        It is our responsibility, regardless of how safe the system
    is, to conduct oversight and address any possible safety issues
    that may be present or arise in the future.
        I look forward to hearing the testimony from the witnesses,
    and thank you again for attending this important oversight
    hearing.
        Finally, before I recognize Mr. Costello for his opening
    statement, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5
    legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include
    extraneous material in the record of this hearing.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        I now recognize Mr. Costello for his opening statement.
        Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I thank you for
    calling the hearing today to review aviation safety in the
    United States. I am pleased to see that a number of the Colgan
    families are with us here, as they have been many times for
    hearings over the past several years.
        We all know that the United States commercial aviation
    system is the safest in the world. It is the safest because of
    the hard work of many individuals and professionals over many
    years at the FAA, the National Transportation Safety Board,
    Government auditing agencies, organized labor, the airline
    industry and also Congress, and in particular this
    subcommittee.
        As both the chairman and ranking member of the Aviation
    Subcommittee, I have always made safety my top priority, and I
    know that Mr. Petri has as well. In the 110th and 111th
    Congresses we held 19 safety-related hearings and roundtables,
    including 2 hearings on runway safety, 4 hearings on pilot
    training and fatigue and a hearing on the FAA's oversight of
    outsourced airline maintenance.
        Additionally, in response to the February 2009 Colgan
    Flight 3407 crash, we worked together to enact sweeping airline
    safety and pilot training reforms, the strongest piece of
    airline safety legislation in decades. We will receive updates
    on all of these subjects today, and it is important that we
    continue to hold subsequent hearings on the implementation of
    the airline safety law.
        I am pleased that we passed and the President signed into
    law the FAA reauthorization bill, although I disagreed with the
    funding cuts in the House bill which the FAA testified would
    have harmed safety because the FAA would have had to furlough a
    large number of safety employees. Fortunately, these cuts were
    rejected in the final conference report. Nevertheless, the DOT
    IG will testify today that we will still need to keep a close
    eye on whether the FAA has an adequate number of safety
    inspectors.
        Likewise, we had a heated debate over an amendment accepted
    on the House floor that both the NTSB and the FAA said would
    undermine aviation safety rulemakings, including a new pilot
    fatigue rulemaking. I opposed this amendment, which was also
    opposed by the Colgan families. The amendment was dropped from
    the conference report, the fatigue rule has been finished, and
    the American public is safer now today because we won that
    battle.
        Looking forward, we must continue to work together to
    ensure that safety continues to be the subcommittee's highest
    priority and that we do not enact policies that could undermine
    our work to improve safety.
        We should continue to be vigilant about the FAA's oversight
    of contract repair stations. Based on a 2003 DOT IG report that
    identifies weaknesses in the FAA's aircraft repair station
    oversight, some members of this subcommittee wanted to require
    foreign repair stations to be inspected at least twice a year.
    Instead, Congress adopted a primarily risk-based inspection
    approach in the recently enacted FAA bill. However, the DOT IG
    will testify that several weaknesses that they originally
    identified in 2003 still remain and that this issue still
    requires vigorous oversight.
        Generally speaking, I am encouraged by the progress the FAA
    has made implementing the comprehensive airline safety and
    pilot training bill that we enacted in the 111th Congress. I
    commend Secretary LaHood and the acting administrator for
    completing a pilot fatigue rule and proposing a new pilot
    training rule that will dramatically increase the training
    standards for first officers.
        As the Colgan tragedy made very clear, aviation safety
    depends on making sure pilots have the training and experience
    necessary to deal with adverse situations. I will continue to
    work with the FAA and all interested stakeholders as this
    process continues to make sure that the FAA produces the
    strongest possible rule.
        Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for calling the hearing
    today. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and I will
    have several questions for them as well. Thank you.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you.
        I would like to ask unanimous consent that our colleague
    William Shuster, a member of the full committee, be permitted
    to participate in all of the proceedings of this subcommittee
    hearing.
        Mr. Duncan, do you have an opening statement?
        Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have heard
    the opening statements that you and Ranking Member Costello
    have given, and I certainly agree with all of your remarks. And
    I salute you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Costello for the
    great work you have done in this Subcommittee on Aviation
    Safety. Certainly we all want to try to make our aviation
    system as safe as possible and do whatever we can. You can
    never rest on your laurels in any field or profession or
    occupation, and we shouldn't rest on our laurels about aviation
    safety. We should always be trying to make things better and
    improve things that we can.
        By the same token, the American aviation system has the
    greatest record of almost any industry and anything. I did
    chair this subcommittee for 6 years, but I now chair the
    Highways and Transit Subcommittee, and it is a very unfortunate
    thing that we have about as many deaths in 3\1/2\ months on the
    Nation's highways as we have had in all U.S. aviation accidents
    combined since the Wright Brothers' flight in 1903.
        I am concerned. I know that this hearing is supposed to
    look at aviation safety in general, and there are many
    different aspects of it. I am concerned about something though
    that we will get more into in the second panel, and I won't be
    able to be here at that time because starting at 10 o'clock I
    am going to be leading a tribute on the floor of the House to
    Coach Pat Summitt, who received the top award of the National
    Alzheimer's Association and is being honored by the Tennessee
    delegation on the floor of the House this morning.
        But there is a provision to apply these same flight crew
    rest requirements to cargo aircraft as passenger aircraft, and
    I think we need to be very careful before we--we need to look
    before we leap on that, because I am told that that rule, if
    applied to cargo airlines, would cost, according to the FAA's
    own analysis, $306 million, which is about 15 times the
    benefits that would accrue. In addition to that, cargo pilots,
    I am told many cargo pilots now fly only 31 hours a month,
    which seems to me is a real sweetheart deal, and fly about half
    the time that passenger pilots fly. So I just don't know that
    we may be correcting a problem that doesn't exist.
        I understand that there were only two crashes in the last
    30 years, or two accidents by cargo planes, and neither one of
    those would have been prevented by this rule that we are
    talking about. In fact, one of them apparently came about
    because of personal problems that the pilot was having at home
    and not anything due to rest.
        So, I hope we look into that proposed legislation very,
    very carefully before we get into it.
        Already, because of the cost of fuel, we have been told
    over the years that each one penny increase in jet fuel costs
    the aviation industry as a whole $180 million to $200 million a
    year, a phenomenal statistic. And now because fuel has gone up
    so much, passenger travel is going to shoot way up, and because
    cargo planes carry almost everything, the cost of almost
    everything is going to go up. So we need to be very careful in
    what we do in this regard.
        I thank you very much for yielding me this time.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. Shuster, would you care to make a
    statement?
        Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.
        I was the author of that amendment that passed on the House
    floor that was taken out in committee. I was disappointed,
    because that amendment I believe dealt directly with safety
    first. But looking at things based on science, not on emotion,
    not on knee-jerk reactions, but based on the cost-benefit
    analysis and looking at the different operations that the
    pilots they participate in, there is passenger and cargo. And
    there is a difference, as my colleague from Tennessee pointed
    out. The time that a pilot operates cargo versus passenger
    aircraft is significantly different.
        But I am very pleased that the FAA came with a final rule
    regarding the flight crew duty and rest requirements, and it
    followed, as did our amendment, followed the President's
    Executive order. I don't always agree with the President, but
    in this case we were on the same page. So, the final rule I
    believe does reflect the Executive order, it does reflect an
    amendment we tried to pass, and it looks at passenger versus
    cargo in a different way. One size doesn't fit all.
        My colleague also pointed out the cost-benefit analysis,
    the cost to the industry, which is probably much higher than
    the FAA thinks it would be. As I said, once size does not fit
    all. There are a few other significant things the cargo
    industry has done in the past several years. It has reduced all
    accidents significantly over the past two decades, and since
    2003, have operated over 8 million flight operations with no
    fatigue-related accidents. That is a pretty strong indication
    they are doing the right thing.
        It provides more and longer flight crewmember rest
    opportunities than passenger flights. They spent millions of
    dollars on sleep facilities, both in cargo hubs and on board
    long-range aircraft. It operates with no passengers or flight
    attendants, thereby allowing restful sleep aboard long-range
    aircraft. And schedule of pilots, as was mentioned, they fly
    significantly less than the passenger pilots.
        So, again, I am looking forward to the hearing. I
    appreciate and respect and support what the FAA did on this,
    and I will continue to fight to make sure we do rules and
    regulations in a reasonable way while maintaining a high level
    of safety.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Petri. Mr. Boswell, did you have a word you wanted to
    say?
        Mr. Boswell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just very briefly. I
    told you I did not, and I looked over your panels, and I just
    want to thank you for having the experts you have got before
    you now. But I am also very interested in Panel 2 that we are
    going to have.
        It just made me reminisce for a second. Years and years ago
    when I became a safety officer in a unit that I was in, and I
    found out when I sat down with the crews, the pilots, the
    people that flew in the aircraft and so on, is where I really
    put it together, and we had what turned out to be an excellent,
    very successful program. So I am glad to see that you have
    airlines and regionals and the Airline Pilot Association as you
    go down that list.
        So, thank you very much. I think that we will learn a lot
    and I look forward to what comes out of this. So I yield back.
        Mr. Petri. I recognize the chairman of the full committee,
    John Mica from Florida.
        Mr. Mica. Well, thank you. And as Elizabeth Taylor said to
    her sixth husband, I don't intend to keep you long. I will try
    to be as brief as possible, like Mr. Boswell.
        Well, first of all, I have to say thank you to Mr. Petri
    and Mr. Costello. This is a very important hearing and a very
    important responsibility of this subcommittee, and that is our
    aviation industry and passenger service safety and oversight of
    that.
        Let me just say here we have been so fortunate. We have had
    some great leadership working together. We did pass finally FAA
    legislation that was 5 years overdue, 23 extensions. In the
    interim we worked together.
        The large commercial aircraft have had an incredible safety
    record. We saw some problems with commuter, and through the
    Colgan families and others everyone was determined to make
    certain tat commuter passengers are just as safe as those on a
    large commercial aircraft. We lost lives there. We put some
    reforms in place, and actually last year's record was
    incredible.
        But let me tell you this. Mark this in the record. We will
    have a horrible incident involving passenger aircraft. Why do I
    say that? Because the odds are just totally stacked against us.
    You can only go so long when you have so many human beings
    involved, when you have technology that sometimes fails. And
    people are going to come back and say well, what did they do to
    make certain that this didn't happen? And this hearing is one
    of them. And we have missed the mark.
        I just got through talking to an aviation group, and I
    cited NextGen. NextGen provides us not only a better way to get
    our planes around, environmentally more friendly, shorter
    points, knowing where the planes are in the air, on the ground,
    changing out of a post-World War II radar-based system to a
    satellite based system, all of that. But that program is 2
    years behind. It is at half a billion dollars. Some of the
    technical components, for example ERAM, 2 years behind, half a
    billion dollars behind. And this needs to come out.
        We have had FAA in turmoil, because I remember Babbitt
    coming to me and people say why did you push to move this bill
    forward? Because Randy Babbitt told me that his operations were
    in a state of confusion. These 2-month, 2-week extensions, were
    costing millions of dollars and keeping the agency in turmoil.
    Now we have him departed. We have had an FAA with no
    administrator at some times, now an acting administrator and an
    under-siege administrator. And it is difficult to get things
    done in that atmosphere. Then you don't have the blueprint,
    which is the Federal law which we now have in place.
        So this is an opportunity to get it back in place. I am
    hoping that we don't have what I described that we are long
    overdue for, and that is going to be, unfortunately, again
    there are just so many human beings, so much technology in
    place.
        You have got to have two things that I think are important.
    One, you have to have the personnel, and you have to have the
    technology. I talked about that for a second. That is behind
    schedule, over budget and not acceptable.
        The second thing is personnel. We have some great air
    traffic controllers, and thank goodness in the most recent
    months we have not had another incident of somebody sleeping on
    the job or not paying attention on the job or lax on the job.
    Most of the incidents, and every one of them the staff will
    tell you, every incident I try to investigation, was this a
    rookie air traffic controller or was this somebody experienced.
    Most of the incidents, unfortunately, have been with people who
    have been experienced.
        So we have met, and we have got to redouble our effort,
    guys, to make certain that the air traffic controllers, and we
    are changing many of them out because of their age and
    retirement. So you have to have a program to make certain that
    they are the best trained and also the best prepared, best to
    go to work rested and all of these things.
        And some of the conditions where air traffic controllers
    actually in the United States stink, they need to be improved.
    I have seen pets accommodated better than some of our air
    traffic controllers, and that needs to be changed out and I am
    going to work with folks to do that. We saw some of the
    accommodations in Canada that were just outstanding workplaces
    and conducive to putting a rested, alert well-trained air
    traffic controller on the job. So we have got to improve that
    part of the equation, which is the human equation.
        So I guess that is my little longer than I should talk, but
    this is very important. Again, I commend you and we will stay
    on it with you and work with the agencies. I want to hear from
    the witnesses. Thank you, I yield back.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Now we turn to our panel. The
    Honorable Margaret Gilligan, who is the associate administrator
    for Aviation Safety of FAA; the Honorable David Grizzle, the
    chief operating officer, Air Traffic Organization at the FAA;
    Jeffrey B. Guzzetti, who is the assistant inspector general for
    aviation and special programs of the Department of
    Transportation; and the person who assists us on many of these
    occasions, Dr. Gerald Dillingham, director, physical
    infrastructure issues, Government Accountability Office.
        Ma'am and gentleman, thank you very much for joining us. As
    you know, we thank you for your prepared statements and would
    invite you to summarize them in approximately 5 minutes,
    beginning with Ms. Gilligan.

        TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE MARGARET GILLIGAN, ASSOCIATE
          ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION SAFETY, FEDERAL AVIATION
     ADMINISTRATION; THE HONORABLE DAVID GRIZZLE, CHIEF OPERATING
       OFFICER FOR AIR TRAFFIC, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION;
     JEFFREY B. GUZZETTI, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AVIATION
     AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; AND
    GERALD L. DILLINGHAM, PH.D., DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
                ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Ms. Gilligan. Chairman Petri, Congressman Costello and
    members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting us here
    today to review aviation safety in the United States. I would
    like to update you on the progress we have made to implement
    the Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010. But as
    mentioned in your opening statements, we know there is a lot of
    interest in air traffic control as well, so I am joined today
    by my colleague David Grizzle, the chief operating officer for
    the Air Traffic Organization, who will be here to answer any
    questions you may have on air traffic management.
        Several provisions in the 2010 act helped facilitate major
    safety advancements, such as the new flight duty and rest
    requirements for pilots and a proposal to require air carriers
    to implement safety management systems. Although some of the
    provisions have taken longer than Congress anticipated under
    the provisions of the act, we have made significant strides in
    accomplishing many of the objectives.
        In the area of pilot fatigue, which was identified as a top
    priority in the FAA's 2009 call to action, we completed the
    final rule, which uses the latest fatigue science to establish
    flight schedules that mitigate and manage fatigue. Flight duty
    periods under the new rules are more comprehensive and include
    flight-related activities such as time spent in training and
    standing by on call for flights at an airport. These duties are
    part of the workday, they contribute to fatigue, and they must
    be counted as part of the core job of flying the airplane.
        We also took into account that off duty activities, such as
    recreational activities or commuting, have an impact on
    fatigue. To address this, the final rule establishes new
    fitness for duty requirements that serve as a reminder to both
    the airlines and the pilots of their professional
    responsibilities to ensure that rest periods are used for what
    they are intended, and that is to rest.
        We met the statutory deadline in the 2010 act to issue a
    proposal requiring air carriers to develop and implement safety
    management systems. The FAA and industry recognize SMS as a
    holistic approach to safety that allows for trend spotting to
    help identify possible safety problems and correct them before
    they lead to accidents or incidents.
        We have initiated two rulemaking projects to address the
    pilot training and experience requirements highlighted in the
    act. The first project is a comprehensive proposal to revise
    the current qualification and training requirements not just
    for pilots, but for flight attendants and aircraft dispatchers.
        Although we had initiated this project before the tragic
    Colgan accidents, in order to fully consider the comments we
    received on the proposal, to address many NTSB recommendations
    that resulted from the investigation of that accident, and to
    incorporate the mandates of the 2010 act, we issued a
    supplemental proposal in May 2011. The comment period closed in
    September and we are working on the comments to develop a final
    rule to address these training enhancements.
        We have also proposed a rule to require first officers to
    hold an airline transport pilot's certificate requiring 1,500
    hours of pilot flight time in most cases. We appreciate that in
    the act Congress acknowledged the measurement of pilot
    experience is not limited solely to the number of hours flown,
    so our proposal would allow a restricted airline transport
    pilot's certificate in two instances. First, graduates of a 4-
    year aviation degree program who receive their commercial
    pilot's certificate and instrument rating while studying at the
    school would need only 1,000 hours of flight time. Former
    military pilots would require only 750 hours of flight time.
    The comment period on this proposal will close April 30th.
        There are, as you have noted, a few areas of the 2010 act
    that have presented some challenge to the FAA. The first
    concerns the area of pilot professionalism. We in industry
    recognize the need to continuously improve professional
    standards to improve flight deck discipline. We have drafted a
    proposal that is currently in executive review as we continue
    to work on balancing the regulatory burden and the
    effectiveness of the proposal.
        Another challenging area is the development of a
    centralized database of pilot records. We are working to define
    the scope of the records to be reported and how to integrate
    thousands of records kept on all forms of media from paper to
    microfiche to various automated systems. We do have several
    major milestones in place and we do anticipate a database proof
    of concept test this summer.
        All of these initiatives have been very complicated and in
    some cases very expensive. As the rulemakings progress, we are
    constantly evaluating how these provisions may best be
    leveraged to improve safety while ensuring the benefits justify
    the costs. We remain committed to addressing these safety
    enhancements while continuing with our daily oversight
    responsibilities, and now while satisfying the requirements
    recently set forth in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of
    2012.
        Chairman Petri, Mr. Costello, members of the subcommittee,
    this concludes our prepared remarks and we are prepared to
    answer questions. Thank you.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. Grizzle.
        Mr. Grizzle. Sir, I do not have a statement separate from
    Ms. Gilligan's.
        Mr. Petri. All right. Mr. Guzzetti.
        Mr. Guzzetti. Chairman Petri, Ranking Member Costello, and
    members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify today on the state of aviation safety and FAA's
    oversight of the National Airspace System.
        As you know, FAA does operate the world's safest
    transportation system, largely due to the dedication of its
    workforce. FAA has implemented many initiatives to enhance
    safety, such as its recent actions in response to the 2010
    Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act. However, to realize the
    full benefits of the programs it has in place, FAA must address
    challenges in three key areas.
        First, FAA needs to improve the way it collects, counts and
    uses data regarding incidents where aircraft come too close
    together in the air and on the ground. Over the past few years,
    FAA has encouraged controllers to voluntarily report errors
    through the Air Traffic Safety Action Program, or ATSAP.
    However, FAA does not count all ATSAP reported errors in its
    yearly totals. As a result, it is unclear whether the 53-
    percent rise we saw in reported controller errors between
    fiscal years 2009 and 2010 is due to more errors, improved
    reporting, or both.
        According to FAA, the increase is likely due to more errors
    being reported through ATSAP, but our work does not support
    this assertion. The agency's en route centers which have had
    systems in place for years to automatically detect separation
    losses saw a 39-percent increase in errors during that same
    period. This would indicate that the increase is due at least
    in part to more actual errors occurring.
        It is clear that FAA can better leverage existing data to
    investigate incidents, identify trends and root causes and
    mitigate their risks. Currently FAA does not effectively
    analyze data captured through ATSAP or through its automated
    detection tool recently installed at terminal facilities.
        With runway incursions, FAA has made progress in reducing
    the most serious ones. Serious incidents declined over the past
    decade from 53 in fiscal year 2001 down to only 7 in fiscal
    year 2011. However, the number of serious incursions reported
    so far this fiscal year is already up to 12, which is nearly
    double last year's events. To sustain the progress made in past
    years, executive level oversight and accountability will be
    needed. This is going to remain a watch item for our office.
        Second, FAA needs to improve its risk-based oversight of
    the aviation industry. In particular, oversight at repair
    stations has been a longstanding challenge for FAA and one we
    have reported on since 2003. While FAA established a risk-based
    system in 2007 for improved surveillance, our ongoing work
    indicates there are still problems. For example, the system is
    not applied consistently and it does not permit trend analyses
    needed to better target repair stations with the greatest
    risks. Our work has also shown that FAA needs to strengthen its
    risk-based oversight of aircraft manufacturers under its
    relatively new delegated authority program known as ODA. We
    issued a report on ODA last year and FAA has responded
    positively to our recommendations.
        Because FAA may never have enough inspectors to oversee
    every aspect of aviation, it is critical that it target its
    inspector workforce to areas with the highest risk. A 2006
    study mandated by this subcommittee found that FAA wasn't
    effectively allocating its inspector workforce and they
    recommended a new approach. FAA introduced a new staffing model
    in 2009 and we are currently evaluating it. Thus far, however,
    it appears that FAA needs to further refine the model to obtain
    reliable staffing projections.
        Finally, FAA needs to continue its focus on implementing
    key provisions of the Airline Safety Act. FAA has made progress
    on many of the Act's provisions, such as updating pilot rest
    requirements. However, the agency has been challenged to
    implement other key measures, as Ms. Gilligan mentioned. For
    example, the new rest rules do not require carriers to identify
    pilots who commute hundreds or thousands of miles to their duty
    location. FAA is also several months behind on issuing rules to
    improve pilot training and implement pilot mentoring programs.
    All of these issues were seen in the tragic 2009 Colgan crash.
        FAA is also behind in its efforts to enhance pilot
    qualifications. The agency expects to issue a rule by August
    2013, a year after the mandated deadline. Due to the increase
    in flight hours the rule will require, FAA has met opposition
    from airlines who feel the quality and type of training should
    be weighted more heavily than the actual number of hours.
    Airlines are also concerned that entry level pilots will have
    difficulty meeting the new flight time mandates.
        FAA also faces challenges in developing a centralized pilot
    records database for carriers to use when hiring pilots. These
    challenges include determining what records should be captured,
    maintaining the flow of information during that transition, and
    addressing concerns with the National Driver Register data.
        In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me reiterate that FAA has
    overcome many challenges and continues to take important steps
    to oversee aviation safety. We will continue to monitor FAA's
    progress to address these issues and we will keep this
    subcommittee apprised of our work.
        This concludes my statement. I will be happy to address any
    of the questions you or other members of the subcommittee may
    have.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. Dillingham.
        Mr. Dillingham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Costello, Mr. Duncan and other members of the committee. As you
    have heard from previous witnesses, FAA regulates one of the
    safest aviation systems in the world, and to its credit FAA
    continues to strive for even higher levels of safety through a
    shift to a more data-driven, risk-based safety oversight
    approach. This shift means that FAA needs safety data that is
    accurate, complete, and gives it the capability to identify
    systemwide trends and manage emerging risks.
        My testimony this morning focuses on three key aspects of
    FAA's implementation of its new approach. First is how FAA uses
    data to manage safety risk; second is how FAA ensures the
    quality of its safety data; and third are the several
    challenges the agency must address in using data to better
    manage aviation safety.
        Regarding how FAA uses data to manage safety, FAA collects
    accident data and uses various voluntary reporting programs to
    collect incident data, such as for runway incursions and
    operational errors. FAA also collects data through its
    inspection and certification program.
        For decades, FAA, NTSB, and the aviation industry have used
    data primarily in a reactive fashion; that is, after an
    accident, to identify the causes and take action to prevent
    their reoccurrence. FAA's new use of safety data combines this
    approach and a proactive approach in which data are used to
    identify emerging risks and strategies to reduce the likelihood
    of accidents before they occur.
        FAA also plans to use data proactively to identify risks
    that might emerge with the introduction of NextGen capabilities
    into the NAS. In 2010, GAO examined how FAA ensures the quality
    of that data. We found that the agency had a variety of
    processes in place that we consider good practices to help
    ensure data quality. However, we did identify some
    vulnerabilities in FAA's processes that could potentially limit
    the usefulness of its data for both safety analysis and for
    conducting oversight through safety management systems. We made
    several recommendations to FAA to help improve and expand on
    this capability to use data.
        Mr. Chairman, although FAA has put in place various quality
    controls for its data, it continues to experience data
    challenges, some of which may hinder the agency's ability to
    assess and manage risks. Similar to the IG's findings, it is
    unclear if the recent increase in operational error reports is
    due to more actual reporting or an actual increase in errors.
    FAA also lacks data in some areas that are important for
    monitoring safety risks. For example, the lack of ramp incident
    data means that FAA is unable to assess the risk of safety
    events in that area.
        Another challenge is in what some industry stakeholders
    have identified as the number one air transportation safety
    issue. That is runway safety. According to FAA, there are three
    runway incursions that occur each day at towered airports in
    the United States, and research has also shown that runway
    excursions can be just as dangerous as incursions.
        Our October 2011 study found that FAA does not have a
    process in place to track and evaluate runway excursions. The
    absence of such a process inhibits FAA's capability to address
    the risks of these time of safety events. Similarly, the lack
    of complete data for inspections of pilot training schools and
    pilot examiners makes it difficult for FAA to ensure that the
    training standards are being met for the initial training of
    pilots. In response to our recommendation or on its own
    volition, for each of the challenges I have identified, as well
    as others that are listed in our written statement, FAA has
    efforts planned or underway to address them.
        In closing, Mr. Chairman, given FAA's forecast of
    significant increases in aviation traffic, we would urge that
    all stakeholders not become complacent with the extraordinary
    aviation safety record that has been achieved to date and
    continue to do what will be necessary to make a safe system
    even safer.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Petri. Well, thank you. I thank you all for your
    summaries. I have a couple of questions.
        Ms. Gilligan, if you have looked at this, it is indicated
    the FAA safety management pilot program, there is a difference
    in the participation between the larger airlines and smaller
    airlines. I think the information I have is that 14 of the 15
    smaller air carriers, those with 20 planes or less, are not
    participating in the program, and the point was made that it
    might not be scalable for smaller airplanes. Is that true or is
    that something that is of concern or is that being addressed?
    Could you discuss that?
        Ms. Gilligan. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. As you know, we
    do have a pilot program, because, before we put the rule in
    place, we wanted to learn ourselves what was the best way to
    frame the regulation for the safety management system. The
    pilot program has been very helpful in helping us better
    understand what the necessary elements are, and specifically to
    your question, how can we assure that the rule allows it to be
    appropriate to the size of the operation.
        This is something we have been aware of for a long time. I
    believe former Administrator Babbitt testified to this
    committee that in an airline with two airplanes and a small
    number of crew, written records may be sufficient, whereas at
    the newly merged United Airlines, for example, clearly
    automated systems that know how to collect and analyze data
    will be necessary to be successful. We are taking that all into
    account as we look at finalizing our rule to assure that the
    rule is sufficiently flexible to allow all of the operators to
    make the most use out of a safety management system effectively
    and efficiently. So we will be watching closely to be able to
    scale it to the size of the operation.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. I think this was mentioned by Mr.
    Guzzetti, but I wonder if you could respond. The people in the
    repair station industry argue that the oversight by the FAA is
    often inconsistent between FAA offices and even within FAA
    offices. Do you recognize that problem or is it being dealt
    with or is there an explanation for that situation?
        Ms. Gilligan. Yes. Again, Mr. Chairman, we certainly have
    heard the criticism of inconsistency among FAA offices. We are
    a large organization with over 125 offices across the country
    and around the world, and individuals who come to work
    intending to do the best they know how to do every day can
    sometimes disagree. So we are constantly looking for ways to
    document what the proper processes and procedures are so that
    our staff is well informed and well trained.
        We do have processes in place for any of our certificate
    holders to raise questions if they believe that they have
    gotten an inaccurate or an incorrect determination from one of
    our inspectors, and we are really building a culture that
    allows for that exchange of professional disagreement, because
    we think that is healthy. Folks in the industry are smart. FAA
    doesn't have the corner on the market on how to interpret all
    of the rules and regulations. We need to work together to make
    sure that we have the right safety outcome.
        So we believe with those kinds of programs in place, where
    people can ask questions, we will all get to the best safety
    outcome. But it is a criticism we are constantly working to
    improve.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. There has been some discussion, Mr.
    Grizzle, of the increase in reported incidences of operational
    errors and then some speculation as to the reason, whether it
    is better reporting or more actual errors or whatever. Could
    you shed any light on that situation?
        Mr. Grizzle. Mr. Chairman, we have been in the process of
    making a substantial change to the culture within the Air
    Traffic Organization to encourage the voluntary reporting of
    operational incidents. We have also been changing our entire
    program for data acquisition of events that do occur. We are
    confident that because of these cultural changes, the reporting
    of incidents has increased. But we are not able to tell which
    part of the increase is the result of greater reporting and
    which part of the increase is the result of more incidents in
    fact occurring.
        However, as you know, the occurrence of incidents is
    extremely rare and that is the reason that we have paid a great
    deal of attention to making sure that we are able to harvest as
    much information as we possibly can from every incident so that
    we can turn that data into information which then becomes risk
    managing changes of procedures, and we have done a very good
    job in that regard.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. Costello.
        Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, just to put things in perspective, if I may,
    to follow up on Mr. Grizzle's comments, I think it is
    noteworthy to take a look at how many operations take place a
    year versus how many operational errors there have been
    reported. And as the chairman said earlier and a number of
    other Members have said, one incident of operational error is
    too many and we need to do everything we can to reduce the
    number of errors.
        But when you take a look at the ATC operations, how many
    operations they handled in fiscal year 2009, there were 120.3
    million and there were 1,234 operational errors, which is 0.001
    percent of the total operations that year. The number of flight
    operations that the air traffic system handled in fiscal year
    2010, there were 118.9 million operations and there were 1,187
    operational errors, which is 0.0016 of the total in that year.
    So it comes down to in fiscal year 2009 about 1 error reported
    either by someone in the system, including a pilot, to 1 error
    per 100,000 flight operations and 1.5 percent errors per
    100,000 flight operations in fiscal year 2010. So I think it is
    worth noting. The purpose of this hearing is to make certain
    that we reduce to zero, so there are zero operational errors.
        With that being said, Dr. Dillingham, let me ask you, in an
    October GAO report, the report, and I quote, says, ``We found
    evidence to suggest that changes to reporting policies and
    processes have likely contributed to the increased number of
    incidents reported into the ATQA, the official data base for
    operational errors.''
        Would you explain some of the evidence that you reviewed,
    the GAO reviewed, in order to reach that conclusion?
        Mr. Dillingham. Thank you, Mr. Costello. We looked at some
    of the data that you in fact have just provided to us and we
    also looked at other situations where new policies and
    procedures were put in place at the same time as technology was
    put in place. And what we found in terms of evidence is we
    found an association wherein we could see that there were more
    operational errors being reported at the same time that these
    various other activities were taking place, but we could not
    establish a causal relationship and sort out the factors that
    might be having the most effect on this reporting. And until
    that kind of analysis is done, until that kind of statistical
    analysis is done, as Mr. Grizzle said, it is an unknown,
    logically it fits, but sometimes logic goes out when you
    actually do the statistical analysis to ensure that what you
    are seeing logically is in fact real.
        Mr. Costello. A followup question. In talking about the
    series of recent policy changes that Mr. Grizzle referred to
    and you referred to as well, the FAA is reporting processes
    that include making incident reports less punitive, removal of
    facility incident targets, implementation of new technology and
    a shifting to a risk-based system.
        Would you explain for the record some of these changes and
    whether or not you believe that there is a correlation between
    these changes and the increase in reporting of operational
    errors? You touched on that in answer to my first question, but
    everything that I have read I have to conclude that there is a
    correlation. You have no reason to doubt that there is a
    correlation, is that correct?
        Mr. Dillingham. I don't have any reason to doubt there is a
    correlation. I would be hesitant to use that statistical term
    of correlation. But understanding what you mean and that there
    is in fact some kind of likely association, all of the things
    that you mentioned as policy changes would contribute to having
    people feel more free to in fact report incidences that they
    were aware of.
        Mr. Costello. For the record, could you explain just a few
    of the policy changes that the FAA has been dealing with at the
    same time taking into account these operational error reports?
        Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir. You mentioned one, the removal of
    the limits that were in place for the number of operational
    errors that could be reported by a facility. When that limit
    was removed, it meant that supervisors were not as concerned
    about going over that limit and anything that might result, any
    kind of discipline or negative association that would result
    from reporting as many operational errors as occurred.
        There is also a de-identification of the controllers who
    are in fact making those kinds of reports, so that again the
    anonymous nature of it made controllers feel a lot safer or
    freer in making those kinds of reports.
        So all of those things together were contributing factors
    as far as we can determine at this point.
        Mr. Costello. Thank you. Mr. Grizzle, would you explain
    what not-to-exceed targets were and whether or not you agree
    with the GAO's assessment?
        Mr. Grizzle. We do agree with the GAO's assessment. Our
    centers have had automatic incident detection technology for
    quite a while. We took our ATO total of incidents that we were
    expecting and we allocated that to facilities so that each
    facility, in effect, had a quota that they were not to exceed.
    Unlike the new error detection technology that we are
    implementing now, which is referred to as TARP, the technology
    that was in place in the centers involved evaluation and
    characterization of the incidents in the facilities. And so
    there was an opportunity for facility managers to characterize
    the events as errors or not. Consequently, with the ``not-to-
    exceed'' requirement in place, this was in fact an incentive
    and a capability to manage down the number of incidents that
    had been reported with the automatic detection technology.
        Mr. Costello. A final question, and then I will probably
    come back and have a few more after the first round. What if
    any role did the TARP program, the Traffic Analysis and Review
    Program, and the implementation of the radar voice replay
    technologies play with regard to the increase in the operation
    error?
        Mr. Grizzle. It certainly has an impact. The TARP is in the
    process of being implemented. It is currently in place in all
    of our terminal facilities, but the data is only being analyzed
    currently at 37 of the facilities. By the end of this fiscal
    year, the data from all of our terminal facilities will be
    analyzed for 24/7 operations, and at that point we believe it
    will have a substantial impact on our reportable incident
    numbers.
        Mr. Costello. Mr. Guzzetti, would you care to comment?
        Mr. Guzzetti. Yes. To piggyback on Mr. Grizzle's comments
    about the implementation of TARP, FAA estimates that the number
    of reported operational errors will increase greatly, perhaps
    by as many as 600 to 900 additional losses of separation each
    day. But again, not all losses of separation are operational
    errors. In fact, just a small percentage. But even if you take
    a small percentage of the amount of losses of separation that
    will be recorded automatically every day by TARP, the number is
    going to jump up. We don't know how much. But it is imperative
    that a baseline is generated after TARP has been implemented
    and settles down so that we get an idea of just what is the
    norm, what is the baseline for the total number of yearly
    operational errors. And only then do I think we can use that as
    a performance measure.
        Mr. Costello. My last question for you, Mr. Guzzetti. You
    cited that in 2010 there was a misinterpretation of arrival
    waivers in Southern California TRACON as a factor in
    contributing to the statistical spike in operational errors.
    Can you explain what actually happened and how it impacted the
    operational error statistic?
        Mr. Guzzetti. Yes, Congressman Costello. In early 2010 in
    the Los Angeles region the controllers there, Southern
    California TRACON, were bringing airplanes into LAX as well as
    Hawthorne. Hawthorne had a runway that was close to LAX and
    they were kind of treating it as three parallel runways in
    terms of routing these airplanes in there.
        The Southern California TRACON was using this procedure for
    many years. They felt it was safe. However, FAA's AOV ATC
    oversight organization came in and said, ``You know what? We
    don't think this is safe. We think there is a loss of
    separation here.'' And they made them go back 45 days, which is
    how long they keep recorded radar data, and they found that 147
    losses of separation as a result of this approach procedure
    should be deemed to be operational errors and they added that
    to the count. That accounted for about 23 percent of that spike
    that I alluded to between 2009 and 2010.
        Mr. Costello. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. Coble.
        Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had two conflicting
    meetings, so I missed much of the testimony, but I appreciate
    the witnesses' contribution.
        Ms. Gilligan, I am told that the FAA is behind in issuing
    the final rule for pilot qualifications. What is the status of
    this rulemaking effort?
        Ms. Gilligan. Yes, Congressman. We did issue that rule. It
    is currently out for comment. The comment period will close at
    the end of this month and then we will work very quickly to try
    to get this to final rule. As you know, under the statute, the
    requirement for 1,500 hours and for all pilots to have an ATP
    will go into effect in August of 2013, so we want our rule to
    be in place by that same time.
        Mr. Coble. Thank you. Furthermore, I am told that the FAA
    is working to refine its inspector staffing model to more
    effectively identify the number of inspectors needed and where
    they should be placed to address the greatest safety risks.
    What is the status of this effort, Ms. Gilligan?
        Ms. Gilligan. That model, sir, has been in use actually
    over the last two budget cycles, so we have been making some
    use of the model. But we are trying to refine the data that
    goes into it. The way we set up the model originally, we
    collected data from subject matter experts, inspectors out in
    the field, about what they do and how often they do it. But we
    do think there can be some refinement brought to that. So with
    each year we are learning more about how to really try to
    calculate what our future need will be based on our past
    experience, which is really how we have set up the model.
        So, again, we have used it as we have developed our budget
    requests for the last couple of fiscal years, but we are just
    trying to make it as tight as we can.
        Mr. Coble. I thank you.
        Mr. Guzzetti, you may have touched on this, but let me ask
    Dr. Dillingham a question. Doctor, what are the causes of
    runway incursions and what has the FAA done to mitigate
    incursion risks?
        Mr. Dillingham. Thank you, Mr. Coble. We have looked at it
    over the last decade, and there are three principal causes for
    runway incursions. One is failure to comply with ATC
    instructions. Another one is what is referred to as lack of
    situational awareness. Oftentimes if a pilot is unfamiliar with
    the aircraft or with the airport in fact, you can in fact lose
    your place and cause a runway incursion. And then the other
    one, the other factor is just not conforming to standard
    operating procedures.
        So those are the three factors. And FAA has taken a myriad
    of actions to address this issue, including updating the
    taxiway and runway markings, putting in technologies like
    runway lights to indicate when a runway is in use. They have
    done a number of things in terms of training of pilots,
    controllers.
        So they have done, as I said, a myriad of things to address
    these things, but they still occur, and part of it is it is a
    learning experience, and also the human element in it means
    that you are not going to get all of them out down to zero. But
    the effort is being made.
        Mr. Coble. Thank you, sir. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen
    for being with us.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. Capuano, any questions?
        Mr. Capuano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I was a
    little late. I had other things I had to do so I didn't hear
    your testimony. I have reviewed it. And also, I am kind of a
    simple guy. The chairman and the ranking member do a great job
    on the details and the technicalities. I am a pretty simple
    guy. I flew down here, flying home hopefully Friday. My wife
    and her family are currently on a plane.
        I just want to know a really simple thing. I think really
    what America wants to know is just one simple thing, and I
    would like to hear from each of you.
        Ms. Gilligan, is it safe to fly?
        Ms. Gilligan. Mr. Capuano, I can assure you that everyone
    at FAA and everyone in this industry works every day to assure
    that it is as safe as it can be. I think our record
    demonstrates that we have made that commitment, and that we are
    continuing to meet it. I think as the chairman and Mr. Costello
    identified early on, we are not resting on those laurels
    though.
        Mr. Capuano. No, I respect everybody's attempt to get to
    zero. We all--everybody wants to do that. But basically, you
    fly, you family flies?
        Ms. Gilligan. Of course.
        Mr. Capuano. You recommend to everybody you know that
    flying is safe.
        Ms. Gilligan. We wish you could fly to the supermarket
    because it is safer than lots of other modes of transportation.
        Mr. Capuano. I could carry more groceries, too. Mr.
    Grizzle, is it safe to fly? Do you recommend? Do you recommend
    to your family to?
        Mr. Grizzle. Sir, it is extremely safe. In fact, when
    people ask me what is the safest airport to fly out of, I say
    the one closest to your home. Because once you get on the
    airplane you are in one of the safest spots you can be in your
    entire day.
        Mr. Capuano. Thank you. Mr. Guzzetti?
        Mr. Guzzetti. I would concur that it is safe to fly. As we
    have all indicated in our testimony, the United States has the
    safest air transportation system in the world. However, there
    is always room for improvement. I am a pilot myself. I fly
    airplanes myself, as well as take my family on airplanes. But I
    also recognize as a former accident investigator and as an
    aeronautical engineer, that there is always room for
    improvement and the key to improvement is constantly remaining
    vigilant and collecting data.
        Mr. Capuano. Mr. Dillingham, the same question.
        Mr. Dillingham. Yes, I concur that it is safe to fly. Some
    aspects of flying are safer than others. I think there is
    beginning to be a consensus that the most dangerous part of the
    flight is when the wheels are still on the ground.
        Mr. Capuano. And I thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Now,
    obviously, I agree with that, but you are the professionals.
    You are the experts. I am not. And the truth is, most
    Americans, they don't understand half of the acronyms you use.
    I struggle to keep up with some of them myself. And the truth
    is, I understand some--I also understand that accidents happen,
    you know, sometimes they are mechanical, and sometimes they are
    human error, and it happens. And I really, I will tell you
    unequivocally, that I really respect the job that all of you do
    to try to get that to zero. You are pretty darn close to zero,
    if you want the truth, from everything I know, and as a flying
    person myself, I want to thank you for that, and thank you for
    your testimony today.
        Mr. Petri. Mr. Shuster.
        Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
    being here today. I appreciate the line of questioning of my
    colleague from Massachusetts, because I have been telling my
    children for the last 15 years when we go to fly somewhere,
    they are concerned about flying and safety, and I always tell
    them the most dangerous part of the trip is getting to the
    airport. So I appreciate that. My 20-year-old son, I will take
    the testimony back and he will finally believe they me that I
    know something--what I am talking about.
        Ms. Gilligan, I want to commend you on the ruling. I think
    it was the absolutely the right way to go, taking into what you
    took into consideration, and the question I have is, isn't it--
    isn't it true that cargo carriers and passengers are vastly
    different models the systems operate under? Although the
    fatigue can have the same reaction, the fact is they operate
    differently. Can you talk a little bit about that, what you
    went through and what you found as you came up to make the
    ruling?
        Ms. Gilligan. Sure. Yes, Congressman, it is accurate that
    the model for cargo is very different from the passenger
    carrying model. Having said that though, as you point out,
    fatigue affects all of us the same way. So we do think that
    there are elements in our new rule that could be very
    beneficial to the cargo industry. In fact, we did take into
    account in the rule that oftentimes pilots are given rests
    after they have flown into a hub airport, while boxes are being
    moved they are given an opportunity for rest, and we would
    allow cargo operators to take credit for that additional rest,
    for example, under the new rule. We also have----
        Mr. Shuster. How long a time could that last?
        Ms. Gilligan. I believe in the rule it was credit for up to
    a 4-hour rest period, and it would be 3 to 4 hours of credit,
    so for additional flight time after that rest period.
        Mr. Shuster. So a pretty significant nap?
        Ms. Gilligan. Yes, because that is really how the industry
    works right now. As I think you know, the model is the aircraft
    fly into a hub location, packages are sorted for quite a period
    of time, and then the flights are taken out. The pilots, during
    that in-between time, can get a substantial amount of rest that
    can allow them then to continue to fly for a longer period of
    time after that rest.
        So we did try to accommodate that in the new rule. And that
    is why the administrator and the secretary have really
    encouraged cargo operators to opt into the new rule, although
    we do did not require that they be covered by the rule.
        Mr. Shuster. And in your analysis, it failed the cost-
    benefit analysis, as you went through. Can you talk a little
    bit about that?
        Ms. Gilligan. Yes, sir. As you mentioned in your opening
    statement, we look at the cost benefit for the full proposal,
    but we do look at it as it would affect particular segments of
    the industry, which is required through the Executive order.
    When we looked at the immediate impacts or the cost impacts for
    the cargo operators, the cost for implementing the new flight
    duty and rest rules was substantially higher than the benefits
    that we could quantify.
        Mr. Shuster. Right.
        Ms. Gilligan. We do believe there is value in reducing
    fatigue, but it is sometimes hard to quantify that, and for
    those reasons we did not keep the cargo community in the rule.
        Mr. Shuster. All right, so in your view, your expert
    opinion, has safety been compromised in any way, shape, or form
    under this rule?
        Ms. Gilligan. The framework that we currently have in place
    that the cargo operators will continue to operate under we
    believe sets an appropriate level of safety. We do think
    improvements will be made for those that will move into the new
    rule, and we will continue to work with the cargo operators as
    they implement their fatigue risk management plans to make sure
    they are analyzing their own schedules to see if there is risk
    and to see that they mitigate it.
        Mr. Shuster. All right. Well, thank you very much and I
    yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Petri. Mr. Boswell, do you have any questions? Ms.
    Johnson?
        Ms. Johnson of Texas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me apologize for being late. This committee meeting started
    while I was in another meeting. Let me preface my remarks by
    simply--my questions by simply thanking the witnesses, and
    thanking them for being a part of the safety, and I want to
    especially thank Dr. Dillingham, who I have seen come before
    this committee year after year after year, and his opinions and
    findings have never been questioned. And I think that speaks
    well for his work.
        I truly believe that the airline industry is safe. For 20
    years I have gone back and forth almost every weekend. And even
    though I have landed places other than where I was supposed to
    land, it was safe, and that is much appreciated. What I would
    like to pose for the witnesses is, what is it we need to do to
    keep it safe? Where are we in NextGen? Where are we in
    technology, and what may be the threats?
        I am sorry I didn't hear your testimony earlier.
        Ms. Gilligan. Congresswoman, actually, where we are
    focused, working with industry, is on trying to understand what
    are mistakes that may be happening in the system today that
    haven't manifested themselves as an incident or an accident,
    but where we can intervene in time to change training or
    procedures or processes so that those mistakes are what we call
    captured so they don't cause real risk in the system.
        And that is really, I think where as an industry we are
    focused, on trying to understand what can we learn from
    everyday operations that let us make the system constantly
    safer. I think we are making good progress in understanding how
    to analyze the data, identify risks, and put in place
    mitigations.
        Mr. Grizzle. And let me speak to the NextGen implications
    on safety. It does, in fact, have a significant impact on
    improving safety. Let me identify three ways, recognizing that
    most of our safety issues are, in fact, human error issues.
    NextGen provides more data to both controllers and pilots so
    they will have more information for making the decisions that
    they need to make.
        There are also tools that substantially reduce the
    opportunity for human error, for example, in communicating
    route changes which will be done in the fully implemented
    NextGen world completely digitally and without having to rely
    upon voice communications.
        The third area is that, because NextGen expedites the route
    of flight of aircraft, it causes fewer route changes that need
    to be done in the first place. And so in those three areas,
    particularly, it will be very beneficial.
        Mr. Guzzetti. Congresswoman Johnson, the Inspector
    General's office, our office, believes that there are several
    areas that FAA could continue to work to improve safety. One of
    them is the issue of what we have been discussing in regards to
    operational errors. The risk of loss of life when two airplanes
    collide on the ground or in the air is low, but if it does
    occur, there will be a catastrophic loss of life. So that is
    why there is a lot of concern about tracking these near misses.
        Secondly, the inspector workforce, the risk-based approach,
    is a positive step, but it is a work in progress. There are
    some problems with the fact that it is not being--it is not
    robust enough at this point.
        And lastly, the things that came out of the tragic Colgan
    accident in regards to human elements in aviation, the pilot
    training, knowing which pilots airlines are hiring and how they
    are being trained, we have identified issues in that regard
    which is contained in our testimony.
        And then I would like to also mention that our office has a
    large body of work in regards to NextGen, and I would agree
    with Mr. Grizzle that the potential for NextGen to make things
    more efficient and more safe is absolutely there. However,
    NextGen is experiencing some management problems, contracting
    problems, and delay problems. This is a new technology and the
    transition will be key to ensure that things are being kept
    safe.
        Ms. Johnson of Texas. Thank you.
        Mr. Dillingham. Thank you, Congresswoman Johnson, for the
    kind words, and I will take that back to my staff as well. I
    think what the FAA representative said, we agree with that,
    that NextGen is going to be a positive in terms of improving
    safety. I think the risk management that FAA is doing now is
    also going to be a positive. And as you said, there is always
    going to be the human element involved in this. But if we look
    from the late 1990s to where we are now in our aviation safety
    record, people keep saying it over and over again, that we
    indeed have the safest system in the world. I think FAA
    recognizes, and we will be monitoring to ensure that they
    recognize where the issues are, and they are about the business
    of dealing with those issues each and every day. So we would
    recommend that they in fact do expedite the technology as well
    as keep up the education and the regulatory oversight that they
    currently undertake.
        Ms. Johnson of Texas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
    yield back.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Let's see. Mr. Cravaack, do you have
    a question?
        Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, sorry. I appreciate
    the testimony today on obviously something that is near and
    dear to my heart. And I would have to, as an airline pilot with
    many hours, I believe we do have fantastic safe skies and
    professionals that want to make sure that our skies remain safe
    and will do everything to do that.
        But I if I would, I would just like to ask a couple of
    questions. Ms. Gilligan, if you could tell me, how did the
    carve-out for cargo pilots actually occur, because going up to
    the President, everything is, you know, is one level of duty
    time, flight-time, duty-time rules. And then there was a carve-
    out for cargo pilots. How did that actually occur?
        Ms. Gilligan. Congressman, as you point out, the initial
    proposal applied to all aspects of the industry. One of the
    things we were looking to accomplish was to have a single
    framework for flight duty and rest to replace three or four
    models that we have now, which have come into place over many
    years as industry grew and as the capabilities and distances
    airplanes could fly increased. So we did have a single
    proposal. But as I said in response to Congressman Shuster, we
    are also required to do an analysis of the cost and benefits in
    different elements of the community, and when we looked at the
    cost for the cargo community, the costs were quite high and the
    quantifiable benefits were substantially lower than those
    costs. And so we always look to try to assure that we are
    getting a comparable level of societal benefits to the costs
    that any rulemaking would drive, and in this case we could not
    reach that balance. Rather than hold up the whole rule to try
    to come up with a new proposal, the rule would go forward for
    the passenger carrying flights because we could demonstrate
    strong societal benefits from those costs, that we would not
    include cargo at this time but that we would work separately,
    as the Secretary indicated, to encourage the cargo operators to
    opt into the new framework which is based on the science of
    fatigue in a way that our other rules really don't reflect.
        Mr. Cravaack. So basically it was a financial decision,
    correct?
        Ms. Gilligan. Part of the rulemaking analysis is to look at
    the cost and benefit that the requirement will have.
        Mr. Cravaack. So the data associated with the extricating
    rhythm of the pilots and flying and things like that was set
    aside for the financial aspect of it?
        Ms. Gilligan. Well, no, sir. The way we look at determining
    the benefits is to look at past accidents and incidents and
    what contributed to them. What the data indicated was that at
    this point the cargo accident rate does not demonstrate fatigue
    at a level that required us to change the standards. That is
    kind of the easiest way to describe it. As has been----
        Mr. Cravaack. Were you looking at it as a percentage
    because there is a lot less cargo aircraft in the air than
    there are passenger aircraft?
        Ms. Gilligan. It actually has to do with the econometric
    model that is used which takes a cost for what society is
    willing to pay to protect a life. And there are many more
    passengers, or lives involved in a passenger aircraft than in a
    cargo aircraft.
        Mr. Cravaack. Could you repeat what you just said?
        Ms. Gilligan. That the econometric model that is used by
    all agencies that do regulations is to look at what society is
    willing to pay to protect the value of life.
        Mr. Cravaack. That is what I thought you said. OK. Thank
    you. I appreciate that testimony. A little chilling, but I
    appreciate it.
        Mr. Grizzle, if you don't mind, both the IG and the GAO
    have indicated an improved reporting process that cannot alone
    explain the increase of operational errors. What does the FAA
    believe are the other contributing factors to increase how the
    FAA is addressing those factors?
        Mr. Grizzle. The most important action we are taking, sir,
    is making sure that we harvest all of the information from the
    voluntary disclosures in order to identify safety risk and then
    be sure that we convert that information into actionable items.
    Through this data we have identified 5 top risk areas, and to
    address those 5 top risk areas, we have developed 22 separate
    risk mitigating procedures that we are in the process of
    implementing and intend to have implemented by the end of this
    year.
        Mr. Cravaack. OK, if I can go back to you, Ms. Gilligan,
    real quick. Segments of the industry are very concerned about
    the public disclosure of the safety management system that is
    being collected and protecting that data. How do you propose to
    address this problem?
        Ms. Gilligan. Well, Congressman, actually the
    reauthorization bill will give us some additional authority to
    be certain that safety data is protected and only used to
    improve the safety of the system. So again, as we go forward
    with our safety management system rule, we will be looking to
    put in place those kinds of protections very much based on the
    work of this committee, which provided the basis for that in
    the reauthorization.
        Mr. Cravaack. I think one of the most valuable inputs that
    you have are pilots, you know, and air traffic controllers need
    to voluntarily submit suggestions without any fear of
    retribution, because that is where the answers are going to
    come from.
        I am over my time, sir, and I yield back.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. Costello.
        Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, thank you. One final question
    for Ms. Gilligan. As you know, in the 2010 Safety Act, for good
    reason, I believe, we put in a requirement for a database for
    centralized pilot records. You mentioned in your written
    testimony that there are several technical challenges
    associated with implementing that section of the act. Can you
    detail those for us for the record?
        Ms. Gilligan. Yes, sir. As we mentioned in the testimony,
    there are some issues around exactly what records need to be
    collected and so we are trying to get common understanding
    throughout the industry of who and what we should be saving and
    what we should be collecting.
        Secondly, there are two big challenges. One is the IT
    system required, getting the database actually put together,
    and we are trying to prototype that this summer which will go a
    long way to helping us understand how the technology of it
    would work.
        But I think the biggest challenge for us will be the actual
    ability to integrate records that are in paper, on microfiche,
    on mimeograph, some of them automated in the last more recent
    years, but for pilot historic records. There are pilots who
    have been in the FAA system for 20, 30, 40 years, and there are
    a tremendous number of records, most of them starkly paper,
    that will all have to be somehow incorporated into the system.
    So now we are trying to understand how we can do that
    effectively and efficiently.
        Mr. Costello. So what can we expect from a planning
    standpoint? Is there a plan to do this?
        Ms. Gilligan. We do have some milestones. Unfortunately, we
    have such a demand in our rulemaking program right now that
    because of the challenges technically, we aren't really ready
    to start the rulemaking process. Again, we are hopeful with the
    prototyping this summer that we will better really understand
    what we are up against, and based on that, we will be able to
    come up with a more realistic schedule.
        Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And again, I thank
    our witnesses for being here and I especially thank the Colgan
    families for being here as well.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. I have one question. I don't know
    quite who to address it to, but we have been talking about a
    nearly perfect record of safety, but arise in some reported
    incidents though at a very small level. Everyone is aware, I
    think who follows it, that the aviation industry has
    traditionally for many years and continues to be, aspects of
    it, under financial pressure. American Airlines is in
    bankruptcy right now, Pinnacle that owned Colgan, which did
    have an accident, is in bankruptcy.
        Is there any correlation or relationship at all or are
    there safeguards to protect from people cutting corners because
    of their financial situation?
        Ms. Gilligan. Mr. Chairman, if I may start. I am sure
    others will have opinions. I think that it is clear throughout
    the industry that an investment in safety is an important
    business investment. I think there is broad understanding that
    a fatal accident has a tremendously negative impact, not just
    on the operator involved but throughout the industry. So what
    we see from the FAA is continued investment in safety systems,
    like the safety management system, like data systems, so that
    carriers understand what is happening within their system.
        At the same time, within FAA, we have always had a program
    where inspectors enhance their oversight when there are
    financial problems. So as we went through mergers we had the
    two teams that continued to oversee, for example, United and
    Continental, as they operated, and a third team that monitored
    and managed the merger so that we had good eyes on everything
    that was happening because there is some risk, obviously, that
    some misstep or some human error can occur while you are making
    those kinds of changes. The same with bankruptcy. As soon as a
    carrier announces that they are going into bankruptcy, we
    enhance our oversight system to focus on evaluating the changes
    they will have to make as they downsize or as they furlough, or
    whatever the effects of bankruptcy may be. And I think those
    two sides, the industry's commitment to aviation safety as a
    good business practice with heightened FAA oversight when there
    is financial problems, gives as you good balance to assure the
    levels of safety continue.
        Mr. Guzzetti. Chairman Petri, if I may, our office is
    completing an audit in regards to code share that I believe the
    subcommittee requested, and one of the aspects of the three
    things we are looking at is whether safety is handled any
    differently with mainline carriers as opposed to the code-
    sharing partners. And you are correct about the economic
    situation. I think most of the code-share airlines' revenues
    are from the mainline carrier which they utilize to feed the
    main lines. But yet our audit is finding that FAA really
    doesn't have a requirement to look at those code-share
    agreements. And perhaps there could be some incentives in those
    agreements, or aspects that could impact safety. That is one of
    the things our audit is looking at.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Again, thank you all for your
    statements, and for your conscientious response to the
    questions we have asked. This concludes the first panel, and we
    will now turn to the second panel. And as it is taking its
    place, as they are taking their places, let me introduce them
    to you. The panel consists Mr. Tom Hendricks, who is the senior
    vice president for safety, security and operations, Airlines
    for America; Mr. Scott Foose, who is senior vice president,
    operations and safety, Regional Airline Association; Captain
    Sean Cassidy, first vice president of the Air Line Pilots
    Association; and Mr. Gary M. Fortner, who is vice president of
    quality control and engineering, Fortner Engineering, on behalf
    of the Aeronautical Repair Station Association.
        I would like to express all of our thanks for you gentlemen
    joining us today and participating in this panel, and for the
    effort that you and your associates have exerted to prepare the
    statements that you have submitted.
        And as you know, we would invite you to summarize those, in
    approximately 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Hendricks.

      TESTIMONY OF THOMAS L. HENDRICKS, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR
     SAFETY, SECURITY AND OPERATIONS, AIRLINES FOR AMERICA; SCOTT
     FOOSE, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, OPERATIONS AND SAFETY, REGIONAL
         AIRLINE ASSOCIATION; CAPTAIN SEAN CASSIDY, FIRST VICE
    PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL; AND GARY
    M. FORTNER, VICE PRESIDENT OF QUALITY CONTROL AND ENGINEERING,
     FORTNER ENGINEERING AND MANUFACTURING, INC., ON BEHALF OF THE
                AERONAUTICAL REPAIR STATION ASSOCIATION

        Mr. Hendricks. Chairman Petri, Ranking Member Costello,
    members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting A4A to
    appear at this important and timely hearing. At the outset, I
    want to express our thanks to the committee for its leadership
    in aviation safety and its support of the initiatives that I
    will discuss this morning, many of which were addressed in the
    recently enacted FAA Modernization Reform Act of 2012.
        Of course, we also appreciate the efforts of the Federal
    Aviation Administration and the National Transportation Safety
    Board. Safety underpins every aspect of airline operations. The
    remarkable safety record of airlines that are members of A4A,
    demonstrates their unflagging commitment to fulfilling that
    responsibility. As a former airline captain I have repeatedly
    witnessed that commitment.
        The results are extraordinary. This is the safest era in
    our history. We are the safest form of transportation on the
    planet, bar none. This safety record is neither random nor
    unintended. We have achieved levels of aviation safety that
    other industries and foreign civil aviation authorities envy.
    While our commitment to safety is unchanging, the way we pursue
    safety has evolved and transformed over time as our
    understanding of human factors has grown, technology has
    advanced and our ability to capture and utilize data has
    expanded. This transformation has been indispensable in
    producing our extraordinary safety record. In simplest terms,
    we operate at a higher level of safety because we have become
    much better at identifying and managing risk.
        We haven't conquered risk. No one can promise that in
    aviation, but airlines have introduced throughout their
    operations very potent data-driven risk assessment systems.
    These systems are tailored to an airline's operations. However,
    there is a common methodology to them. Hazards are identified
    and rigorously analyzed, and risk mitigation measures are
    carefully thought out and implemented.
        Risk assessment has been used in aviation for many years.
    What has changed since the 1990s is the volume and
    accessibility of operational data that can be applied to safety
    issues. Airline safety professionals work in an information-
    rich environment. That means that we now rely on data-driven
    analysis, which frequently involves the combined scrutiny of
    the FAA, employees and management. This yields a high-
    definition picture, if you will, of operating environments and
    transient events and thus more refined risk assessments. And as
    the subcommittee knows, some of the most effective of these
    safety data programs are voluntary. They are very tangible
    manifestations of the industry's willingness to explore new
    means and develop new relationships within the aviation
    community to improve safety.
        In short, a cultural shift has occurred that promotes and
    enables a higher level of safety. Data-based programs enable us
    to identify emerging patterns and properly deploy focused
    resources, and when that action is taken also has changed over
    the years. Today, unlike in past decades, there has been
    increasing emphasis on initiating change rather than simply
    reacting to events. That is proactive safety. This disciplined
    approach, going where the data take us and acting accordingly,
    has significantly advanced safety. It produces the most
    responsive and effective results, and it facilitates the most
    efficient deployment of finite resources in making necessary
    changes. That discipline gives us the confidence to undertake
    change when warranted, but it also gives us the ability to
    recognize when change is uncalled for and to challenge
    assumptions no matter how widely they may be embraced. Not
    every new idea is an improvement or free from unintended
    consequences.
        The FAA's proposed rule on pilot certification and
    qualification requirements, for example, concerns us for these
    reasons.
        I want to inject some words of caution. All who are
    involved in aviation safety need to realize the importance of
    sticking to the disciplined approach that I have outlined. We
    must resist the temptation to tinker with the safety system
    lest we disturb what we have accomplished and the benefits of
    that to our passengers and crewmembers.
        Expertise and rigor should guide us. Going forward, we have
    the tools to foster safety enhancements. That is because
    today's airline safety culture in the United States is
    characterized by, first, a common understanding that safety is
    the foundation of our business, second, robust communication
    within airlines, including with employees and among industry
    and Government stakeholders based on mutual trust, and finally,
    a recognition that safety issue precursors can be identified
    and effective preventative actions taken.
        When we look beyond our borders, the situation appears more
    mixed. Many foreign airlines and civil aviation authorities
    have adopted data-driven approaches to safety. The maturity of
    those systems, however, can vary. Because of that we urge the
    U.S. Government to continue its efforts at the International
    Civil Aviation Organization and in other venues to expand use
    of safety data systems worldwide. This advocacy helps not only
    foreign airlines, but also American citizens who fly on them.
        We look forward to continuing to work with the subcommittee
    on these matters, and I would be happy to answer any questions
    you might have.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. Foose.
        Mr. Foose. Good morning. Chairman Petri, Ranking Member
    Costello, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
    invitation to testify at this hearing. Three years ago RAA
    testified before your committee after a fatal accident in order
    to discuss our members' commitment to safety. At that time, we
    outlined several important safety initiatives already in place.
    We shared our plans to go even further. Today I am here to talk
    to you about what we have been doing since then.
        While our safety work has been both broad and deep and is
    discussed more fully in our written statement, I will focus my
    testimony on four areas in particular: Safety information
    sharing, voluntary safety programs, pilot fatigue, first
    officer qualifications.
        All of our members participate in safety committees
    established by code-sharing airline families. They are also
    active participants in the InfoShare Program cosponsored by the
    FAA and the airlines. In fact, at our recent InfoShare meetings
    half of the attendees and briefings were from regional
    airlines. Safety information is being shared by many means that
    now transcend many boundaries. Regional airlines are not only
    committed participants, but they are also taking leadership
    roles.
        RAA members have been also active, achieved extremely high
    participation levels, in a list of gold standard voluntary
    safety programs. In fact, RAA members have the highest levels
    of participation among all of part 121 carriers in each of the
    key FAA-supported voluntary safety programs, including ASAP,
    FOQA, AQP and safety management systems.
        The majority of carriers transitioning to advance
    qualification programs for pilot training were regionals. While
    carriers of small fleets cannot be expected to participate in
    AQP, RAA's members have made the transition in significant
    numbers. While 25 percent of all 121 carriers trained their
    pilots under AQP, 66 percent of RAA members have that program.
        Also, the large majority of RAA's part 121 members have
    flight operations quality assurance programs in place. This is
    all the more impressive knowing that RAA's members have
    significant data collection equipment obstacles to overcome in
    order to participate.
        I want to express my appreciation to our pilots and air
    associations. They have been key partners and share the credit
    in this accomplishment.
        Another significant milestone for the airline industry was
    marked when the flight and duty time final rule was published
    in December. For the first time we will use science to avoid
    and mitigate fatigue in the cockpit. In 2009, industry
    recognized there was a gap in the available science with regard
    to workload fatigue. RAA took action, initiating an independent
    ground-breaking research study to fill this gap. The goal of
    this study is simple. We want to better understand the
    fatiguing effects of multisegment operations on pilots so we
    can incorporate what we have learned into our training, our
    procedures, and our culture. RAA has taken a leading role in
    fatigue research and will continue to work hard to ensure the
    highest levels of safety in this area.
        Finally, I would like to briefly discuss the proposed pilot
    qualifications rule. But first I want to address a recent
    allegation that regional airlines have no plan in place to
    comply. This is far from the case. In fact, RAA members have
    been very busy developing their transition programs. Several
    programs have been approved and members have begun to
    transition their first officers. We are preparing our public
    comments in which we will urge the FAA to consider the valuable
    conclusions reached by the First Officer Qualifications
    Aviation Rulemaking Committee in formulating the rule. We also
    express our concern that unless the new rule recognizes the
    value and experience that structured training programs provide,
    the burden will now shift to tomorrow's pilots.
        The implication here is not diminished safety, but
    diminished incentive for students to pursue training and
    diminished service to smaller communities. The potential
    availability of new pilots could jeopardize scheduled service
    to dozens of communities. It is estimated that an annual
    shortfall of approximately 2,300 pilots could translate to a
    loss of service to 75 communities. If we do not take advantage
    of this opportunity, we will be encouraging the next generation
    of pilots to merely build hours, when what we really need is
    experience in our cockpits.
        In the 3 years since we last testified before this
    committee, our 60,000 regional airline employees have operated
    nearly 15 million flights at a pace of 13,000 flights each day.
    In fact, today is the safest period of time in commercial
    history. It is our hope that our deeds which have gone well
    beyond the rules demonstrate to you, to each of the passengers
    that we are fully committed to safe operation of each and every
    flight each day.
        This concludes my statement. I look forward to your
    questions.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Captain Cassidy.
        Mr. Cassidy. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Costello, and members of the subcommittee. I am Captain Sean
    Cassidy, first vice president of the Air Line Pilots
    Association, International, and I am also its national safety
    coordinator. I represent more than 53,000 professional airline
    pilots who fly for 37 airlines both in the United States and
    Canada. ALPA is not only the world's largest pilot union, We
    are also the world's largest nongovernmental aviation safety
    organization. I am honored to be here and would like to offer
    our perspective on where the U.S. airline industry stands,
    where we need to go in four critical areas of aviation safety.
        First, although ALPA believes our industry has made good
    progress in taking on pilot fatigue, critical work remains to
    be done to achieve one level of safety for all airline
    operations, a concept that has formed the foundation of ALPA's
    safety work for many years. All pilots are human and we
    experience fatigue in the same way regardless of whether we are
    passengers or we have cargo in our aircraft. Despite this, new
    science-based fatigue regulations apply only to pilots who fly
    passengers and not those who fly cargo. Leaving all cargo
    pilots out of the regulations is a serious safety concern.
        ALPA thanks your colleagues, Representative Chip Cravaack
    and Representative Tim Bishop, for introducing the Safe Skies
    Act of 2012, which would apply the fatigue rules to all airline
    operations. We urge all members of this committee to cosponsor
    H.R. 4350 and to swiftly report out the Safe Skies Act of 2012
    to help achieve one level of safety across the industry.
        I would also like to applaud the families from Colgan 3407
    who not only have been staunch supporters for H.R. 5900, but
    also the Safe Skies Act as well.
        Second, the screening, selection, training, qualification,
    and continued professional development of a pilot are also key
    components of maintaining the highest levels of safety. While
    ALPA is encouraged by the rulemaking proposals both for
    revising training standards and requirements for new first
    officers and for implementing safety management systems at
    airlines, the job is clearly not finished. Of particular
    concern to airline pilots is the new regulations which seek to
    ensure that relevant experiences obtained before pilots begin
    airline service, they must not set the stage for unintended
    consequences of rendering an active airline line pilot suddenly
    ineligible to continue his or her employment. Fairness and
    common sense dictate that efforts to ensure relevant experience
    should not inadvertently take that experience out of the
    cockpit.
        New regulations must include a clear path to follow so
    currently employed airline pilots can continue to fly and are
    able to achieve full compliance with requirements that were
    created after their employment began. In addition, ALPA has
    long emphasized the value of professional development, command
    training, and mentoring. As the U.S. airline industry has
    evolved, opportunities have diminished for new pilots to gain
    experience through years of flying under the command of more
    seasoned aviators. As a result, the mentoring command training
    of professional development that once occurred organically must
    be replaced with formal mechanisms to develop these skills.
        In the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration
    Act of 2010, Congress rightly identified the need for airlines
    to provide specific command training courses for new captains.
    We advocate that new captains receive training to reinforce
    effective communication, leadership, and conflict resolution.
        On a related issue, while mentoring does not replace
    proficiency training, it provides an excellent supplement to
    it. While informal mentoring can often take place if an airline
    safety culture fosters the opportunity, mentoring should also
    be formalized as a standard part of a pilot's professional
    development. In all of these areas, mentoring, leadership, and
    professional development, the changes will take time to fully
    implement and mature. Our industry must act now to make these
    enhancements a reality.
        Third, safety management systems which provide the NextGen
    blueprint for aviation safety, both on the ground and in the
    air, have already proven to be extremely effective as
    demonstrated by our Canadian neighbors. A key principle of SMS
    is to all members of an organization to identify hazards
    without fear of retribution. The ability to capitalize on
    frontline employees' firsthand knowledge is a critical element
    in maintaining safest possible operations. ALPA is encouraged
    that the Federal Aviation Administration appears to be on
    schedule to publish a final SMS rule this summer.
        Finally, and especially important in the context of SMS is
    the absolute priority that our industry must place on the
    protection of safety data. The proven success of voluntary
    safety programs hinges on the strength of the data collected.
    Individuals provide this data based on the expectation that he
    or she will be respected as acting to enhance safety and that
    information will not be misused. Legislation should be
    considered to make certain this information is only used as
    intended and that is to advance safety.
        The pilots of ALPA commend the U.S. Aviation House
    Subcommittee for holding this hearing and allowing us to
    underscore the importance of continuing to pursue the highest
    standards in safe air transportation. Thank you.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you, Captain. Mr. Fortner.
        Mr. Fortner. Thank you. Chairman Petri, Ranking Member
    Costello, and members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the
    invitation to testify this morning.
        Incorporated in 1952, Fortner Engineering is a third-
    generation family-owned company with 45 workers. My company is
    an FAA certificated repair station that specializes in the
    repair and overhaul of hydraulic aircraft components. I am
    testifying in my capacity as the senior vice president of the
    Aeronautical Repair Association, also known as ARSA. The
    efforts of ARSA's members facilitate the safe operation of
    aircraft worldwide by providing expert maintenance services for
    general and commercial aircraft. Overall, these services
    generate over $39 billion of economic activity in the United
    States and employ more than 274,000 workers in all 50 States.
        North America is a major net exporter of aviation
    maintenance services, enjoying a $2.4 billion positive trail
    balance of trade. I would like to use my time this morning to
    highlight four main points: First, for ARSA members around the
    world, good safety is good business. The basic nature of the
    aviation industry demands that safety and security be the top
    priority for our member companies. Operators and airlines will
    not do business with companies that put their passengers and
    valuable business assets at risk.
        Aviation safety does not begin and end with the FAA or any
    other regulatory body. Safety is the responsibility of every
    aviation maintenance employee performing work on behalf of an
    owner or operator, a certificated repair station, air carrier,
    or other aviation business. Government inspectors will never be
    able to oversee each mechanic at every facility at all times.
    The industry has the ultimate obligation, responsibility, and
    authority to ensure that the civil aviation system is safe and
    repair stations are filling that responsibility despite the
    FAA's limited oversight resources.
        My second point is that foreign repair stations are an
    essential element of the global aviation system to help ensure
    the safety of travelers worldwide. FAA certificated foreign
    repair stations are subject to the same safety centers as FAA
    domestic part 145 certificate holders. The International
    Convention of Civil Aviation of 1944 and ICAO standards require
    that the country in which the aircraft is registered oversee
    the maintenance performed on that aircraft and all related
    components regardless of whether work was performed.
    Consequently, maintenance on a U.S. registered aircraft must be
    performed by an FAA certificated maintenance provider.
    Similarly, when an aircraft of foreign registry requires
    maintenance, only a repair station certificated or validated by
    that aircraft's civil aviation authority or registry may
    perform that work.
        As far as other countries are concerned, U.S. repair
    stations are also foreign repair stations. My company has an
    EASA approval that allows us to perform work for EU registered
    aircraft. Consequently, Fortner Engineering has to ensure
    comply not only with the civil aviation authority of this
    country, but additional and different requirements of EASA. Any
    efforts to limit the ability of U.S. carriers to use foreign
    repair stations will inevitably lead to retaliation from
    foreign governments that will hurt hundreds of U.S. companies
    like mine that serve an international clientele.
        Thirdly, the long-term threat to the aviation maintenance
    industry is over-regulation and Government intrusion. Vision
    100, an FAA reauthorization law enacted in 2003, required the
    TSA to issue security rules for all aviation repair stations by
    August 2004. When TSA failed to meet that deadline, lawmakers
    demanded that security regulations be completed by August of
    2008. The penalty for failure to comply was the FAA would be
    prohibited from issuing new foreign repair station
    certificates.
        Nearly 4 years later, the TSA has still failed to issue
    final repair station security regulations, and the FAA is
    currently banned from issuing new foreign repair station
    certificates. TSA's failure to finalize repair station security
    rules is preventing aviation companies from tapping into
    rapidly expanding overseas markets, hindering job creation and
    growth at home.
        My final point is that the lack of standardization across
    FAA regional offices can significantly impact repair stations
    across the country. A situation of Fortner Engineering detailed
    in my written testimony demonstrates how overzealous regulators
    and inconsistent application of regulations impede repair
    stations with no benefit to flight safety.
        ARSA members are routinely plagued by FAA's widespread
    varying application of regulations across the country.
    Inconsistent interpretation and enforcement is frequently cited
    by ARSA members as a major problem and small businesses are
    particularly impacted by a lack of regulatory standardization
    across regions.
        In conclusion, repair stations have long been and continue
    to be a vital part of the aviation industry in our Nation's
    economy. It is no coincidence that the increased use of
    contract maintenance has coincided with the safest period in
    commercial aviation history. In the end, no governmental agency
    can guarantee aviation safety. Safety is a business of aviation
    industry companies and their employees. ARSA looks forward to
    working with Congress to ensure that legislation and
    regulations are based on our one common goal, safety.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Thank you all again. Mr. Hendricks,
    in your prepared statement, you talked about some of the modern
    techniques for analyzing data and improvements that were being
    made, and you cautioned against, quote/unquote, ``tinkering''
    with the safety system. And we are always looking for
    improvements, but we are not looking for mindless tinkering. I
    guess--so could you discuss what it is that you would fear from
    what--expand on the word ``tinkering'' and the consequences of
    that?
        Mr. Hendricks. Sure. Certainly. As I tried to reflect in my
    statement, the results we have been able to achieve are
    extraordinary and unprecedented and we have largely done this
    through these very robust voluntary reporting mechanisms that
    are very much a partnership between airlines, our regulator the
    FAA, and our employees, and it provides us with an amount of
    data that 10 years ago was unthinkable. We are able to do very
    deep analysis of this data that has been protected by the
    Congress from intrusion, and we are able to do analysis that
    frankly is very deep, and very compelling in terms of what
    actions we should take to enable further improvements in
    safety.
        I sit on the executive committee of the Commercial Aviation
    Safety Team which Ms. Gilligan co-chairs with Mr, Ken Hylander
    from Delta Airlines, and we routinely participate in directed
    studies, look at safety threats. We go where the data take us.
    And we are convinced that this path we are on will lead to
    further improvements and is the correct path to assure that we
    will stay on this journey that we are taking to a phenomenally
    safe system that we are currently operating.
        So we want to ensure that we stay true to the data, and
    while we will always try to determine ways to improve the
    system further, we want to ensure that we make any of those
    decisions grounded on these facts that we are able to uncover
    through this intense and very focused analysis of the data that
    we are receiving.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. Foose, I think I know the answer
    to this, but in your testimony you talked about how you had to
    take into account experience versus flight hours.
        Mr. Foose. Correct.
        Mr. Petri. And could you explain what you--and so not just
    looking for hours. I suspect you are talking about the number
    of maneuvers you are doing, rather than just flying, well, it
    is on auto pilot hours, but could you expand on that?
        Mr. Foose. That is correct. The proposed pilot
    certification rule focuses on two areas I wanted to talk about.
    One is the additional training that is required, and we support
    that. We think there is lots of good steps that are proposed in
    there that actually in many ways have already been incorporated
    into our training programs. Our biggest concern is that the--we
    know that the Public Law of course requires 1,500 hours and an
    ATP. Our members have already taken a significant step forward
    and will meet that. All of our pilots will meet that
    requirement by August of 2013. But the FAA in their rulemaking
    activity has proposed an academic system that accommodates only
    4-year aviation degrees and also military as well, but our
    experience with the airlines, and we obviously have lots of
    experience, qualifying thousands and thousands of pilots that
    are in service today and doing so very safely. And what that
    experience tell us is that the quality of training is really
    what tell us whether that pilot really will have the skills and
    the knowledge to do his job appropriately. And when the time
    comes and he is faced with an abnormal situation, he will be
    better prepared to do that. The flight time does not
    necessarily do that, and of course in our written testimony we
    offered and example of how that occurs.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Captain Cassidy, one area of some
    controversy has been the different treatment of freighter
    pilots as opposed to passenger pilots, and we are told one
    explanation is that cargo pilots--actually, the data shows
    actually--fly significantly less than passenger pilots. Could
    you comment on that? Does that difference, in fact, exist, or
    do you know about anything about that?
        Mr. Cassidy. Yes, sir. Well, scheduling differences exist
    relative to the operation. You have long-haul cargo operations
    that fly tremendous distance and extended crew days with
    augmented crews and they fly intercontinental. You also have
    cargo operations that fly stage links which are just sometimes
    as little as 100 miles. So there is a tremendous variety of
    flying that gets done both on passenger and in cargo
    operations. I can speak to you from a little bit of a vantage
    of somebody who has done both, because the airline I am
    currently employed by, we actually have stand-alone cargo
    operations as well as passenger operations. And I think the
    important point is that with regard to crew fatigue issues,
    with regard to the stressors that affect you, many times I have
    actually had higher workload situations flying cargo operations
    rather than passenger ones because of the lack of additional
    crewmembers. You know, from my vantage as an airline pilot,
    fatigue is fatigue is fatigue. I know a little bit about it, as
    does Congressman Cravaack, who we both share a background both
    in military, passenger, and cargo operations, and I honestly
    cannot distinguish why there should be a difference in the way
    that you are treated based upon what resides behind the flight
    deck door.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. Costello.
        Mr. Costello. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Foose, you have
    testified that the regional airlines are making a lot of
    progress in developing plans to implement the ATP requirement,
    although the Inspector General, you have heard his testimony
    that their investigators visited two regional carriers and
    found out that 75 percent of their first officers do not have
    ATP certificates.
        Mr. Foose. Correct.
        Mr. Costello. And they also found out that in both cases
    that neither carrier had developed a plan to ensure that the
    first officers would meet the ATP requirement by the deadline
    of August 2013.
        So my question is, how many of your carrier members have
    developed a plan to ensure that the first officer meets the ATP
    certificates and will be able to meet the enhanced safety
    requirements by August of 2013?
        Mr. Foose. Excuse me, that is a good question and thank you
    for that. I am not sure which carriers they spoke to. In my
    conversations with our operations executive of carriers, we, as
    far as I know, all the carriers have either developed a plan or
    have completed development and submitted that to the FAA
    office. At this point in time, we have three carriers that have
    approved programs, and they have begun to transition their
    first officers.
        Given the August 2013 deadline, we would expect that all
    airlines will have their programs approved and in place and
    being executed as of July or August of this year. At that point
    all of the pilots should be--start the program, be complete by
    August of 2013.
        Mr. Costello. So three carriers have approved plans?
        Mr. Foose. Correct.
        Mr. Costello. And how many members do you have in your
    association?
        Mr. Foose. Twenty-seven, 24 of which are part 121 carriers.
        Mr. Costello. So 3 of the 27 have approved plans.
        Mr. Foose. That is correct.
        Mr. Costello. Let me ask you. Is Pinnacle one of those
    companies, which of course is the parent company for Colgan
    Air?
        Mr. Foose. Yes.
        Mr. Costello. And they are one of your members and do they
    have an approved plan?
        Mr. Foose. I do not know that, sir. I can get back to you
    on that.
        Mr. Costello. Why wouldn't you know that? Why wouldn't you
    know--if you have 27 members and you were coming here today,
    why wouldn't you have found out from your members which ones
    have approved plans, which ones do not, and which ones do not
    have even a plan in place?
        Mr. Foose. That is a good question. I, as of last week,
    when we polled our members we had three approved, but I do not
    know. I have not talked to Pinnacle since then, so I don't know
    if they have been approved since.
        Mr. Costello. How long would it take you to get a list to
    this subcommittee of the 27 members, how many have plans in
    place right now?
        Mr. Foose. We could do that very quickly, sir.
        Mr. Costello. Well, I would request that you would submit
    that to us as soon as possible.
        Mr. Foose. I would be glad to do that.
        [The information follows:]

        Mr. Costello. Captain Cassidy, you have heard the regionals
    say that the proposed rule for pilot qualifications could
    affect the supply of airline pilots. You have heard that
    previously and that is the position of the regionals. How do
    you respond to that?
        Mr. Cassidy. Our association's motto is: Schedule with
    safety. And I think the determinant on whether or not there is
    going to be an excess amount of eligible pilots to fill the
    flight decks in the commercial aircraft is really dependent on
    the industry's efforts to recruit, attract, and retain
    qualified pilots. I think that taking one step beyond that,
    regardless if there exists a paucity or a surplus of pilots, I
    think that our core concern is ensuring that they are as well-
    trained, as safe, as experienced, and as proficient as
    possible, which is why we are so much in favor of the recent
    legislation helping with mentoring leadership, and as well as
    stepped-up hourly qualifications.
        Mr. Costello. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Petri. Mr. Graves, do you have--oh, Mr. Shuster.
        Mr. Shuster. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Captain
    Cassidy, you said you have serious safety concerns with this
    new ruling, and again, based upon the evidence that has been
    put forth over the last several years, cargo has been extremely
    safe, and in fact there has been no increase with incidents
    with fatigue. You know, so where is the concern there if you
    have got an industry that continues to improve?
        Mr. Cassidy. You are correct, sir. The industry--we have--
    basically, I have the pleasure of working in the transportation
    system, which is the safest in the history of the world for the
    last 10 years, and the previous 10 years preceding that was the
    next safest era of operations. So in one respect, this is a
    very high-class problem to have because we are talking about a
    very, very safe system or an even safer one.
        Now, with regard to fatigue issues and cargo, I think that
    those same issues that would serve as precursors for higher
    safety risk for cargo are identical to passenger situation. And
    I think we are just looking at the tip of the iceberg because
    we are now finally getting into scientifically based data
    collection which really determines the precursors to fatigue in
    a way that we have not done in years past.
        I was sitting right next to Secretary LaHood on December
    21st when he made the announcement of the flight-time/duty-time
    regulation, and although cargo was placed in a different
    category than passenger operations under part 117, you know, I
    think I was pretty clear when I heard him say very emphatically
    that even that cargo is not regulated on the side of 117 with
    the passengers, nevertheless it is absolutely the right thing
    to do.
        Mr. Shuster. Well, look, I agree 100 percent with the
    passenger side of it, but, you know, you made the comment that
    you shouldn't be treated differently because of what is behind
    the flight deck door. But in reality, it is not just about what
    the cargo is, whether it is with passengers or if it is cargo,
    it is the operations are significantly different, the hours
    that the pilots are flying are significantly different. And so
    I believe fully that that is the difference. And would you
    agree that the facilities for cargo--or let me ask you this
    way. Are the facilities on the plane, or on the ground, are
    they the same for passenger as they are for cargo, or is there
    a difference?
        Mr. Cassidy. There is different rest facilities that are
    provided on planes that help to give crews the prescribed rest
    and augmented rest and they really vary pretty dramatically
    from completely separated cabins that only the flight crew can
    access to basically a seat back with the passengers. So there
    is a tremendous variety. Cargo as well.
        Mr. Shuster. Cargo and passenger, is cargo significantly
    different facilities than with passenger?
        Mr. Foose. I think that in many cases the answer is yes. As
    Ms. Gilligan referred to before, you know, I think we can use
    like FedEx or one of the big long-haul cargo carriers as an
    example where they actually have separate rest facilities so
    the crews can go in and get prescribed rest while they are
    doing the sort function.
        Mr. Shuster. But what about the number of hours flown. Is
    that a significant difference in fatigue, where you have
    roughly 30 hours where a cargo pilot on average is flying and
    over 50 a passenger. Does that have a significant difference in
    a fatigue? Would you agree with that, or not?
        Mr. Cassidy. It is a difficult question to answer because
    of the tremendous complexity and scale of the different
    operations. You can have somebody who only flew 30-40 hours
    during that month and be placed in a situation where they are
    more fatigued than somebody who flew 70 because of the way that
    the crew rest matrix works and prescribed rest requirements.
        Mr. Shuster. All right. Well, that brings me down to if we
    want to do one-size-fits-all, then we are going to get to some
    point I believe if we continue down this road where we are
    going to have to look at the individual. I know Sam Graves is a
    pilot and I know Mr. Cravaack is a pilot, and maybe he operates
    well on 6 hours of sleep and Mr. Cravaack needs 8 or 10 hours.
    We are going to get to a level where--is that where we are
    headed? I have been dealing with this sleep issue, whether it
    is for the railroads or truck drivers. It really comes down to
    the individual, how an individual operates and if those people
    are getting the right amount of rest. I mean, we are going to
    end up having sleep or rest police or cameras in your room.
        So, again, I just disagree fundamentally that these are two
    different operations. And fatigue is fatigue, but fatigue for
    Mr. Graves and fatigue for Mr. Cravaack ends up at a different
    threshold. So I think we really have to look at cargo and
    passenger differently and, again, look at what is available to
    the cargo passengers. Again, you have said a couple of things
    that I have asked you. The facilities are different, the flight
    duty is different for the different industries.
        So I know you are not agreeing with me, but you sound like
    you are agreeing with some of the principles that I have come
    to believe with, and that is why I have come to the difference.
    Is that accurate?
        Mr. Cassidy. Well, I agree fatigue is fatigue is fatigue
    regardless of who we are discussing. I also think that the
    regulation is very sane and safe in that it provides me, if I
    have a trip, you know, flying a passenger trip, multiple legs,
    I have the assurance that when I shut that hotel room door that
    I have 8 hours of prescribed rest time, period.
        And the other thing which I think is important to
    emphasize, you know, I have the privilege of representing both
    cargo pilots as well as passenger pilots at the Air Line Pilots
    Association, and I have a tremendous amount of faith in every
    single one of those members' ability to ensure that they are
    adequately fit and rested to fly regardless of what the
    regulation says, because the other notable achievement with
    some of this new regs is that it empowers companies to ensure
    that crewmembers are put in a situation where they can
    determine that they are fit to fly and not face any
    disciplinary issues if they identify, for whatever reason, the
    ice maker next door, the hotel elevator going up and down, that
    for whatever reason they just are not in a position where they
    feel safe to fly because of fatigue issues.
        Mr. Shuster. Mr. Chairman, I have one more question. I
    wonder if I might ask it and I will also address it to Mr.
    Cassidy and Mr. Hendricks.
        Mr. Hendricks, you are a former airline pilot, is that
    accurate?
        Mr. Hendricks. Yes, Congressman.
        Mr. Shuster. The new regs, the new rule, limits the number
    of consecutive nights that a pilot may fly to 3 nights. Is that
    your understanding? That would be for passengers?
        Mr. Hendricks. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Shuster. Would that force the carriers into scheduling
    greater numbers of shorter rotations for pilots?
        Mr. Cassidy. It might, and it really depends on the system
    operations for the airline. For instance, I fly for Alaska
    Airlines. Once upon a time we predominantly flew up and down
    the West Coast. Now we do a lot more transcontinental
    operations as well. So when you look at the complexity of a
    scheduling operation, a lot of times they can have mitigating
    strategies which allow them to best utilize a crewmember so it
    doesn't really affect efficiency that much of the operation by
    scheduling practices.
        Mr. Shuster. Mr. Hendricks?
        Mr. Hendricks. Congressman, A4A has engaged a group of
    leading sleep scientists to help answer these types of
    questions, and we thank you for posing it today.
        We will say that with regard to the consecutive nights of
    operation, many times that will in fact impose more fatigue on
    pilots, because flying on the back side of the clock, if you
    are a cargo pilot or you are a long-haul international pilot,
    that first night is the most challenging in terms of managing
    your alertness, and we want to limit the amount of first nights
    of flying that this rule may impose upon the system. So we are
    studying that more closely, and we do have some concerns in
    that regard.
        Mr. Shuster. So quite possibly applying this new FAA rule
    to cargo could make it less safe for cargo pilots, if you are
    going to increase the number of first night flights. Would that
    be a concern?
        Mr. Hendricks. Well, I would agree with Captain Cassidy
    that our crewmembers are all highly professional. We rely on
    them to make assessments of themselves and their fitness to
    fly. And along the lines that Captain Cassidy also mentioned,
    most airlines have completely non-punitive policies in place
    when pilots exercise their prerogative to say that they are too
    fatigued to operate the aircraft. So we support that. There is
    still more study that is required, but we are concerned about
    the increased exposure that pilots may have to this first night
    of night flying.
        Mr. Shuster. Well, I appreciate all four of you being here,
    especially Captain Cassidy and Mr. Hendricks. And thank you,
    Mr. Chairman, for indulging me. I think this is an issue that
    we have got to continue to look at. As I said, I want to make
    sure. Across this Government we do one-size-fits-all in far too
    many things, and I just don't think, and in this case there is
    evidence, significant evidence, that says we have to look at
    this a little differently. So I appreciate your being here.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. Lipinski.
        Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank Chairman
    Petri and Ranking Member Costello for your leadership and for
    holding this morning's oversight hearing on safety. We all know
    that America has the aviation system that is the finest and
    safest in the world, but while we have an impressive safety
    record, we know that errors do happen in rare instances and the
    consequences are often very severe.
        I have Midway Airport in my district, also close to
    Chicago's O'Hare Airport, and I know that safety has to be our
    top priority.
        So I really just wanted to follow up a little bit on what
    Chairman Petri's original question, first question was with Mr.
    Hendricks. I in a previous time before I was in Congress did
    systems analysis. I worked for Swiss Air, although I didn't do
    this kind of risk assessments there.
        But I was just wondering, Mr. Hendricks, you talked about
    in your answer to Mr. Petri and your testimony about data. We
    know that data is the core of safety. I just wanted to get a
    better sense of what kind of data are we talking about? What do
    you look at in your risk assessment?
        Mr. Hendricks. Thank you very much. Many different types of
    data. We have a flight ops quality assurance program. It is
    actually a separate digital recorder on the aircraft that
    records parameters different than the digital flight data
    recorder in many cases.
        We have voluntary reporting systems that our pilots provide
    us, not only pilots, air traffic controllers in the ATSAP
    program. Some airlines have implemented this with the
    professionals that plan the loads on the aircraft. And we take
    into account also the surveillance data from our radars, from
    ADSB in some cases. And all of this is collected and fused by
    the MITRE Corporation, which operates under this umbrella of
    protection that the Congress has granted us to do a de-
    identified, deep dive into all of this data, not specific
    instances, but looking for systemic risk. And that is where we
    have been able to achieve success, because the data is
    protected, it is rich, and it has proven to be very reliable in
    terms of what it is telling us and what mitigations we can then
    put in place to address what we are seeing in the data.
        Mr. Lipinski. Are there any examples that you can give
    about things that have been learned?
        Mr. Hendricks. Well, certainly. The Commercial Aviation
    Safety Team has had numerous directed studies. In fact, 3 years
    ago they were awarded the Collier Trophy. As you know, it is
    one of the most distinguished aviation awards in the United
    States because of this work.
        So they have done directed studies on control flight and
    terrain. We are currently looking at navigating on the runway
    into the area navigation, NextGen type procedures on departure.
    We are looking at other systems such as upset prevention.
        What we have been allowed to do, because we brought down
    the fatal accident rate to such a low level right now, is we
    are able to look at other things we simply didn't have the
    luxury of looking at because there were other pressing matters.
        But I would like to reemphasize the points I made earlier,
    which are the data is guiding us on what we should look at. We
    have a very formal process on the Commercial Aviation Safety
    Team to identify these risks, and then we focus our resources
    in these directed studies to go out and mitigate those risks
    throughout the system. The FAA is providing great leadership in
    this regard.
        Mr. Lipinski. Do you do any international sharing of data
    or findings?
        Mr. Hendricks. That is expanding currently. We are in
    dialogue with the European equivalent of the Commercial
    Aviation Safety Team. There are regional aviation groups
    throughout the world. One of the newer ones and more robust
    safety systems is in the Latin American region.
        I was just last week at a Latin American operations
    conference and the results they are seeing are pretty
    phenomenal. They have a very young fleet. They are collecting
    this data. We are showing them the way in many regards and we
    are learning things that when we operate in that region that
    perhaps we didn't see because we didn't have as much data. So
    we are starting down that path. We need to ensure that we
    protect that data as well as we do in the United States. But
    other regions of the world are starting to see that this is the
    path forward for success.
        Mr. Lipinski. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Petri. Mr. Cravaack.
        Mr. Cravaack. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate everybody
    being here today because everybody here is on the same page. We
    all want safe flights, safe airlines, to be able to get our
    passengers to and from where they want to go as safely as
    possible and bring cargo to the places that really need it. In
    some ports even in our own country we have to rely on cargo
    aircraft to just bring the sustenance to some different cities.
    So we are all working on the same page, let's just put it like
    that.
        Captain Cassidy, if I could just talk--I wish my colleague
    was still here in regards to hear some of this testimony you
    are about to give here. The studies that were done were data-
    based studies, correct?
        Mr. Cassidy. Correct.
        Mr. Cravaack. I mean, they took a look at a lot of--a
    plethora of different fatigues that happen to a pilot on a
    normal basis. The thing is we are not just talking about flight
    times here. We are talking about crossing time zones, going
    from JFK to Tokyo and being on the back side of the clock, your
    circadian rhythm is completely maladjusted, and then being on a
    12-day trip and coming back home. So one of the things that we
    want to talk about when you talk about when cargo guys do that,
    long-haul cargo guys, we want to make sure that they get the
    proper rest and ensuring that occurs.
        Now, one of the things that my colleague brought up to me,
    and he says well, you know, cargo guys, they can rest while the
    aircraft is being--you are smiling--you know, pilots can rest 4
    hours while cargo is being taken off and placed back on. I was
    a wrench on a flight on a 747 and I can guarantee you that
    while that cargo was going off and on, I wasn't resting. I was
    making sure where the cargo was going, making sure it was tied
    down correctly, preflight planning.
        When you talk about flight time, it is when the cockpit
    door is shut and when the cockpit door opens again. It doesn't
    account for the preflight of the aircraft, the flight planning
    and things like that. I wanted to make sure they brought that
    up as well.
        So, you know, in understanding the effect, can you please
    describe to me why fatigue in your opinion as a professional
    pilot is so dangerous to aviation?
        Mr. Cassidy. Well, thank you for that question, and I
    appreciate the leadup to that. I think that the reason fatigue
    is is because it affects every bit of our function, our ability
    to process information, our cognitive function, our judgment,
    our ability to execute a critical, timely--make critical and
    timely choices, especially when you get faced with abnormal
    situations.
        Now, fortunately, 99 percent of the time that we are flying
    we don't get placed in a situation where you have to react in a
    nanosecond. However, there are times, both on the ground and in
    the air, I think it has been pointed out very clearly that a
    lot of our concern, risk factors, exist with runway incursions,
    excursions, ground-ops as well, and you have to be on your
    game. And unfortunately, discussing--you know, having a
    prescribed rest facility while they are doing the cargo
    operation, there is a couple of issues at play.
        First of all is just the responsibility, especially the
    pilot command, to make sure the load is done properly, center
    of gravity, that you understand what the manifest of goods are
    on the airplane, hazardous materials, et cetera, et cetera. But
    even if you did have that rest facility, if your body clock was
    such that it just was telling itself it is just simply not time
    to sleep, you may be in that rest facility but you will
    probably be staring at the ceiling for 4 hours just begging
    your body to sleep, otherwise known as window of circadian high
    and low. Your body travels in certain sleep cycles. Data speaks
    to the fact that a prescribed matrix which takes into account
    your start time for the day, the finish time for the day, the
    number of time zones that you skip, and as well as the number
    of operations that you have, are all very important in
    factoring in what the safest, sanest way to deal with rest
    requirements are.
        Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Captain.
        Mr. Fortner, I am sorry, did I say that correctly? I am an
    old wrench on a 747 and coming out of Singapore on our way to
    Bangkok we had a number four engine fire uncontrollable, and
    the reason why is because the mechanic in Singapore put a wrong
    starter on the engine. Foreign repair facilities are a big
    concern of mine to make sure that we have proper maintenance
    going on in foreign repair facilities.
        What is your main comment on that and making sure that we
    have the right mechanics doing the right things?
        Mr. Fortner. Well, when it comes to an end registered
    aircraft, a U.S. registered aircraft, regardless of where the
    maintenance is being done, it is being done with the same
    rules, regulations, maintenance practices and data no matter
    where it is at. So along the lines of the differencesbetween a
    foreign and domestic repair station, there should not be any
    difference.
        Mr. Cravaack. Who makes sure, I know I am over, but who
    makes sure that that is in fact occurring? Who is spot
    checking? The people that are spot checking, do they have the
    people available to ensure that that occurs?
        Mr. Fortner. Again, being just a simple small U.S. domestic
    repair station, I am speaking a little bit out of my full realm
    of knowledge. But that being said, I do have full faith that
    with the training that is being done over there and that is
    required by U.S. law, that they undergo the same training that
    we do here. The oversight is the same.
        That is not to say that maintenance mistakes don't happen,
    but I don't believe that they are any more likely here versus
    there. That is part of the reason why we have so many
    redundancies and checks.
        Mr. Cravaack. OK. Great. Super. I appreciate that
    testimony. Thank you very much. I appreciate the chair's
    indulgence, and I yield back.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. Lankford.
        Mr. Lankford. Thank you. I actually want to pick up on what
    Chip Cravaack was just talking about just now about foreign
    repair stations as well.
        What percentage do you think, and anyone can answer this,
    but obviously, Mr. Fortner, I think this would be closer to the
    center of your wheelhouse on it. What percentage do you think
    of maintenance that we have, that is scheduled maintenance, not
    just a, hey, the aircraft is parked here for a few minutes.
    Let's check this out while we are here transition. We have got
    a problem before we before we take the next leg scheduled,
    maintenance and repair is done internationally versus
    domestically at this point for our domestic airlines?
        Mr. Fortner. I will be honest with you, I really do not
    have an answer to that question. It is beyond my scope of
    knowledge.
        Mr. Lankford. Does anyone have a perspective on that or a
    guess?
        Mr. Hendricks. Congressman, I am not sure I can answer
    directly, but I can say that the example that Congressman
    Cravaack gave about 747s, there are no facilities in the United
    States that can perform heavy maintenance on 747s. We must take
    these aircraft overseas to have this type of maintenance action
    performed on them. These are very expensive capital assets that
    our airlines own and they are very highly motivated to assure
    that the quality of the repairs and the overhauls is very high.
        Speaking about foreign repair station ratios, if you will,
    I would say that it is a net positive trade balance with repair
    stations, comparing what we bring into the U.S. compared to
    what we conduct outside the U.S., to the tune of over $2
    billion.
        Mr. Lankford. Right, because of the sale of our aircraft,
    the initial construction and sale of the aircraft going out now
    obviously to be repaired. Why is it, why do we have, for
    instance, no facilities domestically for the heavy-duty repair
    for a 747?
        Mr. Hendricks. I don't have a good answer for you. I am not
    sure if it was economically driven or just facility driven. But
    I can say based on my experience in the airline industry, the
    quality of this work that is being done is very high and very
    robust, and that is why airlines continue to do this.
        Mr. Lankford. OK. Other comments on that? Mr. Fortner.
        Mr. Fortner. Again, as purely a domestic repair station, I
    would have to agree that when I go to other repair stations,
    including some foreign ones, the equipment and facilities they
    have over there and the training and personnel that I have seen
    and talked to are on par with anything you would see here in
    the United States.
        Mr. Lankford. Mr. Fortner, in your testimony you had stated
    that it has been 4 years since the TSA has given a final repair
    station security regulation. Do you have any perspective on
    why, what the delay is on getting that final regulation out
    there?
        Mr. Fortner. Sure. Actually it is only 4 since they were
    actually mandated to do it with penalties to the FAA. It really
    has been 9 years since they were first asked to do it. And,
    again, I don't work for the TSA, but, again, from speaking with
    the TSA, my feeling is that it is just a matter of priorities.
    They were a new governmental agency tasked with a lot of
    issues, and I think that----
        Mr. Lankford. So 9 years is not enough time to get that
    done?
        Mr. Fortner. I think that they had--I think they had more
    important things. And I agree with them. I honestly don't
    believe that the issues that they are trying to solve are
    there. It is really a solution looking for a problem. I mean,
    most people, they look at a repair station, I think that most
    public and probably much of Congress thinks of a repair station
    as a place where you land an airplane and you pull it up to the
    hangar and they do work on the airplane.
        The reality is that most of the repair stations out there
    are just like mine, which is I am 6 miles from the closest
    airport. Everything comes to me via UPS and FedEx. The parts
    come in. They fail on an airplane. They come in, we take them
    apart, we evaluate them, repair them, put them back together,
    test them and send them back.
        So long lines of security for a facility like ours that has
    45 employees, I don't think it is what Congress envisioned that
    they were looking at when they mandated this rule. So, again, I
    think the TSA simply had better things to do.
        Mr. Lankford. OK. So your perception, again, obviously you
    are not inside TSA, but your perception is they look at it and
    say this is a silly rule. We have got other things. We will
    just continue pushing this down.
        Do you think it has any impact in the industry, in the
    repair side, to not have that final rule out there? Just let us
    do our business, we are going to do a good job?
        Mr. Fortner. I think the only real impact is the fact that
    you can apply for and receive a foreign repair station
    certificate. It is kind of ironic that right now industry and
    the association are pushing for a rule that we don't want, not
    for the rule itself but to get rid of the penalties that have
    been imposed.
        Mr. Lankford. OK. So you can't get a foreign repair
    certification, is that what you are saying right now, without
    that?
        Mr. Fortner. That is correct.
        Mr. Lankford. But more than ever, we are doing repairs
    internationally?
        Mr. Fortner. Yes.
        Mr. Lankford. But we just can't add new places. You have
    preexisting. So basically this limits competition
    internationally, that you can't add new places. The existing
    ones just pay the penalty. How does that work?
        Mr. Fortner. You cannot add existing foreign repair
    stations, but the U.S. regulated certificated foreign repair
    stations can continue to do business. Does that answer your
    question?
        Mr. Lankford. I think. Do you want to try to clarify that a
    little more? So we are not adding new entities, we just have
    the same existing ones.
        Mr. Fortner. That is correct
        Mr. Lankford. At this point. So if we had the rule, then we
    can increase competition for this. If we don't add the rule,
    then it stays as it is?
        Mr. Fortner. Well, I think that competition is--you know it
    is a global market right now.
        Mr. Lankford. Sure.
        Mr. Fortner. I think that I wouldn't--again, as a purely
    domestic repair station, I don't look at this as competition as
    much as equalizing the playing field for everybody. I think
    that there is a lot of companies out there that are U.S. that
    would like the ability to open a foreign repair station
    facility, because there is a demand and there is a market for
    it. That does not necessarily mean that you going to be taking
    work from a domestic carrier here. There is just work over
    there to be had.
        Mr. Lankford. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you.
        Mr. Fortner, as long as you are here, before we adjourn, it
    is my understanding that the U.S. repair station industry does
    not have a high public visibility, but it does employ some
    nearly 300,000, 275,000 people in the United States and
    contributes nearly $40 billion a year to our economy.
        We have been talking in this hearing about safety. How do
    you strike the right balance or could you comment on any advice
    on how we could strike the right balance between appropriate
    safety regulations and oversight and over regulation that could
    end up being detrimental to people who are employed by this
    industry and who benefit from it?
        Mr. Fortner. I think probably first and foremost, new
    regulation are not always good and not always bad. The security
    rule is a good example of one where it is not necessarily a bad
    regulation as much as I think it is an unneeded regulation.
        Personally, what I would prefer to see is more resources
    put into what we already have, more inspectors, FAA inspectors
    out there to be able to do their jobs. What we see more than
    anything else is the lack of resources given to the people to
    do their job currently. I think that is one of the biggest
    issues that we face right now along the lines of safety and
    security for the repair station side.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. Costello has one comment.
        Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, I really don't have a question,
    but my friend from Oklahoma, in asking the question about
    foreign repair stations, we have, members of this subcommittee
    have visited a number of foreign repair stations as well as
    domestic repair stations and my personal observation is some
    are better than others. But one of the things that concerns me
    the most is we had--when Mr. Sabatini testified before this
    subcommittee a few years ago, I asked him the question, how
    many safety inspectors do we have working at the FAA in all of
    Asia and Europe to inspect the foreign repair stations? And he
    said we had eight at the time. And I said how many repair
    stations do we have? And he gave us the number of repair
    stations. And I asked him the question, can you attest to the
    fact that these inspectors actually physically go in and
    inspect the repair stations once a year? And he said no. And I
    said once every 2 or 3 years? And he said he couldn't really
    tell us that.
        So I would agree that we need to put more resources into
    safety inspectors, both domestically and also internationally.
    And I would also say to the gentleman from Oklahoma, as he
    knows, because I think he has been to the American Airlines
    repair facility, they run an excellent repair facility.
        But the bottom line is the bottom line, and it comes down
    to money. In many cases where if you have an airline, a
    domestic airline in the United States flying empty airplanes to
    San Salvador to have them repaired and to bring them back
    empty, then you know that they are paying less to have them
    repaired in San Salvador than they are in the United States. So
    that is my personal conclusion.
        But I would agree with you that we should have more
    resources going to inspectors to make certain that we have the
    highest level of inspections and safety, both at domestic and
    international repair stations.
        With that, Mr. Chairman----
        Mr. Lankford. Would the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Costello. I would be happy to yield.
        Mr. Lankford. And that is my concern as well. My question
    was really about if there is something that we have done, as
    you said, a regulation in search of a problem, if there is some
    regulation that has been added, if there is some system that
    has been put in place that is outdated and outmoded, that is
    pushing this essential business overseas.
        We do have an excellent maintenance facility in Tulsa,
    Oklahoma, that deals with American Airlines. There are a lot of
    great people that work there, that work very hard, are very
    diligent and very particular about their aircraft. I am sure
    there are people internationally that are also particular about
    their aircraft as well. I am not doubting that, just to say
    this can be done domestically. If there is something that we
    are doing that is encouraging it to go domestic, that would be
    helpful for us to know. Because it would help us with jobs and
    progressing with the industry and the relationships with the
    airlines to the local communities if they would do it locally.
        There is no substitute to having a worker that lives in the
    district for having a tenacious commitment to the airline as
    well. That is different when the work is done internationally,
    and it is separate from it.
        Thank you for that. I yield back.
        Mr. Costello. I thank the gentleman and thank our witnesses
    and yield back the balance of my time.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. It is my understanding our colleague
    Mr. Shuster has some additional questions, but we will ask him
    to submit them for the record and that you respond and we will
    hold the record open for that.
        Thank you all very much. The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]