[House Hearing, 112 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] PROSECUTION OF FORMER SENATOR TED STEVENS ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ APRIL 19, 2012 __________ Serial No. 112-106 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov ---------- U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 73-861 PDF WASHINGTON : 2012 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY LAMAR SMITH, Texas, Chairman F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan Wisconsin HOWARD L. BERMAN, California HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina JERROLD NADLER, New York ELTON GALLEGLY, California ROBERT C. ``BOBBY'' SCOTT, BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia Virginia DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ZOE LOFGREN, California DARRELL E. ISSA, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MIKE PENCE, Indiana MAXINE WATERS, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE COHEN, Tennessee STEVE KING, Iowa HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., TRENT FRANKS, Arizona Georgia LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico JIM JORDAN, Ohio MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois TED POE, Texas JUDY CHU, California JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah TED DEUTCH, Florida TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania JARED POLIS, Colorado TREY GOWDY, South Carolina DENNIS ROSS, Florida SANDY ADAMS, Florida BEN QUAYLE, Arizona MARK AMODEI, Nevada Richard Hertling, Staff Director and Chief Counsel Perry Apelbaum, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel ------ Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin, Chairman LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas, Vice-Chairman BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia ROBERT C. ``BOBBY'' SCOTT, DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California Virginia J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE COHEN, Tennessee TED POE, Texas HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah Georgia TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania JUDY CHU, California TREY GOWDY, South Carolina TED DEUTCH, Florida SANDY ADAMS, Florida SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MARK AMODEI, Nevada MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois JARED POLIS, Colorado Caroline Lynch, Chief Counsel Bobby Vassar, Minority Counsel C O N T E N T S ---------- APRIL 19, 2012 Page OPENING STATEMENTS The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Wisconsin, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security........ 1 The Honorable Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott, a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security........ 3 WITNESSES Henry F. Schuelke, III, Partner, Janis, Schuelke, and Wechsler Oral Testimony................................................. 36 Kenneth L. Wainstein, Partner, Cadwalader, Wickersham and Taft LLP Oral Testimony................................................. 48 Prepared Statement............................................. 51 Alan I. Baron, Senior Counsel, Seyfarth Shaw LLP Oral Testimony................................................. 57 Prepared Statement............................................. 58 LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary..................... 5 Material submitted by the Honorable Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott, a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security....................................................... 7 APPENDIX Material Submitted for the Hearing Record Addendum to the Prepared Statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein, Partner, Cadwalader, Wickersham and Taft LLP................... 74 Letter from Virginia E. Sloan, The Constitution Project, to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr........................... 183 Letter from Virginia E. Sloan and Stephen F. Hanlon, The Constitution Project, to the Honorable Eric H. Holder, Jr...... 185 Letter from Robert Gay Guthrie, President, the National Association of Assistant United States Attorneys............... 188 Prepared Statement of Sean Bennett, Kalamazoo, Michigan.......... 191 OFFICIAL HEARING RECORD Material Submitted for the Hearing Record but not Reprinted Report to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan of Investigation Conducted Pursuant to the Court's Order, dated April 7, 2009, Henry F. Schuelke III, Special Counsel, D.C. Bar no. 91579; and William Shields, D.C. Bar no. 451036, Janis Schuelke & Wechsler This report is available at the Subcommittee and can also be accessed at: http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/dcd/sites/www.dcd.uscourts.gov.dcd/files/ Misc09-198.pdf PROSECUTION OF FORMER SENATOR TED STEVENS ---------- THURSDAY, APRIL 19, 2012 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, DC. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:34 a.m., in room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Sensenbrenner, Gohmert, Goodlatte, Poe, Gowdy, Adams, Scott, Conyers, Johnson, Pierluisi, and Jackson Lee. Staff Present: (Majority) Caroline Lynch, Subcommittee Chief Counsel; Harold Damlin, Counsel; Sheila Shreiber, Counsel; Samuel Ramer, Counsel, Lindsay Hamilton, Clerk; (Majority) Bobby Vassar, Subcommittee Chief Counsel; Aaron Hiller, Counsel; and Veronica Eligan, Professional Staff Member. Mr. Sensenbrenner. The Subcommittee will come to order. Today's hearing examines the troubled prosecution of former United States Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska, which resulted in the Department of Justice requesting the judge to overturn the jury's guilty verdict and dismiss the charges against him. The Justice Department's Public Integrity Section, with the assistance of two assistant U.S. attorneys from Alaska, prosecuted Senator Stevens. The Public Integrity Section is supposed to be the Department's elite unit for handling political corruption cases. In light of what the prosecutors did in this case, I have to question the section's competency and ethics. In July 2008, a few months before he was to run for reelection, Senator Stevens was indicted for making false statements on his annual Senate disclosure form. The indictment charged that he had not paid for certain renovations made to a home he owned in Alaska and failed to disclose the value of the renovations as gifts. The renovations were made by VECO Corporation, an Alaska company owned by the Senator's longtime friend, Bill Allen. In order to allow Senator Stevens the chance to clear his name before the upcoming November election, his attorney requested an October trial date. The government not only agreed to a speedy trial, but suggested an even earlier date of September. The result was that there would be only 55 days between indictment and the start of the trial. Since this was a criminal prosecution, the government was required to produce all exculpatory and impeachment-type evidence known as the Brady and Giglio material. Pretrial, the government summarized what it represented to be all of the Brady and Giglio material in its possession in two letters sent to counsel for Senator Stevens. As would be discovered later, the prosecutors had made misstatements and omitted significant evidence in each letter. This trial started in late September 2008. Senator Stevens' counsel repeatedly asked the judge to dismiss the case because the prosecutors had failed to produce the evidence in violation of their Brady and Giglio obligations. Numerous times the judge found that the prosecutors had violated their discovery obligations. While the judge declined to dismiss the case, he repeatedly ordered the prosecutors to produce the various documents required by Brady and Giglio. He sanctioned the government by excluding certain evidence. In late October, the jury found Senator Stevens guilty on all seven counts of the indictment. As subsequent events would reveal, the jury reached its verdict based upon a distorted version of the facts. Soon after the trial ended, an FBI agent involved in the case took the unusual step of filing a whistleblower complaint with DOJ and the judge, alleging in specific detail that his co-FBI agent and at least one of the prosecutors engaged in serious misconduct and unethical behavior in the prosecution of Senator Stevens. Given these serious allegations, the judge ordered the government to produce materials relating to the agent's complaint. Consistent with its behavior during the trial, the government did not comply with the judge's order. The judge had finally had enough of the government's noncompliance, and held two of the Public Integrity Section's prosecutors in civil contempt. At this point, the DOJ assigned a new team of attorneys from outside the Public Integrity Section to handle the remainder of the Stevens post-trial litigation. They soon discovered that the prosecutors had failed to produce to Senator Stevens' counsel significant exculpatory and impeachment information in the form of interview notes relating to the key prosecution trial witness, Bill Allen. After producing the interview notes to the judge and to Senator Stevens' counsel, DOJ took the drastic step of asking the judge to set aside the guilty verdict and to dismiss the indictment of Senator Stevens based upon the prosecutor's prior failure to produce the interview notes. While the case was tossed out, it was too little, too late. Senator Stevens had lost his bid for reelection and the damage done by the prosecutors was irrevocable. The judge was so concerned about the government's admitted Brady violations, combined with what he described as ``prosecutorial misconduct to a degree and extent that this court has not seen in 25 years on the bench,'' that he took the extraordinary step of appointing a special counsel, Henry Schuelke, to investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute criminal contempt proceedings against the Stevens prosecutors. In November of last year, Mr. Schuelke completed his investigation and submitted to the judge a 500-page report.* The judge released the report to the public on March 15, 2012, and the facts detailed in that report have generated today's hearing. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- *See http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/dcd/sites/ www.dcd.uscourts.gov.dcd/files/Misc09-198.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. Schuelke did not recommend bringing criminal contempt charges against any of the prosecutors due to what he concluded was a deficiency in the judge's orders. One might say that the prosecutors got lucky. Significantly, Mr. Schuelke found that the investigation and prosecution of U.S. Senator Ted Stevens were permeated by the systematic concealment of exculpatory evidence which would have independently corroborated Senator Stevens' defense and his testimony, and seriously damaged the testimony and credibility of the government's key witness. Mr. Schuelke's report describes a series of improper actions taken by the prosecutors and the FBI agent that are sobering. His report takes us inside a major criminal prosecution where he found that the prosecutors won their case through willfully failing to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence, intentionally failing to correct false testimony, making misrepresentations to the judge, to defense counsel, and even to people within DOJ, shirking supervisory responsibility, grossly mismanaging the trial team, and acting on questionable ethical decisions. Further discrediting the prosecutors, he also found that they had a collective memory failure relating to certain key events. As would be expected regarding any report like this one, people have criticized Mr. Schuelke's conclusions, tactics and tones, but there can be no dispute about the hard facts which lead to only one conclusion: that Senator Stevens was denied a fair trial due to the collective misconduct of the prosecutors. If they had complied with their ethical and legal obligations, the jury might not have convicted Senator Stevens. I think it is important that we try to understand how and why the government botched this prosecution before considering whether we need legislative changes. I am also interested to know that what, if anything, DOJ has done in response to the problems that have been uncovered in the Stevens prosecution. DOJ undertook an internal review of the Stevens' prosecutors, the results of which were leaked to the press over a year ago. Despite the Attorney General's public pronouncements to Congress that he plans on sharing the DOJ report, he has not done so. We invited DOJ to send a representative to testify at this hearing, but the Department declined the invitation. I look forward to discussing this very troubling matter today with Mr. Schuelke and the other panel of witnesses which we have scheduled to testify. And I now yield to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, for his opening statement. Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to join you for this hearing regarding the prosecutorial misconduct in the case involving former Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska. I commend the Attorney General for taking decisive action after the findings that you have outlined, dismissing the prosecution of Senator Stevens with prejudice upon learning of the misconduct. I understand that his Department's decision not to comment on the matter during the Office of Professional Responsibility review, but it is clear from other cases that the problem is greater than just the Stevens case. And I am concerned about whether or not there are sufficient safeguards in place to prevent such disturbing cases from occurring in the future. The government is given enormous powers over individuals in the criminal justice system, including the power to jeopardize and take away their freedom, even their lives in some cases. In exercising such enormous power over individuals, it is incumbent upon the criminal justice system to ensure basic fairness to them. And when the government conceals information in a prosecution that could undermine its case against a defendant, such concealment is fundamentally and constitutionally unfair as well as unethical, and it is actually illegal under Brady v. Maryland and other cases. Generally a defendant will have no way to know of or learn of exculpatory evidence known to the government unless the government discloses it. Given the adversarial relationship between the government and the defendant in criminal cases and the natural desire of human beings, including prosecutors, to win a case, there are strong temptations not to reveal case weaknesses. Therefore, there must be strong disincentives, as well as obligations, for the government to overcome such temptations. I believe that the Attorney General and his staff have demonstrated and continue to demonstrate commendable responsibility in revealing the failures of the Department to meet its obligations in the Stevens case. However, I am not convinced that the dependence on after-the-fact actions by an individual Attorney General and disciplinary proceedings against individual attorneys for their failures to reveal exculpatory evidence, if discovered, is a strong enough standard to prevent such problems from occurring in the future. In other recent cases, including potential cases among those reported in recent newspaper articles, regarding unrevealed discredited scientific evidence relied upon for convictions of hundreds of defendants caused me to believe that stronger requirements than those currently in place need to be considered. Also, we have several letters that I will offer for the record, signed by dozens of criminal justice professionals and observers, including many former prosecutors calling for stronger measures as safeguards against concealment of exculpatory information by prosecutors. I look forward to any light the testimony of our witnesses may shed on these issues. I also look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, and the Department of Justice, to ensure that effective measures are in place to prevent such cases as Senator Stevens' case from occurring in the future. Thank you and I yield back. Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you. And without objection, the letters referred to by the gentleman from Virginia will be put into the record. The Ranking Member of the full Committee, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers. Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Chairman Sensenbrenner. I commend you and Ranking Member Scott for your statements, which I concur with, and will merely submit my opening for the record and observe that the Brady rule is being violated in other respects as well. In other words, there are people that don't have the rank of United States Senator who are no doubt being affected by violations of the Brady rule. So it is in that spirit that I commend both the Chairman and the Ranking Member for the work that they have done in this regard. And I will yield back the balance of the time, and I will yield briefly to Bobby Scott. [The prepared statement of Mr. Conyers follows:] Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary In the landmark case Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court writes: ``Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.'' Looking to the constitutional guarantees of due process and effective assistance of counsel in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the Court stated that prosecutors have a duty to disclose evidence that is favorable to the defense. This rule, when honored, helps to ensure fair process in criminal trials. Over time, the Brady rule has become an integral part of our federal criminal system. As a direct consequence of Brady and its line, Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires prosecutors to disclose a wide array of evidence at the request of a defendant. The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500, requires prosecutors to disclose certain information about government witnesses. And, of course, all prosecutors are governed by professional rules of ethics that require us to share information in our possession that may be favorable to the defense. Because the government controls so much of the information pertinent to a criminal trial, we require federal prosecutors to make favorable evidence readily available to the other side. Notably, however, Congress has never codified the Brady rule itself. No statute compels the disclosure of all exculpatory evidence. Instead, we have relied on Department of Justice policy, rules of procedure, and a sense of trust in our federal prosecutors to ensure that Brady is enforced. Today, we will address whether that trust has been misplaced. Specifically, we focus on the trial of the late Senator Ted Stevens, whose prosecution was as flawed as they come. At no point in Senator Stevens' trial did prosecutors conduct a full or effective review for Brady information. They knowingly withheld impeachment evidence, and knowingly failed to correct perjured testimony. We have come to these conclusions after a 2-year investigation by independent counsel Henry F. Schuelke. His analysis demontrates, beyond a reasonable doubt, that federal prosecutors intentionally withheld Brady information from Senator Stevens--and, in some instances, never bothered to learn the extent of the exculpatory evidence in their possession. It has become common to say that, if these offenses could happen to Senator Stevens, they could happen to anyone. Often overlooked is the fact that prosecutorial misconduct of this nature happens with alarming frequency, to the obvious harm of countless defendants--many of them far less prominent than a U.S. Senator. For example, the Lindsay Manufacturing Company was the first corporation to be convicted of charges under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The conviction was reversed after the court found that prosecutors had inserted falsehoods in requests for search warrants, allowed an FBI agent to testify untruthfully before a grand jury, improperly reviewed Brady material, and withheld key Brady evidence from the defense. Consider the case of Edgar Rivas, a sailor on a Venezuelan freighter bound for New York who was charged with possession of more than five kilograms of cocaine. He was sentenced to ten years in prison. On appeal, the Second Circuit learned that prosecutors had obtained a confession from their main witness, Rivas's shipmate, and never disclosed that statement to the defense. Or consider the case of Anthony Washington, a drug dealer with multiple felony convictions. Washington might have been in prison for unlawful possession of a firearm had federal prosecutors not withheld the fact that their main witness had been previously convicted for making a false report. These cases, and others like them, are inexcusable. Still, the Department of Justice has been given time to bring its attorneys into line with Brady. In 2006, the Department revised the United States Attorney Manual to explicitly require Brady disclosure. In 2010, following the embarrassing reversal of Senator Stevens' conviction, Deputy Attorney General David Ogden issued a series of memoranda to provide further guidance for prosecutors. But neither of these policies are judicially enforceable. And given the continued run of Brady violations, it may be time for Congress to consider other options. During the trial of Senator Stevens, in deliberations about whether a court order would be necessary to compel the government to produce Brady material, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan stated: ``I'm not going to write an order that says `follow the law.' We all know what the law is. . . . I'm convinced that the government and its team of prosecutors . . . in good faith, know that they have an obligation on an ongoing basis to provide the relevant, appropriate information to defense counsel.'' Because the court accepted the prosecutors' repeated assertions that they were complying with Brady, it did not issue an order directing the attorneys to follow the law. But if federal prosecutors must be ordered to obey Brady, because it is too vague a rule or too difficult to follow, then it may fall to Congress to draw a brighter line. This is the conclusion drawn in this letter, ``A Call for Congress to Reform Federal Criminal Discovery,'' signed by 141 judges, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, defense lawyers, conservative leaders, and others. Few issues draw so much agreement from such a diverse and experienced group. I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses their insights into how we can prevent prosecutorial misconduct, restore a measure of faith in our federal criminal process, and protect the constitutional rights of all Americans. __________ Mr. Scott. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I just want to mention for the record the statement from the Department of Justice, a letter from the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, ACLU, and a letter from the Constitutional Project that has almost 150 signatories. Mr. Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the material will be included. [The information referred to follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] __________ Mr. Sensenbrenner. Without objection, all Members' opening statements will be included at this time. I would now like to introduce today's witness on the first panel. Henry F. Schuelke, III, is a partner in the law firm Janis, Schuelke, and Wechsler. Mr. Schuelke was named by Judge Emmet Sullivan to serve as Special Counsel to investigate the prosecution of Senator Ted Stevens. Mr. Schuelke previously served twice as Special Counsel to the U.S. Senate. He served as an assistant United States attorney for the District of Columbia. And following his graduation from law school, he served for 4 years in the Judge Advocate General's Corps. He received his undergraduate degree from St. Peters college and his law degree from Villanova University. The Chair is going to swear witnesses at this hearing, so Mr. Schuelke would you please stand and raise your right hand. [Witness sworn.] Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you. I ask that you summarize your testimony in 5 minutes or less. We have the red, yellow, and green lights before you. And when the light turns red, it indicates that the 5 minutes have expired. Mr. Schuelke. TESTIMONY OF HENRY F. SCHUELKE, III, PARTNER, JANIS, SCHUELKE, AND WECHSLER Mr. Schuelke. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Scott, Mr. Conyers, good morning. I appear this morning at the Committee's invitation to answer such questions as the Committee might have concerning the investigation that my colleague William B. Shields and I have performed, having been ordered to do so by the Honorable Emmet G. Sullivan of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. I understand that the Committee has our report, and I am prepared to respond to the Committee's questions. I should like to observe that we had the complete cooperation of the Department of Justice as we undertook this investigation, as well as that of its Office of Professional Responsibility. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to answer your questions. Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you very much, Mr. Schuelke. Mr. Schuelke. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure--is this microphone working? Mr. Sensenbrenner. It is working fine. First of all, can you describe the willful nondisclosures of Brady and Giglio material that you found during the course of your investigation? Mr. Schuelke. I can. I found that the prosecutors, Messrs. Bottini and Goeke in particular, failed to disclose exculpatory information provided to them by the then-anticipated government witness, Mr. Rocky Williams, concerning his understanding based on a conversation that he had with Senator Stevens and Bill Allen before the renovation project ever began, that whatever time and material that Allen's company, VECO, was to provide on the renovation would be included in the bills submitted to Senator and Mrs. Stevens by the general contractor who they had engaged, Christensen Builders, and consistent with that understanding, it was his practice on a monthly basis to retrieve the Christensen Builders invoices, check them for accuracy, take them to Allen's office, so that his time and other VECO employees' time could be added to the bills before they were sent to Senator and Mrs. Stevens. Mr. Sensenbrenner. Do you think that the failure to disclose this exculpatory information would have had an impact on the outcome of the trial? Mr. Schuelke. I do. It was altogether consistent with Senator Stevens' defense, which the government well anticipated and forecast. When Senator Stevens and Mrs. Stevens testified during the course of the trial that they understood and believed that they had paid all the bills--because they did, indeed, pay all the Christensen Builders bills to the tune of $160,000--that testimony was not only challenged in cross- examination and in closing arguments by the government, it was ridiculed. Had the government's own witness, who was the foreman on the job, testified to the understanding which I just described, I believe it would have had a significant impact on the outcome. Secondly, the government, since 2004--that is 4 years before the Stevens trial commenced--was in possession of evidence that its principal witness, Mr. Allen, had suborned a false statement from a young teenage prostitute with whom it was alleged that he had had a sexual relationship. That information, which clearly would have been admissible to impeach Mr. Allen's credibility--namely, that he had suborned a false statement--was not disclosed to the defense. It was not disclosed to the Stevens defense in 2008, nor was it disclosed in the course of two trials conducted in the District of Alaska 1 year before the Stevens trial. Peter Kott and Victor Kohring were two Alaska State legislators who were indicted, tried, and convicted for bribery offenses. The principal government witness in both of those cases was Mr. Allen who had, according to the government--and ultimately according to Mr. Allen's guilty plea--paid the bribes to those two State legislators. The evidence of Mr. Allen's subornation of a false statement was not provided to either of them either. This was a pattern that prevailed over the space of three trials conducted over 1 year. Mr. Sensenbrenner. What do you think motivated the prosecutors to do this? Mr. Schuelke. As I testified when I was asked that question by the Senate Judiciary Committee a couple of weeks ago, I said that I believed that it was the adversary's desire to win, and not to disclose to the defense information which would have hurt the government's case. That is my view today. Mr. Sensenbrenner. So it was win at all costs and not to have justice served? Mr. Schuelke. I think that is a fair characterization, yes. Mr. Sensenbrenner. Okay. Thank you. My time has expired. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. Mr. Scott. Thank you. Mr. Schuelke, when Attorney General Holder came in, what was the status of the Stevens case? I understand that he had been found guilty by the jury, but the judge had not entered the guilty verdict; is that where we were? Mr. Schuelke. When Attorney General Holder took office, the trial had been concluded, you are correct, and the jury had returned a guilty verdict. And post-trial proceedings were underway; that is, motions for a new trial. Mr. Scott. Had the judge entered the guilty verdict? Mr. Schuelke. Well, if you mean, Mr. Scott, was there a conviction entered, the answer is no because a conviction occurs as a matter of law only when the sentence is imposed, and of course the case never got to that point. Mr. Scott. You hadn't gotten to the sentencing phase? What did the Attorney General find out that provoked his investigation? The defense counsel got some tips as to what might have happened? Mr. Schuelke. A couple of things, Mr. Scott. As Chairman Sensenbrenner observed, there was an FBI agent whose name was Chad Joy, who filed essentially a whistleblower complaint, making a number of allegations about the conduct of the lead FBI agent on the case, as well as the prosecutors, that prompted ost-trial motions brought by Senator Stevens' counsel. In the process of responding to those motions, as Chairman Sensenbrenner also observed, Judge Sullivan found two of the government prosecutors to have been in civil contempt for failure to have produced certain records which he had ordered in connection with those proceedings. At that point, the Department of Justice appointed a new team of prosecutors to represent the United States in the course of these post-trial proceedings. Those three prosecutors commenced an investigation. And they focused initially on the most dramatic testimony delivered by Mr. Allen in the trial; namely, that a letter that he had received from Senator Stevens, asking him to make sure and send him the bill was just Senator Stevens covering his ass, based upon a conversation Mr. Allen claimed to recall with a mutual friend of his and Senator Stevens in Alaska. That testimony was, as one might imagine, dramatic and damning to Senator Stevens' defense that he acted at all times with pure intent. As these new prosecutors focused on this, they began to review some internal emails by, between, and among the prosecution team and found a series of emails that were obviously contemporaneous to an interview of Mr. Allen 5 months before the trial. I say contemporaneous, meaning it was obvious that they were emailing back and forth while the interview was in progress. They were curious about this exchange and, in short, ultimately found the handwritten notes of that interview, which had been recorded by two of the prosecutors. Ultimately, the handwritten notes of two more prosecutors and the lead FBI agent were also discovered. All of those notes reflected that Mr. Allen was asked during that interview whether he remembered the note he got from Ted Stevens and whether he remembered speaking to Mr. Persons, the one to whom he at trial attributed the cover-your-ass comment. And all of those notes reflected that he either said no, he did not speak to Persons, or he did not recall speaking to Persons. Mr. Scott. And my time is almost up. But as a result of those findings, the new team of lawyers made a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice? Mr. Schuelke. That is correct. The new team of lawyers, as I understand it, recommended that that be the course taken by the Department. And the Attorney General authorized the motion to dismiss with prejudice, which of course Judge Sullivan granted. Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Gowdy. Mr. Gowdy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Schuelke, if I heard you correctly, Senator Stevens paid $160,000 for the improvements made, the addition? Did I hear you correctly? Mr. Schuelke. Yes, sir, you did. Mr. Gowdy. What was the fair market value of the additions or changes made to the lodge? Mr. Schuelke. The fair market value of the house after the renovations was $152,000. Mr. Gowdy. Were the bills paid contemporaneous with their being submitted? In other words, was he paying the bills in a timely fashion? Or was it a circumstance where he got a lot of bills toward the end? Mr. Schuelke. No. The Christensen Builders bills were paid in the regular course by Mrs. Catherine Stevens upon receipt. The Stevenses, in order to finance this project, had taken a second mortgage, liquidating $100,000 in cash for the project, had liquidated a $10,000 trust and spent from their savings as well. And that is how they timely paid the $160,000 worth of Christensen invoices. Mr. Gowdy. Well, here is what I am struggling with: I actually like prosecutors. I actually like Federal prosecutors. Mr. Schuelke. I do, too. I used to be one. Mr. Gowdy. So when I say what I am getting ready to say it is not by virtue of a criticism toward them. But they are not known for taking really close cases that could go either way, unless they have to, particularly against a high-profile defendant. State prosecutors have to roll the dice more than Federal prosecutors do. So if you have a high-profile defendant with a really good defense team and your allegation is that he unjustly enriched himself via gifts, and the evidence is he actually paid more than the value of the home, what am I missing? Why was the case ever brought in the first place? It doesn't seem to be a very good case from a factual standpoint. Mr. Schuelke. Well, the government had evidence that Bill Allen's company, VECO, had provided labor and materials for the project, and it was the government's theory of the case that Senator Stevens well knew that that had occurred, acknowledged, at least late in the process, that he knew that, which is why he sent the note to Mr. Allen asking him, please send me a bill for whatever work you did. And the government contended that VECO's contribution to this project, as was alleged in the indictment, was $250,000. Now, at trial, when the government introduced the records of the VECO Corporation which purported to establish this $250,000 figure, it was demonstrated that the records were simply inaccurate. They, for example, logged 8 hours a day, 5 or 6 days a week, for Rocky Williams. He didn't work 8 hours a day, 5 or 6 days a week on the project. They logged 8 hours a day, 5 days a week, for another VECO employee, Dave Anderson, who wasn't even in Alaska for several months during that period of time. And Judge Sullivan, upon the motion of Senator Stevens' defense counsel, concluded that those records were false and excluded the majority of those records. Mr. Gowdy. All right, my light is on. So let me ask you this, which is kind of related, I guess somewhat. Before I ask you that, the Federal prosecutors weren't interviewing these witnesses without the Bureau being present, were they? I mean they are not crazy enough to do witness prep without a law enforcement agent present, were they? Mr. Schuelke. As a general practice, they did have FBI agents, and, on occasion, agents of the Internal Revenue Service, accompany them for purposes of interviews. Mr. Gowdy. This may or may not be true because it has been reported, which carries no presumption of credibility, that there is this movement to change Brady/Giglio, the discovery rules, because of this case. There is a Senator from Alaska that has introduced legislation. It strikes me that if the rules as they existed had been followed, you and I wouldn't be having this conversation. Mr. Schuelke. Well, I think that is quite right, Mr. Gowdy. It has been the law, since the Supreme Court decided the Brady case and the Giglio case, that the government is obligated to disclose material exculpatory information. I don't believe that this materiality issue, which I personally think is a problem that needs to be addressed, was a determining factor in the problems that occurred in the Stevens case. But I do think it is a problem that needs to be addressed. I have seen Senator Murkowski's proposed bill. I don't know that I am in a position to subscribe to it in its entirety. But to the extent that it would eliminate the materiality requirement with respect to the disclosure of exculpatory material, I think it is welcome and necessary. Mr. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers. Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I first want to thank you for coming before us today. And I just want to take a moment to look at the larger question of Brady rule violations and how we ought to look at them. I understand the Subcommittee may be considering looking at other kinds of cases like this, and it might add some dimension to the problem. So I would just like you to tell us about your impressions of whether the Brady rule needs strengthening or whether we need to get a way for the prosecutors to actually look at it more and use it more appropriately. Mr. Schuelke. Yes, sir. I shall try, Mr. Conyers. First of all, we should all understand that the Supreme Court has for years announced the rule that in order for a conviction to be reversed for the government's failure to provide exculpatory information, that failure must have had an outcome determinative effect. That is to say, are we left with a situation where we can have no confidence in the verdict because of the failure to disclose Brady information? That is the materiality concept which, in my judgment, is perfectly sensible and appropriate from that post hoc appellate perspective. Now we are in the pretrial situation. The prosecutor has an obligation to disclose Brady material. The prosecutor says--and they have argued in court repeatedly, they did in the Stevens case--well, we were only obligated to disclose material exculpatory information. Now mind you, the prosecutor is one of the adversaries in this process. In my judgment, it is not appropriate for one of the adversaries to be the self-appointed gatekeeper for what may be exculpatory information that the defense, consistent with its strategy, may be in a position to pursue and to use in the course of the trial. And this adversarial process, which is a general proposition I applaud, leaves one in a situation where there is a considerable risk for mischief. If I am the prosecutor and I say, here is this little tidbit which is in my files which reflects adversely on the credibility of my star witness, it is really not material. I don't think I have to turn that over. Human nature is such that good people motivated by this adversarial desire to prevail make those kinds of judgments. They should not. And it is for that reason that I believe, as I have testified, that the materiality requirement with respect to pretrial disclosure of the Brady material should be eliminated. Mr. Conyers. Is it fair, in closing, to ask you whether this kind of problem occurs perhaps more than we on the Judiciary Committee could be aware of? Mr. Schuelke. Well, that is a very good question, Mr. Conyers. One never knows what one doesn't know. Based on my experience both as a prosecutor and a defense attorney for now over 40 years, I do not personally believe that there is a pervasive nondisclosure problem in the thousands and thousands of cases that are brought by the Department of Justice. There have been a number of celebrated ones. There have been a half a dozen or so that have attracted considerable attention in the last 2 years. So it happens. And of course, one never knows if the case goes to trial and there had been no disclosure of Brady material, and the defendant, for whatever reason, was not equipped to ferret it out, if there was not a Judge Sullivan presiding over the matter, one never knows. But it is my personal view, based on my experience, that it is not a widespread pervasive problem in the Department of Justice. And I know that the Department, since the Stevens case, has taken significant steps both in terms of policy, proscription and training to address this problem. Mr. Conyers. Thank you for your views. Mr. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired. We are expecting about 25 minutes of votes pretty soon, and then there will be a second series of votes later on. I would kind of like to do, to speed this hearing up and not to impose undue time delays upon our witnesses, to do what we can in shuttling us in and out. So the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gohmert. Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We know that we had an FBI Agent Joy that filed a whistleblower complaint against the DOJ. As of November 2008, how long had FBI Agent Joy been working for the FBI? Mr. Schuelke. Mr. Gohmert, I don't remember precisely how long. He was quite young and inexperienced. Mr. Gohmert. And still had the courage to come forward with the information. That is very impressive. One of my concerns over the FBI 5-year ``up or out'' policy that this Director implemented, it drove thousands of years of FBI experience out of the FBI and left people with much less experience in charge. And my experience, from having been a prosecutor in my early days out of law school was, you know, you are hard-charging and you need somebody, maybe not as smart as you, but somebody with experience to say, ``This is not a good idea. You should not put a case in jeopardy. We are about justice, and that means your title forces you to disclose Brady material, whether there is a Brady case or not. You are about justice. You are not about winning at all cost.'' And some people have a hard time understanding that and understanding their role. I have got to tell you, just my perceptions. I was not a big fan of Ted Stevens. When I heard and saw and read the information coming from the Justice Department, it sounded like, gee, this guy really had, you know, over $100,000, $200,000 of benefits come his way, and that really is abusive. This is a bad situation. And then when you find out the real facts, he paid more than the value of the structure. And then you find out that, gee, they knew--not only his theory, they had his notes where he was saying, ``Give me the bill. Let me pay the bill.'' And as you said, his wife was paying them as they came in and they end up paying more than the value of the structure itself. It is just hard to imagine prosecutors, Justice officials, FBI officials--I have got a lot of friends in the FBI, a lot of people I have so much respect for. And I do disagree with you that an adversary should not be a gatekeeper. If they understand their goal, their end is justice, not to win at all costs. As you have said, I don't think this is a widespread problem. But I am wondering--and having been a judge and a chief justice, I have sat on disbarment cases back in Texas in State court. I don't know why anybody that literally took the life that Ted Stevens built and destroyed it, took his life, why they should ever be allowed to practice law again if they do not understand the trust and betrayed it as they did here. And I understand your recommendations with regard to contempt of court. You looked at the burden of proof. Had there been any actions taken to pull the ticket to disbar these people that would ruin a man's life, at the end of his life, in such a way by withholding evidence, it sure seems it would have made a heck of a difference. If I am a judge hearing a case without a jury, and I find out the structure is worth less than he paid, that he has notes out there that he gave timely manner and said, Give me the bills, and the evidence was his wife paid the bills as they came in, and then it turns out there is evidence of the key witness involved with a prostitute--can we say ``prostitute,'' involved with a prostitute--I cannot imagine why they should not be allowed to practice law again after ruining this man's life. Have you looked at possible disbarment? Mr. Sensenbrenner. If the gentleman will yield, you can use that word because The Washington Post has used it quite a bit in the last week. Mr. Gohmert. Okay. Well, have you looked at disbarment recommendations? Mr. Schuelke. I have not, Mr. Gohmert. It is beyond my charter, and I don't have a view on that subject. Mr. Gohmert. You don't have a view at all? Not even personally? Mr. Schuelke. I don't care to take a view on it. Mr. Gohmert. Okay. You could have one but you don't care to take a view. Mr. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired. I am going to recess the Committee. And I will admonish both Mr. Johnson and Mr. Pierluisi to be back after the last vote of this series. Otherwise, we will move on. Without objection, the Committee is recessed until after the last vote of the series. [Recess.] Mr. Sensenbrenner. The Subcommittee will be in order. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important Committee meeting on this issue. Ted Stevens was a gentleman who I met for the first time Christmas of 2007, and we were both standing in line together at the White House Christmas celebration, waiting to shake hands with the President. And while he was there, I think it was his wife and a couple of his daughters were with him, and they were very jovial and, you know, just regular, normal people. I know they have hearts and feelings and that kind of thing, and they were happy. Senator Stevens was spry, kind of cantankerous, and he was irascible, but I liked him. He seemed to be a good proud man, used to being in authority and in control. I can only imagine how he must have felt when the jury announced the verdict of guilty in this case. And in this case, it was in 2004 that the government knew that the principal witness, Bill Allen, had suborn perjury by getting a prostitute to testify or make a false statement under oath; is that correct, Mr. Schuelke? Mr. Schuelke. Yes, sir, that is correct. Mr. Johnson. And was Mr. Allen prosecuted for that? Mr. Schuelke. He was not. Mr. Johnson. But that was a note that was in--that was evidence that was in the file of the prosecution in the Stevens case? Mr. Schuelke. Yes. The young woman had been interviewed by an FBI agent and---- Mr. Johnson. Okay. I will stop you there. I just wanted to clear up the facts. And that same information was available in a Federal prosecution of the two cases prior to Senator Stevens' trial. And those two cases involving State legislators were Federal trials as well; is that correct? Mr. Schuelke. That is correct. Mr. Johnson. So we have three instances of failure to disclose subornation of perjury. That would have been material information, would it not? Mr. Schuelke. Yes, sir. Mr. Johnson. And pursuant to Giglio, that information should have been disclosed as well as Brady. Mr. Schuelke. It was Giglio material, I would say. Mr. Johnson. Yeah. And then during the trial in 2008, the prosecution failed to disclose--or during the Ted Stevens case, the prosecution failed to disclose written information in the files, in the way of case notes that the prosecutors had written down what a witness was telling them, that witness being Bill--or, excuse me, Rocky Williams. And then also, that information would have been material also, in your opinion; is that correct? Mr. Schuelke. I believe that was material Brady information, yes, sir. Mr. Johnson. And then you have already testified about the fact that the prosecutors derided Senator Stevens' principal defense which was that, I have this note here and it shows that I requested so-and-so to send me a bill. And prosecutors allowed the witness, Bill Allen, to testify falsely that he was just trying to cover up his ass. Mr. Schuelke. Well, the note from Senator Stevens in 2002 to Mr. Allen said, Bill, when I think of all the ways you help me, I lose count, but you have to send me a bill. And I am going to have Bob Persons talk to you. So don't get PO'd at him. Mr. Johnson. Okay. Mr. Schuelke. Six years later Allen testified at the trial---- Mr. Johnson. Okay. We are getting into the weeds now. I just wanted that particular statement. My time is getting ready to run out, and I hate to interrupt you. But why was there no prosecution recommendation to charge any of the prosecutors with the same charge that probably should have been leveled against Bill Allen back in 2004; it is 18 USC 1622, subornation perjury. And has there been a recommendation to the State bar of the State where these gentlemen, the prosecutors practiced? Mr. Schuelke. Not that I am aware of. Mr. Johnson. And they have not been prosecuted; no recommendation; no sanction has been applied to them? Mr. Schuelke. To the Stevens prosecutors? Mr. Johnson. Yes. Mr. Schuelke. Not that I am aware of. Mr. Johnson. And you do say, though, that Senator Murkowski's legislation should go a little bit further and make sure that the gatekeeper is not the sole keeper of that file insofar as Brady and Giglio materials are concerned. Do you think that it would be a good idea for the judge to have to look at that case, look at the case file, make a determination independently that there is no--or all information that should have been disclosed has been disclosed, and then seal that, file a copy of that file, what he has reviewed in the clerk's office for purposes of later appeals? Do you think that is a reasonable way of going about getting this responsibility out of---- Mr. Schuelke. It is a reasonable way of going about it, assuming that the prosecutor first says, I am in doubt about whether I should disclose this. I will submit it to the judge in camera and let the judge decide. But the prosecutor first has to get to that point in his own analysis. Mr. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman from Puerto Rico, Mr. Pierluisi. Mr. Pierluisi. Good morning, Mr. Schuelke. Mr. Schuelke. Good morning, sir. Mr. Pierluisi. As I understand the Supreme Court case law, the Supreme Court has set a constitutional minimum in this area. So States, and I would assume also this Congress, Congress can set a higher standard and change the rule so that it is more favorable to the defense and to the process as a whole. You mentioned before that in your view, the materiality requirement shouldn't be there. I heard that. Apart from that, do you have any other suggestions to us in terms of how to go about changing the rule? Are we talking about amending rule 16? And if so, in what fashion would you recommend that we would do so? Mr. Schuelke. Well, as you may know, sir, the Rules Committee of the Federal Judiciary has been contemplating such a change since 2006, I believe, and has rejected suggestions that rule 16 be amended to accomplish this purpose. As I recall, when most recently the Rules Committee took it up, they had available to them a poll that was taken of sitting Federal judges across the country, and slightly in excess of 50 percent of the Federal judges recommended an amendment to the rule. The Justice Department opposed such an amendment, and the views of the Justice Department, as I understand it, carried the day. So I persist in the view that such a change is necessary. And while it could be accomplished by an amendment to rule 16, that has not occurred, and I think if the Rules Committee is not going to do it, the Congress should. Mr. Pierluisi. And in your view, is the prosecutor's intent to use or not to use the evidence a relevant factor here, or not? Mr. Schuelke. I am not sure I understand the question. The prosecutor's intention to---- Mr. Pierluisi. Yeah. Because some of the case law seems to suggest and rules also that one of the relevant factors in determining whether you turn over this type of evidence to the defense is whether the prosecutor intends to use it at trial. And in my view, that shouldn't be a factor. And I want to hear from you about it. Mr. Schuelke. I quite agree. That should not be, and I don't know that it typically is a factor. Mr. Pierluisi. Okay. And we have been talking about Congress. Now would you turn your attention to DOJ? The U.S. attorney manual, as you know, is binding on the prosecutors and internally can be used for disciplinary purposes but it has no bearing--it has no remedy for the defense. So that is a flaw. I have seen that they have made some revisions to it. I have seen that training has been enhanced in this area. Is there anything else that the Department of Justice should be doing so that this type of conduct doesn't happen again? Mr. Schuelke. Well, as you have pointed out, the Department, through its U.S. attorney's manual, has a provision, which has recently been revised, together with guidance from the then-deputy Attorney General Ogden, right after the Stevens trial, which as a matter of policy tells the Federal prosecutors that they are to disclose Brady and Giglio material. They are to take a liberal view of it, and in most cases, they are not to impose this materiality standard. As you have also observed, the U.S. attorney's manual has an explicit disclaimer that these policy pronouncements do not have the force of law, and they vest in no one any rights. I believe if the Justice Department, as expressed in the U.S. attorney's manual, is of the view that the materiality requirement ought to be eliminated, then I see no principled reason why they would oppose legislation which does, of course, have the force of law to accomplish the same thing. Mr. Pierluisi. Thank you. Mr. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentlewoman from Florida, Ms. Adams. Mrs. Adams. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Knowing that, how was the Stevens trial team structured? Mr. Schuelke. How was it structured? Mrs. Adams. Uh-huh. Mr. Schuelke. Very shortly before the indictment was returned in July of 2008, Brenda Morris, who was a deputy chief of the Public Integrity Section, who up until that point had very limited involvement in the Stevens investigation, was tapped by the Office of the Assistant Attorney General for the criminal division to be the lead trial prosecutor. The team in the courtroom, in addition to Ms. Morris, was Mr. Nicholas Marsh and Mr. Joseph Bottini. Mr. Marsh was a public integrity lawyer. Mr. Bottini was an assistant U.S. attorney in the district of Alaska. They had significant experience in this public corruption investigation in Alaska because Mr. Goeke, the other Alaska assistant U.S. attorney, and Mr. Marsh tried the first of the two State legislators, whose cases I have described, and Mr. Bottini and a young Public Integrity lawyer named Edward Sullivan tried the other one. So that was the composition of the trial team. Mrs. Adams. Do you believe that the six prosecutors who were the subject of your inquiry were candid, forthright, truthful with you during the course of your investigation? Mr. Schuelke. I believe that they were. Mrs. Adams. Can you explain your references in the report to the simultaneous and collective memory failure, I guess it is of Messrs. Bottini, Marsh, Goeke and Sullivan, to recall the details of their interview with Bill Allen on April 15, 2008? Mr. Schuelke. Can I explain the memory failure? Mrs. Adams. Your references to that. Because you just said they were being forthright. Mr. Schuelke. All of them participated in the interview of Mr. Allen on April 15, 2008. All of them took notes, in which they recorded what he said. Five months later, Mr. Allen has a dramatically different--indeed, a polar opposite--account from the one he gave them in April. And all of them, to a person, maintained that they had no memory of him having said what he said on April 15. As I say in the report, I was unable to determine by compelling evidence that any one of them, in fact, remembered what had transpired in that April interview and falsely represented that they had not. Mrs. Adams. At this time I yield to Mr. Gowdy. Mr. Gowdy. Was this what we sometimes refer to as an open- file case? Or did they try to follow the statute? Mr. Schuelke. In the Stevens case? Mr. Gowdy. Right. Mr. Schuelke. It was not a so-called open-file discovery practice. Mr. Gowdy. If DOJ adopted an open-file status for all of its cases, how many of the concerns raised by our colleagues on the other side would go away? Mr. Schuelke. Some, but not all. Mr. Gowdy. Can you give me an example of something that is potentially impeachment material but not material; doesn't meet the materiality element but is potentially impeachment, Giglio material. Mr. Schuelke. I suppose a witness could testify at a trial that the crime he or she observed occurred on a Tuesday, and that witness could have testified--or in the course of an interview earlier, stated that it occurred on a Thursday. The accounts of the events themselves might in both the interview and the trial testimony have been otherwise altogether consistent. And one can make an argument that the witness' memory at one point, months ago, that it was a Tuesday versus memory that it was a Thursday at the trial was not material. Mr. Gowdy. Well, my time is out. But I appreciate your testimony. And I would hope you would come back at some point. You are a former prosecutor. There are other former prosecutors up here. Reciprocal discovery is something I would like to get your perspective on as well, because I can't recall the name of any criminal defense attorneys--at least in my experience--that have been disciplined in any way for not meeting the reciprocal discovery requirements. And that may be a source of frustration for prosecutors. Mr. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Schuelke thank you very much not only for coming today and answering the questions that we all have relative to this prosecution and your report, but also the extensive time you spent putting together an extremely thorough report on a very messy and sad experience in the history of the Justice Department. So I think the entire country should thank you for your efforts on that. And hopefully your report and what has transpired in the Stevens case will prevent this from happening again. So thank you. Mr. Schuelke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your hospitality. Mr. Sensenbrenner. Yes. Thank you. Okay. We will now go to the second panel of witnesses. Kenneth Wainstein is a partner in the law firm of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft where his practice focuses on corporate internal investigations. He is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown law school. Mr. Wainstein served as an assistant U.S. attorney both in the Southern District of New York and the District of Columbia. Later he served as the U.S. Attorney in the District of Columbia, and then was the first assistant attorney general for national security. He has served as FBI Director Robert Mueller's chief of staff and then as President Bush's homeland security adviser. He received his undergraduate degree from the University of Virginia and his law degree from the University of California at Berkeley. Alan Baron is the senior counsel at the law firm of Seyfarth Shaw where his practice focuses on white-collar criminal defense. He has served as special impeachment counsel to the U.S. House of Representatives three times, and most recently he was Special Counsel in the impeachment of Judges Samuel Kent and G. Thomas Porteous. He also is minority chief counsel to the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and served as an assistant U.S. attorney in Maryland. He received his undergraduate degree from Princeton and his law degree from Harvard. As I said earlier, I will swear the witnesses in. Could the two witnesses please stand, raise your right hand. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Sensenbrenner. Let the record show that both witnesses answered in the affirmative. Their written statements will be entered in the record in their entirety. And you all have been up here before, so you know about green lights, yellow lights, and red lights. Mr. Wainstein. TESTIMONY OF KENNETH L. WAINSTEIN, PARTNER, CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM AND TAFT LLP Mr. Wainstein. Thank you, Chairman Sensenbrenner, Ranking Member Scott, Members of the Subcommittee. I am here with two of my colleagues, Jeffrey Nestler and Sara Zdeb. And together, we are proud to represent assistant United States attorney Joe Bottini in this matter. We are here today for one reason: to demonstrate that the Special Prosecutor got it simply wrong when he found that Joe intentionally violated the rules in the Stevens case. First let me take a minute on who Joe is. Joe is a 27-year veteran of the Alaska U.S. attorney's office. He is universally respected by the Alaska bench and bar, has never had a single allegation of misconduct against him. He has tried and prosecuted hundreds of cases. And the only recognition he wants in life is to be counted among those prosecutors who go to work each day seeking to do justice for the American people. In short, and in my eyes, Joe is a model public servant. Joe is also something else. He is human. He makes mistakes. He acknowledges he made mistakes, serious mistakes in the Senator Stevens case. And he acknowledges and he greatly regrets the impact those mistakes had on the integrity of that trial and on the public's perception of the Justice Department. But Joe does not acknowledge, I do not acknowledge and, most importantly, the facts do not acknowledge that Joe committed those errors purposely or with any bad faith. The Special Prosecutor's report, as you know, concluded definitively that he did. While the report goes on for some 500-odd pages, it really distills down to just two findings about Joe: one, a finding that Joe committed errors; and two, a finding that those errors were intentional. What is completely missing, however, is any connective tissue between those two findings, any actual support for the conclusion that Joe's errors were intentional as opposed to inadvertent. In fact, there is really no analysis of Joe's intent at all. We have carefully gone through the 514 pages and have found a grand total of one paragraph that reports to analyze the intent behind Joe's conduct, one single paragraph for the most critical question in the whole investigation. Professional prosecutors understand that every error is not a crime, and that they have a duty to carefully distinguish between mistake and misconduct before concluding that somebody is guilty of an intentional crime. The Special Prosecutor's report failed to uphold that duty in just about every respect. First, the report fails to take into account the conditions under which the prosecutors were working before and during trial. And the Chairman mentioned these earlier today. Circumstances that made it likely that balls would be dropped and made it therefore more likely that mistake rather than misconduct was behind any errors; circumstances such as the complete failure by the Public Integrity Section management to do its job; the severely shortened time period for trial preparation; and the combative defense tactics that kept the prosecutors off balance during trial, all highly relevant circumstances and none given any real consideration by the report. Second failing: The report fails to consider critically important mitigating circumstances, such as the fact that Joe is universally admired by his defense counsel adversaries as, quote, a man of high moral character and as, quote, the kind of person for whom the expression ``straight arrow'' was invented. And also, the fact that on seven different occasions, Joe actually pushed his Public Integrity Section supervisors to disclose the very information the Special Prosecutor's report accuses him of trying to suppress, requests that were firmly denied each time. Third failing. The report mischaracterizes important facts in a way that puts a nefarious slant on Joe's conduct by saying, for example, that Joe made a prejudicial argument in his closing jury address, an argument that is not found in the jury trial transcript. The report altogether ignores other facts, facts that cut against its findings. For instance, the report finds Joe guilty of suppressing Rocky Williams' assumption about the Senator paying for the work on his house, but never addresses the fact that Joe's outline for his direct examination of Rocky Williams had an entry showing that Joe intended to elicit that very assumption on the record in open court, a circumstance that completely undermines a finding of intentional misconduct and a circumstance that should have been front and center in any credible consideration of that issue. As a final failing, the report reflects a process that showed very little regard for fairness, and, most troublingly, in the way the investigation concluded with no criminal charges, but with a public branding of our client as a proven criminal. Under our system, professional prosecutors have one way and only one way to accuse a person of a crime, and that is with the filing of formal charges that the person can then contest in open court to defend his liberty and his reputation. That rule was not followed in this case. The Special Prosecutor decided not to file charges against Joe but then turned around and publicly declared to the world that Joe was guilty of the worst thing one can say about a Federal prosecutor, that he is dishonest and a cheat. This left Joe with the shame of a criminal accusation but without any opportunity to show the American people that that accusation was wrong. Today, thanks to this hearing, we finally have that opportunity and we are very grateful to the Committee for giving it to us. I look forward to this hearing and I look forward to answering any questions you may have for me. Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Wainstein follows:]* --------------------------------------------------------------------------- *See Appendix for the Addendum submitted with this statement. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] __________ Mr. Sensenbrenner. Mr. Baron. TESTIMONY OF ALAN I. BARON, SENIOR COUNSEL, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP Mr. Baron. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As you noted in introducing me, you mentioned that I had been an assistant United States attorney for Maryland. I think I would only add to that that during that time, I headed the investigation which led to the indictment of a former United States Senator, Daniel Brewster of Maryland. And I am aware therefore--although that was a long time ago--of the pressure that is put on a prosecutor when he is involved in a case of such magnitude and importance. I would note that I have no connection whatever to the Stevens case, I have no relationship with any of the individuals involved in that matter, other than having had minimal contact with Mr. Welch relative to the Porteous impeachment. I join with the Chairman in commending Mr. Schuelke for his comprehensive report. In my view it is clearly the product of an enormous amount of effort conducted in a highly professional manner. So for purposes of my testimony, I accept the accuracy of his findings of fact; specifically, that by any standard--and I think I want to keep those words in mind--``By any standard, the information provided to the prosecutors by Rocky Williams and Bambi Tyree was Brady material.'' And Mr. Schuelke concluded that both Mr. Bottini and Mr. Goeke consciously withheld and concealed this critical information from the defense, and indeed that there were affirmative misrepresentations regarding the Tyree information to the effect that such material did not even exist. And then Mr. Schuelke also found that Mr. Bottini failed to take steps to correct false testimony by Mr. Allen on the witness stand, which testimony Mr. Bottini knew to be false, in violation of the Supreme Court case Napue v. Illinois. Mr. Schuelke was appointed to investigate and prosecute criminal contempt proceedings as may be appropriate against the prosecutors in this case. Despite having the findings that we have all referred to this morning, Mr. Schuelke ultimately concluded that no prosecution for criminal contempt would lie. According to Mr. Schuelke at a hearing on September 10, 2008, the judge in the Stevens case failed to issue--I am quoting now from the report--"a clear, specific, and unequivocal order such that it would support a finding by a district court beyond a reasonable doubt that 18 USC section 4013--that is the criminal contempt statute--had been violated.'' In my view--and I certainly defer to Mr. Schuelke's report, wherever it purports to find facts and reach conclusions based on the enormous investigative effort which clearly underlies it--but the entire transcript of the proceedings on September 10, 2008, is available for review. Anyone here can read--that is the entire universe contained in that transcript. And one can therefore reach one's own conclusion as to what transpired at that critical event. And here, I must regrettably and respectfully disagree with Mr. Schuelke's characterization of what occurred. On September 10, 2008, the court issued a clear, unequivocal order to the government to produce material pursuant to Brady and its progeny. Everyone agreed that they understood their obligation. None of the prosecutors asked for clarification of what was being ordered. And we must recall Mr. Schuelke's earlier conclusion that by any standard, even the narrowest view of what Brady requires, the Williams and Tyree materials had to be disclosed as Brady material. In my view, if you accept Mr. Schuelke's factual premise, the failure to disclose what were clear Brady materials was in direct violation of the court's order. Now, the fact that there was no written order entered on September 10 is irrelevant. It is well established that no written order is required. And it is noteworthy that Mr. Wainstein, who represents Mr. Bottini, in a letter to the Attorney General, dated March 15, 2012, acknowledges A, that no written order is required for contempt proceeding and that the judge's verbal order at the September 10, 2008 hearing was clear and unequivocal. To me, the judge's order was clear, as was its violation. The question is how did this happen? In a sense, it is a bigger issue. The obvious answer is that overzealous prosecutors got caught up in a win-at-all cost mentality and ignored their obligation to prosecute fairly within the limits imposed by the Constitution. But I think there is a deeper question here. There seems to have been a total breakdown of supervision. Who was in charge? Who would accept responsibility to rein in prosecutors when they began to violate their constitutional obligations? What I find--and we can talk about this perhaps in response to questions, because I see my time is elapsing--what I see here is a total breakdown in supervision. You might ask, Why do experienced prosecutors need supervision? Because it puts someone in a position where they must account for what happens. And when you don't have that structure, you get the problem of people going off and essentially doing their own thing, very much to the detriment of the administration of justice. Thank you. Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you Mr. Baron. [The prepared statement of Mr. Baron follows:] Prepared Statement of Alan I. Baron, Senior Counsel, Seyfarth Shaw LLP My name is Alan Baron and I am Senior Counsel to the law firm of Seyfarth Shaw LLP based in Washington, DC. In the course of my career, I have served as an Assistant United States Attorney for Maryland, during which time I headed the investigation which led to the indictment of former Senator Daniel Brewster for bribery while in office.\1\ I am aware of the pressures on prosecutors when involved in a case of such magnitude and importance. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Senator Brewster ultimately entered a plea of nolo contendre after the Supreme Court rejected his claim of immunity under the Speech or Debate clause of the Constitution. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A substantial portion of my career in private practice over the years has involved acting as defense counsel in white collar criminal cases. I am familiar with the requirements of Brady v. Maryland, \2\ Giglio v. United States \3\ and related cases. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ 373 U.S. 83 (1963) \3\ 405 U.S. 150 (1972) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I have also served, from time-to-time, as special counsel in the public sector. I have been retained as special impeachment counsel by the House of Representatives to pursue the impeachment, trial and removal of four federal judges, including former Judge G. Thomas Porteous. I am appearing before the Subcommittee to testify concerning the report filed by Mr. Henry Schuelke setting forth the results of his investigation into possible criminal contempt proceedings against the prosecutors who conducted the investigation and prosecution of Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska (hereafter ``the Report''). I should note that I have no connection whatsoever to the Stevens case and have no relationship with any of the individuals involved in that matter other than minimal contact with Mr. Welch, relative to the Porteous impeachment. Mr. Schuelke is to be commended for this comprehensive report. It clearly is the product of an enormous amount of effort conducted in a highly professional manner. For purposes of my testimony, I accept the accuracy of his findings of fact, specifically that ``By any standard, the information provided to the prosecutors by Rocky Williams and Bambi Tyree was Brady material'' (the Report at 500).\4\ The Report concluded that Mr. Bottini and Mr. Goeke consciously withheld and concealed this critical information from the defense. Indeed, the Report states that there were affirmative misrepresentations regarding the Tyree information to the effect that such materials did not exist (the Report at 503). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ Rocky Williams was foreman for the renovations on the Stevens' house. He told prosecutors, based on statements made by Bill Allen, his boss, and by Senator Stevens, he understood that all charges would be added to the bill submitted to Senator Stevens by the subcontractor. This corroborated the heart of the defense case. Senator Stevens maintained that when he paid the bills submitted to him, he understood he was paying for everything he owed. Bambi Tyree was an underage prostitute with whom Mr. Allen had a relationship. Allen was a major prosecution witness against Senator Stevens. In an unrelated case, Tyree was interviewed by the FBI. The FBI memorandum of that interview states that Tyree submitted a false affidavit at Allen's request denying her sexual relationship with Allen. The Government in that case filed a memorandum under seal which stated Allen had procured the false affidavit. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Finally, Mr. Schuelke found that Mr. Bottini failed to take steps to correct testimony by Mr. Allen on the witness stand which Mr. Bottini knew to be false in violation of Napue v. Illinois \5\ (the Report at 503). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ 360 U.S. 264 (1959). When Allen was interviewed by prosecutors shortly before trial, he changed his version of the facts on a critical issue for the defense. For the first time, Allen characterized memoranda Senator Stevens had sent to him in 2002 asking Allen to be sure and send Senator Stevens a bill for the work, as ``cover your ass'' memos. When asked on cross-examination at trial whether his characterization of the documents as ``cover your ass'' memos was something he had just recently told prosecutors, Allen said ``no.'' That answer was false, but no effort was made to correct the testimony. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. Schuelke was appointed ``to investigate and prosecute criminal contempt proceedings as may be appropriate against the prosecutors in this case'' (the Report at 1). Despite having found that Mr. Bottini and Mr. Goeke intentionally withheld and concealed material exculpatory information which was required to be disclosed to Senator Stevens and Williams & Connolly by Brady and Giglio (the Report at 36), Mr. Schuelke ultimately concluded that no prosecution for criminal contempt would lie. According to Mr. Schuelke, at a hearing on September 10, 2008, the judge in the Stevens case failed to issue ``a clear, specific and unequivocal order such that it would support a finding by a District Court beyond a reasonable doubt that 18 U.S.C. Sec. 401 (3) had been violated'' (the Report at 513). In my view, Mr. Schuelke's report is entitled to deference where it purports to find facts and reach conclusions based on the enormous investigative effort which underlies it. However, the entire transcript of the September 10, 2008 hearing is available for review so that one can reach one's own conclusion as to what transpired at that critical event. Here, I must respectfully disagree with Mr. Schuelke's characterization of what occurred. On September 10, 2008, the court issued a clear, unequivocal order to the government to produce material pursuant to Brady and its progeny. Everyone agreed that they understood their obligation. None of the prosecutors asked for clarification of what was being ordered. We must recall Mr. Schuelke's earlier conclusion that ``By any standard . . .'' the Williams and Tyree materials were Brady. Accordingly, failure to disclose what were clear Brady materials, was in direct violation of the court's order. The fact that no written order was entered on September 10 is irrelevant because it is well established that a written order is not required. See In re Hipp, Inc., 5 F.3d 109, 112 n.4 (5th Cir. 1993). It is noteworthy that Mr. Wainstein, counsel for Mr. Bottini, in a letter to Attorney General Holder dated March 15, 2012, acknowledges that no written order is required for a contempt proceeding and that the judge's verbal order at the September 10, 2008 hearing was clear and unequivocal. Based on the foregoing, I believe that Mr. Schuelke's rationale for not proceeding is unpersuasive. There may be many reasons for a prosecutor to exercise discretion and decide not to prosecute a case, but the reason stated here in not convincing. The judge's order was clear as was its violation. It is fair to ask ``how did this happen?'' The obvious answer is that over-zealous prosecutors got caught up in a win at all costs mentality and ignored their obligation to prosecute fairly and within the limits imposed by the Constitution. The question remains, however, where was the supervision which would have operated as a reality check to rein in prosecutors who, according to the Report, engaged in ``systematic concealment of significant exculpatory evidence which would have independently corroborated Senator Stevens' defense and his testimony, and seriously damaged the testimony and credibility of the government's key witness.''? It is clear from the Report that there was a breakdown in responsibility and accountability in how the case was being handled. Brenda Morris, Principal Deputy Chief of the Public Integrity Section, was thrust into the role of lead prosecutor just a few days before the indictment was filed in a case which had been investigated for two years. According to Ms. Morris, she had resisted being put in the position of lead counsel several times. (See Exhibit 4 in the Addendum to the Report.) Once in the position, she was well behind the curve in mastering the facts and was faced with resentment by the prosecutors who had been on the case. Her solution, in her own words was, ``to make herself as little as possible'' (the Report at 3). In essence, she accepted the position of lead counsel without accepting and exercising the responsibilities inherent in the role. This was at least part of the reason the case imploded. No one was supervising the prosecutors in a meaningful way. This does not in any way excuse the misconduct, but it is part of the explanation for how matters got to the sorry state set out in the Report.\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ The Report exonerates Ms. Morris of knowingly and willfully withholding Brady and Giglio information from the defense (the Report at 506). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The vast majority of federal prosecutors perform their roles with integrity and in conformity with their sworn obligation to uphold the law. Matters went terribly awry in this case, and it is to Attorney General Holder's credit that he decided to dismiss the Stevens case with prejudice, in effect, expunging the verdict. __________ Mr. Sensenbrenner. Mr. Wainstein, I think that Mr. Bottini was very clearly the most experienced of the prosecutors that were prosecuting Senator Stevens. And I just look at the long litany of errors that occurred, and ignoring the judge's admonition. You know, for example, during one hearing, the judge admonished the prosecutors that the government has an obligation to turn over the Brady and Giglio information, and if they don't want to do that, they ought to resign. And then there were some letters that Mr. Bottini authored relative to the Brady and Giglio issues that were sent to counsel for Senator Stevens. In one of those letters Mr. Bottini failed to include significant Brady information provided to him by Rocky Williams, which a few days earlier corroborated Senator Stevens' primary defense. In your written testimony, you said, Mr. Bottini only skimmed the second of the two Brady letters, which also, according to Mr. Schuelke, contain significant misstatements and conceal the importance of important Brady and Giglio information. At trial, Mr. Bottini did not correct Bill Allen's false testimony on cross- examination. On September 10, the judge issued a clear order to the prosecutors to comply with Brady and Giglio or it would support a criminal contempt prosecution. Mr. Williams was sent to Alaska, and Mr. Bottini apparently had some role in making that decision. Mr. Allen suborned perjury. That information was not disclosed. And Mr. Bottini did not produce counsel for Senator Stevens' April 15, 2008 interview notes of Bill Allen pursuant to Brady or Giglio. Now it is going on again and again. And we know of at least two admonitions from the bench to either produce the information, resign, or face criminal prosecution. Mr. Allen's false testimony was not corrected on cross-examination. Now, this is an experienced prosecutor. And it was up to the Department of Justice to determine when to file the indictment. Senator Stevens was up for reelection 4 months after the indictment was filed. And as one who has run for office numerous times, it is pretty hard to get reelected when you are indicted, you don't have an opportunity to have a jury decide your guilt or innocence. And that is, the timing that the Justice Department undertook in determining when to file the indictment I think practically guaranteed that Senator Stevens' attorneys would have asked for a very speedy trial. And finally, there was the complaint that the defense counsel was very aggressive in the presentation of their case. Now, it has been a long time since I have tried cases in court. And I always thought that the counsel, pursuant to rules, was on an ethical obligation to present a vigorous case for their trial. You know, you say that Mr. Bottini was caught up in the milieu of the trial and the lack of supervision from on high. But he was so experienced, couldn't he overcome that? Or couldn't he throw the red flag down on the field and tell his superiors in the Justice Department that they ought to have a hand on the tiller? Basically what I hear from you, Mr. Wainstein, is that well, he did the best he could under the circumstances, and it was the folks up above him that kind of dropped the ball. And I will give you a chance to answer my 4\1/2\ minutes of a litany of things that are in the report. And forget about the red light, because I am not going to ask a follow-up question. Mr. Wainstein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You gave me a lot to chew on here. Let me start off. First, Joe is not saying-- not pointing fingers at the people above him. He is not saying that he didn't do anything wrong. He will say he wishes he did throw a flag. He just bore down and worked on his little area and didn't say, you know what, we really need to do this, we need to stop the presses here, go back to the beginning and try to fix this. And he wishes he did. So he is not saying that this is all somebody else's fault. He is accepting responsibility for the mistakes and the miscalculations he made. Another thing I would like to mention is, you know, you mentioned zealous advocacy by defense counsel. I am not complaining about their work. They are very a successful defense counsel and they do a great job for their clients. My only point is, that is a circumstance that kept the prosecutors on their heels, confused, running here and there, and they never really got their sea legs at trial. And that is one of the reasons why mistakes were more likely, because the critical thing that we have focused on is, is there intentional conduct here or is it mistaken conduct? And the circumstances that we have laid out here, we have laid out with the intention of showing you that this really was a series of mistakes. Now, you have laid out a number of the things that the report indicates that my client is guilty of. Now of course, you are characterizing the facts as characterized in the report. You are accepting the conclusions that these things were done intentionally. And I understand that, because your basis of knowledge is the report. What I am doing is--on behalf of Joe, and frankly on behalf of the other subjects--pushing back on those assertions by the Special Prosecutor, because I think the Special Prosecutor, like you, did a tremendous service to the country here and it was a tremendous challenge what he had to deal with. But I believe that he got some of the facts wrong and he got the inferences wrong. So if you look at a few of the things raised, it is not so clear-cut. For instance, the question about whether Bill Allen provided perjured testimony or wrong testimony that Joe should have corrected. If you actually go back and look at the record, you will see why Joe realized he was totally confused, and the jury who had already--Joe had already advised the jury that Mr. Allen had some cognitive impairments, that he had some serious problems, and those problems actually played out while he was on the stand. The jury understood that he would get confused and he got confused. I think his final question was, hell I don't know what day it was that I talked about this. Joe's recognition--he explained this to Mr. Schuelke--was I realized he was confused. If I tried to clean it up, it would get worse. And the critical thing is that Joe did not use that information, did not try to take advantage of it in his closing argument by suggesting that Allen had not just recently told him this information. He didn't exploit it at all, even though defense counsel raised that issue. My point is, he had a reason for what he did which was not nefarious, was in fact understandable. Rocky Williams, the only other example I would like to cite. He talked about how he learned that Rocky Williams had this assumption that Senator Stevens was going to pay for that work. He did. Rocky Williams told Joe this, and Joe thought about it. He has explained this to Mr. Schuelke. He thought about, boy, this is an assumption by a person who is working on a work site that the guy who owns that work site, the house there, is going to pay for that work. Is that something that we need to turn over to defense? He asked a critical question: Did you Mr. Williams, Rocky Williams, tell the Senator or the Senator's wife that the charges for the work were all going to be put in the Christensen Builders bills that you are paying? ``No, I didn't but I assumed that.'' Well, frankly, Joe's thinking was, everybody on that work site assumes that the owner of the house is paying for the construction on that house. I think we would all assume that. That is not something that can be elicited on the stand. That is just speculation, and is not something that is disclosable. Now, you can take issue with that decision. My point is, he had a reasonable basis for the decision he made that is far from criminal intent to hide facts that should have gotten to the defense, even though one can question whether, you know, in retrospect he should have made the other decision. Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. Mr. Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I am not as concerned about the individual prosecutors involved. Their fate will be determined in another forum. But it does show, I think it is clear particularly from what we have heard from the Chairman and from the gentleman from South Carolina, that things didn't go right in this trial. It should have been treated differently. And if this kind of stuff happens in a high-profile case like this, you can only imagine what happens in the run-of-the- mill cases. In most cases, this kind of information would never come to light. So we have a question of whether or not we need to change our procedures, particularly in light of the laboratory scandal that has just come to light. So in terms of what the standard ought to be going forward, does anybody think admissibility ought to be part of the standard if it is evidence that Brady information has to be admissible? I know in civil standards, if it would lead to admissible evidence it would help impeach witnesses, it would help the investigation, even if it is hearsay, or if it helps settlement you can get discovery in civil cases, and it has nothing to do with admissibility. Should admissibility be part of the standard going forward? Mr. Baron. Let me respond. Usually when you are talking about Brady material, it is material that the prosecution does not want admitted, I mean, because it is going to tend to be exculpatory. It may be material that the defense wants to admit. And certainly if it is relevant and material, it certainly should be admitted, if that is your question. Mr. Scott. Well, should that be part of the standard? It wouldn't have to be admissible evidence. It could be hearsay and other things that are clearly inadmissible that would be helpful to the prosecution. So admissibility is not going to be part of---- Mr. Baron. Admissibility of the evidence in and of itself should not be the standard. It is whether it might lead to evidence that could be used in that way. Mr. Scott. Okay. So we are back to material. Is there any suggestion that the standard on review, on appellate review ought to be different? The standard on appellate review suggests that the availability of the Brady material could have changed the result. Could have--not necessarily--but could have. Is there any suggestion that that standard on appellate review be changed? Mr. Wainstein. I think there is talk about that. I don't know that--I see problems with that. If you were to change the--or to take materiality out of the appellate standard, then every little deviation--let's say to talk about it in a Giglio context, impeachment, to use the example that Mr. Schuelke cited before, about a Tuesday versus a Thursday. You would be litigating every little discrepancy. So there would be no finality to cases, and you would end up with cases being reversed for what really is not outcome determinative. Mr. Scott. So if all of these proposals will not change the standard on appellate review, are we just talking about good practice and not really changing the law? Mr. Baron. I think that the materiality standard--and I think Mr. Schuelke made the point earlier; it is very difficult for someone who is a prosecutor to put himself in the shoes of defense counsel in a hotly contested case and figure out what is material, what is not material, what is relevant, what is not relevant. Indeed, the prosecutor may not really know just what his defense strategy is going to be. How can he make the judgment in a vacuum? So I think that to the extent that one continues to impose a materiality standard, it makes it harder and harder for the prosecutor to make a judgment that is sound. And so therefore I think that is the push of removing that standard because it is unrealistic to expect the prosecutor to make that judgment and indeed very difficult for an appellate court to make that judgment. Mr. Scott. Well particularly because neither may know what the defense knew, and this could be the key little connection that could help them make their case and be material to the defense, but the prosecution had no way of knowing that it was that important information. Mr. Baron. Exactly. Mr. Scott. Now on appellate review, if it turns out that way, and you hadn't released it, you would have a Brady problem. Mr. Baron. Yes. Mr. Scott. So we are talking about good practice; don't get into Brady problems that you can avoid. Just release it all. But you are not talking about changing the standard on review. If it in fact was not material, then there should be--are you suggesting that there is no sanction? Mr. Baron. I think that--to the extent that on appellate review, the court--it is going to be a pretty extreme case that where an appellate court will feel it is in a position to, let's say, reverse a conviction for failure to disclose I think will be material evidence. I agree with Mr. Wainstein that to the extent--you don't want the appellate courts getting bogged down in every relatively minor instance that something was not turned over. If it would not have had some material effect, it seems to me that that is asking too much. I think you bog down, you clog the system with a lot of cases on appeal where it shouldn't be happening. Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Gowdy. [presiding.] I thank the gentleman from Virginia. Mr. Wainstein, I don't really care about how zealous or not zealous the defense counsel was. I would rather have good facts than good lawyers. And it just strikes me that the facts weren't good, which means maybe I am missing something. If you paid $170,000 for something whose fair market value is $160,000, even Mr. Scott can't win that case if he is a prosecutor--I don't think. Am I missing facts? Look, I want to be sympathetic to prosecutors. I was one for a long time. But what am I missing? Mr. Wainstein. Good question, sir. Just keeping in mind, I represent Joe Bottini. And I will say that Joe was not involved in the decision to charge the case. When the decision was made to charge the case, he was actually surprised that an indictment was actually filed. Mr. Gowdy. It is not tough to get an indictment. Mr. Wainstein. No, no, no. I am not making the point that that passed the threshold. I am saying the fact that it was actually issued caught him by surprise. He was off working on a capital case up in Alaska when it was issued. But you know, having been in main Justice for quite some time, I have often seen where you have a case that looks a certain way at the indictment stage and then especially with good defense counsel--and we had good defense counsel here--get involved, it starts to morph and it starts to look different. And I am only speculating because I wasn't inside this process. But sometimes that happens, where the facts just get worse. I think everybody would question, you know, why the case was charged. You have got to remember, it is tough. If you have what looks like a makable case against a sitting United States Senator, charging has its consequences. But not charging also has its consequences. So it is a tough--I just think the people in that position were in a tough position. Mr. Gowdy. You were at DOJ for a time period. This practice of interviewing witnesses without the case agent present, which at best may potentially make you a witness, at worst leads to what we are talking about here, wouldn't that have corrected it if you had had a Bureau agent or an IRS agent or the case agent present for the interview? Mr. Wainstein. Yes. I mean in most cases they did as far as I know, and I think Mr. Schuelke is sort of the expert on the facts. He indicated that he thought that there was an agent there, either FBI or IRS agent. Not always the case agent. One of the problems was--in a couple of the critical interviews, a 302, an FBI report, was not generated. And especially in the interview of Bill Allen, on April 15, 2008, where he made the critical comment--statement which was then-- which he then changed as it got closer to trial, there was no 302 written of that. And that is one of the problems in the case because prosecutors didn't have a written record, which they could have looked at to say, oh, wait a minute; what Bill Allen is saying now in September is different from what he said in April. So that was really the main problem. And I don't believe there were instances where they went forward without agents. They were smart. They get it. Yeah, if you go in there without an agent, you are going to make yourself a witness in case something arises at trial that hearkens back to that interview. Mr. Gowdy. Well, as you probably noticed, Congress is much better at doing autopsies than it is at doing well-checkups. We like to wait until something horrible happens and then we rush in with a long list of cures, most of which are cures for symptoms that don't exist. But it does sully the name of 99 percent of the prosecutors who actually do value the administration of justice more than they do results. And you don't ever make the news when you don't drop the baby. It is only when you do that you have your counsel at a House Judiciary Committee hearing. So do the rules need to change? Does the law need to change? Or is this just a case where the rules are sufficient, they just weren't followed? Mr. Wainstein. I am not going to pretend to be the world's expert on this issue, because my focus in this has been different. It has been Joe. But I think, as someone has said earlier, the rules here were sufficient. And I think especially in the aftermath of this, I give a lot of credit to the Department for what they did, where they have tightened up training, expanded training and that their whole focus is, okay, we are going to give guidance to the prosecutors that they turn over all exculpatory, all favorable information to the defense without regard to the materiality requirement. But we want the law to be a materiality requirement. So that if we don't turn over the Tuesday versus Thursday thing, because we just overlooked it, that we are not going to then put a conviction in jeopardy or really undermine the process of---- Mr. Gowdy. So an open-file policy by not an open-file law? Mr. Wainstein. Well, I don't know if I would say open file. The prosecutor's job is to turn it over whether it is through open file or just telling them, providing the relevant documents to the defense, if they find something favorable, and don't just hold onto it because it is not favorable information that is material. And I think having that as the policy guidance and the law being, okay, but we only actually take action against the prosecutors and against their case if it was material information that wasn't turned over. I think that is a good approach if well trained and well carried out and well supervised. And 99.99 percent of the criminal trials should go smoothly. Mr. Gowdy. My time is up. And I think the Chairman is back. Mr. Sensenbrenner. [Presiding.] The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are two issues that I am concerned with. One is the prosecution being the gatekeeper or the keeper of the file and having the unbridled discretion with which to decide whether or not to disclose information that might be exculpatory to guilt or of impeachment value to the defense. So with that unbridled discretion, it means that most failures to disclose evidence will never be decided--or would never be discovered because at no point during the initial prosecution, the trial, the appeal, at no point does the defense have the right to peruse the entire prosecution file. And I can tell you that this is not the first time this has happened. It happens many times. It even happened in a death penalty case that I handled out of Georgia, that we got the case reversed because the prosecutor used perjured testimony, knowingly, knowingly used perjured testimony. This is in a death penalty case. So this desire to win at all cost, I am afraid is a little more prevalent than we may admit. And then my second problem is that whenever it is discovered, then nothing happens to the prosecutor. People think that lawyers are--you know, make up kind of a good-old- boy club-type situation, and they are supposed to discipline themselves. They don't want another outside force outside of the bar to discipline lawyers. And that is why under most State bar rules, lawyers have an obligation to--when a substantial question as to the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer is in question, then they have an obligation by their State bar association to disclose that information. We have a reluctance to disclose misconduct. It is like tattling on our club member. And that, if it continues, will result in a public demand that the power to discipline lawyer misconduct be put in the hands of nonlawyers, and I don't think we want that. So we need to be cognizant of our obligation to disclose any case where there may be a question about whether or not something was untruthful or not. Now, as far as a remedy for this situation, upon motion of a defense counsel or the State for an in-camera review of the entire State's file and a continuing obligation thereafter to disclose, all the way through appeal, such information, to require that by statute, to require that the court do that by statute, is that a workable solution to this first problem that I cited about the prosecutor being the unbridled gatekeeper? Mr. Baron. Mr. Baron. I think it is a nice idea. But I think from a practical matter there would be something of an uproar by the judges that they don't have the time to be burdened with that. And also, they know about a case. They may have had a couple of hearings in it, but they don't know the case in depth. So to put that burden on them and expect them to be the gatekeeper, even though we like the fact that they are neutral, rather than a prosecutor who is in an adversarial process, it is a huge burden to impose on the courts. And I think implicit in your question is, How do we legislate integrity? And can we? Because ultimately what we see from what Mr. Schuelke found in his report, even if you had had open-file discovery, complete access, things never got into the file that should have been there. Or 302s, the FBI interview form, were edited in such fashion that the exculpatory information was left out and the inculpatory stuff was left in. So ultimately, even the most prophylactic approach is going to turn on the integrity of the people who are serving as prosecutors. I think some of these steps might be a step in the right direction, but we shouldn't kid ourselves. If what happened here--if Mr. Schuelke is right about what happened here, this was really pretty terrible. I don't want to put too fine a point on this. It is pretty terrible. And prosecutors engaged in that kind of conduct, no amount of reviewing the file is going to really reveal that, because they were hiding things, according to Mr. Schuelke. And that is pretty awful. Mr. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentlewoman from Florida, Ms. Adams. Mrs. Adams. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That kind of is very bothersome to me as a law enforcement officer. You mentioned in your opening statement the breakdown in supervision. Would you like to elaborate on that? Would you care to elaborate on that a little bit further? I think from what you are saying here, there was a definite breakdown. Mr. Baron. Yes, of course. I have over the course of my career run a number of investigations, some very big ones where I had a dozen lawyers and a dozen forensic auditors conducting an investigation, and much smaller ones where there were three or four of us. What seems to have happened here--it was very interesting. When Mr. Schuelke was asked to describe what was the administrative structure, he started with the trial itself. But who was running the show for the 2 years that the investigation was going on? When I read the report, I couldn't figure out who was in charge, which is kind of shocking and I think can lead to all kinds of problems. The thing is that even when Brenda Morris was appointed, apparently she was appointed the lead prosecutor a few days before the indictment came down. Apparently, prior to that, according to her submission she made, had basically declined several times taking the role of lead prosecutor. I don't know why she ultimately accepted, whether she was pressured into it, or decided it was a good idea. But in any event, to push somebody into that spot was not a good decision. But then it gets worse. According to her own testimony, she decided that she would, quote, make herself small in her role as now the lead prosecutor. That could only make a bad situation worse. It is basically saying, even though I am accepting the role of lead prosecutor and all the responsibility that comes with that, I am not going to exercise it. I am not going to do that. In the absence of that, all kinds of very bad things happen. There has to be a hierarchy when you are running an investigation or when you are running a case, because with hierarchy comes structure, and with structure comes accountability. You can't have people milling around on their own making these decisions. You need somebody who steps up and says, I am going to lead this, and if things go bad, I am going to be responsible for it, and I am going to give everybody direction. That didn't happen here. It doesn't excuse the misconduct but it helps explain it. Mrs. Adams. Thank you. Mr. Wainstein, your specific criticism about Mr. Schuelke and the way he conducted his investigation, what are they? And his conclusions? What are they? What are your specific criticisms about the way it was handled? Mr. Wainstein. Well, I guess the general criticism is that he looked at what were clearly mistakes, very serious mistakes made on behalf of the whole trial team. And my client participated in those mistakes as well, and was responsible for some. He looked at those mistakes. He gauged them as being very serious and having a serious impact on the integrity of the trial. And I don't take any issue with any of that. But then he concluded that they were intentional. And that is the very critical thing that I am focusing on here, because in my book, if you are--and I think former prosecutors here would all agree--if you find a prosecutor who intentionally broke the rules, punish him to the hilt. That is it. Throw the book at him. Because one bad apple is going to have serious implications not only for that person and that person's trial, but for the whole Justice Department. But that is very different, though, from making mistakes. And that is why I wanted to focus--and I think he didn't focus sufficiently--on the circumstances that were very difficult for these prosecutors that caused them to make the mistakes they shouldn't have made, but nonetheless they were inadvertent as opposed to intentional. Mrs. Adams. Didn't the court give you an opportunity to comment on Mr. Schuelke's report and have those appended to the report? Mr. Wainstein. The report was---- Mrs. Adams. Did they give you the opportunity, the court? Mr. Wainstein. The court gave us the opportunity, after announcing the conclusions, to provide a criticism that could be appended to the report, but not to provide any input that might have any impact on the outcome of the report. Mrs. Adams. Did you choose to do so? Mr. Wainstein. I submitted a 50-or-so-page memo that we had provided before that wasn't even mentioned in the report, with a cover memo. And then Joe said his main concern was talking to his colleagues and the Attorney General in the Justice Department. Mrs. Adams. So you submitted that to the courts to have it appended? Mr. Wainstein. Yes. And that was appended. Yes, ma'am. And then we also provided a letter to the Attorney General. Mrs. Adams. Okay. Which, if any, of the Brady and Giglio violations described in Mr. Schuelke's report do you take issue with? Mr. Wainstein. Well, I don't take issue with--well, there are a couple where he determines it is a Brady violation. And I think there is an argument that it is not a Brady violation. My criticism is not so much that these were not violations. So if you look at it from the perspective of Senator Stevens, he was denied a fair process. No question about it. My criticism, as I explained earlier, is Mr. Schuelke's determination that those violations on the part of Joe were intentional. And my point is, no, they were not intentional. They were mistakes. Mr. Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman's time has expired. The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee. Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for this hearing and thank the witnesses for their presence and express my deep concern over this question. And I really refer to the numbers of individuals who have been released under the new premise of DNA evidence, as led by the Innocence Project. And the reason why I mention that is because a lot of that has occurred in the State of Texas. I know that we are looking at a number of different issues. But I think the underlying premise, what I want to speak to, is when people are convicted wrongly and they are incarcerated inappropriately, because of either a lack of expanded evidence, an unwillingness to investigate evidence and then, of course, not presenting evidence or not sharing evidence. So Mr. Wainstein, within the limits of what you can say, what is the status of your case, of your client? Where is it? Is the case completed? Or are you still in the process of defense of this individual? Mr. Wainstein. I am actually--I am representing him for purposes of the investigation that was conducted by Mr. Schuelke. I also happen to be representing him in regard to the internal disciplinary process at the Justice Department, and that is not completed. Ms. Jackson Lee. And is he, or she, presently still a functioning prosecutor? Mr. Wainstein. Yes. Mr. Bottini, a 27-year AUSA, assistant U.S. Attorney, and is in court, going in and out of court every day, doing everything from meth cases to--he is doing a case involving a militia, members of a militia who threatened to kill a Federal judge. So he is still going in there and doing-- -- Ms. Jackson Lee. So is it in the public domain as to the reason--is it in the public domain based upon Mr. Schuelke's report why he did not present that evidence? Is that in the public domain? Mr. Wainstein. Yes. Our submissions to Mr. Schuelke in which I explained the reasons why these discovery violations happened on the part of Joe, and explained how they were mistakes, that is in the public domain. That was released with the Schuelke report. So yes, people see that. And hopefully people are hearing today that there is another side to the story, not just a finding of intentional misconduct. Ms. Jackson Lee. And I don't want to litigate your case, but I guess since it is in the public domain--Mr. Schuelke's report--is the explanation that the paperwork was voluminous, that it didn't come to his attention, what is the parameters of the explanation of the mistake? Mr. Wainstein. Well, there are several different things that Mr. Schuelke has accused him of doing wrong. And he did make mistakes. He didn't turn over several things that should have been disclosed. Ms. Jackson Lee. That he was aware of? Mr. Wainstein. He was aware of. But one thing he forgot. Another thing he made an assessment that it was something that didn't need to be turned over. Another thing, he tried to get it disclosed but his supervisors wouldn't let him. Seven times he said to his supervisors in the Public Integrity Section, you have got to get this out. We have got to disclose it. And they shut him down. In fact, the section chief supervisor sent him an email saying, You work for Public Integrity. These are your marching orders. Stand down.'' That is why that information didn't get out. Ms. Jackson Lee. Without litigating his case here, if I just take the parameters or the framework that you have just given, I would assume, then, that we look at this question of either prosecutorial abuse or misconduct, we need to look up the chain and try to understand what supervisors are told and what they are not. Let me quickly ask: This proposed legislation that has been suggested that might clarify Brady material, would that be helpful in knowing and having more detailed procedures for presenting or finding evidence? Both of you, any of you. Mr. Baron. I would say that eliminating the materiality requirement for a prosecutor to take into consideration in making a Brady or Giglio judgment, I think that is a step in the right direction. Ms. Jackson Lee. So that means that they would just present what they had and you don't have the discretion to say, ``No, this is not really relevant. I will keep this.'' Is that what you are saying? Mr. Baron. Well, as I understand the legislation, the prosecutor is not to say, gee, this might help them but I don't think it is really material. Ms. Jackson Lee. That discretion is taken away. It is supposed to be turned over, even though the issue of materiality, that is not going to be addressed. You have to turn it over if it might be helpful to the other side. Ms. Jackson Lee. I think this is crucial in terms of what happened to Senator Stevens. And in his death, I apologize for what happened. And I hope we can correct this situation. Thank you. I yield back. Mr. Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman's time has expired. I would like to thank all of our witnesses for their testimony today. Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to submit to the Chair additional written questions for the witnesses which we will forward and ask them to respond as promptly as they can so their answers may be part of the record. Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to submit additional materials for inclusion in the record. Now in closing, let me say that this is probably one of the blackest incidents in the history of the Justice Department, because by their misconduct they have ruined the reputation of a senior United States Senator and probably caused his defeat in the election, both by their timing of the indictment, how the trial was conducted, the lack of supervision by the Justice Department and the like. I think culpability here goes beyond the trial team that actually prosecuted Senator Stevens. There is plenty of evidence that there was a lack of supervision, that the Public Integrity Section wanted to get Senator Stevens one way or the other. And even though some members of the Public Integrity Section have been exonerated in the internal review of the Justice Department, there has to be a review beyond the Justice Department into exactly what happened. All of us in law school are reminded that in addition to being advocates for our clients, we are also officers of the court. And as officers of the court, we have taken an oath to attempt to have justice administered fairly and impartially, which means that it is based upon all of the evidence and the applicable law. As one of my colleagues on the panel has indicated earlier, I think that this terrible miscarriage of justice warrants the investigation of the D.C. bar into whether any of those who were involved in this should be disciplined, with penalties up to disbarment. I don't trust the Justice Department to conduct an impartial investigation. We have heard time and time again that the marching orders were to win at all cost, and to forget about the administration of justice. That is something that is profoundly troubling to me and I think to anybody who looks at this objectively. I am not saying that any one person should possibly be disbarred, but I am saying that the D.C. bar ought to look at this away from the old boys' and girls' network in the Justice Department, and impose what discipline that is warranted on whomever was responsible for what happened in this trial. This is not the first time the Public Integrity Section has gone overboard. We had the case a couple of decades ago of former Congressman Joe McDade of Pennsylvania who basically spent his life savings and then some to get an acquittal verdict from a jury for essentially doing casework for constituents. So I think that what has to happen here is the message has to get out that any prosecutor who does something like this, their career and their bar license may be on the line for doing something that is outrageous and egregious. I am not a bar commissioner. I think that they ought to look at the evidence on this. But they ought to look at it. So with that, without objection, the Subcommittee is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] A P P E N D I X ---------- Material Submitted for the Hearing Record Addendum to the Prepared Statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein, Partner, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] E N C L O S U R E: AUSA Bottini's Submission to the Special Prosecutor [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] EXHIBIT A [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] EXHIBIT B [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] EXHIBIT C [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] EXHIBIT D [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] EXHIBIT E [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] EXHIBIT F [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] EXHIBIT G [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] EXHIBIT H [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Prepared Statement of Sean Bennett, Kalamazoo, Michigan [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]