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UNDERSTANDING FUTURE IRREGULAR WARFARE CHALLENGES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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UNDERSTANDING FUTURE IRREGULAR WARFARE CHALLENGES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 27, 2012.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:33 p.m. in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

Mr. THORNBERRY. The hearing will come to order. One of our witnesses is on the way and will be here shortly, but I think we will go ahead and get started because I understand he is just moments away from being here. I appreciate everybody's patience while we were over voting.

Last fall, this subcommittee held a hearing to begin exploring the possibility that what we call irregular warfare may be a regular, that is frequent, challenge for us in the future, as, in fact, it certainly has been in the past. And we began to explore how we ensure that the hard-won lessons of the past decade are not simply shelved and forgotten as we "get back to normal."

Today we want to go a little deeper in looking at what types of future irregular warfare challenges we are likely to face? What strategies are best suited to deal with these future challenges? And what examples or models may exist to support those strategies and effectively deal with the irregular challenges?

Let me just say that I have read all of the statements from all of the witnesses and they were excellent. Each of you provided well-written statements that were thought-provoking. I have to say, Colonel Maxwell, I got some chuckles out of your description of the naming game that goes on in the Pentagon and it made me feel better. Because sometimes I hear all of these terms that describe the same thing, and as I am trying to sort through what the difference between this, that, or the other thing is, it is somewhat reassuring to know that other people have the same issue and that part of what is going on is just to make sure we don't understand what is going on. But I appreciate very much the statements that each of you provided and I look forward to the subcommittee getting down into asking more questions about them.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

Mr. THORNBERRY. First, though, I would turn to the distinguished ranking member Mr. Langevin for any opening statement he would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before us today. Congress, as we know, has the constitutional responsibility to ensure that our military is fully prepared to defend our country and our vital interests. To do that effectively, we must understand the full range of potential security challenges that we face. Irregular warfare is just such a challenge and it is fitting that we are addressing it today in the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee.

The term IW [Irregular Warfare] evokes mental images of shadowy adversaries on uncertain or ill-defined battlefields, and there is certainly some truth to that. Terrorism is a classic form of IW and—but it is only one subset. Enemies will attempt to forgo a direct confrontation in one of our areas of strength, instead seeking an asymmetrical advantage in an area where we may be less prepared or less able to defend ourselves. For example, our formidable joint formations of air, ground, sea, and air forces and space forces, rather, quickly become ineffective if a cyber attack disrupts our command and control or the critical infrastructure on which our bases depend. And even our most precise weapons become difficult to employ against an enemy who has embedded himself within a civilian population.

So the nature of warfare is, of course, uncertain, but what is certain is that potential challengers will seek ways to circumvent our strengths and exploit our weaknesses. Therefore, it is our responsibility to educate ourselves about developing trends, capabilities, technologies, and tactics that an adversary might use to find an advantage against us or our partners and then posture our forces properly to meet that sort of threat. We need to develop the agile thinking necessary to make prudent defense choices, and this hearing is an important part of that process. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the Appendix on page 36.]

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. We are pleased to have before us today to testify, Dr. Seth Jones, senior political scientist with the RAND Corporation. When he gets here, Dr.—I mean Colonel Robert Killebrew, everybody is a doctor today for some reason—Colonel Robert Killebrew, U.S. Army retired non-resident senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Colonel David Maxwell, U.S. Army retired, Associate Director, Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. Without objection, your complete written statements will be made part of the record. And if you would, we would appreciate it if you could summarize your comments. We will run the clock for 5 minutes, that is a rough guide just to help you keep track of time. But then after you summarize your statements, then we would proceed to questions. So we will get started. Dr. Jones, thanks for being here, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. SETH JONES, SENIOR POLITICAL SCIENTIST, RAND CORPORATION

Dr. JONES. Thank you very much for having this hearing, Chairman Thornberry and Ranking Member Langevin. It is an honor to be here. What I will do is I will briefly touch on the three questions that we were asked to look at, what types of irregular warfare challenges is the U.S. likely to face? What strategies are best suited? And what are existing examples or models to manage irregular warfare challenges? But let me just say, based partly on my own experience in conducting irregular warfare in Afghanistan, that we do face considerable challenges. By today, in Afghanistan, we have about 432,000 counterinsurgency forces. We have spent over $100 billion per year, at least this fiscal year and deployed a range of sophisticated platforms of systems.

The Taliban and its allies, on the other hand, have deployed between 20- and 40,000 forces, a ratio of nearly 11-to-1 in favor of counterinsurgents, and had revenues of between $100 and $200 million per year. A ratio of about 500-to-1 in favor of counterinsurgents. Yet the Taliban's ability to utilize limited resources and sustain a prolonged insurgency, I do think highlights some of the challenges we face on irregular warfare.

What I would like to do briefly is then first touch on irregular warfare challenges. There have been some individuals who have argued that groups like Al Qaeda are on the verge of strategic defeat. What I would argue is that we face a range of irregular warfare challenges in the future. They include threats from nonstate actors, including terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, and Hezbollah; drug trafficking organizations, including Mexican cartels and others; violent global activists, including some of the anarchist groups that have appeared in some of the major G8 and other summits. Also from states, those that challenge purposely the United States through irregular warfare, including Iran and those who do so inadvertently because of weak governance. One might think of our neighbor to the border, for example, Mexico more on the weak governance side.

I think as we look at the future, even as we look at Al Qaeda, and I have included a map, this is figure 1 in my testimony, indicating a range of areas where we have Al Qaeda involvement in irregular warfare, either through its core, its key affiliates, or its key allies. That includes a range of countries in Africa, especially North Africa, but including countries of concern like Nigeria, the Middle East, including expansion in countries like Syria, South Asia, and then in East Asia and countries like the Philippines and Indonesia.

I would also highlight several other challenges that are worth mentioning; one is interagency cooperation. My personal view, there have been some improvements between organizations like United States Special Operations Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency as demonstrated, in part, during the bin Laden raid of improved interagency cooperation in irregular warfare. But I would submit that including, based on my own experience in theater and on the ground, there clearly are challenges between the Department of Defense and other civilian agencies, including the Department of State and USAID [United States Agency for International Development] on a whole range of strategic, operational, and tactical issues. We can get into more of that more later.

I would also highlight issues and concerns about a Vietnam war syndrome. In an effort to forget lessons from the past, issues related to the health of U.S. forces because of irregular warfare, both past, current, and future. And in a range of technological challenge, I have noted some future projections on Wi-Fi and mobile devices; it is part of figure 2 in my testimony just to give a sense of stuff that is possibly coming down the pike.

On strategies, I have highlighted a range of strategies that the U.S. should and could consider. Let me just briefly note for the purposes of this abbreviated testimony that I would remind individuals that as we talk mostly about supporting counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, we also not forget as we experienced in 2001, the United States may also serve in the role of supporting insurgent groups as we have in Libya, as we did in Afghanistan, and as we may in Syria as well. There are a range of issues that need to be addressed along those lines.

Models, and I won't go into details here, but we can in the testimony. I would highlight Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police as being a useful model to drill down on one aspect of irregular warfare.

And then, let me just conclude by saying there are a few things I would submit are worth considering. One is on the organizational side, continuing to fund programs such as 1208 and VSO [Village Stability Operations] and ALP [Afghan Local Police], the latter of which are paid for using Afghan security forces funds; issues related to health of U.S. forces; continuing training and education for irregular warfare and that deals with the war colleges. And then efforts to consider assessing interagency cooperation as useful in the future. So with that, I will conclude my testimony and hand back to you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Jones can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. Colonel Killebrew, have you had a chance to catch your breath?

STATEMENT OF COL ROBERT KILLEBREW, USA (RET.), NON–RESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY

Colonel KILLEBREW. I have, sir. Thank you. And as self-punishment for that, I will only read part of my testimony, because you have seen it all already. I apologize for being late.

I was asked to come and talk about the future of irregular warfare and insurgency. I am a senior fellow at the Center for New American Security, which means I am probably the oldest guy in the room. And I need to make the point that the remarks I am going make here complement my research there, but my remarks are my own not, CNAS [Center for a New American Security].

You have my testimony, there are some paragraphs I would like to read to you just to make the point and to set the tone. Insurgencies have three characteristics that are always useful to remember. One is that they are always ultimately about politics. And because they are about politics, insurgencies are always different because there is a different political objective or a different political environment in each insurgency. So Vietnam is not like

what we are fighting today. What we are fighting today is not like what we are going to fight next. And I will talk about that in a second.

Insurgencies follow sort of a "sine curve." They start with lawbreaking and matters for police, the curve goes up until they reach such a level that military force is required, and then if a counterinsurgent is successful, the curve comes down again and eventually again becomes a matter for crime, for police. That is what we see in every insurgency, even though I have said they are all different, they all follow this curve. And the purpose of counterinsurgency is to drive the level of violence down to the point that the host government can deal with it as a matter of criminal law.

And the second point I would like to make is the relationship of crime to conflict has changed. One of the big changes in the past 20 years or so has been the emergence of crime for a number of reasons as a political force in the world. The experts with whom I deal estimate that as much as a fifth of the world's GDP [Gross Domestic Product] is now from the black economy. When that happens, then illegal money, as in drug money, becomes a political force, akin to ideology, akin to Marxist philosophy in the prosecution of the crime.

One way to look at the Taliban and its associated warlords supporters, for example, is these big smuggling operations. And this committee knows that our operations in Afghanistan the Drug Enforcement Administration has agents that go in with the Delta Force and the black operators because what they are dealing with is a hybrid of insurgency and crime. The insurgency will probably never be snuffed out until some handle is put on the money that flows into the Taliban.

The same is true of the Colombian FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia], or virtually any insurgency in the world today can also be viewed through the eyes of the police as a transnational criminal organization, that is true of all insurgencies. And that is a major change since the day I studied Mao and chased through the jungles of Vietnam.

In the 21st century, crime, terrorism, and insurgency are blending in new political and social combinations that call for new understandings of approaches to counterinsurgency. Although some still deny the reality, and I have been lectured by experts on this, one need look no further than the impact and the reach of the Mexican criminal cartels which are the prototype of the transnational criminal organization to see the face of modern irregular warfare, insurgency, and terrorism.

One of the more ominous things that has happened in the very recent past has been the combination of the Iranian influence and Mexican drug cartels. You saw that in the Saudi ambassador plot, which needs to be taken very seriously because in my view, and this is a subject of some more work I am doing, in my view that represents a policy decision by the Government of Iran to make an active alliance for purposes of striking inside the United States with the drug cartels. Now the Qods force has been in Venezuela for a decade, and the Qods force and the Iranian Republican Guards Corps and the cartels and the FARC and that whole crowd, have always been very deeply involved in the drug trade.

The fact now that the Qods force reached out to the Zetas to engineer or pay for a strike in the U.S. indicates policy change. We ought to be alert to that. There have been other indications we can talk about in testimony that they have already been striking inside the United States at a low level and has just not been detected yet, at least as far as I know in the unclassified sources.

Finally, in the subject of resource allocation, we need to think carefully about how we do the whole-of-government approach. I personally am very impatient now with the overwording we are doing trying to describe what we see emerging as the new form of terrorism. When we use words like irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, asymmetric warfare, and all those other things, those words down the funding stream have meaning in the terms of stovepipes we put that go into the agencies that fight these people. And at the very bottom of the pipe with our young men and women out there in Central America, or Venezuela, or wherever they are, it is difficult for them to operate if their funding is so restricted they can only apply it in one direction.

This is not a paid political announcement by any of those agencies, but I have seen it firsthand and it is a serious problem. As the sphere of warfare changes, the way we think about supporting our war against it has to change. And the most visible sign of that on the operational level are the stovepipes that we built around different definitions of a problem that is changing faster than we can redefine it.

Sir, with that, I will conclude my remarks and wait for testimony.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Killebrew can be found in the Appendix on page 54.]

Mr. THORNBERRY. Colonel Maxwell.

STATEMENT OF COL DAVID MAXWELL, USA (RET.), ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Colonel MAXWELL. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this distinguished panel. In my testimony, I would like to discuss three areas that have been the focus of my studies and my military experience, lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, the potential for irregular warfare following war or regime collapse in North Korea, and some recommendations for special operations forces operating in the future irregular environment.

Let me begin with what I see as the future of conflict. I think we can put the nature of the threats that we will face into three categories: First there will be those existential threats to the United States or allies that will be characterized by state-on-state military conflict, conquest of territory, and the potential for large-scale death and destruction among the participants, military and civilian.

The second type of conflict will be those that threaten the status quo and regional stability of friends, partners, and allies, with lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism. However, the third

category of threat is one that combines the potential for high-end conventional conflict that can only be conducted by states, or among states, along with a non-conventional conflict to include the potential for insurgency and terrorism as well as humanitarian crises. There is currently at least one threat to a U.S. ally that meets this description, and that is North Korea, and so I will touch on that briefly.

Because of the nature of the Kim family regime in the 60-plus year indoctrination of its population into what Australian scholar Adrian Buzo termed "the guerilla mind-set of the guerilla dynasty." Whether there is war or regime collapse, the potential for insurgency, terrorism, and instability in the north could make Iraq and Afghanistan pale in comparison.

Now let me return to the second category of threats, which I think is really the main focus here. Those are the threats that threaten the status quo and regional stability of friends, partners, and allies, but may not require the commitment of large-scale regular U.S. military forces, but a select and tailored force to be able to assist as appropriate in support of U.S. interests. We have seen these types of conflict in Colombia, the Philippines, Trans-Sahel, Horn of Africa, and Yemen as examples. These are conflicts where SOF [Special Operations Forces] can and has played a significant role.

I would like to touch on something here and mention that SOF really brings two distinct capabilities to support both theater and national strategies. Surgical strike and special warfare, and the term "special warfare" being the traditional term, historical term for special operations.

Now summarize these two capabilities, surgical strike is the execution of activities in a precise manner that employs special operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive territory, or environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets or influence adversaries and threats.

While special warfare is the execution of activities that involve a combination lethal, and non-lethal actions, taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.

And together these two really illustrate the missions that are in Title 10, section 167 in the law for special operations. But those are the two distinct categories that describe the spectrum of special operations.

Now, the United States possesses the finest special operations organization for surgical strike in the world in its national level joint special operations force. However, there is no complimentary national joint level task force capability for special warfare. I would recommend investing in such a national level special warfare joint force that would possess the capabilities to support the requirements of Chiefs of Mission and geographic combatant commanders to be able to advise and assist host nations with discrete capabilities and a small footprint.

Second, for those contingencies that require capabilities beyond SOF, we should consider the establishment of a hybrid corps head-

quarters with both regular and SOF personnel to be able to prepare, train, and deploy enabling support or select combat capabilities when such situations require.

Let me touch on Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines because it offers some lessons for consideration when dealing with the second category of threats. First and foremost, U.S. operations there were shaped by assessments. These assessments occur before the plan is developed and these assessments are continually updated through the duration of the operation. Assessments conducted by special operations personnel are critical to providing information that can cause adjustment to the campaign plan as well as support balance and coherency among the ends, ways, and means of strategy.

Now while SOF provided training, advice and assistance in the Philippines, they did not try to create a military in the U.S. image. Advice was tailored on understanding the Philippine military as well as culture. However, they did integrate some high-tech capabilities into Philippine operations, particularly intelligence capabilities.

Finally, U.S. SOF was in a supporting role, never taking the lead, always protecting the legitimacy of Philippine sovereignty. This is a critical element in preventing the perception of the U.S. as an occupying power. I have attempted to look at the future of irregular warfare and, of course, only touched on it. The key to the future is having a force that is trained for certainty and educated for uncertainty.

The three potential categories of threats should shape the force as well as the strategy. A new SOF organization as well as a hybrid corps construct should be considered for dealing with the second category of threats to provide assistance to friends, partners, and allies when they are threatened with lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism. An overlooked threat is North Korea. It has the potential to be an extremely dangerous and complex threat and this requires that the ROK [Republic of Korea]-U.S. alliance prepare for that threat now.

There are many lessons to be learned for ongoing operations that will have application in the future operating environment. I touched on the Philippines, but as I said, Colombia, Trans-Sahel, Horn of Africa, Yemen, all provide lessons that should be studied. The uncertain future demands an agile force that can fight and win the nation's wars and yet operate in other environments that may it not require a large footprint and massive combat power.

Finally, a successful support to U.S. national security objectives in the future will be characterized by efficient, effective, joint military and interagency operations, executing strategy with balance and coherency amongst ends ways and means. And I will close with that, sir.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Maxwell can be found in the Appendix on page 63.]

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you all for your summary and for your excellent written testimony. We can't quite match you all Colonel for Colonel, but we will give it our best shot. I will yield my first 5 minutes to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. WEST. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are two of them and only one of me. As I listen to the testimony here, it reminds me of the quote from George Santayana who said those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it. We have Somali pirates, well, guess what, we used to have to contend with the Barbary pirates. You go back and you look at the old United States Marine Corps small wars manual, you think about what General Blackjack Pershing had to contend with in the Philippines. So I don't think there is anything new under the sun here.

So the first question I have is at the strategic level, do you think that the United States of America really understands the nature of this 21st century battlefield that we are discussing right now? Are we failing at the strategic level, because having been at the tactical level, and being in Vietnam, you know we always won at the tactical level, but it was at the strategic level where we have problems.

Colonel KILLEBREW. I will answer because I am oldest. He said Vietnam so I get to come in. I think the commands in the field understand it. U.S. SOUTHCOM [Southern Command], for example, is reconfiguring itself to handle the TCO [Transnational Criminal Organization] threat, the transnational crime threat. I think that the operators, certainly in the field know it. The man who would be sitting here who could give you the best testimony is the DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency] agent in Colombia who lives with this every day, who has the grand title of the Agent in Charge of the Andean Ridge. He is up to his neck.

I am not sure in this town and in the deeper understandings of strategy we understand it. What is happening in Mexico a new kind of insurgency. As you know, the Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of the Army got their hands slapped when they said that, and for political reasons I understand why. But the fact is that the insurgency that I studied for Vietnam is changing because it is blending with crime, and the information age is giving it capabilities it never had before. We might slightly disagree that we have seen this before. I am not sure that the U.S. Army at least ever had to deal with a hybrid crime-insurgency threat. That cuts across agencies to such a degree, I don't think we have quite taken that on yet.

Dr. JONES. A couple of comments, this is a $64,000 question, I think. I would say the picture is very mixed along these lines. If we look, for example, at the history of Afghanistan, it is in the news today because of some of the public opinion polls, I would say we spent 2002 to 2009, that is a period of 7 years with a bad strategy, a strategy that was focused primarily on building a central government in Afghanistan, neglecting to understand the tribal, sub-tribe clan, informal nature of the country. So I think strategically, we have made mistakes. We made mistakes in Iraq, in my view, for several years; we corrected them. In the Iraq case beginning around 2006, Afghanistan, we made some course corrections beginning 2009 and on to today. But I do think it does demonstrate that we—that our ability to understand and craft strategic decisions and policies has been mixed.

I would also say I don't believe we have a strategic document on this subject. We have a field manual for counterinsurgency, we can

argue about how good or bad it is, but we don't have one on various other aspects of this broader problem set. So I don't—I could not point to a strategic document which outlines this, even from the Department of Defense's perspective. That seems to me insufficient.

Colonel MAXWELL. Yes, sir. I think your question is spot on. Strategy is hard, and I think that is the hardest thing. I think, you know, and, of course, Sun Tzu said strategy can, of course, take care of bad tactics, but tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat. And I think that is where we really have to focus. And as Dr. Jones said, we have done well correcting ourselves. Strategy is not a silver bullet, there is not a Holy Grail, there is not going to be a single strategy that will work everywhere. It takes understanding, as Colonel Killebrew, I think, laid out some very—very important ideas about some of the threats that we will face. We have got to understand those, but then developing a strategy at the national level is hard. But I don't think we are ever going to see again an NSC [National Security Council]-68, a containment, a single strategic document as Dr. Jones alludes to, that is going give us that answer. It has to be continually worked. And we haven't done it well at first, but we usually—and we have done well over time learning the lessons and adapting, but I think that is what we really need to focus on is strategy.

Colonel KILLEBREW. I wonder if I could make one interjection?

Mr. WEST. Sure.

Colonel KILLEBREW. The most fundamental error we have made in the three insurgencies that my career has covered is that we go in thinking that we are going to be the counterinsurgency force. Dave Maxwell will drill me on this over and over that we are not the primary counterinsurgency force. The primary counterinsurgency force is the host country. We always go in with conventional forces, we always fight Whack-a-Mole for a few years until public patience is exhausted, and then we are driven to the right strategy, because resources start becoming scarce. So if I could make one comment about strategy, it is that we start from a strategically bad place with our understanding about the problem we are facing.

Mr. WEST. Thank you gentlemen, thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Great question, great way to start. Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you again to the panel for your testimony. Let me start off with a broad question, in terms of irregular warfare capabilities, which will become more salient to meet future challenges? And are these capabilities, particularly cybersecurity properly resourced, both fiscally and in terms of manpower and training? Let's start with the panel and go right down.

Dr. JONES. Sir, if I understand your question, you were focused specifically on cyber capabilities?

Mr. LANGEVIN. No, I want to know what irregular warfare capabilities will become more salient to meet future challenges, what will we need to be focused on in terms of the enhanced capabilities and get particularly proficient at? I think that goes to the Colonel's

question in his last comment about getting really good at using our resources properly.

Dr. JONES. Sir, my own personal view based at least partly on experience up through 2011 in the field is that we face enemies, whether they are states or nonstate actors that are adaptive, that have the ability to use and leverage a range of communications, technological abilities to push out propaganda, to recruit, to use for financing, and that means when it comes to capabilities, developing a range of capabilities that allow us to move quickly. From the organizational structure, there is a broad discussion about giving U.S. Special Operations Command more command over theater special operations forces.

I think organizationally, we have some constraints on moving quickly across different theaters. I think also on capabilities, we do need to invest more on the technological side in also being able to push out information in ways on the strategic communications side that takes advantage of the proliferation of the social media. And when one looks at what the Taliban are doing, for example, in Afghanistan they have began to take advantage and disseminate propaganda from mobile phones. It is becoming increasingly effective.

We have got to be able to respond to these activities through our own capabilities, disseminating through SMS networks, Twitter sites, Facebook, pushback against individuals, he is now dead, like Anwar al-Awlaki. Part of the capability is, in my view, where we tend to be lacking is not just on our technological side, but is also in how we are—who is the lead agency for this? I am not even sure we could identify a lead agency along these lines. I would identify a range of capabilities.

Let me just come back to—the point, I think, is that the speed with which irregular warfare is having, the territory in which it is being involved in, and the ability to reach out to multiple diaspora populations, states and nonstate actors, charities, is incredible, and requires an ability to be able to move fast. So we could get specific on capabilities, but I think we have got to be able to respond quickly because I do think, take the incidents in Afghanistan over the last several weeks, we were slow in responding in several of those cases.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Colonel.

Colonel KILLEBREW. Sir, I associate with everything my colleague just said. I would just like to expand it a little bit. From the point of view of this old infantryman, we are in the middle right now of a shift in political affairs in the world that is, perhaps, best understood with the speed of the telecommunications revolution, but also in migration patterns and the crime that I have already addressed and weapons proliferation, things are happening out there that don't fit the old traditional bounds.

I apologize in my testimony for using the term Westphalian. But the fact is, the old boundaries, like national border matter, don't matter anymore to our opponents. So with that, I would just say cyber is certainly a capability we have got to get better at. It is an essential part of fighting in the new environment that is developing. I would say Treasury has got to get much, much better at cutting out funding streams. If, as I believe, crime is becoming a

major component of insurgency and counterinsurgency, the easiest way, and probably the only way to hurt those people decisively is to go after their funding streams. But that capability inside the U.S. Government is not as robust as it should be.

Justice has a major role to play in the future world as it is unwilling. One of the most effective things we ever did in Colombia was to turn the DEA loose with its Trusted Officer Program to reform the Colombian police, which has made a huge effort in that country, which they are now trying to propagate the rest of Central America.

State Department, everybody always makes a plug for the State Department, I do, too. If I understand my sources correctly, they cannot hire FSOs [Foreign Service Officers] now, even at the replacement rate, but State particularly with this new crop of State Department people coming along who had been bloodied in Afghanistan and Iraq are now going to start moving into senior positions. And the State Department, there is a chance now to change the State Department and make it much, much more proactive. So those agencies have got to happen.

Within DOD [Department of Defense], the agency I don't know the most about, we have got to get, and this will take the cooperation of the Congress, much, much better at quickly recognizing states that are threatened, forming competent advisory efforts, whether they are from special forces or whatever they come from, getting FMS [Foreign Military Sales] reformed, and getting that stuff to the people who are going fight our wars for us in the future.

Colonel MAXWELL. Sir, I would focus on capabilities and say that rather than material and technology, irregular warfare capabilities rest in people. And I think that that is where we really have to invest, especially in this time of fiscal constraint. It is our people that have to be able to solve complex, political-military problems. And I think we have seen many soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, DEA, our State Department partners around the world doing many great things to solve complex political-military problems. That is something that we can't afford to lose.

As Dr. Jones said, 1975 we were saying never again, counterinsurgency and the like, and we lost a lot of our doctrine. But I would focus our capabilities on developing our people and taking advantage of the hard-won experiences that our military personnel and Government agency personnel have learned over the last 10 years.

In terms of cyber, let me just—we have to continue to train as we have to maintain our combat capabilities from shoot, move, and communicate to complex operations and irregular warfare. I think our focus has to be also on equipment that is dual-use. That is—we are not going have the luxury to specialize in major combat operations and irregular warfare. So we have to search for equipment that will be able to operate in multiple environments, and I think we are on that path.

Cyber, that is something that is really tough for me. I agree wholeheartedly that it is a vulnerability, a strength and vulnerability, a strength that has to be protected. I am reminded of an anecdote that I recall from back in the 1990s, hearing a lecture

from the NSA [National Security Agency], a senior official, who said that it was very difficult to recruit people to defend our networks. Everybody wanted to be a hacker, everybody wanted to be able to penetrate other networks, but nobody wanted to defend, defend our network because it just wasn't a very glamorous job. And of course, that—it is just like terrorism, you can be successful defending a thousand times, but one penetration of the network and you have failed. Whereas the hacker can fail a thousand times and one penetration, he is a success. And so I always recall that, is that defense of our network is very, very hard, but we have got to put a lot of emphasis in that. It is not an area that I am very familiar with except I depend on it, I think we all depend on it, and we are going to depend it more in the future.

Mr. LANGEVIN. So true, thank you gentlemen. I have more questions but maybe the second round. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thanks for being here. Dr. Jones, I appreciate that phrase, he's now dead, I would like to see that used more often. Bad CPA [Certified Public Accountant] humor.

A couple anecdotes, and then to the broader question. First started going to Afghanistan 2005, and it was startling to see how siloed the fight was between going after Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the drug war; DEA had a lane, FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] had a lane, and the Department of Defense had a lane. And they didn't cross each other and they didn't go after each other. And that has gotten fixed over the past 7 years.

I was also in Jalalabad one afternoon on a Sunday afternoon with a Provincial Reconstruction Team and we were basically having a Chamber of Commerce meeting. This was an effort to try to figure out how to take advantage of the agricultural system there in that province. Value added, do some canning or processing and then ship it to Kuwait and all those kinds of things, and have electricity. A flat-out Chamber of Commerce deal. And the guys running this deal was a team from the 101st Airborne who the day before, had been in an 8-hour run-and-gun fight with a bunch of bad guys. And so they took those hats off, and Sunday afternoon, just sitting there trying to figure out how we solve the economic issues. And they don't come here for a second knowing how to do that, but they were full-out trying to make it happen.

And you look at—Colonel Maxwell, you may have alluded to this a little bit—irregular warfare, we don't just take a military team to go do that and fix all of that. Struggles with folks at the State Department who won't deploy, or we can't deploy them because they don't volunteer in the same way that our folks in uniform deploy. So how do we put together the capabilities under some umbrella that allows us to go at it at the right time as opposed to a stair-step approach where we go in there and get security squared away, and then that bright line is done, and then you step in with the State Department capabilities to help build governances, those kinds of things.

It is not linear like that, or should it be, so how do we put together—and none of you really talked about, what kind of blended

agency needs to be there so that you have one person making the decision who has the authority across that spectrum to deploy people, deploy assets and that kind of stuff. And can you do that or is there value in doing that?

Colonel KILLEBREW. I will start, sir. There is a wonderful story from World War I about an old British NCO [Non-Commissioned Officer] on the day the guns stopped firing. He looked out over no man's land and he said, "Thank God all this is over and we can go back to real soldiering again."

When you leave agencies alone in peacetime, they revert to doing what agencies do in peacetime. That guy from the 101st—I am a proud 101st guy—that guy from the 101st, you know, was trained to fight wars, and he probably enjoyed the firefight the day before more than he did the Chamber of Commerce meeting, but he was doing the best he could, you know, doing the best he could. Probably not the right thing to do with a soldier. The fact is that military forces of any country are probably the wrong outfit to use when you are trying to have Chambers of Commerce meetings, or get the economy going, and that kind of thing. I had a friend on a PRT [Provincial Reconstruction Team] say, you know, every time we do something over there, my PRT does something, the people in the village are saying how come the government's not doing this? And we are stealing the air from the government rep who should be doing it.

We have learned an enormous amount the hard way over the past 10 years in both Iraq and Afghanistan. At the operational level, we have learned to do a multi-department organization. If you want to see an organization that goes well, go to JIATF [Joint Interagency Task Force]-South, guy from SOUTHCOM down in Key West, where you will see representatives from the entire U.S. Government working together on a common problem. Your question is, how do we preserve that? And my answer is, first, we take advantage of the new blood that has come in in the past 10 years that understands that.

We develop interdepartmental schools; we develop interdepartmental exercises; we go for the JIATF kind of organization wherever we can find it. And there are more of those around than we realize, where commanders have thrown together branches of government. We recognize them and resource them. And we make the path to success in the various agencies depend on their willingness and capability to work with other agencies.

Now, that is easy to say because I am a military guy. Military people understand how to do that. State Department, if they put together a joint exercise, has to pull somebody out of a critical slot and put them in the joint exercise. And that seat goes unfilled because they don't have the staffing slack to send somebody to school, or to do a joint exercise. So there are methods that approach what you correctly pointed out is something we have to do. They have long tendrils that hang down underneath that we have to address. But I think the overall response is yes, we have to do it; two, we have a force in the field and all the agencies that understand that; and three, the question will become when this is—if it ever is over, as we draw down in Afghanistan, how we keep people from going back to real soldiering again.

Dr. JONES. I will be brief because I see we are over time. I want to give a very quick example to your question. The week before last, I was down in Florida with Special Operations, U.S. Agency for International Development, and State Department, and conventional forces leaving for Afghanistan. So I spent a chunk of time talking to people who were headed over there and some that had come back temporarily for this meeting. There were about 500 total people there. And one very serious issue along these lines—well, there were several that came up; I will just highlight one—and that is with all the effort the United States has spent, in this particular case in trying to get out to the villages, which, in my view, is a critical part now of where we are at, it requires an ability to understand the governance component, that is, helping villagers and locals improve their formal and informal governance, the development component so that we can improve the economic well-being of locals, and the security. That requires multiple agencies.

The problem we have on the ground is not an unwillingness of civilians to go into these areas. There are plenty that are willing. It is not a capability. We have plenty that are capable. Part of this is security offices don't let them go, even with trained Special Operations Forces who are living in and around these villages. This is the practical problem we face on bringing them together where it matters most. It is not at the higher levels, per se, that we are running into the problems. It is at the security—well, I mean it is in some sense. But it is, we restrict ourselves for security practices. And it has very serious complications. I just highlight that as one of several areas that has impeded our ability to do exactly what you are talking about.

Colonel MAXWELL. Sir, I think as you correctly pointed out, our people on the ground, if left alone, will figure it out. And across the military, State, all of our organizations, they sort it out on the ground. To go back to Congressman West's question on strategy, we really need to have a process that integrates at the national level. In my written statement, I talked about an example that I experienced back in the 1990s, Presidential Decision Directive-56 in May of 1997, which was for the management of complex contingency operations, based on a lot of lessons learned from Bosnia, Kosovo—or prior to Kosovo, but Somalia, Haiti, and the like. But what that provided here inside the Beltway was a structure for the interagency to come together and to assess the mission, assess the problems, understand the problems, and develop strategies to be able to solve those problems. And I think if we develop, at the national level, a process—and I know we have our national security processes in the executive at the National Security Council and the like, but if we could develop a disciplined process along the line of the former PDD–56 [Presidential Decision Directive-56], we might be able to solve some of the problems that Dr. Jones is alluding to.

As an example, the agencies from here could give the strategic guidance to make sure that we don't have those restrictions for security and the like. So I think on the ground, we eventually sort it out. But we have got to have a process at the strategic level here that will help us focus on these complex operations and to really orchestrate all the instruments of national power and these agen-

cies to be able to properly resource with proper authorities and the guidance for their organizations.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would really like to follow up with this discussion. Thank you all very much for being here. Because I think we have talked about whole of government, I understand it can be trite, and I agree with you on that. But there are just a few things. And maybe I am going to take you out of your lane for a second, but something that strikes me. I mean, one of the things that we know is that we have been a military at war and not a nation at war. Would you agree with that statement?

Colonel KILLEBREW. Sure.

Mrs. DAVIS. How does that affect what we do? You mentioned, Colonel, that above all, we should be a unified and committed nation. Where does that fit in?

Colonel KILLEBREW. Well, Madam, you are running a grave risk. I have a whole sermon I give on this. But I will try to restrain myself.

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay.

Colonel KILLEBREW. The social changes and the political changes are happening in the world right now, in my view, and I am not a Ph.D. social scientist, but having studied it, I believe are undermining in many cases the concept of nationhood. One country, as I said in my testimony, that is going back at that is Colombia. And you have to look at them, get away from the help we have given them, and look at how they are deliberately trying to foster the concept under law of Colombian nationhood to understand the really depth of what they are doing.

In this country, we have always taken that for granted. And I still take it for granted. We developed a volunteer armed force in which—and by the way, I came in during the draft. So I have seen both. I don't believe a draft would ever be practical again in this country. I think we have a volunteer armed force. I have to tell you, I am very impatient with the fact that no national leader has ever said, since the volunteer force came in, that it would be a good thing for someone's son and daughter to join the Armed Forces. Never. Not even after 9/11.

The concept of nationhood that we have to engender are the things that matter to us under the Constitution. And I don't believe it is furthered by the kind of red-blue split we see right now in the country. I think as you look 10 to 20 years in the future, with the impact of the technology and the social change going on in the rest of the world, I think this runs the risk of undermining our common concept of what we are as a nation. And I think that is something we have to take on. National leadership, persons as yourself, people like me who write, we have to come to understand there is some core idea about what being an American means, that may include serving in the Armed Forces or paying your country back through some kind of service, but larger than that, being willing to accept the concept that a lot of people make up this country, and everybody is an American. That is a kind of grand strategic view, but it has occupied my thought for quite a while now.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Did you want to comment on that, too?

Dr. JONES. I do. Very briefly, I think your question are we a nation at war? If you look at the last decade, decade and a half, we have been at times. We were a nation at war after September 11th, because there was a threat that brought us together as a nation that there was a mutual feeling that we had to defend the borders. I think there was—we were a nation at war in May of last year during and after the bin Laden raid.

I think the challenge we find ourselves in along these lines is in many of the areas where we face irregular warfare challenges, we are talking about countries like Syria now, countries like Libya, where we have, and this is just a subset of them, large Muslim populations. I think we have found that adding and deploying large numbers of conventional forces to these kinds of theaters is not only, in some cases, counterproductive, but certainly doesn't provide a lot of domestic support.

We see that on the Afghan front today. I do think one of the things that this suggests, as we move forward, is, and this goes back to comments that both of the panelists have made, is does it make sense on the irregular warfare threat to think of this really as focusing predominantly on the indirect side? Smaller numbers, competent U.S. Special Operations and intelligence forces dealing more systematically with these kinds of threats rather than deploying hundreds of—over 100,000 forces. Because I don't think, unless we are attacked, like we were on 9/11, we will be a nation at war from a domestic standpoint the way we were on 9/11. I think those kinds of incidents are extremely rare, but the threat is real.

Colonel MAXWELL. Madam, I think, really, to echo both my colleagues' comments, we have to look at the nature of the conflict that we are engaged in. And I think Dr. Jones is right, after 9/11, we were a nation at war, and we have been at times. But we also have to ask ourselves should we be a nation at war? And I think as I look at the categories that I have laid out, the first category, existential threat to U.S. or our allies, we have to be a nation at war if we are faced with that.

I think at the second category, those threats to regional stability and status quo, our friends, partners, and allies, subversion, terrorism, insurgency, lawlessness and the like, that may not cause us to be a nation at war. And as Dr. Jones says, it might require a smaller footprint, a discrete force that may not require the Nation to be focused. The third, a more hybrid threat, I think, would require us to be a nation at war, because the scale and scope of that complex threat, we would need to be a nation at war. So I think it is really a question of the type of threats that we face, and then the strategies that we employ to deal with those threats. But I think—the other aspect I think you are getting at is—and I think we all know this—our Nation supports our military. You know, there is support for it. But the question is, you know, as always, who serves? And there are a lot of people that are serving, and have continued to serve, and they feel that burden on their shoulders, and they are tired.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank all of you. We certainly appreciate all that you do for our families and for future generations. You are kind of the unappreciated front line of freedom, but we appreciate you. Colonel Maxwell, if it is all right, I will start with you. How does manmade electromagnetic pulse or EMP [electromagnetic pulse] factor into your assessment of, you know, on the one end of the spectrum, possibly existential threats to our country, or on the other end, you know, just potentially very significant threats that an enemy waging irregular warfare might use against the United States? And what must the DOD do before we are prepared to react to such a threat and mitigate its effects?

Colonel MAXWELL. Sir, that is a very complex question. EMP, I think, is, from my limited understanding, is very dangerous to us. I think many of our systems are vulnerable to that type of threat. And as we have already talked about the importance of cyber, I think our cyber systems, you know, while some of our individual systems may be hardened, you know, the entire network may not. So I think we could be vulnerable to that.

You know, I think that if someone was to be able to detonate a device that would have EMP here in the United States or somewhere where we are operating, it could probably have devastating effects, even if not directly on our military systems, because I think we are very—you know, we are so interconnected, and the entire global network is not hardened. And so I think there are areas that are vulnerable. And we probably would be severely affected by an EMP strike in any kind of operation. I don't know how to defend against it other than to be able to harden our systems. But again, the nature of the global information grid is something that, you know, that I don't think can be totally protected.

Therefore, we, Department of Defense, U.S. Government, we will have to learn to work through if we lose access to the global information system. And that is something that I think, you know, frankly we have become so dependent on it, may be a real challenge for us. And I think that is a strategic vulnerability that we do have to consider.

Mr. FRANKS. I hadn't planned to, but I might expand on that a little bit. You know, we hardened our nuclear triad to the tune of tens of billions of dollars. And most nuclear scenarios are at least precipitated by an EMP laydown. And if this isn't the threat that some of the reports that we have seen in the last half-dozen years say it is, then we are spending an awful lot of money we don't need to spend. And my thought is, you know, everything I can see is that it is a very significant threat. It potentially is one of the most significant short-term threats that we face. And if that is the case, I am just wondering—and I am just, you know, this is most respectful, but I am just wondering why DOD doesn't seem to be as obsessed with it as some of us are, especially in terms of our grid vulnerability since, you know, DOD relies on the civilian grid for about 99 percent of its electricity. Maybe if anybody wants to take a shot at that question.

Dr. JONES. Sir, I am not an expert on EMP——

Mr. FRANKS. Nobody is, it seems like.

Dr. JONES. Right. What I will say, though, I would say most of the threats we face, both here and overseas, have tended to be ei-

ther conventional, and what I mean by that is transportation-type targets, such as the Al Qaeda-type and Hezbollah-type threats. Iran's proxy efforts have been fairly simple, straightforward types of attacks, not these sophisticated. There have been efforts we have seen for nonstate actors and state actors to look at chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs.

I have not seen, and even when I served in the Government, a lot of evidence that there was EMP being prepared directed at the U.S. homeland.

So again, I may not be the best expert along these lines, but I think one would have to systematically analyze the kinds of threats and attacks we would like to see and we are seeing both state and nonstate actors prepare for, and then put EMP in that context.

Mr. FRANKS. Let me ask the Colonel here to expand on that. But I will just say this much to you, Iran thinks that it is a viable option, because they have certainly done some things that I think are fairly discomforting. And I hope that is on your radar. And Colonel, go ahead, please.

Colonel KILLEBREW. Sir, I just add that the Chinese military doctrine has talked for years about the use of EMP. And they have capabilities we couldn't discuss here. I am not aware of an Iranian capability, but they borrow an awful lot of their doctrine from the Chinese.

Mr. FRANKS. This is the plan, not a capability.

Colonel KILLEBREW. So it should never be discounted. EMP can be both, as you know, a strategic and a tactical problem. If it is a tactical—let's hypothetically say if someone used it on our fleets in the Pacific, it would probably be a tactical radius kind of thing. And most, in fact, all the systems aboard ship I know are hardened against EMP, against a certain degree of EMP. A strategic EMP on the United States would have to be accompanied by other kinds of attacks, as in the Cold War, when it was going to be part of the nuclear exchange.

The military systems would probably be okay. I mean, things would fail, but guys would fix that. The systems that would go down would be the civilian systems. And as far as I know, and I don't—I know a little, but not a lot—as far as I know, civilian power grids have a very low tolerance against the kind of EMP-directed weapon you are talking about.

Mr. FRANKS. That is an understatement, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your testimony, Mr. Chairman, for the hearing. A lot of Americans say they remember, obviously, September 11th, 2001. I remember September 12th, 2001. I woke up, after barely sleeping at all the night before, and wondered how, as someone who had spent 10 years in the Armed Services Committee, I had not done enough to think about the kind of attack that was successful against our country that day. I had sat through hundreds of hearings and briefings, and read reams of material. And if you would have said to me on September 10th that 19 people with box cutters and airline tickets are going to be able to kill 3,000 Americans, I would have been very dubious about that prospect.

And I think that the sin that I committed prior to September 11th was the sin of hubris. I thought that we were so powerful and so mighty and so good at what we did, and we were all those things, that we really were invulnerable to that sort of thing. Help correct my hubris at this time. What should I be worrying about, within the bounds of a public discussion of this, obviously? What should we be worrying about that we are not? You know, we have these discussions, we are all looking at cyber, and that is very, very important. We certainly look at chemical and biological warfare and nuclear IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices], and we worry about all those things. What would you suggest as an area where we are vulnerable that you think people in our position are not paying enough attention to?

Colonel KILLEBREW. I get pushed out on the ice floe again.

Mr. ANDREWS. Again, within the bounds of this public venue.

Colonel KILLEBREW. Mr. Andrews, I will tell you, sir, that a lot of us were sleepless on that night. And in my career in public service and studying defense issues, I made two great mistakes: We failed to see the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ramifications, we failed to see the terrorism threat. I was on the Hart-Rudman Commission about global threats.

Mr. ANDREWS. Yeah.

Colonel KILLEBREW. And no matter what the retrospective view is, I will tell you we had it figured out. It was China and a resurgent Russia. Terrorism didn't even hardly come up on the scope, despite the people who came in and tried to convince us it was serious. So what is the next big thing? That has been my preoccupation since then. And the best advice I could offer is, we in the defense business, and you in the national leadership business, have got to learn to see the world the way it really is, and not through the prism that we want to see it through. That led me to the crime studies. Because the world outside Washington has changed dramatically and is changing dramatically. We can't predict the future.

Mr. ANDREWS. Right.

Colonel KILLEBREW. But what we can do is see things as they are, and not the way we want to see them, and then try to build defenses against that. And that is the best I can do, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Gentlemen?

Dr. JONES. Sir, I think there are several issues. I will highlight two of them. One of them, and I keep hearing it, this mantra over the last several months with the death of Osama bin Laden, that the global jihadist movement is on the verge of strategic defeat.

Mr. ANDREWS. I wish that were true.

Dr. JONES. I think that represents extraordinary hubris. I think as we look around, what we thought was a benign effort that resulted from the Arab Spring in encouraging democratization across the Arab world, has, in many countries, contributed to instability, the collapse of regimes. And as I look across North Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, I see weakening regimes in some places and a strong push of this movement back in. I think that is one area where we would be very—we would be gravely mistaken to be hubristic about. The other thing is hubris that everybody likes us. I think our strategic——

Mr. ANDREWS. We in Congress know that is not true. Oh, you mean the country. I see. Okay.

Dr. JONES. I think our strategic communications on irregular warfare has been, how shall I put it, deeply lacking. And our ability to project our image overseas, or images that we would like, have been deeply troubling. And I think we fool ourselves into arguing that we have a competent strategy across agencies and that we are able to effectively do that overseas.

So those two areas, that the global jihadist movement is dead, and that our ability to proliferate our image overseas and that we are pretty good at it I think would be our—I think would be—would be deeply—we would be deeply mistaken.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Go ahead, Colonel.

Colonel MAXWELL. Sir, I don't have a direct answer. I wish I could answer your question directly. I apologize for the cliche, but you know, the failure of 9/11 was the failure of imagination. And I am reminded of the anecdote, you know, 1995 when the terrorists were policed up in Manila in the Philippines and Operation Bojinka was compromised. And you know, the focus was on assassination of the President, the Pope, hijacking airlines, blowing them up in the sky. But within that computer that was seized was also a plan to fly airplanes into buildings.

And the information was there. It wasn't a developed plan, but it was there. And none of us recognized that as a possibility. I mention that because that was 1995, and 6 years later that happened. And I think one of the things that we have to ensure that we don't have a failure of imagination, is we also understand our adversaries and their timelines are much different than ours. I agree with everything that Colonel Killebrew and Dr. Jones have said. And in fact, I agree that the global jihad is not on its last legs. And I think that what is happening now, what they are planning now may not manifest itself for some years down the road.

And so we cannot have that failure of imagination in the future. And we have got to understand that our timelines are a lot different. We focus on threats now. They are developing threats for the future. And we have got to be prepared for that.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. I guess I kind of want to go back to the beginning for just a second. And I am kind of mentally working my way briefly around the world, starting in Mexico, of course, where you mentioned we have the huge portions of the country run by criminal drug gangs, and indications of foreign influence to work with or take advantage of that situation. We go across the water, for example, Mali, just had a coup. Weak government, but in a neighborhood where there may be a lot more weapons floating around right now, and you have got some separatists in part of the country that are trying to take advantage of the situation.

You have got the mess that is Somalia; you have got Yemen, a situation that has deteriorated since the President has left, and you have got areas of the country that press reports indicate the Al Qaeda-affiliated groups are rather controlling. Of course, you have got Iraq, Afghanistan, go around Philippines and Indonesia, where you have had some kind of either terrorist, separatist-type

groups, which we have had great success at. But my point is as I am thinking around the world, very different situations. And as you all have alluded to, we cannot predict the future, but we have to be prepared for very different situations. And part of our challenge on this side of the table is, what can we do to see that either the programs, authorities, institutions of Government are prepared to deal with very different situations in a very uncertain future.

And as you all talk, you know, each of you kind of has a little different expertise in a different region of the world in addition to your background and expertise, I think that is a big challenge for us. And I would just offer as a beginning for my questions suggestions that you all have for what we can do to try to help make sure that we are prepared for very different circumstances that are going to arise in the future in a variety of places around the world, and yet we have important interests there that are worth becoming involved in some degree.

Colonel KILLEBREW. I am not going first this time.

Colonel MAXWELL. Yes, sir, that is the $64,000 question.

Mr. THORNBERRY. We have already had one of those. Now we are up to $100,000.

Colonel MAXWELL. $128,000, I guess, yes, sir. I would, as a private citizen now, no longer affiliated with the Department of Defense, but I do feel strongly, as I mentioned in my testimony, the number one investment that we have to make for the future is in people and education. I think we have got to make sure that we are educating all of our leaders to be able to understand the environment and to be able to see those threats as they emerge and be able to make the proper recommendations for campaign plans and strategies and the like.

Mr. THORNBERRY. I am sorry, Colonel, but let me just follow up. Are we doing that now? Do you think we are educating properly, for example, our military, to deal with this wide variety, from narco-criminal situations, to failed states, to all the rest?

Colonel MAXWELL. I think that our military is, because of the nature of the last 10 years of war, we have not been able to focus as much on education, professional military education, as we should because of the nature of the conflicts. I don't have the data. I would recommend asking the Army as an example. But I think there is quite a backlog for intermediate level education because those officers have been serving.

And so I think that as we draw down from Afghanistan, you know, obviously withdrawing from Iraq, that I think now is the time to refocus professional military education to be able to do those things. I think that is where an investment, a long-term investment is needed, especially with a professional military force, all-volunteer force that is going to be a—that is a career force. We have got to invest in education. That would be my number one recommendation.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Yes, sir.

Dr. JONES. I think there are a few things worth taking a hard look at. One is education not on the military force side, but the American population. I do not think there is an appreciation for the types of threats that face the American homeland in all the areas you outlined. In many areas, I do not think the Government writ

large has explained to the American population why we are there, what the threats we face are. And so in that sense, I do think there is also an additional element to the education on the American population. I think, and I will go back to this earlier, Congress has various ways of, through NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] and other things, of conducting assessments. I do think there is a strong need to look at the interagency aspects of irregular warfare. I do not believe we are appropriately, strategically, operationally, and tactically prepared for—and flexible enough to respond to a range of these threats across the interagency. I do think there is a grave need to look very hard at what we have done, look at what the threats are in the future, and make a range of recommendations on how to improve what multiple U.S. agencies do. And that includes not just the civilian and fighting components per se, but that also includes the information realm. I mean, who controls that? Who is the lead agency for information on irregular warfare and that whole information operations campaign?

And lastly, I would just say along these lines, I do think there is a very strong need, based on the kinds of discussions we have had already, to ensure that we have a very competent, well-trained Special Operations community. That a lot of what we have talked about, whether it is the drug trade, when it comes to military forces, my own personal view, we are talking about a much lighter footprint. This is not, with the exception of possibly of the Korean case and a small number of others, we are talking about small numbers of American soldiers on the military front. I mean that is really our SOF world. And that means that as we consider ways to cut our defense budget, I think I would be very cautious in the future about cutting too much of those budgets. Because I think this is the kind of future we face.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Let me ask just one drill down question. Do you agree with Colonel Maxwell that we need a JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] equivalent on the special warfare side and within Special Operations Command?

Dr. JONES. I think we need—I am not sure what that means. I do think we need an equivalent at least that would pull together our training end, the training and equipping end. JSOC has done a whole range of things well, and improved their ability to move quickly across the globe. I don't think the Special Operations community has done this as well on the sort of Special Forces training and equipment side. Yeah, I think there is—I am not quite sure if that is where he is going, but I do think there is a strong rationale.

Mr. THORNBERRY. A number of people have commented on the suggestion, so I was interested. Then Colonel Killebrew, you mentioned in your testimony this is about politics, and no two were ever the same, no two situations were ever the same. And that is part of where my question goes. We have got a lot of different situations. And it gets really back to how we prepare for no two situations being the same.

Colonel KILLEBREW. Mr. Chairman, in the services we have a term we use called "centralized authority but decentralized execution." I think one of the things we have to shed ourselves of in the United States is the idea that we can micromanage the world. We can't. We have tried that. It doesn't work.

To preface my comments, sir, that will support this, remember my discussion about the curve. It starts in a police action, winds up in military affairs, and then if we are successful we help a country drive it down to a police action again. I think we have to start with a policy of the United States Government to support the survival of legitimate governments around the world, and to integrate U.S. capabilities to help those governments operate under their laws. That is the success story in Colombia that is working.

It is the tendency of the human person anywhere they live to want to live in a settled, ordered society under the rule of law. That is the great thing we have in our kit bag that the jihadist forces and other forces around the world don't have. That is what we have to export. Whether we do it with Special Forces or conventional forces trained to be advisers, it doesn't matter. My point would be that the effort of the United States Government, however organized, should be to support governments around the world that are struggling against these kind of disruptive forces to reestablish the rule of law in their countries.

I have reached a point in my studies where I say if we do that successfully, then if we deploy conventional military forces in any case other than a direct attack on us, it represents a failure of U.S. policy. We should be able to focus our efforts so successfully that we have a lot of Colombias out there who manage the problems in their own countries with our help. And by the way, the United States DEA and Defense Department works very, very comfortably with Colombia, who is settling their own problems, which are our problems as well.

We don't have to fight every war. We have to be able to support the people who want to bring justice and law to their countries. That in the beginning, when I was in Special Forces, and probably still is, was the ultimate objective of those kinds of operations anyway. And sir, that would recommend how your committee could do great work driving in that direction.

Mr. THORNBERRY. And just on that for a second, do you think there are enough commonalities in how that is done, despite differences in culture and regions and the nature of the threat and that sort of thing? I mean, it has taken us—Colombia is a tremendous success, Philippines is another tremendous success, but it has taken us quite a while to get it down. And part of the question is, do we have a decade or whatever to figure out what is going on on the ground, to train our people up, and then to go implement it? I mean I think the world is moving faster than that.

Colonel KILLEBREW. Actually, I think we have the time. I think one of the great advantages we have now is in the last 10 years it has certainly sensitized the Armed Forces and the young officers and young NCOs and the other agencies of Government to this kind of a problem. I do think, though, that what we have to start with is going to those countries rather humbly and saying how do we help you? How do we not change your institutions but reinforce what you are doing? The case in Colombia, that is what we did. It took us a decade. We were down there longer than that, but the real change started in the year 2000. Armies around the world everywhere are kind of similar. I can talk to a soldier from any country and understand that. Police forces are very different. And we

go to another country's police forces with a different kind of an understanding, different skills. The same is true of legislators.

As you know, we have had very close ties between the Colombian legislative branch and ours. I think these things are not impossible. I think it is a thing that ties together everything we have talked about here today, and that we have to get started.

Mr. THORNBERRY. I agree, by the way. But it is just helpful to flesh out and think a little deeper about it. I have a number of other issues, but I may not be able to get to all of them, including the sorts of technology we need to invest in to help with these capabilities, for example greater emphasis on non-lethals has always been an interest for me. Dr. Jones has talked about information operations. How successful we have been on human terrain teams as we have tried to figure out the people, human landscape. And then contracting, and how—whether we have the flexibility within the current authorities to do that as we apply this in a variety of situations. I may pursue those in a different way, if I can. At this time I would yield to Mr. Langevin for other questions he has.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thanks to our panel. You know, if I could just revisit the discussion we had with respect to Islamist groups in particular, I know Iran and their connections with Latin American criminal organizations. I know we were focused on Iran, but is it my understanding that in the broader context other Islamic groups have these connections with the criminal groups? And if so, what is the extent of the collaboration between the groups? And are these relationships likely to mature in the future?

Colonel KILLEBREW. Well, sir, the answer to the first question is I don't know, and I don't think anybody totally knows now. We know that the Saudi Arabian hit, or the Saudi Arabian attempt on the Saudi ambassador was probably approved at the highest levels of the Iranian Government. But what those contacts are in the region we don't know. We know that the Qods Force, the IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps], and the Mexican cartels, and the FARC are all deeply involved in the drug trade, and frequently collaborate. What goes on inside that collaboration I don't think we know for sure. We certainly couldn't discuss in an open forum if we did. Your second question was what can we do about it?

Mr. LANGEVIN. Are these relationships likely to mature?

Colonel KILLEBREW. I think they will. That is my opinion. I think that it is in the nature of clandestine and covert operations to get better as time goes on. I think there have been a couple of incidents around the United States that indicate they are trying out relationships now. I think as time passes, both the Qods Force and the various cartels—that by the way will be doing this for money, not for ideology—will probably improve. And I think this feeling is shared by a member of the Los Angeles Police Department who is a real expert. I think there is a real danger we are going to start seeing car bombs in some parts of the country unless we are more successful in cutting it off.

Mr. LANGEVIN. And that goes to the second part of that question, the types of irregular warfare challenges that this development poses will be exactly what types of things we are going to see. And you touched on clearly one of them.

Colonel KILLEBREW. That is correct. There was an incident in Arizona just very recently, I believe it was Arizona, where the Border Patrol was chasing a car, managed to stop it with caltrops, and as they approached the car, the guy blew himself up in the car. Those are the kinds of small incidents we are seeing now that in my view should be raising some concern in the Intelligence Community. If you ever go into closed session, that would be a good question to ask.

Dr. JONES. Sir, on the Iranian front, including in Latin America, what we see, based on some research, is not just the Hezbollah activity in multiple countries, and the state to state with Iran's relationship with Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and a range of other countries, but is a much more subtle effort to push and work through Shi'a communities across Latin America, including Mexico. I would expect that as Iran expands its power and tries to expand its power it will continue to reach out, frankly as the Soviets did during the Cold War, to proxy organizations, whether they are groups like Hezbollah. I have written also about Iranian-Al Qaeda connections in Foreign Affairs. But I would say what is discouraging is if one looks at some of the use by Mexican cartels of improvised explosive devices south of the border, including vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, they have not gotten that expertise from the global jihadists, they have gotten it from buying off and getting training from former, in some cases, current Mexican security officials who have been trained in these things. But what we have also seen is a lot of the technology techniques, with the proliferation of social media, is capable of being pushed around on not just the Internet, but on social media.

So Mexican cartels, for example, have downloaded this information. This is why I would strongly suspect that at some point—well, we have seen this. The Faisal Shahzad attack, attempted attack in Times Square was a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device. He got that capability in the Pakistan area. The year before, Najibullah Zazi, they were suicide bombs based very much like the UK 2005 London attacks. The ability, with communications media today, to push lessons on IEDs is deeply concerning. So it is not just the Islamist groups, it is not just Sunni or Shi'a, and it is not just the connection with these groups, but it is also the ability to proliferate that information and to be able to download it and pull it from other sources is what has enabled even the cartels in Mexico to improve their tactics, techniques, and procedures.

That is very concerning. And as we look at the special interest alien networks that are going into and out of the United States to Somalia and a range of other countries, you better believe that not only are there people leaving and coming into the United States with that expertise, but they are able to educate others.

So I think you have put your finger on something that is deeply concerning. And as we look at the countries that this has proliferated on, there were no suicide attacks in Afghanistan before 2001. No suicide attacks in Pakistan. No suicide attacks historically in Iraq. They have proliferated in a range of the countries we are talking about.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Colonel, unless you had something else——

Colonel MAXWELL. I would just add one, take a slightly different look. I also am concerned with what happens to our interests outside of the United States. I think the threats outlined are very important. But I think we should also just recall recently what Iran potentially did in Thailand, in India against Israelis. I think that it is not a stretch that that could happen against American targets overseas in other locations as well. We have got to protect the homeland, but we have a lot of Americans and interests around the world. And I think that it is not a stretch for them to eventually become targets in those other countries.

Mr. LANGEVIN. True. Point well taken. Thank you, gentlemen. I yield back.

Mr. FRANKS. [Presiding.] Dr. Jones, in your written statement you mentioned programs carried out by our Special Forces to empower the Afghans in matters of security, and economics, and government. However, Iran and Afghanistan, as you know, recently signed an agreement to increase economic ties between the two countries, which at least, in my mind, indicates that Iran is also seeking to influence the Afghan people in these matters and to marginalize U.S. interests ultimately. How well prepared are you to respond to these increasing Iranian elements of influence and ensure that whatever progress we have made in Afghanistan at such great cost in American lives and material is not wasted by what could turn out to be a precipitous withdrawal? Do you have any thoughts along those lines?

Dr. JONES. Sir, I do. On the Iranian front in Afghanistan, I would, to put this in broader context, what I would argue is if there is a quick withdrawal from Afghanistan, the concern is not just Iran, but is multiple governments in the region, as we have seen historically in the 1990s, will likely back a range of its proxy organizations in the country. That means the Russians, the Indians, clearly the Pakistanis, the Chinese, and the Iranians.

The Iranian threat tends to be primarily in the west and the Hazara regions in the center of the country, as well as in some parts of the south. I do think that if the U.S. were to precipitously withdraw from Afghanistan, there would, without question, be an Iranian effort to increase its influence, economic, security, political influence in Afghanistan without question. We have seen it on Iran's other border in Iraq after the U.S. departure. That should be a lesson.

But I would also say that it is not just Iran. We would also see a range of other countries, including Pakistan, pushing out its proxies through Pashtun groups. So your concern I would say in many ways is slightly broader.

Mr. FRANKS. I think if my 3-year-old twins were analyzing the situation, they would essentially conclude that the Iranian leadership isn't very nice. So I continue to be concerned about them obviously.

Last question. And I hope that you will try not to succumb to the failure of imagination, and that you will try to see the world as it is, and not as you would like it to be. If you were to give this committee what you thought to be the most prevalent and the most dangerous irregular warfare tactic or challenge that we would face,

what would that be? And I will start with you, Dr. Jones, and see if everybody would give us just a brief response.

Dr. JONES. I still think a low probability but a very dangerous development would be, and one that I don't think we have completely got our hands on, would be the ability of a nonstate actor to smuggle in, it wouldn't have to be a nuclear device, but a chemical or biological device into—or radiological—into the United States to target U.S. citizens. That is something I think that would have a very high impact, low probability. But the continuation among, say, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula of research on this component is deeply concerning. It is one thing to take an aircraft down, as Abdulmutallab tried in December of 2009. But with continuing research along these lines from some of the affiliates, this is a very concerning development. And if one were to add in Iran with nuclear weapons and increasing friction with the United States and others, you know, there are a range of low probability, but highly concerning roles along those lines.

Mr. FRANKS. And you see that as more dangerous than perhaps if Iran gained access to a warhead and tried to do some sort of an offshore EMP attack on the country?

Dr. JONES. I think both would be extremely dangerous.

Mr. FRANKS. Sub-optimal.

Dr. JONES. Sub-optimal, yes, sir, as my 4-year-old would say, I think.

Mr. FRANKS. Yes, sir. All right. Please, go ahead.

Colonel KILLEBREW. I get two answers, sir, with your courtesy. One is nuclear proliferation, to include nuclear strikes inside the United States. I think with everything we have talked about, we can never forget nuclear weapons. They are always there.

The second is a failure of legitimate governments around the world and their fall to jihadists, or criminals, or whatever we choose to call it. In my mind, they are the same problem. If, in 50 years, we wind up with a few legitimate surviving governments surrounded by governments that have collapsed and are ruled by jihadists or criminals, we will be in a very different strategic situation from where we want to be.

Colonel MAXWELL. Sir, I didn't get to talk about it during the testimony, but my imagination leads me to fear what happens on the Korean Peninsula in North Korea and the collapse of that regime and the irregular threats that are going to emanate from that peninsula, which is going to draw in the United States as allies to South Korea, China, potentially Russia, affect Japan. The nexus of the world's largest economies on that peninsula, it will have global effects. And I think that what will arise from a collapsed or post-conflict North Korea, the nature of the population, the nature of the weapons that they have, the guerrilla mind-set of the people and that dynasty, I think we are going to face an irregular threat that we have not comprehended. And that is, not to discount any of the other threats, I agree with those, but I think that is one that we have not fully imagined.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I appreciate that. And I am concerned that if Iran is as belligerent as they are now without nuclear weapons, I wonder what their posture will be as they actually gain them. Anybody else? You know, I started my line of discussion just thanking

all of you. And let me end there, and say thank you for what you do for this country. Those 3-year-old twins mean a lot to me. And I know that they have a much better chance of walking in the sunlight of freedom because of people like you. So I hope that you keep on imagining and writing notes to yourself and keep on trying to outsmart the bad guys. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 4:11 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

March 27, 2012

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 27, 2012

Statement of Hon. Mac Thornberry

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

Hearing on

Understanding Future Irregular Warfare Challenges

March 27, 2012

Last fall this subcommittee held a hearing to begin exploring the possibility that what we call irregular warfare may be a regular, that is frequent, challenge for us in the future, as, in fact, it certainly has been in the past. And we began to explore how we ensure how the hard-won lessons of the past decade are not simply shelved and forgotten as we "get back to normal."

Today we want to go a little deeper in looking at what types of future irregular warfare challenges we are likely to face, what strategies are best suited to deal with these future challenges, and what examples or models may exist to support those strategies and effectively deal with irregular challenges.

Let me just say that I have read all of the statements from all of the witnesses, and they were excellent. Each of you provided well-written statements that were thought-provoking. I have to say, Colonel Maxwell, I got some chuckles out of your description of the naming game that goes on in the Pentagon, and it made me feel better. Because sometimes I hear all of these terms that describe the same thing, and as I am trying to sort through what the difference in this, that, or the other thing is, it is somewhat reassuring to know that other people have the same issue, and that part of what is going on is just to make sure that we don't understand what is going on.

I appreciate very much the statements that each of you provided, and I look forward to the subcommittee getting down into asking more questions about them.

Statement of Hon. James R. Langevin

Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

Hearing on

Understanding Future Irregular Warfare Challenges

March 27, 2012

Thank you to our witnesses for appearing before us today. Congress has the constitutional responsibility to ensure that our military is fully prepared to defend our country and our vital interests. To do that effectively, we must understand the full range of potential security challenges we may face. Irregular Warfare is just such a challenge, and it is fitting that we are addressing it today in the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee.

The term "IW" evokes mental images of shadowy adversaries on uncertain or ill-defined battlefields, and there is certainly some truth in that. Terrorism is a classic form of IW, but it is only one subset. Enemies will attempt to forgo a direct confrontation in one of our areas of strength, instead seeking an asymmetrical advantage in an area where we may be less prepared or less able to defend ourselves. For example, our formidable joint formations of air, ground, sea, and space forces quickly become ineffective if a cyber attack disrupts our command and control or the critical infrastructure on which our bases depend. And even our most precise weapons become difficult to employ against an enemy who has embedded himself within a civilian population.

The nature of future warfare is uncertain, but what is certain is that potential challengers will seek ways to circumvent our strengths and exploit our weaknesses. Therefore, it is our responsibility to educate ourselves about developing trends, capabilities, technologies, and tactics that an adversary might use to find an advantage against us, or our partners, and then posture our forces properly to meet that sort of threat. We need to develop the agile thinking necessary to make prudent defense choices, and this hearing is an important part of that process.

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TESTIMONY

The Future of Irregular Warfare

SETH G. JONES

CT-374

March 2012

Testimony presented before the House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities on March 27, 2012

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Seth G. Jones[1]
The RAND Corporation

The Future of Irregular Warfare [2]

Before the Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
United States House of Representatives

March 27, 2012

Over the past decade, the United States has faced considerable irregular warfare challenges. Take Afghanistan. By early 2012, there were approximately 432,000 counterinsurgency forces in Afghanistan – approximately 90,000 U.S. soldiers, 30,000 NATO soldiers, 300,000 Afghan National Security Forces, and 12,000 Afghan Local Police.[3] In addition, the United States spent over $100 billion per year and deployed a range of sophisticated platforms and systems.[4] The Taliban, on the other hand, deployed between 20,000 and 40,000 forces (a ratio of nearly 11 to 1 in favor of counterinsurgents) and had revenues of $100-$200 *million* per year (a ratio of 500 to 1 in favor of counterinsurgents). In addition, Afghan insurgent groups focused on a range of asymmetric strategies and tactics, from tribal engagement to the use of improvised explosive devices and the Internet. Yet the Taliban's ability to utilize limited resources and sustain a prolonged insurgency highlight some of America's irregular warfare challenges. Consequently, this testimony focuses on three questions:

- What types of irregular warfare challenges is the United States likely to face in the future?
- What strategies are best suited to deal with future challenges?
- What are existing examples or models to support these strategies and effectively manage irregular warfare challenges?

Much like with terrorism and insurgency, there are a range of definitions for irregular warfare. In practical terms, irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over a specific population. Irregular threats include actors who employ methods such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage, subversion, criminal activities, and

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[2] This testimony is available for free download at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT374.html.
[3] U.S. Department of Defense, *Report on Progress and Stability in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, October 2011).
[4] Amy Belasco, *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 29, 2011).

insurgency.[5] This testimony begins with a brief discussion of irregular warfare challenges, including the threat from state and non-state actors. Next, it outlines irregular warfare strategies for situations in which the United States supports both counterinsurgents *and* insurgents. It then discusses the Village Stability Operations program in Afghanistan as a useful model.

I. IRREGULAR WARFARE CHALLENGES

What types of irregular warfare challenges is the United States likely to face in the future? Over the next decade, the United States will likely face a range of irregular warfare challenges. They include threats from non-state actors like terrorist groups (such as al Qa'ida and Hezbollah), drug-trafficking organizations (such as Mexican cartels), and violent global activists (such as anarchist groups). The United States will also face threats from states that generate irregular warfare challenges purposefully (such as Iran) and from those who do so inadvertently because of weak governance (such as instability in Mexico). These threats are increasingly networked, adaptable, and empowered by cyberspace to find new ways to recruit, collect intelligence, train, distribute propaganda, finance, and operate.

To illustrate future threats, it is useful to highlight al Qa'ida and its affiliates, who some skeptics dismiss as being significantly weakened. The future threat from al Qa'ida and its affiliates will likely depend on several factors: the survival of a leadership structure; weak governments in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia; and some support from local cells. Based on current trends, it appears likely that al Qa'ida will retain key leaders (though not necessarily in Pakistan), some governments will remain weak, and al Qa'ida will enjoy local support in some countries. Its objectives will likely remain fairly consistent: overthrowing multiple regimes to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate (the near enemy, or *al-Adou al-Qareeb*), and fighting the United States and its allies who support them (the far enemy, or *al-Adou al-Baeed*). But how these trends develop is unclear. For instance, al Qa'ida may become increasingly decentralized as a global movement, with central al Qa'ida in Pakistan becoming less relevant as power devolves to its affiliates in Iraq (al Qa'ida in Iraq), Yemen (al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula), Somalia (al Shabaab), North Africa (al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb), or other locations. This decentralization would lead al Qa'ida down a path envisioned by the Syrian strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, who encouraged Muslims to become involved in "individual jihad" and "small cell terrorism."[6]

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[5] See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 2010).
[6] Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, "The Jihadi Experiences: The Schools of Jihad," *Inspire*, Summer 1431, 2010, p. 49.

Still, al Qa'ida's pan-Islamic movement suggests that the United States will need to counter its support in multiple regions.[7] Figure 1 shows al Qa'ida's affiliates (groups whose emirs have sworn *bayat* to al Qa'ida's leaders) and allies across the globe. The map highlights countries in which al Qa'ida may aid insurgent groups in the future. In some of these countries, such as Saudi Arabia, it has already tried – and failed – to initiate an insurgency, but could try again.[8] In others, such as Yemen and Iraq, it is already assisting insurgent groups. Countries shaded in black represent those with a current presence where al Qa'ida could support – or continue to support – insurgencies. Of particular note are countries in Africa (such as Nigeria and Egypt) and the Middle East (such as Jordan and Iran) where al Qa'ida could provide aid to insurgencies if there is an opportunity.

Figure 1: Potential Areas Impacted by Al Qa'ida and its Affiliates



[7] See, for example, Thomas Hegghammer, "The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad," *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 3, Winter 2010/11, pp. 53-94.
[8] Thomas Hegghamer, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

In addition to these threats, there are a range of challenges that may impact the future of U.S. irregular warfare efforts. Examples include:

- **Inter-Agency Cooperation:** Inter-agency cooperation appears to have improved between some organizations, such as U.S. Special Operations and the Central Intelligence Agency. But it has been mixed between other organizations, such as the Department of Defense and civilian agencies like the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development. These challenges have, at times, strained relations between military and civilian agencies at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels from Afghanistan to Yemen.

- **Vietnam War Syndrome:** There is also a possibility that the challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan – as well as the prospect of conventional conflict in such areas as North Korea and Taiwan – will tempt some in the U.S. military to dismiss the importance of irregular warfare in the future. As John Nagl concluded in his study of counterinsurgency warfare, referring to the post-Vietnam era: "Rather than squarely face up to the fact that army counterinsurgency doctrine had failed in Vietnam, the army decided that the United States should no longer involve itself in counterinsurgency operations."[9] Not only will irregular warfare remain important for the foreseeable future, but there is a growing body of useful analysis on topics like how insurgencies end that needs to be preserved.[10]

- **Health of U.S. Forces:** More than a decade of combat has taxed U.S. forces involved in irregular warfare. Soldiers have had to deal with considerable stress on their families, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), battle wounds, and numerous other challenges.

- **Technological Changes:** Insurgent and terrorist groups will increasingly utilize the Internet and social media forums to communicate, distribute propaganda, recruit individuals, and accomplish other tasks in the future.[11] Figure 2 highlights trends in global Internet Protocol (IP) traffic through 2015. Overall, IP traffic is expected to grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 32 percent through 2015, which suggests that the number of devices connected to IP networks could be twice as high as the global

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[9] John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya to Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 207.
[10] See, for example, Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, *How Insurgencies End* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010); Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010); Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, "Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars," *International Organization*, Vol. 63, Winter 2009, pp. 67-106.
[11] Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, *War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009).

population in 2015.[12] By 2015, Wi-Fi and mobile devices could account for as much as 54 percent of IP traffic, while wired devices could account for 46 percent of IP traffic. This growth will not just occur in the West, but may grow at the fastest rates in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa.[13] These developments will likely have a notable impact on insurgent operations and tactics, making it easier for insurgents to recruit, distribute propaganda, and communicate.

Figure 2: Global IP Traffic, 2010-2015[14]

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	CAGR 2010-2015
By Type (Petabytes Per Month)[15]							
Fixed Internet	14,955	20,650	27,434	35,879	46,290	59,354	32%
Managed IP	4,989	6,839	9,014	11,352	13,189	14,848	24%
Mobile Data	237	546	1,163	2,198	3,806	6,254	92%
By Segment (Petabytes Per Month)							
Consumer	16,221	23,130	31,592	42,063	54,270	70,045	34%
Business	3,930	4,894	6,011	7,357	8,997	10,410	22%
By Geography (Petabytes Per Month)							
North America	6,998	9,947	12,978	16,116	18,848	22,274	26%
Western Europe	4,776	6,496	8,819	11,774	15,187	18,858	32%
Asia Pacific	5,368	7,317	9,847	13,341	18,060	24,150	35%
Japan	1,414	1,923	2,540	3,283	4,019	4,762	27%
Latin America	665	993	1,465	2,158	3,238	4,681	48%
Central and Eastern Europe	708	1,004	1,413	1,955	2,700	3,713	39%
Middle East and Africa	253	366	550	802	1,235	2,019	52%
Total (Petabytes Per Month)							
Total IP Traffic	20,151	28,023	37,603	49,420	63,267	80,456	32%

II. STRATEGIES

What strategies are best suited to deal with future challenges? The U.S. Department of Defense's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and 2012 Strategic Review briefly mention irregular warfare.[16]

[12] The compound annual growth rate measures the rate of return for an investment over an investment period, such as 5 or 10 years. It is also called a "smoothed" rate of return because it measures the growth of an investment as if it had grown at a steady rate on an annually compounded basis.
[13] Cisco Systems, *Cisco Visual Networking Index: Forecast and Methodology, 2010-2015* (San Jose, CA: Cisco, 2011); Cisco Systems, *Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2011-2016* (San Jose, CA: Cisco, 2011).
[14] Cisco Systems, *Cisco Visual Networking Index: Forecast and Methodology, 2010-2015* (San Jose, CA: Cisco, 2011), p. 6.
[15] A petabyte is a unit of information equal to one quadrillion bytes, or 1,000 terabytes.

But these documents do not outline irregular warfare strategies if, by "strategy," we mean a plan for using armed forces and other instruments to achieve military and political goals. The U.S. Department of Defense's publication *Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats* deals more substantively with irregular warfare, yet it focuses on how U.S. military forces are expected to conduct joint *operations* within a military campaign in the future – not on strategies.[17] In the absence of irregular warfare strategies in these assessments, we must look elsewhere. Below I outline several examples.

A. Counterinsurgency

There are two main counterinsurgency strategies for irregular warfare applicable to the United States.[18]

Population-centric: The first is the population-centric strategy outlined in Field Manual 3-24 and other sources.[19] FM 3-24 drew many of its best practices from such cases as the British in Malaya and the French in Algeria. In these and a range of other cases, the counterinsurgent was also the government. However, in most current cases, it is more difficult for outside powers to force local governments to make necessary political changes. As the U.S. experienced in Vietnam and Afghanistan, an outside power cannot force a local government to be legitimate.[20] In addition, deploying large numbers of outside forces – as some advocates of this strategy insist – has not always been successful.

Indirect: In some cases a better approach may be an indirect strategy that focuses on advising, equipping, and supporting local regular and irregular forces and actors. This type of assistance – which includes foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare – has historically been performed by U.S. Special Operations Forces and intelligence agencies. U.S. efforts to assist the Philippines in 1950s and again since 2001, Thailand in the 1960s, and Colombia against its insurgents in the 1990s and 2000s were relatively successful in weakening or defeating insurgent groups. In each case, the United States used an indirect approach rather than a direct approach. The indirect approach meant that U.S. personnel provided advice and support to host nation

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[16] U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2010); U.S. Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2012)
[17] U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare*.
[18] There are several other strategies, including ones that involve large-scale brutality against a local population, that are not applicable to the United States today.
[19] U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army and Headquarters Marine Corps Combat Development Command (December 2006). On other work, see Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*.
[20] T.X. Hammes, "Counterinsurgency Isn't a Strategy – But it Is a Necessary Capability," Draft Paper, February 2012, pp. 5-6.

forces as those nations did the fighting. While this support at times even included tactical leadership, the focus was always on assisting the host nation and not on U.S. elements engaging the enemy.[21]

B. Insurgency

At other times, the United States may be involved in supporting insurgent groups and will likely have to choose between one of two strategies.

Maoist insurgent strategy: First is the traditional Maoist-style strategy of guerrilla warfare, which the United States supported against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s. It involves organizing a portion of a state's population to impose exorbitant costs on the government.[22] Although a Maoist strategy targets opposing armed forces and their support networks, its goal is to destroy the *will* of the attacker, not necessarily its capacity to fight. It is not a strategy aimed at securing a quick government defeat. As Mao notes, it aims to exhaust the enemy into submission: "When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerrilla strategy, the enemy's rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated."[23]

A Maoist strategy consists of three sequential but overlapping phases. The first involves organizing insurgent political and military structures from among the population. As Mao concluded: "A primary feature of guerrilla operations is their dependence upon the *people* themselves to organize battalions and other units."[24] One of the primary objectives during the first phase is to persuade as many people as possible – by co-opting or coercing them – to commit to the movement. While a Maoist strategy has generally been implemented in rural insurgencies, and was conceived by Mao for that purpose, it has also been adapted to urban insurgencies. If the insurgents can gradually gain support and achieve initial military successes, they enter the second and longest phase, which is characterized by guerrilla warfare and progressive expansion. Further victories, if they occur, may lead to demoralization, lethargy, and defections from the government. This leads to a third phase, which involves destruction of the enemy.

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[21] Ibid., p. 5.
[22] Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith II (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000); Ivan Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 32-33.
[23] Mao, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, p. 46.
[24] Ibid., p. 51. Emphasis added.

Insurgents shift to mobile conventional attacks on a large scale with the hope of government collapse.[25]

Conventional insurgent strategy: The second is a conventional strategy, which the United States supported against the Taliban in 2001.[26] It involves skipping Mao's first two stages and focusing on conventional military action against the government. This strategy includes the use of armed forces to capture or destroy the adversary's armed forces, thereby gaining control of its values – population, territory, cities, or vital industrial and communications centers. The goal is to win the war in a decisive engagement or a series of engagements by destroying the adversary's physical capacity to resist. Insurgent forces may, for example, advance to capture a defender's values or strategic assets – like a capital city, communications center, or base – and the defender moves to thwart that effort. A battle or series of battles then follows until one side admits defeat or there is a political settlement.[27]

III. USEFUL MODELS

One of the most useful – and recent – models has been the development of Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP), indirect programs that supplement direct action and civilian efforts in Afghanistan. They have been developed over the last three years by Special Operations Forces in a range of rural villages. Their goals are to help Afghans stand up for themselves and re-empower their traditional institutions of security, economic development, and informal governance in step with Afghan history and culture. VSO and ALP are joint and inter-agency in nature. Since 2009, VSO and ALP have involved deploying Afghan and U.S. forces to Afghan villages to help local communities provide security, governance, and development – and better connect them to the central government. VSO and ALP sites quickly multiplied across the country and have been successful in regaining territory from the Taliban.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on America's recent experience in irregular warfare and future threats, there are several issues that should be considered:

- **Organization:** Based on current threats and challenges, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) should play the frontline Department of Defense role in countering terrorist, insurgent, and other irregular warfare threats. Despite the

[25] Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, Second Edition (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), p. 50.
[26] Walter Lacquer, *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998); Arreguin-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*, pp. 30-31.
[27] Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*, pp. 30-31.

austere economic environment, it would be wise to continue – if not increase – funds for a range of programs in the future, such as 1208 and the Village Stability Operations / Afghan Local Police programs (the latter which are paid for using Afghanistan Security Force Funds).

- **Health of U.S. Forces:** U.S. soldiers and their families have dealt with enormous stress because of irregular warfare deployments. The likely continuation of these threats – and deployments – suggests that the U.S. Department of Defense needs to continue improving its physical and mental health programs for soldiers and their families. Incidents such as the March 2012 alleged killing of civilians in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan by a U.S. soldier have a negative strategic impact on U.S. irregular warfare operations – and U.S. foreign policy more broadly.

- **Training and Education:** U.S. irregular warfare training has been ad hoc, especially for conventional U.S. forces. Education at core U.S. military institutions, such as the U.S. Army War College, has been better. But there is a danger that irregular warfare training and funding will be cut because some services and institutions may view it as antiquated. Much like after the Vietnam War, this would be a serious mistake.

- **Inter-Agency Cooperation:** Congress may consider supporting an assessment of inter-agency "lessons learned" during irregular warfare campaigns, as it has done for inter-agency teams conducting counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Inter-agency cooperation has not been as effective as it should be, and it may be worth considering an objective, analytical evaluation.

The irregular warfare struggle will be a long one. The battlefield remains a global one, stretching from the great shores of America and the United Kingdom to the rugged peaks of Yemen and Pakistan. This struggle will be measured in decades, not months or years – a concept that doesn't come easy easily to most Westerners.

Curriculum Vitae

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PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

RAND Corporation
Senior Political Scientist. Lead research projects on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency issues, especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Also focus on al Qa'ida operations – and U.S. counterterrorist operations – in South Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, and North America. 2011–present.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Special Operations
Representative for the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations / Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities. Worked on a range of issues, such as the December 2010 Afghanistan Pakistan Annual Review for the President of the United States. Conducted a range of assessments for U.S. Special Operations Command, including "Al Qa'ida in Afghanistan." 2010–2011.

U.S. Special Operations, Afghanistan
Advisor and Plans Officer for the Commanding General, U.S. Special Operations Forces. Worked on a range of strategic and operational issues for Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A), based out of Kabul, Afghanistan. 2009–2010.

Georgetown University
Adjunct Professor, Security Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. Taught classes on "Counterinsurgency" and "Stability Operations." 2002–2009.

United States Naval Postgraduate School
Adjunct Professor, Center for Homeland Defense and Security. Teach classes to mid- and senior-level FBI, Department of Defense, State and Local Police, Department of Homeland Security, and other U.S. government officials on "Comparative Government for Homeland Security." The class examines the counterterrorism experiences of other countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Israel. 2005–present.

RAND Corporation
Senior Political Scientist. Led studies on building village-level defense forces in Afghanistan, counterinsurgency in Pakistan, how terrorist groups end, and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Participated in research on nation-building and state-building efforts including the United States, Europe, and United Nations from 1945 to the present. 2003–2009.

EDUCATION

- *The University of Chicago*: Ph.D. (2004), M.A. (1999) in Political Science.
- *Bowdoin College*: A.B. (1995) with High Honors in Government, Phi Beta Kappa, Summa Cum Laude.

BOOKS

- *Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of Al Qa'ida Since 9/11* (W.W. Norton, forthcoming in 2012).
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- *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010) (lead author).
- *Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009) (co-author).
- *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa'ida* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008) (lead author).
- *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008) (sole author).
- *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007) (co-author).
- *Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? U.S. Internal Security Assistance to Repressive and Transitioning Regimes* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006) (lead author).
- *Securing Health: Lessons from Nation-Building Missions* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006) (lead author).
- *Establishing Law and Order after Conflict* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005) (lead author)
- *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From Congo to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005) (co-author).
- *Building a Successful Palestinian State* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005) (co-author).
- *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Japan* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003) (co-author).

NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES

- Over two dozen articles for such newspapers and magazines as the *Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Newsweek, New York Times, Financial Times, International Herald Tribune*, and others.

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

- "Stabilization from the Bottom Up," Testimony before the Commission on Wartime Contracting, February 22, 2010.
- "U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan," Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia, April 2, 2009.
- "Defeating Terrorist Groups," Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, September 18, 2008.
- "Getting Back on Track in Afghanistan," Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, April 2, 2008.
- "The State of the Afghan Insurgency," Testimony before the Canadian Senate National Security and Defence Committee, December 10, 2007.

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 112th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with appropriate redactions to protect the witness's personal privacy (including home address and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one day after the witness's appearance before the committee.

Witness name: Seth Jones

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

___Individual

_x_Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: RAND Corporation

FISCAL YEAR 2012

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
1	DoD	$10,883,895	NDRI

FISCAL YEAR 2011

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
1	DoD	$64,274,083	NDRI

FISCAL YEAR 2010

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
1	DoD	$49,552,740	NDRI

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2012):1_____;
Fiscal year 2011:1_____;
Fiscal year 2010:1_____;

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2012): See attached_____;
Fiscal year 2011: See attached_____;
Fiscal year 2010: See attached_____;

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2012): See attached_____;
Fiscal year 2011: See attached_____;
Fiscal year 2010: See attached_____;

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2012): $10,883,895_____;
Fiscal year 2011: $64,274,083_____;
Fiscal year 2010: $49,552,740_____;

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2012):0_____;
Fiscal year 2011: 0_____;
Fiscal year 2010: 0_____;

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2012): N/A_____;
Fiscal year 2011: N/A_____;
Fiscal year 2010: N/A_____;

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2012): N/A_____;
Fiscal year 2011: N/A_____;
Fiscal year 2010: N/A_____;

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2012): N/A_____;
Fiscal year 2011: N/A_____;
Fiscal year 2010: N/A_____;

STATEMENT BY

COLONEL ROBERT KILLEBREW, USA (RET.)

SENIOR FELLOW

CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

ON

UNDERSTANDING FUTURE IRREGULAR WARFARE CHALLENGES

MARCH 27, 2012

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this distinguished panel. The future of irregular warfare, and what we should do about it, is as vital a subject as there is in national defense these days, and I am pleased to have this chance to share my views with such a group as yours.

You have my bio; let me just say that, starting as a lieutenant in Army Special Forces in a long-ago war, the subject of war, and specifically irregular warfare, has been my focus for over forty years. Although I have the honor to be a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, the views I present here are my own.

In its plainest form, "irregular warfare" is not "regular" warfare; some forms of irregular warfare can be beneficial; our own nation began with an insurgency, which is a form of irregular warfare. But some forms of irregular warfare become plainly dangerous to us when they challenge what we believe about human dignity and freedom. The kinds of irregular wars we're most liable to confront in the emerging 21st century are new kinds of insurgencies, driven by new motivations and new tactics. I'd like to focus my remarks on the changing nature of insurgency, since I think they are the most likely kinds of irregular warfare we'll see in the future.

Insurgencies have three enduring characteristics that are useful to remember. One is that they are ultimately about politics, as all war is. Second, no two are ever the same, because political conditions are never the same. And finally, insurgencies follow a sort of "arc," or sine curve, that begins with criminal acts, gathers force as it climbs, and then either peaks in success or, if counterinsurgency is successful, is driven back down the curve so that it ultimately becomes a matter for routine law enforcement once again. In a nutshell, successful counterinsurgency means driving the insurgency back down to common crime.

This relationship of crime to conflict – to irregular warfare, insurgency and its little brother, terrorism -- is the dominant factor that is changing the conduct of irregular warfare in the 21st century from what we knew in the 20th. Other factors are the communications revolution, human migration, arms trafficking and there are others. But there is so much

illicit money out there – estimated to be one-fifth of the world's GDP – that it is having an enormous political impact, and one such impact is to fund terrorist and insurgent groups. One way to look at the Taliban and its associated warlord supporters, for example, is as big smuggling operations – drugs, money, arms, you name it. The same is true of the Colombian FARC, or virtually any insurgency in the world today.

In the 21st Century, crime, terrorism and insurgency are blending in new political and social combinations that will call for new understandings of irregular warfare and approaches in counterinsurgency. Although some still deny the reality, one need look no further than the impact and reach of the Mexican criminal cartels – now called "Transnational Criminal Organizations" – to see the face of modern irregular warfare, insurgency and terrorism.

Despite the hard work and sacrifice of operators in the field, and some notable successes, we – the United States government – are poorly organized to meet those challenges, in my opinion. Here are some suggestions on how we can best prepare.

First, we should recognize that we are entering a new post-Westphalian era of potentially constant, borderless conflict. "Irregular warfare" is poised to become the new "regular" warfare. Some states have become "criminal states." Iran, for example, has attempted, and I think will attempt again, to hire criminals to conduct terrorist strikes inside the United States. This is a huge step, and indicates that our borders are no longer protection against other states, as well as against criminals like the 9/11 gang. As a matter of some urgency, it should become the objective of the United States and its friends to find ways to force transnational conflict back into controllable, legal channels, or we will face a century without rules and without restraint.

Second, with regard to insurgency, the most likely form of "irregular warfare," we have to have the right perspective. Unless we're fighting in Alabama, we're *not* the "counterinsurgency" force. The real counterinsurgent is the host country, and we are third-party intruders in a family fight. Our whole aim, therefore – our strategy, our training, our equipment – should be designed to make our host as strong as possible against his insurgency. This is how *we,* the United States, must

learn to fight irregular warfare and counterinsurgency. We urgently need to learn how to advise foreign armies and foreign governments with minimal presence where it counts, rather than muscling in with massive troop buildups and foreign aid that eclipses, and often alienates, the very people we are trying to help. I would be happy to expand on the training and role of military advisors, having been one myself.

As an example of successful US assistance to a successful counterinsurgency, the subcommittee should look closely at the example of Colombia, which has rebounded from a lost cause a decade ago to the best – and only – currently successful example in this hemisphere. The Colombians have not only used their military and police forces together in an exemplary way, but they have also focused their entire government on reestablishing the rule of law, reclaiming their country and on an extensive rehabilitation and retraining program that, frankly, we could learn a lot from. I should add that the Colombians are now helping the Mexicans and others in Latin America, and could be more effective with even a little more help than what we are currently giving them. This is how we win in "irregular warfare."

Third, we need to change our thinking and how we allocate resources. Old definitions of crime, terrorism, insurgency, irregular warfare and so forth often "stovepipe" our responses among government agencies and funding streams; worse, they cramp our mental responses and force them into irrelevant directions, while our enemies, unrestrained, simply adapt and carry on. This subcommittee could make no better contribution that try to un-stovepipe budget lines that split hairs in this regard and free field operators to better collaborate, and this goes across the whole government, not just DoD. My preference would be a general category of "military assistance" that would cover the whole "irregular warfare" area, so that we could provide flexible assistance to our friends – to include combat advisors – without the politically charged (to our allies) label of "warfare" attached. But I leave that to others to decide.

The term "whole of government approach" has been used so often in recent years that it has become trite. But in fact, aiding another country to fight an irregular war, whether insurgency, or terrorism, or

widespread trans-national criminal networks supporting both, takes all the resources from our whole government, not just DoD. Other US agencies have been instrumental in helping our allies – for example, the Drug Enforcement Agency's "Trusted Officer" program assisted the Colombians – and others – to clean up their police forces. The DEA, FBI, USAID and others are often key below-the-line contributors to successful missions that aid our friends. I should not have to point out that State plays a key role, and they are so severely underfunded that, I am told, they cannot now hire Foreign Service Officers at replacement rate.

Finally, we have long-term challenges here at home. I have argued that crime, terrorism and insurgency are blending, and a result of that blend is politically motivated irregular conflict that spreads across borders in ways that would have been unthinkable – and impractical – just twenty years ago.

We can respond in a number of ways, and we have made great strides in homeland security and policing in the past decades. At the highest level, though, our best defense in a turbulent century is citizens who solidly support their government and their nation in a time of great change and stress. The present political gridlock in Washington, and the anti-government cant from some, is eating away at the trust our citizens must have in our government, over the long term, to stand against the disintegrative and destructive forces best exemplified by the Mexican cartels.

Our inability thus far to enact comprehensive and humane immigration reform is a national security Achilles Heel. It not only denies us the services and taxes of perhaps ten million or so potentially patriotic citizens, but also risks creating a fearful, embittered and alienated minority in this country that is already becoming the unwilling – and I stress unwilling -- host for transnational crime. The crimes of 9/11 and the current insurgencies in the world are only the beginning of challenges we will face in the 21st century. The most important counterinsurgency strategy we can adopt – and the most essential – is a unified and committed country. That must be our highest priority.

Robert B. Killebrew
Senior Fellow

CNAS BIOGRAPHY

Colonel (USA ret) Bob Killebrew writes and consults on national defense issues as a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Prior to his retirement from active duty he served for thirty years in a variety of Special Forces, infantry and staff duties. His assignments ranged included duty in Vietnam with MACVSOG, the Vietnamese Airborne Division, command in mechanized, air assault and airborne units, and staff positions in the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, as director of plans, XVIII Airborne Corps, special assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Army, command of a deployed joint task force and as an instructor in strategy and policy at the Army War College.

Since retirement, Bob has served as a consultant to a variety of Defense Department and defense-related organizations, including the Department of Defense, US Army and Air Force, the Defense Research Projects Agency, US Joint Forces Command, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, the Project for a New American Century, Toffler Associates and as a consultant for a number of defense industries and public television. In 1999 he was appointed to the staff of the Hart-Rudman Commission on American defense needs for the 21st Century. In addition to consulting on strategic and operational matters, Bob as also directed or written a number of defense-related studies, including the State/DoD Study The Country Team in American Strategy and The Left-Hand Side of the Spectrum for the Center for a New American Security. Most recent writings include The Crossover of Urban Gang Warfare and Terrorism (National Strategy Forum, Fall 2008) and Terror at the Border for Armed Forces Journal, December, 2008. With Jennifer Bernal he authored the CNAS study Crime Wars; Gangs, Cartels and U.S. National Security, published in 2010. He is currently working with Matthew Irvine on U.S. – Colombian security policy.

Bob is a graduate of The Citadel and holds masters' degrees in history and international relations. While on active duty, he served as American Defense Fellow at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario. He is the author of a book on the relationship of nuclear and non-nuclear warfare, and has provided expert witness testimony before Congressional committees and other governmental agencies. He has also served as a paid consultant to National Public Radio and advises and comments on national security issues for other public media. He and his first trophy wife, Pixie, live in Newport News, Virginia.

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 112th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with appropriate redactions to protect the witness's personal privacy (including home address and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one day after the witness's appearance before the committee.

Witness name: Robert Killebrew

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

__X_Individual

___Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:

FISCAL YEAR 2012

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

FISCAL YEAR 2011

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
1	Department of Defense	$300,000	Study on crime and war

FISCAL YEAR 2010

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2012):_____;
Fiscal year 2011: one_____;
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Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

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Fiscal year 2011: Department of Defense_____;
Fiscal year 2010:_____;

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2012):_____;
Fiscal year 2011: Study about crime and war_____;
Fiscal year 2010:_____;

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2012):_____;
Fiscal year 2011: $300,000_____;
Fiscal year 2010:_____;

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Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2012):_____;
Fiscal year 2011:_____;
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Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

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Fiscal year 2010:_____;

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2012):_____;
Fiscal year 2011:_____;
Fiscal year 2010:_____;

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2012):_____;
Fiscal year 2011:_____;
Fiscal year 2010:_____;

STATEMENT BY

COLONEL DAVID S. MAXWELL, USA (RET.)

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GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

ON

UNDERSTANDING FUTURE IRREGULAR WARFARE CHALLENGES

MARCH 27, 2012

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this distinguished panel. The purpose of my testimony is to provide thoughts on three questions.

1. Types of future Irregular Warfare challenges.
2. Strategies best suited to deal with future challenges.
3. Existing examples or models to support those strategies and effectively manage Irregular Warfare challenges.

In my testimony I will seek to answer those questions and focus on three areas that have been the focus of my studies and military experience: Lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines (OEF-P), the potential for Irregular Warfare following a war or regime collapse in North Korea and recommendations for Special Operations Forces operating in the future irregular environment.

Introduction

As we move toward the close of the eleventh year of the War on Terrorism it is useful to examine the background of the rise of Irregular Warfare and its associated doctrine with the aim of ensuring we preserve the right lessons learned as we try to anticipate the future conflicts with which the U.S. might be faced. However, this will not be an extensive historical review of doctrine or the War on Terrorism but will instead provide a critique of selected areas with the intent to provide some context to the answer the three key questions.

We should recall one historical event that followed the end of the last controversial and difficult conflict that caused major divisions within our Nation and radically altered our military: Vietnam. We came out of the Vietnam experience with the desire not to fight such a war again and in fact within the Army purged much of the doctrine related to Counterinsurgency and Irregular Warfare type activities. The Army in particular embarked on a very successful transformation to an all-volunteer force with the doctrine and weapons systems designed to fight the Nation's existential threat: the Soviet Union on the central plains of Europe. The efficacy of what was known as AirLand Battle and the operational art that was its foundation was proven in Operation Desert Storm.

Yet it is often forgotten that immediately following the defeat of the Iraqi forces and liberation of Kuwait U.S. forces became involved in Operation Provide Comfort in what would perhaps foreshadow two decades of various forms of what can be described as Irregular Warfare though of course that term was not "re-invented" until after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the rise of the Iraqi insurgency. Following Desert Storm the U.S. military was engaged in myriad irregular conflicts from Somalia and Haiti to Bosnia and Kosovo. But even during the first decade after the end of the Cold War it was well known that the types of conflict that were taking place were not really new to the U.S. military and Irregular Warfare and conflict has long been the dominant form that it has faced. In fact, a colleague once remarked that when he first heard that Irregular Warfare was becoming established in doctrine, it reminded him of when Columbus landed in the

New World and the Native Americans were left scratching their heads wondering what was so new about it.

However, with 9-11 and the invasion and occupation of both Afghanistan and Iraq and the rise of the insurgencies, the U.S. military eventually embarked on the development of new doctrine, most all of it tactically- and operationally-focused, for how to conduct counterinsurgency and operate in irregular conflict environments. What then happened is best summed up by the strategist Colin Gray:

> *"The American defense community is especially prone to capture by the latest catchphrase, the new-sounding spin on an ancient idea which as jargon separates those who are truly expert from the lesser breeds without the jargon."*

This describes what happened in the military very well. In reaction to public criticism that the military was unprepared for what followed after the defeat of the Iraqi military and destruction of its government, the military embarked on a rapid doctrinal development effort that resulted in the famed FM 3-24 as well as new concepts and forces laid out in the 2006 and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews. By 2008 the Secretary of Defense issued an instruction (DODI 3000.07) that brought together Unconventional Warfare, Counterinsurgency, Foreign Internal Defense, Counterterrorism, and Stability Operations under the umbrella of Irregular Warfare.

But with this came the proliferation of new terms and concepts that were (and remain) redundant and of little additional value. Examples of such terms include Security Force Assistance (SFA), Building Partner Capacity (BPC), Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA),

Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild/build and Advise (OTERA), Stability Security, Transition, Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO), Provincial (originally provisional) Reconstruction Teams (PRT), and Military Transition Teams (MiTT), again, just to name a few. In addition, re-establishing Irregular Warfare as one end of the spectrum of conflict has also led to the rise of new terms to describe conflicts other than state on state high intensity maneuver warfare. Although a number of these terms were being put forth prior to 9-11 examples of the names for war and conflict included not only Insurgency but also Asymmetric Warfare, 4th Generation Warfare (and 5th as well), Hybrid Warfare, Network Centric Warfare, and a host of other rather esoteric terms such as "post-heroic warfare," "matrix warfare," and "holistic warfare." And we should not forget the Chinese "Unrestricted Warfare."

If Clausewitz were alive today he would repeat what he wrote in the 19th Century:

> *"Again, unfortunately, we are dealing with jargon, which, as usual bears little resemblance to well defined, specific concepts."*

But Clausewitz also wisely remarked that before you embark on war you have to determine the type of war to be fought. Unfortunately this wise counsel has been focused on ***naming*** rather than ***understanding*** the war. The U.S. military has expended a lot time and intellectual capital trying to come up not only with new names of war but also new names of old concepts. I am often reminded of the scene in "Apocalypse Now" in which Captain Willard (Martin Sheen) is sitting in his quarters and says words to the effect, "(Expletive). Still in Saigon. Every day I am here I grow weaker and every day Charlie is in the bush growing stronger." I would turn this to say, "(Expletive). Another new

doctrinal term. Every day we make up new terms and grow weaker, while AQ is in the mountains growing stronger."

Despite this seemingly negative critique, all the services have done a lot of important work despite the focus on naming conventions. This work must be preserved and used rather than purged as it was following Vietnam. This is important especially as the opponents of Counterinsurgency want to sound the same call as was heard in 1975: "Never Again."

To sum up, the military has to get its doctrinal house in order, protect the intellectual strides that have been made, cease the proliferation of new terms and concepts and instead focus on streamlining doctrine to make it efficient and effective, and most important, so that it provides the military with the foundation for education and training in order for it to be able to practice sound operational art and assist in the development and implementation of strategy in support of U.S. National Security policy.

Types of Future Irregular Warfare Challenges

Predicting the future is always a losing proposition because it is filled with uncertainty. However, while we cannot know what will happen, it is likely that the future will include many elements from history, though perhaps in new creative combinations not totally new or surprising to students of military or world history. We should be reminded of the adage "Train for Certainty and Educate for Uncertainty." It is uncertain what will

emerge from the spectrum of conflict. However, as war remains "an act of force to compel an enemy to do our will" we know that we have to train our military for the full spectrum of conflict using the right capabilities of the joint force to achieve our objectives. This should not be interpreted as an attempt to categorize Irregular Warfare as the "graduate level of war" (a description sometime attributed to Counterinsurgency). The ability to be effective in any form of conflict requires a trained ***and*** well-educated force because it is *war itself* that is the graduate level of war. In an uncertain future and, especially, in times of fiscal constraint that our military will experience for the next decade, the most important thing for our military is to educate the force and continue the high level of training for which it has been revered and renowned.

As the focus of this paper is on Irregular Warfare, it is important to define and describe it. The current Joint Chiefs of Staff definition is the start point:

> ***Irregular warfare.*** ***A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations****. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. Also called IW. (JP 1-02)*

The first sentence is the essence of IW while the second is an apparent attempt to define how it is fought and countered. However, this is hardly adequate and often finds analysts and planners trying to fit the conflicts they are observing into that definition. Furthermore, as we know, this definition was adopted despite not having the "buy-in" or support from other government agencies, namely the Department of State. A lot of effort went into the "debate" to get this definition approved.

Having wrestled with this problem for many years prior to 9-11, another way to describe the future operational environment and the contrast between conventional conflict or war and what might be described as non-conventional war or conflict. In a monograph I wrote in 1995 regarding SOF support to Peace Operations, I wrote the following:

> What is clear is that the military is now involved in not only the prevention and resolution of conventional conflicts, but also in *non-conventional* conflicts (a non-doctrinal term). This is the milieu in which the military increasingly operates and which makes peace operations so difficult, yet it is this very environment in which US SOF have traditionally worked. This environment needs to be explored and thoroughly understood in order to deduce solutions to complex problems. To explain this "new" environment, the common definition of conflict will be examined and compared to its non-conventional counterpart. Conflict is defined as *"an armed struggle or clash between organized political parties within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives."* This definition, though somewhat more ambiguous than war, is still rather straightforward and simple to understand. However, non-conventional conflict is something even more ambiguous and difficult to understand. It extends the continuum of conflict. Conflict in the conventional sense begins when the armed struggle begins; however, non-conventional conflict encompasses the types of conflict listed above, starting with the ***threat*** or ***possibility*** of conflict and extending past conflict termination, because the conditions that gave rise to hostilities in the first place may still remain, though not visible or easily recognized. It also includes armed clashes by ***unorganized*** groups that are not seeking to achieve any traditional political or military objectives. Non-conventional conflict encompasses the lawlessness of a society in which the governmental system has collapsed, but no organized group has risen to take its place. Violence and terrorist-like activity can occur out of frustration with no identifiable purpose. This type of conflict is non-conventional, because it is difficult to determine the objectives and methods of the actors, perhaps difficult to even determine the actors, and thus it is difficult to apply conventional elements of national power. This is the sensitive and complex environment in which peace operations may increasingly take place. Although the situation may not be a traditional insurgency, there will likely be many of its characteristics present. In these types of non-conventional environments it is the issue of *perceived*

legitimacy by the people and the political powers involved that places new stresses on military forces whose legitimacy is no longer a matter of fact. This is perhaps the most significant change for military forces given the evolution of the character of *conflict* (while as Clausewitz teaches us the nature remains constant).[1]

To expand the understanding of non-conventional conflict it is useful to turn to *(now deceased)* Sam Sarkesian, a professor of political science at Loyola University, who sets forth ***in 1993*** a set of characteristics that summarize the variety of future non-conventional conflicts in which the US might become involved. He believes that it is in this environment that US SOF will be called upon to operate.

• Asymmetrical Conflicts. For the US these conflicts are limited and not considered a threat to its survival or a matter of vital national interests; however, for the indigenous adversaries they are a matter of survival.

• Protracted Conflicts. Require a long term commitment by the US, thus testing the national will, political resolve, and staying power of the US.

• Ambiguous and Ambivalent Conflicts. Difficult to identify the adversary, or assess the progress of the conflict; i.e., it is rarely obvious who is winning and losing.

• Conflicts with Political-Social Milieu Center of Gravity. The center of gravity will not be the armed forces of the adversaries as Clausewitz would argue, but more in the political and social realms as Sun Tzu espouses.[2]

The above would describe some, if not all, of the conflicts in which US military forces have been involved since the end of the Cold War. In this light it seems that the military faces situations driven by the changed environment in which peace operations must be conducted. The evolution of conflict in the post-Cold War era now presents military forces not only with highly complex

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[1] David S. Maxwell, "Support to United Nations Operations: Is There a Role For United States Special Operations Forces?" School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1995.

[2] Sam C. Sarkesian, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 15.

> operating environments (witness Bosnia), but also with the challenge to continually justify military presence in the eyes of a diverse and potentially antagonistic cast of players. This sensitive environment confounds conventional logic, defies traditional solutions, and has driven the military to a paradigm shift.[3]

Again, the above was written in 1995 but I think it describes today's situation as well. In my opinion, in the future we are going to see conflict from across the spectrum both traditional conventional and non-conventional, sometime separately, sometimes simultaneously, and sometimes sequentially; but of course the scale and scope is unknown and uncertain. Therefore we must educate our force for this uncertainty.

Something that is also rarely discussed is whether the U.S. faces existential threats. Clearly the most existential threat is one that will be waged among nuclear powers who have both the weapons and the delivery capability to inflict devastating society changing effects on the U.S. However, there are few countries with these capabilities and fortunately deterrence theory seems to continue to function effectively among the major nuclear powers (though perhaps not as well among the lesser nuclear powers). As the U.S. looks at conflicts around the world, a question that should always be asked is whether there is an existential threat to the U.S. or its treaty allies. If there is not an existential threat then this should drive the strategy in a way that is decidedly different than the commitment of forces for an existential threat. Or to put it another way, given the level of commitment of the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan, did we really have

[3] Maxwell.

sufficient capability to deal with existential threats either to the U.S. or our allies? I think an objective answer might be no.

But for the future, I think we can put the nature of the threats we will face into three categories. First will be those existential threats to the U.S. or allies that will be characterized by state on sate military conflict, conquest of territory and the potential for large scale death and destruction among the participants – military and civilian.

The second type of conflict will be those that threaten the status quo and regional stability of friends, partners, and allies and will require not the commitment of large-scale regular U.S. military forces, but a select and tailored force to be able to assist as appropriate in support of U.S. interests. The U.S. should consider carefully first whether to contribute any military capabilities at all and if so then in such a way as to ensure that such contribution does not become the focal point or cause of an escalation of conflict. We have seen these types of conflict in Colombia, the Philippines, the Trans Sahel, Horn of Africa, and Yemen as examples. We are likely to see these again in the future and, after determining if assisting such friends, partners, or allies is in the U.S. national interest, then we must be prepared to commit the right forces with the right resources and authorities to achieve U.S. objectives through and with the host nation.

However, the third category of threat is one that combines the potential for high-end conventional conflict that can only be conducted among states along with the non-conventional conflict to include the potential for insurgency and terrorism as well as

humanitarian crises. There is currently at least one threat to a U.S. ally that meets this description and that is North Korea.

Despite its failed economy and the extreme suffering of its population, North Korea still has formidable conventional and non-conventional capabilities. While the outcome of an attack by the north is not in doubt because surely the alliance possesses sufficient combat power to defeat the North Korean military and destroy the Kim Family Regime it is what comes next that will truly challenge the alliance. Due to the nature of 60+ year regime, there is the potential for an insurgency that will make Iraq and Afghanistan pale in comparison, particularly given the "guerilla mindset" of the population and the presence of weapons of mass destruction. Possible scenarios as well as recommendations are spelled out in the attached paper "Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula". This paper outlines five major strategic assumptions, one imperative, and 5 key preparatory tasks summarized below:

Assumptions:

1. The threats within North Korea following war or regime collapse will be irregular, dangerous and complex.
2. The Republic of Korea and its allies will not be welcomed with open arms by everyone in North Korea; by some, perhaps by many, but not by all and therein lies the threat.
3. The U.S. military doctrinal focus on IW has not taken into account the North Korean threat.
4. China will intervene to protect its interests.

Imperative: The ROK must lead unification efforts; military and civilian – as this is critical for long term legitimacy.

Key Preparatory Tasks:

1. Clear and definitive Alliance end state for the Peninsula must be established.
2. A comprehensive influence campaign must be initiated focused on the second tier leadership and the population.
3. Establish a policy and plans for North Korea security forces during post-conflict/collapse.
4. Establish a North Korean "Hands" program (South Korean and U.S.)
5. International Coordination of plans must be conducted – to include China.[4]

Frank Hoffman has described this type of potential conflict as Hybrid because it combines the high-end state war fighting capabilities with the irregular. Should the above assumptions prove true then the ROK-U.S. alliance will face one of the most difficult and complex security challenges in the modern era and certainly since World War II and the Korean War. This conflict requires more than planning. It requires preparation. Please see the attached paper for a more detailed discussion.

Strategies best suited to deal with future challenges

The key to future challenges for the United States lies in the ability to develop strategies that have balance and coherency among ends, ways, and means. Nearly every shortcoming we have experienced in the past decade of war can be attributed either to a

[4] David S. Maxwell, "Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula Thoughts on Irregular Threats from North Korea - Post-Conflict and Post-Collapse: *Understanding Them to Counter Them,"* www.smallwarsjounrnal.com November 2010. Also published as Chapter Six in Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula, Dr. Bruce Bechtol, editor, Marine Corps University Press, Quantico, VA, 2011.

lack of effective strategy or a lack of coherency and/or imbalance among ends, ways, and means.

The problem is best illustrated by the long running debate among those who advocate a counterinsurgency or nation building "strategy" versus those who advocate a counter-terrorism "strategy." We should really give some critical thought as to whether COIN and CT are strategies at all. But the establishment of the two camps has been extremely counter-productive because each camp has advocated the efficacy of the ways they trumpet as strategy when real strategy should focus on using the right ways and means in the right combinations to achieve the desired ends that support national policy and interests. Although it should be obvious, employment of COIN techniques and CT capabilities are not mutually exclusive but we have allowed the divisive debate in both political and military circles to hinder our ability to develop effective strategy to support national policy.

If the future holds three likely categories of threats, then what are the capabilities the U.S. needs for each? For the first, existential threats against the U.S. and its allies, the U.S. require what is has always required: a military educated, trained and ready to fight and win the nations wars. The dominant military capability lies in both the Nation's Regular and Strategic Forces.

The difficulty is balancing the size of this force with the capability to fight and win the nation's wars and provide the capability to deal with the second category that threatens

the status quo and regional stability of our friends, partners, and allies. The U.S. needs a strategy to be able to identify threats and vulnerabilities and if assessed as appropriate, apply the right instruments of U.S. national power in the correct combination to be able to help friends, partners, or allies counter those threats. In the past, the forces that have had the capability to contribute in this area most effectively have been Special Operations Forces (SOF). It will most likely be the force with the necessary capabilities to deal with the second category in the future as well.

For the Hybrid threat posed by, for example, North Korea, it requires the combined capabilities required for the first two categories: Regular, Strategic and Special Operations Forces. While the military can and should develop traditional Operations Plans to deal with the first and third category and train and maintain readiness to execute those plans, it is the second category that requires consideration of a different and non-traditional strategy and capabilities.

The first requirement is the necessity for a functional national security process to orchestrate the instruments of national power to be able to deal with threats to friends, partners, and allies. History is replete with examples of both effective and ineffective application of the instruments of national power. An inherent weakness in the U.S. national security system is the turnover of national security personnel and the lack of defined and common processes and procedures for formulating plans and then orchestrating the execution of the plans to include receiving assessments and then adapting plans as conditions on the ground evolve. In May 1997 President Clinton

signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 "The Management of Complex Contingency Operations." The PDD provided an interagency process to assess and plan for complex operations. Coincidentally, after the PDD was signed interagency training was conducted to test the processes and one of the original complex scenarios used was the collapse of the regime in North Korea. This took place at the same time CONPLAN 5029 –"North Korean Instability and Collapse" was being developed and the U.S. Commander in Korea, General John Tilelli, asked Secretary of Defense Cohen to use the Korean scenario both for training and as a way to bring the interagency into the planning that was being conducted in Korea.

A PDD 56-like process can have application across the spectrum of conflict of course, but is especially applicable to the second category, threats to the status quo and regional stability. It can be an effective tool to both develop strategy to support national policy and supervise and resource execution. However, what is also required are the capabilities and forces and an organization to be able to both provide the assessments to anticipate potential future conflict as well as have the small footprint capability to provide the advice necessary to assist friends, partners and allies. U.S. SOF can be a key capability in this regard. To understand how SOF can play a role it is necessary to look at the two over arching special operations capabilities: Surgical Strike and Special Warfare.

As has been demonstrated since 9-11, the U.S. possesses a surgical strike capability that has performed remarkably well in critical areas around the world. This capability is defined in the draft Army Doctrinal Publication 3-05 Special Operations, as follows:

> **Surgical strike is the execution of activities in a precise manner that employ special operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or influence adversaries and threats.** Executed unilaterally or collaboratively, surgical strike extends operational reach and influence by engaging global targets discriminately and precisely. Surgical strike is not always intended to be an isolated activity; it is executed to shape the environment or influence a threat in support of larger strategic interests. Although the actual strike is short in duration, the process of planning frequently requires interagency and host nation partnerships to develop the target and facilitate post-operation activities.
>
> Surgical strike activities include actions against critical operational or strategic targets; *counterproliferation* actions to prevent the threat and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our forces, allies, and partners; *counterterrorism* actions taken directly and indirectly against terrorist networks to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks; and *hostage rescue and recovery* operations, which are sensitive crisis response missions that include offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorist threats and incidents, including recapture of U.S. facilities, installations, and sensitive material.

This capability resides permanently in a national mission force which is resourced at a very high level. Again, from Saddam to Zarqawi, to hostages on the ground and off the coast in Somalia, other high value targets in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and finally Bin Laden himself, this standing joint special operations force has returned on the nation's investment through this surgical strike capability far beyond the imaginations of the original leaders who founded these organizations and the visionary political leaders who supported them.

The other overarching special operations capability is Special Warfare. Again from the draft ADP 3-05 it is defined as:

Special warfare is the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.

Unconventional warfare **is defined as activities conducted to enable a resistance** movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area (JP 3-05). Unconventional warfare operations are politically sensitive activities that involve a high degree of military risk. These operations require distinct authorities and precise planning, and are often characterized by innovative design. Army special operations forces activities are used to shape the indigenous population to support the resistance movement or insurgency.

Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22). Foreign internal defense activities provide a capability that is oriented on proactive security **cooperation. Foreign internal defense activities shape the environment and prevent or** deter conflict through sustained engagement with host nations, regional partners, and indigenous populations and their institutions.

Foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare may be considered conceptual opposites; however, the training and education provided to Army special operations forces to work with indigenous forces in the conduct of unconventional warfare is equally applicable in foreign internal defense. In both capabilities, Army special operations forces focus on interacting with and empowering indigenous powers to act. The ability for Army special operations forces to build insurgent capabilities during unconventional warfare is the exact skill set used by Army special operations forces when working with or through indigenous forces and host nation institutions to defeat an insurgent threat.

This describes the traditional SOF capabilities and the two key missions for the future which are best suited for dealing with the second category of threats. However, there is one key difference between the Nation's surgical strike and special warfare capabilities: The surgical strike capability has a standing joint special operations force that is maintained the highest state of readiness and has the ability to operate globally to support U.S. national security objectives. The special warfare capability has no counterpart organization. Although United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is a "hybrid" combatant command – with service-like resource responsibilities and authorities and the capability to operationally employ forces – it has not been able to effectively execute operations in comparison to the effectiveness of the standing joint special operations force responsible for surgical strike. The special warfare capabilities remain disparate, assigned to different organizations deploying and working for the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) and U.S. Country Teams. Strong consideration should be given to establishing s standing special warfare joint force that would have global responsibilities to be able to provide long duration and sustained support to U.S. Country Teams and Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC). An investment in a force that is resourced at a high level to provide a global foreign internal defense and as required, unconventional warfare capability with an integrated network from the continental U.S. through the TSOCs and GCCs to specific host nation on the model of the surgical strike standing joint special operations force would pay similar dividends over time and ensure that the hard won Irregular Warfare capabilities would be sustained over time.

However, as many military planners will note, special operations may not possess the capacity for the potential level of effort required depending on evolving threat environments. As has been proven in Iraq and Afghanistan, Regular and Special Operations Forces must be interoperable and capable of mutual support and integration. To be able to have an integrated Regular and Special Operations capability consideration should be given to establishing a "hybrid corps" headquarters that would consist of Regular Forces and Special Operations Forces with special warfare capabilities. This would be a permanent corps headquarters that would focus on the foreign internal defense missions requiring capabilities beyond the organic ones in the standing special warfare joint special operations force. It can both provide forces as well as command and control for larger operations.

This hybrid corps would have global responsibilities. It would be able to provide advisors when there is a delta in SOF capabilities. The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School could re-establish the Vietnam era Military Assistance and Training Advisory (MATA) Course to train Regular Force advisors and be the repository to maintain this skill set for the Army.

These are examples of future capabilities and possible organizations that could support a U.S. national security strategy. However, the key to the future remains understanding the character and nature of conflict, anticipating challenges, and then developing an effective strategy that brings balance and coherency among ends, ways, and means. However, there is no "silver bullet" or "holy grail" of strategy. Future strategies will require

balance and adjustment based on changes in the security situation. There is no single strategic model than can apply to the future such as NSC-68 and Containment.

Existing examples or models to support those strategies and effectively

While there is no single model that can work in all situations, there are numerous examples of effective operations that have been or are currently being conducted around the world. A look at Colombia, the Horn of Africa, and the Philippines will show as many differences as there are similarities. However, there are some key points that do help to explain why these operations seem to be functioning as effectively as they are. One of the common areas is that they are practicing good special warfare skills and in particular the foreign internal defense mission where they are operating in an advisory and assistance role providing training and support to help the host nation's internal defense and development programs in order to defend against lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism. However, I will use the Philippines to illustrate some of the operational concepts that can support a global strategy for the second category of threats.

A more detailed description of how the Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P) evolved can be found in the attached paper: "Foreign Internal Defense: An Indirect Approach to Counter-Insurgency/Counter Terrorism, Lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom- Philippines for dealing with Non-Existential Threats to the United States" which was presented at a conference on *Irregular Warfare Challenges and Opportunities*

of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and sponsored by the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office on December 6, 2011.

The first point to keep in mind is that the title of the paper states that it is an indirect approach to both COIN and CT. From the initial assessment it was understood that the mission had to provide advice and assistance to our Philippine allies on both COIN and CT. A second point is that the U.S. military was not conducting COIN and CT but was advising and assisting the Armed Forces of the Philippines on their conduct of COIN and CT. This cannot be overlooked and leads to a statement that should be considered, namely that the United States military should not be conducting COIN because rarely if ever is the insurgency directed at the U.S. except under perhaps one condition. That condition would be if the U.S. is or appears to be an occupying power. One type of insurgency is by definition focused on ridding a land of an occupying power. If the U.S. is acting like an occupying power and feels the need to conduct U.S. led COIN operations then it is likely *a* major, if not *the*, cause of an insurgency. A problem that most U.S. forces have is that they are so focused on mission accomplishment they often lack the patience to let the host nation operate in accordance with its own capabilities as well as customs and traditions. Which brings the next key lesson.

OEF-P began with a detailed and thorough assessment of the situation from the national strategic to the tactical level done in partnership with Philippine counterparts. This resulted not only in understanding the character of the conflict in the Southern Philippines but understanding the Philippine strengths and weakness and customs and

traditions as well. This was also possible because of decades of engagement between U.S. SOF and the Philippine military It also allowed for the development of a campaign plan that was jointly developed and approved and reinforced the U.S.-Philippine relationship that the Filipinos were in charge on the ground and the American forces were not.

While U.S. SOF provided training, advice and assistance they did not try to create a military in the U.S. image. It was tailored advice based on understanding the Philippine military as well as culture. Again, this reinforced that the U.S. was not in charge of operations. Although the American forces deliberately did not try to create the military in the U.S. image they did integrate some high tech capabilities into Philippine operations, particularly intelligence capabilities.

The Joint Special Operations Task Force –Philippines (JSOTF-P) had a unique mission statement that provides an overview of the entire mission and the foundation for operations.

> *JSOTF-P, **in coordination with the US Country Team**, builds capacity and strengthens the Republic of the Philippines security forces to defeat selected terrorist organizations in order to protect RP and US citizens and interest from terrorist attack **while preserving RP sovereignty**.*[5]

There are three points to make about this mission statement. First, it uses plain language and no jargon or doctrinal terms. It should be understood by military and non-military alike. The second point is that the mission statement recognizes that JSOTF-P must be

[5] Credit for this mission statement belongs to then-LTC Bill Medina who was a planner in the SOCPAC J5 in 2006 and later Chief of Staff, JSOTF-P, 2007.

integrated with the Country Team. There are tremendously effective relationships with USAID, the Pol-Mil section of the embassy, the military attaches, the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, the legal attaché and the intelligence organizations. These relationships ensure integration and synchronization of activities and ensure that JSOTF-P supports the Ambassador's Mission Strategic Plan. Finally the last part emphasizes the critical importance of national sovereignty. Rarely does a mission statement contain such a statement and while the concept of preserving host nation sovereignty is understood to be important, having it explicitly stated in the mission statement reinforces that to every member of the organization.

Finally, JSOTF-P integrates and effectively employs not only joint special operations forces from all four services but also numerous regular forces as well from maintenance and logistics units, ground security forces, intelligence analysts and intercept capabilities, engineers, and medical personnel.

These are just a few of the lessons from OEF-P that will have future application; however, it should not be considered a model. Each security situation is unique and requires thorough assessment in order to craft the appropriate campaign plan to support the national strategy.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to look at the future of Irregular Warfare. The key to the future is having a force trained for certainty and educated for uncertainty. The three potential categories of threats should shape the force as well as the strategy. A new SOF, as well as a hybrid Corps, construct should be considered for dealing with the second category of threats to provide assistance to friends, partners, and allies when the status quo or regional stability is threatened.

An overlooked irregular threat is North Korea. It has the potential to be an extremely dangerous and complex threat and this requires that the ROK-U.S. alliance prepare for the threat now.

Finally there are many lessons to be learned from ongoing operations that will have application to the future operating environment. While this paper looked at U.S. operations in the Philippines there are many to learn from U.S. operations in Colombia, the Trans-Sahel and the Horn of Africa.

The uncertain future demands an agile force that can fight and win the nation's wars and yet operate in other environments that may not require a large footprint and massive combat power. Finally, successful support to U.S. national security objectives in the future will be characterized by efficient and effective joint military and interagency operations executing strategy with balance and coherency among ends, ways, and means.

Enclosures:

"Foreign Internal Defense: An Indirect Approach to Counter-Insurgency/Counter Terrorism, Lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom- Philippines for dealing with Non-Existential Threats to the United States"

"Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula Thoughts on Irregular Threats from North Korea - Post-Conflict and Post-Collapse: *Understanding Them to Counter Them"*

David S. Maxwell is the Associate Director of the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He is a 30 year veteran of the US Army recently retiring as a Special Forces Colonel with his final assignment serving on the military faculty teaching national security strategy at the National War College. He spent the majority of his military service overseas with nearly 25 years in Asia, primarily in Korea, Japan, and the Philippines leading organizations from the A-Team to the Joint Special Operations Task Force level. He has Masters of Military Arts and Science degrees from the US Army Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies and a Master of Science degree in National Security Studies from the National War College of the National Defense University. He is the author of numerous works on Korea, Special Operations, Foreign Internal Defense, Unconventional Warfare and National Security Strategy. He is also a pursuing a Doctorate of Liberal Studies degree at Georgetown. He and his family reside in Northern Virginia.

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David S. Maxwell is the Associate Director of the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He is a 30 year veteran of the US Army recently retiring as a Special Forces Colonel with his final assignment serving on the military faculty teaching national security strategy at the National War College. He is a graduate of Miami University in Oxford, Ohio and holds Masters of Military Arts and Science degrees from the US Army Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies and a Master of Science degree in National Security Studies from the National War College of the National Defense University.

He has served in various command and staff assignments in the Infantry in Germany and Korea as well as in Special Forces at Ft. Lewis, Washington, Seoul, Korea, Okinawa, Japan and the Philippines with total service in Asia of more than 20 years. He served on the United Nations Command / Combined Forces Command / United States Forces Korea CJ3 staff where he was a planner for UNC/CFC OPLAN 5027-98 and ROK JCS – UNC/CFC CONPLAN 5029-99 and later served as the Director of Plans, Policy, and Strategy (J5) for Special Operations Command Korea (SOCKOR). From 2000 to 2002 he commanded 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) in Okinawa, Japan during which his operational detachments participated in numerous operations throughout Asia and the Pacific in Korea, Japan, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, including deployment to Mindanao and Basilan Island for the initial execution of Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines. He has also served as Chief, Special Forces Branch, US Total Army Personnel Command in Alexandria, Virginia. He has been the G3 and Chief of Staff of USASOC and Chief of Staff, SOCKOR. He commanded the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines in 2006-2007. In addition, he is a fellow at the Institute of Corean-American Studies (ICAS) and on the Board of Advisors for Small Wars Journal. He is a Life Member of the Special Forces Association and the National War College Alumni Association. He is currently studying in the Doctorate of Liberal Studies program at Georgetown University.

His awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal (1 OLC), the Legion of Merit, (1 OLC) the Meritorious Service Medal (2 OLC), the Army Commendation Medal (4 OLC), the Joint Service Achievement Medal, the Army Achievement Medal (2 OLC), The Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, the Korean Defense Medal, the Overseas Service Ribbon (numeral 5), the Joint Meritorious Unit Citation, the Army

Meritorious Unit Citation, the Philippine Legion of Honor, the Philippine Humanitarian Service Medal, the Philippine Presidential Unit Citation, the Expert Infantryman's Badge the Master Parachutist Badge, the Korean, Philippines, and Australian Parachute Badges and the Special Forces and Ranger Tabs.

He and his wife, Kim, and their daughter, Elizabeth, reside in northern Virginia.

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Chapter Six "Thoughts on Irregular Threats from north Korea - Post-Conflict and Post-Collapse: *Understanding Them to Counter Them,"* Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula, Bruce Bechtol, editor, Marine Corps University Press, Quantico, VA, 2011.

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 112th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with appropriate redactions to protect the witness's personal privacy (including home address and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one day after the witness's appearance before the committee.

Witness name: David S. Maxwell

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

_X__Individual

___Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:

FISCAL YEAR 2012

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
NONE			

FISCAL YEAR 2011

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
NONE			

FISCAL YEAR 2010

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
NONE			

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2012):____NONE_____;
Fiscal year 2011:_____NONE_____;
Fiscal year 2010:_____NONE-_____;

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2012):____NONE_____;
Fiscal year 2011:_____NONE_____;
Fiscal year 2010:_____NONE_____;

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2012):___NONE_____;
Fiscal year 2011:_____NONE_____;
Fiscal year 2010:_____NONE_____;

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2012):____0_____;
Fiscal year 2011:_____0_____;
Fiscal year 2010:_____0_____;

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2012):___NONE_____;
Fiscal year 2011:_____NONE_____;
Fiscal year 2010:_____NONE_____;

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2012):_____NONE_____;
Fiscal year 2011:_____NONE_____;
Fiscal year 2010:_____NONE_____;

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2012):_____NONE_____;
Fiscal year 2011:_____NONE_____;
Fiscal year 2010:_____NONE_____;

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2012):_____0_____;
Fiscal year 2011:_____0_____;
Fiscal year 2010:_____0_____;

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 27, 2012

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. LANGEVIN. Describe North Korean IW capabilities. Could Combined Forces Command effectively deal with these challenges in a defense of Korea scenario? How would North Korea use cyber-warfare in coordination with other IW assets in such a scenario?

Colonel MAXWELL. North Korea (DPRK) has a broad range of IW capabilities beginning with the world's largest Special Operations Forces (SOF) consisting of 80,000 to 120,000 personnel, depending on how SOF are defined as they range from individual agents through small commando raiding forces to large unit light infantry Ranger-type forces. SOF will conduct a wide range of operations in time of war to include subversion and sabotage throughout the Korean Theater of Operations as well as in Japan and even in other parts of the world specifically targeting U.S. and allied capabilities. North Korea possesses multiple means of infiltration by air in such aircraft as the bi-plane AN–2 COLT, by sea in submarines, semi-submersibles, and surface vessels and both overland crossing front lines as well as tunnels that have likely been constructed under the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ). We can expect North Korea SOF to wear South Korean military and police uniforms as well as civilian clothes. Attacks on U.S. facilities by North Korean SOF in Republic of Korea (ROK) uniforms will sow distrust between ROK and U.S. forces. They will also link up with in-place sleeper agents and attempt to recruit South Korean sympathizers. Their targets will include military and civilian, from air bases and missile defenses to logistics and communications as well as headquarters capabilities. They will attack civilian targets of all kind with the intent to cause chaos among the civilian population to divert security forces from supporting the defense of the ROK. SOF will also conduct operations to complement the other asymmetric capabilities such as when missiles are used to attack alliance air bases. They will target first responders to attacks and continue follow up attacks to increase both the lethality and the chaos caused by missile strikes. Finally, we can expect them to use various types of biological agents to contaminate water, food, and even fuel to disrupt alliance defensive efforts. Furthermore, the North can be expected to employ extensive propaganda operations to influence the ROK public as well as the US and international community. North Korea has studied extensively U.S. and insurgent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and we should expect to see false reports of atrocities being committed by ROK and U.S. forces and similar propaganda building on the lessons learned from other campaigns around the world.

While all these capabilities provide the North with a range of irregular or asymmetric threats valuable in any war scenario, these same capabilities provide the foundation for a resistance force that will prove extremely capable and dangerous in any post-conflict or post-regime collapse situation.

The Combined Forces Command has developed the plans and conducts the training to counter these threats. In the rear areas the responsibility will rest with the Second ROK Army commanded by a Korean four star general and it is likely that the Korean government will impose martial law in order to counter these threats and maintain population and resources control which is critical to any counter-SOF fight. The ROK and U.S. Naval forces will establish defenses to counter maritime infiltration and the combined air defense forces train to counter the air infiltration threats. In addition, U.S. assets effective in rear area security such as the AC–130 gunship and helicopter assets will support the ROK ground forces against SOF threats. Many of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and other counterinsurgency (COIN) techniques and platforms developed to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will be effective in the counter-SOF fight in South Korea. Many of these platforms will be vulnerable to forward area combat operations but will be very useful in the ROK rear area. While the Combined Forces Command plans and trains well to defend against these threats, it is difficult to defend against all the threats and be one hundred percent effective. Two anecdotes illustrate the difficulty. First, the recent sinking of the Choenan by a North Korean submarine indicates that it has a capable subsurface force. It can both attack naval vessels as well as infiltrate SOF. Second, the 1996 Sango Submarine incident that washed up on the east coast of the ROK before completing its infiltration mission

shows how difficult it is to capture or kill some 20+ SOF infiltrators when they were on the run trying to escape the ROK military manhunt and return to the North. This illustrates how difficult counter-SOF operations will likely be. There will be many CFC successes against North Korean SOF but there will be some attacks by the North that will get through. As the saying goes it is much easier conducting SOF attacks than it is defending against them. However, the cumulative effects of a few successful SOF attacks will not cause mission failure for CFC but will nonetheless cause problems. The training time and resources devoted to countering North Korean SOF and irregular capabilities will be well spent in the long run.

The DPRK will make extensive use of cyber capabilities in an attempt to disrupt, degrade, and influence ROK–U.S. alliance operations and will focus at all levels from the political and strategic to the operational and tactical. There are three examples of cyber operations that might foreshadow the types of operations to be conducted. First, the 1999 book Unrestricted Warfare by the two Chinese Colonels provides a template for a wide range of cyber operations from computer network attack against military command and control to financial markets outside the theater of operations. We should expect the North to conduct globally targeted cyber operations. The second example is how the Chinese are conducting cyber operations. One of the traditional Chinese military targets has been the unclassified computer networks of U.S. military logistics and in particular those networks that control the deployment of forces (Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD)). Interruption of or degradation of the flow of U.S. reinforcing forces will be an obvious effect the North will try to achieve. Third, current DPRK cyber operations likely indicate some of the activities they will conduct such as targeting ROK military computer networks. Finally, they are likely to exploit the full range of cyber capabilities to include social media to support their propaganda efforts. They will not only introduce false information (to include photos and video) to the internet, they will provide information to international news organizations to affect public opinion in the ROK and around the world.

In conclusion, both irregular and cyber capabilities are key elements of any North Korean campaign. However, if the regime collapses we can expect elements of the military and security forces to attempt to employ these same capabilities as part of the resistance to ROK reunification efforts. The ROK–U.S. alliance takes these threats very seriously and trains hard to be able counter them. Investment in counter-SOF and rear area operations in the ROK by the ROK government and enabling capabilities from the U.S. will be effective when North Korea attacks and at the same time if the regime collapses, those same capabilities will be useful against resistance forces. But it should be noted that there are no 100 percent effective defenses against irregular and cyber threats. The alliance must be both psychological as well as physically prepared for the few successes that the DPRK will likely be able to achieve. This is important because over-reaction in response to such threats may magnify the effects of these limited successful attacks. The alliance is sufficiently prepared to deal with these threats and must have the requisite resources provided on a continual basis to sustain readiness.

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