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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

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## TUESDAY, MARCH 20, 2012

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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive testimony from the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Dr. James Miller, and the Commander of the International Security and Assistance Force in Afghanistan, General John Allen.

Gentlemen, thank you for your distinguished service to our Nation, especially during this critical moment in Afghanistan. And thank you for joining us here today.

The last year has been a consequential time for coalition efforts in Afghanistan. During this time period, with the surge forces in place, United States and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] forces have conducted major operations to push back the Taliban in the south of Afghanistan, launched operations from Afghanistan to kill Osama bin Laden and further disrupt Al Qaeda, trained thousands of Afghan security forces so that they can secure their territory from terrorist and insurgent groups, and return countless numbers of civilians to school and to work.

However, in the last few weeks, the impressive gains that the United States and NATO were making in Afghanistan have been called into question by some, due to the actions of a rogue few. Some Afghan soldiers have taken up arms against ISAF [International Security and Assistance Force] soldiers, which could diminish trust among forces that are supposed to be partnered.

A sober assessment, however, shows that partnering is valuable and necessary; there are steps that can be taken to minimize such incidents; and that these criminal actions are relatively isolated.

Moreover, the horrific incident of a U.S. Army staff sergeant who allegedly took up arms against Afghan civilians also is both isolated and a criminal act that should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.

These exceptional incidents are not reflective of the hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who have honorably served in Afghanistan, nor are they reflective of the
many thousands of Afghan soldiers who are being trained and are helping to secure Afghanistan today.

Additionally, I remain very concerned about the President’s decision last summer to speed up withdrawal of the surge troops from Afghanistan, as well as his original announcement in his speech at West Point for a date certain in 2014 to withdraw all U.S. combat forces.

These decisions by the President have made it increasingly difficult to build up trust and confidence with the Afghan institutions that will ultimately ensure that the security and political gains by U.S. and NATO efforts are sustained into the future.

Moreover, with our eyes at the exits, I am uncertain whether we will be able to achieve the key tenets of the President’s own strategy due to the constraints that the President himself has put in place.

For example, it has been reported in the media that the U.S. and Afghan governments are attempting to achieve a negotiated solution with the Taliban, and yet the Taliban continue to operate with impunity out of Pakistan because they already know when we will be leaving, and Pakistan has been unwilling or unable to address those safe havens.

Furthermore, due to the President’s decision to begin withdrawing the surge forces early, we increased the risk to our forces to effectively address the second part of the Afghanistan campaign plan, shifting the main effort to eastern Afghanistan and applying military pressure on the Haqqani network, who are responsible for the most dramatic and lethal attacks in Afghanistan.

What is more, in the absence of sustained public opinion to support the mission in Afghanistan, from the White House on down, many have begun to question what we are fighting for.

With friend and foe alike knowing that the U.S. is heading for the exits, our silence is likely viewed as a preamble to retreat, and in warfare, when the mission becomes redeployment rather than mission success, the outcome can quickly become disorderly.

General Allen, I have total confidence in you and your command. The challenge in Afghanistan continues to be great, but I am certain that we can achieve the United States’ core strategic objectives by resolving to provide you with the time and resources you need to be successful.

I think this hearing today is extremely timely, with the American people needing to hear from you on what is really going on over there on the ground.

I look forward to your testimony and the insights into the challenges and the way forward in Afghanistan.

Ranking Member Smith.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, General Allen, Dr. Miller, I appreciate your leadership and support. And I want to start by
agreeing with the chairman's opening remarks about the progress that has been made in Afghanistan since the surge was announced. There has been considerable progress made throughout the country, and I am aware the progress made was because of the bravery, leadership and considerable efforts of our troops and our ISAF partners.

We have pushed the Taliban back, particularly in the south. Those of us who have traveled there regularly could tangibly see the improvements. The villages that we are able to walk through that were major combat zones just a few months before is evidence of the hard work and the progress that is being made.

Perhaps as important as the security gains, you are seeing on the district and the provincial level significant improvement in governance. One of the things that I was impressed about the last time I was there is I saw a great deal more USAID [United States Agency for International Development], State Department, people on the judiciary side. Basically the basic building blocks of governance were being put in place. And that, too, gives sustainability.

Unquestionably, we have made enormous progress in the last couple of years towards giving the Afghan government and the Afghan people the chance to have a stable and lasting government.

Now, progress should not underestimate the challenge that remains. Afghanistan is a very difficult country. It is very poor. Its economy is very difficult. They have a history now of well over 30 years of civil war and the insurgent groups are still present. We can't imagine that we are ever going to leave a perfectly stable, perfect democracy in Afghanistan.

But the progress has been made, and I think the thing that we can all feel good about is we have a much, much better chance that when we leave there will be a stable government that will be able to stand and stop the Taliban from returning to power, and we must always remember that that was the goal that the president clearly stated; you know, defeat and dismantle Al Qaeda and make sure they and their Taliban allies cannot come back.

We are much further along the road to achieving that goal now than we were 2 years ago, and that is due in large part to the efforts of our troops, and we must thank them for that.

But the bottom line is, we are not going to stay there forever. I don't think anybody would say that we should. And if we are not going to stay there forever then we need a plan to leave and to leave responsibly, and that is what was first put in place by the President in 2009 and then solidified at the Lisbon Conference in 2010 with NATO. We have what I think is a realistic plan.

We simply cannot say, "Well, we are never going to leave. We are going to stay because we are fearful that if people think we are going to leave that therefore gives them advantage." Truth is, it also gives them an advantage if we leave it in the minds of the Afghan people that we are never going to leave.

The effect of that is, number one, it undermines the confidence in the Karzai government, the confidence in the district and provincial governments because they do not look like governments that can stand on their own. They look like governments that will be forever dependent upon foreign forces. It also gives the Taliban a very strong propaganda argument that that government is but a
prop for a foreign occupying force, and that, too, will fuel the insurgency. We have to balance that out.

And also we have to understand that having well over 130,000 foreign troops in a country does cause destabilizing effects. I mean, imagine in your own community if every day you had foreign troops rolling down the streets as if they own the place.

We need to get to the point where we turn this back over to the Afghan people as soon as we responsibly can, and the progress that we have made gives us the opportunity to do that. But to simply say that, you know, we are going to stay forever if something goes wrong undermines that very plan.

So it is my hope, General Allen, Dr. Miller, that you will lay out for us how we are making progress on that, and as we go forward, how we are going to make that responsible transition that I think everybody in this room wants.

We want our troops home. We want the Afghan people back in charge of their own security, back in charge of their own government. That is where we want to get. The path is not easy, but it is one we must go down. And I commend both of you for the progress that we have made. And I look forward to hearing about how we can complete that mission and bring our troops home.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on Page 57.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. MILLER. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, Members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. I am very pleased and honored to be here with our outstanding commander in Afghanistan, General John Allen.

Mr. Chairman, I ask that my full remarks be entered into the record and I would like to summarize them.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

Could you pull the mike just a little bit closer please?

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, the United States’ objectives in Afghanistan remain to deny safe haven to Al Qaeda and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government. This Administration is committed to meeting these core objectives, and while we have faced serious challenges, our strategy is succeeding.

Our counterterrorism efforts against Al Qaeda have been extremely successful. Although the job is not finished, there is no doubt that we have severely degraded Al Qaeda’s capacity. As a result of the surge launched in 2009, we have broken and reversed Taliban momentum in Afghanistan and the Afghan National Security Forces are increasingly capable and increasingly in the lead.

Mr. Chairman, our forces are performing extremely well, as I saw firsthand in a trip to Afghanistan less than 2 weeks ago. We are well into a process of transition to ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] leadership, as agreed to at the 2010 NATO Lisbon
summit. In fact, today almost 50 percent of Afghans already live in areas that have begun the transition process to ANSF lead.

As an interim milestone, at some point in 2013, the ANSF will be in the lead for providing security across Afghanistan. At that time, U.S. and coalition forces will be in a support role, which will take a number of forms. This includes U.S. and coalition forces partnered with Afghan units, as is already occurring in many places today, and it will include the smaller footprint associated with U.S. and coalition forces in a train, advise, and assist role.

By the end of 2014, the ANSF will be responsible for the security of Afghanistan. By that time, U.S. and coalition forces will have moved to a much smaller presence focused on counterterrorism and on training, advising, and assisting Afghan forces.

Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt that the Afghanistan war has been a tough fight and the last several weeks have been particularly difficult.

The inappropriate handling of Korans at Bagram Air Base was an error that, while unintentional, sent precisely the wrong signal. This unfortunate act stands in stark contrast to the many years during which U.S. forces have demonstrated deep respect for the religious practices of the Afghan people.

Even more recently, the Afghans and we have had to respond to the horrific killings of 16 Afghan civilians in Panjwai district, Kandahar. The Department of Defense is conducting a full investigation of this senseless act. As you know, a suspect is now in custody and is at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Justice will be done and anyone responsible will be held accountable.

We have also been challenged in recent weeks by attacks by Afghan personnel against U.S. and coalition forces, so-called “green-on-blue” attacks. We will have to work through these incidents and these challenges, as President Obama and Secretary Panetta have discussed in the last week with President Karzai. But it is critical that these tragic occurrences not blind us to the significant progress we have made. I would like to give some examples.

From 2010 to 2011, enemy-initiated attacks in Afghanistan were down 9 percent. This trend has continued into 2012. For January and February this year, enemy-initiated attacks are down a further 22 percent from 2011 levels for the same months.

In October 2008, there were only 140,000 Afghans in the ANSF. Today, there are approximately 330,000 and we expect to reach our goal of 352,000 ANSF ahead of the October, 2012 target date. Today, almost 90 percent of coalition operations in Afghanistan are carried out in partnership with the ANSF. And the ANSF is in the lead for more than 40 percent of operations.

As you know, we are negotiating a strategic partnership between the United States and Afghanistan that will frame our enduring relationship. This strategic partnership will demonstrate that we learned the lessons from 1989 when our abrupt departure left our friends confused and our enemies emboldened.

In partnership with President Karzai and the Afghan government, we recently completed a crucial milestone when General Allen cosigned a Memorandum of Understanding on detention operations with Defense Minister Wardak.
We are also working with the Afghans on a Memorandum of Understanding on special operations which, when completed, will further strengthen our partnership.

Concluding a strategic partnership will send a clear signal that the United States remains and will remain committed to Afghan security. Such an assurance must continue beyond our planned transition in 2014.

As President Obama said in his State of the Union address, “We will build an enduring partnership with Afghanistan so that it is never again a source of attacks against America.”

The need for a long-term commitment extends to our coalition partners as well. As NATO Secretary General Rasmussen said in December, “Our commitment does not end with transition. We will finish the job to help create a secure Afghanistan for our shared security.”

Achieving a durable peace in Afghanistan will require some form of reconciliation among Afghans. It is by no means certain that this effort will bear fruit in the near term, but it is very much in our national security interest to try.

As Secretary Clinton has said, “Any negotiated outcome with insurgents must meet our unambiguous red lines for reconciliation. Insurgents must, one, renounce violence; two, break all ties with Al Qaeda; and three, abide by the constitution of Afghanistan.”

Success in Afghanistan will depend on the support of Afghanistan’s neighbors, particularly Pakistan. Like Afghanistan’s other neighbors, Pakistan has legitimate interests that should be understood and must be addressed.

Pakistan also has responsibilities. Most importantly, it needs to take further steps to ensure that military and extremist groups cannot continue to find safe haven in Pakistani territory. Pakistan has powerful incentives to do so. In 2011 alone, some 2,000 attacks in Pakistan resulted in about 2,400 deaths, mostly from improvised explosive devices.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. We embarked on this fight a decade ago to ensure that the terrorist networks that struck in New York, in Washington, D.C., and in the skies over Pennsylvania would never again be able to use Afghanistan as their sanctuary.

Thanks to the great courage and skill of the U.S. Armed Forces and civilian personnel, to our coalition partners and to our Afghan partners, our strategy is working. While success in warfare is never guaranteed, we are on a path to meet our objectives to deny safe haven to Al Qaeda and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government.

I would like to conclude by thanking the committee for your continued support of our effort in Afghanistan and your strong support of the great men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces.

Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I look forward to the committee’s questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Miller.
General Allen, welcome to your first hearing since you assumed this command. We are very appreciative of having you here today. The time is now yours.

STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN ALLEN, USMC, COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE—AFGHANISTAN

General ALLEN. Thank you, Chairman. It is an honor to be with you here today.

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss our operations in Afghanistan.

It is a pleasure to be here with my friend, Dr. Miller, the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. And Chairman, I ask that my verbal remarks be entered into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

General ALLEN. Thank you, sir.

Let me begin by expressing my gratitude to all of you on the committee for the support that you provide our men and women in uniform every day. That they are well equipped, well trained, and well led is a great testament to the efforts of this committee and to the great work of this Congress. And on behalf of those troops, and on behalf of their families, I want to thank you for that.

In the past 8 months, I have walked the ground of Afghanistan with many of those troops. Along with my friend and partner, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and my NATO compatriot, the senior civilian representative, Ambassador Sir Simon Gass, I have met with the leaders of most of the other 49 nations that serve alongside us in the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF.

And all through this, I have been in close consultation with the Afghan civilian and military leadership, most of whom have experienced the years of Soviet occupation, the civil war, the darkness of the Taliban. In short, they have been enmeshed in their country’s conflict for over three decades.

And from all of this, I can tell you unequivocally three things. First, we remain on-track to ensure that Afghanistan will no longer be a safe haven for Al Qaeda and will no longer be terrorized by the Taliban.

Second, as a coalition, the largest in recent history, we are well aware and well along on the progress to meet our 2010 Lisbon commitments to transition security lead to the Afghan National Security Forces by December, 2014.

And third, our troops know the difference that they are making every day. They know it and the enemy feels it every day.

To be sure, the last couple months have been trying. In the wake of the revelations that American troops have mishandled religious texts to include the Koran, protests—some of them violent—occurred in several but only a few regions across Afghanistan. Thirty-two Afghans lost their lives in these riots, and even more were hurt.

Just since the 1st of January the coalition has lost 60 brave troops in action from 6 different nations; 13 of them were killed at the hands of what appear to have been Afghan security forces,
some of whom were motivated, we believe, in part, by the mis-
handling of religious materials.

And just as tragic, as Dr. Miller mentioned, we are investigating
what appears to be the murder of 16 innocent Afghan civilians at
the hand of a U.S. service member.

Now, each of these events is heart-wrenching, and my thoughts
and my prayers go out to all of those affected by this violence, coa-
lation and Afghan alike. But I assure you the relationship between
the coalition and our Afghan security forces remains strong.

Just 2 weeks ago I was down in the Helmand province visiting
with marines and with the local Afghan commanders. This was in
the wake of the Koran burning incident when violence was at its
peak. A young marine near Marjah said he and his unit were told
about the demonstrations by their Afghan counterparts. The Af-
ghan troops told them, “Let us patrol outside the wire for a couple
days. We have got this for you.”

Understanding the gravity of the risk the Afghans had assumed
for these marines, this particular marine continued, “Our Afghan
brothers were trying to protect us.”

This one statement, spoken by a young marine, conveys the
power of this brotherhood-in-arms that has been forged in battle
now over the years. It speaks to the trust that we have built with
the Afghans and to the shock-absorbency of this relationship.

And yet we know there is much hard and deadly work that re-
mains to be done. But the progress is real, and, importantly, that
progress is sustainable.

We have severely degraded the insurgency. As one Afghan com-
mander told me in the south, in the latter part of 2011, “This time
around the Afghan Taliban were the away team.”

On top of that success, as a result of our recent winter oper-
ations, we have seriously degraded the Taliban’s ability to mount
a major spring offensive of their own. This spring they will come
back to find many of their caches empty, their former strongholds
untenable, and a good many of their foot soldiers absent or unwill-
ing to join the fight.

Indeed, in Kandahar back in December, 50 former Talibs decided
to reintegrate on short notice back into the Afghan society. And
when we asked them why they laid down their arms they com-
plained of the unrelenting pressure that they feel.

They said they found themselves up against capable Afghan
forces in greater numbers, with greater frequency. And while they
were willing to fight foreigners, they were unwilling to fight their
Afghan brothers, especially Afghans who fought back with courage
and with skill because of the training that we had provided them.

And the training we provide them is critical to our mission.
Throughout history, insurgencies have seldom been defeated by for-
eign forces. Indeed, they have been ultimately beaten by indigenous
forces.

In the long run our goals can only be achieved and then secured
by Afghan forces. Transition, then, is the linchpin of our strategy,
not merely the way out.

And during the past 12 months, Afghan security forces have ex-
panded from 276,000 to 330,000. And they will reach their full
strength ahead of schedule, the deadline having been 1 October.
The expansion and the professionalization of the Afghan security forces allows us to recover the remaining 23,000 U.S. surge forces this fall, enables us to continue to pressure the Taliban to reconcile, and makes possible security transition to the Afghans in accordance with our Lisbon commitments and on time.

Security conditions remain good in areas that have transitioned thus far, from Kabul in the east to Herat in the west, from Mazar-e-Sharif in the north to Lashkar Gah in the south. And later this year Afghan security forces are expected to assume security lead for as much as two-thirds, or possibly more, of the Afghan population.

And as the potential unifying influence in Afghanistan, the Afghan forces are better than we thought they were, and they are better than they thought they were when tried in combat.

So as we move them to the fore, they are gaining more and more confidence and they are gaining more and more capability. In the past 5 months, 89 percent of the total conventional operations were partnered with both coalition and Afghan forces, and 42 percent were Afghan-led.

Over the next 2 years coalition forces will remain combat ready, but increasingly focused on security force assistance missions as we continue to move the Afghans into the lead.

In this process, Afghan leadership is simply key. And I can tell you that the Afghans want to lead and they want the responsibility that comes with it.

In fact, for the very first time, our joint coalition-Afghan operational campaign plan for January 2012 through July 2013 was conceived, developed and planned with Afghans in the lead. They are truly emerging as the real defeat mechanism of this insurgency and increasingly as an emblem of national unity. And this is essential for the long-term security of Afghanistan.

But none of us harbor illusions. We know that we face long-term challenges as well. We know that Al Qaeda and other extremist networks, the very same networks that kill Afghan and coalition troops every day, still operate with impunity across the border in Pakistan.

We know that the Taliban remain a resilient and determined enemy and that many of them will try to regain their lost ground this spring through assassination, intimidation, high-profile attacks, and the emplacement of IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices].

We know that Iran continues to support the insurgency and fuels often the flame of violence.

We know that corruption still robs Afghan citizens of their faith in their government and that poor governance itself often advances insurgent messages.

This campaign has been long. It has been difficult. And it has been costly. There have been setbacks, to be sure, and we are experiencing them now. And there will be setbacks ahead.

I wish I could tell you that this war was simple and that progress could easily be measured, but that is not the way of counterinsurgencies. They are fraught with both successes and setbacks which can exist in the same space and in the same time, but each must be seen in the larger context of the overall campaign.
And I believe the campaign is on track. We are making a difference. I know this and our troops know this.

And I would like to take just another moment of your time today, Mr. Chairman, to end where I began this morning, with our troops and the thousands of American and coalition partner troops that are bearing the weight of this conflict and those that will never return to their families.

Know this—that they are central to my every decision and my every word to this committee. And one of them, a young marine who was laid to rest Tuesday in Arlington Cemetery, was a hero. He knew what he stood for and he knew his mission. And he knew the risks. He knew he might have to give his life for this cause for which we fight.

So Sergeant William Stacey prepared a letter for his family to be read in the event of his death. And in it he said, “There will be a child who will live because men left the security they enjoyed in their home country to come to his, and this child will learn in new schools that have been built. And he will walk his streets not worried about whether or not some leader’s henchmen will come and kidnap him. And he will grow into a fine man who will pursue every opportunity his heart could desire. And he will have the gift of freedom, which I have enjoyed so long. If my life buys the safety of a child who will one day change the world, then I know that it was all worth it.”

Mr. Chairman, I can only add that I am confident that Americans are safer today because of the service of members like William Stacey. And I am confident that we will prevail in this endeavor.

Thank you again for this opportunity today, for the extraordinary support that you and this committee provide every day to our magnificent young men and women in uniform I am so privileged and honored to lead.

Thank you, Chairman.
Thank you, Ranking Member Smith.

[The prepared statement of General Allen can be found in the Appendix on page 67.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General.

General, we hear conflicting accounts in the press about both our goals in Afghanistan and the means to achieve those goals. I am hoping that you can clarify the current thinking and what you are being told.

First, can you tell the American people what our mission in Afghanistan is, and are we succeeding?

General ALLEN. Chairman, our mission is to keep the Taliban from overthrowing the Government of Afghanistan and to provide the capacity for the Afghan National Security Forces to provide the security to that government over the long term. But it is also to deny Al Qaeda safe havens in Afghanistan.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I have a series of questions here to further clarify what you just told us. Following the security gains made in the south by the surge forces last year, does your campaign plan still call for coalition operations to shift focus to Regional Command East?

General ALLEN. Chairman, at this particular juncture, we intend to consolidate our hold on the population centers in the south. En-
suring that we have, it is my intention to examine the shift of the main effort to the east at this point. I have not made a final decision in that regard.

We anticipate shifting resources to the east in any case, because it remains there that the principal counterinsurgency fight will ultimately be shaped in 2012.

The CHAIRMAN. Does your plan call for a continued counterinsurgency mission?
General ALLEN. Yes, it does, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. To your knowledge, is the Administration committed to this plan, and sustaining a counterinsurgency mission?
General ALLEN. Yes, it does, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In your best professional military judgment, what level of forces do you require through the end of the 2013 fighting season? And what are the associated objectives you would want to achieve with those forces?
General ALLEN. Chairman, the answer to that question is a bit more complicated. We are in the process now. I am in the process of making decisions with respect to the recovery of the second phase of the surge forces.

I anticipate that those decisions to have been made and for my submission of that recommendation sometime in early April. If we are going to spend the preponderance of the high OPTEMPO [Operational Tempo] period of the summer of 2012 both continuing to fight the counterinsurgency, as I said, to consolidate our gains in south, to expand the security zone around Kabul, at the same time, we will be recovering the second phase of the surge forces, the 23,000.

On 1 October, we will have approximately 68,000 U.S. forces remaining, somewhere around 40,000 ISAF forces, and probably by then 352,000 ANSF.

Because of the nature of the recovery of the force, because of the progress of the campaign that I anticipate in 2012, it is my intention to take the time following the recovery of the surge forces to examine the insurgency, to examine the progress that we have made in the development of the ANSF, to see the posture of the battle space, as it has developed throughout the fighting season of 2012.

And then before the end of 2012, I intend to provide through my chain of command, to the President, a series of recommendations on the kind of combat power that I will need for 2013 and 2014. I don't have a decision at this point, Chairman. And it is not my intention to be able to make that decision today. It is going to require some analysis after the conclusion of the fighting season and the recovery of the 23,000 troops in phase two of the surge drawdown.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Have you been given assurances by the White House that you can have the forces that you believe you need through the end of the 2013 fighting season?
General ALLEN. I have been given assurances by the White House that we are in a strategic conversation, Chairman. There has been no number mentioned. There has been no number that has been specifically implied.
There is an excellent, I believe, strategic conversation that is going on, that will account for my recommendation, the recommendation of the theater commander, and the joint staff in this process.

And I am very pleased, frankly, with where we are in that conversation now, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Has the White House always followed your best military judgment?

General Allen. As the commander in Afghanistan, it has, sir.

The Chairman. The New York Times reported last week that there is a growing belief within the White House that the mission in Afghanistan has now reached the point of diminishing returns.

Do you agree that the mission has reached a point of diminishing returns? If not, why? And is the progress you are making sustainable?

General Allen. I don’t agree with the article. I read the article. In fact, I know that the article was disavowed by people who were quoted in the article.

We are making progress, Chairman. We have made progress, as Dr. Miller had indicated. For example, just in the last 12 weeks, the enemy-initiated violence across the country is 25 percent less than it was during the same period of time last year.

In the same period of 12 weeks, the civilian casualties, for example, is 74 percent less than it was during the same period of last year. The growth of the ANSF has been dramatic. The growth of the ANSF special operators has been dramatic.

And as the ANSF continues to move to the fore, in full partnership with us within this comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign, I believe that there is great potential for us to accomplish all of these objectives.

And I remain committed to the campaign. And I remain optimistic that with the right kinds of resourcing and the comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign continuing as we currently envision it, that we will be successful.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

Ranking Member Smith.

Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I actually want to follow up on that piece there. I think it is just a misunderstanding about the mission and where it is going. We are transitioning. That is the whole point; to bring in other forces.

It is not a matter that the mission is reaching a point of diminishing returns. It is a matter that the mission is reaching a point of reasonable success. And for it to continue to succeed, we need to make that transition.

I mean, it seems like there is always an argument for more troops on our side. If things are going well, that is evidence that we can’t leave, because, “Look, it is working; we have to stay there.” If anything goes wrong, that is evidence that we have to stay longer and in greater numbers, because, “Look, it is not going well.”

That is not the point of our mission. As I said in the outset, nobody on this committee, nobody in this country wants a permanent presence in Afghanistan.
So you have got to take a step back and say, “Okay. If we don’t want that and we want to succeed in the mission that you, General Allen, very clearly described, to make sure that the Taliban do not return to power, that Al Qaeda does not find safe haven, well, then how do we do that?”

Logically, we build up a force of Afghans who can make sure that that does not happen. But that is literally the only option. It is not an option for us to stay there forever in order to make sure that the Taliban and Al Qaeda don’t come back. Therefore, we need to build up a local partner that can do that.

And what we have described this morning—even some of the comments from the chairman show that we are making enormous progress on that. But we don’t succeed until we make that transition.

General, you have mentioned some of the numbers a couple of times. But if you could lay out for us the progress that has been made in terms of the ANSF, you know, all security forces, both in terms of the national military, local police, I think that will give us some idea.

As we have drawn down, you know, from a relative numbers—I don’t know exactly what the numbers are. There are 100,000 U.S. troops; we are coming down to mid-60,000s, I think, by October. NATO has drawn down a little bit.

Give us an idea of how that compares with how the ANSF and domestic security forces have grown, if you could give us those numbers. That is a key part of the transition.

General Allen. Thank you for your comments, because I absolutely agree with you that transition to the ANSF is the key to the success of this mission over the long term.

In January 2011, there were 155 battalion-sized formations in the ANSF. And 101 of those were ranked in the top three of the categories of measure for capability—independent with advisers, effective with advisers, effective with partnership.

In the year since then, that number has grown to 138 battalions that have grown independent with advisers—

Mr. Smith. Just so we are tracking, you went from 101 to 138 in a year?

General Allen. That is correct.

Mr. Smith. Great.

General Allen. And it went from 155 battalion-sized formations to 168 battalion-sized formations. So the Force has grown significantly in just a year. But it has also grown in its capabilities in just a year. And we have seen that not just in the army but also in the Afghan National Police as well.

We have seen the emergence of the Afghan special operations capabilities also dramatically enhanced over the period of the last 2 years, but in the period of last year as well; the 9 Commando Kandaks [battalions], the 72 Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas, the A-Teams, if you will, the emergence of the special police units within the General Directorate of Special Police Units, within the Ministry of Interior.

This has been dramatic progress. And those units, at varying levels of capabilities, either with advisers or with partners, continue
to make progress. And as I said earlier, 89 percent of our operations are partnered operations today.

There are operations on the ground, as we speak, right now, in Afghanistan where Afghan units are in the lead with partnered operations with ISAF forces.

And so we have seen that progress. We intend to continue to pursue that progress. Among the four priorities that I gave to my commanders the day I took command—and those priorities I believe are still operative—while we will continue with my first priority, which is pressure the insurgency in a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign—the second priority, which is only slightly behind it, is to do all we can do accelerate the movement of the ANSF into the fore.

And we are going to continue to pursue that very aggressively, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. One more question. President Karzai has, you know, made a number of comments, you know, being concerned about the U.S. troops, talking about returning us to our bases, ending night raids. I mean, by and large, it seems to me those comments reflect domestic pressure.

I mean, they reflect the Afghan constituents that President Karzai is responsible to being concerned about the foreign military presence. And while President Karzai is aware of the importance of us being there, he is also aware that most of the people in Afghanistan look forward to the day when we are not.

So, number one, is that an accurate reflection, in your view, of what President Karzai and some other domestic politicians in Afghanistan are reflecting? And number two—this is for both Dr. Miller and General Allen—how do you work that relationship?

How do you make sure that the transition continues to happen in a responsible way, and not in a rushed way, given some of that domestic political pressure? But again, I will point out that domestic political pressure that President Karzai and others in the Afghan government are feeling reflects the flaw in the strategy that says, “If things aren't going well, let us just stay there forever.”

There is the reality of dealing with the Afghan population. But how are you managing that relationship, to get to a responsible transition, given those pressures?

General ALLEN. Well, I think, if I may, there is no part of our strategy which intends to stay in Afghanistan forever.

In fact, our strategy, which is a part of the larger ISAF strategy, which was agreed to, ultimately, with NATO, ISAF, and Afghanistan in the Lisbon Conference in November of 2010, called for us to work through the business of transition, moving the ANSF gradually into the lead for security across the country, in a process that will be completed by the end of 2014.

The campaign accounts for that. And the campaign accounts ultimately for the drawdown of U.S. and ISAF forces, as the ANSF moves to the fore, gains its full capability, is fully fielded in the battlefield. And that process is on track and, in fact, envisages the reduction of U.S. numbers and the reduction of ISAF forces in direct support of our ISAF and Lisbon transition goals of 31 December, 2014.
With regard to the voices that we hear in the Afghan government, the Afghan government is on a path towards sovereignty. This is the whole process that we are talking about with respect to the Lisbon Convention, anticipating security lead by 2014.

And we should encourage the voices of sovereignty. We should encourage actions within the Afghan government that seek sovereignty. The MOU that I recently signed with Minister Wardak was one of the greatest acknowledgements of Afghan sovereignty, where as they partner increasingly with us in a comprehensive counterinsurgency, they will take responsibility ultimately for the administrative detention of insurgents in the battle spacing.

And American forces will cease detaining Afghans for long periods of time. And the Afghans will pick up that responsibility. That is appropriate. It is a great indicator of sovereignty, for example.

With respect to night operations, we have been in a long-term conversation with the Afghan government in that regard. I believe that, just in the last 3 months, we have come a very long way in creating greater capacity amongst the Afghans to conduct night operations in a very credible way.

Now we are still heavily partnered with them, and we will be for some period of time. But not only do our operations now—all of our night operations are partnered with Afghan partner unit forces, their own commandos, which are very good commandos.

But we are in the process now of building 12 Afghan Strike Forces of their own. As you know, sir, I have a number of strike forces that are detailed to me that operate under the control ultimately of JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command]. And those are the strike forces that are so famous for the success of the night operations, which have been enormously successful in shredding the enemy’s network of command and control.

We are building that capability with the Afghans. That is another step towards sovereignty. And these are all steps towards a strategic partnership with Afghanistan, which we hope ultimately to have completed before very shortly the heads of state of the 50 ISAF nations meet in Chicago, hosted by the President of the United States.

So I think we are on track, sir. And I think even though that there has been some domestic rhetoric from the President on departing the villages early, et cetera, I will say that both our President and President Karzai had an extended conversation the other day—in fact, they have spoken three times just recently—where both of them were in full agreement that the Lisbon-based process and formulation of transition is on track. And they both support it, which calls for the complete ANSF lead by the close of business on the 31st of December, 2014, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Thank you very much.

I am sorry, Dr. Miller. Do you have something quickly? I am sorry, got a little bit over time. But go ahead.

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Smith, let me just say that obviously General Allen said it all. I just want to reiterate three points.

The first is a commitment to continue the transition process across all the elements that the general talked about.
The second is the relationships. And we have one of our finest commanders and one of our finest diplomats in country with General Allen and with Ambassador Crocker. And in addition to that, the Secretary of Defense and the President have been in contact with President Karzai multiple times, even in the last couple of weeks.

I want to emphasize also that the contacts at the next level down, if you will, with Minister Wardak, the Defense Minister, with Mohammadi for Interior, with the National Security Advisor Spanta—getting the depth to those contacts is also important to improve our mutual understanding and the resilience of the relationship.

And third and finally, let me say that the long-term strategic partnership is going to be vital; not just 2015 forward, but an understanding of us having that commitment is important to sustaining this relationship in the meantime.

Mr. Smith. Thank you. I appreciate that. I know neither of you gentlemen have an easy job. I think you are doing it well.

And there are no guarantees. But we have to transition to Afghan sovereignty as quickly as we responsibly can. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. Bartlett. Thank you both very much for your service to our country. I know that everything we read and hear is not necessarily true, and stories get warped. But there are a series of events that give me some pause if they are true.

I would like, for the moment, for you to imagine that you are a Taliban fighter and this is what you have heard. A number of months ago, the President of the United States says that we are pulling out of Afghanistan in 2014. We are gone.

Several months ago, the Secretary of Defense says that in 2013, we are going to stop combat operations and just continue with security and training of the Afghan forces. And that position is corroborated by the White House.

And then just a few weeks ago, I hear of a program that will give me $125 to $150 a week if I stop fighting, and I can still keep my gun. Now I am a rational Taliban fighter, what do you think might be a rational position that I would take with those facts in mind?

Dr. Miller. Mr. Bartlett, let me answer in two parts.

First, I want to be absolutely clear that the Lisbon transition strategy is still this Administration’s policy and is still the direction in which we are headed. And that includes a transition to Afghan leadership throughout Afghanistan by the end of 2014 and Afghan responsibility for security throughout the country by the end of 2014.

The U.S. and coalition at that time, we would expect, would still provide some support, including train, advise, and assist, and including the capacity for counterterrorism operations, at that point in time.

When the Secretary of Defense and others have talked about the 2013 timeframe, it is a milestone on the path. And in 2013 we expect that each of the tranches of transition that are to Afghan lead that were announced at Lisbon will have begun. So the final tranche will have begun in have begun sometime in 2013.
At that time, there will be Afghans in the lead for security throughout the country. But they will not have full responsibility throughout the country, as they will in 2014.

In 2013, it will be very, very much of a mixed model. In some cases, it will be partnered units, as is occurring very much today. In some cases, it will train, advise, and assist. In some cases we may have moved our forces and coalition forces may have moved to strategic overwatch, but in other cases there will be a much more significant role for U.S. and coalition forces in that intervening period.

So, sir, this is part of that transition process. And sometime in 2013 we will see that milestone with the start of that final tranche, but that begins just an additional round of transition. We expect the conclusion of that to occur by the end of 2014.

Mr. Bartlett. If in the meantime we are offering the Taliban fighter $125 to $150 a month if he will just stop fighting, and he can keep his gun, do you think he might just stop fighting and keep his gun, knowing that we are leaving in 2014 and that then he can pick up the fight and we won't even be there?

Dr. Miller. Mr. Bartlett, I don't reject that possibility, but I want to offer two contrary points, if you will.

The first is that if a fighter wants to pick up his gun at any point in time in Afghanistan; that is likely to be a possibility. And if you look at the availability of AK-47s [assault rifles], this is a country that has had a significant number of weapons for a long period of time.

Second, and critically importantly, what Secretary Clinton stipulated for fighters that come off of Taliban, come off of the field as an outcome, they need to sever ties with Al Qaeda. They need to renounce violence, and they need to agree to the Afghan constitution.

If they do those things, then the gun will be silent. And in many cases, it may actually come to fight on the other side and become part of the Afghan National Security Forces over time.

So, sir, I would hope that and expect that what a Taliban fighter today would see is a commitment, not just between now and 2013 or now and 2014, but an enduring commitment; see an increasingly capable ANSF that General Allen has talked in detail about.

And what they are seeing is that they are going to lose, and if they want to come across in reconciliation to have an opportunity to be a part of the solution and not a part of the problem, that the ANSF, with coalition and U.S. support, will solve.

The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much.

And Dr. Miller and General Allen, thank you for your dedicated service.

I wanted to just follow up on those numbers for a minute—and sustaining the effort on the part of the Afghan army.

It is my understanding that, as you are speaking about the size of the battalions, that we are looking at a force of about 352,000 existing up until about 2014. But after that, due to budgetary reasons and certainly our own investment in that, we are looking at about 230,000.
Is that a correct number—that we are downsizing to that level—you are anticipating that we will be, you know, going to that level?

Dr. Miller. Mrs. Davis, at this time the only figure that is taken as given is the 352,000 as the target for the combined size of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police for the ANSF overall.

We expect that at some point in time, and that time has not been determined—it has been a topic of conversation both in the United States and with the coalition, with the Afghans—at some point in time, it will make sense to reduce that level to a long-term sustainable level. But the point of time that makes sense will depend fundamentally on conditions on the ground.

And some of the calculations that you have heard, and some of which have been in the press, frankly—some accurately and some not so accurately—are looking at a point in time at which the Taliban is significantly reduced and when the scale of the Afghan National Security Force is required to cope with that, would therefore also be lower.

Mrs. Davis. Right. Okay.

Dr. Miller. Neither the end number or any point in time is determined at this time. So people have talked about numbers. People have talked about timelines. None of that is decided and, indeed, we have not yet heard recommendations from——

Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Miller.

I certainly wanted to clarify that because I think there is a concern that if it is downsized to that level, obviously the budget plays a role, but we would also have a lot of former Afghan soldiers in the country, perhaps without a job.

Is that something that we are also looking at; that transition? And what happens after that?

Dr. Miller. General Allen may wish to add to this as well, but a sign of success down the road—and it is not immediate, but down the road—would be that the Taliban was significantly smaller; that the Afghan National Security Forces therefore could be smaller; and then the challenge associated with that would be reintroducing those forces back into the economy.

And the good news is that because of what they would have gone through to become part of the ANSF, they would be trained with respect to literacy. They would be more capable of contributing to that economy. But that demobilization process is something that would need to unfold over time and for which we will need to have an explicit plan.

Mrs. Davis. Yes, thank you. And certainly, literacy is a big concern here. I mean, we are talking about first-grade level for many, many of the troops, and whether or not that is sustainable to have them continue to be able to develop that economy.

General Allen.

General Allen. And we have continued to emphasize literacy. And the soldiers that go through—the police that go through—their basic training, that attain a first-grade level, will be given the opportunity to continue that literacy training. We require that certain leaders have a minimum standard of literacy.

And so as you correctly point out, should there be—and there will be a drawdown at some point of the ANSF from 350,000 to
some number in the post-2014 period—there are options now for those soldiers that there wouldn’t have been before.

And so I would imagine in a managed force reduction, the plan remains to be developed, but pretty soon we are going to have to start to think about it. There will be such aspects of that plan such as vocational training.

Mrs. DAVIS. All important, I agree, General.

Could I just very quickly in the remaining time, General, just ask about morale. You conveyed I think quite eloquently the feelings of troops, I think, and, you know, how they see their mission. But clearly, these kinds of setbacks can be devastating.

I wondered if you could speak more to that, and also whether or not we are doing anything differently as we redeploy troops in looking at records and number of deployments. This obviously is something that bears on everybody’s responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

Can you please answer that question for the record?

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 85.]

General ALLEN. I will, sir. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, my understanding from people who should know—and it has been written about in the press—was the original surge in Afghanistan. The military commanders asked for a floor of 40,000 troops for the original surge in Afghanistan.

They said the best if we could get 80,000. What they actually got approved was 30,000, which was a 25 percent cut from what they said the floor should be. And there are some people who believe that it has cost us added lives and time because that request was not agreed to.

Now, all that was before your time, but I notice in yesterday’s Wall Street Journal, it says that the plans and the result of that 25 percent cut was that the campaigns had to be done sequentially. You couldn’t do both the east and the south at the time. You had to do the south first and then the plan was to move to the east.

Yesterday, the Wall Street Journal said that it is delayed to make that transition from the south to the east because things are not wrapping up in the south as was planned. And I take it from your answer to the chairman’s question that that is true; that we are going to have to stay in the south longer than anticipated before we move the troops to the east to deal with that region. Is that right?

General ALLEN. We have to consolidate the hold on the population centers in the south. It is the spiritual heartland of the Taliban.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes.

General ALLEN. And that surge, those forces that we had, in conjunction with the ANSF and the development of the Afghan Local Police, et cetera, has in many respects permitted us to be successful in ejecting the Taliban from the key terrain down there, which is the human terrain.
So we are going to need to ensure that as we develop the ANSF, that those forces are able to consolidate the hold on the population to prevent the reentry by the Taliban into those forces and into those areas. That is essential.

We do intend to conduct comprehensive counterinsurgency operations in the east. And the east will be very well resourced. And we are going to do both of them simultaneously.

So any suggestion that we are going to hold in the east while we conduct operations in the south is not, in fact, correct. The potential difference is whether I ultimately declare that the east will be the main effort, which permits me to shift other resources, like ISR and potentially some rotary wing assets to the east.

But I will tell you that the RC [Regional Command]–East commander is fully capable of conducting aggressive operations against the insurgency and is well resourced to do so. But my number one goal will be to continue to deny the enemy access back into the key terrain of this insurgency, which is the Pashtun population in the south, sir.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Let me just real briefly—success in the east is going to be essential for the overall success in the mission ultimately, isn’t it, because of the proximity with Pakistan?

General ALLEN. Success in the south is crucial——

Mr. THORNBERRY. I agree with you on the south. I am asking about the east.

General ALLEN. And in the east we will have to conduct comprehensive operations for some period of time there, just by virtue of the proximity of the Pakistani border.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes. That is——

General ALLEN. The lines of movement are much closer to Kabul.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Exactly.

General ALLEN. So we will anticipate continued operations there for some time.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes. You have talked a lot about the growth in the Afghan security forces. And I, among others, have been incredibly impressed by village stability operations and Afghan Local Police.

But it is also my understanding that that takes time, that there is a clear timeline, say 18 months to 2 years, during which this special operations team, maybe augmented by conventional forces, has to live in that village in order to conduct the training and get those Afghan Local Police off on the right path, to stabilize the area, as you have just been describing.

I am a little concerned that we are too focused on numbers here, particularly tremendous growth, that that will make it hard to stick. How are you ensuring that the quality stays there as we have had these tremendous increases in numbers?

General ALLEN. May I get a clarification—quality of the ALP [Afghan Local Police]?

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes, quality of the troops and the ability for them to stabilize, as you were just describing, in the south, how they have got to hold their own, prevent the Taliban from coming back—so that it is more than just a numbers game.

General ALLEN. Well, it will be important that we continue the—as you have correctly pointed out—the deliberate process of cre-
ating the village stability platform, which ultimately creates a community mobilization for the development of the Afghan Local Police.

We have 99 sites that have been approved ultimately for the location of the Afghan Local Police, and we are well on the way—we are over 50 percent of that in terms of the creation of those Afghan Local Police garrisons; and most of those—a vast majority of those—actually support the campaign. And many of those village stability locations we began operations in them months ago.

And so that progress is continuing. We are using our special operators now to be the core element for the creation of the village stability platform, to create the community mobilization, to ultimately embrace their own security, to be the trainers and ultimately the mentors for the Afghan Local Police.

And as time goes on, sir, it is our intention to use Afghan special operators ultimately to—just as we are in other areas—to transition our special operators out of those garrisons and move them on to other areas where they will continue the mission.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Miller—probably could have been in that chair, in that position. I was sitting down here at the time, 2002 and 2003, and the military at the time was telling us in Afghanistan we needed to train 70,000 folks in Afghanistan. And we were going to do 10,000 a year for 7 years or 7,000 a year for 10 years, or something along those lines.

That number has clearly increased over time. It is now up to 352,000.

What can you tell me that is going to assure me that in July you aren’t going to come back—or even, say, after May, in Chicago—you aren’t going to come back and say, “Well, what we meant 400,000. What we meant was 450,000 security forces we needed to train”?

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Larsen, there is some pretty in-depth analysis behind the number 352,000.

I can’t tell you that it shouldn’t be 351,000 or 353,000; but a very good analysis in terms of the requirements for the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, and corresponding assumptions also about the Afghan Local Police and other elements that could provide security.

Sir, I guess I would turn it around and say that if we had a recommendation from General Allen—if we had analysis showing that the number should be different—I would want to hear that from General Allen and I would want to bring that forward to the Secretary of Defense and then forward to the White House.

We have a lot of analysis behind the current assessment. It is based on not just an assessment of what the situation is in Afghanistan and where it may go, but on a pretty good, in-depth analysis of past counterinsurgency efforts.

So I don’t expect that there is going to be a large delta. But, sir, I would say, if there were, I would feel obligated to ask General Allen for his assessment and I would feel obligated to take that assessment forward.
Mr. Larsen. I would hope you would feel obligated to come to us as well?

General Allen, do you have a comment on that?

General Allen. I am satisfied with the 352,000 number. As we have seen this year's campaign unfold, we believe that the partnership relationship that we have now with ISAF and the emerging ANSF—ultimately our drawdown as they continue to grow to their full surge strength of 352,000—I think that is an adequate number.

The issue really isn't the number. I think over the long term the issue will be the disposition of the force on the ground. And it goes back to Mr. Thornberry's comments about operations in the south versus operations in the east; that we may well see that we will have to thicken the defenses in the east over the long term if the safe-haven situation doesn't change.

So it is less about the number than it is probably about the longer-term disposition of those forces on the ground to defend key population centers.

Mr. Larsen. General Allen, I am not asking this next question to get too much into the weeds on the Sergeant Bales incident, because that is going to adjudicated elsewhere. But with regards to the investigation related to command in Afghanistan, the situation on the ground that he was operating in, not the situation, but the command structure in Afghanistan, are there separate investigations going on, separate from the criminal case in Afghanistan?

General Allen. Yes. We will conduct an administrative investigation as well as a criminal investigation.

Mr. Larsen. Could you explain what an administrative investigation is?

General Allen. It will look at the entire command-and-control process; how he was assigned, why he was assigned. It will look at the command relationships associated with his involvement in that combat outpost.

Mr. Larsen. Has that been assigned then, is someone assigned to do that?

General Allen. It is being assigned through U.S. Forces Afghanistan.

Mr. Larsen. Thank you.

And then, finally, General Allen, can you discuss the attrition rate for the Afghan National Army? It is noted that the goal is 1.4 percent. The current is 2 percent attrition rate. That doesn't sound like a lot, but when you are talking 352,000 people, 2 percent starts to get to be a lot.

General Allen. It is improving. The latest number we have, you said 2.0, it is 1.9. That is only a tenth, but it is over a year. That is not an insignificant number of troops.

Mr. Larsen. That is right.

General Allen. We are working very hard within the ANSF to ferret out the reasons for attrition. And a variety of those reasons are the issues of pay, quality of life, leadership, the missions in which those forces have been involved.

And to their credit, the ANSF have embraced many of these issues, and in fact are studying them with great detail. They are removing incompetent or corrupt commanders. They are seeking to improve the quality of life for their troops. They are ensuring that
they get out on leave, which is an important dimension of the morale.

All those things, I think, have pushed down, in fact, attrition, and very shortly, with the expiration of a presidential decree, those individuals that go in an unauthorized absence or an AWOL status are going to start being held accountable for that as opposed to being able to just come and go as they had previously done.

That is all part of a disciplined force. It is all part of a professional force. And we are seeing all of that improve on a regular basis, sir. Thank you for that question.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

General Allen, for the last 3 years, a former boss of yours has been advising me on Afghanistan. I cannot say his name, but I will say that he has great respect for you.

I would like to use a couple of the words he has used recently in an e-mail—“A brilliant soldier statesman,”—talking about you, General Allen—and that you are “as honest as the day is long.”

And I think those qualities, no matter who you are, uniform or out of uniform—you can’t say anything nicer about an individual than that.

Over the past 10 years, I have been hearing from the administration and those who were in your position prior to you being in here today. And Dr. Miller, your comments and General Allen’s is what I have been hearing for 10 years.

I mean, everything is—our gains are sustainable, but there will be setbacks; we are making progress, but it is fragile and reversible. Well, you know, going to Walter Reed in Bethesda recently, I had a young marine lance corporal who lost one leg. And he said to me with his mother sitting in the room, “Congressman, may I ask you a question?”

“Certainly you may, sir.”

“My question is, why are we still there?”

And I look at this e-mail from your former boss, and I would like to read just a portion of it.

“Attempting to find a true military and political answer to the problems in Afghanistan would take decades”—decades, not years—“would drain our Nation of precious resources, with the most precious being our sons and daughters.

“Simply put, the United States cannot solve the Afghan problem, no matter how brave and determined our troops are.”

That gets me to the point that at—what is the metric? What is the event that the Administration and General Allen, you, sir, are going to be candid with the United States Congress—and more important than Congress, the American people—as we are spending $10 billion a month that we can’t even pay for. The Chinese—Uncle Chang—is lending us the money to pay that we are spending in Afghanistan.

When does Congress have the testimony that someone will say, we have done all we can do? Bin Laden is dead. There are hundreds of tribes in Afghanistan and everyone has their own mission, talking about the tribes.
I hope that sometime in between now and 2014, if things are not improving or they are fragile like they are now, somebody will come to Congress and say the military has sacrificed enough; the American people have paid enough; and somebody would shoot straight with the American people and Congress.

Do you know what type of metric—I will ask you both of you, Dr. Miller and General Allen—what type of metric that you would see that you would come back to Congress and say, our troops have done everything; we can declare victory now. But there is one thing we cannot do, and that is change history, because Afghanistan has never changed since they have been existing.

And I will I yield to your—a minute and 41 [seconds] to you both.

Thank you.

General Allen. I think that is a very important question. And as you have, I have visited the wounded in Bethesda as well. There are many of those young troops—as the lance corporal you talked to the other day—who are very, very dedicated to this mission. They want to see it be successful. They want their sacrifice to have meaning. And I think this campaign is going to give their sacrifice meaning.

We are on track to have the ANSF move to the lead. That is what we want. That is what we want success to be in Afghanistan.

Mr. Jones. General, if I may interrupt you one moment, if we get into 2014 and see that President Obama or a Republican president, and the Afghans are not trained to where they need to be, and we are spending money, we are losing lives, will you be honest with the next administration and say to the next administration, you need to stay to the timetable, because we have done all we can do?

You are not going to change history?

General Allen. Congressman, I will be honest with you now and I will be honest with that next administration. I mean, it is my obligation. It is my moral obligation to ensure that this force is resourced and that this force is committed into a strategy that I think will work.

And I believe this strategy will work. It is not about American forces or ISAF forces, even, fighting right to the very end of 2014 and bearing the burden of this campaign. This campaign very clearly envisages that the ANSF will move to the front; the ANSF will have the lead; the ANSF will secure the population of Afghanistan.

And if I think that is coming off the rails, Congressman, I will let you know that.

Mr. Jones. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Miller, General Allen, thank you for your testimony today.

General Allen, many observers have noted that corruption is endemic to Afghanistan and that this corruption feed predatory power brokers and mafias who have co-opted the state.

Over the years, we have made occasional efforts at combating construction, like setting up task-force transparency in Dari. But judging from recent news stories about billions of dollars in cash
being flown out of Afghanistan every year, the former head of the Kabul bank going free, and Afghan National Army helicopters possibly being used to smuggle drugs, it doesn’t seem like we are making much progress.

What can you tell us about successes to address corruption? And do you believe that these efforts will actually address corruption, especially the kind of predatory corruption that feeds on common people sufficiently to allow the Afghan government to function after 2014?

General ALLEN. Ma’am, that is a really important question. And we should not be surprised that there is corruption in Afghanistan. After 30 years of virtually every institution in that country having been destroyed in some form or another, whether it was from the communist coup or the Soviet invasion or the civil war or the Taliban darkness, an awful lot relied ultimately on the wiles of patronage networks, which became criminalized over time.

The question isn’t whether they exist or not. The question is whether we can ultimately oppose the influence of those criminal patronage networks and restore a system of the rule of law and credibility and integrity to the Government of Afghanistan.

And I have no illusions about how difficult that will be. And the efforts that we undertake in ISAF to address those efforts, those influences, I think have begun to take shape in important and meaningful ways.

Since I have been in Afghanistan, through the use of Task Force Shafafiyat Transparency, through Task Force 2010, which has done a great deal about contracting and ensuring transparency in contracting; and in direct conversation with President Karzai, we have taken steps and President Karzai has appointed a presidential executive commission to partner with us, for example, to begin the process of removing organized crime from borders, inland customs depots and airports.

The process of being able to do that will recoup substantial amounts of revenue to Afghan government coffers. It will reduce the very thing that you mentioned about the flying of cash out of Afghanistan. And President Karzai, who talks publicly and often about this culture of impunity, has, in fact, commissioned a presidential executive commission to partner with us in that process.

And we are starting that process now.

I think importantly as well, both of the security ministries—the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, led by the Ministry of Defense—has just completed something called a Transparency and Accountability Working Group.

This has been a complete inventory of all of the functions within the Ministry of Defense, all the way from systems acquisition to personnel assignment. And they are looking to remove criminal capture and criminal influence from both of those security ministries.

And that is a very important step as well, ma’am.

Ms. BORDALLO. General, I have a follow-up question.

General Petraeus cited this exact case as a success story over a year ago. Has the Afghanistan general been tried yet or have any high-profile or senior officials who have been protected or members of these criminal patronage networks been tried?
You didn’t specifically mention this, but this was an Afghan army surgeon general.

General ALLEN. Short answer is, “No,” ma’am.

The longer answer is: I went to see Minister Wardak. I wrote a letter to the President. I presented the evidence of this case to the palace. And there is now a comprehensive investigation under way about the National Military Hospital, which we hope will ultimately result in irrefutable evidence for the prosecution of the commander of that hospital.

The jurisdiction needs to be determined, whether it will be tried through the Attorney General’s Office or through military jurisprudence. But that is a technical outcome.

And the investigation is under way at this time. I think that is a great step forward, frankly.

Ms. BORDALLO. It has been a year.

General ALLEN. And the investigation has only been under way for several months. And I am very glad to see that it is, ma’am.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much.

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Miller, thank you for being here.

General, we appreciate you being here.

And I support what you do. The only thing is, sometimes up here we talk about winning and losing and we are asking questions that the American people will say, “That is not really the question I wanted to ask.”

And, you know, one of the realities we deal with is that Congress spent $825 billion on a stimulus package and we are spending $345 billion for the interest on that. And we are now taking almost that exact sum out of national defense in the country.

And as a result, we are hearing that carriers are going to be postponed. We are taking ships out of commission. We are reducing weapons systems and force structure. And everybody that comes up says we have to do that because of the budget we are dealing with.

So the question I hear from a lot of folks around when I talk about Afghanistan is this. You said earlier that the actions we have had there have made Americans safer. You are the best person we have to articulate how that has happened.

How would you tell the average American that what we have done in Afghanistan has made them safer? And then how would you justify the fact we should continue spending money there as opposed to the ships, the weapons, the force structure that we see being reduced here?

And then the final one is this. What assurances do you see, or what are your projections as far as the economy in Afghanistan after 2014 to be able to sustain the investment that we have put there?

And I am going to give you the rest of my time just to respond to that.

General ALLEN. I may call upon my wingman here to give me a bit of assistance on the policy sides of this.
We remain in hot pursuit of any presence of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. And there is some Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but we want them on their back heels. And they know we are in pursuit and we are aggressively looking for them, and when we find them, we will deal with them. That is the first way that Americans are going to be kept safer.

Second is we are going to continue to pressure the insurgency. We are going to continue to create the opportunity for the Afghan National Security Forces to be the defeat mechanism of this insurgency because our goal beyond ensuring that Al Qaeda cannot use Afghanistan as a launching pad for international terrorism, is to provide the security to the state for the development of democratic institutions and ultimately economic opportunity.

And so with a stable Afghanistan, Americans are safer. With us in hot pursuit of Al Qaeda, Americans are safer. So I believe that Americans can see that the results of the sacrifices that have been made by the American people to resource this was have in many respects a direct-line relationship to 11 September, 2001, where, unimpeded, the Taliban provided safe haven to Al Qaeda, which plotted and ultimately executed the attack upon the United States on that day from the safety of Afghanistan.

It is going to be very difficult for that to occur today, and it will be our hope that in the end, a stable Afghanistan, guarded by a credible ANSF, will make it impossible for it to happen in the future. But that is in the future and we will continue to work at that, sir.

You asked about the money for the support of the campaign versus potential decisions for program tradeoffs. Clearly, those are decisions that will be made by the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with his service chiefs and the joint chiefs—the same people in most cases.

But I have to thank you all. I have to thank the Congress of the United States, and through you, as the elected representatives, the American people for having resourced this campaign.

We really need nothing. We want for nothing, for the great support that you have given us; support that we have received through the CERP [Commanders' Emergency Response Program] program and for the Afghan Infrastructure Program; the great support that we have received in the armor that has been provided to us through the MATVs [MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle] and the MRAP [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected] systems.

We have been very, very well provided for, and I know that the service chiefs remain in their way committed to continue to provide us the weapons systems, the capabilities and the well-trained troops necessary ultimately——

Mr. FORBES. General, I have only got about 30 seconds. Could you just hit the last part about—what is your forecast on the economy in Afghanistan and whether you feel that that is going to be sufficient in 2014 to be able to continue and to be able to continue the investment we have put there?

General ALLEN. I think we need to watch this very closely. As I think you know, sir, there will be a conference that follows the Chicago conference. It will be in Tokyo which will be, in essence,
an international conference that will look to gain money for development over the long term.

After the Bonn II conference that occurred last year, there was a commitment by the international community to support Afghanistan through what they called “a decade of transformation” that follows the Lisbon transition.

That decade of transformation, we hope, will see the international community provide the necessary support ultimately to the Afghan economy in the period of time after 2014 so that we don’t ultimately have the experience of an economic security issue as opposed to the security issue as it relates to a continued insurgency.

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank both witnesses for your testimony.

Some of the comments that have been made both in this room and outside this room have, again, sort of focused on whether or not the President’s timeline that he laid out, you know, is somehow sort of putting at risk our policy and the successes that you have fought so hard to accomplish in Afghanistan.

I would just like to again, if I could, go a little bit deeper in terms of, you know, what has already happened in terms of the troop recovery or drawdown. Again, we now have completed the initial 10,000 troop drawdown. I guess first of all, I just wanted to ask you, General, that now that we are some months past that, I mean, are you in any way—do you have any concerns about whether or not that reduction in force has hobbled your efforts that you have been describing here this morning as far as accomplishing the transition to the Afghan National Army?

General ALLEN. The 10,000 that came out last year have not—

Mr. COURTNEY. Right.

General ALLEN. I am still in the process of making the decisions with respect to the 23,000 that will come out.

Mr. COURTNEY. And the 10,000, which again is already a fait accompli, again, was that concentrated more on the headquarters and of the——

General ALLEN. Many of them were.

Mr. COURTNEY [continuing]. Allocation?

General ALLEN. That is correct. And they are gone. They are already gone. They were gone by the end of 2011.

Mr. COURTNEY. And when we talk about, you know, the leadership that you said is so critical for the Afghan military, I mean, one way that you stimulate leadership is with, you know, both sort of carrots and sticks.

And certainly, you know, as we saw in Iraq, having a timeline can be a very healthy thing in terms of also when you are trying to accomplish a transition, that you are, again, telling people that
they can’t be dependent or count on, you know, the U.S. to always be there to provide their own security goals.

And I guess, I wonder if you could just sort of talk about that a little bit, about whether or not having a timeline has also provided incentive for the Afghans to sort of step up their game?

General Allen. It has, indeed, sir. And the value of the Lisbon transition process is that it is a process. It is something that is measurable. And as you know, the Lisbon transition process occurs over five tranches of terrain that comes off the map and ultimately goes into Afghan sovereignty.

Each one of those tranches is accompanied by detailed conversations and conferences between ISAF and our ANSF partners to ensure that the security forces in those areas are postured and ready to take over the lead for security; not to be finished in terms of security, but the lead for security in those areas.

It has, I believe, very seriously focused the conversations both in terms of the development of the ANSF and the resourcing of the ANSF, and in that sense, has been positive.

Mr. Courtney. Thank you.

I would like to just turn briefly to another topic which, when I visited with you last fall, we talked about—our group did—which was the issue of safe havens in Pakistan and the challenge that that poses with, you know, all of the good intent and great success in terms of training up Afghans—if the Taliban can sort of operate with impunity in and out of Pakistan, that really provides, you know, a real weakness in terms of accomplishing the goal of denying the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government.

I was wondering if you could sort of update us in terms of what you are seeing right now in terms of trying to plug that hole.

General Allen. It continues to be a threat to the campaign. As you know, it is—the nature of the Taliban in those safe havens differs, varies according to where they are geographically. I believe that, in the south, the southern Taliban elements out of the Quetta Shura Taliban have been successfully— their momentum has been successfully thwarted both by ISAF forces and the forces of the ANSF.

It is in the east where I spend a great deal of my time focusing on the Haqqani Network and on the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and other of the Taliban elements, the Commander Nazir Group in Paktika, the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan.

So I spend a lot of my time dealing with that.

As I said before, with respect to the numbers associated of the ANSF, in the end, I think it is less a function or a factor of what the numbers will be of the ANSF than it will be their posture over the long term.

If we don’t see some political outcome from reconciliation, which can have the effect ultimately of reducing the effectiveness and the effect safe havens; if we don’t see Pakistani action to address the safe havens, then ultimate we are going to have to thicken the defenses of the Afghan people to provide as much friction as possible to protect the strategic center of gravity, which is Kabul and the security zone around Kabul.

And we anticipate that that is probably going to have to become an outcome. We will be watching the campaign unfold this year
and next year to determine ultimately, in consultation with our Afghan partners, how they will dispose their forces in the end.

But the chances are very good that, if the issues in the Pakistani safe havens do not resolve in our favor one way or the other, we will probably have to have a larger presence of the ANSF than we had anticipated, which may require us to thin the ANSF in other places in Afghanistan.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will recess for 5 minutes. And when we return, Mr. Wilson will be on for questioning. Thank you.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, General Allen, Dr. Miller, we sincerely appreciate you being here today. I am very grateful that in my home state of South Carolina, my former National Guard unit, the 218th Brigade, served for a year in Afghanistan.

And, General, they felt like you, and commanded by our Adjutant General Bob Livingston, that they were working with Afghan brothers, that they were truly making a difference, they were helping train the security forces of Afghanistan to protect themselves.

Additionally, this past weekend, I was honored to be at a deployment of personnel from the Army National Guard with General Livingston. They will be going as an agricultural team to help the people of Afghanistan develop their economy.

And to see the military families there, the dedication, the service members, the veterans who came, it truly is the new greatest generation.

With that in mind, I am very concerned that the Wall Street Journal last night reported that the Administration is offering a compromise regarding night raids in Afghanistan, and specifically that it would subject operations to advanced reviews by Afghan judges. One option under discussion in the talks would require warrants to be issued before operations got a green light.

Can you comment on the accuracy of the report? Why is such a compromise in the interest of the United States?

General ALLEN. First, sir, thank you very much for your comments on your troops. They are magnificent. And Bob Livingston is one of the great soldiers I have had the honor to serve with over time. And so thank you for the service of those troops in Afghanistan.

So, I would like to decline answering the specifics of that question, because we are in very sensitive negotiations now on night operations.

We do intend that night operations ultimately acknowledge the Afghan constitution and Afghan law, but the process specifically of the execution of night operations has yet to be negotiated. It is not my intention that night operations lose their momentum, which is really what gives them their effectiveness.

And so any specific conversation about the issuance of warrants or the— or prior review of mission folders by judges, it is very premature at this point and in fact I have not been involved in any negotiation specifically about that at this point, sir.
Mr. Wilson. And it had always been my hope that it is mutually beneficial to have night operations for the protection of the people of Afghanistan. And so best wishes on trying to get that point across. But they are the primary beneficiaries of having improved security.

General Allen. And they do know that, sir.

Mr. Wilson. Good.

General Allen. They tell me that all the time.

Mr. Wilson. I hope they do. Because when I read about it, I just—it is appalling that they would actually give a green light to the other side.

Additionally, in your testimony you indicate that Iran continues to support the insurgency and fueling the flames of violence, particularly the Iranian influence of advising, training, supplying weapons, munitions.

Which groups are they working with? Where in the country? What is Iran's goal?

General Allen. They have operated primarily or worked primarily with the Taliban elements in the west. That is the only area in which we have seen the presence of support to the Taliban.

Our sense is that Iran could do more, if they chose to, but they have not. And we watch the activity and the relationships very closely.

You know, there is an ancient relationship between the Persian people of Iran and the Afghan people. In fact, today is the beginning of Nowruz, which is the Persian New Year. And there is real potential common ground between our objectives and Iranian objectives with respect to counternarcotics, arms struggling, human trafficking. There are a large number of Afghan refugees in Iran.

There is the potential for common ground, for us to cooperate ultimately in the long-term benefit of Afghanistan. But I know that Iran and Afghanistan have a long relationship. It is a national relationship that President Karzai has, in fact, pointed to on a number of occasions that could benefit Afghanistan over the long term.

The troubling part right now is the fact that there is some assistance that is going to the Taliban from Iran, and we seek to check that.

Mr. Wilson. Well, again, I appreciate both of your service. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Ms. Tsongas.

Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And good morning to both of you; it is a pleasure to have you with us.

I wanted to address the status of women and the impact on their lives as we transition to the Afghan National Security Forces and, in time, out of Afghanistan.

In November, I met with several female Afghan parliamentarians who were here in Washington. All were members of the opposition. And while they acknowledged that progress had been made towards female equality in the post-Taliban era, particularly with regards to female education, they also expressed a number of concerns with roadblocks towards further reforms.
So the decision made earlier this month by Afghan President Mr. Karzai to endorse a code of conduct that forbids women to travel alone in public, permits husbands to beat their wives is an outrageous affront to the rights of Afghan women and, I think, greatly undermines the significant progress that this brave group has made in the last decade.

His decision to align himself with the Council of Clerics and their code really does cause great concern, since the same values we have sought and fought so hard to displace are being put forward as the future of Afghanistan.

During a recent bipartisan delegation to Afghanistan I visited, along with a number of colleagues, with Afghan girls who hoped one day to become doctors, teachers and entrepreneurs, and with Afghan women who were training to become helicopter pilots in the Afghan military. It really was an extraordinary trip really and highlighted so well the advances that have been made for women.

They wanted nothing more than to help provide for their families and contribute to the future success of their country. But in consigning these women to the status of second-class citizens, Mr. Karzai has turned his back on those who are still emerging from decades of abuse by the Taliban and I think threatens the future ability of Afghanistan to function as a stable democracy and an American ally.

I am pleased that the Administration has taken some steps to deter some of the most egregious abuses of the Afghan government, such as temporarily cutting off financing for the Pul-e-Charkhi prison at the edge of Kabul, which has subjected female visitors to invasive body cavity searches, as was recently reported in the New York Times. However, this is an issue not yet resolved.

So, my question is, as we draw down from Afghanistan over the next several years, what can we do to make sure that we don’t lose the hard-fought gains for the rights of Afghan women, 50 percent of the population? And what, if any, leverage will we have as we go through this process and after our withdrawal is complete? And how do you see Congress being able to help the Administration preserve the gains which have been made?

It seems to me, if we are seen as simply walking away from those gains, we have done not just the Afghan women, but ourselves a great disservice.

So I ask Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER. Ms. Tsongas, thank you.

Ma’am, let me answer in three parts, if I can. The first is to acknowledge that the Government of Afghanistan will not always do exactly what we prefer and what we wish.

At the same time, we have and we continue to make clear our view that this is an important issue. And just as you said, that has been a consistent message from this Administration.

It is often, in our view, more effective to do that less visibly. Sometimes it has been more visibly.

Second, as you noted, over the course of this campaign and, in fact, even over the course of this surge, as we are seen improved security, there are very substantial gains that have occurred for women, including for education.
When I was at Regional Command–South a couple of weeks ago, just one relatively in a sense small, but incredibly important fact—and that is that now 40,000 women are receiving an education that they were not just a few years ago in Kandahar.

And third, I would say that while our fundamental national interest is to prevent the re-emergence of safe havens for Al Qaeda and to prevent the Taliban from coming back and displacing the Afghanistan government, over the long-term and indeed in the intervening period, part of the basis of our relationship with the Afghan government will include how it treats its citizens.

And so this will remain a continuing conversation.

Ms. Tsongas. And do you express a bright line in your conversations around some of these issues, so that it becomes very clear?

The Chairman. Gentlemen's time has expired.

If you will take that one for the record later?

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 86.]

Dr. Miller. Take it for the record.

The Chairman. Mr. Turner.

Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Miller. General Allen, thank you for being here.

General Allen, over the past several years, I have focused my attention on the Afghan narcotics trade as a major source of funding for the insurgents. In 2006, General James Jones, then the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe stated, “the Achilles Heel of Afghanistan is the narcotics problem.”

He went on to say “I think the uncontrolled rise of the spread of narcotics, the business that it brings in, the money that it generates, is being used to fund the insurgency, the criminal element, anything to bring chaos and disorder.”

In 2010, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime published a study showing that opium production rapidly increased from the period of 2006 to 2010. And I have a chart from CRS [Congressional Research Service] that summarizes that report. I am fond of holding up this chart and folding it in half. Because if you fold it in half, you can see that during the periods of the surge, if you will, of production, it nearly doubled over what the historical levels were prior.

In a recent correspondence, you told me, “The narcotics trade and its linkage to the insurgency contribute to regional insecurity, corruption, volatility in the rule of law and stagnation of economic development.”

General Petraeus has agreed that it was a serious problem, noting that the trade financed roughly one-third of the Taliban’s funding. General Mattis confirmed this number just 2 weeks ago before this committee.

In an attempt to confront this issue, I have discussed this issue with you, President Karzai, General Petraeus, General Mattis, and DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency], just to name a few.

And in response to my question on this issue, General Mattis stated that, “The U.S. Government and other international partners, including the Afghans, are reducing poppy cultivation and opium production in Afghanistan. Our interagency counternarcotics
strategy supports a comprehensive set of actions to reduce opium production.

“That strategy includes numerous initiatives, campaigns and joint collaborative efforts that took years to create and implement.”

And I want to complement you and your leadership on these efforts and on the apparent success. The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Winter Poppy Assessment for April 2011 demonstrated an actual decrease in 2011 opium production.

Further, in correspondence with General Petraeus last year, he told me that his forces have seen a 48 percent decrease in opium production. And in the first quarter of 2011, we saw a 341 percent increase in drug seizures nationwide, compared to the same period ago.

And I want to continue with the charts and the folding them over. This is the one that has been updated to show the fall. If you fold off the surge, you can see that you are back down to levels that once again represent historical level.

And while I find these trends reassuring, I am concerned that the premature withdrawal of U.S. and ISAF forces in Afghanistan might reverse this trend and allow the insurgents to regain this lucrative source of funding.

In fact, just 2 weeks ago, General Mattis stated that, “We will create an Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police that has this capacity, if we continue on the track that we are on right now.”

Your testimony before this committee today, in your capacity as commander, you stated that the progress in Afghanistan is real, sustainable, and that we have severely degraded the insurgency.

General Allen, we are still pushing the programs to the degree that you stated in your earlier response, received in September, and receiving similar positive responses in the decreased levels of opium productions?

Do you anticipate that these positive results will continue as we draw down our forces? And does the Afghan Army have the capacity to address these counternarcotic efforts?

And if the Administration ignores the advice of its combat commanders and decides to accelerate withdrawal, what do you anticipate happening to the counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan in the future?

And then one last question; it is my understanding that this issue of narcotics in Afghanistan will not be on the NATO summit agenda, although the NATO summit agenda is described as an Afghanistan agenda. It would seem to me, with all of the references and understanding of how this contributes to the insurgency, the Taliban instability, that it would be high on the list.

General.

General Allen. It is my intention to preserve, to the maximum extent that we can, the gains that we have made in both the interagency approach to counternarcotics, both on the U.S. side, but also the interagencies capabilities that have been built into the Afghan side as well—the counternarcotics police of Afghanistan, the vetted investigative units, the high-end special police units within the General Directorate of Police Special Units, the GDPSU of the MOI [Ministry of Interior].
There are a variety of units that are gaining, both in capabilities and in skills—that have grown as a direct result of our advisory capacity and our partnership capacity with them as well.

Operations such as Kahfa Kardan, which I think you probably are aware of, which was a comprehensive counterdrug operation last year. We intend to undertake a similar operation again this year.

So it is my intention to remain committed to use both the inter-agency resources that we have in country, in close partnership with the U.S. embassy and with other international partners there, to continue to develop the capabilities of the Afghans themselves, both to interdict the cultivation of narcotics, but also the production of drug products and the shipment and the movement of those.

It is my intention to remain on track in that regard. There is no signal to me that there is going to be an accelerated drawdown of the forces necessary to continue to support those processes as well.

And I will have to check into the NATO summit agenda to see if there might be sub-points which could, in fact, be the opportunity to discuss this issue, sir.

Mr. Turner. Thank you very much.

Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.

In the aftermath of the mistaken burning of Muslim holy books by American military forces, followed by the massacre of 16 innocent civilians, 9 of whom were children, apparently at the hands of an American soldier, Americans as well as Afghan citizens are outraged.

This climate of hostility can lead to bad things happening. Insofar as the American soldier accused of committing this massacre is concerned, it should be kept in mind that America has asked much from our American soldiers in the field.

This particular gentleman who stands accused, I understand, has been deployed four times to Afghanistan and also to Iraq. And I would imagine that his state of mind would be a question that will have to be answered by the factfinders when the trial comes up.

And so I would just simply ask that we not yield to the instinct to throw the soldier under the bus and wash our hands of the fact that he has been put in a situation that many people would snap under.

So that would be my statement as far as that is concerned. I think he deserves the presumption of innocence that the Constitution entitles he as well as us to.

General, we are in the process of gradually drawing down U.S. forces and transitioning responsibility to Afghan forces. And you have stated that progress is being made in terms of the development of the Afghan security forces, the security gains that have been made, economic development occurring on the ground, largely due to U.S. aid.

Governance is improving. And you also commented that the acts that I just talked about—the two recent acts—they do not accurately characterize the overall impact, positive, of United States involvement.
Now, it has also been alleged that President Obama made a key blunder, for lack of a better word, in setting forth a date that American combat troops would be withdrawn, the last of them. So we have got about 18 months before that happens.

Do you think that that has been a good thing, the announcement? Has that been a good thing or a bad thing in terms of on the ground in Afghanistan?

General Allen. Well, thank you for that question, and thank you for your comment on Staff Sergeant Bales. And I assure you, the investigation will be thorough, and we do operate from a presumption of innocence. It is the nature of who we are and it is the nature of our Constitution. And thank you for that comment, Congressman.

We are going to have combat forces in Afghanistan to the end of our deployment, to the end of 2014. But we fully anticipate, though, that in 2013, as the ANSF continues to move to the lead and as the fifth tranche of transition occurs, which, according to the Lisbon conference, technically means that the ANSF are in security lead across the country, our forces will move into a support roll to continue to accelerate and to support the ANSF as it completes the security transition out to the end of 2014.

So we will still have combat forces in Afghanistan all the way to the end. They will be fewer in number, and the nature of the forces will be in many respects advisory in nature, but we can anticipate that the U.S. will be engaged in combat operations in support of the ANSF in the lead right to the end of 2014, sir.

Mr. Johnson. Has it hurt us or helped us?

General Allen. I think it has helped us to focus on the mission. I think it has helped the Afghans to focus on their need to become proficient and to move into the fore. And on the whole, in the end, I think it has been beneficial. And it is not just been a unilateral U.S. decision. It has been an ISAF decision. Forty-nine other countries have joined us in this.

Mr. Johnson. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Conaway.

Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, gentlemen, thank you for being here.

I want to add I don’t think my colleague from Georgia intentionally left off the outrage we all feel of the 13 men killed in the “green-on-blue” incidents as a result of that litany of things that went wrong, including one specialist, Payton Jones, who was laid to rest Saturday in Marble Falls, Texas.

General Allen, there are those on this committee and on both sides of these buildings that are openly calling for a reassessment now and a quicker drawdown of troops out of Afghanistan, that is quicker than what is currently planned under all the other agreements.

I would also like just to parenthetically mention I have never heard anybody say that us staying in Afghanistan forever was even a remote option. So my colleagues who have constantly pounded that away this morning—I am not sure where they have got that idea—but back to my point.
I understand that, after October 1, you will do an assessment of how to handle the 68,000 who are there and the mission all the way through the end of 2014.

If suddenly now the Administration announces, without your input, that they are going to change the parameters with which you get to work, the number of people you are working with and/or the capacity that you will have in place during this transition, what impact will that have on our ability to be successful with those reduced resources and/or a different model that is remarkably different than what you are currently planning to use?

General Allen. First, there is no indication that the Administration is planning to——

Mr. Conaway. Well, there are those in the legislative branch, though, that are pushing that, and sometimes that has some impact, not often.

General Allen. It would ultimately be a function of what the number would be. But the nature of the relationship that we have right now is that the conversation about what combat power is necessary, what the force structure ought to look like, is a strategic conversation. I have been given no indications that there is a number that will ultimately be detailed to me to build a strategy around.

And so, while I could——

Mr. Conaway. But a number that is different than the Lisbon agreement?

General Allen. That is correct.

Mr. Conaway. Okay.

General Allen. So, at the end of the recovery of the phase two surge forces, as I mentioned and as you correctly stated a moment ago, I will give the President my best military advice with regard to the combat power that we will need to accomplish this mission, probably in 2013. I am not sure that I would be able to see out to 2014 at that point, but I would probably have a pretty good feel for it.

Mr. Conaway. Okay.

General Allen. But it isn’t just a function of U.S. forces because I will be giving a similar recommendation up the NATO chain to the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, Admiral Stavridis, but also to the Secretary General of NATO. So it will be a combined recommendation.

Mr. Conaway. The proposed budget for 2013 drops the financial support for the training-and-equip mission from some $11 billion to $5 billion. Is that a reflection of the fact that we are coming to the end of that work and we need less resources, or is that budget driving the train as opposed to what is happening actually on the ground, meaning you need less resources?

General Allen. Much has already been purchased by them, and so we are really fielding the equipment less—more so than buying the equipment at that point.

Mr. Conaway. Dr. Miller, can you give us some indication of what the impact on the Afghan economy has been, from the care and feeding of ISAF forces being in place, and what is going to replace that in their economy when that number is dramatically less after 2014?
Dr. Miller. Sir, yes. Let me first just add to General Allen’s comments on the ASFF [Afghanistan Security Forces Fund] funding.

In addition to us having reached a certain point with respect to the purchase of equipment, General Allen and his team, supported by CENTCOM [Central Command], supported by the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], they have done a hard scrub and looked at, as we transition, what is not just the number but size and type of equipment that is necessary as the Afghans begin to increasingly take leadership, so a very in-depth scrub, and credit to General Allen and his staff for leading that effort.

With respect to the specific impact of U.S. presence on the economy, if I could, sir, I would like to take that for the record and get you our best estimate. I don’t have a good number that would take account of——

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 86.]

Mr. Conaway. But it would have to be broader than just U.S. presence. As the general pointed out, rightfully so, this is an international effort. So it is really the ISAF forces in total that will be leaving at some point in time.

So, obviously, this 10-year plan to strengthen, or to support the Afghans after this transition is going to be—Afghanistan after this transition is going to be really important, because I don’t think that the current level of funding, for whatever reason, is going much beyond the near future.

So I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Critz.

Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Miller, General Allen, thank you for being here and for your service.

I missed the point—Mr. Turner had asked about poppy growth. Can you give me a specific as to how much less poppy growth there is going on in Afghanistan now as compared to when it was at its peak?

General Allen. Let me take that question and I will get you a definitive answer on that which give you some of the history and where we are today and incorporates, both for Mr. Turner and you, the sense of where we think we will be going both in terms of Afghan security force development that supports counternarcotics.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 85.]

Mr. Critz. Right. Can you tell me what has replaced poppy growth in the places that we know it has been eradicated?

General Allen. There have been a number of crops—wheat, pomegranate, what we would consider to be normal agricultural cash crops.

Mr. Critz. Now, I understand that pomegranates—there is a lot of infrastructure needed to do the——

General Allen. That is correct.

Mr. Critz. Is the infrastructure in place?

General Allen. It is going to be a long-term development for them.
Mr. CRITZ. Long term meaning——

General ALLEN. Years.

Mr. CRITZ. 5? 10?

General ALLEN. I can't tell you. Again, I will add that into the question I take.

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Critz, I also will contribute to adding more detail to the record, but it is absolutely a very long-term prospect and it is expected to be 10 years-plus.

If I could, I want to, while I have got the floor on this issue, thank the committee for its support of the task force on Business and Stability Operations.

Dr. MILLER. That is $150 million this year of Department of Defense money that is going to help helping economic development in Afghanistan, in close partnership with USAID, but in fact looking at both long-term prospects, for example, for minerals that could help turn the corner, or help at least improve their posture long term, but also looking at some of these agricultural enterprises how to encourage them to move forward and how to bring in capital that will help them be sustainable over time.

Mr. CRITZ. Okay. Well, talking about sustainability, that brings me to—my next question is as I noticed in the reporting that the ANSF is going to be about 352,000 people at some point; ANA [Afghan National Army] being 195,000; ANP [Afghan National Police] being about 157,000.

General, in your estimation or in your actually expert analysis, the growth and the development of noncommissioned officers within the ANSF and the growth and expertise that is growing within the junior officer corps, are the numbers there to support a force that is this large? And then, going forward, is the economy of Afghanistan strong enough to support a force this size?

So first, I want to know about what you see within the military itself, the expertise and capabilities, and then from an economic standpoint as well.

General ALLEN. It is an important question, and the answer is at this juncture, we are still building the NCOs [non-commissioned officers] and the junior officers and that is going to be for some time.

Mr. CRITZ. Okay.

General ALLEN. The good news is that the schools are in place now, that the curricula are coming on-line and we are building a noncommissioned officer and a junior officer that is steeped in the kinds of capabilities that we need the ANSF to have.

And I believe that we all recognize that the Afghan economy is going to, for some period of time, require international community assistance in order to sustain the ANSF.

There is, as we all know, and the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations has done great work in this regard; there are substantial resources underground in Afghanistan. It is going to take a number of years before the process ultimately of the extractive industry coming online can produce the kind of revenues to support an ANSF with capabilities.

And so at this point, no, but the international community has indicated the desire to continue to support the ANSF over the long term.
Mr. CRITZ. Okay. And that builds to my next question, which is—
2014 is the next presidential election, and we have been talking
about corruption, patronage networks.
Is the central Government of Afghanistan at a point now as we
begin this drawdown towards 2014, or as we set up the process, is
the central Government strong enough to sustain the infrastruc-
ture needed?
I mean, obviously, we are doing a COIN [counterinsurgency] op-
eration throughout Afghanistan, so this is not one big army that
marches across the country. This is a series of different little fief-
doms, for lack of a better term, that feeds right into that patron-
age and corruption sort of model. So is that central Government
strong enough cohesively to hold that all together?
And I see I am almost out of time, so if you want to answer that
for the record, that would be fine.
General ALLEN. We will take it for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on
page 86.]
Mr. CRITZ. Okay. Thank you, sir.
And I yield back.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Wittman.
Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Miller, General Allen, thank you so much for joining us
today. Thank you for your service to our Nation and for your lead-
ership.
General Allen, I want to go to you and pick up some of the words
from your testimony. You stated that throughout history,
insurgencies have seldom been defeated by foreign forces. Instead,
they have been ultimately defeated by indigenous forces and then
secured by the forces there in the country. And in the long run, our
goals can only be achieved and then secured by Afghan forces.
Transition, then, is the linchpin of our strategy, not merely the way
out.
Let me ask this. How do you make sure that the linchpin doesn’t
break? And as you have stated, this has been a long and difficult
and costly campaign. How do we make sure in the transition that
there is enough time and space for the ANSF, the Afghan Local Po-
lice, the Government, in fact, to make sure that they are stood up
and they can actually have a chance of being successful in pushing
things forward?
And then as a follow on to that, as you are looking at conditions
on the ground, what will you be considering as far as capabilities
of the Afghan National Security Forces, the capabilities of the
enemy, as you plan for the drawdown of our troops?
General ALLEN. The process of transition, as you know, occurs
across several different tranches. And then each one of those
tranches before they are announced, we go to significant levels of
detail of planning both on the ISAF side, but also in partnership
with the Afghan coordinator for transition, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, who
has done, frankly, magnificent work in the process of leading tran-
sition.
But also very significantly, we spend a great deal of time with
the Director of National Security, engineer Nabil; with General
Wardak, the Minister of Defense; and with General Mohammadi, who is the Minister of Interior. And we look very, very carefully at those areas that are transitioning to ensure that the ANSF elements within those areas have the capacity to handle the security environment that they will ultimately have to face as that particular area transitions.

For example, in tranche one, it was the very first one. We chose areas that were relatively secure at the time where the ANSF seemed to be in pretty good shape. Because this was the first one, this was all new. What we have discovered is that in fact all of those areas are actually in very good shape right now.

Tranche two is in the process of transition now and we are in the process of formulating tranche three. We are looking very carefully to ensure we don’t over-burden the ANSF core command with too many regional areas in one particular area. We are looking very closely to see that there is a coherent partnership with the ISAF forces to be a safety net, if necessary, to ensure that is no regression when the time comes for the transition.

So we watch it very closely. And then we monitor those areas once we have begun transition to ensure that it is an irreversible process. And we are going to do that throughout all five tranches.

With regard to the conditions on the ground, obviously I am in constant contact with our intelligence organizations. We are watching very closely the state of the insurgency inside Afghanistan. We are looking very closely at the state of the insurgency inside Pakistan. I think we have had some very important indicators just this year.

On 1 January of 2011, there were only 600 of the Taliban that had reintegrated. On 1 January of 2012, well over 3,000 had reintegrated, and today there is over 3,600, with another 400 in the pipeline ultimately seeking to reintegrate.

That says something about the insurgency at the grassroots level. And because so much of the insurgency is not an idealistic insurgency or a religious insurgency, as much as it is an insurgency that reflects dissatisfaction locally, that tells us a number of things.

It tells us that the foot soldiers in many respects are just tired of the fight and they want to go home. And they are going home and they are assimilating back into their communities.

It also tells us that the nature of who it is they have to oppose, which is an increasingly capable and pervasive Afghan National Security Force, is the force that they don’t want to have to fight, and so they are going home. And also now they have got opportunities with improved local governance and improved economic opportunity at the local level.

It is not the same all across the country and there have been setbacks in some places in the country, but many of the grievances that ultimately sent many of these insurgents to join the Taliban and the insurgency—I think we can take some positive indicators away that the conditions have changed in some respects that prompts both the advent of the Afghan Local Police very quickly in many of these populations, but also the large numbers of insurgents who have reintegrated.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, Dr. Miller, when you look at the end-state in terms of, let us say, our conventional ground combat units are gone from the country. I suspect we would still have after 2014 maybe some advisory presence, some light footprint, maybe some special operations personnel to do counterterrorism operations.

What would you estimate the cost of that to be?

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Coffman, your sense of the likely missions appears right to me, including counterterrorism and the train, advise, and assist mission. At this point, it is impossible to give either the——

Mr. COFFMAN. I am sorry. I am referring to the cost to the U.S. taxpayer or the cost of international support to the Afghan government to sustain their security forces and what support that they would expect after 2014.

Dr. MILLER. I see.

We have had discussion about what the appropriate and necessary sustained level of contribution is for Afghan national security forces over time. As we had discussed earlier, you can think of it in a sense as what is the approximate cost to sustain at 352,000; which is where we are, which is 330,000 today and growing to 352,000 for ANSF?

There is a cost associated with that, and we are looking toward the international community to begin to pay a portion of that, at least starting on the——

Mr. COFFMAN. Is it $4 billion? I have seen that figure. Is it $4 billion?

Dr. MILLER. To sustain at 352,000 we expect it would be more than that.

Mr. COFFMAN. More than that.

Dr. MILLER. To sustain at a lower number that it would be further down the road at a point in time when the insurgency had been further degraded and smaller, the number of $4 billion or a little over has been certainly part of the conversation, but I don’t believe that that is certainly at this point either the final answer for the cost of a given force, nor do I think it reflects a final answer on the implicit size of a force that is required at a given point in time.

So I would say that the number that we know today is that we are growing to 352,000 for the Afghan National Security Forces; that at some point we expect that will come down. We don’t know the timing of that. And because we don’t know the timing of that nor the levels that we will go beyond 2014, can’t give you a good estimate of costs, although people are certainly making various estimates and some of those have accurately and inaccurately have appeared in the press.

Mr. COFFMAN. General Allen, would you define our security objectives in Afghanistan as keeping Al Qaeda out, keeping the Taliban from taking over the country, and having some type of base of operations whereby we can launch counterterrorism strikes, such as the one we did recently in taking out Osama bin Laden?

General ALLEN. I would be very careful about the third as an articulation. At this juncture, first of all, there has been no discussion
with the Afghan government per se—a U.S. enduring presence post-2014.

We anticipate concluding a strategic partnership accord in the not too distant future, and in conjunction with that conversation we will begin to have the discussions with the Afghans about what an enduring U.S. force might look like.

At this juncture, the conversation is largely about roles and functions that might be undertaken. There will probably be a counterterrorism presence, but it will not be to operate in the region. It would be a counterterrorism presence to prevent Al Qaeda within Afghanistan from finding itself an operationally relevant safe haven, which it does not have now.

Mr. Coffman. Thank you, General Allen.

Let me just say I am torn on this mission. Having served in Iraq with the United States Marine Corps, I have been in meetings where we had to convince tribal leaders—or convince tribal leaders to cooperate with us knowing that if we let them down that they would be dead, that Al Qaeda would come back, the insurgents would come back and would kill them.

And so I believe that we have a moral obligation here, even though I believe it was the wrong path for America, that we could have achieved our security objectives without this heavy conventional footprint on the ground without giving them a structure of governance that doesn’t fit the political culture of the country, without trying to change their entire culture, and without trying to give them the economy that they never had at U.S. taxpayers’ expense.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The Chairman. Gentleman’s time expired.

Mr. Scott.

Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, at the start of the meeting one of the statements that you made was that our goal was to keep the Taliban from overflowing the Afghanistan government and deny Al Qaeda a safe haven. Those are two very distinctly different goals.

And I would like to focus, if you will, on the overthrowing the Afghanistan government and in the ties that the Afghanistan government is making with China. And many reports out there suggest that China has supported a peace process between the Taliban and the Afghanistan government.

And if you look at the amount of foreign aid the U.S. Government has sent to Afghanistan, it is somewhere around $48 billion, where China has done approximately $58 million. There is approximately $1 trillion worth of natural resources in Afghanistan. The contract seemed to be being signed with China for China to actually receive the contracts and the benefit, the financial benefits there, of, quite honestly, a lot of loss of life and blood and money from the U.S. taxpayer.

And I guess my question is, if China is the one that has set themselves up to reap the windfall and the rewards from the natural resources of Afghanistan and the United States is not going to have trade ties, if you will, for anything other than essentially trinkets and rugs, why shouldn’t China bear the cost of ensuring
that the Taliban doesn’t overturn the Afghanistan government instead of the U.S. taxpayer?

General ALLEN. Well, it is an important question, and I would not disagree with you that China ought to be asked to provide some of that support in the long term.

But, of course, there are other countries that are involved ultimately in Afghanistan’s future, and Afghanistan is choosing to have relationships with them as well. The Indian government, for example——

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

General ALLEN [continuing]. With whom we have very strong relations, appears to be poised ultimately not just to have a substantial economic interest, perhaps even eclipsing the Chinese interest, but a strong economic interest in Afghanistan, but also has long-term ties, very healthy and friendly ties with Afghanistan and, in fact, is offering to support the development of the Afghan National Security Forces.

So I think it is not just a matter of China. I think that there are going to be other international factors that are at play in Afghanistan.

Mr. SCOTT. General, if I may, you said that India has offered. I assume there is a financial number that India has offered to help with the Afghanistan forces? Has China offered a significant dollar figure, or is it——

General ALLEN. I will have——

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. Just that they want the resources?

General ALLEN. I will have to do the research for you on that. I will take that question.

Mr. SCOTT. Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Scott, if I could just add that obviously we want the Afghanistan economy to improve over time. We want it, over time, to be self-sufficient. We have talked about that being a long road.

What we expect for the United States is that we are able to compete on a level playing field and that our companies can go in for the extractive industries and for all the industries, not just the localized smaller-scale ones. And we have made that expectation clear, and our companies have had an opportunity to compete.

Part of helping Afghanistan take those next steps, get on its feet economically over a long period of time is, in fact, going to be to help it create those opportunities internationally, not just for the United States but for other countries as well.

Mr. SCOTT. Dr. Miller, if I may——

Dr. MILLER. And I believe that we will compete very effectively over time.

Mr. SCOTT. From my standpoint, I am not talking about exploiting Afghanistan. I am talking about the fact China is essentially exploiting our men and women in the military and the United States taxpayer by having us pay the burden in both blood and money for, quite honestly, an area where China is going to be the one that reaps the windfall benefits of stability in Afghanistan.

And if they are not willing—I don’t understand where the benefit to the U.S. citizen comes in spending $10 billion a month if 21 months from now the end result is going to be the same. We are
going to be out of there. We will have lost more men, more women. We will have spent more money. And yet China is going to step in. China is capable of stepping in right now.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank all of you for being here.

General, appreciate your team being here. I know when you put on that uniform you do a great deal for the cause of freedom. I have to point out a special greeting here to Commander Brook DeWalt, who has been a friend of mine for a very, very long time, ever since he was a little boy. No, that is not quite correct. But thank you for being here.

And I wanted to suggest, first of all, that it is my opinion, and there is context here, that the date certain in the drawdown as articulated by the Administration in my judgment has had a detrimental effect on our overall mission here and put some of their commanders on the ground in a difficult position.

But I wanted to follow up with Representative Wilson’s question regarding malignant Iranian influence in Afghanistan. You responded that there is potential for common ground between us and Iran to cooperate for the long-term benefit of Afghanistan.

And you stated that you are seeking to check the negative assistance between Iran and Afghanistan.

And I guess my first thought is, do you think this is possible, or is—this common ground between us and Iran is possible, given the leadership in the current Iranian regime?

And how does the long history between Iran and Afghanistan provide any sort of a basis for leveraging events in favor of our national security?

Do you know for certain that we are effectively checking negative assistance by Iran to the insurgency?

And the overall, then, question is, is it wise, in your opinion, to proceed with the current drawdown given the Iranian government’s support to this insurgency in Afghanistan?

A lot of questions there; sorry I threw them all at once.

General ALLEN. We are seeking to understand exactly what Iran is doing in Afghanistan. But we also understand that Iran and Afghanistan have their own bilateral relationship. And that is an ancient and a, in many respects, productive relationship for Afghanistan.

I will not take issue with the fact that the Afghan government has a relationship with Iran. My issue is primarily in the area of security and what we understand to be Iranian assistance to certain elements of the Taliban.

It has not been dramatic. It has not been pervasive. But we seek to understand it, and we have interdicted that assistance on a number of occasions. And so we will continue to watch it very closely. We will see if it is modulated, if it is increased or if it becomes more pervasive, then we will have to take actions as necessary within Afghanistan to continue to check that process.

Mr. FRANKS. Dr. Miller, did you want to weigh in on that?
Dr. Miller. If I could just add very briefly, as you know, sir, the Iranian government has also provided not only rhetorical but material support to the Afghan government.

And so what we see is, in many instances, a positive influence, but then, just as General Allen has talked about, at the same time, in another part of the country, we have seen Iranian support for the insurgency.

So what we would obviously like to do is to encourage continued support for the Government in Kabul and to, through various means, including the interdiction that General Allen talked about, reduce to a minimum, attempt to eliminate any incentives for support to the insurgency.

Mr. Franks. I guess it just occurs to me, given, you know, Iran's history of making IEDs to blow up our troops in Iraq shouldn't engender a great deal of trust on our part to the—you know, the potential of using the longstanding relationship between Afghanistan and Iran to our benefit.

I am not sure that there is a real basis for that. But, I mean, I defer in this case to the people on the ground. I am just suggesting that there seems to be a general pattern here, and I am just wondering what the drawdown and the date certain has done to the overall—at least the psychological array of our enemies' attitude toward continuing to resist the efforts of freedom there in Afghanistan.

General, if you have any other thoughts?

General Allen. I was just going to say that we have not seen the Iranian signature weapons in Afghanistan that we saw frequently in southern Iraq. And that would be a very quick indicator to us that things have changed dramatically.

Mr. Franks. Right. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

We have got two committees going on at the same time, so I have to sprint to the other one, so thank you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Palazzo.

Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And of course I would like to thank our distinguished guests for being here today and for your service to your country.

I was just wondering if the general had a scuba bubble above his gold jump wings; we just can't see it because he ran out of uniform for all of his prestigious ribbons and medals?

General Allen. You are kind to ask, but I have tried to stay above the water most of the time in my career.

Mr. Palazzo. Common air-breather.


Mr. Palazzo. I perfectly understand.

I would like to just say, you know, it is, kind of, fascinating that we are talking about Afghanistan, but then the subject of China comes up.

You know, we go to the Pacific region and of course you expect to hear China; in every country you go to, the subject of China comes up.

This morning I was talking about the Arctic and China came up, you know, about how they are building ice-breakers to begin, I guess, going out there to try to lay claims in the Arctic Ocean, or
wherever, for resources because we know they are definitely a resource-driven country. So that is just something that this committee, I guess, is going to be hearing a lot of.

But I am glad you all are here today. I have been hearing some questions, and I guess it is related to a lot of the incidents that have been taking place in Afghanistan by some of our American service members. One is the Koran burning; the other is the alleged killing of civilians by a member of the military, and other things.

And our concern is, you know, immediately, of course, in this 24/7 news cycle and the Internet and things of this nature, people are thinking that we are going to turn over American service members to the Afghan government to be tried and to possibly be punished.

Of course, personally, I hope you will validate what I am thinking, is that that is never going to happen. It is not going to happen in these cases. But could you just elaborate on that, either one?

General ALLEN. The current relationship that we have with Afghanistan permits us, at this juncture, to prosecute these cases under U.S. law, and we intend to do so.

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay. And that is based on the status of forces agreement?

General ALLEN. Correct.

Mr. PALAZZO. And so, I mean, is it a possibility that this Administration could say, well, that is great, but turn him over to the Afghan government?

General ALLEN. I am not the one to ask.

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay. I didn’t——

General ALLEN. From my perspective, I intend to work very closely with the United States Army, ultimately, to prosecute this case, and we will do it under U.S. law. And I was clear with that, in that discussion with President Karzai.

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay, Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Palazzo, just to confirm that we have no such plans to do so.

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay. But that could be an option, if so chosen, that you—there is nothing barring turning over a U.S. service member to the Afghan government to be tried?

Surely our men and women in uniform have some form of protection from corrupt government?

Dr. MILLER. As the general mentioned, there is the Status of Forces Agreement in which it is understood that we have that right, and we have given every indication that that is the way that we will proceed.

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay. You know, I am not trying to go anywhere with that. I was just curious, because I hear that, and there are some concerns, but as of now, we are not going to let that happen. That is good. We need to make sure that never happens, period. I don’t know if we have to do something legislatively to codify that.

Next question—just what is the mood of our young NCOs serving in Afghanistan in light of, you know, a decade at war?

I know some of them may be on their second or third tour, some on their first, some of them trying to get into the action before it is over. I understand how young military minds think—just an overall short opinion?
General ALLEN. I asked my sergeant major his view, and his view is that the morale is high.

These troops are focused on a mission; 10 years into this conflict, they are as professional as we have ever seen the non-commissioned officers of our armed forces, in particular the U.S. Army and the United States Marine Corps, who have, on a day-to-day basis, been in close contact with the enemy, where the benefits or where the real advantage that ultimately accrues to us in a counterinsurgency is by small unit non-commissioned officer and junior officer leadership.

And they are magnificent, frankly. And after this long in this conflict, to see the morale as high as it is, the professionalism as high as it is, and as you say, the desire to continue to serve, really speaks well for the young men and women of our United States.

Mr. PALAZZO. All right. Thank you all. My time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Allen, I have one final question. There are many detainees currently held in the U.S. detention facilities in Afghanistan whom the U.S. forces have identified as enduring security threats to the United States.

Some of these detainees are Afghans and some are third-country nationals. The recent memo of understanding regarding the transition of detention operations in Afghanistan does not provide a separate plan for Afghan detainees who pose an extraordinarily high threat.

The MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] requires the United States to transition all Afghan detainees to the custody of Afghanistan within 6 months. The MOU states that Afghanistan will consider favorably U.S. input regarding whether to release a particular detainee, but given the current posture of the Afghan government, this is not very reassuring.

I am concerned about history repeating itself here. In Iraq, we waited until the last minute to deal with this issue and that particular example is not one that we should be seeking to repeat.

In light of the new MOU, what is your plan regarding the handling of high-value detainees, both Afghans and third-country nationals, to ensure that these individuals will not pose a threat to the United States in the future?

General ALLEN. And I will defer to Dr. Miller here in a moment. But should there be a disagreement with the Afghans, should there be an intention expressed to release one of the detainees, ultimately, that they control, if we express our desire that they not, they will give it favorable consideration.

If, in fact, they continue to desire to release that detainee that question will then go to a bilateral commission which has been established within that Memorandum of Understanding. The chair on the U.S. side and the chair on the Afghan side of the bilateral commission is the Commander of ISAF and the Minister of Defense, where we will have the conversation ultimately about whether that individual should be released or not.

So I believe we will ultimately be able to resolve this to our benefit within the bilateral commission if they don’t take our initial desire to be their decision ultimately.
With respect to third-country nationals, that remains to be determined. We have not yet addressed that, Chairman, and we will do that in the future.

Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, could I add just—everything that General Allen said is exactly right. I just want to add to it, and that is that in addition to the transition effort that is under way being led by General Allen, there is an interagency task force that is focused on this question, including on third-country nationals and how to deal with high-value detainees.

And we are working very closely with the team that is in-theater and understand that these issues need to be addressed and we need to come up and have a conversation, sir, with you and your colleagues as well. It is relatively at the front end, but we know that, you know, 6 months is not that much time. So we look forward to having that conversation as this work progresses.

The Chairman. Very good. The concern we have is that detainees that have been released have returned to the fight, and we found that they, in a fairly high percentage, have gone back to killing Americans, and we really want to make sure that we monitor and avoid that.

Thank you very much for being here today. I think we have cleared up a lot of questions. I hope this is beneficial. I think it will be to the American people to understand more clearly what is happening in Afghanistan, the progress that we are making there.

Thank you very much.

And this committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 20, 2012
Statement of Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services

Hearing on
Recent Developments in Afghanistan

March 20, 2012

Good morning ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive testimony from the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Dr. James Miller, and the Commander of the International Security and Assistance Force in Afghanistan, General John Allen. Gentlemen, thank you for your distinguished service to our Nation during this critical moment in Afghanistan, and thank you for joining us today.

The last year has been a consequential time for coalition efforts in Afghanistan. During this time period, with the surge forces in place, United States and NATO forces have conducted major operations to push back the Taliban in the south of Afghanistan; launched operations from Afghanistan to kill Osama bin Laden and further disrupt Al Qaeda; train thousands of Afghan Security Forces so that they can secure their country from terrorist and insurgent groups; and return countless numbers of civilians to school and to work.

However, in the last few weeks, the impressive gains that the United States and NATO are making in Afghanistan have been called into question by some—due to the actions of a rogue few. Some Afghan soldiers have taken up arms against ISAF soldiers, which could diminish trust among forces that are supposed to be partnered. A sober assessment, however, shows that partnering is valuable and necessary, there are steps that can be taken to minimize such incidents, and that these criminal actions are relatively isolated. Moreover, the horrific incident of a U.S. Army staff sergeant who allegedly took up arms against Afghan civilians also is both isolated and a criminal act that should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. These exceptional incidents are not reflective of the hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who have honorably served in Afghanistan—nor are they reflective of the many thousands of Afghan soldiers who are being trained and are helping to secure Afghanistan today.

Additionally, I remain very concerned about the President’s decision, last summer, to speed up withdrawal of the surge troops from Afghanistan, as well as his original announcement, in his speech at West Point, for a date certain in 2014 to withdraw all U.S. combat forces. These decisions by the President have made it increasingly difficult to build up trust and confidence with the Afghan in-
stitutions that will ultimately ensure that the security and political gains by U.S. and NATO efforts are sustained into the future.

Moreover, with our eyes at the exits, I am uncertain whether we will be able to achieve the key tenets of President’s own strategy, due to the constraints that the President, himself, has put in place. For example, it has been reported in the media that the U.S. and Afghan governments are attempting to achieve a negotiated solution with the Taliban; and yet, the Taliban continue to operate with impunity out of Pakistan because they already know when we will be leaving and Pakistan has been unwilling or unable to address those safe havens. Furthermore, due to the President’s decision to begin withdrawing the surge forces early, we increase the risk to our forces to effectively address the second part of the Afghanistan campaign plan—shifting the main effort to eastern Afghanistan and applying military pressure on the Haqqani Network, who are responsible for the most dramatic and lethal attacks in Afghanistan. What’s more, in the absence of sustained, public campaign to support the mission in Afghanistan—from the White House on down—many have begun to question what we’re fighting for. With friend and foe alike knowing that the U.S. is heading for the exits, our silence is likely viewed as a preamble to retreat. And, in warfare, when the mission becomes redeployment, rather than mission success, the outcome can quickly become disorderly.

General Allen, I have total confidence in you and your command. The challenge in Afghanistan continues to be great, but I am certain that we can achieve the United States’ core, strategic objectives by resolving to provide you with the time and resources you need to be successful.

I look forward to your testimony and insights into the challenges and way forward in Afghanistan.
Statement of Hon. Adam Smith  
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services  
Hearing on  
Recent Developments in Afghanistan  
March 20, 2012

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and I would like to thank our witnesses for appearing here today. General Allen, Acting Under Secretary Miller, thank you for your efforts and long service on behalf of our Nation.

We have made significant progress in achieving our goal in Afghanistan to “disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat Al Qaeda and to prevent its return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.” The death of Osama bin Laden and the elimination of much of Al Qaeda’s senior leadership over the last few years has made America safer. On the ground in Afghanistan, our military, with our ISAF and Afghan partners, has done tremendous work, particularly over the last couple of years, to push the Taliban out of the south and southwest of Afghanistan. I congratulate our witnesses for their part in these achievements. The progress made to date has gone a long way to better position the Afghan government, and the Afghan people, for success.

We should be under no illusions, however. Being in a better position in Afghanistan is still finding yourself in a very difficult spot. Afghanistan is a poor country, with an uneducated population, plagued by groups that use violence to achieve their goals, and with a government that is often both incompetent and corrupt. Fortunately, our mission there is not to build a perfect Afghanistan, but solely to help build an Afghanistan that is capable of denying the Taliban and their Al Qaeda allies a safe place to operate.

As we consider our strategy over the next several years, it is my belief that it is time to lean forward on transitioning the responsibility for security to the Afghan National Security Forces and the Afghan government. This is happening now—after the latest tranche of provinces and districts are transitioned, over 50% of the Afghan population will reside areas where the Afghan army and police are in the lead to provide security. Similarly, all around Afghanistan, U.S. military units partnered with Afghan units are allowing the Afghan units to increasingly take the lead in planning and leading operations while the U.S. units increasingly act in support. I believe we need to look for ways to push this process to go as quickly as we can safely do so.

If there is one demonstrable historical truth, it is that foreign forces in Afghanistan are destabilizing over time. Our troops are doing tremendous work on behalf of the Afghan people, but no people would be happy with over 130,000 foreign troops carrying out combat operations in their country. Increased friction and tension are almost unavoidable, and we have seen some of the results of that with the increase in killing of coalition forces by members of the ANSF and the recent riots over the accidental burning of the Koran. Over time the presence of so many foreign troops will also
undermine the legitimacy of the Afghan government that relies on them. We have seen, and are seeing, the impact of this pressure as well—President Karzai’s recent comments attacking the United States, while unfortunate and misguided, almost certainly reflect the domestic pressure under which he finds himself as his people come to resent the presence of a foreign army. In turn, this pressure and the resulting comments reduce the reliability of President Karzai as a partner.

The solution to this dilemma, that over time our large-scale presence will have diminishing returns, is simple—we should accelerate the plans we have already made. The NATO Lisbon Conference of 2010 laid out a realistic plan for transition. Our challenge now is to look for ways to implement it as fast as we responsibly can.

Our troops and their civilian counterparts from other parts of the government have done a great job. With their Afghan and ISAF partners, they’ve largely driven the Taliban from the south and southwest of Afghanistan and allowed the opportunity for local governance to take root. Across the country, violence levels are down. U.S. and ISAF forces have built the Afghan National Security Forces from an anemic 155,000 in November of 2008 to about 330,000 now and a planned level of 352,000 this October. Al Qaeda has been driven from Afghanistan and their senior leadership has been decimated in Pakistan. This is amazing work. But after 10 years of war, and great cost to both the American and Afghan people, it is time to find additional ways to put the Afghans in charge of their own fate as quickly as we responsibly can and bring our troops home.
NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

DR. JAMES N. MILLER
ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR POLICY

BEFORE THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

MARCH 20, 2012

NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on a matter of vital importance to the United States: the present status and future course of our military engagement in Afghanistan.

I welcome the opportunity to discuss both the progress we are making and the challenges that we face. I am especially pleased to be here with the outstanding Commander of the International Security Assistance Force, and of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, General John Allen.

The United States’ objectives in Afghanistan remains to deny safe havens to al-Qaida, and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government.

This administration is firmly committed to meeting these core objectives in Afghanistan. And in the past several years – due to the dedication and sacrifice of our forces, our Coalition partners, and the Afghan people – we have made enormous strides.

- Our counter-terrorism efforts against al-Qaida have been extremely successful. Although the job is not finished, we have severely degraded al-Qaida’s capacity.
- As a result of the surge launched in 2009, we have broken and reversed Taliban momentum.
- The ANSF are increasingly capable, and increasingly in the lead. We have begun the transition to Afghan security responsibility, which is to be completed by December 2014.

The Afghanistan war has been a tough fight. And the last several weeks have been particularly tough. We have seen some in the United States, and indeed some in Afghanistan, question whether we are on the right path. We will have to work through the difficulties, and talk through the issues, as President Obama and Secretary Panetta did last week with President Karzai.

Members of the committee, our forces are performing extremely well, as I’ve seen firsthand during a week-long trip to Afghanistan that finished less than two weeks ago. U.S., Coalition, and Afghan forces are working shohna ba shohana, or “shoulder to shoulder,” reversing the Taliban’s momentum and building the capacity of the ANSF.
As a result of these shared efforts, we are well into a process of transition to ANSF leadership, as agreed at the 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit. In fact, today, approximately fifty percent of Afghans live in areas that have begun the transition process.

As an interim milestone, at some point in 2013, the ANSF will be in the lead for providing security across Afghanistan. U.S. and Coalition forces will be in a support role. This support will take a number of forms, including U.S. and Coalition units partnering with Afghan units, and the smaller footprint associated with a “train, advise, and assist” role.

By the end of 2014, the transition of security leadership will be complete, and Afghans will be fully responsible for the security of Afghanistan. U.S. and Coalition forces will have moved to a much smaller presence focused on counterterrorism, and on training, advising, and assisting Afghan forces. Of course, remaining U.S. forces will be fully combat-capable.

Despite continued progress on transition and in the overall campaign, some recent incidents have tested the relationships that we have worked so hard to build over the past decade with the government and people of Afghanistan.

The inappropriate handling of Qurans at Bagram Airbase was an error that – while unintentional – sent precisely the wrong signal. This unfortunate act stands in stark contrast to the many years during which U.S. forces have demonstrated deep respect for the religious practices of the Afghan people.

Even more recently, our nations have had to respond to the horrific killings of sixteen Afghan civilians, including nine children, in Panjwai District, Kandahar. The Department of Defense is conducting a full investigation of this senseless act of violence. A suspect is now in custody at the Joint Regional Confinement Facility – Midwest at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Justice will be done, and any responsible will be held appropriately accountable.

We have also been challenged by attacks by Afghan personnel against their U.S. and Coalition partners, so-called “Green on Blue” attacks. These include the shooting of two American
officers at the Interior Ministry in Kabul on February 25, allegedly by an Afghan police officer. With the help of U.S. and Coalition forces, the Afghans are working to improve security and counter-intelligence in order to prevent such attacks. General Allen has also directed a number of steps to improve force protection.

Working shoulder-to-shoulder with our Afghan partners is essential to our mission success. What’s more, our experience to date also suggests that sustaining close relationships with the ANSF may reduce the likelihood of these horrible and unacceptable “Green on Blue” attacks.

It is critical that the tragic occurrences of the last few weeks not blind us to the very significant progress and real momentum we have seen in Afghanistan. From 2010 to 2011, enemy-initiated attacks were down nine percent across Afghanistan. This trend has continued in 2012. For January and February of this year, enemy-initiated attacks are down 22 percent from the comparable period in 2011.

Our surge forces, in Regional Command South and Regional Command Southwest, have made tremendous progress. Previous battlegrounds, such as Sangin and Marjah, are now policed by Afghans. By the end of this September, the final U.S. “surge” forces will return home, and U.S. forces will be reduced from a peak of 101,000, to 68,000.

While the surge of U.S. forces has played a major role in improving the security situation, improvements to the quantity and quality of the Afghan National Security Forces have been critically important.

Building an effective ANSF is crucial to success in Afghanistan, and we are making good progress. To get a sense of how far we have come in the last several years, in October 2008, there were only 140,000 Afghans in the ANSF. Today, there are approximately 330,000 — nearly two-and-a-half times as many. We are nearing our October 2012 goal of 352,000 Afghan soldiers and national police in uniform — and we expect to reach that goal well before October.
The quality of the ANSF is vitally important. And while there is much more work ahead, we are
seeing some good signs. For example, Afghan National Army (ANA) attrition rates have
improved from over three percent per month to less than two percent, although they are still short
of the goal of no more than 1.4 percent per month. The Afghan National Police (ANP) has done
better than its target attrition rate of no more than 1.4 percent for the last several months.

We are seeing the results of this improvement where it counts most – on the ground. Afghan
forces continue to take charge and lead operations to secure their country. Almost 90 percent of
Coalition operations in Afghanistan are now carried out in partnership with the ANSF. And the
ANSF is the lead for more than 40 percent of operations. These figures will continue to grow.

Afghan troops gave their lives protecting Americans on numerous occasions during the recent
protests. The performance of the Afghan forces under this enormous stress is a clear indicator of
how far the ANSF have come.

As we transition to Afghan lead on security, we are also working to conclude a Strategic
Partnership that will provide a long-term framework for the enduring relationship we hope to
achieve beyond the completion of transition at the end of 2014. Concluding a U.S.-Afghanistan
Strategic Partnership will send a clear signal to the Afghan people, to the Taliban, and to the
region that the United States remains committed to Afghan security and to regional peace and
stability. As President Obama said here at the Capitol in his State of the Union address in
January, “[W]e will build an enduring partnership with Afghanistan, so that it is never again a
source of attacks against America.”

This Strategic Partnership will reinforce the sovereignty of Afghanistan and address our shared
national security concerns. Completing and implementing this Strategic Partnership will avoid
the mistake of 1989, when our abrupt departure left our friends confused and our enemies
emboldened.

In partnership with President Karzai and the Afghan government, we recently completed a
crucial milestone in our transition to Afghan lead, when General Allen co-signed a memorandum
of understanding on detention operations with Afghan Defense Minister Wardak. Under this memorandum of understanding, both countries will work to transfer detention facilities in Afghanistan to Afghan control over the next six months, under guidelines designed to ensure an orderly and secure handoff of responsibility.

We are also working with the Afghans on a memorandum of understanding on “special operations,” which when completed will further reinforce Afghan sovereignty and strengthen the partnership between our two nations.

The importance of a long-term commitment extends to Coalition partners. At the NATO Summit in Lisbon in 2010, the United States, our allies and partners, and Afghanistan agreed to support an Afghan-led transition process. At the upcoming NATO summit in Chicago, we will discuss the next phase of transition, including shifting from primarily a combat to a support role in 2013, in advance of Afghans taking full responsibility for their own security in 2014.

As a part of NATO Summit transition discussions in Chicago, leaders will also discuss how we can support sustainable and sufficient Afghan National Security Forces for Afghanistan’s future, and how we can further strengthen the NATO-Afghanistan partnership beyond 2014. As NATO Secretary General Rasmussen put it in December 2011, “[O]ur commitment does not end with transition... We will finish the job to help create a secure Afghanistan – for our shared security.”

Achieving long-term stability in Afghanistan will require some form of reconciliation among Afghans. This is why the administration – with eyes wide open – supports responsible efforts toward a political settlement to the Afghan conflict. I would like to thank Ambassador Grossman for all of his hard work to help open the door, so that Afghans can talk to Afghans about the future of their country. As Secretary Clinton has said, the necessary outcomes of any negotiation are that insurgents must: (1) renounce violence; (2) break all ties with al-Qaida; and (3) abide by the constitution of Afghanistan, especially the guarantees for the rights of women and minorities.
Achievable, sustainable success in Afghanistan will depend on the participation and support of Afghanistan’s neighbors, especially Pakistan. Like Afghanistan’s other neighbors, Pakistan has legitimate interests that should be understood and addressed. But Pakistan also has responsibilities, including respecting Afghan sovereignty and working with the Afghan government to foster regional stability. Most importantly, Pakistan needs to take decisive steps to ensure that militant and extremist groups cannot continue to find safe haven in, or conduct attacks from, Pakistan’s territory.

Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify here today with General Allen. This has been a long and difficult war. We embarked on this fight a decade ago to ensure that the terrorist networks that struck in New York; in Washington, DC; and in the skies over Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001 would never again be able to use Afghanistan as their sanctuary and training ground.

Thanks to the great courage and skill of the U.S. Armed Forces and civilian personnel, our Coalition partners, and our Afghan partners, our strategy is working. While success in war is never guaranteed, we are on a path to meet our objectives to deny safe haven to al-Qaida, and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government.

We are moving intelligently and purposefully toward the day, in the near future, when Afghans once again are in full control of their own security, and able to define their own national destiny as a peaceful, stable member of the community of nations.

I would like to conclude by thanking the Committee for your strong continued support of our effort in Afghanistan, and of the great men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

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Dr. James N. Miller was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on April 3, 2009. He serves as the principal staff assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and provides advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense on all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.

Prior to his confirmation, Dr. Miller served as Senior Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security. Previous positions include serving as Senior Vice President (2003-2007) and Vice President (2000-2003) at Hicks and Associates, Inc.; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Requirements, Plans, and Counterproliferation Policy (1997-2000); assistant professor at Duke University (1992-1997); and senior professional staff member for the House Armed Services Committee (1988-1992).

A member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Dr. Miller has served as an advisor to the Combating WMD Panel of DoD’s Threat Reduction Advisory Committee and the Defense Science Board, as senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and as senior associate member at St. Antony’s College, Oxford. In 2000 he received the Department of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service.

Dr. Miller received a B.A. degree with honors in economics from Stanford University, and Master’s and Ph.D. degrees in public policy from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.
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STATEMENT OF
GENERAL JOHN ALLEN
COMMANDER
US FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON
DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN
20 MAR 2012

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss our operations in Afghanistan.

Let me begin by expressing my gratitude to all of you for the support you provide our men and women in uniform. That they are well-equipped, well-trained, and well-led is a great testament to the efforts of this Committee and to the work of this Congress. On behalf of those troops and their families, I thank you for that.

In the past eight months, I have walked the ground of Afghanistan with many of those troops. Along with my friend and partner, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and my NATO compatriot, Senior Civilian Representative Ambassador Sir Simon Gass, I have met with leaders of most of the 49 other nations serving alongside us. And all through this, I have been in close consultation with Afghan civilian and military leadership, most of whom have been enmeshed in their country’s conflict for over three decades.

From all of this, I can tell you, unequivocally, three things: First, we remain on track to ensure that Afghanistan will no longer be a safe haven for Al Qaeda and will no longer be terrorized by the Taliban. Second, as a Coalition - the largest in recent history - we are well along in our progress to meet our 2010 Lisbon commitments, to Transition security lead to the Afghan National Security Forces by December 2014. Third, our troops know the difference they are making and the enemy feels it every day.

To be sure, the last couple months have been trying. In the wake of the revelations that American troops had mishandled religious texts, to include the Quran, protests - some of them violent - occurred in several, but only a few, regions across Afghanistan. Thirty-two Afghans lost their lives in those riots; even more were hurt. Just since the first of January, the Coalition has lost sixty brave troops in action, from six different nations. Thirteen of them were killed at
the hands of what appear to have been Afghan security forces, some of whom who were motivated, we believe, in part by the mishandling of religious materials. Just as tragic, we are now investigating what appears to be the murder of sixteen innocent Afghan civilians at the hands of a US service member. Each of these events is heart wrenching, and my thoughts and prayers go out to all those affected by the violence - Coalition and Afghan alike.

But I assure you, the relationship between the Coalition and the Afghan security forces remains strong. Just two weeks ago, I was down in Helmand Province, visiting with Marines and with local Afghan commanders – in the wake of the Quran burning incident when violence was at its peak. A young Marine near Marjah said he and his unit were told about the demonstrations by their Afghan counterparts. The Afghan troops told them, “Let us patrol outside the wire for a couple days. We’ve got this for you.” Understanding the gravity of the risk the Afghans had assumed for them, the Marine continued, “Our Afghan brothers were trying to protect us.” This one statement, spoken by a young Marine, conveys the power of this brotherhood-in-arms forged in battle. It speaks to the trust we have built with the Afghans and to the shock absorbency in this relationship.

We know there is much hard and deadly work to do. But the progress is real, and, importantly, it’s sustainable. We have severely degraded the insurgency. As one Afghan commander told me in the South in the latter part of 2011, “This time around, the Taliban was the away team.” On top of that success, as a result of our recent winter operations, we have seriously degraded the Taliban’s ability to mount a major spring offensive of their own. This spring, they will come back to find many of their caches empty, their former strongholds untenable, and a good many of their foot soldiers absent or unwilling to join the fight.

In Kandahar, back in December, fifty former Talibs decided to formally reintegrate back into Afghan society. When asked why they lay down their arms, they complained of the
unrelenting pressure they were under. They said they found themselves up against capable Afghan forces in greater numbers and with greater frequency. And while they were willing to fight foreigners, they were unwilling to fight their Afghan brothers - especially Afghans who fought back with courage and skill, because of the training we had provided to them. And the training we provide to them is a critical part of our mission.

Throughout history, insurgencies have seldom been defeated by foreign forces. Instead, they have been ultimately beaten by indigenous forces. In the long run, our goals can only be achieved and then secured by Afghan forces. Transition, then, is the linchpin of our strategy, not merely the “way out.”

During the last twelve months, the Afghan security forces have expanded from 276,000 to 330,000. They will reach their full surge strength ahead of scheduled deadline in October. The expansion and professionalization of Afghan security forces allow us to recover the remaining 23,000 US surge troops by this fall, enable us to continue to pressure the Taliban to reconcile, and make possible security Transition to the Afghans in accordance with our Lisbon commitments and on time.

Security conditions remain very good in areas that have transitioned thus far from Kabul in the east to Herat in the west; from Mazar-e Sharif in the north to Lashkar Gah in the south; and later this year, Afghan security forces are expected to assume the security lead for two-thirds, or possibly more, of the Afghan people. As the potential unifying influence in Afghanistan, the Afghan forces are better than we thought, and they’re better than they thought they would be. As they move to the fore, they are gaining more and more confidence, and they are gaining more and more capability. In the past five months, 89 percent of the total conventional operations were partnered with both Coalition and Afghan forces, and 42 percent
were Afghan-led. Over the next two years, Coalition forces will remain combat-ready, but increasingly focused on Security Force Assistance missions.

Afghan leadership simply is key. I can tell you the Afghans want this responsibility. In fact, for the very first time, our joint Coalition-Afghan operational campaign plan for January 2012 through June 2013 was conceived, developed, and planned with Afghans in the lead. They are truly emerging as the real defeat mechanism of this insurgency and increasingly as an emblem of national unity and this is essential for the long term security of Afghanistan.

None of us harbor illusions. We know that we face long-term challenges as well. We know that Al Qaeda and other extremist networks - the very same networks that kill Afghan and Coalition troops every day - still operate with impunity across the border in Pakistan. We know the Taliban remain a resilient and determined enemy, and that many of them will try to regain their lost ground this spring, through assassination, intimidation, high-profile attacks, and the emplacement of IEDs. We know that Iran continues to support the insurgency and fuels the flames of violence. We know that corruption still robs Afghan citizens of their faith in their government and that poor governance itself often advances insurgent messages.

This campaign has been long. It has been difficult, and it has been costly. There have been setbacks, to be sure, we’re experiencing them now, and there will be more setbacks ahead.

I wish I could tell you that this war was simple, and that progress could be easily measured. But that’s not the way of counterinsurgencies. They are fraught with success and setbacks, which can exist in the same space and time, but each must be seen in the larger context of the overall campaign. And I believe that the campaign is on track. We are making a difference. I know this, and our troops know this.

I’d like to take just another moment of your time today, Mr. Chairman, to end where I began this morning, with our troops, the thousands of Americans and Coalition partners that are
bearing the weight of this conflict, and those that will never return to their families. Know this, they weigh on my every decision and my every word to this Committee.

One of them, a young Marine, was laid to rest last Tuesday in Arlington Cemetery. He was a hero, he knew what he stood for, and he knew his mission. And he knew the risks. He knew he might have to give his life for this cause for which we fight – so Sergeant William Stacey prepared a letter for his family – to be read in the event of his death. In it, he said:

...there will be a child who will live because men left the security they enjoyed in their home country to come to his. And this child will learn in the new schools that have been built. He will walk his streets not worried about whether or not his leader's henchmen are going to come and kidnap him. He will grow into a fine man who will pursue every opportunity his heart could desire. He will have the gift of freedom, which I have enjoyed for so long. If my life buys the safety of a child who will one day change this world, then I know that it was all worth it....

Mr. Chairman, I can only add that I am confident that Americans are safer because of servicemembers like Sgt Stacey, and I am confident that we will prevail in this endeavor. Thank you, again, for this opportunity today ... and for the extraordinary support you and the Committee provide every day to the young men and women I am so privileged to lead.
General John R. Allen
Commander, International Security Assistance Force - Afghanistan; and Commander, United States Forces - Afghanistan


Following commissioning, he attended The Basic School and was assigned to Second Battalion, 8th Marines where he served as a platoon and rifle company commander. His next tour took him to Marine Barracks 8th and I, Washington D.C. where he served at the Marine Corps Institute and as a ceremonial officer. General Allen then attended, and was the Distinguished Graduate of the Postgraduate Intelligence Program of the Defense Intelligence College. He would serve subsequently as the Marine Corps Fellow to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He was the first Marine Corps officer inducted as a Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Returning to the Fleet Marine Force in 1985, he commanded rifle and weapons companies and served as the Operations Officer of Third Battalion, 4th Marines. During this period he received the Leftwich Leadership Trophy. In 1988, General Allen reported to the Naval Academy where he taught in the Political Science Department and also served as the Jump Officer and Jump Master of the Academy. In 1990, he received the William P. Clements Award as military instructor of the year.

General Allen reported to The Basic School as the Director of the Infantry Officer Course from 1990-1992 and was subsequently selected as a Commandant of the Marine Corps Fellow, serving as a special assistant on the staffs of the 30th Commandant and the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command. In 1994, he served as Division G-3 Operations Officer for the Second Marine Division and subsequently assumed command of Second Battalion, 4th Marines; re-designated as Second Battalion, 6th Marines. This unit served with JTF 160 in Operation SEA SIGNAL during Caribbean contingency operations in 1994, and as part of the Landing Force of the 6th Fleet in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR during Balkans contingency operations in 1995-1996.

Following battalion command, General Allen reported as the Senior Aide de Camp to the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, ultimately serving as his Military Secretary. He commanded The Basic School from 1999 to 2001, when he was selected in April 2001 to return to the Naval Academy as the Deputy Commandant. General Allen became the 76th Commandant of Midshipmen in January 2002, the first Marine Corps officer to serve in this position at the Naval Academy.

General Allen’s first tour as a General Officer was as the Principal Director, Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a position he occupied for nearly three years. From 2006-2008, General Allen served as Deputy Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and Commanding General, 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, deploying to Iraq for OIF 06-08, serving as the Deputy Commanding General of Multinational Force - West (MNF-W) and II MEF (Forward) in the Al Anbar Province. General Allen's most recent tour as a General Officer was as the Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command, a position he held from July 2008 - June 2011.

General Allen graduated with military honors from the Naval Academy with the Class of 1976, receiving a Bachelor of Science degree in Operations Analysis. He is a 1998 Distinguished Graduate of the National War College. He holds a Master of Arts degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University, a Master of Science degree in
Strategic Intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College, and a Master of Science degree in National Security Strategy from the National War College. Personal decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Medal, and the Legion of Merit with three Gold Stars in lieu of four awards.

Foreign awards include the Mongolian Meritorious Service Medal, First Class; the Gold Medal of the Polish Armed Forces; and the Taiwan Order of the Resplendent Banner with Special Cravat.
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 20, 2012
ISAF Monthly Data
Trends through January 2012

Published on 21 February 2012.
NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC
**Enemy-Initiated Attacks (EIA)**

**Nationwide Monthly Attacks**

**ISAF Observations**
- ANSF / ISAF and SOF operations continue to interdict enemy capability in main effort areas.
- Enemy-initiated attacks continue to decline in accordance with annual seasonal patterns.
- Nationwide enemy-initiated attacks for January 2012 are 27 percent lower than January 2011.

**Definition:** Enemy-initiated attacks comprise enemy action (enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire) and explosive hazard events, to include executed attacks only (improvised explosive device (IED) explosions / mine strikes).

**Data Source:** Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) Database, as of 16 Feb 2012.
**Enemy-Initiated Attacks**

Nationwide Monthly Year-Over-Year Change

**ISAF Observations**
- In contrast to the large year-over-year increases before 2011, enemy-initiated attacks over the last 3 months are 19 percent lower compared to the same period last year.
- Each month since May 2011 had fewer enemy-initiated attacks than the corresponding month in 2010.
- This is the longest sustained downward trend in enemy-initiated attacks recorded by ISAF.

**Definition:** This chart shows the year-over-year change in enemy-initiated attacks (EIA). The total number of EIAs is shown in the background (light blue). The red bars represent an increase of monthly enemy-initiated attacks compared to the same month the year before; blue bars represent a decrease. The changes over three month periods are depicted at the top of the chart.

**Data Source:** Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) Database, as of 16 Feb 2012.
**Enemy-Initiated Attacks (EIA)**

Monthly Year-Over-Year Change by RC (Jan 08 – Jan 12)

**ISAF Observations**

- In RC Southwest, EIA in the last 12 months are 54 percent lower compared to the same 12 months one year earlier.
- RC North has seen a decrease in EIA for eight consecutive months compared to the same months one year earlier.
- In RC South, EIA increased by 13 percent in Jan 2012 compared to Jan 2011.
- RC East, the most populated region in Afghanistan, has seen a 34 percent decrease in EIA in Jan 2012 compared to Jan 2011. This is attributed to extreme winter weather conditions.
- RC Capital, which has fully entered the transition process, remains one of the most secure areas in Afghanistan.
- ISAF/ANSF will continue to take the initiative by conducting operations against the enemy this winter.

These comparative charts are plotted using the same scale to show the varying levels of enemy-initiated attacks between ISAF Regional Commands (RCs).

**Data Source:** Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) Database, as of 16 Feb 2012.
**Definition:** Executed Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks comprise explosive hazard events, to include IED explosions and mine strikes.

**Data Source:** Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) Database, as of 16 Feb 2012.

**ISAF Observations**
- IED and mine explosions for Jan 2012 are 30 percent lower when compared to Jan 2011.
- Insurgents continue to rely on IEDs as the principal means to execute their campaign.
- Over 60 percent of civilian casualties caused by insurgents result from indiscriminate IED explosions.
- More than half of IEDs and mines were found and cleared rather than exploded.
Monthly Civilian Casualties
With Assigned Culpability

**ISAF Observations**
- Insurgents caused over 90 percent of civilian casualties (deaths and wounded) in Jan 2012.
- The number of ISAF-caused civilian casualties decreased by 85 percent from Jan 2011 to Jan 2012.
- ISAF continues to work with the ANSF to make every effort to protect the Afghan population and ensure that the number of civilian casualties is kept to an absolute minimum.

**Definition:** The figures reported in this chart reflect incidents of conflict-related civilian casualties (deaths and wounded) that have been confirmed through investigation to have been caused by either ISAF or insurgents. The data reported here is consistent with ISAF policy, which directs that all credible allegations of civilian casualties be reviewed.

**Data Source:** ISAF Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) Repository, as of 17 Feb 2012.
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

March 20, 2012
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS

General ALLEN. Ensuring the morale of US service members remains my utmost concern. While setbacks such as the Quran burning or the killing of seventeen Afghan civilians allegedly by US service members are shocks to our sense of morality, the individual Soldier, Sailor, Airman, and Marine knows that such isolated actions are an anomaly and are in no way representative of the great work being accomplished every day in Afghanistan. Despite such setbacks, United States service members serving in Afghanistan have a sense of mission accomplishment and understand the long-term benefits of their endeavors to the future of Afghanistan and to the security of the United States.

There is a concerted effort to minister to the physical, behavioral, mental, emotional, and spiritual needs of service members as they redeploy from the CJOA–A to home stations. The USFOR–A Surgeon’s Office employs two tools in particular to aid in redeployment: 1) Down Range Assessment Tool (D–RAT) and 2) the Post Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA). The D–RAT is designed to assist leaders in supporting service members. Service members who show increased risk factors will receive additional consideration during Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP) visits. Information from the D–RAT is provided to medical staff working directly with SMs during the SRP. If a SM has been identified as having elevated risk, it prompts plane-side or other immediate behavioral health support. The PDHA is a health survey similar to the pre-deployment health assessment, but it also focuses on specific deployment related health concerns. The PDHA may be conducted in the last 30 days of deployment but must be completed NLT 30 days post deployment. The SM’s deployment history and a complete electronic medical record are used in an overall, individual assessment. If concerns are raised, there is a mandatory meeting with a behavior health provider.

In addition, the USFOR–A Chaplain’s Office tasks Religious Support Teams (RSTs) throughout the CJOA–A, to provide a Suicide Awareness Refresher briefing and a Redeployment, Reunion, and Reintegration briefing with all redeploying service members. Finally, each of the Services has developed programs enabling service members to transition during the redeployment phase to the culture of their respective branch and life at home station. [See page 19.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER AND MR. CRITZ

General ALLEN. Depending on which estimate one cites, Afghanistan’s poppy cultivation peaked in 2007 with 193,000 hectares (UNODC) or 2004 with 206,700 hectares (US Government). In 2011, 131,000 hectares (UNODC) or 115,000 hectares (US) of poppy were cultivated in Afghanistan. It is too early to estimate how much poppy has been cultivated in 2012.

Farmers’ planting decisions in the absence of poppy cultivation vary widely based on location and socioeconomic group. For instance, in Helmand Province, where there have been dramatic reductions in poppy cultivation since the establishment of the Helmand Food Zone (HFZ) in 2008, transitioning to sustainable alternatives has seen mixed success. Income diversity largely remains restricted to areas around major urban centers where there are markets for licit crops and opportunities for nonfarm income. Cultivation of poppy has reportedly increased outside of the HFZ, enabled by high opium prices and the lack of sharecropping opportunities inside the HFZ where less labor intensive crops are being grown.

ISAF supports the development of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), the CN component of the ANP, overseen by the internationally funded CNPA Development Unit. The CNPA Tactical Operations Center supports this development through training, as well as developing a capacity to plan and support CNPA-directed interdiction missions integrated with CNPA special units. These highly-trained CN units, including the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), Technical Investigative Unit (TIU), and Air Interdiction Unit (AIU) all fall under the CNPA. The NIU is a 470-person DEA-mentored tactical element capable of conducting interdiction operations in a high-threat environment, supporting CN operations with a full range of capabilities. Though partnering
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with ISAF remains strong, the NIU has demonstrated an ability to operate independently. A self-driven, 77-person unit with superior investigative skills, the SIU carries out complex CN investigations using intelligence developed by the TIU, a unit comprised of 9 vetted officers and 200 contract linguists, which performs court-authorized judicial wire intercepts. Members of the SIU also serve as part of a Financial Investigative Team at the Afghan Threat Finance Cell. Finally, the AIU plays a strategic role by enabling elite Afghan CN law enforcement personnel and their DEA partners to conduct missions in dangerous areas and remote terrain. Operational coordination among the various specialized units has continued to improve, as reflected in a number of joint operations.

Counternarcotics and other specialized training, as provided by the Counter-narcotics Training Academy (CNTA) is a key element of these capacity building efforts. The CNTA, run by NTM–A, provides basic training to all CNPA officers, designed to provide fundamental instruction to effectively investigate and prosecute narcotics crimes. The CNTA continues to develop a train the trainer program to build the capacity of an independent Afghan training center. The initiative is considered critical for Afghanistan’s long-term capability to address narcotics trafficking and organized crime. In addition, UNODC-created Mobile Training Teams provide basic intelligence training to provincial CNPA and are supplemented by a DEA-established Regional Training Team that provides instruction for the specialized units. [See page 38.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY

Dr. MILLER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] [See page 38.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS

Dr. MILLER. The U.S. Government has been clear regarding the importance of women’s rights in Afghanistan. President Karzai reaffirmed his personal commitment to ensuring that women enjoy the protections enshrined in Afghanistan’s Constitution.

Many Afghan women are worried that a negotiated settlement that includes a Taliban role in Afghan government might jeopardize their rights. As we’ve said before in Kabul, London, Bonn, New York, and Washington: the United States will insist that this not happen.

The U.S. goal for Afghan reconciliation is for the Afghan Government and Taliban to talk about the future of their country. Negotiations must include women, as well as ethnic minorities and members of civil society. Insurgents who want to reconcile must abide by Afghanistan’s Constitution and the rights enshrined in it, including women’s rights. [See page 33.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CRITZ

General ALLEN. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) is well-poised to conduct the upcoming 2014 elections, which will mark the transfer of political authority from the present administration to the next. It will be a key time of transition in the country. To be sure, corruption remains a problem in GIRoA and various factions will jockey for power and influence. However, despite challenges to its authority, this present government has held together. President Karzai has said publicly and privately that he will adhere to the constitutional term limit and that he will not seek a third term. While this Afghan Government is young and has experienced expected growing pains, there is no tangible indication at this time that the election will precipitate political fracture or violence.

The expanding and increasingly effective Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will be the most important guarantors of a peaceful and productive transfer of political authority throughout the 2014 election process. Those forces will be in charge of security on Election Day with the International Election Commission, United Nations Development Program, and ISAF standing in support. The Afghan National Police (ANP) will serve as the inner cordon in highly populated areas, and the Afghan National Army (ANA) will guard the outer rings of those population centers to guard against external threats and interference.

The ANSF has proven to be an increasingly effective and battle-tested force. They proved able to provide security for the Loya Jirga that took place in Kabul last November, which was an enormously important and logistically challenging event. In
addition, in the wake of the unfortunate incident regarding the mishandling of religious materials this February, and the violent protests that followed, the ANSF exhibited measured restraint, sound judgment, professionalism, and great courage in protecting the right to free speech of their fellow Afghans, their own security; and, they protected us as well. [See page 40.]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 20, 2012
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES

Mr. Reyes. Currently, almost $2 billion in aid to Pakistan is on “hold.” What would the Pakistanis have to do to start this aid flowing again? Do you consider it likely that they would do this?

Dr. Miller. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. Reyes. One of the things Congress is looking at is the future of aid and assistance programs to the Pakistani military. What are your views on the necessity to continue providing aid to the Pakistani military? Should we continue funding this, and if so, what constraints should we place on the aid?

General Allen. Pakistan and Afghanistan share a 1,510 mile border and extensive cultural and blood ties through the Pashtuns that live in both countries. As the Commander of ISAF and US Forces Afghanistan, we have sought a mutually cooperative relationship with the Pakistani military—important for cross border coordination and to the counterinsurgency that occurs on both sides of the border. Pakistan has also suffered approximately 32,000 civilian and military casualties in its own COIN campaign. Coordination and cooperation amongst the Afghan National Security Forces, Coalition forces, and Pakistani military is critical to the successful neutralization of the insurgency on both sides of the border and creates habits of cross border coordination between Afghanistan and Pakistan that must be sustained long after the departure of ISAF.

Mr. Reyes. Currently, almost $2 billion in aid to Pakistan is on “hold.” What would the Pakistanis have to do to start this aid flowing again? Do you consider it likely that they would do this?

General Allen. The US remains committed to a strong and mutually respectful relationship with Pakistan. I support that policy. Decisions on delivering civilian and security assistance to Pakistan in support of that relationship are the province of the State Department and the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense and are outside of my mandate as COMUSFOR-A.

Mr. Reyes. We have been at war for ten years. Is there mission fatigue in NATO and what steps are we taking to ensure coalition support through 2014?

General Allen. NATO is the preeminent security alliance in the world today. With NATO’s support we have formed the largest and most capable warfighting Coalition in modern history, which includes all 28 NATO members as well as 22 other nations. At Bonn, Coalition members, acting in concert with the rest of the International Community, called for a “Transformational Decade” to continue the task of building a prosperous Afghan economy. I regularly meet with Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Defense, Chiefs of Defense, Ambassadors, Senior National Representatives, and NATO consultative bodies. In each meeting, we discuss the contributions each country can make within the limits of their own resources and political environment. That ISAF represents a 50 nation Coalition demonstrates that it is not just the US that has a vital stake in ensuring that Al-Qaeda, and its allies and affiliates, are unable to spread their web of terror around the globe. The solidarity of the Coalition is an important factor in our success thus far.

At Chicago, NATO and Coalition leaders will discuss how we can support a sustainable and sufficient ANSF and how we can strengthen the NATO–Afghanistan Enduring Partnership. Some Coalition members have raised their troop contributions, while others are reinvesting their combat formations into trainers and advisors. Furthermore, the UK, France, and Italy have signed strategic partnership agreements indicating their commitment to Afghanistan beyond 2014.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. Langevin. Mr. Miller, given the evolving security environment and landscape in the region, do you believe we should engage in a long-term partnership policy, and what should our military presence in the region look like in 2014 and beyond?

Dr. Miller. The United States has recently finalized a long-term strategic partnership agreement with the Government of Afghanistan. This important agreement will be a framework for a post-2014 U.S. military presence that will include per-
sonnel involved in training/advising/assisting the Afghan National Security Forces, as well as Special Operations forces continuing counterterrorism cooperation in Afghanistan. We will encourage our coalition partners to provide similar long-term support to help set conditions for successful transition to Afghan security lead by the end of 2014, with a much smaller U.S. and coalition presence.

Mr. Langevin. General Allen, IEDs continue to be the Taliban weapon of choice in the theater; how is the U.S. military addressing this threat?

General Allen. The U.S. Military, as well as our Coalition and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) partners, follow a Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C–IED) strategy based upon three lines of operation that are support by intelligence and understanding. The U.S. defines these lines of operations as: Train the Force (TtF), Defeat the Device (DtD); and Attack the Network (AtN).

First, we are training the force and we continue to develop the force structure to address IEDs, both of which are Service responsibilities. We all work together to capture and distribute lessons learned and best practices. The result of this cooperative effort between the Services, CENTCOM, and the Theater is that our troops arrive in theater well-trained on how to counter the latest enemy tactics and techniques. Second, we defeat the device, which is primarily defensive in nature and focuses on how to stop the insurgent achieving his aim with an IED. It consists of several Force Protection measures, which includes appropriate techniques, tactics, and procedures, as well as counter measures such as vehicle design and armor. The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle is a good example of this. This also includes the detection of IEDs once they are emplaced ranging from human eyesight on the ground to airborne ISR assets. Finally, we are attacking the network by identifying vulnerabilities within the insurgent network. JIEDDO provides operations and intelligence integration support.

Equally important are the ANSF and their increasing capability to defeat IEDs. We are supporting the development of Route Clearance and Explosive Ordnance Disposal capabilities for the ANSF. Efforts are also underway to develop Afghan Biometrics, Forensics, and Exploitation capability in support of the rule of law, so those who provide IEDs can be criminally prosecuted. Afghan SOF are increasingly attacking the network. We are educating the ANSF and ALP to detect the device, and over time, defeat and dispose of the device and training and improvement of capabilities continues. We are also working with GIRoA on the development of an Afghan C–IED Strategy.

Mr. Langevin. In your opinion, is enough being done to protect our forces from the threat of IEDs?

General Allen. The Department of Defense (DOD), through the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) and complementary Service programs, is doing a great job getting the best C–IED equipment and training to our forces. Despite a high number of IED attacks, these efforts have contributed to a low rate of effective enemy attacks. The combination of training, equipment, and intelligence based operations are enabling our troops to find a greater number of IEDs prior to detonation or surviving after a detonation. Additionally, the DOD is investing Research and Development dollars to find ways to pre-detonate, detect, and neutralize IEDs before detonation or to mitigate the effects following detonation. We are defeating the device with high rates of detection and clearance. We're better protecting dismounted and mounted troops with foot mobile Counter Remote Control IED Electronic Warfare devices and with protective undergarments, and improved the armor on MRAPs, and MATVs. We will continue to do all we can to fight this threat as 66% of US casualties in 2011 were caused by IEDs.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Mr. Turner. Over the past several years I focused my attention on the Afghan Narcotics trade as a major source of funding for insurgents. In 2010 UNODC (The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime) published a study showing that opium production rapidly increased from 2006 to 2010. In a recent correspondence you told me that “[t]he narcotics trade and its linkage to the insurgency contribute to regional insecurity, corruption, volatility in the rule of law, and stagnation of economic development.” I compliment you on your leadership on these efforts as they appear to have experienced success. UNODC’s (The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime) April 2011 winter poppy assessment demonstrated a decrease in 2011 opium production. While I find these trends somewhat reassuring, I am concerned that the premature drawdown of U.S. and ISAF forces in Afghanistan will reverse this trend and allow the insurgents to regain this lucrative source of funding. In fact, just 2 weeks ago, General Mattis stated that “we will create an Afghan national army, Af-
ghan national police that has this capacity if we continue on the track we are on right now." Now, General Allen, are we still pushing these programs to the degree that you indicated in your response that we received in September or are we still seeing the same positive results? Do you anticipate that these positive results will continue as we draw down our forces? Does the Afghan army have the capacity to address these counternarcotic efforts?

And if this Administration ignores the advice of its combat commanders and decides to accelerate the withdrawal of forces, what do you anticipate happening to the counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan in the future? Will we continue to see this lower level of poppy production?

Given the critical role that narcotics play in funding the insurgency, wouldn’t you agree that this is an important matter for discussion in this year’s NATO Summit in Chicago?

General Allen. ISAF continues to support CN efforts to target and disrupt the narcotics cycle, as well as those individuals directly associated with it. For instance, in 2011, ISAF and Afghan partners seized 15,685 kg of morphine, representing a 22 percent increase over the same period last year. Wet precursor chemical seizures were up 778 percent, dry precursor chemical seizures were up 1,000 percent, and marijuana seizures were up 1,400 percent.

ISAF is working closely with GIRoA to enhance Afghan CN capacity and institutions to enable transition of effort by 2014. ISAF supports GIRoA in implementing its National Drugs Control Strategy (NDCS), focused on GIRoA’s four national CN priorities: targeting traffickers and their backers, strengthening and diversifying legal rural livelihoods, reducing the demand for illicit drugs while improving the treatment of drug users, and developing state CN institutions at the central, provincial, and district levels. ISAF also continues to support and mentor a number of Afghan units so that they can serve as the lead components in CN operations. For example, the CN Police of Afghanistan (CNP–A) are mentored by the US DEA and UK Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) and the General Directorate of Police Special Units is supported and mentored by ISAF SOF. These combined efforts, in conjunction with security provided by an increasingly capable and effective ANSF, will help maintain the positive trajectory of countering the illicit narcotics trade in the country.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS

Ms. Tsongas. I remain concerned by the repeated incidents of Afghan soldiers turning their guns on coalition forces. Since 2005, more than 50 ISAF troops had been killed and 48 wounded by Afghan troops.

According to USA Today, in a January 17 article (“ISAF limits details of troops killed by Afghans”), ISAF no longer responds directly to requests for details on cases where Afghan troops turn their weapons on NATO troops. The article quoted a Navy Lieutenant Commander Badura, who said this change in policy was implemented in the latter half of 2011, and that the practice now is for each coalition partner to formulate its own policies on releasing this information.

However, General Mattis took issue with this assessment the other week when he testified before our Committee, and the Committee staff has received conflicting reports on what the current policy is.

Can you please clarify for the record what the current ISAF policy is, and the rationale for that policy? How does this policy reflect our concerns regarding our Afghan partners?

General Allen. Gen. Mattis’ testimony is accurate. The current ISAF policy is to release information on green-on-blue incidents to the public. It is also our policy to withhold the release of information, as it pertains to the service members involved, until host nation notification has been accomplished and next-of-kin notification completed. The release of information surrounding green-on-blue incidents will be accomplished once confirmation of the information surrounding these types of incidents is verified.

After careful assessment, ISAF concluded that discussing green-on-blue incidents was of public interest. Our policy ensures ISAF is open and transparent concerning green-on-blue incidents involving its personnel. This policy has no affect on our relationship with our Afghan partners; it is carried out in coordination with them in order to ensure all information obtained from green-on-blue incidents is factual and accurate before being publicly released.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN

Mr. WITTMAN. General, you currently have over 90,000 U.S. troops in country that will take you through this fighting season. After a significant drawdown this fall you will have 68,000 U.S. “boots on the ground” for the fighting season in 2013. What risk are you incurring by this slow transition to ANSF lead in Afghanistan operations? Will you need 68,000 U.S. troops to execute the 2014 fighting season before completing the drawdown and the Afghan government assumes the lead in December 2014?

General ALLEN. The conditions for recovering US surge forces have been created by the growth of the ANSF and their improving capabilities. Our Campaign plan is based on the Transition of lead security responsibility to the ANSF, and support of the overall Transition process to achieve our objectives as laid out by the NATO Summit at Lisbon in 2010.

Developing a sound mitigation strategy for the transfer to ANSF lead was a key part of our Campaign planning efforts. We believe that our Campaign plan is working. The ANSF are moving to the fore across the country, and we are finding two things as this occurs: first they are better than we expected them to be; and second, they are better than they thought they would be.

Security Force Assistance enables us to continue to support the ANSF as they move into the lead. The conversion of a combat force that conducts Security Force Assistance to a Security Force Assistance organization with combat capabilities is part of this process and the next logical phase of our counter insurgency campaign.

After the conclusion of the 2012 fighting season and the 23,000 Phase II Troop Surge Recovery, ISAF will examine the state of the insurgency, the development of the ANSF, and the anticipated operational requirements for 2013. ISAF intends to provide through the chain of command, to the President, and the Secretary General, recommendations on the kind of combat power needed for 2013, which will include an estimate of the US force requirements.

Mr. WITTMAN. General, last year your predecessor General Petraeus testified before this committee saying, “As a bottom line up front, it is ISAF’s assessment that the momentum achieved by the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2005 has been arrested in much of the country and reversed in a number of important areas. However, while the security progress achieved over the past year is significant, it is also fragile and reversible. Moreover, it is clear that much difficult work lies ahead with our Afghan partners to solidify and expand our gains in the face of the expected Taliban spring offensive.” General, with the effort to draw down our forces by the end of 2014, are we still willing to concede that our progress is fragile and reversible? It seems that outside of the Taliban and the terrorist networks operating in and around Afghanistan our biggest enemy is time. Do you have enough time to execute a sound, measured, responsible drawdown while still maintaining a force capable of training the ANSF to take the lead and keep the Taliban and terrorist networks from resecuring a foothold in Afghanistan?

General ALLEN. The Coalition and ANSF have made significant gains and continue to make progress. There are several factors that will make this progress more durable, such as the commitment of NATO and the deterrence of regional actors. A Strategic Partnership between the US and GIRoA also ensures a long-term commitment to Afghanistan over time, and it helps to ensure the progress and gains are irreversible.

Some of the other factors include the increasing capability of the ANSF and the state of the insurgency. The ANSF must move to the fore, gain its full capability, and be fully fielded on the battlefield. During the past 12 months, Afghan National Security Forces have expanded from 276,000 to 330,000, and they will reach their full strength of 352,000 ahead of the 1 Oct 12 goal. The expansion and the professionalization of the ANSF enables the recovery of the remaining 23,000 U.S. surge forces this fall, and it makes security transition complete by 31 December 2014. The degradation of the insurgency by the ANSF and Coalition forces is another factor that is helping to solidify our gains.

Mr. WITTMAN. General, you mentioned that “throughout history, insurgencies have seldom been defeated by foreign forces. Instead, they have been ultimately beaten by indigenous forces. In the long run, our goals can only be achieved and then secured by Afghan forces. Transition, then, is the linchpin of our strategy, not merely the ‘way out.’” General, how do we keep that linchpin from breaking? As you mentioned, this has been a long, difficult, and costly campaign, how do we ensure that this transition is executed in a manner where enough time and space is created to allow the ANSF and the Afghan government to take the lead in their country?
General ALLEN. The time and space required to optimize the chances of success through Transition is being created by conducting the process in five, sequential Tranches, two of which are already underway and the third is in final development. Each province is evaluated, initially at the district level, for suitability to begin transition. Integral to this process are the individual implementation plans that are written in coordination with GIRoA. They address the three pillars of Security, Governance and Development, with Rule of Law considered under the Governance pillar. The plans identify critical issues in each of these three pillars that need to be mitigated or addressed in order to establish irreversible security. Areas that are in Transition have Afghans in the lead, with Coalition partners providing varying degrees of support. The support is modified as the ANSF increase their capability; Coalition combat forces move from being partners or mentors to advisors while at the same time providing key enabler support.

Planning for Tranche three commenced in February 2012, and implementation is scheduled to begin in May 2012. All of Afghanistan will be under Afghan security lead and support by ISAF partners, advisors and enablers, by the latter part of 2013. This will provide at least 18 months for final Transition areas to fully develop effective forces before security is handed over to GIRoA on 1 January 2015. Each area in the process of Transition is closely monitored by ISAF forces for signs of regression. There has not been any regression in Tranche one and two areas; in fact, security has markedly improved in most of these areas.

Mr. WITTMAN. General Allen, with regard to the troop drawdown strategy, what are specific conditions on the ground, relating to both Afghan National Security Force capabilities and the capabilities of the enemy you will be examining to manage the U.S. troop drawdowns? What are the largest gaps in the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Force today that need to be improved by 2014 for the Afghan security forces to maintain a stable Afghanistan?

General ALLEN. The overall troop draw down strategy depends on the growing capabilities of the ANSF and the decreasing capabilities of the enemy. Planning continues to determine future force level requirements which incur the least amount of risk to the development of the ANSF, the accomplishment of the Campaign Plan objectives, and the transition of security responsibility from ISAF to ANSF.

As the ANSF move increasingly into the lead we are discovering that they are better than we thought they would be and they are better than they thought they would be. The ANA and ANP recruiting growth have exceeded expectations, and the ANSF will achieve its 352K manpower goal before October 2012. The initial focus for the ANSF 352K increase was building combat capability and leveraging ISAF enablers to support the ANSF. This decision delayed the development of ANSF enablers. Therefore, ISAF is increasingly focusing on development of ANA enablers, in particular logistics and CASEVAC capabilities. The gradual transition process from ISAF to ANSF led security ensures the ANSF are capable, properly equipped, resourced, and trained to operate independently. The drawdown of Coalition forces occurs as the ANSF capabilities increase and their level of required ISAF support diminishes.

Mr. WITTMAN. General, in light of the new Afghanistan detention Memorandum of Understanding, what is your plan regarding the handling of high-value detainees, both Afghans and Third Country Nationals, to ensure that these individuals will not pose a threat to the United States in the future?

General ALLEN. In accordance with paragraphs four and six of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the US is to transfer to Afghanistan, Afghan nationals held by it at the Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP). The MOU does not require the U.S. to transfer third country nationals to Afghanistan. For now, third country nationals will remain in the custody of U.S. forces at the DFIP until their further disposition is worked out by the U.S. Government, in accordance with U.S. law and policy.

Under paragraphs four, five, eight and eleven of the MOU, Afghan nationals transferred to Afghanistan are to be prosecuted or held in administrative detention consistent with international humanitarian law.

Afghanistan is to take all necessary steps, consistent with international humanitarian law, to ensure that detainees transferred to it are prevented from engaging in or facilitating terrorist activity so as to ensure that they do not pose a continuing threat to Afghanistan, the international community, or the United States. Under paragraph nine of the MOU, Afghanistan is to consult with the U.S. before releasing any detainee, and, if the U.S. provides its assessment that continued detention is necessary to prevent the detainee from engaging in or facilitating terrorist activity, Afghanistan is to consider favorably such assessment.

Most importantly, under paragraph twelve of the MOU, if Afghanistan still desires to pursue a release, the matter is referred to a Bilateral Committee composed
of the Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and the Afghan Minister of Defense, and those two senior officials take the decision on whether to release (or not), after making a risk assessment consistent with Additional Protocol II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. This means that, ultimately, no high risk detainee can be released without the consent of the senior most US military official in Afghanistan.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CRITZ

Mr. C RITZ. With regard to the sustainability of Afghan National Security Forces, I noticed in the reporting that ANSF is going to be about 352,000 at some point, ANA being 195,000 and ANP being about 157,000. Is the growth, development, and expertise of non-commissioned and junior officers sufficient to support a force of this size? Going forward, is the economy of Afghanistan strong enough to support a total force of this size?

General A LLEN. The ANSF are expected to reach the surge-strength goal of 352,000 by October 2012. There is sufficient growth among non-commissioned officers (NCO) and junior officers to support this force, although growth has not been as fast as we would like in some areas. It will take time to generate and effectively utilize a capable senior NCO cadre, since NCOs need to have experience in order to earn the requisite degree of trust and respect to be fully effective. The ANA and ANP currently have significant shortages in the NCO ranks based on the needs of the 352,000 surge force, but these shortages will be reduced over time. The ANA and ANP are both short NCOs, primarily among the senior NCOs; this gap will be filled in the coming eighteen months. The fielded force of the ANA has a shortage of approximately 2,300 officers, of which 2,100 are junior officers (lieutenants and captains). We anticipate that the numbers in the training pipeline are sufficient to fill this gap. There is sufficient training, developmental, and leadership capacity to support the 352,000 surge force. Training courses provide ANA officers and NCOs with basic and specialty skills prior to their assignment to the fielded force. The initial training for the ANP NCOs is focused on basic skills with pillar-specific (e.g. uniformed police, border police, national civil order police) skills woven into their course of instruction. The initial training for ANP officers is general, with pillar-specific instruction conducted following their graduation from the initial course. The estimated annual cost of the 352,000 surge force following the procurement of all capital infrastructure and equipment will be about $6B per annum. The Afghan economy will not be strong enough to fiscally support a surge force of this size without significant financial assistance. Given that the force strength of 352,000 will constitute a surge force, the ANSF Plan of Record planned for a post-2015 ANSF that will be smaller in force size. The planned force will be capable of combating the range of likely future threats, while remaining fiscally sustainable with International Community assistance.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. YOUNG

Mr. Y OUNG. Secretary Miller, what should Congress be looking for in the next year and a half? What benchmarks should be examined in 6 months, 1 year and 18 months? Will meeting those benchmarks result in victory?

Dr. MILLER. ISAF conducts a quarterly assessment of the status of the Campaign Plan in Afghanistan. DOD uses these metrics to inform its Section 1230 Report on Progress Towards Stability in Afghanistan, which is provided to Congress every six months. This Report includes DOD’s assessment of progress in the Campaign Plan, Afghanistan National Security Forces Development, Transition, Security, Governance and Development, Regional Engagement, and Counternarcotics. We will continue to provide this Report so that Congress can get a holistic look at progress in Afghanistan over time. Additionally, Section 1221 of the FY 12 NDAA directs DOD to include ANSF benchmarks in the Section 1230 Report. The Department is currently preparing a benchmark annex to the April 2012 Report and plans to fully incorporate the Section 1221 requirement into the October 2012 report.

Mr. YOUNG. General Allen, I worry that to complete our mission U.S. Forces have been given a number and asked what will it buy rather than being asked what they need and being told how much it costs. How have we tied our resources to a winning strategy?

General A LLEN. ISAF has engaged in extensive planning to determine the resources required for a strategy for success in Afghanistan. Several notable examples are provided below.
Last fall, ISAF conducted an extensive planning process to update our campaign. The new campaign plan integrated Transition to Afghan security lead, ANSF development and U.S. surge recovery. After the conclusion of the 2012 fighting season and the 23,000 Phase II Troop Surge Recovery, ISAF will examine the state of the insurgency, the development of the ANSF, and the anticipated operational requirements for 2013. ISAF intends to provide through the chain of command, to the President, and the Secretary General, recommendations on the kind of combat power needed for 2013, which will include an estimate of the US force requirements.

In the near-term, the development of the ANSF is ahead of schedule. It currently stands at approximately 330,000 personnel, and it will reach 352,000 troops ahead of the 1 October 2012 goal. The expansion and the professionalization of the Afghan security forces enables the recovery of the remaining 23,000 U.S. surge forces this fall, enables ISAF and the ANSF to apply continued pressure on the Taliban, and makes possible security Transition to the Afghans in accordance with the Lisbon mandate.

Mr. YOUNG. General Allen, has the incorporation of middle-ranking Taliban personalities into the Joint Priority Effects List (JPEL) had a significant effect on the overall insurgency in Afghanistan?

General ALLEN. The incorporation of middle-ranking Taliban personalities in the Joint Priority Effects List (JPEL) has degraded the insurgency's capability and capacity, particularly in disrupting the planning for high profile attacks. The insurgency retains the capacity to replace low to mid-level commanders and fighters through its extensive support network within Pakistan, making many effects temporary. Nonetheless, the continual short-term disruptions are an important aspect of the campaign, as it buys space and time to further develop the ANSF and the Afghan Special Forces, and it applies pressure across enemy networks that constrain their effectiveness.

Beyond disrupting specific plots, JPEL operations also challenge insurgents' ability to maintain leadership continuity, inhibit insurgency adaptation, and stress command and control. It is noteworthy that the insurgency has migrated to more asymmetric tactics (IEDs, indirect fire attacks, and assassinations), since these types of tactics minimize direct contact with security forces and require lower quality mid-level leadership to sustain.

Inclusion of mid-level insurgent commanders on the JPEL allows Battle Space Owners (BSO's) to target insurgent leaders under current ROEs. Without this latitude, BSOs would be limited in their ability to target and detain insurgents.