[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
INVESTIGATING THE CHINESE THREAT, PART I: MILITARY AND ECONOMIC
AGGRESSION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 28, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-137
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
or
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
73-536 PDF WASHINGTON : 2012
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey--
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California deceased 3/6/12 deg.
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
RON PAUL, Texas ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
JOE WILSON, South Carolina RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
CONNIE MACK, Florida ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
DAVID RIVERA, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas KAREN BASS, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New York
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Dean Cheng, research fellow, Asian Studies Center, The
Heritage Foundation............................................ 8
Mr. John J. Tkacik, Jr., senior fellow and director of the Future
Asia Project, International Assessment and Strategy Center..... 25
Larry M. Wortzel, Ph.D., Commissioner, United States-China
Economic and Security Review Commission........................ 70
Taylor Fravel, Ph.D., associate professor of political science,
Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 81
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Dean Cheng: Prepared statement............................... 10
Mr. John J. Tkacik, Jr.: Prepared statement...................... 27
Larry M. Wortzel, Ph.D.: Prepared statement...................... 72
Taylor Fravel, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 83
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 112
Hearing minutes.................................................. 113
INVESTIGATING THE CHINESE THREAT, PART I: MILITARY AND ECONOMIC
AGGRESSION
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 28, 2012
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock a.m.,
in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The committee will come to order.
Welcome to my fellow members on the committee and to our
distinguished panel of witnesses who are joining us today.
If they could take their spots, thank you so much.
After recognizing myself and my friend, Mr. Berman, the
ranking member, for 7 minutes each for our opening statements,
I will recognize the chairman and the ranking member of the
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific for 3 minutes each for
their opening statements, followed by 1-minute opening
statements for all other members wishing to speak.
We will then hear from our witnesses. I would ask that you
summarize your prepared statements to 5 minutes each before we
move to the questions and answers with members under the 5-
minute rule.
As Mr. Wilson, Mr. Bilirakis, and Mr. Duncan were unable to
ask questions during the hearing with the Secretary of State, I
had said publicly toward the end that I will be recognizing
them, when they come, first by seniority for questions before
returning to the regular order of questioning for the majority
side.
So, without objection, the witnesses' prepared statements
will be made a part of the record.
Members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions
for the record, subject to the length limitation and the rules.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes.
Napoleon once famously remarked that ``China is a sleeping
dragon. Let her sleep, for when she awakes, she will shake the
world.''
The 21st century is the era of China's awakening. The
decades to come will test whether China will truly shake the
world.
This hearing is a first in a series to examine the range of
threats to U.S. national security, our interests, and allies,
posed by a rising China and, also, to receive recommendations
on how to counter such threats. Today we will examine recent
military and economic actions taken by the People's Republic of
China and evaluate what they mean for United States interests
and those of our allies.
In advance of his transition to the presidency of China,
China's Vice President visited the United States last month.
The White House went to great lengths to ensure that the visit
went smoothly, reiterating a commitment to a peaceful and
stable relationship. The actions taken may have included a
turning-away of a high-level asylum-seeker at a consulate in
China and included Vice President Biden's dismissal of a
meeting request from the spouse of one of China's most
prominent dissidents.
With respect to Mr. Wang, the reported defector, China's
dissent news service posted an audio broadcast of a Chinese
official who read the report from the Chinese Party of China,
CPC, Central Committee on Mr. Wang. Allegedly, the report
stated that Wang entered the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu on
February 6th, spoke to U.S. officials about ``relevant exchange
and cooperation projects, then asked for asylum.''
The report allegedly goes on to say that, at the request of
U.S. personnel, Wang filled out an application for political
asylum, but late the next day, on February 7th, after ``a face-
to-face talk with a comrade directly dispatched from the CPC
Central Committee,'' Wang agreed to leave the U.S. Consulate.
The possibility that the administration turned away an
asylum-seeker, and possibly a high-value intelligence source,
raises a number of serious questions that require immediate
answers. I have a pending request with the Department of State
for specific information on this matter.
Generally, the administration's overtures have failed to
alter Beijing's behavior or its policies. China continues the
artificial depreciation of its currency, which steals American
jobs away. China continues to undermine the U.S. technological
edge through all available means, including circumvention of
U.S. export controls and by hacking into private and
governmental computer systems. China's ongoing participation in
industrial espionage is evidenced by a recent criminal
indictment of individuals charged with stealing trade secrets
from the DuPont Corporation.
Also, piracy of intellectual property rights remains a
significant problem for U.S. companies doing business in China,
such as the Illinois-based paper shredder manufacturer
Fellowes, Incorporated.
Through such illegitimate means, China has made tremendous
advances in the modernization of its military with a budget
that some experts expect by the year 2015 will surpass the
totality of all 12 of its Asia-Pacific neighbors. Along with
increased maritime capacity, Chinese aggression has manifested
itself in its broad territorial claims throughout the South
China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Yellow Sea.
Last November, the White House finally acknowledged
Beijing's bullying of its neighbors and President Obama
announced a pivot to emphasis the U.S. strategic and economic
interests in the Asia-Pacific region. In reaction to President
Obama's pivot, one People's Liberation Army general wrote a
commentary which quickly spread across Chinese Web sites. The
general said, ``This is aimed at China, to contain China. The
United States has committed a fatal strategic error. It has
misjudged its foes.''
Among the expert panel of witnesses today is Dr. Larry
Wortzel, Commissioner of the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, who will testify that China has prepared for
cyber warfare. According to the Commission's latest report, the
PLA has the cyber attack capacity to cripple computer networks
in the U.S. Pacific Command.
China also remains a significant benefactor of other
authoritarian regimes, providing missile defense, missile-
related technology to Iran, investing heavily in Iran's energy
sector, blocking strong action in Syria, expanding its
relations with and seeking energy resources from Sudan,
Venezuela, and Cuba. And Beijing has supplied Castro with a
massive $750-million oil rig designed to extract offshore oil
from sites near the United States. Any future accident would
risk a nasty oil spill into Florida's coastline.
China's refusal to cooperate with sanctions contributed to
North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Although North
Korea's new leader recently announced that he would suspend
nuclear tests and allow inspections in exchange for food, North
Korea shortly followed up by announcing that it would launch a
satellite in April. This would be in violation of U.N. Security
Council resolutions.
China is North Korea's major supplier of food, energy, and
weaponry, but Beijing does nothing in the face of North Korea's
threatened missile launch. The Nuclear Security Summit, which
President Obama recently attended in South Korea, does not seem
to have affected the North Korean decision. In fact, Pyongyang
responded to the President's warnings by moving the missile to
the launch pad. When push comes to shove, Beijing always sides
with its authoritarian allies, be they in Damascus, Havana,
Tehran, or Pyongyang.
The Obama administration spent its first 2 years seeking
accommodation with Beijing with little in return. Having failed
with charm, the administration has come belatedly to seeking a
more realistic approach to the China issue. Hopefully, it is
not too little too late.
Now I am pleased to turn to the distinguished ranking
member for his opening statement. Mr. Berman is recognized.
Mr. Berman. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, for
calling this hearing.
It was 40 years ago last month that President Nixon
undertook his historic trip to China, a visit that changed the
course of world events and continues to reverberate today. That
trip and the establishment of diplomatic relations with China
were rooted in a Cold War strategic context in which the
ultimate goal was to prevent Soviet expansionism.
In the early years of the U.S.-China relationship, the
interactions between our two nations were narrowly-focused and
took place almost exclusively at the government-to-government
level. Today, four decades later, the bilateral U.S.-China
relationship has its own strategic rationale that is global in
scope. In addition to the ties between our two governments, the
two countries have formed deep and wide economic, educational,
and cultural connections that resonate not only in Washington
and Beijing, but in the farmlands of Iowa and rural China.
At the time of the Nixon visit, China was a poor and
isolated nation. Today, after decades of astonishing economic
growth, hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens have been
lifted out of poverty; a large middle class is forming.
China has become the world's second-largest economy and
plays an integral role in the international system. With
China's rise as a global power, Chinese influence can be seen
and felt all over the world, from the boardrooms in the world's
major financial centers to the back roads of Africa.
There are some in this country, and some on this committee,
who argue that a rising China poses a significant threat to the
United States, that China is looking to supplant America's
leadership role in the world. And in China, some believe that
the United States is in decline and determined to contain China
and curb its rise.
However, many others, including on this committee, believe
that U.S. cooperation with a rising China is both possible and
desirable, and that a bitter and acrimonious rivalry between
our two countries would have detrimental impact on global
stability. As Henry Kissinger recently wrote in Foreign
Affairs, ``The U.S.-China relationship should not be considered
a zero-sum game, nor can the emergence of a prosperous and
powerful China be assumed in itself to be an American strategic
defeat.''
Even if the U.S. and China are able to work together on a
positive basis to address regional and global issues--and I
hope that we are--there will inevitably be disagreements and
points of friction in our bilateral relationship. When those
arise, the United States must never hesitate to speak out and
take action, particularly when American interests and those of
our allies and partners are at stake.
This means calling on China to end its discrimination
against U.S. companies, stop the theft of U.S. intellectual
property, cease its unfair currency practices. It means shining
the spotlight on Beijing's appalling lack of respect for human
rights, democracy, and rule of law. It means calling on China
to renounce the military option in resolving its ongoing
political dispute with Taiwan. And it means demanding that
China explain its rapid military buildup, abide by
international maritime laws and norms, cooperate with the
international community to end violence in places like Syria
and Sudan, and work with the United States and others to solve
the North Korean and Iranian nuclear problems.
It remains to be seen how China will ultimately address
these issues, what kind of role Beijing wants to play on the
world stage, as it continues its economic growth and
geopolitical rise. At times, China seems to want to be treated
like a great power. Yet, it often ducks the responsibility that
comes from being a leading player or, even worse, as we saw in
the Chinese veto of the U.N. Security Council resolution on
Syria, blocks the rest of the world from doing the right thing.
China has benefitted greatly and achieved prosperity for
its citizens from an open international economic system. Yet,
China has engaged in mercantilist behavior, sometimes ignored
rules of the global economy, and constructed a playing field
for non-Chinese companies in China that is unfair, opaque, and
corrupt.
All of this boils down to a choice for China. Will it use
its growing power and newfound standing in the world solely for
its own benefit or will it pursue a constructive path that
strengthens the global order for the benefit of all nations?
I thank the panel of witnesses for being here today and
look forward to hearing their views on the future of the U.S.-
China relationship, and yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Berman. Thank you for
your opening statement.
And the Chair wishes to send greetings to that heckler in
the back, Harry Wu, a wonderful friend of our committee, and
who understands a thing or two about China's brutality.
Mr. Smith is recognized for 1-minute opening statements,
and we will recognize everyone to speak for 1 minute.
Mr. Smith. I thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I would
ask unanimous consent to have my full statement made a part of
the record.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Without objection.
Mr. Smith. China's declared defense budget, already the
second-highest in the world, will increase by 11.2 percent this
year to $106.4 billion. This follows a nearly unbroken string
of double-digit increases over the last two decades.
As Beijing has escalated its military buildup, China has
also expanded its geopolitical ambitions and increased its
claim within the South China Sea. China's Asian neighbors have
started to strengthen their own defenses and sought new
security ties with the U.S. and other partners.
The challenges of China that it presents are not limited to
any corner of the globe. China continues to advance its
capabilities to initiate cyber attacks and exploit U.S. cyber
security vulnerabilities, which present grave threats to U.S.
national security and economic interests.
Finally, China's economic investments into Africa and other
parts of the world also pose significant threats, such as
locking up the supply of strategic minerals or rare earth
elements used in high-tech products, including smart bombs, and
offering a poor policy example of the respect for human rights
to its partners.
Tomorrow I will chair my fourth hearing on China's growing
influence in Africa and the bad governance model that it is
exporting to African countries like Sudan and elsewhere.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Thank you so much, Mr.
Smith.
Mr. Sherman is recognized.
Mr. Sherman. If we had balanced trade with China, our
unemployment rate would be under 5 percent and the cost of
containing China's aggressiveness in its region would be far
less. But there are high, enormous profits available by
maintaining the present trade system.
And so, a huge propaganda effort is deployed to convince
the American people that our current trading system is both
fair and beneficial. We have a choice between two roads. One is
to renounce the current MFN treatment of China and demand the
negotiation of a balanced trade agreement, with a voucher
system perhaps, that you need a voucher to import anything from
China.
But the road more traveled is to keep repeating empty
criticisms of China, in order to lull the American people to
sleep, as if such repetitions for decades are going to cause a
change in Beijing's policy, and to leave us with an aggressive
China, unemployed Americans, and a highly-contempted foreign
policy and economic establishment.
I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
Ms. Schmidt is recognized.
Ms. Schmidt. Thank you, and I want to thank you for this
hearing.
I am increasingly concerned about this administration's
approach with China, be it its relationship with Taiwan, the
issue with the Dalai Lama, and, most importantly, the issue
currently about AsiaSat, which is an issue whether the
administration is agreeing to transfer communications satellite
to munition controls for China. And that concerns me greatly.
So, I hope we touch on those issues in this hearing.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Ms. Schmidt.
Mr. Sires is recognized.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Madam Chairlady, and thank you for
being here today.
You know, I have many concerns with China: Their abysmal
human rights record, their increase in defense budget, their
disregard for total international norms. So, I just want to
hear what you have to say about some of those concerns that I
have about China.
Thank you very much for being here.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chabot is recognized.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair, for pulling together
such a distinguished panel here as you have this morning.
Having been one of the founding chairs of the Congressional
Taiwan Caucus, and having served as co-chair of that for about
a decade, I do hope that our witnesses will take at least some
time today to focus on China's military threat to our long-time
friend and ally, Taiwan.
I remember when I first came to Congress back in 1995, I
learned at that time that China had approximately 100 missiles,
and every year it would go up. There would be a few hundred
more and a few hundred more and a few hundred more. Now they
are up to approximately 1,600 missiles, both medium-range and
short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan. So, I hope
during the hearing that we can focus some time on that.
I know Mr. Tkacik and I have discussed the threat to Taiwan
many times. So, I particularly look forward to hearing his
testimony and the other members as well.
And I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.
Ms. Bass is recognized.
Ms. Bass. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member Berman.
I do look forward, as the chair of the Subcommittee on
Africa mentioned a few minutes ago, tomorrow we are going to
have a committee hearing on China's role in Africa, and I look
forward to that. Also, perhaps some of the panelists might
comment on that relationship as well. Specifically, I am
interested in the labor issue, so when the Chinese go into
African nations, bringing Chinese labor with them as opposed to
hiring the local population.
As China continues down a path of growth, there are
important questions that must be answered regarding China's
military power, its foreign exchange policies, human rights,
cyber espionage, China/Taiwan relations. While China's ascent
can neither be stopped nor ignored, we must continue to focus
attention on ensuring responsible Chinese policies and
practices that promote peace, growth, and opportunity.
Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, ma'am.
Mr. Connolly is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing.
The U.S.-China relationship is absolutely one of the most
important, obviously, in the world, and it is a relationship
that must be worked out. But the United States has to insist on
its interests in this relationship; otherwise, it is one of
unequal partners.
And we need to focus, obviously, on our human rights
values, as we interact with the Chinese, and we also have to
insist economically on the increasing pressure of intellectual
property rights. Intellectual theft is epidemic in China, and
it must be addressed as we move forward in this relationship on
behalf of not only our interests and our business interests,
but, frankly, for the future maturation of China itself as an
interest of the family of nations.
I thank the chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. I thank all the members
for their opening statements.
And now, the Chair is pleased to welcome our witnesses.
First, Dean Cheng, who is currently the research fellow for
Chinese Political and Military Affairs at the Heritage
Foundation. Prior to joining the Heritage Foundation, he was
the Senior Analyst with the China Studies Commission and also
served with the Science Applications International Corporation.
Welcome.
Next, I would like to welcome John Tkacik, a senior fellow
and director of the Future Asia Project at the International
Assessment and Strategy Center. Mr. Tkacik is a retired Foreign
Service officer who has devoted over 20 years of government
service to Chinese/Taiwanese affairs. From the years 2001 to
2009, Mr. Tkacik was also a research fellow on China at the
Heritage Foundation.
We welcome you, sir.
And we are also pleased to welcome Larry Wortzel, the
Commissioner of the United States-China Economic and Security
Review Commission. Dr. Wortzel was reappointed by Speaker
Boehner for a 2-year term, expiring on December 31, 2012. He
has a distinguished career in the U.S. Armed Forces, which
included two tours of duty as a military attache at the
American Embassy in China. And he likes to go bass fishing in
my home state of Florida.
And finally, I would like to welcome Taylor Fravel. He is
associate professor of political science and member of the
Security Studies Program at MIT. Dr. Fravel studies
international relations with a focus on international security,
China, and East Asia, and is currently completing a study of
China's military doctrine since 1949.
A wonderful set of panelists. I welcome you all. I ask that
you, again, keep your presentation to no more than 5 minutes.
And without objection, your prepared statements will be made a
part of the record.
So, Mr. Cheng, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. DEAN CHENG, RESEARCH FELLOW, ASIAN STUDIES
CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Cheng. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member
Berman, and distinguished members of the committee, for the
opportunity to be here this morning.
The views I express in this testimony are my own and should
not be construed as representing any official position of the
Heritage Foundation.
My comments today will focus on the military aspect of the
threat from the People's Republic of China, but I would like to
emphasize that the Chinese concept of national security is a
holistic one, rooted in the idea of comprehensive national
power, which includes not only military capabilities, but
economic capacity, level of science and technology, diplomatic
respect, and even culture.
The Chinese People's Liberation Army is the most visible
aspect of China's comprehensive national power. China fields
the world's largest military and has enjoyed double-digit
increases in its defense budget for the last two decades.
China's official defense expenditure, generally seen as
understating actual defense spending, has now passed the $100
billion mark.
These expenditures have funded what Jiang Zemin termed
``the two transformations'' involving a shift from quantity to
quality and emphasizing the ability to fight high-tech wars,
what the Chinese now call informationized wars. In short, this
is not your father's or your grandfather's PLA.
Chinese military writings regularly note that future
warfare will require networks of sensors and communications in
order to win the contest between systems of systems. So, China
is building, for example, a constellation of high-resolution,
multi-spectral earth observation satellites to support its new
fighters, tankers, submarines, and missiles. At the same time,
Chinese tests of anti-satellite capabilities in 2007 and again
in 2010 underscore the growing ability of the PLA to deny
opponents C4ISR capabilities.
To be fair, it is important to recognize that China, as the
world's most populous country and second-largest economy, is
bound to have a very large military, given its expanding
economic interest and substantial manpower pool. And it is
wishful thinking to expect that China will follow the Soviet
path and bankrupt itself on defense spending. And indeed, the
Chinese leadership regularly emphasizes that national economic
construction is higher priority than army-building.
But while weapon systems are important, how the Chinese
think about employing them is vital. And one of the great
concerns that should worry us is that the Chinese do not
necessarily think the way we do, especially in terms of
deterrence and crisis management.
The American outlook has been heavily shaped by the Cuban
missile crisis, itself affected by President Kennedy's lessons
drawn from World War I. This has focused American attention on
avoiding inadvertent escalation and accidental war.
By contrast, the PRC chose to precipitate a conflict with
the USSR in 1969, when both nations were nuclear-armed. And
this different attitude is also reflected in the Chinese
refusal to talk about creating maritime rules of the road. In
the Chinese view, such rules allow both sides to feel safe when
operating in close proximity, but the Chinese have very little
interest in making the United States feel safe in the western
Pacific in disputed waters, when they are engaging in what
Beijing sees as illegitimate activities. The solution to
avoiding accidents or crises, in their view, is for the United
States to pull back.
This fundamentally different perspective on deterrence and
crisis management is symptomatic of the reality that China is
different from Iraq, Serbia, or Afghanistan. China has a
substantial indigenous military industrial base. It possesses
space and cyber capabilities on a rough par with the United
States, as well as its substantial nuclear arsenal. The Chinese
pose a fundamentally different scale of threat than have other
states in the past or even North Korea or Iran would in any
calculation in the future.
These differences are exacerbated by what U.S. analysts
have termed China's anti-access/area denial strategy. As the
PRC takes a holistic view toward assessments of national power,
so Chinese efforts to prevent the United States from readily
deploying to the western Pacific involve strategic and
operational as well as tactical elements.
At the strategic level, the Chinese pursue a range of
political warfare measures, including the so-called warfares of
legal warfare, public opinion warfare, and psychological
warfare, all of which seek to influence domestic, adversary,
and third-party audience perceptions and attitudes by
undermining legitimacy, strengthening friendly will, and
arousing sympathy.
At the operational level, Chinese military writing suggests
an emphasis on establishing information superiority or
dominance over an opponent, which, in turn, involves securing
space and cyber dominance, thereby preventing an opponent from
coordinating their forces or targeting their weapons.
When coupled with tactical systems, such as anti-ship
ballistic missiles, we then see a unified approach that links
tactical to operational to strategic, the objective being to
allow the Chinese leadership to dissuade local states from
supporting the United States for allowing it to operate in its
area.
The Chinese have a consistent approach with persistent
actions. The challenge from Beijing seems clear. It is up to us
to respond.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cheng follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Tkacik, did I get your name, more or less? Nailed it?
You are recognized, sir. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN J. TKACIK, JR., SENIOR FELLOW AND
DIRECTOR OF THE FUTURE ASIA PROJECT, INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT
AND STRATEGY CENTER
Mr. Tkacik. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Berman,
distinguished members, thank you for giving me the opportunity
to appear here today.
I have submitted extensive written remarks, and I
appreciate the chairman's offer to put them in the record.
Let me say at the outset, China, since 1989, and, indeed,
since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992, has assumed an
adversarial posture toward the United States, Europe, and
Japan, and others, in a variety of foreign policy and war-
fighting areas.
As one Chinese strategist puts it, ``In the world today,
virtually every one of America's adversaries are China's
friends.'' This is not a coincidence. China's leadership sees
the United States as a challenge to the legitimacy of the
regime. And indeed, across the board, from nuclear and missile
proliferation to human rights, to global climate change, and
fisheries, China adopts a diametrically-opposite policy to the
United States.
And even during the Iran and Iraq wars--or excuse me--the
Iraq and Afghanistan wars, China has gone out of its way to
provide weapons and explosives, and I would argue computer
network assistance, to hostile states and insurgents in direct
combat with U.S. coalition and NATO forces.
My job is to look out into the future of Asia 20 years or
so and calculate what we are likely to see. Basically, I am
following straight-line trends over the past 20 years, and I
will project them into the next 20 years. What we have is not
reassuring.
When you try to integrate multiple trend lines and
aggregate the results, the margins for error grow and the
conclusions are necessarily speculative. But if 20 years ago
one had done a straight-line projection of China's previous
decade of economic and population growth, or for military
spending, or even foreign exchange reserves growth, your
projections 20 years later in 2012 would be low. They would be
sort of on the mark, but they would have been low. China is now
the largest industrial power on earth. China's industrial
sector has overtaken America's.
Now, many of the international threats that the United
States faces around the world are discrete military,
transnational terrorism, et cetera, but, as such, analyzing
them is more or less straightforward. Not so with China. China
poses a direct, multidimensional matrix of threats and
approaches it with a strategy which I believe the Beijing
leadership has thought through in great detail over the past
two decades. China is now clearly following a broad national
strategy of state mercantilism which has scant regard for
international norms, intellectual property. It has an immense
industrial spying apparatus. And in fact, any tools that expand
China's wealth are utilized without regard to legality,
proprietary, or convention.
The threats are economic. They are industrial. They are
commercial and financial. They are technological, scientific,
territorial, and political. They involve transnational crime
and environmental challenges. There are also colossal
demographic challenges that, too, can turn into threats on very
short order. The military threats posed by China are intensely
more complicated by the non-military dimensions. And all these
threats can blow up in America's face in a moment's notice.
My written remarks are quite extensive, but they only touch
upon a few areas where America's national security is already
in jeopardy. Let me start with the economic threats from China.
They include trade, financial, industrial, and
technological factors and the Chinese strategies that underpin
them. There's no question but that the cyber threat is the
single greatest threat to the United States, and to be a bit
dramatic, to the entire rules-based international system that
China now has approached.
Chinese intelligence and the entire Chinese state have
access to everything in everyone's computers. I wish I were
exaggerating, but, alas, I am not. Imagine what you could do
with complete, unfettered access to the emails of your
political rivals, your economic rivals, your banks, your news
organizations, the personal emails of anybody you wanted, all
of the Fortune 500 companies of America, the Fortune 1,000
across the world. That is precisely the threat.
In my written submission, I will also touch upon China's
territorial sea claims, but not its threats to its continental
neighbors because those are penumbral to America's core
interest and to those of our treaty allies. Suffice it to say
that China's territorial sea claims in the South China Sea, the
Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea are absolute. They brook no
challenge.
China's own legislation, its supreme national law, permits
only the intrusion on these waters of foreigners who ``abide by
Chinese law.'' And I must say, recent Chinese statements that
no country claims the entire South China Sea are true, except
that China claims 1.5 million square kilometers of it. The rest
of it is negotiable.
I will leave that as my oral presentation. I would like to
get into the issues of Taiwan and others in the questions and
answers.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tkacik follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, sir. Thank you.
Dr. Wortzel?
STATEMENT OF LARRY M. WORTZEL, PH.D., COMMISSIONER, UNITED
STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION
Mr. Wortzel. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Berman,
committee members, thank you for the opportunity to appear
today.
On March 7th, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission released a report on Chinese capabilities for cyber
espionage and cyber warfare. The report concluded that the
People's Liberation Army has developed information warfare
capabilities to defend military and civilian computer networks
while seizing control of an adversary's information system. In
peacetime, cyber espionage is a cornerstone of China's
intelligence-collection operations.
Cyber attacks are appealing to China because they leave no
clear fingerprints, and such attacks would be preemptive. The
PLA calls its strategy for cyber attacks ``Integrated Network
Electronic Warfare.''
And I would like to depart from my role as a commissioner
for a minute and give you my personal views on this war-
fighting doctrine. During the Cold War, the Soviet military
planned to start a war with radio electronic combat, a
combination of electronic warfare with artillery, aircraft, and
missile strikes. The Soviets expected to degrade an enemy's
combat capability by 60 percent before a shot was fired.
The PLA's Integrated Network Electronic Warfare doctrine is
Soviet doctrine on Chinese steroids. INEW added computer
network attacks and space attacks on satellites.
The commission's report also expresses concerns about some
of China's largest telecommunications firms. These firms
benefit from a network of state research institutes and
government funding and programs that have the sponsorship of
the military. Also, Chinese Government research organizations
and universities are working on national programs for research
on cyber technology.
The report notes that the U.S. military's NIPRNET, or Non-
Secure Internet Protocol Routing Network, is particularly
vulnerable to computer attack and exploitation, and any
assistance to Taiwan in a crisis could be disrupted.
Finally, the report documents vulnerabilities in the U.S.
telecommunications supply chain where backdoors built into
hardware or coded into software may give unauthorized access to
systems. The U.S. Army ordered a large number of computers from
a Chinese company for installation on our NIPRNET-based
logistics system. Army officials believe that they can only
exclude purchases from foreign firms for equipment controlled
on the United States Munitions List, but not for the whole
Army. It seems to me that the entire enterprise information
architecture of the Department of Defense, if not the whole
government, should be a national security concern.
If existing legislation cannot be interpreted differently,
then new legislation may be required. Congress should consider
directing the Executive Branch to maintain a classified list of
countries, people, and companies that pose a serious cyber
threat to our Government and industry. Such a list should be
validated across the intelligence community and vetted by the
Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Court. During the
procurement process, cleared government officials should be
required to consult that list and to exclude people or
companies on the list from introducing hardware or software
into government networks.
When our security officials can attribute an attack to a
foreign person, in a closed Federal court, such as the Foreign
Intelligence and Surveillance Court, they should be able to
seek a warrant for arrest. And in the case of a foreign
company, there should be a statutory prohibition on a company
judged to be involved in cyber espionage from doing business in
the United States. And we should encourage our allies to do the
same. The Australian Government just barred Huawei, a Chinese
company, from work on Australia's national infrastructure,
cyber infrastructure.
The United States also should have a clear policy that it
declares that attacks in cyber space are acts of war and a
cyber attack may generate a weapons strike and a state of war.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I
welcome any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wortzel follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Dr. Fravel is recognized.
STATEMENT OF TAYLOR FRAVEL, PH.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE, SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Fravel. Madam Chairman, Congressman Berman, and
esteemed members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to
participate in today's important discussion.
I would like to discuss one particular challenge that China
poses, its behavior in the territorial and maritime disputes in
the South China Sea. Orally, I would like to make four points.
My first point, first, between 2007 and 2011, China adopted
a much more assertive approach toward the disputes in the South
China Sea. During this period, China challenged, and in some
cases threatened, foreign oil companies, including American
ones, investing in Vietnam's offshore oil and gas blocks,
emphasized its own expansive claims in these waters, detained
hundreds of Vietnamese fishermen near the Chinese-held Paracels
Islands, and harassed Vietnamese and Philippine vessels
conducting seismic surveys in waters that Beijing claims.
China adopted this more assertive approach for several
reasons. First, China was often reacting to efforts by other
claimants, especially Vietnam, to strengthen their own position
in the South China Sea. As there are some conflicts,
territorial disputes are prone to negative spirals of
instability because one state's efforts to defend its claims
will be viewed by others as a challenge that requires a
response.
Second, more generally, China's leaders were more willing
to assert interest in the region after successfully hosting the
Olympics and weathering the financial crisis in 2008.
Third, various Chinese maritime agencies competing with
each other for greater authority and resources also played a
role in China's behavior.
The second point: Since June 2011, China has adopted a
less-assertive approach in the South China Sea disputes. China
has stopped the most confrontational aspects of its assertive
approach, especially the frequent detention of Vietnamese
fishing vessels and the harassment of oil and gas exploration
activities in waters that China claims.
In addition, China's new approach has several components,
including reaffirming cooperation through joint development,
holding summits with leaders from the Philippines and Vietnam,
reaching agreements for managing tensions with the association
of Southeast Asian nations and with Vietnam, and directly
engaging other claimants, for example, by establishing a $70
million Maritime Cooperation Fund.
China adopted a less-assertive approach because it realized
that it had overreached and overreacted. By threatening other
claimants, China tarnished the cooperative image that it had
sought to cultivate since 2000, created a common interest among
these states encountering China, and created strong incentives
for states in the region to improve their ties with the United
States.
Central to the change in China's behavior was the firmness
displayed by both states in the region and the United States,
especially when Secretary of State Clinton declared a U.S.
national interest in the South China Sea in July 2010. In sum,
China's actions had undermined its broader grand strategy,
which emphasizes maintaining good relations with both its
immediate neighbors and with great powers like the United
States.
My third point: China's recent behavior in the South China
Sea has important implications for understanding China's
foreign policy today. In the South China Sea, China's
assertiveness has sought to deter other states from acting
against Chinese interest and claims. China has not acted to
compel states to accede to China's claims, however. The
emphasis on deterrence in China's foreign policy is consistent
with the emphasis on deterrence in China's military strategy
today.
Although China is actively modernizing its armed forces, it
remains reluctant to use them in many political and military
issues. In the South China Sea, for example, China has relied
primarily on civilian maritime law enforcement agencies to
assert and defend its claims, not the Chinese navy.
With 14 neighbors on land and eight at sea, China's foreign
policy remains constrained by its external security
environment. China has limited room for maneuver and must seek
to maintain good relations with neighboring states, especially
when faced with resistance to China's policies from its
neighbors and from states like the United States.
My final point concerns several brief policy
recommendations: First, the United States should maintain and
consolidate its military and diplomatic presence in East Asia
currently being undertaken as part of the rebalancing of
American strategic priorities.
Second, the United States should continue to underscore its
national interest in international norms that are threatened by
China's more assertive policies, especially freedom of
navigation and the peaceful resolution of disputes.
Third, the United States should maintain its longstanding
principle of neutrality in territorial disputes of other
countries to prevent transforming them into bilateral conflicts
between the United States and China.
Fourth, the United States should ratify the Convention on
the Law of the Sea to increase the effectiveness of U.S.
efforts to pursue a rules-based approach to managing and
resolving disputes over maritime jurisdiction.
Madam Chairman, thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fravel follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you to
all of our panelists for excellent testimony.
I would like to ask you gentlemen about China's relations
with North Korea and with Iran. I know that we don't have much
time. But China's enablement of North Korea's nuclear
development program has allowed Pyongyang to become a de facto
nuclear power. Does Beijing really desire a nuclear-free Korean
peninsula or does China prefer a situation where an erratic and
unpredictable North Korea ties down the United States and their
East Asian allies while China pursues its own regional
ambitions in the South China Sea and elsewhere?
And on Iran, news reports of Beijing supplying Tehran with
surveillance equipment to spy on Iranian citizens is only the
latest example of extensive Chinese/Iranian security links.
There have been reports of Chinese military cooperation with
Tehran in the upgrade of Iranian fighters, missile technology,
and production of speed boats to patrol the Gulf and the
Strait. Have the U.N. sanctions against Iran, including an arms
embargo, diminished Beijing's supply of weapons and missile
technology to Tehran?
A former Los Alamos nuclear engineering analyst said that
Beijing's nuclear cooperation with Iran ``created the
foundation of the Iranian nuclear program today.'' Would you
agree with that assessment?
So, North Korea and Iran, we will start.
Mr. Cheng. It is obviously difficult to determine what
China prefers, given the opacity of Chinese decision making.
But I would suggest that China prefers neither a nuclear-free
North Korean nor necessarily an erratic and unpredictable North
Korea.
Instead, at the moment, given the leadership transition
that is ongoing in China, it would seem most likely that the
Chinese would prefer, frankly, that just somebody else deal
with the North Korean situation, most likely the United States,
while China deals with its internal power shift.
Now, in the longer-term, China would most prefer a docile
North Korea that it can control and manipulate, which it
currently does not necessarily have. Given the unlikelihood of
this situation, it would prefer a North Korea that does not
precipitate a war on the peninsula, but which would not be
reunified with the South, and which would focus American
attention elsewhere away from Beijing.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Tkacik. One has to remember that North Korea is China's
oldest, and I think right now still the only, treaty ally in a
military mutual defense treaty. I have watched China/North
Korea for 20 years, and I have come to the conclusion that
China seems, indeed, to want North Korea to behave the way it
does. China has pretty much total control in North Korea, both
by virtue of its economic and trade relationship and the
military treaty. And it seems evident from the latest
succession that China was absolutely critical in giving the
benediction to the ascension of Kim Jong Un.
In late 2010, a senior American nuclear weapons specialist,
Sigfried Hecker, went and visited North Korea and was taken to
the uranium enrichment plant in Yongbyon that had just opened
up within the previous several months. Hecker said that this
was the most modern thing that he had ever seen.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Let me just give--I have got 1 minute left. Thank you.
Mr. Wortzel. Madam Chairman, I see, and have seen, despite
the rhetoric out of Beijing, I have seen nothing in Chinese
nuclear doctrine writings other than the position that a weaker
country threatened by a hegemonic state--and that means the
United States--ought to be able to deter aggression with
nuclear weapons. So, they have no problems with a nuclear-armed
North Korea. They have no problems with nuclear-armed Pakistan.
They pretty much encourage that. They left behind the
infrastructure that helped Iran with its nuclear program.
And I will just conclude with that.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Fravel. Very quickly, I will just echo some of the
comments that my colleagues have made. I think that China
prefers above either a nuclear-free peninsula or erratic DPRK
behavior, a divided peninsula in which the DPRK continues to
exist as an independent state. I don't think that they are
actively encouraging erratic behavior by the DPRK because,
ultimately, it causes more problems for them than it solves.
Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Berman?
Mr. Berman. Yes, I would like to get responses to three
questions without using all my time to ask the questions.
First, to Dr. Fravel, the Director of the National
Intelligence sort of confirmed your analysis or shared your
analysis regarding China's less-assertive behavior over the
last 10 months in the South China Sea. Do you think this was a
deep change or a tactical change on the part of China? And how
do we turn it into a long-term change in behavior rather than
just a shift that shifts back into a reactionary cycle that
could lead to open conflict?
Second, I would be curious if one of you could address the
question of whether, in your opinion, the upgrade program for
Taiwan's F-16s is sufficient for Taiwan's self-defense in the
near-term as well as the long-term.
And finally--and I think, Dr. Wortzel, you touched on
this--regarding Iran, it seems to me the odds of our current
policy achieving its goal may be very dependent on the extent
to which China becomes a cooperating partner in the sanctions
leading to a diplomatic resolution strategy that we are now
pursuing.
What would the likely impact on U.S.-China relations be if
Chinese energy companies involved in Iran were to be sanctioned
by Washington? While China may not have any naturally-negative
view of another country having nuclear weapons to deter a
``hegemonic power,'' us, why wouldn't China's fear of a
military confrontation and its impact on its need for reliable
and relatively-cheap energy be enough of an incentive to get
them to join that?
Dr. Fravel, first, as quickly as possible in the 2\1/2\
minutes left.
Mr. Fravel. Thank you very much.
Very quickly, I would say that China's change in behavior
in the South China Sea was initially a tactical shift, but I
believe it has a strategic logic and has the potential to
endure for a period of time, although it will certainly not
resolve the underlying conflicts in the region. It has a
strategic logic because, from Beijing's perspective, the goal
is to limit sort of states in the region from pursuing deeper
security ties with the United States. And the way to do that,
from Beijing's perspective again, is to try to address some of
the concerns that the states in the region have about China's
behavior.
So, I think it has some likelihood of enduring for some
period of time, but, ultimately, what would be needed is a much
longer-term solution that would address the conflicting claims
in the region.
Thank you.
Mr. Berman. Thank you.
Taiwan, and then Iran.
Mr. Cheng. Sir, on the issue of the Taiwan upgrades, the
upgrades are to a series of aircraft that are already 20 years
old. Every aircraft that is being upgraded is pulled off the
line for an extended period of time, which means the net number
of aircraft that Taiwan can put in the air is reduced.
The proposed sale of F-16C/Ds would replace aircraft that
were designed in the 1950s. Not doing so, basically, means that
Taiwan has an air force that, through sheer attrition and age,
will be reduced over time without China having to do anything.
Mr. Wortzel. Mr. Berman, first of all, I think the upgrade
helps, but it is insufficient for Taiwan.
On Iran, I think that if energy companies were sanctioned,
it would certainly help if Chinese energy companies were
sanctioned. They are still very dependent on Iran and very
reluctant to do anything to sever that. Obviously, Russia is
part of that equation.
Mr. Berman. But why wouldn't the fear of the exercise of a
military option to set back Iran's nuclear program and the
consequences of that on China's energy needs become a more
dominant factor?
Mr. Wortzel. One would think it would, but, first of all,
it hasn't----
Mr. Berman. So far.
Mr. Wortzel [continuing]. Obviously, so far. And second, if
you are going to conduct surgical strikes on that nuclear
program, you really haven't affected the pumping in the ports.
It would have to be a completely different form of warfare. And
so far, nobody is contemplating that, and they are probably
aware of that.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr.
Berman.
Mr. Smith is recognized.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
Dr. Wortzel, tomorrow Carolyn Bartholomew, your fellow
commissioner, will testify at our hearing on the impact of
China on Africa. But let me ask a question. China's population
control has been employed as a weapon of mass destruction
imposing a devastating impact on women and death to children,
especially the girl children. Last September, in yet another
hearing on these crimes against humanity, and a look at
possible consequences, two consequences that are grossly, I
think, under focused on were brought out during the hearing.
There is a book--many of you or all of you may have read
it--Valerie Hudson's book called the ``Bare Branches: The
Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population.'' In
that book--and she testified at our hearing and updated her
information--her argument is that the one-child-per-couple
policy has not enhanced China's security, but demonstrably
weakened it.
She points out, as Nick Eberstadt famously phrased it,
``What are the consequences for a society that has chosen to
become simultaneously both more gray and more male?'' She
points out that, by 2030, the ratio for seniors-to-workers will
be 2.5, and 1.6 workers for senior citizens in 2050; and also,
that the number of boys, 118 boys for every 100 girl babies,
and the ratio may be as high as 122.
She points out that these surplus males, as she calls them,
and others have called them, the bare branches, a colloquial
Chinese expression, will disproportionately be poor and less-
educated Chinese young men, and the possibility for
destabilizing China itself. Certainly the corresponding
propensity or invitation to the Chinese Government to expand,
to use international aggression as a safety valve, is laid out
both historically in her book and her testimony as something
that might happen.
And she says, and I will ask you the question then, ``When
we look at global aging, China is aging, and the likely
economic effects of aging, and combine them with the analysis
of the effects of abnormal sex ratios on society, the
synergistic effects are likely to be quite dangerous for the
Chinese Government.'' And again, she talks about the
possibility of war with Japan and certainly Taiwan and others
in the crosshairs.
Your thoughts?
Mr. Wortzel. Mr. Smith, I know Nick's work very well, Nick
Eberstadt, and he has documented these problems very well. I
don't subscribe to the theory that a surplus of males
necessarily leads to a Spartan state. It leads to a lot of
problems in getting people in the military, but, I mean, this
is an authoritarian country; they will get who they need. And
it does lead to potential instability, but not a Spartan state
necessarily.
Mr. Smith. Well, I wasn't saying Spartan state. I was
saying----
Mr. Wortzel. Well, I mean, it doesn't necessarily, when I
say a Spartan state, I mean to aggression as a channel. The
thing it certainly does lead to is an awful lot of
prostitution. It leads to a lot of trade in persons, and women
from Southeast Asia and Korea and Mongolia suffer because of
that.
Mr. Smith. Yes?
Mr. Tkacik. No, I agree with that. I think that the
demographic challenge of a male population I think does mean
that China's military will be, I think, more disciplined. And,
No. 2, there will be a tremendous demographic aggression
against Chinese neighbors where populations in the periphery
are out looking for women to bring into China as wives. It will
cause instability.
I don't think, if there is a war, China is going to lose
it, though.
Mr. Smith. I wasn't just saying it would lose it. It is
that it would be a safety valve. That is what the thesis of her
book, in part, was all about.
Mr. Tkacik. Yes.
Mr. Smith. And I did ask her whether or not the Pentagon
has shown any interest. It ought to be factored into at least
their thinking. And she said----
Mr. Tkacik. I have not seen any interest. No, I think
people think about this, but when you consider that the main
concern of the Chinese Communist Party is economic growth and
stability, that sort of aggression reverses that. So, I mean,
one thinks they might think that through.
Mr. Smith. Yes?
Mr. Cheng. Sir, two other considerations. One is in a post-
war environment, what happens to the parents and grandparents
of the casualties? Since currently they are supported by the
children, assuming that China is not able to fight an
immaculate war with no casualties, you wind up with political
consequences afterwards.
The flip side to that is that there is also an inherent
public health issue with the growth in prostitution, issues
like that. Things like AIDS, et cetera, can spread like
wildfire through the Chinese surplus male population.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Smith.
Mr. Connolly?
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
An observer listening to you all on this panel, and to our
byplay with you, could, if you landed from Mars not knowing
much about this relationship, conclude all is dark and the
relationship is unrelentingly hostile; we are dealing with a
growing and powerful adversary in the People's Republic of
China from intellectual property issues to military posture, to
actually countering U.S. foreign policy issues on nuclear
proliferation, North Korea, Syria, their own hegemony in the
Pacific Basin and military posture to one-child-per-family
policies, to all kinds of things.
I wanted to give panelists an opportunity to comment on
that because surely there is more to the relationship, though
these are very serious issues and cannot be swept under the
carpet. But I haven't heard you talk much about how we move
forward and what is at stake in trying to work out some kind
of--forgive me again, Madam Chairman--modus vivendi with this--
--
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. You are going to start getting
penalized for that.
Mr. Connolly. I'm sorry.
Dr. Wortzel, do you want to start?
Mr. Wortzel. I would be happy to. Thank you for the
question, Mr. Connolly.
First of all, as our 2011 report on the commission pointed
out, things have gotten worse.
Mr. Connolly. Worse? Worse?
Mr. Wortzel. It may not be dark, but it is pretty cloudy. I
think what we have to do is work with friends and allies to
reinforce rule of law in China and to reinforce the observation
of international common practice by China, because they don't.
And we have to work with allies and friends to make sure they
do and that they comply with their WTO obligations. They have
really backed away from many of them.
Mr. Connolly. Let me ask you, if I may, Dr. Wortzel, to
expand. What is U.S. leverage and how well do you think we use
it?
Mr. Wortzel. I think, first of all, our leverage is
weakened slightly now by the economic relationship and the need
for vestment in Europe from China. So, it is less leverage.
But I think the big leverage we have is the fact that we
have a strong economy and that the Chinese really do want to
take advantage of that for their own exports in the near-term.
There are a lot of problems to resolve with respect to that,
but that is our primary leverage.
Our secondary leverage, well, perhaps as important is,
frankly, our ability to prevent a state that sees itself
culturally as the center of at least Asia, if not the world,
from exercising the coercion against its neighbors that it
traditionally has as a regional suzerain surrounded by vassal
states.
Mr. Fravel. One perspective might be to look at the
exchanges between our two countries. I believe the U.S. Embassy
in Beijing is now the second-largest diplomatic post after the
Embassy in Baghdad. That sort of reflects the fact that in all
segments of society there are close relations between many
Chinese and many Americans, especially at the person-to-person
level, not necessarily the government-to-government level.
Just as a quick anecdote, when I started studying Chinese
in the fall of 1989 at a small liberal arts college in Vermont,
there were seven students in my class. Today at that same small
liberal arts college in first-year Chinese there are now 55 or
60 students.
And so, I think, despite all the challenges that Larry has
laid out and that other panelists have laid that, the fact that
there are greater exchanges at the people-to-people level is
arguably one source of optimism in the much longer-run. But,
again, I certainly recognize and acknowledge the challenges.
Thank you.
Mr. Tkacik. I would point out that China is a rising power,
and that the United States, Europe, Japan are status-quo
powers. There is a grave potential for collision as the
international systems enter into a power transition phase.
I think the University of Chicago's John Mearsheimer
pointed out in 2008 that, as history shows, powerful states on
the rise often fight wars with other major powers. Now this is
a replay of 100 years ago in Europe, 100 years ago in Japan,
50-60 years ago in Central Europe.
I have a feeling that what we are looking at is a
historical problem, and we have not yet dealt with it.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. I'm sorry, Mr. Cheng, my time is up.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Ms. Schmidt?
Ms. Schmidt. Thank you.
I actually have two questions. I will deliver them both and
allow the experts to answer them.
The first deals with George Friedman's book, ``The Next 100
Years,'' and his assessment of where we will be militarily in
2050. He believes that we will be engaging more through
satellites and space more than with men on the ground.
Given that, and given the position of this administration
to sell restricted satellite technology, the AsiaSat issue,
what risks do you see for the U.S. in doing this, not just now,
but in the future?
And the second deals with Taiwan. When President Mao was
elected in Taiwan, he began a closer relationship and tie with
China, especially with the Olympics and getting the ability of
people to get in and out of China more easily. That, I believe,
has put a seemingly larger presence of China into Taiwan's
economy.
Given that, and the issue with the waterway issue between
China and Taiwan, how real do you see the economic/maritime
threat to Taiwan with China? And what resolution would you see
for it?
Mr. Cheng. On the issue of space warfare, I think it is
very important to recognize that PLA writings make very clear
that one of the essential aspects to successfully fighting what
they term a local war under informationized conditions is the
ability to secure space dominance. The Chinese ASAT test in
2007 was the single worst debris-generating event in all of
history. People forget that afterwards China conducted another
ASAT test in 2010.
I would suggest that the current administration's efforts
to implement an international space code of conduct in the hope
of getting the Chinese to then sign on, when China and other
space faring countries have already said that they will not do
so, is perhaps the ultimate triumph of hope over experience.
And in this regard, I think that the announcement that we
are thinking of selling space technology to China, when the
administration has repeatedly said that export control reforms,
which arguably are necessary, will not affect our controls on
China, raises real questions about what direction the
administration thinks it is heading in.
Mr. Tkacik. I would point out that, Congresswoman Schmidt,
you are absolutely correct. The new Taiwan President has
adopted a policy of accommodating China. Just in the last
several months, we have seen an entire new change in the
political posture of Taiwan, which basically agrees that Taiwan
is part of China. I think once Taiwan has made that choice,
then you are now looking at Taiwan moving out of the column of
the Western democracies and the community of democracies in
East Asia and moving into the column of the sphere of China's
security interests.
The thing you have to remember is that Taiwan still has a
sophisticated basing structure. It has phased-array radars
mounted high up in Taiwan's mountains which used to be or which
are designed to scan the Chinese mainland for ballistic missile
launches, and now will be turned out into the western Pacific
to scan for the U.S.
Taiwan's deepwater ports, submarine bases in eastern
Taiwan, just a few dozen miles from Japanese territory, which
had enabled friendly submarines to slip undetected into one of
the deepest maritime trenches in the Pacific, they will likely
give Chinese diesel/electric submarines home in the future.
There is also a possibility of China and Taiwan cooperation
against Japan and the United States in the East China Sea. The
importance of the Senkakus for defining East Asia's and Japan's
and the United States' maritime depth opposite the new Chinese
superpower I think cannot be overstated.
And all this may result--I think this is what we are
looking at, is that Ma Ying-jeou, the President of Taiwan, now
has a very clear China policy. What is also clear is that he
does not have an America policy.
Mr. Wortzel. I would only say that I fundamentally disagree
with Friedman, that until we get space-based weapons or rods
from God--and that is not real likely--no part of a maritime
domain was ever controlled from space. Space is fundamentally
important to our military operations. We have a very powerful
Navy, a powerful Air Force, and troops that can go in and put
boots on the ground.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Ms. Schmidt.
Mr. Sherman is recognized, unless you would like to have a
few minutes. Then, we can go to Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chabot is
recognized.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Could I hear the other members of the panel? We had a
meeting in back and just got in, but I heard Mr. Tkacik
discussing Taiwan.
Well, let me go to you first, Mr. Tkacik, again, and then
to the others.
Is what I just heard you say about Taiwan and the shift
under President Ma, the direction that he has gone, do you
think that is irreversible at this point? Or what is your
opinion there?
Mr. Tkacik. Well, I don't think it is irreversible. I think
what has happened is that, over the last, I have to admit, the
last two administrations, the Bush administration and the Obama
administration, basically, we have cut Taiwan loose. Taiwan is
now in a phase where they basically feel they have no support
in the United States, that the U.S. Government, the U.S.
administrations are not supporting a Taiwan that is part of the
network of Asian democracies that comprises island Asia as
opposed to mainland Asia.
When you are faced with that kind of a situation, the
Taiwanese voters basically say, ``There's no sense in me voting
for any kind of government that is going to challenge China
because we are not going to get any support.'' I think that in
2000 they thought they were going to get support, and in 2004 I
think the Taiwanese voters thought they were going to have the
support of the United States, but no more.
Now, if that were to change, I think, yes, it would make a
big difference in Taiwan's electoral process. But, right now,
the policies that the government in Taipei are adopting are
moving inexorably toward the Chinese sphere of security
responsibility.
Mr. Chabot. Would the other members of the panel like to
comment on that? Mr. Cheng or Dr. Wortzel?
Mr. Wortzel. I certainly would, and I thank you for the
opportunity to do so.
I think John, Mr. Tkacik, is right. But the operative word
he used is the elections and the voters. So, it is not like Ma
Ying-jeou has just come up with this policy that has no
support. And the legislature hasn't helped either Taiwan or
itself or the United States when they had a good armed sales
package. So, part of that is partisan politics on Taiwan.
Mr. Chabot. And let me stop you there for a second, Doctor.
By that, my recollection is that the United States was trying
to get the needed weaponry into their hands. The legislature at
that time, for political reasons or whatever, was so divided
that they couldn't get their act together enough to approve
much of----
Mr. Wortzel. That's exactly right. The legislature was and
still is divided. I think much of the populace was divided, and
that is reflected in the legislature.
And then, finally, in my personal view, Taiwan's military
piecemealed a little bit of a whole bunch of good things,
instead of going for a major defensive architecture that would
have allowed them to engage in cooperative target engagement
with all their ships and aircraft and ground systems. So, that
was mismanaged, too.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Mr. Cheng?
Mr. Cheng. Representative, I think that I am certainly not
in any kind of position to give advice on Taiwan because they
are a democracy and they make their own choices. All I can say
is that, for the United States with regard to Taiwan, and
throughout the region, what we need is a consistent strategy
and persistent actions, a consistent strategy of defending our
interest in standing up for our principles, persistent actions
that are consistent with that strategy, whether it is the sale
of needed arms under the legal terms of the Taiwan Relations
Act, not simply upgrades, as has been inquired about, or
whether it is the commitment of American forces on a persistent
basis, unlike the vast relation we saw with the George
Washington Battle Group back in 2009. Our failure to do so I do
believe has political repercussions, including in democracies
like Taiwan.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
And I have limited time. So, let me make just a comment
real quickly here.
I think the fact that the Taiwanese Government has decided
to move itself in the direction of the criminalization of
politics is unfortunate as well. Their previous President,
President Chen, still is behind bars. I think for an
administration to come and essentially jail the previous
administration is a tragedy, and I think that they ought to
deal with that sooner rather than later.
I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Sherman is recognized.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
I ask anyone on the panel to comment. Is there serious
discussion in Taiwan of developing an independent nuclear
weapons capacity? And would they have the capacity to do so
within a few years?
Mr. Tkacik. I think the answer is absolutely no. Taiwan did
have a fairly robust nuclear weapons research campaign in the
1970s and again right up until January 1988. Probably, if they
had been successful, we wouldn't be discussing this now.
But both the major political parties in Taiwan I think are
adamant against any such thing now. The ruling party is called
the Chinese Nationalist Party, and it supports Taiwan's
eventual reunification with China.
The opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party, is
adamantly anti-nuclear. So, there is just no----
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. I would like to go on to another
question.
Mr. Wortzel. Well, I would like to add to that, if I may.
Mr. Sherman. But I am sorry, I----
Mr. Wortzel. They don't have the strategic depth to
confront China with nuclear weapons.
Mr. Sherman. I would like to move on to another question.
We have a toxic trade relationship with China, a $300-billion
trade deficit. What that means is they send us $300 billion of
stuff every year and we send them $300-billion worth of paper.
I can understand why Americans like this. It produces huge
profits, helps consumers. With this ideology of free trade, we
can simply ignore that the Chinese Government controls import
decisions, not through tariffs but through other means. And so,
it fits our theoretical model of the way the world should work.
So, that provides us with an intellectual underpinning to
support the huge profits and the wonderful stuff we get.
What I don't understand is China. Every year they ship us
$300-billion worth of fine things, and they get bonds. Can
anyone here explain the bond fetish of the People's Republic of
China?
Mr. Wortzel. Well, I personally can't. I can say that our
commission's reports over a series of about 4 years and a
number of hearings that we have held make it pretty clear that
the United States treasuries market and bond market remains
still the most stable place to park that money and to get it
back, and that the undervalued currency and the continued
undervaluation of that currency is based on the ownership of
those treasuries.
Mr. Sherman. Yes, I can understand that, if you are going
to save money, U.S. Treasury bonds are a wonderful place to put
it. What I don't understand is why a developing country insists
upon saving several hundred billion dollars a year rather than
importing.
Let me move on to another question. Germany has a balanced
trade relationship with China. So, we could reach the
conclusion that German workers and entrepreneurs are better
than their counterparts in the United States or that the
foreign policy establishment in Germany is doing a better job
for the German people than the foreign policy establishment in
our country.
How has Germany conditioned access to its market on fair
access for its exporters to China? Dr. Wortzel or anyone else
may answer.
Mr. Wortzel. Well, I don't know the answer to that, but I
can tell you, from having dealt with German defense and high-
technology firms and their relationships with China, they take
a very different approach to transferring technology. They
recognize it will be stolen. They don't worry about sales and
transfers. But what they do is take already outmoded technology
for them and manufacturing and are quite willing to sell it and
transfer it with the idea that their research and development
is far ahead.
Mr. Sherman. Does anyone else have a view as to why Germany
is able to have a balanced trade relationship with China?
Mr. Tkacik. Well, the Germans have a robust industrial
infrastructure. They produce very good----
Mr. Sherman. So do we.
Mr. Tkacik. Well, I don't know if we do any more. I think
that in the last 10 years I think----
Mr. Sherman. So, you would blame the American worker and
manufacturing companies rather than the foreign policy----
Mr. Tkacik. I would blame a political decision in China not
to buy American goods. I would point out that, while we have a
$300-billion trade deficit with China, China basically, all
told, has a $100-billion trade surplus. So, they are using
American money to buy other people's goods and other people's
resources and commodities. It seems to be a conscious economic
decision on the part of China not to buy American.
Mr. Sherman. I agree.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Mr. Royce is recognized.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
My subcommittee held a hearing on China's so-called
indigenous innovation policy, and indigenous innovation is just
basically the concept for the Chinese Government extortion of
U.S. technology, in the view of many.
For years, American businesses were afraid to speak out on
this issue. I think they feared they would be shut out of the
Chinese market. But now we have a different attitude. Now, at
long last, you see U.S. businesses speaking out long and hard
about this indigenous innovation issue.
I would like your views on these policies, the forced
transfer of U.S. technology over to the government in China. I
would just like to underscore that this is some of the most
valuable technology that U.S. companies possess.
I should add that Mr. Connolly and I have legislation
coming out of that hearing that we held that I introduced
changing these practices. That is H.R. 2271.
But let me just get your thoughts on the record.
Mr. Cheng. Representative, I think that it is important to
put all this in the context of the Chinese emphasis on
comprehensive national policy, the idea that a nation's
position is a reflection of science and technology and
industry.
In this regard, then, the emphasis is on technological
development as a means of bringing China up the value chain to
get it out of making the low-end items, becoming more of a
manufacturing power and a post-industrial set of capabilities.
This is consistent with what the Chinese have termed the two
bombs/one satellite policies, which also emphasize domestic
development, partly a fear that it would be cut off, as it was
after the Sino-Soviet split, from foreign technology. But,
also, partly the idea that you want to obtain foreign R&D which
is, therefore, going to be lower cost, and the creation of
state champions to create better.
The aspect of indigenous innovation should also be seen in
the context of cyber warfare, in the sense of, if I can't get
you to invest here, I may be willing to use cyber methods to
try to, frankly, steal it from you.
Mr. Royce. And some argue that they are not that great at
innovation, and that is why they steal. That is why they steal
it.
But go ahead.
Mr. Wortzel. Well, I mean, there are cultural impediments
to creating new ideas, and there are structural because of the
Communist Party organization, and they recognize that.
But I have to say our commission looked at--I haven't seen
your legislation, sir, but we looked last year at Mr. Webb's
suggestion, Senator Webb's suggestion. We were not able to come
to an agreement on it.
But I will give you, if I might, the position that I
suggested on this issue. That is, you take a look--somehow
pharma for me is a decent model. I mean, you don't want to
limit the transfer of technologies that may have been developed
with government funding and research or taxpayer-funded
research and development to China. But, after a while, it
doesn't always pay to control it. You know, the M1911A1 pistol
was 1911.
But pharma for me, because there is this sort of 5-year
window, 7-year window, where the patents then go away, and
other companies can use it, is a reasonable model to think
about. The taxpayers deserve some return and not to lose what
they funded certainly for a fixed period of time. But how far
that should go, we couldn't agree.
Mr. Tkacik. I mean, I would add that the Chinese have gone
out of their way to steal America's most advanced technologies.
They have done this to Applied Materials. They have done it
Cisco Systems. They have done it to Google. They have done it
to Microsoft.
And just in the last week, we saw a very interesting report
from, I guess it was, Business Week, on how the Chinese stole
the software and blueprints from American Superconductor, a
Massachusetts company, basically, leaving American
Superconductor with $700 million in unpaid equipment bills. And
the Chinese basically turned around and said, ``That we don't
need anymore. We can build this ourselves.'' It was
breathtaking.
The problem I have, though, is that when the Chinese go and
steal this technology from us, after a while they do begin to
develop an indigenous research and development capability
that----
Mr. Royce. Let me make one last point. Last year, the DoD's
annual report on the Chinese military reported an extensive
tunnel network underneath China designed to hide its nuclear
weapons. It could be 3,000 miles long, as I understand it. That
would imply, they say, that the often-cited 300 to 400 weapons
may, in fact, be many times that. Yes or no?
Mr. Tkacik. The answer is yes.
Mr. Royce. Thank you.
I yield back, Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Manzullo is recognized.
Mr. Manzullo. I am always intrigued by how Americans try to
work with Chinese based upon an American model of thinking.
Mr. Cheng, I commend you in your paper for talking about
something that most people don't even imagine, and that is the
manner in which the Chinese approach something. If I could call
your attention to page 5 of your testimony, you make the
statement, paragraph 3, line 3, ``The first issue is that the
Chinese do not think the way we do.'' Then, you point that out
by way of various examples. Also, the same pattern appears in
Mr. Tkacik's testimony and, actually, across the board.
I was at a remarkable meeting of the U.S.-China Business
Council on April 22, 2004. I wrote this down, keep it in my
BlackBerry, as quoting Madam Wu Yi, at the time who I guess was
the equivalent of the Secretary of Treasury perhaps.
She said that China has a ``market-based, managed, unitary
floating exchange rate.'' I wrote that down, and I said this
can't be. And then, my aide there said, well, this is in the
official English translation of what she said in Chinese.
What is particularly bothersome is the fact that we tend to
deal with the Chinese based upon Western thinking. I just want
to throw that out to Mr. Cheng and other members of the panel.
I know you agree with me on that, but talk about it and the
impact it has on American diplomacy with China.
Mr. Cheng. In brief, sir, I would submit the following:
That in many ways we tend to think of China as a rising power.
We think of ourselves as a status-quo power, which is hardly
surprising given that we are happy with where we are after
about 250 years of history.
I would suggest that China actually thinks of itself as a
status-quo power. The problem is how you define the status quo.
For us, in our history, China has always been a weak power and
only now has been rising over the last, say, 20 years. For
China, with its 3-, 4-, 5,000 years of history, it has almost
always been the dominant power in Asia and, therefore, the
known world for them.
China, therefore, is seeking to re-establish itself. This
is not Germany in 1900 newly-unified. This is a country that
sees itself as returning to the world stage in its proper
place. That is a very different perspective.
Mr. Manzullo. Anybody else want to comment on that? Dr.
Fravel?
Mr. Fravel. Well, just a different example would be Chinese
negotiating behavior. So, for example, many Chinese
negotiations, the Chinese will want to first talk about
principles and get agreement upon principles and, then, sort of
establish a friendship or reach an agreement; whereas, I think
the Americans approach it sort of the opposite. You reach the
agreement first and, then, you sort of become friends
afterwards.
And so, I think it creates a lot of challenges in
negotiations with China. I think it is very important to
understand what these differences are and how they will affect
various aspects of U.S. foreign policy.
Mr. Manzullo. Dr. Wortzel?
Mr. Wortzel. Well, I think that we want to stick to a
Western viewpoint because essentially those are the legal norms
and the international norms by which the world conducts itself,
conducts warfare and trade. I think the mistake that we
sometimes make is to think that Chinese perceptions and policy
mirrors our way of looking at it.
So, I think it is very important to understand, as Dr.
Cheng did, how the Chinese--or Mr. Cheng--how the Chinese think
about things. But I don't think we should depart from a Western
viewpoint. The goal of our policy in the World Trade
Organization is to get them to adopt that or at least live by
it.
Mr. Manzullo. Mr. Tkacik?
Mr. Tkacik. Tkacik.
Mr. Manzullo. Tkacik.
Mr. Tkacik. I would just say that China is no longer a
rule-taker. China is now a rule-maker in the international
system. And imagine what the world is going to be like when
China makes the rules.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Manzullo.
Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and
thank you for holding this hearing, providing this kind of
leadership to focus our attention on some real threats to our
prosperity and to our security.
Let me just note for the record, Madam Chairman, that when
we refer to China, we are not referring to the people of China.
We are referring to the regime that controls the people of
China and its entourage. But the people themselves are not
responsible for the policies that we are talking about because
China is the world's largest dictatorship and human rights
abuser, to the degree that we are upset by the way the Chinese
are setting up the rules on how they relate to us. One can only
imagine the horror of having to live under a regime as arrogant
and as oppressive as they do in China. So, let us reach out to
the Chinese people.
What we have seen is the greatest transfer of wealth and
power in the history of the world. In the last 30 years, we
have seen a transfer of wealth from the United States and other
Western countries, but especially the United States, to China,
to a China that, as I say, is governed by the world's worst
human rights abuser/dictatorship.
This transfer of wealth, it should be no surprise. You
know, are we really astonished that this has happened? No. We
have seen it going on, and it is a result of specific policies
that we have had in our Government, policies that we have not
been able to change here in Congress because we have a business
elite in the United States who are making profit for
themselves, for the elite, off this policy, even though it may
transfer wealth away from the rest of us, and, of course, a
policy that has been also supported by people in the Executive
Branch, for whatever their grandiose schemes of trying to make
China a more peaceful country, a less dictatorship, because we
are going to make them more prosperous.
That theory, of course, the what I call a ``hug-a-Nazi/
make-a-liberal theory,'' has not worked. And surprise,
surprise, they are still the world's worst human rights abuser,
but now they have all of our technology and they are building
high-tech weapons based on what we have given them, the wealth
as well as the technological capabilities.
And, of course, they are the ones responsible, Madam
Chairman, for the greatest and just most blatant theft of
American technology and the investment that it took to create
that technology of anything that any of us have witnessed in
our lifetime.
And for the record, it has been reported that the head of
the EU Space Agency recently met with the Chinese in order to
see if it is possible we can permit them to be partners and
dock their rockets onto the International Space Station.
I was a little late for today's hearing. I was at a meeting
of the Science Committee. I will put on the record here as
well: The United States should not in any way agree to having
Chinese rockets and Chinese participation in the International
Space Station.
Of course, the rockets are made up of technology that they
have stolen from us. Thus, they have no R&D cost, which has
drained our money and our resources. To permit them now to
participate in the International Space Station would be adding
much harm and much insult to already something where there is
harm and insult.
I noticed that Ambassador Gary Locke, our Ambassador to
China, in a recent speech indicated that the Obama
administration expects to loosen export controls ``that will
enable more high-tech goods to be exported to China.''
There has been a recent, for example, loosening of those
export controls by a company called AsiaSat, which now has been
given an export license. It is a Hong-Kong-based company. But
it has got tremendous and very identifiable roots and contacts
and controls by the Beijing regime.
And Ambassador Locke disclosed that China has submitted a
list of 141 high-tech items that they want from the United
States. Madam Chairman, I would request that this committee ask
for that list. And Ambassador Locke has indicated that 46 of
those items are readily available and could almost go without
any controls. I would ask that this committee request----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. I will be glad to make that request,
and we will put it in writing and make sure that he receives
it.
Thank you. The gentleman's time is up, if you want to
conclude with some----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, gentlemen. I am sorry, but I
needed to put that on the record.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. We will make that
request, and thank you so much.
Mr. Kelly is recognized.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I thank the panel
for being here.
Now China is the world's most active and persistent
perpetrator of economic espionage. Every day U.S. businesses
are targeted by China for cyber exploitation and theft,
resulting in huge losses of valuable intellectual property and
sensitive information.
So, China has stolen a wealth of IP from companies such as
Google, which somebody talked about; Yahoo, Northrop Grumman,
as well as a number of smaller companies that are afraid of
speaking up, lest they provoke even further attacks from China.
U.S. companies have reported an onslaught of Chinese cyber
intrusions that steal sensitive information like client lists,
merger and acquisition data, pricing information, and the
results of research and developmental efforts. This information
is used to give Chinese companies an unfair competitive
advantage against our American companies from whom it was
stolen.
Now while these hackers continue to steal intellectual
property, they take new high-paying jobs from American workers
right along with it. Estimates of this loss and economic
espionage are hard to make, but they range anywhere from $2
billion to $400 billion a year. Just as important, many of
these same vulnerabilities used to steal intellectual property
can also be used to attack the critical infrastructures we
depend on every day.
My question is, what is your assessment of this
administration's actions in light of its solemn duty to protect
U.S. businesses and infrastructure from cyber exploitation and
theft? In fact, we even have a clearly-defined policy. Any of
the folks on the panel?
Mr. Wortzel. I think the administration's approach has
improved and is improving. I think having a U.S. Cyber Command
and I think the great work by the Department of Justice and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in notifying U.S. industry--94
percent of the penetrations of American industry are discovered
by agencies of the U.S. Government, not those industries. It is
the government that tells them. Unfortunately, sometimes it
takes 400 days or so for that to happen. So, they can use more
assets. But I think they have a very good effort.
If you look at espionage convictions, if you look at
convictions for violations of the Arms Export Control Act, the
Export Administration Act, and the Industrial Espionage Act,
Economic Espionage Act, I think Justice has done an excellent
job over the past 6 or 8 years in bringing people to justice.
What we lack in the cyber arena are the things that I
actually put into my testimony. We don't have a way to take a
Chinese company to task or a Chinese actor and prohibit them
from entering the U.S. market. I have suggested ways to do
that. I think they are practical and reasonable.
Our commission held a hearing on this same subject on
Monday. We had a couple of very good suggestions from cyber
specialists who suggested companies adopt annual audits, in
addition to defenses. And that with these annual audits,
instead of waiting for the FBI or the Department of Homeland
Security to tell them they have been penetrated, they will
discover it.
General Cartwright, the former vice chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, made an excellent suggestion, in fact, cited
times of cooperation when the United States Government found
penetrations by China. They went right to the Chinese
Government.
Mr. Kelly. Well, let me ask, because time is of the essence
in all of this. As you said, sometimes it takes 400 days.
Mr. Wortzel. Yes.
Mr. Kelly. So, what kind of a price are U.S. businesses
paying on this and the workers and the rest of the people that
are involved in this theft? It just seems to me that, while we
may have some policy, we don't have a clearly-defined policy.
Where I am from in northwest Pennsylvania, we are losing jobs
all the time and people are wondering, what are you going to do
to stop this?
Mr. Wortzel. Network monitoring is extremely important.
Mr. Kelly. But in terms of losses, what do you think we
have lost?
Mr. Wortzel. Well, again, you have to document it. You have
to have a legal mechanism to go after it and get it back. I
mean, it is a legal problem.
Mr. Tkacik. I would just add one thing, that it was very
unsettling to me that the one agency in the entire U.S.
Government that knows what it is doing in cyber penetration was
not given the lead in America's cyber penetration strategy by
the Obama administration. I think NSA has to be in the lead
because they are the only ones that know what they are doing.
I had one other profound thought, and it slipped my mind.
So, I will just----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. I have had those senior moments so
often. [Laughter.]
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Burton is recognized.
Mr. Burton. First of all, I want to apologize for my
tardiness. I had another meeting I had to go to. So, I am sorry
I missed a lot of your testimony. And if my questions sound
redundant, please forgive me.
The first thing I want to ask is, when I walked in, I heard
you say there is 3,000 miles of tunnels in China that are used
to conceal weaponry. First of all, why would they be doing
that? I don't understand it. They are a nuclear power. We all
know their nuclear capability. They have enough nuclear
warheads and delivery systems to annihilate almost everybody on
earth. Why in the world would they want to have 3,000 miles of
tunnels to conceal more weaponry when they have already got
enough? Anybody?
Mr. Wortzel. First of all, there probably are about 3,000
miles of tunnels. They are not all storing nuclear weapons.
There are underground national command centers, command-and-
control equipment. There are military stores. There are civil
defense stores in there. So, there are logistics and petroleum
and ammunition in there.
But all of China's nuclear doctrine, so far as I understand
it--and I think I do--is that if they are attacked, and it is
unclear whether that would be a conventional or a nuclear
attack, but if they suffer a very strong attack, they want
their nuclear forces to be able to emerge even 2 to 4 days
later and fire a very, very devastating second strike.
Mr. Burton. Wow.
Mr. Wortzel. So, part of this is denial and deception.
Mr. Burton. Maybe I should check and ask the question, what
do we have in response to that?
Mr. Fravel. One other element to add here is that the
building of the tunnels in China began, actually, in the 1960s
when China was very worried about whether or not it would have
a secure strike capability because many of its missiles were
quite vulnerable to first strike. And so, these tunnels have a
very long history, primarily, as Larry just mentioned, in terms
of ensuring some second-strike capability. And then, they are
also used for other purposes in terms of storage of supplies,
and so forth.
But it is not a new, the point I want to make, it is not a
new phenomenon. It is part of a very sort of longstanding
practice.
Mr. Burton. But it may be, but to build 3,000 miles of
tunnels is going to take more than a week anyhow.
Mr. Fravel. It has taken about four decades.
Mr. Burton. Sure, it took more----
Mr. Tkacik. I would add that a Georgetown study, which I
thought was very good, documented that I think at least half of
the tunnels had been built since the mid-1990s.
The other thing is that we do have a good sense of what
China's fissile material production capacity is. They
absolutely refuse to discuss fissile material cutoff and any
kind of enforcement or inspection.
Mr. Burton. Okay.
Mr. Tkacik. So, we don't know.
Mr. Burton. The other thing I would like to ask--and you
may have already answered this question--when Mr. Wang went
into our Embassy and was there for some time and he was refused
asylum, and he was a real potential source of intelligence
information, I would like to get your take on why we would even
consider letting him out and letting him be captured by the
Chinese.
Mr. Tkacik. Well, I think China----
Mr. Burton. Well, just 1 second. And I understand that we
had the Vice President of China coming in, and that might be
part of it.
And the other thing is, I read in my preparation here that
there are some instability prospects in China and there is a
possibility that there might be some kind of a coup.
So, if you could comment on those two things in the
remaining time I have, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Tkacik. In my days in the State Department, I had to
deal with a couple of walk-ins, three separate walk-ins. I have
to say that the State Department doesn't really train you in
how to deal with these things. You sort of learn about it by
experience. I think, by the last one, we figured it out.
But in the case of Wang Lijun, who seems to have gone into
the American Consulate, I really don't know if the reports that
he filled out an application form for asylum are correct. I am
not sure that that is----
Mr. Burton. Well, my goodness, he was there for 24 hours.
Mr. Tkacik. Well, he was there for----
Mr. Burton. I mean, I can't imagine him just saying, ``I
want asylum. I am a high-level person in the Chinese
Government. I am here. I want to stay. I have got information
for you,'' and we say, ``Oh, we haven't filled out the forms.
We are going to keep you.''
Mr. Tkacik. Yes, I don't think that is--I think what had
happened is that he actually did fear for his life. My
understanding is that he approached the British Consulate in
Chongqing first, and this whole mystery surrounding the death
of a British citizen in Chongqing last November really
heightens this enigma. I think he went to the American
Consulate because he thought that was the only place he
wouldn't be killed.
My hypothesis is that what we had was that he probably was
negotiating with the Chinese Government for his life. It is
basically up to maybe the committee here or the Intelligence
Committee to get a briefing from the State Department on what
actually happened. But we just don't have enough information.
I mean, I would also add that, if this guy wanted asylum,
going to the American Consulate in Chengdu is probably the last
place he should have gone. We, I think, believe that if he had
really wanted asylum, he knew that he had to get out of China
first before he applied for asylum and not apply for it inside.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. We will make the proper inquiries,
Mr. Burton. Thank you for bringing that case up.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. And our Part II of this China
hearing will be on human rights. And so, I am sure that we will
consider his case at length.
Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us. Thank you to the
audience and to the press who is here. Thank you most
especially to our members. And with that, the hearing is
adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]