ASSESSING MOBILITY AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES AND OPERATIONAL RISKS UNDER THE REVISED 2012 DEFENSE STRATEGY

HEARING

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPower AND PROJECTION FORCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

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ASSESSING MOBILITY AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES AND OPERATIONAL RISKS UNDER THE REVISED 2012 DEFENSE STRATEGY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES,  

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:37 p.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. W. Todd Akin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

Mr. AKIN. I am going to bring the hearing to order here. We are going to have some members showing up in a few minutes.

And before I read an opening statement, if it is all right with you, I will start with a prayer.

Father, we thank you for each day you give us. We thank you for the pretty day outside. We thank you for the many people who serve our country. We ask you please to watch over our words and our thoughts at this time in this hearing. Please watch over the people who serve us overseas.

And I ask this in Jesus' name.

Amen.

Thank you, gentlemen.

I would like to welcome everyone here to the first hearing of the second session of the 112th Congress for the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee. I look forward to continuing our bipartisan efforts that have been a longstanding tradition in this subcommittee in providing our service men and women with the best equipment possible in this most challenging budget environment. That is an understatement.

Testifying before us are representatives from the Air Force, Army and Government Accountability Offices. We have General Ray Johns, Commander of Air Mobility; Lieutenant General Bud Wyatt, Director of Air National Guard; Major General Jim Barclay, Deputy to the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff; and Major General Chris Bogdan, the KC–46 Tanker Program Manager; and Mr. Cary Russell, Acting Director of GAO’s [Government Accountability Office] Defense Capabilities and Management Directorate.

Gentlemen, welcome and thank you for the many years of service providing leadership that enables our military to be the finest in the world. Today, we are here to assess the increased risk incurred within the airlift and tanker mobility portfolios of the Army and
Air Force as a result of the President's April, 2011 initiative calling for continued reductions to the defense budget.

As a result, the fiscal year 2013 budget request for DOD [Department of Defense] is $45.3 billion or 8 percent below the planned fiscal year 2013 budget submitted in last year's fiscal year 2012 request. The end-state consequences resulted in divestment of 150 aircraft from air mobility programs and will even force the Air Force to fly brand-new C–27 joint cargo aircraft directly from the production line to the “boneyard” in Arizona this year.

Furthermore, this new budget-driven defense strategy negates the 2010 quadrennial defense review scenarios developed just 2 years ago that were used to right-size airlift programs in anticipation of the threats and contingencies that the U.S. Government should be prepared for in the 2016-and-beyond time period.

Nothing to date has occurred over the last 2 years indicating that the world has gotten safer or that the foreseeable operations tempo of our military will significantly decrease to justify such a large reduction of force structure.

A smaller force structure operating under the same operational tempo only leads to our military wearing out their equipment quicker than planned. Just ask the Navy. They have 285 ships today, but currently operate them as if they had a fleet of 350.

The next threat around the corner that is certainly predictable is budget sequestration. The $487 billion in cuts imposed upon the defense budget already concern me and I certainly do not support the devastating effect that sequestration will have on national security come this January. It makes no sense to me why some believe that penalizing defense, which is only 20 percent of our discretionary budget, an additional $500 billion to $600 billion through sequestration, is acceptable policy.

The only outcomes from such a mindset is a guarantee that we will move toward becoming a regional power and open a global void that another rising power will most certainly fill. I ask our witnesses to please help the subcommittee understand what impact sequestration will have on your respective areas of the DOD budget.

Gentlemen, I thank you again for being with us today. We look forward to your testimony.

And I now recognize the ranking subcommittee member, who is—okay, Mrs. Davis are you going to stand in? Good. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 33.]

STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to express these remarks on behalf of Congressman Mike McIntyre, ranking chair of the subcommittee.

I would like to thank all the witnesses for appearing here today and for your service to our country.

Given the number of recently announced reductions, it is important for us to have a clear understanding of what the airlift requirements are to meet the new defense strategy. With the retire-
ment of all 27 C–5As, the elimination of the entire C–27J fleet, and the retirement of 65 C–130s, I am concerned about whether or not we have the mobility resources required to meet current and future global demands.

While there will be a drawdown in the overall end-strength of the ground forces in the coming years, there will also be a shift of resources to the Asia-Pacific area of responsibility, and that will require increased support. My understanding is that many of these shifts will begin in the coming years, while our commitments to the current conflict in Afghanistan remain.

I am interested in hearing how the strategic shift, combined with our current commitments, will impact mobility demands. I am anxious to hear from the witnesses about the decision to terminate the C–27J program and retire all the current aircraft we have already bought and paid for. A clarification in the assumptions that were made in this process and how the Air Force plans to fulfill this requirement would be helpful to the subcommittee.

With regard to the KC–46 tanker-replacement program, I am encouraged to see signs that the program is progressing in a positive direction. Recent briefings to committee staff shows both low risk in the areas of cost and technical performance and moderate risk in scheduled performance. I know that the KC–46 program office is working diligently to keep the program on a stable track and avoid any design or contract changes that could potentially delay delivery and allow for increased costs.

Once again, thank you very much to the witnesses for appearing here today, and we all look forward to your testimony.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McIntyre can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

Mr. AKIN. Thank you.

Eloquent; good job.

Okay, we are going to have opening statements.

First, General Johns, go ahead. I think, what are we talking about, maybe 5 minutes or so? About 5 minutes or so; and then going to be Lieutenant General Wyatt, Major General Barclay, and then Mr. Russell.

Okay? Good.

Thank you, General.

STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND E. JOHNS, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR MOBILITY COMMAND

General JOHNS. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the full written statement be placed in the record.

Chairman Akin, Acting Ranking Member Mrs. Davis, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you about our Nation's air mobility capabilities. I am honored to be joined by the distinguished members of this panel, and particularly pleased that General Wyatt is here. Air Mobility Command is the 135,000 airmen from Active, Guard, and Reserve. We could not do our mission without the full support and commitment of the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve.

We in the mobility forces answer the call so others may prevail across the spectrum, from humanitarian to combat operations. In
March of last year, we moved 13,000 military and civilian personnel to Japan to support tsunami relief. We evacuated thousands of DOD dependents back to the U.S. over radiation concerns and provided 79 percent of the refueling required for Libya operations and continued to support the ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan with air, land, and air-drop missions. It was truly our version of March Madness.

AMC [Air Mobility Command] is a force provider. We are the air component of United States Transportation Command, so we do not determine the requirements, but are responsible for making sure the combatant commanders’ requirements can be met.

Our Nation’s air-mobility fleet is a national treasure that truly sets us apart as a world power. We take the stewardship of this fleet very seriously. We want to ensure our Nation’s leaders that follow generations from today will have the same strategic options we now enjoy.

We can project combat power anywhere in the world when we match an air-refueling tanker with a strike platform. We can re-supply a forward-operating base cut off from the ground using our airlifters for air drop. We can return a wounded soldier to critical care back in the United States within hours of being injured.

We are also keenly aware of the fiscal realities we face. This committee, like few others, understands the impact of a $487 billion reduction of funding over the next 10 years. Air mobility is not immune from this. Let me assure you today that very thoughtful analysis and deliberation went into the fiscal year 2013 President’s budget request. No less than four different studies performed by various stakeholders and OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and the joint staff and the air staff informed the air mobility portion of the President’s budget request.

We will be smaller, but at the same time, more modern and more agile than we have ever been. I can assure the committee that we can support the 2012 defense strategic guidance.

AMC supports the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget request. We truly appreciate the impact, though, of the force structure changes that it will have on your communities, and they are our communities also. We searched for total force solutions, and with the help of General Wyatt and many others, we believe we are best poised to go into the future.

Again, we thank you for letting us discuss air mobility today. We look forward to your questions, and a special thank you to this committee for your enduring support of what we hold as a national treasure, our airmen and this mission.

[The prepared statement of General Johns can be found in the Appendix on page 36.]

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, General.

And General Wyatt.

STATEMENT OF LT GEN HARRY M. WYATT, USAF, DIRECTOR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD

General Wyatt. Chairman Akin and Ranking Member McIntyre and members of the subcommittee, I am honored to appear before you today representing the over 106,000 dedicated men and women of our Nation’s Air National Guard.
As the director of the Air National Guard, my job is to ensure Guard airmen have the resources and training necessary to accomplish their assigned missions and task. But as a U.S. Air Force officer and an American citizen, I want an Air Force which has both the capability and capacity to meet future national security challenges, and I want that Air Force at the lowest possible cost.

There have been a number of airlift requirement studies in the last two years, as I know you are aware. I doubt that any of them have captured the full requirements to meeting overseas contingency operations, direct support to the Army, and domestic emergencies. It is not for a lack of trying. We simply do not fully understand all of the airlift requirements.

The Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study 2016, or MCRS 2016, is the most comprehensive study, but there is an assumption that “ground transportation provides the best rate of closure.” I question whether that stands up to historical fact or exercise experiences.

Hurricanes, floods, blizzards, and earthquakes block access roads and damage bridges, making ground transportation very difficult. As demonstrated in many real-world experiences, it is far easier and faster to clear a few miles of runway and ramps than hundreds of miles of highways.

And in complex, catastrophic events, such as last summer’s National Level Exercise 11, sometimes referred to NLE 11, a major earthquake along the New Madrid Fault or the Japanese experiences of a year ago, outgoing refugee traffic will make in-bound relief traffic practically impossible.

I recognize that a once-in-a-100-year event, such as the Hurricane Katrina, may not be the best benchmark for requirements planning, but it does provide a frame of reference for complex, catastrophic events.

In response to Hurricane Katrina, the Air National Guard used 83 Air National Guard airlift aircraft or about 35 percent of the Air Guard inventory at that time to transport supplies, equipment, and aid workers into the stricken area and to evaluate victims.

Of the 29 Air Guard airlift units that supported the Katrina recovery mission, 6 have undergone major mission changes, primary due to BRAC [Base Closure and Realignment] 2005, and more could be affected by fiscal year 2013 budget.

It is also not just about numbers of aircraft that will be needed to respond to simultaneous domestic and overseas events. It is also about basing or disbursement. During a major event, such as a hurricane, earthquake, or chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear event, the aircraft and personnel in the affected area may not be available to respond.

We have all learned a lot since Hurricane Katrina, and even since MCRS 2016 was done. NORTHCOM [Northern Command], FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency], and the National Guard are working to improve the Nation’s response capabilities and to better understand response requirements including airlift. But now is not the time to assume away domestic airlift needs.

It is interesting to note that, because of the timing of MCRS 2016, it was not informed by the new national strategy or the lesson of National Level Exercise 11 or the restructuring of the chem-
ical, biological, and radiological enterprise, which created 10 homeland response forces in the Air National Guard, each comprised of 550 passengers or soldiers and airmen that could in all likelihood require airlift transportation to the next domestic emergency.

Thank you for inviting me here today. Thank you for your service to the Nation and support to the United States Air Force and its Reserve Components. And I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Wyatt can be found in the Appendix on page 48.]

Mr. Akin. Thank you, General.

And Major General Barclay.

STATEMENT OF MG JAMES O. BARCLAY, USA, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

General Barclay. Chairman Akin, Ranking Member McIntyre, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear here today, and I also welcome this opportunity to testify before you and appreciate the tremendous ongoing support of Congress and your committee to our soldiers stationed around the world.

These soldiers need our efforts to sustain and support them as they continue to fight in one of our Nation’s longest wars and doing this with an all-volunteer force.

While our operational tempo is very high, our commitment to ensuring our Army force remains a viable and essential enabling capability to the joint force remains steadfast to the Army.

Your continued leadership and support in providing full, timely and sustained funding is critical to our success.

Everything we do in the Army, every decision we make, has one constant that we cannot subordinate, and that is the mitigation of risk to our soldiers who are in harm’s way.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I thank you again for your continued generous support and demonstrated commitment to the outstanding men and women of the United States Army and their families. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Barclay can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]

Mr. Akin. Thank you, General.

And then Mr. Russell.

STATEMENT OF CARY RUSSELL, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. Russell. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McIntyre, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and talk about our work on DOD’s mobility capabilities.

As you know, in February 2010, DOD completed its Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016, or MCRS 2016. It is important to examine this study and its limitations in light of DOD’s new strategic guidance on defense priorities and the Air Force’s proposal for aircraft reductions.
I will briefly summarize the key findings from our report on MCRS 2016 and then highlight some important air mobility issues to consider with respect to the Department’s new strategic guidance.

DOD’s MCRS 2016 study was intended to provide an understanding of the range of mobility capabilities needed for possible future military operations by identifying the capabilities and requirements to support national strategy. In essence, the MCRS 2016 was to help leaders make investment decisions regarding mobility systems.

MCRS 2016 had several specific objectives, and my statement will focus on our analysis of two of these. One, determining the gaps or shortfalls and overlaps or excesses associated with mobility capabilities; and two, providing a risk assessment.

We found that although the MCRS 2016 included some useful information concerning air mobility systems, it did not provide decisionmakers with specific information on shortfalls and excesses or the associated risks.

For each of the three cases of potential conflicts or disasters that DOD used in the MCRS 2016 study, DOD identified the required capabilities for air mobility systems. But the study stopped short of explicitly stating whether a shortfall or excess existed.

For example, in each case the study identified unused strategic airlift capacity but did not state whether this unused capacity represented an excess of strategic mobility aircraft such as the C–5.

The MCRS 2016 also did not provide risk assessments related to potential shortfalls and excesses in mobility capabilities. Assessing risk related to shortfalls and excesses is important. The risk associated with shortfalls is that the mission might not be accomplished, while the risk associated with excesses is that resources may be expended unnecessarily.

The MCRS 2016 showed, for example, that airborne tanker demand exceeded tanker capacity by 20 percent in one of its cases, but it did not identify the risk associated with this potential shortfall.

At the time we issued our report on the MCRS 2016 in December 2010, we recommended that DOD explicitly identify shortfalls and excesses in mobility systems, identify the associated risks, and provide this additional analysis to DOD and congressional decisionmakers.

Although DOD disagreed with the recommendations, decisionmakers rely on studies such MCRS 2016 so that they can make informed choices to address shortfalls and excesses.

If the MCRS 2016 had identified an excess, decisionmakers may have chosen either to retire aircraft or keep an operational reserve to mitigate against unforeseen events. Or if the study had identified a shortfall, decisionmakers may have chosen to accept the operational risk or sought to increase capabilities.

Furthermore, quantifying the risk associated with specific mobility systems could help with decisions to allocate resources so that the most risk can be addressed at the least cost. Therefore we continue to believe that DOD needs to report on shortfalls, excesses, and associated risks.
I would like to now turn to a brief discussion of DOD’s new strategic guidance, issued just this past January, which could affect air-mobility requirements.

DOD has stated that the guidance will ensure that our military is ready for the full range of contingencies. However, it includes changes from previous strategy, such as U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operation.

Based on the new guidance, the Air Force has proposed changes to the mobility air fleet, including reductions of 130 mobility aircraft. But the Air Force’s February 2012 document that outlines its proposed reductions does not provide details of any analyses.

Given the new guidance, it is unclear to what extent the requirements developed from the MCRS are relevant today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. That concludes my remarks. I would happy to take any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Russell can be found in the Appendix on page 65.]

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Russell.

And, General Bogdan, I understand you did have a couple of thoughts before we get started in the questions and all.

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN CHRISTOPHER BOGDAN, USAF, DIRECTOR, KC–46 TANKER MOBILIZATION DIRECTORATE

General Bogdan. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Akin, Ranking Member McIntyre, and the distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity for me to address this committee with an update of the status of the KC–46 program, 1 year after contract award.

I have been the KC–46 Program Executive Officer and Program Director since May of 2009, as we began the second KC–X source selection. I appreciate the subcommittee’s continued support of our Air Force tanker programs and of our Air Force and look forward to answering your questions today and continuing to brief you and your professional staff on a regular basis on the execution of the KC–46 program. Thank you.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you very much.

One thing that may be for the benefit of the committee I think that might be helpful is just to go to kind of a before-and-after here in terms of just number of aircraft, because that would give us a little bit of a sense of what we are doing.

So let us identify—let us just start from the top. We have got tankers. And how many do we currently have before we make these cuts?

General Bogdan, you don’t know for sure? Okay.

General BOGDAN. Yes, sir, I do.

Currently the tanker fleet consists of KC–135s and KC–10s, and there are 453 in the inventory today; 59 of them are KC–10s and 794 of them are KC–135s.

Mr. AKIN. Let us do those numbers again. I wasn’t quite fast enough.

The total in inventory is how much?

General BOGDAN. Four hundred and fifty-three.
Mr. Akin. Four hundred and fifty-three—and we are going to drop that to what?
General Johns. Mr. Chairman, we are going to take down 20 KC–135s.
Mr. Akin. 43.
General Johns. 20 will come off the KC–135, sir.
Mr. Akin. 20?
General Johns. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. So we are going to go minus 20 out of the KC–135.
Okay. So we——
General Johns. And the KC–10s stay the same, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Akin. Okay. Okay.
And then let us see what we have beyond that. We have got your big C–17s. What do you call the——
General Johns. C–17, sir, that is the——
Mr. Akin. Right. What do you call them, though——
General Johns. Loadmaster.
Mr. Akin. Yes, I know, but what—they are the large cargo-hauling planes. Is there a category for those?
General Johns. Strategic airlift aircraft.
Mr. Akin. Okay.
General Johns. So we put that, the C–5 and the C–17, in the same category, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Akin. And we are reducing—how many do we have total aircraft?
General Johns. 223.
Mr. Akin. 223.
General Johns. And we have sustained that number, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Akin. So you keep the same number——
General Johns. Correct.
Mr. Akin [continuing]. Of those. You are retiring, what is it, the C–5s that are the A models?
General Johns. Yes, Mr. Chairman. So we have 79 C–5s, which are A’s, B’s and M models——
Mr. Akin. Yes.
General Johns [continuing]. And we are going to ask them to retire 27 C–5As, not convert them, and retire them.
Mr. Akin. So you are going from 223 down by 27, right?
General Johns. Two hundred twenty-three, plus we would have to add the 79, if you want to put C–5s and C–17s together. So C–17s stay the same at 223; the C–5 goes from 79 down to 52.
Mr. Akin. Okay. So you got strategic and then you have—the C–130s. You don’t call those strategic, right?
General Johns. Tactical airlift.
Mr. Akin. Tactical, yes.
General Johns. Mr. Chairman, we are going from 390 to 318 C–130s.
Mr. Akin. 390 to 318.
General Johns. And then the C–27 is the—I call it the little brother.
Mr. Akin. Yes.
General Johns. And it is going to be going down. Again, we are going to go to zero with that. And we haven’t fully taken the——
Mr. AKIN. What do you have, 38 now?
General JOHNS. No, sir. We have nine delivered, and we are supposed to get more, and then we are going to go down zero.
Mr. AKIN. Okay. So that kind of covers the whole—does that cover the whole waterfront of all the aircraft?
General JOHNS. The ones that we are talking about for the airlift support, yes, Mr. Chairman, we have the specialty fleet at Andrews, but that is not really part of——
Mr. AKIN. Part of what we are discussing here.
Now then the Guard—are these numbers to include what you have in the Guard as well?
General JOHNS. That is true.
Mr. AKIN. Okay.
General JOHNS. The general has decided——
Mr. AKIN. Okay, so this is across the whole spectrum of what we are trying to do.
I am one of these people I have to get the big picture before I can get into the details a little bit, so bear with me.
So now, because the fact that we are whacking the budget for reasons that have nothing to do with the military whatsoever or the condition of the world whatsoever—I mean, other than the world outside of Washington D.C., that is—there was a decision that we are going have to do things with less money. So we come up with a new strategy in order to justify, you know, spending less money.
So we take a look at potential contingencies around the world, and then from that we back out what we think might happen. And from those numbers you come up with a strategic airlift requirement, is that correct?
In other words, if somebody does this to somebody else, military planners take a look at that operation. And then they are going to say, “Well, that means we are going to need so much airlift.” Is that the way it works?
General JOHNS. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Again, looked at what does the Nation need of its military on that strategic defense part, and then how does that apply to what airlift requirements are there to support that. From humanitarian across to full military spectrum wartime——
Mr. AKIN. I think that is what I was trying to say anyway. So in other words, the other part of the military generates what they think they are going to need for airlift, is that correct? Or do you say this is what I think you are going to need?
General JOHNS. Mr. Chairman I think the COCOMs [Combatant Commands] come together under—the joint staff OSD—ultimately TRANSCOM [Transportation Command]—will say, “Here is all the requirements,” and then we look at, “How do I match the aircraft to that requirement?”
So we have an input but there is also the views of others who say, “Here is how we think you can utilize the aircraft.” So it is a big effort that comes together. But clearly air mobility command—the Air Force, TRANSCOM—answer that basically capability of what is required.
And we answer that to the other leadership in the OSD who talk to us and say, “Okay. Have you thought about this? Have you
thought about that?” So it is a very large discussion, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. AKIN. Well, I believe it is a large discussion. What I am trying to identify is where are the assumptions loaded at the front end?

Are you given that, “We need to move this much material in this period of time from here to here,” that type of thing? Is that what you are given to work with?

General JOHNS. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. AKIN. And then from those you can say, “With these aircraft we could do it”?

General JOHNS. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. AKIN. Okay, now the assumptions that went into that—are you involved in those assumptions or is that something that is happening sort of—are those numbers that are passed on to you that you don’t really challenge particularly?

General JOHNS. No, we are involved in and we do have discussion about—and I won’t say challenge, but we do discuss them and debate them.

Mr. AKIN. Okay. Okay, that is helpful.

So what we are saying is that somehow or other we are planning that we are not going to be able to do as much stuff and therefore we can get by with a lower level of number of aircraft?

General JOHNS. Yes, Mr. Chairman that is true, but we also had an excess from before. So we are also trying to be good stewards. I shouldn’t have any additional capability that I don’t need to ensure the success that we can always say yes to whatever call we get from the Nation.

Mr. AKIN. Right.

Now, Mr. Russell, you were pretty erudite. You know, it is afternoon after lunch. This is tough on some of us, okay?

What I think I am hearing you say is: Here is the trade-off. You have a certain probability that you can meet all these requirements. If you don’t, the wheels fall off of the whole mission, so what is it cost you to keep a little bit of Reserve versus what your risk if you don’t—if you can’t make that capability? Are those the things you were looking at?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes, I think generally.

And when we talked about the shortcomings of the MCRS 2016; it really didn’t lay that out. It laid out a capacity required, and then it laid out existing capacity and it showed a delta. Either it was too much, you know, more capacity required or less, but it didn’t go forth and declare a certain number of aircrafts like a C–5 is in excess or lay out a risk associated with maintaining that fleet in terms of, you know being able to accomplish the mission or being in a position of having more aircraft than needed.

Mr. AKIN. Okay, and General Wyatt, I think what I was hearing you say in very tactful language was you weren’t really included in the planning process is that—or am I saying that too strongly?

General WYATT. Well I think, you know, when you look at the way the MCRS was put together, the primary focus of the MCRS was the national warfighting strategy and the warfight overseas.

Mr. AKIN. Okay.
General Wyatt. My concern with MCRS is that it was kind of a cursory look at the requirements of the homeland, I think the——

Mr. Akin. Is your requirement pretty much strictly homeland? Or do you supplement sometimes way that other Guards do sometimes you get units moved overseas to do stuff?

General Wyatt. Mr. Chairman we do both. Our Air Guardsmen swear an oath to the Constitution of the United States which requires them to answer the President’s call for the Title 10 mission overseas warfight. And we also take an oath to the constitution of our respective states, which requires us to answer the call of the governors for domestic activities within the state boundaries.

Mr. Akin. But still, General Johns, you know the aircrafts that are in the Guard right? So, when you are looking at capability of moving stuff, that is something that everybody understands. Or is there a lot of other logistical stuff that has to go with those aircraft that needs to be part of that equation as well?

General Johns. I worry about the enterprise. I worry about the airmen, Active Guard and Reserve. As I said, two-thirds of the capability of the Nation in mobility is in the Guard and Reserve.

Mr. Akin. Two-thirds?

General Johns. Two-thirds; two-thirds of the tankers, two-thirds of the C-5s, and about two-thirds of the C-130s. We did that back in the mid-1990s when we said, “Okay; we are coming out of the old scenario,” and we said, “We only need the Guard and the Reserve for that strategic mobilization for the big wars.”

Well that held true until about 2001, and then we went to the Guard and Reserve for so many of our contingencies and deployments. So I literally count on the Guard and Reserve to answer the call tonight.

We went to Libya to support the air refueling mission as we were supporting the efforts there. I went to the Guard units and the Reserve units because a lot of my Active Duty were already deployed and said, “Can you take this mission?” And sir, every guardsman, every reservist said, “Sir, when do you want us to leave?” and the answer was, “Tomorrow.”

And on that phone call, because we didn’t have mobilization authority—it was volunteerism—I had 564 airmen, primarily Guard and Reserve, deploy from their home units and head to Moron, Spain. And they stayed there on and off from March to October. That is the kind of commitment we have from our Guard and Reserve. But, I also have to worry about balancing, because this Guard and Reserve—the traditional—they have full-time jobs; they have families. And they can come in and say, “Sir, we can’t do this.”

Mr. Akin. I understand that kind of balance. I am just wondering—I got the impression that the plan that we are looking at here has been pulled together fairly quickly because of the budgetary requirements.

And General Wyatt, you can—given the parameters that were—if you buy the assumptions in the model, are you comfortable enough that you can provide what is needed just assuming we don’t blow through that model?
General WYATT. As far as the Federal warfight, the Title 10 mission, I am comfortable that we can do that. I have some concern on the domestic operations requirements——

Mr. AKIN. Because you could get slammed with something that you are not sure about and now you are strength is lower. And if we get hit with a big national contingency or something, then that is a problem, or could be a problem?

General WYATT. Yes sir. As the Air Guard, aircraft that are in—and airmen that are in Title 32 status working for the governors, in the event of a national Title 10 effort, we would come to the aid of the Active Component as we did in Odyssey Dawn.

And likewise, if there were something that happened that overwhelmed the Guard in the domestic arena, we would look to the Active Component and the Reserve Component, and the Army National Guard brothers and sisters for lift capability too.

The question becomes the timing that it takes to get there. And the commitments that General John's Title 10 forces have around the world. And, you know, there are some scenarios that would stress both the Title 10 warfight and the domestic operations depending on the scenarios and the events.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you General. I know I have been talking a little bit too long for my colleagues here.

Mr. McIntyre, you want to?

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you gentlemen for your service to our country.

General Johns, assuming our current commitments remain the same in the near term, how do you plan to meet the airlift requirement that will go along with the strategic shift of forces to the Asia-Pacific AOR [Area of Responsibility] in the plan for rotational presence throughout that region?

General JOHNS. Sir, the commitments that we have on the higher end of the spectrum remain unchanged. So that is something we planned for and that will remain. If we have increased rotational during peacetime—more exercises and things like that—in that environment, we are not stressed.

So in wartime, we mobilize the entire Guard and Reserve and everyone—we go to the fight, we come home when we are done.

In peacetime I won't mobilize, so I go to the volunteerism, I go to the Active Duty. And there my real issue is, “Do I have enough airmen to do a dwell-to-deploy?” We talk about a one-to-two, where you are gone one period and home twice as long for the Active Duty. I want to sustain that.

For the Guard and Reserve, it is about a one-to-five, because again of their full-time commitments to employers and families. So how do we balance that?

So we look at that, and say do we have the right rotational presence. So in the 2013, I actually found that I was short on the Active Duty C–130 aircrew and maintainers. We built three squadrons of C–130 aircrew and maintainers, but we put them with the Guard and the Reserve because they have a predominance of the iron.

So this way I am actually able to balance the force, get access to the hardware, by putting Active Duty members with the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve to share the aircraft. So
that is how we balance in the peacetime contingency when we are not mobilized sir.

Mr. McIntyre. Thank you.

General Barclay, you said in your testimony that the direct support role does not fulfill 100 percent of the Army's requirement for time-sensitive, mission-critical cargo and personnel. The Army fills this gap with contract airlift in CH–47 aircraft in Operation Enduring Freedom.

Having said that, if you could clarify for us—if the Air Force has the responsibility for executing the Army's direct support mission critical airlift mission, why then is the Army having to supplement the Air Force with contractor provided airlift and CH–47 helicopter aircraft to meet your requirements?

General Barclay. So it is a combination of several reasons as we are trying to meet those needs of the deployed forces in theater.

The Air Force does provide—we have an ongoing now direct-support study where the C–27s and the C–130, which were providing direct-support airlift to free up some of the 47 hours and allow them to get to more combat-focused operational missions; but there is still a gap there required to meet the full movement of supplies and sustainment to those forces; some of those because the disparate locations require more rotary wing.

And so that is why, if you look at the combination of what we have in theater now, those contract platforms, 55 of them are rotary-wing type, and there are about 10 to 12 fixed-wing moving those type of supplies. But the majority of them are rotary-wing to assist the Army to continue to move supplies out to those FOBs [Forward Operating Base] and COBs [Contingency Operating Base] for the soldiers.

Mr. McIntyre. All right. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Akin. Okay.

Mr. Young.

Mr. Young. I thank all our panelists for your service; thank you for being here today.

Mr. Russell, I will direct my first question to you, but I guess I will tee this up by saying that, you know, I have been a bit frustrated through this whole process. As we are refocusing our military strategy, we have heard from a number of uniformed persons, think-tankers, and others who appeared before the full committee and our subcommittees indicating that any cuts to our military budget have to be strategy-based as opposed to merely a budget exercise.

That is budgeting down or up to a particular figure doesn’t make a whole lot of sense as we develop a new strategy here and adapt to that strategy.

Former Defense Secretary Gates said that, you know, Look, if we are going to embark upon more military cuts, we need to articulate specifically where we are no longer going to go and what missions we are no longer going to perform, or which missions are of lesser importance.

And we have done that in a very vague way, I think, through the new strategic guidance. It has been followed up by the budget request, but translating the new strategic guidance, which is an es-
sentially an edit to the existing Quadrennial Defense Review—
translating that into specific line items and programmatic
changes—I have very little idea how this, sort of, black magic has
occurred.

And so that takes me to Mr. Russell and the report that I just
had an opportunity to read that I thought was very helpful and en-
couraging. I think your reading of the situation, at least with re-
spect to the air mobility command, is similar to mine.

You know, I highlighted a number of different things you wrote
here, but in essence, you are saying that the Air Force's February
2012 document—I am quoting here—"that outlines its proposed air-
craft retirements does not provide details of any analyses. Given
the new strategic guidance, it is unclear the extent to which the
requirements developed from the MCRS 2016 are still relevant."

That is written in a very academic and unexciting sort of fash-
ion—but that seems pretty damning when you are coming up with
new budget requests.

They don't provide any details of analysis. How are we, in our
oversight role, to, you know, make a decision as to whether or not
these proposed cuts and different spending priorities—if they are
done wisely?

That is part A of my question, and then part B would be, do you
believe that analysis exists somewhere? Is it on paper, and if so,
where do you think we might find it, and from whom?

Mr. RUSSELL. Okay. Well, first, with regards to the second part
of the question, we focused our work, and my statement was on the
MCRS 2016 study, so haven't seen the studies that have been done
subsequent to that, so it is difficult to know what is in it and what
is not, but you are right; we have not seen any details that have
explained the methodologies behind it.

But going back to the first part, you are right; the MCRS 2016
study really was built based upon detailed defense planning guid-
ance in effect at the time with detailed scenarios. And all that
rolled up into a set of requirements, which was then provided.

The criticisms we had was that it didn't draw the line directly
to excesses or shortages, but it was a very elaborate methodology.
So the question is: Now that we have a new defense strategy, what
do those scenarios look like today?

And that is what is not certain. So, in order to take the MCRS
2016 study and all the elaborate methodology that was done there,
and then walk it to today's decision is difficult because it is not
sure how that new strategy translates into those specific scenarios.

Mr. YOUNG. Based on your past work in this area, Mr. Russell,
do you have any idea, and perhaps after you consider this question,
others might weigh in, where those studies might reside, who we
might contact to receive them?

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, there is a number of folks—you go back to
the MCRS 2016, the OSD CAPE, the Cost Assessment and Pro-
gram Evaluation, played a large role in developing that—in those
studies. And I presume they might have played a role here in some
of these studies as well.

And then TRANSCOM, U.S. Transportation Command, also in
the MCRS–16, also played a heavy role in designing that and then
developing that study as well.
Mr. YOUNG. Okay. You know, I think my general sentiment here seems to be shared by a number of adjutants general of the National Guard, because I have seen a letter that several signed on to, addressed to our Secretary of Defense, indicating they weren’t included in this sort of planning here.

So I have got about 15 seconds, and I will turn it over to the panel, if you have any closing thoughts about this topic.

General JOHNS. If I may, sir, the MCRS was done, as we said, in 2010, so it was—as the new strategy was built, OSD took different scenarios, as we talked about, and said, “Okay, what is the feasibility and how many scenarios will occur,” so Chairman Dempsey had talked about that with the committee.

The joint staff did an operational assessment 12, and then the dep-sct [Deputy Secretary] also did some other things with CAPE and said, “Okay, let us kind of take MCRS now that we know what it was; we changed the scenarios. Let us do a one-off.” And that was what informed us as we were building this President’s budget submission.

Mr. YOUNG. I would like to see some papers. I would like to maybe see these studies. You indicated there are four separate studies that went into the President’s air-mobility request. Is that something I could obtain, General?

General JOHNS. Sir, let me take it for action because that was done by the Department of Defense, and I am part of that. I will take that back to the Department.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 81.]

Mr. YOUNG. All right.

General JOHNS. And I will take that back to the Department.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you very much.

I yield back.

Mr. AKIN. Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.

When General Schwartz came over, last week, I guess, we, again, had a number of members who asked questions about the C–27 and the decision to, again, not just truncate the program but eliminate it and take brand-new planes and send them to the boneyards, I guess it is called.

And intuitively, I think people are just going to have a hard time, sort of, understanding that. But, you know, we figured, well, okay, we will have an analysis that is going to show why even flying these planes is a net loser.

Our committee staff has actually done, I think, a pretty interesting job of looking at other cost estimates of what it costs to operate the C–27; which, as you know, there is a couple planes over in Afghanistan now.

In terms of the flying-hour costs, in terms of the lifecycle costs, I mean, it actually seems like it is the opposite, that the C–27 is more efficient and cheaper to operate than the C–130s.

So explain to me again why we—you know, again, we have cut programs. I mean, I come from Connecticut. We are very familiar with the F–22 and what happened with that program, but we didn’t stop flying the planes.
I just have a hard time getting my head around why we are not just using what is already built and apparently using with costs that actually work, in terms of efficiency?

General JOHNS. If I can, Mr. Courtney, as we look at coming down, I have two measures: How many do we need for a capacity and how good do we have to be for a capability?

And so with the reduction of $487 billion, we had to go back and look and say, “What do we really need to meet all the commitments of our Nation, from contingency to, as I said, military operations?”

And we have a commitment to direct support, you know, to the Army, and that is very important to us. But as we came down and looked at it, yes, the C–27 was a very good aircraft; it is a very good aircraft. The unit at Mansfield has done wonderful work in deploying with it.

We have been with them; we talked to them; the wing commander sits behind me, and a phenomenal airman.

But the issue came, as we went down to the minimum capacity we needed, what should we keep in the Air Force?

And, yes, the C–27 is cost-effective, but it is a niche capability compared to what we can do with the C–130. So as we went down, I would rather have a fleet of C–130s than give up more C–130s to keep the C–27, because the C–130 can serve a larger purpose.

In the initial stages of a war, I can use a C–130 from day one; I don't get to use the C–27 until day whatever, when I am now doing direct support for the Army because it is not in the initial phases.

When I look at the number of pallets I can carry, I can carry more with the C–130. So I have to reduce to the fleet capacity-wise, I would rather have it be with C–130s.

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, and again, I would find that a perfectly acceptable answer if we were talking about going from 38 down to whatever the produced number is, which is 18 or 19 or whatever is.

But to absolutely just mothball them—I think people really are going to struggle with that. You know, the chairman, sort of, walked through with you the net reductions in—category by category, which, again, was very helpful in terms of framing the top line.

But it is my understanding that all of those reductions are going to be in the Air National Guard and not a single plane in the Active Duty Component.

And given, you know, what General Wyatt said about the domestic needs, that, you know, he is somewhat concerned about, I mean, have we got the right balance here?

I mean, I have just, sort of, wondered whether that sort of—well, why don't you respond to that question?

General JOHNS. Sir, the second part first.

When we look at the balance of the Active and the Guard and Reserve, two-thirds of the C–130s are in the Guard and Reserve. Right now, the Active Duty members, with the limited assets that we have in the Active Duty, I have them on a dwell-to-deploy that is one-to-one. They are gone as much as they are home. And I see that commitment staying there.
My guardsmen—and I will say “my guardsmen” because I am very worried and I—you know, they are on a one-to-five dwell-to-deploy and going down to a one-to-four.

So we are asking a lot of them. We have plenty of aircraft. It is about the crew. So this last cycle, we—actually, we built Active Duty crews to put them with the Guard units so I can actually reduce the burden on the Active Duty aircrews. So that is why we worried about that.

And then to your question about, “Why not just go to a lower number of C–27s?”—it goes to the ownership costs; because, if I have one or two, I still have the depot concerns; I have all of the overhaul capability. And then people will debate about what the numbers are, but I still have a cost of ownership even if I have a small amount.

So the more efficient operation is to basically have a fleet that doesn’t include both the C–27 with all the lifecycle costs there. Though we can talk about efficiencies, it is still an additional cost, when I can go to a C–130 fleet.

Mr. COURTNEY. And again, I mean, that sounds logical.

And, General Wyatt, you know this. I mean, in Connecticut we actually built up infrastructure to prepare for the mission of C–27 and so it does seem like we have already made that investment in terms of some of these, you know, depot class, et cetera.

The question obviously at the end of the day in terms of the Air Guard is just, you know, “Where are we going to be with our domestic priorities?”

Governor Malloy from Connecticut has joined a number of governors expressing deep concerns. Again, the MC–12 sounds like a really interesting plane and mission. Still, again, I think people are trying to understand, you know, or visualize, you know, where New England, you know, reconnaissance missions are going to be flying.

I mean, I assume they will be deployed overseas, but in terms of the domestic role of, you know, the New England units, it is hard to see how that fits into, you know, the priorities of the governors that are there. I don’t know if you want to comment on that, General.

General Wyatt. We know the ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] in the Air Force is a growing demand, and so there are, I think, some enduring missions in the ISR world where the MC–12 resides.

There are missions that we have performed in the Air National Guard with the RC–26 supporting counter-drug operations. And the MC–12, while it has an ISR role in the Title 10 fight, it also could assist in our counter-drug operations and will be a good backfill, I think, for the RC–12, which is being eliminated out of the Air National Guard inventory as part of the PB13 [President’s Budget Fiscal Year 2013], too.

When we looked at kind of two different issues—mobility to governors is extremely important for all the reasons that I talked about. ISR is important, too. So you have an enduring mission that we think will be coming into Connecticut. You are right. There was a MILCON [Military Construction] project there to build a hangar for C–27s. The MC–12 is a considerably smaller aircraft.
But the thing that we have to put into perspective here, as General Johns tries to reach that balance—he has some issues that he has to address. You know, I am not a combatant commander, so my primary concern is the domestic role. And I guess what concerns me is not a whole lot of focus in my opinion to the domestic requirements—hopefully, we will get that in the future as we learn more from the exercises that we do do.

But it is a combination of things that goes back to the 2005 BRAC and the loss of a considerable amount of mobility out of the Air National Guard at that point in time. The Army is divesting 43 C–23s out of the Army National Guard. I kind of look at it from a perspective of the National Guard, Army and Air; and when you combine the divestiture of the C–23, the divestiture of the C–27, the reduction of C–130s out of BRAC, the reduction of C–130s as a result of PB13, I can't help but get a little bit concerned.

It is difficult and tough questions that we have to answer because we have the balance that is needed for the Title 10 warfighter overseas, but we also have to be concerned about the domestic operations here in the homeland and we are working through the Department to try to get that balanced focus on both of those requirements for the Air Force.

Mr. Akin. Thank you.

And Mr. Griffin.

Mr. Griffin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Johns and General Wyatt—whoever has the best knowledge on this, feel free to answer.

As you know, I have Little Rock Air Force Base in my district, and I am real interested in AMP [Avionics Modernization Program] versus what some are calling AMP-lite. And I understand that the President has talked about—or the president's budget claims that there will be a savings of $2.6 billion by transitioning away from AMP to AMP-lite.

And I have been having a hard time getting an analysis. I hear the top-line number, but clearly there are assumptions underlying the analysis. And I would like to just formally ask if you could go back to DOD and, just like you are for my colleague over here, and find out if I can get copies of any supporting documentation that would enlighten me on what the assumptions are underlying the alleged cost savings.

And I am interested, for example, when you are looking at AMP versus AMP-lite, did you consider the cost of the Navigator slot that is going to stay there; the retirement for that Navigator and all that?

So anything that you could get me that lays that out would be very helpful because, you know, I just like to trust, but verify, and crunch some of those numbers myself. And so if you could help facilitate that, that would be great.

It looks like you are answering that you did consider the Navigator personnel costs. Is that what you are saying, General?

General Johns. Yes, sir, we did.

And we also looked at—as a test pilot, I first flew an AMP C–130 in 1991. And now, we are delivering it. And what an AMP does basically is takes an analog aircraft and tries to make it a digital aircraft. And so we were on the lead of doing that.
And so we went through that and we learned a lot by doing it with the C–130—one of the first aircraft to do that. And we have come a long way with it, but the costs to actually do AMP are very high, and we will provide those numbers.

What we looked at are called the “son of AMP” or the follow-on. Basically, many other air forces of C–130s, they have actually gone out to other people and they have said, “Hey, we can do this much cheaper now because technology has advanced.”

So by doing this, we are giving the same basic safety capabilities that I need for my aircrew, and so the aircraft and the crews can perform because, again, they are very dedicated airmen that do this, at a much lower cost, significantly lower cost. But it does mean we are keeping the Navigator with us, and that was part of the discussions we had as we looked at doing that, sir.

Mr. GRIFFIN. And my understanding—and correct me if I am wrong—but I met with a lot of the pilots on the National Guard side at Little Rock Air Force Base a couple of weeks ago, I guess. And I had them sort of go down the list and enumerate for me what they anticipated would be left out of AMP-lite as compared to an AMP in terms of capabilities.

And so, any information you have got on that would also be helpful. Sort of, “These are the things we have got to drop if we go to an AMP-lite.”

And has there been any kind of independent analysis of AMP versus AMP-lite? Just anything that you could get me on that would be great.

General JOHNS. I would be happy to find it, Mr. Griffin, whatever we have.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 81.]

Mr. GRIFFIN. Okay.

While I have got you here, General Wyatt, this is a little off-subject, but I am going to ask it anyway.

With regard to the 188th in Fort Smith—we have talked about the A–10s and the fact that the A–10 mission is potentially going away. My understanding is that Secretary Panetta met with the Council of Governors in late February, maybe on the 28th or so, and that he had agreed to allow the Council of Governors to submit some recommendations for an alternate plan.

Is that correct? Are you familiar with that?

General WYATT. I am, sir, and that is correct.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Okay.

Could you give me an update on where that is in the process? Have they submitted the alternate plan? It looks like they have. I have got some of the contrasting reductions—the manpower adjustments here. Is that being considered? How long will that take? Could you elaborate on that?

General WYATT. The Council of Governors’ plan, though, was submitted and is currently under review inside the United States Air Force. Air National Guard staff is working with headquarters Air Force staff to validate the cost estimates in the Council of Governors’ plans. And at this point, it is being worked internally to the Air Force corporate process.
As far as expectations, we are on a pretty tight timeline, so I would expect some sort of decision out of the Air Force here in the next week to 10 days, but don’t hold me to that because I am not the one driving the time schedule, but it is being considered. Yes, sir.

Mr. Griffin. Okay. And now I have only got 17 seconds, but I would just mention that with regard to the 188th in Fort Smith, I feel like the comments that Mr. Russell made in his report about there not being a basis for understanding how decisions were made. I feel that way about the 188th as well.

And as we talked about over on the Senate side when we met, if any analyses come to light that you could share with me, that would be very helpful because, from the outside, it looks like decisions were made at 30,000 feet, if you will, and then they were just sort of forced—they were just pushed down on the force structure.

It doesn’t seem that there was a lot of individual analysis of Fort Smith and the different locations. Basically, I am asking for information.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all.

Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Johns, General Wyatt, General Bogdan, and General Barclay and Mr. Wilson, thank you very much for your service to the Nation and for appearing before the committee today.

General Johns, if I could start with you, I would like to begin with a question about your force structure moving forward. One of the primary missions of the Armed Forces outlined in the new strategy is to defend the homeland and support civil authorities.

My question is, are you confident that the C–130 can provide the best support to that mission? And how large is the set of CONUS [Continental United States] airports that would have been able to be served by the C–27, but cannot be served by the C–130?

General Johns. Sir, thank you for the question.

And General Wyatt talked about the guardsmen responding to the governor. I will offer that every military member will respond immediately to when our Nation calls, domestically and internationally. We will take an aircraft that is flying and say there is a crisis somewhere. We will divert that aircraft airborne and go pick up.

The one that comes to mind is the tsunami. We diverted a C–17 to March Air Reserve Base, picked up the L.A. search-and-rescue team, air refueled, then nonstop to Tokyo, where we were the first ones there to help save lives.

So it is not really not about the guardsmen doing this. It is about our military. And so those assets that are available, they are the Nation’s assets, from a C–17, a large aircraft, even a C–5 or a 130, if we need to move it somewhere and we have done this—I don’t want to say we do it daily, but we do it routinely across the Nation, across the globe—just say, “There is somebody in need. Let us divert the aircraft airborne and go pick up.”

The one that comes to mind is the tsunami. We diverted a C–17 to March Air Reserve Base, picked up the L.A. search-and-rescue team, air refueled, then nonstop to Tokyo, where we were the first ones there to help save lives.

So that is what we do, we answer that call. And I understand the concern about the guardsmen, but really I look at it as totality of the mobility capability to support our Nation, which includes that domestic mission.
So I believe we have the capability to respond to the domestic missions. The question will be: How many do you want to plan on having while we are engaged in a global war?

So that is where some of the math comes in, to say, “Well, did we plan on three, did we plan on six?” And so we go through that calculus and say, “The most likely is let us plan on this many occurring here in the States. Let us look at what the overseas commitments will be,” then, “Do we have enough force structure?”

So I believe we have looked at that to assess that we can respond to the national mission here locally, and then across to the global commitments.

Mr. Langevin. But it still doesn’t answer my question, though. How large is the set of CONUS airports that would have been able to be served by the C–27 that can’t be served by the C–130?

General Johns. Sir, we have a worldwide database, and so I can’t answer the CONUS ones. I know globally it is 97 percent of all the bases are common to the C–27 and the C–130. But let me get an answer for the record, if I may, on specifically how many are unique to the C–27.

But also, importantly, how close would that small, little strip be, if there is a difference, to a base that can service C–130 in terms of mileage, and, you know, if it is a five, 10 mile difference? So I would like to answer that for the record, if I may.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 81.]

Mr. Langevin. Fair enough. And maybe you answered my next question. How do you plan to address the shortcomings associated with state airports that cannot accommodate a C–130 given the state’s needs during domestic operations, such as a complex contingency operation?

General Johns. Yes, sir.

And then, again, I also count on my Army brethren, because every Air National Guard has an Army National Guard component, and I think also every state has helicopters, those marvelous CH–47s that can also respond and go right to somebody’s backyard if we have to.

So I think it is a combination of the Air and Army Guard to respond, and the Army and the Air Force at large to respond to the national need.

Mr. Langevin. With the proposed pivot to the Asia-Pacific region, how will your airlift requirements change?

General Johns. Sir, in terms of the higher end, that has been factored in. I see no change there.

Where I see a change potentially is the increased exercise opportunities potentially down in Australia. So do I have more forces that I rotate? And a majority of the forces that actually move are commercial partners. Those commercial folks move 90 percent of all of my passengers right now.

So I actually contract that out for exercises and also for redeployments to and from Afghanistan, they go on commercial air. So I see that capability residing as we do the exercises globally.

Mr. Langevin. Very good. Those are basically the questions that I had. I appreciate the first part of the answer you gave when you talked about how nimble you can be and will be in terms of meet-
ing the needs wherever they are, whether it is at a—situations arise at the state level or internationally; how nimble and flexible you are and your folks are in terms of responding to those emergencies and those contingencies.

And I really do appreciate the job you are doing and thank you all of your service.

With that, I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. AKIN. Mr. Hunter, please.

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Thank all of you on the panel today for your service and time.

I guess the first thing I would say is I think we are in big trouble. And, two, I think that you are having to explain away cuts that you wouldn’t do unless you were forced to do them and then explain the rationale behind them. I think that is where we are at right now.

My question, I will just focus kind of largely on Guard and Active ratios. What were they? I mean, up until now what were the ratios for mobility? Did you have them down?

General WYATT. If I recall, initially, in early February, when the Air Force released its iron flow, I think the initial percentages were 51 percent Active, 49 percent Guard and Reserve. That would be the Reserve Component. And then PB13 shifts the percentage I think to 55–45 or 54–46.

Mr. HUNTER. 54–46?

General WYATT. Yes, sir.

General JOHNS. On mobility, though, it is much more 34 Active Duty to 66 Guard and Reserve, and what the shift does now is make me about 36 Active Duty versus.

So it is much different on the mobility side, again, because two-thirds of our capability really has been in the Guard and Reserve, with the exception of the C–17.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So explain that to me; I am not understanding—54–46, but not really.

General JOHNS. That is for the total Air Force.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

General JOHNS. Now, I am looking at just the mobility as a subset. Predominance of it really has been in the Guard and Reserve since the late 1990s. So it is different than——

Mr. HUNTER. 54–46 counts what, if it is not mobility? Like fighter planes or what?

General JOHNS. Yes, sir. Fighter planes, the ISR, the bombers, the entire capability in the United States Air Force, I would offer.

Mr. HUNTER. What was the percentage of just mobility prior to the PB?

General JOHNS. When I look at the tankers, the KC–135s, and I look at the C–130s and the C–5s, and I am probably in the 34–66 percent. And so now that takes me—that is what it was. And by the shift I am up a couple percent in the Active Duty and down a couple percent in the Guard and Reserve.

And, sir, if I could, I will provide the specific numbers for the record for you.

Mr. HUNTER. I don’t care about specific numbers; I am just trying to get the gist of this.
Then you got the 54–46 from the 49–51. Does that save you money? And that is total Air Force. Does that save the Active Duty Air Force money, General Johns?

General JOHNS. Sir, I am pausing because when a person to work for full-time, a guardsman or Active Duty is all the same; and when they are mobilized at the same cost.

When I am not using them—and in my world I am using all the same, so it doesn't specifically save me money. It may in the other parts of the Air Force if I am having them just in a strategic reserve and not requiring to use them. There is a savings, I think, to have members in the Guard and Reserve, you know, being on that traditional role and only being called when the Nation needs them.

Mr. HUNTER. Well, the reason I am asking—this is kind of obvious—even if it just goes up 1 percent Active and down 1 percent Reserve/Guard, that still doesn't make sense to me then.

General JOHNS. It is about the dwell-to-deploy.

Right now, for example, I try to sustain our Active Duty to one-to-two dwell-to-deploy in the Guard and Reserve at one-to-five. Why I have had to increase it in the mobility side is because my Active Duty, I have so few of them——

Mr. HUNTER. But you are cutting them at the same time.

General JOHNS. No, sir, in the 130 I am actually growing those—Active Duty in the mobility side, sir, is all staying the same, in the Active Duty side we are potentially growing in the C–130 by three squadrons.

Mr. HUNTER. So you are saying that the Air Force personnel numbers are going to be going up?

General JOHNS. In the mobility side, sir, yes, the mobility numbers actually grow a little bit in the Active Duty side and they come down in the Guard and Reserve side.

Mr. HUNTER. So the numbers come down in the Guard and Reserve side; by how much?

General JOHNS. That is correct. I can give you the numbers total that would involve——

Mr. HUNTER. Don't do that. Let us me ask this. Does that save money?

General JOHNS. It doesn't save money, but it balances the force. It balances the force for me so that I can keep the Active Duty healthy and I can keep the Guard and Reserve as I look at the demands of the force.

So it is actually trying to do the right thing to preserve the health and welfare of our airmen who we are asking so much to do.

So I am actually increasing the cost by having more Active Duty come on to balance this because too much was in the Guard and Reserve, based on the rotational needs we have.

Mr. HUNTER. Do you concur with that, General Wyatt?

General WYATT. Let me just say that, in the Air Force corporate process, the Air Guard is allowed a voice and we are allowed to make input into the process, in fact encouraged to do that.

We don't always agree, as we engage in these debates, but the decision has been made, and so, as a Title 10 officer, I am supporting the way ahead.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay, well, that is pretty plainspoken. Well, once again, I think we are in big trouble, and Congress will try to fix this for you.

I yield back. Thank you.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you.

And I think Mr. Coffman is next.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all for your service to our country.

Mr. Russell, I will start with you. When we had a strategy, or still have a strategy, and I guess it is going to change, where the United States has the ability to do two concurrent conflicts at the same time.

And I understand that we will, with these changes, be able to engage in one conflict and then, I guess, a spoiling or a holding action in the other one.

I wonder if you or somebody else on the panel could confirm that the scenario before us today will strip us from the ability to engage in two concurrent conflicts. Is that correct? Would anybody like to—is anybody capable of answering that?

General Johns.

General JOHNS. Yes, sir. What we have done by going to the new scenario before us today will strip us from the ability to engage in two concurrent conflicts. Is that correct? Would anybody like to—is anybody capable of answering that?

General Johns.

General JOHNS. Yes, sir. What we have done by going to the new scenario is the two near-simultaneous, as you said very well, spot-on, have been adjusted. And so that then adjusts how much airlift we have to have to meet that requirement.

So as the strategy has been adjusted, then the capacity we need to meet that strategy has come down. So that is the foundation of what we are doing here.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. So that allows you to make the cuts that are before us today. It is the mere fact that we have changed our strategy, that we have downsized our strategy; so therefore you have downsized the force accordingly.

Is that correct, then?

General JOHNS. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Then go back. Are there any other areas—okay, we talked about, I think, is it the C–130—I am sorry—what was the area again that we were reducing the Guard and Reserve Component?

General JOHNS. We are actually reducing C–130s, C–5s, KC–135s and C–27s. All four are coming down in the Guard and Reserve Component.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. And then tell me, is there—on that reduction, is there a commensurate reduction, then, in the Active Duty side on that?

I think you mentioned in which one—where was the growth in the budget?

General JOHNS. There is a very small reduction on the Active Duty side of the tanker. That is very small. It is three aircraft, I believe. So the rest of the Active Duty stays where it is, except in the C–130, where we are growing that by three units, three squadrons.

And the reason the Active Duty stays where it is, their dwell-to-deploy, how much I am asking them to be deployed right now is so high that, if I took down the Active Duty any further, I would
basically—their dwell-to-deploy would be worse than a one-to-one. I am trying to get them to one-to-two.

So there is so much demand. It is just about trying to balance the Active and the Guard at this time.

Mr. COFFMAN. Well, here is the thing. And I think that that—where I might differ with you on that, because I think there is a fairly significant savings by being able to rely on the Guard and Reserve more.

And so we have phased out of Iraq. We are phasing down out of Afghanistan. And what we have seen is a tremendous willingness upon the Guard and Reserve to do some very short-term deployments.

I think the Guard in my home state goes—the Air Guard has been going on 4-month deployments.

And I think there is a willingness, even though the pace will slow, to do some of that, and not to go back to the status quo ante, when we are a strategic versus and operational reserve in the Guard and Reserve.

So I think, really—I really question the direction that we are going, that it is not—not only is it not cost-effective but I think, by virtue of having higher personnel costs, we are eating into acquisition costs unnecessarily.

So can any of you—General Wyatt and General Jones—can both of you comment on that?

General WYATT. Well, you know, the numbers that are in the PB13, I think this will, maybe, help put some numbers to what you are saying, Congressman.

In the mobility Air Force, I think there was 124 total airplanes that were divested in PB13, 60 of those out of the Air National Guard, 61 out of the Air Force Reserve, and the three that General Johns mentioned out of the refueling fleet.

It gets to a, I guess, an analysis of what the Federal warfight demand will be in the future. And if it is going to be high, then you might balance the force. If it is going to be high for a long time, you might balance the force more heavily in favor of the Active Component, as General Johns has described.

If it is not going to be high for a long time, it would make sense, because the Air Guard is more cost-effective, especially when in garrison, to shift the balance that other direction.

That is the debate that has taken place inside of the Air Force, as we go forward.

Mr. COFFMAN. Let me just say quick, and I will go to you, General Johns, and that is that, you know, as—I am an Iraq War veteran, United States Marine Corps, and I have got to tell you, I don’t think we are going to go down this heavy conventional footprint, nation-building path again.

I think those days are over with. And if I have anything to do with it in the House Armed Services Committee, I will make sure that we don’t go down that road again.

And so I just don’t see—if we are in a conventional conflict, absolutely, but I don’t see us going down this road where we are going to have to mobilize so much of our Guard and Reserve, you know, for this kind of counterinsurgency nation-building stuff.
General JOHNS. Sir, if I may, one of the things I worry about is the dwell-to-deploy for the Guard and Reserve. We say we want to keep them on a one-to-five because they are traditional guardsmen and reservists, and they have full-time employers.

Mr. COFFMAN. Sure.

General JOHNS. So I don’t have mobilization authority for much of what we do. So they go to their employer and say, “The Air Force needs us; I am going again. The Air Force needs us; I am going again.” And it is to Haiti and it is a Katrina and it is a Rita and it is a Tomodachi.

The employers then put some pressure on those folks, because I visited 121 units—I have 16 units left to go to see all the Guard and Reserve units that do our business—and talk to them and listen to them, and I am concerned about their ability to continue to support, for long terms—not this year or next year—but when the economy turns and they all have all have good jobs and they keep going back to their employer.

Well, they have pressure on them that they can’t support beyond the one-to-five dwell-to-deploy. The tankers right now, sir, in the Guard and Reserve are at a one-to-3.8 dwell-to-deploy. They are surging, and every day we call on them and they do marvelous things.

But can we sustain this for the health of their continued support to the Air Force and our Nation? That is what we are trying to balance here.

Mr. COFFMAN. And just one last thing, Mr. Chairman.

And I know we have got to find where that balance is. Let me just say that the—and I need to have that discussion with my Guard back home. I mean, the morale is high. Retention is high. You know, they seem to love what they do. And so I would like to talk to them.

But you know, the Israeli military is on a constant war-footing and they rely—if they had the ratio of Active Duty to Guard—to their Reserve equivalent that we have, they would bankrupt the country overnight. And yet they seem to maintain a war-footing and rely on their equivalent of the Guard and Reserve.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you.

All good questions; I thank you all for helping us out here.

I had just a couple of follow-ups. First of all, this is a little bit more parochial, General Wyatt. We just talked about losing a couple of hundred people out of the state of Missouri.

First of all, are there any kinds of provisions—you have got some people that have been serving honorably and well for some period of time, and all of a sudden they hit the bricks. Anything we can do to help them out?

General WYATT. Currently working through OSD, I think, or maybe some legislative proposals—that would help us.

Our big challenge in the Air National Guard in fiscal year 2013 is the fact that we lose 5,100 of those Air National Guardsmen. Our end-strength is reduced that much. We also have some re-missioning to the tune of about another 3,200.

So it is essential that in order to hang onto these highly experienced, highly skilled people that the taxpayer has invested a lot of
money in, there are some things that the Air National Guard and the Air Force supports that would help us as we go forward; things like as an individual maybe is terminated, extending their TRICARE benefits for a little bit longer to allow them to make that transition.

Perhaps allowing the Air National Guard to pay for PCS [Permanent Change of Station] moves so that if an individual loses a job in a particular state, but there is one that is open, it is a lot cheaper to move that individual with PCS funds, as opposed to recruit and go out and retrain a new individual.

There are things like allowing a guardsman a little extra time to exercise the GI Bill benefits that they have earned, not changing the eligibility or qualification requirements for the GI bill, but allowing them a little bit more extra time to exercise those benefits.

Mr. Akin. So we can give people some options anyway and the possibility is they might be able to find this. Of course, if we are dropping—what did you say, 5,000 people——

General Wyatt. It is 5,100 in fiscal year 2013. It is a pretty steep drop and that is why——

Mr. Akin. Yes, so they are all going to be looking for probably a limited number of openings if somebody might retire or something like that. It is going to be hard to—you are not going to get all 5,000 of them back, just some.

General Wyatt. Yes, sir.

Mr. Akin. Yes, okay.

General Wyatt. These benefits that I am talking about would obviously not apply across the board.

We do have some individuals who will retire when given an option to transition into another aircraft, if they have several years in, they may have said, “Hey, I have done my fair share; it is time for me to retire.” So some of those will fall out of our ranks through natural attrition, but we would need some tools to help us——

Mr. Akin. I think we are just getting the first taste of what some of the medicine that we are putting together here in Congress. And obviously, people on this committee I think even from both parties are not very happy with where we are going, and that is not even talking sequestration.

So there is a great deal of angst here, but some limited degree that we know of what we can do to try and fix it. We are going to try, but that is where we are.

Thank you for that. And let me see if there is anything else.

The other thing is, you know, this idea of pivoting, you know, to move further away from America, so therefore don’t need as much airlift. Somehow, the logic of that seems a little strained. You know, I appreciate trying to sell some new change and put a good spin on it, but I remain a little bit skeptical. The further we have to go, it seems like to me it is going to be more airlift.

I think that is pretty much got things covered, unless you had a follow-up or something? No.

Well, gentlemen, thank you for being here today and the professionalism. And you got the answers for us. It is very helpful, but we are grumbling a little bit.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 4:57 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

March 7, 2012
Statement of Hon. W. Todd Akin
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces

Hearing on
Assessing Mobility Airlift Capabilities and Operational Risks Under the Revised 2012 Defense Strategy

March 7, 2012

I’d like to welcome everyone to the first hearing of the second session of the 112th Congress for the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee. I look forward to continuing our bipartisan efforts that have been a longstanding tradition of this subcommittee in providing our service men and women with the best equipment possible in this most challenging budget environment.

Testifying before us today are representatives from the Air Force, Army, and Government Accountability Office. We have:

- General Ray Johns, Commander of Air Mobility Command;
- Lieutenant General “Bud” Wyatt, Director of the Air National Guard;
- Major General Jim Barclay, Deputy from the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff of the G–3–5–7;
- Major General Chris Bogdan, KC–46 Tanker Program Manager; and
- Mr. Cary Russell, Acting Director for GAO’s Defense Capabilities and Management Directorate.

Gentlemen, welcome, and thank you for your many years of service providing leadership to those that enable our military to be the finest in the world.

Today, we’re here to assess the increased risk incurred within the airlift and tanker mobility portfolios of the Army and the Air Force as a result of the President’s April 2011 initiative calling for continued reductions to the defense budget. As a result, the fiscal year 2013 budget request for DOD is $45.3 billion, or 8 percent below, the planned fiscal year 2013 budget submitted in last year’s fiscal year 2012 request.

The end-state consequences resulted in divestment of 150 aircraft from air mobility programs and will even force the Air Force to fly brand-new C–27 Joint Cargo Aircraft directly from the production line to the “boneyard” in Arizona this year.

Furthermore, this new budget-driven defense strategy negates 2010 QDR scenarios developed just 2 years ago that were used to right-size airlift programs in anticipation of the threats and contingencies that the U.S. should be prepared for in the 2016-and-beyond time period. Nothing to date has occurred over the last 2
years indicating that the world has gotten safer or that the foreseeable operations tempo of our military will significantly decrease to justify such a large reduction of force structure. A smaller force structure operating under the same operational tempo only leads to our military wearing out their equipment quicker than planned. Just ask the Navy . . . they have 285 ships today, but currently operate them as if they had a fleet of 350.

The next threat around the corner that is certainly predictable is budget sequestration. The $487 billion in cuts imposed upon the defense budget already concern me, and I certainly do not support the devastating effect that sequestration will have on our national security come this January. It makes no sense to me why some believe that penalizing defense, which is only 20 percent of our discretionary budget, an additional $500 to $600 billion dollars through sequestration is acceptable policy. The only outcomes from such a mindset is a guarantee that we’ll move towards becoming a regional power and open a global void that another rising power will most certainly fill. I ask our witnesses to please help the subcommittee understand what impact sequestration will have to your respective areas of the DOD budget.

Gentlemen, thank you again for being with us today and we look forward to your testimony.
I would like to thank all of the witnesses for appearing here today and for their service to the country.

Given the number of recently announced reductions, it is important for us to have a clear understanding of what the airlift requirements are to meet the new Defense Strategy. With the retirement of all 27 C–5As, the elimination of the entire C–27J fleet and the retirement of 65 C–130s, I am concerned about whether or not we have the mobility resources required to meet current and future global demands.

While there will be a drawdown in the overall end strength of the ground forces in the coming years, there will also be a shift of resources to the Asian-Pacific Area of Responsibility that will require increased support. My understanding is that many of these shifts will begin in the coming years while our commitments to the current conflict in Afghanistan remain. I am interested in hearing how this strategic shift combined with our current commitments will impact mobility demands.

I am anxious to hear from the witnesses about the decision to terminate the C–27J program and retire all the current aircraft we have already bought and paid for. A clarification of the assumptions that were made in this process and how the Air Force plans to fulfill this requirement would be helpful.

With regard to the KC–46 Tanker replacement program, I am encouraged to see signs that the program is progressing in a positive direction. Recent briefings to committee staff show both low risk in the areas of cost and technical performance and moderate risk in schedule performance. I know that the KC–46 program office is working diligently to keep the program on a stable track and avoid any design or contract changes that could potentially delay delivery and allow for increased cost.

Again, I want to thank all the witnesses for appearing here today and I look forward to hearing your testimony.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

PRESENTATION TO THE
SEAPower AND PROJECTION FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

March 7, 2012

SUBJECT: ASSESSING MOBILITY AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES AND OPERATIONAL RISKS UNDER THE REVISED 2012 DEFENSE STRATEGY

STATEMENT OF: General Raymond E. Johns, Jr.
Commander
Air Mobility Command
Introduction

Chairman Akin, Ranking Member McIntyre, distinguished Members of the sub-committee, thank you for allowing us to come before you today. I’m especially pleased to be joined today by General Wyatt; we could not accomplish our mission without the support of National Guard Airmen. Air Mobility Command is made up 135,000 Airmen who belong to the active duty, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard. We provide Global Reach for the Nation as part of the Mobility Air Forces and we are proud stewards of this national capability. No other nation can project power on a global scale in the manner your Air Force can, and the Mobility Air Forces are the foundation of this. We support the entire spectrum of operations, from humanitarian to combat. We answer the call so that others may prevail and that was never truer than in 2011. Over February and March we were supporting air refueling operations over Libya, providing disaster relief to tsunami ravaged Japan, airdropping critical supplies to forces in Afghanistan and redeploying forces from Iraq. On one of our busier days during this period, we executed 16 million ton miles (MTM) of airlift including organic, commercial and passenger missions. That level of support represents only 30 percent of the total capacity of the organic and commercial partner (CRAF) strategic airlift fleets.

Last year our Airmen airdropped nearly 80 million pounds of combat supplies to our forward operating bases in Afghanistan; more than in the entire Korean War, and we accomplished that with a fraction of the overall air mobility fleet. That’s what Global Reach means to the Nation and we are committed to ensuring the options our senior leaders have today remain for generations to come.

At the same time, we are keenly aware of the current fiscal environment and we take very seriously our role in assuring America receives a sufficient and effective capability at the lowest cost possible. We believe the FY13 President’s Budget request meets those two requirements and support the request in the strongest terms possible.

Supporting Forces

We provide forces as the air component of United States Transportation Command (USTC). They in turn work directly with the geographic combatant commanders (GCC) to ensure logistics requirements for contingency operations are feasible. We do not determine the
requirement, but we are responsible for ensuring our Airmen and our aircraft fleet can meet the requirement we are given. The solutions we arrive at to meet that requirement are the product of analyses by not only our command, but Headquarters Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

**Historical Perspective**

We understand that the air mobility portion of the FY13 PB request might seem to some as the product of a simple budget cutting drill. It is no revelation to this committee that the Department of Defense was charged with reducing its total obligations by $487 billion over 10 years. Air mobility was not immune to that process. I can assure to you that the choices made were done using all analysis available. The FY12 air mobility fleet is based on the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study-2016 (MCRS-16). That study considered a range of scenarios, the most demanding of which was two near simultaneous large scale campaigns. This scenario generated an organic strategic airlift requirement of 32.7 MTM/D, an organic tactical airlift requirement of 335 C-130s and a sustained tanker requirement of over 500 aircraft. The time sensitive/mission critical direct support- airlift mission (TS/MS) was not included in MCRS-16, but was evaluated by a RAND study entitled “Intra-theater Lift – Direct Support” completed in 2010. The RAND study provided a range of tactical aircraft required for the TS/MS mission, from 42 to 86 coincident to risk, from high to low. The FY12 PB supported 58 tactical airlift aircraft for the TS/MS mission, 20 C-130s and 38 C-27Js.

Within months of MCRS-16 being published in 2010, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reflected new directions in our National strategy that would change the foundational assumptions used in MCRS-16. Beginning with new integrated security constructs (ISC) in 2011, the Department began to reshape how we would fight in the future. The work continued with the Joint Staff’s Operational Availability 2012 Force Planning Construct (OA-12). In this study air mobility requirements were reviewed and analyzed by OSD, the Joint Staff and the Air Force and based on reduced mobility requirements the capacity of inter-theater and intra-theater force structure could be reduced.

In each of these studies, the Department examined GCC requirements in light of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). The new guidance required less air mobility force structure
than had been programmed in the MCRS-16 based FY12 PB. The Department accomplished a final review during FY13 budget deliberations comparing FY12 with the proposed FY13 PB air mobility inventory to ensure the proposed force structure would meet GCC requirements. This took the form of an excursion to the previously accomplished MCRS-16. The elements of each MCRS-16 scenario that most closely resemble the new strategy were extracted and then combined to generate a new requirement based on the new DSG. All previous and future studies of air mobility requirements rely upon integrated security constructs that include supporting GCC, ensuring homeland defense, covering priority foundational activities around the globe, and accounting for JCS withholds, depot availability, and some level of formal schoolhouse activity to keep the training pipeline flowing. We advocate the need for continuing analyses focusing on strategy and the threat to air mobility aircraft that includes TS/MC missions, air refueling, intra and inter theater airlift and homeland defense. Any new analysis must also take into account the non-mobilized contingency and the wartime mobilized requirements as it relates to deploy to dwell for our Airmen.

Simply stated, with the requirements for two near simultaneous large-scale land campaigns removed from the 2012 DSG and in turn the most demanding MCRS-16 scenario no longer considered, the demand on the air mobility fleet is greatly reduced. We’re not done; we continually analyze the air mobility fleet and ensure it can meet all emerging requirements. As the force provider, we will have the right amount of capability. Too little and we cannot fulfill our mission, too much and we are obligating resources that could be better spent on other priorities. To provide Global Reach for the Nation, we must continually balance modernization and readiness, force structure and our Airmen. The FY13 PB request strikes the right balance.

Strategic Airlift

We look at our force structure in three general categories, the strategic airlift inventory (inter-theater), the tactical airlift inventory (intra-theater) and the air refueling inventory. Starting with strategic airlift, the FY12 Air Force Program of Record (POR) was 222 C-17s, 52 C-5Ms and 27 C-5As for a total fleet size of 301. This fleet fully met the 32.7 MTM/D requirement from MCRS-16. Previous to the FY12 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) statutory language required the Air Force to maintain a fleet of 316 strategic airlifters. The FY12 NDAA lowered this floor to 301, and we thank the committee for your support of that
effort. The Air Force will be proposing a new statutory floor of 275 for the FY13 NDAA; which if adopted would allow us to manage the fleet in the most efficient way possible.

With the additional procurement of one C-17 directed by the FY12 National Defense Appropriations Act, the FY13 PB request POR for strategic airlift is 223 C-17s and 52 C-5Ms for a total fleet size of 275. We are asking to retire 27 C-5As resulting in an savings of $135 million in FY13. The C-5A retirements are phased, with five initially in FY13 and the remainder between FY14 and FY16. This allows for some flexibility as the C-5M fleet reaches initial operating capability which we currently project to be March 2013 and full operational capability, which we expect in 2017. The FY13 PB request continues to fund this critical modernization effort, the C-5M, at $1.23 billion. The C-5M combines advanced avionics and the Reliability Enhancement and Re-engineing Program (RERP), ensuring the C-5 will continue to fly for decades to come. The FY13 PB request also continues to fund the Global Reach Improvement Plan (GRIP) at $138.2 million. The GRIP will bring our entire C-17 fleet to a common configuration, the C-17A. This common configuration includes extended range fuel tanks and the Onboard Inert Gas-Generating System (OIBGS II). With continued funding of these modernization efforts, the proposed strategic airlift fleet of 275 meets strategic airlift requirement of today and the future and results in a force structure with greater capacity than the one we owned when Operation Iraqi Freedom began. The FY13 PB request strategic airlift inventory can meet ongoing and emerging GCC requirements in both non-mobilized contingencies and full wartime mobilization.

**Tactical Airlift**

Our tactical airlift force structure is primarily made up of C-130H/Js. We’ve also added the C-27J to the tactical airlift fleet specifically for TS/MC mission. It also important to mention the C-17 is routinely used in a tactical role. As the C-17 transitions from its strategic role during a contingency it can relieve the burden on the C-130 fleet. A robust C-17 fleet allows us to reduce both the C-5 and the C-130 inventories. The FY12 POR was 372 C-130 H/Js and 38 C-27Js. This satisfied the MCRS-16 requirement of 335 intra-theater tactical aircraft plus 20 C-130 H/Js dedicated along with 38 C-27J for TS/MC missions. The FY13 PB request supports a C-130 H/J fleet of 318 and divestiture of the C-27J.
The proposed fleet of 318 C-130 H/J fully meets the capability required to support the 2012 DSG. Of the 318 C-130HJs, sufficient numbers remain to meet the Army’s requirement for TS/MC mission support. By retiring 39 C-130Hs in FY13 and a total of 65 C-130Hs over the FYDP, we save nearly $500 million dollars in operations, maintenance and upgrade costs over the FYDP. The remaining fleet will consist of 134 C-130Js and 184 C-130Hs, assuming the procurement of 29 additional C-130Js over the FYDP. The FY13 PB request terminates the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP). We are looking at less costly solutions that will ensure peace time airspace access for the C-130H fleet to begin in FY14. The cancelation of C-130 AMP will result in a $2.6 billion savings over the FYDP.

Time Sensitive/Mission Critical Direct Support

The Air Force honors its promise to support the Army’s need for TS/MC operations. But the mission should not be tied to a specific type of aircraft and the 2010 RAND report concluded that both the C-130 and C-27J can perform the full spectrum of TS/MC missions. Going forward, we will fulfill this requirement with the C-130. We are unable to afford niche capabilities, and the C-27J falls into that category with limited payload capacity and range. We know we can accomplish the TS/MC mission with the C-130s: our very first direct support test was accomplished using two C-130 aircraft. Currently in Afghanistan the mission is being accomplished with two C-27Js and one C-130. A recently signed memorandum of understanding by both the Air Force and Army reaffirms the concept of employment for TS/MC support. The Air Force will stop delivery of the C-27J at 21 aircraft; we are currently not contractually obligated for the remaining 17 in the FY12 POR. Due to the small fleet dynamics, OSD estimated the lifecycle costs over 25 years to be greater for the C-27J than the C-130. By divesting the C-27J fleet, we save $1.42 billion over the FYDP. The proposed FY13 PB request tactical airlift fleet will have sufficient capacity to support the 2012 DSG.

Aerial Refueling

The current air refueling fleet is comprised of up KC-135 and KC-10 aircraft. As the committee is well aware, our refueling fleet averages 47 years of age. That’s one reason the KC-46A tanker remains among the Air Force’s top acquisition priorities. A little more than a year ago, the Air Force awarded Boeing an engineering, manufacturing and development contract for
the KC-46. The KC-46 Program, under the superb leadership of Major General Christopher Bogdan, continues to make excellent progress toward delivering the KC-46 to our command. The KC-46A office program office has continued to work with our command, the Federal Aviation Administration and other numerous DoD stakeholders toward Preliminary Design Review. We continue to execute the program to the cost and schedule baseline we established, along with Boeing. We will deliver a new tanker, ready for war on day one. The FY13 PB request fully funds the KC-46A program.

The FY13 PB request retires 20 KC-135s leaving the overall air refueling fleet at 453 (59 KC-10s and 394 KC-135s). The MCRS-16 based requirement called for an air refueling fleet size of more than 500 aircraft during periods of peak demand. As part of the 2012 DSG review, the Department determined that a fleet of 453 tankers could meet non-mobilized contingency and wartime requirements evaluated in OA-12. Retiring 20 KC-135s in FY13 saves $100 million over the FYDP. While we are excited about the KC-46A entering the fleet, we will continue to rely on the KC-135 to meet air refueling demands for many years to come. The FY13 PB request continues to invest in upgrades in both the KC-135 and KC-10 fleet. The KC-10 is currently beginning a communication, navigation surveillance (CNS) and air-traffic management system (ATM) upgrade that will ensure peacetime airspace access for years to come. The KC-135 continues its Block 45 avionics upgrade and 95 aircraft will be upgrading their engines for greater fuel efficiency. The FY13 PB request supports a more modern and capable air refueling fleet capable of supporting the 2012 DSG.

**Force Structure**

During the drawdown of the 1990’s the Air Force, with Congressional approval, began shifting force structure from the active duty into the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserves. At the time, the shift made a great deal of sense, allowing us to maintain significant resources in reserve that might occasionally be needed at a fraction of the cost of keeping them in the active component. During the last decade of combat operations, we’ve been able to meet war fighter requirements through a mix of partial mobilizations and increased sustained reserve volunteerism. Let me be very clear, our reserve component has always answered our call and we are committed to sustaining their readiness alongside the active duty.
The challenge we’re faced with involves our C-130 and KC-135 fleets, where 65% of our aircraft and crews reside in the reserve component. The active duty force has been operating at a 1:1 dwell to deploy ration for several years, and we expect that to continue at least through 2014. We cannot further reduce the already limited active duty force. As we reduce force structure, it appears the reserve component shares more of the burden because they simply possess more of the resources. Once the retirements and force shaping the FY13 PB request supports are complete, the reserve component will still account for 60% of these two fleets. This is the force structure needed to achieve a 1:2 deploy to dwell for our active duty and a 1:5 dwell for our reserve component Airmen. As we transition to a steady state peacetime force, we need this slight adjustment of force structure to honor the promise we’ve made to our Airmen and their families and still meet our daily takings around the world. This rebalancing will allow us to open three additional reserve-associate C-130 squadrons; active duty Airmen who will be co-located with existing reserve component C-130 units. We will transfer 16 C-17s from the active duty to the reserve component as we continuously look to rebalance our strategic airlift force structure, 8 C-17s in FY13 and 8 in FY15.

Our force structure adjustments reflect the combined efforts of the active duty, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve and we are very grateful they brought so many options to the table. We recognize these force structure changes will affect many communities around the country. We humbly ask the committee consider our responsibility as stewards of the air mobility portfolio and what we want to accomplish for both our active duty and reserve component Airmen.

Conclusion

As we meet here today, your mobility Airmen are delivering hope with airlift and airdrop around the world through humanitarian and combat missions. They are fueling the fight with tankers to ensure the Nation possesses long range strike options and our ground forces always receive support from above. They are saving lives with aeromedical evacuation and critical care air transport teams, giving our wounded the best chance of survival in the history of warfare. We are committed to our warfighters on the ground; it is personal for us. We will always say yes, we will always answer the call. I am confident that your air mobility fleet and force structure reflected in the FY13 PB request will fully support the 2012 DSG and continue to
provide Global Reach for the Nation. Thank you for your enduring support of our Airmen and this capability.
BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

GENERAL RAYMOND E. JOHNS JR.

Gen. Raymond E. Johns, Jr. is Commander, Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill. Air Mobility Command’s mission is to provide rapid, global mobility and sustainment for America’s armed forces. The command also plays a crucial role in providing humanitarian support at home and around the world. The men and women of AMC – active duty, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve and civilians - provide airlift, aerial refueling, special mission and aeromedical evacuation.

General Johns graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1977. His aviation career includes T-38 and C-141 instructor pilot, as well as the chief test pilot and test program manager for the VC-25 Air Force One Replacement Program. He was chosen as a White House Fellow in 1991 where he was a senior staff member in the Office of National Service. The general has served at Headquarters U.S. European Command in security assistance and congressional affairs, and at Headquarters U.S. Pacific Command as Deputy Director of Strategic Plans and Policy. Within Headquarters U.S. Air Force, he served as Deputy Director and, latter, Director of Air Force Programs. The general commanded a test squadron, operations group and airlift wing, and he was the Director of Mobility Forces for operations in Bosnia.

Prior to assuming his current position, General Johns served as Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., where he developed, integrated, evaluated and analyzed the U.S. Air Force Future Years Defense Program that exceeded $522 billion, and the Air Force Long Range Plan to support national security objectives and military strategy. The general was responsible to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff. General Johns is a command pilot and experimental test pilot with 4,500 flying hours in a variety of aircraft.

EDUCATION

1977 Bachelor of Science degree in aeronautical engineering, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
1992 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1984 Air Command and Staff College, by correspondence
1988 Master of Science degree in administration, Central Michigan University
1989 Program Management Course, Defense Systems Management College
1993 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
1995 National Security Management Course, Syracuse University, N.Y.
GENERAL RAYMOND E. JOHNS JR.

University, Cambridge, Mass.

ASSIGNMENTS
19. November 2009 - present, Commander, Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Ill.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS
3. October 1996 - January 1997, Director of Mobility Forces, Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia, as a colonel

FLIGHT INFORMATION
Rating: Command pilot and experimental test pilot.
Flight hours: 4,500
Aircraft flown: C-17, C-141, T-38, VC-25, NVC-135, KC-10 and C-5

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Legion of Merit
Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters
Air Medal
Aerial Achievement Medal
GENERAL RAYMOND E. JOHNSTON JR.

Joint Service Commendation Medal
Air Force Achievement Medal
Combat Readiness Medal
National Defense Service Medal with bronze star
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Armed Forces Service Medal

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION
Second Lieutenant June 1, 1977
First Lieutenant June 1, 1979
Captain June 1, 1981
Major May 1, 1988
Lieutenant Colonel April 1, 1990
Colonel Feb. 1, 1994
Brigadier General March 21, 2001
Major General Aug. 1, 2004
Lieutenant General Oct. 10, 2006
General Nov. 20, 2009

(Current as of October 2010)
STATEMENT BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY M. WYATT III
DIRECTOR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPower & PROJECTION FORCES

SECOND SESSION, 112TH CONGRESS

ON

ASSESSING MOBILITY AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES AND
OPERATIONAL RISKS UNDER THE REVISED 2012 DEFENSE
STRATEGY

MARCH 7, 2012

NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
Opening Remarks

Chairman Akin, Ranking Member McIntyre, and distinguished members of the subcommittee; I am honored to appear before you today on behalf of the 106,700 outstanding men and women serving in our nation’s Air National Guard (ANG). I would like to begin by expressing my sincere appreciation to the Committee for its tremendous support to the Air National Guard. Your work ensures America continues to have a ready, reliable, and accessible Air National Guard, responsive to our domestic needs as well as providing operational capabilities critical to the success of our Total Force. As we face more constrained resources and a declining defense budget, we must accentuate the strength of the Air National Guard—our cost effectiveness.

Air National Guard in National Defense

For more than two decades the United States Air Force has provided the “proof of concept” for how our military can operate as a Total Force. Our Air Guardsmen have demonstrated their commitment to this concept and are indispensable to the Air Force’s Total Force effort. The world is a very different place today than when Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird established the Total Force in August 1970, but the underlying principle of the Total Force remains true: the nation can maintain defense capabilities at less total cost through a careful and thoughtful balancing of Active and Reserve Component forces.

As the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review concluded, effective use of the Guard and Reserves “will lower overall personnel and operating costs, better ensure the right mix and availability of equipment, provide more efficient and
effective use of defense assets, and contribute to the sustainability of both the Active and Reserve components.” It is time for us to settle and move past the cost comparison debate and begin making decisions based on this new environment of austerity we find ourselves navigating.

Last fiscal year Air Guardsmen, 89.5% of those whom volunteered to serve, filled almost 56,000 manpower requests. On March 17, 2011, as the United Nations Security Council debated the Libyan no-fly zone resolution, ANG aircraft and air crews were already en route to Forward Operating Bases to await orders.

Air Guardsmen have deployed to support contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, provide air logistics support to the National Science Foundation in Antarctica, and help to defend U.S. interests on every continent around the globe. As demands upon the U.S. Air Force expanded beyond flight operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Air Guard men and women were there, providing medical assistance, explosive ordnance disposal experts, security forces, and other combat and support capabilities.

The ANG’s contribution encompasses more than just overseas contingencies; our Air Guardsmen provide critical support to homeland defense and civil authorities. On October 1, 2011, Air Guard men and women were actively engaged in homeland defense and support to civil authorities.

These missions included protecting American skies through the Aerospace Control Alert mission, assisting with critical infrastructure protection and assisting their local communities with disaster recovery in North and South
Dakota, Missouri, and Nebraska. Almost 600 Air Guardsmen supported local and national counterdrug programs, and 121 Airmen assisted the U.S. Border Patrol on our southwest border. ANG C-130 crews, equipped with Modular Airborne Fire Fighting Systems, dropped 20,000 gallons of fire retardant on Southwest fires in support of the National Forestry Service, part of more than 360,000 gallons dropped during the entire wildfire season.

Air Guard members want to continue their service to their country, state, and local community. These men and women are very proud of the National Guard's 375 years of service, but they also understand that the nation's needs are changing. They are dedicated to ensuring the ANG remains an essential and cost effective element of the Total Force.

For the ANG to be effective, it must have equipment capable of performing the mission and the ability to integrate seamlessly into joint operations. Investment in the ANG is as good a business decision today as it was at the dawn of the Total Force in 1970. There is no better value for fielding air power to both our nation and its governors.

**Domestic Operations**

Using community-based facilities, the ANG provides America with immediate regional support at less cost than large military installations, costing taxpayers less than two cents of every dollar spent on defense. The ANG has particular core capabilities for which we are uniquely trained and equipped, including:
Air Defense
Air Traffic Control
Airlift (transportation, supply, & evacuation)
Civil engineering
Specialized medical care & evacuation
Incident awareness & assessment
Aerial firefighting
Search and rescue (air & ground)
Explosive Ordinance Disposal
Hazard Material (HAZMAT) detection, identification, & removal
Communications

The ANG’s support to civil authorities is based upon the concept of “dual-use,” i.e., equipment purchased by the Air Force for the ANG’s federal, combat mission, can be adapted and used domestically when not needed overseas. For example, an ANG F-16 wing contains not only F-16 fighter aircraft but fire trucks, forklifts, portable light carts, emergency medical equipment including ambulances, air traffic control equipment, explosives ordnance equipment, etc., as well as well trained experts — all extremely valuable in response to civil emergencies. As the Air Force proceeds with its recapitalization and modernization plans, we need to consider domestic disaster response capabilities requirements in these plans.

**Fighting Fires from Above**

In 2011, Air Guard crews flying C-130s equipped with Modular Airborne Firefighting Systems (MAFFS), dropped more than 677,188 gallons of water and more than 6 million pounds of fire retardant on wildfires.
Each C-130 aircraft fitted with MAFFS is capable of dropping up to 3,000 gallons of retardant or water in five seconds. Today, three of the four MAFFS units are operated by the ANG: the 145th Airlift Wing (AW), 146th AW and the 153th AW. The ANG provides the National Interagency Fire Center six C-130 aircraft and crews trained to fly the U.S. Forest Service-owned MAFFS units.

**Overseas Defense Mission**

The National Guard is battle ready. Since 9/11, National Guard Citizen Soldiers and Airmen have been mobilized more than 660,000 times in support of the overseas and domestic-missions, some multiple times. Within the ANG, 179,700 Airmen have been mobilized since 9/11.

In FY11, more than 19,500 Air Guardsmen deployed to more than 60 countries, and every continent, filling over 56,000 Air Force manpower requests. Nearly 90 percent of those manpower requests were filled with volunteers. This includes 2,380 Airmen mobilized in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), 10,470 deployed in support of the Balkans, Sinai, and additional locations.¹

When the United Nations Security Council declared a no-fly zone resolution over Libya, Air National Guard aerial refueling aircraft and crews were the first to respond, providing 14 of the 24 tankers.

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¹ The Air Guard numbers include Airmen who have mobilized multiple times.
Smartly Equipped

Using National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA) funding, the ANG spent $15 million for urban search and rescue and $20 million for command and control equipment to improve domestic response coordination.

Modernization of critical dual-use equipment ensures the National Guard has the right tools for both homeland and wartime missions. Efficient and cost-effective modernization will become even more important as budgets decline and legacy systems remain in the Air National Guard inventory well past their original design lives.

The ANG pursues “good enough” 80% solutions to modernization shortfalls using readily available, off-the-shelf technology to provide capabilities at much lower cost than comparable DoD programs. This approach uses NGREA funding more efficiently and increases capability across more weapon systems and mission areas.

To save money, the ANG is pursuing a $125,000 helmet-mounted cueing system for its A-10 and F-16s that allows the pilot to quickly acquire high value, fleeting targets in seconds versus minutes by simply looking at the cueing system. Comparable systems on other fighters cost $650,000 per aircraft.

Positioned for Cyber

The Department of Defense is currently refining its framework to thwart cyber attacks in the future while defending our critical military networks today. The National Guard has access to a wealth of information technology talent within its ranks, including Guardsmen working at world-class companies. These
Airmen have a unique blend of civilian and military skills across the information technology spectrum, making the National Guard a ready defense asset in the national cyber security mission.

**Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS)**

The DCGS weapons system serves as the "virtual back end" of the U-2 Dragon Lady, RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-1 Predator, and MQ-9 Reaper. Air Force DCGS locations around the globe receive raw data feeds from these secure platforms and provide finished analysis to coalition forces and combatant commanders.

Currently, the ANG has six stand-alone DCGS nodes in Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, and Nevada, and two classic associate units co-located with the active AF nodes in Virginia and California.

**Air Guard Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAs)**

RPAs provide combat intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, close air support, force protection and escort, base security, and precision strike capability to joint force commanders. Airmen from across the U.S. conduct RPA operations 24/7.

The ANG flies 11 Predator and Reaper Combat Air Patrols (CAPS), providing more than 220 hours of full motion video every day to joint force commanders and warfighters on the ground.

The ANG has MQ-1 Predator units in Arizona, California, North Dakota, Texas, and Ohio. Each Air Guard MQ-1 unit flies Overseas Contingency
Operations CAPs. This effort equates to nearly 73,000 combat hours (3,650 combat sorties) per year.

The ANG has one MQ-9 Reaper Squadron, the 174th Fighter Wing in Syracuse, NY. The 174th is forecast to fly approximately 7,300 combat hours (365 combat sorties) per year. Five additional Air Guard MQ-9 RPA units will be added by FY14

Closing Remarks

Our National Guard Airmen have proven themselves to be ready, reliable, and accessible in recent actions here at home and overseas. Every dollar spent on the Air National Guard provides our nation an unmatched return on investment. Given adequate equipment and training, the Air National Guard will continue to fulfill its Total Force obligations and seamlessly integrate into the Joint theater operations and respond to domestic emergencies.

We need your help to ensure that the Air National Guard of tomorrow is as ready, reliable, accessible, and cost effective as it is today.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, I look forward to your questions.
BIOGRAPHY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY M. WYATT III

LT. Gen. Harry M. Wyatt III is the Director, Air National Guard, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. He is responsible for formulating, developing and coordinating all policies, plans and programs affecting more than 106,700 Guard members in more than 98 flying wings and 200 geographically separated units throughout the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands.

General Wyatt entered the Air Force in 1971 and graduated from undergraduate pilot training at Laredo Air Force Base, Texas, in 1973. He is a command pilot with more than 3,000 hours in the A-7, C-29, F-16, F-100, F-106, T-33, T-37 and T-38 aircraft. Before assuming his current position, General Wyatt served as the Adjutant General of Oklahoma, responsible for commanding units of the Air and Army National Guard.

EDUCATION
1971 Bachelor of Arts degree in business administration, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas
1980 Juris Doctor degree, University of Tulsa, Okla.
1984 Air War College, by seminar
2010 Pinnacle General and Flag Officer Course, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
2010 Leadership at the Peak, Center for Creative Leadership, Colorado Springs, Colo.

ASSIGNMENTS
5. August 1977 - March 1979, F-100 pilot, 125th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Tulsa Air National Guard Base, Okla.
18. December 2001 - January 2003, Chief of Staff, Joint Force Headquarters Oklahoma Air National Guard, Oklahoma Military Department, Oklahoma City, Okla.
19. January 2003 - February 2009, Adjutant General, Joint Force Headquarters Oklahoma ANG, Oklahoma Military Department, Oklahoma City, Okla., as a major general
20. February 2009 - present, Director, Air National Guard, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS
January 2003 - February 2009, Adjutant General, Joint Force Headquarters Oklahoma ANG, Oklahoma Military Department, Oklahoma City, Okla., as a major general

FLIGHT INFORMATION
Rating: Command pilot
Flight hours: More than 3,000
Aircraft flown: A-7, C-26, F-16, F-100, F-106B, T-33, T-37 and T-38

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Air Force Outstanding Unit Award
Combat Readiness Medal
National Defense Service Medal with bronze star
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Humanitarian Service Medal
Air Force Longevity Service Award with silver and two bronze oak leaf clusters
Armed Forces Reserve Medal with silver hourglass
Small Arms Expert Marksmanship Ribbon
Air Force Training Ribbon

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS
1971 Officer Training School, 50,000th graduate

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS AND ASSOCIATIONS
Oklahoma Bar Association
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Oklahoma
Craig County Bar Association
National Guard Association of the United States
National Guard Association of Oklahoma
Oklahoma Trial Judges Association
Rotary Club of Vinita, Oklahoma
American Legion, Dale Peace Post 40, Vinita, Okla.

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION
Second Lieutenant: Nov. 24, 1971
First Lieutenant: Nov. 24, 1973
Captain: Nov. 24, 1975
Major: Nov. 24, 1985
Lieutenant Colonel: Nov. 24, 1992
Colonel: June 30, 1996
Brigadier General: July 1, 2002
Major General: Oct. 28, 2006
Lieutenant General: Feb. 1, 2009

(Current as of December 2011)
STATEMENT BY

MAJOR GENERAL JAMES O. BARCLAY, III
DEPUTY G-3/5/7
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3/5/7

BEFORE THE
SEAPower and Projection Forces Subcommittee
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives

SECOND SESSION, 112TH CONGRESS

ON

Assessing Mobility Airlift Capabilities and Operational Risks under the Revised 2012 Defense Strategy

MARCH 7, 2012
Chairman Akin, Ranking Member McIntyre and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss Army aviation. I welcome this opportunity to testify before you and appreciate the tremendous and ongoing support this Committee has provided to our Army and our Soldiers stationed around the world.

You specifically asked the Army to address several concerns on airlift requirements. We provide the following information in response to your concerns.

Strategic airlift was discussed at the recent Army Air Force Warfighter Talks. Army and Air Force leadership agreed that the Air Force would maintain sufficient strategic airlift to support joint partners and defense requirements. Additionally, there will be no further reduction, below the 2013 budget position, to the Air Force strategic airlift force structure until a new materiel capabilities requirements study is completed. This study will review and assess strategic lift requirements based on the 2012 Defense Strategy.

Intra-theater airlift is an Air Force role and mission. The Air Force has committed its airlift fleet to meet the Army's direct support airlift requirements, particularly for time sensitive, mission critical cargo and personnel. Just as the Army performs roles in support of other Services within the Army's core competencies, we rely on the Air Force to sustain the appropriate equipment,
manning, force structure, and readiness to support Army's logistical airlift requirements.

The Army has received great support from the Air Force when their aircraft were in a direct support role. This direct support role allowed the Army to control the loads and the utilization of the aircraft. The Army was able to get what it needed where it needed on time.

The direct support role does not fulfill 100% of the Army's requirement for time sensitive, mission critical cargo and personnel. The Army fills this gap with contract air and CH-47 aircraft in Operation Enduring Freedom.

The Army's decision to divest the C-23 is a direct result of transferring the fixed wing cargo mission for Army time sensitive, mission critical requirements to the Air Force. The limitations in payload in high altitude/hot temperature environments and inability to carry 463L pallets prevent the aircraft from satisfying the Army's entire direct support requirement. Currently the Army has 41 C-23 aircraft in its inventory with seven planned for divestment in Fiscal Year 2012 and eight in Fiscal Year 2013. The aircraft will be fully divested by December 2014.

The Army's CH-47 fleet has been the workhorse of the overseas contingency operations and vital to homeland security requirements. The CH-47 has flown over 370,000 hours in support of combat operations at operational tempo rates 3 to 5 times the peacetime rate. The current fleet mix of CH-47D and CH-47F aircraft are maintaining excellent readiness rates from the extensive reset program for the aircraft. The CH-47 fleet requirement is 509 aircraft with.
current inventory of 493 aircraft. The CH-47F is currently being fielded with buyout in Fiscal Year 2018 and last deliverables in 2019. The program of record is a two part program: new build and remanufactured.

The next several years will be pivotal for our Army. The resources provided to the Army to conduct operations while transforming and modernizing will determine the Army's ability to continue to accomplish its mission and to be postured to meet future commitments. To execute these plans, we need your continued leadership and support to provide full, timely, and sustained funding so that we will be ready for current and future challenges.

I am ready to address any questions you may have.
United States Army

Major General James O. Barclay III
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7
United States Army
400 Army Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310-0400
Since: Aug 2010

SOURCE OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE: USMA

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES
- United States Military Academy – BS – No Major
- United States Naval War College – MA – National Security & Strategic Studies

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED
- Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
- United States Army Command and General Staff College
- United States Naval War College

FOREIGN LANGUAGES: None recorded

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从     到     职位
Aug 10  Present  Assistant, G-3/5/7, United States Army, Washington, DC
Jul 08  Aug 10  Commanding General, United States Army Aviation Center of Excellence and Fort Rucker, Fort Rucker, Alabama
Jun 06  Jul 08  Director, Joint Center for Operational Analysis-Lessons Learned, United States Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, Virginia
Jun 05  Jun 06  Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), 1st Infantry Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Feb 05  Apr 05  Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), 42nd Infantry Division, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
Jul 04  Jan 05  Executive Officer to the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
Nov 03  Jul 04  Executive Officer to the Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC
Jul 03  Nov 03  Executive Officer to the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, United States Army, Washington, DC
Jun 00  Jun 03  Commander, Aviation Brigade, later Chief of Staff, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, Texas and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
Jul 98  Jun 99  Deputy Division Chief, Force Policy and Planning Division, United States Atlantic Command, redesignated United States Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia
Aug 97  Jun 98  Student, United States Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island
Nov 94  Jun 97  Commander, 3rd Battalion, 25th Regiment, redesignated 3rd Battalion, 10th Aviation, later Deputy Chief of Staff, 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, New York and OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Haiti
Feb 92 Aug 94  S-3 (Operations), 159th Aviation Group (Airborne), later Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 159th Aviation Regiment, later Executive Officer, 159th Aviation Group (Airborne), later Secretary of the General Staff, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Jun 90 Oct 91  S-3 (Operations), 3d Battalion, 3d Aviation, later S-3 (Operations), 4th Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany and I-3 (Operations), Combined Battalion Task Force, OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT, Iraq

Jul 89 Jun 90  Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Jul 87 Jun 89  Staff Action Control Officer, later Contract Management Officer, United States Army Communications-Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey


Oct 82 Jun 86  Flight Platoon Leader, later Operations Officer, B Company, later Assistant S-3 (Operations), 101st Aviation Battalion, later Executive Officer, B Company, later S-2 (Security), later S-3 (Operations), later Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 101st Aviation Battalion, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky

Apr 82 Oct 82  Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia

Feb 81 Jun 82  Aeroscot Section Commander, B Troop, 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, Eighth United States Army, Korea

Apr 80 Jan 81  Student, Officer Rotary Wing Aviator Course, United States Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama

Jun 79 Mar 80  Rifle Platoon Leader, C Company, later Support Platoon Leader, 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia

**SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS**

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<td>Jun 06-Jul 08</td>
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- Director, Joint Center for Operational Analysis-Lessons Learned, United States Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, Virginia
- Executive Officer to the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq
- Deputy Division Chief, Total Force Policy and Planning Division, United States Atlantic Command, redesignated United States Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia
- S-3 (Operations), 3d Battalion, 3d Aviation, later S-3 (Operations), 4th Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany and I-3 (Operations), Combined Battalion Task Force, OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT, Iraq

**SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS ASSIGNMENTS**

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<td>Colonel</td>
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- Assistant Division Commander/Maneuver, 42d Infantry Division, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
- Executive Officer to the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq

**US DECORATIONS AND BADGES**

- Distinguished Service Medal
- Defense Superior Service Medal
- Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Bronze Star Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Meritorious Service Medal (with 5 Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Army Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Army Achievement Medal
- Parachutist Badge
- Air Assault Badge
- Master Army Aviator Badge
- Senior Army Aviator Badge
- Army Staff Identification Badge
GAO

Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives

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MOBILITY CAPABILITIES

DOD’s Mobility Study Limitations and Newly Issued Strategic Guidance Raise Questions about Air Mobility Requirements

Statement of Cary Russell, Acting Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
March 7, 2013

MOBILITY CAPABILITIES

DOD’s Mobility Study Limitations and Newly Issued Strategic Guidance Raise Questions about Air Mobility Requirements

What GAO Did This Study

Over the past 30 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested more than $140 billion in its airlift and tanker forces. In 2010, DOD published its Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2015 (MCRS-16), which was intended to provide an understanding of the range of mobility capabilities needed for possible military operations. In January 2012, DOD issued new strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, affecting force structure decisions. This testimony addresses GAO’s previous findings on the MCRS-16 and air mobility issues to consider in light of DOD’s new strategic guidance.

What GAO Recommends

GAO previously recommended that DOD clarify the risk of surges and decreases in the mobility force structure and the associated risks. DOD did not concur with the recommendations, stating that the MCRS-16 identified shortfalls and excesses and included a risk assessment. GAO disagreed, noting that, for example, the MCRS-16 did not explicitly identify excess aircraft and did not include risk assessments when potential shortfalls existed.

What GAO Found

The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2015 (MCRS-16) provided some useful information concerning air mobility systems—such as intra-theater airlift, strategic airlift, and air refueling—but several weaknesses in the study raised questions about its ability to fully inform decision makers. In particular, the MCRS-16 did not provide decision makers with recommendations concerning shortfalls and excesses in air mobility systems. In evaluating capabilities, the MCRS-16 used three cases that it developed potential conflicts or natural disasters and identified the required capabilities for air mobility systems. Based on data in the MCRS-16, GAO was able to discern possible shortfalls or potential capacity that could be considered excess or an operational reserve (see figure), even though the MCRS-16 was ambiguous regarding whether actual shortfalls or excess capabilities exist. It also did not identify the risk associated with potential shortfalls or excesses. Identifying the risk associated with specific mobility systems could help with decisions to allocate resources.

Figure: Potential Shortfalls and Excesses in Air Mobility Capabilities Derived from MCRS-16

The Department of Defense (DOD) issued new strategic guidance in January 2012, which is intended to help guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force. However, DOD has issued strategic guidance into specific planning scenarios, which it used in studies (such as the MCRS-16) to generate requirements that inform force structure decisions. Based on the new strategic guidance, the Air Force has proposed reducing its mobility air fleet by 130 aircraft, which would leave 593 mobility aircraft in the air fleet. According to Air Force officials, the proposals will enable the Air Force to deliver the airlift capabilities required to implement the new strategic guidance and remain within funding levels. However, the Air Force’s document that outlines its proposed aircraft retirements does not provide details of any analyses used to support the reductions. Given the new strategic guidance, it is unclear the extent to which the requirements developed from MCRS-16 are still relevant. In weighing the Air Force’s proposal, decision makers would benefit from a clear understanding from DOD of the basis for the proposed aircraft retirements and DOD’s ability to execute its new strategic guidance with its planned air mobility force structure.

View: GAO-12-297T. For more information, contact Cary Russell, (202) 517-1803. russelc@gao.gov

United States Government Accountability Office
March 7, 2012

The Honorable W. Todd Akin
Chairman
The Honorable Mike McIntyre
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

Chairman Akin, Ranking Member McIntyre, and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss air mobility issues and supporting analyses. As we have previously reported, over the past 30 years, DOD has invested more than $140 billion in its airlift and tanker forces. In 2010, DOD completed the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16), which was to provide senior leaders with a detailed understanding of the range of mobility capabilities needed for possible future military operations by identifying the capabilities and requirements to support national strategy. The MCRS-16 reported on several mobility issues, including intratheater airlift, strategic airlift, and air refueling in the context of three cases that included a mix of different types of potential conflicts and natural disasters. DOD concluded that, with few exceptions, the projected mobility capabilities in 2016 were sufficient to support the most demanding projected requirements. The MCRS-16 study was prepared in 2010 based on the defense strategy and planning scenarios current at that time. In January 2012, DOD issued new strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. In the past, DOD has translated strategic guidance into specific planning scenarios, which it has used in studies (such as the MCRS-16) to generate requirements that inform force structure decisions.

¹To conduct the MCRS-16, DOD modeled a broad spectrum of military engagements that supported national strategic operations using forces listed in the 2009 President’s Budget with appropriate fiscal year 2010 adjustments and compared these capabilities with the requirements for the 2016 time frame. Based on the strategy in effect at the time, DOD considered the increased level of U.S. military engagements around the world and an increased reliance on airlift for moving equipment and supplies.

My statement today will address our previous findings on the MCRS-16,\(^3\) with an emphasis on air mobility issues, as well as air mobility issues to consider in light of DOD’s January 2012 strategic guidance on defense priorities. To prepare this testimony, we relied on the findings of our December 2010 review of the MCRS-16. For that report, we reviewed the unclassified executive summary and the classified report of the MCRS-16, the study’s terms of reference, and study plan. We focused our December 2010 report on the extent to which the MCRS-16 met its study objectives. In conducting our review, we met with the MCRS-16 study leaders to obtain further context and information concerning the study as it was presented in DOD’s report. For this testimony statement, we also reviewed DOD’s January 2012 strategic guidance on defense priorities and the Air Force’s proposed force structure changes, and contacted officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Air Mobility Command. We conducted work for our report in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provided a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective.

**Background**

**MCRS-16**

DOD’s MCRS-16, which was completed in February 2010, was to provide senior leaders with a detailed understanding of the range of mobility capabilities needed for possible future military operations and help leaders make investment decisions regarding mobility systems. The study was driven by strategy current at the time. The study scope included, among other things, the way changes in mobility systems affect the outcomes of major operations and an assessment of the associated risks. MCRS-16 had several objectives, including to determine capability

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\(^3\)GAO, **Defense Transportation: Additional Information Is Needed for DOD’s Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 to Fully Address All of Its Study Objectives**, GAO-12-837T (Washington, D.C., Dec. 8, 2012).
shortfalls\(^*\) (gaps) and excesses\(^*\) (overlaps) associated with programmed mobility force structure, provide a risk assessment, and identify the capabilities and requirements to support national strategy.

In order to assess mobility capabilities, DOD officials responsible for the MCRS-16 used three cases to evaluate a broad spectrum of military operations that could be used to inform decisions regarding future mobility capabilities. The three cases are described below:

- **Case 1**: U.S. forces conduct two nearly simultaneous large-scale land campaigns and at the same time respond to three nearly simultaneous homeland defense events.

- **Case 2**: U.S. forces conduct a major air/land campaign concurrent with the response to a large asymmetric\(^*\) campaign and respond to a significant homeland defense event.

- **Case 3**: U.S. forces conduct a large land campaign against the backdrop of an ongoing long-term irregular warfare\(^*\) campaign, and respond to three nearly simultaneous homeland defense events.

Each case required a certain percentage of mobility airlift capacity—
including strategic airlift (C-17s, C-5s), intratheater airlift (C-130s, C-27s), and air refueling aircraft (KC-135s, KC-10s)—that DOD would employ on the most demanding day of the case. If DOD had fewer aircraft than

\(^*\)According to DOD, a capability gap is the inability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks. The gap may be the result of no existing capability, lack of proficiency or sufficiency in existing capability, or the need to replace an existing capability. A shortfall may result from a lack of forces, equipment, personnel, material, or capability, and is reflected as the difference between the required resources and those available to a combatant commander. When a lack of resources would adversely affect the command's ability to accomplish its mission, it is described as a shortfall.

\(^*\)For this testimony, overlap and excess are used interchangeably. An overlap (excess) can occur when the military seeks to achieve a desired effect by performing tasks under specified standards and conditions and redundant capabilities exist to accomplish a mission or task and the overlap is determined to be operationally undesirable or excessive.

\(^*\)In military operations, the term asymmetric means the application of dissimilar strategies, tactics, capabilities, and methods to circumvent or negate an opponent's strengths while exploiting his weaknesses.

\(^*\)Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).
required, a potential shortfall would exist and there could be a risk that the mission might not be accomplished. If DOD had more aircraft than required, a potential excess could exist, and there could be risk that resources could be expended unnecessarily on a mobility capability.

<table>
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<th>DOD’s January 2012 Strategic Guidance on Defense Priorities</th>
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| In January 2012, DOD issued *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, which describes the projected security environment and the key military missions for which DOD will prepare. DOD may make force and program decisions in accordance with the strategic approach described in this guidance, which could differ from the guidance—the National Military Strategy—that was used by the MCRS-16 to determine requirements. The new strategic guidance is intended to help inform decisions regarding the size and shape of the force, recognizing that fiscal concerns are a national security issue. To support the new strategic guidance, which acknowledges the constraints of limited resources, the Air Force has proposed changes concerning the retirement of aircraft in its airlift fleet. Specifically, in February 2012, the Air Force proposed to:

- Retire the oldest 27 C-5 aircraft, thereby reducing the fleet to 275 strategic airlift aircraft—which, according to the Air Force, would consist of 223 C-17s and 52 C-5s.
- Retire the 66 oldest C-130 aircraft—the primary aircraft used in DOD’s intratheater airlift mission—thereby reducing the fleet to 318 C-130s.
- Retire or cancel procurement of all 38 planned C-27 aircraft, which were intended to meet time-critical Army missions.

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*The Air Force has also proposed reductions in its air refueling fleet:

*DOD’s January 2012 Budget Priorities and Choices document identifies a remaining force of 223 C-17 aircraft, which differs from the remaining 223 C-17s identified in the Air Force’s February 2012 Force Structure Changes document.

*The C-5 Galaxy is one of the largest aircraft in the world and the largest airlifter in the Air Force inventory. The aircraft can carry a fully equipped combat-ready military unit to any point in the world on short notice and then provide the supplies required to help sustain the fighting force. The C-5 can carry outsized and oversize cargo and has a greater capacity than any other airlifter.

*The C-130 is a medium-range, tactical airlift aircraft designed primarily for transport of cargo and personnel within a theater of operations. Variants of the C-130 perform other missions, including rescue and recovery, air refueling, special operations, fire-fighting and weather reconnaissance.*
DOD Did Not Clearly Identify Some Important Mobility Issues in the MCRS-16 and Its New Strategic Guidance Raises Questions

While the MCRS-16 included some useful information concerning air mobility systems, the report did not clearly meet two of its objectives because it did not provide decision makers with specific information concerning (1) shortfalls and excesses associated with the mobility force structure or (2) risks associated with shortfalls or excesses of its mobility capabilities. Moreover, the MCRS-15 generally did not make recommendations about air mobility capabilities. These weaknesses in the MCRS-16 raise questions about the ability of the study to provide decision makers with information needed to make programmatic decisions. In addition, DOD’s January 2012 strategic guidance could affect its air mobility requirements. I will first address the issues related to DOD’s MCRS-16, and then turn to a discussion of the new strategic guidance.

Study Did Not Clearly Identify Shortfalls and Excesses in Air Mobility Systems

The MCRS-16 did not meet its objective to identify shortfalls and excesses in most of its assessments of mobility systems. For each of the three cases of potential conflicts or natural disasters DOD used in the MCRS-16, the department identified the required capabilities for air mobility systems. However, the MCRS-16 stopped short of explicitly stating whether a shortfall or excess existed. Moreover, it did not make recommendations regarding the need for any changes to air mobility assets based on any shortfalls or excesses. Using DOD data from the MCRS-16, we were able to discern possible shortfalls or potential capacity that could be considered excess or used as an operational reserve even though the MCRS-16 report was ambiguous regarding whether actual shortfalls or excess capabilities existed (see figure). 19

19The C-21 Spartan is a mid-range, multifunctional aircraft. Its primary mission is to provide on-demand transport of time-sensitive, mission-critical supplies and key personnel to forward-deployed Army units, including those in remote and austere locations. Its mission also includes casualty evacuation, airdrop, troop transport, aerial resupply, and homeland security.

20Operational reserves can be an emergency reserve of men or materiel established for the support of a specific operation.
Figure: Potential Shortfalls and Excesses in Air Mobility Capabilities Derived from the MCRS-16

As shown in the figure, the MCRS-16 determined that in each case, there was unused strategic airlift capacity, but the study did not specifically state whether the unused capacity represented excesses or identify excesses by aircraft type. When an excess exists, decision makers need to know which aircraft and how many could be retired. Specifically, the MCRS-16 did not identify the required number of C-5s or excesses of C-5 aircraft, but at the time of our report, the Air Force stated its intention to seek the retirement of 22 C-5s, which it increased to 27 and proposed again in February 2012. Furthermore, the MCRS-16 did not identify the most combat-effective or the most cost-effective fleet of aircraft even
though DOD had previously stated that the MCRS-16 would set the stage to address the cost-effectiveness of its strategic aircraft.\footnote{GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Timely and Accurate Estimates of Costs and Requirements Are Needed to Define Optimal Future Strategic Airlift Mix, Nov. 20, 2008.}

Decision makers rely on studies such as the MCRS-16 so that they can make informed choices to address mobility shortfalls and excesses. In our December 2010 report, we recommended that DOD explicitly identify the shortfalls and excesses in the mobility systems that DOD analyzed for the MCRS-16 and provide this additional analysis to DOD and congressional decision makers. In commenting on our draft report, DOD disagreed with our recommendations, stating that the MCRS-16 explicitly identifies shortfalls and excesses in the mobility system. In its comments, DOD identified strategic airlift as an example of an excess. While the MCRS-16 showed that there was unused capacity associated with strategic airlift, it was not clear from the study whether this unused capacity could serve as an operational reserve. If the study had clearly identified an excess in strategic lift capabilities, decision makers may have chosen to retire aircraft and reallocate resources to other priorities or to keep an operational reserve to mitigate against unforeseen events. Similarly, if the study had identified a shortfall in strategic lift capabilities, decision makers may have chosen to accept the operational risk or sought to address the shortfall by increasing capabilities. DOD has not taken action based on our recommendation, but we continue to believe that explicitly identifying the shortfalls and excesses in mobility systems is useful to decision makers in making programmatic decisions.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{Study Did Not Identify Associated Risks of Shortfalls or Excesses in Air Mobility Systems}
\item The MCRS-16 also did not clearly achieve its study objective to provide risk assessments.\footnote{According to the National Defense Strategy in effect at the time of the study, risk assessment is an essential part of balancing risks, given limited resources, and requires identifying the potential for damage to national security combined with the probability of occurrence and a measurement of the consequences should the underlying risk remain unaddressed.} Assessing risk related to shortfalls and excesses is important—the risk associated with shortfalls is that the mission might not be accomplished, while the risk associated with excesses is that resources may be expended unnecessarily on a mobility capability. However, the MCRS-16 did not include risk assessments of airlift.
\end{itemize}
systems. For example, the MCRS-16 showed potential excesses in strategic and intratheater aircraft but did not identify the risk associated with these potential excesses. Furthermore, the MCRS-16 identified a reduced intratheater airlift fleet (401 C-130s) in comparison with the previous fleet (a maximum of 674 C-130s), but it did not describe the level of risk associated with this reduced fleet size. Concerning air refueling, the MCRS-16 reported that airborne tanker demand exceeded tanker capacity by 20 percent in MCRS-16 case two but did not identify the risk associated with that potential shortfall.

In our December 2010 report, we recommended that DOD provide a risk assessment for potential shortfalls and excesses and provide this additional analysis to department and congressional decision makers. DOD disagreed, stating that MCRS-16 included a risk assessment which links the ability of mobility systems to achieve warfighting objectives. Therefore, DOD has not taken action on this recommendation. While warfighting risk metrics can inform decision makers concerning overall mobility capabilities, decision makers would benefit from knowing the risk associated with particular mobility systems as they make force structure decisions. Quantifying the risk associated with specific mobility systems could help with decisions to allocate resources, enabling decision makers to address the most risk at the least cost.

DOD’s New Strategic Guidance May Affect Required Air Mobility Capabilities

In January 2012, DOD issued new strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, that will guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force. The strategic guidance is to ensure that the military is agile, flexible, and ready for the full range of contingencies. However, the strategic guidance includes changes from previous strategy—for example, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations. In the past, DOD has translated strategic guidance into specific planning

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*In 2005, DOD’s Mobility Capabilities Study described a fleet containing a maximum of 674 C-130s as a moderate risk fleet. By comparison, DOD’s MCRS-16 reported that a fleet of 401 C-130s exceeded demands.

**DOD defines stability operations as an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.
scenarios, which DOD has used in studies (such as the MCRS-16) to
generate requirements that inform force structure decisions. Based on the
new strategic guidance, the Air Force has proposed changes to the
mobility air fleet, including the retirement or cancellation of procurement
of 130 mobility aircraft. According to Air Force officials, the new strategic
guidance requires the Air Force to balance risks by making difficult
choices. However, the Air Force’s February 2012 document that outlines
its proposed aircraft retirements does not provide details of any analyses.
Given the new strategic guidance—which articulates priorities for a 21st
century defense—it is unclear the extent to which the requirements
developed from the MCRS-16 are still relevant. In weighing the Air
Force’s proposal, decision makers will require additional information
concerning what types of potential military operations are envisioned by
the strategic guidance and to what extent DOD has analyzed its planned
force structure using cases that reflect the new strategic guidance.

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, the MCRS-16 study did not fully provide congressional
decision makers with a basis for understanding what mobility systems are
needed to meet requirements, how many are needed, and what are the
risks of having too many or not enough of each aircraft to meet defense
strategy. While DOD disagreed with our recommendations, we continue
to believe that the study missed opportunities to identify specific shortfalls
and excesses and did not provide associated risk assessments. Further,
the MCRS-16 study was completed more than 2 years ago using defense
planning guidance in effect at that time. With DOD’s newly issued
strategic guidance on defense priorities, the department’s potential
scenarios may have changed. Decision makers would benefit from a clear
understanding from DOD of the basis for the proposed aircraft retirements
and DOD’s ability to execute its new strategic guidance with its planned
air mobility force structure.

Chairman Akin and Ranking Member McIntyre, and members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I am happy to
answer any questions that you may have at this time.
Contacts and Acknowledgments

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Cary Russell at (404) 679-1806 or russellcg@gao.gov. In addition, contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony are Alissa H. Czyz, Assistant Director, James P. Klein, Ronald La Due Lake, Richard S. Powelson, Michael C. Shaughnessy, Jennifer S. Spence, Annie M. Steele, Joseph J. Watkins, and Stephen K. Woods.
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

MARCH 7, 2012
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GRIFFIN

General JOHNS. The Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP), FY13–FY17, cost savings from terminating C–130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) and initiating the “Optimize Legacy C–130 Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM)” program is $2.3B. Additionally, when adding the “To Complete” cost of AMP in the FY12 PB to what the Air Force has funded in the FY13PB for CNS/ATM, the Air Force identified a total cost savings of $3.5B in investment dollars.

By going with the new Optimize Legacy C–130 CNS/ATM, which retains the navigator position, the Air Force took into consideration that we would lose the mission personnel “cost savings” of $482M in base year dollars (reference 31, Dec 2010 C–130 AMP Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) to Congress) vice AMP.

Furthermore, the 2010 SAR identified that there were no other life cycle costs savings by continuing with AMP. The SAR identified an expected cost increase in both Unit Level Consumption ($513.4M Base Year dollars) and Sustaining Support ($157.7M Base Year dollars) for AMP modified aircraft.

Lastly, the termination liability for C–130 AMP is $5.1M. [See page 20.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

General JOHNS. There are 1,115 CONUS airfields in the AMC GDSS Airfield Database (ASRR), and of those, only 30 are suitable for C–27s and NOT suitable for C–130s (2.6% of the database). [See page 22.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. YOUNG

General JOHNS. The MCRS 2016 was accomplished in 2010 using three cases; each consisting of OSD approved warfighting scenarios. Revised strategic guidance to the scenarios superseded one of these cases, and the Air Force used the two cases consistent with the new strategic guidance to shape mobility force structure decisions.

The RAND “U.S. Air Force Intra-theater Airlift Requirements for Direct Support Missions for the U.S. Army” study was also accomplished in 2010 and analyzed the direct support to the US Army requirements. This was a “platform-agnostic” analysis that noted C–130s could perform the mission at least as well as the C–27J. It used a warfighting scenario that was a subset of those used in the MCRS to determine a range of aircraft required to meet this mission set.

The Joint Staff also conducted a force structure study called Operational Availability 12, or OA–12. While this Joint study focused on the combat air forces, Headquarters Air Force A9, Studies and Analyses, Assessments and Lessons Learned Directorate, used the force planning construct from OA–12 to further analyze the mobility force structure subsequently informing the Service’s force structure decisions.

Finally, the Office of Secretary of Defense’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office conducted an independent airlift study that took a warfighting scenario consistent with the new strategic guidance and analyzed the strategic airlift fleet force structure, ultimately validating the strategic airlift force structure the Air Force had developed.

The Air Force has provided copies of the MCRS 2016 and RAND Direct Support Mission studies for review and briefed the classified analysis summarizing the impact of OA–12 on the mobility fleet to multiple groups of House and Senate PSMs and MLAs. We stand ready to provide additional briefings as necessary. The AF does not have the final CAPE briefing or report to provide. [See page 16.]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 7, 2012
Mr. AKIN. The mobility aircraft inventory will decrease significantly over the next 3 years as a result of the new defense strategy requirements. The Air Force will decrease its strategic airlift to 275 aircraft, tactical airlift to 318 aircraft, retired 20 KC–135 tankers, and the Army plans to divest itself of 42 C–23 tactical airlift aircraft. However, the current operational tempo, ongoing operations, and forecasted threats, may not be conducive and align with the new strategy and the different planning assumptions used to size the force structure within that strategy. In your opinion, what risk will we incur in meeting future mobility requirements with a reduced mobility aircraft force structure if the planning assumptions within the new defense strategy do not materialize?

General JOHNS. The Air Force plans to reduce the strategic and theater airlift fleets by about 10% and the tanker fleet by about 5%. The FY13 PB request air mobility fleet will be a more modern and reliable fleet that retains significant capacity and capabilities. If the planning assumptions within the new defense strategy do not materialize, there is a risk that airlift and air refueling support will not be available to the degree desired. Airlift flows could be delayed and air refueling support could be diminished in one or more theaters of operations. The impact can be mitigated by prioritizing air mobility resources to large scale operations in one region while retaining a lesser capability to deny the objectives of an opportunistic aggressor in a second region. At the end of the day, the country is retaining a capable array of air mobility assets, and our forces will not be defeated on any battlefield for lack of air mobility support.

Mr. AKIN. In the February 2012 Air Force White Paper provided to Congress outlining the Air Force’s fiscal year 2013 force structure reorganization, the Air Force states that “although the U.S. has removed all combat forces from Iraq and the new strategic guidance reduces the steady state requirement for ground forces, we expect Air Force steady state rotational requirements to remain nearly constant, or perhaps increase, under the new strategy.” Given the anticipated increase in Air Force rotational requirements, does it make sense to reduce our airlift inventory until we’re able to determine what the new rotational “baseline” will be?

General JOHNS. Based on the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance analysis indicates that an intra-theater fleet of 318 C–130s and an inter-theater fleet of 223 C–17s and 52 C–5Ms will meet the demand of the fully mobilized wartime surge scenarios. There is a forecast that steady-state rotational requirements within the wartime scenarios will remain constant, or perhaps slightly increase, does not indicate the need for larger overall fleets, but does point to the need to ensure the active duty/air reserve component mix within the airlift fleets are sufficient to meet rotational deployment demand without a higher reliance on mobilization of reserve component forces. This is why the Mobility Air Force fleet reductions outlined in the FY13 PB request attempt to balance active duty and air reserve component force structure.

Mr. AKIN. General Schwartz briefed the committee during a briefing on January 25, 2012 that his greatest concern with the new defense strategy is that the Air Force may not have the capacity in the mobility aircraft and combat aircraft fleets to execute the new strategy. Can you please quantify for the committee the risks incurred with the significant reduction to the mobility airlift fleet and what it may mean in meeting warfighting requirements of the combatant commanders?

General JOHNS. The Air Force plans to reduce the strategic and theater airlift fleets by about 10% and the tanker fleet by about 5%. The FY13 PB request air mobility fleet will be a more modern and reliable fleet that retains significant capacity and capabilities. If the planning assumptions within the new defense strategy do not materialize, there is a risk that airlift and air refueling support will not be available to the degree desired. Airlift flows could be delayed and air refueling support could be diminished in one or more theaters of operations. The impact can be mitigated by prioritizing air mobility resources to theaters of our choosing and delaying full support to others. At the end of the day, the country is retaining a capable array of air mobility assets, and our forces will not be defeated on any battlefield for lack of air mobility support.
Mr. Akin. The Air Force proposes making a significant adjustment of mobility force structure not only for aircraft inventory numbers, but also closing units and standing up new units around the country. The total cost of this reorganization of mobility locations, we’ve been told, is approximately $603 million dollars. Why is the Air Force incurring such cost to realign units with different mobility missions and locations around the country?

General Johns. While cost savings are part of the decision-making process, the most important factor is the Air Force’s ability to provide the capabilities required by the new Defense Strategic Guidance, “Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.” This new strategy directs the services to build a leaner, more flexible, and technologically advanced force. As a result, the Air Force is balancing our Total Force to match the capability and capacity requirements of the new guidance. The proposed Reserve Component force structure reductions were determined using a deliberate and collaborative process which leveraged careful analytical review of warfighting scenarios consistent with the new strategic guidance. Two decades of military end strength and force structure reductions in our active duty component have changed the active and reserve component mix, and achieving the appropriate active and reserve component mix is critical to sustaining Air Force capabilities for forward presence and rapid response, as well as meeting high rate rotational demands with a smaller force.

To meet this end, the Air National Guard (ANG) developed five Capstone Principles to help guide this transition: allocate at least one flying Wing with ANG equipment to each state; recapitalize concurrently and in balance with the Regular Air Force; manage ANG resources with ANG people; adopt missions that fit the militia construct; and, build dual-use capabilities (Emergency Support Functions) relevant to the states. Similarly, our Reserve Component used the following four principles: ensure aircraft reductions do not negatively impact operational support to Combatant Commands; ensure force structure movements do not create any new Air Force bills; ensure risk is minimized by optimizing crew ratios to exploit expected increases in mission capability rates; and, consider locations that continue to have an Air Force mission due to the presence of another Air Force Component. This Total Force approach allowed us to maintain the right Active/Air Guard/Reserve mix which will allow us to meet our operational demands with a leaner force while taking care of our Airmen.

Mr. Akin. In your written testimony, it states that “with the requirements for two near simultaneous large-scale land campaigns removed from the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and in turn the most demanding 2016 Mobility Capability and Requirements Study scenario no longer considered, the demand on the air mobility fleet is greatly reduced.” In your opinion, why has the Department determined that the scenarios modeled just two years ago for the year 2016 time period are no longer relevant in maintaining mobility airlift capabilities for?

General Johns. The process of developing a national military strategy includes selecting potential adversaries, defining the level of threat they represent and the time span in which they will have to be engaged with. In each of these elements there is a range of values that can be rationally set. The threat scenario modeled in the national military strategy is entirely rational and I fully support the budget devised to field the capabilities necessary to support that strategy.

Mr. Akin. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review concluded that the effective use of the Guard and Reserves “will lower overall personnel and operating costs, better ensure the right mix and availability of equipment, provide more efficient and effective use of defense assets, and contribute to the sustainability of both the Active and Reserve components.” However, the force structure adjustments that the Air Force made to the mobility portfolio actually increased the portion of force structure located within the active component under the new strategy. Given that this contradicts the 2010 QDR assessment of Guard and Reserve benefits, why is it that the Air Force chose to reorganize the mobility force structure in this manner?

General Johns. The key to the QDR is the “effective” use of the Guard and Reserves. We are at a point now in our force structure where roughly 65% of our C-130 and KC-135 capability resides in the reserve component. We do not believe we can continue to meet the day to day combatant commander requirements with this force structure without continued mobilization authority and we cannot plan to have that authority forever. It is important to note that the force structure adjustments to the mobility portfolio do not increase the number of assigned aircraft to the active duty. The active duty will stand up active duty units co-located with existing ARC units leveraging total force capabilities.

Mr. Akin. In your opinion, is the Air National Guard’s equipping strategy effective for an operational reserve? Does the current Air Force procurement plan for mobil-
ity aircraft adequately address aging aircraft issues in the Air National Guard? Please explain.

General JOHNS. Yes. The equipping strategy for the Mobility Air Forces effectively covers the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve Command, and the Active Duty. The C-17, our most modern inter-theater airlifter, is based across ANG, AFRC, and AD locations. The most modernized C-5s, the C-5M, will be based at AFRC and AMC locations. The KC-135R, currently being equipped with the Block 45 modification, is based across ANG, AFRC, and the AD, with the majority in the ANG and AFRC. The C-130J is based across ANG, AFRC, and AD locations. The majority of the newest variants of the legacy C-130 fleet reside in the ANG and AFRC. We plan to base the KC-46A, our newest tanker, across the Total Force IAW the SecAF’s Strategic Basing Process.

Mr. AKIN. How do you plan to help the Air National Guard mitigate projected mobility aircraft shortfalls to ensure their units retain capability for both Title 10 federal and Title 32 state executed missions?

General JOHNS. The entire mobility air forces, notwithstanding their unit or component stand ready to assist any state in times of emergency. The 2010 NDAA created streamlined processes for the federal government to provide DOD resources to the states. No state, even those without an airlift unit should think they won’t get the assistance they require.

Mr. AKIN. O&M costs (flying hour costs) vary by aircraft type as do the overall costs to operate any given aircraft between the Active Air Force and the Reserve Component. If an aircraft costs more to fly but is flown less by more experienced pilots in the Air National Guard component, wouldn’t it make fiscal sense to put those aircraft in the Air National Guard rather than the Active Air Force? And, wouldn’t we get a longer lifetime out of those aircraft this way?

General JOHNS. At the heart of this discussion about force structure should be the question of capability. When a reserve component unit is fully mobilized it brings similar capabilities at a similar cost compared to its active duty counterpart. However, we typically don’t have mobilization authority for our day to day combatant commander requirements. The active duty unit provides the Nation that day to day capability. Also, in most instances the experienced aircrews that make up the reserve component started as inexperienced active duty aircrews. By design, the active duty is a feeder of experience into the reserve component. We need these aircrews to fly regularly to build experience when they are young; the active duty provides that opportunity. The Nation receives a tremendous value from the reserve component, but only because of the active duty investment up front. If we were to shift to a model where the majority of inexperienced aircrews entered directly into the reserve component, we believe over time the capability those units provide to the Nation would be greatly diminished.

Mr. AKIN. In your testimony, you state that “the [Army’s Direct Support/Mission Critical] mission is being accomplished with two C-27s and one C-130”, yet General Barclay’s testimony contradicts this by stating “the [Air Force’s] direct support role does not fulfill 100% of the Army’s requirement for time sensitive, mission critical cargo and personnel. The Army fills this gap with contract airlift and MH-47G air- craft in Operation Enduring Freedom.” When does the Air Force plan to assume 100% of the Army’s Direct Support/Mission Critical airlift missions? Or, does the Air Force plan to never assume 100% of the missions? If not, why not?

General JOHNS. The Air Force is committed to supporting the Army Direct Support/Mission Critical requirement. CENTCOM, the combatant command responsible for requesting forces has not requested the Air Force assume 100% of the Direct Support/Mission Critical mission for a variety of reasons.

Mr. AKIN. Given the reduced airlift inventory in both the Air Force and the Army, how would you assess the operational risk incurred with the Air Force meeting the Army’s Direct Support/Missions Critical airlift mission in future contingencies and training operations?

General JOHNS. The FY13 PB request allows for 48 C-130H/J aircraft to be available for the Direct Support/Mission Critical mission. We believe this is sufficient to meet previously established requirements.

Mr. AKIN. Currently, there are two C-27J aircraft deployed to support the Army’s direct-support/time-sensitive cargo mission in Afghanistan, and the Air Force plans to deploy two more in the April to May timeframe. Can you provide the committee an update as to how the aircraft in theater are performing their mission and whether or not you’ve gotten any negative feedback from the warfighter’s they are supporting?

General JOHNS. Clarification: the Air Force will replace the two C-27s in theater with two other C-27Js in April. There will still only be two C-27Js in theater.
The C–27J has performed to expectations of responsiveness, reliability and performance since its deployment to support the US Army’s Time Sensitive/Mission Critical cargo mission. The feedback on the C–130 aircraft performing this mission has been equally positive.

Mr. Akin. What is the current reimbursable flying hour cost per hour for DOD users stated in AFI 65–503, table A15–1 for the C–27J, C–130H and C–130J aircraft for fiscal year 2012?

General Johns. Per AFI 65–503, table A15–1, the current FY12 reimbursement rate for DOD users of the C–27J is $1,299/ flying hour, for the C–130H is $7,626/ flying hour, and for the C–130J is $5,945/ flying hour.

Mr. Akin. According to recent Operation Enduring Freedom data that the committee has received from the Department regarding C–27J current operations, 65 percent of the time C–27s have been tasked to move only 1 pallet of cargo, and the remaining 35 percent of time, have been tasked to only move 2 to 3 pallets of cargo. In your professional opinion, would it be more efficient to move 1 to 3 pallets of cargo with either a C–130H or C–130J aircraft? If not, why not?

General Johns. Given that a C–27 and C–130J are sitting on the ramp and a 1 to 3 pallet load of cargo needs to be moved, it is more efficient to use the C–27 to move that load. However, it is less efficient to establish an entire system to support the C–27 in order to move that 1 to 3 pallet load rather than using C–130s that are already in the fleet and can perform a wider array of missions with greater capacity. The issue with the C–27J is not the cost efficiencies of payload capacity, but with the forecast cost of continued procurement in conjunction with the overall infrastructure and sustainment costs of a separate fleet spread across multiple locations. The C–27J is an entire major weapon system (MWS) introduced into a fleet that has already been identified as surplus to need. An additional MWS entails another depot, another schoolhouse, another fleet of simulators, and new BOS tails associated with every beddown location. In today’s fiscally constrained environment, the AF could no longer justify the overall cost for the C–27J’s niche capability.

Mr. Akin. The Air Force C–27 Analysis of Alternatives, revalidated in 2008, states that a fleet of 38 C–27J aircraft are needed to support, with high risk, 1 major contingency operation. Given that the new defense strategy focuses on only executing 1 major contingency operation, why would it not be prudent to keep at least 38 C–27Js, or more to reduce the assessed risk, in the inventory to meet warfighting requirements that were validated in the C–27 Analysis of Alternatives?

General Johns. The more recent RAND study, “Intratheater Lift-Direct Support” provided a range of tactical aircraft required for the TS/MC mission. It also concluded that the C–130 and C–27J were equally suited for executing the TS/MC mission. The FY13 PB request includes up to 48 C–130s for the TS/MC mission.

Mr. Akin. The committee notes that the Air Force used the current Air National Guard basing strategy of 9 locations for 38 C–27J aircraft, with 4 aircraft at each to base, in the business case analysis that decided the fate of the program. In your professional opinions, is basing 38 aircraft at 9 locations an efficient plan, and if not, did you look at any other basing strategies that would enable a more efficient and cost-effective program?

General Johns. The Service Cost Position, $308M per aircraft, is based upon a rule set by DOD to account for all cost elements associated with the program. Specifically for C–27J, it includes a 4 aircraft based at 9 bases, plus 2 aircraft for formal training and the all associated Air National Guard manpower. This Service Cost Position was signed by the AF Service Acquisition Executive and the Air Force Financial Management and Comptroller back on 24 May 2011 for the full-rate production decision milestone. The AF is currently completing a business case analysis of the C–27J to the C–130, directed by the Senate Armed Services Committee. The cost benefit analysis accomplished for the SASC report is a comparative analysis between the C–27J and the C–130 and applied a completely different set of assumptions from the Service Cost Position; the two efforts are not directly comparable. The Air Force performed cost excursions to compare the C–27J life-cycle costs to those of the C–130 by examining analytic excursions of different basing, manning, and unit size options. We will provide that to the committees once completed.

The analysis demonstrated that for a similar or even reduced cost, the C–130 offers greater capability to support the warfighter, therefore the AF made the difficult decision to cancel the C–27J program. The remaining 318 C–130s retained in the fleet have sufficient capacity and capability to meet both the Direct Support and General Support missions in the new strategic guidance. Buying or retaining excess capacity in the intra-theater airlift fleet will disadvantage our ability to balance risks across the Air Force core functions.
Mr. Akin. How many parts and avionics does the C–27J have in common with the C–130 aircraft? Was this considered during the cost evaluation of depot maintenance stand-up for the C–27J aircraft?

General Johns. The C–27J and the C–130J share a common heritage based on Lockheed-Martin's membership on the original C–27J design team. Based on this heritage, there are avionics and engine components that are common to both platforms. However, Lockheed split away from the C–27J team several years ago and the number of avionics and engine components that are common to both platforms has slowly decreased as the C–130J configuration has evolved. At this time, there are approximately 30 avionics and engine components that are common to both platforms (and no common airframe parts). The cost estimate for the C–27J did not include costs for the depot activation for the common avionics components. For the common engine components however, the Air Force assumed a strategy that shares depot activation costs between the C–130J and the C–27J, as well as with the CV–22 and the RQ–4 (since these last two platforms also have common engine components with the C–27J). Therefore, the cost estimate allocates one sixth of the depot activation cost for these common engine components to the C–27J program.

Mr. Akin. The Air Force plans to send 21 brand new C–27J aircraft to the boneyard. What is the Air Force's plan for the aircraft once they reach the boneyard?

General Johns. The Air Force is currently reviewing potential options for divesting the C–27J fleet. In accordance with DOD guidance, the Air Force will offer these aircraft to Military Services, DOD activities, DOD Law Enforcement Support Office, Security Assistance agencies, and other Federal agencies before they would be put into storage at the 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group (AMARG), Davis-Monthan AFB, NM. If the aircraft are not acquired by any authorized agency, the C–27Js will be placed in long-term, inviolate storage.

Mr. Akin. Has the Air Force done any preliminary analysis of what the airlift requirement will be for the new Asia-Pacific force laydown structure that is being proposed? If not, how will it be determined?

General Johns. The Air Force has no preliminary analysis of what the airlift requirement will be for the new Asia-Pacific force laydown structure that is being proposed. AMC plans to participate alongside USTRANSCOM, OSD and the combatant commanders to conduct a mobility study that will determine this requirement.

Mr. Akin. The Major Capabilities Requirements Study-16 study assumed that DOD would maintain 3 prepositioned locations of military stock equipment. Now that DOD plans to downsize the number of locations of prepositioned stock equipment to 2 locations. What does this do in terms of adding additional requirements for strategic aircraft during the Phase 0 and Phase 1 of a major contingency operation?

General Johns. The Mobility Capabilities & Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS 16) began with the National Military Strategy (NMS) and determined the capabilities and requirements needed to deploy, employ, sustain and redeploy joint forces in order to accomplish that strategy. While it does take into account locations of prepositioned stock, it is not safe to assume there is a linear relationship between numbers of prepositioned stock locations and the size of the strategic airlift fleet. The multimodal modeling assesses airlift, aerial refueling, sealift, surface transportation, ashore and afloat prepositioning, forward stationing, and infrastructure. It puts these multimodal tools against the time phased force deployment plan. Ultimately, for planning purposes we run excursion upon excursion against scenarios anticipated by the NMS and determine the optimum force structure to accomplish that strategy with a given level of risk.

While MCRS–16 analyzed requirements of an older strategy which called for a peak capacity of 32.7MTM/D, one of the study's scenarios is sufficiently consistent with the new strategy to inform our force structure and indicates a 29.1 MTM/D capacity is sufficient. Our proposed mobility air fleet has a capacity of 30.4 MTM/D, which meets this potential demand with a small amount of margin in reserve. This fleet size and mix allows us to execute the National Military Strategy at an appropriate level of risk.

Mr. Akin. In your testimony, you state that “the KC–135 continues its Block 45 avionics upgrade and 95 aircraft will be upgrading their engines for great fuel efficiency.” Is the Air Force re-engining the KC–135 fleet? If so, what is the total cost of this upgrade and why are the current engines not sufficient?

General Johns. No, the Air Force is not re-engining the KC–135 fleet. However, starting in FY13 we will be upgrading engines with up-to-date technology during normal overhaul operations to gain fuel and sustainment efficiencies. The KC–135 engines have been extremely reliable; in fact, 56% of engines (988 of 1741 engines) have never required a depot shop visit and have been on wing an average of 9500 flying hours. However, because they have stayed on wing so long, they have fallen
technologically behind their commercial counterparts, and are starting to reach an age where maintenance issues are becoming more common. Utilizing spares manufactured with the latest technology improves fuel efficiency and provides long-term sustainment cost avoidance by reducing the number of required future overhauls. We plan to upgrade approximately 93 engines in FY13 at a cost of $29M. The AF business case analysis assumed the entire fleet would be upgraded over approximately 16 years (dependent on future force structure decisions), at a total cost of $278M (constant FY11 $). Expected benefits are a total of $1.3B in avoided engine overhaul costs (beginning FY25) and 56M gallons of fuel saved through 2046—a return on investment of greater than 5 to 1, with a break-even point of 2027.

Mr. AKIN. The mobility aircraft inventory will decrease significantly over the next 3 years as a result of the new defense strategy requirements. The Air Force will decrease its strategic airlift to 275 aircraft, tactical airlift to 318 aircraft, retired 20 KC–135 tankers, and the Army plans to divest itself of 42 C–23 tactical airlift aircraft. The Army’s current operational tempo, ongoing operations, and forecasted threats, may not be conducive and align to coincide with the new strategy and the different planning assumptions used to size the force structure within that strategy. In your opinion, what risk will we incur in meeting future mobility requirements with a reduced mobility aircraft force structure if the planning assumptions within the new defense strategy do not materialize?

General WYATT. The value the Mobility Air Forces (MAF) bring to the nation cannot be overstated. If one looks around the world, what separates us from the other nations is we can project power and sustain it, anywhere and at any time. The Air National Guard (ANG) provides crucial capabilities vital to defending our nation and supporting our citizens. We need to ensure America properly resources and recapitalizes our ANG MAF to be prepared to respond to events in an uncertain future. The MAF mission is a good fit for our Citizen Airmen; it is a good fit for America because our inherent cost savings can be leveraged to preserve greater capacity and capability to help preserve America’s mobility forces. Reversibility is key should the planning assumptions within the new defense strategy not materialize. If the assumptions for the new strategy prove to be wrong and we need to regrow the mobility community, we will, initially, have reduced our ability to regenerate that mobility force structure. Once force structure is cut, it will take a significant amount of time and money to regenerate them. This is a calculated risk in that mobility force capacity allows our nation to hedge against future uncertainty and changing assumptions. I haven’t seen analysis detailing what mobility requirements would be if the Army and Marine Corps in fact need to grow in response to a changing security environment. But, in my opinion, the ANG needs to recapitalize our mobility fleet concurrently and proportionately with the Regular AF, to ensure we preserve the greatest capability for our nation at the greatest value to the American tax payer. If we leverage the cost-effectiveness of the Reserve Component mobility forces to the maximum extent possible, we can retain greater flexibility to regenerate force structure if needed to support a larger ground force.

Mr. AKIN. In your written testimony, you state that “the nation can maintain defense capabilities at less total cost through a careful and thoughtful balancing of Active and Reserve component forces.” In your opinion, is the Air Force’s current force structure plan for mobility aircraft appropriately balanced between the active and reserve components? If not, why not? What adjustments would you make if given the opportunity to do so?

General WYATT. Recent RAND analysis shows that the Reserve Component (RC) has lower fixed and variable flying hour costs. Hence, it is our belief that it is more economical to size the force structure to use the RC until their maximum capacity is reached before employing the Active Component (AC). Furthermore, because RC personnel are generally more experienced than their AC counterparts, we believe the RC is able to maintain a trained, ready, and available workforce at less cost.


a. F–16 squadron variable cost/flight hour (average): $168M Active Duty/$12M ARC
b. C–130 squadron fixed costs (average): $120M Active Duty/$39M ARC
c. F–16 squadron variable cost/flight hour (average): $24,400 Active Duty/$22,000 ARC
d. 11 Primary Aircraft Assigned (PAA) C–130 squadron variable cost/flight hour (average): $31,797 Active Duty/$18,020 ARC

Mr. AKIN. In your written testimony, you state that “the nation can maintain defense capabilities at less total cost through a careful and thoughtful balancing of Active and Reserve component forces.” In your opinion, is the Air Force’s current force structure plan for mobility aircraft appropriately balanced between the active and reserve components? If not, why not? What adjustments would you make if given the opportunity to do so?"
General WYATT. The balance between the Active Component (AC) and the Reserve Component (RC) are dependent on several assumptions in light of the national strategy. Reversibility and affordability are key elements of the assumptions. The Fiscal Year 2013 President's Budget changed the Mobility Air Forces AC/RC mix from 51%/49% to 54%/46%.

We need to ensure that Air National Guard (ANG) mobility aircraft are recapitalized concurrently and in proportion to active duty, to include the KC–46 and C–130Js. The ANG strikes a harmonious balance between affordability as an operational force, and reversibility as a surge-to-war force for large contingencies. Looking into the future, if analysis showed the federal war fight demand was going to be higher for an extended period of time, a force balanced more heavily in favor of the active component might be more desirable. If the demand was not anticipated to be higher for an extended period of time, it might make more sense to shift the balance in the other direction because the ANG is more cost effective.

Mr. AKIN. Understanding that the Air National Guard meets many active component deployment requirements through volunteerism of its forces, and not actual mobilization, if more force structure were moved into the reserve component, do you believe the Air National Guard could still meet active component deployment requirements through continued volunteerism in the long-term? Basically, is volunteerism sustainable in the long-run?

General WYATT. Yes, we expect volunteerism to be the norm; however, mobilization does provide our Guard members with some measure of protection with their employers. The Air National Guard (ANG) has shown a sustained ability to meet deployment requirements through volunteerism. Over the past three years, the ANG sourced approximately 75% of all Combatant Command requirements through volunteerism. Our view, and the belief of the Adjutants General, is that we can sustain the current levels of volunteerism indefinitely.

Mr. AKIN. What additional funds, if any, are needed in fiscal year 2013 and beyond to improve the equipment readiness of Air National Guard mobility aircraft units that do not currently meet standards?

General WYATT. While the FY13 request meets our needs, should additional funds become available, the Air National Guard (ANG) has identified $13.3 million worth of additional requirements to meet the mission needs of the ANG mobility fleet. The additional requirements we have identified include:

• $2.7 million for aircraft fixtures, test sets, maintenance stands, and ground handling trailers for C–5 aircraft.
• $9.9 million for analyzers, cranes, fixtures, test sets, trailers, and wrenches for C–130 aircraft.
• $735,683 for cable assemblies, fixtures, heaters, jacks, power supplies, ground handling trailers, and test sets for KC–135 aircraft.

These items would modernize cockpits for the Air Reserve Component C–130H fleet to comply with Communication/Navigation System/Air Traffic Management Requirements by FY 2025, and replace instruments which are obsolete and not available due to diminished manufacturing sources.

Mr. AKIN. O&M costs (flying hour costs) vary by aircraft type as do the overall costs to operate any given aircraft between the Active Air Force and the Reserve Component. If an aircraft costs more to fly but is flown less by more experienced pilots in the Air National Guard component, wouldn't it make fiscal sense to put those aircraft in the Air National Guard rather than the Active Air Force? And, wouldn't we get a longer lifetime out of those aircraft this way?

General WYATT. Recent RAND analysis shows that the Reserve Component (RC) has lower fixed and variable flying hour costs*. Hence, it is our belief that it is more economical to size the force structure to use the RC until their maximum capacity is reached before employing the Active Component (AC). Furthermore, because the RC has higher experience, we believe it is able to maintain a trained, ready, available workforce at less cost.

Recently acquired high-cost platforms, the F–22 and the F–35, are both designed with an 8,000 flight hour service life requirement. On average, an Air National Guard (ANG) fighter pilot flies 30% fewer hours/year than an active duty pilot. This results in a longer airframe service life of approximately seven years, based on an annual average of 250 hours/fighter in the ANG and 325 hours/fighter in the AC. A longer service life directly reduces the required cost of future fighter recapitalization or expensive service life extension modifications.

* Costs of Operating AC and RC, RAND, Project Air Force, March 2012

a. F–16 squadron fixed costs (average): $120M Active Duty/$93M ARC
b. F–16 squadron variable cost/flight hour (average): $24,400 Active Duty/$22,000 ARC
c. C–130 squadron fixed costs (average): $168M Active Duty/$12M ARC
d. 11 Primary
Currently, there are two C–27J aircraft deployed to support the Army's direct-support/time-sensitive cargo mission in Afghanistan, and the Air Force plans to deploy two more in the April to May timeframe. Can you provide the committee an update as to how the aircraft in theater are performing their mission and whether or not you’ve gotten any negative feedback from the warfighter’s they are supporting?

General Wyatt. You are correct; we presently have two aircraft providing direct support in Operation Enduring Freedom. In April-May, we will complete our first unit rotation. Ohio’s 179AW has led the way since July 2011 with our initial deployment. After serving 270 days, they will be replaced by Maryland’s 135AG. We are not adding more aircraft during this rotational swap; instead, we are simply bringing the next unit into the fight. Our original plan, coordinated with Air Mobility Command, is to provide two additional aircraft to support the mission in late 2013.

From the theater, we are receiving very positive feedback from the Army. The Army’s 25th Combat Aviation Brigade issued a press release this past week that showed the positive effect the C–27J provides in closing the last tactical mile. The presence of the C–27J has allowed the Army to shift its general support airlift off its CH–47 fleet and allows them to focus their support on forward operating bases that are only accessible by rotary wing aircraft. The Army estimates that “it has saved $30 million by conducting missions with the C–27J instead of the CH–47 Chinook.” The aircraft is fulfilling the full range of intratheater airlift for the Combatant Command.

Mr. Akin. According to recent Operation Enduring Freedom data that the committee has received from the Department regarding C–27J current operations, 65 percent of the time C–27s have been tasked to move only 1 pallet of cargo, and the remaining 35 percent of time, have been tasked to only move 2 to 3 pallets of cargo. In your professional opinion, would it be more efficient to move 1 to 3 pallets of cargo with either a C–130H or C–130J aircraft? If not, why not?

General Wyatt. The C–27J was originally planned to fulfill the Army intratheater airlift needs as the Service retired its C–23 Sherpa. In that same timeframe, the Air Force recognized that the same platform could be used to fulfill its Light Cargo Aircraft needs. The culmination has been to develop, field, and deploy an aircraft that leverages its smaller capacity to move smaller payloads in a more efficient and effective manner. Air Mobility Command’s Air Mobility Master Plan 2012, November 2011, identified that the C–27J would add “a more efficient means to move small payloads, shorter distances, into austere locations.” Since arriving in theater August 2011, our practical experience is that the aircraft has met this expectation. We are achieving Air Force efficiency in moving the smaller payloads with no loss of effectiveness to the Army.

Mr. Akin. The committee notes that the Air Force used the current Air National Guard basing strategy of 9 locations for 38 C–27J aircraft, with 4 aircraft at each to base, in the business case analysis that decided the fate of the program. In your professional opinions, is basing 38 aircraft at 9 locations an efficient plan, and if not, did you look at any other basing strategies that would enable a more efficient and cost-effective program?

General Wyatt. The current basing model construct was based on the model initially crafted by the Joint Program Office for the C–27J. At that time, the ANG had the ability to field and support the program under that basing concept. However, it is recognized that a 4 Primary Aircraft Assigned basing construct is not an efficient allocation of personnel or to support deployed operations. During the C–27J Full Rate Production discussions in 2011, we have concurred with Air Mobility Command and Headquarters Air Force that basing the 38 aircraft at seven bases vice nine would still allow the ANG to field the aircraft and fulfill its mission set. Other excursions at differing basing numbers have and can continue to be explored as this program evolves. Our goal would be to support a more efficient and cost-effective program.

Mr. Akin. Within the Air Force’s cost-benefit analysis when comparing the C–27 to the C–130H, were personnel, maintenance and operations costs estimated for the C–27 adequately captured based upon the differences between how the Air National Guard and active component Air Force activate and apply personnel and fiscal resources? Was the Air Force’s C–27J Service Cost Position assumptions for unit personnel reflective of current and approved unit manning documents of the unit’s that currently have C–27J fielded?

General Wyatt. The Air Force’s Service Cost Position is an estimate of what the total program cost could entail and is used to plan for all possible costs. The service cost portfolio was based on the program’s original manpower estimate. As we began
to convert units to their new mission, we paired and tailored our manning documents to achieve the current day needs. Subsequently, our unit manning is different than the original manpower estimate.

Mr. Akin. How many parts and avionics does the C–27J have in common with the C–130 aircraft? Was this considered during the cost evaluation of depot maintenance stand-up for the C–27J aircraft?

General Wyatt. The C–27J shares 456 common parts with the C–130J. This includes avionics and propulsion system parts. The C–27J shares 46 common parts with other weapon systems.

The C–27J Service Cost Position does take into account the parts and avionics commonality between the C–27J and the C–130J. The Cost Position assumes the depot process will leverage the three existing Air Logistics Centers processes. The C–27J’s System Program Office has a Depot Working Group, and their charter is to continuously evaluate and identify how to leverage the existing depot systems, and to ultimately lower the aircraft’s lifecycle sustainment costs.

Mr. Akin. The mobility aircraft inventory will decrease significantly over the next 3 years as a result of the new defense strategy requirements. The Air Force will decrease its strategic airlift to 275 aircraft, tactical airlift to 318 aircraft, retired 20 KC–135 tankers, and the Army plans to divest itself of 42 C–23 tactical airlift aircraft. However, the current operational tempo, ongoing operation and forecasted threats, may not be conducive and align to coincide with the new strategy and the different planning assumptions used to size the force structure within that strategy. In your opinion, what risk will we incur in meeting future mobility requirements with a reduced mobility aircraft force structure if the planning assumptions within the new defense strategy do not materialize?

General Barclay. The United States Air Force is best suited to respond to this question.

Mr. Akin. You state in your testimony that “the direct support role does not fulfill 100% of the Army’s requirement for time sensitive, mission critical cargo and personnel. The Army fills this gap with contract airlift and CH–47 aircraft in Operation Enduring Freedom.” If the Air Force has the responsibility for executing the Army’s Direct Support/Mission Critical airlift mission, why is the Army having to supplement the Air Force with contractor provided airlift and CH–47 helo aircraft to meet your requirements?

General Barclay. The terrain over which OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM is being conducted is challenging and austere. The time sensitive/mission critical mission the ground commander has to execute is not always near an available airfield capable of landing fixed wing aircraft. These missions require rotary wing aircraft such as the CH–47 and contract airlift both fixed and rotary wing. Although the agreement between the Air Force and Army on time sensitive mission critical cargo will not satisfy 100% the Army’s requirement it will significantly reduce the reliance on contract air and free up CH–47s for tactical missions.

Mr. Akin. How many dedicated aircraft does it take to support one heavy brigade combat team for the Direct Support/Mission Critical airlift mission in a major contingency operation, and how do you assess the Air Force’s reduced tactical airlift inventory in meeting your future requirements?

General Barclay. There is not a planning figure for resourcing brigade combat teams with Direct Support aircraft. The intent is to resource a division task force, based on mission analysis, with a tailored package of two to four Direct Support aircraft. Based partially on a RAND study stating it will require 42–92 aircraft to fulfill the Army’s time sensitive/mission critical (TS/MC) task, the Air Force further assessed the requirement and determined it will take 48 aircraft to meet the TS/MC requirement. At this time, the Army is willing to accept that assessment partially because it coincides with our own 2007 assessment of acquiring 54 Joint Cargo Aircraft; 48 for missions and six for training.

Mr. Akin. For each of the fiscal years 2009, 2010, 2011 and to date in 2012, what percentage of the total time-sensitive/mission critical airlift missions in both combat and training operations have been met by Air Force fixed-wing intra-theater airlift aircraft? How many missions over those same years has the Army designated “time-sensitive/mission critical” and how many of those total missions have been flown by Air Force fixed-wing aircraft?

General Barclay. a. Even though time sensitive/mission critical (TS/MC) is not a new concept, it is an emerging doctrinal term that has no formal definition and as a consequence, there is not an established metric to track TS/MC requirements. The combatant commander makes his own determination on what is TS/MC and based on his assessment of current operations, he might decide to reprioritize cer-
tain logistics commodities. The Army and Air Force are in the process of developing how to define/track TS/MC.

b. Because TS/MC data is not available, we are unable to discern how many TS/MC missions the Air Force has supported. Today, when a TS/MC mission is required, it is being supported by a USAF aircraft, a commercially contracted aircraft, or an Army rotary wing aircraft; whichever is most readily available at the time.

Mr. AKIN. Given the reduced airlift inventory in both the Air Force and the Army, how would you assess the operational risk incurred with the Air Force meeting the Army's Direct Support/Missional Critical airlift mission in future contingencies and training operations?

General BARCLAY. The Air Force believes the risk to the Army is minimal because the Air Force is completely committed to supporting the time sensitive/mission critical (TS/MC) Direct Support theater airlift requirements. Based partially on a RAND study stating it will require 42–92 aircraft to fulfill the Army's TS/MC task, the Air Force further assessed the requirement and determined it will take 48 aircraft to meet the TS/MC requirement. At this time, the Army is willing to accept that assessment partially because it coincides with our own 2007 assessment of acquiring 54 Joint Cargo Aircraft; 48 for missions and six for training.

Mr. AKIN. In the future, how many Direct Support/Mission Critical airlift missions do you expect the Air Force to provide?

General BARCLAY. Presently, there is not an established planning figure on how many missions the Army expects the Air Force to provide. It is difficult to apply a number because time sensitive/mission critical (TS/MC) is an emerging doctrinal term that has no formal definition and as a consequence, there is not a metric to track TS/MC requirements. The combatant commander makes his own determination on what is TS/MC and based on his assessment of current operations, he might decide to reprioritize certain logistics commodities. The Army and Air Force are in the process of developing how to define/track TS/MC.

Mr. AKIN. The Army's plans to divest itself of the C–23 Sherpa airlift fleet was predicated on the Air Force's procurement of the C–27 aircraft to support the Army's Direct Support/Mission Critical airlift mission. Now that the Air Force plans to divest itself of the C–27, is the Army reassessing whether or not you will keep the C–23 Sherpa, and/or, possibly try to assume the C–27 from the Air Force?

General BARCLAY. The Army is continuing with its plan to divest the C–23 Sherpa fleet. The C–23 primarily mitigated the requirement for time sensitive/mission critical cargo for the Army. The current agreement between the Army and Air Force will meet this time sensitive/mission critical requirement. The C–23 fulfilled an Army cargo requirement; the C–27 was conceived to fulfill this requirement replacing the C–23. The current agreement with the Air Force is not platform or aircraft specific but is based on the same Army cargo requirement.

Mr. AKIN. Does the Army have any plans to assume responsibility of the C–27 aircraft from the Air Force and field it? If not, why not?

General BARCLAY. The Army does not plan to assume the responsibility of the C–27J aircraft from the Air Force. Under the current agreement between the Army and Air Force, the Air Force will provide Direct Support air lift for time sensitive, mission critical missions thereby removing the Army's initial requirement for the C–27 aircraft.

Mr. AKIN. Currently, there are two C–27J aircraft deployed to support the Army's direct-support/time-sensitive cargo mission in Afghanistan, and the Air Force plans to deploy two more in the April to May timeframe. Can you provide the committee an update as to how the aircraft in theater are performing their mission and whether or not you've gotten any negative feedback from the warfighter's they are supporting?

General BARCLAY. There has been no negative feedback from theater on the current support provided by the Air Force. However, new concepts take time to mature and develop. We anticipate this Direct Support relationship to continue to improve and become more effective as both the Army and Air Force collect lessons learned and continue to review the agreement, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs).

Mr. AKIN. In February, Boeing announced that it would close its production and maintenance facility in Wichita, Kansas as a cost-savings measure. What impact does the Army see on the KC–46 program and how do you plan to mitigate any program disruptions? Will any cost increases to the KC–46 program occur as a result of this facility closure?

General BOGDAN. Boeing is closing the Wichita facility by the end of 2013 and moving all KC–46 work to the Puget Sound area. Specific functions and capabilities to be moved include the finishing center, boom assembly, and KC–46 FAA supplemental type certification (STC). Boeing has plans in place to mitigate the loss of key...
aerial refueling engineering, manufacturing, and production expertise resulting from
the move. Additionally, the movement of STC requires new FAA delegation author-
ity to conduct STC. Boeing and the Air Force are working with the FAA to obtain
this updated STC authority.

If the transition occurs as Boeing plans, this move should result in an overall risk
reduction for the KC–46 program. For example, all development testing will be con-
solidated in one location, all manufacturing will be in the same area with expertise
being co-located, and the need for long ferry flights to Wichita to complete aircraft
assembly is eliminated. Contractually, the movement of KC–46 work from Wichita
does not impact the competitively negotiated KC–46 business deal.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GRIFFIN

Mr. GRIFFIN. According to the President’s budget proposal for fiscal year 2013, the
Administration plans to cancel the AMP and replace the AMP with a less ambitious,
less costly program, commonly referred to as “AMP Lite,” for modernization of the
C–130 fleet, including 184 C–130 aircraft. According to General Schwartz, these up-
grades would likely be similar to those used on the KC–10 refueling aircraft and
would keep the navigators in our C–130s. The President’s FY13 budget claims this
will save $2.6 billion. However, it is my understanding that the $2.6 billion in sav-
ings does not include the cost of a new program start, current contract termination
costs, cost of keeping the navigator position, or the life-cycle savings that AMP will
provide.

Question: When determining the cost of AMP Lite, did the Air Force consider the
cost of retaining the navigator position over the life cycle of the legacy C–130 fleet?
If so, what is the cost? How much will the new start effort truly save after consid-
ering the termination liability, and other life cycle cost savings are removed from
the solution? What were other criteria for considering the cost of AMP Lite?

General JOHNS. The Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP), FY13–FY17, cost savings from terminating C–130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) and initiating the
“Optimize Legacy C–130 Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Man-
agement (CNS/ATM)” program is $2.3B. Additionally, when adding the “To Com-
plete” cost of AMP in the FY12 PB to what the Air Force has funded in the FY13PB for
CNS/ATM, the Air Force identified a total cost savings of $3.5B in investment
dollars.

By going with the new Optimize Legacy C–130 CNS/ATM, which retains the navi-
gator position, the Air Force took into consideration that we would lose the mission
personnel “cost savings” of $482M in base year dollars (reference 31, Dec 2010 C–
130 AMP Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) to Congress) vice AMP.

Furthermore, the 2010 SAR identified that there were no other life cycle costs
savings by continuing with AMP. The SAR identified an expected cost increase in
both Unit Level Consumption ($513.4M Base Year dollars) and Sustaining Support
($157.7M Base Year dollars) for AMP modified aircraft.

Lastly, the termination liability for C–130 AMP is $5.1M.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT

Mr. BARTLETT. In General Schwartz’s written testimony before the full Com-
mittee, he stated that the Air Force is divesting the C–27 aircraft in favor of the
“multi-role” C–130 because the AF considers the C–27 a “niche” capability. How-
ever, on May 19, 2009, the AF verbally testified to this committee that “our pro-
grams reflect their commitment to pursuing joint, multi-mission solutions such as
the procurement of 8 C–27Js in fiscal year 2010.” Why, does the AF believe three
years later that the C–27 is no longer a multi-mission capable aircraft? Has there
been any formal Air Force testing conducted that proves the C–27 is no longer a
multi-mission aircraft?

General JOHNS. Background of Question: In February 2008, the Air Force certified
to Congress in a letter that the “Time-sensitive/mission-critical resupply is crucial
to our success as warfighters . . . we also believe there are mission sets that may
support additional procurement of the C–27 . . . (such as) building international
partnerships around a common airframe; National Guard support of Federal Emer-
gency Management agency regions; delivery of Special Operations Forces teams and
other small unit maneuvers; more efficient movement of small payloads in theater,
taking convoys off the road; precision air drop of bundles and Joint precision Air-
drop System operations; and, recapitalization of Operational Support Aircraft inver-
tories.”
The C–27J is a capable aircraft that can conduct similar operations as the C–130, but on a smaller scale (less range, speed, payload). However, our analysis demonstrates that it does so at greater cost. Therefore the AF has made the difficult decision to cancel the C–27J program and fulfill the Direct Support mission it was designated to conduct with the more capable and cost-effective C–130.

Mr. BARTLETT. What are the cost and schedule impacts to the Navy’s BAMS program from ending and mothballing the USAF Global Hawk Block 30 program? What are the cost impacts to operating and sustaining the remaining variants (Blocks 20 and 40)?

General JOHNS. The Air Force must defer to the Navy regarding cost and schedule impacts to BAMS due to the divestiture of the Global Hawk Block 30. This information is not available within the Air Force.

The FY13 PB contains the cost required to develop, retrofit and sustain the remaining Block 20/40 fleet (does not include BACN-specific payload updates and costs, which are funded under OCO). There will be no additional infrastructure or spares costs associated with flying Block 20/40 aircraft without Block 30 in the program. In order to reduce operations and maintenance cost, the Air Force will reduce the number of operational sites to coincide with the removal of Block 30 aircraft operations. Though cost per flying hour will increase due to reduced aircraft quantities, reliability and maintenance improvements are funded within the Global Hawk budget to further control costs.

Mr. BARTLETT. Our budget crisis demands that we maximize the efficiency for every program. At a macro level it is clear that an unmanned system can fly longer and further than a manned system. A recent CSBA analysis showed in great detail how unmanned systems feature ⅓ the life cycle cost of manned systems. Explain how it is in the long-term budgetary and national security interests of our nation to abandon an unmanned system that by all accounts is performing exceptionally well in theater for a five decade old manned system.

General JOHNS. It is accurate that the RQ–4 can fly longer and further than the U–2, and in last year’s Nunn-McCurdy certification, the RQ–4 was found to be $220M less expensive per year to operate than the U–2. However, OSD CAPE based this analysis on a High Altitude orbit 1,200 miles from the launch base. During the analysis done in the FY13 Budget Review, the launch base for the RQ–4 and U–2 was assumed to be from their normal operating locations. Coupled with the fact that the cost per flying hour of the RQ–4 and U–2 is roughly equivalent at $32K per hour, per information contained in the Air Force Total Ownership Costs Database, the RQ–4 did not offer a cost advantage over the U–2 in the FY13 Budget Review.

After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced requirement.

Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was not prudent given there is no difference in the operating costs between the RQ–4 and U–2 when operating from their normal operating locations and the U–2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to divest the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although money was saved with the decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U–2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B.

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