    [House Hearing, 112 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 112-108]

                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                             FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

                                       ON

                              BUDGET REQUEST FROM

                              U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 MARCH 1, 2012

                                      _____

                          U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

      73-434                   WASHINGTON : 2012
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                       HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                          One Hundred Twelfth Congress

                HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
    ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland         ADAM SMITH, Washington
    MAC THORNBERRY, Texas                SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
    WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina      LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
    W. TODD AKIN, Missouri               MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
    J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia            ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
    JEFF MILLER, Florida                 ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
    MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio                 RICK LARSEN, Washington
    JOHN KLINE, Minnesota                JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    MIKE ROGERS, Alabama                 MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
    TRENT FRANKS, Arizona                JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
    BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania           DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
    K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas            NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado               CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
    ROB WITTMAN, Virginia                LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
    DUNCAN HUNTER, California            MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana     BILL OWENS, New York
    MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado               JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
    TOM ROONEY, Florida                  MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    TIM RYAN, Ohio
    SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia               C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
    CHRIS GIBSON, New York               HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
    VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri             BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
    JOE HECK, Nevada                     COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
    BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois            KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
    JON RUNYAN, New Jersey               JACKIE SPEIER, California
    AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
    TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
    STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
    ALLEN B. WEST, Florida
    MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
    MO BROOKS, Alabama
    TODD YOUNG, Indiana
                      Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
                    Kimberly Shaw, Professional Staff Member
              William (Spencer) Johnson, Professional Staff Member
                        Lauren Hauhn, Research Assistant

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                         CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
                                      2012

                                                                       Page

    Hearing:

    Thursday, March 1, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense
      Authorization Budget Request from U.S. Pacific Command.........     1

    Appendix:

    Thursday, March 1, 2012..........................................    29
                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 1, 2012
      FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM
                              U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
      California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services..............     1
    Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
      Member, Committee on Armed Services............................     3

                                   WITNESSES

    Willard, ADM Robert F., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command.....     4

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''..............................    33
        Smith, Hon. Adam.............................................    35
        Willard, ADM Robert F........................................    37

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Mr. Coffman..................................................    65
        Mrs. Davis...................................................    65

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Ms. Bordallo.................................................    71
        Mr. Conaway..................................................    73
        Mr. Forbes...................................................    70
        Mr. Heinrich.................................................    74
        Mr. Langevin.................................................    70
        Mr. McKeon...................................................    69
        Mr. Reyes....................................................    69
        Mr. Schilling................................................    75
        Mr. Scott....................................................    75
        Mr. Wittman..................................................    73

      FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM
                              U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

                                  ----------

                              House of Representatives,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                               Washington, DC, Thursday, March 1, 2012.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in room
    2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
    McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

        OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
     REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
                                SERVICES

        The Chairman. The committee will come to order. You know
    with the busy schedule we have had the last couple of weeks I
    inadvertently overlooked the fact that we have a new Member of
    our committee, my colleague from California, Jackie Speier. We
    want to officially welcome you to the committee and are happy
    that you are here with us.
        Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed
    Services Committee meets today to receive testimony from
    Admiral Robert Willard, Commander of the United States PACOM
    [Pacific Command], more than 38 years of service, almost 39.
    You have distinguished yourself as one of our top military
    leaders, one of our top pilots. I understand that your claim to
    fame is wearing the black hat, flying the enemy plane in ``Top
    Gun.'' Congratulations you survived that.
        Admiral Willard, thank you for your long, distinguished
    service to our Nation. And thank you to Donna, your spouse,
    your partner. She has also been a great support of the Navy. I
    know when we were down there she was the--I don't know the
    title but it was kind of like you did everything for the USS
    California and their crew.
        Admiral Willard. Sponsor.
        The Chairman. Our newest attack submarine and I was able to
    participate a little bit in that and saw the love that the crew
    had for you and those who built that boat. So it was good to
    see Admiral Willard taking your picture and fitting in the role
    reversal model.
        Admiral, with your retirement next week I know you have
    been very busy handing over command to Admiral Sam Locklear. So
    I thank you for taking the time to appear before this committee
    one last time. I apologize in advance, we will be having some
    votes. I know Members will be leaving, but we do really
    appreciate you taking the time to be with us.
        Our economy and security has never been more dependent on
    our military, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. The
    President's new strategy focuses on a so-called pivot to the
    Asia-Pacific. While I don't quite question the critical
    importance of this theater, I am concerned that our forces may
    not be properly postured to support this ship. The Chief of
    Naval Operations has said that ship and aircraft deployments in
    the Pacific would remain at current levels. Over the next 5
    years we cut 16 ships out of our new construction budget and
    retire 9 more. Further, our tanking and airlift capacity will
    be reduced, limiting our ability to project power and sustain
    our forces.
        This budget does not address reductions to our nuclear
    deterrent, but the Administration is reportedly contemplating
    unilateral reductions below New START [Strategic Arms Reduction
    Treaty] levels. As you have discussed often with us, quantity
    does have a quality all of its own, especially in a theater
    that covers half of the Earth's surface.
        We must be prepared to effectively respond with the needed
    manpower and assets. As I stated at last year's hearing, it is
    important our forces in the Pacific have the personnel,
    training, equipment, and the authorities they need to instill
    confidence in our allies, deter aggression, and remain ready to
    respond decisively to any contingency. It is not yet clear how
    the new strategy will meet these goals. Events in Asia can
    change rapidly as we saw in December with the death of North
    Korean dictator Kim Jong-il. Alongside our South Korean allies,
    our forces must be ready to deter further North Korean
    provocation.
        China's growing influence creates concern for many of our
    regional allies. The balance of power against the Taiwan
    Straits continues to shift in the direction of Beijing. The
    South China Sea is a vital shipping lane through which more
    than $5 trillion in trade passes each year. Deterring,
    delaying, or denying U.S. forces from operating along China's
    periphery is still a key goal of the People's Liberation Army.
    As China's military budget continues to grow annually by double
    digits, the PLA [People's Liberation Army] is focused on
    improving their capacities to counter U.S. military
    capabilities and exploit any potential weaknesses that we may
    have.
        We also see the growing threat of terrorism in the region
    as aims of certain groups like LeT [Lashkar-e-Tayyiba] expand
    beyond their traditional border disputes.
        In partnership with our allies and friends, our forces must
    stand ready to respond to unprovoked, hostile behavior and
    defend our regional allies and security interests.
        We look forward to your testimony and shedding the
    additional light on the matters and the range of security
    challenges that we face in the Pacific.
        Ranking Member Smith.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
    Appendix on page 33.]

    STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
              RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to join
    you in welcoming Ms. Speier to the committee. It is great to
    have her on. We have already worked on some issues that she has
    been interested in on the Armed Services Committee. It is great
    to have her on the committee and welcome. It is great to have
    you join us.
        I also definitely want to thank Admiral Willard for being
    here today, but also for his service. He is retiring soon, his
    last opportunity to testify before us, and we certainly want to
    thank Mrs. Willard as well. It is a total team effort, a career
    like the one that you built. And we really appreciate all of
    have both done for our country.
        I also appreciate talking to Mrs. Willard before and she
    said that her presence she always thought it would make the
    Members be nicer to Admiral Willard, but she did point out that
    it never actually worked, but it is still sentiment. We really
    appreciate all that you both have done, great service to our
    country. And your last command incredibly important in the
    Asia-Pacific theater, we have a number of allies and partners
    in the region and a number of challenges in the region. I agree
    with the list the chairman rolled out, trying to figure out how
    to deal with the rising China, the unpredictability of North
    Korea, a number of different terrorist groups in the
    Philippines, Indonesia, and elsewhere. It is a critically
    important region.
        The Navy is one of our best, best allies in terms of
    delivering a positive U.S. message; it shows our presence in
    the region. I think that is the most important thing about our
    strategy going forward. The President has said we are a Pacific
    power. We want to make it clear to everyone in the world,
    particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, that we will continue
    to be a Pacific power, and the Navy is one of the best ways
    that we demonstrate that. Our presence there builds those
    partnerships and builds those relationships.
        I remember reading somewhere that last year alone there
    were over 700 port calls in Asia by the Pacific Command, and
    all of those are opportunities to build relationships and build
    friendships and build partnerships. Of course our Pacific
    Command has responded to many natural disasters in the area,
    most recently that earthquake and tsunami in Japan but
    certainly the earthquake and tsunami before that in Thailand
    and Indonesia.
        You put the best face on U.S. policy in the region and we
    really appreciate that work. It is critical that we give you
    the resources to enable that mission to go forward.
        I look forward to your testimony, look forward to your
    answers to our questions, and again thank you very much for
    your service and your leadership.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
    Appendix on page 35.]
        The Chairman. Thank you very much. Admiral.

       STATEMENT OF ADM ROBERT F. WILLARD, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
                            PACIFIC COMMAND

        Admiral Willard. Thank you very much, Chairman McKeon. Mr.
    Chairman, in order to accommodate the committee's questions
    sooner, I will keep my remarks brief and ask that my full
    statement be included for the record.
        The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
        Admiral Willard. Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, thank
    you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss United
    States Pacific Command in the Asia-Pacific region. I would like
    to begin by thanking you for recognizing my wife Donna and her
    sponsorship of the USS California. She is present today and has
    been at my side for nearly 38 years. She is an outstanding
    ambassador for our Nation and a tireless advocate for the men
    and women of our military and their families. Together we have
    thoroughly enjoyed this experience both with our counterpart
    foreign friends and with all of you who advocate for our men
    and women in uniform. Thank you.
        I would like to acknowledge this committee's enduring
    support for our joint forces and by your actions their
    contribution to our Nation's security. Your visits to the
    region have been and will continue to be an important reminder
    of the United States' national interests there.
        North Korea, the world's only remaining nation divided by
    armistice, continues to threaten peace and security in
    Northeast Asia now under the leadership of a 29-year-old son of
    Kim Jong-il. There we are observing closely for signs of
    instability or evidence that leadership transition is
    faltering. As General Thurman will attest in his testimony to
    you, we believe that Kim Jong-un is currently tightly
    surrounded by KJI [Kim Jong-il] associates and for the time
    being that the succession in North Korea appears to be on
    course.
        With that said, we also believe Kim Jong-un will continue
    to pursue his father's course of strategy that embraces
    nuclearization, missile development, WMD [Weapons of Mass
    Destruction] proliferation, provocations, and totalitarian
    control over North Korean society.
        As you stated, management of the China relationship
    continues to be a challenge to U.S. Pacific Command on many
    levels. Our military-to-military relationship is still not
    where it should be. Although a strategic level exchange of
    views with DOD [Department of Defense] persisted throughout
    2011, the PLA continues to advance its military capabilities at
    an impressive rate, is growing bolder with regard to their
    expanding regional and global presence, and China continues to
    challenge the United States and our partners in the region in
    the maritime, cyber and space domains.
        President Obama and Secretary of Defense Panetta recently
    reaffirmed the strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific and our
    Nation's future focus on its security challenges in the
    document ``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for
    21st Century Defense.'' It appropriately addressed the
    opportunities and challenges that PACOM faces in a region
    covering half the world and containing the majority of great
    powers, economies, populations, and militaries.
        Importantly, our five treaty allies, Australia, Japan,
    South Korea, Republic of the Philippines, and Thailand,
    together with many regional partners, represent the greatest
    opportunities for the United States and Pacific Command to
    contribute to a broad security association in the region. Of
    particular note we seek to advance our important relationship
    with India in South Asia.
        We are making progress in adjusting PACOM's force posture
    toward Southeast Asia, following overtures from Australia,
    Singapore, and the Philippines to help enable and increased
    rotational military presence in this important subregion.
        As was evidenced by United States support to Japan during
    the epic triple disaster last March, close military
    cooperation, frequent exercises, and interoperable systems
    merged to create the type of partnerships that take us to
    levels of cooperation such that we are ready and effective.
        Throughout the Asia-Pacific numerous transnational threats,
    such as bio and extremist organizations, proliferation,
    trafficking, piracy and perpetual natural and manmade
    disasters, challenge our Nation and our allies and partners in
    the region. Across this wide spectrum of current and potential
    future threats PACOM must provide persistent overwatch,
    ensuring our Nation retains continued strategic access and
    freedom of movement in the global commons.
        Amidst this challenges everyday our soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, marines, and civilians devote their efforts to
    contributing to Asia-Pacific security. Their success has long
    been enabled by this committee's enduring support, including
    the resources and quality of life that you provide them to
    accomplish their important missions. During the 2\1/2\ years
    that I have been in command you have allowed me and my
    commanders to share our perspectives with you, sought to
    understand the dynamics of this complex region, and traveled
    and met with our military families and foreign partners. Yours
    has been a powerful message and demonstration of U.S.
    commitment to the 36 nations in the Asia-Pacific. On behalf of
    the more than 330,000 men and women of the United States
    Pacific Command, thank you for your support and for this
    opportunity to testify one final time. I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Willard can be found in
    the Appendix on page 37.]
        The Chairman. Thank you very much, Admiral, and again thank
    you for your distinguished career, your tremendous service to
    the Nation. I think this command that you are retiring from is
    one of the most important to our Nation and to the world. And
    with the President's new switch in strategy and moving, as he
    said, moving, I don't know exactly how he put it, but moving
    more emphasis on the Pacific region, I think as we have had
    other chiefs coming in and testifying talking about the budget
    cuts and how we are going to be asked to do more with less, it
    seems that no region will be asked to do more with less than
    your command. And what I would like is if you could lay out for
    us are you gaining any additional capacity or ability to carry
    out this new effort? And could you let us know what in your
    best military judgment the requirements, capabilities, any
    potential gaps that we should be looking at as we go through
    the budget process and reaffirming this announcement by the
    President. Please.
        Admiral Willard. Yes. Thank you, Chairman. And I think one
    of the relevant questions of the day, given both the budget
    that has been presented and the strategy that has been
    articulated by the President, by Secretary of Defense Panetta.
    U.S. Pacific Command in the 2\1/2\ years that I have been in
    command and in my previous assignment as U.S. Pacific Fleet,
    has been well served I think by the Nation in terms of the
    force structure that is there. And while we have been there we
    have been endeavoring to adjust posture to optimize the forces
    that we do have. We have been at war for 10 years and during a
    decade of warfare we have given to the theater, as all the
    combatant commanders have, such that particularly our Army and
    our Marine Corps have been decremented by about 10 percent as
    they have rotated in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan over the
    last 10 years.
        When you ask the question will we gain more, I think as we
    draw down from two wars that are now a decade old, we will see
    a recovery of particularly the ground forces that have been so
    dedicated to those conflicts. As well the strategy that has
    been laid out by the President and Secretary of Defense
    prioritize the security environment globally, and I think that
    is very important to both recognize and then track to ensure
    that we actually take the actions that those words I think so
    appropriately establish. And it provides focus on the Asia-
    Pacific region as one of those important security environments
    globally. And your summary of the rationale, the reasons why I
    think was very accurate.
        So I think what is important is to recognize that even in a
    situation where the budget will cause for force reductions
    postwar and given our current economic environment within the
    country, that where we bias the forces that we do have will be
    most relevant, and given the focus on the Asia-Pacific and the
    focus on the Middle East, I think that in the future we should
    anticipate that the force structure that we attempt to optimize
    will be biased in those directions. So I expect U.S. Pacific
    Command to continue to be well served.
        So to the extent that the budget focuses on particular
    capabilities, ballistic missile defense, cyber and others, I
    think all the combatant commanders will enjoy increased
    emphasis there, but in the Pacific Command I look forward to
    the ground forces in particular, our special forces, returning
    to the region on a permanent basis and for the focus to be
    represented by a biasing of other forces such as our Naval
    forces and Air forces there.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much. Ranking Member Smith.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you. Admiral, give us a little bit of a
    look at the repositioning of troops between Okinawa, Guam,
    mainland Japan and Hawaii. And I was particularly concerned
    with how it impacts Guam and when those plans are going to be
    finalized, and how you see us resolving the continuing
    difficulty on Okinawa in terms of how we place Marine Corps
    base there, trying to shut down Futenma but we can't find a new
    place. How do you see that coming out? The sooner we can figure
    it out the better for all involved, but certainly for Guam and
    particularly to understanding exactly what they are going to
    have. Just give us a little bit of a preview on what is
    happening with that.
        Admiral Willard. As you know, we are still in discussions
    with the Japanese on this. We have working groups on both sides
    that are attempting to finalize plans for the 8,000 or so
    marines that we committed in 2006 to redistribute from Okinawa.
    And you refer to a Futenma replacement facility, the air field
    that actually contains the rotary wing lift for the marines
    that are currently on Okinawa and, as a separate issue within
    the Defense Policy Review Initiative, the shift of the location
    of that airfield from the urban area in Okinawa to Camp Schwab,
    an area further north on the island.
        In the past within the Defense Policy Review Initiative,
    DPRI, the two were linked together, FRF, the Futenma
    Replacement Facility, and the movement of the 8,000 marines.
    One of the agreements between Japan and the United States
    recently was to delink the two so that the challenges, the
    policy challenges that have been posed that have caused delays
    and the Futenma replacement facility could be dealt with
    separate from the issues of Guam and other sites for our Marine
    Corps. And at the same time, the Marine Corps, Secretary
    Panetta and U.S. Pacific Command, in the course of
    deliberations of optimum sites for our marines, given both the
    economic environment that we are in and the specific strategic
    needs of U.S. Pacific Command in the region to have those
    marines sited properly, have been working on the distribution
    of both the headquarters elements from Okinawa and the marine
    troops from Okinawa and where they should be located. And
    presently the view is for about 4,700 marines to be located on
    the island of Guam and others to be distributed to sites such
    as Hawaii and, as you know, a rotational presence out of
    Darwin, Australia. Those combinations are part of the ongoing
    working group deliberations with Japan and the United States.
        There is a way to go with it and the Futenma replacement
    facility issue has resulted in strong advocacy by Tokyo, by the
    governance there, and continued challenges locally in Okinawa.
    And we think that Camp Schwab remains the best option. The
    Government of Japan appears to sanction that. We will continue
    the deliberations with them and attempt to see progress made
    over the coming year.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Admiral. Thank you.
        The Chairman. We are well into the first vote. Looks like
    there is going to be five votes. What I am going to do is call
    on Mr. Bartlett and then we will resume questioning as we
    return back from the vote.
        Mr. Bartlett.
        Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. Admiral, thank you very
    much for your long years of service to our country. For several
    years now I have been watching a global phenomenon that could
    enormously affect your area of responsibility and I wanted to
    get your insights into it. The United States has only 2 percent
    of the known reserves of oil in the world. We use 25 percent of
    the world's oil. China has even on its mainland less oil than
    we have. They do not yet use as much as we. But last year they
    bought more automobiles than we bought in this country so their
    use of oil is increasing.
        China is very aggressively buying oil all over the world.
    While we are an enormously larger user of oil than China, we
    are buying oil reserves nowhere in the world. And I am
    wondering why you think China is buying oil reserves all over
    the world. Sir, it doesn't make any difference today who owns
    the oil, the person who comes with the dollars, and let's hope
    it stays dollars, who comes with the dollars to the global oil
    auction gets the oil they need. Why would we not be buying oil
    when China is very aggressively buying reserves of oil all over
    the world?
        Admiral Willard. Congressman Bartlett, I can't speak to
    U.S. rationale for its oil energy policies in their entirety. I
    would certainly direct you to the Department of Energy to
    answer that question, but I would offer to your point China is
    very much interested in energy sources globally, as is India.
    We have more than one nation, as you know, in the Asia-Pacific
    region that are both industrial, growing, expanding economies
    and very much interested in energy resources worldwide. Energy
    security is a concern of the United States Pacific Command;
    both the security of the energy as it moves around the world
    and the potential disputes that challenges and competition over
    energy could generate. And so we pay a great deal of attention
    to the issues in regions such as the South China Sea and
    emerging regions in the Indian Ocean where energy is being
    tapped. And again to your point, there is great competition for
    this; China, India, Japan and others very much concerned about
    their access to energy and their ability to secure it globally.
        Mr. Bartlett. At the same time that China is buying oil
    reserves all over the world, they are very aggressively, as you
    know, sir, building a blue water navy. They don't really need a
    blue water navy if they are only interested in protecting their
    shores, do they? Won't a brown water navy do just fine there?
        Admiral Willard. The Chinese have been fairly clear in
    their desire to not only have a navy that can project itself
    within the region immediately surrounding China, but also be
    influential enough to both protect its interests and contribute
    to global security concerns elsewhere beyond the first island
    chain region and out into the Pacific as well as in the Indian
    Ocean. As you know, they have committed now for several years
    to counter piracy operations off the Gulf of Aden. I think that
    their focus is on sea lines of communication that they consider
    to be vital to their commerce and to their economy.
        Mr. Bartlett. They have 1,300,000 people, 900 million of
    them in rural areas that through the miracle of communications
    know the advantages of industrialized economy, and they are
    saying, Hey, guys, what about us?
        Do you think that there is a possibility that with their
    need to satisfy the needs of this huge population that the time
    would come and they would say, Hey, guys, I am sorry but we own
    the oil and we can't share it? Wouldn't that require a big blue
    water navy to make sure they control the sea lanes so that they
    could absolutely certify that the oil was theirs and they would
    not need to share it with the rest of the world?
        Admiral Willard. Again, I think China's view of the need
    for a blue water navy as they see their economy expand and
    their great power status establish itself, they would reflect
    on other great economies and great powers and the use of navies
    and other arms of their military to secure and protect what is
    theirs.
        I wouldn't speculate that China has designs on challenging
    the rest of the world with regard to what is on the waterways.
    In fact our military-to-military engagement with China is aimed
    at both learning to coexist with their military and also
    ensuring that at the end they are a constructive contributor to
    global security and not an impediment to it. So I would have a
    more optimistic view of the trends with regard to the PLA-Navy
    and what their goals are. We don't believe that their goals are
    to challenge other nations' access to energy or other commerce
    but rather to secure their own.
        Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, sir. I hope you are right.
        The Chairman. Thank you. We will recess now for votes. We
    will return back as soon as the votes are done.
        [Recess.]
        The Chairman. Thank you for your patience. The committee
    will come to order.
        Mrs. Davis.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Admiral Willard,
    thank you so much for all of your service, all of these years.
    You have so many great experiences and reflections I am sure.
    If I get through my questions I want to ask you to give
    Congress a word of advice, if you might, from what you have
    seen in the give and take, and it doesn't all have to be
    positive. I want you to go out on a limb a little bit since you
    are retiring. Okay?
        The first question I wanted to ask you was about the
    retiring seven cruisers. And I understand that we sometimes get
    about 35 years of service, most of these have 20, I know that
    some are in a state of disrepair that they don't want to move
    forward with, but on the other hand there is a concern about
    that. Do you share that? And what does it take to bring them
    back to service if in fact we do retire them?
        Admiral Willard. Thank you, a great question. In my
    previous assignment I was a Pacific fleet commander and I spent
    a considerable amount of time worrying over life cycle
    maintenance and challenges associated with our surface ship
    Navy. And I have had the discussions fairly recently with our
    Chief of Naval Operations with regard to his plans and the 30-
    year shipbuilding plan in order to produce enough ships to be
    able to accommodate our security needs throughout the world.
    And as was mentioned earlier, as a combatant commander and
    especially one in a maritime area such as the Asia-Pacific, a
    quantity of surface ships has a quality all its own. And there
    is time distance factors in this area of responsibility that
    are unique in the world.
        The overall ship count in my view matters, but matters less
    than what we do with those ships when we have them. And the
    Chief of Naval Operations I think would attest that his plan
    calls for a gradual increase in our ship count, but that it
    won't occur in the next several years, it occurs beyond that as
    a consequence of some of the decommissionings and retirements
    that are ongoing.
        So the short answer is, am I concerned? We are always
    concerned about the number of ships and type model series of
    ships to meet our needs throughout the world. I have been well
    served both as a Pacific fleet commander and now as a Pacific
    Command commander that the forward-deployed Naval force and the
    other Naval forces concentrated in San Diego and Pearl Harbor
    and forward in Guam have been adequate to serve our presence
    needs in the region. I am confident that given the priorities
    that President Obama has established and that Secretary Panetta
    has very much supported, the Asia-Pacific will continue to get
    the number of and type of surface ships that it needs.
        We will still have, I think, a little over 80 Aegis ships
    that will continue to serve our Navy. And I know a lot about
    the life cycle challenges that the Chief of Naval Operations
    faces and his need to retire some of these ships earlier than
    the ideal life cycle would have called for. But I think he does
    that eyes wide open. He does that knowing that eventually we
    will recover from this.
        Mrs. Davis. Are they sometimes brought back?
        Admiral Willard. They are sometimes brought back. I guess
    the most notable example would be our battleships that were
    retired after World War II and some of those were recovered,
    recommissioned four times in the course of my career. Actually
    as they were brought back into service for varying conflicts
    and at varying times when we were in buildup periods within our
    Navy. So it is possible to reconstitute the ships that we
    retire and we can actually put ships into lay-up status in a
    decommissioned status at varying levels so that we can bring
    them back quicker. Sometimes they take longer.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Admiral. I just wanted to say at the
    onset that San Diego is very proud to play the critical role
    they are playing now in the Pacific, and I think we anticipate
    being able to do that. We are not moving and neither is the
    Navy. So we appreciate that very much.
        My time is up. I just want to, on personnel issues with
    families do you see particular challenges that families and
    personnel have in the Pacific that you would like to address?
    And you can do that with me at another time if you would like.
        Admiral Willard. Yes.
        The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired if you
    could respond to her for the record, please.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 65.]
        The Chairman. Mr. Forbes.
        Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Admiral, we do
    thank you for your service. We are going to miss you a great
    deal as you retire, but we thank you for all that you have
    done. This is probably one of the most delicate parts of your
    job in coming in here and testifying and knowing what you can
    say and what you can't say. But I know that when we established
    our network of bases in the region we did so partly to ensure
    that we would never have to fight our way in again. And the
    question I would ask you is what would be the impact on your
    ability to perform the duties that you need to perform if we
    were to bring especially the marines back on to the continental
    United States? Because you know we have a lot of voices that
    say we ought to no longer have them forward deployed.
        And the second thing is how much is it going to impact you
    if we do away with the prepositioned stocks that we have been
    having in the Pacific?
        The third thing, I hate to give you three, but the third
    one is, I am concerned, like you said, sometimes numbers start
    becoming a serious thing in and of themselves. How do you see
    the comparison between the number of subs we are going to have
    and the number of subs the Chinese will have over the next 8-
    year period in the Pacific?
        Admiral Willard. Thank you. Should the marines be withdrawn
    from their period presence in the Pacific to Garrison in the
    United States, it would be very impacting to the United States
    Pacific Command. The marines that are located in Okinawa now on
    paper, about 18,000 strong--they have been decremented over the
    course of the wars to 13,000 or so--are generally our first
    responders in the region, disaster response. We respond to
    natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific region on the average of
    once every 8 weeks. Most recently we were in Thailand and the
    marines were in Thailand to handle some of the deflooding, some
    of the flooding challenges that they had when Thailand
    experienced the worst flooding in 50 years. And a year ago
    nearly today when Japan had its epic series of disasters, the
    3rd Marine Expeditionary Force commander himself and the
    marines deployed immediately to northern Honshu to assist the
    Japanese ground forces in the recovery efforts following the
    tsunami and earthquake, continued earthquake series that
    occurred there.
        Our marines are part of every contingency plan that we
    have. And when you consider the time-distance factors in the
    Pacific, the largest ocean in the world, it is very important
    that we maintain the posture and presence forward that we do.
    In fact I was asked, have been asked many times what is most
    important to you, and it is the forward presence within the
    Asia-Pacific simply because of the time-distance challenges
    that we face there and being able to be responsive as flexible
    as we need to be.
        And I guess the last point I would make is our marines, our
    ground forces, the nations in the Asia-Pacific, even those that
    are some of the largest archipelagos in the world, like
    Indonesia, and Philippines, and even Japan, have militaries
    that are generally ground force centric, they are army centric,
    surprisingly. And the ground forces are a major tool for
    engagement and capacity building within these nations and our
    marines play a special role in that. So their forward presence
    to me is very, very vital.
        Mr. Forbes. How about prepositioned stocks?
        Admiral Willard. Prepositioned stocks, not just servicing
    our marines but servicing virtually any contingency in the
    area? Again very, very vital. I know that there have been
    discussions with regard to putting some of our prepositioned
    stocks into a lesser readiness status. Fortunately there is no
    plan to do that with our prepositioned stocks in Guam or Diego
    Garcia, and they are vital to me as well. So the prepositioned
    stocks are necessary in our contingency planning but they are
    also a source that we exercise with our marines on a frequent
    basis to ensure that we know how to use them correctly.
        Mr. Forbes. I only have 20 seconds left. Can you hit me
    with your forecast of where we are going to match up over the
    next 8, 10 years with our subs versus what you see happening
    with China in the Pacific?
        Admiral Willard. Submarine activity in China, the growth in
    both capability and capacity has been impressive to watch in
    the submarine force. And our submarines fortunately are biased
    60 percent in the Pacific and that is very helpful. So it is
    necessary, I think, that the United States maintain a
    substantial submarine force in the Pacific and the forward
    presence of our submarines as well in order to contend with all
    the challenges that we face there and the submarine community
    contributes to a lot of what we do.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Langevin.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Willard,
    thank you for appearing before this subcommittee today and for
    your many years of service to our Nation. As the chairman has
    mentioned and you mentioned yourself this morning, this will be
    your last appearance in a policy hearing before this committee
    as you will be retiring later this year. With that in mind, I
    just want to thank you again for your nearly 40 years of
    service to this country and to the sacrifices that you have
    made to ensure that we continue to have those freedoms that we
    all enjoy and that so many take for granted. You have our most
    sincere gratitude.
        I would like to start, really to continue on with the
    discussion that my colleague Mr. Forbes just raised with the
    future of Naval assets. With the coming focus, added focus and
    the pivot to the Asia-Pacific region and China's continued
    investments in power projection and A2/AD [anti access area
    denial] capabilities, can you speak to the future utilization
    of our submarine force? Specifically, can you discuss the need
    for the capabilities offered by the Virginia class submarines
    and the future challenges presented by a declining submarine
    fleet size?
        Admiral Willard. First, I don't think there is a question
    that the United States possesses the finest submarine force the
    world has ever seen. And I have every confidence in our
    submarines in the Pacific and anywhere else in the world that
    they can perform the job that they perform and the very quiet
    way that they go about achieving that. So we rely on our
    submarines greatly for a great many things. They are
    multimission capable assets and we employ them globally, and
    again they serve to secure the Pacific in every way.
        The Virginia class submarine is our newest, most
    formidable, and provides increased capacities in some cases
    that we very much need. I am not prejudiced because my wife has
    sponsored one. I would offer that the Virginia class subs are
    the best submarine the world has probably ever seen. And that
    is not to take away from the great service our Los Angeles
    class have performed. They have done remarkably well and they
    continue to perform remarkably well across our oceans.
        Submarines happen to be an area where there is a
    proliferation in this part of the naval forces throughout the
    Asia-Pacific. Vietnam is acquiring additional submarines, the
    Japanese are acquiring submarines, Malaysia recently acquired
    submarines, Indonesia has designs on increasing its submarine
    fleet. India just took possession of a Russian submarine that
    is very capable. So we see the submarine forces in the region
    themselves proliferating, not to mention China's advancing
    submarine capability.
        It is important that the submarine forces among our allies
    and partners are coordinated with our own efforts, and again I
    think we establish a pretty good benchmark for everyone to
    consider in terms of how to professionally employ that
    particular asset. Great boats.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you. With regard to cyber security,
    which I focus a great deal on, I believe that we can no longer
    expect to have a single domain conflict. I am pleased that you
    mentioned that several times this morning, obviously it is on
    your radar, and you realize what a challenge we face in that
    area. And quite frankly, the low barriers to entry into the
    cyber arena means that any future conflict will have a cyber
    dimension. To that end I am very concerned about the
    capabilities of our basis to withstand a cyber attack directed
    against outside supporting infrastructure. So much is owned and
    operated by the private sector which we don't control, such as
    the electric grid. And I have had conversations with Secretary
    Panetta, General Dempsey, Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert,
    and many others before this committee about the resilience in
    the face of such a threat. Have you examined the ability of our
    bases in PACOM's AOR [Area of Responsibility] to operate and
    recover in the event of such an attack? Do you feel that our
    bases and networks are adequately resourced in the cyber domain
    and have the resilience to support full spectrum operations in
    the face of coordinated A2/AD [Anti-Access/Area Denial] cyber
    threats?
        Admiral Willard. I have examined it. I think
    vulnerabilities exist and I am as concerned as you are with
    regard to the cyber threat. I think it threatens not only
    infrastructure broadly across the United States and elsewhere
    in the region among our allies and partners as well, but it
    also challenges every day my command and control capabilities
    in the region, whether that is to the bases or to the forces
    that are afloat or flying themselves. Cyberspace of all the
    domains is probably the most broadly challenged right now and
    most in need of very strong governance and the necessary
    authorities to defend it both passively and actively.
        I think Cyber Command was a great initiative on the part of
    the United States. I work very closely with Keith Alexander. We
    are conducting a year long pilot in the Pacific right now
    trying to advance our cyber defense capabilities and we will
    continue to do that. We have done that for several years, and I
    think we are making progress. But across domains, I am
    concerned about the maritime certainly in the region, I am
    concerned about space, I think I am concerned about cyberspace
    most of all.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you again.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Wilson.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral,
    very much for being here. My father served with the 14th Air
    Force, the Flying Tigers, in India and China. And so, as you
    know, military service impacts your whole family. And so I grew
    up with a real understanding and appreciation of how
    hardworking and capable the people of India and China are. It
    has been really good to see the developing relationship with
    India. Because of my dad's service I became the chairman of the
    India Caucus. So I have seen a relationship develop between our
    countries. What is the status of the partnership with India?
        Admiral Willard. Thank you, great question, and thank you
    for bringing India up and South Asia as a very important
    subregion within the Asia-Pacific.
        The relationship with India is strong and growing stronger.
    It is not without its challenges. We don't have a great, a long
    history between the countries, as you know. We went through a
    cold war without much of a relationship at all and following
    the nuclear tests in the late 1990s, we suspended relations
    government-to-government. So we have really only been
    acquainted with India in the past decade. And mil-to-mil we
    began at a pretty nascent stage and have progressed to the
    point that today we exercise with India across all the
    Services. It is one of the most significant security assistance
    programs that we have in the Asia-Pacific theater right now. I
    think government-to-government the United States and India have
    made great progress. And I have had the opportunity to be
    introduced into India's senior leadership and they are very
    interested in an ongoing relationship with the United States.
        At the same time they pride themselves in what they term
    strategic autonomy, kind of a nonalliance philosophy. And as a
    consequence of that, we are challenged in the relationship by
    virtue of India seeking to balance its associations with many
    other nations as well. We are challenged in our relationship
    with Pakistan as a consequence of the animosity that has
    existed historically between India and Pakistan. And India is
    in a very challenged part of the world, as we all know, with
    Afghanistan close by, Pakistan is a neighbor, the Kashmir issue
    which has persisted for a long time, and disputed border
    between India and China. So there are a lot of issues on the
    plate and we are seeking to continue to dialogue with India,
    terror being one of them, and try to improve the relations
    where we can.
        Mr. Wilson. I was grateful to be in Islamabad last week
    during the same time that the Speaker of the Indian Parliament
    of all things was visiting. And so to see the relationship and
    trade has resumed between India and Pakistan and to me a stable
    Pakistan, the greatest beneficiary would be India. So I hope
    that is the case. In fact too they have a joint enemy, that is
    LeT. And of course LeT led the murderous assault on Mumbai.
        What efforts are being made to counteract that level of
    terrorism?
        Admiral Willard. Yeah, thank you. We have currently special
    forces assist teams, Pacific assist teams is the term, laid
    down in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives as well as
    India, and we are working very closely with India with regard
    to their counterterrorism capabilities. And in particular on
    the maritime domain, but also government-to-government, not
    necessarily DOD but other agencies assisting them in terms of
    their internal counter terror and counter insurgency. Lashkar-
    e-Taiba is very dangerous, Pakistani based, very good
    operational security, and a lot of international design in
    terms of their aspirations. So it is a very important threat
    and we are working very closely with the nations in the region
    to help contain it.
        Mr. Wilson. That is really very positive. Another positive
    spot is Palau and the strategic significance of Palau with the
    territory of Guam that we appreciate so much. For America what
    are we doing working with Palau?
        Admiral Willard. We just changed over the small team of
    engineers that we maintain in Palau on a continual basis. I
    think our Army engineers just turned over with Navy Seabees in
    a ceremony in the region. Palau is one of our compact
    association states. There are three, the Federated States of
    Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands. Strategically the
    three provide a southern flank to Guam which is obviously a
    very strategic territory of the United States. I am obligated
    to defend the compact states, and we work closely with the
    compact states on many of their challenges. Small teams of
    engineers is one method of doing that, but we also frequently
    visit with Pacific partnership and Pacific angel, the hospital
    ship, and provide engineering, veterinary and medical services
    where we can.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Bordallo.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Admiral
    Willard, thank you for your dedicated service and your
    testimony today, and I know this will be one of your last times
    before Congress. I want to take this opportunity to thank you
    and your wife Donna for the services to our country. I think
    you are the Navy's number one team.
        Admiral Willard. Thank you.
        Ms. Bordallo. As you know, the realignment of marines from
    Guam to Okinawa has recently undergone significant changes. And
    I appreciate DOD's recent efforts to address local concerns
    about the rotational forces. However, I do remain concerned
    that this decision was driven primarily by concerns raised in
    the Senate, not this committee, as well as budgetary
    considerations.
        Can you elaborate on the strategic rationale for these
    proposed changes? Aren't we just potentially shifting costs
    from MILCON [Military Construction] over to O&M [Operations and
    Maintenance] accounts over the long term?
        Admiral Willard. I have been part of the Global Posture
    Review by the Department of Defense over the course of the last
    couple of years. Former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates, as you
    recall, called for that review following the last Quadrennial
    Defense Review. And the posture review has been a hard look at
    where United States Pacific Command forces are.
        Notwithstanding defense policy review initiative with
    Japan, but where they are broadly. And there was a strong
    desire to balance the forces more effectively in Southeast Asia
    and South Asia. Right now as you know, all of the permanent
    forces, with the exception of those in Guam and those in
    Singapore, are by and large in Northeast Asia. Whether or not
    they are permanently based or rotational forces is
    inconsequential, frankly, to me. I can work with either one.
    There are benefits to both.
        In general, when we think of our foreign partners and their
    appetite for permanent bases, there isn't one. So rotational
    force presence, for example in Darwin, Australia, I think will
    be very effective.
        What is most important to me is that the forces that we
    have present in Guam and elsewhere are maintained at a
    readiness level where they can be the first responders in the
    region so they have to dwell there long enough to be trained
    and exercised and equipped, resourced and engaging on a fairly
    continuous basis.
        So the duration with which they are present in Guam matters
    to me. And the work, the ability to lift those marines or other
    forces where they can do the most good matters to me as well.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Admiral. The next question I have
    is last year General Dunford testified before the Readiness
    Subcommittee that it would take seven consecutive miracles to
    move marines from CONUS [Continental United States] to respond
    to contingencies or operational plans in PACOM AOR if portions
    of the III MEF [Marine Expeditionary Forces] were based in
    CONUS. Now, do you share this view and could you elaborate on
    some of the strategic considerations why III MEF, Marine
    Expeditionary Forces, need to remain in the PACOM AOR?
        Admiral Willard. Well, the Pacific Command AOR, just as a
    review, extends from the West Coast of the United States to a
    dividing line between India and Pakistan. But the fact that it
    covers half the world and that the Asia-Pacific theater extends
    entirely across the Pacific Ocean, the strategic imperative
    that the marines be forward and present exists. In fact that is
    true for all the Service forces.
        So the fact that we have Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine
    Corps, and Special Operations Forces readily accessible,
    forward and present in the Asia-Pacific, very crucial because
    of the lift requirements at great expense and time to cover the
    distances involved in bringing them from garrison in the United
    States. So very, very important strategically to Pacific
    Command that the forces are forward and accessible.
        And we talk about forces beyond the international dateline.
    Frankly, I think the forces that are located in Hawaii are
    strategic in terms of their ability to respond into the region.
    But forces on the West Coast become more problematic simply
    because they have to be mobilized and moved such a great
    distance.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral, and again
    thank you for your service to our country.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Turner.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, thank you for
    your service and certainly your distinguished career.
        I chair the Strategic Forces subcommittee so as you go from
    that subcommittee we have nuclear weapons, missiles, missile
    defense, space--several areas that overlap within your area of
    expertise. I have three questions. Two I am going to lump
    together, even though they are not similar. The two I lump
    together I know you can provide an answer as your perspective
    on these occurrences.
        Secretary Gates referenced when he was at the Shangri-la
    conference in June of 2011 a potential new North Korea mobile
    intercontinental ballistic missile. He said: With the continued
    developments of long-range missiles and potentially a road-
    mobile intercontinental ballistic missile and their continued
    development of nuclear weapons, North Korea is in the process
    of becoming a direct threat to the United States.
        Admiral, I would like your thoughts on the development by
    North Korea of this ballistic missile technology, a road-mobile
    intercontinental ballistic missile, and your thoughts on what
    must be done to counter such a threat.
        And then secondly, our subcommittee held a hearing last
    year on Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons modernization
    programs. And one hearing that I had I think was the first
    actually in Congress to discuss a report authored by Dr. Phil
    Karber, and the report detailed an unclassified report of the
    existence of a large Chinese tunneling program, perhaps 5,000
    kilometers of tunnels. In fact, the tunneling seems to have
    doubled from 25 kilometers to 5,000 kilometers in the past 20
    years.
        Would you please discuss why you believe China is racing to
    construct these elaborate underground facilities and what are
    they trying to protect, hold at risk? How many of these tunnels
    are we able to hold at risk with our U.S. nuclear weapons
    technology? What do you propose or suppose the tunnel's purpose
    is, Admiral?
        Admiral Willard. Thank you, Congressman. First on the issue
    of road-mobile, as you know we are challenged by mobile missile
    systems. That is why they are created. I mean, holding mobile
    missile systems at risk is always problematic for any armed
    force and we are no exception.
        There is development within North Korea of a road-mobile
    intercontinental ballistic missile system that we have
    observed. We have not observed it being tested yet, to my
    knowledge, and we are watching the development very closely.
        The missile system is advertised to be significant in terms
    of its range capability, and I think it is something that we
    will continue to monitor very, very closely as it develops. And
    you know, what will it mean to us when it proves itself? There
    will be a decision made with regard to how we posture to deal
    with what could be something less predictable than Taepo Dong
    II or some of the other ballistic missile capabilities that are
    a little more easy to observe.
        Mr. Turner. Before we go on to China, as you just said, the
    ability to hold the missile at risk because it is mobile means
    I am presuming that there should be that much more of increased
    focus on defense, if this is a system that we should face in
    its use; is that correct?
        Admiral Willard. I think that is one of the posture options
    that will have to be considered, yes.
        Mr. Turner. And the Chinese tunnels?
        Admiral Willard. Many nations in the Asia-Pacific region
    utilize hardening of facilities in order to provide for their
    security, their defense. I would offer that North Korea is a
    prime example of this, where tunneling is very much a part of
    the defensive infrastructure in the--among the armed forces in
    North Korea with regard to their being hardened and defensible.
    We see it, frankly, in many locations. China, no exception. The
    tunneling activities associated with China's submarine force is
    very obvious and have been widely publicized.
        When we anticipate the purpose of that, the purpose of that
    is generally to provide both a hardened environment for the
    force structure that they utilize there, whatever that happens
    to be.
        Mr. Turner. Which you presume to be?
        Admiral Willard. I think we would take that into closed
    session and discuss it. But, again, there is the point of
    hardening. There is also the point of being able to move forces
    in tunnels, unobserved. So there are a variety of benefits that
    come from developing underground facilities to occupy the needs
    of the Armed Forces. And again, China is one example; there are
    many in the world.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Speier.
        Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
    Admiral, for your incredible service to our country and to your
    spouse for standing with you.
        I have a question. As we move into an era of shrinkage in
    terms of our fleets, and we look at new ways to be innovative
    and efficient, I am told that there are ways in which we can
    transfer our troops from our large ships by keeping them in
    the--in place, rather than spending 6 months getting to where
    they are supposed to be serving their time there, and then
    spending 6 months returning to the United States for
    maintenance and repair. And in particular, there is a
    suggestion that has been made by a number of people who are
    fairly noteworthy, that we could basically fly in new troops to
    these destroyers and cruisers rather than have them moving
    across the waterways long distances that take as much as 6
    months. Do you have any thoughts on that?
        Admiral Willard. Being a sailor and having deployed 6 or
    more months many, many times, I certainly have an opinion on
    it. I think that--a couple of important things to note. First
    of all, the suggestion that we can fly in, fly out crews and
    locate a ship in a distant port has been experimented with in
    fairly recent times within the last decade. We have attempted
    to at least demonstrate the capability to do this. It comes at
    some expense. There are disadvantages to it. And one of the
    disadvantages is the ability of that ship to be brought back to
    a location where it can be maintained properly.
        So it is generally, if we talk about ships forward in
    Australia or ships forward in Singapore, there has to be a
    place to service those ships when they require it, in order to
    achieve the life cycle duration that we desire out of those
    ships. And there is the continuity associated with a crew
    manning a ship for a long period of time. So flying in, flying
    out crews is also a challenge that has to be overcome in that
    scenario.
        That said, one of the discussions that we are having
    regarding the overture that Singapore made to perhaps utilize
    Changi Naval Base for our littoral combat ships, one of the
    concepts for doing that would be a rotational presence of the
    ship's crew. So it is possible, it comes with advantages and
    disadvantages. It is not without cost. And I think there are
    times when it is appropriate.
        I think the rotational cycle that we have developed with
    the ships coming out of the major force concentration area,
    fleet concentration areas in the United States has been
    effective. And it is not as if we are not conducting business
    as soon as we leave port, I mean, whether it is training and
    exercise or whether it is the opportunity to touch many areas
    across the Pacific. The transit of ships is not without utility
    to me I guess is the way I would put it.
        Ms. Speier. So you are suggesting there is a cost
    associated to it. What I have been told is that you can do with
    3\1/2\ ships what normally takes 5 ships and you can actually
    see an efficiency of 40 percent. So I am a little confused as
    to whether there are cost savings here or costs associated with
    doing that.
        Admiral Willard. Well, there will be costs either way. Once
    again, the idea of rotating crews forward to man up a ship,
    leaving that ship in place, comes with its own dynamics in
    terms of how we manage that ship's maintenance cycles and so
    forth. So it is not without its challenges.
        What you are referring to is what it takes to maintain a
    single ship forward in terms of the cyclical nature of
    deployment, when we are conducting forward deployment. And
    typically it is about four to make one, to your point.
        I would again contend that there are advantages to that.
    One of the advantages is the ability to return the ship and
    return the crews to a home base and a level of continuity and
    maintenance continuity that advantages the ship. And it is not
    as if there is a point A, point B in this calculus. When ships
    transit the Pacific, we have them working the entire time they
    are in transit, whether it is in the southern Pacific, island
    nations, territorial areas, or whether it is forward in the
    western Pacific or whether it is in the Indian Ocean and
    Persian Gulf region. So----
        Ms. Speier. My time has expired.
        Admiral Willard. Ships that deploy are continually in work.
        Ms. Speier. Thank you. I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Wittman.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Willard,
    thank you so much for joining us today. I deeply appreciated
    you hosting our congressional delegation that visited the
    Pacific Command during the summertime. That was one of the most
    eye-opening and rewarding experiences of my service here in
    Congress. So I thank you. And thank you for your 39 years of
    service to our Nation and to our Navy. From being a squadron
    commander to carrier commander, to fleet command, to being part
    of what I think is one of the greatest movies ever made, that
    is an absolutely stellar career. We deeply, deeply appreciate
    it. It is an honor to have men such as yourself leading our All
    Volunteer Force.
        And Donna, thank you for your unlimited passion for our
    sailors and for our Navy and your commitment. You have been a
    stellar example of service and sacrifice to our Nation and to
    our military. So thank you so much. It is great to have such a
    great Navy family out there serving this Nation. So we deeply
    appreciate that.
        Admiral Willard. Thank you.
        Mr. Wittman. I wanted to ask this question. You had spoken
    about the new strategy in the Asia-Pacific. As we look at that,
    and we are looking at $487 billion in reductions to defense
    budgets, my question is this: Are you going to be able to
    achieve that new strategy with these reductions? And I think
    you are being asked to do an awful lot with a lot less.
        And if we look at what is happening, you look at the SCN
    [Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy] Navy account being reduced,
    you look at the number of ships being reduced. You also see
    some decommissioning of ships before the end of their service
    lives. You see a number of programs being moved to the right,
    outside of the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], the SSNs,
    we are going down 1 year to a single ship being built that
    year. The F-35, the SSBN(X). It seems like we are asking an
    awful lot.
        And my question is: In the Pacific Command, will there be
    the assets, the ships, the planes necessary for you to be able
    to carry out that mission? It seems like we are asking an awful
    lot with this big shift, but we are doing it in a time of some
    pretty severe reductions in resources. I want to get your
    perspective on how you see that unfolding.
        Admiral Willard. Thank you. First, Congressman, I think you
    characterize it very well. It should be a concern for all of us
    that the actions that we take with the fleet and with the other
    Service forces that we have are the right ones in accordance
    with a strategic design. I think that one of the real strengths
    of what President Obama and Secretary Panetta unfolded as a set
    of strategic priorities was to try and establish the places in
    the world that we felt from a security standpoint were of the
    greatest importance for our Nation, and I was pleased but not
    surprised that the Asia-Pacific was prominent in that
    discussion.
        What that means is that the commitment we are making is
    that we will put the forces into those highest priority regions
    that are required. And I think that is the answer to your
    question. I would anticipate that my successor will vocalize
    his requirements very clearly to the Pentagon and elsewhere,
    and that by and large these requirements will be met.
        I think in the Aegis we are challenged across the Services
    with regard to these budgets. And should, heaven forbid,
    sequestration or other very severe cuts take place, then I
    think the Department of Defense is going to be challenged to
    execute to these set of priorities. But I think the strength in
    the work that has been done is to try to establish a strategy
    whereby we can make the right decisions with regard to where
    the forces go.
        Mr. Wittman. I want to get a little bit of your perspective
    about things that are happening currently with China. As your
    great career as a naval aviator, you spent a lot of time in the
    Asia-Pacific. You also were there at a time when we watched the
    buildup in Russia through the seventies and eighties. We
    watched that Cold War scenario. We have seen that wane. You
    have also been a part of watching a buildup in China, an
    exertion of China's influence in that particular region.
        What do you see as the biggest challenge for us in the
    Asia-Pacific in years to come? And having that metric of the
    Russian buildup in the Cold War, where do you see the United
    States being 5 years, 10 years, 15 years down the road in the
    Asia-Pacific with what is currently happening in China and
    elsewhere, even in places like North Korea?
        Admiral Willard. Chairman McKeon talked about the more than
    $5 trillion of commerce, of which a sizable portion is U.S.
    commerce that is on the water in the South China Sea. As we
    look forward to our greatest challenges it is going to be the
    ability to coexist among all of the nations in the Asia-Pacific
    region, China being one of them. And right now, one of my
    daunting strategic challenges is to engage effectively with
    China and with the People's Liberation Army in order to be able
    to coexist and both contribute to the security of this region
    for its future prosperity.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Ms. Hanabusa.
        Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Hi, Admiral.
        Admiral Willard. Aloha.
        Ms. Hanabusa. Aloha. I was going to tell you the same
    thing. I won't repeat my colleagues, especially Congressman
    Wittman, but my mahalo to both you and Donna for everything
    that you have done. And I would like to add to that my mahalo
    on behalf of the people of the State of Hawaii. You have been
    absolutely great. You have embraced them and I think they have
    embraced the both of you right back.
        Having said that, Admiral, you know one of the things that
    we take for granted is munitions. Do you have any concerns
    regarding the DOD's current inventory of munitions?
        Admiral Willard. I do. The short answer is yes, I have
    concerns. When we look across our munitions inventories,
    notwithstanding what has been expended over the past 10 years,
    there exists gaps and shortfalls and insufficiencies in a
    variety of different areas. In the new strategic design in
    terms of priorities, there is emphasis on improving our missile
    defense capabilities, as one example, and our crew missile
    capability. So we think that there will be advances in some
    munitions inventories. But the short answer to do I have
    concerns? The answer is yes.
        When we talk about major operations, nation state level
    operations, there are munitions, acquisition production rates,
    and in some cases insufficiencies that we have got to overcome.
        Ms. Hanabusa. So how does that look in terms of the fiscal
    year 2013 budget request? Are we procuring a sufficient number
    of weapons to basically ensure you and other combatant
    commanders the sufficient numbers that you will need?
        Admiral Willard. We have spent the last couple of years
    articulating the munitions status very clearly into the
    Department of Defense. And I have had a good association with
    Deputy Under Secretary Carter and others with regard to
    determining what to do about some of the munitions challenges
    that we face.
        Again, the 2013 budget will improve some areas that we have
    regarded as critical in the past, specifically related to
    ballistic missile defense where the production rates of SM3s
    and other capabilities have been limited--and cruise missile
    inventories. There remain other areas in which we are
    challenged. And our responsibility has been and will continue
    to be to articulate those as clearly as we can so that the
    Services make the appropriate investments to try and overcome
    some of these shortfalls.
        Ms. Hanabusa. I guess in another conversation before you
    retire, we can see where those other areas are.
        Now, Admiral, we have had this discussion before, but I
    would like you to be able to walk us through. We talked about
    basically rotational bases and afloat. Now, we know kind of
    what that means, but can you use the remainder of this time to
    tell us what do you envision when we talk about rotational
    bases and we have basically service men afloat, especially
    since we are going to be forwarding them to areas where we
    don't have bases, traditional bases?
        Admiral, Willard. Thank you. When we talk about posture, we
    are generally talking about where we are either permanently
    based or where we are able to rotate from. So Hawaii is a
    permanent base for us. We have a fleet concentration area
    there. We have some very significant strategic assets, such as
    the shipyard there that we are able to operate from and we
    deploy and we employ the forces that are stationed in Hawaii.
        Elsewhere, such as the offering made by Singapore,
    Australia, in terms of the Darwin marines, and the discussions
    that we are currently having with the Philippines, may afford
    us opportunities to rotate forces--not fly, in fly out, but it
    is a term they use--but essentially bring forces forward, allow
    them to train and operate from those bases for a temporary
    period of time, and then replace them with other forces that
    will in turn rotate.
        So we have the responsibility to posture correctly. And
    then there is the presence requirement, which is entirely
    different. This is where day to day, the forces should be
    operating to engage with other countries to exercise or to be
    present to help secure the Asia-Pacific region.
        Ms. Hanabusa. So when we are talking about a rotational
    type of force and they are deploying from a particular area,
    like the Philippines or Darwin, are they envisioned to have--to
    live there for a period of time? To have actual quarters there?
        Admiral Willard. They have quarters there, yes. We do not
    anticipate that they will be taking their families there, so
    there is not a permanence to their presence there. They will
    dwell there to exercise with their Australian counterparts and
    eventually deploy into the region where we need them.
        Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Mr. Palazzo.
        Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Admiral Willard,
    thank you for being here and thank you for your service to your
    country. I was on Chairman Wittman's CODEL [Congressional
    Delegation] to PACOM and I would have to say it was--I echo
    everything that he said. Eye opening. It was very professional.
    Your staff was wonderful. It was definitely a learning
    experience and also ratified a lot of the concerns I guess we
    pick up in our day-to-day job. But it elevated it to put it on
    our radar, and that is what Secretary Panetta and the President
    and their new defense strategy kind of echoes as well; that we
    are looking at emerging threats, we are looking at the security
    and safety and safe passage of our shipping lanes because of
    the commerce and the economies and the fragile alliances that
    are out there. And there is no way to separate America's
    national security from our economic security and vice versa.
        One of the things that I did pick up throughout--and many
    of my questions have already been answered--was talking to our
    friends in the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of Korea, was
    that they want to know what we were doing. They were looking to
    us for leadership. Not only just, you know, just the leadership
    that America has provided for hundreds of years, but of course
    they are wanting to know what our fiscal affairs are like and
    are we getting our house in order. Because my takeaway was that
    we have some very good friends over there, but at the end of
    the day they are worried about their personal security and
    stability of their nation and their sovereignty, and that if we
    had a reduction of force or we started doing some shifting back
    and forth, that these alliances could be put into jeopardy.
    Would you care to comment on that?
        Admiral Willard. I think you make great points. And our
    alliances and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region are the
    great opportunities that exist there. And our current alliances
    with nations such as Japan and South Korea, the Philippines,
    Australia and Thailand, to name our allies, are very, very
    important to the overall security of the region. And to your
    point, there is a refrain there that expresses concern about
    the staying power of the United States, the commitment to the
    region which has been allayed, frankly, in the last couple of
    years because of the very strong commitment that this
    Administration and our various secretaries have made to the
    Asia-Pacific.
        But there is a concern, especially witnessing the economic
    situation that the United States finds itself in regarding our
    ability to sustain ourselves and be influential and continue to
    be a partner in the region, and I assure them that we will, and
    assure them that a presence--forward presence remains paramount
    to the United States.
        So I am frankly, you know, very pleased to see the emphasis
    that the Asia-Pacific has received in this strategic design by
    this administration and our Secretary. And I think it is vital
    to the region to take that message and then to see us back it
    up with the actions that we take.
        Mr. Palazzo. Well, if the opportunity comes up again to go
    back on a PACOM CODEL, Mr. Chairman, please put my name and Ms.
    Bordallo's on there too, I think she would like to go. Because
    we just touched the surface and we would like to learn a lot
    more about our assets over there.
        Now, knowing that this has become part of the emerging,
    possible emerging threats somewhere that we have to have on our
    radar, I am concerned that the Secretary and others, not just
    the Navy and the Army and other branches of Services, that
    their rhetoric is really not matching the reality or the level
    of concern that we may have in this region, because we are
    looking forward to the 30-year shipbuilding plan. Are we going
    to be at 313 ships, or is it going to be less than that? So we
    are all anxious to look at that.
        Are we going to have the resources and assets in the
    theater to address this? But it looks like we are going to be
    decommissioning ships decades before their useful lives are up.
    We are pushing new shipbuilding to the right. A lot of these
    things just do not make a lot of sense. We are saying there are
    future threats, but at the same time we are not going to
    address them currently. What do you see as your most important
    needs for the next 5 years?
        Admiral Willard. The sustainment of the force structure and
    forward presence of that force structure that we have enjoyed
    in the past, and the additions that will come out of the
    conclusion of the last two wars that have occurred. So there is
    a reconstitution that is ongoing, and certainly the capacities
    that the United States Armed Forces have are important to us.
    That they be biased appropriately into the Asia-Pacific region
    is very important to the Asia-Pacific Command.
        The Chairman. Mr. Larsen.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, good to see
    you, and thank you for hosting us a few months back, the small
    business panel, as part of this committee. We had a great set
    of visits out there, and appreciate the time out there.
        I have four questions. They are kind of all over the place.
    I will be quick with each one of them and if you could answer
    them one at a time. Can you characterize the relationship with
    Indonesia?
        Admiral Willard. Very strong, 140 or so activities annually
    with Indonesia. Very impressed, frankly, with President
    Yudhoyono and his democratic government and the progress that
    they have made, particularly in military reform. And we are
    reengaged with KOPASSUS [Indonesian Army Special Forces
    Command] at a pace, but nonetheless reengaged. They are
    effective in counterterrorism and they are reaching out to many
    countries but particularly to the United States.
        Mr. Larsen. Great. Second, we are shifting from P3s to P8s
    now, and Whidbey Island is part of that and Jacksonville is
    part of that. Can you just talk briefly about the role--what
    the P8s will be giving you versus moving from the P3s and what
    the P8s might give you in the Pacific Command?
        Admiral Willard. I think in general we get dwell from those
    assets that we haven't--that we just can't enjoy from an asset
    like the P3. So we are very much looking forward to the fact
    that this is a jet that can move quickly, and it is going to
    come with a great deal of capability.
        So the P8 will be a great addition in what is an inherently
    maritime area of responsibility. I have great use for them and
    we are very much looking forward to a P8 community out there.
        Mr. Larsen. Great. I think when you first sat down in my
    office when you first started as PACOM, we had this discussion
    about--PACOM had just started, or was in the middle of further
    discussions with the Government of Japan about ballistic
    missile defense and the operations of BMD [Ballistic Missile
    Defense], not necessarily the cooperation, but how it is going
    to be operating. Can you give an update on that?
        Admiral Willard. I think the Japanese have advanced
    greatly. We continue to team in this, as you would expect, very
    much, 7th Fleet with the Japanese self-defense force. Able to
    work ballistic missile defense scenarios into many of the
    exercises that we perform. I right now regard the Japanese as a
    very credible BMD force and continuing to grow in its
    capacities.
        Mr. Larsen. So any issues left over from the operational
    questions that existed because of the--it was embedded--the
    problem was embedded in the Japanese Constitution about self-
    defense and whether or not we could fully operate BMD if we
    needed to if there was a fly-over--to fly over the islands.
        Admiral Willard. Thank you. I think these are manageable
    issues. What I have learned over the past 2\1/2\ years is that
    in working closely with the Japanese--and, frankly, their
    defense force appropriately brings their civilian oversight
    into the room frequently as we have these discussions--they
    have been very good about educating the Diet and others in the
    Ministry of Defense with regard to what it really takes to
    defend Japan. And as you know, I have that responsibility.
        So in the deliberations that we have with the Japanese
    joint staff and others in developing the concepts to cooperate
    in ballistic missile defense, I think there has grown a good
    understanding of the requirements to accomplish this. There
    continue to be constitutional limitations in what those
    Japanese defense forces can do, as you you know. But again I
    think in the way in which we have structured our tactics,
    techniques, and procedures we are able to work our way through
    those.
        Mr. Larsen. Okay. And finally, the last page of your
    testimony you discuss JPAC [Joint Personnel Accounting
    Command], specifically China, Burma, and DPRK [Democratic
    People's Republic of Korea]. Could you maybe briefly touch on
    maybe Burma, what next steps we are going to be taking to
    continue recovery operations there?
        Admiral Willard. We are going to move back into Burma--we
    have been there before, as you know--but looking very much
    forward to that opportunity. And with the level of cooperation
    that we have seen from the Burmese Government recently, the
    overtures that they have made and some of the reforms that they
    are committing themselves to, I think we will have less concern
    about the security of those forces when, in fact, they go in
    there. So the Personnel Accounting Command is very busy out in
    the Asia-Pacific and, frankly, globally right now, and ready to
    move back into the DPRK, to your point.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Scott.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, Ma'am, thank
    you for your service to our country. Admiral, I was glad to
    hear you say that China's goal, you thought, was to be a
    constructive contributor, if you will, to commerce and peace in
    the region. Did I understand that correctly?
        Admiral Willard. I think they would certainly assert that,
    and despite the challenges that we face and continue to
    endeavor to overcome, it is my hope as well.
        Mr. Scott. Could you speak to the cross-strait
    relationships between China and Taiwan? And I guess what you
    said is the first I have heard that, and certainly respect your
    opinion. But they keep approximately 1,500 missiles and rockets
    pointed at Taiwan which certainly would lead you to believe
    that maybe they weren't going to be such a constructive
    contributor, if you will, to peace in that region. Could you
    speak to that briefly?
        Admiral Willard. There is very impressive combat power
    across the strait on mainland China. Whether that is integrated
    air defense system, ballistic--offensive ballistic missile
    capabilities or force structure in their ports and airfields.
    It is very impressive. It has been there a long time now,
    several years, and has not diminished. They continue to improve
    the capability. So in terms of a balance of power, I mean, it
    is generally one-sided.
        The cross-strait relations have improved since President Ma
    was elected in 2008 and reelected just last year, we have
    witnessed improved relationships between mainland--the People's
    Republic of China and Taiwan. And we anticipate that will
    continue with President Ma's reelection. And we are encouraged
    by that, frankly.
        That said, the combat power, as you allude, is somewhat
    incongruous to those improved relations cross-strait. But as
    they improve their relationship economically and
    diplomatically, we think that it should lower the likelihood of
    coercion or conflict taking place.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you. And when I woke up this morning and
    saw the news, the comments about North Korea and our food aid
    in exchange for them stopping their nuclear programs, how
    optimistic should we be that there will be a long-term change,
    if you will, in the approach of North Korea's leadership
    towards nuclear weapons, if you will?
        Admiral Willard. First to clarify, in the ongoing
    negotiations that have been going on, there are discussions of
    food aid. There have been now for, by and large, the past year.
    And the United States has been engaged in discussions very
    recently with regard to quantities of food that we anticipate
    providing to North Korea on the humanitarian side. In the same
    discussion but a separate topic, has been the discussion of
    nuclearization and the efforts to verifiably denuclearize North
    Korea.
        We have a new--a new successor in North Korea, as you know,
    since Kim Jong-il passed. He passed on leadership to his 29-
    year-old son, Kim Jong-un. We know something of him, not
    everything. We are observing closely the actions of the new
    administration in Pyongyang with regard to how they will deal
    with a variety of security and coercive strategy issues,
    nuclearization being one of them.
        And we are encouraged by the outcome of the talks that
    talked about the possibility of IAEA [International Atomic
    Energy Agency] being let back into Yongbyon [Nuclear Scientific
    Research Center] and the cessation of some of the activities,
    including ballistic missile development. But I think this is
    something that we need to watch very carefully, wait and see.
    In the past we have not seen much change out of what is now a
    third generation of leadership in Pyongyang.
        Mr. Scott. Hopeful, but not optimistic; Is that it?
        Admiral Willard. I think that is well said.
        Mr. Scott. Well, Admiral, with 10 seconds left to go, I
    represent Robins Air Force Base, home of the JSTARS [Joint
    Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System]. I know that they
    have flown many missions for you and I certainly would
    appreciate your support of that platform as we go forward.
        Admiral Willard. It is a brilliant platform and you
    certainly have my support.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Coffman.
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Willard thank
    you so much for your service to our country and your role as
    the commanding officer for U.S. Pacific Command. And I wish you
    the best in retirement, which will be coming up pretty soon.
        First, if I understand it right, we no longer have ground
    forces in the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea;
    is that correct?
        Admiral Willard. That is correct. We continue to--our
    United Nations commander, J.D. Thurman, General Thurman,
    continues to be responsible for the overall security across the
    DMZ [demilitarized zone] and maintenance of the armistice. But
    the forces that were previously forward on the DMZ have been
    relocated.
        Mr. Coffman. And is there a plan to give operational
    control to the South Korean military?
        Admiral Willard. In December 2015 is the currently
    scheduled date. As you will recall, the 2012 date passed and
    there was a delay. But right now, what we term operational
    control transition is scheduled to occur in December 2015.
        Mr. Coffman. And am I right to understand--I think we have
    28,000 U.S. military personnel, about that number----
        Admiral Willard. Roughly.
        Mr. Coffman [continuing]. In South Korea today?
        Admiral Willard. We do.
        Mr. Coffman. Now, is there still in place a plan for a
    multimillion-dollar military construction program to bring the
    families up, sort of as a program for tour normalization in
    South Korea? Where is that right now?
        Admiral Willard. Somewhat in suspension, I guess is the
    best way to term it. And J.D., I am sure when he testifies,
    will provide you the details on that. But looking at the number
    of families that currently reside in South Korea with their
    service member, I think J.D. recognizes that in this fiscal
    environment, completing tour normalization as it was originally
    scoped is probably not viable, and he is continuing now to look
    at it and dialogue with the Pentagon with regard to what he
    perceives to be the right mix of families and service members,
    both accompanied and unaccompanied, on the peninsula.
        Mr. Coffman. Do you know if they are having--one thing that
    the United States Army does versus the Marine Corps, and I
    served in both, is the Army tends to on some of its forward-
    deployed units rotate individuals in and out of those units,
    whereas the United States Marine Corps rotates units at the
    battalion level in and out of the area of operation. So is the
    Army having a discussion to move to more of a rotational basis
    for forces as opposed to assigning individuals? Are you aware
    of any discussion like that?
        Admiral Willard. No, I am not, though there is an ongoing
    discussion with regard to the Army in the Asia-Pacific region
    writ large, and how, with a reconstituted ground force
    following the two wars, the Army intends to support my needs in
    the region.
        I would offer that the Army forces on the Korean peninsula,
    especially given the decisions that have been made recently
    with regard to tour normalization and us, you know, slowing or
    stopping this now, are the dominant ground force on the
    peninsula, where the marines are down in Okinawa, Japan.
        Mr. Coffman. Okay. After we reach--after we hand over
    operation and control to the South Koreans, if we are able to
    achieve that in 2015, are there any projections as to drawing
    down our forces at that point in time?
        Admiral Willard. There are not. Operational control is at
    the leadership level. And this is now to say that rather than
    the United States commanding the defense of the Republic of
    Korea in wartime, that the Republic of Korea themselves will
    command and the United States will be in support. So that
    28,000 or so ground forces that we have maintained on the
    peninsula throughout the period since the war and during
    armistice are intended to continue to support the defense of
    the Republic of Korea.
        Mr. Coffman. The South Koreans, as I understand it, are
    spending 2.7 percent of their gross domestic product, their
    GDP, on defense. The U.S. right now is about 4.7 percent. What
    kind of burden sharing--maybe you could get back to me because
    we are running out of time. I wonder if you all could get back
    to me, Admiral, as to what exactly the South Koreans are paying
    in terms to support our presence in the peninsula.
        Admiral Willard. We will provide those numbers to you.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 65.]
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you. I yield back.
        The Chairman. Admiral, Donna, once again on behalf of the
    entire committee, we thank you very much for your 39 years of
    service. Wish you all the best in the new venture that you will
    be embarking on shortly. And this committee stands adjourned.
        Admiral Willard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    your continued support for our Armed Forces.
        [Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

    =======================================================================

                                A P P E N D I X

                                 March 1, 2012

    =======================================================================

                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 March 1, 2012

    =======================================================================

                  Statement of Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon

                  Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services

                                   Hearing on

      Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from
                              U.S. Pacific Command

                                 March 1, 2012

        Our economy and security has never been more dependent on
    our military, especially in the Asia-Pacific Region. The
    President's new strategy focuses on a so-called ``pivot to
    Asia-Pacific.'' While I don't question the critical importance
    of this theater, I am concerned that our forces may not be
    properly postured to support this shift.
        The Chief of Naval Operations has said that ship and
    aircraft deployments in the Pacific would remain at current
    levels. Over the next 5 years, we will cut 16 ships out of our
    new construction budget and retire 9 more. Further, our tanking
    and airlift capacity will be reduced, limiting our ability to
    project power and sustain our forces. This budget does not
    address reductions to our nuclear deterrent. But the
    Administration is reportedly contemplating unilateral
    reductions below New START levels. As you have discussed often
    with us, quantity does have a quality all its own--especially
    in a theater that covers half of the Earth's surface.
        We must be prepared to effectively respond with the needed
    manpower and assets. As I stated at last year's hearing, it is
    important our forces in the Pacific have the personnel,
    training, equipment, and the authorities they need to instill
    confidence in our allies, deter aggression, and remain ready to
    respond decisively to any contingency. It is not yet clear how
    the new strategy will meet these goals.
        Events in Asia can change rapidly, as we saw in December
    with the death of North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il. Alongside
    our South Korean allies, our forces must be ready to deter
    further North Korean provocations.
        China's growing influence creates concern for many of our
    regional allies. The balance of power across the Taiwan Straits
    continues to shift in the direction of Beijing. The South China
    Sea is a vital shipping lane through which more than 5 trillion
    dollars in trade pass each year. Deterring, delaying, or
    denying U.S. forces from operating along China's periphery is
    still a key goal of the People's Liberation Army. As China's
    military budget continues to grow annually by double digits,
    the PLA is focused on improving their capacities to counter
    U.S. military capabilities and exploit our weaknesses.
        We also see the growing threat of terrorism in region, as
    aims of certain groups like LeT [Lashkar-e-Tayyiba] expand
    beyond their traditional border disputes.
        In partnership with our allies and friends, our forces must
    stand ready to respond to unprovoked, hostile behavior and
    defend our regional allies and security interests. We look
    forward to your testimony shedding additional light on these
    matters and the range of security challenges we face in the
    Pacific.

                          Statement of Hon. Adam Smith

               Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services

                                   Hearing on

      Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from
                              U.S. Pacific Command

                                 March 1, 2012

        I would like to welcome Admiral Willard and thank him for
    making a long journey to be here with us today. I look forward
    to his expert testimony on a variety of important matters.
        Earlier this year, the President released the findings of a
    strategic review, which clearly articulated the global threat
    environment, and presented a broad strategy to address those
    threats moving forward. This strategic review appropriately
    places a renewed focus on the critically important Asia-Pacific
    region, a shift that will surely call for additional resources
    and an enhanced role for U.S. Pacific Command.
        The Asia-Pacific region is a vital region of the world that
    includes a number of important U.S. allies and partners.
    Without question, U.S. service men and women play a crucial
    role in maintaining these relationships and in promoting peace
    in the Pacific.
        Many of our partners in the regions are concerned about the
    recent rise of China. While I do not believe that a conflict
    with China is inevitable, we should continue to work to promote
    mutual interests, mitigate concerns, and perpetuate
    multilateral cooperation in the region. We should also continue
    to develop our security relationship with India and continue to
    strengthen existing relationships with partners such as Japan,
    South Korea, Australia, and Singapore.
        Transnational threats, such as violent extremism, cyber-
    threats, and illicit trafficking in persons, narcotics, and
    weapons continue to menace the region. Disease, malnourishment,
    environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and natural
    disaster do as well. The more we can do to defuse tensions
    through cooperative efforts with our many allies and strategic
    partners in the region, the more we can help to realize the
    immense potential for growth in the region.
        The United States will continue to lead in the Pacific and
    to offer assurances through our forward military presence in
    the region, and the U.S. Pacific Command's flexible force
    posture will continue to be essential to surmounting security
    challenges now and in the future.
        While I believe that the defense budget provides PACOM with
    the resources necessary for securing our strategic objectives,
    I would like to remind the Committee that the defense budget is
    consistent with the Budget Control Act that was passed by
    Congress. Although I did not support passage of that law, many
    members of the House Armed Services Committee did. The
    Department of Defense submitted a budget that complies with
    congressionally mandated funding levels and that supports our
    strategic objectives.
        I look forward to receiving your testimony and to
    continuing our dialogue on these and other important issues.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    =======================================================================

                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                                 March 1, 2012

    =======================================================================

                  RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS

        Admiral Willard. [The information was not available at the
    time of printing.] [See page 10.]
                                    ------

                 RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN

        Admiral Willard. [The information was not available at the time of
    printing.] [See page 28.]
    ?

    =======================================================================

                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 March 1, 2012

    =======================================================================

                        QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON

        Mr. McKeon. A recent report issued by the Congressional Research
    Service points out that China has repeatedly suspended its mil-to-mil
    contacts with the United States as a retaliatory measure for various
    U.S. actions. It also describes the limitations of those relationships.
    The report does not suggest suspending mil-to-mil contacts, but what is
    your opinion on ways to improve them? Does the U.S. get as much benefit
    from mil-to-mil contacts with the PLA as they do? Are there different
    approaches that we could take to improve the value of those contacts?
        Admiral Willard. The Department of Defense conducts mil-to-mil
    contacts with the PLA because we believe such contacts help build a
    cooperative capacity to address common security challenges, foster
    institutional understanding of each others' military doctrines and
    intentions, and build a common view of the international security
    environment. The PLA continues to suspend mil-mil contacts as a means
    to express displeasure for various U.S. actions that run contrary to
    PRC interests, a practice which indicates the PLA places less value on
    a sustained, reliable, and continuous military-to-military relationship
    with the United States.
        One method of raising the value of mil-to-mil contacts is to
    increasingly conduct such contacts in a multi-lateral setting or to
    link bilateral mil-to-mil contacts with multi-lateral engagements where
    the PLA has an interest of increasing its level of participation. One
    of the greatest strengths of USPACOM's forward presence in the Asia-
    Pacific region is that we are there at the invitation of our partners
    and allies, who hold a like-minded view of the security environment. By
    inviting the PLA to mil-to-mil engagements where our partners and
    allies already either co-host or actively participate makes it
    increasingly difficult for the PLA to regret without adversely
    impacting their relationships with those nations. The intent is to
    bring the PLA more frequently to the table, to demonstrate that it is
    better for the PLA to be a part of the conversation, rather than apart
    from the conversation.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES
        Mr. Reyes. I understand that China is becoming more economically
    involved in both Central and South American countries. What visibility
    does PACOM have on these activities and what are your greatest concerns
    involving these actions?
        Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mr. Reyes. Since 2002, it appears that the activities and the
    numbers of the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf have decreased in the
    Philippines. What actions is PACOM taking in order to ensure that this
    group and others in the country are eradicated? Has there been an issue
    with drug trafficking out of the country in order to fund the terrorist
    groups? How are you engaging international partners on the terrorist
    groups in the area?
        Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mr. Reyes. What is the status of mil-to-mil engagements with China?
    How would you propose improving the value of such contacts?
        Admiral Willard. Although the Defense Consultative Talks took place
    in December (an institutionalized dialogue) there have been no other
    bilateral mil-to-mil engagements since last September. However, some
    engagement still takes place sporadically along the periphery through a
    multitude of multilateral, rather than bilateral, venues across the
    Pacific theater.
        When China's President, Xi Jinping, visited Washington in February
    and met with Secretary Panetta, the two sides agreed to move forward in
    developing the specifics of this year's program of military-to-military
    exchanges and also expressed support for an exchange of visits between
    Secretary Panetta and China's Minister of National Defense at an
    appropriate time.
        During the week of 26 March 2012, representatives from the
    Department of Defense and the Chinese military will hold discussions
    detailing the bilateral military-to-military engagement plan for 2012
    which will include Secretary Panetta's trip to China.
        One method of raising the value of mil-to-mil contacts is to
    increasingly conduct such contacts in a multi-lateral setting or to
    link bilateral mil-to-mil contacts with multi-lateral engagements where
    the PLA has an interest of increasing its level of participation. One
    of the greatest strengths of USPACOM's forward presence in the Asia-
    Pacific region is that we are there at the invitation of our partners
    and allies, who hold a like-minded view of the security environment. By
    inviting the PLA to mil-to-mil engagements where our partners and
    allies already either co-host or actively participate, makes it
    increasingly difficult for the PLA to regret without adversely
    impacting their relationships with those nations. The intent is to
    bring the PLA more frequently to the table to demonstrate that it is
    better for the PLA to be a part of the conversation, rather than apart
    from the conversation.
        Military engagement can be valuable, but can only truly work if
    China is equally committed to open and regular exchanges that serve to
    enhance and deepen the mil-to-mil relationship. We should use military
    engagement with China as one of several means to demonstrate U.S.
    commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage
    China to play a constructive role in the region and to press China to
    partner with the United States and our Asian Allies and Partners in
    addressing common security challenges.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
        Mr. Forbes. Given the limitations of the Harpoon, how would you
    assess the requirement for a new ASCM with greater range against other
    competing priorities?
        Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mr. Forbes. Despite describing the great potential of the UCLASS
    program in testimony for negating emergent A2/AD technologies, this
    program appears to be downgraded in the Navy's FY13 budget request and
    the FYDP. The UCLASS program was cut by $240 million this year and the
    limited operational capability (LOC) date is being delayed by two years
    from 2018 to 2020. Also, UCLASS was not mentioned as a key program for
    projecting power in contested areas in the Defense Budget Priorities
    and Choices document nor was it identified in the written testimony of
    Secretary Mabus as a capability the Navy is investing in to counter
    advanced A2/AD challenges. How important does PACOM consider the
    capabilities found in the UCLASS program for meeting its mission
    requirements?
        Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mr. Forbes. What are the challenges presented to U.S. Navy undersea
    dominance by the numerical growth and modernization of the PLA(N)
    submarine fleet over the next 8-10 years. What risk assessment has been
    conducted relative to contingency plans given PLA(N) submarine force
    structure projections versus the projected U.S. SSN shortfall in the
    2020-2030 timeframe? What mitigation strategies have been emplaced by
    the Commander to address the potential inequity in undersea warfare
    between the U.S. submarine force and the PLA(N) submarine force in the
    out years?
        Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
        Mr. Langevin. Yesterday the State Department announced that North
    Korea agreed to implement a moratorium on long-range missile launches,
    nuclear tests, and nuclear activities at Yongbyon, including enrichment
    in exchange for food aid. While I'm sure all of us here will continue
    to carefully examine all aspects of the security situation on the
    Korean peninsula, how do you expect this announcement to affect PACOM's
    security posture, if at all, as well as that of our regional allies?
        Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mr. Langevin. During your testimony you mentioned a yearlong cyber
    pilot with CYBERCOM to advance cyber capabilities in the Pacific. Could
    you elaborate more on the progress and goals of this pilot? How do you
    plan on integrating lessons learned into future operations and
    capabilities?
        Admiral Willard. 1. USPACOM established the Cyberspace Operations
    Command-Provisional (CYBERPAC-P) in February 2011 in order to bring
    together key PACOM stakeholders into a single entity for the
    synchronizing of cyberspace operations. With the pending approval of
    the Transitional Cyberspace CONOPS, CYBERPAC-P was renamed the
    Cyberspace Operations Center Pacific (CYBERPAC) to serve as the
    theater's Joint Cyber Center (JCC).
        2. CYBERPAC's mission is to plan and conduct theater cyberspace
    operations by synchronizing regional, national and allied cyberspace
    capabilities in support of USPACOM objectives in order to maintain
    freedom of action in cyberspace for U.S. Forces, our Partners, and
    Allies while denying the same to our adversaries.
        3. CYBERPAC's essential tasks include: a. Coordinate Theater DOD
    Global Information Grid Operations. b. Direct and coordinate Theater
    Defensive/Offensive Cyber Operations. c. Plan against designated
    cyberspace threats. d. Coordinate with Direct Reporting Units, Sub-
    Unified Commands, and appropriate U.S. government agencies for
    cyberspace effects. e. Synchronize Cyber Operations with Allies and
    regional partners.
        4. As the Regional JCC, CYBERPAC continues to direct, coordinate
    and synchronize the planning and execution of regional cyberspace
    operations with USCYBERCOM, as the agent for global cyberspace
    operations. Over the past 13 months, the CYBERPAC has greatly enhanced
    PACOM's ability to integrate cyberspace operations into the full
    spectrum of operations and has emerged as the standard model for a
    regional JCC. Lessons learned and best practices continue to be
    integrated into the CYBERPAC construct through Tier 1 exercises and
    current contingency operations.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
        Ms. Bordallo. In the discussion on the realignment the overall
    strategic imperatives of this move have not been adequately addressed.
    The key to these realignments is about strengthening our alliance with
    Japan. To that extent, what message are we sending the Japanese by
    utilizing U.S. Forces Japan as primarily a logistics and administrative
    function versus being an operational command like U.S. Forces Korea?
    U.S. Forces Japan did a tremendous job during Operation Tomodachi but
    how could the operation have been enhanced by an operational command
    based in Japan? If U.S. Forces Japan was being utilized as an
    operational command in every sense of the word, could they be assigned
    a mission of enhancing U.S.-Japan bi-lateral training?
        Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Ms. Bordallo. Can you comment on your view of future Navy ship
    maintenance and repair requirements and capabilities required in the
    Western Pacific? In particular, do you foresee maintenance and repair
    requirements for submarines or the LCS on Guam?
        Admiral Willard. The current Submarine repair model for Guam will
    remain unchanged for the foreseeable future. As the number of Littoral
    Combat Ships home ported in the Pacific increases, more voyage repairs
    in support of Western Pacific deployments are likely. However, the
    support provided would be similar to that currently given to other Navy
    ships that transit in the vicinity of Guam.
        Ms. Bordallo. With the increased military presence ramping up in
    the Asia-Pacific region, I find it concerning that the Department of
    Defense is cutting critical resources in that particular AOR. A recent
    example is the Air Force announcing the divestiture of the Global Hawk
    block 30, of which there are currently 3 aircraft at Andersen Air Force
    Base. Do you feel that you will still have adequate ISR capabilities in
    the PACOM AOR if these 3 aircraft and potentially other assets are
    divested from the inventory? What risk are we currently facing with ISR
    capabilities in the PACOM AOR and what steps are being taken to
    mitigate that risk?
        Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Ms. Bordallo. President Obama has made reducing reliance on
    contractors and rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative
    of his Administration. In your opinion, given the restrictions on the
    size of your civilian workforce imposed by the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense, does the current PACOM workforce construct reflect an
    appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military and
    contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and
    requirements? Please support your response with workforce and cost data
    as required by statutes and policies.
        Admiral Willard. USPACOM's sourcing of functions and work between
    military, civilian and contracted services must be consistent with
    workload requirements, funding availability, readiness and management
    needs, as well as applicable laws and statutes. USPACOM's FY 2013
    budget requests, and associated civilian workforce reductions, reflect
    USPACOM's best judgment today. It represents a carefully coordinated
    approach based on the overall command strategy and policy, balancing
    operational needs and fiscal reality. USPACOM remains committed to
    meeting its statutory obligations to annually review missions,
    functions and workforce composition, including reliance on contracted
    services, and to ensure the USPACOM workforce is appropriately balanced
    and aligned to our most critical priorities.
        Ms. Bordallo. Did PACOM seek relief from DOD mandated civilian
    personnel levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-
    effectively performed by civilians?
        Admiral Willard. USPACOM requested a SECDEF exception to the FY10
    civilian personnel cap for 38 contractor-to-civilian conversions in the
    FY12 program. The 38 conversions were determined to be exempt from
    private sector performance for readiness/management needs. These in-
    sourcing actions were expected to result in net savings for USPACOM, as
    civilian performance has been estimated to be more cost-effective than
    contract performance.
        Ms. Bordallo. To what extent has PACOM used insourcing to reduce
    reliance on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate
    efficiencies?
        Admiral Willard. HQ USPACOM's current workforce percentages are 50%
    military, 34% civilian and 8% contractor with the remaining 8% as over-
    hires and activated reservists. As a result of in-sourcing, USPACOM's
    rebalanced workforce has generated significant cost saving which is
    reflected in the USPACOM budget.
        Ms. Bordallo. Are you comfortable that all contracted services
    currently supporting PACOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse
    source of labor?
        Admiral Willard. We have diligently scrutinized our contracted
    services and are convinced we have the right balance of support.
        Ms. Bordallo. What processes are in place within PACOM to ensure
    the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian
    workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other
    labor sources such as contractors or military personnel?
        Admiral Willard. The civilian workforce and associated fiscal
    funding reductions are being managed through a functional assessment of
    workload priorities. USPACOM tracks manpower authorizations, personnel
    and associated funding to manage workload requirements for military,
    civilians, activated reserves, USPACOM-funded contractors and civilian
    overhires for the current and future fiscal years. When civilian
    employees resign or retire, the vacant position is reviewed based on
    organizational assessments, prioritization of missions and functions,
    and the associated risk and degradation to USPACOM readiness.
        Ms. Bordallo. In the PACOM plan for direct labor reporting, signed
    by your Chief of Staff on November 21, 2011, and submitted to the
    congressional defense committees as part of the consolidated DOD plan,
    PACOM planned to incorporate manpower reporting language beginning
    October 1, 2011. How many contract actions have been executed with this
    requirement since October 1, 2011?
        Admiral Willard. No contracts, with this requirement, have been
    executed with this requirement since 1 October 2011.
        Ms. Bordallo. There was a lot of discussion last year about the
    ``exceptions'' to the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated.
    Please provide a detailed list of all exceptions PACOM has had approved
    to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any exceptions
    that were requested but not approved, and the justification for such.
        Admiral Willard. The SECDEF approved the conversion of 38
    contractors to civilian in the FY12 program which were previously
    approved and programmed in the FYDP. The 38 contractors consisted of 12
    at USPACOM Headquarters, 21 for Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command and
    five for Defense Intelligence Agency/USPACOM Joint Intelligence
    Operations Command. None of USPACOM's requests were disapproved.
        Ms. Bordallo. As efficiencies are being executed across PACOM, is
    the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as
    eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions?
        Admiral Willard. USPACOM submits an annual inventory of inherently
    governmental and commercial activity (IG/CA) inventory of all
    appropriated funded military and DOD funded civilian manpower
    authorizations, categorized as either inherently governmental or
    commercial activities. Workload and functions tied to military or
    civilian authorizations that have been eliminated or divested are
    tracked and reported in the IG/CA inventory using the manpower mix
    criteria and functional codes.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
        Mr. Conaway. Are DOD's ISR platforms appropriate for use in the
    contested airspace environment that we see in the PACOM AOR and if not,
    what should we be doing to prepare our ISR assets for the contested
    environment?
        Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mr. Conaway. The PACOM AOR has some of the most technologically
    advanced nations in the field of cybersecurity. What can we do as a
    nation and in the PACOM AOR to defend and defeat any attacks on our
    network?
        Admiral Willard. 1. Defending our networks and defeating attacks
    requires the following:
        a. Exercise a Whole-of-Government or Whole-of-Nation Strategy. The
    DOD must partner closely with U.S. government departments, agencies and
    the private sector to enable a whole of government strategy to address
    diverse cyber threats to military targets, civilian infrastructure,
    personal identifiers and intellectual property. Many of the DOD's
    critical functions and operations rely on commercial assets, including
    internet service providers and global supply chains, over which the DOD
    has no authority to mitigate risk. The DOD is developing partnerships
    with the private sector and government agencies, including law
    enforcement, to best defend U.S. interests in cyberspace. For example,
    a memorandum of agreement has been signed between DOD and DHS to
    enhance inter-departmental strategic planning, synchronization of
    operations and mutual support for capability development.
        b. Recruit, Train, Retain, Organize, and Equip a Cyber Workforce.
    Meeting the dynamic needs of cyber operations and managing cyber risks
    requires a talented, trained force to develop innovative capabilities
    and provide information assurance, real-time situational awareness and
    network environments that are secure and resilient to evolving threats.
    DOD will need to continually develop the integration and resourcing of
    cyber workforce requirements and make itself competitive to entice and
    retain skilled personnel.
        c. Invest in the Development of Industrial Cyberspace Capabilities.
    Technological innovation is at the forefront of national security. The
    DOD will need to enhance its research, development, testing, evaluation
    and acquisition processes to employ rapid cycles of technological
    innovation. The DOD should focus significant investments on developing
    game changing approaches to strengthen its defense capabilities and
    make its systems unrecognizable to malicious activity. For example, we
    should focus research on mission assurance and maintaining effective
    cyberspace operations, including cyberspace maneuvering, active cyber
    defense and full spectrum cyberspace operations. We should also pursue
    new architectures to defend its critical networks, harden systems and
    create assured environments to protect current and future systems from
    attack.
        d. Build Relationships with U.S. Allies and International Partners.
    The development of international shared situational awareness and
    warning capabilities will enable collective cyber self-defense and
    deterrence. By sharing timely indicators and threats, allies and
    international partners can increase collective cyber defense. Thus, DOD
    will need to build and improve relationships with key allies and
    international partners, including efforts to develop standard operating
    procedures for strategic communications, establish cyber centers of
    excellence and advance international cyberspace norms and principles
    that protect the free flow of information, goods and ideas.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
        Mr. Wittman. Admiral Willard, with the new strategy to shift our
    focus to the Asia-Pacific how do the $487 billion in defense cuts over
    the next 10 years affect your ability as the Combatant Commander
    responsible for the Asia-Pacific to execute this strategy? In my
    opinion you are being asked to do more with a lot less. The Navy's SCN
    account is decreasing, our ship count is decreasing, we are
    decommissioning ships before the end of their service life, and we are
    moving advanced weapons platforms like SSNs, F-35, and SSBN(X) further
    to the right and well outside the FYDP. Do you feel the Navy and Air
    Force will be able to provide PACOM the numbers and types of ships and
    aircraft sufficient to support PACOM's responsibilities under the
    Department's new strategic guidance?
        Admiral Willard. USPACOM has not assessed an ``inability'' to focus
    on Asia-Pacific issues in the near term. As DOD provides further
    details on future expectations, USPACOM will assess current readiness
    accordingly.
        We believe USPACAF and USPACFLT will be able to provide USPACOM the
    numbers of forces sufficient to support our responsibilities. This
    assumes a commitment by the Air Force, Navy and Department of Defense
    to focus investments in the Pacific and availability of partner nation
    capability. The fiscal realities will challenge all of us; however,
    USPACOM and this nation have a long tradition of meeting its
    responsibilities during tough times and will continue to do so in the
    future. The Navy and Air Force will find ways to work together in
    unprecedented ways to meet this challenge through efforts like the Air
    Sea Battle strategy. These efforts will identify requirements,
    establish ownership, find efficiencies and eliminate duplicative
    efforts. Ultimately, this will drive us towards better theater
    integration and coordination of efforts.
        Mr. Wittman. Admiral, in the '70s and '80s you dealt with the
    Soviet Union and operations that supported the Cold War. With China's
    rapid military modernization, do you see the United States entering
    into a Cold War-type scenario with China in the coming years? We have
    the number 1 Navy in the world, how do we mitigate Chinese Navy from
    securing a foothold in the Asia-Pacific that projects power and asserts
    their maritime dominance of the region? Particularly in areas like the
    South China Sea and the East China Sea.
        Admiral Willard. The United States' relationship with China is more
    complex than the relationship between the United States and the Soviet
    Union during the Cold War. The U.S. and USSR bilateral relationship
    existed largely in the diplomatic and security realms. By comparison,
    in addition to our diplomatic and security relationship with China, we
    have robust economic, cultural, environmental, and other linkages that
    make the U.S. and China far more interdependent than the U.S. and USSR
    ever were. I don't think a return to the days of the Cold War is
    plausible and it is certainly not desirable. With regard to maritime
    dominance, the U.S. Navy asserts its right to free and unfettered
    access to the waters beyond the territorial seas of any nation in
    accordance with UNCLOS. We don't question the right of China or any
    nation to enjoy the same free and unfettered access to those waters in
    accordance with international norms and we consistently support the
    peaceful resolution of disputes. The East China Sea and South China Sea
    are congested waterways with multiple overlapping claims of
    sovereignty, including territorial and maritime claims. USPACOM
    conducts routine, coordinated presence operations in the Western
    Pacific in order to ensure a consistent presence, fulfill multiple
    operational requirements, and retain the necessary operational
    flexibility to address contingencies. Throughout the conduct of these
    operations, USPACOM is careful to strike the appropriate balance
    between operations that reassure allies and partners, operations which
    challenge excessive maritime claims, and actions that serve to deter
    behavior which is not consistent with international norms.
        Mr. Wittman. Admiral, the South China Sea continues to become a
    more contentious region with the convergence of sovereignty claims,
    vital international trade routes, expansive natural resources, and
    increasing military strength of multiple countries in the region. With
    the escalating tensions concerning oil and natural gas drilling plans,
    with potentially some American companies involved as well as American
    allies, it seems the question is when the region will spark, not if. My
    question is: What do you see ahead for the South China Sea in the next
    2-5 years? What would you anticipate PACOM's reaction to be if a small
    kinetic conflict broke out between two countries' maritime assets in
    the region? Lastly, do you see the homebasing of 4 LCSs and marines in
    Darwin as a significant gamechanger in future South China Sea issues?
    Do you feel those shifts will escalate or decrease tension in the
    region?
        Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH
        Mr. Heinrich. ADM Willard, please detail for the Committee the
    operational benefits that the capabilities being developed under the
    Counter-Electronics High Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project
    (CHAMP) JCTD offer in your area of operation. In addition, what would
    be the benefits of having additional resources to enhance those
    capabilities?
        Admiral Willard. The Counter-Electronics High Power Microwave
    Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP) JCTD provides us with new approach to
    engage soft electronic systems with significantly reduced collateral
    damage on non-targets. This in turn allows us to engage critical
    targets that are difficult to engage due to location in sensitive areas
    currently on the restricted strike list. An attack by a CHAMP-like
    system also potentially reduces the post-conflict reconstruction over
    kinetic effects. The CHAMP JCTD was designed to demonstrate the
    benefits of engaging targets with High Power Microwaves. Additional
    resources would provide for a program of record for the capability and
    incorporate the solutions to the identified deficiencies of the
    demonstrator system.
        Mr. Heinrich. CENTCOM's Urgent Need for ISR Data led to the
    development and launch of ORS-1, which went operational in January 2012
    and is getting very high marks. Given the new strategic emphasis on
    Asia and the Pacific, with large areas of denied-access terrain, does
    PACOM have an Urgent Need for a similar capability?
        Admiral Willard. The short answer to your question is ``yes''.
    USPACOM has been working closely with the Operationally Responsive
    Space program on a satellite of our own. ORS-2 is in development and
    scheduled to be launched in 2015. While it has a different payload than
    ORS-1, the capability will have a positive impact on USPACOM ISR
    collection gaps, most notably, those areas that are out of the reach of
    our airborne systems.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING
        Mr. Schilling. There are proposed changes to the basing arrangement
    in the Pacific Theater. How will they affect PACOM's ability to address
    North Korea's nuclear ambitions? How will this affect our ability to
    respond to China's military buildup?
        Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mr. Schilling. What are PACOM's plans to optimize our alliances and
    regional partnerships and do you have benchmarks you are trying to
    achieve?
        Admiral Willard. In general, while cooperation with regional allies
    and partners is generally strong and on a positive trajectory, we
    recognize the need to continue to strengthen our alliances and regional
    partnerships while building new ones. Our bilateral alliances remain
    the cornerstone of regional security and U.S. policy. Our relations
    with our treaty allies have never been better. We aim to encourage
    Korea's increasing emergence as not just a regional power, but a
    responsible global leader. We're working closely with the government in
    Australia on a host of critical security issues and it is our
    indivisible bond with Japan that has driven the United States,
    especially our armed forces, to lead the world's effort to help our
    ally in its time of greatest need. In addition to our close cooperation
    and exercise with our Philippine and Thai allies, the United States is
    also transforming its mil-to-mil relations with a number of emerging
    partners, including Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and India. Our
    strategic partnership with India, in particular, holds immense
    potential for shaping a geo-political balance within and beyond the
    region that favors political and economic freedom. In short, the United
    States is well positioned in the Asia-Pacific region, both in terms of
    our expanding partnerships as well as our enduring capabilities, to
    promote our National interests in the dynamic 21st century.
        The United States Pacific Command's Theater Campaign Plan is the
    mechanism used to manage security relations with allies and other
    countries and collaborative relationships with other organizations. The
    plan establishes both long and short term objectives all aimed toward
    achieving the strategic end states outlined in our national level
    strategic guidance. To mitigate risk this plan, and its execution,
    remain adaptive. Twice a year, USPACOM will formally assess the
    campaign. From this assessment, the Command will decide whether to
    adjust the resourcing, execution or priorities of the theater campaign.
        Mr. Schilling. How do you see PACOM moving forward in our
    relationship with Taiwan?
        Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
        Mr. Scott. What were the contributions of the U.S. Coast Guard to
    PACOM in 2011?
        Admiral Willard. a. The Coast Guard Pacific Area Commander, at the
    request of Pacific Command's Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies,
    visited India and participated in a workshop held in Mumbai entitled
    ``Exploring India-U.S. Cooperation, Safeguarding Prosperity in the
    Indian Ocean.''
        b. As the Executive Agent for USPACOM to the Quadrilateral Defense
    Working Group, Coast Guard District 14 worked closely with
    representatives from Australia, New Zealand and France to plan and
    conduct maritime operations across Oceania. These operations were
    primarily related to preventing illegal commercial fishing, but they
    also entailed the sharing of information at several levels.
        c. The Coast Guard Pacific Area Command established a Coast Guard
    Reserve Unit at USPACOM. This Reserve Unit will ultimately have a
    complement of 17 Coast Guard Reservists assigned to various Pacific
    Command directorates.
        d. Coast Guard District 14 served as an adjunct component to
    USPACOM in a number of contingency situations. Of particular note, in
    conjunction with New Zealand, District 14 provided critically needed
    fresh water to the New Zealand Territory of Tokelau. Tokelau was just a
    few days away from having no fresh water, whatsoever, when Coast Guard
    Cutter WALNUT arrived with 36,000 gallons of drinking water and a New
    Zealand needs assessment team. Similarly, a District 14 C-130 aircraft
    transported a Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit and
    Center for Disease Control personnel to the Republic of Marshall
    Islands (Marjuro) to combat an outbreak of Dengue Fever (608 confirmed
    cases). This rapid deployment of control specialists was instrumental
    in preventing the spread and increase in severity of the outbreak;
    consequently there was no loss of life.
        e. Coast Guard District 14 participated with USPACOM in Operation
    Pacific Partnership, the theater's premier humanitarian civic
    assistance program. The program builds and strengthens alliances and
    partnerships with participating host nations and integrated partners.
        f. Coast Guard Pacific Area Command Cutters and personnel
    participated in the Cooperation Afloat and Readiness Training exercise.
    This is a USPACOM-sponsored exercise consisting of a series of multi-
    national bi-lateral maritime training events between forces from the
    United States and participating Asian countries.
        g. Coast Guard Pacific Area Command Cutters and personnel
    participated in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise, a biennial field
    training exercise that includes ships, cutters, units and personnel
    from the United States (Navy and Coast Guard), Australia, Canada,
    Chile, Japan, Peru, the Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom. The
    exercise is designed to enhance interoperability of combined forces and
    improve war fighting capabilities.
        h. Coast Guard District 14 conducted operations with USPACOM as
    part of the Oceania Maritime Security Initiative. Coast Guard Liaison
    Officers rode onboard Navy ships that transited Oceania for the purpose
    of Maritime Domain Awareness involving commercial fishing vessels in
    United States Exclusive Economic Zones and in waters of partner nations
    in Oceania.
        i. Coast Guard District 14 exercised United States Shiprider
    Agreements (there are currently 8 such agreements) with various Pacific
    Island nations by conducting commercial fisheries law enforcement
    patrols that included foreign shipriders onboard Coast Guard Cutters.
    These patrols deterred illegal fishing and protected vital marine
    resources in United States Exclusive Economic Zones, as well as those
    of the Pacific Island nations; thus dove-tailing with Pacific Command's
    broader regional security goals. District 14 has expressed interest in
    establishing two more Shiprider Agreements with additional Pacific
    Island nations, resources permitting.
        j. At the request of USPACOM, Coast Guard Pacific Area Command
    provided support for and participated in various annual training
    exercises with the Republic of Korea.
        k. Coast Guard Pacific Area Command's Maritime Intelligence Fusion
    Center Pacific provided various intelligence products for the Pacific
    Commander:
        1) Maritime Domain Awareness to Navy/Military Sealift Command
    vessels and submarines;
        2) awareness regarding transnational crime, alien migration and
    living marine resources;
        3) daily targeting products regarding foreign flagged ships with
    Chinese, Russian and Ukrainian crews; and
        4) targeting products in support of Operation TOMADACHI, e.g., the
    tracking of vessels that may have been exposed to low level radiation
    when their transit was near Fukushima, Japan.
        l. The Coast Guard acted as a ``door opener'' for USPACOM to
    various foreign nations--notably including (but not limited to) Vietnam
    and India--vis a vis capacity building by conducting 14 Maritime
    Training Team visits and hosting 34 students in resident courses.
    Topics for the Maritime Training Teams included Law Enforcement, Search
    and Rescue, Port Security, Pollution Response and Leadership.
        m. The Coast Guard maintained a Maritime Advisor in Indonesia to
    assist its maritime service with training, capabilities and
    professionalization.
        n. In an effort to enhance the naval capabilities of a USPACOM
    strategic partner, the Coast Guard provided the Republic of the
    Philippines with a former High Endurance Cutter, along with requisite
    training, via the Excess Defense Article process. This Cutter will be
    used by the Philippines to project a greater maritime presence in its
    territorial waters.
        o. The Coast Guard Liaison Officer to USPACOM supported Pacific
    Command initiatives in a variety of instances, e.g., serving as the
    United States Co-Chairman of the Maritime Security Committee for the
    Republic of the Philippines-United States of America Military Defense
    Board/Security Engagement Board.
        p. The Coast Guard funds seven active duty billets at Joint
    Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W), at a cost of $1,074,184.00.
    JIATF-W is the USPACOM Commander's executive agent for counter
    narcotics. Other JIATF-W support includes:
        --The USCG District Fourteen Intelligence Branch Chief attended the
    JIATFW daily intelligence brief once a week and worked closely with
    JIATFW staff on illicit trafficking events, and provided liaison to
    other Coast Guard and law enforcement entities in the region.
        --During multiple smuggling events, the USCGC SEQUOIA and the
    Maritime Law Enforcement Team from Maritime Safety and Security Team
    Honolulu (91107) were on stand-by to conduct intercept and boarding
    operations against vessels suspected of smuggling.
        --The Coast Guard Cryptologic Unit Hawaii provided direct
    intelligence support for JIATFW's Illicit Tracking Cell and Collections
    Management Branch.
        --The USCG Maritime Intelligence Center Pacific (MIFCPAC) provided
    living marine resources expertise which enabled JIATFW to determine the
    legitimacy of maritime targets, and a myriad of documentation-related
    requests for information concerning suspect vessels.
        --Coast Guard Air Station Barber's Point C-130 maritime patrol
    aircraft provided airborne maritime domain awareness during scheduled
    patrols for District Fourteen, which enabled JIATFW analysts to
    determine an accurate picture of what vessels were actually on the
    water at any given time.
        --The Coast Guard Investigative Service worked closely with
    JIATFW's Special Programs Application program manager, and this
    collaboration resulted in the seizure of 900 kilograms of marijuana;
    the confiscation of one fishing vessel suspected of drug trafficking;
    nine illegal migrants taken into custody, including one with an
    outstanding warrant in another state, and identified maritime smuggling
    routes from Mexico to the United States.
        Mr. Scott. What is the role of military bands within PACOM and are
    they a cost-effective way of bringing people together and fostering
    greater understanding?
        Admiral Willard. The military bands within USPACOM are one of the
    most effective means of fostering relationships between allies,
    partners and even our adversaries. They use music to bridge language,
    cultural, societal and socio-economic differences. These bands provide
    a soft power projection tool for theater security cooperation efforts
    and helps build strong relationships with countries throughout the
    USPACOM AOR. Each band has objectives which include building
    partnerships, sustaining war fighter morale, encouraging and enabling
    coalition partners, providing precise ceremonial engagements,
    recruitment of talented service members and fostering military pride,
    patriotism and service.
        In portions of the Pacific, there are times when a military band is
    the exact right instrument of national power to employ, especially when
    other combat capabilities are in short supply and better employed
    elsewhere. The USPACOM military bands have bridged gaps in
    relationships that are decades old, such as the Marine Forces Pacific
    Band being the first U.S. band to visit Cambodia since the Vietnam War
    or the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) Band being the first
    U.S. band to travel to mainland communist China. During that trip, the
    band performed at the Shanghai International Music Festival where they
    were able to interact with the People's Liberation Army Band, as well
    as bands from Japan, Malaysia, Thailand and the Republic of Korea. The
    band was able to positively influence relations with the people of
    these nations through their participation in the festival as well as
    engaging with the local schools by providing one-on-one instruction and
    training students how to repair and maintain the longevity of their
    instruments.
        USPACOM military bands also perform multiple community relations
    roles through participating in humanitarian assistance and civic
    initiatives. The U.S. Pacific Fleet and Marine Forces Pacific Band both
    contribute to the annual Pacific Partnership deployment where they and
    other Services members work closely with host nations, partner nations,
    non-governmental organizations and other U.S. government agencies to
    leave a lasting impact through cooperative engagements in the region.
        In 2010 the Acting Consul General of Russia, Patricia Miller,
    stated, of the 25th Infantry Division Band's visit to Sakhalin Island
    region, ``their concerts in three days did more to showcase America
    than what the Consulate could have done in several months. The Russians
    were able to see a very human side of the U.S. Army.''
        Due to the unique capabilities of USPACOM bands and the ability to
    reach hundreds of thousands of people through the universal language
    and appeal of music, there is no other PACOM asset that can reach so
    many people in such a meaningful, peaceful and lasting way.
        Mr. Scott. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard in building
    partnerships within PACOM's AOR?
        Admiral Willard. a. The U.S. Coast Guard's (USCG) 27,000 personnel
    in the Pacific Area frequently support USPACOM, engaging in a wide
    range of activities that support USPACOM's Theater Campaign Plan. In
    addition to USCG International engagements such as the North Pacific
    Coast Guard Forum and International Ship & Port Facility Security Code
    assessments, the USCG supports USPACOM's exercises such as Rim of the
    Pacific (RIMPAC), a biennial Field training exercise that includes
    ships, cutters, units and personnel from the U.S., Australia, Canada,
    Chile, Japan, Peru, the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom. The
    USCG also supports Pacific Fleet's CARAT exercise in Thailand, the
    multi-lateral Southeast Asia exercise Cooperation Against Terrorism
    (SEACAT) and the proliferation security initiative exercise DEEP SABRE.
        b. As the Executive Agent for USPACOM to the Quadrilateral Defense
    Working Group, Coast Guard District 14 (based in Honolulu HI) worked
    closely with representatives from Australia, New Zealand and France to
    plan and conduct maritime operations across Oceania. These operations
    were primarily related to preventing illegal commercial fishing, but
    they also entailed the sharing of information at several levels.
        c. Coast Guard District 14 served as an adjunct component to
    USPACOM in a number of contingency situations. Of particular note, in
    conjunction with New Zealand, District 14 provided critically needed
    fresh water to the New Zealand Territory of Tokelau. Tokelau was just a
    few days away from having no fresh water whatsoever when Coast Guard
    Cutter WALNUT arrived with 36,000 gallons of drinking water and a New
    Zealand needs assessment team. Similarly, a District 14 C-130 aircraft
    transported a Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit and
    Center for Disease Control personnel to the Republic of Marshall
    Islands (Marjuro) to combat an outbreak of Dengue Fever (608 confirmed
    cases). This rapid deployment of control specialists was instrumental
    in preventing the spread and increase in severity of the outbreak;
    consequently there was no loss of life.
        d. In 2011, the USCG supported U.S. Pacific Fleet's premier
    Humanitarian Exercise, Pacific Partnership, for the first time with two
    cutters, supporting engagements in Tonga and Micronesia. Pacific
    Partnership consisted of 600 military, interagency and non-governmental
    organizational medical professionals and engineers engaging the
    countries of Tonga, Vanuatu, Papua-New Guinea, Timor-Leste and the
    Federated States of Micronesia. The USCG is currently programmed to
    support Pacific Partnership 13, next year, which is scheduled to visit
    the Oceania region of the USPACOM AOR.
        e. The USCG provided significant support to USPACOM by acting as a
    ``door opener'' to various foreign nations--notably (but not limited
    to) Vietnam and India--vis a vis capacity building by conducting 14
    Maritime Training Team visits and hosting 34 students in resident
    courses. Topics for Maritime Training Teams included Law Enforcement,
    Search and Rescue, Port Security, Pollution Response and Leadership. f.
    Coast Guard Pacific Area Command Cutters and personnel participated in
    the Cooperation Afloat and Readiness Training exercise. This is a
    USPACOM-sponsored exercise consisting of a series of multi-national bi-
    lateral maritime training events between forces from the United States
    and participating Asian countries.
        g. In an effort to enhance the naval capabilities of a USPACOM
    strategic partner, the Coast Guard provided the Republic of the
    Philippines with a former High Endurance Cutter, along with requisite
    training, via the Excess Defense Article process. This Cutter will be
    used by the Philippines to project a greater maritime presence in its
    territorial waters.
        h. Coast Guard District 14 exercised United States Shiprider
    Agreements (there are currently 8 such agreements) with various Pacific
    Island nations by conducting commercial fisheries law enforcement
    patrols that include foreign shipriders onboard Coast Guard Cutters.
    These patrols deterred illegal fishing and protected vital marine
    resources in United States Exclusive Economic Zones, as well as those
    of the Pacific Island nations, thus dovetailing with Pacific Command's
    broader regional security goals. District 14 has expressed interest in
    establishing two more Shiprider Agreements with additional Pacific
    Island nations, resources permitting.
        i. The USCG International Training Detachment provides Mobile
    Training Teams (MTTs) on various maritime safety and security topics to
    countries throughout the Pacific. Last year countries included
    Bangladesh, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Malaysia, Marshall Islands
    and Western Samoa.
        Mr. Scott. How would you rate the performance of E-8C JSTARS
    aircraft within PACOM?
        Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mr. Scott. The hospital ships Comfort and Mercy are high-demand,
    low-density platforms. If the United States had a larger fleet of
    hospital ships, would there be enough work for them to perform within
    PACOM's AOR?
        Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mr. Scott. How would you assess the current state of Taiwan's
    submarine fleet?
        Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mr. Scott. Which aircraft is better suited in combat against
    China's J-20: an upgraded F-16 A/B or the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter?
        Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mr. Scott. Besides the Republic of China, are U.S. Flag and General
    Officers banned from visiting any other country within PACOM's AOR?
        Admiral Willard. State Department and OSD have strict policies that
    restrict U.S. Flag and General Officers from visiting Burma. Officers
    of the rank of O-6 and above require permission from the highest levels
    of OSD and STATE. The U.S. DOD policy on military engagement with Burma
    has not changed. The below excerpt is from OSD-P:
        --DOD policy is not to engage with Burma's military. This policy
    includes, but is not limited to, a prohibition on any form of security
    assistance or cooperation, such as Foreign Military Financing or
    International Military Education and Training, arms transfers, foreign
    counterpart visits and bilateral meetings--State has the lead on
    diplomatic engagement with Burma and the Department of Defense is
    prepared to provide any necessary support.
        Mr. Scott. Does the present ban on U.S. flag and general officers
    from visiting the Republic of Taiwan violate the Taiwan Relations Act?
        Admiral Willard. No, the present restrictions on visits by U.S.
    flag and general officers to Taiwan do not violate the Taiwan Relations
    Act. The Act does not expressly mandate such restrictions, nor does it
    expressly prohibit such restrictions.
        Mr. Scott. What would be the deterrence value if Taiwan were to
    acquire 10 diesel-powered submarines?
        Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mr. Scott. If Taiwan had 20,000 sensor fuzed munitions, would it
    greatly increase Taiwan's ability to deter a Chinese invasion force?
        Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mr. Scott. Would MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime)
    compatible (300km range) missiles offer Taiwan any numerous asymmetric
    advantages?
        Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mr. Scott. Will Taiwan require 5th generation fighters in the 2020s
    given the current security situation?
        Admiral Willard. I believe Taiwan will require an inject of
    additional fighter aircraft in the future to address the decline of its
    overall fighter inventory and to ensure it can carry out its basic
    defense functions. Any such capability would still need to be part of a
    truly integrated air and missile defense system that is mobile and
    redundant to include an air force protection plan that promotes airbase
    hardening.