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                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

           SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES HEARING

                                       ON

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FISCAL YEAR 2013 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD
                               FEBRUARY 29, 2012

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               SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                        MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
    JEFF MILLER, Florida                 JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
    JOHN KLINE, Minnesota                LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
    BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania           ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
    K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas            SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
    CHRIS GIBSON, New York               TIM RYAN, Ohio
    BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois            C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
    ALLEN B. WEST, Florida               HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
    TRENT FRANKS, Arizona                KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
    DUNCAN HUNTER, California
                    Peter Villano, Professional Staff Member
                   Timothy McClees, Professional Staff Member
                          James Mazol, Staff Assistant
                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                         CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
                                      2012

                                                                       Page

    Hearing:

    Wednesday, February 29, 2012, Department of Defense Fiscal Year
      2013 Science and Technology Programs...........................     1

    Appendix:

    Wednesday, February 29, 2012.....................................    37
                                  ----------

                          WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 2012
     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FISCAL YEAR 2013 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS
                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
      Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
      Capabilities...................................................     9
    Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities..............     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Freeman, Marilyn, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
      for Research and Technology....................................     3
    Gabriel, Kaigham (Ken) J., Ph.D., Deputy Director, Defense
      Advanced Research Projects Agency, U.S. Department of Defense..     8
    Klunder, Rear Admiral Matthew L., USN, Chief of Naval Research,
      U.S. Navy......................................................     4
    Lemnios, Hon. Zachary J., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
      Research and Engineering, Office of the Under Secretary of
      Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.............     2
    Walker, Steven H., Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air
      Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering, Office of the
      Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition...........     6

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Freeman, Marilyn.............................................    58
        Gabriel, Kaigham (Ken) J.....................................   115
        Klunder, Rear Admiral Matthew L..............................    75
        Langevin, Hon. James R.......................................    41
        Lemnios, Hon. Zachary J......................................    44
        Walker, Steven H.............................................    96

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Langevin.................................................   129
        Mr. Miller...................................................   129
        Mr. Ruppersberger............................................   136
        Mr. Schilling................................................   138
        Mr. Shuster..................................................   134
     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FISCAL YEAR 2013 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
             Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
                          Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 29, 2012.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:00 p.m., in
    room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
         TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND
                              CAPABILITIES

        Mr. Thornberry. The hearing will come to order.
        Mr. Langevin is on his way, and so we will look forward to
    seeing him shortly. But in the meantime, we are supposed to
    have votes at 4:45 or 5:00, and you all could not possibly wait
    through all those votes, so we want to try to get to all our
    questions before that. So we are going to go ahead and get
    started.
        Let me thank everybody for being here. When most of us
    gathered this time last year, we talked about the dangers of
    cutting S&T [Science and Technology] in tight budgetary times,
    and we are having tight budgetary times. According to our
    calculations, these accounts were cut about 2.5 percent. It is
    tempting to say it could have been worse, and obviously it
    could have been. And yet, part of our concern is not just the
    total dollar figure but how we are all spending the taxpayers'
    money. And so there are many topics for us to get to today, and
    we will do so through the course of our questions.
        But let me go ahead and turn to our witnesses. And we
    appreciate each of you being here.
        We have the Honorable Zachary Lemnios, Assistant Secretary
    of Defense for Research and Engineering; Dr. Marilyn Freeman,
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and
    Technology; Rear Admiral Matthew Klunder, Chief of Naval
    Research; Dr. Steven Walker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
    Air Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering; and Dr. Ken
    Gabriel, Deputy Director of DARPA [Defense Advanced Research
    and Projects Agency].
        Each of you have submitted written statements. Thank you
    for those. Without objection, they will be made part of the
    record. And if we could ask each of you to summarize your
    statement in about 5 minutes or so, then we will move from
    there to questions.
        So, Mr. Secretary, I will turn it over to you to start.

     STATEMENT OF HON. ZACHARY J. LEMNIOS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
       DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, OFFICE OF THE UNDER
    SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

        Secretary Lemnios. Good afternoon, Chairman Thornberry and
    members of the committee. I just have a few short statements
    that summarize my written testimony, which will be in the
    record.
        The President's $11.9 billion request for DOD [Department
    of Defense] science and technology supports the President's
    defense strategy and reflects his commitment to ensure a strong
    S&T enterprise to develop the advanced capabilities upon which
    our men and women in uniform have come to reply upon. This
    request provides the necessary resources to maintain the
    decisive technological edge for today's challenges and the
    foundation to stay ahead of the most lethal and disruptive
    threats of the future.
        The ability of the joint forces to project power and
    succeed in future operations is increasingly challenged by new
    capabilities, made possible by advances in technology, and by
    new tactics that employ commercial technologies in new and
    innovative ways. The clear technical advantage upon which our
    forces have come to rely, and which we currently enjoy, can
    only be guaranteed with a dedicated and sustained effort.
        The globalization of technology, which we have discussed
    previously, has enabled the rise of global research and
    development investments and has collapsed the pace of
    innovation for both the U.S. and our adversaries. This has
    opened up new opportunities for technological surprise. It is
    both a challenge and it is an opportunity for exploitation.
        The President's budget request provides the right mix of
    programs and investments in basic, applied, and advanced
    research to guarantee our leadership position. It includes a
    number of enterprise initiatives across the Department that
    ensure these valuable resources are invested wisely, with
    focus, and with the goal of accelerating the transition of
    concepts into capabilities for our forces.
        Importantly, our success is made possible by the important
    work of our dedicated scientists and engineers, both in the
    Department of Defense and in the larger S&T enterprise that we
    discussed this last year. That enterprise is comprised of
    academia, industry, our Federal laboratories, our federally
    funded research and development centers, and our university-
    affiliated research centers. This is the most impressive
    collection of technical talent to be found anywhere in the
    world, and our budget request provides the necessary resources
    to keep this enterprise healthy and strong.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to present
    these brief remarks. The congressional support for the
    President's budget for the research and engineering enterprise
    will have the resources I need to ensure a strong technical
    base to enhance our Nation's security. And I look forward to
    your questions. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Lemnios can be found
    in the Appendix on page 44.]
        Mr. Thornberry. Dr. Freeman.

    STATEMENT OF MARILYN FREEMAN, PH.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
                OF THE ARMY FOR RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

        Dr. Freeman. Good afternoon. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry
    and the distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate
    the opportunity to discuss the fiscal year 2013 Army S&T
    program and the significant role of S&T in supporting our
    warfighters.
        I want to thank the members of this committee for your
    important role in supporting our soldiers who are at war and
    for your advocacy of the Army's S&T investments that will
    sustain our technological preeminence to our future soldiers.
    Your continued support is vital for our success.
        My vision for Army S&T is to invent, innovate, and
    demonstrate technology-enabled capabilities that empower,
    unburden, and protect our soldiers. I hear often, as I am sure
    you do, from soldiers themselves that technology saved their
    lives and was critical to their remarkable accomplishments.
        When I became DAS [Deputy Assistant Secretary] of R&T
    [Research and Technology] a year and a half ago, I embarked on
    a path to change the perception that Army S&T was irrelevant.
    This path is leading to a significant change in the S&T
    culture, and it is still a work in progress. We now actively
    engage with senior Army leadership, the Army staff, senior
    executives of the laboratories and centers, and all parts of
    TRADOC [U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command] to establish
    real priorities for Army S&T prior to the beginning of the
    formal Army POM [Program Objective Memorandum] cycle.
        In 2011, for the first time, we collaboratively developed a
    set of 24 challenges on which to focus our near-term research
    efforts. We formulated a number of new programs to begin in FY
    [Fiscal Year] 2013 that address these challenges and by the end
    of FY 2017 to demonstrate new technology-enabled capabilities.
        In the coming year, I intend to develop a set of programs
    to better define and prioritize the rest of the S&T portfolio.
    For the remainder of the 6.2 and the 6.3 funding, we will
    formulate programs to meet the midterm needs of the program
    executive offices and program managers. We will also create
    programs to develop and demonstrate technologies that have a
    high potential to bridge gaps or achieve leap-ahead
    technologies and capabilities.
        Additionally, we will establish a set of priorities for our
    basic research efforts--problems and challenges against which
    better programs can be formulated and executed. Of course, we
    will do all of this in concert with the guidance provided by
    the Defense Strategy for the 21st Century and the OSD [Office
    of the Secretary of Defense] S&T priorities.
        In 2013, the Army is placing increased emphasis on
    investment in ground and aviation vehicle survivability,
    research in focal plane arrays, and alternative fuels for
    ground vehicles. We will accept some greater risk through
    reducing funding in lethality, unmanned autonomous ground
    vehicles, and military engineering.
        As we adjust to an era of decreasing or flat budgets, Army
    S&T must be capable of doing more with less and correctly
    managing the risk associated with shrinking budgets by
    identifying and focusing on the highest priorities for the
    future. I believe that the S&T management strategy allows us to
    do just that.
        And as I mentioned last year, I continue to have major
    concerns with the long-term health of our laboratory--both
    infrastructure and workforce. And as Dr. Lemnios has said, it
    is important that we keep the cadre of scientists and engineers
    in our laboratory systems to solve our problems. It is
    absolutely essential that we work on this problem together, and
    I hope to do so with you.
        While we have some basic improvements to our infrastructure
    through the BRAC [Base Closure and Realignment] processes, we
    do not have a long-term good policy or answer to how we work on
    our infrastructure. And we really, really need to have more
    discussions about that.
        In closing, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
    the opportunity to testify here and for your support of the
    Army's science and technology investments. I am proud to
    represent the efforts of over 12,000 Army scientists,
    engineers, technicians, and research professionals dedicated to
    our soldiers with world-class technology-enabled capabilities.
        I will be pleased to answer your questions and those of
    this subcommittee.
        Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Freeman can be found in the
    Appendix on page 58.]
        Mr. Thornberry. Admiral.

       STATEMENT OF RADM MATTHEW L. KLUNDER, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
                          RESEARCH, U.S. NAVY

        Admiral Klunder. Good afternoon, Chairman Thornberry,
    Ranking Member Langevin, and the members of the committee. It
    is certainly an honor to be here before you today to report on
    science and technology efforts within the Department of the
    Navy and assess how the President's FY 2013 budget request
    supports the Navy and the Marine Corps.
        I am accompanied today by Brigadier General Mark Wise, the
    commander of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab in Quantico,
    Virginia. He is a great partner in our effort to lead the Navy
    and Marine Corps science and technology community.
        Our objective is to support a Navy and Marine Corps capable
    of prevailing in any environment, with the understanding that
    anti-access and area-denial threats will continue to increase
    in the future. We work directly with the Secretary of the Navy,
    the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant to achieve
    this goal.
        We do that by, one, focusing on S&T areas with big leap-
    ahead payoffs, but also, two, encouraging innovative thinking
    and business processes to make our existing systems more
    effective. And finally, three, we are constantly striving to
    improve transition of S&T into acquisition programs to enable
    the most cost-effective weapons systems possible. In the spirit
    of this striving for affordability, we are also working to
    strike the right balance between responsive near-term
    technology insertions and also long-term basic research.
        While the starting point is continued evolution of current
    systems, we progress toward incremental improvements in spiral
    development of known technologies to new development of
    undiscovered, disruptive technologies. Our portfolio across all
    the Navy and Marine Corps balances a range of complementary but
    also competing imperatives, in that we support advances and
    initiatives in existing established operational areas while
    still also looking at a far-reaching complement of long-term
    research efforts that may prove disruptive to traditional
    operational concepts.
        Our ability to support the warfighter also depends on our
    ability to sustain a science and technology, engineering, and
    mathematics workforce in our Active and Reserve ranks and our
    research laboratories. We believe the key to achieving this
    goal lies in supporting STEM [science, technology, engineering,
    and mathematics] education in a continuum of experiences from
    kindergarten all the way through postdoctoral opportunities.
        Now, I believe many of you all and certainly your staffs
    are familiar with many of our technology programs. If I can, I
    would just like to highlight two: the Electromagnetic Rail Gun
    and the Free Electron Laser [FEL].
        Our discussions with your staff during the FY 2012
    authorization process led to refinements in that rail gun
    program and planning, about which SECNAV [Secretary of the
    Navy] and I will come to you later next month to report as per
    the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act.
        Similarly, the discussions within the Navy and with your
    staff also led to refinements in the FEL program which we
    intend to implement this year. In that implementation where we
    are focusing on components of FEL, we are also looking to
    mature our Solid State Laser Technology with our sister
    services.
        We have made significant contributions to the fleet and the
    force's ability to share information across combat systems;
    command and control systems; and intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance systems. In the world of cyber warfare and
    information dominance, we do believe it is critical that we are
    able to integrate systems into a common information environment
    that is modular, based on open standards, automated, and allow
    for a reduction in manpower requirements and acquisition costs.
        All of these issues are outlined in some detail in my
    written testimony, along with more detailed surveys that are
    enclosed in our ONR [Office of Naval Research] contributions,
    such as areas of irregular warfare, unmanned systems, and also
    medical care for our wounded warriors.
        I would certainly be remiss if I did not mention the
    stellar contribution that is made by our entire workforce at
    all the Navy labs and warfare centers, with special recognition
    for the Naval Research Laboratory [NRL] right nearby in
    Anacostia. Many of your staff have visited, but I certainly
    invite all of you to take advantage of an opportunity to see
    this nearby facility firsthand. The work is absolutely
    impressive. The people are impressive. One of our greatest
    challenges, certainly, as Marilyn alluded to, is to
    recapitalize on our facilities--in this case, the NRL
    facilities--and to ensure continuation of their cutting-edge
    work.
        I thank you again for your tremendous support, and I look
    forward to answering your questions. I do believe that the
    state of our Navy and Marine Corps S&T investments are sound.
    They represent good stewardship of the taxpayers' dollars. And
    we believe they enhance significantly the safety and
    performance of our warfighters today and well into the future.
        And thank you, sir. I will be ready for any questions.
        Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Klunder can be found in
    the Appendix on page 75.]
        Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Walker.

        STATEMENT OF STEVEN H. WALKER, PH.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT
        SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND
    ENGINEERING, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
                            FOR ACQUISITION

        Dr. Walker. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee
    and staff, I am pleased to have the opportunity to provide
    testimony on the fiscal year 2013 Air Force science and
    technology program.
        To protect our Nation amidst a myriad of current and future
    security challenges, the Air Force must be an agile, flexible,
    ready, and technologically advanced part of the joint team. The
    Air Force S&T program plays a vital role by creating compelling
    air, space, and cyberspace capabilities for precise and
    reliable global vigilance, reach, and power.
        The Air Force 2013 President's budget request for S&T is
    approximately $2.2 billion, which includes nearly $200 million
    in support of devolved programs consisting of High Energy Laser
    efforts and the University Research Initiative.
        This year's budget request represents a decrease of $64
    million or about a 2.8 percent reduction from fiscal year 2012.
    This reflects a more modest reduction than taken across the
    total Air Force budget and indicates the strong support for
    science and technology from our leadership.
        The Air Force S&T fiscal year 2013 President's budget
    request supports the following overarching priorities, as
    detailed in our S&T strategy.
        Priority one is to support the current fight while
    advancing breakthrough S&T for tomorrow's dominant warfighting
    capabilities.
        While developing technologies to equip our forces of
    tomorrow is the primary objective of S&T, our dedicated
    scientists and engineers are equally motivated to contribute to
    the current fight by getting their technologies into the hands
    of the warfighter.
        For example, Air Force S&T has played a significant role in
    developing and delivering combat capability to our warfighters
    in the CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] AOR [area of
    responsibility] through the deployment of a concept or a system
    called Blue Devil. This persistent intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance capability demonstrated the first-ever
    integration of wide-area field-of-view and narrow field-of-
    view, high-definition, day and night sensors cued by advanced
    signals intelligence. Warfighter feedback on the situational
    awareness provided by Blue Devil Block 1 has been
    overwhelmingly positive.
        Priority two is to execute a balanced, integrated S&T
    program that is responsive to the Air Force core functions.
        In light of the defense strategic guidance released last
    month, we ensured our current strategies and plans were
    appropriately aligned with new and enduring emphasis areas. Our
    S&T program supports the Air Force capabilities fundamental to
    the major priorities of the guidance, such as deterring and
    defeating aggression; projecting power in anti-access and area-
    denial environments; operating in the space and cyberspace
    domains; and maintaining a safe, secure, and effective
    strategic deterrent.
        We have also engaged the small-business community in this
    endeavor through the Rapid Innovation Fund, which is focused on
    key technology areas such as supporting current contingency
    operations, cyberspace security, mission assurance, improved
    systems sustainment, and power generation and energy for our
    platforms.
        Priority three is to retain and shape the critical
    competencies needed to address the full range of S&T product
    and support capabilities.
        We are continuing to support Air Force science, technology,
    engineering, and mathematics [STEM] initiatives to develop and
    optimally manage the S&T workforce of the future through our
    Bright Horizons strategic document. Our newly established Air
    Force-level STEM outreach office ensures effective coordination
    with other service and agency STEM programs and gives us a
    better understanding of the effectiveness and impact of our
    STEM investments.
        Finally, priority four is to ensure the Air Force S&T
    program addresses the highest priority capability needs of the
    Air Force.
        Our process for creating and executing Air Force flagship
    capability concepts over the last 2 years is maturing well. We
    have continued the High Velocity Penetrating Weapon concept to
    demonstrate critical technologies to reduce the technical risk
    for a new generation of penetrating weapons to defeat
    difficult, hard targets. And we have continued the Selective
    Cyber Ops Technology Integration Program, which is executing
    smoothly toward providing cyber technologies capable of
    affecting multiple nodes for the purposes of achieving a
    military objective.
        While the Air Force decommissioned our Responsive Space
    Access FCC [Flagship Capability Concept] during our annual
    review this year, we commissioned a new FCC for Precision
    Airdrop to develop technologies to improve airdrop accuracy and
    effectiveness while minimizing risk to our aircrews.
        In conclusion, this budget request reflects our refocused
    S&T portfolio given budgetary challenges and the new defense
    strategic guidance. I believe this request also reflects the
    promise of future warfighting capability enabled by the
    technologies that will be developed with this investment.
        Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for the opportunity to
    testify today and thank you for your continued support of the
    Air Force S&T program.
        Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Walker can be found in the
    Appendix on page 96.]
        Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Gabriel.

    STATEMENT OF KAIGHAM (KEN) J. GABRIEL, PH.D., DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
     DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
                                DEFENSE

        Dr. Gabriel. At DARPA, we are often asked to predict the
    future. After all, since it was created in 1958, DARPA's
    singular mission has been to prevent and create strategic
    surprise. It may appear that the best way to fulfill that
    mission is to predict what is next. But at DARPA we believe it
    is not about predicting the future, it is about building it.
        Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, members of
    the subcommittee, my name is Ken Gabriel. I am the Deputy
    Director of DARPA.
        I could discuss some of the Agency's accomplishments over
    the last year, including the second flight of HTV-2 [Hypersonic
    Test Vehicle-2] or Blast Gauge, a wristwatch-sized device to
    measure overpressure and TBI [traumatic brain injury]. But
    instead what I would like to talk to you about today is what
    keeps us up at night.
        In anti-access and area-denial, the global electronics
    industry unintentionally and without malice has created
    vulnerabilities. Computing, imaging, and communication
    capabilities that as recently as 15 years ago were the
    exclusive domain of military systems are now in the hands of
    hundreds of millions of people around the world.
        We don't argue against the benefits such capabilities have
    brought. Indeed, many of the commercial advances have roots in
    DARPA programs from decades past. But these vulnerabilities are
    not an abstract threat. Electronic warfare was once the
    province of a few peer adversaries. Today it is possible to
    purchase commercial-off-the-shelf components for more than 90
    percent of the electronics in an EW [electronic warfare]
    system. Nearly a dozen countries are now producing EW systems
    at ever-increasing pace, from a new system every 10 years
    decades ago to one every 1\1/2\ years today.
        These insights led us to new investments that leverage COTS
    [commercial-off-the-shelf] technology where we can and develop
    technologies where COTS can't or won't go. One example of
    leveraging COTS is the Intrachip Enhanced Cooling Program.
    Cooling a COTS chip allows us to, for example, run the chip 10
    times faster than it was designed to run, creating
    differentiating capabilities for ourselves. DARPA's Adaptive RF
    [Radio Frequency] Technologies Program seeks to extend the
    range of military radar and radios by developing high-power
    transmit and receive modules--something the commercial industry
    has no use for and where COTS won't go.
        In cybersecurity, there has been much focus on increasing
    our defensive capabilities, but we require capabilities in both
    defense and offense across the full spectrum of conflict. DOD
    tasks and purposes are sufficiently different that we cannot
    simply scale intelligence cyber capabilities and adequately
    serve the needs of the DOD. Modern warfare demands the
    effective use of cyber and kinetic means. That requires DOD
    cyber capabilities matched to our kinetic options.
        We launched several programs designed to create cyber
    capabilities with the diversity, dynamic range, and tempo of
    DOD operations. Cyber Fast Track is just one such program. It
    taps a pool of nontraditional experts and innovators, many of
    them members of the ``white hat'' hacker community. To some,
    ``hacker'' evokes concern, but ``hacker'' is a positive term
    that describes a person of exceptional capability and
    creativity, someone who sees a novel use for an existing
    capability or technology.
        In the last 7 months, more than 100 proposals were received
    and 32 awards were made, 84 percent of them small companies and
    performers who have never done business with the government
    before. Cyber Fast Track is expanding the number and diversity
    of talent contributing to the Nation's cybersecurity.
        Some of these observations today feel uncomfortable, even
    to us. Our responsibility, however, is to the uncomfortable.
    They are the seeds of what allow us to fulfill our mission to
    prevent and create strategic surprise.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Gabriel can be found in the
    Appendix on page 115.]
        Mr. Thornberry. And I really appreciate everybody being
    brief. This is always a challenging hearing for me because
    there are so many interesting things to talk about, it is hard
    to talk about it within the time limits that we have. But you
    all did a good job, and I appreciate it.
        I am going to yield first to Mr. Langevin for any opening
    statement he would like to make and then go right ahead with
    any questions you may have.
        Mr. Langevin.

      STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
    RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS
                            AND CAPABILITIES

        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thanks to all of our witnesses for appearing today.
        Like all of us on this committee, I believe that much of
    our Nation's military and economic strength lies in our ability
    to lead the world in innovation and that the defense science
    and technology enterprise continues to be a major contributor
    to that leadership. I am pleased the President's recently
    released defense strategic review recognizes this. And in light
    of necessary fiscal tightening, his fiscal year 2013 budget
    request largely protects defense science and technology
    investments.
        Portions of those funds are targeted for STEM education
    activities--a key investment in maintaining strong intellectual
    capital and technological advantage in this country. I believe
    all of you in your written testimony noted, to some extent,
    your overall interest and concern toward fostering and
    maintaining a world-class scientific workforce.
        I share that interest and strongly believe that the
    Department of Defense plays an important role in the entire
    STEM education pipeline--a pipeline of professionals that not
    only develops new and improved warfighting capabilities but
    also prepares competent operators and maintainers of these
    game-changing technologies. I look forward to hearing more from
    our witnesses today on each of your efforts in this area.
        I particularly want to applaud you, Admiral, for the Navy's
    commitment to double Naval STEM investment by FY 2015. I also
    would like to highlight ONR's recent recognition as a leader
    among industry and government in promoting workforce diversity
    and developing strong partnerships with minority-serving
    institutions to advance STEM academic excellence throughout all
    sectors of our future workforce.
        Much of the Department's basic research investment goes
    directly to universities to advance our understanding across a
    wide array of disciplines, building upon the critical
    investments at the K-12 level and producing benefits not only
    to our national security but also to the leadership of the
    United States in academic research and development. I firmly
    believe that outreach to and engagement with our youth are the
    best investments we can make to ensure a technological edge in
    the future.
        Dr. Freeman, I appreciate the concerns raised in your
    written testimony about our defense R&D [research and
    development] facilities. These facilities provide needed
    capabilities for DOD with their uniquely skilled personnel and
    for our overall R&D efforts.
        Labs are also key to attracting the best and the brightest
    to solve difficult problems. But, conversely, if not properly
    resourced, inadequate facilities and equipment can make it
    harder to attract and retain the personnel that we need, let
    alone stay ahead of our technological competitors.
        During similar budget posture hearings, some of your
    Department colleagues responsible for big weapons procurement
    may talk about one system that, alone, could cost over $100
    million. One hundred million dollars in the S&T world could
    mean dozens of early-stage programs or demonstration programs.
        I recognize that you can't go through your entire S&T
    portfolio in one hearing, but I would appreciate a brief
    comment on areas supporting directed energy and the development
    and tests of technologies supporting prompt global strike
    objectives. And for those of who you would care to elaborate on
    cyber, I would appreciate that, as well.
        Additionally, I believe this committee and, frankly, all of
    Congress would benefit from your oral statement on the
    implementation and early successes, if any, of the Rapid
    Innovation Program.
        And lastly, but with special importance to myself and the
    chairman, I would like to take some time today to explore the
    critical and uniquely dynamic area of cybersecurity research
    and development. As we all know, the Nation faces serious
    cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities that cut across
    ``.mil,'' ``.com,'' and ``.gov'' alike. I look forward to
    hearing more about the Department's research investments and
    strategy to develop the tools and capabilities that we need to
    operate effectively and securely in the cyber domain, both now
    and in the future.
        With that, I would like to thank all of you once again for
    appearing before us today, and I look forward to our questions.
    Thank you very much.
        And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the
    Appendix on page 41.]
        Mr. Thornberry. Do you want to go ahead and do your
    questions?
        Mr. Langevin. Sure. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Dr. Gabriel, if I could start with you. With the rapidly
    changing needs of today's warfighter, how does DARPA choose
    what to invest in and what to build? In other words, how do you
    come to the decision that a subject area is ``DARPA hard''?
        Dr. Gabriel. Well, sir, as you might imagine, the challenge
    at DARPA is not coming up with ideas, it is choosing from among
    them, as you point out.
        We do deep analytical analysis of thrust areas that we see
    as important capabilities for the Department and national
    security. Those analytics define and point out areas where we
    see divergences and where we see opportunities. We have done
    them in a number of areas, including cyber, which many of you
    have seen, the Cyber Analytical Framework.
        And from those frameworks, we take the ideas and
    essentially ask three key questions: Is this area game-changing
    and will it have lasting impact? The second criteria we assess
    it against is, is this an area that requires DARPA expertise
    and capabilities? Not every idea worth doing is something that
    DARPA should do. The third question that we ask when we assess
    choosing between programs is, how does it balance the rest of
    our investments? Because we have limited resources in bandwidth
    and we must choose our investments wisely so that we can meet
    the mission of the Agency to prevent and create strategic
    surprise.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Dr. Gabriel.
        Let me turn to cyber and Secretary Lemnios.
        I am pleased to see the emphasis on cybersecurity in each
    of your testimony here today. And I am also pleased that since
    last year's hearing on these matters the Department of Defense
    has identified cyber as one of the Department's seven key S&T
    areas.
        Secretary Lemnios, how are you ensuring that the various
    defense cyber R&D efforts are both responsive to the DOD's
    strategy for operating in cyberspace and well-coordinated
    across agencies and individual laboratories?
        Secretary Lemnios. Representative Langevin, we are--as you
    know, cyber is one of our Department's seven S&T priorities. We
    began the rebalance of the S&T enterprise for the Department
    about 18 months ago in identifying those priorities. And in
    doing so, we had long conversations with the operators--with
    the uniformed members of the services and the operators that
    would actually use those capabilities. We built a set of
    architectures, and we are actually now working the capability
    sets to develop that tech base.
        With regard to cyber, I imagine you see all sorts of folks
    in this room that can give you opinions on how to assess the
    quality of cyber concepts. We have had the discussion both in
    the private sector and certainly in government circles.
        The focus of our effort this past year has been to build a
    measurement framework so that we can start assessing with data
    how fragile our networks are, where there are vulnerabilities,
    and how do we take S&T concepts, science and technology
    concepts, and transition those.
        DARPA has been a key part of that, in developing cyber
    range concepts several years ago. We started to transition
    those well into the services and into other agencies. And
    across the Department, I have brought together--we have brought
    together the science and technology community to start working
    those issues in collaboration. So we, in fact, have efforts
    that are cross-correlated across the enterprise.
        I think the focus here is the pace of innovation in cyber
    and how we transition those concepts. And as I have spoken with
    many of you before on this, that has been some of your
    concerns. How do we transition ideas from a research bench into
    an operational bench? And we are actually very focused on that.
        Mr. Langevin. Very good.
        Obviously, one of the priorities that I have, too, is
    making sure that we are continuing to develop the cyber
    workforce and that we make sure that we have good situational
    awareness about who has those capabilities within the various
    services. And something I encourage you to consider is pressing
    the various services to survey in those areas.
        You know, some of the brightest minds, in many ways, with
    cyber, they may not be the admirals and the colonels and the
    captains. It is going to be the newest recruits, you know, who
    grew up with this technology and can take to this stuff like
    fish to water. We ought to have a robust understanding of what
    those capabilities are and how we can plug them into the right
    fields.
        Let me just turn before my time expires. Dr. Gabriel, you
    noted, I believe correctly, that we simply cannot scale
    intelligence community cyber capabilities to the needs of
    ``.mil.'' Additionally, in the past, Dr. Dugan has stressed the
    need to address the divergence of the threats we face and the
    defenses that we use against them. Where do you view DARPA's
    niche with regards to addressing tomorrow's cyber challenges?
        And for the panel, if you could comment, what do we need to
    change to ensure that we are better able to identify and
    mitigate risks in the cyber domain?
        Dr. Gabriel. So, sir, one of the ways in which we have been
    looking at how we can uniquely contribute in this area is
    recognizing that cybersecurity is not just about bits and
    networks; it is about the security of physical systems and
    embedded systems.
        And an activity that we are undertaking, which we would be
    happy to come and talk to you in a more classified environment
    about, is how we, from our unique perch, are able to bring
    together folks from across the spectrum for that kind of threat
    and look at systems not only from the perspective of computer
    science and cybersecurity folks but EW people, embedded
    systems, and computer architecture, and knock down the walls
    between those stovepipes so that we can get an integrated look
    at what are the opportunities and the threats involved in that
    and, from that insight of the integrated look, get new
    capabilities and new solutions that were not possible to get
    from any one domain itself.
        So that, along with some of the things we have talked about
    in the past about how we become convergent with the threat of
    cyber by programs like PROCEED [Programming Computation on
    Encrypted Data] and CRASH [Clean-Slate Design of Resilient,
    Adaptive, Secure Hosts], which we have described before, which
    seek to attack the asymmetry of the cybersecurity challenge.
        Mr. Thornberry. Let me get back around, if I could, so
    other Members can have a chance to ask. And then we will come
    back to this cyber, because I think Mr. Langevin asked a very
    good question of everybody, and I want to get back because I
    think everybody has a contribution to make here.
        Let me just, from an overall standpoint, ask each of you to
    comment on your budget in the following ways: Number one, what
    have you done differently as a result of the new strategy, if
    at all?
        Number two, what are you doing less of? And, Dr. Freeman,
    you mentioned some of this in your opening statement. The Air
    Force written statement gives, you know, pretty blunt, ``We
    have to do less of this thing.'' And that is what we need to
    know, too.
        So if we could just go down the line very briefly in my 5
    minutes, how does the strategy affect what you are doing, and
    what you are doing less of that would increase risk?
        Secretary Lemnios.
        Secretary Lemnios. So, again, we started this process
    almost a year ago, 18 months ago, in looking at what the S&T
    priorities--how those line up.
        In fact, I had an opportunity last fall to take about 3
    months and go through the entire scope of the Department's
    projects--270 program elements, 30,000 briefing charts. I
    visited all of our laboratories and all of the programs that we
    could, sort of, go through. The result of that was to give me
    confidence that not only the dollar request but the content of
    that request was properly aligned. So I was looking for those
    places that would align--those concepts, the technical concepts
    that would align to the Department's strategy that came out
    about a month ago.
        And, as a result, in the President's budget request we
    realigned projects. We added a big push in hypersonics. We put
    a big push in the Air Force in an advanced engine. We put
    additional funding in the Army for advanced imagers. Funding at
    DARPA was added in advanced manufacturing, about $300 million.
    We added funding in a variety of areas--electronic warfare,
    cyber autonomy. So we actually shaped this budget based upon a
    close look at the projects we had in concert with the
    Department's strategy.
        At the OSD level, at the Department level, within my direct
    office, I actually reduced our staffing, and I pushed many of
    the projects that we were executing within OSD out to the
    services to execute. I think it is a far more effective way to
    run those. It is a tighter coupling to the services, and it
    results in far better transitions.
        Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Thank you. And I realize this is hard
    to get in the limited time we have, but I appreciate the
    specifics. That helps.
        Dr. Freeman.
        Dr. Freeman. So your first question is what have we done
    differently in light of the 21st-century strategy that came
    out, and, basically, right now we have not done a lot. It has
    not made us change a lot in our focus, because over this last
    year our focus had already shifted to the soldier and the small
    combat unit and what they need and the capabilities they need,
    which are really wherever they go, to do all the missions that
    need to be done. So we did not take a look at really changing
    anything in this budget to do that.
        We did, however, intend to be--as I described, our process
    intends that we can actually take a look now over this next
    year to anything we need to do in the 6.2 and the 6.3 budget
    that would need to be shifted, as we look. And we did take a
    little extra risk, as I said, in unmanned vehicles, the
    command-and-control of them, focusing the additional effort in
    autonomy to understanding the issues that soldiers have with
    respect to trust of autonomous vehicles, trust of ground
    vehicles and being able to use them as team members. And we
    also took a little bit in the UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle]
    airborne radar world, because we just didn't have enough money
    to focus on more than one radar at the time. I think those are
    the two major efforts.
        Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. That is exactly what I am
    looking for.
        Admiral.
        Admiral Klunder. Yes, Mr. Chairman, with our budget, we
    felt--even before the new DOD strategy came out, we certainly
    got enough assessments and capability gaps to understand that
    we needed to refocus and know where the tilt in our anti-access
    and area-denial focus should be.
        We actually had before this DOD strategy came out in
    January, we had 13 focus areas for the Naval S&T strategic
    plan. We have now brought those down to a total of 9. I will
    offer that, of those nine, five of them are specifically
    directed toward anti-access/area-denial. That would be assured
    access, battle space, it would be autonomy and unmanned
    systems, expeditionary and irregular warfare, our information
    dominance in cybersecurity, and then our power projection and
    integrated defense. Those are the five that were brought into
    the A2/AD [anti-access/area-denial] specifically.
        In what we haven't done, for the last number of years--and
    we are not patting ourselves on the back--but we have by far
    had the most accurate oceanographic modeling forecasting models
    in the world. We certainly aren't doing away with those; they
    are very important. But we know that at this point, in terms of
    maturity, we are in pretty good shape there, and those could
    take a slight reprieve.
        I would also offer that in some of our plan form designs,
    we are very mature, in the ships we have designed recently and
    some of our planned aircraft. We think, again, right now, for
    this time being, we haven't done anything dramatic but we have
    at least reduced some of the focus there.
        Mr. Thornberry. Okay.
        Admiral Klunder. I think that would probably be the two
    areas, sir.
        Mr. Thornberry. That is great.
        Dr. Walker.
        Dr. Walker. Sir, we responded to the defense planning
    guidance, spent the better part of 2 to 3 months working with
    the lab to identify where we should lead, watch, or integrate
    with others and then follow, based on our core competencies as
    well as the new strategy.
        We are all over the A2/AD area in the Air Force. We have a
    new investment in turbine engine--adaptive technologies for
    turbine engines. This is an area where we have always led and
    want to continue to lead. Hypersonics and supersonic activity
    for ALCM [Air Launched Cruise Missile] replacements and looking
    at how we do things quicker and over longer ranges. And then
    weapons for fifth-gen aircraft, we want to develop those, as
    well as electronic warfare as we move into A2/AD environments.
        Where we had to decrease was work in micro UAVs, deployed
    airbase technologies, some thermal sciences, and then some
    plug-and-play activity for small sats that we just never got
    the industry to buy into.
        Mr. Thornberry. Yeah.
        Dr. Walker. Thank you.
        Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Perfect.
        Dr. Gabriel, did the strategy affect you all?
        Dr. Gabriel. Well, sir, we are certainly informed by the
    strategy, but along with our own analytic frameworks which I
    have just discussed with you, with ISRs [intelligence,
    surveillance, reconnaissance] and others--position, navigation,
    and timing.
        I can summarize that what we have done and what we are
    doing more of is cyber and manufacturing--cyber in particular,
    both defense and offense, and particularly cyber capabilities
    that are uniquely DOD needs vice, say, intelligence needs.
        Mr. Thornberry. Uh-huh.
        Dr. Gabriel. In manufacturing, it is one that you have
    heard us talk about before: controlling for time, to get at
    some of the vulnerabilities associated with the increasing time
    that it takes us to field defense systems.
        What we are doing less of is energy and autonomy, frankly.
    Not that we are never going to do things in those areas again,
    but we have finite resources and we are focusing them on cyber
    and manufacturing.
        Mr. Thornberry. Interesting. Thank you.
        Mr. Kline.
        Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all, witnesses, for being here, for your
    testimony, and for, as the chairman said, keeping that
    testimony under 5 minutes. It may be a world record, I don't
    know. I hope somebody recorded it.
        I was very fascinated by the testimony, particularly of the
    Navy and the Air Force, on STEM. You have several pages,
    Admiral, in your testimony. And, Dr. Walker, you mentioned it.
    I actually don't know anybody who is opposed to more science,
    technology, engineering, and mathematics education. Mr.
    Langevin missed it.
        Last year, I was invited to speak to a group of chamber
    folks in Rochester, Minnesota. They were exploring what the
    chamber could do about STEM, and so they wanted to know--they
    wanted me to come down and talk about what the Federal
    Government was doing about it. And knowing I had to give that
    speech, I actually looked it up--actually, my staff did. And it
    turns out that, at that time last summer, there were 209
    Federal STEM programs--209. And I don't know if that included
    Iridescent, Sea Perch, FIRST [For Inspiration and Recognition
    of Science and Technology] Robotics, Youth Exploring Science,
    and the rest of them.
        And I see, Admiral, that ONR was tasked with coordinating
    Naval STEM educational and outreach activities. And apparently,
    the ONR Naval STEM Coordination Office ``provides a cohesive
    approach to STEM education and outreach across the service
    laboratories and warfare centers.''
        Dr. Walker, you have something called Bright Horizons.
        What I am getting at and what is my question--and I am just
    sort of focusing on you two--is, how coordinated are you? I
    mean, it does seem to me that 209 may be enough, in terms of
    numbers of programs. And you are involved in them at the
    kindergarten level.
        Gosh, I hope you have a lot of people and a lot of money to
    do this or at least that you are, in fact, coordinated and know
    what those other 208 programs are, so that we can make sure we
    are getting a return.
        Admiral, tell us how that is working.
        Admiral Klunder. Yes, sir. The timing of your question is
    perfect, sir, because just this morning I had coffee with a
    large, large room of exactly those individuals, to try and
    coordinate those efforts. I think everyone, and certainly from
    the Navy and Marine Corps, we value STEM. We feel that everyone
    has been very excited about it.
        But what we are trying to do, in that exact point, sir,
    about coordinating the efforts and really true collaboration so
    we are not duplicating efforts, now what we are trying to do
    is--and we had this very healthy talk this morning--we have
    tried to move to a next level, a phase two of the effort. And I
    don't mean from funding, necessarily. I mean from, have we
    truly identified those events, those project-based learning--
    not daylong events but maybe it is a 2- or 3-day-long event,
    trying to determine where do we get the best return, the best
    connective tissue that leads us into an actual person, young
    person, entering a STEM kind of career path for the future.
        I am here, frankly, as I always would, sir, to tell you
    that the initial phase of this was a lot of excitement, a lot
    of movement, a lot of momentum, but, truly, we haven't--the
    collective group hasn't been able to identify yet where were we
    on a return. Now we are starting to see that. We are starting
    to look at, were the internships increased? Were the direct
    entry in the Navy and Marine Corps with a STEM background
    increased? Were our undergraduates going to a graduate program
    that may service not only just a Navy and Marine Corps
    laboratory but also my colleagues' laboratories but also just
    the Nation as a whole?
        And that is what we are trying to get right now for not
    only the Secretary of the Navy but working with my colleagues
    in the Air Force, sir.
        Mr. Kline. Thank you. So this meeting today included just
    Navy-related, or did the Air Force folks come in?
        Admiral Klunder. We had a number across not just Navy and
    Marine Corps disciplines but also a number of those civilian
    organizations you just described, sir.
        Mr. Kline. Well, that is good to hear. And I think it is
    important that you do that. I hate to see us putting the scarce
    resources of people, as we are cutting them back, the DDR&E
    [Deputy Director for Research and Engineering] or the Assistant
    Secretary--so it has already cut back staff. And yet we have
    people with great excitement and great goodwill running around
    trying to help in the STEM area.
        And I do think that 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215 may be
    just a tad more than we need. I would a whole lot rather see
    them coordinated and get some return for that investment. And I
    appreciate your effort there.
        And I yield back.
        Mr. Thornberry. Ms. Davis.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for joining us.
        Secretary, I wanted to ask you about your department's
    Office of Small Business Programs and the Rapid Innovation
    Programs that you have put the request out for, I guess, and
    you said four areas. And it sounds like you had a good response
    to that.
        But I wonder if you could tell us a little bit more about,
    were you tasking generally just these four areas? And what do
    you have to help us out with these? If you got that many
    responses, you know, how are you dealing with that?
        One of the things that I bet I share with all of my
    colleagues is a lot of frustration on the part of small-
    business developers, that it is very hard for them to get
    through the morass of--getting attention, obviously, when they
    have something significant.
        Could you just talk a little bit more about that? And what
    do you expect to happen as a result of this?
        Secretary Lemnios. Representative Davis, that is the--the
    connection that we are building and strengthening with the
    small-business community is absolutely essential in driving
    innovative concepts from the private sector into the
    Department's key capabilities. It is absolutely essential. The
    timelines, industry gets it. The small-business communities are
    ways to drive new concepts that just simply won't arrive out of
    long-term procurements.
        This committee understands that. Congress passed the Rapid
    Innovation Fund, which we are acting on now. We issued four--
    the Department issued four solicitations: one from each of the
    services and then one that is an OSD solicitation that includes
    the fourth estate, it includes SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations
    Command], the Small Business Innovative Research Program, I
    think DARPA was included in that one, and MDA [Missile Defense
    Agency].
        So that was a broad reach asking the small-business
    community to come back with two focused efforts. One were your
    ideas that would, within 2 years and within a $3 million cap,
    provide solutions for our joint urgent operational needs--that
    is, those solutions that could be immediately transitioned to
    the warfighter. And then second was those ideas that would have
    significant impact to our acquisition programs, that would tie
    directly to an acquisition program.
        We are still in source selection, but what I can tell you
    is that we received as a result of those four solicitations
    about 3,500 responses. I am the source selection authority for
    one of those four activities. The other services are working
    those through their channels.
        But we did two things. We presented to industry a clear
    articulation of those challenges in an unclassified environment
    that sort of made it clear in layman's terms. And we listened
    to industry to try to shape the responses so that, in fact, we
    are able to make those connections not just for this
    solicitation but for the follow-on activities.
        The way we will assess it will be not just is the money
    spent, did we actually get contracts on the record, but have we
    received the products as a result of that. You know, can I go
    to SOCOM, can I go to an operator and see the result of that
    small-business concept implemented in that operational
    capability--or to that acquisition program, that transition
    path.
        This is an experiment. We are in the first phase. We have
    been working lockstep with the Hill to make sure that we are
    implementing it as you have directed us to.
        Mrs. Davis. Is that $200 million going to enable you to do
    what you would like to do, in terms of really getting it----
        Secretary Lemnios. Well, it is actually twice that. It is
    actually $400 million or $500 million. So it is a large amount
    of money.
        Mrs. Davis. Oh, okay.
        Secretary Lemnios. But we want to make sure that the first
    set of solicitations are executed synchronously and that we see
    the results. So the results of this will be evaluated as we go
    forward.
        Mrs. Davis. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate that. If you come
    across a situation where perhaps our larger companies are
    looking at those, as well--and they certainly have that
    opportunity to do that. But I think when you talk about pushing
    things back to OSD, what worries me a little bit is that some
    of the larger companies that we have all been used to working
    with over the years, you know, sometimes ace out, quite
    honestly, some of the smaller companies that have the greatest
    opportunity for innovation.
        Secretary Lemnios. I will just say as a follow-up, the
    large companies are watching carefully who is responding, and I
    think there will be connections made. My sense is that, as we
    move forward, I think we will see a change in the way that
    works.
        Mrs. Davis. Great. Okay. Thank you very much. I appreciate
    that.
        If I could very quickly, Dr. Gabriel, how are you
    connecting with so much of the research on PTSD [post-traumatic
    stress disorder] that is ongoing through the veterans community
    and, certainly, our universities and other research entities?
        Dr. Gabriel. Well, ma'am, it also is going to be responsive
    to your previous question about small business. Because, in my
    oral testimony, I mentioned the wristwatch-sized Blast Gauge
    device. This was a device that was designed, developed, and
    produced by a small business, actually, less than a year, less
    than a million dollars, and informed by the fundamental
    neuroscience work that has gone on in a previous program at
    DARPA to understand the correlation between blast exposure, in
    particular overpressure, and to PTSD and TBI.
        The program, in partnership with the Army, we fielded an
    entire Second Brigade, Fourth Infantry Division throughout
    their entire deployment last year, from August to actually just
    a little bit--a few weeks ago. The entire brigade had--every
    warfighter had three of these. I would be happy to pass it
    around. These are the Blast Gauges. This was developed, four
    iterations, very quickly, with the speed and capability of the
    small business to deliver those products.
        It started out at $85 a unit, which for the full deployment
    was $1.6 million. And now, because of the innovation and speed
    of execution of the small company and the learnings they got
    from the manufacturing, they are able to do an entire brigade
    for $540,000.
        So I think it is vital to pull small businesses in, not
    just through SBIR [Small Business Innovation Research] programs
    but actually to couple them to the core programs of each of the
    agencies.
        Mr. Thornberry. Mr. West.
        Mr. West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.
        And thanks to the panel for being here. And it was good
    seeing you down at the AUSA [Association of the United States
    Army] Winter Symposium.
        One of the things I believe, our best military technology
    is our human technology, and I think our smartest weapon that
    we have are the men and women in uniform. And, of course, with
    that being said, when you look at the budget cuts that we are
    going to have, when you look at about 129,000 of our men and
    women in uniform we are going to send away, my first question
    is, what are we doing from a science and technology perspective
    to fill that gap that we are going to be losing, with those men
    and women, for us to still be able to be successful on the
    battlefield? That is my first question.
        And then the second question is, you know, what are the key
    and critical programs, the top one or two programs that each
    and every one of you are looking at? But then also going back
    to what we talked about a little earlier, how are we looking to
    develop common operating platforms?
        You know, when I was at the AUSA Winter Symposium, I saw
    the unmanned ground vehicles. I know we have unmanned aerial
    vehicles. I know we are working to unman sea vehicles. How do
    we get all of these unmanned systems on the same operating
    platform so we don't create such an incredible burden in the
    research and development systems and also in the logistical
    supply systems?
        So those are my two questions.
        Secretary Lemnios. Representative West, let me start from a
    Department perspective. Absolutely, it is the case that when I
    visit men and women in uniform in the field, it is the
    warfighter that makes the difference. I was at Camp Roberts 6
    months ago, and, you know, I saw training books, I saw training
    manuals, but I saw the real work being done by soldiers that
    were able to innovate concepts that were never part of any
    training manual, but they just knew how to make things happen.
    And that is absolutely critical.
        On the way we leverage--the way we use science and
    technology to leverage the effectiveness of the warfighter,
    there are two specific examples that I will give. The other
    panelists may have others.
        The first is, in theater, clearly, one of the bottlenecks,
    manpower bottlenecks, is in the processing, exploitation, and
    dissemination cells that are taking enormous data feeds and
    translating them to operational decisions. And if you visit--
    and you were--you understand this well. It is an environment
    where tempo matters, where consequence of error is enormous,
    where the data is ambiguous. In some cases, it is missing; in
    some cases, it is just plain wrong and you have to sort of go
    through this. And we have programs across the Department that
    are looking at ways to integrate those data fields in ways that
    provide much better fidelity, much better responsiveness.
        In the area of common operating picture, we have a major
    initiative with the Pacific Command that we call Cloud Break.
    It is an environment where we are, in fact, building across the
    Department an integration environment for a common operating
    picture. It is a testbed that allows small businesses and
    others to come in, put their algorithms in a joint information
    operations center where the combatant command actually gets the
    residual benefit of those efforts, and we get to see how these
    things trade one against another.
        I think, at the end of the day, S&T in many of these areas
    has the opportunity--and we have seen it--to drive the
    effectiveness of the warfighter by reducing the burden, the
    work burden, and improving fidelity of the operational picture.
    Giving the community access to training environments is one way
    to do that.
        Mr. West. Thanks.
        Dr. Freeman. Yeah, let me make a couple of comments.
        You know, the first thing is, the operational capability of
    unmanned systems is one of the things that we really want to
    capitalize. We have seen a lot, and particularly, you know, in
    the UAVs, big proliferation of UAVs, big utility, big payoff
    for everybody on using those systems at all the different
    echelons.
        But one of the things we have in the Army is that, as I
    mentioned in my testimony, the issue that if you indeed are
    going to supplement and/or assist soldiers, small units, you
    know, warfighters, then there has to be an issue, particularly
    when there are things on the ground and you are operating
    together in relatively close proximity or you are counting on
    those systems to be there and not to break down and to do the
    things you want, that is where the technology really needs to
    go--the trust in those systems.
        And we need to be able to demonstrate to our soldiers, to
    our warfighters, that particularly on the more complex things--
    I mean, flying in the air is great and it is very complex, but
    on the other hand there is not a lot of proximity there, as you
    have on ground systems.
        So working these issues of how, if we are going to
    supplement and/or help with reduced numbers of people, how we
    are going to do that, we have to work technology-wise on
    developing the systems that people can trust. That really,
    really is important.
        Mr. West. Okay.
        Admiral Klunder. Yes, sir, thank you. And before I forget,
    you asked about top priorities, and I do want to emphasize--and
    we will get a chance to talk about cybersecurity later, and
    that is absolutely one of ours, both on the defensive and
    offensive side, as my DARPA colleague alluded.
        But, certainly, the value of our people in the Navy and
    Marine Corps, that is without question. And where we think we
    may be able to leverage, again, technology, science--and this
    is both manned and unmanned streams. If we are going to have
    this huge amount of data that Mr. Lemnios described, we feel
    there that automation--but not just automation, the algorithms
    that we need to be able to do, with onboard processing that now
    allows not that 100 percent of throughput to go down to our
    limited manpower and pool of heroes, but now maybe it is really
    that 10 percent of vital critical information we need to throw
    down through the pipes. I would just offer, that is an area
    that we think we may be able to solve some of those manpower
    and personnel issues on shortages.
        Certainly, in terms of an area that we think is very
    important--I think I am back to a point we talked about in
    being responsive to not only our COCOM [combatant command] and
    our fleet and force requirements, warfighter requirements, but
    just, frankly, our national security requirements. And that is,
    when we look at something, for instance, over in 5th Fleet, a
    year ago we may not have had as robust a mine warfare
    capability that we thought we needed with the current scenarios
    that we are being faced with. Today, I can tell you, due to
    responsive technology on some unmanned vehicles and the sensors
    that those carried, we think we now can confront the threat in
    a positive manner.
        And I would like to offer that that was maybe a success
    that we saw within a year time frame where we broke through
    some barriers that you might normally see.
        Mr. West. Yes, sir. Thanks.
        Dr. Walker. One of the areas I didn't mention where we have
    increased investment is autonomy. And we are actually leading
    that area for Mr. Lemnios as one of his seven priority areas.
        Trust, you know, how do we trust these systems is
    critically important. Human machine interface is another area
    that we are working pretty hard to--or to, you know, lower the
    number of humans involved in that piece. And then the human
    performance piece, trying to do more data fusion, turning the
    data into knowledge so that we can have less folks sitting back
    looking at the data and interpreting it.
        So those are the key areas we are trying to maintain and,
    actually, increase investment.
        Dr. Gabriel. So, sir, we believe data is a force
    multiplier. The challenge is to turn that data into actionable
    information.
        And we are looking at that in two major ways. One is, we
    have looked across our ISR portfolio and shifted from about 70
    percent sensor investment, 30 percent exploitation to more of a
    50-50, more in the exploitation to turn that data into
    information. And also beginning to look at activities in big
    data, where there are emerging concepts, algorithms, and ideas
    coming from basic mathematics of how do you deal with lots and
    lots of data from big data.
        Mr. West. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Shuster.
        Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank all of you for being here today.
        I want to go back to the Rapid Innovation Fund briefly. I
    know Mr. Lemnios spoke about it, but I wonder if the other four
    panelists might briefly comment on the value you are seeing, if
    any at all, going through the process in terms of technology
    and the acquisition process.
        So if you could just----
        Dr. Freeman. Yeah, let me start, and then my colleagues can
    add.
        You know, we in the Army use this Rapid Innovation Fund,
    and we focused our BAA [Broad Agency Announcement] on the top
    10 challenges that I identified that were our warfighter
    challenges that we were looking to be able to solve. And we got
    a tremendous response back from small businesses and very
    nontraditional folks who wouldn't necessarily have responded to
    some of our other things. And we are really happy to do that.
        One of the things we did is we evaluated all of the over
    1,000 proposals that we got. I had a number of people in both
    the laboratories and then the people who were going to be
    running these what we call TECD [Technology Enabled
    Capabilities Demonstration] programs that focus on these
    challenges actually doing the evaluations. And, therefore,
    those technical program managers got to actually look through
    all of these ideas and these innovative thoughts and saw things
    that they would never, ever see before.
        And so we really appreciate the opportunity to do this and
    then to link these up so that they get brought into our Army
    programs as integral parts of them, not as something separate,
    not as something, you know, totally different, but something
    that we are integrating and bringing those into our programs.
        In addition, I have taken the list of innovations and the
    things that we got, responses we got back, and I am also
    looking at them for a second scrub to see if there are things
    in there that we may not be able to take directly to one of
    these TECDs because it was a little bit out of the timeline or
    not quite focused enough but are really good ideas and seeing
    if there are things that we should fund out of that out of our
    core program, as well.
        So I really think this has been a big boon for the Army.
        Mr. Shuster. Thank you.
        And the rest of you have seen that kind of----
        Admiral Klunder. Absolutely. And I won't duplicate the
    small-business side, but that is truly one of the core pieces
    of our RIF [Rapid Innovation Fund].
        One offer is that, within that Rapid Innovation Fund, we
    have taken what we call our ``tech solutions.'' That is where,
    within a year, we want to have--if a sailor or Marine has come
    to us and said, this is really a detriment to my performing my
    job out in the fleet or the force, can we turn that kind of
    innovation within a year? And that is where we have seen some
    real successes here.
        It could be in things that we do even as simple as
    training, virtual training, that we want to get that quickly to
    a fleet sailor or Marine. Something also that we have seen
    innovative, in terms of a counter-piracy mission, for instance.
    We had young officers on a ship, going, ``How am I going to
    interact?'' Well, we have done that--again, within less than a
    year, we have been able to adapt that training through this
    kind of model, put it out to the Surface Warfare Officer's
    School, and now they are able to understand that scenario much
    better.
        Mr. Shuster. Okay.
        Dr. Walker. In our BAA, we put high importance on
    transition to programs of record. So we--actually, the product
    centers and the Air Logistics Centers are actually running the
    review process. So we are making sure that--and the small
    companies are finding that refreshing, because they actually
    have an opportunity to get into a program of record. So we are
    very positive on the program.
        Mr. Shuster. Great.
        Dr. Gabriel. Sir, we have Rapid Innovation, in some sense,
    spread out throughout our programs. I talked to you about some
    of the activities going on with the Blast Gauge. That came from
    a small business. That was part of the core program that we
    had.
        Mr. Shuster. Thank you.
        And if I might, I know that as we went through the last
    authorization there was some concern about the process going
    through, was it fair and open competition.
        I wonder, Mr. Lemnios, if you could comment on that.
        Secretary Lemnios. Well, it is a fair and open competition.
    It was an open solicitation. The reason we rate it as a pilot--
    and we did this in concert with discussions that we have had
    with leadership here--is to make sure that, in fact, the effect
    that we put in the solicitation is the effect that we will see
    as a result of those contracts.
        We have two very measurable effects here. One is, did the
    product of that contract actually end up in a warfighter's
    hands in 24 months, or did the product of that effort actually
    end up in an acquisition program in 24 months?
        I think what we have done here--let me just take a minute--
    I think what we have done here is, we are opening a new
    dialogue with the private sector exactly along those lines of
    driving innovation in the small business and larger community.
    Our defensetechnologymarketplace.mil was put online to show the
    small-business community and the industrial base where our
    focus is. And we have asked for their feedback on where their
    IRAD [internal research and development] is. And so we are
    trying to build that engagement to drive innovation.
        Mr. Shuster. Well, thank you. I think that helps us when we
    go through the next reauthorization. Because, again, I know on
    the other side of the Capitol there were some concerns about
    the open, fair process, so I appreciate your comments on that.
        And thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. And I appreciate the work of the
    gentleman on his panel related to this very area. Thank you.
        Mr. Gibson.
        Mr. Gibson. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        I appreciate the panelists being here today.
        Dr. Gabriel, with regard to the Focus Center Research
    Program, from my looking at it, it appears to be a pretty
    effective public-private partnership, particularly your work
    with the Semiconductor Research Corporation, $13 million
    invested and $18 million from the private side.
        But I am curious to know your assessment and then, beyond
    that, what your vision is, looking at this budget, what
    priorities you have given for that.
        Thanks.
        Dr. Gabriel. So, sir, thank you. You are absolutely right.
    I think, from our perspective, this is an area that we see as
    beneficial in a number of ways.
        One, as you pointed out, every dollar of Federal funding is
    matched by a factor of one and a half to one. So for every
    dollar we put in, the industry consortium puts in one and a
    half dollars.
        It does a number of things. It advances the semiconductor
    technology in ways that are beneficial to the industry at
    large. It has structured IP [intellectual property]
    relationships with universities that are beneficial to the
    university as well as industry. And it has been a tremendous
    accelerator of training and education for the next generation
    of scientists and engineers in the semiconductor industry.
        Mr. Gibson. And looking forward, priorities? Guidance?
    Anything that we should be looking for in the coming year and
    beyond?
        Dr. Gabriel. The industry representatives, the governing
    council that represents the industry members, they are in the
    midst of putting together their recommendations for how they
    would like to see the program evolve in the next phase, or in
    the next 3 years, if you will, of their anticipation.
        And we will be having discussions with them over the next
    few months. We expect them to be articulating the type of
    technology areas they want to focus on as well as some of the
    activities and structures of the sorts of research they would
    like to support.
        Mr. Gibson. Well, very well. And I look forward to
    monitoring that. And I am certainly very proud of the work that
    our area is doing on this score. And I want to thank all the
    panelists again.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Franks.
        Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I know the other committee members have sort of borne in
    the heat of the day here and I showed up at the last minute. I
    don't know if you can believe this, there is actually--I had a
    conflict. I haven't learned to bi-locate yet. And it never
    happens to me, but this time it did.
        Thank you all for being here. Thank you for being sort of
    that invisible front line of freedom for all of us. We know
    that the work that you do in the technology advances and
    scientific advances are absolutely vital to the cause of
    freedom, and we are grateful.
        I am going to do something I usually don't do. I am going
    to kind of let whichever one of you think would be the best one
    to respond to this question. And it is a question; it is not a
    leading narrative here. I want to genuinely know your
    perspective.
        Reports show that domestic military installations receive
    99 percent of their electricity from the civilian power grid.
    Furthermore, numerous studies have concluded that our civilian
    power grid could be critically vulnerable to both manmade and
    naturally occurring electromagnetic pulse, in this case either
    EMP [electromagnetic pulse] or GMD [Geospace Magnetospheric
    Dynamics].
        One of your roles is to develop technology enhancements and
    processes to rapidly transition critical technologies to our
    national security force.
        First, let me just ask the obvious question. Do you assess
    the civilian power grid to be vulnerable to both natural and
    manmade EMP? Does anyone assess it that way?
        Dr. Freeman. I am going to take a little bit of a stab.
        A number of years ago, I was on a defense board where we
    were looking at those things, and I interacted a lot with our
    Defense Science Board and those folks. And, you know, the
    answer to that question from the perspective of a lot of
    different folks was, yeah, we have issues there, and we have to
    look at those, and we seriously have to understand that.
        In the Army, in particular, because we do have an awful lot
    of installations, we have an awful lot of bases that we look
    at, I work very closely and the folks in my office, and across
    the laboratory system in the Army, work very closely with the
    installations folks as we assess what our vulnerabilities are
    to power and energy issues. And one of the things that we are
    trying to do is actually set up the ability for our various
    bases and our various installations to be more energy self-
    sufficient, more energy-secure, and to have the ability not
    only to be more efficient and effective but also to be safe and
    not vulnerable.
        It is a part of what we are actually looking at. And the
    science and technology community has a part to play there, and
    we are, in the Army at least, playing that part.
        Mr. Franks. Well, that is a good answer. I have worked with
    some of the bases in our own state to that end, to that exact
    end.
        Are you aware of some of the technologies that may be
    available today to mitigate the threat against the civilian
    grid? Has anybody--please.
        Secretary Lemnios. So we have certainly looked at the risk
    assessment and the threat assessments, but they really are
    base-specific. There is a set of core technologies that need to
    be layered, and the threats need to be identified by a
    geographic area. And I am happy to sit down with you under a
    different environment and have that discussion.
        Mr. Franks. Well, there was some technology that I learned
    about here recently, because this has been something that has
    been a concern of ours on the Armed Services Committee since we
    heard the EMP Commission report some years ago. And the neutral
    phase blockers ought to be something to be considered, because
    the cost is minimal, it allows the grid to run at a higher
    efficiency, it pays for itself. It is an incredible thing to
    look at.
        So if you consider this a threat, is there a timeline
    available that portrays when the civilian power grid could, in
    your mind, be adequately protected against EMP? Or how serious
    is the situation now, and when do you think--what is being done
    to protect it, and when do you think you might have it where we
    would have some level of confidence?
        Secretary Lemnios. Representative, I am not--I don't think
    any of us are prepared today to give you a calendar date as to
    when that is going to occur or what those risks are.
        I will simply tell you, as I have looked at risk
    assessments, not only in that domain but others, there are very
    few silver bullets that allow you to sort of take the risk from
    a very high level to a low level.
        What we do in most cases--in fact, in all of the ones that
    I have been involved in--is pull a red team together to do not
    only a threat assessment, but how would you, in fact,
    compromise a particular target. I will give you specific
    example. In cyber, a lot of the DARPA work is informed by red
    teams that actually look at measures and countermeasures. Our
    electronic warfare strategy is informed by red-team, blue-team
    assessments.
        And so, on this particular one, I have taken a note, and I
    am happy to come back and chat with you.
        Mr. Franks. I appreciate that.
        Mr. Chairman, I will yield back here, just with the thought
    that, if this is as serious as some of these reports that we
    are getting indicate, then it seems to me it is something that
    we should all understand really where we are on it and what our
    plan is.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Langevin.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        If I could, Secretary Lemnios, the Weapons Systems
    Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 basically created two new
    offices charged with improving key areas of our acquisition
    process: the Director for Developmental Test and Director for
    Systems Engineering.
        So, Secretary, I believe that both of these offices report
    to you. Almost 3 years later, what impact are those offices
    making? And are they helping, or did they just create another
    layer of useless bureaucracy?
        Secretary Lemnios. Representative Langevin, those offices
    were created--were passed unanimously by both the House and the
    Senate, signed by the President earlier in 2009.
        We stood up the offices to do two things: to, first, reduce
    the risk of operational testing, to really identify those
    operational issues well ahead of the final acceptance of weapon
    systems and also, much earlier in the process, pre-Milestone B,
    well ahead of the final acquisition, to really understand the
    system risk of both the technology and the architectures that
    are used in our systems.
        We have a very comprehensive report that is coming to the
    Hill that outlines all of that. Our annual report is actually--
    I think it is due in a few weeks, and you will see the
    compilation of that.
        But the end result of all this is that those two offices
    are engaged in every Defense Acquisition Board. They are asking
    the hard questions. They are asking the program managers to
    come back with evidence that we understand the risk, we
    understand the cost structure, we understand the time latency
    of our programs. And you will see that in the annual report.
        Mr. Langevin. Very good. I look forward to reading that
    report.
        Admiral, if I could turn to you. Admiral, how do you plan
    on continuing to execute both the Solid State and the Free
    Electron Laser development programs? And where are your current
    challenges in those programs?
        Admiral Klunder. Thank you, sir. It is nice that we are all
    here together today.
        Certainly, on Solid State Laser, I will describe that
    first. Working with my colleagues across the services and with
    DARPA, we truly feel that in the last few years that technology
    has become much more mature, something that is achievable in
    terms of helping our warfighters out in the field.
        I do want to offer that, from a Naval standpoint, there are
    obvious challenges to us in the maritime domain that affect
    things like lasers. Being able to have a beam director that can
    really focus down through the maritime kind of environment and
    atmosphere is a challenge. But we are looking at it, and we are
    teaming with my colleagues here across the table.
        I do offer to you that, on the Free Electron Laser, we
    still see huge value in that. But we are also realistic, and
    working with your staff also, to realize that some of the
    technologies there still have a ways to go, frankly. There are
    some things on injector technology, some of the high-capacitor
    technology that we know are not in that, kind of, 2-year arm.
    It is more like maybe out here in a 10-year arm, potentially,
    that we are looking at.
        I do want to also offer that, in terms of integration to a
    Navy or Marine Corps kind of asset, that we also have to look
    at certainly the footprint aspects to a Free Electron Laser.
    And that is another challenge that we are looking at, sir.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
        If we could go back to the issue of cyber. And to the
    panel, what do we need to change to ensure that we are better
    able to identify and mitigate risks in cyber domain? I know I
    asked that question earlier and time ran out, but I would like
    to come back to that and ask the panel to comment.
        Secretary Lemnios. Representative Langevin, let me start.
        Again, the cyber S&T area was one of our priorities, and it
    is one that we will be building for many years. This area
    actually very closely follows the work that we have seen and
    developed in electronic warfare. There are measures, and there
    are countermeasures. In the electronic warfare domain, those
    measures and countermeasures are measured in terms of maybe
    days, maybe weeks, maybe months. In cyber, they are measured in
    terms of minutes and hours.
        So there is a challenge of both understanding the cyber
    threat and responding to it quickly, and building tools that
    allow us to both defend and operate in an environment that is
    greatly changing.
        The focus of the Department's effort this year has been in
    building a common operating picture so that we understand those
    networks and we start building the measurements and the test
    campaign to understand, in fact, how we can use our S&T efforts
    and transition them.
        Going forward, I suspect that you will see in the coming
    years ways to integrate a larger number of efforts across our
    networks. And that is going on right now in the services and
    certainly at DARPA, in terms of new concepts that are being
    developed.
        We have brought the Department together. The Department
    spend in cyber across the budget is about $3.4 billion. In the
    S&T area, it is between $600 million and $800 million a year.
    It is one of our focused efforts. It is one that has received a
    lot of attention. In fact, we plussed that up from last year in
    order to drive innovation into this area.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Secretary.
        Others on the panel?
        Dr. Walker. Sure.
        We are in the midst, in the Air Force, of a study, Cyber
    Vision 2025, led by our Air Force chief scientist, Dr. Maybury.
    I am his mission support lead, which essentially means trying
    to take a look at how we do responsive cyber acquisition.
        But what you hit on earlier is, how do we develop the next
    cyber warriors, so to speak, because I think the people element
    to cyber is just as important as some of the other stuff. And
    one of the things we are finding is--or one of the things we
    are looking at is, how can we work with our undergraduate
    institutions--the Air Force Academy, for sure, but even
    civilian undergraduate institutions--to get more of a cyber
    element into the computer science and computer engineering
    curriculum? We have been working with Syracuse University--our
    Rome Laboratory has been working with Syracuse University to do
    just that over the last year. And we are working with a couple
    other universities, but trying to get a more technical, cyber-
    oriented curriculum.
        Working with some of our civilian institutions I think is
    going to be important to produce people that can think cyber
    and come into the services and help us.
        Admiral Klunder. Sir, to kind of trump Steve's comments
    just a second ago about the young people, I offer to you that
    we feel--as we have teamed up on the STEM effort that
    Representative Kline alluded to, we absolutely are committed to
    that kind of focus area also within our STEM training.
        I would use as an example my sophomore in college, my son.
    And I talked to him, I said, what are you going to take for an
    elective this year, son, in this semester? And he said, well,
    you know, Dad, there is this fantastic cyber expert that is
    coming in for one semester. And I know that is a selfish plug
    at the Naval Academy, but that is exactly what we have tried to
    do--bring in experts from the field. Because, as I mentioned
    before, sir, cyber isn't a traditional kind of warfare domain
    that you can take 10 years for an acquisition program to
    address. Those technologies flip every year, every 2 years.
        And if we can't stay responsive, not only with our training
    of the people but also with our urgent operational fulfillment
    of those warfighter needs--and that is the other aspect quickly
    I would offer: that we have found great benefit, not only
    working with my colleagues across the table but at the other
    agencies in this town, in connecting right up front,
    collaboratively. If there is a warfighter, a COCOM urgent
    operational need, a JUON [joint urgent operational need], that
    we need to address now for national security reasons, frankly,
    we have been able to team quickly and kind of break down some
    of those more traditional acquisition barriers and move in more
    of a responsive, get-it-out-there kind of need.
        And I think we have been successful. We know there are
    always challenges. I am not trying to say we are always looking
    in front of the target. But we think that is a way we can
    address that in a little more responsive way, sir.
        Mr. Langevin. And that applies to the people, too? You are
    making an effort to identify those people that may not be
    necessarily assigned to the cyber domain, that field and that
    is their, you know, their day job, but something that they have
    skills and that could be utilized?
        Admiral Klunder. Absolutely. And we don't always
    necessarily have to look for a person that is in a computer
    science major, necessarily. We want to keep their depth of
    knowledge through electives, through any kind of acclimation
    through the cyber domain because we think--frankly, you might
    even eventually have a political science major that might want
    to get some kind of cyber expertise, and we could bring them
    into this kind of a future career path.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
        Dr. Freeman. And let me just take a little slightly
    different slant. And it kind of goes back to something Ken
    said.
        You know, we recognize, certainly, that we have a need to
    protect our networks but also our data and our equipment from
    this ubiquitous threat. And, you know, that is something that--
    it isn't just about computers by themselves. It is by, you
    know, all the things that we have.
        And I came out of the nuclear community, you know, many,
    many, many, many years ago. And one of the things that I did as
    a young scientist or engineer is I was taught that the first
    thing that you do if you are a designer is that you design
    something in your mind and then you have people who try to
    attack it and then you have people who try to solve that as a
    designer, so that you build in the resilience and you build
    into your design the ability to make it hard for those people
    who want to get into the systems to actually do that harm.
        And so one of the things, in addition to all the things
    that everybody else has said, is we have to train our
    scientists and engineers--not just our computer scientists and
    engineers, but all of our design folks to wear what we used to
    call the black hat, the white hat, and the gray hat, to go
    figure out how to do better designs of systems and to think
    through not just designing for success in performing something
    but also thinking about how it might be attacked. And that
    includes protecting the data, protecting the equipment, knowing
    where things are. I mean, all of that stuff is going to be
    really important. And I really feel very strongly that we need
    to get our scientists and engineers across the board interested
    in that.
        Mr. Langevin. Yeah. I agree. The Internet, when it was
    built, was never built with security in mind, and I guess
    unfortunately. But we are trying to retrofit now, as we do it.
    But if we can think as we are designing new systems, ahead of
    time thinking about security, I think we will be better off for
    it.
        With that----
        Mr. Thornberry. Will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Langevin. I am----
        Mr. Thornberry. Well, I just wanted to follow up. I hate to
    break this to you. We are actually going to have to start
    training the lawyers to understand some of this stuff. And I
    think the point you all are making is one that I have come to
    understand as we deal with this issue. It is not enough for
    just computer science people to understand it. We are going to
    have to have, you know, ``Cyber for Dummies,'' because it will
    permeate everything that we deal with.
        And, you know, this is not really you all's issue, but I do
    think we have some responsibility to push that. You are on to
    something, I think, that is exactly right.
        I didn't mean to----
        Mr. Langevin. No, I thank you, Chairman, and I agree with
    your comments. And, with that, I yield back.
        Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
        Secretary Lemnios. Mr. Chairman, if I might just add one
    point? You are spot on, that it actually is part of our
    responsibility to broaden that tech base.
        To connect the dots, and sort of one last point in the
    sentence, and that is, we have an opportunity to train new
    students through our STEM initiatives. This summer, we have 670
    students that we are sponsoring through our SMART [Science,
    Mathematics and Research for Transformation] Program that will
    be placed in our Department's laboratories. So that is a
    shaping function. Those students are being selected. In fact,
    we have 2,800 applicants for the next round of admission into
    that program. It is a year of--it is a year of service for
    every year of college tuition that we provide. And we can
    actually shape, and we have shaped, the posture of that class
    that we accept into technical fields, which might include
    cybersecurity, might include cyber policy, certainly includes
    advanced technology in those areas that we see are the growing
    ones for the Department. And that is our feedstock.
        And so this STEM future-needs-of-the-Department shaping
    function actually does close and we have a way to do it. You
    have given us the authorities to do this. The 219 authorities
    allow us to extend that, and we are certainly working across
    the laboratories with those authorities. And we are working to
    make those connections.
        Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Secretary, while we are on the subject
    of cyber, let me ask the annual ``how do you deconflict''
    question. Because any time there is something that is the hot
    issue, all sorts of stuff gets that label. Yeah, we have all
    sorts of things that are being labeled with ``cyber'' these
    days, not just in S&T, obviously, but throughout the
    Department.
        So reassure us that you are looking at all of these cyber
    initiatives across the services, across the different DOD
    agencies of various kinds, and that there is some method to
    this madness.
        Secretary Lemnios. So, Representative Thornberry, the
    Senate 933 report, which we are finishing up, outlines the
    Department's strategy for cyber integration. It includes the
    Cyber Integration Management Board. That is sort of the policy
    piece within the Department to do exactly as you are asking--as
    you are suggesting.
        But I will also tell you that, as part of the review that I
    conducted last fall with a small team, you know, I went and I
    visited the laboratories, I talked to the researchers, spent
    time at DARPA, spent time at each of the services. One thing
    that impressed me, we have a remarkable set of talent. We have
    a good set of programs. They are a balanced set of programs,
    everything from those things that might make you a little itchy
    to those things that are going to be operationally relevant in
    short order because they are being built with deliberate
    timelines. And we have to have that balance, we have to have
    flexibility.
        The integration effort across the Department will be
    through the Cyber Integration Management Board that the
    Department is standing up to do exactly as you are suggesting.
        Mr. Thornberry. Let me shift topics for just a second.
    Another area that this subcommittee has been particularly
    interested in, kind of related to our other responsibilities,
    is irregular warfare. The country has learned a lot, sometimes
    painfully, over the last 10 years about irregular warfare.
    Obviously, it goes back much further than that.
        But I am just curious. There is some feeling that, as
    things wind down in Afghanistan, there will be a temptation to
    move on to other kinds of fights. And from an S&T perspective,
    is there anything that just pops into your brain that is going
    on in your fields that would be related to irregular warfare to
    help make sure that we don't have to relearn lessons again
    someday in the future that have been bought at a pretty high
    price over the last 10 years?
        Secretary Lemnios. Representative Thornberry, I am going to
    go back to some comments that Ken Gabriel made regarding the
    cost point for electronic warfare. And, in many ways, I look at
    that as an analogy to--a real analogy to irregular warfare in a
    different domain.
        Mr. Thornberry. Yeah.
        Secretary Lemnios. So while we are certainly drawing down
    overseas contingency operations and we will be moving that to a
    different point, the urgency--irregular warfare is really about
    urgency and it is about rapid transition. Through the last 10
    years of war, the Department has put in place a fast lane to
    get concepts quickly to theater. We have demonstrated that with
    MRAPs [Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles] and body armor
    and other systems that are being fielded on timelines that are
    unimaginable to the standard acquisition process, that have
    been remarkably effective, that save lives every day.
        The question then becomes, what does that actually look
    like in a theater where the technology tempo is changing month
    to month? And that is actually what is driving our connection
    with the communities that we are trying to build these channels
    with--with innovative small-business communities, with
    technology transition concepts. A real push in cyber to build
    app store models for the way we operate systems that sort of
    mimic what we are seeing in the private sector, where you can
    go to any company and buy your next product in a year's time
    and you know that you have doubled the capacity of that product
    on the same cost point.
        So I think what you will see is irregular warfare is really
    a moniker for rapid fielding of new technologies. And everyone
    here is on that--you know, we are all on that. You know, we are
    pushing in the S&T area, as I mentioned, the ones that are
    service-specific, the ones that are crosscuts, and really
    trying to drive new models with the private sector.
        Dr. Freeman. If I can kind of go back, if you look at the
    24 challenges that we have laid out in the Army as saying that
    they are our highest S&T priorities that we are looking at, and
    they are all focused on the soldier and the small unit and all
    of the things that they have had to do but we also believe they
    are going to continue to have to do around the world,
    regardless of where we are.
        I think we actually kind of get at, at least on the Army
    side particularly, by focusing on those things, you know, for a
    major portion of our program, not losing those lessons learned.
    We will still have COPs [command observation posts] and FOBs
    [forward operating bases]. We will still have the issues of
    getting technology out to far distant people and people who are
    doing all of those different kinds of jobs that are going to
    continue. Whether you are in the Asia Pacific or whether you
    are doing anything else, we know that that is going to be
    there. And I think what we are doing is trying to focus at the
    tip of the spear. I think that will help.
        Mr. Thornberry. That is a good point. We don't know where
    we will be, but we most likely will be someplace remote, and
    that is a whole set of challenges.
        Admiral Klunder. Chairman Thornberry, this is a selfish
    plug for my colleague behind me in the Marine Corps, but I need
    to give him a quick shout-out. Our whole S&T strategic plan was
    catered and focused to that anti-access/area-denial, which,
    again, needs be forward presence and be a 9-1-1 kind of
    response and mentality. So that is something we are going to
    continue to do for the absolute foreseeable future.
        One area, though, I will offer that we probably don't think
    about as much when we think about expeditionary irregular
    warfare, and it is back to that kind of information piece that
    we have talked to a little bit, not only just cyber, but I am
    talking about the agility to do that. And that is something we
    are looking at. It is not about residing in spectrums that only
    our threats know about and are very comfortable in. It is about
    looking at ways to be agile around those spectrums; that,
    again, we can still be irregular and expeditionary, that they
    can actually track us in those very defined spectrums that we
    are all used to playing in, if that made sense, and from an
    information dominance cyber standpoint, sir.
        Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
        Dr. Walker. And we in the Air Force over the last 10 years
    have gotten really good at unmanned ISR but in environments
    where we control the air. And so, as we move into A2/AD and
    nonpermissive environments, how do we do that mission and how
    do those systems interact with our manned platforms is an area
    we are taking a hard look at.
        Also, how we work with the Navy in an AirSea Battle
    construct. And it is not really irregular war, but it is a new
    concept that we are fleshing out. And, you know, one of the key
    technology areas there is electronic warfare, as has been
    mentioned. So how do we do more together in that space, as well
    as cyber, for that type of scenario.
        Dr. Gabriel. So, sir, I would take it back and say that
    irregular warfare is really about adaptability and your speed
    of response. And that is the focus, as you have heard us talk
    about our Advanced Manufacturing Initiative--everything from
    ground combat vehicles to optical systems and reducing the time
    that it takes for us to design, develop, and test and field
    those sort of systems.
        One additional layering that I would add in terms of what
    we have learned most recently over the past few years are from
    some of the activities that we had in theater--TFJ Dot [Task
    Force Joint DARPA Operational Trials], which we have described
    to you, everything from LIDAR [Laser Identification, Detection,
    and Ranging] to the Blast Gauges I talked about earlier. Those
    came about not only with a focus on time but a very tight
    coupling and integration of both the S&T folks as well as the
    operators, side-by-side, so that the development cycle times
    weren't lengthened by the back and forth ping-ponging but,
    rather, the fact that they were sitting right next to each
    other and quickly converging and iterating on a much better
    solution.
        Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Secretary--I think it was you--you
    caught my attention with your comments about globalization of
    technology. Earlier this week, I was out in California at a
    cyber conference. And you walk around the floor, you see all
    these small businesses that, you know, just have, you know, it
    looks to me, pretty amazing stuff.
        So I guess my question is, how--and it is really for any of
    you, I guess. But how do you, number one, know what is
    happening in technology in the world, particularly when so much
    occurs with small businesses that don't have the regular
    interaction with you?
        And, secondly, somebody, one of the companies I met with,
    proudly told me their R&D budget was more than double DARPA's
    whole budget. You know, they seemed very proud of that. But
    part of the question is, how do you all leverage what the
    companies are doing? And, I mean, so you have the small
    businesses, you have big companies with massive budgets of R&D.
    How does all of that fit together as you all are moving ahead?
        Secretary Lemnios. Well, first of all, money is not
    everything, but it does help. The global R&D budget, globally,
    is about $1.2 trillion. About a third of that is in Asia, about
    a third of that is in this country, and about a third of that
    is rest of world. But, round numbers, about $400 billion that
    U.S. companies spend in research and development.
        Our budget request of $12 billion is focused on those
    particular areas where the Department either will drive new
    areas that we need to open or will sustain competence and
    leadership in areas that we, in fact, depend upon.
        And as far as how do we find those ideas, you know, if you
    are an agency director and you have a budget, they sort of find
    you. I can't tell you how many proposals I get each week. I am
    not an agency director, but they seem to find me. And I
    encourage that. You know, we look for ideas that don't come
    from traditional sources. We have open solicitations.
        We try to build a much stronger connection with industry. I
    mentioned the Defense Innovation Marketplace is one way to
    drive that discussion. We are building a very strong connection
    with industry's IRAD. What I actually want to do is help
    industry understand the Department's future needs so that they
    can shape their investments. You know, it is sort of like,
    let's partner on this and be smart about it. Industry is asking
    for that. The Rapid Innovation Fund is a piece of that. It is
    not all IRAD-centered, but it certainly leverages that.
        So I think we are trying to build a much tighter connection
    with industry, having industry understand where the Department
    is going so that they can use their budgets accordingly.
        At the end of the day, it is about people. So whether you
    have a budget twice the Department's budget or not, it is
    really about the people that have technical ideas. And I will
    again point back to Ken and the model that DARPA has. You know,
    they can rotate a good part of their portfolio because they can
    bring people in rapid sequence. You know, we actually across
    the Department are trying to build those threads, and that is
    critically important.
        Mr. Thornberry. Yeah.
        In a way, it gives DARPA an advantage, because you do
    rotate your people in so they have that freshness of knowledge
    about what private industry is doing, I guess.
        Dr. Gabriel. Absolutely right, sir. We rotate people in 3-
    to 5-year durations. That not only rotates in fresh ideas,
    fresh perspectives, new perspectives, but it also gives a sense
    of urgency to the people doing their job, right? They have a
    finite time to get it done.
        But I think there are two other areas in which we are
    leveraging and understanding what is happening in the
    commercial marketplace and in industry. One is, 70 percent of
    our budget actually goes to industry--small business, medium-
    size, big-size. And often that is leveraging the investments
    that they are making, and are also areas that they are creating
    their next-generation capabilities and products. So that is
    ensuring that we are getting involved with them very early on
    with things that they are looking for in terms of future
    capabilities.
        And, finally, I would say that we are constantly looking at
    our own internal business processes so that we are opening the
    aperture as wide as we can to bring in a greater diversity and
    number of folks to do business. I mentioned Cyber Fast Track in
    my oral testimony--it is in the written--where we have
    consciously worked hard to tap into a segment of the cyber
    community, where, as I shared with you, 84 percent of the
    people that are now working with us had never done business
    with the government before.
        Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
        Dr. Freeman. And let me go back, if I may, just to one
    point that is, sort of, the outside this country; how do we
    know what is going on outside this country?
        One of the things that we have in the Army, and I think
    other people have something similar, but we have what we call
    ITCs, which are International Technology Centers. And we have
    people who are scientists and engineers who are stationed in
    various places around the world in these centers whose job is
    to go out and look for what is going on out in those areas. We
    have somebody, you know, in Europe, somebody in Africa. We have
    all different places in Asia, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
    So we are people who are looking for that. And they come back
    and they report back to us and to our scientists and engineers
    what they are finding out there that is pertinent to us.
        Second of all, let me go back to the people. Those
    scientists and engineers in all of our laboratories go to
    conferences. And it is very important that we allow them to do
    that around the world, because that is one of the places--just
    like you saw things out in California, that is where our
    scientists and engineers see things that are different and
    bring that information back into our corporate laboratories and
    help us to understand how we are doing things either
    differently or where they are with respect to us with
    technology.
        Mr. Thornberry. Yeah. And I know the Navy has a similar
    effort, because we have talked about it.
        And I just think it is--there is so much moving so fast, it
    is an enormous challenge. So I appreciate what you all do.
        I have one last question, and then anything else Mr.
    Langevin may have. I have been preparing for some remarks I
    will have to give later, looking back at one author's opinion
    about--well, actually, he surveys past revolutions in military
    affairs and talks about the technologies that will drive the
    next revolutions in military affairs.
        I would be interested if you all disagree with any of
    these, if you think they are not that big a deal, or if there
    is a big thing that is left out: One is robotics; second is
    space; third is lasers and directed energy; fourth is cyber;
    fifth is nanotechnology; and sixth is biology, both, you know,
    improving our own soldiers and nefarious kinds of biology.
        Does something jump into your mind that he left out there,
    as far as technologies that could drive the next revolution in
    military affairs?
        Yeah, Dr. Gabriel.
        Dr. Gabriel. Yes, sir, if I may, I think one that is
    glaring in its absence is a hyperconnected, socially networked
    world. As you know, everyone is now connected. We talked in my
    oral testimony about hundreds of millions of people walking
    around with cell phones. But they are connected now, and they
    are connected in ways that was not possible even 10 years ago.
        We did, as we shared with you before, a competition at the
    40th anniversary of the building of the Internet where the
    competition was to find ten 8-foot-diameter red weather
    balloons situated somewhere in the lower 48 States. Those
    balloons were found in 8 hours and 52 minutes by socially
    networked, connected groups that had an incentive to find them.
    This was a $40,000 prize. Those ten 8-foot-diameter red weather
    balloons could not have been found with the assets--the
    traditional assets that we had.
        So they are creating both opportunities and threats for us
    with this sort of capability.
        Mr. Thornberry. And so, Arab Spring-like examples. Your
    point is that that whole phenomena is a whole field in and of
    itself. It is not just faster communication; it is a whole
    field in and of itself.
        Dr. Gabriel. Absolutely, sir. Not only for--imagine you set
    up a checkpoint, we set up a checkpoint somewhere, and within
    seconds everybody knows where it is, how many people are there
    because of that connectivity that is everywhere in the world.
    In Bangladesh, there are 30--out of 100 in the population, 30
    have cell phones. Worldwide average is 64 per 100.
        Mr. Thornberry. Interesting.
        Dr. Freeman. I guess I would add one more, and it is more
    of the things that it could be good or it could be bad, and it
    is about power and energy. And if we do not--I mean, we really
    have to--I mean, and some of these things like nanotechnology
    and some of those other things are part of that, but a real
    focus on where and what we can do with power and energy is
    really, really something that I think can either be a game-
    changer or it can be a game-killer.
        Mr. Thornberry. Yeah. No, that is a good point. It bothered
    me a little bit, one of you all mentioned reducing your
    investment on energy as a result of the budget cuts. And, yeah,
    I take your point. It will be central to anything we do in the
    future.
        Anybody have anything else?
        Mr. Langevin, do you have any other questions?
        Mr. Langevin. I thank the panel.
        Mr. Thornberry. Yeah. Well, I do, too.
        Thank you. Again, you all timed it just perfectly. Votes
    are about to start. And so, thank everybody for being here and
    for what you have done.
        With that, the hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                               February 29, 2012

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                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER

        Mr. Miller. In light of today's constrained fiscal environment, can
    you talk to the importance of Developmental Test & Evaluation and its
    importance in controlling acquisition costs?
        Secretary Lemnios. Developmental Test & Evaluation (DT&E) is one of
    the critical elements in controlling acquisition costs.
        Since the late 1990s, major weapons systems have been failing
    initial operational testing and evaluation (IOT&E) at an increasing
    rate. Specifically, 25 percent of programs completing IOT&E between
    1984 and 2000 failed either Effectiveness or Suitability. By the time
    Congress enacted and the President signed the Weapon Systems
    Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA), this failure rate had increased to 43
    percent. Developmental Test & Evaluation is an important element of any
    program to ensure that deficiencies in acquisition programs are
    identified early--when it is most cost-effective to fix them--before
    programs reach operational testing or production milestones. Tight
    concurrency between DT&E and production decisions risks elevated
    retrofit costs that could have been avoided by proper phasing of DT&E.
    Robust DT&E across the Department's acquisition programs is the
    mechanism to deliver vital data.
        Mr. Miller. Congress created the position of Director of
    Developmental Test & Evaluation to ensure that deficiencies in programs
    are identified and addressed before those programs reach operational
    testing--because it's cheaper to find it and fix it early than it is to
    go back and fix it once it's already in production. The Director,
    Operational Test & Evaluation has 326 programs he's responsible for.
    The Director, DT&E has about 270 programs, but only \1/4\ of the staff
    of DOT&E. Do you believe OSD/DT&E is properly resourced in terms of
    both manpower and funding?
        Secretary Lemnios. The FY13 President's Budget Request for OSD/DT&E
    manpower and funding would provide adequate resources to support the
    responsibilities of the office.
        We have effectively used government detailees, government
    rotational assignments and technical staff across our Federally Funded
    Research and Development Centers to add capacity and bring technical
    depth into the office. These resources have allowed us to increase the
    capacity of DT&E and share best practices across the Department to
    effectively engage with major defense acquisition programs for which
    DT&E has statutory oversight.
        Mr. Miller. In 2009, Congress passed the Weapons System Acquisition
    Reform Act, which states that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for DT&E shall be the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and
    the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, on
    developmental test and evaluation. It also states that the DDT&E will
    report to and be supervised by the Under Secretary. Do you believe the
    Department of Defense has complied with that legislation in terms of
    organizational and reporting structures it has put in place?
        Secretary Lemnios. I believe the Department has complied with WSARA
    in terms of organizational and reporting structures. The DASD (DT&E)
    advises the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition, Technology and Logistics on all matters relating to
    developmental test and evaluation within the Department. In particular,
    the USD(AT&L), as the Milestone Decision Authority for Major Defense
    Acquisition Programs, relies on the DASD(DT&E) for advice on the
    demonstrated maturity of designs to enter initial production and on the
    adequacy of planned test programs at the beginning of Engineering and
    Manufacturing Development. The reporting chain through ASD(R&E) allows
    for alignment between DT&E and Systems Engineering efforts within the
    Department.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
        Mr. Langevin. I am pleased to see the emphasis on cybersecurity in
    each of your testimony, and I am also pleased that since last year's
    hearing on these matters the Department of Defense has identified cyber
    as one of the Department's seven key S&T areas. Secretary Lemnios, how
    are you ensuring that the various defense cyber R&D efforts are both
    responsive to the DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace and well-
    coordinated across agencies and individual laboratories?
        Secretary Lemnios. The Department recently established the Cyber
    Investment Management Board (CIMB) in response to the National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011. This board is comprised
    of the Department's policy, acquisition, and technology leaders, to
    provide strategic oversight of the Department's cyber investments. To
    shape the Department's cyber S&T investments, the DoD Cyber S&T Working
    Group was established. It brings together representatives from across
    DoD's operational and S&T organizations and serves as focal point for
    coordination of cyber S&T across the DoD research community and related
    DoD organizations. This Department-wide Working Group was entrusted
    with the task of developing the Cyber S&T Roadmap that outlines the S&T
    gaps and leap-ahead capabilities needed to implement the DoD Strategy
    for Operating in Cyberspace. ASD (R&E) established a pair of cyber
    security program elements to address gap areas and create enhanced
    cross-laboratory collaboration among the Services and NSA at the
    technical level.
        Mr. Langevin. For the panel, what do we need to change to ensure
    that we are better able to identify and mitigate risks in the cyber
    domain?
        Secretary Lemnios. In the short term, we are working with the
    commercial vendors to harden their IT products to be resilient to
    attack through efforts such as the Enduring Security Framework. Over
    the longer term, cyber research needs to mature like other scientific
    disciplines.
        The science underpinning cyber is immature. To address these
    shortcomings, DoD research agencies such as the Air Force Office of
    Scientific Research fund university research on this topic. In
    addition, we have designed and initiated a cyber measurement campaign
    to assess the performance of cyber technology quantitatively. This
    campaign will develop a comprehensive, long-term plan to incorporate
    quantitative assessment into cyber S&T. This includes identifying the
    technical foundations for a cyber measurement framework, developing
    technically sound metrics, and developing capabilities to fill
    experimentation and test range gaps.
        The DoD research community is working with the Intelligence
    Community and industry to provide early warning on new cyber risks,
    threats, and exploits. In 2011, the Cyber S&T Priority Steering Council
    developed a research roadmap covering the foundations of trust,
    resilient infrastructure, agile operations, and mission assurance as
    technical foundations for cyber security. The ASD(R&E) Cyber Applied
    Research and Advanced Development programs are also investing in tools
    for software and hardware analysis, hardening of tactical systems and
    moving target defenses. Research in these areas will enhance our
    ability to identify and mitigate operational and supply chain risks.
        Mr. Langevin. Secretary Lemnios, how would you characterize the
    health of the DOD labs and the R&D workforce?
        Secretary Lemnios. I would characterize the health of the DoD
    laboratories as sufficient to meet current missions. However, I also
    see a need to strengthen this enterprise in an era where technology is
    globally available and innovation cycles have collapsed from years to
    months.
        The DoD labs continue to serve as the core element of the
    Department's technical base. Indeed, the 37,000 scientists and
    engineers (S&E) in our labs represent 34 percent of the Department's
    total S&E population. Of these scientists and engineers, 26 percent
    possess Masters degrees while nine percent possess PhDs. This higher
    than the U.S. national S&E workforce, which is comprised of 21 percent
    Masters degrees and seven percent PhDs (FY2010 data from the National
    Science Board 2012 Science and Engineering Indicators report). DoD labs
    are part of a national security enterprise that works closely with
    other laboratories including Federally Funded Research & Development
    Centers (FFRDCs), University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs),
    Academia, Industry and the Department of Energy (DOE) National labs in
    developing future warfighting technologies as well as providing quick
    response to immediate warfighting technical needs. Each lab has unique
    capabilities to meet specific missions that we closely monitor to
    ensure the Department's core technical competencies are addressed. Our
    labs support the most technically advanced military in the world and we
    believe the laboratories have played a major role in achieving this
    accomplishment.
        Our laboratory system is a mix of corporate research labs, e.g.,
    Naval Research Lab and Army Research Lab that maintain basic science as
    their primary focus, and engineering centers such as the Navy Warfare
    Centers and the Army's Research and Engineering Development Centers
    that maintain the Department's in-house system engineering expertise.
    The Services invest approximately one third of their basic science
    budgets to in-house programs. A recent review of the labs' basic
    science program was conducted by the Defense Science Board and
    concluded the in-house basic research program is technically strong and
    healthy.
        Mr. Langevin. How does the Department utilize its STEM education
    and outreach programs to build the workforce we need for the future?
    How does the Department coordinate efforts and balance depth versus
    breadth with regards to STEM outreach?
        Secretary Lemnios. The portfolio of DoD STEM education and outreach
    programs provides the Department with opportunities to provide an
    incentive to large numbers of young people across the country to pursue
    STEM education as well as to produce a high-quality STEM workforce. The
    ASD(R&E) chaired STEM Executive Board, which is comprised of Senior
    leadership from across the Department, serves as the primary mechanism
    for cross-Departmental coordination, and for Department-wide balance
    regarding depth and breadth.
        DoD STEM programs at the undergraduate and graduate levels provide
    the Department a source of high-quality talent available for the DoD
    workforce. The Science, Mathematics and Research for Transformation
    (SMART) program, a scholarship-for-service program, provides students
    and current DoD employees an opportunity to pursue undergraduate or
    graduate degrees in one of 19 academic disciplines that are critical to
    the Department's STEM workforce needs. Students are required to provide
    a year of service in one of the DoD's laboratories for each year of
    funding received through SMART. To date, nearly 400 students have
    completed degrees and joined the DoD workforce.
        The National Security Science and Engineering Faculty Fellowship
    (NSSEFF) provides research awards to 29 high-performing and
    distinguished university researchers and their students to conduct
    revolutionary research that is critical to DoD and national security.
    In turn, these 29 Fellows have attracted over 400 exceptional students
    and postdoctoral scholars. These researchers and their students have
    made significant contributions in critical areas to DoD. As evidence,
    their research productivity has resulted in over 1,000 presentations
    (418 international), 329 peer-reviewed publications and 39 patents. To
    ensure that DoD has direct connectivity with NSSEFF students, they have
    been engaged with DoD scientists and engineers at our laboratories and
    presented at a student focused conference.
        Mr. Langevin. Are there particular concerns that you have with
    regards to the health of the DOD R&D community that we need to address?
        Secretary Lemnios. Maintaining the health of the DoD R&D community
    is one of my top priorities. As with any ``thought-based'' enterprise,
    the quality of people is at the top of the priority pyramid. Without
    high quality people, the health of the R&D community will be difficult
    to maintain. The DoD laboratory community (a subset of the overall R&D
    community) is distributed and diverse, and is comprised of 37,000
    scientists and engineers (S&E) and represent 34 percent of the
    Department's total S&E population. Of these scientists and engineers,
    26 percent possess Masters degrees while nine percent possess PhDs.
    This is higher than the U.S. national S&E workforce, which is comprised
    of 21 percent Masters degrees and seven percent PhDs. The overall R&D
    enterprise is of similarly high quality, and consists of public
    employees and uniformed Service members in DoD agencies and labs,
    researchers in academia, scientists and engineers in DoD-sponsored
    Federally-Funded R&D Centers (FFRDCs), research staff at the National
    Labs, and technologists at DoD prime contractors and small businesses.
    As the Department shifts its focus to the priorities called for in the
    new DoD strategy Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
    Century Defense, it is important that all of these sectors in the DoD
    R&D community remain fully engaged.
        The President's FY 13 Budget Request is carefully crafted to ensure
    that all these sectors of the DoD R&D community can continue to
    contribute robustly to the evolving challenges.
        Mr. Langevin. For the panel, what do we need to change to ensure
    that we are better able to identify and mitigate risks in the cyber
    domain?
        Dr. Freeman. I believe that Army S&T has sufficient funding and
    authorities to execute our cyber security efforts. S&T efforts are
    focused on securing our tactical networks, to provide a more secure
    foundation in which participants and components, including devices and
    software, are able to work together in near real time to: identify,
    prevent and anticipate cyber attacks, limit the spread of attacks
    across participating devices; minimize the consequences of attacks; and
    recover systems and networks to trusted states.
        Mr. Langevin. Are there particular concerns that you have with
    regards to the health of the DOD R&D community that we need to address?
        Dr. Freeman. I have three major areas of concern--infrastructure,
    facilities and workforce. With regard to facilities, we are currently
    undertaking a comprehensive site survey to document the condition and
    capabilities of our S&T infrastructure and facilities. Currently, the
    condition of facilities is examined at the installation level against a
    set of criteria that does not consider the specialized scientific
    requirements of our buildings. This approach does not give us the data
    required to truly understand the particular needs of the S&T facilities
    themselves, as opposed to the overall health of the installations on
    which they are located. This is a complicated undertaking, as the S&T
    enterprise is spread over five commands, and in many cases those
    commands are not the owners of the buildings they use. However, without
    this comprehensive survey, we will not be able to produce a true
    priority list for the most urgent areas of concern. With respect to our
    workforce, people are the Army's most valuable resource. Our Science
    and Technology workforce comprises government civilian scientists,
    technicians, engineers, wage grade workers and support personnel, as
    well as Soldiers and contract personnel who offer a wide array of
    specialties and abilities that allow Army science and technology labs
    and centers to cover the full spectrum of research, engineering and
    operational support for the nation, particularly the Warfighter.
    Developing and maintaining the world-class cadre of scientists,
    engineers, and technologists we have requires a three-phased approach:
        1) invest in educational outreach initiatives to build a diverse,
    STEM capable talent source for the future workforce,
        2) invest in research initiatives at the college and graduate
    school level to provide focus and generate expertise for the next
    generation of Army researchers, and
        3) grow existing workforce capabilities through exchange programs
    and other authorities that provide for workforce development to help us
    maintain a vibrant, agile, well-educated cadre of Scientist and
    Engineers. Perhaps our most serious challenge is the contemplated
    workforce reductions necessitated by a severely constrained budget.
    Without a world-class cadre of scientists and engineers, and the
    infrastructure that supports their work, the Army S&T enterprise would
    be in serious trouble. Previous 1-n lists developed by each command
    have ranked our S&T positions lower in priority than other non-S&T
    positions, and a disproportionate loss of science and engineering
    talent could have devastating consequences for the Army. Continuing
    this practice, or following a ``last in, first out'' approach to
    reducing the workforce will have severe ramifications on our ability to
    provide our current and future Soldiers with the technology that
    enables them to defend America's interests and those of our allies
    around the world.
        Mr. Langevin. For the panel, what do we need to change to ensure
    that we are better able to identify and mitigate risks in the cyber
    domain?
        Admiral Klunder. This is a very complicated question with few easy
    answers. First and foremost, every interface and interaction in
    cyberspace is a potential vulnerability. This is an asymmetric
    situation where the defender must protect everything and the attacker
    can succeed by circumventing a single defensive barrier. There are a
    number of key elements that comprise our cyber domain, each of which
    provides our adversaries with potential exploitable vulnerabilities and
    result in significant challenges for the defender. The most prevalent
    examples include software (applications as well as operating systems),
    hardware (including microprocessors and programmable logic such as
    field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs)), and lastly, the user.
    Complicating this picture is the fact that we lack the critical
    technological understanding of the information technology (IT) supply
    chain that we employ in our critical systems--resulting in pool of
    unknown vulnerabilities ripe for exploitation. The supply chain also
    includes DoD contractors and subcontractors and the challenges in
    protecting the integrity of their networks the data.
        Additionally, embracing commercial practices and technology has
    made for an uneasy tradeoff between affordability and security. The
    results and effects are irreversible--large parts of our information
    infrastructure use foreign technologies and manufactured parts
    including chipsets, firmware, software applications, computer
    workstations and peripherals, and the very Internet routers moving DoD
    email through cyberspace. Software, likely the most critical of the
    three aforementioned key elements, is a major source of security
    failures and exploited vulnerabilities, and which largely remains a
    craft practiced by artisans, not engineers, despite the years of basic
    research into the mathematics of programming languages and algorithms.
    Defects from whatever source such as poorly defined protocols,
    inadequate testing, and ambiguous requirements and/or specifications
    create exploitable vulnerabilities. Expectations for patch management
    are assumed upon delivery and even prior to initial operation. Such
    practices have created a reactive rather than proactive environment,
    and in large part, these practices have been accepted by the military.
        These challenges have resulted in the development of a
    comprehensive strategy that is comprised of three major tenets. The
    first tenet of our science and technology (S&T) program is to address
    software and the vulnerabilities that result from the previously
    illustrated example defects. The strategy includes developing tools to
    automatically analyze and reduce layering and software growth. This
    results in smaller, simpler and more cohesive software that should
    improve module verification and system level testing. Next, tools are
    being developed to analyze commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) shrink-wrap
    software (executable binary code). This analysis affords us two
    opportunities never available before: first, we can now detect the
    presence of embedded malicious code and second, we can ``trim''
    unnecessary software features not required for use in our military
    environment. Our software strategy is also focused on developing tools
    for better whole code software verification and automated testing of
    both government-off-the-shelf (GOTS) and COTS software.
        The second tenet of our S&T program is to address hardware
    vulnerabilities, with particular emphasis on the challenges we face
    with our supply chain. Efforts are currently focused on new anti-tamper
    technology to detect when unauthorized changes have occurred. These new
    approaches include, for example, hardware metering techniques and
    physical unclonable function (PUF) circuits. We see promise in these
    technologies and their value in protecting our hardware devices and the
    associated intellectual property.
        Lastly, the third tenet of our S&T program is to address users and
    their associated behavior in cyber space. Realize, for example, the
    success of a phishing attack is predicated on the successful
    exploitation of the user. We recognize that we cannot address the vast
    pool of vulnerabilities across our cyber domain, therefore, in this
    tenet we are developing technologies (algorithms, techniques, sensors,
    etc.) to improve our detection and pro-active remediation of
    insecurities by characterizing behavior that is vulnerable to
    exploitation. These behavioral models are not only of the user, but the
    applications that operate on the network as well--with particular
    emphasis on identifying the genesis of ``behavior'' that typically
    results in insecurities.
        Mr. Langevin. Are there particular concerns that you have with
    regards to the health of the DOD R&D community that we need to address?
        Admiral Klunder. U.S. military supremacy has been tightly linked to
    technological dominance. We need to maintain a strong R&D community and
    infrastructure to ensure our technical dominance.
        The Department of Navy (DoN) R&D community is comprised of 15 major
    activities supporting the broad spectrum of DoN missions and technology
    requirements. The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), 12 Warfare Centers,
    and 2 Systems Centers provide the critical science and engineering
    back-bone to ensure sustained technological superiority.
        The Navy appreciates the Congress' continued support of Section
    852, the Acquisition Workforce Fund that has authorized recruitment,
    training, and retention of scientists and engineers with the skills and
    experience necessary to meet our technical challenges. Additionally,
    the Navy appreciates the Congress' support of Section 219 enabling
    defense laboratories to invest in critical scientific and engineering
    capabilities of their respective mission areas. These have reaped
    positive benefits for the DoN.
        The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) conducts some of the most
    advanced research in the world, which depends on state-of-the-art,
    costly, high-precision equipment and facilities. Deferred investment in
    facilities hinders the recruitment and retention of a high quality
    workforce, causes millions of dollars in damage to laboratories and
    equipment, and results in many months of delays to critical research
    projects while laboratories are restored. Maintaining and revitalizing
    the Naval R&D infrastructure remains a concern. This is underscored
    even more during this period of tightened budgets.
        The Warfare and Systems Centers are key conduits for integration
    technologies into existing and future systems and platforms. As was
    noted in the 2010 Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) study on the
    Status and Future of the Naval R&D Establishment, the Warfare Centers
    and Systems Centers are a ``gateway between current and emerging
    technologies and future Naval warfare capabilities.'' Conscious and
    sustained investment in the workforce and infrastructure of these
    activities is essential for our future security.
        Mr. Langevin. For the panel, what do we need to change to ensure
    that we are better able to identify and mitigate risks in the cyber
    domain?
        Dr. Walker. Our vision is for an assured cyber advantage across
    air, space, cyber, C4ISR (command, control, communications, and
    computer (C4) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)),
    and infrastructure. An end state would include assured air, space and
    cyber operations conducted globally through a wide spectrum of cyber
    conditions and threats; a full spectrum set of cyber capabilities to
    reliably deliver a broad range of effects; persistent, global, cyber
    situation awareness; integrated command and control for kinetic and
    cyber weapon effects; assured, reliable, affordable supply chains for
    cyber infrastructure; and highly skilled and effective cyber-warriors
    and workforce. Successfully accomplishing such a vision requires not
    just Air Force leadership but the ability to leverage technology
    developments from industry, other Services and government agencies to
    develop capabilities to meet Air Force requirements.
        To ensure we are better able to identify and mitigate risks in the
    cyber domain, we need to achieve the following four strategic goals:
        1. Assure and Empower the Mission--Enable Air Force missions to be
    assured while cyber threats are avoided, identified, contained and/or
    defeated; conduct effective full spectrum operations while maintaining
    real-time situational awareness for command and control.
        2. Create Next-Generation Cyber Warriors--Select, educate, train,
    and augment cyber warriors for superior performance; enable
    visualization of a complex cyber common operational picture.
        3. Enhance Agility and Resilience--Develop resilient, agile
    architectures that can avoid, fight through, and recover from attacks;
    intelligently mix government and commercially-developed technology to
    achieve both trust and affordability.
        4. Invent Foundations of Trust and Assurance--Provide the Air Force
    with organic capabilities to mitigate supply chain intervention and to
    establish hardware and software root-of-trust; create the foundations
    of trust for applications, functions and missions; develop the
    mathematical algebra to represent missions, applications and
    infrastructure for provably correct mission characterizations in
    contested environments.
        Mr. Langevin. Are there particular concerns that you have with
    regards to the health of the DOD R&D community that we need to address?
        Dr. Walker. The health of the R&D community depends on our ability
    to retain a strong science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
    (STEM) workforce. The Air Force is developing measures through our STEM
    Advisory Council and Bright Horizons, the Air Force STEM Workforce
    Strategic Roadmap, to improve our ability to attract, retain, shape,
    and manage our mission critical STEM workforce. Bright Horizons
    discusses the national challenge of producing STEM-degreed talent and
    the importance of Air Force maintaining a competitive edge by
    recruiting and retaining STEM personnel.
        The Air Force is confronted with supply and demand challenges that
    require us to strategically manage our STEM workforce. These problems
    include a declining STEM talent pool from our educational system, lack
    of diversity in our future STEM workforce, worldwide competition for
    STEM talent, and low attraction to Air Force STEM careers.
        Through Bright Horizons, we are identifying current and future STEM
    workforce requirements, developing strategies to address any gaps
    between them, and establishing methods to measure for success.
    Priorities for the Air Force include hiring of STEM-degreed
    individuals, STEM interns, and Science, Mathematics and Research for
    Transformation (SMART) Scholars; and protecting STEM training and
    education resources. Our STEM workforce is critical to the Air Force,
    and our success depends upon implementing the initiatives within Bright
    Horizons.
        Mr. Langevin. For the panel, what do we need to change to ensure
    that we are better able to identify and mitigate risks in the cyber
    domain?
        Dr. Gabriel. [The information was not available at the time of
    printing.]
        Mr. Langevin. Are there particular concerns that you have with
    regards to the health of the DOD R&D community that we need to address?
        Dr. Gabriel. [The information was not available at the time of
    printing.]
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
        Mr. Shuster. The Department of Defense invests millions of dollars
    each fiscal year in research and development through our universities,
    yet most of these initiatives do not advance to the applied and
    advanced research levels. What can be done to assist universities with
    technology transfer in order to ensure DoD is getting a return on their
    investments? Would the Department of Defense consider partnership
    programs with experts in the field of technology transfer to assist
    universities cross the bridge from innovation to commercialization?
        Secretary Lemnios. The Department's funding of research and
    development through universities is principally executed through 6.1
    basic research project funds. These efforts support long term
    investments in new technologies and concepts where discovery is needed
    and the underlying technology base needs to be developed. While our
    universities excel at basic research, not all funded concepts will
    advance to applications. Many will set the foundation for future
    applications, while others will be overcome by competing ideas in the
    advanced research process. As such, the return on investment is
    measured in long timelines with the understanding that today's basic
    research investments provide future options that would not be available
    without seed research funding.
        For those concepts that are reaching maturity, the Department is
    launching a pilot effort to facilitate the transfer of university-
    developed innovation to industry for commercialization. This effort
    involves inviting industry scientists familiar with the development of
    advanced technologies from firms from the defense industrial base to
    attend the Department's Multidisciplinary University Research
    Initiative (MURI) project reviews. By inviting industry to these
    reviews, which had not been done before, we hope to facilitate early
    stage information exchange between university researchers and industry
    product developers. MURI projects are DoD funded multi-university and
    multidisciplinary projects that bring together prominent scientists to
    develop new concepts in emerging areas of basic science; there are
    approximately 150 MURI projects currently underway. Industry attendance
    at the reviews provides the firms insight into the university research
    and opportunities for them to cement early relationships with the
    researchers in areas of interest to the firm. We believe developing
    these early relationships while the research is underway will
    facilitate the transfer of university developed technology into
    commercial products much faster and more completely than is done today.
    At the first meeting of this pilot effort sixteen firms from the
    defense industrial base attended and interacted with the university
    researchers. The response from industry and universities to the pilot
    effort has been positive. The next industry-university MURI review is
    planned to occur around August 8-10, 2012.
        We are starting with the MURI program because it has a demonstrated
    track record of major accomplishments and proven to be an excellent
    source of new and very innovative concepts that can lead to new
    products. As this pilot effort progresses we plan to host joint
    workshops with our industrial base and academic associations to discuss
    ways to apply the lessons learned from this pilot program to other DoD-
    funded university and defense lab basic research programs.
        Mr. Shuster. As chairman of the Panel on Business Challenges within
    the Defense Industry, I have seen the incredible capability that Small
    Businesses can bring to the table to quickly and effectively innovate
    and commercialize technology. What is the Department of Defense doing
    to utilize small businesses to facilitate technology transfer and help
    advance University and Defense Lab research progress to full-scale
    production? What mechanisms do you have to transition the efforts of
    the S&T community, including Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR)
    programs, into major acquisition programs of record?
        Secretary Lemnios. There are a number of programs available to
    transition small business research efforts into programs of record.
         The Rapid Innovation Fund was established by section 1073
    of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2011 which gives priority to small business technology that resolve
    joint urgent, or critical national security needs. The RIF focuses on
    relatively mature technology that can be transitioned into an
    acquisition program, or made available to the Department as a new
    commercial product within 24 months. The Department is beginning
    contract awards and will have a better sense of the success of the RIF
    in 3Q FY 2013.
         The DoD SBIR/STTR Program currently has two programs to
    encourage the transition of SBIR and Small Business Technology Transfer
    (STTR) research into DoD acquisition programs: the Phase II Enhancement
    Program, and the Commercialization Pilot Program.
            --The SBIR/STTR Phase II Enhancement Program facilitates
            transition by providing SBIR/STTR Phase II awardees with
            additional funds when there is a strong pull for the awardee's
            technology. To qualify for the enhancement funds, the awardee
            must provide matching funds from a non-SBIR/STTR source; e.g.,
            a DoD acquisition program or the private sector.
            --The Commercialization Pilot Program accelerates
            commercialization and fielding of capabilities through enhanced
            collaboration among the small business, prime contractors, and
            the DoD science and technology acquisition communities.
            Participation in the CPP is by invitation, and participants
            receive a variety of assistance services and/or opportunities
            to include modifications to existing Phase II contracts with
            additional non-SBIR funding and/or additional SBIR funding
            beyond the normal SBIR funding guidelines. The purpose of the
            additional funds is expand research, development, test, or
            evaluation that leads to an accelerated transition and
            commercialization. DoD Components have criteria and processes
            to identify projects with the potential for rapid transition.
         The Department's Rapid Reaction Fund (RRF) and Quick
    Reaction Fund (QRF) programs have been used to accelerate the
    transition of technology developed by small businesses. One example is
    the Augmented Reality Visualization of the Common Operating Picture
    (ARVCOP) project. This concept was funded through RRF and resulted in
    an augmented reality tactical display that allows sailors to visualize
    hazards, sea lanes, markers, etc., in reduced visibility. ARVCOP is
    currently being used by the Navy, and a variant of the capability is
    available on the commercial market.
                                     ______

                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUPPERSBERGER
        Mr. Ruppersberger. What is the long term investment strategy in 6.1
    basic science and research for the Department of Defense? Which areas
    are being funded strategically to support the long term needs of our
    service and intelligence customers?
        Secretary Lemnios. DoD basic research supports transformational
    science with the potential to revolutionize the Nation's warfighting
    capabilities. In addition, DoD basic research helps educate well over
    ten thousand new scientists and engineers every year, assuring the
    Nation's continued national security, economic vitality, and technical
    preeminence.
        Each of the Military Departments pursues a strategic focus on
    numerous basic science topics including but not limited to, physics,
    lasers and optics, space science, geophysics, oceanographic and
    atmospheric sciences, acoustics, chemistry, biology, materials,
    mathematics, information and computer sciences, decision-making,
    psychology, sociology, aerospace engineering, electrical engineering,
    and mechanical engineering.
        In addition, we have developed a set of six cross-cutting
    ``strategic basic science investment areas'', around which we are
    shaping the Department's basic research investment. The six are:
        Engineered Materials: materials not found in nature, and designed
    for ultra-efficient microelectronics, smaller radars, and perhaps the
    next generation of stealth.
        Synthetic Biology: exploiting the convergence of nano-engineering
    and life at the cellular level for the efficient production of food,
    fuel, energy, and new sensors.
        Quantum Information Science: new physical paths towards ultra-
    secure communications, precise navigation without GPS, and ultra-fast
    computation.
        Cognitive Neuroscience: understanding the neuro-pathways in the
    human brain and the science of perception, training, and trauma.
        Modeling Human Behavior: understanding how the ensemble of humans,
    known as society, expresses its character, rules, and cultures.
        Nanoscience and nanotechnology: where advances continue unabated,
    and power new future technologies.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. How is the Department of Defense translating
    ideas into practice? Is there a technology commercialization strategy
    other than the use of SBIR and STTR funds?
        Secretary Lemnios. The Department's technology transition strategy
    identifies new mechanisms to engage with non-traditional performers
    including small businesses and opens new channels for small business to
    access Department facilities and resources. This strategy is focused on
    improved transition or commercialization of small business-developed
    technologies through a variety of opportunities including:
          Provide access for small businesses to the Department's
    training and test facilities to test and refine technology development.
    For example, the Joint Experimental Range Complex (JERC) at the U.S.
    Army Yuma Proving Ground provides opportunities for small businesses to
    test and refine their technologies in realistic DoD operational
    environments, and with feedback from operational personnel. The test
    and refine process increases the probability of successful transition
    of the small business technology into a DoD program of record, or into
    commercialization as a new product.
          Provide small businesses access to DoD laboratories'
    intellectual property, personnel, equipment, data, facilities, or other
    resources through Cooperative Research and Development Agreements
    (CRADAs). A CRADA facilitates technology transfer between the federal
    government and private sector by enabling technical exchange and
    information sharing. For example, The Army Research, Development, and
    Engineering Center at Picatinny Arsenal established an agreement with
    the County College of Morris County, N.J. to provide collaborative work
    space with 18 small businesses. The CRADA provides the small businesses
    a structure to use the lab's facilities and equipment to develop their
    technology, and to work collaboratively with lab personnel on
    technology development efforts. The lab and the college provide
    training and business support for the companies, and the companies
    receive funding and staff support from the New Jersey Commission on
    science and Technology and New Jersey Incubation and R&D funding
    programs.
          The Department's Rapid Reaction Fund (RRF) and Quick
    Reaction Fund (QRF) programs focus on developing and fielding solutions
    to operational challenges. One example of a successful developmental
    effort by a small business is the Augmented Reality Visualization of
    the Common Operating Picture (ARVCOP) project. This concept was funded
    through RRF and resulted in an augmented reality tactical display that
    allows sailors to visualize hazards, sea lanes, markers, etc., in
    reduced visibility. ARVCOP is currently being used by Navy riverine
    forces and a variant of the capability is available on the commercial
    market. In a similar engagement model with industry, the QRF funded the
    Inflatable Satcom Antenna project in which a small business developed
    1.8m and 2.4m satellite antennas that can be folded into duffel bags
    for transportation. The antennas can be quickly set up and broken down
    for storage. This capability greatly reduces the logistics requirements
    (size and weight) when compared to moving similar sized traditional
    satcom antennas. The Marine Corps is using the Inflatable Satcom
    Antenna systems.
          The Rapid Innovation Fund (RIF) was established pursuant
    to section 1073 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Year 2011 which gives priority to small businesses whose
    technologies resolve joint urgent, or critical national security needs.
    The RIF focuses on relatively mature technologies that can be
    transitioned into an acquisition program, or made available to the
    Department as a new commercial product within 24 months. In September
    2011, the Department issued solicitations for RIF proposals and
    received over 3500 responses. Approximately 160-180 of the responses
    will receive contract awards. The RIF represents an experimental new
    mechanism for the Department of Defense to engage with the small
    business community. The Department is beginning contract awards and
    will have a better sense of the overall effectiveness of this
    congressionally-established program in 3Q FY 2013.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. What is DARPA doing to counter emerging threats?
    What areas require more investments or reallocation of funds to prevent
    technological surprise?
        Dr. Gabriel. DARPA has developed several analytic frameworks. These
    frameworks are designed to be deeply quantitative, to reveal the
    essential parameters governing a decision space, and to reveal gaps and
    opportunities. Accessible to technical and operational executives, the
    analytic frameworks are structured to ensure the Agency, and the
    Department, are better able to choose and focus investments.
    Ultimately, these frameworks have the power to reveal areas where the
    Department is divergent with threats and technological trends and thus,
    need new options.
        For example, following the insights from our ISR analytic
    framework, we shifted our investments from sensor development to
    exploitation.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. What new aerospace platforms is DARPA developing
    to prevent technological surprise? For example are you working on
    anything related to rapid access to space systems, long range global
    strike or high speed rotorcraft?
        Dr. Gabriel. Several programs in the Tactical Technology Office
    (TTO) at DARPA address the prevention of technological surprise through
    aerospace platform and technology development in the areas referenced.
    A brief description of each program is below.
        The Triple Target Terminator program seeks to develop and
    demonstrate a high speed, long range aerodynamic missile to defeat
    current and projected enemy aircraft, cruise missiles, and surface to
    air defense targets.
        The Hypersonic Technologies program is developing and testing an
    unmanned, rocket-launched, maneuverable, hypersonic air vehicle capable
    of very long range, long duration prompt global reach missions.
        Space Enabled Effects for Military Engagements seeks to demonstrate
    technologies enabling small, disposable, affordable satellite
    constellations capable of rapid deployment for persistent tactical
    military ISR applications.
        The Airborne Launch Assist Space Access program is developing a
    system to enable launch of tactically responsive payloads within 24
    hours of request at the cost of $1M per flight in the 100 pound payload
    class.
        System F6 is developing and testing the feasibility and benefits of
    replacing large monolithic spacecraft with a cluster of wirelessly-
    interconnected modules capable of secure, real-time resource sharing.
        The Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) X-Plane program will
    develop and demonstrate in flight VTOL technologies to facilitate
    advancement of the next generation of military rotorcraft with
    significantly improved speed, range, endurance, efficiency; and the
    ability to hover at altitude.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING
        Mr. Schilling. How do you see the role of cyber security advancing
    under the new budgetary constraints? What will be the main obstacles
    and how do you plan to work around those obstacles?
        Secretary Lemnios. The President of the United States and the
    Secretary for Defense released new strategic guidance, Priorities for
    21st Century Defense, which identifies cyber as a key part of the
    January 2012 strategy. Advancement of Cyber S&T is a critical element
    to enable military, intelligence, business operations, and command and
    control of full spectrum military operations, as recognized in the DoD
    Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace. The importance of meeting cyber
    security capability needs is reflected in the designation of cyber as
    one of the Department's seven key S&T areas and an increase in the
    President's Budget Request from $453 million for cyber S&T activities
    in FY12 to $486 million in FY13. This is one of the few major
    investment areas that actually showed growth in the FY13 Request and
    continues to move higher on our list of investment priorities.
        As the ASD (R&E), I established the DoD Cyber S&T Working Group to
    shape the Department's cyber S&T investments. I chartered the
    Department-wide Working Group to develop the Cyber S&T Roadmap. The
    implementation of the Cyber S&T Roadmap and continued success in
    developing capabilities through the ASD(R&E) cyber security program
    elements will enhance cyber security.
        The Department has benefited tremendously from using relatively
    inexpensive and fast-moving commercial technology, but, the resulting
    systems have been simple and inexpensive to attack while being
    difficult and costly to defend. This is exactly the situation our
    strategy will remedy by creating systems with built-in resiliency and
    resistance features to continually change the cost and complexity
    relationships on which attackers currently rely. Our S&T strategy is
    designed to drive up the cost of an adversary's efforts to attack
    compared to the efforts to defend our systems. Focused S&T investment,
    even in an era of tightened budgets, is necessary to drive down the
    cost of the operational effort to defend systems.
        Mr. Schilling. How will the funding of research and development
    inhibit the growth of DOD technical and science capabilities? What will
    be the hardest hit areas?
        Secretary Lemnios. The FY 2013 President's Budget Request (PBR) for
    DoD science and technology is $11.861 billion, which represents a
    balanced, but modest, decline of $386 million compared to the FY 2012
    PBR of $12.247 billion. This is a decline of 4.73 percent when adjusted
    for inflation. Within this budget request, the Department decided to
    more strongly support sustainment of Basic and Applied Research. While
    a decline of just less than 5 percent buying power in the science and
    technology program does have a small impact, it is manageable, and
    reasonable when taken in the context of the overall DoD budget decline.
    Funding reductions occurred in all Services, and seemed to cluster
    around military engineering, weapons research, and energy research.
    Specific areas with greater risk in the Army include: military
    engineering technology development for installations and field
    operations, and applied topographical research for geospatial products;
    plus weapons, munitions, missile, and rocket technology development for
    small precision munitions, such as mortars. Navy reductions were the
    least of the Services and included technology development to improve
    logistics operations, sustainment, and some power & energy programs.
    Within the Air Force, reductions occurred and additional risk was
    accepted in the following areas: laser protection for anti-access
    standoff munitions and for aircraft pilot visors; novel navigation
    techniques for non-permissive environments; space precision navigation
    and timing; trusted systems for avionics devices; and advanced airborne
    networked and wide-band communications. Funding reductions also
    occurred in the following Defense-wide technology areas: National
    Defense Education Program; human, social, cultural, behavior modeling;
    Joint Experimentation; Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations;
    counter weapons of mass destruction; biomaterials technologies; machine
    intelligence; cognitive computing; command, control & communication
    systems; and advanced electronics. Although the reductions are
    numerous, most are below $20 million in magnitude, and funding for the
    Department's highest priority technology programs was protected.
        Mr. Schilling. How will DARPA's role be changed in the new DOD
    force structure and will DARPA change its decision-making processes on
    what projects to pursue? If there are changes, what will they be?
        Dr. Gabriel. There are no entitlements to programs or people at
    DARPA, and we have no internal facilities or infrastructure. Since
    1992, the total number of program managers has remained unchanged at or
    below 120. These technical experts serve for a tour of 3 to 5 year,
    putting their careers in suspended animation in service to country.
    Going forward, it is imperative that DARPA continues to maintain
    maximum flexibility to rapidly hire the best technical minds in our
    nation to help fulfill the DARPA's singular mission to create and
    prevent strategic surprise.
        When determining what projects to choose, the challenge isn't
    coming up with ideas, but rather choosing among them. We ask ourselves
    three questions in determining what projects to pursue:
          Will it be game changing and have a lasting impact for
    the Department and National Security?
          Does it require DARPA technical expertise and agility?
          How does it contribute to the balance of existing DARPA
    investments?