[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE: EXAMINING PROTECTIVE AND INVESTIGATIVE
MISSIONS AND CHALLENGES IN 2012
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 14, 2011
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Serial No. 112-44
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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__________
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Billy Long, Missouri Janice Hahn, California
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania, Chairman
Paul C. Broun, Georgia, Vice Chair Jackie Speier, California
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Loretta Sanchez, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Brian Higgins, New York
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina (Ex Officio)
Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Officio)
Kevin Gundersen, Staff Director
Alan Carroll, Subcommittee Clerk
Stephen Vina, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Patrick Meehan, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence.............................. 1
The Honorable Jackie Speier, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence.............................. 4
Witnesses
Mr. Mark Sullivan, Director, United States Secret Service, United
States Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
For the Record
The Honorable Patrick Meehan, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Letter From the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association... 3
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE: EXAMINING PROTECTIVE AND INVESTIGATIVE
MISSIONS AND CHALLENGES IN 2012
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Wednesday, September 14, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:14 p.m., in
Room 210, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Patrick Meehan
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Meehan, Cravaack, Quayle, Speier,
and Hahn.
Mr. Meehan. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee
on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to order. The
subcommittee today is meeting to hear the testimony of Director
Mark Sullivan of the United States Secret Service regarding the
missions and challenges that we will face in 2012.
I want to note for the record we anticipate briefly being
called to votes and very much appreciate your presence today,
and we will be looking for a way to try to accommodate both of
these in a way that will fit the flow. Hopefully what we may be
able to do is to have an opening statement from myself and the
Ranking Member, and with respect to time, it may make more
sense to come back, allow you to have your testimony, and then
we can go into questions.
Before we begin today's hearing, I would like to thank the
Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan and his staff for allowing
us to use his hearing room. There was an overflow today due to
a conflict with another subcommittee markup. I invited Chairman
Ryan to today's hearing, but he made it clear when he decided
not to run for President, that he prefers to keep his distance
from the Secret Service.
Today's hearing is an examination of the duties,
responsibilities, and performance of the United States Secret
Service, and we will hear the challenges that we will face in
the coming year, particularly the protection challenges in the
upcoming 2012 Presidential election cycle, in light of all of
the issues that we see on a global scale. The hearing follows
our past examination of the Department of Homeland Security's
intelligence enterprises. It will help us continue in our
efforts to ensure effective Congressional oversight of
counterterrorism and intelligence-related functions of the
Department of Homeland Security.
The Secret Service is a highly-regarded institution best
known for protecting the President of the United States.
However, what is often overlooked is that its work goes far
beyond protecting the President. In addition to its protective
mission, the Secret Service ensures the integrity of the United
States currency, which is vital in a functioning country in the
world economy. Accordingly, the mission includes everything
from running beside the President's caravan to running
counterfeit money stings in Colombia and penetrating the
networks of Russian hackers. It is a global and multifaceted
law enforcement organization.
Yesterday a number of directors, Petraeus, Muller, Clapper,
Olson, Napolitano, all testified before Congress about the
evolving terrorist threat posed by lone wolf terrorists and
radicalized extremists. I think this is an issue that we have
to be anticipating in 2012.
I would like to point out that the Secret Service also
deals with terrorist threats against the President and
protectees regularly and have long experience and have
expertise with the concept of lone wolves, the two of them
enormous challenges that relate to this terrorist threat.
The 2012 Presidential election cycle is fast approaching.
Some may say it is already here. For the Service this includes
candidate protection and the security at both Democratic and
Republican Conventions. So I look forward to hearing from
Director Sullivan how the Service is adjusting with your
tightened budget environment to meet this critical mission,
particularly in light of the threat environments and the many
demonstrations that can be anticipated in events like that.
In addition to protection, the Service's investigative
responsibilities have expanded to include financial crimes like
identity theft, counterfeiting, and computer fraud and
computer-based attacks on the Nation's financial, banking, and
telecommunications infrastructure. Ten years ago, in the wake
of 9/11, the Secret Service took on an expanded mission with
the investigation of cybercrimes, recently opened an office in
Estonia to combat Russian cybercrime. The PATRIOT Act calls for
the establishment of a Nation-wide electronic crimes task force
in order to bring together multiple components to help
investigate, detect, and mitigate or prevent attacks on the
Nation's financial and critical infrastructure.
As a former United States attorney, I appreciate the
remarkably expanding role and work closely with the Secret
Service in all of these capacities, but particularly as the
emerging roles of the Electronic Crimes Task Force in fighting
cybercrime.
As part of the mission, the Secret Service plays the lead
role in planning, coordination, and implementation of security
operations at special events of National significance. The next
Secret Service will be leading security efforts at the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Hawaii, the Presidential
State of the Union Address, and significantly, to me, both the
NATO and the Group 20, G-20, meetings which will be held in
Chicago, and I think during the time when you will already be
doing substantial Presidential protection.
In addition, next week the Secret Service will be heavily
involved in protecting the heads of state at the annual United
Nations General Assembly in New York City again during a period
of time when we may be looking at a relatively significant
international event if, in fact, there is a movement forward by
the Palestinian organizations to seek international
recognition.
The success of the Secret Service depends upon the constant
and unrelenting support of the entire intelligence community
paired with positive relationships with State and local
agencies. I believe it is a model for the entire Department in
developing relationships with State and local agencies and
leveraging the rest of the intelligence community. I am going
to ask I have unanimous consent for a letter from the Federal
Law Enforcement Officers Association that I would like to
insert into the record in support of that effort. So without
objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
August 2, 2011.
The Honorable Patrick Meehan,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Committee
on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing on behalf of the membership of the
Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association (FLEOA), to express our
views with respect to the subcommittee hearing entitled ``Secret
Service Missions and Outlook.'' We respectfully request that this
letter be made part of the record for this hearing.
The Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association (FLEOA) is the
largest non-partisan, non-profit law enforcement association
representing 26,000 Federal law enforcement officers from 65 agencies.
FLEOA is considered the ``voice'' of Federal law enforcement and has
advocated for measures including the Law Enforcement Officers Safety
Act (LEOSA), the Federal Law Enforcement Badge of Bravery, and the
James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act. FLEOA has and continues
to work with Members of Congress towards the goal of ensuring that
Federal law enforcement officers and their agencies are supported,
funded, and appropriately supported in their missions.
The U.S. Secret Service is one of the premier law enforcement
agencies in the world. FLEOA represents Secret Service Special Agents
and has established a strong relationship with Director Sullivan, who
has persevered in his tenure as Director through some difficult
challenges faced by his agency. The Secret Service's protective mission
is paramount to National security and its investigative mission is a
lynchpin in securing our Nation's financial system.
From its inception, the Secret Service was given broad
investigative then protective authority as it was one of the first
Federal investigative law enforcement agency in our Nation's history.
Recently, the agency has faced funding and staffing concerns as a
result of the broad budget issues the Federal Government faces. In
2012, the next Presidential Campaign will occur and FLEOA feels it is
imperative that the Congress support and fulfill the needs outlined by
the Secret Service.
Increases in Funding
Over time, Secret Service jurisdiction has expanded and the agency
has broadened both its investigative and protective missions. Often
these increases occur at the behest of either the current
administration or Congress. Without regard to their situation, the
Secret Service and its Special Agents answer the call and effectively
carry out any assigned mission.
Unfortunately though, these enhanced authorities have not been
commensurate with the level of funding and support it has received. The
agency has often found itself doing without or having to come back to
the Congress and appeal for more. For an agency with such a stellar and
distinct reputation and mission, the budgeting process has not mirrored
it or its agents' extensive mission or needs. FLEOA recommends that the
Congress raise the level of Secret Service funding to allow the agency
to maintain its stature in the law enforcement world including in
research and development so the Secret Service can stay with advances
in ballistics, armor, explosives, and other protective technologies.
Campaign Year Pay Cap Waiver
Agent staffing is a critical component of every Presidential
Campaign. For the Secret Service, a Presidential Campaign equals a full
deployment of its personnel and resources. Agents of the Secret Service
perform a valiant service every 4 years for the people of the United
States. Staffing and managing the Presidential Campaign and ensuring
the smooth transition of the Executive branch, is not a light
assignment. Secret Service Agents and its support staff work extensive
hours, travel to multiple destinations and encumber an enormous
responsibility. The Federal Government's pay cap often blocks
remuneration to the agency's most senior Special Agents who hold the
command positions during a campaign. This has a negative effect on
morale and retention. This full deployment of Secret Service personnel
and assets occurs within the tight parameters of a security matrix that
works and is effective. The campaign's logistical challenges are
exacerbated by hiring freezes and attrition--so often the agents endure
fatigue while bearing the challenge of last-minute schedule changes,
added-on campaign stops, or stadium rally site added the night before.
FLEOA has and continues to recommend a waiver to the Federal pay
cap for the campaign year. As is done with Department of Defense
civilian personnel in CENTCOM or AFRICOM, this would assist with
recruitment and retention and acknowledge the hard work and sacrifice
they make on behalf of the American people during that intensive year.
FLEOA supports the Secret Service with its missions and hopes the
Congress will look to support the agency commensurate with the level of
dedication and sacrifice its agents perform everyday for the American
people.
Sincerely,
Jon Adler,
National president.
Mr. Meehan. Before I begin, I would like to note as well
this past weekend was the anniversary, as we all know, many of
us attended numerous events, of the tragic events of 9/11,
including the attacks on the World Trade Center where the New
York field office of the Secret Service was located. Sadly, the
Service lost the life of Special Master Officer Craig Miller,
who was actually one of those heroes who ran into the building
helping to save others. So we honor his memory today and the
other Secret Service employees who were among the first
responders of 9/11.
So, with that, I am honored to welcome Mark Sullivan, the
Director of the Secret Service, here today to testify. You are
a busy man. I want to thank you for taking the time to be with
us to--in preparation for our discussions about the great
challenges you face and with your agency in anticipation of
2012.
Now I would like to recognize the Ranking Minority Member
of the subcommittee, the gentlewoman from California, Ms.
Speier for her statements.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this
hearing today. I apologize for my tardy arrival to you, to Mr.
Sullivan, and to all the members of the public.
Let me say at the outset, Director Sullivan, we thank you
for participating in this hearing today and for enlightening
not just us, but the public in general about the important work
of the Secret Service and to review some of the challenges that
you have had in the past.
This is a critical time for the Secret Service as the
campaign season for 2012, for the Presidency, begins to heat
up. In the last Presidential election, then-candidate Barack
Obama reportedly received a record number of threats requiring
him to get Secret Service protection earlier in the campaign
cycle than any candidate in the history of this country.
We now face a diverse array of threats from terrorist
groups, lone wolves, deranged individuals, and others we may
not even know about. We learned that dramatically last January
when our dear friend and colleague Gabrielle Giffords was shot
and six people killed in Tucson, Arizona.
In what is sure to be an eventful election year, does the
Secret Service have all the resources and support it needs to
protect the candidates in this constrained budget environment?
A question for you, Director Sullivan.
Although the Secret Service has done an excellent job in
keeping our candidates safe in past elections, it has had
trouble managing its budget. The DHS inspector general recently
released a report finding that the Secret Service violated the
Antideficiency Act when the CFO failed to notify DHS and the
Congress that the Service had overspent its appropriated funds
during the hectic 2008 campaign. In the run-up to the 2012
campaign, I am interested to hear about what changes have been
made and controls put in place to prevent this from happening
again.
The Secret Service's mandate goes beyond just protecting
the President and candidates. They also have the responsibility
for protecting other Government officials, foreign dignitaries,
and the security for designated NSSEs. As the Chairman has
noted, providing protection for the U.N. Assembly, which has
just begun its work and sits in the heart of Manhattan, also
falls to the Secret Service. We are reminded by events over the
past week with the sobering news of a credible threat
surrounding the 9/11 10th anniversary that these events of
special significance also face threats from actors and actions
of terror.
In addition, there are many events over the next year that
the Secret Service must prepare for, including the APEC summit,
the G-20 summit, and the Democratic and Republican National
Conventions. It is critical that all of the Secret Service's
protective activities are conducted with the appropriate
planning, resources, and oversight.
The Secret Service has a vital mission, but it has faced
significant criticism in the past. The Secret Service has come
under fire from many, including the Ranking Member of the full
committee, who points out that the Service's poor history of
promoting a diverse workforce and for several discriminatory
practices it has been accused of in the past several years. Of
course, the last time Director Sullivan testified before the
committee, before my time on the panel, it was to answer to the
much-publicized White House security breaches. I am looking
forward to finding out if these issues have been addressed once
and for all.
I am also eager to learn more about the Secret Service's
other important mission, to investigate crimes against our
financial institutions and maintain the security of our
economy. At first this meant the Secret Service had to protect
our currency from counterfeiters, but the way we conduct
business, from personal payments to transactions between large
institutions, has drastically changed in the internet era, and
our economic security is threatened by a diverse array of
criminal activity, from counterfeiting to credit card fraud to
hacking.
So let me underscore this last question. Does the Secret
Service have the expertise and the resources it needs to keep
up with the times and be effective as a crime fighter in this
dynamic environment?
The Secret Service is absolutely vital to our Nation's
security and prosperity, and I commend the men and women of the
Secret Service for carrying out their work with diligence on 9/
11 and every day of the year.
Once again, I want to welcome you, Director Sullivan, and I
look forward to working with the Secret Service to ensure they
have all the necessary resources required to carry on this very
important dual mission. I yield back.
Mr. Meehan. Well, I want to thank the Ranking Member for
her opening comment.
I am going to make a judgment. At 2:27--by the record, they
expected to call us for votes between 2:20 and 2:30. Now,
Director, how long do you think your opening statement will be?
Mr. Sullivan. It is about 4 minutes.
Mr. Meehan. I think, my math, we should try to get this in,
and then we will also--please, when you hear the bells go, you
know that is when the moment for us to begin. But we will have
a minute or 2.
Why don't you take your time, do your opening statement,
and then at the conclusion of your opening statement, we will
recess, because I am confident we will be called to vote
thereafter, and then we will return and begin the opportunity
to ask you a few questions.
Before I begin, let me just tell, the rest of the committee
is reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
So we are pleased to have a distinguished witness before us
today on this important topic.
Director Mark Sullivan was sworn in as the 22nd Director of
the United States Secret Service on May 31, 2006. Director
Sullivan has led a distinguished career at the Secret Service.
He began his career as a special agent assigned to the Detroit
field office in 1983. He has held many positions within the
United States Secret Service, including Deputy Special Agent in
Charge of the Counterfeit Division; Special Agent in Charge of
Vice Presidential Protective Division; and also in charge of
human resources and training; the Assistant Director for the
Office of Protective Operations; and finally, Deputy Director
of the Secret Service.
During his work with the Office of Protective Operations,
Director Sullivan managed all protective activities for the
agency encompassing 12 divisions and 2,300 employees. He has
been the recipient of numerous awards for superior performance
throughout his 25-year tenure and 30-year career in law
enforcement. Most recently he was awarded a Distinguished
Presidential Rank Award.
Director Sullivan, your entire written statement will
appear in the record. We look forward to your comments.
STATEMENT OF MARK SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES SECRET
SERVICE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Sullivan. Good afternoon, and thank you, Chairman
Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished Members of the
committee. I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss
the investigative and protective mission and challenges of
2012.
I would like to thank all the Members for the work you have
done over the years to ensure that we, our front-line
employees, have the resources that we need to be effective in
today's threat environment. This has been especially critical
given the challenges we have been confronted with in recent
years. Emerging threats, a historic campaign, increases in the
number of designated National special security events, and the
proliferation of cybercrimes directed at our banking and
financial payment systems has required our front-line employees
to remain vigilant and adaptable at all times.
Despite these challenges, the men and women of the U.S.
Secret Service continue to perform their duties in an
outstanding manner. In fiscal year 2010, protective details and
field agents ensured the safe arrival and departure for more
than 5,900 domestic travel stops and 515 international travel
stops.
Foreign dignitary protection reached a record of just over
2,500 travel stops, including visits by 236 heads of state and
government. Dignitary protection also included security
operations for the nuclear security summit and the 65th
anniversary of the United Nations General Assembly, where we
staffed protective details for 125 foreign heads of state and
government and 51 spouses.
In the area of criminal investigations, our long-standing
priority of investigating financial crimes prevented roughly
$13.5 billion in potential loss. Building on that success, the
number of financial crime cases we closed in fiscal year 2010
increased just over 7 percent from fiscal year 2009 levels, a
reflection of our ability to adapt to emerging trends in
financial crimes.
We expect fiscal year 2012 to be the most demanding year
our agency has faced since the 2008 Presidential campaign. The
biggest demand on our time and resources and our people will be
the 2012 Presidential campaign, which includes candidate/
nominee protection and the planning, coordination, and
implementation of security operations for six planned NSSEs.
In preparation for the 2012 Presidential campaign, we began
training candidate protective details in May 2011. These
details recently completed their training and will be
ultimately assigned to provide protection for Presidential
candidates. The details are comprised of special agents from
our domestic offices who operate on 21-day rotational
assignments. Upon completing their rotating assignment, each
special agent returns to their respective field office to
continue their criminal investigations or participate in
protection assignments in and outside of their district. These
rotational duties continue through the end of the campaign or
until the candidate they are assigned to protect withdraws from
the campaign.
We are also coordinating with other Federal law enforcement
agencies that may assist us during the upcoming campaign. As
they did during the 2008 campaign, we anticipate that the
Transportation Security Administration officers will, from time
to time, assist our Uniformed Division officers with the
security screening at various protective venues.
Protective advance team training at numerous field offices
throughout the country has also been completed. This refresher
training is provided to special agents who will conduct the
protective security advances for our campaign visits throughout
the country.
Both the Democratic National Convention in Charlotte and
the Republican National Convention in Tampa have also been
designated as NSSEs. Under the NSSE designation, the
operational security requirements include protection for the
convention sites and venues, the candidate nominees and the
dignitaries, delegates, and general public participating in the
event.
In addition to the DNC and RNC, we are also planning for
four additional NSSEs, including the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation summit in Honolulu in November 2011, the State of
the Union Address, and the G-20 and NATO summits, both of which
are scheduled to take place next spring in Chicago, Illinois.
As the lead Federal agency, law enforcement agency,
responsible for the operational security plan at NSSEs, we will
establish multiagency communications centers, or MACCs, for
each event. Each Federal, State, and local agency with an
operational role in these events will have command-level staff
assigned to the multiagency coordinating center. This
coordination ensures that all agencies have full situational
awareness and can immediately provide assets or assistance to
one another if needed.
In closing, while fiscal year 2012 promises to be a
challenging year, I am confident that through the determination
and strong work ethic of our special agents, our Uniformed
Division officers and our administrative, professional, and
technical staff, we will successfully meet those investigative
and protective challenges.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished
Members of the committee, this concludes my opening statement,
and I am happy to answer any questions you may have at this
time or wait until you come back.
[The statement of Mr. Sullivan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark Sullivan
September 14, 2011
introduction
Good afternoon Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and other
distinguished Members of the committee. I am pleased to appear before
you today to discuss the anticipated protective and investigative
challenges the Secret Service will face in fiscal year 2012. In the 8
years since the Secret Service was transferred to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), the men and women of our agency have made
significant contributions to the overarching goals of the Department.
In recent years, the Secret Service has faced emerging threats that
have required enhancements at permanent and temporary protective sites,
a historic Presidential campaign, increases in the number of designated
National Special Security Events (NSSEs), and the proliferation of
cyber crimes directed at our banking and financial payment systems and
other critical infrastructure.
Despite these challenges, the men and women of the Secret Service
continue to perform their duties in an exemplary manner. In fiscal year
2010, Secret Service protective details and field agents ensured 100
percent incident-free protection for 5,906 domestic travel stops and
515 international travel stops. Foreign dignitary protection reached a
record 2,495 travel stops, including visits by 236 heads of state and
government, and 107 spouses from over 147 countries. Dignitary
protection also included security operations for the Nuclear Security
Summit in April 2010 and the 65th anniversary of the United Nations
General Assembly in September 2010. Additionally, the protective
mission was supported through 7,726 site surveys.
Thus far in fiscal year 2011 the Secret Service protective details
and field agents have provided protection at 246 domestic travel stops
and 49 international travel stops. Further, the U.S. Secret Service has
already commenced extensive security planning and coordination for the
Asia Pacific Economic Conference to be held in Honolulu, Hawaii on
November 12 and 13. Last, we have begun the training of the candidate
nominee protective details in preparation for the 2012 Presidential
Campaign.
In the area of criminal investigations, Secret Service field
offices closed a total of 9,137 cases in fiscal year 2010, an increase
of 7.8 percent over fiscal year 2009. These cases led to 8,930 arrests.
Additionally, the Secret Service continued to strengthen our
partnerships with U.S. Attorney offices, sustaining a high conviction
rate of 99.3 percent for all cases that went to trial. The Secret
Service's longstanding investigative priority of combating financial
crime led to an estimated $13.5 billion in potential losses prevented,
of which $6.95 billion was tied to cyber crimes. Building on these
successes, the number of financial crime cases closed increased 7.1
percent from comparable fiscal year 2009 levels, and resulted in 5,589
arrests, a reflection of the Secret Service's ability to adapt to
emerging financial and cyber crime threats.
In her appearance before the House Security Committee in March
2011, Secretary Napolitano noted that, ``Today's threat picture
features an adversary who evolves and adapts quickly and who is
determined to strike us here at home--from the aviation system and the
global supply chain to surface transportation systems, critical
infrastructure, and cyber networks.'' In the past 2 years, the
attempted assassination of the Deputy Interior Minister of Saudi Arabia
and the failed detonation of an explosive device on Delta/Northwest
Airlines flight 253 have illustrated the importance of advanced
screening techniques. Additionally, as evidenced by materials
discovered during the search of Osama bin Ladin residence, our
protectees remain a highly sought-after target by terrorist
organizations. However, even in a general sense, a heightened threat
environment for our country is an obvious concern to the Secret
Service, since many aspects of our dual mission rely on safe modes of
transportation, the security of fixed and mobile sites where our
protectees work and visit, and secure communications.
As documented through the Department's Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review\1\ and bottom-up review process,\2\ the Secret
Service's missions include the protection of our National leaders,
ensuring the continuity of National leadership, protection of visiting
heads of state and government, implementation of operational security
plans and protective activity for designated NSSEs, as well as
investigating crimes directed towards our Nation's banking and
financial payment systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Department of Homeland Security. (2010). Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland.
\2\ Bottom-Up Review Report, July 2010.
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The Secret Service anticipates that fiscal year 2012 will be a very
demanding and challenging year. As you will recall, the 2008 campaign
presented a number of unforeseen challenges, such as being directed to
provide candidate protection earlier than any time in history, a
protracted Democratic primary, massive crowds at campaign rallies all
over the country, and larger venues to secure. In fiscal year 2012, the
Secret Service will not only be responsible for candidate/nominee
protection, but also six anticipated NSSEs: (1) Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) Summit; (2) Presidential State of the Union Address;
(3) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit; (4) Group of
Twenty (G-20); (5) Republican National Convention; and (6) Democratic
National Convention.
protective operations
The Secret Service's protection mission is comprehensive, and goes
well beyond surrounding a protectee with well-armed special agents.
Over the years, the agency's protective methodologies have become more
sophisticated, incorporating such tools as airspace interdiction
systems and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
detection systems. As part of the Secret Service's continuous goal of
preventing an incident before it occurs, the agency relies heavily on
meticulous advance work and threat assessments to identify potential
risks to our protectees.
Advances in technology as well as the interdependencies of our
country's network systems have required a new paradigm in the way we
approach protection. No longer can we rely solely on human resources
and physical barriers in designing a security plan; we must also
address the inherent vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures upon
which security plans are built. Addressing such potential areas of
vulnerability is part of the comprehensive security plan the Secret
Service develops to provide the highest level of protection to
protectees.
Candidate Protection
Today, the Secret Service's Dignitary Protection Division is
responsible for campaign planning and protection. By statute, the
Secretary of Homeland Security determines who qualifies as a major
Presidential or Vice Presidential candidate. This determination is made
in consultation with an advisory committee comprised of the Speaker of
the House, the Minority leader of the House, the Majority and Minority
leaders of the Senate, and one additional member selected by the other
Members of the committee, which has historically been the Sergeant at
Arms of either the House or the Senate.
While much has changed in the 43 years since we began protecting
Presidential candidates, the challenges associated with planning and
budgeting for candidate protection 2 years ahead of Presidential
campaigns remain. Forecasting staffing and costs for Presidential
campaigns is surrounded by a great deal of unknowns, such as the number
of candidates that will run for the Presidency, how much they will
travel, and how soon the field of candidates is selected.
In analyzing past campaigns, one of the first things to consider is
historical information of the number of Presidential and Vice
Presidential candidates who received Secret Service protection. The
number of Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates receiving
Secret Service protection hit a high point in 1976 with 15 protectees
and a low point in 2004 with three protectees. However, this
information does not reflect Secret Service protection for candidate
spouses and children, both of which have become significant factors in
recent years as they have been granted protection by Executive
Memoranda earlier in the campaign cycle.
2012 Presidential Campaign
Consistent with previous campaigns, the Secret Service's primary
means for estimating costs associated with candidate/nominee protective
details is the ``protection day.'' The protection day calculation
includes costs such as travel, per diem, hotels, and overtime required
to sustain a candidate/nominee protective detail for 1 day. It should
be noted that factors outside of the Secret Service's control, such as
the frequency of travel, events with large venues and crowds, or
international travel by the candidates also impact cost.
In addition, the projected number of protection days is critical to
the overall estimated cost of the campaign. Although we cannot predict
exact start and end dates of when candidates and their dependents
receive protection, we can identify a range of how many total
protection days will be required. To achieve this estimate, the Secret
Service performed a probability-based analysis which incorporated
historical campaign information, recent trends in candidate protection,
and other factors such as anticipated primary schedules.
2012 President Campaign/Candidate Nominee Operation Section Training
In preparation for the 2012 Presidential Campaign, the Secret
Service's Dignitary Protective Division--Candidate Nominee Operation
Section (CNOS) in conjunction with the JJRTC began the training of
protective details in May 2011. All of the protective details are
expected to have completed training by the end of August 2011 and will
ultimately be assigned to provide protection for a Presidential
candidate.
The CNOS protective details are comprised of special agents from
our 142 domestic field offices. The CNOS details operate on 21-day
rotational assignments. Upon completing their protective rotation, they
return to their respective office and continue their criminal
investigative cases or participate in protection assignments in their
district. Agents assigned to a candidate protective detail continue on
this protection rotation through the end of the campaign or until the
candidate they are assigned to protect withdraws from the campaign.
Additionally, the CNOS initiated a training program to prepare
other Federal law enforcement agencies that may assist the Secret
Service during the 2012 Presidential Campaign. At this time, we
anticipate that Transportation Security Administration officers will
periodically assist the Secret Service Uniformed Division Officers with
security screening operations at various protective sites. The CNOS has
also started ``Protective Advance Team Training'' at numerous Secret
Service Field Offices throughout the country. During this training,
refresher training is provided to special agents who will conduct the
protective security advances for campaign visits throughout the country
during the 2012 Presidential Campaign.
National Special Security Events (NSSEs)
In addition to candidate/nominee protection, the Secret Service
will be responsible for the security planning for six anticipated NSSEs
in fiscal year 2012, the APEC Summit; the Presidential State of the
Union Address; the NATO Summit; the G-20 Summit; the RNC; and the DNC.
Title 18 U.S.C. 3056 (e)(1) and various Presidential directives over
the years have established the Secret Service as the lead Federal
agency responsible for the planning, coordinating, and implementing
security operations for NSSEs. Federal partners are critical to the
overall success of these events with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation responsible for crisis management and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency responsible for consequence management.
Due to the extensive planning and coordination efforts required for
an NSSE, the Secret Service has already temporarily transferred
personnel to plan, coordinate, and implement the security operations
for the APEC Summit. To ensure effective coordination and planning, the
Secret Service has established a Steering Committee with 24
subcommittees to cover all areas of the security plan. For several
months now, special agents from the Office of Protective Operations/
Dignitary Protective Division have been on the ground meeting with
their State and local law enforcement partners, fire safety personnel,
first responders, military, and numerous other entities to ensure the
overall security plan for the APEC Summit.
In addition, we recently learned that the NATO Summit and the G-20
will be held in Chicago, IL next spring. Senior staff from our Chicago
Field Office has already engaged their State and local law enforcement
partners in Illinois to begin the critical security planning and
coordination for these events.
Information Sharing with Our Law Enforcement Partners
Due to the dual mission of the Secret Service, we have always
maintained a close working relationship with our State and local law
enforcement partners. On a daily basis, special agents assigned to
domestic field offices work criminal investigations with their State
and local partners. These preexisting relationships allow the Secret
Service to perform its protective responsibilities seamlessly. When a
protective visit is scheduled, the Special Agent in Charge of that
office immediately contacts the Chief of Police, the Sheriff, and State
Police to convene a police meeting and discuss the security planning
for the upcoming protective visit. At this meeting, the Secret Service
provides information concerning the visit with our law enforcement
partners. We then establish teams, consisting of Secret Service agents,
State, and local law enforcement for each aspect of the protective
visit. Sharing this critical information and working together ensures
that all necessary entities have full awareness of the anticipated
protective movements and can thus plan accordingly.
As the lead Federal law enforcement agency responsible for the
security planning, coordination and implementation and operations at
NSSEs, the Secret Service will establish the Multi-Agency
Communications Center (MACC). During the NSSE, each agency that has an
operational role in the NSSE will have command-level staff in the MACC.
This coordination ensures that all agencies have full simultaneous
situational awareness of events occurring and can immediately provide
assets or assistance to one another if needed.
For example, the majority of threat investigative cases are worked
by our special agents in our domestic field offices. When investigating
threats made against any of our protectees, the Secret Service
frequently works with our State and local partners. Often, individuals
who have made threats against our protectees may have also made threats
against State and local officials or are at least known to the local
and State law enforcement community. Consequently, communicating and
sharing information with our local and State partners is critical to
the success of these investigations.
investigative operations
The partnerships that the Secret Service relies on to successfully
perform our protection responsibilities are cultivated at the field
office level. In addition to the permanent protective details dedicated
solely to the protection of our Nation's leaders, the backbone of the
Secret Service is our network of 142 domestic and 23 international
investigative field offices, which carry out protective intelligence
and financial crimes investigations while providing the surge capacity
needed to successfully carry out its protection responsibilities.
All Secret Service special agents begin their career as a criminal
investigator in a field office. The training, judgment, and maturity
they develop as criminal investigators in their field office
assignments are essential to the transition into the next phase of
their careers--protecting our Nation's leaders. During their time in
the field, special agents are routinely assigned to temporary
protective assignments. This developmental period enhances their skills
in both the protective and investigative arenas and promotes the
philosophy of having a cadre of well-trained and experienced agents
capable of handling the Secret Service's dual mission. By conducting
criminal investigations, special agents develop relationships with
local, State, and Federal law enforcement partners that prove critical
when protectees visit their district. These relationships also enhance
investigations into protective intelligence investigations against
Secret Service protectees.
Moreover, the effective relationships we have developed with our
international law enforcement partners are attributable to our long-
term commitment to work with the host nation in a cooperative
environment. This environment fosters relationships built on trust and
mutual respect, and results in the sharing of information and best
practices. Where permanent stations are not available, the Secret
Service relies on temporary assignments to respond to emerging trends
in overseas counterfeiting and other financial crimes.
Cyber Crime Investigations
Beyond the support that investigative field offices provide to the
protection mission, the Secret Service's investigations into financial
crimes has prevented billions of dollars in losses to the American
taxpayer over the years. In recent years, Secret Service investigations
have revealed a significant increase in the quantity and complexity of
cyber crime cases. Broader access to advanced computer technologies and
the widespread use of the internet has fostered the proliferation of
computer-related crimes targeting our Nation's financial
infrastructure. Current trends show an increase in network intrusions,
hacking attacks, malicious software, and account takeovers resulting in
data breaches affecting every sector of the American economy.
While cyber criminals operate in a world without borders, the law
enforcement community is constrained by jurisdictional boundaries.
Therefore, the international scope of these cyber crime cases has
increased the time and resources required for successful investigation
and adjudication. To address the threats posed by these transnational
cyber criminals, the Secret Service has adopted a multi-faceted
approach to investigate these crimes while working to prevent future
attacks. A central component of our approach is the training provided
through our Electronic Crimes Special Agent Program (ECSAP), which
gives our special agents the tools they need to conduct computer
forensic examinations on electronic evidence obtained from computers,
personal data assistants, and other electronic devices. At the end of
fiscal year 2010, more than 1,400 special agents were ECSAP-trained.
Since 2008, the Secret Service has provided similar training to 932
State and local law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges
through the National Computer Forensics Institute (NCFI) located in
Hoover, AL. Prior to the establishment of the NCFI, the Secret Service
provided training to State and local law enforcement officials through
the Electronic Crimes State and Local Program (ECSLP).
The Secret Service's commitment to sharing information and best
practices with our partners, the private sector, and academia is
perhaps best reflected through the work of our 31 Electronic Crimes
Task Forces (ECTFs), including two international task forces in Rome
and London. Currently, membership in our ECTFs include: 4,093 private
sector partners; 2,495 international, Federal, State, and local law
enforcement partners; and 366 academic partners.
To coordinate these complex investigations at the headquarters
level, the Secret Service has enhanced our Cyber Intelligence Section
(CIS) to identify transnational cyber criminals involved in network
intrusions, identity theft, credit card fraud, bank fraud, and other
computer-related crimes. In the past 2 years, CIS has directly
contributed to the arrest of 41 transnational cyber criminals who were
responsible for the largest network intrusion cases ever prosecuted in
the United States. These intrusions resulted in the theft of hundreds
of millions of credit card numbers and the financial loss of
approximately $600 million to financial and retail institutions.
Counterfeit Suppression
The Secret Service remains committed to suppressing the
counterfeiting of U.S. currency around the world. Domestically, $8.2
million of counterfeit U.S. currency was seized before entering public
circulation in fiscal year 2010, an increase of 7.9 percent over fiscal
year 2009. Our international field offices seized $261 million,
representing an increase of 170 percent over fiscal year 2009, and a
734 percent increase over fiscal year 2008. These seizures included the
suppression of 428 counterfeit plants.
The effective relationships we have developed with our
international law enforcement partners are attributable to our long-
term commitment to work with the host nation in a cooperative
environment. This environment fosters relationships built on trust and
mutual respect, and results in the sharing of information and best
practices. Where permanent stations are not available, the Secret
Service relies on temporary assignments to respond to emerging trends
in overseas counterfeiting and other financial crimes.
One example of this is the Secret Service's response to the
proliferation of counterfeit originating in Peru. From fiscal year 2008
to fiscal year 2009, the Secret Service noted a 156 percent increase in
the worldwide passing activity of counterfeit U.S. currency emanating
from Peru. In response to this increase, which was second only to the
domestic passing of digital counterfeit in fiscal year 2008, the Secret
Service formed a temporary Peruvian Counterfeit Task Force (PCTF) in
partnership with Peruvian law enforcement officials. Since beginning
operations in Lima, Peru on March 15, 2009, the PCTF has yielded 50
arrests, 21 counterfeit plant suppressions, and the seizure of more
than $33 million in counterfeit U.S. currency. To date, Secret Service
personnel have conducted 44 temporary duty assignments to Peru. Due to
the overwhelming success of the PCTF, the Secret Service and Peruvian
law enforcement officials agreed to extend operations in 6-month
increments throughout fiscal year 2011.
james j. rowley training center
The Secret Service endeavors to recruit, develop, and retain a
diverse and well-qualified workforce necessary for meeting the
challenges I have discussed here today. That is why the training
provided through the agency's JJRTC is so critical. In a single year,
hundreds of newly-hired special agents, Uniformed Division officers,
special officers, and technical personnel undergo extensive training in
protective methodologies used to protect major sites and events,
firearms marksmanship, use of force/control tactics, financial crimes
investigations, cyber forensic training and other courses. The Secret
Service also offers protective security and other training to our
Federal, State, and local law enforcement personnel from across the
country, as well as our international partners.
conclusion
I would like to thank the subcommittee for holding this hearing. I
am confident that through our determination and strong work ethic, our
special agents, Uniformed Division Officers and our Administrative
Professional and Technical staff, the Secret Service will successfully
meet the challenges ahead.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today. I look
forward to working with the subcommittee and would be happy to answer
any questions you may have at this time.
Mr. Meehan. Well, Director Sullivan, you are probably the
one guy that is used to changes in schedules and being quick on
the fly. But I received a note from the cloakroom that they
expect to call this vote in just a minute or 2, and so my
judgment is that what we will do is recess for the moment and
look to return as quickly as possible after those votes are
concluded. I think we have a short string of votes, and we will
begin the questioning. I will encourage my colleagues to come
back and join us for the opportunity to speak with you. Okay?
Mr. Sullivan. That would be great. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you.
We will stand adjourned until conclusion of votes.
[Recess.]
Mr. Meehan. The Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence, looking at the United States Secret Service,
Examining Protective and Investigative Missions and Challenges
in 2012, is called back to order.
Secretary Sullivan, I thank you for your opening statement,
and I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
Secretary Sullivan, right now we are in the beginning of, I
think, something that interests so many Americans, which is
what they generally associate the Secret Service with, which is
the protection of the President in a campaign cycle, but in
addition you have responsibilities to protect any number of
candidates who would like to be the President. As a result,
great challenges.
Can you tell me how it is that you begin the process of
distinguishing among the many who are out there to identify and
determine whom you will provide services for, when you make
those calculations, and how you distinguish what kinds of
resources need to be put together for any one particular among
them as they begin the process once they qualify?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, Chairman. Thank you.
Well, first of all, the Department of Homeland Security
Secretary is the person who decides who does receive protection
from us for a campaign. She makes that--he or she makes that
decision in consultation with an advisory committee, and they
will determine who is a major candidate and if, in fact,
protection is needed.
That advisory committee is made up of the Majority leader
of the Senate, Minority leader of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House, the Minority leader of the House. There is a fifth
at-large member, and for the last several campaigns that has
been on a rotating basis either the Sergeant at Arms for the
Senate or the Sergeant at Arms for the House.
This protection, the candidate needs to come forward and
make that request for protection in order to be considered.
There is certain criteria that the committee will look at. The
Secretary has already sent letters up to all of these Members
outlining what that criteria is, but they will take a look at
that criteria. If need be, they will take a look at the--they
will request us to do a threat assessment, and then based on
all this, the information they get from the--from these
guidelines they are given, they will make a determination if,
in fact, protection should be initiated.
Mr. Meehan. When you say ``a threat assessment,'' what does
that mean? You will do a threat assessment about what?
Mr. Sullivan. We will do a general threat assessment for a
particular individual. We will do a general threat assessment
just what is going on at this period.
Mr. Meehan. So one person may actually include a different
kind of level of threats, or a nature of threats against one
person, at least as you anticipate them, may be different from
another candidate?
Mr. Sullivan. That is correct.
Mr. Meehan. Then how do you respond to those
determinations, and when will they make those kinds of
determinations so that you are able to calculate where and how
you move your resources around in this coming year?
Mr. Sullivan. What we will do is take a hard look at who
that particular individual is we are going to be protecting. We
try to--we try to take into account where they are going to be
going, what they are going to be doing. Again, we assume these
people are actively out there campaigning. What we begin to do,
and, quite frankly, we start this the day after the
inauguration, we begin to put a plan together in place for the
next campaign. We do an after-action report on the previous
campaign. We look at lessons learned, and we begin to put our
plan together.
What we have been doing over the last year now, we have
purchased equipment, we have identified the staffing
requirements for each detail, we have put together----
Mr. Meehan. Are they the same as they have been in years
past in light of the----
Mr. Sullivan. Pretty much. We make different--there are
different modifications we make, and, of course, there are
different countermeasures we have added as we have gone along.
As the threat has evolved, our reaction to that threat----
Mr. Meehan. The threat, I assume, in some ways is more
sophisticated each cycle.
Mr. Sullivan. That is correct.
But right now we have trained upwards of about 12- or 1,400
people to go out and to staff these details. These people that
we use to staff these details are people that work out in the
field. That is why our field office infrastructure is so
important. They are the backbone of the campaign for us.
Mr. Meehan. I have a number of questions I would like to
ask to follow up on those particular points, but I have always
been curious about one thing, which is the very nature of these
political campaigns means that they can be very precarious. An
issue one day can change a candidate's travel from one
purported location to another on a minute's notice. Yet I know
that especially when you get to the point where it is narrowed
to a few critical candidates, you spend sometimes days ahead of
the arrival of a particular candidate in a location assuring
the safety of that.
How does the changing nature of candidates' routines affect
your work? Is there any consideration given if somebody decides
that they want to go to a different location on a moment's
notice? How do you deal with that? Is that taken into
consideration by candidates?
Mr. Sullivan. You know, that is a great point, Chairman.
Again, I come back to our field office people and how important
it is for our people out there in the field to have really
good, strong relationships and communication with our State and
local law enforcement partners. They really do make this work
for us.
To your point, we do see it where a candidate will--we will
be told maybe 1 day, 2 days prior that we are going to be going
to a certain city. I know when I was an agent in charge out in
the field, there were many nights I would call a local law
enforcement counterpart to let them know that we were going to
be having a visit in 2 days, and we would put together a police
meeting.
One of the things we do for every visit that we have
regardless if it is a week or if it is 2 days, we will get all
of our State and local partners together, have a police meeting
with them and all of our other Federal law enforcement partners
if they are involved, and we will outline for them the
itinerary of the particular protectee or candidate. We will
give them any threat assessment that we may have, any issues we
have going on. We will ask them if there are any issues on
their end. But we will pretty much put a plan together.
I will tell you, every visit we have goes off without a
hitch, and it is because of that great relationship and the
hard work by our State and local law enforcement partners and
our people.
Mr. Meehan. Well, thank you, Director.
My time has expired, and I now turn it to the Ranking
Member, Ms. Speier.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Chairman.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Director Sullivan, for being with us.
I would like to start my questioning on the issue of on-
line content, and do you have the kinds of resources you need
to do your job in a platform that is dramatically changing as
we speak? For example, this last summer the twitter account of
FOXNews was hacked into, and someone tweeted a number of times
that President Obama had been assassinated.
How do you access that? How are you able to determine it is
a hoax? How do you monitor threats? Do you have the kinds of
resources you need to comb the internet for potential
terrorists and for acts like the one I just mentioned?
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you. When I was a new agent, a lot of
times if you got a threat, it would come in the mail, and if
the person who was making the threat was very courteous, they
would put their return address on there. You would know who to
go out and talk to.
But regardless of whether it is by mail or over the
internet, our people are extremely aggressive with that. Again,
I go back to just how much the duality of our mission does help
us with our protection. What we learn as investigators and what
we have learned working our financial crimes through our
Electronic Crime Task Force and our electronic crime special
agent program really has helped us with our--with these
internet threats we have.
We do have an internet threat desk. We do work with all of
our State and local and Federal partners. We do comb the
internet. We have a system right now that people are working 24
hours a day just going through the internet looking for any
type of buzzwords or any type of threatening or inappropriate
activity out there that we may see that involves any of our
protectees.
But I would say that we have a very robust system and some
very qualified and good people that are working these type of
threats. I will also tell you that when we do identify that
individual who has made that threat or that inappropriate
interest that they are displaying, whether it is 2 o'clock in
the morning or 2 o'clock in the afternoon, our people are out
there looking for that individual to interview them.
Ms. Speier. So you have enough nerds working for you?
Mr. Sullivan. I am sorry ma'am.
Ms. Speier. You have enough nerds working for you?
Mr. Sullivan. We have some really qualified people who have
some great cyberskills.
Ms. Speier. All right. Very good.
At the hearing 2 years ago, you said, ``And I tell all of
our people that we can't just depend on human resource people
to do our recruitment, that everybody in this organization has
to be a recruiter.'' This was in response to an issue of
diversity within the Service.
Can you speak to how that has improved and what steps you
have taken since making that statement to make sure that your
recruitment is robust in terms of making sure you have a
diverse group of people serving?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, ma'am, and I continue to do that at
every office meeting I have, every town hall meeting I have. I
bring that up, we talk about recruitment. Again, I say that
with due respect to HR, but I really do think if any
organization--if you are going to depend on HR to do all your
recruitment for you, you are going to fail. It has to be the
job of every employee in your organization to be out there
recruiting.
Ms. Speier. Do you have some numbers that you can share
with us about how it has improved?
Mr. Sullivan. Ma'am, I can get you those numbers.
Ms. Speier. Can you get those?
Mr. Sullivan. I would be more than happy to do that.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
Mr. Sullivan. I will tell you that I meet with every new
agent class and every new Uniformed Division class before they
graduate, generally the numbers being 22, 23, 24 officers and
agents in every class. I will meet with them for an about an
hour, hour and a half or so, along with our Deputy Director,
and the first thing each of us look at is the make-up of that
class.
I can tell you that the classes that I have been meeting
with over the past few years have been one-third--we had a
couple recently that were one-half women and minorities. So I
will tell you that I do not feel that we are where we need to
be, but I will tell you I continue to see it improving. I
believe in role models----
Ms. Speier. I think you have answered the question. I want
to get one more question in before my time expires, and that is
on financial crimes.
Many of your counterfeit investigations and operations are
located in South America. We have been focused on this
committee on the role of Hezbollah in South America and Central
America, and to what extent they are coming into the United
States to do their fundraising. Can you enlighten us on any
information you have about your efforts and your focus in South
America?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes. We started several years ago in
Colombia, in Bogota, with counterfeit currency. Most of the
offset of the traditional type of counterfeit that we saw was
coming out of South America. We partnered up with the Colombian
police, with their vetted forces, and we made a significant
dent in the amount of--in securing counterfeit currency before
it was put out into the market, before it came into our
country, being aggressive down there with counterfeit currency.
We have seen as a result a lot of the counterfeiting we have
seen in Bogota is now going into Peru, and we are about to open
an office in Peru. But most of our efforts, Congresswoman, are
focused on counterfeit currency in South America.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Ranking Member Speier.
At this point, I will turn to questions to the gentleman
from Minnesota, Mr. Cravaack.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Sullivan, I want to thank you for all of your
service to this country, and also all the people of the Secret
Service all their fine service they have done as well in
keeping us all safe at night so we can lay down our heads. So
thank you, sir, to all your people.
Specifically in your testimony you highlighted the work the
Secret Service does, investigate cyber-related crimes and
suppressing counterfeiting. In previous years we have read a
lot about states like North Korea, for example, that have been
heavily involved in counterfeiting U.S. currency.
In your testimony you note that there has been a dramatic
increase in worldwide counterfeiting throughout the U.S.
currency. I am interested to know over the past 3 years, has
the Secret Service observed a rise in the percentage of state-
sponsored counterfeiting and cyber-related criminal activity?
If so, what is the most prevalent kinds of state-sponsored
crimes?
Mr. Sullivan. As far as state-sponsored crimes go,
Congressman, if we do come up with anything that we believe to
be state-sponsored or terrorism, we turn that over to the FBI.
Our focus is mainly on criminal violations. What we are
seeing, quite frankly, and a lot of it is coming out of Eastern
Europe, is an increase in cyber intrusions, network intrusions,
where these individuals are intruding into financial systems,
banking power system. There is a whole loosely organized group
there where one group will do the intrusion; another group may
buy those numbers, traffic those numbers out. But our focus is
mainly on the criminal financial aspect of these particular
individuals.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you.
Now, in the interest of expanding your investigative arm,
in all of basically the brief history the Chairman has given us
and you gave us a little bit earlier, what is your perfect
Secret Service in the next 5 years? What would it look like?
Mr. Sullivan. We are--I have to tell you we are recruiting
an incredible workforce. The people that we are recruiting
right now are coming into it, they have a very good cyber
background, it is second nature to them.
But I believe we need to just continue to maintain and
evolve with the threat as we see it and stay ahead of it, stay
ahead of the threat. I am looking for our organization to be
diverse, reflective of our society. I want us to continue to be
proactive to those threats that we are seeing out there every
day. I am looking for us to make sure that as we see the
country change, that we change with it as far as shift in
population, that we put our resources where they need to be. I
want our people to look--we give our agents in charge out there
in the field--we want them to have the freedom to take a hard
look at, you know, what is it that is going to have the high
impact in that location. You know, what might be a priority in
New York isn't going to be a priority in Los Angeles.
But we just have a really good, I believe, workforce out
there, looking to work extremely hard and evolve with the
threat.
Mr. Cravaack. There has been some debate whether the
Department of Homeland Security is the most appropriate place
for the Secret Service. Can you expound upon that and give us
what your thoughts are?
Mr. Sullivan. Sure. We came over to the Department of
Homeland Security back in March 2003. We came over from the
Treasury Department. We had been there for 138 years. I think
as with any agency entering an organization where there is
going to be over 200,000 people, I think there is going to be
some growing pains.
I believe when you look at the QHSR, and you look at the
result of that, I think you will see that there is a place for
the U.S. Secret Service within the Department of Homeland
Security. The purpose of the Department of Homeland Security is
to keep the homeland safe and to keep our American way of life
safe. I believe that is what we do by protecting those people
we are entrusted to protect and by protecting our financial
infrastructure.
Mr. Cravaack. As the Secret Service expands its
investigative arm, do you think that is going to inhibit your
mission on the protection side, or how do you think you are
going to be able to balance all that?
Mr. Sullivan. I think it enhances it. When you look at all
the people that we have on protection details, all of us start
the same way. We all begin our careers in a field office. We
all begin learning about the organization, we learn how to be
criminal investigators. Everybody is an 1811 criminal
investigator. We are out there interviewing people, we are
learning how to evaluate people, we are learning how to
evaluate situations. I think it just makes us better at
protection.
You look at the way we have evolved with some of the things
we do, we go out and we do a protective advance, a lot of what
we do now is to go out and protect that critical
infrastructure, you know, the elevator systems, the
transportation systems, the air infiltration systems, the water
purification. Years ago those would be attacked manually. Today
they are attacked remotely. These skills that Ranking Member
Speier had asked me about as far as cyber, we learn that as
investigators it helps us with our protection.
So I believe that the duality of our mission really does go
hand-in-hand, and what makes us better in protection is what we
learn as investigators, and what we makes us better in
investigation, I believe, is what we have learned in
protection.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, sir. I appreciate your time, and I
yield back, sir.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Meehan. We are hoping your material works better out in
the Secret Service than our buzzers do here in the Budget
Committee, but as I noted before----
Mr. Sullivan. We can come take a look at it for you, sir.
Mr. Meehan [continuing]. They are cutting everything these
days in Washington.
Thank you, Mr. Craavack.
Let me take a moment before I recognize our next
Congressperson for questioning to welcome Ms. Hahn to our
subcommittee. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first
time that we have been sitting together, so we collectively
welcome you to the committee and look forward to working with
you on the important matters ahead.
So the Chairman recognizes the gentlewoman from California
Ms. Hahn.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you, Chairman Meehan, for that gracious
welcome, and to Ranking Member Speier. This is my first
subcommittee meeting, but I am really looking forward to
serving on the subcommittee as I think the issues are extremely
important and extremely relevant to my district at home.
Director Sullivan, I appreciate your testimony today before
us. In 2001, the U.S. PATRIOT Act mandated the Secret Service
to establish a Nation-wide network of electronic crimes task
force, and my own city in Los Angeles in 2002, the Los Angeles
Electronic Crimes Task Force was created and was tasked with
working with Federal, State, and local law enforcement in
providing network security and digital data recovery.
Can you tell me a little bit more about the role of this
agency, its current initiatives? How does this task force work
with local law enforcement, including LAPD, L.A. County
sheriffs?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, ma'am. The Electronic Crime Task Force
concept has been an incredible success for us, I believe. We
had our first original one in New York going back to the late
1990s.
What the Electronic Crime Task Force does is it brings
everybody under one roof going after the same people, and
Nation-wide we have 29 electronic task forces Nation-wide,
which brings, I think, into play about 2,500 State and local
law enforcement. We have got about 1,800 or 2,000 members who
are from the financial and banking industry, and we have about
350 people from academia.
But really this is a great force multiplier. It is all
about partnership. These people coming into the same office
every day working together going after the same people.
Training is also a very critical part of what we do. All of
our special agents, when they go through their initial training
period as new agents, they get a basic computer class, computer
training, and then from there they get into more training. We
have three different levels of training for all of our agents.
We have the basic training, we have cyber or network intrusion
training, and then we also have forensic training.
As a result of how well that has done for our people, in
cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security and the
State of Alabama, we have opened up in Hoover, Alabama, a cyber
training institute for State and local law enforcement as well
as local prosecutors. So far we have put about 1,000 people,
State and local law enforcement, through that training, giving
them the same--again, a force multiplier. Many of these people
are involved in our Electronic Crime Task Forces, but they are
able to go out--we get them the equipment, we give them the
training, and they are able to go out and do the same thing our
agents are doing.
Ms. Hahn. Let me ask you one other question.
Interoperability is a problem that was identified when we heard
the 9/11 report card in the Homeland Security Committee. It was
one of the major lessons we learned that day on 9/11: The
inability of our first responders to communicate resulted in a
loss of lives. Ten years later apparently we still haven't been
able to create and fund that system. I know my district has the
Port of Los Angeles in it, L.A. International Airport, and I am
always hearing from my local law enforcement agencies that the
need for a National interoperability communications system is
vital.
The Secret Service, do you see that as a problem as well?
What is your ability to communicate with first responders in a
crisis situation?
Mr. Sullivan. I think that is part of the reason when we
put any event together, we are always going to be planning
for--we want every single trip and every single visit to be a
success, but you always have to plan for the worst-case
scenario. That is why, again, I go back to the police meetings
we have and why they are so important, and why we--for each
event we do have--if it is an NSSE, we have a multiagency
coordinating center, and in that multiagency coordinating
center, we are going to have every command-level individual
from every single department is going to be represented in
there, and that could be anywhere from 50 to 55 people. So if
an incident does occur, we are all going to be in there
together, everybody is going to have the same information, and
everybody is going to be able to talk to each other and respond
to that particular threat.
But I would agree with--I would agree with the assessment
that you are getting from your State and local law enforcement
that there is more work that needs to be done with
interoperability.
But I do think that we, working with our partners, when we
are working on these planned events, we are taking into account
every contingency to make sure we do have the best
communication plan we can have if an incident were to occur.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Ms. Hahn.
Now the Chairman recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, who
may know a little bit about this from previous experience. So
the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Quayle.
Mr. Quayle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Director Sullivan, for being here today. Mr. Chairman, you are
right. I have to say right off the bat that I have had a lot of
interaction with the men and women of the Secret Service, and
they are, by far, some of the best and most professional people
that I have ever had the privilege to be around. So I just want
to say thank you for running such a great organization, and the
people in the Secret Service are just tremendous.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Quayle. One thing in your testimony, you raised the
concern of the widespread use of the internet has led to a lot
of the proliferation of computer-related crimes that have been
targeting our Nation's financial infrastructure, and it
affected virtually every sector of the American economy. How is
the Secret Service dealing with that threat? Are there any
areas that you think might be able to be strengthened?
Mr. Sullivan. Again, I go back to the model we have with
our Electronic Crime Task Force, where we bring everybody
together, and what we try to do is just try to stay one step
ahead of the technology. These people that we are up against
that are committing these crimes, every time we figure out a
solution to prevent them from what they are doing, they are out
looking for the next technology. Their technology is evolving
the same way as everybody's technology is evolving, and they
really do take advantage of that.
So we find by working with academia--we have people at the
Carnegie Mellon, at the engineering institute there--we work
with them to again let them see the trends we are seeing, but
also for them to help us with countermeasures to that and look
for better law enforcement tools for us to operate on.
But the best people we have are the people that are dealing
with this crime out there and just staying current with it, and
making sure that we get them the training that they need, make
sure that we get them the equipment they need, and make sure
that we keep them current.
Mr. Quayle. Do you think you are staying one step ahead
rather than being reactive? Because I know in all sorts of law
enforcement, whether cybersecurity or whatever, it is hard to
keep that one step ahead, because every single time you think
you are one step ahead, then you get pinged with another thing
you hadn't even thought about before.
Mr. Sullivan. It is a combination of both. I would say a
lot of it is reactive. We have to see what that threat is out
there, and then we try to be very aggressive reacting to that.
We, using different investigative techniques, I think--and
again, that goes back to how we have prevented about $13
billion in fraud, whether we are working with informants--you
know, there is a lot of good--even though we have a new type of
crime here, we still do rely on good old police work and making
sure we are out there talking to people who might have
information, and making sure that our people are out there
being very aggressive in looking at what the particular crime
is. But a lot of it is reactive, without a doubt.
Mr. Quayle. Thank you, Director Sullivan.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Quayle.
I have a couple of follow-up questions myself, and I have a
few things I would like to ask you, and then I will open it. If
we have anybody that would like to ask an individual question
or participate in some follow-up with you, I will invite that
and allow that as well for a few moments.
But I want to return, Director Sullivan, to some of the
line of questioning that I spoke about before, because I
identify this coming cycle as a moment in which there is going
to be a great deal of attention on our process and our
candidates. We have been here watching a transition in the
world of terror in which we have identified the nature of the
threat that we saw on September 11 a decade ago, the
sophisticated ring operating in concert, and now we have begun
to see, at least experienced here in the United States, to the
extent that we have had issues with terrorism, it has been
changed. We have seen individuals operating as lone wolves as
the word would go.
In addition, we are seeing a pattern of activity in which
some from outside of this country are trying to reach back,
connect with individuals within here. We call this the
radicalization aspect.
I am not sure that we have ever dealt with both of those
while we have conducted a Presidential campaign, or at least to
the extent that we think it exists today.
Without going into any particular techniques or other
things, is this certainly an issue that you and the agency have
anticipated? How is it that you communicate with our other
agencies who are looking at the global picture and trying to
identify risks to the homeland, not the least of which would be
a risk to an iconic situation like a candidate?
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Chairman.
I think this is a benefit from us being part of the
Department of Homeland Security. I know that it is a priority
for the Secretary to counter violent extremism, and part of her
strategy is to reach out to the community, make sure that we
are letting our State and local law enforcement partners out
there know what we know, and making sure that we have the best
information out there as well.
As far as we are concerned, we are a big consumer of
information. We are not an intelligence component, but for our
threat reduction, for our risk management, we really do depend
on the information that we get from all of our partners. I can
tell you--and I think this past weekend you mentioned the
events up in New York and Pennsylvania and here in Washington,
DC, and I can tell the Chairman, the information we got from
all of our Federal partners out there, whether it was the FBI
or from the intelligence community, we got tremendous support
regarding these events, the information that was out there,
that really did help us put together the best plan we could put
together. But when we put a plan together, we take into account
the lone wolf, we take into account the organized terrorist
attack, we take into account the threat of VBIEDs, of IEDs. All
of that we take into account.
Mr. Meehan. The changing nature of the infrastructure out
there that you have to--it is no longer just the individual
with a--unfortunately, it is weapons as well have changed.
Mr. Sullivan. Absolutely. So over the years, as again as I
have talked about before, as we see that threat evolve, we have
evolved with it, but I can't emphasize enough just the support
that we get from all of our State, local, and Federal law
enforcement partners. We really do succeed because of that
information and the support we get from them.
Mr. Meehan. Let me ask one follow-up question related to,
again, anticipating 2012. I notice we call the special events
the events of National significance that are going to be
occurring here. Any one of those would be important, but you
are going to be in the spring of 2012. That implies that you
are really at the height of the political season. At the same
time you are going to be dealing with two rather significant
incidences that will probably attract international attention.
My own recollection is whenever the G-20 gets together, it
becomes an international event unto itself.
How are you going to be positioned going into the dual
challenges of dealing with the continuing protection of your
multiple dignitaries while looking at these very significant
events that are likely to require a fair amount of security for
us in this Nation?
Mr. Sullivan. Again, I go back to our partnership. Right
now we have had people in Honolulu for a number of months now
putting together their operational plan for the APEC summit. At
the same time we have people in Charlotte and Tampa working
with their State and local law enforcement partners putting the
plans together for both conventions. We will be naming, or I
think we have already named, people that are going to be
working in Chicago on the NATO and the G-20 summit. This is
going to be their focus.
What we do for these events, Mr. Chairman, is we have an
executive steering committee. The executive steering committee,
the three main Federal partners that are involved in that
committee would be FEMA for the consequence management, we have
the FBI for the crisis management, and we have us for the
operational planning. Then in addition to that, we have the
State and local law enforcement that are involved in the public
safety. Their leadership will also be on that executive
steering committee.
Underneath that executive steering committee, we would have
anywhere from about 20 to 25 subcommittees. These subcommittees
work on different areas that we believe to be issues. We have
people working on an airport subcommittee, we have the airspace
subcommittee, we have an intelligence subcommittee, we have
fire and life safety subcommittee. We have a subcommittee for
everything you can think of.
Mr. Meehan. Sounds like Congress.
Mr. Sullivan. But all these subcommittees, everybody is
coming into work every single day. So it goes back to what I
talked about before, Chairman: The collaboration that we have
out there, the partnership that we have out there, quite
frankly, if we didn't have that, we could not do this by
ourself. We really do rely on all of our partners out there to
make sure that we are able to do the visit. Again, we don't go
in there and say, we are in charge. We go in there and say,
this is a partnership, an equal partnership, and everybody is
valued here, and we really do want to work this together.
I think this must be working because since 1998, we have
already done 37 of these, and every one of them seems to get
better with time, and we learn from each one of them as well.
Mr. Meehan. I thank you for your collaboration, and I have
seen it first-hand. The challenges mount, but it certainly
seems clear the work with the others is particularly
appreciated, with the locals in particular.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Meehan. Now I would turn to the Ranking Member, Ms.
Speier.
Ms. Speier. Two quick questions.
Many States have the open carry laws, which allow you to
carry your guns openly. During the Presidential campaign in
2008, there were assault weapons at some public rallies.
How do you deal with their Constitutional right to carry
those weapons and yet make sure that the safety of the
candidates and the public is provided for?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes. Our people go out, and we abide by the
rules of that State. But what we do is we have--at every venue
we have, we have what we call a secure zone. Nobody is allowed
into that secure zone, and we make sure that we give ourselves
enough stand-off distance so that there is no type of weapon
that is going to be within that area that we believe is going
to do any harm to us.
But we also have other protective countermeasures going on
to make sure that we do identify anybody who is out there with
the weapon, that we can identify those individuals and make
sure that we will--that they will not be capable of bringing
any harm to us.
But again, it goes back to our partnership with State and
local law enforcement. They are just so important at what they
do, and they do help identify those threats to us before they
get to a point where it might be unmanageable.
Ms. Speier. Do some States allow for open carry of loaded
guns?
Mr. Sullivan. I believe so. I am not--I believe they do,
though, yes.
Ms. Speier. All right. My second question and final
question deals with the issue you had previously where you
overspent your budget and didn't inform Congress or DHS. What
steps have you put in place to prevent that from happening
again?
Mr. Sullivan. I would just say, for us, we put together
these type of events with a campaign. It really is very
difficult for us to forecast out a cost. There is a lot of
things that come into effect here; the crowds, and the number
of days, and just a whole myriad of different things.
What happened in this particular instance was right at the
end of December 2008, we learned that four additional NSSEs
were going to be on for during the inauguration. Philadelphia,
there was going to be a train trip originating in Philadelphia
coming down to Washington. So Philadelphia; Wilmington,
Delaware; Baltimore, Maryland; and an event at the Lincoln
Memorial were all designated as NSSEs.
As we looked at our budget, we realized that the money that
we had for the campaign, the transition in the inauguration was
not going to support these four NSSEs. We notified the
Department of that challenge and let them know that we needed
to do a reprogramming.
You know, one point I do want to be clear on: We did not
overspend from overall budget, but what happened was we had to
take money out of one protection line account and put it into
this NSSE account. So we took it from one protection account
and put it into another protection account. Unfortunately, we
did not--a written notification of this was not sent up to
Congress, and thus we were given this violation.
Some of the things we have done in the mean time is that we
do have more frequent interaction with the DHS budget shop on
this particular issue. There is a lot more oversight
internally, internal controls that--budgetary controls we have
to monitor the budget.
But I will tell you, Congresswoman, I, we as an
organization, took this to be a very, very serious thing. I
think if you read the report, it will show that this was not an
intentional oversight, it was just that these events came at us
at a very fast pace, and we reprogrammed from our own line
items that were not within that particular PPA, and the timely
notification to Congress was not made. We have talked to our
appropriators on that. We have told them that we will make sure
not only in written language, but verbally--we will make sure
that they know we are going to be doing any reprogramming.
Ms. Speier. All right. I thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Ms. Speier.
I know the gentleman from Minnesota has one final question.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you again, Mr. Director.
One of the questions I have, in your testimony you have
kind of alluded to expanding the paradigm of protection to
include a vulnerable infrastructure. How does the Secret
Service go about doing that, in the extent of being able to
talk in an open mike, in protecting our infrastructure and
moving forward?
Mr. Sullivan. Again, I go back to what I--you are talking
about the infrastructure around the event. We have started up
a--it is called the Computer Systems Protection Division.
Again, these are all of our agents who have been trained in
forensic or cyberintrusion, but that these agents are out there
looking to see if there is anybody out there trying to use
cyber to attack our systems, looking to make sure that we
prevent that from happening.
But again, I go back to the variety of our mission. These
people that understand protection, understand investigations,
these are the people that we are using to conduct these
assessments. For the NSSE, for example, we have a group of
people that are dedicated to paying attention and being very
proactive on these issues here.
But again, I go back to everything that was done manually
years ago is all being done remotely now either from within
this country or outside of our country, and we just want to
make sure that we evolve with that threat and make sure we
defeat it the same way it is originating, which is via cyber.
Mr. Cravaack. Is there any areas that you feel the Secret
Service could use more help in in regards to a soft underbelly
that you haven't been able to quite reach the challenges that
are faced?
Mr. Sullivan. Well, the biggest challenge we have is right
after I became--one of the biggest issues, right after I became
Director, I asked that we take a look at our IT infrastructure.
I guess the best way to describe it, if you are looking for a
1980 state-of-the-art IT infrastructure, we were your guys. Our
IT infrastructure was just old, and it needed a lot of support
and a lot of upgrades to it.
Working with Congress, working with the Department, and
working with many others, we have been able to upgrade our IT
infrastructure significantly. I believe that our IT
infrastructure now is a lot more secure, I believe it is a lot
more robust, but we still have a ways to go with that. We have
stabilized it, but there are still some issues we need to work
on with our IT infrastructure. I believe as we go further into
the 21st Century, the better our IT infrastructure can be, and
all the things we are doing with IT now, if we can get that
even further improved, I think that is going to help us with
our operational mission as well as our business enterprise that
we are doing, and maybe help prevent some of the challenges we
had with the ADA, for example, like getting us better time
information on where we are with our budget.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Director, and I yield back.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Cravaack.
The Chairman notes the rapid ascension of Ms. Hahn on this
committee, but I know that Ms. Hahn has a concluding question.
Ms. Hahn. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I thought about it when you asked Mr. Quayle, you
recognized Mr. Quayle, and you said you have had some
experience with this. It was something, and you probably all
know the answer to this question, but who in our Government
gets Secret Service protection and for how long? Is it all the
candidates, their spouses, their children, just the nominee,
Presidents, wives, children? How long after? Who in our
Government receives Secret Service protection and for how long?
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Congresswoman.
By statute the people we protect are the President, First
Lady, their family; the Vice President, Dr. Biden in this case,
and their family; former Presidents and their spouses; foreign
heads of state and other dignitaries. I think that is about it
by statute that are receiving protection right now.
One of the things I try not to do is name people by names
because potentially there could be people that aren't receiving
protection, and people may be under the assumption they are
receiving protection. But by statute that is pretty much who is
receiving protection.
Ms. Hahn. How long after; is it lifetime for all of these?
Mr. Sullivan. Up until I believe it was 19--2001, it was
for lifetime for the President and First Lady. There was a law
passed, I believe, in the mid-1990s now that has outlined that
protection now for a former President would be for 10 years
after they leave office.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you.
I yield the balance of my time.
Mr. Meehan. I noted that as I was reviewing the documents--
and that was a very good question. It was one that I was
wondering as well--and I saw that I think at least from the
previous, the most recent President on, that they are going to
put a cap at a certain point after a decade or so and then--so
that was under statute. So that will be a change moving into
the future.
So I want to thank you for your testimony and to the
Members for questions. Members of the committee may have some
additional questions, and if they do, I will ask that they be
submitted to you and you would respond in writing, if you
would. The hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
Let me conclude as well we share with you a concern, and a
supportive concern, for the challenging mission that you have.
You have done a great job of identifying the expansive mission,
particularly as we are watching technology change in the focus
of a global economy with your protection of our money supply,
so to speak. But as we come particularly into 2012 in this
time, of which we are well aware the changing nature of the
world and the identification of America as a target, we stand
here ready. If there are issues or moments of concern, we hope
that you will reach back to the committee and at least allow us
to do our best to be responsive to the questions you might
have.
So I thank you for your service and for the service of your
many partners and agents, who I know, in anticipation of this
year, will be doing great work for America and for the people
who you protect. Thank you.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate it.
Mr. Meehan. Without objection, the committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]