[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STATUS REPORT ON THE TRANSITION TO A CIVILIAN-LED MISSION IN IRAQ
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
HOMELAND DEFENSE AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 12, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-108
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
http://www.house.gov/reform
_____
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
JOHN L. MICA, Florida Ranking Minority Member
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
JIM JORDAN, Ohio Columbia
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
CONNIE MACK, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TIM WALBERG, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan JIM COOPER, Tennessee
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
RAUL R. LABRADOR, Idaho DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee PETER WELCH, Vermont
JOE WALSH, Illinois JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida JACKIE SPEIER, California
FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania
Lawrence J. Brady, Staff Director
John D. Cuaderes, Deputy Staff Director
Robert Borden, General Counsel
Linda A. Good, Chief Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign
Operations
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman
RAUL R. LABRADOR, Idaho, Vice JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts,
Chairman Ranking Minority Member
DAN BURTON, Indiana BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PETER WELCH, Vermont
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on October 12, 2011................................. 1
Statement of:
Kennedy, Patrick F., Under Secretary for Management, U.S.
Department of State; Alexander Vershbow, Assistant
Secretary for International Security Affairs, U.S.
Department of Defense; and Alan F. Estevez, Assistant
Secretary for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, U.S.
Department of Defense...................................... 5
Estevez, Alan F.......................................... 24
Kennedy, Patrick F....................................... 5
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Estevez, Alan F., Assistant Secretary for Logistics and
Materiel Readiness, U.S. Department of Defense, prepared
statement of............................................... 26
Kennedy, Patrick F., Under Secretary for Management, U.S.
Department of State, prepared statement of................. 8
STATUS REPORT ON THE TRANSITION TO A CIVILIAN-LED MISSION IN IRAQ
----------
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 12, 2011
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense
and Foreign Operations,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m. in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Tierney, and Quigley.
Staff present: Thomas Alexander and Richard A. Beutel,
senior counsels; Brien A. Beattie, professional staff member;
Molly Boyl, parliamentarian; Mark D. Marin, director of
oversight; Rafael Maryahin, counsel; Cheyenne Steel, press
assistant; Nadia A. Zahran, staff assistant; Ashley Etienne,
minority director of communications; Carla Hultberg, minority
chief clerk; Paul Kincaid, minority press secretary; Adam
Koshkin, minority staff assistant; and Scott Lindsay and Carlos
Uriarte, minority counsels.
Mr. Chaffetz. Good morning. The committee will come to
order.
I would like to begin this hearing by stating the Oversight
Committee's mission statement.
We exist to secure two fundamental principles. First,
Americans have the right to know the money Washington takes
from them is well spent. Second, Americans deserve an efficient
and effective government that works for them. Our duty on the
Oversight and Government Reform Committee is to protect these
rights. Our solemn responsibility is to hold government
accountable to taxpayers because taxpayers have a right to know
what they get from the government.
We will work tirelessly in partnership with citizen
watchdogs to deliver the facts to the American people and bring
genuine reform to the Federal bureaucracy. This is the mission
of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee.
I would like to welcome everybody to this hearing. It is
entitled, ``Status Report on the Transition to A Civilian-led
Mission in Iraq.''
I would like to welcome Ranking Member Tierney and other
members of the subcommittee and thank members of the audience
for their participation and attendance here today.
Today's proceedings continue the subcommittee's effort to
examine the challenges facing the Defense Department and the
State Department as they transition from a military-led to a
civilian-led effort in Iraq. This is the subcommittee's second
hearing on this matter.
On November 17, 2008, the Bush administration and the
Government of Iraq signed a Status of Forces Agreement which
set a December 31, 2011 deadline for the departure of all U.S.
military forces from Iraq. To date, the Defense Department has
redeployed thousands of troops and dramatically reduced its
footprint. From all outward appearances, the Department seems
to be hitting its benchmarks.
As they draw down, the State Department is increasing its
footprint. To fill the void left by the Defense Department, the
State Department will hire thousands of private contractors to
complete the mission. In all, the State Department's footprint
will balloon to approximately 17,000 personnel. According to
the Government Accountability Office, the GAO, nearly 14,000
will be private contractors.
These contractors will perform a wide range of tasks
including life support services and logistics. They will also
recover downed aircraft and personnel, dispose of ordinance and
transport personnel. The State Department will also hire a
private army of nearly 7,500 security contractors to do
everything from guarding the walls and gates to guarding VIP
convoys and flying UAVs.
While they will have the ability of sense and warn of
incoming ordinance, they will not have the ability to shoot it
down. I find this puzzling and would like to discuss this
further.
As the Defense Department winds down, the State Department
is ramping up in what may be more of a political shell game
than a draw-down of forces. When President Obama tells the
American people that forces will be out of Iraq, I am not sure
the average American understands that the troops will be
replaced with a private army of security contractors.
Nevertheless, the State Department faces a daunting and
unprecedented challenge. Many have expressed doubts as to
whether the State Department will meet the December 31st
deadline and whether it can oversee the administration's surge
in private contracting. According to the GAO, the State
Department ``has acknowledged that it does not have the
capacity to independently acquire and oversee the scale and
nature of contracted services needed.''
The Commission on Wartime Contracting has also expressed
tremendous concern. Last July, it wrote that despite
interdepartmental efforts ``the current planning for the
Defense to State transition of vital functions in Iraq is not
yet adequate.'' On March 1st, Commissioners Grant Green and
Michael Thibault testified before this subcommittee. When asked
whether the State Department was ready, they answered no. They
explained that it has neither the funds to pay nor the
resources to manage the thousands of additional contractor
employees.
Last week, six of the eight Commissioners testified before
the full committee about billions of waste, fraud and abuse in
contracting, something in the range of $30-$60 billion. They
warned that the State Department is struggling to prepare
requirements for contractors and to effectively oversee them.
In other words, it appears the State Department has not
made enough progress to ensure a smooth transition. I hope it
has a different message to convey this morning. A commitment
from Ambassador Kennedy that the State Department will be fully
capable on January 1st would be a great start.
On a related matter, I would appreciate it if the Defense
Department would clear up some confusion surrounding its draw-
down. There have been numerous reports that President Obama may
order thousands of combat troops to remain in Iraq at the Iraq
Government's request to conduct training of the Iraqi military.
While I understand negotiations are ongoing with the Iraqi
government, I believe the American people have the right to
additional clarity on how many troops will remain and what
their mission and legal status will be. The Iraqi Government
has said that it will strip away any U.S. troops that remain
next year of the limited legal immunity that they currently
enjoy. No one here wants to see brave American soldiers
prosecuted in Iraqi courts for defending themselves from
insurgent attacks. Our troops should have the same legal
protections on January 1st as they did on December 31st. It is
the President's obligation to see that they do. With only 2\1/
2\ months, the administration must work quickly to get this
done.
We have a distinguished panel here today that has been very
involved in this and I appreciate each of your gentlemen
joining us here today. I look forward to hearing from this
panel of witnesses.
I would now like to recognize the distinguished ranking
member, the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney, for his
opening statement.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Our current military operations in Iraq, Operation Iraqi
Freedom, as we all know, began on March 20, 2003 when President
Bush ordered the invasion of Iraq. I can remember, as many of
you probably do, watching it on television. I watched with
great trepidation, based on the weaknesses of the
administration's case for striking in the first place.
Since then, our brave men and women in uniform have fought
hard to help return the country to civilian rule. After heroic
sacrifices over 8 years, that has cost over 4,000 American
lives and nearly $1 trillion, the men and women of our armed
forces can leave Iraq with their heads held high. I am not so
sure about those policymakers who made the decision to put
their lives and America's treasure at risk.
We are now ready to enter the next stage of our efforts in
Iraq. In 2008, the Bush administration agreed to withdraw all
U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011. The Obama
administration has tried to stick to that agreement and
indicates that it is on track to meet that deadline. I think
that is what we will explore here today.
The State Department has been charged with the
responsibility for supporting the stability and development of
Iraq once the military has left. Now the task is to make sure
that our military's efforts are not squandered and that Iraq's
fragile stability is not lost. Let me be clear, I strongly
support the draw-down of military forces in Iraq and the
transition to a civilian-led mission.
I understand the extraordinary burden this will put on the
State Department, particularly since some who seem to be
complaining most about the transition and whether or not it
will work are the ones who voted against reducing the State
Department's budget which is sort of a contradiction in the
situation.
Our role today should not be to blame the State Department
for the military to civilian transition that been in process
for 3 years and is required by a bilateral agreement with the
sovereign nation of Iraq. Rather, our committee's role should
be to press for greater management and oversight of the
resources that State will be deploying in the name of the
United States.
This is our third hearing on this topic in the last year
under both the Democratic and Republican majorities in the
House. By most accounts, State has made important progress and
is now ready to assume the mission. I want to acknowledge State
for its hard work in preparing for the transition.
Still, today I would like to address one ongoing concern I
have about the continuing use of private contractors in war
zones. Just last week, the full committee held a hearing on the
Commission on Wartime Contracting's final report to Congress.
At that hearing, the Commission raised significant concerns
about the future role of private security contractors who will
be employed by the State Department after the military leaves
Iraq.
At the hearing, Commissioner Robert Henke highlighted a
recently adopted Office of Management and Budget policy memo
that for the first time addresses the proper role of security
contractors in combat zones. The policy memo embraced a risk-
based analysis to determine what functions are inherently
governmental and what functions can properly be delegated to a
contractor. It is an important step in the right direction.
The memo continues by defining specific examples of
inherently governmental functions that should never be
performed by a private contractor. Notably it found, ``Security
operations performed in environments where, in the judgment of
the responsible Federal official, there is significant
potential for the security operations to evolve into combat''
should be considered an inherently governmental function.
I would like to hear from our witnesses today, and
specifically Ambassador Kennedy, about the intended role of
security contractors in Iraq after the transition. I would like
you to specifically address OMB's guidance that was cited by
Commissioner Henke.
In his written statement today, Ambassador Kennedy said the
Department of State will employ approximately 5,000 private
security contract employees in Iraq. I agree with his
assessment but this is a significant number. Beyond the number
of security contractors that will be employed in Iraq, I am
concerned about the specific functions these contractors will
be expected to perform.
For example, I understand the Department will employ a
number of contractors to be responsible for rapid response to
security situations in the field in addition to the stationary
security forces who will be responsible for protecting the
Embassy. These rapid response forces will be responsible for
emergency response including securing State Department
employees in the case of an attack.
To my mind, this situation will almost certainly require
the private security contractor to engage in combat. I think
any reasonable person would see that to be in direct conflict
with the OMB policy memo and therefore an improper use of
private security contractors under that guidance.
Ambassador Kennedy, I look forward to hearing how the
Department plans to deal with this issue and others. I want to
thank all of our witnesses once more for showing your interest
here today.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
Members will have 7 days to submit their opening statements
for the record.
I would now like to introduce our distinguished panel. We
have Ambassador Patrick Kennedy, the Under Secretary for
Management, at the Department of State. Ambassador Alexander
Vershbow is the Assistant Secretary for International Security
Affairs at the Department of Defense. Mr. Alan Estevez is the
Assistant Secretary for Logistics and Materiel Readiness at the
Department of Defense.
Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses are to be sworn
before they testify, so I would ask you to please rise and
raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. Let the record reflect the
witnesses answered in the affirmative.
In order to allow time for the discussion, please try to
limit your opening testimony to 5 minutes but we will be fairly
generous with those 5 minutes. It is also my understanding that
the Department of Defense will issue a joint verbal statement
that will be given by Mr. Estevez.
I would like to start with Ambassador Kennedy. You are now
recognized for 5 minutes or little bit more if you need it.
STATEMENT OF PATRICK F. KENNEDY, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ALEXANDER VERSHBOW,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AND ALAN F. ESTEVEZ, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
STATEMENT OF PATRICK F. KENNEDY
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Tierney.
Thank you for inviting me to update the State Department's
progress in transitioning from a military-led to a civilian-led
presence in Iraq, from DOD's mission to State's mission. I ask
that I be permitted to submit my full testimony for the record.
Mr. Chaffetz. So ordered.
Mr. Kennedy. Continued U.S. engagement with Iraq is
essential. A stable and self reliant Iraq is profoundly in the
national security interest of the United States. Our diplomatic
presence is designed to maximize influence in key locations,
Erbil and Kirkuk in the north, Baghdad in the center and Basra
in the south. State will continue the police development
program, moving beyond basic policing skills to provide police
forces with the capabilities to uphold the rule of law. The
Office of Security Cooperation will help close gaps in Iraqi
security forces capabilities through security assistance and
cooperation.
Turning now to our safe and secure management platforms, we
have made much progress since March when I discussed eight key
components to launching these platforms in Iraq. My written
testimony details our progress in each area. I will focus here
on contract oversight in security.
First, with regard to our entire support platform, we are
not struggling to award contracts. We have competitively
awarded all contracts for facility construction fit out, for
security and aviation support to stand up three diplomatic
support hospitals and for life support. We are mindful of
recent reports such as that by the Commission on Wartime
Contracting regarding waste. We understand the extraordinarily
difficult budget environment and have carefully assured prudent
use of our funding.
We have continued to work very closely with DOD every day
at unprecedented levels. The Joint DOD Equipping Board has
identified more than 3,200 pieces of equipment worth
approximately $224 million to be transferred as excess, sold or
loaned to State. In the area of contracting and contracting
oversight, throughout our efforts, State is always cognizant of
inherently governmental functions.
We contract for services that are not inherently
governmental. State personnel were actively engaged with the
Office of Federal Procurement Policy in preparing its new
policy letter. We continue to focus on effective transition
contracting and deploying experienced contracting personnel.
State can surge resources to address specific contingency needs
through an internal funding mechanism which is a 1 percent fee
charged on all contracting services.
We have hired 102 additional contracting staff and support
staff over the past several years and made improvements in the
area of suspension debarment, increased competition and
enhanced training.
In the area of security, task orders for static and
movement security have been competitively awarded for all State
sites in Iraq on the basis of best value. In the past few
years, State's Diplomatic Security Service has expanded its
plan for oversight and operational control of private security
contractor personnel. It will have more than 175 direct hire,
State Department personnel to administer the contract and its
task orders in Iraq ensuring contract compliance by
approximately 5,000 security contract employees.
These 5,000 will cover all of our sites in Iraq to protect
U.S. Government staff, reflect State's continuous operation in
locations where previously we had not been able to operate,
guard forces in Iraq or like other local guards, serving as the
first line of our defense for our facilities and staff.
They differ, however, from our typical guard force in that
they have higher recruiting, screening and training
requirements, a higher percentage of American and third country
national personnel and specialized weapons and equipment which
are necessary to defend our personnel and facilities from
attack.
In contingency areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan, our
security contractors are under the direct management and
oversight of State Department Diplomatic Security Service
direct hire personnel. Their function was illustrated last
September 13th during the terrorist incident in Kabul where the
Embassy security elements acted swiftly to protect Embassy
staff and Afghan visitors and moved them to safe locations,
took defensive actions as directed by the Chief of Mission and
acted in concert with host nation security forces.
We are staffed to achieve the operational measures and
increase direct oversight to ensure professionalism and
responsibility of security contractor personnel. Diplomatic
security personnel at each post in Iraq and Afghanistan serve
as managers for these security programs. They provide direct
operational oversight of all protected motorcades in Iraq and
Afghanistan. This is done for each and everyone.
We fully realize the scope of our diplomatic activities in
Iraq are beyond anything that we have done in the past.
However, State has a history of embracing challenges. We have
the competence and the personnel to mobilize in Iraq and we
have DOD's full partnership at every level from Secretary
Panetta and Chairman Dempsey to the excess property clerks on
the ground.
With the teams in place, our executive steering group, our
Baghdad team, joint State/DOD teams and State's Iraq transition
coordinator, we will deliver on this new State Department
mission because it is in the U.S. national interest that we do
so.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me and for
your continued support and that of Ranking Member Tierney for
the Department of State. I will welcome any questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:]
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
I now recognize Mr. Estevez for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ALAN F. ESTEVEZ
Mr. Estevez. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
We have a written statement to include in the record that
provides a more general overview of the situation in Iraq.
However, in the interest of time, I would like to summarize the
progress that the Department of Defense has made as it supports
the Department of State during the transition to civilian
control in Iraq.
The Department of Defense remains fully engaged in support
of Operation New Dawn and is committed to a smooth transition
to the Department of Statement in support of the enduring
diplomatic and security assistance missions in the region. We
are in execution phase of this transition and are on track and
in some cases, are ahead of schedule with all of the logistics
functions associated with the draw-down of forces and support
to the Department of State.
Both the Department of Defense and the Department of State
are committed to working together to achieve a successful
transition. Although the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is not responsible for
establishing policy in this area, we are responsible for many
of the details associated with the transition, including
contracting support, maintenance and supply support and other
logistics components of the transition.
As the principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics testified on March 2,
2011, we have established a temporary Senior Executive Steering
Group focused on coordinating and synchronizing the materiel
and support aspects of the transition. Our combined Office of
Secretary of Defense Joint Staff Equipping Board has addressed
the individual equipment items that the Department of State has
requested which range from medical equipment to camera rocket
protection.
As Ambassador Kennedy noted, to date we have identified
more than 3,200 end items that are being transferred, sold or
loaned to the Department of State. These items represent 100
percent fulfillment of the Department of State's request for
equipment support. In addition to 60 Caiman plus mine resistant
ambush protected vehicles that were approved for loan at the
time of the last testimony, the Department of Defense has since
agreed to loan to the Department of State two Giraffe Radar
rocket systems and a suite of 164 biometric collection and
identification systems.
As of October 1, 2011, our force numbers are down to
roughly 43,500. The contractor population also continues to
decrease as the number of military personnel lay support
diminishes. We have also made steady progress in executing the
plan to retrograde and redistribute equipment.
Over the last year in Iraq, joint Department of Defense and
Department of State teams have executed well coordinated plans
that have synchronized the handoff of responsibilities to the
Department of State at those locations where the Department of
State will be the lead agency. The transition of these sites is
not a turn key operation and each site presents its own unique
set of challenges.
As we resize these sites to fit the diplomatic mission, new
perimeters continue to be established. Containerized housing
units are moved in accordance with mission requirements;
utilities are being rerouted; and as required, additional site
preparation and force protection materiels are being installed.
The Department of Defense is also providing a number of
specific functions on a reimbursable basis under the authority
of the Economy Act. The LOGCAP IV Task Order was awarded to
provide the Department of State with base life support and core
logistics services. This contracting mechanism is scalable and
can respond to changing conditions on the ground.
Food distribution as well as fuel supply and disposition
services will continue to be provided by the Defense Logistics
Agency. The Army Sustainment Command recently modified its
contract for maintenance of select equipment and is providing
contract services for static and movement security. The Defense
Contract Management Agency and Defense Contract Audit Agency
will continue to provide administrative contract support and
oversight. Again, the Department of State will reimburse the
Department of Defense for all contracts and service support
provided.
In closing, let me reassure you that the Department of
Defense is proactively partnering with the Department of State,
is fully engaged in executing the draw-down of U.S. military
forces and equipment in Iraq, and remains agile enough to
respond to any potential changes in these requirements.
Thank you for your time and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Estevez follows:]
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. I assure you that your full
written statements will be entered into the record. Without
objection, so ordered.
I would now like to recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Ambassador Vershbow, I would like to start with you.
An article came out yesterday in the Philadelphia Inquirer
with the headline ``U.S. Military Trainers Can Stay, Leader
Says.'' I am troubled by what President Talaboni said, ``We
have agreed to retain more than 5,000 American trainers without
giving them immunity. We have sent them our agreement to retain
this number and are awaiting their response, yes or no.''
I find it deeply troubling that there is the prospect of
our troops being in Iraq without immunity. I think this is
totally unacceptable. Can you please give us an update on the
situation?
Mr. Vershbow. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to
respond.
Indeed there are some important issues raised by that
article. First of all, Iraq's political leadership has
indicated that they are interested in a training relationship
with the United States after 2011. We very much want to have an
enduring partnership with the Iraqi government and people and a
relationship with the Iraqi security forces would be a very
important part of that relationship.
I think as you know we have long been planning to have the
Office of Security Cooperation Iraq, OSCI, which would be under
Chief of Mission Authority, serve as the cornerstone of a
strategic security partnership and it would be the hub for a
range of security assistance and security cooperation
activities. That, of course, is the baseline.
We have been reviewing the official statement issued by
Iraqi leaders on training assistance on October 4th and
discussing with them how this fits into the principle of
security cooperation under the 2008 Strategic Framework
Agreement. I should add that we appreciate the democratic
spirit displayed by Iraqi leaders in debating this important
subject and we will continue discussions with our Iraqi
counterparts in the days ahead.
These negotiations are ongoing and it is premature to
discuss what any potential training relationship might look
like.
Mr. Chaffetz. Will our troops have immunity, yes or no?
Mr. Vershbow. I will get to that issue, Mr. Chairman.
As we work to define the parameters of what it will look
like, the issues raised yet again in this article regarding
status protections, of course, will be an important issue.
Again, I don't want to get into the specifics of the
negotiations but we will always ensure that our forces have the
appropriate protections that they need when they are deployed
overseas.
Mr. Chaffetz. When you say appropriate protections, is that
immunity?
Mr. Vershbow. I think there is a difference terminology
implied.
Mr. Chaffetz. Yes. That is why I am seeking a little
clarification here. I am not feeling too comfortable at the
moment. Will our troops have immunity?
Mr. Vershbow. They will have status protections which has
been defined under the security agreement, the Status Forces
Agreement, that now applies as indicating that our forces will
be subject to U.S. law rather than Iraqi law. We will be
looking for something going forward that provides a comparable
level of protection. Exactly how that will be achieved, again,
is the subject of ongoing negotiations.
Some of the personnel, as I mentioned, under the OSCI will
be covered under the Chief of Mission authority. The question
that is still being discussed is whether any additional
personnel would be involved and how they would be protected. We
certainly take very seriously the concerns you have expressed.
Mr. Chaffetz. Let me move on. I think this is a major,
major point of concern. It is obviously a major point of
difference. It is something that obviously must be resolved. It
is totally unacceptable to think that our troops would be there
without immunity as they enjoy currently.
Ambassador Kennedy, let me go back to these lost
functionalities. Last time we gathered together, we were
referred to the July 12, 2010 Commission on Wartime Contracting
Special Report. It talked about the lost functionalities--this
is on page 4 of that report. There were 14 specific security-
related tasks now performed by Department of Defense that State
must provide as the military draws down.
I know there has been progress on at least seven of those,
but could you give me an update as to of those 14 specific
ones, what are you not prepared to take care of?
Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, as we outlined in my June 8th
letter to the committee, we believe that we have covered the
functions that are absolutely essential to our operations
there.
Mr. Chaffetz. Would that be all 14 of these?
Mr. Kennedy. I think you can say we will have the ability
to do everything except, for example, the recovery of downed
aircraft. Should an aircraft go down, we will be able to move
to recover the personnel from those aircraft but because we
don't have quite the heavy lift of the Department of Defense,
we may not be able to recover the airframe itself.
Mr. Chaffetz. So of the 14, that is the only one that you
are concerned about?
Mr. Kennedy. I am concerned about everything possibly going
wrong.
Mr. Chaffetz. But functionality?
Mr. Kennedy. Earlier in your opening statement, you asked
about counter battery neutralization. We will have the ability,
thanks to my colleagues in the Defense Department with a system
which is called Giraffe, which is an early warning system that
tracks incoming rockets or mortars and gives us sufficient
warning to deal with that so that we will be able to sound the
alarm.
In the construction activities that we are undertaking at
all the sites where our personnel will both work and live, we
are constructing overhead cover that means should one of those
missiles or mortars strike one of our facilities--this has
happened in Baghdad and the construction techniques we have
been using in Baghdad have proven very, very effective--there
is no penetration of the building itself.
Mr. Chaffetz. Can we or will we fire back?
Mr. Kennedy. Sir, the State Department has no howitzers and
no counter rockets. We will not fire back, that is not a
diplomatic activity. We now have a diplomatic mission in Iraq,
not a military mission, but if I might add, we are partnered
extensively with the Iraqi military and the Iraqi police who
have been assisting us during the last few months we have been
without such a counter battery fire ability and the Iraqi
police and Iraqi military has been of great assistance of
disrupting the attempts of forces to attack our facilities via
rockets and mortars.
Mr. Chaffetz. God bless the men and women who are going to
continue to be there because if it is the policy of the United
States not to fire back, I have deep concerns. We will continue
to discuss this.
I have been very generous with my time. I now recognize the
gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Ambassador Kennedy, will you describe or compare for me
what a normal State Department deployment to any particular
country would be and how that stacks up against what you are
going to be doing in Iraq. Take a non-conflict area and talk
about size of operation for a comparably sized and populated
country and how the missions are going to vary.
Mr. Kennedy. I think, Mr. Tierney, that in terms of the
personnel deployed to do what I will call substantive and basic
administrative and logistic work, our Embassy and consulates in
Iraq would be comparable to a similar country. What is
different in Iraq is the additional layers of security, medical
and life support that we have to provide there because our
people cannot go shopping on the outside. There is an active
and ongoing threat to life and limb.
We have taken a package that is necessary to conduct the
State Department's mission. There is obviously a police
training component which does not exist in every country and
then we have added security, medical, logistics and life
support that is appropriate for the situation on the ground in
Iraq but we very much believe, and we think we are seeing
evidence, that supplement, so to speak, will be able to be
withdrawn measure by measure over time as the security
situation further stabilizes and as we are able to obtain more
goods and services on the local economy.
Mr. Tierney. In how many locales will State Department
diplomatic personnel be located?
Mr. Kennedy. Four, Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Widely disseminated around the country or
closely knit?
Mr. Kennedy. They will be in the north in Erbil where we
have two closely linked sites; in Baghdad where we have our
Embassy and two other compounds literally right across the
street, a police training compound on the other side of the
river and a logistics hub at Baghdad Airport. We will have a
small consular presence co-located with the Office of Security
Cooperation in Kirkuk and then we will have a Consular General
in Basra in the south, sir.
Mr. Tierney. There will be convoys, I assume, going from
one to the other from time to time?
Mr. Kennedy. There will be supply convoys. Our plan is to
conduct those movements via air.
Mr. Tierney. All to be via air?
Mr. Kennedy. Obviously except the ones across the street
and the road to the airport is very often safe. We have an
aviation capability, thanks to Congress' assistance, that will
enable us to move personnel via either fixed wing in from Amman
or Kuwait and the long distances, Baghdad up to Erbil, Baghdad
down south to Basra, and then we have distributed helicopter
rotary wing capability in order to move our personnel should it
be required between nearly placed locations.
Mr. Tierney. You are essentially going to have no ground
convoy security issues?
Mr. Kennedy. Obviously there are some movements within
Baghdad or outside of the compound in Basra where yes, there
will be security issues which is why we have turned to our
colleagues in the Department of Defense and they have been
providing us on loan with mine resistant transport vehicles.
Mr. Tierney. Who is going to provide the human security for
those convoys?
Mr. Kennedy. That security will be provided by contractor
personnel but each one of those movements with contract
security personnel, each and every one of those will have a
State Department diplomatic security officer in the convoy who
is the agent in charge, using security parlance. He or she is
in charge, they give the orders. The contractors only respond
to the orders given by the diplomatic security Federal
employee.
Mr. Tierney. Has there been any thought given to taking
State personnel from other locations around the world and
locating them in this conflict likely area and instead using
the contactors elsewhere?
Mr. Kennedy. We have analyzed that. I have a grand total of
1,800 diplomatic security special agents and about another 100
security professionals in my entire staff. I would have to
strip the entire world, and given what we all know to be the
threats against U.S. interests around the world, plus my
requirement to protect the Secretary of State, distinguished
foreign visitors to the United States and enforce the passport
and visa laws of the United States, I simply do not have it. I
have stripped to 175 to make sure that I have professionals
overseeing the contracts as a whole and then a State Department
direct hire professional in each one of those convoys.
Mr. Tierney. The Secretary of State has written Members of
Congress indicating a concern for proposed reductions in the
State Department's budget. If those reductions are enforced,
will that impact your ability to hire and train additional
people to perform that function?
Mr. Kennedy. It will, sir. We know that we have this
mission. We have been, I think, as judicious as possible, as
streamlined as possible, borrowing and receiving transfers of
equipment from the Department of Defense, but if the
President's budget request is not enacted, we will have a
severe difficulty maintaining our tasked presence there in
Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and worldwide, for that matter.
Mr. Tierney. I yield back for now. There will be another
round, I assume.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
Ambassador Vershbow, let us talk about the number of U.S.
troops. What are the Iraqis requesting or authorizing, how many
is the President authorizing?
Mr. Vershbow. Mr. Chairman, no decisions have been made.
Discussions are still ongoing on the nature of the
relationship, from which would be derived any number.
Mr. Chaffetz. The number of 3,000 to 4,000 troops that we
hear, is that accurate or inaccurate?
Mr. Vershbow. As I said, there are a lot of things going on
in these discussions which predates the announcement of October
4th when the Iraqi leaders took the position they have taken
regarding no immunities. Obviously the discussions now have
taken on a different dimension. Beyond that, I really cannot
say because nothing has been decided. The shape of the
relationship will be determined in part by how this issue of
status protections is addressed.
It is a work in progress. Even as we speak, discussions are
taking place between our Ambassador, the Commander, General
Austin, and Iraqi leaders. It is really difficult to give you
more than that today.
Mr. Chaffetz. There was a report that General Austin had
asked for between 14,000 and 18,000 troops. Is that true?
Mr. Vershbow. Again, I cannot comment on internal
deliberations. A lot of different ideas have been bounced
around in the course of the last few months.
Mr. Chaffetz. Do you know what the actual request was?
Mr. Vershbow. The military leadership was asked to provide
a range of options and they have done that. That was the basis
on which we engaged the Iraqis.
Mr. Chaffetz. Do you know what General Austin requested?
Mr. Vershbow. I cannot talk about that in an open session,
Mr. Chairman. It is classified.
Mr. Chaffetz. Fair enough.
When do we have to make this decision? I guess it is the
end of the year, right? Is there a particular timetable to
this?
Mr. Vershbow. There is no absolute deadline. Right now we
are on the trajectory that was established by the agreement by
the previous administration in November 2008 to draw down all
of our forces which are now around 43,000 and then move in 2012
to the Office of Security Cooperation Iraq which would have 157
U.S. military and DOD civilian personnel and additional
security assistant team contractors supporting specific FMS
cases.
The discussions that are going on now relate to what
potential additions to that presence would be agreed. Whether
that would be before or after the end of the year remains to be
seen. Obviously the discussions are ongoing. It might be
simpler to reach the agreement before all of our forces have
left, but we are talking about an entirely different
relationship in either case. I cannot predict when these
discussions will close.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
Ambassador Kennedy, let us talk about the hiring of all of
these contractors. When we get to January 1st, based on where
we are at here in October, where are we going to be on the
staffing levels? Are we set to hit 100 percent of the goal, if
you can clarify that a bit for me? There are obviously
different categories. Security is may be a bit more important
but food service is going to be equally as important. Where are
we in that spectrum of being able to accomplish that goal?
Mr. Kennedy. We have awarded contracts for all the services
that we require in Iraq at all the installations and those
contract task orders have been awarded. The contractors are in
the process of mobilizing. The medical contractor, for example,
is already mobilized. The aviation contractor is already
mobilized. The life support contract has been awarded thanks to
my colleagues at the Department of Defense, awarded on our
behalf, and a contract that we will fund. That contractor is
mobilizing and it is, in fact, a contractor that DOD has been
using at all the sites that we will be engaged in except two
and that is well on the way.
We believe that we will have no problem in those support
services areas being fully staffed and fully supportive of our
personnel before December 31.
Mr. Chaffetz. Can we talk about the hospital? You mentioned
the hospital or medical needs. There has been some concern that
there won't be the capacity to deal with a mass casualty event,
that the medical facility at the Baghdad International Airport
will have the capability to only handle six patients overnight.
Do you have any concerns with that?
Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, yes, I do have a concern, but I
also have to operate in the realm of reality. We do also have a
medical unit at the American Embassy compound downtown. It is
not a hospital unit staffed with surgeons. Also because of our
aviation capabilities, have the capability of quickly
transporting personnel who have been stabilized but need
further surgery to locations such as Jordan, Kuwait, Turkey or
all the way to Europe should it be required.
We believe we have put into place a layered system that
would be able to deal with what we foresee as the facts on the
ground.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. I will now recognize Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Ambassador Kennedy, the protection for the
logistical contractors and various functions that they are
doing whether it be kitchen help or people over the police
training area, is that also going to be provided by private
contractors?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, sir, that is within the number of 5,000
which is approximately 3,500 static perimeter guards around our
facilities and 1,500 movement personnel.
Mr. Tierney. Will they be getting a similar type of State
employee or security personnel supervision?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, sir. The Diplomatic Security Service will
control both the static guards and the movement guards.
Mr. Tierney. Who specifically is going to be training the
police on that and under which program?
Mr. Kennedy. That is under the Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement, the police training program
under Assistant Secretary Brownfield's leadership.
Mr. Tierney. It is a combination of State personnel?
Mr. Kennedy. It is a combination of State Department
personnel and some contract trainers for some activities.
Mr. Tierney. Has there been any consideration given to
doing out of country training of these police personnel?
Mr. Kennedy. There has been some consideration of that. I
will have to get back to you sir with more details. What we are
trying to do is a large number of people with sort of second
echelon. The Bureau of Narcotics and Law Enforcement and my DOD
colleagues have done a great job in training the police on the
beat. This training is, in effect, advanced training and we
believe that one of the most important locations to do that is
at the Baghdad Police College which adjoins the training center
I mentioned.
Mr. Tierney. If you have done an analysis of the possible
benefits of out of country training of that nature by the U.S.
personnel or by a combination of international personnel, I
would like to see it if you could.
Mr. Kennedy. I will ask Assistant Secretary Brownfield to
get that to you.
Mr. Tierney. Who has been vetting and training the private
contractors that are going to be providing security?
Mr. Kennedy. The State Department Diplomatic Security
Service runs background investigations on every single one of
these individuals. They are given sir, what are called public
trust clearances which is the equivalent to a secret security
clearance, although they do not have the need to know. It is
the same rubric, police checks, national agency checks,
interviews, vetting, records checks. We feel very, very
comfortable that the individuals we are engaging to do this
security work are of the highest standard.
Mr. Tierney. The Wartime Contracting Commission basically
indicated they thought there should be consideration given to
the operational, the political and the financial aspects or
risks of contracting functions on that. I am assuming you were
precluded from doing that because of the limitations you have
in personnel? You simply had to spread your people thin to
manage and supervise contractors and really didn't have the
opportunity to weigh it and those other factors of risk?
Mr. Kennedy. There are two parts to that. Obviously there
is personnel and resources. I only have 1,800 as I mentioned,
but I try to take the holistic approach. What I see are
requirements in both Iraq and Afghanistan, if I might add that.
This is a surge; this is not a permanent requirement that I see
the Bureau of Diplomatic Security having to rise to adding
5,000 additional personnel for the long haul, the number we
will have in Iraq.
I see this as a surge. The State Department, other
government agencies have always dealt with surge requirements
by turning to contractors. To hire someone, to promise them a
20, 25 or 30 year career when we do not see the need for their
services beyond 3 to 5 years, just citing that as a factor,
would saddle the State Department and the American taxpayer
with a number of level of personnel that is not in the best
interest.
Mr. Tierney. That would be one of the considerations I
assume they would want to measure. The other, of course, would
be the potential of non-State Department or non-Defense
Department people performing an act or taking on some activity
that totally puts the country at risk or makes some political
situation untenable.
Mr. Kennedy. That is entirely possible, but that is why
though, all of our personnel, whether static or movement, act
under the direct supervision of diplomatic security special
agents or security protective officers who are all direct hire.
Mr. Tierney. What contingency plan does the State
Department have if facts on the ground change substantially
enough that it is no longer feasible to have private security
contractors in use?
Mr. Kennedy. I think that is an option I have thought
about. I cannot speak for my colleagues. I think I would have
to report to the Secretary that we would have to severely scale
down our operations in Iraq. I have even done an analysis based
upon an old General Accounting Office study on the number of
Federal law enforcement personnel in the entire Federal
Service. Even if I took 10 percent of the Bureau of Prisons
guards, I would not have enough static officers there and the
Bureau of Prisons might have some comment on that.
I believe that these professionals that we engage that we
vet, that we rewrite the syllabus for their training, we spot
check their training, we direct their performance hands-on,
eyes-on, I believe that is the way to go.
Mr. Tierney. The plan is if it becomes untenable, then
there is a scaled down operation as opposed to hiring more and
more contractors?
Mr. Kennedy. I am sorry?
Mr. Tierney. So many things on the ground change and become
so violent over there.
Mr. Kennedy. I am sorry, I thought you meant I could no
longer keep contractors there?
Mr. Tierney. Right and that is my point if it comes to a
point where the contractors are not feasible to operate where
you have made the analysis on that, it is not to keep loading
them in hoping things are going to change just to scale down
operations?
Mr. Kennedy. I think we have in our plan sufficient
contractors to provide perimeter security in cooperation with
the Iraqi police and military.
Mr. Tierney. I know you do but contingency plans are for
when that doesn't work. I think I heard you say you would
recommend the Secretary scale back?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Estevez, do you have a dollar figure or
estimate of what assets will be either turned over to the
Iraqis or left behind?
Mr. Estevez. There are a couple different programs we have
for turning things over to the Iraqis, including foreign
military sales. They are buying military equipment from us
which is not left behind, basically new equipment. There are
some things they have purchased from us.
Mr. Chaffetz. What is the value? How much have they
purchased?
Mr. Estevez. I am trying to give you a couple different
programs, under what we call foreign excess property is $321
million to date. That will go up as we continue over the next 3
months to draw down.
Mr. Chaffetz. That is where the Iraqi government pays the
United States.
Mr. Estevez. No, that is we give it to them. That is
because the cost benefit analysis is we don't need this stuff.
It includes T-wall barriers and generators that don't work in
the United States and vehicles that aren't up to U.S. vehicle
code. The cost benefit analysis says we save $600 million by
not transporting that equipment back to the United States where
the military doesn't have programs to sustain that.
Mr. Chaffetz. We didn't try to trade it for something? We
are just handing it to them?
Mr. Estevez. It is in our benefit to help them build their
capability so that their military and security forces can
sustain.
Mr. Chaffetz. These are not all military assets?
Mr. Estevez. Again, we are talking about generators,
housing, air conditioners, TVs, things like that. Before it
goes to the Iraqis, we have processes that are for the United
States--States say the State of Utah wants that. They have
capability to say we want that.
Mr. Chaffetz. Sign us up.
Mr. Estevez. Your plan, you just have to pay the
transportation back to the United States for that piece of
equipment.
I don't think I have the dollar value of what we have given
them under what was 1202 authority which was authorized by
Congress to provide them with equipment they need to buildup
their military capability so that we can depart and they can
sustain themselves, for their internal security and eventually
for external security for the nation.
Mr. Chaffetz. Is there a way to look at the list of the
assets and say the State of Utah, if they want it, come get it.
Mr. Estevez. We have put that process in place.
Mr. Chaffetz. Process in place?
Mr. Estevez. Before we turn over something, we say here is
the list of equipment, Base X, that we are turning over to the
Iraqis and there is an organization called National Association
of Surplus--it is NASAP--that screens that, the State of Utah
says I am looking for a generator for a hospital, they say a
there is a generator available. Here is how you get it back and
that becomes available.
Mr. Chaffetz. We don't have time in these few minutes, but
if you could help clarify both the dollar value, the assets
themselves and these programs if they are available to States
or municipalities, wherever they might be, that would be
helpful.
Mr. Estevez. I would be happy to do that.
Mr. Chaffetz. Is there a grand total number of the assets
we are leaving behind?
Mr. Estevez. That is that number. There is about 50,000
other pieces of military equipment that we have provided to the
Iraqis again under congressional authority.
Mr. Chaffetz. Do we have a dollar value?
Mr. Estevez. I do not have the dollar value on that but I
can get you the dollar value on that for the record.
Mr. Chaffetz. I would appreciate that.
Mr. Estevez. Let me see if I can give you the number that
we have given to the States. But I will give you that as well.
Other than that, nothing else if being left behind. We are
retrograding, other than those types of equipment that we
really don't need anymore. The process is that if it is needed
in Afghanistan, it goes to Afghanistan. If it is needed
somewhere else in the U.S. Central Command, it goes there. Most
of the equipment there belongs to the units that we deployed
there and when they return, they carry that back with them to
the United States.
Mr. Chaffetz. The logistics of this must be amazing. If you
could please keep looking for that number. Let me go back to
Ambassador Kennedy.
I want to talk about the $481 million is my understanding
for the interim consular post. These are interim facilities,
right? They are supposed to last 3 to 5 years. This would be in
Erbil and Basra as opposed to building more permanent type
structures? I know there was a congressional funding issue here
in play. The concern is spending $481 million on what would be
an interim facility that is only going to last a few years.
Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, I will get you the specific
breakdown of that figure. We are being as minimalist as
possible. We are reusing T-walls, the sites we are using both
in Basra, Erbil, Baghdad and Kirkuk are all former U.S.
military troop sites, so we are using equipment they are
transferring to us under another one of the programs you were
just asking my colleague about.
Mr. Chaffetz. Am I off on the number, the $481 million for
two facilities?
Mr. Kennedy. I think that number includes things that
artificially inflate the number. I will give you a piece of
paper on that.
Mr. Chaffetz. Fair enough. I would appreciate that.
The last thing I want to discuss here is what is happening
with Iran and their presence there. We have had previous
incidents with Iranian-made missiles being fired at us. What do
you see happening right now? It appears they are just laying
low waiting for January 1st to come about and the concern is
they are going to step up these things and start to go after
our 17,000 personnel there. What is your assessment of the
situation?
Mr. Kennedy. My assessment is that Iran does not wish to
see a stable, democratic Iraq as a lynchpin of a new way of
doing business in that part of the world and they will go to
significant extremes to disrupt our efforts to assist the
government and people of Iraq to achieve the democracy. They
have a fledging democracy. It is building, it will take a while
to build the democracy as I think we know from our own country.
It is in the interest of the Iranians to disrupt our efforts
and I believe that they will continue to do so.
Mr. Chaffetz. How do we defend ourselves? Basically, we are
taking a position that it is going to be our policy to just
duck and cover without the ability and the opportunity to fire
back. How capable do we think the Iraqis are going to be to
actually go out and take out the threat of somebody actually
continuing to fire upon an embassy, for instance?
Mr. Kennedy. Because of the excellent training and joint
operations that our military has been conducting with the
Iraqis over the last few years, I believe, and I could ask my
DOD colleagues to comment, that the Iraqi capabilities are
growing significantly and continue to grow.
Mr. Chaffetz. Are they adequate?
Mr. Kennedy. They are certainly not up to U.S. military
standards, no, sir, but it is an effort that is on the upswing.
I believe they are cooperating with us. The Iraqi police are
working with us and I believe we will be able to accomplish
that over time.
Mr. Chaffetz. I guess I am concerned about January 1st,
which isn't too far around the corner. One of these letters
from Joseph McManus, Acting Assistant Secretary, Legislative
Affairs, Department of State, back in July 2011 said ``Although
the competency and capabilities of the ISF have improved in
recent years, they are generally capable of providing internal
security for Iraq, they still face specific capability gaps and
continue to operate in an uncertain security environment.''
This is just an ongoing concern. We think we can expect the
expansion of Iran's presence there to try to disrupt what is
going on and I do not know how we would defend ourselves
against it.
Mr. Kennedy. I believe that our continued cooperation with
Iraqi officials--the Iraqis want to have a democracy in Iraq.
They do not want to be a satellite of Iran. There was a very,
very bloody war that took place several years ago between Iraq
and Iran. I believe we can count on the Iraqis to pursue their
own self interest which is to maintain a free democratic and
stable Iraq and we need to partner with them in that endeavor.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. I yield.
Mr. Tierney. Ambassador, one of the tools, as a diplomat
you will recognize we are not using with Iran in this situation
is diplomacy. I think that might have some limiting effects on
our ability to try and bring some order to what is going on in
that part of the world and is something for us all to consider.
I won't ask you to comment on it because you are a diplomat
and I know what your answer will be. Certainly I think it is
something we should think about because we have all these
people so well trained as diplomats and then not use one of the
tools in our arsenal on that.
Mr. Estevez, can you tell me how much money the Department
of Defense will no longer have to spend in Iraq once the
transfer is made over to State on an annual basis?
Mr. Estevez. I cannot. I will have to provide that for the
record.
Mr. Tierney. Ambassador Vershbow, do you have any
information on that?
Mr. Vershbow. I don't have the numbers in front of me. We
will get back to you.
Mr. Tierney. I know Ambassador Kennedy does, don't you?
Mr. Kennedy. Figures I have seen, Mr. Tierney, say that the
difference is approximately $50 billion a year by the
Department of Defense versus an estimated $6 billion a year for
the Department of State. I think that is a significant shift in
mission; I think it is a significant reduction in funding.
Mr. Tierney. I know we discussed it before. I thought these
gentlemen had it. I wanted to make sure they had an opportunity
to say if they knew it was otherwise.
The $6 billion the Department of State has, are you now
forced under the current budgetary situation to take that from
other Department of State activities or have you received
adequate funds to plus up that amount?
Mr. Kennedy. In the President's budget request for fiscal
year 2012, the State Department budget is presented in two
segments, a regular budget and an overseas contingency
operating budget which is a parallel to what the Department of
Defense has used for many years. If the President's budget
request is enacted as requested, meaning both the regular
budget and the contingency operating budget, we would not have
to draw funds from the regular to support the contingency
operation.
Mr. Tierney. What would happen if the House budget, as it
passed the House, were the effective operating vehicle?
Mr. Kennedy. At an 18 to 20 percent cut to State Department
operations, I literally, even though it is my responsibility to
plan for contingencies, my pencil can't get there, sir.
Mr. Tierney. I think it is reasonable to assume if we want
to fund the $6 billion for your operation in Iraq, it has to
come from somewhere which means other areas that are already
under funded will be drawn down.
Mr. Kennedy. Absolutely.
Mr. Tierney. Are you knowledgeable of any USAID activities
that will be continuing on in Iraq?
Mr. Kennedy. I know that AID will continue to operate in
Iraq. There is funding requested in the Foreign Assistance
Program for them. Frankly, I am not an expert on the AID
programs. I know that we are making provisions, I and my
colleagues, for the platform on which AID will have a presence
in Iraq.
Mr. Tierney. That is what I was getting at. The security
for AID would be through you or directly on their own hires?
Mr. Kennedy. Since they are under Chief of Mission
authority, their security will be provided by the Diplomatic
Security Service.
Mr. Tierney. What steps have you taken at the State
Department to deal with the issue of debarment and suspension?
I know First Kuwait couldn't get debarred when there was little
doubt it should have been, so how are we improving that
situation so contractors will always know there is some bite
when they violate?
Mr. Kennedy. Working with the Procurement Executive at the
Department, he has just issued a new State Department PIB that
increases substantially our ability to follow up on the
Commission on Wartime Contracting's recommendations, not in
this report but in previous ones and we will be able to provide
a greatly upgraded ability to suspend and debar under the
program we have set forward. I would be glad to send a copy of
our new program to you and your staff.
Mr. Tierney. Last, what measures has State taken to ensure
they will have adequate oversight of the LOGCAP IV when you
take over the contract and how long do you think that is going
to last? Will that be your vehicle after 2012?
Mr. Kennedy. I think it will be a vehicle for more than 1
year. We realize this is a major activity. Someone took a quote
of mine or one of my colleagues totally out of context saying
that the State Department does not have the resources to
oversee the LOGCAP IV contact. That is entirely true but there
was a semicolon there and that is why we, on a reimbursable
basis, engaged the Defense Contract Audit Agency and the
Defense Contract Management Agency as our partners in
overseeing the LOGCAP contract. It will be fully overseen and
fully audited.
We are just using professionals from the Department of
Defense who have the career specific talents and abilities to
do that kind of life support contract which we don't. I would
never have engaged in that route unless I had agreement with
DCMA and DCAA to provide us on a reimbursable basis the
oversight that is required.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Chaffetz. I would now recognize the gentleman from
Illinois, Mr. Quigley.
Mr. Quigley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Kennedy, you just touched briefly on the
debarment issue. We have years of frustration to counter a
report that promises hope as we finish our activities, the
report you just referenced to Mr. Tierney. Just to use a few
examples of the frustrations we might face here, the First
Kuwaiti General Trading and Contacting Co. as an example.
Do you recall being here 4 years ago in 2007 before this
same committee and we were talking about the construction and
they were the prime contractor to build the State Department
Embassy in Iraq. There were cost overruns of $144 million,
labor abuses and from what we now know, a kickback scheme
involving hundreds of millions of U.S. taxpayer dollars.
Despite all these problems, the State Department has allowed
First Kuwaiti to continue to operate around the world,
including in Saudi Arabia and other countries.
If you cannot deal with that after all these years, what
gives us any hope that debarment and suspension will have some
sort of effect because there is a new plan?
Mr. Kennedy. I don't want to debate specific numbers with
you because I would like to sit with you and discuss them, but
there were not cost overruns of $146 million, nor am I aware of
a huge kickback scheme for First Kuwaiti related to State
Department activities amounting to hundreds of millions of
dollars.
We monitored that. I will admit in building the American
Embassy in Kuwait, the then Director of Overseas Buildings used
a construction oversight model which did not deliver everything
that I would have wanted if I had been the Under Secretary at
that time. That model has been changed.
The State Department outside of the contract in Baghdad has
never awarded a contract to First Kuwaiti. The references you
made to Saudi Arabia and also one in Indonesia were awarded to
an American company registered and operating in the State of
Maryland named Grunley Walsh. They subsequently sold to another
American company called Aurora who utilized First Kuwaiti as a
subsidiary of theirs.
Mr. Quigley. Doesn't that seem like an obvious way to get
around?
Mr. Kennedy. I am not a lawyer.
Mr. Quigley. The fact they can actually use them anyway, it
is semantics that you are getting into at this point. We didn't
actually do it, somebody else did. The fact that they are
allowed to gets to the point. I would love to have the private
debate that you encourage about the problems that existed with
First Kuwaiti.
Mr. Kennedy. I would be glad to call upon you and I will
seek an appointment. We have no plans to use First Kuwaiti ever
again. The problems that arose in Baghdad were, in effect,
almost parallel to the awarding of the original contracts for
Surabaya and for Jeddah and the problems were unearthed along
the way. The contract was already in place with the American
company and we put additional monitoring personnel on those.
Because of the potential cost to the American taxpayer of
stopping a contract in the middle and breaking it and then
trying to restart it, we have been moving very, very
expeditiously. The contract in Jeddah, in fact, is suspended.
There is no work. I have halted work on that. They are at 99
percent complete.
Mr. Quigley. Were there problems or not? Why would you
think about stopping a contract in the middle if there weren't
any problems? What were the problems?
Mr. Kennedy. The problems came out in Baghdad and in
Surabaya and Jeddah in effect simultaneously.
Mr. Quigley. What were the problems? If I had it all wrong,
what were the problems more specifically?
Mr. Kennedy. Poor management onsite, on-scene.
Mr. Quigley. Poor management created what problems?
Mr. Kennedy. Time delays. We have State Department
construction engineers and architects onsite. I think in the
building trades it is called the owner's representative on-
scene in Jeddah and in Surabaya. Those representatives were
constantly requiring work to be stopped and work to be redone
at the contractor's expense, not at ours.
That is the poor performance leading to seeing a product
that was not headed in the direction that we wanted. That is
why we have representatives onsite who can tell the contractor
that wiring, that wall is not built according to the
specifications, the contract and the bid documents. You tear it
out, you get no additional funds for correcting your errors.
Mr. Quigley. I have run out of time. Can you quickly tell
us how many contractors has the State Department suspended or
debarred in Iraq?
Mr. Kennedy. Suspended or debarred in Iraq, I don't have
that number at the tip of my tongue. I will get that for you.
Mr. Quigley. Can you get it to the full committee?
Mr. Kennedy. Absolutely. We will address it to the
chairman.
Mr. Quigley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chaffetz. The gentleman yields back. I recognize Mr.
Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Ambassador Kennedy, have you taken advantage
of the good offices of the Special Inspector General for Iraq
or the Government Accountability Office, or both at the outset
of your venture for what advice and counsel they may give you
and lessons learned on past contracting situations?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, sir. The Special Inspector General for
Iraq, the Government Accountability Office, the State
Department's Inspector General, have been engaged in an
incredible number of inspections and oversights. I have a long
list that I won't bother to read off to you of all the work
they are doing. There are multiple audits and inspections going
on. I believe two of them, as we speak.
Mr. Tierney. That is one argument. The other is using them
for advice and counsel as you startup.
Mr. Kennedy. We read every single one of their reports and
use those as lessons learned for the future.
Mr. Tierney. But you have not engaged directly with them at
any point in time?
Mr. Kennedy. The Inspectors General do not like to give
advice because if they give advice, in effect they feel it is a
pass they have given me. I would say you have told me to do X,
I did X, it didn't work.
Mr. Tierney. I had a different impression from talking to
folks over there but I understand that aspect of it but I do
think it is important to glean all the lessons learned that we
can.
Mr. Kennedy. I read every single one of the reports they
have done on the platform that I have built, my predecessors
built and we plan to continue.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Chaffetz. I have one last question and will give you
each an opportunity to cite your biggest concern moving
forward, but before we get to that, I am still concerned about
the capability for medical type situations with only six beds
overnight. Does the State Department have a plan for evacuation
should that need to occur? We are talking about 17,000 people.
How do you address that?
Mr. Kennedy. We have been working with the Department of
Defense and with our embassies in Inman and Baghdad on mass
casualty scenarios using both our assets and assets that we
might be able to call upon from DOD. There is such a plan being
developed.
I might point out the number is not 17,000; it is much
closer to 16,000.
Mr. Chaffetz. I feel so much better.
Mr. Kennedy. If you take just the State Department
component there, it is actually closer to maybe 10,000 plus my
Department of Defense colleagues.
Mr. Chaffetz. When you say 10,000, 10,000 what?
Mr. Kennedy. I would say 10,500-11,000 State Department
government employees and contractor support. As my colleagues
from Defense discussed, there is the Office of Security
Cooperation which is part of the Chief of Mission's
responsibilities but they have their own personnel.
Mr. Chaffetz. As we move forward, would it be reasonable by
the end of the month you could provide me a specific number and
how that breaks down so there is no confusion moving forward?
Mr. Kennedy. Today, if I tote up everything, the answer for
State and OSCI is 16,009. We track this very, very closely
because we have no intention of over building and I do not wish
to under build either.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
Let me start with Mr. Estevez. I want to wrap up here. We
need to be brief. Your biggest concern moving forward, the
thing we have to achieve and tackle by the end of the year?
Mr. Estevez. Under the current scenario of drawing down to
zero, aside from the OSCI presence in Iraq, it is a massive
logistical move, 43,000 folks in about 2\1/2\ months, about
800,000 pieces of equipment to come out--actually closer to
850,000, so from the standpoint of logistics, that is a
phenomenal piece of work.
We have done that and we have been doing this for the last
2 years really, the draw-down. We are confident we can do it
but there are always hitches in this type of operation. Should
there be successful negotiations, turning some of that around
is also complicated but absolutely executable.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. Ambassador Vershbow.
Mr. Vershbow. I think that from a policy point of view,
between now and the end of the year, we hope that we can come
to an agreement with the Iraqis on the full dimensions of a
long term security relationship with that country that meets
their needs and which also serves our long term strategic
interest.
I think the long term success of Iraq's efforts to
consolidate its sovereignty, its democracy, its stability has
become even more important in the wake of the Arab spring. The
Iraqis face many threats, some internal, some external. I share
your concern, Mr. Chairman, about Iran. As Ambassador Kennedy
said, they don't necessarily have an interest in stability in
Iraq or in seeing Iraq become a sovereign state that determines
its down destiny. Indeed, Iranian militias are likely to
continue to pose a threat to security.
That makes it all the more important that we develop a
strong and robust security partnership with the Iraqis that
helps them improve their abilities which have improved
significantly since we basically handed over the principal
responsibility to them more than a year ago. They recognize
that they need additional support going forward and I think it
is in our strategic interest to develop a relationship that
meets their needs so we can help them counter these threats and
become an anchor of stability in a turbulent and fast changing
Middle East.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. Ambassador Kennedy.
Mr. Kennedy. When we started this transition process, my
great fear was that we would not be mission capable to take
over the responsibilities given to the Secretary of State under
the new system. I believe that today we are mission capable.
The remaining task is to complete the physical plant build out.
We have the aviation in place, we have the security personnel
in place, we have the logistics in place, we have the life
support in place. All our building projects are under way.
There have been the normal delays operating in a war zone
from delays getting steel into the country to we thinking the
U.S. military would be offsite X on day one and they were
offsite on day 27. That is not pointing at them in any way,
they have been absolutely fabulous in their cooperation. We
could not have asked for anything more.
We are now mission capable but I still have to complete
internal and some external build-out of facilities within our
compounds.
Mr. Chaffetz. Very good.
Thank you all for your commitment to our Nation and our
country, the hard work and dedication and your patriotism. I
appreciate the staff that does so much of the work here in
helping us along the way. I thank Mr. Tierney.
I would also appreciate that if there are additional
updates you feel need to be brought before the committee, we
would certainly appreciate that.
The committee now stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]