[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: CAN TERRORISTS STILL EXPLOIT OUR VISA SYSTEM?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND
MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 13, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-43
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
_____
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Billy Long, Missouri Janice Hahn, California
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Chairwoman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Henry Cuellar, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Ben Quayle, Arizona, Vice Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Paul Anstine, Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Clerk
Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border
and Maritime Security.......................................... 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 7
Witnesses
Mr. Thomas Winkowski, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field
Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. Edward J. Ramotowski, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Acting,
Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Mr. John D. Cohen, Deputy Counter-Terrorism Coordinator,
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
Mr. Peter T. Edge, Deputy Associate Director, Homeland Security
Investigations, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department
of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 30
Prepared Statement............................................. 32
Mr. Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 36
Prepared Statement............................................. 38
Appendix
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border
and Maritime Security:
Slide.......................................................... 53
TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: CAN TERRORISTS STILL EXPLOIT OUR VISA SYSTEM?
----------
Tuesday, September 13, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Miller, McCaul, Quayle, Rigell,
Duncan, Cuellar, Clarke, and Thompson (ex officio).
Also present: Representative Bilirakis.
Mrs. Miller. I am going to call the hearing in order here
this morning. Of course this is the Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security. I think
we have a very interesting, interesting and critically
important topic to discuss this morning. The title of our
hearing is ``Ten Years After
9/11: Can Terrorists Still Exploit Our Visa System?''
We will be hearing testimony from a fantastic distinguished
panel whom I will be introducing in a moment. As I make my
opening statement you may want to take a look at some of the
pictures that we are going to have up on the screen of various
terrorists, murderers, cowards, cockroaches, however you want
to categorize these individuals that overstayed their visas.
So 2 days ago of course we commemorated the 10th
anniversary of the devastating acts perpetrated by these
cowardly terrorists who took the lives of nearly 3,000 of our
fellow citizens. As a Nation most of us had not really heard
before of al-Qaeda before that day despite their contributions
which funded the 1993 attacks on the World Trade Center, fatwa
that had declared war against our Nation in 1996, the bombing
of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and of course
the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000. Despite these attacks
we were really not prepared and certainly our countrymen paid a
horrific price.
In Article I, Section 8 we find the enumerated powers of
Congress, and in the first paragraph of that section you find
what, in my opinion, is certainly the first and foremost
responsibility of the Federal Government, and that is to
provide for the common defense. The very purpose of this
committee is aligned with this principal responsibility of the
Government and to guard against another attack.
Photographs along our wall in this committee hearing room
certainly remind us of our purpose to defeat al-Qaeda and like-
minded groups and to defend our homeland, which includes of
course securing our borders.
On that day in September we learned a very hard lesson as a
9/11 Commission has noted. For terrorists, they said, travel
documents are as important as weapons and four of the 9/11
hijackers had overstayed visas, a missed opportunity to prevent
the attacks.
Since September 11, we have put a series of measures in
place to strengthen our visa security process and today have a
layered approach that begins overseas at the U.S. embassies and
consulates around the world which pushes our border out to
deter and prevent visa fraud and terrorists from obtaining
travel documents. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents
and Customs and Border Protection officers are now stationed
overseas to conduct additional background checks on prospective
visa applicants. Certainly while this system is an improvement
over what was in place before 9/11, it is by no means perfect.
We will be exploring today what we can do to improve our
system.
Our enemies are intent on attacking our country and are
actively seeking to avoid our countermeasures. Our job is to be
one step ahead instead of constantly reacting to their last
attack.
In the case of the Christmas day bomber--I see his picture
there--it certainly illustrates the lengths terrorists will go
to thwart our security measures. The Christmas day bomber was
known to the intelligence community. His father had approached
the embassy in Nigeria with his concerns that his son may be
involved in terrorism. But still he was able to fly on a valid
U.S. visa. He tried to detonate his concealed explosive device
7 minutes before the plane was to land in Detroit. Of course I
reside in the Detroit area, fly in and out of that airport,
just flew out of it yesterday, which would have placed that
plane certainly over my Congressional district, over southeast
Michigan. So I am especially interested to hear from our
witnesses today about the progress we have made to ensure that
another known person of concern cannot board an aircraft with a
valid U.S. visa.
Last week before the full committee, Ranking Member Cuellar
and I were just talking, we heard from Representative Lee
Hamilton and former Secretary Tom Ridge regarding the progress
of the 9/11 Commission recommendations. The report recommended
and Congress mandated a biometric exit program to ensure that
foreign visitors have not overstayed their visa and have
returned home. However, this administration has still not
articulated the way forward on this vital program.
The U.S. Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator
Technology, or US-VISIT as they call it, captures foreign
nationals' fingerprints at the port of entry and at U.S.
consulates overseas in instances where the individual is
traveling on a visa. The fingerprints are then recorded and
compared with fingerprints already in the Federal database to
check for immigration violators, criminals, and others wanted
for violation of U.S. laws.
In 2009, US-VISIT conducted an exit pilot project at the
Detroit and Atlanta airports and generated 175 watch lists and
more than 120 visa overstay hits. So I think if we are serious
about controlling who comes into our Nation and preventing
another attack, we need to get serious about an exit program.
It has been more than 2 years since the pilot, and the
Department again has yet to articulate a program or plan to
move forward with a comprehensive exit plan in the air
environment or elsewhere.
More than just preventing terrorists from entering the
country, the lack of a visa exit program inhibits our ability
to control our border. I think it is an interesting statistic
that in this country as we talk about illegal immigrants and
how many are here in our country, it is interesting to note
that it is theorized that about 40 percent of everyone who is
here illegally didn't come across the border. They are here
because of overstay of visas, 40 percent. That is a very
startling number.
Today there is a backlog of 757,000 unvetted visa overstay
records. So we obviously have to do better than that, and I
will be very interested as our hearing progresses about talking
about this backlog, what we are doing to ensure that we don't
have such as backlog in the future.
ICE pursues only a small fraction of these visa
overstayers. By not seriously enforcing visa overstays, we are
sending a message that if you make it past the port of entry,
the chances of us ever finding you are slim to none. ICE
enforcement memos put an additional question mark over our
enforcement efforts there.
We do know that terrorists have a very strong affinity for
using a student visa process to enter the country, as earlier
this year a young man from Saudi Arabia purposely sought out a
program that would allow him to come to the United States as a
student. Then of course he has been accused of purchasing
chemicals that he intended to use to construct an IED.
So we have a lot of questions about this, and certainly our
visa security process needs to be robust. We have to deny
terrorists the freedom of movement because 10 years ago we saw
what failure looked like very unfortunately on that horrific
day which we all commemorated just this past Sunday.
[The statement of Mrs. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairwoman Candice S. Miller
September 13, 2011
Two days ago we commemorated the 10th anniversary of the
devastating acts perpetrated by cowardly terrorists who took the lives
of nearly 3,000 of our fellow citizens.
As a Nation, most of us had not heard of al-Qaeda despite their
financial contributions which funded the 1993 attacks on the World
Trade Center, fatwa that declared war against our Nation in 1996, the
bombing of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the bombing
of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000. Despite these attacks, we were not
prepared, and our countrymen paid the price.
In Article I Section 8, we find the enumerated powers of Congress,
and in the first paragraph of that section you find what is, in my
opinion, the principal responsibility of the Federal Government--to
provide for the common defense.
The very purpose of this committee is aligned with the principal
responsibility of the Government--to guard against another attack.
Photographs along the wall here in the hearing room remind us of our
purpose--to defeat al-Qaeda and like-minded groups and defend the
homeland.
On that day in September, we learned a hard lesson--as the 9/11
Commission noted, ``For terrorists, travel documents are as important
as weapons.'' Four of the 9/11 hijackers had overstayed visas--a missed
opportunity to prevent the attacks.
Since September 11 we have put a series of measures in place to
strengthen our visa security process. Today, we have a layered approach
that begins overseas at U.S. Embassies and Consulates around the world
which pushes our border out to deter and prevent visa fraud, and
terrorists from obtaining travel documents.
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement agents and Customs and Border
Protection officers are now stationed overseas to conduct additional
background checks on prospective visa applicants.
While this system is an improvement over what was in place before
September 11, it is by no means perfect.
Our enemies are intent on attacking our country, and are actively
seeking to avoid our counter measures. Our job is to be one step ahead,
instead of constantly reacting to their last attack.
The case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab illustrates the lengths
terrorists will go to thwart our security measures.
The Christmas day bomber was known to the intelligence community,
his father had approached the Embassy in Nigeria with his concerns that
his son might be involved in terrorism, but he was able to fly on a
valid U.S. visa.
Abdulmutallab tried to detonate his concealed explosive device 7
minutes before the plane was to land in Detroit--which would have
placed that plane over my Congressional district. I am especially
interested to hear from our witnesses about the progress we have made
to ensure that another known person of concern cannot board an aircraft
with a valid U.S. visa.
The 9/11 Commission report recommended and Congress mandated a
biometric exit program to ensure that foreign visitors have not
overstayed their visa and have returned home.
The U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology, or US-
VISIT captures foreign nationals' fingerprints at the port of entry and
at U.S. Consulates overseas in instances where the individual is
traveling on a visa. The fingerprints are then recorded and compared
with fingerprints already in Federal databases to check for immigration
violators, criminals, and others wanted for violations of U.S. laws.
In 2009, US-VISIT conducted an exit pilot project at the Detroit
and Atlanta airports and generated 175 watch list and more than 120
visa overstays hits. However, full deployment of an exit program is
being delayed due to space and infrastructure constraints, and the
remaining question of how to limit disruption to the flow of people and
commerce into the United States. The Bipartisan Policy Center 9/11
Report Card lists this recommendation as ``unfulfilled''.
If we are serious about controlling who comes into the Nation and
preventing another 9/11 attack, we need to get serious about an exit
program. It has been more than 2 years since the pilot and the
Department has yet to articulate a plan to move forward with a
comprehensive exit plan in the air environment or elsewhere.
More than just preventing terrorists from entering the country, the
lack of a visa exit program inhibits our ability to control the border.
Nearly 40% of all illegal aliens do not sneak across the border in the
dark of night; they walk through the front door, and never leave.
Today, there is a backlog of 757,000 unvetted visa overstay
records. We can and must do better than that. I will be interested in
hearing about our progress on this backlog and what we are doing to
ensure that we do not have such a backlog in the future.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement pursues only a small fraction
of these visa overstayers. By not seriously enforcing visa overstays,
we are sending the message that if you make it past the port of entry,
the chances of us ever finding you are slim to none.
We know that terrorists have a strong affinity for using the
student visa process to enter the county as earlier this year a young
man from Saudi Arabia purposely sought out a program that would allow
him to come to the United States as a student. He stands accused of
purchasing chemicals he intended to use to construct an Improvised
Explosive Device (IED).
I am sure my colleague, Mr. Bilirakis will have some questions for
the witnesses on the status of our efforts in this area.
Our visa security process must be robust, and we must deny
terrorists the freedom of movement because 10 years ago we saw what
failure looked like.
Mrs. Miller. At this time the Chairwoman would now
recognize the Ranking Minority Member of the subcommittee, the
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Cuellar, for his opening statement.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Chairwoman Miller, for holding this
committee hearing. I also want to thank the Ranking Member of
the full committee for the work that he has done in the past on
this issue. I am pleased that the subcommittee is meeting today
to examine the issues of visa security, which is particularly
appropriate as we recently marked the tenth anniversary of the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
The 9/11 hijackers did not sneak into this country, did not
cross a river, the Rio Grande, but rather entered the United
States on visas. More recently the attempted bombing of an
airline by Umar Farouk on Christmas day 2009 refocused
attention on the vulnerabilities in the visa process.
Since 2001, the Department of Homeland Security and
Department of State, with direction from Congress, have taken
important steps to strengthen visa security, including efforts
to identify and enforce overstays, individuals who are admitted
to the United States legally either with or without a visa but
then overstay their authorized period of admission. Of the
approximately 11.5 million to 12 million unauthorized resident
alien populations, the most recent estimates proposed that it
is about 33 to 48 percent are overstays. That is almost 50
percent of all the people that got here, again I emphasize did
not cross the Rio Grande but actually came in through a visa
and overstayed.
Five of the 19 September 11, 2001 hijackers were overstays.
There should be no argument against about the vital importance
of the work completed by the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, ICE, and the Counterterrorism and Criminal
Exploitation Unit, the CTCEU, whose primary responsibility is
overstay enforcement.
In addition to the CTCEU overstay investigations, the
primary responsibility for apprehending and removing overstays
as well as aliens who did not have lawful immigration status
rests with ICE, the Enforcement Removal Operation, the ERO. It
is my understanding certain individuals subject to orders were
removal from the United States are often delayed due to the
respective host government relations with the United States and
members.
Madam Chairwoman, I will have a handout on this, an
overhead to go over this, and ask the witnesses on this
particular issue. Consequently host countries refuse to accept
the return of the nationals or use lengthy delay tactics. I
know this is an issue that I sat down with John Morton in the
State Department trying to get the State Department to move a
little faster on this particular issue. I look forward to
hearing more from the State and GAO about the U.S. former
relations with these recalcitrant countries and why visas
continue to be issued to individuals from such countries, and
at what rate and as well as recommended steps for improvement
and actions being taken. Again, Members, I would ask you to
look at this particular issue as we talk about this.
Also within DHS and ICE, ICE has stood up a visa security
unit, the VSUs, at high-risk visa issuing posts. It is my
understanding, I might be wrong, but it is my understanding
that historically there has been some tension between ICE and
State regarding getting new VSUs established and hopefully we
have gone beyond that turf battle. I hope to hear from the two
agencies about whether they have made progress in overcoming
those obstacles.
Customs and Border Protection also plays an important role
in preventing terrorist travel to the United States. They have
established the Immigration Advisory Program Units at key
overseas airports to help screen travelers to the United
States. Also I visited the CBP's National Targeting Center and
I have seen the good work that they are doing along with their
interagency partners, prescreening individuals en route to the
country.
Many believe that given its security missions and resources
DHS should play an even greater role in the visa processes. At
a minimum we need to make most of our limited visa security
resources and ensure that all agencies are doing their part.
I look forward to hearing from our DHS and State witnesses
about how their agencies can work cooperatively to prevent
those who would seek to do us harm from traveling to the United
States.
It is worth noting that despite all the attention of the
vulnerabilities along the Southern border, and again I
emphasize to Members, an estimated 40 to 48 percent, as the
Chairwoman said, of those currently in the United States
illegally entered legally through the proverbial front door but
have overstayed, again visas legally into the United States but
overstayed, not crossing the Rio Grande.
We know that the overwhelming majority of those who enter
the country do so for legitimate purposes. Even those who enter
the country illegally or enter legally but overstay the
majority mean this country no harm. But nevertheless those
people have overstayed and violated the law.
However, a decade after 9/11 the fact remains that there
are terrorists and others who seek to enter the United States
for purposes to hurt us and our communities. So I look forward
to a good, frank dialogue on this important Homeland Security
matter, and I thank the Chairwoman Miller for holding this
important hearing and the witnesses for joining us here today.
Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman. Before I recognize the
Ranking Member of the full committee I would ask unanimous
consent that the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, who is
the Chair of the committee's Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications, be permitted to sit
on the dais and participate in today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
At this time the Chairwoman would recognize the Minority
Ranking Member of the full committee, the gentleman from
Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for his opening statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I
appreciate you holding this hearing. I also welcome our panel
of witnesses.
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Congress
recognized the importance of securing the visa process and
required it to be used as a counterterrorism tool. Since that
time the Departments of Homeland Security and State have made
important strides toward better securing the visa and passenger
prescreening processes for travelers to the United States,
efforts including establishing visa security units at high-risk
embassies and consulates, deploying immigration advisory
program personnel at foreign airports and enhancing
prescreening of airline passengers before they arrive in the
United States. However, the attempted bombing of Northwest
flight 253 on Christmas day 2009, by an individual with a valid
U.S. visa served as a wake-up call about the persistent visa
security vulnerabilities.
During the 111th Congress, the Committee on Homeland
Security and this subcommittee held hearings to examine the
circumstances surrounding the attempted Christmas day bombing.
From our examination of the chain of events leading up to the
incident, it is clear that there were several failures that
allowed the perpetrator to board the U.S.-bound flight.
Today I look forward to hearing what progress has been made
in closing those security gaps since that incident nearly 2
years ago. I also hope to hear that DHS and the State
Department have taken proactive measures to address possible
emerging threats to visa security. I have long held that we
must develop a layered security approach that pushes borders
out and begins the screening process far in advance of a
passenger boarding a flight in this country.
Both DHS and the State Department have vital roles to play
in this effort. Clearly defined responsibility and close
coordination between the departments are essential to success.
I want to hear from the witnesses today whether the turf
battles between the departments are now a thing of the past or
if they still linger. I certainly hope it is the former and not
the latter.
Of course these security efforts require appropriate
personnel and resources and that in turn requires adequate
funding. Members of Congress who talk a good game on border
security will need to put their money where their mouths are
when it comes to funding these programs, even in tight
budgetary times.
Just as we must ensure the security of the visa process for
those entering the United States, we must also ensure
individuals depart this country in a timely manner. As already
indicated, over 40 percent of the persons unlawfully present in
the United States enter this country legally and have
overstayed. Among those millions of people may be a handful of
those who seek to do us harm.
In accordance with the 9/11 Commission recommendations,
Congress has repeatedly required DHS to deploy a biometric
entry-exit system under US-VISIT to attract visitors to the
United States. Yet a decade after September 11, 2001, we are no
closer to having such a system than we were on that fateful
day. Some of us read the paper this morning and I guess
somebody is going to tell us something new about that in this
hearing. I look forward to hearing that. The lack of progress
toward this mandate under this administration and its
predecessors is simply unacceptable. I hope to hear from our
witnesses about how DHS can fully fulfill our 9/11 Commission
recommendations and Congressional mandates. We will never truly
have visa security until an entry-exit system is completed.
I thank the witnesses for being here today and I look
forward to their testimony. I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman for his comments. It is
interesting to note that the administration is going to be
making an announcement about this issue based on the fact that
we are having a hearing about it. So I sometimes think it is
exactly what Congress needs to be doing, exercising its
oversight responsibilities to get some action on various
things.
What I will do is go through and read the bios of our very
distinguished panel, and we appreciate you all coming. We can
go through rather than interrupting each time.
First Mr. Thomas Winkowski, who is the Assistant
Commissioner from the Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security, was
appointed the Assistant Commissioner in August 2007. He is
responsible for operations at 20 major field offices, 331 ports
of entry, 58 operational container security initiative ports,
and 15 preclearance stations in Canada, Ireland, the Caribbean.
Previously he served as Director of Field Operations in Miami,
where he was responsible for managing all inspectional
operations at the Miami International Airport and the seaport,
Port Everglades, Fort Lauderdale International Airport, and
West Palm Beach and Key West as well.
Then we will hear from Mr. Edward Ramotowski, who is the
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Acting, Bureau of Consular Affairs,
the U.S. Department of State. He assumed his current position
as Managing Director of Visa Services at the U.S. Department of
State in August 2009, and in that position he oversees the visa
office in Washington, DC, two domestic processing centers, as
well as visa operations at over 200 U.S. embassies and
consulates abroad. From August 2006 to July 2009 he served as
principal officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Guadalajara,
Mexico. He has previously worked as a Special Assistant to the
Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, Chief of the
Consular Section of the U.S. Embassy in Nassau, Bahamas and the
U.S. Council in Warsaw, Poland.
Then we will hear from Mr. John Cohen, who is the Deputy
Counterterrorism Coordinator, Department of Homeland Security.
He serves as the Principal Deputy Coordinator for
Counterterrorism at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
and as the Senior Advisor on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement
and Information Sharing. He has also served as the Senior
Advisor to the Program Manager for the Information Sharing
Environment, Office of the Director of National Intel, where he
authored and coordinated the implementation of key components
of the National Strategy for Information Sharing.
Peter Edge, the Deputy Associate Director, Homeland
Security Investigations, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Department of Homeland Security, began his law enforcement
career in 1986 in Essex County, New Jersey Prosecutor's Office,
prior to his selection as a Special Agent was with the U.S.
Customs Service in Newark, New Jersey. In 2005, Mr. Edge was
promoted to the position of Assistant Special Agent in Charge
of the SAC New York office where he lead high-profile
investigative components such as the El Dorado Task Force, the
New York High Intensity Financial Crime Area, JFK International
Airport, and the Immigration Division. Today he serves as the
Deputy Associate Director of Homeland Security Investigations
for the U.S. Immigration And Customs Enforcement.
Then we will hear from Mr. Richard Stana, we welcome him
back to the committee again, the Director of the Homeland
Security and Justice, Government Accountability Office. During
his 27-year career with the GAO, he has directed reviews on a
wide variety of complex domestic and military issues while
serving in headquarters, field, and overseas offices. Most
recently he has directed GAO's work relating to immigration,
customs law enforcement, drug control corrections, court
administration, and election system.
So you can see we have a very, very distinguished panel. We
will begin with Mr. Winkowski. The floor is yours, sir, for
your prepared testimony.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS WINKOWSKI, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE
OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Winkowski. Good morning, Chairwoman Miller, Ranking
Member Cuellar, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss CBP's
visa security efforts.
Since its establishment in 2001, the National Targeting
Center's priority mission has been to provide tactical
targeting and analytical research support for CBP's
antiterrorism efforts. The NTC develops tactical data and
actual intelligence to prevent high-risk travelers and goods
from entering the United States.
Centralized NTC targeting endeavors combined with
interagency collaboration as well as robust partnerships with
our foreign counterparts ensure a coordinated response to
terrorists in National security events.
CBP works in coordination and collaboration with a number
of Government agencies with broad authorities, robust
capabilities, and missions that are complimentary for other
Nation's security. Each agency's unique capability and
resources leverage DHS's layered risk management approach to
safeguarding U.S. borders.
A few critical examples of this, Chairwoman Miller, the NTC
coordinates with the terrorist screening center to resolve
every terrorist screening database encounter. We work closely
with the State Department to enhance visa security. As a
result, the State Department has revoked more than 1,000 visas
based on CBP's vetting results and recommendations.
ICE has collocated visa security personnel at the National
Targeting Center to augment and expand current operations. We
are collaborating with TSA in the private sector on an air
cargo advanced screening pilot which was implemented following
the October 2010 attempts by extremists to ship explosive
devices in their cargo shipments.
Additionally, CBP has information-sharing agreements with
foreign partners, including Canada, the United Kingdom, New
Zealand, and Australia.
On an average day CBP processes nearly 1 million travelers
at our ports of entry. The challenge faced by CBP each day is
rapidly and accurately identifying those individuals that pose
a threat to the United States and prevent their entry into the
country. CBP takes action at a number of points in the travel
continuum.
In the area of visa and visa waiver program security, while
the State Department is responsible for visa issuance, CBP has
partnered with the State Department to ensure the visa issuance
and travel process. In March 2010 we implemented a system that
vets all visas on a continuous basis.
Under the Visa Waiver Program and the Electronic System for
Travel Authorization, ESTA, we conduct enhanced vetting on Visa
Waiver Program applicants in advance of travel. As you recall,
that was a 9/11 Commission recommendation.
In the area of predeparture screening, CBP now conducts
predeparture screening of all travelers prior to boarding
flights bound for the United States. When the NTC identifies a
high-risk traveler through this process, we coordinate with our
immigration advisory program offices that are located in 8
airports around the world or our regional carry liaison group
which is located in three areas in the United States, in
Honolulu, JFK Airport, and Miami International Airport, to
resolve the issues or recommend to the carrier that a traveler
not be boarded.
Now as a result of these efforts 100 percent of travelers
on all flights arriving at and departing from the United States
are checked against Government databases prior to boarding a
flight. In fiscal year 2011, CBP made more than 2,000 no-board
recommendations to carriers. In the area of outbound in
addition to predeparture screening of inbound travelers, we
have also enhanced our outbound screening efforts. As a result
CBP has notable success in identifying and preventing the
departure of the Time Square bomber in May 2010 as well as a
suspected serial killer that was departing Atlanta airport in
August 2010.
In closing, CBP is continuing proactively looking for
solutions to threats to the homeland identified by
operationalizing intelligence through real-time targeting,
officer screening, and data sharing. Partnering with our
agencies and nations, effectively extending our borders and
exchanging information, makes this a truly global fight again
terror.
Our future state should include additional screening
processes and methods to make this protection a greater reality
so the American public remains safe. Chairwoman Miller, Ranking
Member Cuellar, and Members of the subcommittee thank you for
the opportunity to testify. I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The statement of Mr. Winkowski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas Winkowski
September 13, 2011
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
today to discuss the good work of U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) related to ensuring and enforcing security measures implemented
since the attacks of September 11, 2001. I appreciate the committee's
leadership and your commitment to helping ensure the security of the
American people.
cbp's role in multiple layers of defense
CBP and, more broadly, Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
continually refine our risk-based and layered approach to security,
focusing our resources on the greatest vulnerabilities, extending our
borders outward, and interdicting threats before they reach the United
States. DHS, in cooperation with our interagency and foreign partners,
is now screening people and goods earlier in the travel process. With
more advanced and better quality data than ever before, we now employ
an extensive network of research and analysis well before a traveler
applies for admission at a U.S. port of entry.
Depending on the traveler's point of origin and travel and entry
document requirements, the screening process can begin in a number of
ways: With the application for a visa, application for electronic
travel authorization, purchase of an airline ticket, or arrival at a
foreign airport or domestic port of entry. At each step along the way,
CBP, in cooperation with other Government agencies and commercial
carriers, reviews information about the traveler, including their
documents, their effects, and/or their responses to questions, prior to
arrival at a U.S. port of entry. Several Federal agencies are
responsible for different aspects of our aviation security, while other
countries and the private sector--particularly the air carriers--also
have important roles to play. These multiple layers of defense across
departments and agencies secure the aviation sector and ensure the
safety of the traveling public.
The foiled plot to bring liquid explosives onboard U.S.-bound
flights from the United Kingdom in 2006, the attempted bombing of
Northwest Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, the failed Times Square
bombing in May 2010, and the attempts to mail explosive devices within
printer cartridges from Yemen in October 2010 are all powerful
illustrations that terrorists continue to try to overcome security
measures we have enacted since September 11, 2001.
CBP continually evaluates and supplements existing security
measures with additional enhancements to strengthen our ability to
identify and prevent the international travel of mala fide travelers
and cargo. The success of these additional security measures depends in
great part on our ability to gather, share, and respond to information
in a timely manner--using both strategic intelligence to identify
existing and emerging threat streams, and tactical intelligence to
perform link analysis and targeted responses.
CBP and Intelligence
As part of our efforts to screen passengers bound for the United
States, CBP uses the U.S. Government's consolidated terrorist watch
list, specifically, the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), managed by
the Terrorist Screening Center. In addition, we use additional relevant
information from the intelligence community to determine whether
someone may be a risk to a flight, requires further screening and
investigation, should not be admitted, or should be referred to
appropriate law enforcement personnel.
Further, CBP's Office of Intelligence and Investigative Liaison
(OIIL), which serves as the situational awareness hub for CBP, provides
timely and relevant information along with actionable intelligence to
operators and decision-makers and improving coordination of CBP-wide
operations. Through prioritization and mitigation of emerging threats,
risks, and vulnerabilities, OIIL helps CBP to better function as an
intelligence-driven operational organization and turns numerous data
points and intelligence into actionable information for CBP officers
and analysts.
National Targeting Center
The National Targeting Center (NTC) is another key tool for DHS in
analyzing, assessing, and making determinations based on the TSDB and
other intelligence information. The NTC is a 24/7 operation,
established to provide tactical targeting information aimed at
interdicting terrorists, criminal actors, and contraband at the
earliest point. CBP's Automated Targeting System (ATS) is a decision-
support tool crucial to the operation of the NTC and is a primary
platform used by DHS to match travelers, conveyances, and shipments
against law enforcement information and known patterns of illicit
activity.
Safeguards for Visas and Travel
One of the initial layers of defense in securing air travel is
preventing dangerous persons from obtaining visas, travel
authorizations, and boarding passes. Before boarding a flight destined
for the United States or arriving at a U.S. port of entry, most foreign
nationals need to obtain a visa--issued by a U.S. embassy or
consulate--or, if they are eligible to travel under the Visa Waiver
Program (VWP), they must apply for a travel authorization issued
through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA).\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Exceptions would be citizens of countries under other visa
exempt authority, such as Canada. Citizens of countries under visa
exempt authority entering the U.S. via air are subjected to CBP's
screening and inspection processes prior to departure. In the land
environment, they are subjected to CBP processing upon arrival at a
U.S. port of entry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department of State (DOS) is responsible for visa issuance. DOS
also screens all visa applicants' biographic data against the DOS
Consular Lookout and Support System, which includes entries that alert
consular officers to the existence of TSDB files, for records related
to potential visa ineligibilities and checks their biometric data
(i.e., fingerprints and facial images) against other U.S. Government
databases for records indicating potential security, criminal, and
immigration violations prior to the issuance of the visa. For
individuals traveling under the VWP, CBP operates ESTA, a web-based
system through which individuals must apply for travel authorization
prior to traveling to the United States. Through ESTA, CBP conducts
enhanced vetting of VWP applicants in advance of travel to the United
States in order to assess whether they could pose a risk to the United
States or the public at large. Additionally, through interactive
communications with CBP, air carriers are required to verify that VWP
travelers have a valid authorization before boarding an aircraft bound
for the United States.
Pre-departure Vetting
CBP can also gather information and assess risk at the point of
travel booking. CBP conducts pre-departure and outbound screening for
all international flights arriving into and departing from the United
States. This works in concert with the Transportation Security
Administration's Secure Flight program, which vets 100 percent of
passengers flying to, from, and within the United States against the No
Fly and Selectee portions of the known or suspected terrorist watch
list, or TSDB. The NTC uses a variety of data sources and automated
enforcement tools to perform its function. The process starts when a
traveler purchases a ticket for travel to the United States; a
Passenger Name Record (PNR) may be generated in the airline's
reservation system. PNR data contains various elements, including
information on itinerary, co-travelers, changes to the reservation, and
payment information. CBP receives PNR data from the airline at various
intervals beginning 72 hours prior to departure and concluding at the
scheduled departure time.
CBP uses the Automated Targeting System (ATS) to then evaluate the
PNR data against ``targeting rules'' that are based on law enforcement
data, intelligence information, and past case experience. ATS allows
CBP to identify and interdict travelers with potential nexus to
transnational crime, including terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and
human smuggling.
The traveler's check-in provides the next opportunity in the travel
process for CBP to gather information and assess risk. On the day of
departure, when an individual checks in for his or her intended flight,
the basic biographic information from the individual's passport is
collected by the air carrier and submitted to CBP's Advance Passenger
Information System (APIS). Carriers are required to verify the APIS
against the traveler's government-issued travel document and provide
the data to DHS at least 30 minutes before departure, or up to the time
of securing the doors if using APIS Quick Query, for all passengers and
crew on board.\2\ APIS data contains important identifying information
that is not included in PNR data, including verified identity and
travel document information such as a traveler's date of birth,
citizenship, and travel document number. DHS vets APIS information on
all international flights to and from the United States against the
TSDB, as well as against criminal history information, records of lost
or stolen passports, public health records, and prior immigration or
customs violations and visa refusals. APIS is also connected to
Interpol's lost and stolen travel document database for routine queries
on all foreign passports used for check-in.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ APIS is the electronic data interchange for air carrier
transmissions of electronic passenger, crew member, and non-crew member
manifest data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another layer in the vetting process is the Immigration Advisory
Program (IAP), which stations CBP officers at eight foreign airports in
six countries in coordination with the host foreign governments.
Officers are deployed to these key transit hubs and work with border
control authorities, foreign law enforcement agencies, and air carriers
to identify known or suspected terrorists and other high-risk travelers
and assist in preventing them from boarding aircraft destined for the
United States. CBP officials at the NTC support IAP by screening all
travelers against the TSDB, including the subset No Fly list, ESTA
denials, visa revocations, public health lookouts, lost and stolen
passport records, and all State Department records for persons
identified as actually, or likely, having engaged in terrorist
activity. At IAP locations, CBP officers can make ``no board''
recommendations to carriers and host governments regarding passengers
bound for the United States who may constitute security risks, but
officers do not have the authority to arrest, detain, search, or
prevent passengers from boarding planes. Those authorities lie with the
host government.
After the attempted bombing on December 25, 2009, CBP expanded on
the NTC's IAP pre-departure screening efforts to include screening at
all foreign airports with direct flights departing to the United States
to identify and assess risks prior to travel and prevent the boarding
of high-risk travelers. When pre-departure screening identifies a
potential high-risk traveler, the NTC confirms the information through
vetting procedures, and then coordinates the issuance of ``no board''
recommendations to carriers via the nearest ICE or CBP Attache, Air
Carrier Security Office, and the CBP Regional Carrier Liaison Group.
Now, as a result of these efforts, 100 percent of travelers on all
flights arriving at and departing from the United States are checked
against Government databases prior to boarding a flight. During fiscal
year 2011 to date, pre-departure screening by the NTC has kept more
than 2,000 high-risk or otherwise inadmissible travelers from boarding
flights destined for the United States.
In March 2010, the NTC implemented a new program to conduct
continuous vetting of U.S. nonimmigrant visas that have been recently
issued, revoked, and/or denied. The continuous vetting ensures that
changes in a traveler's visa status are identified in near real-time,
allowing CBP to immediately determine whether to provide a ``no board''
recommendation to a carrier or recommend that DOS revoke the visa, or
whether additional notification should take place for individuals
determined to be within the United States. If a violation is
discovered, and the person is scheduled to travel to the United States,
CBP will request that DOS revoke the visa and recommend that the
airline not board the passenger. If no imminent travel is identified,
and derogatory information exists that would render a subject
inadmissible, CBP will coordinate with DOS for a prudential visa
revocation. If the subject of an existing visa revocation initiated by
the DOS or recommended by CBP is found to be in the United States, CBP
will notify the ICE Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation
Enforcement Unit for further action as appropriate.
Additionally, ICE has co-located Visa Security Program (VSP)
personnel at the NTC to augment and expand current operations. ICE
special agents and intelligence analysts conduct thorough analysis and
in-depth investigations of high-risk visa applicants. The focus of the
VSP and NTC are complementary: The VSP is focused on identifying
terrorists and criminal suspects and preventing them from exploiting
the visa process and reaching the United States, while the NTC provides
tactical targeting and analytical research in support of preventing
terrorist and terrorist weapons from entering the United States. The
co-location of VSP personnel at the NTC has helped increase both
communication and information sharing.
Vetting While En Route to the United States and Upon Arrival
While flights are en route to the United States, CBP continues to
evaluate the updated APIS and PNR information submitted by the
airlines. Based on the information garnered during the in-flight
analysis, as well as the CBP officer's observations at the port of
entry, a determination is made as to whether the traveler should be
admitted to the United States following primary inspection or referred
for a secondary inspection.
conclusion
As this committee no doubt knows, we live in a world of ever-
evolving risks, and we must move as deftly as possible to identify and
fix security gaps and to anticipate future vulnerabilities. CBP will
continue to work with our colleagues within DHS, and with DOS, and the
intelligence community to address these challenges.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify. I look forward
to answering your questions.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much. The Chairwoman now
recognizes Mr. Ramotowski for his comments and his testimony.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD J. RAMOTOWSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
ACTING, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Ramotowski. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking
Member Cuellar, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
As a 25-year veteran of the United States Foreign Service, it
is an honor to testify before you just 2 days after our Nation
marked such a somber event, the 10-year anniversary of the 9/11
attacks. My colleagues and I in the Foreign Service in the
State Department will never forget that day, and we are fully
determined to ensure that such a tragedy does not occur again.
My focus today is on how the Department of State reformed
the visa process in the 10 years since 9/11 to eliminate
loopholes for terrorists to exploit our system, as well as
additional measures the Department undertook in response to the
December 25, 2009 attempted airline bombing.
Today visa processing rests on a multi-layered approach to
security, what we refer to as the five pillars, technological
advances, biometric innovations, personal interviews,
interagency data sharing, and intensive training. All of these
pillars supported the Department's response to the Christmas
day incident and we are continually refining and improving them
to deal with constantly evolving threat.
Among the key measures taken, we improved our visa Viper
terrorist information reporting program, by directing all
chiefs of mission to ensure that it was working effectively at
all their posts and instructing consular officers to include
complete information about the U.S. visa status of any
individuals included in Viper reporting.
As a second critical step, we issued new instructions to
officers on visa revocation procedures, and we enforced
standing guidance on their discretionary authority to deny
visas under Section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act with specific reference to cases that raise security and
other serious concerns.
We also created a dedicated revocation unit in Washington
that is focused exclusively on ensuring that any derogatory
information on a U.S. visa holder is rapidly evaluated and
acted upon.
As another step, we improved the capability of consular
systems to match visa records against new and emerging
derogatory information, to support the revocation process in
appropriate cases. We employ sophisticated name searching
algorithms to ensure matches to derogatory information
contained in the millions of records in our lookout system. We
use our authority to immediately revoke a visa in circumstances
where we believe there is an imminent threat.
The continuous vetting of the database of issued visas by
the Department and our partner agencies helps ensure that new
derogatory information that arises after visa issuance is
rapidly analyzed for revocation purposes.
Let me briefly turn to the overall visa security and the
five-pillar system we have in place today. Before any visa is
issued the applicant's fingerprints are screened against DHS
and FBI databases. We use facial recognition technology to
screen visa applicants against a watch list of photos obtained
from the terrorist screening center as well as visa applicant
photos contained in our own consular consolidated database.
Our new on-line visa application forms have the potential
to provide consular and fraud prevention officers as well as
our intelligence and law enforcement partners the opportunity
to analyze data in advance of a visa interview, including the
detection of potential nonbiographic links to derogatory
information. We have ambitious plans to screen more of this
data with our partner agencies to make the visa system even
more secure.
We also invest heavily in our people. Each consular officer
completes the basic consular course and receives continuing
advanced education in interviewing and name-checking techniques
throughout his or her career. Language fluency and area and
culture knowledge are other important skill sets that consular
officers use daily to improve the adjudication of visas.
We work closely with our partners to ensure that no
terrorist receives a visa or is admitted into our country. Our
vast database of visa information is fully available to other
agencies and we have specifically designed our systems to
facilitate comprehensive data sharing. In return we have
unprecedented levels of cooperation with law enforcement and
intelligence agencies and benefit from their capabilities and
resources in ways that were not possible at the time of 9/11 or
even on Christmas day 2009.
Distinguished Members of the committee, our current layered
approach to border security screening in which each agency
applies its particular strengths and expertise best serves our
border security agenda while furthering traditional U.S.
interest in legitimate travel, trade promotion, and exchange of
ideas. The United States must meet both goals to guarantee our
long-term security.
Thank you and I welcome your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Ramotowski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward J. Ramotowski
September 13, 2011
Good afternoon Madame Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar,
and distinguished Members of the committee. I thank you for this
opportunity to update you on the steps we have taken to increase the
security of the visa process.
The Department of State (the ``Department'') is dedicated to the
protection of our borders, and has no higher priority than the safety
of our fellow citizens. We are the first line of defense in border
security because the Department is often the first Government agency to
have contact with foreign nationals wishing to visit the United States.
We are committed, along with our partner agencies, to a layered
approach to border security that will enable the U.S. Government to
track and review the visa eligibility and status of foreign visitors
from their visa applications throughout their travel to, sojourn in,
and departure from, the United States.
corrective actions implemented after december 25, 2009
After the December 25, 2009 attempted terrorist attack on Northwest
flight 253, the President ordered corrective steps to address
identified weaknesses in the systems and procedures we use to protect
the people of the United States. In the months following the attack, we
reviewed our requirements for reporting potential terrorists who are
not applying for visas, which fall under our ``Visas Viper'' program,
as well as visa issuance and revocation criteria, and we introduced
technological and procedural enhancements to facilitate and strengthen
visa-related business processes.
Our immediate focus was on the deficiencies identified following
the attempted attack on flight 253 by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. On the
day following his father's November 2009 visit to the U.S. Embassy in
Abuja, Nigeria, the Embassy sent a Visas Viper cable to the Department
and the Washington intelligence and law enforcement community, stating
that Abdulmutallab may be involved with Yemeni-based extremists. In
sending the cable and checking State Department records to determine
whether Abdulmutallab had a visa, Embassy officials misspelled his
name, and as a result of that misspelling, information about previous
visas issued to him, and the fact that he held a valid U.S. visa, was
not included in the cable.
At the same time, the Consular Section entered Abdulmutallab's name
into the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), our on-line
database of lookout information. This correctly spelled CLASS lookout
was shared automatically with the primary lookout system used by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and accessible to other agencies.
On the basis of this CLASS entry, DHS's U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) determined, after the flight departed Amsterdam, that
Abdulmutallab warranted secondary screening upon arrival in Detroit.
Additional reporting on this case carried the correct spelling, with
additional reports reaching the necessary agencies in Washington.
To address the deficiencies identified in that review, including
our concerns with the Visas Viper process, we took immediate action to
improve the procedures and content requirements for Visas Viper cable
reporting. We directed all Chiefs of Mission to ensure that the Visas
Viper program functioned effectively at their posts, and that all
appropriate agencies and offices at post contributed relevant
information for Viper nominations. We instructed consular officers to
include complete information about all previous and current U.S. visas
in Visas Viper cables. The guidance cable included specific
instructions on methods to comprehensively and intensively search the
database of visa records so that all pertinent information is obtained.
We also issued new instructions to officers regarding procedures and
criteria used to revoke visas and reiterated guidance on consular
officers' use of the discretionary authority to deny visas under
section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), with
specific reference to cases that raise security and other concerns.
Instruction in appropriate use of this authority has been a fundamental
part of officer training for several years.
In addition to changes in standard procedures for searching visa
records, we immediately began working to refine the capability of our
current systems, with a particular focus on matching records of
currently valid visas against new and emerging derogatory information,
to support visa revocation in appropriate cases. For visa applications,
we employ strong, sophisticated name-searching algorithms to ensure
matches between names of visa applicants and any derogatory information
contained in the 42 million records found in CLASS. This robust
searching capability, which takes into account variations in spelling,
has been central to our procedures since automated lookout system
checks were mandated following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. We
constantly use our significant and evolving experience with searching
mechanisms for derogatory information to improve the systems for
checking our visa issuance records.
CLASS has grown more than 400 percent since 2001--largely as a
result of improved data sharing among the Department, Federal law
enforcement agencies, and the intelligence community. Almost 70 percent
of CLASS records come from other agencies, including information from
the FBI, DHS, DEA, and the intelligence community. CLASS also includes
unclassified records regarding known or suspected terrorists (KSTs)
from the Terrorist Screening Database, which is maintained by the
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and contains unclassified data on KSTs
nominated by all U.S. Government sources. We automatically run all
applicants' names against the Department's Consular Consolidated
Database (CCD), which holds our historical visa records, as part of our
on-going commitment to optimizing the use of our systems to detect and
respond to derogatory information regarding visa applicants and visa
holders. A system-specific version of the automated CLASS search
algorithm runs the names of all visa applicants against the CCD to
check for any prior visa applications, refusals, or issuances.
The Department has been continuously matching new threat
information with our records of existing visas since 2002. We have long
recognized this function as critical to the way we manage our records
and processes. This system of continual vetting evolved as post-9/11
reforms were instituted, and is now performed in cooperation with the
TSC. All records added to the Terrorist Screening Database are checked
against the CCD to determine if there are matching visa records.
Matches are sent electronically from the Department to TSC, where
analysts review the hits and flag cases for possible visa revocation.
In addition, we have widely disseminated our data to other agencies
that may wish to learn whether a subject of interest has a U.S. visa.
Cases for revocation consideration are forwarded to the Department
by our consular offices overseas, CBP's National Targeting Center
(NTC), and other entities. As soon as information is established to
support a revocation (i.e., information that could lead to an
inadmissibility determination), a ``VRVK'' entry code showing the visa
revocation is added to CLASS, as well as to biometric identity systems,
and then shared in near-real time (within about 15 minutes) with the
DHS lookout systems used for border screening. As part of its enhanced
``Pre-Departure'' initiative, CBP uses these VRVK records, among other
lookout codes, to recommend that airlines should not board certain
passengers on flights bound for the United States. Almost every day, we
receive requests to review and, if warranted, revoke any outstanding
visas for aliens for whom new derogatory information has been
discovered since the visa was issued. Our Operations Center is staffed
24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to address urgent requests, such as when
a potentially dangerous person is about to board a plane. In those
circumstances, the State Department can and does use its authority to
revoke the visa, and thus prevent boarding.
The Department has broad and flexible authority to revoke visas and
we use that authority widely to protect our borders. Since 2001, the
Department has revoked approximately 60,000 visas for a variety of
reasons, including nearly 5,000 for suspected links to terrorism; 1,451
of those occurring since the attempted attack on December 25, 2009.
Following that incident, we reviewed the last 10 years of Visas Viper
nominations, as well as ``P3B'' entries (potentially ineligible for a
visa due to suspected ties to terrorism) in CLASS to determine whether
Visas Viper subjects were properly watch listed, and to determine the
visa status of all P3B subjects. The Department's Visa Office completed
a review of all 2001-2010 data and revoked 30 visas.
Most revocations are based on new information that has come to
light after visa issuance. Because individuals' circumstances change
over time, and people who once posed no threat to the United States can
become threats, revocation is an important tool. We use our authority
to revoke a visa immediately in circumstances where we believe there is
an immediate threat. At the same time, we believe it is important not
to act unilaterally, but to coordinate expeditiously with our National
security partners in order to avoid possibly disrupting important
investigations.
a more secure visa application process
The Department constantly refines and updates the technology that
supports the adjudication and production of U.S. visas. Under the
Biometric Visa Program, before a visa is issued, the visa applicant's
fingerprints are screened against DHS's Automated Biometric
Identification System (IDENT), which has a watch list containing
available fingerprints of terrorists, wanted persons, and immigration
law violators; and against the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (IAFIS), which contains more than 50 million
criminal history records. More than 10,000 matches of visa applicants
with records on the IDENT watch list are returned to posts every month,
normally resulting in visa refusals. In 2010, IAFIS returned more than
57,000 criminal arrest records to posts. The Biometric Visa Program
partners with the DHS US-VISIT Program to enable CBP officers at ports
of entry to match the fingerprints of persons entering the United
States with the fingerprints that were taken during visa interviews at
overseas posts and transmitted electronically to DHS IDENT. This
biometric identity verification at ports of entry has greatly enhanced
CBP officers' ability to identify photo-substituted visas and the use
of valid visas by imposters.
We also use facial recognition technology to screen visa applicants
against a watch list of photos of known and suspected terrorists
obtained from the FBI's TSC, as well as the entire gallery of visa
applicant photos contained in our CCD. Facial recognition screening has
proven to be another effective way to combat identity fraud.
The Consular Electronic Application Center (CEAC) is another major
technological advance. CEAC is an electronic platform where applicants
submit visa applications and photos via the internet, eliminating
paperwork, decreasing visa application and adjudication times, and
reducing the number of forms applicants must complete. The worldwide
roll out of the on-line DS-160 nonimmigrant visa application form is
complete, and we are currently piloting the on-line DS-260 immigrant
visa application form. These new on-line forms provide consular and
fraud officers the opportunity to analyze data in advance of the
interview, enhancing their ability to make decisions, and soon will
afford intelligence and law enforcement agencies opportunities to
analyze visa application data before applicants appear for their
interviews. The on-line forms offer foreign language support; however,
applicants are required to answer in English, to facilitate information
sharing between the Department and other Government agencies. The new
application forms are ``smart,'' meaning that certain answers to
questions will trigger subsequent questions. The system will not accept
applications if the security-related questions have not been fully
answered, and ``irregular'' answers are flagged to ensure that consular
officers address them in the interview.
In April 2011, we greatly enhanced the way we track visa fraud. We
globally deployed a tool called the Enterprise Case Assessment Service
that provides a platform to store fraud-related research that used to
be stored outside of consular systems. This new tool associates fraud-
related information with visa records, making it available to consular
officials around the world. Should fraud be confirmed during the course
of a visa interview, consular officers can record that data in this new
tool, where it can be easily referenced if the individual attempts to
re-apply for a visa. Future iterations of this tool will track fraud in
other consular services, such as U.S. passport applications, and will
enable us to track the activities of third-party document vendors and
visa fixers. We hope soon to be able to share this new data source with
our U.S. Government partners to enhance interagency cooperation on
fraud prevention.
student and exchange visitor visas
I am aware that the Members of this committee have a keen interest
in the processing of student and exchange visitor visas. Consular
processing of these visa classes follows the same sequence of
clearances as the other visa classifications, including collection of
biometrics and submission of the on-line DS-160 form. All CLASS and
other security checks apply.
In addition, in order for an applicant to demonstrate that he/she
is qualified to apply for a student or exchange visitor visa, the
applicant must have been issued specific documentation, in addition to
what is required for other visas classes, and present it to the
consular officer at the time of interview. A student, for instance,
must have been issued a Form I-20A-B by the school he/she will attend
in order to apply for an F-1 student visa (or for dependants, an F-2
visa), or a Form I-20M-N if the student has been accepted at a
vocational school. In order to qualify for an exchange visitor visa (J-
1, dependent J-2), the applicant must present a Form DS-2019 issued by
the designated sponsor of one of the 15 categories of exchange visitor
programs.
Upon acceptance to the chosen educational institution or
organization, the student or exchange visitor is assigned a unique ID
number in the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS),
a DHS database. The individual retains the same number throughout his
or her educational career.
For an applicant to be found eligible for an F, M, or J visa, the
student must meet the requirements specific to student or exchange
visitor status (accepted at a school authorized by DHS to issue the
Form I-20, pursuing a degree or certificate with sufficient finances,
etc.) necessary to participate in the type of program chosen. In
addition, the student must demonstrate the intent to engage only in
approved activities for the visa class, the ability to meet the
financial requirements of the activity undertaken, and demonstrate a
present intent to depart the United States upon the completion of the
chosen activity.
training
Consular officers are trained to take all necessary steps during
the course of making a decision on a visa application to protect the
United States and its citizens. Every consular officer is required to
complete the Department's Basic Consular Course at the National Foreign
Affairs Training Center prior to performing consular duties. The course
places strong emphasis on border security, featuring in-depth
interviewing and name-checking technique training, as well as fraud
prevention. Throughout their careers, consular officers receive
continuing education in all of these disciplines to ensure they
integrate the latest regulations and technologies into their
adjudicatory decisions.
To augment this training and strengthen the security of the visa
program, in early 2010 the Department launched a program to provide
consular officers overseas with enhanced security clearances. This
allows them to participate more fully in posts' review of security
issues that bear on the issuance of passports and visas, and the
protection of U.S. citizens traveling and living abroad. In the past
few months, a concerted push on this project resulted in the tripling
of the number of highly-cleared consular officers (to more than 150) in
key positions at high-threat posts. The Office of Counterintelligence
and Consular Support, in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, has
increased its efforts to identify relevant reporting for review by
those consular officers.
security advisory opinions
The Department's Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) mechanism provides
consular officers with the necessary advice and background information
to adjudicate cases of visa applicants with possible terrorism
ineligibilities. Consular officers receive extensive training on the
SAO process, including modules on cultural and religious naming
conventions, which assists them in identifying applicants who require
additional Washington vetting. The SAO process requires the consular
officer to suspend visa processing pending interagency review of the
case and additional guidance. Most SAOs are triggered by clear and
objective circumstances, such as nationality, place of birth,
residence, or visa name check results. In addition, in cases where
reasonable grounds exist regardless of name check results, consular
officers may suspend visa processing and institute SAO procedures if
they suspect that an applicant may be inadmissible under the security
provisions of the INA.
the visa security program
The Department of State believes that the Visa Security Program
(VSP), under which DHS deploys U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) special agents to conduct visa security screening and
investigations at certain overseas consular posts, is a valuable
component of the U.S. Government's overall policy of protecting our
borders. We have a close and productive partnership with DHS, which has
authority for visa policy under section 428 of the Homeland Security
Act, and are fully supportive of the mission and future of the VSP, as
well a number of data-sharing arrangements.
The VSP increases the utility of the visa application and interview
processes to detect and combat terrorism, criminality, and other
threats to the United States and the traveling public. ICE special
agents assigned to Visa Security Units provide timely and valuable on-
site vetting of visa applications and other law enforcement support to
our consular officers. We work very closely with DHS to ensure that no
terrorist receives a visa or is admitted into our country.
Reports from our posts with ICE visa security operations suggest
that, as the VSP has matured over the past few years, ICE special
agents have, where resources permit, moved beyond a singular focus on
visa application review. They have been able to contribute their
expertise and resources to enhance our response to all kinds of threats
to the visa and immigration processes--terrorism, human smuggling and
trafficking, and trafficking in a wide variety of contraband. As
reported by one of our missions, ``(i)n addition to their concerns with
visa security, [ICE special agents'] efforts have also led to arrests
and indictments in the areas of child pornography and countering the
proliferation of controlled technology. This is a win-win
partnership.''
In Washington, we work very closely with our VSP colleagues on day-
to-day issues affecting the operations of the program, as well as
longer-term issues related to the expansion of the program to select
overseas posts. VSP special agents in Washington review our visa
databases and advise posts of emerging information about visa holders.
Another important aspect of our Washington partnership is the
resolution of issues raised as the VSP expands to more posts. In
January 2011, the Department's Bureaus of Consular Affairs (CA) and
Diplomatic Security (DS) concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
with ICE. This MOU governs VSP-Department of State interactions within
visa sections, procedures for resolving the very few disputed visa
cases that emerge from the VSP review process, and collaboration
between ICE special agents and their DS law enforcement colleagues
assigned as Regional Security Officers (RSOs) or Assistant Regional
Security Officer Investigators (ARSO-Is) assigned to consular sections.
Under the umbrella of section 428 of the Homeland Security Act and
the implementing Memorandum of Understanding between the Departments of
State and Homeland Security, we work together to resolve cases. When
warranted, DHS special agents assigned to the VSP will conduct
targeted, in-depth reviews of individual visa applications and
applicants prior to issuance, and recommend refusal or revocation of
applications to consular officers. We work with DHS to ensure that
terrorists do not receive visas and to expeditiously revoke visas as
appropriate.
The Department works collaboratively with DHS, pursuant to an
October 2004 MOU between the Department and the VSP on the
``Administrative Aspects of Assigning Personnel Overseas,'' and
National Security Decision Directive 38 (NSDD-38). This directive
outlines factors to be considered by Chiefs of Mission when considering
requests by a U.S. Government agency to create a new position at a post
abroad. NSDD-38 gives Chiefs of Mission responsibility for the size,
composition, and mandate of U.S. Government agency staff under his or
her authority.
Currently, there are 19 visa-issuing posts in 15 countries with an
ICE VSP presence. Before submitting an NSDD-38 request, ICE officials,
with the support of senior State Department officers from CA and DS,
conduct a post-specific, on-site assessment. The visit provides an
opportunity for the team to consult with officials at post to validate
the interagency assessment of the risk environment, determine the
feasibility and timing of establishing an office, and brief the Chief
of Mission on the role of the VSP.
layered security and data sharing
The Department embraces a layered approach to security screening.
In addition to our support of the VSP, over the past 7 years the
Department and DHS have increased resources significantly, improved
procedures, and upgraded systems devoted to supporting the visa
function. DHS receives all of the information collected by the
Department during the visa process. DHS's US-VISIT is often cited as a
model in data sharing because the applicant information we provide,
including fingerprint data, is checked at ports of entry to confirm the
identity of travelers. DHS has broad access to our entire CCD, which
contains more than 143 million records, related to both immigrant and
nonimmigrant visas, covering the last 13 years. A menu of reports
tailored to the specific needs of each particular unit is supplied to
elements within DHS such as ICE's agents assigned to conduct visa
security investigations overseas.
We make all of our visa information available to other U.S.
Government agencies for law enforcement and counterterrorism purposes,
and we specifically designed our systems to facilitate comprehensive
data sharing with these entities. We give other agencies immediate
access to more than 13 years of visa data for these purposes, and they
use this access extensively. For example, in May 2011, over 23,000
officers from DHS, the Department of Defense (DoD), the FBI, DOJ, and
the Department of Commerce submitted nearly 2 million queries on visa
records in the course of conducting law enforcement and/or
counterterrorism investigations.
Working in concert with DHS, we have proactively expanded biometric
screening programs and integrated this expansion into existing overseas
facilities. In partnership with DHS and the FBI, we have established
the largest biometric screening program on the globe. We were a pioneer
in the use of facial recognition techniques and remain a leader in
operational use of this technology. Currently, more than 146 million
images are enrolled in our facial recognition database. In 2009, we
expanded use of facial recognition from a selected segment of visa
applications to all visa applications, and we are now expanding our use
of this technology to passport records. We are testing use of iris
recognition technology in visa screening, making use of both identity
and derogatory information collected by DOD. These efforts require
intense on-going cooperation from other agencies. We have successfully
forged and continue to foster partnerships that recognize the need to
supply accurate and speedy screening in a 24/7 global environment. As
we implement process and policy changes, we are always striving to add
value in both border security and in operational results. Both
dimensions are important in supporting the visa process.
In addition, every post that issues visas has a fraud prevention
officer and locally employed staff devoted specifically to fraud
prevention and document security. We have a large Fraud Prevention
Programs office in Washington, which works closely with DS, and we have
fraud screening operations using sophisticated database checks at both
the Kentucky Consular Center in Williamsburg, Kentucky, and the
National Visa Center in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Their role in
flagging questionable applications and applicants who lack credibility,
present fraudulent documents, or give us false information adds a
valuable dimension to our visa process.
DS adds an important law enforcement element to the Department's
visa procedures. There are currently 75 ARSO-I positions approved for
73 consular sections overseas specifically devoted to maintaining the
integrity of the process. In 2010, DS approved 48 additional ARSO-I
positions to work in consular sections overseas. They are complemented
by officers working domestically on both visa and passport fraud
criminal investigations and analysis. These highly-trained law
enforcement professionals add another dimension to our border security
efforts.
The multi-agency team effort, based upon broadly-shared
information, provides a solid foundation for securing our borders. The
interagency community continues to automate processes to reduce the
possibility of human error while at the same time enhancing our border
security screening capabilities.
We face an evolving threat of terrorism against the United States.
The people and the tools we use to address this threat must be
sophisticated and agile and must take into account the cultural and
political environment in which threats arise. Our officers must be
well-trained, motivated, and knowledgeable. Information obtained from
these tools must be comprehensive and accurate. Our criteria for taking
action must be clear and coordinated. The team we use for this mission
must be the best. The Department has spent years developing the tools
and personnel needed to properly execute the visa function overseas and
remains fully committed to fulfilling its essential role on the border
security team.
training foreign passport officials
As part of our fraud prevention efforts, CA is working with the
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) Bureau
through INL's International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) network to
provide passport anti-fraud training to officials from foreign passport
issuance agencies.
The first class was piloted September 7-9, 2011 in El Salvador, for
officials from various Central American countries. The training is
designed to improve the integrity of other countries' passport issuance
by helping them institute organizations, processes, and procedures for
detecting fraudulent passport applications as part of their
adjudication and issuance processes.
We plan to offer this training in 2012 at the ILEAs in Botswana and
again in El Salvador.
foreign partner capacity-building programs
The Department regularly engages our foreign partners bilaterally,
regionally, and on a multilateral basis to address the issue of
terrorist transit. This engagement involves a range of activities,
including the exchange of information in a variety of security
channels, the execution of capacity-building programs on border and
document security, the provision of border screening programs like the
Terrorist Interdiction Program/Personal Identification Secure
Comparison and Evaluation System (TIP/PISCES), and regular
consultations on broader issues. Our capacity-building efforts are
intended to foster regional cooperation and collaboration, whether
through participation in organized regional groupings, such as the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, which facilitate regional
training and exercises, or through assistance programs, such as the
Regional Security Initiative (RSI), which funds regional
Counterterrorism (CT) training and cooperative efforts across all CT
priority regions.
The Department works in close coordination with the interagency
community for the development and implementation of the full range of
CT programming, through a range of fora. In addition to participation
in regular National Security Council-led meetings, we have established
mechanisms, such as the aforementioned RSI, which brings together our
Embassy leadership with the full range of interagency representatives
to discuss key issues of regional concern. This is replicated at the
working level through the Regional Interagency Consultative Group. In
North Africa, as already noted, we also have the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership, through which State, DoD, and USAID
cooperate and coordinate efforts to strengthen the counterterrorism
capacity of our regional partners. The success of this approach has led
to consideration of a similar construct for other regions. In addition
to coordination through formal structures, we cooperate informally on a
regular basis with the Departments of Defense, Justice, Homeland
Security, and the Treasury on our counterterrorism efforts across the
board.
u.s. government efforts to stop terrorist travel
The U.S. Government has many programs designed to thwart terrorist
travel around the world. Many portions of the U.S. Government play a
critical role in stopping terrorist travel--DHS and its components,
DoD, the law enforcement and intelligence communities, and State
Department consular officers.
U.S. passports and visas contain sophisticated security features
that make them very difficult to forge. The electronic chips in our
passports and the machine readable lines on our visas employ some of
the most sophisticated technical security measures available. State
Department consular officers work with our partners from CBP and ICE to
train foreign border and airline personnel in the detection of
fraudulent travel documents. The Department's Office of the Coordinator
for Counterterrorism (S/CT) also helps foreign partners at risk for
terrorist activity to establish their own computerized stop-list
systems via the TIP/PISCES program.
In the additionally critical areas of international travel document
security and interoperability, we have intensified our work. With
passport-issuing authorities of International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) member States around the globe, we have striven to
ensure that, as with the U.S. ePassport, other issuing authorities meet
internationally established standards for security and
interoperability. This has included the cooperative and growing use of
the Public Key Directory (PKD), which is centrally managed and overseen
by a board of actively participating ICAO member states. The PKD is a
directory used by a receiving state to verify the digital signature
used by a travel document's issuing authority, thereby authenticating
the passport in real time.
The ePassports, which we have been issuing since December 2005,
introduce a new class of security feature to identity documents: A
digital signature. The validation of a signature guarantees that the
chip contents, which include the facial image, are genuine and belong
to the physical document. Only on this basis can it be proven that a
specific ePassport was issued to the person that claims to be the
rightful owner. The ICAO PKD is integral to the effort to have an
efficient and commonly-accepted means of sharing and updating digital
signatures (public keys) used by the world's ePassport-issuing
authorities.
Where validation using the ICAO PKD occurs during travel, whether
at points of embarkation, transit, or upon entry, it provides much
greater levels of assurance than are currently possible with
traditional machine-readable travel documents. Border inspectors will
be better able to identify inadequately documented travelers. Border
inspectors worldwide can, in effect, assist the issuing authority in
enhancing the integrity of all ePassports.
The benefits of the ICAO PKD increase exponentially as the number
of States participating, and the number of ePassports in circulation,
increase. Participating States and entities stand to benefit most,
because their participation in the ICAO PKD maximizes global coverage
of validation of their travel documents.
Electronically reading the PKI adds a third level of security for
biometric passports, joining visual/tactile and laboratory features of
the document, and scanner reading of the biometric content. This
combination of features constitutes a tool bag for CBP officers to use
in verifying the authenticity of the person and his/her passport when
entering the United States.
The U.S. Government's advanced information-sharing initiatives
ensure that we and our international partners are in constant contact
regarding the threat of terrorist travel. CBP's use of Advance
Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Record (PNR) data are
valuable tools in detecting travel patterns and co-travelers of
terrorist suspects. The U.S. Government's agreements with foreign
partners under Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 6 allow
us to share terrorist screening information with trusted partners, in
order to interdict known and suspected terrorists.
We also have entered into arrangements for the sharing of visa
information with foreign governments, consistent with the requirements
of section 222(f) of the INA. Since 2003, there have been arrangements
in place with Canada for such sharing under certain circumstances. With
DHS, the Department is participating in a pilot program, through the
Five Country Conference (United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
and the United Kingdom) for identification of travelers based on
biometric matching in some individual cases. We are in negotiation with
the governments of Canada and the United Kingdom for agreements that
would provide a legal basis for us to implement arrangements for the
automated sharing of visa refusal data and for systematic confirmation
of an applicant's identity through biometric matching. These
arrangements would be limited to information regarding nationals of
third countries. We expect both agreements to be completed this year,
and similar agreements with Australia and New Zealand in 2012.
The Department plays a key role in all of these international
initiatives. With our partners at the TSC, we negotiate the HSPD-6
agreements overseas. We are a close partner with DHS in API and PNR
discussions overseas, in particular with respect to the current talks
with the European Union on PNR. Together, all of these programs are
helping achieve the goal of constraining terrorist mobility. This is
our obligation to the American people.
conclusion
We believe that U.S. interests in legitimate travel, trade
promotion, and educational exchange are not in conflict with our border
security agenda and, in fact, further that agenda in the long term. Our
long-term interests are served by continuing the flow of commerce and
ideas that are the foundations of prosperity and security. Acquainting
people with American culture and perspectives remains the surest way to
reduce misperceptions about the United States. Fostering academic and
professional exchanges keeps our universities and research institutions
at the forefront of scientific and technological change. We believe the
United States must meet both goals to guarantee our long-term security.
Our global presence, foreign policy mission, and personnel
structure give us singular advantages in executing the visa function
throughout the world. Our authorities and responsibilities enable us to
provide a global perspective to the visa process and its impact on U.S.
National interests. The issuance and refusal of visas has a direct
impact on our foreign relations. Visa policy quickly can become a
significant bilateral problem that harms broader U.S. interests if
handled without consideration for foreign policy equities. The conduct
of U.S. visa policy has a direct and significant impact on the
treatment of U.S. citizens abroad. The Department of State is in a
position to anticipate and weigh all those factors, while ensuring
border security as our first priority.
The Department has developed and implemented an intensive visa
application and screening process requiring personal interviews,
employing analytic interview techniques, incorporating multiple
biographic and biometric checks, all supported by a sophisticated
global information technology network. We have visa offices in
virtually every country of the world, staffed by consular officers
drawn from the Department's professional, mobile, and multilingual
cadre of Foreign Service Officers. These officials are dedicated to a
career of worldwide service, and provide the cultural awareness,
knowledge, and objectivity to ensure that the visa function remains the
frontline of border security. Each officer's experience and individual
skill set are enhanced by an overall understanding of the political,
legal, economic, and cultural development of foreign countries in a way
that gives the Department of State a special expertise over matters
directly relevant to the full range of visa ineligibilities.
This concludes my testimony today. I will be pleased to take your
questions.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much. The Chairwoman now
recognizes Mr. Cohen for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF JOHN D. COHEN, DEPUTY COUNTERTERRORISM
COORDINATOR, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member
Cuellar, Mr. Thompson, Members of the subcommittee. Thank you
for the opportunity to be here today to discuss efforts to
prevent terrorists from exploiting our visa system. As you have
heard and as you pointed out yourself, through a combination of
expanded and recurrent vetting of visa applicants, visa
holders, as well as improved capabilities that I will describe
in just a bit of vetting potential overstays, the ability of
terrorists to exploit our visa systems has been greatly
diminished.
Over the past 3 years Secretary Napolitano has made it a
top priority for the Department through ICE, the efforts of ICE
and CBP and US-VISIT, and our headquarters elements to improve
our ability to vet prior to departure those traveling to the
United States on visa or waiver country. We have made
significant progress in leveraging the vast holdings of the
intelligence community, the law enforcement community, and
improve the information sharing and operational coordination
between law enforcement, intelligence community, and those
responsible for protecting our borders.
Today what I am about to describe is the next step in that
process, because we have embarked on an effort to automate data
queries that in the past were carried out through manual
database checks. This is important because in many respects a
big part of the problem and one of the main reasons that we had
what were commonly referred to as backlog was because of the
time-consuming nature that these database queries required. By
interlinking immigration, National security, and law
enforcement information systems, and better using intelligence-
driven targeting capabilities such as those used at the
National Targeting Center and through the automated targeting
system, we have and will continue to bring greater efficiencies
to this process, and this will allow for more effective use of
personnel involved in investigations and analysis.
You referred to earlier, Madam Chairwoman, to the 1.2--
750,000 records that had been unvetted. We began with 1.6
million records and through an initiative began earlier this
year that involved CBP, ICE, US-VISIT, NCTC, and others we were
able to eliminate from that 1.6 million records approximately
800,000 records that we were able to determine had actually
departed the country or had changed their immigration status.
That left approximately 839,000 records that we were then
able to vet through the holdings of the NTC and leveraging
CBP's technical capabilities through a variety of law
enforcement databases. Each one of those 839,000 records has
been vetted from a National security and public safety
perspective. Let me repeat that, the entire set of records in
that 839,000 data set has been vetted from the National
security and public safety perspective. Through this process,
this automated and manual process, we have been able to provide
to ICE, CTCEU, and ICE investigations several thousand
additional leads which they have fully vetted, fully
investigated and are in the process of completing their
investigative processes. This was a significant milestone. We
learned from that effort that we could do more to automate the
process. Over the next 6 to 12 months you will see a number of
improvements. We will further enhance our ability to prevent an
onerous, suspected terrorist from exploiting the visa system or
visa waiver program because we will be bringing automated
processes to our ability to determine the location and the
immigration status. We are seeking to eliminate to the greatest
degree possible all of those manual database checks that are
carried out in this country, that are carried out by visa
security agents abroad. We will improve US-VISIT's ability to
determine whether a person is in overstay status and quickly
identify and forward to ICE investigators overstays are of a
National security or public safety concern.
We will incorporate and enhance vetting capability that
aggregates information for multiple systems into a unified
electronic dossier, reducing the need for US-VISIT researchers
and ICE agents to review multiple systems. We will be able to
provide Congress country-by-country data on percentages of
nationals who have overstayed their period of admission. We
will establish a more complete, enhanced biographic exit system
which includes expanded use of biometric data collected and
retained in law enforcement immigration and DOD systems.
In addition to providing enhanced biographic exit
capability, we will have established the foundation for a
biometric exit capability. As resources become available and
biometric collection technology continues to mature in the
coming years, we will integrate those advances into this
biographic exit foundation.
We are looking to leverage, as I pointed out, the same
architecture into the visa protection program, allowing ICE to
bring analytic responsibilities back home here to the United
States, thereby allowing agents abroad to be more focused on
investigative activities.
I appreciate again the opportunity to be here today, and I
look forward to answering any questions. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]
Prepared Statement of John D. Cohen
September 13, 2011
introduction
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished
Members, I am pleased to appear before you to outline the efforts of
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to both prevent terrorists
from entering the United States and ensure that our Visa System is
secure.
I am testifying today in my role as the Principal Deputy
Coordinator for Counterterrorism (CT) at the Department. In this
capacity, I will address the Department's efforts to enhance the
security of the Visa System, and also discuss the creation and
evolution of the CT Coordination functions at DHS. In addition, I will
describe specific actions being taken by the National Protection and
Programs Directorate's (NPPD's) United States Visitor and Immigrant
Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Program to complement the
efforts of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), alongside whom I am pleased to be
testifying today.
enhancing visa security to prevent terrorist travel
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave DHS the responsibility of
preventing terrorists from entering the United States, providing the
Department with the authority to establish and administer the rules
that govern the granting of visas. This includes ensuring that the visa
process is secure. Under this authority, DHS works closely with the
Department of State to use the Visa System as a first layer of security
to prevent known or suspected terrorists from traveling to the United
States. Central to this mission is ensuring that consular officers at
the State Department have necessary information, and then appropriately
vet this information, which includes fingerprints and photographs,
through the Department and our interagency partners.
Since 9/11, DHS has enhanced our Nation's ability to detect
individuals seeking to exploit the visa system through recurrent
vetting of visa holders. In May 2010, CBP's National Targeting Center--
Passenger (NTC-P) implemented a new program to conduct continuous
vetting of U.S. non-immigrant visas that have been recently issued,
revoked, and/or denied. The Visa Hot List vetting ensures that changes
in a traveler's visa status are identified in near real-time. If a
violation is discovered, and the person is scheduled to travel to the
United States, CBP will request that DOS revoke the visa and recommend
to the airline that the person be denied boarding. If no imminent
travel is identified, CBP will coordinate with DOS for a visa
revocation, if appropriate. If the subject of an existing visa
revocation initiated by the DOS or recommended by CBP is found to be in
the United States, CBP will notify the Counterterrorism and Criminal
Exploitation Enforcement Unit for further action.
In addition, since December 25, 2009, we have accelerated our
efforts to synchronize, streamline, and advance the Department's
overall vetting capability, which both increases security and
efficiency. In particular, the Department is currently working to
enhance screening efforts for those who have potentially overstayed
their period of admission and modernize and enhance the Department's
Biographic Exit architecture.
In May 2011, at the direction of Secretary Napolitano, DHS's CT
Coordinator organized an effort to ensure that all overstays,
regardless of priority, receive enhanced National security and public
safety vetting by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and CBP.
NPPD/US-VISIT used automated means to review all records in the
backlog by checking ADIS, CLAIMS, and I-94 holdings to reduce the
backlog. As a result of this review, we identified 843,000 visa
overstays who were no longer in the country. Then, both NCTC and CBP
vetted the remaining 757,000 potential in-country overstay leads, along
with 82,000 previously vetted overstay leads. CBP used its Automated
Targeting System to query multiple databases, and to compare records to
CBP's intelligence-based threshold targeting rules to identify
indicators such as suspicious travel patterns or irregular travel
behavior. Simultaneously, NCTC vetted the backlogged records through a
number of databases held by the intelligence community.
By the end of July 2011, all of the previously un-reviewed possible
overstays records had been reviewed from a National security and public
safety standpoint and ICE is currently pursuing leads that meet our
priorities.
This effort has increased the standard of review of overstay leads,
at reduced cost. The process allows ICE to better prioritize targets
for investigation and removal. It is a prime example of how increased
coordination can help our Department to better leverage information and
capabilities spread across the Department and the Federal Government.
The Department is nearing the final stages of developing a plan
that not only institutionalizes these vetting enhancements, but also
improves the current biographic exit system as well. We are focusing
our efforts on improving information sharing, streamlining screening
and vetting, and ensuring identification of potentially harmful
individuals.
This plan includes many enhancements, including those which will
allow DHS to:
Quickly identify and forward to ICE investigators overstays
that are of a National security concern.
Integrate and leverage relevant CBP, ICE, and US-VISIT
information systems and operational processes to automate
manual data queries and to vet DHS-held immigration and travel-
related information against a broad array of law enforcement
and IC data holdings.
Incorporate an enhanced vetting capability that aggregates
information from multiple systems into a unified electronic
dossier reducing the need for US-VISIT researchers and ICE
agents to review multiple systems during their Validation and
Vetting processes.
Take action against all overstays. DHS will forward
information to the State Department for the purpose of
cancelling visas of those who overstay. DHS will also eliminate
the ability of those who overstay from using the Visa Waiver
Program by cancelling any ESTA approvals or denying ESTA
submissions for those who have overstayed. DHS will also place
lookouts on individuals who overstay beyond certain statutory-
identified time limits, so that they are inadmissible to the
United States. DHS believes this will create a deterrent
effect.
Provide to Congress country-by-country data on percentages
of nationals who have overstayed their period of admission.
DHS is committed to working with Congress to make these
improvements.
In addition to improving visa security, DHS has also implemented
other measures to prevent another terrorist attack, including:
Unifying immigration and border management systems to
implement a more effective capability to access and employ
biometric- and biographic-based information when reviewing
possible terrorist travel.
Enhancing capabilities for identifying fraudulent documents
and imposters and implementing measures to confirm the
authenticity and validity of travel documents.
Establishing interoperability and information-sharing
protocols with our Federal partners.
Supporting State and local law enforcement agencies and the
intelligence community; using a more complete and accurate
picture of a person's immigration, terrorist, and criminal
history enables DHS to more effectively make connections in
determining who might pose a threat or use more than one
identity.
Establishing and maintaining strategic partnerships with an
increasing number of international partners. In these
partnerships, we share appropriate information, provide
technical assistance, develop commonality in biometric
standards and best practices, and investigate and test emerging
biometric technologies.
the role of the coordinator for counterterrorism
Following the attempted bombing of Northwest flight 253 on December
25, 2009, Secretary Napolitano gave NPPD's Under Secretary Rand Beers
the additional role of CT coordinator. The Department's CT Coordinator
is responsible for coordinating all counterterrorism activities for the
Department and across its directorates, components, and offices related
to the detection, prevention, response to, and recovery from acts of
terrorism.
In November 2010, DHS established the Counterterrorism Advisory
Board (CTAB) to further improve coordination on counterterrorism among
DHS Components. As the CT Coordinator, Under Secretary Beers serves as
the chair of the CTAB, with the Under Secretary of Intelligence and
Analysis (I&A) and the Assistant Secretary for Policy supporting the
Board as Vice Chairs. Members include the leadership of TSA, CBP, ICE,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Coast Guard
(USCG), USCIS, the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), NPPD, and the Office of
Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS). The DHS General Counsel
serves as legal advisor to the CTAB.
In December 2010, the Department also established a
counterterrorism working group, known as the CTWG, to support the CT
Coordinator, and Secretary Napolitano later appointed me as Principal
Deputy CT Coordinator.
The CTAB's mission is aligned with the Department's central
mission: To prevent terrorist attacks and enhance security. The CT
Coordinator, the CTAB, and the CTWG serve as the connective tissue that
brings together the intelligence, operational, and policy-making
elements within DHS Headquarters and the Components.
We rely on I&A to provide an understanding of potential threats and
to coordinate with intelligence components within the Department and
intelligence community. We then facilitate a cohesive and coordinated
operational response, through the CTAB and other mechanisms, to deter
and disrupt terrorist operations.
The CTAB is both headquarters- and Component-driven. Components
have the opportunity to address the Secretary's priorities in an
organized, coordinated fashion, but also use the CTAB to bring
attention to their initiatives and priorities that need support from
headquarters and other components. In addition, the CTAB fosters
collaboration among Components and provides situational awareness of
what each Component does and needs during a high-threat scenario.
Similarly, we work with the DHS Office of Policy to address day-to-day
and long-term strategy issues identified through this process and work
to implement those changes.
Let me provide the following examples of how this process has
worked over the last few months, with the offer to provide greater
detail in a classified setting.
nppd/us-visit
One of NPPD/US-VISIT's most important roles is to identify visitors
to this country and to assist in the overall security of our
immigration system.
NPPD/US-VISIT provides biometric identification and analysis
services to distinguish people who pose a threat from the millions of
people who travel for legitimate purposes. The program stores and
analyzes biometric data--digital fingerprints and photographs--and
links that data with biographic information to establish, and then
verify, identities. NPPD/US-VISIT's IDENT, is the Department's
biometric storage and matching service.
IDENT contains a watch list of more than 6.2 million known or
suspected terrorists, criminals, and immigration violators. This
capacity enables US-VISIT to provide homeland security decisionmakers
with critical information when and where they need it. For example,
this system can be utilized during by CBP primary screening during to
run the fingerprints of foreign nationals against the watch list, with
results returned in fewer than 10 seconds.
IDENT data, paired with biographic information from NPPD/US-VISIT's
ADIS, supports decision-maker determinations as to whether foreign
travelers should be prohibited from entering the United States; can
receive, extend, change, or adjust immigration status; have overstayed
or otherwise violated their authorized terms of admission; should be
apprehended or detained for law enforcement action; or need special
protection or attention, as in the case of refugees. Through ADIS,
NPPD/US-VISIT can identify individuals who have overstayed their period
of admission and then forward these leads to ICE for further action. In
addition, IDENT plays a critical role in the biometric screening and
identity verification of non-U.S. citizens for the State Department,
ICE, CBP, USCIS, and the U.S. Coast Guard.
NPPD/US-VISIT's IDENT is fully interoperable with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) 10-fingerprint-based Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). Daily transactions
of FBI fingerprint data shared between IAFIS and IDENT number in the
tens of thousands, providing the capability for FBI and NPPD/US-VISIT
customers to simultaneously match biometrics against our system and
watch list, as well as FBI data.
Enhanced interoperability with the FBI has enabled NPPD/US-VISIT to
launch the Rapid Response capability, which allows CBP officers to
search and receive a response against the FBI's entire criminal master
file of more than 69 million identities, in near real-time, during
primary inspection. Rapid Response is operational at four air ports of
entry and is planned for Nation-wide deployment at air ports of entry
next fiscal year.
DHS is also working closely with the Department of Defense (DOD) to
increase information sharing and establish interoperability between
IDENT and DOD's fingerprint database, the Automated Biometric
Identification System. We currently have manual methods for sharing
this data, which has helped DOD identify foreign combatants and match
latent fingerprints retrieved from objects such as improvised explosive
device fragments or collected from locations where terrorists have
operated.
The goal is to have the U.S. Government's three largest biometric
systems--those of NPPD/US-VISIT, the FBI, and DOD--completely
interoperable, thereby enriching our data sets by making information
sharing more seamless and automating the biometric-checking process to
make it far more efficient. Even after complete interoperability has
been achieved, the three systems will continue to be maintained and
governed by each agency's respective policies, including those that
ensure appropriate privacy safeguards are in place.
international cooperation and collaboration
DHS works extensively with foreign governments to increase
information sharing to prevent terrorist travel at the earliest point
possible. The Department is focused on sharing appropriate information,
increasing system interoperability, providing technical assistance, and
establishing commonality in data and biometric standards and best
practices. For instance, we are:
Working with Mexican federal police and immigration
authorities to identify and stop dangerous people from
transiting to Mexico; enhancing efforts to combat transnational
crime and confront organizations whose illicit actions
undermine public safety, erode the rule of law, and threaten
National security; and supporting Merida Initiative capacity-
building programs such as the incorporation of biometrics into
Mexico Immigration's Integrated System for Migration
Operations. DHS has supported non-intrusive inspection
equipment training, financial crimes investigative training,
canine enforcement training, assistance in transitioning the
Mexican Customs from a revenue-based institution to a law
enforcement-based institution, and improvements in immigration
control programs.
Forging new partnerships with New Zealand, India, South
Africa, the Republic of Korea, Germany, Spain, Greece, and the
Dominican Republic to support their implementation of biometric
systems.
Sending technical experts to the United Kingdom, Australia,
Canada, and, potentially, New Zealand, to help build biometric
capabilities and develop more systematic methods for
information sharing.
Implementing the Preventing and Combating Serious Crime
agreements to formalize sharing of biometric and limited
biographic data under the U.S. Visa Waiver Program with
Germany, Spain, the Republic of Korea, and other countries.
Working with the International Civil Aviation Organization,
the International Transport Association and INTERPOL to support
the exchange of information and best practices and the
establishment of standards in the areas of aviation security,
identity management, emerging technologies, document security
and verification, and fraud detection.
The Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) is another example of
partnership between the Department, foreign governments, and commercial
air carriers to identify and prevent high-risk, improperly-documented
travelers from boarding U.S.-bound flights. IAP is currently in
operation at eight airports in six countries. IAP officers have
established strong working relationships with foreign law enforcement
and counterterrorism officials and facilitated a direct link and real-
time communication between foreign counterparts, the U.S. Embassy/
Consulate, and the National Targeting Center.
DHS will continue to expand international coalitions to protect our
Nation in the face of evolving terrorist threats, an increasingly
interconnected global economy, and growing transnational crime. Along
with our partners, we view cooperation, collaboration, and information
sharing as critical in reaching our common goals of enhancing global
security while facilitating legitimate travel and ensuring access to
our economies.
success stories
Information sharing among agencies and international partners
continues to yield significant results, as demonstrated by these
success stories:
On February 3, 2011, the Australian Department of
Immigration and Citizenship submitted a batch of fingerprints
under the High Value Data Sharing Protocol of the Five Country
Conference for matching against IDENT. The fingerprints of a
subject applying for asylum in Australia matched an identity on
the IDENT biometric watch list as a known or suspected
terrorist in the FBI's Terrorist Screening Database. DHS
contacted the FBI Counterterrorism Division and its Terrorist
Explosives Device Analytical Center to confirm the subject's
derogatory information. The FBI then notified Australian
authorities. The individual was not granted asylum status in
Australia based on this information.
In November 2010, DHS assisted in a case involving an
applicant for employment at a nuclear power plant. It was
determined that the subject was using a false document under a
false identity, in an attempt to demonstrate his legal status
to reside and work in the United States. The subject was
subsequently arrested by DHS law enforcement authorities as an
overstay and placed into Federal custody awaiting removal
proceedings.
In October 2009, a vessel named Ocean Lady, transporting 76
undocumented persons, arrived off the coast of British
Columbia, Canada. The intent of all individuals on board was to
claim asylum status in Canada. The Canada Border Services
Agency (CBSA) intercepted the vessel and worked with the ICE
attache in Ottawa to determine whether information on the
identities of the individuals existed in U.S. systems. Pursuant
to an existing agreement between CBSA and DHS, the asylum
claimants' fingerprints were submitted to NPPD/US-VISIT for a
search. The fingerprint searches in IDENT identified two
subjects as known or suspected terrorists and members of the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Both subjects had also
previously applied for U.S. nonimmigrant visas in 2008 and had
been denied. Both subjects were denied asylum in Canada.
conclusion
DHS is working hard to stop terrorists before they ever get to the
United States. As we continue to work to address today's complex
challenges, we will look for innovative ways to bridge gaps in
information, technology, and human decision-making. Working with our
partners; using common technologies, standards, and best practices; and
sharing critical information will better protect us from those who seek
to exploit our immigration systems. DHS is also cognizant that although
physical security is of paramount concern and it is vital that we do
everything possible to prevent terrorist travel, we must steadfastly
seek to ensure that privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are
always protected. In developing and operating our programs, the
Department's Office of Privacy and Office of Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties are an integral part of the process.
By strengthening and increasing coordination within the Department,
across the Federal Government, and with our international partners, we
will develop and implement comprehensive measures that make efficient
use of limited resources. With the appropriate coordination and
structure within DHS Headquarters, we can better support our
Operational Components as they work to enhance the security of our
immigration systems while facilitating legitimate travel. In my role as
Principal Deputy CT Coordinator for the Department, I look forward to
continuing to work with you to address the challenges that remain.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished
Members, thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I will be
happy to answer any of your questions.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Cohen. We look
forward to questioning you on all of that new information you
just gave us, so get ready.
Next the Chairwoman recognizes Mr. Edge.
STATEMENT OF PETER T. EDGE, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Edge. Good morning, Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member
Cuellar, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. On
behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Director Morton, thank you
for the opportunity to discuss ICE's efforts to prevent the
exploitation of our visa system by terrorists.
Visa overstays and other forms of status violation bring
together two critical areas of ICE's mission: National security
and immigration enforcement. The importance of determining who
to allow entry into the United States and ensuring compliance
with the conditions of the such entry cannot be understated.
We are proud of the good work we have done over the last 10
years to protect the integrity of our visa system. ICE
recognizes that those who pose National security threats often
commit immigration benefit fraud while seeking to enter or
remain in the United States, and we work hard to detect and
deter immigration fraud by continually enhancing our anti-fraud
efforts.
Working closely with Citizenship and Immigration Services,
or CIS, ICE exercises criminal authority in the detection and
deterrence of immigration fraud. While recognizing CIS's
administrative authority, this strategy allows ICE to
concentrate its effort on major fraud conspiracies and other
cases of National security or public safety interest while
allowing CIS to address the bulk of immigration benefit fraud
cases administratively.
As you know, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 directs DHS
to assist in the identification of visa applicants who wish to
enter the United States for illegitimate purposes, including
illegal immigration, criminal activities, and terrorism-related
activities. The visa adjudication process is often the first
opportunity to assess whether a potential non-immigrant visitor
or immigrant presents a threat to the United States.
The Visa Security Program is one of several ICE programs
designed to minimize global risk. Our special agents in the
Visa Security Program focus on select applicants who may have
connections to terrorism or transnational criminal
organizations. We then coordinate with the State Department to
develop targeting plans based on the various threats. DHS does
not participate in all of these adjudications, but rather
becomes a part of the process following initial screening of an
applicant where ICE's visa security operation happens to be
present.
DHS actions compliment the consular office's initial
screening, applicant interviews, and reviews of the
applications and supporting documentation. ICE now conducts
visa security operations at 19 high-risk visa adjudication
posts in 15 countries. In fiscal year 2011 to date the Visa
Security Program has screened over 900,000 visa applicants and,
in collaboration with our State Department colleagues,
determined that 130,000 require further review. Following the
review of these 130,000 applicants, ICE identified derogatory
information on more than 10,400 applicants. In every instance
the State Department followed ICE's recommendation concerning
the visa applicant.
A vulnerability that in the past had been exploited
involved the acceptance of foreign students and visitors into
the U.S. educational system. Helping to mitigate this
vulnerability is ICE's Student and Exchange Visitor Program, or
SEVP, which is a self-funded program based on fees collected
from students, exchange visitors, and schools. This program
certifies, recertifies, and decertifies schools' eligibility to
sponsor foreign individuals for scholastic enrollment and other
academic purposes. The SEVP acts as the bridge for Government
organizations that have an interest in information on foreign
students. SEVP helps DHS and the State Department to monitor
schools and exchange programs regarding the visa
classifications of F for academic and M for vocational and J
for exchange category visitors.
SEVP administers the F and M student visa categories, while
the State Department manages the J exchange visitor program.
SEVP collects, maintains, and provides the information so that
only legitimate foreign students or exchange visitors gain
entry into and remain in the United States. SEVP uses the
Student and Exchange Visitor Information System, or SEVIS, to
track and monitor schools and programs, student exchange
visitors and their dependents approved to participate in the
U.S. education system.
SEVP interacts closely with ICE's Counterterrorism and
Criminal Exploitation Unit, CTCEU, the first National program
dedicated to the enforcement of nonimmigrant visa applications.
Today through the CTCEU, ICE proactively develops cases for
investigation and cooperation with SEVP and the US-VISIT
program.
As we move forward it is imperative that we expand the
Nation's enforcement efforts concerning overstays and other
status violations specifically regarding those who threaten
National security or public safety. Accordingly, ICE is
analyzing various approaches to this issue, including
sharpening the focus of programs that address vulnerabilities
exploited by visa violators.
Ten years after the attacks of 9/11 ICE has made
significant progress in preventing terrorists from exploiting
the visa process.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I
would appreciate your continued support of ICE and law
enforcement. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Edge follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter T. Edge
September 13, 2011
introduction
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee: On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and
Director Morton, thank you for the opportunity to discuss U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) efforts to prevent the
exploitation of our visa system by terrorists. Visa overstays and other
forms of status violation bring together two critical areas of ICE's
mission--National security and immigration enforcement, and the
importance of determining whom to allow entry into the United States
and ensuring compliance with the conditions of such entry cannot be
understated. We are proud of the good work we have done over the last
10 years to protect the integrity of our visa system, and I look
forward to sharing with you both our successes thus far and the
opportunities we see to improve our systems.
joint anti-fraud strategy
We recognize that those who pose National security threats often
commit immigration benefit fraud while seeking to enter or remain in
the United States, and we work hard to detect and deter immigration
fraud and to continually enhance our anti-fraud efforts. Working
closely with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), ICE
exercises criminal authority in the detection and deterrence of
immigration fraud, while recognizing USCIS' administrative authority.
This strategy allows ICE to concentrate its efforts on major fraud
conspiracies and other cases of National security or public safety
interest, while allowing USCIS to address the bulk of immigration
benefit fraud cases administratively.
Through the ICE Document and Benefit Fraud Task Forces (DBFTFs), we
focus our efforts on detecting, deterring, and disrupting document and
benefit fraud. DBFTF participants include USCIS, the Department of
State, the Department of Labor, and the Social Security Administration.
Task Force investigators with expertise in different aspects of fraud
collaborate with U.S. Attorneys' Offices around the country to
formulate a comprehensive approach in targeting the criminal
organizations and the beneficiaries behind these fraudulent schemes.
the visa security program
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 directs DHS to assist in the
identification of visa applicants who wish to enter the United States
for illegitimate purposes, including illegal immigration, criminal
activities, and terrorism-related activities. The visa adjudication
process is often the first opportunity to assess whether a potential
non-immigrant visitor or immigrant presents a threat to the United
States. The Visa Security Program (VSP) is one of several ICE programs
focused on minimizing global risks.
Our VSP Special Agents focus on select applicants and any
connection the applicants may have to terrorism or transnational
criminal organizations and coordinate with DOS to develop targeting
plans based on assessed conditions and threats. The VSP ensures
thorough reviews of applicants of concern in order to assess whether
they pose a security threat to the United States. DHS does not
participate in all visa adjudications, but rather becomes a part of the
process following initial screening of an applicant in countries where
an ICE visa security operation is present. DHS actions complement the
consular officers' initial screening, applicant interviews, and reviews
of applications and supporting documentation.
ICE now conducts visa security operations at 19 high-risk visa
adjudication posts in 15 countries. In fiscal year 2011 to date, the
VSP has screened 900,000 visa applicants and, in collaboration with DOS
colleagues, determined that 130,000 required further review. Following
the review of these 130,000 applications, ICE identified derogatory
information on more than 10,400 applicants. In every instance, DOS
followed the VSP's recommendation concerning the visa applicant.
In March 2010 Customs and Border Protection's National Targeting
Center (NTC) implemented a program to conduct continuous vetting of
U.S. non-immigrant visas that have been recently issued, revoked, and/
or denied. The continuous vetting ensures that changes in a traveler's
visa status are identified in near real-time, allowing CBP to
immediately determine whether to provide a no board recommendation to a
carrier, recommend revocation of the visa to Department of State, or
notify the ICE NTEU for individuals determined to be within the United
States. Since the program's inception the Department of State has
revoked more than 900 visas based on requests from CBP on information
uncovered after a visa was issued.
Additionally, ICE has deployed VSP personnel to the NTC to augment
and expand current operations. The NTC provides tactical targeting and
analytical research in support of preventing terrorist and terrorist
weapons from entering the United States. The co-location of VSP
personnel at the NTC has helped increase both communication and
information sharing. The NTC conducts pre-departure screening of all
travelers on flights bound for the United States. Screening identifies
high-risk passengers who should be denied boarding, including those
whose visas have been revoked.
the student and exchange visitor program (sevp)
The Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) is a self-funded
program based on fees collected from students, exchange visitors, and
schools. It also certifies, recertifies, and decertifies schools'
eligibility to sponsor foreign individuals for scholastic enrollment
and other academic purposes. SEVP oversees reporting requirements and
policies related to foreign nonimmigrant students and exchange
visitors, and provide overall guidance to schools regarding SEVIS.
SEVP acts as the bridge for Government organizations that have an
interest in information on foreign students. SEVP helps DHS and DOS
monitor schools and exchange programs, as well as F (academic), M
(vocational), and J (exchange) category visitors. SEVP administers the
F and M student visa categories, while DOS manages the J exchange
visitor program.
SEVP collects, maintains, and provides the information so that only
legitimate foreign students or exchange visitors gain entry to, and
remain in, the United States. The result is an easily accessible
information system that provides timely information to DOS, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services and ICE. SEVP has a mutual commitment of shared responsibility
with the educational community to maintain support and cooperation.
Currently, SEVP has certified over 10,360 schools.
SEVP uses the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System
(SEVIS) to track and monitor schools and programs, students, exchange
visitors, and their dependents approved to participate in the U.S.
education system.
the counterterrorism and criminal exploitation unit (ctceu)
The Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit is the first
National program dedicated to the enforcement of nonimmigrant visa
violations. Today, through the CTCEU, ICE proactively develops cases
for investigation in cooperation with the SEVP and the United States
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Program.
These programs enable ICE to access information about the millions of
students, tourists, and temporary workers present in the United States
at any given time, and identify those who have overstayed or otherwise
violated the terms and conditions of their admission.
Each year, the CTCEU analyzes records of hundreds of thousands of
potential status violators, after analysis of data from SEVIS and US-
VISIT, along with other information. These records are resolved by
further establishing potential violations that would warrant field
investigations, establishing compliance, or establishing departure
dates from the United States. Between 15,000 and 20,000 of these
records are resolved by in-house analysts each month. Since the
creation of the CTCEU in 2003, analysts have resolved more than 1.6
million such records using automated and manual review techniques. On
average, ICE opens approximately 6,000 investigative cases annually,
and assigns them to our Special Agents in the field for further
investigation, resulting in over 1,400 administrative arrests per year.
Agents and analysts in ICE monitor the latest threat reports and
proactively address emergent issues. This practice has contributed to
ICE's counterterrorism mission by initiating or supporting high-
priority National security initiatives based upon specific
intelligence. The practice is designed to detect and identify
individuals exhibiting specific risk factors based on intelligence
reporting, including international travel from specific geographic
locations to the United States, and in-depth criminal research and
analysis of dynamic social networks. This person-centric approach to
nonimmigrant prioritization moves away from the traditional
identification approach based upon country of birth, gender, and age.
In order to ensure that the potential violators who pose the
greatest threats to National security are given priority attention, ICE
uses intelligence-based criteria, developed in close consultation with
the intelligence and law enforcement communities. ICE assembles the
Compliance Enforcement Advisory Panel (CEAP) on a tri-annual basis to
ensure that it uses the latest threat intelligence to target
nonimmigrant overstays and status violators who pose the greatest
threats to National security and to discuss possible changes based on
current threat trends.
A recent ICE investigation in Las Cruces, New Mexico, highlights
how the CTCEU functions. As a result of CTCEU data analysis and field
investigation, in February 2010, ICE Special Agents arrested two
foreign nationals who were admitted as F-1 nonimmigrant students and
violated the terms and conditions of their admission. Both individuals
were referred for investigation after their status was terminated in
SEVIS for failure to maintain student status, as well as for possessing
several indicators of National security concerns.
Likewise, in March 2010, ICE's Counterterrorism and Criminal
Exploitation Group in Miami, Florida, initiated ``Operation Class
Dismissed,'' a criminal investigation that led to the indictment of the
owner/operator of a Miami-based foreign language school and one of its
employees on four counts of conspiring to commit a criminal offense
against the United States. The owner and employee were suspected of
fraudulently sponsoring foreign students by certifying student status
to nonimmigrants, without requiring them to maintain full courses of
study in order to comply with the terms of their admission. ICE's
primary goal in these types of investigations is to focus on the
criminal violations of the owner/operators of these businesses and the
administrative violations on the students. This ICE investigation
uncovered information that only approximately 5 percent of the school's
students attended class on any given day. In addition to the
indictment, follow-up investigation by ICE resulted in the
administrative arrests of 116 student visa violators purported to be
attending the school from countries including Thailand, Syria,
Honduras, South Korea, Japan, Colombia, the Dominican Republic,
Turkmenistan, Turkey, Indonesia, Venezuela, Brazil, and Kyrgyzstan.
As we move forward, it is imperative that we expand the Nation's
enforcement efforts concerning overstays and other status violations
specifically regarding those who threaten National security or public
safety. Accordingly, ICE is analyzing various approaches to this issue,
including sharpening the focus of programs that address vulnerabilities
exploited by visa violators.
coordination with us-visit and other dhs components
CTCEU also works in close collaboration with US-VISIT, part of the
DHS's National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD). US-VISIT
supports DHS's mission to protect our Nation by providing biometric
identification services to Federal, State, and local government
decisionmakers to help them accurately identify the people they
encounter, and determine whether those people pose risks to the United
States. DHS's use of biometrics under the US-VISIT program is a
powerful tool in preventing identity fraud and ensuring that DHS is
able to rapidly identify criminals and immigration violators who try to
cross our borders or apply for immigration benefits under an assumed
name. Biometric information sharing between the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's Criminal Justice Information Services and US-VISIT is
the foundation of ICE's Secure Communities IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability
Program.
Through Secure Communities, aliens--including those who have
overstayed or otherwise violated their immigration status--who are
encountered by law enforcement may be identified as immigration
violators when criminally arrested by State and local law enforcement.
Once individuals are identified through Secure Communities, ICE
officials determine what enforcement action is appropriate, consistent
with ICE's enforcement priorities. Currently, Secure Communities is
deployed in over 1,500 jurisdictions in 44 States.
US-VISIT also analyzes biographical entry and exit records stored
in its Arrival and Departure Information System to further support
DHS's ability to identify international travelers who have remained in
the United States beyond their periods of admission by analyzing
related biographical information.
ICE receives or coordinates nonimmigrant overstay and status
violation referrals from US-VISIT Data Integrity Group (DIG) from three
unique sources, which includes the typical overstay violation; a
biometric watch list notification and a CTCEU Visa Waiver Enforcement
Program (VWEP) nomination. The first type, Nonimmigrant Overstay Leads,
is used by the CTCEU to generate field investigations by identifying
foreign visitors who violate the terms of their admission by remaining
in the United States past the date of their required departure.
A second type of lead is generated from biometric data collected by
US-VISIT. US-VISIT routinely receives fingerprint records from a
variety of Governmental sources and adds them to a biometric watch list
that includes individuals of National security concern. These new watch
list records are checked against all fingerprints in the US-VISIT's
biometric database, the Automated Biometric Identification System, or
IDENT, managed by US-VISIT, to determine if DHS has previously
encountered the individual. If US-VISIT identifies a prior encounter,
such as admission to the United States, the information is forwarded to
ICE for review and possible field assignment. Similarly, US-VISIT
monitors records for individuals who, at the time of admission to the
United States, were the subject of watch list records that did not
render the individuals inadmissible to the United States. Therefore, if
such individuals overstay their terms of admission, information on the
subjects is forwarded to ICE for review and possible referral to
investigative field offices for follow-up.
The third type of lead pertains to the CTCEU's Visa Waiver
Enforcement Program (VWEP). The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) is the
primary source of nonimmigrant visitors from countries other than
Canada and Mexico. Although the overstay rate from this population is
less than 1 percent, ICE created a program dedicated to overstays
arising from this VWP population given the large number of individuals
in this category. Prior to the implementation of the VWEP in 2008,
there was no National program dedicated to addressing overstays within
this population. CTCEU provides a refined weekly list of individuals to
US-VISIT for additional scrutiny, who have been identified as potential
overstays who entered the United States under the VWP. In accord with
its intelligence-based criteria, a relevant portion of this report is
then imported into the CTCEU's internal lead tracking system for review
and possible field assignment.
Additionally, the CTCEU develops potential overstay and status
violation leads from SEVIS and other sources, imports these leads
directly from those databases, and applies its intelligence-based
criteria to determine whether investigative referral is appropriate.
Throughout its history, the integrity of SEVIS data and its
applicability have been valued throughout the law enforcement.
ice's presence overseas
Stopping a threat before it reaches our shores is an important
priority that ICE supports internationally. Through our Office of
International Affairs (OIA), we have personnel in 70 offices in 47
countries. ICE personnel in these offices collaborate with our foreign
counterparts and Federal partner agencies in joint efforts to disrupt
and dismantle transnational criminal organizations engaged in money
laundering, contraband smuggling, weapons proliferation, forced child
labor, human rights violations, intellectual property rights
violations, child exploitation, human smuggling and trafficking, and
many other violations. Additionally, ICE facilitates the repatriation
of individuals with final orders of removal, returning violators to
their home countries.
overseas coordination with dos
Effective border security requires broad information sharing and
cooperation among U.S. agencies. On January 11, 2011, ICE signed a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) outlining roles, responsibilities,
and collaboration between ICE and the DOS Bureaus of Consular Affairs
and Diplomatic Security. The MOU governs the day-to-day operations of
ICE agents conducting visa security operations at U.S. embassies and
consulates abroad. To facilitate information sharing and reduce
duplication of efforts, ICE and DOS support collaborative training and
orientation prior to overseas deployments. Once they are deployed to
overseas posts, ICE and DOS personnel work closely together in:
Participating in working groups; coordinating meetings, training, and
briefings; and engaging in regular and timely information sharing. The
VSP's presence at U.S. embassies and consulates brings an important law
enforcement element to the visa review process. Additionally, this
relationship serves as an avenue for VSP personnel to assist Consular
Officers and other U.S. Government personnel to recognize potential
security threats in the visa process.
ICE continues to evaluate the need to screen and investigate
additional visa applicants at high-risk visa issuing posts other than
the 19 posts at which the agency currently operates, which were
determined in collaboration between ICE and DOS. ICE will continue to
conduct joint site visits with DOS to identify locations for deployment
based on emerging threats. We are engaged with our counterparts at DOS
in determining a common strategic approach to the broader question of
how best to collectively secure the visa issuance process. We look
forward to continuing to report back to you with updates on this
process.
recent successes
Working in tandem with other DHS personnel, as well as our
international, Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners, we have
enjoyed significant successes preventing visa fraud. I would like to
elaborate briefly on a few of these cases.
In December 2010, ICE Special Agents were involved in the
identification and investigation of a transnational alien smuggling
organization that facilitated the illegal travel of Somali nationals
into Yemen and on to other Western locations including the United
States. ICE Special Agents received information from the ICE Attache
office in Amman, Jordan that two Somali nationals had been intercepted
in Amman attempting to travel to Chicago using counterfeit travel
documents, and contacted local officials in Yemen and Somalia to
investigate how the counterfeit documents had been obtained and how the
subjects had transited Yemen. The information developed was shared with
other U.S. agencies at post in Sana'a via the Law Enforcement Working
Group, as well as ICE domestic offices and the appropriate FBI Joint
Terrorism Task Force. While the joint investigation is on-going,
efforts to date have eliminated this scheme as a method of entry to the
United States.
More recently, in May 2011, ICE Special Agents within the VSP
Security Advisory Opinion Unit (SAOU) investigated a Saudi Arabian
national who obtained a nonimmigrant visa to enter the United States by
concealing his true identity from DOS by using a variation of his true
name. Through vetting efforts, the SAOU identified this individual's
true identity and revealed that he was a known terrorist with
significant ties to other known terrorists, and who was likely involved
in the planning of a terrorist attack in 2003. Based on this
investigation and at the request of the VSP and SAOU, DOS revoked the
individual's visa on National security-related grounds and prevented
him from traveling to the United States.
conclusion
Ten years after the attacks of 9/11, ICE has made significant
progress in preventing terrorists from exploiting the visa process.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and for your
continued support of ICE and its law enforcement mission.
I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Edge. You certainly do have our
continued support, and now the Chairwoman recognizes Mr. Stana.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. STANA, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Stana. Thank you, Chairwoman Miller and Mr. Cuellar,
for the invitation to testify at today's hearing about GAO's
work on this very important topic, the integrity and security
of our visa processes.
As you know, each year millions of visitors come to the
United States legally for a temporary visit. In the 6-year
period from fiscal year 2005 to 2010 there were 36 million
nonimmigrant visas issued for things like pleasure, business
travel, student exchanges and so on, among other things. In
addition, during that same period over 98 million visitors were
admitted to the United States under the visa waiver program.
While most visa abusers you might say are motivated by
economic opportunities to enter the United States and work,
there are other National security consequences. As was
mentioned earlier, 5 of the 19, 9/11 hijackers were here on one
or the other overstay category, and 36 of 400 individuals
convicted in international terrorism-related investigations by
the Department of Justice were overstays.
As you have heard from the other panelists, both DHS and
State have made some progress in shoring up our visa processes.
I would like to discuss three areas from my prepared statement
which could possibly add some context to what you have heard.
First, let's talk about the problem. We have overstays
whether the person was admitted to the U.S. on a valid visa or
through the visa waiver program. As was previously mentioned,
the Pew Hispanic Center has estimated that about 40 percent of
the total illegal alien population in the United States came in
legally through a visa. On average that is about 4 in 10 and
contrast the resources that we spend on interior enforcement
with what we spend on the 60 percent for border enforcement, a
big difference.
To its credit, as you heard, ICE uses a risk management
approach to focus its limited resources on overstays leads that
it considers most likely to pose a threat to National security
or public safety. But that said, ICE averages only about 1,200
overstay arrests per year and devotes a little more than 3
percent of its investigative resources to overstays.
Now to be fair, finding overstays can be difficult, they
don't self-advertise. Sometimes they leave the United States,
sometimes they are now on status, sometimes they simply cannot
be located. There are other programs that ICE and other DHS
components operate, like work site enforcement and secure
communities that do address overstays or overstays are a
component of those programs. But when you add it all up, you
take all those programs together, we are not making much of a
dent in that 40 percent of the illegal alien population.
Moving forward, ICE expressed interest in increasing the
resources to overstay investigations and assigning some
responsibilities to ERO. But they haven't established time
frames yet or identified the resources to make this happen.
My second point involves the US-VISIT system. There's good
news and not so good news. The good new is it is operating 300
air, sea, and land ports of entry and it seems to be working
well. It gathers biometric information which can enable DHS to
identify travelers, check law enforcement databases, and
prescreens others.
The not-so-good news is that it has only a very limited
capability to process exit records currently. The exit process
now includes processing air carriers, electronic submissions of
manifest data and other biographic information as well as
inconsistent collection of
I-94s. So all told, it is not in a position right now to
reliably state who has overstayed their visa and remains in the
country.
As of July, this past July, US-VISIT obligated about $193
million to develop air, sea, and land exit solutions since
2002. They had different types of exit solutions and piloted
them, but all have been determined to be insufficient and
incomplete. There are some other arrangements being discussed
now, such as with the Canadians, to make their exit as a person
leaving the United States going into a Canada become our--their
entrance become our exit and share information. But those
agreements have not been formalized and there is more work that
remains.
Finally, let's turn to the issue of ensuring visa integrity
and security overseas. ICE has deployed agents to certain
embassies and consulates as part of its Visa Security Program,
as you have heard, but at some posts we found that guidance,
training, and standard operating procedures were not
established, which led to tensions between ICE and State, as
well as operational inconsistencies. We also found that while
ICE had a presence at 19 posts in 15 countries; it did not have
agents located at 11 of the top 20 high-risk posts. You know,
expanding the program can be limited by embassy space and
budget consideration, but ICE has not acted on possible
alternatives. Although I am listening to some of my fellow
panelists this morning, it sounds like perhaps that information
is superseded and there are steps to be taken to expand their
vetting and screening processes.
On the positive side we heard about ESTA a few minutes ago.
ESTA was implemented without many glitches. They are screening
about 99 percent of the travelers coming into the United States
on visa. However, there were about, I believe it was about
350,000 travelers who were boarded on airplanes without having
a verified ESTA document and of those about 650 of those it was
later found should not have been permitted to board the
airplane. DHS has yet to analyze these cases to see if these
were of legitimate concern or there were systematic weaknesses
that need to be addressed for the program.
That concludes my statement. It is important to balance
visa security responsibilities with a need to enhance travel,
and we have made a number of recommendations to both State and
DHS to help this happen.
Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Stana follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard M. Stana
September 13, 2011
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-11-910T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
The attempted bombing of an airline on December 25, 2009, by a
Nigerian citizen with a valid U.S. visa renewed concerns about the
security of the visa process. Further, unauthorized immigrants who
entered the country legally on a temporary basis but then overstayed
their authorized periods of admission--overstays--could pose homeland
security risks. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has certain
responsibilities for security in the visa process and for addressing
overstays. DHS staff review visa applications at certain Department of
State overseas posts under the Visa Security Program. DHS also manages
the Visa Waiver Program through which eligible nationals from certain
countries can travel to the United States without a visa. This
testimony is based on GAO products issued in November 2009, August
2010, and from March to May 2011. As requested, this testimony
addresses the following issues: (1) Overstay enforcement efforts, (2)
efforts to implement a biometric exit system and challenges with the
reliability of overstay data, and (3) challenges in the Visa Security
and Visa Waiver programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations in prior reports that, among other
things, call for DHS to strengthen management of overstay enforcement
efforts, mechanisms for collecting data from foreign nationals
departing the United States, and planning for addressing certain Visa
Security and Visa Waiver programs' risks. DHS generally concurred with
these recommendations and has actions planned or underway to address
them.
visa security: additional actions needed to strengthen overstay
enforcement and address risks in the visa process
What GAO Found
Federal agencies take actions against a small portion of the
estimated overstay population, but strengthening planning and
assessment of overstay efforts could improve enforcement. Within DHS,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Counterterrorism and
Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) is the lead agency responsible for
overstay enforcement. CTCEU arrests a small portion of the estimated
overstay population in the United States because of, among other
things, ICE's competing priorities, but ICE expressed an intention to
augment its overstay enforcement resources. From fiscal years 2006
through 2010, ICE reported devoting about 3 percent of its total field
office investigative hours to CTCEU overstay investigations. ICE was
considering assigning some responsibility for noncriminal overstay
enforcement to its Enforcement and Removal Operations directorate,
which apprehends and removes aliens subject to removal from the United
States. In April 2011, GAO reported that by developing a time frame for
assessing needed resources and using the assessment findings, as
appropriate, ICE could strengthen its planning efforts. Moreover, in
April 2011, GAO reported that CTCEU tracked various performance
measures, but did not have a mechanism to assess the outcomes of its
efforts. GAO reported that by establishing such a mechanism, CTCEU
could better ensure that managers have information to assist in making
decisions.
DHS has not yet implemented a comprehensive biometric system to
match available information (e.g., fingerprints) provided by foreign
nationals upon their arrival and departure from the United States and
faces reliability issues with data used to identify overstays. GAO
reported that while the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status
Indicator Technology Program's biometric entry capabilities were
operating at ports of entry, exit capabilities were not, and DHS did
not have a comprehensive plan for biometric exit implementation. DHS
conducted pilots to test two scenarios for an air exit solution in
2009, and in August 2010, GAO concluded that the pilots' limitations,
such as limitations not defined in the pilot evaluation plan like
suspending exit screening at departure gates to avoid flight delays,
curtailed DHS's ability to inform a decision for a long-term exit
solution. Further, in April 2011, GAO reported that there is not a
standard mechanism for nonimmigrants departing the United States
through land ports of entry to remit their arrival and departure forms.
Such a mechanism could help DHS obtain more complete departure data for
identifying overstays.
GAO identified various challenges in the Visa Security and Visa
Waiver programs related to planning and assessment efforts. For
example, in March 2011, GAO found that ICE developed a plan to expand
the Visa Security Program to additional high-risk posts, but ICE had
not fully adhered to the plan or kept it up to date. Further, ICE had
not identified possible alternatives that would provide the additional
security of Visa Security Program review at those high-risk posts that
do not have a program presence. In addition, DHS implemented the
Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) to meet a statutory
requirement intended to enhance Visa Waiver Program security and took
steps to minimize the burden on travelers to the United States added by
the new requirement. However, DHS had not fully evaluated security
risks related to the small percentage of Visa Waiver Program travelers
without verified ESTA approval.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) programs and efforts to strengthen the
security of the visa process, including efforts to identify and take
enforcement against overstays--individuals who were admitted to the
United States legally on a temporary basis--either with a visa, or in
some cases, as visitors who were allowed to enter without a visa--but
then overstayed their authorized periods of admission.\1\ The attempted
bombing of Northwest Airlines flight 253 on December 25, 2009, by a
Nigerian citizen in possession of a valid U.S. visa renewed concerns
about the security of the visa process. Each year, millions of visitors
come to the United States legally on a temporary basis. From fiscal
year 2005 through fiscal year 2010, the Department of State issued over
36 million nonimmigrant visas for business travel, pleasure, tourism,
medical treatment, or for foreign and cultural exchange student
programs, among other things.\2\ In addition, from fiscal year 2005
through fiscal year 2010, over 98 million visitors were admitted to the
United States under the Visa Waiver Program, which allows nationals
from certain countries to apply for admission to the country as
temporary visitors for business or pleasure without first obtaining a
visa from a U.S. consulate abroad.\3\
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\1\ Visitors who are allowed to seek admission without a visa
include citizens of Canada and the British Overseas Territory of
Bermuda (and certain residents of other adjacent islands, such as the
Bahamas) under certain circumstances, as well as Visa Waiver Program
participants (see footnote 3). In-country overstays refer to
nonimmigrants who have exceeded their authorized periods of admission
and remain in the United States without lawful status, while out-of-
country overstays refer to individuals who have departed the United
States but who, on the basis of arrival and departure information,
stayed beyond their authorized periods of admission.
\2\ Temporary visitors to the United States generally are referred
to as ``nonimmigrants.'' For a listing and descriptions of nonimmigrant
categories, see 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15); see also 8 C.F.R.
214.1(a)(1)-(2). Generally, nonimmigrants wishing to visit the United
States gain permission to apply for admission to the country through
one of two ways. First, those eligible for the Visa Waiver Program
apply on-line to establish eligibility to travel under the program
prior to departing for the United States (unless they are seeking
admission at a land port of entry, in which case eligibility is
established at the time of application for admission). Second, those
not eligible for the Visa Waiver Program and not otherwise exempt from
the visa requirement must visit the U.S. consular office with
jurisdiction over their place of residence or, in certain
circumstances, the area in which they are physically present but not
resident, to obtain a visa. Upon arriving at a port of entry,
nonimmigrants must undergo inspection by U.S. Customs and Border
Protection officers, who determine whether or not they may be admitted
into the United States.
\3\ In order to qualify for the Visa Waiver Program, a country must
meet various requirements, such as entering into an agreement with the
United States to report lost or stolen passports within a strict time
limit and in a manner specified in the agreement. Currently, 36
countries participate in the Visa Waiver Program: Andorra, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore,
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom.
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Further, the most recent estimates from the Pew Hispanic Center
approximated that in 2006, out of an unauthorized resident alien
population of 11.5 million to 12 million in the United States, about 4
million to 5.5 million were overstays.\4\ In February 2008, we reported
that most overstays are likely motivated by economic opportunities to
stay in the United States beyond their authorized periods of
admission.\5\ Individuals overstaying their authorized periods of
admission could pose homeland security concerns. For example, in some
instances overstays have been identified as terrorists or involved in
terrorist-related activity, such as 5 of the 19 September 11, 2001,
hijackers. Further, according to DHS data, of approximately 400
individuals reported by the Department of Justice as convicted in the
United States as a result of international terrorism-related
investigations conducted from September 2001 through March 2010,
approximately 36 were overstays.\6\
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\4\ Pew Hispanic Center, Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized
Migrant Population (Washington, DC: May 22, 2006).
\5\ GAO, Visa Waiver Program: Limitations with Department of
Homeland Security's Plan to Verify Departure of Foreign Nationals, GAO-
08-458T (Washington, DC: Feb. 28, 2008).
\6\ For more information on these convictions, see Department of
Justice, National Security Division Statistics on Unsealed
International Terrorism and Terrorism-Related Convictions (Washington,
DC: March 2010).
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DHS has certain responsibilities for strengthening security in the
visa process, including identifying and taking enforcement action to
address overstays. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
is tasked with, among other duties, inspecting all people applying for
entry to the United States to determine their admissibility to the
country and screening Visa Waiver Program applicants to determine their
eligibility to travel to the United States under the program. U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the lead agency for
enforcing immigration law in the interior of the United States and is
primarily responsible for overstay enforcement, and within ICE, the
Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) is primarily
responsible for overstay investigations. The United States Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program (US-VISIT) within DHS's
National Protection and Programs Directorate supports the
identification of nonimmigrant overstays. In 2002, DHS initiated the
US-VISIT Program to develop a comprehensive entry and exit system to
collect biometric data from aliens traveling through U.S. ports of
entry. In 2004, US-VISIT initiated the first step of this program by
collecting biometric data on aliens entering the United States.
Further, the Department of State is responsible for issuing visas to
foreign nationals seeking admission to the United States. In addition,
DHS has responsibility for managing the Visa Security Program and the
Visa Waiver Program. Specifically, ICE oversees the Visa Security
Program under which it deploys officials to certain U.S. embassies and
consulates to strengthen the visa process by working with Department of
State officials in reviewing visa applications.\7\ DHS is also
responsible for establishing visa policy, including policy for the Visa
Waiver Program.
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\7\ The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat.
2135) established DHS and gave the Secretary of Homeland Security
authority to issue regulations with respect to the issuance and refusal
of visas. Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act authorizes the
Secretary of Homeland Security to assign DHS employees to consular
posts overseas to support the visa process through various functions.
See 6 U.S.C. 236(e).
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As requested, my testimony will cover the following key issues: (1)
Efforts to take enforcement action against overstays and reported
results; (2) DHS's efforts to implement a biometric exit system and the
reliability of data used to identify overstays; and (3) challenges and
weaknesses in the Visa Security and Visa Waiver programs. This
testimony is based on our prior work on overstay enforcement efforts,
the US-VISIT program, the Visa Security Program, and the Visa Waiver
Program. We issued reports from these efforts in April 2011, August
2010 and November 2009, March 2011, and May 2011, respectively.\8\ For
these reports, we examined program documentation, such as standard
operating procedures, guidance for investigations, and implementation
plans. We also interviewed DHS and Department of State officials.
Additional details on the scope and methodology are available in our
published reports. We conducted this work in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
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\8\ GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for
Collecting, Assessing, and Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS's Efforts
but Would Have Costs, GAO-11-411 (Washington, DC: April 15, 2011);
Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited
Understanding of Air Exit Options, GAO-10-860 (Washington, DC: Aug. 10,
2010); Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of
Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed, GAO-10-13
(Washington, DC: Nov. 19, 2009); Border Security: DHS's Visa Security
Program Needs to Improve Performance Evaluation and Better Address Visa
Risk Worldwide, GAO-11-315 (Washington, DC: Mar. 31, 2011), and Visa
Waiver Program: DHS Has Implemented the Electronic System for Travel
Authorization, but Further Steps Needed to Address Potential Program
Risks, GAO-11-335 (Washington, DC: May 5, 2011).
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In summary, DHS has taken action to strengthen security in the visa
process, but operational and management weaknesses have hindered the
effectiveness of these efforts. First, ICE investigates and arrests a
small portion of the estimated overstay population in the United States
because of, for example, competing enforcement priorities. ICE also
reported allocating a small percentage of its investigative work hours
to overstay investigations since fiscal year 2006, but the agency has
expressed an intention to augment the resources it dedicates to
overstay enforcement efforts moving forward. However, ICE does not yet
have a target time frame for completing its planning efforts for
augmenting overstay enforcement resources, and it lacks mechanisms for
assessing the effectiveness of its enforcement efforts. Second, DHS has
not yet implemented a comprehensive biometric entry and exit system for
collecting biometric data on foreign nationals when they depart the
United States. In the absence of such a system, DHS uses primarily
biographic data to identify overstays. However, unreliable data hinder
DHS's efforts to accurately identify overstays. Third, ICE has deployed
agents to certain embassies and consulates as part of the Visa Security
Program, but has not performed mandated training, has faced staffing
challenges, and has not fully adhered to its program expansion plan.
DHS has taken action to strengthen the security of the Visa Waiver
Program, but has not fully analyzed program risks or completed required
reports on participating countries' security risks in a timely manner.
We made a number of recommendations to DHS to strengthen its efforts in
these areas, such as improving its management and assessment of
overstay enforcement efforts, planning for a biometric exit capability
and mechanisms for collecting data from foreign nationals departing the
United States at land ports of entry, and addressing risks in the Visa
Security and Visa Waiver programs. DHS concurred with these
recommendations and has actions planned or under way to address them.
federal agencies take actions against a small portion of the estimated
overstay population
ICE Investigates Few In-Country Overstays, but Its Efforts Could
Benefit from Improved Planning and Performance Management
As we reported in April 2011, ICE CTCEU investigates and arrests a
small portion of the estimated in-country overstay population due to,
among other things, ICE's competing priorities; however, these efforts
could be enhanced by improved planning and performance management.
CTCEU, the primary Federal entity responsible for taking enforcement
action to address in-country overstays, identifies leads for overstay
cases; takes steps to verify the accuracy of the leads it identifies
by, for example, checking leads against multiple databases; and
prioritizes leads to focus on those the unit identifies as being most
likely to pose a threat to National security or public safety. CTCEU
then requires field offices to initiate investigations on all priority,
high-risk leads it identifies.
According to CTCEU data, as of October 2010, ICE field offices had
closed about 34,700 overstay investigations that CTCEU headquarters
assigned to them from fiscal year 2004 through 2010.\9\ These cases
resulted in approximately 8,100 arrests (about 23 percent of the 34,700
investigations), relative to a total estimated overstay population of 4
million to 5.5 million.\10\ About 26,700 of those investigations (or 77
percent) resulted in one of these three outcomes:\11\ (1) Evidence is
uncovered indicating that the suspected overstay has departed the
United States; (2) evidence is uncovered indicating that the subject of
the investigation is in-status (e.g., the subject filed a timely
application with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) to change his or her status and/or extend his or her authorized
period of admission in the United States); or (3) CTCEU investigators
exhaust all investigative leads and cannot locate the suspected
overstay.\12\ Of the approximately 34,700 overstay investigations
assigned by CTCEU headquarters that ICE field offices closed from
fiscal year 2004 through 2010, ICE officials attributed the significant
portion of overstay cases that resulted in a departure finding, in-
status finding, or with all leads being exhausted generally to
difficulties associated with locating suspected overstays and the
timeliness and completeness of data in DHS's systems used to identify
overstays.
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\9\ CTCEU also investigates suspected Visa Waiver Program
overstays, out-of-status students and violators of the National
Security Entry-Exit Registration System, a program that requires
certain visitors or nonimmigrants to register with DHS for National
security reasons. For the purpose of this discussion, these
investigations are referred to collectively as ``overstay''
investigations. In addition to CTCEU investigative efforts, other ICE
programs within Enforcement and Removal Operations may take enforcement
action against overstays, though none of these programs solely or
directly focus on overstay enforcement. For example, if the Enforcement
and Removal Operations Criminal Alien Program identifies a criminal
alien who poses a threat to public safety and is also an overstay, the
program may detain and remove that criminal alien from the United
States.
\10\ The most recent estimates from the Pew Hispanic Center
approximated that, in 2006, out of an unauthorized resident alien
population of 11.5 million to 12 million in the United States, about 4
million to 5.5 million were overstays. Pew Hispanic Center, Modes of
Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population (Washington, DC: May 22,
2006).
\11\ Investigations resulting and not resulting in arrest do not
total 34,700 due to rounding.
\12\ With regard to the second outcome, that the subject is found
to be in-status, under certain circumstances, an application for
extension or change of status can temporarily prevent a visitor's
presence in the United States from being categorized as unauthorized.
See Donald Neufeld, Acting Associate Director, Domestic Operations
Directorate, USCIS, ``Consolidation of Guidance Concerning Unlawful
Presence for Purposes of Sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i) and
212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the [Immigration and Nationality] Act,''
memorandum, Washington, DC, May 6, 2009.
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Further, ICE reported allocating a small percentage of its
resources in terms of investigative work hours to overstay
investigations since fiscal year 2006, but the agency expressed an
intention to augment the resources it dedicates to overstay enforcement
efforts moving forward. Specifically, from fiscal years 2006 through
2010, ICE reported devoting from 3.1 to 3.4 percent of its total field
office investigative hours to CTCEU overstay investigations. ICE
attributed the small percentage of investigative resources it reported
allocating to overstay enforcement efforts primarily to competing
enforcement priorities. According to the ICE Assistant Secretary, ICE
has resources to remove 400,000 aliens per year, or less than 4 percent
of the estimated removable alien population in the United States. In
June 2010, the Assistant Secretary stated that ICE must prioritize the
use of its resources to ensure that its efforts to remove aliens
reflect the agency's highest priorities, namely nonimmigrants,
including suspected overstays, who are identified as high-risk in terms
of being most likely to pose a risk to National security or public
safety. As a result, ICE dedicated its limited resources to addressing
overstays it identified as most likely to pose a potential threat to
National security or public safety and did not generally allocate
resources to address suspected overstays that it assessed as non-
criminal and low-risk. ICE indicated that it may allocate more
resources to overstay enforcement efforts moving forward and that it
planned to focus primarily on suspected overstays whom ICE has
identified as high-risk or who recently overstayed their authorized
periods of admission.
ICE was considering assigning some responsibility for noncriminal
overstay enforcement to its Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO)
directorate, which has responsibility for apprehending and removing
aliens who do not have lawful immigration status from the United
States. However, ERO did not plan to assume this responsibility until
ICE assessed the funding and resources doing so would require. ICE had
not established a time frame for completing this assessment. We
reported in April 2011 that by developing such a time frame and
utilizing the assessment findings, as appropriate, ICE could strengthen
its planning efforts and be better positioned to hold staff accountable
for completing the assessment. We recommended that ICE establish a
target time frame for assessing the funding and resources ERO would
require in order to assume responsibility for civil overstay
enforcement and use the results of that assessment. DHS officials
agreed with our recommendation and stated that ICE planned to identify
resources needed to transition this responsibility to ERO as part of
its fiscal year 2013 resource-planning process.
Moreover, although CTCEU established an output program goal and
target, and tracked various performance measures, it did not have a
mechanism in place to assess the outcomes of its efforts, particularly
the extent to which the program was meeting its mission as it relates
to overstays--to prevent terrorists and other criminals from exploiting
the Nation's immigration system. CTCEU's program goal is to prevent
criminals and terrorists from exploiting the immigration system by
proactively developing cases for investigation, and its performance
target is to send 100 percent of verified priority leads to field
offices as cases.\13\ CTCEU also tracks a variety of output measures,
such as the number of cases completed their associated results (i.e.,
arrested, departed, in-status, or all leads exhausted) and average
hours spent to complete an investigation. While CTCEU's performance
target permits it to assess an output internal to the program--the
percentage of verified priority leads it sends to field offices for
investigation--it does not provide program officials with a means to
assess the impact of the program in terms of preventing terrorists and
other criminals from exploiting the immigration system. We reported
that by establishing such mechanisms, CTCEU could better ensure that
managers have information to assist in making decisions for
strengthening overstay enforcement efforts and assessing performance
against CTCEU's goals. In our April 2011 report, we recommended that
ICE develop outcome-based performance measures--or proxy measures if
program outcomes cannot be captured--and associated targets on CTCEU's
progress in preventing terrorists and other criminals from exploiting
the Nation's immigration system. DHS officials agreed with our
recommendation and stated that ICE planned to work with DHS's National
security partners to determine if measures could be implemented.
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\13\ Verified leads are leads that CTCEU has determined to be
accurate and viable by analyzing information from Government and
commercial databases containing information related to immigration
status. For example, these procedures are intended to verify that an
individual suspected of overstaying has not departed the country or
been granted an extension of stay by USCIS.
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The Department of State and CBP Have Taken Action to Prevent Ineligible
Out-of-Country Overstays from Returning to the United States
In addition to ICE's overstay enforcement activities, in April 2011
we reported that the Department of State and CBP are responsible for,
respectively, preventing ineligible violators from obtaining a new visa
or being admitted to the country at a port of entry. According to
Department of State data, the Department denied about 52,800
nonimmigrant visa applications and about 114,200 immigrant visa
applications from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2010 due, at
least in part, to applicants having previously been unlawfully present
in the United States for more than 180 days, according to statute.\14\
Similarly, CBP reported that it refused admission to about 5,000
foreign nationals applying for admission to the United States from
fiscal year 2005 through 2010 (an average of about 830 per year)
specifically because of the applicants' previous status as unlawfully
present in the United States for more than 180 days.\15\
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\14\ State Department data indicate that a total of about 36.5
million nonimmigrant visas and about 2.7 million immigrant visas were
issued from fiscal year 2005 through 2010.
\15\ CBP data indicates that, in total, about 1.3 million foreign
nationals were determined to be inadmissible to the United States by
the CBP Office of Field Operations from fiscal year 2005 through 2010.
As is the case with the State Department, CBP is unable to isolate and
quantify the number of aliens it has determined to be inadmissible
because of the aliens having overstayed by 180 days or less, because
actions taken against these aliens are recorded under grounds of
inadmissibility that may apply to, but are not limited to, overstays.
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dhs has not implemented a reliable exit system and faces reliability
issues with existing visa overstay data
DHS Has Not Yet Implemented a Comprehensive Biometric Exit System
DHS has not yet implemented a comprehensive biometric system to
match available information provided by foreign nationals upon their
arrival and departure from the United States. In August 2007, we
reported that while US-VISIT biometric entry capabilities were
operating at air, sea, and land ports of entry, exit capabilities were
not, and that DHS did not have a comprehensive plan or a complete
schedule for biometric exit implementation.\16\ In addition, we
reported that DHS continued to propose spending tens of millions of
dollars on US-VISIT exit projects that were not well-defined, planned,
or justified on the basis of costs, benefits, and risks.\17\ Moreover,
in November 2009, we reported that DHS had not adopted an integrated
approach to scheduling, executing, and tracking the work that needed to
be accomplished to deliver a comprehensive exit solution as part of the
US-VISIT program. We concluded that, without a master schedule that was
integrated and derived in accordance with relevant guidance, DHS could
not reliably commit to when and how it would deliver a comprehensive
exit solution or adequately monitor and manage its progress toward this
end. We recommended that DHS ensure that an integrated master schedule
be developed and maintained. DHS concurred and reported, as of July
2011, that the documentation of schedule practices and procedures is
on-going, and that an updated schedule standard, management plan, and
management process that are compliant with schedule guidelines are
under review.
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\16\ The purpose of US-VISIT is to provide biometric (e.g.,
fingerprint) identification--through the collection, maintenance, and
sharing of biometric and selected biographic data--to authorized DHS
and other Federal agencies.
\17\ GAO, Homeland Security: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status
Program's Longstanding Lack of Strategic Direction and Management
Controls Needs to Be Addressed, GAO-07-1065 (Washington, DC: Aug. 31,
2007).
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More specifically, with regard to a biometric exit capability at
land ports of entry, we reported in December 2006 that US-VISIT
officials concluded that, for various reasons, a biometric US-VISIT
exit capability could not be implemented without incurring a major
impact on land facilities.\18\ In December 2009, DHS initiated a land
exit pilot to collect departure information from temporary workers
traveling through two Arizona land ports of entry. Under this pilot,
temporary workers who entered the United States at these ports of entry
were required to register their final departure by providing biometric
and biographic information at exit kiosks located at the ports of
entry. DHS planned to use the results of this pilot to help inform
future decisions on the pedestrian component of the long-term land exit
component of a comprehensive exit system.
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\18\ GAO, Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces, Strategic,
Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-
07-248 (Washington, DC: Dec. 6, 2006).
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With regard to air and sea ports of entry, in April 2008, DHS
announced its intention to implement biometric exit verification at air
and sea ports of entry in a Notice of Proposed Rule Making.\19\ Under
this notice, commercial air and sea carriers would be responsible for
developing and deploying the capability to collect biometric
information from departing travelers and transmit it to DHS. DHS
received comments on the notice and has not yet published a final rule.
Subsequent to the rule making notice, on September 30, 2008, the
Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2009, was enacted, which directed DHS to test two
scenarios for an air exit solution: (1) Airline collection and
transmission of biometric exit data, as proposed in the rulemaking
notice and (2) CBP collection of such information at the departure
gate.\20\ DHS conducted two pilots in 2009, and we reported on them in
August 2010. Specifically, we reported that the pilots addressed one
statutory requirement for a CBP scenario to collect information on
exiting foreign nationals. However, DHS was unable to address the
statutory requirement for an airline scenario because no airline was
willing to participate. We reported on limitations with the pilots,
such as the reported scope and approach of the pilots including
limitations not defined in the pilot evaluation plan like suspending
exit screening at departure gates to avoid flight delays, that
curtailed their ability to inform a decision for a long-term air exit
solution and pointed to the need for additional sources of information
on air exit's operational impacts.\21\ We recommended that the
Secretary of Homeland Security identify additional sources of
information beyond the pilots, such as comments from the Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, to inform an air exit solution decision. DHS
agreed with the recommendation and stated that the pilots it conducted
would not serve as the sole source of information to inform an air exit
solution decision. In July 2011, DHS stated that it continues to
examine all options in connection with a final biometric air exit
solution and has recently given consideration to using its authority to
establish an advisory committee to study and provide recommendations to
DHS and Congress on implementing an air exit program.
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\19\ 73 Fed. Reg. 22,065 (Apr. 24, 2008).
\20\ Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574, 3668-70 (2008).
\21\ GAO, Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer
Limited Understanding of Air Exit Options, GAO-10-860 (Washington, DC:
Aug. 10, 2010).
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More Reliable, Accessible Data Could Improve DHS's Efforts to Identify
and Share Information on Overstays
In the absence of a comprehensive biometric entry and exit system
for identifying and tracking overstays, US-VISIT and CTCEU primarily
analyze biographic entry and exit data collected at land, air, and sea
ports of entry to identify overstays. In April 2011, we reported that
DHS's efforts to identify and report on visa overstays were hindered by
unreliable data. Specifically, CBP does not inspect travelers exiting
the United States through land ports of entry, including collecting
their biometric information, and CBP did not provide a standard
mechanism for nonimmigrants departing the United States through land
ports of entry to remit their arrival and departure forms.
Nonimmigrants departing the United States through land ports of entry
turn in their forms on their own initiative. According to CBP
officials, at some ports of entry, CBP provides a box for nonimmigrants
to drop off their forms, while at other ports of entry departing
nonimmigrants may park their cars, enter the port of entry facility,
and provide their forms to a CBP officer. These forms contain
information, such as arrival and departure dates, used by DHS to
identify overstays. If the benefits outweigh the costs, a mechanism to
provide nonimmigrants with a way to turn in their arrival and departure
forms could help DHS obtain more complete and reliable departure data
for identifying overstays. We recommended that the Commissioner of CBP
analyze the costs and benefits of developing a standard mechanism for
collecting these forms at land ports of entry, and develop a standard
mechanism to collect them, to the extent that benefits outweigh the
costs. CBP agreed with our recommendation and stated it planned to
complete a cost-effective independent evaluation.
Further, we previously reported on weaknesses in DHS processes for
collecting departure data, and how these weaknesses impact the
determination of overstay rates. The Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act required that DHS certify that a system is in
place that can verify the departure of not less than 97 percent of
foreign nationals who depart through U.S. airports in order for DHS to
expand the Visa Waiver Program.\22\ In September 2008, we reported that
DHS's methodology for comparing arrivals and departures for the purpose
of departure verification would not inform overall or country-specific
overstay rates because DHS's methodology did not begin with arrival
records to determine if those foreign nationals departed or remained in
the United States beyond their authorized periods of admission.\23\
Rather, DHS's methodology started with departure records and matched
them to arrival records. As a result, DHS's methodology counted
overstays who left the country, but did not identify overstays who have
not departed the United States and appear to have no intention of
leaving. We recommended that DHS explore cost-effective actions
necessary to further improve the reliability of overstay data. DHS
reported that it is taking steps to improve the accuracy and
reliability of the overstay data, by efforts such as continuing to
audit carrier performance and work with airlines to improve the
accuracy and completeness of data collection. Moreover, by statute, DHS
is required to submit an annual report to Congress providing numerical
estimates of the number of aliens from each country in each
nonimmigrant classification who overstayed an authorized period of
admission that expired during the fiscal year prior to the year for
which the report is made.\24\ DHS officials stated that the Department
has not provided Congress annual overstay estimates regularly since
1994 because officials do not have sufficient confidence in the quality
of the Department's overstay data--which is maintained and generated by
US-VISIT. As a result, DHS officials stated that the Department cannot
reliably report overstay rates in accordance with the statute.
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\22\ 8 U.S.C. 1187(c)(8).
\23\ GAO, Visa Waiver Program: Actions Are Needed to Improve
Management of the Expansion Process, and to Assess and Mitigate Program
Risks, GAO-08-967 (Washington, DC: Sept. 15, 2008).
\24\ 8 U.S.C. 1376(b).
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In addition, in April 2011 we reported that DHS took several steps
to provide its component entities and other Federal agencies with
information to identify and take enforcement action on overstays,
including creating biometric and biographic lookouts--or electronic
alerts--on the records of overstay subjects that are recorded in
databases. However, DHS did not create lookouts for the following two
categories of overstays: (1) Temporary visitors who were admitted to
the United States using nonimmigrant business and pleasure visas and
subsequently overstayed by 90 days or less; and (2) suspected in-
country overstays who CTCEU deemed not to be a priority for
investigation in terms of being most likely to pose a threat to
National security or public safety. Broadening the scope of electronic
lookouts in Federal information systems could enhance overstay
information sharing. In April 2011, we recommended that the Secretary
of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of Customs and Border
Protection, the Under Secretary of the National Protection and Programs
Directorate, and the Assistant Secretary of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement to assess the costs and benefits of creating biometric and
biographic lookouts for these two categories of overstays. Agency
officials agreed with our recommendation and have actions under way to
address it. For example, agency officials stated that they have met to
assess the costs and benefits of creating lookouts for those categories
of overstays.
additional steps needed to address risks in the visa security and visa
waiver programs
Visa Security Program
As we reported in March 2011, the Visa Security Program faces
several key challenges in implementing operations at overseas posts.
For example, we reported that Visa Security Program agents' advising
and training of consular officers, as mandated by section 428 of the
Homeland Security Act, varied from post to post, and some posts
provided no training to consular officers. We contacted consular
sections at 13 overseas posts, and officials from 5 of the 13 consular
sections we interviewed stated that they had received no training from
the Visa Security Program agents in the last year, and none of the
agents we interviewed reported providing training on specific security
threats. At posts where Visa Security Program agents provided training
for consular officers, topics covered included fraudulent documents,
immigration law, human smuggling, and interviewing techniques. In March
2011, we recommended that DHS issue guidance requiring Visa Security
Program agents to provide training for consular officers as mandated by
section 428 of the Homeland Security Act. DHS concurred with our
recommendation and has actions under way to address it.
Further, in March 2011 we reported that Visa Security Program
agents performed a variety of investigative and administrative
functions beyond their visa security responsibilities, including
criminal investigations, attache functions, and regional
responsibilities. According to ICE officials, Visa Security Program
agents perform non-program functions only after completing their visa
security screening and vetting workload. However, both agents and
Department of State officials at some posts told us that these other
investigative and administrative functions sometimes slowed or limited
Visa Security Program agents' visa security-related activities. We
recommended that DHS develop a mechanism to track the amount of time
spent by Visa Security Program agents on visa security activities and
other investigations, in order to determine appropriate staffing levels
and resource needs for Visa Security Program operations at posts
overseas to ensure visa security operations are not limited. DHS did
not concur with our recommendation, stating that ICE currently tracks
case investigation hours through its data system, and that adding the
metric to the Visa Security Program tracking system would be redundant.
However, DHS's response did not address our finding that ICE does not
have a mechanism that allows the agency to track the amount of time
agents spend on both investigation hours and hours spent on visa
security activities. Therefore, we continue to believe the
recommendation has merit and should be implemented.
Moreover, we found that ICE's use of 30-day temporary duty
assignments to fill Visa Waiver Program positions at posts created
challenges and affected continuity of operations at some posts.
Consular officers we interviewed at 3 of 13 posts discussed challenges
caused by this use of temporary duty agents. The Visa Security
Program's 5-year plan also identified recruitment of qualified
personnel as a challenge and recommended incentives for Visa Security
Program agents as critical to the program's mission, stating, ``These
assignments present significant attendant lifestyle difficulties. If
the mission is to be accomplished, ICE, like State, needs a way to
provide incentives for qualified personnel to accept these hardship
assignments.'' However, according to ICE officials, ICE had not
provided incentives to facilitate recruitment for hardship posts.\25\
ICE officials stated that they have had difficulty attracting agents to
Saudi Arabia, and ICE agents at post told us they have little incentive
to volunteer for Visa Security Program assignments. Thus, we
recommended that DHS develop a plan to provide Visa Security Program
coverage at high-risk posts where the possibility of deploying agents
may be limited. DHS agreed with our recommendation and is taking steps
to implement it.
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\25\ The Department of State has designated roughly two-thirds of
its 268 overseas posts as hardship posts. Staff working in such
locations often encounter harsh environmental and living conditions
that can include inadequate medical facilities, limited opportunities
for spousal employment, poor schools, high levels of crime, and severe
climate.
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In addition, ICE developed a plan to expand the Visa Security
Program to additional high-risk visa-issuing posts, but ICE had not
fully adhered to the plan or kept it up to date. The program's 5-year
expansion plan, developed in 2007, identified 14 posts for expansion
between 2009 and 2010, but 9 of these locations had not been
established at the time of our March 2011 report, and ICE had not
updated the plan to reflect the current situation. Furthermore, ICE had
not fully addressed remaining visa risk in high-risk posts that did not
have a Visa Security Program presence. ICE, with input from the
Department of State, developed a list of worldwide visa-issuing posts
that are ranked according to visa risk. Although the expansion plan
stated that risk analysis is the primary input to Visa Security Program
site selection and that the expansion plan represented an effort to
address visa risk, ICE had not expanded the Visa Security Program to
some high-risk posts. For example, 11 of the top 20 high-risk posts
identified by ICE and Department of State were not covered by Visa
Security Program at the time of our review. The expansion of the Visa
Security Program may be limited by a number of factors--including
budget limitations and objections from Department of State officials at
some posts--and ICE had not identified possible alternatives that would
provide the additional security of Visa Security Program review at
those posts that do not have a program presence. In May 2011, we
recommended that DHS develop a plan to provide Visa Security Program
coverage at high-risk posts where the possibility of deploying agents
may be limited. DHS concurred with our recommendation and noted actions
under way to address it, such as enhancing information technology
systems to allow for screening and reviewing of visa applicants at
posts worldwide.
Visa Waiver Program
As we reported in May 2011, DHS implemented the Electronic System
for Travel Authorization (ESTA) to meet a statutory requirement
intended to enhance Visa Waiver Program security and took steps to
minimize the burden on travelers to the United States added by the new
requirement.\26\ However, DHS had not fully evaluated security risks
related to the small percentage of Visa Waiver Program travelers
without verified ESTA approval. DHS developed ESTA to collect passenger
data and complete security checks on the data before passengers board a
U.S.-bound carrier. DHS requires applicants for Visa Waiver Program
travel to submit biographical information and answers to eligibility
questions through ESTA prior to travel. Travelers whose ESTA
applications are denied can apply for a U.S. visa. In developing and
implementing ESTA, DHS took several steps to minimize the burden
associated with ESTA use. For example, ESTA reduced the requirement
that passengers provide biographical information to DHS officials from
every trip to once every 2 years. In addition, because of ESTA, DHS has
informed passengers who do not qualify for Visa Waiver Program travel
that they need to apply for a visa before they travel to the United
States. Moreover, most travel industry officials we interviewed in six
Visa Waiver Program countries praised DHS's widespread ESTA outreach
efforts, reasonable implementation time frames, and responsiveness to
feedback but expressed dissatisfaction over ESTA fees paid by ESTA
applicants.\27\
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\26\ See 8 U.S.C. 1187(h)(3).
\27\ In September 2010, the U.S. Government began to charge ESTA
applicants a $14 fee when they applied for ESTA approval, including $10
for the creation of a corporation to promote travel to the United
States and $4 to fund ESTA operations.
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In 2010, airlines complied with the requirement to verify ESTA
approval for almost 98 percent of the Visa Waiver Program passengers
prior to boarding, but the remaining 2 percent--about 364,000
travelers--traveled under the Visa Waiver Program without verified ESTA
approval. In addition, about 650 of these passengers traveled to the
United States with a denied ESTA. As we reported in May 2011, DHS had
not yet completed a review of these cases to know to what extent they
pose a risk to the program. DHS officials told us that, although there
was no official agency plan for monitoring and oversight of ESTA, the
ESTA office was undertaking a review of each case of a carrier's
boarding a Visa Waiver Program traveler without an approved ESTA
application; however, DHS had not established a target date for
completing this review. DHS tracked some data on passengers that travel
under the Visa Waiver Program without verified ESTA approval but did
not track other data that would help officials know the extent to which
noncompliance poses a risk to the program. Without a completed analysis
of noncompliance with ESTA requirements, DHS was unable to determine
the level of risk that noncompliance poses to Visa Waiver Program
security and to identify improvements needed to minimize noncompliance.
In addition, without analysis of data on travelers who were admitted to
the United States without a visa after being denied by ESTA, DHS cannot
determine the extent to which ESTA is accurately identifying
individuals who should be denied travel under the program. In May 2011,
we recommended that DHS establish time frames for the regular review
and documentation of cases of Visa Waiver Program passengers traveling
to a U.S. port of entry without verified ESTA approval. DHS concurred
with our recommendation and committed to establish procedures to review
quarterly a representative sample of noncompliant passengers to
evaluate, identify, and mitigate potential security risks associated
with the ESTA program.
Further, in May 2011 we reported that to meet certain statutory
requirements, DHS requires that Visa Waiver Program countries enter
into three information-sharing agreements with the United States;
however, only half of the countries had fully complied with this
requirement and many of the signed agreements have not been
implemented.\28\ Half of the countries entered into agreements to share
watch list information about known or suspected terrorists and to
provide access to biographical, biometric, and criminal history data.
By contrast, almost all of the 36 Visa Waiver Program countries entered
into an agreement to report lost and stolen passports. DHS, with the
support of interagency partners, established a compliance schedule
requiring the last of the Visa Waiver Program countries to finalize
these agreements by June 2012. Although termination from the Visa
Waiver Program is one potential consequence for countries not complying
with the information-sharing agreement requirement, U.S. officials have
described it as undesirable. DHS, in coordination with the Departments
of State and Justice, developed measures short of termination that
could be applied to countries not meeting their compliance date.
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\28\ See 8 U.S.C. 1187(c)(2)(D), (F).
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In addition, as of May 2011, DHS had not completed half of the most
recent biennial reports on Visa Waiver Program countries' security
risks in a timely manner. In 2002, Congress mandated that, at least
once every 2 years, DHS evaluate the effect of each country's continued
participation in the program on the security, law enforcement, and
immigration interests of the United States. The mandate also directed
DHS to determine based on the evaluation whether each Visa Waiver
Program country's designation should continue or be terminated and to
submit a written report on that determination to select Congressional
committees.\29\ According to officials, DHS assesses, among other
things, counterterrorism capabilities and immigration programs.
However, DHS had not completed the latest biennial reports for 18 of
the 36 Visa Waiver Program countries in a timely manner, and over half
of these reports are more than 1 year overdue. Further, in the case of
2 countries, DHS was unable to demonstrate that it had completed
reports in the last 4 years. DHS cited a number of reasons for the
reporting delays. For example, DHS officials said that they
intentionally delayed report completion because they frequently did not
receive mandated intelligence assessments in a timely manner and needed
to review these before completing Visa Waiver Program country biennial
reports. We recommended that DHS take steps to address delays in the
biennial country review process so that the mandated country reports
can be completed on time. DHS concurred with our recommendation and
reported that it would consider process changes to address our concerns
with the timeliness of continuing Visa Waiver Program reports.
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\29\ See the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of
2002.
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This concludes my prepared testimony statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that Members of the subcommittee may have.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Stana. I appreciate
all the testimony of all the witnesses. I know we have a lot of
questions.
One of the things that struck me as you all were testifying
was the common theme about sharing information, et cetera, and
working together with your sister agencies, with your partners
and having good partnerships. That is a theme in my office and
I think certainly most Members' offices, that was a critical
element of the
9/11 Commission recommendations about moving from the need to
know to the need to share and getting out of our respective
silos, et cetera, et cetera. We talk about that all the time.
It is very important certainly. I think that is why our
committee staff put you all so close together. You are just
smashed together.
As I mentioned, the first and foremost responsibility of
the Federal Government to provide for the common defense is
actually in the Constitution; securing our borders is a
Constitutional mandate of the Congress, and that is what this
committee is all about. So we want to work with the
administration in every way possible to secure our borders. I
really do not look at it as a Republican or Democratic issue. I
see this in very nonpartisan terms. I am delighted that because
this committee has been very, very vocal about continuing the
presence of the National Guard as a force multiplier for CBP
and Border Patrol along the Southern border the administration
just recently has agreed to do so for some period of time. I
think we could use more, but still it is a very, very
excellent, positive step forward, I think.
Mr. Cohen, as you are outlining today, I don't know whether
serendipity or whatever, you don't need to comment on that, but
certainly the timing of having the administration talk about
things that this committee has been pushing for for some period
of time in regards to the visa program, announcing those today
as we are having this hearing does strike me as a bit
interesting and very welcome, very welcome. So we are delighted
to hear about those kinds of things.
I guess I would start, Mr. Cohen, with you. I was trying to
take some notes as you were outlining this. So there may be a
couple of questions in this. But you mentioned that you had 1.6
million names that you started with and about 800,000 of those
you found then had left, which was an interesting number. So we
really didn't know about that until you started this, which is
okay, and then 839,000 left to vet, which you have done so,
several thousand sent to ICE. I am trying to understand where
we are in this whole vetting process, if you would flesh out
your testimony a little bit with that, because you mentioned
also that Congress would get the data for instance by country
and some of the other metrics that you outlined. I am
interested to know when that might be. I thought you said 6, 12
months. I am interested in that.
I guess just generally there is no secret about the painful
economic transition that is happening Nationally and all of us
are concerned about the budget deficit, and what we want to do
of course is prioritize our expenditures so that we are doing
what we need to do with the resources that we have. I think by
using technology--that was going to be a question I had before
you outlined here about the biometric forms, and some of the
biometric and biographic information, of course using the
biographic information, but the biometric forms whether that is
iris scan or retinal scanning or fingerprints, all of these
different kinds of things. I am a big believer in utilizing
technology as a cost-effective, cost-efficient, in this case
National security efficiency matrix as well has been overlayed.
So I was delighted to hear you talk about that.
So I don't know if I am making my question clear, but I am
trying to understand exactly what it is that you have outlined
for us today, because what you said is essentially what we have
been trying to get at as a committee.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I think you are
right, there are a couple of factors that have come into play
that have allowed us to come here today and be able to describe
what I think is a pretty fully based approach to how to deal
with this issue. I think the level of cooperation that has
matured across not only the Department, but across the Federal
interagencies, across the law enforcement community, the
intelligence community as well as the immigration community,
coupled with quite frankly a maturation of information systems.
Whether it is the information systems of the NCTC, the
information systems of the intelligence community, the
information systems used by US-VISIT, ICE, and CBP and State
Department, there has been a maturation over the last several
years. I would argue that what I started to describe earlier
probably could not have occurred several years ago.
So how do we get to where we are today? Earlier this year,
for many of the reasons you all have outlined earlier, the
Secretary pulled CBP, ICE, US-VISIT together and said, we need
to vet the 1.6 million records that are commonly referred to as
the overstay backlog from a National security and public safety
perspective. We have to get it done and we have to get it done
now. That meant we all came together and we reached out to our
intelligence community colleagues and we came up with a way to
leverage existing technical capabilities to vet from a public
safety and National security perspective those records.
The first step was US-VISIT running through their systems
that 1.6 million records. That is how they were able to
eliminate the first tranche of that data to determine that they
had left the country or they had actually changed their
immigration status.
The remaining records, a portion of those were considered
confirmed potential overstays. Based on existing protocols
those 82,000 records would have been more fully evaluated under
the preexisting manual database checks and protocols that
existed through the ICE prioritization process.
What we did this time is we took those 82,000 records and
the remaining 757,000 records, which under the prior paradigm
would never have been fully vetted, and we ran them through the
NCTC system and then we then leveraged the capabilities of
automated targeting system to query not only law enforcement
and other immigration databases but we leveraged the
intelligence-driven targeting rules that ICE--that CBP utilizes
in the course of their general business. Out of 839,000 records
we were able to identify a subset that were potentially public
safety or National security threats. Working with ICE and CBP
and the intelligence community, we were able to essentially go
through each and every one of those 2,000 records.
A subset of those, several hundred, were potential leads
that ICE eventually ran down to the point where we were talking
about dozens. So we started with 1.6 million records and ended
up with dozens of new investigations. Now some of those,
several hundred, were preexisting investigations, some had
died, some were in jail. Which think they were overstays
because they were actually in jail. Some we determined had left
the country because we were querying different databases like
Interpol databases, et cetera. But we were able to automate
that public safety and national security vetting process.
We brought the same group together to say, okay, can we do
the same thing from a location and immigration status
perspective? Current capabilities did not allow that. To be
able to vet those 757,000 records from a location and
immigration status perspective would have required time-
consuming manual databases--database queries, excuse me. So we
put this team--we focused this team on coming up with a design
on how to automate those processes as well. That work has been
underway for several months now. I think we have come up with a
concrete plan. As we looked at what would result when we put
that plan into motion, we estimate will take between 6 to 12
months, we will have phased in results along that time period.
We not only will be able to fully vet from an on-going basis
any other potential overstays, or visa applicants, or visa
holders, or people requesting other immigration benefits from a
public safety or National security perspective, but we will
also have enhanced biographic exit capability from added
biometric features, such as better utilization of fingerprint
identification numbers and other biometrics. If we couple that
with research being done by our S&T on biometric data
collection capabilities from an exit perspective, you have the
foundation for a biometric exit capability in the future.
Mrs. Miller. Well, I for one cannot tell you how much
better I feel now than I did at the beginning of this hearing
listening to your explanation and as you have been talking
about your process here. I guess one follow-up, when you talk
about follow-on, sometimes ``follow up'' are the two most
important words in the English language. You have this large
group that you began with, 1.6 million, and you went through
various iterations down to a couple of hundred apparently that
are continuing with some sort of investigative process there.
How will you do in following up so we never get to that huge
backup again? So you will be able to--maybe you told me that,
but I didn't quite get it. How are you going to continue to do
this so it will not happen in the future, we will be able to in
real time understand if there is a significant threat to
National security--not 6 months after the fact.
Mr. Cohen. So, for me, one of the most exciting parts of
this has been to watch how as we have brought more clarity to
the technological capabilities that can come when we interlink
these systems, that that has caused a parallel excitement on
the operational side. ICE has, working with CBP and others, has
been rethinking the way that they track day-to-day. So instead
of us being reactive, an overstay list being--a potential
overstay list being created, it being prioritized best based on
preexisting prioritization standards, CBP and the technologists
will be working developing essentially a hot sheet, which on
day-to-day will look at new derogatory information coming in,
new immigration information coming in, new travel information
coming in and will essentially create a dashboard available to
ICE on a day-to-day basis that will provide them insights about
those public safety and National security risks that are either
overstays or existing visa holders.
So ICE is actually--this has provided an opportunity for
ICE, as they are able to free up more personnel from these
database queries, to be more imaginative and creative in how
they use their existing investigative resources.
Maybe I would defer to Mr. Edge if he wants to add any more
to that.
Mrs. Miller. Mr. Edge.
Mr. Edge. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Miller.
That is certainly a very accurate assessment. The part that
US-VISIT begins we are able to take after all these leads have
been fully evaluated and vetted through various databases, and
then we farm those leads out to our various offices in the
field. We have 265 offices on the domestic side and 70 offices
internationally. So once those leads are sent out to the field,
our agents are able to conduct investigations and very detailed
investigations, based on the quality of the information that we
have received.
So it certainly has worked very well. We certainly see that
it is going to continue to work. We also have received well
over 194,000 leads, not only from US-VISIT, but from the SEVIS
process as well. We have initiated 7,272 investigations as a
result, and that is pretty significant, certainly something
that we haven't been doing over the past--since the inception
of the agency and us trying to combat terrorism.
As a result, we have also been able to make 2,194 arrests.
So the information that we are getting now has really been
analyzed carefully, resulting in some significant results. As
Mr. Cohen indicated, we are able to conduct some quality
investigations by gathering this information and sending it to
additional databases in the intelligence community as well as
our counterparts in the law enforcement world.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
I would just conclude my questioning here by once again
observing that this is really how Congress is supposed to act,
where we are doing oversight, we are asking various questions,
hopefully getting the agencies to respond.
You certainly are responding and I think in a very
appropriate manner. So I am appreciative to hear all of this
today.
With that, I would like to recognize our Ranking Member,
Mr. Cuellar, for his questions.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you very much, Chairwoman.
I have two sets of questions. One has to do with the time
that after an alien is ordered to be removed, how long it takes
for that person to stay.
Members, I would ask you to look at the handouts, and I
believe Diana is going to put an overhead also. What is the
average time to get the travel documents issuance before they
are removed? So it involves a little bit of the State
Department.
[The information follows:]
The other one is an issue I brought up at the committee
last week, I believe, about a Mexican-based school that taught
students how to fly. They were in south Texas. Instead of being
there on student visas, they were there learning--being taught
on tourist visas it sells. Again, the way this came about,
because one of the Mexican pilots, training pilots, went over
and buzzed some of the boaters at one of the places and had to
create that type of activity to bring this up.
So I will go first with the travel. As you know, when an
alien other than a Mexican national is ordered removed from the
United States, a consular officer from the alien's country of
origin must issue a travel document. This travel document
allows the alien to return to his or her country and are
necessary to effect the order removal of aliens from the United
States. There are some countries, like Guatemala, Honduras, and
the DR that have electronic travel documents that make that to
move a lot faster. Of course, with Mexico overall we have a
good working relationship where they will take them rather
quickly.
But as you can see up there, there are certain countries,
and this is only just a few: Pakistan takes 92 days. This is
after--just to get the travel documents. China, 147 days;
India, 160 days; Bangladesh, 192 days; Zimbabwe, 257; Cambodia,
300 days; Vietnam, 337; Iraq, 391 days. Again, I know from the
State Department, because--and I want to thank John Morton,
because he is the one that brought up this issue about a year
ago. We sat down with the State Department, and we were given
the diplomatic reasons why the State Department couldn't move
on.
But at the same time, keep in mind that that will cost us
money, because any time they stay here in the United States, it
is going to cost us money. This is from the time an order was
given. This is not before the time; this is after. So if you
add all of those, it is going to cost the taxpayers thousands
and thousands and thousands of dollars to keep those folks
here.
The chart, as I mentioned, those are the recalcitrant
countries that are just slow in accepting their nationals back,
and they will give up different reasons. They are good at
giving information so they can get their visas. But when we
want to send them back, they will give you all these reasons.
My only thing is this: If we can be given the reasons again
why it is difficult to get these countries to get them to
accept the folks back and what is being done by the United
States, and are those delays a consideration when determining
whether to issue visas to individuals for certain countries? My
thing is, if they are taking a hard time to take back those
folks, then when we give them visas, why are we continuing to
give them visas when at the end, they are going to take their
time? I really think that the State Department should consider
that. Should we consider restricting visa issuance to those
countries until they begin to accept their nationals in more
timely visas? Again, I am a Georgetown Graduate School of
Foreign Service, I understand all the diplomatic reasons. But
again, as a taxpayer and as a Member of Congress that
represents all those folks, I think that is something that we
need to play a little bit more hardball with those countries
that are taking their time and costing us a lot of money.
The second part of the question is the situation that we
had in south Texas. How can students that come in, take flying
lessons in small planes--and we know what happened in 9/11. You
know they are coming in to learn. They are here on tourist
visas and not student visas. Then of course, when we talk to
the FAA and Homeland Security, everybody will say, well, we
don't do this, we don't do this, we don't do that. That is
their responsibility, not our responsibility. It goes to what
the Chairwoman and Chairman Thompson has been and all of us
have been talking about, all Members of the committee, is:
Where is the coordination?
I mean, at the end of the day, the American taxpayer
doesn't want to know what agencies blame what agency. They want
to know: What are the results and how are you keeping us safe?
The first part of the question is the recalcitrant agent
countries. I guess we will start with the State Department.
Mr. Ramotowski. Thank you, Congressman.
Let me first say that the State Department is acutely aware
of the seriousness of this issue. We share your concern. We are
taking all possible steps to improve the situation with respect
to recalcitrant countries. Together with our interagency
partners we have established a high-level working group to work
out a strategy for dealing with the most egregious countries.
In addition to that, former Under Secretary Burns, now deputy
secretary, instructed all our chiefs of mission to do what they
could to produce positive responses in the recalcitrant
countries.
Mr. Cuellar. Could I ask you a question? Since April--I
think it was in April 2011 that we met in my office with the
State Department and John Morton. Has anything been done except
establish a working task force--with all due respect. I mean
that with all respect. I appreciate all the help that you and
Secretary Clinton are doing. Anything been done since that time
besides incur more taxpayers' dollars? Is the task force the
only thing that has been done?
Mr. Ramotowski. Well, these issues are also being addressed
case by case with the foreign consulate officers here in
Washington. Again, our staff works with ICE and the other
agencies involved to try to encourage the foreign countries to
take back more of these individuals. But as you have
recognized, it is a difficult process. There are many issues at
stake, and the progress hasn't been as rapid as we would all
like.
I would point out, too, that our new ambassador to China,
former Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke, is personally aware of
and engaged in this issue and is determined to see more
progress with respect to China. So we are doing everything that
we can. Let me close by saying that for us, this is a very
serious issue.
Mr. Cuellar. I appreciate that. Could we put a little bit
more pressure on them at the beginning instead of the end?
Mr. Ramotowski. We will try our best, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. We will follow up on the second question on
the second round on that. Just keep thinking about that
particular case in south Texas.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the other gentleman from
Texas, Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Fifteen of the hijackers came from Saudi Arabia. When I
look at the Visa Security Program, it does not have 11 of the
top 20 high-risk posts included, including Saudi Arabia, which
seems sort of interesting to me.
So Mr. Edge and Mr. Cohen, can you explain to me why Saudi
Arabia is not on this--part of this program?
Mr. Edge. I believe Saudi Arabia is a part of the program
as we speak today.
Mr. McCaul. They are?
Mr. Edge. Yes, they are.
Mr. McCaul. Then perhaps I had some misinformation.
Let me continue with Mr. Cohen. I am glad that after 10
years later, we are making progress on our exit program. When
do you plan to have that fully implemented?
Mr. Cohen. We anticipate that the capabilities that I
described earlier will be implemented within 6 to 12 months.
Mr. McCaul. Will that include also biometric?
Mr. Cohen. It will include enhanced biographic with certain
biometric elements included. As I referenced earlier, more
expanded use of information captured on the front end,
fingerprints, et cetera. We are also--it will also include
within that same time period more advancements in research on
biometric technologies we can use here as part of the exit
program.
Mr. McCaul. I agree with Madam Chairwoman. That is
certainly good news. That is where the Congress in our
oversight working with you actually is a positive experience.
Let me move on to visa overstays. The Secretary announced
that criminal aliens are a high priority for deportation. As a
former Federal prosecutor, I certainly understand that with
limited resources. On the other hand, she seemed to infer that
noncriminal aliens that were having visa overstays could stay
in this country and apply for work permits.
First of all, Mr. Edge, can you respond to that; is that
the administration's position?
Mr. Edge. Well, our position as a law enforcement agency is
to take the information that we acquire from the SEVIS program
and US-VISIT and focus on those overstays that pose the most
threat and potentially are the most dangerous to our country.
Mr. McCaul. I get that, and I agree with that. But I was
disturbed by the inference that the noncriminal aliens
overstaying could stay here and apply for work permits. Was
that an accurate statement on the part of this administration?
Mr. Edge. I am not familiar with that statement. I would
have to defer to the Department.
Mr. McCaul. Okay. Perhaps I need to ask the Secretary
herself that question.
Mr. Stana, if that is the policy of this administration, do
you think that would pose a threat in any way to our security?
Mr. Stana. Well, given with the theme of the hearing, the
integrity of the visa process, you would certainly call it into
question.
Listening to the new program that ICE and DHS is putting
together, I think it is a step in the--I would welcome the
opportunity to take a look at it. It raises a whole host of
questions. But if we are still going to focus on the National
security and public safety folks, which is the thing to start
with, it still leaves the vast majority of people untouched,
and it gives the impression that once you are in the country,
you are in, unless you act out, and then you might get caught.
Mr. McCaul. Because as I look at some of these, whether it
is hijackers or high-profile terrorist violators, many of them
were noncriminal aliens here on a visa overstay.
Mr. Stana. Well, and the fact that the Christmas day bomber
went through the visa processes, many of which were in place in
December 2009, apparently got in on the airplane and got a
visa, just calls into question how much question has to be
raised before you deny boarding.
Mr. McCaul. Mr. Edge, I hope you can get back to me on that
question in terms of what is the administration's position.
[The information follows:]
A typical scenario is someone enters legally, overstays, marries a
United States Citizen and applies for adjustment of status. I believe
in this case the person may qualify for an Employment Authorization
Document (EAD) based on the pending I-485, Application to Adjust
Status. Here are some other examples under which an individual, like an
overstay, would get an EAD:
Deferred Action;
Temporary Protected Status;
Withholding of Removal;
Applicant for Cancellation of Removal;
Certain Asylum applicants (where applications have been
pending for more than 180 days);
Certain individuals who are subject to Final Removal Orders
can also apply for employment authorization if they cannot be
physically removed for some reason or if they are the sole
supporters of other family members.
[Ruth Tintary, Associate Chief Legislative Branch for USCIS provided
this answer to ICE, Office of Congressional Relations]
Mr. McCaul. Or perhaps, Mr. Cohen, you may have an answer
to that.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, Congressman, if I may.
So, first and foremost, because of resource issues
primarily, the administration prioritizes the targeting of
those visa overstays that represent a National security or
public safety risk. Through the capabilities that I have
described earlier, as we are better able to identify people who
are actually confirmed overstays, meaning we have assessed that
they are actually located in this country and they have not
changed their immigration status, we then, as we do now, will
have the ability to provide that information so they can be
inputted by CBP and others into their systems and State
Department into their systems. So if there is a second
encounter, meaning they are arrested, meaning that they seek to
apply for another visa, they seek to apply for other types of
entry, the information that they are an overstay will be
available to those CBP officers or others.
Mr. McCaul. Well, again, a majority of the hijackers were
overstay noncriminal aliens. The Blind Sheik responsible for
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing was a visa overstay without
a criminal record. So I think it is important, and I am
concerned--and that is why I look forward to hearing from the
administration--I am concerned about sending a message out
there that if you are a noncriminal alien, it is okay to stay;
in fact, you can apply for a work permit as well.
Mr. Cohen. If I may, Congressman, one last point. You make
an excellent point about whether information about the
hijackers was in databases like NCIC because they have been
arrested. What there was on many of the hijackers, or on
several hijackers, was derogatory information or other law
enforcement information that under this new construct would
come to the attention of authorities; information in FinCEN,
information that may reside in other repositories of the
intelligence community, other than say the TSDB. So what we are
seeking to do is expand our ability to vet visa information or
information regarding potential overstays against a much
broader set of law enforcement or intelligence information than
we have done so in the past.
Mr. McCaul. I look forward to working with you on that, and
thank you for your testimony.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia,
Mr. Rigell.
Mr. Rigell. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Thank you all to our panel. I appreciate the work that you
are doing.
You know, that we have had no major domestic terrorist
attack since 9/11 certainly is a high degree of success, and we
recognize that. Now, also, though, at the same time that we
have approximately 4.5 million illegal immigrants here who came
here on a visa and then overstayed, that is unquestionably a
failure. I am going to in my short time here try to see how we
link performance with--and accountability with performance
here.
Mr. Ramotowski--I, too, have a difficult last name to
pronounce--what is the approximate number of countries who
citizens are eligible to apply for a visa to come to the United
States?
Mr. Ramotowski. Well, the citizens of all countries are
eligible to apply to travel to the United States.
Mr. Rigell. Okay. So any country?
Mr. Ramotowski. Yes.
Mr. Rigell. Now, among that range of countries then, surely
there is some disparity between those countries whose citizens
have a higher percentage of violating our visa conditions than
others, right?
Mr. Ramotowski. That is correct.
Mr. Rigell. Okay. Could you please identify for us then
those top five countries?
Mr. Ramotowski. I don't have statistics here, sir, on the
number of visa overstays by country. We would have to get back
to you on that.
Mr. Rigell. Okay. If you would, please. Not so much by
the--well, I would like it to be the actual number, but also as
a rate, a percentage. Because those countries who--it would
indicate to me that if we have the top five countries, I would
say, what is taking place at our offices there, our State
Department offices there, our embassies, to understand what is
taking place there?
Now, on that, as a follow up, with the actual personnel
side, actually approving a visa is by definition a judgment
call. We are trying to predict future human behavior,
inherently difficult. We have some mechanisms that help us with
that and the biometrics that we are working on, on all of those
things, but at the end of the day, it is a judgment call. It
would stand to reason, wouldn't it, that some folks are better
at that than others, wouldn't it?
Mr. Ramotowski. That is correct.
Mr. Rigell. Okay. What processes and procedures do we have
in place that would help us discriminate in the most positive
sense of the word those personnel who are really good at this
and others who clearly aren't very good at it?
Mr. Ramotowski. Well, again, Congressman, we have a layered
approach to the training of our personnel. As I mentioned in my
statement, they receive an intensive basic consular course when
they join the Foreign Service that includes training in
interview techniques, behavior detection and all of our
consular automated systems. Many of them also do consultations
with other law enforcement agencies before they go out to their
post. When they arrive in country--and I should also point out
that they are given training in the language and culture and
area studies of the regions to which they are sent. When they
arrive in country, senior consular personnel are charged with
overseeing their professional development and monitoring their
work.
Mr. Rigell. I appreciate that.
I really don't want to be rude by interrupting you. We have
such little time here, and this is a very important question
for me. Let's say, for example, that there are 500 visas
approved by a particular person and their failure rate is in
the 12 percent range, and generally, you would say, well, that
is pretty good compared to maybe the average for that country.
But there is another person over time who you see has a 42
percent failure rate, that is 42 percent of the visas he or she
approves actually end up overstaying. I am trying to--I am
trying to help our Government have this culture of
accountability. So you have described a lot of things there,
but I did not hear how we circle back around and try to track
performance, not to punish someone, but to help those--to
elevate those who are doing well, and maybe if we do have a
person who is not having a particularly good track record on
this, that we either help them become better or, frankly, we
remove them.
Mr. Ramotowski. Well, Congressman, as I was saying, we do
have a process for evaluating our personnel. It is a continuous
process. Individuals who do not perform to the Service's
expectations can be denied tenure and removed from Service.
Mr. Rigell. Thank you, sir. I just would circle back maybe
around on some written questions that I will submit to
understand better the metrics of that, if there are actual
metrics of violations.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman will now recognize the gentleman from
Florida, Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I appreciate you giving me the opportunity to participate
today.
According to the Homeland Security Department's numbers,
more than 7,300 foreign students have left school early for
various reasons but illegally remain in the United States. More
than 800,000 students in the United States participate in the
Student and Exchange Visitor Program. Most of them come here
for noble intentions. While not all would-be terrorists come to
the United States under the guise of a student visa, we have
seen examples where several have. I know everyone--well, we
have examples right here.
For this reason, I have long advocated for legislation of
the Student Visa Security Improvement Act, which I introduced
to ensure that student visas are issued to those genuinely
interested in obtaining an education. It seeks to ensure that
once allowed into the country on a student visa, students are
actually here to study and do not drop off the radar. So I have
a couple of questions here.
Secretary Ramotowski, to what extent does the State
Department coordinate with DHS to review and screen student
applications for security concerns?
Mr. Ramotowski. Congressman, student visa applicants are
screened through the same intensive process that all these
applicants are screened with, with some additional features.
They have their fingerprints taken and screened through our
biometric fingerprint systems. We also use facial recognition
technology to screen those applicants. We conduct an intensive
visa interview with consular officers in the local language or
in English. In addition to that, we utilize extensively the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement SEVIS system to ensure that
the student is attending a registered school and has in fact
completed the registration process at that school.
As I mentioned in my remarks, after the visa is issued,
there is a continuous vetting process of all issued visas, such
that if at any time derogatory information surfaces from any
source, law enforcement or intelligence, it can be promptly
analyzed and the visa can be reviewed for possible revocation.
So, yes, we work very closely with Homeland Security and our
other partner agencies on these cases.
Mr. Bilirakis. Well, why is it then that we have 7,300
students that are here--or former students that are here
illegally in the United States? How can we help you with that
issue?
Mr. Ramotowski. I think, Congressman, and I obviously can't
speak for them, but individuals overstay for a variety of
reasons. We are continually reviewing our processes at our
posts abroad to ensure that if there is a change in the
country, perhaps economic activity, an economic crisis or
something of that sort, that our officers are fully aware when
they make their visa adjudication decisions that there might be
other factors encroaching on an individual's decision whether
to comply with our immigration laws or not. We will never
knowingly issue anyone who is unqualified or has an intention
to overstay in the United States a visa.
Mr. Bilirakis. Are we searching for those individuals,
those 7,300, that are located here in the United States? Do we
have any idea where they are?
Mr. Ramotowski. I will defer to my Homeland Security
colleagues on that one.
Mr. Edge. If I may, Congressman, ICE is working very
closely with the Department of State in sharing our various
databases. Currently we have more than 10,364 institutions as a
part of the SEVP program, and we follow up with the various
institutions on a regular basis to determine if these students
are remaining in school. So those students that certainly are
out there as overstays, their names are being vetted through
the various systems that we highlighted earlier in our
testimony today, and they are being prioritized. We certainly
would be looking for the most egregious ones, those that pose a
threat to our National security.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
For the entire panel, to what extent are some fraudulent
educational institutions able to serve as visa mills and as a
back door into the country? What tools exist or are needed to
close this loophole, for the entire panel?
Mr. Stana. Well, I will start off. I think what my other
panelists said was probably what we all wish for. We all hope
that the information provided by the educational institutions
is accurate and there is no fraud. Our work has shown, however,
that that is just not the case. Sometimes information which ICE
depends on to do its casework is submitted late into SEVIS or
not at all. The students themselves don't update the
information that they have to update about their job status, so
it may appear that they are still in school.
There is fraud involved, Mr. Bilirakis. I think you
mentioned that is what you alluding to, at universities. There
was one in the paper I think, and I am not saying this was
fraudulent, but University of Northern Virginia, that was
alleged to be of the type that you are saying.
So I think that we have to take more steps than we have in
the past to make sure that this is as seamless as we would like
it to be. Right now it is not. There are too many inaccuracies
in the data, and there are too many cases of fraud in
connection with these schools, other people taking the
students' tests for them, people not checking photo IDs when
they should, and so on.
Mr. Ramotowski. I would just like to add, Congressman, that
that underlines the importance of the personal interview that
our officers conduct and our embassies and consulates. Because
although someone may submit a fraudulent test paper, a highly
trained consular officer can often note discrepancies in the
interview that would open a line of inquiry and lead to the
denial of that visa.
In our high-fraud posts, we also have fraud prevention
units and fraud prevention managers. They are dedicated to
ensuring the integrity of the visa system. They investigate
questionable cases and provide the results of those
investigations back to the visa officers. So we take this
concern very seriously, and we work closely, again, with
Homeland Security in maintaining the integrity of the process.
Mr. Bilirakis. Madam Chairwoman, I know my time has
expired. I have one additional question, but I will wait for
the second round.
Mrs. Miller. Okay. Thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from South
Carolina, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thank you for
the timeliness of this hearing.
It never ceases to amaze me that when we schedule a hearing
on a topic like this, that we see the administration react in a
positive manner, and then that is a good thing.
There was an article today in the AP, ``Broader Security
Checks to Reduce Visa Overstays.'' It may have been brought up
earlier, but it is a good thing that we are having an impact,
so thank you for that.
I want to address my question, I guess it could go to Mr.
Edge or Mr. Cohen or Mr. Stana, but visa overstay is definitely
a topic that concerns folks in my home State of South Carolina,
because we know that we have got to do a better job than what
we do in this country. When you see statistics, such as a
backlog of 1.6 million people have overstayed their visas in
the United States--and recently you all have vetted those
through multiple channels, which I will talk about in a minute,
there are still 839,000 people here that I think Mr. Cohen said
the Department vetted everyone for potential National security
and public safety concerns. But there are still 839,000 people
here that have overstayed their visa in violation of the
sovereignty of the United States of America, and I just have to
say, why? Why do we still have 839,000 people here who are here
illegally?
Mr. Cohen. Great question, Congressman, and you have made a
really important point.
The sad fact is that we do not know until we go through a
manual vetting process what number of that 839,000 actually are
either still in this country or have changed immigration
status. That is why the capabilities I described earlier are so
important, because in the past, because of resource issues and
the lack of technical capability, it required US-VISIT, ICE, to
manually do a series of manual database checks that was
incredibly time-consuming, so there were large numbers of
records that were never evaluated. Now, those people may have
left. They may have changed status; we just did not know that.
Mr. Duncan. Can you pause right there and explain to me as
a freshman Congressman what ``change in status'' is, what you
mean by that?
Mr. Cohen. Change of status means they came into the
country under a visa, they may have changed their immigration
status. They may have extended their visa. They may have
reapplied for a new visa. They may have applied for a new visa
with a slight variant in their name.
Mr. Duncan. Would not we know if they applied for a change
in status that they are no longer here as a student and they
have changed and you take them out of that category, wouldn't
that be automatic?
Mr. Cohen. In some cases, yes. In some cases, the way that
the systems had been designed in years past, that information
was not immediately apparent, and it would require an
individual, an investigator, or a researcher, to go into
multiple systems to determine that.
Mr. Duncan. So if Tom Davis comes into this country from
Ireland and he realizes he is here on a student visa, he
overstays his visa, he has gotten a job or he is now consulting
for a company, and he wants to change that status to here for
business reasons or whatever, and he comes to your office and
says, I want to change my immigration status, Tom Davis from
Ireland, here is my Social Security Number, here is my whatever
identifying factor that you have, you can't electronically with
all the abilities we have today take that Tom Davis out of that
category and put him in another, and he would not be listed in
the 839,000 people that we are talking about now? Is that that
difficult?
Mr. Cohen. The way systems were designed in the past, yes,
sir, and that is what we are fixing.
There is one example I can talk to you about the 839,000
records that we did vet, where we found an individual who came
based on a visa applied for by her husband. She then changed
status and got a visa on her own. She is a very good student at
a southern university. The system would not have automatically
picked that up and did not. That is what we will be fixing
through this new capability, this interlinking of systems that
I referred to earlier, Congressman.
Mr. Duncan. It is very obvious to me that we have got a
broken visa system for overstays based on these numbers when
you vetted over half of them through multiple channels and
said, okay, those guys have gone back to their country; we
still have 839,000, 2,000 of which warrant further
investigation because they are probably here for maybe God
knows what. But I believe that we have got to pursue in this
Nation, in my last seconds here, a biometric countercheck so
that we know when someone leaves this country that they have
left. If they haven't shown up and left the country within
their stated time, then we put them in a category that they are
here illegally and we start running down their last address and
we start taking care of securing our country.
The sovereignty of this Nation is very, very important to
me. It is no wonder we see instances like we recently saw with
a member of a certain family who has been here, overstayed a
visa for a very, very long time, so very timely. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman for those comments.
I think the gentleman has demonstrated a frustration that
many of us feel that when you see an administration who has
just recently announced their policy that say they are not
going to deport illegal aliens, known illegal aliens, unless
they think they are a public safety threat.
So that is a very unfortunate backdoor amnesty, however you
want to characterize. It is an end-run around the legislative
process.
I am now speaking to other Members of Congress. I don't
expect any comment from any of our panelists. I am talking
about an administration-announced policy that I have vehemently
stated I have a lot of problems with. I think that is going to
add to our problem. It is going to incentivize others to get
here, stay here, and knowing that unless they really do
something criminal, even a DUI, which apparently is not enough
criminal activity to be a public safety threat to deport an
individual. That is a significant problem I believe to our
National security here and to the political will of the
American people who have demonstrated over and over again they
want to secure our borders and they want to get rid of a lot of
the illegal aliens who are here, whether they are overstays or
what have you.
I would just comment to Mr. Stana, because you have
mentioned here--one thing that you said that I felt was very
interesting, when you said the amount of the budget that we are
spending to protect, secure our borders and yet here we have 40
percent plus of all the illegals that are in the country are
overstays from their visa. You just mentioned specifically with
ICE that you are only spending 3 percent of your budget on
these overstays when they are 47 percent of some of the
problems that we have.
So I would just ask Mr. Stana, you mentioned about the
information Mr. Cohen gave today and you looking forward to
evaluating that. Will the GAO just go ahead and evaluate this?
Or are you looking for a letter from our subcommittee, or what
will trigger your analysis and recommendation?
Mr. Stana. What would trigger a study would be a letter
from the subcommittee or committee.
Mrs. Miller. You are going to have it very shortly then.
Mr. Stana. If both sides would do it, it would be
advantageous.
There are a number of questions that were raised. I think
this is definitely a step in the right direction, but there are
questions about timeliness and reliability when you are using
biographic versus biometric. The rest of the system has to be
resourced to be able to move people along the line to
deportation, if that is the goal. Of course, you mentioned the
immigration impact aside from the National security impact, and
when that part of the tail would be resourced as well. So there
are lots of questions. As I say, it is a step in the right
direction. It is something that I am sure you have been looking
for for awhile. I just would like to see how reliable the
system would be.
Mrs. Miller. Very good. That letter will be forthcoming.
I also want to mention again about the Christmas day
bomber. Obviously, I come from southeast Michigan. That
particular incident has sort of faded from the National radar
screen, but I will tell you, it has not faded in my media
market, because as we speak, the Christmas day bomber, who is
now his own attorney, he is his own attorney, and they are
going through jury selection. It makes me crazy every day I am
watching this guy going--after we Mirandized him, sent him to
the University of Michigan, the best burn center in the entire
Nation, and now he is going through this entire process, and
how much the city of Detroit actually is having to pay for
security, et cetera, for this guy going through our system when
he should be, in my opinion--again I am talking to other
Members of Congress; I am not looking for any comment from any
of you, this is an administrative-stated policy--this
individual in my estimation should be treated as an enemy
combatant. They are looking at the battlefield in asymmetrical
terms, and on that particular day, the battlefield was seat 19A
of that Northwest flight, and that was a battlefield in his
mind.
I think we hurt ourselves by not appropriately responding
to that. But I guess this is a question in regards to him,
because it is my understanding that running the name through
the NCIC database, et cetera, that his name as it was
introduced after his father came to the embassy in Nigeria, et
cetera, was misspelled. So how has that--I mean, will that
happen again? What steps have we taken to correct that?
Mr. Ramotowski. Madam Chairwoman, we have taken a number of
steps to ensure that that will never happen again. The database
that we use to store the records for issued visas has fuzzy
logic for name searches such that a future search, a current
search with a misspelling will still return all possible
records and close matches. In addition to that, our embassy in
Nigeria had forwarded a telegram, as was noted here, to
Washington indicating that the father had come in and had
concerns about his son's dealings with extremists in Yemen.
That was sent as a Visas Viper message. At that time, the
interagency watch listing guidance did not call for the
automatic watch listing of that sort of information. That has
been changed, and at this point, I have no doubt whatsoever
that Mr. Abdulmutallab would have been watch listed, would be
watch listed now. The State Department in turn has changed its
revocation policy. Upon receipt of a Visas Viper message of
that kind now, we automatically review the issued visa for
revocation and act upon it, unless a law enforcement or
intelligence agency has formally asked us not to take action.
So we have corrected many--all of the State Department
issues that were identified in the aftermath of the Christmas
day bomber, and most important of all is the continuous vetting
of issued visas. Like I mentioned in my remarks, at any time,
the watch listing system can be updated with new derogatory
information from whatever source, and that will be vetted
against the databases of issued visas, so if there is any match
to a possible visa holder, we will review that and revoke it.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much. I appreciate that
information, and am very comforted to hear of those corrections
being made. My final question I would ask of Mr. ICE--excuse
me, Mr. Edge from ICE. You mentioned about the visa security
units being in 19 countries, et cetera, and I know you talked a
little bit about how that is happening in some of the high-risk
embassies and the consulates, et cetera.
I thought it was interesting listening to Mr. Ramotowski
talk about the Department of State and how you handle your
agents in regards to language skills and various kinds of
things. I am just wondering how you do with having your agents
with language skills in these various areas. Also because,
again, we are talking about budgetary considerations, I am not
sure, but I would guess that it is very, very expensive to set
up, to stand up such a unit in any of the consulates or
embassies, and is there any way of replicating, maybe not 100
percent, but doing--I am not sure how many others you would
like to have in a perfect world, what your optimal number
actually is, is there any way of replicating that State-side to
assist you from a budgetary standpoint, but really helping us
prioritize again from a National security perspective?
Mr. Edge. Well, certainly, the agency could always do more
with more, but the Congress has been very, very helpful to us
in setting up the current visa security programs in the various
countries that we have them in.
Also hearing my counterparts' statements a little while ago
from the consular perspective of the interviews that take
place. During those interviews and the high-risk posts around
the world, we would certainly have an ICE agent, special agent
who is highly trained in investigations and interview
techniques to sit with our Department of State counterpart. It
would be a joint effort to determine whether or not
admissibility should be granted and a visa should be issued.
As far as the expansion of the program, it costs about $2.2
million to open up an office and $2.2 million to continue the
full operation of such a post. So we are doing the best we can,
and we would welcome the continued support of the Congress in
meeting the requirements of our mission. But our attempt to
push the borders out and do a lot of this work overseas, as
well as a lot of the vetting that we spoke about earlier on the
domestic side, will certainly bolster our borders in countless
ways.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you.
Perhaps GAO could take a look at how that might happen
State-side as well to do some of those kinds of things, not to
tell you your business.
Mr. Stana. Actually, we have. We have looked at some of the
efforts they have to not only do their work overseas but try
domestically to do some of the screening via computer matches.
There was one item, which I think was dropped from the budget
before it went to OMB, I think it was a $17 million line item,
which would have enabled a match--matching law enforcement
databases to visa applications, which would have done the
initial screening worldwide, $17 million. Given the numbers he
was talking about, it seems like it might be a bargain. We
haven't looked at it to see if it was a bargain, but the
numbers were right.
Mrs. Miller. Very good. I appreciate you outlining that. I
am sure my staff has taken a note of that. We are going to look
at that as we proceed through our budgetary process here in the
future.
At this time, the Chairwoman would now recognize Mr.
Cuellar, our Ranking Member, for his questions.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
Before I ask my question, just to be fair to this current
administration, everything depends on resources. I think what
President Bush saw, what President Clinton and Bush No. 1 also
saw the same thing; you can do as much as what Members of
Congress give you, isn't that correct?
Mr. Edge. That is correct, Congressman.
Mr. Cuellar. Isn't it true also that the current
administration has deported more criminal aliens than any other
administration?
Mr. Edge. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. By a lot larger number, is that correct?
Mr. Edge. That is correct.
Mr. Cuellar. All right. Thank you.
Let me go back to the original question I had, but before I
ask you this thing about the flight training school in south
Texas. Mr. Stana, I appreciate everything GAO. I am a big fan
of what you all do. In your testimony, Mr. Stana, you stated
that the 2010 airlines complied with the requirements that
verify ESTA approval for almost 98 percent of the Visa Waiver
Program's passengers prior to boarding. However, the remaining
2 percent, about 364,000 travelers travel without this Visa
Waiver Program--without ESTA approval. Tell me what happened
here in your opinion.
Mr. Stana. What seems to have happened in those cases--
first off, the statistic went up to 99 percent. I think when we
looked at that program, the 98 percent figure was from slightly
prior, so it is getting better all the time.
In that case, I think it was a computer glitch where the
computer was down, they couldn't get the ESTA verifications in
on time. I have no idea how many of these ESTA inquiries result
in a ``do not board'' or a stop for people. I don't think that
data is tracked. I might be mistaken, but I don't think that
data is tracked. But what we did see is that there were about
650 out of the number you cited that caused enough concern
that, upon reflection, they said that they shouldn't have been
allowed to board. But the computer was down; they couldn't get
the assurances before the person boarded the plane.
Also, I should note that there is a timing issue here. You
could submit the ESTA paperwork up to 2 years before a flight,
and something could happen to you within those 2 years, you get
a drunk driving conviction or something, which would result in
an inability to board. All this really means is you have got to
go to the consulate to get a visa manually as if this were not
a visa waiver country.
Mr. Cuellar. Gentlemen, for the other questions dealing
with the south Texas----
Mr. Winkowski. If I could just add just a little clarity
there. When we started up with the ESTA system, we relied on
the carriers to program this system so they could get a ``no
board'' message. That took a little while, No. 1. No. 2, all
ESTA applications are vetted on a continuing basis, like the
visa. So if you have an individual that has applied for an
ESTA, the ESTA is good for 2 years, and something happens in
between that time that individual then is denied the ESTA and
is notified to go to the embassy for a visa.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
Talk to me about south Texas. How do foreigners coming to
the United States go to a flying school, training school on a
tourist visa instead of a visa, and then how do we get agencies
who start pointing the finger to each other and we can't seem
to coordinate? Apparently, there were no terrorist ties to
these students, at least from what I have been told, but it is
just a little concerning that some other country can come in
and do--you know, somebody from another country could come in
and do the same thing and get some flight training. Whoever
wants to handle this.
Mr. Edge. In this particular instance, Ranking Member
Cuellar, certainly the SEVP program didn't provide us with the
information because the flight school was not registered with
the program. You know, Praat was not a certified school at the
time in September. What we have to do a better job of certainly
is to communicate with our fellow Federal agencies, in this
case the FAA, when they recognize that there are in fact people
who are here on visitors' visas, a B-1 or B-2, who are enrolled
in flight school when that should certainly be a F visa, N visa
or a J visa, which would be more appropriate for that type of
training.
If that were the case, we certainly would have had a little
more vetting, and we would have been able to take a closer look
at things. What we are doing now is taking a look at the flight
school itself and conducting an investigation, the particulars
of which I would be more than happy to offer you a briefing on
outside of the scope of this hearing to give you a complete in-
depth update, but there is certainly work to be done.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
I appreciate it. I appreciate a briefing at a later time on
that. I would ask you to do that.
Gentlemen, my time is up. I want to thank all of you. I
know that from the GAO, and I hope they listen to your good
recommendations, and hopefully that you will take that in a
constructive way what the GAO has given you. To all of you I
really appreciate what you all do to keep our country safe.
Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I appreciate it
very much.
For the panel or whoever would like to respond, what
percentage of visa applicants are interviewed personally?
Mr. Ramotowski. Congressman, I will have to take that
question back. It varies by country, and there is no set
percentage that we apply. Most first-time applicants in most
countries are interviewed. Renewal applicants under certain
circumstances can qualify for a waiver of that interview if
they are renewing their visa in the same category within 12
months of the prior visa's expiration. So it would vary by
country and by post.
Mr. Bilirakis. If you could get that information to me, I
would really appreciate it very much.
Mr. Ramotowski. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. With regard to the question that the
Chairwoman asked with regard to the visa security units, I
understand there are about 50 high-risk units identified by
DHS, and it is ICE and the Department of State, and there are
19 in place. Can you please provide this committee with a
progress report regarding the updated MOU between DHS and
State?
Mr. Edge. Certainly, sir, we would be able to provide that
in writing at your request. We do have 57 high-risk issuing
posts, and 19 are fully operational at this point in time.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. If you could get that to me, I would
really appreciate it. Thank you.
I yield back, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from South
Carolina.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
First off, let me say, I am Scotch-Irish, and I used
Ireland earlier in an example only. I don't want the folks in
Ireland to say I was targeting their country. That happened one
time when I mentioned the Northern border, and the Canadian
press wrote something that I was talking of--it gets
misconstrued. So no ire intended to Ireland at all.
Gentlemen, let me say first also that my ire is not
directed at you or the agencies, but rather, I reflect the very
passionate frustration of many, many Americans when it comes to
immigration issues. It is in particular something that should
be easier for us. From the folks in South Carolina looking at
what Government does, they say this issue, visa-related
immigration, should be easy because we are allowing guests to
come into our country. We are giving them access through the
visa process. It is not like they are just walking across our
Southern border coming here, and that is a whole other issue of
immigration, but we are issuing a visa. So it should be easier
to make sure they don't overstay because we are giving them the
ability to come here. I know I am simplifying matters in a lot
of ways.
Mr. Winkowski, you have been sitting down there very
patiently. I don't have a question for you, but I want to say
thank you to you also. I met Chief Fisher a number of times,
and I appreciate what you guys do.
My staff would like me to ask you a question, but I am
really interested in the fact that if we have got Visa Security
Program, if it is designated to be risk-based and the program
is supposed to be active in the riskiest of countries, why are
11 of the top 20 high-risk posts not included? At high-risk
posts where there are no visa security agents, what is the
consular process for ensuring terror threats do not receive a
visa?
I guess I will direct that to Mr. Edge.
Mr. Edge. Well, the process to determine what posts are
high-risk certainly is determined by the funding that is
available. We also work very closely with the Department of
State to determine at what posts would warrant based on the
visa applications and other metrics, what posts would warrant a
visa security unit overseas.
Mr. Ramotowski. Let me follow up, Congressman, if I could,
from the State Department's perspective. We screen all our
applicants as if they are high-risk in the sense that you can't
guarantee where the next threat will come from. So all of our
posts and all of our officers are trained to use our systems,
to conduct intensive interviews and to be prepared to refuse
visas to individuals who seek to do us harm, regardless of
where in the world they actually apply for a visa. In this era
of globalization, you can't predict where the next case will
come from.
Mr. Duncan. Mr. Stana, what checks are not done with that
regard?
Mr. Stana. You mean if the VSU is not at a post?
Mr. Duncan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stana. It is just like Mr. Ramotowski said, they do a
certain amount of vetting. The added security from the ICE
person being there comes from their ability to use their law
enforcement experience to maybe query another data set that
isn't normally queried or ask the kinds of questions that a law
enforcement background should give you.
But I would like to make one other point, Mr. Duncan. I
think your point is a good one with the 11 of 20 high-risk
posts not being staffed by VSUs. On the other end, there is a
large number of the bottom 25 percent posts that are staffed
with VSUs. I mean, there might be a rational reason why they
would be there, but it would be good to reexamine that in the
light that maybe some of those folks in the bottom 25 percent
risk category, at least some of them, might be better served
being in the top-risk posts.
Mr. Duncan. I know overseas service is very expensive, and
so we have got CBP folks at overseas locations and consular
affairs. Is there a way or are you looking at maybe bringing
some of those people home that are stationed there and working
more closely with U.S.-based? It is a flat world. We have got
X-rays being looked at, they are taken here, looked at
overnight in another country; it is a 24-hour cycle. So are we
considering some of that to make it more cost-efficient? I will
ask Mr. Winkowski that.
Mr. Winkowski. Congressman, that is a very good question.
What we have done in Customs and Border Protection is we have
taken a hard look at our immigration advisory program that we
have in eight countries of about 40 officers. We continue to
evaluate the need to have officers in certain locations as well
as the need to have them in different locations. So, for
example, in Korea, we had made the decision that we did not
need to have individuals at the airport in Korea, rather we
could handle virtually, your point of the world being flat,
that we could handle it out of our regional carrier liaison
group out of Honolulu. So what happens is as that advanced
information and that pre-departure information is sent through
the system, that particular unit looks at that, identifies
individuals that we believe are high-risk, perhaps has a visa
that has been revoked, perhaps is a TSDB, perhaps has some type
of admissibility issue, and we coordinate with the host
government and the airlines to prevent that person from going
on the aircraft.
Conversely, there are other locations, for example
Heathrow, very active, a lot of feeder flights in from areas of
strategic importance, and we see a need to have those people
there. So we are continuing to evaluate on a regular occurring
basis, because as you point out, it is very, very expensive.
Mr. Duncan. So you have got a good relationship with the
host countries is what you are saying?
Mr. Winkowski. Yes, we do. We have a very, very good
relationship.
Mr. Duncan. Madam Chairwoman, is there a way we can get the
GAO to make sure, or request and to make sure that the
ultimate--the most technology is being used to keep the costs
down, but at the end of the day, we don't want any undie bomber
to get on a plane and come to this country and create harm. So
I appreciate what they do, but I also want to make sure we are
getting the most bang for the buck for the taxpayer.
Mrs. Miller. Absolutely. We will talk to the GAO about that
and perhaps incorporate some of those requests in this letter
that we will be drafting very shortly.
I thank the gentleman.
I thank certainly all of the panelists. I think this has
been an excellent hearing. As we started at the outset talking
about here we are on the 10th anniversary of the horrific,
horrific attacks of our Nation on 9/11 and whether or not
terrorists continue to exploit our visa system. It is clear
from the testimony that we have had today that we have come a
very long way, and I think we are making enormous progress and,
again, as Mr. Cohen has outlined today a huge step forward.
But you know the largest room is always a room for
improvement, and we have to continue to do that. Again, it is
Congress' responsibility to provide the oversight to the
various agencies, and it is our responsibility as well to
budget the dollars and to make sure that the agencies
understand our priorities and that we all work together
cooperatively. I think we need to obviously continue to
highlight some of our progress, but also not be afraid to take
a very candid focus on what we need to do as a Nation to
continue to secure our borders, to, as I mentioned at the
outset, under our Constitution, our Constitutional
responsibilities to secure our borders and to keep our citizens
safe.
So I would also mention to the Members that if they have
any additional questions, the hearing record will be held open
for 10 days, and they can submit those questions for the
record. Again, we thank all of our witnesses for coming today.
The committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]