[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S ROLE
IN VERIFYING EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 14, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-SS3
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Ways and Means
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COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY
SAM JOHNSON, Texas, Chairman
KEVIN BRADY, Texas XAVIER BECERRA, California
PAT TIBERI, Ohio LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas
AARON SCHOCK, Illinois SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
ERIC PAULSEN, Minnesota FORTNEY PETE STARK, California
RICK BERG, North Dakota
ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
Jon Traub, Staff Director
Janice Mays, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Advisory of April 14, 2011, announcing the hearing............... 2
WITNESSES
Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, United
States Government Accountability Office........................ 6
Marianna LaCanfora, Assistant Deputy Commissioner, Office of
Retirement and Disability Policy, Social Security
Administration................................................. 21
______
Tyler Moran, Policy Director, National Immigration Law Center.... 34
Ana I. Anton, Ph.D., Professor, Department of Computer Science,
College of Engineering, North Carolina State University, on
behalf of the Association for Computing Machinery.............. 48
Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Directors of
the American Council on International Personnel, on behalf of
the HR Initiative for a Legal Workforce........................ 70
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable Mr. Dreier......................................... 94
AARP............................................................. 96
American Civil Liberties Union................................... 98
American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees...... 109
American Immigration Lawyers Association......................... 111
American Meat Institute.......................................... 113
Asian American Center for Advancing Justice...................... 118
Jessica St Pierre................................................ 121
Joint Committee on Taxation...................................... 123
National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare...... 132
National Council of Social Security Management Associations...... 135
National Immigration Law Center.................................. 146
Secure ID Coalition.............................................. 150
MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Questions and Responses for the Record:
Ana I. Anton, Ph.D............................................... 154
Austin T. Fragomen, Jr........................................... 158
Marianna LaCanfora............................................... 163
Richard M. Stana................................................. 166
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S ROLE
IN VERIFYING EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY
----------
THURSDAY APRIL 8, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Ways and Means,
Subcommittee on Social Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:06 p.m., in
Room B-318, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Sam
Johnson [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
[The advisory of the hearing follows:]
HEARING ADVISORY
Chairman Johnson Announces Hearing on the Social Security
Administration's Role in Verifying Employment Eligibility
Thursday, April 07, 2011
Congressman Sam Johnson (R-TX), Chairman, Subcommittee on Social
Security of the Committee on Ways and Means, today announced that the
Subcommittee will hold a hearing on the Social Security
Administration's (SSA's) role in verifying employment eligibility. The
hearing will take place on Thursday, April 14, 2011, in room B-318
Rayburn House Office Building, beginning at 2:00 p.m.
In view of the limited time available to hear witnesses, oral
testimony at this hearing will be from invited witnesses only. However,
any individual or organization not scheduled for an oral appearance may
submit a written statement for consideration by the Subcommittee and
for inclusion in the printed record of the hearing.
BACKGROUND:
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 made it
illegal for employers to knowingly hire immigrants who were not
authorized to work in the United States, requiring employers to examine
documentation from each newly hired employee to prove his or her
identity and eligibility to work. IRCA led to a process based on the
Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, requiring employees to
attest to their work eligibility and employers to certify that the
documents presented reasonably appear to be genuine and relate to the
individual. The Social Security card is one of a number of documents
the employee may use to demonstrate employment eligibility.
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 required the then Immigration and Naturalization Service, which
became part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003,
to conduct three pilot programs, including the Basic Pilot, to
determine the best method of verifying an employee's employment
eligibility.
Although initially a temporary program, the Basic Pilot's
authorization was extended and ultimately expanded to be available to
employers nationwide. In the 2010 Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act (Public Law 111-83), the Basic Pilot was renamed
``E-Verify'' and the program was extended until September 30, 2012.
E-Verify is an internet-based system administered by the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services within DHS in partnership with the
SSA. The employer enters information into the E-Verify system from the
Form I-9. Verification requests are first transmitted to the SSA, which
checks whether the worker's information matches the SSA's records;
those involving non-citizens are then routed to DHS. If a worker's
information does not match these government databases, a tentative
``non-confirmation'' notice is sent and the worker then must contact
either SSA or DHS to present needed documentation in order to keep
their job.
While E-Verify is free, and participation is mostly voluntary, some
companies may be required to use E-Verify by State law (including
Arizona and Mississippi) or Federal regulation. All Federal agencies
are required to use E-Verify for their new hires and certain Federal
contractors and subcontractors are required to use E-Verify for new
hires and existing employees working directly under the contract.
Since fiscal year 2005, the number of E-Verify requests each year
has grown from 980,000 to about 16.5 million in fiscal year 2010.
Currently, about 254,000 employers (approximately 4 percent of all
employers) are registered to use E-Verify at approximately 867,000
worksites.
In a recent report to the Subcommittee (Federal Agencies Have Taken
Steps to Improve E-Verify, but Challenges Remain, GAO-11-146), the
Government Accountability Office found the E-Verify system had made
progress in improving accuracy with immediate confirmations rising to
97.4 percent. However, the study also noted the system was still
vulnerable to unauthorized workers and unscrupulous employers
presenting stolen or borrowed documents for the purpose of identity
fraud.
In announcing the hearing, Chairman Sam Johnson (R-TX) stated, ``A
broken federal worksite enforcement policy keeps Americans out of a
job, leaves workers vulnerable to identity theft, law-abiding employers
with uncertainty and unscrupulous employers able to exploit the system.
We can and must do better.''
FOCUS OF THE HEARING:
The hearing will focus on the progress made and challenges created
by E-Verify, including the potential burdens on employees, employers
and the SSA. The Subcommittee will examine how the current shortcomings
of the system could be improved to ease the verification process during
this critical time of job creation. Finally, the Subcommittee will also
review other proposals to expand employment eligibility verification,
including enhancing the Social Security card with tamper-proof,
counterfeit-resistant or biometric features and increasing enforcement
through the sharing of taxpayer wage information.
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the World Wide Web at http://www.waysandmeans.house.gov/.
Chairman JOHNSON. The subcommittee will come to order.
Welcome, everyone.
Employers are on the front lines of ensuring a legal
workforce, and it is a battle for these employers. Consider for
a moment that due to our broken immigration enforcement system,
the Pew Hispanic Center estimates there are over 8 million
illegal workers in this country. With unemployment around 9
percent, these illegal workers often compete with lawful
citizens for much-needed jobs.
Today's hearing will examine the employment verification
systems available for employers' use, including E-Verify, the
largely voluntary system jointly administered by Social
Security and Homeland Security. Since our last hearing on this
subject nearly 3 years ago, the use of E-Verify has expanded.
Today there are over 250,000 employers. That is about 4 percent
is all of all U.S. employers registered to use the system. In
addition, the use of E-Verify has been mandated in three
States, and for the Federal Government, and certain Federal
contractors and subcontractors.
Social Security is an integral partner in E-Verify because
it has the only database that can confirm citizenship. I want
to make clear, however, I am very uncomfortable that Homeland
Security is checking on U.S. citizens. That said, Social
Security and Homeland Security have, to their credit, worked
together to make E-Verify more workable and more accurate.
However, as we shall hear shortly from the Government
Accountability Office, E-Verify remains vulnerable to identity
theft and to employer fraud.
As my Texas colleague and chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, Lamar Smith, has said, perhaps the most valid
criticism of E-Verify is the identity theft loophole. And I
couldn't agree more. If an employee presents a stolen Social
Security number and fraudulent photo ID, E-Verify will
erroneously indicate that the individual is authorized to work.
The employer has been duped, and an innocent American may face
years of financial and legal woe because his identity has been
stolen.
To build on the successes of E-Verify while making needed
adjustments to ensure successful implementation, last Congress
I introduced H.R. 5515, the New Employee Verification Act, or
NEVA. NEVA would achieve three important goals: One, ensure a
legal workforce, safeguard workers' identities, and protect
Social Security.
It is true that Congress gave the American people an
employment verification system that works while protecting
Social Security's ability to serve the public. I would hope
that this is one immigration-related issue where both sides
could find common ground. As we move forward, we must carefully
consider the potential burdens to Social Security and, most
importantly, to workers and employers struggling in these
trying times to get Americans working again.
I appreciate all of you all being here. I think that we are
going to have a good panel today, and I thank you for joining
us. So I look forward to hearing our expert testimony from all
of you.
Chairman JOHNSON. And I now recognize my friend and the
ranking member, Xavier Becerra, for his opening remarks.
Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling today's
hearing to examine the impact of electronic employment
verification eligibility verification systems and the impact it
has on the Social Security Administration (SSA) and on our
workers in the United States.
The Social Security Administration has played a critical
role in the verification of our workforce since 1997, when the
basic pilot program began, which is now, of course, known as E-
Verify. Today the majority of employees who are checked through
E-Verify are cleared fairly quickly; however, some workers are
not. Our witnesses today will describe what happens to a worker
when they receive a tentative nonconfirmation that the
information submitted by their employer does not match
information contained on government databases.
A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
concluded that individuals often face significant difficulties
in resolving nonconfirmations. This is not a trivial matter
because the inability to resolve an erroneous nonconfirmation
can lead to loss of a job.
In addition, I am deeply troubled to learn that many
employers do not comply with E-Verify program rules designed to
prevent discrimination or abuse of the system. In this
downturned economy, one job loss due to mechanical or technical
error or employer noncompliance with E-Verify requirements is
one job lost too many.
Mr. Chairman, at this time, I would like to submit into the
record the stories of Americans who have suffered greatly from
problems with E-Verify. These illustrate the kinds of
challenges U.S. citizens and legally authorized workers face in
keeping their jobs.
Chairman JOHNSON. Without objection.
Mr. BECERRA. Thank you.
Mr. BECERRA. Many would like to expand the E-Verify system,
but we should not do so unless we first address the kinds of
problems with the existing system that is identified in today's
hearing. In addition, to be able to meet the needs of this
growing program, more research has to be dedicated to it.
While some have proposed making E-Verify a permanent,
mandatory program, the Congressional Budget Office has
estimated that this would cost the taxpayers nearly $18 billion
over the next 10 years.
As we work forward and make progress in trying to improve
this program, the ultimate solution to what we are trying to
address through E-Verify is to reform our broken immigration
system. In places like Arizona, where E-Verify is mandatory,
some employers have resorted to paying their employees under
the table or have simply just stopped complying with the
program. The State has also seen a loss of income tax revenue,
confirming predictions that mandatory E-Verify in the absence
of immigration reform simply drives employees into the
underground economy.
Chairman Johnson, I look forward to working together to
jointly improve our electronic employment verification system,
and I thank you for calling today's hearing.
Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, sir.
Today we are joined by five witnesses. Our first witness
will be Richard Stana, Director of Homeland Security and
Justice, United States Government Accountability Office. Next
is Marianna LaCanfora, Assistant Deputy Commissioner, Office of
Retirement and Disability Policies, Social Security
Administration. Next is Tyler Moran, Policy Director, National
Immigration Law Center. Next is Ana Anton, Ph.D. professor,
Department of Computer Science, College of Engineering, North
Carolina State University, on behalf of the Association for
Computing Machinery. And finally, Austin Fragomen, Chairman of
the Board of Directors of the American Council on International
Personnel, on behalf of the HR Initiative for a Legal
Workforce.
I welcome all of you, and we look forward to hearing your
testimony. Each witness will have 5 minutes, and your written
statements will be made part of the record in the event that
you run over a little. So I thank you, and I welcome you.
And thank you, Mr. Stana. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. STANA, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. STANA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Becerra
and Members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today
to discuss the results of our work on E-Verify, which is a
voluntary program that can be used to verify the work
authorization of newly hired employees.
I would like to discuss three points from our report, and
then later I would like to briefly discuss some issues that may
be of interest to the subcommittee on how it would affect the
Social Security Administration.
First let us discuss the TNCs, the tentative
nonconfirmations. The USCIS has substantially reduced the
number of TNCs from about 8 percent of all queries just a few
years ago to 2.6 percent in fiscal year 2009, which was the
subject of our study, down to 1.7 percent last year. So that is
moving in the right direction. This was done by expanding the
number of databases that are queried. They now look at
naturalization databases, and they look at passport data. USCIS
also screens for common data entry errors like transpositions
or a European date format that can be easily fixed. But
erroneous TNCs continue to occur when employee names are
misspelled, or they are transposed, or people with multiple
surnames use different surnames in one document than they use
in another document, and thus it triggers a TNC.
Erroneous final nonconfirmations can occur when SSA field
office staff do not update the EV-STAR system, which is an
information system on workers who receive SSA TNCs, but SSA is
addressing this issue, so we hope that this will be resolved
soon.
Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Stana, we ask that you, instead of using
the acronyms, mention the names of these programs, because a
lot of folks who might be watching may not understand what a
TNC and all those other things are.
Mr. STANA. Okay. Thank you.
An FNC is a final nonconfirmation, which is the final
notice that you are not confirmed. It is not redressable. In
other words, there is no appeal mechanism for that, which may
get to the issue you both were talking about with Americans who
are work-authorized but get a bad shake out of the system.
So improving government data sets, increasing employee
awareness, and making sure employees have a sufficient amount
of time to redress the TNC notices is really what is needed
here.
Now, I would like to turn briefly to the issue of identity
theft that both of you have mentioned. This is a very important
issue, and it is one that the system has not been able to
address. Identity theft can occur if I were not work-authorized
and would use another person's identity to say that my Social
Security number is this, and my driver's license number is
this, and the E-Verify system says I am work-authorized when I
am really not.
Westat did a study on E-Verify a couple of years ago. They
found that about 3 percent of the confirmed work-authorized
people really aren't. In other words, it creates a false
positive. And sometimes this is done by individual workers
getting an identity that works. Sometimes it is done with the
complicity of the employer; the employer says these documents
are valid, let us enter these into the E-Verify system, and we
will put you on our payroll.
USCIS has taken a number of steps to try to address this,
like a photo-matching tool for 3 of the 26 documents you can
use to validate your authorization to work in the United
States. But again, this whole system hinges on the integrity of
the employer. The employer looks at the photo on the screen,
looks at the photo that you present, or looks at the person who
is before them and either says it is or it is not a match. So
that is an issue that they have to work on a little bit more,
finding a key to unlocking the identity theft issue.
Turning to some of the discrimination issues, there is
concern that people who have hyphenated names may get a bad
shake out of the system, or people who have hyphenated names
may encounter certain challenges that those of us who don't do
not. They may order their names in a certain sequence
differently on different documents. It is not against the law
to do that, but it is going to trigger a tentative
nonconfirmation.
USCIS has a monitoring and compliance unit that they use to
try to identify discriminatory behaviors among employees, such
as seeing if a person is not given work assignments or reduced
pay until a final confirmation comes through. This is against
the law. But again, with about 80 people across the country in
this unitand no on-site inspection--I take that back. There was
one at the Social Security Administration--it is difficult to
determine whether discriminating behavior exists.
My last point from our report involves resources. Like the
I-9 system, unless the E-Verify system is properly resourced,
it is not likely to work well. This is because you have to have
someone on site to make sure that the system is properly used
and, to the extent possible, to make sure that identity theft
is minimized or eliminated. USCIS has to rely on ICE for
investigating, sanctioning and seeking prosecution of
noncompliant employers, but given its priorities, ICE is not
likely to devote many resources to this area. So policy
decisions are going to have to be made on how many resources
the Congress wishes ICE to put into worksite enforcement.
Lastly, I'd like to discuss E-Verify's impacts on SSA.
First, to the extent that SSA staff needs to resolve tentative
nonconfirmations, it does take time away from other duties.
When the TNC rate goes down from 8 to 1.7 percent, that is
helpful. If we go to a mandatory system, we may need more
resources so it does not adversely impact the SSA workload.
The other thing that could impact the SSA workload is the
self-check system, where an employee or potential employee like
you or me could query a system to see if the system would
identify us as work-authorized. It is new. It is being piloted.
While the pilot is ongoing, it doesn't now seem to be stressing
the SSA workload too much. If it becomes mandatory, or if the
pilot is expanded nationwide, it could have an effect. But I
will let the Social Security Administration discuss ant adverse
impact.
That concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer any
questions.
Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stana follows:]
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Chairman JOHNSON. Ms. LaCanfora, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF MARIANNA LACANFORA, ASSISTANT DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
OFFICE OF RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY POLICY, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
Ms. LACANFORA. Thank you. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member
Becerra and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss SSA's supporting role in E-Verify, DHS's
electronic employment eligibility verification system. I would
like to start by briefly describing the purpose of our Social
Security numbers, or SSNs.
Assigning SSNs is key to administering Social Security
programs. We establish the SSN as a way for employers to report
an employee's earnings accurately. We use the SSN to credit
wages to the earnings record that we maintain for each worker.
The earnings record is the basis for determining eligibility
for, and the amount of, Social Security benefits.
The SSN also plays a key role in E-Verify. By law, all
employers are required to verify the identity and employment
eligibility of new employees. E-Verify is a voluntary,
electronic tool that employers can use to comply with the law.
When an employer submits information about a new hire, DHS
sends this information to us electronically to verify the SSN,
the name and the date of birth in our records. For new hires
alleging U.S. citizenship, we also confirm citizenship based on
the information that we have in our records. For any
naturalized citizen whose U.S. citizenship we cannot confirm
using our records, DHS verifies naturalization and thus the
authorization to work. For noncitizens, if there is a match
with our records, DHS will then determine the current work
authorization status. DHS notifies the employer of the results
of these verifications.
So far this fiscal year, we have handled about 7.5 million
queries. In fiscal year 2010, E-Verify handled over 16.5
million queries and automatically confirmed work authorization
in about 98 percent of these queries instantly or within 24
hours. The remaining 2 percent received an initial systems
mismatch. We call that a tentative nonconfirmation. Of that 2
percent, just under half contacted us at Social Security to
resolve the mismatch.
When an individual comes into one of our offices with a
tentative nonconfirmation, we work to resolve the discrepancy.
For example, the person may need to change their name in our
records due to a marriage or a divorce that they had not
previously reported to us.
It is important to note that we need to verify the identity
of any individual whose record we update. That is why we must
process almost all of these updates during face-to-face
interviews in our local offices. In some cases we may be unable
to resolve the discrepancy the same day because the individual
may need to obtain evidence, such as a marriage certificate.
We use EV-STAR, which is a Web-based portal, to update the
E-Verify system with the status of a pending case. Once we
resolve the discrepancy by updating our records, or by
determining that our records should not be changed, we again
update EV-STAR to show the outcome of the case. The employer
can check E-Verify for the status of the case and see the final
confirmation or nonconfirmation.
We have worked with the DHS over the last few years to
improve the E-Verify system. For example, in 2009, we completed
a significant improvement to our computer systems that support
E-Verify. This improved system ensures that there is no
interference between our mission-critical workloads and DHS's
E-Verify program. At the request of DHS, we designed the system
to handle up to 60 million queries per year. With additional
hardware and funding, we could increase our capacity if the
need arises. Even with this and other improvements we remain
focused on further reducing the need for workers to visit our
local offices.
Each year DHS provides funds to cover our E-Verify-related
costs. Our costs include systems maintenance costs and the cost
of assisting individuals to resolve the tentative
nonconfirmations. Receiving timely and adequate reimbursement
from DHS for E-Verify is critical.
In conclusion, I thank you for giving me this opportunity
to discuss our role in assisting DHS to administer the E-Verify
system. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, ma'am.
[The prepared statement of Ms. LaCanfora follows:]
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Chairman JOHNSON. Ms. Moran, welcome. You are recognized
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF TYLER MORAN, POLICY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION
LAW CENTER
Ms. MORAN. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Johnson,
Ranking Member Becerra and Members of the Committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to testify on E-Verify. The National
Immigration Law Center has worked on E-Verify since it was
implemented in 1997, and I have personally advocated for
improvements in this program for almost a decade.
E-Verify faces a number of challenges despite the progress
that it has made, and these challenges would be greatly
exacerbated if this program is made mandatory. That is why it
is particularly troubling that there may be a bill in the House
this year to make this program mandatory, because it almost
certainly would pass. According to the Congressional Budget
Office, a mandatory E-Verify bill would result in over $17
billion in tax losses because undocumented workers would not
leave the country. They and their employers who are currently
paying taxes would simply go underground to get around the
system.
SSA also testified in 2007 that over 3 million workers
would have to go to SSA to stand in line and correct database
errors or lose their jobs. And this is a system, as Mr. Stana
has testified, that doesn't detect half of undocumented
workers.
Additionally, if a mandatory system is put on line without
legalizing the 8 million undocumented workers in our economy,
it is going to set the system up for failure, not to mention to
decimate industries like agriculture.
I want to start by addressing the error rate. The 98
percent confirmation rate sounds very impressive, and there
have been a lot of improvements to the programs. But I think it
is more helpful to talk about the number of workers affected
versus the percentage. Using Westat's conservative estimates,
in the mandatory system, 1.2 million people would have to stand
in line at SSA to correct their records or lose their jobs, and
770,000 people would likely lose their jobs. This is an
underestimate because every employer that has audited, their
own data comes up with higher error rates. For example, when
Los Angeles County audited its use of E-Verify, it found on the
low end that 2 percent of SSA TNCs were erroneous. To make this
really concrete, a 2 percent error rate in Texas would mean
244,000 people going to SSA or losing their jobs. And in
California that would mean 362,000 people--78,000 alone in L.A.
going to only 7 SSA offices.
So these are future projections, but using Westat's
statistics in fiscal year 2010 alone, 80,000 U.S. citizens and
lawful immigrants lost their jobs. Jessica, a native-born U.S.
citizen from southern Florida, is one of those people who
called our office. She got a job offer that she accepted at a
good-paying telecommunications company. They told her she got a
TNC. She went to SSA. She provided the documentation. They
said, you are all set, and provided her with paperwork that her
name and SSN matched. She went back to her employer, who at
first said okay. Three days later they said, I am sorry, you
got a final nonconfirmation, we are going to have to fire you.
She went back to SSA, waited in line and said, I thought it was
okay. They said it is okay. She went back to the employer and
the employer said, I am sorry. She was very frustrated. She
called USCIS, DHS, and finally called us. She was out of work
for 3 months, including over the Christmas holiday. And she now
has a lower-paying job.
The worst part about this is that there is no due process
in the system, and there is nothing we can do for Jessica to
get back her wages or to get back her job. So it is important
to note that Jessica is not the only one that faces these
challenges at SSA. People have to take off time from work. It
takes costs them money and often they have to go back multiple
times.
I want to highlight Arizona because I think it is a good
window into what a mandatory system could look like without
legalizing undocumented workers. Arizona is the first State to
make E-Verify mandatory, and there is three main takeaways.
One, undocumented workers didn't leave the State, they didn't
leave the country; they went into the underground economy, or
they are now popping up as independent contractors. Number two,
employers are coaching workers how to get around the system.
And number three, despite penalties and mandates, half of
employers aren't even using it. So you might think this is all
worth it if the system works. But again, 54 percent of
undocumented workers aren't detected by the system.
So what are the solutions? As I said in my opening
statement, E-Verify has made a number of improvements, but it
is just not ready for prime time. If and when Congress decides
to make this program mandatory, there are a number of policies
that have to accompany it, and they are in my written
testimony, but I want to highlight three.
Number one, it has to be paired with a path to legal status
for the 8 million undocumented workers. People aren't going to
pack their bags because of E-Verify. They are going to stay
here, and there are going to be major repercussions for the
economy.
Number two, we have to create due process so people have a
way to challenge these errors, and that they get back pay if
they lose their jobs. We have 9 percent unemployment. We can't
have 1 million workers losing their jobs.
And number three, you should phase in E-Verify with
performance evaluations along the way for database accuracy,
privacy, and employer compliance to make sure the system works
for workers and businesses alike.
So in a year when Congress is all about cutting budgets and
high-performance programs, mandatory E-Verify just doesn't make
sense. When this bill goes to the House floor, you are going to
hear a lot about protecting jobs and undocumented immigrants,
but I think the members of this committee can play a really key
role in highlighting the impact on SSA and impact on U.S.
citizens who are the people that are most affected by this
program.
Thank you.
Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, ma'am.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Moran follows:]
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Chairman JOHNSON. It sounds like you don't like the
program. We have got to do something to stop the illegal
workers.
Ms. MORAN. If we pair it with legalization, then we can
talk.
Chairman JOHNSON. Dr. Anton, you are recognized for 5
minutes. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF ANA I. ANTON, Ph.D., PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF
COMPUTER SCIENCE, COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING, NORTH CAROLINA STATE
UNIVERSITY, ON BEHALF OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTING
MACHINERY
Ms. ANTON. Good afternoon, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member
Becerra and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify. This statement represents my own
professional position, as well as that of the Association of
Computing Machinery's U.S. Public Policy Council.
By way of introduction, I am a professor of software
engineering at North Carolina State University and the director
of an academic privacy research center. In addition, I serve on
several industry and government technical boards and advisors,
including the DHS Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory
Committee.
The E-Verify pilot system is intended to ensure that only
authorized citizens and legal residents can be employed in the
United States, a laudable objective, especially in a time of
notable unemployment. Unfortunately the intent has not matched
the realization. Complex systems such as E-Verify are fallible
and often misused and subject to mission creep. One large-scale
evaluation of E-Verify reported that the majority of illegal
immigrants checked through the system were incorrectly deemed
eligible to work primarily as a result of identity fraud. Thus
E-Verify remains vulnerable to and incentivizes the use of
identity fraud.
Among the issues noted in my written testimony are three
that are especially critical to consider from a systems
engineering perspective. First, E-Verify must be able to
accurately identify the individuals and employers authorized to
use the system in a trustworthy manner before it is widely
deployed. Second, proof of success with a pilot must be
required before extensively expanding it. Third, complex
systems such as E-Verify are often misused and repurposed in
ways that violate sound principles of security and good
software engineering. This should be considered in the design
of the system and in supporting legislation.
Given the identification-authentication concerns in E-
Verify, it is important to distinguish between an identifier
and an authenticator. Both have very special technical meanings
and are often confused. In my written testimony I described the
differences between identification and authentication. In
brief, an identifier is a label associated with a person. An
authenticator provides a basis to believe that some identifier
accurately labels the person.
Within the context of E-Verify, the self-check pilot
system, which we heard of a few minutes ago, it authenticates
individuals by requesting information that can easily be
obtained via the white pages and public tax records by
individuals other than the holder of the Social Security
number. The requested information is not sufficient for proper
authentication. The pilot allows unauthorized individuals and
fraudsters to access the system, allowing them to check stolen
information to determine if it can be used to craft a new
fraudulent identity to obtain employment. As currently
configured, mandated use of E-Verify would encourage an
increase in computer fraud, abuse and identity theft.
Additionally, to protect the innocent, employers who take
action on nonconfirmation returns without informing applicants
and providing them an opportunity to appeal and correct
mistaken records must face strong penalties. Exceptions for
cases of natural disaster or emergency should also be built in.
Under such circumstances, requirements should be waived or
suspended when seeking new employment.
In the time remaining, I will highlight a few
recommendations from my written testimony, again from a systems
engineering perspective. First, it is critical to eliminate the
weaknesses in E-Verify and objectively audit the pilot before
it is scaled up or extended to individuals for anything other
than employment. Lack of proper system validation and
verification will almost certainly lead to cost and schedule
overruns, system breakdowns, intrusions and perhaps
obsolescence.
Second, it is imperative that vulnerabilities be examined
and risks addressed to protect the system as well as the
identity of the individual whose information is contained
within it.
Third, adopting biometric technologies as a solution to the
E-Verify authentication problem would be premature and is
unlikely to solve some of the fundamental problems with the
current system.
In conclusion, we are encouraged by your attention to these
issues, and the computing professionals that I represent stand
ready to help you in your efforts.
Thank you for your attention.
Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, ma'am. I appreciate your
comments.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Anton follows:]
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Chairman JOHNSON. Mr. Fragomen, welcome. You are recognized
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR., CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL,
ON BEHALF OF THE HR INITIATIVE FOR A LEGAL WORKFORCE
Mr. FRAGOMEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Becerra, Members of the Subcommittee. I wish to thank you for
your kind invitation to share my thoughts on employment
eligibility verification and the problems U.S. employers face.
Before we discuss E-Verify, I would like to acknowledge the
fine job done by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
in expanding and improving the program. Based on the agency's
last numbers, enrollment is up to 254,000 employers, and you
just heard that 98.3 percent of the queries result in automatic
response within 24 hours, which shows a steady improvement over
the past decade. However, the number of participants only
represents about 3 percent of all employers, and scalability is
still a concern.
While E-Verify has become very effective in matching a name
with a Social Security number, it is not effective in making
certain that the employee is who he or she claims to be on the
form I-9. According to a December 2009 report, 54 percent of
unauthorized workers who undergo E-Verify are erroneously
confirmed as work-authorized.
E-Verify has made some progress towards solving this
problem. One example is the incorporation of photographic
images from green cards, Department of Homeland Security work
authorization cards and U.S. passports. And we appreciate that
there are plans to include driver's license data from motor
vehicle departments around the country, but so far there is
only one State involved in a pilot program.
Over the past 2 years, the employer community has witnessed
much more scrutiny by Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Agency, not that I am objecting to enforcement of the law, I
think that is perfectly appropriate. But employers want
certainty. Employers want to know they have a true safe harbor
when they obey the law, and those are really the two
cornerstones.
Under the status quo, employers do not have clear guidance
on what to do when informed of a Social Security record
mismatch, or when the information does not match government
records, there is no assurance that the employers are not
victims of identity fraud.
I believe the solution to the unauthorized employment
problem and ultimately an important weapon in addressing
illegal migration is reliable employment eligibility
verification. Before we can eliminate false nonconfirmations in
E-Verify, there must be sufficient resources allocated to the
Social Security Administration to clean up its records. We also
need clear guidance on what to do with Social Security number
mismatches. However, we do not believe it is necessary for all
employers to reverify their entire workforce.
For the system to be effective, additional steps are
necessary to stop identity fraud. Matching photographs, of
course, will have a positive impact, but it does not eliminate
subjectivity on the part of the employer. Instead, this will
require incorporating biometric technology, such as that
proposed in the Johnson-Giffords New Employment Verification
Act, and other comparable technology. If we can stop identity
fraud, it will give law-abiding employers a safe harbor and at
the same time take away the subjectivity that encourages
discrimination, either deliberate or inadvertent.
Further, having an effective and reliable system would
strengthen the argument for Federal preemption in immigration
enforcement, something that business and immigrant rights
advocates both want.
Finally, an effective eligibility program is a critical
component of law enforcement filling the gaps that border
control and visa tracking currently leave in the process.
Thank you for this opportunity to share my thoughts.
Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fragomen follows:]
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Chairman JOHNSON. What is the State that is using the
driver's license?
Mr. FRAGOMEN. Mississippi.
Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you.
We have got a vote. There will be two votes. I am going to
put the committee in recess for 30 minutes, or if we get back
sooner. Thank you. We stand in recess.
[Recess.]
Chairman JOHNSON. The committee will come back to order.
I would like to ask Mr. Fragomen, the most critical issue
facing America today is jobs. And I think without jobs and job
creation, our country is doomed to a lower standard of living
for decades to come. What steps need to be taken, in your
opinion, to ensure that employment verification, in particular
an expanded E-Verify, doesn't complicate or impede creating a
job and hiring the right person for the job?
Mr. FRAGOMEN. I think that is a very critical issue. The
most important factor is to move into this slowly if we have
mandatory verification, and to make sure that it is possible to
scale the system to the level that it would need to be and to,
as they say, get it right. Now, in order to get it right----
Chairman JOHNSON. When you say ``scale the system,'' what
do you mean?
Mr. FRAGOMEN. In terms of increasing it. The system now
covers about 3 percent of employers.
Chairman JOHNSON. We have been fighting that for years.
Mr. FRAGOMEN. It needs to cover 100 percent, which means we
have to add about 7.5 million employers to the system, which
means that the volume of transactions that the E-Verify, for
instance, would have to be able to accommodate would be
multiples of what it is currently. And you know the problems
that software encounters when you try to increase its capacity
by that magnitude. And the second thing is----
Chairman JOHNSON. I know. But Social Security claims they
have the most modern system available today. I mean, that is
what they tell me.
Mr. FRAGOMEN. They might. Except the number of tentative
nonconfirmations, when you multiply it by that number of
employees, becomes a very significant number if you figure
about 1 to 1.5% percent of the cases wind up as tentative
confirmation. There are ones that don't get resolved easily.
The other aspect of it is that there be adequate resources
dedicated to Social Security so that they do it right, that the
system be fully electronic, that it incorporate biometrics or
other fraud-prevention technology or software; and secondly,
that we have a uniform law, that this applies everywhere, and
it preempts the current State laws.
I think it is very important that the employer is offered a
safe harbor, because at the end of the day, it is really the
government's responsibility to get the system right to protect
the employer, and to offer a safe harbor, and to protect the
employees against potential discrimination. But to accomplish
all of those goals, it really has to be a government-driven
system that can prevent identity fraud.
Chairman JOHNSON. Well, every expert we have talked to
acknowledged the fact that E-Verify can't detect identity fraud
very well and may, in fact, encourage it. So that puts the
employer on the frontline of trying to detect and prevent
identity fraud. So can you tell us the challenges faced by your
companies in their attempts to detect identity illegalities and
yet fill the jobs that Americans need?
Mr. FRAGOMEN. I think it is very frustrating to companies
who have to go through this process, because essentially they
have to accept the documentation that is given to them by the
employee as long as it looks reasonable on its face. And there
is really nothing further, no further steps they can take. If
they ask for additional documentation, they could easily be
accused of discrimination. And the companies, of course, are
generally very concerned about making certain they do things
right and they don't hire workers that aren't legally
authorized to work because, of course, they could lose these
employees in an enforcement action, and then, of course, that
would hinder their ability to deliver the service that they are
delivering.
So it is counter--it is a counterintuitive situation
because you have--you are presented with documentation, you
really don't like the way the documentation looks, but you have
no reason to say with certainty that there is anything
inappropriate, you just have to accept it. So I think it puts
the companies in an extremely difficult position. And of
course, if it turns out that the documentation, in fact, is
fraudulent, then the employer's whole business is at risk, and
an enforcement action, and he loses a big portion of his
workforce.
Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you very much.
My time has expired. Mr. Becerra, you are recognized.
Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I thank
each of and every one of you for your testimony.
I don't believe there is a person in this Congress and, I
suspect, sitting here in this audience who wouldn't agree that
as a sovereign Nation, we have to do everything we can to make
sure that we understand who is in our country and who is
securing employment in our country. And I know that we continue
to try to figure out the best way to get there. So your
testimony is important because Congress is going to make every
effort to try to take us to a place where we can tell the
world--not just Americans, tell the world--that we are going to
determine the best way to figure out who should come into the
country and who should be able to work in our country. And so I
wish you great deal of good fortune as you continue to assemble
the information and the data that will help us make the best
decisions here.
I am concerned about two things in particular: As we try to
move forward in verification for employment, that we are not
undermining the essential work that is supposed to be done by
the agencies that might be placed in a position of charge to do
the work. So in the case of Social Security Administration, you
are already backlogged in trying to deal with disability claims
from Americans who are trying to get their benefits. You are
backlogged when it comes to trying to secure the different
resources you need to do the other things that come from having
the most popular identifier in the world, the Social Security
number. So I am wondering if you can give us a better sense.
Right now E-Verify is a program used in 2 or 3 percent of
the employment community. And if you expand it and make it
mandatory throughout the Nation, we are expanding it
dramatically. And we have already heard the stories of the
potential fraud, potential misuse of identity, and certainly
the dramatic dislodgement of employment that an American may
have secured rightfully and then loses it. How are we prepared,
then, to move to a fully national mandatory system?
And so perhaps what I can do is ask Mr. Stana first to give
us a sense if you think any of the Federal agencies that would
be in charge of a nationwide mandatory system are equipped
today with resources and personnel to go to ramp up to full 100
percent participation of the employment community.
Mr. STANA. Well, I think, as you pointed out in your
statement, the CBO estimated it would take billions of dollars
to make sure that Social Security and DHS and whoever else
would be involved would have both the technology and the
personnel to make this happen. Currently do they have that to
ramp up right away to a mandatory system? Probably not. But
with proper resources, they could get there.
The other questions you raised about the ID theft and
making sure that you don't have false negatives, the system
will need adequate resources to get on top of these issues. The
challenges do not pertain to the 95 percent of the population
that is properly handled, it is about the 5 percent that is
problematic.
Mr. BECERRA. But the 95 percent of the population might pay
the price as we try to deal with that 5 percent.
Mr. STANA. You can't ignore the 95 percent.
Mr. BECERRA. But, Ms. LaCanfora, let me ask you this.
Social Security in this tough budget environment is taking a
hit in this 2011 budget. Chances are it might take a hit in the
2012 budget. You are already having a difficult time dealing
with all of these other responsibilities you have to our
Americans who are applying for retirement benefits, for
disability benefits, survivors' benefits. Can Social Security
ramp up to a 100 percent E-Verify participation without
sufficient resources to do this?
Ms. LACANFORA. The simple answer is no, Mr. Becerra. We
appreciate and share your concerns about funding. It really
depends largely on what you consider mandatory 100 percent
expansion. Right now E-Verify is largely used for new hires,
with few exceptions, and if you look at the current volume, we
get about 16.5 million queries a year. If you ramp it up to new
hires nationwide, that would be around 60 million queries a
year. If you ramp it up even further to include current
employees, you could be getting up to 140 million queries a
year or more.
So it depends on the mandate. But certainly any mandate
would have a significant impact on Social Security, increased
traffic in our local offices, and we would need to be funded
for that.
And I would also support the comment made by one of my
colleagues earlier to say that any mandatory move should be
phased in so that we have the opportunity to ramp up and hire
as needed.
Mr. BECERRA. And, Dr. Anton, and, I hope, Mr. Fragomen, you
as well will continue to provide us with some information that
helps us pinpoint some of what your testimony really focused
on, and that is how you make this work. How do you collect the
information? How do you deal with this Internet fraud that is
out there? We really need that to be able to move forward.
Ms. Moran, I hope you will continue to give us the real
case, real live examples of individuals, U.S. citizens, lawful
permanent residents who have been impacted because we haven't
done this perhaps as quickly in implementing a workable program
as we would like. So as we continue to figure out how to ramp
up, I hope you all will continue to give us information.
Unfortunately my time has expired, but I would have loved
to have gotten into it more with you all. But I appreciate very
much your time with us today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you. I appreciate your comments.
Mr. Paulsen, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. PAULSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Fragomen, small businesses are top job providers. How
much of a barrier is not having Internet access for using E-
Verify for those folks?
Mr. FRAGOMEN. Well, not having Internet access certainly
makes it much more difficult. As you know, you could make
verification available by telephone again, but that is not a
particularly desirable way to do it. I suppose the good news is
this is becoming less of a problem as telephones now are
morphing into Internet-enabled devices. So I think it will
become less of a problem over a period of time. But certainly
it is an issue now.
And the other big issue, too, I think, for small businesses
is just the impact on the small businesses if they have a small
staff. Since they tend to not have too many employees that have
to go, quote, hang around the Social Security office with
thousands of other people who will be doing the same thing at
the same time, you can imagine what the impact of that would be
on these smaller companies.
Mr. PAULSEN. I was kind of wondering if you thought smaller
employers essentially should be held to the same standard as
larger companies in terms of a compliance measure. They can't
get access to the Internet like larger employers. Are you
concerned that a work verification system might not only
discriminate against the workers, but also against potential
small employers?
I should ask you, what about the situation where a
potential worker is caught in a tentative nonconfirmation
problem, and the need for communications between Social
Security and the employer become critical?
Mr. FRAGOMEN. Once again, that is a big issue. I think, in
fact, most situations are going to require the employee to
actually go to the Social Security office or whatever to try to
get these problems resolved. I don't know how many of them are
really going to be successfully resolved electronically. But
certainly, not having Internet access would be a big problem,
and I think it would require on behalf of the smaller employers
that they may just have to try, as I say--try to use some of
these technologies so that they can get more in the game.
Now, whether it would be reasonable to exempt them, I think
that becomes difficult when you consider the number of small
employers there are, and the fact that frequently these small
employers are where the undocumented immigrants may be
employed. So I think giving them sort of exemption would
probably be a good idea maybe for a period of time.
Mr. PAULSEN. That was my follow-up. I was curious if you
thought it would be a reasonable option to give them an
exemption for a certification for a business, the smaller ones
in particular, if they have shown to be good employers or they
have had a good-faith effort to actually abide by the law.
Mr. FRAGOMEN. Yeah, I think it would be very reasonable to
do that for, as I say, a period of time, because as we
discussed a minute ago, it would be important to phase in the
program, and the larger employers could be phased in first
before smaller employers.
Mr. PAULSEN. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Berg, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. BERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My question, Ms. LaCanfora, concerns some new hires are
authorized to work. We heard a little bit about receiving an
erroneous tentative nonconfirmation from the E-Verify system.
It seems like we have got too much bureaucracy in here that is
really creating a problem for people that are obviously getting
kicked or flagged with the system. So I guess my question is,
we know Social Security can extend the deadline, and we have
field office employees that can make the entry into the
electronic system, the EV-STAR. What is SSA doing to try to
improve this and keeping people from falling through the
cracks?
Ms. LACANFORA. Thank you for the question. Over the past 2
years, we have worked closely with DHS to decrease the number
of tentative nonconfirmations. It used to be somewhere, I
think, as my colleague said, up around 8 percent. Right now
tentative nonconfirmations are around 1.7 percent of the total,
and less than 1 percent actually come to Social Security. So
the other tentative nonconfirmations may be resolved through
DHS. So we get less than 1 visit for every 100 queries coming
through the system. That is far lower than it has been in
previous years.
In terms of the EV-STAR System, we have, as a matter of
fact, next week an enhancement to the system coming in where if
someone walks into one of our offices as a result of a
tentative nonconfirmation, they don't have to tell our employee
that. They can say, listen, I have some sort of discrepancy I
need to resolve. And what will happen is when our employee goes
into the system, an alert will pop up saying, check EV-STAR, so
we can assure that we catch every one of these cases and then
document it properly in the system. We expect that that
enhancement will significantly increase our use of EV-STAR.
Mr. BERG. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Smith, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Fragomen, would you talk about the impact of the
patchwork of laws on employers? If you could emphasize that,
and then about the challenges this creates for Homeland
Security in determining the volume of E-Verify workloads.
Mr. FRAGOMEN. Well, impact is very significant. The State
laws basically differ from each other. They frequently differ
from the Federal law. States sometimes struggle with issues
that would seem very simple, but in a modern economy, it
becomes les obvious. For instance, what is the place of
employment; if you physically work in one location, but you
report into and you are paid by an employer or an office that
is in the State; or perhaps there is no office at all in the
State, but you actually, in fact, render services that benefit,
for instance, a company with whom you have a contract in that
State. So they have a lot of difficulty identifying what the
different standards are. And then, of course, you have your
virtual employees who are just working at home.
So the bottom line is that it is a very, very expensive
proposition for corporations to try to track all of these
different rules and try to comply with them on a State-by-State
basis.
Mr. SMITH. And, Ms. LaCanfora, everything is fully
reimbursed at Social Security, right?
Ms. LACANFORA. Yes. DHS reimburses us for all of our costs.
Mr. SMITH. Can you elaborate how that reimbursement takes
place?
Ms. LACANFORA. Sure. What happens is at the beginning of
the year, DHS will estimate the number of queries that they
expect. We at Social Security estimate the amount of the
fallout that we expect to happen; in other words, the number of
people that will actually walk into a field office. And with
those two numbers, we then estimate the amount of money that
DHS should reimburse us for the year, and they pay us that
money up front, and then at the end of the year, after we know
how many queries we actually got and how many field office
visits we actually got, then we reconcile those numbers and we
sort out the change.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you.
Mr. Tiberi.
Mr. TIBERI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I left, I told Mr. Fragomen--just to let everybody else
know before I ask the question--just this morning I had an
employer talk to me about this issue. A family-owned business,
participating voluntarily in the E-Verify system, has been very
frustrated with the lack of continuous continuity in the
system. Sometimes it takes up to 7 days for verification. At
that point, usually if it takes that long, the applicant that
he is going to hire is gone and goes to another employer who
doesn't have an E-Verify system. So he is frustrated from that
perspective.
He is frustrated that this small business owner who owns 12
restaurants in Ohio was audited in a voluntary manner by ICE
and found that 83 of his employees in total that were E-
Verified had given him incorrect information on the I-9 form,
so he got fined. He fired the 83 employees, and they are
probably working somewhere else. And here is an employer who is
actually trying to participate in the system.
So I have grave concerns about how a mandatory system would
work when clearly the voluntary system is not working for
employers--some employers today. So I would like to ask each of
you--and we can start at the end here, what do I tell my
constituents about why I should support a mandatory system when
clearly the voluntary system is not working?
Mr. STANA. When we did our work that resulted in the report
that was issued a few months ago, we went out to the State of
Arizona and North Carolina and a few other places and talked to
employers and employer groups, and asked them what they wanted
in an E-Verify system. Some of the issues you are bringing up
today really weren't on their radar screen. They said they want
something that is reliable, fast and not burdensome. And they
are worried about other employers having a competitive
advantage because they misuse the system. They fear they could
lose an employee who later goes down the street to another
employer who misuses the system and gets hired.
So I think what I would say to your constituent is that to
the extent that this system is reliable, fast and not
burdensome, it would be ready for prime time, in our
estimation.
Mr. TIBERI. But today he would argue--I am not sure it is
not reliable--the E-Verify system is not reliable, sometimes
takes up to 7 days, and in this case not very timely or
accurate.
Mr. STANA. Without knowing the facts and circumstances of
that case, maybe he described it differently. He shouldn't have
sent the information into the E-Verify system until he actually
hired the individual. You shouldn't use it for screening. That
is a no-no. But if it takes 7 days to get a response, that is
an exception. If such delays happen a lot, then that is of
concern.
Mr. TIBERI. It happens a lot, he said.
Ms. LACANFORA. I would say SSA has a very limited role in
E-Verify. We obviously have a database, as was mentioned
earlier, with over 450 million records of Social Security
numbers, which include dates of birth and some citizenship
information. But DHS is responsible for all other aspects of
the E-Verify system. I have to defer to them largely to respond
to your question.
Mr. TIBERI. Ms. Moran.
Ms. MORAN. I am not going to convince you to support a
mandatory system. In fact, I don't think that you should. What
we need to do is find a solution to the broken immigration
system. The employer in your state wants those 83 employees.
They need employment. We need to just find a solution so that
employer in good faith isn't liable for immigration violations,
and he or she can get the workers that they need.
Mr. TIBERI. Thanks.
Ms. ANTON. I would just like to point out there is another
issue that has been raised that affects small employers, which
is the fact that small employers generally don't have the
resources to properly secure their systems. And so in addition
to being fined for that kind of thing, they are going to have
data breaches, they are going to have databases which contain
information that identifies other people, and they are going to
be easy targets for people to hack into their systems, insider
or out. So that is another consideration is they don't have the
resources; not just Internet access, but the fact that their
systems are vulnerable to botnets they don't even know that are
on there, viruses, et cetera.
Mr. TIBERI. Great point. Thank you, sir.
Mr. FRAGOMEN. Well, it seems to me that if the government
mandates that you go through this process, that they then have
to assure that as a trade-off, that the system will be certain,
and you will be given a safe haven if you do what you are
supposed to do. So before the system, in my mind, is ready for
prime time, it has to be--it has to be improved to the point
where that is possible. And it has to address this whole issue
of identity fraud. And until it addresses identity fraud, has
adequate resources, fully electronic, et cetera, it should not
be mandated because it is not reliable.
Mr. TIBERI. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you.
Mr. Brady, you are up.
Mr. BRADY. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing.
I really appreciate the comments of all of the witnesses
today. I am convinced in the broader issue that we have to
close the back door of illegal immigration so that we can keep
open the front door of legal immigration. Workforce
verification being timely and accurate is the key to that, to
do it successfully and fairly.
Dr. Anton, you had an interesting comment in your testimony
about mission creep and how databases start to tie into one
another, and before you know it, you are going to have a
dangerous situation. Some have suggested that Social Security,
IRS and Homeland Security share taxpayer data in the workforce
hires. We hear that often. We, the committee, have been very
apprehensive about any sharing of taxpayer data. Now, our
jurisdiction regarding Section 6103 in the IRS Code prevents
it. In fact, our staff asked the Joint Committee on Taxation to
prepare a report on these provisions in preparation for this
hearing, and, Mr. Chairman, I request that this report be
entered into the hearing record.
Chairman JOHNSON. Without objection.
Mr. BRADY. So, Doctor, can you speak to the taxpayer data
issue and mission creep and workforce issues.
Ms. ANTON. Certainly. So from a privacy point of view,
clearly when you start commingling IRS data with other
databases in the United States, that raises a lot of red flags.
As a technologist, I can say that requiring, for instance,
authentication--for authentication, let us say that you had to
provide what was the figure on line 19 of your IRS statement
from tax returns from last year. That is something that no one
else can get. That is something that only I can look at. So,
from that perspective as an authenticator, it is pretty strong.
But the concern, then, is that that raises a lot of risks once
you start providing that kind of access between systems, and
every time you start piggy-backing databases, then you are
ultimately increasing the risk of security problems,
transmission of information, data leaks, data peeping, like
when there is celebrity peeping, et cetera. So it raises a lot
of the different risks that have to be considered, and how do
you secure all of those transactions as well.
Mr. BRADY. In laymen's terms, businesses and agencies today
focus on keeping their data secure. How much greater does the
risk increase when you start sharing those types of data across
agencies?
Ms. ANTON. Ultimately the more data that you have about
someone in a database, the easier it is to access a lot more
information and cobble together new identities, and so it
becomes a very rich target for attack. So that is something the
government has to think about is what do we really--there is no
such thing as a secure system. We have centuries of experience
with war to show that there is no such thing as a secure system
or country, et cetera. And so with that knowledge, we have to
think about do we really want a system that will eventually be
broken into, that will make it easier for people to propagate
identity fraud.
Ms. ANTON. So there are just different risks that we have
to do. And we need to consider how do you design the system in
such a way that we address the real problem at hand instead of
patching things on in the hopes that we keep putting Band-Aids
on--okay, well, maybe if we just check people to see whether or
not they are eligible to work--and then we have all of these
other problems. And the real problem, I think, is an
immigration problem. So I will just throw that there.
Mr. BRADY. Got it. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Brady. That is
interesting. You know your line 19 on your IRS form?
Ms. ANTON. I don't. I just threw that out there. But the
point is that I would have to look it up. And if I have to look
it up, then someone else can't use it.
Chairman JOHNSON. I am not sure I could find mine 10 days
after I file the form.
You know, all of you, use of biometric data is always
another proposal for ID and authentication. We have been
talking about that for a long time, and, of course, it is not
perfect either. But can each of you comment on biometrics and
what you think of this?
Mr. STANA. Let me answer that two ways. First off, it could
be very expensive to do it right. And to do it right might be
something other than putting a chip in a card and sliding it
into a reader, because those kinds of systems have been hacked
in a matter of hours. So that is not good. You have to have a
separate data set. So that could be very expensive, but maybe
in some form necessary to make this thing work.
Second, biometrics raise all kinds of privacy concerns. How
much of your identity should the government have? That is a
question that I am not ready to answer. Should the government
have my retina scan? Should the government have my fingerprint?
Well, they already have my fingerprints, but how much
information do you want the government to have? And then you
get into the data privacy and security issues.
Chairman JOHNSON. I would like to give it to them so I can
get through the airport quicker.
Mr. STANA. Well, that is the other thing. Some people would
be perfectly willing to give it up if they could bypass the
system somehow; they'd like to put their hand on a reader, and
instantly be work-authorized. Others are very sensitive about
that.
Ms. LACANFORA. I will preface my comment by saying I am not
an expert in biometrics, but I do agree that incorporating
biometrics into E-Verify would be a costly proposition. DHS, it
was mentioned earlier, is allowing employers now to access
passport photos and is working to obtain driver's license
photos. And looking at photos is one means of identity
assurance, although not foolproof. I think decision makers need
to weigh those options against the biometric option to see what
is cost-effective and what gets the job done to the extent
possible.
Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you.
Ms. MORAN. So the cost and the accuracy issues have already
been mentioned. And I encourage you to look at some studies of
the Transportation Worker Identification Credential, the TWIC
card. It is like a billion dollars, huge error rate, it is kind
of in a mess. So I would encourage you to look at that. I think
it is the closest thing.
The point is that----
Chairman JOHNSON. It worked, though.
Ms. MORAN. I mean, for some it does, but there has also
been some very high error rates, and also the census folks got
a 20 percent error rate on fingerprints when they tried to do
it for the workers last time around.
So I think the point is that E-Verify, biometrics, nothing
is a magic bullet. Again, not to repeat myself, but if you
still have undocumented workers in the economy, just like E-
Verify, they are just going to go underground and get around
the system.
Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you.
Ms. ANTON. So I would just note that if you also add
biometrics to a database, that becomes a very, very rich,
wonderful asset for anyone who wants to gain access to it.
And another challenge with biometrics is this is another
single-factor authentication approach. And so we really are
advocating a layered approach where we have multiple ways to
authenticate people.
There are places in which biometrics, I think, work very
well. For instance, to enter in the Olympic Village, there is
always hand geometry, and your hand geometry gets compared to
your badge. That isn't retained in any database. So I have to
have my credential with me to get in. And so that is a very
nice way, approach to do it because you don't have the
responsibility of having a database with all the biometrics
stored in it.
On the other hand, it is extremely expensive because it
means you have to have a reader every single place, and there
can be hardware failure associated with that.
Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you.
Mr. FRAGOMEN. If over half of the unauthorized workers who
undergo E-Verify are erroneously confirmed as work-authorized,
it seems as though we are creating a pretty vast system which
impacts on the whole populace, and we are not being very
effective at ferreting out unauthorized workers. So it seems to
me that as problematic as it might be because of the cost, you
still must stop the use of false breeder documents which can
lead to issuance of fraudlulent identification suggesting you
are someone different from who you really are, and which can
cause obvious data security problems. It seems to be that
unless we tackle identity fraud and false breeder document
problems, at the end of the day, I don't know that we are being
very effective in keeping unauthorized workers out of the
workforce.
Chairman JOHNSON. It is a cumbersome idea, but it might
work.
Mr. Becerra, do you care to question?
Mr. BECERRA. You actually inspired a question that sort of
stems from something Dr. Anton mentioned earlier. You mentioned
that trying to expand E-Verify when is prone to errors, prone
to intrusion, and loss of privacy, and at the very end you
close by saying it is almost as if we are trying to build a
system that hasn't been proven to work effectively because we
have a decrepit immigration system that is not helping us keep
tabs of folks in the first place we are authorized to work. So
it sounds like we are piling on top of a broken system.
Other systems that we are not quite sure are ready for
prime time may cause difficulties for Americans' privacy and
security and may lead to a lot of businessmen and women having
to go through some expense and perhaps difficulties with their
business if they must go through a system that doesn't always
give them the check they need. And so it seems like we would
rather than pile on, we should clear the dust and deal with the
foundation of why we are talking about coming up with a
verification system in the first place.
Ms. ANTON. Yes, I wholeheartedly agree, and as you were
speaking, it reminded me of everything we would read about
business process for engineering during the late 1980s, early
1990s, where one of the problems is that people were building
systems that automated existing broken business processes and
practices. And so that is why systems become obsolete.
And so I think it is really good to think out of the box
and think it would be really big, this is a grand challenge, if
you will, and how do we solve a problem; and then build a
system that really supports a well-designed business practice.
Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Fragomen, a question for you. If you could
take control of this, could you devise a system that would work
for verification purposes?
Mr. FRAGOMEN. Well, I think it would be possible. You have
to start with the premise that you have to try to limit the
number of persons that enter the U.S. illegally. That has to be
the first step. You have to have more effective border
security. You have to have better systems to keep persons who
enter legally from overstaying their status and becoming
illegal.
You have to then--once you have a more secure entry system
and better control, it seems to me then you definitely have to
have a workplace enforcement system that is driven by
bioidentifiers.
Interior enforcement doesn't work. For instance, the law
that Arizona passed and, of course, was just found
unconstitutional, it doesn't really work, and it never has,
because you can't basically formulate reasonable suspicion to
believe who is in the U.S. illegally, which would then arguably
give you a right to question that person; reasonable suspicion
to believe that they are an alien unlawfully present in the
U.S. So you really can't do that without using racial
appearance as a primary factor. So that is never going to work.
So really your only shots at this are border enforcement, a
legal immigration system that allows a larger number of people
to come into the country to work legally, and workplace
enforcement. I think you need those three things combined.
Mr. BECERRA. It sounds like you have just read off the
litany of things that most people say we need for comprehensive
immigration reform.
Mr. FRAGOMEN. It is certainly a number of those pieces.
Mr. BECERRA. Thank you. I appreciate all of your testimony,
and we will probably have you back again soon.
Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you all for being here. I
appreciate you taking the recess with us. We did do two votes,
and, you know, the world is still turning.
Thank you all so much. This meeting is adjourned.
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