[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
A REVIEW OF ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH
PROTECTING AND IMPROVING OUR NATION'S
AVIATION SATELLITE-BASED GLOBAL
POSITIONING SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE
=======================================================================
(112-71)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AVIATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 8, 2012
__________
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey Columbia
GARY G. MILLER, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois CORRINE BROWN, Florida
SAM GRAVES, Missouri BOB FILNER, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
DUNCAN HUNTER, California RICK LARSEN, Washington
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
BILLY LONG, Missouri HEATH SHULER, North Carolina
BOB GIBBS, Ohio STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania LAURA RICHARDSON, California
RICHARD L. HANNA, New York ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida
JEFF DENHAM, California
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN,
Tennessee
------ 7
Subcommittee on Aviation
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Chairman
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
SAM GRAVES, Missouri PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio BOB FILNER, California
FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota, Vice TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
Chair MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
BILLY LONG, Missouri STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida Columbia
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
JOHN L. MICA, Florida (Ex Officio) (Ex Officio)
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN,
Tennessee
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ iv
TESTIMONY
Panel One
Hon. John D. Porcari, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of
Transportation................................................. 3
Vincent Galotti, Deputy Director, Air Navigation Bureau,
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) of the United
Nations........................................................ 3
Panel Two
Captain Sean P. Cassidy, First Vice President, Air Line Pilots
Association, International..................................... 15
Thomas L. Hendricks, Senior Vice President of Safety, Security
and Operations, Airlines for America........................... 15
Craig Fuller, President, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association.. 15
John M. Foley, Director, Aviation GNSS Technology, Garmin
International, Inc............................................. 15
Scott Pace, Ph.D., Director, Space Policy Institute, Elliott
School of International Affairs, The George Washington
University..................................................... 15
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hon. Jerry F. Costello, of Illinois.............................. 28
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Hon. John D. Porcari............................................. 30
Vincent Galotti.................................................. 36
Captain Sean P. Cassidy.......................................... 43
Thomas L. Hendricks.............................................. 56
Craig Fuller..................................................... 59
John M. Foley.................................................... 64
Scott Pace, Ph.D................................................. 79
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
John M. Foley, Director, Aviation GNSS Technology, Garmin
International, Inc., responses to questions from Hon. Eddie
Bernice Johnson, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Texas.......................................................... 75
ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD
Jeffrey Carlisle, Executive Vice President, Regulatory Affairs
and Public Policy, LightSquared, letter to Hon. Thomas E.
Petri, Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, February 8, 2011
[sic], including response to hearing briefing memorandum and
request to Federal Communications Commission for initiation of
proceeding..................................................... 94
David R. Hinson, Administrator, U.S. Department of
Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, letter to Dr.
Assad Kotaite, President of the Council, International Civil
Aviation Organization, October 14, 1994........................ 122
Marion C. Blakey, Administrator, U.S. Department of
Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, letter to Mr.
Roberto Kobeh, President of the Council, International Civil
Aviation Organization, September 10, 2007...................... 124
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
A REVIEW OF ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH
PROTECTING AND IMPROVING OUR NATION'S
AVIATION SATELLITE-BASED GLOBAL
POSITIONING SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 2012
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:00 a.m. in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas E. Petri
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Petri. The subcommittee will come to order. We meet
today to discuss a critical part of transportation
infrastructure, the Global Positioning System, commonly
referred to as GPS.
So, I thank the witnesses for their participation in
today's hearing, and would like to say a special welcome to
Deputy Secretary, Mr. Porcari, and Mr. Galotti, our witnesses
from the United Nations International Civil Aviation
Organization, a very important framework for our global
aviation industry. Your participation in today's hearing speaks
to the importance of this issue, not only here, but around the
globe.
For this committee, for this subcommittee, aviation safety
is the top priority. According to the Department of
Transportation, the Global Positioning System has served as a
critical component of aviation safety improvements that the
aviation community has embraced. Moreover, GPS is critical to
the safety and efficiency improvements planned as part of
NextGen, that we are in the process of rolling out here in this
country and other countries as well.
Our aviation infrastructure and efforts to update it with
the Department of Transportation's NextGen program are a
platform for growth in the U.S. economy. NextGen is also a
catalyst for job creation within the aviation industry.
It is important for Government to avoid constraining that
growth by limiting the efficiency gains and job creation
achieved by NextGen, which is reliant on GPS. As important as
GPS is to transportation safety and efficiency, its signal
strength is very weak. Therefore, GPS is susceptible to
interference by other transmissions, even if those other
transmissions are constrained within their own spectrum
allocation.
Over the past year or so, the subcommittee has watched with
interest the developments of issues related to radio spectrum
within the L band. As the Federal Communications Commission
deliberates the issues before it, we recognize the potential
impacts on the transportation community, and hence, today's
hearing.
However, out of fairness to the parties involved in the FCC
proceedings, I would ask the witnesses to focus their comments
today on the question at hand regarding the importance of GPS
as an element of transportation infrastructure, and the public
policy considerations of the transportation community to
protect that infrastructure.
Today's hearings serve as an opportunity to hear ideas for
the best way forward, given what we have learned about GPS.
Where there are good engineers, there may be a variety of
solutions. And it would be helpful for technologies to co-exist
because, given the spectrum demand, the problem of interference
between competing uses on various points along the spectrum is
not going away.
So, I would encourage the agencies and industry to find a
way to safely co-exist, if possible. I believe that we can and
must find a way for us to continue to encourage innovation in
both the broadband and GPS industries.
Finally, before I recognize Mr. Costello for his opening
statement, and other Members, I would ask unanimous consent
that all Members have 5 legislative days to revise and extend
their remarks and include extraneous material for the record of
this hearing.
[No response.]
Mr. Petri. Without objection, so ordered. And now I will
recognize Mr. Costello.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I want to thank
you for calling the hearing today. I will submit my statement
for the record.
I welcome our witnesses and look forward to hearing their
testimony. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Petri. Mr. Cravaack, did you----
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
thank Chairman Petri and Ranking Member Costello for holding
these important hearings on the critical importance of GPS to
our Nation's transportation infrastructure.
I would like to welcome today's witnesses, and I look
forward to hearing your testimony on the importance of the
issue regarding the future of GPS. GPS is the cornerstone, as
you well know, of aviation system that is in our country, and
any threat to GPS needs to be handled with the utmost care, and
ensure that our skies are safe.
One of my key concerns has been the LightSquared project,
and how it affects GPS devices. I am very concerned that the
reliability of GPS might be put at risk. I will be interested
to hear any opinions or any solutions to the situation, because
we need to solve all concerns before they become a problem and
put lives at risk.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses, their
thoughts on the GPS and its role in our aviation system. Thank
you again, and I look forward to hearing from your testimony.
And I yield back.
Mr. Petri. Thank you. Now we turn to our first panel, which
consists of the Honorable John Porcari, deputy secretary of the
United States Department of Transportation, and Mr. Vincent
Galotti, who is the deputy director, air navigation bureau,
International Civil Aviation Organization, or ICAO, of the
United Nations.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for coming. Thank you for
your prepared statements. And we would invite you to summarize
them, if possible, in about 5 minutes, and then we will have
some questions, I suspect.
Thank you very much, and we will begin with Mr. Porcari.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JOHN D. PORCARI, DEPUTY SECRETARY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; AND VINCENT GALOTTI, DEPUTY
DIRECTOR, AIR NAVIGATION BUREAU, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
ORGANIZATION (ICAO) OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Mr. Porcari. Thank you, Chairman Petri and Ranking Member
Costello. Thanks to the members of the subcommittee. I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today.
The simple fact is the Global Positioning System (GPS)
applications are vital to transportation safety and efficiency.
Tens of millions of drivers across America use GPS to navigate
every day. In the Department of Transportation's Federal
Aviation Administration, we estimate that by 2013, 60,000
aircraft will be equipped with GPS to navigate the skies over
America. This is what we refer to collectively as NextGen.
On the ground, Positive Train Control, which is an improved
safety application for rail transportation, relies on GPS, as
well. The Intelligent Transportation Systems will depend on GPS
as a key technology for vehicle collision warning and crash
avoidance systems.
What's more, GPS is essential for the operations of first
responders, search and rescue, resource management, weather
tracking and prediction, earthquake monitoring, and other
critical national security functions. From there, the list goes
on and on.
Now, as you know, the LightSquared Corporation has proposed
to create a wireless broadband network. In the Obama
administration, we believe deeply in what LightSquared is
attempting to do, which is to make the Internet more accessible
to more people all across the country. This is an urgent
national priority. But after comprehensive testing, we have
concluded that the current plan to provide such services
adversely affect GPS signals. And I will be happy to delve into
the details during our conversation, as I have in my written
testimony.
In short, both LightSquared's original and revised plans
generate considerable harmful interference with GPS. Our
researchers could find no obvious practical mitigations to
solve the interference issues.
I would also point out that substantial Federal resources,
including over $2 million from the FAA, has been diverted from
other programs in testing and analyzing LightSquared's
proposals.
Even if these interference issues were somehow resolved,
LightSquared would still have to design fixes for known
interference with high-precision GPS receivers that are vital
for agriculture, science, and surveying. And LightSquared's
operating plan still leaves open the possibility of
broadcasting on both bands. Its FCC filings propose only a
``standstill'' on broadband use of the upper 10 MHz band.
Considering all these factors, the Executive Committee
(EXCOM) of the National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation,
and Timing group have now unanimously concluded that
LightSquared's proposal is fundamentally incompatible with GPS
use, and that no additional testing or analysis is warranted at
this time.
Going forward, the EXCOM agencies continue to strongly
support President Obama's directive to make available a total
of over 500 MHz of spectrum over the next 10 years suitable for
broadband use.
We recognize that we all have to do our part in spectrum
use, making it as efficient as possible. We propose to work
with the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration in the Department of Commerce to draft new GPS
spectrum interference standards.
These standards, which would inform future potential
commercial operators, would let them know in advance which uses
in adjacent bands would or would not be compatible with GPS,
and will ensure that this national policy protection for GPS
evolves through clear communications with stakeholders, and
that it is implemented without affecting existing and emerging
uses of space-based positioning, navigation, and timing
services that are vital to economic, public safety, scientific,
and national security needs.
In summary, our GPS system is one of the more vital, if
less visible, parts of our national infrastructure. With that,
I will be happy to answer any questions. And again, thank you
for permitting me to testify.
Mr. Petri. Thank you.
Mr. Galotti?
Mr. Galotti. Thank you, and good morning, Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member, and subcommittee members. It is an honor to be
able to testify before this subcommittee, and I would like to
thank you for the opportunity. My testimony today will focus on
the importance of what we call the global navigation satellite
systems to international civil aviation.
And there are a few other global systems. Russia has its
GLONASS, which has had some reliability and maintenance
problems over the years, although that government is now
committed to a Next General system. There is the European
Galileo, not yet operational, and of course China is in the
process of launching its Compass system.
Because of the reliability and continued upgrading of the
GPS and the commitment of the United States Government, GPS has
evolved into the most fundamental and important piece of
supporting infrastructure for the global aviation system.
And just at the beginning I would like to mention that the
United States is one of the primary contributors to ICAO in
terms of technical expertise and knowledge, and in support of
consensus-building and excellence in international standards
and policy development, for which we are grateful. Most of the
technical work that we do is accomplished by groups of experts
nominated by the member States. The FAA has been the major
contributor to ICAO in this respect, and I believe it has
served the U.S. interests extremely well.
ICAO's close involvement with satellite navigation systems
goes back to the work of the ICAO Committee on Future Air
Navigation Systems, more commonly known as the FANS Committee.
The U.S. was a major contributor and participant of that
committee. In adopting the outcomes of the FANS Committee at
the 10th Air Navigation Conference in 1991, a conclusion was
reached that the exploitation of satellite technology appears
to be the only valuable solution to overcoming the shortcomings
of the present system, and also fulfill the global needs and
requirements of the foreseeable future, and that satellite-
based systems will be the key to worldwide improvements.
In recognition of this turning point and acknowledgment by
the world community of the importance of GNSS, which was highly
dependent--and is--on the U.S. GPS, President Clinton formally
offered the GPS standard positioning service, SPS, to the
global aviation community through ICAO to support international
civil aviation. This commitment was reaffirmed in 2007 under
President Bush, as follows: ``The U.S. Government maintains its
commitment to provide GPS SPS signals on a continuous worldwide
basis, free of direct user fees, enabling worldwide civil
space-based navigation services, and to provide open, free
access to information necessary to develop and build equipment
to use these services.''
Even before the work of the FANS Committee and the offers
of both Presidents Clinton and Bush, the availability of GPS to
civil aviation first came about, as I am sure you are aware of,
when President Reagan authorized its use for international
civil aviation after the shootdown of Korean 007.
Following the initial U.S. offer, ICAO developed
international standards to satellite navigation systems. With
the availability of the GPS system, it became globally
recognized by the international civil aviation community as the
central element of GNSS. ICAO and the entire international
civil aviation community are now completely reliant on the
longstanding U.S. Government policy and its commitment as a key
enabler to international aviation.
And I just want to go over a few of the important ways that
GPS supports international aviation. There are many areas in
the world where the conventional terrestrial navigation and
infrastructure is inadequate. And GNSS is often the only
reliable source of navigation information.
Before GNSS, navigation in high-seas airspace was crude and
inaccurate. Separate distance between aircraft used by air
traffic control were as much as 100 miles laterally and 15 to
20 minutes. The superior accuracy of GNSS, especially when
integrated with sophisticated flight management systems, has
enabled a number of substantial navigation improvements, which
are the foundation of the concept of performance-based
navigation, or PBN.
In PBN, airspace separation between aircraft is
significantly reduced, thereby increasing capacity while
bringing safety, efficiency, and environmental benefits. The
United States provides air traffic control services over vast
expanses of high-seas airspace.
In the North Atlantic there are over 2,000 crossings a day.
The transpacific passenger traffic is expected to grow by 4.2
percent between 2009 and 2030. Intra-Asia-Pacific traffic
during that period is expected to grow by 5.1 percent. And
right now there are approximately 8,000 flights per year that
operate on cross-polar routes, and they are totally reliant on
GPS.
Until very recently, all final approaches to land at major
airports were accomplished by means of instrument landing
systems. This is OK in States that are able to maintain these,
and that have the infrastructure to support that. In many parts
of the world, maintaining such systems is prohibitive because
of the cost and expertise. Using PBN approach procedures based
on GPS, more and more approaches to land are accomplished by
means of the equipment in the aircraft only, with little or no
reliance on ground equipment, bringing enormous safety
benefits. And airports that previously had no instrument
approaches now have PBN.
Today, when U.S. airlines fly into Lagos, Nigeria; Almaty,
Kazakhstan; Ulan Bator, Mongolia; Dakar, Senegal; Quito,
Ecuador; and Georgetown, Guyana, to name but a few out of
hundreds, they are more assured of safe operations because of
GPS.
GNSS is important for Next Generation aircraft
surveillance, and I am sure you are all aware of automatic
dependent surveillance broadcast. But over oceanic airspace,
automatic dependent surveillance contracts allows air traffic
control to have surveillance, where this was impossible.
And finally, two of the most significant near-term air
traffic management improvements that have recently become
available are continuous descent operations and continuous
climb operations. This is a major initiative at ICAO, and GPS
allows this extremely efficient flight routing to be enabled.
And now, just a few words about the spectrum major issue
that has as much to do with the importance of GPS as anything
else. I am referring to the problem of frequency spectrum.
Available radio frequency spectrum is the lifeblood of
aviation, and the protection of spectrum used by aviation radio
systems is absolutely essential for safety. ICAO has been
vehemently supporting the protection of GNSS spectrum for
decades, in all international fora, especially the world radio
conferences--and there is one going on in Geneva right now.
Against that background I would urge you to consider that
any decision by the United States that affects frequency
spectrum, which impacts on GNSS, will have a critical impact on
the safety record, the investments made in GNSS, the
international standards, and the recertification of equipment.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, I would like to appeal to you and
the committee that ICAO and international civil aviation
continue to benefit from U.S. leadership and cooperation in
many ways, including invaluable support through the sharing of
technical information and expertise, support of consensus-
building and excellence in international standard and policy
development, and concrete projects to assist countries in need
of strengthening their aviation programs.
GPS is among the most important ways that the U.S. provides
technological, humanitarian, and political leadership. ICAO
looks forward to deepening this relationship and working
together.
Thank you for this opportunity to share ICAO's views with
this important subcommittee.
Mr. Petri. Thank you. Thank you both. At previous hearings
this subcommittee has been informed that as we gain momentum in
deploying the NextGen technology, it will have enormous return
on the American Government's investment in it, reduce fuel use
for the industry by some 20 or 30 percent, expand the capacity
of the system without having to build additional runways and so
on, improve the safety of the system, shorten the time of
flights, and it goes on and on and on. To reduce the sound
footprint, as planes are able to glide down more for many of
the airports where that has been a problem. A lot of benefits
from this new--for using this technology in the aviation
industry, as other industries have found.
I do have a couple of questions. First, Mr. Porcari, you
mentioned that you proposed the Department of Transportation
work with the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration to draft new GPS spectrum interference standards
to strengthen existing national policy protection of adjacent
band spectrum. Could you elaborate on what that all means?
Mr. Porcari. I would be happy to, Mr. Chairman. One thing
that recent events has shown us is that GPS is not only a
national infrastructure asset, but that protecting that asset,
we are going to have to be much more sophisticated in the
future on how we do that.
In layman's terms, on both sides of the existing GPS
frequency there were mobile satellite-type applications that
were also quiet, as it were, that did not interfere with GPS's
ability to hear what is a very weak signal from space,
basically 50 watts, 22,000 miles up.
The spectrum interference standards--and we would take a
whole-of-government approach to this, working through our
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Executive Committee--the
idea would be to identify before anyone puts capital at risk or
major project at risk, what are compatible uses to GPS.
In general terms, the more precise the GPS receiver--for
example, the avionics in an aircraft--the more precise they
are, the more that they are likely to have a wideband receiver
that, in fact, needs to be able to listen beyond the GPS
frequency. Acknowledging that, and building a policy around
that, would be, we think, a very good use of staff time and,
from a policy perspective, critical to protecting GPS as an
asset.
Mr. Petri. Proposing to set interference standards--how is
the proposal to set interference standards different from
setting receiver standards?
Mr. Porcari. There are currently no receiver standards. The
idea of spectrum interference standards would be to give
everyone involved, the industry and others, confidence in the
long term that, as they build more and more precise GPS
devices--and I know our focus is on aviation, where GPS is
absolutely critical to operations today, but will be even more
so in the future--but other applications: precision farming,
construction, and others. Spectrum interference standards would
be clear guidelines for all users, both within the GPS spectrum
and adjacent spectrums.
We think, if we can build the kind of consistency and
predictability for both the GPS users and adjacent spectrum
users, that that will serve everyone's interests well.
Mr. Petri. Yes, I understand there is some sort of a
curfunkle about the adjacent--who is interfering on whose turf
in this particular area, and that, in fact, it was allowed for
a little broader use of spectrum, because it didn't interfere
with adjacent use. And then, when the type of use was changed
somewhat at the staff level, that has created a problem. Is
that what you are trying to avoid?
Mr. Porcari. Yes, Mr. Chairman. That is exactly it. GPS, by
its very nature, is a very weak space-based signal that is very
faint when it is received by GPS receivers in the atmosphere,
or in terrestrial applications.
I think of it in zoning terms, because that is probably the
way to think about compatibility of uses. GPS was--the spectrum
was originally put in a quiet neighborhood, because it needed a
quiet neighborhood with quiet neighbors to be able to have
accuracy in receivers. The adjacent pieces of spectrum were for
mobile satellite service, which was another quiet use.
What has happened with this specific proposal is
essentially you went from a mobile satellite service proposal
with limited ground augmentation to a ground-based service with
limited satellite augmentation. And that really changed the
fundamental nature of signals, and how they would be received.
But it is, I think, really important to point out that GPS was
put in a quiet piece of the spectrum on purpose because,
fundamentally, it has to have quiet neighbors.
Mr. Petri. So this was well known at the technical level at
the time this strategy was put in place?
Mr. Porcari. Yes, I believe that the physics and the
technical parts of it have been well-known all along.
I would also point out that, as Mr. Galotti had, from an
international perspective, harmonizing that use of the
frequency internationally was important as well, so that the
same kind of safety of flight avionics that we are using today,
and as we build a larger NextGen system of systems, can be used
around the world.
Mr. Petri. Mr. Galotti, in your testimony you referred to
the GPS spectrum use being under some threat, and it being
discussed at past world radio conferences and I think some
current or upcoming conferences as well. Could you elaborate on
that, and what role you, as representing the global aviation
industry, play in those conferences, and how you have been able
to work out resolutions in the past?
Mr. Galotti. The international telecommunication holds a
world radio conference every 3 years. And it is a huge event,
it lasts for 4 weeks. The States go with very powerful
representation. And also industry goes with incredible force.
Telecommunication providers are--as you can imagine, have the
most to gain, and they put a lot of pressure, and they work
around the clock, virtually, on--getting emails from my people
at 2:00 and 3:00 in the morning.
ICAO is an observer. But during the 3 years in between we
meet with all of our member States and we develop--we prepare
an ICAO position that at least the member States agree to, so
we get just about unanimous decision on the ICAO position for
radio frequency spectrum. It doesn't always pan out that way at
the event itself because, again, there is a lot of lobbying,
there is a lot of pressure, a lot of jobs at stake. But as
observers there, we do have a lot of close contacts with the
States and with friends in the aviation industry. And we have
been very successful in working with the member States. And the
United States has been a strong supporter of protecting the GPS
spectrum from other uses. Thank you.
Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. Costello?
Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, thank you. To Deputy Secretary
Porcari, to follow up on the chairman's question, he asked the
same question that, actually, I was going to ask. But I would
like to have you clarify a point.
My understanding is that you are proposing that DOT work
with other agencies to develop a policy. Does that mean for
radio transmission standards in the spectrum? Is the
interference now between the agencies--are we talking about
transmission standards? Or what are we talking about?
Mr. Porcari. What we are really talking about is, more
generically and more broadly, spectrum interference standards,
where we could establish, by consensus and with input from
everyone who has an equity in this, industry, interested
observers and others, the kind of standards that would protect
the GPS spectrum, both today and in the future.
If you look at the evolution of GPS, just in the last 10 or
15 years, for example, the GPS uses, especially in aviation,
have gotten more and more precise, and they are now safety of
flight issues, which requires spectrum interference protection.
Mr. Costello. We are talking primarily about transmission
standards.
Mr. Porcari. We are talking about primarily the requirement
for precise navigation devices that use GPS to be able to
utilize as broad a band as possible, which they have been to
date, and which was acknowledged in the original approval of
mobile satellite services on either end of that spectrum.
So, I say this because, in fairness to all the potential
users outside of the GPS band, establishing those standards
would give them a good sense of what kind of uses would be
compatible, and which would not.
Mr. Costello. You also mention in your testimony that the
Obama administration--that their goal is to free up federally
owned spectrum and make it available for mobile broadband,
especially providing access to underserved rural communities. I
certainly support that goal, and I think many members of the
committee would, as well, especially for underserved
communities for wireless service, and where consumers would
benefit from competition between service providers.
Let me ask. If the mobile satellite service band is not
compatible with the high-speed wireless transmissions, then
what can the administration do to provide greater access to
high-speed service?
Mr. Porcari. The administration, the Department of
Transportation and every part of the administration, is again
committed to identifying those 500 MHz of additional spectrum
over the next 10 years.
We strongly support what you have underlined, which is the
need for rural broadband and broadband competition. There are
some features of the recent proposal that are very valuable,
from that perspective. But we think that working across the
Government with our Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
Executive Committee, with NTIA, will ultimately be helpful.
Obviously, we would not presume to know what actions the
Federal Communications Commission, an independent agency, would
take.
Mr. Costello. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Petri. Mr. Coble.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
for your testimony.
Mr. Porcari, are there immunity standards for military GPS
receivers that protect them from transmissions from outside the
GPS band?
Mr. Porcari. Congressman, my understanding--and I believe
General Shelton testified before the House Armed Services
Committee--is that there are not. And I do know that, at least
in some cases, the Department of Defense aircraft are using
commercial, off-the-shelf avionics that are FAA-certified for
commercial use, as opposed to military.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, sir. Well, let me ask you another
question, Mr. Porcari. What standards are currently in place to
make sure that the receivers and equipment purchased pick up
only signals used in the GPS frequency band?
Mr. Porcari. There are no current standards in place. That
is part of the reason for the discussion. Again, we think,
going forward, having the consistency and predictability of
spectrum interference standards will help all parties involved.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, sir. Mr. Galotti--I will put this
question to each of you.
What impact might protections for GPS have on the
marketplace for radio spectrum, A? And then, B, how does this
bear on the question as to whether or not GPS warrants
protections?
[No response.]
Mr. Coble. Either of you is fine. Mr. Galotti? Want to
start with you?
Mr. Galotti. Thank you, Congressman. I guess there are
various figures that exist as to the number of jobs, and the
value of spectrum. And, as I have said earlier, there is
tremendous pressure from the telecommunication providers who
have significant figures on jobs.
But on the other hand, aviation globally, I believe the
number that is out there is worth about $3 trillion to the
global economy a year, when you consider the economics, the
tourism, the aviation industry itself, the business, carriage
of goods and other things.
So, probably a good case could be made that, economically,
aviation is critical. But there will be more and more pressure
from particularly the telecommunication providers. Thank you.
Mr. Coble. Particularly from who?
Mr. Galotti. The telecommunication providers. Sorry, sir.
Mr. Coble. Right. I didn't hear you.
Mr. Galotti. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Coble. Mr. Porcari, you want to weigh in?
Mr. Porcari. Yes, Congressman. I don't know the values of
the spectrum in itself.
I would point out that the national investment we have made
in GPS, first from a military-only perspective and now from a
combined military-civil perspective, has been enormous. It is
one of the more precious and important pieces of national
infrastructure we have, even if you can't see it and feel it.
It is also a U.S. national leadership issue.
I would point out in the aviation context, I would argue
that one of the single best safety advances we have made in the
last 20 years, which is the terrain avoidance warning system--
20 years ago, controlled flight into terrain, for both
commercial and recreational aircraft, was a leading cause of
accidents. The terrain avoidance warning systems that are GPS-
enabled have taken controlled flight into terrain from a
leading cause of accidents into something that is way down on
the list.
Another example is, as of today, part of our NextGen
system, ADSB, is operational in the Gulf of Mexico, where we
have had no radar coverage. And we have thousands of flight
operations a day, for example, serving offshore petroleum rigs
via helicopter that had no radar coverage before that, are now
served by ADSB.
So, it is important to make sure that we understand the
value on both sides of the equation, including the enormous
national investment that has been made in GPS, which has gone
far beyond military uses, has gone far beyond aviation uses,
and for precision farming, construction, safety of our train
systems, those are not possible today without GPS.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, my red light is
about to illuminate, so I will yield back.
Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. Duncan?
Mr. Duncan. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And this is my
first real involvement with this, so there is much of it that I
don't really understand.
But, Mr. Secretary, I have read this statement from this
assessment. It says by the deputy secretaries of the Department
of Transportation and the Department of Defense, and I assume
that is from you?
Mr. Porcari. Yes.
Mr. Duncan. And it is a very strong statement that you put
out about 3\1/2\ weeks ago. And you say there that--you mention
that LightSquared had an original proposal and then they
modified it. Can you explain to me, in layman's terms, how much
of a change they made in their original plan?
And it also tells us in our briefing papers that they are
disputing your findings, or your assessment.
Mr. Porcari. I will be happy to, Congressman.
Mr. Duncan. OK.
Mr. Porcari. And layman's terms is all I am capable of
here.
Mr. Duncan. OK.
Mr. Porcari. So I will try to do it in that sense. The
original LightSquared proposal of roughly a year ago, January
of 2011, proposed up to 40,000 ground-based transmitters that
would effectively blank out the GPS signal in large stretches
of the U.S. and in some very critical areas. There was some
early testing done, both by the Department of Defense and the
FAA. It was clear from that testing that there was an
interference issue.
The forum for this is a relatively obscure group, the
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Executive Committee, which
the Deputy Secretary of Defense and I co-chair, Deputy
Secretary Carter representing the military users, and myself
representing all the civil users. Through that committee, which
includes all the executive-branch agencies, which includes
others, including the Federal Communications Commission, as an
observer, it was clear that additional testing of a different
proposal was in order.
We worked with LightSquared. They were part of developing
the testing protocols. They were part of the testing itself.
And the results, I think, are very clear-cut. I would point out
that the testing results from both the NPEF work and separate
Federal Aviation Administration work are currently with NTIA
and will be transmitted to FCC shortly.
But those results were independently verified by both the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratories and then the Lincoln
Laboratories at MIT. And from my layman's perspective, the
result, especially with the precision safety of flight avionics
that we use in aircraft, the results were unacceptable.
Mr. Duncan. Well, let me ask you this. I said it was a very
strong assessment. And what I am talking about, it says,
``Based upon this testing and analysis, there appears to be no
practical solutions or mitigations that will permit the
LightSquared broadband service, as proposed, to operate in the
next few months or years without significantly interfering with
GPS.''
I understand the dangers or the concerns or the problems.
But it is a fascinating thing to me that you could say that
there is nothing that they could even do within the next few
years. It does tell us--and I have no connection whatsoever
with LightSquared, I have never even talked to these people.
But it says they dispute these findings. How do they dispute
them, do you know? Or could you tell us something?
Mr. Porcari. First, I believe the LightSquared
representatives can and should better explain how they dispute
the findings. I would point out that the statement,
Congressman, is strong. I believe it is warranted, given the
circumstances.
When we talk about in the next few months or years,
remember there is a very large installed base of GPS receivers.
Just focusing on aviation for a moment, there is about 60,000
GPS receivers out there that are used for safety of flight
things like terrain avoidance warning systems. Each of those is
about $40,000. If you look at the life cycle of aircraft and
avionics, they serve for decades.
And the reason for that part of the statement is to point
out that there is no easy retrofit or filter or any other kind
of retrofit that would, from a safety of flight perspective,
make the proposal, as currently proposed by LightSquared,
compatible with aviation.
Mr. Duncan. Well, I am not saying it wasn't warranted. I
just was saying it is a fascinating thing that there would be a
statement that nothing could be done even in the next few
years, when technology advances as fast as it does. So it was
kind of an interesting thing. Thank you very much.
Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. LoBiondo? You--Mr. Cravaack?
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
your testimony today. I can truly tell you, as a pilot, there
was a palpable difference in the cockpit when you have terrain
avoidance systems using GPS. When you are flying that approach
coming in from the east going in to Salt Lake City, and you
know you are skirting the top of those mountains, it was really
a comforting feeling to have that GPS in the cockpit.
But LightSquared is--has agreed to a standstill, as I
understand it, on the use of the upper portion of the spectrum,
and it is the portion that is actually closest to the GPS
signal. And LightSquared has stated that it would like to work
with the GPS community to develop ``mitigating strategies,'' as
they put it, in order to initiate commercial operations in the
upper spectrum within 2 and 3 years.
Is--in your opinion--I understand in your testimony you
said there is no mitigating conclusion here, and that--do you
really think 2 or 3 years to be able to find some type of
strategy is in that window?
And two, from what we know, even though we really can't
identify a mitigating strategy, the cost to general aviation to
implement that strategy, as well? So----
Mr. Porcari. Thank you, Congressman. First I would point
out I am not sure what a standstill means on the upper 10 MHz.
There are no time limits to that, and no technical triggers,
that I am aware of, on that.
There is a fundamental incompatibility between the
LightSquared proposal, as proposed, and the continued use of
GPS as a precision air navigation use. And again, I would point
out that this has been built over decades now, where more and
more we are dependent on GPS for a much higher standard of
safety than we are able to achieve with the old instrument
landing systems, without the terrain avoidance warning systems,
without wide area augmentation systems. All of those are very
significant safety advances.
I can't speculate on the cost, because I am not sure anyone
can quantify the cost, even if it could be done, of retrofits,
if they were technically viable, to existing avionics uses.
Mr. Cravaack. So, just to be clear then, there is no plans
at this time to retrofit or reconfigure any systems to work
LightSquared into this bracket, is that correct?
Mr. Porcari. That is correct, Congressman. I would say, in
contrast, mobile satellite service uses on the adjacent
frequencies, which is what they were originally zoned for, if
you will, have been and will be compatible.
Mr. Cravaack. Super. Thank you very much, and I yield back.
Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. Fleischmann? Mr. Ribble? Mr.
Farenthold?
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much. And I am troubled that
a terrestrial base system like LightSquared has the potential
for interfering with GPS. I am afraid it points out the actual
delicate nature of the GPS system, and its potential
vulnerability to be--for nothing else, an attack. You hear
reports of a truck driver with a jamming device degrading the
system near Newark Airport. Suppose someone not friendly to
this country were to intentionally put up some high-powered
jamming stuff. We would be in trouble.
Historically, LORAN has been considered a backup to GPS.
But that is currently being dismantled. I am concerned that we
have all of this reliance on GPS from everything from my car to
my cell phone to landing a 777 aircraft in the future. It seems
to me that we are creating a vulnerable system with no backups.
Can you all comment on that?
Mr. Porcari. Yes, Congressman. First, you have brought up a
very important point. There are--by its very nature, there are
vulnerabilities for the GPS. You pointed out one specific
incident where a commercially bought, over-the-Internet $99
jammer caused real issues at one of our major airports in the
country.
One of the things that we have done is a national
positioning, navigation, and timing architecture study of the
overall system architecture. Following on that, the Federal
Aviation Administration has committed to an alternate PNT
research program where, just as today, with our terrestrial
radar-based air navigation system we have vulnerabilities, and
you basically build defense in depth with backup systems, we
know, as we move with the implementation of NextGen, as we move
forward with that, it will be more and more important to have
backups to the GPS-based system.
They will only be short-term backup systems. And it is
important to point out that we are moving aggressively----
Mr. Farenthold. Could you define ``short-term backup''? I
don't----
Mr. Porcari. Well, I mean for short duration. In other
words, if we were denied the use of GPS systems for air
navigation today for an extended period of time, it would have
severe impacts on the national airspace system. If it were for
10 minutes, it would be a little bit different.
Mr. Farenthold. OK.
Mr. Porcari. But----
Mr. Farenthold. So minutes, as opposed to days.
Mr. Porcari. Minutes, as opposed to days. But again, you
have put your finger on a vulnerability in the system that----
Mr. Farenthold. And it seems a vulnerability easy to
exploit.
Mr. Porcari. Well, it can be. Part of this is the
architecture and design going forward of how we design the
system of systems that is NextGen. We are very focused on this.
Also, I would point out there is an important enforcement side.
There is no legitimate commercial use for a GPS jammer.
Mr. Farenthold. All right. And just for my information, I
have seen press reports about other countries developing their
own GPS satellite arrays. Do we know where that is going?
Mr. Galotti. Thank you, Congressman. The Russian Federation
had established their system in the 1990s. And when the Soviet
Union disintegrated, it was not maintained. But I understand as
of December of 2011, now they have a full constellation and
they have committed to GLONASS-K, which is similar to GPS III,
and they hope to have that in place by 2014.
The Europeans have Galileo, which--two satellites are up.
And I think the total constellation is, I believe, 18.
And China is putting in place what they call Compass. They
have 2 satellites in place, and they plan to launch 6 in 2012,
and the full complement by 2020. And that will initially be for
East Asia and China, parts of the----
Mr. Farenthold. And if you will allow me just to geek out
for a second, we have got a massive array of radio transmitters
in the form of our cell tower network that can contain
longitude and latitude information in the cell tower. Is any
research going into tapping into those to create some sort of
system as a fallback to GPS?
Mr. Porcari. I don't know. What I would be happy to do is
actually research that and get back to the committee.
Mr. Farenthold. Yes, just curious. It seems like there is--
--
Mr. Porcari. It is a good question.
Mr. Farenthold [continuing]. An infrastructure in place.
You might be able to develop a fallback system.
Mr. Porcari. I appreciate the question, and I will find out
for you.
Mr. Farenthold. OK. And my time has expired. Thank you.
Mr. Petri. Well, I am sure we all have a lot of other
questions, but I will leave it there for the purpose of this
hearing at this point. Thank you very much. It has been very,
very informative.
Mr. Porcari. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Galotti. Thank you.
Mr. Porcari. Thank you, Members.
Mr. Petri. The second panel consists of Mr. Thomas L.
Hendricks, who is senior vice president of safety, security and
operations, Airlines for America; Captain Sean Cassidy, first
vice president, Air Line Pilots Association, International;
Craig Fuller, president of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association; John M. Foley, director, aviation GNSS technology,
of Garmin International, Inc., and Dr. Scott Pace, who is the
director of the Space Policy Institute, Elliott School of
International Affairs, The George Washington University.
I thank you for making--all of you--for making the time to
be with us today on this very--somewhat technical but very
important subject for sectors of our economy and our safety and
competitiveness, as a country. And we will begin with Captain
Cassidy, waiting for Mr. Hendricks.
TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN SEAN P. CASSIDY, FIRST VICE PRESIDENT, AIR
LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL; THOMAS L. HENDRICKS,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF SAFETY, SECURITY AND OPERATIONS,
AIRLINES FOR AMERICA; CRAIG FULLER, PRESIDENT, AIRCRAFT OWNERS
AND PILOTS ASSOCIATION; JOHN M. FOLEY, DIRECTOR, AVIATION GNSS
TECHNOLOGY, GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC.; AND SCOTT PACE, PH.D.,
DIRECTOR, SPACE POLICY INSTITUTE, ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Captain Cassidy. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and the members
of the subcommittee. I am Captain Sean Cassidy, first vice
president of the Air Line Pilots Association International, and
I represent more than 53,000 professional pilots based in the
United States and Canada. It is an honor to appear before the
subcommittee to underscore the tremendous contribution that the
satellite-based navigation system makes to ensuring efficient
and safe operations in the United States and around the globe.
Given the vital importance of the Global Positioning System
as a key component of this country's transportation
infrastructure, it is appropriate, and indeed essential, for
the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and this
Aviation Subcommittee to be fully engaged in protecting that
system.
As the members of the subcommittee know, over more than two
decades the invaluable navigation information available through
GPS has enabled air transportation to make tremendous gains in
safety and efficiency.
Since 1983, when GPS became available to the public at no
cost, the system has evolved to become a vital tool for
aircraft navigation, all-weather approaches and landings,
surveillance, maintaining required separation between aircraft,
and pilot situational awareness.
GPS allows pilots to fly aircraft using the safest and most
efficient routes, which benefits every flight operation, but
particularly those over the Atlantic and Pacific, or on
transport on long-range routes, where diversion options are
very limited. The enhanced accuracy of GPS also allows aircraft
on parallel runways to operate independently, safely increasing
arrival rates.
In major metropolitan areas that are served by several
airports, GPS allows us to analyze the entire airspace and
operate flights based on a regional strategy, rather than
airport-by-airport. These opportunities to improve flight
operations, possible only through GPS, reduce fuel burn,
decrease noise, and cut CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions,
while making our industry safer, more efficient, and better
positioned to meet future demand.
Let me give you one example from my own flying experience.
The airport at Juneau, Alaska, the State capital, is situated
on a base surrounded by high terrain. Before GPS, we pilots
only had two choices for approaching landing at Juneau, and
they are both very challenging. The approach from the east and
the one from the west both required fairly high cloud ceilings
and a tight turn at low altitude to line up for landing.
Without GPS, the terrain and weather conditions forced many
flight cancellations.
In 1996, Alaska Airlines pioneered a GPS-based instrument
approach to Juneau, Alaska. The pinpoint accuracy of the GPS
approach allows me to fly directly over the center of the
Gastineau Channel, as depicted in the photo up on the screen,
and stay clear of the high terrain surrounding the channel and
the airport. The result enhances safety and reduces delays and
cancellations.
Since then, the Alaska Airlines has expanded the GPS-based
approach to other airports in the country. In 2011, the airport
completed more than 1,500 flights that would likely have been
canceled or diverted, and the net result was $19 million worth
of saved revenue, and over 210,000 gallons worth of fuel that
was not burned.
Across the United States the FAA has published more than
11,000 GPS approaches to thousands of airports, including our
own backyard here at Reagan National, where highly accurate
GPS-based approaches reduce flight delays, diversions, and
cancellations.
GPS signals are low power by design to allow them to be
based on satellites. However, this low-energy environment also
makes them susceptible to interference from other radio
transmissions. For this reason, only low-powered satellite-
based signals have historically been permitted in the radio
frequencies that are closest to the GPS bandwidth.
One recent proposal to deploy 40,000 high-powered ground-
based transmitters and the radio frequency spectrum that is
directly adjacent to GPS bandwidth raised alarm as a result of
the risk it posed to the safety of air transportation, as well
as to emergency services such as first responders.
Rigorous industry and Government testing demonstrated that
if LightSquared's proposal had been allowed to go forward, GPS
would be inaccessible over large regions of the U.S. at normal
operational altitudes for airliners. Were this proposal or
anything like it to be allowed to proceed, pilots will lose a
tremendous navigational tool that is especially important in
mountainous terrain, remote areas, and bad weather, and that
supports a safe and efficient air transportation system that
helps drive the U.S. economy and secure tens of thousands of
jobs.
Looking to the future, GPS is critical to our efforts to
modernize the U.S. air traffic control system through NextGen.
ALPA is a staunch advocate for Next Gen, because of its
enormous potential to enhance safety, increase capacity and
efficiency, and protect the environment. As part of the NextGen
initiative, the FAA has already invested more than $1 billion
in GPS-based technology that is designed to replace radar-based
surveillance of aircraft. As NextGen continues to mature, GPS
will become more important.
The pilots of ALPA commend the U.S. Aviation Subcommittee
for holding this hearing, and allow us to underscore the
unmatched benefit that GPS provides to air transportation, both
now and in the future. Thank you very much.
Mr. Petri. Thank you.
Mr. Hendricks?
Mr. Hendricks. Chairman Petri, Ranking Member Costello, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting us to
appear at this timely and important hearing. And I do apologize
for my slight delay in my pushback for my testimony this
morning. It is good to speak with you again.
The continued integrity of the Global Positioning System is
critically important to the millions of customers who we fly
every day, as well as to the tens of millions of other people
in our country who rely on it. GPS will be the backbone of air
navigation, both domestically and internationally, in the
coming years. Interference with this accessibility and
reliability would be catastrophic for civil aviation and the
communities that depend on air transportation. We deeply
appreciate the subcommittee's recognition in the FAA
reauthorization bill of the importance of this technology, and
particularly your support for the continued advancement of
NextGen.
With respect to the LightSquared proposal, the
incontestable fact is that it will create widespread GPS
interference, which will have ruinous effects on aviation.
Experts have repeatedly reached that conclusion. LightSquared's
proposal, therefore, should be withdrawn. This matter needs to
be put to rest, once and for all.
To be clear, we do not oppose the expansion of wireless
broadband services. But any expansion cannot be permitted to
interfere with existing or anticipated aviation GPS use, many
of which will significantly enhance safety. We are dependent on
that technology; there is no substitute for it.
One obvious lesson of the convoluted experience with the
LightSquared application is the need for a governmentwide
policy that protects the aviation GPS spectrum. Without such an
authoritative policy, spectrum encroachment will remain a
threat.
As the subcommittee knows all too well, we have
historically relied on a ground-based air navigation system. It
is a system that has become increasingly defined by its
limitations. Users of the system have, for the most part, had
to fly from one ground navigation aid to the next, often
resulting in circuitous routings. This inefficiency wastes time
and fuel. It also restricts the number of routings that
aircraft can use, which in turn constricts capacity growth.
GPS is at the heart of the ongoing multibillion-dollar
NextGen program that will shift air navigation from that
outmoded terrestrial system to a modern satellite-based system.
This is a transformational change. All who are involved in it--
Congress, the Federal Aviation Administration, airlines,
general aviation, and the Department of Defense--recognize the
need for that transformation. This massive effort will result
in more precise navigation, safer operations, far more direct
aircraft routings, better airspace utilization and airspace
capacity growth. Because of these operational improvements,
there will be substantial reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions.
One existing application of GPS has produced a breakthrough
in the safety of airline operations. It has been referred to
earlier here: the elimination of controlled flight into terrain
accidents for large jet aircraft in the United States. Enhanced
ground proximity warning systems aboard aircraft combine GPS
information with onboard terrain databases to provide flight
deck crews with look-ahead warnings of dangerous terrain. This
has made air travel far safer than it was only recently, and
illustrates the remarkable benefits that leveraging GPS with
other technologies can achieve.
The introduction in the coming decades of NextGen
capabilities will be the real game-changer. Its integration of
GPS with other technological innovations will create the
satellite-based system of air traffic management that we all
realize is necessary. GPS is the indispensable element of this
long-needed overhaul.
Given the essential role of GPS, the Federal Government
must develop comprehensive safeguards for aviation's use of it.
The stakes are too high for the passengers and shippers that
rely on air transportation, the communities and businesses that
depend on air service, and the airlines and their employees, to
leave to chance our continued ability to utilize GPS to the
greatest advantage. Consequently, we need a governmentwide
policy that guides Federal agencies' responses when potential
interference issues emerge. That policy must make clear that
interference in the aviation spectrum is prohibited, and that
other users cannot be permitted to encroach into the aviation
spectrum.
Domestically, the most obvious place to begin to strengthen
governmental policy against GPS interference is the National
Executive Committee for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation,
and Timing, the PNT. The PNT is a Government organization
established by Presidential directive to advise and coordinate
Federal departments and agencies on matters concerning GPS.
The PNT is chaired jointly by the Secretaries of Defense
and Transportation, and includes equivalent-level officials
from the Departments of Homeland Security, State, Interior,
Agriculture, and Commerce. The Federal Communications
Commission chairman participates in the PNT as a liaison. At
the very least, the FCC should be required to consult with the
PNT before taking action on any application to operate a
terrestrial-based communications network that may affect the L-
band spectrum, which is the band that GPS uses.
On the international front, U.S. Government positions
expressed at international conferences at which spectrum issues
are considered, such as the world radio communications
conference that is currently being held in Geneva, must reflect
the importance of protecting the GPS spectrum throughout the
world.
We appreciate the subcommittee's interest in this vital
issue. We are prepared to assist you in any way we can. And I
would be happy to take any questions you might have.
Mr. Petri. Thank you.
Mr. Fuller?
Mr. Fuller. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Costello. Craig Fuller, president and CEO of the Aircraft
Owners and Pilots Association. It is always a pleasure to be
before the committee.
I am going to start with a statement I don't always get to
make, and that is that we are in absolute full agreement with
the Obama administration on the question before you today. I
thought the statements by the deputy secretary of
transportation were right to the point. We agree with every
point that was made there.
Indeed, the other members of the administration, other
departments and agencies that have looked at this, are of the
same view. There is only one somewhat reluctant regulator out
there that seems not to have gotten this message. But perhaps
today's hearing will help, although I know that is a topic
maybe for another day.
I have a statement I have filed for the record. It makes
many of the points that have been made. I thought I would give
just a couple of comments--a little different perspective.
You know we all say GPS is extremely important. We
certainly believe that. But in a way, GPS is pretty simple. I
took off yesterday from Frederick, Maryland, in an aircraft. As
soon as it was airborne--in fact, even before it was airborne--
a small box in the plane received multiple signals from GPS
transmitters in space. All that box did initially was identify
those signals and determine precisely where it was. That is
GPS.
The genius of GPS is what it enables. The fact that GPS has
been around for a long time as a technology that can determine
precisely where something is in space doesn't mean that this is
somehow old and not exciting, because the excitement in GPS is
what it enables. The fact that that box, as I traveled, kept
determining exactly where that airplane was in space--you now
have two points--the box calculated my air speed. The box
calculated my heading. The box calculated that there are towers
on hills near Frederick, Maryland, that I was within 500 feet
of. If I had an emergency of some kind, the box would tell me
exactly where the nearest airport was, what the route was to
it, and how long it would take me to get there, simply because
it could receive this very small signal from space, from the
GPS transmitter.
I guess I would submit that while some may say, well, it is
time to look to new technology for greater benefits, we have
just begun to tap this genius of GPS and what it can enable. As
you have heard today, it is absolutely at the center of NextGen
technology. We have 5,200 public-use airports in this country.
We couldn't possibly afford to put instrument landing systems
in all those airports with equipment on the ground. And yet
every one of those airports can have a precision approach to
every runway on the field, using GPS capabilities. That is what
it enables. And it enables emergency helicopters to go
precisely to the scene of a crime, to a mountain climber that
needs to be rescued, and know exactly what the closest landing
site is for the helicopter. All these things are enabled by
this GPS signal.
So, I guess, from where we sit, my 400,000 members who are
flying general aviation airplanes see this as absolutely
essential. By the way, you have heard from two very respected
members of the industry who fly large airplanes. The airplane I
was in was a two-seater Aviat Husky, and it has this same GPS
capability that airliners have.
I think when we talked about this issue before I said it
is--there is nothing wrong with a Government agency looking
forward and seeing an opportunity and letting it be explored.
And indeed, the Food and Drug Administration does that all the
time with miracle cures in medicines. But sometimes they don't
work. And I think what the agencies of the Federal Government
have said is, ``We embrace the concept that is being
considered, but the approach simply doesn't work,'' and it puts
at risk all that GPS enables, which is not only what we have
experienced for the last 20 years we have been using it, but
the promise that it holds for the future.
So, we very much appreciate the committee's interest in
this. We certainly embrace, as I said, the statements made by
the administration. We strongly urge that the Federal
Communications Commission rescind waivers that keep this cloud
over us on this important topic until further research can be
done.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Petri. Thank you.
Mr. Foley?
Mr. Foley. I am grateful for the opportunity to participate
in this important hearing. I am John Foley, director of
aviation GNSS technology at Garmin. The 9,200 people at Garmin
are devoted to designing and building GPS devices for millions
of users worldwide, improving their lives and safety.
The GPS industry in this country alone accounts for over
130,000 direct jobs. What was once a government-only technology
is now fully woven into the fabric of our infrastructure. That
did not happen overnight. It has taken two decades of hard work
to mature it from a fledgling technology into a reliable force
for safety and efficiency. Yet, unbelievably, what we have
built together is now threatened.
Today, virtually all types of aircraft utilize GPS for
navigation and approaches. Loss of even a fraction of GPS
reliability would pose significant danger to aviation safety.
Four areas are particularly worrisome: loss of GPS while on
approach would unsafely increase pilot workload during a
critical phase of flight; loss of GPS would deny coverage at
hundreds of airports and heliports lacking ground-based
navigation aids; without GPS, the terrain awareness and warning
system, or TAWS, would not work; loss of GPS means a loss of
situational awareness for cockpit displays of traffic and
weather information, including on the ground, to prevent runway
incursions. Last, but not least, reliable GPS is essential for
the FAA's proposed NextGen system.
We can sum up the last year in four words: grant first,
test later. Grant first, test later seems to stand the process
of public decisionmaking on its head. This approach placed a
severe burden on everyone's time, attention, and resources, a
burden that should have been placed on those seeking something
from the FCC. Everyone concerned about GPS reliability had to
devote 6 months last spring and millions of dollars to testing
the effects of constantly changing proposals. The tests
revealed extensive interference. Anyone aware of the tremendous
difference in signal strength between GPS and a high-powered
terrestrial network could have predicted this result.
Yet, despite all this, another round of extensive
Government testing occurred last fall. The PNT EXCOM again
concluded in a recent letter to the NTIA that various plans for
a high-powered terrestrial broadband network would cause
harmful interference to many GPS receivers. The letter noted
that the FAA's separate analysis similarly concluded that such
proposals are not compatible with several GPS-dependent
aircraft safety systems, and that no practical solutions exist
to prevent significant interference to GPS. The EXCOM stated
that no further testing was necessary.
Garmin has found many developments over the last year to be
troubling. Why did the FCC make a far-reaching decision without
conducting its own tests or spending time to evaluate Garmin's
first test results? Shouldn't an applicant have the burden of
demonstrating market readiness?
Why were objections from the Departments of Transportation
and Defense ignored?
We hope you are asking these same questions, too.
Well, where do we go now? We believe that the PNT has the
right structure, the right stakeholders, including a liaison
role for the FCC, and on paper should be effective. However,
future coordination must be improved. The FCC should obtain PNT
EXCOM sign-off when proposals before it potentially interfere
with GPS reliability, the level of reliability that our
customers have come to expect.
Going forward, if the PNT believes that the creation of a
post--of something akin to a national chief GPS officer would
help ensure that coordination, we could support that. We think
such an officer should alternately come from the Departments of
Defense and Transportation.
In their recent letter to NTIA, the EXCOM said that they
proposed to draft new GPS spectrum interference standards. In
response, we simply note that in the last year parts of our
Government seemed unaware that, at least for certified aviation
GPS devices, the FAA and Department of Defense standards
already address interference. Any analysis in the future should
recognize and build upon that work.
In short, Garmin and other manufacturers have had their
businesses greatly disrupted by the failure of Government to
effectively coordinate. It has cost us millions of dollars and
thousands of person hours that could have been better spent
improving GPS products. If anything, for businesses, consumers,
and the Nation, this year has in essence been a trial run. We
have learned a lot, but the threat is still there, and we need
your continued vigilance to help.
Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Petri. Thank you.
Dr. Pace?
Mr. Pace. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to this
committee for an opportunity to discuss this topic. As you have
heard, GPS is a global utility that is critically important to
all modes of our Nation's transportation infrastructure.
What I would like to do is provide a little historical or
policy perspective, because some of these issues of threats to
GPS are actually not new. There have been and continue to be
many policy and legal risks for GPS, from funding constraints,
the transition to modernized signals, international trade
barriers, and domestic regulations. The most serious threats,
however, are not to the GPS itself, but to the spectrum
environment upon which it depends. If you will, the foundation
on which all these applications reside.
Every type of threat, from band sharing, segmentation, out
of band emissions, noise floor increases, and reallocation of
adjacent bands, have been attempted over the past 15 years. To
date, all such threats have been removed or mitigated through
government-industry cooperation and through bipartisan support
from multiple Congresses and administrations who sought to
protect the spectrum in which GPS operates.
Four Presidents, two Republican, two Democratic, have
issued policy statements regarding GPS. These statements have
recognized the dual-use nature of GPS as more than a military
system, crucial to a broad range of U.S. interests. Similarly,
Congress has passed numerous bills related to the protection of
GPS, and Federal statutes can be found under both Title 10,
Armed Services, and Title 51, National and Commercial Space
Programs.
Regulatory processes for rulemaking are well-defined in the
Administrative Procedures Act. I would say that the United
States has sufficient law and policy on the books to protect
GPS. What has been missing at times has been a willingness to
enforce those laws and procedures, and follow the basics of
good Government. Given the high stakes involved in preventing
risk to GPS, it is attempting to look for a special policy
fence that would automatically prevent problems from arising.
Given the FCC is an independent regulatory commission, however,
that does not report to the President, any special policy for
GPS will require congressional action in a very complex area.
Receiver standards have been mentioned as a possible way of
allowing higher power emissions in bands adjacent to the GPS
spectrum, or at least creating a more predictable regulatory
environment for new entrants. I do not believe this will be a
useful approach, and would suggest instead focusing on defining
GPS spectrum protection criteria. It is a subtle difference,
but an important one.
The creation of government-driven design standards outside
of those necessary for national security and public safety can
stifle innovation. Receiver standards can also be a subtle
regulatory means of sacrificing some categories of users and
their applications in rapidly evolving markets. On the other
hand, transparent protection for the GPS spectrum environment
can provide better predictability for new entrants, while not
constraining GPS applications.
Finally, I would like to mention two areas of risk not
related to spectrum. In today's fiscal environment, it may be
tempting to slow or cancel the acquisition of GPS III
satellites, or hope to rely on foreign systems to fill the
gaps. This is a very dangerous idea, given our Nation's
reliance on GPS and the lack of demonstrated reliability of
foreign systems.
A second risk area would be disruptions to existing GPS
users as an unintended result of modernization. There is a need
to explicitly confirm that changes to GPS are backwards
compatible with the installed base. If not, there needs to be a
transition plan developed with the relevant stakeholders in
Government, industry, and even nongovernment organizations,
such as advisory committees and scientific societies. We have a
precious resource in that installed base that needs to be
protected.
Finally, the spectrum neighborhood in which GPS resides
should be preserved, as you have heard from other witnesses. As
GPS modernization proceeds, the U.S. Government should ensure
that the installed base suffers no disruptions, as new GPS
capabilities come online. And for the aviation community, it is
not an overstatement to say that eternal vigilance is, in fact,
the price of safety.
I thank you for your time, and I would be happy to answer
any questions you might have.
Mr. Petri. We thank you, and we thank the entire panel for
your contribution.
Craig Fuller talked about this simple technology with 1,000
and more, many more, permutations and advantages--I was
thinking in my own area we have a boat manufacturer now that
has a boat hook, it is a GPS. You push a button and the boat
will stay perfectly still without an anchor in the ocean.
And of course, John Deere and these people now can do--
apply fertilizers to fields based on the characteristics at
that spot on the field, and it has a huge return for the
additional investment--make agricultural more productive, less
wasteful, and all the rest. And it is all GPS. And this is only
the beginning of how we can refine the application of
technology for changes in circumstances on practically a 6- by
6-inch basis across our country.
You have heard the testimony of the previous panel. And I
really wonder if, in particular, Mr. Foley and Mr. Pace would
care to comment on it. You have in your prepared remarks--but
we found ourselves in a rather peculiar situation in that I--I
am sure good-meaning people who see a business opportunity
spent some billions of dollars to help achieve a national
objective, which is a good one, of making broadband more
available, high-speed broadband across our country, and yet we
had a GPS system set up and elaborate for a number of years,
that needed to be in a quiet area, as was testified before. And
it was well known, evidently, the price of that spectrum
reflected that to some extent.
And yet, that spectrum was acquired and the previous
purpose was broadened at the staff level at the FCC, evidently
leading people to think they could do something. And it is
going to ruin a lot of savings of people who have invested in
all this technology.
So is this a staff failure? Or are people leading someone
down the primrose path, or--I mean how--or do we need clearer
fences here, explain to people why this--evidently the spectrum
price reflected some knowledge at the investor level, as to
what was going on.
But was it a failure of the technical advisors of these
investors to--or do you have any--I guess it is speculation,
but maybe looking forward, how can we avoid this waste of
resources in the future, or rescue the situation that we find
ourselves in?
Either of you have any ideas?
Mr. Foley. Well, thank you. I think the main thing--and I
think we have all kind of highlighted on that--is that we need
to make sure that we protect the spectrum that we have. And
looking kind of backwards, I think, at least from my
perspective as a GPS receiver manufacturer, there are some
standards for interference that have been in place for quite
some time, back to 1996, I believe. So it was a bit of a
surprise for us to see that when this new proposed system came
up, it was actually putting out signals far in excess of those
receiver--or interference protection limits.
So, any future plans would want to--we would want to build
on those existing limits. And I think that is what the PNT has
said, and DOT has said. So, to the extent that we do that, I
think that is the best way to move forward.
And, just more generally, as I stated in my testimony,
improved coordination between the PNT and the FCC and the rest
of Government, to make sure that all the stakeholders get
represented when new policy decisions are made.
Mr. Pace. I think, Mr. Chairman--I think looking back at
it, I think the fundamental error was in not really applying
the intent or the past practices of the Administrative
Procedures Act, and notices of proposed rulemakings that
involve reallocation of spectrum.
The argument was made that this was not a reallocation from
mobile satellite services to a high-powered broadband
terrestrial mobile service, that this was, in fact, simply a
relaxation of some--maybe some outdated constraints and some
waivers could be applied, and maybe some new efficiencies could
be found.
I think, in retrospect, that was too clever by half, that
it was a reallocation, that a notice of proposed rulemaking
should have been done, the notice of proposed rulemaking would
have generated the technical data necessary to understand what
was involved, and that one would have fairly quickly seen that
this was a non-starter.
When this originally started back in about 2003, the idea
of an ancillary terrestrial component to mobile satellite
service was considered a kind of a fill-in, a gap-filler, a
relatively low-power system. No one was talking about 40,000
high-powered cell towers blanketing the country. Nobody was
talking about having an independent terrestrial service
separate from the satellite services. The FCC was very clear
over the years that they would not allow a separate, standalone
service, that, in fact, it always had to be tied to the
satellite service, and no interference with the satellite
service would occur.
Terrestrial broadband systems would not interfere with
mobile satellite services in their own band, what they call co-
channel interference, which is a really big sin.
So, I think that the position of people at the time was to
try to find some way to make these ancillary systems work. I
think there was good faith technical effort. There was really
no technical data available then. And then people gradually,
gradually got into trying to change it into something else, a
reallocation. And they did not do a notice of proposed
rulemaking. And hence, I think people were surprised when they
found out that when they actually got data, that it was a much
different situation than what they had intended.
So, I don't know how you prevent people from making bad
decisions. I don't know if that is really possible. I do think
we have rules and procedures that, if followed, would have
protected us.
Mr. Petri. Any other comments?
Mr. Fuller. Mr. Chairman, I just have a quick comment. One
of the reasons, seriously, for my enthusiasm about the clarity
of the Obama administration statement today is that it should
send a very clear signal to any agency, even an independent
agency. And we really don't have to speculate. There are plenty
of people who have issued press releases. There are plenty of
representatives making cases. But no one has done the hard work
of testing that has come to any other conclusion than this
won't work.
And so, I would hope that the administration, who had to
clear the testimony today at OMB at the Executive Office of the
President, I would hope the administration would provide an
equally clear message to its appointees and an independent
agency to say, ``If you have some special knowledge that none
of us have been able to uncover, then bring it forward. Bring
it to the Congress. Bring it to the industry.''
So far, literally--we have had press releases, but we have
had not nearly the kind of certainty that experts, technical
experts in this field, have. And I think the process that led
to the testimony today is sound and solid and represents the
best clear thinking in this administration that the project
should not go forward as proposed.
Mr. Petri. Mr. Cravaack?
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
great testimony. There is so much information that you have
just given us, I really appreciate it.
One of the things you have said, Mr. Fuller--I don't want
to--I want to make sure that the committee understands it. With
the GPS system, there needs to be no terrestrial navigational
systems at an airport. So you could be flying, and if you have
an emergency, just as you alluded to, you could create an
approach to go into an airport to fly into it that would not
have any other navigational devices to it.
So, if you could expand upon that, that would be very
helpful. And also talk about the minimums that you could bring
this aircraft down to if you needed to.
Mr. Fuller. Getting into dangerous ground, because I can
talk about flying all afternoon.
The interesting thing is that--and they will speak for
themselves, but I think this is a topic on which we are in
absolute agreement throughout the aviation community. The
general aviation community has equipped with GPS avionics for
years. The commercial aircraft industry has equipped with this
technology for years, and is equipping more with the prospect
of the NextGen technology being more fully utilized. All of it
gives the ability, whether I am in the two-seater Aviat Husky
or the Citation jet, or these gentlemen flying a commercial
airline, that we have the technology to take us from the
altitude--our en route altitude down to a couple of hundred
feet above the center line of the runway using nothing but the
satellite-based technology above the earth, and the GPS box and
the related computers in the aircraft.
Furthermore, it allows them to know where I am at and me to
know where they are at, so it provides separation of aircraft.
That is going to be an increasingly important feature with this
technology. It makes it possible to do this whether you are
flying to your destination airport that you go to all the time,
or you have an emergency and you have to suddenly find a
suitable runway nearby.
So, as I said, this basic principle of being able to define
precisely where you are in space continuously over time
provides all kinds of enhancements.
Mr. Chairman, I also have a sailboat, and, believe it or
not, it also helps us. In case the anchor is slipping, an alarm
goes off because it shows the boat is moving. So there are all
kinds of possibilities.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you. And Captain Cassidy, as a pilot,
can you tell me in regards to NextGen and what--some of the
interference--what is your nightmare scenario? What do you see
that the effects of you flying your commercial aircraft with
LightSquared that could affect you, as a pilot, navigating down
that gulf there?
Captain Cassidy. Well, I suppose the nightmare scenario
would be that I anticipated that I was putting myself back up
in Juneau, flying down the Gastineau Channel, that I had a very
highly reliable, highly effective navigation system, and
suddenly somebody flipped the switch on it and then I had to go
back to the old procedures. It would make me much more
concerned about the safe conduct of flight, because now I would
be--have a lot less of ability to have a very good estimate at
what my arrival fuel would need to be at my missed approach
point in order to get to my divert.
And that kind of tails on to what Mr. Fuller just said. I
think that one of the big safety aspects of GPS technology is
it allows you to be more proactive and anticipate contingency
situations further down the road. In this case, I would--based
upon what the arrival weather would be, I would estimate what a
safe arrival fuel would be that would allow me then to divert
and go to an alternate, and also have the coordinates of that
alternate, and also, on top of that, have the approaches built
into that alternate in my flight management system so it is all
there and I have a one-stop-shop. And that is an incredible
safety benefit that is clearly purely the benefit of satellite-
based navigation.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Captain. Mr. Chairman, can I have
indulgence, just a little more time? Thank you.
Mr. Foley, in regards to LightSquared, obviously they are
trying to get in the lower end of the spectrum. That is their
initial business plan. They are going to try to get into--I see
them trying to start working into the higher end of the
spectrum, as well.
Is their current proposal any different than past proposal?
And if they do try to get into the higher spectrum, what does
that mean to you, as your business model?
Mr. Foley. Well, let me say I think the LightSquared
proposals have changed numerous times over the past year or so.
But primarily, operating on that upper 10 MHz frequency closest
to GPS, all of the testing that has been done so far, all of
the analysis has shown that would be just catastrophic. You
will have widespread outages of GPS. The majority of the
receivers that we tested just did not work at those types of
power levels that close.
Moving to the lower 10 helps somewhat, but all of the
analysis we have done so far says that doesn't get a clean bill
of health, either. There are still significant problems with
that proposal, as well, you know, specifically, the terrain
awareness and warning systems. We talked about ADSB operations
at low altitude. It poses a lot of problems for aviation.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, sir. And with that, I will yield
back. Thanks for your chair's indulgence.
Mr. Petri. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you all for the
effort that went into your prepared testimony, and for your
being here, and your enlightening testimony today.
And this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]