    [House Hearing, 112 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                       A REVIEW OF ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH
                     PROTECTING AND IMPROVING OUR NATION'S
                        AVIATION SATELLITE-BASED GLOBAL
                       POSITIONING SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE
    =======================================================================

                                    (112-71)

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                                    AVIATION

                                     OF THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                       TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                FEBRUARY 8, 2012

                                   __________

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                 COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

                        JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman
    DON YOUNG, Alaska                    NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
    THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin           PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
    HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina         JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey            Columbia
    GARY G. MILLER, California           JERROLD NADLER, New York
    TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois         CORRINE BROWN, Florida
    SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 BOB FILNER, California
    BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania           EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
    SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio                   LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
    CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan          TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
    DUNCAN HUNTER, California            RICK LARSEN, Washington
    ANDY HARRIS, Maryland                MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
    ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas  TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
    JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington    MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
    FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire       RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
    RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois             GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
    LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania           DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
    CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota             MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas              JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania
    LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana               TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
    BILLY LONG, Missouri                 HEATH SHULER, North Carolina
    BOB GIBBS, Ohio                      STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
    PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania         LAURA RICHARDSON, California
    RICHARD L. HANNA, New York           ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana         DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
    STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida
    JEFF DENHAM, California
    JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
    CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN,
        Tennessee
                                    ------                                7

                            Subcommittee on Aviation

                      THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Chairman
    HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina         JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
    SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
    JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio                   BOB FILNER, California
    FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire       EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
    RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois             LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
    CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota, Vice       TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
        Chair                            MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
    BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas              MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    BILLY LONG, Missouri                 STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
    PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania         ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
    STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida            Columbia
    JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida (Ex Officio)     (Ex Officio)
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
    CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN,
        Tennessee
                                    CONTENTS

                                                                       Page

    Summary of Subject Matter........................................    iv

                                   TESTIMONY
                                   Panel One

    Hon. John D. Porcari, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of
      Transportation.................................................     3
    Vincent Galotti, Deputy Director, Air Navigation Bureau,
      International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) of the United
      Nations........................................................     3

                                   Panel Two

    Captain Sean P. Cassidy, First Vice President, Air Line Pilots
      Association, International.....................................    15
    Thomas L. Hendricks, Senior Vice President of Safety, Security
      and Operations, Airlines for America...........................    15
    Craig Fuller, President, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association..    15
    John M. Foley, Director, Aviation GNSS Technology, Garmin
      International, Inc.............................................    15
    Scott Pace, Ph.D., Director, Space Policy Institute, Elliott
      School of International Affairs, The George Washington
      University.....................................................    15

              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Hon. Jerry F. Costello, of Illinois..............................    28

                   PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

    Hon. John D. Porcari.............................................    30
    Vincent Galotti..................................................    36
    Captain Sean P. Cassidy..........................................    43
    Thomas L. Hendricks..............................................    56
    Craig Fuller.....................................................    59
    John M. Foley....................................................    64
    Scott Pace, Ph.D.................................................    79

                           SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

    John M. Foley, Director, Aviation GNSS Technology, Garmin
      International, Inc., responses to questions from Hon. Eddie
      Bernice Johnson, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Texas..........................................................    75

                            ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD

    Jeffrey Carlisle, Executive Vice President, Regulatory Affairs
      and Public Policy, LightSquared, letter to Hon. Thomas E.
      Petri, Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, February 8, 2011
      [sic], including response to hearing briefing memorandum and
      request to Federal Communications Commission for initiation of
      proceeding.....................................................    94
    David R. Hinson, Administrator, U.S. Department of
      Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, letter to Dr.
      Assad Kotaite, President of the Council, International Civil
      Aviation Organization, October 14, 1994........................   122
    Marion C. Blakey, Administrator, U.S. Department of
      Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, letter to Mr.
      Roberto Kobeh, President of the Council, International Civil
      Aviation Organization, September 10, 2007......................   124
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                       A REVIEW OF ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH

                     PROTECTING AND IMPROVING OUR NATION'S

                        AVIATION SATELLITE-BASED GLOBAL

                       POSITIONING SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE

                                  ----------

                          WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 2012

                      House of Representatives,
                              Subcommittee on Aviation,
                Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:00 a.m. in
    Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas E. Petri
    (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Petri. The subcommittee will come to order. We meet
    today to discuss a critical part of transportation
    infrastructure, the Global Positioning System, commonly
    referred to as GPS.
        So, I thank the witnesses for their participation in
    today's hearing, and would like to say a special welcome to
    Deputy Secretary, Mr. Porcari, and Mr. Galotti, our witnesses
    from the United Nations International Civil Aviation
    Organization, a very important framework for our global
    aviation industry. Your participation in today's hearing speaks
    to the importance of this issue, not only here, but around the
    globe.
        For this committee, for this subcommittee, aviation safety
    is the top priority. According to the Department of
    Transportation, the Global Positioning System has served as a
    critical component of aviation safety improvements that the
    aviation community has embraced. Moreover, GPS is critical to
    the safety and efficiency improvements planned as part of
    NextGen, that we are in the process of rolling out here in this
    country and other countries as well.
        Our aviation infrastructure and efforts to update it with
    the Department of Transportation's NextGen program are a
    platform for growth in the U.S. economy. NextGen is also a
    catalyst for job creation within the aviation industry.
        It is important for Government to avoid constraining that
    growth by limiting the efficiency gains and job creation
    achieved by NextGen, which is reliant on GPS. As important as
    GPS is to transportation safety and efficiency, its signal
    strength is very weak. Therefore, GPS is susceptible to
    interference by other transmissions, even if those other
    transmissions are constrained within their own spectrum
    allocation.
        Over the past year or so, the subcommittee has watched with
    interest the developments of issues related to radio spectrum
    within the L band. As the Federal Communications Commission
    deliberates the issues before it, we recognize the potential
    impacts on the transportation community, and hence, today's
    hearing.
        However, out of fairness to the parties involved in the FCC
    proceedings, I would ask the witnesses to focus their comments
    today on the question at hand regarding the importance of GPS
    as an element of transportation infrastructure, and the public
    policy considerations of the transportation community to
    protect that infrastructure.
        Today's hearings serve as an opportunity to hear ideas for
    the best way forward, given what we have learned about GPS.
    Where there are good engineers, there may be a variety of
    solutions. And it would be helpful for technologies to co-exist
    because, given the spectrum demand, the problem of interference
    between competing uses on various points along the spectrum is
    not going away.
        So, I would encourage the agencies and industry to find a
    way to safely co-exist, if possible. I believe that we can and
    must find a way for us to continue to encourage innovation in
    both the broadband and GPS industries.
        Finally, before I recognize Mr. Costello for his opening
    statement, and other Members, I would ask unanimous consent
    that all Members have 5 legislative days to revise and extend
    their remarks and include extraneous material for the record of
    this hearing.
        [No response.]
        Mr. Petri. Without objection, so ordered. And now I will
    recognize Mr. Costello.
        Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I want to thank
    you for calling the hearing today. I will submit my statement
    for the record.
        I welcome our witnesses and look forward to hearing their
    testimony. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Petri. Mr. Cravaack, did you----
        Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
    thank Chairman Petri and Ranking Member Costello for holding
    these important hearings on the critical importance of GPS to
    our Nation's transportation infrastructure.
        I would like to welcome today's witnesses, and I look
    forward to hearing your testimony on the importance of the
    issue regarding the future of GPS. GPS is the cornerstone, as
    you well know, of aviation system that is in our country, and
    any threat to GPS needs to be handled with the utmost care, and
    ensure that our skies are safe.
        One of my key concerns has been the LightSquared project,
    and how it affects GPS devices. I am very concerned that the
    reliability of GPS might be put at risk. I will be interested
    to hear any opinions or any solutions to the situation, because
    we need to solve all concerns before they become a problem and
    put lives at risk.
        I look forward to hearing from the witnesses, their
    thoughts on the GPS and its role in our aviation system. Thank
    you again, and I look forward to hearing from your testimony.
        And I yield back.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Now we turn to our first panel, which
    consists of the Honorable John Porcari, deputy secretary of the
    United States Department of Transportation, and Mr. Vincent
    Galotti, who is the deputy director, air navigation bureau,
    International Civil Aviation Organization, or ICAO, of the
    United Nations.
        Gentlemen, thank you very much for coming. Thank you for
    your prepared statements. And we would invite you to summarize
    them, if possible, in about 5 minutes, and then we will have
    some questions, I suspect.
        Thank you very much, and we will begin with Mr. Porcari.

       TESTIMONY OF HON. JOHN D. PORCARI, DEPUTY SECRETARY, U.S.
       DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; AND VINCENT GALOTTI, DEPUTY
     DIRECTOR, AIR NAVIGATION BUREAU, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
               ORGANIZATION (ICAO) OF THE UNITED NATIONS

        Mr. Porcari. Thank you, Chairman Petri and Ranking Member
    Costello. Thanks to the members of the subcommittee. I
    appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today.
        The simple fact is the Global Positioning System (GPS)
    applications are vital to transportation safety and efficiency.
    Tens of millions of drivers across America use GPS to navigate
    every day. In the Department of Transportation's Federal
    Aviation Administration, we estimate that by 2013, 60,000
    aircraft will be equipped with GPS to navigate the skies over
    America. This is what we refer to collectively as NextGen.
        On the ground, Positive Train Control, which is an improved
    safety application for rail transportation, relies on GPS, as
    well. The Intelligent Transportation Systems will depend on GPS
    as a key technology for vehicle collision warning and crash
    avoidance systems.
        What's more, GPS is essential for the operations of first
    responders, search and rescue, resource management, weather
    tracking and prediction, earthquake monitoring, and other
    critical national security functions. From there, the list goes
    on and on.
        Now, as you know, the LightSquared Corporation has proposed
    to create a wireless broadband network. In the Obama
    administration, we believe deeply in what LightSquared is
    attempting to do, which is to make the Internet more accessible
    to more people all across the country. This is an urgent
    national priority. But after comprehensive testing, we have
    concluded that the current plan to provide such services
    adversely affect GPS signals. And I will be happy to delve into
    the details during our conversation, as I have in my written
    testimony.
        In short, both LightSquared's original and revised plans
    generate considerable harmful interference with GPS. Our
    researchers could find no obvious practical mitigations to
    solve the interference issues.
        I would also point out that substantial Federal resources,
    including over $2 million from the FAA, has been diverted from
    other programs in testing and analyzing LightSquared's
    proposals.
        Even if these interference issues were somehow resolved,
    LightSquared would still have to design fixes for known
    interference with high-precision GPS receivers that are vital
    for agriculture, science, and surveying. And LightSquared's
    operating plan still leaves open the possibility of
    broadcasting on both bands. Its FCC filings propose only a
    ``standstill'' on broadband use of the upper 10 MHz band.
        Considering all these factors, the Executive Committee
    (EXCOM) of the National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation,
    and Timing group have now unanimously concluded that
    LightSquared's proposal is fundamentally incompatible with GPS
    use, and that no additional testing or analysis is warranted at
    this time.
        Going forward, the EXCOM agencies continue to strongly
    support President Obama's directive to make available a total
    of over 500 MHz of spectrum over the next 10 years suitable for
    broadband use.
        We recognize that we all have to do our part in spectrum
    use, making it as efficient as possible. We propose to work
    with the National Telecommunications and Information
    Administration in the Department of Commerce to draft new GPS
    spectrum interference standards.
        These standards, which would inform future potential
    commercial operators, would let them know in advance which uses
    in adjacent bands would or would not be compatible with GPS,
    and will ensure that this national policy protection for GPS
    evolves through clear communications with stakeholders, and
    that it is implemented without affecting existing and emerging
    uses of space-based positioning, navigation, and timing
    services that are vital to economic, public safety, scientific,
    and national security needs.
        In summary, our GPS system is one of the more vital, if
    less visible, parts of our national infrastructure. With that,
    I will be happy to answer any questions. And again, thank you
    for permitting me to testify.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you.
        Mr. Galotti?
        Mr. Galotti. Thank you, and good morning, Mr. Chairman,
    Ranking Member, and subcommittee members. It is an honor to be
    able to testify before this subcommittee, and I would like to
    thank you for the opportunity. My testimony today will focus on
    the importance of what we call the global navigation satellite
    systems to international civil aviation.
        And there are a few other global systems. Russia has its
    GLONASS, which has had some reliability and maintenance
    problems over the years, although that government is now
    committed to a Next General system. There is the European
    Galileo, not yet operational, and of course China is in the
    process of launching its Compass system.
        Because of the reliability and continued upgrading of the
    GPS and the commitment of the United States Government, GPS has
    evolved into the most fundamental and important piece of
    supporting infrastructure for the global aviation system.
        And just at the beginning I would like to mention that the
    United States is one of the primary contributors to ICAO in
    terms of technical expertise and knowledge, and in support of
    consensus-building and excellence in international standards
    and policy development, for which we are grateful. Most of the
    technical work that we do is accomplished by groups of experts
    nominated by the member States. The FAA has been the major
    contributor to ICAO in this respect, and I believe it has
    served the U.S. interests extremely well.
        ICAO's close involvement with satellite navigation systems
    goes back to the work of the ICAO Committee on Future Air
    Navigation Systems, more commonly known as the FANS Committee.
    The U.S. was a major contributor and participant of that
    committee. In adopting the outcomes of the FANS Committee at
    the 10th Air Navigation Conference in 1991, a conclusion was
    reached that the exploitation of satellite technology appears
    to be the only valuable solution to overcoming the shortcomings
    of the present system, and also fulfill the global needs and
    requirements of the foreseeable future, and that satellite-
    based systems will be the key to worldwide improvements.
        In recognition of this turning point and acknowledgment by
    the world community of the importance of GNSS, which was highly
    dependent--and is--on the U.S. GPS, President Clinton formally
    offered the GPS standard positioning service, SPS, to the
    global aviation community through ICAO to support international
    civil aviation. This commitment was reaffirmed in 2007 under
    President Bush, as follows: ``The U.S. Government maintains its
    commitment to provide GPS SPS signals on a continuous worldwide
    basis, free of direct user fees, enabling worldwide civil
    space-based navigation services, and to provide open, free
    access to information necessary to develop and build equipment
    to use these services.''
        Even before the work of the FANS Committee and the offers
    of both Presidents Clinton and Bush, the availability of GPS to
    civil aviation first came about, as I am sure you are aware of,
    when President Reagan authorized its use for international
    civil aviation after the shootdown of Korean 007.
        Following the initial U.S. offer, ICAO developed
    international standards to satellite navigation systems. With
    the availability of the GPS system, it became globally
    recognized by the international civil aviation community as the
    central element of GNSS. ICAO and the entire international
    civil aviation community are now completely reliant on the
    longstanding U.S. Government policy and its commitment as a key
    enabler to international aviation.
        And I just want to go over a few of the important ways that
    GPS supports international aviation. There are many areas in
    the world where the conventional terrestrial navigation and
    infrastructure is inadequate. And GNSS is often the only
    reliable source of navigation information.
        Before GNSS, navigation in high-seas airspace was crude and
    inaccurate. Separate distance between aircraft used by air
    traffic control were as much as 100 miles laterally and 15 to
    20 minutes. The superior accuracy of GNSS, especially when
    integrated with sophisticated flight management systems, has
    enabled a number of substantial navigation improvements, which
    are the foundation of the concept of performance-based
    navigation, or PBN.
        In PBN, airspace separation between aircraft is
    significantly reduced, thereby increasing capacity while
    bringing safety, efficiency, and environmental benefits. The
    United States provides air traffic control services over vast
    expanses of high-seas airspace.
        In the North Atlantic there are over 2,000 crossings a day.
    The transpacific passenger traffic is expected to grow by 4.2
    percent between 2009 and 2030. Intra-Asia-Pacific traffic
    during that period is expected to grow by 5.1 percent. And
    right now there are approximately 8,000 flights per year that
    operate on cross-polar routes, and they are totally reliant on
    GPS.
        Until very recently, all final approaches to land at major
    airports were accomplished by means of instrument landing
    systems. This is OK in States that are able to maintain these,
    and that have the infrastructure to support that. In many parts
    of the world, maintaining such systems is prohibitive because
    of the cost and expertise. Using PBN approach procedures based
    on GPS, more and more approaches to land are accomplished by
    means of the equipment in the aircraft only, with little or no
    reliance on ground equipment, bringing enormous safety
    benefits. And airports that previously had no instrument
    approaches now have PBN.
        Today, when U.S. airlines fly into Lagos, Nigeria; Almaty,
    Kazakhstan; Ulan Bator, Mongolia; Dakar, Senegal; Quito,
    Ecuador; and Georgetown, Guyana, to name but a few out of
    hundreds, they are more assured of safe operations because of
    GPS.
        GNSS is important for Next Generation aircraft
    surveillance, and I am sure you are all aware of automatic
    dependent surveillance broadcast. But over oceanic airspace,
    automatic dependent surveillance contracts allows air traffic
    control to have surveillance, where this was impossible.
        And finally, two of the most significant near-term air
    traffic management improvements that have recently become
    available are continuous descent operations and continuous
    climb operations. This is a major initiative at ICAO, and GPS
    allows this extremely efficient flight routing to be enabled.
        And now, just a few words about the spectrum major issue
    that has as much to do with the importance of GPS as anything
    else. I am referring to the problem of frequency spectrum.
        Available radio frequency spectrum is the lifeblood of
    aviation, and the protection of spectrum used by aviation radio
    systems is absolutely essential for safety. ICAO has been
    vehemently supporting the protection of GNSS spectrum for
    decades, in all international fora, especially the world radio
    conferences--and there is one going on in Geneva right now.
        Against that background I would urge you to consider that
    any decision by the United States that affects frequency
    spectrum, which impacts on GNSS, will have a critical impact on
    the safety record, the investments made in GNSS, the
    international standards, and the recertification of equipment.
        In summary, Mr. Chairman, I would like to appeal to you and
    the committee that ICAO and international civil aviation
    continue to benefit from U.S. leadership and cooperation in
    many ways, including invaluable support through the sharing of
    technical information and expertise, support of consensus-
    building and excellence in international standard and policy
    development, and concrete projects to assist countries in need
    of strengthening their aviation programs.
        GPS is among the most important ways that the U.S. provides
    technological, humanitarian, and political leadership. ICAO
    looks forward to deepening this relationship and working
    together.
        Thank you for this opportunity to share ICAO's views with
    this important subcommittee.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Thank you both. At previous hearings
    this subcommittee has been informed that as we gain momentum in
    deploying the NextGen technology, it will have enormous return
    on the American Government's investment in it, reduce fuel use
    for the industry by some 20 or 30 percent, expand the capacity
    of the system without having to build additional runways and so
    on, improve the safety of the system, shorten the time of
    flights, and it goes on and on and on. To reduce the sound
    footprint, as planes are able to glide down more for many of
    the airports where that has been a problem. A lot of benefits
    from this new--for using this technology in the aviation
    industry, as other industries have found.
        I do have a couple of questions. First, Mr. Porcari, you
    mentioned that you proposed the Department of Transportation
    work with the National Telecommunications and Information
    Administration to draft new GPS spectrum interference standards
    to strengthen existing national policy protection of adjacent
    band spectrum. Could you elaborate on what that all means?
        Mr. Porcari. I would be happy to, Mr. Chairman. One thing
    that recent events has shown us is that GPS is not only a
    national infrastructure asset, but that protecting that asset,
    we are going to have to be much more sophisticated in the
    future on how we do that.
        In layman's terms, on both sides of the existing GPS
    frequency there were mobile satellite-type applications that
    were also quiet, as it were, that did not interfere with GPS's
    ability to hear what is a very weak signal from space,
    basically 50 watts, 22,000 miles up.
        The spectrum interference standards--and we would take a
    whole-of-government approach to this, working through our
    Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Executive Committee--the
    idea would be to identify before anyone puts capital at risk or
    major project at risk, what are compatible uses to GPS.
        In general terms, the more precise the GPS receiver--for
    example, the avionics in an aircraft--the more precise they
    are, the more that they are likely to have a wideband receiver
    that, in fact, needs to be able to listen beyond the GPS
    frequency. Acknowledging that, and building a policy around
    that, would be, we think, a very good use of staff time and,
    from a policy perspective, critical to protecting GPS as an
    asset.
        Mr. Petri. Proposing to set interference standards--how is
    the proposal to set interference standards different from
    setting receiver standards?
        Mr. Porcari. There are currently no receiver standards. The
    idea of spectrum interference standards would be to give
    everyone involved, the industry and others, confidence in the
    long term that, as they build more and more precise GPS
    devices--and I know our focus is on aviation, where GPS is
    absolutely critical to operations today, but will be even more
    so in the future--but other applications: precision farming,
    construction, and others. Spectrum interference standards would
    be clear guidelines for all users, both within the GPS spectrum
    and adjacent spectrums.
        We think, if we can build the kind of consistency and
    predictability for both the GPS users and adjacent spectrum
    users, that that will serve everyone's interests well.
        Mr. Petri. Yes, I understand there is some sort of a
    curfunkle about the adjacent--who is interfering on whose turf
    in this particular area, and that, in fact, it was allowed for
    a little broader use of spectrum, because it didn't interfere
    with adjacent use. And then, when the type of use was changed
    somewhat at the staff level, that has created a problem. Is
    that what you are trying to avoid?
        Mr. Porcari. Yes, Mr. Chairman. That is exactly it. GPS, by
    its very nature, is a very weak space-based signal that is very
    faint when it is received by GPS receivers in the atmosphere,
    or in terrestrial applications.
        I think of it in zoning terms, because that is probably the
    way to think about compatibility of uses. GPS was--the spectrum
    was originally put in a quiet neighborhood, because it needed a
    quiet neighborhood with quiet neighbors to be able to have
    accuracy in receivers. The adjacent pieces of spectrum were for
    mobile satellite service, which was another quiet use.
        What has happened with this specific proposal is
    essentially you went from a mobile satellite service proposal
    with limited ground augmentation to a ground-based service with
    limited satellite augmentation. And that really changed the
    fundamental nature of signals, and how they would be received.
    But it is, I think, really important to point out that GPS was
    put in a quiet piece of the spectrum on purpose because,
    fundamentally, it has to have quiet neighbors.
        Mr. Petri. So this was well known at the technical level at
    the time this strategy was put in place?
        Mr. Porcari. Yes, I believe that the physics and the
    technical parts of it have been well-known all along.
        I would also point out that, as Mr. Galotti had, from an
    international perspective, harmonizing that use of the
    frequency internationally was important as well, so that the
    same kind of safety of flight avionics that we are using today,
    and as we build a larger NextGen system of systems, can be used
    around the world.
        Mr. Petri. Mr. Galotti, in your testimony you referred to
    the GPS spectrum use being under some threat, and it being
    discussed at past world radio conferences and I think some
    current or upcoming conferences as well. Could you elaborate on
    that, and what role you, as representing the global aviation
    industry, play in those conferences, and how you have been able
    to work out resolutions in the past?
        Mr. Galotti. The international telecommunication holds a
    world radio conference every 3 years. And it is a huge event,
    it lasts for 4 weeks. The States go with very powerful
    representation. And also industry goes with incredible force.
    Telecommunication providers are--as you can imagine, have the
    most to gain, and they put a lot of pressure, and they work
    around the clock, virtually, on--getting emails from my people
    at 2:00 and 3:00 in the morning.
        ICAO is an observer. But during the 3 years in between we
    meet with all of our member States and we develop--we prepare
    an ICAO position that at least the member States agree to, so
    we get just about unanimous decision on the ICAO position for
    radio frequency spectrum. It doesn't always pan out that way at
    the event itself because, again, there is a lot of lobbying,
    there is a lot of pressure, a lot of jobs at stake. But as
    observers there, we do have a lot of close contacts with the
    States and with friends in the aviation industry. And we have
    been very successful in working with the member States. And the
    United States has been a strong supporter of protecting the GPS
    spectrum from other uses. Thank you.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. Costello?
        Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, thank you. To Deputy Secretary
    Porcari, to follow up on the chairman's question, he asked the
    same question that, actually, I was going to ask. But I would
    like to have you clarify a point.
        My understanding is that you are proposing that DOT work
    with other agencies to develop a policy. Does that mean for
    radio transmission standards in the spectrum? Is the
    interference now between the agencies--are we talking about
    transmission standards? Or what are we talking about?
        Mr. Porcari. What we are really talking about is, more
    generically and more broadly, spectrum interference standards,
    where we could establish, by consensus and with input from
    everyone who has an equity in this, industry, interested
    observers and others, the kind of standards that would protect
    the GPS spectrum, both today and in the future.
        If you look at the evolution of GPS, just in the last 10 or
    15 years, for example, the GPS uses, especially in aviation,
    have gotten more and more precise, and they are now safety of
    flight issues, which requires spectrum interference protection.
        Mr. Costello. We are talking primarily about transmission
    standards.
        Mr. Porcari. We are talking about primarily the requirement
    for precise navigation devices that use GPS to be able to
    utilize as broad a band as possible, which they have been to
    date, and which was acknowledged in the original approval of
    mobile satellite services on either end of that spectrum.
        So, I say this because, in fairness to all the potential
    users outside of the GPS band, establishing those standards
    would give them a good sense of what kind of uses would be
    compatible, and which would not.
        Mr. Costello. You also mention in your testimony that the
    Obama administration--that their goal is to free up federally
    owned spectrum and make it available for mobile broadband,
    especially providing access to underserved rural communities. I
    certainly support that goal, and I think many members of the
    committee would, as well, especially for underserved
    communities for wireless service, and where consumers would
    benefit from competition between service providers.
        Let me ask. If the mobile satellite service band is not
    compatible with the high-speed wireless transmissions, then
    what can the administration do to provide greater access to
    high-speed service?
        Mr. Porcari. The administration, the Department of
    Transportation and every part of the administration, is again
    committed to identifying those 500 MHz of additional spectrum
    over the next 10 years.
        We strongly support what you have underlined, which is the
    need for rural broadband and broadband competition. There are
    some features of the recent proposal that are very valuable,
    from that perspective. But we think that working across the
    Government with our Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
    Executive Committee, with NTIA, will ultimately be helpful.
        Obviously, we would not presume to know what actions the
    Federal Communications Commission, an independent agency, would
    take.
        Mr. Costello. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Petri. Mr. Coble.
        Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
    for your testimony.
        Mr. Porcari, are there immunity standards for military GPS
    receivers that protect them from transmissions from outside the
    GPS band?
        Mr. Porcari. Congressman, my understanding--and I believe
    General Shelton testified before the House Armed Services
    Committee--is that there are not. And I do know that, at least
    in some cases, the Department of Defense aircraft are using
    commercial, off-the-shelf avionics that are FAA-certified for
    commercial use, as opposed to military.
        Mr. Coble. Thank you, sir. Well, let me ask you another
    question, Mr. Porcari. What standards are currently in place to
    make sure that the receivers and equipment purchased pick up
    only signals used in the GPS frequency band?
        Mr. Porcari. There are no current standards in place. That
    is part of the reason for the discussion. Again, we think,
    going forward, having the consistency and predictability of
    spectrum interference standards will help all parties involved.
        Mr. Coble. Thank you, sir. Mr. Galotti--I will put this
    question to each of you.
        What impact might protections for GPS have on the
    marketplace for radio spectrum, A? And then, B, how does this
    bear on the question as to whether or not GPS warrants
    protections?
        [No response.]
        Mr. Coble. Either of you is fine. Mr. Galotti? Want to
    start with you?
        Mr. Galotti. Thank you, Congressman. I guess there are
    various figures that exist as to the number of jobs, and the
    value of spectrum. And, as I have said earlier, there is
    tremendous pressure from the telecommunication providers who
    have significant figures on jobs.
        But on the other hand, aviation globally, I believe the
    number that is out there is worth about $3 trillion to the
    global economy a year, when you consider the economics, the
    tourism, the aviation industry itself, the business, carriage
    of goods and other things.
        So, probably a good case could be made that, economically,
    aviation is critical. But there will be more and more pressure
    from particularly the telecommunication providers. Thank you.
        Mr. Coble. Particularly from who?
        Mr. Galotti. The telecommunication providers. Sorry, sir.
        Mr. Coble. Right. I didn't hear you.
        Mr. Galotti. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Coble. Mr. Porcari, you want to weigh in?
        Mr. Porcari. Yes, Congressman. I don't know the values of
    the spectrum in itself.
        I would point out that the national investment we have made
    in GPS, first from a military-only perspective and now from a
    combined military-civil perspective, has been enormous. It is
    one of the more precious and important pieces of national
    infrastructure we have, even if you can't see it and feel it.
    It is also a U.S. national leadership issue.
        I would point out in the aviation context, I would argue
    that one of the single best safety advances we have made in the
    last 20 years, which is the terrain avoidance warning system--
    20 years ago, controlled flight into terrain, for both
    commercial and recreational aircraft, was a leading cause of
    accidents. The terrain avoidance warning systems that are GPS-
    enabled have taken controlled flight into terrain from a
    leading cause of accidents into something that is way down on
    the list.
        Another example is, as of today, part of our NextGen
    system, ADSB, is operational in the Gulf of Mexico, where we
    have had no radar coverage. And we have thousands of flight
    operations a day, for example, serving offshore petroleum rigs
    via helicopter that had no radar coverage before that, are now
    served by ADSB.
        So, it is important to make sure that we understand the
    value on both sides of the equation, including the enormous
    national investment that has been made in GPS, which has gone
    far beyond military uses, has gone far beyond aviation uses,
    and for precision farming, construction, safety of our train
    systems, those are not possible today without GPS.
        Mr. Coble. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, my red light is
    about to illuminate, so I will yield back.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. Duncan?
        Mr. Duncan. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And this is my
    first real involvement with this, so there is much of it that I
    don't really understand.
        But, Mr. Secretary, I have read this statement from this
    assessment. It says by the deputy secretaries of the Department
    of Transportation and the Department of Defense, and I assume
    that is from you?
        Mr. Porcari. Yes.
        Mr. Duncan. And it is a very strong statement that you put
    out about 3\1/2\ weeks ago. And you say there that--you mention
    that LightSquared had an original proposal and then they
    modified it. Can you explain to me, in layman's terms, how much
    of a change they made in their original plan?
        And it also tells us in our briefing papers that they are
    disputing your findings, or your assessment.
        Mr. Porcari. I will be happy to, Congressman.
        Mr. Duncan. OK.
        Mr. Porcari. And layman's terms is all I am capable of
    here.
        Mr. Duncan. OK.
        Mr. Porcari. So I will try to do it in that sense. The
    original LightSquared proposal of roughly a year ago, January
    of 2011, proposed up to 40,000 ground-based transmitters that
    would effectively blank out the GPS signal in large stretches
    of the U.S. and in some very critical areas. There was some
    early testing done, both by the Department of Defense and the
    FAA. It was clear from that testing that there was an
    interference issue.
        The forum for this is a relatively obscure group, the
    Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Executive Committee, which
    the Deputy Secretary of Defense and I co-chair, Deputy
    Secretary Carter representing the military users, and myself
    representing all the civil users. Through that committee, which
    includes all the executive-branch agencies, which includes
    others, including the Federal Communications Commission, as an
    observer, it was clear that additional testing of a different
    proposal was in order.
        We worked with LightSquared. They were part of developing
    the testing protocols. They were part of the testing itself.
    And the results, I think, are very clear-cut. I would point out
    that the testing results from both the NPEF work and separate
    Federal Aviation Administration work are currently with NTIA
    and will be transmitted to FCC shortly.
        But those results were independently verified by both the
    Idaho National Engineering Laboratories and then the Lincoln
    Laboratories at MIT. And from my layman's perspective, the
    result, especially with the precision safety of flight avionics
    that we use in aircraft, the results were unacceptable.
        Mr. Duncan. Well, let me ask you this. I said it was a very
    strong assessment. And what I am talking about, it says,
    ``Based upon this testing and analysis, there appears to be no
    practical solutions or mitigations that will permit the
    LightSquared broadband service, as proposed, to operate in the
    next few months or years without significantly interfering with
    GPS.''
        I understand the dangers or the concerns or the problems.
    But it is a fascinating thing to me that you could say that
    there is nothing that they could even do within the next few
    years. It does tell us--and I have no connection whatsoever
    with LightSquared, I have never even talked to these people.
    But it says they dispute these findings. How do they dispute
    them, do you know? Or could you tell us something?
        Mr. Porcari. First, I believe the LightSquared
    representatives can and should better explain how they dispute
    the findings. I would point out that the statement,
    Congressman, is strong. I believe it is warranted, given the
    circumstances.
        When we talk about in the next few months or years,
    remember there is a very large installed base of GPS receivers.
    Just focusing on aviation for a moment, there is about 60,000
    GPS receivers out there that are used for safety of flight
    things like terrain avoidance warning systems. Each of those is
    about $40,000. If you look at the life cycle of aircraft and
    avionics, they serve for decades.
        And the reason for that part of the statement is to point
    out that there is no easy retrofit or filter or any other kind
    of retrofit that would, from a safety of flight perspective,
    make the proposal, as currently proposed by LightSquared,
    compatible with aviation.
        Mr. Duncan. Well, I am not saying it wasn't warranted. I
    just was saying it is a fascinating thing that there would be a
    statement that nothing could be done even in the next few
    years, when technology advances as fast as it does. So it was
    kind of an interesting thing. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. LoBiondo? You--Mr. Cravaack?
        Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
    your testimony today. I can truly tell you, as a pilot, there
    was a palpable difference in the cockpit when you have terrain
    avoidance systems using GPS. When you are flying that approach
    coming in from the east going in to Salt Lake City, and you
    know you are skirting the top of those mountains, it was really
    a comforting feeling to have that GPS in the cockpit.
        But LightSquared is--has agreed to a standstill, as I
    understand it, on the use of the upper portion of the spectrum,
    and it is the portion that is actually closest to the GPS
    signal. And LightSquared has stated that it would like to work
    with the GPS community to develop ``mitigating strategies,'' as
    they put it, in order to initiate commercial operations in the
    upper spectrum within 2 and 3 years.
        Is--in your opinion--I understand in your testimony you
    said there is no mitigating conclusion here, and that--do you
    really think 2 or 3 years to be able to find some type of
    strategy is in that window?
        And two, from what we know, even though we really can't
    identify a mitigating strategy, the cost to general aviation to
    implement that strategy, as well? So----
        Mr. Porcari. Thank you, Congressman. First I would point
    out I am not sure what a standstill means on the upper 10 MHz.
    There are no time limits to that, and no technical triggers,
    that I am aware of, on that.
        There is a fundamental incompatibility between the
    LightSquared proposal, as proposed, and the continued use of
    GPS as a precision air navigation use. And again, I would point
    out that this has been built over decades now, where more and
    more we are dependent on GPS for a much higher standard of
    safety than we are able to achieve with the old instrument
    landing systems, without the terrain avoidance warning systems,
    without wide area augmentation systems. All of those are very
    significant safety advances.
        I can't speculate on the cost, because I am not sure anyone
    can quantify the cost, even if it could be done, of retrofits,
    if they were technically viable, to existing avionics uses.
        Mr. Cravaack. So, just to be clear then, there is no plans
    at this time to retrofit or reconfigure any systems to work
    LightSquared into this bracket, is that correct?
        Mr. Porcari. That is correct, Congressman. I would say, in
    contrast, mobile satellite service uses on the adjacent
    frequencies, which is what they were originally zoned for, if
    you will, have been and will be compatible.
        Mr. Cravaack. Super. Thank you very much, and I yield back.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you. Mr. Fleischmann? Mr. Ribble? Mr.
    Farenthold?
        Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much. And I am troubled that
    a terrestrial base system like LightSquared has the potential
    for interfering with GPS. I am afraid it points out the actual
    delicate nature of the GPS system, and its potential
    vulnerability to be--for nothing else, an attack. You hear
    reports of a truck driver with a jamming device degrading the
    system near Newark Airport. Suppose someone not friendly to
    this country were to intentionally put up some high-powered
    jamming stuff. We would be in trouble.
        Historically, LORAN has been considered a backup to GPS.
    But that is currently being dismantled. I am concerned that we
    have all of this reliance on GPS from everything from my car to
    my cell phone to landing a 777 aircraft in the future. It seems
    to me that we are creating a vulnerable system with no backups.
    Can you all comment on that?
        Mr. Porcari. Yes, Congressman. First, you have brought up a
    very important point. There are--by its very nature, there are
    vulnerabilities for the GPS. You pointed out one specific
    incident where a commercially bought, over-the-Internet $99
    jammer caused real issues at one of our major airports in the
    country.
        One of the things that we have done is a national
    positioning, navigation, and timing architecture study of the
    overall system architecture. Following on that, the Federal
    Aviation Administration has committed to an alternate PNT
    research program where, just as today, with our terrestrial
    radar-based air navigation system we have vulnerabilities, and
    you basically build defense in depth with backup systems, we
    know, as we move with the implementation of NextGen, as we move
    forward with that, it will be more and more important to have
    backups to the GPS-based system.
        They will only be short-term backup systems. And it is
    important to point out that we are moving aggressively----
        Mr. Farenthold. Could you define ``short-term backup''? I
    don't----
        Mr. Porcari. Well, I mean for short duration. In other
    words, if we were denied the use of GPS systems for air
    navigation today for an extended period of time, it would have
    severe impacts on the national airspace system. If it were for
    10 minutes, it would be a little bit different.
        Mr. Farenthold. OK.
        Mr. Porcari. But----
        Mr. Farenthold. So minutes, as opposed to days.
        Mr. Porcari. Minutes, as opposed to days. But again, you
    have put your finger on a vulnerability in the system that----
        Mr. Farenthold. And it seems a vulnerability easy to
    exploit.
        Mr. Porcari. Well, it can be. Part of this is the
    architecture and design going forward of how we design the
    system of systems that is NextGen. We are very focused on this.
    Also, I would point out there is an important enforcement side.
    There is no legitimate commercial use for a GPS jammer.
        Mr. Farenthold. All right. And just for my information, I
    have seen press reports about other countries developing their
    own GPS satellite arrays. Do we know where that is going?
        Mr. Galotti. Thank you, Congressman. The Russian Federation
    had established their system in the 1990s. And when the Soviet
    Union disintegrated, it was not maintained. But I understand as
    of December of 2011, now they have a full constellation and
    they have committed to GLONASS-K, which is similar to GPS III,
    and they hope to have that in place by 2014.
        The Europeans have Galileo, which--two satellites are up.
    And I think the total constellation is, I believe, 18.
        And China is putting in place what they call Compass. They
    have 2 satellites in place, and they plan to launch 6 in 2012,
    and the full complement by 2020. And that will initially be for
    East Asia and China, parts of the----
        Mr. Farenthold. And if you will allow me just to geek out
    for a second, we have got a massive array of radio transmitters
    in the form of our cell tower network that can contain
    longitude and latitude information in the cell tower. Is any
    research going into tapping into those to create some sort of
    system as a fallback to GPS?
        Mr. Porcari. I don't know. What I would be happy to do is
    actually research that and get back to the committee.
        Mr. Farenthold. Yes, just curious. It seems like there is--
    --
        Mr. Porcari. It is a good question.
        Mr. Farenthold [continuing]. An infrastructure in place.
    You might be able to develop a fallback system.
        Mr. Porcari. I appreciate the question, and I will find out
    for you.
        Mr. Farenthold. OK. And my time has expired. Thank you.
        Mr. Petri. Well, I am sure we all have a lot of other
    questions, but I will leave it there for the purpose of this
    hearing at this point. Thank you very much. It has been very,
    very informative.
        Mr. Porcari. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Galotti. Thank you.
        Mr. Porcari. Thank you, Members.
        Mr. Petri. The second panel consists of Mr. Thomas L.
    Hendricks, who is senior vice president of safety, security and
    operations, Airlines for America; Captain Sean Cassidy, first
    vice president, Air Line Pilots Association, International;
    Craig Fuller, president of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots
    Association; John M. Foley, director, aviation GNSS technology,
    of Garmin International, Inc., and Dr. Scott Pace, who is the
    director of the Space Policy Institute, Elliott School of
    International Affairs, The George Washington University.
        I thank you for making--all of you--for making the time to
    be with us today on this very--somewhat technical but very
    important subject for sectors of our economy and our safety and
    competitiveness, as a country. And we will begin with Captain
    Cassidy, waiting for Mr. Hendricks.

    TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN SEAN P. CASSIDY, FIRST VICE PRESIDENT, AIR
     LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL; THOMAS L. HENDRICKS,
       SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF SAFETY, SECURITY AND OPERATIONS,
    AIRLINES FOR AMERICA; CRAIG FULLER, PRESIDENT, AIRCRAFT OWNERS
    AND PILOTS ASSOCIATION; JOHN M. FOLEY, DIRECTOR, AVIATION GNSS
    TECHNOLOGY, GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC.; AND SCOTT PACE, PH.D.,
          DIRECTOR, SPACE POLICY INSTITUTE, ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF
        INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

        Captain Cassidy. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and the members
    of the subcommittee. I am Captain Sean Cassidy, first vice
    president of the Air Line Pilots Association International, and
    I represent more than 53,000 professional pilots based in the
    United States and Canada. It is an honor to appear before the
    subcommittee to underscore the tremendous contribution that the
    satellite-based navigation system makes to ensuring efficient
    and safe operations in the United States and around the globe.
        Given the vital importance of the Global Positioning System
    as a key component of this country's transportation
    infrastructure, it is appropriate, and indeed essential, for
    the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and this
    Aviation Subcommittee to be fully engaged in protecting that
    system.
        As the members of the subcommittee know, over more than two
    decades the invaluable navigation information available through
    GPS has enabled air transportation to make tremendous gains in
    safety and efficiency.
        Since 1983, when GPS became available to the public at no
    cost, the system has evolved to become a vital tool for
    aircraft navigation, all-weather approaches and landings,
    surveillance, maintaining required separation between aircraft,
    and pilot situational awareness.
        GPS allows pilots to fly aircraft using the safest and most
    efficient routes, which benefits every flight operation, but
    particularly those over the Atlantic and Pacific, or on
    transport on long-range routes, where diversion options are
    very limited. The enhanced accuracy of GPS also allows aircraft
    on parallel runways to operate independently, safely increasing
    arrival rates.
        In major metropolitan areas that are served by several
    airports, GPS allows us to analyze the entire airspace and
    operate flights based on a regional strategy, rather than
    airport-by-airport. These opportunities to improve flight
    operations, possible only through GPS, reduce fuel burn,
    decrease noise, and cut CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions,
    while making our industry safer, more efficient, and better
    positioned to meet future demand.
        Let me give you one example from my own flying experience.
    The airport at Juneau, Alaska, the State capital, is situated
    on a base surrounded by high terrain. Before GPS, we pilots
    only had two choices for approaching landing at Juneau, and
    they are both very challenging. The approach from the east and
    the one from the west both required fairly high cloud ceilings
    and a tight turn at low altitude to line up for landing.
    Without GPS, the terrain and weather conditions forced many
    flight cancellations.
        In 1996, Alaska Airlines pioneered a GPS-based instrument
    approach to Juneau, Alaska. The pinpoint accuracy of the GPS
    approach allows me to fly directly over the center of the
    Gastineau Channel, as depicted in the photo up on the screen,
    and stay clear of the high terrain surrounding the channel and
    the airport. The result enhances safety and reduces delays and
    cancellations.
        Since then, the Alaska Airlines has expanded the GPS-based
    approach to other airports in the country. In 2011, the airport
    completed more than 1,500 flights that would likely have been
    canceled or diverted, and the net result was $19 million worth
    of saved revenue, and over 210,000 gallons worth of fuel that
    was not burned.
        Across the United States the FAA has published more than
    11,000 GPS approaches to thousands of airports, including our
    own backyard here at Reagan National, where highly accurate
    GPS-based approaches reduce flight delays, diversions, and
    cancellations.
        GPS signals are low power by design to allow them to be
    based on satellites. However, this low-energy environment also
    makes them susceptible to interference from other radio
    transmissions. For this reason, only low-powered satellite-
    based signals have historically been permitted in the radio
    frequencies that are closest to the GPS bandwidth.
        One recent proposal to deploy 40,000 high-powered ground-
    based transmitters and the radio frequency spectrum that is
    directly adjacent to GPS bandwidth raised alarm as a result of
    the risk it posed to the safety of air transportation, as well
    as to emergency services such as first responders.
        Rigorous industry and Government testing demonstrated that
    if LightSquared's proposal had been allowed to go forward, GPS
    would be inaccessible over large regions of the U.S. at normal
    operational altitudes for airliners. Were this proposal or
    anything like it to be allowed to proceed, pilots will lose a
    tremendous navigational tool that is especially important in
    mountainous terrain, remote areas, and bad weather, and that
    supports a safe and efficient air transportation system that
    helps drive the U.S. economy and secure tens of thousands of
    jobs.
        Looking to the future, GPS is critical to our efforts to
    modernize the U.S. air traffic control system through NextGen.
    ALPA is a staunch advocate for Next Gen, because of its
    enormous potential to enhance safety, increase capacity and
    efficiency, and protect the environment. As part of the NextGen
    initiative, the FAA has already invested more than $1 billion
    in GPS-based technology that is designed to replace radar-based
    surveillance of aircraft. As NextGen continues to mature, GPS
    will become more important.
        The pilots of ALPA commend the U.S. Aviation Subcommittee
    for holding this hearing, and allow us to underscore the
    unmatched benefit that GPS provides to air transportation, both
    now and in the future. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you.
        Mr. Hendricks?
        Mr. Hendricks. Chairman Petri, Ranking Member Costello, and
    members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting us to
    appear at this timely and important hearing. And I do apologize
    for my slight delay in my pushback for my testimony this
    morning. It is good to speak with you again.
        The continued integrity of the Global Positioning System is
    critically important to the millions of customers who we fly
    every day, as well as to the tens of millions of other people
    in our country who rely on it. GPS will be the backbone of air
    navigation, both domestically and internationally, in the
    coming years. Interference with this accessibility and
    reliability would be catastrophic for civil aviation and the
    communities that depend on air transportation. We deeply
    appreciate the subcommittee's recognition in the FAA
    reauthorization bill of the importance of this technology, and
    particularly your support for the continued advancement of
    NextGen.
        With respect to the LightSquared proposal, the
    incontestable fact is that it will create widespread GPS
    interference, which will have ruinous effects on aviation.
    Experts have repeatedly reached that conclusion. LightSquared's
    proposal, therefore, should be withdrawn. This matter needs to
    be put to rest, once and for all.
        To be clear, we do not oppose the expansion of wireless
    broadband services. But any expansion cannot be permitted to
    interfere with existing or anticipated aviation GPS use, many
    of which will significantly enhance safety. We are dependent on
    that technology; there is no substitute for it.
        One obvious lesson of the convoluted experience with the
    LightSquared application is the need for a governmentwide
    policy that protects the aviation GPS spectrum. Without such an
    authoritative policy, spectrum encroachment will remain a
    threat.
        As the subcommittee knows all too well, we have
    historically relied on a ground-based air navigation system. It
    is a system that has become increasingly defined by its
    limitations. Users of the system have, for the most part, had
    to fly from one ground navigation aid to the next, often
    resulting in circuitous routings. This inefficiency wastes time
    and fuel. It also restricts the number of routings that
    aircraft can use, which in turn constricts capacity growth.
        GPS is at the heart of the ongoing multibillion-dollar
    NextGen program that will shift air navigation from that
    outmoded terrestrial system to a modern satellite-based system.
    This is a transformational change. All who are involved in it--
    Congress, the Federal Aviation Administration, airlines,
    general aviation, and the Department of Defense--recognize the
    need for that transformation. This massive effort will result
    in more precise navigation, safer operations, far more direct
    aircraft routings, better airspace utilization and airspace
    capacity growth. Because of these operational improvements,
    there will be substantial reductions in greenhouse gas
    emissions.
        One existing application of GPS has produced a breakthrough
    in the safety of airline operations. It has been referred to
    earlier here: the elimination of controlled flight into terrain
    accidents for large jet aircraft in the United States. Enhanced
    ground proximity warning systems aboard aircraft combine GPS
    information with onboard terrain databases to provide flight
    deck crews with look-ahead warnings of dangerous terrain. This
    has made air travel far safer than it was only recently, and
    illustrates the remarkable benefits that leveraging GPS with
    other technologies can achieve.
        The introduction in the coming decades of NextGen
    capabilities will be the real game-changer. Its integration of
    GPS with other technological innovations will create the
    satellite-based system of air traffic management that we all
    realize is necessary. GPS is the indispensable element of this
    long-needed overhaul.
        Given the essential role of GPS, the Federal Government
    must develop comprehensive safeguards for aviation's use of it.
    The stakes are too high for the passengers and shippers that
    rely on air transportation, the communities and businesses that
    depend on air service, and the airlines and their employees, to
    leave to chance our continued ability to utilize GPS to the
    greatest advantage. Consequently, we need a governmentwide
    policy that guides Federal agencies' responses when potential
    interference issues emerge. That policy must make clear that
    interference in the aviation spectrum is prohibited, and that
    other users cannot be permitted to encroach into the aviation
    spectrum.
        Domestically, the most obvious place to begin to strengthen
    governmental policy against GPS interference is the National
    Executive Committee for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation,
    and Timing, the PNT. The PNT is a Government organization
    established by Presidential directive to advise and coordinate
    Federal departments and agencies on matters concerning GPS.
        The PNT is chaired jointly by the Secretaries of Defense
    and Transportation, and includes equivalent-level officials
    from the Departments of Homeland Security, State, Interior,
    Agriculture, and Commerce. The Federal Communications
    Commission chairman participates in the PNT as a liaison. At
    the very least, the FCC should be required to consult with the
    PNT before taking action on any application to operate a
    terrestrial-based communications network that may affect the L-
    band spectrum, which is the band that GPS uses.
        On the international front, U.S. Government positions
    expressed at international conferences at which spectrum issues
    are considered, such as the world radio communications
    conference that is currently being held in Geneva, must reflect
    the importance of protecting the GPS spectrum throughout the
    world.
        We appreciate the subcommittee's interest in this vital
    issue. We are prepared to assist you in any way we can. And I
    would be happy to take any questions you might have.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you.
        Mr. Fuller?
        Mr. Fuller. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Costello. Craig Fuller, president and CEO of the Aircraft
    Owners and Pilots Association. It is always a pleasure to be
    before the committee.
        I am going to start with a statement I don't always get to
    make, and that is that we are in absolute full agreement with
    the Obama administration on the question before you today. I
    thought the statements by the deputy secretary of
    transportation were right to the point. We agree with every
    point that was made there.
        Indeed, the other members of the administration, other
    departments and agencies that have looked at this, are of the
    same view. There is only one somewhat reluctant regulator out
    there that seems not to have gotten this message. But perhaps
    today's hearing will help, although I know that is a topic
    maybe for another day.
        I have a statement I have filed for the record. It makes
    many of the points that have been made. I thought I would give
    just a couple of comments--a little different perspective.
        You know we all say GPS is extremely important. We
    certainly believe that. But in a way, GPS is pretty simple. I
    took off yesterday from Frederick, Maryland, in an aircraft. As
    soon as it was airborne--in fact, even before it was airborne--
    a small box in the plane received multiple signals from GPS
    transmitters in space. All that box did initially was identify
    those signals and determine precisely where it was. That is
    GPS.
        The genius of GPS is what it enables. The fact that GPS has
    been around for a long time as a technology that can determine
    precisely where something is in space doesn't mean that this is
    somehow old and not exciting, because the excitement in GPS is
    what it enables. The fact that that box, as I traveled, kept
    determining exactly where that airplane was in space--you now
    have two points--the box calculated my air speed. The box
    calculated my heading. The box calculated that there are towers
    on hills near Frederick, Maryland, that I was within 500 feet
    of. If I had an emergency of some kind, the box would tell me
    exactly where the nearest airport was, what the route was to
    it, and how long it would take me to get there, simply because
    it could receive this very small signal from space, from the
    GPS transmitter.
        I guess I would submit that while some may say, well, it is
    time to look to new technology for greater benefits, we have
    just begun to tap this genius of GPS and what it can enable. As
    you have heard today, it is absolutely at the center of NextGen
    technology. We have 5,200 public-use airports in this country.
    We couldn't possibly afford to put instrument landing systems
    in all those airports with equipment on the ground. And yet
    every one of those airports can have a precision approach to
    every runway on the field, using GPS capabilities. That is what
    it enables. And it enables emergency helicopters to go
    precisely to the scene of a crime, to a mountain climber that
    needs to be rescued, and know exactly what the closest landing
    site is for the helicopter. All these things are enabled by
    this GPS signal.
        So, I guess, from where we sit, my 400,000 members who are
    flying general aviation airplanes see this as absolutely
    essential. By the way, you have heard from two very respected
    members of the industry who fly large airplanes. The airplane I
    was in was a two-seater Aviat Husky, and it has this same GPS
    capability that airliners have.
        I think when we talked about this issue before I said it
    is--there is nothing wrong with a Government agency looking
    forward and seeing an opportunity and letting it be explored.
    And indeed, the Food and Drug Administration does that all the
    time with miracle cures in medicines. But sometimes they don't
    work. And I think what the agencies of the Federal Government
    have said is, ``We embrace the concept that is being
    considered, but the approach simply doesn't work,'' and it puts
    at risk all that GPS enables, which is not only what we have
    experienced for the last 20 years we have been using it, but
    the promise that it holds for the future.
        So, we very much appreciate the committee's interest in
    this. We certainly embrace, as I said, the statements made by
    the administration. We strongly urge that the Federal
    Communications Commission rescind waivers that keep this cloud
    over us on this important topic until further research can be
    done.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you.
        Mr. Foley?
        Mr. Foley. I am grateful for the opportunity to participate
    in this important hearing. I am John Foley, director of
    aviation GNSS technology at Garmin. The 9,200 people at Garmin
    are devoted to designing and building GPS devices for millions
    of users worldwide, improving their lives and safety.
        The GPS industry in this country alone accounts for over
    130,000 direct jobs. What was once a government-only technology
    is now fully woven into the fabric of our infrastructure. That
    did not happen overnight. It has taken two decades of hard work
    to mature it from a fledgling technology into a reliable force
    for safety and efficiency. Yet, unbelievably, what we have
    built together is now threatened.
        Today, virtually all types of aircraft utilize GPS for
    navigation and approaches. Loss of even a fraction of GPS
    reliability would pose significant danger to aviation safety.
    Four areas are particularly worrisome: loss of GPS while on
    approach would unsafely increase pilot workload during a
    critical phase of flight; loss of GPS would deny coverage at
    hundreds of airports and heliports lacking ground-based
    navigation aids; without GPS, the terrain awareness and warning
    system, or TAWS, would not work; loss of GPS means a loss of
    situational awareness for cockpit displays of traffic and
    weather information, including on the ground, to prevent runway
    incursions. Last, but not least, reliable GPS is essential for
    the FAA's proposed NextGen system.
        We can sum up the last year in four words: grant first,
    test later. Grant first, test later seems to stand the process
    of public decisionmaking on its head. This approach placed a
    severe burden on everyone's time, attention, and resources, a
    burden that should have been placed on those seeking something
    from the FCC. Everyone concerned about GPS reliability had to
    devote 6 months last spring and millions of dollars to testing
    the effects of constantly changing proposals. The tests
    revealed extensive interference. Anyone aware of the tremendous
    difference in signal strength between GPS and a high-powered
    terrestrial network could have predicted this result.
        Yet, despite all this, another round of extensive
    Government testing occurred last fall. The PNT EXCOM again
    concluded in a recent letter to the NTIA that various plans for
    a high-powered terrestrial broadband network would cause
    harmful interference to many GPS receivers. The letter noted
    that the FAA's separate analysis similarly concluded that such
    proposals are not compatible with several GPS-dependent
    aircraft safety systems, and that no practical solutions exist
    to prevent significant interference to GPS. The EXCOM stated
    that no further testing was necessary.
        Garmin has found many developments over the last year to be
    troubling. Why did the FCC make a far-reaching decision without
    conducting its own tests or spending time to evaluate Garmin's
    first test results? Shouldn't an applicant have the burden of
    demonstrating market readiness?
        Why were objections from the Departments of Transportation
    and Defense ignored?
        We hope you are asking these same questions, too.
        Well, where do we go now? We believe that the PNT has the
    right structure, the right stakeholders, including a liaison
    role for the FCC, and on paper should be effective. However,
    future coordination must be improved. The FCC should obtain PNT
    EXCOM sign-off when proposals before it potentially interfere
    with GPS reliability, the level of reliability that our
    customers have come to expect.
        Going forward, if the PNT believes that the creation of a
    post--of something akin to a national chief GPS officer would
    help ensure that coordination, we could support that. We think
    such an officer should alternately come from the Departments of
    Defense and Transportation.
        In their recent letter to NTIA, the EXCOM said that they
    proposed to draft new GPS spectrum interference standards. In
    response, we simply note that in the last year parts of our
    Government seemed unaware that, at least for certified aviation
    GPS devices, the FAA and Department of Defense standards
    already address interference. Any analysis in the future should
    recognize and build upon that work.
        In short, Garmin and other manufacturers have had their
    businesses greatly disrupted by the failure of Government to
    effectively coordinate. It has cost us millions of dollars and
    thousands of person hours that could have been better spent
    improving GPS products. If anything, for businesses, consumers,
    and the Nation, this year has in essence been a trial run. We
    have learned a lot, but the threat is still there, and we need
    your continued vigilance to help.
        Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you.
        Dr. Pace?
        Mr. Pace. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to this
    committee for an opportunity to discuss this topic. As you have
    heard, GPS is a global utility that is critically important to
    all modes of our Nation's transportation infrastructure.
        What I would like to do is provide a little historical or
    policy perspective, because some of these issues of threats to
    GPS are actually not new. There have been and continue to be
    many policy and legal risks for GPS, from funding constraints,
    the transition to modernized signals, international trade
    barriers, and domestic regulations. The most serious threats,
    however, are not to the GPS itself, but to the spectrum
    environment upon which it depends. If you will, the foundation
    on which all these applications reside.
        Every type of threat, from band sharing, segmentation, out
    of band emissions, noise floor increases, and reallocation of
    adjacent bands, have been attempted over the past 15 years. To
    date, all such threats have been removed or mitigated through
    government-industry cooperation and through bipartisan support
    from multiple Congresses and administrations who sought to
    protect the spectrum in which GPS operates.
        Four Presidents, two Republican, two Democratic, have
    issued policy statements regarding GPS. These statements have
    recognized the dual-use nature of GPS as more than a military
    system, crucial to a broad range of U.S. interests. Similarly,
    Congress has passed numerous bills related to the protection of
    GPS, and Federal statutes can be found under both Title 10,
    Armed Services, and Title 51, National and Commercial Space
    Programs.
        Regulatory processes for rulemaking are well-defined in the
    Administrative Procedures Act. I would say that the United
    States has sufficient law and policy on the books to protect
    GPS. What has been missing at times has been a willingness to
    enforce those laws and procedures, and follow the basics of
    good Government. Given the high stakes involved in preventing
    risk to GPS, it is attempting to look for a special policy
    fence that would automatically prevent problems from arising.
    Given the FCC is an independent regulatory commission, however,
    that does not report to the President, any special policy for
    GPS will require congressional action in a very complex area.
        Receiver standards have been mentioned as a possible way of
    allowing higher power emissions in bands adjacent to the GPS
    spectrum, or at least creating a more predictable regulatory
    environment for new entrants. I do not believe this will be a
    useful approach, and would suggest instead focusing on defining
    GPS spectrum protection criteria. It is a subtle difference,
    but an important one.
        The creation of government-driven design standards outside
    of those necessary for national security and public safety can
    stifle innovation. Receiver standards can also be a subtle
    regulatory means of sacrificing some categories of users and
    their applications in rapidly evolving markets. On the other
    hand, transparent protection for the GPS spectrum environment
    can provide better predictability for new entrants, while not
    constraining GPS applications.
        Finally, I would like to mention two areas of risk not
    related to spectrum. In today's fiscal environment, it may be
    tempting to slow or cancel the acquisition of GPS III
    satellites, or hope to rely on foreign systems to fill the
    gaps. This is a very dangerous idea, given our Nation's
    reliance on GPS and the lack of demonstrated reliability of
    foreign systems.
        A second risk area would be disruptions to existing GPS
    users as an unintended result of modernization. There is a need
    to explicitly confirm that changes to GPS are backwards
    compatible with the installed base. If not, there needs to be a
    transition plan developed with the relevant stakeholders in
    Government, industry, and even nongovernment organizations,
    such as advisory committees and scientific societies. We have a
    precious resource in that installed base that needs to be
    protected.
        Finally, the spectrum neighborhood in which GPS resides
    should be preserved, as you have heard from other witnesses. As
    GPS modernization proceeds, the U.S. Government should ensure
    that the installed base suffers no disruptions, as new GPS
    capabilities come online. And for the aviation community, it is
    not an overstatement to say that eternal vigilance is, in fact,
    the price of safety.
        I thank you for your time, and I would be happy to answer
    any questions you might have.
        Mr. Petri. We thank you, and we thank the entire panel for
    your contribution.
        Craig Fuller talked about this simple technology with 1,000
    and more, many more, permutations and advantages--I was
    thinking in my own area we have a boat manufacturer now that
    has a boat hook, it is a GPS. You push a button and the boat
    will stay perfectly still without an anchor in the ocean.
        And of course, John Deere and these people now can do--
    apply fertilizers to fields based on the characteristics at
    that spot on the field, and it has a huge return for the
    additional investment--make agricultural more productive, less
    wasteful, and all the rest. And it is all GPS. And this is only
    the beginning of how we can refine the application of
    technology for changes in circumstances on practically a 6- by
    6-inch basis across our country.
        You have heard the testimony of the previous panel. And I
    really wonder if, in particular, Mr. Foley and Mr. Pace would
    care to comment on it. You have in your prepared remarks--but
    we found ourselves in a rather peculiar situation in that I--I
    am sure good-meaning people who see a business opportunity
    spent some billions of dollars to help achieve a national
    objective, which is a good one, of making broadband more
    available, high-speed broadband across our country, and yet we
    had a GPS system set up and elaborate for a number of years,
    that needed to be in a quiet area, as was testified before. And
    it was well known, evidently, the price of that spectrum
    reflected that to some extent.
        And yet, that spectrum was acquired and the previous
    purpose was broadened at the staff level at the FCC, evidently
    leading people to think they could do something. And it is
    going to ruin a lot of savings of people who have invested in
    all this technology.
        So is this a staff failure? Or are people leading someone
    down the primrose path, or--I mean how--or do we need clearer
    fences here, explain to people why this--evidently the spectrum
    price reflected some knowledge at the investor level, as to
    what was going on.
        But was it a failure of the technical advisors of these
    investors to--or do you have any--I guess it is speculation,
    but maybe looking forward, how can we avoid this waste of
    resources in the future, or rescue the situation that we find
    ourselves in?
        Either of you have any ideas?
        Mr. Foley. Well, thank you. I think the main thing--and I
    think we have all kind of highlighted on that--is that we need
    to make sure that we protect the spectrum that we have. And
    looking kind of backwards, I think, at least from my
    perspective as a GPS receiver manufacturer, there are some
    standards for interference that have been in place for quite
    some time, back to 1996, I believe. So it was a bit of a
    surprise for us to see that when this new proposed system came
    up, it was actually putting out signals far in excess of those
    receiver--or interference protection limits.
        So, any future plans would want to--we would want to build
    on those existing limits. And I think that is what the PNT has
    said, and DOT has said. So, to the extent that we do that, I
    think that is the best way to move forward.
        And, just more generally, as I stated in my testimony,
    improved coordination between the PNT and the FCC and the rest
    of Government, to make sure that all the stakeholders get
    represented when new policy decisions are made.
        Mr. Pace. I think, Mr. Chairman--I think looking back at
    it, I think the fundamental error was in not really applying
    the intent or the past practices of the Administrative
    Procedures Act, and notices of proposed rulemakings that
    involve reallocation of spectrum.
        The argument was made that this was not a reallocation from
    mobile satellite services to a high-powered broadband
    terrestrial mobile service, that this was, in fact, simply a
    relaxation of some--maybe some outdated constraints and some
    waivers could be applied, and maybe some new efficiencies could
    be found.
        I think, in retrospect, that was too clever by half, that
    it was a reallocation, that a notice of proposed rulemaking
    should have been done, the notice of proposed rulemaking would
    have generated the technical data necessary to understand what
    was involved, and that one would have fairly quickly seen that
    this was a non-starter.
        When this originally started back in about 2003, the idea
    of an ancillary terrestrial component to mobile satellite
    service was considered a kind of a fill-in, a gap-filler, a
    relatively low-power system. No one was talking about 40,000
    high-powered cell towers blanketing the country. Nobody was
    talking about having an independent terrestrial service
    separate from the satellite services. The FCC was very clear
    over the years that they would not allow a separate, standalone
    service, that, in fact, it always had to be tied to the
    satellite service, and no interference with the satellite
    service would occur.
        Terrestrial broadband systems would not interfere with
    mobile satellite services in their own band, what they call co-
    channel interference, which is a really big sin.
        So, I think that the position of people at the time was to
    try to find some way to make these ancillary systems work. I
    think there was good faith technical effort. There was really
    no technical data available then. And then people gradually,
    gradually got into trying to change it into something else, a
    reallocation. And they did not do a notice of proposed
    rulemaking. And hence, I think people were surprised when they
    found out that when they actually got data, that it was a much
    different situation than what they had intended.
        So, I don't know how you prevent people from making bad
    decisions. I don't know if that is really possible. I do think
    we have rules and procedures that, if followed, would have
    protected us.
        Mr. Petri. Any other comments?
        Mr. Fuller. Mr. Chairman, I just have a quick comment. One
    of the reasons, seriously, for my enthusiasm about the clarity
    of the Obama administration statement today is that it should
    send a very clear signal to any agency, even an independent
    agency. And we really don't have to speculate. There are plenty
    of people who have issued press releases. There are plenty of
    representatives making cases. But no one has done the hard work
    of testing that has come to any other conclusion than this
    won't work.
        And so, I would hope that the administration, who had to
    clear the testimony today at OMB at the Executive Office of the
    President, I would hope the administration would provide an
    equally clear message to its appointees and an independent
    agency to say, ``If you have some special knowledge that none
    of us have been able to uncover, then bring it forward. Bring
    it to the Congress. Bring it to the industry.''
        So far, literally--we have had press releases, but we have
    had not nearly the kind of certainty that experts, technical
    experts in this field, have. And I think the process that led
    to the testimony today is sound and solid and represents the
    best clear thinking in this administration that the project
    should not go forward as proposed.
        Mr. Petri. Mr. Cravaack?
        Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
    great testimony. There is so much information that you have
    just given us, I really appreciate it.
        One of the things you have said, Mr. Fuller--I don't want
    to--I want to make sure that the committee understands it. With
    the GPS system, there needs to be no terrestrial navigational
    systems at an airport. So you could be flying, and if you have
    an emergency, just as you alluded to, you could create an
    approach to go into an airport to fly into it that would not
    have any other navigational devices to it.
        So, if you could expand upon that, that would be very
    helpful. And also talk about the minimums that you could bring
    this aircraft down to if you needed to.
        Mr. Fuller. Getting into dangerous ground, because I can
    talk about flying all afternoon.
        The interesting thing is that--and they will speak for
    themselves, but I think this is a topic on which we are in
    absolute agreement throughout the aviation community. The
    general aviation community has equipped with GPS avionics for
    years. The commercial aircraft industry has equipped with this
    technology for years, and is equipping more with the prospect
    of the NextGen technology being more fully utilized. All of it
    gives the ability, whether I am in the two-seater Aviat Husky
    or the Citation jet, or these gentlemen flying a commercial
    airline, that we have the technology to take us from the
    altitude--our en route altitude down to a couple of hundred
    feet above the center line of the runway using nothing but the
    satellite-based technology above the earth, and the GPS box and
    the related computers in the aircraft.
        Furthermore, it allows them to know where I am at and me to
    know where they are at, so it provides separation of aircraft.
    That is going to be an increasingly important feature with this
    technology. It makes it possible to do this whether you are
    flying to your destination airport that you go to all the time,
    or you have an emergency and you have to suddenly find a
    suitable runway nearby.
        So, as I said, this basic principle of being able to define
    precisely where you are in space continuously over time
    provides all kinds of enhancements.
        Mr. Chairman, I also have a sailboat, and, believe it or
    not, it also helps us. In case the anchor is slipping, an alarm
    goes off because it shows the boat is moving. So there are all
    kinds of possibilities.
        Mr. Cravaack. Thank you. And Captain Cassidy, as a pilot,
    can you tell me in regards to NextGen and what--some of the
    interference--what is your nightmare scenario? What do you see
    that the effects of you flying your commercial aircraft with
    LightSquared that could affect you, as a pilot, navigating down
    that gulf there?
        Captain Cassidy. Well, I suppose the nightmare scenario
    would be that I anticipated that I was putting myself back up
    in Juneau, flying down the Gastineau Channel, that I had a very
    highly reliable, highly effective navigation system, and
    suddenly somebody flipped the switch on it and then I had to go
    back to the old procedures. It would make me much more
    concerned about the safe conduct of flight, because now I would
    be--have a lot less of ability to have a very good estimate at
    what my arrival fuel would need to be at my missed approach
    point in order to get to my divert.
        And that kind of tails on to what Mr. Fuller just said. I
    think that one of the big safety aspects of GPS technology is
    it allows you to be more proactive and anticipate contingency
    situations further down the road. In this case, I would--based
    upon what the arrival weather would be, I would estimate what a
    safe arrival fuel would be that would allow me then to divert
    and go to an alternate, and also have the coordinates of that
    alternate, and also, on top of that, have the approaches built
    into that alternate in my flight management system so it is all
    there and I have a one-stop-shop. And that is an incredible
    safety benefit that is clearly purely the benefit of satellite-
    based navigation.
        Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Captain. Mr. Chairman, can I have
    indulgence, just a little more time? Thank you.
        Mr. Foley, in regards to LightSquared, obviously they are
    trying to get in the lower end of the spectrum. That is their
    initial business plan. They are going to try to get into--I see
    them trying to start working into the higher end of the
    spectrum, as well.
        Is their current proposal any different than past proposal?
    And if they do try to get into the higher spectrum, what does
    that mean to you, as your business model?
        Mr. Foley. Well, let me say I think the LightSquared
    proposals have changed numerous times over the past year or so.
    But primarily, operating on that upper 10 MHz frequency closest
    to GPS, all of the testing that has been done so far, all of
    the analysis has shown that would be just catastrophic. You
    will have widespread outages of GPS. The majority of the
    receivers that we tested just did not work at those types of
    power levels that close.
        Moving to the lower 10 helps somewhat, but all of the
    analysis we have done so far says that doesn't get a clean bill
    of health, either. There are still significant problems with
    that proposal, as well, you know, specifically, the terrain
    awareness and warning systems. We talked about ADSB operations
    at low altitude. It poses a lot of problems for aviation.
        Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, sir. And with that, I will yield
    back. Thanks for your chair's indulgence.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you all for the
    effort that went into your prepared testimony, and for your
    being here, and your enlightening testimony today.
        And this hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]