[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
OPERATION FAST AND FURIOUS: THE OTHER SIDE OF THE BORDER
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 26, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-100
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
http://www.house.gov/reform
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
JOHN L. MICA, Florida Ranking Minority Member
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
JIM JORDAN, Ohio Columbia
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
CONNIE MACK, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TIM WALBERG, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan JIM COOPER, Tennessee
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
RAUL R. LABRADOR, Idaho DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee PETER WELCH, Vermont
JOE WALSH, Illinois JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida JACKIE SPEIER, California
FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania
Lawrence J. Brady, Staff Director
John D. Cuaderes, Deputy Staff Director
Robert Borden, General Counsel
Linda A. Good, Chief Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on July 26, 2011.................................... 1
Statement of:
Gil, Darren, former ATF Attache to Mexico; Jose Wall, ATF
Senior Special Agent, Tijuana, Mexico; Carlos Canino, ATF
Acting Attache in Mexico; Lorren Leadmon, ATF Intelligence
Operations Specialist; William Newell, former ATF Special
Agent in Charge, Phoenix Field Division; and William
McMahon, ATF Deputy Assistant Director for Field Operations
West, including Phoenix and Mexico......................... 10
Canino, Carlos........................................... 23
Gil, Darren.............................................. 10
Leadmon, Lorren.......................................... 30
McMahon, William......................................... 46
Newell, William.......................................... 37
Wall, Jose............................................... 18
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Indiana, prepared statement of.......................... 57
Canino, Carlos, ATF Acting Attache in Mexico, prepared
statement of............................................... 25
Connolly, Hon. Gerald E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Virginia, prepared statement of............... 80
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 8
Gil, Darren, former ATF Attache to Mexico, prepared statement
of......................................................... 13
Issa, Chairman Darrell E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, prepared statement of............. 4
Leadmon, Lorren, ATF Intelligence Operations Specialist,
prepared statement of...................................... 33
McMahon, William, ATF Deputy Assistant Director for Field
Operations West, including Phoenix and Mexico, prepared
statement of............................................... 47
Newell, William, former ATF Special Agent in Charge, Phoenix
Field Division, prepared statement of...................... 40
Wall, Jose, ATF Senior Special Agent, Tijuana, Mexico,
prepared statement of...................................... 20
OPERATION FAST AND FURIOUS: THE OTHER SIDE OF THE BORDER
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2011
House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Darrell E. Issa
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Issa, Burton, Jordan, Chaffetz,
Walberg, Lankford, Amash, Buerkle, Gosar, Labrador, Meehan,
DesJarlais, Gowdy, Ross, Guinta, Farenthold, Kelly, Cummings,
Maloney, Norton, Kucinich, Tierney, Connolly, Quigley, Davis,
Welch, Murphy, and Speier.
Staff present: Robert Borden, general counsel; Steve
Castor, chief counsel, investigations; John Cuaderes, deputy
staff director; Carlton Davis, Henry J. Kerner, Jonathan J.
Skladany, and Jessica L. Laux, counsels; Kate Dunbar, staff
assistant; Adam P. Fromm, director of Member liaison and floor
operations; Linda Good, chief clerk; Jean Humbrecht,
professional staff member; Ashok M. Pinto, deputy chief
counsel, investigations; Laura L. Rush, deputy chief clerk;
Ashley Etienne, minority director of communications; Carla
Hultberg, minority chief clerk; Justin Kim, Scott Lindsay,
Donald Sherman, and Carlos Uriarte, minority counsels; Dave
Rapallo, minority staff director; and Susanne Sachman Grooms,
minority chief counsel.
Chairman Issa. The hearing will come to order.
Today's hearing continues the committee's ongoing
investigation into the reckless program known as Operation Fast
and Furious.
The Oversight Committee exists to secure two fundamental
principles: First, Americans have a right to know that the
money Washington takes from them is well spent; and second,
Americans deserve an efficient, effective government that works
for them. Our duty on the Oversight and Government Reform
Committee is to protect these rights. Our solemn responsibility
is to hold government accountable to taxpayers because
taxpayers have a right to know what they get from their
government.
We will work tirelessly in partnership with citizen
watchdogs to deliver the facts to the American people and to
reform the government's bureaucracy. Thus far, the committee
has heard testimony from ATF agents who reported that they were
ordered to let guns destined for Mexican drug cartels to walk
away from the hands of known criminals.
Today this committee will have the opportunity to question
supervisors of these agents who knew about and believed these
tactics were appropriate. The committee will also hear from ATF
agents who worked in Mexico and who were horrified to learn
ultimately about this program.
The task before the committee is very serious. The acting
director of ATF in a transcribed interview with investigators
has said that the Justice Department is trying to push all of
us away from its political appointees. Indeed, the Justice
Department continues to withhold key information and has
inappropriately interfered with this investigation.
Let me be clear, the Justice Department is not our partner
in this effort. They are the subject of this investigation, and
their continued interference will not be allowed to derail the
committee's work.
Last month, members of this committee traveled to Mexico on
a factfinding mission where we were briefed on how the United
States and Mexican law enforcement agents are working together
to fight the drug lords who are responsible for more than
34,000 deaths in the last 4\1/2\ years.
That effort cannot be derailed by the fallout of Fast and
Furious. One of our goals is to ensure that the Mexican
Government can have confidence in its partner here in the
United States from this date forward that we in fact will not
let guns walk, that we will be as open and transparent as
possible.
In the time ATF officials in Mexico have been increasingly
alarmed by both volume and location of weapons that have been
recovered, after reporting these concerns to ATF and Justice
Department officials in Washington, these agents were told
nothing about Fast and Furious. Again, our trip to Mexico City
taught us that ATF agents and, more importantly, likely DEA
agents and likely two U.S. Ambassadors were not informed about
a program that was causing an increase in violence and an
increase in guns arriving throughout Mexico, from Tijuana to
Mexico City to Sonora and beyond.
We have before us today witnesses who worked in Mexico for
years, and they will tell the committee their frustration about
being kept in the dark by officials in Washington and in
Phoenix and about what really happened as a result of Operation
Fast and Furious. They are going to have the opportunity to
tell this committee about what happens when the Justice
Department intentionally lets weapons flow across the border
and how Mexican officials reacted when they began to learn the
truth.
The committee will also offer ATF supervisors the
opportunity to publicly explain why they thought it was okay to
let weapons flow from Phoenix to Mexican drug cartels without
making an effort to interdict them.
The committee is eager to know why one particular suspect
was permitted to purchase 685 weapons before he was arrested.
We are also eager to hear justifications for decisions that
have created deep divisions within the ATF and outrage in both
the United States and Mexico.
We have yet to--we have not yet seen the end of the
violence from Operation Fast and Furious. The deadly
consequences of this irresponsible program could last for years
to come. Today the committee estimates at least 1,600 weapons,
including .50-caliber sniper rifles, are still out there
waiting to kill. The possibility that administration officials
perhaps at the highest level of the Justice Department approved
this strategy and are now trying to cover up their own
involvement by stonewalling the committee is alarming.
Today we are focusing primarily on the effects of Fast and
Furious in Mexico. President Obama is keen to talk about who
didn't know about the program and who didn't authorize it. But
the American people have a right to know once and for all who
did authorize it and who knew about it.
The ranking member and I both pledged the Terry family that
we would focus our efforts on finding out who was responsible
for Fast and Furious. Until we have those answers, the
committee will remain focused on these basic questions.
And with that, I yield to the ranking member for his
opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Darrell E. Issa
follows:]
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Mr. Cummings. I want to thank the chairman for this
hearing. And I want to thank all of our witnesses for your
service to our country and for what you do every day to protect
so many lives.
We have an important responsibility in this committee to
thoroughly investigate allegations of waste, fraud and abuse
and to follow evidence wherever it may lead and to base our
conclusions on the evidence before us.
The committee has now been investigating allegations
relating to Operation Fast and Furious for 5 months. The
committee staff have conducted 16 transcribed interviews of ATF
managers and field agents in Phoenix, Washington and Mexico.
During these interviews, officials at various levels have
acknowledged mistakes in the planning, execution and oversight
of this operation. That is most unfortunate.
Although key questions remain, I would like to make four
points. First, the head of ATF Acting Director Ken Melson
stated during his transcribed interview on July 4th that he did
not become aware of any allegations about so-called gun walking
until they were reported publicly. And this is what he said:
That issue had never been raised; it had never been raised to
our level by the whistleblowers in Phoenix that stayed in-house
down there.
Second, the officials interviewed by the committee did not
support the allegation that the controversial tactics allegedly
employed in this operation, such as suspending surveillance or
failing to interdict weapons, were part of a top-down strategy
devised by senior ATF management or the Justice Department.
Again, Acting Director Melson said that no Justice Department
officials ever told him or anyone at ATF that these tactics
were part of a new strategy to let guns go. He stated, ``we
never discussed those types of tactical strategies.''
William Hoover, the acting director of the ATF, is the
principal liaison between ATF and the Deputy Attorney General's
Office. He also rejected this allegation. When asked whether
these tactics were part of a top-down policy, he responded,
``no, sir, it is my firm belief that the strategic and tactical
decisions made in this investigation were born and raised with
the U.S. Attorney's Office and with the ATF and the OCDETF
strike force in Phoenix.''
He added, ``there's been reports that deputy attorney--the
department attorney general's office was aware of the
techniques being employed in Fast and Furious; that's just
not--that's not the case, because I certainly didn't brief them
on the techniques being employed.''
Third, although these tactics may not have originated in
headquarters of ATF or the Justice Department, the evidence
before the committee indicates that after receiving briefings
in March 2010, Deputy Director Hoover and other senior ATF
officials became seriously concerned about the number of
weapons being trafficked by the suspects. As a result, Deputy
Director Hoover ordered an exit strategy, those are his words,
to close the case and seek indictments within 90 days.
Although this exit strategy was developed, there were no
indictments until this past January. One question I hope to
explore today is why it took nearly 10 months, from March 2010
to January 2011, to close this operation and bring indictments.
Finally, nearly all of the officials interviewed by the
committee strongly supported additional law enforcement tools
to combat the flood of high-powered military grade assault
weapons from the United States into Mexico. Mexico is our
neighbor, our ally and our friend; yet U.S. weapons are arming
the world's most violent and powerful international drug
cartels, costing the lives of 40,000 Mexicans in the last 4--5
years.
While I will continue to work with Chairman Issa to
investigate the facts of Operation Fast and Furious, we must
also examine opportunities for reform. And I look forward to,
again, following the evidence where it may lead.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings
follows:]
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Chairman Issa. I thank the ranking member.
All Members will have 7 days to submit opening statements
and extraneous material for the record.
We now recognize our first panel of witnesses. Darren Gil
is a former ATF attache in Mexico. Jose Wall is ATF Senior
Special Agent in Tijuana, Mexico. Carlos Canino--I'll get
better in time--is the ATF acting attache in Mexico. Lorren
Leadmon is the ATF team leader, Field Intelligence Support Team
Southwest Border. William Newell is the former ATF Special
Agent in Charge of the Phoenix Field Division. And William
McMahon is the ATF Deputy Assistant Director For Field
Operations West.
And I apologize, as usual, for never getting names quite
right.
Pursuant to the rules of this committee, all witnesses must
be sworn.
Would you please rise and raise your right hands to take
the oath?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Issa. Let the record reflect that all witnesses
answered in the affirmative.
Thank you. Please be seated. Now, even for this committee,
this is a large panel, so if each of you take 5 minutes, we
have 30 minutes. If you take more than 5 minutes, the guy next
to you will also take more than 5 minutes. So, please, observe
the green, yellow and red light. Realize that any official
material or even additional material you choose to submit will
be put into the record. So you can provide us what is exactly
in your opening statement, which often happens, read in a
verbatim way, or you can summarize and get it all done in 5
minutes or less. It is your choice. And I appreciate your
staying within the time so that we can have maximum time for
questions.
Mr. Gil.
STATEMENTS OF DARREN GIL, FORMER ATF ATTACHE TO MEXICO; JOSE
WALL, ATF SENIOR SPECIAL AGENT, TIJUANA, MEXICO; CARLOS CANINO,
ATF ACTING ATTACHE IN MEXICO; LORREN LEADMON, ATF INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS SPECIALIST; WILLIAM NEWELL, FORMER ATF SPECIAL AGENT
IN CHARGE, PHOENIX FIELD DIVISION; AND WILLIAM MCMAHON, ATF
DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR FIELD OPERATIONS WEST, INCLUDING
PHOENIX AND MEXICO
STATEMENT OF DARREN GIL
Mr. Gil. Thank you, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member Cummings
and----
Chairman Issa. You're going to have to pull the mic close.
They're deliberately designed to be somewhat insensitive, so
you almost have to kiss them to make them work.
Mr. Gil. Very well. Well, thank you again for inviting me
to the conference hearing this morning.
First, I offer my sincere condolences to the families of
agents Brian Terry and Jaime Zapata. I'm deeply sorry for their
loss and for the grief that this ill-conceived operation may
have caused.
Also, I thank ICE Special Agent Victor Avila for his
services and sacrifices in fighting the narco-violence in
Mexico and along the border. I can only imagine the horror of
helplessly watching a brother law enforcement officer die in
the line of duty.
As a former head of ATF in Mexico, I also would like to
apologize to my former Mexican law enforcement counterparts and
to the people of Mexico for Fast and Furious. I hope they
understand it was kept secret from me and my colleagues.
Unfortunately, as a result of this operation, it is the
Mexican people who will continue to suffer the consequences of
narco related firearms violence. I have no doubt, as recent
media reports have indicated, that American citizens will also
face more firearms related violence as a result of this
operation.
I would like to provide the committee with a brief
description of my background. I received a bachelor's degree in
criminology from the University of Maryland, a master's degree
in criminal justice from the University of Alabama and am
currently completing my dissertation at the University of
Southern Mississippi focusing on international affairs and
security studies.
I've been in service to our Nation since my enlistment in
the U.S. Army in 1980. After service in the Army I joined the
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and later received my
commission as an ATF Special Agent in 1987. I then served for
23 years in various positions in ATF, including intelligence
and assignments and as attache to Mexico, until I recently
retired.
I chose ATF because it was a small organization with a
focused mission, combatting the most violent offenders in
America. During my first 12 years as a field agent, I
participated in or directed investigations that targeted the
worst of the worst. For the remainder of my career, I
supervised, managed and led agents who conducted similar
investigations.
Throughout my career, not once never did firearms walk from
any investigations I directed or fell under my command. This
includes my services as ATF attache in Mexico. To put it
bluntly, it is inconceivable in my mind or the mind of any
competent ATF agent to allow firearms to disappear at all.
Furthermore, it is even more inconceivable that a competent
agent would allow firearms to cross an international border
knowing that they are destined for the worst of the worst
criminals in the Western Hemisphere.
I recall my first days at the ATF academy where it was
drilled into us that under no circumstances would any firearms
in any investigation leave the control of ATF. Instructors
stressed that even if a weapon was lost by accident, the agent
was still subject to termination.
My point is that ATF agents don't allow and ATF as an
organization has not tolerated firearms to disappear. Yet
apparently that happened here.
After retiring from ATF, I started receiving inquiries from
former colleagues, including Special Agents Vince Cefalu and
Jay Dobyns, as well as from the press. They all wanted to know
whether I was aware that ATF had allowed firearms to walk into
Mexico. I advised my former colleagues that I was not aware but
I refused to speak to the media without a complete
understanding of the issue.
After talking with several agents, I became convinced that
firearms might have been walking to Mexico by ATF. Thankfully,
Congress and the media continued to investigate, and Fast and
Furious began to receive greater notoriety. Nonetheless I
remained reluctant to speak out about what I had come to
suspect since retiring from ATF but was never told about this
operation.
When I later learned that ATF executive staff would not
make statements exonerating my former staff in Mexico of any
knowledge of the gun walking aspects of this operation, only
then did I decide to speak to the press. My understanding is
that my initial interview with Sharyl Atkinson of CBS News did
have some calming effect on relations between the Mexico
government and ATF personnel in Mexico. To this day, I do not
understand the failure of ATF executive staff to provide their
own support in this matter to their personnel in Mexico.
During dissertation research, I came across a study
entitled ``The Waco, Texas, ATF Raid and Challenger Launch
Decision: Management, Judgment and the Knowledge Analytic.''
The paper's title could have been substituted ``Operation Fast
and Furious'' for ``Waco, Texas, ATF Raid,'' and the
conclusions would have been the same, namely poor management,
poor judgment and poor leadership resulted in disaster.
Operation Fast and Furious is indeed a disaster. I'm here
today to answer the committee's questions, but I also have a
few questions of my own. For example, who actually presented
this operation for implementation? What was the objective? My
staff was already working with Mexico in tracing thousands of
firearms recovered from crime scenes. Why the need to introduce
even more firearms into a country that is seized by narco-
violence? Why did ATF leadership fail to exercise oversight of
this disaster? And why were ATF personnel in Mexico kept in the
dark from this operation, which has now imperiled trust and
cooperation between United States and Mexican law enforcement
at a time when trust and cooperation is more essential than
ever?
During my tenure in Mexico, I observed firsthand the
extraordinary changes occurring there. The heads of the
agencies leading these changes are some of the bravest people I
ever met. As a result of their leadership, they have become
targets of Mexican drug organizations. I find it grotesquely
ironic that as a representative of U.S. law enforcement in
Mexico, my staff and I were asked to expose ourselves and our
families to the same sort of risks while speaking to our
American counterparts of integrity, rule of law, honor and duty
in policing. Meanwhile, members of our own ATF and Department
of Justice, for whatever reason, appear to have refused to
follow the same principles.
As a career Special Agent, I believe in the mission of
people of ATF. The men and women of ATF go to work every day
with a strong sense of duty. I hope that once all the facts are
known about this operation, that ATF will emerge a stronger,
more effective organization, focused on its core mission,
taking the worst of the worst armed violent offenders off the
streets.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I'll
be happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gil follows:]
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Chairman Issa. Thank you.
Mr. Wall.
STATEMENT OF JOSE WALL
Mr. Wall. Thank you, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member Cummings
and members of the committee for inviting me to speak today.
I am saddened by the circumstances that bring me here
today. As an employee of ATF, I know that this situation is an
anomaly and not reflective of the good work that ATF does in
the service of this country. And I am hopeful that this process
will shed light on what has occurred so that we in ATF do not
have to travel down this path again.
This year marks my 26th year of Federal service and my 19th
as an ATF Special Agent. During my years as an ATF Special
Agent, I have been involved in hundreds of firearms trafficking
investigations. These investigations date back to the early
1990's. I have seen firearms trafficked internationally from
the United States to countries as diverse as the Netherlands,
Canada and Macau. These international investigations were as
unique as the places to where the guns were going. However, one
aspect shared by most of these investigations was the fact that
most international gun trafficking is being done in the
interest of organized crime.
In late 2007, I became the border liaison officer for the
Phoenix Field Division. My duties allowed me to develop a
working relationship with Mexican authorities and to travel
into Mexico to examine guns or meet with officials. It was at
this time that the struggle against the drug trafficking
cartels was started by the government of Mexico. Large scale
gun battles and murder became a daily occurrence in Mexico.
To me and other agents, it became apparent that the level
of firepower being used was more than we had ever seen. As the
level of firearms trafficking increased, we in the Phoenix
Field Division realized that this was an arms race between the
various cartels, an arms race that could very well determine
the future of Mexico and tremendously impact our own country's
future.
Phoenix agents initiated many good investigations during
this time. These investigations served to disrupt the
trafficking of guns and prevented them from reaching Mexico,
but the urgency displayed by the agents in stopping these gun
traffickers was not apparent in the prosecution of these cases.
As we saw, some of our best trafficking cases languish at the
U.S. Attorney's Office.
In an effort to do more against this tide of weapons, in
the fall of 2009, I transferred to the newly opened ATF field
office in Tijuana, Mexico. There I worked closely with ATF and
other agents. I also traveled to some of the most heavily
fought for areas in Mexico. In these contested areas I examined
hundreds of firearms. Among these, I examined some that can now
be traced to the Fast and Furious investigation.
The majority of these firearms had been seized from
criminals engaged in drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion
and other crimes. Having firsthand knowledge of the reality in
Mexico, I was skeptical when the first whistleblower came to
this committee with allegations of hundreds, maybe thousands of
guns being allowed to walk into the country of Mexico. I could
not believe that someone in ATF would so callously let firearms
wind up in the hands of criminals, but it appears that I was
wrong, that hundreds and quite possibly thousands of guns have
been allowed to reach the hands of organized crime in Mexico,
and that this activity has seemingly been approved by our own
Justice Department and ATF management in the misguided hope of
catching the big fish.
Having had enough experience with gun trafficking
investigations, I can only imagine that once the DOJ OIG report
was released, a report that was critical of ATF efforts in
stopping gun trafficking, the emphasis changed to following the
food chain up to the leaders. What the persons approving this
debacle failed to realize is that the end does not justify the
means.
These firearms that are now in the hands of people who have
no regard for human life pose a threat to all of us, a threat
to which none of us is immune. I am especially concerned for
the brave law enforcement officers and military in Mexico and
here in the United States. I fear these firearms will continue
to exact a terrible toll long after these hearings are over.
Finally, I have a request of this committee that the
serious problem of gun trafficking not be forgotten. I don't
believe we need another toothless law. What we need is vigorous
enforcement and prosecution of those that would traffic in
firearms. A policy of no tolerance for straw purchasers and a
change in the sentencing guidelines that would dictate
mandatory sentences for these crimes would go a long way in
curbing this criminal activity. I thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wall follows:]
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Chairman Issa. Thank you.
Special Agent Canino.
STATEMENT OF CARLOS CANINO
Mr. Canino. Thank you, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member
Cummings and members of the committee for inviting me to speak
today. I want to thank you for taking the time and effort to
visit Mexico last month to get a boots-on-the-ground
perspective.
On behalf of Charge' John Feeley, I want to convey his deep
appreciation for your interest in Mexico and U.S.-Mexico
relations. I'm not here today to lay blame, point the finger or
assign punishment; that will be for others to determine. I am
simply here to discuss these events as I know them and let the
committee and the American people know what the ATF Mexico
Country Office, referred to as the MCO, knew and when we knew
it.
During my 22 year career with ATF, I proudly spent 15 years
as a street agent investigating violent crime and gun
trafficking and the last 7 supervising others doing the same.
I'm a recipient of the U.S. Attorney General's Award for
Excellent Law Enforcement, two ATF Distinguished Service Medals
and two Medals of Valor. I mention this not to boast but to
illustrate my recognized dedication to ATF and public service.
I paid my dues.
I can say with authority that walking guns is not a
recognized ATF investigative technique. These guns went to
ruthless criminals. U.S. law enforcement and our Mexican
partners will be recovering these guns for a long time to come
as they continue to turn up at crime scenes in Mexico and the
United States. It infuriates me that people, including my law
enforcement, diplomatic and military colleagues, may be killed
or injured with these weapons.
In my professional opinion, this investigative strategy was
flawed. It was allowed to continue due to ineffective oversight
in the Phoenix Field Division and possibly beyond. It's alleged
that over 2,000 guns were trafficked in this investigation. To
put that in context, upon information and belief the U.S. Army
75th Ranger Regiment has approximately 2,500 rangers. That
means that as a result of this investigation, the Sinaloa
cartel may have received almost as many guns that are needed to
arm the entire regiment. Under these 2,000 weapons, 34 were
.50-caliber sniper rifles. That is approximately the number of
sniper rifles a Marine infantry regiment takes into battle;
that's 3,000 men.
For the MCO, this case is one of the many ATF traffic
investigations with a U.S.-Mexico nexus. I would like to inform
this committee and the American public that I believe what
happened here was inexcusable and we in Mexico had no part in
it. We were aware of this investigation, but we were never
aware of the policy to walk guns in this investigation.
Since these questions have surfaced, I have become aware
that critical details were deliberately kept from the MCO as
well as ATF's Office of Strategic Intelligence. I have reason
to believe that we were kept in the dark because the ATF
leadership in Phoenix feared that we would tell our Mexican
partners.
Reasonable people can disagree on investigative techniques,
but there is no room for walking guns. This goes against
everything we are taught at ATF. And I hope the committee gets
to the bottom of these allegations.
In Mexico, ATF has been doing great work, and I'm proud of
our efforts in combatting violent crime with our Mexican
counterparts. The whole point of law enforcement mission in
Mexico is to liaise with Mexican government officials and
support their efforts to combat the transnational organized
crime that plagues both our countries and threatens the
security of our people. These allegations stemming from this
case that a few ATF agents and supervisors deliberately allowed
guns to walk have destroyed ATF's credibility with our Mexican
law enforcement partners and the Mexican public.
As this committee knows, Mexico is plagued by terrible
violence. Time and again, my Mexican counterparts blame the
United States for contributing to that violence. But paramount
to ATF, they blame us for an uncontrolled flow of weapons that
end up in the hands of Mexican criminals.
I do not endorse the view of the Mexican government that
American indifference is responsible for the violence and
deaths. I make mention of it because it is what I hear on a
daily basis in my dealings with my Mexican colleagues. However,
in this particular case, with these specific guns, I'm unable
to defend this position.
This case has made my life more difficult for me
personally. Imagine my shame when my mother called me on the
telephone and said, please tell me you weren't involved in
this. My mother is a very wise person. She may not know much
about law enforcement, but she knows right from wrong. Even at
great risk--even at great distance, she could see that walking
guns was a terrible risk.
The public safety must always come first. Please remember,
regardless of good intentions, walking guns will never be
right.
The ATF rank and file know this, and we have not been given
a satisfactory explanation for what happened. So what I would
like to say to my ATF colleagues is simply this: Stand tall.
Hold your heads high. We work for a great agency. Look around,
because there are heroes at ATF. We do not quit. We will not
lie down. We will continue to honor our commitment to each
other and to the public.
I thank you for your time, and I welcome any questions the
committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Canino follows:]
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Chairman Issa. Thank you.
Mr. Leadmon.
STATEMENT OF LORREN LEADMON
Mr. Leadmon. Good morning, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member
Cummings and designated--excuse me, distinguished members of
the committee.
My name is Lorren Leadmon, and I'm honored that you've
summoned me here today to serve as a witness for the citizens
of the United States. I'm an intelligence operation specialist
with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
and a law enforcement veteran with 40 years of dedicated
service.
I'm appearing before you today with a heavy heart, laden
with sorrow, to provide this committee with testimony that I
hope will prove to be useful.
First, I would like to express my grief by extending a
sincere apology on behalf of myself and likeminded ATF
colleagues to the family of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry.
Likewise, I offer an apologize to all Mexican law
enforcement officers and military personnel placed in harm's
way while confronting the violent criminals armed by the
targets and their associates in the Fast and Furious
investigation.
I started my employment with ATF in December 2004 in the
Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information. I was
designated to support ATF's Project Gunrunner from the
inception of the initiative in April 2005. In July 2008, I
became the team leader of the newly established Field
Intelligence Support Team For the Southwest Border. The team
works in partnership daily with OSII personnel assigned to the
El Paso Intelligence Center and ATF personnel working in
Mexico.
Each of the partners work toward a common goal to determine
the location and circumstances surrounding firearms recovered
throughout Mexico, identifying the criminal element associated
with the firearms, collecting intelligence pertaining to the
criminal elements and ensuring the firearms are traced. The
team coordinates the information with case agents and the field
intelligence groups. A major function of the team is to
identify the firearms trafficking trends and patterns and to
establish links between firearms trafficking cases and seizure
events in Mexico.
The team is dedicated to ATF's strategic mission as set
forth in the 2007 Project Gunrunner Southwest Border Initiative
Report that is summarized as follows: Working with its domestic
and international law enforcement partners ATF will deny the
tools of the trade to the firearms trafficking infrastructure
of the criminal organizations operating in Mexico through
proactive enforcements of its jurisdictional areas in the
affected border States in the domestic front, as well as
through assistance and cooperative interaction with the Mexican
authorities in their fight to effectively deal with the
increased violent crime.
The report had the following strategic outcome: Suppression
of the firearms and explosives related violence occurring on
both sides of the border through effective law enforcement
collaboration involving the focused training, investigation and
interdiction of the illicit trafficking and illegal use of
firearms, explosives and ammunition.
The Southwest Border Team first learned of the Fast and
Furious investigation November 20, 2009. I had located the
seizure event in Sonora. The Mexican authorities had recovered
42 guns from two transporters in a vehicle that just crossed
the border from Arizona. With the assistance of the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, I was able to obtain the
information on the firearms, submit traces, and the results of
the--ascertain the results of the investigation.
From those firearms, there were 37 that related back to the
Fast and Furious investigation. And the information--this
information became the foundation for the fact that all the
firearms obtained in the Operation Fast and Furious
investigation were potential crime guns and murder weapons
predestined to be utilized by outlaws and assassins affiliated
with a violent criminal organization in Mexico.
In the months leading up to February 2010, the Fast and
Furious purchasers were buying the types of firearms preferred
by drug trafficking organizations in record numbers. By this
time, they had purchased over 1,000 firearms and some of the
purchases were procuring them in lots of 10 to 20 at a time. At
the same time, approximately 200 firearms in this investigation
were recovered in the United States and Mexico.
The types of firearms and the volumes of the purchases, the
seizures and circumstances surrounding the seizures, along with
the information provided by our law enforcement partners fully
corroborated the fact that these firearms were being acquired
by a violent criminal organization in Mexico.
In December 2009, I began--to the beginning of March 2010,
I conducted numerous briefings on the investigation with the
ATF senior management staff in headquarters. During each
briefing, I provided detailed information depicting the
progression of the acquisition of firearms and described the
location, number, type and identity of the purchaser for each
firearm recovered.
I provided the briefing to acting director--the acting
director in the first part of 2009 concerning firearms
trafficking to Mexico in which he was briefed on the upstart of
the Fast and Furious investigation. He later attended one of
the field operations briefings in the first part of January. In
March 2010, I conducted a video conference briefing with the
managing officials from the four ATF border divisions; an
attorney from the Department of Justice and every one of the
ATF senior management staff, except for the acting director.
With the assistance of the group supervisor in charge of
the Fast and Furious investigation, I provided a briefing
outlining the amount of firearms purchased and the expenditures
up to the end of February along with the number of firearms
seized and seizure locations. The totals briefed were the same
as previously stated here. The issue of the firearms not being
seized by the case agents was brought up briefly and discussed.
From this point on----
Chairman Issa. If you could summarize, the rest will be
placed in the record.
Mr. Leadmon. All right. So, basically, what we are talking
about is by the end of it, we had the 2,000 guns. To date,
there's about 590 that have been recovered; 363 in the United
States; 227 in Mexico. And they're still coming.
I would just like to say at the end here, the strategy of
the Fast and Furious investigation did not take into account
the public safety of the citizens of the United States and
Mexico and blindly concentrated only on the goals of the
investigation. The blatant disregard for public safety has had
tragic consequences that will continue in the unforeseen
future. And the rest of my testimony you can see.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Leadmon follows:]
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Chairman Issa. I thank you very much.
Special Agent Newell.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM NEWELL
Mr. Newell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa, Representative Cummings and distinguished
members of the committee, I am William Newell of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. As a former Special
Agent in charge of the Bureau's Phoenix Field Division from
June 2006 to May of this year, I oversaw ATF operations in the
States of Arizona and New Mexico, which includes 552 miles of
the U.S.-Mexico border.
I appear before you today to discuss ATF's Operation Fast
and Furious, an ongoing and active OCDETF strike force
investigation of a large-scale firearms trafficking
organization. For the past 23 years, I fully dedicated myself
to confronting violent crime, especially firearms related
violent crime along the Southwest border.
Having served 15 of these years along the Southwest border
combatting firearms trafficking, I am keenly aware that this
violence, fueled largely by Mexico's drug cartels, poses a
serious challenge for U.S. law enforcement--United States and
Mexican law enforcement, threatens the safety of innocent
civilians and law enforcement personnel on both sides of the
border.
At the conclusion of every investigation of this magnitude,
a thorough review is appropriate in order to determine whether
tactics--whether changes in tactics and strategy are in order.
With that in mind, I recognize that in this case and future
large-scale investigations, it is imperative that there exists
an effective flow of information between the field and
headquarters elements to ensure that critical investigative
information is being shared timely.
Second, in retrospect, in a case of this magnitude it is
incumbent upon me to communicate a greater sense of urgency to
my staff and the U.S. Attorney's Office as to the need for the
return of expeditious charges.
Finally, I now recognize that in these types of
investigations, more frequent risk assessments would be
prudent. Firearms trafficking investigations are not always
easy to conduct for a variety of reasons, including a lack of a
Federal statute that specifically prohibits firearms
trafficking related activity, the fact that firearms, unless
altered in some way, are not in and of themselves contraband, a
lack of adequate punishment for straw purchasers, thus
impacting our ability to identify the leadership of the
criminal organization and the limited resources at our
disposal.
These types of investigations are made even more
challenging when none of the individuals in the firearms
trafficking chain are presumptively prohibited by law
possessing firearms. Consequently, in order to identify and
investigate the responsible higher-level individuals, agents
must use a wide variety of investigative techniques. This can
take time and considerable effort.
Throughout this case conscientious and dedicated agents
pursued numerous leads in order to determine who the
decisionmakers of this organization were in an effort to get
beyond the straw purchasers and thus potentially disrupt and
dismantle the entire organization.
Through experience, we have learned that the arrest and
prosecution of straw purchasers alone does little to frustrate
the capacity of the Mexican cartels to continuously obtain
firearms, as new straw purchasers are easily recruited to
replace those arrested and continue the cycle of purchasing
firearms.
Finally, our conduct of this investigation, as with any
large scale OCDETF investigation, was coordinated with ATF's
supervisor at headquarters in Washington, DC, and with Federal
firearms prosecutors at the Phoenix U.S. Attorney's Office.
In October 2009, the Department of Justice proposed a
Southwest border strategy to combat Mexican cartels, which was
finalized in January 2010 and which outlined successful
strategies related to the identification, disruption and
dismantlement of Mexican cartels through comprehensive multi-
agency criminal enforcement operations with an emphasis on
impacting the leadership and command structure of such
organizations in order to have a substantial and sustained
impact.
The DOJ strategy recognized the ineffectiveness of merely
interdicting weapons absent identifying and eliminating the
sources and networks responsible for transporting them. It was
with this guidance in mind that Operation Fast and Furious
originated.
To be clear, Fast and Furious was a no-step operation
designed to, one, identify the purchasers, financiers,
transporters and decisionmakers in a Mexican cartel-based
firearms trafficking organization; two, to interdict, when
lawfully possible, firearms presumptively destined for Mexico;
three, to share, when appropriate, relevant information with
United States and Mexican law enforcement authorities; four, to
develop intelligence on other firearms trafficking
organizations; and five, to charge, arrest and dismantle the
entire organization.
In this regard, there are some key points I would like to
make. One, it was not the purpose of the investigation to
permit the transportation of firearms into Mexico, and to the
best of my knowledge, none of the suspects in this case were
ever witnessed by agents crossing the border with firearms.
Two, our agents, in compliance with ATF policy, were
engaged in the strategic effort to determine who the
decisionmakers and actual purchasers of the firearms were in
order to disrupt the entire criminal organization. The
effectiveness of this strategy has been recognized by the
Department of Justice Office of Inspector General in a review--
in their review of Operation Gunrunner.
Three, we attempted to be innovative in tracking and
seizing firearms purchased by the suspected straw buyers. Four,
when appropriate during the investigation, we made reasonable
effort to share and coordinate the relevant investigative
details to our Mexican law enforcement counterparts.
Finally, throughout my past 23 years in law enforcement, I
have lost some very good friends to firearms related violent
crime. I witnessed firsthand the grief and despair suffered by
families who have lost loved ones in the law enforcement
profession. That is why I take very seriously my responsibility
and dedicated myself to doing everything within my authority to
confront and curtail these criminal organizations that would
seek to do harm to my peers and innocent civilians. I did not
discard that responsibility in the conduct of this
investigation.
The death of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry is one I will
mourn for the rest of my life, as I do for all those brave
heroes who have taken up the badge to serve and protect and
then made the ultimate sacrifice.
I express my deepest condolences to the Terry family and
may our Heavenly Father bless him and the Terry family through
this very difficult time.
Distinguished Members, I now stand ready to answer your
questions, and thank you for the opportunity to make this
opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Newell follows:]
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Chairman Issa. Thank you.
Special Agent McMahon.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM MCMAHON
Mr. McMahon. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Cummings, and distinguished members of the committee.
I am Bill McMahon, deputy assistant director, Office of
Field Operations for of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
and Explosives. Thank you for inviting me to this important
hearing.
Let me be clear from the onset, as the ATF senior executive
in charge of the West Region, I share responsibility for
mistakes that were made in the Fast and Furious investigation.
The advantage of hindsight, the benefit of a thorough review of
the case clearly points me to things that I would have done
differently. However good our intentions, regardless of our
resource challenges, and notwithstanding the legal hurdles we
face in fighting firearms traffickers, we made mistakes.
But know that I am very proud of the men and women who
risked their lives investigating this case. Under tremendous
pressure, they continue to work this case and many others we
have in the American Southwest. Please do not let our failings
impact their noble deeds.
Mr. Chairman, I was the Assistant Special Agent in charge
of New York City on September 11, 2001. Our offices were in the
World Trade Center. I have witnessed great human suffering
brought to bear by those to whom violence is a stock and trade.
This is one of the reasons I was so committed to bringing down
the complex network of criminals operating in our homeland and
bringing violence on both sides of the southern border. But in
our zeal to do so and in the heat of battle, mistakes were
made, and for that, I apologize.
Mr. Chairman, I am no stranger to the great and ultimate
sacrifices made by my fellow law enforcement officers. I have
lost friends in the line of duty, whether it was in the rubble
of the World Trade Center, on the streets of our communities,
or in the desert Southwest. Nothing hurts more than losing a
fellow law enforcement officer in the line of duty.
With that in mind, I want to express my sincere condolences
to the Terry family. And while the investigation into his
tragic murder remains ongoing, and because of this, I may not
be able to comment on that investigation, please know that I
honor his great sacrifice, and I am truly sorry for his
family's loss.
With that in mind, I appear before you today of my own free
will to answer to the best of my ability questions you have
regarding this operation and my role in it. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McMahon follows:]
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Chairman Issa. Thank you all.
Before we begin, I have been made aware that all of you, or
presumably all of you, received from the Department of Justice
counsel a letter that speaks specifically to your testimony
here today, and it's from Barry S. Orlow. Did all of you
receive that letter?
Mr. Gil. No, sir.
Chairman Issa. You did not?
Mr. Gil. No, I did not.
Mr. McMahon. No, sir. Those letters were only issued to
people that were actually under subpoena. And that is normal
for any case we have agents that are under subpoena by defense
or others.
Chairman Issa. Okay.
I want to make some clarifications. The letter infers that
you may not be able to answer certain questions here today. And
I want to make sure it is clear that where it says, for
example, you may not reveal any information covered by Rule
6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure related to a
manner that occurred before a Grand Jury, and it goes on, up
and above.
Now, we have a former 20-year defense attorney to my right.
We have a former prosecutor in Mr. Gowdy down below; Mr.
Meehan, a former U.S. attorney; and a number of other people
who have worked before they came here in law enforcement. I am
asking all of them, if a question occurs from any of us that
clearly would lead to something believed to involve
compromising the ongoing investigation or the actual chances of
convicting somebody, that we take a pause. I am not beyond
that.
If you believe, any of you, that you are asked a question
that in this format would, by it being open to the public,
would compromise the ability to convict any of the 20 people
now charged or others who you reasonably believe will be
charged, I want you to take a pause.
On the other hand, I want you to understand, every question
we ask, you are compelled to answer, unless you assert your
Fifth Amendment rights. There is no executive order or
executive branch decision that can stop us from compelling that
answer.
If you believe that you are protecting the ability to reach
convictions or to save somebody who is undercover in any other
way would be harmed by your giving an answer in open hearing, I
want you to assert that we need to be in executive session.
The committee can go to executive session at any time by a
simple vote of the committee or concurrence of the chairman and
ranking member. We probably will not go to executive session at
that moment but would pend that question until the end.
So understand our intention is to be very clear. We know
that in fact the cartels continue to operate. We do not want to
have material here unreasonably disclosed.
I want to make one other thing clear before we start, and
then I will recognize the ranking member. This committee has
been made aware that there were wiretaps in this Fast and
Furious investigation. That was not by the Justice Department
turning over material required by subpoena. We will not be
going into the details of any subpoena in our questioning, and
we do look forward to Justice providing the subpoenaed material
in a timely fashion they have not yet done.
But again, those are under seal. So their existence, which
was obtained and has been fairly widely understood, is no
longer under seal. But the details of those at this point,
including Kenneth Melson's statement that when he read the
details, he was sick to his stomach, is as far as we are going
to go on the details of wiretap at this time.
This hearing is about our relations with Mexico, what they
knew in Mexico, what they didn't know, how the agency did or
didn't communicate.
That doesn't mean that we may not want other information
from you in due time, but I think we want to be very careful
that today we have no reason to go into some of these areas,
and so we are going to avoid them.
With that, if the ranking member has any comments.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Just some clarifying items. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I
want to thank you for what you just said.
I think that is a very balanced approach to take, and we
are all concerned about ongoing investigations and putting
people in jeopardy that should not be as a result of our
efforts here.
But I just want to, there may be some things, Mr. Chairman,
where, say, for example, these gentlemen may not even know that
they are crossing a line. And I know that we are looking into
the Justice Department. I have no problem with that.
But if we have a situation where Justice, and I understand
we have some Justice attorneys here, where they think that
there may be a crossing of the line, is there a way that we can
at least pause and just make sure that we are not crossing over
into some territory, the very type of territory you are talking
about?
Chairman Issa. And I appreciate the gentleman's question.
Although I want that very carefully and sparingly used, and
the Justice is not an invited guest here today, if you believe
that a line of questioning is going down that way, we will
entertain a request from representatives of Justice.
Again, this investigation is about Justice. It is about
your bosses. We believe that in fact there are people culpable
for what happened for the mistakes, as Special Agent McMahon
said, the mistakes that were made, besides Special Agent
McMahon, so we do intend to get to those errors and mistakes.
But for the ranking member, absolutely, we want to make
sure that if somebody inadvertently starts down a line of
questioning, whether you see it, somebody from Justice brings
this to our attention, Mr. Gowdy, who certainly understands
what it takes to preserve a prosecution, Mr. Meehan or anyone
else, that I want this to be a little bit like the quality
control line on a Toyota production, anybody can pull the stop
if you see a mistake about to happen.
Now, that doesn't change the fact that this letter is a
little out of line, and it may be boiler plate, but it implies
that you don't have to answer. Yes, you do have to answer, but
we will use executive session or another setting to get
additional information so as to ensure that what we must do
does not get in the way of what you all must do.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, just one other thing.
Chairman Issa. Of course.
Mr. Cummings. I was just looking at the expression,
particularly of Special Agent McMahon.
I want to make sure that they understand what you just
said. I mean, can you inquire? Do you all understand what he
just said? All right. Very well. I just want to make sure.
Chairman Issa. And I use the English language so poorly
that sometimes my wife does mention that perhaps just because I
say what I mean doesn't mean that they can figure out what it
means, too.
But again, set it off at the right tone because this is
important that we get to where we have to get to, but do it in
a respectful way for the fact that there are lives at stake on
both sides of the border of many of your brethren.
I will now recognize myself for a line of questioning.
Mr. McMahon, you said that you made mistakes, that people
made mistakes. Would you like to give us just one of those
mistakes?
Mr. McMahon. Sure. Again, as I said, after a thorough
review of everything after the fact, I do see that one of the
mistakes that I made personally was maybe more thoroughly
reviewing some of the documents that were coming across my desk
on this case. And I think that has been brought out in my
review, and it is something that I know will not happen again.
Chairman Issa. Special Agent Newell, as recently as
yesterday, you called this, you said, Fast and Furious is a
phenomenal program. Now, it was, I hope not is. Do you stand by
that?
Mr. Newell. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Issa. This was quoted in the Washington Post. It
came out yesterday, that, and they quoted you by name as having
called this a phenomenal program. Do you think--did you at one
time think and do you think today that Fast and Furious was a
phenomenal program?
Mr. Newell. Chairman, that quote, I don't know the date of
that quote, it wasn't yesterday, it was--I am sorry.
Chairman Issa. But it came out. Okay. Let me rephrase the
question. This is back to my inability to work with the English
language. Did you ever think that Fast and Furious was a
phenomenal program?
Mr. Newell. Well, Mr. Chairman, to answer your question, I
believe that Fast and Furious was conceived with the idea of
disrupting and dismantling an entire organization.
Chairman Issa. But let's get into the details. Fast and
Furious was at its heart about letting guns walk. Your agency
knew that if you let guns leave--be bought by straw purchasers,
who you knew in fact were straw purchasers, including two
felons, and in the opening statement when people talk about
people that had every right to buy them, felons at that moment
that they bought them were criminals; they could have been
stopped. They could have been arrested. There was an inherent
crime. So at least in the case of two of the buyers, they were
felons. They bought guns. They committed a crime by buying
them. They were allowed to move on and eventually turn those
weapons over to intermediaries who got them to the drug
cartels. That was always part of the program. Do you think that
that was in fact, whether you say phenomenal, do you think that
that was a good idea?
Mr. Newell. Well, Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, I am
unaware of two felons involved in this case.
Chairman Issa. I am informed they became felons during the
pendency of the case, so I may not know the exact date. But
let's go on beyond that.
Even if they weren't felons, documents that we have seen
provided by whistleblowers show that in fact all along in this
program, you knew that the weapons purchased were destined for
drug cartels. You knew all along that the weapons--that someone
buying over 600 weapons was not buying them for sport hunting,
especially 50 calibers. So do you, and my time is running lean
on trying to get an answer, did you think it was a good
program? It appears as though you thought it was a good program
at some time.
Mr. Newell. Sir, as I said in my statement, I acknowledge
now that we did make some mistakes in this initiative, in this
program.
Chairman Issa. Okay. I think we all acknowledge that you
are right on that.
When I was in Mexico, I observed a lot of things. And,
Special Agent Canino, my understanding, I was told in Mexico by
a number of your colleagues--you were not there at the time--
that when they entered into the data base, into the trace data
base Fast and Furious weapons, they got a system error. In
other words, they didn't get a hit or a miss, they got a
network error. Are you aware of that?
Mr. Canino. Yes, sir.
Chairman Issa. So when your agents, your Federal agents,
with 20 or more years entered in the information that would
have allowed them to contact a special agent in Phoenix, they
did not get the information that would have allowed them to
contact the special agent in Phoenix; isn't that correct?
Mr. Canino. That's correct, sir.
Chairman Issa. So you were blocked.
Mr. Gil, and I have run over a lot of my time with the
other questions, but for both you and Mr. Canino, if you had
known about this program, were you or were you not obligated to
tell the Ambassador?
Mr. Gil. Sir, upon my arrival, I had discussions with the
Ambassador about arms trafficking being the number one issue.
The second call I would have made would have been on the
Ambassador. The first call I would have made would have been
directly to the Acting Director of ATF to find out exactly what
this case was all about.
Chairman Issa. So in my remaining time--and, Special Agent
Wall, this would, of course, apply to Tijuana, too--if you are
operating in a foreign nation as an American law enforcement
individual, as a liaison invited on behalf of a government, not
having law enforcement power in that country, don't you owe it
to the Ambassador to keep him or her fully informed of anything
you learn? Because you're not there to do law enforcement,
you're there to help them do law enforcement through the
embassy. So for all three of you, first three witnesses, isn't
it reasonable to believe that one of the reasons that you were
not told about Fast and Furious is had you been told, in
addition to the Acting Director, the Ambassador and the rest of
the State Department would have had to have been read into this
program considering its magnitude?
Mr. Canino. Sir, to follow what Darren said, we weren't
aware of the technique that ATF agents were actually following
known gun traffickers away and letting them go. That is insane.
It was inconceivable. You would never think that because ATF
does not do that. If I had known that that was, in fact,
occurring, I would have called ATF headquarters. And if we did
not get relief from them, we would have gone upstairs and told
the Ambassador, and hopefully he would have been able to stop
it.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, from early on in this case, various ATF agents
and officials raised concerns about the number of guns
purchased by Fast and Furious suspects that were flowing from
Arizona to Mexico. Mr. Leadmon, you testified in March 2010
that you provided a detailed briefing about Fast and Furious to
Acting Deputy Director Hoover, Assistant Director Chait, and
several others; is that correct?
Mr. Leadmon. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Now, Mr. McMahon, after this March 2010
briefing, Mr. Hoover directed the Phoenix field office to
prepare an exit strategy to shut down the operation within 90
days; is that correct?
Mr. McMahon. That's correct, sir. We did ask for an exit
strategy, a 30-60-90-day exit strategy.
Mr. Cummings. And in his interview Mr. Hoover told the
committee that this was the first time in his career he had
ever asked for an exit strategy, but that he felt that he
needed one because he was very concerned about the large number
of guns being purchased by these suspects.
Mr. McMahon, did you share Mr. Hoover's concern about the
large number of weapons in this case with others?
Mr. McMahon. Absolutely, sir. I think we were all concerned
about the large number of case. But this magnitude of a case
was something we had never encountered before in my career.
Mr. Cummings. And did you ask Mr. Newell, Special Agent
Newell, to provide with you an exit strategy?
Mr. McMahon. I did, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And when did the exit strategy envision
indictments arriving?
Mr. McMahon. We received the exit strategy, I believe, the
end of March.
Mr. Cummings. Of what year? Of 2010?
Mr. McMahon. Of 2010, I am sorry. And we had a 30-60-90-day
plan. If certain things were accomplished by 30 days, we would
be able to seek an indictment. If certain things were
accomplished by 60 days, we would obtain indictments. That sort
of thing.
Mr. Cummings. So you had more or less some sort of a time
schedule; is that correct?
Mr. McMahon. That's correct.
Mr. Cummings. Were you following that schedule? In other
words, were you checking back every 30 days, 60 days, whatever?
Mr. McMahon. We were actually--I was checking back more
than that. Bill and I were probably talking weekly about the
activity of what was going on in the case and how much closer
we were to completing our investigation.
Mr. Cummings. Well, according to that strategy from the
very beginning, what was the day that you expected, envisioned
indictments arriving? You did it in March, what, 2010?
Mr. McMahon. Correct. We were expecting indictments
sometime in the summer of 2010.
Mr. Cummings. Now, I want to understand why it took from
March 2010, when Mr. Hoover ordered the operation to be shut
down, until January 2011, when indictments were finally issued.
Can you help with us that?
Mr. McMahon. Well, again, we were working day to day with
the U.S. Attorney's Office. And it is a partnership when you
put a case like this together. And we thought we had enough.
Obviously, we have to prove that to the prosecutors that we
have enough, and that does take a little bit of extra time.
Mr. Cummings. That was more than a little bit of extra
time; was it not? I mean, you were talking initially, I guess,
about the summer of 2010, and you end up January 2011. You're
approaching a year as opposed to a few months. Is that right?
Mr. McMahon. It was about 6 months, sir, yes.
Mr. Cummings. Now, Mr. Newell, when did you eventually shut
down ATF's investigative portion of this operation?
Mr. Newell. Well, sir, the investigation is ongoing as we
speak.
Mr. Cummings. But at some point--I am talking about what we
were just talking about, Special Agent Newell.
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. There was a plan to shut this piece down, an
exit strategy. And I am asking you to refer to what I just
asked Special Agent McMahon, Mr. McMahon, about.
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. What was the plan?
Mr. Newell. The plan was end of July present to the U.S.
Attorney's Office what we believed to be the evidence that we
needed to secure the first round of indictments. And as the
exit strategy said, the 30, 60, 90 days was not a firm,
depending upon, you know, what type of investigative material
or information we get, depending on each 30-60-90-day
timeframe. So it was roughly about--I believe about mid-August
when we felt that we presented to the U.S. Attorney's Office
all the evidence we needed to secure the first round of
indictments. So in essence we probably went over a couple of
weeks.
Mr. Cummings. So, I assume, Mr. McMahon, did you approve
this going beyond the time period that you initially stated for
the exit strategy? Is that right?
Mr. McMahon. There was nothing to approve, sir. I was
getting updates from Bill about his work with the U.S.
Attorney's Office.
Mr. Cummings. So basically if he said, look, we need more
time, you just assumed you needed more time?
Mr. McMahon. And he would give me a reason why we needed
the more time. Correct.
Mr. Cummings. And so Mr. Issa, Chairman Issa, said the
purpose of the program was to let guns walk. And I just want
Mr. Newell and Mr. McMahon to be clear. We are trying to get to
the bottom of this. We have been going ring around the rosy
forever. What was the purpose of this operation to the best of
your knowledge, Special Agent Newell, and then yours, Mr.
McMahon?
Mr. Newell. Mr. Cummings, thank you for the question. The
purpose of this investigation was to identify, and disrupt and
dismantle an entire firearms-trafficking organization that was
linked to Mexican drug cartels. That was the purpose. And to do
so we needed an extraordinary amount of work on the part of the
agents to, in fact, achieve that goal.
Mr. Cummings. But it was not to let guns walk; is that
correct?
Mr. Newell. No.
Mr. Cummings. Go ahead.
Mr. Newell. No, sir. As I said in my statement, sir, one of
the things that I--that frustrates me to some extent is there
is that belief. And at no time in our strategy was it to allow
guns to be taken to Mexico. No, sir.
Mr. Cummings. I don't know if you heard Special Agent
Canino, but he was almost in tears and very frustrated because
he felt that all of this went against the very things that he
stands for and these other agents stand for.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I would just like Mr. McMahon to
just answer my question, and then I'll----
Chairman Issa. Without objection.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McMahon. I totally agree with you, sir. That is not in
the makeup of an ATF agent. We do not allow guns to walk. What
we did in this investigation was investigate a large group of
individuals that were breaking the law, and we were trying to
put our case together so that we could actually make an impact.
If we pick off these one or to two straw purchasers, they get
replaced in a day, and we have even more guns going into
Mexico. That was the plan.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now recognize Mr. Burton for his 5 minutes.
Mr. Burton. First of all, Agent Newell, what was the origin
of this program? Who came up with this idea? Where did it come
from?
Mr. Newell. Well, sir, it was based on--it was based on the
fact that when we--the OCDETF Strike Force was initiated, the
idea of the OCDETF program is to disrupt and dismantle entire
organizations.
Mr. Burton. Who came up with this idea? Was it you or Mr.
McMahon or somebody higher up the food chain?
Mr. Newell. Idea for what, sir?
Mr. Burton. For the whole program.
Mr. Newell. It is one investigation, sir. Fast and Furious
is one investigation.
Mr. Burton. Where was--I mean, the selling of the guns, or
the giving of the guns in Fast and Furious, where did that come
from? Who made that decision?
Mr. Newell. Well, sir, we have a policy that allows for the
transfer of firearms in order to pursue targets in
investigation, identify----
Mr. Burton. As I understand it, there was as many as 2,000
firearms; is that correct?
Mr. Newell. That's approximately--yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. And you were allowed--you allowed 2,000
firearms to go in the system, this Fast and Furious program.
How were you tracking those?
Mr. Newell. Well, sir, Fast and Furious--I apologize, but
Fast and Furious was not a program, it was an investigation
that was----
Mr. Burton. Okay. How did you track the weapons, the 2,000
weapons?
Mr. Newell. Depending on how the information got to us.
Sometimes the information got to us after the sale. Sometimes
it got to us through investigative means that firearms were----
Mr. Burton. Did you have a set of records that showed who
got them and who reported to you where they went and all that?
Mr. Newell. Through our tracing system we have a way to
determine when firearms were seized. And we also received
information from----
Mr. Burton. On all the firearms did you get this
information?
Mr. Newell. No, I don't believe so, sir, no.
Mr. Burton. Why not?
Mr. Newell. Why not we didn't get all the information?
Mr. Burton. Yeah. If you have 2,000 firearms that are out
there that are going in the program or the investigation, and
you're putting them out there, it seems to me you would want
to--if you are trying to make a case, you would want to track
those and know where all of them went.
Mr. Newell. Well, we did track the ones that we knew about,
yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Well, there were 2,000 firearms. Did you have
control of those at any time?
Mr. Newell. We seized, sir, over approximately 300 guns in
this case in the United States through our efforts. And the
other firearms we put into our suspect gun data base.
Mr. Burton. I must be missing something. You had 2,000
firearms.
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. You put them into the system, into the
investigation, correct?
Mr. Newell. I did not, no, sir.
Mr. Burton. Who did?
Mr. Newell. Agents in the group, agents in Group VII.
Mr. Burton. Okay. Who kept records of that? The agents that
were doing it, did anybody keep records who they were giving
the guns to?
Mr. Newell. Sir, I am a little--the weapons were being
purchased by a criminal organization.
Mr. Burton. Okay.
Mr. Newell. So when we found out about that information, be
it through weapons seizures, or through cooperating dealers, or
through other means, we would keep track of that, yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. So you have a record of all of the weapons that
were put into--that were sold.
Mr. Newell. To this day we are still discovering more,
because this was a very prolific firearms-trafficking
organization. When we first initiated this investigation in
November 2009, I believe the number was--they had already
purchased that we believe to this date, and the number changes,
something like 400 firearms. By the time we initiated our
OCDETF strategy to focus on the entire organization, I think it
was close to 1,000 firearms by the time we opened up our
OCDETF.
Mr. Burton. I must have missed something, because it seems
to me if there were 2,000 weapons that were sold and went into
the--and you were investigating this, and you were trying to
find the criminals that were buying them, that there would be a
record of all of the weapons that were sold.
Mr. Newell. We have a record of----
Mr. Burton. All of the weapons that were sold.
Mr. Newell. No, sir, because we are still to this date
discovering firearms that were purchased by these individuals
that we weren't aware of.
Mr. Burton. Okay. So do you have a record of the ones that
purchased those weapons, the individuals that purchased those
weapons?
Mr. Newell. The ones we are aware of, yes, sir, we do have
them.
Mr. Burton. You have the records of all those?
Mr. Newell. I do believe so, yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. And you're still in the process of making the
case on this?
Mr. Newell. Because we are identifying additional suspects
as we go, yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. I will yield to you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2802.005
Chairman Issa. Would the gentleman yield?
Yes. So let me understand. From previous testimony, agents
were there at the scene. Videotape or video observance, digital
video observance, occurred as they bought them. The agents in
many, many cases followed the suspect leaving with 6, 10, 20
weapons for a period of time. And then they were ordered by
this task force to break off and let those weapons continue
going. And you have charged Mr. Acosta, one of the 20
defendants, the only one that is not just a meth user, who was
straw buying, you have charged him with being trafficking.
When did you know that Acosta was trafficking weapons--his
intent was to traffic weapons into Mexico? And when weapons
occurred in Mexico that you knew Acosta had received from straw
buyers, and they turned up at crime scenes in Mexico, then what
did you do?
Mr. Newell. Sir, regarding Mr. Acosta, I believe it was Mr.
Acosta, sir, or----
Chairman Issa. Acosta.
Mr. Newell. Mr. Acosta.
Chairman Issa. He is the money man.
Mr. Newell. Actually Mr. Acosta in this investigation right
now is the head of the Phoenix cell of this trafficking
organization.
Chairman Issa. Right.
Mr. Newell. So----
Chairman Issa. And you knew he was trafficking. You knew he
was receiving these weapons. You knew these weapons were
showing up at crime scenes. I am just trying to understand, and
my time has expired, but why you couldn't seem to answer the
gentleman's question straightforward? You knew guns that you
had watched be delivered or bought to be purchased went to
third parties and ended up in Mexico, and yet this program
continued as though you somehow didn't know they were--that the
purchasers, the same purchaser who had purchased guns that were
already in Mexico, was purchasing more.
I yield back. Who do we have next? Mr. Davis is next for 5
minutes.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Leadmon, you have been at ATF for 7 years studying gun
trafficking on the southwest border. Before that you were a
homicide detective here in Washington, DC, for many years. Can
you describe to us briefly how the Mexican drug cartels get
firearms from the United States?
Mr. Leadmon. Yes, sir. I guess one way to kind of summarize
this, this came to light to me several years ago when an
individual describing it to me put it as follows: He says the
Mexican people have been trafficking drugs into the United
States since 1880. They have also been buying Sam Colt's guns
since 1880. So that kind of gives you a groundwork of the
culture and the reason why we have this problem, because we
have these firearms being sold, and the Mexicans are coming up,
these cartels, and they are purchasing these weapons. That is a
fact.
Mr. Davis. In your experience, what type of weapons are in
demand by the cartels?
Mr. Leadmon. Like I alluded to in my written testimony,
which I didn't get to finish, but there is a--we have actually
gone in and identified a lot of what we call DTO-preferred
weapons. And these are usually your AKs, your ARs. They like
the .38 Supers, the .45s. We have a list of them. And in this
particular case, the firearms are being purchased by--all the
firearms being purchased by these individuals were----
Mr. Davis. Let me ask you, why do you think they focus on
these type weapons?
Mr. Leadmon. Because they are weapons to use to--one, they
have to protect theirselves against their rivals. Two, they are
confronted by law enforcement in Mexico and the military, so
they need this type of firepower and that heavier firepower to
exist down there.
Mr. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Wall, you have spent the last 19 years as an ATF
special agent and have most recently served as the ATF
representative in Tijuana, Mexico. We have heard a lot today
about the problem of gun trafficking in Mexico, and I am hoping
that you can help me better understand the problem. Based on
your experiences in Mexico, where are the cartels' guns coming
from?
Mr. Wall. From my experience, the majority come from the
United States.
Mr. Davis. Are you seeing a representative sample of all
guns used in crimes in Mexico, or are the Mexican authorities
just maybe showing you firearms that they believe come from the
United States?
Mr. Wall. They make them available to us. In the last 4
years since 2007, I have probably looked at slightly over 2,000
firearms in Mexico. These are firearms that I went out, and
soon after they were seized at a crime scene or a stash house,
I went out and examined the guns. And of those 2,000, less than
50--let's just say 50 of them I could tell were from foreign
manufacture, meaning outside the United States, possibly from
South America, guns that maybe were tied back to even the
guerilla wars in Central America.
Mr. Davis. So you believe that these statistics are
accurate, that they are real?
Mr. Wall. I know guns, and I know what I see. And I am the
person on the ground, yes, sir.
Mr. Davis. Are you finding many of the weapons coming from
Central America? Some people seem to think that some actually
are coming from Central America. Do you think that many of them
are?
Mr. Wall. Some do, yes, especially with some groups.
Certain cartels have more of a tendency to acquire their
firearms in Central America or South America, possibly even
from guerilla groups. However, the other cartels, the ones that
I am familiar with, most of their firearms are U.S.-sourced
firearms.
Mr. Davis. So you think the United States is the main
source of these weapons?
Mr. Wall. Yes, sir, I do.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentleman from Utah Mr. Chaffetz for 5
minutes.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Chairman.
Agent Newell, when did you first become aware, know,
anticipate, or maybe even suspect that these firearms in this
program were being transported or transferred into Mexico?
Mr. Newell. Sir, I think we started getting the first
traces I want to say I believe sometime in November 2009, yes,
sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. So in November 2009 you believed they were
being transferred or transported into Mexico. Did that cause
you any concern?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir. It always does.
Mr. Chaffetz. But you say here the program continued on,
knowing full well that these guns were going to Mexico. You
said in your opening statement here, it is not the purpose of
the investigation to permit the transportation of firearms into
Mexico.
Mr. Newell. When we were lawfully able to seize firearms in
this case, and the many, many firearms-trafficking cases we
conduct in Phoenix and Arizona and across the southwest border,
we take every effort to stop that, yes, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. But in January, coming out of your office, in
a January 2010--I mean, you testified today in your opening
statement it was not the purpose of the investigation to permit
the transportation of firearms into Mexico. That's today.
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. Yet in March--I am sorry, January 8, 2010, in
this memo, point number 13, you write, or it is written,
``Currently, our strategy is to allow the transfer of firearms
to continue to take place, albeit at a much slower pace, in
order to further the investigation and allow for the
identification of additional coconspirators who would continue
to operate and illegally traffic firearms to Mexico drug-
trafficking organizations.'' So it was the goal, it was the
intention of the program to allow guns to be trafficked to
Mexico based on this memo; is that correct?
Mr. Newell. No, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. What is wrong--that is from your statement.
It also says in here, a number of different seizures in Mexico.
It seems very inconsistent, at best, to suggest that it was not
the purpose to allow them to go to Mexico, yet you know in 2009
that they are going to Mexico, and you put it in a memo in
2010, January 2010. How are those statements compatible?
Mr. Newell. Well, sir, if I may, and I am glad I am given
the opportunity to clarify that paragraph that has been
obviously well publicized. The wording in that, the way my
understanding was when that briefing paper was drafted, was
that our efforts to allow the transfer to identify additional
coconspirators was so that we could further the investigation,
take out the whole organization. Otherwise, these individuals
would, in fact, continue as part of a larger----
Mr. Chaffetz. So you allowed is it hundreds or is it
thousands of weapons to continue to flow through this program
and go into Mexico?
Mr. Newell. I am sorry, can you repeat the question, sir?
Mr. Chaffetz. How many hundreds or thousands of weapons did
you allow to be purchased, knowing that they were going to
Mexico?
Mr. Newell. Sir, the purchase was being done by a criminal
organization, a large----
Mr. Chaffetz. But you facilitated it. You allowed it; did
you not? I mean, that was part of the program, allow these
straw purchases to happen so that the guns could end up in
Mexico. And you know in 2009 that that is happening.
Mr. Newell. Sir, again, the goal of the organization, the
goal of the investigation was to disrupt and dismantle the
entire organization.
Mr. Chaffetz. I know. I understand the goal. But the
problem is you're purposely, knowingly allowing the guns to go
to Mexico, and you have information in 2009 that it is being
successful, yet you never put a stop to it. It is meeting the
goals and intentions you laid out in this memo in January 2010,
and it continued on and on. And consequently, there were
thousands of weapons that ended up in Mexico, killing people.
Killing people. That's the reason that we're here today.
When did you first know or think that guns were walking?
Mr. Newell. Sir, in this investigation, as best of my
knowledge, we didn't let guns walk for that perspective.
Mr. Chaffetz. When did you first think that they were?
Mr. Newell. Were what, walking?
Mr. Chaffetz. Walking, yes. Did you ever--have you ever
thought that they were walking?
Mr. Newell. Sir, the policy regarding transfer of firearms
regards the fact that we were trying to develop an
investigation.
Mr. Chaffetz. I know what you are trying. When did you
first think that guns were walking?
Mr. Newell. Sir, again, the goal of the investigation----
Mr. Chaffetz. When did you first think that guns were
walking? Did you ever think that? Do you think that here today?
Mr. Newell. I truly believe, as I have said before, that we
didn't intentionally let guns walk.
Mr. Chaffetz. Let's go to slide two, if we could, please.
This is an email from Mr. Newell to Mr. McMahon on December 21,
2010, 6 days after Brian Terry was killed. ``Since I don't like
the perception that we allowed guns to walk, I had David Voth
pull the numbers of the guns recovered in Mexico, as well as
those we had a direct role in taking off here in the U.S.''
So you're telling me you didn't suspect that the guns were
walking?
Mr. Newell. As my email says, it is about the perception.
There was--I didn't want people to think there was a
perception, because in my mind that was not the case.
Mr. Chaffetz. How were guns not walking?
Mr. Newell. Sir, knowing and proving that the transfer or
purchase of firearms is illegal are two different things.
Mr. Chaffetz. I am asking. This is 1 month before the
indictments and 2 months before John Dodson went on CBS News
with the accusations that the case was still an active
investigation. Why did you have Mr. Voth pull the numbers 1 day
after the Terry murder for the number of guns recovered in
Mexico and the United States? Did you know Fast and Furious was
about to come under massive scrutiny?
Mr. Newell. I did not know at that time that it was going
to come under this level of scrutiny, no, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. What is the difference--explain to me why you
don't think that guns were walking. You obviously thought that
others had that perception.
Chairman Issa. Mr. Chaffetz, could you summarize?
Mr. Chaffetz. My apologies. I am way over. Thank the
gentleman.
Chairman Issa. We now go to the gentleman from Vermont Mr.
Welch for 5 minutes.
Mr. Welch. Thank you very much.
Mr. Newell, I am also trying to justunderstand the sequence
here that some of my colleagues were asking about. As I
understand it, agents would watch a straw purchaser purchase
guns. Correct?
Mr. Newell. Yes.
Mr. Welch. They would follow the straw purchaser and come,
in some places, to another location where they would observe
that the guns were left. Correct?
Mr. Newell. Left. Yes, sir. I believe.
Mr. Welch. They were dropped off by the straw purchaser and
delivered to whoever the middleman was. Right?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Welch. All right. And then on a couple of occasions the
agents called in for permission to make an arrest, and they
were denied that permission because of the overall objective of
the plan. Correct?
Mr. Newell. I am aware of that in one instance, yes, sir.
Mr. Welch. All right. So the question I have, and I think
Mr. Burton and Mr. Issa were asking this, what procedures did
you have in place to follow where the guns went from that point
where they were dropped off to wherever they ended up?
Mr. Newell. I know we had surveillance teams out there that
their job was to do that, yes, sir.
Mr. Welch. But you got a report. I am an agent. I observe a
straw purchaser. I watch the purchaser go to a delivery point.
So the next step is following the guns from that delivery point
to wherever they may end up. Now, I understand how this plan
worked from the point of watching the straw purchaser make the
purchase, watching the straw purchaser make the drop, but I
don't understand what happened after that or what your system
was in order to follow where those guns went.
Mr. Newell. Well, sir, it wasn't my system, it was
decisions that were made in the field by dedicated agents
that----
Mr. Welch. No, no. There has to be a system. What is the
system? Whoever's system it is.
Mr. Newell. Well, agents in the field do the best they can
to follow firearms, follow loads and see where they are going
and----
Mr. Welch. I don't get that. Trained law--you guys have
plans, right, about how you're going to execute a complicated
and very dangerous situation? So I am just wondering what it
is. A load of assault rifles has been delivered to a middleman.
Was there an explicit plan by which you would follow where
those guns went after the drop to the middleman?
Mr. Newell. The best of my knowledge, we did everything
possible to, in fact, do that with the resources we had out in
the field.
Mr. Welch. Right. But I am asking how you did it.
Mr. Newell. With surveillance, with agents on the ground,
boots on the ground.
Mr. Welch. Well, if you had boots on the ground, how is it
that you wouldn't know where those guns went from the drop to
the next step?
Mr. Newell. Because in some instances guns would go to a
home. And unless we had any--unless we had any lawful basis to
approach those individuals, we sat on surveillance as much as
resources would allow. And then other priorities, other cases
would take them away from that house.
Mr. Welch. All right. So then basically there was not
either the resources to follow those guns from the drop to
wherever they ended up.
Mr. Newell. Not in every instance, but in some instances,
yes, sir.
Mr. Welch. All right. Mr. Leadmon, in your testimony you
discussed the 2007 Project Gunrunner. You highlighted the
strategic mission of the ATF and the need to cooperate with
domestic and international law enforcement partners to deny the
tools of the trade to the firearms-trafficking infrastructure.
Can you clarify one important issue about what happened? Do you
have an opinion that it was a mistake in this operation to
focus on the Mexican cartels, the criminal organizations that
are trafficking firearms? Or was it a mistake or a failure to
prioritize public safety as ATF targeted the cartels?
Mr. Leadmon. It is not an opinion, it is my observation.
What I will say is that I think there is a term here, everybody
said, ``Let these guns walk.'' I personally believe our agents
walked away from the guns as they were traveling down the road,
similar to seeing something off at a train station.
To skirt around this, to me, is ludicrous. These firearms,
right, like I testified earlier, were crime guns, murder
weapons. We knew it in 2009. We knew that based on our
information out of Mexico. We knew where these guns were ending
up by our partners in Mexico down there recovering them and
researching them. There is no doubt that this was going to a
criminal organization as early as 2009. As every day went on
thereafter, it became more and more substantiated.
My thing here is we have been talking about lawful ways of
arresting or going in. Well, we have an obligation to the
Mexican people and the U.S. Government and the citizens of the
United States. There is other ways to stop the flow of guns
other than arresting people. You can go and seize the guns. You
don't have to arrest them. You can approach the people, right,
and put an obstacle in front of them so they will stop the
purchase of these firearms, instead of allowing thousands of
guns to be purchased and try to tie the cases to make it a big
case because you have big numbers.
What we should have done is broke these people down as they
came up before we let these guns go south, and then through our
intelligence assets, and through our hard work of our other
agents and networking from the other divisions, we could tie
these cases together and go after and get the big people.
That's how our law enforcement partners do it, and that's how
we should do it.
Mr. Welch. Thank you.
My time has expired. I yield back.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentleman from South Carolina Mr. Gowdy
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gowdy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Special Agent Newell, you said firearms are not in and of
themselves contraband. That's true unless they are sold to,
possessed by, or acquired by a prohibited person, which would
include a straw purchaser. So my question to you is this: Did
ATF have contemporaneous or preknowledge of any straw
purchasers purchasing weapons in Arizona?
Mr. Newell. Well, sir, straw purchasers are not prohibited
individuals unless they have been convicted of some crime.
Mr. Gowdy. No, it is against the law to purchase a gun
knowing you're going to transfer it to someone else to
therefore get around the fact that the person you're going to
give it to is a prohibited person. Agreed?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. Okay. Well, that's a straw purchaser. Someone
who is going to give the gun to a prohibited person is a straw
purchaser.
Mr. Newell. Yes.
Mr. Gowdy. So now that we have that cleared up, did you
know that anyone who was acquiring firearms from firearms
dealers in Arizona were straw purchasers? Contemporaneous with
the acquisition, did ATF know it?
Mr. Newell. We have to prove that, in fact, that it's a
violation, yes, sir. We presented to the U.S. Attorney's Office
evidence that we believed that these individuals were, in fact,
straw purchasers.
Mr. Gowdy. Let's do it another way. The very first weapon
recovered in Mexico through a trace, did you go back to the
purchaser of that weapon and interrogate them?
Mr. Newell. I did not, no, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. Did anyone with ATF?
Mr. Newell. I am not aware of that, no, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. Why not?
Mr. Newell. I don't know, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. You've got a gun that was purchased in Mexico--
that was purchased in the United States that makes it into
Mexico. You know through your trace that that's the gun. Did
you go back to the person who purchased it? That's an old-
fashioned investigative technique. It is not as complicated as
letting guns walk. It is more effective, though, to actually go
interrogate the person who made the acquisition. Did you do
that?
Mr. Newell. Sir, as I stated earlier, in this
investigation, realizing that if you take out one straw
purchaser you're not making an impact on the greater
organization----
Mr. Gowdy. I want to ask you about the greater
investigation, because I have read now four different times you
have said ``disrupt, dismantle, destroy.''
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. How are you going to extradite drug kingpins
from Mexico?
Mr. Newell. We don't have plans do that, no, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. So once the guns make it to Mexico, there was
nothing you were going to do about those drug kingpins.
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir, there was.
Mr. Gowdy. What?
Mr. Newell. One of the things we wanted to do was as soon
as we had solid information on who the drug kingpin, if you
will, was, to share that information with Mexico.
Mr. Gowdy. But you didn't share the information with Mexico
ahead of time. So they are supposed to trust American law
enforcement, who has been conducting an investigation and knows
firearms are going into Mexico, and you tell them after the
fact, and they are supposed to thank you and be partners in
this endeavor?
Mr. Newell. Sir, it wasn't only until we had information on
who the specific recipient or the drug kingpin was that we felt
it was prudent to share that information, because we weren't--
--
Mr. Gowdy. How are you going to dismantle Mexican drug
cartels if you are not going to extradite the kingpins back to
the United States?
Mr. Newell. Because we hoped that the Mexican officials
would, in fact, prosecute them for that.
Mr. Gowdy. So you're doing this to help the Mexican
criminal justice system. You're just not going to tell the
Mexican criminal justice system about it.
Mr. Newell. No, sir, I disagree with that premise.
Mr. Gowdy. That's exactly what you just said, Special
Agent, that you were going to tell them about it after the
fact.
Mr. Newell. We had to know it first. We had to know who the
drug--we had--through this investigation, and as it continues--
--
Mr. Gowdy. Okay. You have the first trace that tells you a
U.S. gun is found in Mexico. Why did you not go interview the
person who acquired the gun? Why not do the investigation the
old-fashioned way, with car stops, with search warrants, with
active surveillance? Why do it this way? It was never going to
work.
Mr. Newell. Well, again, years of experience have shown us,
sir, that removing one straw purchaser will not have an effect
on the larger investigation.
Mr. Gowdy. Well, Special Agent, the only way it possibly
could have worked would have been if Mexico had extradited
these kingpins. If you want to disrupt, dismantle, destroy, the
only way it could work is if you told Mexico--or I would have
settled for you just telling your own fellow agents about it
ahead of time. Because ATF and Mexico didn't know about it, did
they?
Mr. Newell. Well, sir----
Mr. Gowdy. Yes or no? Did Mexico ATF office know about
this?
Mr. Newell. They were aware of the investigation, yes, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. They were aware that weapons were going into
Mexico and you knew about it?
Mr. Newell. That we knew about it? Sir, weapons go into
Mexico all the time.
Mr. Gowdy. From straw purchasers that you knew about. Let
me ask you this: If Mexico were to ask us to extradite the law
enforcement officers who knowingly aided and abetted weapons
going into Mexico, what would your reaction to that be?
Mr. Newell. I would explain to them that our concern in an
investigation of this type is to take out the whole
organization so we have the greatest impact possible. If you
just take off one straw purchaser, you're not having an impact
on the greater effort, which is the whole organization.
Mr. Gowdy. Special Agent, my time is up. I will just say
this in conclusion. I worked with ATF for 6 years directly. I
worked with ATF indirectly for 10 years as just a State D.A.
This is one of the saddest days in my 6 months in Congress. It
may be the saddest day. ATF has a wonderful reputation in South
Carolina. We never once contemplated letting firearms walk
ever. A first-year Quantico or Glencoe person knows that.
I will yield back.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now recognize the gentlelady from California Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Special Agent Newell, what were you thinking? I think
that's what we are all scratching our heads about here today.
And the embarrassment that you have put on ATF generally, an
outstanding organization of line agents, is deeply troubling to
all of us. But what I am really concerned about is but for the
fact that there were whistleblowers, but for the fact those
whistleblowers went to Senator Grassley, but for the fact CBS
did an investigation, this travesty would still be going on
today. That's my big objection.
Who did you tell? Did Mr. Melson know about this?
Mr. Newell. About the investigation?
Ms. Speier. Yes.
Mr. Newell. My belief is yes. I briefed him and----
Ms. Speier. When did he know about it? When you started it?
When you were conceiving it?
Mr. Newell. I am not exactly sure when the first time he
was made aware of the investigation.
Ms. Speier. Who did you make aware of the idea of this
investigation?
Mr. Newell. Well, when the investigation first initiated,
in, I believe, November, we sent up--or I sent up a briefing
paper, we sent up a briefing paper, I believe, the first part
of December.
Ms. Speier. To whom?
Mr. Newell. To my supervisor.
Ms. Speier. Who is?
Mr. Newell. Mr. McMahon.
Ms. Speier. And, Mr. McMahon, what did you then do?
Mr. McMahon. When I was briefed on the initiation of this
investigation, I passed it up the chain. This is the initiation
of an investigation. We had a--pretty early on, that is why the
title Fast and Furious came on it, we had a large group of
people that were buying a lot of guns in a short period of
time. And then we were having recoveries in Mexico. What we had
was purchases in the United States, recoveries in Mexico. We
didn't have what was in between, and that's what the agents in
Phoenix were trying to prove.
Ms. Speier. So you all thought this was a great idea.
Mr. McMahon. To stop guns going into Mexico, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Speier. No, this particular investigation of letting
guns walk into Mexico.
Mr. McMahon. We didn't have an investigation of letting
guns walk. We had an investigation into a group of individuals
who were breaking the law and trafficking guns into Mexico.
Ms. Speier. All right. So 2,000 guns walked into Mexico.
You have retrieved maybe 300; is that correct?
Mr. Newell. I believe the current number is roughly 600
firearms have been recovered.
Ms. Speier. And my understanding is that the way you were,
``surveilling them,'' is that you were putting GPS systems on
them; is that correct?
Mr. Newell. On the firearms or on vehicles? Depends on--we
used all kinds of investigative techniques to further the
investigation to try to determine if, in fact, the firearms
were going into Mexico.
Chairman Issa. Would the gentlelady yield? We have previous
testimony that three times and only three times were any
electronic tracking devices placed on the products.
Ms. Speier. Only three times?
Chairman Issa. That's correct.
Ms. Speier. And that those batteries ran out is what I was
told as well; Is that correct?
Chairman Issa. Exactly.
Ms. Speier. All right. What Peter Forcelli, the special
agent, testified earlier said that in his opinion, you know, if
we monitor money being wired to the Middle East, and we take
down actual information about people who buy Sudafed, because
we are concerned about meth labs, we know that gunrunning is
coming from the United States into Mexico, that is the source
of it, why aren't we required--why aren't we requiring people
who purchase multiple long arms from reporting that? And my
question to each of you is should we be doing that? We do it
for things like Sudafed, but we don't do it for long arms.
Mr. McMahon. I believe that we put forward a demand letter
requiring gun dealers along the southwest border to report the
sale of two or more firearms that fire from the shoulder at
greater than .22-caliber that accept a detachable magazine.
Ms. Speier. What's the penalty if they don't?
Mr. McMahon. If the FFL doesn't? It would be part of the
revocation process if they don't follow our rules.
Ms. Speier. They would lose their license.
Mr. McMahon. Correct.
Ms. Speier. That's like a slap on the hand, isn't it?
Mr. McMahon. That's all that we have at our disposal.
Ms. Speier. I am asking you if there should be a law passed
requiring the reporting of long arms that exceed a certain
number.
Mr. McMahon. I think that is the job of this body.
Ms. Speier. No, we are asking you. You are out in the
field. You are telling us that the gunrunning into Mexico, the
drug cartels are getting those guns from the United States.
They are originating here. So I want everyone on the panel to
just answer that question.
Mr. McMahon. Demand letter three that is going forward is
going to be a great tool for us to combat this.
Ms. Speier. All right. Mr. Newell.
Mr. Newell. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Yes. Yes, any tool that we have to assist us in detecting
early on, to detect, help us assist to detect early on a
firearms-trafficking organization that is trafficking in large
quantities of multiple--of assault-type weapons would help.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
Next.
Mr. Leadmon. Yes, ma'am. I think that if we are going to do
this, it should be in a balanced approach, maybe through
legislation. But we also have to take in mind that we do have
Second Amendment rights. And this needs to be balanced. And I
think that we should approach this with caution.
Ms. Speier. What does that mean? Either you think we should
have one or we shouldn't.
Mr. Leadmon. That means to me that there is a common good
in this idea and this legislation, but there is a
responsibility for us to balance it also.
Ms. Speier. Next?
Mr. Canino. Yes, ma'am, it would help.
Mr. Wall. Yes, ma'am. I agree with Mr. Leadmon, though, we
need to balance it with the Second Amendment rights. We require
purchases of handguns within--two or more handguns within a 5-
day period to be reported to us. However, the situation in
Mexico right now and along the southwest border, I think it is
an exigency that we have some type of--well, some help along
that line with the assault weapons or the long guns.
Mr. Gil. I would disagree to some extent that that would be
beneficial. I would rather have a relationship with the Federal
firearms licensee for when an individual does come in and wants
to purchase multiple weapons of any sort, handguns or long
guns, that they would work with us on that. And that would
provide us some information targeting those individuals. So I
would somewhat disagree with that.
Ms. Speier. My time has expired.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentlelady.
We now go to the gentleman Mr. Walberg for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you for
also giving us the opportunity to go to Mexico City and meet
with the officials down there, both our hardworking agents and
agencies, as well as the Federal police in Mexico. I just--
hearing some of the responses this morning, I am kind of
surprised that the Mexico Federal Police met us with such
openness in providing information to us of what they are
attempting to do when it is apparent we let them down.
I guess to try to come at it from the other side to get
some answers, let me ask Mr. Canino--and thank you for your
service----
Mr. Canino. Thank you.
Mr. Walberg. When did you first learn that a large number
of guns were being seized in Mexico and traced back to Phoenix?
Mr. Canino. Well, sir, it was around November or so. My
intel officer in Mexico reported to me that there was a large
amount of weapons in the suspect gun data base.
Mr. Walberg. What was your reaction to that?
Mr. Canino. Well, sir, I looked at it. I thought three
things about this case. Number one, I thought that the case was
out of Phoenix. Anybody who has ever talked to any agents in
Phoenix or worked in Phoenix knows that the U.S. Attorney's
Office there has been reluctant to prosecute firearms cases.
That's number one.
Number two, I thought that our agents in Phoenix had
stumbled upon a gun-trafficking group, and in their due
diligence were finally realizing, okay, these guys have beat us
for these many guns.
And number three, I thought somehow our agents are losing
these loads, or a combination of all three.
Never, never in my wildest dreams would I think that ATF
agents were ordered or participated in actually following known
gun traffickers and just walking away. That is, to me,
inconceivable. And to this day I still am trying to get my head
around this.
What happened in this case is this is the ATF gun
trafficking book, something we have done since 1972, and we do
it well, and they went in Phoenix to the shredder and shredded
the best practices, all the techniques that you use to
investigate a gun-trafficking case. It is not rocket science.
If it was, I wouldn't be here.
Mr. Walberg. Had you received any warning from ATF in
Phoenix or Washington about the possibility of a spike in guns
showing up in Mexico?
Mr. Canino. No. I was talking with Lorren and the folks at
the Office of Strategic Intelligence, you know. We became
aware, okay, there is a gun-trafficking case in Phoenix. The
first guns that I became aware of that were related to that
case were in November 2009, where nine guns turned up in a
seizure of 42 guns in Sonora, Mexico.
Mr. Walberg. So no warning.
Mr. Canino. Once those guns came up and we traced them,
hey, okay, now we found out there was a case out of Phoenix.
But out of that case, out of those nine guns, that person who
purchased those nine guns purchased close to 700 guns. So in
2009, we knew--``we'' meaning ATF, ATF Phoenix, ATF Mexico--we
knew that at least one person involved in that case had guns
recovered in Mexico. And like I said, that person was allowed
to buy 700 guns.
Mr. Walberg. Mr. Gil, let me ask you the same questions.
When did you first learn that a large number of guns were being
seized in Mexico and traced back to Phoenix?
Mr. Gil. Sir, I learned actually during the same event that
Mr. Canino just referred to. He and my chief analyst, Dennis
Fasciani, came into my office. And I had just arrived in early
October, and this event came across. So they briefed me at that
time.
Mr. Walberg. And your reaction to that?
Mr. Gil. I picked up the phone. We discussed it. I picked
up the phone. I called the Phoenix Field Division to find out
what was going on with this investigation, we were recovering
an abnormal number of weapons, and if they were aware of it,
and if so, what was going on.
Mr. Walberg. And you received no warning prior to that?
Mr. Gil. No, sir.
Mr. Walberg. In the few remaining seconds let me move over
to Mr. Leadmon. What's eTrace?
Mr. Leadmon. It is the ATF's electronic tracing system. It
is the system we use to submit traces and to get the results.
Mr. Walberg. Was the data base useful for tracing guns, or
did you face obstacles with the tracing system?
Mr. Leadmon. Well, within the tracing system we have a
flagging system called ``suspect guns.'' And in that suspect
gun data base, right, it is utilized to notify case agents when
a weapon that they suspect is being used in a criminal--a crime
gun, that it is flagged, and then the agent's notified.
Mr. Walberg. Were they any delays in the uses of eTrace on
this particular issue?
Mr. Leadmon. No, the tracing comes out of--especially the
Mexico guns or the U.S. guns--that comes from the recovering
officers or their agency. But the flagging system has a
mechanism in it--or it did in the inception of Gunrunner--
excuse me, project--this project, Fast and Furious, it had a
system that was--we couldn't have it through our electronic
system.
Mr. Walberg. Why was that?
Mr. Leadmon. It was just a matter of just merging the
systems together. It is now part of our eTrace system, and it
is all fully available.
Chairman Issa. The gentleman's time has expired.
We now go to the gentleman from Illinois Mr. Quigley for 5
minutes.
Mr. Quigley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. There is
several committee meetings going on. So if I ask a question
that's been answered, I apologize.
But perhaps the most obvious, Special Agent McMahon, was it
your intention to go back and get these weapons after this all
took place? People left these stores with guns. Your intention
was to go back and get all these weapons. Correct?
Mr. McMahon. Our intention was to prove that they were
doing something illegally when they bought those weapons, and
that's easier said than done. Proving that someone's a straw
purchaser actually means that you have to prove the day that
they came in to fill out that form, that they lied when they
answered one of the questions. And proving that, we had to
prove that they knowingly lied when they filled out that form.
So once we have determined that someone is a straw purchaser,
yes, we want to be able to get the weapons that they are
responsible for as quick as possible.
Mr. Quigley. Did you believe that you could get these
weapons back, if that was the case, regardless of where they
went?
Mr. McMahon. Again, I think our problem with this case is
proving that a violation occurred in the United States and then
determining how those weapons were being transported into
Mexico. We know that of all the people we identified in this
case that are purchasers, none of them were actually physically
taking the weapons into Mexico. We were checking border
crossings, all of those sort of things, and that was not
happening. So there was a great unknown at the beginning of
this case trying to figure out what the size of this network
was and how it was operating.
Mr. Quigley. Well, if you and Special Agent Newell have
used the line, if we pick off one or two straw purchasers
today, they simply get replaced, in your words, in your mind,
why is that the case?
Mr. McMahon. Well, because I think the way I understand
firearms trafficking into Mexico, which is totally different
than any type of firearms trafficking we have ever done
before--I am from New York. I worked firearms trafficking cases
all the time, but it is totally different in Mexico. What you
will have is a plaza boss that orders guns from the United
States. He will give someone in the United States, say, $70,000
and says, I want $70,000 of guns. And he expects to get $70,000
worth of guns.
Mr. Quigley. How do they find each other typically?
Mr. McMahon. That's an established network from the drug
trade of drugs going north. So that individual----
Mr. Quigley. I am sorry, so that relationship is already
there because of the drug trade?
Mr. McMahon. Absolutely.
Then that person will recruit individuals that have clean
records that are U.S. citizens to buy weapons. Now, if we start
picking off one or two people, that hurts the money in the
person in the United States, but the person in Mexico is still
going to get his $70,000 worth of guns. And that's what
happens. So knocking off straw purchasers one by one, yeah, it
makes life hard on the money person in the United States, but
it doesn't make an impact in Mexico. And that's the key to what
we're trying to do at ATF. And there has to be that balance,
obviously.
As I said, the mistakes--in no way should we have ever
allowed anyone to get up into the 600 purchases without talking
to that person, trying to find out what they were doing, seeing
if they would cooperate. But again, I think we learn things in
every case we ever do, and we are learning an awful lot from
this one.
Mr. Quigley. Well, this is a network. People talk. So they
would talk about what it is like to be a straw purchaser from
an economic point of view. They encourage someone else, as you
say, to do this. What would discourage someone from being a
straw purchaser that we could do?
Mr. McMahon. I think obviously, you know, stiffer sentences
for some of these individuals. We are tied to--when we make a
case against these individuals, obviously they have all clean
records. The Federal system is tied into punish individuals
that have a criminal history. Obviously, straw purchasers will
not have a criminal history. That makes them viable to purchase
weapons. That would help us an awful lot to have a hammer over
their head to either cooperate or ultimately never do this.
Mr. Quigley. We've heard the expression that many feel like
this is doing 60 in a 55, or some reference to that, that it is
not particularly strongly punished, and typically not with a
jail term. Is that your understanding?
Mr. McMahon. It is. It shouldn't be. Every time I talk
about this, whether it is through the media, or other people,
or Members of Congress, always trying to stress that these
individuals that think they are just doing maybe a paper
violation are actually causing havoc in another country or else
here in the United States, because the people that need them to
buy guns aren't using them to protect their store or protect
their residence. They're using them to create mayhem.
Mr. Quigley. And the last question. Editorials about the
Second Amendment aside, if you go into a store, a gun store, in
Arizona, how many AK-47-type weapons can you buy?
Mr. McMahon. As many as he has.
Mr. Quigley. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Cummings. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Quigley. Yes.
Chairman Issa. Ask unanimous consent the gentleman have 30
seconds.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Special Agent Newell, I must tell you that your testimony
has been quite frustrating, I think, for both sides. I just
want you to answer one question. Mr. Leadmon said the way this
should have been conducted. Do you remember hearing what he
said? He said the way this should have been done.
Mr. Newell. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. I just wanted to know your reaction to that.
Mr. Newell. Well, sir, as I said in my opening statement, I
recognize that in retrospect there were mistakes made in how we
handled this investigation. We should have--one of the things I
said in my opening statement was it was incumbent upon me to
have more risk assessments throughout the investigation. I
acknowledge that. I acknowledge the fact that one of the things
I should have done was more frequently throughout the
investigation conduct risk assessments to ensure whether this
was still a prudent strategy to occur.
But I will tell you, sir, that from years and years of
experience, as Mr. McMahon just said, these Mexican drug
cartels are going to get their firearms. They're going to get
them. So we have to do everything we can in terms of taking out
the infrastructure that manipulates the straw purchasers. Straw
purchasers are the lowest rung on the ladder. They are like a
street-corner drug dealer. If you just focus your
investigations on straw purchasers, you're not having a lasting
impact.
But to answer your question, sir, I acknowledge that yes,
in fact, that there should have been more frequent risk
assessments. I acknowledge that fact.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
We now go to the gentleman from Tennessee, Dr. DesJarlais.
Mr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the
panel for appearing here today.
Regretfully, I have to attend a teleconference, but I would
like to yield my time back to the chair, as it is very
important we continue this discussion.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I would like to follow up somewhat along the lines that the
ranking member was on. Mr. Patino bought 730 weapons is our
best count right now. He worked through Mr. Acosta. For both of
Special Agent Newell and McMahon, was there a time in which
either one of you were aware that Mr. Acosta, buying weapons,
the total of 730 from this particular straw buyer, who was on
food stamps, who had no income--was there a time that you
became aware Mr. Acosta intended on transporting those weapons
to the drug cartels to sell them? You have charged 19 straw
purchasers, who are all out on their own recognizance right now
just waiting for trial sometime next year. You have charged one
person with trafficking. Was there a time you became aware
that, in fact, you had a known group of buyers, including Mr.
Patino at 730 weapons, and you knew that the purchaser, the
money man, intended on transporting those to Mexico? Was there
ever a time that you knew that? Mr. McMahon first.
Mr. McMahon. There was never a time that I knew that, no.
Chairman Issa. Mr. Newell.
Mr. Newell. There was never a specific time that we knew
that, no, sir.
Mr. Issa. Please stay awayfrom words like ``specific.''
They worry me. Was there ever a time? Did you get to an
understanding that you had a known buyer buying from these
people with an intent to traffic them to the cartels? Was there
a time?
Mr. Newell. Throughout the investigation we had information
that----
Chairman Issa. What was the first time that you had that
information?
Mr. Newell. That this group was trafficking firearms to
Mexico?
Chairman Issa. That you had a known buyer, Mr. Acosta or
that group, and that the purchasers--some of the straw
purchasers they were buying from were, in fact, providing to
these people for their purpose of transporting?
I ask you this question very simply. Now, wait a second.
You have been here as a paid not answerer so far. And I
appreciate that you have been here as a paid not answerer, but
there comes a point where I go, wait a second, 730 weapons
bought by a man who had no money. Every penny he bought with he
had to get from somebody. You knew that at some point. You knew
who was buying them, and you allowed it to continue.
Now, there comes a point where, as we go through the rest
of the investigation--and this was about Mexico, and I want to
get back to that very quickly--but there comes a point where we
have to have more than just mistakes were made. My
understanding is you knew from credible information, your
organization knew that, in fact, you had a buyer providing the
money to Patino and others, that he was taking possession of
those weapons, and you knew with specificity that those
weapons, some of them had already ended up in Mexico; is that
correct?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Issa. And what was the first date; 2009, what was
the first date?
Mr. Newell. Sir, to answer your question, throughout the
investigation we had information that Patino was--Mr. Patino
was working with Mr. Acosta throughout the investigation.
Chairman Issa. Okay. So from day one you had a straw
purchaser with no means of support buying hundreds of weapons,
providing them to his intermediary, which meant that both of
them were very much a part. You didn't have a buy and lie
situation at this point, you had an individual who could be
charged with his participation in the actual trafficking of
weapons. You had somebody who was trafficking specifically for
the intent of getting it to the drug cartels, providing huge
amounts of information--I'm sorry, huge amounts of money. You
had that early on. We're now 2 years later, and you've only
charged 18 other people with buy and lie and the one person you
knew early on was doing this.
Where, quite frankly, is any semblance of roll-up or any
semblance of going further? It looks like you knowingly allowed
these to be sold, waiting to see if the other end in Mexico
would give you information. It seems like you knowingly allowed
these weapons to get out of your control knowingly to someone
you knew was trafficking into Mexico. You saw the results, you
allowed it to continue, and now you're telling us, we don't let
guns walk.
Well, I've got to tell you, before this investigation ends,
I've got to have somebody in your position or at Justice admit
you knowingly let guns walk, because right now your agents,
both the agents here today from Mexico and the agents that were
part of Phoenix and part of this program who became
whistleblowers, had told us you were letting guns walk. It's
only you and Mr. McMahon and other people at Justice who
continue to come before this committee and say, we don't let
guns walk. Are they lying, or are you lying?
Mr. Newell. Sir, in this investigation it is my opinion
that we did not let guns walk.
Chairman Issa. You're entitled to your opinion, not to your
facts.
With that we go to the gentleman Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wall, before you were transferred to the ATF field
office in Tijuana, Mexico, you were in the Phoenix office; is
that correct.
Mr. Wall. Yes, sir, I was.
Mr. Tierney. And you said in your written testimony that
you personally saw some of the AFT's best trafficking cases
languish in the U.S. Attorney's Office. Is that an accurate
statement?
Mr. Wall. Yes, that's accurate, sir.
Mr. Tierney. Now, we also had other ATF agents tell us the
same thing, that there was a lagging of proceeding on these
cases in the U.S. Attorney's Office.
When was that period of time that you were assigned to the
Phoenix office?
Mr. Wall. Well, I was working primarily gun trafficking to
Mexico from 2007 until I left for Tijuana in 2009, fall of
2009.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Newell, a number of ATF witnesses that the
committee interviewed have said that this case was ready for
indictment probably in August 2010, but the U.S. Attorney's
Office didn't really seek the indictments until January 2011.
Is that an accurate reflection of your memory?
Mr. Newell. Yes.
Mr. Tierney. Do you know why you experienced these delays?
Mr. Newell. I think that's a question better asked of the
U.S. Attorney's Office, sir.
Mr. Tierney. Did they ever give you an understanding of why
it was that they were seeking to delay?
Mr. Newell. That they were continuing to put together
information they needed to seek indictments.
Mr. Tierney. And it was that broad an explanation, no
certain specifics?
Mr. Newell. Certain specifics regarding financial for the
money laundering statutes that are in the--money laundering
violations that are in the indictment.
Mr. Tierney. Did you consider those reasons to be
legitimate, or did you think that they were somewhat suspect?
Mr. Newell. I believe that they were legitimate in the
sense of the return on some subpoenas, yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney. Now, Mr. McMahon, you said that a number of
your agents were certainly frustrated from time to time with
the U.S. Attorney's Office in Phoenix, correct?
Mr. McMahon. That's what was being relayed to me from Bill,
yes.
Mr. Tierney. But you didn't have direct knowledge of that;
agents hadn't expressed it to you?
Mr. McMahon. I shouldn't say that. Yes, there is a personal
friend that I had that works in Phoenix that I hired in New
York. He did express his frustration with the U.S. Attorney's
Office, yes.
Mr. Tierney. Now, at some point in time when, Mr. Newell
and Mr. McMahon, you thought that the case was ready for
indictment, the August 2010 and after that, did you start using
seizure warrants to interdict some of the weapons?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir. We started doing that, I believe, in
September 2010 in an effort to seize firearms as we were
waiting for the indictment.
Mr. Tierney. All right. So----
Mr. Newell. Civilly. Seize firearms civilly.
Mr. Tierney. So once you thought that the case had been
made----
Mr. Newell. Yes.
Mr. Tierney [continuing]. Then you started to take extra
actions to make sure that the weapons didn't get beyond a
certain point. All right. And when would you exercise the
seizure warrants in relation to this whole trafficking activity
that was going on?
Mr. Newell. Well, sir, I thank you for the question. During
the summer of 2010, we finally convinced certain individuals in
the Judiciary that we had a very strong--we believe we had a
very strong ability or theory on being able to seize firearms
civilly in order to stem the flow, and we got that approved, I
would say, September 2010.
Mr. Tierney. Now, this problem with the U.S. Attorney's
Office in Phoenix, the lag of time between when the people in
the field thought that they had their case made and waiting for
the indictments to go down, is that a problem that exists with
the current U.S. attorney?
Mr. Newell. I will say, sir, that having been there 5 years
when I was there from 2006 to 2011, the current U.S. attorney
has been much more aggressive and much more proactive than
previous administrations, yes.
Mr. Tierney. The previous administrations, however, were
insistent in having that issue, a lag on that?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. McMahon, you told the committee that ATF
agents had secured confessions from straw purchasers to develop
certain cases, but that your agents presented those cases to
the U.S. Attorney's Office in Phoenix, and the assistant U.S.
attorney declined to prosecute and said there was no violation.
Do you remember telling the interviewers that?
Mr. McMahon. I do remember speaking about a single case
that was relayed to me by Bill Newell, yes.
Mr. Tierney. Can you give us some specifics of what it was
you related?
Mr. McMahon. What was told to me was we were working an
operation at a gun show. Our agents observed someone that
looked suspicious pushing a baby carriage with a couple of long
guns in it. They followed her out to the parking lot where she
actually transferred that to an individual, and our agents saw
a transfer of money. We had other agents follow the car that
had the guns now out of the parking lot, pulled him over, did a
traffic stop, identified him as a multiple convicted felon with
not only the two guns this woman gave him, but also a third
gun. We also confronted the woman, and she confessed that she
was paid to purchase these weapons. I believe it was a Saturday
or Sunday when this happened. Bill relayed to me that it was
presented to the duty agent in Phoenix, and they suggested that
we take the case to State court.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
I'm going to yield back to the ranking member at this point
in time.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Chairman Issa. We will ask that you also have another 30
seconds.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Special Agent Newell, I want to go back to something the
chairman asked you, because I want to make--I want us to be
real clear, and this is for the benefit of the entire
committee.
I've got a--I'm trying to figure out what your definition
of ``walking guns'' is. Maybe that's part of the problem. I
think we--because I think almost everybody up here has our
opinion about this, and I'm just wondering if there's a
difference between your definition of walking--allowing guns to
walk and ours.
Mr. Newell. Well, thank you. I appreciate the opportunity
to answer that.
My definition of walking, and I believe it's the common law
enforcement term, is when a law enforcement agency, be it ATF,
be it DEA, be it a State and local agency, actually puts some
sort of evidence into the hands of a suspect in furtherance of
an undercover operation, in furtherance of an investigation,
and then does nothing with that property. That property, for
instance, with ATF it can be a prop gun, one of our evidence
guns. You put it in the hands of that suspect and then don't
take--don't do the follow-up, don't attempt to determine where
that gun is going.
Mr. Cummings. So you don't think there was any walking
allowed in this based on that definition in this case?
Mr. Newell. Based on that definition, yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentleman from Arizona Mr. Gosar for 5
minutes.
Mr. Gosar. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Newell, one of my colleagues on the other side brought
it up about new laws. Now, I want to emphasize, it wasn't the
gun sales operator. And let me emphasize that again. It wasn't,
was it, because they were alarmingly bringing forth these
sales; were they not?
Mr. Newell. I'm sorry, Congressman.
Mr. Gosar. Oh, here we go again.
Mr. Newell. Well, I didn't understand.
Mr. Gosar. It seems like this is the Moe, Curly and Larry
show, and we're looking for Larry. I mean, it's disruptive to
actually see what I'm seeing here. As a business person coming
from Main Street America to actually see what I'm seeing here,
you've got to be disgusted about this. And to go round and
round the corner, it's ridiculous.
Agent Canino, I watch your body language. I'm a health care
physician.
Mr. Canino. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gosar. I watch body language like crazy. Tell me what
you disagree with that man right there.
Mr. Canino. On this specific case?
Mr. Gosar. Yes. Talking about records. Let's talk about
records. Are there adequate records being kept?
Mr. Canino. At the FFLs?
Mr. Gosar. Yes.
Mr. Canino. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gosar. And how they relate between the sale of these
guns and Mexico.
Mr. Canino. I think ATF does a great job in regulating the
firearms industry.
Mr. Gosar. But in this case in tracking, were they actually
able to track them? They had no idea where they were going, did
they?
Mr. Canino. No, sir. The reason--you've got to put this in
context. Everybody is saying, oh, this case was so big, it was
complicated. Firearms-trafficking cases are not complicated,
sir, okay? They're not complicated. The reason this case was so
big was because we didn't do anything, plain and simple.
Everybody wants to make this bigger than it is.
Like I said earlier, you don't have to--I spent 19 years,
15 as a street agent, 4 leading a street group, okay? You don't
have the luxury or the right, in my opinion, as an ATF agent to
say, I like this law, I like that law, okay? That's you guys
set the law; we follow it. Now, it's up to me as an ATF agent
how best to make up an investigative technique and best
practices so I can make a case and present it to the U.S.
attorney. I've done my job. Now it's up to the U.S. attorney if
he wants to prosecute it or not. I'm going to bring him the
best case I can.
In this case, like I said earlier, we have the ATF
trafficking guidelines and best practices, and we just threw it
out the window. Nobody got stopped. Like I said earlier, how
can you let somebody buy 730 guns, and at what point are you
going to stop them? I mean, I am embarrassed, sir. I have
agents, guys who I consider American heroes, my friends, who I
never thought I would hear this, who they've told me since this
broke, Carlos, I'm ashamed to carry an ATF badge, to me. I have
cried over that literally, and I'm unashamed to say that. This
is not a job to me, it's a profession. I don't have a hobby. My
hobby is being an ATF agent. I love this job. I hit the lottery
when I came on. And I'm proud of what I do, and I'm proud of
the ATF agents in this country. We have heroes, we really do.
But--and I've been watching your body language, too, and Mr.
Burton's. I'm sorry, sir, but that's all I could say. I have no
other way to describe this.
Mr. Gosar. Well, I mean, I look at this, and I look at--you
know, when we're doing medical procedures, we look at what's
our end game and what's all the processes in between, and
there's collateral damage. And the problem is that collateral
damages are crimes, and there are going to be deaths like we
just saw, and there are going to be many more. And they're on
this side, and they're on that side. And do you know what that
tells me? That tells me that when you were in this planning
stage, we've got a problem. It's not on the field, it's right
there in the office, in the head office coming up with this.
This was absurd to even have this idea. And to hear this merry-
go-round bantering back and around where we can't get an answer
from Mr. Newell, I mean, the buck stops to somebody. Who is it?
It's obviously to me. It's not these two gentlemen right here.
I want to find out who Larry is. That's where we're going
to have to go with this. But this is absurd. And the fact that
we used people's lives and their--and our friends from Mexico
as pawns in this without even discussing it, how absurd. It's
reprehensible to even conceive of what's transpired here. And I
hope the buck stops, and I hope you take accountability all the
way through, because this can't go on again. This is--I mean,
both sides of the aisle are furious, and the American people
ought to be furious at you. If this is what you would get for
higher ups in ATF or the Department of Justice, shame on you.
And I yield back.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentleman from Virginia for his 5 minutes,
Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'm sure all of
our panelists are so pleased to be here today.
I guess I have a slightly different take on the subject. I
don't defend Fast and Furious, and I don't defend the actions
of the U.S. Attorney's Office at the time in Phoenix, and I
certainly believe that it was a botched attempt that led to a
tragedy, perhaps many tragedies. And I think this committee and
this chairman are right to raise those issues and to try to
assign blame.
But there's another part of the story I doubt very much the
press will print in tomorrow's headlines, because it's so much
easier to print who screamed the loudest at ATF and that you
got beat up. But what the press won't print tomorrow, sadly, is
the fact that Congress' hands are hardly clean on this subject.
We have done everything to make sure that the ``F'' in ``ATF''
is nullified. We have made sure that you haven't got a
permanent Director for 6 years. We laud the private sector.
What private company would think it's okay to lack a permanent
CEO for 6 years? We have done everything in our power in
Congress to try to defang the ATF to make sure that it's
toothless. We've done everything we can to fight your budget
and reduce it so that you don't have the resources to do the
job. We're not criticizing you for not doing well. We had
testimony before this committee by one of your colleagues
called by the committee majority who said there are more New
York police officers per square mile in New York than there are
ATF agents in all of the State of Arizona, and yet somehow
we're going to stop the hemorrhaging of arms trafficking going
into Mexico with that kind of paltry set of resources. But that
won't be in the headline tomorrow.
Some of the loudest critics of ATF today are also on a bill
misnamed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Enforcement Act. What does that bill do? It allows firearms
dealers to liquidate their inventories after having their arms
dealer license revoked, and would decriminalize gun sale
recordkeeping violations even if they contributed to cross-
border gun trafficking. How does that help ATF and its mission?
Where is the accountability here in Congress on this subject?
It's easy to beat up on you, it's easy to look for a
scapegoat when the agenda really is to make sure that we make
it harder, not easier, to enforce gun trafficking. We had
testimony from one of your colleagues before this committee who
said there's more regulation on over-the-counter Sudafed than
there is in arms trafficking going into Mexico. And he
testified, and was interrupted in this testimony because it
wasn't welcome, that he believed we needed to toughen
enforcement laws as a tool for ATF to be able to fulfill its
mission along the border.
So I have no doubt that we can all pile on, and correctly,
criticizing ATF for a botched mission. But what isn't said, and
sadly what the press isn't going to bother to write about, but
they should, is the fact that Congress for 6 long years and
maybe longer has done everything in its power to make sure, in
fact, you can't do your job. And this set of hearings needs to
explore that, too.
With that I yield back the balance of my time to the
ranking member.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Gerald E. Connolly
follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2802.006
Mr. Cummings. There is no currently no Federal statute that
criminalizes firearms trafficking. Instead traffickers are
often prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. Section 922, which prohibits
engaging in firearms business without a license. The need for a
Federal firearms trafficking statute was also a common refrain
of law enforcement agents interviewed by the committee, as Mr.
Connolly said. They told us that a dedicated firearms
trafficking statute would give them the ability to address
patterns of activity by traffickers who divert firearms from
legal to illegal commerce.
Mr. Leadmon, based on your decades in law enforcement, do
you believe a Federal firearms trafficking statute would be
helpful in disrupting the flow of guns to Mexican drug cartels?
Mr. Leadmon. Yes, sir. I have viewed your proposed
legislation. I agreed with it wholeheartedly. One of the things
I think that might be added to that is a little more emphasis
on international trafficking. Maybe we can tighten it up a
little bit as far as going to drug cartels. I, too, think that
if you reach a certain amount of weapons, that can even be a
life offense.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentleman from Texas Mr. Farenthold, also
a Member who went to Mexico City.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to take a moment to address something I heard,
before I asked the questions, from the other side. They were
talking about how much more difficult it is and how much more
regulated the purchase of Sudafed is. I don't see anywhere in
the Constitution where we're guaranteed the right to bear
Sudafed, but we are guaranteed the right to bear arms. So I
think that is an inappropriate distinction.
Mr. McMahon, when my friend the former prosecutor, the
gentleman from South Carolina, asked you what the goal of this
was, you said that it was to bring down a drug kingpin in
Mexico. Is that a fair assessment?
Mr. McMahon. Did I say that, sir?
Mr. Farenthold. I'm sorry, I guess that was Mr. Newell.
Did you say that, Mr. Newell.
Mr. Newell. I believe what I said was the goal of the
investigation was to disrupt and dismantle an entire firearms-
trafficking network, yes, sir.
Mr. Farenthold. And so I believe you said a drug kingpin.
Let me ask Mr. Gil--and to identify some drug kingpins. Let
me ask Mr. Gil, does the Mexican Government know who the drug
kingpins are in Mexico?
Mr. Gil. Sir, they are aware of the heads of the
organizations. To answer your question shortly, yes.
Mr. Farenthold. And so let me go ahead and ask you another
question there, Mr. Gil. In your time working with the Mexican
Government as a former ATF attache in Mexico, did they ever ask
us to do anything like that; you know, you let guns come across
the border so they could track them or find or bring down
government king--or drug kingpins?
Mr. Gil. No, sir.
Mr. Farenthold. All right. Let me go on to Mr. Canino. I
want to applaud your service and your candor with this
committee. We've heard that we're trying to bring down the drug
kingpins, or whatever the words were, as far as stop the
trafficking. If you were put in charge of developing an
investigation to do that, how would you do that? Would your
plan involve letting firearms move across the border, or how
would you do it?
Mr. Canino. To stop a drug kingpin?
Mr. Farenthold. Or if you want to go even more simply with
the firearms, stop the firearms trafficking?
Mr. Canino. Well, to stop a drug kingpin, I would call DEA
because that's what they do, number one. Number two, you work
the traffic investigations paint by the numbers. It's
frustrating to be an ATF agent. That comes with the badge,
okay? Trafficking investigations, the laws, like I said, you
have to be open-minded, I guess is the word I'm looking for. I
don't know if that's the best description.
But like I said, it's paint by the numbers. You have to
work--it's like building a house. You start building a
foundation; you work from the bottom up. In this case nobody
got stopped. They didn't grab somebody and say, okay, hey,
we're going to roll you. And I don't want to get into sources
and methods, but there's a whole--you know, we have schools on
this.
Mr. Farenthold. If you watch a cop show, you know how it's
done.
Mr. Canino. Right.
Mr. Farenthold. You follow the guns, or you arrest them at
the first stop and try to flip them both. Or if you really want
to partner with the Mexican Government, you follow the guns
until it crosses the border and radio across to your colleagues
in Mexico, and they move it up the line there. It seems like
common sense to me.
Let me ask--I want to ask this question to everybody on the
panel, because I think this is really important. We've seen
Operation Fast and Furious. We've recently heard about
Operation Castaway, a similar program in Florida. Are any of
you all aware at this time of any similar operations going on
that allow guns to flow across the border to friendly countries
now? Are you all aware of those, and if you are, are we doing
anything to stop them? And if you could just come on down the
line. We'll start with Mr. McMahon.
Mr. McMahon. I am not aware of any case like that of
friendly or unfriendly government, no.
Mr. Newell. Neither am I, sir.
Mr. Farenthold. Is anybody?
Mr. Leadmon. No.
Mr. Canino. No, sir. I'm unaware of any.
Mr. Wall. No, sir.
Mr. Gil. No, sir.
Mr. Farenthold. And we only found out about this one
through whistleblowers. And my prayer is that if there is
anybody watching this committee hearing, ATF or another agency,
that knows of something going on like this, that they let this
committee know about it. This is one of the most shameful
moments, I think, in our government's history when we are
letting guns go across the border to our friends in Mexico.
Let me just ask another--I only have 32 seconds left. I'm
going to stick around for a second round of questioning, so
I'll yield back my remaining 30 seconds.
Chairman Issa. And I'll pick it up.
Special Agent Newell, what did this program expend in
money; millions of dollars, right?
Mr. Newell. The program or the network?
Chairman Issa. Well, Fast and Furious. Up on this side we
think of it as a program, you think of it as a simple
investigation. The investigation, you spent millions of dollars
over the course of 2 years, correct?
Mr. Newell. I don't believe it was millions of dollars,
sir.
Chairman Issa. Hundreds of thousands?
Mr. Newell. Probably a couple hundred thousand dollars,
yes, sir.
Chairman Issa. Agents were camped out in some cases for a
period of time at a drop location?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Issa. So when you were trying to do the big hit,
the big fix, the big get the roll big guys, why is it that
testimony shows us that only three times were there any kind of
detection plants? And I don't want to get into sources and
methods either, but only three times we have been told that
they tried to do any detection, and one of these, GPS tracking,
was a Radio Shack make-it-yourself. Why in the world would the
quality and the quantity of agents and time, video cameras
planted with Internet connections, etc., why is it there wasn't
some tracking to track the weapons?
Mr. Newell. We had trackers on vehicles, sir. We had the
trackers you mentioned on weapons. But again, it goes to
resources. I mean, it's resources. We have agents that are out
there working 16-, 18-, 20-hour days.
Chairman Issa. Unfortunately you have just made my case,
and time has expired. Eighteen hours of an agent's time is so
much more money than one of these tracking devices that you
were penny wise and pound foolish by not having sophisticated
devices.
With that we go to the gentlelady from the District of
Columbia for her 5 minutes. Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Well, suppose you had had a tracking device.
Then what would have been the next step?
Mr. Newell. Well, ma'am, it depends on how long the
firearms stayed in the area. For instance, many of the--in many
of the transactions here, the firearms never left the Phoenix
area, and trackers, the battery life of a tracker is only good
depending on----
Ms. Norton. So if it didn't leave the Phoenix area, what
could you charge this so-called trafficker? This law-abiding
citizen who doesn't have a record, but he's buying many, many
guns, what could you charge him with?
Mr. Newell. There's nothing to charge him with at that
point. We have to prove a violation has existed, has occurred.
Ms. Norton. I just want to say, to sit in a hearing and
hear people beat up on the ATF is very, very interesting to me.
You sit in a Congress where the gun lobby controls the Congress
of the United States. On the Republican side of the aisle,
they're totally controlling; on my side of the aisle, they are
virtually controlling. And the Second Amendment is cited as you
try to do your job to keep guns from essentially bringing down
the government of an ally.
So when it comes to Mexico, let me ask you, what kind of
gun control laws does Mexico have? Any of you know about their
gun control laws? Yes, sir.
Mr. Canino. Yes, ma'am, I do.
Ms. Norton. Yes, sir. Would you speak up?
Mr. Canino. Civilians could buy nothing greater than a .38-
caliber. Anything after that is for the exclusive use of the
military and the police.
Ms. Norton. So here is Mexico who does its job on its side
of the border. It says--essentially it makes it very difficult
for anyone except someone in law enforcement or the military to
get a gun. So they come to the United States where trafficking
is wide open.
Let me ask you this: We are concentrating on Mexico now.
Let me ask you about trafficking to Chicago. Let me ask you
about trafficking to the District of Columbia, to Baltimore.
Let me ask you about trafficking to L.A. Do these same
traffickers operate as effectively in our country as we have
now seen them operate taking guns to Mexico?
Mr. McMahon. Well, I believe that the organizations are a
little bit different. That's why I said earlier about we've
never encountered an organization like this for Mexico.
Trafficking in the United States, my experience anyway, is a
little bit different. It's a little bit more association-
related. But obviously trafficking domestically is a major
issue for us. And I spent the majority of my career working
those kind of cases.
Ms. Norton. If a person, let's say, buys 200 guns, and here
you made mistakes. If I had a dollar for every mistake this
Congress has made when it came to guns, I would be a very rich
woman. You made a mistake. It was a fatal mistake, it was a
mistake for which you are being held accountable. Let's say you
hadn't made a mistake, that someone without a record bought
guns. That's me. You found me with 200 guns. What could you do
to me?
Mr. McMahon. Nothing at all, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Did you feel disarmed in your fight against
this wholesale movement of guns from our country to Mexico, or
did you feel you were equipped to, in fact, by law enforcement
to do what was necessary?
Mr. McMahon. I think in my experience, ATF agents are very
resilient. You have to be to make the case. And that's what our
people do. And they do that every day, and they're out there
doing that today.
Ms. Norton. And they may design tactics to try to make
them--to make themselves more effective on the ground?
Mr. McMahon. I think that's what we should always be doing,
yes.
Ms. Norton. Could I ask each of you, would you feel better
able to stop this traffic if the Congress passed a law that
made it and added to our Criminal Code a section that
prohibited the transfer of a gun when an individual knows the
gun will be transferred to a person who is prohibited from
carrying a gun or intends to actually use the gun illegally?
Mr. McMahon. We currently do have a statute that does
handle that. That's the whole ``lying on the Federal form''
violation.
Ms. Norton. But lying on the Federal form gets you to
where?
Mr. McMahon. Gets us to--if we can prove that someone
knowingly filled out that form incorrectly or lied----
Ms. Norton. Can you seize guns? We've been talking about
seizures here. In order to seize guns, what does the ATF have
to show?
Mr. McMahon. That a violation of law is committed with that
firearm.
Chairman Issa. The gentlelady's time is expired, but if
anyone else wants to answer the question----
Ms. Norton. What's the law that's been violated?
Chairman Issa. If anyone else wants to answer.
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that that
firearm was somehow used in the violation of a--furtherance in
violation of a crime or in violation of a crime. We can't just
go out and randomly seize firearms from individuals. Firearm
are in themselves not contraband. If we stop someone on the
street with 5 AKs, 10 AKs, 20 AK-47s----
Ms. Norton. Or 100 AKs.
Mr. Newell [continuing]. Or 100, and they're not
prohibited, as frustrating as that may be, and believe me it is
extremely frustrating, but as frustrating as that may be, we
may not have any legal ability to take those--to seize those
firearms.
Chairman Issa. Does anyone else want to answer that? Mr.
Gil.
Mr. Gil. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
In my experience, and as I look around the room here, I've
had the opportunity to work in pretty much every State of the
Union, and I've always been able to use the current laws to
success in investigations. Whether you're pulling somebody over
with 100 AK-47s, I found that ATF special agents are very
qualified in interviewing techniques; 99.9 percent of the time
we'll get confessions from those individuals, we'll take those
guns. And if not that case, then we would at least end up
getting an abandonment from them for those weapons so they
don't hit the streets.
So there are other avenues to approach versus--that we
could use under the current laws.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
We now go to the most qualified person on the committee to
ask questions, the gentleman from Pennsylvania Mr. Meehan.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Special Agent, you're a trained special agent for ATF. Are
you trained in the issue of walking guns?
Mr. Canino. No, sir.
Mr. Meehan. With regard to walking guns, when you are in
training, what do you know about--what does ATF tell you about
walking guns?
Mr. Canino. You don't walk guns. Sir, I teach at the ATF
National Academy, I teach at our first-line supervisor school,
I teach at our command-and-control school for GS-15s and above.
Mr. Meehan. Are you aware of anybody who has been
disciplined for walking a gun in ATF?
Mr. Canino. No, sir. But Darren was talking to me last
night and put it in perspective. If you're an ATF agent, and
you lose your gun, it's 3 days, no questions asked, up to
termination on the circumstance if you lose your gun.
Mr. Meehan. If you lose your gun.
Mr. Canino. If it was your gun, it's 3 days.
Mr. Meehan. What do you define as walking a gun?
Mr. Canino. What exactly happened in this case.
Mr. Meehan. In your words what do you think walking a gun
is?
Mr. Canino. Walking a gun is when you have custody and
control of that firearm, and you let it get in the hands of a
suspect, and you don't interdict that suspect. In this case we
had cooperators at the gun stores, so they're acting as agents
of the government. So it doesn't matter if those guns came out
of an ATF prop vault or----
Mr. Meehan. Thank you.
Agent Newell, is that what you meant when you said that if
ATF puts evidence into the hands of the gun--or into the hands
of a suspect, there's a distinction somehow between a straw
purchaser getting it or ATF putting it? Please explain to me
what you talk--what you meant by the distinction of ATF putting
it in the hands of a suspect.
Mr. Newell. The distinction for me, Congressman, is that
it's ATF actually putting evidence or some sort of prop firearm
in the hands of a suspect.
Mr. Meehan. So that's a distinction from a straw purchaser
who goes and under your observation?
Mr. Newell. In that aspect, yes, sir, it is.
Mr. Meehan. So you're suggesting here that the distinction
is because you did not put the hand--the gun in the hands of
the purchaser here, that somehow there's a distinction from
allowing a gun to walk?
Mr. Newell. Well, Congressman, I disagree with something
Mr. Canino just said regarding the fact that the FFLs were
acting as agents of the government. My recollection of this
case, two FFLs in particular were clearly instructed as to
follow the letter of the law, to abide by the rules and
regulations.
Mr. Meehan. Let's move on because that's a distinction. The
strategy. You were asked a specific question who defined the
strategy for Fast and Furious?
Mr. Newell. Well, a case like Fast and Furious goes through
several levels of approval, sir.
Mr. Meehan. Who originated the strategy for Fast and
Furious?
Mr. Newell. I believe it was at the street level.
Mr. Meehan. Tell me who the person is who created the
strategy for Fast and Furious? You are the special agent in
charge of your area. It emanated from your district.
Mr. Newell. Right.
Mr. Meehan. Who originated the concept for Fast and
Furious?
Mr. Newell. Sir, it's not one person who did that, it was a
group of individuals who looked at the set of facts in this
case and determined that this was the best strategy to follow
to take----
Mr. Meehan. Where did it start? Where does the stream
start?
Mr. Newell. It starts----
Mr. Meehan. Tell me who participated in that conclusion.
Mr. Newell. Well, it's several individuals. It was a group
supervisor, assistant special agent in charge, myself and
individuals in headquarters.
Mr. Meehan. Okay. So there were a number of people who were
very learned in this process. Now, you testified here today
earlier no part in the strategy to allow guns to be taken to
Mexico. It was no part in the strategy to allow guns to be
taken to Mexico; is that right?
Mr. Newell. To knowingly allow guns to go to Mexico, yes.
Mr. Meehan. To knowingly allow guns to go to Mexico.
Mr. Newell. Sir, in this case we did everything. We had
seizures in this case. When we had evidence----
Mr. Meehan. I asked you a specific question. I said that
there was no part in the strategy to allow guns to go to
Mexico; is that accurate?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Meehan. Would Mr. McMahon have participated in any way
in the development of this policy or this the Fast and Furious
strategy?
Mr. Newell. I know he was aware of it, yes.
Mr. Meehan. He was aware of it.
Mr. McMahon, you testified a plaza boss. He has $70,000, he
wants $70,000 worth of guns. What's a plaza boss?
Mr. McMahon. It's someone who controls an area for a
cartel.
Mr. Meehan. And where is that plaza boss?
Mr. McMahon. In Mexico.
Mr. Meehan. So you testified that part of the theory here,
your words, is the plaza boss expects $70,000 worth of weapons.
Mr. McMahon. Correct.
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Newell, the strategy Mr. McMahon identifies
that you expect, you understand that he expects $70,000 worth
of weapons, where does that get in that there was no part in
the strategy to allow guns to be taken to Mexico?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir. We still--during the beginning parts
of this case, we did not know who the plaza boss was. We didn't
know who----
Mr. Meehan. That's not my question about who the plaza boss
was. The question is is there a plaza boss? Agent McMahon just
said he's in Mexico.
Mr. Newell. Right.
Mr. Meehan. And the plaza boss expects $70,000 worth of
guns. Now you're saying no part of this strategy was allow the
guns to go into Mexico. Who is right here?
Mr. Newell. Sir, the strategy wasn't to allow guns to go to
Mexico.
Mr. Meehan. But what did Agent McMahon just say? This was
an OCDETF case.
Mr. Newell. Yes.
Mr. Meehan. Who else participated in this, in the form of
this going up the chain----
Chairman Issa. I ask unanimous consent the gentleman be
allowed to have another 30 seconds.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you.
Was this an OCDETF case?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir, it was.
Mr. Meehan. Okay. That implies that at a certain point in
time, it moves beyond your agency; does it not?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Meehan. What does that mean with regard to OCDETF? What
kind of other participants were there as part of OCDETF?
Mr. Newell. Well, there are other agencies who are involved
in this.
Mr. Meehan. Other agencies. What other agencies were
involved in this?
Mr. Newell. In this investigation, they were full partners
in this case, was the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, now
known as Homeland Security Investigations; we had Internal
Revenue Service; and we had assistance to some level from DEA.
Mr. Meehan. So are you saying DEA, IRS and ICE all knew
about this program to participate in the OCDETF?
Mr. Newell. They participated in the investigation, yes.
Mr. Meehan. In the investigation. Were they aware that guns
were being walked to Mexico?
Mr. Newell. Sir, again, I'm assuming that they--I mean, I
know they would know of the strategy.
Mr. Meehan. They were aware of the strategy?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Meehan. Which included what Special Agent McMahon
talked about, allowing $70,000 worth of guns to go to the plaza
boss?
Mr. McMahon. Sir, I never said that we were allowing
$70,000 worth of guns to go on.
Mr. Meehan. You said it was the expectation.
Mr. McMahon. I was giving a scenario of how it works.
There's a plaza boss in Mexico that's requiring $70,000 worth
of guns. So if he's not getting it from the network we're
investigating, he's getting it from somewhere else. It wasn't--
the $70,000 example I gave you wasn't specific to this
investigation, it was an over-real generalization of how
trafficking to Mexico works.
Mr. Meehan. But we're talking about plaza bosses, we're
talking about plaza bosses in Mexico.
Chairman Issa. The gentleman's time has expired. We are
going to have a second round in just a moment.
The gentlelady from New York Ms. Buerkle.
Ms. Buerkle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm uncertain as to where to start here because of what
I've heard. I think that I'll start with Mr. Canino.
Mr. Canino, your comments were that it's inconceivable to
let guns go, it's not the way the ATF does things. So in your
experience is what happened in Operation Fast and Furious an
aberration from the usual way that ATF does business?
Mr. Canino. This is the first time I've ever heard of
anything like this in 20--I start my 22nd year on Friday. This
is the first time I've heard anything like this.
Ms. Buerkle. And during the course of this operation, were
you advised that there was going to be--at one point did you
become aware that there was going to be a different method of
operation?
Mr. Canino. Ma'am, I need to put this in context. I
didn't--the first time I ever heard of someone accusing ATF
agents of actually watching suspected gun traffickers just
drive away was when Special Agent Dodson was on CBS. I had--and
I didn't believe them, and I was very vocal about that. I
didn't become aware until it started coming out little by
little, talking to fellow agents. And then mid-April I saw some
documents, and that convinced me that what Special Agent Dodson
was alleging was, in fact, correct.
Ms. Buerkle. Thank you.
And the other special agents that are here, Mr. Gil, Mr.
Wall, Mr. Leadmon, in your experience is this the first time
you've ever seen ATF operate this way?
Mr. Gil. Again, I recently retired. And after--going on 23-
plus years. It's inconceivable. And again, I didn't believe it
even after seeing Mr. Dodson as well. And I still didn't
believe it until after I talked with Mr. Dodson and others that
then I became convinced that perhaps ATF did walk these
weapons.
Ms. Buerkle. And Mr. Wall.
Mr. Wall. As I stated in my opening remarks, yes, it's the
first time I have ever seen it. And I was very skeptical. I
didn't believe Mr. Dodson at all.
Ms. Buerkle. And Mr. Leadmon.
Mr. Leadmon. Ma'am, part of my duties and functions is to
look at the southwest border cases, all of them, and this is
the first one I've seen.
I would like to add something that the panel was asking
earlier. You asked when we first became aware that Mr. Acosta,
right, was involved as the leader of the straw purchasing ring
and some of the other issues as to Mr. Patino. That was in
2009, and it was early on. I briefed it to my senior directors
January 2010. And we know this, and one of the driving forces
behind how we know that these were going to Mexico and there
were Mexico people involved is because our other law
enforcement partners provided us with information, specific
information, that allowed us to know exactly what was going on
and to what cartel it was going to. This was not a mystery. We
knew this in December 2009. I briefed it in 2010, January.
Ms. Buerkle. Thank you, sir.
So, Special Agent Newell and Special Agent McMahon, we'll
get to you because you're his supervisor. So at some point,
based on the IG's report and DOJ, they said, we're going to try
something different here. I'm assuming, because that's the way
things work in government, and maybe I'm wrong, that someone
said, we need to have this operation, and we're going to make a
determination that for the first time ATF is going to conduct
business this way, we're going to let these guns walk. Now,
maybe he didn't say it, but in essence that's really what
happened, because this is a different way of conducting
business with ATF.
Where would that plan have come from? Somebody--and I know
you said you sat down with this group, Mr. Newell, but somebody
higher up than you made a determination that for the first time
ATF was going to run this. We've heard from this panel, we've
heard from the panel prior to today that this is a complete
aberration from the way ATF has done business. Where would that
have come from?
Mr. Newell. Well, ma'am, in putting a strategy together for
this case, the strategy came from several places. The
Department of Justice issued originally in a draft in 2009,
October 2009, and January 2010 about how to combat southwest
border drug trafficking by Mexican drug cartels, and one of
them dealt with firearms trafficking, which said through use of
the OCDETF colocated strike forces, mere interdiction is not
the answer; you have to go after the structure of the
organization of the--whatever it be, firearms, human, drug-
trafficking organization to make the biggest impact.
Ms. Buerkle. Okay. And who would that memo have come from?
Mr. Newell. I do believe that memo came down from the
Deputy Attorney General's Office.
Ms. Buerkle. And then--so this is now we're going to change
strategy. This is going to be a different way to conduct an
operation. So you get your directive from them. And then these
groups that you talked about, you sat down and you came up with
a plan, or did that plan come from up on high?
Mr. Newell. The plan figured into--or the memo figured into
how we were going to address this. When we first looked at it
in November 2009, it was already a very active, prolific
firearms-trafficking organization, as Mr. McMahon testified. In
my 23 years we have never seen an organization that was this
prolific in buying firearms in such a short period of time. So
we felt that at that time, in conjunction with the OCDETF
Strike Force where this Group VII was located, that the best
way to attack this organization was through the use of a
multiagency, conspiratorial-type investigation would dismantle
the whole organization.
Chairman Issa. The gentlelady's time is expired.
We now go to the gentleman from Michigan Mr. Amash.
Mr. Amash. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to yield my
time to Mr. Gowdy.
Mr. Gowdy. I thank the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. Leadmon, for those who are perhaps watching and not
familiar with the full panoply of investigative techniques,
surveillance is a tried and true investigative technique,
correct?
Mr. Leadmon. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. What about consensual encounters where you just
do a knock and talk, where you walk up to somebody and ask
them? There's a reason Dostoevsky wrote Crime and Punishment,
there's a reason Edgar Allen Poe wrote The Tell-Tale Heart.
Sometimes people confess, don't they?
Mr. Leadmon. Yes, sir. There's several tools in the
toolbox, especially when you're faced with the fact that we
know that these weapons are going to be used in such carnage
down in Mexico and the United States. We should have pulled
every tool out of that toolbox, not just to make our case. Our
case should not have been the priority here. The stopping the
flow of those firearms should have been the number one
priority. And we should have reached into that toolbox, we
should have conducted interviews, or we should have done
interviews to surrounding people. We should have tracked these
weapons better. We should have followed everything by the
letter to stop them. I mean, just where do we stop with the
number of guns; 1, 5, 10?
Mr. Gowdy. Have you ever heard tell of a law enforcement
officer stopping someone for speeding when really they may have
had another purpose in mind?
Mr. Leadmon. I have heard that----
Mr. Gowdy. It happens from time to time, doesn't it?
Crossing the yellow line?
Mr. Leadmon. Sooner or later you are going to make a
mistake.
Mr. Gowdy. Exactly. And when you do a lawful, nonpretextual
car stop, it also opens up a full panoply of other search
options, right, like searching the vehicle or a pat-down?
Mr. Leadmon. Yes.
Mr. Gowdy. How about a proffer? Is that in your toolbox to
go to a U.S. attorney and say, I would like to proffer this
person, I would like to send them a grand jury subpoena?
Mr. Leadmon. Correct.
Mr. Gowdy. It's the same way you conduct every other
investigation other than this one, right?
Mr. Leadmon. Correct.
Mr. Gowdy. From shoplifting to murder, we do them all the
same way except this one?
Mr. Leadmon. Correct.
Mr. Gowdy. Special Agent Newell, I happen to think this was
ill-conceived from its inception. You have testified repeatedly
that the purpose was to destroy and dismantle drug cartels. So
I'm going to ask you again, how would this ever have succeeded?
What was your purpose? How would we have known, hey, this was a
great investigation, it succeeded?
Mr. Newell. Sir, you said to disrupt a dug cartel. The
purpose of this investigation was to disrupt and dismantle a
firearms-trafficking organization that was feeding firearms----
Mr. Gowdy. In Mexico.
Mr. Newell. In the United States. A firearms trafficking
organization in the United States. Not only the straw
purchasers; the middlemen, the transporters, the financiers.
Mr. Gowdy. Well, then, when the guns were going into
Mexico, you should have known that this was an abject failure,
because that's not what you wanted, right?
Mr. Newell. Absolutely. We didn't want any guns.
Mr. Gowdy. So when you found out the first gun went into
Mexico, why did you not abort the investigation?
Mr. Newell. Because we were still putting the facts
together to be able to convict all----
Mr. Gowdy. When is the very first time you knew or should
have known that firearms were going to Mexico?
Mr. Newell. Well, I believe it was when I got the--when we
got the first traces, I was advised of the first traces, which
I believe was November 2009.
Mr. Gowdy. 2009. And when did you abort the investigation?
Mr. Newell. The investigation is ongoing, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. Right. That's my point. So you knew the weapons
were going to Mexico?
Mr. Newell. Right.
Mr. Gowdy. Were you at some point going to let Special
Agent Canino know about it?
Mr. Newell. Mr. Canino knew about the investigation.
Mr. Gowdy. He knew that weapons were going into Mexico?
Mr. Newell. Well, absolutely, yes.
Mr. Gowdy. When were you going to let your Mexican
counterparts know about it?
Mr. Newell. I'm assuming they knew that firearms--because I
have--you know, sir, one of the issues about that is there's
only one field division in this country, only one, that has a
PGR representative in it. That's the Mexican Department of
Justice. In all my years of working with Mexico--I spent 4
years in Bogota, Colombia, representing ATF in South America. I
am very, very, very key on the fact that we need to share
information with our foreign law enforcement partners.
Mr. Gowdy. Well, you testified earlier that you were going
to turn the information over to Mexican prosecutors and let
them prosecute. Because I asked you were you also going to
allow U.S. law enforcement officers to be extradited to Mexico
for breaking their law, and you said no. So my question to you
is this: How in the world are you going to get our brothers and
sisters in law enforcement to trust--why would you trust the
prosecution if you don't trust them during the investigation?
Mr. Newell. Sir, to answer your question about the drug
cartel, the kingpin, or--in your words, the kingpin that we're
going to get the guns in Mexico, we did not have information
until late in this case, an ongoing part of this case, who that
individual was. And I invited with Mr. Canino, we invited in
December 2010, as well as in January, Mexican prosecutors to
come in. And I don't think that's ever been done before. And
I'm the one that requested it.
Mr. Gowdy. Did you debrief them on Fast and Furious?
Mr. Newell. Yes.
Mr. Gowdy. Did you tell them the guns were going into
Mexico?
Mr. Newell. Well, yes.
Mr. Gowdy. You told them when?
Mr. Newell. Well, my PGR representative that I have in my
office who has been there for 2 years knew about this case, not
in specifics.
Mr. Gowdy. When the first gun showed up in Mexico that you
knew was from Phoenix, the first one that was connected to this
showed up in Mexico, did you go interview the straw purchaser?
Mr. Newell. No, sir, we did not.
Mr. Gowdy. Why not?
Mr. Newell. Because, again, our strategy was that we,
knowing from years of experience, you take off one straw
purchaser, you're not having an effect on the greater
organization, which is at that point--in November 2009 you have
to realize it wasn't----
Mr. Gowdy. Have you ever flipped a cooperating witness
before?
Mr. Newell. Yes, I have.
Mr. Gowdy. How do you do it without asking them? How do you
do it without interviewing him?
Mr. Newell. It depends on what your goals in investigation
are.
Mr. Gowdy. Your goal is to bring down an organization. It's
very compelling testimony to have someone from within the
organization testify against his comrades, right?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. So why didn't you go--why didn't you approach
him?
Mr. Newell. Approach who, sir, the one straw purchaser?
Mr. Gowdy. Yes, the straw purchaser.
Mr. Newell. Again, the goal, sir, in this case was to take
out the whole organization. We felt that by just trying to flip
one straw purchaser, if he, in fact, did flip, it would not
affect the overall goal.
Chairman Issa. The gentleman's time is expired. We'll have
a second round.
We now go to the gentleman from Idaho Mr. Labrador.
Mr. Labrador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Special Agent Canino, I just think I just heard Special
Agent Newell say that you knew about this gun walking. Can you
please----
Mr. Canino. Yes, sir. I want to make it perfectly clear to
you, the American people, the Mexican Government, my family, my
friends, at no time ever did I know that ATF agents were
following known suspected gun traffickers, one of which bought
700 guns, and we knew about his guns showing up in Mexico 6
weeks after we opened up that investigation--never, ever would
I imagine that we were letting that happen. We have 4,000
investigations, plus or minus, with a Mexico-U.S. nexus. There
are guns coming in. That's trafficking, that guns are coming
into Mexico. I had no clue that we were allowing these guys to
operate like this.
Like Mr. Gowdy said, there was no interdiction to start any
case. You have to--you have a toolbox. We have classes. Jose
Wall teaches those trafficking classes. I've been to them. It's
like building a house. You start from the bottom, and you try
to work your way up, you know. At one point you're only going
to reach so far. And then you come in and you have a meeting
and you say, okay, how can we advance this? You meet with the
U.S. attorney. From what I see here, none of this was done, or
if it was, it wasn't very effective.
Mr. Labrador. So when did you first realize that the gun-
walking allegations were true?
Mr. Canino. April.
Mr. Labrador. Of this year?
Mr. Canino. Yes. April--I mean, I was starting to lean that
way, and then I was at ATF bureau headquarters in April for a
meeting, and I sat down with Mr. Leadmon, and he convinced me.
Mr. Labrador. Did you come across any specific evidence to
prove that ATF had taken part in these actions?
Mr. Canino. One more time. Sorry.
Mr. Labrador. Did you come across any specific evidence to
prove that ATF had taken part in these actions?
Mr. Canino. Well, from the totality of the circumstances,
and then speaking with different agents and speaking with Mr.
Leadmon, yeah. And, you know, the guns showing up in Mexico.
Mr. Labrador. Did you review any documents or anything?
Mr. Canino. You know, sir, when I visited Mr. Leadmon, I
saw--I took a look at the management log, and if I read it
correctly, there are three instances in the first two pages
where we walk away from guns. At that point I was so disgusted,
I didn't even want to look at the case file anymore.
Mr. Labrador. And when was that?
Mr. Canino. That was in mid-April or so of this year.
Mr. Labrador. Why were you so upset with this information?
Mr. Canino. Because it goes against everything we're
taught. I mean, like I was explaining earlier, you don't do
that. We're not taught to do that from the first day we walk
into the academy all the way until you leave this job, like
Darren said. It's not a recognized investigative technique.
This is not a special case, this is just a trafficking case
that we do. This is what we do, you know, amongst other things.
But trafficking is what we do, especially on the southwest
border. This was--this wasn't a one of, this wasn't a who done
it. This was, you know--this was a ground ball.
Mr. Labrador. Just a basic case?
Mr. Canino. Yeah.
Mr. Labrador. What you do every day?
Mr. Canino. Exactly.
Mr. Labrador. Special Agent Newell, do you know who Kevin
O'Reilly is?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Labrador. What's the nature of your relationship with
him?
Mr. Newell. I've known Kevin for, I would say, probably 10
or 12 years.
Mr. Labrador. How often do you communicate with him?
Mr. Newell. I haven't communicated with him in a while, but
probably three or four times a year, something like that, or
maybe more depending on him reaching out to me.
Mr. Labrador. Isn't it a little bit unusual for a special
agent in charge of an ATF field division to have direct email
contact with the national security staff at the White House?
Mr. Newell. He's a friend of mine.
Mr. Labrador. How many times did you talk to him about this
case?
Mr. Newell. The specifics of this case? I don't think I--I
don't think I had one specific conversation with him about the
specifics of this case.
Mr. Labrador. Who----
Chairman Issa. Would the gentleman allow me to help him a
little? Not that you need it. But could you take the word
``specific'' out and answer the general, did you talk to him
about this case?
Mr. Newell. I might have talked to him about this case,
yes, sir.
Mr. Labrador. Do you know when that was?
Mr. Newell. I was probably--as I recall, I think it was
during the summer. It might have been the summer or early fall
of 2010.
Mr. Labrador. So, Special Agent McMahon, you took
responsibility this morning here for the actions of the agency,
and I appreciate that. Who at the highest levels--I can't
imagine that this is something that you decided to do on your
own. Who did you communicate with at the highest levels about
this case?
Mr. McMahon. I communicated to my chain of command within
ATF. We were all very much made aware of this investigation and
what was going on.
Mr. Labrador. And who was aware at--who was aware that this
investigation was occurring and that guns were being walked to
Mexico?
Chairman Issa. You can answer that question. The time has
expired, but go ahead.
Mr. McMahon. I mean, no one was aware that guns were
walking at my level or above me. And again, we're getting
caught up in this whole definition of ``walking.'' But even
given whatever the definitions are, no one from my level up
knew of any gun walking.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentleman from Florida Mr. Ross for 5
minutes.
Mr. Ross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McMahon, I had an opportunity to read your opening
statement. I apologize, I have been in and out of here.
First of all, appreciate your service. And I understand
your remorse with what is going on here. I have to talk to you
a little bit about your interview that you had, your
transcribed interview. And I would like to review some of that
with you.
In fact, if I could get slide six brought up. This is a
transcript of your interview that you had for the committee
when you were asked whether you read the wiretap applications
for the Fast and Furious. And you responded, ``No, I did not.''
Do you recall that question and that answer?
Mr. McMahon. I do.
Mr. Ross. Okay. Then you were asked if it was your job to
sign off on the wiretap applications, you stated, ``No, I never
signed off on a memo for a wiretap application.''
Mr. McMahon. That is correct.
Mr. Ross. That was your statement, and it is still today?
Mr. McMahon. Yes, it is.
Mr. Ross. Slide seven. Could we see slide seven? Okay.
This is a memorandum dated February 5, 2005, addressed to
you from the group supervisor of Phoenix Group VII. And the
first line states, This memorandum serves to request
authorization to initiate a Title III cellular telephone
intercept. It is addressed to you. Do you recall that
memorandum?
Mr. McMahon. I recall seeing it just recently, yes.
Mr. Ross. Just recently? You don't recall seeing it before?
Mr. McMahon. I do not.
Mr. Ross. At all.
Mr. McMahon. I do not.
Mr. Ross. Okay.
Slide eight. If we could get slide eight up there.
And this is an email from William Newell to you on February
5, 2010. Attached to this email was an email--was a memo that
we just saw in the past slide. And the email states that
attached to the coverup memo requesting authorization to
conduct a T-III intercept on the main suspect of the OCDETF
Strike Force firearms trafficking case out of the Phoenix
entitled, ``The Fast and Furious.'' I am FedExing that to you.
Do you recall receiving that email?
Mr. McMahon. I don't recall, but I mean, I obviously
received that email, yes.
Mr. Ross. Okay.
Mr. McMahon. I don't specifically recall receiving this
email, no.
Mr. Ross. Do you recall seeing the attachment that was
attached to it?
Mr. McMahon. No, I do not. And I think our email records
show they weren't able to scan the attachment because it was so
large, and they said they were going to FedEx it.
Mr. Ross. Who said that to you?
Mr. McMahon. I think it says it here in this email.
Mr. Ross. Told you it was too large?
Mr. McMahon. That is what I read here. It says, I could not
scan the actual affidavit due to its size, so I am FedExing it.
So scanning it would mean attach it to this email.
Mr. Ross. Now, this is a request for a wiretap. Yeah. This
is a request for a wiretap that is attached to the email.
Mr. McMahon. A wiretap is actually an affidavit that is
prepared at the U.S. Attorney's office.
Mr. Ross. Okay.
So let's go to slide nine then. Okay. This is an affidavit
prepared by Special Agent Hope MacAllister in support of an
application for authorization to intercept wire communications.
It is attached for your review.
Now, the signature block is for Mark R. Chait, but there is
someone else's signature there. Do you recognize that
signature?
Mr. McMahon. I do.
Mr. Ross. Whose signature is that?
Mr. McMahon. That is my signature.
Mr. Ross. Okay. So you were aware of this request for a
wiretap.
Mr. McMahon. Absolutely.
Mr. Ross. Okay. And having seen these documents now, is
there anything you--would you like to clarify any of your
testimony or your interview at all?
Mr. McMahon. Not at all, no. I know that we forwarded the
application for the wiretap through the legal counsel process
to get their approval before it went back to the Phoenix U.S.
Attorney's office and then on to the OEO in Main Justice.
Mr. Ross. Okay. But you just testified just minutes ago
that you weren't--don't recall ever requesting authorization
for the T-III intercept.
Mr. McMahon. No, I said that I never recall receiving this
request. I did get the actual application for the wire--many
wiretaps, and then they were forwarded on.
Mr. Ross. And this is one of those requests for the wiretap
that you authorized, the affidavit.
Mr. McMahon. The last slide that you put up that had my
signature for Mark Chait----
Mr. Ross. Yes.
Mr. McMahon [continuing]. That would transmit the actual
application for wiretap, yes.
Mr. Ross. Okay. Now, in your interview, were you asked
about this?
Mr. McMahon. Not this specifically, no.
Mr. Ross. Okay. Did you volunteer it?
Mr. McMahon. Not that I recall, no.
Mr. Ross. Okay. Any reason why not?
Mr. McMahon. I am trying to figure out what I need to
volunteer. I think I did tell the staff when I was interviewed
that I don't recall--I did recall receiving applications.
Mr. Ross. You downplayed to Mr. Kumar your knowledge about
any of this.
Mr. McMahon. I downplayed to Mr. Kumar my knowledge about
this?
Mr. Ross. Yes. Didn't you?
Mr. McMahon. No, that is not correct. I told Dan Kumar
everything I knew about this case.
Mr. Ross. When was that? In March 2010?
Mr. McMahon. It was throughout this investigation. I think
Dan sat in on some of the briefings. We discussed it.
Mr. Ross. I see my time has expired.
Chairman Issa. I ask the gentleman have an additional 30
seconds.
Would the gentleman yield that 30 seconds?
Mr. Ross. Yes, sir.
Chairman Issa. So if I am to understand, just as a lay
person, I am one of the nonlawyers up here, so that is why I
introduced the qualified people early on. But as a lay person,
it looks to me like you had an intimate part in the wiretap
request. Your signature was part of a request process. And yet
when we asked you about your being involved in them, you did
not volunteer to tell us about this part. You simply relied on
you didn't actually sign the affidavit. Is that what you are
saying? The truth was you didn't sign the affidavit, even
though you signed this document and saw other documents and
were sent other documents that you may not remember?
Mr. McMahon. I signed this document that transmitted the
application for the wiretap to our counsel's office for them to
review.
Chairman Issa. But you never looked at it?
Mr. McMahon. No, I did not. Again, I think I said earlier
on mistakes were made. And one of the first questions you asked
me, sir, is what mistakes. And that mistake is not doing a
thorough enough review of the documents that were coming across
my desk. I accept full responsibility for that.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
Would the gentlelady from New York like to have a round of
questions?
Mrs. Maloney. First of all----
Chairman Issa. The gentlelady is recognized.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you very much.
And I thank you and the ranking member for holding this
hearing, and all of you for your service to our country. We
appreciate it.
We have had a series of hearings. I regret I was also in a
hearing that we are having in Financial Services that I am
ranking member on it, so I had to be there. So I wasn't here
for most of it. But Mr. Cummings is going to brief me
completely on everything that happened.
But in one of our prior hearings, we had Special Agents
that basically testified that the enforcement was not strong
enough, that that was one of the problems on the border, that
there wasn't an express law against trafficking in guns. And
that a lot of times the penalties were, to use the terms of one
of the agents, he called them toothless, that you really
couldn't do anything with it.
And they said that the penalties, even in trafficking guns
and very serious offenses, and straw purchases and all kinds of
things, really ended up in nothing more than probation. So,
therefore, they didn't even feel like pursuing convictions
because the penalties were so lax. And it was inadequate either
to deter illegal purchases, and it wasn't strong enough to
encourage the cooperation of suspects when they were
cooperating. They had to have stronger laws.
So I put in a bill with other members of this committee to
make trafficking in guns a Federal crime. And I would like to
ask Special Agent McMahon and Newell whether or not you think
this would help in combating violence, drug trafficking,
illegal gun trafficking at the border.
Mr. McMahon. Currently, obviously, we have some laws that
are in place that we are using and we are enforcing to the best
of our ability. I think any extra tool is going to be helpful
to us. I think when it gets more specific, as I think some of
the legislation that has been presented would be more specific,
would make things obviously easier.
Mrs. Maloney. Do you think it would disrupt the flow of
guns on the border? Do you think it would help in that way?
Mr. McMahon. I think a tool like that would help, yes.
Mrs. Maloney. And Newell, would you also like to testify on
it?
Mr. Newell. Yes, ma'am, I believe, as a matter of fact, the
Congressional Research Service in July 2009 published a report
which said, I believe the title of it was ``Gun Trafficking in
the Southwest Border.'' And in there, they talked about the
need for a specific statute to address the trafficking of
firearms by a group of individuals that would aid law
enforcement, a statute that would aid law enforcement in being
able to address the specific activity that is currently not
illegal. So any tool that we would have to assist us in that
obviously would be welcome.
Mrs. Maloney. Does everyone else on the panel agree? If you
disagree, would you like to express why? Does everyone agree
that this would be a tool that would be helpful or----
Mr. Gil. I would somewhat disagree.
As I stated earlier, I think the lying and buying, the
straw purchase is by definition itself, you are buying a weapon
or purchasing a weapon or obtaining a weapon for transfer to
some other third party in and of itself is trafficking. We have
some personnel that give outstanding trafficking courses
throughout my career, certainly in the last few years. And we
provided this training to State and locals, as well as to our
Federal partners. And lying and buying, straw purchasing is of
itself is trafficking. And that is what we promoted during
these sessions.
Now, I would agree with you that, by definition, a straw
purchaser has no criminal history. Therefore, we would have to
increase the penalty for those folks that are actually making
the initial purchase.
Mrs. Maloney. That is what the bill does. And I think
oftentimes I listen to the people that are in the combat, that
are on the streets trying to get the job done, which is our
Special Agents. And in several panels, including today, they
have said that a strong anti-gun-trafficking bill would help
them do their jobs. So I think we should listen to them.
One of the testimonies in our last hearing, one of the
agents said that they were military-type weapons, that it
wasn't--no one wants to inhibit a hunter for getting a gun to
go hunting with or someone to protect themselves. But these
were really the type of weapons, like AK-47s, that are used in
military combat. And they were training and trading in these
very deadly, deadly guns. And I understand even the protective
equipment has to be reinforced for military-type guns.
And the rule that was put in place to report on rifles that
are being--long guns that are being sold was also, they
testified, very helpful. And I would like to hear what your
view is from the front lines, Mr. Newell and Mr. McMahon.
Mr. McMahon. We were asked that question earlier. We all
agreed that the demand letter reporting the multiple sale of
those rifles would be helpful for us, yes.
Mrs. Maloney. Is there any other tool that this Congress
could give you that would help you save lives? We are all for
the Second Amendment for a lawful person to own a gun. But for
a criminal and a drug cartel to have easy access, I think the
number was 40,000 deaths last year.
Chairman Issa. The gentlelady's time has expired. Is there
a question?
Mrs. Maloney. Yes. I just want to know if there are other
tools we could give you that would help you combat on the front
lines the illegal sale of guns that is leading to the violence
on the border.
Mr. McMahon. I have testified before Congress a number of
times. And it is not my place to ask. I know ATF will do
whatever we can with the resources and the laws that Congress
provides us.
Mrs. Maloney. Any others?
Chairman Issa. With that, we now go to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Meehan.
And this is a second round, folks.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Newell, I am certainly struggling to find out who
knew what, when, in the form of the not only formulation of
this process, but the approvals as well. So it is my
understanding that this was conceptualized in November 20,
2009. Is that correct? Fast and Furious?
Mr. Newell. No, sir. The investigation first began in
November 2009 under the name of Jacob Chambers, who at that
time was identified as one of the more prolific straw
purchasers. As the case progressed, and I will say that in
November, about mid-November 2009, when the Special Agents
started looking into what appeared, obviously, to be some
connected activity in terms of straw purchases, she did a
phenomenal job in putting a bunch of pieces to the puzzle
together, if you will, and noticed that one individual by the
name of Jacob Chambers seemed to be at that time one of the
more prolific straw purchasers.
At that time, I think when she put all the pieces together,
she knew at that time it was something like 350 guns that had
been purchased by this group. As the case progressed through
December and then early January, we were working out of the
OCDETF strike force, I think she realized----
Mr. Meehan. When did you begin the process of having this
be an OCDETF strike force case?
Mr. Newell. In mid-January, yes.
Mr. Meehan. In mid-January 2010?
Mr. Newell. We submitted it as an OCDETF proposal in
January 2010, yes.
Mr. Meehan. Okay, 2010. Okay.
Mr. Leadmon, am I correct from your testimony, I just heard
you make a comment with respect to you are an intelligence
analyst, among other things. Isn't that correct? One of the
things that you do is try to take a global perspective on how
guns may be moving in the United States and Mexico and
anywhere?
Mr. Leadmon. Yes, sir.
Mr. Meehan. Okay. So part of this is to follow the flow of
guns. Your testimony was that within 6 weeks of the beginning
of this, other law enforcement--yeah, other law enforcement
providers provided us with information in December 2009,
because you were concerned about guns that were in Mexico being
found in Mexico.
So, in essence, December 2009, prior to really the
beginning of Fast and Furious, you as the analyst are already
identifying for people that guns are being trafficked into
Mexico that you are concerned are coming from Phoenix.
Mr. Leadmon. Yes, sir. Let me kind of explain that a little
bit and bring things in perspective. In November 20, 2009,
there was an interdiction by the Mexican authorities in which
there was approximately 41, 42 weapons, firearms recovered. The
information we got through the assistance of ICE and so forth
down there, they covered the interviews----
Mr. Meehan. Was this in November 2009, 42 guns were seized?
Mr. Leadmon. Yes.
Mr. Meehan. So 42 guns were seized in Mexico.
Mr. Leadmon. Correct.
Mr. Meehan. And you are just beginning this OCDETF in
January, which means you are moving up the chain and getting
approvals from other people beyond you, Special Agent Newell,
beyond you, Mr. McMahon. You are getting approvals to pursue
this. You know 40 guns have already left Phoenix and gone into
Mexico at that point in time. Mr. Newell.
Mr. Newell. You are correct.
Mr. Meehan. I am correct that in January, when you begin
this, you were aware that those guns were trafficked from
Phoenix into Mexico.
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir. To be clear on that seizure, I
believe Mr. Leadmon has better information. I think it was
seven of those guns were Fast and Furious guns.
Mr. Leadmon. Thirty-seven.
Mr. Newell. Thirty-seven of those guns were Fast and
Furious guns. And we did submit in mid-January, for OCDETF
approval, of the Fast and Furious plan.
Mr. Meehan. What was the plan then? Because you knew at
this point in time--before you testified that there was no part
of any plan that guns would be known to be going to Mexico. Now
you are telling me that you are part of bringing in OCDETF
because now you have confirmed that guns are going to Mexico
and things are going well. So, at some point in time, I am
trying to get clear when it was that you are now participating
in helping to get authority from up higher for a broader
investigation. OCDETF, as you said, is multiple agencies that
are participating in this.
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir, like I said, in mid-January 2010, we
submitted for OCDETF approval the investigation, which
eventually was approved by the Southwest Region OCDETF Office
in Houston, I believe, the first week of February.
Mr. Meehan. You testified before OCDETF, right here today,
including in this OCDETF from DOJ, the Deputy Attorney General.
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Meehan. Those are your words. At what point in time are
you aware that the Deputy Attorney General became aware of any
aspect of this investigation?
Mr. Newell. I am not aware at what time he became aware,
sir.
Mr. Meehan. When do you believe that he became aware?
Mr. Newell. I am not sure. I believe it was earlier this
year, but I am not sure.
Mr. Meehan. But you stated that OCDETF from the beginning,
these are your words, as this was being conceived, this is your
testimony today, it was not just--I asked you where this came
from.
Mr. Newell. Right.
Mr. Meehan. And then in your subsequent testimony, you
identified that this is from DOJ, the Deputy Attorney General.
This is the conception phase, Mr. Newell, the conception phase.
Your words. The Deputy Attorney General. So when did he know
it? What did he know?
Mr. Newell. Sir, what I mentioned about the Deputy Attorney
General was that, in October 2009, a draft, and then
eventually, in January 2010, a formalized strategy on the DOJ
strategy to combat Southwest border violence, drug--Mexican
drug cartel, Southwest border violence came out, which
highlighted, among other things, how to attack different levels
of criminality by the Mexican drug cartels, be it firearms, be
it drugs, be it full cast smuggling.
When it came to firearms, there was a strategy outlined
there which said, you know, mere interdiction is not the only
solution. You know, working with co-located OCDETF strike
force, it is imperative that we attack the infrastructure, and
the command and control infrastructure of these organizations
to have a lasting impact. That's not verbatim, but it is
something along those lines.
Mr. Gowdy [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired,
the distinguished former U.S. Attorney.
At this point, the chair would recognized the distinguished
gentleman from Maryland, the ranking member of the full
committee, Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Special Agent Newell, I want to pick up on
the last questioning. You testified that Fast and Furious
originated with street agents and local supervisors of Group
VII. Do you remember saying that?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And so what did you mean by that? I mean--go
ahead. Because we have a lot of questions as to how this thing
came about. And that seems to be leading us somewhere. And I
just want to see where we are going.
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir. Agents in the field, in pursuit of
evidence in further of some investigation, some sort of
criminality, be it a firearms case, an explosives case, an
arson case, will open up an investigation, with their
supervisor's concurrence, into whatever they believe to be, you
know, some sort of criminality by one or more individuals.
That's how a case is initiated, and that's how this case was
initiated. It was initiated under the name of Jacob Chambers,
et al.
Mr. Cummings. Okay.
And Special Agent Canino, you testified that you are a
senior trainer and instructor for ATF agents, but have never
heard of noninterdiction, or gun walking, as an approved
tactic. It is just not done?
Mr. Canino. No, sir. I've never heard of it.
Mr. Cummings. And Mr. McMahon, did anyone at the ATF
headquarters instruct Phoenix Group VII to conduct the
investigation in the manner that we know it ended up being
conducted in and to not interdict weapons of known straw
purchasers?
Mr. McMahon. No, sir, we did not.
Mr. Cummings. That's a fact?
Mr. McMahon. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. So this was not a new DOJ policy?
Mr. McMahon. No, sir, it was not a new DOJ policy. I think
what we got to realize is guns to Mexico from the United States
has been a problem for an awful long time. We have been trying
to make an impact, and it is something that we are continuing
to try to do.
Mr. Cummings. Now, going back to you, Special Agent Newell,
you know, if we listen to all the testimony, this is what it
boils down to. I listen to your definition of walking, and
you're basically talking about a commission, and it sounds like
we have an instance here of omission; in other words, failing
to stop guns from going through. So but there is something
bigger than that. And that is, it seems like we need to
balance, knowing guns are going into Mexico, and this grand
plan to try to get to the cartel, and the whole idea if we
omit--you know, making sure that these guns don't go in--in
other words, we let them go--they go in, let them go in, and
stand by and watch them, where these guns end up and the harm
that, when they got in the wrong hands, what they would do. Was
there ever a balancing of that? Because that seems like what
this boils down to.
I mean, I think that is why these agents are so upset. They
are trying to figure out, you know, did anybody say, okay, this
is going against the policy that we normally do? Our number one
goal is to make sure weapons don't get into the hands of the
wrong people. But then they are trying to get their arms around
it. Was there some greater, greater cause that was worth it,
the risk to see these guns actually land in the hands of the
wrong people? Can you comment on that? Do you understand the
question?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir, I understand the question. And one of
the things I said in my opening statement, sir, was that--one
of the things I readily admit is that there should have been
more--it was incumbent upon me that there should have been
more, throughout the case, risk assessments to determine where
we were in the investigation. Because as I've said before, the
whole plan was to take out the whole organization. But I
realize in retrospect that there were times when I should have
conducted more risk assessments.
Mr. Cummings. And to your fellow agents here, I think you
would agree then that if you truly did a balancing situation,
you probably would not have gone along with this the way things
went. Is that right? In other words, the omission piece. You
follow me?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. You know what bothers me here? You got agents
here who are very emotional about this. I mean, and I
appreciate these are honorable people who go out there and put
their lives on the line every day. And then they've got you,
who is more of a supervisor type, and they use I guess some of
sort of a military style operation where you're supposed to do
what the folks over the top of you tell you. But then you start
looking at the folks over the top of you, and you say, well,
you know, what is this about? So you can comment because I am
running out of time.
Mr. Newell. Like I said, Congressman, in my opening
statement, was I realize now in retrospect there should have
been more risk assessments. I realize that. I acknowledge that.
And that was one of the mistakes that were made. I should have
had more risk assessments throughout the case.
Mr. Gowdy. I thank the gentleman from Maryland.
Special Agent Newell, there has been some talk this morning
and this afternoon about tools in the toolbox so to speak. What
is the penalty for 924(c), first offense?
Mr. Newell. Five years, 60months.
Mr. Gowdy. What is the penalty for the second offense?
Mr. Newell. I believe it is 15 years.
Mr. Gowdy. What is the penalty for the third offense?
Mr. Newell. I believe it is 30 years.
Mr. Gowdy. And so you are quickly approaching 60 years with
the 924(c)'s. And OCDETF, this was an OCDETF case, right?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. What does the D stand for in OCDETF?
Mr. Newell. Drug.
Mr. Gowdy. And 924(c) is a Federal statute that proscribes
the use of a firearm during the commission of a drug
trafficking offense or other Title XVIII offenses, right?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. So this had to have a drug connection, or it
wouldn't have been an OCDETF case.
Mr. Newell. Actually, sir, I believe in 2008, 2009, the
OCDETF office issued guidance which said that you can in fact--
you can use the OCDETF program to attack firearms trafficking
organizations because the other related crimes.
Mr. Gowdy. These were drug cartels, though, right?
Mr. Newell. The firearms trafficking organizations?
Mr. Gowdy. Right.
Mr. Newell. It was related to a drug cartel, yes, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. What is the statutory maximum for lying and
buying?
Mr. Newell. The statutory maximum, I believe, is 5 years.
Mr. Gowdy. What is the statutory minimum for 924(e)?
Mr. Newell. Fifteen years.
Mr. Gowdy. What is the statutory maximum for 924(e)?
Mr. Newell. It can be up to life.
Mr. Gowdy. Up to life. So if you can get up to life for
924(e), you can get over 60 years in theory for 924(c)'s, and
you don't think you have enough tools in the toolbox?
Mr. Newell. I did not say that, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. Do you believe you have enough tools in the
toolbox?
Mr. Newell. I believe the laws that we have now, the ones
that we have, that's the ones we have to use. Any additional
tool would be welcomed.
Mr. Gowdy. Let me ask you this. When you begin a sentence,
``You didn't get this from me,'' what does that mean to you?
Mr. Newell. This means that you didn't get it from me.
Mr. Gowdy. Well, but that's kind of a pleonasm, isn't it?
Because you are getting it from them. So it's a--what do you
mean by that, you didn't get this from me? I am referring to
your email to Mr. O'Reilly.
Mr. Newell. Well, obviously, Mr. O'Reilly was a friend of
mine. And it's--I shouldn't have been sending him that.
Obviously, I recognize that. Being a friend.
Mr. Gowdy. What do you mean, ``you didn't get this from
me?'' Does that mean you should not have been talking to him
about it?
Mr. Newell. Not that I shouldn't have been talking about
it. He is a friend of mine. He asked for information, and I
provided it to him.
Mr. Gowdy. Well, then why wasn't it appropriate for you to
give it to him? Why would you preface it by saying ``you didn't
get this from me?'' Was it an improper communication?
Mr. Newell. No, it wasn't an improper communication.
Mr. Gowdy. Then why would you preface it by that?
Mr. Newell. He has been a friend of mine for a long time,
and he asked me for information. So I gave him information that
just probably is an improper use of the term or phrase.
Mr. Gowdy. Okay. I yield my remaining time to the chairman.
Chairman Issa [presiding]. So following up on where Mr.
Gowdy was, and I apologize, we are trying to keep going during
the votes.
Mrs. Maloney. Are there votes?
Chairman Issa. Yes. You have 1 minute left. Actually, you
have 36 seconds left. You sent something to somebody because
they were a friend that works in the White House on the
National Security Team who requested something about a rather
esoteric single investigation. Why do you think he asked you
for that information that you didn't get these from me? Why do
you think he asked for that information you said he didn't get
from you?
Mr. Newell. Well, sir, the way I am reading the email now,
and my recollection, he wasn't asking about a specific
investigation, he was asking about our efforts during the
Gunrunner impact team over the summer of----
Chairman Issa. Why do you think he was asking?
Mr. Newell. If I recall that email, he was asking for
information to brief his boss, I believe, in preparation for a
trip to Mexico, in our efforts along, in our area along what we
were doing to combat firearms trafficking and other issues.
Chairman Issa. Okay. So this is September 2010.
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Issa. Wasn't it already a failed program that you
had recognized needed to be shut down, that there was a 30, 60,
90-day shutdown some time ago? Wasn't this after you had been
frustrated by a U.S. attorney who couldn't seem to end this
thing?
Mr. Newell. Well, at this time, sir, I believe our case had
been over at the U.S. Attorney's Office now for about probably
2 to 3 weeks.
Chairman Issa. Okay. Let me go on another line of
questioning for you, because I have these ATF agents who don't
see the world the way you, Bogota, and your other experience
see it. And I just want to understand the difference. You saw
this as necessary. You saw that you had to make your case. You
saw that 30, 60, 90 days went by even after you recognized that
an awful lot of guns had walked. You may not have said you
walked them, but they walked. They are in Mexico. They are
distributed broadly. So 2,000 weapons are gone and you still
think this program was a good program. Right?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Issa. Okay. So you would do this program again?
Mr. Newell. As I said earlier in my opening statements, I
would do several things differently if we were to do something
like this again.
Chairman Issa. But you would do a program in which you
contact federally licensed gun sales organizations, tell them,
in response to what they believe are suspected straw
purchasers, to go ahead and install video cameras, watch these
people buy, and follow them to a location and then wait to see
where they turned up.
Mr. Newell. That would be one of the things in the risk
assessments that I would seriously consider changing.
Chairman Issa. What about the American people? You said
risk assessment. You know, that sounds like the doctor telling
you that you have non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and there is a zero
percent chance, but we think we can operate and get you an
extra month. Risk assessment.
Mrs. Maloney, Ms. Norton, they are radically against the
Second Amendment. They absolutely, positively do not want
anyone having any guns. They are pretty straightforward about
it. They will say they respect the Second Amendment, but they
have never seen a gun limitation they don't want.
In your case, your agency has a special, special
obligation. Maintain the Second Amendment, law-abiding
citizens' rights to keep and bear arms; stop bad people from
getting them. Now, you said you need more laws.
I am going to go to some of the other agents for a moment.
Mr. Canino, if the U.S. attorney agreed to prosecute every
case, or in a State where there were strong gun laws, if he or
she only gave up that prosecution if the State agreed to
prosecute, would we have dramatically reduced gun violence on
both sides of the border if there was 100 percent prosecution
of existing laws?
Mr. Canino. Eliminate gun violence?
Chairman Issa. No, I said greatly reduce.
Mr. Canino. I don't think--what is the word I am looking
for--I don't think Federalizing--I don't think Federalizing
street crime is the answer. I think there's plenty of gun laws.
Now, some of them are better than others. Some of them there's
really no deterrence; there's no significant time that people
are facing. That's the frustrating part.
But in my opinion, you know, the political reality is that
right now there is no appetite or will for any substantive
legislation. I am an ATF agent. I can't worry about that. I got
to worry about catching bad guys. And I'm going to do the best
can with what I've got. And that's it.
Chairman Issa. Agent Wall, you happen to be just south of
the San Diego border right now. I am just north of it.
President Bush fired Carol Lam to a great extent on my request.
I don't worry about the other eight U.S. attorneys that got
fired. I helped get her fired because she wouldn't prosecute
trafficking in human beings, and she wouldn't prosecute gun
crimes. She basically said, turn them over to the State, and
then walked away, knowing that in most cases, they wouldn't
prosecute. Does it make a difference if you have a U.S.
attorney at each of those border areas who takes trafficking in
human beings, trafficking in drugs, and trafficking in guns
seriously enough to basically not let anyone walk away not
being prosecuted just because they might only get 6 months or a
year?
Mr. Wall. Yes, sir. Unequivocally. Federal agents, police
officers on the Federal task force, and agents in ATF, in my
opinion, we have a tremendous effect on crime.
However, when cases don't get prosecuted, when they
languish, as I said in my opening statement, and the cases are
either declined or given the minimal sentence, it doesn't send
a message to the people engaged in this type of activity. Take,
for example, gun trafficking. When you have individuals that
aren't prosecuted, however maybe there was a search warrant
served and guns were taken from them, all they are going to do
is tell the next guy, hey, watch out for these guys that do
this because this is how I got caught. But there is no
deterrent. We need to prosecute people. We need to put them in
prison for this. And we need to put them there for a while.
Chairman Issa. Special Agent Canino, in your experience, if
you have somebody dead to rights, you have them with the
weapons, let's just take our 730 man, if you walked in and
said, look, we've got you, we know who you've been selling to,
we've got you, if you don't give us testimony right now, if you
don't roll, you're not leaving here, and you're going away for
a very long time; in your experience, is there a high
likelihood that they're going to essentially flip on the next
guy up in return for essentially the minimum charge of simply
buying and lying? Is that an effective tool when you have what
we had in this case? We knew that he had sold to a trafficker.
We had hundreds. Any jury is going to consider him part of the
trafficking charge you can bring. And we had evidence of
exactly who he sold to, so we could tell him we already know
who you sold to. But if you are not willing to testify, we are
going to put you away with him. And by the way, people have
died in Mexico. And then we are going to allow you to be
extradited to Mexico. Does that technique--and I am not asking
you for your techniques, I am giving you the NCIS one, because
that way we are not get into sources and methods, but does that
work?
Mr. Canino. Yes, sir. I mean depending. Each individual is
different. But if it is done correctly and respectfully, and
you treat the person like a human being, and you honestly tell
them, hey, you know, these are your choices----
Chairman Issa. So here it is, I really don't want to hit
you with the stick, but I will.
Mr. Canino. Pretty much. I mean----
Chairman Issa. Let me go to Mr. Leadmon for a second.
On March 5, 2010, you did a briefing at ATF headquarters on
operation Fast and Furious. At that time, did you brief that
over 1,000 weapons had been sold?
Mr. Leadmon. Yes, 1,026.
Chairman Issa. Did you in that presentation brief and show
the links between the straw purchasers and the Sinaloa cartel?
Mr. Leadmon. I identified the cartel. And in the briefing,
I showed the links toward the seizures in Mexico and how they
moved from Sonora over to Juarez area.
Chairman Issa. So was it clear on March 10th, when you gave
that briefing, that everyone in the room that guns were going
to gun dealers in Arizona and then going into Mexico?
Mr. Leadmon. Absolutely.
Chairman Issa. Who was in the room at that time?
Mr. Leadmon. Everybody in senior management, ATF field
operations, except for Mr. Melson.
Chairman Issa. Were there representatives of the Department
of Justice?
Mr. Leadmon. Yes.
Chairman Issa. Who?
Mr. Leadmon. Mr. Joe Cooley.
Chairman Issa. So Justice was fully informed that guns were
walking?
Mr. Leadmon. I don't think he is very high hanging fruit,
but he was there.
Chairman Issa. Did anyone express concern at this meeting
that the number of weapons appearing in Mexico, or the number
of weapons bought by straw purchasers seemed to be too high?
Mr. Leadmon. Yes, someone on the other end of the--in the
video, because we had a video conference, I believe it was
somebody out of the Dallas Field Division voiced that concern,
and there was some discussion.
Chairman Issa. And we also have a memo that says we got to
close this down, basically, at that same time. So at a
thousand, it was too many.
Let me ask our two defenders of this program. And I am
sorry, but that does appear as how your role here today has
been. Did it ever occur to either one of you after Mr.
Leadmon's March 10th, or before, that you could let some of
these walk and interdict others? Meaning, quite frankly, when
somebody had already bought 100 of them and transported them to
him, they weren't going to sell them to somebody different. You
knew it was a straw purchaser. He basically usually had one
customer. He has made the sale once, twice, 20 times. Did it
ever occur to you to go ahead and at least stop these guns a
few times?
As you said, Mr. Newell, make it expensive by intercepting
some of them?
Just blind dumb luck they had to figure--and this is just
me talking, but I think I have lived this thing long enough.
The cartels had to realize at some point that you were helping
them buy guns because they were having such a good batting
average. Isn't that true? The fact that these guys weren't
interdicting the guns almost had to be conspicuous at some
point. Couldn't you have at least stopped some of these guns to
make it look more real?
Mr. Newell. Well, sir, as I said in my opening statement,
that's one of the things I would do different.
Chairman Issa. Well, we are going to take a short recess.
There will be a little bit of voting. We will come back. And I
know you have been patient.
During the recess, our restrooms are available to you. I
would suggest that on that side, there is a restroom where you
don't have to go out and be accosted by the cameras and so on.
But what I would like you to do, Special Agent Newell and
Special Agent McMahon, but for all of you, I would like each of
you, if you will agree, to give me back a list of the things
that you would do differently.
And Special Agent Newell, I would like your list because
you're the one that has most said it.
Special Agent McMahon, I would like yours because you
oversaw it and you said some things. But each of the four of
you, from your experience, would you each be willing to give me
what would be done differently?
Now, I know the easy thing is, I wouldn't have done the
damn stupid thing. But short of that, case-by-case breakdown,
what would have to be different if this would be done? Because
this is the Committee on Oversight and Reform. The minority
suggests that we pile on a bunch more gun laws. And maybe that
will happen someday. But I am looking for answers that we can
do to get effective work that you need to do, effective
prosecution. And if it needs legislation, we are happy to look
at it and put it into the mix. But I am looking for the kind of
reform for the most part that doesn't just assume that a
stronger gun law, selectively enforced by U.S. attorneys who
lose interest in these cases, is necessarily the only answer.
So, with that, we stand in recess until about 5 minutes
after the last vote.
[Recess.]
Chairman Issa. The hearing will come to order.
We now recognize the chairman emeritus, Mr. Burton, for his
round of questioning.
Mr. Burton. That means the old guy.
Chairman Issa. Well, that, too.
Mr. Burton. First of all, I want to start off by saying
that the ATF, the FBI, the CIA, all of our intelligence
agencies, we have high regard for all of you. And I know some
of my colleagues indicated today that we were beating you over
the head. We are not. We are investigating this issue. And we
are certainly not investigating the good work that you guys do.
And I know some of your colleagues have been killed; some
of you have been injured. We know you lay your lives on the
lines for us. And so you have our respect and admiration for
what you do.
Now, let me just say to Mr. McMahon and Mr. Newell, you
know that you are under oath.
Mr. McMahon. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Newell. Yes.
Mr. Burton. Okay. Both of you know that. What I want to
know is do you know who was involved in the decisionmaking
process to start this whole program?
Mr. McMahon. Again, I think this was not a program; this
was a criminal investigation.
Mr. Burton. Well, okay, this criminal investigation. Do you
know who suggested or started this criminal investigation?
Mr. McMahon. The agents on the street are the ones that
will initiate the investigation.
Mr. Burton. I know, but someone said this is what we are
going to do. Who started it? Where did you get the instructions
to do this?
Mr. McMahon. We don't give our agents instructions to do
things. They go out and produce cases on their own.
Mr. Burton. So what you are telling me now is that this
investigation that we are talking about, what is the name of it
again? What is it called?
Chairman Issa. Fast and Furious.
Mr. Burton. Fast and Furious, this just came from an agent
in the field, and that was it; nobody else had anything to do
with it. You didn't get a letter of instruction or anything
like that.
Mr. McMahon. Absolutely not.
Mr. Burton. What about this--you say you got a memo. There
was a memo from a Deputy Attorney General about this. What was
that?
Mr. McMahon. I believe that Bill Newell was referencing a
memo the Deputy Attorney General put out regarding our strategy
on how we are going to combat firearms----
Mr. Burton. Who was the Deputy Attorney General?
Mr. McMahon. I believe that one came from Deputy Attorney
General Ogden.
Mr. Burton. Deputy Attorney General Ogden. When did that
come?
Mr. McMahon. It had nothing do with Fast and Furious.
Mr. Burton. What did it have to do with?
Mr. McMahon. It had to do with the government's strategy to
help combat the violence that is going on in Mexico.
Mr. Burton. Did it have anything to do with the weapons
that were going down there?
Mr. McMahon. Absolutely.
Mr. Burton. Okay. So it did have something do with what we
are talking about.
Mr. McMahon. Yes, it did.
Mr. Burton. Okay. And his name is what?
Mr. McMahon. I believe it was David Ogden, but I am not
positive.
Mr. Burton. Okay. But you also said earlier in testimony
that there were a number of other agencies that were involved
in this whole investigation process. You mentioned IRS,
Customs, DEA, FBI, and so forth. You remember that? What were
the names of the people that were involved in that?
Mr. McMahon. Again, I think Bill Newell answered those
questions regarding this case being conducted out of----
Mr. Burton. What I want is the names of the people that
were involved in the investigation from each agency.
Mr. McMahon. I don't know the names.
Mr. Burton. Somebody does. Do you know, Mr. Newell?
Mr. Newell. I know a couple of the names, yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Okay. We want those names. The reason why we
want those names is I am going to ask the chairman to talk to
them about continuing this investigation to find out how
involved everybody was, and why it went on as long as it did
when we knew in 2009 that this kind of thing was going on. And
if there were IRS agents, FBI agents, DEA agents, Customs, or
others, we want to know who was involved so we can question
them as well. So I want their names. Do you have any of their
names right now?
Mr. Newell. No, sir, I don't.
Mr. Burton. And you don't remember any of their names?
Mr. Newell. I remember one of their names.
Mr. Burton. What's his name.
Mr. Newell. I believe that the ICE agent assigned to the
case was a young man by the name of Lane France.
Mr. Burton. Lankford?
Mr. Newell. Lane France.
Mr. Burton. Lane French?
Mr. Newell. France, sir.
Mr. Burton. Okay, you got that. How about the other
agencies? Do you remember any of the names? Were there other
people involved?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir, but I don't know their names, sir.
Mr. Burton. Can you find their names for us?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Can you get those names for us?
Mr. Newell. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Burton. Okay. Will you get those names for us?
Mr. Newell. Absolutely.
Mr. Burton. Okay. And every single one of those names from
those various agencies that were involved in the whole thing.
We would like to have their names and their titles and the
agencies they work for.
Mr. Newell. Okay. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. And you will get those for us?
Mr. Newell. I will do my best, yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. No, no, no, no. I don't want you to do your
best. I want the names. Can you get us the names?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir, I will.
Mr. Burton. And you do know who they are and you know how
to get their names?
Mr. Newell. I will find out who they are, and I will get
their names, yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Okay.
Chairman Issa. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Burton. I would be happy to yield.
Chairman Issa. Would you also include the dates that they
were read into this program with sufficient specificity that
they would understand the details of how the gun following that
you say is not gun walking occurred? In other words, we don't
want to just have names of people on lists; we want to have the
names of people who were read into the program.
Mr. Burton. And the dates that they were involved.
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir. And if I can clarify a point, sir.
Mr. Burton. But before you go clarifying, I want to make
sure I get all this.
Mr. Chairman, I want to make absolutely sure we have their
names, dates, times, places that they were involved in this
investigation so that we can trace it all the way back to its
origin and see where we went, see who was involved, and how all
these weapons, 2,000 weapons got down in there into Mexico, and
whether or not somebody higher up in the Justice Department or
the food chain might have been involved. And the only way we
can get that information is from you two, or the other people
who were involved in the investigation from these other
agencies. So I just want to say one more time, this is very
important that you understand that you are telling us right now
that you will get us this information, you can get us the
names, times, dates and places that we need. And you will do
that.
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Okay. Very good. I just want to make sure
you're under oath and you understand that. I yield to the
chairman.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman. We now go to the
gentleman from Cleveland, Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Newell, on June 15, 2011, three agents under your
command testified before this committee. And they outlined the
very serious allegations that prompted this investigation. The
line agents told us that as part of Operation Fast and Furious,
one, they were instructed to cut off surveillance of suspected
straw purchasers; two, they were ordered to forego arrests of
straw purchasers; and three, they were prohibited from seizing
or interdicting weapons from straw purchasers on several
occasions when they believed they had the lawful authority to
do so.
Mr. Newell, these are very serious allegations. But in your
transcribed interview with the committee, you said you never
heard these complaints before they became public in February of
this year. Is that right?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kucinich. Here is what you said. You said, To the best
of my recollection, I don't remember any time ever being
advised that there was some discourse amongst the agents. I
became aware of that when some of the documents were released
that I saw, and I want to say it was probably February, early
February, something like that of this year. Isn't that
information you would have expected to have received earlier?
Mr. Newell. I would have hoped to have received that
earlier, yes, sir.
Mr. Kucinich. Who would have been responsible for bringing
these agents' concerns to your attention?
Mr. Newell. Well, if they followed the chain of command, I
would hope that that information had gotten to me, yes, sir.
Mr. Kucinich. But who specifically would have been
responsible? I mean, there are people in your chain of command.
Can you----
Mr. Newell. If they had voiced those specific concerns to
their supervisor, I would hope that--and they did not get a
response that they felt appropriate from their supervisor, then
obviously--they obviously have the right to go over his or her
head, in this case his head, and go to the second line, and so
on from there.
Mr. Kucinich. Well, obviously, the committee has the names
of the people who were in those various lines of command. So
Special Agent McMahon, in your interview, you said the same
thing, that you didn't hear about these allegations until they
were reported in the press. Isn't that right?
Mr. McMahon. That's correct.
Mr. Kucinich. And is that information you would have
expected to receive sooner? Did you feel you should have
received it sooner?
Mr. McMahon. I would have hoped to. If the concerns that
were expressed this late on were expressed earlier on, I would
hope that if there was so much urgency, it should have been
brought to our attention earlier.
Mr. Kucinich. The line agents testified that they made
their concerns known to their group supervisor, David Voth. Yet
he, too, told the committee that he knew nothing about their
allegations. He said this, ``I don't recall people coming to me
with those concerns.'' Now, Mr. McMahon, as the line agents'
immediate supervisor, should Mr. Voth have known about the
allegations?
Mr. McMahon. I am assuming if they were expressed to him,
he should have known about them, yes.
Mr. Kucinich. The committee has apparently identified a
conflict in the testimony. Either the line agents are having
difficulty being able to communicate the truth or their
supervisor is having that difficulty. Now, what steps, Mr.
McMahon, did the ATF's management take to ensure that line
agents can make headquarters aware of their concerns if their
direct supervisor is not responsive? And can they do that
without in effect bringing upon themselves some kind of
sanctions for going other the head of a line supervisor?
Mr. McMahon. I believe they can. I think the processes that
we have set up in ATF headquarters allow that. We have an
ombudsman program. We have obviously the chain of command
anywhere in there. I think our director, every time he has
actually been out to visit offices, he has told people about
his open door line of communication. He receives emails from
line agents. I have tried do the same thing on my visits to the
field divisions that I oversee. You know, you try to make
yourself as open as possible to everyone within the Bureau.
Mr. Kucinich. I thank the gentleman. And I just want to say
we all appreciate the very difficult and challenging work that
everyone at the agency has to carry out, so I'm sure you can
understand the questions that have been raised about the
conduct of this particular operation, that things don't fit,
and when they don't fit, it makes it difficult for Members of
Congress to be able to defend the kind of support that they
want to maintain for the Bureau. So I want to thank you for
being here.
I yield back.
Mr. Meehan [presiding]. I want to thank the gentleman from
Ohio. At this point in time I will give myself 5 minutes for
further questioning.
Mr. Leadmon, when we last left, you were talking about law
enforcement partners providing you information in December 2009
that had given you concern about guns that had actually showed
up in Mexico; isn't that correct?
Mr. Leadmon. They didn't provide it to me, they provided it
to the Phoenix agents, and it was routed to me.
Mr. Meehan. So when you say ``other law enforcement
partners,'' is this partners outside of ATF?
Mr. Leadmon. Correct.
Mr. Meehan. Can you identify what other partners at this
point in time in December 2009 were part of this investigation?
Mr. Leadmon. They weren't part, to my knowledge, but they
were running a parallel, and it was DEA. I don't want to get
into their investigation, even though they wrapped up that
investigation I want to say February or so of 2010, but they
were----
Mr. Meehan. February 2010, but they became part of the
OCDETF case; isn't that right, Mr. Newell, DEA?
Mr. Newell. There were several investigations involving
DEA. But what Mr. Leadmon is talking about is I believe the
information on that seizure came from DEA to us, and then it
was routed to Mr. Leadmon.
Mr. Meehan. Came to you.
Mr. Gil, at point in time--or, Mr. Canino, while you were
in the field doing this, were you aware of any other agencies
that had information pertinent to this that you believed was
not being shared with you?
Mr. Gil. The only other agency that we worked with while in
Mexico would have been ICE, and we actually used them to a
certain extent to conduct interviews either with us or on our
behalf regarding arms trafficking.
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Leadmon.
Mr. Leadmon. A clarification. That investigation was not
originating out of Mexico. That was a U.S. investigation that
DEA was doing out of the Phoenix area.
Mr. Meehan. Okay. Thank you.
Special Agent McMahon, you just responded partially to a
question, and unfortunately you weren't allowed to give a full
answer, but I was intrigued by what you were beginning to say
when, again, there was a once more question about the genesis
of the case, and you began to talk about agents in the field.
You know, the agents were the ones that begin to make these
cases. Can you explain to me what you mean by that?
Mr. McMahon. Well, the way ATF works is our agents are the
ones that conduct the investigations, they're the ones that
generate investigations. Obviously they should get approval
from their first-line supervisor of which investigations to
open or not.
Mr. Meehan. So those agents, what were they investigating,
just straw purchasing in general?
Mr. McMahon. When you have a division group, the division
usually breaks down those groups into specific types of cases.
You might have an arson explosives group, you might have a gang
group, you might have a firearms trafficking group. If you're
out in the field----
Mr. Meehan. The agents working on this case.
Mr. McMahon. The agents were assigned to a gunrunner group
that was specifically assigned to investigate firearms
trafficking to Mexico.
Mr. Meehan. At what point did the gunrunner group take it
up higher to the chain as part of this? Did they include the
assistant U.S. attorney? Was there an assistant U.S. attorney
appointed to that group?
Mr. McMahon. I'm not sure if it was appointed to that
group, but I know we usually try to get an assistant U.S.
attorney onto the case as early as possible.
Mr. Meehan. How early do you think, Mr. Newell, do you
recollect, that an assistant U.S. attorney was assigned to this
case?
Mr. Newell. From the very beginning.
Mr. Meehan. From the very beginning?
Mr. Newell. Yes.
Mr. Meehan. Okay. Did the assistant U.S. attorney to you
knowledge communicate with the U.S. attorney about this case?
Mr. Newell. To my knowledge, I don't know, sir.
Mr. Meehan. You don't know the answer. But this case began
somewhere in November 2009, and we have testimony that by
December 2009, there was already concern about scores of
weapons that were being recovered in Mexico. But what was the
response of the assistant U.S. attorney to that revelation?
Mr. Newell. Well, as outlined in the January 8th briefing
paper, they felt that there was not enough evidence at that
time to secure anymore--or to secure for prosecution, so to
continue monitoring the sales.
Mr. Meehan. They continued monitoring the sales, but were
they aware and did they believe that guns, ultimately
thousands, were continued to be trafficked with the approval of
the assistant U.S. attorney?
Mr. Newell. I'm not sure exactly what they were aware of,
sir, but I know they were informed.
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Gil, at any point in time, did you get a
visit from anybody? And who was the highest person that visited
you from the Department of Justice with respect to this matter?
Mr. Gil. To a certain extent it would have been a DOJ
contingent to business, I believe, during the summer or spring,
and I believe it was Kevin Carlisle. Lanny Breuer visited.
Mr. Meehan. Lanny Breuer is the head of the Criminal
Division; is that not right?
Mr. Gil. At that time. I don't know where he is today.
Mr. Meehan. When did Mr. Breuer visit you in Mexico with
respect to this case?
Mr. Gil. I would have to check.
Mr. Meehan. What's your recollection?
Mr. Gil. I think it was the summer of----
Mr. Meehan. The summer. That would be after we already know
that thousands of guns had been trafficked?
Mr. Gil. Yes.
Mr. Meehan. Was that communicated to him?
Mr. Gil. By me, no.
Mr. Meehan. By anybody, to your awareness?
Mr. Gil. No, sir.
Mr. Meehan. My time has passed.
At this point in time the chair would recognize the
gentlelady Mrs. Maloney.
Mrs. Maloney. Well, I thank you for recognizing me. And I
am deeply concerned that while I was on the floor voting, that
the chairman, for whom I have tremendous respect, made
derogatory remarks about Ms. Norton and myself. And as I hear,
I would like to quote what he said: Mrs. Maloney and Ms.
Norton, they are radically against the Second Amendment. They
absolutely positively do not want anyone having any guns.
They're pretty straightforward about it. They'll say they
respect the Second Amendment, but they've never seen a gun
limitation they do not like.
I would like to say that I support the Second Amendment,
and I support legal guns for sportsmen, for law defense, for
hunters, for self-defense. Just recently one of our colleagues,
Leonard Boswell, literally someone broke into his home, and he
thought his life was in danger. His grandson took a legal
registered gun and got the intruder out of the home. I respect
the right to own legal guns for self-defense, for other
reasons, but I do not support illegal guns that are fueling
drug wars and putting lives at risk.
In testimony before this committee it was told that 40,000
people have died in the last 5 years on the border of Mexico.
What we have put forward is a simple statute that would
prohibit gun trafficking in illegal guns to people who want to
use them for illegal purposes. I think that is respecting law
enforcement, helping law enforcement, and protecting lives on
both sides of the border. And I must also say that the ATF
agents who testified and were called by the majority to
testify, they indicated that this would help them do their job
and help them to protect innocent people in Mexico and in the
United States of America.
And I just really wanted to clarify that since I feel that
Ms. Norton and myself were attacked unfairly. And I do not
think that legitimate debate or ideas or legislation should be
attacked in this unfair way. So I just would like to clarify
that.
Chairman Issa [presiding]. Would the gentlelady yield?
Mrs. Maloney. Absolutely.
Chairman Issa. Well, I stand corrected if, in fact, you're
for the Second Amendment. And I will not consider the same with
Ms. Norton, who said that my entire side of the aisle was owned
by the NRA in some of hers, or somebody in the District of
Columbia continues to support basically this being a gun-free
zone in violation of the Second Amendment. But I take you at
your word, and I'm sorry that I exaggerated to include you.
Mr. Cummings. Will the gentlelady yield very briefly?
Mrs. Maloney. Absolutely.
Mr. Cummings. I want to thank the chairman for his apology,
but I can attest to the fact, Mr. Chairman, that when the
gentlelady and I introduced our recent bill, she basically said
what she just said, that she had no problem. And I think the
confusion comes in those of us who have seen over and over
again the result of gun violence, those of us who go to the
funerals, those of us who listen to the ATF agents who beg to
make sure that we help them because they're fighting weapons of
war. And that's what we are concerned about. We didn't debate
it. The ATF agents came in here and said it. Some of them have
said it today.
So I yield back to the gentlelady, and I want to thank the
chairman.
Mrs. Maloney. I just want to also add that I think we both
agree on both sides of the aisle that mistakes were made in the
handling of Operation Fast and Furious, and we are legitimately
trying to get answers and to look at this. But the larger issue
that I feel is in danger of possibly being overlooked is the
flow of illegal weapons. And we're not talking about regular
guns. In the testimony from the agents, they called them
military-style weapons. They were AK-47s, very special deadly
rifles. So these aren't normal guns, these are our military
guns. And this is an even larger issue than Fast and Furious
is, to stop the flow of illegal guns. And I believe that on
both sides of the aisle we can agree that illegal guns flowing
into America or Mexico is something we need to address and stop
as quickly as possible.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentlelady.
We now go to the gentleman from Texas Mr. Farenthold for
his round.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I'm going to kind of bring it more back to where we were
going, I think, with the investigating Operation Fast and
Furious as opposed to discussing the merits of any proposed new
gun regulations or gun laws. Let me ask some of the gentlemen
from ATF, if you remembered the lessons we learned from 9/11,
we found that we probably would have had a much better chance
of stopping the attacks on the World Trade Center had the
various organizations within our government been communicating
with each other better. We've spent millions of dollars on
fusion centers for information sharing among agencies. And then
I'm troubled to find here that you're basically running an
investigation covering some of the same suspects, basically
parallel investigations, with the Drug Enforcement
Administration, and there was an unwillingness to or a failure
to coordinate among those agencies. Would that be a fair
assessment of what happened: There were multiple
investigations, and the DEA didn't know what you were up to,
and vice versa?
Mr. McMahon. Sir, as far as I'm concerned, that is the
complete opposite of that. I think when we received funding to
get our gunrunner groups up and running, one of the first
things we did was assign them to strike force groups so they
could work hand in hand with the other agencies. And I think
this case is an example of how that was one of the positive
things out of this case. DEA had some information that they
shared with us that helped us in our investigation and actually
helped foster it even more so.
Mr. Farenthold. Then why weren't you all coordinating, and
there were two different investigations going on? At the very
least that seems wasteful of the taxpayers' money.
Mr. McMahon. I don't think from what I've seen that there
were two different investigations. It was two parallel
investigations. DEA obviously is going to focus on the
narcotics. We focus on the firearms.
Mr. Farenthold. I've got a couple other questions. I ran
out of time last time going off on things that just struck me
as odd.
Mr. McMahon, during the pendency of the Operation Fast and
Furious, did you ever get the chance to go down to Mexico and
visit with any of our folks down in Mexico?
Mr. McMahon. I did. Yes.
Mr. Farenthold. Did you speak to Mr. Canino?
Mr. McMahon. I did.
Mr. Farenthold. And did he raise any concerns about some of
the guns tracing back to Phoenix?
Mr. McMahon. Not that I recall, no.
Mr. Farenthold. Mr. Canino, did you all discuss that, do
you recall?
Mr. Canino. Yeah. It wasn't anything specific, it was in
passing. Like I said earlier, you know, when--and Mr. McMahon
has been very supportive of our office in Mexico and me
personally. But like I stated earlier, when this case was going
on, and when Darren asked me, what do you think is going on,
like I stated earlier, I thought the U.S. Attorney's Office in
Phoenix is reluctant to let our guys make any arrests. Our guys
have stumbled onto a drug trafficking--I mean, a gun-
trafficking ring, they're doing their due diligence, and that's
why so many guns have turned up in the suspect gun data base so
quickly. And three, I thought that our guys were just losing
them on surveillance, not being able to get to the gun store in
time. That's what I thought at that time. You know, I didn't
know that we had cooperators in a couple of the gun stores. So
my--our concern, and I just said, hey, how come there's so many
guns turning up so quickly?
Mr. Farenthold. And he didn't share with you what was going
on?
Mr. Canino. Well, like I say, we have a drug-trafficking
case in Phoenix, and, you know, all the guys are doing a good
job.
Mr. Farenthold. All right. Mr. McMahon, did Mr. Gil ever
raise concerns over the number of weapons that were being
recovered in crime scenes in Mexico?
Mr. McMahon. Congressman, I think it's important to realize
that guns were being recovered in Mexico for quite a while, and
we were all concerned about that. Guns were coming from
Phoenix, they were coming from Texas, they were coming from--I
mean, that's what we did, that was our main focus in Mexico and
obviously along the southwest border. For the past 4 years,
that's where all of our resources, our new resources, have
gone. Guns being recovered in crime scenes in Mexico from the
United States is something that ATF has been putting everything
we have into for the past quite a few years, as long as I've
been in headquarters.
Mr. Farenthold. All right. Well, I see I once again have
run out of time, and I realize we are getting late, so I yield
back. Thank you very much.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Cummings. You know, as we wind this hearing down, I was
just sitting here and I was just thinking, you know, this
agency is very important, and we've heard now from two sets of
agents, all of whom seem to be, I know, very dedicated to their
jobs. And I think one of my greatest concerns as we go forward,
Special Agent Newell and McMahon, since you're in supervisory-
type positions, you know, I just hope this does not hurt the
morale of the organization.
When I look at the emotions of Special Agent Canino and
others, I mean, in some kind of way we've got to make sure that
we get back on track. I just think it's so important because
the job that you do is--what, there's only 1,800 of you all?
It's not many.
Mr. McMahon. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Cummings. It's a small agency. And we can't afford to
have division in this kind of agency. Would you agree, Special
Agent McMahon?
Mr. McMahon. I totally agree, sir. That's the highest
priority for us right now is to get our people back on track.
Not a lot of us can have or show the passion that Carlos has,
but I guarantee you we all have that. We might keep it inside a
little bit more than Carlos does, but this is a passionate
thing for all of us.
We talk about the Second Amendment, and I believe that we,
ATF, are the defenders of the Second Amendment. And we have to
follow a very fine line of what's part of the legal commerce
and what's part of the illegal commerce, and that's part of the
challenge, a challenge that we fully accept. And that's
something that we were--drilled into us from early on while in
the academy. It's something we fully accept, and it's something
that we do every day. And as I said in my statement, I am very
proud of the people that are out there now and have been out
there in the past and the work that they're doing.
Mr. Cummings. I'm going to go back to a July 12, 2011,
letter to the Attorney General. Chairman Issa and Senator
Grassley wrote these words. They said, there has been public
speculation that gun control politics may have been a
motivating factor behind approving the risky strategy used in
Operation Fast and Furious. In other words, by allowing straw
purchasers to continue to operate, and by encouraging gun
dealers to go through with what were obviously suspicious
sales, the ATF helped create a big case in order to justify
additional regulatory authority. The letter notes that the
committee has seen no evidence to support this speculation, but
goes on to ask the Department of Justice to respond anyway.
Mr. Newell, you were the special agent in charge who
oversaw this operation and the agents who worked it for the
last year. What is your reaction to this speculation when you
were engaged in Operation Fast and Furious? I ask you for the
record, were you deliberately attempting or do you know others
that were deliberately attempting to send guns to Mexico to
justify additional firearms regulations?
Mr. Newell. In response to your question, sir, I don't
recall saying that.
Mr. Cummings. I didn't say you did. I'm just saying do you
believe that----
Mr. Newell. No, I don't.
Mr. Cummings [continuing]. Based on everything you know?
Mr. Newell. No, sir, I don't.
Mr. Cummings. Okay. Mr. McMahon.
Mr. McMahon. Absolutely not, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And did you see any evidence that your line
agents acted out of anything but a sincere desire to combat a
major trafficking network in this case? Mr. McMahon.
Mr. McMahon. Not at all, sir.
Mr. Newell. Not at all, sir. That was their goal, and that
was--they are very dedicated agents out in the field who are
doing that every day in this case and many other cases.
Mr. Cummings. While it's fair to question the judgment used
in the case, and I certainly question it, and again we are
trying to get to the bottom of all of this, suggesting a
conspiracy to harm others goes beyond the pale. And I think
that--you know, I just--I just want to make sure that the
American people are clear that we have an ATF which is
operating and doing what it is supposed to do. Obviously some
mistakes have been made, very unfortunate mistakes. And I think
the one thing we have to do is we have to learn from those
mistakes and not let them happen again, because they can have
very, very, very tragic consequences.
And so with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Issa. Thank you. And I'll try to be brief in a
couple of last questions.
First of all, I ask to include some additional documents
that were shared and partially redacted with Justice so that we
can keep them in the record and potentially ask you questions
afterwards. Would all of you be willing to answer additional
questions based on what's in the record afterwards if we have
follow-ups? Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Newell, on January 8, 2010 you produced a memo that in
line 13 said, currently our strategy is to allow the transfer
of firearms to continue to take place, albeit at a much slower
pace, in order to further the investigation and allow the
identification of additional coconspirators who would continue
to operate illegally trafficking firearms to Mexico DTOs.
Now, if I read that correctly, in addition to later where
it says, DEA has specifically requested that the ASAC and SAC
level at the ATF continue the investigation, if I read this
memo of yours correctly, at least by January 10th or January 8,
2010, you knew that these weapons were going to--specifically
weapons that you were allowing to be sold were going to the
drug cartels in Mexico, and that you lobbied for in this memo
the continuation partially because of DEA's request? Is there
anything in plain English that I don't understand here?
Mr. Newell. Yes, sir. As I stated earlier in the testimony,
I think that sentence about who would--that part of the
sentence ``who would'' is--``who would continue'' is based on
the fact that we believe that if we didn't take the necessary
steps to disrupt the whole organization, this group would
continue to traffic in large quantities of firearms to Mexico.
Chairman Issa. Agent, we're not disagreeing that these are
determined, incredibly rich, billions-of-dollars-of-drug-money
groups that have the power to corrupt the Mexican Government,
at times corrupt U.S. officials, to buy anything they want
anywhere in the world in vast quantities. Certainly I don't
think anyone on the dais fails to understand that we have a
narcostate almost being formed in Mexico the way we had in
Colombia, and that they and we are fighting to push back on a
terrible tragedy that has occurred in Mexico.
But the question here is as of January 8th, I find this
document to be irrefutable evidence that you knew that weapons
you continued to sell, quote, albeit at a slower pace--although
actually the evidence is it didn't slow down right away, but
eventually it did--were, in fact, going to Mexico. You knew it.
You knew that when you sold to particularly some of the
specific individuals whose weapons had already been found, you
knew that the straw buyer was buying it, you knew who they were
transporting it to, who was paying for it and where it was
ending up. Isn't that true as of January 2010?
Mr. Newell. Well, we didn't sell the firearms, sir.
Chairman Issa. Well, you came pretty close. You told the
firearm dealer to go ahead and sell it. You knew who the buyer
was. You knew there was a repeat buyer. You knew who the
intermediary was that was the supplier of money, and you knew
where they were ending up. Isn't that all true?
Mr. Newell. We believed that obviously we were working a
firearms-trafficking organization that----
Chairman Issa. Wait a second. Look, we're not talking about
what you had to prove to a jury of 12. I'll go over these
agents, and they're going to make you look like a fool here if
you don't answer this honestly. You knew that A was going to B,
and B was going to the cartels. You knew that outright. So did
the DEA as of January 8th--and that's what this briefing says,
doesn't it? Answer me honestly just once, clearly and simply.
Mr. Newell. Sir, with all due respect, when it comes to the
DEA portion of that, it was the fact that DEA had an ongoing
investigation from which we gathered the information which led
to the initiation of our case. So that sentence there discusses
the fact that DEA said, hey, whatever you do, don't do anything
to compromise our case, which we respected.
In response to your other question is absolutely, the group
that we were working, we knew that that was their intention to
funnel guns to Mexico.
Chairman Issa. Wait a second. Intention. Not intention. It
was a pattern of success that had occurred for a year; isn't
that true? You had watched straw buyers, repeated straw buyers,
make purchases, deliver them, and those weapons had shown
consistently in the hands of specific cartels, and, as you
know, you knew who was paying for them. Isn't that all true?
Mr. Newell. Well, you said a year, sir. When that memo was
written in January, we were probably, I would say, 2 months
into the investigation at that point.
Chairman Issa. Three months earlier, I apologize. The
previous year.
Mr. Newell. Three months.
Chairman Issa. Okay. So 3 months into this program, about
1,000 weapons or less in, you knew that the weapons you were
telling gun dealers to go ahead and sell to the same straw
buyers again and again--you already had 20, the number 20 is
here. So I'm kind of going, well, you've indicted 20, 19 of
whom were the straw buyers, so you knew the straw buyers and
the repeats kept coming after you knew starting point, bag man
or money man, and end point; isn't that true?
Mr. Newell. Sir, what we believed and what we suspected is
far short of what we could prove.
Chairman Issa. Okay. Finally you've given me the answer I
wanted. You knew everything you needed to know to understand
everything that led to the charges. What you didn't have was
enough to make a case, so you went on month after month for
1,500 more weapons while you were trying to make a case; isn't
that correct?
Mr. Newell. Sir, in January we didn't know all 20 at that
point. The 20 that we indicted, we had a large group of straw
purchasers, and we were continuing to build a case throughout.
But we still--in full conjunction with the U.S. Attorney's
Office, we still needed the evidence to be able to prove that
these individuals were, in fact----
Chairman Issa. Who at the U.S. Attorney's Office wanted
this investigation to go on past January 8, 2010?
Mr. Newell. When?
Chairman Issa. Who? Did Lanny Breuer--was he briefed by
January 8, 2010?
Mr. Newell. I don't know if he was, sir.
Chairman Issa. But his office approved the wiretaps under
his authority. You said you didn't read the wiretaps. I guess
neither one of you read the requirements. But somebody had to
be briefed who signed it on his behalf, on his authority. Did
either of you ever brief Lanny Breuer or anyone else that could
sign on his behalf?
Mr. Newell. I did not, no, sir.
Mr. McMahon. I did not, no.
Chairman Issa. Okay. So I guess we're just going to figure
that you knew on January 8th that you had the same people
buying weapons repeatedly, leading to the same cartel, and you
didn't quit because you hadn't made your case, so we continued
selling until we had a dead Federal agent and a scandal? That's
pretty much what I've heard here today. Any of the agents that
work in the field, did any of you see something different then?
This thing kept going after everything was known, except maybe
if we keep doing it long enough, we'll get better cases for the
U.S. attorney; and then it began falling apart after Brian
Terry was murdered? Does anyone in the first four see anything
different? Correct me if I've missed something.
Mr. Gil. Chairman, I'm still sitting here listening to the
conversation, and it's still unbelievable to me, and to be
quite honest with you, I still don't know what to believe, why
this investigation was initiated, and why it continued for so
long. I can't. I know you look speechless. I'm speechless. I
just don't know.
Chairman Issa. Well, words escape me to try to do any
better than you don't know why and I don't know why either.
The gentlelady from New York for an additional round.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you.
I would like to follow up on the line of questioning of
Congressman Farenthold when he was talking about the lack of
communication, which after 9/11 we had many commissions, we had
many studies. And what came out of these commissions was that
our intelligence wasn't working, and we weren't communicating.
And we then overhauled our government, the most major overhaul
of our intelligence since 1948. And it seems to be a little bit
of the same thing of what I am hearing about these hearings,
because people are saying they didn't know anything, and people
are saying they told people and it's not getting through, so
the communication is not taking place.
When you mention 9/11, the mayor of New York, and we are
about to come upon the 10th anniversary of that tragic day, has
been airing TV ads in New York where they use the words of an
al-Qa'ida leader who is talking to his followers and saying, go
to America. It's so easy to get a gun. Go to America, get all
the guns you need in our fight for the al-Qa'ida. So this is an
ad about how illegal people who want to hurt Americans are
being instructed literally to come to America and get guns in
order to combat democracies. And so I think this hearing is
very, very serious about the flow of illegal guns.
Earlier we had a hearing and we had several agents who
seemed very brave, very frustrated and very courageous. And
they testified that they were concerned about the sale of the
guns to straw agents; they were concerned about not having
arrests, about being ordered not to make arrests and not to
conduct surveillance. And I understand that you were asked, Mr.
Newell and Mr. McMahon, and you did not hear any of their
frustrations. They testified that they reported this to their
supervisors, and nothing happened, and that's why they were so
frustrated.
So I think we've got to figure out what happens when
someone reports something they feel is illegal, wrong,
dangerous or harmful to life. And I'm not just talking about
what happened in Fast and Furious, I'm talking about going
forward. Agents on the ground who think that someone should be
arrested, and they're being told not to make an arrest, or when
they're being told not to make a surveillance, and a supervisor
says don't do it, and they're saying we should do it, and
they're complaining to someone else, that information has to go
up the line in order to have proper law enforcement and proper
protection for our citizens.
So I ask anyone on the panel to comment, but I see this as
a very serious, a very serious blockade or a very serious
problem. If people who feel something wrong and harmful to the
safety of Americans or Mexicans is taking place, then someone
should be listening. And if a chain of command is not
listening, maybe there should be an alternative chain of
command put in place or something, because this type of concern
has to get to the proper authorities in order to make proper
decisions to make arrests, continue the surveillance and do the
proper things to stop illegal activity.
So I just would ask any of you to comment on what we've
been hearing. People say they asked for help, and other people
say they never heard anything, so what's going on? Is there
some, you know, black hole that complaints fall into? What is
the chain of command? Why did not the complaints or concerns of
the on-the-line defenders of justice, why didn't their concerns
about what they thought was illegal and dangerous get to the
proper authorities?
Mr. McMahon. I can take that, if I could. That is a
concern, a major concern. ATF is my family, and obviously when
I heard agents criticize things that were happening on the
street and obviously there's a communication breakdown, that's
very concerning to me.
One of the things I wrote down here, the things that I
would like to improve on, is my access to people in the field,
maybe even just sitting down, hey, what can you tell me, what's
going on, that sort of thing. I'm actually going to be going
into a new position soon that's going to be talking about--I'll
be overseeing the review of our office and the effectiveness
andefficiency.
Mrs. Maloney. Well, what happened now? Are you conducting
an investigation to find out why the information from the
agents on the street didn't get to the proper authorities?
Mr. McMahon. Well, I believe the inspector general is
conducting that investigation, and we look forward to the
results of that.
Mrs. Maloney. And when do you expect that to come back?
Mr. McMahon. I don't know.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentlelady.
I will recognize myself for another round. I'm going to go
down the row as we often do here and just pose a single
question for each of you to answer. Special Agent Newell
answered it already. If it was January 9th, you had just
written that briefing; you knew what Special Agent Newell and
Special Agent McMahon knew about what had happened, what was
happening; you knew about the DEA's request; but you also knew
about where these guns were ending up. Mr. Gil, start with you.
If we put you in charge of the Phoenix field office on that
day, what would you do?
Mr. Gil. Mr. Chairman, that investigation would have been
closed, come to a conclusion.
Chairman Issa. In 30, 60, 90 days?
Mr. Gil. No, sir, immediately. That part of an
investigation on a trafficking is not--you have the trafficker,
you have him there, you have the probable cause, you have the
intelligence, you have everything you need to make the arrest;
and as the discussion occurred earlier, the other tools in the
toolbox are there, interviews, phone records, interviews of
cohorts and so forth. The investigation with these guns,
they're not a disposable product. These weapons, they're going
to be out there for years, decades, and they're a durable good,
they're a marketable item. And that's why historically ATF, my
career, my training officer educated us on this, as I trained
my young agents on, it's just--it's inconceivable that you
would let weapons walk.
Chairman Issa. Agent Wall.
Mr. Wall. The same thing, Chairman. Letting one gun walk is
a huge risk. Again, a gun can last 10, 20, 30 years. A gun in
the hands of criminals, virtually it's a loaded weapon that's
out there that's uncontrollable. We in ATF typically--I just--
I'm dumbfounded by just the number of weapons and how it got to
that point, and really just supporting what Mr. Gil said.
Chairman Issa. Agent Canino.
Mr. Canino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you know, we've met now a couple of times. You can see
I'm kind of passionate about what I do. I don't want to give
you the impression, or the ranking member, or the committee the
impression that I never made mistakes. I was a street agent for
15 years, very active street agent. Anybody who knows me knows
my reputation. They know I've made mistakes.
You know, I respect Gil and Bill. I consider them friends.
I know it's not easy for them to be here today. But hopefully
this won't happen again. And hopefully when the committee
finally issues their report, our agency will be the better for
it, and we can move on down the line.
I agree. I think the first order of business for our agency
right now is to build the morale, close ranks and move forward
and support each other.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
Mr. Leadmon.
Mr. Leadmon. Yes, sir. I would like to expand and say that
I think Congressman Maloney kind of touched on what the
underlying problem is for our agency in these major
investigations. She talked about 9/11, the lessons we've
learned, the lack of sharing of information, the intel. Well,
from my perspective, in my law enforcement career involved in
major case investigations in the District of Columbia, I
learned some things with my task forcing with other agencies,
FBI, DEA and ATF. And one of the things that I see in ATF that
we're lacking, we're lacking on the intel-led investigative
side of the house. Our intel structure within the ATF is very
limited. Our field FIGs need resources. Our headquarters
entities need resources also.
Now, to put this in perspective, ATF now, with the battle
that Calderon is waging against the drug cartels in Mexico, we
need to meet that challenge. And that challenge is they're
going out and they're taking off these guns in these seizure
events. We have to stop the flow because they can't win if they
keep getting replenished. So with that in mind, we have to
start taking some of the best practices of our other agencies.
And, i.e., under an intel-led investigation, I'm not just
talking about single investigations. In ATF we have silo
systems. We have divisions that work out of their divisions.
Everything comes out of the division. This has to stop. There
has to be headquarters; not oversight, ``get all in their
business'' type thing. But it has to do like our other agencies
are that exchanges the information freely, partners up with
outside agencies at all levels, not just in the divisions, but
all the way up into headquarters. And to do that we have to
build a structure, an intelligence structure, to support not
only our agents in the field, but our partners in Mexico and
our other Federal agencies.
Chairman Issa. I'm going to cut you off only because of
time limitations. We have a subcommittee coming in in a short
time.
But first of all you're singing, I think, on a bipartisan
basis to what we need to do. And we probably will have you back
as we get into the corrective phase, the reorganization, if
appropriate.
Let me just ask one closing question. Jaime Avila, Panino--
Patino, I'm sorry, Chambers and Stewart, they're all on the
street today. They have not been convicted of a crime as straw
buyers. If they walked into a gun shop today, just because
they've been arrested, does that mean they can't buy? Would
they be able to buy a weapon today?
Mr. McMahon. They wouldn't be able to buy the weapon
because they're under indictment. But I'm not sure if the NICS
system in Phoenix would capture that if they did attempt to buy
a weapon.
Chairman Issa. So today you know that they shouldn't be
able to buy, they shouldn't be on the street, but 20 straw
buyers are on the street, and you're not sure if all 20 are, in
fact, presently in the system where any federally licensed gun
store would stop them immediately; is that correct?
Mr. McMahon. Well, that's not our system, sir. The NICS
system is run by another agency.
Chairman Issa. No, I understand that. But right now you
don't have full confidence that these people are not out doing
straw purchases again?
Mr. McMahon. No, sir. They were granted bail, as everyone
is entitled to.
Chairman Issa. They were also granted a speedy trial that I
understand is delayed at least until February of next year, so
they continue to be out there?
Mr. McMahon. That's correct. The trial was scheduled for
June, and then it's been postponed until February.
Chairman Issa. Okay. With that I'm afraid we have to
adjourn. I thank you all.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, a point of personal privilege.
Chairman Issa. Yes, a point of personal privilege.
Ms. Norton. Since my position was mischaracterized in this
hearing, I have come back to state my true position, and I
wonder if I may be given a few minutes to do that.
Chairman Issa. If you want to state your true position,
bearing in mind that you told us that all of us on this side of
the aisle were owned by the NRA----
Ms. Norton. If I could be heard from you, if I could state
my position. I was here for some time, Mr. Chairman, and I note
that I didn't hear anyone speak up then. I can understand
that----
Chairman Issa. Actually the gentlelady left before----
Ms. Norton. I was here for about 15 or 20 minutes. But it's
the right of any Member to speak up. And I can only be
grateful, Mr. Chairman, that you didn't say that I was vile or
words of a kind that were uttered when another Member was
outraged that in his absence his position was characterized.
Yes, as I heard pontificating before law enforcement
officers who risked their lives, I was moved to indicate that
we had not given ATF agents the tools that they deserve. Indeed
I indicated that the issues spread even into our cities.
As for the District of Columbia laws, which apparently were
raised, the District of Columbia barred guns in light of
carnage over the decades. Those laws had been found to be
constitutional, and for decades every appellate court had so
found for the District's laws and for the laws of other States
until an activist and much more conservative Supreme Court
overturned the findings of prior Supreme Courts for the first
time.
The District of Columbia proceeded to obey the new law and
enacted a set of gun laws, which have since been found
constitutional, and yet Members of this body have filed bills
seeking to overturn the laws of a local jurisdiction not their
own simply because they disagree with the way they approach gun
control. You can approach gun control any way you like in
Arizona or California, but you are not at liberty to tell the
people of the District of Columbia who have to live with the
carnage how to approach it, particularly when the laws have
been declared constitutional.
Yes, I stand by the notion that the reason that the ATF
agents don't have the laws they need is because the Republicans
have over and over again introduced laws that would, in fact,
keep them from getting those laws and have stood in the way of
their acquiring those laws. And I have been bipartisan because
there have been some in my own party who have stood with them.
Mr. Chairman, having taken the agents to the woodshed, it
does seem to me then the Congress--they're entitled to
something from us. So I would like to ask you, in light of the
fact that they have all testified that they need more tools in
order to do their job, whether you would cosponsor the bill
that has been introduced that would, in fact, give them a
trafficking tool so that this would not happen again to them or
to us, and would you be willing to sponsor that bill, Mr.
Chairman?
Chairman Issa. No, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Enough said.
Chairman Issa. And with that, gentlemen, you bear witness
to the other side of the aisle at work.
With that, we stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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