[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE WORLD BANK AND MULTILATERAL
DEVELOPMENT BANKS' AUTHORIZATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
POLICY AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 4, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services
Serial No. 112-68
_____
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama, Chairman
JEB HENSARLING, Texas, Vice BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts,
Chairman Ranking Member
PETER T. KING, New York MAXINE WATERS, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois
RON PAUL, Texas NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California
GARY G. MILLER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey RUBEN HINOJOSA, Texas
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina CAROLYN McCARTHY, New York
JOHN CAMPBELL, California JOE BACA, California
MICHELE BACHMANN, Minnesota STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
KEVIN McCARTHY, California DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico AL GREEN, Texas
BILL POSEY, Florida EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri
MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin
Pennsylvania KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut
NAN A. S. HAYWORTH, New York GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
JAMES B. RENACCI, Ohio JOHN C. CARNEY, Jr., Delaware
ROBERT HURT, Virginia
ROBERT J. DOLD, Illinois
DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona
MICHAEL G. GRIMM, New York
FRANCISCO ``QUICO'' CANSECO, Texas
STEVE STIVERS, Ohio
STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee
Larry C. Lavender, Chief of Staff
Subcommittee on International Monetary Policy and Trade
GARY G. MILLER, California, Chairman
ROBERT J. DOLD, Illinois, Vice CAROLYN McCARTHY, New York,
Chairman Ranking Member
RON PAUL, Texas GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
JOHN CAMPBELL, California DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
MICHELE BACHMANN, Minnesota ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on:
October 4, 2011.............................................. 1
Appendix:
October 4, 2011.............................................. 29
WITNESSES
Tuesday, October 4, 2011
Debevoise, Hon. Eli Whitney II, former U.S. Executive Director,
The World Bank Group; and Senior Partner, Arnold & Porter LLP.. 10
Green, Hon. Mark, former U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania; former U.S.
Representative (R-WI); and Senior Director, U.S. Global
Leadership Coalition (USGLC)................................... 8
Murphy, John, Vice President for International Affairs, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce............................................ 15
Runde, Daniel F., Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis; and Co-
Director of the Project on U.S. Leadership in Development,
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).......... 12
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
Debevoise, Hon. Eli Whitney II............................... 30
Green, Hon. Mark............................................. 37
Murphy, John................................................. 44
Runde, Daniel F.............................................. 50
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Miller, Hon. Gary:
Letter from the Bretton Woods Committee to Speaker Boehner
and Majority Leader Reid, dated October 4, 2011............ 57
THE WORLD BANK AND MULTILATERAL
DEVELOPMENT BANKS' AUTHORIZATION
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Tuesday, October 4, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on International
Monetary Policy and Trade,
Committee on Financial Services,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:27 p.m., in
room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gary Miller
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Members present: Representatives Miller of California,
Dold, McCotter, Huizenga; McCarthy of New York, Moore, Carson,
and Scott.
Ex officio present: Representative Frank.
Also present: Representative Al Green of Texas.
Chairman Miller of California. The committee is called to
order.
Today's hearing will be on the World Bank and multilateral
development banks' authorization.
We are going to limit each side to 10 minutes, as agreed to
with the ranking member previously. At this point, I yield
myself as much time as I may consume.
We meet today to examine a discussion draft legislation to
authorize general capital increases for the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB), the African Development Bank (AfDB),
and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
The Treasury Department has requested authorization for the
United States to make capital increase payments in order to
maintain American leadership at these multilateral development
banks (MDBs), which is important to U.S economic and national
security. However, if the United States does not increase its
capital stock at the banks, then the United States could lose
its leadership position.
This is the fourth hearing in our subcommittee's
consideration of these authorization requests. At our first
hearing, we looked at the leadership role of the United States
at the MDBs. Under Secretary Brainard testified that having a
leadership position at the MDBs can influence bank policy
decisions and, in some cases, can provide veto power over the
decisions. If we do not authorize and fund these requests, the
U.S. share will diminish, impacting our leadership and
influence at these institutions.
Our second hearing focused on the impact of MDBs on U.S.
job creation. We learned about the ways in which MDBs'
financing helped open developing markets, which can spur
private-sector economic growth and employment in the United
States.
Our third hearing focused on how the World Bank and MDBs'
assistance to middle-income and poor countries around the world
contributes to U.S. national security. We learned about how
MDBs' assistance helped developing countries become stable
nations that can counteract the proliferation of terrorism and
other threats to the United States.
Today's hearing considers a discussion draft of the
Administration's request for authorization for the general
capital increases. As we review this discussion draft today,
our focus will be on the consequence of any reduction or delay
in meeting the U.S. commitment to the MDBs; the impact of U.S.
leadership at the MDBs, ensuring that investment help to
safeguard national and economic security; and specific policy
directives or conditions that should be included or amended in
the authorization legislation to ensure U.S. national and
economic security.
This hearing process has been an important one so that our
subcommittee fully understands the role and impact of the MDBs
on U.S. economic and national security. While the hearing
leaves little doubt about how critical it is for the United
States to move forward on schedule with the capital increases,
I know the discussion draft causes some of my colleagues pause,
because these authorizations come at a time when we are all
focused on getting our own massive debt under control.
These are the first capital increases we have had to
consider in almost 2 decades. Our series of hearings on the
Administration's request were intended to help Members assess
the benefit of the MDBs, given the current fiscal challenges
that are facing Congress.
This hearing illustrates that U.S leadership at these
institutions is of critical importance. The MDBs are vital to
addressing the world's most pressing economic and national
security challenges. At a time when we are worried about fiscal
constraints, I would argue that the ability of these
institutions to leverage limited resources is exactly what we
need to do.
Bilateral foreign assistance is under significant strain
right now. The MDBs can alleviate this strain by pooling our
resources with others to fund the most pressing development and
national security needs. For example, every $1 the U.S.
contributes to the IBRD as a part of the general capital
increase will result in $30 in development lending. At the
African Development Bank, every U.S. dollar yields more than
$70 in lending.
This approach makes financial sense. And with U.S.
leadership at these institutions, we can ensure that their
development support is aligned with U.S. interests. So while we
are considering a discussion draft that contains authorization
for spending, I would argue that this is a fiscally responsible
approach to meeting our Nation's economic and national security
interests.
This discussion draft contains a funding authorization as
requested by the Administration. Prior to the subcommittee
markup, we intend to include policy directives for the U.S.
executive directors at these banks to ensure that these
institutions have strong safety and soundness measures,
procurement and anti-corruption safeguards, and transparent
processes.
I look forward to working with the subcommittee members as
we formulate these directives so that we can ensure that banks
are well-managed, effective, and focused on priorities that
will lead to security and economic stability around the globe.
If the United States does not make these capital increases,
the implications are serious. This is a difficult issue because
a critical mission that the MDBs perform--promoting peace and
stability--is not at the forefront of our constituents' minds.
The MDBs help foster U.S. national and economic security
because we have a leadership role at these institutions.
While we face critical fiscal choices right now, we cannot
cede ground to other countries like China who are eager to
replace us as leaders in all these institutions. If we do not
lead, others will. They will set the agenda and priorities at
the MDBs. I know our witnesses today plan to discuss these
consequences, and I look forward to the hearing.
At this point, I have 5 minutes to yield, and the ranking
member has yielded that to former Chairman Frank.
Mr. Frank. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I won't take the whole
5 minutes.
I appreciate the way in which you and the gentlewoman from
New York, the ranking member, have worked together here. This
should not be--there are matters that are legitimately partisan
where the parties and the ideologies legitimately differ. I
don't believe this is one of them. This is a matter of clear
national interest that has had a strong bipartisan element. The
president of the World Bank is, of course, a former high-
ranking official of several Republican Administrations, Mr.
Zoellick. And it is one of the areas, I think, in which there
has been the greatest continuity in American foreign policy,
which is very important. You can't do economic development like
a yo-yo.
This is about the most cost-effective way we can spend our
dollars. CBO does a very good job of pointing out that while we
vote what looks like large sums, if you look at the actual
budgetary impact on the United States, they are really quite
small. It also gives us a way to have, frankly, a lot of
influence with a little bit of cover. There is often resentment
of America's role in the world--often unfair, generally unfair,
in my view. In this case, we get a multilateral set of clothes
to wear while we are still able to pursue goals that we would
probably have pursued otherwise, and I don't think there is
anything illegitimate about that.
Much of what needs to be done here is to tell countries
what to do when they might not want to do it. And if the United
States were to do that unilaterally, that would be a problem.
Doing it in the role of a multilateral institution is helpful.
There was a time when that was being abused. I do think
some of the multilateral institutions, 20 years ago and more,
had an excessively rigid view, a one-size-fits-all approach to
economies. That has been replaced by a great deal of
flexibility. I think we now have instruments that are
important, that help implement reasonable policies, that show
flexibility.
And there is more, I think, of an understanding that you
can discredit democracy. In many of these cases over the years,
we were trying both to promote economic development and
democracy, as people evolved from non-democratic regimes. And
in too many cases, I think people were given the idea in some
of these countries that democracy meant pain, it meant paying
more for your water, it meant a whole lot of things that they
weren't necessarily crazy about, and that didn't do democracy
any good. That doesn't mean you retreat from these rational
proposals, but you do them in a better way.
So I again say that you, Mr. Chairman, and the ranking
member have worked very well on this. I know there have been
conversations with our colleagues on the Appropriations
Committee. I would hope this committee could go forward. And,
as I said, I have been here since 1980. I can't remember a
President, a Secretary of State, or a Secretary of the Treasury
of any party who was not an enthusiastic supporter of our
participation in this. And I would hope that would carry over
today.
Thank you.
Chairman Miller of California. I yield the balance of our
time to Vice Chairman Dold.
Mr. Dold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for
holding this important hearing on authorizing general capital
increases for the multilateral development banks as well as for
holding our previous hearings on the MDBs. And I certainly echo
the ranking member of the full committee's thoughts with regard
to a bipartisan approach. I think this is certainly an
important task.
The Obama Administration has asked Congress to maintain
America's MDB leadership by authorizing the multilateral
development banks' general capital increases. And, in response,
we have held several hearings to explore MDB funding
requirements, necessary MDB improvements, the benefits of
America's MDB leadership, and the costs that we would incur if
we were to abdicate the MDB leadership to countries like China
or other countries that might not share all of our national
interests.
Those earlier hearings demonstrated that America's MDB
leadership gives the United States meaningful influence over
the multilateral development banks' policies and practices
while also improving clear domestic economic benefits and
national security benefits.
As many of our business leaders have told us, our MDB
leadership promotes domestic economic prosperity and domestic
job growth by contributing to political and economic stability
around the world and by helping to open foreign markets to
United States companies. By doing so, the MDBs are contributing
to the next generation of consumer market countries, to their
benefit and to America's benefit as well. In fact, over the
last decade, U.S. businesses and individuals received nearly
2,500 procurement contracts with the World Bank Group, totaling
over $1.6 billion.
In addition to our business leaders explaining the domestic
economic benefits, many of our military and national security
leaders have testified or written in support of fully funding
our MDB contributions. According to those leaders, the MDBs are
a critical component of our national security strategies. By
helping stabilize vulnerable nations, our MDBs help them to
counteract terrorism and weapons proliferation and other
threats to the United States, while also influencing their
policies in ways that have a positive impact on our own
national security interest.
And we receive all of these economic and national security
benefits at a very small contribution, while also leveraging
multiples of that cost in the form of contributions from other
countries, private-sector investments, and loan repayments.
As I have said many times before, all of us can do a better
job of communicating how little we are actually paying for
these substantial economic and national security benefits. The
reality is that we cannot have meaningful impact on our
deficits or national debt by abdicating our MDB leadership to
China and other nations that don't necessarily share our
national interest.
While I support maintaining our MDB leadership, we all
understand that the MDBs aren't always perfect and that there
are always opportunities for improvement. I am pleased that the
appropriate Administration officials have been responsive to
improvement suggestions. For example, I was pleased to hear
that Assistant Treasury Secretary Lago announced at our last
hearing that the United States would generally vote against
Argentina projects until Argentina begins to comply with its
international agreements and obligations.
I know I have gone over my time, Mr. Chairman, so I yield
back.
Chairman Miller of California. No, you actually have--you
had 2 minutes that wasn't recognized on the clock. There was a
mistake. You have time.
Mr. Dold. Oh, fantastic. Thank you. I am going to continue
then, if I may.
I believe that we also must ensure that we have strong
anti-corruption policies and systems, sound financing
practices, strong procurement safeguards, thoughtful
environmental considerations, and general transparency.
So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
all of these topics and about the discussion draft that has
resulted from our previous hearings. I do believe that this is
an important topic. It is of vital national security interest
as well as economic interest for our country. It is one of
those things that, I am pleased to say, has broad bipartisan
support, and I certainly look forward to working with my
colleagues on the other side of the aisle to move this forward
swiftly.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Miller of California. Thank you.
Mr. Carson is recognized for 2 minutes.
Mr. Carson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very
important hearing.
Multilateral development banks provide the assistance
needed in developing countries that helps sustain and further
promote economic and social development. This hearing is
timely. We will be discussing the authorization and
appropriation of measures for capital increases for MDBs,
including the World Bank, at a time when our Nation is facing
huge economic challenges. And as we make difficult funding
choices, it is very critical that we not forgot how
international aid is closely linked to our own economic
development. This funding shores up export markets, promotes
economic development and good governance, and it is a critical
tool in our national security.
I agree, it is important to examine the effects of total
foreign aid provided to developing countries, including both
bilateral aid and multilateral aid. We should continue to
change our focus from getting money out the door to developing
countries to delivering services to developing countries. We
also need to engage in long-term activities, like the
evaluation of projects after they are completed. We should
continue to focus on building transparency of operating costs
and how aid money is spent.
This aid does serve vital economic and political functions.
With one in four people in the developing world living on less
than $1.25 a day, rescinding assistance is simply not an
option.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my
time.
Chairman Miller of California. Thank you.
Mr. Scott, you are recognized for 3 minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
This is indeed a very, very important hearing, and I am
delighted that our chairman has chosen to hold it.
I think a fundamental question we have to ask ourselves up
front, though, is, how effective would this debt relief be in
helping to alleviate poverty and promoting growth long-term in
the developing countries where ruling governments are believed
to be suffering from rampant corruption and nepotism, which is
very real? So I think as we approach this, we have to examine,
what impact does this corruption, does all of this have? And,
in those cases, what would be an effective solution as we go
forward?
And as we continue to discuss the importance of
multilateral development banks, we have to ensure that the
critical needs of certain nations are met in order to better
guarantee economic development and, thus, to give some
stability to these societies and their communities. Greater
access to capital will certainly allow certain countries to
improve the quality of life of its citizens by means of
improvement or even the initial establishment of some very,
very simple cases--in infrastructure systems, like electricity,
running water, things we basically take for granted in our
country.
The general capital increases as proposed in the discussion
draft before this subcommittee today are certainly a good
start. And since the MDBs significantly increased their lending
following the 2008 financial crisis, many of these
organizations are in need of new funding. The discussion draft
would satisfy this requirement to fill emptied accounts and
would enable developing countries to take full advantage of the
opportunities provided them.
However, we should view the authorization and appropriation
of the MDBs as an opportunity to promote reform for these
institutions and have some understanding of the depth of the
corruption and the nepotism that is rampant in many of these
countries. Many developing countries have accumulated debt as a
result of irresponsible borrowing and lending practices and, at
times, caused by leaders' pursuit of political influence,
often--very often--at the expense of the nation's very own
citizens.
To avoid such consequences, guidelines are very much needed
to ensure the approval of responsible loans, namely
accountability and transparency and appropriate evaluations of
financial impact. But this type of oversight would resemble
very much what our full committee passed in the form of the
Dodd-Frank financial reform last year. And it is needed to
ensure that nations actually benefit from any degree of debt
relief. That is critical and should be the bottom line.
So I look forward to our discussion, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you very much.
Chairman Miller of California. Thank you.
I would like to welcome our panel today. We are going to
introduce you a little out of order. Ms. Moore would like to
introduce Mr. Mark Green.
First, the Honorable Eli Whitney Debevoise was the U.S.
executive director of the World Bank Group from 2007 to 2009
and is currently a partner at the law firm Arnold & Porter.
While serving as the U.S. executive director, Mr. Debevoise had
a leading role in capital increases and share realignment
negotiations and participated in preparation for G8 and G20
summits. He is also the great grandson of Eli Whitney, the
inventor of the cotton gin.
Welcome.
Mr. Daniel F. Runde holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in
Global Analysis and is co-director of the Project on Prosperity
and Development at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, CSIS. Prior to joining CSIS, Mr. Runde was the head of
the foundation unit at the International Finance Corporation of
the World Bank Group. Before that, he served at USAID as the
director of the Office of Global Development Alliance. In
September 2010, Mr. Runde was named as one of 40 under 40 in
international development in Washington, D.C., by Devex Group.
Mr. John Murphy is the vice president of the International
Division of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Mr. Murphy played a
key role in the Chamber's work relating to protection of
intellectual property, global regulatory cooperation, trade
facilitation, and the World Trade Organization's Doha
development agenda negotiations.
Mr. Murphy, we are glad you are here today to represent the
Chamber.
At this point, I will turn it over to Ms. Moore.
Ms. Moore. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And I want to
join my other colleagues in thanking you for calling this
hearing today on this very important subject.
It is really my pleasure to introduce our former colleague,
Ambassador Mark Green, who served in the House of
Representatives from 1999 to 2007. But I also served with him
in the Wisconsin State legislature. He served in the House, and
I had moved on to the Senate. And he had a very keen, sterling
understanding of economics at that time. So, at a time when we
were making strategic investments in Wisconsin, I would offer
legislation in the State Senate and call him up and beg him to,
please, don't let the Democrats mess up my legislation and to
baby-sit it for me. So I really, really appreciated working
with him on a bipartisan basis back then.
He came along to Congress and served from 1999 to 2007. And
he served on the Judiciary Committee and the International
Relations Committee. He does have a J.D. from the University of
Wisconsin-Madison, so he is a well-educated lawyer.
At that time, he really, Mr. Chairman, I am reflecting on
your opening comments where you talked about the security
component in this legislation, the economic stability and
promoting peace and stability and not being preempted by other
countries. And he certainly developed an expertise in
international affairs during his tenure here in the House of
Representatives. He put together innovative foreign policy
initiatives, helped craft the Millennium Challenge Act; the
Global Access to HIV-AIDS Prevention, Awareness, and Treatment
Act of 2001; and the U.S. Leadership Against HIV-AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act.
After his service here, he became the Ambassador to
Tanzania, overseeing the largest Millennium Challenge compact
that we have had and significant PEPFAR programs. He has been
the managing director of the Malaria No More Policy Center in
Washington and is on the current board of the Millennium
Challenge Corporation.
He is a family man, married with kids. And he certainly
does get it, the importance of this initiative. And I do
welcome Ambassador Mark Green here today.
Chairman Miller of California. I would like to welcome each
of you.
Without objection, your written statements will be made a
part of the record. You will each be recognized for a 5-minute
summary.
And, Ambassador Green, you and I were classmates in 1998,
and it is good to have you back. You are recognized, Mr. Green.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARK GREEN, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR
TO TANZANIA; FORMER U.S. REPRESENTATIVE (R-WI); AND SENIOR
DIRECTOR, U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP COALITION (USGLC)
Mr. Mark Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
McCarthy, my friend and former colleague, Congresswoman Moore,
and all the members of the subcommittee. It is an honor to
appear before you here today to discuss the importance of the
multilateral development banks and America's international
affairs programs from a national security perspective.
I am here today in my capacity as a former ambassador and
as senior director with the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition.
USGLC is often called the ``strange bedfellows coalition''
because it is comprised of both American businesses like
Boeing, Caterpillar, Wal-Mart, Land O'Lakes, and the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, but also leading humanitarian NGOs--CARE,
World Vision, Catholic Relief, and Bread for the World. We
bring together bipartisan military, business, faith-based, and
community leaders from all across the country who are united in
the belief that even though all of these programs only
constitute about 1 percent of our Federal budget, these
programs are vitally important for America's national security
and economic growth, as well as our values.
It goes without saying that our Nation is facing lots of
fiscal challenges. As a former member of this committee, I know
very well that you have tough choices to make in coming months.
I also know that most Americans aren't really aware of the
critical mission that the World Bank and other MDBs perform,
and this puts even more political pressure on all of you for
the funding requests and the legislative requests that you
receive.
My view, respectfully, is that support for these
institutions is simply part of our Nation's leadership
obligations. These obligations help so many of our friends and
allies in need and, as I hope this hearing will show, they help
us, the United States, the American people.
The world has changed dramatically, obviously, over these
last few decades. Cold war threats have now been replaced by
terrorism, pandemics, weak and failing states, and a number of
growing strategic challenges, strategic competitors to America
in the global arena. Our national security today is not only
dependent upon the strong deterrent effect of a robust military
but, quite frankly, also in a wide range of investments in our
diplomatic and development tools. In addition to important
programs that the United States oversees through USAID and
other agencies, the MDBs provide a source of funding that aids
in economic growth, and that, in turn, helps with stability and
with peace.
Investing in development enhances our national security by
preventing conflicts before they require costly military
action. As former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has said,
``We must now use our foreign assistance to help prevent future
Afghanistans and to make America and the world safer.''
Former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates commented last year,
``Development contributes to stability. It contributes to
better governance. And if you are able to do those things and
do them in a focused and sustainable way, then it just may be
unnecessary for us to send in soldiers.'' He summed it up best
by adding, simply, ``Development is a lot cheaper than sending
soldiers.''
My personal view and the view of the USGLC membership is
that security in these challenging, ever-changing times means
that our leaders must have all of the tools of power--hard
power and soft power, military and civilian. And that includes
important tools of development and diplomacy, bilateral and
multilateral. The programs of the World Bank and the MDBs are a
crucial tool in that toolbox.
Withholding or cutting back U.S. contributions would not
only limit the amount of capital available to them for carrying
out their key missions, but it would risk diminishing our
influence around the world. It risks ceding leadership to other
countries, including rising powers like China that offer
alternative funding sources for development.
I think it is very important to realize that, as developing
nations emerge, history shows they tend to reflect the values,
the structures, the institutions, and the cultures of those
that helped them. You don't have to go back very far in
history. You can look at South Korea and the extraordinary
challenges that nation was facing 50 years ago, and the support
that they received through the World Bank, which they have
largely repaid. They have now become not only one of our
crucial trading partners but one of our great military
partners. And the work that they have done to help us make sure
that the world is safe and more stable, particularly in that
part of the world, quite frankly, it is invaluable, it is
irreplaceable.
So we face lots of challenges. We face lots of fiscal
challenges. We all know that they are there. And every agency,
every institution must tighten its belt and scrutinize every
program. But I think the great risk that we all see out there
is, if the United States were to walk away from these
institutions, there would be no way the world could be a better
place. Clearly, we would be diminishing our own influence. And
the world, simply put, is a better place when America is
engaged, when America is strong, and when our leaders--past
Administrations, current Administration, and future
Administration--have all the tools in the toolbox.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mark Green can be found on
page 37 of the appendix.]
Chairman Miller of California. Thank you, Mr. Green.
I am going to be generous on time. We only have one panel
today, and I think the testimony is very important to us.
Mr. Debevoise, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELI WHITNEY DEBEVOISE II, FORMER
U.S. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE WORLD BANK GROUP; AND SENIOR
PARTNER, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP
Mr. Debevoise. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member McCarthy, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before
the House Financial Services Committee's Subcommittee on
International Monetary Policy and Trade regarding the
authorization of capital increases for the World Bank and the
other multilateral development banks.
I would like to pause here for a minute just to emphasize
that we are talking about banks, albeit development banks. And,
certainly, they produce very tangible development results. The
World Bank has just published a so-called ``Corporate
Scorecard'' where you can see some of the concrete results,
results that help us achieve the Millennium Development Goals,
and specific results in countries, results in terms of teachers
recruited and trained, children immunized, pregnant women
receiving antenatal care, roads constructed, people provided
with access to improved sanitation, transmission and
distribution lines constructed or rehabilitated, areas with
irrigation services. So this is a key development instrument we
are talking about.
But we are talking about replenishing the capital of the
hard-loan windows of these banks. That is different from the
soft-loan windows or IDA or the African Development Fund, which
operate on the basis of triennial negotiations and annual
appropriations. We are talking here about the hard-loan
windows. And as has been mentioned already, requests for
general capital are infrequent when we are talking about the
hard-loan windows for these banks.
Yet, we should also remember that 70 percent of the
planet's poor, defined as living on $1.25 a day or less, live
in the countries that are eligible for borrowing from the hard-
loan windows. To give you an example, in one country in South
Asia today, there are 500 million people living without
electricity--more people than the entire population of the
United States living without electricity. And this is a country
which is in transition from the soft-loan to the hard-loan
area. So we need to keep the focus on what we are talking about
with this specific legislation which is before you today.
We also need to remember that we have been through a
financial crisis. And I must say that, given the announcements
that came out of last weekend's meetings right here in
Washington, things aren't looking so good as we look over the
horizon.
The MDBs were asked to respond to the financial crisis the
last time, and respond they did very strongly. The G20 asked
them to find $250 billion so that, as we saved our banks and
our population, the Europeans saved theirs, the poor people in
the world were not forgotten. And the MDBs responded strongly,
and that is, in fact, why we are here today. Because of the
strength of that response, the capital of these institutions is
depleted. And in the case of IBRD, for example, they will not
be able to return to pre-crisis lending levels without more
capital.
We have heard a lot today about U.S. leadership. I think it
is important to understand that our leadership manifests
itself, in part, through our financial support. It also
manifests itself through the quality of the ideas that we
present for pursuit of the MDBs' economic growth and poverty-
reduction mission. We do not possess 50 percent of the votes in
any of the MDBs, so we cannot unilaterally block any particular
loan or impose any particular policy. Although the MDBs have a
strong American presence, they are not U.S. Government agencies
or U.S.-controlled entities, so we must use our diplomatic
voice to secure the outcomes we desire. And I might say, we
have a very good track record of success at doing that.
But if we do not subscribe to these general capital
increases, our ability to persuade others will be reduced. You
can imagine the conversation with the executive director from
one of the African constituencies when Burundi and Rwanda have
contributed to this capital increase and we have not. I don't
think the conversation would go very well. So we should not
forfeit the position that we have.
I am sure that Members will be curious to know what process
was used to determine the need for the capital contributions
and the level of their contributions. I have tried to describe
this process in my written testimony.
The key thing to understand is that these institutions are
managed financially in a very conservative manner. And the
United States is the strongest voice for that. We get
tremendous leverage out of these capital investments. To give
you an example, for the IBRD, the Administration request is for
$117 million per year for the next 5 years, and we will get 30,
40, 50 times leverage out of that money. There are countries
for whom we give bilateral assistance annually that is
multiples of the $117 million which is being requested for the
IBRD.
Finally, I should say that there are reforms accompanying
these requests for capital increases, reforms that the United
States has pushed hard for throughout the negotiation process,
reforms in terms of greater focus on development results, a
subject which was addressed in some detail in IDA negotiations
in the past and is now going to be used in the hard-loan
windows as well.
Disclosure policy: There is a new disclosure policy where
the presumption has been reserved. The presumption is now in
favor of disclosure of documents, and only a short list of
documents as exceptions, not the other way around.
The institutional integrity units have been strengthened,
and their performance is dramatically better. The inspection
panel, which was an institution created at the instigation of
the United States, the insistence of the United States, is now
strong and vigorous. And the United States has been a stalwart
defender of its independence.
So these are just some examples of the reforms. There are
others I could talk about.
In conclusion, I would respectfully submit to this
committee that it is time to move this authorization
legislation for the World Bank and MDB capital increases, and
it is the right decision for U.S. national and economic
security. And we need to act now, as well, because inaction
will result in forfeiture of our rights.
So I commend these capital increases to you and thank you
for your attention. I stand ready to answer any questions you
may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Debevoise can be found on
page 30 of the appendix.]
Chairman Miller of California. Thank you very much.
Mr. Runde, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL F. RUNDE, SCHREYER CHAIR IN GLOBAL
ANALYSIS; AND CO-DIRECTOR OF THE PROJECT ON U.S. LEADERSHIP IN
DEVELOPMENT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
(CSIS)
Mr. Runde. Thank you, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member
McCarthy, and members of the subcommittee.
Chairman Miller of California. You might want to pull the
microphone closer to you. We can't hear you.
Mr. Runde. Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much. I have a
loud voice, but this helps. Thank you.
Thank you, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member McCarthy, and
members of the subcommittee. I am honored to appear here today
and to have the opportunity to testify on the general capital
increase for the multilateral development banks and U.S.
leadership in them.
The bottom line is, walking away from the general capital
increase is a downpayment on American decline.
The Obama Administration has made a request to Congress for
an extraordinary contribution to a number of the MDBs, the
multilateral development banks. It is critical that Congress
act on this request so that the United States can maintain its
overwhelming influence over these institutions, ensure that we
have strong multilateral funding partners for the many
challenges we face, and also invest in our national security.
I recognize that making this request for the so-called
general capital increases comes at a very difficult time, but
the costs of walking away are very high. Maintaining our de
facto control over the MDBs through this contribution is a
critical investment in America's national security because
these institutions provide money and advice that, in
fundamental ways, support our allies and U.S. national security
objectives in places such as Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Haiti,
Colombia, Tunisia, and Southern Sudan. They are our set of
funders of a U.S. version of globalization. We are in
competition with other powers offering their darker version of
globalization.
A strong set of MDBs under U.S. leadership is also a
critical instrument for achieving victory in the long war. The
MDBs offer an American operating system for countries who want
to plug into the positive aspects of globalization, including
free-market principles, a more open trade regime, and the rule
of law.
In order to maintain our current level of leadership and
influence in these MDBs, the United States will need to
continue to retain its own ownership stake. We are going to
have to pay to play. If not, other countries will fill the void
and step in to take these institutions in directions that we
will not like.
The MDBs export, as I said, an American operating system of
globalization. These institutions are heavily influenced by the
United States. All or most of the business is conducted in
English. All or most of the senior leadership and leading
technical experts have studied, worked, or lived here in the
United States. The MDBs almost always conduct agreements under
U.S. or U.K. law. And the export performance standards and
practices perfected or used in the United States.
Washington policymakers often overlook the fact that the
MDBs enjoy a level of credibility in many country contexts that
the United States simply does not enjoy. If the MDBs are
recommending the same course of action that we are
recommending, in some contexts it is more palatable and the
policymaker in a foreign country is more willing to accept the
advice from an MDB. They are an instrument of our economic and
national security interests worldwide.
If we do not authorize the recapitalization and
replenishment of the MDBs, a number of very negative
consequences will likely occur.
First, at the World Bank, we risk losing our unique veto
power. At the African Development Bank, we risk decreasing our
shareholdings by two-thirds, which would jeopardize our only
seat on the board of directors.
Of particular concern is the Inter-American Development
Bank. At the IDB, all funding from other states is contingent
on whether or not the United States pays its contribution, as
to whether or not the United States ponies up its contribution.
If the United States does not authorize recapitalization of the
IDB, all other donors would cut back, sending an incredibly
negative signal to Latin America and creating a far less
effective IDB. Specifically, the IDB lending will shrink from
its current and target levels of approximately $10 billion to
$12 billion to pre-crisis levels of $6 billion to $7 billion a
year.
Recovery and reconstruction efforts in Haiti would be
directly impacted, with the real potential to destabilize a
very fragile democracy, with significant national security
implications to the United States. Approximately $2 billion of
development funding for Haiti is at risk because the IDB has
agreed to use $2 billion of its income for Haiti over the next
decade.
Shareholding in the various MDBs is distributed to reflect
country contributions over many years. Shares that the United
States does not pay for will ultimately be made available to
other countries. And there is little doubt that they will be
eaten up by countries with a different world view than us.
In addition, because of our financial contributions in the
past, we have enjoyed a preponderant role in these institutions
by maintaining critical leadership posts: the World Bank
presidency and other pivotal vice presidential posts at other
institutions. In recent years, U.S. control of these roles has
come under increased attack. By not participating fully in the
general capital increase, we strengthen those who would like to
see the United States lose these critical personnel posts.
During the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the MDBs were asked
by their shareholders, including the United States, to fire all
their bullets as part of the crisis response. As a result, the
recovery in developing countries was--the MDB softened the
effects of the economic crisis and helped clear a path for the
global economic recovery in developing countries.
The way these institutions work is that they have a certain
amount of shareholder capital from governments, including the
United States, and the MDBs lend money against the shareholder
capital. As you have heard from others, for every dollar
provided by the United States, the World Bank lends $25 to
developing countries. However, as a result of the financial
crisis, most of the current shareholder capital is already
spoken for through the loans that these institutions have made.
If we want these institutions to continue to play a significant
role in shaping the world around us in ways favorable to us, we
need to ensure that they are able to lend at current levels.
At the same time, U.S. foreign assistance, as well as that
delivered by other donor countries, is coming under significant
strain. As a consequence of the inevitable cuts in our
bilateral foreign assistance budget, it is likely that the
United States will stop providing foreign assistance
bilaterally, primarily through USAID, to a large number of
middle-income and lower-middle-income countries as we focus our
limited dollars on the most pressing development and national-
security-focused countries. Well-financed MDBs under U.S.
leadership need to be a part of a U.S. graduation strategy,
filling in the gaps for the United States in middle-income
countries.
Just a couple of observations about the national security
implications and why the United States is safer with strong
MDBs.
First, in situations where there is a conflict, such as
Libya and Afghanistan, the United States needs to build up and
support local institutions as quickly as possible and do so in
a way where we burden-share with other donors. And the MBDs
allow to us do that.
Second, in situations where we are supporting newly formed
governments, policymakers need expert advice to manage public
money, set up health systems, regulate banking systems, and set
up the rules of the game for basic services like electricity
and water. The MDBs often have the best technical experts in
the world on a wide range of issues, ensuring that a government
actually functions.
These institutions are far from perfect. In zones of
conflict, they need to improve their flexibility, and they need
to be willing to develop specialized cadres who can be deployed
in some of the world's worst contexts. These institutions can
be very slow, and these institutions need to change. But we
minimize the chances that these institutions will improve the
right way if we do not have a leading seat at the table. As I
said earlier, walking away from the general capital increase is
a downpayment on American decline.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today, and I welcome any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Runde can be found on page
50 of the appendix.]
Chairman Miller of California. Thank you.
Mr. Murphy, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JOHN MURPHY, VICE PRESIDENT FOR INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member
McCarthy, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. On
behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, I am pleased to speak
today about the importance of founding a robust international
affairs budget in general and supporting the general capital
increase for the World Bank and the other multilateral
development banks in particular.
No priority facing our Nation today is more important than
putting Americans back to work. The biggest policy challenge we
face is to create the 20 million jobs needed in this decade to
replace the jobs lost in the recession and to meet the needs of
our growing workforce. World trade and expanding U.S. access to
global markets will play a vital role in reaching this goal.
After all, outside our borders are markets that represent
73 percent of the world's purchasing power, 87 percent of its
economic growth, and 95 percent of it consumers. The resulting
opportunities are immense. Already, one in three manufacturing
jobs depends on exports, and one in three acres on American
farms is planted for hungry consumers overseas.
Nor is trade just for big companies. More than 97 percent
of the quarter-million U.S. companies that export are small and
midsized firms. And last year, more than half of all U.S.
exports went to developing countries for the first time in a
number of years.
The international affairs budget plays a vital enabling
role for U.S. companies to tap foreign markets and create jobs
and prosperity at home. Although it represents less than 1.5
percent of the total Federal budget, the international affairs
budget is critical to creating jobs, saving lives, and
protecting our national security. Within that, the Chamber
strongly supports authorizing and appropriation measures for
capital increases for the multilateral development banks.
American businesses understand these institutions' vital
role in fostering prosperity. The banks' loans and expertise
help developing countries to become reliable trading partners
and open up their markets for U.S. goods and services. These
loans come with conditions, such as strengthening transparency,
promoting good governance, and improving the investment
climate.
For example, in Ghana, a World Bank-funded project helped
build a flyover bridge and a network of roads linking the
country's economic hubs with existing routes, creating a
multipurpose industrial park. The results included over 3,000
investment projects valued at more than $12 billion and more
than 300,000 new jobs. These investments and the accelerating
pace of economic growth and development in Ghana powered a
tripling in U.S. exports to Ghana over just the past 4 years.
That sum sustains thousands of American jobs.
Also, to facilitate cross-border trade, the World Bank has
supported border modernization and trade facilitation
initiatives with very favorable results. For example, a project
covering Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda has employed the one-stop
border concept. The project has reduced the border clearance
time for cargo at one post on the Kenya-Uganda border from an
average of almost 2 days, 5 years ago, to an average of only 7
hours today.
It is also worth mentioning the critical role that the
multilateral development banks played in addressing the
shortage of trade finance that accompanied the recent financial
crisis. That shortage of trade finance threatened to greatly
add to the decline in world trade at the time and to exacerbate
the recession that struck the United States and many other
countries.
In all of these cases, the United States plays a
significant role in helping to shape these policies as the
largest shareholder at the World Bank and the IDB and one of
the largest at the others. As you have heard here today,
failure to support the capital increase would undermine U.S.
leadership and the ability to shape development priorities.
I will skip over some of the things you have already heard.
In addition, MDB loans generate many contract opportunities
for U.S. firms and thousands of jobs here at home. The U.S.
Chamber is mindful of the difficult financial circumstances
facing our country. As the Chamber and more than 150 other
business organizations wrote in a joint letter to Congress last
week, the United States must find a way to stabilize its debt,
reform entitlement programs, and comprehensively restructure
the U.S. Tax Code.
Achieving the necessary fiscal adjustment cannot be
accomplished by abandoning more than a half a century of
leadership in the multilateral development banks. Indeed, the
capital increase for the banks is a small fraction of the
international affairs budget, which, as I have said, is,
itself, less than 1.5 percent of the total Federal budget.
The United States cannot afford to sit on the sidelines
while others seize leadership in the world economy, including
at the multilateral development banks. We need to support this
capital increase. At stake is the standing of the United States
as the world's leading power, our ability to exert positive
influence around the world, our reputation and our brand
overseas, and our best hopes of escaping high unemployment here
at home.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce looks forward to working with
members of the subcommittee to secure approval of the general
capital increases for the multilateral development banks.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy can be found on page
44 of the appendix.]
Chairman Miller of California. I thank each of you for your
testimony. It was very, very informative.
Mr. Debevoise, some people mistakenly think capital
increases, or GCIs, are foreign aid. Can you explain the
difference between these GCIs and foreign aid? And what happens
to the profits earned from these loans? Does that help offset
what the United States has to spend on foreign aid?
Mr. Debevoise. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I emphasized in my opening remarks, we are talking about
the hard-loan windows of banks. So these are institutions that
make loans at roughly market rates and they do generate
profits. Annually, in each of the institutions, there is
discussion about what to do with the profits. As in the
management of any prudent bank, you set some aside for
reserves; you put some in retained earnings so that the
business could increase; and if there are things left over--in
the case of the MDBs, money is currently being transferred to
soft-loan windows.
So, at the IBRD this last year, $520 million was allocated
for transfer to IDA, which is the soft-loan window, thereby
directly reducing the call on IDA contributors in that amount.
There also can be transfers to special windows for crisis
response situations, as well.
Chairman Miller of California. So a normal call would be
the amount being transferred, so it is really an offset; it is
a benefit to us on that side?
Mr. Debevoise. Right. The amount being transferred, if you
will, reduces the amount that the United States and other
donors to IDA would otherwise be asked to contribute on an
annual basis.
Chairman Miller of California. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Green, if the United States does not contribute to the
GCIs, what are the potential risks to our national security?
And how do MDBs break the cycle of conflict and insecurity in
unstable countries?
Mr. Mark Green. I think the best way of thinking about it--
can I harken back to my opening testimony about the challenges
and the threats that we face these days? As I mentioned, I
served, obviously, in a part of the world where those
challenges were very evident. Tanzania is a country that knew
terrorism all too painfully.
One of the things that was very clear is that poverty does
not cause terrorism. That is something that we need to repeat
over and over again. However, destitution, abject poverty can
lead to despair. And despair is a condition, sadly, that all
too often extremists know how to exploit.
Where we can be part of institutions and initiatives that
are working to create opportunity, to address those conditions
that can lead to despair, we are most definitely enhancing our
national security, we are most definitely involving ourselves
in poverty relief, so that we are not only addressing the
conditions but that we are being seen as doing so, which is
very good for our image around the world and the alliances that
we seek to build.
When we step back from these multilateral institutions,
which, as Congressman Frank pointed out, are sometimes able to
operate in parts of the world where, for a variety of political
reasons, it may be more difficult for to us operate, we are
seen as being less engaged in taking on those challenges. And
there is, simply put, no way that that enhances our security.
Removing ourselves creates a void in a vacuum for players,
state players and non-state players, to be more engaged. And I
think history shows us that can be a dangerous situation for
us.
So we are talking about preventing conflict, we are talking
about addressing conditions that can lead to conflict. To me,
that is as smart a national security investment as we can make.
Chairman Miller of California. Thank you.
Mr. Runde, if we don't fund the GCIs, what would the impact
be to the various banks? And the comment by Mr. Green, the
consequence of losing our leadership position in the banks, how
would that--do you agree with that?
Mr. Runde. There will be very negative consequences for the
United States if we don't participate. We are going to, as I
said, lose de facto control over these institutions. We are
exploiting an American form of globalization through these
institutions. And to the extent that we lose control over these
institutions, the kinds of messaging, the kinds of policies
that these institutions export are going to change. We are
going to move from a Texas Hold 'Em rules of the game to,
perhaps, Chinese Mahjong rules of the game, in terms of the
sorts of rule sets that are going to be exported from these
multilateral development banks over time--not immediately, but
over time.
So I think we have to be very cognizant of the fact that we
are on the knife-edge of control of a lot of these
institutions. We do have to use our diplomatic voice, we have
to persuade, but, overall, we continue to have control over
these institutions.
In the case of the Inter-American Development Bank, we
spend a lot of time in the United States worrying about how we
should engage with Latin America and how we can be
constructive. To the extent that we are cutting back 50 percent
on the lending that the IDB is going to do as a result of us
not participating, it is an extremely bad signal. People really
follow the goings-on of the Inter-American Development Bank in
Latin America, and so to the extent--we may not hear about it
here, but they will certainly hear about it there, and it will
have a very negative impact on our personal brand, in addition
to what I described in terms of the implications for situations
like Haiti.
In the case of the African Development Bank and in the
World Bank, those shares are going to come up for sale. There
are willing buyers to buy those shares, and the negative
impacts that I described earlier. And I think we will lose
control over the World Bank presidency if we are not careful.
Chairman Miller of California. I don't have time to ask Mr.
Murphy a question, but maybe later. Mrs. McCarthy for 5
minutes.
Mrs. McCarthy of New York. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Runde and Mr. Murphy also. Each one of you has talked about
what the consequences would be if we do not pay our fair share
and to stay ahead of it, and yet no one really mentions
outlays. What countries are you talking about that might take
over?
Mr. Runde. I think that certainly China has expressed
interest in buying shares of the African Development Bank, that
basically they have been--
Mrs. McCarthy of New York. So let's give it a--what would
you think is an example if China took over that would be
different than the way we run the banks? I will open that up to
everybody.
Mr. Runde. I will take a stab at that. I think the things
that we have pushed, for example, labor and environmental
standards that we have exported through the World Bank and
other multilateral development banks, that we have helped
perfect here in the United States and that are exported through
these institutions, I think we could expect that those sorts of
standards would get a lot less emphasis.
I also think the sorts of safeguards around corruption or
around laying the groundwork for better governance or
responsiveness to public--I am not saying democracy building
per se, but sort of setting the table for democratic reforms
and being responsive to--being more responsive to the societies
that a government serves, I think those sorts of reforms that
the multilateral development banks export would be certainly a
lot less emphasized.
Mrs. McCarthy of New York. Mr. Murphy, what would the
atmosphere be for our American businesses that are exporting if
we lost our leadership with the banks?
Mr. Murphy. I think Mr. Runde's comment about the Inter-
American Development Bank is very appropriate. If you look at
the profile of American exports today, Latin America last year
purchased 3 times as much goods as China. This is an incredibly
important market for us. The Inter-American Development Bank is
by far the most effective Pan-American institution. It is
respected across the hemisphere. It does things that really
matter, and at a time when in the past decade, U.S. exports to
South America grew twice as fast in the past decade as our
exports to Asia did, we need to be seen as leading the way
within that institution and funding its efforts which are still
incredibly important in terms of investments in infrastructure
and education and in other programs.
Mrs. McCarthy of New York. One of the things I think we as
Members of Congress struggle with is how to explain to our
constituents why this is so important, especially with the
economy problems that we are seeing here in our country. So, in
everyday language, not Washington language, how would you give
the best argument on why this is important to the United
States, why it is important for jobs and for our workers, and
why it is important that we pay our dues, because it is very
hard to explain to people why many of us support these issues?
Mr. Debevoise. Thank you, Congresswoman, for that question.
I will try and do it in three or four short sentences for you.
Jobs depend on U.S. economic growth. U.S. economic growth
is tied to exports. Increased exports need stable markets.
These institutions contribute to the establishment of stable
markets for U.S. exports that create jobs.
Mr. Mark Green. Thank you, Ranking Member McCarthy. I guess
I will try to take it a step further. As I harkened to earlier,
history shows us the developing countries, as they emerge,
reflect the values and institutions of those that assisted them
along the way. The World Bank, the MDBs, as well as our own
bilateral assistance, economic assistance, is vital in helping
many of these nations develop the kinds of institutions that
are friendly to American involvement, including business
investment.
On top of that, we talk a great deal about the importance
of trade and exports in keeping our economy growing. We need to
remember that a large percentage of the projected export
opportunities, growth opportunities, in this world for American
businesses are in the developing world. In many parts of the
developing world, they do not yet have the fully developed
rules and institutions that would protect the kinds of things
that American entrepreneurs are looking for in terms of their
investments: private property ownership, well established;
greater transparency; capitalist values in terms of bids for
business; and rule of law and predictability. All of those
things are vitally important if American capital, American
business, is going to make investments in those markets. These
institutions, and our support for these institutions, can
facilitate that, which will lead to job creation.
Mrs. McCarthy of New York. Thank you very much. I yield
back.
Chairman Miller of California. Mr. Dold, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Dold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As all of you probably know, Argentina has completely
disregarded international agreements and obligations with
respect to the World Bank's international arbitration
decisions, and Argentina has also not shown any improvements in
counterterrorism and counternarcotics cooperation. For many of
us in Congress, these are major problems that would seem to
warrant American opposition to any MDB projects for Argentina.
I am pleased that during our last hearing, the Administration
announced that they would not be supporting Argentina, and has
done so. But more generally, I think many of us are concerned
not just with Argentina, but with any country that violates its
international obligations, actually receiving MDB funding.
So the question I have for the panel: Do any of you have
any suggestions about how we here in Congress can legislatively
ensure that we are not violating or not voting in favor of MDB
funding for countries like Argentina who violate their
international agreements?
Mr. Murphy. If I may, thank you very much for that
question.
Over the past 40 years, the United States has negotiated
bilateral investment treaties to protect U.S. investment abroad
with more than 40 countries, and in that time, governments have
respected arbitral awards under those treaties in virtually
every instance, until recently in the case of several cases
relating to Argentina. It is very worrying and it calls into
question the respect globally for these kinds of rules which,
in fact, are embedded in more than 2,000 treaties worldwide.
So from the perspective of the business community, we are
pleased that the Administration has taken this step that you
have mentioned, that they are using this lever of influence to
convey that concern, and we would encourage that to continue in
the future.
Mr. Dold. Okay. Specifically, first of all, Mr. Debevoise,
thank you so much for your answer to the ranking member. Very
concise, and certainly one that we can use back at home when we
are talking at town hall meetings as to why in the world we are
spending money abroad.
But if I can ask you, Mr. Debevoise and Mr. Runde, to
comment, what can the MDBs do to ensure that environmental and
social safeguards and transparency remain part of the MDB
philosophy, and what would you say to those who say that the
MDBs aren't doing enough to promote environmental and social
safeguards in those countries in which they operate?
Mr. Debevoise. Thank you for that question, Congressman.
On the transparency front, I think that the World Bank has
advanced hugely with the new disclosure policy. It is a
difference of night and day, and I think that is a development
that should not go unnoticed. We had an earlier question about
what happens if we forfeit our leadership. I can tell you that
the transparency policy that was adopted at the World Bank
would not have happened under a situation with other strong
voices on that board.
And in the environmental and social safeguards area, I
think the Bank today really is a leader, both in the private
sector and in the public sector sides of the Bank. Commercial
banks around the world do not make loans to sensitive, natural
resource projects today without applying something called the
equator principles which were developed at the IFC, part of the
World Bank Group. We also have now very vigorous oversight in
this area through the inspection panel mechanism, another
mechanism that was strongly promoted by the United States and
for whose independence we stand up regularly.
So there are always going to be constituencies who feel
aggrieved by particular projects, but I believe that the
standards that are being developed and applied now are, in
fact, quite robust and are the world leaders.
Mr. Runde. I would just echo what Mr. Debevoise said about
the standards. I think--I was going to mention the equator
principles which, as Mr. Debevoise mentioned, were devised at
the International Finance Corporation, and which if you want to
do any sort of project finance investments in developing
countries, they require meeting these equator principles, and
so there are dozens and dozens of international banks that are
signatories to these standards.
And then if you want to do any sort of significant
infrastructure investments, say, hydroelectric dams or other
sorts of infrastructure, there are all sorts of significant
environmental and other sorts of social hurdles that have to be
looked at before those sorts of projects go through. I think
that has been a direct result of U.S. leadership in asking hard
questions. So I think having U.S. leadership has been very
important, seeing those sorts of standards be put in place and
enforced.
Mr. Dold. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Miller of California. Thank you. Ms. Moore is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Moore. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
A big concern that this committee has raised is about the
current debt situation and expenditure, the unwillingness on
the part of many of our colleagues to make the 1 percent
expenditure for these foreign investments. So, given that, I
guess I want to ask, and I will start out by asking Mr. Runde,
I was looking at your--I am sorry, Mr. Murphy--from the
statement of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to share with us
what the multiplier effect is for the investment in these MDBs
with respect to the small amounts that we invest?
And also, I wanted to ask Ambassador Green, who has been a
member of this body, what we could say to the Majority party,
who are Republicans right now, about the scoring of these
investments and tell us a little bit about--and anyone else on
the panel who might want to share in this--the difference in
the callable capital, which is not scored and the paid-in
authorization request. For example, the World Bank
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the
callable capital investment, the U.S. share would be $9.78
billion, and then the callable capital, which is not scored, is
$9.19 billion, and then the paid-in authorization request is
$587 million over 5 years, $587 million over 5 years which is a
little--it is about $115-or-so million a year in 5 years. That
would be the investment.
So I guess I want you guys to comment on whether or not
this is a bang for the buck we might be able to sell to our
colleagues in the Majority with respect to the investment
opportunities this presents.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you for the question.
With regard to the multiplier effect in my written
testimony, I was referring--I was reflecting on how the World
Bank Group, since its creation in the aftermath of World War
II, has been able to provide nearly half a trillion dollars in
financing for development projects around the world and was
able to do this with a U.S. investment of just $2 billion in
its capital base. That is a remarkable accomplishment, if you
do the math. That is $25 in additional contributions from
around the world for every one U.S. taxpayer dollar that went
into it. We consider that an excellent investment.
And if you consider how the Bank's work has helped cut the
mortality rate of young children in half in developing
countries, reduce by half the proportion of people living in
poverty, it is a remarkable record, and that is absolutely an
investment in markets that are helping to drive American
exports today.
Ms. Moore. Ambassador Green?
Mr. Mark Green. Thank you. And I may not be the best
qualified to go over the details of the scoring and break it
down for you, but what I can say is, as we all know, we are
sometimes victims of our own scoring rules. And I think one of
the things that we have to remind ourselves is that regardless
of which party we are talking about, and where our leaders come
from, everyone agrees that a growing economy is the most
important single goal that we can pursue in terms of providing
the revenues and the good-paying jobs. Every economist will
tell you that increasing exports is a vitally important part--
in fact, it is an absolutely necessary part--of any growth
strategy that the United States will undertake.
These contributions help us in two ways. First off, they,
for a modest investment, allow us to receive a much greater
benefit because of the burden-sharing, the fact that we pay
only in a portion for the benefits that are put out.
But secondly, and I come back to it, for our job creators
to be able to invest overseas, to export overseas, to be able
to be involved overseas, there are certain foundational needs
that they have. Investment in the World Bank facilitates those
conditions that all of our entrepreneurs need in order to make
any of the export opportunities meaningful.
When you ask exporters why they aren't able to go into
certain countries in Africa, they will tell you it is because
of a lack of a rule of law, unpredictability, insufficient
transparency. The rules that the World Bank fosters,
facilitates, and in some cases makes an absolute precondition
of any loans that they make, are absolutely in our interest, in
our governmental interest, but more importantly, in the
interest of our job creators.
Ms. Moore. Thank you, Ambassador. Just a follow-up. Do you
all agree that--I think that the example I gave was World
Bank's International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
where the U.S. share is $9.78 billion, and the callable capital
is $9.19 billion. Has there ever been an instance that any of
you know of where that callable capital has had to be paid?
Mr. Debevoise. Congresswoman, the answer to that question
is no, not since 1945 has there ever been a call on the
callable capital.
I referred earlier today to the prudent financial
management of these institutions, and this is an example of
that. There is 6 percent that is actually paid in, in this
capital increase and 94 percent which is callable capital; yet
we are able to leverage. I know there are times in this
committee where the word ``leverage'' might be a bad word, but
this is leverage that is very prudently managed, and one of the
consequences of dipping below 15 percent voting power in the
World Bank would be that we would lose the ability to veto
amendments to the articles.
One of the key articles is the article that says that the
callable capital is only available to pay bondholders if the
bank defaults. The callable capital cannot be called just
because the bank wakes up one day and says we want some more
money. If we lose that 15 percent, the credibility in Wall
Street and the capital markets of the world will be at risk.
Ms. Moore. Thank you so much. And thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for your indulgence.
Chairman Miller of California. Mr. Huizenga for 5 minutes.
Mr. Huizenga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it.
Ambassador Green, it is good to see you again, and I just want
to start off by saying thank you. I appreciate your leadership
on some of these issues, and I know you had a chance to travel
extensively with my predecessor into Africa and other places as
well. I am a firm believer, though, that every garden party
needs a skunk, and I just want to kind of pursue a few things.
I am one of those people who is concerned about the outlay,
the exposure that the American taxpayer has, and I understand
some of my colleagues haven't met a spending program they
haven't liked in the past, but these are uncharted territories
that we are in, not just here in the United States but with the
world economy. And it strikes me that we are trying to do two
things here, or at least the explanation seems to be doing two
things: one, deal with aid; but two, talking about business
investments.
And I am just--I am concerned with the world economy as it
is. Can we really expect that there are not going to be any
defaults? I know you had just said that there have not been, I
believe you said, since 1945 at least, a callable situation
where those loans could be called. This $7.5 billion direct
investment is about $36 billion, according to my math and
numbers that I have, in potential exposure for this government
and for our taxpayers.
And going back to my colleague from Illinois, his question
to Mr. Murphy, it seemed to me he didn't really answer the
question about how can we be assured that our tax dollars are
not supporting governments that are problematic to us as we are
moving forward. And, again, these tend to be nonbankable
projects, right? That is, they can't go out and get traditional
bankable paper. They can't get traditional backers. What is the
assurance that these really are positive projects that we need
to be involved in?
So I open it up to any of you for a quick follow-up. And
Mr. Murphy, I would like to hear specifically from the Chamber
on that, too.
Mr. Debevoise. Thank you, Mr. Huizenga. It is a skunk's
question, but fortunately, I don't sense the odor, because the
answer is quite positive in that regard.
The Bank has a long history of lending. It started lending
to France after the Second World War and now lends in other
countries. At the moment, there is one country in default to
the World Bank: Zimbabwe. Argentina has paid everything, all of
the other countries that you might think of that have had
difficulty. That is because the Bank has a preferred creditor
status, and it is recognized as such. Now, that is a de facto
recognition. It is not a formal legal seniority, but it works.
When I sat on the World Bank board and looked at the
financials every year, I was always asking, is the loan loss
reserve large enough? And the experience has been stellar. The
defaults have been limited to cases where countries have
literally been destroyed by civil war or things like that. But
this institution, and the others as well, have very strong
reserves to cover that type of situation, and it is something
that is looked at very closely by the rating agencies which
continue to rate the institution as AAA.
Mr. Huizenga. I have 1 minute here, and I know I want to
get a couple of other answers, but have we not redefined that
debt in the past? Have we not restructured that?
Mr. Debevoise. I think what you are referring to is debts
that were incurred by IDA countries, not by IBRD countries.
That is what MDRI, the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, is
all about. Those are the poorest of the poor countries, with
per capita income below $1,300 a year of GNI; but IBRD
countries, it is a completely different situation. There has
never been any debt relief for an IBRD borrower.
Mr. Huizenga. Mr. Murphy?
Mr. Murphy. My response is perhaps not as satisfactory as I
would like it to be, but if the United States does not make
these investments, then we lose the ability to be influential
in the councils of how these decisions are made within the
multilateral development banks. If you look around the world
today, particularly in Africa, you see that Chinese investment
and direct assistance is increasingly important. It is often
tied to the development of natural resources in that country.
The alternative to our investments and increasing the ability
of the multilateral development banks to be influential in the
developing world is most likely to see more activism on a
direct bilateral basis by rising powers such as China.
Mr. Huizenga. I appreciate the chairman's charitable clock
time here, but I guess I need to leave with this: Have there
really been any successes in changing these corrupt
governments? I think it was Mr. Runde earlier who talked about
Haiti. One of the problems with Haiti as I have been reading--I
have not visited there, but it is one of the things I have been
reading--is the rampant corruption that is continuing to go on
there, and how is that not an exposure that we should be afraid
may come back and haunt us?
Mr. Runde. Thank you for that. I do think that in some
context, there is a national security component to what we are
trying to do. I think in the case of Haiti, which is unique I
think for a number of reasons, I think we have to think about
the counter factuals. If we don't prop up that government, do
we really want several hundred thousand people getting on boats
and coming to Miami? I think that is the cost. We have to
choose what sort of an outcome we want. So I would say that in
the case of Haiti, that is sort of in the background.
I think in the case of other countries, have we seen
countries reform over time? Absolutely. I think about countries
like Chile or South Korea or Ghana or France that were all
recipients of World Bank loans over time and participated in
reforms that were American-influenced. And so, yes, absolutely,
we see countries graduating from foreign assistance over the
last 20 or 30 years. South Korea is now a donor. Chile is about
to become a donor. Brazil is about to become a donor. So these
are examples.
Not all countries are doomed to failure, but I do think it
is very hard to go back home--when I come home for
Thanksgiving, I talk to my parents around the dining table, who
don't follow foreign assistance and aren't really that
interested in it and are kind of skeptical about it. I think
there are sort of four arguments that we have to make for why
we have to be a participant in this.
One is, this is about stable and growing markets. This is
about who buys our goods and services. The second is national
security. In many country contacts, we are fighting insurgents
where we need our host country partners to demonstrate that
they can provide public goods and services, and the MDBs play a
crucial role in that. So places like Iraq and Afghanistan or
places like Haiti, where we have failed governments, we are
helping to prop them up, and these institutions stay longer
than sometimes the American people have the stomach for
staying. And so they are built to last. They are built to stay
beyond our ability to stay or sort of help the local process,
willing to let them stay. If we don't do this, someone else
will is the third argument. It is not as if we take our bat and
ball and go home. There are other folks waiting in the wings to
offer an alternate vision of globalization which isn't one that
is favorable to the United States of America. And then if we
want to be leaders of the free world, we have to pay to play,
and if we don't do this, this is a downpayment on American
decline.
Chairman Miller of California. Mr. Huizenga, I would like
to show you a testimony by the Admiral, sent by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, very informative, and that is the first time
the Joint Chiefs have ever sent a witness to this committee. On
national security issues that they have been really involved
with and benefit from, it is very informative.
I had expressed and apologize for mispronouncing your name,
but I corrected it.
Mr. Huizenga. That is all right, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Miller of California. Mr. Green, you are
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Al Green of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for allowing me to be a part of this hearing. I thank you
and the ranking member because this has been very informative
and I think very beneficial.
I would like to thank all the witnesses for your testimony.
I tried to follow it. I had to step away for a moment, so my
question may be repetitive in that it has already been
addressed, but I would like to speak for just a moment to you
about the foreign markets for U.S. companies. I have
intelligence indicating that half of the global growth is
expected in developing countries, and that we are talking about
$3 trillion in infrastructure spending.
Would one of you kindly elaborate and give some indication
as to how this will impact the ability of U.S. companies to do
business and how that business will impact the U.S. economy?
Mr. Murphy. Thank you very much for that thoughtful
question. Last year, over half of U.S. exports went to
developing countries for the first time in a number of years. I
think this is a reflection of the fact that you just pointed
out, that developing countries are growing more rapidly than
the developed markets. You see a situation where countries such
as Brazil have literally tens of millions of people making a
transition from a level of income where they are shopping in a
local market to where they can go to a supermarket and buy
processed goods. They can buy shampoo. They are joining a
consumer culture to a degree that is raising their living
standard, and these are markets where U.S. companies and their
products, their goods and services, are very much in demand.
What we at the U.S. Chamber hear from our members is an
incredible level of interest in some of these large emerging
markets such as Brazil and India, Indonesia, and very much so
in Africa as well, and a number of African countries are
graduating from being so-called frontier markets to countries
that are growing, in some cases, by double digits, double-digit
income growth, and at a time when demand is slack here in the
United States, the housing crisis has kept the U.S. consumer in
a, shall we say charitably, restrained mode, this is very
welcome to American companies, and it is going to be crucial to
our recovery.
Mr. Al Green of Texas. Thank you. Let me move to another
area that is somewhat esoteric. I would like for you to address
the currency of choice for the MDBs. Is it the American dollar?
Is that the currency of choice, generally speaking?
Mr. Debevoise. Congressman, thank you for that question.
Mr. Al Green of Texas. May I just share that the reason I
ask is because many people are not aware of the currency
challenges that are out there in terms of a desire to move into
new currency. There is currencies of choice, ``competition'' is
a better word with the euro, competition with the yuan. That is
why I am asking, because I want to know how our currency is
faring in terms of being promoted. The American dollar is
important to the American economy as a currency of choice.
Mr. Debevoise. Thank you, Congressman Green.
The answer to your question is that at the World Bank, the
U.S. dollar is the currency of account, and all of the accounts
are maintained in U.S. dollars in terms of the formal
reporting, and most of the borrowing is hedged back into U.S.
dollars. That portion which is not is because there might be a
disbursement in some local currency, but for the most part, it
is a dollar-oriented institution.
Mr. Al Green of Texas. And the second part of this question
deals with our lack of voting privileges. Would that then put
us in a position such that we cannot continue to influence our
model as a currency of choice for the Bank? Do we lose
something if we are not--I hate to use the terminology that has
been used--but we are not playing by contributing, if I may say
so?
Mr. Debevoise. Congressman Green, I think the question has
been asked, and the influence of the United States is very
important for maintaining something like that in the
institution, in all the institutions, frankly.
Mr. Al Green of Texas. Finally, with the few seconds left,
you mentioned the hard-loan window versus the soft-loan window,
and for a neophyte, those are terms that I can draw some
conclusions about. But could you just for a moment explain a
little bit more about the hard loans versus the soft loans in
terms of how they benefit countries?
Mr. Debevoise. What we are talking about is categories of
countries. Countries with per capita GNI, gross national
income, above approximately $1,300, borrow from the hard-loan
window, and they pay interest at a roughly market rate.
Countries with per capita GNIs below that level deal with the
soft-loan window. In the case of the World Bank Group, that is
called IDA. In the African development group, that is called
the African Development Fund, and similarly in Asia.
And the terms that they get are a mixture of outright
grants and loans which--
Mr. Al Green of Texas. Let me interrupt you to say, I will
ask you to explain it to me afterwards. We are over my time,
and I am an interloper. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I will get my
answer.
Chairman Miller of California. Thank you. I want to thank
the panel. You have been excellent. Your testimony is very,
very good. I want to thank Ambassador Green and Mr. Runde for
their patience. They came for the last hearing, and they were
here ready to go, but it was canceled at the last moment. So I
thank you for coming back again today and giving us your time
and all of your talents.
Without objection, I submit the following for the record: a
letter from the Bretton Woods Committee urging strong support
for the Administration's request for general capital increases
for the MDBs. The committee writes: ``It is important to
sustain global leadership and influence in the MDBs in order to
promote U.S. national security interests and advance U.S.
business opportunities abroad. Former Presidents George Bush,
Jimmy Carter, honorary co-chairs of Bretton Wood Committee.''
This letter is signed by 14 of the committee's members
including Nicholas Brady, Henry Kissinger, Lee Hamilton, Paul
O'Neill, Jim Kolbe, and Brent Scowcroft.
With that, the hearing is adjourned. The Chair notes that
some members may have additional questions for the panel which
they may wish to submit in writing. Without objection, the
hearing record will remain open for 30 days for members to
submit written questions to these witnesses and to place their
responses in the record.
This committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:57 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
October 4, 2011