[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CAMP ASHRAF: IRAQI OBLIGATIONS AND STATE DEPARTMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 7, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-92
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
_____
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New York
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
RON PAUL, Texas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DAVID RIVERA, Florida
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman
MIKE PENCE, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York DENNIS CARDOZA, California
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
CONNIE MACK, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania
ROBERT TURNER, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Daniel Fried, Special Advisor on Ashraf, U.S.
Department of State, accompanied by Mrs. Barbara Leaf, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Iraq, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs,
U.S. Department of State....................................... 12
The Honorable Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., chairman, Henry L.
Stimson Center................................................. 32
Elizabeth Ferris, Ph.D., co-director, Brookings-LSE Project on
Internal Displacement.......................................... 138
Colonel Wes Martin, USA (Retired), (former base commander of Camp
Ashraf)........................................................ 145
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Daniel Fried: Prepared statement................... 15
The Honorable Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr.: Prepared statement..... 35
Elizabeth Ferris, Ph.D.: Prepared statement...................... 140
Colonel Wes Martin, USA (Retired): Prepared statement............ 147
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 224
Hearing minutes.................................................. 225
Colonel Wes Martin, USA (Retired): Material submitted for the
record......................................................... 226
CAMP ASHRAF: IRAQI OBLIGATIONS AND STATE DEPARTMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
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WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 2011
House of Representatives,
Subcommittees on
Oversight and Investigations,
and the Middle East and South Asia,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:55 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations)
presiding.
Mr. Rohrabacher. This joint hearing of both the Oversight
and Investigations and Middle East and South Asia Subcommittees
will come to order.
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for coming today.
I want to thank my colleagues for joining us.
We are going to open up this hearing with an introduction
to the subject matter with a video shot earlier this year
showing the events just before and during and after the April 8
attack on Camp Ashraf by Iraqi soldiers operating under the
orders of the Baghdad government of Prime Minister Maliki. It
is a short video, about 1 minute. It was filmed by a resident
of Camp Ashraf and edited from a much larger collection of film
recorded during those days.
The narrative is that while U.S. military personnel were
present the Iraqi forces were held in check, but when the U.S.
soldiers were ordered to leave the area, the Iraqi troops
attacked. Later confirming the casualties of the attack, U.S.
personnel did return to give aid to the wounded and take
witness of those who had been killed.
And, again, this hearing is a hearing of two subcommittees.
We will be giving opening remarks after this short video.
[Video shown.]
Mr. Rohrabacher. I would like to draw attention also to the
posters underneath the monitors. If you noticed during the
video, you saw that gentleman aiming his rifle and shooting.
That was what we call premeditated murder. The people who were
being targeted by that individual, who was aiming his gun, were
unarmed civilians. This, in itself, is--I guess when they kill
one or two people, it is murder; when you kill tens of people,
it becomes an atrocity and perhaps even a war crime. And the
fact that this was being done by--at least with the approval of
the Iraqi Government is something that is of great concern to
the United States, especially when the beginning of the video
shows U.S. troops exiting the area just prior to this atrocity.
This hearing is the last chance for Congress to impress
upon the State Department the gravity of the crisis that we
face and the stain on American honor that will result if action
is not taken to avert another massacre of unarmed civilians in
Camp Ashraf. If that bloodletting happens, it will be a crime
perpetrated by a conspiracy between Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki
and the Iranian theocracy which is pulling the strings.
Whatever has been going on for two decades, since the
arrival of U.S. forces in 2003, Camp Ashraf has been a peaceful
community of political dissidents and refugees which is
certainly a community--since we have arrived there in 2003--
which does not deserve the label of terrorist, as we have been
told by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees that the U.S.
terrorist designation--and this is representatives of the U.N.
High Commissioner, I might say--have in the past told us that
the terrorist designation is a major obstacle to finding safe
places to relocate Camp Ashraf's residents outside of Iraq.
If these people in Camp Ashraf are forced to stay in Iraq,
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees believes the
Maliki regime may pull 50 to 60 individuals out of Ashraf and
deport them to Iran. This because the mullahs in Tehran have
listed them as a terrorist organization and these people that
they would pull out have been designated by Tehran as
terrorists with Interpol. And the United States' listing of the
MEK as terrorists will be used by Maliki to justify his
murderous cooperation with Iran.
Why are we, the United States, being an accomplice to this
crime? If they are deported or subjected to another massacre,
the blood in the sand will also stain the Gucci shoes of our
U.S. State Department.
At the end of the year, which is only 24 days away, all
American military personnel will have left Iraq. On that same
day, the Baghdad government of Prime Minister Maliki has
decreed that Camp Ashraf is to be closed. For more than 20
years this camp has been home to 3,400 members of the People's
Mojahedin Organization of Iran, also known as the MEK, a
secular opposition group in exile working against the bloody
Islamic mullah dictatorship in Iran.
Maliki will disperse the residents to new camps which may,
in reality, be prisons. His objective is to deport the Iranian
dissidents or at least their leaders to Iran where they will be
imprisoned and, it is easy to predict, imprisoned, tortured,
and killed.
Maliki's alignment with the vicious Iranian theocracy is
clear. To please his Tehran masters, he has already inflicted
violence and death on the Camp Ashraf population. As we have
just seen, in the early hours of April 8 this year, units of
the Iraqi Army numbering 2,500, including armored vehicles,
assaulted unarmed Iranian civilians at Camp Ashraf, murdering
at least 34 residents and wounding hundreds more. As we saw in
the video, this wasn't just random shooting. There were
individuals who were picking out targets, unarmed people, and
shooting them, as if they were deer in a deer hunt, as we just
saw.
We also just saw that American military personnel were
pulled out of the camp just hours before that attack. What does
that tell us? What does that tell us? Someone made that
decision. This was an atrocity and a crime against humanity.
Some media outlets have noted that the attacking troops
were ``armed and trained by the United States.'' And when you
see that and you see that group of dead bodies and you notice
that all of these people were unarmed, this is a shame on them
and a shame on us.
Camp Ashraf residents had been promised protection under
the Fourth Geneva Convention by senior U.S. commanders in Iraq.
There is a poster right there that is showing an ID card that
was issued to a camp resident and the agreement--I guess that
is what this one is that I was pointing to before we started.
This poster shows the agreement between the camp and the United
States, trading a pledge of peace and disarmament for American
protection.
The reason the camp was disarmed, the reason these people
had no means of defending themselves was that they had made an
agreement with the United States Government to disarm and,
thus, they were shot down as if they were deer being hunted by
hunters, no way to defend themselves.
When sovereignty was turned over to Iraq, the transfer of
responsibility for Camp Ashraf to the Baghdad government was
conditioned on a direct promise that the residents would
continue to be protected. In April, the United States utterly
and completely failed its responsibilities after making that
promise to the people of Camp Ashraf.
After the attack, the State Department asserted that a
``crisis and loss of life was initiated by the Government of
Iraq and the Iraqi military.'' But what about before the
attack, as I just mentioned? The U.S. Embassy and the commander
of U.S. forces undoubtedly knew of the Iraqi military build-up
outside the camp. Was the Iraqi Government then contacted? We
need to know that. If so, what was the Iraqi response when we
contacted them?
And as I mentioned before as well, the U.S. military unit
deployed near Camp Ashraf was ordered away just before the
attack. Well, obviously--if not obviously, perhaps on the face
of it, it appears to be that there was a conspiracy, including
our Government and the Maliki government, to commit murder, to
take the lives of unarmed people.
So who in our Government knew about this? What type of
agreement was made? And why was nothing done to prevent it if
we did know about it? We wanted to ask the State Department
officials these questions but were told no one was available to
testify at the hearing of this subcommittee on July 7.
Late yesterday, we finally received a letter in partial
response to the questions we have sent to the State Department
over 5 months ago. We will consider the response and may ask
for more clarification and information after today's hearing.
Our priority is now to learn what will happen in the
future. Will we be turning away again? What can people expect?
Will we turn away? And what happens if there is another
massacre in the making? We are just going to walk away then?
What will be our position if there is another massacre? And
will the residents just end up in concentration camps or in
jail or being tortured in Iran or Iraq itself? Will we and can
we, are we even trying to evacuate the residents of Camp Ashraf
in the next 3 weeks?
America has spent its blood and treasure, $1 trillion, the
blood of thousands of our young men and women, only to allow a
government to come to power in Baghdad that is the puppet of
the Iranian mullah dictatorship, the most dangerous enemy of
America and threat to peace and stability in the Middle East;
and the government that we have fought and paid for and bled
for in order to bring into existence has now become their ally.
In his recent op-ed in The Washington Post, Prime Minister
Maliki cited the U.S. listing of the MEK as a terrorist group
and called them ``insurgents,'' using this justification for
his intransigence toward Camp Ashraf. So if the Iraqi Prime
Minister cannot discuss U.S.-Iraqi relations without mentioning
Ashraf and cannot mention Ashraf without mentioning the
terrorist listing, how can we deal with this issue without
talking about our Government's listing of the residents of Camp
Ashraf as being terrorists?
In 1997, Iran persuaded the Clinton administration to put
the MEK on the State Department's Foreign Terrorist
Organization List. This naive gesture was supposed to improve
relations with Tehran. But the relations did not improve, and
Iran continues to support violence across the region and crush
dissent at home and develop nuclear weapons capabilities that
we have no idea whether we are the target or Israel or some of
the other countries which the mullah dictatorship doesn't like.
We have been told that the State Department is re-
evaluating the MEK's designation as terrorists. In her
appearance before the Foreign Affairs Committee on October 27,
Secretary of State Clinton acknowledged that the European Union
has taken the MEK off its terrorist list, which it did in 2009.
The State Department hasn't taken them off the list. But the
Europeans have done so. And the clock is running out.
The U.S. should continue to insist that the promise given
by the United States to the residents of Camp Ashraf and the
promise then given by the Iraqi Government to us must be
respected and upheld. This is not just a matter of decency but
of the credibility of the Maliki government and the honor of
the people of the United States. The Iraqi Government must
allow the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to fulfill his
mission in moving the residents of Camp Ashraf out of Iraq to
safe havens in other countries with the full support of the
United States.
But as I mentioned before, I have been personally told by
UNHCR officials that this terrorist designation maintained by
the United States is an impediment to finding places to
relocate the residents of Camp Ashraf outside of Iraq.
I hope that our State Department witnesses can assure us
today that these objectives will be accomplished before the end
of December when the absence of U.S. troops will change the
reality and that the residents of Camp Ashraf will be at the
mercy of Iraqi forces under the command of a political leader
who is in cahoots with the Iranian mullah dictatorship.
All of our other members will be given time for opening
statements. But, Mr. Carnahan, would you like to proceed with
your opening statement?
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you for
your dedicated work on this issue. Thank you for having this
follow-up hearing, as promised.
In light of recent events, the trip you led to Iraq a few
months back and the scheduled departure of the U.S. military in
just a few short weeks, this hearing provides a timely
opportunity for us to once again assess not only the precarious
humanitarian situation at Camp Ashraf but also to consider the
broader issues of the U.S.-Iraq policy going forward.
I am fortunate to represent an active Iranian American
community back home in St. Louis who care deeply about family
members and residents at Camp Ashraf. I am glad to have some of
them here today. Welcome again and thank you for your advocacy
and being part of this effort.
In 2003, the residents of Camp Ashraf were granted
protected status under the Geneva Convention. Pursuant to the
status of forces agreement between the U.S. and Iraqi
Governments, however, jurisdiction of the camp has been under
Iraqi jurisdiction since 2009. With the draw-down of U.S.
forces in Iraq and the Iraqi Government's repeated calls for
the residents to leave Iraq, there is a serious concern about
the safety and welfare of the residents. The administration has
raised concerns about their safety, and I will be interested to
hear what progress has been made through our bilateral and
multilateral efforts.
In addition to ensuring that the rights of the residents
are maintained, I am also interested in an update from our last
hearing on relocation efforts. Several hundred have returned to
Iran with the help of the international Red Cross, and the U.S.
has offered to help relocate residents prior to internationally
coordinated closure of the base.
I would like to hear the witnesses discuss what options are
available moving forward, what implications those options have
on U.S. policy to Iraq as well as Iran. Specifically, would it
be beneficial to know what other countries have shown a
willingness to admit residents?
Turning to the broader issues of U.S. policy toward Iraq
following the troop withdrawal at the end of this month, I
would like to hear each witness discuss the challenges ahead as
our policy in Iraq shifts to becoming a State Department- and
USAID-led effort, focusing on diplomacy and development.
The safety of residents at Camp Ashraf poses immediate
concern, but I am also interested to hear what our continued
efforts in the country will look like. I look forward to the
hearing today. Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your
continued efforts to champion a humanitarian solution for this
issue.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me just note that these humanitarian
and human rights challenges that we face are confronted by a
united Congress in the United States, and the bipartisanship
that has been demonstrated by Mr. Carnahan and my fellow
colleagues is an example to the rest of the world where people
who believe in freedom can work together.
And I would like to ask for unanimous consent that Mr.
Filner, Congressman Filner from San Diego who is not a member
of this committee but has been very active on the issue, be
permitted to sit in with us and be treated as a member of the
committee for today.
Hearing no objection, so ordered.
We now would like to call on Representative Chabot, the
chairman of the Middle East and South Asian deg.
Subcommittee, who is officially the cosponsor or is cochairing
this event. And we appreciate hearing your opening statement,
Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. Good afternoon.
Let me begin by thanking my colleague, the gentleman from
California, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, Mr. Rohrabacher, for calling this timely and
important joint hearing with the Subcommittee on the Middle
East and South Asia that I happen to chair.
This hearing was scheduled to begin at 2:30. We got started
a little bit late, and I have another meeting that I have to be
at at 4 o'clock. So I am going to have to leave then, but my
staff will be here and remain and make sure that we hear
everything that has been said here today.
In January 2009, the Iraqi Government took the sovereign
control of Camp Ashraf and responsibility for the 3,400
residents living in it. Since then, there have been several
extremely disturbing incidents, one of which we just saw, which
resulted in the deaths of Camp Ashraf residents. I am
particularly disturbed by the deaths of as many as 35 residents
of Camp Ashraf, resulting from clashes with Iraqi forces on
April 8, 2011, again.
Reports of shortages of food, fuel, and medical supplies
are also very concerning. This is simply unacceptable. The
Iraqi Government must take all necessary and appropriate steps
to prevent the loss of life.
Although the status of the individuals residing at Camp
Ashraf continues to pose a deeply problematic challenge, it is
incumbent on all parties to ensure that no harm comes to its
residents. Accordingly, the overriding objective of the Obama
administration's dialogue with Iraq on the matter of Camp
Ashraf should first and foremost be to encourage the protection
of the camp residents, ensure appropriate humanitarian aid is
provided for the residents, and ensure that the Iraqi
Government lives up to the obligations which underlie the
transfer agreement. As the international community works to
resolve the difficult dilemma, no further harm must come to the
camp residents.
As we work to resolve this situation, however, it is
incumbent on all parties to remember that the 3,400 residents
are not just words on a page but people, human beings. The
status of the residents of Camp Ashraf is a complex issue and
one that requires an international solution which takes into
account the desires of the actual residents.
Correspondingly, I would like to echo recent calls to push
back the December 31 deadline to close Camp Ashraf. I fear that
trying to rush a solution only risks further harm to the camp
residents. Although permanent homes for these residents will
certainly take time to find and, as such, patience will be
required on the part of all concerned parties, it is critical
that the international community understand the urgency of the
situation and proceed expeditiously.
I want to again thank Chairman Rohrabacher for calling this
hearing. I look forward to hearing the testimony of the
witnesses. I yield back my time.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
Ms. Chu, do you have an opening statement?
Ms. Chu. Well, I would like to ask unanimous consent to be
a guest and to be able to----
Mr. Rohrabacher. To be last? Yes, no problem. To ask
unanimous consent to be first is a difficult one.
I would like to recognize Congressman Poe.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We have a crisis that is taking place halfway around the
world, and the United States should be aware of this crisis and
the impending deadline. December 31st in the United States
comes with fireworks, New Year's Day, but there also may be
fireworks and fire in Camp Ashraf unless the United States
intervenes to make sure something bad does not happen.
In 24 days, the Iraqi Government has promised to close down
Camp Ashraf. Where the residents will be forced to go, we
really don't know. They could be expelled to Iran, where many
of them will face death, in my opinion. The little tyrant from
the desert Ahmadinejad and his Iranian regime have already
murdered hundreds of their family members. Those people in Camp
Ashraf could be located to another place in Iraq.
And why would the Iraqi Government want to close down a
camp and just move them to another camp in Iraq? Well, because
the Iraqi Government knows that the phrase ``Camp Ashraf'' is
known throughout the world as a place of refuge for Iranian
freedom fighters. Iraq knows if it attacks the residents while
they are in Camp Ashraf they will face worldwide condemnation,
like they did in 2009 and 2011 when they massacred over 40
unarmed civilians. As related by my colleagues, those were
people that were killed. They are not statistics. They were
real people. And these 47 people are dead because the Iraqi
Government killed them. Two times, two assaults on the camp.
Is this what is going to happen on January 1 unless the
United States intervenes? We don't know. But do we allow this
to occur? I hope not. And it is unfortunate--or maybe
fortunate--that some of the family members of these 47 people
are here with us today, pleading that Congress act to prevent
another massacre of citizens in the camp.
The residents of Camp Ashraf said they don't trust the
Iraqi Government. I don't blame them. They have invaded their
camp twice. I have a letter here to a member of the European
Parliament by members of the camp who believe that on January
1, unless something occurs, they will face certain death, and
they will not go away voluntarily. They won't resist, but they
will not go away voluntarily. They do not want to be moved
because they think it is certain death.
What the residents want is to be moved to another country
besides Iran. The residents of Camp Ashraf have applied to be
recognized as political refugees by the United Nations. Iraq
knows that if the residents get refugee status, they won't be
able to violate their human rights without more serious
consequences. So with strong pressure from the Iranians, Maliki
and his thugs are closing the camp on December 31 before the
U.N. refugee process can finish.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, I went with you on June 11 to
Iraq, along with the ranking member and others from this
committee, and you asked Maliki if we could go to Camp Ashraf
and see what happened, get the residents' point of view of what
is taking place. He was indignant. He refused to let us go to
Camp Ashraf. In fact, the reason he used was because our
Government has labeled the MEK as a foreign terrorist
organization. Therefore, he closed the camp to us.
He was so incensed that what occurred later made the
international press--primarily in Europe; it wasn't mentioned
in the United States--but while we were flying to another
portion of Iraq, we found out through the State Department that
we had been evicted from Iraq for asking the question to go to
Camp Ashraf. And of course we stayed as long as we wanted to.
But that is Maliki's point of view and his reaction to the
question that was asked, if we could visit the camp.
On December 12, Maliki will be in the United States. He
will be in Washington, DC. I am gathering a letter with
signatures to the President urging him to raise the Camp Ashraf
issue during this meeting. We have 47 signatures. We hope to
have more.
The clock is ticking. The days are numbered. I hope the
witnesses today can exactly outline specifically what will be
done by this administration to protect the residents of Camp
Ashraf. I hope we don't hear, as in my opinion we have heard in
the past, more comments about why our Government continues to
side with the Maliki government and the interests of Iran over
the freedom fighters in Camp Ashraf. And I yield back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Your Honor. And I
always appreciate the members of my committee following my lead
and taking a soft-spoken approach to these challenges.
Congressman Rivera.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. But I believe just
previously Congresswoman Chu was asking unanimous consent to be
a guest, not to be last.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Was that last or a guest?
Ms. Chu. It was a guest.
Mr. Rohrabacher. How about both?
Mr. Rivera. I will certainly yield to the gentlewoman from
California. Ladies first.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Please continue, Mr. Rivera, with your
opening statement, and then our two guests will be permitted to
have opening statements as well.
Mr. Rivera. Perfect. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will
adhere to your 2-minute admonition as well.
My main question I would like answered during this hearing,
Mr. Chairman, particularly from Ambassador Fried, is this issue
of the arbitrary December 31 deadline and what is the United
States doing to avoid what can only be referred to as a New
Year's Eve massacre occurring at Camp Ashraf?
Because we know what is coming. In this particular case,
the past is prologue. We have seen previously psychological
torture around the camp, utilizing noise-making mechanisms to
try and provide an ambiance that can only be described as
torture there for the residents. Physical deprivation. We saw
the videotape at the beginning of this hearing.
We know what is coming. What is the United States doing to
avoid that massacre that we know is coming?
The December 31 deadline I believe is simply a pretense to
carry out the forced repatriation of these residents, forced
repatriation to brutality, to torture, and to an environment of
death. So we must do all in our power to avoid this New Year's
Eve massacre. And I want to know and I hope this hearing will
shed light and provide answers to this important question.
And I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, and I apologize for
mishearing my colleague. Let me just note, I have what you call
a surfer's ear. It is in this ear from jumping into the cold
water too many times.
But, Mr. Filner, would you like to proceed with an opening
statement?
Mr. Filner. I am glad to hear that you can only hear from
the left.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the honor of being a
part of the committee today.
What is happening, by the way, is rare in committee
meetings that are going on around the Hill today; and I hope,
Ambassador and Ms. Leaf, you will report this back to Mrs.
Clinton. Usually, you see the two sides just fighting each
other, rather than coming to any agreement or consensus. And I
think we are all together on this side, and I appreciate the
chairman's leadership on it.
I would associate myself--God may strike me down for this--
but with all the remarks that Chairman Rohrabacher said. And
rather than try to interrupt Ambassador Fried's testimony,
because I was a little upset by it, I will just say some things
now about it. I found your testimony a little bit troubling.
You start off by saying, ``a common understanding of the
facts is important.'' I agree with you. I am not sure your
statement has led to that or helped us toward that common
understanding.
In your paragraph to try to destroy the credibility of the
MEK, you said, ``by 1980, Iraq dictator Saddam Hussein had
established a relationship with the MEK, cooperating with it to
advance his efforts to undermine the Iranian Government.'' How
evil. The dictator Hussein established--just substitute ``the
United States Government'' for ``the MEK.''
I mean, come on. Who was there supporting Hussein in all
his efforts during this period of time? It was the United
States. But now it is because he worked with the MEK they are
the bad guys?
There has been credible reporting--and there has also been
credible reporting on the reverse--that the MEK militarily
supported Hussein's violent suppression of groups in Iraq which
opposed his regime. Well, so did the United States.
You are looking at me rather strangely, as if we did not
participate in the Hussein regime. He was our ally against
Iran. I am not saying it is right or wrong. But you are
saying--you are taking Hussein's bad image, giving it over to
MEK. Where were we in all of this? Where was the United States?
If you want to say that the MEK should be on a terrorist
list, put the U.S. Government there, too. And in fact I have
heard the first Secretary of Homeland Security, Secretary
Ridge, say publicly that nothing ever crossed his desk, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, which showed the MEK to be
anything of a terrorist organization. The Attorney General
Mukasey said the exact same thing, he never saw anything about
that. The chief of staff of the President of the United States,
Andrew Card, said the exact same thing. They never saw anything
that, in their judgment, would lead to thinking of the MEK as a
terrorist organization.
So all of the facts on one side is just at least arguable,
if not false. So I find it strange that you are going to try
to--and I can say this because I have a Ph.D. In history, so I
am allowed to say it is historically inaccurate.
So, please, let us try to be factual here. Let us try to
look at, as my colleague said earlier, this is a group of
people who support our policy against Iran, that they want, as
we want, a democratic, secular, nonnuclear Iran. We should find
every way possible to work with them, not find every way, which
you said in your statement, every way to have problems with
them.
I want to know from you, Mr. Ambassador, what are we going
to do to help them survive, not all the problems that are there
that make it difficult. We know the problems. Let's find a
place for the refugees. Let's protect them if necessary.
You left 5 or 10 troops in there. That is not very many.
Leave 5 or 10, I bet you that changes the whole situation.
Put a resolution in the Security Council saying the U.N.
troops should be there to protect Ashraf. That is not easy to
do. But let's show where the United States stands on this
stuff. Take some leadership. Show some aggressiveness. Don't
just give us bureaucratic stuff that says, oh, the place is so
difficult. It is so complex. We have got all these problems. I
am not sure we can do anything by December 31.
That is baloney. We can. Show some leadership. Don't be so
timid. Show that we care about--that this is the most critical
place in the world, and we want a change in Iran, and we should
be doing everything we can to help make that true.
Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Congresswoman Chu.
Ms. Chu. Thank you so much.
Well, I was elected in 2009, and my time here feels like it
has been marked by events at Camp Ashraf. It was then that
residents in the camp suffered their first bloody attack at the
hands of Iraqi forces where 11 were killed and over 300
injured. Hundreds of armed security forces used bulldozers to
force their way into the camp. They used tear gas, water
cannons, and batons against unarmed residents who tried to stop
them from entering.
I was even more horrified to see the full videotape of the
events of April, 2011. Iraqi forces were shooting at unarmed
women, men, and children. Thirty-four people were killed, and
over 320 residents were injured. I could not believe the way in
which it showed soldiers shot indiscriminately at people as if
though they were just objects that they were looking at through
target practice.
I am here today to be a voice for the families who worry
about their loved ones. The U.S. will leave Iraq at the end of
the year on the same timeline that President Maliki is planning
to close Camp Ashraf. Once U.S. forces leave, there will be no
way to protect these residents. After these two attacks, and
with Iraqi forces continuing to surround these camps, I cannot
have it on my conscience or the conscience of the United States
for these 3,400 residents to be harmed when we could have
stopped it.
I believe that the State Department and the President
should use its position and influence to extend the December 31
deadline for the closure of Camp Ashraf, that we should push
the Iraqi Government not to relocate Camp Ashraf residents to
places all over inside Iraq, and we need to urge the Iraqi
Government to allow the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to
do its work in helping the residents of Camp Ashraf find a safe
place to go when the camp is closed. That is the least that
they deserve.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, and let me just make
one correction for my colleague. That was not
``indiscriminate'' shooting. That was worse. That was very
discriminate. That was very pointed and very aimed shooting at
the specific individuals who were murdered that day, including
women and minors who were unarmed. They were targeted. They
went through the sites. It wasn't just somebody shooting into
the air and accidentally hitting somebody. This is premeditated
murder, and that is one of the reasons that we are here today.
Now that we have all had our say, it is time to hear some
explanations and hopefully have some questions and answers and
some dialogue to shed some light on what you can see is
legitimate outrage on the part of the Members of Congress who
understand what is going on here.
So first let me note we have two fine witnesses from the
State Department, two professionals who have dedicated their
lives to serving their country and to serving the interests of
the United States of America overseas and developing an
expertise on how to deal with foreign governments and with such
situations.
Daniel Fried is a career Foreign Service Officer. He
started in 1997. And over his career our paths have crossed
many times in many different locations, and he is a pro. And
that is why he is here today, because the State Department felt
they needed someone to be here and to discuss this issue who
had the depth of knowledge and the ability to look at this and
to enlighten the Congress. Because he has got in-depth
knowledge of this incident, this situation as well as America's
dealings in that part of the world, in the Balkans and
everywhere else.
Barbara Leaf is currently the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Iraq in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs; and she
has actually taken this post as of August, 2011. However, prior
to that, she has been very deeply involved in her career in
that part of the world, including Iran and Iraq and the
Balkans.
So, again, we have two State Department pros,
professionals, and we are anxious to hear your testimony and to
conduct a dialogue with you afterwards.
So who would like to go first?
Mr. Fried.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL FRIED, SPECIAL ADVISOR ON
ASHRAF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY MRS. BARBARA
LEAF, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR IRAQ, BUREAU OF NEAR
EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Fried. Chairmen Rohrabacher and Chabot, Ranking
Member Carnahan, thank you for the opportunity to testify and
to report to you on the substantial ongoing efforts of the
United States to address this serious humanitarian issue.
The Government of Iraq has announced that Camp Ashraf must
be closed by the end of this year, and arrangements for the
security and humane treatment of the residents have not been
finalized. With time short, all parties must cooperate and
accept the credible proposals being put forward by the United
Nations for a humane, secure, and mutually agreed relocation of
the residents.
Vice President Biden stressed during his recent trip to
Baghdad the importance the United States places on a peaceful
and secure resolution of the situation at Camp Ashraf. The
Secretary has tasked me to ensure that the U.S. Government is
taking every responsible action possible, working with the
Government of Iraq, the United Nations, and our allies and
partners and in contact with the residents of Camp Ashraf and
those who speak for them to achieve a safe and secure
relocation of the residents of Camp Ashraf. We are working
urgently.
Still, it is important to be clear about the history of
Camp Ashraf. Camp Ashraf is operated by, and its residents led
by, members of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq , the MEK. The MEK sought
the violent overthrow of the Shah of Iran and during the 1970s
used terrorist tactics, including the assassination of six
Americans, among them three U.S. military officers. And the MEK
supported the occupation of, and hostage taking at, the U.S.
Embassy in Tehran.
Shortly after the Iranian Revolution, the MEK shifted its
tactics toward the new Iranian regime. By 1980, Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein had established a relationship with the MEK;
and, in 1986, Hussein invited the MEK to Iraq. Approximately
7,000 MEK members resettled in camps in Iraq, including Camp
Ashraf. Saddam Hussein's government provided funding, training,
and military equipment to the MEK; and, in exchange, the MEK
served as a private paramilitary group for the Saddam Hussein
regime.
There has indeed been credible reporting that the MEK
militarily supported Hussein's violent suppression of groups in
Iraq which opposed his regime, including shortly after the
first Gulf war. This explains how the U.S. military came across
this armed group in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom, some
of the reasons why the MEK was added to the Foreign Terrorist
Organization List in 1997 and the animosity felt toward the MEK
by many Iraqis.
In 2003, U.S. military forces negotiated a ceasefire and
disarmament with the MEK leadership in Iraq. MEK camps and
bases were consolidated to Camp Ashraf. U.S. commanders stated
that they considered Camp Ashraf residents as protected persons
under the Fourth Geneva Convention. This does not mean that the
residents were considered refugees, but the United States
afforded the residents of Camp Ashraf their rights under the
Geneva Convention as protected persons and ensured to the
extent possible that they were protected from hostilities. The
U.S. military did this at great risk.
Once a sovereign Iraqi Government was established in June,
2004, Camp Ashraf's residents were no longer protected persons
as a legal matter. Nevertheless, for the duration of the
authorities under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 and
subsequent resolutions, U.S. forces continued to treat the
residents of Ashraf as protected persons as a matter of policy,
the right call, given the unsettled and violent conditions in
Iraq and the hostility of many Iraqis toward the MEK. And we
conveyed this to the camp's residents.
When our U.N. mandate expired on January 1, 2009, U.S.
military remained in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi
Government. It had no authority to provide protection for the
residents of Camp Ashraf and accordingly transferred security
responsibility for the camp to the Iraqi Government.
The leadership at Camp Ashraf was informed that the U.S.
military would no longer play a role in the camp's physical
protection. Concurrently, at the U.S. Government's request, the
Iraqi Government provided assurances of humane treatment. In
addition, the Iraqi Government allowed U.N. and U.S. officials
to monitor the well-being of the camp's residents.
As everyone here knows, the Iraqi Government has probably
expressed its decision to close Camp Ashraf by the end of this
year. Yet the exercise of a sovereign right does not obviate
the need for care and restraint.
We have seen and condemned the terrible loss of life as a
result of past attempts, including last April, by Iraqi police
and security forces to enter the camp. The United States has
stated publicly--and I want to reiterate now--that we expect
the Iraqi Government to refrain from the use of violence.
In addition, the United States has been consistent in
urging the Iraqi Government to resolve the humanitarian and
security issues at Camp Ashraf expeditiously and before the
closure of the camp. This in particular was part of the Vice
President's message to the Iraqi leadership in Baghdad during
his latest visit. At the same time, the camp leadership must
respect and recognize Iraqi sovereignty as we seek to resolve
this matter.
In addition, as we have conveyed and continue to convey to
the leaders of Camp Ashraf and to those who communicate with
the MEK's Paris-based leadership, the MEK must act responsibly
and not put any Ashraf residents or ask any Ashraf residents to
place themselves in harm's way.
A humane and secure relocation is possible, but it will
take intense and serious efforts by all parties. The Iraqi
Government has been working with the U.N. on a resolution of
the situation at Camp Ashraf. Some encouraging progress has
been made. We welcome this. We hope that the MEK and Camp
Ashraf leaders will engage constructively as well and work with
the U.N. on its approach. A solution is possible if all work
seriously to reach agreement on proposals that allow for the
safe and mutual determination of each resident's individual
legal status and his or her desire to leave Iraq while
respecting individual rights and all in a context of security
and humane treatment.
The State Department has, is, and will continue to work
closely with the U.N., its assistance mission in Iraq led by
Ambassador Martin Kobler and the UNHCR to help achieve a
humanitarian resolution. These U.N. organizations are playing a
serious and constructive role in the urgent efforts to craft a
solution. The European Union is supporting these efforts as
well.
Our goal is to help find an expeditious and humane
resolution to the closure of Camp Ashraf. We will continue to
engage intensively at the highest levels to head off any
actions that could result in violence and will continue to
encourage the residents to accept the reasonable, humane, and
secure proposals crafted by the U.N. to relocate them from
Ashraf.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today about
this urgent issue, and I welcome your questions. And, Mr.
Chairman, I would also welcome the dialogue that you suggested.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fried follows:]
----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. I understand that Deputy Secretary Leaf is
here to help with questions but doesn't necessarily have an
opening statement; is that correct?
Ms. Leaf. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. Then I will proceed
with some questions, and then we will go on to the others.
First of all, Mr. Ambassador, you just stated several times
in your opening statement that each party has to do its part
and that it will take an intense effort by all parties to get
out of this situation. Let me ask you this: Do you believe that
the United States is doing all we can? Are we involved in an
intense effort when we can't even get ourselves to take the MEK
off the terrorist list?
Ambassador Fried. Should I answer?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes. Tell me. On the face of it, that
seems very contradictory. We can't even get ourselves to make a
redesignation, and you are suggesting that all of us have to
have an intense effort? How intense is it to have to make a
policy for our own Government in order to diffuse the
situation?
Ambassador Fried. Certainly the efforts of my office and my
colleagues at the Near East Bureau are intense. Secretary
Clinton was explicit that she wants me to work flat-out on this
issue, and that is what I and my colleagues, Ambassador Jeffrey
in Baghdad are doing. That is a directive from the Secretary.
We are all engaged. I can assure you that is happening.
It is not my place to comment about the process of the
foreign terrorist organization designation. My office is not
playing a lead role in that process. I know it is moving along,
and I am very mindful of the arguments you made----
Mr. Rohrabacher. How long has it been moving on? How long
has it been moving on?
Ambassador Fried. This process has been some months. But,
again, it is not my office engaged in it.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, let me just note----
Ambassador Fried. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher [continuing]. That intense effort does not
in any way accurately describe the State Department's
activities in dealing with just a simple chore that they
themselves have responsibility for of redesignating the MEK and
taking them off the terrorist list, as our European allies have
already done.
So I am sorry, but you are not representing your department
in the State Department. You are here representing the State
Department, and the State Department isn't operating intensely
on this issue. Because on the face of it, they haven't--maybe
it is an intense pace for a snail. Snails may think that they
are really intensely trying to get across someplace, but they
are going to get splashed because they are a very slow
creature.
Let me ask you this: Do you know of any cases in history
where revolutionary organizations have fought against
tyrannical regimes and later became very respectable democratic
forces in society?
Ambassador Fried. In history? Certainly.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Maybe you could mention a few.
I mean, I remember Jomo Kenyatta was a terrorist. Oh, boy,
they frightened the whole world with terrorism about him. And
didn't he and his organization become a very positive
democratic force in Kenya after the British colonialists left?
Mr. Filner. Thomas Jefferson.
Ambassador Fried. There is ample evidence in history of
exactly the kind of transformation you are referring to.
Certainly. No question about that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. So we know it has happened in
history, and we know that our European allies have already
redesignated the MEK as a nonterrorist organization. So what is
it with the State Department? They don't know history? Or they
just aren't as intense as our friends in Europe?
Ambassador Fried. I know that the process is continuing.
The Secretary's decision will be made on the basis of the facts
and the law. I know that we are working hard for the
interagency process to get this done. And more than that,
because it is in process, I can't say. With your permission, I
will carry back your views and what the views of this committee
are.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I would like you to carry back another
message; and that is if, indeed, you are correct and what I am
seeing is not an accurate picture--what I am seeing is
roadblocks and not an intense commitment. But my observation--I
hope I am wrong. Please carry back the word that I will
apologize to you and to the State Department for thinking the
worst of you, for just believing that the reason why the
Secretary of State has not come through with the documents that
she has promised to come through with about Camp Ashraf, that
you know I have just been actually not giving her the benefit
of the doubt and thinking that maybe there is something wrong
here that she is trying to cover up.
But if you are able to succeed in a peaceful evacuation of
Camp Ashraf, saving the lives of these people, I will then go
back to always giving our friends at the State Department the
benefit of the doubt. You can carry that message. I don't know
what kind of incentive that is.
But let me just note, I recognize the work that you do.
Both of you have worked all your lives and have worked really
hard for our country. But I happen to believe the State
Department is an organism that quite often does not know one
end of the organism from the other, frankly; and, in this case,
it seems to be a closed loop where we ask for information and
we don't get it.
I mean, we asked--Secretary Clinton sat right where you are
sitting and told us we would have the documents about Camp
Ashraf. Now can you tell me, whereas you are representing the
State Department, why we don't have those documents yet? Or was
it a little difficult to get over to the file and take them out
and send them over to Congress because you were too busy being
intensified in something else?
Ambassador Fried. If I understand the request that you have
made, the letter which you have just received answers some of
your questions, as you said. I believe that that letter
contains an offer of a classified briefing to give you more
information in addition to the classified briefing you received
at our Embassy. So I believe that offer is on the record, and I
repeat it now.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Let me for the record note that over
the years--in the 1990s, I was on this committee. I have been
on this committee for 20 years. And I remember asking then-
Secretary of State Albright for the documents that would
pertain to American policy toward the Taliban. And at that
time, which we have learned since, the United States Government
had cut a deal with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia that we were
basically supporting the Taliban. And none of those documents
were ever made available to this committee, even though the
Secretary of State made a commitment to make those documents
available. Is it the policy of the State Department to make
commitments for providing documents to the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the United States House of Representatives but to
do so with an intent of not fulfilling that pledge?
I thought you would say that, thank you.
Okay. What I am going to do is let me colleague, Mr.
Carnahan, proceed with his questions. We have about 15 minutes
to go and then we will break for votes on the floor and come
back for the second panel. Mr. Carnahan.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all
for being here, I guess I want to get back to this
redesignation issue, Ambassador, and describe for the committee
that process, where exactly the process stands, let's start
with that.
Ambassador Fried. I appreciate and accept the chairman's
comment that I am representing the whole Department, so I take
that on board. With that said, I am not an expert in the
process but I will do my best to answer your question
straightforward as I can. The process involves interagency
input that is nearly complete, then exhaustive and
comprehensive package goes up to the Secretary for her
consideration, I believe. I believe this will happen soon. I
can't promise you a timeline and I don't believe in making
promises I can't keep, but I can tell you that the--issue of
redesignation is one that is much on the Secretary's mind, and
she knows this is coming.
Mr. Carnahan. And is it anticipated that will be done
before or after the December 31st deadline?
Ambassador Fried. I can't say. I can't say and I can't give
a promise----
Mr. Carnahan. I am not asking for that, I am just asking
for your best knowledge and information.
Ambassador Fried. Um----
Mr. Carnahan. You can't say, I understand.
Ambassador Fried. There are--because this is not--this is
based on the facts and the law and I can't--to make a promise
that I couldn't keep is something I am loath to do or commit.
Mr. Carnahan. I am not asking you that. So let's move on,
the other timeframe I want to ask you about, and maybe you can
elaborate more on is this December 31st deadline with regard to
the efforts that you describe are underway, and again, I would
appreciate those efforts. I think they are urgent and I
certainly want to be sure. I think everybody here wants to be
assured that there is not another humanitarian crisis or
massacre because of inaction or delay. So my question is with
regard to that timeframe, do you foresee us being able to
process those 3,000-plus people who have applied to get that
process completed before that deadline?
Ambassador Fried. As a practical matter, unfortunately no,
that is not. Now, yesterday--but if you want, I can elaborate
on the issue of the timeline and the problem it poses.
Mr. Carnahan. Please do, in an additional follow-up. So
within that process, is part of the effort that you are
undertaking now, discussions to extend that deadline to allow
proper time for this to happen? And if you would talk about
that as well.
Ambassador Fried. Certainly. Yesterday, the U.N. Security
Council had a session on Iraq, and a large portion of it was
devoted to exactly this issue. Afterwards, the head of the U.N.
mission in Iraq, Martin Cobler, who is leading these efforts
with the Government of Iraq had flown in from Iraq for this
session. Told the press that he believes the Government of Iraq
should extend the deadline. He also said that the leaders at
Camp Ashraf and the leaders of MEK in Paris should fully
participate--I am not quoting, but I am paraphrasing--fully
participate in his efforts, and he also reminded the world that
the responsibility for a peaceful resolution lies with the
country whose sovereign in Iraq, that is, the Iraqi Government.
We are working--the State Department is working very
closely with Ambassador Cobler. It is true as I said simply
practical and factual matter that all of the refugee processing
cannot be completed by December 31st.
Mr. Carnahan. Can you give an estimate of what would be an
amount of time when that processing could be done?
Ambassador Fried. I will do that, but I should say first
that we will be in a far, far stronger position urging the
Iraqi Government to take Cobler's advice and extend the
deadline, if, in fact, there is an active, if the MEK comes to
the table, figuratively, I mean, and helps work out
arrangements for secure relocation. Time is needed, but the
question is time for what? And it has got to be--the answer to
that ought to be time for arrangements to be made so that the
people at Camp Ashraf can be moved in conditions that are safe
rather than chaotic. And that cannot happen unless they agree
to it, because if it is forcible, it ends very badly. I am
sorry about the long answer but I wanted you to know.
Mr. Carnahan. I see my time is about up. If we are
negotiating what that time needs to be to do that, what should
that request be in terms of do we need 2 months? Six months? If
they are talking about an extension, what kind of extension are
we really needing to request?
Ambassador Fried. My colleague may have something to say,
but it would be--I suspect it would be a matter of months, but
our ability to get that extension is far stronger if there is
an active process underway.
Ms. Leaf. Sir, if I could add, since I have been working
this account a bit longer than Ambassador Fried, to underline
what he said earlier about the intensity of efforts and sort of
across the board, we have several people at our Embassy in
Baghdad who make regular visits out to the camp. And in
addition to the Ambassador's interventions and discussions over
the course of the last couple months, there has been great
intensity of discussions with the U.N. agencies about how they
might approach this so that we might best buttress their
efforts.
I wouldn't be willing of course to speak in lieu of them in
terms of what time frame they need, but we have been very
encouraged in this most recent period with the discussions that
Ambassador Cobler has had with the Government of Iraq and very
operational, practical discussions. So we are, of course,
letting him lead in terms of the mechanics of it, and we are
coming full bore in behind in a political sense, both here in
Washington in discussions at high level with Iraqi officials as
well as out there on the ground.
As Ambassador Fried said, what will be useful now to take
it to another stage is for the leadership of the camp to engage
in that vein. We took a variety of attacks on this issue over
the course of the spring and summer on the U.S. basis as
opposed to following U.N. lead. And we were stymied in a sense
in being able to move forward because the residents of the
campus existed on sort of a block approach to resettlement. And
we are simply not aware of any country that is willing to take
on that responsibility. And indeed, UNHCR's approach is on this
matter, I am paraphrasing here, is that they will not accord
group status.
Finally there was a breakthrough on this some weeks back,
and residents began forwarding individual applications, but
time is of the essence here for the residents of the camp and
leadership of the camp to engage forthrightly with Ambassador
Cobler so we can make good headway on this. Thank you.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. And Judge Poe will be
our next questioner. But just one more question from the chair,
how much aid are we providing Iraq this year and next year?
Military and development aid?
Ms. Leaf. I don't have the figures right at hand, I will
get those to you. The aid request in terms of economic support
funds that we requested this year were, I think, in the range
of $325 million. The FMS amounts are considerably higher. Iraq
has put its own money toward that as well, but I would be happy
to get you those.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And the military?
Ms. Leaf. On the FMS, it is in the range, I want to say $4
billion, but I will get you the exact figure, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Over $1 billion?
Ms. Leaf. Yes, well over, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well over $1 billion. Just know that there
with a program just here in our committee about training the
Iraqi police, which was going to be a $900 million program over
a certain number of years. And I would suggest that if we are
so intense in our efforts to get to see a solution to this,
that maybe we should suggest that they are not going to get
some of our money. Maybe they doubt our sincerity when we don't
make a threat like this. And I would now yield to Judge Poe.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As far as I know I have
seen all the classified briefings that the State Department has
shown us on the issue of the designation of the MEK. I have
read everything that has come to our attention about the
designation.
I am not convinced that the MEK ought to stay in the
Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States.
Ambassador, you alluded to another classified briefing. Is
there more information that this committee hasn't seen
regarding why the MEK is still on the designation? Is there
recent information or is there just--what are you talking about
that you will furnish another classified briefing on the issue?
Ambassador Fried. My reference to a classified briefing was
to the chairman's question about the events of last April and
the questions he raised in his letter to Secretary Clinton. It
was not--my offer was not with respect to the FTO issue.
Mr. Poe. Okay. I wanted to be clear on that because there
is no more information. As far as you know, the State
Department has furnished all that information to us either here
or in classified briefings; is that correct?
Ms. Leaf. Sir, I'd be happy to take that question back, but
they are looking at it actively now.
Mr. Poe. So there is more information?
Ms. Leaf. I'd be happy to take that back.
Mr. Poe. What does that mean?
Ms. Leaf. I'd be happy to take your question back and
respond to you in writing.
Mr. Poe. So you won't tell me here in this hearing whether
there is or is not more information that the committee hasn't
received about the designation.
Ms. Leaf. What I can tell you is that they have been
working on the package for some months as you are aware. I
can't speak to every detail and what you have been briefed on
previously, but I will be happy to take that back.
Mr. Poe. Well, as far as I know of the information you have
allowed us to see, you haven't convinced that the FTO
designation should remain. That is the key to why we are having
this problem. You--we want these residents to be safe, they
want to be able to get refugee status, and they want go to
foreign countries, and foreign countries won't take them
because the United States still labels them as FTOs, Foreign
Terrorist Organizations.
Now my question to you, Mr. Ambassador, as Malaki told us,
the reason he acts the way he does toward Camp Ashraf is
because we as the United States Government keep them on the FTO
list. That is why he wouldn't let this committee go to Camp
Ashraf, that why he wants to have them relocated because of our
designation, that is what he says, that is what he tells us. So
I would hope the State Department would reach a decision as our
European friends have that they should be removed from the FTO
list and the delay, the delay, the delay costs lives.
My question now is April 11th--April of 2011, 36 folks in
the Camp Ashraf were killed. Are we investigating that? Are we
holding anybody accountable for that? Is the United States?
Ambassador Fried. We condemned a loss of life and the
killings at Camp Ashraf. We have raised this repeatedly with
the Iraqis, and it is out of concern for further violence that
Secretary Clinton has asked me to take on this assignment.
With respect to----
Mr. Poe. Are we holding anybody accountable? That is my
question. Has anybody held--has the Malaki government, the
soldiers that came in using American equipment, has anybody to
this date been held accountable or are we just talking about
it?
Ambassador Fried. We have made very clear our deep
unhappiness at those killings.
Mr. Poe. I am sure--excuse me, I am sure that the people
whose family members are present and if they were killed in
Camp Ashraf are glad that we are deeply concerned. My question
is, has anybody in the Iraqi Government or anybody anywhere
been held accountable for the deaths of those people by our
Government? That is all my question is.
Ambassador Fried. Our Government? I am not aware of it.
Mr. Poe. We haven't.
The concern is the deadline, December 31st as people on
this committee have alluded to and has stated, that is the day
of reckoning, people at Camp Ashraf are afraid for their lives.
Does the United States, our Government, the State Department,
support relocation of the residents to another camp in Iraq?
Ambassador Fried. Yes, we do.
Mr. Poe. How do we know it is going to be safe for the
people of Camp Ashraf to be moved to another place?
Ambassador Fried. That is exactly the subject of the
detailed negotiations underway. Trust but verify is a good
principle to have.
Mr. Poe. Do you think they will, in the next 24 days, we
will be able to assure some kind of agreement with the Malaki
government that whatever happens to these folks, they will be
safe?
Ambassador Fried. I very much hope so, and it is our
intention to work with Ambassador Cobler, who has got the lead.
To support the conclusion of such an agreement, that cannot
happen if the U.N. is working only with the Government of Iraq.
The leaders at Ashraf and people at Camp Ashraf have to be part
of this process, and we encourage them to step forward and work
so that there can be a mutually-agreed arrangement rather than
something that is unilateral. Unilateral doesn't work, it can
end very badly, so we are pushing hard for exactly this, and it
is our view that if either an agreement can be reached or
enough progress can be made, that we could get the time we need
to get that kind of agreement. We, in this case, is the U.N.,
they have the lead, but we are working actively.
Mr. Poe. I see my time has expired. I will ask unanimous
consent to submit other questions to the Ambassador and Ms.
Leaf.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And I would, at this point, suggest if
there are other questions that members have will be submitted
in writing, we would hope that you would answer them forthwith.
We still have a few minutes left. It is the intention of the
chair to have Mr. Rivera and the other members of the committee
have their questions as much time as we have got. Non members
of the committee who are sitting in are welcome to join us. As
soon as the full members of the committee are done with their
questions, will be given a chance if we have time. We will
break, however, just before the next vote, meaning the votes
will happen, we have 15 minutes to get down there, we will take
10 minutes to finish up this business, give our colleagues
hopefully a chance to ask questions. And then our two witnesses
from the State Department will be dismissed and we will have a
second panel starting right after the last of the votes in this
series.
I want to take this opportunity to thank both of you. I am
very aggressive in my questioning, and I do not mean that to be
in disrespect, because I do want to you know that down deep, I
know you folks work really hard and I am very grateful and
appreciative to the work you have done in your life to make
things work overseas. This is an important issue and so we get
a little passionate about it too. Mr. Rivera you may proceed.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize for
having, we had our weekly meeting with the Speaker that we had
to attend for just a few moments. If I am repeating a question
that was asked previously, again, I apologize. But before I
left I had said the main answer I want to get from this hearing
is what is the Obama administration doing? What is this
government doing to prevent the massacre on December 31st?
Ambassador Fried. There was some discussion of this in the
back and forth, but I will repeat it. It is the critical
question, of course. We are focused now on the process of
negotiations being led by the United Nations with the
Government of Iraq for a mutually-agreed departure of the
residents from Camp Ashraf and their safe, secure humane
relocation inside Iraq in a way that will allow the UNHCR
process them.
Mr. Rivera. Have we made it clear to the Iraqi Government
or to the officials at the United Nations that such a
repatriation upon the December 31st deadline is unacceptable?
Ambassador Fried. Repatriate?
Mr. Rivera. Have we made it clear that the December 31st
deadline of what the Iraqi Government has announced that that
is unacceptable to this government?
Ambassador Fried. It is the U.N.--I was saying earlier, but
I will repeat it. Ambassador Cobler, heading the efforts for
the U.N. yesterday after a Security Council session devoted to
this issue, said that the deadline needs to be extended, but he
also said that the leaders at Camp Ashraf and the MEK leaders
in Paris need to participate in the process, they need to step
up and help come to a mutually-agreed solution.
Mr. Rivera. So the deadlines needs to be extended, that
means the deadline must be extended. That is our position, the
position of the Obama administration, that deadline must be
extended; is that correct?
Ambassador Fried. It is impossible to get everything done
before the deadline. However, our ability to get an extension
of the deadline, to convince the Iraqi Government to extend the
deadline is going to depend on whether there is a serious
process underway and that is why we call on the leaders at Camp
Ashraf to get into this process so that we have the best chance
of a peaceful outcome, which is what we all seek.
Ms. Leaf. Congressman, if I could just add something, we
had been engaged in some months earlier in efforts to work out
arrangements facilitated by the U.S. Government, the U.S.
military while it still existed in some numbers there, to do a
safe and secure relocation of the residents with assistance
from UNHCR so that UNHCR could begin processing. There were a
number of impediments to doing so, one of the which was the
insistence of the residence that UNHCR do all of its refugee
interviewing at Camp Ashraf, and UNHCR took the stance it could
not do so for a number of reasons, among which it viewed it as
a coercive environment.
So we were engaged in very intensive discussions throughout
the course of months, however, when the new head of UNAMI
Martin Cobler arrived in Iraq in early fall, he really took
this issue over and in a very activist way and began
discussions with all parties. And this is an effort, as
Ambassador Fried said, that we fully support. We have made very
clear that to the Iraqis in discussions here and out there in
Baghdad that the U.N. is the best and necessary partner on this
effort and that it is incumbent on the government to work----
Mr. Rivera. With respect to our Government, there is no
doubt from our Government that the fate of the residents of
Ashraf is dire, unless we intervene and make it clear that
their fate is our concern. Do we have any doubt about that?
Ambassador Fried. No. There is no doubt that this situation
is serious, we are worried about the possibility of violence,
and working flat out to ward it off.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you. I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We may even be serious enough to cut off
certain funds if we are still giving them billions of dollars
to people who won't commit to us if they are not going to
murder unarmed people in a refugee camp.
Mr. Turner, do you have some questions?
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A question for
Ambassador Fried, what, in your opinion, is the biggest
obstacle to the State Department listing the--delisting MEK as
a terrorist organization.
Ambassador Fried. It is not a question of obstacles, it is
a question of a review of the facts and the law in this case.
And that decision will be made by the Secretary, the memo is in
preparation, will be a long package of documents. It will be
sent to her, she will have to make that decision, that is all I
can say at this time, sir.
Mr. Turner. When did the EU delist this organization, do
you recall?
Ambassador Fried. I would have to get----
Mr. Turner. It has been quite awhile.
Ambassador Fried. Over a year, I believe.
Mr. Turner. Are there any different facts that----
Ambassador Fried. We have our own data and we have own
legal standards. We are, of course, aware of what the EU has
done, and it is obviously timely to review that. The Clinton
administration, the Bush administration decided this one way,
and this administration is looking at the issue now.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, I yield back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. And Mr. Filner.
Mr. Filner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just briefly if I may,
I know we have to adjourn. The absurdity of the listing of the
MEK as a terrorist organization is shown by your testimony. On
the one hand, we are treating them as terrorists. Then you are
saying they have to engage and sit at the table, and they have
to take a role. You are treating them in a way that says oh,
yeah, there are legitimate parties here. If they are legitimate
parties, delist them. I don't know why you think you can have
it both ways, you are calling someone a terrorist and saying
please be engaged in this process, you terrorists, we don't
trust you at the table, because you may take out a gun and
shoot us, but please sit down. That is absurd. The whole thing
of--you talk about urgency, all your stuff is on process, you
can't promise time lines. I mean, you are presently now, if I
understand, your official position is envoy about the closing
of Guantanamo? Is that your title?
Ambassador Fried. Special envoy for closure of Guantanamo,
yes, sir.
Mr. Filner. Oh, good. I hope we don't move as slow as we
did on that one in this case. Look you 25 days, we haven't
closed it, right?
Ambassador Fried. We can get into the reasons.
Mr. Filner. We haven't closed it, have we?
Ambassador Fried. No.
Mr. Filner. Okay. So 2 years from now, I hope you say well,
we were trying to deal with Ashraf, but they were complexities
there. You have 25 days. I don't hear from you the assurance
that many of these people would like to hear, because they have
relatives there, and they have close friends there, that
somehow the United States is going to take action that does not
depend on all these other complexities. If you just recommended
today, half dozen troops stay there at Camp Ashraf or recommend
today that the Security Council take this action or recommend
today that the U.N. take some specific action, you are not
doing that. You keep talking about the complexities and the
timelines and you can't comment on this and there's this and
that. Give us some assurance that what you just said, you think
the situation is dire. I don't see any evidence that you think
the situation is dire. It takes months for us to get a letter
from the Secretary on these issues. We tried to visit Camp
Ashraf, they won't let us. How do we know the situation is
dire?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Give the Ambassador a chance to answer the
question.
Mr. Filner. I yield back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And hopefully we will give Ms. Jackson Lee
a chance to ask a question. Mr. Ambassador, would you like to
answer that?
Ambassador Fried. It is hard to know where to begin, but we
do regard the situation as serious, and the word ``dire'' is
appropriate.
Mr. Filner. Then do something today which shows that. What
can you tell us today that the United States is going to do to
protect those people?
Mr. Rohrabacher. If you want him to answer your question.
Mr. Filner. He goes on with bureaucratic baloney.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We got a couple of minutes. Mr.
Ambassador, you have 15 seconds, we are going to give Jackson
Lee a minute and then we have run off and vote.
Ambassador Fried. The best way to resolve this peacefully
is to work with the U.N. to get a negotiated solution quickly
so that the people there can leave the camp in safety and
security, that is what we are aiming at, and we are indeed
working intensely every single day.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay, Ms. Jackson Lee, did you have a
question?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I have to take a second to
thank you and Mr. Carnahan. This is a miracle to believe that
we have a full hearing on Camp Ashraf is absolutely a miracle
and a tribute to the Iranian Americans that are sitting in this
room. But let me say on April 8th, the Iraqi arm and police
under the command of Mr. Malaki attacked Camp Ashraf with
ammunition and weapons, I believe, from the United States. At
least 34 people were killed and 8 women were killed. At the end
of this month, Mr. Malaki determines to close this. Ambassador
Fried, and to Ms. Leaf I thank you for your service, I have
this question for you immediately. Just what is the United
States intending to do? I want you to cut off funds from
Malaki, I want Malaki, as he comes, I appreciate the
sovereignty and I appreciate the dignity of his office, but I
believe he should not have an oval office meeting with the
President until he agrees before he walks into that oval office
that he will not murder, kill and maim the people of Camp
Ashraf. He does not deserve a seat with our President if he is
not going to agree before that meeting.
What are you prepared to do to stop the bloodshed? Are our
soldiers going to be there? Are you going to insist that if
there is an extension? What are you intending to do, if I may
have that answer?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Ms. Jackson Lee asked a really important
question. Will you take that message back and give us an
answer, will this President meet with Prime Minister Maliki
even if he hasn't made an agreement on this issue, come to an
understanding?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Can I just add, will you have soldiers
there, are you going to absolutely stop them from closing it?
Ambassador Fried. After many years and the expense of blood
and treasure, our soldiers are leaving Iraq. We are working
flat out to support arrangements for the safe and secure humane
relocation of the residents of Camp Ashraf. We are doing so on
an urgent basis, very mindful of the calendar and the ticking
clock. That is where our efforts are focused.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Could you go to address Ms. Jackson Lee's
original question, is the President of the United States going
to be meeting with Prime Minister Maliki, even if he has not
reached an understanding on this issue and if you do not know
the answer, will you take that to the State Department and let
them know how concerned we are about it?
Ambassador Fried. First, I will certainly take back the
concern of this committee, absolutely, sir. And secondly, I
will say that in my judgment, the best way to convey the
gravity of the situation and the concerns of this committee is
to have that meeting and go forward with it.
Mr. Rohrabacher. With that said, this hearing will be
adjourned in one moment when I just leave the thought, actions
speak louder than words. You are talking to somebody, whose
going to understand that that is weakness, rather than if you
don't talk to him.
Ms. Jackson Lee. It is a human rights issue, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee, this part of
the hearing is in recess until after the next vote. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Rohrabacher. We will assume that our friends on the
other side of the aisle think it is okay for us to proceed and
talk to Ranking Member Carnahan. Prior to the break he said he
was inundated with some things, so I am sure he will be here.
So this hearing will come to order again.
For our second panel we have with us three fine witnesses,
and I think the first panel certainly gave us a lot of things
to think about, and I think we have a now shed light on a very
serious issue. And just doing that hopefully will help us find
a solution before another tragedy occurs.
Our first witness is Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield who has
a long, long history of being active professionally and helping
the United States in its diplomatic efforts. Assistant
Secretary of State, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Assistant Secretary State Political Military Affairs you name
it, it is that long. We are very happy to have you. And today
he is chairman of the Henry Stimpson Center here in Washington,
DC.
We have Wes Martin who is a retired Army Colonel. In combat
he served as a senior antiterrorism force protection officer
for all coalition forces in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom
and has a long history in the area of National defense. We also
have with us one of those prose from the academics from the
think tanks here in Washington, Elizabeth Ferris from the
Brookings Institution.
We welcome all of you and what we would--perhaps, move
forward if you could summarize your testimony in 5 minutes,
that would be great then we will go on for some dialogue and
hopefully some other members will be joining us, but also, if
members are not joining us you should be aware that they are
available. We hope you are available for questions that we
could send you in writing that you could answer back in
writing. So Ambassador Bloomfield, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, JR.,
CHAIRMAN, HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER
Ambassador Bloomfield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, good
afternoon. I have prepared a statement and would ask it be
entered for the record.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So ordered.
Ambassador Bloomfield. I would be pleased to discuss it in
response to your questions. By way of introduction, I will make
three brief points. I will start with the last point I
discussed in my prepared statement. You will be aware that many
retired military leaders have publicly called for the U.S.
Government to ensure that the residents of Camp Ashraf are
unharmed as U.N. agencies try to process them for onward
disposition. The motives of these senior leaders have been
publicly questioned.
Having worked as a civilian in the Pentagon, White House
the State Department on defense and security issues for many
years, I know most of these officers, and believe the criticism
of them to be misguided. Their sole concern is the honor of the
U.S. military, which extended a promise of protection to the
residents of Camp Ashraf 8 years ago. That promise has twice
been violated by Iraq's military forces, and a third attack
could occur by the end of this month.
U.S. laws governing arms transfers and security assistance,
the Arms Expert Control Act and the Leahy Law enforcing human
rights standards, would appear to have been violated and must
be upheld. Above all, our military forces, who, along with
their families, have paid such a high price for their service
in Iraq must be permitted to exit Iraq with honor. That is the
bottom line American interest at stake in the Camp Ashraf
situation. And if some American journalists have been slow to
grasp it, I have no doubt that Iran's leaders see a strategic
opportunity here to harm our reputation and credibility as a
superpower at a time when the future the Middle East is being
contested.
Second, you will find in my prepared remarks reference to
an independent assessment I wrote in August which will, I hope,
be part of the electronic record of this hearing. For much of
this year, I have been critically examining the factual record
that commonly attaches to the Mujahedin-e Khalq, the entity
listed since 1997 as a Foreign Terrorist Organization with
which the residents of are Camp Ashraf are affiliated.
In the interest of time, I will leave it to the members to
pursue any questions from my research, which relies on the most
credible sources I could find and calls into question many of
the most damaging allegations commonly made against the MEK. I
offer the members my prepared testimony as an alternative
narrative of recent history that has major implications for
U.S. policy. And I respectfully recommend that the Congress
formally seek a cleared intelligence community assessment of my
findings to confirm or credibly rebut them item by item with
hard facts, and to report back to Congress.
Why is this important? And this is my final point. I am
persuaded that three decades of history involving the MEK which
Americans have viewed exclusively through the specialized prism
of terrorism is, in fact, a deadly war between two groups over
political rights in Iran. Americans have had little interest in
this story mainly because we are told that these people were
the ones responsible for killing American officers and
contractors in Tehran in the 1970s. If I still thought these
were the people who killed Americans, I probably would not have
looked much further myself. But my research indicates that the
Americans were killed by a different group than the MEK of
Massoud and Maryam Rajavi.
So I have pursued this story further, and what I see is a
contest for Iran's future that Ayatollah Khomeini won in 1981
by jailing and executing tens of thousands of people who
opposed dictatorship. The European court cases dismissing
terrorism charges against the MEK did not say that the MEK had
repented and ceased its terrorist behavior. They said that the
MEK's violent actions over two decades from 1981 to 2001, all
aimed at the regime in Tehran, had never been terrorism.
What do we miss when we look at the actions of only one
party in a conflict? Obviously, the other side's actions.
Whether or not the MEK and its political affiliate have any
prospect of being a player in Iran's future, and you won't find
a single Washington expert who thinks they do, it is
indisputable that for three decades, the regime in Tehran has
treated them as a first-order threat to its own legitimacy and
survival in power. I am very concerned that the American people
are not informed about Iran's worldwide intelligence
activities, deceptive information operations, and leveraging of
hostages, trade opportunities, and nuclear talks in an effort
to make Western governments accomplices in its war against
these exiled regime opponents.
The residents of Camp Ashraf are in danger today, but so is
American influence in the Middle East if we do not connect the
dots, widen our aperture, and better understand Iran's actions
and strategic political objectives on all fronts. I thank you,
sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bloomfield follows:]
----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Now we will see if someone from Academe
can actually keep within the same time frame of 5 minutes that
our diplomat did.
STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH FERRIS, PH.D., CO-DIRECTOR, BROOKINGS-
LSE PROJECT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
Ms. Ferris. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, you may proceed.
Ms. Ferris. Let me make it clear at the outset, that I am
speaking from my perspective of having 25 years of experience
in very difficult humanitarian situations. And also as an
independent academic researcher. I have never been to Camp
Ashraf, I don't have expertise in judging whether or not it
should be designated as a terrorist organization, but based on
very difficult situations in other parts of the world and other
times, I would like to suggest that finding solutions should be
the main focus. And what we have learned from some of these
other situations are, there is a role for international
standards and international processes. You have to look and see
what is in the interest of the different stakeholders and come
up with a solution that responds to those interests.
For example, we look back at Vietnam and the huge
Vietnamese refugee situation and see it as having been a
successful thing. But at the time, there were agonizing choices
and compromises that were made. When we look at the
international principles that are relevant, first of all, the
fundamental right to life, security of the person, and basic
human dignity. Iraq must be held accountable for the safety of
people in Camp Ashraf, that is a sine qua non, it has to be the
basis for all policy.
Another basic international principle is that people must
not be sent back to situations where their lives are in
jeopardy that applies whether or not countries have signed on
to the refugee convention which Iraq has not, but that has
become customary international law. That has to be the bedrock,
both of U.S. policy and of finding a solution.
Now if you look at solutions for refugee situations and
here we know the residents of Camp Ashraf have not yet been
formally determined to be refugees, but there are three
solutions: People can go back voluntarily, which is, in most
cases, the best solution but doesn't seem particularly
appropriate here, unless there are some cases of people who do
want to return.
A second is local integration, to be allowed to stay in
their country of refuge with full benefits, rights, and most of
all, in safety and security. Again, Iraq has made it very clear
that this is not an option for the residents and a long term of
Camp Ashraf.
The third solution, resettlement in a third country, has
historically been used for only a small percentage of the
world's refugee, but it was designed to respond exactly to
cases such as this one, where people can be supported to start
new lives elsewhere in a way that respects their safety and
also other basic human needs.
I think that this resettlement in a third country is the
best option probably for most of the residents of Camp Ashraf.
So if you work backwards from that and say, ``What will it take
to get there?'' First of all, this question of the impossible
deadline we have heard of the closure of Camp Ashraf by
December 31st of this year that deadline needs to be extended,
I would suggest for at least for 6 months, to enable the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to put into place the
procedures and standards to determine whether or not people
individually meet the criteria of refugee status. There are
some things that follow from that in terms of the way those
determinations are made.
Then the process needs to begin, although it has already
begun, of looking for countries which will accept and receive
the residents of Camp Ashraf who have been determined to be
refugee. And here the role of the U.S. Government is critical,
when you yourself said in the earlier panel, Mr. Chairman, some
of the difficulties when the U.S. cannot resettle people
because of terrorist designation.
But, you know, the U.S. Government has come up with very
creative ways of working around legislative prohibitions and
standards and procedures in other cases, whether it is coming
up with different places for processing or declaring exceptions
or paroling people in, which is not a very good solution, but
it is one that perhaps should be considered.
At the same time, the U.N. and others should explore
possibilities for resettling people in other countries, in
Europe and Australia and some of the nontraditional
resettlement countries such as Brazil, which might be willing
to take some. But it is all linked. Those governments are
saying, well, if the U.S. Government isn't going to accept
people for resettlement, why should we? I understand that
several European governments have made decisions to accept some
residents for resettlement, but they need to say so publicly
because if Iraq believes the international community is serious
about resettling people elsewhere, I think that it will have
more incentive to cooperate not to close the camp and to make
it possible for people to be processed and resettled
afterwards. Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Perfect timing.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ferris follows:]
----------
Mr. Rohrabacher.Colonel Martin.
STATEMENT OF COLONEL WES MARTIN, USA (RETIRED), (FORMER BASE
COMMANDER OF CAMP ASHRAF)
Colonel Martin. Sir, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this
opportunity to address the joint committees. We have a saying
in combat, if you find yourself in a fair fight, you didn't
come prepared. To my left is Lieutenant Colonel Julie Norman
who was a joint interagency task force commander at Camp Ashraf
as well, and worked closely with the Mujahedin.
The attacks that we have seen numerous times on the video
is included in a very extensive packet I have provided to the
people, and I wish to point out, one is Sabbah, she was born in
1981 in an Iranian prison. And the other one is Majad born in
1961, mechanical engineer, both educated in Germany. Having
served in Camp Ashraf and worked with many people like Sabbah
and Majad, I can honestly say the residents of Camp Ashraf are
not terrorists. They are real people with names, faces, lives,
and they once had protected person status, and those that had
protected person status was revoked and those lives have been
extinguished. The State Department calls these people
terrorists.
Also in my packet, many contracts that we worked out with
the residents of Camp Ashraf and the leadership to include
bringing us water. These people also, whenever I left the
perimeter, as Julie can tell, I did it continually, I had
members of Camp Ashraf at my side. They were not armed, but I
was proud to have them there. And when I look at those videos,
I see something in addition. When I see those people rushing to
rescue their friends, I know if I or the soldiers with me had
been shot up, they would equally be rushing to our rescue,
those are not terrorists, those were allies.
Ironically, the State Department does not put Mahdi Army on
its terrorist list, it doesn't put the Qods force. I have lost
people to the Mahdi army, I have lost two. We have lost
hundreds of the United States forces to Moqtada Sadr's Mahdi
army, and Qod's force recently that was planning the Saudi
Ambassador attack. Our State Department's response then was we
need to see how high up the leadership this plot went. The
antiterrorism for Iraq, I can assure everyone, it went all the
way to Khameini.
And the other thing State Department said is well, we
should have increased diplomatic isolation. Louis Freeh and I
were trying to figure that out. He said, what is that? To me it
sounds like someone in State Department spent a lot of time in
college watching Animal House, and we want to put Iran on
double secret probation. The State Department claims to have
intel. I have gone over the intel and I have provided them the
information from Mr. Zebari, the foreign minister, Kurd, they
said they didn't attack us. I gave it to the State Department 6
months later, it came out they attacked the Kurds. And I went
back, What are you doing? Oh, well, we don't talk to the people
who put that out. The State Department is very stovepipe in
what they are doing. This is the organization that paid Chalabi
$33 million for a bunch of false information that we used to
send our soldiers to war. 4,500 warriors later and tens of
thousands of innocent Iraqis later, we know now Chalabi was
lying the whole time. Fairness to the State Department and
Defense Intelligence Agency, serving Donald Rumsfeld also
provided a lot of misinformation.
So it is not just the State Department. But I do submit the
State Department employees today are serving Secretary Clinton
no better than they were serving Colin Powell.
As we heard earlier today, State Department wants to go all
the way back to the founding of the PMOI. Well, why don't we go
back to 1953 when a very popular Iranian Government was
overthrown by our own CIA and a very brutal dictator was put in
its place? The State Department never wants to do that, nor do
detractors, they also claim it is a Marxist-Leninist
organization. It was founded on equality between those led and
those being led. Clerics don't have sole authority on the
congregations, nor do they have sole authority to interpret the
Koran. People call that Marx and Lenin? I call that Jefferson
and Madison.
Then we have the rumors, we heard a lot of them, and I hope
today I will be able to address of lot of those rumors and take
them apart one by one. I used to take them apart when I was
base commander at Camp Ashraf, as did Julie Norman.
We talked about review the FTO status, the fact and the
law. Well, the fact and the law, they are wrongfully placed on
that list, they are only foreign, they don't know threat
against the United States, they are on my flank. And also, they
don't have the means anymore. So if we talk about the fact and
the law, they need to be removed. And then I hope we have a
chance to talk about this putting them in a consolidated
location because I have even more information, I think, than
the State Department. Sir, I thank you.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Martin follows:]
----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, whereas I am the only
one left on the panel, I will proceed and take whatever time I
will consume. Let me get this straight. Mr. Ambassador, the
massacre that has already taken place until that is dealt with
legally, and the people who committed that murder are brought
to justice, or the role of the government is defined, that you
are suggesting that it is then illegal under current law for us
to sell arms to Iraq? Is that----
Ambassador Bloomfield. May I just clarify.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes.
Ambassador Bloomfield. For 4 years I had the delegated
responsibility for arms transfers as Assistant Secretary of
State for Political Military Affairs. Under section 3 of the
Arms Export Control Act, every recipient of U.S. defense
equipment is required to utilize that equipment only for the
purposes that it was transferred. Whenever there is a question
of not using the equipment in accordance with the terms of
transfer, the State Department is usually required to file a
section 3 report to the Congress that explains the
circumstances that have called into question the use of the
equipment, and the law does point to a cutoff of arms in the
extreme case of an egregious misuse of weapons. That is a very
rare occurrence.
I saw it once, I think in 1982, when Secretary Weinberger
found a casing of cluster munitions on a pile of--well, it
appeared in The New York Times on a pile of rubble in Beirut,
and he terminated weapons to Israel until such time as they
worked it out with the Americans.
The other law that I mentioned----
Mr. Rohrabacher. So we found a casing, a military item that
was not sold to Israel in order to be involved with Lebanon or
to be utilized in that fashion. And we immediately cut off
aid----
Ambassador Bloomfield. President Reagan cut it off.
Mr. Rohrabacher [continuing]. Cut off aid to Israel.
However, we now have a video of our arms shooting down
innocent women and children, and Iraqi army officers engaged in
aiming their rifles and shooting the guns themselves, that we
don't retaliate at all against that.
Ambassador Bloomfield. It is open-ended. The State
Department is not always the fastest agency to answer the mail.
And section 3 reports have been known to take months to
deliver. I do not know the status of whether a section 3 AECA
report has been required or is being prepared for the Congress.
There is a second law implicated here, too. Senator Leahy
had passed a human rights law I think about 10 years ago which
applies in two different legislative vehicles, one to Defense
Department and one to State Department security assistance. In
the event of a possible gross violation of human rights by an
armed force which is trained and equipped by the United States,
there is supposed to be an investigation aided by the U.S.
Embassy on the scene, reporting back to the State Department
where they make a judgment as to whether gross human rights
violations have occurred. The people who were specifically
involved must never be allowed to receive U.S. training ever
again.
I wrote the guidance that went to Embassies worldwide for
the Leahy law in the State Department, along with Lorne Craner
who was the DRL Assistant Secretary.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Now the double standard that you are
talking about is just a bit overwhelming. And Colonel Martin
mentioned the Mahdi Army. And of course we understand that the
army Sadr has--do we call him the Ayatollah? What do we call
this man?
Colonel Martin. Sir, he is working on his Ayatollah status,
but--I am serious--but he has not achieved Ayatollah yet.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Well, we understand that he
personally murdered a fellow cleric. We know that. And we also
know that his armed militias have killed a significant number
of Americans, not to mention the large number of fellow Iraqis.
And yet he is not on the terrorist list. Is that right,
Colonel?
Colonel Martin. Sir, he is not on the terrorist list.
Neither is the Mahdi Army.
Mr. Rohrabacher. But those folks at Camp Ashraf who are
unarmed, they are on the terrorist list?
Colonel Martin. That is correct. Those people who put
themselves between my troops in danger and I had to haul them
back. We have the guns. We will engage. They wanted to be
between us and the people trying to kill us. They are the ones
being called terrorists. Muqtada is not being called a
terrorist. Hakim's Badr Corps is not being called a terrorist.
And they were out there killing.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, Ambassador Bloomfield made it a
point to suggest that he had studied the background of the MEK
and that he believed that even the MEK of 30 years ago was
not--and it has been adjudicated by whom they were not
terrorists even to that point?
Ambassador Bloomfield. There is a 140-page judgment in the
British court system that goes into great detail. There was a
ruling by the counterterrorism magistrate in France this past
April. They both consistently judge that terrorism is not the
characterization for the activity that has been----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yeah. Let me note that we get into a lot
of trouble in the United States with the word ``terrorist''
because we have such incredible double standards. And I
personally believe that we need to have a definition of
terrorism and stick to it. Even when it hurts our friends, we
need to stick to it.
In this case, we have a double standard in order to hurt
people who are opposed to the mullah dictatorship, which is our
worst enemies, and a double standard so that they are labeled
terrorists while the man who--and whose army had killed a bunch
of Americans and is allied with the country that wants to
destroy stability and freedom in that region, he is not on the
terrorist list. And the double standard is just beyond
imagination.
Colonel.
Colonel Martin. Sir, it gets even worse. Just last week
Maliki--and it came out in the news media in Iraq, where my
sources are providing me the information. I am getting it from
the streets of Iraq. Maliki has informed Muqtada that he will
receive 1,500 officer positions, 750 each in the Department of
Defense and the Department of Interior, of which Maliki is
still the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Interior. So
he controls the police, he controls the military, and also he
has eight brigades directly assigned to him, and those brigades
are totally infiltrated by Muqtada.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, just remember that our State
Department is very intense about this, trying to find a
solution. And, as I said, snails can be very intense, but they
are very slow or maybe they are not going to get the job done.
Let me go back to the definition of terrorism. And I
believe that what we have to do is to define terrorism as a
group of people who are willing to commit acts of violence
against civilian populations in order to terrorize them in
order to achieve a political goal. And there are countries that
are good countries that have sometimes sunk to the level of
terrorism and there are other countries that, of course, just
commit acts of terrorism and that is their modus operandi. Did
you want to say something about that?
Ambassador Bloomfield. If I may, Mr. Chairman.
There is the law of war and the theory of the law of war.
Michael Walzer is a great theorist of the law of war, and
others have written about proportionality for many, many years,
which is to say that once you have beaten the other side, you
don't need to use excessive force. If it is enough to win, you
have won. So even among conventional military forces,
professional forces, there is doctrine which embraces a
principle that you do not use force beyond sort of civilized
limits. And terrorism breaches that egregiously by----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, the civilized position is that if
you have someone who is unarmed who is a civilian, acts of
violence committed against those who work for a tyrannical
regime should not be considered acts of terrorism by the
definition that I proposed. And I think we need to make that a
definition. That is the one I suggest.
If, indeed, the MEK during the time of the Shah attacks
supporters, people who are in the government of the Shah of
Iran, they were attacking a nondemocratic government and power,
and that is not necessarily--in fact, I don't think it is
terrorism. Attacking the troops of a dictatorship is certainly
not terrorism. And, frankly, I believe even attacking the
military of another country should not be called terrorism, and
we have done that in the United States numerous times. I don't
care if they are planting to bomb in a club or whatever.
But if they are killing--you put military personnel,
whether they are U.S. or whether they are people from a
dictatorship, that is an attack, that is an act of war, and it
is not necessarily an act of terrorism.
So even if the MEK did, in another lifetime with people who
were never involved with the current people who are in the MEK,
commit acts of violence that targeted the Shah's government,
that is not necessarily terrorism; and if some American
military personnel were killed, as long as they weren't
American civilians, that would be an act of war against us but
not an act of terrorism.
Ambassador Bloomfield. If I could just say, I would hope
you would agree with me, nothing that you are saying and
nothing that we would say is to condone or encourage violent
tactics as a way of achieving something.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Correct.
Ambassador Bloomfield. Conflict resolution runs deep in
American history. And the attempt is always made by policy, if
it is well done, to try to resolve issues through democratic
means, through peaceful means, through negotiation, if
possible, so that even going back to the Founding Fathers and
Abraham Lincoln and others who talked about tyranny, violence
is a last resort.
So when the United States is looking at the facts and
trying to judge people, what is the character of this group,
when I read what people were saying about the MEK when I first
focused on it earlier this year and then began to examine the
reality, I could not reconcile the two; and that is what got me
into the issue. Why is there a gap between what the media
commonly says and even what the State Department terrorism
reports say, and what the facts seem to point to, why the gap?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me ask you about that, Mr. Ambassador.
We had a witness here from the State Department, and his main
testimony, a major part of it, was a history of the MEK. And
where did you find areas of disagreement with that history?
Ambassador Bloomfield. I don't want to focus solely on
Ambassador Fried, who is a colleague and someone I have
admired. He is trying very hard to----
Mr. Rohrabacher. We know we can disagree with someone and
still respect them.
Ambassador Bloomfield. I think that the position he was
repeating was consistent with his Department's position. And I
think the box that the State Department stands in is the one
that says, I am not looking at the other side of the conflict.
I am just looking at acts of violence by one group. Here is
what they did on that date. Here is what they did on this date.
Nobody is disputing that armed resistance was part of the
MEK's history. The question is, how did it start? What was
their purpose? And this business of being an unregenerately
negative Marxist, strange cult, human rights-abusing group, you
picture a group of people whose minds you could never
understand, sitting in a spider hole with a knife in their
teeth.
The history of this group, I am persuaded, is very much an
intellectual history of students, students who, if you are as
old as I am and studied political development and all the
revolutions that have occurred in the past century, you know
that when the colonial era started to end, countries were
nationalizing oil. And Iran had a group of students that wanted
to have their own autonomy, that didn't want to be dependent on
foreign powers. Iran had a serious issue with Russia going back
many years. And, of course, the coup against Mossadegh, who was
a nationalist, restored the Shah to power. These were
intellectuals.
And you can read the papers. It is on the record of this
hearing. You can click on all the links and you will see that
in 1980 Massoud Rajavi had thousands of students on the lawn at
Sharif University listening to him quote all the political
philosophers who were probably on the side of postcolonial
liberation.
So we can have a debate over whether we have the identical
politics or not. But that was the genesis of the group. They
believed in something. They didn't believe in violence. They
believed in rights-based democracy.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Of course, the irony of what you are
saying is that Mossadegh--the vehicle used by those who
overthrew Mossadegh was the--cutting a deal with the same
mullahs that later on overthrew the Shah. And it was the
continuing payoffs from the CIA to those mullahs that kept the
Shah in power as long as it did.
Was that an inaccurate description?
Ambassador Bloomfield. If you read the legendary history of
John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles in those Cold War years,
the CIA took a lot of actions for reasons of state. I am not
here to judge the people in power at that time. I have great
respect for American public servants.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That is a good way of not confirming what
I just said.
Ambassador Bloomfield. But what I am saying is that today
we are making judgments as well, and we have to make judgments
for reasons of state. And a lot of the things we are talking
about here have to do with the reputation and honor of the
United States.
My whole focus on this issue is not to advocate one
position. You have been elected to office. I am going to let
you decide. But I am trying to set the information table
straight. I believe that we are only getting part of the story.
And if all I do is to give people a wider aperture and a better
appreciation of what really happened here, I will be very
content to let elected leaders in both branches on both sides
of the aisle make the decision.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, I am happy you are talking about
elected leaders. Because I don't know anybody who elected those
folks over at the State Department or the CIA. And I did read
Eisenhower's memoirs--and I would recommend them--about the
overthrow of Mossadegh. And it was just a very short
description and it was a fascinating description of what went
on.
What we have got here is a situation that is coming to a
head very quickly. And I wanted to know what you folks thought
of the great suggestion--I might add that it was fascinating
that Sheila Jackson Lee, who is not a member of this committee,
who wanted to come in and make a statement and we were just
running out of time, but I wanted to give her at least some
time to get something in. And right there at the end, I think
that was very profound, the point she made, and I wonder what
you thought of that, is that--the suggestion that the President
not meet with Maliki until he has agreed to at least extend the
deadline on Camp Ashraf? What are all three of your opinions of
that suggestion?
Go right ahead, Colonel.
Colonel Martin. Sir, first off, it is an outstanding
suggestion.
Maliki has been getting a free ride from our country. In
2002, he was a street vendor in Damascus. Now, 3 years later,
he was the Prime Minister. That man has made billions off the
United States, and it pains me to see how much money this guy
is getting.
Joe Biden went over there and came back and said, ``Oh, we
overestimate the Iranian influence in Iraq. No, we don't
overestimate. We underestimate. And the people in Iraq on the
streets can't believe it.''
Somewhere Maliki has to be made to understand that we are
not taken in by his hype, and we are getting a solid
understanding of what is really going on inside that country.
He has been working with Ahmadinejad, and his national security
adviser Rubaie has been feeding Iran all kinds of information
because I was getting it from the MEK what was being fed. And
some of it was being fed to him by a State Department
representative that was a continual source of embarrassment.
So what Sheila Jackson Lee had said I greatly think is a
good idea because somewhere we need to bring this guy under
control. And I also think telling Iraq, you are not getting all
this money because we are tired of making your people in
positions of power very wealthy at the expense of the Iraqi
people. Except Kurdistan, they are living in poverty.
Sir, I yield.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Dr. Ferris.
Ms. Ferris. I was very intrigued when she asked that
question. It seemed a very direct response to a very difficult
situation.
I think the U.S. has a lot of diplomatic economic tools
that can be used to make it clear that there are certain
limits. The deadline must be extended for closing the camp,
solutions must be found, and we should use every means we--I
didn't know about this section 3. But to me that sounds also
like something we should pursue in terms of the way that the
arms that we have supplied have been used.
Ambassador Bloomfield. I do not want to sort of tear down
the edifice that 8 years of military invention tried to build.
I want Iraq to come out stable. I want it to come out a good
neighbor to all. These negative tendencies that are being
talked about I want to see minimized. I want it to be a country
that is governed by the rule of law, that gives rights to all
the communities. And, frankly, it is not for me to micromanage
how the administration does these things.
I recall another group of Iranians that were in imminent
threat of loss of life. An earthquake had just happened in Bam,
inside Iran. Nobody even called Washington. The Central Command
air component commander just sent in C-130s with blankets and
water and electricity and whatnot. We saved some lives.
So no one can tell me that we don't have the logistical
ability to do all sorts of things or the diplomatic ability to
find a spot outside of the geography of Iraq where the whole
shooting match--sorry for that Freudian slip--could be moved so
that the U.N. can do its work and onward disposition can be
processed.
I recall a cabinet-level person, who I won't name, in the
Bush administration when I was doing sensitive negotiations
around the world who said, I am not interested in inputs. You
know, don't tell me all the things you are doing. All we care
about is the output. Did you get it done?
And right now the only thing that matters is, will the
3,400 lives at Camp Ashraf be unharmed as this U.N. mission is
carried out? I don't know how long it will take. I don't know
where it will occur. I don't know who will have to exert
themselves to make it come about or how this conversation that
seems to be in the air that can't take place with all the
parties will finally be accomplished. It is not my task. But I
am an optimist, and I am a believer that you can do amazing
things if you are the United States if you want them done. It
just has to be taken up at high levels.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, Mr. Ambassador, let me suggest that
you are a very knowledgeable person, and I certainly appreciate
the depth of information that you have and made available to
us. It has helped my understanding.
But let me just suggest that, unless you are willing to
make decisions, hold people accountable, rather than just
leaving that to others, nothing is going to happen. I mean, we
are going to lose. And the bottom line is, unless right at this
moment we start holding people accountable and saying--and that
is why I have repeated over and over again, if there is another
massacre, the people at our State Department, if they have not
removed this designation as a terrorist organization, they are
partly responsible, if not culpable, if not some type of an
accomplice in committing this murder.
And, frankly, you are right. Things will get settled. But
they are only going to be settled when those of us are willing
to stand up and basically hold specific individuals accountable
and kick them out if they do the wrong thing and not--just let
these people who have been making these kinds of decisions
continue in power.
That is the reason you have oversight hearings in Congress,
is to find out who is accountable and to hold them accountable,
ask for explanations, give people a chance to give their side
but come to a determination and figure out it is not just an
idea that is the problem but there is a person over here, too,
who is attached to that idea.
And, right now, we are coming into this deadline. And the
Europeans have been able to look at the truths that you have
found through your research and have managed to get themselves
to get the MEK off the terrorist list because they now
understand that that designation, if it ever was justified, is
not justified.
But if we don't take it off and these people get massacred,
it is those people in our establishment who have not done what
the Europeans were able to do who are partly responsible for
the death of innocent people. So that is what this is all about
today. And it is about finding out just exactly what the
details are but also making sure that we know that, if
something doesn't happen, these guys at the State Department
are going to be held accountable for it.
You can answer that.
Ambassador Bloomfield. If I could just say, Mr. Chairman,
it seems to me that we have people in the room who have friends
and relatives inside the camp. They are human beings. Many of
them are educated human beings. They have a lifestyle which
would surprise a lot of people. They are very worldly in many
cases.
This is a train wreck that hasn't happened yet. And not
only is it imperative that it not happen, but I believe our
reputation in Europe--you mentioned the Europeans. They are
watching this very closely. And I am not here to say I know the
one thing that will fix the whole problem. I know you are very
focused on the listing issue. I have tried to be extremely
careful to simply deal with the facts and to demand that the
facts be----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Oh, I don't think there is one thing that
is going to solve this, even getting them off the terrorist
list, but that will be a big step forward.
Ambassador Bloomfield. I have not settled on final
judgments, and I haven't advocated specific solutions. But I
will put one idea forward. You did hear Ambassador Fried talk
about trying to get the people at Camp Ashraf to participate
more constructively, however he put it. And if they would only
do their part, as it were, this could all be agreed, and we
could figure out what to do next.
I simply want to say that because the people at Camp Ashraf
are not just 3,400 individuals, they are on the terrorism list,
so the United States Government considers them part of a larger
organization which has leadership in France. If it is too hard
for the State Department officially to have a conversation with
the people in France who could say yes or no--and I have two
memos that they wrote basically offering all sorts of options
to solve this problem, so I am mystified that the details are
so hard--my point is, maybe if there is an outside party who
could put a videoconference together and get Paris, Ashraf,
State Department, CENTCOM, Iraq, and the U.N.--let's have the
conversation. Let's stop the train wreck before it happens. I
am an optimist. I believe it is possible.
Mr. Rohrabacher. The people sitting on this side of the
table can't make that happen. I mean, we can't. We are
legislators, and we are not in the executive branch. What you
just said could very easily happen if anybody with authority in
the State Department would have determined that a long time
ago. That should have been determined a long time ago.
And, by the way, let me agree with you and let people
understand, the people of Camp Ashraf are going to have to do
their part as well. And there is certainly indications that
they haven't been willing to reach people and to go the extra
half mile as well. If we are going to save lives, everybody has
got to contribute to the solution.
Colonel, does this remind you at all of--I am sure you have
read the history of Colonel Gordon in the Sudan where they knew
that he was going to go under. And they knew he was--and I just
remember that back in my reading back about 20 years ago how
the British Government just wouldn't make a decision until
finally they made the decision to help Gordon; and, by that
time, he had been overrun and murdered.
Colonel Martin. Sir, that specific one I don't remember.
But this is exactly what is going to happen. And I don't think
they are going to make it to December 31. I think Maliki is
going to pull the same stunt he did with the execution of
Saddam Hussein, and that was a despicable act.
I was talking to Judge Poe about it earlier. Sam Houston
taught us, you don't build democracies off lynchings. That is
why Santana wasn't lynched.
Muqtada al-Sadr had contacted Maliki and told him, I want
Saddam executed tomorrow by my people. And Muqtada had promised
his people that Saddam would not live to see the light of the
new year. Maliki contacted General Gardner and said, I want him
turned over. Gardner said, what are you talking about? He is
already scheduled to be executed on the 10th of January. ``I
want him now.'' And it was pursued within task force 134.
``What is going on?'' And that is when it was revealed what
Muqtada was up to.
But the State Department weighed in, demanded that Saddam
be turned over, and he was. And then he was delivered to face
justice. And as you saw on the videos, that chanting ``Muqtada,
Muqtada,'' and when Saddam was executed and then dropped to the
ground and kicked and everything else, that is--and then, when
that blew up on the videos, the State Department jumps out of
the way. And we in the military take all the heat rounds as to
why we allowed that to happen when, in fact, we objected.
The Saddam execution is a lesson because now Maliki is
going to jump before December 31. He attacked the first and the
second time immediately after Secretary Gates--a very fine
man--was in the country. Immediately after gives the impression
that Secretary Gates blessed this. I know he didn't.
Now Maliki is coming to see President Obama, and he is
going to go back to Iraq just about the same time all U.S.
troops are pulled out. I can see him attacking sooner than the
end of the year. And if I may, sir, this is from Maliki's own
political magazine and it is the center page where, when you
open it up, it always opens. And here is what the article says.
Mek organization, international terrorists from a previous
dictatorship and the depth of western hypocrisy. The world
crowded with hundreds of very dangerous terrorist organizations
according to your laws. Mek is one of these organizations.
It goes on.
The history of the Mek organization is full of crimes
against both Iraq and Iranian nations. After the rising of the
Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979, Mek organization, with direct
support of the West--and it goes on.
This is an attack from Maliki's own political magazine on
Europe and the United States as well as the MEK. Maliki knows
most Americans don't read Arabic. And, as a result, this is the
kind of stuff that goes unnoticed by the State Department
people.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, let me just note that when I was
younger I remember seeing Mussolini strung up by his heels, and
I had no sympathy for Mussolini. And I have seen dictators
strung up by their heels, and I don't care what they did to
Saddam Hussein. I don't care that. The people that we need to
care about in this world are innocent, honest people that want
to build a better world, not these gangsters who get power and
slaughter innocent people.
My father was in the military, too, so I understand that
military people want things done with order or they view them
as being destructive in the end. I personally disagree with
that, but I respect that opinion. And I know you are a very
honorable man and would state that principle for us.
I think that what we are going to do is end it here, and I
will just have a very short closing statement. But I will give
each one of the witnesses 1 minute to summarize.
Ambassador Bloomfield. Thank you very much, Chairman
Rohrabacher. I am grateful for the opportunity to put on the
record the summary of my inquiry into this.
I repeat that I am not an advocate because I think there
are already plenty of advocates on this subject. And the
problem that I have seen, as I have looked at this problem, is
that people are set in their views. And the views are far
apart, and they are not dealing from the same base of
information. So the approach I have tried to take is to find
credible sources that will help people at least agree on the
information; and if they have the same information, maybe they
can have a conversation about where that takes us in terms of
policy.
The other point that I have emphasized as I have looked
into this--and I spent 5 days in France last month and talked
with lots of people, heard their stories; and it convinced me
that there is an even deeper story than I thought. There is an
untold story that needs to be understood in Washington. I do
not want to see American policy flying blind, particularly at a
time when the Middle East is undergoing such change.
We talk about Iran's nuclear program. Most of that
discussion is about how far advanced the technical program is.
I am persuaded that the likelihood that they would use or even
hand out a nuclear bomb to a terrorist group is small. The far
higher likelihood is they would use the status of a nuclear
power to do the things they are doing right now in Lebanon, in
the Palestinian areas, in Iraq, in Bahrain, in Yemen, and in
Iran. And this is the political agenda that the mullahs are
following.
We really have missed a big piece of the story, and I hope
people will look at my prepared testimony and my August study
as a resource. It has a lot of source documents you can click
on and make your own judgment. I am not going to tell you what
it adds up to, because I don't need to. But I hope the Congress
will ask the intelligence community to confirm the tentative
conclusions that I have brought forward.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. And how about
that for an academic approach?
Dr. Ferris.
Ms. Ferris. Thanks.
Much of the discussion today and indeed around the whole
issue is focused on the delisting and terrorism and so forth,
which are important issues. But I would urge you not to forget
the question of solutions, the concrete solutions for the human
beings in this camp. Where will they go? If the delisting were
to occur tomorrow, there would still be questions about access
to the camp, about U.N. interviews, about coming up with
solutions and, most of all, about protection and security of
those people who are very much at risk today.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Colonel.
Colonel Martin. Sir, actually, I agree with you on the
opinion of Saddam; and I made sure he knew it, too. My concern
was, it empowered Muqtada, the way he was executed.
And I also agree on the concern about moving out of Camp
Ashraf. They have got their logistics bases, they have got
their communications, they have got their support and their
internal support with each other and, as a result, they have
been able to endure all this psychological torment and
everything else. Now to pick them up and move them to another
location with the intent of breaking them down--and the word we
originally were getting is maybe Camp Liberty.
What is coming out in the Iraqi news media is they are
going to move them down to Samarra and Nasiriyah, down into the
Shia strongholds and also where the Badr corps is very strong
and also Muqtada's army is very strong as well as the access to
the Quds force. So to move them out of Camp Ashraf somewhere
else in Iraq is like the story of the mouse that walked into a
trap carrying his own cheese, except it is the MEK people who
are going to be put into that trap.
They need to be picked up and brought out of Iraq
completely. I proposed to the State Department a long time
ago--and we have got bases that BRAC is closing here in the
United States. We have brought people to Guam. We have brought
people to other locations. Let's just pick them up in their
entirety, tell them, you have got one bag. Fill it up. Send in
six super jets, large airliners, in Balad, which is just 20
miles away, put them on the planes and bring them out.
Unfortunately, the State Department has wasted a lot of
time that decisions could be resolved. Now we are going on the
line. And the Iranian democracy will not die with the residents
of Camp Ashraf, should that happen, but it will be a very
serious stain on the West, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Colonel.
And I would just close with some following observations,
and that is: Number one, the mullah regime will someday fall.
And let us make sure that these brave souls at Camp Ashraf who
have stood as a symbol of resistance to the mullah regime are
able to go home to a free and democratic Iran once the mullah
regime is over. And that will happen. The mullahs are not a
democratic government. They are a government that totally
represses their opposition, controls the means of
communication, and actually rules that country as a theocracy.
And that is not the will of the Iranian people, by a large
number of the Iranian people. So let's hope that that day comes
soon.
And had we had a strategy years ago to eliminate that
regime by supporting the democratic elements within Iran, I
believe all of what we are talking about today would be moot.
And, instead, we not only have not done that; we have basically
permitted the situation to get so bad that we may now end up
with a situation where thousands of people may be slaughtered
right in front of our eyes and there is sort of nothing we feel
we can do about it. And we could sit there and watch this
feudalistic, medieval type of concept of Islam take control of
nuclear weapons that threaten not only stability but threaten
the lives of people throughout that region, throughout the
world.
We have let this go too long, and now we have got a
deadline by the end of the year just to save those lives. We
have got to start holding people accountable, and we have got
to start having specific goals in mind to achieve certain ends
that will change the reality, change the direction of history.
History isn't something that you inherit and have no say
in. You make history. We make history. We make history by what
we are willing to fight and die for and what we are willing to
invest. And we need to make sure that the history of tomorrow
is a history in which the mullah regime in Iran has not
committed horrible crimes of nuclear weapons and other types of
crimes, that they have already committed some of them.
Letting the people of Camp Ashraf be murdered would be one
of the worst defeats for those people who are struggling to
create a more democratic and stable region--could possibly have
absorbed. The people of Camp Ashraf, if they are murdered and
the Iraqi Government gets away with this in cahoots, as I say,
with the mullahs, people all over that region are going to
know, well, look, the Americans even let the people of Camp
Ashraf be slaughtered, knowing that it was coming.
We can't afford to let that happen. That would be a huge
defeat for the cause of freedom in the region and stability and
peace. So we are not doing this just because we owe it to the
people of Camp Ashraf as human beings. We believe that God
gives rights to all human beings. We respect them. But we are
also doing it because this will have a huge impact on the
stability and the well-being of the entire region and the world
and, yes, the stability and security of the people of the
United States.
So this hearing I think has added a great deal to the
discussion and hopefully it will result in action being taken
in these next 2 or 3 weeks that will prevent another tragedy
like we saw just a short time ago.
And with that said, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:37 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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