[House Hearing, 112 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.A.S.C. No. 112-89] INSTITUTIONALIZING IRREGULAR WARFARE CAPABILITIES __________ HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ HEARING HELD NOVEMBER 3, 2011 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 71-528 WASHINGTON : 2012 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202�09512�091800, or 866�09512�091800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected]. SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman JEFF MILLER, Florida JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota LORETTA SANCHEZ, California BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas SUSAN A. DAVIS, California CHRIS GIBSON, New York TIM RYAN, Ohio BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland ALLEN B. WEST, Florida HANK JOHNSON, Georgia TRENT FRANKS, Arizona KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York DUNCAN HUNTER, California Peter Villano, Professional Staff Member Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member Jeff Cullen, Staff Assistant C O N T E N T S ---------- CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 2011 Page Hearing: Thursday, November 3, 2011, Institutionalizing Irregular Warfare Capabilities................................................... 1 Appendix: Thursday, November 3, 2011....................................... 39 ---------- THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 2011 INSTITUTIONALIZING IRREGULAR WARFARE CAPABILITIES STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities................................................... 2 Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.............. 1 WITNESSES Bayer, MG Peter C., USA, Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy, U.S. Army...................................................... 3 Harris, RDML Sinclair M., USN, Director, Navy Irregular Warfare Office, U.S. Navy.............................................. 4 Martinez, Brig Gen Jerry P., USAF, Director for Joint Integration, Directorate of Operational Capability Requirements, U.S. Air Force................................... 6 O'Donohue, BGen Daniel J., USMC, Director, Capabilities Development Directorate, U.S. Marine Corps..................... 5 APPENDIX Prepared Statements: Bayer, MG Peter C............................................ 45 Harris, RDML Sinclair M...................................... 58 Langevin, Hon. James R....................................... 44 Martinez, Brig Gen Jerry P................................... 75 O'Donohue, BGen Daniel J..................................... 67 Thornberry, Hon. Mac......................................... 43 Documents Submitted for the Record: [There were no Documents submitted.] Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing: Mrs. Davis................................................... 93 Mr. Shuster.................................................. 93 Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing: Mr. Miller................................................... 97 Mr. Schilling................................................ 100 INSTITUTIONALIZING IRREGULAR WARFARE CAPABILITIES ---------- House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Washington, DC, Thursday, November 3, 2011. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES Mr. Thornberry. We will call the hearing to order. Let me welcome our witnesses and guests. You all please have a seat. We appreciate everybody being here for this hearing on a topic that I think will play a significant role in the security of the country moving ahead. It seems to me the basic question is to what extent we learn from our experience and build on it, and to what extent we assume that the past was just an aberration and now we can, quote, ``get back to normal.'' I am not sure that the conventional wisdom about normal is quite right. Dr. Sebastian Gorka and David Kilcullen found that of the 464 conflicts since 1815 recorded in the Correlates of War database, 385 of them involved a nonstate actor. That is 83 percent. Dr. Bernard Fall's research, cited in the ``2006 Marine Corps and SOCOM Multiservice Concept for Irregular Warfare,'' found there were 48 small wars in the first 65 years of the 20th century, which, taken together, involved as many people and as many casualties as either of the two World Wars. A review of U.S. military activities over the last 20 years in places like Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Colombia, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Uganda confirms this trend. The tight defense budgets ahead of us means strategic choices must be made. The United States must, in my view, maintain a full spectrum of capability. But the odds are that we are going to be involved in some form of irregular warfare in the future, just as we always have been in the past. We have learned or relearned much about it in the last decade at a tremendous cost of blood and treasure. It would be incredibly shortsighted of us not to ensure that those lessons are taught, and ingrained, and applied going forward. That is the reason for this hearing today, and it is the reason for our continued monitoring of this issue in the days ahead. Let me turn to the ranking member Mr. Langevin for any comments he would like to make. [The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES Mr. Langevin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to welcome our witnesses here today. Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before us and for your service to the Nation. We shouldn't let the term ``irregular warfare'' confuse us. It is not an obscure challenge understood and practiced by a few specialists; rather it is becoming the norm for our country. If the military history of the last two or three decades tells us nothing else, it teaches us that when the United States finds ourselves in a conflict, it is irregular more often than not. In fact, although we prepared for a war with the Soviet Union, in truth our forces have rarely met a similarly arrayed enemy, and we have, as in the case of the opening second war with Iraq, we saw that conflict quickly evolve into an irregular war. We have learned, or rather relearned, the hard way that these conflicts are not just for Special Operations Forces, but really require the entire General Purpose Force working jointly with the interagency if we are to be successful. Now, with this in mind, I look forward to learning from our witnesses today how much their respective services and the Department of Defense policy have really taken to heart the lessons of the recent past. Are you prepared to deter and defeat future conventional threats? Have you also incorporated the need to train, man, and equip for irregular warfare across our force, and across your force, to the same extent? Many of the capabilities required for traditional warfare are critical parts of an irregular campaign. Ultimately the trick is having service members who are mentally agile, flexible, and innovative enough to recognize when the character of conflict changes and move seamlessly and successfully between the two types of conflict. This will be a challenge as we grow our force to meet future conventional and unconventional threats. I am looking forward to hearing how we are doing in that regard. I would like to ask each of you for an example of the capability that is critical for success in irregular warfare, but not particularly useful in traditional conflict. Next I am interested to hear how well we are integrating irregular warfare efforts with our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies, particularly with regard to Special Operations Forces, in counterterrorism efforts. With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing and look forward to hearing from our witnesses. I yield back. [The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the Appendix on page 44.] Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman. I am pleased to welcome our witnesses here today. Without objection, your complete written statement will be made part of the record. And let me introduce now Major General Peter Bayer, Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy for the U.S. Army; Rear Admiral Sinclair M. Harris, Director, Navy Irregular Warfare Office, U.S. Navy; Brigadier General Daniel O'Donohue, Director, Capabilities Development Directorate, U.S. Marine Corps; and Brigadier General Jerry P. Martinez, Director for Joint Integration, Directorate of Operational Capability Requirements, U.S. Air Force. Again, thank you all for being here. And as I said, your statement will be made part of the record, but we would appreciate any comments you would like to make or summarizing of it first. General Bayer. STATEMENT OF MG PETER C. BAYER, USA, DIRECTOR OF STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY, U.S. ARMY General Bayer. Chairman Thornberry, and Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the committee, on behalf of our Secretary, the Honorable John McHugh; and our Chief of Staff, General Ray Odierno; and the more than 1 million soldiers in uniform, thank you for the opportunity to be here before you today. As you know, in 2002, our Nation went to war with two armies, one comprised of conventional forces. It was prepared to prevail against traditional adversaries in direct combat. And the second, composed largely of Special Operation Forces, was prepared to excel in an irregular environment. Our Army quickly learned that success in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the other battlefields of this decade required adaptation of both General Purpose and Special Operations Forces, and that they must work together as part of the joint force and the interagency team. In the past decade the Army has captured that adaptation by institutionalizing irregular warfare across the entire force, and today irregular warfare is part of the Army's DNA. We have trained our soldiers and leaders, adjusted our doctrine, adapted formations, and developed world-class education and training centers which integrate irregular warfare capabilities. Even more importantly, our soldiers successfully employ the skills critical to victory in irregular warfare every day in combat. Irregular warfare mission set is at the very heart and core of Army expertise, the ability to operate decisively, delivering precise and discriminate lethal, and nonlethal effects among the people. However, our work is not done. The Army continues to learn from current operations, develop capabilities, train leaders, and adapt doctrine as we look forward to secure the gains from the last decade. As we look to the future, our Army will seek to ensure that a smaller force remains fully capable of decisive operations in all domains against hybrid threats. We believe the future operational environment demands irregular warfare competency. To do this, we must optimize the balance between soldier, structure, readiness, and modernization, and continue to focus on the professional military education of our leaders and soldiers. Through competent, adaptive, versatile, and creative leaders in formation, the Army ensures its ability to continue to be the strength of the Nation, America's force of decisive action. With the continued support of the American people and Congress, our Army will remain the world's preeminent land power. Again, on behalf of the Army and our leadership, thanks for the opportunity to be here today, and I welcome your questions. [The prepared statement of General Bayer can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. Admiral. STATEMENT OF RDML SINCLAIR M. HARRIS, USN, DIRECTOR, NAVY IRREGULAR WARFARE OFFICE, U.S. NAVY Admiral Harris. Good morning, sir. Chairman Thornberry, Congressman Langevin and other distinguished Members, it is an honor for me to be here with you today to update you on the Navy's efforts to institutionalize irregular warfare. The Navy's efforts are vital to our national security as part of a comprehensive approach to address complex security challenges. Our Sailing Directions, recently authored by CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] Greenert, emphasize that our mission is to deter aggression, and, if deterrence fails, to win our Nation's wars. Today the Navy is engaged around the world conducting preventative actions and activities to stabilize, strengthen, and secure our partners are providing reasonable deterrence against state and nonstate actors. The Navy at the same time continues to fight and win our Nation's wars in concert with United States Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Army. We expect the demand for the Navy to increase in the future security environment as combatant commanders seek offshore options as a part of joint solutions. The Navy and the Marine Corps and Coast Guard continue to use our maritime strategy to guide us in our efforts to secure the maritime domain and encourage global partnerships. Again, our Sailing Directions coupled with our enduring maritime strategy underscore the Navy's focus on multimission platforms and highly trained sailors conducting activities across the full spectrum of operations in and from the sea. And our forward presence allows us to better understand and respond to the underlying causes and conditions of regional instability, while actively evolving our proficiency to prevent and counter irregular threats. As part of our efforts to institutionalize irregular warfare competency and capacity, the Navy's ``Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges'' was released in January of 2010. It provided focus for the Navy on mission areas of irregular warfare as well as maritime activities to prevent, limit, and interdict irregular threats and their influence on regional stability. Navy efforts to institutionalize and provide proficiency in confronting irregular challenges are in accordance with the ``DOD Directive 3000.7.'' Navy's irregular warfare missions include counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, security force assistance and stability operations, and maritime security operations. These are underpinned by the need for a backbone of information dominance. To meet the demands in a mission consistent with the maritime strategy, the Navy has leveraged the whole of the fleet to meet irregular challenges. Navy intelligence and strike capabilities support counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, maritime partnership stations, maritime headquarters, and operation centers provide unique skills that directly address irregular challenges. There are many examples of how the Navy meets global operational commitments and responds to crises as they emerge. Overseas contingency operations continue while 11- to 12,000 Active and Reserve sailors serving are preparing to deploy in order to support ground operations around the globe. Navy carrier strike groups provide up to 30 percent of the close air support for troops on the ground in Afghanistan. Navy/Marine Corps pilots fly almost 60 percent of the electronic attack missions. And as our national interests expand or extend beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, so do the operations of the Navy. The Navy will meet uncertain global challenges as a forward force, ready, present, and persistent in areas critical to our national interests. To do this, we must ensure our Navy remains the finest, best trained, and most ready in the world to confront irregular challenges while retaining the ability to face more capable adversaries. The Navy looks forward to working with Congress to address our future challenges. I thank you for your support of our Navy, and I look forward to answering your questions. [The prepared statement of Admiral Harris can be found in the Appendix on page 58.] Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. General. STATEMENT OF BGEN DANIEL J. O'DONOHUE, USMC, DIRECTOR, CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE, U.S. MARINE CORPS General O'Donohue. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today. On behalf of the Marines and their families, thank you for your support. The Marine Corps is the Nation's expeditionary force in readiness. As such, we are a fully deployed, scalable, crisis response force ready to meet the complex irregular challenges of the future. Irregular warfare is deeply interwoven into our past, present, and future. It is in our DNA. We continue to learn, innovate, and adapt in the course of our main effort operations in Afghanistan. At the same time, we are in-stride building a post-OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] force. That force is designed not for protracted counterinsurgency, but rather for targeted forward engagement, crisis response, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, security force assistance, and stability operations in support of our allies. We have prepared for irregular warfare with a premium on readiness; rapid adaptation; precise application of all aspects of national power; strategic, operational, and tactical mobility; and an integrated capability with Special Operations, joint, interagency, and allied partners. It was 10 years ago today under circumstances no one could predict that 2 Marine expeditionary units of 4,400 marines and 6 amphibious ships were assembling to strike Al Qaeda after the horrific acts of 9/11. This task force on short notice rapidly concentrated from wildly dispersed forward engagement missions to decisively attack across hundreds of miles from the Arabian Sea, to Kandahar, and then on to Kabul. Using the flexibility at sea base, they could attack at a time and place of their choosing, were self-sustaining, and required no forward basing or supporting infrastructure, and they had only a minimal footprint ashore. Notably, with no time for special preparation and in an underdeveloped theater, Task Force 58 conducted a full range of irregular operations against Al Qaeda and in support of the Northern Alliance. These operations were completely integrated with SOF [Special Operations Forces], interagency, and our allies. This dynamic ability at a moment's notice to shape, deter, and defeat and deny our enemies sanctuary is emblematic of the irregular warfare capabilities that we continue to improve on in our current and future force. We build on 113 irregular warfare operations since 1990 to include, most recently, humanitarian assistance operations in Japan, Pakistan, and Haiti; counterpiracy operations in the Arabian Sea; and operations in Libya. We provide insurance against the unexpected with an adaptive, multicapable force that has a global reach to defend American citizens, commerce and our vital national interests. As with Task Force 58 10 years ago, we are ready today to respond to all manner of crises and contingencies to include especially irregular warfare. I thank you for the opportunity to testify. [The prepared statement of General O'Donohue can be found in the Appendix on page 67.] Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. General. STATEMENT OF BRIG GEN JERRY P. MARTINEZ, USAF, DIRECTOR FOR JOINT INTEGRATION, DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR FORCE General Martinez. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss irregular warfare with you today. Winning today's fight with our joint and coalition team is a top priority. As almost 40,000 deployed airmen can attest, the Air Force is engaged in irregular operations supporting combatant commander objectives worldwide. I could not be more proud of the work our airmen are doing. They are trained and dedicated professionals. The Air Force has capitalized on the lessons learned over the last 10 years and incorporated them into policy, doctrine, operating concepts, and educational programs. These elements are continuously updated with the most current concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures, thus empowering our airmen who are agile and adaptable, and who are ready to succeed in today's diverse environments. The Air Force has not only taken action in training and education, we also continue to make adjustments in how we project air power in our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as mobility, personnel recovery, information operations, command and control, armed overwatch, close air support, and aviation security force assistance. In doing so, we have created an adaptable culture and airmen with an understanding of irregular warfare, using the tools at hand to overcome the challenges we face. We expect irregular warfare to remain relevant for some time. We are prepared to meet those future challenges. Thank you very much for your time and for your continued support of our Air Force and our Nation's military. [The prepared statement of General Martinez can be found in the Appendix on page 75.] Mr. Thornberry. I believe you all have given the briefest opening statements I have ever seen in my time here, but that is all right because I think this is a topic that demands a conversation, and so I appreciate the opportunity to have one. Let me just briefly begin with kind of a background question. General Bayer, you had a statement in your opening statement, and you repeated it here today, that caught my attention, that the Nation effectively went to war with two armies in 2002: General Purpose Forces that were prepared to excel against traditional adversaries in direct combat, and Special Operations Forces that were prepared to prevail in an irregular environment. Looking back, before 2002, would you agree that our Nation has a history of not ingraining the lessons of irregular warfare in our military education, and training, and so forth? General Bayer. Mr. Chairman, you ask a great question, and I think the answer is yes, we tend to focus on the war we just fought as we look to the future. And I think one of the things that is different about now for the U.S. Army after a decade at war is that we recognize, as we look forward, war among the people is the future, and as you look across our doctrinal kind of construct, as we look to the future, our ``Army Capstone Concept'' into our recently published ``Army Doctrinal Publication 3.0, Unified Land Operations,'' we describe the enemy of the future as a hybrid enemy that will have regular, irregular, criminal, and terrorist components of it; that will operate in manners that we can't always describe. And what it demands is a force who has competence in this irregular warfare skill set ranging from counterterrorism all the way over to stability ops. As one of the first soldiers in Baghdad on the conventional side of the house, I was the operations officer for the 3rd Infantry Division, I will tell you that we planned two separate operations to get to Baghdad. There was a conventional force plan and a Special Operations Force plan. I had limited knowledge of what they were doing, and when we both arrived in Baghdad to begin to coordinate, we had a lot of great people, but we were not prepared to operate together amongst the people. I don't believe that is the case now, sir. Mr. Thornberry. Let me ask, does anybody disagree with that, that in our history we have not really--I hate this word ``institutionalized,'' but institutionalized the lessons of irregular warfare? And does anybody disagree with the proposition that we are going to have a lot more of this sort of stuff in the future? I will get to you in a minute. But none of our witnesses? Okay. I think it is important to kind of just lay some groundwork to see we don't have a very good track history of this, and yet it is likely to be much of what we do in the future. I will be anxiously awaiting Mr. Gibson's questions in just a minute. But right now I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Langevin. Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and again thank the panel for their testimony here today. I would like to go back to my question in my opening statement. I would like each of you to give an example of a capability that is critical for success in irregular warfare, but not particularly useful in traditional conflict. General Bayer. Sir, I will start. I think for the Army that is a really tough question, because the core of our expertise and what we have learned most importantly in the last decade, it is about our soldiers. So if you look specifically at how we have prepared soldiers to operate effectively in the irregular warfare spectrum, it is about increased language capabilities, it is about increased culture capability, and it is about equipping them with the tools that can be utilized to deliver, you know, precise effects among the people. Sometimes those effects are on the counterterrorism side of the house, where we need to go kill somebody, and we need to kill select people, not innocents. And sometimes those effects are operating amongst the population and utilizing biometrics to be able to identify friend from foe, so to speak, over a period of time so that we are precise in our application. And then ranging all the way over to stability effects, arming them with the capabilities, such as civil affairs, military information support operations, lawyers who are trained in rule of law, so we can enable them to build capacity in both their security forces and their governance. So for us I think it is about the soldier, sir, which is applicable in both, and it is the skill sets we give that soldier for operations in irregular warfare. Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. Admiral. Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. I have to agree with my Army partner here that it is very hard to find the dividing line where a technology or a training or a capability is only used in a conventional campaign vice used in the irregular, because, quite frankly, there is a very gray area in war. War is war, and you have to flex between the two, it seems like, seamlessly from one day to the next. Some of the sensors that we were working towards in support of SOF operations that we will put on unmanned platforms are targeting individuals vice things, and those tend to be more toward the IW [irregular warfare] spectrum than the conventional, so in terms of that as one example, the sensors that we will put on unmanned platforms that look for cell phone or other type of communication devices to target specific individuals. In terms of integration with SOF, the Navy for a number of years now has done something called Agile Quest, which prepares our deploying ships and their crews to operate in support of SOF operations. But we have been doing more integration between the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command and SOF, to try to relieve the stress on Special Forces so they can go off and do those high-profile missions. So, again, it is a full spectrum of activity. The equipment has to be multimissioned because from one day to the next, maybe even inside the same day, we will be operating on both sides of the spectrum. Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Admiral. General. General O'Donohue. Sir, just to pick up the theme, and to get back to the chairman's question, ever since Desert Storm we have been developing irregular warfare capability. We saw future warfare as not being the son of Desert Storm, but as being the stepchild of Chechnya. And this was the concept of the ``three block war'' that Marines have to operate both in establishing peace, in outright conflict, or in humanitarian assistance, all within the same conflict. So our lessons since Desert Storm have really led us to more one of emphasis rather than distinction. And so as we look at a capability as purely IW, really not in the way that we are thinking. This idea of hybrid threat, the idea that even a state power would be able to use an irregular tactic against a conventional force is not one that we see any explicit distinction. So the force to prepare has to look at the full range, it has to be able to operate, and if there is any definition about irregular warfare, it is the aspect of it is without pattern; that we have an adaptive enemy, the population will always be relevant, and what we need to do is push down the ability of combined arms, lethal, nonlethal, all the elements of state power, so we can establish not just perhaps the 10-minute firefight or the 1-hour firefight, but the fundamental conditions that led to the conflict that started it. So, again, irregular warfare is inextricably linked with the force structure, and especially the one we have recast to the future with the 186-8 [186,800] force is fundamentally different than pre-OEF, it is one of emphasis, though, not really one of distinction. Mr. Thornberry. General. General Martinez. Sir, one of the areas that I think is definitely with irregular warfare that we never used in conventional wars was our new Air Advisor program that we have implemented in the Air Force. Throughout my years growing up in the Air Force, we were taught simply to go out and destroy an enemy's air force. That was our job: to go defeat the enemy, not to build an air force. And as we started getting into irregular warfare operations, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, you clearly see the need that those foreign countries, they need a developed air platform, they need a developed capability to help ensure stability in their region. And in order to do that, we have done several things in the Air Force to promote that. First, we established Air Expeditionary Wings in both countries, where we put advisors over there to help the locals learn about air power. And those areas are not just strictly skills of flying an airplane; it is everything from security of an airport, to the logistics, to the maintenance, and the many other facets that go with air power. Right now in Afghanistan we have 515 of those advisors helping over there. In addition, we changed our organizational structure and developed two Mobility Advising Squadrons. We have a squadron on each coast, and within those squadrons we have a lot of different skill sets, some of which I just discussed. And their role is now at a moment's notice to go somewhere and help whoever is in need of building a better air platform, again to provide stability in their region. In the past we didn't do this. We recognized it was a need in this irregular warfare, and we made the changes in our Air Force. Mr. Langevin. I thank you all for your insights. My time has expired. Hopefully we will get to a second round, and I will have additional questions. But with that, thank you for your input here today, and I will yield back. Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Conaway. Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I have got a specific question for the Marines and a broader question. General O'Donohue, can you give us some insight as to what the utility of amphibious operations will be? The Marine Corps excels at that in irregular war. You mentioned a little bit of that in your opening statement, but the broader post-landing kind of thing that the Marine Corps has traditionally looked as being the premier force. General O'Donohue. The most stressing condition could be an imposed landing. The most common one is not. So day to day marines are doing operations related to regular, most often with Navy/Marine team, from a platform that gives us strategic mobility. We can move, in the case of Libya, before the National Decision Authority has decided what they want to do, but we can provide--without an incursion ashore--provide an offshore presence that serves as a deterrence and gives options and decisions base for our national decision makers. It allows us to put in TAC [tactical air control] combat power ashore, and not just against traditional targets, but irregular. If you had to scale against a terrorist network, you had to go after counterproliferation targets of high priority, the Marine Corps has the ability, the command and control, the sustainment from an amphibious platform to be able to do that. And in many areas we complement SOF day-to-day with their specialized missions, but there are ones again that we are the supported commander, as was the case in Task Force 58. So, again, it is the ability of sustainment from sea, it is that strategic projection, to pick a time and place of your choosing, to enter the environment, and to do so in the case of a strike or raid without a destabilizing presence. You can moderate the amount of force that would go in. You don't have to seize a port or airfield or a base for your own sustainment. You can really target how much you want to reinforce an ally or how much you want to affect the conditions in a very measured way from that platform. Mr. Conaway. Thank you. The broader question is, just by way of kind of fleshing out the question in terms of challenges to making this happen, I have recently watched some village stability operations in Afghanistan, northern Afghanistan, in which a Special Forces A Team matched up with a--General Purpose Forces are conducting those operations led by the A Team and the Special Forces. It seems to be working well. One of the issues is, can you get to scale across the country with the concept? You don't have enough A Teams to make that happen, so how do you blend and bring in a technique that is generated out of the A Team background broadly across? So what are the challenges to blending the conventional forces and the irregular warfare concepts on the fly to make things happen that we want to? Anybody can pitch in on that. General Bayer. Congressman, I will jump in. I think the first is doctrine. And we believe our doctrine generally as we have advanced it has described the requirement for Special Operation Forces and General Purpose Forces to work together. Clearly the village stability operations being practiced in Afghanistan right now are at the front edge of kind of new concepts. So the challenges, we bring that back. You are limited right now by, you know, the density of forces that are forward deployed and the other missions in their ability to do it. But I think the longer-term challenge for us is how do we integrate that in training? And in our training centers we are moving to what we call full-spectrum kind of scenarios that portray this hybrid threat and require a unit commander at the brigade level to deal with a multitude of problem sets, so to speak, during their training. So I think our challenge is, how do we have both Special Operations Forces and General Purpose Forces [GPF] present in that training rotation and work together prior to employment? And we have some work to do to ensure that. Part of it is density of their utilization for operational missions and how many folks are left behind in the training. Mr. Conaway. Has the Joint Forces Command that stood down, has that impacted your ability to do those kinds of things? General Bayer. From an Army perspective, no, sir. That has not impacted our ability to do the things I described. Mr. Conaway. Anybody else? General Martinez. Sir, from an Air Force perspective, it has been minimal impact. The Joint Staff has absorbed most of those duties, actually, the J7, handling doctrine, training and irregular warfare aspects; as well the J8, who currently does the joint requirements. So we have seen really no impact at all. Mr. Conaway. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General O'Donohue. Sir, just on your first question on the integration of SOF, Marine is inextricably linked. One characteristic of the force we project for the future was a growth of Marine MARSOC [Marine Special Operations Command], about a little over 3,000 to 3,500 Marines that give us obviously an organic connection with SOC [Special Operations Command]. We operate with them every day. We started with the first conceptual doctrinal piece was a multiservice concept for irregular warfare, which was a companion piece with the Marines and SOF. And then the complementary capability of the highly trained small units that operate in that battlefield using the unique capabilities and authorities that SOF has in combination with the Marine high training is one that is operating today in Afghanistan, afloat as we go with the MEUs [Marine Expeditionary Units], and we will continue in the future. Admiral Harris. Sir, I could add one more example for both of the questions you had. The first was utility of amphibious forces, and being an amphib officer for the past 10 years, I have had a firsthand chance to work with the Marine Corps/Navy team doing this. And one example I would use is that on the same day that we were doing humanitarian assistance in Pakistan during the floods in 2010, delivering water and delivering food, we also had the takedown of the Magellan Star in the middle of the Gulf of Aden, again leading the Marine Corps team, operating from amphibious ships, working with the general force, had a cruiser in support, doing IW-type mission. At the same time the USS Peleliu was flying missions in support of ground troops doing counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. One arc, one Navy-Marine Corps team that shows you on one day, and this was not an uncommon day, how valuable amphibious forces are. In terms of the integration with SOF and GPF, I mentioned Agile Quest, which is trained out of Fleet Forces Command, are doing to a greater extent. What we do in the Navy is before we continuously train and modify the training depending on the COM and the fleet commander demand signals as they go forward, to make sure that our sailors are prepared to operate not just in a conventional way, but operate also with Special Operation Forces. Maersk Alabama is a good example where on the fly we are able to seamlessly integrate. Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Mr. Thornberry. Ms. Davis. Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of you for your service and your leadership. I wanted to turn to the issue of language and cultural training, and as you may know, the GAO [Government Accountability Office] stated recently that both the Army and the Marine Corps should--must better document the results of their language and culture training programs to make them more effective. And basically what they were saying is they need to better leverage language and cultural knowledge and the skills so they can make better individual assignments assessing operational needs as well. Could you speak to that? Do you think that there is enough emphasis that has been placed on pre-deployment training to your General Purpose Forces on language training, regional and cultural expertise? How do you meld those in terms of IW and conventional forces? General Bayer. I will be happy to start. The answer is we in the Army, we still have work to do. One of our lessons learned is, to enable soldiers to effectively operate in the environments we have the last decade, which are center mass of the IW spectrum, we have to have increased cultural and language capability. So we have initiated a number of programs to do it. One of the limiting factors for our units that are employed in the counterinsurgency fights in Iraq and Afghanistan quite honestly has been the pace. When you are gone a year and you are home a year, to try to create the kind of language capacity we are talking about in the general purpose formations is quite challenging, to get them to what we would refer to as kind of a 1/1 level of proficiency, conversational. So we have utilized a number of training aids, some shorter courses, done things like our 09 Lima, bringing in foreign nationals into the force to be interpreters assigned--in Army uniform assigned with the forces. As we look forward, we are institutionalizing a program we call a Regionally Aligned Brigade, and it is the utilization of a brigade, a general purpose brigade, aligned to a combatant command and a U.S. Army service component command to go do Phase Zero prevent-type activities, so security force assistance, pre-conflict to shape the environment. And one of the programs we have lined up is to give an increased amount of cultural capability and language capability to that formation pre-deployment. But we also recognize it is only feasible to do that if you have a longer preparatory time, as I stated. So we think the GAO report, it is not untrue in terms of there is work to do, but we believe we have grown substantially and recognize the importance of it. General O'Donohue. We stood up our Center for Advanced Operational Culture and Language in 2004, with a recognition of the challenges ahead of us. It has had a very particular and sharp focus obviously in Iran and Afghanistan. The language skills in particular are difficult and long to build. We put them and integrate them into each one of our units in the PTP, our Pre-deployment Training Program. Probably the broader aspect of it that is relevant especially is really to the future where we don't know where we are going to go, and we have to have the ability to have a language capability that is targeted, and we will the increase in our foreign affairs and regional affairs expertise of both now--the officer and now newly in the enlisted level. But the idea is, how do you adapt to a culture, and how do you, again, without notice, in an area that you perhaps weren't predicting, you have to address a threat. A lot of that is related to how do you adapt, the idea of how you look at the human training, the cultural training, your understanding. Now, this is true of SOF forces where language is just one component, but the other one is your awareness, and be able to operate, and be able to look at patterns and recognize things as you start going into a fresh one, and that will be the new challenge. So we have had many issues focused on Afghanistan, and then we have to look and address a broader one. We give marines as they join a particular area they are going to focus on that they have to develop through the course of their career, the education and training piece. All of this is ingrained. It is a moving target, and we have to look at shifting to the future one where we won't have an established theater or forewarning of where we are going to actually be. Mrs. Davis. Do you see any of this going by the wayside because of budget constraints? Will there be a continuing emphasis as far as you can see? General O'Donohue. I can say explicitly, and I was part of the force structure review that the Commandant took as he recasts the Marine Corps for the future in terms of capabilities, and we were forced with making trades between what you categorize irregular capabilities and what would be standard as conventional. And we have about 8,000 Marines even at a smaller force than we had pre-OEF to give us that kind of capability. So senior leadership has looked at the problem and made most decisively in how we allocate our scarce Marine Corps at 186-8 and how we are going to do it, and there was that regular piece---- Mrs. Davis. I was also partnering, of course, with some of the universities around the country, San Diego State, and my colleague here from San Diego knows this well also, has done a very good immersion program utilizing the residents in the community as well to help and assist with that. So I think that is certainly important for the future. And my time is up. I will come back for another round, Mr. Chairman, if you are doing it. Sir, do you have one more. Mr. Thornberry. Go ahead. General Martinez. Ma'am, in terms of language, the Air Force has recognized a need as we are involved in deployments throughout the world for language training, and our Chief of Staff directed a very aggressive program for airmen to start becoming better linguists out there in the world. We started a program called the Language-Enabled Airmen Program, or we call it LEAP. LEAP is basically, we take folks who have a minor understanding of a language, and then we put them through a very heavy immersion to get them better qualified to speak that language. It increases their language capability, but the important piece is that it is amongst the general population of the airmen, it is not our special forces folks that do this. We recently had a board that met just in September to pick the next wave of folks that would go through this training, and 329 people were selected in 46 different languages. So right now in the program the Air Force has 772 people doing this training. Admiral Harris. Very quickly, ma'am, the Navy has got the LREC program, which is our Language and Regional Expertise and Cultural program, which again goes to the general purpose for sailors. I actually have an LREC course back at home so I can learn Spanish to add to my German. Additionally, our Office of Naval Research has the Human and Social Cultural Behavior Modeling program, which tries to get at that awareness, how they are trained to be more aware of their cultural surroundings for sailors and obviously for marines, because ONR works for both Navy and Marine Corps team. Mr. Thornberry. If I could interrupt and follow up for just a second. As I read the GAO's comments, again they were looking at the Army and Marine Corps, one of the points they make is that the information about what training has been completed in the language proficiency is not captured in the personnel records or within service-level training. So it is kind of like we don't know who we have got to do things--who had this capability. Something breaks out somewhere, and there is not a database to go and say, oh, we have got these 20 people who speak such and such. Doesn't that get to whether irregular warfare skills are institutionalized within the services? General O'Donohue. Sir, the Marine Corps has just started a database. To do that, it tracks not just language, it tracks operational and analytical capability if you are trying to look at patterns and analysis in an environment, so all relevant skills. We still have to get those who have experience in terms of the training, advisors. So it is new, it has started, we have addressed the problem, and we have a little way to go in terms of getting the full gamut of skills, not just language, that might be relevant. Mr. Thornberry. Again, part of what we are doing is looking for evidence, looking for signs, is this sort of capability really getting ingrained in the services, and I thought it was an interesting point that the GAO found as one piece of evidence, not end-all, be-all. Mr. Gibson. Mr. Gibson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and also to our ranking member, for calling this hearing. I think this is a very critical area that indeed we do need to have dialogue on the way forward. I thank the panelists for their leadership, for their service. And, in fact, General Bayer is somebody I served with in Mosul in some of the toughest times, and he was a distinguished soldier and leader, and it was an honor to serve with him. You asked the question, Chairman, earlier on about the future of our country and irregular warfare, and you asked the question broadly, does anybody disagree with the statement that you put forward. And clearly there is going to be a need for a competency or capability with irregular warfare. My nuanced view on this really has to do with the level of political and strategic, not any qualms. In fact, anything that has been presented here today, I agree with. I think there has been some good testimony already put forth. To me, it is fundamental to take a look at who we are as a people, and what does it mean to defend a republic, and how do we then organize our Armed Forces to do that, to protect America and our cherished way of life? I am of the mind that we ought to take a hard look at our commitments overseas, the requirements we levy on the Armed Forces. And I think if we do that, we will reorganize in a way that will actually make us safer and save money. We just came through a very difficult decade and couldn't be more proud of our service men and women and their families, deployment after deployment after deployment, and not complaining, just getting it done with great sacrifice and hardship. We can't go through another decade like the one we just came through, or on the other side we won't be the same republic. So I think that is really incumbent on us, and that is why I applaud the chairman calling the hearing today. But even with the world view that I lay out that is certainly a minority viewpoint right now, and I know I have got a lot of work on that score, there is still going to be a need for the strongest military in the world right here and deterrence that goes with it; all the maritime comments made as far as shared access and having a capable force here, prepared--a joint force prepared to go anywhere on a moment's notice. And then there is also the threat, the existential threat, that we face: Al Qaeda. Undeniable, and we have to rise up to that challenge, so that is where irregular warfare is front and center. Mr. Chairman, as you know, we are working this in our committee, and we have a provision in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] right now for Special Operation Forces about the way we are going to relook that. I am of the mind, based on my experiences, that fusing intelligence and operations is key to this in actually elevating that capability to a global response in terms of our allies and friends. I think that will help make us safer and more effective in the war against Al Qaeda. And towards that end, that goes to some of what General Bayer was mentioning in terms of the two armies and us having that capability going forward. But even in the world view that I lay out, I can't say that the probability is zero that general forces could get involved in this again. I can imagine some circumstances close to home here where we may have to be involved in such activity. So really this gets me to my question, and it has to do with balance. It has been mentioned here in some of the testimony full-spectrum capability and how an institution--and how the institutions prepare for this, how you strike out, how do you prioritize. In the Army we used to call it DTLOMS [Doctrine, Training, Leadership Development, Organization, Materiel, and Soldier] we used to organize across, and recognizing that even before the war, we did make investments toward irregular warfare. I can think of a time when I was in the box at JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center] in the fictional country of Cortina; 5 of the 11 days in the box, it was on low-intensity conflict. It is just we weren't doing as well as we know that we need to do it now. So how do we then rise to that challenge, looking across the functions, doctrine, leader development, materiel, training, including home station unit training and joint training? How do we do that? General Bayer. Congressman, I will jump in. Tough question. I think the first thing you start with is if you use that kind of DTLOMPF [Doctrine, Training, Leadership Development, Organization, Materiel, Personnel and Facilities] structure, is your doctrine right? We think that we have got a correct expression of doctrine as we look forward in describing the environment and the type of threats our Nation may ask us to face. The second is your organization. You know, one of the things the Army--or both Secretary McHugh and General Odierno have affirmed their commitment to completing the build-out of Special Operations Forces. So we recognize that as we become a smaller Army, a larger percentage of our operating force will be Special Operations Forces. And that is a deliberate decision to enable us to have those capabilities on the higher end of the irregular warfare spectrum, recognizing skills like counterterrorism, et cetera, or require some advanced capabilities. The next piece is in the training base, how do we get to the point you are making of how do we integrate these two together in the training base? And it really is a--you got to want to do it, and I think that our leadership does. One of the things I have heard General Odierno tell the staff here a couple times recently is if we are the same Army 10 years from now that we are today, it means we failed, and we haven't learned anything from where we have been. So the guidance and the desire from the senior leaders in terms of looking forward across all of doctrine, organization, how we train leaders, et cetera, is pretty solid, but proof is in execution, as you know. And as resources come down, and we have a smaller Army, we recognize we have some challenges to make it happen for our Nation, but we are committed to them. I know I have only scratched the surface of your question. Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. If I could follow up, I would agree with using the DOTMLPF structure. You could address each of these, and I could address each of these in areas where the Navy is continuing to institutionalize that. But that balance question is huge, because there is such a materiel-intensive force, our ships, and our planes and our submarines. And, of course, our mission set does portend us to be prepared for that high-end of operations. We have to be; that is our charter. But we are also fully recognized through our training that we are going to operate as we have always done since the inception of the Navy in an irregular environment. They have to have those sailors that are able to walk across a full spectrum. I will just take a couple of quick examples. In our leadership training we have in our postgraduate school, and our Naval Academy and our war college, irregular warfare is part of that curriculum. I think there are two majors, in fact, at postgraduate school in California, just to highlight the importance of it amongst our sailors. In terms of the materiel, we continue to look at innovative techniques on how we can take our high-end platforms and make sure that they can support either SOF operations or other irregular operations by not just targeting things, but being able to target people as needed. General O'Donohue. The Commandant reported back to Secretary of Defense based on the results of a force structure review, capability review, based on a threat really expressed by the chairman at the beginning of this hearing. In that force we had a forward-deployment engagement where we are going to have to take some risk where we can't take the combatant demand. It is essentially in a Marine Corps of a 24-battalion base that allows us day-to-day, and then shift in terms of prioritized focus, specific--the Middle East or areas, not that we are not globally responsive, but there is a less capacity to do that, and there is a prioritized method of doing so. So those 24 battalions, essentially a sizing construct for the force. This idea of being crisis response, we can aggregate those forces that are distributed often with the Navy team. Single ships can come together, as I displayed an example given with CTF 58, to go to a more substantial operation. And then you get the higher end, the MCO [Major Combat Operations], which, again, a commitment of about 20 battalions. The point here and the efficiency of it is these are the same battalions, so they are trained at a high level, they can operate IW, and they can aggregate, they can distribute-- distribute operations with platoons operating 39 miles separate. Applying the full instruments of national power, they can combine and concentrate if need be. Took risk not just in forward engagement in meeting combatant demand, but also in the phase 4 and 5 operations, the sustained operations ashore. We can't do them, it is lesser included, but the force we have now of 22k is the force to do that. The force of the future, the 186-8k, accepts risk in that area. And then we use what we call the enablers. We have a very highly trained force, and we had those 8,000-some others, intelligence, EOD [explosive ordnance disposal], civil affairs, FAOs [foreign area officers], that you can combine together to apply to a problem. And just, for example, we had a tank battalion, a little bit of training, high-training status of any marine, they were able to go into a Black Sea rotation and satisfy most of the theater security cooperation needs of a COCOM [combatant command]. So force design for a conventional high-end threat, but, given the high level of training of some enablers, able to satisfy others. General Martinez. Sir, I think probably one of the most important pieces in your question is as we move in this irregular warfare arena, it really has to start from a commitment from the senior leaders of the service. And I think each service has to recognize the type of warfare that is probably expected of us in the near future. Some time back the Air Force made a very strong commitment to irregular warfare, realizing that this really is the way we fight now and probably will be in many respects in the future. And some of the actions that we took was, one, first organizing our force differently to include establishing an office in the Pentagon under the Air Force that works irregular warfare, doctrine, training, et cetera; also implementing training programs. We started a three-tier training program that is purely about expeditionary training and how we go to those different arenas and fight. We actually started an Air Force Expeditionary Center, which teaches courses, I think it is somewhere around 80-plus courses, on different things that our airmen need to know to work in those environments, as well as putting them in our professional military education, and most importantly is taking lessons learned. I think that is really crucial in this area is that we have to understand what we are doing, and then where we are not doing it well, and then where we could do better, and putting in a process to do that, we incorporate it as well. And then I think the last piece is, that we haven't mentioned yet today, is we have a generation of airmen growing up, especially our young ones, that they know nothing but this type of warfare. You know, we call it irregular. It is irregular to the old guys, because this isn't how we are used to fighting. To our young airmen this is the way they fight, this is what they know. So it is just as important as we focus on irregular warfare that we are also keeping our younger folks in the military in tune to conventional warfare. Mr. Gibson. So, Mr. Chairman, I know I am out of time here. Let me just sum up by saying I am encouraged by the responses, the agility, the commitment to facing and rising up to our challenges and threats. And in view of your comment about dialogue, you know, I think it is important going forward that we find ways that the Congress helps and not harms this vision. Thank you. Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Shuster. Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. Over the past several years, when the leadership comes to-- the military comes before us, they talk about how language is a game changer, and you talked a little bit about that. One of the quick questions, just real briefly, I heard the Air Force has a program that is going across the force to the airmen to offer language training. Do the other branches have the same sort of program? Please be brief. A yes or no answer would be good. I don't need the details. Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. LREC is our program. Mr. Shuster. Army? General Bayer. Not mandatory for all soldiers. General O'Donohue. We have a broad, targeted program, sir. Mr. Shuster. I would think that this would be important. The GAO report says you are not inventorying who is getting the training. I think it is also equally important to go out there and offer it across the force and test people for the aptitude, because there may be a guy that is a logistics officer, and you got to have logistics people in Afghanistan, and Iraq, and other places in the world. So I encourage you to look at that, to go across the force to find a guy, a private who may be a genius when it comes to speaking several languages that we don't know about. So, as I said, that being so important that I heard from Petraeus to McChrystal, to McRaven saying it is so important, we should really be focusing on that. Second question I have is our allies, as we--the world is a big world, they are out there, and I know they have irregular forces. Are we able to use them as a multiplier force working together, because we operate well together? You don't have to point out country-by-country, but certainly are there other forces out there as capable as ours that we can work extremely well with and insert them when we can't be somewhere, or help them get to places we can't---- General Bayer. Congressman, our Army experiences, there are a select number of armies around the world that we can truly operate seamlessly with. This happened with our most senior partners in NATO, others to varying degrees. One of our challenges, quite honestly, is that most of the nations of the world have divested themselves of support for security at a rate faster than our Nation. So what we see amongst our allies is vastly and rapidly declining capabilities, which makes, as we look to a future world, the assumption that some would make that we can get greater cooperation from our allies challenging, I think. But there are some we work very, very well with. Mr. Shuster. Anybody else? Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. Probably the clearest example happens in our 5th Fleet, where we have got a number of coalition operations that go on for our countering piracy, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that may go by sea. That is with, again, coalition navies from around the world. Mr. Shuster. I think I got a good enough answer on that to get an idea. To shorten the prep time with cultural and language training, some folks that I have talked to and in SOCOM [Special Operations Command] have advocated for--there are about 90 countries out there that are on the brink or could be failed states soon, and we may be asked to come in and help. And they have advocated a strategy of inserting today, countries that want us, an 8- to 12-man team in that country so that if things go bad, that we shorten the prep time, and we have half a dozen, dozen people on the ground that can help us. I just wanted your general view of that. You think that is a smart thing to do? Is that something we should in Congress be trying to push forward to get those senior leadership the assets and the ability to do those types of things? General O'Donohue. Sir, that happens every day, both in small teams and on a persistent basis, working with the COCOM, who comes up with the theater security engagement process. So it is not exclusive to SOCOM. There are standing relationships. And obviously, we have deployments with the Marines and the Navy, with the MEUs that go out and operate as well to reinforce those. General Bayer. Congressman, our experience has been that that is a worthwhile investment, and its developing capacity relationships are critically important as you look to the future. So those are worthwhile investments, and I concur with my Marine counterpart. We do it all the time. General Martinez. Sir, an important program that we have right now in the Air Force--it is actually the Air National Guard that is doing it--we have a State Partnership Program, where Air National Guard units are getting, basically, in a bilateral relationship between countries around the world and a State. Right now, there are 63 partnerships that occur. And those National Guard units with the members of that country will provide mentorship, they build crucial relationships, they ensure dialogue is flowing. Recently traveling with the Capstone Program, every country I stopped in, the locals from the country were extremely positive about their relationships with the Air National Guard and how they felt that actually really helps keep them linked to the United States. Mr. Shuster. That is great. I see my time is running out, but if I could just submit a question for the record that maybe you could answer me in writing. In the times we face now with tight budgets, I certainly am an advocate for not cutting the Defense Department any more. In fact, let us figure out a way to make sure we fund you at higher levels. But from your positions of looking at irregular war, looking at budgets and planning, what are the top priorities that we absolutely cannot touch to make sure that you can do the important work that you do? So if you could submit that in writing over the next week or two, I certainly would appreciate that. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 93.] Mr. Shuster. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Hunter. Mr. Hunter. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I don't really have a question. I am a little bit curious, though. I know the Navy and Marine Corps have an answer to this. The Army probably does, too. I wasn't indoctrinated in Army history, so I don't know. But the Marine Corps had a Small Wars Manual in 1940; the banana wars; 1890 to 1930. None of this is new, literally. None of what we are talking about right now is new. The materiel is, and the new gizmos, and the sensors, and the UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], but the rest of this stuff is old. When we went into Fallujah, it was the same thing. In fact, I was a SASO [Stability and Support Operations] guy. They call it SASO now. It is a stability and support operation guy. None of this stuff is new. The Navy and the Marine Corps have been doing this for over a century, going to little places, getting with the local population, getting the guerillas on our side. The Army has probably done the same thing. So I don't know, I don't know if I even have a point besides this is nothing new. It is doctrinal. It has been around for over 100 years. It just seems like it is a new iteration, it is a different language, it is a different place, it is a different continent, maybe, than we have been in the past, but it is not new. And I think we have adapted extremely well. With that, I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. Thornberry. Mr. West. Mr. West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member. Thanks to the panel for being here. I want to try to dovetail off of what my colleague Mr. Gibson and also what Mr. Shuster was talking about. Back in the mid- to late 1980s, we saw that the Army then made Special Forces a dedicated branch instead of how they had been doing it previously. Just recently, within the last 5 to 7 years, MARSOC has come onboard. So my question really is this: As we look at the irregular warfare threats--because I think the most important thing is that we have to start matching our capability and capacity to the threats that are out there. So when we go across the geographic AORs [areas of responsibility], and we look at the irregular warfare threat-- because, sir, as you said, General Martinez, you are right. To the young people now, this is regular warfare. For us that grew up once upon a time having the Fulda Gap, this may be irregular warfare. But how do we make sure that we have the capability and requirements to--I mean, the capacity to meet these requirements? Because my biggest concern is that there is a shortfall out there because the enemy is seeking to fight in this manner. And I don't want to see us be caught much so and with our pants down. As our colleague Mr. Hunter said, this is just a repeat of things that we have seen previously. So the question is: Where do you see the shortfalls out there with our Special Operations Forces contending with the irregular warfare threat throughout these geographical AORs? And then are we looking at means by which we can retrain some of our conventional forces to fulfill some of those shortfalls and gaps? General Bayer. Congressman, I will start. As I mentioned, the Army leadership remains committed to completing the growth of SOF, which means about a 30 percent growth, give or take, in the last decade. So proportionately they are a bigger part of a smaller Army. What we have recognized really is that the GPF can do some of the mission sets that are commonly associated with irregular warfare, and it is not the exclusive domain of Special Operations Forces. As you gentlemen both know, both you and Congressman Gibson, you know, we have General Purpose Forces that actually can do counterterrorism missions in a counterinsurgency environment. So part of it is we have to blend those forces together in terms of mission profiles, so to speak. The other thing, I think, as we look forward, it is Phase Zero activities: prevent; it is being able to commit to the combatant commanders' forces, General Purpose Forces, to augment the Special Operations Forces that have very finite levels of languages, cultural, advise-and-assist type capabilities, but to take some of the burden off development of security capacity and use General Purpose Forces to do security force assistance, you know, basic skill transference 101. And our Regionally Aligned Brigade concept will field the first of those, generate the first of them, in fiscal year 2013 is aimed at trying to do that in the ``Phase Zero, shape the environment'' type of timeframe. So I hope that answers part of your question, sir. Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. Great question. And, again, I agree with my Army colleague, quite frankly, in the same type of approach. How the Navy does it, quite frankly, is through our partnership stations, which are General Purpose Force sailors on general ships that have operated in the Africa AOR since 2007; in the Pacific since 2004 with the Pacific Partnership; with the Southern Partnership Station, which has been going on since 2007; and Continuing Promise in about the same area as well. Now, in these partnership stations we bring together not just Navy, but also other services, interagency, and NGOs [non- governmental organizations] in a number of these operations in order to, as we talk about Phase Zero, trying to shape the area. And that provides for stability operations, which is, of course, part of IW. In addition, we are looking to take some of the burden off of our special operators. NECC, our Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, has done a number of missions in the training and the security force assistance missions that have been transitioned from the SOF, from NSW [Naval Special Warfare], to NECC. General O'Donohue. We try to mitigate risk. Again, I explained before about how the Marine Corps is going after it. But the idea of being multicapable, and being able to aggregate from a forward-deployed posture where you are influencing, shaping, and then be able to respond to a crisis, for that strategic mobility is critically important. We can't predict, as we didn't with Afghanistan, where the next fight might be. We need to be able to get there to affect the initial conditions, reinforce a partner at the right time to do it, and then allow for a more considered response. That is a focus that the Marines have taken. There is a readiness aspect of it; again, a very efficient way to keep our units ready across the spectrum to be able to do this. The way we mitigate the risk as well is the Reserves. The Reserves have a tremendous capability--both in specific capabilities and resources and talents--that we can draw on to the Active Force both to augment or to mitigate risk as well. The force structure we designed at 186-8k has those elements and assumes that the Reserves can mitigate some of the risks that the Active Force has taken. General Martinez. Sir, I think an important point to make when you look at this conventional versus the irregular warfare and Special Ops operators out there is, what can we do to take the burden off them? Our country has asked a lot of Special Ops Forces, and, wow, have they delivered in the last 10 years. One of the things that we do in the Air Force is we are looking for ways to transfer some of those duties. First, you can do it by training your general populace to better understand language, region, culture, and the things that traditionally in the past Special Forces members have been extremely good at. The other is looking at actual missions. Earlier I mentioned an air advisor course, where we teach people to go out and basically teach other countries how to set up an air force. That role actually started and was done by Special Ops Forces. It was not general populace that did that; it was the Special Ops people who owned that mission. And within the Air Force we have migrated it over time through this Air Academy and taught our general forces how to contribute to those missions and let Special Ops go on and do other things. Mr. West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess I will yield back the rest of Mr. Hunter's time. Mr. Thornberry. We are being a little more flexible today because there is obviously a lot to talk about here and a lot of good questions and answers. I want to go back a little bit, because in the last few exchanges there has been discussion about the doctrine, how it is not new, and so forth. I think the concern is that while the doctrine may be on paper, the reality of it, when it comes to promotions and dollars spent and so forth, may be somewhat different. Let me just cite some examples and invite the appropriate one of you to make any comments you would like. So, for example, I guess for the Army, I have a study from the Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Christopher Lamb, et al., wrote, and it is titled: ``MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform.'' And basically it goes through the history of resistance in the Pentagon to MRAPs [Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles]; how this committee actually was a key instigator in getting some up-armored Humvees first and then tried to push the MRAPs. But he makes some statements which may or may not be true about the cultural resistance within the Pentagon to irregular warfare and to spending money on equipment which has, as its primary use at least, irregular warfare. It goes on to say the problems with irregular warfare go well beyond the acquisition system. So I don't know. General, is this something in the past, this problem, or are they at least in a vein of concern here that will extend beyond our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and inhibit our ability to prepare for the future? General Bayer. Sir, from my perspective, I think it is a thing of the past. But I acknowledge that for some people, change is uncomfortable, and it is something we see in every aspect of life. When faced with a different future and where you are, some people will have a hard time adapting. I will tell you that the guidance of our current set of leadership, Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, is crystal clear to me as an Army staff officer. And I would just echo the words of General Odierno: If we are the same Army 10 years from now that we are today, then we have not learned a thing, and shame on us, essentially. And he is absolutely right. And I don't sense amongst my peer group of leaders and those that I work with every day in the Pentagon a mentality that is similar to what was expressed relative to, you know, bringing the MRAP into duty. What I would tell you as a previously conventional forces soldier raised as an armor officer in armor formations, who has now been to Iraq multiple times, I believe the culture of the Army has changed to accept that, and the probability of future conflicts says it is going to be among the people and look strikingly similar to what we have seen in the last decade, and I think our culture has changed to accept that, sir. Mr. Thornberry. I think that is a fair point, let me just say. And I think General Martinez mentioned it a while ago. People who have been through this over the last decade are not going to go back to the way we were. I think that is a point well taken. General O'Donohue, Marines are primarily responsible for nonlethals, correct? General O'Donohue. They are the executive agent, yes, sir. Mr. Thornberry. This has been an issue for me for some time. I requested a GAO study, I don't know, some time ago, and the results of what the GAO found are similar to what we were just talking about about the MRAPs; that there is cultural resistance to nonlethals. Obviously, it is not exclusively an IW sort of equipment. But they go and talk about how many research and development efforts basically amounted to nothing. And part of it is not having the priority, not having the oversight, but also cultural resistance. Is this another example of something where, you know, the Building, if you will, resists spending money on things that are primarily IW- oriented? General O'Donohue. Sir, I can only speak to the Marine position. So not to confuse with the joint program and joint evaluation that is an executive agent versus a Marine program, so within that context there is a very strong push within that joint nonlethal environment for programs that have actually been successful. The requirement was conceived, a program was devised, and it has been brought home. So within that context, separating the executive agent responsibility that is joint, to the Marine Corps programs themselves, there is success within there. Some of the systems there are very focused on very specific situations. They are not a widely capable--capability that gives a marine forward, say, a spectrum of effects that he needs. So if you give a marine, for instance, a shotgun, it might not be the weapon he needs to be carrying in an environment where he needs a full-spectrum of range. So I think the next development in nonlethals is to give them a scalable response. It is not exclusively nonlethal, but allows them to range up to the area of effects that he needs. That has really been one of technology and being able to integrate it, and not one of desire. Mr. Thornberry. Somewhere I have read in these materials that it is better to get something 75 percent within months than 99 percent within years. If we wait on the technology to have the dialable deal here on your weapon, we may be waiting a long time. On the other hand, it seems to me if we are going to be operating within populations, having capability such as nonlethals provide is an important capability. Admiral, let me just toss one to you. This is a little bit different. But I notice yesterday in the Wall Street Journal, Dr. Krepinevich had an article that talked about the enormous amount of infrastructure we have underseas, but also the growing capability of nonstate actors in underwater vehicles and the potential dangers that that presents. It is kind of a different sort of threat than what the Navy has traditionally been looking at. Is that sort of thing, protecting our underwater infrastructure--you know, oil stuff, mainly--and dealing with these somewhat crude, but effective underwater vehicles part of what you all are looking at, and what is the role of the Coast Guard in doing that as well? Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. That is an area of emphasis, quite frankly, inside of my office, inside the Navy and other parts of the Navy, to look at unmanned vehicles that can be used to detect deleterious actors that might use either personnel or equipment to target infrastructure or target ships. A lot of cyberspace is on the bottom of the water, quite frankly. That is another area where I know that our 10th Fleet has got interest. But we certainly are looking at the right investments to use systems to monitor that underwater space as well. Mr. Thornberry. It is a little different from the traditional Navy role, so I think that is something we will be interested in, too. Mr. Langevin. Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thanks to the panel for a second round. I wanted to touch on a question Mr. Shuster had raised. That is what I was planning to do for my second round. There is obviously a variety of things that go into making up our national security, making sure that our Nation is protected; obviously, our military capability, diplomacy, and other such things. One of those is, obviously, our fiscal security. Right now, obviously, the Nation is challenged in that we have a weak economy, and we have exceptionally high budget deficits. So as we are looking across the range of what we need to do to get our fiscal house in order, and given the current fiscal environment, what aspects of irregular warfare capabilities right now do you feel are most at risk, and how are each of the services prioritizing irregular warfare as funding decreases? General Bayer. Congressman, what is most at risk for the Army are soldiers, because we recognize that our fair share of handling or addressing the Nation's fiscal requirements is a smaller Army. And our prime weapon system is a soldier. So we recognize that we will have a smaller Army that has to stay balanced. So the second part of that is, really, we know that in irregular warfare none of those mission sets is one we can divest ourselves of. They must remain inherently part of our core competencies. What it really comes down to is we have reduced capacity to offer to the Nation to go execute missions in defense of our national security, from the Army's perspective. Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. I think similarly the Navy, the biggest concern in terms of what is at risk as our fiscal pressures happen on our defense capability and our infrastructure is the fact that as our force structure is pressurized and manpower is pressurized, we are going to have to choose what areas we will be there to prevent crisis and do preventative activities, and in other areas we won't be able to have that forward presence that acts in a preventative way to stop crises. The other part is going to be the time to respond. With fewer forces spread farther out, it is going to take longer to respond to crises as they show up. So the pressure on the whole of the force, both from the infrastructure--the ships, planes, submarines--and the personnel, is going to increase our time of response. General O'Donohue. I concur. The issue is primarily capacity. Irregular warfare is embedded in what we do. As we come down, as we looked at the capability, the base review, is it balanced, and we are not coming down to a pre-OEF force, so there are drivers in the future fight that are related to irregular that have to be honored in the force structure. There would be a concern, again, about strategic, operational, and tactical mobility. This gives us a range to apply influence across a battlespace, and a breadth and depth an enemy can't cope with, in all areas of national power. Those assets-- amphibious shipping alike--and other means, the tactical connectors that we use at the high-end are also the ones we use at low-end. If you look at Haiti and the like, a replacement for the EFV/ACV [Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle/Armored Combat Vehicle], those type of things. So mobility, I think, is an aspect of the problem as well. General Martinez. Sir, I think the piece that is going to be really important in this is it is going to come down to prioritization, and I think each of us as a service needs to make sure that we are doing the best that we can to prioritize the needs. When you are in a fiscally challenged environment, you are going to have to make tough decisions, and those decisions need to really keep in mind the warfighter. They also need to keep in mind the conventional warfare that we could face in the future. In the Air Force, some of the things that we have done is we have recently implemented a prioritization change within our Air Force Requirements Oversight Council to help get a good, solid grasp on that. And I think the one advantage that we may have in this is by nature of the mission of the Air Force, conventional versus irregular is not necessarily zero sum for us. If we invest in good ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] with our Predators or our Reapers, our overhead watch, those platforms are usable in irregular warfare just as much as they would be useful in a conventional battle. We could easily watch a single home in an irregular environment, or we could be watching a mass army approaching in a conventional. Mr. Langevin. With that, I will yield back. Thank you. Thank you for your answers. Mr. Thornberry. Mrs. Davis. Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the fact that you are talking about prioritization. I think that is also managing talent. And if I could just refer to General Odierno's comments recently regarding the role of women in the services, he spoke to the fact that it is not just about allowing women to have the opportunities that they should be allowed, but it is about managing that talent in the services. And we know that the Army now is training elite women soldiers, female soldiers. Certainly, the Marines have had the FETs--the female engagement teams--in Afghanistan. Where do you put women's role in the military in that future that we are looking at? Odierno, again, as you quoted, the military shouldn't look the way it is today. If 70 percent of jobs in the services are barred to women, where do you take this discussion? I am going to put you on the spot a little bit, perhaps, because this is a sensitive issue to a lot of folks. But I am just wondering what your comments are about that. General Bayer. Congresswoman, I will happily jump in. My personal opinion is that there should be no boundaries for women. I believe that women soldiers have acquitted themselves exceptionally well in everything we have asked them to do. And the reality for soldiers over the last decade is we find ourselves doing things we never expected to be doing. And they, like their male counterparts, have performed fabulously. So I personally believe we should remove those boundaries. And the reality of the environments we fight in, there are no neat divisions of the battlefield that say a certain sex or type of person can operate, you know, in this little segment of the battlefield and be safe or apply their skills only there. The battlefield is 360. It is all around us. And I looked at and I have read and interfaced with some of our peers from allied nations who have integrated women into combat formations, and they have done it successfully. Admiral Harris. Ma'am, I will just give you a quick example. I relieved Michelle Howard as the Commander for Expeditionary Operations in 5th Fleet, and I was relieved by Peg Klein. So from my vantage point, women have gotten pretty much an equal footing in a number of areas and an increasing role in our Navy, and it is seamless. And it is probably more of a generational thing of us who are 50 and older, we can remember when it wasn't that way, but when you talk to the young sailors now, officers or enlisted, they don't see a difference. Mrs. Davis. I particularly see that in the Navy, of course. General O'Donohue. We are part of a comprehensive OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] review with an open mind to look at the facts already that were beyond the policy for women. I was a battalion commander in OEF, and we had a female convoy commander who ran a road that was arguably more dangerous than anybody in terms of giving us supplies based on the old rules and conventions. My previous aide now is in a female engagement team that you mentioned with MARSOC, and she will be at the leading end of operations in Afghanistan. So we are beyond the bounds of current policy of geographic collocation. Are there metrics and standards that you go with things into entry force where there are physical aspects of it, again, a complete open mind to an understanding of not a presumption or assumption about what can be done, but is there a rational reason why you couldn't? Mrs. Davis. Thank you. General Martinez. Ma'am, I am very proud of our Air Force and the fact that our women are in fighter aircraft as we speak all over the world defending our country. They have a tremendous record of success. They have been shot at, they have been hit, and they have performed magnificently. Having just returned in March from a year in Afghanistan, I was very privileged to travel throughout the country and see airmen pretty much everywhere. And, you know, the roles that our women take now, they have changed so much from the past. They are out there in the fight, and, you know, you can look and see that we have lost women to combat debts over there. So I am proud of our Air Force. I think we do a great job. I personally could never understand why we would tell somebody they can't do something because of their gender. That is a personal opinion. Mrs. Davis. Thank you. I appreciate your comments on that. And just quickly--and you can actually do this for the record if you would like--we have had a lot of talk about whole-of-government approaches, and certainly when we come to the area that we are discussing today, it is very important in terms of the interaction and the interdependence in many ways with the State Department, with other government entities. Would you, when you have a chance, take a moment to just-- how, specifically, are you doing things differently in your service with the State Department today, and what do you see is lacking? You know, is there something that would make a difference in terms of being more successful at that relationship and as we move forward in the role that is played as we talk about irregular and conventional forces? What would you like to see that look like, and what do you think we ought to be doing to ensure that that is a reality? I know the chairman and I have spoken about this before, and we know we are not there, that there is a great deal to be done. Different people have suggested something more akin to a jointness kind of document, if you will. I am not sure if that is the right answer. But what is it that would actually push this in the direction that you think would be better for the country and would fit in more with the discussion that we have today? I would appreciate that when you have a chance to do that. Thank you very much. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 93.] Mr. Thornberry. Great question. Mr. West. Mr. West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mrs. Davis, hopefully I can get a front-row seat to the next GI Jane, Part 2. I will agree with you that the modern battlefield is totally different than the battlefield that we originally saw, and we have to look at how we can integrate all people on that battlefield. With that being said, Mr. Chairman, I have one last question. I just found out I have a phone call coming from the Administrator of FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], so I am going to have to run out. But, you know, when we look at irregular warfare, and we look at how this enemy set is, I think there is one thing that we see as a commonality, except for Afghanistan, and that would be the littorals. So my question is: How are we developing that capability to once again make sure that we can contend with an enemy in this littoral environment, and also making sure that we keep those sea lanes of commerce and trade open? Because as we saw a few years ago, who would have ever thought once again that we would be dealing with piracy at sea? Also, an addendum to that question is: As General Odierno said, we don't want the Army to look like 10 years from now as it is today. Is the Army taking into account that once again it may have to get involved in those type of operations as well? Admiral Harris. In terms of littoral warfare, I say that the Navy and Marine Corps team is taking great strides to increase our ability to operate in the littoral. One of the examples is our stability operations doctrine that we are working right now. The Marine Corps is the lead. The Coast Guard and Navy work in support of that doctrine. But even beyond that, how we do our partnership stations, again, to make sure we have that cultural awareness in those areas in Phase Zero to try to keep it from getting past that or into Phase One or into a higher level of warfare. So we are continuing to emphasize our expeditionary knowledge inside the Navy as part of the Navy-Marine Corps team. I will give the balance of my time to my Marine Corps counterpart, which I am sure has more examples. General O'Donohue. Again, you would have to ask the Marines about the importance of littorals, sir. But 75 percent of the world population, the large aspect of the problems they face in the future are related to littorals. We are a maritime nation. How do we project power; how do we deny sanctuary to the enemy; and how do we provide options from a sovereign base, a U.S. naval ship that doesn't need basing rights? As we start coming back from our forward presence and basing, and with the anticipation of an unpredictable future, it is unstable, what gives us the strategic mobility to allow us to influence the action? Working with the Navy on significant exercises, Bold Alligators continue with partner nations; working with the Australians, who are developing two amphibious ships; and obviously the Pacific, an area of interest, economic and every way--security--with a key chokepoint in the Straits of Malacca; the influence of extremism, not yet a predominant factor in the Pacific, but potential, and the idea when the Marine Corps comes out of Afghanistan, our prioritization will be the Pacific; and then, obviously, with the global reach, to affect other littorals. So you will see a rebalancing--in fact, came today--both of us will be at a littoral maneuver war game jointly between the Marines and Navy--in fact, all the services--to look at the problems you address, sir. General Bayer. Congressman, just briefly, the Army role is really part of the joint operational access concept, which is currently under development. So we recognize as part of the joint team we have a role. And we think we have a very heavy role in the Phase Zero shaping engagement operations because predominantly security forces around the world are land-based. So that is part of our role, to help give us access in the littorals. Mr. West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. Let me ask each of you to address organization for a second, because, you know, I somewhat stumbled over introducing each of you with your various titles. It is only the Navy that has someone who is Director of Navy Irregular Warfare Office, not that titles necessarily limit the scope. But I am struck by the fact that to really deal with what we are talking about today, ingraining throughout the services this capability, skill set, way of thinking, you are talking about not only doctrine, but the organizational structure, training, the acquisition, leadership development, personnel assignments. And I guess my question is how do you--and let me acknowledge it has got to come from the top, absolutely--but how does somebody other than the one at the top, whether it is you all's positions or somewhere else, keep a watch on this every day? How do you ensure that somebody is there kind of raising the hand, saying, well, how does that affect irregular warfare; or, is this a capability good for irregular warfare? I am not interested in a flow chart, but I am interested more in the practical. In your organizational structures for each of the services, how does that work? Who is the advocate? General. General Bayer. Sir, at the department level, it is me. I am delegated through my boss, the G-3/5/7 in the Army, by the Secretary of the Army, as our lead for irregular warfare, in accordance with Department of Defense guidance. So from an Army policy proponency strategy perspective, it is me. Colonel Andrew Dennis, who is a U.K. officer who sits behind me, leads our division that does that on a day-to-day basis. We partner predominantly with our Training and Doctrine Command for concept development, material development, et cetera. We have a number of institutions. The Irregular Warfare Fusion Center that is out at our Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, so soon-to-be-Lieutenant General Perkins has that. Our Peacekeeping and Stability Ops Institute at Carlisle does stability operations. So we have a defined network. I am the Army staff officer that is responsible for it, and we partner with our Training and Doctrine Command. Mr. Thornberry. Let me just ask a follow-up, and then each of you all can address the follow-up, too. So if you think that irregular warfare capabilities are being shorted in acquisition decisions, or that there is--the personnel decisions are not being made appropriately for people with that skill set, can you influence that, or at least bring it to somebody's attention? General Bayer. Yes, sir. We have a number of forums as we look forward both through concept development on the training/ doctrine side of the house. And then on the resource allocation side of the house, you know, we have a set of regularly prescribed forums that help us develop on, you know, an annual basis that 5-year program where I inform my boss. So we vote, so to speak. Mr. Thornberry. Admiral. Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. As you already pointed out, I am the Director for Irregular Warfare for not just the Chief of Naval Operations, but also the representative for the Secretary of Navy as well. And, believe me, I get asked constantly what are we doing, are we doing enough, how can we do more, from my chain of command. I engage quite often with OSD/SOLIC [Office of the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict] on the policy side, also with Irregular Warfare on the capability side on what our capacities are. At the fleet level we have got, again, fleet forces and PAC fleet, who we integrate and we talk to and work with daily. Doctrine commands and schools I have already mentioned. Beyond that, we have established a network we call our Confronting Irregular Challenges Community of Interest, which has got about 30 or more different organizations not just from the Navy, but from academia and other services as well that highlight and bring up irregular warfare capabilities and needs to confront these challenges. We have been meeting now for several months as we have been implementing the instruction division from our CNO. General O'Donohue. Sir, I am responsible for capability development writ large for the Marine Corps. We are in a process of transition. The Commandant has given clear guidance about the emphatic importance of irregular warfare to the future, and his guidance was in his transition point: How do we strengthen and consolidate numerous efforts to the urgent need of the current war; how we rationalize them for the future? We had stood up a Center for Irregular Warfare in 2007, which has custody for all aspects of irregular warfare. It was a stand-alone center. It is maintained at center status. It has now been brought into my organization. So just as we look at fires, maneuver, irregular warfare is represented in every aspect and every move related to combat development across all aspects of DOTMLPF. So, again, I think it is a mark of the maturation of how we look at irregular warfare that it has been brought in so tightly to the institution. General Martinez. Sir, I mentioned earlier that in the Air Force we actually established an office in the Pentagon to oversee irregular warfare. This was a big shift in transition for us as we moved into this new type of fight. And we recognize that, and we now have that office in place, and they are working with things like doctrine, and tactics, and training, et cetera. Your question about then who is your advocate, well, certainly they are an advocate. I will tell you, in my opinion, I think our real advocate is our airmen that are out there in the field every day. I think it is fair to say, just as like our fellow services here, they have deployed so much, that I don't think they would accept anything less than good training, than good equipment, and all the things that go with it. I know personally I have deployed four different times already to the Middle East, and I am amazed at the level of where I was on my first deployment and, on my most recent deployment, the level of training, equipment, and preparation that I was provided by our service to go do that job. Mr. Thornberry. General, does the new office in the Pentagon have the ability to weigh in on personnel decisions and acquisition decisions? General Martinez. The office is not under the acquisition realm, but they certainly have an input to it. They are under what we call our A3/5, which basically runs our operations and plans for the Air Force. And the A3/5 has inroads to acquisition. We work with them every day, working requirements and the things that the Air Force needs. In addition to that, they have inroads to the A8, which runs our money. So they are absolutely connected to it, they have a voice, and they have an advocate as our A3/5, our three-star general. Mr. Thornberry. I just think that is key to go from doctrine to the hard decisions that are made every day about people and money, which is kind of where the rubber meets the road. Another example might be, if one were to--I think nearly all of you all have mentioned professional military education, which I would argue may be even more important in a time of declining resources than it is at any other time, if you look historically. But I just wonder if you looked at the courses that are currently offered kind of cumulatively in all the schools, how many would be irregular warfare-connected courses, and how many would be more of what we think of as conventional warfare-connected courses? Again, there is no one piece of evidence that tells us anything definitive, but I just wonder if that is a piece of evidence that might enlighten us as to where our emphasis is being put. Anybody have a comment? Admiral Harris. I will go ahead and jump on that first, sir. I will start with Newport, the Naval War College and their Center for Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups. It has hosted our irregular warfare conference the past 2 years. It has become part of their curriculum to a greater extent. Go to the National Defense University, which Admiral Rondeau runs, and their Center for Complex Operations. There is great work there that looks across all the services. The Naval Academy I have already mentioned. We have irregular warfare incorporated into their curriculum. And then to the Naval Postgraduate School, which has got two majors, I believe, there in irregular warfare. Mr. Thornberry. I guess my question really is--I mean, no question, there are specific things going on in each of the services. I am just kind of trying to sit back and look at the cumulative total. Where is the greater emphasis? Are these kind of ones and twos, these sorts of programs and courses? Or, when you take a look at the whole PME [professional military education] complex, how does the emphasis fit? General O'Donohue. Sir, I can give you for the Marine Corps representative. Our Command and Staff College is one-third specific to irregular warfare. Again, it is hard to tease it out. For instance, our Marine Corps planning process, we used to look at mission analysis. Now we do problem framing, which takes all aspects of irregular warfare. So that is not specific to irregular warfare in this part of the curriculum, but a third of the curriculum is absolutely specific to irregular warfare, and the rest, obviously, relates. And this is in the context of the Commandant's guidance. In a period of declining resources, we will increase education and training to the Marines. General Martinez. Sir, in our School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, which is really a graduate-level PME that we have in the Air Force, it is a short anecdote, but just to give you a number, information warfare lessons are now in 6 of the 11 courses, so over 50 percent. Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. That is helpful. Let me ask one more thing, and then I will yield to Mr. Langevin. Somebody--Conaway, I think--asked earlier whether the abolishment of Joint Forces Command made any difference to what you all are doing. And it turns out just this morning I see in a magazine called Training and Simulation Journal, and the title is: Modeling Irregular Warfare. You know, one of the things the Joint Forces Command was tasked to do was to be a Center of Excellence for simulation and modeling. This article goes on to talk about, of course, how difficult it is to have simulations for irregular warfare; all of the different variables, and so forth. But basically it says we are better than we used to be, but still not very good at doing that. I am wondering, in that case--thinking, again, about training and education efforts, how do you all see where your service is as far as modeling and simulation when it comes to these sorts of--these types of engagements? Admiral Harris. I will go ahead and jump on this one again. One of the areas that our Office of Naval Research is pushing is efforts on human, social, cultural, and behavioral modeling program. It has been going on for some time now. Code 30 and 34 in ONR [Office of Naval Research] are the ones who are leading that effort. Again, that is for both the Navy and Marine Corps, and other services as they see utility in that type of model simulation. Additionally, from the campaign level, our assessment division, N81, also works toward how to model that irregular warfare to a greater extent. So we are trying to do it from the campaign level down to the individual training of individual sailors and marines. General O'Donohue. Just to build on that, again, the companion is obviously training and exercises that are not strictly modeling, if you will. The high-fidelity exercises that approach that and are supported by the modeling are ones that we participate and host regularly. Mr. Thornberry. Well, it just seems to me this is an area, kind of going back to something Mrs. Davis was talking about, where this has to be not only joint among the services, but interagency. And without a Joint Forces Command to do that sort of modeling and simulation, I think it is something I would expect would fall off somewhat because it is not--it is going to be unlikely, I think, any of the individual services would do that kind of broad look. So it is something I am kind of interested in. Mr. Langevin. Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Internet obviously has changed the world in so many ways, not the least of which is our Nation's sense of use of it in the military and how it has affected modern warfare. It is obviously a very powerful tool for our military. So it is for both peer adversaries as well as asymmetric actors. So because of that dependence, obviously we will never see modern conflict again where we don't have a major cyber component as a part of it. How does our use of cyberspace impact irregular warfare, and how are we making use of that capability? General Bayer. Sir, probably if we really wanted to have an honest discussion about it, it probably needs to be a classified discussion. I will say at the unclassified level, based on my personal experience in irregular warfare, we know our adversaries all use cyber. They use it to organize. They use it to transfer resources. They use it to pass propaganda. So it goes without saying that we have to develop then the tools to counter that in that domain in order to be able to, you know, prosecute both counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, et cetera. The services are all beginning to invest significant--I can speak for the Army--significant additional resources into cyber. We are working with Army Cyber Command and U.S. Cyber Command to try and define what it is we are exactly looking for as we look forward. But as we look at a smaller Army, one of the things we know is going to grow is cyber. We have kind of put a bill on the table as a placeholder that said over the next 5 years or more, cyber is going to grow by hundreds of spaces to develop the capabilities we need. We haven't necessarily defined them finitely yet, but we recognize it is increasingly important. Admiral Harris. Sir, I would completely agree with General Bayer that cyberspace is a contested domain. To have a real in- depth conversation about it, you have to go classified. But we have established recently our 10th Fleet, which is our cyber fleet, again, working with U.S. Cyber Command. I mentioned in my opening statement the word ``information dominance,'' which is our phrase for talking about the activities, and the personnel, and the systems that are needed to dominate that space, just as we do the maritime, the air, and the land, in order to win our Nation's wars, and hopefully prevent us from having to get into war. General O'Donohue. Sir, the same. Air, land, sea, the electronic spectrum, and in cyber are aspects that we integrate and need to dominate not just at the strategic level, but at the tactical. We have created a Marine Forces Cyber Command that has both the mission to support marines forward, and also one that directly corresponds to irregular warfare and its larger mission. We have at the tactical level--before we had a fire support coordinator, who did kinetic effects. We have nonkinetic effects we are looking at. And we are looking at integrating cyber, electronic warfare, IO [information operations]--in fact, these areas are all converging--so you have an integrated capability, not just one, but integrated both with nonlethal fires and maneuver, with marines forward. General Martinez. Sir, without doubt, in this day and age, you have got to have an offensive and a defensive cyber capability. The actual capabilities that we have are mostly classified, but in generic terms, you can certainly see that using our space assets and cyber assets, we use them for things as simple as navigation, weather, intelligence, communications, and many other things. I would be happy to get into specifics, if you needed to, in a classified forum. Mr. Langevin. I know this is something that the chairman and I spent a lot of time on and cyber space, cyber security is an issue that obviously is growing in importance and presents unique opportunities, but also great challenges to our Nation and our Nation's military. Thank you for your perspective on that. With that, I will yield back. Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman. Where I would add, that evolution and maturation of doctrine is really critical and not just within the services, but within the country as a whole. Enormous challenges. More than the technical, I think, the law, and the policies, and doctrine and so forth. Admiral, let me just follow up. If you would like, you may certainly want to follow up with a written answer. But would you just make a brief overview about the relationship between you all and the Coast Guard when it comes to irregular warfare? Seems to me they have some law enforcement authorities that complement, hopefully, what you all do. Can you just comment on that briefly? Admiral Harris. Yes, sir, I would be glad to, because my last operational tour, the PATFORSWA [Patrol Forces Southwest Asia], which was operating in the Arabian Gulf, came under Expeditionary Strike Group 5, so I worked with the Coast Guard on a daily basis. What we find with the Coast Guard, quite simply, is this. While the Navy maybe has capacity out to here in the number of ships, and sailors, and planes and the things we have to go out and do our mission, our authorities are fairly narrow because we are Title 10. On the other hand, the Coast Guard has got a culture and has got capability and has a way of doing these things, and they have got a lot of entryway with the Departments of Interior in a number of nations that really hit the home of what the preventive actions that have to happen. Unfortunately, the Coast Guard only has capacity out to here, so it is trying to marry those two up, and we have been successful with our LEDET [Law Enforcement Detection] operation. We have been successful with the forward-deployed Coast Guard that has operated in the 5th Fleet of operations, working with the nations inside that area. We have been successful in the MOTR, the Maritime Operational Threat Response, again working with the Coast Guard. And then going back to our strategy that is signed off by our Chief of Naval Operations, by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, by the Commandant of the Coast Guard. So we have gotten stronger and stronger and better and better in working together to try to fill those gaps. Mr. Thornberry. Well, I just offer that as you look at that interworking relationship, if there are authorities issues that we can help clarify, then let us know, because I think your description of the situation is very good, but maybe we can help marry those up a little bit if there is a need to do that. The last question I have is I think General O'Donohue mentioned hybrid warfare. And mostly when we think about irregular warfare, it is what other people are doing to us. In a general sense, are we working on the doctrine of how we may want to use irregular warfare against others? General O'Donohue. Yes, sir. Again, everything is about an asymmetric advantage. The relevance of the population is something that we assume almost in every context. We have the ability to distribute. Again, we talked about platoons that were operating 39 miles at distance. They can combine. And really it is about giving options to commanders at the lowest level with the broadest sense of combined arms, both lethal and nonlethal, so he can use the tools to the best advantage against an opponent that now is presented with a dilemma. We can attack across the breadth and length of the operating environment. We can use all the instruments of national power. So incredible flexibility. If there is one definition for irregular warfare, it is that it is without pattern. The next threat will be different than the other one. So the idea of training and education, for forcing adapt very quickly, and now he has all the tools in the echelon, from the tactical to the operational and then to the strategic. Signals intelligence. EW [electronic warfare] is one example of that. It has freed up a tremendous amount of maneuver in the battlespace. Cyber is potentially another in that category. General Bayer. Sir, I would just echo those comments. Absolutely. And for the Army it is about what we call one of our core competencies, Combined Arms Maneuver. But it is the application of all the resources you have in a manner that gives you a decisive advantage. And what we recognize is there is no pattern necessarily, so it is how we aggregate these resources. So we absolutely are focused on it. Mr. Thornberry. From my standpoint--and you mentioned it-- from the tactical to the strategic level, and sometimes I think we are better at the tactical, maybe, than looking at irregular warfare from a strategic level, which also deserves our attention. I think that is all the questions we have for now. Again, thank you, each of you, for being here and for your answers. This was helpful to me, and I think it was to other Members, too. This is obviously an issue that we want to continue to follow in the months ahead. But with that, again, with our thanks, the hearing stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] ? ======================================================================= A P P E N D I X November 3, 2011 ======================================================================= ? ======================================================================= PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD November 3, 2011 ======================================================================= [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.001 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.002 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.003 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.004 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.005 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.006 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.007 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.008 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.009 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.010 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.011 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.012 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.013 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.014 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.015 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.016 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.017 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.018 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.019 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.020 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.021 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.022 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.023 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.024 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.025 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.026 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.027 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.028 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.029 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.030 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.031 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.032 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.033 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.034 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.035 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.036 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.037 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.038 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.039 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.040 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.041 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.042 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.043 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.044 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.045 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.046 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1528.047 ======================================================================= WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING November 3, 2011 ======================================================================= RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER General Martinez. Irregular Warfare has become even more important in dealing with global security threats. The Air Force must continue to maintain the ability to respond with kinetic capability as well as build partnerships with other air forces to bolster international cooperation, sustain powerful, global forces for stability, and ensure access to the global commons. The FY12 PB continues to support the ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) personnel and infrastructure needed to successfully prosecute the irregular campaigns we have in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the foreseeable future, we expect this demand for ISR to continue. The Air Force will also continue to engage in aviation partnering activities with foreign nations in order to develop professional aviators, support staff and effective infrastructure. There are extremely difficult decisions the Air Force will have to make to prioritize limited resources and prepare for a wide range of evolving security threats the nation might face. These decisions must be based on strategic considerations, not compelled solely by budget targets. The Air Force will prudently evaluate the future security environment, deliberately accept risk, and devise strategies that mitigate those risks in order to maintain effective capabilities against those evolving threats. [See page 20.] ______ RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS General Martinez. The interagency relationship between the US Air Force (USAF) and Department of State (DoS), as well as USAID, is very strong and growing stronger. Both in terms of philosophical recognition among Air Force leadership for the need for a closely-linked interagency team and in terms of formal programs and communications, the USAF and DoS are working together every day. While we are making excellent progress building the interagency relationship, we are still striving to improve. First and foremost, we need to better communicate our current efforts, progress made, and continuing opportunities both inside and outside the departments to help improve interagency coordination and interaction. Second, we must continue to support our existing interagency training and outreach efforts with sufficient personnel, funding, and policy to ensure these activities will endure. In terms of conventional, steady-state forces, USAF-DoS exchanges are well-supported on both sides of the interagency team. The USAF currently has 21 positions embedded within DoS, with plans to expand to 25 under the new draft agreement between the departments, including a Major General who serves as the Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Political-Military Affairs Bureau. DoS, in turn, provides up to 10 Foreign Policy Advisors to USAF commands. In addition, advisors are provided to warfighting commanders on an as needed basis to establish greater interagency cooperation in current planning and operations. In this way, future DoS leaders are gaining more experience working with their defense counterparts. We have several programs that are aimed at improving the knowledge, capability, and integration between the USAF and DoS. In 2004, the Air Force initiated the Political-Military Affairs Strategist (PAS) program to develop interagency and international expertise among its future senior leaders. Each year, the program competitively selects up to 100 mid-level Air Force officers who have shown the potential for advancement to senior level positions and provides them formal education and on-the-job experience in a position with strong interagency and/or international engagement. Upon completion of the program, the officers are placed back on their primary career path for command, joint staff, and other career-developing positions. In addition, the Air Force has up to 5 field grade officers per year completing their intermediate- or senior-level service school through a fellowship at DoS. In these ways, the Air Force is developing a cadre of mid-level officers who will be tracked throughout their careers for their acquired political-military expertise and future senior-leader assignments. It should be noted that among these officers, promotion rates have exceed the Air Force averages to Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel. Beyond these dedicated political-military affairs specialists, interagency lessons have been built into the curriculums of our professional military education, and the interagency training opportunities being offered to both our Regional Affairs and International Health Specialist career fields are further expanding interagency awareness and opportunities throughout the force. [See page 29.] ======================================================================= QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING November 3, 2011 ======================================================================= QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER Mr. Miller. Following up on DOD Directive 3000.05, issued in 2005, DOD Instruction 3000.05, issued in 2009, states that it is DOD policy that Stability Operations ``shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.'' Despite this clear directive, and despite being fully-engaged in counterinsurgency campaigns for the past 10 years, our combat units devote only a fraction of their pre-deployment training to attaining proficiency in stability operations. What is being done to address this disparity? General Bayer. The Army must prevail in current fights while ensuring that we retain depth and versatility as the Nation's force of decisive action across the range of military operations. Future battlefields will be populated with hybrid threats: combinations of regular, irregular, terrorist, and criminal groups. The Army must retain the flexibility to operate both in missions requiring maneuver over extended distances, and in missions requiring the establishment of security over wide areas; whatever the threat. During these campaigns, re-establishing security is an essential prerequisite for a return to civilian control. Until that is done, deploying forces must be prepared to protect themselves and defeat any threat they may encounter while performing their mission. As host nation security forces assume a larger role in maintaining the security environment, fewer U.S. security forces are required for that role--as is the case now in Afghanistan where an increasing percentage of U.S. Army personnel are required for security force assistance. The Army established the 162nd Brigade at Fort Polk, Louisiana, in May 2009 to train deploying advisory teams. In response to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Army increased the 162nd's capability to provide increased training support to stability operations. Beginning in February 2012, the U.S. Army Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk will integrate the training of a significantly increased number of Security Force Assistance Teams responding to Theater requirements. The Army requires all deploying forces/personnel to meet theater-specified counter-insurgency (COIN) qualification requirements. Furthermore, the leadership in all deploying combat brigades, division, and corps attend a COIN seminar conducted by the Army's COIN center of excellence at Fort Leavenworth. Stability operations are being internalized by the Army. Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0, Unified Operations, recognizes stability operations as integral to decisive action by Army units during unified operations. Rotations at U.S. Army Combat Training Centers for non-deploying forces are being redesigned to emphasize combined arms operations and wide area security, both of which are Army core competencies that enable return to civilian control. Additionally, the Army is developing a concept to regionally align a brigade with security cooperation capability/training to each geographic Combatant Commanders. Mr. Miller. Following up on DOD Directive 3000.05, issued in 2005, DOD Instruction 3000.05, issued in 2009, states that it is DOD policy that Stability Operations ``shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.'' Despite this clear directive, and despite being fully-engaged in counterinsurgency campaigns for the past 10 years, our combat units devote only a fraction of their pre-deployment training to attaining proficiency in stability operations. What is being done to address this disparity? Admiral Harris. The Navy routinely conducts Stability Operations as part of its forward presence, as evidenced by humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR) operations from the sea in Haiti, Pakistan, and Japan, coalition counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, support to NATO forces operating in Libya, support to USCG law enforcement activities, and Partnership Station engagement in the Pacific, Africa, and Latin America. Over the past three years, the Navy has under taken a number of initiatives to enhance its capabilities in this mission area. Admiral Roughhead, as CNO, established the Navy Irregular Warfare Office (NIWO) in July 2008 as the Navy's advocate for actions subsequently directed by DoDD 3000.07 and DoDI 3000.05. The Navy Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges, promulgated in January 2010, places special emphasis on Stability Operations and building partner capacity as a measure to prevent instability. NIWO works closely with the OPNAV staff, other Services, USSOCOM, geographic combatant commands, the Interagency and foreign partners to advance comprehensive approaches for preventing and responding to instability. With regard to pre-deployment training, deploying Navy units participate in Agile Quest, a Special Operations Force (SOF)-Fleet training exercise, Amphibious Task Group work ups, and leader training in Naval War College Maritime Staff Officer Courses. The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) established the Expeditionary Training Group (ETG) to conduct a range of Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESF), Riverine, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit (MDSU), Expeditionary Intel and Civil Affairs integrated training, focused on Phase Zero stability operations to build partner maritime capacity. This training emphasizes Joint, Coalition and Interagency coordination to achieve partner nation security objectives. In addition, the ETG has been designated the executive agent by U.S. Fleet Forces and Pacific Fleet commands to conduct staff planning and mission rehearsal for Navy Partnership Station deployments to the Pacific, Africa, and Southern commands. These missions, conducted in cooperation with U.S. country teams, work closely with the navies and civilian authorities of developing nations to enhance stability. NECC has established, trained, and deployed crisis response Adaptive Force Packages (AFPs), consisting of staff and seleted NECC forces, to respond to Humanitarian Asssitance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), Maritime Infrastructure Protection or other short fuse contingency missions. The Navy's specialized ability to support Stability Operations exists in the NECC Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command (MCASTC). MCASTC provides Maritime Civil Affairs Teams for routine deployment in support of Fleet Civil Military Operations and when required, for specific support to Counterinsurgency, Counterterror, Foreign Internal Defense, and Security Cooperation missions. MCASTC maintains Maritime Civil Affairs Teams as an on-call surge capability for HA/DR efforts such as operation UNIFIED RESPONSE in Haiti. Additionally specialized Civil Affairs Staff units are available to augment Fleet and Joint Task Force staffs planning Security Force Assistance missions. MCASTC provides Security Assistance detachments and tailored mobile training teams (MTTs) that conduct maritime security force assistance to bolster State Department led Maritime Security Sector Reform efforts. Navy technology investments in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) (e.g. Fire Scout, STUAS, Scan Eagle), new UAV payloads, and information sharing and fusion techniques are enabling information dominance among fleet units, SOF, and coalition partners who respond to instability. Incorporating advanced technologies for mine hunting and neutralization on LCS will improve the Navy's ability to conduct Stability Operations in contested waters. Additionally, the Navy is pursuing a number of initiatives to codify its doctrine and operating concepts for Stability Operations and IW-related activities. A forthcoming tri-service Navy-Marine Corps- Coast Guard doctrine for conducting maritime stability operations will acknowledge the importance of this mission area and improve planning and coordination of Stability Operations with interagency, NGO, and coalition partners. The Naval War College recently conducted a comprehensive maritime stability operations game involving U.S. government, NGO, industry, and coalition naval partners. The Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG), also at the Naval War College, conducts annual symposia related to irregular warfare and stability issues. The Navy maintains liaisons at the Department of State and USAID to provide increased awareness and information sharing, which is key to future operations. The Naval Post Graduate School offers two masters programs related to IW (Special Ops/IW and Security Affairs and Reconstruction). Last summer, Johns Hopkins University/ Applied Physics Lab (JHU/APL) conducted a collaborative study on Navy Roles and Capabilities in CIC. It analyzed capability gaps for stability operations, steady state security force assistance, and maritime security operations. The objective of each of these initiatives is to increase understanding of roles naval forces play in Stability Operations and to improve the Navy's integration with the efforts of other agencies, organizations and foreign partners. Mr. Miller. Following up on DOD Directive 3000.05, issued in 2005, DOD Instruction 3000.05, issued in 2009, states that it is DOD policy that Stability Operations ``shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.'' Despite this clear directive, and despite being fully-engaged in counterinsurgency campaigns for the past 10 years, our combat units devote only a fraction of their pre-deployment training to attaining proficiency in stability operations. What is being done to address this disparity? General O'Donohue. Pre-deployment training is based on each unit's approved mission essential task list (METL) and the pre-deployment training requirements established by the Marine forces component commander. Units preparing for deployment receive extensive pre- deployment training in irregular warfare, including the tasks and activities required in stability operations. This training uses a building block approach, beginning with individual skills such as cultural and language training, and progresses through increasing levels of collective training. Pre-deployment training culminates with a comprehensive 25-day exercise known as Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV). The final phase of EMV is a mission rehearsal exercise that provides a rigorous assessment of a unit's ability to execute operations using culturally-relevant role players and realistic irregular warfare scenarios. The Marine Corps also recognizes that interoperability with our joint, interagency and multinational partners is essential to success in the complex operating environments that characterize irregular warfare and stability operations. Our service-level pre-deployment training incorporates joint, interagency and multinational partners into a dynamic, capabilities-based training program in order to prepare our deploying forces for the full spectrum of military operations. With regard to joint training, the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) provides the primary means to incorporate joint context into USMC training events. The Marine Corps currently has five accredited JNTC programs. In interagency training, our ongoing interagency (IA) initiatives are designed to:
Expand and improve IA integration for both theater- specific and non-theater specific training. Improve coordination and increase IA participation in USMC training by aligning service requirements to the IA's internal tasking process. Enhances our awareness of our IA partners' roles and capabilities. Increase our forces' participation in IA-sponsored training, such as the Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Development for Afghanistan Pre-deployment Training (ADAPT) and Afghanistan Field Orientation Training offered at the Foreign Service Institute. In multinational training, our primary goal is to prepare our forces and their coalition partners to operate together in Afghanistan. Our training focuses on operational level interaction through reciprocal participation in mission rehearsal exercises with partner nations. We are also pursing improved interoperability at the institutional level through staff and instructor exchange programs. Looking ahead, our Training and Education Command is coordinating with selected coalition partners to explore future training opportunities in a post-OEF environment. In summary, our pre-deployment training strives to prepare our forces for potential missions in the most effective and efficient manner possible. Our unqualified operational success, spanning more than 10 years of continuous operations, validates our approach. Mr. Miller. Following up on DOD Directive 3000.05, issued in 2005, DOD Instruction 3000.05, issued in 2009, states that it is DOD policy that Stability Operations ``shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.'' Despite this clear directive, and despite being fully-engaged in counterinsurgency campaigns for the past 10 years, our combat units devote only a fraction of their pre-deployment training to attaining proficiency in stability operations. What is being done to address this disparity? General Martinez. As directed by DoDD 3000.05, Stability Operations, the Air Force implemented Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-43, Stability Operations, 16 May 2011, detailing Air Force support of stability operations. Stability Operations is a core US military mission and the Air Force provides tailored training to all deploying personnel based on mission requirements. Training for stability operations is incorporated into pre-deployment training for personnel deploying to Afghanistan and all units have been directed to comply with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness' Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 11-002--Counterinsurgency (COIN) Training and Reporting Guidance for Preparing U.S. Forces to Succeed in Afghanistan and Pakistan. ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING Mr. Schilling. How can the organic base help address the new challenges that the military faces with irregular warfare? How has it done to this date and how can it improve? General Bayer. The Army's organic industrial base (OIB), consisting of manufacturing arsenals, ammunition plants, and maintenance depots, has the capability to respond quickly to support conventional and irregular warfare requirements. As an example of responding to irregular warfare, the Rock Island Arsenal counteracted the enemy's use of improvised explosive devices during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom by manufacturing specialized armor kits for tactical wheeled vehicles to protect the Warfighter from roadside bombs. Current OIB facility capabilities can also be expanded through the establishment of public-private partnerships with private industry partners to support emerging requirements to counteract irregular warfare tactics. The Army continually improves this process through enhanced communication with its private industry partners and through its assessment of current and anticipated irregular warfare techniques. Mr. Schilling. We have continued to hear that the military will need to reorganize how it works in order to deal with the upcoming budget cuts. How will this reorganization affect the way in which you can address irregular warfare in the future? Are there ways that Congress can help, outside of funding, to ensure that any changes to the DOD will facilitate your ability to address irregular warfare now and in the future? General Bayer. The biggest institutional challenge, given fiscal constraints, will be ensuring the right mix of capability to support our mission and requirements. The Army must maintain the full capability to conduct Unified Land Operations to seize, retain and exploit the initiative through the decisive action of offensive, defense or stability operations. Our nation demands we be prepared to operate successfully across this expansive mission set. Future battlefields will be populated with hybrid threats: combinations of regular, irregular, terrorist, and criminal groups. The Army must retain the flexibility to operate both in missions requiring maneuver over extended distances, and in missions requiring the establishment of security over wide areas; whatever the threat. As pressures for cuts in defense spending and force structures increase, the Army must assess which capabilities to emphasize, how many of each, and at what level; finding the right mix will be a challenge. As we have learned from the last ten years, the military cannot succeed in today's operating environment alone. Full integration of U.S. Government capability in planning, training, and conduct of irregular operations is critical to success. In future operating environments it will remain critical that the Joint and Interagency community develop a policy framework that enables a whole-of-government approach for operations that support irregular warfare. Likewise, the Army will continue to improve its ability to team with partners in support of coalition operations in an irregular warfare context. Mr. Schilling. How can the organic base help address the new challenges that the military faces with irregular warfare? How has it done to this date and how can it improve? Admiral Harris. Navy forces are inherently agile, and their multi- mission capabilities enable them to operate across the full range of military operations. The same type of Sailors that supported Operation Tomodachi also supported Operation Odyssey Dawn. The same training to confront irregular challenges provided to Sailors deploying from San Diego is given in Norfolk as well. With growing emphasis on fleet- special operations forces (SOF) interoperability, the Navy's role in countering terrorism, piracy, and other forms of instability by, with, and through a variety of partners is rapidly expanding. The Navy is also working to provide better equipment and tactics to the fleet. Among these improvements are expanded use of UAVs and new payloads to expand collection opportunities, new protocols for fusing intelligence at local levels, and information sharing protocols that will leverage the contributions of coalition partners. Expanded research and development of mine hunting and neutralization technologies will enable fleet forces to operate more effectively in littoral areas where irregular challenges must be addressed. The Navy's emphasis on building partner security capacity is reflected in the establishment of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command and its Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command (MCASTC). MCASTC provides Security Assistance Detachments; mobile training teams (MTTs) that conduct security force assistance with the navies of developing countries and support the Navy's partnership programs in the Pacific, Africa, and Latin America. More Navy personnel are receiving Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) training and its Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program is expanding to meet new requirements. Notwithstanding many initiatives to enhance Navy irregular warfare capabilities, improving the Navy's capacity to address dynamic security challenges through prevention and flexible response is wholly dependent on the size of its fleet. Mr. Schilling. We have continued to hear that the military will need to reorganize how it works in order to deal with the upcoming budget cuts. How will this reorganization affect the way in which you can address irregular warfare in the future? Are there ways that Congress can help, outside of funding, to ensure that any changes to the DOD will facilitate your ability to address irregular warfare now and in the future? Admiral Harris. As ADM Greenert stated during his House Armed Service Committee hearing on the Future of the Military Services and the Consequences of Defense Sequestration on 2 November 2011, ``We do our best operating forward at what I call the strategic maritime crossroads. [ . . . ] We have to be prepared. We have to respond when tasked, and our challenge is to posture for that possibility.'' The strength of Navy forces resides in its multi-mission nature and the ability to operate across the full spectrum of naval operations in peacetime, combat, contingency, and pre-crisis conditions. The Navy's ability to respond to security challenges, including those involving irregular threats, depends on its ability to sustain forward presence in regions key to U.S. national interests. The size of the fleet directly determines the level of that presence. A reduction in the Navy's operating and procurement budgets may also have an adverse affect on our mission priorities, requiring the Navy to ``buy risk'' if forced to determine what it can accomplish and what it can't with a reduced fleet (e.g., the need to choose between competing destabilizing threats due to reduced forward presence). If budget cuts reduce the Navy's capacity to maintain its current level of forward presence, careful prioritization will be required along with possible greater emphasis on building partner capacity to offset reduced presence. Aside from contributing to stable maritime governance in regions of strategic importance, Navy efforts to build partner capacity can also help maintain the Navy's core mission skills and enable the U.S. to peacefully compete for influence with rising regional powers. If a smaller Navy becomes a reality with a shift in emphasis to bolstering maritime partner capacity, the Congress could adjust authorities to facilitate broader partner training roles for the Navy. However, operating under new authorities without additional funding will undoubtedly have a negative impact on the Navy's readiness to accomplish its core missions (e.g. 10 USC 168 grants authorities for military-to-military contacts and comparable activities, but has yet to be accompanied by specific appropriations, resulting in a lack of ability to execute the functions enumerated in the statute under its authority). Mr. Schilling. How can the organic base help address the new challenges that the military faces with irregular warfare? How has it done to this date and how can it improve? General O'Donohue. The Commandant of the Marine Corps' Planning Guidance states that the demand for military forces with irregular warfare (IW) capabilities will expand over the next two decades. With that in mind, the Marine Corps has taken aggressive steps to posture itself to meet the full spectrum of IW challenges. One of the key areas in which the Marine Corps has bolstered its ability to support IW operations is in the organic base. The Marine Corps maintains two organic depot-maintenance sites--one in Albany, GA, and one in Barstow, CA. Both sites are structured and designed to respond rapidly to the ever-changing requirements of the operating forces. In addition to the two U.S.-based sites, the Marine Corps has also established forward- deployed logistics nodes in the Central Command Theater to serve as hubs for a wide range of logistics functions. These logistics hubs routinely support Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) and Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) forces in the Central Command Theater by providing a robust forward-deployed maintenance capability and ensuring that worn equipment expeditiously enters the maintenance cycle in CONUS when required. The Marine Corps' organic base also supports the Urgent Universal Needs (UNS) process, acting as the choice source of repair to upgrade and maintain a variety of equipment sets, including the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) family of vehicles, the Ground Based Operational Surveillance System (G-BOSS), mobile trauma bays and gunner shields for special-operations forces, to name a few. All of these equipment sets directly support IW missions. Additionally, Marine Corps Logistics Command's Innovation Lab has the capability to reverse- engineer, design and field various parts, components and platforms to meet the Marine Corps' diverse range of IW requirements. The Marine Corps' recruit training depots at Parris Island and San Diego and Officer Candidates School at Quantico provide entry level training that is essential to the process of transforming young men and women from civilians into Marines. This training lays the foundation for developing the widely-varied skills needed to succeed in irregular warfare. Central to the transformation process is a rigorous values- based training program that strives to inculcate our core values in all Marines and provides an essential foundation for developing the ethical decision-making skills needed in the complex operational environments that characterize irregular warfare. At the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 29 Palms, California, our MAGTF Training Command provides a rigorous, pre-deployment training program that serves as ``graduate'' level training for our units preparing to deploy to OEF. This training covers the entire irregular warfare spectrum from live fire, combined arms training based on kinetic counterinsurgency scenarios to non-live fire force-on-force training events that prepare our units for the subtler forms of influence used in stability operations, such as key leader engagements and training indigenous security forces. To date, the Marine Corps has done an excellent job addressing emerging IW challenges. The Marine Corps' middleweight force structure makes it the ideal force to support IW engagements, as the Corps is light enough to get there quickly, heavy enough to carry the day upon arrival, and fully capable of operating independent of local infrastructure. The flexibility, responsiveness and robust capabilities of the organic base will continue to be key enablers of the Marine Corps' ability to counter IW threats in the future. Improvements and advancements in the areas of technology, specifically with regard to mission rehearsal systems and identity dominance will be necessary in order to keep the military ahead of the enemy. The organic base must stay healthy and resourced to maximize effectiveness and enable the best support to IW challenges of the 21st century. Mr. Schilling. We have continued to hear that the military will need to reorganize how it works in order to deal with the upcoming budget cuts. How will this reorganization affect the way in which you can address irregular warfare in the future? Are there ways that Congress can help, outside of funding, to ensure that any changes to the DOD will facilitate your ability to address irregular warfare now and in the future? General O'Donohue. The Marine Corps is the nation's expeditionary force in readiness. As such it is prepared for all manner of crises and contingencies. It recognizes the complex, highly adaptive threats that we face. In the future, as in the past, multiple regional powers and a host of lethal groups will exploit numerous seeds of instability, proliferating increasingly lethal technology and extremist ideology while leveraging the advantages of networks hidden amongst the population. Marines are prepared to meet that challenge with our Navy, Special Operations, Army, Air Force and interagency partners. As we look to the future, the post-Operation Enduring Freedom Marine Corps is fundamentally different from the current and pre-9/11 force. It draws on a rich history of innovations in irregular warfare but is recast as a scalable crisis response force ready to counter complex irregular, conventional and hybrid threats--and the gray areas in between. We have substantially invested in relevant organizations such as Marine Special Operations, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, partnering, civil affairs, electronic warfare, cyber, regionally oriented command and control, and information operations. Tasked organized with our highly trained line units, these enablers provide versatile, scalable capability for a broad range of missions to include deterrence, counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, partnering, reinforcement to our allies, humanitarian assistance, and assured access for the joint force under any condition our national interests require. In his 2010 planning guidance, the Commandant, General James Amos, provided specific guidance for strengthening and consolidating irregular warfare organizations. We have increased the size of the Center for Irregular Warfare Integration Division and tasked them to deliberately assess our capabilities for future irregular warfare. This is intended to integrate joint and interagency practices with our current guidance and insights in order to ensure a holistic approach to identifying and implementing necessary changes. We consolidated two organizations into the new Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG), which provides pre-deployment training and other support to operating forces that conduct training and advisory missions in each of the geographic combatant command areas of responsibility. The Marine Corps is further expanding the Foreign Area Officer/Regional Area Officer (FAO/RAO) program to the enlisted ranks in the form of Foreign Area Staff Non Commissioned Officers/ Regional Affairs Non Commissioned Officers (FAS/RAS). The Marine Corps has doubled the size of its Civil Affairs Groups, growing from two to four and increasing them in size. It has led DOD in the creation of an automated Irregular Warfare Manpower Skills Tracking system that enables commanders to easily identify Marines with documented civilian education, military skills and experience that could be useful in the conduct of IW. Language, regional, and culture training and education efforts were developed in response to validated operational requirements. The overall regionalization and specialization effort extends across DOTMLPF. The Center for Advanced Operational Culture and Learning (CAOCL) provides standards-based training throughout the operating forces and has implemented the Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization Program (RCLFP) as a mandatory component of both resident and distance education throughout a Marine's career. These programs are assisted by the creation of Language Learning Resource Centers at major bases. Effectively countering irregular threats relies primarily on non- materiel aspects of preparing Marines for Irregular Warfare (IW) activities. Acknowledging upcoming reorganization, addressing irregular warfare operations capabilities does not rely solely on a specific organization or organizations. Addressing IW relies on the successful integration of IW-related capabilities across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities spectrum. The Marine Corps will maintain its focus on maximizing efficiency in these capabilities: institutionalization of IW training and education; train, advise, and assist foreign security forces; language and culture expertise; attacking the network; population based intelligence; interagency coordination and collaboration; non-lethal weapons engagement; identity dominance; and information operations. The Marine Corps will continue to follow the guidance and orders of the President and the Office of the Secretary of Defense when training and equipping Marines to succeed in irregular warfare operations. Opportunities to further increase IW capability and readiness could include: Adapt collaborative frameworks to plan, act, assess, and adapt: Alignment of various interagency planning processes with Defense processes could avoid imbalances in assessment, planning, and execution. Support the development of National Security/Interagency professionals: Career paths which give career professionals incentives to pursue diverse interagency experience, education, and training. This could yield structures and personnel which are better able to coordinate and collaborate as national security partners. Mr. Schilling. How can the organic base help address the new challenges that the military faces with irregular warfare? How has it done to this date and how can it improve? General Martinez. The ``organic base'' is not associated with any Air Force, force structure or Title 10 function. The term often referred to as the ``organic base'' is used to describe an assortment of arsenals, maintenance depots and ammunition factories which are operated, funded and modernized by the US Army. Mr. Schilling. We have continued to hear that the military will need to reorganize how it works in order to deal with the upcoming budget cuts. How will this reorganization affect the way in which you can address irregular warfare in the future? Are there ways that Congress can help, outside of funding, to ensure that any changes to the DOD will facilitate your ability to address irregular warfare now and in the future? General Martinez. Within our current organizational structure, the Air Force is prepared to conduct direct action irregular warfare effectively and efficiently. Indirect IW capabilities supporting building partner capacity are effective but less well developed. The Air Force has added an additional mission, building security capacity of partner nations, to contingency response wings and groups in Air Mobility Command, Pacific Air Forces, and U.S. Air Forces Europe. Units are aligned with specific regions of the world to support these operations. Additionally, two mobility support advisory squadrons recently established initial operational capability at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey and Travis Air Force Base, California, and form the core of our general purpose force security force assistance capability. Between our traditional aviation and irregular warfare capabilities, the Air Force can provide joint force commanders tremendous capabilities for future irregular warfare operations. Upcoming budget cuts, however, will impact how many of those operations the Air Force may be able to respond to at any one time. Building partnership capacity, a resource-intensive mission, requires adequate authorities and predictable funding. Legal authorities and funding for partner nations are complex, confusing, and restrictive--a vestige of the Cold War. For example, Title 10 U.S.C. appropriations may not be used for the explicit purpose of building capacity in the DOD to train foreign partners. These restrictions inhibit Security Force Assistance air advising and aviation enterprise development. Further, single-year funding restrictions cause difficulty in developing long-range plans for countries of interest. However, USD(P) along with DoS have included a FY12 legislative proposal to establish the Global Contingency Security Fund that should streamline authorities and funding.