    [House Hearing, 112 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 112-78]

       NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION IN RUSSIA AND CHINA: UNDERSTANDING
                          IMPACTS TO THE UNITED STATES

                                   __________

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                OCTOBER 14, 2011

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                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                         MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman
    TRENT FRANKS, Arizona                LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado               JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   RICK LARSEN, Washington
    MAC THORNBERRY, Texas                MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    MIKE ROGERS, Alabama                 JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
    JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana     C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
    SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia               BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
    AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
                     Drew Walter, Professional Staff Member
                    Leonor Tomero, Professional Staff Member
                     Alejandra Villarreal, Staff Assistant

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                         CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
                                      2011

                                                                       Page

    Hearing:

    Friday, October 14, 2011, Nuclear Weapons Modernization in Russia
      and China: Understanding Impacts to the United States..........     1

    Appendix:

    Friday, October 14, 2011.........................................    23
                                  ----------

                            FRIDAY, OCTOBER 14, 2011
       NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION IN RUSSIA AND CHINA: UNDERSTANDING
                          IMPACTS TO THE UNITED STATES
                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking
      Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     4
    Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Fisher, Richard D., Jr., Senior Fellow, International Assessment
      and Strategy Center............................................     7
    Lewis, Dr. Jeffrey, Director, East Asia Nonproliferation Program,
      James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey
      Institute of International Studies.............................     9
    Schneider, Dr. Mark B., Senior Analyst, National Institute for
      Public Policy..................................................     5

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Fisher, Richard D., Jr.......................................    48
        Lewis, Dr. Jeffrey...........................................    73
        Sanchez, Hon. Loretta........................................    31
        Schneider, Dr. Mark B........................................    33
        Turner, Hon. Michael.........................................    27

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        Letter from General Chilton and Admiral Mullen...............    85
        Executive Summary from Study Commissioned by the Defense
          Threat Reduction Agency....................................    86
        Excerpt Concerning Underground Tunnels from Department of
          Defense 2011 Report on China...............................    87

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Ms. Sanchez..................................................    96
        Mr. Turner...................................................    91
       NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION IN RUSSIA AND CHINA: UNDERSTANDING
                          IMPACTS TO THE UNITED STATES

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                              Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                              Washington, DC, Friday, October 14, 2011.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:38 a.m., in
    room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Turner
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
            OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Mr. Turner. Good morning. I want to welcome everyone to the
    Strategic Forces Subcommittee's hearing on ``Nuclear Weapons
    Modernization in Russia and China: Understanding Impacts to the
    United States.''
        This hearing is very timely because we are currently faced
    with a highly uncertain future regarding our own nuclear
    deterrent modernization program. Despite commitments from many
    key leaders, that modernization of our nuclear weapons
    stockpile, delivery systems, and supporting infrastructure is
    critically needed.
        We are on the verge of halting our modernization program
    before it even begins. The fiscal year 2012 Energy and Water
    appropriation bills currently in Congress would make dramatic
    cuts to nuclear modernization funding levels that were agreed
    to last year by the President and Senate during consideration
    on the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] treaty.
        In that context, it is important to understand if and how
    other countries, especially China and Russia, are modernizing
    their nuclear forces and how that modernization should impact
    our decisions here in the United States.
        To help us explore these issues, we have before us several
    distinguished non-governmental experts on nuclear weapons
    program strategies and forces in China and Russia.
        They are Dr. Mark Schneider, Senior Analyst, National
    Institute for Public Policy; Mr. Richard Fisher, Jr., Senior
    Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center; and Dr.
    Jeffrey Lewis, Director, East Asia Nonproliferation Program,
    James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey
    Institute of International Studies.
        Thank you all for joining us today. We appreciate you
    sharing your insights with us. Based upon your written
    statements, you all seem to be in agreement that Russia and
    China are modernizing their nuclear forces.
        Dr. Schneider, you point out that ``Russia is modernizing
    every leg of its nuclear triad with new, more advanced
    systems,'' including new ballistic missile submarines, new
    heavy ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] carrying up
    to 15 warheads each, new shorter-range ballistic missiles, and
    new low-yield warheads.
        You highlight a series of disturbing statements by senior
    Russian officials regarding how Russia has come to put
    increased emphasis on nuclear weapons in military planning,
    including a possible intention to use nuclear weapons first in
    an attempt to end regional- or even local-level conventional
    wars.
        Dr. Schneider, you also reference information that Russia
    may possibly be violating the Intermediate Nuclear Forces
    Treaty. If true, this is deeply disturbing. I hope you will
    discuss this in the summary of your remarks.
        Mr. Fisher, you point out that China is steadily increasing
    the numbers and capabilities of the ballistic missiles it
    deploys and is upgrading older ICBMs to newer, more advanced
    systems. China also appears to be actively working to develop a
    submarine-based nuclear deterrent force, something it has never
    had.
        Your testimony also highlights reports of a very large
    tunnel system China has constructed. A recent unclassified
    Department of Defense report says that this network of tunnels
    could be in excess of 5,000 kilometers and is used to transport
    nuclear weapons and forces.
        An unclassified study commissioned by the Defense Threat
    Reduction Agency, and conducted by Dr. Phillip Karber out of
    Georgetown, is about to be released, which goes into even
    greater detail on this worrying development.
        As we strive to make our nuclear forces more transparent,
    China is building this underground tunnel system to make its
    nuclear forces even more opaque.
        Dr. Lewis, from your prepared statement, it appears that
    while you agree with your fellow witnesses that China and
    Russia are modernizing, you likely don't agree with them on
    what the implications of that modernization are for the United
    States and for our decisionmaking.
        But you do caution that some of the modernization efforts
    in China and Russia could lead to instability in a crisis. In
    particular, I would appreciate if in your opening statement you
    would touch on the stability implications of deployment of a
    heavy, multiple-warhead, fixed silo-based ICBM in Russia as
    well as China's nuclear force concept of operations--which
    requires arming their delivery systems in a crisis.
        With all of this modernization going on in Russia and
    China--and every other nuclear power--our own nuclear
    modernization program may never get past the ``plan'' stage.
        Last December, President Obama and the Senate agreed to
    robust funding for nuclear modernization efforts. In letters to
    the Senate, President Obama agreed to modernize the strategic
    triad of delivery systems and accelerate key infrastructure
    products at NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration]
    labs and plants.
        The President also said, ``I recognize that nuclear
    modernization requires investment for the long-term, in
    addition to this one-year budget increase. That is my
    commitment to the Congress--that my Administration will pursue
    these programs and capabilities for as long as I am
    President.''
        The President came through on this pledge in his budget
    request, and then the House supported full funding for NNSA in
    fiscal year 2012 Budget Act and the Fiscal Year 2012 National
    Defense Authorization Act. But now, that commitment is falling
    apart and stalling. The fiscal year 2012 Energy and Water
    appropriations bills would cut NNSA funding by up to 10 percent
    for the budget request and the current continuing resolution
    returns NNSA to 1.5 percent less than fiscal year 2011 levels.
        In the House, 65 Members signed on to a letter--one that
    contains gross inaccuracies about the cost of sustaining and
    modernizing our stockpile--calling for over $200 billion in
    cuts of nuclear weapons funding over 10 years.
        Considering that the budget for sustaining, operating, and
    modernizing our nuclear weapons complex and nuclear forces is
    on the order of $220 billion over the next 10 years, the cuts
    proposed in this letter would amount to unilateral disarmament.
    I was disappointed to see that so many of my colleagues signed
    on to such an irrational proposal.
        But I am thankful that all of my majority colleagues on
    this subcommittee are standing firm for the need for
    modernization. We recently sent a letter to four key Senate
    appropriators, asking them to stand by a written commitment the
    Senators had previously made to the President last December, in
    which they each pledged their ``support for ratification of the
    New START Treaty and full funding for the modernization of
    nuclear weapons arsenal.''
        No less an authority than the Secretary of Defense supports
    fully funding NNSA's nuclear modernization efforts. Just
    yesterday in testimony before our committee, Secretary Panetta
    said he ``certainly would oppose any reductions with regards to
    the funding for nuclear [modernization].'' This is a strong
    statement of support from a Secretary who is under intense
    pressure to cut defense spending.
        Secretary Panetta also said at yesterday's hearing, ``With
    regard to reducing our nuclear arena, I think that this is an
    area where I don't think we ought to do that unilaterally; we
    ought to do that on the basis of negotiations with the Russians
    and others to make sure that we are all walking the same
    path.''
        I couldn't agree more. That is why one of the New START
    Implementation Act provisions contained in the House-passed
    fiscal year 2012 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] link
    would ensure that we don't unilaterally reduce, and that any
    further reductions occur in conjunction with a formal treaty or
    an act of Congress.
        Today, we are going to examine nuclear modernization
    efforts in Russia and China. We need to understand what these
    countries are doing, in contrast to what we are doing. Our
    nuclear modernization plans is just that. It is just a plan.
        We are only beginning to embark on it. Meanwhile, these
    other countries continue to advance the capability and
    reliability of their nuclear forces. We need to understand the
    potential long-term consequences of watching as Russia and
    China modernize their nuclear arsenal--while we sit back and
    simply maintain our existing aging nuclear forces.
        With that, let me turn to my ranking member, Ms. Sanchez,
    for her opening statement and appreciate her.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the
    Appendix on page 27.]

       STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
      CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join Chairman
    Turner in welcoming Dr. Schneider, Mr. Fisher, and Dr. Lewis to
    this hearing about the modernization of Russia and China's
    nuclear weapons programs and the impact that it would have, and
    does have, on our nuclear policy and our posture.
        This is an issue, of course, of big interest to the
    subcommittee and this hearing is, I think, very useful as a
    follow-on to the classified briefings that our subcommittee has
    recently received on nuclear weapons programs earlier this
    summer.
        We have been working very hard to get everybody up to speed
    on this committee in an effort to, I think, have as unified a
    voice as we can about the security and issues that we have here
    on this committee.
        I think this is a very valuable opportunity for us to get a
    better understanding of where we believe modernization efforts,
    what direction they are going for both of these countries, the
    different models that are being used to maintain nuclear
    weapons, how these nuclear weapons, the modernization plans,
    add to the capability of Russia and China vis-a-vis our
    capabilities; whether they add to the deterrence in the sense
    of, if you have weapons does that deter others from using them
    and therefore nobody is using them or whether the fact that
    they are modernizing--how that impacts our own arsenal and what
    types of modernization efforts we might consider, considering
    that both the United States and Russia have over 95 percent of
    the nuclear weapons in the world's arsenal.
        Given those efforts, we want to do what is the best
    progress in making the changes that we need for our nuclear
    weapons policy. And in this context I would love to hear your
    views, particularly on how we can most effectively decrease the
    risk that nuclear weapons might be employed as a result of
    accidental or unauthorized launch. That is one of my biggest
    worries with respect to China and Russia. Do they have the
    capability to keep everything in check, even in chaotic times?
        On whether multilateral measures, such as the Comprehensive
    Test Ban Treaty, would help them for nuclear weapons
    modernization, and what must be done to preserve and to
    strengthen our strategic stability vis-a-vis what is going on
    with Russia and China?
        So I thank you for your expertise and our subcommittee
    looks forward to hearing from you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the
    Appendix on page 31.]
        Mr. Turner. Thank you.
        The subcommittee has received written statements from each
    of the witnesses, and without objection, these statements will
    be made part of the record.
        And now, we will turn to our witnesses and ask each to
    summarize their written statement in about 5 minutes. We will
    then proceed with Member questions.
        We will start with Dr. Schneider.

     STATEMENT OF DR. MARK B. SCHNEIDER, SENIOR ANALYST, NATIONAL
                      INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

        Dr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Minority
    Member Sanchez, and distinguished members of this committee,
    for inviting me to testify. I think this is a very important
    topic, nuclear deterrence. And the success of nuclear
    deterrence is absolutely critical.
        I believe that there is a great deal of similarity between
    Russia and China in terms of the modernization programs and the
    role of nuclear weapons and their strategy. There is very
    little similarity between their views and our views on nuclear
    weapons, and I think that creates a very dangerous situation,
    particularly if we make unilateral cuts in our capabilities.
        The Russians and the Chinese are modernizing every element
    of their strategic triad. There is no debate about that at all.
    You have the older programs which were begun in the 1990s that
    have now reached fruition, that they are either being deployed
    or just about to be deployed. That's the SS-27 and the Bulava-
    30 SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic missile] with a new Borei
    class submarine.
        In 2011, the Russians announced a major increase in nuclear
    delivery vehicle capabilities that involves four new or
    modified ICBMs and SLBMs. The most threatening is the new heavy
    ICBM, which is basically a cold war relic, and the main mission
    being counterforce attacks against the U.S. ICBM force.
        The general trend in their capabilities has been going to
    larger numbers of MIRV [multiple independently targetable
    reentry vehicle] weapons, the 10 to 15 you mentioned, Mr.
    Chairman, on the new heavy. And you know, numbers like 12, 10,
    6 on various other missiles. That is a major shift in their
    policy.
        The Chinese are deploying right now two new ICBMs, DF-31
    and DF-31A. They are building a new missile submarine, a new
    ballistic missile, and an improved bomber. The Chinese are much
    more secretive about their plans than the Russians are, and we
    have very incomplete information in many respects on that.
        But certainly there is evidence, particularly in the Asian
    press that they--and there is some confirmation of this in the
    Pentagon report on Chinese military power--that they are going
    to MIRV their ICBM and developing a new MIRV ICBM, referred to
    as DF-41 in the Asian press. And there are reports in the Asian
    press of one, possibly two, MIRV SLBMs. So we are seeing a
    major increase in capability.
        Both Russia and China are increasing. They have announced
    they are actually increasing the number of their nuclear
    weapons. In the case of Russia that is to build up to the New
    START levels, which they are currently below in terms of
    accountable warheads by 2018. However, since New START only
    counts one weapon per bomber, they could be as much as 800
    warheads above the New START limits. They have the countable
    number.
        The Russians and Chinese are developing new types of
    nuclear weapons. There is no dispute. There is no serious
    dispute about the case of Russians. Senior military leaders
    have actually said this on numerous occasions that, as Mr.
    Chairman Turner stated, they are developing low collateral
    damage and precision low-yield nuclear weapons. There are
    multiple sources of information on that.
        And there are reports that both are engaged in very low-
    yield nuclear testing. And that makes sense in light of the
    modernization program. Russia has literally thousands of
    nuclear weapons. The Obama administration has acknowledged that
    they have 10 times the number of weapons that we do.
        It is not only the numbers, it is the diversity of the
    weapons. They have capabilities to attack a wide variety of
    targets that we simply do not have the ability to attack,
    because of the unilateral reductions in our--well, not
    unilateral--reductions in our capability over the last 10 or 15
    years.
        Mr. Chairman, the reports of the new prohibited ground
    launch cruise missile are actually pretty common in the Russian
    press. They are concerned in the sense that they could be
    recreating what was supposedly eliminated with the--actually
    was, I believe, at the time--the Zero Option INF [Intermediate-
    Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty.
        I debated whether to put this into the statement, because I
    didn't want to distract attention from the broader aspects of
    the Russian programs. This is, I think, a very important thing.
    There are a large number of reports. It comes from people all
    over the political spectrum and in the Russian Federation.
        And I think in light of the number of reports and the
    nature of the people who are making these reports, the
    journalists and the arms control experts, I would take this
    very seriously. And I think it ought to be looked at on a
    serious basis.
        The Russian and Chinese have different--notionally
    different--nuclear doctrines. I think there is more similarity
    between China and Russia than the notional announced doctrines,
    in the sense I do not believe the Chinese ``no first use''
    policy is real. If you take a very close look at it, it doesn't
    commit them to anything because we were the first to use
    nuclear weapons to end World War II.
        And there are still reports in the Japanese press, the
    Kyodo News Agency, says they have obtained classified Chinese
    documents which talked about adjusting the nuclear use
    threshold and engaging in preemptive nuclear strikes in a
    conventional war.
        Russians are very overtly in that direction. This has been
    stated at the highest level, and in their published military
    doctrine they reserve the right to use nuclear weapons, not
    only in response to nuclear attack or a chemical or biological
    attack, but in conventional warfare under certain conditions.
        This is very disturbing, because they literally
    characterize the first use of nuclear weapons as de-escalation
    of the conflict. That is literally amazing. I mean, I cannot
    imagine anybody really believing that, but that is what they
    say.
        Mr. Turner. Dr. Schneider, I need you to conclude so we can
    move to the other witnesses and then get to questions. If you
    could take just a few moments to conclude your statement?
        Dr. Schneider. Okay, I will try to go very fast.
        The Russians exercise all the time in nuclear escalation
    scenarios in local warfare, and they also do major announced
    strategic nuclear exercises. I believe a lot of this is
    political intimidation. The Russians have engaged in numerous
    types of nuclear threats, including 15, approximately, high-
    level nuclear targeting threats.
        They fly bombers into air defense identification zones of
    the U.S., NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and Japan.
    The most recent one was on Wednesday of this week, where they
    precipitated defensive reactions by three NATO air forces. I
    regard that as beyond the pale.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Schneider can be found in
    the Appendix on page 33.]
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Dr. Schneider. As we ask questions,
    perhaps you can embellish with the remainder of your statement.
        Mr. Fisher.

          STATEMENT OF RICHARD D. FISHER, JR., SENIOR FELLOW,
              INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY CENTER

        Mr. Fisher. Thank you. Today, to assist this committee's
    deliberations on one of the most vexing challenges to the
    security of the United States: how to assess the future
    strategic nuclear capabilities of the People's Republic of
    China's People's Liberation Army, and how to plan for the U.S.
    strategic capabilities that will ensure deterrence of PRC
    [People's Republic of China] nuclear aggression and coercion
    against the United States, its friends and allies.
        Just as one citizen speaking for myself, I would like to
    thank the chairman and the members of this committee for taking
    the time to explore these issues you have listed for today's
    hearing, as they will have a direct bearing on decisions for
    which there may be little margin for error and will require the
    steady leadership of this committee.
        I am aware that your deliberations are now taking place in
    what could quickly become a dire budgetary environment, which
    has already caused deep bipartisan concern, to include many
    members of this committee, and as seen by the warnings over the
    last several days by Secretary of Defense Panetta.
        There has been speculation in the press of cutbacks in
    strategic systems. However, standing on my nearly two decades
    of research on China's general military trends, and focusing as
    well on its strategic modernization, I would add my voice of
    concern to those who are also raising concern about the
    potential cuts in our strategic capabilities that could follow
    from these widely reported budgetary reductions.
        By way of summarizing my written testimony for which I have
    submitted for the record, I would like to offer five main
    points about China's nuclear and military modernization.
        First, at this time in our relationship with the PRC, and
    perhaps as long as the Chinese Communist Party remains in
    power, it is not the time to be reducing American nuclear and
    conventional deterrent capabilities, especially in Asia.
        As the PRC leadership perceives weakness in the United
    States, it will be emboldened to take risks. The PRC has a
    history of engaging in optional wars, especially if it can
    change its strategic environment at very little cost. We have
    seen this in Vietnam, Korea, against India.
        And it is worth noting that the next leader of the PRC, Xi
    Jinping, for a time worked for a very high office in the PLA
    [People's Liberation Army] Central Military Commission while
    Deng Xiaoping was conducting a very successful war against
    Vietnam in 1979. He saw how to take risks militarily.
        From the Korean Peninsula to the Taiwan Strait, East China
    Sea, South China Sea, its support for nuclear and missile
    technology proliferation, its threatening behavior in the
    commons of cyberspace, space, the United States finds itself in
    some degree of confrontation with China, and sometimes rather
    alone.
        And while we can point to many positive actions and
    indications from the PRC, I do not believe that these include
    agreement on what levels of military transparency can lead to
    confidence, especially confidence regarding nuclear forces. The
    PRC in recent years has rejected real discussions with the
    United States that might lead to nuclear stability. But it is
    also not clear that China's potential demands to agree to
    nuclear stability would be acceptable to the United States.
        My second point is that it would be necessary to hold up
    what is accepted knowledge, what we think we know about PRC
    nuclear policies and strategies, to a much longer history of
    Chinese strategies that venerate deception. Will the PRC always
    have a small force focused on the needs of retaliation? The
    doubts that have already been raised about China's ``no first
    use'' policy. I would agree with that.
        And for a military that is now building toward global power
    projection capabilities--naval, air, airmobile army forces--
    what is to say that China will always be satisfied with a
    smallish nuclear force for just retaliation?
        My third point would be that it is important to understand
    the breadth and direction of the PLA's nuclear modernization as
    we try to understand their policies and their build-up. This
    question takes up most of my prepared testimony. At the top of
    my concerns would be how quickly will the PLA start to deploy
    new ICBMs and SLBMs with multiple warheads?
        There is a new large mobile ICBM for which we have had
    public imagery since 2007, but for which the Pentagon has not
    yet publicly identified. My sources suggest that this ICBM
    could carry up to 10 warheads. There is a potential for
    outfitting older DF-5 ICBMs and perhaps future versions of the
    DF-31 and JL-2.
        A second concern would be growth in the PLA's regional
    missile forces. Reports earlier this year indicate that they
    are now developing a new 4,000-kilometer IRBM [intermediate
    range ballistic missile] that could be ready by 2015 to
    supplement the DF-31 or DF-21 MRBM [medium range ballistic
    missile]. And we have seen phenomenal growth in the number of
    land attack cruise missiles.
        My third concern would be to monitor the PLA's progress in
    developing an eventual national missile defense capability and
    expanded space warfare capabilities.
        And my fourth point would be that one crucial difference
    between the challenges of deterring Russia and deterring the
    PRC pertains to the degree that China has abetted the nuclear
    capabilities of North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, helped them to
    become a network of proliferation.
        And these countries with their known relationships to
    terrorist organizations appear to be moving toward an age that
    may include nuclear terrorism. How does the United States--the
    United States, in my opinion, has failed to arrest China's
    support for this network. We may in the not-too-distant future
    be paying a very heavy price.
        And this leads to my fourth and final point, and I will
    conclude. Looking toward the future of the American nuclear
    deterrent posturing capability, looking into this decade and
    beyond, the deterrence challenge from the PRC is not just
    limited to the PRC per se, but should also include a network of
    dictatorships who either currently or imminently could have
    nuclear systems abetted by China.
        How do we convince the Chinese not just to stop abetting
    this network, but to help us roll it back? All of this points
    to me for a requirement for grave caution, especially as this
    committee considers very important questions about funding and
    preserving a nuclear deterrent capability that must be
    preserved.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Fisher can be found in the
    Appendix on page 48.]
        Mr. Turner. Thank you. Dr. Lewis.

          STATEMENT OF DR. JEFFREY LEWIS, DIRECTOR, EAST ASIA
           NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM, JAMES MARTIN CENTER FOR
     NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
                                STUDIES

        Dr. Lewis. Thank you. Well, it should go without saying
    that it is an honor to be here before you today. The place I
    would like to start is by noting that no country has used a
    nuclear weapon in anger since the end of the Second World War,
    and that our overriding interest is in continuing this norm
    against nuclear use.
        With the end of the cold war, I think today the principal
    danger is not a surprise attack or a bolt from the blue by
    Russia or China. Rather, the most plausible route to nuclear
    use is now an accident, an unauthorized use or miscalculation
    in a crisis. It is in the United States interest that we drive
    these risks as low as possible while maintaining our nuclear
    deterrent.
        It is sometimes said that the United States is the only
    country that is not modernizing its nuclear arsenal. I would
    submit that this is not true. In some cases phrases like
    nuclear modernization confuse the modernization of bombers,
    missiles, and submarines with the design of new nuclear
    warheads or new bombs.
        All states with nuclear weapons, including the United
    States, are replacing or modernizing delivery vehicles. The
    U.S. triad of strategic forces, ballistic missile submarines,
    intercontinental ballistic missiles and bombers, I believe
    remains the most professional, most capable, and best funded
    strategic force in the world.
        There are no countries producing ``new'' nuclear warheads
    today, although the United States, Russia, and China continue
    to manufacture nuclear warheads that were designed and tested
    before each signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in
    1996.
        Like the United States, both Russia and China are
    conducting subcritical experiments at their former nuclear test
    sites to support ongoing stockpile stewardship. Preparations
    for subcritical tasks are very difficult to distinguish from
    very low-yield ``hydronuclear tests.'' Russia and China could
    not, however, develop new nuclear weapons with yields that I
    would consider militarily significant without conducting tests
    large enough to be readily detected.
        Overall, I believe the United States is the best equipped
    of the three states to maintain its stockpile of nuclear
    weapons under the current moratorium on explosive nuclear
    testing. There is no one in the United States today who I
    believe would seriously propose swapping our nuclear stockpile
    and our triad of delivery vehicles for those of either Russia
    or China.
        It will not surprise you that I disagree with many of the
    assertions made about the details of Russia and China's
    programs today, but those details are not what is fundamentally
    important given the numbers that we are looking at right now.
    There are no foreseeable scenarios under which either country
    could initiate the use of nuclear weapons against the United
    States, our forces abroad, or allies without suffering
    overwhelming destruction that would outweigh any possible
    gains.
        Deterrence against nuclear attack from Russia and China
    today, I believe, is incredibly strong. There are however,
    however remote, plausible scenarios that may result in the use
    of one or more Russian or Chinese nuclear weapons. These are
    non-deliberate scenarios.
        The most pressing task for the United States is to ensure
    that our nuclear forces, policies, and postures can provide for
    stable deterrence during a serious crisis with either country.
    Russian leaders dating to the Soviet era have been deeply
    concerned about their ability to command their nuclear forces
    during a crisis, and have long feared a decapitating strike by
    the United States.
        However unreasonable, such fears seem to have outlasted the
    cold war. The most well-known case involved a false alarm in
    1995 when Russian officials momentarily mistook a Norwegian
    sounding rocket for an American attack.
        Whether such fears are reasonable or not, they explain a
    series of, I find, otherwise puzzling Russian behaviors. The
    Soviet Union constructed a system called Perimeter, which is
    sometimes called the ``Dead Hand,'' that would ensure Soviet
    nuclear forces could retaliate in the event that their
    leadership had been killed.
        The Russian Federation expressed a very strange concern
    about the possibility that U.S. missile defense interceptors in
    Poland might be fitted with nuclear weapons and used like a
    Pershing II in the cold war. Russian officials also insisted in
    the New START negotiations on a provision prohibiting parties
    from placing offense missiles in missile defense silos. They
    also insisted on a higher number of warheads, but a lower
    number of delivery vehicles.
        Although Russian officials do not say so directly, I think
    these otherwise puzzling actions reveal a continuing worry
    about their ability to command their nuclear forces in a
    crisis. Some of the actions that they may take to ensure their
    ability to retaliate may be deeply dangerous.
        With China, the challenge is somewhat different. Chinese
    leaders appear to keep their limited number of nuclear weapons
    in a state of ``no-alert,'' with the warheads stored
    separately. In a serious crisis, according to some training
    materials for Chinese officers, Beijing intends to place these
    forces on alert as a signal to American policymakers to signal
    their resolve.
        As Beijing deploys new mobile missiles, this may mean
    sending those missiles out into the field and flushing
    ballistic missile submarines into the ocean. It is not clear to
    me how an American President might respond to such a signal,
    especially if the crisis were a serious one. And I would just
    note that the recent history of the U.S.-China crisis
    management is not encouraging in this regard.
        I will just simply close by noting that these challenges
    require not more deterrence, but continued attention from the
    United States to ensure that our overwhelming capacity to deter
    Russia and China is both effective and stable. My 5 minutes are
    up, so let me give you the time you need to find out what you
    want to know.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Lewis can be found in the
    Appendix on page 73.]
        Mr. Turner. Thank you so much. Dr. Schneider, I want to
    return to the topic in which you were leaving off in your
    opening statement. And I am going to ask you to elaborate on
    the disturbing statements that you were referencing that were
    made by senior Russian officials about their nuclear forces and
    how their nuclear employment policies are changing, and how
    should we view these statements in conjunction with Russia's
    nuclear weapons modernization efforts?
        As you were stating, Russia's military doctrine appears to
    be putting increasing emphasis on nuclear weapons as a means to
    deter, prevent and, disturbingly, as you stated, de-escalate
    conflicts, which as you said makes no sense even in conflicts
    at the regional or local level. Some Russian officials have
    even talked about using nuclear weapons in a preventive or
    preemptive manner in a conventional conflict.
        I would like you to discuss, then, the nexus between what
    you were identifying. What are the implications of this for the
    U.S. and the allies as we provide extended deterrent
    assurances? What does it mean for our policies? What does it
    mean that we should be looking to for capabilities? I know many
    of our NATO partners believe that Russia's shift in policies
    are compensating for deficiencies in its conventional forces.
        And I am pleased to note that in all of your statements,
    every one of you, in indicating that, you know, we have not had
    a nuclear conflict, a nuclear conflict being unlikely when we
    have a strong deterrent. I mean that is really the whole aspect
    of the crux of the hearing is that, you know, we understand
    that nuclear conflict is unlikely if there is strong deterrent.
        So we have to evaluate what are the effects on our
    deterrent, how can it possibly be weakened, what others are
    doing, how does it affect the equation of the effectiveness of
    our deterrent? Your statements about what is occurring, both in
    Russia policies and monetization, affects our policies, and I
    would like you to speak to that for a moment, please, Dr.
    Schneider.
        Dr. Schneider. Thank you.
        The Russian military doctrine and one of the, I think, the
    most dangerous aspects of it is that it was developed by
    Vladimir Putin when he was cabinet secretary, or actually NSC
    [National Security Council], the equivalent to the NSC
    secretary.
        It involves on its face first use of nuclear weapons, in
    effect, preemptive use, in a variety of circumstances that we
    don't believe any Western political leader or any Member of
    Congress would consider using nuclear weapons in local wars,
    things that are relatively inconsequential.
        Yet, Russian nuclear doctrine does that. That was revealed
    by the current secretary of their national security council,
    Mr. Patrushev, actually several times in 2009. The actual
    doctrine, as he described it, goes beyond the published version
    in 2000 or the revised version that was put out in 2010.
        My concern about Russian nuclear doctrine is not that they
    are going to wake up one day and launch a nuclear first strike
    at us. It is that they see nuclear forces and nuclear threats
    as a way of achieving political clout that they cannot achieve
    otherwise because their economy is basically a basket case.
    They have one-tenth of our gross national product. They are not
    a superpower in any sense other than they have a massive
    nuclear capability.
        They have made threats directly relating to U.S. military
    action before. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom in
    2003, they staged a major nuclear exercise in the Indian Ocean,
    overt nuclear exercise, where they launch not only nuclear-
    capable, exclusively nuclear-armed, cruise missiles. Russian
    press, for example, reported a simulated attack, a nuclear
    attack on Diego Garcia. They announced a cruise missile
    attacks, nuclear-capable cruise missile attacks on an aircraft
    carrier. And there aren't too many aircraft carriers in the
    Indian Ocean other than, at that time, American aircraft
    carriers.
        So this is the linkage of what the Russians are doing and
    their view of their own sort of great power status, which
    really can't be supported by the Russian economy, I think, is
    dangerous. I am afraid that, under some circumstances, they
    could box themselves into a corner, and they consistently
    oppose many U.S. policies. They consistently threaten the use
    of force. Matter of fact, during the week that they invaded
    Georgia, they made a nuclear threat, explicitly nuclear threat,
    against Poland.
        I think this is a very dangerous thing, because the Russian
    military leaders are hearing from their most senior officials
    that it is safe and sensible to talk about nuclear strikes in
    minor conflicts. And there are a number of Russian journalists,
    by the way, who agree with what I am saying right now;
    although, overall, there is very strong support for nuclear
    weapons in Russia.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Fisher, I am going to ask you to help us
    understand. Now that we have looked at the basis, China and
    Russia are modernizing. Our modernization program is just a
    plan. It is one that needs funding in order to be executed. We
    have a letter from General Chilton and Admiral Mullen that, you
    know, clearly states the United States is the only nuclear
    weapons state not currently modernizing its nuclear
    capabilities and supporting infrastructure, which we will
    include in the record.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 85.]
        Mr. Turner. There are risks associated with that. In a
    prior hearing, I used the example that, you know, I have a 1964
    Cadillac. I love it. I love to drive it. I would not want to
    rely on it. You know, I have modernized my transportation
    equipment, and we similarly have this concern of, we are
    relying on an aging infrastructure at a time when we see those
    that we want deter are modernizing.
        Could you please describe to me, what are some of the risks
    associated with Russia and China continuing to do the research
    developing and deploying new nuclear weapons capabilities while
    we sit back and simply maintain our existing and aging nuclear
    weapons? And you know, this is obviously a very helpful
    perspective as we look to the current process of the fiscal
    year 2012 funding.
        Mr. Fisher.
        Mr. Fisher. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Concern number one would be that, as we enter or consider
    follow-on reductions in our numbers of nuclear warheads that we
    could, probably in this decade or certainly shortly within the
    next decade, cross a line in which China's rising number of
    delivered deployed warheads could not--perhaps not cross ours
    in number, but rise to a point that when you add the onset of
    ballistic missile defenses and expanded space warfare
    capabilities, would undermine in a very significant way our
    ability to deter Chinese aggression, especially on their
    periphery in Northeast Asia, on the Taiwan Strait.
        Secondly, I am concerned with decisions that we have
    already taken. The decision to retire the tactical nuclear-
    armed Tomahawk cruise missile, essentially our only secure
    deterrent delivery vehicle is--that decision taken with very
    little fanfare or argument, to me, was taken in short
    consideration of the degree to which Chinese conventional anti-
    aircraft missiles and its modernizing air force is able to
    increasingly threaten our tactical nuclear--airborne tactical
    nuclear delivery that we appear to have decided to rely on.
        My concern is compounded by China's propensity to take
    tactical and strategic advantage when it presents itself and to
    strike with very little warning. The examples of Mao's attack
    during the Korean War; the ability of the Chinese leadership to
    lull the Indian leadership and then attack them; the ability to
    have attacked Vietnam in 1979, when Vietnam was basically
    isolated, and there were--deep military losses, but Deng
    Xiaoping was able to change the strategic environment in Asia
    to his favor.
        My concern is that even a small drawdown in an American
    capability could result in some degree of Chinese temptation
    that we should be working to avoid. Just this past year, or
    early September, we discovered from recovered Libyan government
    documents how China was considering selling $200 million in
    arms to Moammar Gadhafi. What was the process that caused the
    Chinese to even consider this, which, to the surprise of many,
    they even admitted later, after those documents were released?
        Was it because the United States deliberately decided to
    take a backseat in the coalition to support the Libyan rebels?
    For whatever reasons, that contributed to that decision, good
    or bad. There was this potential that we would have paid a real
    price in the terms of a Chinese attempt to extend the regime of
    Moammar Gadhafi.
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Fisher, I appreciate your answer then in
    summation is that deterrence is an equation of which imbalance
    has risk, and I appreciate that.
        Dr. Lewis, in your written statement, you say there are no
    foreseeable scenarios under which either country could initiate
    the use of nuclear weapons against the United States, our
    forces abroad or our allies without suffering overwhelming
    destruction that would outweigh any possible gains. Deterrence
    against deliberate nuclear attack from Russia and China today
    is extremely strong.
        I appreciate that statement because it recognizes really
    what the goals and objectives of this committee has been with
    respect to the issue of deterrence, and that is, you know,
    deterrence is something that is not an inherent capability. It
    is something that arises out of investment and research.
    Deterrent capability of today can decay and age, capabilities
    can be outdated and threats or needs change.
        And in that change, you had--in an article that you had
    written in The Diplomat on September 23, my understanding is
    that you advocate modifying our existing B83 nuclear bomb,
    giving it an earth-penetrating capability, and therefore
    enabling it to hold at risk deeply buried underground
    facilities. Your article, I believe, suggests that the
    capability may be needed to deter North Korea's Kim Jong Il,
    who is building lots of underground facilities.
        In the article, you are essentially putting forth the
    prospect of an existing bomb having a new capability. So when
    we look at modernization, we can look at modernization of
    having existing capabilities conducting a different mission.
    Your article, I believe, says that the B61-11 earth penetrator
    is ill-suited for certain North Korean underground targets that
    we need to hold at risk, and so we need the new capability
    perhaps by the B83.
        This proposition is, in effect, modifying existing warheads
    giving the new capabilities--is, in effect, a modernization
    process, and I would like for you to comment on--because
    obviously, one of the things that we look at in that deterrence
    process is in modernization is what are our new capabilities
    that we need and how do we look at modifying so that we might
    be able to achieve them.
        Dr. Lewis. Let me start by saying I am in no way
    theological about these things. If there is a gap in
    deterrence, I would support filling it. And if things are
    unnecessary, then I would not support funding them.
        In this particular case, this would be a modification of an
    existing weapon need and existing requirement. And so what was
    proposed was for Sandia National Laboratories to do a sled test
    that would indicate whether or not this was a capability that
    would be feasible or not.
        I believe it is entirely consistent with the policy
    outlined in the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review
    and if the sled test suggested that would work, that would be
    fine.
        We envisioned that primarily as a North Korea-directed
    issue because there are apparently some targets in North Korea
    that may be difficult to hold at risk. But I think that in
    another context--for example, with Russia and China--such a
    capability would be of relatively little value given the kinds
    of numbers and forces.
        Yes, we wrote that. It is designed to deal with a very
    specific problem in North Korea. I am not sure that that would
    help us much with the problems that I see with China and
    Russia, where I think deterrence is so robust that I am much
    more concerned about how things may go awry in a crisis.
        Mr. Turner. Well, my final question, and then I will be
    turning to my ranking member, and if that doesn't work, would,
    as you just identified the evolving risks associated with then
    what needs to be an evolving deterrent, permit us to build a
    purpose-built weapon that would address that if there is not an
    ability to modify our existing inventories?
        Dr. Lewis. Well, I don't want to speak for my co-author,
    but we agreed that the deterrent benefit one would get from
    something like this would be quite small. We just had a very
    simpleminded view. If there is a target, we should calculate
    the hardness and have something to hold it at risk.
        But we set two red lines for ourselves. One red line was
    that we should not violate the policy against new nuclear
    weapons as outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, and I
    believe we have stayed within that; and the second is that we
    would not proceed to explosive testing because I think in
    either case, the deterrent benefit, although real, would
    probably be in those two instances outweighed by the negative
    diplomatic cost of doing so.
        Mr. Turner. Ms. Sanchez.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lewis, it is my
    understanding that when we look at a capability, we look at the
    weapon itself and then we look at the delivery system or the
    conjunction of the two.
        So when I look at modernization, at least when I think of
    it, I think of modernizing both systems. Can you speak to
    whether you--I mean, you alluded earlier in your statement that
    the modernization of our submarine systems or the modernization
    of our other methods of deploying, that we continually
    modernize that.
        Do you think that is enough or do you think we should be
    doing the type of modernizing that China and Russia are doing
    in some cases, and maybe doing even more behind a black
    curtain, let us say?
        Dr. Lewis. Well, let me start by saying I look at the
    problem in exactly the same way that you do. I would not want
    the United States to pursue the modernization path that the
    Chinese and the Russians have had. If we look at the way that
    they handle their nuclear weapons, in Russia you see this very
    clearly.
        Russian nuclear weapons are manufactured with the
    expectation that they will last a very short period of time and
    so they must be continually remanufactured which is, I think,
    not the ideal way to do this; whereas U.S. nuclear weapons were
    made with incredible resiliency and are capable of being life-
    extended.
        And so if I have these two paths in front of me, I would
    certainly prefer the way the United States does it. And as I
    said in my statement, I would not swap the forces.
        Ms. Sanchez. And I would ask this of all of you, starting
    with Mr. Lewis and then going down the line--it seems to me
    that if China or Russia were to make a quantum leap, if you
    will, in their nuclear capability aside from the delivery
    system, that we would somehow have to know about it because
    they would have to test it. Otherwise, I would assume--what
    little I know of physics, which I have many years of it by the
    way--but I would assume that they would just have to test it
    somehow, and that there is no way to hide that.
        Is that a false assumption? In what way could they be
    modernizing the actual weapon and not have us realize it or see
    it or hear it, et cetera?
        Dr. Lewis. Yes, ma'am. You are not incorrect at all. I
    included in my testimony a chart prepared by the National
    Academy of Sciences that----
        Ms. Sanchez. Yes, I saw of that.
        Dr. Lewis [continuing]. With the purposes of testing at
    various yields and I think that it is quite clear that neither
    Russia nor China, if they were to conduct tests that they could
    conceal, would be able to use those tests for anything that I
    think would be balance-altering, you know?
        If you look at the examples, there are things, like, one-
    point safety tests which, although I don't want the Russians
    and the Chinese testing, I suppose if they are doing it for
    safety, that is certainly better than the alternative.
        What fundamentally we have is, I think, a situation where
    all three states to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
    Treaty, China in particular is very constrained in its ability
    to put multiple warheads on its newest missiles without
    testing.
        And so I have been a very strong supporter of ratifying
    that treaty, which I know was an issue before the Senate, but I
    just believe it is strongly in the United States interest to
    keep Russia and China from being able to test nuclear weapons
    since I believe that under the current moratorium we have a
    significant advantage over them and our ability to maintain and
    whether you call it modernize or modify our existing stockpile.
        Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Fisher, what do you think?
        Mr. Fisher. Congresswoman, my suggestion would be that, in
    regards to China especially, that it is as paramount to have
    all of our ears and eyes open. If there is a way to mask or
    divert attention from a nuclear test event, I would expect the
    Chinese to engage in that practice whether it be somehow
    modifying the sound waves that emerge from a test so that it
    would not appear to be the same kind of vibration that a
    nuclear explosion would yield.
        I agree with Jeffrey that in terms of missile testing,
    especially for multiple warheads or advanced warheads, that
    would be something that we could observe for as long as we had
    the satellites to observe those tests.
        But I think we should also consider that a Chinese standard
    for modernizing a warhead may not be what we would require and
    that it is at least conceivable that a degree of advanced
    computer simulation may suffice in some cases for modification
    of warheads that we might prefer to test.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Fisher. Doctor.
        Dr. Schneider. Thank you. I disagree in terms of the impact
    of the nuclear testing constraints on the ability of Russia to
    modernize its forces.
        There is a very substantial literature ranging from high-
    level Russian governmental officials who have stated they were
    introducing new nuclear weapons. There is a very extensive
    press coverage of this which goes in more detail than the
    government officials do on exactly what they are doing in
    nuclear weapons modernization.
        There are declassified CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]
    reports that are available on the Internet, fortunately highly
    redacted, but they clearly indicate the Russians are developing
    new low-yield nuclear weapons.
        There is some fairly extensive reporting in the Russian
    press of the conduct of hydronuclear tests. Unfortunately, the
    atomic energy ministry does not share Mr. Lewis' view of the
    value of very low-yield testing, and I quoted that in my
    prepared statement. They think that it is very important to
    weapons development.
        In addition to that, there is evidence, at least some--and
    including a report of the House Intelligence Committee of about
    10 years ago--the Chinese may be testing nuclear weapons at
    very low yields.
        I take these reports with a great deal of credibility
    because, again, you can get on the Internet and you can look at
    the declassified intelligence, mainly CIA reports.
        Ms. Sanchez. But, Doctor, I am really getting to the--I
    understand what you are saying and I don't doubt anything you
    say. What I am asking is--I mean, here are people, CIA people,
    et cetera, who are saying we have seen it, we hear it, it is
    there, they are doing it or what have you. Whether it is in the
    mainstream of belief or not is different, but there is somebody
    spotting what is going on.
        So my question is if they were going to make a fundamental
    difference to their weapon which would exceed our capabilities,
    would not somebody think they saw, think they heard it, think
    they felt it?
        Dr. Schneider. Not necessarily, no.
        Ms. Sanchez. Not necessarily? Do you think they could--is
    that because it is theoretical and they would build it anyway
    and they wouldn't test it or is that because they could test it
    and they could alter so much of the test that none of us could
    see or hear or feel it?
        Dr. Schneider. There are serious limitations on our ability
    to detect nuclear tests. The debate on how high a yield you can
    go without detection is at least 1 to 2 kilotons with
    decoupling, and if you test in salt mines it may be up to 10
    kilotons.
        Even sub-kiloton nuclear tests--and I would suggest the
    committee review the JASON--not only the National Intelligence
    Estimates that was done last year, but even on an unclassified
    basis, the JASON Report of 1995 where they talked about being
    able to do partial boosting at half-kiloton yield and
    extrapolate that to full boosted yield.
        That would allow you to develop dramatically new nuclear
    high-performance nuclear weapons. And I believe you can go way
    above a half-kiloton with little risk of detection if you do
    decoupling or you test in salt mines.
        Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me just one
    more question of our--I have so many, and I am just really
    trying to get some pearls of wisdom out of these guys.
        What drives and what constrains current Chinese and Russian
    nuclear weapons modernization efforts?
        Dr. Lewis. I believe that the Chinese nuclear program is
    driven by a very straight desire to have the same technological
    capabilities, though not the same numbers, as Russia and the
    United States. So they will try to have at least 1 of whatever
    we might have 1,000 of. And I think further that both Russia
    and China, although this will sound very strange, do
    fundamentally fear the United States would use nuclear weapons
    first.
        And I have spent a lot of time trying to explain to Chinese
    and Russian experts what a crazy view that is. But I think that
    that is the only thing that explains both Russia's very strange
    reliance on this Perimeter system, and the Chinese plan to put
    forces in the field as a kind of signal. So technology, and I
    suppose to some extent, fear.
        Mr. Fisher. Congresswoman, my view is that nuclear weapons
    as well as broader range military modernization we are seeing
    in the PRC stems from the ultimate desire to pursue regime
    survival. In 1989----
        Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Fisher, regime survival or rule of the
    world?
        Mr. Fisher. All of this is designed to promote the survival
    of the Chinese Communist Party-led dictatorship. This is the
    ultimate goal that the PLA serves for the Communist Party. And
    the nuclear weapons modernization is pursued first and foremost
    with that goal in mind.
        In my opinion it will proceed apace, a larger, broader,
    conventional modernization that is designed to increasingly
    advance and defend the interests of the Chinese leadership as
    they seek to defend interests in Asia, beyond the Asian
    periphery, and then globally into the next decade.
        And in my opinion, the size and pace of nuclear
    modernization will be related to the degree to other aspects of
    China's broader conventional modernization.
        Dr. Schneider. Thank you. I think in the case of Russia,
    nuclear weapons are very much a part its self-image as a great
    power. They have very little claim to anything else. That has
    been very explicitly stated by then-President Putin, of course
    future-President Putin, and then-Defense Minister Serdyukov. He
    is now a deputy prime minister and heads up the industrial part
    of their military complex.
        In the case of China, I think nuclear weapons are very much
    part of their striving to obtain superpower status. You don't
    increase your defense budget by double digits for decades,
    which they have done in the past and apparently to do so in the
    future, without having certain ambitions, you know, concerning
    the use of military force.
        And I think nuclear weapons are a part of that. I expect a
    very large increase in Chinese nuclear weapons capability over
    the next two decades. It is going to be slow, but it is going
    to be steady, and in the end it is going to be very big.
        Ms. Sanchez. None of you mentioned constraints. But I will
    just leave that. Maybe you can think about that and----
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you.
        I just want to make one comment as a result of the
    testimony we have been receiving. During design, the expected
    life cycle of our weapons was somewhere between 10 and 15
    years, it is my understanding. And the average age currently of
    our weapons is 26 years. So I think that that helps highlight
    the discussion that we are having here of the issue of the need
    for modernization of exceeding the expected design life cycle.
        Mr. Lamborn.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Excuse me. Thank you all for being here. This is a really
    important discussion. Before I begin my questions, I would like
    to introduce into the record the executive summary from a study
    commissioned by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. It is a
    comprehensive open-source assessment of the Chinese underground
    tunnel system.
        The full study is due to be released soon, but at the
    request of this subcommittee a preview of the executive
    subcommittee has been provided. And I ask that the executive
    summary be made a part of the record.
        Mr. Turner. Without objection.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 86.]
        Mr. Lamborn. And additionally, the Department of Defense's
    2011 report on the Chinese military discusses the troubling
    development of the Chinese underground complex of tunnels. And
    I ask that, too, be made a part of the record.
        Okay, thank you.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 87.]
        Mr. Lamborn. Dr. Schneider, in its 2011 annual report on
    military developments in China just entered into the record,
    the DOD [Department of Defense] says that China has constructed
    and continues to expand a complex of underground tunnels,
    perhaps over 5,000 kilometers in length, to enable its nuclear
    forces to transport nuclear weapons undetected and to launch
    from a large number of locations.
        What are the implications of this tunnel complex to the
    United States and our allies?
        Dr. Schneider. It is almost mind-boggling. I knew they use
    what we call hardened deeply buried tunnel facilities to
    protect their strategic forces. But until recently I had no
    idea it was remotely that extensive. It has enormous
    implications in terms of their view toward nuclear warfare, the
    survivability of their systems and their leadership in the
    event of war.
        It is virtually impossible to target anything remotely like
    that, irrespective of how many nuclear weapons you have. And
    that is a concern when you put it in the light of some of the
    more fanatical statements that have been made over the years by
    Chinese generals about the, you know, nuclear warfare.
        Including, you know, statements going back to the Mao era,
    and actually reiterated as recently as 2005 in Beijing about
    losing a few hundred million people being relatively
    insignificant, we will survive, and that sort of that stuff.
        That is really crazy stuff. And you got to deter these
    guys. I very strongly support Mr. Lewis' suggestion of
    modifying the B83 into an earth or rock penetrator. That is a
    very important capability to have, not only for North Korea,
    but for Russia and China as well.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Lamborn. And does this large underground complex make
    verifying the size and structure of China's nuclear forces more
    difficult? And if so, is this a very destabilizing factor?
        Dr. Schneider. Well, yes. I mean, it certainly makes it far
    more difficult. The Chinese are using mobile ICBMs, which are
    inherently very difficult to verify. For example, when we went
    into the INF treaty with Russia, the Reagan administration said
    there was a dispute of several hundred missiles on how many
    intermediate range missiles the Russians actually had. And
    these are the type of mobilized--well, in that case mobile
    IRBM. But the difference between an ICBM and an IRBM is just a
    few meters in canister length. So basically, it is the same
    sort of thing.
        We know a lot less about China overall than we know about
    the Russians in nuclear capability, if for no other reason that
    the Russians talk about it all the time, where the Chinese are
    fairly secretive. I think you can find deliberate leaks by the
    PLA in Hong Kong press. I think they are using that as a
    mechanism of debating some issues that they can't openly debate
    in China. But I suspect we are going to see a very large
    increase in Chinese capability, including extensive MIRVing.
        That is alluded to in the case of the--you know, the
    possibility of that--in the case of the ICBM force in the
    latest version of the Pentagon report on Chinese military
    power. They are talking, I think, very clearly about the VF-21
    program, which I believe Mr. Fisher mentioned previously, has
    the potential for 10 warheads.
        Mr. Lamborn. And with the tunnel complex, they could be
    increasing the size of their stockpile with us not even knowing
    it?
        Dr. Schneider. Yes, obviously; quite frankly, yes. They
    have the resources, they have got the technology. As a matter
    of fact, yesterday I found a very interesting statement by Yuri
    Solomonov, who is the chief Russian ICBM solid fuel designer.
    He once headed up their design bureau, MITT [Moscow Institute
    of Thermal Technology].
        And he said they were 15 years behind the Russians in
    missile technology. Now, 15 years ago this is post-cold war and
    they were introducing the SS-27. That is a very significant
    statement on his part. And he said he expected them to come up
    to 5 to 10 years behind the Russians. That is a very
    significant development.
        Mr. Lamborn. All right. Thank you.
        Mr. Fisher, the Obama administration has made unilateral
    declarations that there are certain conditions under which
    nuclear arms would not be used, conditions that had not been so
    limited previously.
        Have the Russians or the Chinese made any reciprocal
    limiting declarations in response to the Obama concessions?
        Mr. Fisher. Not that I am aware of, sir. The Chinese, who I
    am most familiar with--they have a long history of statements
    about their ``no first use'' policy, and how that is
    understood. And, in turn, doubted because of conflicting
    Chinese statements especially over the last two decades. But I
    am not aware of any specific Chinese statement in response to
    the Obama statement, other than a----
        Mr. Lamborn. Or Russian?
        Mr. Fisher. No.
        Mr. Lamborn. And with the passage of New START, did the
    Chinese react in any way? For instance, have they decelerated
    any of their modernization efforts?
        Mr. Fisher. Not to my knowledge, sir. I think that it
    continues apace. We may see the emergence of a Chinese triad
    within this decade. A new continental range bomber, multiple
    MIRVed missiles, perhaps a follow-on class of SSBN after the
    Type 094, not to mention missile defense advances, advances in
    new IRBMs and in space warfare capabilities.
        Mr. Lamborn. Well, to me the power of example is very
    limited for those who are relying on that. And for Dr. Lewis,
    what is the view of China and Russia to each other as a
    potential nuclear adversary? And are any of their forces or
    defenses dedicated to the other country?
        Dr. Lewis. Yes. Yes, they are quite worried and, one might
    even say, paranoid about one another. A significant percentage
    of the things that the Chinese have done when it comes to
    modernizing their forces seem to be Soviet and then Russia
    oriented. So for example, they spent considerable time making
    sure that their ICBMs, which we often think of as being pointed
    at us, were capable of penetrating the Moscow ABM [anti-
    ballistic missile] system. There is a very significant fear
    there that makes it very complicated as we try to engage with
    both countries.
        I will say one other thing, which is the Russians in
    particular are quite taken with this tunneling argument. And it
    just goes to illustrate I think the depth of the mutual
    hostility because I and a colleague have been looking into the
    tunneling issue. And it is very interesting. One of the
    questions we had was where would all the plutonium for the
    warheads have come from? Because they only have the two
    production reactors.
        And it turns out one of the citations, which is in Chinese,
    is a teenage girl's blog, which is in and of itself a
    repetition of an English language Usenet discussion from the
    mid 1990s where a guy posting anonymously because he didn't
    want his wife to know what he was doing just was making up some
    numbers. I think the fact that I hear these numbers repeated by
    Russian experts really just demonstrates the depth of paranoia
    on both sides.
        Mr. Lamborn. And lastly, Mr. Fisher, would you like to
    comment on the Chinese tunnel complex issue?
        Mr. Fisher. Congressman, I share the concern of my
    colleagues very much. The existence of this vast tunnel network
    to me raises the immediate question of, ``Do we really know how
    many missiles do the Chinese have today?'' The normally
    accepted number that goes into the annual Pentagon PLA reports
    of 20 DF-5s strikes me as unrealistic given not only the
    existence of this tunnel complex where they can be hidden, but
    also the fact that production of this missile can easily be
    facilitated by existing space launch vehicle production lines.
    And that these production lines have been churning away since
    the 1980s. I put into my written testimony an illustration of
    what I believe are dismantled DF-5 fuselages on horizontal
    trolleys within one of these tunnel complexes. The image was
    released in 2006 by the Chinese. And it to me just illustrates
    this question very clearly.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Turner. Well thank you. I want to thank each of our
    witnesses today. As you know, this is part of our overall
    effort to get a grasp of not only the countries that we are
    looking at for our deterrence, but also looking at their
    modernization programs as it affects our policies. This will be
    followed by classified briefings for this committee where we
    can take some of the open source information and correlate to
    what is known by our intelligence gathering. So thank you for
    being here, and we greatly appreciate your efforts and
    diligence on this issue.
        [Whereupon, at 12:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                October 14, 2011

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                     QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

        Mr. Turner. Your opening statement mentions open source evidence
    that Russia may be in violation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces
    (INF) Treaty. Please explain the evidence for this, and what the
    implications of this should be for the United States going forward.
        Dr. Schneider. Under the INF Treaty, ground-launched cruise
    missiles with a range of 500-km to 5,500-km are prohibited. To violate
    the INF Treaty, a ground launched cruise missile would merely need to
    have the range potential to fly to such a range. A ballistic missile
    would have to demonstrate a range between 500 and 5,500-km.
        There are a substantial number of Russian press reports that state
    that the R-500, a ground launched cruise missile first tested by Russia
    in 2007 and associated with the nuclear capable Iskander missile
    system, has a range between 1,000 and 3,000-km. Two of these reports
    say that the R-500 is actually a derivative of the Soviet cruise
    missile eliminated by the INF Treaty. One of the reports says that the
    R-500 missile exceeded 500-km in its first flight test. Another
    suggests there is also a second prohibited missile. The journals that
    published these reports are well known (including four in an official
    government news agency), and the authors are well known military
    reporters and arms control experts. These individuals range from pro-
    regime to anti-regime. It is also clear that these reports are not
    multiple publications treating a single story because they widely
    separated in time and in some detail.
        One well known Russian journalist reports that Russian surface-to-
    air missiles and missile defense interceptors have a secondary surface-
    to-surface (SAMs) nuclear attack role. The INF Treaty has an exception
    for air and missile defense interceptors that are used solely for this
    purpose. It does not permit SAMs to have a dual role.
        Since these missiles would be classified as ballistic missiles
    under the Treaty, it requires testing to a prohibited range to violate
    the Treaty.
        It is clear that the Moscow ABM, if the report is true, violated
    the INF Treaty from its entry-into-force and the S-500 air/missile
    defense would violate the Treaty when it is fully tested. Whether the
    S-300 and S-400 surface to air missiles violate the INF Treaty would
    depend upon their testing history.
        These are very serious issues. If these reports are true, Putin's
    Russia has returned to the worst arms control behavior of the Soviet
    Union. Violating the ``zero option'' arms control treaty sends a clear
    message about the danger of the pursuit of ``nuclear zero.'' If these
    reports are true, this is an issue that literally must be resolved by
    Russian resumption of Treaty compliance. If this does not happen, I
    believe the U.S. should withdraw from the INF Treaty.
        Mr. Turner. You mentioned that Russia is developing low-yield,
    precision nuclear weapons. These would appear to be a ``new'' nuclear
    weapon for the Russia arsenal. Does Russia have any policy against
    developing ``new'' nuclear weapons? What are the implications to the
    U.S. and our allies if Russia continues developing these new nuclear
    weapons capabilities while the U.S. simply maintains its current, aging
    nuclear weapons?
        Dr. Schneider. Russian leaders openly and repeatedly say Russia is
    developing and deploying new nuclear weapons, and this is reported in
    the Russian press in more detail. Former Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov
    characterized them as ``unique'' which may be a reference to their low
    collateral damage designs. There are two declassified, if highly
    redacted, CIA reports on the subject of Russian development of low
    yield nuclear weapons. In the words of then-Secretary of Defense Robert
    Gates, ``China and Russia have embarked on an ambitious path to design
    and field new weapons.''
        Russian development efforts, combined with hydronuclear testing,
    places us at a great disadvantage. As then-Secretary of Defense Robert
    Gates observed in 2008, ``At a certain point, it will become impossible
    to keep extending the life of our arsenal, especially in light of our
    testing moratorium. It also makes it harder to reduce existing
    stockpiles, because eventually we won't have as much confidence in the
    efficacy of the weapons we do have. Currently, the United States is the
    only declared nuclear power that is neither modernizing its nuclear
    arsenal nor has the capability to produce a new nuclear warhead . . .
    To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible
    deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without
    either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization
    program.'' We have done neither.
        We cannot replicate old tested designs exactly. As we correct
    problems in our stockpile, we are making changes. As Secretary Gates
    said in 2008, ``With every adjustment, we move farther away from the
    original design that was successfully tested when the weapon was first
    fielded. Add to this that no weapons in our arsenal have been tested
    since 1992. So the information on which we base our annual
    certification of stockpile grows increasingly dated and incomplete.''
    We are rapidly losing experienced designers due to aging and
    retirements. There is a potential of a major asymmetry in weapons
    reliability developing due to Russian hydronuclear testing and recent
    design experience.
        Rebuilding our nuclear weapons infrastructure is critically
    important, but we must recognize that this alone does not mean our life
    extended nuclear weapons will actually work. If our primaries do not
    develop sufficient yield, the weapons will be duds.
        The combination of the enormous asymmetry in modernization of our
    delivery systems and the risk of loss of deterrent reliability due to
    lack of testing must increase concerns among our allies, particularly
    in Eastern Europe, who feel threatened by Russia and have been subject
    to direct nuclear targeting threats. The asymmetry in low yield and low
    collateral damage weapons may also increase the risk of Russian use of
    such weapons in a crisis.
        Mr. Turner. Do you believe that the nature, effectiveness, and
    credibility of our extended deterrent relationships with allies are
    affected by nuclear weapons and delivery system modernization efforts
    in Russia and China when compared with our own here in the United
    States?
        Dr. Schneider. Yes. Some of our allies are very concerned about the
    Russian and Chinese threat. Others are concerned about Iranian and
    North Korean nuclear capabilities. They will become increasingly
    concerned as their capabilities increase and the modernization
    asymmetry grows. To characterize the minimal changes we are making in
    our delivery systems as ``modernization'' is not realistic when we are
    not generally enhancing military capabilities which are potential
    adversaries are doing all the time. Irrespective of how reluctant our
    allies are to develop their own nuclear deterrent capabilities, I
    believe at some point they will be tempted to develop nuclear weapons
    due to limitations in our deterrent, extended deterrent and damage
    limiting potential.
        We do not have the right types of nuclear weapons for effective
    extended deterrence and current policy precludes any changes in our
    posture. Our deterrent force is aging and ``modernization'' efforts are
    generally not increasing our military potential. Our potential enemies
    are not doing the same. To quote then-Secretary of Defense Robert
    Gates, ``Currently, the United States is the only declared nuclear
    power that is neither modernizing its nuclear arsenal nor has the
    capability to produce a new nuclear warhead.''
        Mr. Turner. Dr. Lewis said in his opening remarks that in his
    opinion, ``Russia and China could not, however, develop new nuclear
    weapons with yields that I would consider militarily significant
    without conducting tests large enough to be readily detected.'' Do you
    agree that Russia and China cannot conduct militarily significant
    nuclear weapons tests without being detected? What, if anything, do
    open sources indicate China and Russia are doing in the nuclear testing
    arena? Are they complying with the terms of the Comprehensive Test Ban
    Treaty? What are the implications of this to the U.S. and our allies?
        Dr. Schneider. No. There is extensive evidence that both Russia and
    China are deploying new and improved nuclear weapons. Their leaders say
    this. In 2005, Russia's Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said, ``New
    types of nuclear weapons are already emerging in Russia.'' Colonel
    General Vladimir Verkhovtsev, then-chief of the Defense Ministry's 12th
    Main Directorate which handles Russian nuclear weapons, said Russia is
    deploying ``new nuclear weapon complexes . . . . that possess improved
    specifications and performance characteristics . . .'' (Emphasis
    added). In April 1999, then-Security Council Secretary Vladimir Putin
    said that the three Presidential decrees signed by Yeltsin ``concern
    the development of the whole nuclear weapons complex and the
    endorsement of the concept of the development and use of strategic
    nuclear weapons.'' (Emphasis added). Nikol Voloshin, a senior official
    of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, revealed in June 2001 that work was
    nearing completion on a warhead for the Topol-M (SS-27), while ``At the
    same time modernization is proceeding on the other warheads.'' The SS-
    27 warhead is clearly a new design because as Colonel-General Nikolay
    Solovtsov and Lieutenant General Vitaliy Linnik, Head of Armament and
    Deputy Commander of Strategic Missile Troops both have stated, the SS-
    27 warhead has an ``enhanced-yield charge'' or ``an increased yield.''
    To increase the yield of a thermonuclear weapon it is necessary to
    redesign the secondary. Ivanov stated that the SS-27/RS-24 MIRV warhead
    was a ``new warhead'' and that it is the same warhead being used on the
    Bulava 30. In September 2003, Lev Ryabev, Deputy Atomic Energy
    Minister, stated that young Russian scientists are ``doing real
    things'' with the goal of ``keeping and improving of Russia's nuclear
    arsenal.''
        A declassified August 2000 CIA Intelligence Memorandum concluded
    that, ``Judging from Russian writing since 1995 and Moscow's evolving
    nuclear doctrine, new roles are emerging for very-low yield weapons--
    including weapons for tailored radiation outputs.'' On April 29, 1999,
    President Yeltsin reportedly ordered Russian development of precision
    low yield nuclear weapons that could be used for strategic or tactical
    nuclear strikes.
        There are multiple Russian press reports which say Russia now has a
    new strategic nuclear warhead in the 100-kiloton/100-kilogram range.
    Some of these and other reports say their best Cold War design was 110-
    130-kilogram and yielded 50-75 kilotons. The reports of 100-kg warheads
    are consistent with the throw-weight and nuclear warhead numbers per
    missile declared for the new Bulava 30 SLBM under the START Treaty. Two
    Russian generals have said that Russia increased the yield of the SS-27
    single warhead. The numerous Russian press reports that both the SS-27/
    RS-24 and the Bulava 30 will carry 10 warheads would require further
    improvement of Russian yield-to-weight ratios in small and light
    warheads. I have traced the report about the SS-27/RS-24 10 warhead
    capability back to a statement by the Russian Defense Ministry.
        Russian nuclear weapons development has not been limited only to
    increasing yield-to-weight ratios. In November 1997, Viktor Mikhaylov,
    then-Atomic Energy Minister, stated that Russia was working on a weapon
    ``which penetrate[s] the ground before exploding. I must say that our
    developments here are at the highest level . . . . Right now we are
    standing firm.'' In December 2002, he stated that, ``The scientists are
    developing a nuclear `scalpel' capable of `surgically removing' and
    destroying very localized targets. The low-yield warhead will be
    surrounded with a superhardened casing which makes it possible to
    penetrate 30-40 meters into rock and destroy a buried target--for
    example, a troop command and control point or a nuclear munitions
    storage facility.''
        There are Russian press reports that say Russia is conducting
    hydronuclear testing. The Russian press reported that President
    Yeltsin's April 29, 1999, decree on nuclear weapons approved
    ``hydronuclear field experiments.'' Recent Russian press accounts
    indicate that hydronuclear testing actually began in 1994. In November
    2010, Alexei Fenenko of the Russian National Academy of Scientists
    wrote that over the past 15 years, ``significant progress'' was made in
    hydronuclear testing.
        Hydronuclear tests that are designed to produce measurable nuclear
    yields are inconsistent with a zero-yield CTBT or zero-yield moratorium
    Russia claims to be observing. It is very interesting that then-First
    Deputy Minister for Nuclear Energy Viktor Mikhaylov, on April 29, 1999,
    wrote about the importance of hydronuclear testing to maintaining the
    nuclear arsenal. He stated: ``No state will be able to create nuclear
    weapons for the first time based solely on hydronuclear experiments . .
    . But developed traditional nuclear powers can use hydronuclear
    experiments to perform tasks of improving reliability of their nuclear
    arsenal and effectively steward its operation. All countries indirectly
    gain here inasmuch as the risk of nuclear accidents is lowered.
    Determining the limits of `authorized activity' is no simple process
    and only professionals can direct it correctly.'' In July 2001,
    Mikhaylov said that, ``The fact is that the developed, traditional
    nuclear powers, using hydronuclear experiments, can perform the task of
    improving reliability of the nuclear arsenal and effectively track its
    operation while reducing the risk of possible accident.''
        These official statements clearly suggest that Russia was
    conducting hydronuclear explosions and that Mikhaylov wanted to keep
    this activity under the complete control of the Nuclear Energy Ministry
    for obvious reasons. Why else should Mikhaylov be talking about the
    importance of hydronuclear testing when it was prohibited by the
    Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the testing moratorium Russia was
    claiming to observe? Such disregard for political commitments and legal
    obligations would be consistent with past Soviet behavior and the
    Russian actions documented in the Department of State's August 2005
    report on adherence to arms control agreements, which recorded a
    continuing pattern of Russian treaty violations. Such tests would be
    useful for the development of new nuclear weapons.
        Numerous declassified, but unfortunately heavily redacted, Clinton
    administration CIA intelligence reports discussed possible Russian
    nuclear testing and whether it was related to the development of new
    warheads. One declassified CIA report concluded that ``hydronuclear
    (low-yield) experiments . . . are far more useful for Russian weapons
    development'' than subcritical tests. At a minimum, these reports
    indicate that the CIA took this possibility very seriously.
        As stated in my prepared statement, the Russian Atomic Energy
    Ministry has said that hydronuclear testing improves both the
    reliability and safety of nuclear weapons. It also revealed that the
    Soviet Union had conducted 89 atmospheric hydronuclear tests until
    1989. I do not believe we can assume that hydronuclear tests are the
    only thing that the Russians are now doing simply because that is what
    is reported in the Russian press. The verification threshold of the
    CTBT is high enough to permit testing of sufficient yield to develop
    new strategic as well as new tactical nuclear weapons.
        Any covert Russian nuclear testing significantly increases the
    threat to the U.S. and our allies.
        Mr. Turner. Do you believe a potential U.S. minimum deterrence
    posture, whereby we maintain a small number of nuclear warheads and
    threaten retaliation against enemy cities if attacked, is credible? Why
    or why not? How would such a posture by the U.S. affect our extended
    deterrent and efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons?
        Dr. Schneider. No. As then-Under Secretary of Defense Walter
    Slocombe told the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2000, we do not
    target cities. Even if we changed our policy, I don't believe that
    massively disproportionate threats are an effective deterrent since we
    are likely to be self deterred from such action and our adversaries
    know this.
        Allied governments that are worried about their security will be
    concerned about minimum deterrence because it minimizes deterrent
    credibility, maximizes collateral damage and minimizes damage limiting
    capability. It is impossible to substitute effectively conventional
    capability for nuclear deterrence because of the vulnerability of
    conventional weapons to nuclear EMP and their extremely inadequate
    capability against hard and deeply buried facilities. As Margaret
    Thatcher once observed, every town in France has a monument to the
    failure of conventional deterrence.
        Mr. Turner. The Obama Administration is currently conducting a 90-
    day ``NPR Implementation Study,'' which will likely result in changes
    to U.S. nuclear weapon employment guidance. According to senior
    administration officials, including President Obama's National Security
    Advisor, Tom Donilon, it could also set the stage for unilateral
    reductions in U.S. nuclear forces. How would unilateral U.S. reductions
    or changes to the employment guidance be perceived by leaders in Russia
    and China? Do you believe we have sufficiently certain information on
    the nuclear forces and policies of China and Russia to enable
    unilateral U.S. reductions or major shifts in employment policy without
    undue risk?
        Dr. Schneider. I think Russia and China would interpret minimum
    deterrence as enhancing the value of their nuclear capabilities. I
    suspect we would see even more nuclear threats from Russia and China.
    Russia would clearly have nuclear superiority and China would have an
    easier option to achieve it. While there are always limitations in our
    intelligence about Russia and China, I think their basic attitudes
    toward nuclear weapons are clear and minimum deterrence would translate
    into minimum security for the U.S. and our allies.
        Mr. Turner. The open-source information available on Chinese
    nuclear forces, strategy, and production is extremely limited. China
    claims this deliberate ``opaqueness'' and the associated uncertainty is
    needed to ensure the effectiveness and survivability of their so-called
    ``minimum deterrence'' force. Our forces are reasonably transparent,
    particularly with President Obama's decision to release numbers on the
    size of our nuclear stockpile and data exchanges related to the New
    START Treaty. a. What is your assessment of China's deliberate policy
    of opaqueness on its nuclear forces? b. If we continue making further
    reductions on the ``path to global zero'', at what point does China's
    opaqueness reach a critical line, where we cannot continue to reduce
    our forces without unacceptable risk? c. What are--or should be--the
    impacts of this opaqueness on the nuclear strategies of the U.S. and
    other countries?
        Mr. Fisher. China has been fairly consistent and consistently
    hypocritical. China bewails the nuclear weapons excesses of the United
    States and Russia but refuses to take even initial steps toward
    transparency for its nuclear forces that could set the stage for
    subsequent dialogue that could lead to stability. China's consistent
    effort to put the burden on others to reduce their nuclear weapons
    certainly raises suspicions about what they are doing for their own
    nuclear capability. Given China's potential to arm new DF-5 versions
    and the ``DF-41'' ICBMs with multiple warheads, it is even more
    important that the U.S. not reduce its nuclear arsenal to pursue some
    ideological ``path to global zero'' that China does not show any sign
    of agreeing with. Reductions already made by the Administration are
    unwise given China's potential to increase its nuclear arsenal and
    further U.S. reductions would only compound this error.
        Mr. Turner. China says that it maintains a minimum deterrence
    posture designed to deter nuclear attacks on its homeland. But China is
    also known to be seeking military capabilities to expand its sphere of
    security influence beyond its borders. Do you believe China will retain
    a minimum deterrence posture towards its nuclear weapons as it seeks a
    greater security role beyond its shores? Under what circumstances might
    it seek to move toward a more aggressive deterrence posture with higher
    numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and higher alert
    levels?
        Mr. Fisher. I believe that it is plausible to expect that as China
    seeks a globally capable conventional military force, it will also seek
    a much larger ``world class'' nuclear force. China will build greater
    numbers of large ICBMs and new SSBNs to deter the U.S., Russia and
    India. China will quietly welcome further U.S. nuclear reductions as
    that will reduce the difference to U.S. force levels, adding its
    ability to deter Washington from defending its interests. I would
    suggest that a Chinese force of 500 defended warheads would
    significantly undermine the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent in the
    minds of our Asian allies. China's nuclear forces will increase further
    should Japan, South Korea, Vietnam or Australia decide to pursue a
    nuclear deterrent.
        In addition, the United States needs to devise its own public
    definition about what comprises a ``minimum'' nuclear deterrent. China
    may have ideas that 200 to 300 warheads could still constitute a
    ``minimum'' deterrent compared to the nuclear forces of Russia and the
    United States. But it is not clear that Japan, South Korea, Australia,
    Vietnam and Taiwan, all states with the potential to pursue their own
    nuclear deterrent, will also view such Chinese warhead numbers as a
    ``minimum'' level.
        Mr. Turner. Do you believe that the nature, effectiveness, and
    credibility of our extended deterrent relationships with allies are
    affected by nuclear weapons and delivery system modernization efforts
    in Russia and China when compared with our own here in the United
    States?
        Mr. Fisher. Today, based on what is known about China's nuclear
    forces, U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is credible, but not as
    credible as when U.S. naval forces had access to secure submarine
    launched nuclear LACMs. North Korea's reported development of a mobile
    ICBM to complement their mobile IRBMs only increases the need for a
    U.S. secondary or tactical nuclear deterrent in Asia. With the
    retirement of the TLAM-N and the decision to rely on aircraft delivered
    tactical nuclear weapons, this element of the U.S. deterrent is now
    vulnerable to North Korea's and China's expansive air defenses.
    Furthermore, if forced to use ICBMs or SLBMs to counter a North Korean
    long range missile strike, the U.S. increases the risk that China or
    Russia will misinterpret the U.S. move and potentially launch their own
    nuclear missiles. In addition, should the PRC succeed in increasing its
    warhead levels to 500, and a BMD system to defend them, that would
    significantly undermine the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear
    deterrent in the minds of Allied leaders in Asia.
        Mr. Turner. Dr. Lewis said in his opening remarks that in his
    opinion, ``Russia and China could not, however, develop new nuclear
    weapons with yields that I would consider militarily significant
    without conducting tests large enough to be readily detected.'' Do you
    agree that Russia and China cannot conduct militarily significant
    nuclear weapons tests without being detected? What, if anything, do
    open sources indicate China and Russia are doing in the nuclear testing
    arena? Are they complying with the terms of the Comprehensive Test Ban
    Treaty? What are the implications of this to the U.S. and our allies?
        Mr. Fisher. I believe that measures being taken by the U.S. to use
    advanced computer techniques to help verify or even design new nuclear
    weapons are also techniques being sought by Russia and China. As for
    China, we know little about what passes for sufficient nuclear testing.
    China may accept a lesser degree of testing for a new weapon design.
        Mr. Turner. Do you believe a potential U.S. minimum deterrence
    posture, whereby we maintain a small number of nuclear warheads and
    threaten retaliation against enemy cities if attacked, is credible? Why
    or why not? How would such a posture by the U.S. affect our extended
    deterrent and efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons?
        Mr. Fisher. I do not believe the U.S. has the option both to pursue
    realistic ``minimum deterrence posture'' and to preserve its security
    and freedom. It can have one, but not the other. China would take a
    U.S. decision to pursue a minimum nuclear deterrent posture as a
    license to invade Taiwan, enforce its territorial claims in the East
    China Sea and impose military control over the South China Sea. Such a
    U.S. decision would also pitch China into an even higher paced general
    military buildup in order to accelerate its quest for global military
    dominance to displace the United States. After doing so China would
    then seek a series of confrontations with Washington to develop a
    system for American subordination to China's dictat.
        Mr. Turner. The Obama Administration is currently conducting a 90-
    day ``NPR Implementation Study,'' which will likely result in changes
    to U.S. nuclear weapon employment guidance. According to senior
    administration officials, including President Obama's National Security
    Advisor, Tom Donilon, it could also set the stage for unilateral
    reductions in U.S. nuclear forces. How would unilateral U.S. reductions
    or changes to the employment guidance be perceived by leaders in Russia
    and China? Do you believe we have sufficiently certain information on
    the nuclear forces and policies of China and Russia to enable
    unilateral U.S. reductions or major shifts in employment policy without
    undue risk?
        Mr. Fisher. I do not believe that the U.S. has sufficient
    information about China's nuclear forces to take the decision to pursue
    unilateral nuclear reductions. To pursue new unilateral U.S. warhead
    reductions without verifiable data on China's nuclear order of battle,
    its nuclear modernization plans, its real nuclear doctrine, its plans
    for missile defenses and its plans for outer space warfare, would
    severely damage American national security.
        According to open reports, a new study by Dr. Phil Karber of
    Georgetown University on China's expansive, possible 5,000km long
    network of tunnels, undermines confidence in the open reporting by the
    Department of Defense about China's current nuclear missile numbers.
    While this report does not suggest an actual new estimate, the sheer
    size of the tunnel network devoted to hiding China's nuclear missile
    arsenal strongly suggests Chinese missile numbers may handily exceed
    open DoD estimates. Until such a time that China decides to provide
    verifiable assurance that its missile numbers are close to open U.S.
    estimates, the United States should not be considering further
    unilateral reductions in U.S. warhead numbers.
        Mr. Turner. Russian leaders have been talking about deploying by
    2018 a new, heavy, silo-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
    that will carry multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles
    (i.e., it will be ``MIRV'd''). Some experts indicate this system would
    greatly detract from crisis stability, because its fixed location makes
    it vulnerable and Russian leaders would face a very short ``use-it-or-
    lose-it'' decision timeframe. Why is Russia contemplating deploying
    this system? What are the benefits to Russia? What, if anything, should
    be the U.S. response if Russia deploys this system? How should this
    decision by Russia impact U.S. decisions about our nuclear force
    structure and policy?
        Dr. Lewis. Among Russian defense entities, there appears to be a
    debate about the need for new liquid-fueled ballistic missiles. The
    process leading to the award of a contract appears to reflect internal
    politics among Russia's design bureaus more than any specific strategic
    rationale. As such, the long-term commitment of the Russian leadership
    to a new liquid-fueled Heavy ICBM remains uncertain.
        New Russian Heavy ICBMs, if based in vulnerable fixed sites, may
    undermine strategic stability by exacerbating Russian fears about the
    survivability of their forces during a crisis with the United States.
    The United States should seek to prevent or curtail deployment of such
    missiles through arms control negotiations.
        That said, the main Russian concern appears to be the vulnerability
    of its leadership and command and control system to a ``decapitating''
    first-strike that denies Russia the ability to retaliate against a
    nuclear attack. Managing fear in Moscow about the viability of its
    command and control system remains, in my view, the most important path
    to enhancing strategic stability. The United States should continue to
    invest in command, control and communications capabilities to maximize
    a U.S. President's decision-time in a crisis, as well as continue to
    engage Russian leaders on measures to reassure them that the United
    States does not seek a decapitating first strike against the Russian
    Federation. The United States has never sought such a capability and it
    is not in our interest for Russian leaders to be confused about that
    fact.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
        Ms. Sanchez. Should U.S. modernization of its nuclear weapons be
    tied to Russian or Chinese modernization? Why/why not? How does the
    effectiveness of Russia and China's nuclear deterrent compare to ours?
    And given what we know of the different models for maintaining nuclear
    weapons, would you trade our nuclear weapons for China's or Russia's?
        Dr. Schneider. Yes, although we should also modernize to deal with
    rogue state threats in the most effective manner. As then-Secretary
    Gates stated in 2008, ``There is no way to ignore efforts by rogue
    states such as North Korea and Iran to develop and deploy nuclear
    weapons or Russian or Chinese strategic modernization programs.''
        Russia already has nuclear superiority due to its 10-to-1 advantage
    in tactical nuclear weapons. As former Under Secretary of Defense
    Ambassador Robert Joseph put it, we are now ``Second to One.'' There is
    no way we can freeze the capability of our strategic missiles at the
    technical level we achieved between 1970 and 1990 without the Russians
    pulling ahead (which seems already to have happened) in most areas,
    with the exception of perhaps SSBN quietness and stealth levels.
        Even without U.S. unilateral cuts, I believe China will gradually
    reduce the gap in numbers and technology and eventually pull ahead, if
    we stand still. There are many reports in the Asian press of Chinese
    plans to MIRV their new strategic missiles extensively, although no
    time frame is given. Despite inferior technology, China now has
    extensive regional missile capability with near precision accuracy.
    This Chinese advantage is going to grow simply because they are
    introducing new and improved missiles and we are doing nothing to
    improve accuracy. The Chinese, according to Aviation Week, are
    developing a 4,000-km range ballistic missile with a nuclear
    capability.
        Russian and Chinese strategic nuclear forces would not be suitable
    for the U.S. We cannot operate mobile ICBMs, build extensive tunnel
    facilities because of their cost, live under their standards of safety
    or match their manpower commitments. It would be useful for the U.S. to
    have elements of their tactical and theater nuclear capability, but it
    would have to be an American version of their capability built to our
    standards.
        Ms. Sanchez. What role, benefits and risks are there for further
    nuclear arms control measures given Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons
    modernization efforts and plans?
        Dr. Schneider. Arms control can only have a positive security
    impact if it is complied with. The Soviet Union/Russia has a poor
    compliance record. The lower we go in nuclear weapons, the greater the
    risk of cheating and the consequences of cheating. New START, with its
    degraded verification regime, is not a good basis for additional arms
    control. We need the restoration of a slightly modified START telemetry
    regime and the restoration of continuous monitoring of mobile ICBM
    production. The New START warhead counting regime needs major surgery
    so that we can accurately count deployed warheads.
        Despite its arms control rhetoric, I see little indication that the
    Obama administration is pressing Russia on future arms control, which
    Russia does not want. Indeed, according to Sergey Karaganov, Dean of
    the Faculty of the Moscow World Economics and Politics at the National
    Research University-Higher School of Economics, ``For the time being,
    in order not to lose what has been achieved, the White House . . .
    refrained from pushing for the beginning of negotiations on reducing
    nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, in which Russia is
    many times superior in terms of numbers. This is why Moscow does not
    want these negotiations.'' Press reports concerning high level meetings
    in 2011 talk almost completely about the Russian missile defense
    agenda. Obama administration statements concerning future negotiations
    about tactical nuclear weapons do not talk about negotiations any time
    soon. Nor are they talking about fixing the problems with START. They
    generally talk about ``transparency'' rather than ``verification.'' One
    statement by NSC Arms Control Coordinator Dr. Gary Samore sounds like
    they are thinking about transparency rather than limits on tactical
    nuclear weapons.
        Statements by administration officials about unilateral reductions
    make no sense if the administration plans near term arms control
    negotiations concerning its announced agenda--further reductions in
    strategic nuclear forces and limits on tactical nuclear and non-
    deployed nuclear weapons of all types. Moreover, there is an obvious
    disconnect between this agenda and the lack of limitations in New START
    on non-deployed mobile ICBMs which is one of the main cheating threats.
        Ms. Sanchez. What impact would the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
    (CTBT) have on stemming nuclear weapons modernization, particularly for
    China? And what are Russia and China's positions on the CTBT?
        Dr. Schneider. The CTBT is not impacting Russia or China, both of
    which are extensively modernizing their nuclear forces. There are
    reports that both Russia and China are engaging in hydronuclear
    testing.
        In the 1990s, the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry, in a report in
    which then-Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov personally
    participated in drafting, said that Soviet hydronuclear tests ``played
    an important role in the analysis of the safety and reliability of
    nuclear weapons.'' (Emphasis added).
        The detection threshold for decoupled nuclear tests and tests
    conducted in salt mines is too high to prevent covert testing that can
    allow the development of new advanced nuclear weapons. I would
    recommend that the Committee review the recent NIE on the CTBT and
    compare it in detail to the comparable assessments made in the NIE
    written during the Clinton administration. I would also recommend that
    the Committee obtain classified briefings from the National
    Laboratories concerning what is possible at various testing yields for
    nuclear weapons development.
        A 2002 National Academy of Sciences report concluded that, with a
    fully functional International Monitoring System, ``an underground
    nuclear explosion cannot be confidently hidden if its yield is larger
    than 1 or 2- kt.'' It said that cavity decoupling had achieved a
    signal-reduction factor of 70 in a 400-ton yield. A January 2001 study
    by Dr. William Leith of the U.S. Geological Survey concluded that, ``In
    thick salt deposits and domes, it is feasible to construct cavities of
    sufficient volume and dimensions for full decoupling of an underground
    nuclear explosion larger than 10 kt . . . . Above 10 kt, the resulting
    seismic event . . . might be detected, and located by the fully-
    functioning CTBT International Monitoring System (the southern
    hemisphere, this threshold will be higher) . . . . [S]uitably thick
    salt deposits are present in many naturally-seismic regions that are
    also areas of nuclear proliferation concern (e.g., Iran, Iraq, Syria,
    China, Russia) . . .'' Dr. Leith also concluded that: ``At yields less
    than about 1 kt, any country desiring to decrease the seismic signal
    from a small underground nuclear explosion can do so by detonation in a
    deep, moderate-size, elongated cavity mined in high-strength, low
    porosity rock (e.g., granite) or, if available, in salt. The
    construction of such a cavity is not limited by the available mining
    technology, based on numerous examples of underground construction at
    depth, worldwide . . . . With careful site selection, the decoupled
    event would not be large enough to be detected seismically, for broad
    areas of most countries.''
        CTBT verification involves monitoring more than known test sites. A
    September 2001 study by Vitaly V. Adushkin and William Leith reported
    that the Soviet Union conducted 117 nuclear tests outside of nuclear
    weapons test sites. In 1999 Principal Deputy Atomic Energy Minister
    Viktor Mikhaylov revealed that nuclear tests had been conducted in 16
    areas of the U.S.S.R. Indeed in one of these tests, ``Soviet scientists
    set off a nuclear blast in 1979 next to a Ukrainian coal mine, then
    sent thousands of miners back to the shaft a day later without telling
    them,'' and that Soviet ``officials had disguised the incident by
    staging a civil defense drill and evacuating the town's 8,000
    residents, most of whom were miners.'' While Russia could not do this
    today in an inhabited area, Siberia is a very large place and largely
    unpopulated.
        Dr. Paul C. Robinson, then-Director of the Sandia National
    Laboratory (SNL), in 1999 Congressional testimony on the CTBT stated
    that he was ``concerned by the erroneous claims'' that the CTBT
    ``prohibits the United States or any other nation from deploying new
    nuclear weapon designs or adapting existing nuclear explosives for new
    warheads.'' The main failure mechanism in a thermonuclear weapon is the
    primary, which if it delivers inadequate yield, will result in a dud.
    Covert nuclear testing undetectable under the CTBT can be used to
    develop and certify new primaries. Even the pro-CTBT 1995 JASON report
    concluded that:

              For the U.S. stockpile, testing under a 500 ton yield limit
            would allow studies of boost gas ignition and initial burn,
            which is a critical step in achieving full primary design
            yield. The primary argument that we heard in support of the
            importance of such testing by the U.S. is the following: the
            evidence in several cases and theoretical analyses indicate
            that results of a sub-kiloton (500 tons) test of a given
            primary that achieves boost gas ignition and initial burn can
            be extrapolated to give some confidence in the yield of an
            identical primary with full boosting. Therefore, if a modified
            or remanufactured primary is introduced into the stockpile in
            the future to correct some aging problem, such tests on the
            modified system would add to confidence that the performance of
            the new primary is still adequate.

        Much higher yield tests than 500-tons yield can be conducted
    without detection with decoupling, testing outside of known test sites
    or in SALT mines. There is also the possibility of covert tests
    conducted at sea to hide the nationality of the test or in deep space.
    These higher tests would have still greater implications for weapons
    development.
        In October 1999 The New York Times reported that, ``In a new
    assessment of its capabilities, the Central Intelligence Agency has
    concluded that it cannot monitor low-level nuclear tests by Russia
    precisely enough to ensure compliance with the Comprehensive Test Ban
    Treaty . . .'' Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) concluded that, ``I have
    little confidence that the verification and enforcement provisions will
    dissuade other nations from nuclear testing.'' During the 1999 CTBT
    debate, then-Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) Director Dr. Paul
    Robinson stated that, ``unfortunately, compliance with a strict zero-
    yield requirement is unverifiable'' and, ``If the United States
    scrupulously restricts itself to zero yield while other nations may
    conduct experiments up to the threshold of international delectability,
    we will be at an intolerable disadvantage.''
        Russia and China support the CTBT. If they are covertly testing as
    press reports say, it gives them a substantial advantage.
        Ms. Sanchez. Understanding the Chinese and Russian current and
    planned modernization efforts, should the U.S. change its current
    nuclear posture and policy, including numbers and targeting? Why, why
    not?
        Dr. Schneider. I believe we must modernize each leg of the TRIAD. I
    would accelerate efforts to develop the new nuclear cruise missile
    because of the defense penetration and sustainment problems with the
    existing ALCM. I believe that some B-61s should be given glide bomb
    capability to better counter advanced defenses. We need to start work
    on new large solid rocket motors in order not to lose design capability
    and be able to replace our ICBM force in 2030. I would also look at
    ways to upgrade our missile accuracy at modest cost. Creating a sub-
    strategic capability for our Minuteman ICBM and Trident II, similar to
    the U.K. sub-strategic Trident capability, is possible at extremely low
    or zero cost if done as part of a life extension program.
        I would not make any unilateral cuts in our nuclear capability.
    Cuts will increase the prospect of China deciding to match us in
    numbers and make the implication of the Russian nuclear advantage
    worse. Indeed, if we are going to attempt to achieve a new arms control
    agreement with Russia, this is the worst possible thing to do from the
    standpoint of negotiating leverage. Russia will see unilateral nuclear
    cuts as enhancing its leverage concerning nuclear threats and they will
    have no incentive to agree to limits on tactical nuclear weapons.
        I would not change existing targeting guidance just for arms
    control purposes. Changes that make sense on their own merits are a
    different issue. I do not support targeting cities simply because it
    takes fewer nuclear weapons to destroy them than our existing targeting
    strategy. I believe targeting cities for the purpose of killing
    civilians is morally bankrupt and inconsistent with humanitarian
    international law.
        Ms. Sanchez. What drives and constrains current Chinese and Russian
    nuclear weapons modernization efforts?
        Dr. Schneider. Russia sees nuclear weapons as central to its
    security because of conventional weakness, the military effectiveness
    of nuclear weapons and it is the only basis for claiming that Russia is
    a great power. I am concerned that Russia views nuclear threats as a
    means of preventing NATO actions like Allied Force in Yugoslavia. It is
    clear that Putin would have reacted very differently to Libya. During
    his first presidency, Putin did not have nuclear superiority. He now
    has it. I am concerned about how he may use it.
        The main constraining force on Russia is lack of an economy that
    can support Soviet style strategic forces. The main constraining force
    on China is inferior technology.
        I believe that China sees nuclear weapons as part of its overall
    deterrence and warfighting capability. This is dangerous because of
    Chinese claims concerning Taiwan and China's declared willingness to
    pay ``any price'' to prevent Taiwanese ``independence.'' This is the
    only international confrontation involving nuclear weapons where a
    nation claims sovereignty over the entire territory of another nation.
    The ``one China'' rhetoric aside, China does not control Taiwan and can
    only do so by military force or the threat of military force. China is
    increasing its military budget more each year than the entire Taiwanese
    military budget. U.S. arms sales policy toward Taiwan, particularly our
    unwillingness to sell the F-16, is making war more likely.
        Ms. Sanchez. How much insight do we have into China's nuclear
    program and what can be done to increase Chinese transparency about its
    nuclear program?
        Dr. Schneider. Not as much as we would like. China is very
    secretive and practices a great deal of deception.
        The principal Chinese nuclear weapons organization, the Chinese
    Academy of Engineering's Institute of Physics, employs 8,500
    professional technical staff members. Yu Min, described by Xinhua as
    the ``architect of the country's first H-bomb,'' claims that China's
    key nuclear capabilities are ``on a par with the United States and the
    former Soviet Union.'' Xue Bencheng, one of the most important
    scientists involved in the development of China's neutron bomb, stated
    that the July 1996 Chinese nuclear test was ``a great spanning leap''
    because it solved the problem of nuclear weapons miniaturization.
        According to Vyacheslav Baskakov and Aleksandr Gorshkov, Russian
    military journalists: ``Specifically, it [China] will succeed in making
    the shift from its current megaton-class nuclear ordinance to a level
    of hundreds and tens of kilotons, thereby increasing the effectiveness
    of available forces and weapons, flexibility of use in various
    circumstances and combat situations on both a strategic and tactical
    level. For example, it is believed that the yield of the strategic
    nuclear warheads with which Chinese ICBM's are now equipped will
    decrease from 1-4 megatons to 250-650 kilotons each. The yield of
    tactical and operational-tactical nuclear warheads, according to expert
    assessments, will total from 90-100 kilotons each.''
        There are convincing reports that this recent progress has not been
    entirely indigenous. ``For example, the House Select Committee on U.S.
    National Security and Military Commercial Concerns with the People's
    Republic of China, generally known as the Cox Committee, concluded
    that: The People's Republic of China (PRC) has stolen classified
    information on all of the United States' most advanced thermonuclear
    warheads, and several of the associated reentry vehicles. These thefts
    are the result of an intelligence collection program spanning two
    decades, and continuing to the present. The PRC intelligence collection
    program included espionage, review of unclassified publications, and
    extensive interactions with scientists from the Department of Energy's
    national weapons laboratories.''
        A number of heavily redacted CIA intelligence reports on China's
    nuclear weapons testing have been declassified and made public. They
    include details that suggest a broad interest in developing nuclear
    weapons for tactical platforms, modernizing and replacing older warhead
    technologies. One of them states that, ``A nuclear test at Lop Nor in
    1990 may be related to development of a warhead for a Chinese short-
    range ballistic missile.'' The National Intelligence Daily (NID) in
    1993 stated that accelerated Chinese testing expected by 1996 may also
    be related to ``tactical systems to be developed in the future.'' In
    September 1995, the NID reported that, ``China could be seeking to
    confirm the reliability of a nuclear artillery shell designed in
    advance of a nuclear test ban'' in order to defend against Russian
    invasion or an amphibious landing. The device may have been a gun
    assembled uranium device. The Chinese nuclear tests in 1993 were driven
    ``by its need to modernize its nuclear force, built largely using 1960
    and 1970 technology.'' The NID in 1993 stated that China planned seven
    nuclear tests, including ``testing for new SLBM and ICBMs warheads, by
    1996 . . .'' In June 1994, the NID assessed that China was developing
    new nuclear weapons that ``may use more advanced concepts such as
    aspherical primaries and possibly a type of IHE [Insensitive High
    Explosive].'' In 1995, the NID judged that Chinese testing was also
    aimed at developing ``a cruise missile warhead and may involve safety
    upgrades to existing systems.'' A Chinese nuclear test planned for 1994
    was aimed at ``the completion of warhead development for new
    intercontinental and submarine launched ballistic missiles and the
    development of technologies to enhance confidence in warheads for an
    enduring stockpile under a nuclear test ban.''
        China will not voluntarily agree to transparency measures. Despite
    its propaganda efforts on nuclear weapons, it has avoided arms control
    and transparency. Only intense pressure on China has any chance to
    change this.
        Ms. Sanchez. Has China ever sought parity with the U.S. and Russia?
    Why?
        Dr. Schneider. During the Cold War, China did not have the economic
    or the technical capability to challenge the U.S. or Russia and made no
    effort to do so. Since the end of the Cold War, China has made a major
    effort to expand the quantity and quality of its nuclear forces. China
    can only approach current U.S. levels if it develops advanced delivery
    vehicles and nuclear warheads. To challenge us, China will need MIRV
    warheads. According to the most recent Pentagon report on Chinese
    military power, the PRC may be developing a new road-mobile ICBM,
    ``possibly'' capable of carrying a multiple independently targetable
    warhead (MIRV). This is apparently the missile that is referred to as
    the DF-41 in the Asian press. Jane's reports it may carry up to 9-10
    warheads. There are reports in the Asian press that China plans to
    heavily MIRV its SLBMs--as many as 576 warheads on six submarines,
    although no time frame is reported. While the Pentagon report on China
    does not provide unclassified projections of future Chinese nuclear
    capability, the Republican Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee
    in the Committee report on New START estimated that the Chinese nuclear
    force would grow to 500-1,000 weapons in the next decade. In addition
    to strategic systems, China has a variety of medium and intermediate
    range ballistic missiles. Aviation Week reports that China has
    announced that its new 4,000-km range ballistic missile will be nuclear
    capable.
        I believe we will see a gradual buildup of Chinese nuclear weapons
    over the next two decades with the ultimate objective of matching the
    U.S. in nuclear weapons as well as in all military capabilities. They
    have the economic capability to do this and our policy is making it
    easier.
        Ms. Sanchez. What does China's no first-use and alert posture
    maintaining nuclear warheads separated from the delivery vehicles tell
    us about their nuclear policy? Does this matter?
        Dr. Schneider. I do not believe China's ``no first use'' policy is
    real. A careful look at the Chinese wording of China's ``no first use''
    policy reveals that it commits them to nothing. As former U.S. military
    attache to China, Colonel (ret.) Larry Wortzel has pointed out, ``The
    U.S. has already used nuclear weapons against Japan in August 1945 . .
    . [thus] if China launched a surprise nuclear attack tomorrow, it would
    still not be the first nation to use nuclear weapons.'' The Pentagon
    report on the Chinese military warns that ``there is some ambiguity''
    over the conditions under which China's No First Use policy would
    apply, ``including whether strikes on what China considers its own
    territory, demonstration strikes, or high altitude bursts would
    constitute a first use.'' I believe this is understated.
        The Japanese Kyodo News Agency revealed that it obtained classified
    Chinese documents which say that China ``will adjust the nuclear threat
    policy if a nuclear missile-possessing country carries out a series of
    air strikes against key strategic targets in our country with
    absolutely superior conventional weapons . . .'' China's U.N. Arms
    Control Ambassador once said that ``no first use'' does not apply to
    Taiwan. Chinese nuclear doctrine has evolved toward ``active defense,''
    which has a nuclear warfighting component.
        If ``no first use'' is really Chinese government policy, how does
    one explain the fact that over the last decade there have been repeated
    threats from the Chinese military of first use against the United
    States over the Taiwan issue? According to Andrei Chang, founder and
    editor of the Kanwa Defense Review, a Canada-based publication that
    specializes in following Chinese military developments reports that
    ``after 1996 China has a number of times attempted to impose nuclear
    deterrence against the U.S. and Taiwan, both strategically and
    tactically.'' Perhaps the most famous recent such threat was made in
    1996 by Lt. General Xion Guangkai, then a deputy chief of the General
    Staff. The general made an implied threat to destroy Los Angeles in the
    event of a conflict over Taiwan. He was also quoted as saying that to
    prevent Taiwanese independence, ``China was prepared to sacrifice
    millions of people, even entire cities in a nuclear exchange.''
        Writing in 2000, academic Ellis Joffe noted that, ``A Chinese
    military publication was more blunt. The United States, it said, will
    not sacrifice 200 million Americans for 20 million Taiwanese . . .'' He
    added, ``They will acknowledge it [the Chinese victory] and withdraw.''
    Another Chinese military journal reportedly said that China had made
    preparations to ``fight a nuclear war with the United States.'' In
    February 2000, then-Colonel Zhu Chenghu, then-Deputy Chief of the
    Strategic Research Institute of Chinese National Defense University,
    stated that, ``China has the capability to launch a nuclear attack
    against the United States. If the United States tried to interfere in
    our dispute with Taiwan, it would suffer a powerful blow as a result.''
    In July 2005, Zhu Chenghu, now a Major General and a Dean of the
    National Defense University, at a meeting for reporters sponsored by
    the Chinese Foreign Ministry, threatened the destruction of several
    hundred U.S. cities if the United States used conventional weapons
    against China in response to a Chinese attack on Taiwan. In an August
    2007 interview with Chinese Major General Cai Yuqiu, Vice Principal of
    Nanjing Army Command College, published in Ta Kung Pao, an internet
    version of a PRC-owned daily newspaper, reported that, ``Cai Yuqiu said
    that he really appreciated the four sentence fight principle by Mao
    Zedong, i.e., we will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are
    attacked, we will certainly counter-attack. As to whether we will use
    nuclear weapons first, the above principle can also be followed. If we
    have been repeatedly `attacked,' then there should not be a limit for
    our counter-attack.''
        When China announced its ``no first use doctrine'' in 1964, it
    simultaneously faced tens-of-thousands of nuclear weapons (with little
    hope of reducing the disparity to even one hundred-to-one within the
    foreseeable future) and movement toward a crisis relationship with the
    Soviet Union. The situation is completely different today. Writing in
    January 2005, Colonel Wen Shang-hsien of the Taiwanese military
    reported that after the year 2000 the PRC adopted a nuclear doctrine
    that allowed for a ``a preemptive strike strategy,'' under which the
    PRC would use ``its tactical nuclear weapons in regional wars if
    necessary.''
        Ms. Sanchez. How does the development of a Russian mobile heavy
    mobile ICBM affect strategic stability and our deterrent? And what role
    might U.S. policy and posture play in Russia's decision to develop a
    heavy ICBM with MIRV capability?
        Dr. Schneider. Russia is developing a new heavy ICBM which the
    Russian press says will carry 10 heavy or15 medium sized nuclear
    warheads. It is not a mobile ICBM but rather will be based in
    substantially upgraded silos, protected by active defenses and GPS
    jamming, according to Russian press reports.
        Russia is developing the new heavy ICBM for the same reasons it did
    in the Cold War. The obvious target of the missile is the U.S. ICBM
    force. Russia's upgraded ICBM silos will be more survivable than
    existing Russian ICBM silos. However, the silos will be unlikely to be
    as survivable as the new Russian SS-27 mobile ICBMs. It a very
    important piece of evidence that Russia is planning for a nuclear
    warfighting capability against the U.S.
        Ms. Sanchez. Do you believe Russia will seek to build back up to
    New START levels if the number of their nuclear warheads and delivery
    vehicles fall below New START levels in the next few years?
        Dr. Schneider. Russia was below the New START deployed warhead and
    delivery vehicle limits on the day New START entered into force,
    according to Russia's first New START data declaration. During the New
    START Treaty's ratification, Russian defense minister Anatoliy
    Serdyukov stated three times that Russia was already below the New
    START limits on both deployed nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles
    and intended to build up to them. He said: ``We will meet every
    parameter established by the treaty before 2028, while the warhead
    limits will be met by 2018.'' Russia's first New START data update
    declaration, published by the State Department in October 2011, said
    that they have moved from below the New START warhead limits to above
    them, an overall increase of 29 warheads.
        I believe Russia will make every effort to keep the number of its
    nuclear warheads as high as possible. I do not believe Russian forces
    will ever decline to 1,550 operationally deployed strategic nuclear
    weapons as they were counted in the Moscow Treaty of 2002. Even ITAR-
    TASS admits that they can stay several hundred weapons above the New
    START limit because of the bomber weapons counting rule which counts a
    bomber as carrying only one warhead.
        Ms. Sanchez. Should U.S. modernization of its nuclear weapons be
    tied to Russian or Chinese modernization? Why/why not? How does the
    effectiveness of Russia and China's nuclear deterrent compare to ours?
    And given what we know of the different models for maintaining nuclear
    weapons, would you trade our nuclear weapons for China's or Russia's?
        Mr. Fisher. Inasmuch as both Russia and China have opted to deploy
    heavy mobile ICBMs to increase their survivability, I believe it is
    necessary for the United States to increase the survivability of its
    land based ICBM force beyond reliance on hardened silos. Given the near
    certainty that China and Russia are going to deploy new heavy ICBMs
    with multiple warheads, it is imperative for the United States to
    develop a similar new heavy, mobile ICBM. I would not trade U.S.
    weapons for those of China or Russia but I do believe that the U.S. can
    develop and should develop a superior heavy mobile ICBM with adequate
    local active protection systems.
        Ms. Sanchez. What role, benefits and risks are there for further
    nuclear arms control measures given Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons
    modernization efforts and plans?
        Mr. Fisher. Any further U.S. reductions in its nuclear arsenal
    would be most unwise without a verifiable understanding of China's
    current nuclear order of battle, its plans for nuclear modernization,
    its real nuclear doctrine, its plans for missile defenses and its plans
    for outer space warfare.
        Ms. Sanchez. What impact would the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
    (CTBT) have on stemming nuclear weapons modernization, particularly for
    China? And what are Russia and China's positions on the CTBT?
        Mr. Fisher. It is my assessment that for any Chinese adherence to a
    CTBT to be credible that the U.S. would have to insist on access to
    known and future discovered Chinese nuclear testing facilities. But as
    I believe that such access will not be granted by China, I therefore
    have little confidence that a CTBT would inhibit China's nuclear
    modernization.
        Ms. Sanchez. Understanding the Chinese and Russian current and
    planned modernization efforts, should the U.S. change its current
    nuclear posture and policy, including numbers and targeting? Why, why
    not?
        Mr. Fisher. Given what I know about China's potential nuclear
    modernization plans, its potential plans for missile defenses and for
    outer space warfare, I would suggest the following: 1) There be no
    further reductions in U.S. nuclear warhead numbers, SSBN deployment
    rates or targeting policies; 2) The U.S. should have the ability to
    increase its warhead numbers very quickly if China's nuclear warhead
    count exceeds 300; 3) The U.S. should develop a new heavy mobile MIRV
    ICBM with active point defenses like rail guns to increase their
    survivability; 4) The U.S. should develop a new SSBN to succeed the
    Ohio class; 5) The U.S. should develop active military space combat
    capabilities to deter China's use of similar capabilities that it is
    developing.
        Ms. Sanchez. What drives and constrains current Chinese and Russian
    nuclear weapons modernization efforts?
        Mr. Fisher. China's nuclear modernization and buildup is driven by
    its desire to become the preeminent global military power during this
    century. This ambition is constrained by the amount of resources that
    China can devote to this goal without increasing domestic stability
    threats to the continuation of the Communist Party dictatorship.
        Ms. Sanchez. How much insight do we have into China's nuclear
    program and what can be done to increase Chinese transparency about its
    nuclear program?
        Mr. Fisher. The United States, as well as the rest of the World,
    has a fundamentally insufficient understanding of China's nuclear
    weapons program, both for the purposes of pursuing a path to strategic
    stability with China, and in comparison to the transparency permitted
    by the United States and Russia. Furthermore, we do not have sufficient
    understanding regarding China's direct and indirect roles in assisting
    the nuclear weapons capabilities of North Korea, Pakistan, Iran and
    China's possible understanding and/or relationship to proxies of these
    countries, like Hezbollah, that could be used to deliver rogue-state
    nuclear weapons. Until China decides that far greater transparency
    about its own nuclear program, or about those nuclear programs that is
    has assisted, is in its national security interest, very little can be
    done save to redouble U.S. espionage and intelligence operations
    targeting China's nuclear weapons sector.
        Ms. Sanchez. Has China ever sought parity with the U.S. and Russia?
    Why?
        Mr. Fisher. China is waiting for the right time to seek nuclear
    superiority over the United States. China is well on its way to
    achieving superiority in conventional weapons over the United States in
    the Asia-Pacific region. The numbers of aircraft carriers, amphibious
    projection ships, combat aircraft, and large transport aircraft that I
    estimate that China is seeking by the 2020s, would require a massive
    shift in U.S. forces to deter a potential conflict--given a likely
    continuation of global U.S. military commitments. In nuclear weapons,
    China does not have to achieve ``parity'' in order to upend the nuclear
    balance. A PLA force of 500 defended nuclear warheads would deeply
    undermine Asian allied confidence in the extended U.S. nuclear
    deterrent.
        Ms. Sanchez. What does China's no first-use and alert posture
    maintaining nuclear warheads separated from the delivery vehicles tell
    us about their nuclear policy? Does this matter?
        Mr. Fisher. It is not clear to me that modern tube-launched and
    stored ICBMs and SLBMs are deployed without their nuclear warheads.
    Constantly unlocking complex seals on these large tubes, needed to
    sustain ``cold launch'' gas pressures, augers against China keeping its
    warheads ``de-mated'' from their DF-21, DF-31, DF-31A and future ``DF-
    41'' ICBMs. This is also, of course, impossible to sustain for SLBMs at
    sea. Keeping these newer mobile ICBMs deployed with warheads also
    reduces their response time, both for offensive and defensive
    contingencies. Unless this Committee has access to information that the
    PLA does ``de-mate'' all of its modern solid fueled tube-launched
    nuclear missiles, then I would advise that the U.S. not credit China
    with a ``relaxed'' nuclear posture suggested by this question.
        Ms. Sanchez. How does the development of a Russian mobile heavy
    mobile ICBM affect strategic stability and our deterrent? And what role
    might U.S. policy and posture play in Russia's decision to develop a
    heavy ICBM with MIRV capability?
        Mr. Fisher. I am much more concerned about China's development of a
    new large mobile ICBM that most likely will be MIRV equipped. Given
    China's willingness to release limited imagery regarding this new
    missile, I also find it very unfortunate that the U.S. government has
    not revealed more data concerning this missile. The development of this
    missile could have far more profound effect on U.S. nuclear deterrent
    requirements because China's far greater effort to remain untransparent
    about this program. I would urge this Committee to in turn urge the
    Administration to provide the American people with a far more complete
    warning about this new missile, to the degree that source protection
    permits. As previously stated, I believe the advent of new Russian and
    Chinese large mobile MIRVed ICBMs places great pressure on the U.S. to
    develop its own new modern mobile ICBM that can also be paired with
    active defenses.
        Ms. Sanchez. Do you believe Russia will seek to build back up to
    New START levels if the number of their nuclear warheads and delivery
    vehicles fall below New START levels in the next few years?
        Mr. Fisher. I do not have a sufficient understanding of Russia's
    nuclear plans to give a useful answer.
        Ms. Sanchez. Should U.S. modernization of its nuclear weapons be
    tied to Russian or Chinese modernization? Why/why not? How does the
    effectiveness of Russia and China's nuclear deterrent compare to ours?
    And given what we know of the different models for maintaining nuclear
    weapons, would you trade our nuclear weapons for China's or Russia's?
    [Question #15, for cross-reference--ed.]
        Dr. Lewis. The overall balance of deterrence is not sensitive, in
    my judgment, to the technical details of opposing nuclear forces--
    particularly not at current levels in excess of 1,000 deployed nuclear
    warheads, many of which are deployed on submarines that are virtually
    invulnerable today.
        The United States should seek to maintain a secure and credible
    option to respond to a nuclear attack against the United States, our
    forces abroad and our allies and partners. Beyond a basic requirement
    that forces be survivable in large enough numbers to hold at risk those
    targets judged necessary for deterrence, small technical advantages in
    nuclear forces confer no political or strategic advantage. Most
    measures relating to nuclear weapons policy, forces and posture are
    about reassuring ourselves that we have done enough as good stewards of
    our strategic forces. These measures have little or no impact on
    calculations in Moscow or Beijing.
        Although the overall balance among all three forces is very robust,
    I would not trade nuclear forces with any other country. Russian
    leaders appear deeply concerned about the survivability of their
    nuclear forces, a situation that I believe no U.S. President could
    accept. Chinese leaders appear willing to accept levels of numerical
    inferiority that would compromise current approaches to extending
    deterrence to U.S. allies and partners. Moreover, the United States
    retains a more agile and capable industrial base than either country.
    [Answer to question #15, for cross-reference--ed.]
        Ms. Sanchez. What role, benefits and risks are there for further
    nuclear arms control measures given Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons
    modernization efforts and plans?
        Dr. Lewis. During the Cold War, a bipartisan consensus existed on
    the need to drive the Soviet Union toward a more stabilizing nuclear
    weapons posture that did not rely heavily on early use to maintain
    survivability. Today, we lack a consensus about why further arms
    control measures are necessary beyond a reasonable assumption that the
    collapse of this process, along with its verification and transparency
    measures, would undermine strategic stability and U.S. security.
        Russian leaders, as I noted in my testimony, are deeply concerned
    about their ability to command their nuclear forces during a crisis and
    fear a ``decapitating'' first strike by the United States. The United
    States should place particular emphasis on measures that reduce Russian
    fears about the viability of their command and control structure. Long-
    standing efforts by the Clinton, Bush and now Obama Administrations to
    establish the Joint Data Exchange Center (now Joint Data Fusion Center)
    to share early warning data with Moscow is one example of a measure
    that might contribute to stability. The United States might also
    negotiate an agreement with Moscow to not place nuclear weapons on
    missile defense interceptors. (The FY2003 National Defense
    Authorization Act prohibits the expenditure of any funds on the
    research, testing or development of nuclear-armed missile defenses.)
        China is currently in the process of adding new solid-fueled
    ballistic missiles to its strategic forces. In a serious crisis,
    according to some training materials for Chinese officers, they intend
    to place these forces on alert to signal their resolve. As new mobile
    missiles have become available, this may mean sending road-mobile
    missiles out into the field and flushing ballistic missile submarines
    (which are not yet armed with operational ballistic missiles) into the
    ocean. The United States and China need urgently to begin strategic
    stability consultations now, rather than during a serious political or
    military crisis.
        Ms. Sanchez. What impact would the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
    (CTBT) have on stemming nuclear weapons modernization, particularly for
    China? And what are Russia and China's positions on the CTBT?
        Dr. Lewis. If China were to ratify and observe the terms of the
    CTBT, China would probably be unable to develop new nuclear warhead
    designs small enough to permit placement of multiple warheads on
    China's new solid-fueled ballistic missiles. This would constrain the
    size of China's strategic forces, greatly reducing the potential threat
    to the U.S. and its allies in the region.
        Russia has ratified the CTBT. Russia maintains that it is complying
    with the CTBT, conducting only so-called subcritical nuclear tests at
    Novaya Zemlya, similar to those conducted by the United States at the
    Nevada Test site.
        Chinese officials privately indicate that they will ratify the CTBT
    after the United States does. Chinese officials do not publicly
    describe stockpile stewardship activities, but almost certainly are
    conducting subcritical tests at the Lop Nor test site.
        The United States would likely be able to detect tests above a few
    hundred tons at either the Novaya Zemlya or Lop Nor test sites, ruling
    out most nuclear tests. The current test moratorium ``locks in'' the
    current Russian practice of remanufacturing nuclear weapons as a basis
    stockpile stewardship measure and significantly constrains the ability
    of both Russia and China to modernize their existing nuclear weapons
    designs.
        Ms. Sanchez. Understanding the Chinese and Russian current and
    planned modernization efforts, should the U.S. change its current
    nuclear posture and policy, including numbers and targeting? Why, why
    not?
        Dr. Lewis. Today, nuclear weapons play a smaller role in U.S. and
    allied security than at any time since the end of the Second World War.
    Our challenge is to align our nuclear weapons policies, forces and
    posture with this limited role. Neither Russia nor China are
    modernizing their forces in a way that could, at this time, threaten
    what is an extraordinarily robust balance of terror.
        The overall balance of deterrence is sufficiently strong that the
    United States could further reduce the number of nuclear weapons,
    further relax certain readiness requirements, and further ``scrub''
    existing target sets with no risk to national security. The United
    States should consider such changes to the extent that they may yield
    cost savings in the current budgetary environment or enhance strategic
    stability.
        Ms. Sanchez. What drives and constrains current Chinese and Russian
    nuclear weapons modernization efforts?
        Dr. Lewis. Russian leaders continue to value maintaining a
    relatively large nuclear arsenal, both as a deterrent against the
    United States and a hedge against the growing military capability of
    China. Russian leaders also appear acutely concerned about the
    vulnerability of their forces, particularly their ability to command
    those forces in a crisis.
        China is continuing on the modernization path established in the
    mid-1980s, replacing existing liquid-fueled ballistic missiles with
    solid-fueled ballistic missiles. China may also modestly expand the
    total number of warheads capable of reaching the United States,
    although large increases in nuclear forces do not appear underway. (At
    the same time, China is rapidly increasing the number of
    conventionally-armed ballistic and cruise missiles.) China is not
    currently developing new nuclear warhead designs. China's modernization
    appears driven by a national commitment to acquire the same types of
    capabilities, albeit in smaller numbers, as those possessed by the
    United States and Russia.
        Ms. Sanchez. In your opinion, what can China or Russia gain by
    performing sub-kiloton testing? How would this impact their
    modernization efforts? How would these tests, especially by Russia,
    impact U.S. deterrent capability?
        Dr. Lewis. I know of no evidence that either Russia or China are
    conducting so-called hydronuclear tests (which produce a small nuclear
    yield and would be prohibited under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
    Treaty) as opposed to sub-critical tests similar to those conducted by
    the United States (which do not produce a nuclear yield and would not
    be prohibited under the CTBT).
        Neither Russia nor China would be able to develop new thermonuclear
    warhead designs of yields above 1-2 kilotons with only sub-kiloton
    testing. China, in particular, would face difficulty in developing
    warheads that would allow it to place multiple warheads on a mobile
    missiles.
        Overall, clandestine sub-kiloton testing would pose little threat
    to the overall deterrent balance--although the United States should not
    ignore evidence of willfull treaty violations if they should occur. On
    the other hand, the United States should be careful not to make hasty
    accusations that later turn out to be false. For example, the Clinton
    Administration demarched Russia for conducting a clandestine nuclear
    test in August 1997 that later turned out to be an earthquake.
        The United States should seek additional test-site transparency
    measures, principally with Russia, as part of a concerted effort to
    secure ratification in the United States Senate and bring the CTBT into
    force.
        Ms. Sanchez. How much insight do we have into China's nuclear
    program and what can be done to increase Chinese transparency about its
    nuclear program?
        Dr. Lewis. The United States intelligence community appears to have
    reasonably detailed information about Chinese fissile material
    production, ballistic and cruise missile development and force
    structure (bases, brigades, etc.). Declassified U.S. intelligence
    estimates that China maintains a total stockpile of approximately 200-
    300 nuclear weapons deployed on ballistic missiles are almost certainly
    accurate to within an order of magnitude. China has hundreds, not
    thousands, of nuclear weapons.
        Moreover, the growing openness of Chinese society has led to an
    explosion of information that can assist in tracking the evolution of
    Chinese strategic forces. Today, the greatest challenge is in sorting
    the enormous ``noise'' produced by the a cacophony of Chinese bloggers,
    hyper-patriots, military buffs and so on who often recycle inaccurate
    or distorted Western information as their own analysis.
        Recent reports that China has more than 3,000 nuclear weapons,
    which appear to be based largely on an anonymous internet posting,
    demonstrate the potential pitfalls in this new era of transparency.
        An important goal of strategic stability consultations should be
    specific measures to enhance transparency relating to China's force
    structure and modernization programs.
        Ms. Sanchez. Has China ever sought parity with the U.S. and Russia?
    Why?
        Dr. Lewis. No, Chinese leaders have never sought numerical parity
    in nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles with either U.S. or Russian
    strategic forces.
        Chinese leaders view technological milestones, not force levels, as
    the important feature in the nuclear balance, which they regard as
    extraordinarily robust. Chinese leaders would prefer, for example, to
    have a smaller number of modern missiles and warheads than an
    equivalent number of inferior strategic forces.
        This reflects a ``possession'' mentality where Chinese leaders view
    seek the same capabilities as other nuclear-weapons states, even if
    they chose to deploy only small numbers or, in the case of enhanced
    radiation warheads, none at all. Similarly, this emphasis on matching
    the capabilities of other powers is evident in Chinese efforts to
    develop a ``hit-to-kill'' system similar to the U.S. missile defense
    programs.
        Ms. Sanchez. What does China's no first-use and alert posture
    maintaining nuclear warheads separated from the delivery vehicles tell
    us about their nuclear policy? Does this matter?
        Dr. Lewis. China maintains a very unusual nuclear posture--it
    maintains a small nuclear force based largely on land-based ballistic
    missiles kept off alert and with the most restrictive employment
    guidance (a ``no first use'' policy). Chinese military textbooks and
    exercises suggest that Chinese leaders plan to ``ride out'' a nuclear
    attack before ordering a retaliatory strike.
        There are bureaucratic, historical and cultural reasons for this
    unusual decision. The simplest explanation is that, unlike Western
    policymakers, Chinese leaders believe deterrence is not difficult to
    achieve or maintain. As a result, Chinese leaders have endured a level
    of vulnerability that neither Washington nor Moscow would accept.
        Many American analysts have difficulty accepting that China would
    willingly choose such a deterrent. They deny that Chinese leaders
    really have a ``no first use'' policy or argue that there must be
    thousands more nuclear weapons hidden somewhere. In fact, Chinese
    leaders simply think differently about nuclear weapons than their
    American counterparts.
        Radically different Chinese and American views about nuclear
    weapons complicate strategic dialogue between officials from the two
    countries and, in a crisis, might undermine strategic stability by
    reinforcing mutual suspicions. Although leaders from both countries
    generally acknowledge the need for strategic dialogue and have
    attempted to establish various fora, the overall level of communication
    and understanding between the two remains dangerously inadequate.
        Ms. Sanchez. How does the development of a Russian mobile heavy
    mobile ICBM affect strategic stability and our deterrent? And what role
    might U.S. policy and posture play in Russia's decision to develop a
    heavy ICBM with MIRV capability?
        Dr. Lewis. See Question 15 [answer at top of page 104].
        Ms. Sanchez. Do you believe Russia will seek to build back up to
    New START levels if the number of their nuclear warheads and delivery
    vehicles fall below New START levels in the next few years?
        Dr. Lewis. Russia will be able to maintain the full number of
    treaty-permitted delivery vehicles under the New START Treaty, unless
    it retains large numbers of obsolete and vulnerable systems. A
    reasonable projection for modern delivery vehicles in the coming years
    is approximately 500.
        Russia will, on the other hand, attempt to maintain the full 1550
    deployed nuclear warheads. Russia's decision to continue the extensive
    use of multiple warheads on ballistic missiles may undermine strategic
    stability.
        As a result, the New START Treaty made important progress in
    driving Russia toward a more stabilizing force posture, but additional
    agreements would be necessary to further reduce the dangers to the
    United States. In particular, the United States should seek to
    resurrect the ban on multiple warheads for land-based ballistic
    missiles that was lost with the START II Treaty, even at the cost of
    further reductions in the number of treaty-accountable delivery
    vehicles.