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**THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
AND THE U.S. MILITARY TEN YEARS
AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES FROM
FORMER SERVICE CHIEFS
AND VICE CHIEFS**

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]

**THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE U.S.
MILITARY TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES
FROM FORMER SERVICE CHIEFS AND VICE CHIEFS**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, October 4, 2011.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. “BUCK” MCKEON,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COM-
MITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. The House Armed Services Committee will come to order.

We meet this morning to receive testimony on “The Future of National Defense and the U.S. Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives from Former Service Chiefs and Vice Chiefs.”

This hearing is the third in our series of hearings to evaluate lessons learned since 9/11 and to apply those lessons to decisions we will soon be making about the future of our Force. In the past month, we have heard from former chairmen and a vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and also a panel of outside defense experts. Today, we will hear from a former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, a Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and a former Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

In these capacities, our witnesses were directly involved in the management, training, and equipment—equipping of our Force. This panel’s collective time of service to our Nation is over 110 years.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Their knowledge of the decisionmaking process within the Department of Defense, as well as their cumulative years of service, will provide this committee with vital information as we look to the future of our Force.

While we continue to make progress in Iraq and Afghanistan and with the killing of high-profile terrorists, including Osama bin Laden and, most recently, Al Qaeda leader Anwar al-Awlaki, I remain concerned that our Nation is slipping back into the false confidence of a September 10th mindset. Believing that we can maintain a solid defense that is driven by budget choices, not strategic ones, is a dangerous path for our national security.

I am not arguing that the military can be held exempt from fiscal belt-tightening. Indeed, half a trillion dollars has been cut from the Defense Department already. The military has absorbed about half

of the deficit reduction measures enacted to date. But these cuts have happened in advance of the development of a new strategy for national defense and without any changes to the military's roles and missions.

Even more concerning is that if the Joint Select Committee does not succeed in developing and passing another deficit reduction plan, an additional half a trillion dollars could be cut from our military automatically. It also remains to be seen whether or not additional cuts may be proposed by the Administration even if the "Super Committee" [Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction] is successful. News reports last week indicated that the President is proposing further cuts to defense—again, driven by math, not strategy. But all this talk about dollars doesn't translate well into actual impacts on the Force and the risk to our Nation.

I hope our witnesses today can help us understand, based on the lessons of the last 10 years and their over 100 years of experience, what strategic choices we face in the current global security environment and how further cuts to the military could shape these choices.

The U.S. military is the modern era's pillar of American strength and values. In these difficult times—in these difficult economic times, we recognize the struggle to bring fiscal discipline to our Nation, but it is imperative that we focus our fiscal restraint on the driver of the debt instead of the protector of our prosperity.

With that in mind, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today.

Now let me turn to our ranking member, Adam Smith from Washington.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding this hearing and the hearings that you have held to date to discuss the defense budget, our strategic posture, and where we go from here in very uncertain times.

And I am very pleased to have the witnesses we have before us today. I look forward to their testimony. I think they can add considerable insight as to what those best choices are.

And I also agree with the chairman that the proposed cuts in the defense budget are a big risk, particularly if we do not make the cuts necessary to prevent sequestration. If we do not make the other changes to the budget that could prevent that, you are looking at sizable reductions in our national security budget and the Department of Defense in ways that we are not ready for and have not anticipated. And I agree with the chairman that that is something to be prevented.

I did not support the debt ceiling agreement in large part because all of the cuts were lumped on to the non-entitlement portion of the budget. Not only is that a problem for defense, that is also a problem for other non-entitlement areas, like education and infrastructure, homeland security, things that are equally important

to the security of this Nation, as is the Department of Defense. So we definitely have reason to be concerned about the impact of those cuts in the Department of Defense.

I will, however, say that I think resources are part of the equation. We frequently hear in this committee folks say we shouldn't consider money when we are talking about national security because it is just that important. Well, unfortunately, it is a fundamental fact of life that the resources that you have available to you are part of the equation in figuring out what you are going to be able to do. And we do have choices, in terms of how this impacts our need for revenue, what our tax rates are going to be, how much we are going to have to cut from other programs. And I think we have to consider that when we are looking at what our national security strategy should be.

But with that said, we need a strategic review of the Department of Defense. Much has changed in the last 10 years, and much will change going forward. As we begin the drawdown in Afghanistan, complete the drawdown in Iraq, as asymmetric hybrid threats continue to emerge in unpredictable ways, it is very appropriate right now to do a major strategic review of where best to spend our money in the Department of Defense.

I know the Administration is embarking upon such a strategic review. This committee, obviously, is doing that. We need to make some hard choices and look at why we spend the money we spend in the Department of Defense. You know, why do we insist on a 313-ship Navy? Why do we have the force structure that we have? What do we ask them to do? And, as importantly, if we are going to reduce any of that, what are we going to stop asking them to do? How are we going to make those changes and make sure that those two things match up?

But I just want to close by emphasizing one of the points I made earlier, and that is that the rest of the budget matters in this discussion. And I know what this committee would like to do is to focus on the Department of Defense and national security and simply say that, look, these cuts are unacceptable for this reason; and as far as where you get the money, well, that is somebody else's problem, but here is why it is absolutely critical to our national security that we not cut below this level. But I think we do so at our own peril.

We have to consider the rest of the budget. If we, as a committee, are going to present a plan that says the defense budget has to be at this level, then it better fit within a realistic budget. We better be prepared to talk about where we are going to get the revenue to fund that or, if we don't want to get the revenue to fund that, how much are we going to cut the other programs? Because if those other cuts and that other revenue is not politically feasible, then, you know, we can scream as loud as we want about the cuts to defense, but they are going to happen.

So we have to talk about revenue, we have to talk about where we are going to cut other programs in order to afford the defense that this committee decides that we want. So I hope we will have that broad discussion, as well.

And, again, I thank the chairman for having this hearing, and I look forward to the testimony from our very esteemed witnesses. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I am happy to welcome our witnesses here today. We have General John Jumper, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force; General Richard Cody, former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; General H. Steven Blum, former Chief of the National Guard.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. We look forward to your testimony.

Let's begin with General Jumper.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN P. JUMPER, USAF (RET.), FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

General JUMPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to return to these rooms after so many years of absence and to see so many familiar faces and to appear with my colleagues here. We have shared many very interesting hours before this committee in the past together.

And I would also like to thank members of the committee, both, actually, collectively and individually, for all that you have done for the soldiers and marines, in particular, but for all service members on post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injuries. The process that—processes that you have supported and enacted have helped us diagnose and treat this very disastrous disorder that our people return from combat, and it is very difficult to diagnose. So thank you, Mr. Chairman, the committee, and the individuals who have supported those efforts.

Sir, I have submitted my statement for the record, and I will just highlight a few points and take very little time in doing.

I think there are several very important things to remember, sir.

One is that, as we look forward to the future in trying to predict the world that we are going to be in, we have to admit right up front that we are lousy predictors. If we look back prior to the fall of the wall [Berlin Wall] in 1988 and you look at the newspapers back in that time, we read how the U.S. economy will be number two to Japan by the turn of the century, we read all these papers, and you can hardly find the names "Saddam Hussein," "Slobodan Milosevic," "Osama bin Laden." These are the very names that went on to shape U.S. policy and U.S. military actions for, lo, the next 20 years. We are not good at predicting.

And what that means to people, like the people at this table, who wake up, stay up at night worrying about things, the things we worry about are the things that we don't know and what comes next. And as we look forward to the general instability in the world, we have to have a broad range of responses available. It is not just about counterinsurgency or not just about nuclear deterrence; it is not just about a conventional response to traditional threats. It is about all of these things.

And the other thing that we have learned over time is that the things that we get drawn into are not things that we would have anticipated in any way or even thought that we might find our-

selves involved with. You can go back to 1994 and the Rwanda situation. As you look back on that, we did not get involved, but if you look back on that, we probably could have sent a rifle company into Rwanda during that crisis and saved 250,000 lives. We chose not to do it at the time. We did choose to get involved in other things: Kosovo, as a result of a genocide that was going on at the time; and our participation in the last year or so in the Arab Spring movements around the world.

It is not for the military people to decide what we are going to get involved with, but we do have to answer the phone when the phone rings and you get that question, what have you got for me? And when you answer that question, you have to have a broad range of responses and capabilities able to answer the Nation's needs.

All the while, I think it is imperative that we keep our eye, Mr. Chairman, on our deterrent capability. And as we draw down and we look at cuts, the things that come under pressure are the things that, in many times, are the most dangerous. We have to—this committee has to help the military leadership keep focus on the safety, the security, the reliability of our nuclear weapons as we draw down and we maintain this nuclear deterrent as part of our strategy.

As far as roles and missions go, there is a lot the military can do to reduce the overlap in its capabilities. I have always been a proponent of a written concept of operations. The system that we use right now, we go out and we start buying things. Before we even are able to articulate how we are going to fight, we buy the things to fight with. I have always thought that a written concept of operations, joint concept of operations, that steered our way in areas of redundancy and overlap would reduce a lot of that redundancy and overlap that we see.

Also, as budgets draw down, Mr. Chairman, it puts great pressure, internal pressure, on the Services, and it brings out the very worst of us with regard to internal strife, especially, I might say—and Steve will acknowledge this, I am sure—between the Active Duty, the National Guard, and the Reserves over resources.

We have seen in the last 10 years the vital part that the National Guard and the Reserves have played in the rotational base as we have gone back and forth with our units in fighting the war on terror. That support has been unprecedented. The committee is going to have to, again, give focused support to making sure that as we draw down we achieve that right balance, that right and correct balance, between Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve.

And, of course, the other things that come under pressure as we look at further cuts, the first thing that goes is training, research and development. I have always said that while the enemy may enjoy some asymmetrical advantages, low-tech asymmetrical advantages, the asymmetrical advantage of this Nation is its technology.

And I hearken back to the young airmen on horses in the early days of Afghanistan digitally relaying coordinates up to B-52s that were dropping GPS [Global Positioning System]-guided munitions. It was the B-52 that was designed in the 1950s, the airmen riding the horse that the cavalry gave up I believe in 1932, the GPS kit

that was strapped on to a bomb that came from World War II. It was the innovation and the technology that allowed us to turn the things that we had into things that we needed at the moment, at the time.

We do not want to give up the ingenuity of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that reinvent things every day that work on the battlefield. It is that technology, that research and development that usually is the first that is hit when you get into a budget squeeze.

And, finally, I am going to say that—I would like to say that there are low-hanging—there is low-hanging fruit out there where we can realize savings as a military. There is a lot in logistics. If we just unleash the power of best business practices and competition, we could find tremendous savings in the logistics area.

Once again, the service chiefs understand and they know this, but it is going to take the help of this committee and this Congress, sir, to be able to support our military leadership as they seek these ways to save and to minimize the drawdowns.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Jumper can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

General Cody.

**STATEMENT OF GEN RICHARD A. CODY, USA (RET.), FORMER
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY**

General CODY. Good morning, Chairman, and thanks for having us. I will be brief.

On 8 April 2008, I testified before this committee as the Vice Chief of the Army. Then, I was honored to represent our Nation's one million-plus soldiers, nearly 600,000 of them who were serving on Active Duty, Active Guard and Reserve on Active Duty, over 250,000 of whom were deployed worldwide, most on 15-month combat tours, as I testified on issues critical to the current and long-term readiness of the Force. Today, again, I am honored to testify before you as a private citizen, a retired soldier, but one who continues to do what I can to support our great soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen.

Many things have changed since I testified in April 2008. The surge in Iraq has ended, and the Army is on course to withdraw some 45,000 soldiers by the end of the year. We have surged more soldiers and marines and airmen into Afghanistan. The end-strength growth of 65,000 additional soldiers that we started in 2004 is complete, but now there is movement to reduce the Army's Active Duty end strength, as well as the Marines, by significant numbers. The Army has completed the restructuring of the Force and just finished the largest BRAC [Base Closure and Realignment], MILCON [Military Construction], and global repositioning of our Army since World War II, all while fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, our economy is in a crisis mode. Probably most importantly, we have now been at war for over 10 years, and our ground forces and their families are worn thin.

That said, many things have not changed. In 2008, I reported to you that the world we live in is exceedingly dangerous. Recent

events in Southwest Asia, the Pacific, and the Arab Spring only highlight this fact in spite of the courageous efforts of our service men and women worldwide.

I also reported to you that our Army was out of balance; that repeated tours of 12 months in combat with only 13 months back before deploying again was putting tremendous stress on the All-Volunteer Army and their families. Today, that stress is still there, as the Army continues to deploy soldiers on 12-month combat tours with less than 24 months back between tours.

I testified then that we are consuming our strategic readiness, people and equipment, with repeated tours in the harshest environments we have ever fought in, and, most importantly, that our ability to man, equip, and train for full-spectrum operations somewhere else in the world while fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan was not possible.

In 2008, I reported that the cumulative impact of 6 years of continuing resolutions was causing significant problems within the Services' ability to run their programs, prepare our men and women for the next rotation, and to reset equipment—equipment that had been in combat for over 6 years then, now much longer. Today, we enter another fiscal year with a CR [Continuing Resolution] while at war. It is one thing to deal with the uncertainty of our enemies and what new threats in the world we have to prepare for, but it is entirely another to deal with the uncertainty of year-to-year budgets and what resources will be available to sustain today's fight and reset a force that has been at war for over 10 years for the next fight.

As Congress and the Pentagon and the Executive Branch wrestle with the budget reduction required by the Budget Control Act, the real question with regard to the Services and DOD's [Department of Defense] budget is simple: What missions do you want our military to continue to perform? What threats do you want our military to counter? What levels of readiness do you want the military to sustain?

As General Jumper has said, history has taught us that we have not been very good at predicting where, when, and against whom the U.S. military will have to fight to protect the national interests and the security of this Nation and its 315 million citizens. Simply put, when we size, scope, and resource our military for the peaceful and U.S.-friendly world we all hope for and not for the dangerous, hostile, and unpredictable world that we actually live in, it is the American service men and women and our Nation that we put at risk.

During my 6 years in the Pentagon as the Army's G3 and as Vice Chief, this Congress has always responded to the critical needs of our Force, especially during the early years of Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. It is well documented we entered this Global War on Terrorism woefully short of equipment, resulting from the defense budget cuts in the late '90s after the first Gulf war, especially for our Guard and Reserve forces, and Congress responded. In my mind, further cuts in the DOD budget beyond what Secretary Bob Gates outlined with his \$400 million is putting our military and our country at high risk. That spirit of support by Congress is still needed today for our troops.

Thank you, sir.
 [The prepared statement of General Cody can be found in the Appendix on page 46.]
 The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
 General Blum.

**STATEMENT OF LTG H. STEVEN BLUM, USA (RET.), FORMER
 CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU**

General BLUM. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee.

First of all, a genuine “thank you” for the opportunity to here appear this morning and hopefully dialogue with the Members of this committee on such an important subject, and that is the Armed Forces of the United States, particularly since 9/11 and the future of those forces.

Throughout my 42 years in uniform, I can honestly say that this Nation has been well served by this committee and its predecessors. You have always risen to the occasion.

The CHAIRMAN. General, is your mic on?

General BLUM. No, it probably is not, but I will turn it on.

General CODY. Push to talk, Steve.

General BLUM. Thanks.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General BLUM. So, for 42 years I served in uniform, and during that entire time this committee and the members of this committee and your predecessors that served before you have always been able to provide outstanding, nonpartisan support for our men and women in uniform to ensure that we had the resources, we had the policies, and we were asking the tough questions that often, frankly, need to be asked in a building that gets very complacent with itself and its procedures. And I am speaking about the Pentagon.

So you have been very, very strong partners, and the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and Coast Guardsmen of the Nation have benefited for at least my time in service from your service to the Nation. So I appreciate you having these hearings and giving us the opportunity to appear this morning before you.

I will shorten my remarks. I have given you a set of prepared remarks for the record, but, first, I will shorten my remarks by saying “amen” to what General Jumper said. Every single word that he said I agree with. And General Cody, every single word that he said I support and agree with so far.

Now, we have not always agreed; the gentlemen at this table have not always agreed. We have had some tough, tough dialogue getting the United States Armed Forces, in particular the Air Force and the Army elements that I had responsibility to provide the States’ National Guard forces, as a Federal reserve of those two great Services, we did not always see eye-to-eye to how we did it.

But we do agree this morning on two very critical points: One, our Nation and our Constitution is worth defending. And, two, freedom is not free, and you can’t get readiness at a discount rate. You get what you pay for.

Today, we face a security environment around the world that this retired soldier feels may be the most complex and dangerous that we have ever faced in our Nation’s history. Predictability is

not there. The international security landscape shifts every day, and every Member in this room and those in the gallery have been surprised by world events almost daily. So, as a result, our Nation now requires more of its Armed Forces than at any other time in the Nation's history. What a soldier has to do today, the tasks, the skills that they must possess are entirely different than those that George Washington needed at Valley Forge, that Ulysses S. Grant needed at Gettysburg, that John Pershing needed, that Douglas MacArthur needed or Pete Schoomaker or Dick Cody needed from their Army in Iraq and Afghanistan and the other 40 nations in the world where we are out engaged today in very, very dangerous and difficult operations.

To state the obvious, as Mr. Smith said, this challenge does not just lie in the military; it resides in every sector of our society. As a Nation, we really do have to find a way to do more, efficiently, with less. There is no question about it. But to do that job right, I maintain that the national security strategy of this Nation has to be independently developed without any fiscal constraints. Once you set the strategy, then and only then can you make meaningful decisions based on an informed dialogue, based on managing and measuring risk. And then and only then can we determine how to best accomplish that strategy within the existing resources that the Nation can provide.

Certainly none of us at this table think that we are going to be able to resource everything and anything that we need, and we understand that there will be some risk we are going to have to assume. But when we assume that risk, it should be done in something—in a different thought process than strictly a numbers drill.

After some very, very difficult rebalancing, reorganization, and spending enormous amounts of the United States taxpayers' treasury to catch up, we now have the most professional and capable total force in the United States military that this Nation has ever fielded or the world has ever seen. It is unquestioned.

Ladies and gentlemen, we must maintain this peerless military. It is really the lens through which most of the world views our Nation. And if they see us as strong, they view us much different than if they view us as weak. And I have just come back from some international travel, and the way we are viewed overseas today is not the way we were viewed overseas 5 years ago. And if you ask them how they view us 5 years from now, it is even more disappointing. We cannot and must not allow that to happen.

We must avoid repeating the past mistakes when simply numbers drills and, frankly, parochial interests of the Services, of the departments, and of parties and politics entered into an equation on national security rather than geopolitical realities. We must drive the decisions so that we are prepared for the next unpredicted, unexpected threat against our freedom and our way of life.

As this committee deliberates the tough choices that our Nation faces, I ask you to consider a new paradigm that is being embraced by probably most, if not all, of the internationally successful, profit-driven companies in the world. These companies have adopted a new paradigm. They size their full-time professional staff, whether it is manufacturing or sales or scientific development, they size

that full-time professional staff for the smallest, lowest, steady-state business requirement of their business, but they size their part-time force, the trained and ready professionals that are ready on call, for their most optimistic demand or surge capability, market-driven.

Why do they do this? They do this because they don't have unlimited resources, and they want to—they want to husband what they do have and save that and at least keep part of it so that they can have research and development, they can have capital improvement, they can talk about modernization and recapitalization and expansion in the business community. What they want to avoid is mortgaging the ability to have that agile flexibility or to be able to take advantage of an opportunity in the market because they have their costs sunk into personnel costs, entitlements, benefits, retirement, and health care. Although we all at this table agree that those things are important, there is going to have to be some balance.

If you see that model as successful, this soldier, this citizen soldier, thinks that that model may be informative to this committee, and you should seriously consider this when alternatives come out for how we are really going to balance the capability we need to have and the force structure and the size of the force we need to have and how we have traditionally salami-sliced the forces, to get to the acrimony that General Jumper was talking about, because the fair share is not always fair and it is not even always smart. I would suggest you take a look at this model because it does give you a new paradigm to examine how we do these kinds of things in a constrained environment, and I think it is quite useful.

I think the strategy argues clearly for an increased reliance on the Guard and Reserve as part of the total force. For the last 10 years, not only have our men and women in all Services performed in a magnificent manner, it is noteworthy that the Guard and Reserve, after the extraordinary measures taken by the gentlemen at this table, among others, and the committee that I am speaking before today, we brought the Guard and Reserves from a 1947 structure on September 11th, 2001, into the 21st century, to right now they are standing shoulder to shoulder with the airmen and the soldiers of the United States Army and the United States Air Force. And I would challenge anybody in this room to distinguish a Guardsman, a Reservist, or an Active Duty member of the military unless you interrogated them or asked them specifically where they had come from, what they were doing before you saw them in theater or you saw them performing their work.

I don't think you want to take a giant step backwards just because of a budget drill and have today's operational reserve be forced or relegated into only a Cold War-relic strategic reserve role once again. And anything—I might remind you, anything you do to decrement or to lessen the capability of the National Guard and Reserves, you are basically passing a burden down to the governors of this Nation and making their constitutional responsibilities and authorities even more difficult to protect the citizens in every zip code that you actually represent here in Congress.

If you want to read a little bit more, I would recommend General Craig McKinley's recent white paper, published March 31st, 2011,

“A Great Value Today and in the Future.” I would recommend that to you.

Last fact before I close: When you call out the Guard and Reserve, you do, in fact, call out America. When you are considering value, the value of that, ladies and gentlemen, is priceless.

Thank you for what you do for our Nation. Thank you for holding these hearings on this most serious and urgent matter. And I anxiously will be welcoming any questions that you might have. And thanks for the opportunity to contribute in this dialogue on this very serious issue. Thanks.

[The prepared statement of General Blum can be found in the Appendix on page 56.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Let’s consider the impact of funding cuts on end strength. We know, from what we have seen so far with the \$465 billion in the first tranche, there is going to be a significant cut in end strength. But in the event of sequestration or a 10-percent reduction to the fiscal year 2013 budget request, military spending would be reduced by about \$55 billion a year, starting next October. If the Department chooses to shed end strength to meet just part of this goal, we could easily be back below pre-9/11 levels for the Army and Marine Corps.

Based on your experience, what would the consequences be to the Force and the military readiness by reducing the Army and Marine Corps end strength to or below pre-9/11 levels by fiscal year 2013? And what are the consequences for reducing the size of the Air Force, which is already smaller than the force we had on 9/11?

And one last thing that I have is, one of the things that we have talked quite a bit about the last few years but the last few months we haven’t been talking about is the reset as we pull our troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq. Where are we going to get the money to reset? How much is that going to take? And what effect is that going to have on the Force?

General CODY. The Chief told me I could take it first.

I spent 6 years in the Pentagon, Mr. Chairman, working on force structure. The first time I testified before this committee was 1998, after Task Force Hawk. I stated then for the record that I thought we were a 10-division Army with a 14-division mission. Got criticized quite a bit.

Interesting to note that in the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] of 2000, before 9/11, as you say, September 10th, there was movement afoot by the accountants and budgeters to cut that force from 10 divisions down to 8. That stopped when 9/11 happened.

We entered this Global War on Terrorism with a force of 482,000, a little over 500,000 National Guard, I think about 200-some-odd-thousand Army Reservists. Our readiness levels of those units, combat support and combat service supports from the cuts of 1994 through ’98 had left those portions of the units untrained. Our first-to-deploy units, like the 101st, the 82nd, the 1st Cavalry Division were fine—3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment—but, quite frankly, we didn’t have the depth.

What I have learned in 6 years of doing this was, when you take a look at the 1-4-2-1 that is in this committee’s think piece of, one, you know, how we force-structure, when you put in all these

different strategies and then you force-size it, if you don't put that strategy into motion and put a tempo nature to it, you run out of troops very quickly.

Let me explain. We had a force-sizing construct that got us to 482,000 that said we would be fighting one decisive, with the ability to swing to another decisive, and we could be in four lesser contingencies. That is fine, and so they force-sized to that. The trouble was, we got into this war, and we were there 2003, 2004, 2005. If you remember, in 2004, we were so short forces, we had to turn to the National Guard and activate and mobilize nine National Guard brigades that were not equipped, which meant we had to dip into our strategic reserve equipment through the world.

We have underpredicted every year, and that put tremendous stress on the Active Duty Force and on the National Guard because of people using these force-sizing constructs and not putting it in motion. And today we are a tired Army, today we are a tired Marine Corps, today the National Guard is tired. But we have built them up.

I think cuts below 540,000 in the Active Duty force puts that at risk again, because we don't know where we are going to be 5 years from now. We are in a 10-year war today. It is longer than Vietnam. I think yesterday was the high-water mark. That is the war we think we are in. Our enemies are in a 100-year war. And so we have to be very, very careful of these force-sizing constructs. I believe you need to force-size for mid to worst case. Because, quite frankly, that is what we have been executing for the last 10 years.

I testified before this committee that we predicted in 2004 and '05 that we would be down to six brigades in Iraq. In execution, in year 5 and 6, we are at 19 to 21 brigades. Yet we force-structured the budget for going down to six to eight brigades. And how did we make it up? You all had to pass omnibuses and supplementals, and they were late to the fight. That is the danger when you start bringing this force down.

The other thing I will just say—and then I will turn it over to General Jumper and General Blum—when we started the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, America's demographics were different. And the military kept track of men at the time, because that is the way we tracked it, 17- to 24-year-olds. When we started the All-Volunteer Force back then, over 90 percent—almost 90 percent of that demographic, 17- to 24-year-old males met the minimum mental, physical, and moral standards to be in the military. When we started really growing the Army and growing the Marine Corps in 2006, 35 percent of that population in the U.S. today meets the minimum standards. That is a real problem.

And so, if we cut again and break trust with this force that stayed with us for 10 years and then we run into something else—as we have talked about, we don't get to pick and choose—I don't know if we can grow that force back again. So it is a big problem for us.

General JUMPER. Mr. Chairman, I think General Cody's words are right on the mark.

From an Air Force point of view, we see, I think, as you have said earlier, the necessity to accommodate—accompany any reduction in forces with a strategy that can be understandable and en-

forceable by the military services. If we make cuts through the lens of the budget, then we have, in the past, always done ourselves an injustice and found ourselves really unprepared for what has happened next. And we stand a greater danger of doing that now than we ever have before.

The tempo of the equipment in the Air Force is much like that of the Army and the Navy. We have run our—especially our airlift and our tactical systems very hard. When this conflict first started off, as we prepared to go into Iraq in 2003, we had 10 Air Expeditionary Force packages assembled and ready to go; they were on a rotational basis. We essentially pulled all of those forward to meet the initial requirements to get into theater and set ourselves up and had to reset our whole rotation base because we used elements of all 10 of those force packages.

If we get into the situation where budgets also dictate our relationship with our allies, it is something else we have to do from a strategy point of view. Indeed, I do believe that it is time to reconsider our relationship with some of our allies and our participation in some of our alliances, and those could well be restructured. But to lose contact with longstanding allies or abandon the common cause that we have established over years of time I think would be extremely dangerous and would jeopardize our Nation's ability to be a strategic force for stability in the entire world, which I think we are.

And then when it comes to reset, of course the Air Force's problem is not nearly as difficult as the Army and the Marines. But, again, we have equipment that has been used day-in and day-out, deployed, redeployed, with scant time to catch up with the proper maintenance and overhauls that are required. When we get everything back, a lot of this equipment is going to be—is going to require, again, expensive upgrades and overhauls.

I would reiterate that I think there is a lot of money to be saved here by looking at some commercial best practices to see how we might go about this. But, indeed, just to reset the forces that we have and the equipment that we have is going to be—require the support of this committee.

And so I think that, again, as we draw down, it is going to be—have to be with a strategic goal in mind, it is going to have to be with the idea that our relationships around the world will be modified of necessity, and that we very quickly get to dangerous levels that will keep us out of critical parts of the world scene that we have always been a part of.

Thank you, sir.

General CODY. I didn't answer, Mr. Chairman, the equipment reset. I had a brain cramp.

In 2006 and '07, we had ramped our depots. I will speak for the Army depots, the five Army depots, but, certainly, Yermo and Georgia depots in the Marines got ramped up also. We moved from 5 million direct labor hours when the war started to 27 million direct labor hours. Our depots actually bailed us out of our readiness problems as we grew, and they did unbelievable work. And they teamed with commercial, and we actually mobilized the depots with the commercial industry to reset our equipment.

We said then, in 2006 and 2007, that we would have to spend about \$17 billion a year to reset this equipment that has been in the worst environments we have ever had, highest OPTEMPO [Operations Tempo]. Basically, tanks, Bradleys, Apache helicopters—you pick them—night vision goggles, weapons systems, where we are putting 15 years of life on them in 1 year, that equipment all stayed over in Iraq and Afghanistan because we had to rotate out equipment, so it hasn't come out. It is now coming out.

Back in 2008, we had five brigades' worth of equipment sitting in our depots to be repaired. I don't know what the number is today. But when I look at the depot and the reset accounts and the O&M [Operations and Maintenance] dollars of the military's budget, it is woefully short. And there is a big bow wave and a bill to be paid on this equipment when it comes back.

And it will be a readiness issue that a future Chief will be in here next year or the year after, saying, "Okay, you cut our procurement dollars, we brought the equipment back, and now we are C4 because of equipment." And I see that as a very big problem.

General BLUM. Again, I find myself in a position of concurring totally with General Jumper and General Cody and their comments.

I would only have one other thing to add. The unintended consequence is the signal that you send to our adversaries because they measure some of our actions as our resolve, our national resolve. And I have already told you some of the impressions that I have picked up in some recent international travel, that there is a perception that our resolve may be waning. If that is the perception of our friends and our allies, what do you think the perception might be of our adversaries or our potential enemies?

The other signal, again, is that you must understand that with the current strategy that we have, any reduction of the Force, the total force or any component of that force, only increases the stress on the members of that force, because we are not yet in any of the Services at the dwell-to-deployment cycle that we would like to be. We are not—in other words, if we were heavyweight fighters, we are not getting our time in the corner between rounds. Sometimes we are going out there and fighting two rounds before we even get any time in the corner. And that is taking a toll on the Force, and that needs to be considered if we are going to sustain the tremendous, magnificent military that we presently have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The question I want to ask is, where do you see where we could make savings within the current budget? And if you look at what our current strategies are, our current missions—accept for the moment that we are going to keep those missions, you know, with the anticipated changes in Iraq and Afghanistan—you know, are there places we could save money and still maintain that mission capability? And then the second piece of the question would be, okay, if we can't, what missions should we decide not to do in order to find savings? Those are the two questions.

Just to set the context—I set this a little bit in my opening statement but didn't drive home the point on where our budget is at.

I think the points you gentlemen make about the challenges to the Department of Defense budget and the missions we have asked our uniformed military to perform is correct, but there is also a big huge budget challenge. And our budget is 40 percent out of whack. You know, the amount of money we raise is 40 percent less than the amount of money we spend.

And if you accept for the moment that we need to balance that budget and that we are not going to bring in any new revenue and we can't touch defense, basically what you would have to do is you would have to cut everything else in the budget by roughly half. To be honest, the "half" is a slight exaggeration; it is probably 48 percent. That means Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, education, infrastructure—everything—by almost 50 percent. And I am personally not even—I wouldn't begin to be prepared to do that.

So those are the choices that we face as we put this forward. And I think we have to keep that in mind, because every portion of that budget can give testimony along the lines of what you are talking about, about the devastating impact of those cuts, and be somewhat accurate. So we are in a bit of a pickle here.

So I ask the question, again, within our current mission set, are there areas where you go, you know what, we could save money there, we could do this more efficiently and still meet that mission set? Or second question is, what missions are we currently funding for that we probably shouldn't be? Are there any two areas where you could find savings in—well, in one of those two ways or both?

Thank you.

General CODY. When you—I mean, it is a dilemma. But when you take a look at what has happened in the last 10 years, even with Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Gates, and now with Secretary Panetta, the military has already cut some 240 programs across the board to shift the weight of the Force. We were a big, lethargic force, better set for the cold war, not set as well for asymmetrical and irregular warfare. And so we did it while we were fighting the war. We actually restructured the entire Army. The Air Force restructured. We restructured the National Guard into a better dual-purpose force that could be operational.

The problem was, we did it, Mr. Congressman, on the fact that we already were in a hole from 1994. I mean, from '94 to '98, even to '99, it was almost a procurement holiday. And so you had two things: You had a force that wasn't sized for the threats of the—

Mr. SMITH. If I may, General, I accept all that. You know, we are where we are.

General CODY. Yeah.

Mr. SMITH. The question is—I mean, it seems to me what the three of you gentlemen are saying is that there is no level of cuts, there is nothing in the current military that can be cut. Let me put it slightly different: Not that there is nothing in the current military that could be cut; we can't spend less than we are currently contemplating. In fact, we should spend more.

General CODY. No.

Mr. SMITH. Is that accurate? I mean, it leads to implications, but—

General CODY. No.

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. That is where we have to start.

General CODY. No, no. There are cuts to be made. I mean, before even the Budget Control Act, Secretary Gates and the Services already ponied up something like \$400 billion. While we are fighting a war, while we have 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and while you had something like 80,000 troops at the time in Iraq and other commitments across the world, he said, "I can find \$400 billion worth of efficiencies. Cut back on these programs." We only have one new Air Force airplane on the drawing board for the first time in years, compared to some of our competitors. So that was being done.

To tie the whole or half the weight of the budget control problems that this country has put itself in to a military who, by the way, has been trying to police itself up very—in my mind, tough love down there in terms of budget cuts, the years I was there, while we were fighting a war.

I think there are more places you can go, but I warn that if you are talking about significant cuts to end strength, if you are talking about significant cuts to resetting the Force and not—

Mr. SMITH. Understood. Do you—

General CODY [continuing]. And not maintaining the program—

Mr. SMITH. Right.

General CODY [continuing]. I don't know where we are going to be if something goes wrong.

Mr. SMITH. Understood. Do you have—do any of you have—you say there are more places. Do you have specific ideas?

General CODY. Yeah, there are some more places, but I don't see them as significant as the \$400 billion that has already been put on the table. In fact, I am a little nervous about the \$400 billion.

Mr. SMITH. That is the gist I am getting.

General CODY. Yeah. I mean, listen, this is tough. This is about choices as a Nation. Unfortunately, we don't get to pick. And this is, as Steve Blum has said—and we can go talk to historians—I think this world is more dangerous than at any time in modern history.

Mr. SMITH. Do you think it is possible to meet those national security needs that you have outlined without increasing the revenue that we have in the Federal Government?

General CODY. I am not an economist. I think, at some point, we are going to have to ask, how much is America sharing the burden? I mean, I know everybody—you know, we have unemployment problems, we have all kinds of problems. But, quite frankly, when you talk to soldiers and you talk to families, they have been carrying this burden for 10 years, a heavy burden, financially as well as separations and everything else.

And, you know, we have to wake up and realize this is a terribly unfriendly world for us right now and extremely dangerous. And so, if we have to tax more, I am all for taxing everybody. You guys will have to figure out what it is because I am not an economist.

Mr. SMITH. Right.

General CODY. But it is not going to get better. Putting our fiscal house in order is important, but we need to be very, very careful about the choices and chances we take with our national security right now.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.
I yield back.

General JUMPER. Sir, may I add that, as Dick says, the Services are right now over there putting together plans to deal with this \$400 billion-or-so cut, whatever it turns out to be.

We have also given up, in the last—in the last 10 years, \$46 billion worth of research and development through cancelled programs, things that were scheduled to be—come in to recapitalize our forces that have been cancelled, major programs. Just the research and development and where we were in those programs when they were cancelled added up to \$46 billion.

Having said that, I do believe there are places we should look. I think that we should take a serious look at our tactical nuclear program, our tactical nuclear forces as a part of our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] alliance and how much of that we really need. As I said before, I think we could take a look at how much forward stationing we really need as we relook at the structure of our alliances around the world. And then I think, again, in the area of logistics, I think within the spirit of the air logistics centers and the depot 50/50 sharing rule, I think we could find ways to restructure to let industry best practices in and save ourselves a tremendous amount of money as we look forward to resetting.

But as Dick points out, when you look at this in proportion to the problem we have, these are certainly things we all should do—a lot of this is low-hanging fruit—but it takes a lot of courage, a lot of support from this committee. As uniformed military leadership sits at this table and asks for your support to do tremendously unpopular things, they are going to need your support to do it in order to take advantage of even these small actions that might be—that might be helpful in the—in reducing the burden.

Still in all, the problem you point out, Congressman Smith, is one that we all have to be concerned with, and that is this tremendous burden that has to be paid for in some way. You are exactly right.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

I first have a question for General Blum for my colleague Frank LoBiondo, who can't be here. General Blum, could you please tell us—give us your thoughts on how the Air Force could be better utilizing the Air National Guard's fighter fleet in terms of transferring missions and getting them newer iron, while reaping the benefits of overall cost savings?

General BLUM. Thank you. Let me see if I can get this microphone to come on.

Thank you for the question. And Congressman LoBiondo's question gets, actually, to the business model that I talked about a little bit earlier.

The good news with the Guard and Reserves is that they are now competent, professional, and, actually, when they are on duty with their Active Duty counterparts, you are talking equality in per-

formance and capability. Some argue that they bring civilian-acquired skills and that makes them, in some mission sets, even more valuable. I am not making that argument right now, although I could.

What I am suggesting is, for the routine missions—for instance, if you want to expand the capability of the Air Force, airplanes cost what airplanes cost. It isn't any cheaper for a National Guard pilot to fly them than an Air Force pilot to fly them, as far as what the fuel costs or what the operating hours cost or what the cost of the airplane is. Where you gain your efficiencies there is you are only paying that pilot to fly the plane when he is flying the plane; you are not paying him 365 days of the year or the days that he is not flying.

And so, you could maintain—you could make an argument—you could maintain three to four pilots in the Air National Guard essentially available to fly that plane, owned and operated by the United States Air Force on call, for the cost of one pilot in the Air Force. And you could also make the argument that that pilot may end up being—tends to be a more experienced pilot because they serve longer and they retire later, and so you basically get a longer shelf life from them.

So what it does is it gives you a personnel model that does get to what Mr. Smith is talking about and how do you do more with less? In other words, okay, if I am going to do with this all-Active Duty Air Force, you are going to pay a dollar for every, you know, you are going to pay full amount for that pilot to be on duty every single day, and he isn't going to fly every day. But when you do it with the Guard or Reserves, you are only paying that pilot for when he is actually in the cockpit and performing the mission, essentially. There are other times you pay him for training and administrative and medical exams and that kind of thing, but the cost is roughly a magnitude about three to four to one. In other words, you can get three or four Guard or Reserve people in the Air Force for what it costs for a full-time Air Force person.

Now, that doesn't mean you don't need a full-time Air Force. Even as the chief of the Guard and Reserve, I was also—I mean, the Guard, I was also a U.S. Northern Command and joint combatant command, and there is a very legitimate need for a standing Air Force and an Active Duty Air Force. And, you know, you are going to have to balance the risk versus the reward, the benefits against the disadvantages. And there are a few disadvantages.

But if you are just looking at how do you basically expand the force without exponentially increasing the costs, then I would say an increased reliance on the Guard and Reserve is something that this committee ought to really take a pretty serious look at, because there are some efficiencies there. But I don't want to say, and I won't say, that you don't need an Active Duty Air Force of substantial size so that it can handle the steady state, so that you are not disrupting and interrupting citizen soldiers needlessly. But on the other hand, if their national strategy cannot be met by the national resources, then you are going to have to look at different business models than what we have looked at in the past.

What General Jumper alludes to is what will possibly happen, sir, if we get—not we, because we are retired—but if the current

people in the positions that we recently held get a mandate, what likely will occur in the building is that there will be a fair sharing, what they—quote, unquote, “fair sharing” of cuts against the active force, the Guard force, and the Reserve force. And so what we will do is we will cut a slice of the pie out of the Army and that will cost full value because they are full-time people. And then you’ll get—let’s say that value is X. And then we will do the same pie slice or a different pie splice out of the Guard or Reserve, and that will cost X-minus because they don’t cost the same; frankly, they cost less.

So you will actually get less, you will harvest less by that slice than you will in the Active Duty slice. But what it will really start is the Yugoslavian model of an army disintegrating into three different armies and fighting itself, and the Air Force doing the same, because all three of us have seen this ugly dynamic happen now through our whole adult careers.

That should be avoided. It doesn’t serve the Nation well; it doesn’t serve the members of the Armed Forces well; and it doesn’t serve the American citizens well.

So to answer your colleague’s question directly, I will repeat what I said. I think a careful examination of the risk versus reward and the value of having an expanded force and an increased reliance in the Guard and Reserves—it doesn’t allow you to get airplanes cheaper, it doesn’t allow you to operate them cheaper, but it does cut down your personnel costs, and they are significant in a volunteer professional force.

General JUMPER. Sir, if I might jump on to these comments. Is that permitted?

The CHAIRMAN. We are over time. We will get back to you. Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the service that you are doing for the country and Congress by having these hearings.

I think there is insufficient attention being paid to the fact that if the Special Select Committee does not come to an agreement, we are facing certain automatic cuts in the neighborhood of half a trillion dollars over a 10-year period to the Defense budget.

You can argue that that is a good idea or a bad idea, but to not even take into account the argument as to whether it should happen or not is very important. And the fact that you are having these hearings is focusing attention on that, and I thank you for that.

And I thank the gentlemen on the panel for their incredible service to our country. I can’t express enough how grateful we are for the lives you have given to your country and how well you served.

I want to ask a question that is not a rhetorical question. I do want you to answer as well as you can.

In the 10 years since 2001, if you take out the overseas contingency operations, put aside all the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in real dollar terms the core Defense budget is 40 percent higher than it was in 2001.

Our end strength is essentially the same as it was in 2001. Our number of ships and airplanes is essentially what it was in 2001. A little different, but not much different. Now, about a fifth of that

cost, that 40 percent increase, has gone to increased compensation for uniformed personnel and civilian personnel. Where did the rest of the money go? What did we buy for that money?

General CODY. I can take that question, Congressman. Because a lot of it went to the Army to equip combat, combat support and combat service support soldiers for a 360-degree battlefield. That was in the procurement accounts. It was also to equip and bring up to combat status the equipment in the National Guard and Reserves. I can give you about—I mean, I dealt with this every day for 6 years. Radios the Guard didn't have because they weren't secure, we didn't buy them so we had to get them upgraded. The night vision goggles, they had the old night vision goggles and we had to buy them. But we also had to buy them for everybody, because there was no line where you had rear echelon and you didn't have to worry about protected lines. Everybody was in the battlefield.

Jessica Lynch's convoy that got hit was a telling moment for all of us that combat service support troops need to be equipped as well as the combat troops. We have a moral obligation if we are going to put troops into harm's way that they are the best equipped, best led, and best trained.

That generated gunnery. Before our combat soldiers fired gunnery three or four times a year; our combat service support people didn't. We had to bring everybody up to that.

Mr. ANDREWS. General, all the things you talk about I think have essentially unanimous support on this committee, because we understand the urgency of outfitting our troops properly. But, you know, some of it, the GAO [Government Accountability Office] said that \$296 billion of that money went to cost overruns in 27 major weapon systems. You know, R&D [research and development] phase is exploding. As I was looking at data on the SBIRS program, the Space-Based Infrared Program, the per-unit cost of that program has quintupled since the program began, which, you know, means we are going to spend five times as much money when we actually buy the copies of it in the end.

What suggestions do you have as to ways that we can curb this voracious appetite for cost overruns in major weapons systems?

General CODY. Well, I think, one, as I look back on it—first off, you are right, there have been some Nunn-McCurdy breaches and large cost overruns in space programs, big platforms and things of that sort.

You know, quite frankly, the predictability of the budget each year causes problems not only for the program managers that are running these things, but also for the industry that is trying to predict what their costs are going to be.

I can remember on the joint strike fighter when they rescopeed it several times, as they rescopeed that program, the costs went up. I am not an expert in that acquisition process for sure. I have been on the receiving end of it.

Mr. ANDREWS. The unit cost on that has gone up by almost double since that program started.

General CODY. I think, you know, what Secretary Carter is doing in looking at these things is the right thing to do. But I also want to go back to the fact that during these 10 years, we cut several

programs, and really lightened and refocused the Force in ways that, quite frankly, if we hadn't been at war, we wouldn't have done. And we restructured the Force and we equipped the Force with what is really needed.

And so the fiscal overruns and the anecdotes of this program or that program are interesting, but when you take it in the whole, DOD has done a pretty good job in the last 10 years of policing up some of these things.

Now there are ones that stick out like a sore thumb, and I think you ought to deal with that as you can. But we do have a moral obligation every day. If we are going to send men and women into combat, they better be the best led, they better be the best equipped. We don't want to go into a fight with parity.

Mr. ANDREWS. I see my time is up. I would completely agree with you. I would also say we have a moral obligation to taxpayers to be sure that we paying value for what we—absolutely need to equip the troops with what they need. But we have a moral obligation to the taxpayers to show that we are not paying \$3 for something we could buy for a dollar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for your kind words about holding this hearing. We are also on the Education Committee, and you look at the dollars that have been spent on education over the last 10 years, 20 years and then look at the return and how the education scores and everything else have gone down, we have got problems not just at the DOD, we have got problems across the whole of Federal Government spending that we also really need to look at.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and as I begin, I want to thank Congressman Andrews for his very heartfelt statement about our chairman, his bipartisanship, and how indeed this hearing is important and the tradition of this committee truly has been to support our military, to defend our country. And I see the primary function of the national government as national defense.

Also, I am really grateful to see General Blum and General Cody here. I have had three sons serve in the National Guard—one for a year in Iraq—and it was an extraordinarily meaningful experience to him to help the American people at home by defeating the terrorists overseas.

And I am also grateful, General Jumper, that I have a nephew in the Air Force, so I am covering you. And I know of your leadership, but also we are a joint service. My number two son is a doctor in the Navy who served in Iraq. So again, thank you for what you do.

And indeed as we are talking about the future of national defense, for each one of you beginning with General Blum, because you indicated the dangerous environment, the no predictability. I certainly agree with the statement that we are in a 100-year war. The statement has been that we have the watch, they have the time. That is what they think. I believe, ultimately, the American people do have resolve.

Could you, each one of you, indicate what you see as the biggest threat to the United States and the American people today?

General BLUM. I think the biggest—are you asking me to go first on this?

Mr. WILSON. Please, absolutely, General.

General BLUM. The biggest thing that I worry about frankly is complacency and being numbed. It almost becomes a constant background noise, because so few of U.S. citizens really are engaged in this conflict.

It is the smallest percentage of any conflict we have ever had in the history of our country, when you think about it. Those that are defending our freedom are guaranteeing or ensuring our way of life, and the fact that you can do what we are doing in this building and what we do outside, that burden is being carried by an extraordinary low percentage of the American people.

And frankly, the Guard and Reserve provide the connective tissue so that our Armed Forces, as magnificent as they are, and as trained and professional and dedicated and patriotic as they are, don't become viewed by the American people as a foreign legion or a mercenary unit.

That is why I would do absolutely nothing to lessen the connectivity to the American people through the Guard and Reserves, because business cases will cause you to consolidate Active Duty bases, make them more efficient. Where they are gets more and more away from the general population. What they do behind those gates is pretty much "who cares" to the general population unless they make their living off of what goes on in there.

And the sons and daughters like mine and yours, and those in the room that have members that are serving, I don't want them disassociated with the American people. And I think the best insurance policy for when making sure that the American people are in this fight—look, I will give you examples. Dover Air Force base in Delaware, if they deploy, nobody in Delaware really knows where they went or what they did or if they are gone. But if the Delaware Guard goes, the Delaware Air Guard goes, everybody in Dover knows all about it, or everybody in Newcastle knows all about it.

If you go to West Virginia, there is no Active Duty in West Virginia, so the only connectivity to our Armed Forces in West Virginia is the Guard and Reserve, and there are many States like that.

So the footprint to gain efficiencies that that we all want, our Department of Defense to be efficient and cost-effective, there are downside risks to that. An All-Volunteer Force means, you know, okay, go over there. But when you send a Guard unit or Reserve unit, the whole community goes. And they are there while they are there and they support them while they are there.

So that is one of the big reasons that I say the thing I am most afraid about in a long war with United States where everybody doesn't have somebody in this, very few of us do, is that we get complacent and it becomes—we get disconnected from the American people. That is my greatest fear. Because if you keep the American people in this, and you keep the national focus on what is going on, then I don't think we have anything to fear. I think the enemy better be very fearful.

But if the American people get disassociated from this, either from fatigue or numbness to it, or because they don't have a per-

sonal stake in it, I think it is a terrible, terrible danger. So that is why I say an increased reliance on the Guard and Reserve is not only economically smart, it is really a strategically imperative—it is a strategic imperative if you are going to maintain a volunteer force.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate it as well having the hearings. I think one of the concerns I have is sometimes there isn't the opportunity for give and take on a number of these issues. And so I would hope that in addition to the hearings, maybe there is some way that we can also have a greater role as we move into this process right now. And I thank you all very much, again, for being here and for your service.

And, you know, along with that, you have been around a long time. You have been to these hearings for many, many years. You have probably felt a number of frustrations as you see some of the decisions that are made, whether they are tactical or strategic. Could you share with us—is there anything that you feel that would be helpful as we move forward and want to play a role in these discussions, because we think it is so critical that it is not just a knee-jerk decision that is made regarding these cuts. And I am not suggesting that they will be, but I think you know how important it is to really be thinking on the front and back end. You know, what is going on here? What are the unintended consequences and how do we make sure that we do the right thing?

Is there anything in your history of being so engaged at this level that you could share that would be helpful as we move forward?

General CODY. Well, thank you, Ma'am. And I never, you know, worried coming over here. I didn't enjoy it a lot, but I never worried about it because I knew at the end of the day, we needed to tell the story. We needed to lay our cards on the table. And then cooler heads would prevail. But we are at an inflection point in our history.

General Blum talked about the national will, basically, of this country. I do worry about that. But right now what we have learned in the last 10 years and what I have learned, and several of the former service chiefs and vices and leaders, is this: The All-Volunteer Force is absolutely the best thing this country has done in the military. It is absolutely precious. And the fact that we have got young men and women who last year and the year before after watching this war raised their right hand and said, "You know what? I am going to go serve. This is important."

I worry about losing the All-Volunteer Force as we get into these fights about budgets and about entitlements versus defense and things like that. I can't remember a force—and I have been in a long, long time from the Vietnam War to now—I can't remember a more professional, patriotic, and dedicated force, as well as their families. And so I put that as job one. We have got to retain this All-Volunteer Force.

Mrs. DAVIS. Can I ask you, General, do you believe that the discussions around military retirement could impact those decisions of the volunteer force—

General CODY. Absolutely.

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. And do you have any thoughts about what the committee is doing? The Defense Business Board is recommending, as you know, going to 401(k)s. Could you weigh in on that?

General CODY. We don't know how to do 401(k)s. We don't know how to do any type of that management. We live checkbook to checkbook. I have seen the figures on it. Be very, very careful with this retirement program. I have seen numbers that say that only 13 percent of the people actually benefit from it. Yes, those are the people that lead. Those are the people we invested in. So we size an Army, we size an Air Force, it is a young man and woman's game. People come in and serve and then they go out and become great citizens.

Mrs. DAVIS. I am sorry, my timing—so as we look as some of these personnel issues that are coming up then, and I don't know if any of you generals would like to comment, are there areas in personnel that we should be looking at that would help us be more sustainable, as people have suggested, of course, that it is not sustainable anymore?

General CODY. I think your personnel costs will start going down as your footprint goes down because it is very expensive having troops in combat with combat pay and everything else. That will go down. We brought up save the benefit TRICARE [DOD health care program] 6 years ago, 4 years ago now. I think we ought to take a look at TRICARE again. I mean, I am retired now. I probably could pay a lot more for TRICARE than I am paying now and I probably should. We haven't raised it since 1993 or 1994. I would be careful with it. I don't want to hurt young sergeants and everybody else who—we got to graduate it. But I think there are some savings in TRICARE as well as best practices, as General Jumper talked about, about reducing the cost of health care. Get industry involved to figure out how to use generic drugs and all kind of other things to be more efficient. But I think TRICARE is a place we could go. But to keep it, but run it more efficiently.

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. I don't know, Mr. Chairman, if General—did you want to comment on that, General Blum?

General BLUM. I don't think I have anything to add beyond that. I think General Cody has identified some ideas worth exploring.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I think in terms of looking at savings, it is not just a matter of reducing the budget, but it is also looking at areas that we have to actually increase spending. Cyber warfare. The safety of our satellites. And looking at, you know, the new sort of asymmetric weapons like the anti-ship ballistic missile that China is coming up with.

But with that said, I do think that that there are opportunities in taking a look at our force structure and seeing what we could emphasize in the Guard and Reserve. I do think we need to look at certain benefit issues and I think you mentioned retirement and TRICARE and those things have to be looked at.

One question I have of you, and I have got to tell you, I think that our young men and women today, I think we have the most extraordinary military in our history. I retired in 1994 from a com-

bination of Active Duty and Reserve time. But then came out of retirement 11 years later to go serve in Iraq in 2005 and 2006. And so I got to meet them and I just was amazed which I looked back when I came in the military in 1972 to going back just a night and day difference of our forces.

So one question I have is that—retention rate is very high right now. I mean, and I think because of the professionalism that we have, I think people want to stay in the organization. Obviously the economy is a factor, although I don't think it is the leading factor why people want to stay in. We have a very elite military. But we retained the same kind of up-and-out structure, a pretty rapid promotion system. Should we be slowing down that promotion system to allow more folks time in grade to be able to benefit from their experience, from their training that we paid for? Anybody like to answer that?

General CODY. I think they have already done that, Congressman. They have made that adjustment. Clearly the promotions to major—captain to major were expedited only because we were growing the Force. In the Marine Corps and the Army, we are we are growing the Force and there were more slots. And so the last stuff I have seen, they have actually slowed it down to what you remembered back in the 1980s. And I think we also have to remember a captain who serves 1 year in combat has probably got as much experience as a captain who had 3 years back not in combat. And so we balanced it very well. The best are still getting promoted, but we also grew the Force. And I think the promotions are going back to be settled where they are.

I just want to make sure—I want to make sure that I think any tweaks for the retirement system need to be looked at very, very closely. And I do think that we could look at TRICARE, but I wouldn't mess with TRICARE for the Active Duty Force.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Let me ask you, we have, I think, still have 107,000 between Europe and South Korea—I think 79,000 in Europe, and I think it is 28,000 in South Korea. Only four out of, I think, the 28 NATO allies are spending the minimum 2 percent that is required under the NATO charter, and I think two of them are probably doing it for the wrong purposes, Greece and Turkey. Are they relying too—I mean, can't we demonstrate our commitment to them by doing joint military operations as opposed to maintaining those forward bases?

General JUMPER. I think that is a very good observation, sir. And when I was talking about I think it is time to recalibrate our participation in certain alliances, that is probably the key one that needs to be reconsidered.

I don't know that we need to have zero participation up front. And I firmly believe that we need to keep our contact with our NATO allies close. But I also think that we need to make sure that we take steps to ensure they are pulling their fair share of the weight as well. Clearly that has fallen off over the years.

And in Asia, of course, I think that this is the next place that we really have to worry about. I am not sure how much I would modify over there based on how volatile the situation—

Mr. COFFMAN. My time is running out, but on South Korea, do you think that at this point in time we ought to bring in the families for the 28,000 there at the \$13 billion of construction costs?

General JUMPER. It can always be reviewed. I think if you are going to put the All-Volunteer Force people over there, you have to pay attention to the families. It is a great morale issue to separate the two. I think that that is the next area of danger we need to focus on, so I am not sure how much I would modify the Asian scenario.

The COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Garamendi.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My apologies to the witnesses and others. With two big committees going at the same time, it is back and forth. I missed a lot of what you have to say and I am sorry about that.

The testimony that you gave at the outset indicated that we really need to start with a strategic vision of where we are in the world today and what we are likely to have in the future. I have found a most interesting dialogue or opportunity for a dialogue with a document called "A National Strategic Narrative," produced by two members of the Armed Forces, Porter and Mykleby, that talks about how we need to view ourselves in the world of the future, and that we no longer live in a bipolar world, but rather one that is multifaceted with threats that can emerge very, very rapidly from totally unknown places, for example, the Internet. And suddenly Egypt isn't the Egypt of yesterday, but it is something quite different.

In that context, they suggested that we rethink how we use our military not as being the biggest, strongest dog on the street, but rather a big strong dog together with others, in other words, a collaborative world. I think we saw that in the Libya situation. Not as robust a NATO as we might like.

I think what I would like to do is to introduce you gentlemen and the committee to that narrative and for us to think about that in the context of what we are going to have to go through, which is a reordering of the military.

And what are the strategic strengths that we must preserve? You mentioned deterrence. Do we need 3,000 nuclear weapons or can we get by with 300 nuclear weapons that are properly deployed and safe, secure, and reliable? Those kinds of thinking. Do we need to have a triad, or is a dual mechanism necessary? Do we need a sixth fleet—or seventh fleet in the South China Sea? Or can we have a collaborative work with our partners?

Those are the kind of things that I think we really need to look at now as we look at the reordering, the repositioning and the budget for the Defense Department.

So I think what I would do is just, if you have seen that document, if you would like to comment on it, I would appreciate it. If you haven't seen it, my staff will be here in a moment. I had those documents on my desk and they carefully picked them up and took them away. But they will be back. So if you have seen the document, please comment.

General JUMPER. Yes, sir, I have seen the document. I haven't read the whole thing yet, but it reminded me of a session that I

had with the great world diplomat, Lee Kuan Yew, the guy who founded Singapore and then ruled it for 35 years, and I was able to have a session with him at one time. And he said to me: America must never lose sight of its role as the world's great benign superpower. And this document reminded me of his remarks.

And I think as we reconsider our position in the world, this is how we need to think of ourselves from a strategic point of view and decide exactly what that does mean. It means for sure being a force for stability in the world without being the world's policeman. It means rethinking how we do posture ourselves.

Unfortunately, some of our experience with our allies has not been what it should be as you think about sharing the load, et cetera, because it becomes obvious very quickly to military people that the United States has the greatest capability, and it becomes very comfortable to others to live under that umbrella.

So again—here I hearken again, let's look the at international affairs budget and what we do to engage with nations, again, as a force for stability in the world that indirectly, Mr. Chairman, does help the military if we pay attention to our diplomatic efforts around the world to engage nations. These things should fit together in different ways and not really compete with each other when it comes to these serious discussions of cuts.

General CODY. I agree. I haven't read all of it, but when I read it, I hearken back to the QDDR [Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review] that the State Department put out which basically said we need to have a synergy between defense, diplomacy, and development. And quite frankly, I think we need to look at that as our full national security strategy. And I think what Secretary Clinton and Bob Gates started needs to be looked at.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I would just wrap up in 10 seconds and say it seems to me that this is the fundamental starting point for what we are trying—what we must accomplish in this year and probably the next year ahead of us. That we take a look at this overarching way in which this Nation acts.

One thing that we haven't yet brought up is our own economic strength, which is a major piece of this. And I know that in the discussions that we hear around here, we have to maintain the defense industry's ability to build things, and, yes, but at the same time we need to maintain our ability to make things in America. That is the overall manufacturing base and intellectual research base of this Nation.

All of those things come together, it seems to me, in a way that is going to be different in the future. And that discussion ought to take place as we figure out what the Defense budget's going to be, both the overall budget as well as the elements within it. And gentlemen, I would love to engage you in a long cup of coffee at some point to discuss that with you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the extra 1 minute 25 seconds.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. General, I think I cut you off, you had some comment on Mr. Bartlett's question for Mr. LoBiondo about the Air National Guard fighter fleet transferring missions.

General JUMPER. I would just like to, first of all, comment as I did in my opening remarks about the superb relationship that the Air Force and the Air National Guard have maintained, and how

well the Air National Guard stepped up to significantly increase the pace of duty and action during these past 10 years.

I sometimes wish that the enthusiasm that our Air National Guard shows for the flying missions also extended to and the same question would have been asked about other missions: Space, cyber and the support functions which are equally critical to our combat capability and which the Air National Guard is also very capable of taking on. Command and control, I should add to that too. In many cases, they do, I must say, they do. But we always seem to get down to the flying missions when we talk about comparisons and resources,

And in fact, I think even Steve would admit that as the experienced—as much as we enjoy the experience of the Air National Guard and their pilots and especially their maintainers, it is also a core competency of our United States Air Force that we are able to get ourselves off the ground anywhere in the world in 72 hours to respond to whatever does emerge in an era where we have to anticipate these growing short-term surprises and be able to deal with them and react to them.

But these are the issues that have to be discussed and balance is always the prime word. I don't let these—when I was the chief I did not let these discussions get out of hand or off balance or tilted one way or the other in favor of one or the other. But I also insisted that we have a healthy discussion about all of the missions that the Air Force is responsible for and sharing all of those in equal proportions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Smith, do you any further comment?

Mr. SMITH. Nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN. I just would like to say in wrapping this up that one thing we need to remember is we have already cut in the last year \$465 billion going forward over the next 10 years. That is already done. The chiefs are trying to figure out how that will be implemented. They have given their recommendations to the Secretary. He will be up here for a hearing next week and we will be able to talk some more about that.

Ms. Davis had a question or comment, something about cuts should not be indiscriminatory. But if we get into the sequestration, that is just equal across the board. There will be no chance to weigh and let those who have the most experience figure out how best to utilize those cuts. That is just already done and there will be no discretion there.

And so I have problems with that in two ways: The amount and the way it is done. And I think that until we have really digested the \$465 billion, half of the cuts that we have done out of discretionary have come out of defense. And I just—everybody needs to understand that. We are not saying that defense shouldn't be a part of this. It has been a heavy part. And this is the purpose of these hearings, is to give us a chance to let the experienced people tell us what these cuts are really going to mean when the rubber hits the road.

So appreciate you taking the time and being with us today. And there will be more of these type hearings as we move forward. And one of the members mentioned he would like to have a long cup

of coffee with you. I think I have felt that you are there whenever there is a request. So I think other members, if they feel like they are not getting enough out of these hearings, I encourage them to give you a call and have some of these other discussions. There should be no limit on gathering information, because these things are very, very important.

With that, we will end this hearing. Thank you again very much for your service and for being here today. This committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

OCTOBER 4, 2011

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

OCTOBER 4, 2011

Statement of Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
The Future of National Defense and the U.S.
Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives from
Former Service Chiefs and Vice Chiefs
October 4, 2011

The House Armed Services Committee meets this morning to receive testimony on “The Future of National Defense and the U.S. Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives from Former Service Chiefs and Vice Chiefs.”

This hearing is the third in our series of hearings to evaluate lessons learned since 9/11 and to apply those lessons to decisions we will soon be making about the future of our force. In the past month, we have heard from former Chairmen and a Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and also a panel of outside defense experts. Today, we will hear from a former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, a Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and a former chief of the National Guard Bureau. In these capacities, our witnesses were directly involved in the management, training and equipping of our force. This panel’s collective time of service to our nation is over 110 years. Their knowledge of the decisionmaking process within the Department of Defense, as well as their cumulative years of service will provide this committee with vital information as we look to the future of our force.

While we continue to make progress in Iraq and Afghanistan, and with the killing of high-profile terrorists including Osama bin Laden and most recently, Al Qaeda leader, Anwar al-Awlaki, I remain concerned that our Nation is slipping back into the false confidence of a September 10th mindset. Believing that we can maintain a solid defense that is driven by budget choices, not strategic ones, is a dangerous path for our national security.

I am not arguing that the military can be held exempt from fiscal belt-tightening. Indeed, half a trillion dollars has been cut from DOD already—the military has absorbed about half of the deficit reduction measures enacted to date. But these cuts have happened in advance of the development of a new strategy for national defense and without any changes to the military’s roles and missions.

Even more concerning is that if the Joint Select Committee does not succeed in developing and passing another deficit reduction plan, an additional half a trillion dollars could be cut from our military automatically. It also remains to be seen whether or not addi-

tional cuts may be proposed by the Administration, even if the “Super Committee” is successful. News reports last week indicated that the President is proposing further cuts to defense—again, driven by math, not strategy.

But all this talk about dollars doesn’t translate well into actual impacts on the force and risk to our Nation. I hope our witnesses today can help us understand, based on the lessons of the last 10 years, what strategic choices we face in the current global security environment and how further cuts to the military could shape those choices.

The U.S. military is the modern era’s pillar of American strength and values. In these difficult economic times, we recognize the struggle to bring fiscal discipline to our Nation. But it is imperative that we focus our fiscal restraint on the driver of the debt, instead of the protector of our prosperity. With that in mind, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today.

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
The Future of National Defense and the U.S.
Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives from
Former Service Chiefs and Vice Chiefs
October 4, 2011

I would like to thank the witnesses for appearing here today. We are in a time of significant uncertainty concerning the budget, and the input and advice provided by General Jumper, General Cody, and Lieutenant General Blum will be extremely helpful in understanding the impact of potential cuts on the Services.

Our country faces a long-term, systemic budget dilemma—we don't collect enough revenue to cover our expenditures. Currently, we must borrow about 40 cents for every dollar the Federal Government spends. This problem must be addressed from both ends—spending will have to come down, and we're going to have to generate new revenues.

Like many, if not most, of our members here, I share the view that large, immediate cuts to the defense budget would have substantially negative impacts on the ability of the U.S. military to carry out their missions. I am also deeply concerned about cuts to all non-entitlement spending, which bore the brunt of the recent deficit deal. Furthermore, if the "Super Committee" fails to reach a deal, then cuts through sequestration will only impose deeper and more dangerous cuts to our military and non-entitlement spending such as infrastructure, education and homeland security.

I believe that we can rationally evaluate our national security strategy, our defense expenditures, and the current set of missions we ask the military to undertake and come up with a strategy that requires less funding. We on this committee like to say that strategy should not be driven by arbitrary budget numbers, but by the same token not considering the level of available resources when developing a strategy is irresponsible and leads inevitably to asking our military to undertake jobs for which we do not resource them. We can, I believe, spend smarter and not just more.

It is also important that we address the revenue side of our budget problem. Recently, some of my colleagues on this committee issued dire warnings about the potential impacts of additional defense budget cuts. I share their concerns, and that is why we must consider raising additional revenue. In order to avoid drastic cuts to our military and other important programs, revenue must be on the table.

It is my hope that this hearing will help remind everyone here that we have to make some serious choices. Our budget problems must be looked at in a comprehensive manner. If we are serious about not cutting large amounts of funding from the defense budget, something else has to give. Large, immediate, across-the-board cuts to the defense budget, which would occur under sequestration,

would do serious damage to our national security. In order to avoid large cuts to the defense budget, we're going to have to stop repeating ideological talking points and address our budget problems comprehensively, through smarter spending and new sources of revenue.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. And thank you to our witnesses for appearing here today.

**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
AND THE U.S. MILITARY TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11**

**Statement For The Record: John P. Jumper
General, USAF (Retired)
Air Force Chief of Staff, 2001 - 2005**

What threats to our homeland can we anticipate as we look forward?

As we attempt to anticipate future threats it's important to remember our track record on successful predictions. Any objective assessment must begin with the fact that we are lousy predictors. Before the first Gulf war (Desert Shield, Desert Storm) we had no idea how the likes of Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, or Osama bin Laden, would perpetrate aggressions and atrocities that dominated US policy and shaped military actions for the next 20 years.

We are safe in assuming two things.

1. The terrorist threat will continue to pose the greatest threat inside our borders and to US forces and interests overseas. This danger becomes more serious as we consider that nuclear weapons get ever closer to the hands of irresponsible, rogue leaders throughout the world.
2. We must be prepared for more than counterinsurgencies. As nations gain the power to resist US policy in ways that could include aggressive action, our ability to deter and then react rapidly with substantive capabilities is as important as ever.

The argument is not whether aggressive foreign nations harbor ambitions of invading the US. I believe it's more a matter of reacting to, or being dragged into, conflicts perpetrated by frictions or atrocities that compel us to react. In Bosnia and Kosovo we led a NATO force that reacted to ongoing genocide. What should we be prepared for if frictions arise that involve allies in Asia or South America?

We have been able to react to the spectrum of conventional warfare (Iraq, Serbia) as well as counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan because the US military forces were equipped with needed capabilities, were able to modify or adapt existing technology, or were able to rapidly field necessary capabilities quickly. All the while we have maintained a nuclear deterrent and kept a watchful eye on nuclear proliferation and must continue to do so with focused attention on nuclear safety, reliability and security.

What are appropriate roles and missions for the US Military?

The roles and missions carved out for the military are time tested and well understood. I believe that a certain amount of overlap and redundancy is necessary for absolutely critical functions. In the field, you find the military services falling all over themselves to do what it takes to get the mission accomplished. Joint-minded operations are being carried out every

day. Behind the scenes of any major military operation you will find that very little is done by one service alone.

We could do much more to allow the services to better define the limits of necessary overlap and to further interdependence on one another's capabilities. There is absolutely no doubt that this could best be done by development of Joint Concepts of Operation that requires services to think through how we plan to deploy and fight in various situations, and to define and limit the areas of necessary overlap. This process would force new ways of deriving requirements and reshape the acquisition process by demanding that we describe how we are going to fight before we decide what we will buy to fight with.

The lessons we are learning in this new age of warfare must be applied with due respect for lessons of the past. The key word is balance. As we build capabilities in counterinsurgency we must be respectful of the very traditional and conventional capabilities that are emerging from potential adversaries who have watched and learned from US military successes over the past 20 years. The common understanding of asymmetrical advantage is the use of low technology to defeat high technology. We easily forget that the asymmetrical advantage of the United States is our technology multiplied many-fold by the ingenuity of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines to rapidly shape our technological advantage in the course of battle.

The military also has a role as responsible stewards of nuclear weapons. As we reduce our nuclear posture it must be with the full support of Congress to maintain funding for the safety, reliability and security of the weapons that remain; to include relentless attention to counter proliferation.

As we enter the cyber age it will be necessary to do much more than to defend networks and data sources. We will need to develop the necessary weapons to fight back in a cyber-engagement. As the services and agencies develop the doctrine of cyber intelligence preparation; forensic and predictive analysis; and, doctrine of defense and offense, Congressional support for the weapons and tools of this new type of warfare will be critical.

What are the consequences of further cuts to the military over the next decade and what choices do we have to make?

It will be extremely difficult for the services to implement even the currently projected cuts. If the Joint Select Committee fails to reach consensus the resulting additional cuts to the defense budget would lead to dramatic loss of capability and the adverse impact on morale of a force that has served the nation so well for the decade of the war on terror.

It is unfortunate that when the services are faced with large budget cuts the easiest targets are, in many ways, the most damaging. We tend to hit training, readiness and research & development first as we attempt to save force structure. If all of the projected cuts are implemented, all of these budget categories will be impacted. Thus, our ability to repair and reset the force; to recapitalize the force; to recover lost training; to have the spare parts to

keep current systems operating; and, to retain our technology advantage through Research and Development would be simultaneously and severely impacted.

Indeed there is much that can be done to realize greater efficiency with current resources. If significant force reductions eventuate, they must be done with proper balance between Active Duty, National Guard and Reserve forces. All must share in eventual drawdowns and all must share responsibility for all assigned missions and the operational tempo demanded by these missions. This cannot be done without the support of the Congress as our military leadership makes difficult recommendations.

I also believe that enormous savings are available in the logistics functions if the full power of best business practices and competition can be brought to bear. Again, the Congress must stand behind our military leaders as they struggle to find solutions.

In any case our Nation's Military Leadership will be asked to recommend reductions more severe than any I have seen in my career. They cannot do so alone.

What are the impacts of reducing force structure and end strength?

Reductions in end strength and force structure must be tied to a realistic strategy and deliberate policy decisions that can still be supported in the face of cuts. Our current policies of support to alliances, forward presence and stationing, rapid global response, credible deterrence and the ability to sustain operations will all be called into question.

In many cases a proper balance for the United States may call for the redefinition of our alliances and reconsideration of our fair share of defense relationships. These decisions may permit prudent reductions in permanent commitments overseas. However, as an American and a former member of the world's greatest military I believe it is our obligation to maintain a force able to react with authority to instabilities and atrocities in the world when so directed, and to be able to do so rapidly and effectively.

What are the Implications of changes in global force posture/increasing US isolationism?


In a world that is on a slippery slope of instability, ungoverned pockets of terrorist growth, rogue leaders in control of nuclear weapons and growing disparity between the world's richest and poorest, it is unreasonable that the world's only great benign superpower should drift into isolationism.

As stated earlier, the time is appropriate to reassess our alliances and our commitments to them, however, it does not seem reasonable to back away from nations who struggle to implement political structures that support self-determination and the liberties promoted by our own policies.

There is no doubt that U.S. military basing and presence has been a force for stability in the world. Even if redefined and deliberately reduced our forward partnerships are important pillars of our credibility and visible signs of our commitment and should not be abandoned.

JOHN P. JUMPER

GENERAL (RET.)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE



John P. Jumper joined the private sector in September 2005 following an extraordinary 39-year military career, including serving as the 17th Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force. In his four years as the senior uniformed official in America's air and space service, General Jumper led more than 700,000 men and women through the Global War on Terrorism, force modernization, and strategic transformation. Working with his civilian and military colleagues, he administered annual budgets of more than \$100 billion and oversaw the delivery of numerous air and space combat and support systems, from the F-22 fighter to the Global Hawk unmanned system, among many others. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he provided military advice directly to the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council. He also served as a trusted partner to the military leaders of U.S. allies, including dozens of Air Chiefs from around the world who look to the U.S. Air Force as a model for innovation and effectiveness.

Prior to his position as Chief of Staff, General Jumper served in a series of positions as a wartime commander and leader of large organizations and high-technology systems. From 2000 – 2001, he was Commander, Air Combat Command, the nation's largest provider of air and space power to combat commanders. During Operation Allied Force, the 1999 war in Kosovo and Serbia, he commanded U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Allied Air Forces Central Europe. He was a key planner on the Joint Staff during Operation Desert Storm, leading the nation's effort to bolster biological warfare defense. He also served as Senior Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Secretary Les Aspin. General Jumper commanded an F-16 fighter squadron and two fighter wings, accumulated 5000 flying hours that includes more than 1400 combat hours in Vietnam and Iraq.

General Jumper holds a degree in electrical engineering from the Virginia Military Institute and an MBA from Golden Gate University. He currently serves on the Board of Directors of several publicly traded companies, Goodrich Corporation, Jacobs Engineering, and SAIC. An active public speaker and strategic consultant, General Jumper also serves on non-profit Boards of the Air Force Association, The Marshall Foundation, The VMI Board of Visitors and the Air Force Village Charitable Foundation. He and his wife, Ellen, live in Burke, Virginia.

FISCAL YEAR 2009

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
Fed Sub Contract W900KK-07-D0715	US Army	\$2,800.00	NATO Air Policing Working Group
Fed Sub Contract W900KK-07-D0715	US Army	\$15,000.00	Baltic Air Capabilities Seminar - #1
Fed Sub Contract W900KK-07-D0715	US Army	\$15,000.00	Baltic Air Capabilities Seminar - #2
Fed Sub Contract W900KK-07-D0715	US Army	\$15,000.00	NATO Exercise Unified Engagement

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2011): 0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: 0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: 4 _____.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: DoD _____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2011): 0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: 0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: Consultant – Development of Concepts of Operation.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2011): \$0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: \$0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: \$47,800 _____.

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government: **NONE**

Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
Fiscal year 2010: _____;
Fiscal year 2009: _____.

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held: **NONE**

Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
Fiscal year 2010: _____;
Fiscal year 2009: _____.

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.): **NONE**

Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
Fiscal year 2010: _____;
Fiscal year 2009: _____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held: **NONE**

Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
Fiscal year 2010: _____;
Fiscal year 2009: _____.

STATEMENT BY

GENERAL RICHARD A. CODY (Retired)
31ST VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY

BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

FIRST SESSION, 112TH CONGRESS

U.S ARMY ISSUES 2001-2011, AND BEYOND

OCTOBER 4, 2011

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

On 8 April 2008 I testified before this Committee as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. Then, I was honored to represent the Nation's one million plus Soldiers, nearly 600,000 of whom were serving on Active Duty and over 250,000 of whom were deployed worldwide, most on 15 month combat tours, as I testified on issues critical to the current and long term readiness of the US Army. Today, I am again honored to testify before you as a private citizen, a retired Soldier, but one who continues to do what I can to support our outstanding Soldiers, Marines, Sailors and Airmen.

Many things have changed since April 2008. The surge in Iraq has ended and the Army is on course to withdraw the remaining 45,000 Soldiers by the end of the year; we have surged more forces into Afghanistan. The end strength growth of 65,000 additional Soldiers that we started in 2004 is complete, though now there is movement to reduce the Army's active duty strength by significant numbers. The Army has completed the restructuring of the force and just finished the largest BRAC, MILCON and global repositioning of our Army since World War II; all while fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today our US economy is in crisis mode, and probably most importantly, we have now been at war for over 10 years.

That said, many things have not changed. In 2008 I reported to you that the world we live in is exceedingly dangerous. Recent events in Southwest Asia, the Pacific, and the Arab Spring only highlight this fact, in spite of courageous efforts

of our service men and women. I also reported that our Army was out of balance, that repeated tours of 12 months in combat with only 13 months back before deploying again was putting tremendous stress on the All Volunteer Army and their Families. Today that stress is still there as the Army continues to deploy Soldiers on 12 month combat tours with less than 24 months between tours. I testified then that we were consuming our strategic readiness, people and equipment, with repeated tours in the harshest environments we have ever fought in. And most importantly, that our ability to man, equip and train for full spectrum operations somewhere else in the world, while fighting the current battles in Iraq and Afghanistan, was not possible.

In 2008 I reported that the cumulative impact of 6 years of Continuing Resolutions was causing significant problems within the Services' ability to run their programs, prepare our Soldiers for their next rotation and to reset the equipment; equipment that has been in combat for over 6 years. Today we enter another Fiscal Year with a CR while at war. It is one thing to have to deal with the uncertainty of our enemies and what new threat to prepare for. But it is entirely another to have to deal with uncertainty of year to year budgets and what resources will be available to sustain today's fight and reset an Army that has been at war for over 10 years for the next fight.

As Congress, the Pentagon and the Executive Branch wrestle with the budget reduction required by the Budget Control Act, the real questions with regard to

the Services' budget is simple: What missions do you want our military to continue to perform? What threats do you want our military to counter? What level of readiness do you want the military to sustain? History has taught us that we have not been very good at predicting where, when and against whom, the US military will have to fight to protect the national interest and the security of this nation and its 315 million citizens. Simply put, when we size, scope and resource our military for the peaceful and US friendly world we hope for, and not the dangerous, hostile and unpredictable world we live in, it is the American service men and women, and our nation, that we put at risk.

During my six years in the Pentagon as the Army's G-3 and as Vice Chief, the Congress has always responded to the critical needs of our force, especially during the early years of operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. It is well documented that we entered this Global War on terrorism woefully short of equipment, resulting from the defense budget cuts in the late 90's after the first Gulf War, especially for our Guard and Reserve forces, and Congress responded. That spirit of support by this Congress is still needed today.

Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions.

Richard A. Cody

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Richard A. Cody (born August 2, 1950) is a retired United States Army general who served as the 31st Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army from June 24, 2004 to July 31, 2008. He retired from the Army on August 1, 2008.

Contents

- 1 Early life and career
- 2 Medals and Awards
- 3 See also
- 4 References

Early life and career

Cody was born in Montpelier, Vermont, on 2 August 1950. He was commissioned a second lieutenant upon graduation in 1972 from the United States Military Academy. His military education includes completion of the Transportation Corps Officer Basic and Advanced Courses; the Aviation Maintenance Officer Course; the AH-1, AH-64, AH-64D, UH-60, and MH-60K Aircraft Qualification Courses; the Command and General Staff College, and the United States Army War College. Cody is a Master Aviator with over 5,000 hours of flight time, and is an air assault graduate.



General Cody at a press conference in 2007.

Prior to his current assignment, Cody spent 32 years in a variety of command and staff assignments, most recently serving as Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army. Other



General Richard A. Cody

Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army

Born	August 2, 1950 Montpelier, Vermont
Allegiance	 United States of America
Service/branch	 United States Army
Years of service	1972-2008
Rank	**** General
Commands held	101st Airborne Division 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division 1st Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment
Battles/wars	Operation Desert Storm Operation Enduring Freedom
Awards	Distinguished Service Medal Defense Superior Service Medal Legion of Merit (5)


key assignments include Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and Fort Campbell; Director, Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army; Deputy Commanding General, Task Force Hawk, Tirana, Albania; Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; Commander, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Commander, 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division; Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, Combined Field Army, Korea; and Director, Flight Concepts Division.

Distinguished Flying Cross
Bronze Star
Meritorious Service Medal (5)

Cody has served several tours with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) as Commander, 1st Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment (Attack) during Operation Desert Storm; Aviation Brigade Executive Officer, 101st Aviation Brigade; Battalion Executive Officer and Company Commander in the 229th Attack Helicopter Battalion, and Battalion S-3 in the 55th Attack Helicopter Battalion. He served as a platoon commander in the 2nd Squadron, 9th Cavalry and A Company (Attack), 24th Aviation Battalion and as Commander, E Company (AVIM), 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia.

He and his wife are both avid golfers, and spent much of their free time while stationed at Fort Campbell on the base's golf course. Vicki has written a book about military life for military families. The military's largest Child Development Center (CDC) is named after the Codys. It is called the Cody Child Development Center, which is located on Fort Myer, Virginia.

Medals and Awards





Army Staff Identification Badge

See also

References

- *The original version of this article incorporated text copied from General Richard Cody's Biography (<http://www.army.mil/leaders/leaders/vcsa/biography.html>) on the website of the US Army. By statute, works authored by US Government employees in the course of their duties are in the public domain.*

Military offices		
Preceded by George W. Casey, Jr.	Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army June 24, 2004 – July 31, 2008	Succeeded by Peter W. Chiarelli

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_A._Cody"

Categories: United States Army generals | United States Military Academy alumni | Recipients of the Distinguished Service Medal (United States) | Recipients of the Legion of Merit | Recipients of the Distinguished Flying Cross (United States) | Recipients of the Bronze Star Medal | 1950 births | Living people | United States Army Vice Chiefs of Staff | Recipients of the Air Medal | United States Army Command and General Staff College alumni | People from Montpelier, Vermont

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**DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION**

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Witness name: GENERAL(R) Richard A. Cody, 31st Vice Chief of Staff, US Army

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

Individual

Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: _____

FISCAL YEAR 2011

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

FISCAL YEAR 2010

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

FISCAL YEAR 2009

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
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 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
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Fiscal year 2010: _____;
Fiscal year 2009: _____.

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Fiscal year 2010: _____;
Fiscal year 2009: _____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
Fiscal year 2010: _____;
Fiscal year 2009: _____.

WITNESS STATEMENT OF: LTG (RET) H STEVEN BLUM

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

HEARING ON THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE MILITARY TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2011

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today before the House Armed Services Committee on the Future of National Defense and the U.S. Military Ten Years After 9/11. Throughout my 42 years of service in uniform to this nation, I have found that the House Armed Services Committee has always been able to provide outstanding non-partisan support. It has taken the often difficult, but always necessary, actions to ensure that our men and women in uniform have the resources and policies that make it possible for them to accomplish their myriad missions.

Today, we face a security environment that may be the most complex and dangerous in our nation's history. The international security landscape shifts literally every day. As a result, our nation requires more than ever of its armed forces. At the same time, fiscal realities force constraints on current and future defense budgets. To state the obvious and this challenge faces not just the military but every sector of our society – we must find ways to do more with less. To do this job right, we should establish the National Security Strategy independently of budget constraints. Strategy must come first. Only then can we make meaningful decisions, based on informed dialogue, to determine how best to accomplish our strategy within existing fiscal constraints.

Let us recognize that today we have the most experienced, professional and capable military force ever to serve our nation. We must maintain this peerless military readiness and capacity to protect our nation against often uncertain and sometimes unpredicted threats. We also must avoid repeating past mistakes when numbers and parochial interests, rather than geopolitical realities, drove decisions and produced unexpected and undesirable second and third order effects.

As this committee considers and deliberates the tough choices our nation faces, I ask you to consider the strategic approach being embraced today by many of the most successful for-profit corporations around the world. They are responding to difficult market conditions by sizing their fulltime professional work force to handle the lowest expected level of business activity. At the same time, they are building a part-time work force designed to handle the largest expected surge requirements. With this strategy, these excellence-focused companies can focus deployment of capital on cost-effective modernization, profit-enhancing expansion, and research and development. They avoid committing themselves to pay, benefits and entitlements commitments that inexorably diminish performance now and in the future.

Does not this enlightened strategy argue for increased reliance on the National Guard and Reserves? History would suggest that this task will fall to this body. When it inevitably does, remember this.

The performance of the National Guard and Reserves in the decade following 9/11 has been nothing short of stellar. They have consistently met and exceeded all mission requirements both overseas and at home. Their truly exceptional service and sacrifice argues forcefully for consideration of an expansion of

their role and significance in our National Security Strategy. I respectfully commend to the members of this committee a white paper entitled "The National Guard: A Great Value Today and In the Future" by General Craig R. McKinley, current Chief of the National Guard Bureau, published March 31, 2011. It is a work worthy of your time when considering cost versus force structure options. It is a fact that when you call out the Guard and Reserves, you indeed call out America. The value of such a powerful national capability? Priceless!

Thank you for what you do for our nation, and for the opportunity to appear before this committee and hopefully contribute to resolving the very serious issues at hand.

H STEVEN BLUM

LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RETIRED)

Lieutenant General H Steven Blum (Retired)
UNITED STATES ARMY



Lieutenant General H Steven Blum retired after serving the Nation for over 42 years. General Blum's final assignment was as the Deputy Commander, United States Northern Command, and Vice Commander, U.S. Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command (USELEMENORAD), headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, where he was the first National Guard officer to serve as a Deputy Combatant Commander.

While serving as the deputy commander, United States Northern Command, General Blum helped lead the command to anticipate, prepare and respond to threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories and interests within the assigned area of responsibility and, as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide defense support of civil authorities including consequence management operations.

General Blum's previous assignment was Chief, National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia. As Chief, he was the senior uniformed National Guard officer responsible for formulating, developing and coordinating all policies, programs and plans affecting more than half a million Army and Air National Guard personnel. Appointed by the President, he served as the principal adviser to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force on all National Guard issues. As National Guard Bureau Chief, he served as the Army's and Air Force's official channel of communication with the Governors and Adjutants General. General Blum was instrumental in transforming the National Guard from a once ponderous Cold War strategic reserve into an agile, lethal operational force capable of joint and expeditionary warfare—a uniquely flexible force simultaneously capable of responding to a broad range of civil and humanitarian crises. As a result of General Blum's vision, the Guard today stands more ready, reliable, essential and accessible than at anytime in its near-four hundred years of existence.

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, General Blum was responsible for the deployment of over 50,000 National Guard citizen soldiers and airmen from every state and territory. This operation was the largest, fastest and most effective military response to a natural disaster in history. The efforts resulted in the saving of over 17,000 lives. Additionally, he oversaw the deployment of 5,000 National Guard soldiers from 34 contributing states to the southwest border in a highly successful two-year long mission, Operation Jumpstart, providing military support to the US Border patrol.

Enlisting as a private and serving through the ranks, General Blum received his commission from Officer Candidate School on Aug. 28, 1971. He has commanded at every level to include a Special Forces Operational Detachment-A, a Light Infantry Battalion, an Infantry Brigade, and a Division Support Command. Prior to commanding the 29th Infantry Division (Light), General Blum served as Assistant Adjutant General for Army, Commanding General, Maryland Army National Guard, and Assistant Division Commander (Support), 29th Infantry Division (Light). General Blum served as the Commanding General for Multinational Division (North) Stabilization Force 10 in Operation Joint Forge, Bosnia Herzegovina. This complex multinational, coalition force of over 11,000 citizen-soldiers spread out over a five- state area (Maryland, Virginia, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New

Jersey) was augmented by soldiers from a Russian Airborne Brigade, a Turkish Army Brigade and a multinational Nordic-Polish Brigade.

General Blum's decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Army Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit with two Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters, Meritorious Service Medal with two Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters, Army Commendation Medal with one Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster, Joint Meritorious Unit Award, Army Achievement Medal with one Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster, Army Reserve Component Achievement Medal with one Silver Oak Leaf Cluster, National Defense Service Medal with Bronze Star, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, Armed Forces Service Medal, Humanitarian Service Medal, Armed Forces Reserve Medal with "M" Device and Gold Hourglass, Army Service Ribbon, Army Reserve Component Overseas Training Ribbon, NATO Medal, Special Forces Tab, Secretary of Defense Identification Badge, Expert Infantryman Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, Air Assault Badge, and Army Staff Identification Badge. In addition, he has been awarded Parachutist Badges from Russia, Poland and Canada.

General Blum has been appointed to the position of Executive in Residence with The Johns Hopkins University, School of Education, Division of Public Safety and Leadership. This appointment reflects the experience, education and the many contributions he has made to the nation in the field of public safety.

He is currently the Managing Director and Practice Lead for Sitrick & Company, a world renowned crisis communications organization. Additionally, General Blum consults in the area of domestic and international planning, training and disaster response for private and government organizations.

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Witness name: LTG (retired) H Steven Blum

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

Individual

Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: self

FISCAL YEAR 2011

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
n/a			

FISCAL YEAR 2010

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
n/a			

FISCAL YEAR 2009			
Federal grant(s)/ contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
n/a			

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Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____ n/a _____;
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 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____ n/a _____;
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 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

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 Fiscal year 2010: _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____ n/a _____;
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Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

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Fiscal year 2009: _____ .

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____ n/a _____ ;
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Fiscal year 2009: _____ .