[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PROTECTING U.S. SOVEREIGNTY:
COAST GUARD OPERATIONS IN THE ARCTIC
=======================================================================
(112-63)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 1, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey Columbia
GARY G. MILLER, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois CORRINE BROWN, Florida
SAM GRAVES, Missouri BOB FILNER, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
DUNCAN HUNTER, California RICK LARSEN, Washington
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
BILLY LONG, Missouri HEATH SHULER, North Carolina
BOB GIBBS, Ohio STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania LAURA RICHARDSON, California
RICHARD L. HANNA, New York ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida
JEFF DENHAM, California
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN,
Tennessee
------ 7
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska RICK LARSEN, Washington
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland CORRINE BROWN, Florida
FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana, NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
Vice Chair (Ex Officio)
JOHN L. MICA, Florida (Ex Officio)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ iv
TESTIMONY
Panel One
Papp, Admiral Robert, Commandant, United States Coast Guard...... 6
Treadwell, Hon. Mead, Lieutenant Governor, State of Alaska....... 6
Panel Two
Caldwell, Stephen L., Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
Government Accountability Office............................... 27
Falkner, Dr. Kelly, Deputy Director, Office of Polar Programs,
National Science Foundation.................................... 27
Garrett, Rear Admiral Jeffrey M., United States Coast Guard
(Retired)...................................................... 27
Whitcomb, Dave, Chief Operating Officer, Vigor Industrial, on
behalf of the Shipbuilders Council of America.................. 27
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Caldwell, Stephen L., Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
Government Accountability Office............................... 38
Falkner, Dr. Kelly, Deputy Director, Office of Polar Programs,
National Science Foundation.................................... 79
Garrett, Rear Admiral Jeffrey M., United States Coast Guard
(Retired)...................................................... 84
Papp, Admiral Robert, Commandant, United States Coast Guard...... 86
Treadwell, Hon. Mead, Lieutenant Governor, State Of Alaska....... 92
Whitcomb, Dave, Chief Operating Officer, Vigor Industrial, on
behalf of the Shipbuilders Council of America.................. 103
SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD
Caldwell, Stephen L., Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
Government Accountability Office, responses to questions from
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Washington.................................................. 68
ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD
Edison Chouest Offshore, Inc., written statement................. 108
Philemonoff, Ron, Chief Executive Officer, Tanadgusix
Corporation, written statement................................. 113
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PROTECTING U.S. SOVEREIGNTY:
COAST GUARD OPERATIONS IN THE ARCTIC
----------
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2011
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:00 a.m. in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Frank LoBiondo
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. LoBiondo. The subcommittee will come to order. The
subcommittee is meeting this morning to review Coast Guard
operations in the Arctic. As we all know, the ice caps are
shrinking in the Arctic, effectively creating new coastline and
navigable waters where the Coast Guard will be required to
operate.
This opening is already providing significant economic
opportunities for the energy and maritime transportation
sectors, but also has exposed a new set of risks and challenges
to our national security and sovereignty. The subcommittee has
been talking about the Arctic for years, and has continuously
advocated for increased polar capabilities. However, the Coast
Guard's ability to respond to emerging threats and emergencies
in the Arctic is less today than it has been at any point in
the last 50 years.
Neither of the Polar Icebreakers is currently operational,
though the taxpayer is spending millions of dollars a year to
maintain those ships in a caretaker status. It is time that we
stop wasting money on old, ineffective assets, and focus
instead on acquiring assets that will provide the capabilities
we need to continue to increase our foothold in the Arctic.
What we really need is to have an honest national
conversation about what we want our involvement in the Arctic
to be, and what we need to do to maintain that presence. We
will continue to ask for, beg for, plead for, wait for a
coherent Arctic vision from the administration and a subsequent
resource proposal, because having a vision and having a
proposal without the resources is not going to go very far.
Again, I firmly believe that we need to be protecting our
national interest in the Arctic, and hope that the
subcommittee's actions will draw light to this increasingly
important and urgent issue.
I would like to thank Admiral Papp and Mr. Treadwell for
being here today. But first I would like to turn it over to Mr.
Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
scheduling this morning's hearing to assess the capabilities of
the U.S. Coast Guard's ability to maintain and protect the
sovereign interests of the United States in the Arctic.
Before I begin my remarks, I want to take a moment to
welcome, actually, three of our witnesses who have traveled
quite some ways to get here. The first two from Washington
State, Rear Admiral Jeff Garrett, who will be on the second
panel, U.S. Coast Guard (retired), served with distinction as
the CO of the Coast Guard icebreakers Polar Sea and Healy, and
was involved in polar icebreaking deployments throughout the
eastern and western Arctic and Antarctica. So, we welcome
Admiral Garrett. And, I am sure his many years of experience
will shed some helpful insights on our issue.
Also, I want to thank and welcome Mr. David Whitcomb, vice
president for production support of Vigor Industrial. Vigor
Industrial recently acquired the former Todd Pacific Shipyards
in Seattle, which for years maintained the Coast Guard's fleet
of icebreakers. I want to thank Mr. Whitcomb for participating,
and I look forward to an update from him on the status and pace
of repairs to the Polar Star.
Also, just an added note here to my comments, I want to
thank Lieutenant Governor Treadwell here. And if you could,
pass on my greetings to my former resident assistant at Pacific
Lutheran University known only then as Sean Parnell, who is now
Governor Sean Parnell of Alaska. Please express my greetings to
the Governor. I appreciate that very much.
Mr. Chairman, in reflecting on this morning's topic, it is
hard for me to recall another instance where the solution to a
policy problem has been so apparent, yet the reaction of the
Congress is so contrary or unresponsive. I may not know the
precise definition of the word ``irony,'' but scheduling a
hearing to discuss the Coast Guard capabilities in the Arctic
less than 3 weeks after the House passed legislation that would
decommission the Coast Guard's two heavy icebreakers seems
ironic to me.
It has been the policy of the U.S. since 1965 for the U.S.
Coast Guard to develop, establish, maintain, and operate the
U.S. icebreaking fleet in each polar region. Anyone who has
looked at this issue over the years has come to the same
conclusion: we need to invest now in new heavy icebreakers, or
face a sharply diminished presence in the Arctic and Antarctic.
As our Nation's primary Federal maritime agency, the Coast
Guard has played and will continue to play a significant role
in Arctic policy implementation and enforcement, while also
fulfilling its other mission responsibilities for search and
rescue operations, maritime safety, scientific research, and
environmental protection.
I want to commend Commandant Papp for his efforts to stay
the Service and to maintain and enhance the Coast Guard's
operational capabilities in these very challenging budgetary
times.
Due to the extreme operating environments found at high
latitudes, the Coast Guard icebreakers serve as a mobile,
multimission operating platform. This has enabled the Coast
Guard to project U.S. global leadership and to protect our
national security and economic interests in the Arctic and
Antarctic. And, by all accounts, the Coast Guard's use of
icebreakers has served the Nation very well, until recently.
As far back as October 1990, Polar Icebreaker requirements
report the handwriting has been on the wall. If we are going to
maintain a reliable presence in the high north, we must make
the necessary investments to sustain an icebreaker fleet.
Fortunately, the Coast Guard responded positively to this
report, and provided the appropriations necessary to build and
launch the Coast Guard icebreaker Healy in 1999. Regrettably,
the declining condition of both Coast Guard heavy icebreakers,
the Sea and the Star, each of which have exceeded their 30-year
life expectancies, has failed to generate a similar response
from Congress, and no new funding for recapitalization of
icebreakers is on the horizon.
Instead, over the past several years the Congress has
received multiple reports from the Government Accountability
Office, the Department of Homeland Security's inspector
general, the National Research Council, the Coast Guard, and
other agencies that make basically the same recommendations as
in the 1990 report: We need to invest now in new heavy
icebreakers, or lose our capabilities to operate in the Arctic
and Antarctic.
What I find especially frustrating is that this comes at
precisely the same time other nations, including Russia, China,
Norway, Korea are rushing to build new icebreakers to stake
their claims in this emerging area in the Arctic. It is absurd
for us in Congress to maintain that Coast Guard can do more
with less when the best minds in our Nation have, for years,
recommended, if not admonished, the Congress to do one thing to
protect our national interests in the Arctic: invest in new
heavy icebreakers.
Instead, as I mentioned earlier, we have passed legislation
to decommission our two heavier icebreakers within the next 3
years, an idea which I believe is misguided, for which the
administration has forcefully and rightfully stated its strong
opposition. However, I also note the administration has not
provided us a plan for how to fund new icebreakers.
The bottom line is that we can't afford to outsource the
Coast Guard's icebreaking mission to any country. Considering
that it will take anywhere between 8 to 10 years to plan,
design, and build a new heavy icebreaker, we had best initiate
a discussion now with our colleagues in the Senate, the
administration, the Coast Guard, and other Federal agencies to
reach agreement on a long-term strategy to provide not only new
heavy icebreakers, but also the other infrastructure
investments that are going to be absolutely necessary to
support Coast Guard operations above the Arctic Circle.
We either choose to address this challenge or we risk
losing a critical foothold necessary to maintain U.S.
sovereignty in an Arctic frontier of emerging global economic
importance. Too much is at stake to remain complacent, and we
need to act.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Larsen. I would just like to
say I--trying to find the right word to say for your comment of
ironic, which I guess it is. But maybe more so, sad. And I
welcome your efforts to use your considerable influence and
power with the administration to get some articulated, you
know, view of policy and, maybe more importantly, the resources
to go with it.
I think we are more in agreement on this issue than in
disagreement. But I would have loved to have had something
substantive to move with. And I appreciate your concern and
interest. You have got, I think, a unique perspective on it.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You will note my
comments here, as well as my comments on the floor during the
debate on the Coast Guard bill, that not only did the
administration oppose the Coast Guard bill because of the
decommissioning language, but I also noted on the floor as
well, as I noted here today, that they have as well failed to
provide a funding plan about--with regards to icebreakers.
So, I do think we have a--we are pretty close in agreement
on this, but we need to flush these things out, which is the
importance of this hearing today, and I appreciate you
scheduling this.
Mr. LoBiondo. And now to give us the answer to put it over
the top, Mr. Young of Alaska.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I can't really top
what's been said. But I am the only real representative of the
Arctic in Congress. I say this with a great deal of pride. I
live above the Arctic Circle. And Alaska has made the United
States an Arctic nation. I think that is crucially important.
What has been said here is--by both you and the ranking
member, that this is our waters, 200 miles out for sure. And
then it becomes international waters, and there is where the
interests of China and Russia and--actually, there are five
nations involved, and we are fifth of the five being, you know,
involved.
And as far as Admiral Papp--this is not your fault, it is
Congress' fault. It is hard to get Congress to concentrate on
what is necessary for the future. They have no vision, as far
as the need and the necessity of the Coast Guard involvement
because of the Arctic. The shipping route was mentioned, the
icebreaker necessity. And we will be able to, I believe--in the
near future be able to ship things much cheaper with that route
than you would with the Panama Canal. We look at cost of fuel,
et cetera.
But we sit here--and we can argue about the Coast Guard
capability. I was involved in the funding of the first--the
three Coast Guard icebreakers we had. And they're wore out. And
they are really not heavy icebreakers. They are--I call medium
icebreakers, not heavy icebreakers. I think we have to look at
all aspects of getting icebreaking capability, including
leasing, and I will say that again and again. Buy-in, if we can
get this Congress to recognize it. But this Congress has to
come to the plate. We would like to get a recommendation from
this administration and future administrations. And the past
administrations failed us, too.
And so, this is very, very important. We are supposedly the
most powerful country in the world. And yet we are neglecting
the one, I think, bright spot, because I know in my State we
have tremendous potential for minerals and necessary things
that we are importing now that have been locked up because of
the ice. And then, consequently, now it will be free. But we
need the navigation capability.
Admiral, you know, because of the closeness to the Pole a
lot of GPSs don't work correctly. There is a lot of other
problems of navigation. And we have to start looking at the
whole program.
And as far as I know, there is no oil spill that knows
borders. And China is involved, Russia is involved, Canada is
involved, Iceland is involved. And they are drilling in the
Arctic--which in fact, if they had a spill--with no safeguards
at all. And that could--and it will cross into our borders, and
potentially do us great damage.
So, I think we should be more aggressive, Mr. Chairman. I
compliment you and the ranking member on the interest not only
in the Arctic, but the Coast Guard. But that Congress, as a
whole--you mention Coast Guard, and they roll their eyes. And I
think that is so very, very unfortunate. Because the Arctic is
the future of this Nation.
So I look forward to the witnesses today, and get some
reports from them and urge both the admirals and the Coast
Guard to come out with a program.
And if you can't do it, we should be able to do it as a
Congress, and I expect the chairman to help us do this, and get
our leadership to understand if we are going to go ahead and
cut back on the military, let's not be cutting back on the
Coast Guard. Because that will be--as they have been in the
past--an active unit of our military that is working
constantly, not only for search and rescue, but for the
development of our resources.
And with that, I yield back my time.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Landry?
Mr. Landry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, Lieutenant
Governor, thank you for being here. I know it seems odd that a
congressman from South Louisiana who probably sees water freeze
maybe once every 5 years would be interested in this particular
topic, but you know, I grew up at a time when America and
Congress did big things, and the people that served in Congress
were titans. We led. Frontiers were things that challenged us.
And, you know, we sent a man to the moon, we built an
interstate system, we brought Alaska into the union. We built a
fleet of space shuttles. We did big things. And, you know, we
can still do big things. Under this current fiscal environment
we still are required to lead. We still should be challenged by
those frontiers. But we must have an eye on fiscal management.
And so, we have worked on legislation in this Congress that
would allow us to continue to have icebreaking presence, even
after the decommissioning of the Polar Sea and Polar Star, by
directing the Coast Guard to use private leases to supply these
vessels. This isn't a foreign idea. I mean how many times has--
you know, that is why we have--in this country have a long
history of supporting our maritime industry, because we
recognize that the Government could not always supply the needs
on a constant basis. And so we supported our private maritime
fleet.
And so, I look forward to trying to come up with a solution
to increase our icebreaking capabilities. And I know, Admiral
Papp, that with your guidance and some input from this Congress
from both sides of the aisle, we can come up with a solution,
even under the fiscal environment that we find ourselves in.
And so, I look forward to hearing the questions that the
Members have, and answers that you will provide. And with that,
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you. Admiral Papp, thank you for
joining us today. The floor is yours.
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL ROBERT PAPP, COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES
COAST GUARD; AND HON. MEAD TREADWELL, LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR,
STATE OF ALASKA
Admiral Papp. Thank you, Chairman LoBiondo and Ranking
Member Larsen, and all the other distinguished members of the
subcommittee. Thanks for the opportunity to appear here today,
and for your continued support of our Coast Guard, especially
our hard-working Coast Guard men and women.
As you have noted, America is a maritime nation. The United
States relies upon the sea for our prosperity, our trade, our
transportation, and security. And, as also was noted, we are an
Arctic nation. The Arctic region, including the Beaufort,
Chukchi, and Bering Seas, and the Arctic Ocean, is truly an
emerging maritime frontier.
Although the northern part of the Arctic has remained
frozen much of our lifetimes, change is clearly occurring.
Arctic ice is gradually diminishing. And in the summer months,
an entire new ocean is emerging. This accessibility is spurring
an increase in human activities such as natural resource
exploration, shipping, and eco-tourism.
Similar to the rest of U.S. waters, the safety, security,
and stewardship of the Arctic region impacts every American.
Indeed, the Arctic contains an estimated 22 percent of the
world's technically recoverable oil and natural gas. The Shell
Exploration and Production Company plans to drill exploratory
wells in the Chukchi Sea and Beaufort Sea beginning in 2012.
Other companies will likely follow.
For more than 221 years, our Nation has relied upon the
U.S. Coast Guard to protect those on the sea, to protect the
country against threats delivered by the sea, and even to
protect the sea, itself. Our challenge today is to ensure we
are working to develop a Coast Guard capable of meeting our new
and emerging responsibilities in the Arctic region as capably
as we have performed our long-established missions in existing
areas of operation.
As with any new endeavor, posturing our forces to do so
presents challenges, risks, but perhaps a few opportunities, as
well. Today, based upon what we have learned, I am pleased to
offer you my best military advice on our Arctic operational
needs. Before I do so, however, I must tell you that I am
concerned by the recent authorization language passed by the
House that ties my hands in some ways and limits my ability to
move the Coast Guard forward on all mission fronts, including
those emerging in the Arctic.
My first concern is the mandate to decommission Polar Star.
This provision would eliminate the Nation's only existing heavy
icebreaking capability as soon as 2 years after the Polar
Star's reactivation in 2013, and after Congress has invested
over $60 million to extend the Cutter's service life.
Admittedly, keeping this 30-plus-year-old ship running is a
challenge for all of us, and it is not a long-term solution for
our Nation's heavy icebreaking needs. But while I can
understand the desire to accelerate a solution, I don't see an
alternative source of U.S. heavy icebreaking capability that
could be made available within the next 3 years. Thus, this
mandate puts us in a position of confronting expanding Arctic
missions without a heavy icebreaker.
We have weathered the last couple of years without an
active heavy icebreaker, but I strongly recommend against
making this a permanent solution. And I urge reconsideration of
this provision in conference.
My second concern is the authorization's bill mandates
constraining our ability to procure the National Security
Cutters, just as we have stabilize costs and matured their
design. While I understand and share the committee's desire to
deliver the most capable and effective replacement for the 12
High Endurance Cutters, I cannot see how technically
challenging and disruptive performance milestones help us to
achieve that.
The National Security Cutter is a stable and successful
acquisition program now managed by some of the best acquisition
professionals in the Federal Government. This legislation risks
disrupting the production schedule, raising costs, and
jeopardizing the entire national security project. And I will
state here today that the National Security Cutter is more
important to me, in terms of carrying out Coast Guard missions
in Alaska, than an icebreaker. But we still need an icebreaker,
as well.
In sum, it is my judgement and advice to you that the Polar
Star must be kept as part of the heavy icebreaker bridging
strategy for the next 5 to 10 years, and that the National
Security Cutter shipbuilding program momentum must be
maintained.
Now, the Coast Guard is no stranger to Arctic waters, and
we have operated in the Arctic for most of our history. The
majority of our Arctic operations are concentrated in the
southern Arctic, or Bering Sea, where we protect the fish
stocks and fisherman. Protecting one of our Nation's most
richest biomasses, those who make their living harvesting it,
and other shippers who transit through its often treacherous
waters creates a persistent demand for Coast Guard services. We
understand and we have the experience to meet these challenging
maritime missions. Resourcing them will be another story.
But we have also been actively gathering information about
operating above the Arctic Circle and the Chukchi and Beaufort
Seas as we prepare for a gradual northerly expansion in demand
for our services in ice-diminished Arctic waters. For the past
3 years we have conducted seasonal cutter, small-boat, and
helicopter operations, along with biweekly Arctic Ocean
flights.
This year we are organizing a major operation in the 17th
Coast Guard District in anticipation of drilling in the Chukchi
Sea. This operation will feature a mixture of flight deck-
equipped cutters, sea-going buoy tenders, fixed-wing aircraft
and helicopters, and communications support infrastructure. I
have made it a priority to personally travel to Alaska the past
two summers with DHS leaders and interagency leaders like the
Department of Interior Secretary Salazar, Deputy Secretary
David Hayes. And we have met with local and State partners,
including Governor Parnell and Lieutenant Governor Treadwell,
who is here today. Also, with the Alaska native tribes and
industry, to see the challenges that we are confronting
firsthand.
In the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas we are now seeing a
gradual transition from very limited episodic demand into a
more sustained seasonal demand. At some point these demands may
involve--evolve into a full-fledged seasonal operation.
Therefore, our present operational concept is largely an
extension of our current posture, mobilization of sea-based
command and control forward operating bases from which we will
conduct operations with gradually increasing support from our
shore-based aircraft.
Should a national incident arise in the Arctic, we will
mobilize the entire inventory of Coast Guard assets. We will
accomplish the mission, just as we always have during our 200-
century--our two centuries of service to the Nation. But to
fulfill this promise to America, our heroic Coast Guard men and
women need--and, frankly, they deserve--the modern assets to
get the job done.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to your questions, sir.
Mr. Young. [presiding.] Thank you, Admiral. And you notice,
in respect for your rank, I let you go over for a couple
minutes.
Admiral Papp. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Young. You are quite welcome. And now, Mr. Treadwell.
And I am going to watch you real close, but I will even let you
go over 2 minutes, if you want to. Go ahead.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Young. That was Lieutenant Governor, I am sorry.
Mr. Treadwell. No problem.
Mr. Treadwell. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, for
the record I am Mead Treadwell, Lieutenant Governor of Alaska.
And thank you for having me here. Or, I should say, back here
today. Admiral Papp and I sat next to each other in 2006 on
this issue, and it is about time we get some action.
The purchase of Alaska in 1867 made America an Arctic
nation. Yet after 150 years, the myth of Seward's Folly still
lingers. It is time to quite arguing whether investment in the
north is worth it, and recognize the valuable people,
resources, and location we gained as a Nation.
We ask this committee--and, by extension, Congress and the
executive branch--to look at the bigger picture in the global
Arctic, and recognize three imminent needs. First, Alaskans
have said it before, Governor Sean Parnell testified on this in
2009, we will say it again. It is time for Congress and the
administration to act, and to act now, to add new Polar Class
Icebreakers in the United States Coast Guard's fleet. The need
is more urgent than ever. The changing Arctic will bring--it is
bringing historic changes in global shipping patterns.
Secondly, Congress and the administration need to recognize
that their own mandates and policies, including a significant
mandate passed just last year, have directed that we maintain
icebreaking operations, and neither the intent nor the letter
of these mandates are being met.
And third, in addition to icebreakers, we need legal
measures to protect our shores from the dangers of unregulated
itinerant vessels that are now carrying hazardous cargoes near
our coast through the Bering Strait, which Admiral Papp's
predecessor has described as the Bering Gate. And it is the
only way in and out of the Arctic Ocean from the Pacific.
First, let me emphasize to you that changes in the Arctic
are creating tremendous game-changing opportunities. We know
ice covers at historic minimums, multiyear ice is decreasing.
We know that icebreaking technology has made--has advanced,
bringing significant new efficiencies. Northern sea routes
sought for hundreds of years are now a reality.
What that means is that international shipping of oil and
gas resources and other potentially hazardous cargoes through
the Bering Strait is growing rapidly, as foreign shippers set
their sites on Asian markets. Other Arctic and non-Arctic
nations are seeing this potential, but America is missing the
boat.
I was in Arctic forum in September in Arkhangelsk, Russia,
in a room about this size with Vladimir Putin, where he
announced Russia intends to make the northern sea route as
important to global commerce as the Suez Canal. Russia is
putting its money where its mouth is; they are building nine
new icebreakers, discounting tariffs on their icebreaker
escorts, so shippers can use the northern sea route for a
savings of about 40 percent. Sweden, Finland, and Canada, even
the European Union, China, Korea, and Japan are beefing up
their icebreaker fleets and paying attention to the historic
opportunities. The United States must plan for an Arctic
shipping future that could be like a new Suez Canal.
My second point today is that we are failing to meet our
own national mandates, goals, and policies. President Franklin
Roosevelt's 1936 Executive Order 7521 to keep channels and
harbors open to navigation by means of icebreaking operation
has not been implemented in the West. This article from the
Anchorage Daily News today shows that there is a fuel problem
in Nome. They can't get the gasoline they need to Nome for the
winter. The article reports that the shippers canvassed the
Nation looking for icebreakers and ice class tugs and barges to
get fuel there, but so far it has had no success. If this were
the Great Lakes or New England, it is standard practice, has
been since the Roosevelt Executive order, to have icebreakers
there to support commerce.
The Arctic Research and Policy Act directs the Office of
Management and Budget to build and deploy icebreakers, and
allocate funds necessary to support icebreaking operations.
Last year's authorization act mandates the Coast Guard to
promote safe maritime navigation by means of icebreaking where
necessary, feasible, and effective, and that makes President
Roosevelt's order the law of the land. The act also directed
the committee on marine transportation system to develop an
integrated shipping regime. I met with CMTS leaders on my last
trip to Washington, and urged them to be far more ambitious
about thinking about Alaska's--America's role in this shipping
route.
Last May, Secretary of State Clinton joined seven Arctic
nations on a search and rescue agreement. We had the first
search and rescue exercise in October in Whitehorse, Mr.
Chairman. That binding agreement to provide search and rescue
operations in our sector of the Arctic is compromised by our
lack of icebreakers in this region.
Perhaps the recent decision of the U.S. House to retire the
Nation's only heavy icebreaking ships without replacements will
force a legitimate conversation about the need for icebreakers.
But we should, however, be cautious. It is a risky game of
chicken. And if this game, if it fails it fails Americans, and
Alaskans, most of all.
Under our current economic situation some question whether
we can afford icebreakers. Mr. Chairman, I would argue we can't
afford to go without them. It has been argued we should charge
for icebreaker escort services, like the Russians. Or ship
owners might pay for services like they do in the Panama and
the Suez Canal. U.S. vessels pay for oil spill escort vessels'
preparedness and insurance. A bill pending in this Congress
would have the U.S. lease, rather than own, icebreakers it
needs in the Arctic. And some have suggested perhaps instead of
scrapping our current infrastructure entirely, you might
consider selling the icebreakers to the private sector for
refurbishment, creating jobs and lowering Government costs.
But how will we work out our finances America and its
trading partners could reap, and we could miss the boat as
others reap huge economic opportunities from these shipping
routes?
And this brings me into my last point. Congress needs to
understand there are two classes of ships operating the Bering
Strait region right now, and in the Aleutians. There are those
that are under contingency planning requirements for oil spills
and those that are not. U.S. vessels are highly regulated. In
fact, over 120 laws control the use of the coastal zone and
offshore areas. But ships originating outside of the U.S. and
passing though the Bering Strait are not required to have a
contingency plan. My formal testimony has a list of about six
potential options that we could use to bring these ships under
regulation. But having an icebreaker is necessary to help
enforce it.
The State of Alaska, I should report, is doing its part.
The State actively supports the marine safety, life safety, and
pending Arctic and marine aviation infrastructure work at the
Arctic Council. We support and we have offered funds to help
the U.S. Coast Guard's efforts to bring forward basing to
Alaska's north coast. We participate extensively in research
fostered by the U.S. Arctic Research Commission and the
University of Alaska. Our legislature has the Northern Waters
Task Force, making recommendations on mitigation strategies and
infrastructure and regulatory needs. We have got a port study
going on with the Army Corps of Engineers. We support the
marine exchange of Alaska that has put a network of automatic
identification system receivers to let us know what kind of
ships are passing through.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, Alaska has and will
continue to work hard on an Arctic policy, because we are
America's Arctic. It is our home, our heritage, and our future.
And we work hard with high hopes for outcomes. But first we
need icebreakers. Without action on this, America is putting
its national security on the line, and we are going to miss the
historic game-changing opportunities of the Arctic, while
watching other nations advance.
Second, Congress and this administration must fill its
established mandates, goals, and policies for the Arctic.
And third, we need to take legal action to protect our
coast and prevent spills in the Arctic and the Aleutians. We
have been an Arctic nation for 150 years. It is time to set
aside that myth of Stewards Folly, and realize, yes, the
investment is worth it, and the payoffs for America are huge.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Governor--I mean Lieutenant Governor;
I better not get the Governor excited.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Young. I want to thank both the witnesses. And with
this I will turn to the ranking member, Mr. Larsen, to ask some
questions. I run this a little different than other chairmen; I
always ask the alternating sides to ask questions first, and I
will close out. So, Mr. Larsen?
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will start with
Admiral Papp.
One of the debates we are having here is the lease versus
own plans. And I am curious, first off, about the Coast Guard's
assessment of the worldwide availability of leased heavy
icebreakers. Second, what would be the--what is the difference,
in your estimation, of heavy icebreakers versus non-heavy
icebreakers, and their capability to operate in the Arctic? Can
you start there?
Admiral Papp. Yes, sir. Interestingly enough, last week I
was in London at the International Maritime Organization. Given
my concern and interest in the Arctic, I hosted a lunch for the
other seven countries that comprise the Arctic, and of course,
most importantly, the five of us that are interested in
operating on the waters of the Arctic.
I took great interest in sitting next to the minister of
the interior for Sweden. She was very apologetic to me that
they had to call Oden home, because they need every icebreaker
they can have, and her own government put pressure on her to
break the commitment to send Oden to break out Antarctica this
year.
Each one of the countries said that they are short on
icebreakers. They are trying to build them as quickly as
possible, but there is no surplus right now. So anything, in
terms specifically for heavy icebreakers, in my estimation, has
to be new construction.
As far as leasing, I don't believe there are any others
that are available for lease, at least not readily. I think the
National Science Foundation, in a solution to replacing the
Oden, is getting an icebreaker from Russia, but I haven't
confirmed that.
Mr. Larsen. OK. But the--so the other part was the
difference between a heavy icebreaker and one--and a medium
icebreaker, or something that is not a heavy icebreaker.
Admiral Papp. Well, the----
Mr. Larsen. In terms of operating and capability and so on.
Admiral Papp. Right. Are you looking for the specifics, in
terms of how much ice----
Mr. Larsen. I am looking for you to answer my question
about where there are differences--can they operate in the
Arctic or not?
Admiral Papp. Oh, yes, sir. We have Polar Class one, two,
and three, Polar Class one being the most heavy of the
icebreakers. We consider Healy--what we call our medium
icebreaker--to be somewhere in Polar Class two or Polar Class
three. Shell is building two that are capable of Polar Class
three, as well.
And I think generally they can operate. They could probably
operate down in Antarctica, depending upon the conditions of
any particular season. But there are seasons where the ice will
be very heavy, and you need a heavy icebreaker. The reason we
are pushing for a heavy icebreaker is because we also have a
responsibility to break out--in the Antarctic to break into
McMurdo for the resupply. So we have to have that versatility
to both be able to operate in the Arctic and Antarctic.
Mr. Larsen. So, the other question about ownership versus
leasing--and I don't want to steal anyone's thunder, because we
are having this debate, but the availability of leasing
icebreakers that are here in the United States, so private
leasing--leasing from private companies in the United States,
as opposed to leasing from one of these other countries.
Admiral Papp. As far as we can determine, there are no
icebreakers available--no heavy icebreakers available for
leasing right now. They would have to be constructed. If we
were to lease an icebreaker, I am sure that a company building
an icebreaker outside of the Government does not have to
contend with the same Federal acquisition rules that we have to
if we were to construct an icebreaker. It could probably be
done quicker.
Personally, I am ambivalent, in terms of how we get an
icebreaker for the Coast Guard. We have done the legal
research. If we lease an icebreaker, we can put a Coast Guard
crew on it and still have it as a U.S. vessel supporting U.S.
sovereignty. But they aren't available right now.
And the other challenge that we face is Federal acquisition
rules and A-11 requirements that score the money for leasing.
We would have to put up a significant amount of upfront money,
even with a lease, that we don't have room for within our
budget, currently.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. Regarding--am I on a clock, here? I don't
want to take a lot of time, but----
Mr. Young. I didn't put you on a clock, but I am about
ready to do that. So you go ahead, about two more questions,
and we will come back to you, OK?
Mr. Larsen. I will make them multipart questions, then.
Mr. Young. OK.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Larsen. With regards to the infrastructure side of the
Coast Guard's plan for high-latitude operations, you mentioned
in your testimony as an example, if you had to respond to a
disaster in the Arctic you would use onshore basing for fixed
wing and operations. But where would you--where would that be?
And what would be the response time?
Admiral Papp. Well, I can tell you right now that we are
already developing a plan--I have been briefed by the district
commander preliminary, we are going to be briefing the deputy
secretaries of Interior and Homeland Security next week. We
will base in Barrow. We have actually been able to find a
hangar where, from time to time, they will allow us to move our
helicopters in to do maintenance. But we don't have a permanent
hangar to put them in. But we have got a good, modern air strip
there with proper instrumentation. And we are accustomed to
flying in and out of Barrow, it is just that there is not much
infrastructure there, in terms of doing long-term support and
maintenance.
Additionally, as I--I have had that visit up there since I
last reported to you--we went in with a travel party of 12 and
couldn't find enough rooms to take care of us. We ended up
sleeping overnight in dorm rooms at the old DEW Line facility
that is there in Barrow.
So, to sustain a large presence during this season, we
would be up there. We are going to have to find some sort of
lodging for those on shore. But in reality, most of our plan is
based upon having ships up there. The ships have flight decks.
They have long endurance. They have got enough fuel to stay up
there. And most of our work will be done from afloat. That is
also where we have superior command and control capabilities,
communications, navigation, et cetera, on the cutters, both
icebreakers and High Endurance Cutters.
Mr. Larsen. And my final question would be with regards to
ships. Where would those be home-ported? Where would those
actually be?
Admiral Papp. Well, one of the ships is coming out of
Kodiak. That is its home port. The Alex Haley and--will deploy
Alex Haley up there for most of the summer. The other ships
that will go up there will probably come out of West Coast
ports. Bertholf, one of the new National Security Cutters, is
the other primary ship we will be using. That is in Alameda,
but will deploy, refuel either in Kodiak or Dutch Harbor, and
then deploy up there for probably a couple of months. We may
put one of our High Endurance--older High Endurance Cutters up
there from time to time, and we also will probably take a
couple of our 225-foot sea-going buoy tenders, which have
pretty good long-range sustainability, and have light
icebreaking capability.
Mr. Larsen. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. I thank the ranking member. Mr. Coble?
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, good to have
you and the Lieutenant Governor with us this morning.
Over the last decade, the issue of icebreaking capability
in the polar region has been studied, it seems, endlessly.
There has been a naval operations concept, the National
Research Council report, the U.S. Arctic Research Commission
report, a DHS inspector general report, a Coast Guard report to
the Congress, a high-altitude mission need analysis. And the
list goes on. Each one has come to the same conclusion, and
that is what is the--that the U.S. Coast Guard needs new Polar
Icebreakers.
Admiral, if you know, does the administration and the
Department support the need for new icebreakers?
Admiral Papp. I believe right now that I am getting
questions from the administration and from the Department which
indicate that they recognize that the need is developing for us
to have icebreaker capability up there. It hasn't gone much
beyond that.
I would agree with you. We have studied it a lot. They all
seem to come to the same conclusion. But I think because it is
such a large investment, we just haven't proceeded beyond that.
Mr. Coble. Thank you. Beyond the 2009 Presidential
directive on the Arctic, it seems to me there has been little
guidance from the administration on what the United States
should be doing in the Arctic. There have been several reports
and plans that mention a need for a presence there, but they
have all fallen short, it seems to me, of a concrete mission
statement for the Arctic.
And I guess my question is twofold. What will the
administration--when will the administration provide a plan for
the proper role of our Nation in the Arctic, and what should
the national presence be in the Arctic, and what should the
Coast Guard's presence be in the Arctic?
Admiral Papp. Sir, I have no timeline on an administration
plan for the Arctic. In the absence of that, I feel a strong
responsibility for Coast Guard equities that are involved up
there. And, as I said, in the short term, with the drillings
starting in the Chukchi Sea, we have had to come up with a plan
for Coast Guard operations up there for next summer. But it is
also coordinated with the Department of Interior, as well.
So, we are very hopeful that, between the Department of
Homeland Security and the Department of Interior, that we will
start with our short-term plans, in terms of how we are acting
up there, which will gain momentum into developing those long-
term plans.
And this has the support of Secretary Napolitano. I just
came from a meeting with her on Tuesday, informed her of the
progress we are making, and she is very interested in getting
the briefing after we do it to both the deputy secretaries for
Interior and Homeland Security.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Admiral. Gentlemen, let me ask you
this. Does it concern you that other Arctic nations, and even
some non-Arctic nations, such as China, are, I am told, years
ahead of the United States in terms of Arctic planning?
How do we best protect our sovereignty and national
interest in the Arctic?
Admiral Papp. Well, I would say, sir, a persistent presence
in the Arctic. First of all, another more strategic issue is
accession to the Law of the Sea Treaty, which gives us a venue
and standing with all the other Arctic countries that have
already signed on to that. We can make plans, we can map, we
can talk about what we think is our extended outer continental
shelf claim, which expands our exclusive economic zone. But
until we have the status or the standing of being part of that
convention, we cannot make legitimate claims.
So, in the absence of that, we have been sending Healy up
there to do mapping of the area. Healy provides a sovereign
presence in those waters. And, of course, as we start drilling
this next year, we will have an increased Coast Guard presence
up there asserting our sovereignty.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Admiral. Lieutenant Governor, you
want to weigh in on that, as well?
Mr. Treadwell. I think what I would like to say is we do
support Accession Law of the Sea. There is a provision in the
law of the sea, article 234, that allows us to help protect
against these itinerant vessels.
And besides the oil drilling that we fully support and we
hope will happen this summer, we just have to pay attention to
the fact that people are already shipping crude oil, iron ore,
gas condensate, aviation fuel, and other cargos right through
the Bering Strait. And if there is a spill, we don't--that is
not the American oil companies' responsibility. These are
cargos going from Norway to Japan, from Russia to Thailand,
from Russia to China. And this is happening right through this
narrow spot in the ocean.
And it helps us to have that capability of icebreakers to
protect our own interests. So there is the sovereign interest.
I am not too worried that somebody is going to take our land.
It is important that we do the mapping, but the sovereign
interest of being able to protect our shore and our coast line
is missed when we don't have that maritime capability.
Mr. Coble. I thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, I have got a
judiciary hearing I have got to attend. I will try to come
back.
Mr. Young. I thank the gentleman for his questions. Mr.
Landry?
Mr. Landry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, I find it
just fascinating, the comment you made speaking to Mr. Larsen,
in that--the comments that were made around that table from
other countries saying that there is a shortage of icebreakers.
And so, as a business owner and someone, you know, who
tries to live the American Dream, I recognize that we have an
opportunity, of course, if we help and promote our private
sector maritime industry, where we could be a leader in having
a private icebreaking fleet. So, you know, again it is an
interesting twist. Because it would be great to see those
countries and say, ``You know, Admiral, boy, I will tell you,
Americans just are making first class icebreakers and we would
like to lease from you all, as well.''
Do you agree that 10 icebreakers, based upon the 2010
``High Latitude Study,'' is what you all need, 6 heavy and 4
medium icebreakers? Do you agree with that?
Admiral Papp. Well, sir, we could certainly put those to
use. You would need that many to do a persistent presence--in
other words, keeping an icebreaker up in the Arctic at all
times of the year, and also having the ability to be down at
the Antarctic as well. The ``High Latitude Study'' looked at
that, and you are really looking at both those areas.
Mr. Landry. So--and of course I think we can all agree that
we probably, in the current fiscal condition we are in, would
never be able to appropriate the money to build 10. So would
you prefer to have 5 icebreakers you own, or 10 you lease?
Admiral Papp. I would have to think about that. That sounds
like an intriguing deal, but I am just not sure.
Mr. Landry. OK. I mean I think I know what the answer is,
but I appreciate it. I mean because I certainly would like you
to have what the study would recommend that we would have, and
that would be the maximum amount of vessels that we could put
up there.
I know that a recent Coast Guard study projected that the
cost--a cost of $859 million to design and construct a new
heavy icebreaker. Is that the total cost of the icebreaker?
Admiral Papp. Yes, sir.
Mr. Landry. So that would include the cost for regularly
scheduled overhauls?
Admiral Papp. No, that is the price for constructing the
icebreaker itself. And then you would have to put annual
budgetary authority and our operating expenses to then maintain
it and, of course, money for periodic overhaul.
Mr. Landry. And then, of course, eventual decommissioning
costs as well, I would assume.
Well, let me ask you this. If it is going to cost us $859
million to build 1 new heavy icebreaker, would the Coast Guard
be putting all of the cost of that build in the first year of
the appropriation, or would it spread it out in multiple years?
Admiral Papp. Sir, that is speculation. Because I would
make the case that this is something that should not be a
burden solely upon the Coast Guard budget. Icebreakers are used
across--to support across the Government operations----
Mr. Landry. And I agree with you as well, Admiral. I am
just trying to understand, from a budgetary perspective, how we
would attack this in recognizing how CBO would score it.
In other words, when you would make the request, regardless
of whether you would go to other agencies to put in their pot
of money, would we take that $859 million and just add that
into the first year, or would we try to spread it out, based
upon the construction time of the vessel?
Admiral Papp. No, you would start out with certain smaller
amounts of money to take you through the acquisition process,
in terms of design specifications and then down-select of
designs from multiple companies. And then you would not put the
bulk of that money in until you are ready--you have down-
selected and ready to start construction.
We are going----
Mr. Landry. Mr. Chairman, I find this fascinating, because
when we try to score the lease, the CBO puts it all up in the
first year. And so we are not comparing--we are not able to
compare apples to apples. It is like an apple to an orange. I
mean the admiral just said--and I think he is right--in that if
we would budget a new heavy icebreaker, they would spread the
cost of that appropriation over a time period. But yet, when we
try to score the leasing, CBO puts the entire lease for the 20
years in--and penalizes us in that first year----
Admiral Papp. I need to clarify that, sir. Because, I mean,
what we are required to do is there is certain money for
design, but once you start construction--in fact, we are going
through this now with the National Security Cutter--one of the
challenges we find in terms of trying to fit the National
Security Cutter in our budget is that OMB, under the
requirements of A-11, requires us to put long lead materials,
construction costs, and then post-construction costs all in the
same budget year, whereas in the past we might be able to put
long lead materials in a given year and then follow-on
construction costs.
And following strict A-11 guidance has required us to put
all that money in 1 year. Hence, the reason they do it with
leases, in terms of scoring upfront, as well.
Mr. Landry. Right. But I still don't think it is an apples-
to-apples example. I mean at the end of the day, the Federal
Government is not going to outlay the entire cost of the lease
in 1 year.
And the problem we have up here--and, look, Admiral, it is
our problem, and it is not your fault--this Federal Government
doesn't understand cash flow. You know, and that is my point,
is that we are being penalized, and we are not able to truly
assess a lease-versus-build option. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. I thank the gentleman. And, you know, Admiral, I
don't know whether you should do it or whether we should do it,
but somebody should be able to lay out a plan. Which is more
economical, owning, maintaining, manning a ship by the Coast
Guard after going through all the other Federal requirements,
or leasing from a company that would build the appropriate
vessel that you put the covenants in?
And I think there has to be a plan. Maybe we should do it.
You know, I hear these different stories. I don't know whether
leasing is cheaper. But I do know they don't have to go through
the programs that you have to go through, under the Federal
laws. It may be cheaper. Is maintenance cheaper? Maybe.
Probably. So that is the answer we get. Because what we want
are the vessels in the Arctic. And I hope that you would be
working with us so we can come down with a program.
And, you know, I appreciate your support for the completion
of the eight National Security Cutters. You know, the criteria
included in the recently House-passed Coast Guard bill set by
the Coast Guard when funds now more than $3 billion are
requested to acquire the National Security Cutters. It is truly
unfortunate the Coast Guard now feels meeting its own
requirements are disruptive. Now that is sort of strange to me.
I am not being hostile. I--we use those in that bill. Now they
are disruptive? Why?
Admiral Papp. Well, for instance, sir, one of the things is
demonstrating 225 days underway. In order to do 225 days
underway, we need to do a multiple crewing concept, which--we
don't have the money right now to buy the additional crew, nor
do we have the--all the ships online yet. I mean we just have
three. The third has been delivered. And we are operating them
and testing them. When you have the full build-out, and you
have the additional crews to be able to do the crew rotation
and swap, you can get to those extra days.
I think one of the other provisions was demonstrating UAV
capability. We are continuing to do that, but the Coast Guard
can't afford to do that all on our own, because what we need is
the support of Navy, which is developing unmanned systems. And
we are leveraging off them spending the money and doing the
testing. And, in fact, this next summer we will be testing one
of their smaller systems.
Mr. Young. Well, Admiral, all I can say is those
recommendations came from your department. They are not--we
didn't make those up. And either they were given to us
accidentally or inappropriately, but you know, I would like to
see you follow through and if you tell us why--I guess you just
did, to some degree--why you can't do it.
You mentioned another thing that interested me, where you
would be staging--the areas. And you mentioned Kodiak. I
believe that is where the Healy is, is that correct?
Admiral Papp. That is where the Alex Haley is.
Mr. Young. Alex Haley. I sponsored language in the last
bill about your study and the look at locations that are ice
free or nearly ice free that would serve as year-round bases
for the vessels and aircraft to support operation in the Arctic
region. While I recognize it is important to have base
facilities in the far north, that is awful shallow water, as
you know. That is going to be our biggest challenge.
But are you looking into any other bases, other than
Kodiak? Are you looking at the--any of the islands, or Nome, or
Platinum, or anything like that, or are you just settled now on
Barrow?
Admiral Papp. Well, Barrow is the place that we are looking
at that has probably the most--the best infrastructure that is
in existence for the shore side of what we are doing.
Mr. Young. What I am leading up to, Admiral, is when you
say there is going to be vessels stationed in the lower 48,
that bothers me. And I am not being selfish about this, but
this is an Arctic region, not Hawaii or not San Diego, or not
San Francisco, or not Seattle.
Mr. Larsen. Nothing in Seattle.
Mr. Young. Nothing in Seattle.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Young. But, you know, just--I mean have you--are you
looking at other areas for basing?
Admiral Papp. No, sir. As a matter of fact, we are going to
have fewer ships to base, and we will need fewer ports.
But you know, the history of us going into Alaska, even in
our days as the Revenue Cutter Service, when Alaska was a
territory, we have always had bases primarily in Seattle, where
we deployed the ships from.
Mr. Young. Well, you know why that was. Be very careful.
You know why that was. Because Alaska was a--you know, a
foreign territory, and all the money was in Seattle. And that
is where the pressure went.
Now, I am just suggesting respectfully, because we have the
largest Coast Guard operation in the United States in Alaska.
But if you are going to station vessels like the Gates and
those things, they ought to be stationed in Alaska, not down in
the lower 48. It saves fuel. Housing can be a problem, we can
solve that problem. I want to talk to Mr. Treadwell about that
a little later. But keep that in mind.
And if I can go back to the concept of the cutters again,
we are talking about the cutters, all the time about the
cutters. Are we planning enough other support, infrastructure?
Is there a plan? Have you got a plan about what we need up
there, other than the cutters?
Admiral Papp. Well, yes, sir. We don't have a plan right
now, but what we are doing is we have been evaluating the last
4 years, and going up there and testing our equipment that we
currently have and looking at the locations. We have exercised
out of Barrow, out of Kotzebue, and out of Nome, to look at
those three locations.
Mr. Young. Have you looked at St. George and St. Paul?
Admiral Papp. Well, we operate out of there from time to
time. As you probably know, when we get into the crabbing
season and the fishing season, we forward deploy helicopters
and C-130s first of all to Cold Bay and then up to St. Paul.
And what we are looking at is just actually an extension of
what we have done in the past, except this year we will take
those aircraft and move them further north, up to Barrow, to
operate during the----
Mr. Young. What about docking ships in either one of those
areas? They are the only ice-free areas in the Arctic that I
know of.
Admiral Papp. Well, therein lies the challenge. And I am
trying to answer your question on basing up there. Kodiak has
limited capacity.
I started my career up there. I was stationed on a ship out
at Adak. I lived at Adak for 2 years. And of course Adak is
closed down now. You can go in there and occasionally get fuel.
If we go back to the Revenue Cutter Service days, we based
out of Dutch Harbor. And I have been into Dutch Harbor many
times. And there is, in fact, where Shell is going to muster
all its forces before they start to proceed up to the Chukchi.
We will be there. We will refuel in Dutch Harbor, as we have
probably for over 100 years, and then proceed up north towards
the Arctic.
Nome is the only one, in my estimation, that has potential
right now. I know since my days of sailing around the Bering
Sea they have finally built a pier there. But the pier--I think
the depth of the pier was only about 22 feet of water, which
doesn't accommodate a lot.
Mr. Young. That is a problem. And looking at the--I believe
it is Platinum, or down in that area, there is a deep harbor
there, but it is quite a ways out. See, I am trying to get you
closer to the Arctic.
Admiral Papp. Right.
Mr. Young. And, you know, that saves fuel and it saves
response time which is, I think, crucial.
Admiral Papp. Right.
Mr. Young. And we will get back on this icebreaker thing,
because I am not--I am trying to figure out a way that shows
the tax payer which is the best way to put those icebreakers in
the Arctic. You know, Russia has got, I think, five atomic-
driven icebreakers. I know they have got one big one. And that
is crucially important, to make sure that works.
But Mr. Treadwell, you mentioned what the State is doing,
all the good things. Why don't you propose to the Governor that
we buy those two decommissioned icebreakers and refurbish them,
and then we will lease them back to the Coast Guard?
Mr. Treadwell. As I said in my testimony, Mr. Chairman,
that suggestion has been made. It was yesterday with Senator
Lesil McGuire, who published an op ed piece on this, and is
going to be sending the committee a letter suggesting the State
get involved in financing the icebreakers, as well as the port
efforts.
At this point we have told--and when the commandant and I
last met and the Governor and he last met, we talked about ways
the State can support forward basing. And we are putting money
and lots of effort into this western Alaska port study, to
understand where we have got deepwater capability, where we
might focus on having ports.
And obviously a capability would be a harbor refuge for
this international shipping coming by, as well as supporting
oil field development and fisheries. Some of the fisheries,
fleets are moving north from Seattle. And any Coast Guard
vessels are all part of that calculus.
Mr. Young. Well, instead of getting those decommissioned
vessels, maybe we just ought to have the State contract to
build two big new icebreakers. And Admiral Papp, you would be
more than willing to lease from the only Arctic nation or only
Arctic State, from the State of Alaska, to do the work for you
up there, and then you would have your icebreakers. And the
solution would be solved, we don't have to get it out of the
Congress, and we would have a little control over our own
destiny. I want you to start thinking about that. It is outside
the box.
Mr. Larsen, you have some more questions?
Mr. Larsen. My first one is for the chairman. What do you
have against the Pacific Northwest?
Mr. Young. I have nothing against it, but we were treated
as a colony for so long, and we are finally getting control of
our fisheries. Now we want to be in control of the Arctic. I
think that is important.
Mr. Larsen. Well, we can--one day--when we get this solved,
we can actually have a debate about where things--let's be sure
we get things built, then we can debate about where they go.
Actually, the chairman's questions about infrastructure and
where things go and what kind of support infrastructure is
necessary is important. But what I am gathering, Admiral, is
that we are still notional. We are not in a position where the
Coast Guard is ready to put anything into an 2013 or an 2014
request. Is that about right?
Admiral Papp. That is right, because we already have a
number of acquisition projects that we are working that we are
having a lot of difficulty fitting within the limits of the
budget right now. So adding new assets for emerging needs is a
real challenge for us to accomplish.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. Is there--I think from my perspective--and
the chairman is sort of getting at this--but from my
perspective, sort of getting an idea of what that looks like
for--you know, what would a deployed--what would the footprint
look like? What would the infrastructure look like? What would
it be?
Not so much on the map, but to kind of--what is it that you
need that would be specific to this set of missions in the
Arctic? Having that in a more organized form would be helpful
to me so that I can envision it better----
Admiral Papp. Right.
Mr. Larsen [continuing]. And then maybe be able to act on
it.
Admiral Papp. Well, we still have a winter season up there
where it is iced in, and there will be little to no commercial
activity going on.
Mr. Larsen. Right.
Admiral Papp. So I am reluctant to put a permanent
footprint--I don't have the room within my budget to
appropriate a permanent footprint up there. So, in the absence
of that, we do what we have done in numerous areas for many
years, is the strength of the Coast Guard is having substantial
ships with good command and control capabilities that can stay
out there in a sustained basis, which we have been doing in the
Alaska territory and in the State of Alaska, in the Bering Sea,
in the Arctic for well over 100 years.
Yes, they deploy from down south. But that is because
sometimes we need them to do other jobs, as well. And we have
been now--for 45 years we have had 12 High Endurance Cutters
that we could call upon to get this job done.
In the current limits of the budget and the projects that
we have got going on, they are going to be replaced by eight
ships. And operating in the Bering Sea isn't the only
responsibility I have. I have worldwide responsibilities for
those ships. And with fewer of them it becomes more difficult.
But those are what we need right now, because we are not
going to be able to do a year-round presence up there. So what
we need is icebreakers, which will get up there at the
beginning of the season, when the ice starts breaking up, and
then it can come back in there as the ice starts forming again.
But during the summer months, when there is going to be
this increase of activity, either because of ships coming
through the North Sea route or the drilling that is going on,
we need substantial ships that have the command and control
capabilities, that can do search and rescue, that can launch
and recover helicopters, that have substantial fuel reserves so
they can stay up there on a sustained basis. And that is what
the National Security Cutter provides for us.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. Lieutenant Governor Treadwell, I want to
be careful about getting into Alaska's business.
Mr. Treadwell. Sure, good idea.
Mr. Larsen. As much as I don't appreciate folks getting
into Washington State's business.
However, this gets at the chairman's questions. Has
Alaska--have you all done--walked through sort of what your
vision of that footprint might look like? You talk about the
western Alaska port study and so on and kind of where you all
would fit into this picture as a State and----
Mr. Treadwell. Yes. To respond, a couple things. First off,
we did push and we are working with the Corps of Engineers on
the western Alaska port study right now. But as you heard in my
testimony, we put a lot of stock in what you told the Committee
on Marine Transportation Services----
Mr. Larsen. Sure.
Mr. Treadwell [continuing]. To do last year. And I went and
met with the leadership of that group and said, ``You have got
to be much more ambitious.''
And the disconnect here is that I will sit here, and we are
wondering whether or not we can eke one icebreaker out of
this----
Mr. Larsen. Right.
Mr. Treadwell [continuing]. When I have been in Russia, I
have been in China, I sit down with the Arctic nations, as I
did with Secretary Clinton in May, and you know, we brought all
eight nations together to do this Arctic marine shipping
report. This report said that there is an Arctic-wide
infrastructure that needs to be done. There is a project
pending at the Arctic Council on that now.
And, you know, 10 percent of Alaska's workforce services
the airplanes that carry most of the air cargo between Asia and
Europe, between Asia and North America. A ship landing with
cargo from China in your district may have stopped for fuel in
our district.
Mr. Larsen. Right.
Mr. Treadwell. And the point of it is we may be ending up
playing that global role on global shipping, as we take a look
at that. And that is where we have been hoping that the Federal
Government would look at the whole picture.
And when the ``High Latitude Study''--which I only learned
this morning was fully available--says that you need 10
icebreakers, part of it is we need to think about our role in
commerce. Last year you not only told CMTS to think about the
big picture, but you also told him that he has a mandate to--
you took Franklin Roosevelt's Executive order and you put it in
the law.
And you hear from the Great Lakes folks all the time how
important icebreaking is to commerce there. They shut down for
the first 3 months of the year, usually. We have got a
situation where from the middle of the summer through the first
month of the year you are going to have Arctic commerce for the
decades to come, at least. And we think it is important to have
that presence.
I should say one other thing about Washington versus
Alaska. A lot of these ships that are transiting the Bering
Strait have been for many years--start in Seattle.
Mr. Larsen. Yes.
Mr. Treadwell. Bring goods to--there have been times when
you've seen tugs and barges or heavy draft ships leaving ports
in Washington State, going through the Bering Strait to serve
markets in Russia, Alaska, or Canada.
Mr. Larsen. I was just going to note. It is a lot more of
Washington and Alaska, as opposed to Washington versus Alaska.
Mr. Treadwell. Yes, sir----
Mr. Young. No, you don't understand. It is not versus. We
just want to be treated, you know, like part of the United
States, not as a colony any more, you know.
Mr. Treadwell. Well, you know, just to add one more thing,
and it can--the discussions I have had with the chairman. You
know, if you were trying to expand the Panama Canal $1 billion,
the price of one of these icebreakers, $859 million, would
barely move a mile of dirt. And yet you have got something
happening here at the beginning of this century which is as
significant for global commerce as what happened at the
beginning of the last century, with this waterway opening up.
And we have to think----
Mr. Young. I am going to ask one question and go to Mr.
Landry.
Admiral, you have been speaking about the Arctic. What is
your feeling about the Shell activity, as far as in the
Chukchi, and the Beaufort, as far as oil spill response, the
availability of ships? What is going on up there, as far as you
know, as a Coast Guard involver?
Admiral Papp. Well, I was very interested in that. In fact,
I went to Shell headquarters in Anchorage, while I was up
there. And they gave me a very thorough briefing on their
plans. And I have to tell you I was impressed. Last time I--we
had the hearing on the Arctic, I was concerned because I had
not seen Shell's plans. I know what we had available. But I am
feeling much more comfortable, now that we have come up with
our operation plan for next summer. And I have had a chance to
view Shell's plans, as well.
And once again, I have taken a superficial look at them,
but the 17th District Commander, Admiral Ostebo, has reviewed
it thorough with his staff. And we have been providing our
input to the Department of Interior, who will approve their
response plans.
But they truly did their homework, I believe. And I think
they are going to be well prepared for next summer.
Mr. Young. Now, they have purchased or leased vessels, or--
what kind of vessel support are they going to have?
Admiral Papp. Well, I know--in fact, I got an article
yesterday about one of the--one of their icebreakers happens to
be being built in Louisiana, surprisingly enough.
But it--I saw the plans for them when I was up in
Anchorage, and so I was interested in seeing this article
yesterday that popped up. It is actually probably about as
capable for breaking ice as Healy is. Doesn't have the
scientific capabilities that Healy does, because when we build
an icebreaker it has got to serve multiple communities and
departments and responsibilities, but----
Mr. Young. Is that the Nanuq?
Admiral Papp. Actually, this one they said is unnamed. They
are going to use a competition of Alaska school children to
come up with a name for the vessel.
Mr. Young. OK. But are those anchor ships or are they drill
ships or are they oil spill ships? What are they?
Admiral Papp. They are oil spill response fleet and it is
icebreaker capable, and also set so--it can set the anchors for
the platform.
Mr. Young. It is really an anchor ship is what I--sets the
anchors for the drill rigs and----
Admiral Papp. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young [continuing]. Everything else. I was just curious
what you thought of it, because that is very important to the
State of Alaska and this Nation.
Admiral Papp. Well, my expectations were low when I went to
Anchorage, and I was very impressed, coming away from
Anchorage, when I spoke to Shell.
Mr. Young. Mr. Treadwell, you got any comments on that same
line?
Mr. Treadwell. I have reviewed what Shell is doing in a
cursory manner. I have also looked at the Coast Guard's plans
for next summer. I think we are well prepared for a drilling
season next summer.
Mr. Young. Good.
Mr. Treadwell. The issue of the ships, the company that is
building these ships for Shell has visited with me and other
State officials, and that is why you heard us say in our
testimony that we think the leasing option should be
considered. We don't have a way to judge the relative cost. But
if it--on the face of it, it seems like it may be a way to get
us the capability that the admiral needs.
Mr. Young. Mr. Landry, excuse me.
Mr. Landry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We would love to build
you an icebreaker, but I would much rather you lease it--in
Louisiana.
Admiral, what is it that--I mean other than--do you just
believe that going on a leasing option is a slippery slope for
you all?
Admiral Papp. I don't know how to characterize it. We have
looked at various business case scenarios, each and every time.
Looking at--once again, from our normal perspective, Coast
Guard perspective, which has been owning ships forever--and
generally we keep ships 30 to 40 years or beyond--there is a
point where leasing becomes more expensive. It is out at about
the 20- to 25-year timeline. I just don't have the experience
with leasing to be able to give you a good opinion on it.
And once again, I am ambivalent. We just need the
icebreaking capability. I think it is for people who can do the
analysis, the proper analysis. But they also have to take into
account the capabilities required, and we need to get about the
business of determining the exact capabilities that we need,
which would take into account National Science Foundation
requirements, Coast Guard requirements, the requirements to
break into McMurdo, to come up with a capable-enough ship.
Mr. Landry. Well, are those the requirements that they are
mandating on the vessels that they are leasing from foreign
sources right now?
Admiral Papp. I have not--the Coast Guard has not been
involved with their leasing process for other countries.
Presumably, and as I understand it, what they are doing is they
are looking at a ship that is capable enough----
Mr. Landry. To break the ice.
Admiral Papp [continuing]. Breaking in. But that was only
because they were hiring it to break out for the resupply of
McMurdo. Clearly, they--when they were doing science
deployments in the Arctic, Healy has been perfect for them. In
fact, I visited Healy while I was up in my Alaska visit, and
National Science Foundation was aboard. They love that ship, in
terms of its accommodations, its labs, et cetera, that were
built pretty much to their specifications.
Mr. Landry. Now the U.S. Navy leases vessels that are not
involved directly in combat activities. Do you envision these
icebreakers playing a direct combat role in the missions that
you all have up there?
Admiral Papp. Oh, it could, potentially, depending--I mean
I don't foresee a scenario right now where we are going to be
war-fighting in the Arctic. But who knows what--it is an
uncertain future.
Mr. Landry. But would you be designing those vessels in a
design that would implement them into that combat role?
Admiral Papp. Well, we would prefer to have a design that
would accommodate a combat role, and that would be up to our
manning standards, fire-fighting damage control standards that
we expect on all our Coast Guard cutters.
Mr. Landry. And so that is what I am trying to understand.
I mean I still think--you know, it is just--look. If Shell
is leasing their icebreakers and their vessels, and all of the
majors lease the vessels that they utilize in their maritime
offshore--in their offshore operations, and we certainly know
that those majors are perfectly capable of owning and fleeting
their own vessels--and they did at one time, actually, a long,
long time ago they used to do that, and then they got away from
it--I just think that when you look at--from a holistic
standpoint, when you look at it and say, ``OK, the cost of
construction, the cost of design, the timeframe involved, the
maintenance''--because if you blow a rod on a leased vessel, it
is not--you don't have to come back to us to appropriate that
amount. You don't have to decommission it.
In fact, the other thing is that if you lease it on a 20-
year lease, or a 20-, 25-year lease span, that means you get a
newer, up to dated, more sophisticated icebreaker after that
timeframe, where before, here we are--example in case with the
Polar Star and the Polar Sea--in that we have got to patch up a
much older ship. And so, instead of looking at it in a 30- or
40-year lifespan, we could actually get you two icebreakers you
could utilize over that lifespan, if we lease it.
So, again, I only say that just to--for food for thought.
Admiral Papp. Well, as I said, sir, I am truly ambivalent
to this, except from what experience I do have.
Now, two points. Yes, the Navy leases some ships, but we
have got a Navy that has well over 300 ships. So if they lose a
leased vessel or if something is pulled back or something
happens, they have plenty of other ships they can fall back
upon. Right now all I am falling back on is the Coast Guard
cutter Healy. And it feels good to know that we own that and
that is our ship for 30 or 40 years, and we can rely upon it.
In terms of leasing, my personal experience is I lease one
of my two cars. And I pay a lot of money leasing my car, but at
the end of the lease period I have no car and I have spent a
lot of money. So I don't know if that is directly applicable to
ships as well. But right now I have got--half my garage is
empty, because I just turned one in. And I----
Mr. Landry. But you are getting ready to get a brand new
one, I am sure. I don't think you are going to stay as a one-
car garage.
Admiral Papp. I was really considering buying the next car,
sir.
Mr. Young. Now we are going to ships and cars. It is time
to cut this off.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Young. Mr. Cravaack?
Mr. Cravaack. Can I change it to trains now?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Cravaack. Well, first off, Admiral, thank you for all
the great men and women in the United States Coast Guard. I
apologize for being late, I was in another committee meeting.
But all the great things that the Coast Guard do on a daily
basis that none of us know about. So thank you to the United
States Coast Guard.
And as our strategic interests increase in the Arctic
region, so must the responsibilities of the United States Coast
Guard, as well. And I find it difficult to understand the
wealthiest Nation in the world relying on one single vessel to
do icebreaking up in the Arctic. Hopefully the Polar Star will
be able to be reconditioned to a satisfactory point where we
will be able to engage that as well.
But I truly believe in your mission. And being a Navy guy,
I understand about maintaining our own vessels. And my--one of
my questions I had when we were--my colleague here--when you
are leasing a vessel, say for example an icebreaker, can you
take that into a war zone?
Admiral Papp. Yes, sir. We have looked through the legal
considerations on this. As long as we have a Coast Guard crew--
in fact, you can even make a mixed crew of civilians and Coast
Guard people. But as long as it is commanded by a commissioned
officer, you can assert sovereignty, you can take it into war
zones. And, in fact, the Navy does that, as well.
Mr. Cravaack. OK. That is a--I wasn't aware of that.
But I am with you. I think it should be our vessel and
manned by our crews, and with--flying a United States flag that
is a Navy vessel, so--or a Coast Guard vessel. So I am with you
on that point.
And I would just like to support--undying support for the
United States Coast Guard and their mission and what they do,
and I think we should give them the resources they need to
complete their mission.
So, with that, I yield back.
Mr. Young. I thank the gentleman. And I don't have a
question, but I have been informed that Nanuq is a 4,500 gross
ton vessel, and it stands offshore for 25 miles. The Aiviq--
called ``the Walrus''--is an anchor hammer, platform supply,
search and rescue, ice management, and supplemental search and
rescue unit, and weighs 8,500 gross tons, and it stays up there
all season in the ice. So I just want to get that straight.
I want to thank the admiral and thank you, Lieutenant
Governor. We are going to try to solve this problem with the
help of everybody cooperating, and making sure the Arctic is
recognized. And we might come up with a--I call it an Arctic
policy for solving these problems.
I happen to agree with both the ranking member and Mr.
Landry on the necessity of this. Because if we are just sitting
still, all the rest of the countries are all actively involved,
it is not good for us. And I think we ought to see the big
picture. This is equal to sending a man to the moon, probably
more important. That was more exciting, but this is more
important to the future of the Nation.
Thanks to both of you for being before the committee. You
are dismissed.
Next panel. Dr. Kelly Falkner, deputy director, office of
polar programs, National Science Foundation; Mr. Stephen
Caldwell, director of homeland security and justice, Government
Accountability Office; Mr. Dave Whitcomb, chief operating
officer of Vigor Industrial on behalf of the Shipbuilders
Council of America; and Rear Admiral Jeffrey Garrett, United
States Coast Guard (retired).
And we will go down the line as we were introduced. Dr.
Falkner, as soon as you take your seat, we will get busy. That
is a good idea. Doctor?
TESTIMONY OF DR. KELLY FALKNER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
POLAR PROGRAMS, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION; STEPHEN L.
CALDWELL, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; DAVE WHITCOMB, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER,
VIGOR INDUSTRIAL, ON BEHALF OF THE SHIPBUILDERS COUNCIL OF
AMERICA; AND REAR ADMIRAL JEFFREY M. GARRETT, UNITED STATES
COAST GUARD (RETIRED)
Dr. Falkner. Chairman, Ranking Member Larsen, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, I appreciate this
opportunity to discuss how the National Science Foundation is
meeting its icebreaking needs for research in the Arctic, as
well as for research and operations in the U.S. Antarctic
program that NSF coordinates on behalf of the U.S. Government.
To promote scientific progress, NSF bears a critical
responsibility for providing scientists with access to the
oceans. And, in particular, to the polar oceans. These waters
comprise only 10 percent of the global ocean area, but have a
disproportionate influence on our climate. In recent decades,
the polar oceans have undergone wide-ranging physical,
chemical, and biological changes, which scientists are eager to
study. Moreover, they are among the least-explored parts of our
planet and are ripe for new discoveries.
My oral testimony will focus on the needs of the U.S.
research community for polar ocean access from NSF's
perspective. I will then offer brief comments on the recently
passed House version of the U.S. Coast Guard's authorization
bill, H.R. 2838.
Mr. Chairman, ice capable research platforms are essential
to keeping the U.S. at the forefront of polar research. A
number of nations have recently constructed--as you have heard
this morning already--or are in the process of constructing new
ice capable ships. Absent the U.S. Polar Class Icebreakers,
only Russia currently has the heavy icebreaking capability to
access the Arctic Ocean in winter. Only Russia and Sweden
currently have proven capability to provide access for resupply
of two of our Nation's three year-round Antarctic research
stations.
NSF is providing funding for the Sikuliaq, a light-duty
icebreaker that will launch in 2014. This vessel will be used
to study the vital ecosystems and ocean processes in the
resource-rich waters of the Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea. The
only other U.S. Government-owned research icebreaker is the
U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy, a 12-year-old vessel that can
routinely operate in ice up to about 5 feet thick, and on which
we sponsor Arctic marine research.
For ice capable platforms in the southern ocean, NSF-
supported scientists rely on two leased vessels, Nathaniel B.
Palmer, and the Lawrence M. Gould, both owned by Edison Chouest
Offshore. These U.S. research ships cannot reach some
scientifically important areas in the ice on their own. Joint
expeditions with the Swedish heavy icebreaker Oden allowed this
access in recent times. However, earlier this year Sweden
concluded that it needed Oden at home. Our only domestic
alternative would require the Coast Guard to redeploy Healy
from the Arctic, where it is in heavy demand by scientists. My
Coast Guard colleagues can speak more knowledgeably about how
an Antarctic redeployment of Healy would affect their missions.
So, as you can see, NSF relies on icebreakers to keep us
active at the frontiers of polar marine research. NSF also
relies on heavy icebreakers to maintain a viable Antarctic
research program for the Nation. As articulated in Presidential
Memorandum 664, and subsequently reaffirmed in a series of
Presidential decision directives, U.S. policy calls for year-
round U.S. presence at three research stations in Antarctica.
Maintaining this presence is essential to U.S. geopolitical,
diplomatic, and scientific interests. Our presence also ensures
the U.S. a leading role in governance through the Antarctic
Treaty. NSF support is relied upon by other Federal science
agencies to carry out Antarctic research.
For many years, the U.S. Coast Guard annually opened a
vital supply channel in the sea ice to McMurdo Station, which
serves as NSF's logistics hub. Without resupply, both McMurdo
and South Pole Station would have to close. When the Polar Star
and Polar Sea approached the end of their design lives, NSF
began contracting for support from other countries. Our current
contract with Russia's Murmansk shipping company will continue
for 3 years. But as you might imagine, Mr. Chairman, NSF would
prefer to rely on U.S. assets for such a vital mission.
Thus, NSF was disappointed to learn that the House-passed
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2011 called for
decommissioning of Polar Star within 3 years. We have been
hoping that Polar Star would be available for 7 to 10 years for
icebreaking services, once the ongoing renovations were
completed.
So, Mr. Chairman, committee members, U.S. researchers have
led the world in polar science. I refer you to my written
statement that highlights polar marine science objectives of
global relevance.
U.S. scientific preeminence can only continue with
appropriate research and logistical support. NSF will continue
to work with the Coast Guard and other Government agencies to
develop a longer term solution to the Nation's icebreaker
needs.
Thank you for your time.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Doctor. Stephen Caldwell.
Mr. Caldwell. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Larsen, other
members of the committee, thank you for having GAO up here to
talk about Coast Guard Arctic operations.
My statement today is based on a report we did in September
2010 with recent updates. There will be three areas of focus.
First will be Coast Guard efforts to determine the
requirements, second about icebreakers, and then third about
interagency coordination.
Our 2010 report described a lot of activities the Coast
Guard had to identify its requirements. These included
deploying assets up to the Arctic. It also included seasonal
forward operating locations, which we have already talked
about. Then, after the publication of our report, the ``High
Latitude Study'' was released. The ``High Latitude Study'' had
much more details, in terms of Coast Guard's options and plans
for the future. This study is contractor-written, the Coast
Guard has not necessarily made decisions on which options are
best.
In my written statement, in appendix two and three, we
summarize some of the key points of the ``High Latitude
Study.'' The ``High Latitude Study'' identified some of the
most important missions in the Arctic, and which ones were most
impacted by some of the deficiencies and gaps in Coast Guard
capabilities.
The study then looked at a variety of force mixes. It
looked at a current baseline, as well as six different force
mixes, and looked at the ability of those force mixes to
actually reduce risk in the Arctic. And it also looked at some
of the costs associated with those different force mixes.
Regarding icebreakers, there has been three recent studies
to look at the icebreakers, including the ``High Latitude
Study.'' There was also a recent Coast Guard icebreaker
recapitalization report, again done by a contractor. And it has
already been mentioned there was a DHS IG report last year on
icebreakers.
All three of these reports discuss the current state of
Polar Icebreakers. Only one of our three Polar Icebreakers is
currently operational. The two contractor studies, both the
recapitalization report and the ``High Latitude Study,'' called
for new icebreakers to be built, with options ranging from 2
new icebreakers, heavy class, up to 10 new icebreakers, with 6
of those being heavy class, and 4 of those being the medium
class, which would be needed to meet the complete suite of U.S.
Government requirements, including those of the Department of
Defense.
Obviously, new icebreakers will cost a lot of money. Even a
single icebreaker currently doesn't fit within the Coast Guard
budget framework, as we have talked about. The estimated cost
of some of the options I have talked about from the 2 to 10
icebreakers, range from $2 billion to $7 billion.
For a number of years, GAO has been helping this committee
and other committees look at Coast Guard's funding for
acquisitions, including the Deepwater Program, and talked about
how those programs are really crowding out some of the other
important acquisition needs, as well as polar and domestic
icebreaking.
The recapitalization report that was recently done came to
the same conclusion, that the funding was not available within
Coast Guard's budget, and made some other suggestions, such as
having DOD fund the new icebreakers. That is how the most
recent icebreaker, the Healy, was funded, out of the Department
of Defense's U.S. Navy shipbuilding budget.
Regarding interagency coordination, our 2010 report had
quite a lot of detail on Coast Guard efforts to coordinate with
not only other Federal agencies, but the State, local, private
sector, native groups, as well as the international
organizations. Our assessment was generally pretty positive on
the level of that coordination.
Since publication of that report, Coast Guard is in a new
coordination effort with the Navy. This is called the
Capabilities Assessment Working Group. And this group is
looking at for both the Navy and the Coast Guard together, what
are some of their short-term investment priorities. That group
is planning to put a white paper out later this year.
As part of other work we are doing for the Armed Services
Committee, we are looking more at that group, and we will
report on that early next year.
And, in closing, I will be happy to respond to any
questions. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Caldwell. Mr. Whitcomb.
Mr. Whitcomb. Chairman Young, Ranking Member Larsen,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, my name is Dave
Whitcomb, I am the chief operating officer at Vigor Industrial,
the largest private sector construction, repair, and
maintenance company in the Pacific Northwest.
Through top Pacific shipyards in Seattle which Vigor
acquired earlier this year, our shipyards have been closely
involved with the maintenance and repair of the Coast Guard
icebreakers Polar Star and Polar Sea, since they were
commissioned in the late 1970s. We have also maintained the
medium Coast Guard cutter icebreaker, The Healy. In my
testimony today I want to describe the condition of the
existing ships, what can be done economically to ensure that
those assets continue to perform their missions, and what the
alternative of constructing new heavy Polar Icebreakers would
entail and cost.
Let me begin with the single most important point of my
testimony: the hulls and frames of the Polar Star and the Polar
Sea are perfectly sound and capable of continuing to perform
icebreaking for the foreseeable future.
To fully appreciate why this matters, and what the unique
value of these ships truly is, it helps to understand what goes
into building them. The internal frames of the ships are
comparable to the studs or the girders on a building. On the
Polar Sea and the Polar Star the frames of the vessel are about
16 inches apart. On a National Security Cutter--let me back up.
Those are--they are 30 inches deep, they have a 4-inch face
frame at the top of the frame, and that leaves an effective
space between them of 12 inches. By comparison, a National
Security Cutter spacing of the frames is 27 inches in the
extreme bow of the vessel, and 49 inches in the rest of the
ship. It gives you an idea of the difference in the build of
the two vessels.
On the Polar Sea and the Polar Star, the steel plating in
the ice belt of the hull is 1\3/4\ inches thick, compared to
\5/16\ and \3/8\ inches thick on a National Security Cutter. I
have two pieces of steel that I would like to pass forward to
the committee afterwards, to give you an idea of the difference
of those two vessels.
Consider what it takes to fabricate and bend steel that is
1\3/4\ inches thick. Also consider that to weld the framing to
the hull plating, the steel plating has to be heated to high
temperatures, then highly skilled welders have to go in to
those heated and confined spaces and weld that steel together.
It is arduous, difficult, and expensive work. Indeed, on the
initial build at Lockheed, some of the most experienced workers
simply walked off the job because the conditions were so
challenging.
What all this means is that it is extremely expensive and
demanding to build heavy Polar Icebreakers, something our
Nation has not done now for more than 30 years. That is why the
existing ships are unique and hard to replace.
I want to emphasize that we do believe there is a need to
build new heavy icebreakers, and we urge the Congress and the
administration to work together to quickly authorize and fund
such a project. This position is also held by the Shipbuilders
Council of America, which represents more than 50 companies and
120 shipyards across America.
But as members of this committee can appreciate, if even
the Congress immediately began the process of authorizing and
funding new heavy icebreakers, fully functioning replacements
would not likely be mission ready for 10 years or longer. What
is more, realistic estimates indicate that the cost of a new
heavy icebreaker would likely be at least $1 billion.
Until Congress and the administration provide for such
funding, and the replacements are actually in the water, we
must have the capability to complete the vital missions of our
Polar Icebreakers--that our Polar Icebreakers have performed
for decades.
The good news is that the Coast Guard cutter, Polar Star,
is now nearing completion of its reactivation, which will
prepare it to function effectively for at least a decade or
more, assuming regular maintenance. The other good news is that
the Polar Sea also can be restored to full mission readiness
with a comparable longevity at relatively modest cost, and in a
reasonably short period of time.
Vigor Industrial estimates that bringing the Polar Sea up
to an operationally capable condition would require
approximately $11 million. We base this on the fact that we
have done comparable work on the Polar Star already, and are
well aware of what is required. My written statement also
includes details of that estimate. This work would require
approximately 2 years to complete, and might well be finished
sooner, dependent upon the availability of key components.
The take-home message is that for just over 1 percent of
the cost of a new vessel, and at a 2-year versus 10-year
minimum time horizon, the United States of America would have a
second fully functioning heavy icebreaker able to complete
vital missions under our own flag for at least a decade.
Others today have spoken of the dangers inherent in
relinquishing our icebreaking capacity to former adversaries or
economic competitors. Our message today, from a shipbuilding
and repair perspective, is simple: there is an affordable,
proven, prompt, and practical alternative that should not be
squandered.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. I
have provided additional information in my written testimony,
and would be glad to answer your questions.
Mr. Young. Rear Admiral Garrett.
Admiral Garrett. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Larsen, and distinguished members of the committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today's
hearing.
As a Coast Guard officer, I spent much of my career serving
in the Nation's multimission Polar Icebreaker fleet, operating
in both polar regions, as well as supporting these operations
in staff assignments ashore. For most of my career, polar
operations were usually conducted for defense support and
science programs sponsored by other agencies. But
transformational changes occurring in the Arctic now
extensively affect most of the Coast Guard's statutory
responsibilities.
The Coast Guard has made a valiant effort, as Admiral Papp
described, to project an Arctic presence deploying cutters,
boats, aircraft, and specialized teams to Arctic Alaska to test
equipment capabilities and procedures, and enhance Arctic
operational experience. Unfortunately, the most critical and
effective capability that the Coast Guard could apply to its
increasing Arctic responsibilities is largely missing from the
scene. At a time of growing need, our Polar Icebreaker
capabilities are steadily drifting into obsolescence.
With only the icebreaker Healy in operational condition
during the upcoming year, consequences of icebreaker
disinvestment are beginning to emerge. The Coast Guard has been
unable to deploy an icebreaker for Arctic multimission purposes
for over 2 years, and planned science missions for Polar Sea
have had to be canceled. Perhaps most ominously, a Coast Guard
icebreaker will not be available for critical U.S. Antarctic
program support 2 months from now.
When Healy is engaged in dedicated science support or
undergoing maintenance, the Coast Guard has no Polar
Icebreakers for other Arctic or Antarctic contingencies or
missions. These mission gaps will be somewhat mitigated in
2013, at least for the short term, when Polar Star is scheduled
to return to service.
Although I was privileged to serve in both Polar Class
ships, and am very proud of the 70 years they have collectively
served the Nation, the Coast Guard will nevertheless be
depending on 1960s technology that is expensive to operate and
subject to the risk of additional failure.
During the ``High Latitude Study,'' as we considered
present and future Arctic demands on the Coast Guard, it became
evident to me that the Coast Guard's lower 48 footprint--that
is geographically distributed logistics bases, boat stations,
air stations, and sector offices--would be an extremely
expensive and inappropriate blueprint for needs in Arctic
Alaska.
Moving sea ice, shallow coastal waters, and permafrost make
vessel mooring facilities, as one example, very difficult to
engineer. Moreover, the seasonality of operational demand and
long distances would also make fixed installations less
efficient. Instead, again, as Admiral Papp mentioned, a Polar
Icebreaker patrolling offshore provides an ideal arctic mobile
base. With helicopters, boats, cargo space, heavy lift cranes,
extra berthing, configurable mission spaces, and command
control and communications facilities, an icebreaker can
respond to contingencies and be augmented with special teams
and equipment, as needed.
This is not to deny that some shore infrastructure would be
needed, but an icebreaker can move to where the action is,
carry out Coast Guard missions, engage with local communities
and other Federal, State, and local agencies, exercise response
plans, and simultaneously provide a visible national presence.
What is clearly called for is a continued level of
icebreaker capability to accommodate the developing Arctic
demand for Coast Guard services, as well as to fulfill the need
for broader national sovereignty and presence. We must maintain
near-term capabilities, keeping Polar Star and Polar Sea
available for polar operations, and move forward to build two
new icebreakers that can meet future needs more effectively and
more efficiently.
These are among the recommendations of the National
Research Council's 2007 report on icebreaker capability. The
subsequent ``High Latitude Study'' and icebreaker
recapitalization analysis further inform the issue and provide
a sound basis for an icebreaker acquisition effort.
A review of U.S. requirements would not be complete without
examining how other nations are confronting developments in the
Arctic. Our declining polar capabilities place us distinctly in
the minority, as has been mentioned earlier. The other Arctic
nations are actively acquiring new ice capable assets, most
notably the multivessel building programs of Russia and our
Canadian allies.
Non-Arctic nations, most notably China, are building
icebreaking ships and have announced plans for increased Arctic
involvement. Even smaller nations, such as South Korea, South
Africa, and Chile have recently acquired or are planning new
polar ships.
In summary, I believe that if the United States is to
protect its Arctic interests and retain its leadership role in
both polar regions, the Coast Guard must have the ability to be
present in those places today and in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for
considering these important issues, and for the opportunity to
be here today.
Mr. Young. I thank the panel. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Garrett, can
you talk a little bit about your assessment of the pros and
cons of leasing versus owning?
Admiral Garrett. Yes, sir. The perspective I could offer
was when I was a member of the Commandant's staff back in the
late 1980s here in Washington. We were directed to pursue
exactly the same sort of lease versus buy analysis. And, in
fact, the Coast Guard had a two-track procurement strategy to
compare leasing a new Polar Icebreaker or buying it.
After over a year of analysis, studies, discussion with
other agencies, looking around, what became clear was: number
one, there was no off-the-shelf asset readily available; and
secondly, that in the long run when you cost it all out and
calculate the value of the stream of payments--leasing would
actually cost more.
And when we did the recapitalization analysis recently we
also reviewed leasing again. I think the findings in that
report indicate leasing is more expensive, over the life of the
vessel, by about 12 percent.
Mr. Larsen. Why is that? Or why did you find that?
Admiral Garrett. A couple of technical things. First of
all, whoever builds the ship--and again, this would have to be
a ship built for the Coast Guard, since there is not something
off the shelf out there that you could lease--whoever builds it
has to raise capital. And nobody can raise capital more
inexpensively than the Federal Government.
Secondly, whoever leases the ship is obviously going to
want to make a profit on that lease. As Admiral Papp referred
to leasing a car, you know, there is going to be a profit
involved. And so, if you take the net present value of all
those payments, you come out with a more expensive package if
you are comparing the same vessel.
The other issue I think is more intangible, and that is
just the fact that we are really not talking about an
auxiliary, like the Navy leases, a supply ship or something
like that. We are talking about a frontline Coast Guard capital
asset, if you will, a capital ship that is going to be doing
frontline Government missions, projecting U.S. sovereignty.
And, as you know, the Navy doesn't lease those kind of ships
for its frontline fleet, and the Coast Guard doesn't lease
those kind of ships for its basic mission capabilities, and
that is what we are really talking about, in terms of the ship
we need here.
So, while a lease may look attractive, I think there are
several things that indicate it may not be the right way to go.
And I think that is what we came down to in the recent
analysis. And again, this was all documented in the past. That
late 1980s analysis was resummarized in the President's 1990
report to Congress, which basically says leasing is more
expensive and is not the way to go for a new ship. And that
report cleared the way for the ship that actually became the
Healy.
Mr. Larsen. OK. One final question for you, and then Mr.
Caldwell, I want you to answer it as well. But it has--I think
in your testimony or in the report that you are associated with
you did conclude--I don't know if it is a conclusion, but you
did note that it is expensive to have basing in the lower 48,
relative to Arctic Alaska, and that is a cost of operation for
us thinking about how to think about a footprint up there. Is
that about right?
Admiral Garrett. Yes, sir. As we did the ``High Latitude
Study'' and looked at how can the Coast Guard carry out its
responsibilities and provide the services to the people that
live in Arctic Alaska, that lower 48 footprint where we build
lots of little stations and air stations and have lots of
physical infrastructure, is going to be very hard to reproduce
up there. Very shallow coastal waters, ice that moves in and
out seasonally, permafrost, all those kind of things, and then
just expensive building costs make some kind of a permanent
footprint very expensive.
As Admiral Papp mentioned, having a mobile way of coming in
and carrying out those seasonal missions as you need to do them
may be a more cost-effective way of doing it, over the long
term. This is not to say you don't need some infrastructure
like communications and perhaps some aircraft support, things
like that.
Mr. Larsen. Mr. Caldwell, did you all look at that in this
GAO study? I don't recall----
Mr. Caldwell. We haven't done an independent look at the
different footprint options. We did look pretty closely at the
``High Latitude Study'' and what they laid out. I think that
the Corps of Engineers or people with that kind of expertise
would be the ones to look at it, in terms of the actual cost of
a deepwater port that you could use year-round. You have very
shallow waters once you get up to the Arctic Circle and the
northern slope of Alaska. Because of the very shallow draft
there, building a deepwater port is a challenge.
The ``High Latitude Study'' did provide some options. Some
of those are seasonal. As Admiral Papp said, there is a
seasonal nature to the risks up there, and the activity up
there, and we don't foresee that as changing for some time. The
oil exploration is the one aspect, once you get into the
production phase, which would presumably go year-round.
Finally, you need to think about what kind of Coast Guard
presence is needed. You can provide a search and rescue
presence with some kind of aircraft assets. But for more
serious or prolonged operations up there, you are going to need
surface assets. And there would be some advantages to those
being mobile. The ``High Latitude Study'' actually looked at
where you would post those assets. Some would be in the
Beaufort Sea, some would be toward Barrow and the opening of
the Bering Sea. Some would be in the Chukchi Sea.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. One final question right now--I am sure
the chairman has a few questions and I will defer to him after
this last question.
But for Mr. Whitcomb, this $11 million number caught us--
you know, it is a very surprising number that you are making
the point, that for $11 million you can get the ship out and
running. But does that only include making it operational to be
on the water and functioning? Because it has to be outfitted
with the systems to, you know, be integrated in communications
systems with the Coast Guard, its--are you just looking at it
from a strictly shipbuilding perspective, a ship that can get
out in the water and go from point A to point B? Because there
is more cost to--for a cutter, there is more cost to that, from
our perspective.
Mr. Whitcomb. The $11 million number is based on the work
that we are currently doing on the Polar Star. So, as it
relates to the communications or electronics of the vessel, it
is not specific to those items. But the numbers are--the
similar numbers that we are using currently to put the Polar
Star back into service.
Mr. Larsen. So----
Mr. Whitcomb. So it is the--it is mechanical-type systems.
Mr. Larsen. OK. Right, OK. That is clear. I note that you
have an estimate as part of your written testimony. Probably
want to get a little more flesh on that for us to consider.
Mr. Whitcomb. I can get you that and forward it to you.
Mr. Larsen. Yes, that would be great. And I probably have
some more questions, but I will defer to the chairman.
Mr. Young. Mr. Whitcomb, I am anxious to see that, too,
because what I have been told, $11 million basically gets the
ship re-engined, and that is all it does. You don't put in new
air conditioning or--that is an old ship. And it might be
floatable, it might be able to do the duty, but I am not sure I
would want to put the crew back on it.
That is something we might want to consider, because if we
can do that, we have to look at that aspect. Because we are not
going to build any new ships very soon in this Congress, and we
should do it. But we do need that capability. Heating breaks
down, what have we got?
So my question to you is that $11 million is--you may be
doing it to Polar Star, but are you upgrading anything? The
galley, or anything else?
Mr. Whitcomb. Sir, the $11 million, if you want me--would
you like me to go through the highlights of that $11 million?
Mr. Young. Yes, yes.
Mr. Whitcomb. It is $5 million for the engine overall, it
is--there is a chunk of it in there for replacing the obsolete
cranes that are on there. And there is $3 million for
completing the modifications to the controllable pitch
propellers. A prototype was already done on the Polar Sea, and
that modification is currently being done on the Polar Star.
And those are the key components.
The Polar Sea went through a refit in 2006, or finished a
refit in 2006. So some--I don't know the overall condition of
things like heating and air conditioning and some of the
inhabitability pieces. We could look at that, if you would like
further information on it.
Mr. Young. I think we ought to, because I wasn't excited
about decommissioning that ship. I think it probably came from
the Department of Homeland Security, which is not one of my
favorite agencies, I have to say that. And to take and have a
backup is crucially important. We are going to have the Polar
Star and the Healy, and we should have the other one, because
things do happen.
Admiral, do you want to----
Admiral Garrett. Yes, Mr. Chairman, could I comment on
that?
Mr. Young. Yes.
Admiral Garrett. The Polar Sea, when it came up with the
engine cylinder problems a year-and-a-half ago or so, was fully
operational. And, in fact, it had undergone, as Mr. Whitcomb
said, $35 million to $40 million worth of upgrades. So it was a
substantially upgraded ship at the time the engine problems
laid it up. And it was fully operational and actually doing
Arctic missions while the Polar Star was in a layup condition
at the pier.
Just before the Polar Sea's engine problems were
discovered, the Polar Star had gone into the yard to begin this
full refurbishment work. But the Polar Sea has already had a
substantial amount of that. And the items that Mr. Whitcomb
identifies are the last remaining increments of those upgrades.
So it is not like you have an old ship that you have got to
start from scratch with. You basically have a fully operational
ship that is lacking some engine overhauls and a couple of
other items that the Star is getting in her refit.
Mr. Young. Well, I am happy to hear that. I mean we may
relook at this issue, because like I say, if we have to have
that backup and all it takes is $11 million, that is not even a
spit drop. And make an operational vessel, as long as it has
got refitting to take place to do it. I mean that--this is new
to me, and I do thank both of you for that, because that is
something that can be done, you know.
Mr. Larsen, I am about ready to get out of here. You got
any more questions?
Mr. Larsen. For Mr. Caldwell, in your testimony, in the
last part of it, you consider the interagency cooperation and
you mention some studies or--not even studies, white papers--
that might come up in the next year, early next year. Could you
review those for the subcommittee, and what we should expect to
see?
Mr. Caldwell. The Capabilities Assessment Working Group
white paper is not done yet, so we have----
Mr. Larsen. Yes.
Mr. Caldwell [continuing]. Not reviewed it. We expect,
since it was supposed to be out late this year, that by the
time myself and my colleagues on GAO's defense team do that
report in January, we will have a better picture of what that
might be.
Mr. Larsen. Yes, could you just review what that is, again,
for us?
Mr. Caldwell. It is called the Capabilities Assessment
Working Group, and it is a group of the Department of Defense
and Coast Guard, trying to identify what are the most critical
short-term investment needs. I don't know whether they will
make recommendations as specific as which budget year, and
which agency's budget will pay for such investments.
But obviously, those are the key questions. I think we know
what needs to be done, in the short term--or in the longer
term. It is just, at this point, a question of figuring out how
we are going to pay for it, and under what mode of ownership.
Mr. Larsen. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Young. I want to thank the panel. You have been
informative, and we have got a problem; we will try to solve
it.
This meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]