[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FROM NPOESS TO JPSS:
AN UPDATE ON THE NATION'S RESTRUCTURED
POLAR WEATHER SATELLITE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND
OVERSIGHT
AND
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND
ENVIRONMENT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-39
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chair
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
Wisconsin JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California ZOE LOFGREN, California
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico
PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia PAUL D. TONKO, New York
SANDY ADAMS, Florida JERRY McNERNEY, California
BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN, TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
Tennessee FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi VACANCY
MO BROOKS, Alabama
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
DAN BENISHEK, Michigan
VACANCY
------
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
HON. PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia, Chair
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
Wisconsin ZOE LOFGREN, California
SANDY ADAMS, Florida BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois JERRY McNERNEY, California
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
DAN BENISHEK, Michigan
VACANCY
RALPH M. HALL, Texas EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
------
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment
HON. ANDY HARRIS, Maryland, Chair
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois PAUL D. TONKO, New York
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri ZOE LOFGREN, California
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas JERRY McNERNEY, California
PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN,
Tennessee
RALPH M. HALL, Texas EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
C O N T E N T S
September 23, 2011
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Paul C. Broun, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science, Space,
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.................. 18
Written Statement............................................ 19
Statement by Representative Andy Harris, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 22
Written Statement............................................ 23
Statement by Representative Brad Miller, Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives........... 20
Written Statement............................................ 21
Witnesses:
The Honorable Kathryn Sullivan, Ph.D., Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for Environmental Observation and Prediction and
Deputy Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration
Oral Statement............................................... 25
Written Statement............................................ 27
Mr. Christopher Scolese, Associate Administrator, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration
Oral Statement............................................... 43
Written Statement............................................ 44
Mr. David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management
Issues, Government Accountability Office
Oral Statement............................................... 46
Written Statement............................................ 48
Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
The Honorable Kathryn Sullivan, Ph.D., Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for Environmental Observation and Prediction and
Deputy Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration................................................. 76
Mr. Christopher Scolese, Associate Administrator, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration........................... 107
Mr. David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management
Issues, Government Accountability Office....................... 111
Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record
Submitted Report for the Record, ``NASA's Management of the
NPOESS Preparatory Project''................................... 113
From NPOESS to JPSS:
An Update on the Nation's Restructured
Polar Weather Satellite Program
----------
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2011
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, and
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Paul Broun
[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight]
presiding.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Broun. The Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight and the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment will
come to order.
Good morning, everyone. Welcome to today's hearing entitled
``From NPOESS to JPSS: An Update on the Nation's Restructured
Polar Weather Satellite Program.'' In front of you are packets
containing the written testimony, biographies and truth in
testimony disclosures for today's witness panel.
Before we get started, since this is a joint hearing
involving two subcommittees, I want to explain how we will
operate procedurally so all Members understand how the question
and answer period will be handled. As always, we will alternate
between the majority and the minority Members and allow all
Members an opportunity for questioning before recognizing a
Member for a second round of questions, if we have time. We
will recognize those Members of either Committee present at the
gavel in order of seniority on the Full Committee and those
coming in after the gavel will be recognized in the order of
their arrival, and I recognize myself for myself for five
minutes for an opening statement.
The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System, NPOESS, program was originally envisioned to
reduce duplication and save $1.3 billion. Initial estimates for
that program came in at $6.5 billion for six satellites,
operating in three orbits, carrying 13 instruments, with the
first satellite launched around 2010. The costs of the new
Joint Polar Satellite System, or JPSS, are now more than double
the costs of the original program, but that doesn't fully
reflect the dire straits the program is truly in. With JPSS,
NOAA is only planning to operate three satellites in one orbit,
one of which is technically a NASA research satellite. If you
were to add the costs of the Department of Defense and European
portions of the system, which were originally parts of NPOESS,
the costs would be much higher, roughly $17 billion when you
add the Defense Weather Satellite System and well over $20
billion when you add the cost of what the Europeans spent on
MetOp. Aside from cost, the schedules have been delayed, and
gaps in data coverage are looming.
To date, the Federal Government has spent over $6 billion
on the NPOESS and JPSS programs, and the only thing we have to
show for it is a modified research satellite that hopefully
will launch next month. In the past, the program was troubled
by interagency bickering, overly optimistic cost estimates, lax
oversight and technical complexity. More recently, the
uncertain fiscal environment has also challenged the program.
NOAA's testimony states the projected gap in services is
due to ``the lack of adequate, timely and stable appropriated
funds.'' In my mind, if the program had actually delivered on
its cost, schedule and performance, we would not be in this
position right now. Unfortunately, we are in this position, and
there is certainly enough blame to go around. Multiple
Administrations and Congresses controlled by both Republicans
and Democrats, numerous contractors, and multiple agencies all
have had a hand in this program. The new problems faced by this
program are the result of a perfect storm of factors: a drastic
reorganization, a scheduled ramp-up in development costs and
flat funding from Continuing Resolutions.
This Committee has been consistent in both its support, and
its oversight of NPOESS and JPSS. This is evidenced by the
Committee's Views and Estimates that call for full funding of
JPSS, and the fact that this is the Committee's eighth hearing
on the topic.
At a hearing on NPOESS two years ago, I asked the questions
``how did we get here?'' and ``where do we go from here?'' At
last year's hearing, I asked ``where are we going?''
Unfortunately, I still don't have an answer to that question.
Nearly two years after the President reorganized the
program, we still do not have a baseline. As GAO will state in
their testimony, ``It is still not clear what the programs will
deliver, when, and at what cost.'' This is despite the fact
that the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 and the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2008 requires both NASA and NOAA to
provide program baselines. NOAA contends that they cannot
develop a credible baseline for costs and capabilities without
a stable and predictable budget horizon. On the other hand,
Congress remains skeptical of entrusting the taxpayers' money
with a program that has proven to be a poor steward of scarce
resources without having firm cost, schedule and performance
metrics to hold the program accountable to.
I look forward to working with the Administration as we
move forward. As I have said at previous hearings, every
American is impacted by this program whether they know it or
not. It is our responsibility to ensure that the farmers, the
fisherman, the hunters, the war fighters and everyday commuters
continue to receive weather and climate information. But we
must not forget to be good stewards of taxpayers' money as
well.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Broun follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Paul Broun
The National Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)
program was originally envisioned to reduce duplication and save $1.3
billion dollars. Initial estimates for that program came in at $6.5
billion for six satellites, operating in three orbits, carrying 13
instruments, with the first satellite launched around 2010. The costs
of the new Joint Polar-orbiting Satellite System (JPSS) are now more
than double the costs of the original program, but that doesn't fully
reflect the dire straits the program is truly in. With JPSS, NOAA is
only planning to operate three satellites in one orbit (one of which is
technically a research satellite). If you were to add the costs of the
Department of Defense (DOD) and European portions of the system, which
were originally parts of NPOESS, the costs would be much higher--
roughly $17 billion when you add the Defense Weather Satellite System
(DWSS), and well over $20 billion when you add the cost of what the
Europeans spent on MetOp. Aside from cost, the schedules have been
delayed, and gaps in data coverage are looming.
To date, the federal government has spent over $6 billion on the
NPOESS and JPSS programs, and the only thing we have to show for it is
a modified research satellite that hopefully will launch next month. In
the past, the program was troubled by inter-agency bickering, overly
optimistic cost estimates, lax oversight, and technical complexity.
More recently, the uncertain fiscal environment has also challenged the
program.
NOAA's testimony states the projected gap in services is due to
``the lack of adequate, timely, and stable appropriated funds.'' In my
mind, if the program had actually delivered on its cost, schedule, and
performance, we wouldn't be in this position. Unfortunately, we are in
this position, and there is certainly enough blame to go around.
Multiple Administrations and Congresses controlled by both Republicans
and Democrats, numerous contractors, and multiple agencies all had a
hand in this program. The new problems faced by this program are the
result of a perfect storm of factors: a drastic reorganization, a
scheduled ramp-up in development costs, and flat funding from
Continuing Resolutions. This Committee has been consistent in both its
support, and it's oversight of NPOESS and JPSS. This is evidenced by
the Committee's Views and Estimates that call for full funding of JPSS,
and the fact that this is the Committee's eighth hearing on the topic.
At a hearing on NPOESS two years ago I asked the questions `how did
we get here?' and `where do we go from here?' At last year's hearing I
asked `where are we going?' Unfortunately, I still don't have an answer
to that question. Nearly two years after the President reorganized the
program, we still do not have a baseline. As GAO will state in their
testimony, ``it is still not clear what the programs will deliver,
when, and at what cost.'' This is despite the fact that the NASA
Authorization Act of 2005 and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2008 requires both NASA and NOAA to provide program baselines. NOAA
contends that they cannot develop a credible baseline for costs and
capabilities without a stable and predictable budget horizon. On the
other hand, Congress remains skeptical of entrusting the taxpayers
money with a program that has proven to be a poor steward of scarce
resources without having firm cost, schedule and performance metrics to
hold the program accountable to.
I look forward to working with the Administration as we move
forward. As I've said at previous hearings, every American is impacted
by this program whether they know it or not. It is our responsibility
to ensure that the farmers, fisherman, war-fighters, and everyday
commuters continue to receive weather and climate information. But we
must not forget to be good stewards of taxpayers' money as well.
Chairman Broun. Now the Chair recognizes Mr. Miller for an
opening statement. Mr. Miller, you are recognized for five
minutes.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Dr. Broun. Good morning. I want to
thank the two Chairs of the Subcommittees for calling this
hearing. This certainly continues to be a subject that needs
our time and attention, and I know that Ms. Edwards may be late
but she would join with me in congratulating NOAA and NASA on
the good work they have done in the last year trying to get
this project back on track. It is undoubtedly true, as Chairman
Broun has said, that this remains a snake-bit project but it
appears that because of your efforts, it is being bitten by
fewer and less-venomous snakes, and sometimes you just have to
celebrate small victories. This is a project that needs to
succeed. We need the data that these satellites will promise.
The Science Committee has devoted years of oversight to the
satellite program. When I was Chairman of the Investigations
and Oversight Subcommittee, I led much of the work on that with
bipartisan support from Dr. Broun and from Mr. Sensenbrenner.
The relentless pressure from this Committee and from GAO helped
create the environment in which the program could be
restructured and which we recognized the changes had to happen,
and NOAA and NASA were put in charge of their own fates.
Once in charge of their own fates, however, our friends on
the Appropriations Committee did drop the ball by failing to
fund this program fully. Decisions have consequences, and that
one short-sighted choice means that there will be gaps in
weather and climate forecasting data. I hope we can build
consensus support for this program, for a reform program, so
that we never again have to ask that NOAA and NASA push back
delivery of the first JPSS satellite.
This Committee's first hearing on this subject was in 2003,
my first year in Congress. It does feel like some things never
change here. At that time, the launch date for the first NPOESS
satellite was projected to be 2009, and here we are in 2011, as
Chairman Broun has already said, and now the first JPSS
satellite, the renamed satellite, is not scheduled to launch
until 2017. We are eight years beyond our first hearing but
remain six years away from the launch of the first next-
generation power satellite. This pattern of delay must change,
and the decisions made by NOAA and NASA during the last year
suggest that they do understand the importance of changing
that. NOAA and NASA had made some smart choices as far, as we
can tell, and they have put us on a path that will prevent a
data gap in the next few months. However, the appropriations
shortfall has ensured that a gap will happen, now projected for
2016 until 2017. That gap will mean that we will see a decline
in the accuracy of forecasts beyond the two to four day window
that our satellites and weather sensors support. We must do any
and everything we can to ensure that American taxpayers,
American travelers, American business sectors that are so
dependent upon weather forecasts do get the short- and long-
term forecasts that are critical to saving lives and protecting
property and planning business activities around.
This year alone, the country has witnessed in every region
and on every coastline some of the most extreme record-breaking
weather events. The more warning we have, the better decisions
public officials can make about public safety and the better
choices our businesses can make. The idea of not fully funding
the satellite program is unacceptable. It is remarkably
shortsighted. The delays, lack of baseline, and cost overruns
we will hear about today are important; but the most important
fact is that the budget shortfall delivered in the fiscal year
2011 budget is going to produce a weather data gap and any
future shortfalls will create an even greater gap. In failing
to support the program, we are putting our lives, our property,
and critical infrastructure in danger, and without accurate and
timely information, we would no longer see accurate, advanced
warnings of extreme events. This will make it extremely
difficult to conduct safe and strategic evacuations of American
people from coastal areas and elsewhere.
I hope we will spend our time today trying to deal with the
needs of this program as it is, agreeing where we need to go
and determining to make sure that we all work together to get
there. This program in my first term was a program that was
snake-bit and a Republican President but there was never any
suggestion that this was a partisan failure and it is not a
partisan failure now. It is something we should all be trying
to make work because too much of America depends upon this
data.
Finally, I want to encourage NOAA and NASA to take every
step they can responsibly, that they can responsibly take, to
narrow the projected gap in data that we anticipate after March
of 2016. If you need help in getting what you need, please tell
us, please ask us to help.
I now yield back to the Chairman my negative 26 seconds.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Brad Miller
Good morning. I want to thank both Chairs for calling this hearing
today. This is certainly a subject worthy of our time. I also want to
join my colleague, Ms. Edwards, in congratulating NOAA and NASA on the
good work they have done throughout this past year getting this project
back on track.
The Science Committee has devoted years of oversight to this
satellite program. During my tenure as Chairman of the Investigations
and Oversight Subcommittee, I led much of the work on this--with
bipartisan support from my Ranking Members, both Mr. Sensenbrenner and
Mr. Broun. The relentless pressure from this Committee and from GAO
helped create the environment in which the program could be
restructured and NOAA and NASA put in charge of their own fates. Once
in charge of their own fates however, our friends on Appropriations
dropped the ball by failing to fully fund this program.
Decisions have consequences, and that one short-sighted choice
means that there will be gaps in weather and climate furcating data. I
hope we can build consensus support for this program so that we never
again have to ask the NOAA and NASA to push back delivery of the first
JPSS satellite.
The Committee's first hearing on this subject was in 2003, my first
year in Congress. At that time, the launch date for the first NPOESS
satellite was projected to be 2009. Here we are in 2011 and now the
first JPSS satellite is not slated to launch until 2017. We are eight
years beyond our first hearing but remain six years away from the
launch of the first next generation polar satellite. This pattern of
delay is must change, and the decisions made by NOAA and NASA during
the last year suggest that they understand this.
They have made smart choices, as far as we can tell, and they have
us on a path that will prevent a data gap in the next few months.
However, the appropriations shortfall has ensured that a gap will
occur--now projected for 2016 and into 2017. That gap will mean that we
will see a decline in the accuracy of forecasts beyond the two to four
day window that our other satellites and weather sensors support.
We must do any and everything we can to ensure that American
taxpayers, American travelers, and American business sectors are
supplied the short--and long--term weather forecasts that are critical
to saving lives and protecting property. This year alone, this country
has witnessed in every region and on every coastline some of the most
extreme, record-breaking weather events. The more warning we have the
better decisions public officials can make about public safety and the
better choices our businesses can make.
The idea of not fully funding this satellite program is totally
unacceptable. The delays, lack of a baseline, and cost overruns we will
hear about today are important; but the most important fact is that the
budget shortfall delivered up in FY2011 is going to produce a weather
data gap and any future shortfalls will create an even greater gap.
In failing to support this program, we are putting our lives,
property, and critical infrastructure in danger. Without accurate and
timely information, we would no longer see accurate advance warnings of
extreme events. This will make it extremely difficult to conduct safe
and strategic evacuations of American people. I hope we will spend our
time today dealing with the needs of this program as it is, agreeing
where we need to go, and determining to make sure we all work together
to get there.
Finally, I want to encourage NOAA and NASA to take every step they
can responsibly take to narrow the projected gap in data that we
anticipate after March of 2016. If you need help in getting what you
need, please ask us for that assistance.
Yield back.
Chairman Broun. Well, thank you, Mr. Miller. You know I
have never kept a tight time clock on you.
I now recognize the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy
and Environment, Dr. Harris, for his opening statement. Dr.
Harris, you are recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Harris. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be
brief.
Good morning. I want to thank our witnesses for being here
today to testify on the Joint Polar Satellite System. I do
appreciate you taking time from what have to be busy schedules
to appear with us this morning.
You know, the most critical issue facing our Nation today
is out-of-control spending by the Federal Government. Knowing
that we cannot spend more than we have should seem like pretty
simple math, but it has taken dire economic conditions for some
folks to wake up and take notice. In these times, it is even
more important than ever that the money we do spend is spent
wisely and efficiently.
You know, the JPSS program does appear to be the poster
child of a runaway government program that has overpromised, is
over budget, and honestly has underperformed. While the White
House's decision to split apart the defense and civilian
satellite programs last year may have been the correct one, the
lack of understanding about the complexity of that transition
and insufficient planning appears to have contributed to even
further delays and what is turning into even a more costly
program.
Now, there is no doubt that weather satellites play a vital
role in keeping the country informed and safe. However, given
the number of problems this program has experienced, the time
has come to talk about what is the best way for NOAA to obtain
the necessary data to make these forecasts. And by best way, I
do mean the most efficient and cost-effective way. As Chairman
of the Energy and Environment Subcommittee, I want to
understand what policies got us in this mess to begin with and
how do we avoid the same problems in the future because as the
Ranking Member said, this is a project that does need to
succeed.
The Executive Order to combine the defense and civilian
satellite programs was issued in 1994 but the first satellite,
a research- turned-operational satellite, is set to launch just
this year. It has taken these government agencies 17 years to
go from the initial order to the actual launching of a
satellite. Given this record, it appears that NOAA actually
needs to start thinking now what it will do to obtain the
necessary data when the JPSS satellites are no longer
functional 17 years from now, assuming they last that long.
Honestly, we no longer have the luxury to blindly
appropriate funding for any program in the government, no
matter how essential. Careful planning, realistic expectations,
and innovative, outside-the-box type of thinking will be
required in order to ensure weather forecasting capabilities in
the future.
Thank you again for your time, and I yield back the balance
of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Harris follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Andy Harris, Subcommittee on Energy and
Environment
Good morning. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today to
testify on the Joint Polar Satellite System, or JPSS. I appreciate you
taking time from your busy schedules to appear before us this morning.
The most critical issue facing our nation today is out-of-control
spending by the Federal government. Knowing that we cannot spend more
than we have should seem like pretty simple math, but it has taken dire
economic conditions for some folks to wake up and notice. In these
times, it is even more important that the money we do spend is spent
wisely and efficiently.
The JPSS program is the ultimate example of a runaway government
program that has over promised, is over budget, and has underperformed.
While the White House's decision to split apart the defense and
civilian satellite programs in February 2010 may have been the correct
one, the lack of understanding about the complexity of transition and
insufficient planning have contributed to even further delays and a
more costly program.
There is no doubt that weather satellites play a vital role in
keeping the country informed and safe. Severe weather jeopardizes human
health, costs billions of dollars every year, and has a significant
impact on our economic vitality. The ability to do timely and accurate
weather forecasting is not at question here, and should not be
compromised. However, given the number of problems this program has
experienced, the time has come to talk about what is the best way for
NOAA to obtain the necessary data to do these forecasts. And by best
way, I mean the most efficient and cost effective way.
I am pleased we are having this hearing today, and I commend the
Chairman of the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee on his
continued work ensuring that Federal science and technology programs
are appropriate, cost-effective, and are managed properly. As Chairman
of the Energy and Environment Subcommittee, I want to understand what
policies got us in this mess to begin with, and how do we avoid the
same problems in the future. The JPSS program will only give us two
satellites for a cost of more than double its initial estimates.
However, without a baseline for this program, it is impossible to say
what the ultimate costs will be.
The witnesses from this Administration will likely blame ``budget
uncertainty'' from this Congress for the planning failures of JPSS, but
providing a basic and reasonable baseline for a project is something
that every business in the country has to do.
The Executive Order to combine the defense and civilian satellite
programs was issued in 1994. The first satellite--a research turned
operational satellite--is set to launch later this year. It has taken
these government agencies seventeen years to go from the initial order
to the launching of a satellite. Given this record, NOAA needs to start
thinking now what it will do to obtain the necessary data when the JPSS
satellites are no longer functional seventeen years from now--assuming
they last that long.
We no longer have the luxury to continuously appropriate funding
for programs like this. Careful planning, realistic expectations, and
outside-the-box type of thinking will be required in order to ensure
continued and advancing weather forecasting capabilities in the future.
Thank you again for your time.
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Dr. Harris.
If there are any Members who wish to submit additional
opening statements, your statements will be added to the record
at this point.
At this point I would like to introduce our witness panel.
Our first witness is the Hon. Kathryn Sullivan, Dr. Kathryn
Sullivan, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Environmental
Observation and Prediction, and Deputy Administrator at the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Our second
witness is Mr. Christopher Scolese, Associate Administrator for
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and our
third and final witness is Mr. David Powner, Director of
Information Technology Management Issues at the Government
Accountability Office.
As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited
to five minutes each after which the Members of the Committee
will each have five minutes, or we may shorten that due to time
and votes that are predicted to occur somewhere around 11:00.
It is the practice of the Subcommittee on Investigations
and Oversight to receive testimony under oath. Do any of you
have objections to taking an oath? No? Let the record reflect
that all witnesses are willing to take an oath by their heads
being shook from side to side in the traditional method of
saying no. You may also be represented by counsel. Do any of
you have counsel here today? They all shake their heads side to
side again. So let the record reflect that none of the
witnesses have counsel.
If all of you would please now stand and raise your right
hand? Do you solemnly swear or affirm to tell the truth, the
whole truth, so help you God? Be seated, please. Let the record
reflect that all the witnesses participating have taken the
oath.
I now recognize our first witness, Dr. Sullivan. You may
proceed. And as I said, we have got votes that are projected
between 11:00 and maybe a little after, so if you all could
hold to your five minute times or maybe even if you could
shorten it up, please. Dr. Sullivan.
TESTIMONY OF HON. KATHRYN SULLIVAN, PH.D.,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL OBSERVATION AND PREDICTION,
AND DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you here today and discuss the
status of the Joint Polar Satellite System.
As was noted from the panel, the year 2011 has established
itself in the record books as an historic year for weather-
related disasters. Truly, every state and territory has
experienced some kind of severe weather event that has cost
lives and exacted a high economic toll. As Deputy Administrator
and frankly as an ordinary citizen, I am very proud of the
unfailing dedication of NOAA's employees and contractors who
provided the forecasts, watches and warnings that allowed
people in these areas to take timely, lifesaving actions and
enabled rapid response and recovery.
Members of this Committee, as your remarks make clear, know
all too well how critical the polar operational weather
satellites are to our forecasting enterprise. Over 90 percent
of the data that goes into numerical weather models comes from
satellites and by far the largest proportion of that comes from
the instruments aboard our polar orbiters. We would indeed lose
the forecast reliability upon which preparedness response and
the protection of life and property rest if we lost this unique
source of critical environmental intelligence.
I would like to take just a few moments to highlight some
of the key developments that we have achieved during the past
year. This week, NOAA completed the Level 1 Requirements
Document for the JPSS program with formally validated and
prioritized requirements and thus defines the scope and focus
of the program. In order to collect and analyze these
requirements, individuals from NOAA, NASA and the Defense
Department were designated by their respective organizations to
represent and communicate the needs of their users. With the
recent transition of the Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder
instrument through a NASA JPSS contract, NOAA and NASA have now
completed the transition of all of the capabilities and assets
that were designated for the JPSS program from the NPOESS
program. This is a major accomplishment for both agencies, the
Defense Department and our contractor companies. With this
complete, NOAA and NASA have now returned to the weather
satellite management and oversight structure that has served
the Nation so well for many decades. Under this construct, NOAA
retains the overall responsibility for the JPSS program while
NASA serves as our acquisition agent.
In addition, we are finalizing the management control plan
that lays out in detail how the two agencies will work together
to deliver JPSS. This document is currently being circulated
for final review at both of our agencies and we expect to have
it signed in the very near future.
We all know that nothing gets done without talented staff,
and the challenging meaningful work are what attract the best
and brightest. NOAA and NASA management remain on constant
alert to ensure that we have the right mix of skills and top-
notch talent working on this program in both the contractor and
civil service ranks. We have been aided in this important task
in fact by the NPP program. Put bluntly, NPP is not only
bridging our data streams between our current polar orbiters
and JPSS but frankly has served as a bridge for our workforce.
I believe that this has helped us avert talent losses that we
might otherwise have suffered due to budget uncertainties.
Looking ahead, full funding at the President's fiscal year
2012 budget request level would permit us to ramp up the
workforce to levels needed to meet the current launch readiness
date. This would be an increase of over 500 high-quality STEM
jobs. Fiscal year 2011 budget uncertainties prevented us from
taking these actions during that year.
I am also pleased to report that Harry CiKanek started on
September 12th as the Director of the Joint Polar Satellite
System Office.
In addition to those milestones, we have stood up the JPSS
program office, fully staffed it with a competent and
experienced NOAA/NASA team that leverages the expertise that
had been acquired in the former NPOESS Integrated Program
Office. We selected a spacecraft bus contractor. We have
accelerated the fielding and testing of the ground system in
preparation for the NPP launch so that we can use that data
operationally, and we have completed all of the testing and
preparation activities to support an on-time launch on October
25th. I believe these milestones constitute a firm foundation
for JPSS future program success.
I would be remiss if I did not address the funding picture.
The fiscal year 2011 Continuing Resolution levels fell well
short of the amounts requested in the President's budget, and
even after reprogramming, the JPSS program was unable to move
forward at the rate needed to assure continuity of data. As
noted from the Chair, we now face a near-certain gap of data in
the 2016 time frame.
In conclusion, I would like to reflect on why we are here
today. Very soon after coming aboard this past May, I visited
Joplin, Missouri. My trip came just days after a major tornado
ripped through the town, cutting a swath more than 6 miles long
and up to a mile wild. The utter devastation was mind boggling
and heart wrenching. I was standing the Red Cross emergency
shelter filled with hundreds of now-homeless people when a
woman came out of her way towards me, took my hand in both of
hers and looked up at me with tear-filled eyes. She had spotted
the NOAA logo on my polo shirt and wanted to thank me for the
warnings our National Weather Service teams had provided. These
had saved her life, quite literally, and also given her time to
gather a dozen of her neighbors under a sheltering staircase as
the building came down around them. She knew all too clearly
how much worse things might have been without NOAA's forecast
and warning services.
NOAA appreciates the Committee's continued interest in the
success of the agency satellite programs. They are very
complicated and difficult systems to build and field. We
believe we are now on the right track, and though funding
uncertainties continue to be a serious challenge, we remain
hopeful that the fiscal year 2012 appropriations process will
put the program on sound footing for mission success, and I
will be happy to answer any of your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Sullivan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kathryn Sullivan, Ph.D., Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Environmental Observation and Prediction and
Deputy Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Dr. Sullivan.
I now recognize our second witness, Mr. Christopher
Scolese. Sir, you may proceed. You are recognized for five
minutes.
TESTIMONY OF MR. CHRISTOPHER SCOLESE,
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Scolese. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Subcommittee for the opportunity to appear today to share
information regarding NASA's role in and commitment to NOAA's
Joint Polar Satellite System program, JPSS.
As has been stated, JPSS is essential to the Nation's
weather forecasting system and is critical to the Nation's
research activities in earth science. As the Nation's civil
space agency, NASA is fully supporting JPSS on a reimbursable
basis for NOAA.
NOAA and NASA share a 40-year partnership developing the
Nation's polar and geosynchronous weather satellites. That
partnership continues as NOAA and NASA implement the
restructuring of the NPOESS program. The 2010 restructuring of
NPOESS resulted in the establishment of JPSS, as has been
noted.
In April 2010, NASA established the Joint Agency Satellite
Division within our science mission directorate to assure that
NASA effectively supported NOAA's requirements for JPSS. We
refer to this office as JASD. This office is responsible for
the cross-agency collaboration between NOAA and NASA and
assures that senior NASA management up through the
Administrator is aware of the progress and issues on this
critical national program so they can be resolved quickly. The
combined NOAA and NASA team is responsible for the formulation
and implementation of all JPSS missions and their associated
elements including the spacecraft, instruments, launch
services, ground segments and post-launch support. Over the
past year, NASA has worked closely with NOAA to put in place a
high-caliber team of experienced personnel from both agencies
to implement JPSS, and that team is working well.
The initial focus of the JPSS team has been to complete
activities required to support the upcoming launch of the
NPOESS Preparatory Project satellite, NPP, as has been
mentioned earlier. Originally, this was designed as a
technology demonstration for NPOESS and to provide data
continuity between key elements of NASA's earth-observing
satellites and NPOESS, which was to replace those. NPP will now
also serve as an operational bridge mission for the current
polar weather satellites until the launch of the first JPSS
mission.
In addition to supporting the NPP mission, the JPSS team
has focused the last 12 months on completing the transition of
the program and contract elements from the former NPOESS
program to the new JPSS program. As has been mentioned, the
JPSS program is now of control of and managing all the
instruments and ground system contracts. In September 2010, the
JPSS program awarded a fixed-price contract for the JPSS-1
spacecraft, a bus that is similar to the NPP spacecraft bus.
That was done in order to reduce risk and uncertainty in both
cost, schedule and technical.
NASA shares NOAA's commitment to the success of the JPSS,
as evidenced by the caliber of personnel assigned to the
program and the continued support from NASA senior management.
The requirements are defined, the program is in place, and with
the requested funding we are confident that we can implement
the JPSS program as planned. NOAA and NASA are striving to
ensure that the Nation's weather and environmental requirements
are met on the most efficient and predictable schedule without
reducing system capabilities or further increasing risk. With
the delivery of the NPP satellite to Vandenberg Air Force base
on August 30th, the first fruits of the NOAA/NASA partnership
for JPSS are undergoing final preparations for launch this
October 25th. With your continued support, we expect this
partnership to successfully develop and deliver the JPSS-1
mission for launch in fiscal year 2017.
Once again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
I appreciate the support of this Committee and the Congress for
NASA's programs and for JPSS and look forward to answering any
of the questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Scolese follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Christopher J. Scolese, Associate
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to share information regarding the NASA
role in, and commitment, to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) Program. JPSS
is critical to the Nation's weather forecasting system, climate
monitoring and research activities. As the Nation's civil space agency,
NASA is fully supporting JPSS on a reimbursable basis for NOAA.
Background
In February 2010, in conjunction with the FY 2011 Budget Request,
the Administration directed a major restructuring of the National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS).
That decision was reaffirmed by the June 2012 National Space Policy. In
April 2010, NASA established the Joint Agency Satellite Division (JASD)
within its Science Mission Directorate to manage the NASA role as
NOAA's acquisition agent for JPSS systems. Specifically, JASD was
charged with managing the transition of NPOESS to the new JPSS, as well
as for formulation and implementation of all JPSS missions and their
associated elements, including instruments, spacecraft, launch
services, the ground segment, and post-launch support. Since that time,
NASA has worked with NOAA to put in place a high-caliber team of
experienced personnel from both agencies to implement JPSS, and this
team is working well.
JPSS Organization
NASA and NOAA have been partners for over 40 years in developing
the Nation's polar and geosynchronous weather satellites. With the
President's direction last year, NASA and NOAA have returned to this
successful partnership where NASA serves as the acquisition agent. The
establishment of dedicated teams at both NASA Headquarters and the NASA
Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, has enabled a
smooth transition to the new JPSS program.
NASA and NOAA have established joint program management boards to
direct JPSS, and have integrated their decision-making processes to
efficiently and effectively manage this cooperative activity. The NASA
and NOAA teams have demonstrated a strong working relationship over the
last 18 months.
NPP
The initial focus of the JPSS team has been to complete the
activities required to support the launch of the NASA NPOESS
Preparatory Project (NPP) satellite. NPP was originally designed as a
technology demonstration for NPOESS and to provide data continuity
between key elements of the NASA Earth Observing System (EOS)
satellites and the first NPOESS satellite. NPP will fly the first
copies of a new generation of Earth observing instruments, and we will
spend the first 18 months comparing their performance with legacy
sensors flying on NASA and NOAA satellites currently in orbit. The NPP
mission is intended to characterize performance of these new sensors,
providing feedback to improve the development of the operational
sensors that will fly on JPSS. As these sensors are characterized and
calibrated against the legacy sensors, data products from these sensors
will be made available to the research and operational weather
communities. While NPP was not intended to be used as an operational
asset, our plan is to make data available to the NOAA operational
weather community as soon as is practical, to serve as a bridge from
the current polar weather satellites to the first JPSS mission in FY
2017.
In support of the NPP mission, JPSS is providing engineering
support for three critical instruments provided by the NPOESS program
and is continuing the development of the ground system that will
operate NPP (as well as subsequent JPSS and the Defense Weather
Satellite System (DWSS) spacecraft) and process the instrument data
products. Last year, one of our major concerns with the transition from
NPOESS to JPSS was the readiness of the JPSS ground system to support
the NPP mission schedule. Upon the launch of NPP, the ground system
will be responsible for command, control, communications, and data
processing. I am pleased to report that the NASA-NOAA team has made
significant progress over the past 12 months to ensure the JPSS ground
system will enable NPP to launch next month as planned.
Since the ground system contracts were transferred last year from
the Department of Defense (DOD) to NASA, the JPSS program has certified
close to 1,500 products ready for launch, completed twenty software
releases, completed numerous operational exercises totaling almost 400
hours of spacecraft interface time and has closed more than 4,000 work
requests.
While the ground system was being readied for the launch of NPP,
the JPSS program has fulfilled commitments previously made to both the
DoD and European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological
Satellites (EUMETSAT), including refurbishment of the MG1 antenna in
McMurdo Station in Antarctica, to allow it to receive X-band data for
EUMETSAT's Meteorological Operational satellite programme (MetOp),
cutting the data latency in half for the mid-morning orbit. The program
also installed the first of the JPSS receptor sites in McMurdo,
modified using DoD funds, allowing the Defense Meteorological Satellite
Program (DMSP) to receive their mission data at McMurdo as well. These
capabilities will also be used by the JPSS-1 mission when it launches
in FY 2017.
JPSS Transition Status
In addition to supporting the NPP mission, the JPSS team has
focused for the last 12 months on completing the transition from the
NPOESS program and contracts to the new JPSS program and contracts. The
transition to JPSS is now complete and NASA, as NOAA's acquisition
agent, is in control of, and managing, all of the JPSS instrument and
ground system contracts, including a new NASA contract to produce the
Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder (ATMS) signed last week. The
change to NASA-held and managed contracts has been beneficial for a
number of reasons, including, NASA's expertise as an experienced space
acquisition organization and government management of separate
contracts for each major element (spacecraft, instruments and ground
segments). Through the transition, the instrument vendors continued to
make progress in the development of the flight units for JPSS-1, and a
spacecraft contract was awarded to Ball Aerospace for JPSS-1. Assuming
full funding of the President's FY 2012 budget request for NOAA, it is
anticipated that JPSS-1 will be ready to launch in the first quarter of
FY 2017, five years after the planned October launch of NPP.
Conclusion
NASA and NOAA are committed to the JPSS program, and ensuring the
success of this program is essential to both agencies and the Nation.
The requirements are defined, the program is in place, and with the
requested funding NASA and NOAA are confident that the agencies can
implement the JPSS program as planned. NOAA and NASA are striving to
ensure that weather and environmental requirements are met on the most
efficient and predictable schedule without reducing system capabilities
or further increasing risk.
With the delivery of the NPP satellite to Vandenberg Air Force Base
in Lompoc, California, on August 30, 2011, the first fruits of the
NASA-NOAA partnership for JPSS are undergoing final preparations for a
planned launch on October 25, 2011. With your continued support, NASA
expects this partnership to successfully develop and deliver the JPSS-1
mission for launch in FY 2017, thus ensuring continued support of
NOAA's weather and environmental monitoring program.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I
appreciate the continued support of this Subcommittee and the Congress,
and I would be pleased to respond to any questions you or the other
Members of the Subcommittee may have.
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Mr. Scolese.
I now recognize our final witness, Mr. David Powner. Sir,
you may proceed. You are recognized for five minutes.
TESTIMONY OF MR. DAVID POWNER, DIRECTOR,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT ISSUES,
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Powner. Chairman Broun, Chairman Harris, Ranking Member
Miller and Members of the Subcommittees, we appreciate the
opportunity to testify this morning on the JPSS program.
Last summer when I testified before this Subcommittee, we
stressed the importance of addressing key transition risks
associated with the disbanding of NPOESS and establishing a new
program. We also emphasized the importance of expediting
decisions on the cost, launch schedules and the functionality
to be delivered with this new satellite acquisition. NOAA and
NASA have made solid progress transferring contracts and
establishing an experienced program management team. To date,
the contracts for the spacecraft and the five JPSS sensors have
been transferred from NPOESS that was previously managed by DOD
to NASA.
Additionally, just last week, a new JPSS Director started
bringing solid aerospace engineering and almost three decades
of experience to the program. Although this progress is
commendable, I would like to stress that transitioning program
management to NASA alone does not guarantee success. In fact,
we have listed NASA's acquisition management as high risk since
1990, given its inconsistent performance in delivering large-
scale projects. Given that, it is imperative that NOAA performs
rigorous executive-level oversight of JPSS. The program
management plan that Dr. Sullivan mentioned should lay out the
details of the program's needed governance structure.
Although there is good news in the transferring of
contracts and establishing an experienced management team, the
JPSS program still needs to make firm decisions on the
program's cost, launch dates and the functionality to be
delivered. Eighteen months have passed since the disbanding
decision and there is still no baseline and NOAA does not plan
to establish this baseline until later this year. Clearly,
budget uncertainties have contributed to this. I would like to
highlight why this baseline is so important.
First, from a cost perspective, it is important that NOAA
bases its cost estimate on realistic budget scenarios. The
program has an internal cost estimate but is unwilling to
disclose this until an independent cost estimate is completed.
NOAA told us this estimate should be around $12 billion. If
estimates come in higher than this $12 billion market, it
appears NOAA is willing to reduce functionality to keep overall
costs within this ballpark.
Another reason the baseline is critical is to know exactly
when the JPSS sensors will be launched so that potential gaps
in satellite coverage can be managed. My written statement lays
out these potential gaps. The bottom line is this: we are
banking on NPP, the demonstration satellite now used for
operations, to provide coverage from roughly 2012 to 2017. Due
to a necessary on-orbit checkout period, the anticipated gap in
coverage between NPP and the first JPSS satellite is expected
to be around 6 to 12 months. This gap will increase if NPP
doesn't last the full five years, and opinions on this vary.
For example, some NASA engineers are concerned that selected
NPP sensors will only last three years. This gap will also
increase if the first JPSS launch is delayed beyond late 2016.
These gaps are critical, Mr. Chairman. NOAA reports that data
gaps could place lives, property and critical infrastructure in
danger.
My two key takeaways this morning are, one, baseline the
program as soon as possible, and two, have contingency plans in
place to manage the potential gaps in coverage. Regarding the
gap, first and foremost is NPP performance and is ability to
last roughly five years. We will get our first indication of
this soon after next month's launch. Also launching the first
JPSS bird in late 2016 at a minimum is key. NOAA has been
proactively managing this situation and is looking at options
to remove functionality so that the first JPSS satellite is
launched possibly sooner. Expediting these decisions and
contingencies are critical to ensuring the continuity of
weather and climate data.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. Thank you for
your leadership and oversight of this acquisition.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Powner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. David A. Powner, Director, Information
Technology Management Issues, Government Accountability Office
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Mr. Powner. I appreciate the
witnesses all holding their statements to five minutes just
like we had a great example from Mr. Miller holding your
statement to five minutes--well, we will call it five minutes.
So anyway, I want to thank you all for your testimony. I am
reminding Members that Committee rules limit questioning to
five minutes, so please limit your questions to five minutes
for the sake of expediency, and the witnesses will please
answer in a short time so we can get through as many questions
as possible because we still have votes looming. The Chair at
this point will open the round of questions. The Chair
recognizes himself for five minutes.
Section 103(a)(1) of the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 and
Section 112(b)(1) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2008 prevent NASA and NOAA from entering into a contract for
development of a major program unless the respective
Administrators determine that the technical, cost and schedule
risks of the program are clearly identified and the program has
developed a plan to manage those risks. The laws also direct
NASA and NOAA to transmit a report to this Committee at least
30 days before entering into a contract for development under a
major program. Has NOAA or NASA provided a baseline for JPSS as
required by the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 and the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008?
Dr. Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, let us be clear, if we may, on
the various usages of the word ``baseline'' because in some
contexts it means different things. We have an established
program estimate of the budget. We now have a firm requirements
document, the Level 1 Requirements Document, and on the basis
of those two parameters, we have moved forward with this
program. I can't speak to when reports were submitted prior to
May of this year when I came aboard as NOAA Deputy
Administrator but I would be happy to look into those matters
for you.
Chairman Broun. Well, please do because the law requires a
report to be submitted to the Committee 30 days before entering
into a contract.
Mr. Scolese, could you answer that question, please?
Mr. Scolese. I will have to go off and take that for the
record, sir. The plan was identified last year as we discussed,
and I would have to go off and look at what was actually
submitted.
(Mr. Scolese's response submitted after hearing pertaining to
material requested for the record by Chairman Broun: ``Not yet, as the
report is due when an initial program baseline is established. NOAA
will submit a baseline for JPSS in accordance with the direction
provided in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act,
201. NASA, as the acquisition agent under a reimbursable agreement with
NOAA, will be assisting NOAA in the preparation of those report.
Consistent with NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management
Requirements (NPR 7120.5), and the requirement in the Consolidated and
Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, the baseline for the JPSS-
1 mission will be established at its confirmation review (Key Decision
Point C) in 2012.'')
Chairman Broun. Mr. Powner during his testimony said that
no baseline has been provided, and he also discussed very
eloquently why that baseline is extremely important. GAO is
saying that no baseline has been provided. Can you give us some
time frame of when we can expect that baseline, Dr. Sullivan?
Dr. Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, with the L1RD, the requirements
document in hand, and when we have our independent cost
estimate completed, which should be later this year, those two
will be reconciled. Laying that against the first-quarter
fiscal year 2017 current target launch date, we then can define
for you a program path forward and we will get that to you as
soon as we can. We will certainly reconcile that and
accommodate that in the President's fiscal year 2013 budget
request.
Chairman Broun. I would appreciate that. I know that you
have some problems, as Ranking Member Miller said. There are a
lot of snakebites going on in this program, and we need to cure
the snakebites and go forward and get the flying birds, and
that is what I think all of us on both sides of the aisle are
extremely interested in doing.
What are the differences between NPP and JPSS-1 and how
much did the NPP cost, how much will JPSS cost and why is it so
expensive to produce essentially a carbon copy, from my
understanding, a satellite that is already built and prepared
to launch in just a few weeks? Both of you, or either of you.
Mr. Scolese. Well, we work very closely together so
hopefully you will see that in our answers as well. To answer
the last part first, the JPSS-1 satellite is not an identical
clone of NPP. As we talked, as was mentioned earlier, NPP is a
technology demonstration satellite. Its prime purpose was and
still is to go off and verify the technologies, make sure that
the measurements can be made so requirements for lifetime were
not there. It was to go off and verify that we could do and
meet the requirements. As Mr. Powner pointed out, there is some
concern----
Chairman Broun. Mr. Scolese, I have got about 30 seconds
left, and I asked you about cost, and that is the important
thing.
Mr. Scolese. Well, the short answer then, sir, is that they
are not identical. There is still additional work that needs to
be done on the sensors to guarantee the seven-year life. And as
far as the spacecraft is concerned, we did buy that fixed price
so it is about the same price between NPP and JPSS-1, which is
why you are not seeing a different price on that, but there is
still development work on the sensors that has to be done.
Chairman Broun. My time is expired. I now recognize Mr.
Miller for five minutes.
Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't have objected if you
had taken another 20 seconds.
Dr. Broun asked about the first of Mr. Powner's takeaways.
I want to ask more about the second and that is the contingency
planning for gaps in the data. Dr. Sullivan pointed out that we
have had just about every extreme event imaginable in the last
year--droughts, floods, fires, tornados, hurricanes. All of
that would have been--it would have been very helpful to have
as accurate a forecast as possible. Presumably the satellite
would not have helped with the earthquake, but otherwise all
the extreme events, the more information we had for
forecasting, the better. Fortunately, there has been no
evidence of locusts to this point. But we are on our 15th named
hurricane.
Dr. Sullivan, I know that we are pinning our hopes on the
success and on the longevity of NPP but what are the other
plans for mitigating the potential gaps in coverage that we are
facing over the next few years?
Dr. Sullivan. We continue to work hard on that, Mr. Miller,
and we will work contingencies as we go forward. I would like
to just emphasize two factors that really drive our concern to
have the afternoon orbit filled. One is weather forecast models
are run on 6-hour cycles, 7 a.m., 1 p.m. and then 7 p.m., 1
a.m., and as you can appreciate, a satellite that comes over
just a few hours ahead of the 7 a.m. and 1 p.m. run give you
fresh data, current data, a current snapshot of the earth
similarly for the 7 p.m., 1 a.m. run, the afternoon data is
very important.
Second point of importance about the afternoon orbit has to
do with the earth itself and in particular for the continental
United States to sample the atmosphere early in the morning
when it tends to be a bit quiescent from the overnight hours
and then sample it again in more energetic and active convetive
phase of the day. Those two very different snapshots are
invaluable information, if you will. They are important
information content for the models. That is why if there is not
a satellite active in the afternoon orbit, it is not just as
simple as taking the morning orbit bird or taking some other
satellite. The time of day actually matters.
We certainly will continue to use data from the morning
orbit that is covered by the European MetOp satellite. We have
and have had a number of bilateral and multilateral data
exchange arrangements with other nations. Japan has a satellite
coming along, GCOM-W1, that will host an instrument that bears
some relevance to our needs. We are working on arrangements to
take data from that satellite. Taking the data to our command
center is one thing; making it possible technically in
formatting and accuracy and precision to get that data into the
numerical model is another not trivial technical challenge, but
we are looking at that. So you name a nation that has a polar-
orbiting satellite with a relevant instrument that has the
accuracy, precision and stability needed to not degrade the
forecast capability of our models and we will make every effort
to take advantage of that data.
Mr. Miller. Thank you.
Mr. Powner, it does appear that the gap in coverage is
connected to funding problems but also obviously the management
issues. I mean, we have now been dealing with the problems in
this program when we had a Republican President, a Republican
Congress; when we had a Republican President and Democratic
Congress; a Democratic Congress and a Democratic President; and
now a Democratic President and Republican Congress. It seems
like this is a program--this program's problems are problems
for all seasons.
The criticisms of GAO--I know GAO remains critical of this
program, but your criticisms do seem much less harsh than they
have in the past, and there are management issues remaining. I
know most of your criticism is about the need for a baseline,
but do you think that the new management, the joint partnership
between NOAA and NASA, versus the old management structure, or
are you pretty confident that that is the management structure
that can this program on track?
Mr. Powner. Clearly, if you look historically when DOD was
in the picture, it is a much more streamlined management
structure. I think everyone is happier on both sides. We feel a
lot more comfortable with that. I do think we would like to see
specifics about how the executive oversight will occur on the
program because historically looking at NPOESS, the executive
oversight was very poor. There was a question earlier, Chairman
Harris, you asked about the problems of the past. The problems
of the past were poor executive oversight and poor program
management, too much technical complexity, and all those things
we can't lose sight of and we need to stay on your toes from a
program management point of view. So yes, we are more
optimistic than we have been in the past but again, it is
important to continue to keep everyone on their toes. Hearings
like this clearly do that, so thank you, Ranking Member Miller.
Mr. Miller. My time has expired and I yield back.
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Mr. Miller.
Now I yield five minutes to my friend, Chairman Dr. Harris.
Mr. Harris. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and again, I
thank the panel for coming here today.
Dr. Sullivan, I just want to clear up one thing you said
because, you know, it is obviously a heart-wrenching story you
told about Joplin, but the polar satellites really have very
little to do with tornado warnings, don't they? I mean, in your
testimony, I think it says they are 3 to 7 day, and I assume
you didn't give 3- to 7-day warnings to Joplin about that
tornado.
Dr. Sullivan. In both the Tuscaloosa outbreaks in April and
the Joplin outbreaks, Dr. Harris, we did indeed warn those
communities 3 days in advance of----
Mr. Harris. But that is not what that person responded to
was not the 3-day warning. They responded to the ground-based
warnings that you have. Let us just be honest. I understand the
importance of telling that story but this hearing is about
polar satellites and what data we need from polar satellites,
so let us get to the core of that.
You know, if I don't have enough money to buy all the bells
and whistles on a car because the economy is bad, I leave out
the moon roof, maybe the sound system, maybe get the stripped-
down model. How much of the climate change, the long-term
climate change sensors on that JPSS, how much are they costing
of that project, and in fact, wouldn't eliminating the long-
range climate sensors so that we can focus on the core mission,
what I think the core mission of the weather service is, which
is weather. Wouldn't that in fact shorten the time frame to
launch that satellite and decrease the cost?
Dr. Sullivan. Those sensors were in fact demanifested at an
earlier milestone. I think Mr. Scolese can give you the
accurate dates that predates my coming back to NOAA. So they
are no longer carried on the JPSS program budget.
Mr. Harris. Nothing at all to do with long-range climate?
Dr. Sullivan. No, sir.
Mr. Harris. Good for you.
Now, let me ask a question here. Mr. Powner, there is
something disturbing in the GAO report because it says that
part of this gap is because some of the selected NPP sensors
may only last three years because of workmanship issues. Am I
missing something here? This isn't in space yet. We are going
to launch something up that has a workmanship issue and
therefore potentially creating a gap in our knowledge?
Mr. Powner. Correct. There would have been questions about
workmanship issues associated with several satellites. Their
example is like CrIS, when you look at vibration testing, there
was an issue with vibration testing, and we can go right on
down the line. Many of these issues were highlighted over the
years. The fundamental question is, due to some of those
workmanship issues, it was originally to be a research
satellite so it wasn't built with the rigor that you would
expect with an operational satellite, so keep that in mind.
Some of those things are questionable, and if you listen to
some of the internal NASA engineers, there is a question about
whether it will last, some of those sensors, the full five
years.
Mr. Harris. So we are going to launch what amounts to a
faulty satellite knowing that it is not going to--I mean, this
is just mind-boggling to me. I mean, did we pay the people who
did this workmanship? Did we pay the engineers who designed it?
I don't get it. Maybe it is a rhetorical question.
Let me ask, Dr. Sullivan, let me just go back to this issue
of the gap because aren't there--in fact, if this information
is so valuable, and I know we share it with governments
throughout the world, with other countries, so this information
has value. Now, in the American system, when something has
value, someone in the private sector's ears usually go up and
say wait a minute, I might be able to provide this. I scoured
your testimony. I don't see anything about how we might in fact
involve the private sector in solving some of these issues that
we have in getting this data gap filled.
Dr. Sullivan. I would be happy, Dr. Harris, to give you
some information on requests for information that we have
indeed put out to private sector companies exploring the
possibility of providing data across the full spectrum of those
mission needs.
Mr. Harris. Then why isn't it included in your testimony?
Dr. Sullivan. Omission on my part. It should have been----
Mr. Harris. Well, I mean, look, if this gap is so--what I
need to know and I think the Committee needs to know is, you
know, exactly all the things we are doing to fill that data
gap, and that is a glaring omission, unless you believe that
only the government can do the job. Now, that is--and I suspect
that is the problem here.
Dr. Sullivan. I do believe, Dr. Harris, when it comes to
the high precision, high accuracy and highly stable data of
atmospheric sounding that is essential, that is truly the
lifeblood of weather forecasting. We have seen no proposals or
responders that demonstrate any sense of a market other than
the United States government for instruments of that class.
Mr. Harris. Okay. Well, I have got to tell you, you know,
medical instruments, you know, we also need a little accuracy
and the government doesn't make any. You know, the private
sector makes high-quality, dependable--when a constituent, a
citizen in America's life is at stake, true life is at stake on
a daily basis, we trust the private sector to gain data for
them, so I suggest that you consider that as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Dr. Harris.
Now the Chairman will recognize another physician, Dr.
Benishek, for five minutes. Dr. Benishek.
Mr. Benishek. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am just sort of amazed by the fact that these things are
so expensive and we don't seem to be able to manage the
construction on a reasonable basis. It seems that we went from
four satellites to two and it is costing more money. How is
that possible?
Mr. Scolese. Well, I am not sure that there is a very good
answer for that. NASA and NOAA really took over this program at
the restructuring and we had to go off and look at what we
could do within the resources that we have available and what
we could project, and that is how we ended up where we were.
The original program, as was stated, started in 1994 as
principally a Department of Defense and a NOAA program that was
formulated and finalized, I believe, in the late 1990s, early
2000s. So we are really talking two different programs here.
Mr. Benishek. Well, it just seems that we are talking about
$10 billion, and we went from four satellites to two. I don't
know, how does it all get--how do we lose $5 billion? How do we
go from, you know, $2.5 billion a satellite to $6 billion? I
just don't see how it could be such a cost overrun.
Mr. Scolese. Well, I think we have to look at all the
pieces that are in the program, and there is a ground system
that is required to bring down the data or collect the data
from the satellite. It comes down to the ground. That is a
piece of the total program, so you can't just divide it by the
number of satellites. It is also the ground system there and
they provide them to--and you have to help me here, I think
four locations for the civil program as well as for the DOD
programs. So there is more than just the satellites that are in
there. It is also the ground systems and it is the software
that will then take that data and turn it into useful products.
Mr. Benishek. All right. What exactly are we getting with
the new satellite that didn't have with the old satellite? What
is the upgrades? What is new about it that is costing us so
much money?
Dr. Sullivan. We are not really changing the set of
measurements that we make, Mr. Benishek. The instruments that
we have aboard or that are slated for NPP and JPSS are
sounders, imagers, really the workhorse instruments that are
the backbone of weather forecasting. The state of the art and
the nature of current manufacturing, the complexity of those
instruments increases incrementally every 10 or 20 years as the
Nation goes into a new manufacturing phase for the polar
satellites, but it is certainly not a mission creep and an
expansion of what we are doing. The complexity in terms of
spatial resolution, more fine-scaled measurement to support the
accuracy of forecasting that we have today and the time limits
of data again to sustain the accuracy of forecasting that we
have today costs more nowadays than it did in the 1970s.
Mr. Benishek. All right. Mr. Harris, would you like to have
the rest of my time?
Mr. Harris. No, that is fine.
Mr. Benishek. Then I will yield back.
Mr. Harris. [Presiding] I would like to recognize for five
minutes the gentlelady from Florida.
Ms. Adams. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
You know, I was going through and listening to everything,
and it says since the 1960s we have had the two separate
operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems.
Since 2003 there have been hearings to find out, you know,
maintain some form of oversight of the JPSS program, which
found itself significantly over budget, behind schedule and
considerably descoped. I am listening to your discussion today,
and then it goes on and says in 1993 there was an attempt to
streamline the programs. It brought them together, created the
NPOESS, and then later on they say that the program was fraught
with problems, delays, inefficiencies and severe cost overruns
that in February 2010 the Office of Science and Technology
Policy announced a fundamental reorganization of the program.
So here we go.
Then it goes back in and gives a little bit more detail
about in 2003 again the Committee began serious oversight
because of the major performance problems, schedule delays for
the primary imaging instruments, which caused significant
overruns, all types of management structure that delayed rather
than fostered decisions at critical moments. Again, fast
forward, at a Science Committee hearing on June 17, 2009,
witnesses testified before the Committee that the program
leadership had deteriorated to the point that only White House
intervention would assure that there would ever be any NPOESS
satellites at all.
So we are sitting here and I am listening to all of this
discussion, and I have a few questions. What percentage of your
budget is devoted to the GOES and JPSS programs essentially
being run by NASA?
Dr. Sullivan. I am sorry, Ms. Adams. Are you asking that
question with respect to the NOAA budget or----
Ms. Adams. Yes, NOAA's budget. What percentage?
Dr. Sullivan. I can give you an estimate. We would be happy
to provide you the precise figures.
Ms. Adams. Well, can you tell me, is it essentially a pass-
through to NASA?
Dr. Sullivan. It is not a 100 percent pass-through of the
appropriated funds. A sizable portion passes through for
satellite acquisition but another portion stays with us for the
ground system, for flight operations, for algorithm
development. A portion of the total program that brings the
data to the ground turns it into useful records that can be
adjusted into the weather models. That portion is NOAA's direct
responsibility.
Ms. Adams. Do we know if NASA is spending any of their
funding on the JPSS program and how much it is?
Dr. Sullivan. We do know that the NOAA funding passed
through to NASA for the JPSS program is being spent to develop
JPSS. I can let Mr. Scolese speak to the current budget
numbers.
Mr. Scolese. It is a fully reimbursable program so we are
using NOAA funds.
Ms. Adams. So there is no cross-agency support funds being
used?
Mr. Scolese. That is correct.
Ms. Adams. Okay. I am going to try to get as many of my
questions answered as possible.
Mr. Scolese. One point, on NPP, which was a research
satellite, NASA did and is paying for the bus and for the
launch.
Ms. Adams. So you----
Mr. Scolese. But that was a different program. That wasn't
originally part----
Ms. Adams. But it is part of the NOAA issues, correct?
Mr. Scolese. Well, it is going to----
Ms. Adams. So there is some funding, NASA's funding?
Mr. Scolese. For NPP, yes, that is correct.
Ms. Adams. Dr. Sullivan, it is fair to say that some JPSS
sensors are more focused on providing data essential for
weather forecasting, correct?
Dr. Sullivan. Yes, it is.
Ms. Adams. While others are focused on long-term climate
science, correct?
Dr. Sullivan. No. The JPSS satellite is tailored to NOAA's
weather-observing requirements.
Ms. Adams. So no sensors whatsoever?
Dr. Sullivan. No, ma'am.
Ms. Adams. Okay. That is not what we have been told, so I
am just curious.
Dr. Sullivan. There were climate sensors in an earlier
version of the JPSS program definition. They were descoped. I
would have to verify the time for you but a year or more ago.
They are in a budget line within NOAA to try to launch those
sensors on other platforms but they are not part of the JPSS
program.
Ms. Adams. So will they be launched on free flyers or
something else?
Dr. Sullivan. We are still evaluating options to try to
support those on free flyers or hitchhiker payloads on
commercial buses, and we expect to have some results from those
evaluations by the end of the year or early into 2012.
Ms. Adams. Will you have the costs associated with that?
Dr. Sullivan. Yes, we should.
Ms. Adams. I yield back.
Chairman Broun. I thank you, Ms. Adams.
Now I recognize Dr. Benishek--not Dr. Benishek, Dr. Bucshon
for five minutes. Go ahead, Dr. Bucshon.
Mr. Bucshon. Mr. Chairman, I don't have anything specific
so if you want me to yield back my time to you, I can do that.
Chairman Broun. Very good. We will go through a second
round of questions then, and because of votes now projected at
11:30, we will limit the round of questions to three minutes
per Member, so I recognize myself for three minutes.
Let us assume that the government will be funded by CRs for
the remainder of the year and most likely through all of 2012.
Unfortunately, I think that is a real good bet. How will NOAA
and NASA prioritize the work on JPSS if it only gets CR funded?
Both of you.
Dr. Sullivan. Well, JPSS is certainly one of the highest
priorities in NOAA's mission portfolio so it would get a very
high ranking. It is not the only important and worthy thing the
agency does but I think you could see in our actions to date
during fiscal year 2011 the importance that we place on it.
Chairman Broun. And Mr. Scolese, I would assume same
answer.
Mr. Scolese. Yes, sir, and I think I would just add that
part of those funds will be used with NPP and what we discover
with NPP in orbit will also play into that as well as the level
of funds in the CR.
Chairman Broun. Well, I certainly hope in spite of the
warnings that we get from Mr. Powner about the workmanship from
GAO that satellite lasts longer than it was originally designed
to do.
What options does this program have for operating in the
funding environment of continuing CRs, Dr. Sullivan?
Dr. Sullivan. I am not sure I understand your question, Dr.
Broun.
Mr. Broun. If we have continuing resolutions as I very
firmly believe that we will have, what options do you have in
that funding environment for continuing to try to get this
program flying, get the birds in space so that we have this
data that is necessary and hopefully so that these gaps will be
as minimized as possible?
Dr. Sullivan. Well, within resources available under the
CR, we would certainly focus on the long lead items and try to
build in the capability to accelerate or continue to move at a
steady pace. We would as we did in fiscal year 2011 keep a
clear eye on contract viability and try to not have to go
through not only the workforce churn but the incremental
additional expense of terminating and then having to re-up
contracts. I could ask Mr. Scolese to join in here with further
comments if you would like.
Mr. Scolese. Yes. As you know, one of the most difficult
things for a project manager, and I have been there, is
uncertainty in what your budget is going to be because you are
constantly replanning, and so that is the difficulty we will
have to do. We will have to work with NOAA to try and establish
our priorities and see if we can't stick with those, but the
more replanning that we have to do, the more uncertainty there
is, the more difficult it is to accomplish the goals that we
all want to accomplish here.
Chairman Broun. Well, I appreciate that, and I think there
are things that you really need to look at because I think the
high certainty is that we are going to have CRs for the rest of
this Congress, and depending on what the election in 2012 gives
us, who knows where we are going to go from there. Only the
Lord himself knows. But I think we are going to have CRs. I
think this is going to be a huge issue for you guys and so I
think you all need to look at every single option that is
available because I want to see these birds flying. I want to
see it done in the most cost-effective way. I want us to be
good stewards of the hard-earned money of taxpayers that they
are giving to this program.
My time is expired and now I will recognize Mr. Miller for
three minutes, and I took up almost 23 seconds in that one.
Mr. Miller. I think I am still a little ahead of you in
going over.
Dr. Sullivan, obviously you have received less funding for
this program than what you forecast, what you expected, what
you needed, what you were planning for, and you had to
establish some priorities. How did you decide why the NPP
satellite and the ground station updates were the top
priorities for NOAA in the fiscal year 2011 budget?
Dr. Sullivan. I would highlight two reasons, Mr. Miller.
One was the time frame in which NPP is slated to fly and what
we hope its life duration actually will be can serve as a very
valuable data bridge. Secondly, it really still helps
substantially in risk reduction, both improving the technology
and the sensor designs that we have and that we intend for
JPSS-1, and from a ground segment point of view, to be able to
prepare to use the data operationally also puts us in a
position to debug, to get ready for the long-term use of these
instruments for the entire next generation of polar weather
satellites, so it made good sense to us in a constrained
funding environment to be sure we were ready to fly NPP with
NASA, use the data operationally and get our feet wet, learn
the lessons that we need to learn to really be able to use that
system and evaluate its long-term future potential.
We, as a near second priority, also worked very hard with
our NASA counterparts to keep key--keep momentum and viable
contracts on the key long lead items for the JPSS portion of
the program.
Mr. Miller. With my remaining time, I will just point out
that a century ago, I think 4,000 people in Galveston died in a
hurricane because they had absolutely no forewarning that a
hurricane was moving onto shore, was out there in Gulf, and
actually hurricanes in which thousands of people died were
fairly common throughout--until we developed our better
forecasting abilities, and I know that this is a program we
have all criticized. It has been worthy of our criticism. But
the idea of launching a satellite into space and looking down
at Earth and developing data from which we could forecast
weather is actually kind of hard. Thank you.
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Mr. Miller.
Dr. Benishek, you are recognized for three minutes.
Mr. Benishek. I will yield back the remainder of my time.
Thanks.
Dr. Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, may I offer clarification to
Ms. Adams?
Chairman Broun. She is fixing to be recognized for three
minutes, so we will see what she wants to do that three minutes
of time.
Ms. Adams, you are recognized for three minutes.
Ms. Adams. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, we have talked a lot about continuing resolutions
and everything else and the cost and everything else. With what
is going on with JPSS, we haven't seen a request from the
Administration, OMB or anything, an anomaly for the JPSS
program. Why?
Dr. Sullivan. Well, I cannot speak for the OMB and the
White House on that matter, Ms. Adams. I know we are in
discussions actively with the Administration about ways in
which we might jointly handle the program if indeed we go into
extended continuing resolutions, and I am assured from my
sources that it is recognized as a very high priority by the
Administration, but I can't speak to their decisions on
strategy and CRs.
Ms. Adams. How long does it take for POES and GOES
satellites to check out after launch?
Dr. Sullivan. Well, the amount of time it takes currently
is reflective of the length of time that we have been running
the current NOAA K series of satellites, so it is a few months.
If you will give me a moment, I can pull the exact data up for
you. We estimate for NPP that that calibration, validation
period will take a total of about 18 to 24 months to get to the
point where we have the full, precise, what we call
Environmental Data Records that are being pulled into numerical
weather prediction models.
Ms. Adams. So for GOES and POES, I have about six months.
Is that correct?
Dr. Sullivan. Yes, for the current series of satellites
which we have learned multiple lessons on, we----
Ms. Adams. How long did it take in the very beginning to
calibrate them?
Dr. Sullivan. It certainly was longer for the----
Ms. Adams. Can you get the Committee that amount?
Dr. Sullivan. We can get you what the first run was. We
estimate for----
Ms. Adams. Let me ask another question here. So you believe
that the reason for the length of time is because it is a newer
system?
Dr. Sullivan. Yes.
Ms. Adams. And you didn't learn a lot from the first
systems that you think it is going to take a lot longer this
time?
Dr. Sullivan. We did learn a lot from the first systems but
the algorithms, the actual software to accomplish the similar
tasks is all new software.
Ms. Adams. If I remember correctly, you told my colleague
here that it was essentially the same, just a little upgrade.
Dr. Sullivan. The software to handle the data streams are
very different. We do expect to learn a lot between NPP and
JPSS-1 and have a shorter calibration, validation period then.
Ms. Adams. Now, I would like to ask how confident GAO is
that NASA and NOAA will be able to meet the late 2016 launch
date for JPSS, given the past performances.
Mr. Powner. I think it is fair to say if you look at the
NPOESS program, we never hit a date, so we feel good about the
current program management team that is in place and the
executives who are overseeing this program. We are hopeful they
are going to hit it but based on past performance, it is less
complicated not having DOD in the picture. Okay, that is clear,
and I think what is important is, let us get that baseline,
manage to the baseline and deliver in late 2016. That is what
is really key, to minimize that gap.
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Ms. Adams. I assume you yield
back since your time has run out.
Now the Chairman will recognize Dr. Bucshon if you have any
questions. Okay.
Dr. Sullivan, as well as all the witnesses, I am going to
ask the Members to present written questions for you and you
can at that time, if you would, please, go ahead and answer Ms.
Adams' question and fill in any gaps that may be there.
I thank you all for you all's valuable testimony today and
I thank the Members for all you all's questions. The Members of
either Subcommittee may have additional questions, as I have
already mentioned, and please respond quickly with those
questions, as I am sure you will. The record will remain open
for two weeks for additional comments from Members. The
witnesses are excused.
I thank you all very much, and the hearing is now
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the Subcommittees were
adjourned.]
Appendix I:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Dr. Kathryn Sullivan, Ph.D.,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Environmental Observation
and Prediction and Deputy Administrator, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration
Questions Submitted by Chairman Paul Broun, Subcommittee on
Investigations & Oversight and Chairman Andy Harris,
Subcommittee on Energy & Environment
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Responses by Mr. Christopher Scolese, Associate Administrator,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Questions Submitted by Chairman Paul Broun, Subcommittee on
Investigations & Oversight and Chairman Andy Harris,
Subcommittee on Energy & Environment
Q1. Please describe, in detail, the differences between NPP and JPSS-
1?
How much did NPP cost?
A. The estimated life cycle cost to NASA for NPP is $895 million. In
addition, the NPOESS program provided three instruments that are
estimated to cost $656 million, excluding the non-recurring development
costs from the NPOESS program.
The total estimated cost of the NPP satellite, including launch, is
$1551 million.
How much will JPSS cost?
A. NASA establishes a cost baseline for programs and projects at Key
Decision Point (KDP) C, which follows the Preliminary Design Review
(PDR). PDR for JPSS-1 is scheduled for December 2012, with KDP C
following in January. At that point a formal baseline will be
established for the ground and flight elements required for the JPSS-1
mission. NOAA will provide the formal baseline to Congress after the
KDP C.
What are the differences in performance characteristics?
A. The NPP and JPSS-1 satellites are very similar in design. As such,
we expect their performance to be comparable except for JPSS-1's
improved reliability over NPP arising from NASA and NOAA's experience
gained from NPP, allowing the agencies to correct issues in design,
manufacturing, and test processes.
Though the NPP and JPSS-1 spacecraft buses are largely alike, there are
some significant differences:
JPSS-1 has a Ka-band communications link (in addition to
an X-band communications link) to broadcast the mission data to the
JPSS Ground System. This communication link makes the spacecraft
compatible with the Ground System's worldwide receptor network to
shorten the amount of time between data collection and subsequent
transmission to the users.
JPSS-1 has an operational life of seven years versus
NPP's five years in order to meet NOAA's Level 1 requirements.
NASA is building JPSS-1 to NASA mission class B standards
versus NPP's class C. The Class B standards have more stringent mission
assurance standards in order to improve the spacecraft reliability and
lifetime.
JPSS-1 has many changes to address obsolescence from the
time that NPP was built a decade ago. These changes include newer solar
array and battery technology, and product line updates to the
Spacecraft computer, GPS receiver, and inertial reference sensor.
Significant differences between the NPP and JPSS-1 instruments are:
NPP has two Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS)
sensors: one viewing Earth nadir and the other viewing the Earth limb.
JPSS-1 has only the nadir sensor per the Nunn-McCurdy NPOESS descope
review decision.
There were many small to medium changes made to the JPSS-
1 instruments to address issues identified during the build and test of
the NPP instruments. These include changes to improve reliability
(e.g., cuts and jumpers eliminated from circuit cards, static-sensitive
parts replaced, launch lock thermal tolerance increased), to improve
manufacturability (e.g., brazed joint structure changed to single piece
structure), and to correct performance waivers (e.g., eliminating
optical crosstalk, improving calibration target for better accuracy,
reducing electromagnetic sensitivity).
Q2. How are management decisions made between NOAA, NASA Headquarters,
and the Goddard Space Flight Center?
A2. NASA and NOAA have been partners for more than 40 years in
developing the United States' polar and geosynchronous weather
satellites. With the President's direction last year to restructure the
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS), NASA and NOAA have returned to this successful partnership
structure, with NOAA maintaining overall responsibility of the JPSS
program and NASA providing technical expertise and serving as the
program acquisition agent.
NASA and NOAA use the NASA Program and Project Management Processes
and Requirements, NPR 7120.5, as the framework for managing JPSS. The
relative roles between NASA Headquarters and GSFC are the same under
JPSS as under typical NASA Science missions, while the headquarters
functions are managed cooperatively between NASA and NOAA. NASA and
NOAA co-chair both of the decision-making boards (Science Directorate
Program Management Council and Agency Program Management Council)
required to approve readiness to proceed at each of the Key Decision
Point milestones. Both NASA and NOAA sign and control the Level 1
Requirements Document, which defines the requirements for the program,
and the Program Plan/Management Control Plan, which defines how the
program operates. The ultimate decision authority for the program lies
with NOAA.
Does a management control document between NOAA and NASA
exist for the JPSS program? If so, please provide a copy.
The Program Plan/Management Control Plan for JPSS will define the
working relationships between NOAA and NASA, and between NASA
Headquarters and Goddard Space Flight Center. This document is
currently undergoing final review and NOAA will provide it once
complete.
Q3. How much did The Visible Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS)
cost for the NPP satellite?
A3. Since NOAA's NPOESS program developed the VIIRS instrument flown on
NPP, NASA defers to NOAA on this question.
How much will the VIIRS instrument cost for JPSS-1?
The KDP C, which will establish the project's formal baseline, is
scheduled for January 2013. NOAA will provide the formal baseline to
Congress after the KDP C.
Q4. Does all of the funding for NASA's work on the JPSS program come
directly from NOAA? If NASA provides funding for JPSS, please indicate
the amount and what budget line it comes from.
A4. All the funding for NASA's work on JPSS comes from NOAA. JPSS is a
fully reimbursable program, similar to GOES-R and the earlier POES
weather program. NOAA funds the work performed by NASA Centers in
support of these programs. NASA Headquarters has one full-time Program
Executive for JPSS and varying portions of senior management providing
oversight of the Center activities, which are funded by NASA's Agency
Management and Operations budget.
Q5. How many Federal employees and contractors at NASA are involved in
the JPSS program?
A5. Currently there are 75 civil servants and 137 support contractors
involved in JPSS. We expect to increase to 111 civil servants and 204
support contractors in FY12, assuming full funding of the FY12 budget.
Q6. Reassigned to NOAA
Q7. How does the JPSS acquisition model for NOAA compare to the
acquisition model used by NASA to procure Landsat imagery satellites
for the Department of the Interior?
A7. NASA has developed both the operational weather satellites for NOAA
and the Landsat satellites for the Department of the Interior (DOI) for
more than 40 years. Historically, the weather satellites have been
developed for NOAA under reimbursable agreements. On the other hand,
NASA has developed Landsat satellites, including the now in-development
Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM)/Landsat 8, within the NASA
appropriation and then transferred operations to USGS. With the
President's FY 2012 budget request, NASA and DOI have proposed to
develop Landsat 9 on a reimbursable basis similar to our successful
historical approach with NOAA weather satellites. This both aligns
ownership of the mission requirements and funding within the sponsoring
agency and allows NASA to act as the acquisition agent for DOI.
Questions Submitted by Ranking Member Brad Miller,
Subcommittee on Energy & Environment
Q1. The NPOESS program had a history of cost over-runs and schedule
delays that continued up to the day it was ended. How is NASA managing
development of the JPSS flight and ground elements differently to
reduce the likelihood of continued over-runs and delays?
A1. NPOESS had a complicated management structure. While NOAA and DoD
have similar weather system requirements, they differ in some areas,
which made designing a single system for both uses a challenge.
Additionally, NASA served as a third independent partner. The NPOESS
prime contractor was responsible for development of all the
instruments, ground system and spacecraft, and acted as the system
integrator for all of these elements. Government oversight of the
individual elements under development was limited. The Program Office
for NPOESS was located in Silver Spring, MD, rather than in a
spacecraft acquisition center and therefore lacked the proper
personnel, processes and experience.
For the JPSS program, NASA is the acquisition agent for a single
customer, NOAA, with clearly defined priorities. NASA is acting as the
system integrator and is contracting with each of the instrument,
ground and spacecraft providers directly, allowing for rigorous
technical and financial government oversight of each element. NASA has
located the JPSS Program Office at Goddard Space Flight Center, which
is NASA's primary acquisition center for Earth-observing spacecraft and
thus has the relevant expertise. This structure builds on the
successful partnership between NASA and NOAA for the previous polar and
geosynchronous weather satellites.
In establishing the JPSS program, we have reduced the number of
government organizations with decision authority over NOAA's primary
afternoon orbit requirements and eliminated layers of management
between the Program and the contractor as it affects this orbit. These
changes simplify priority-setting, decision-making, and accountability.
The JPSS program has simplified the satellite architecture to use a
smaller spacecraft bus based on a commercial platform, eliminating much
of the risk of the new development in the NPOESS C1 spacecraft. The
program has also undertaken a review of instrument and spacecraft spare
hardware, and is making plans to procure critical and long-lead spare
items to reduce the impact in the event of a hardware failure during
development.
NASA and NOAA have also established an independent Standing Review
Board that will chair major reviews for JPSS starting in FY 2012,
providing an independent assessment of the management and progress of
the JPSS program to NASA and NOAA management.
Q2. The NPOESS Program had a complicated executive and program
management structure. Explain how the JPSS executive and program
management structure is different, and why it will be more effective.
A2. NOAA is the only organization providing strategic direction for the
JPSS program, whereas three different agencies each provided strategic
direction for NPOESS. Decision-making is not stymied because of
conflicting priorities or budgeting strategies. NASA has established a
new Joint Agency Satellite Division (JASD) within the Science Mission
Directorate at Headquarters to manage all of the NOAA satellite
developments within NASA. JASD has ready access to all of NASA senior
management, providing quick resolution to any issues as they develop.
Areas of authority are also clearly delineated. NOAA provides the
interface with the user community and international partners and gives
direction to NASA, which provides the acquisition and technical
expertise to oversee the instrument, spacecraft, and ground system
contracts. Under the NPOESS program, the prime contractor had direct
control of the instrument and ground system development, which allowed
few opportunities for the government to provide input and direction.
Under JPSS, there is more program and acquisition oversight by the
government on instrument and ground system development, since NASA has
direct management of these contracts. NASA and NOAA report to the NOAA/
NASA Agency Program Management Council (PMC) every month. NOAA co-
chairs this council with NASA, and NOAA's National Environmental
Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS) has a monthly
Management Status Review with NASA to ensure the project stays on
track.
Q3. The NPOESS instruments scheduled to fly on NPP have been described
as less than perfect. How is NASA managing development of the
instrument differently to ensure performance meets requirements?
A3. The new JPSS Program assigned program management to GSFC, which has
extensive experience in managing flight projects and developing
instruments. GSFC has a large, competent staff of engineers who have
knowledge and experience in all aspects of instrument development. GSFC
also has unique test and analysis facilities that support instrument
development.
GSFC has recruited and assigned personnel with extensive experience
in the development of spaceflight instruments to manage the
instruments. The Flight Project Instrument Management and Systems
Engineering team includes senior personnel with a successful history in
developing instruments for GOES, HST, SDO, TRMM, EOS, and Landsat. In
addition, we have stationed government engineering and mission
assurance personnel in the contractor's VIIRS, CrIS, OMPS, and ATMS
facilities to oversee and guide instrument development.
As part of the transition from NPOESS, the JPSS team completed a
review of all instrument anomalies, concerns, waivers, and risks
associated with the NPP instruments. We worked methodically through
these issues, determining which were relevant to the JPSS instruments,
assessing the consequence of each, and determining the options to
address or mitigate the issues. As a result of this process,
approximately two-thirds of the issues from the NPP instruments have
been eliminated for the JPSS instruments. Plans are underway to
determine how to further reduce the risk of the remaining issues, and
we expect many of them will be retired at the time of the launch,
leading to improved performance and reliability of the JPSS-1 mission.
Further improvements are already planned for the JPSS-2 instruments.
The JPSS team has also conducted an extensive review of how well the
instruments comply with NASA spaceflight engineering and mission
assurance guidelines. Through a gap analysis process, we have
identified differences between the previous processes used for
instrument development and what the NASA standards recommend. We are
also working methodically through this gap analysis to determine how
best to address the differences. We have developed an Instrument
Mission Assurance Requirements (IMAR) document that will be applicable
to all future hardware builds. This IMAR will ensure that future
developments use NASA-approved electronic parts, materials, and
workmanship standards. It will dictate when government inspections are
required. It also ensures that the instrument contractors have a robust
mission assurance program with appropriate government insight. JPSS is
also analyzing the instrument test programs to determine their
compliance with NASA environmental verification and test standards;
changes are now being implemented to make the instrument thermal-vacuum
and electro-magnetic compatibility test programs more robust and bring
them in line with NASA standards.
Responses by Mr. David A. Powner, Director,
Information Technology Management Issues,
Government Accountability Office
Questions Submitted by Chairman Paul Broun, Subcommittee on
Investigations & Oversight and Chairman Andy Harris,
Subcommittee on Energy & Environment
Q1. Has NOAA satisfied GAO's inquiries concerning the new structure,
budgets and timeline for the JPSS program?
A1. Although the JPSS management control plan--which will likely
describe the structure of the program--has been in development for
about 21 months, it has not yet been signed, and neither NOAA nor NASA
could provide a firm time frame for its completion. The JPSS cost and
schedule baseline is still under development; thus, the expected cost
of the JPSS program, and its anticipated launch dates, have not yet
been finalized. The JPSS program estimates that its program baseline
will be completed no earlier than July 2012.
Questions Submitted by Representative Randy Neugebauer
Q2. With such unreliable financial projections, I find it hard to
justify spending seemingly unknown amounts of money that we don't have
for the JPSS program. Given our nation's financial situation, with over
$14 trillion in debt, how can we justify continuing to throw money at a
program that has historically not proved to be a wise or effective
steward of taxpayer dollars?
A2. NOAA plans for the JPSS program to provide weather and climate data
continuity in the afternoon orbit. According to NOAA, a gap in these
data would lead to less accurate and timely weather prediction models
used to support weather forecasting; and advanced warning of extreme
events--such as hurricanes, storm surges, and floods--would be
diminished. The agency reported that this could place lives, property,
and critical infrastructure in danger. However, because NOAA has not
yet established a cost or schedule baseline for JPSS, it is not yet
clear what will be delivered, by when, and at what cost. In May 2010,
we recommended that NOAA expedite decisions on the expected cost,
schedule, and capabilities of its planned satellite program. The JPSS
program estimates that its program baseline will be completed no
earlier than July 2012.
Appendix II:
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Additional Material for the Record
Additional Material for the Record: ``NASA's Management of the NPOESS
Preparatory Project,'' NASA's Office of Inspector General
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