TOTAL FORCE READINESS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
JULY 26, 2011
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

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(III)
TOTAL FORCE READINESS

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:02 p.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Mr. FORBES. I want to welcome all of our members and our very distinguished panel of experts to today’s hearing focused on total force readiness and how we resource, train, and equip our military for the challenges that they face.

No one will dispute that we have the most capable and professional military in the world. However, I worry about our state of readiness, not for mastheads on the horizon or columns of tanks rolling towards us, but for the looming defense budget cuts many in this Congress seem willing to inflict on our military.

Two weeks ago, this subcommittee heard about the challenges the Navy has faced in preserving and enhancing its readiness and current capabilities. I suspect we will hear today how our other military services face many of the same challenges and how they all would be negatively impacted by hundreds of billions of dollars in budget cuts.

As we consider our deficit, Federal spending, and the impact on our defense budget, I believe we should be asking four questions: First, what are the threats we face? Second, what resources do our combatant commanders need to protect us against those threats? Third, what do these resources cost and how can we obtain them as efficiently as possible? And fourth, what can we afford and what are the risks to our Nation if we do not supply those resources?

I believe many in Congress and the White House have been asking only the portion of question four that asks how much they want to spend, and have been ignoring the other questions almost entirely.

However, in January, Chairman Mullen was quoted as saying that any additional budget cuts can almost only be met through substantial reductions in force structure, which goes against the national security requirements which we see in the world we are living in.

Similarly, just before his departure in June, Secretary Gates warned that no further reductions should be considered without an
honest and thorough assessment of the risk involved, to include the missions we may need to shed in the future.

I realize that our witnesses today are in a difficult position. I would simply ask: Help us help you. I hope our frank discussion during this hearing can help us all better understand the seriousness of the challenges we face and those still ahead. We must not let our legacy be one of overseeing the slow dismantlement of the greatest military on the Earth.

We all have a responsibility to ensure our men and women in uniform are given all the tools necessary for the job we have asked them to do, and I look forward to hearing from our very distinguished witnesses.

Today, we have with us General Peter W. Chiarelli, the Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. We are proud of his service to our country and we are delighted to have him with us today.

We also have Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations for the U.S. Navy. Admiral, we are proud of your service, and we are also proud of the work we know you will do as the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] of the Navy. And we know they made a good selection there.

Equally important today is the presence of General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps for the U.S. Marine Corps. General, we know you have been at the tip of the spear in all the fights, and we just are honored to have you with your expertise and experience coming before our committee today.

And finally, General Philip M. Breedlove, the Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. General, you have done a great job, and we are just honored to have your presence with us today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

Mr. FORBES. I now turn to my dear friend and chairman of the full committee, Buck McKeon, for any comments he would like to make. Mr. Chairman, we are delighted to have you join us for a portion of this hearing and would love to hear any comments that you might have.

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. “BUCK” MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am just happy to be here. I just got to shake hands with the chiefs down there and said I feel like I am in—maybe I won’t repeat it. I am honored to be in your presence is what I said, and I am really looking forward to this hearing. I am looking forward to your testimonies.

This is something that we have really been focused on. I think the four questions that the chairman outlined are really important. I had a chance over the weekend to talk to each of the chiefs because I am concerned with the cuts that have been escalating so rapidly over the last year. It is hard to keep up with where we are, and I just wanted to know from them how far—how much further they can go, because I was expecting to hear some requests from our leadership. Fortunately, they didn’t ask for any more cuts in
the solution that they are working on to solve our problem right now.

But thank you. I am glad to be with you and look forward to your testimony.

Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Chairman McKeon.

I would now like to turn to my fellow co-chair of the China Caucus and also the ranking member of this committee, Madeleine Bordallo from Guam—and she just got back from Guam—for any remarks she may have. Ms. Bordallo.

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Today we continue our discussion on the overall readiness of our military forces, and we will hear from all of the Vice Chiefs of our military services. We thank them for their service to our Nation and for appearing before our subcommittee today.

Over the past decade, we have asked our All-Volunteer Force to sustain continuous combat operations, and they have done so remarkably well. Our men and women who deploy in support of operations worldwide are some of the best trained and the best equipped service members that this Nation has ever seen.

I think many of us on this subcommittee can remember back several years ago when service members frequently deployed without proper training or necessary equipment. Those were the days when readiness was at its lowest state, but this committee took appropriate steps to correct that problem, and now the readiness rates for our deploying units are consistently high.

Some today are inclined to believe that readiness continues to decline across the services, but to me that is a false assumption. Reset efforts and a decrease in operations tempo and incrementally improved the services’ readiness to support not only ongoing contingency operations but also to prepare for future challenges. In fact, this year was the first year that the Army was able to conduct full-spectrum operations training since the beginning of the war in Iraq, because operational tempo has decreased and dwell time has increased. Given this positive development, I hope that our witnesses will address what we need to do to stay on that track.

It should come as no surprise, however, that we have readiness challenges, especially among our non-deployed forces. For one, Congress has not made things easy by passing defense authorization bills at the 11th hour and providing months and months of continuing resolutions. But the greater issue causing readiness challenges is being engaged in two wars for more than a decade. As long as we remain engaged in ground combat in both Iraq and Afghanistan, our ability to respond to another event or contingency, should they arise, will be negatively affected.

This fact concerns me greatly as the elected Representative of Guam, which sits in the strategically important region of the Western Pacific, where threats from North Korea and China remain a constant threat. Case in point: How would we have responded in Korea if the Cheonan incident had been followed by further provocations from North Korea?
Finally, like our subcommittee chairman, I am concerned about possible further cuts to the defense budget. These cuts will place additional pressures on each service's budget at a time when combat operations continue to stress and stretch our forces. I hope that our witnesses today can discuss the potential impacts that further budget cuts would have on their ability to perform their missions and meet theater commanders' validated requirements, as well as their ability to posture for the future.

The only way to restore readiness across the board is to decrease the demand for forces, but we should not make the mistake of not making necessary investments to better posture our forces to respond to emerging threats.

Mr. Chairman, thank you. And again, I feel that this hearing is very, very important and continues this committee's long history of oversight of the readiness of our military. Having the right mix of manpower, a total force ready to be employed and engaged as an instrument of national security, is essential to preserving our way of life. And I look forward to the testimony from our witnesses this afternoon and their responses to our questions.

And I thank you and yield back.

Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Madeleine.

As we discussed prior to the hearing, I would like to dispense with the 5-minute rule for this hearing and depart from regular order so that members may ask questions during the course of the discussion. I think this will provide a roundtable-type forum and will enhance the dialogue of these very important issues. We would like to proceed with standard order for members to address the witnesses; however, if any member has a question pertinent to the matter being discussed at the time, please seek acknowledgment and wait to be recognized by the chair.

We plan to keep questioning to the standard 5 minutes; however, I don't want to curtail productive dialogue. So I believe we can do this and still ensure each member has the opportunity to get his or her questions asked. As we have explained to each of our witnesses, that helps us to have a better dialogue.

I think you will find that the expertise of the members of this committee is quite vast, and we just want to get that where they have that ability to ask those questions and make sure that we are getting them answered, if we can.

If we get bogged down, the chair will ask members to hold further discussion until the first round of questioning is complete. Do any members have any questions about how we propose to conduct the questioning?

If not, I ask unanimous consent that for the purposes of this hearing we dispense with the 5-minute rule and proceed as described. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Now, we look forward to our statements from our witnesses. Gentlemen, I know that you have submitted prepared remarks that we will be introducing for the record. We would love for each of you to take a few minutes and tell us whatever you would like to say. This is your opportunity to get before this committee the importance of the readiness issues that you see.

General Chiarelli, since you happen to be sitting in that seat, I take it you are going to be the first one up on deck with your state-
ment, and then we will proceed right on down the line from there. General.

STATEMENT OF GEN PETER W. CHIARELLI, USA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

General CHIARELLI. Chairman McKeon, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, distinguished members of the committee, I want to thank you for allowing me to appear in front of you today. As the chairman said, you have my written statement and I look forward to questions and answers after my opening comments.

These are challenging times. We have been at war for almost a decade, both in Iraq and Afghanistan. I am very, very proud of the job our soldiers, their families, and our Department of the Army civilians have done during that almost decade of conflict. To all this is added a serious fiscal crisis that our country is going through.

Looking ahead, I think there are three main things that we—from an Army standpoint, we must ensure. First is that we must maintain into the future a force that is capable and as ready as it is today. There is no going back. We must maintain the edge we have gained over 10 years of conflict. We must modernize that force so it is relevant for tomorrow, and the Army has a very, very good modernization plan. And we must design a force that is affordable, and that is my promise to you.

Since World War II, we have been 100 percent correct in one thing, and that is a failure to forecast the fights of the future. We are in an era of persistent conflict, and I would argue if we get out of that conflict we will go into an era of persistent engagement in order to avert conflict. Whatever reductions are made carry risk, and with reductions we will not be able to do as much tomorrow as we are able to do today. Everything we do should be aimed at reducing that risk.

And for the Army there are four points that I would like to make:

The first is it is absolutely critical that the Army get itself to a baseline BOG:DWELL [Boots on the Ground:Dwell] of 1 to 2. That means for the active component force, when deployed for 12 months, we must get them to a baseline of 24 months at home, going to an optimal BOG:DWELL 1 to 3. For the Reserve components it should be 1 year mobilized, 5 years at home, before we request them to go on a second mobilization. That is absolutely essential for the work that I have been doing in health promotion, risk reduction, and suicide prevention. That BOG:DWELL ratio is absolutely critical.

As you well know, the Army has a requirement for 22,000 soldiers that we call the temporary end strength account. Temporary end strength was created to allow us to get off of stop-loss and also to help us make up for the medically non-deployable soldiers that we had in our units.

In addition to that, we have been asked to give up 27,000 soldiers in force structure in 2015 and 2016 based on some assumptions. We have done the analysis of that drawdown to 520, and our strong recommendation is that that be a gradual drawdown, a drawdown of both force structure and the TESI account, Temporary End Strength Increase, if required to do so. That is absolutely es-
ential if we are going to take care of our soldiers and our families. And we would also argue that we need to maintain a portion of that Temporary End Strength Increase because of the fact we have over 13,000 soldiers in the disability evaluation system after 10 years of conflict.

I promise you we will continue to do our part to find cost savings, eliminate redundancies, and improve business practices, and the capability portfolio review process that we have embarked upon and the network integration exercises that we are running at Fort Bliss are examples that I would be happy to expand on during questions and answers.

The bottom line: While the current fiscal environment may require changes or reductions to force structure, we must act responsibly. We must ensure for the United States Army that whatever we have is a balanced force. We have a tendency to protect force structure because we are a people-oriented and -focused force, not platform-oriented. But we have three dials we have to turn here. We have to make sure that we have the required dollars to train. We have to be able to equip our force and the proper force structure. All those dials must be moved at the same time so whatever force we have is a balanced force, able to do the missions the country asks it to do.

I want to thank you for your continued and generous support and demonstrated commitment to what I think we all believe is the greatest Army in the world. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Chiarelli can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General. Admiral.

STATEMENT OF ADM JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY

Admiral GREENERT. Chairman Forbes, Congresswoman Bordallo, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Readiness, thank you for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing alongside the Assistant Commandant and my fellow service chiefs.

I am honored to represent the men and women in Active Duty, Reserve, and civilian who work each day to ensure that our Navy is ready to perform the full range of capabilities necessary to ensure the security of the Nation. On their behalf, I want to express my appreciation and our appreciation for the work of this committee in support of the sailors’ service and the committee’s work to ensure that their welfare, the sailors’ welfare, and the welfare of their family is taken care of.

I also want to say that we in the Navy are pleased and encouraged by the progress that Representative Giffords has made. As the CNO mentioned when he addressed the full committee in March, Representative Giffords is a Navy spouse and a member of our family, the Navy family, and has been a friend of the Navy and Marine Corps throughout her career. So our thoughts and prayers and wishes for her speedy recovery remain with her as she continues her journey to return, and we look forward to her return to this committee.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask my written testimony be accepted for the record.
Our Navy remains globally deployed. Fifty to 60 percent of our ships are underway on any given day; 27,000 Navy people are at sea or on the ground or engaged in directly supporting combat operations in Central Command. We have naval forces providing deterrence against North Korea; providing maritime security and executing global maritime partnership initiatives in Europe, South America, Africa, the Mideast and the Pacific; providing humanitarian assistance disaster relief, as we have in Haiti, Pakistan, and Japan over the last year.

The Sixth Fleet is supporting NATO power projection operations in Libya, and our ballistic missile defense capable surface ships provide theater ballistic missile defense in Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Pacific. Also, the Navy ballistic missile submarines provide the most survivable element of our strategic deterrent triad. Now, all these activities are directly aligned with our maritime strategy and our six core capabilities that that strategy articulates.

Our sailors, your sailors, are doing a superb job in a myriad of tasks, and the combatant commander positive feedback that we get testifies to their performance. Our sailors represent the foundation of our readiness.

Overall, Navy's readiness is acceptable, but as you have seen in the quarterly readiness report we provided to the Congress, there are indicators of a declining trend. I view these indicators and the trend with concern. It is clear to me that the Navy is under stress. This is reflected in a host of indicators and resource areas. Like our partner services, we have been engaged in combat operations for 10 years while continuing to support other theater and area of responsibility requirements. For example, to best meet combatant commander needs for deployed Navy forces and to simultaneously respond to emerging requirements, we have increased deployments and we have increased deployed time. This has resulted in reduced training time, a narrowing of pre-deployment training for certain units for tailored and mission-specific tasks. We had to reschedule or descope depot maintenance periods, and we have had limited opportunities for unit level training and maintenance, and it has dramatically compelled us to more routinely exceed personnel op tempo [Operations Tempo] guidelines.

Your Navy has been a rotational force for decades and consequently we are used to what we call “resetting in stride” between deployments. This principle has kept core Navy readiness measures above minimum requirements, but the stress on the force is real and it has been relentless.

I can't tell you for sure, Mr. Chairman, if we are at an inflection point or a tipping point, but I don't see how we can sustain this pace of operations indefinitely and meet the readiness standards. If we try to do so, I think it will consume the expected service life of our force structure earlier than designed and planned and will face a cascading increase in the cost to achieve the expected service life of those ships. And reaching that expected service life is a foundational element of our future ship inventory and, accordingly, our shipbuilding plan.
Therefore, it is important for us to reestablish, in my view, a sustainable level of operations consistent with force structure and supportable by our fleet response plan. Our responsibility is to provide a Navy ready today to do today's mission. It is also our responsibility to be ready to meet tomorrow's challenges. So, accordingly, the CNO strives to carefully balance modernization and procurement with current readiness requirements in developing our budget submission.

For example, we have taken steps in the 2012 budget request to reduce our reliance on overseas contingency operation funding, particularly in the operating accounts. However, we remain dependent upon some level of OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] to fully meet today's baseline readiness requirements. Our readiness would be dramatically impacted if OCO's funding is further reduced or terminated without a corresponding reduction in those operating requirements.

So, Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Bordallo, and members of the committee, you can be proud of the work of the men and women serving your Navy. They get it done on behalf of the combatant commanders around the world, and I appreciate the opportunity to be with you today, and I look forward to the discussion. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Admiral Greenert can be found in the Appendix on page 54.]

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral. General Dunford.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General DUNFORD. Chairman McKeon, Chairman Forbes, Congresswoman Bordallo, distinguished members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to join you here today. It is an honor to represent your Marines.

I would like to begin by offering a few key observations regarding our current and our future readiness. Today, of the 202,000 marines on Active Duty and the 39,000 in the selected Marine Corps Reserve, 30,000 are forward deployed; 20,000 are actually in Afghanistan. Due to the support of the Congress, those forward-deployed forces are well-manned, trained, and equipped in keeping with our Commandant's number one priority, but our forward-deployed units have personnel and equipment requirements that exceed standard allowances. The additional equipment is due to the nature of the fight and the very distributed of operations in Afghanistan. The additional personnel are required to support staffs and trainers for Afghan security forces.

We meet those additional requirements by pulling equipment and personnel from home station. As a result, units at home station continue to experience significant personnel and equipment shortfalls. In fact, approximately two-thirds of our units at home station are in a degraded readiness state.

Home station readiness is a particular concern for the Nation's expeditionary force and readiness. The forces at home station represent our capability to respond to unexpected crises and contingencies. Last year, units at home station responded to several unplanned requirements, including those in Afghanistan, Libya, and Japan. Marines were also called to reinforce embassies in Egypt,
Bahrain, Guinea, and Kyrgyzstan. In these cases, Marines had days, in some cases hours, to respond. We are reminded that crisis response is come as you are. If the Marine Corps is asked to support another major contingency at this time, we would respond, but home station shortfalls would affect our ability to meet the timelines established by the combatant commanders. Also, we are not currently meeting the combatant commanders’ demand for forward-deployed marines.

Even as we work to meet current requirements, we are looking ahead. We have conducted an assessment of the future security environment and of force structure review. Based on our analysis, we plan for a force with the right capabilities and capacities to provide the Nation with an expeditionary force and readiness that meets the vision of the 82nd Congress.

Our intent is to reset our forces coming out of Afghanistan and reconstitute an Active Force of 186,800 marines with 39,500 in the selected Marine Corps Reserve. That force will be manned and equipped as a force in readiness and will be designed to be forward deployed and engaged, and it will be prepared for a wide range of crises and contingencies.

With your continued support, tomorrow’s Marine Corps will remain a force that is ready to respond to today’s crisis, with today’s forces, today.

I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Dunford can be found in the Appendix on page 67.]

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. General Breedlove.

STATEMENT OF GEN. PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, USAF, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

General BREEDLOVE. Chairman McKeon, Chairman Forbes, Ranking member Bordallo, and distinguished members of the committee, it is my pleasure to be here today representing the more than 690,000 Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen. Thank you for providing me the opportunity to update you on the readiness of your United States Air Force. My intent today is to address a few Air Force readiness trends and highlight some of the challenges we are facing.

I am pleased to report that America’s Air Force continues to provide the Nation with unmatched global vigilance, reach, and power as a part of this joint and coalition team. The Air Force remains a mission-focused and prepared force, an increasingly difficult task given 20 years of constant deployed combat operations dating all the way back to Operation Desert Storm.

Notably since 2003, we have seen a slow but steady decline in reported unit readiness indicators. This makes our ability to be ready for the full spectrum of operations at an acceptable risk quite challenging, especially for the combat Air Forces and for our limited supply of high-demand units.

Our enduring commitment to readiness in the joint fight is evidenced by the 40,000 American airmen deployed to 285 locations around the globe. Of this group, nearly 28,000 are on a continually rotating basis to directly contribute to operations in U.S. CENTCOM [United States Central Command], including 10,000
airmen in Afghanistan providing close air support to U.S. and coalition ground forces, airlift, air refueling, personnel rescue, air medical evacuation, and training to develop our partner Air Force there.

An additional 57,000 total force airmen, or 11 percent of our force, are forward stationed overseas, providing capabilities in direct support of our COCOMs [United States Combatant Commands]. And from their home stations in the United States, 220,000 total force airmen, 43 percent of the Air Force, provide daily support to worldwide operations, standing nuclear alert, commanding and controlling our satellites, analyzing intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance data for the forward troops, and much, much more.

This high operations tempo continues to stress 16 of our enlisted specialties and 6 of our officer specialties, well below the 1 to 1 acceptable minimum.

Aircraft readiness: Through the dedicated work of our airmen, the Air Force’s aircraft inventory remains ready despite extensive use in contingency operations and increases in fleet average age. The mobility Air Forces are in good shape. Our modernization and recapitalization efforts, most notably the KC–46, remain on track. The combat Air Force’s readiness is adequate despite the challenge of rapidly accumulating hours and the fleet faster aging than we originally planned, as well as delayed modernization and recapitalization efforts.

To keep our legacy platforms viable well into the future, the Air Force intends to use funds saved through our efficiency efforts to subsidize modernization. A good example is our plan to retire six B–1 bombers to fund B–1 fleet upgrades.

In addition to air power, Air Force continues to reliably provide the Nation with required space and cyber capability, precision navigation and timing through GPS [Global Positioning System] and secure satellite COM [communications], missile warning and network defense against a barrage of cyberspace attacks. We have achieved a record 80 consecutive, successful, national security space launches since 1999, and our space readiness meets the requirement.

Likewise, as a critical component of our Nation’s strategic deterrence, the Air Force has maintained our 450 ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] on continuous alert at greater than 99 percent readiness rate. This is a mission we cannot fail in.

Mr. Chairman, committee members, the Air Force remains steadfastly committed to providing global vigilance, reach, and power for America and the joint team. Despite fiscal challenges and high ops tempo, Air Force personnel, weapons systems, and organizations prepare and are prepared for today’s fight. Thank you for your continued support of your United States Air Force, for our airmen and for their families.

I look forward to your questions, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Breedlove can be found in the Appendix on page 80.]

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. And to each of our panelists we thank you for being here. As Chairman McKeon indicated at the beginning, we view each and every one of you as true American
heroes. We don't say that lightly; we believe that. And equally important, we believe that the men and women who serve under you are true heroes for this Nation, defending freedom.

As I look out upon the world that we face, my biggest concern is not an enemy masthead that I see coming over the horizon. It is not a new missile that we don't know about, and it is not even a group of planes that could be flying over there. One of the biggest fears that I have is these enormous budget cuts that we see coming down the pike. We have heard tunes of anywhere from $400 billion to $1 trillion.

As I look at it, the questions we need to ask for national security are pretty straightforward. They are commonsense questions.

The first question that we have to ask is this: What is the true risk? What are the threats that America faces, both today and in the near and far future? In doing that, we have a number of different tools. We use the Quadrennial Defense Review that each of you are very familiar with, the National Security Strategy. Many of these are unclassified. We know that you have a number of documents that you use to bring together to assess that risk and to make sure we know what it is. But at some point in time we have to ask the question: What is the risk that America is facing?

The second question that we have to ask is: What resources do our combatant commanders need to fulfill the missions necessary to defend America from those risks?

The third question is: How much are we paying for those resources and how can we do it as efficiently as possible?

And then the fourth question is: How much can we afford, and what is the risk to America if we don't provide those resources?

I can tell you that I believe with every ounce of strength that I have that the debate that we have had in the United States over the last several months has been around only one portion of one of those questions. And it is: What do we want to spend and how much can we afford? But we are not looking at the risks that we are assuming by not expending those moneys.

I know the tremendous pressure each of you are under as you come here today, and I also know this: If we don't ask those questions, we may all be presiding over the dismantling of the greatest military the world has ever known. That will not be our legacy.

The chairman has given me this gavel, and he has done it because he knows that I will ask those tough questions, and we will do that today. And he also knows that we are prepared if we need to, and you think we need to, we are all set up, we will gavel this session and we will go into a classified setting if that is necessary. But we won't leave the men and women who serve under you without the resources they need to do the missions necessary to defend this country.

General Dunford, your marines have been at the front of almost everything we have done over the last several decades. They have risked their arms, their legs, their quality of life, their life itself, in doing that fight. So I think we should come to you first.

And the question that I want to ask you which is at the heart of it, if we believe that readiness is the ability of the military services to provide the combatant commanders with the resources necessary to meet the operational requirements necessary to defend us
from the threats we face, the question I would ask you is this: In your best professional military judgment, given the tremendous demands on your service, are you currently able to provide the combatant commanders with the resources—all the resources they need to meet their operational requirement?

General DUNFORD. Chairman Forbes, thank you for that question. First, as I mentioned in the opening statement, I am absolutely confident that in the case of the United States Central Command, we are providing that combatant commander with all the Marine forces that he needs. And those forces, as is the Commandant’s number one priority, those forces are the best trained, best equipped, and best manned units that we can provide.

The requirement to meet the Central Command demand has caused us to accept risks in other areas of operations. So currently we are not able to meet all the forward presence requirements of the other combatant commanders in the Pacific Command, in the Southern Command, European Command, and Africa Command.

Also, in the case of another major contingency operation, the United States Marine Corps would not right now be able to meet the timelines of the combatant commanders in response to another major contingency operation, should it occur simultaneously with current operations in Afghanistan.

Mr. FORBES. General, you have heard the same statements that we have heard about potential cuts from different sources, $400 billion to a trillion dollars. Assuming that we divided this equally and the Marine Corps had to take as much as $200 billion of cuts over the next 10 years, could you absorb those, and what would the impact be on the readiness state of the Marine Corps if that were to come your way?

General DUNFORD. Chairman, we have taken a look at the figure of $400 billion, and we have taken a look at what our fair share would be it if would come down to the Department of the Navy and we would take a pro-share cut of those reductions inside the Department of the Navy.

I think within $400 billion, we would have some challenges in taking those cuts. I think if they were to exceed $400 billion we would start to have to make some fundamental changes in the capability of the Marine Corps.

Mr. FORBES. Would your reductions come in the nature of personnel and force structure?

General DUNFORD. Chairman, as a result of the way that we are organized, 60 percent of our total obligation authority actually goes to people. So if we were forced to take cuts, they would absolutely come in the form of capacity.

Mr. FORBES. General Breedlove, I know you have talked about the aging of your fleet, and so my first question to you is the same one to General Dunford. Given the demands on the service right now and the Air Force and your best professional military judgment, are you currently able to meet all the demands from our combatant commanders with the resources they need to meet their operational requirements?

General BREEDLOVE. Mr. Chairman, my answer starts very similar to General Dunford’s. In the case of CENTCOM, I believe we can meet all of those requirements. I will tell you that some of our
low-density, high-demand requirements—personnel recovery, ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance], and a few—are right at the ragged edge, and as we continue to be challenged by new tasks around North Africa and other places, we are right at the limit of supporting CENTCOM in those low-density, high-demand assets.

Similarly, once you get outside of CENTCOM, we would have some risk, and those risks fall in these familiar areas: personnel recovery, ISR, some of our intel assets' limited demand, are being pretty much consumed by the CENTCOM fight. And therefore, we would accept risk as we would approach other COCOM requirements around the world that we have.

Mr. FORBES. And some of those would include PACOM [United States Pacific Command], for example?

General BREEDLOVE. Yes, sir, exactly.

Mr. FORBES. In addition to that, General Dunford addressed the impact that cuts would make on the Air Force. I am looking right now at the average age of some of your fleet, and it could be a few years either way, but as I look at it, your strategic bombers are about 34 years old; tanker aircraft, 47; your airlift aircraft, 19. What impact would those cuts have on the readiness for the Air Force?

General BREEDLOVE. We have also looked at the conversation which is happening about our fair share of 400, and it would cause us quite some concern in the recapitalization of just what you talk about, Mr. Chairman. We do have an attack air fleet and a bomber fleet that is in bad need of recapitalization, and our plans throughout this period would be challenged by those cuts.

Similarly to General Dunford, what we have looked at is that in a $400 billion cut, our capacity would have to come down. We have determined that we will not go hollow. When I came into the flying business in the seventies, I looked at what hollow was on Air Force bases. As I walked down the line and saw holes in aircraft where there were no engines and we had maintained a certain amount of infrastructure and iron, but it was unflyable. And we can’t afford to go there with the requirements of our COCOMs today.

So a $400 billion cut would force us to constrict our force in order to maintain a ready and fit force to fight, and we come to almost the same conclusion that General Dunford did. Beyond $400 billion, we would have to go into a fundamental restructure of what it is our Nation expects from our Air Force.

Mr. FORBES. General, you and I have also had some discussions regarding the importance of technology and advanced technology for the Air Force. We see as one of the forces around the world, obviously, the Chinese and what they are doing with a huge modernization. In your best professional military judgment from assessing what the Chinese have been doing in the last several years, when they make commitments or promises that they are going to have various numbers of aircraft online within certain years, do they deliver on those promises?

General BREEDLOVE. They do, sir, and that is probably the most scary thing about what they are doing. Clearly, we are some number of decades ahead of the Chinese in stealth and in the capability to employ stealth and to do these high technically pieces of work
in the military. You don’t catch up that 3 or 4 decades overnight. Normally, it would take you 3 or 4 decades to do it, but quite frankly, the way that they are intruding into the nets of our manufacturers and our government, they are catching up in an increased rate because of what they learn in those cyber intrusions.

So, yes, sir, it does scare me. When they say they are going to build 300 J–21s in the next 5 years, they will build 300 J–21s in the next 5 years. They will put the money to whatever they decide to do, and that scares me because of the determination and the fact that they will deliver.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General.

General Chiarelli, again thank you for being here. No surprise question to you. You have heard the questions that I have asked to General Dunford and also to General Breedlove. I would like to ask you the same thing.

In your best professional military judgment, given the demands of the Army currently, are you currently able to provide the combatant commanders—all of our combatant commanders—with the resources they need to meet the operational requirements of the missions that they currently face?

General CHIARELLI. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question, and I would add that we have been shoulder-to-shoulder with our Marine brethren throughout both conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan from the beginning.

Mr. FORBES. And we know you have.

General CHIARELLI. And I would tell you, yes, in CENTCOM we are, but not without a cost. I think you know that our aviation assets are on the 1 to 1 BOG:DWELL today. I recently visited an aviation brigade in Fort Hood, Texas, that had just returned from the theater, and 12 months to the day after they returned they were back for another 12-month deployment, and currently at 1 to 1, and a majority of our forces we have over there are below 1 to 2. That is 12 months at home—12 months deployed, 24 months at home.

No, we cannot meet all the other COCOM commanders’ validated demands. Those are prioritized through the global force management process. We work hard to meet them. We are not able to meet them all, and we help them manage that risk.

We are looking very, very hard at a $400 billion cut. We don’t totally understand the total impact that is going to have on the force, but when you double that to $800 million or more—or $800 billion or more, that is—you are reaching an area there that I think would definitely—we would have to look very, very hard at our strategy, what we can and cannot do.

Mr. FORBES. General, if you can’t meet the combatant commanders’ need for the resources for their operational requirements today, and you were to have these cuts coming down, how are you right now in terms of your equipment needs, and would these cuts come out of equipment or would they come out of personnel?

General CHIARELLI. We are absolutely focused on whatever force we have is a balanced force. And there is three big dials that we have to turn. We have a tendency to hold on to force structure longer than we should because, as I indicated in my opening comments, we are people-focused. We are not platform-focused, but we
have made a commitment, both the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, that whatever force we have, if cut, whatever force is left will be a balanced force. We will have the necessary funds to train that force to do the missions we ask it to do. We will equip and we will ensure that force is a modernized force going into the future, and we will have the force structure that allows us to man that equipment, but we will not in any way favor one account or the other.

Mr. FORBES. Would it be fair to say that if you have those budget cuts you would have to further reduce the resources that you could supply to our combatant commanders?

General CHIARELLI. That is fair to say.

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, again, we thank you for your presence here, look forward to your service as CNO. You know that there have been some somewhat substantiated rumors floating around Congress that I mentioned to you the other day regarding our aircraft carriers, and particularly the possibility of delaying the construction of current aircraft carrier underway from 5 years to 7 years, and also doing away perhaps altogether with the next carrier that is on deck.

In your best professional military judgment, if that proposal was presented to this committee, should we embrace it and support it, or should we fight against it?

Admiral GREENERT. Well, first, Mr. Chairman, I would have to say that in the deliberations of our fiscal year 2013 budget there are a whole host of items on the table, but the best—we have found that the best center for aircraft procurement and construction, and that is, if you will, interval between construction, I think we are talking about, is 5 years. And that is our program of record right now for CVN–79. That is the carrier in question.

We find that when you go beyond that you have an overhead cost, you have a labor cost increase, and you lose the skill, the proficiency of the workers. So that is kind of about in the sweet spot. So we would prefer not to do that. That is not the best way to build an aircraft carrier if you have that option.

The CVN–79 is the intended relief for the Nimitz, which as retired, if I am not mistaken, in 2025. So anyway, what I tell you, any rumor to that extent is definitely predecisional. There are a lot of things under deliberations right now, sir.

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, we recognize that. Let me ask you this: In your best professional military judgment, given all the demands on the Navy now, are you currently able to provide the combatant commanders with the resources they need to meet their operational requirements?

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our validated signal, if you will, for providing the combatant commanders what they need is the global force management allocation plan. That is the result of deliberations in the joint staff with the combatant commanders, with the services, and the Secretary of Defense's staff. The combatant commanders unconstrained, if you will, what they believe they need is the input to this process. That is reviewed for validity, if you will, for policy, for strategy. The outcome of that is the global force——
Mr. FORBES. And Admiral, I want to make sure I phrased my question to you correctly, so I am sorry to interrupt you, but I didn’t say what they wanted; I said what they needed.

Admiral GREENERT. What they—my signal to me, what they need, is the global force management allocation plan. We meet that plan right now, with the caveats I gave you in my oral statement. We are on the edge right now. There are some aspects of my fleet response plan, my covenant to provide rotational forces forward that I find that I am concerned about some of those trends, and I described those to you.

So to answer your question, yes, we meet those. An unconstrained combatant commanders’ demand, I would need, doing some analysis, about some 400 ships. I have 285 ships today.

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, last question I am going to ask this. When Admiral Burke was here little over a week ago he said that the COCOM demand was for about 16 or 18 subs at any one time. He said we could only deliver about 10 subs at any one time, not because they didn’t need them, but because that is all we could afford to deliver. Big difference.

I am looking at the shipbuilding plan that has been submitted by the Navy, and looking out. We had Admiral Willard testify before one of our subcommittees a little over a year ago, that the Chinese now for the first time in their lifetime had more ships in their Navy than we did in ours. And I know we can argue about capability, but at some point in time numbers become capability.

The second thing we looked at is the Navy has said we needed a floor of 313 ships. Then they came back and somewhat tweaked that and said 328. You know, and we have chatted about this before, in the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] independent panel that did an analysis on that number, they came up and felt we needed 346 ships. Regardless of whether it is 313, 328, or 346, in CBO’s [Congressional Budget Office] review of the shipbuilding plan that has been brought forward, they asked the question how the numbers work out, because based on their numbers and the cost of the ships they feel instead of going to 313, we could be going down to 270, 250, even 170 depending upon the cost of the ships.

Here is the question I have for you. This year this committee put $14.9 billion in shipbuilding. The average over the last 3 decades, as you know, has been $15 billion that Congress has put in for shipbuilding. We know we can’t supply enough subs right now for our combatant commanders’ request. We know, as you mentioned and also as CRS [Congressional Research Service] has come out and told us, if we were to delay a carrier, that carrier cost for either not building one or delaying them would increase not just our carrier costs, but the cost of our subs and the cost of doing the maintenance on our ships. We also know that last year the Navy had a $367 million shortfall in their ship repair accounts.

Admiral Burke, Admiral McCoy testified about a week or so ago, that when we don’t do the maintenance on the ships, we reduce the lifecycle for those ships and we increase the cost of the maintenance. The number differentiation on that shipbuilding plan is this: If we had the $15 billion, we can’t reach even a 313-ship goal.

You heard General Breedlove say when the Chinese say they are going to do something, they normally do it. And they are talking
about building a lot of ships over the next few years. My concern to you is, if we are short already—and I think the numbers are between that we need 17- to $19 billion, so we could be short $2½ billion to $19 billion. What in the world would the Navy do on its shipbuilding plan if you had to take further reductions coming down from some of these budget hits?

Admiral GREENERT. Well, Mr. Chairman, you have really eloquently described the conundrum.

Mr. FORBES. I tried.

Admiral GREENERT. The balance—and it is really all about that balance.

If we had a reduction of a kind that was passed around here, $400 billion, $886 billion, without a comprehensive strategic review, a fundamental look at what we are asking our forces to do, without a change in activity as I described, we won't be able to meet the global force management plan today. I am pretty sure of that. It will exacerbate our readiness trends which you are familiar with, and if we have to go to force structure, reduction of force structure, which you mentioned, I am concerned about the industrial base. You are familiar with it, and you know that it is a fragile item.

Mr. FORBES. And Admiral, of that comprehensive strategic review, the one part of that we cannot change is what the threats are; would that be fair to say? We can change our analysis and the missions we are going to do to fight this, but we can't change the threats as such.

Admiral GREENERT. I would only add a caveat. You can't change a threat. You can determine what you view to be in your vital interests, your national interests. Threats are certainly a part of that equation.

Mr. FORBES. Good. Thank you. Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of questions for each of the witnesses, and I guess in the interest of time, if you can be brief in your response, I know we have votes later on.

How long will it take to return your service's forces to their pre-2001 readiness posture? How much will it cost to achieve that level of readiness? And will we ever again attain that level of readiness? And is that even the correct standard of measurement? I guess we will start with General Chiarelli.

General CHIARELLI. Ma'am, we never want to go back to 2001.

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, I am talking about prewar.

General CHIARELLI. Even prewar. Our level of readiness today is much better than it was in the prewar period, much better than it was in the prewar period, but that does not—you still have to understand we have got a force that has been fighting for 10 years, and from a strained standpoint is a force that has been strained over time. We have equipment that has to be reset and when that equipment returns from theater, we will need the funds to reset that equipment. But we have never had a force that is more combat-tested than the United States Army of today. Ten years of fighting with an All-Volunteer Force, soldiers who have been on three, four, five, and six deployments, gives you a level of readiness
when it comes to their ability as soldiers that I don’t believe has ever been as high as it is today.

Ms. Bordallo. So even cost, the whole package, is much better today?

General Chiarelli. Level of readiness is greater. We never want to go back.

Ms. Bordallo. All right.

General Chiarelli. But that doesn’t mean there aren’t things we need to fix.

Ms. Bordallo. Admiral.

Admiral Greenert. Thank you, ma’am. I think I need to characterize our force in 9/11 first, and then I will answer your question.

We had 316 ships on 9/11. We have 285 today. On 9/11 we had 385 [385,000] sailors in the Navy. Today we have 325 [325,000]. So we are a different Navy. We are a smaller Navy.

Our readiness posture today, the foundation of it, is the process, the fleet response plan. We owe and have a covenant with the combatant commanders to meet a global force management plan. To meet that, I think our unfunded requirement probably best describes where we want to be in maintenance, and that is $367 million in ship depot maintenance and $317 million in aviation spares.

That would give you my best estimate of where I would like to be to meet a readiness standard cost-wise, to quantify it for you, ma’am.

Ms. Bordallo. So you take a different view, then. In other words, you are a smaller Navy today than you were back then.

Admiral Greenert. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. Bordallo. And our next one is General Dunford.

General Dunford. Thank you, Congresswoman Bordallo.

Let me answer the question about the pre-9/11 benchmark first. When we looked at the future and we developed what we believe to be the Marine Corps that the Nation will need tomorrow, we didn’t look at 9/11, we looked at the threats in the future. So we don’t benchmark our readiness for tomorrow based on where we were yesterday.

I agree with General Chiarelli with regard to the quality of the force. We have never had a force that is more capable than the one that we have today.

Having said that, we have seen significant degradation, particularly in the category of equipment readiness, over the past 10 years. So when we look at the cost of resetting—that is, replacing or fixing the equipment that will come out of Afghanistan—as well as the cost of modernizing, our initial figures are on the order of $12 billion. That $12 billion, again, is to reset the equipment that will come out of Afghanistan as well as modernize to the degree that we have done the analysis right now.

I would qualify that figure somewhat by saying that there are many lessons learned from Afghanistan and from Iraq right now that we haven’t yet institutionalized. We are in the process right now of examining our equipment standards, how much equipment a unit rates. And I suspect that we will find that particularly in the case of communications gear and, in some cases, mobility capability that we will need additional equipment.
But $12 billion is about the number right now that we have, and that is a combination of reset and reconstitution.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General.

General Breedlove.

General BREEDLOVE. Thank you, ma’am.

I will echo just a couple of comments of my Navy colleague. The Air Force is smaller now than it was in 2001 by some 250 fighters and some other forces. So I don’t think that it is likely that we will return to the size and the capacity that we once had in the fiscal environment we face. We will be a smaller force.

I will also echo the remarks of my fellow vices, in that, while we were ready in 2001, we are a combat-tested and incredibly ready force now as we deploy. That sometimes comes at the expense of the non-deployed forces, as we make sure that those forces that are forward get the supplies and the abilities that they have.

Our small capabilities, limited-number but high-demand capabilities, have been rode hard for the last 10 years. To get back to the material readiness that the vice commandant speaks about is a tough road to hoe in what we see to be the next fiscal environment.

Ms. BORDALLO. Uh-huh. So in a few of your cases, then, you are a smaller organization, but you are far more ready and qualified today. Is that the message?

General BREEDLOVE. When it comes to the capability——

Ms. BORDALLO. That is correct.

General BREEDLOVE [continuing]. Of our airmen as they fight on the ground and in the air, we are a battle-tested and proven force and ready there. It is our material readiness that is strained, in our aircraft and our high-demand, limited-density assets.

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, I thank you very——

General CHIARELLI. May I add something, ma’am? I am sorry.

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes.

General CHIARELLI. I was wondering if I could add something.

We are a larger force today, but we didn’t get large quick enough. I don’t know if everyone remembers, but there was a period in time, because we could not grow the force as fast as demand was requiring, that we had to go to 15-month deployments. When I say we never want to go back to that again, we never want to go back to that again. What that did to soldiers and to families was nothing any of us want to see again.

So when I say we don’t want to go back, it is much easier to take down this force, and quicker, than it would be to build it up, should something that we don’t foresee happen in the future.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General.

I have another question. This will be my last. I would like to ask about training opportunities in the Pacific. Now, I know that some of you are more apt to answer that than the others. But it appears that training opportunities in the Pacific are trending in the wrong direction, particularly in Okinawa.

What steps is the Department of Defense and each of the services taking to address broader training issues in the Pacific? And to what extent is each of the services participating in environmental impact statements funded by the Pacific Command but led by the Marines to look at Pacific training? And how do we get training right in the Pacific?
I guess I will start with you, General.

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman Bordallo, as you know, we are actively involved in implementation of the DPRI [Defense Policy Review Initiative] agreement. And as you pointed out, one of the biggest challenges we have as we look at the proper laydown of Marine forces after we come out of the war is ensuring that they have training opportunities for the entire Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Those opportunities right now are limited and don’t fully meet all of our requirements.

As we become more desegregated in conjunction with the DPRI, those training requirements will actually increase. We will need to find other opportunities to increase training opportunities.

We have identified our training requirements; we have done a detailed analysis. We provided that analysis to the U.S. Pacific Command. We provided that analysis to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. And we are actively involved both in the environmental impact studies as well as the negotiations that OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] is leading with a number of countries in the Pacific to ensure that our training requirements in the future are met.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much, General.

General Breedlove.

General BREEDLOVE. Yes, ma’am. As you well know, with your familiarity of the Pacific, as Korea and Japan become much more dense with people and their use of airspace becomes much more constricted for our aircraft, and as our aircraft get more and more sophisticated and need more room in which to practice, we are severely challenged in Japan and in Korea to meet our training needs.

And so we are forced now to seek our training actually in the continental United States, in Alaska, or maybe back at Nellis. So we have to move the forces from the forward area back to the rear area to get them training, which, of course, is expensive and takes time out of their training. So we, too, are looking for opportunities to increase our training capability.

As far as the issue of the Marines, we are working and partnering with our Marine brothers and sisters to best meet the demands should we have to do joint basing and look at those opportunities around.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General.

Admiral Greenert, you were once stationed in Guam, so I am sure you are quite familiar with the region.

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, ma’am. Thank you for the question.

First of all, we are quite pleased with the support we get in Guam for training. We have been training there for years. Our explosive ordnance disposal, our SEALs [Sea, Air, and Land], our maritime expeditionary support forces, our RIVRONs [Riverine Squadrons] all train there. And so I would say, for expeditionary warfare, it is hard to find a better site than the islands in and around Guam and the government of Guam’s support.

Other training opportunities we have to continue to develop: missile defense. And, in this case, it is the Pacific Missile Range in Kauai. We have to continue to upgrade that and make sure that
it stays technologically in synchronization with the development of missile defense technologies that we have to test out.

Acoustic training. Antisubmarine warfare is a skill set unique to us, and we have to dominate the undersea domain. And so, finding those ranges, whether it be ad hoc where we use our own, if you will, organic equipment or, if you will, instrumented range, those are our challenges, ma’am.

Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Admiral.

And General Chiarelli.

General Chiarelli. Well, ma’am, as we all know, a majority of our training is in Korea and Hawaii. We were able to train at both locations. I recently toured Hawaii and the training facilities there. We work both environmental and cultural issues there. But have absolutely outstanding training facilities for the 25th and other visiting units.

In addition to that, we have elements in Kwajalein that are able to do excellent missile defense training in that area.

Ms. Bordallo. Well, thank you very much, gentlemen. It is encouraging news.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Madeleine.

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Breedlove, as you know, Robbins Air Force Base is the heart of my district, and Fort Benning is just to my west, Kings Bay to my east. The Marine Corps Logistics Base in Albany is also in Georgia. And I want to thank all of you for what you mean to my State. And I, for one, want to do anything and everything that I can to help you be successful in your job.

With that said, I would like to just ask a simple question. And as I listen and watch the news, the thing that we keep coming back to with regard to inefficiencies, if you will, seems to be driven by uncertainty, not knowing what your budget number is going to be, whether it is going to be a flat line or a 3 percent up or a 3 percent down.

Would you be better served if the difference was split and you knew exactly what it was going to be, than the inefficiencies of not knowing? Would you be better off if you knew you were going to have 1 percent less if you absolutely knew that you were going to have it? Could you accomplish more?

General.

General Chiarelli. It is very, very difficult to do the work necessary to prepare a budget the size of the Army’s budget in the amount of time I fear we are going to have to be able to do that. It creates all kinds of inefficiencies that we worry about because so many of our programs are interrelated.

I ran into a particular program while doing capability portfolio reviews where I had over 200 launchers but only 100 missiles, which made absolutely no sense. There was no one who planned to do that. And I am sure that something like that happens when you are forced at the last minute to put together all the documentation required to submit a budget without the appropriate time to do that in a very, very focused and correct way.
So it does make it more difficult, and I believe it generates inefficiencies.

Admiral GREENERT. I would echo what General Chiarelli said. The mechanics of putting together a budget is extraordinary in the Navy and the Army, Marine Corps, Air Force.

I would add that we need a strategy, you know, given a dollar value, even if it is a percentage, in my opinion, a strategy and guidance to deal with that change, be it up or be it down, I think is important, because that enables us to have a deliberate process that can be collaborative, and then we can pursue a joint or inter-agency solution, which tends to be more efficient than a rapid service-only kind of solution, which can be the manifestation of a short timeframe.

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I would echo Admiral Greenert’s comments. I think if we had a clear strategy, with predictability with resources that would be available, we would be more efficient.

General BREEDLOVE. I will pile on that remark. If we understood the strategy and the demand, that makes it easier for us to determine how to meet that demand.

To your first point, Mr. Congressman, if we have a certain amount of budget cut, we can go to our force and constrict that force and maybe retain all of the different capabilities of that force. If the cut becomes so deep that you cannot find those efficiencies by taking portions of several capabilities, you may have to take an entire capability out in order to get to the deep savings that you need in depots, in modernization, in force structure and people and basing when you take an entire slice out.

So understanding the depth of the problem up front allows us to make good decisions about how we would go after force structure as we are going to constrict.

Mr. SCOTT. So if we did the budget on a 2-year basis, how much would that help, if you had a 24-month planning and execution timeline on the budget?

General Breedlove.

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, I will step up to that first.

Any stability in these kind of budgets are helpful. In fact, when we look at how we buy in space and other large procurement programs, the ability to put stability into a purchasing program allows the subcontractors and others to predict and count on and then produce in good quantities. So stability in budget is always helpful as we plan for these types of things.

Mr. SCOTT. Gentlemen, my time has expired, but thank you for being here, and thank you for what you do for our country.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Austin.

The distinguished gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling this hearing.

And, gentlemen, thanks for being here, and thanks for your service.

Discussing this issue is always, I think, from my perspective, tenuous, because you don't want to give too much information to those that are wanting to know exactly what our status is, but I
think it is very useful to us to be able to be in a position to see how we can best help, in terms of making each of the services ready and prepared for whatever challenge we have.

My question is for General Chiarelli. And, you know, we have talked from time to time about the Army's plans to ensure that our soldiers in the field have that communications network that they need and that they have come to rely on here in carrying out the fight in the 21st century.

So perhaps I will start by asking you to tell us a little bit more about the Army's network modernization strategy. And, most importantly, I think most of us are interested in, how is the Army prepared to stay ahead of the changes that technology makes literally every 6 months?

General CHIARELLI. Well, sir, thank you for that question.

We are very, very pleased in something I indicated in my opening statement, the network integration exercise that we just conducted out of Fort Bliss, Texas. For the very first time here in the United States, we had the entire network deployed across Fort Bliss and White Sands. And it was an amazing, amazing exercise where we were able to see for the first time how the network integrates and, in fact, do many of the integration challenges that commanders are going to have downrange. We will have that next exercise in October.

We published a sources-sought document—and this is what I find very, very exciting—out to the industry where we and TRADOC [United States Army Training and Doctrine Command] had seen gaps in network capabilities. Within 30 days, we had 71 white papers come in, where industry had spent their own dime to put together products that fill those gaps. Many of them will be tested in October for the first time. This is noteworthy because, rather than using our R&D [Research and Development] money, industry has used theirs to bring to us products that they believe will fit the needs of the Army.

We are pushing the network down to the tactical edge. And the network integration exercises to be conducted every 6 months at Fort Bliss are going to prove to be valuable—valuable to the COCOM commanders, to the warfighters, and, I believe, to the American taxpayers.

Mr. REYES. In terms of this first test that occurred—and I say that because, you know, we have gone from the introduction of the iPhone to now the iPhone 4. And that is an example of how that technology evolves and changes so quickly. So how is the Army—I want to get back to the question of, how is the Army preparing itself to stay ahead of that curve?

Because I don't want to—the only thing I can relate this to is the B–52 bombers that were old when I was in Vietnam, and today we are still using them. Nothing against the B–52s, but in today's world technology changes so fast that I think we are in the position to make sure that we at least keep up with it.

General CHIARELLI. Well, we have done a couple of things. The first is to publish the first-ever operating environment, where we have set the left limits and the right limits of the Army's network and asked industry to build within that left and right limit. If they don't, we are not going to buy.
We have changed our acquisition strategy. We are going to only buy as many as we need. The tendency has always been in the Army to find something and buy one for everyone. That is not what we are going to do. In capabilities packages that go over 2-year periods, we are going to buy what we need and then look for changes in technology to provide to follow-on forces in successive capabilities packages.

All this is possible because of the network integration exercises that we are doing at Fort Bliss. And I really think it is going to change the way the Army acquires, in so many different ways.

Mr. Reyes. Thank you.

And, Mr. Chairman, I would invite and the ranking member come out and see, perhaps in October, the test, the second test on that. It is really remarkable, the way that it has been integrated, and I think it is the way of the future.

Mr. Forbes. We would like to do that. And we are planning right now some trips to our various yards to look at them, and maybe we can put that on the list.

The distinguished gentleman from Mississippi is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. Palazzo. Mr. Chairman, thank you for hosting this hearing today.

And thank you to our witnesses for being here and for the service to our country. I appreciate it.

Ensuring the readiness of our Nation and our ability to respond to global threats is one of my number-one priorities here in Congress. We are, no doubt, in a time of serious uncertainty when it comes to the national debt limit and the path forward. Some in Congress have suggested that cutting defense spending is an acceptable way to meet the goals of deficit reduction. I couldn't disagree more with some of my colleagues that think of that.

I have a few questions regarding our current issues of readiness. And if we have a little extra time, I would like to hear your thoughts about defense spending cuts.

Admiral Greenert, I know the Navy has chosen to reduce the Marine Corps prepositioning stock in EUCOM [United States European Command]. Can you talk a little more about the decision to move two maritime prepositioning squadrons from the reserve status back to Jacksonville, Florida?

Admiral Greenert. Well, actually, Congressman, what I am familiar with is moving the maritime prepositioning squadrons, what we call the ROS–5 [Reduced Operating Status–5] status. I can speak to that. We did that in deliberation with the Marine Corps within the Department.

There are three squadrons. The first two squadrons, which are very committed to a timeline to meet an operational plan requirement, that is on track. And the ROS–5, as we say, ready in 5 days, we view as an acceptable risk, again, in consultation with the Marine Corps. We have found that the Maritime Sealift Command has been very reliable in delivering in that ROS, be it ROS–5, –15, –30. And, again, after consultation and deliberations, we believe it is an acceptable risk.
The movement of squadrons back to Jacksonville, I will research that, and I will have to get back to you on the detail of those particular individual squadrons. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 93.]

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay. Thank you.

And I guess for General Dunford, with a smaller footprint, are we able to meet COCOM requirements?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, the primary purpose of maritime prepositioning is to meet the combatant commander's operational plan requirements. Two squadrons would meet the old plan requirements.

What is more important than the numbers of squadrons is the actual composition of the squadrons. And as long as the two remaining fully operational squadrons can carry about 80 percent of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade's equipment, then I am comfortable that we can meet the combatant commander's requirements with two squadrons.

What you lose with the loss of a third squadron actually is the day-to-day support for theater security cooperation and phase-zero shaping operations in the other combatant commanders' areas of operation.

Mr. PALAZZO. Do you believe the current mix of equipment is correct?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, the equipment that we have aboard those ships right now are legacy construct. We are in the process, as I mentioned, of doing a detailed force structure review. Part of that detailed force structure review will take a look at what the organizational construct will be for the Marine Corps, and that will drive some changes in our equipment.

So the current legacy squadrons are correct for today. We are going to make some changes to our tables of equipment, and that will incur some changes, as well, in the organizational construct of the squadrons.

Mr. PALAZZO. Do you have any idea of what kind of financial commitment we would be looking at, to go from legacy to the new—what you envision the force going to?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I don't have that available right now. We are in the process—this is a complicated issue. We are working with United States Transportation Command on some of the platforms that might be available, working very close with the Navy on the ships that would be available. And, of course, we are doing our own internal analysis on the actual equipment that we will require aboard those ships.

So all that analysis will go on over the next several months. And I think, certainly, by the spring of next year, we will be prepared to come back and articulate the future of maritime prepositioning.

Mr. PALAZZO. That is all I have. Thank you, gentlemen.

I yield back.

Mr. FORBES. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to all the witnesses for your testimony today.
Admiral Greenert, great to see you. Congratulations on the news that pretty soon——

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, sir.

Mr. COURTNEY [continuing]. It will be “CNO” only in front of your name.

And I wanted to ask you a couple questions. Mr. Forbes talked a little bit earlier about some of the speculation regarding aircraft carriers. One of the other sort of topics that has been out there, in terms of the budget pressures—in fact, I think it was General Cartwright gave a speech recently where he talked about the SSBN replacement program and possibly looking at alternatives, such as a stretch Virginia, which, superficially, seems to have some attraction. In fact, this committee looked at that concept last Congress.

And, I mean, given the fact that it would require a smaller missile, ICBM, that is not built right now, and I think there are lots of other questions that the design of that vessel would generate in terms of complications and certainly potential costs, I was wondering if you had any comment regarding that speculation that, again, is in the press about that as an alternative, a cheaper alternative to the Ohio replacement.

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir. I know a little bit more about it than what you have read—you and I have read in the press.

General Cartwright, I have a lot of respect for him and his vision, and so it is probably worthy to look into. But what we know about it, we looked at a Virginia, if you will, module as one of the alternatives. That was reviewed by the Defense Science Board. And the SSBN–X concept that we are preparing for today was the ultimate outcome of that.

I think we have to look at the survivability of such a vessel, a Virginia, with that missile compartment, the range of a missile. A smaller missile might limit options. And those are all part and parcel for the key performance parameters of the overall system that, again, we would have to look into.

And redesigning the missile will obviously add cost, rather than just using the D–5 missile, and that could change the balance.

So all of those items would have to be looked at again, because I think they would play into bear on the affordability.

Mr. COURTNEY. And, again, this is really a mission that really is a core strategic goal which the Nuclear Posture Review and Quadrennial Defense—I mean, really, it has just been across the board that this is something that we have to build into risk assessment in terms of having a sea-based deterrence.

So, again, I think the Navy did a terrific job, in terms of bringing down the cost per vessel with that process that you just described. And I am sure there are going to be additional efforts to try and see if there are other ways to find savings. But that concept just seems like fraught with delay and costs that, again, I think could really just boomerang in terms of what, you know, people are trying to achieve.

The other question I wanted to ask you was, when myself and Mr. Forbes and others were pushing to boost the shipbuilding program for Virginia a few years back, I mean, we were certainly looking at numbers at the time that mission requests from combatant commanders for submarine deployments was roughly about 50 per-
cent, in terms of what was actually being met. And I think those were, like, 2009 figures.

I was wondering, again, just sort of put it in context, in terms of where—your testimony today, in terms of where we are. Are we going up, down, in terms of that? Or is that percentage pretty much the same today?

Admiral GREENERT. The percentage is, I would say, a little down. In other words, a number of years ago, the request by COCOM was 19, and we were able to provide 11 based on force structure—or, earlier mentioned, 16 versus 10. And these are, as you know, SSN days, SSNs out there deployed. So that is the context of that.

Now, as you well know, if you look at our ship inventory, when it comes to submarines, 48 is the number that we testified a need to. That is the requirement. And we won't be able to meet that requirement through the years, which is why we are very focused on two Virginia-class submarines, a year to construction, to help meet that COCOM demand.

Mr. COURTNEY. Great.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.

General Dunford, Mr. Rogers had a question. He had to leave to go to another hearing, but he wanted me to ask this question. If you were required to reduce your forces by 10,000 or more within the next 18 to 24 months, how would that impact the Marine Corps?

General DUNFORD. Chairman, first of all, we are at 202,000 right now, and we still have many units that are well below the one-to-two deployment-to-dwell that General Chiarelli referred to earlier. So, until we draw down from Afghanistan, we can't significantly reduce our overall end strength.

And we would have to, when we do reduce our end strength, do so in a measured way, so as not to break faith with the Marines that have done so much over the past 10 years. And the numbers of Marines that we can draw down in any given year is directly related to the numbers of Marines we enlisted 4 years prior.

So our number for planning, for example, is somewhere in the vicinity of 4,000 a year is the maximum number of Marines that can be drawn down in a given year. Some years, it is a little bit less. But, on average, our planning figure is we can draw down about 4,000 Marines a year without breaking faith with Marines or their families.

Mr. FORBES. Good.

Admiral Greenert, I had another question for you regarding in the Air-Sea Battle concept. You know, we know that has been requested by Secretary Gates for, I think, over a year now. Any idea when we might be seeing that and how close we are to getting that out?

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The study, if you will, is in Mr. Panetta's office—Secretary Panetta. We anticipate he will look at it soon, give his comments. And we look forward to being able to release appropriate aspects of it in unclassified and classified form as appropriate. We look forward to that.

Mr. FORBES. So we think that is pretty close?
Admiral GREENERT. I hope so, sir. You know, we are focused on it.

Mr. FORBES. And just a couple more questions.

General Dunford and General Chiarelli, you both talked about the reset portion and how important that was to you. I think, General, you talked about $10 billion for the Army if—or how much was that for the Army?

General CHIARELLI. We are looking at $25 billion to $20 billion.

Mr. FORBES. Twenty-five-point—

General CHIARELLI. Twenty to $25 billion is going to be the total cost for reset—

Mr. FORBES. Twenty to $25 billion.

General Dunford, I think you said 12.

General DUNFORD. Chairman, that figure combined our reconstitution and our modernization, as well. We have requested in the 2012 budget approximately $3 billion of reset. We have estimated that we will require an additional $5 billion of reset at the conclusion of hostilities, and need OCO funding for approximately 2 to 3 years after coming out. And then what I added in to that $12 billion was actually our initial estimate of modernization of $5 billion. So that is how I got to approximately $12 billion.

We did have some other resources that we requested in 2011. We have received those resources, and now we are currently analyzing our request for 2013.

Mr. FORBES. For both of you, if budget cuts came down and impacted your ability on that reset, the dollars that you had, how would that impact your timeline capability of doing the reset that you need?

General CHIARELLI. There are a number of answers to that question, sir.

First of all, the bill doesn’t go away. And we have been counting on 2 to 3 years after the end of hostilities being able to get OCO money, because that is a true cost of war, to do that reset.

One might look at this year’s reset budget and say, “Army, you have $775 million that you are not going to be able to execute.” That is correct, but that is because 41,000 pieces of equipment went into Afghanistan when we thought it was going to be coming back home to take care of the surge in Afghanistan. And, as you know, we make the estimates for reset 2 years before the money actually gets to us. So, when changes occur, we have to have the equipment back in the States to do the reset; if the equipment doesn’t come back, we can’t do the reset. That is why we have that additional money this year.

But that don’t make the bill go away. That equipment is going to come back at some point in time, and when it does, it is going to have to be reset.

Mr. FORBES. Okay.

General Dunford.

General DUNFORD. Chairman, our total procurement account in the Marine Corps, it runs about $2 billion. It has been steady for about 20 years. During this FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], we are projected to be at a high of about $2.7 billion during the FYDP.
So you can see what a $5 billion reset would do to our modernization account. It would have a significantly adverse effect if we were forced to pay the reset bill out of our baseline budget. Quite frankly, we wouldn't be able to get to where we need to get to along the timeline that we believe is critical.

Mr. Forbes. And, Admiral Greenert, the last question I have for you. Going back to the numbers we were chatting about earlier on our shipbuilding plan, I think it would be fair to say that the Congress has been averaging about $15 billion over last three decades. This year, we put in $14.9 billion.

As you know, CBO has come out with their report suggesting that, to follow your plan, you would need about $19 billion per year. I think some of your own figures—but I don't want to throw these at you—show that we would need about $17.3 billion. But let's just take the CBO figures.

How realistic do you think it is, with the budgets that we are seeing and proposed cuts, that we are going to have those kind of increases going into the shipbuilding plan over the next several years? And if we can't come up with a realistic scenario of getting those dollars, does that mean our shipbuilding plan is not a realistic plan?

Admiral Greenert. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I looked at the CBO report, and, as we know, the differences vary by year, if you will, by tranche of years. First 10 years, we are pretty close. It is about inflation indices, labor differences, cost differences, and, really, the foundation, if you will, or the assumptions put into the design of the ships. We vary slightly on what the future ship might look like.

But, nonetheless, to get to your question at hand, if we receive a reduction of the ilk we were talking about, $886 billion, and we have to reduce force structure and we can't build ships to the level that we need to, then our shipbuilding plan—it gets back to strategy. I would have to change the strategy. So, as stated by all our leadership, we need a change in strategy.

Mr. Forbes. Good.

Now, for any of our four witnesses, anything that we have left out that you want to get on the record? Anything you would like to change that you have stated? We want to make sure you have the time to do that.

General Chiarelli, any last comments that you have for us?

General Chiarelli. Mr. Chairman, I can't think of any. I think you have done a very, very good job of covering the waterfront, so to speak.

Mr. Forbes. Good. Well, thank you, General.

Admiral, anything?

Admiral Greenert. You covered our waterfront, as well, sir.

Mr. Forbes. Good, good.

General Dunford.

General Dunford. Chairman, I would just probably echo something that General Breedlove said earlier. I think all the witnesses today joined the military in the 1970s, and probably what we found when we joined was certainly what looked to me like a hollow force with regard to equipment readiness and training and so forth. And we very much appreciate your efforts to ensure that, when we do draw down a force and we do take a look at where reductions
might be taken in the budget, we do so in a measured way so that we don’t end up, at the end of the day, with a force that is hollow in the future.

Mr. FORBES. Good.

And General Breedlove.

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, we just thank you for your stewardship of our military services. And if we do have to face the kind of budget cuts that we are hearing about, we look forward to being a partner with you to make sure that we get our forces right for the future.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General.

And I think, if you could just be patient, I think Ms. Bordallo has one last question.

Ms. BORDALLO. I thought we might end on a positive note. And I would like to ask all of the witnesses, how do we build on the progress that each of you discussed in terms of retaining the very capable force that we have now?

We will start with you, General.

General CHIARELLI. Well, we can’t lose their trust. And that is absolutely critical.

The Chief of Staff of the Army has a great picture where it shows a soldier who is talking into a microphone, a lieutenant out in the field. And we really don’t know what he is saying, but, as the chief often says, we are the only army in the world where, if he is asking for something, anything, he knows he is going to get it.

And that is a level of trust we have with the soldiers of the United States Army. And we just need to make sure that, whatever we do, we never take away his ability and his belief that, if in combat he asks for it, he is going to get it, or she is going to get it.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral.

Admiral GREENERT. Very eloquently done by General Chiarelli. And I think he has hit a key part of it. Our sailors want to be challenged, and they want to feel that what they are doing is relevant. And they want to be—they need to be motivated, remain motivated.

But the old saying in the Navy, I think, applies: You enlist the sailor; you reenlist the family. We have to be sure that our sailors believe that we will also take care of their families while they are away, deployed.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral.

General.

General DUNFORD. One of our commandant’s top priorities he describes is keeping faith with our Marines and their families.

And I think there are two parts of that. The first is ensuring that if we are going to send them in harm’s way, they have the wherewithal to accomplish the mission with a minimal loss of life or equipment.

And the other part is that when they are focused on the mission, they don’t have to look over their shoulder to see if they are well-supported back home. They know, as General Chiarelli said, that they can trust that the United States Marine Corps is taking care of their family and their loved ones when they are forward deployed.
And I think those are the two key elements of maintaining a quality force in the future.


General Breedlove. Thank you, ma’am. And I would echo a couple of the things my compatriots have already said.

First of all, trust. And part of that trust is we don’t send American soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines to the battle with the second-best equipment or the second-best training. We have to continue to equip and train our force so that they can overcome anybody that gets in front of them.

Second, again, is to challenge them. How do you train troops who are the most battle-tested we have ever had in our service? We have to continue to invest and to put our efforts toward giving them quality training that will not only prepare them for today’s fight but the future fight that may be very different than today’s.

And then, finally, recognize their sacrifice and the sacrifices of their families as we go forward.

Thank you, ma’am.

Ms. Bordallo. I thank all of you gentlemen for the service that you have donated to our country. You have placed your entire life, your careers. And I think I join the—I am sure I join the Chairman in saying that we are tremendously proud of our men and women in the military service. Thank you.

Mr. Forbes. We echo that.

And, General Chiarelli, we will just tell to all four of you, it is the commitment of this subcommittee and this full committee that we are going to make sure that when those men and women are on that line and that microphone, that we are over here listening and making sure they get those resources. And thank you all for helping us do that.

I now ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members be allowed to submit questions for the record for today’s hearing. Is there any objection?

And, without objection, so ordered.

Mr. Forbes. With that, thank you all so much.

And we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X

JULY 26, 2011
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 26, 2011
Statement of the Honorable J. Randy Forbes  
Chairman, Readiness Subcommittee  
“Total Force Readiness”  
July 26, 2011

I want to welcome all of our members and our distinguished panel of experts to today’s hearing focused on total force readiness and how we resource, train, and equip our military for the challenges they face.

No one will dispute that we have the most capable and professional military in the world. However, a dichotomy exists when you contrast the decline in readiness funding with the increase in scope of missions we expect our military to undertake.

Two weeks ago, this subcommittee heard about the challenges the Navy has faced in preserving and enhancing its readiness and current capabilities. I suspect we will hear today how our other military services face many of the same challenges.

This downward trend in our military readiness, when compared with the threat environment we already face and the rapidly increasing capabilities of many emerging powers, is particularly troubling.

In January of this year, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates admitted that Beijing’s military modernization caught the U.S. intelligence community off guard.

Just two weeks ago, researchers from the World Security Institute released a study noting that China, in ten short years, has “likely equaled the US’s ability to observe targets from space” which could reduce the United States’ ability to conduct certain operations in the region.1

Juxtapose these trends against a backdrop of large U.S. force structure reductions and the $400–$900 billion in defense cuts proposed over the past several weeks, and you can see how current challenges can grow to become significant problems.

In January, Chairman Mullen was quoted saying that “any significant additional budget cuts can almost only be met … through substantial reductions in

force structure” and that this goes “against the national security requirements that we see in the world we’re living in.”

If you look at some of the major readiness indicators, the numbers seem to reinforce these concerns. For years, we have taken calculated risks in certain areas to properly resource operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the trend cannot continue indefinitely.

At some point, the “nice-to-haves” are long gone and we begin sacrificing the “must-haves.” Certainly, there are tough decisions ahead for our military and this Congress. However, with each decision we must ask ourselves, “What is the risk?” and “Are we prepared to accept it?”

I am afraid that if the risks continue to increase, at some point our Combatant Commanders will be forced to decide which missions they can no longer perform because the resources are just not there.

Just before his departure in June, Secretary Gates expressed these exact concerns warning that “no further [budgetary] reductions should be considered without an honest and thorough assessment of the risks involved, to include the missions we may need to shed in the future.”

And, while some may agree that a narrower mission or high risk is acceptable, this is not a position that I am prepared to accept. Unfortunately, this is exactly the direction we are headed if we do not take strides to preserve the budget and our critical investments.

This subcommittee has a responsibility to ensure our men and women in uniform are given all the tools they need to do their job safely and return home. To do so, it is incumbent upon us to preserve and defend strategic investments for the future.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about both our current state of readiness, and how we can help preserve and enhance it for the future.

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RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT BY

GENERAL PETER W. CHIARELLI
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FIRST SESSION, 112TH CONGRESS

ON

ON READINESS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

JULY 26, 2011

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
INTRODUCTION

Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of our Secretary, the Honorable John McHugh, our Chief of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, and the more than one million Soldiers who serve in the Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve, as well as those serving in our Active Component, I thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the state of readiness of the United States Army.

I want to thank you for your steadfast support and demonstrated commitment to our men and women in uniform. I have testified before this subcommittee many times during my tenure as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and I always appreciate the genuine concern the Members routinely show to matters as they pertain to our Soldiers, Army Civilians, Family Members and the overall readiness of our Force. It is largely through your support that we have the resources and manpower required to sustain us in the current fight, while simultaneously preparing and training Soldiers and resetting/replacing equipment for the next fight. We are deeply grateful and appreciative of your continued, strong support.

You called me and the other service Vices here today to provide you an assessment of the current readiness of our respective services in the context of increasingly constrained budgets and changes to force structure. Let me assure you upfront, your Army remains the most capable and decisive land force in the world. It is better trained and equipped, and our young leaders are better prepared than at any
other time in history. However, as you well know, America’s Army has been operating at a tremendous pace for nearly ten years. Demand for forces stressed our supply during most of this period and today our Soldiers and their families are under a great amount of stress and strain. Our Army is out of balance. Current demand continues to challenge our ability to generate forces; and, although small improvements in readiness of forces in the “Train/Ready” phase of our Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) model have been visible over the past year, these gains are tentative and a direct result of three factors: previous funding, stabilized demand, and a marginal increase in the average length of Soldiers’ DWELL at home station.

**PRIMARY CHALLENGES**

We have three primary challenges with respect to readiness of the Force. First, we must ensure that next-to-deploy units have the resources and training required to accomplish the mission. Due to the sustained demand on available forces over the past decade, the Army has had to build trained and ready units closer and closer to the deployment date. This increases the risk to COCOM commanders.

Our second readiness challenge lies to our first challenge: to further build strategic depth by increasing operational flexibility for units in the “Train/Ready” phase. As demand declines and home station DWELL increases, these units will have sufficient time to recover/recuperate, be properly resourced and conduct training for operations across the full spectrum of conflict.
Our third readiness challenge relates to the overall health and well-being of the Force – most importantly, Soldiers and Family Members; but, also referring to the state of readiness of our vehicles and equipment. Nearly ten years of conflict have taken a significant toll on our people in terms of physical and mental injuries and illness, education, stress on the Family, and employer support. These wars have also taken a toll on our equipment. Continued funding is critical to ensuring the necessary Reset of our vehicles and equipment; as well as to ensure we are able to procure the right systems that are both affordable and sustainable for the next 20 years.

PREPARING AN ARMY FOR AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

We recognize in this era of persistent engagement the need to properly rebalance our Force to ensure long-term readiness. In recent years, we made significant progress towards this endeavor, with the continued support of Congress and this committee in particular. In fact, we expect to meet our goal to rebalance the Force by the end of FY12. We have done this through successful implementation of a four-year plan centered on our key imperatives: to continue to sustain the current Force; prepare forces for success in both today’s and tomorrow’s conflicts; Reset returning units; and transform our Army, adapting as required to meet the demands of the future.

For the latter half of the last century, the United States Army faced a relatively certain future characterized by straightforward strategic and operational environments; obvious enemies; clearly identifiable threats to vital national interests; and adequate resources required to man and equip the Force. Under these circumstances, a tiered
readiness approach characterized by “haves” and “have-nots” and an equipping strategy that made large procurement commitments based on long-range goals made sense. Today’s uncertain, dynamic strategic and operational environment, coupled with current political and fiscal realities, and the rapid pace of technology development have made these outdated strategies no longer supportable.

America’s Army now faces, and will continue to face for the foreseeable future, a broad array of complex challenges as the Nation approaches the start of the second decade of a long-term struggle against a global extremist network. Looking ahead, we must ensure we have a fully manned, trained, equipped and modernized Force prepared and ready to meet the complex challenges of the future. We must balance all four of these requirements to achieve a versatile mix of tailor able and networked organizations, operating on a rotational cycle, able to provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces, at a tempo that is predictable and sustainable for our all-volunteer Force.

While we pursue the right balance, Army leadership remains mindful of the fact that our nation is dealing with significant fiscal and economic pressures. Those pressures have a direct impact on the strength of our national defense. We understand we owe it to the American public to make the most of every dollar entrusted to us for the defense of our Nation. I assure the Members of this subcommittee, I and the Army’s other senior leaders take this responsibility very seriously. We recognize we cannot expect to operate the way we have over the past decade. We cannot expect the same
level of funding and flexibility to continue indefinitely. As we drawdown forces in Iraq and eventually in Afghanistan, we must determine what the Army of the future will look like, to include force mix and organizational structure. While funding levels may be reduced in coming years, it is essential that we make the necessary investment to ensure a strong, capable defense.

In today’s fiscally-constrained environment, we are all under tremendous pressure to find cost savings. While there is great appeal to pursuing the easy gains made by making cuts to force structure, there is significant risk associated with making arbitrary top line cuts without doing what is necessary to ensure what remains is a balanced, albeit smaller force capable of modest expansion should the need arise. The following section provides additional context on where we are today with the size of the Army, how we got here, and where we are headed.

In January 2007, to meet the demands of the current strategic environment, the President approved and Congress authorized the “Grow the Army” plan. The 74,200 Soldier increase included: 65,000 in the Active Component (AC), 8,200 in the Army National Guard (ARNG), and 1,000 in the United States Army Reserve (USAR). Congress and the Secretary of Defense subsequently approved an additional Temporary End Strength Increase (TESI) of 22,000 Soldiers to enable the Army to offset the loss of operational inventory due to the elimination of Stop Loss, the increase in the number of wounded and injured Soldiers and the increase in the number of other non-deployable personnel.
We are currently working towards achieving the authorized end strength of 547.4K by the end of FY13. In January 2011, the Army was further directed by the Secretary of Defense to cut an additional 27K personnel to achieve an end strength of 520.4K by the end of FY16. This additional reduction is to be based on operational demands.

It is imperative that as we begin to draw down forces, we do not sacrifice our combat experience and unit cohesion by cutting large numbers of Soldiers arbitrarily. We also do not want to repeat the errors of the past by starting too late in the process. It is critical to the long-term readiness of our Army that we make changes to force structure based upon our best estimation of current and future mission requirements. Bottom line: we must maintain balance as we adjust end strength.

Every year, the Army conducts the Total Army Analysis (TAA), a phased force structure analysis process that examines the projected Army force from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives. Necessary changes are made as a result of these reviews based upon mission and availability of resources. The TAA will inform the draw down. The TAA for 2014-2018 will take into consideration operational demands, unit readiness, and those actions necessary to sustain and care for the All-Volunteer Force and the division of structure between the operational and generating forces. These plans will proceed at a pace required to ensure mission success while retaining the flexibility to respond to unforeseen contingencies. Given these imperatives, the initial
analysis makes it clear that a gradual drawdown is in the best interest of our All Volunteer Force.

A gradual drawdown of end strength and TESI enables the Army to effectively shape the force using the least disruptive methods: reducing recruitment goals, lowering retention requirements and natural attrition. The TAA process will also enable the Army to review its force structure and brigade composition. During the past 10 years of conflict, the Army has learned a great deal about the effectiveness of its units in combat. The Army’s analytical process will determine which units need to be deactivated. This will ensure the Army is able to continue to meet the demands of the Combatant Commands and maintain the strategic depth required to respond to any unforeseen contingencies in the future.

The Army is constantly evolving as it learns; actively conferring with commanders at all levels recently returned from theater to find ways to further improve unit organization, training and equipment, thereby ensuring the Army maintains its status as the premier land power.

**DOING OUR PART**

In order to maintain the appropriate force structure, and achieve our goal to providing a tailorable and scalable force capable of meeting our national security requirements, the Army’s senior Leaders recognize we must do our part. We must continue to identify cost-savings, reform our business practices and assumptions, and
look to gain efficiencies wherever possible. While this is not an easy task, I am confident it is achievable as we continue to inculcate a cost culture within the Army focused on efficient delivery of required capabilities—both new and enhanced—while at the same time divesting ourselves of redundant, out-dated, low-risk activities.

Over the past nearly two years, the Army has been aggressively pursuing efficiencies as part of our ongoing modernization strategy. We are doing so in two ways; both through a review of current programs and capabilities, with a goal to eliminate redundancies and identify cost-savings, and also through the adoption of a more efficient and affordable incremental modernization strategy.

Incremental modernization enables us to more effectively and efficiently deliver new and improved capabilities to the Force by leveraging mature technologies, shortening development times, planning growth potential, and integrating capabilities deliberately to give us the greatest advantage in the future, while hedging against uncertainty. Incremental modernization does not neglect existing equipment. In addition to expanding or improving capability by developing and fielding new technologies, the Army will continue to upgrade, improve, and recapitalize existing capabilities, while simultaneously divesting those capabilities deemed redundant or no longer required.

Instead of developing a requirement for a capability and then buying as many as are needed upfront; we are building and procuring what we call, “capability sets.” Every
two years or so we integrate the next capability set, reflecting any changes or advances in technology realized during that two year period.

By modernizing in such an incremental manner, instead of purchasing equipment upfront in quantities large enough to equip the entire force, we can provide the most relevant capabilities available to deploying units prior to deployment; later equipping those units in the “Equip” and “Train/Ready” phases with the most up-to-date version of needed capabilities.

A great example of this new strategy in action was the recent Network Integration Evaluation (NIE) conducted at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The NIE was the largest network field exercise of its kind. It was the first demonstration of a revolutionary new way in which we are designing network capabilities, procuring them, testing them, and ultimately delivering them to our warfighters.

Overall, the intent was to achieve a well-defined, yet agile, process that will allow us to:

- identify capability gaps;
- adjust/refine our requirements;
- solicit best solutions from industry;
- integrate and test holistically;
- while, amending the acquisition cycle to quickly field network capabilities.
Bottom line, we know that the NIE will enable the Army to make much smarter acquisition decisions – probably earlier in the acquisition process – resulting in better investments and potentially avoiding investments in capabilities that never pan out.

Meanwhile, under the direction of the Secretary of the Army, the Under Secretary of the Army, Dr. Joseph Westphal and I are continuing to oversee the ongoing Capability Portfolio Review process.

Our goal in conducting these reviews remains twofold: first, to ensure that funds are programmed, budgeted and executed against validated requirements and alternatives that are cost- and risk-informed; secondly, we want to revalidate capabilities through an examination of Combatant Commanders operational needs, wartime lessons learned, the ARFORGEN model, emerging technologies, affordability, interest, and opportunity.

Integrated Portfolios, a concept which the Army is still developing, will further align equipping stakeholders to achieve balance within and across capabilities required to execute the Army’s Operating Concept. Equipment portfolios support continuous assessment across capability development, requirements, resourcing, acquisition, distribution, use and divestiture. Each portfolio will have a strategy developed to provide context, outline objectives, methods, metrics and values against which to judge success; a description of required resources to execute the strategy over the life of the
program; and a discussion of risk, including operational impacts in the event portfolio
capabilities are not met. Implementing these strategies will enable portfolio
stakeholders to better assess current and proposed capabilities against requirements;
fuse and align the modernization community to ensure integration across the separate
requirements, acquisition, sustainment, and resourcing communities; and do so in an
affordable manner. Continued Army examination and adjustment of our business
processes will help us to meet equipping balance and affordability requirements.

Through the Capability Portfolio Review process, to date, we have identified a
number of areas where we’re able to make changes and eliminate redundancies or
outdated requirements. We expect to recoup significant savings that can be reinvested
to fund higher priority capabilities and programs.

TOPLINE CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS

At the beginning of my statement I provided you our three biggest readiness
challenges. I would like to conclude by providing you my priorities as Vice with respect
to Army readiness:

1. Achieving a minimum of 1:3 (Active Component) and 1:5 (Reserve
Component) BOG:DWELL. This is critical to ensuring the long-term health
and well-being of our Force, particularly given the significant number of
individuals struggling with musculoskeletal and other types of physical injuries
and behavioral health conditions, including post-traumatic stress and
traumatic brain injury. In this era of persistent engagement, we must maintain the appropriate force structure required to meet our national security requirements around the world while allowing our Soldiers and Family Members sufficient time to rest and recover.

2. "Fulfilling the Contract." We must fulfill our obligation to complete the full Reset process. Reset is a cost of war, and it prepares our formations for an unpredictable future and evolving threats. I am concerned that increased fiscal pressure will force cuts in this area. It is critical to our long-term readiness that we maintain support for the Army’s Reset of vehicles and equipment two to three years beyond the conclusion of Overseas Contingency Operations.

3. Commitment to the Army’s Modernization Program. We must avoid making cuts to key and critical modernization programs. Doing so may have far-reaching implications on the readiness of the Force given the pace of technology development. The Network and the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV), in particular, are absolutely critical to achieving the Army of 2020 we envision.

4. Responsibly Reducing Army Force Structure. As I mentioned earlier, The Army is currently conducting Total Army Analysis (TAA) 2014-2018 to determine the appropriate balance of force structure between the operating
force and the generating force; while also conducting the deliberate analysis required to determine how and when to implement directed end strength reductions. This is critical to achieving the appropriate BOG:DWELL ratios vital to the health of the Force. This will also enable the Army to right-size the Force to ensure we provide the Combat Commanders with the forces needed. I am greatly concerned about the potential consequences of making arbitrary top line end-strength reductions to force structure.

CLOSING

These continue to be challenging times for our Nation and for our military. That said, I assure the members of this subcommittee – your Army’s senior leaders remain focused and committed to effectively addressing current challenges, while also determining the needs of the Force for the future.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I thank you again for your steadfast and generous support of the outstanding men and women of the United States Army, Army Civilians and their Families. I look forward to your questions.
General Peter W. Chiarelli became the 32nd Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army on August 4th, 2008. In his previous assignment, he was the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense from March 2007 to August 2008. He hails from Seattle, Washington and is a Distinguished Military Graduate of Seattle University. General Chiarelli was commissioned a second lieutenant of Armor in September 1972. Throughout his career he has served in Army units in the United States, Germany and Belgium. He has commanded at every level from platoon to corps.

His principal staff assignments have been as the Operations Officer, 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas; Executive Assistant and later Executive Officer to the Supreme Allied Commander, Commander United States European Command at SHAPE Headquarters, Mons, Belgium; as the Director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, at Headquarters, Department of the Army.

He commanded a motorized infantry battalion at Fort Lewis, Washington; an armor brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington; served as the Assistant Division Commander for Support in the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas; commanded the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas and in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom II; and commanded Multi-National Corps-Iraq.

General Chiarelli holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Political Science from Seattle University, a Masters of Public Administration from the University of Washington, a Masters of Arts in National Security and Strategy from Salve Regina University.
STATEMENT OF

ADMIRAL JONATHAN GREENERT

VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

ON

TOTAL FORCE READINESS

JULY 26, 2011
Chairman Forbes, Congresswoman Bordallo, and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee, it is an honor for me to be with you representing the over 600,000 Navy men and women – active, reserve, and civilian. As we have done for more than 235 years, today our Navy is forward-deployed around the world protecting our national security and prosperity. Our dedicated Sailors are operating globally at sea, on land, in the air, and in space and cyberspace. I appreciate your continued support for them and their families.

As the demand for our Navy continues to grow, our Maritime Strategy, issued more than three years ago with the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard, continues to guide our Navy’s operations and investments. Its core tenets are enduring and our Navy is executing daily the six core capabilities it articulates for our sea Services: forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response. The Navy is providing ready forces to the Combatant Commanders today, and our current year (FY11) funding, including Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, is meeting the Fleet’s requirements. The first priority in our budget submission for the readiness accounts in FY12 was to continue to provide our front line warfighters with the funding they require to accomplish their missions. We also continue our initiatives to improve the overall readiness of our surface ships, and execute our maintenance accounts within an acceptable level of risk. Although we have taken steps to reduce reliance on OCO for baseline requirements in our operations accounts in the FY12 budget submission, Navy Fleet operations and maintenance remain dependent on OCO. Ashore, we have focused the FY12 request on maintaining critical capabilities in support of the warfighter, but continue to take some risk in recapitalization of our shore infrastructure in order to meet operational requirements.

Our future readiness depends first on maintaining the right balance between our current readiness requirements and the procurement of future platforms and capabilities. To deliver a
ready Navy in the future, we must achieve the expected service life of our current ships and aircraft which will make up a significant portion of the future force. Within our current top line budget, that requires that we limit demand for Navy forces to a level that is sustainable within our planned force structure over the long term.

The following sections address current Navy readiness and trends, our future readiness challenges, and the expected readiness outcomes of the President’s Budget for FY12.

**The Navy Today**

Our Navy continues to meet planned global operational commitments and respond to crises as they emerge. We remain engaged in operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Our Navy has more than 12,000 active and reserve Sailors on the ground and another 15,000 at sea in Central Command, including the ongoing support of 4,260 Individual Augmentees to both operations. Our aircraft carrier air wings provide about 30 percent of the close air support for troops on the ground in Afghanistan; our Navy and Marine Corps pilots fly almost 60% of electronic attack missions there.

Because our national interests extend beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, so do the operations of our Navy. Over the last year, more than 50 percent of our Navy has been underway daily; globally present, and persistently engaged. Last year, our Navy provided deterrence against North Korea; conducted counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean and North Arabian Sea with a coalition of several nations, and trained local forces in maritime security as part of our Global Maritime Partnership initiatives in Europe, South America, Africa and the Pacific. Our ballistic missile submarines continue to provide the most survivable leg of our strategic deterrence triad; Navy forces in the Sixth Fleet supported NATO operations in Libya; and, our Maritime Ballistic Missile Defense capable ships provided theater BMD in Europe, the Middle East and the Pacific. Navy responded with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to the
earthquake in Haiti, the flooding in Pakistan, and the earthquake and tsunami in Japan; and, conducted the world’s largest maritime exercise, Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), which brought together 14 nations and more than 20,000 military personnel, to improve coordination and trust in multi-national operations in the Pacific. Navy sealift continues to deliver the “lion’s share” of heavy war and humanitarian equipment in the Central Command and Pacific Command areas of responsibility, while Navy logisticians operate the seaport and airport facilities that ensure this vital materiel arrives on time. Our Sailors remain forward throughout the world, projecting US influence, responding to contingencies, and building international relationships that enable the safe, secure, and free flow of commerce that underpins our economic prosperity.

**Remaining Ready to Fight**

The CNO’s priorities for the Navy remain unchanged: to build tomorrow’s Navy, to remain ready to fight today, and to develop and support our Sailors, Navy civilians, and their Families. We continue to advance our Navy in each of these areas thanks to your support.

Our Navy remains the most capable maritime force in the world. However, we are stretching our force to meet Combatant Commander requests. From 2000 to 2008, our Navy’s ship-underway days increased by 15 percent, yet, the number of ships in the Fleet decreased by 10 percent. Greater demand for Navy forces has led to longer deployments and shorter dwell, or “turnaround times,” which increase stress on our Sailors and force structure, and drive up maintenance requirements for our ships and aircraft. Our Navy is different from other Services in that we “reset in stride”; that is, we rely upon regular, rotationally scheduled maintenance of our ships and aircraft, and training and certification of our crews between deployments, to sustain our force. Our Navy’s “continuous reset,” when executed properly, translates into decades of service for each ship and aircraft, a significant return on investment.
Our FY12 budget submission achieves the optimal balance among the CNO’s priorities. Although it relies on a combination of “base budget” and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, it reduces the extent to which we rely on OCO funding for our enduring Combatant Commander missions. Our FY12 request continues the effort we started two years ago to reduce the cost to own and operate our Fleet, particularly the overhead. We leveraged the opportunity presented by Secretary Gates to reduce overhead costs, and applied the savings to warfighting capability and capacity, by executing a deliberate, thoughtful, and integrated approach to finding efficiencies that improve the long-term sustainability of our force. We are taking steps to buy smarter, streamline our organizations and operations, realign manpower, and pursue energy efficiencies. Through these efforts, and with your support, we will improve readiness, improve warfighting capabilities, optimize organizations, and increase the number of ships and aircraft in our procurement plans.

**Assuring Future Readiness**

Our Navy continues to conduct a high tempo of global operations, which we expect to continue even as forces draw down in Afghanistan. Global trends in economics, demographics, resources, and climate change portend an increased demand for maritime presence, power, and influence. America’s prosperity depends on the seas: 90 percent of world trade moves on the world’s oceans, and underwater telecommunications cables facilitate about $3.2 trillion of commerce each year. As new trade patterns emerge, such as those that will result from the expansion of the Panama Canal and the opening of the Arctic, and as disruption and disorder persist in our security environment, maritime activity will evolve and expand. Seapower allows our nation to maintain U.S. presence and influence globally and, when necessary, project power without a costly, sizeable, or permanent footprint ashore. We will continue to maintain a forward-deployed presence around the world to prevent conflict, increase interoperability with...
our allies, enhance the maritime security and capacity of our traditional and emerging partners, confront irregular challenges, and respond to crises.

Both current and future readiness must be assessed from the perspective of the Navy as a part of the Joint force. Under the Joint Staff’s Global Force Management (GFM) process, the Combatant Commanders’ requirements are sourced across all available Joint capabilities. Navy’s global presence with credible combat power guarantees our access and freedom of action over, on, and under the sea. We are teaming with the Air Force and Marine Corps to develop the Air Sea Battle concept that will identify the doctrine, organization, training, procedures, and equipment needed for our Navy to counter growing military threats to our freedom of action. This joint effort will inform the conceptual, institutional, and material actions needed to employ integrated forces that support U.S. operations to project power and influence, protect allies and partners, and secure our national objectives in peace and war.

Our FY12 base budget and OCO funding requests balance the need to meet increasing operational requirements, sustain our Sailors’ proficiency, and conduct the maintenance required to ensure our ships and aircraft reach their full service lives. Highlights of initiatives that ensure our Navy remains ready to fight today and in the future follow.

\textbf{Afloat Operations}

The Fleet Response Plan (FRP) remains the construct for Navy force generation. It is designed to maintain, train and certify individual units and task groups in defined, progressive levels of readiness and employability to meet both deployed and surge requirements of the Combatant Commanders in accordance with the GFM allocation plan. While Navy is meeting all Joint Staff directed GFM commitments, we continue to experience a tempo of operations higher than anticipated or designed in our Fleet Response Plan. Sustainment of this high tempo remains dependent upon the OCO budget as well as the necessary time to train and maintain the
force. Although our approach to “reset-in-stride” — a traditional rotational force has enabled Navy to maintain an acceptable and stable overall readiness posture, the current increased demand (and resulting extended deployments) have compressed or reduced training and compressed the time to execute intermediate level and unit level maintenance. This is reflected in a slight, and consistent, downward trend in some indicators of material readiness since 2007. Ultimately, it will impact the expected service life of our ships and aircraft over the long run unless we also “reset FRP” to a demand signal that is balanced and requisite with our force structure.

Ship Operations

The FY12 budget (baseline plus OCO) request provides the Ship Operations account with funding for an average of 58 steaming days per quarter (deployed) and 24 steaming days per quarter (non-deployed). This level of ship operations enables the Navy to execute required FRP training/certification requirements. Measures, such as increased use of simulators, concurrent scheduling and execution of multiple training and certification events while underway, and the judicious use of fuel use these resources most efficiently.

Air Operations (Flying Hour Program)

The Flying Hour Program (FHP) account provides for the operation, maintenance, and training of ten Navy carrier air wings, three Marine Corps air wings, Fleet Air Support (FAS) squadrons, training commands, Reserve forces, and various enabling activities. The FY12 budget (baseline plus OCO) resources the FHP account to achieve required Training-rating (T-rating) levels for Navy and Marine Corps squadrons. With this requested funding, tactical aviation squadrons conduct strike operations, provide flexibility in dealing with a wide range of conventional and irregular threats, and provide long range and near range protection against airborne surface and sub-surface threats. FAS squadrons provide vital Fleet logistics and intelligence. The Chief of Naval Air Training trains entry-level pilots and Naval Flight Officers,
and Fleet Replacement Squadrons provide transition training in our highly capable, advanced Fleet aircraft. Reserve Component aviation provides adversary and logistics air support; makes central contributions to the counter-narcotics efforts; conducts mine warfare; and augments maritime patrol, electronic warfare, and special operations support.

Navy is increasing the use of simulation to reduce non-deployed flying hours and is continuing to invest in new simulators. We are also investing in improvements to existing simulators to enable further reductions in aircraft flying hours while maintaining requisite training levels for deployed operations.

Navy Expeditionary Forces

Expeditionary Navy forces support the Combatant Commanders by deploying security, construction, logistics and training units. These capabilities are expected to remain in demand supporting OND/DOE missions in CENTCOM, and the global long-term, steady state security posture. The FY12 budget (baseline plus OCO) provides specific expeditionary capabilities, supporting both Joint and Navy requirements, in explosive ordnance disposal, mobile diving and salvage, riverine operations, maritime civil affairs, and intelligence, and meeting the adjudicated GFM requirement.

Shore Operations

Shore infrastructure supports and enables fleet readiness. It is an essential element to the quality of life and quality of work for our Sailors, Navy civilians, and their families. However, continued high operational and fiscal demands have led Navy to balance resources and requirements, and take deliberate risk in certain areas ashore to enable critical warfighting needs. Accordingly, our future shore readiness, particularly the recapitalization of our facilities and infrastructure, remains at risk.
To make judicious use of today’s available resources, Navy is targeting our shore investments that have the greatest impact on warfighting readiness and the quality of life of our Sailors and their Families. We are focusing sustainment efforts on bachelor quarters and mission-critical facilities such as shipyards, airfields, hangars, piers and dry docks. Likewise, we are directing investments ashore toward the recapitalization of those same critical assets, and the construction and modernization of new mission and warfighting-related support facilities.

Despite today’s fiscal challenges, Navy continues to fully support air and port operations and key shore initiatives such as nuclear weapons security, bachelor housing, family services and shore energy improvements.

**Maintenance Accounts**

**Ship Maintenance**

Keeping our ships in acceptable operating condition is vital to their ability to accomplish assigned missions, now and in the future, and reach their expected service life, a key factor in the Navy’s 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan. Surface ships, aircraft carriers and submarines currently in commission comprise approximately 70% of the ships that will be in service in 2020. Reaching expected service life requires an integrated engineering approach to research, plan, fund, and execute the right maintenance. Ship depot maintenance is the single biggest account affecting surface ship readiness.

The FY12 budget request (baseline plus OCO) resources the ship maintenance account to 94 percent, representing a $900M increase since 2008. This funding level represents the best balance between current force readiness and building the future force within available funding. In this request, we continue actions to reverse the negative trend of surface ship readiness by initiatives such as moving 1,129 Sailors from shore billets to our ships to enable maintenance, training, and to meet operational demands. Further, this will enhance pierside shipboard Planned
Maintenance while improving Sailor home tempo. We are improving our ability to research, plan and execute maintenance by increasing Manning at our Regional Maintenance Centers (RMCs), by institutionalizing our engineered approach to surface ship maintenance, converting the successes of our Surface Ship Lifecycle Maintenance (SSLM) initiative, instituted two years ago, into the Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program Activity (SURFMEPP), and continuing the work of the Naval Sea Systems Command (Code SEA-21) staff. While there will be some near-term return on investment from these actions, the long-term payoff will be realized through the pride of ownership, high standards, and commitment to quality in the next generation of surface Sailors. Navy will monitor the outcome of these initiatives as they continue over the next several years, adjusting as results dictate to achieve the necessary readiness improvement.

Aviation Maintenance

The Aviation Depot Maintenance account provides operational aviation units sufficient Ready for Tasking (RFT) aircraft to accomplish assigned missions. As a result of additional funding provided by Congress, we expect to complete FY11 with no backlog in either airframe or engine maintenance. The FY12 budget request (including OCO) resources the Aviation Depot Maintenance account to 95 percent of modeled requirement, and funds the repair and overhaul of 742 airframes and 2,577 engines. This will result in an acceptable projected backlog of 23 airframes and 162 engines, which is moderate, and below our one year backlog goal of 100 airframes and 340 engines. The Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) “AIRSpeed” strategy continues cost-wise readiness initiatives, focusing efforts to reduce the cost of end-to-end resourcing, increase productivity, and improve the operational availability of aircraft. This strategy provides a robust capability to use efficiencies to manage the highest priority requirements.
Training Readiness: Connecting us to Our Future Force

Navy recently received recognition for high quality training and development programs. Most recently, Navy was honored by Training Magazine as one of the premiere training organizations in the country, ranking seventh out of 125 evaluated organizations. We remain committed to seeking out best practices and benchmarking our programs against the best.

Education and training are strategic investments, enabling us to develop a highly-skilled force to meet the demands of the Maritime Strategy and the Joint force. Our FY12 education and training budget supports increased investments in curricula, technical training equipment, and instructors for critical mission areas such as integrated air & missile defense including Ballistic Missile Defense, cyber, propulsion engineering and anti-submarine warfare. Simulators continue to present significant opportunities for increasing training capability, capacity, and effectiveness across the Fleet, while controlling operating costs, minimizing stress on equipment and reducing risk to the safety of our Sailors. The FY12 budget request supports continued investments in simulator technologies.

The Fleet Synthetic Training program continues to serve as the backbone of our networked simulation capability to support training and certification from the unit level through Joint and coalition warfare. In FY12, additional capabilities are included for training and certification for the Maritime Ballistic Missile Defense mission. This capability will meet the full training requirement in a virtual environment.

Conclusion

In a speech earlier this year\(^1\), the CNO captured the role of the Navy in meeting the challenges of global security as he noted: “I’m not alone in observing that the United States

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1 ADM Gary Roughead, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, at the Surface Navy Association Annual Symposium, January 13, 2011
faces a test to its global leadership today and for the foreseeable future. Yet no nation is better equipped to lead in the international system, and no Service is better suited to present the agile and the right power we will need in the emerging security environment. The United States global presence in defense of free access to the global commons remains invaluable and cannot be replaced.” Together with the U.S. Marine Corps, and with the Joint force, our Allies, and new partners, Navy remains ready to defend our Nation, and the common interests of the community of nations, from those countries or other actors who would seek to harm us.

In that spirit, for FY12, we have balanced our resources to sustain Navy readiness today within acceptable risk in each of the core capabilities defined in our Maritime Strategy, while building the capacity to sustain the Navy of the future. We look forward to working with the Congress to address our future challenges, and thank you again for your support of the Navy’s mission and particularly for your commitment to the welfare of our Sailors, Navy civilians, and their families. I request the Committee’s continued support of our FY 2012 budget request.
Vice Chief of Naval Operations

8/13/2009 - Present

Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert

Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert is a native of Butler, Penn. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1975 and completed studies in nuclear power for service as a submarine officer.

His career as a submariner includes assignments aboard USS Flying Fish (SSN 673), USS Tasog (SSN 639), Submarine NR-1 and USS Michigan (SSBN 727 - Gold Crew), culminating in command of USS Honolulu (SSN 718) from March 1991 to July 1993.

Subsequent fleet command assignments include Commander, Submarine Squadron 11, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Marianas, Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet (August 2004 to September 2006) and Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (September 2007 to July 2009).

Greenert has served in various fleet support and financial management positions, including deputy chief of naval operations for integration of capabilities and resources (N8); deputy commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet; chief of staff, U.S. 7th Fleet; head, Navy Programming Branch and director, Operations Division Navy Comptroller.

He is a recipient of various personal, and campaign awards including the Distinguished Service Medal (5 awards), Defense Superior Service Medal and Legion of Merit (4 awards). In 1992 he was awarded the Vice Admiral McDonald Award for inspirational leadership. He considers those awards earned throughout his career associated with unit performance to be most satisfying and representative of naval service.
STATEMENT OF
GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD
ASSISTANT COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
BEFORE THE
READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON
TOTAL FORCE READINESS
26 JULY 2011
The Marine Corps is America’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness.

This short sentence captures the essential task levied by the Congress to be “the most ready when the Nation is...least ready.” The importance of this task has proven to be timeless and requires a Marine Corps adept at providing forward deployed, forward engaged forces that are optimized for crisis response and assured access but capable of accomplishing a broad range of missions. That is what your Corps of Marines provides for the Nation today. With the continued support of Congress, that is exactly what we will provide for the Nation in the future.

The ready posture of your Navy-Marine Corps Team sends a clear message to both our allies and potential foes. It provides time, space, and options to national leadership in times of crisis. We have a significant impact at the beginning of international disturbances as we bolster diplomatic efforts with credible force. We can respond with prompt, decisive action to a wide range of challenges.

“Being ready when the nation is least ready” is particularly important in these uncertain and dynamic times. We have entered a period of austerity in which this Nation will have to make difficult choices and carefully manage risks to our national interests. Maintaining a part of the joint force at a very high state of readiness — particularly a part of the force that can operate independent of foreign basing — is the kind of insurance policy the nation will need for the unpredictable future. The Marine Corps has historically provided that insurance policy for well less than ten percent of the Total Obligation Authority of the Department of Defense.

While the first priority of your Corps is to provide the best trained and equipped units for the current fight in Afghanistan, we are also focused on the future. Recently we conducted an in-depth review of our mission and force structure. In this analysis, we challenged ourselves to deliver the optimum mix of capabilities our Nation will need in the post-Afghanistan security environment while maintaining our culture of frugality. We have crafted a strategically mobile, “middleweight” force optimized for forward-presence and rapid crisis response. We will be light enough to leverage the flexibility and capacity of amphibious ships and other forms of lift, yet heavy enough to accomplish the mission when we get there.

We will be organized, manned, trained, and equipped in a manner that reflects the requirements of an expeditionary force in readiness. Our analysis indicates that we can meet the projected requirements of Combatant Commanders with a future force of 186,800 Active Marines and 39,600 in the Reserve Component. That force will have the right balance of
capabilities and capacities and support the sourcing of combined arms Marine Air-Ground-Logistics Teams. We will continue to recruit a high quality force and our manning will support the need to respond to today’s crisis, with today’s force, today – enlisted billets will be filled to 99 percent of the requirement established by our tables of organization and officer billets will be filled to no less than 95 percent of the requirement.

As we develop and maintain the force of the future, we will be informed by 10 years of wartime experience. Our comprehensive predeployment training initiatives have been critical to the success of our Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan. The investments we have made in combined arms live fire opportunities, immersive training, and flight hour programs have enabled our Marines to accomplish the mission and saved lives. Our investment in education has proven to be equally important – particularly for our non-commissioned officers and junior officers. We will continue to seek levels of operations and maintenance funding that will support challenging, realistic training, quality education, and high readiness across the operating forces. There is no tiered readiness in an expeditionary force in readiness. It is the ‘bench’ at home station that provides the depth and responsiveness for the unexpected.

Equipment readiness is also a critical element of overall Marine Corps readiness. The last decade of combat operations has taken a heavy toll on our equipment. Congress has been extremely helpful in keeping our equipment readiness up for the deploying units, but for those at home in their training and dwell-time, we are seeing growing shortfalls as time goes on. As we move beyond Afghanistan, we will need continued support to reset our equipment and restore the readiness of our units at home station. We will also need support in modernizing our equipment as we seek to reconstitute the Corps for tomorrow’s challenges.

Finally, our overall readiness to perform assigned missions is closely related to the readiness of our Navy partners; particularly within the Amphibious Ready Groups. The Navy and Marine Corps perform as a team when it comes to forward presence, engagement, deterrence, and crisis response. We can have all the readiness we need in our Marine units, but if we cannot position our capabilities where and when required and project that power ashore in a timely manner, then we lack the relevance needed to meet the challenge at hand. The readiness of the amphibious force is a critical requirement for the nation’s force in readiness.
Current and Recent Operations

The pace of current operations for the Marine Corps remains high, with approximately 30,000 Marines — representing 25 percent of its operating forces end strength — forward-deployed across the globe. Current operations encompass deliberate, well-planned deployments such as Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), the Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) events as well as crisis response operations, such as Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya.

Marine Corps pre-deployment training programs ensure combat formations, as well as the individual Marine, consistently deploy as the best-trained and most ready force to meet operational requirements. Deploying and deployed units report high levels of readiness and are trained, resourced, and ready for their assigned missions, which include:

- The OEF MAGTF – approximately 20,000 Marines and Sailors in Afghanistan
- One forward-based Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) assigned to USPACOM for crisis and contingency response
- One forward-deployed MEU in the Gulf of Aden postured as the USCENTCOM theater reserve to support crisis response as required
- A forward-deployed command element in Bahrain allocated for planning and command and control of Marine forces in USCENTCOM
- TSC and military-to-military engagement events and exercises with partner nations in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, the Asia-Pacific region and North and South America, totaling 149 events in 2010 and 71 events thus far in 2011
- Two squadrons of Marine Corps F/A-18 fighter aircraft aboard U.S. Navy forward-deployed aircraft carriers

Marine Corps units recently deployed for unplanned requirements and/or crisis response also report high levels of readiness for their assigned missions. Examples include:

- The commitment of a seventh infantry battalion in Afghanistan at the request of the Commander, USCENTCOM from January 2011 to present
- A forward-deployed MEU in the Mediterranean Sea in support of USAFRICOM’s Libya operations from April to July 2011
- A MEU and other elements of III MEF based in Okinawa deployed to mainland Japan in response to the tsunami and resulting nuclear crisis, specifically
providing humanitarian assistance to the Japanese people and evacuating approximately 8,000 U.S. citizens from March to May 2011

- Deployment of 130-specially-trained personnel from the Marine Corps’ Chemical Biological Incident Response Force to assist the government of Japan’s consequence management efforts in the wake of the nuclear incident from March to May 2011

- Humanitarian and disaster relief missions in Haiti from January to April 2010, in Pakistan from August to November 2010, and in the Philippines from September to October 2009 and again in October 2010

- Reinforcement of U.S. embassies in Niger (February 2010), Kyrgyzstan (April 2010), Bahrain (from September 2010 to June 2011), Egypt (January to May 2011), and Yemen (from May 2011 to present) to assist and protect U.S. diplomatic personnel

- Planning and advisory support to the Republic of Korea during the Yeonpyeong Island crisis in November 2010

- Maritime security operations to ensure freedom of navigation along sea lines of communication, to include the recapture of the Merchant Vessel *Magellan Star* and the rescue of its crew from Somali pirates on 9 September 2010

With all the Marine Corps has done and continues to do, the Marine Corps provides exceptional value to the Nation. For 8.5 percent of the annual Defense budget, the Marine Corps provides approximately 31 percent of the ground operating forces, 12 percent of the fixed wing tactical aircraft, and 19 percent of the attack helicopters in the Joint Force. The Marine Corps’ 1:9 ratio of officers to enlisted personnel is the lowest of all the services. The Marine Corps’ 1:6 ratio of civilian employee to supported Marine is also the lowest of all the services.

**Current Readiness Assessment**

Today’s Marines are highly trained and combat proven across the range of military operations. Marine units in Afghanistan operate in a rapidly evolving, highly complex environment against a very adaptive, resourceful enemy. Depending upon the population density of a given area, infantry battalions are responsible for anywhere from 50 square miles of urban and rural terrain to upwards of 500 square miles. Within this battlespace, Marine units work to
defeat the insurgency along multiple lines of operation, which include security, governance, rule of law, and economic development. These multiple, mutually supporting lines of operation, and the distributed nature of the conflict, are what have required the Marine Corps to augment forward-deployed units with additional equipment and personnel from non-deployed forces and strategic programs.

Current readiness of the force must be viewed from two perspectives: the ability to meet/sustain known operations and rotational requirements, and the ability to respond to crises and contingencies with the non-deployed force. The Marine Corps’ effort to prepare and deploy units against known requirements at a high level of readiness has been successful. The Marine Corps can sustain its current requirements on an enduring basis; however, high readiness of the deployed force comes at the expense of the non-deployed force. Non-deployed units are in a constant cycle of post-deployment dwell and subsequent training for their next deployment. Sustainment of current operations has reduced the aggregate readiness of the non-deployed force. This translates to increased risk in the timely execution of unexpected crises or large-scale contingencies, since the degraded non-deployed force would respond to any emergent crisis or contingency operation.

For the past several years, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required the Marine Corps to operate primarily in a land-based environment.1 High operational tempo and the necessary sustained focus on irregular warfare, stability operations, and counterinsurgency in Iraq and now Afghanistan, have degraded the Marine Corps’ fundamental core competency – its amphibious expertise. Outside the regular training and deployment cycles of the Marine Expeditionary Units, training opportunities for amphibious operations have been limited due to supporting operations in OEF and the limited availability of amphibious ships. Accordingly, training shortfalls in amphibious and prepositioning operations affect the Marine Corps’ ability to respond to other operational plans, contingencies, and activities.

The Marine Corps is very concerned that the Navy’s amphibious fleet is beginning to show signs of strain. The only three-ship Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) in the PACOM area of operations recently deployed without one of its amphibious assault ships, the USS DENVER,

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1 This is nothing new; the Marine Corps does what the Nation needs, when the Nation needs it. Excerpt from the 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Report No 688, Strength of the Marine Corps, 1952: "...throughout American history the Marine Corps has repeatedly served time and again with the Army throughout the process of land wars and today is once again engaged in the same function."
which will be in unscheduled maintenance for the next few months. A recent engineering casualty to another ship in the same ARG, the USS ESSEX, took this ARG off-line – further degrading the MEU’s crisis response capability.² The Marine Corps’ ability to fulfill the intent of Congress is directly tied to the readiness of the Amphibious Fleet.

Despite the amphibious training challenges facing the Marine Corps due to sustaining current operations in Afghanistan and the limited availability of amphibious ships, the Navy-Marine Corps team has taken steps in the last 24 months to address training shortfalls in amphibious operations. We conducted one major Marine Expeditionary Brigade-level exercise on the East Coast and another on the West Coast, Exercise BOLD ALLIGATOR 11 and Exercise DAWN BLITZ 11, respectively. The Marine Corps also conducted several amphibious exercises in the Pacific region, to include Exercise COBRA GOLD in Thailand. Participating partner nations included Thailand, Singapore, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Malaysia. This exercise improved partner nation interoperability and capacity to conduct joint and multinational operations in support of crisis response. A critical event culminating in a successful Exercise COBRA GOLD was Exercise FREEDOM BANNER. This was a maritime prepositioning force (MPF) exercise during which equipment and supplies were offloaded from two MPF ships in support of follow-on Exercise COBRA GOLD.

Readiness Concerns

The Marine Corps’ top readiness concerns are: (1) its ability to simultaneously sustain current operations in Afghanistan and to respond, rapidly, with a cohesive force to an additional large-scale contingency; and (2) the reset and reconstitution of the force, post-conflict. With regard to the first issue, contingency response, readiness shortfalls for non-deployed units have been the price of sustained combat operations. The second concern is related to the first in that the long-term participation in conflict has significantly undermined the readiness of the force.

Top Concern #1: Readiness of the non-deployed force to support crisis and contingency response.

The critical readiness shortfalls for the non-deployed force are personnel and equipment.

²The USS ESSEX is a Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) amphibious assault ship.
• **Personnel:** Units in dwell are heavily leveraged, in terms of leadership and expertise, to meet ongoing operational commitments. Although the operating forces possess experienced leaders, trainers, and planners, a significant number are not available due to sourcing service individual augments, joint individual augments, and Afghan partner mentor teams. While these Marine leaders, planners, and trainers are enhancing the capabilities of Afghan security forces and performing needed functions in forward-deployed joint and Marine headquarters, their extended absence leaves some non-deployed units short of key personnel needed to lead and train Marines. Approximately 35 percent of non-deployed units report key personnel shortfalls.

• **Equipment:** Non-deployed units and strategic programs, such as our pre-positioning programs, have been used to source equipment needs for forward-deployed and deploying units. Reduced equipment sets available to units in dwell present training challenges and an increased risk to providing timely response to major contingencies. Approximately 68 percent of non-deployed units report degraded readiness in the areas of capabilities and/or resources. Resource shortfalls manifest themselves as capability gaps in individual unit and collective core competencies. The largest contributing factor to unit capability gaps is equipment; approximately sixty-three percent of non-deployed forces report mission essential equipment shortfalls. The reasons for degraded equipment readiness are as follows:

  - The strategic shift from Iraq to Afghanistan required the Marine Corps to hold equipment in theater, and identify serviceable assets for movement to OEF – equipment the Marine Corps has been unable to reset and return to non-deployed units.

  - The difficult operating environment and distributed nature of the battlespace in Regional Command Southwest are degrading the normal expected service limits of some principle end items, dramatically increasing the frequency of preventive maintenance actions. In some cases, the expected service life of equipment has decreased by up to one-half. Marine Corps legacy aircraft supporting operational missions are consuming service life at a rate up to three times faster than scheduled.

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3 This number is based on DRRSS-MC data reflecting units at home station which have a readiness level of C3:4:5. Those readiness levels are attributed to a shortfall in equipment or personnel. The maintenance readiness of material is is quite high, averaging in the high 90’s. These statistics are consistent with what is reflected in Service readiness reporting.

4 Source: Field Supply and Maintenance Analysis Office Analysis of I MEF (Fwd) Units in Afghanistan, 29 Aug 10
Averaged across the fleet, the Marine Corps is consuming aircraft service life at a rate 1.85 times faster than planned. The result is compressed timelines between re-work events and earlier retirement of aircraft than originally programmed. The majority of Marine Corps legacy platforms are nearing the end of their service lives, and most production lines are closed. New aircraft with low average ages and robust service life projections are the future of Marine aviation and its support of Marine Corps and joint operations.

- The equipment life expectancy issues mentioned above, as well as battle damage and wear, have necessitated the establishment of a robust forward-in-stores capability and a major equipment rotation program to support deployed forces. This further strains the equipment available to non-deployed forces.

- Since the non-deployed force is augmenting forward deployed units with additional equipment and personnel, many non-deployed units are not ready for combat operations. If some of these "not ready" units were required for another major contingency or operation, the Marine Corps would globally source and organize them into fully capable units prior to their deployment, likely increasing the time required to task organize for a contingency. This is the incurred risk that the Marine Corps has assumed - risk that affects successful execution of unexpected crises or contingencies with minimal loss of life and materiel.

**Top Concern #2:** Reset and reconstitution of the force.

Reset is a maintenance and logistics strategy that involves repair and reconditioning of equipment operated in combat or replacement for combat losses. Reconstitution involves actions beyond reset that modernize combat capability to meet current and future requirements. Reconstitution includes personnel, equipment and training. Force reconstitution spans activities from normal sustainment (rearm, refuel, recover/dwell, repair, and replace) through reorganization and regeneration of units for redeployment. An example of reconstitution would be an infantry battalion that has returned from Afghanistan and after a sufficient period of recovery, is manned to its table of organization; equipped to its future, modernized table of equipment; and has completed all training required for it to accomplish the core combat mission.
for which it was designed. The reconstituted battalion is now ready for redeployment because it has been manned, trained, and equipped to a high level of readiness.

Reset funding will: support the depot-level maintenance of OEF equipment; procurement of vehicles, major weapons systems, and engineering equipment lost in combat; and replenishment of ammunition stores. Reset costs will increase the longer the current conflict endures and will require a multi-year support effort beyond the conclusion of combat operations. The Marine Corps anticipates a post conflict reset liability appropriately resolved principally with Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. Ensuring the Marine Corps has what it needs to reset and reconstitute for the future is the most pressing concern affecting long-term readiness.

**Future Readiness**

The 21st Century battlefield will be characterized by distributed and disaggregated operations at sea and ashore. Such operations will require greater equipment density at the small unit level in the areas of command and control systems, survivable vehicles, and crew-served weapons. This requirement will invariably lead to higher equipment costs. Overall equipment costs will also grow due to the increased expense of modern equipment on a “by item” basis. While the increasing cost of equipment is a disturbing trend, senior leaders are decisively engaged in an effort to control the cost of modernization.

The Commandant has directed that the Marine Corps will reconstitute to a “middleweight force,” ideally positioned between special operations and heavy forces, and able to rapidly shift across the range of military operations. This construct will enable the Marine Corps to operate throughout the spectrum of threats – irregular, hybrid, and conventional – or the areas where they overlap. The Marine Corps is currently in the midst of a comprehensive reconstitution planning effort to fulfill the Commandant’s vision.

Lessons learned from a lengthy period of combat operations resulted in adjustments to the Marine Corps’ tables of equipment, especially for communications, vehicles, and crew-served weapons. The Marine Corps has learned that the modern battlefield often involves significant distances between units—substantially more distance than was required in more traditional conflict. The Marine Corps’ tables of equipment were based on that older model of conflict, and in many cases, were often ill-suited or inadequate for the dispersed battlefield. The
experience of modern warfare led the Marine Corps to assess and adjust, both in the method of fighting, but also in the way the forces were equipped. Modern conflict led to other advances as well. For example, the cost of clothing and personal equipment for a Marine was $1,200 in 2000. In 2010, that cost increased to approximately $7,000 as we incorporated technological advances in individual weapons, uniforms, and protective equipment.

The Marine Corps estimates it will cost approximately $12.5 billion to reset its equipment and reconstitute the force following OEF. This will provide the necessary resources to fund the reset of equipment; implementation of the Marine Corps’ force structure review; and cover the cost of reconstituting the force with a modernized table of equipment resulting from changes in Marine Corps doctrine, organization, and training. The Marine Corps began to address its reset and reconstitution shortfall by requesting $2.5 billion in FY12 OCO funding to support ongoing operations and an additional $253 million in its FY12 baseline budget for equipment procurement.

In closing, the Marine Corps is the United States’ force in readiness. It has been mandated by Congress to be “the most ready when the Nation is…least ready.” It is not intended to be a second land army. Its primary mission is to train, organize, and equip landing forces for amphibious operations and subsequent combat operations ashore and provide a balanced ground-air task force capable of suppressing and containing international disturbances short of large scale war. Additionally, the Marine Corps has been tasked “within the Department of the Navy, to develop concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures and organize, train, equip, and provide forces, normally employed as combined arms air ground task forces, to serve as an expeditionary force-in-readiness….”

These Congressional and DoD mandates exist because the lessons this nation learned from our unpreparedness in the beginning stages of the Korean War. These lessons of

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3 This figure reflects $2.5 B for reset in FY12 and $5 B for end of OEF unresolved reset liability, as well as $5 B in reconstitution costs. The sum of these estimated costs is $12.5 B.
6 U.S. Department of Defense, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, Department of defense 5100.01, 21 December 2010), 31-32
unpreparedness were written in the blood of American service members. We risk the loss of the very capabilities gleaned from those lessons if funding to the Navy-Marine Corps Team is cut too deeply. The Marine Corps has worked diligently throughout our Force Structure Review to analyze what is required to provide the nation with an expeditionary force in readiness that can project power from the sea. An end strength of 186,800 Marines, modernization of our tactical aviation assets, resetting our equipment sets to match required readiness levels, and enough capability and capacity from Navy amphibious ships is required to accomplish the mission.

Proportionate cuts across the Department of Defense and the Services have a disproportionate effect on the Marine Corps due to our smaller size, and the fact that the preponderance of our force—more so than any other Service—is in our operating forces; those very forces that provide the nation its capability to respond immediately to crises. The 82nd Congress recognized this critical point when it categorically rejected the idea of a "percentage" relationship between the strength of the Marine Corps and that of other services as "the very antithesis of the concept of Marine readiness."9 Alongside our Navy counterparts, we provide a balanced air-ground-logistics team that is forward deployed and forward engaged: shaping, training, deterring and responding to all manner of crises and contingencies every day of the year. In an increasingly dangerous and uncertain world, this Nation must provide for the protection it needs. The Navy-Marine Corps Team is the first-level investment in that protection because we are always on station and on watch.

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9 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 666, Strength of the Marine Corps, 1952: "The committee considers it very necessary to point out that the most significant weakness inherent in a percentage relationship of Marine Corps strength to naval strength is that such a relationship unavoidably produced the lowest Marine Corps strength at the very time when a Marine force in readiness is most needed. The need for Marines as a ready force is paramount when the Nation is largely demobilized. the Nation's ground shock troops must be most ready when the Nation is generally least ready. Accordingly, the committee has concluded that the percentage relationship insisted upon by the Department of Defense is the very antithesis of the concept of Marine readiness. The committee has rejected it accordingly."
General Dunford was promoted to General and assumed the duties of Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps on 23 October 2010. A native of Boston, Massachusetts, General Dunford graduated from St. Michael's College and was commissioned in 1977.

General Dunford's assignments in the operating forces include Platoon and Company Commander, Co K, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines; Company Commander, Co A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines; and Company Commander, Co L, 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines. He served as the Operations, Plans, and Training Officer in 2d ANGLICO and the Regimental Executive Officer, 6th Marines. He commanded the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines and the 5th Marine Regiment. He served as the Chief of Staff, 1st Marine Division.

Other assignments include Aide to the Commanding General, III MEF and a tour in the Officer Assignment Branch, HQMC. He has also served as the Marine Officer Instructor, College of the Holy Cross; as a member of the Commandant's Staff Group; and as the Senior Aide to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Joint assignments include service as the Executive Assistant to the Vice Chairman, JCS; Chief, Global and Multilateral Affairs Division (35); and Vice Director for Operations (JJ).

As a general officer, he has served as the Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine Division; the Director, Operations Division, Plans, Policies and Operations, HQMC; and the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations; and most recently as Commanding General, 1st MEF and Commandant, Marine Corps Central Command.

General Dunford is a graduate of the U. S. Army Ranger School, Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, and the U. S. Army War College. He holds an M.A. in Government from Georgetown University and an M.A. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

PRESENTATION TO THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBJECT: TOTAL FORCE READINESS

STATEMENT OF: GENERAL PHILIP BREEDLOVE
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE

JULY 26, 2011

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Purpose: To "highlight the overall state of the Air Force’s readiness, highlight any current trends, and identify some top readiness challenges or shortfalls."

Readiness Subcommittee Overview: The Readiness Subcommittee oversees military readiness, training, logistics and maintenance issues and programs, military construction, installations and family housing issues, and the BRAC process. It also oversees civilian personnel, energy security, and environmental issues that affect DOD. The Readiness Subcommittee makes sure that our troops are properly trained and their equipment is properly maintained so they can succeed in their missions, and that they have the facilities and services they deserve when they return home.

Sources:
AF Posture Statement 2011
AF Budget Communication Card
HASC Hearing on DoD Efficiencies, 26 Jan 11
SASC Hearing on Defense Budget Requests, 17 Feb 11
Efficiencies Briefing with Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, 6 Jan 11
HASC Readiness Subcommittee Hearing, 10 Mar 11 (Lt Gen Carlisle)
SASC Readiness Subcommittee Hearing, 18 May 11 (Lt Gen Reno)
SASC Seapower Subcommittee Hearing, 15 July 11 (Gen Johns)
VCASF Skull Slides for Readiness Hearing

Outline
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4. Personnel Readiness
5. Space & Cyber Readiness
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7. Nuclear Deterrence
8. Conclusion
1. Introduction
The United States continues to confront a dynamic international environment requiring the military to remain strong and agile enough to face a diverse range of threats. Along with our Joint partners, the Air Force defends and advances the interests of the United States by providing unique capabilities across the full spectrum of operations required to succeed in today’s fight and future conflicts. The Air Force remains a mission-focused and highly prepared force, a difficult task given over 20 years of constant combat operations.

2. Daily Ops and Readiness
Our enduring commitment to readiness and the Joint fight is evident in the missions being accomplished by nearly 40,000 American Airmen deployed to 285 locations across the globe. Last year the Air Force conducted more than 45,000 sorties supporting Operation IRAQI FREEDOM/NEW DAWN and almost 120,000 sorties supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, delivered over 1.78 million passengers and 712,000 tons of cargo, and employed almost 2,580 short tons of munitions. Additionally, we have transported almost 92,000 patients from the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), and our combat search and rescue forces met the “golden hour” goal of transporting seriously wounded warriors to treatment facilities within 60 minutes of injury nearly 98 percent of the time. Our aeromedical evacuation sorties moved critically injured warriors to regional hospitals within hours of injury, contributing to the 98 percent battlefield injury survival rate. As a critical component of our nation’s strategic deterrence, we have maintained our nation’s 450 ICBMs on continuous strategic alert at a greater than 99% readiness rate, exceeding the U.S. Strategic Command’s requirement. Lastly, we achieved a record 80 consecutive successful National Security Space launches since 1990.

This level of activity reflects our commitment to provide Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power in today’s Joint fight. However, this high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) has had some detrimental effects on our overall readiness. Since 2003, we have seen a slow but steady decline in reported unit readiness indicators. Maintaining our ability to be ready for the full spectrum of operations at an acceptable level of risk is challenging, especially for the Combat Air Forces (CAF) and some limited-supply/high-demand units.

3. Budget Overview
The Air Force’s FY12 budget request for $119.0B reflects an extraordinary effort to ensure America gets the maximum value out of every dollar. The United States faces diverse and increasingly complex security challenges requiring a range of agile and flexible capabilities. This budget request supports the Air Force’s ability to meet these challenges today and emergent threats of tomorrow. To effectively organize, train, and equip a force that can meet national needs in air, space and cyberspace at a time of fiscal challenges, the Air Force is seeking efficiencies to eliminate unneeded expenditures and rebalance spending. Doing so will allow the Air Force to shift resources from overhead and support functions to force structure and future modernization while streamlining operations across the enterprise.

In FY12, the overall end strength remains relatively constant at 332,800 active duty Airmen, reserve component end strength at 71,400, and Air National Guard end strength at 106,700. Our FY12 $45.3B operations and maintenance (O&M) budget request supports
operations at 80 major installations and funds air, space, and cyber operations, as well as intelligence, logistics, nuclear deterrence, special operations, and search and rescue capabilities.

Efficiency efforts include consolidating four air operations centers into two, eliminating three Numbered Air Forces, reducing fuel and energy consumption, and improving depot and supply-chain business processes to sustain weapons systems. Realization of cost-savings allows the Air Force to reallocate funding to modernize and recapitalize weapons systems, improve capabilities and enhance warfighter operations. Examples include: investing in the Long-Range Strike Family of Systems, including a new penetrating bomber, maximizing production of the MQ-9 Reaper, increasing procurement of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), modernizing F-15 radars, and purchasing more Joint Strike Fighter simulators. The efficiency effort allowed the Air Force to improve readiness despite the challenges facing the nation, especially given the fiscal environment.

4. Personnel Readiness

Our dedicated Airmen are the foundation of the Air Force. Recruiting, training, and retaining an all-volunteer force requires significant investment. This investment drives the effectiveness of our highly skilled and technically proficient force. Combatant commander requirements are being supported from both the continental U.S. and overseas bases. Of the almost 40,000 Airmen forward-deployed worldwide, more than 29,000 are continuing on a rotating basis to contribute to operations in the CENTCOM AOR— including 10,000 airmen in Afghanistan providing close air support to U.S. and coalition ground forces, airlift and air refueling, personnel rescue, air medical evacuation, training to develop our partner air force, and many other missions.

An additional 57,000 total force Airmen are forward stationed overseas providing capabilities in direct support of our combatant commander requirements. And from home stations here in the United States, approximately 219,000 Airmen provide daily support to combatant commanders’ worldwide operations, including standing nuclear alert, commanding and controlling our satellites, controlling remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), analyzing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data and much more.

However, today’s high operations tempo continues to stress 16 of the 132 enlisted specialties and six of the 125 officer specialties. In these stressed specialties, we offer critical skills retention bonuses, selective reenlistment bonuses, or initial enlistment bonuses to all enlisted and two of these officer career fields. These bonuses allow us to target crucial specialties in order to bolster these career fields’ Manning and mitigate potential negative OPEP effects on our Airmen and their families.

5. Space & Cyberspace Readiness

The Air Force continues to reliably provide required space capabilities, such as precision navigation and timing, secured satellite communications, missile warning, and space situational awareness capabilities. Space capabilities provide the United States and our allies unprecedented national security advantages in strategic decision-making, military operations, and homeland security.

We plan to achieve greater efficiencies in acquiring space assets by implementing better business practices in satellite and space lift procurement, establishing more stability in the development process, and utilizing block buy in procurement. Space lift is a critical component of the national security space enterprise. Despite our success, space lift is still a complex and
costly undertaking. Three recent launch studies reached the same conclusion that immediate commitment to a fixed annual production rate for launch vehicles is imperative to sustain the industrial base and control costs. To ensure this commitment, the FY12 budget submission requests an additional $3.5B across the FYDP to reach a procurement rate of five DoD EELV boost cores each year.

The Air Force FY12 budget request includes $4.6B to sustain and maintain our critical cyberspace capabilities. The Air Force contributes to the Joint force by developing, integrating, and operating cyberspace capabilities in three mission areas: support, defense, and offense. Access to cyberspace is increasingly critical to meet Joint and allied requirements for freedom of maneuver in all domains. Air Force networks face a continuous barrage of assaults from state-sponsored actors, terror networks, international criminal organizations, individual hackers, and all levels of threats in between.

The 24th Air Force, the Air Force component of U.S. Cyber Command, achieved full operational capability on October 1, 2010. The Air Force is also aligning education and training programs with our operational approach to cyberspace to develop our cyberspace professionals. In December 2010, we graduated our first cadre of cyberspace operators.

In addition, the Air Force increased situational awareness of Air Force networks while securely improving information sharing and transport capabilities. Investments in additional network defenders increase protection of information vital to Joint force operations. In the offensive mission area, formal training programs for both initial and mission qualification provide trained forces to U.S. Cyber Command when tasked. Additionally, as the lead support agency to U.S. Cyber Command, the Air Force is responsible for the construction and installed infrastructure for the new U.S. Cyber Command Integrated Cyber Center at Fort Meade, Maryland.

6. Aircraft Readiness

The dedicated work and professionalism of our Airmen ensures our aircraft inventory is ready despite extensive use in contingency operations and increases in fleet average age. Due to these challenges, modernization and recapitalization of our aircraft remains a very high priority.

The readiness of the Mobility Air Forces remains high while meeting robust and dynamic operational requirements. Our airlift fleet continues to provide strategic airlift as well as theater and direct support airlift missions moving personnel and a wide variety of equipment and supplies. The awarding of the KC-46A contract starts the timeline for recapitalizing our aerial refueling aircraft. The planned acquisition of 179 aircraft will help provide refueling capability for decades to come. We will retire 7 C-5As in FY11 in order to eliminate excess strategic airlift capacity as recommended by the Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study-2016. Modernization and enhancement of the workhorse mobility fleet will continue with the C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-engine Program (RERP), the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP), and the C-17 Block 13-17 upgrade program.

The readiness of Combat Air Forces aircraft is adequate despite challenges from accumulating hours on our fleet faster than envisioned when these aircraft were first fielded. During the FY12 program review, the Air Force delivered to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD CAPE) the Service fighter force position of 1200 Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory (PMAI) and 2000 Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI). Delays in the F-35 program and decreased funding for F-22 modernization increase our reliance on the legacy fighter fleet, driving the need to extend their service life and modernize.
combat capability. AF actions to extend and modernize the legacy fleet are a bridge to 5th generation capability and are not considered replacement actions. The F-16 Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) is one example of the effort to mitigate the fighter force capacity shortfall. Funding the initial development of a Long Range Strike Family of Systems, which will include a new penetrating bomber and next generation, extended-range standoff missiles, will allow the Air Force to address anticipated threats. To keep our legacy platforms viable well into the future, the Air Force intends to use funds saved through our efficiencies to subsidize modernization, such as our plan to retire six B-1 bombers and use the savings to fund datalink and cockpit upgrades for the B-1 fleet. If we are not allowed to retire these bombers, continuing to maintain them as basic aircraft inventory will reduce our savings over the FYDP by more than $290M (an 80% reduction in savings).

Lastly, since 2005, the Air Force has heavily invested in remotely piloted aircraft (MQ-1/9, RQ-4) operations, resulting in over 200% more airframes and 300% more manpower. Most other mission area fleets, including fighter, airlift, and aerial refueling aircraft, have remained static or are now smaller in numbers and manpower. Over the past twelve months, the Air Force dramatically increased the capability to collect, process, and disseminate timely multi-intelligence information to the warfighter by delivering an additional 14 MQ-1/9 combat air patrols (CAPs) to U.S. CENTCOM and other Combatant Commanders. Today we are providing 55 CAPs and are currently in a summer surge. As part of the surge we are on track to expand the number of MQ-1/9 CAPs to 59 CAPs by end of FY11. We continue to examine our options for reconstituting from our RPA surge and the planned expansion of our capability in FY12 and FY13.

7. Nuclear Deterrence

Continuing to strengthen our nuclear enterprise remains a top Air Force priority, and we have taken positive steps within the FY12 budget request to continue to strengthen and improve this Core Function.

Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) achieved full operational capability (FOC) on September 30, 2010, moving all Air Force nuclear-capable bombers and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) under one command. After a recent review, the Air Force has determined that nuclear munitions maintenance units currently assigned to Air Force Material Command should be realigned under AFGSC. This action will establish effective organizational structures that best achieve unity of command, unity of effort and standardized processes and policies, further strengthening the nuclear enterprise and its associated readiness. The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center continues to pursue vital and deliberate sustainment of the nuclear enterprise through efforts such as the Air Force Comprehensive Assessment of Nuclear Sustainment process. As for nuclear force structure, bomber force modernization continued in an effort to maintain a viable force beyond 2030. We have completed the transition to four B-52 operational squadrons with the addition of the 69th Bomb Squadron at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota. ICBM modernization and sustainment also continued with investments in new test equipment and launch facility environmental control systems.

The Air Force completed a number of assessments to address systemic issues with ICBM infrastructure and operating procedures as well as a report on the age and pedigree of the infrastructure and equipment associated with the ICBM system. Based on these assessments, it is clear that a significant portion of the existing infrastructure will eventually require modernization or complete replacement in the years ahead.
The Air Force budget request of $5.2B for nuclear deterrence operations demonstrates a commitment to sustaining the ICBM force through 2030 with investment including command and control, cryptographic improvements and ballistic missile fuse sustainment. The budget request also includes other programs such as the tail kit portion of the B61 nuclear weapon life extension program, the future long-range standoff weapon, and the Common Vertical Lift Support Platform that highlight our efforts to strengthen the future of nuclear deterrence. Beyond weapon system sustainment and modernization, the Air Force is focusing on human capital as we carefully balance requirements for our limited, intensively scrutinized, high-demand Airmen in the nuclear enterprise.

The Air Force successfully began implementation of a new verification regime and is planning for the elimination and conversion of launchers under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. We will work with the OSD and U.S. Strategic Command to identify and assess options for future force structure adjustments consistent with the Treaty provisions.

8. Conclusion

Air Force personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and organizations are prepared for today’s operations and tomorrow’s uncertain challenges, despite fiscal challenges and high operations tempo. With an uncompromising commitment to our core values of integrity, service before self, and excellence in all we do, the Air Force remains ready to provide global vigilance, reach, and power for America.
GENERAL PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE

Gen. Philip M. Breedlove is Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. As Vice Chief, he presides over the Air Staff and serves as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Requirements Oversight Council and Deputy Advisory Working Group. He assists the Chief of Staff with organizing, training, and equipping of 680,000 active-duty, Guard, Reserve and civilian forces serving in the United States and overseas.

General Breedlove was raised in Forest Park, Ga., and was commissioned in 1977 as a distinguished graduate of Georgia Tech’s ROTC program. He has been assigned to numerous operational, command and staff positions, and has completed nine overseas tours, including two remote tours. He has commanded a fighter squadron, an operations group, three fighter wings, and a numbered air force. Additionally, he has served as operations officer in the Pacific Command Division on the Joint Staff, executive officer to the Commander of Headquarters Air Combat Command, the senior military assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force, and Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff.

Prior to assuming his current position, General Breedlove served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. He was responsible to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff for formulating policy supporting air, space, irregular warfare, counterproliferation, homeland security, weather and cyber operations. General Breedlove has flown combat missions in Operation Joint Forge/Just Guardian. He is a command pilot with 3,500 flying hours, primarily in the F-16.

EDUCATION
1977 Bachelor’s degree in civil engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology
1982 Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1991 Distinguished graduate, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1993 Master of Science degree in aeronautical technology, Arizona State University
1995 Master’s degree in national security studies, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
2002 Fellow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Seminar XXI, Washington, D.C.

ASSIGNMENTS
GENERAL PHILIP H. BREDLOVE

5. September 1983 - January 1985, F-16 aircraft commander and instructor pilot, 614th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Torrejón AB, Spain
7. March 1987 - January 1988, F-16 pilot, 326th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Ramstein AB, West Germany
9. August 1988 - August 1990, F-16 flight commander, then assistant operations officer, 52nd Tactical Fighter Squadron, Ramstein AB, Germany
10. August 1990 - July 1991, student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
12. May 1993 - July 1994, Commander, 87th Fighter Squadron, Kunsan AB, South Korea
15. July 1997 - June 1999, Commander, 27th Operations Group, Cannon AFB, N.M.
17. May 2000 - May 2001, Commander, 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan AB, South Korea
20. June 2004 - June 2005, Commander, 31st Fighter Wing, Aviano AB, Italy
21. June 2005 - October 2006, Vice Commander, 16th Air Force, Ramstein AB, Germany
22. October 2006 - July 2008, Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS
2. June 1995 - July 1997, operations officer, U.S. Pacific Command Division, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a lieutenant colonel
3. October 2006 - July 2008, Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a major general

FLIGHT INFORMATION
Rating: Command pilot
Flight hours: More than 3,500
Aircraft flown: F-16, T-37 and C-21

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
- Distinguished Service Medal
- Defense Superior Service Medal
- Legion of Merit with three oak leaf clusters
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
- Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters
- Aerial Achievement Medal
EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION
Second Lieutenant June 1, 1977
First Lieutenant Dec. 10, 1979
Captain Dec. 10, 1981
Major Nov. 1, 1985
Lieutenant Colonel June 1, 1993
Colonel Jan. 1, 1998
Brigadier General Oct. 1, 2005
Major General June 23, 2006
Lieutenant General July 21, 2008
General Jan. 14, 2011

(Current as of January 2011)
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

JULY 26, 2011
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO

Admiral GREENERT. The Mediterranean-based Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (MPSRON 1) will be relocated to the U.S. East Coast. Bids for layberths have yet to be sought, but the Blount Island Command in Jacksonville, FL, is one of many potential layberths on the East Coast being considered. The vessels do not have to be consolidated in a single homeport.

The two other MPSRONs, based in the Pacific Ocean, meet all OPLAN and CONPLAN time requirements. [See page 25.]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

JULY 26, 2011
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Mr. FORBES. The QDR Independent Review Panel supported an increased force structure in both the NORTHCOM and PACOM areas of responsibility. We seem to be headed in a different direction. So, how do we balance a future smaller force to meet the increased needs in these and other areas?

General CHIARELLI. Anticipated reductions of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan will enable us to restore our strategic depth and allow us to meet other security obligations by reappportioning available forces to meet the current strategic guidance. Reducing the numbers of deployed forces will result in increased presence and activity at CONUS and OCONUS basing locations. This more stable force will be able to return to predictable training programs to prepare for full spectrum operations thereby placing increased requirements on our current facilities but resulting in better prepared forces to meet Combatant Commander (COCOM) requirements. These theaters do retain important capabilities and enablers. More effective force structure can be realized from the continued transformation of Headquarters (HQs) when appropriate and reallocation of selected enablers to the global force pool. The end state is increased capability the Army can provide to the COCOMs in support of full spectrum operations. Total Army Analysis for Fiscal Years 2014–2018 is currently ongoing and will enable the Army to provide the correct mix of organizations required to maintain a balanced and affordable force that is able to meet COCOM requirements.

Mr. FORBES. The budget cited numerous “efficiencies” found in reductions to personnel through defunding civilian positions associated with insourcing initiatives and instituting a hiring freeze. Similarly, the Committee has received reprogramming requests that cite further savings in the reduction of contracted work. Where are we accepting risk by reducing contractors and civilian workers while undertaking large reductions in force structure?

General CHIARELLI. At this time, the Army is confident it is taking the necessary steps to mitigate the potential risks associated with reductions in the contractor and civilian workforce. Through a deliberate process, the Army works with commanders to right-size the civilian and contractor workforce and ensure there is no reduction in the level of services provided for soldiers and families. As force structure is reduced, we will make appropriate adjustments so that the workload and the work force remain balanced.

Mr. FORBES. Please update the subcommittee on your Service’s efforts to reset the force. What are the impacts of a delayed and/or scaled-down reset and reconstitution (R2) effort? How would such a reduction affect your mission capability? Are current OMB guidelines on modernization through reset too restrictive?

General CHIARELLI. Since the Reset Program began in 2002, we have Reset over 2.5 million pieces of equipment and, on average, 25 brigade sets of equipment annually. As a result of these efforts, our operational readiness rates of equipment in theater has generally met or exceeded 90 percent ground equipment and 75 percent aviation equipment. To date in Fiscal Year 2011, the Army has Reset over 80,000 pieces of equipment at the depot level and over 500,000 pieces of equipment (e.g., small arms, Night Vision Devices, and chemical and biological protective items) through our Special Repair Teams. A scaled down Reset effort would cause the Army to experience a decline in the aggregate number of trained and ready combat capable formations to respond to any unforeseen contingency operations. Additionally, it would disrupt the current pace of equipment Reset at our national maintenance facilities.

There is no degradation in equipment readiness attributable to current Office of Management and Budget Reset guidelines.

Mr. FORBES. What are the long-term strategic implications to the force of providing ready deployed and deploying forces at the expense of non-deployed units?

General CHIARELLI. The high demand for forces over the course of the last decade has created a situation where the Army has to shift resources from the generating force to the operating force in order to maintain our required levels of manning for deploying units. From FY08–FY11, non-deployable Soldier rates have increased approximately two percent each year, with the current non-deployable rate just over
16% of the active force. Of that percentage, 11,000 Soldiers are in the Disability Evaluation System (DES) with approximately 7,000 in the operating force and 1,900 currently assigned to units with a Latest Arrival Date (LAD). To ensure deploying units meet the deployment criteria at 90 percent available strength at departure for deployment, Human Resources Command (HRC) must over-man deploying units to ensure the deployment manning criteria is met. Non-deploying formations have reduced levels to provide the needed Soldiers. This impacts the ability of the Army to generate enough manpower to fill a deploying unit prior to participation in critical Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MREs) which usually occurs within 90 days prior to deployment. Consequently units are not as highly trained on collective tasks because all unit members did not participate in the MRE. Additionally, meeting administrative requirements and making up individual training for late arriving Soldiers places an additional burden on small unit leaders during a time when their focus should be on preparing the unit for deployment.

The Army has also decremented the generating force to ensure our war fighting units are manned at an acceptable level for deployment in support of the full range of operations. If projected demand reduces in parallel with the reduction in Army force size and structure, the long-term strategic implications are more manageable. However, if the future demand exceeds future supply, the Army will continue to have difficulty maintaining those institutions that facilitate unit deployments and provide for the professional development and training of our force.

Mr. FORBES. To the extent possible in open session, please describe the impacts that any equipment shortages have had on full spectrum training?

General Chiarelli. Equipment shortages do adversely impact full spectrum training. We know that 55% of units in the Army have less than 80% full across their authorized equipment sets. It has been a number of years since our Brigade Combat Teams have had enough dwell between deployments that they could focus on anything other than the counter-insurgency training necessary for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result we have not had the benefit of unit commander’s feedback to fully understand the second order impacts to full spectrum training.

In the aggregate, the Army can provide most major systems (combat vehicles such as tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, tactical wheeled vehicles, howitzers, weapons, etc); however, we continue to work through modernization issues (most notably C4ISR/network-related shortfalls) and selected shortages of low density but nonetheless important equipment like specific types of tool sets and test equipment, armored ambulances, etc. These shortfalls continue to adversely impact full spectrum training, and the Army expects that these impacts will become more apparent as more and more units are able to conduct full spectrum training. At the same time, the Army is now delivering much of what the Army invested in during the past five years; this, coupled with the reduction in numbers of Army units deployed in the CENTCOM area, should enable the Army to continue to make steady progress in improving our equipment on hand posture across the Army to support full spectrum training.

Mr. FORBES. How are you adapting to budgetary reduction in FY 2011? What challenges would you experience should additional cuts be levied against you?

General Chiarelli. With the Army still heavily engaged in operations in Afghanistan and to a lesser degree in Iraq, the $5.7 billion reduction to our FY 2011 budget request required us to take a hard look at balancing what is required for meeting our current national security obligations while reducing risk to support future contingencies. The Army was able to adapt to some of the FY2011 budgetary reductions by leveraging previous efficiency efforts such as reducing reliance on service support contractors and reducing civilian personnel to FY10 levels. However, the majority of the FY 2011 reductions occurred in the Research, Development and Acquisition appropriations. The Army was able to work closely with congressional committees to identify areas with the lowest risk and greatest flexibility to absorb reductions and deferrals but these changes will still affect the delivery of capabilities in the future years.

Additional reductions to the FY 2012 and 2013 budgets will require the Army to bring down manpower, readiness and procurement accounts in a balanced way to avoid creating hollowness in this force. Significant reductions would be extraordinarily difficult and impact nearly every Army equity, program and community. We must maintain faith with our Soldiers, Families and Civilians while meeting our critical modernization needs, resetting the force through our depot maintenance and sustainment operations and taking care of the behavioral health needs of our force.

Mr. FORBES. The Army recently alerted this committee to roughly $751 million in excess reset funding due to improved condition of returning equipment, retention of equipment in Iraq for risk mitigation, and to accommodate growth of theater provided equipment (TPE) sets. How confident are you about your FY12 reset forecast?
When does the “bow wave” of TPE reset hit? How are we leveling workload to ensure capacity across this trough for the coming wave? What happens if we stay in Iraq at their request beyond December 2011?

General CHIARELLI. The $751M excess in FY11 was a result of the late return of equipment from Iraq due to combatant commander risk mitigation. TPE in Iraq was retained beyond unit redeployment dates in order to ensure immediate equipment availability if a temporary troop increase was required to react to a crisis. Based on current National Strategy, the Army is confident that we have requested adequate funding for our FY12 Reset requirements. The Army estimates that the “bow wave” of TPE Reset for Operation New Dawn will occur between FY12 and FY14. Another “bow wave” will occur upon conclusion of operations in Afghanistan. We have the capacity and flexibility within our Industrial Base, both organic and private industry, to adjust to equipment Reset requirements as the operational system dictates. Additionally, a portion of our equipment Reset is completed by our units and our installations.

Any delay in return of equipment from Iraq beyond December of 2011 will result in an adjustment for future year Reset funding as our Reset requirements and liability is delayed further into the out years for execution.

Mr. FORBES. LTG Stevenson testified earlier this year that the Army's reset liability is around $10 billion and will take about 2–3 years to complete after major operations in CENTCOM end. What impact would significant reductions in budget authority such as the Senate's “Gang of Six” $866 billion proposed cut have on Army reset and its readiness assuming “persistent engagement” in OEF/OND? How would it impact depots, arsenals, and ammo plants?

General CHIARELLI. Loss of Reset buffer of 2–3 years beyond the end of operations will result in difficult choices for the Army. The Army will likely be forced to decrement funding of essential equipment repair, training, Soldier services, and similar Army programs.

The impact to arsenals, depots, and ammunition plants is equally significant. Adverse impacts could include civilian workforce reductions, dormant repair and production lines, reduced throughput, and decreasing equipment readiness.

Mr. FORBES. The QDR Independent Review Panel supported an increased force structure in both the NORTHCOM and PACOM areas of responsibility. We seem to be headed in a different direction. So, how do we balance a future smaller force to meet the increased needs in these and other areas?

Admiral GREENERT. Navy must address several competing demands with the current force, which we adjudicate through the Global Force Management (GFM) Process. This process, led by the Office of SECDEF and Joint Staff, decides how to allocate operating ships and aircraft among the six regional Combatant Commanders based on the Guidance of Employment of the Force (GEF).

Today, Navy is meeting the JCS-directed (via GFM) Combatant Commander needs. We don’t have the capacity, though, to meet all unrestrained Combatant Commander requests for forces.

Looking forward, our current shipbuilding and aviation plans balance the anticipated future demand for naval forces with expected resources. With anticipated funding being flat or declining in the future, we focus our investments to ensure the battle force has the capability for Navy’s core missions with the capacity to be present forward in the most critical regions. At the same time, our plans take into account the importance of maintaining an adequate national shipbuilding design and industrial base.

Assuming Navy forces will continue to be allocated by the GFM process to Combatant Commanders, the investment choices we make today will either enable or constrain what will be available. Given the potential for dramatic fiscal reduction, we need a comprehensive strategic review that takes a fundamental look at what we are asking our forces to do in an era of constrained resources. If Navy force structure is significantly reduced, a review is recommended in order to meet the global force management plan today and balance the needs of tomorrow.

Mr. FORBES. The budget cited numerous “efficiencies” found in reductions to personnel through defunding civilian positions associated with insourcing initiatives and instituting a hiring freeze. Similarly, the Committee has received reprogramming requests that cite further savings in the reduction of contracted work. What are we accepting risk by reducing contractors and civilian workers while undertaking large reductions in force structure?

Admiral GREENERT. In-sourcing is one of the tools the DoN and DoD will use to establish the appropriate mix of military, civilian, and contractor employees in our workforce to affordably accomplish its roles and missions. In addition to having the right skill set, our workforce must also be appropriately sized with the appropriate
skill set. We are eliminating some civilian positions and reducing new hires to gain efficiencies and reduction in overhead. This reduces the number of overall positions we will in-source but balances the skill set, alleviating redundancy. The Department of the Navy is currently monitoring the impact of these reductions from FY11 and will continue doing so in FY12.

Mr. FORBES. Please update the subcommittee on your Service’s efforts to reset the force. What are the impacts of a delayed and/or scaled-down reset and reconstitution (R2) effort? How would such a reduction affect your mission capability? Are current OMB guidelines on modernization through reset too restrictive?

Admiral GREENERT. Navy is different in some respects from other Services in that we “reset in stride”; that is, we rely upon regular, rotationally scheduled maintenance of our ships and aircraft, and training and certification of our crews between deployments, to sustain the long-term material condition of our force. Our Navy’s reset in stride, when executed properly, translates into decades of assured service for each ship and aircraft, a good return on investment. This reset is intended to be executed every year, as opposed to only during a reset and reconstitution effort after contingency operations. As such, it should eventually be part of our baseline funding. Navy platforms will not reach Expected Service Life if OCO funding is not aligned with contingency operations, enabling “reset in stride.”

For expeditionary equipment used in operations ashore in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is estimated to take approximately two years to complete depot maintenance reset; the equipment will be reset after contingency operations are complete. Most expeditionary equipment is used for contingency operations, so maintenance is funded with OCO appropriations. If contingency operations cease without OCO funding for reset, expeditionary equipment readiness will be severely impacted.

Navy does not deem current OMB guidelines on modernization through reset to be overly restrictive.

Mr. FORBES. What are the long-term strategic implications to the force of providing ready deployed and deploying forces at the expense of non-deployed units?

Admiral GREENERT. To pay for “ready deployed” readiness expenses that are emergent or unplanned, we sometimes are compelled to reduce operating funding for non-deployed units to assure readiness of deployed forces. From a strategic perspective, this affects Navy’s ability to support surge requirements. From a force provider perspective, this tends to reduces non-deployed maintenance and training funding as forces prepare to re-deploy to meet emergent requirements (deployed). This makes it difficult to maintain (long-term) the material readiness of the force, and in some cases requires us to tailor training and certification of deploying units to “mission-specific” qualifications, instead of the full spectrum of naval operations. In addition, reduced time non-deployed is a stress on our Sailors and Families.

Mr. FORBES. To the extent possible in open session, please describe the impacts that any equipment shortages have had on full spectrum training?

Admiral GREENERT. With one exception, Navy training has not been impacted by equipment shortages. The exception is in Navy P–3 squadrons, where wing fatigue life required the grounding of approximately one-third of the aircraft fleet. This has required mission-tailored training for deploying aircrews due to training aircraft availability. The corrective action is well underway and currently ahead of schedule.

Mr. FORBES. How are you adapting to budgetary reduction in FY 2011? What challenges would you experience should additional cuts be levied against you?

Admiral GREENERT. In FY11, budget constraints inherent in the ongoing Continuing Resolution required the Navy to freeze new civilian hiring, limit some support functions, and adjust the schedules of some procurement contracts. We also identified efficiencies to reduce overhead costs—the impact of which we are still assessing.

In FY12 and beyond, there are no obvious programs or activities in which to make further efficiency reductions, pending additional analysis and internal policy change. In the FY12 budget Navy proposes to cut overhead to reinvest in our ability to provide forces. It would be imprudent to make further overhead reductions without first evaluating the impact of these cuts.

Mr. FORBES. At one time we relied heavily upon the Navy and Air Force to provide individual augmentees to meet ground force requirements in CENTCOM. What is that level of dependence now and how has the long-term use of sailors and airmen to meet ground force requirements impacted the readiness of the Navy and Air Force?

Admiral GREENERT. The Joint force still depends on Individual Augmentee (IA) Sailors to meet evolving ground force requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan as these conflicts have progressed through various phases. The Navy provides over half of its IA support in core Navy skill areas, such as cargo handling, airlift support, and Seabees. As of 01 September approximately 4,800 Sailors were serving in these
“core” missions. Navy also provides approximately 4,100 Sailors for a range of “non-core” missions, such as provincial reconstruction, detainee operations, civil affairs, and customs inspection. The Joint sourcing process to meet both “core” and “non-core” requirements is deliberate and currently focused on reducing IA requirements without unduly increasing the risk to mission success.

Navy’s FY12 end strength anticipates a phased reduction in IA demand for Iraq and Afghanistan. Should IA demand remain at current levels or increase, we will be challenged to meet manning requirements for the Fleet.

Mr. FORBES. The QDR Independent Review Panel supported an increased force structure in both the NORTHCOM and PACOM areas of responsibility. We seem to be headed in a different direction. So, how do we balance a future smaller force to meet the increased needs in these and other areas?

General DUNFORD. Tomorrow’s Marine Corps, though smaller than the force conducting current overseas contingency operations, is not simply a reduced version of today’s Marine Corps nor is it a reversion to the pre-9/11 posture. The imperative for the Marine Corps is to preserve capabilities developed since 9/11, expand our engagement efforts, respond to crisis, and still be able to project power for the most dangerous threat scenarios. To that end, we accept a degree of risk by reducing our active component capacity for conducting multiple, major sustained operations ashore, relying on an “operationalized” reserve component to mitigate that risk. Of necessity, our force structure represents many judiciously considered factors and makes pragmatic trade-offs in capabilities and capacities to achieve a posture that creates opportunity and provides an operational stance that enables flexibility and rapid response. The resulting force structure provides a force optimized for forward-presence, which facilitates both ongoing engagement activities and rapid crisis response; provides readiness for immediate deployment and employment; re-shapes organizations, capabilities, and capacities to increase aggregate utility and flexibility across the range of military operations; properly balances critical capabilities and enablers; creates an operationalized reserve; and creates opportunity for more closely integrated operations with our Navy, Special Operations, and inter-agency partners.

We will use a conditions based approach to enable tomorrow’s Marine Corps. As our forces draw down in Afghanistan, we will reorganize over time to the 186.8K structure. Although we will be smaller than today’s force, we will ensure a robust forward presence in PACOM through a mix of forward deployed forces and a restart of the unit deployment program.

Mr. FORBES. The budget cited numerous “efficiencies” found in reductions to personnel through defunding civilian positions associated with insourcing initiatives and instituting a hiring freeze. Similarly, the Committee has received reprogramming requests that cite further savings in the reduction of contracted work. Where are we accepting risk by reducing contractors and civilian workers while undertaking large reductions in force structure?

General DUNFORD. In meeting the Secretary’s (SECDEF) efficiency initiatives the Marine Corps is heavily engaged in many efforts aimed at improving our warfighting business operations. A thorough assessment of civilian labor across the Marine Corps, to include contractors, is one of the major actions the Commandant of the Marine Corps has undertaken to achieve efficiencies throughout the Marine Corps. To support this effort the Marine Corps implemented an enterprise wide freeze on all internal and external hiring actions for all appropriated fund positions back in December 2010. This action was designed to assist Headquarters Marines Corp activities and commands across the Corps in reconciling their current civilian workforce against manpower requirements and budgetary constraints. While hiring has resumed for some activities and commands, hiring actions will continue to be closely scrutinized to ensure requirement are balanced against fiscal constraints. To complement these efforts the Marine Corps has reduced personnel associated with infrastructure and headquarters support activities, with particular emphasis on duplicative functions across the enterprise. This reduction in “tail” functions and activities will allow rebalancing towards “tooth” functions and activities, thus sustaining the Marines Corps war fighting priorities. Additionally, the Marine Corps reduced civilian billets programmed for the future as a result of insourcing initiatives in order to meet reduced funding levels. While the Marine Corps is accepting risk in some of its management and oversight functions, the on-going strategic review of civilian and contractor requirements will allow the Marine Corps to mitigate that risk by rebalancing its civilian workforce based on validated requirements at all levels and functions across from an enterprise perspective.

Mr. FORBES. Please update the subcommittee on your Service’s efforts to reset the force. What are the impacts of a delayed and/or scaled-down reset and reconstitution
effort? How would such a reduction affect your mission capability? Are current OMB guidelines on modernization through reset too restrictive?

General Dunford. The Marine Corps has been planning a methodical reset of equipment from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) while simultaneously executing Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) reset actions. This month marks the end of successfully resetting equipment that returned from OIF. Planning efforts for resetting equipment returning from OEF began early this year with a symposium to capture lessons learned from the draw down and reset of equipment deployed to OIF. The Commandant of the Marine Corps completed a Force Structure Review to realign personnel, and equipment structure to meet the requirements of the modern post-OEF Middleweight Force. A series of planning conferences have been conducted to refine our plans for redeployment and retrograde out of Afghanistan to leverage resources to enable an in-stride reset and reconstitute the force. The planning actions over the past year have enabled the Marine Corps to draft a strategic-level OEF Ground Equipment Reset Strategy scheduled for release in October, 2011. As an enabler to Reset and Reconstitution, the Marine Corps will publish the OEF Reset Playbook that will synthesize our reset actions across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels in order to reconstitute to the Middleweight Force.

A delayed and/or scaled down reset and reconstitution effort will result in persistent equipment and training shortfalls for a significant part of the Marine Corps. These shortfalls would require the Marine Corps to emphasize readiness for deployed and next-to-deploy units at the expense of the non-deployed force. The inability to properly resource non-deployed combat units to high levels of readiness would compel the Marine Corps to further adopt a form of “cyclical readiness” rather than steady force-wide readiness.

A scaled down reset and reconstitution effort would negatively impact the Marine Corps’ capacity to respond to unexpected crises or contingencies with non-deployed forces. Since a degraded non-deployed force would likely respond to an emergent crisis or contingency operation, the employing Combatant Commander loses depth, flexibility, and responsiveness for the unexpected. The strategic implication is increased time to respond to unexpected crises or large-scale contingencies.

OMB has been supportive of the Marine Corps buying the latest versions of equipment to replace equipment losses from OEF. However, based on the current restrictions for spending reset funding, the Marine Corps is restricted from resetting aging equipment used for training our forces at home station. Thus, operational units preparing for deployment using equipment sets (e.g. Mojave Viper) for training do not meet the OMB criteria. We believe these equipment sets should be included in reset funding requests.

Mr. Forbes. What are the long-term strategic implications to the force of providing ready deployed and deploying forces at the expense of non-deployed units?

General Dunford. The non-deployed force provides the Nation depth and responsiveness for the unexpected. The long-term strategic implications of underfunding non-deployed units are:

- Increased risk in the timely execution of unexpected crises or large-scale contingencies
- Increased risk in the successful execution of a military response to unexpected crises or large-scale contingencies at tolerable cost in American lives and materiel
- Increased risk in achieving a successful strategic outcome to the crisis or contingency; the larger the crisis or contingency, the greater the risk

This question infers the long-term strategic implications of tiered readiness. Tiered readiness is the deliberate attrition of the non-deployed force’s combat capability and deployability in favor of sourcing planned rotational requirements; readiness is optimized for a known deployment.

The major shortcoming with tiered readiness is meeting known, planned requirements is only one facet of readiness; the ability to respond to crises and contingencies with the non-deployed force is also important—something tiered readiness fails to properly take into account. Congress requires the Marine Corps to be most ready when the Nation is generally least ready. Tiered readiness is at odds with this mandate. The Marine Corps will leverage its non-deployed forces and task organize to meet crises and contingencies.

Mr. Forbes. To the extent possible in open session, please describe the impacts that any equipment shortages have had on full spectrum training?

General Dunford. The Marine Corps’ training is focused on preparing forces for counterinsurgency operations (COIN) in Afghanistan. In pre-deployment training, we strive to provide the same equipment that our Marines will use in theater. While there have been equipment shortages in both home station and at Service level
training locations, these deficiencies have not significantly impacted our ability to meet pre-deployment training requirements. Our equipment shortages reside in the following areas: 1) Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C–IED) equipment; 2) Command and Control (C2) equipment; and 3) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and other sensor systems.

CIED Equipment: Effective C–IED operations require unique skill sets that are first developed through a progressively-challenging training program that encompasses individual and collective skill development at all levels of leadership. Examples of this highly specialized equipment include IED detection kits, metal detectors, counter-radio controlled IED electronic warfare systems (CREW) and C–IED training lanes. The majority of these systems are fielded to support operational requirements in theater. To mitigate the finite amount of systems available for training, we provide support for standardized, home station training to the operating forces on all bases including equipment and technical expertise, as well as support for institutional pre-deployment exercises such as Enhanced Mojave Viper. Once deployed, Marines continue to train in order sustain their CIED skill-sets and integrate any newly fielded systems—often incorporating immediate lessons learned. Training and Education Command currently has personnel forward deployed to ensure this in-theater sustainment training and the lessons learned are institutionalized. Additionally, our Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory is working with the Joint IED Defeat Office to further update equipment and mitigate any shortfalls.

C2 Equipment: Units deploying to Afghanistan are directed to maintain specific C2 systems while in theater and to incorporate these systems into pre-deployment training. Due to technological advances, many of these systems are fielded rapidly to support operational requirements and most of the equipment resides in country. To mitigate the finite amount of systems available for training, we maintain MAGTF Integrated Systems Training Centers (MISTCs) at all major Marine Corps Bases. The MISTCs provide standardized, home station training to the operating forces on multiple C2 systems. Additionally, many of the C2 system program initiatives allocate funding for Field Service Representatives (FSRs) from respective companies to both train Marines and provide on-site technical support.

UAV/Sensor Systems: Much like C2 equipment, UAV and other sensor systems have been fielded rapidly, resulting in shortages of systems available at home-station. We alleviate our shortages through collaborative training with other Services and use of simulators. Units are also augmented with appropriate contracted field support from FSRs in Afghanistan.

Mr. FORBES. How are you adapting to budgetary reduction in FY 2011? What challenges would you experience should additional cuts be levied against you?

General DUNFORD. The Marine Corps maintains a long-standing reputation in the Department of Defense as being a frugal, lean Service that delivers the best value for the defense dollar. As such, the Marine Corps has adapted to budgetary reductions by continuing our tradition of pursuing ways to streamline operations, identifying efficiencies, and reinvesting savings in order to get the most out of every dollar. It is this mentality that has allowed us to continue to provide the best trained and equipped Marine units to Afghanistan, even in this era of constrained resources.

The Marine Corps recognizes the fiscal realities that currently confront the United States, and we are already making hard choices inside the Service and ensuring that we ask only for what we need as opposed to what we may want. The Marine Corps is currently taking steps to rebalance the force while simultaneously posturing it for the future; additionally, we are continuing to maintain our forward presence and provide Marine combat forces to Afghanistan. We understand that the nation will face difficult resource decisions in the future, and additional cuts will impact the manner in which we address the challenges presented by an uncertain and ever-changing world. As such, the Marine Corps will resource the appropriate capabilities to remain the nation’s expeditionary middleweight force and has a well analyzed plan for the reset and reconstitution of equipment which has been severely used during the last decade of war. Commensurate with our responsibility to maintain warfighting readiness, we must ensure that we keep faith with our Marines and their families. Additional budgetary reductions will influence our ability to accomplish all of these objectives while simultaneously continuing to conduct combat operations in Afghanistan. Accordingly, such budget reductions will result in increased risk, requiring careful consideration to ensure we maintain an effective and efficient force capable of providing operational reach and agility during times of crisis.
Mr. FORBES. The QDR Independent Review Panel supported an increased force structure in both the NORTHCOM and PACOM areas of responsibility. We seem to be headed in a different direction. So, how do we balance a future smaller force to meet the increased needs in these and other areas?

General BREEDLOVE. The Air Force will carefully enhance and modernize the capabilities of our legacy and fifth generation aircraft so as to balance our ability to meet the increased needs and Combatant Commander (COCOM) requirements within NORTHCOM and PACOM. The Air Force will continue to participate in the Department’s Global Defense Posture discussions and will support the integrated process through which the Department validates and prioritizes defense posture initiatives and implementation. We will continue to work closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, other Services, and the COCOMs as part of the ongoing Department of Defense Comprehensive Review to ensure our force structure is consistent with and fully advances U.S. National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy objectives. In the face of an increasingly austere defense funding environment, the Comprehensive Review will guide future force structure decisions based upon sound strategy development. You can be assured the Air Force will endeavor to field the most capable force available, within size and funding constraints, to meet the requirements of the Joint warfighter, while balancing risk across the spectrum of operations.

Mr. FORBES. The budget cited numerous “efficiencies” found in reductions to personnel through defunding civilian positions associated with insourcing initiatives and instituting a hiring freeze. Similarly, the Committee has received reprogramming requests that cite further savings in the reduction of contracted work. Where are we accepting risk by reducing contractors and civilian workers while undertaking large reductions in force structure?

General BREEDLOVE. We accepted risk in overhead and support services to ensure risks are reduced across mission capabilities and readiness, i.e. moving resources from tail to tooth. The contract efficiencies are aimed at reducing the Department’s reliance on contract services. These reductions include service support contracts, knowledge based services, acquisition program overhead, and contractor supported studies.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense efficiency objectives limits Air Force civilian growth above fiscal year 2010 levels. The Air Force is minimizing potential risk by conducting a highly-focused, strategic review of our entire workforce. We are reviewing all core functions and assessing trade-offs, to include reevaluating in-sourcing plans and implementing hiring controls to rebalance the workforce within existing resources. This review is also focused on reducing manpower in overhead and support functions to realign dollars and manpower to the most critical force structure and mission needs. Specific adjustments will be programmed as we work through our FY13 President’s Budget. The Air Force will continue to reassess the need for additional steps to achieve necessary civilian workforce levels while minimizing the impact on current personnel.

Mr. FORBES. Please update the subcommittee on your Service’s efforts to reset the force. What are the impacts of a delayed and/or scaled-down reset and reconstitution (R2) effort? How would such a reduction affect your mission capability? Are current OMB guidelines on modernization through reset too restrictive?

General BREEDLOVE. There are no immediate impacts of a delayed and/or scaled down reset and reconstitution effort to the Air Force. The Air Force R2 is structured and calendar driven. Aircraft and engines are continuously returned to meet regularly scheduled depot maintenance. For vehicles and support equipment, when the mission is complete a majority of these assets will remain in theater, with the exception of special purpose vehicles and generators which return to depot as needed. A reduction in overseas contingency operations funding will impact the Air Force’s ability to meet future requirements.

Current Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidelines on modernization reset are not too restrictive. There are no immediate operational aircraft or equipment shortfalls due to current OMB guidelines; however, stressed fleets due to high operations tempo are accelerating service life, and mitigation strategies require longer-term investments.

Mr. FORBES. What are the long-term strategic implications to the force of providing ready deployed and deploying forces at the expense of non-deployed units?

General BREEDLOVE. The Air Force established a predictable, standardized battle rhythm to ensure rotational forces are organized, trained, equipped, and ready to respond to combatant commanders’ requests for forces. Using a rotational construct, each unit undergoes a period of reconstitution before entering another deployment vulnerability period. When combatant commander requirements exceed the forces available in the vulnerability period, the Air Force either reduces the reconstitution
period of “non-deployed” units or selects individuals from organizations with no designated combat capability (e.g., those who fulfill Air Force-level organize, train, and equip Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E) responsibilities).

Continued periods of reduced reconstitution have long-term effects on unit readiness and affect the health and welfare of Airmen and their families. Additionally, sustained deployment of over 20 percent of our individual Airmen from organizations with Service-level OT&E responsibilities will reduce our ability to sustain operations and provide ready, trained, and equipped Airmen for future engagements.

Mr. FORBES. To the extent possible in open session, please describe the impacts that any equipment shortages have had on full spectrum training?

General BREEDLOVE. Ongoing operations continue to pose a challenge to Air Force equipment and supplies. Overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding has been instrumental in avoiding shortfalls and maintaining critical capabilities for our Joint force commanders.

The Air Force is currently experiencing a shortage of advanced targeting pods (ATP) that are used during operational deployments on Combat Air Forces aircraft. Because the quantity of ATPs available is below the requirement, the Air Force can only support pre-deployment training and deployed operations, leaving a limited number of pods to support day-to-day training.

ATPs are not permanently assigned to a particular aircraft or unit; rather they are moved between units to support the priorities set by Air Combat Command as follows: current combat/contingency operations; Air Expeditionary Force spin-up training for units within the four-month prior to deployment window; test requirements; continuation training for operational/combat-coded units; and lastly, flying training units (FTU).

Mr. FORBES. How are you adapting to budgetary reduction in FY 2011? What challenges would you experience should additional cuts be levied against you?

General BREEDLOVE. The budgetary reductions presented execution challenges and impacted areas requiring mitigation strategies that drove risk and tradeoffs. Congressionally-mandated operations and maintenance (O&M) reductions were absorbed in areas such as civilian pay, base support, and facilities, sustainment, restoration, and modernization (FSRM). The reductions delayed new mission beddowns, airfield, runway, dorms, and utility infrastructure projects. They drove operational workarounds and inefficiencies and increased sustainment costs. Reductions also slowed the civilian hiring process. The Air Force is committed to achieving efficiencies across the force and will continue to make tradeoffs to preserve our most important capabilities while supporting current operations and taking care of our men and women in uniform. This late in the execution year, we do not expect any additional budgetary reductions.

Mr. FORBES. The Air Force has reduced its flying hour training program and reexamining its mix of live and virtual training including opportunities to rely more on the use of simulators. How will the Air Force measure the impact of changing the mix of live and virtual training on the quality of training as well as individual and unit readiness?

General BREEDLOVE. The Air Force leverages critical live fly training with increasingly capable virtual training devices and simulators. In a continual process, the Air Force reassesses the mix between live fly and virtual training to strike the right balance. As simulator technology and fidelity improve, training methods and simulator capabilities are assessed to ensure requirements are met as efficiently and effectively as possible. The Air Force has already shifted a significant amount of live fly training into our simulators. Reductions in flying hours require investments in infrastructure and training system upgrades and procurement.

Unit commanders assess unit readiness on a monthly basis via the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) and the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). Individual readiness is tracked with unit training programs. Any negative training impact to Air Force operational readiness would be reported and tracked through those reporting systems.

Mr. FORBES. Each Air Force unit is designed to perform a specific mission requiring a particular skill set. However, Air Force personnel may be assigned to support current operations by deploying to perform a related mission that does not necessarily require their full skill set. When individuals are engaged in operations that require only a subset of their full skill set, their competence in some other skills may erode because the individual is unable to complete the full extent of their training requirements to remain qualified in their core mission. To what extent has the Air Force identified unit types or career specialties in which assigned personnel are not receiving comprehensive training for their core missions and what steps, if any, have been taken to mitigate any identified gaps in training?
General BREEDLOVE. The Air Force approved specialized procedures for maintaining specialty skills to include comprehensive training management processes. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36–2201, Air Force Training Program, requires supervisors to review the training records of enlisted Airmen prior to their deployment to ensure the training continuum is not broken. In turn, the supervisors document any remaining upgrade training requirements and training remarks as appropriate on the On-the-Job Record Continuation Sheet, or automated version. If Airmen are out of their in-theater specialty for an extended period, they will increase their proficiency in lost competencies through force development programs that include any combination of education, training, and experience (i.e., Career Development Courses, on-the-job training, and/or specific placement in development positions).

Additionally, the Air Force trains rated personnel in accordance with 11-series Mission Design Series (MDS)-Specific Volume 1 AFIs, which identify events that must be accomplished for aircrew personnel to maintain mission qualification and currency. Depending on real-world mission requirements, some skill sets may experience a loss in training in order to accommodate immediate mission requirements, which reinforce other skill sets. When personnel return to their unit, individuals receive the necessary training to regain proficiency in unit mission tasks and accomplish training events as necessary to comply with Volume 1 requirements. This is a recognized issue associated with the Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF) cycle, and it is provided for in the cycle dynamic. The Air Force is standardizing deployment lengths to 179 days and increasing dwell to afford more time for reset and training opportunities. The Air Force restructured the AEF to include tempo banding for high-stressed capabilities in response to the long-term surge.

Mr. FORBES. The Air Force has been flying CENTCOM sorties since Operation Desert Storm. General Breedlove, do you anticipate a similar operational tempo post-Operations New Dawn and Enduring Freedom? What is the impact to the Air Force aging fleet of aircraft? How important, then, do reset and modernization become? How would deep cuts impact your ability to modernize/recapitalize?

General BREEDLOVE. Yes, we anticipate a similar operational tempo post-Operations New Dawn and Enduring Freedom. The readiness of Combat Air Forces aircraft remains high despite challenges from accumulating hours on our fleet due to continuing combat operations in multiple theaters of operation.

Delays in the F–35 program increase our reliance on an aging legacy fighter fleet, driving the need to extend legacy fighters’ service life and modernize their combat capability. Air Force actions to extend and modernize the legacy fleet are a bridge to 5th generation capability and are not considered replacement actions. The F–16 Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) is one example of the effort to mitigate the fighter force capacity shortfall. Additionally, development of a Long Range Strike family of systems, including a new Long Range Strike (LRS) bomber and next generation, extended-range standoff missiles, allows the Air Force to address anticipated threats.

To keep our legacy platforms viable, the Air Force intends to use funds saved through efficiencies to subsidize modernization. One such example is our plan to retire six B–1 bombers and use the savings to fund modernization and sustainment upgrades for the B–1 fleet. Restrictions on the proposed B–1 retirements would reduce our overall savings by a minimum of $290 million (an 80 percent reduction in savings), limiting our ability to maintain a viable B–1 fleet.

The readiness of the Mobility Air Forces remains high while meeting robust and dynamic operational requirements. Our airlift fleet continues to provide strategic airlift as well as theater and direct support airlift missions moving personnel and a wide variety of equipment and supplies. The awarding of the KC–46A contract starts the timeline for recapitalizing our aerial refueling aircraft. Delays or reductions in KC–46A production will have impacts on Air Force readiness and ability to meet operational requirements. Reset and modernization are essential to ensure continued readiness of our fleet inventory.

Mr. FORBES. The Air Force just released figures to the HASC that they have spent $433M of O&M on Libya. Where in O&M did that money come from? What is the impact? Does this indicate significant financial commitments we should consider beyond OEF/OND when making budgetary decisions?

General BREEDLOVE. Approximately three-quarters of the Libya costs are attributed to flying hours, which are being paid for within the flying hour program. The Air Force flying hour program has not been reduced, nor have air operations training been deferred, to support the U.S. participation in Libya operations. However, unused/available flying hours from the F–22, C–130, and C–17 platforms have been realigned to KC–135, KC–10, operational support aircraft (OSA), and F–16 plat-
forms to support emerging and high priority flying/training requirements, one of them being the Libya operation.

The accrual of unused/available flying hours can be attributed to a variety of reasons:

Mobility Air Force (MAF) hours were available from the following weapons systems: C-130s: Aircraft are being used to support increased US Transportation Command operations and are not available for programmed training hours; PACAF C-17s: Hours available due to execution slightly below programmed hours.

Unused/available MAF flying hours were moved to the KC-135, KC-10 and OSA flying hour programs. In the Combat Air Forces (CAF), F-16 execution rates are much higher in support of Libya operation than at home station. CAF was able to cover approximately 70 percent of the increased flying hour requirement with F-22 hours available due to the stand down of that platform. The remaining Libya costs represent, in part, airlift bills sourced from unused Airlift Readiness Account funding available because Transportation Working Capital Fund cash balances are sufficient. Additionally, other costs (e.g. travel, command, control, command, and computers, and global lift & sustain) were cash-flowed by major commands and are being offset by deferred facilities sustainment and restoration expenses and reductions in contractor support.

The Air Force will continue to support the Department of Defense contingency operations as high-priority requirements, and there will likely be significant financial commitments required to support those operations in future years. However, in a fiscal environment with declining toplines, identifying, budgeting, and justifying dollars for unforeseen contingencies will be increasingly important to maintaining critical Air Force warfighter capability.

Mr. F ORBES. At one time we relied heavily upon the Navy and Air Force to provide individual augmentees to meet ground force requirements in CENTCOM. What is that level of dependence now and how has the long-term use of sailors and airmen to meet ground force requirements impacted the readiness of the Navy and Air Force?

General BREEDLOVE. The Air Force currently has 4,893 personnel deployed to support Joint Expeditionary taskings (ground forces) and 2,541 supporting Individual Augmentee (headquarters staff) taskings—a total of 7,434. This is a decrease from 12,896 in 2009.

Although certain career fields are experiencing high opstempo which presents challenges regarding dwell times and individual training, the Air Force will continue to use innovative approaches to mitigate operational impacts. Current unit reporting via the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) and the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) indicates no adverse impact to overall Air Force operational readiness from supporting joint fight requirements.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO

Mr. LOBIONDO. What are some examples of the negative impact of O&M funding reductions to training?

General CHIARELLI. Given the current fiscal environment, the Army is examining possible negative impacts of potential operations and maintenance (O&M) funding reductions to training by assessing adjustments through the three dials I spoke of in my opening statement. Potential reductions carry different risks, and our analysis continues to be aimed at reducing the impacts of that risk while maintaining a versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations, operating on a rotational cycle to provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for full spectrum operations and to hedge against unexpected contingencies—all at a tempo that is predictable and sustainable for our all-volunteer force. Potential reductions to the Ground OPTEMPO and Flying Hour Programs may impact on the Army’s ability to provide units trained for Full Spectrum Operations by reducing the funded miles and crew hours thereby curtailing the number and intensity of training events at Company, Battalion and Brigade levels at home stations and at the Combat Training Centers. As a consequence, the Army could be challenged to prepare for contingencies across the spectrum of conflict and may require more time to prepare larger formations for deployment after notification of a requirement to deploy. Potential reductions could also impact the Army’s ability to execute home station individual and collective gunnery training by limiting the availability of ranges and deferring replacement of damaged targets. Range modernization efforts may be impacted as the construction footprint of several MILCON projects will not have Unexploded Ordnance clearance completed. Reductions to Mission Training Complex capabilities could limit Battalion and Brigade staff proficiency on their mission command sys-
tems in a realistic training environment due to facility availability and exercise design limitations. The Training Support Centers may not be able to provide Instructor/Operator support for numerous complex virtual trainers, including for flight simulators and support for Medical Simulation Training and other training devices. The Army may have to curtail units scheduled to train at the Combat Training Centers or send only portions of those units limiting the training value derived from training with a world class Opposing Force (OPFOR), detailed and impartial After Action Review from the Observer Controllers, and a robust Contemporary Operating Environment enabling concurrent and simultaneous training in multiple environments against hybrid threats. Potential reductions may impact on the Army’s Institutional Training capability to conduct Initial Military Training and critical functional skills. This could result in a potential back log of recruits awaiting training at the institutional training base. Soldiers may not receive duty specific skill training required by the Soldier’s unit thus contributing to degradation in unit readiness. Additionally, funding reductions may impact the Army’s ability to develop agile and adaptive leaders at all levels by reducing the Army’s capacity to conduct Professional Military Education. We are looking to Congress to help the Army maintain balance. As the committees consider their reductions the Army is ready to assist by providing our assessment of any and all specified reductions.

Mr. LOBIONDO. What are some examples of the negative impact of O&M funding reductions to training?

Admiral GREENERT. Navy O&M funding in support of training is adequate in the current execution year (FY11), and as proposed in the Navy budget submission for FY12.

Mr. LOBIONDO. What are some examples of the negative impact of O&M funding reductions to training?

General DUNFORD. The Marine Corps remains committed to continued success in Afghanistan by providing the best trained and equipped forces. The Fiscal Year 2013 budget submission continues to fund core skills required for continued success in Afghanistan while also investing in irregular warfare capabilities like MARSOC, MARFORCYBER, and five new Marine Expeditionary Command Elements. Impact of funding reductions will be in the form of reduced capacity in the following areas:

- The Marine Corps’ force structure must provide a strategically mobile, middle-weight force optimized for rapid crisis response and forward-presence.
  - Budget cuts have a disproportionate impact on the Marine Corps. For 8.5 percent of the annual Defense budget, the Marine Corps provides approximately 31 percent of the ground operating forces, 12 percent of the fixed wing tactical aircraft, and 19 percent of the attack helicopters in the Joint Force.
  - A reduction in training will further challenge the Marine Corps to respond to 2 large scale regional contingency operations.
- Enhanced small unit training (squad and below) would be at risk. Small unit training is essential for success in distributed operations such as in our most recent campaigns in (OIF and OEF).
- Large scale training would be impacted at the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) level. Immersion of Marines into large scale decentralized training environments has been a vital part of pre-deployment training programs and has improved leadership decision making at all levels.

Mr. LOBIONDO. What are some examples of the negative impact of O&M funding reductions to training?

General BREEDLOVE. The high tempo of Air Force operations and the use of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)/Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF) hours in support of Combatant Commander taskings has masked our true training flying hour requirements. The Air Force base budget for the operations and maintenance (O&M) flying hour program has declined 29 percent in the last seven years. Failure to smoothly transition the appropriate number of hours from OCO/TWCF to normal O&M flying hour programs as overseas contingency operations wind down will result in readiness challenges for the Air Force. Additional reductions could have cumulative impacts on future years, such as reducing the number of aircrew members who gain “experienced” status in their first
operational assignment. This, in turn, could create deficits in filling critical flight instructor and rated staff positions.

Mr. LoBiondo. What do you believe is the recapitalization solution for the ASA units that sit alert for NORAD while also training for and supporting other combatant commanders through overseas deployments, especially given some of the findings of the ASA report issued to Congress a couple of months ago?

General Breedlove. Defending the homeland remains a priority for the Air Force as we organize train and equip forces for the joint warfighter. Recapitalization of the Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) force, previously known as Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA), is one part of the much broader perspective of having the right mix of capabilities in the right components (active, Guard, Reserve) performing the right missions. We will find the right balance between anti-access capabilities (5th generation stealth) across all components balanced with an alert aircraft fleet that is capable of performing the air sovereignty mission of defending the homeland.

As the Air Force completes the final moves of the Combat Air Force (CAF) Redux plan (FY 08–12) this coming year, all Air National Guard (ANG) units, including those who sit ACA duty, will have the necessary platforms to perform their assigned missions. In support of this plan, Burlington Air Guard Station, Vermont has been identified as the Preferred Alternative for the first F–35A ANG unit, with the final basing decision expected to be made in the summer of 2012. As the various models of F–15s and F–16s approach the end of their forecasted service lives, the Air Force will continue to use the principles of Total Force Integration to balance the proper capabilities across all components.

As such, NORAD’s recent report to Congress on the ACA mission, in the Air Force’s view, did not warrant any immediate recapitalization solutions. Overall, the Air Force assesses current capabilities across the joint community are well-matched to the estimated threat level.

Mr. LoBiondo. The Air Force has been challenged in recent years to keep backlogged aircraft maintenance low and mission capable rates up, even as optempo remains high and aircraft continue to age. What is the Air Force doing to keep platforms going beyond their expected service life? Do you expect that optempo will remain steady? If so, how vital then is adequate funding for aircraft operation and maintenance?

General Breedlove. The Air Force remains focused on maximizing aircraft service life through a number of formalized fleet health sustainment programs. Most platforms leverage proactive integrity programs, such as the Aircraft Structural Integrity Program, in which areas such as airframe strength, durability, damage tolerance, corrosion control, and material defects are closely managed. Additionally, avionics modernization programs focus on continuous avionics and software systems upgrades to capitalize on emerging technology to address diminishing manufacturing sources and retain capability in dynamic threat environments. Furthermore, many platforms undergo formal Service Life Extension Programs, in which structural, propulsion, avionics, and mechanical subsystems upgrades are combined into one modernization effort. The Air Force also utilizes the Fleet Viability Board process to provide an independent source for operational health, associated availability, and cost of continued ownership to assist with sustainment and recapitalization investment decisions. Lastly, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board promotes the exchange of the latest scientific and technical information to enhance the accomplishment of the Air Force mission. These proven programs are critical to ensuring continued airworthiness for service life extensions.

We expect the tempo for Air Force operations to remain the same. The required capability areas will shift with mission requirements but the overall Air Force support will be largely unchanged. Adequate funding will ensure supply chains, maintenance operations, and flying operations are not further stressed, which could negatively impact war readiness engine levels, aircraft availability, and mission readiness. As such, adequate funding to support these programs is vital to mission capability across the entire fleet.

**QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK**

Mr. Loebsack. One of the concerns I have regarding our readiness as we draw down in Iraq and Afghanistan and as we review future budgets and our future readiness posture is that we don’t repeat the mistakes of the past when we lost critical organic manufacturing capabilities.

It makes little sense to lose the workforce that has built the equipment for our troops in combat over the past ten years and to shutter the manufacturing base that has produced that equipment. That is why I’ve been working with Congressman
Schilling to expand the authority for the Army’s industrial facilities to enter into public-private partnerships to maintain the critical skills and workforce that are essential to Army readiness. But I am concerned that the Army does not have a long-term plan in place for workloading the facilities.

Can you outline what plans the Army is pursuing to ensure that the Army’s organic manufacturing base has the workload necessary to maintain its critically needed capabilities?

General Chiarelli. The Army continues to employ a multi-pronged approach to maintain sufficient workloads at the Army’s manufacturing Arsenals in order to ensure their workforce strengths and skill sets are sustained to meet future contingency operations.

The Army has taken the following steps to mitigate projected workload reductions in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funded workloads at the Army manufacturing Arsenals: The Army has drafted an Organic Industrial Base Strategic Plan (OIBSP) that provides the framework for ensuring that the Army’s Arsenals and Depots remain viable and relevant in a post-OCO funded environment. The four pillars of the Army OIBSP are:

1. Modernization, which requires investment in new technology, training, and plant equipment at the same rate that the Army modernizes its weapon systems;
2. Capacity, which identifies and aligns core competencies and workloads to support current and future surge requirements while maintaining effectiveness and efficiencies at each facility;
3. Capital Investment, which requires the investment in our facilities to maintain “state-of-the-art” capabilities and quality of work environment (QWE) standards; and
4. Resource Alignment, which requires the Army to prioritize funding in support of these four pillars to achieve the desired end state—viable and relevant OIB facilities.

- Foreign Military Sales (FMS)—The Army is exploring opportunities for Army Arsenals to manufacture replacement gun tubes and other components for nations that purchase Excess Defense Article (EDA) howitzers and other equipment. A Security Assistance option with increasing potential is the EDA program that allows countries to acquire excess defense items or equipment at either reduced or no cost to eligible foreign recipients on an “as is, where is” basis.

- The Army Materiel Command’s (AMC’s) TACOM Life Cycle Management Command, the Army’s parent organization for Army Arsenals, recently hosted a 3-day summit for its commercial partners, Army Program Executive Offices (PEOs), Program Management Offices (PMOs), and the Army’s OIB activities. The objective of the 3-day summit was to highlight the Army’s OIB capabilities and identify opportunities for the Arsenals to partner with commercial firms in order to meet future PEO/PMO requirements.

- We continue to invest in the manufacturing Arsenal infrastructure to ensure that the facilities are modernized with advanced technological capabilities. Capital investment improvements total close to $25 million in FY11 and are expected to remain at this level through the Five Year Defense Plan.

The Army also supports current HASC and SASC legislative language in the National Defense Authorization Act which authorizes the Secretary of the Army to designate Army Arsenals as Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITEs) in the recognized core manufacturing competencies and also enhances the Arsenals’ ability to establish workshare agreements with private industry through Public Private Partnerships. CITE designation will recognize and preserve Army Arsenal core manufacturing competencies, enhancing their ability to better compete for work and gain greater PEO/PMO recognition.

The bottom line is that the Army OIBSP recognizes the critical role of the manufacturing Arsenals within the integrated industrial base and is aggressively pursuing opportunities to increase Arsenal workloads at a sustained level over time.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS

Mr. Owens. As the Representative for Fort Drum I’m sure you understand that I have paid particular attention to the proposed end strength put forward by the Army. To that end, you note in your testimony that the Army is working towards “achieving the authorized end strength of 547.4K by the end of FY13” and “520.4K by the end of FY16”. Further, you noted that this will be accomplished through re-
ducing recruitment goals, lowering retention requirements and natural attrition. It
seems to me that these built-in, environmental measures for reducing end-strength
may limit sudden disruption to Army units, but they also reduce the amount of con-
trol the Army will have over how they occur. What measures can the Army take
to ensure that any force reduction occur in a manner that allows installations and
commanders, as well as military communities, to fully prepare for any future end
strength reductions?

General Chiarelli. The Army Staff is actively engaged with supporting the develop-
ment of OSD plans to help ensure that installations, commanders, and military
communities can adequately prepare for any future end strength reductions. Plan-
ing includes a full range of options under varying timelines to ensure any DoD re-
ductions are completed in accordance with OSD directives taking into considera-
tion operational readiness and the impact on the Army's most valuable resource, Soldiers
and Families.

The Army is seeking reinstatement or creation of separation authorities to enable
voluntary and involuntary force shaping actions between now and 2017. The Army
will likely need to exercise the full extent of voluntary and involuntary force shaping
measures to maximize flexibility and minimize the impact on Soldiers and Families
as we size and shape our force to achieve a balanced end-strength. We are currently
working within DoD to scope the measures that will be necessary, and, where ap-
propriate, the Department will seek legislative authority to help us shape the force.

Mr. Owens. It is no secret that the U.S. Army has a difficult history in the pro-
curement of major weapons programs. As reported in the Washington Post
earlier this year, a recent study commissioned by the Army shows that between 1995 and
2009, the Pentagon spent more than $32 billion on weapons programs that were
eventually cancelled. These include the Crusader Cannon, the Comanche Helicopter
and others. While the scope of this hearing does not include specific systems, I re-
main concerned about the potential to spend funds on assets that will never help
our men and women in the field, while installations like Fort Drum in my Congres-
sional District continue to make sacrifices to meet new budget realities. Do you be-
lieve the Army is taking sufficient steps to prevent a reoccurrence of these weapons
cancellations, and is there potential to use even a portion of those savings to meet
budget shortfalls at installations here at home?

General Chiarelli. In order to address the challenges with the development of
major weapons systems, the Army undertook an unprecedented review of the Army
Acquisition process. The Decker-Wagner panel, commissioned by the Secretary of
the Army, examined weapons system procurements from “cradle to grave” with a
key focus on properly defining requirements. The panel discovered that many of the
Army’s development and procurement problems stemmed from pursuing require-
ments that ultimately did not match the needs of the Soldier, were cost prohibitive
or were technologically infeasible. The Army has been working to rapidly review and
implement many of the innovative recommendations.

These efforts will not only support a stable modernization strategy, but will also
result in producing systems that are timely, within budget parameters, and meet
the needs of the Soldier. As the Army implements sweeping change to its acquisi-
tion system, lessons learned from its efforts will be infused into other procurements
across the Services and the Department.

As part of his comprehensive efforts to reform Army acquisition, in February
2010, Secretary McHugh ordered Army-wide “capability portfolio reviews” (CPR) to
revalidate requirements through a wide range of criteria, including Combatant Com-
mander requests, wartime lessons learned, the leveraging of emerging technologies,
elimination of redundancy, and system affordability. Each review examines systems
across a certain spectrum to make recommendations for modernization improve-
ments or, if appropriate, project terminations. The Army is already realizing signifi-
cant savings through terminations and avoidance of unnecessary program costs.
CPRs are designed to get the right system, with the best technology to the
warfighter at the right time.

The Army’s top modernization priorities—the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) and
the Network, provide opportunities to leverage proven technology, as well as use les-
sions learned from other programs. The Army must have a combat vehicle fleet and
information technology infrastructure that allows our primary ground forces to han-
dle full spectrum missions from regional conflicts, hybrid threats, hostile state ac-
tors to natural disasters and humanitarian relief efforts. Regarding the GCV, our
Soldiers need a single, modern armored vehicle to take them to the fight. The
Army’s Network modernization will enable the rapid flow of large amounts of crit-
cal data on the battlefield, down to the individual Soldier. Both programs are seek-
ing to leverage harvested technologies, as well as state-of-the-art developments, to
ensure the systems are affordable and ready for adaptation to accommodate needed future capabilities.