[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NOAA'S FISHERY SCIENCE:
IS THE LACK OF BASIC
SCIENCE COSTING JOBS?
=======================================================================
OVERSIGHT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES, WILDLIFE,
OCEANS AND INSULAR AFFAIRS
of the
COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
Tuesday, July 26, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-52
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Natural Resources
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COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
DOC HASTINGS, WA, Chairman
EDWARD J. MARKEY, MA, Ranking Democrat Member
Don Young, AK Dale E. Kildee, MI
John J. Duncan, Jr., TN Peter A. DeFazio, OR
Louie Gohmert, TX Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, AS
Rob Bishop, UT Frank Pallone, Jr., NJ
Doug Lamborn, CO Grace F. Napolitano, CA
Robert J. Wittman, VA Rush D. Holt, NJ
Paul C. Broun, GA Raul M. Grijalva, AZ
John Fleming, LA Madeleine Z. Bordallo, GU
Mike Coffman, CO Jim Costa, CA
Tom McClintock, CA Dan Boren, OK
Glenn Thompson, PA Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan,
Jeff Denham, CA CNMI
Dan Benishek, MI Martin Heinrich, NM
David Rivera, FL Ben Ray Lujan, NM
Jeff Duncan, SC John P. Sarbanes, MD
Scott R. Tipton, CO Betty Sutton, OH
Paul A. Gosar, AZ Niki Tsongas, MA
Raul R. Labrador, ID Pedro R. Pierluisi, PR
Kristi L. Noem, SD John Garamendi, CA
Steve Southerland II, FL Colleen W. Hanabusa, HI
Bill Flores, TX Vacancy
Andy Harris, MD
Jeffrey M. Landry, LA
Charles J. ``Chuck'' Fleischmann,
TN
Jon Runyan, NJ
Bill Johnson, OH
Todd Young, Chief of Staff
Lisa Pittman, Chief Counsel
Jeffrey Duncan, Democrat Staff Director
David Watkins, Democrat Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES, WILDLIFE, OCEANS
AND INSULAR AFFAIRS
JOHN FLEMING, LA, Chairman
GREGORIO KILILI CAMACHO SABLAN, CNMI, Ranking Democrat Member
Don Young, AK Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, AS
Robert J. Wittman, VA Frank Pallone, Jr., NJ
Jeff Duncan, SC Madeleine Z. Bordallo, GU
Steve Southerland, II, FL Pedro R. Pierluisi, PR
Bill Flores, TX Colleen W. Hanabusa, HI
Andy Harris, MD Vacancy
Jeffrey M. Landry, LA Edward J. Markey, MA, ex officio
Jon Runyan, NJ
Doc Hastings, WA, ex officio
------
CONTENTS
----------
Page
Hearing held on Tuesday, July 26, 2011........................... 1
Statement of Members:
Fleming, Hon. John, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Louisiana......................................... 1
Prepared statement of.................................... 3
Markey, Hon. Edward J., a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Statement submitted for the
record..................................................... 110
Sablan, Hon. Gregorio, a Delegate in Congress from the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands............... 5
Prepared statement of.................................... 6
Statement of Witnesses:
Angers, Jefferson, President, Center for Coastal Conservation 68
Prepared statement of.................................... 70
Cadrin, Steven, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of
Fisheries Oceanography, School for Marine Science and
Technology, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, and
Member, Science and Statistical Committee, South Atlantic
and New England Fishery Management Councils................ 35
Prepared statement of.................................... 37
DiDomenico, Gregory, Executive Director, Garden State Seafood
Association................................................ 82
Prepared statement of.................................... 84
Frank, Hon. Barney, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Oral statement of........... 10
Gauvin, John, Fisheries Science Director, Alaska Seafood
Cooperative................................................ 90
Prepared statement of.................................... 92
Geiger, George, Owner/Operator, Chances Are Fishing Charters. 98
Prepared statement of.................................... 100
Harris, Duane, Member and Past Chairman, South Atlantic
Fishery Management Council................................. 22
Prepared statement of.................................... 24
Jones, Hon. Walter, a Representative in Congress from the
State of North Carolina.................................... 8
Prepared statement of.................................... 9
Mica, Hon. John, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Florida, Oral statement of.............................. 7
Morris, Julie, Assistant Vice President for Academic Affairs,
Office of the Provost, New College of Florida, and Former
Member, Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council and
Member of the Secretary's Marine Fish Advisory Committee
(MAFAC).................................................... 29
Prepared statement of.................................... 31
Nelson, David, Charter/Commercial Fishing Captain, Ponce
Inlet, Florida............................................. 75
Prepared statement of.................................... 77
Pearce, Harlon, Jr., Owner, Harlon's LA Fish LLC, and Member,
Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council and Chair of the
Council's Data Collection Committee, Representing the
Louisiana Seafood Promotion and Marketing Board and Gulf of
Mexico Fishery Management Council.......................... 62
Prepared statement of.................................... 64
Schwaab, Eric, Assistant Administrator, National Marine
Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce................ 13
Prepared statement of.................................... 14
OVERSIGHT HEARING TITLED ``NOAA'S FISHERY SCIENCE: IS THE LACK OF BASIC
SCIENCE COSTING JOBS?''
----------
Tuesday, July 26, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans and Insular Affairs
Committee on Natural Resources
Washington, D.C.
----------
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:10 p.m. in
Room 1324, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. John Fleming
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Fleming, Wittman, Duncan,
Southerland, Harris, Runyan, Sablan, Pallone, Bordallo, and
Hanabusa.
Also present: Representative Frank.
Mr. Fleming. The Subcommittee will come to order. The
Chairman notes the presence of a quorum. Good afternoon. Today
the Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans and Insular
Affairs will conduct an oversight hearing titled, ``NOAA's
Fishery Science: Is the Lack of Basic Science Costing Jobs.''
Under Committee Rule 4(f), opening statements are limited
to the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee so that
we can hear from our witnesses more quickly. However, I ask
unanimous consent to include any other Members' opening
statements in the hearing record if submitted to the clerk by
close of day today. Hearing no objection, so ordered.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN FLEMING, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
Mr. Fleming. In 2006, Congress passed amendments to the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act to
require that fishery managers make harvest decisions based on
science. These amendments also required that fishermen be held
accountable to these new scientifically based harvest limits.
These were, and are, worthy goals. However, I suspect if
congressmen knew then what we know now, these amendments would
have been written very differently. Those requirements were
based on the model of fisheries management in the North
Pacific, which has been held up as an example that the rest of
the country should emulate. Unfortunately, the amount of data
available for fisheries outside the North Pacific is radically
different than that available to managers in the North Pacific.
In addition to the 2006 amendments, the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, otherwise known as NOAA,
published revised National Standard 1 guidelines, which gave
fishery managers additional requirements for dealing with the
scientific uncertainty. These guidelines have led to the layer
upon layer of precaution to be included when setting harvest
levels for those fisheries for which there is inadequate or
stale data.
That means that for fisheries that have not been surveyed
for many years, the harvest levels will be artificially low.
This has become particularly troublesome for species on the
East Coast and in the Gulf of Mexico. Counting fish is
difficult. Having good data for fishery managers is not cheap,
and tight budgets do not make this any easier.
However, NOAA has made budget decisions that have taken
money away from the basic fisheries research to fund new
initiatives like marine spatial planning and satellite
programs. In fact, the Fiscal Year 2012 budget request included
funding for just one satellite that accounts for almost 20
percent of the entire budget request.
This has resulted in inadequate fisheries data for
councils. To quote from a letter by the chair of the South
Atlantic Council to Secretary Locke in April 2010: ``Fisheries
management in the South Atlantic suffers from a chronic yet
well documented lack of basic data, which hampers scientists'
ability to evaluate exploited populations and managers' ability
to develop and ensure accountability with management measures.
This lack of data adds uncertainty at all levels of scientific
and management processes.''
Today, we will hear examples showing that the lack of data
is resulting in reduced harvest levels, which in turn harms
fishermen and coastal communities. This has become especially
difficult for the charter fishing operations, who cannot book
fishing trips when they cannot tell customers whether the
fisheries will be open a week or a month from now.
In addition, restrictions on fishing opportunities are not
just because of the new Magnuson-Stevens Act amendments. The
lack of adequate information on Endangered Species Act and
Marine Mammal Protection Act listed animals is also causing
fisheries problems. We will hear at least two examples today.
In one case, NOAA has proposed uplisting the Atlantic
sturgeon and splitting the population into five distinct
population segments, when they admit that they have not
conducted a comprehensive survey of any of the East Coast
species of sturgeon, Gulf, shortnose, or Atlantic. Despite this
admission, NOAA is likely to restrict a number of East Coast
fisheries due to concerns about sturgeon interactions.
We will also hear that NOAA's restrictions on the Bering
Sea Pacific Atka Mackerel Fishery will result in losses of up
to $60 million per year based on faulty stock assessments. Both
of these examples will result in lost jobs and lost economic
activity, and both examples raise concerns about whether NOAA's
basic research activities are adequate to meet the requirements
of the statutes that they are required to implement.
Clearly, this is a view that is shared by the House
Appropriations Committee as well. The House Appropriation
Committee report to accompany H.R. 2596, the Commerce, Justice,
Science Appropriations bill for Fiscal Year 2012 states the
following, quote: ``The Committee notes that lack of accurate,
up-to-date data for numerous economically vital fisheries has
caused significant problems as NMFS works to implement
provisions that were incorporated into the Magnuson-Stevens Act
in 2006.
``NMFS has proceeded to implement these provisions,
particularly as they relate to setting annual catch limits on
all fisheries, in a manner that ignores profound shortfalls and
requisite data. More robust stock assessments based on more
frequent surveys are vitally important to improve management of
our marine fisheries and meet the requirements of the MSA. The
Committee supports targeting and prioritizing stock survey
funds to address critical data gaps in fisheries that have
suffered dramatically from inadequate data gathering.
``Additionally, the Committee supports the further
utilization of fishery-independent data collection efforts and
encourages NMFS to take advantage of existing non-Federal
resources that are capable of providing timely and reliable
data to improve stock assessments of critical fisheries,'' end
quote.
For today's hearing, we asked our witnesses a number of
questions. How have the 2006 amendments, including the
requirement that councils establish a mechanism for specifying
annual catch limits to prevent overfishing affected domestic
fishery management? Is the data generated by NOAA adequate for
fishery managers to comply with these new provisions? How has
the agency's guidance for councils' use of old data in the
precautionary or risk-averse approach affected coastal
economies and fishery-related jobs? Has the agency's use of the
requirement for best scientific information available become a
convenient excuse for the use of incomplete or old data in
management decisions rather than gathering new or more complete
data? And finally, will the creation of a new recreational data
collection program provide better information to fishery
managers and provide data for in-season management adjustments?
If not, what does this mean for recreational fishing seasons
and the ability of fishery-dependent businesses to plan given
this uncertainty.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and hope
that through this conversation we can find some solutions for
the lack of data available to fisheries managers. And I will
just encapsulate what is really a fairly long discussion here,
and that is to say that because NOAA has been unable to do the
surveys or unwilling based upon priorities, that we end up with
inadequate data or stale data, and as a result, the assumptions
have to be adjusted in a more conservative way, therefore
cutting off adequate opportunities for fishing based on the
fact that we underestimate in some cases the populations.
I look forward to hearing the testimony of our
distinguished witnesses, and now recognize our Ranking Member,
Mr. Sablan, for any statement he would like to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fleming follows:]
Statement of The Honorable John Fleming, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans and Insular Affairs
In 2006, Congress passed amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act to require that fishery managers make
harvest decisions based on science. These amendments also required that
fishermen be held accountable to these new scientifically-based harvest
limits. These were, and are, worthy goals. However, I suspect if
Congressmen knew then what we know now, these amendments would have
been written very differently.
Those requirements were based on the model of fisheries management
in the North Pacific which has been held up as the example the rest of
the country should emulate. Unfortunately, the amount of data available
for fisheries outside the North Pacific is radically different than
that available to managers in the North Pacific.
In addition to the 2006 amendments, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) published revised National Standard 1
guidelines which gave fishery managers additional requirements for
dealing with scientific uncertainty. These guidelines have led to layer
upon layer of ``precaution'' to be included when setting harvest levels
for those fisheries for which there is inadequate or ``stale'' data.
That means that for fisheries that have not been surveyed for many
years, the harvest levels will be artificially low. This has become
particularly troublesome for species on the East Coast and in the Gulf
of Mexico.
Counting fish is difficult. Having good data for fishery managers
is not cheap and tight budgets do not make this any easier; however,
NOAA has made budget decisions that have taken money away from basic
fisheries research to fund new initiatives like marine spatial planning
and satellite programs. In fact, the Fiscal Year 2012 budget request
included funding for just one satellite that accounts for almost 20
percent of their entire budget request. This has resulted in inadequate
fisheries data for Councils.
To quote from a letter sent by the Chair of the South Atlantic
Council to Secretary Locke in April, 2010, ``Fisheries management in
the South Atlantic suffers from a chronic, yet well-documented, lack of
basic data which hampers scientists' ability to evaluate exploited
populations and managers' ability to develop and ensure accountability
with management measures...This lack of data adds uncertainty at all
levels of scientific and management processes.'' The letter also
states, ``In summary, the Council does not believe that a sufficient
data delivery system is in place to properly implement the system of
ACLs and AMs that the Council is establishing in Amendments 17A and 17B
and the Comprehensive ACL Amendment.''
Today, we will hear examples showing that the lack of data is
resulting in reduced harvest levels--which in turn harms fishermen and
coastal communities. This has become especially difficult for the
charter fishing operations which cannot book fishing trips when they
cannot tell customers whether the fisheries will be open a week or a
month from now.
In addition, restrictions on fishing opportunities are not just
because of the new Magnuson-Stevens Act amendments. The lack of
adequate information on Endangered Species Act and Marine Mammal
Protection Act-listed animals is also causing fisheries problems. We
will hear at least two examples today. In one case, NOAA has proposed
uplisting the Atlantic sturgeon and splitting the population into 5
distinct population segments when they admit that they have ``not
conducted a comprehensive survey of any of the east coast species of
sturgeon, Gulf, shortnose or Atlantic.'' Despite this admission, NOAA
is likely to restrict a number of east coast fisheries due to concerns
about sturgeon interactions.
We will also hear that NOAA's restrictions on the Bering Sea
Pacific Atka mackerel fishery will result in losses of up to $60
million per year based on faulty stock assessments and that NOAA has
now cancelled a tagging study that would have provided better
information.
Both of these examples will result in lost jobs and lost economic
activity. And both examples raise concerns about whether NOAA's basic
research activities are adequate to meet the requirements of the
statutes that they are required to implement.
Clearly, this is a view that is shared by the House Appropriations
Committee as well. The House Appropriation Committee Report to
accompany H.R. 2596, the Commerce, Justice, Science Appropriations bill
for FY 2012 states,
``The Committee notes that lack of accurate, up-to-date data
for numerous economically vital fisheries has caused
significant problems as NMFS works to implement provisions that
were incorporated into the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) in 2006.
NMFS has proceeded to implement these provisions, particularly
as they relate to setting annual catch limits on all fisheries,
in a manner that ignores profound shortfalls in requisite data.
More robust stock assessments, based on more frequent surveys,
are vitally important to improve management of our marine
fisheries and meet the requirements of the MSA. The Committee
supports targeting and prioritizing stock survey funds to
address critical data gaps in fisheries that have suffered
dramatically from inadequate data gathering. Additionally, the
Committee supports the further utilization of fishery
independent data collection efforts and encourages NMFS to take
advantage of existing non-Federal resources that are capable of
providing timely and reliable data to improve stock assessments
of critical fisheries.''
For today's hearing, we asked our witnesses a number of questions:
How have the 2006 amendments--including the
requirement that Councils establish a mechanism for specifying
annual catch limits to prevent overfishing--affected domestic
fishery management?
Is the data generated by NOAA adequate for fishery
managers to comply with these new provisions?
How has the Agency's guidance for Council's use of
old data and the precautionary or risk averse approach affected
coastal economies and fishery-related jobs?
Has the Agency's use of the requirement for ``best
scientific information available'' become a convenient excuse
for the use of incomplete or old data in management decisions
rather than gathering new or more complete data?
And finally, will the creation of a new recreational
data collection program provide better information to fishery
managers and provide data for in-season management adjustments?
If not, what does this means for recreational fishing seasons
and the ability of fishery-dependent businesses to plan given
this uncertainty?
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and hope that
through this conversation, we can find some solutions for the lack of
data available to fisheries managers.
______
STATEMENT OF HON. GREGORIO SABLAN, A DELEGATE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
Mr. Sablan. Thank you. Thank you very much, Chairman
Fleming. Today the Subcommittee meets to hear testimony on
science-based fisheries management. By the end of this year,
the Regional Fishery Management Councils will have put annual
catch limits or ACLs and accountability measures in place to
end overfishing and rebuild overfished fish stocks as required
by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act.
In 1996, after witnessing the decline of important
fisheries around the country, Congress first required the
Councils to end overfishing and rebuild stocks that had been
fished to perilously low levels. While the Councils implemented
numerous reviewing plans, overfishing continued in many
fisheries. In response, the Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization
Act of 2006 went a step farther and required that fishery
management plans adopt ACLs and accountability measures for
stocks subject to overfishing.
Requiring ACLs was intended not only to prevent overfishing
from occurring, but also to drive improvements in fishery data
collection and research, and to develop a more precise
assessment of the amount of fish that can be caught. The Act
also included specific provisions to strengthen the role of
science in fishery management decision-making. Science-based
management is the proven way to end and prevent overfishing,
and we must utilize the existing science that is being
conducted across the Nation by the Regional Fishey Management
Councils.
Undoubtedly, there will always be uncertainty in managing
fisheries, but ignoring the existing data and methods will
simply put our fisheries at increased risk of overfishing,
resulting in a more difficult and longer recovery. Protracting
this recovery will prevent fishermen and coastal communities
from realizing the economic value of rebuilding fish
populations, which NOAA estimates to be a $31 billion increase
in annual sales, and an additional 500,000 new jobs.
The best way to support this recovery is through science-
based management. But unfortunately, funding for fisheries
research and management in the Fiscal Year 2012, Commerce,
Justice, Science Appropriations bill is 17 percent below the
President's request.
Clearly, we must do more now to invest in fishery science
to ensure that fishing opportunities are available for
generations to come. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses today about how science-based management is critical
to preserving fish, fishing jobs, and coastal communities now
and into the future. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sablan follows:]
Statement of The Honorable Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans and Insular Affairs
Thank you, Chairman Fleming. Today the Subcommittee on Fisheries,
Wildlife, Oceans and Insular Affairs meets to hear testimony on
science-based fisheries management. By the end of this year, the
Regional Fishery Management Councils will have put Annual Catch
Limits--or ACLs--and Accountability Measures in place to end
overfishing and rebuild overfished fish stocks, as required by the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act.
In 1996, after witnessing the decline of important fisheries around
the country, Congress first required the Councils to end overfishing
and rebuild stocks that had been fished to perilously low levels.
While the Councils implemented numerous rebuilding plans,
overfishing continued in many fisheries. In response, the Magnuson-
Stevens Reauthorization Act of 2006 went a step further and required
that fishery management plans adopt ACLs and Accountability Measures
for stocks subject to overfishing.
Requiring ACLs was intended not only to prevent overfishing from
occurring, but also to drive improvements in fishery data collection
and research, to develop a more precise assessment of the amount of
fish that can be caught. The Act also included specific provisions to
strengthen the role of science in fishery management decision-making.
Science-based management is the proven way to end and prevent
overfishing, and we must utilize the existing science that is being
conducted across the nation by the Regional Fishery Management
Councils. Undoubtedly, there will always be uncertainty in managing
fisheries, but ignoring the existing data and methods will simply put
our fisheries at increased risk of overfishing, resulting in a more
difficult and longer recovery.
Protracting this recovery will prevent fishermen and coastal
communities from realizing the economic value of rebuilding fish
populations, which NOAA estimates to be a $31 billion dollar increase
in annual sales and an additional 500,000 new jobs. The best way to
support this recovery is through science-based management, but
unfortunately, funding for fisheries research and management in the FY
12 Commerce, Justice, Science Appropriations bill is 17% below the
President's request. Clearly, we must do more now to invest in
fisheries science to ensure that fishing opportunities are available
for generations to come.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about how
science-based management is critical to preserving fish, fishing jobs,
and coastal communities now and into the future.
______
Mr. Fleming. I thank the gentleman. Now, we will hear from
our first panel.
Mr. Sablan. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I ask unanimous consent
that Congressman Frank, my good friend from Massachusetts, join
us to testify at today's hearing.
Mr. Fleming. Without objection, we welcome Congressman
Frank to join the first panel.
Mr. Frank. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Fleming. Like all witnesses, Panel, your written
testimony will appear in full in the hearing record, so I ask
that you keep your oral statements to five minutes, as outlined
in our invitation letter to you, and under Committee Rule 4(a).
Our microphones are not automatic in this room. While I am
sure you know how things work, I will just explain for everyone
that you have five minutes to give your presentation. You will
be under a green light. It will turn yellow one minute out, and
then when the red light comes on, we ask that you wrap up as
quickly as possible so we can get to everyone.
I would now like to introduce our first panel. First, The
Honorable John L. Mica, the gentleman from Florida. Welcome,
sir. The Honorable Walter B. Jones, the gentleman from North
Carolina. Is it this room or the other room that is named after
your dad? It is the other room, I believe. And then, of course,
The Honorable Barney Frank, the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Chairman Mica, you may begin, sir.
STATEMENTS OF HON. JOHN MICA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. Mica. Well, thank you so much, and I do want to really
say how much I appreciate Chairman Fleming and the Ranking
Member, also Mr. Hastings, the Chairman of the full Committee,
for granting our request to hold this hearing. I have been
asking that we pay more attention to this issue since March
2009, when the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council voted
by a very slim margin, seven to six votes, to impose a ban on
red snapper fishing all the way from Florida up to the
Carolinas.
Let me say that even when Mr. Henry Brown was the Ranking
Member, he sent a letter asking for a hearing. We sent a joint
letter. Just about everybody in the Florida delegation and
others signed it November of 2009. Nothing was done. So I can't
tell you how pleased we are that this Committee under new
leadership has responded.
Now, from the very beginning--well, first of all, I don't
know much about the fishing industry, even though I represent
Florida. I should say I didn't know much, but I certainly
learned in a hurry the incredible impact fishing, both
commercial fishing and sports fishing, has in my state and my
district.
We heard from the very beginning, and we have reports back
to 2009--I have commercial and charter fishermen who told us
that we would impact not only businesses--this is an article
which we will put in the record if it is appropriate--in St.
Augustine, which is a major fishing point and center for our
state, to put of business and take a toll. This is the
projection on restaurants, hotels, and others in town.
I have a recent assessment from Jody Lynn of St. Augustine,
who has a charter fishing business, and she said just recently,
``Since the ban went into effect, our charter business has
dropped from 200-plus trips a year to just 104 trips.'' This is
a $5 billion industry, so we have put people out of business,
as predicted, and we have also just made employment so
difficult in a very tough economic time to begin with. So huge
economic damage.
Now, let me just say, if a ban would preserve an endangered
species, red snapper or others, I would support it. I
introduced legislation that was ignored again by the committee,
no hearing, nothing. I introduced H.R. 3307. And all I said is,
let's confirm the data. Now, I am not a big fisherman, and I am
not a marine biologist or scientist. So I looked at what others
said, and back in 2009, a professor of marine biology in
Florida, Dr. Raymond Waldner, said, ``Having examined the
Federal Government's assessment and proposals regarding
Atlantic red snapper, we conclude that the data used are of
questionable reliability, which makes the resulting analysis
and conclusions questionable as well.''
So again, you have seen the incredible economic negative
impact that was predicted; it took place. You have seen that
they passed this without again having accurate data. It was
passed on a seven-six vote. One thing I learned, interesting,
from the fishermen too is 30 to 40 percent of the fish that--we
are still catching red snapper, and 30 to 40 percent of them
die when they throw them back in.
You know, these fish don't come up and look to see what
Congress has done lately as far as a ban. They are taking the
bait, and we are killing them. The anecdotal reports I get from
fishermen--you will hear from Captain Dave Nelson. We also have
Syd Prescott, who represents some of the industry here. They
can tell you about the runs and what they see.
So based on science, the step I think was flawed. The
action was premature. We never had the opportunity of this
hearing before Congress or I think in the proper forums to
consider this. So again, I am dismayed. I think that this
committee needs to go back and look at the Magnuson Act, the
overall Act, and also the actions that have resulted that have
done inestimable damage to my district, the State of Florida,
and the Nation's economy.
I apologize. I have ten seconds left. I am going to have to
speak and run because I have a bill on the Floor right at this
time. Thank you for your consideration. I will leave two
seconds to yield back.
Mr. Fleming. Thank you for yielding back, Mr. Chairman, and
certainly come and go as you need to, sir. We understand.
Mr. Mica. And I will leave several documents for submission
to the record.
Mr. Fleming. Yes, thank you. And with unanimous consent,
there is no objection.
Mr. Fleming. Next we have Congressman Jones. Sir, you have
five minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER JONES, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity. I
can confirm that the Magnuson Act definition of best available
science and the lack of science on fish stocks are causing
serious job losses in the district that I represent in North
Carolina. A great example of this is NOAA's December 2010
approval of amendment 17(b) to the South Atlantic snapper/
grouper plan. That amendment closed Federal waters from 240
feet to 200 miles offshore from Florida through North Carolina
to protect two fish, speckled hind and Warsaw grouper, for
which there are no valid stock assessments.
In fact, the last stock assessment on speckled hind was
completed 11 years ago. The last stock assessment on Warsaw
grouper was completed over 20 years ago. Imposing such a
massive closure based on outdated science is not a good policy.
It is also costing my constituents their jobs. The annual
economic loss to fishermen in my district from amendment 17(b)
is over $1 million.
I am pleased that NOAA is helping to get some of these
fishermen back to work, but serious damage has been done. This
unnecessary situation is the result of Magnuson Act
requirements to set annual catch limits on species determined
to be undergoing overfishing based on best available science.
NOAA has interpreted the Magnuson definition of best available
science to mean any available science, regardless of how old it
is and how sound it is.
So in the case of amendment 17(b), even though the science
was over ten years old, it was used to produce a finding that
the stocks are now undergoing overfishing. That finding
triggered the Magnuson Act requirements for an annual catch
limit which the agency set at zero. Unfortunately, this is not
an isolated incident. Fishing communities around the country
are suffering under similar circumstances.
The fishermen that I talked to agree that at least two
changes are necessary to fix the problem. First, Congress must
improve the Magnuson Act definition of best available science.
If the most recent stock assessment is more than five years
old, it should not be considered as best available or used as a
basis for management decisions.
Second, we need more money for fishery science. That is why
it is so troubling that NOAA is robbing money from the science
budget in order to ram their job-destroying catch shares agenda
down the throats of fishermen. For Fiscal Year 2012, NOAA
proposed to redirect $17.4 million from science to catch
shares. This again is unacceptable. It is troubling to see NOAA
take tens of millions of dollars in Saltonstall-Kennedy funds,
which are required by law to be spent on fisheries research,
and instead use them to fund NOAA operations.
In Fiscal Year 2009 alone, NOAA used over two-thirds of its
$108 million in Saltonstall-Kennedy revenue on operating
expenses, leaving less than one-third for fisheries research
grants. At the very least, this practice appears improper. It
may be illegal. In the interests of transparency and
accountability, I believe the Inspector General of the Commerce
Department or GAO should open an investigation into NOAA's
administration of Saltonstall-Kennedy funds.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and this committee
again for this opportunity. As Mr. Mica said, it is time that
we review what is sound science. And with that, I will yield
back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]
Statement of The Honorable Walter B. Jones, a Representative in
Congress from the State of North Carolina
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony on
this important topic. On behalf of Eastern North Carolina fishermen, I
can confirm that the Magnuson Act's definition of ``best available''
science and the lack of science on fish stocks are causing significant
job loss in North Carolina.
A great example of this can be seen in NOAA's December 2010
approval of Amendment 17B to the South Atlantic Snapper-Grouper
Management Plan. That amendment closed federal waters from 240 feet to
200 miles offshore from Florida through North Carolina to protect two
fish species--speckled hind and warsaw grouper--for which there are no
valid stock assessments. In fact, the last stock assessment on speckled
hind was completed 11 years ago. The last stock assessment on warsaw
grouper was completed over 20 years ago! Imposing such a massive
closure based on such outdated science is terrible policy. It's also
costing my constituents their jobs, as boats are literally tied to the
dock because of this. The annual economic loss to fishermen in my
district from Amendment 17B is well over $1 million dollars. I am
pleased that NOAA is helping to get some of these fishermen back to
work, but serious damage has been done.
This unnecessary situation is largely the result of the Magnuson
Act's requirements to set annual catch limits on species determined to
be undergoing ``overfishing'' based on ``best available science''. NOAA
has interpreted the Magnuson Act definition of ``best available''
science to mean ``any available'' science, regardless of how old it is,
or how sound it is. So in the case of Amendment 17B, despite the fact
that the only available science was well over 10 years old, it was used
to produce a determination that the stock is currently undergoing
overfishing. This finding triggered the Magnuson Act's requirement for
imposition of an annual catch limit, which the agency found should be
set at zero.
Unfortunately, this situation is not an isolated incident. Fishing
communities around the country are suffering under similar
circumstances. The fishermen I talk to unanimously agree that at least
two changes are necessary to fix this problem.
First, Congress must pass legislation to improve the Magnuson Act's
definition of ``best available'' science. If the latest available stock
assessment is more than five years old, it should not be considered
``best available'' or used as the basis for management decisions.
Second, we need more money for fisheries science. That is why it is
extremely troubling that this Administration continues to rob money
from the NOAA science budget in order to ram their job-destroying catch
shares agenda down the throats of fishermen across the country. For
Fiscal Year 2012, NOAA proposed to redirect $17.4 million from science
to catch shares. That is simply unacceptable.
It is also troubling to see NOAA annually take tens of millions of
dollars in Saltonstall-Kennedy funds--which are required by law to be
spent on fisheries research--and instead redirect them to fund NOAA
operations. In Fiscal Year 2009, NOAA used over two-thirds of its $108
million in Saltonstall-Kennedy revenue on operating expenses, leaving
less than one-third for fisheries research grants. At the very least,
this practice appears improper. It may also be illegal. In the interest
of transparency and accountability, I believe the Inspector General of
the Commerce Department or the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
should open an investigation of NOAA's administration of Saltonstall-
Kennedy funds.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to thank you again for holding this hearing.
This is an important issue, and I appreciate the opportunity to
testify.
______
Mr. Fleming. The gentleman yields back. The Chairman thanks
you. Mr. Frank, sir, you have five minutes.
STATEMENT OF BARNEY FRANK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Mr. Frank. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And as he often does,
Mr. Jones has put this case forward quite carefully and in a
very well documented fashion. I am very pleased that we worked
together on a number of things. We have one particular bill
especially relevant in the funding situation. We uncovered a
pattern, the Inspector General did, of the agency taking the
money that they received from fines and using it quite
improperly for their own benefit. So you have both an incentive
for them to be levying fines more frequently and in larger
amounts because they were the beneficiaries. And there were
even some questionable expenditures, and it was money that
could have gone to research.
So one of the things we have is a bill that is before your
committee that would take the fines and give them in the rest
of this Fiscal Year, 80 percent to the Federal Government, 20
percent to the States. But from the next Fiscal Year on, give
them to the States to do the research because it is important
that we have good research, and it is also important that we
have independent research. It is important that we not simply
have research that is done by the people who may have their own
biases.
So I recommend to you this legislation, which would make a
significant amount of money available to do independent
research, and it would convert the fines of the current system
from an incentive to be excessively rigid--and I have to say,
we have just all worked together to get an investigation of the
way fishermen are treated. And I am a little bit disappointed
in some of my friends in the environmental community who kind
of thought we were crying wolf. And I have to say, as a
liberal, if immigrants, political protestors, or members of
racial minorities had been abused by law enforcement in the
same way that fishermen had, there would have been very loud
protests.
And I am sorry it took so long for some of my friends to
understand that the right to fair law enforcement should not
depend on other policy terms. And I think we are finally
getting there. We have a new head of law enforcement.
But there are some other legislative changes that are
necessary. The definition of science--and again, we want it to
be good science. We want it to be science where there is some
independence. We get a Catch-22 where the Magnuson Act does say
that they could revise the amount that people can catch if
there is a showing that this is having terrible economic harm,
and you can justify it. But we have been told that they can
only do that with data, but they can only do it with their own
data. And we need to make that more flexible.
There is a problem with the Magnuson Act definition also on
the bycatch, as Mr. Mica talked about, where in multi-species
fisheries, a shortage of one shuts down a whole fishery, and
where you have this very rigid view about bycatch so that fish
that are caught are thrown overboard when they could be made
available for people.
And finally, we had a successful experiment, again in a
bipartisan way. We had the aid of Senator Snowe in the Senate,
Mr. Jones, myself, and some others. We amended--it is
particular relevant for the New England area--the Canadian
Boundary Act because that had the requirement that is in the
Magnuson Act that you have to rebuild the stocks within ten
years. Ten years is very arbitrary. I asked Dr. Lubchenco at
NMFS, is there any justification for the ten years. She said,
well, the fact that it is in the statute is the only
justification. I asked her if she would then change the
statute, and she unfortunately, as is her wont, was
uncooperative.
But that ten years is arbitrary. If we are making progress
in restocking the fish, and it is going to take 12 or 13 years,
but steady progress is coming, and maybe there was an incident
not related to fishing that slowed it down, there isn't any
reason why we couldn't have some flexibility there. And I said
to my environmental friends, we are not talking here about
permanently fouling the water or deteriorating air quality. We
are talking about the number of fish we have, and that is not
an absolute number. But what we did in the Canadian boundary
issue was to give flexibility so we don't have to live by the
ten years, and that is working very well, and it will mean
there will be enough fish.
You know, we had a little debate at the end of last year
that some Members will recall about lame duck legislation.
Well, part of the problem is that the Magnuson Act under which
we are now acting was a lame duck bill passed in 2006, in that
lame duck session, with a chairman who unfortunately had been
defeated. And I think that we suffer from that.
So this is an example of legislation to go through. The
bill we have in terms of how you use the fines is an example.
And I think we can in fact amend the Magnuson Act to be fully
protective of fish stocks.
Just the last thing. The notion that fishermen want to fish
stocks out of existence assumes that the current generation of
fishermen, who love this, want to be the last fishermen ever.
Nothing could be farther from the truth.
Mr. Fleming. Well, I thank the gentleman. I would like to
thank our colleagues for their interest in this important
issue, and also for your time coming here today. It is a very
busy time for Congress. I am just going to open the dais for
any specific question of the gentlemen. I want to get them back
to their duties as soon as possible. Rather than having a round
of questions, we will just simply ask, if you have any
questions, we do have another panel of scientific experts that
are going to be coming up, which we are going to drill down on.
Mr. Frank. And we won't be offended if you think they have
more to tell you than we do.
Mr. Fleming. So with that, anyone have specific questions
for our colleagues today? Well, if not, gentlemen, thank you so
much for your testimony.
Mr. Frank. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members.
Mr. Fleming. And as the gentlemen leave, we would ask for
our next panel to step forward.
[Pause]
Mr. Fleming. I would now like to introduce our second
panel. First we have Mr. Eric Schwaab, Assistant Administrator
for National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration; Mr. Duane Harris, Member and Former
Chairman, South Atlantic Fishery Management Council; Dr.
Steve--let's see. Well, I guess we are a little bit out of
order here. But that is OK. Just stay where you are. We will
switch around here. Next is Ms. Julie Morris, Assistant Vice
President for Academic Affairs, Office of the Provost, New
College of Florida; and Dr. Steve Cadrin, Associate Professor,
Department of Fisheries Oceanography, School for Marine Science
and Technology, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth.
And again, like all witnesses, your written testimony will
appear in full in the hearing record, so I ask that you keep
your oral statements to five minutes as outlined in our
invitation letter to you and under Committee Rule 4(a).
Our microphones are not automatic. And again, lights work
very straightforwardly. You have five minutes to give your
testimony, four minutes under the green light. Then you will
have one minute under yellow. When it turns red, we ask that
you wrap up.
So with that, I will now recognize Assistant Administrator
Schwaab for your testimony. Sir, you have five minutes.
STATEMENT OF ERIC SCHWAAB, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Schwaab. Chairman Fleming, Ranking Member Sablan, and
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today. My name is Eric Schwaab. I am the Assistant
Administrator for Fisheries within the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration.
Coastal and marine fisheries such as salmon in the Pacific
Northwest, red snapper in the South Atlantic and Gulf of
Mexico, and cod in New England have been vital to the
prosperity and cultural identity of the coastal United States
for hundreds of years. As of 2009, using our most recent
complete estimate, U.S. commercial and saltwater recreational
fisheries support 1.4 million full- and part-time jobs, many of
these local jobs that cannot be outsourced, and generate $166
billion in sales impacts.
Sustainability of our Nation's fisheries relies on
continual effort to monitor fisheries and update scientific
information. So our science and that of partner agencies and
organizations plays a critical role in ensuring the continued
productivity of these resources.
National standard two of the Magnuson-Stevens Act mandates
that all fisheries' conservation and management measures must
be based upon the best scientific information available. While
there are challenges in securing sufficiently accurate,
precise, and timely data that allow us to respond to changing
conditions, on balance science-based management leads to
improved productivity and sustainability of coastal jobs.
Through the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the United States has a
clear mandate to achieve sustainable fisheries. NMFS is
committed to generating the best fishery science to help
achieve this mandate. Strong science coupled with sound
management is beginning to pay off. Over the ten-year period
between 2000 and 2010, we saw 36 stocks once overfished achieve
rebuilding goals and come off that list, and 36 stocks once
undergoing overfishing managed at sustainable fishing levels
and also removed from the overfishing list.
In the Pacific Northwest, lean cod was designated as
overfished in 1999. A variety of restrictions ended overfishing
in 2005, and the stock was rebuilt ahead of schedule. Atlantic
sea scallops were once severely overfished, but with
cooperation from scallop fishermen, the stock was rebuilt in
2001, and is now the top-valued fishery in the United States.
Compared to when scallops were overfished, New England
scallop fishermen are now sustainably harvesting an additional
17.5 million metric tons per year, and ex-vessel revenues have
increased by $93 million annually.
The 26 stocks and stock complexes in the Alaska groundfish
fisheries have long been managed under annual catch limits.
None of these stocks is overfished or subject to overfishing,
and all are near or above the abundance levels that support the
long-term optimum yield from the fishery.
These success stories are a product of strong leadership
and investment by Congress, and hard work of scientists and
fishermen across the country to obtain the data needed to
effectively inform management decisions. But they do require
long-term commitments.
Our progress shows that investment in science and
management results in sustainable fisheries. That is why NMFS
and our partners have always focused on getting the most data
and the highest priority and quality data by fully utilizing
the funding Congress has provided. With sustained congressional
support, we can continue to make substantial progress.
Conversely, reducing commitments to science or retreating from
the mandates of the Magnuson-Stevens Act will hurt our
fisheries and reduce local economic benefits.
As part of the President's Fiscal Year 2012 budget, NOAA is
seeking to increase the expand annual stock assessment budget
by $15 million, for a total of more than $61 million. This
funding would allow NMFS to increase the number of stocks with
adequate assessments, helping to verify that overfishing is no
longer occurring and allow catch levels that support both
sustainability and economic viability.
It is important to note that this single budget line
represents only about one-third of the total funding that NMFS
spends on stock assessments and fishery monitoring, and that
there are additional costs for infrastructure and for the sea
days provided by the NOAA fleet for fish surveys. Investments
such as this can help our fisheries and our economy grow. NMFS
has estimate that if all stocks were rebuilt and harvested at
their maximum sustainable yield, this could increase ex-vessel
value by as much as $2.2 billion, which would generate $31
billion in sales impacts and support 500,000 jobs.
Sustaining the science to understand stock dynamics,
document stock status, and develop and implement annual catch
limits is paramount to reaching these goals.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to
testify before you today. I am happy at the appropriate time to
answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schwaab follows:]
Statement of Eric Schwaab, Assistant Admistrator, National Marine
Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
U.S. Department of Commerce
Chairman Fleming and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today on the question, ``NOAA's
Fishery Science: Is the Lack of Basic Science Costing Jobs?'' My name
is Eric Schwaab and I am the Assistant Administrator for Fisheries,
within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
Department of Commerce. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is
dedicated to the stewardship of living marine resources through
science-based conservation and management, and the promotion of healthy
ecosystems. As a steward, NMFS conserves, protects, and manages living
marine resources to ensure functioning marine ecosystems and
recreational and economic opportunities for the American public.
NOAA's fishery science adds value to our Nation's fisheries and can
lead to increased opportunities for businesses and the employment they
generate. National Standard 2 of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act) mandates that
all fisheries conservation and management measures must be based upon
``the best scientific information available'' (16 U.S.C. 1851(a)(2)).
While there are challenges in securing data of sufficient accuracy,
precision and timeliness so as to understand and respond maximally to
changing conditions, on balance, science based management leads to
improved productivity and sustainability of fisheries and fishery
dependent businesses.
I will begin by describing the elements of fisheries science,
focusing primarily on fish stock assessments, to explain current
efforts. I will talk about the importance of the different types of
data we use, how they contribute to stock assessments, and how stock
assessments are used to advise fisheries managers. Fisheries science is
a data-intensive endeavor, and NMFS and our management partners have
always focused on getting the most data, and the highest priority,
highest quality data, by fully utilizing the funding Congress has
provided for us to do this vital work. This funding and the work it
supports enable us to sustain and enhance our fisheries. Further,
either reducing funding levels or retreating from the mandates of the
Magnuson-Stevens Act, as amended, will hurt our fisheries and reduce
the economic benefits they provide to coastal communities.
I also note that NMFS has a broad and diverse science enterprise
that supports not only fisheries management but also habitat and
protected species programs. NMFS's science is necessary to implement
the Magnuson-Stevens Act, Endangered Species Act, and Marine Mammal
Protection Act. Sound science is needed to ensure that target fishery
species, endangered species and marine mammals and their habitats are
conserved. Scientific understanding and effective management decisions
are essential to efforts to maintain or recover species to healthy and
ecologically-sustainable levels. Through this understanding and
management, fisheries will be sustainable, and activities like energy
development and national security actions will proceed appropriately
and consistent with relevant legislative mandates. Quality information
will allow management to meet conservation objectives while also
ensuring optimal levels of economic activity that can be sustainably
supported by the resource.
Marine fisheries, such as salmon in the Pacific Northwest and cod
in New England, have been vital to the prosperity and cultural identity
of coastal communities in the United States for hundreds of years. As
of 2009, our most recent complete estimate, U.S. commercial and
saltwater recreational fisheries supported 1.4 million full and part-
time jobs--including local jobs that cannot be outsourced--and
generated $166 billion in sales impacts.\1\ Sustainability of our
Nation's fisheries takes continual effort to monitor fisheries and
update scientific information. With continued Congressional support,
NMFS will continue to make substantial progress toward science-based,
effectively managed, and economically viable commercial and
recreational fisheries that will benefit coastal communities and the
U.S. economy both today and for generations to come.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ National Marine Fisheries Service. 2011. Fisheries Economics of
the United States, 2009, available at http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/st5/
publication/fisheries_economics_2009.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The elements and data requirements of fisheries science
Fishery science provides information needed to define and attain
sustainable and valuable fisheries. Without high quality fishery
science, we cannot be confident that the Nation is attaining optimum
yield from its fisheries, or that we're preventing overfishing and harm
to ecosystems and fishing communities. Attaining optimum yield requires
an investment in information about fish stocks, their fisheries and
their ecosystems. The United States has a clear legislative mandate to
achieve sustainable fisheries, based on a strong regulatory structure
in association with the Regional Fishery Management Councils. NMFS is
committed to generating the best fishery science to implement this
program. We are international leaders in fishery science, at the
forefront of rebuilding overfished stocks and preventing overfishing,
efforts that are beginning to pay off in many coastal communities.
Today, we know more about our fish stocks than ever before, and it is
vital that our science not regress, as this would inevitably lead to
declines in our stocks and a loss in the economic and social values
they provide.
NMFS collects the data required for stock assessments through both
fishery-independent observations, such as surveys of fish abundance,
and through fishery-dependent observations, such as data collected by
fishery observers and vessel trip reports provided by fishermen. In FY
2011, this capability will be primarily supported through the Expand
Annual Stock Assessments budget line which is funded at $53.4 million.
Other significant contributions to the total stock assessment effort
include Survey and Monitoring, Fisheries Statistics, Fishery
Information Networks, Observer Programs, and others. In addition, NMFS
utilizes NOAA Office of Marine and Aviation Operation's Fishery Survey
Vessels as a primary platform for many of its stock assessment data
collection activities. As part of the FY 2012 President's Budget, NOAA
is seeking to increase the Expand Annual Stock Assessment budget by $15
million, while at least maintaining funding from other contributing
budget lines. This funding will improve assessments for high priority
stocks; update assessments for stocks more frequently; and, conduct
fishery-independent surveys to enable assessment of more stocks,
including data poor stocks, 3-5 years from now. This funding will help
verify that overfishing is no longer occurring and allow optimum catch
levels to be set to support the sustainability and economic viability
of fish stocks.
The stock assessment process is generally considered to include
both data collection and the analysis of that data by fishery
scientists. Data for fishery science is based generally on three core
components: fishery catch from fishery monitoring programs, fish
abundance from fishery-independent surveys, and fish biology. By
tracking these three components over time and incorporating these data
into stock assessment models, scientists can estimate range and
abundance of stocks, calculate maximum sustainable yield, determine
whether overfishing has been occurring or whether the stock has
declined into an overfished state, and can forecast a sustainable level
of catch, which provides the foundation for setting annual catch limits
in accordance with law. Because fish stocks and their fisheries are
broadly distributed throughout state, national, and international
zones, the monitoring programs needed to provide these data are
geographically extensive. Finally, the amount and quality of data
available are used to estimate degrees of uncertainty that can inform
assessments and the level of risk associated with various management
actions.
Fishery catch information strives to measure total catch. One
component is obtained by monitoring commercial landings, largely in
partnership with the states and the marine fishery commissions. This
landed catch information is augmented by at-sea monitoring of bycatch
and information on discards collected by fishery observer programs. For
recreational fisheries, NMFS' Marine Recreational Information Program
is applying new and improved methods to the difficult challenge of
estimating total catch by the millions of recreational anglers
nationwide. Rarely are fishery catch monitoring programs focused on
single species or fisheries; instead they are generally designed to
monitor multiple species and fisheries over large geographic areas.
NMFS has relied heavily on its partnerships with the states and the
interstate marine fisheries commissions to conduct efficient and cost-
effective monitoring of commercial landings and recreational catches.
The federally-funded Fisheries Information Networks have provided a
means through which NMFS has been able to work collaboratively with its
partners to design and implement well-integrated data collection
programs that meet the management needs of both state and federally-
managed fisheries. Cooperative regional programs such as the Atlantic
Coastal Cooperative Statistics Program, the Gulf Fisheries Information
Network, the Pacific Fisheries Information Network, the Pacific
Recreational Fisheries Information Network, the Western Pacific
Information Network, and the Alaska Fisheries Information Network have
worked effectively to eliminate unnecessary overlaps, standardize data
elements and collection methods, and improve the timeliness of data
processing, statistical analysis, and dissemination of catch statistics
to all partners. Much of the commercial landings and recreational catch
data is actually collected, processed, and managed by state agency
personnel in accordance with procedures developed in collaboration with
NMFS. Continued funding of the Fisheries Information Networks will be
crucial for maintaining our current capabilities for monitoring
commercial and recreational catches. The House Appropriations Committee
mark up of the FY 2012 Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies
Appropriation bill includes a 30 percent cut from the FY 2011 spend
plan in funding for the Fisheries Information Networks, which would
considerably reduce the effectiveness of these programs.
NMFS' National Fisheries Information System Program has provided a
mechanism for cross-regional collaboration and sharing of ideas on how
best to improve the timeliness, quality, and accessibility of
commercial and recreational fishery catch information. The Fisheries
Information System Program has been working to continue to develop
electronic dealer reporting programs and electronic logbook reporting
programs to provide more timely and accurate updates on commercial
landings. The Fisheries Information System and the Fisheries
Information Networks have also been working together to develop and
implement information management architectures that will eventually
allow comprehensive access to complete and up-to-date state and federal
catch statistics within each region, as well as at the national level.
Cooperative efforts are now also focused on improving quality
management of catch data collection programs through enhanced reviews
and evaluations of the current procedures for quality assurance and
quality control. Improving the timeliness, accessibility, and quality
of catch information is extremely important to facilitate the work of
fishery managers in monitoring fishing performance.
Fisheries observers are trained biologists placed on board
commercial fishing and processing vessels, as well as in some shoreside
processing plants. They are the most reliable, unbiased source of data
on the actual at-sea performance of commercial fisheries. They collect
data on bycatch, enabling accurate estimation of total mortality, a key
component of stock assessment modeling. In some fisheries, they provide
data on catches. They also provide high-quality data on interactions
with protected species. This information is important to ensure that
protected species remain healthy and their interactions with fisheries
are minimized so that harvest opportunities are affected as little as
possible. In FY 2010, NMFS logged over 68,000 observer days in 45
fisheries.
Fish biology information is most diverse in its sources, with
important information coming from NMFS monitoring programs, academic
studies, cooperative research and other programs. The outcome of these
activities is vital information on fish longevity, growth,
reproduction, movement, and other factors needed to calibrate fish
stock assessment models. The biological information we collect includes
age data for many of our most important stocks. With the addition of
fish age data, we are able to apply more complex and sophisticated
stock-assessment models that provide better information on changes in
fish abundance over time, more direct information on fish mortality
rates caused by fishing, and more precise forecasts of future changes
in fish abundance and potential annual catch limits.
Fish abundance information is best obtained from standardized,
fishery-independent surveys covering the extensive range of the fish
stocks. The average catch rate of fish typically is measured at
hundreds of sampling locations over the range of a suite of fish
stocks. These surveys are repeated, typically annually, to measure the
change in catch rate over time, which is the cornerstone information of
the fishery assessment models. When possible, NOAA vessels conduct
these surveys to achieve the highest degree of standardization and to
simultaneously collect the broadest range of associated habitat,
ecosystem and environmental data. In some regions, the primary
platforms for the surveys are chartered fishing vessels that may be
partially funded through catch set-asides or other forms of cooperative
research. Where fishery-independent surveys are not feasible, such as
for open ocean tunas, or have not been funded, NOAA uses catch rates
from the fishery as a proxy approach. Compared to fishery-independent
surveys, this approach provides a lower level of confidence of
standardization over time, because changes in commercial or
recreational landings can be influenced by factors other than
abundance, such as market forces or changes in regulations.
NMFS partners with states in conducting some of our surveys,
particularly in coastal waters. The state vessels are generally smaller
than the NOAA vessels, and can operate in shallower, nearshore and
estuarine areas. This is particularly important for providing data on
stocks that occur in these important habitats. For example, the
Southeast Area Monitoring and Assessment Program, commonly known as
SEAMAP, is a collaboration dating back to 1977 involving NMFS, the Gulf
States Marine Fisheries Commission, and the states bordering the Gulf
of Mexico. SEAMAP provides much of the fisheries-independent data used
in Gulf of Mexico stock assessments, and is funded at $5.1 million in
FY 2011. These funds are transferred to the Commission and individual
states via grants and cooperative agreements to conduct the surveys.
There are numerous other surveys conducted by, or in partnership with,
states that provide data to NMFS for stock assessments.
While sophisticated stock assessments provide information on what
changes have occurred in fish abundance, they do not tell why these
changes occurred. For this, NMFS seeks to augment our fish assessments
with habitat studies, fishery oceanography, ecosystem investigations
and other programs to explain why changes have occurred and improve
forecasts of long-term and short-term fishery available yield and
holistic ecosystem impacts.
It is important to note here that protected species surveys (marine
mammals and threatened and endangered species) are also important, as a
paucity of information on these species can lead to conservative
assumptions regarding fishery interactions, which can lead to
restrictions on fisheries.
Stock assessments, uncertainty buffers, and management advice
From 2005 to 2010, NMFS had the data and capacity to assess an
average of 95 stocks each year. With this level of assessment activity,
NMFS is not able to provide adequate assessments for all of the 500
plus stocks in U.S. Fishery Management Plans, but is able to provide
regular assessments for the most important stocks. Assessment activity
is distributed to address the most important needs to the extent
possible. Some important stocks have been assessed every one to two
years, while several other stocks that had not been previously assessed
were assessed for the first time during this six-year period. Of the
500 plus managed stocks, 230 have been identified as members of the
Fish Stock Sustainability Index. These Fish Stock Sustainability Index
stocks constitute over 90 percent of U.S. commercial landings. For the
Fish Stock Sustainability Index stocks, NMFS has been able to increase
the number with adequate assessments from 119 in 2005 to 132 in 2010.
For the purpose of tracking performance, an assessment is considered to
be adequate for five years after its most recent update. All of these
132 adequate assessments meet this criterion. The overall index score,
which tracks our knowledge about the stocks, as well as progress in
ending overfishing, ensuring stocks are not overfished, and rebuilding
stocks has increased by 63 percent since 2000. That substantial
increase shows that investment in both science and management results
in sustainable fisheries.
Uncertainty is inherent in all fish stock assessments. Because fish
abundance surveys and fishery monitoring programs have sampling error,
fish stock assessment models are simplifications of all the complex
processes occurring in nature. Neither ecosystem studies nor advanced
technology surveys can eliminate this uncertainty completely. To
address this uncertainty when setting fishery catch targets, fishery
managers typically include a buffer between the overfishing limit and
the target for allowable catch. The objective is to lower the
probability that the overfishing limit will be exceeded, while not
overly restricting fishing opportunities. The size of this buffer
depends on the degree of uncertainty in the assessment result and the
degree to which the Council's Fishery Management Plan seeks to avoid
overfishing. For example, if the plan calls for no more than a 45
percent chance that overfishing would occur, then a stock with a highly
uncertain assessment would have a larger buffer than would a stock with
a more precise assessment. Investments in more and better assessment
data reduce uncertainty, and thus reduce the size of the buffer without
increasing the chance of overfishing. This in turn allows for greater
fishing opportunities and improved economic benefits. Conversely,
reduced investment in assessments will lead to either increased
uncertainty and lower catch limits or greater risk of overfishing.
To ensure that we provide fishery managers with the best available
science, NMFS includes extensive peer reviews as a component of our
stock assessment processes. The peer review process provides fishery
managers and constituents with confidence in the integrity of
assessments and assurance that they represent the best available
science. The Magnuson-Stevens Act clarifies that such peer reviews are
a valuable part of the management process. The Regional Fishery
Management Councils' Scientific and Statistical Committees use the peer
reviewed stock assessment results as the basis for providing fishing
level recommendations to their Fishery Management Councils. NMFS is
working with the Regional Fishery Management Councils and their Science
and Statistical Committees as each Council works to implement
regionally relevant protocols for peer reviews and to expand the role
of the Science and Statistical Committee in providing fishing level
recommendations.
Provision and allocation of survey vessel time
The provision and allocation of survey vessel time for conducting
our fish surveys is a particularly important issue. Surveys provided by
NOAA survey vessels are the primary sources of fisheries-independent
data used to monitor stock abundance and are augmented by chartered
commercial vessels for some surveys.
Eight fisheries survey vessels, including four new Dyson-class
vessels, conduct the majority of these fishery-independent surveys. A
ninth vessel, the Miller Freeman, was recently removed from service due
to numerous mechanical failures and declining safety. These vessels
conduct dozens of surveys each year; however, this number is in
decline. NOAA's Office of Marine and Aviation Operations' (OMAO) base-
funded days at sea for the overall NOAA fleet have declined from
approximately 200 days per ship (average FY 2004--FY 2006) to as few as
153 days per ship in FY 2010 (maximum operating tempo for NOAA vessels
is 235 days at sea). In 2008, NOAA vessels conducted 56 surveys for
fish assessments, protected species assessments, and supporting
studies. Only 40 surveys were conducted in FY 2010, and 40 are planned
to be conducted in FY 2011. Primary factors contributing to the
reduction of capacity for the NOAA fleet include: changing composition
of the fleet including new more sophisticated fisheries survey vessels
with improved scientific capabilities; higher personnel costs
associated with staffing, safety and regulatory requirements, and
increased fuel and maintenance requirements, especially for aging
vessels.
Since 2007, NMFS has provided programmatic funds, called ``Program
Funded Days'' to the NOAA fleet, so that critical surveys could be
sustained. Additional funds have been provided for charter commercial
vessels to conduct surveys for which NOAA vessels were not available or
not appropriate. In FY 2011, NMFS will spend over $8 million on
chartered surveys, using funds that otherwise would have been used to
increase the pace and quality of stock assessments including
investments in advanced technology. Some surveys have been shortened in
length, limiting their effectiveness, and in other cases surveys have
been cancelled altogether.
This decreased survey time ultimately results in stock assessments
that include estimates with a higher uncertainty, which must be
considered by fishery managers when establishing annual catch limits to
avoid overfishing as required by the Magnuson-Stevens Act. This could
lead to more conservative annual catch limits. In uncertain situations,
lower catch levels decrease the possibility of overfishing, thereby
increasing long-term economic opportunity from a sustainably managed
resource. Even if a stock is stable, without sea time to collect enough
updated data on stock abundance and distribution, stock assessments
cannot verify this stability without high uncertainty. An increased
utilization rate for the fleet will result in more frequent and/or
extensive fishery surveys, leading to updated stock assessments and
increased confidence in establishing annual catch limits. NOAA is
currently identifying several options for increasing days at sea,
because a robust NOAA fleet directly benefits our coastal communities
and increases fishery-related jobs. To reiterate, the FY 2012
President's Request to the Expand Annual Stock Assessments budget, an
increase of $15 million, will support fishery-independent surveys to
enable assessment of more stocks.
Cooperative research
Another valuable source of fisheries-independent data is
cooperative research. The agency's cooperative research provides both
targeted survey data and opportunities for hands-on, face-to-face
interactions between fishermen and scientists from NMFS, other
management agencies and academia. Cooperative research is essential to
leveraging the knowledge, tools, techniques, skills, and experiences
that fishermen possess that would otherwise be unavailable to our
scientists. It also fosters better understanding and increased
acceptance of our science by these vital stakeholders. In FY 2011,
Congress provided over $16 million in funds for cooperative research,
including: $10.1 million to the National Cooperative Research Program
and $6 million for cooperative research activities from the National
Catch Share Program.
Regional cooperative research priorities are established
collaboratively among the NMFS Science Centers and Regional Offices,
Regional Fishery Management Councils, interstate Commissions, state
fishery management agencies, academia, and interstate stakeholders in
accordance with the cooperative research priorities in Section 318 of
the Magnuson-Stevens Act. The agency's cooperative research portfolio
corresponds on a regional basis to the respective Regional Fishery
Management Council multi-year research priority plans. These plans are
Regional Fishery Management Council functions under Section 302(h)(7)
of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, which requires the Regional Fishery
Management Councils, in conjunction with their Science and Statistical
Committees, to develop multi-year research priorities for fisheries,
fisheries interactions, habitats, and other areas of research that are
necessary for management purposes every five years.
Since NMFS's cooperative research program is designed to complement
NMFS's base monitoring programs, most of the activities generate
information that is not collected by agency assets. Improvements in the
data available for management, including from cooperative research,
allow for greater confidence in stock assessment estimates and less
need to reduce allocations to protect against uncertainty.
Marine Recreational Information Program
NMFS is now implementing the new Marine Recreational Information
Program, which has been designed based on the recommendations of the
National Research Council's 2006 review of the Marine Recreational
Fishing Statistical Survey. NMFS is developing and testing new survey
methodologies to improve the accuracy, geographic resolution and
timeliness of recreational fishing catch and effort data. These
improvements are necessary to support successful management of
fisheries with Annual Catch Limits and Accountability Measures. The
President's FY 2012 budget request includes an increase of $3 million
to begin implementing improvements developed through the Marine
Recreational Information Program.
NMFS currently develops recreational fishery catch estimates for
the Gulf and Atlantic coasts via three ongoing surveys. The coastal
household telephone survey generates information on angler trips. The
access point angler intercept survey provides data on catch per trip.
The results of these two surveys are combined to generate catch
estimates for shore and private boat angling modes. The for-hire survey
and the access point angler intercept survey are utilized to provide
estimates for the for-hire (charter and head boat) mode. The Marine
Recreational Information Program is developing revised methods that are
being phased in over the next two years to substantially reduce sources
of error and improve the accuracy of effort and catch estimates based
on a combination of telephone, mail and access point surveys.
Currently, the Marine Recreational Information Program is implementing
a new design-unbiased method to retrospectively estimate catch
statistics from the Marine Recreational Fishing Statistical Survey for
data from 2004 to the present. Next winter, the program will implement
an improved sampling design for access point surveys that will further
reduce the potential for error. These revised methods have been
developed by a team of NMFS and independent survey experts and, as with
all changes to our survey methods, have been subject to independent
peer review. The same team, in collaboration with Pacific Recreational
Fisheries Information Network and state natural resource agencies, has
also reviewed survey methods in use in California, Oregon and
Washington, and has recommended survey design improvements to address
potential sources of error in those surveys. The states will be testing
these recommendations with the Marine Recreational Information Program
support over the next two years.
In addition, NMFS implemented the National Saltwater Angler
Registry Program in 2010 and has developed new survey designs for
estimating fishing effort that are based primarily on sampling from
lists of registered anglers who fish from shore or private boats or
from lists of registered for-hire boats and their operators. The new
registry-based approach will replace the coastal household telephone
survey and upgrade the for-hire survey. NMFS expects that
implementation of the new fishing effort surveys will begin in 2011.
These changes address the highest priority findings of the National
Research Council's 2006 review of our current survey methods.
The potential for in-season management of recreational fisheries
Improving the timeliness of catch estimate delivery that could
support active, in-season tracking and management of recreational catch
is a significant challenge. The Marine Recreational Information Program
will continue to use sample survey methods to estimate recreational
catch for private boat and shore fisheries. Currently, preliminary
estimates of catch for these surveys for the Atlantic and Gulf coast
fisheries are available for 45 days following a two-month sampling
period. In March 2011, NMFS conducted a workshop with key management
partners and stakeholders to assess needs for more timely catch
estimates and the tradeoffs associated with improving data timeliness.
The key outcomes of the workshop are posted at: http://
www.countmyfish.noaa.gov/workshop/Data%20Timeliness%20Workshop%
20Key%20Outcomes%20FINAL.pdf. A final report and recommendations for
improving timeliness of recreational catch estimate delivery, and for
improving methods for forecasting in-season catches, will be completed
by late summer. During the workshop, managers expressed a need to
shorten sampling periods from two months to one month for at least some
portions of the year on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. The President's
Budget Request for FY 2012 includes an increase of $3.0 million for the
Marine Recreational Information Program, of which $2.0 million is
targeted at shortening sampling intervals for the Atlantic and Gulf
coasts to address this need.
The Marine Recreational Information Program is also developing
electronic trip reporting methods for the for-hire fisheries.
Electronic reporting, when mandated and strictly enforced and
supplemented with independent validation, would enable near real-time
tracking of the catch of the charter and headboat sector. Of the
funding increase requested for FY 2012, $1.0 million is targeted at
implementing electronic for-hire trip reports in the Southeast and
Northeast Regions.
Providing preliminary catch estimates to managers more frequently
during fishing seasons, and improving models for projecting catch from
such preliminary data, may enable managers to more confidently track or
project recreational catch and consider in-season adjustments to
prevent significant overharvest of catch limits, or to re-open
fisheries that closed before annual catch limits were reached. In some
cases, including fisheries with short open seasons or limited catch,
such in-season capability will be difficult to achieve with sample
survey methods, regardless of any efforts to shorten sample periods. In
these cases, the Regional Fishery Management Councils may apply tools
consistent with the National Standard 1 guidelines to prevent catch
from exceeding catch limits, potentially triggering subsequent
reductions in recreational sector catch limits. Such tools include
setting catch targets at levels below the catch limits that are
proportionate to the management uncertainty associated with the timing
of the availability of catch estimates or setting multi-year catch
limits with periodic adjustments to management measures in response to
monitored catch over time. By improving the timeliness of our current
estimates and applying the management tools available, NMFS and the
Regional Fishery Management Councils can work together to maximize
recreational opportunities while preventing overfishing.
Effect of 2007 amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act on domestic
fisheries
The 2007 amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act have had a
significant impact on fisheries management. A key element of these
amendments is the requirement that the Regional Fishery Management
Councils specify annual catch limits to prevent overfishing for all
fisheries experiencing overfishing by 2010, and for all fisheries by
2011. NMFS has been working hard to acquire the necessary data, conduct
the stock assessments, and work with the Regional Fishery Management
Councils and their Scientific and Statistical Committees to specify and
put in place the required annual catch limits. NMFS and the fishermen
it serves have benefited considerably from the funding we have received
from Congress to meet these challenging requirements.q
NMFS strives to provide as up-to-date stock assessments as
possible. Fish assessments and their forecasts of potential fishery
yield are not unlike weather forecasting. In both cases, complex
natural forces cause fluctuations, which require monitoring and
periodic forecast updates to avoid getting ``stale'' and to remain
highly relevant. Just as a two-week old weather forecast can still tell
you whether it is winter or summer, an old stock assessment can still
have the average conditions about right even as it loses track of
subsequent fluctuations. However, old stock assessments do not capture
recent trend information, such as whether the stock is on a rebuilding
plan or is collapsing. The best interval between assessment updates
depends upon many factors including the degree of natural fluctuations
for that stock, the value of the fishery and intensity of fishing
activity, whether the stock is on a rebuilding plan, is overfished or
undergoing overfishing, and other factors. In 2012, NMFS will deploy a
comprehensive stock assessment prioritization strategy to ensure agency
resources and efforts are directed to those stocks whose assessments
are most in need of updating, or which are the highest priority for a
new assessment.
For the 40 stocks that were subject to overfishing in 2010, the
average age of the assessment was 2.6 years. Further, of the 20 stocks
that have been on the overfishing list since 2000, the average age of
their assessments was approximately 3.5 years, versus 1.8 years average
age for the other stocks on the list. Similarly, for the 48 stocks that
were overfished in 2010, the average age of the assessment was 2.0
years. Of the 13 stocks that have been on the overfished list since
2000, the average age of their assessments was also approximately 3.5
years, versus 1.4 years average age for the other stocks on the list.
However, it is clear that there are stocks for which NMFS does not
have adequate assessments. NMFS fully intends to make more progress in
assessing these stocks, especially those identified as high priority,
and there is some potential for gains through greater efficiency in the
assessment process. However, fishery science is a data-intensive and
labor-intensive endeavor, and making substantial improvements will
require additional resources for data acquisition and analysis. In
addition, NMFS is striving to conduct more surveys using advanced
sampling technologies that can achieve higher standardization and, in
some cases, can directly measure fish abundance at each survey
location, not just a standardized catch rate. With such information,
NMFS will be able to provide more precise and accurate assessments
sooner. At present, these technologies are still in the developmental
phase. In the future, they will enable greater efficiency and increased
accuracy and precision for our assessments, but these benefits will
take some years to be realized.
Rather than resulting in unnecessarily reduced harvest levels,
management under annual catch limits is in fact rebuilding stocks and
leading to better and more sustainable harvests. For example, the 26
stocks and stock complexes in the Alaska groundfish fisheries have long
been managed under annual catch limits. None of these stocks is
overfished or subject to overfishing, and all are at abundance levels
that support the long term optimum yield from the fishery.
NMFS is confident that, in the long run, these amendments will
enable us to rebuild stocks, increase yields, and provide the economic
benefits and employment that robust stocks can sustain. High quality
fisheries science is vital for attaining these results. More timely and
more precise estimates of abundance of targeted populations will enable
better assessments, better management and ultimately better and,
importantly, more sustainable profits to the fishing industry.
Conversely, the loss of support for fisheries science and corresponding
support for fishery management activities would have a very deleterious
effect on the fisheries sector.
The Magnuson-Stevens Act calls for annual catch limits in all
fisheries such that overfishing does not occur. This is a forward-
looking, proactive approach to preventing overfishing and providing a
clear indication of the target management level for the fishery.
Various forms of catch quotas, which are basically annual catch limits,
have been used successfully for decades in the implementation of some
fishery management plans. With imprecise stock assessments and catch
monitoring, we can never be completely certain that overfishing will
not occur, even with annual catch limits. However, the probability that
overfishing will occur can be calculated, which can inform socio-
economic analyses of the trade-off between the confidence in preventing
overfishing versus the amount of foregone short-term fishing
opportunity needed to achieve this confidence. One of the greatest
challenges is in the data-poor fisheries where assessments are not yet
possible. Here, NMFS is working on alternative approaches that provide
preliminary determination of catch levels that will prevent
overfishing.
Concluding remarks
NMFS has made significant progress in improving the status of fish
stocks. We recognize that robust data collection and stock assessments
and responsive management programs are vital to rebuilding overfished
stocks and strengthening economies. Of the 84 stocks determined to be
overfished between 2000 and 2010, 36 stocks are no longer overfished.
Of the 76 stocks determined to be subject to overfishing in the same
time period, 36 stocks are no longer subject to overfishing. In
addition, 23 stocks have been rebuilt over this same time period. For
fisheries subject to overfishing, the Regional Fishery Management
Councils and NMFS have taken final actions to end overfishing and put
annual catch limits in place. The Regional Fishery Management Councils
and NMFS are also on track to meet the 2011 deadline to have annual
catch limits included in fishery management plans for all managed
stocks. NOAA's FY 2012 budget request includes $7.6 million for NMFS to
support the establishment, monitoring, and compliance of annual catch
limits, and $5.6 million for the Regional Fishery Management Councils
to set, evaluate, and revise annual catch limits and associated
regulatory measures to end overfishing. One of the top priorities for
use of the $15 million requested increase to Expand Annual Stock
Assessments in FY 2012 will be to update assessments for stocks listed
as overfished or subject to overfishing to verify that overfishing has
ended.
In the Pacific Northwest, lingcod was designated as overfished in
1999, with overfishing occurring for several years. A variety of
restrictions ended lingcod overfishing in 2005, and the stock was
rebuilt several years ahead of schedule. Atlantic sea scallops were
once severely overfished, but with cooperation from scallop fishermen
the stock was rebuilt in 2001 and is now the top-valued fishery in the
United States. Compared to the 1990-1999 time period when scallops were
overfished, New England scallop fishermen are now sustainably
harvesting an additional 17.5 million metric tons per year and ex-
vessel revenues have increased by $93 million annually.\2\
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\2\ National Marine Fisheries Service, Office of Science &
Technology, Annual Commercial Landings Statistics, available at http://
www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/st1/commercial/landings/annual_landings.html.
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NMFS has estimated that if all stocks were rebuilt and harvested at
their maximum sustainable yield, this could increase ex-vessel value by
as much as $2.2 billion, which would generate $31 billion in sales
impacts and support 500,000 jobs across the broader economy. Sustaining
the science to understand stock dynamics and document stock status is
paramount to reaching these goals.
The July/August 2011 issue of Sport Fishing contains two ``Bright
Spots'' articles touting the benefits of eleven different conservation
efforts that enabled stocks to recover from periods of low abundance.
These range from flounder to salmon to billfish; from the Pacific
Northwest, to the Gulf of Mexico, to the Northeast.
Ending overfishing, rebuilding stocks and managing on a sustainable
basis using sound science will have real benefits to the fishing and
the communities that depend on fishing for employment.
Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss NMFS's fishery
science. We are available to answer any questions you may have.
______
Mr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Schwaab. Next, Mr. Harris, you
have five minutes.
STATEMENT OF DUANE HARRIS, MEMBER AND PAST CHAIRMAN, SOUTH
ATLANTIC FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL
Mr. Harris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Subcommittee. Thank you for allowing me to appear before you
today to address the science required to support the mandates
of the 2006-2007 amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act, and how the lack of basic
science has affected fishermen in fishing communities in the
South Atlantic. My name is Duane Harris, and I represent the
State of Georgia on the South Atlantic Fishery Management
Council.
The 2007 amendments have had a profound effect on fisheries
management. The Council no longer has the ability to deviate
from scientific recommendations, even when those
recommendations are acknowledged to contain considerable
uncertainty. The provisions to end overfishing immediately upon
implementation, combined with the requirements of the
scientific and statistical committee establish the limits that
prevent overfishing remain the most important changes affecting
management in the South Atlantic.
In testimony I presented in 2009 before this Subcommittee,
I used red snapper to illustrate problems as a result of the
amended Act. That example is still pertinent to the issues I am
addressing today. Initial red snapper stock assessment
suggested large cuts in harvest were necessary to end
overfishing, despite evidence that the stock was improving
under regulations that reduced but did not eliminate
overfishing.
Although options existed that would achieve the rebuilding
strategy while greatly reducing impacts on fishermen, they were
not available to the Council because they would have resulted
in continued overfishing on red snapper beyond the date when
overfishing was mandated to end. Our scientific and statistical
committee has struggled as it attempts to comply with a mandate
to provide recommendations to end overfishing and rebuild
overfished stocks in the absence of necessary information and
stock assessments.
As a scientific body, the SSC is hesitant to provide
scientific advice when there is no science to support it. Under
the amended Act, this is exactly what the SSC is required to do
for the majority of species managed by the Council. This leads
the SSC to provide very precautionary catch levels that may
have significant impacts on the fishing industry.
Forcing a scientific body to make recommendations to the
Council in the absence of necessary data and stock assessments
does a disservice to and threatens to undermine the integrity
of the entire management system.
Since the red snapper fishery closure, the Southeast
Fishery Science Center has received additional funding to
develop and implement a comprehensive fishery independent
survey. This is a positive step forward. Without such a survey,
the Council will have no way to evaluate improvements in the
red snapper fishery or to compensate for the information lost
as a result of the closure.
Commercial fishing quotas are an essential management tool.
However, unless commercial landings are tracked efficiently and
correctly, the system breaks down. Fortunately, a system exists
which will dramatically improve this program at no cost to NOAA
Fisheries. That program is the more efficient Atlantic Coast
Cooperative Statistics Program. The Southeast Fisheries Science
Center needs to embrace and adopt this system.
In 2008, a Spanish mackerel stock assessment was rejected
by a panel of independent experts. That left Spanish mackerel
without a recent stock assessment. As a result, the scientific
and statistical committee selected a very precautionary
allowable biological catch. Consequently, the Council's
proposed Spanish mackerel annual catch limit would be expected
to result in reduced ex-vessel revenues to commercial fishers
of approximately $680,000 due to a reduction in commercial
harvest.
These reduced revenues could result in the loss of an
estimated 17 harvester and 10 dealer processor full-time
equivalent jobs. The Council supports efforts underway to
resolve recreational data collection issues through the Marine
Recreational Information Program, and we hope and trust this
program will not only reduce uncertainty in estimates and
considerably improve the timeliness of their availability, but
also take advantage of technology to address fishermen's
willingness to submit information.
In summary, the goal of the 2007 amendments to the Act to
end overfishing is absolutely necessary to recover stocks and
provide additional opportunities for commercial and
recreational fishermen. Despite the difficulty of the task at
hand, ending overfishing is in the best interests of the
Nation. But there is definitely a cost associated with ending
overfishing in the other requirements of the amended Act.
Data provided by NOAA Fisheries are currently insufficient
for the majority of the stocks we manage. In some instances,
the Council's mandated management actions have impacted
fishermen and fishing businesses, resulting in reduced revenues
and/or job losses. However, there have been improvements in the
last couple of years in a number of areas, such as development
of fishery-independent surveys, hiring more stock assessment
scientists, and working with fishermen to collect scientific
data through cooperative research programs.
There is still much improvement needed. Improving the data
on which stock assessments are based, both fishery-dependent
and fishery-independent data is essential if we are to gain
back the trust of the fishing public.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I
appreciate your time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Harris follows:]
Statement of Duane Harris, Past Chairman,
South Atlantic Fishery Management Council
Mister Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
allowing me to appear before you. My name is Duane Harris and I
represent the State of Georgia on the South Atlantic Fishery Management
Council (Council). Today I will address the questions posed and provide
the information requested by the Subcommittee. All of my comments are
made with the sincere intent of providing a clear understanding about
how the 2007 amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act (Act) have affected our Council's management of the
marine fisheries resources in the South Atlantic. I will also address
the NOAA Fisheries science required to support the mandates in the
amended Act and how the lack of needed information has affected
fishermen and fishing communities.
1. How Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
amendments have affected fishery management.
The 2007 amendments have had a profound effect on fisheries
management. The Council no longer has the ability to deviate from
scientific recommendations, even when those recommendations are
acknowledged to contain considerable uncertainty, be based on out-of-
date or ``stale'' information that may be contradicted by more recent
anecdotal observations, or may result in numerous known and, in some
cases, unintended consequences for fishermen and fishing communities.
The provisions to end overfishing immediately upon implementation,
combined with the requirements that the Scientific and Statistical
Committee (SSC) establish the limits that prevent overfishing, remain
the most influential changes affecting management in the South
Atlantic.
In testimony I presented on October 27, 2009 before this
Subcommittee, I used red snapper to illustrate problems the Council was
encountering as the result of amendments to the Act, and the red
snapper example still is pertinent to the issues I am addressing today.
An initial red snapper stock assessment suggested large cuts in harvest
were necessary to end overfishing, despite evidence that the stock was
improving under existing regulations that reduced but did not eliminate
overfishing. The only way to achieve the mandated reductions was to
prohibit directed harvest of red snapper and to shut down all effort in
the multi-species snapper grouper complex fishery where red snapper
were concentrated. Although options existed that would achieve the
rebuilding strategy, while greatly reducing impacts on fishermen, they
were not available to the Council under the amended Act because they
would have resulted in continued overfishing on red snapper beyond the
date for which overfishing was mandated to end. As would be expected,
such measures were met with considerable opposition by a public
experiencing the best red snapper fishing in over a decade. This led
the Council to request a delay in closing a large area off of south
Georgia and northeast Florida until the public's anecdotal observations
could be vetted through our stock assessment process.
A new stock assessment conducted in 2010 agreed in part with the
observations of the fishermen and verified that a large year class of
red snapper had entered the fishery. The biomass increased sufficiently
for the Council to take action to recommend the Secretary of Commerce
not implement the large area closure off of Georgia and Florida.
However, the new stock assessment results indicated the prohibition of
harvest on red snapper was still needed to end overfishing. Prior to
the recent Magnuson-Stevens Act amendments, the Council could have
chosen that option initially and developed regulations to phase out the
overfishing over several years and in doing so balance the needs of the
stock with those of the fishery. During this time, progress on other
much needed stock assessments was delayed to accommodate resources
directed toward red snapper. The Council also expended considerable
time and effort evaluating numerous alternatives in its attempts to
address the enormous social and economic impacts and public
dissatisfaction. Public faith in the process declined considerably as
the red snapper issue dragged on and still continues today.
2. Increased role of the Scientific and Statistical Committee
The South Atlantic Council's Scientific and Statistical Committee
(SSC) has always played a strong role in the management process, with
the Council typically adopting regulations consistent with SSC
recommendations even prior to the recent amendments to the Act.
However, the SSC has struggled as it attempts to comply with the
mandate to provide recommendations to end overfishing and rebuild
overfished stocks in the absence of the necessary information and stock
assessments. For many species stock status or relationships between
current landings and stock abundance and productivity are not
available. As a scientific body, the SSC is, not surprisingly, hesitant
to provide recommendations that will be considered scientific advice
when there is no science to support them. However, under the amended
Act, this is exactly what the SSC is required to do for the majority of
the species managed by the Council. These circumstances lead the SSC to
provide very precautionary catch levels that generally have significant
impacts on the fishery.
We have several Fishery Management Plans (FMPs), including Coral,
Sargassum, Golden crab, and Dolphin Wahoo, that lack reliable data on
landings, effective effort, and the basic survey information that is
considered necessary for proper management. This is also true for many
species in the Snapper Grouper FMP. Despite the lack of scientific
information indicating the level of landings that would result in
overfishing, the amended Act requires the SSC to provide an Allowable
Biological Catch that will prevent overfishing from occurring. Forcing
a scientific body such as the SSC to make recommendations to the
Council in the absence of the necessary data and stock assessments does
a disservice to the entire management system and threatens to undermine
the integrity of all scientific recommendations.
3. Mechanism for establishing Annual Catch Limits (ACLs) to prevent
overfishing.
The mechanism we use for establishing Annual Catch Limits to
prevent overfishing begins with our stock assessment process called the
SouthEast Data, Assessment, and Review or SEDAR. SEDAR is a cooperative
fishery management council process initiated in 2002 to improve the
quality and reliability of fishery stock assessments in the South
Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, and US Caribbean. The improved stock
assessments from the SEDAR process provide higher quality information
to address fishery management issues. SEDAR emphasizes constituent and
stakeholder participation in assessment development, transparency in
the assessment process, and a rigorous and independent scientific
review of completed stock assessments.
SEDAR is organized around three workshops. First is the Data
Workshop, during which fisheries, monitoring, and life history data are
reviewed and compiled. Second is the Assessment process, which is
conducted via webinars, during which assessment models are developed
and population parameters are estimated using the information provided
from the Data Workshop. Third is the Review Workshop, during which
independent experts review the input data, assessment methods, and
assessment products. SEDAR is a good stock assessment process.
Unfortunately in most instances the data to feed the processes is
lacking.
After completion of a SEDAR stock assessment, all three workshop
reports and all supporting documentation, including the findings of the
independent experts relative to the status of the stock, is then
forwarded to the Council's Scientific and Statistical Committee for
certification as appropriate for management based on the ``best
scientific information available''. The SSC then meets and develops
specific management recommendations, including such things as
Overfishing Level (OFL) and Allowable Biological Catch (ABC), as
appropriate. For the species that have not had a stock assessment or
for stocks considered data-poor, the SSC and Council have developed a
control rule that provides a mechanism for providing an Allowable
Biological Catch level. However, the problem this mechanism creates is
when data are insufficient to determine what level of harvest will
ensure that overfishing does not occur, the SSC must use the
precautionary approach in developing its management recommendations to
the Council, which results in very low Allowable Biological Catch.
The SSC recommendations are provided to the Council and from these
the Council must develop the Annual Catch Limit. Prior to the recent
amendments to the Act, the Council was not bound by the SSC's
recommendations and had more flexibility in establishing catch levels.
We could consider such things as uncertainty in the stock assessment,
the specific life histories of the stocks and characteristics of the
fishery itself in establishing what could be done to rebuild fisheries
and at the same time mitigate the social and economic impacts on the
fishermen and fishing communities. The Council no longer has that
flexibility and must establish Annual Catch Limits that do not exceed
the Allowable Biological Catch recommendation of the SSC, regardless of
the social and economic impacts.
4. Whether data generated by NOAA are adequate.
Data provided by the NOAA Fisheries are currently insufficient for
the majority of the stocks in our jurisdiction. Stocks with reliable
catch statistics, adequate biological sampling and measures of
population abundance comprise only a very small percentage of the
stocks managed by the Council. To compound this problem, many of the
remaining stocks suffer from a lack of data in more than one of the
necessary areas (catch, biological characteristics, and abundance
measures). Because of this, data-poor approaches developed in other
parts of the country to provide Allowable Biological Catch for
unassessed stocks have not helped the situation in the southeast.
In recent years there have been some improvements. Catch statistics
have become more reliable. However, there is still a lack of resources
to provide for much needed fisheries observers in the southeast.
Without observer coverage, it is difficult to determine the accuracy of
self-reported landings in logbooks. Biological data collection has
increased considerably also, especially for age structures of fish
(otoliths). Unfortunately, in many cases there are inadequate personnel
resources available to analyze these otoliths. There have been
improvements in the fisheries surveys conducted by NOAA Fisheries, but
currently they are only a small fraction of what is truly needed for
management.
Since the red snapper fishery closure, the Southeast Fisheries
Science Center has received additional funding to develop and implement
a comprehensive fishery independent survey. This is a positive step
forward. Without such a survey the Council will have no way to evaluate
improvements in the red snapper fishery or to compensate for the
information lost as the result of the closure. The importance of this
survey to the future success of the Council's management program cannot
be overstated and funding must be maintained.
Another positive effort in recent years has been the Cooperative
Research Program, where funds have been appropriated to enlist
commercial and recreational fishermen to help with data collection.
This program has been beneficial in a number of ways. Not only has it
provided more resources for gathering information in terms of people
and vessels, but perhaps most importantly it has increased the
credibility of data collection in the eyes of the fishermen. Funding
for this program should be continued.
In addition, the Council has recommended developing a comprehensive
biological sampling program. At the most basic level the program should
include hiring additional port samplers to monitor commercial and for-
hire fisheries throughout the region as well as increasing sampling
from recreational catches. Also, the Southeast Fisheries Science Center
should become part of the Atlantic Coast Cooperative Statistics
Program. There are two additional areas we believe that NOAA Fisheries
should address: First is quota monitoring. The existing Atlantic Coast
Cooperative Statistics Program (ACCSP) Commercial Quota Monitoring
Program that operates in the states of North Carolina northward could
be extended to the states of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida at no
cost for software. This ongoing ACCSP program provides automatic daily
reports on species with a commercial quota. Contrast this with the
existing system used by NOAA Fisheries in the southeast using black sea
bass as an example: On July 6, 2011 the Council received a memo from
the Regional Administrator to our Executive Director showing
preliminary black sea bass landings of 139,052 pounds (45% of the
quota) being landed as of June 30, 2011. On Friday July 8, 2011 we
received a notice that the commercial black sea bass fishery would
close on July 15, 2011, culminating in a 45 day season. This fishery
will not reopen until June 1, 2012. The estimated level of landings for
the season or what the revised quota was based on the commercial
overage last season is still not available. It is unfair to have the
fishermen pay the price for an ineffective quota monitoring program
through payback of overages when the more efficient ACCSP system could
have been used at no cost to NOAA Fisheries. We are concerned that once
our Comprehensive Annual Catch Limits Amendment is implemented, which
will add more species to the quota monitoring program, the NOAA
Fisheries current system will crash and it will be the fishermen and
the resource paying the price.
The second area that should be addressed is bycatch monitoring. The
existing NOAA Fisheries data programs do not provide estimates of
bycatch mortality that can be used to calculate total mortality for use
in tracking Annual Catch Limits. This has led our Council to specify
Annual Catch Limits in terms of landings only and then examine the
impacts of the unaccounted for bycatch mortality when stock assessments
are conducted. To help resolve part of the problem in the snapper
grouper fishery, NOAA Fisheries should increase the current 25% bycatch
logbook coverage to 100% logbook coverage. In the absence of a fishery
independent data program, 100% logbook coverage would greatly improve
the current 25% coverage. The Council cannot meet the Magnuson-Stevens
Act requirement to specify Annual Catch Limits to account for all
sources of mortality with the existing data programs.
5. Agency guidance on use of old or stale data.
Overall, there has been very little guidance from NOAA Fisheries
relative to use of ``old'' or ``stale``data. Generally, because of the
lack of data noted earlier, the Council is forced to use the
information that is available regardless of how old or stale it may be
considered. It is either that or nothing.
6. Is the precautionary approach combined with decreased funding and
depressed harvest levels impacting jobs and communities?
Most of the stock assessments in the South Atlantic must rely
largely on harvest data from the fishermen. These ``fisheries
dependent'' data can give an accurate representation of what is being
taken out of the water; however, they may not yield reliable
information on the status of the stock. Without reliable fisheries
independent and dependent data streams, true stock status cannot be
determined. This is the scenario the Council and Scientific and
Statistical Committee find themselves in many instances, dictating a
precautionary approach to management. This generally results in low
Allowable Biological Catch and Annual Catch Limits, ultimately
restricting harvest, not because the stock status is known to be in bad
shape, but because not enough information is available to make an
accurate assessment. Error on the side of conservation is the phrase
often used. We are already paying the price on stocks like red snapper,
black sea bass and Spanish mackerel for inadequate sampling in the past
that has led to the current precautionary management strategies.
A recent example of how the lack of adequate data resulted in
extremely negative impacts on commercial fishermen involves two minor
fish stocks, speckled hind and Warsaw grouper. Both stocks were
declared to be undergoing overfishing and overfished back in the early
1990's by NOAA Fisheries, based on annual trends in fishermen's catches
alone. At the time the Council took action to protect these species by
eliminating all directed harvest, however, some incidental catch was
allowed. No stock assessment has been completed on these stocks since
the initial determination. The only data available since the 1990's
have been derived from the very low incidental catches that have
occurred. The directed fishery for these species has been closed nearly
20 years. Without data and a new stock assessment, there is no way of
knowing whether the stocks have rebuilt, are rebuilding, or continue to
undergo overfishing and are overfished. Stock assessments have been
scheduled for these species; however, these assessments have been
postponed to deal with higher priority species such as red snapper,
black sea bass, etc.
The most recent revisions to the Act required the Councils to end
overfishing by December 31, 2010 for all stocks that are undergoing
overfishing. Without data to know whether or not overfishing had ended
for speckled hind and Warsaw grouper and if they were still overfished
or not, the Council's Scientific and Statistical Committee was required
to set Allowable Biological Catch so that no landings of these species
would be allowed. Subsequently, when setting the Annual Catch Limits,
the Council was obliged to ensure that harvest of these two species be
avoided. Fish that live at the depths inhabited by speckled hind and
Warsaw grouper are almost always dead when brought to the surface,
therefore fishing in areas where speckled hind and Warsaw grouper might
be caught had to be closed. Based on the information available, the
Council believed the only way to accomplish this was to close all
bottom fishing from a depth of 240 foot seaward. This action in effect
closed off more than half of the EEZ to bottom fishing, and resulted in
significant losses to commercial and recreational fishermen (primarily
fishing for blueline tilefish) and fishing dependent businesses. Due to
lack of information, the impact of this closure was much greater than
anticipated. The Council is just now completing an amendment that will
rectify the current situation by reopening the closed area, and
developing plans to implement other measures to protect speckled hind
and Warsaw grouper.
A specific example of how jobs can be affected when NOAA science is
lacking occurred in the Spanish mackerel fishery. In 2008, a Spanish
mackerel stock assessment was conducted. However, during the stock
assessment process review phase (the final peer review phase) the stock
assessment was rejected by the panel members due to too many
uncertainties in the biomass values from the assessment. That left
Spanish mackerel without a recent stock assessment, requiring the
Scientific and Statistical Committee to use the data poor control rule
to derive a precautionary Allowable Biological Catch. Consequently, the
Council's proposed Spanish mackerel Annual Catch Limit would be
expected to result in a reduction in ex-vessel revenues to commercial
fishers of approximately $680,000 due to a reduction in commercial
harvest and the accountability measure requirement that harvest,
possession, and sale of Spanish mackerel be prohibited when the
commercial quota is met. If compensating revenue is not obtained from
alternative species, these reduced revenues could result in the loss of
an estimated 17 harvester and 10 dealer/processor full-time equivalent
jobs.
7. Is the requirement to use the best available information becoming
an excuse to use old data rather than collect more data?
I do not believe NOAA Fisheries reliance on using the best
scientific information available is an excuse to use old data rather
than collect more data. The impediment, at least in the southeast
region, simply seems to be resources. Although recent budgets have
provided more funding for data collection in the southeast, funding
levels are still insufficient to resolve the lack of data needed for
management.
The Southeast Fisheries Science Center has shown a willingness to
collect more data, e.g. added logbook discards for both commercial
vessels and headboats, increased trip interview sampling, initiated a
fisheries independent survey, expanded the Marine Resources Monitoring,
Assessment, & Prediction Program (MARMAP) and the Southeast Area
Monitoring and Assessment Program (SEAMAP) and added new stock
assessment scientists. The problem is that all of these efforts still
fall short of meeting identified needs due to funding shortages.
8. Views on Marine Recreational Information Program, improving data
collection but perhaps falling short of providing info for in-
season adjustments, thus impacting planning by industry.
Concerns with recreational statistics provided through the old
Marine Recreational Fisheries Statistics Program (MRFSS) are well
documented by many sources and need not be repeated here. The Council
supports efforts underway to resolve recreational data collection
issues through the Marine Recreational Information Program (MRIP), and
the Council hopes that Marine Recreational Information Program will not
only reduce uncertainty in estimates and considerably improve the
timeliness of their availability, but also take advantage of current
technology to address fishermen's willingness to submit information.
Recreational data collection improvements through the development
of Marine Recreational Information Program are necessary to improve
management under the amended Act. Precision and reliability are bigger
concerns than timeliness in the South Atlantic, perhaps because many of
our stocks have suffered from high uncertainty in old Marine
Recreational Fisheries Statistics Program estimates. Whether the Marine
Recreational Information Program will fall short of providing
information to accommodate in-season adjustments remains to be seen.
However, when the program is implemented, it will be the timeliest data
on recreational catch and discard rates available to us.
In some cases the recreational allocation for some of the stocks
managed by the Council is very low. In the South Atlantic, the
recreational fishing sector Annual Catch Limits for snowy grouper was
523 fish per year under the rebuilding plan. Even under Marine
Recreational Information Program, NOAA Fisheries will not be able to
monitor the recreational catches in a timely manner. In 2010,
recreational anglers were estimated to have caught more than 1,500
snowy grouper. With Council required fishing sector paybacks
(accountability measures) for overfished stocks, this could result in
the recreational fishery for snowy grouper being closed for two years.
Let me summarize the main points in my testimony this afternoon.
First, the goal of the 2007 amendments to the Act to end overfishing is
an absolute necessity to recover stocks and provide additional
opportunities for commercial and recreational fishermen. Despite the
difficulty of the task at hand as illustrated by the South Atlantic red
snapper fishery closure, ending overfishing, is, without question, in
the best interest of the nation. But there is definitely a cost
associated with ending overfishing and many of the other requirements.
Data provided by NOAA Fisheries are currently insufficient for the
majority of the stocks we manage. In some instances, the Council taking
mandated management actions without the accurate and timely data needed
has impacted fishermen and fishing businesses, resulting in reduced
revenues and/or job losses. However, there have been improvements
during the last couple of years in a number of areas, such as
development of fisheries independent surveys, hiring more stock
assessment scientists and working with fishermen to collect scientific
data through cooperative research programs. There is still much
improvement needed. NOAA Fisheries must continue to improve fisheries
data collection that is essential for providing accurate and timely
stock assessments. Conducting a stock assessment for a species like red
snapper every five or six years is not acceptable. The Science Center
staff of stock assessment scientists needs to continue to be increased
in order to provide this information. Improving the data on which stock
assessments are based, both fishery dependent and fishery independent
data, is essential if we are to gain back the trust of the fishing
public. We cannot continue in the adversarial role that has been
created between the Council and fishermen as the result of our recent
management actions.
The Southeast Region of the U.S., including the South Atlantic,
Gulf of Mexico, and Caribbean, has not been funded at the level needed
to provide data and stock assessments on as timely a basis as is needed
for the three councils in this region to effectively and efficiently do
their job. The budgets of the Southeast Fisheries Science Center and
the Southeast Regional Office must be reviewed and increased as
necessary to provide timely stock assessments on which the councils
base management recommendations.
Mister Chairman, in closing I would like to again thank you and the
Subcommittee for allowing me to appear before you on behalf of the
South Atlantic Fishery Management Council. We appreciate you holding
this hearing and for your Subcommittee's interest in NOAA's fisheries
science and how the lack of necessary data to effectively manage is
impacting fishermen and fishing communities.
______
Mr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Harris. Next we have Ms.
Morris. You have five minutes, ma'am.
STATEMENT OF JULIE MORRIS, ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT FOR
ACADEMIC AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE PROVOST, NEW COLLEGE OF
FLORIDA, FORMER MEMBER, GULF OF MEXICO FISHERY MANAGEMENT
COUNCIL AND MEMBER OF THE SECRETARY'S MARINE FISH ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
Ms. Morris. Thank you, Chairman Fleming and Ranking Member
Sablan, for inviting me to speak to the Subcommittee this
afternoon. My name is Julie Morris. I live in Sarasota,
Florida. My testimony today is based on 18 years experience
with science-based fish and wildlife management. Most recently,
from 2001 to 2010, I served as a member of the Gulf of Mexico
Fishery Management Council, and I served terms as both vice-
chairman and chairman of that group.
Today I want to address uncertainty in fisheries
management, some of the challenges in recreational fisheries,
and some concluding thoughts about the future of fisheries
management. The reauthorized Magnuson-Stevens Act told the
Councils that we really do need to end overfishing, and that
science committees should play a key role.
It is common for science to include uncertainty. Let's
think for a moment about political polling, which is very
useful, even though the results are expressed with a certain
margin of error. Fishery science is similar, but more
complicated. And, of course, we can't pose questions to fish.
Fishery science is not perfect, and frequently it is contested.
But we know that it works.
Fishery scientists deal with uncertainty head-on. They
measure it. They account for it. They study how to reduce it.
On the other hand, policy folks are generally uncomfortable
with uncertainty. When the Gulf of Mexico Science Committee
estimates the harvest level, they also tell us how certain they
are, what the margin of error is that their estimate is
correct.
The logic is that we will be more certain about well-
studied, highly valued species. And because we are more
certain, we can fish closer to the highest sustainable level.
Other species are poorly understood or quirky. Their size and
age may not be correlated, or they may have strong year classes
at unpredictable intervals with weak reproduction in between.
For these species, the estimate of the tipping point between
sustainable and unsustainable fishing levels is foggier. And
like driving on a foggy road, we need to slow down a little,
turn on the lights, and fish more cautiously.
In the Council's new method, the science committee will use
standard stock assessment techniques to set acceptable catch
levels. In cases where we have little more than a record of
annual landings, and it is a little foggy, the science
committee will set catch limits at the average landings until
there is a signal that the stock is either plummeting or
growing by leaps and bounds. This is a reasonable approach, and
the science we have is sufficient.
We were given the flexibility to figure out how to keep
uncertainty in mind when we set acceptable biological catches.
We have worked on it for over three years, and the Council is
scheduled to adopt its new process in August. Council and
science committee members are reasonable people who don't want
to make things harder for fishermen. After all, the majority of
council members are in the fishery business.
At the same time, we know that fishing gets measurably
better once we end overfishing. MSA holds the Gulf Council's
feet to the fire on ending overfishing, and this will be good
for fish and fishermen over the long term. That said, more
data, especially fishery-independent data and observer data on
catch and bycatch would be tremendously helpful. We look to
Congress to provide funding for this, and we look to NOAA to
make effective use of additional funding.
Is precautionary fishery management leading to job losses?
I don't see it in the Gulf of Mexico. First, our management is
not very precautionary. Second, it has been a really tough
decade for fishery jobs in the Gulf of Mexico, for reasons that
have very little to do with fishery management. Fuel prices
jumped. We had intense competition from imported seafood.
Hurricanes wiped out our shoreside fishery infrastructure.
Finally, the Deepwater Horizon disaster closed fishing grounds,
contaminated some fisheries, and undermined the Gulf seafood
brand in the eyes of the public.
Before closing, I wanted to make a few comments about
recreational fishing. Recreational fishing is difficult to
manage in the Gulf of Mexico, especially when there are many
capable fishermen and too few fish. This is not the fishermen's
fault. They are committed conservationists. Since we can't
count and weigh every fish, we rely on surveys. The Marine
Recreational Information Program, which we call MRIP, will
improve our survey data. But we need to add new tools to our
management toolbox.
There are good models from hunting that we can adapt to
fishing. When greater than half the catch is recreational in
several key Gulf species, the need for better tools has become
acute.
In conclusion, policy and management decisions can't wait
until the science is perfectly clear because it never will be.
We push ahead and make timely decisions based on our
understanding of what will be best for both the fish and the
fishermen. The Magnuson Act is working and being applied in a
reasonable manner in the Gulf of Mexico. Let's allow it to
work.
Thank you, and I look forward to answering any questions
you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Morris follows:]
Statement of Julie Morris, Former Member of
Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council
Introduction
Thank you for the opportunity to speak to the Subcommittee on
Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans and Insular Affairs. My name is Julie
Morris. I reside in Sarasota Florida, and I work at New College of
Florida, a public honors college within the Florida State University
System. My title is Assistant Vice President for Academic Affairs, an
academic administrative position.
Since 1992, I have served in a series of decision-making positions
for science-based management of fish and wildlife. I have been
nominated/appointed to these positions by both Republican and
Democratic Governors. From 1992-1999, I served as a commissioner of the
Florida Game and Freshwater Fish Commission, Florida's Constitutional
agency for all wildlife and freshwater fish. In 1999, an amendment to
Florida's Constitution combined marine fisheries management with
freshwater and wildlife creating a new agency, the Florida Fish and
Wildlife Conservation Commission (FFWCC). I served as the first
Chairman of the FFWCC from 1999-2000. In 2001, I was appointed by the
Secretary of Commerce to be a member of the Gulf of Mexico Fishery
Management Council (GMFMC). I was reappointed twice, serving on the
Council until August of 2010.
Today's testimony is based on my 18-year experience in state and
federal management of fish and wildlife. As a layperson, I have worked
hard to understand fisheries and wildlife science. I've gained an
understanding of fisheries science, fishery economics, the applicable
law, and the process of management. Commissioners and Council Members
we are provided scientific and economic analyses. They also listen to a
wide range of public testimony. They integrate these both into
reasonable, fair, and equitable management measures for sustainable
fisheries.
In my testimony, I will make the case that the 2007 MSA amendments
have resulted in positive changes for fisheries management in the Gulf
of Mexico. More data would be a tremendous help and I support
Congressional efforts to increase funding for fisheries data and
assessment. That said, the GMFMC Scientific and Statistical Committee
(SSC) has developed a reasonable methodology that uses available data
to comply with the 2007 MSA amendments.
I do not believe that precautionary fisheries management has
resulted in a significant loss of fishery jobs in the Gulf of Mexico.
Fisheries jobs have been lost, but the primary drivers have been the
high cost of fuel, the great recession, the Deepwater Horizon disaster
(fishing closures, actual contamination, and the misguided public
perception that Gulf fish and shellfish are tainted), competition from
cheap imported seafood, hurricane damage to fisheries infrastructure,
and harmful algal blooms.
I am convinced that we need better tools and better data to manage
recreational fisheries in federal waters, especially in the Gulf of
Mexico where recreational catches equal or exceed commercial catches in
several key species.
The bedrock goal of MSA is to maintain sustainable harvests for the
long-term benefit of the nation. The 2007 amendments reinforce this
goal by strengthening the role of science in determining acceptable
biological catches, and ending the practice of fishing at unsustainable
levels. Once we end overfishing, rebuilt stocks will provide expanded
opportunities for economic activity based on sustainable fishing.
How have the 2007 MSA Amendments affected domestic fishery management?
The GMFMC's management plan to set overfishing levels and the
acceptable biological catch is scheduled for final adoption in August
2011. This culminates a three-year process, which included four public
scoping meetings, nine public hearings, and numerous Council and SSC
work sessions.
Management actions to end overfishing in four reef fish stocks were
already underway prior to the 2007 MSA amendments. Between 2008- 2010,
GMFMC adopted science-based catch limits and accountability measures
for four overfished stocks (gag grouper, gray triggerfish, greater
amberjack, and red snapper). As a result, overfishing has ended for
gray triggerfish and red snapper. In anticipation of the 2007 MSA
Amendments, the Council included accountability measures in these
management actions.
The 2007 MSA amendments direct the Councils to set catch limits
that do not exceed the advice of their SSC. This is an important change
that will prevent overfishing and maintain sustainable harvests over
the long term.
In response to the 2007 MSA Amendments, the GMFMC's Science and
Statistical Committee (SSC) developed a consistent methodology (called
the ABC Control Rule) to characterize the level of scientific
uncertainty in their calculations of Overfishing Level (OFL) and
Acceptable Biological Catch (ABC) for particular stocks. Estimating
uncertainty is a normal practice in fisheries science.
At the same time, the Council determined that they could accept
risk ranging from 10%-40% that the estimate of OFL was incorrect. For a
fast reproducing species, the Council can accept a 40% risk that the
OFL might be wrong. For a long-lived, slow to recover, and easily
depleted species the Council wants a smaller risk. The SSC uses this
risk range in their methodology to create a buffer between OFL and ABC.
Also in response to the 2007 MSA amendments, the Council added a
new process for considering management uncertainty when setting catch
limits. The new process will consider:
How frequently the catch limit has been exceeded in the
past 4 years
The precision of landings data
Whether in-season accountability measures are used.
Overfished and overfishing status of the stock.
The GMFMC undertook a review of all of its managed species. This
review led to a determination that about a third of GMFMC managed
stocks no longer needed federal management. Species primarily caught in
state waters will be managed by the states. Harvested stocks with
annual catches below 15,000 pounds will no longer be managed. This is a
useful streamlining of federal management.
Managed stocks have been organized into groups based on geographic
distribution, life history, and vulnerability to fishery. Some groups
include an indicator species, a species that has been addressed in a
stock assessment. If catch limits for the indicator species are
exceeded, there will be accountability measures for the whole group.
Other groups do not include an assessed species, and accountability
measures will kick in only when the catch limit for the whole group is
exceeded. One data-poor, minor species will not trigger a catch limit
and accountability measure for the whole group.
Is the data generated by NOAA adequate for fishery managers to comply
with these new provisions?
More data and more resources for stock assessments would be very
helpful. In the Gulf of Mexico, we have a great need for fisheries-
independent data to understand how stocks are changing independent of
the social and economic factors that affect harvests and landings. We
also need observers to improve our data on bycatch and dead discards. I
understand that Congress is considering adding funds for ocean-related
activities, including stock assessments. I wholeheartedly support
additional funds.
In addition to NOAA, fisheries data comes from many sources,
including state agencies, interstate commissions, universities, and
private entities. The scientific basis for fisheries management has
improved dramatically since I joined the GMFMC in 2001. We are gaining
more information about the life history and reproductive potential of
managed species. The models we use for stock assessments are constantly
improving.
Fisheries data and stock assessments are always contested,
especially when valuable, highly targeted species are involved. It is
very important that our stock assessments are subject to scientific
peer review and equally important that assessments include a full
description of assumptions and uncertainties. The 2007 MSA amendments
and the new GMFMC's ABC Control Rule reinforce these good practices.
In he plan scheduled for adoption this August, the SSC will have
the flexibility to determine acceptable biological catches using one of
three statistically sound methods in a tiered approach depending on
type of data available.
One method will be used when there is a standard
quantitative assessment that estimates MSY (OFL) and includes a
probability distribution around MSY (ABC) that reflects
uncertainty.
A second method will calculate MSY (OFL) and ABC based
on a data-poor assessment methodology that can provide a
quantitative measure of uncertainty
A third method will calculate OFL and ABC based on
landings history if no assessment is available. The SSC will
use its expert opinion and standard statistical techniques to
determine ABC at a level either above the mean observed
landings (if it is not necessary to constrain catches) or at or
below mean observed landings (if recent landings are likely
unsustainable). The Council determines how much risk it will
accept in setting ABC
What about NOAA guidance for using old or stale data?
Viewed in one way, data is not stale or old or misleading. Viewed
in another way, all data is out-dated as soon as it is collected, and
it is not possible to have completely current data.
At the outset of a stock assessment in the Gulf of Mexico,
scientists thoughtfully consider how best to use available data.
Available data is evaluated by the Southeast Data Assessment and Review
(SEDAR) process. Historic data are valuable for understanding long-term
trends and year-to-year variability. NOAA provides useful guidance for
translating data collected under earlier protocols into a form that is
comparable to data collected with current protocols. For the highly
targeted and valuable species in the Gulf, data is regularly updated.
There are always time delays between the collection of data and
management actions. It takes time to collect data, analyze data, run
data through assessment models, and conduct rigorous peer review of the
assessment results. Once an assessment is complete, the Council process
of amending a management plan takes 1-2 years, even longer if the
management action is controversial. This is a frustrating reality of
federal fisheries management.
Is the precautionary, risk-adverse approach combined with decreased
funding for fishery research and cooperative research resulting
in unnecessarily depressed harvest levels affecting economy and
jobs?
I do not believe that precautionary fisheries management has
resulted in a significant loss of fishery jobs in the Gulf of Mexico.
Many fisheries jobs have been lost, but the primary drivers have been
the high cost of fuel, the great recession, competition from cheap
imported seafood, hurricane damage to fisheries infrastructure, harmful
algal blooms and the Deepwater Horizon disaster (temporarily closed
fishing areas, actual contamination, lingering misguided perceptions
that Gulf seafood is tainted),
Furthermore, a GMFMC staff analysis compared the current method for
setting quota for grouper and tilefish with the method in the new
management plan. The new method results in slightly higher quotas for
these fisheries.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7648.001
The management actions that ended overfishing of Gulf red
snapper in 2008 were taken based on the MSA requirements and NOAA
guidance that existed prior to new risk-adverse approaches. Ending
overfishing in red snapper was not precautionary. It was consistent
with the long-standing MSA requirement for harvests to be sustainable.
A 2007 stock assessment indicated that unsustainable catches of red
snapper in the northern Gulf were preventing the depleted stock from
rebuilding. Red Snapper immediately started to rebuild once overfishing
ended, with allowable catches increasing from 5 million pounds in 2009
to 7.185 million pounds in 2011.
Does the MSA requirement for use of best available scientific
information in management decisions become an excuse for using
incomplete or old data in management decisions rather than
gathering new data?
In my experience, the requirement for use of best available
scientific information has not become an excuse to avoid gathering new
data.
There is a well-established legal standard that ``best available
scientific information'' is an acceptable basis for management. The use
of ``best available scientific information'' is essential for Councils
to fulfill their responsibility to make timely management decisions. At
times, fishermen oppose changes in management and urge the Council to
delay action until there is a new assessment or new update in hopes
that the science advice will change. This can be an additional source
of delay for scientifically defensible management actions, actions that
are necessary to reach sustainable harvests.
During the Council process, it is not uncommon for additional
analyses to be run with updated information to address questions that
come up in public testimony and committee deliberations.
What are my views on new recreational data collection program, to
provide better information for fishery managers, but not
providing data for
in-season management adjustments?
When stocks are fully recovered, annual catches will gain stability
and the year-to-year uncertainty of recreational fishing season length,
bag limits and size limits will be minimized.
Recreational fishermen are strong conservationists, interested in
the biology of the fish, and committed to increasing the health of the
fishery. They highly value the experience of catching and eating wild,
beautiful fish. It is not their fault that recreational fishing is
difficult to manage.
Our tools for managing recreational fishing fall short in several
ways. We need a management system that can respond quickly using timely
in-season data. We need a system in which recreational fishermen can
accurately report their catch and their discards and limit their
catches to acceptable levels. These shortcomings in our management of
recreational fishing have a significant negative impact on the health
of the Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery. It is a frustrating and
uncomfortable situation for both anglers and managers.
When a recreational fishery has the capacity to catch unsustainable
numbers of fish, the traditional tools of bag limits, size limits, and
open and closed seasons are not adequate to manage the fishery. In the
GMFMC, recreational harvest accounts for half or more of the catch in
three of our most valuable fisheries (red snapper, gag grouper, and
King mackerel).
We need to develop new management tools to increase accountability
and management certainty for recreational fishing. Potential tools to
explore (many drawn from recreational hunting models) include: fish
tags, lotteries, catch shares for charterboat and headboat operators,
specified catches that can be shared by members recreational fishing
clubs or a particular charterboat fleet, real time electronic reporting
of recreational catches, and improved estimation models and data
collection methods for recreational catch and effort. I believe MRIP
will greatly improve our understanding of the Charterboat and Headboat
recreational catches, and will take us closer to in-season management
measures in this sector of the recreational fishery.
Additional Comments
The new methodology developed by the GMFMC to determine the buffer
between overfishing level and the acceptable biological catch is
scientifically defensible and an improvement compared to current
practice. However, it is difficult for non-scientists to understand. In
the Council process, one of our goals is to help the affected public
understand why we take a particular management action. The ABC control
rule is a hard one to explain.
When the Council has very little data about a managed species, it
is hard for our science committee to know what the right catch limit
should be. In these situations, the GMFMC makes the reasonable choice
of allowing current catches to continue; until there is a signal that
something has changed in the fishery. Though reasonable, this approach
is not really precautionary. It is an open question whether the Council
process will be able to respond quickly to these signals.
______
Mr. Fleming. All right. Thank you, Ms. Morris. Next, Mr.
Cadrin. You have five minutes, sir.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN CADRIN, Ph.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR,
DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES OCEANOGRAPHY, SCHOOL FOR MARINE SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS DARTMOUTH, MEMBER,
SCIENCE AND STATISTICAL COMMITTEE, SOUTH ATLANTIC AND NEW
ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCILS
Dr. Cadrin. I thank the Members of the Subcommittee for the
invitation to testify. My name is Steven Cadrin. I am a
professor at the University of Massachusetts School for Marine
Science and Technology. I was asked to address how the 2007
amendment to the Magnuson-Stevens Act affects fishery
management; more specifically, whether the data generated by
NOAA are adequate for fishery managers to comply with the new
requirements, and if using outdated information is affecting
fishery-dependent jobs; second, if NOAA's reliance on using
best scientific information available is a convenient excuse
for defending outdated information; and finally, my views on
the adequacy of data collection programs.
My response to the Subcommittee is that current scientific
information is inadequate to meet NOAA's approach to
implementing the Act. The problem is twofold. There are major
deficiencies in the quality and frequency of stock assessments
and fishery statistics. And second, National Standard
guidelines for implementing the Act pose unrealistic demands on
the scientific system.
In the context of decreased budgets, scientific resources
need to be reprioritized. In addition, the national strategy
for fishery management needs to be reconsidered so that demands
on the scientific system are more suited to the current
scientific capacity, and performance of the management system
is more robust than the inherent uncertainties in fishery
science.
New requirements of the 2007 reauthorization act impose
substantially greater demands on the fishery science and
management system. My written testimony describes several
examples to demonstrate that scientific inadequacies negatively
affect fishing communities. National standard guidelines on the
catch limit mandate require frequent and accurate stock
assessments, comprehensive and real-time fishery monitoring, as
well as risk analysis for each fishery.
The Act mandates that fishery management be based on the
best scientific information available. Current practice
implements the best science mandate by adhering to official
peer review processes for each region. Some regional peer
review processes do not currently meet the other requirements
of the Act, such as frequent status determination and
specification of annual catch limits.
A more efficient system of stock assessment and peer review
is needed to increase scientific capacity. Scientific support
for catch limits also involves in-season fishery monitoring
that is timely enough to inform future catch limits and support
fishery-dependent business decisions. Some components of total
catch, such as commercial fishery discards and recreational
fishery catch, are not well estimated, and estimates are not
available in a timely fashion. Uncertainty and slow delivery of
catch statistics precludes in-season management or adaptive
fishing decisions to optimize catch allocations, incurring
considerable cost to fishing communities.
In the context of inadequate scientific information, there
are several potential solutions to help improve the scientific
capacity for supporting annual catch limits. Scientific
resources can be reprioritized to support more frequent and
accurate stock assessments, as well as more timely and accurate
fishery monitoring data. Peer review processes can be
streamlined using external expertise to solve scientific
problems.
NOAA's scientific capacity can be expanded and improved by
partnering with universities and research institutes. Each
regional scientific and statistical committee can be empowered
to help serve the necessary peer review role and help solve
scientific problems. The demands on fishery science can also be
reduced in several ways. Exemptions from annual catch limits
should be considered for those fisheries for which catch cannot
be reliably monitored.
The mixed-stock exemption from catch limits and
accountability measures should be considered for bycatch and
rebuilding stocks to avoid the wasteful and costly consequences
of applying those approaches to mixed stock fisheries. More
strategically, alternative management procedures should be
considered that take advantage of the best of fishery science,
rather than emphasizing the worst of it.
In reply to the Subcommittee's specific questions, I
conclude that the data generated by NOAA is inadequate for
fishery managers to comply with the new requirements of the Act
and associated National Standard guidelines, substantially and
negatively affecting fishery-dependent jobs. NOAA's reliance on
using best scientific information available is an inappropriate
justification for defending outdated information. And finally,
data collection programs are inadequate for providing in-season
catch information, negatively affecting fishery-dependent
business decisions and making fisheries accountable for
scientific uncertainty.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the rest of the Committee.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cadrin follows:]
Statement of Steven X. Cadrin, Ph.D., Associate Professor, University
of Massachusetts Dartmouth, School for Marine Science and Technology
I thank the Members of the Subcommittee for the invitation to
testify before you today. My name is Steven Cadrin. I am an Associate
Professor of Fisheries Oceanography at the University of Massachusetts
Dartmouth, School for Marine Science and Technology. I have over twenty
years of experience as a quantitative fisheries scientist with
expertise in fish stock assessment and fishery management. I am proud
to have been an employee of NOAA for the fifteen years before I started
my current position. Although I am not representing any organization,
my testimony draws on my experiences as chair of the New England
Fishery Management Council's Scientific and Statistical Committee from
2008 to 2011, a member of the South Atlantic Fishery Management
Council's Scientific and Statistical Committee and associated
interactions with Fishery Management Councils in all other coastal
regions of the U.S.
I was asked to address how the 2007 amendment to Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act affects domestic fishery
management, with a focus on the new role of Scientific and Statistical
Committees and the new requirement for annual catch limits to prevent
overfishing. More specifically, the Subcommittee requested my views on:
1) whether the data generated by NOAA is adequate for fishery
managers to comply with the new requirements, and in the
context of decreased funding, if the application of a
precautionary approach using outdated information is affecting
coastal economies and fishery-dependent jobs;
2) if NOAA's reliance on using ``best scientific information
available'' is a convenient excuse for defending outdated
information; and
3) the adequacy of data-collection programs, including
recreational fishery statistics, the inability to provide in-
season catch information, and the effect of uncertain catch
statistics on fishery-dependent business decisions.
1. Adequacy of Data Generated by NOAA
The current scientific information used to support fishery
management decisions is inadequate to meet the NOAA's approach to
implementing the Act. The problem is twofold: 1) there are major
deficiencies in the quality and frequency of stock assessments and
fishery statistics, and 2) National Standard Guidelines for
implementing the Act pose unrealistic demands on the scientific system.
In the context of decreased budgets, scientific resources need to be
reprioritized. In addition, the national strategy for fishery
management needs to be reconsidered so that demands on the scientific
system are more practically suited to the current scientific capacity
and performance of the management system is more robust to the inherent
uncertainties in fisheries science.
My view is supported by two recent reviews that were commissioned
by the National Marine Fisheries Service. A recent national review on
scientific institution building concluded that ``NMFS needs more
national scientific leadership, and better management, information
systems and organizational structures, to plan and implement national
programs'', and ``this problem has ramifications with respect to the
science based roots of the agency and science as the foundation for
policy and management'' (Sissenwine and Rothschild 2011). An
independent assessment of the fishery management system in New England
identified problems and challenges and formed recommendations including
``conduct a comprehensive analysis of all NMFS data systems to identify
areas that will improve data gathering, data management, data analysis
and data use'' (Touchstone Consulting Group 2011).
New requirements of the 2007 amendment to the Act impose
substantially greater demands on the fishery science and management
system. The current scientific capacity was more adequate for meeting
the requirements of the previous version of the National Standard
Guidelines which focused on status determination (i.e., relative stock
size, sustainability of harvest) and general management advice. Even
state-of-the-art fishery science cannot fully support the risk-based
catch limits with accountability measures suggested in the current
Guidelines.
I will describe several examples to demonstrate that the failure to
effectively adapt to new requirements negatively impacts fisheries,
fishery resources and the communities that depend on them. Although the
examples are primarily from New England, many of them exemplify similar
problems or potential problems in other regions. National Standard
Guidelines suggest that catch limits should be based on an estimate of
the catch associated with overfishing and uncertainty in the estimate
of the overfishing limit, or the catch that will allow rebuilding of
overfished stocks; and fisheries should be held accountable for
exceeding catch limits (NOAA 2009). Such implementation of the catch
limit mandate requires frequent and accurate stock assessments,
comprehensive and real-time fishery monitoring, as well as risk
analysis for each fishery. Although the Act establishes National
Standard 1 so that ``Conservation and management measures shall prevent
overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield
from each fishery for the United States fishing industry'',
deficiencies in the scientific basis of fishery management decisions
can result in either foregone yield or overfishing, both of which are
costly to fisheries and fishing communities.
As implemented in the National Standard Guidelines, specification
of annual catch limits requires frequent stock assessments and
projected catch over a short period (e.g., one to three years). Stock
assessment involves an update of the most recent fishery statistics and
resource surveys to evaluate stock status and provide a basis for catch
forecasts. Catch limits that are based on recent stock assessments and
short-term projections take advantage of the strengths of conventional
fishery science, in which catch forecasts are almost entirely based on
a synthesis of updated fishery and survey observations. Conversely,
catch limits based on longer-term predictions (e.g., greater than three
years) are based largely on assumed population dynamics rather than on
current data. Long-term predictions rely on the ability to predict
annual recruitment of young fish and their future vital rates, which is
one of the most challenging problems in fishery science.
Example 1--New England groundfish, our nation's oldest
commercial fishery and one of its most productive, serves as an
example of the inadequate frequency of stock assessments
provided by NOAA for fishery management decisions. NOAA
concluded that it did not have the capacity to provide annual
stock assessments for all northeast fisheries (Northeast
Fisheries Science Center 2009). The Northeast Regional
Coordinating Committee is in the process of revising its
assessment and peer review process, because the requirements of
the catch limit system far exceed NOAA's scientific capacity.
As a result of this deficiency in scientific resources, the
planned approach for specifying catch limits for the groundfish
fishery from 2012 to 2014 is medium-term catch forecasts, five
to seven years from the 2008 stock assessments. The New England
Fisheries Management Council's Scientific and Statistical
Committee advised NOAA and the Council that such medium-term
projections would not be an adequate basis for specifying catch
limits. The Council is now faced with the difficult task of
specifying effective catch limits based on outdated assessments
and unreliable catch projections, and the uncertainty will be
reflected in precautionary catch limits.
In addition to the need for stock assessments to be frequent,
accuracy is also required to determine appropriate catch limits. Only a
small portion of stock assessments can accurately project catch
associated with overfishing and its uncertainty, which is the technical
basis of the National Standard Guidelines for deriving annual catch
limits. Many assessments are data-poor, and are not informative enough
to reliably evaluate stock size, fishing mortality, maximum sustainable
yield reference points or catch projections to determine catch
associated with overfishing. National Standard Guidelines suggest that
Councils should be more precautionary in the face of such uncertainty,
leading to lower catch limits and potential economic impacts as a
result of scientific uncertainty. Despite the obvious deficiencies of
data-poor stock assessments, the National Standard Guidelines require
annual catch limits for all stocks, with few exceptions.
Example 2--The New England skate complex offers an example in
which fishery landings cannot be identified by species. Mixed-
species catch limits are required to meet separate-species
management objectives for ending overfishing and rebuilding
overfished stocks. In such data-poor situations, catch limits
are largely based on expert opinion, and their performance for
meeting fishery management objectives is unknown. Despite these
major uncertainties in the stock assessment of skates, the
fishery is accountable for overfishing, and fishing communities
are impacted from conservative catch limits in the face of
scientific uncertainty. The fishing industry has incurred
substantial costs in the form of lost jobs and income as a
result of inadequate scientific information. Precautionary
limits to the skate fishery caused 300 workers to be laid off
from seafood processors in New Bedford (Whiteside 2011).
Other stock assessments are more informative than those for data-
poor stocks, but still have substantial uncertainties that cannot be
quantified or used to determine catch limits. A troubling feature of
many stock assessments in each coastal region of the U.S. is the lack
of consistency from one stock assessment to the next. Retrospective
inconsistency is the change in perception of previous stock size or
fishing mortality when new data are added to the assessment. Managing a
fishery based on an assessment with retrospective inconsistency
involves setting an apparently appropriate catch that in retrospect
caused substantial overfishing or foregone yield.
Example 3--The fishery for Georges Bank yellowtail flounder,
one of the principle groundfish stocks off New England, is an
example of the frustrating and costly impact of retrospective
inconsistency. From 2006 to 2009, the fishery caught less than
the catch limit advised by the scientific process in each year.
However, the 2011 stock assessment indicates that those
apparently appropriate catches produced overfishing each year,
in some years more than five times the overfishing threshold
(Transboundary Resources Assessment Committee 2011). Despite
efforts to correct the stock assessment, the retrospective
problem continues to obfuscate perceptions of stock status and
obstruct attempts to manage the fishery or rebuild the
resource. After decades of overfishing, in the face of severe
restrictions to the fishery, the stock cannot rebuild within
the desired time frame, even with no fishery. Adequate
scientific information would have prevented these fishery
management failures.
The implications of uncertain, infrequent stock assessments and
inadequate fishery monitoring create potential economic impacts on
fishing communities. National Standard Guidelines suggest partitioning
scientific uncertainty from management uncertainty so that fisheries
are only accountable for the latter. However, that approach is only
successful for data-rich assessments that are frequently updated and
accurately quantify scientific uncertainty. The examples above
demonstrate that inaccurate stock assessments, infrequent updates and
unquantified uncertainties can hold fisheries accountable for
scientific uncertainty.
2. NOAA's Reliance on ``Best Scientific Information Available'' as an
Excuse for Inadequate Information
The Act mandates that fishery management be based on the ``best
scientific information available'', which is defined for application to
fisheries by the National Research Council (2004) and Sullivan et al.
(2006). Current practice and draft guidelines for National Standard 2
implement the ``best scientific information available'' mandate by
adhering to official peer review processes for each region. Some
regional peer review processes do not currently meet the other
requirements of the Act, such as frequent status determination and
specification of annual catch limits. The two aspects of stock
assessments required by the implementation of catch limits (greater
frequency and higher-quality) are competing needs that draw on the same
scientific resources. A more efficient system of stock assessment and
peer review is needed in all regions to increase the capacity of the
scientific system.
Although independent peer review is an essential element of
operational science, some regional peer review processes have produced
inadequate information for implementing the catch limit management
system, because it is not frequent enough and not reliable enough. Many
regional peer review processes are slow to respond to new information
and are generally unsuccessful for solving stock assessment problems.
Some regional peer review processes focus on a few stocks each year and
add a great deal of time to the fishery management system while adding
little scientific value. A more streamlined peer review process that
uses external scientific expertise to solve problems would be more
suited to the catch limit system than some of the regional peer review
processes.
Example 4--The stock assessments produced by the Northeast
Regional Stock Assessment Workshop in the last year illustrate
the need for a more effective and efficient peer review system.
The 51st Stock Assessment Workshop attempted to develop
analytical assessments for silver hake, red hake and offshore
hake (Northeast Fisheries Science Center 2010). Despite decades
of fishery monitoring and survey data as well as months of work
from dozens of scientists and support staff, the Workshop was
not successful in developing stock assessments for any of those
stocks that could adequately meet the requirements of the catch
limit system. The 52nd Stock Assessment Workshop was similarly
unsuccessful in developing an analytical assessment for Gulf of
Maine winter flounder, a critical stock in the New England
groundfish fishery. In each of these cases, the Council is
faced with the difficult task of specifying a catch limit based
on inadequate scientific information.
One provision of the Act offers a resource for efficient peer
review and creative problem solving but is currently under-utilized.
Each regional Fishery Management Council has established a Scientific
and Statistical Committee to help develop, evaluate, and peer review
scientific information for fishery management. Although catch limits
are bound by the Committees' recommendations, some regional offices of
NOAA and Councils insist on prioritizing the peer review process. The
scope of Scientific and Statistical Committee responsibilities are
often limited to applying results from the official peer review process
without deviation from accepted methods and approaches. The defense of
outdated science and problematic methods has precluded creative problem
solving or responsive decision making. Empowering Scientific and
Statistical Committees would improve the scientific basis for fishery
management while serving the role of checks and balances.
Example 5--Recent management decisions for the New England sea
scallop fishery provide an example of the limitations placed on
Scientific and Statistical Committees and the resistance to
deviate from the official peer review recommendations. In 2009,
the New England Scientific and Statistical Committee
recommended catch limits for sea scallops that were based on a
stochastic estimate of the overfishing definition. The
Northeast Regional Office of NMFS concluded that the Committee
did not have authority to revise the overfishing definition,
and catch limits should be based on the overfishing threshold
recommendation from the most recent official peer review.
Subsequent peer review of the sea scallop stock assessment by
the 50th Stock Assessment Workshop confirmed that the
stochastic estimate was the best scientific information
available (Northeast Fisheries Science Center 2010). The cost
of using outdated recommendations for managing the sea scallop
fishery was estimated to be over $60 million and 500 jobs
(Georgianna 2010).
3. Adequacy of Data Collection Programs
Beyond the need for frequent and accurate stock assessments,
scientific support for catch limits involves in-season fishery
monitoring that is timely enough to inform future catch limits and
support fishery-dependent business decisions. Several transitions to
electronic monitoring have improved the timely collection and reporting
of landings from commercial fisheries. However, other components of
total catch such as commercial fishery discards and recreational
fishery catch are not well estimated, and estimates are not available
in a timely fashion. Uncertainty and slow delivery of catch statistics
precludes in-season management or adaptive fishing decisions to
optimize catch allocations, incurring considerable costs to fisheries
and fishing communities.
Accountability for overfishing is being implemented in a way in
which fisheries `pay back' any catch that exceeds the annual catch
limit in the form a reduced catch limit in the subsequent year. Such an
implementation requires accurate in-season monitoring to allow
fisheries to manage their own catch and avoid accountability measures.
Therefore, in situations of slow or inaccurate monitoring, fisheries
are indirectly accountable for scientific uncertainty.
Example 6--Inadequate catch monitoring is demonstrated by
estimates of discards in New England. The Northeast Region has
adopted a Standardized Bycatch Reporting Method for commercial
discards that is based on data from at-sea observers (Wigley et
al. 2007). The stratification for observer sampling is stock
area and fleet, which is too coarse to efficiently estimate
discards, often inferring `phantom discards' (i.e., estimates
of discarded catch that are artifacts of the methodology rather
than a reflection of actual catch). Many groundfish sectors are
charged with discards against their allocation based on the
Standardized Bycatch Reporting Method, but the stock-wide
estimators assume that each vessel in the sector has the same
discard patterns. Some vessels have rare discards that have
been documented by NOAA observers and the NOAA study fleet, but
these vessels are charged the fleet-wide stock-wide discard
rate, and the sector is accountable for exceeding their catch
allocation, even if the overage is an artifact of an inaccurate
discard estimate. Furthermore, the Standardized Bycatch
Reporting Method removes any incentive for individual fishermen
to reduce bycatch.
The Standardized Bycatch Reporting Method for yellowtail
flounder bycatch in the scallop fishery is both slow and
biased. Estimates of yellowtail bycatch are not available on a
timely basis, and the annual estimate of bycatch is not
provided until months after the fishing year ends. The estimate
of yellowtail discards in the scallop fishery is biased,
because observers are more likely to sample southern New
England, where there are more yellowtail, than the Mid Atlantic
Bight, where there are few yellowtail. When the observer data
are used for a stock-wide, fleet-wide estimate of discards, the
estimate of discards is more influenced by the southern New
England bycatch rate. When the same observer data are
appropriately stratified by region, the estimate of yellowtail
discards decreases. The Standardized Bycatch Reporting Method
indicates that the scallop fishery substantially exceeded their
allocation of yellowtail in 2010, which they will be
accountable for in the future, but alternative stratifications
that recognize regional patterns indicate that there was no
overage or only a slight overage. This example demonstrates how
fisheries are accountable for scientific uncertainty.
Example 7--Recreational fishery statistics also demonstrate
slow delivery of uncertain catch estimates and how the catch
limit with accountability system implemented by the National
Standard Guidelines poses unrealistic demands on scientific
monitoring programs. For example, the recreational fishery has
contributed approximately 20% to 30% of the total catch of cod
in the Gulf of Maine over the last decade, and that portion is
reported to have increased substantially since the last stock
assessments. However, estimates of recreational catch are not
available for the analysis supporting 2012-2014 catch limits
for groundfish. Uncertainty in recreational fishery statistics
negatively effects catch limit monitoring as well as stock
assessments. Some components of catch are not being adequately
monitored to determine future catch limits, and fishery-
dependent businesses that are accountable for exceeding catch
limits cannot plan according to timely catch statistics.
Alternative management procedures (e.g., size limits, bag
limits, gear restrictions, time/area closures) would be more
suited to the properties of recreational fisheries and more
robust to the problems associated with monitoring catch from
recreational fisheries.
The fishery's accountability for scientific uncertainty is
particularly a problem for bycatch species and rebuilding stocks. The
catch limit system is most efficient when specific stocks can be
targeted or the stock-specific limits reflect the mix of stocks
available on the fishing grounds. When catch limits do not match the
multispecies availability, catch limits for one stock constrain the
ability of the fleet to catch the full allocation of healthy species.
Several aspects of scientific uncertainty exacerbate the mixed-stock
problem. When stock assessments underestimate stock size, catch limits
are lower than they should be, and fishermen have difficulty avoiding
the species that have artificially low catch limits. Furthermore, when
some stocks are rebuilding, their catch limits remain relatively low
while the stock rebuilds, increasing the challenge to avoid rebuilding
stocks while targeting other stocks. These problems are intensified
when accountability measures further reduce the catch limits on
rebuilding bycatch stocks, thereby increasing the mismatch between the
catch limit and the species mix on the fishing grounds. Therefore,
scientific uncertainty and catch limits with accountability prohibit
mixed-stock fisheries from harvesting their allocated catch limits and
form a wasteful management strategy with huge economic losses.
Example 8--The mixed-stock problem, intensified by scientific
uncertainties, severely limits the New England groundfish
fishery from landing its total multispecies allocation. For
example, southern New England winter flounder are behind
schedule in the agreed rebuilding plan largely because of
scientific uncertainties in the stock assessment, and only an
incidental bycatch is allowed. According to the National
Standard Guidelines, this restrictive approach to catch limits
needs to be maintained until the stock is completely rebuilt.
If rebuilding is successful, the challenge of avoiding winter
flounder will be exacerbated. Furthermore, if catch limits are
exceeded, the fishery will be held accountable in the form of
further reductions in catch limits of a rebuilding stock. This
example shows that scientific deficiencies for meeting the the
catch limit and accountability system implemented by National
Standard Guidelines impose substantial costs to the fishery. As
a result of the mixed-stock problem, the groundfish fishery
only caught 35% of the allocated catch in 2010, and employment
decreased by nearly 13,000 crew days from 2009 to 2010 (Kitts
et al. 2011).
National Standard Guidelines suggest that catch limits should be
based on each regional Fishery Management Council's desired risk
tolerance for overfishing. However, such risk management decisions
require evaluation of economic costs and benefits that are not
routinely provided by the scientific process. Although some economic
data are collected from fisheries, the information is not comprehensive
enough to evaluate costs and benefits of alternative catch limits, and
economic analyses are limited to impact statements that are completed
after management actions are decided. A broader approach to informing
risk tolerance would be management strategy evaluation, which has only
been applied to few U.S. fisheries in a cursory way. Ignoring economic
aspects of alternative catch limits poses unknown costs to fisheries.
Example 9--The first iteration of the national catch limit
system was implemented in 2010 and 2011, and catch limits have
been largely driven by scientist's estimates of limits and
recommended probability of overfishing, or expert judgment for
the many stocks that have data-poor or problematic assessments.
Implicit risk tolerance ranges from 10% to near-50% probability
of overfishing, but most catch limits are not based on explicit
risk decisions. More extensive risk management would include
cost-benefit analyses, in which multiple utilities (revenue,
profit, employment, etc.) and consequences of events (e.g.,
cost of overfishing, cost of triggering a rebuilding plan, cost
of foregone yield) would be considered in the evaluation of
risk tolerance. National Standard Guidelines need to be
expanded to include these important scientific analyses as a
routine aspect of deriving annual catch limits to help maximize
benefits, minimize costs and achieve optimum yield.
In the context of inadequate scientific information provided by
NOAA, there are several potential solutions to help improve the
scientific capacity for supporting annual catch limits. Solutions can
address both aspects of the problem: the adequacy of scientific
information and the implementation of the catch limit mandate.
1) Scientific resources can be reprioritized to support more
frequent and accurate stock assessments as well as more timely
and accurate fishery monitoring data.
2) Peer review processes can be streamlined, using external
expertise to solve scientific problems.
3) NOAA's scientific capacity can be expanded and improved by
partnering with universities and research institutes that have
the human resources and infrastructure to help bear the burden
of the new requirements of catch limits.
4) Each regional Scientific and Statistical Committee can be
empowered to help serve the necessary peer review role and more
importantly help solve some of the major scientific problems in
stock assessments.
The demands on fishery science can also be reduced in several ways.
1) Exemptions from annual catch limits should be considered
for stocks and fisheries for which catch cannot be reliably
monitored.
2) The mixed-stock exemption from catch limits and
accountability measures should be considered for bycatch and
rebuilding stocks to avoid the wasteful and costly consequences
of mixed-stock fisheries.
3) More strategically, alternative management procedures, such
as data-driven catch limits that are regularly reconsidered
through management strategy evaluation, should be considered
that take advantage of the best of fisheries science rather
than emphasizing the worst of it (e.g., Butterworth and Punt
1999).
In summary, I conclude that the scientific information provided by
NOAA is inadequate to meet the needs of the catch limit system as
currently implemented, and the inadequacy of science is costing jobs.
Most stock assessments are too infrequent and too inaccurate to derive
annual catch limits that avoid overfishing while allowing optimum
yield. Major components of total catch, such as commercial fishery
discards and recreational fishery catch, are imprecisely estimated and
not monitored in a timely way to support in-season management and
business decisions. Economic data and analyses are insufficient to
evaluate risk-based catch limits. In many cases, fisheries are
accountable for scientific inadequacy, with major costs to fishing
communities. The scientific information required to support the fishery
management system specified in the National Standard Guidelines is much
greater than NOAA's current scientific capacity.
In reply to the Subcommittee's specific questions, I conclude that:
1) The data generated by NOAA is inadequate for fishery
managers to comply with the new requirements of the Act and
associated National Standard Guidelines, substantially and
negatively affecting coastal economies and fishery-dependent
jobs;
2) NOAA's reliance on using ``best scientific information
available'' is an inappropriate justification for defending
outdated information and avoiding creative problem solving; and
3) Data-collection programs are inadequate for providing in-
season catch information, negatively affecting fishery-
dependent business decisions and making the fishery accountable
for scientific uncertainty.
References
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implementation of management procedures. ICES Journal of Marine
Science 56: 985-998.
Cuddy D. Herring fishery could catch a break. The Standard Times July
19 2011, New Bedford MA.
Georgianna, D. 2010. Short term economic impact of scallop framework
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2010.
Kitts A, Bing-Sawyer E, McPherson M, Olson J, Walden J. 2011. Interim
Report for Fishing Year 2010 on the Performance of the
Northeast Multispecies (Groundfish) Fishery (May 2010--January
2011). US Dept Commer, Northeast Fish Sci Cent Ref Doc. 11-07;
41 p. Available from: National Marine Fisheries Service, 166
Water Street, Woods Hole, MA 02543-1026, or online at http://
www.nefsc.noaa.gov/nefsc/publications/
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Scientific Information Available'' Standard in Fisheries
Management. The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.
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and Assessment Needs to Support the Development of Acceptable
Biological Catches (ABCs) and Annual Catch Limits (ACLs) for
Managed Fishery Resources in the Northeast Region. A White
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consultation with the NEFMC/MAFMC/NERO/NEFSC ACL Working Group,
October 2009.
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Commer, Northeast Fish Sci Cent Ref Doc. 10-17; 844 p.
Available from: National Marine Fisheries Service, 166 Water
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www.nefsc.noaa.gov/nefsc/publications/
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Assessment Workshop (51st SAW) Assessment Report. US Dept
Commer, Northeast Fish Sci Cent Ref Doc. 11-02; 856 p.
Available from: National Marine Fisheries Service, 166 Water
Street, Woods Hole, MA 02543-1026, or online at http://
www.nefsc.noaa.gov/nefsc/publications/
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National Standard Guidelines; Final Rule. Federal Register 74
(11): 3178-3213.
Sissenwine M and B Rothschild. 2011. Building Capacity of the NMFS
Science Enterprise. Unpublished report to NMFS, January 2011.
Sullivan PJ, JM Acheson, PL Angermeier, T Faast, J Flemma, CM Jones, EE
Knudsen, TJ Minello, DH Secor, R Wunderlich and BA Zanetell.
2006. Defining and implementing best available science for
fisheries and environmental science, policy, and management.
American Fisheries Society, Bethesda, Maryland, and Estuarine
Research Federation, Port Republic, Maryland.
Touchstone Consulting Group. 2011. A Review of the New England Fishery
Management Process. Report to NMFS April 2011
Transboundary Resources Assessment Committee. 2011. Georges Bank
Yellowtail Flounder. TRAC Status Report 2011/01.
Whiteside JF. 2011. Scientific and Statistical Committee's meeting
April 12, 2011. Memorandum to J. Pappalardo, New England
Fishery Management Council Chair, April 6, 2011.
Wigley SE, Rago PJ, Sosebee KA, Palka DL. 2007. The Analytic Component
to the Standardized Bycatch Reporting Methodology Omnibus
Amendment: Sampling Design, and Estimation of Precision and
Accuracy (2nd Edition). US Dep. Commer., Northeast Fish. Sci.
Cent. Ref. Doc. 07-09; 156 p.
______
Mr. Fleming. Well, I think you, Mr. Cadrin, and thank you,
panel, for your questions. At this point, we will begin Member
questions for our witnesses. To allow all Members to
participate and to ensure we can hear from all of our witnesses
today, Members are limited to five minutes for their questions.
However, if Members have additional questions, we can have more
than one round of questioning. I now recognize myself for five
minutes.
Let's see. Mr. Schwaab, on several questions you have said
that if stocks were rebuilt, it would increase the value of
fisheries by more than $2 billion annually. However, when your
agency requires significant, in some cases as many as three
separate calculations levels, that is, of precaution,
calculations levels of precaution, it significantly reduces the
economic activity. So you can see kind of the conundrum that we
get in there, is, yeah, when the fish levels get high, that
opens up the economic benefits. But at the same time, if we are
constantly underestimating the fish levels out there, then
obviously we are sort of hurting ourselves economically.
So is your calculation really relevant?
Mr. Schwaab. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would make a couple
of comments. First, the uncertainty that is factored into the
management decisions, the catch limits and the management
decisions that are made in the short term are designed to
reflect the uncertainty that is inherent either in the
scientific process, the ability to measure the number of fish
out there, or the uncertainty that is inherent in our ability
to execute the management approaches that are put in place.
I don't think that there is necessarily a disconnect
between factoring in that uncertainty in the short term in a
way that ensures that we reach the longer-term goals. So in
fact, by factoring in uncertainty at the appropriate level in
the short term, we increase the chance of achieving the longer-
term goal that I spoke to that yields the kind of benefits I
described.
Mr. Fleming. OK. If all of the economic restrictions to
fisheries caused by ESA restrictions were added up, how much do
you think it would total per year?
Mr. Schwaab. I have no idea, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Fleming. OK. All right. Let me go on to another
question, another angle here. Congress appropriated more than
$50 million each for four new fishery research vessels, and now
the Fiscal Year 2012 projections are only to be used for only
140 days at sea, previously 411 in Fiscal Year 2008. That means
each vessel will be tied up for 225 days each year.
Is it true that you maintain two separate crews for each
vessel?
Mr. Schwaab. Mr. Chairman, I am not familiar with the
operations of the individual vessel crews, so I can't speak to
the type of crew patterns that exist there. I can affirm
generally the days at sea numbers that you described under
current budget circumstances.
Mr. Fleming. Can you get those numbers back to us offline?
Mr. Schwaab. Yes, sir. I would be happy to.
Mr. Fleming. We would appreciate that. OK. Now, what do
both crews do when the ship sits idle--or assuming there are
two crews out there. What does both or at least one do when the
ship is idle?
Mr. Schwaab. I will be happy to provide that information
with you as well in that followup.
Mr. Fleming. OK. So you don't have any idea at this point
what they do when the ship is tied up.
Mr. Schwaab. No, sir. The actual operation of the ships is
conducted by a separate line within NOAA. And while there are
certainly people that would have that level of understanding, I
am not one of them.
Mr. Fleming. OK. How many fishery surveys are currently
being done using non-NOAA vessels?
Mr. Schwaab. Well, I can't give you an exact number. I can
tell you that there are quite a few fishery surveys that are
being done through contract vessels. There are fishery surveys
that are being done that feed into the assessment process
through indirectly a number of academic institutions as well,
and there are certainly fishery surveys that are underway
across State-level jurisdictions as well.
Mr. Fleming. Have you looked at the cost effectiveness of
using the contractors or outside vessels and crews versus ones
that you have in-house?
Mr. Schwaab. Yes, sir. In a number of cases we do because
of the cost effectiveness use either some of those other
mechanisms that I spoke to, contract vessels. We certainly
depend upon where data is produced by research institutions or
State-level investigations, and those data are available. They
are incorporated into the assessment process as appropriate.
Mr. Fleming. OK. All right. Thank you. My time is up. I
yield then to the Ranking Member, Mr. Sablan.
Mr. Sablan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Schwaab, recently there has been concern over how to manage the
so-called data-poor species. Is it possible to manage fisheries
in a sustainable manner without a full-scale stock assessment?
Can you provide us with some example of how your agency is
setting annual catch limits and accountability measures for
data-poor species? And could you elaborate on what happens with
some of the stocks when the accountability measures are
triggered?
Mr. Schwaab. I am sorry. I missed the last part.
Mr. Sablan. Could you elaborate on what happens with some
of these stocks when the accountability measures are triggered?
Mr. Schwaab. Yes. So the data-poor situation first. There
are, as you would note from at least our written testimony, a
number of data-poor situations that exist out there. The agency
and the Councils are challenged by those circumstances. We have
been for a number of years now working very closely with the
Councils' Scientific and Statistical Committees on an annual
basis on a number of key issues. One of those issues of focus
has been the issue of what to do with data-poor stocks.
There are a number of techniques that have been employed,
and they vary dramatically from stock to stock based upon the
amount of information that is available and what types of
circumstances might exist around that fishery. But, for
example, we have worked very closely with the Councils in the
setting of catch limits, for example, that are based on some
representation of recent history, historical landings, where
fishery-dependent data that would support that exists. There
are other techniques also that we might employ.
As to accountability measures, generally when catch limits
are set, and those catch limits are reached, again from fishery
to fishery, there are a number of techniques that might be
employed. Some of those are just very simply a closure of a
fishery. In others, there might be some anticipated further
restrictions in, for example, recreational fisheries, seasons,
or krill limits or bag limits. There are any number of
accountability measures that might be employed as catch limits
are approached or reached.
Mr. Sablan. All right. And we may get back to that, but I
have another question, Mr. Schwaab. We are on the verge of a
major accomplishment here, I think, setting catch limits and
accountability measures for all Federally managed stocks. Will
these management measures prevent overfishing and avoid the
overfishing problem that has plagued our domestic fisheries for
decades, costing major losses in jobs and revenues?
Mr. Schwaab. Mr. Sablan, I think you are exactly right. By
reaching the full potential of the 2006 reauthorization, at the
end of this year--at the end of last year, for stocks that were
undergoing overfishing and at the end of 2011 for all other
Federally managed species the Councils will have put in place
catch limits and accountability measures that will ensure
sustainable fishing, and in the cases where rebuilding is
required, an appropriate rebuilding trajectory.
This will, by every estimation, lead to much higher levels
of productivity on a more sustainable basis across domestic
fisheries over time.
Mr. Sablan. All right. Thank you, Mr. Schwaab. Ms. Morris,
in your written testimony you mentioned a few new management
tools to improve accountability on the recreational sector. Can
you expand on a few of those?
Ms. Morris. Well, we should definitely be taking advantage
of everybody's electronics for individual recreational
fisherman to be able to timely report their catches. And, you
know, there is an issue with verification of that, but I think
that is one area where we can make tremendous progress.
I think with the charter boat and head boat section of the
recreational fishery, they are sort of coming together and
organizing and wanting to come up with their own mechanisms
using e-log books and weighing their catch, counting their
catch, reporting their catch very accurately. I think with the
MRIP surveys, we will start to get a much better sense about
accountability in that fishery.
And then if you look at models from hunting, there are
tags, lotteries, lots of different fertile ideas that we can
adapt from hunting, potentially for recreational fishing.
Mr. Sablan. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Fleming. The gentleman yields back his time. Next up we
have Mr. Duncan from South Carolina.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Up until being elected
to the U.S. Congress, I served as the chairman of the
Agriculture and Natural Resources and Environmental Affairs
Committee in the South Carolina House of Representatives, and
had a lot of opportunity to speak with fishermen. And let me
just say I am an avid fisherman myself. I enjoy going offshore,
enjoy inshore. Living two and a half hours from the coast, it
is a little difficult, more difficult for me than maybe the
gentleman sitting to my right, to get on a boat and go out and
catch red snapper or grouper or even an occasional sailfish off
the coast.
But I do have a lot of friends that do it on a regular
basis, and I talk with a lot of the captains and others. So in
the spring of last year, 2010, I chimed in as the chairman of
that committee against the closure of the South Atlantic for
red snapper, and that is the issue that I have on my mind today
because talking with the captains and looking at the SEDAR 15
and SEDAR 24 data, and trying to extrapolate from that where
the commonsense was used in the data entry in coming up with
some of the original baseline numbers--and I have to say that
it appears to me that you have no idea how many fish are out
there, because you are relying on a computer model that has a
flawed baseline.
And so I would suggest that before we close the fishery in
the South Atlantic, that we would do more to get out to the
docks and to build the relationships with the fishing boat
captains, get on their boats as observers. I am not talking
about just the head boats that are going out 30 miles. I am
talking about the guys that are going out farther than that and
fishing the reefs all down along the coast, not just off the
coast of South Carolina, and collect the real data, and then
use the 300 days at sea in the Atlantic area--I lost that
chart, but to do the long lines, not just in the, you know, 50,
75, 100 feet depths, but get out to 200, get out to 250, get
out to 300 feet deep along the coast where the snapper are and
really determine what is there as backup to what you are
hearing from the head boat captains and the party boat captains
and the guys that are out there doing it whose livelihoods are
dependent upon days at sea taking sports out there to fish.
And I can tell you, I am going to let Mr. Southerland talk
about some data that was given to us that shows that the
conclusions of only 500-and-something-thousand fish supposedly
remaining in the South Atlantic, and if you take the actual
catch data from the captains, there is no way, no way, that it
adds up.
And so I will use--Mr. Harris, you said April 2010 as chair
of the South Atlantic Council you wrote to Secretary Locke and
said that fisheries management in the South Atlantic suffers
from a chronic yet well documented lack of basic data, which
hampers scientists' ability to evaluate exploited population
and a manager's ability to develop and ensure accountability
with management measures, and this lack of data adds
uncertainty at all levels of scientific and management process.
So my question to you in just a second is do you still feel
this is true because I am comparing this to, Mr. Chairman, the
data that was used by the International Panel on Climate Change
to come to a conclusion within the United Nations, fabricating
data or using some sort of preconceived idea of what the
baseline should be, and then extrapolating an end result.
An example of the fishery data that is used in my district,
or excuse me, in my State, the Catawba River, they are closing
or holding up a permit for a dam that generates power on the
Catawba River because there might be a shortnose sturgeon that
hadn't been seen in that river system in over 70 years, because
nobody has gone out there to look for it. But yet it might be
there, so we are not going to allow the power process to go
forward.
And so, Mr. Harris, do you still stand by that statement?
Mr. Harris. Yes, Congressman, I do. And I agree with your
statement that we should go out and collect more data using the
fishing public to add to the data that we already have. We have
a good stock assessment process in the South Atlantic, however.
And I will stand by that stock assessment process. It is not
great, but it is the best we have had in a long, long time. We
have a data workshop, an assessment workshop, and then we have
a panel of independent experts that come in and review the
results of those workshops and determine whether those data
should be used--whether the stock assessment should be used for
management or not.
And you heard me say in the case of Spanish mackerel, they
rejected it. And so we don't have a current stock assessment
for Spanish mackerel because the independent experts rejected
the stock assessment. We have to have more stock assessments.
We have to have more data. We have to use the fishermen to help
us collect those data. We have to do it throughout the entire
range of the fishery in all depths. And once we can do that,
then I think we can feel a lot better about the stock
assessments that we have today. But we do have a good process
in the South Atlantic.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Fleming. The gentleman yields back. Next up is Mr.
Runyan. You have five minutes, sir.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Schwaab, for the
best decade, the Atlantic monkfish industry has been extremely
important in New Jersey and several other States on the East
Coast, and is valued at over $380 million between 1995 and
2004, according to your agency's figures. But despite the value
of the fishery, the species is still considered data-poor. It
has been a struggle to get your agency to spend a million and a
half dollars every three years to conduct a monkfish-specific
survey, yet you have spent $15 million in the past seven years
on Atlantic sturgeon research, for which you have never
generated a stock assessment. We are not considering the Hudson
River one a true stock assessment, for which there is no
sturgeon.
We now face a situation where precautionary measures to
protect sturgeon under the Endangered Species Act may harm the
monkfish fishery and kill jobs and revenues in our coastal
communities. Can you please justify the priorities and how to
make sense for the scientific management and socioeconomic
perspectives?
Mr. Schwaab. Thank you, Mr. Runyan. While I can't verify as
I sit here the numbers that you just described, I don't have
any reason to doubt them either. We have responsibilities under
fisheries management. We have responsibilities under Endangered
Species Act implementation. We have very specific requirements
under the Endangered Species Act to investigate species status,
particularly in response to listing requests.
In the case of sturgeon that you described, that is exactly
the process that we are in right now, conducting a listing
investigation in response to a status request, a listing
request.
Mr. Runyan. But what about the differential? You obviously
have the monkfish that are a huge driver of the economy there,
and you are putting a lot of money into something that isn't.
Mr. Schwaab. Again, the ways in which funds are allocated,
we obviously allocate science fisheries management and research
money across a wide variety of fisheries, of stocks. In the
same way, we allocate Endangered Species funding across a wide
variety of stocks that have either been proposed for or are
already deemed to be appropriately listed.
You know, as to the apparent discrepancy that arises there,
I can't really speak to them necessarily as an either/or
situation there. They are responsibilities that we share and
have to divide in the context of our statutory requirements.
Mr. Runyan. But it almost seems like it is defying common
sense to where there is a fishery there that has a huge
revenue--your office has admitted that--and the data is not
there to allow something like that to continue to allow the
industry to thrive. That is part of the reason why we are here
frustrated.
I mean, and it also carries over into other things. You
have instances where you have snapper and sea bass, where they
are not necessarily being overfished, but they are being taken
out too quickly. There is no flexibility within this. You are
just going to shut it down and walk away from it, not all
instances, but certain instances. And this is where--and I
think Mr. Frank kind of commented on it in the first panel. I
don't think we are taking a commonsense approach to this. We
are just saying yes or no, and again we are doing it all with
bad data.
It is frustrating, and it is frustrating to me, let alone
the fishermen I interact with all the time, that they just
don't get it. I don't even think you can respond to it because
it is frankly frustrating. And obviously, the data is not there
to back any of this up either way. And I think that is the
frustrating part because as I said in the first question, we
have a lot of money committed to this with no results coming
out of it.
Mr. Schwaab. I would just comment, sir, that we are
certainly not doing it all with bad data. There are significant
good data in these decisions. Are there stocks where we would
like to have more data? Absolutely. Are there places where
having more data would allow us to reduce some of the
uncertainty buffers? Absolutely. But there are also many
circumstances where good data has contributed to ending
overfishing to rebuilding fisheries, and to creating more
sustainable opportunity for both commercial and recreational
fisherman.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you. My time has expired. I yield back.
Mr. Fleming. The gentleman from New Jersey yields back.
Next, the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
the panel members for joining us. I am going to begin with Mr.
Schwaab, and this is a simple yes or no answer. Is NMFS going
to have completed stock assessments for all 528 of the stocks
under Federal jurisdiction by the end of this year, and within
six months, as required under the 2007 Magnuson amendments,
before you put in place annual catch limits?
Mr. Schwaab. No, sir.
Mr. Wittman. OK. All right. How then are you going to deal
with the 400 species that you don't have stock assessments for,
but you have to put in place an annual catch limit?
Mr. Schwaab. Through a variety of proxies that depend in
some cases on catch histories, in other cases on other sources
of data.
Mr. Wittman. Let me ask this then. I want to talk about a
specific stock. And it is my understanding that the South
Atlantic Fisheries Management Council is going to drop 39 of
the 73 species from their snapper/grouper fishery management
unit, effectively removing them from Federal jurisdiction. Is
removing fish species from any and all Federal management one
of these alternative approaches? And is NOAA going to be forced
to take these approaches because of the impending ACL deadline?
Mr. Schwaab. So there is already, Mr. Wittman, a process
for an ecosystem component species, which is one that is not
generally retained in the fishing process, and those ecosystem
component species can be retained within the auspices of a
fishery management plan. As to taking species that might be
generally retained, thereby not falling within that definition,
and moving them outside of the management plan for the purposes
of meeting the requirement, it is not something that we would
favor.
Mr. Wittman. OK. Are the Councils, though, being forced to
remove these species outside of management plans because of
these ACL time constraints?
Mr. Schwaab. Not to my knowledge, sir. Some of the Council
representatives might have a view to offer.
Mr. Wittman. Mr. Harris?
Mr. Harris. What we are doing is looking at all of the
species in the snapper/grouper complex and determining how much
of that catch occurs in State waters as opposed to Federal
waters. And we have a variety of options that are on the table
right now, and we will come to a conclusion at our August
meeting with respect to those. But if you have a species, for
example, that only 10,000 pounds are caught in Federal waters,
does it make sense to go through this involved process of
setting annual catch limits for that species?
And that is what the Council is debating right now. And we
haven't come to a conclusion yet, but we have several options,
20,000 pounds, 50,000 pounds, 5,000 pounds. If so much of the
catch comes from State waters, perhaps it is more appropriate
for the State to manage those species rather than the Council.
Mr. Wittman. OK. Thank you. Mr. Schwaab, I want to read
back to you one of your comments. You said one of the greatest
challenges is in the data-poor fisheries, where assessments are
not yet possible. Here the National Marine Fisheries Service is
working on alternative approaches that provide preliminary
determination of catch levels that will prevent overfishing.
Can you let us know, what are some of these alternative
approaches that you are working on to address these data-poor
stocks, and can you tell us a little bit about how you are able
to impose scientifically legitimate catch limits without
adequate assessments?
Mr. Schwaab. Yes, sir, Mr. Wittman. One example would be in
a case where you have a stock that has sustainably produced or
consistently produced at a particular level over a period of
time, and you have some fishery-dependent reported data that
can in fact confirm that level of productivity over a period of
time. You can make some assumptions then about the ability of
that stock to continue to sustain that level of production and
set catch limits accordingly going forward.
Mr. Wittman. You talked about the need for resources to
evaluate these stocks, and that that was a limiting factor. Are
there alternative approaches that NMFS is considering that
would be more cost effective, especially since we are talking
about such a large number, in what you are talking about within
a finite realm of resources?
Mr. Schwaab. Yes, sir. We spoke to some already in, for
example, different platforms, use of contract vessels,
relationships with academic institutions and the like. There
are also new technologies that we are exploring, both to
increase or to reduce cost, but in some cases to increase
accuracy around certain species like reef fish that might be
less appropriately surveyed through some of the traditional
fishery-independent survey methods that have been in use.
So there are any number of things from alternative
platforms to new technologies to new modeling approaches that
might be appropriate to reduce costs and continue to provide
the data we need.
Mr. Wittman. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Fleming. The gentleman yields back. And I know the
gentleman from Florida has an itchy trigger finger, Mr.
Southerland. So we will give him five minutes as well.
Mr. Southerland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all
of the individuals here today. Than you for your time and
testifying today.
Ms. Morris, I want to ask you a question. I am from Panama
City, Florida, live on the Gulf. I want to ask you, you are
obviously familiar with the Gulf. Do you feel the level of
actual survey data provided to the Gulf Council is adequate for
management purposes?
Ms. Morris. For the well-studied species and the most
highly valued species, I think the science is getting better
all the time. I think it is sufficient, and so my answer would
be yes. For the lesser known species, the species that aren't
as highly valued, aren't as highly targeted, it would be great
to have a lot more data. And we really do need more fishery-
independent data. We need more observer data. It would be
lovely to have the kind of observer data that they have in the
North Pacific for our fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico. It would
be very good to have more resources for data.
Mr. Southerland. Do you agree that if the level of data
provided to the Council increased, the likelihood of higher
harvest levels would also increase? Or do you think they would
decrease?
Ms. Morris. Well, you know, I think the logic of the MSA
was that with better science we could fish closer to the
highest sustainable levels. And I think that is true. I have
heard some of the recreational fishermen and charter boat
fishermen say that if we had real data on how much is being
caught in the recreational fishery, it would be more than we
are estimating is caught now. And that would present its own
issues and problems.
So sometimes more data will lead to new challenges, new
management challenges, new policy decisions.
Mr. Southerland. Let me ask you, you stated here today that
you had too many fishermen and too few fish. You actually said
that today, so that kind of stuck. So should we continue to
decrease the season for red snapper as well as the catch
limits, based on your stated comment that we have too many
fishermen and too few fish?
Ms. Morris. Just to clarify what I said is that when we
have a fishery with lots of capable fishermen and too few fish
for them all to catch their bag limits, we have a very
difficult recreational fishery management situation.
Mr. Southerland. OK.
Ms. Morris. And so if we have--I am sorry. Go ahead.
Mr. Southerland. But are we in that situation now with red
snapper?
Ms. Morris. Fortunately, the red snapper catches are
increasing every year. As the stock begins to rebuild, it is
very cruel and counterintuitive that we have to continue to
have a short season because the average weight of each fish
that is caught by the recreational fishermen is greater. And so
when you count the pounds, we are allowing greater pounds of
catch. But that is creating a shorter season, and that is one
of the reasons that I think we really do need to think outside
the box to get additional tools for managing recreational
fisheries.
Mr. Southerland. One of the things that--you know, we have
obviously fishermen in Florida that are absolutely dying. They
are losing everything they had. You alluded to the storms. You
alluded to Deepwater Horizon. You alluded to a lot of things.
And yet we are seeing evidence, great evidence, in these
pictures that we are showing around--those are my three
siblings, Tim, Suzanne, and Shane. Those are our children, the
next generation. You know, we have been out four times this
year, catch fish similar to that in about an hour and a half,
back to the hill in time to mow the grass, wash the cars,
actually put snapper on the grill.
And so instead of listening to people that seem to want to
shrink the seasons, and they want to blow smoke--and you
haven't done that necessarily in your testifying today. But
please believe me, there are plenty who blow smoke and want to
convince us that there are no fish in the Gulf of Mexico and
want to continue to put pressure, in spite of pictures like
this--and this is a weekly occurrence in our family. It is also
family time, if you haven't noticed that. And so it is so
aggravating to hear people come and testify before Congress
blowing smoke that are not based--they don't have good data.
They don't have good science. And yet we find that NOAA can
have these partnerships with private individuals to get better
data, and yet oftentimes we see shrinking budgets in those
areas by choice.
And so, you know, I put this up there because I want people
to know that we are catching big fish, OK? Now, if we are
catching big fish, and the fisheries are healthy, regarding
snapper in the Gulf and other species, then it is only right
and just that the rules by which we oversee these fisheries
would be loosened a little bit because we are in Florida at
historic unemployment numbers. The economy is woeful. And yet I
feel that the boot of government is continuing to press down on
those that make their living fishing.
And so to have fish like these, OK--and in your words, you
said you had too few fish, OK? I think these pictures beg to
differ with that statement. And again, I didn't know any other
way to do this, Mr. Chairman, than to actually bring some real
data, OK? And so the only thing that I hate is that I am not in
those pictures. But I didn't want to show you the ones that I
was in.
But so, I mean, it is hard. And what I am trying to do is
make an argument for every day citizen, OK, that is working
hard all week to try to go offshore and fish, and the data that
we see is that the fishery in red snapper is healthy. The
numbers are large. The fish are healthy, and it just is
aggravating. So I guess I didn't really ask you a whole lot of
questions. You answered the questions I did ask you, and I am
over my time. So, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. I would love
these pictures to be entered into the record.
Mr. Fleming. Yes.
Mr. Southerland. This would thrill my family.
Mr. Fleming. Without objection.
[NOTE: The pictures have been retained in the Committee's
official files.]
Mr. Southerland. And if you would like us to, I would say,
you know, I would love to bring some up because we can fry
those up with some cheese grits, some hush puppies, and we will
all enjoy.
Mr. Fleming. Well, based on the size of the fish, from my
observation, I would like to see the one that got away. That
must have been really large.
Mr. Southerland. They are big. They are large. Thank you.
Mr. Fleming. All right. The gentleman yields. Next up is
Mr. Landry.
Mr. Landry. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just walked in
here, and I will be brief. I too share my distinguished
colleague from Florida's regret in that I am not in that
picture as well. I will tell you that I also echo his concern
in that I can remember when I was young going out and doing
snapper fishing, and it was everything we could to try to get
the bait below the trigger fish before--so we could get down to
some snapper. And that is not the case anymore. The case is I
think the snapper have eaten all the trigger fish because I can
tell you that the guys that I am talking to who are fishing out
there in the Gulf of Mexico this year, as a matter of fact--and
I note that this is a year after Macondo are catching record-
sized fish. And they too are concerned that we are not being
generous enough. After we have been restrictive, I think the
question is how do we find a balance. It seems like we swing
from one end all the way to the other. And I am concerned about
the guys out there who make a living catching this fish. And I
just want you all to use sound scientific data.
And I can tell you that probably the best scientific data
you can find is on the other end of a rod. So I would just like
to echo his concerns as well and let you know that not only in
Florida are they doing that, but in Louisiana they are having
abundant catches. And I think that it is for two reasons. One,
I think we have an abundance of snapper, and two, we have great
structure. That structure comes in the form of oil and gas
structure off the coast of Louisiana.
So with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Fleming. OK. The gentleman from Louisiana yields back.
We have completed the first round of questions, and the panel
has indicated interest to ask a second round. And if you are
open to it, we will be happy to launch into it. With that, I
will yield to myself.
Let's see. Mr. Cadrin, you indicated that you argue that
the current level of scientific information is not available to
meet the National Standard 1 guidelines. Do you believe it is
statutory language or the agency's interpretation of that
statute that is causing the problem?
Dr. Cadrin. Well, as I noted in both my written and oral
testimonies, the problem is twofold. There are some
inadequacies of science for any fishery management system. But
those inadequacies are exacerbated by the National Standard
guidelines and the way that the annual catch limit and
accountability measures system is being implemented.
In some ways, we are taking the worst of fishery science
and focusing on that. Most of our catch limits are based on
short- to medium-term projections, and looking forward is
always more difficult than looking back. In some ways, there
would be alternatives that could take advantage of the
strengths of fishery science. By shoehorning all of our stocks
in fisheries into a catch limit and accountability system, it
has disadvantages, and in some cases are wasteful.
So the problem is twofold, with scientific inadequacies
exacerbated by the way the Act is being implemented.
Mr. Fleming. OK. And I apologize, Dr. Cadrin. Excuse me for
calling you Mister. But I am not sure if I am clear on your
answer because the specific question is do you believe that it
is the statutory language or the agency's interpretation. It is
kind of a yes or no or A versus B question.
Dr. Cadrin. I would have to say it is the interpretation
because if exceptions to the annual catch limit mandate were
allowed, it would relieve many of these frustrations.
Mr. Fleming. OK. Thank you. Another question for you. How
do time requirements of NEPA hinder the SSCs from getting
timely data or restrict timely management decisions?
Dr. Cadrin. NEPA is one constraint to the timeliness of the
system and the decision making. However, there are ways of
working within that system to have default catch limits that
can be modified by current scientific information so that the
NEPA process goes forward with a default catch limit that gets
modified with subsequent information.
So I agree that is a major constraint, but one that can be
dealt with in adaptive ways.
Mr. Fleming. OK. All right. That completes my questioning,
so I will yield back to the gentleman, Mr. Sablan.
Mr. Sablan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Schwaab,
how do investments in stock assessments translate into greater
fishing opportunities, more economic benefits and reduced risk
of overfishing?
Mr. Schwaab. Thank you, Mr. Sablan. The most direct way is
in reducing these precautionary buffers. So we have
requirements to end overfishing, to rebuild stocks in the cases
where rebuilding is required, and we have some responsibility
to achieve those goals with reasonable certainty given the
science available. So that leads to where there is less precise
or accurate science greater uncertainty, therefore buffers that
are essentially left uncaught. Increased science allows those
buffers to shrink in size, thereby allowing the greater harvest
potential closer to the maximum yield to be accomplished in
that individual's fishery.
There are also obviously issues relating to the ability to
account for bycatch and other factors that change over time
that have to be accounted for that allow us to manage with more
science on a more higher level and more sustainable basis.
Mr. Sablan. All right. And what is your agency's plan for
integrating the technological innovations in fisheries
monitoring and data collection?
Mr. Schwaab. So we actually have a team that is looking
specifically at some technological innovations and new
applications. We dedicate a portion of our research funding
each year to both direct in-house investigations of alternative
techniques, as well as to provide some outside funding to
support research institution endeavors in support of new
technologies or new applications.
Mr. Sablan. All right. Thank you. Ms. Morris, I have
several questions for you, if I may. Some of the panelists have
referred to data as stale. And do you agree with this
characterization of data, or do you believe that this data can
still inform the management process?
Ms. Morris. Well, so stale is sort of a negative way to
cast data.
Mr. Sablan. Yeah. When you talk stale fish, it is not good.
Ms. Morris. Yeah, right. So data is data. And historic data
is really valuable for figuring out the trends in the fishery
and the variability in the fishery. And so, you know, we do
have annual catch data and landings for just about all of the
species that we manage. And so I don't think it is really a
matter of data being old because old data is valuable to
establish those trends. I think we just want data that gives us
more--different kind of data that gives us more insight into
what is actually going on with the fish. And that is what is
missing.
So there have been recent examples in the Gulf of Mexico
where data that was collected under previous protocols and then
new data is collected under newer protocols. NOAA gives us
guidance about how to go back and translate the old data in a
way that it can be compared with the new data and create a
history that makes sense.
Mr. Sablan. And you were just talking about the Gulf of
Mexico Council?
Ms. Morris. Yes.
Mr. Sablan. So we are also hearing how the lack of data is
causing a decrease in annual catch fish in fisheries. But you
stated--you just said that the Gulf Council allows current
catches to continue in situations where data is limited. Can
you explain this discrepancy?
Ms. Morris. Well, so Eric was talking about some of the
strategies that the science committees use when they have
species without much data. So one of the ways that the Gulf SEC
is planning to handle that is if they have only landings and a
record of landing for a species, they are going to sort of take
the average catch over time and set the catch limit at that
level, which seems like a pretty reasonable thing to do. And
then if there is some indication in the future that either
landings are really going down dramatically or there is a lot
more fish out there than there had been previously, those will
be reevaluated and changed at that time.
Mr. Sablan. I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Fleming. OK. The gentleman yields back. We have Mr.
Duncan from South Carolina.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the
panelists for hanging over for a second round of questioning.
Mr. Schwaab, first off, what type of surveys are done in the
South Atlantic by NOAA, and how often are they done?
Mr. Schwaab. So, Congressman, there are actually a number
of historic surveys that did look at, for example, fishery-
dependent data. Some of the newer innovations include a 2011
trap and video survey that actually just--it is currently
underway. There is an annual--a new red snapper and shark
bottom longline survey, which began this week in the South
Atlantic from Cape Hatteras to Miami. Those are the two most
notable that I would reference for you in the South Atlantic as
it relates to red snapper.
Mr. Duncan. Looking at the fishing survey vessel days at
sea, I notice that the East Coast has the Delaware II and the
Bigelow, is the only ones I see on the East Coast. Can you tell
me where those two boats are harbored?
Mr. Schwaab. In the Northeast. We also have the Pisces,
which works in the South Atlantic as well, which is in
Pascagoula.
Mr. Duncan. And it comes around Florida and does the South
Atlantic there?
Mr. Schwaab. Yes, sir.
Mr. Duncan. OK. So you have basically one boat in the
southern region, a lot of square miles for that boat to cover.
I watch the ``deadliest Catch.'' I know how those boats go out
there and just----
Mr. Schwaab. I could provide to you a more complete summary
of vessels and their coverage over place and time.
Mr. Duncan. Yeah. I would love that, to see.
Mr. Schwaab. Thank you.
Mr. Duncan. And I want to emphasize again the relationships
that are necessary. And I am sure you guys are doing this, but
the relationships with the fishing boat captains and the guys
that are out there doing it every day--and I just want to end
in the little bit of time I have left, as the Chairman of the
Ag Committee, I remember talking with a gentleman from New York
who was over at the Ag Committee in the New York Legislature.
And he was also a farmer.
In New York, the Department of Health and Environmental
Control, whatever it is called there, instituted a ban on
spraying herbicide, Roundup, within--at the original
implementation of that reg, within 500 feet of a road. And he
called the person that was over at that agency and said, meet
me out at my farm. And so she came out there, and before she
got there, he had one of his hands walk out 500 feet from the
road and put a little flag, a little survey flag. And she got
out of the car, and they walked. He said, we are going to walk
out here to the flag. That is 500 feet from the road. And so
they started walking, and she started looking over her shoulder
at the road, and they kept walking, and she kept looking over
her shoulder at the road. And she said, you know, what, I think
500 feet is a little excessive, when it should have been 50
feet or 30 feet, to protect the ditches and to keep that
herbicide from getting in the drain.
And so the moral of that story and what I have remembered
is a lot of times the folks that are inputting the data in the
SEDAR 15 or SEDAR 24, or whatever the next report is, need to
realize that, you know, the real world is a little different
than possibly the cubicle or the office here in Washington. And
I think it is necessary for these guys to get out there to
build those relationships, get out on the boats, go to the
dock, wait on those fishing vessels to come in, talk to those
anglers, talk to the association guys like Jeff Angers with
CCC, and find out really the real-life impact of the
regulations that are being created within the Beltway here and
the real-life impact on the guys that are dependent upon the
fishing, dependent upon the resource, and what the true data
really is because it is obvious to anyone that looks at the
SEDAR 15 or 24 that the changes there going back to the 1955, I
believe it was, really is flawed.
And so before you close fishing in the South Atlantic--and
went out last summer and fished, and we caught a beaucoup of
fish. I questioned the data then, and I question it today, and
I ask that you guys take in the real-life implications of the
policies made here. And I yield back.
Mr. Fleming. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. And next
up again is Mr. Runyan.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Schwaab, on May
4th a joint hearing of the Natural Resources and the
Agriculture Committees submitted a number of important
questions relating to NMFS' biological opinions for ESA-listed
salmon. Can you pledge to provide answers to those questions in
the next two weeks?
Mr. Schwaab. Yes, sir. I will be happy to check into the
status of those, and if at all possible meet that timeline.
Mr. Runyan. I appreciate that. And just kind of going
into--I have been kind of talking finances again, and I kind of
want to touch on that because it is obviously clear that you
don't have sufficient tools or resources to implement the
scientific requirements of the Act that we are here discussing.
But yet can you kind of explain how NOAA kind of internally
diverts millions of dollars, whether it is coastal marine
planning, regional ocean partnerships, marine protected areas,
and catch share programs, when the basic core science all this
is based on is not there.
Mr. Schwaab. Thank you, Congressman. I would first suggest
that it is not something I would characterize as a diversion.
It is something that I would characterize as an allocation to a
variety of different responsibilities. As I spoke earlier of
the challenges both in protected species work and in--and we
have been talking all afternoon about the science, fisheries
science challenges that we have. We have substantial management
challenges that we share with the Councils.
So initiatives like supporting catch shares that are
developed and adopted by the Councils are every bit as much a
part of our responsibilities as securing some of the basic
science that is needed to make some of these decisions. And in
fact, one might argue, I think effectively, that putting, for
example, catch share programs in place, where they are adopted
and implemented locally, can yield improved management
conditions that will actually reduce costs over time to the
agency from a management perspective.
Similarly, working very closely with fishermen in the
context of coastal and marine spatial planning to ensure that
important habitats, important fishing grounds are identified
and addressed in the context of other uses that are being put
into place on coastal and ocean waters is every bit as
important in many regards as some of these science challenges
that we are talking about.
So we have a number of different challenges, a number of
ways in which we support fishermen and others that require us
to allocate all too scarce resources, and we do the best we
can.
Mr. Runyan. Well, to your knowledge, though, is there any
hierarchy, more weight there to any one than the other of where
you are going to allocate those funds?
Mr. Schwaab. I wouldn't describe it as a hierarchy or a
weight per se. I mean, there are all sorts of judgments that
are made in how to meet the best extent possible all of these
responsibilities, and we do the best we can.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Fleming. The gentleman yields back. Next is Mr.
Southerland.
Mr. Southerland. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to thank you
for giving me an opportunity to wish that I was with my family
today. But I wanted to just ask a simple question. We make a
lot of statements, obviously. Many of us are very aggravated
where we find ourselves regarding our fisheries. And so you
have the challenge of hearing that aggravation. But, you know,
we have to find solutions based on what the problem is.
This town is not known for that oftentimes. We just create
bigger problems. I mean, just quickly, OK, without me making a
statement, regarding the data--OK, we have talked about
partnerships. We have talked about what you can do with people
that are in the profession. You know, I tell you, if you really
want buy-in, then the people that these regulations affect have
to be a part, OK? That is just a must. And that is not just
good principles to building a family, I believe that that is a
good principle to build a society. Let them have a part.
So with the time I have left, I would ask Mr. Schwaab
regarding that, just real quickly, what is some low-hanging
fruit here that is ready to pick? Here is your moment. I teed
it up.
Mr. Schwaab. Thank you, Mr. Southerland. There are a number
of things that we have talked about already with respect to
data collection, and obviously any number of ways that we are
already seeking to improve our collection from implementation
of new surveys, some of which I have referenced in the South
Atlantic, closer working relationships with academic
institutions and with fishermen, which we are constantly trying
to incorporate more effectively into the work that we do.
I will give you one specific----
Mr. Southerland. One really good one. If you were king for
a day, and you said, I am going to take this idea and implement
it, what would it be?
Mr. Schwaab. Well, I was just going to give you one example
that we have actually been pursuing very explicitly with
recreational fishermen, primarily because of concerns in the
Gulf and the South Atlantic, and that is, you know, how can we
do a better job of managing discard mortality.
So if you have species that are protected, you don't want
to, for example, if you can avoid it, close down a large area
to fishing for other species because of incidental bycatch of
those protected species. And we actually worked very closely
with the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission and
leaders from the recreational community and academic
institutions around the country to conduct essentially a
bycatch workshop and look at techniques that we can identify
and employ to allow fishermen to catch fish and then put them
back in a way that doesn't yield 40 percent mortality.
Mr. Southerland. Got you. Great idea. I think run with
that. Run with that, OK? That should be your mantra.
Mr. Harris, I want to compliment you on your comment you
made earlier about relying upon the States. What a novel idea.
You would think that our Founding Fathers never thought of
that. OK? The States know best. Government governs best when it
governs closest to the people. For us to sit here in Washington
and say that we know better than the 67 counties that make up
the State of Florida is a bit arrogant.
So I commend you on that statement that you made earlier. I
think that in regarding, you know, the data, we can really rely
much more heavy on the States. And so I kind of picked yours
out for you, Mr. Harris.
Ms. Morris, I mean, you have been in the Gulf, and so, I
mean, obviously, you know our neck of the woods there. So you
are king for the day. What would it be?
Ms. Morris. Data collection, right?
Mr. Southerland. Yes.
Ms. Morris. Boy, if we could just really find a way for----
Mr. Southerland. Without hurting people, by the way.
Ms. Morris. Yeah, without hurting people.
Mr. Southerland. That is kind of a caveat.
Ms. Morris. If we could find a way for recreational
fishermen to accurately report their catch by species, and also
accurately report their discards, that would be wonderful.
Mr. Southerland. That is a great idea, and I would be
willing to bet if you made them feel like they were part of the
solution, you would get buy-in, because I am also a hunter. And
I fill my buck tags, I fill my doe tags, and I stay within the
rules. You have the luxury of 18 seconds.
Dr. Cadrin. Thank you. One idea would be to develop a
partnership with the fishing stakeholders that was a two-way
partnership in which fishermen were provided incentives to
providing more accurate data, and in turn getting more real-
time fishery monitoring so that they could make fishery
business decisions.
Mr. Southerland. Excellent. And I would say you have people
that enjoy fishing that want to preserve it. And I want to fish
with my great grandchildren. You just saw my children. And so
those are all great ideas. Thank you very much. Mr. Chair?
Mr. Duncan. Can I be king for a day?
Mr. Southerland. You can be king for a day next.
Mr. Fleming. The gentleman yields back. We have Mr. Landry
of Louisiana.
Mr. Landry. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Schwaab, I
almost lost my bearing for a second as to exactly who was in
front of me. I thought maybe you were coming into our third
panel. So let me quickly try to catch up with this issue that
is very important to us down in Louisiana. You know, concern
has been raised that an increase in sea turtle strandings is a
result of there being a significant increase in sea turtles.
More turtles would likely increase the interaction between
turtles and fishermen. Is this likely? Because we seem to have
a--my concern, I guess is a better way to put it, is that I
understand there are some environmental groups that want to sue
you all in trying to get our commercial fishermen to add
additional tag devices because of lately some significant
turtle deaths.
Mr. Schwaab. Thank you, Mr. Landry. This is something that
we have been concerned about, increases in turtle strandings
over the last couple of years. We have been working out of our
regional office and through our enforcement personnel in the
Southeast region very closely with the fishing industry to try
to ensure maximum compliance with existing tag requirements.
And at the same time, we have initiated a scoping process
through a series of public meetings to talk about what if any
additional steps might be appropriate to get a handle on turtle
strandings.
Mr. Landry. Well, I am confused because it is my
understanding that turtle nesting sites have gone from 800 to
over 20,000 in 8 years. So, you know, that means that there are
more turtles in the Gulf rather than less turtles in the Gulf.
And my concern is that I don't think we need, especially at
this time, to be placing any additional restrictions or
regulations on my poor commercial fishermen down there, when in
light of the fact that we had the Deepwater Horizon spill. We
don't know what the impact of that is yet. I have my own
opinion. But the biggest impact right now is from importation
of domestic demand actually.
Well, let me ask this question. Do foreign shrimpers in
other countries, do they put tags on their boats?
Mr. Schwaab. Mr. Landry, we actually have a process, and we
have recently employed it with Mexico, to ensure comparable
conservation practices to those that are in place here
domestically for shrimp that are imported here.
Mr. Landry. Well, and that is my point. I want to make sure
that my shrimpers down here get on a level playing field
because, you know, long after, as we see, it doesn't take long
for the cameras to leave the Gulf of Mexico, and people are
putting my poor shrimpers out on TV and saying these guys are
going to be just destroyed. And yet, you know what, before that
spill, we had every shrimp boat from Grand Isle to Delcambre
because we had run the price of diesel up to $5 a gallon.
And so my point is that at a time when our shrimpers are
struggling from a perception standpoint and shrimp imports are
increasing, and we have shrimp in the Gulf of Mexico, we don't
need to add additional regulations on them just because we got
more turtles in the Gulf of Mexico.
Mr. Schwaab. So as it relates to your comment about a level
playing field, I couldn't agree more. We certainly want to make
sure that our domestic fishermen are on a level playing field
with those who are importing product here. Obviously, with
respect to turtle conservation, there is a responsibility that
we carry there. We do our utmost to work very closely with the
commercial fishing industry to strike the right balance.
Mr. Landry. Well, have you all done an accurate--or when is
the last time you did I guess a survey of turtles in the Gulf
of Mexico before you reached this conclusion that maybe you
need to do more enforcement? When is the last time we had an
accurate I guess survey which told us how our turtle population
is faring?
Mr. Schwaab. So we do annual nesting surveys to take
counts. Those are imperfect because there is a lag time,
obviously.
Mr. Landry. Right.
Mr. Schwaab. The Fish and Wildlife Service and our agency
completed a five-year review for Kemp's Ridley turtles in 2007
as a part of a listing review. That would have been the most
recent sort of comprehensive----
Mr. Landry. And what did that show? You know, where were we
from five years ago to today from an increasing turtle
population?
Mr. Schwaab. It simply affirmed the listing status that was
in place at that time, which was endangered.
Mr. Landry. Well, wait a minute. It was endangered at 800
sightings, I guess is what you--I mean, turtle nesting sites.
And now we have 20,000. How many do we got to have before it
gets off the endangered species list? I mean, I don't know?
When we got 100,000 nesting sites along the Gulf of Mexico? I
mean, where is there a happy medium in this?
Mr. Schwaab. So I don't have in front of me the nesting
trends leading up to that 2007 review point. We did have that
high year in--at least recent high in 2009, with over 22,000
nests identified, although levels in 2010 and 2011 have been
below that 2009 level.
Mr. Landry. By how much?
Mr. Schwaab. I don't have that information.
Mr. Landry. Well, how can you say that if you don't know
it?
Mr. Schwaab. I can say that it was below the 2009.
Mr. Landry. But, I mean, like 19,000 is below 20,000. I
mean, there is a big difference.
Mr. Schwaab. Yeah. I would be happy to provide you with
some more----
Mr. Landry. Please. I would like to see it.
Mr. Schwaab.--explicit numbers. But I do not have them with
me.
Mr. Landry. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Fleming. The gentleman yields back. And that completes
our second round of questioning. I want to thank the panel of
witnesses for your great effort today, and thank you for your
patience as we held you for a second round. So thank you. You
can be excused, and we would ask the third panel to step
forward.
[Pause]
Mr. Fleming. Well, thank you, panel, for coming to be with
us today. I can't see everyone's name tags, but they are a
little bit different than my list here, so I will try to be
sure and keep everyone in their proper order.
First among our panel, we have Mr. Harlon H. Pearce, Jr.,
LA Fish, member of the Gulf of Mexico--is that LA or Louisiana?
Louisiana, that is right. We just chatted, OK. Louisiana Fish,
member of the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council and
Chair of the Council's Data Collection Committee; Mr. Jefferson
Angers, President, Center for Coastal Conservation; Mr. Gregory
DiDomenico, Executive Director, Garden State Seafood
Association; Mr. David Nelson, a charter captain and commercial
fisherman, Port Orange, Florida; and then on to Mr. John
Gauvin, Fishery Science Projects Director, Alaska Seafood
Cooperative; and then Mr. George Geiger, a recreational
fisherman, Sebastian, Florida.
Like all witnesses, your written testimony will appear in
full in the hearing record, so I ask that you keep your oral
statements to five minutes, as outlined in our invitation
letter to you and under Committee Rule 4(a). Our microphones
are not automatic, so please press the button when you are
ready to begin. You have probably had a chance to observe how
our timing lights work. Very simply, it is a green light for
the first four minutes, then a minute of yellow light. And when
it turns red, you need to wrap up your testimony.
Mr. Pearce, you are now recognized for five minutes, sir.
STATEMENT OF HARLON PEARCE, JR., OWNER, HARLON'S LA FISH, LLC,
MEMBER OF THE GULF OF MEXICO FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL AND
CHAIR OF THE COUNCIL'S DATA COLLECTION COMMITTEE
Mr. Pearce. Thank you, Chairman Fleming, Ranking Member
Sablan, and Members of the Committee. My name is Harlon Pearce,
and I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify before you
today on several factors currently impacting seafood jobs in my
home state of Louisiana.
I am the owner of Harlon's Louisiana Fish, a seafood
wholesaler based in Kenner, Louisiana. I serve as the chairman
of the Louisiana Seafood Promotion and Marketing Board. And
since 2006, I have been a member of the Gulf of Mexico Fishery
Management Council. In every one of these forums, I have always
advocated for developing a strong and sustainable commercial
fishing industry that properly utilizes the Gulf of Mexico's
abundant natural resources while also ensuring the longevity of
our strong fishing tradition. Louisiana produces one-third of
the domestic seafood produced in this country. We are number
one in shrimp. We are number one in oysters. We are number one
in crawfish. We are number one in alligator, and number two in
crab, number two in fin fish, which means $2.4 billion to the
economy of Louisiana yearly.
One in 70 jobs in Louisiana is related to the seafood
industry, and the Gulf of Mexico seafood community contributes
to the employment of over 885,000 people across the country.
And with national unemployment hovering near double digits,
strengthening this economic powerhouse should be a top
priority.
As chairman of the Gulf Council's Data Collection
Committee, I am supportive of requirements that the Regional
Fishery Management Councils place an increased emphasis on data
and science when determining catch limits to prevent
overfishing. At the Gulf Council, we have instituted the use of
annual catch limits based on recommendations from our science
and statistical committee to prevent overfishing for several
species. If the ACL is met or exceeded, accountability measures
such as seasonal closures or quota closures are triggered.
While this management concept is preferable in theory, in
reality NOAA's lack of timely and thorough fishery data means
our ability to enact fair catch limits is severely restricted.
While I support NOAA and the Regional Fishery Management
Council's ability to institute catch shares programs as a
management tool, I firmly believe that available data must be
improved prior to moving forward with these decisions.
The Gulf of Mexico is a national treasure that belongs to
every citizen, and we all have the right to utilize this
resource. The inability of fishery managers to access needed
scientific data and their continued reliance on best available
science is doing the owners of our fishery a great disservice.
When we rely on outdated science that does not reflect the
health of certain rebounding stocks, a precautionary approach
may be to set unnecessarily low catch limits that shortchange
fishermen and consumers.
In the Gulf of Mexico, only 10 of 12 of our stocks are
considered data adequate. Seventy to eighty species of our
stocks are considered data inadequate. We lack current data on
Goliath grouper, red drum, cobia, 4 grouper species, and 11
snapper species. Certain Gulf fisheries have been closed for
over 20 years because there is insufficient data to conduct
stock assessments.
The use of closures as a management tool because of
insufficient data is simply unacceptable. All fisheries
closures should be accompanied by a rebuilding plan in order to
preserve sustainability of the stocks, as well as
sustainability of American workers.
I have been called selfish at times because I want to get
stock assessments for these fisheries, and I guess I am
selfish. I am selfish for all your constituents that have
ownership of that fishery that want to eat Gulf seafood at
their table or eat at their favorite restaurant. I am selfish
for all your constituents that want to come to the great Gulf
of Mexico and fish on one of our great charter boats and catch
the fish that they own. I am selfish for that private
recreational fisherman that deserves access to his fishery in
the Gulf of Mexico for the fishery that he owns. So I am
selfish. I want our fishermen in the State to survive in a
stronger way than they are today.
Another concern is the five-year lag time between data
collection and final implementation of fishery management
plans. Currently, Gulf Council science is using data collected
in 2009 to conduct a 2011 stock assessments, which cannot be
incorporated into final management plans until after
consideration by the full council in a lengthy public period
process, which will likely take until 2014 with 2009 data.
This five-year delay in translating the fisheries data into
public policy is a serious concern. Yet we may be able to
overcome this challenge with more cooperative research programs
using fishermen that involve all fishing sectors. One key to
the solution may be electronic recreational data collection
programs. Development of a data collection program that
provides recreational anglers with electronic reporting tools
will fill in data collection gaps with real-time information
and help resource managers to better understand all sectors of
our fishery.
During our upcoming Gulf Council meeting in August, I will
begin formulation of a new recreational data collection
advisory panel to better understand the specifics of this
process. At this time, I am in full support of recreational
data collection becoming part of our management solution as
long as it is electronic.
Another way to ensure annual catch limits are established
using the most current data maybe to grant NOAA and other
departments more time in order to fulfill their data collection
duties. I understand that Congressman Wittman has introduced
legislation, the Fishery Science Improvement Act, which
provides flexibility in the timelines required to establish
annual catch limits in cases where there is inadequate data.
This measure may provide managers with much needed relief
from the arbitrary December 31st, 2011, deadline for
establishing catch limits where no scientific information
exists on the health of the stock. In an effort to examine
every possible solution to this problem, I would encourage the
Committee to give this Fishery Science Improvement Act your
full consideration.
Also, Senate Bill 1400 by Landrieu and Nelson allocating 80
percent of the penalty phase of the BP under the Water
Management Act would give 5 percent of that money to the Gulf
for research, sadly needed research. So I ask you to please
support that bill so that we can get the money down to the Gulf
Council.
The Administration budget priorities may also be hindering
U.S. fishery reduction numbers and jobs. In light of recent
budget shortfalls, NOAA may be shifting funding away from stock
assessments in order to fund other priorities, including
expedited initiation of catch share programs. Of course, I
would strongly encourage this Committee to take every action
possible to ensure the solvency of NOAA assessment programs.
And I agree with Representative Landry when it comes to the
turtles. We have a problem with turtles, and we need to know
what is out there with our turtles. And I am sure he will ask
me some questions before this is over.
All of the concerns I have described today are forcing U.S.
fishery production into a downward spiral. In my written
testimony, I have included two charts provided by the National
Marine Fisheries Service that are outline employment in both
recreational and commercial fisheries across the Gulf of Mexico
from 2006 to 2009. While the charts do not establish a
causality, it is plain to see a dramatic decline in fishery
jobs that should give us all cause for concern. A renewed
emphasis on fishery data collection combined with a commitment
to rebuilding Gulf Coast fisheries impacted by the Deepwater
Horizon spill should go a long way toward reversing these
troubling trends.
If we can Twitter and Facebook, we should be able to get
electronic data into our fisheries, and get real-time data that
we can really do a great job with at the Gulf Council. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pearce follows:]
Statement of Harlon Pearce, Owner, Harlon's LA Fish LLC, Kenner,
Louisiana, Representing the Louisiana Seafood Promotion and Marketing
Board and the Gulf of Mexico Fisheries Management Council
Chairman Fleming, Ranking Member Sablan and Members of the
Committee, my name is Harlon Pearce and I am pleased to have this
opportunity to testify before you today on several factors currently
impacting seafood jobs in my home state of Louisiana. In order to give
you the most accurate perspective on this issue, I will be wearing my
seafood wholesaler hat today, although my forty year career in
Louisiana's fisheries goes beyond that. I am the owner of Harlon's LA
Fish, a seafood wholesaler based in Kenner, Louisiana; I serve as the
Chairman of the Louisiana Seafood Promotion and Marketing Board; and
since 2006, I have been a member of the Gulf of Mexico Fisheries
Management Council. In every one of these forums, I have always
advocated for developing a strong and sustainable commercial fishing
industry that properly utilizes the Gulf of Mexico's abundant natural
resources while also ensuring the longevity of our strong fishing
tradition.
The state of Louisiana ranks as one of the United States' top
seafood producers. Nearly one third of all domestic seafood consumed in
the contiguous U.S. comes fresh from our waters. In addition to being
the number one oyster producing state, Louisiana harvests more than 90%
of our crawfish, 69% of our nation's shrimp, and more hard and soft
shell crab meat than any other state in the country. As such,
Louisiana's economy is highly dependent on a strong seafood supply
chain. Nearly one in seventy jobs in Louisiana is seafood-related with
a total economic impact of $2.4 billion annually. Many of these jobs
are in family-owned and operated companies that have been in business
for generations. Nationally, a NOAA Economic Impact Study determined
that the Gulf of Mexico seafood community contributes to the employment
of over 885,000 people across the country. With national unemployment
hovering near double digits, strengthening this economic powerhouse
should be a top priority
Despite our vigorous production numbers, the Louisiana seafood
community has faced its share of challenges in recent years, most
notably with the horrific hurricane season of 2005, the Deepwater
Horizon spill last April, and most recently the flooding of the
Mississippi River which may have serious impacts on our oyster and crab
fisheries. There are also several regulatory obstacles facing our
community including a shortage of accurate fisheries stock assessments
and a lack of updated fishery data which lead to uninformed and often
overly-restrictive management protocols.
At this point, a primary challenge to maintaining seafood jobs is
the misperception that seafood from the Gulf of Mexico is tainted with
toxins from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. In a poll conducted by
Louisiana State University on April 11, 2011, 69% of consumers express
concern that seafood from the Gulf of Mexico might be tainted from the
spill--a concern that is completely unfounded yet continues to plague
our local economy. In fact, in October, 2010, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
NOAA announced that every seafood sample taken from the Gulf tested
100-1000 times lower than the safety thresholds established by the FDA
for oil residues and that ``American consumers can feel confident in
the quality and safety of Gulf seafood.'' Sadly, the American public is
not getting the message.
In a misguided attempt to respond to these unfounded consumer
concerns, several retailers and restaurants across the country have
sworn off Gulf seafood entirely with some displaying signs telling
their customers that they would not serve seafood from the Gulf of
Mexico. On the supply side, as a result of precautionary closures of
fishing waters during the spill, Louisiana seafood businesses lost
continuity of supply and, in turn, lost our seat at the table with
buyers. As a result of these combined obstacles, my business is down
25-35% and will take at least three to five years to fully recover.
In order to address lagging consumer perceptions of Gulf seafood,
the five Gulf states have recently come together in an unprecedented
fashion to form the Gulf Seafood Marketing Coalition. This Coalition
was formed with a mission of working together to rebuild and enhance
the image of Gulf seafood much like the beef, pork and milk industries
have famously done in the past. The Coalition is currently undertaking
extensive market research to help clarify exactly why consumers are
shying away from our products and what it will take to bring them back.
While this short-term work is imperative, restoring our brand
internationally will take years and ensuring a steady stream of funding
for this effort may prove difficult.
Fortunately, Congress has an opportunity to assist in the Gulf
seafood marketing effort by passing legislation that will dedicate at
least 80% of BP penalties paid under the Clean Water Act (CWA) to the
Gulf states to restore the ecosystems and economies damaged during the
spill. Specific to seafood marketing, S. 1400, the RESTORE Act, lists
``Programs to promote the consumption of seafood produced from the Gulf
Coast'' among the authorized expenditures. This seafood marketing set-
aside from BP's penalties would cost the taxpayers nothing yet would
fund critical consumer research and messaging programs to help restore
confidence in Gulf seafood. I am certain that if Congress approves this
legislation with the seafood marketing component intact, our five-state
Gulf Seafood Marketing Coalition effort will prove to be a key part of
the solution for strengthening the Gulf of Mexico seafood community
well into the future.
I would like to spend the remainder of my time outlining a few key
areas of our federal fisheries management regime that may have an
equivalent impact on seafood businesses in Louisiana and across the
Gulf coast.
As Chairman of the Gulf Council's Data Collection Committee, I am
supportive of requirements that the Regional Fishery Management
Councils place an increased emphasis on data and science when
determining catch limits to prevent overfishing. At the Gulf Council,
we have instituted the use of Annual Catch Limits (ACLs) based on
recommendations from our Science and Statistical Committee (SSC) to
prevent overfishing for several species. If the ACL is met or exceeded,
accountability measures such as seasonal closures or quota closures are
triggered. While this management concept is preferable in theory, in
reality, NOAA's a lack of timely and thorough fishery data means our
ability to enact fair catch limits is severely restricted. While I
support NOAA and the Regional Fishery Management Councils' ability to
institute catch share programs as a management tool, I firmly believe
that available data must be improved prior to moving forward with these
decisions.
The Gulf of Mexico is a national treasure that belongs to every
American citizen and we all have the right to utilize to this resource.
The inability of fishery managers to access needed scientific data and
their continued reliance on ``best available science'' is doing the
owners of our fishery a great disservice. When we rely on outdated
science that does not reflect the health of certain rebounding stocks,
the ``precautionary approach'' may be to set unnecessarily low catch
limits that short change fisherman and consumers. In the Gulf of
Mexico, we only have adequate data on approximately 12 out of 80
species. We lack current data on goliath grouper, red drum, cobia, 4
grouper species, and 11 snapper species. Certain Gulf fisheries have
been closed for over 20 years because there is insufficient data to
conduct stock assessments. The use of closures as a management tool
because of insufficient data is simply unacceptable. All fishery
closures should be accompanied by a rebuilding plan in order to
preserve sustainability of the stocks as well as the sustainability of
American workers.
Another concern is the 5-year lag time between data collection and
final implementation of fishery management plans. Currently, Gulf
Council scientists are using data collected in 2009 to conduct their
2011 stock assessments which cannot be incorporated into final
management plans until after consideration by the full Council and a
lengthy public comment period--a process which will likely take until
2014.
This 5-year delay in translating fisheries data into public policy
is a serious concern, yet we may be able to overcome this challenge
with more cooperative research programs that involve all fishing
sectors. One key to the solution may be electronic recreational data
collection programs. The development of a data collection program that
provides recreational anglers with electronic reporting tools will fill
in data-collection gaps with real-time information and help resource
managers to better understand all sectors of our fishery. During our
upcoming Gulf Council meeting in August, I will begin formulation of a
new Recreational Data Collection Advisory Panel to better understand
the specifics of this process. At this time, I am in full support of
recreational data collection becoming part of our management solution
as long as it is electronic.
Another way to ensure annual catch limits are established using the
most current data may be to grant NOAA and their partners more time in
order to fulfill their data collection duties. I understand that
Congressman Wittman has introduced legislation, the Fishery Science
Improvement Act, which provides flexibility in the timelines required
to establish annual catch limits in cases where there is inadequate
data. This measure may provide fishery managers with much needed relief
from the arbitrary December 31st, 2011 deadline for establishing catch
limits where no scientific information exists on the health of the
stock. In an effort to examine every possible solution to this problem,
I would encourage the Committee to give the Fishery Science Improvement
Act your full consideration.
The Administration's budget priorities may also be hindering U.S.
fishery production numbers and jobs. In light of recent budget
shortfalls, NOAA may be shifting funding away from stock assessments in
order to fund other priorities, including expedited initiation of catch
share programs. Of course, I would strongly encourage this Committee to
take every action possible to ensure the solvency of NOAA's stock
assessment programs.
Another challenge facing Louisiana's seafood community is the
current debate over the usage of Turtle Excluder Devices (TEDs). As you
may know, NOAA is considering new guidance governing the use of TEDs in
the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery. This regulatory action is intended
to address a recent uptick in sea turtle strandings which occurred in
2010 and the first half of 2011. While it is imperative that we protect
sea turtles, there is currently no definitive link between the turtle
strandings and the shrimp industry. In fact, the greatest number of
strandings occurred at a time when a vast section of the Gulf of Mexico
shrimp fishery was shut down in response to the Deepwater Horizon
spill.
In order to fully understand the dynamics leading to sea turtle
strandings this year, this Committee should urge NOAA to make sea
turtle stock assessments a top priority. NOAA is currently basing
management decisions on outdated data for many fisheries and sea
turtles are no exception. As a result of the Endangered Species Act
listing and cooperation from the Gulf of Mexico shrimping community, it
has been reported that the numbers of sea turtle nesting grounds along
the coast of Mexico have exploded from 800 turtles in 2003 to over
20,000 nests in 2011. This exponential population increase should be
taken into account when determining the cause of recent strandings and
whether or not additional TEDs requirements are necessary.
As far as what the industry can do, a combination of sea turtle
education and enforcement of current TEDs regulations will ensure this
rebounding species continues to thrive. The State of Louisiana is
slated to launch a new sea turtle outreach program designed to educate
shrimpers about sea turtles and raise awareness about the appropriate
usage of TEDs. Congress should work alongside NOAA to engage the
broader shrimp industry in similar efforts to improve understanding and
compliance. By partnering federal regulators with industry, we can work
together to protect the health of our sea turtle populations and
maintain jobs for American fishermen.
All of the concerns I have described today are forcing U.S. fishery
production into a downward spiral. In my written testimony, I have
included two charts provided by the National Marine Fisheries Service
that outline employment in both recreational and commercial fisheries
across the Gulf of Mexico from 2006--2009. (See attachment) While the
charts do not establish causality, it is plain to see a dramatic
decline in fisheries jobs that should give us all cause for concern. A
renewed emphasis on fisheries data collection combined with a
commitment to rebuilding Gulf Coast fisheries impacted by the Deepwater
Horizon spill should go a long way towards reversing these troubling
trends.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to present these issues to the
Committee for consideration and I look forward to answering any
questions you may have.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7648.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7648.003
.eps__
Mr. Fleming. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Pearce. Next, Mr. Angers.
STATEMENT OF JEFFERSON ANGERS, PRESIDENT,
CENTER FOR COASTAL CONSERVATION
Mr. Angers. Mr. Chairman and Members, I am Jeff Angers. I
am the President of the Center for Coastal Conservation. I am a
native Louisianian and a recreational fisherman.
My testimony today is presented on behalf of my
organization, the American Sport Fishing Association, the
Billfish Foundation, Coastal Conservation Association, the
International Game Fish Association, the National Marine
Manufacturers Association, and the Congressional Sportsmen's
Foundation.
The question we face today has its answers in the famous
admonition from former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in
December of '04, quote, ``You go to war with the army you have,
not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.''
NOAA Fisheries should manage America's saltwater fish to the
science they have in hand rather than the science they wish
they had.
But the Federal Government is today making major precedent-
setting fishery management decisions based on the science that
it wished it had. Magnuson requires ACLs on all stocks by an
arbitrary deadline of the end of this year. The agency and the
Councils are moving to implement these hard limits by the
deadline. Now, with 528 stocks of fish or complexes of stocks
of fish under Federal management, but only 114 of those, quote,
``adequately assessed,'' closed quote, how is the agency
arriving at hard limits on the 80 percent of the stocks that
are not adequately assessed? They are guessing. We heard
reference to proxies. We heard references to biology. They are
guessing.
Terrestrial and freshwater wildlife resource management
agencies would not think of operating without standardized
stock assessments. Yet for our marine fishery resources,
proponents of the status quo say that readily available
information such as biology--let's just take biology--is
adequate to replace a standardized, peer-reviewed, scientific
stock assessment as the foundation of management, even when the
decisions based on it will have dramatic economic and social
consequences. A hodgepodge of information that perhaps may add
up to an informed guess will always fall short of the standards
we as a nation have used for managing our fish and wildlife
resources.
We should today reject the notion that a SWAG, a scientific
wild guess, is good enough to be the foundation of management
for the hundreds of marine stocks that have either never had an
assessment or have been deemed inadequately assessed by NOAA
Fisheries and for which there is no evidence that the stock is
being overfished.
Last year, NOAA Fisheries generated national estimates of
effort and participation was 2006, 2006. But those numbers from
five years ago indicate a few interesting facts. 24.7 million
saltwater anglers taking four trips a year, 100 million
recreational fishing trips a year. This great American
business, marine recreational fishing generating $92 billion in
total sales, employing 534,000 American citizens, contributing
$622 million in license purchases, paying $650 million in
excise taxes to be apportioned back to the States for fishery
management and conservation purposes. How is the uncertainty of
a SWAG, a management guess, affecting us?
In a word, I will say gravely. All of us here can agree,
fishing is good. Catching, cleaning, and eating fish with your
family and friends is a good, healthy, all-American past-time.
So fishing is good. I think we can all agree too that
overfishing is bad. No one wants to have overfished stocks.
Recreational fishermen respect, support, and propose many of
the classic fishery management tools that ensure healthy
fisheries. Those classic tools include seasons and quotas, time
and area closures, size limits, krill limits. These tools work,
and they will still be in place even without an arbitrary
SWAG'ed ACL.
We want America's oceans to be teeming with fish because
for recreational fishermen and the inefficiencies of a single
hook in the Lord's vast ocean, we need a lot of fish to be out
there. So any attempt to end overfishing is generally appealing
to a recreational fisherman. But the ramifications of the ACL
provisions amending Magnuson in '06 were not truly appreciated
at the time. It has become painfully apparent that NOAA
Fisheries does not have the data to properly manage fisheries
to the requirements of those provisions.
Sadly, the terrestrial model of fish and game management
that has been applied so successfully to ducks, to geese,
turkey, bass, trout, elk, deer, everything, is not to be found
in the Nation's oceans. Mr. Wittman and several of you filed
the Fishery Science Improvement Act, H.R. 2304 last month to
ensure that the Federal Government was not making fishery
management decisions based on science it wished it had. The Act
allows the agency to use sound science to inform its decision-
making, and it lifts the requirement to implement ACLs on
stocks for which there is inadequate data and no evidence of
overfishing.
Let's not abandon classic fishery management tools for one-
size-fits-all ACLs when we do not have the science to set those
ACLs. Let's give improved science a chance to work for
conservation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Angers follows:]
Statement of Jefferson Angers, President, Center for Coastal
Conservation, on behalf of Center for Coastal Conservation; American
Sportfishing Association; Coastal Conservation Association;
Congressional Sportsmen's Foundation; International Game Fish
Association; National Marine Manufacturers Association; and The
Billfish Foundation
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman. My name is Jeff Angers, and I am the
president of the Center for Coastal Conservation. I am native
Louisianian and a recreational fisherman interested in science driving
sound decision-making at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. I would like to thank you for this opportunity to speak
to the Subcommittee as it addresses NOAA Fisheries Science: Is the Lack
of Basic Science Costing Jobs?
The Center for Coastal Conservation is a coalition of America's
leading advocates for marine recreational fishing and boating. We are
dedicated to promoting sound conservation and use of America's marine
resources. Our organization includes the American Sportfishing
Association, Coastal Conservation Association, International Game Fish
Association, National Marine Manufacturers Association, The Billfish
Foundation, as well as other institutions and individuals across the
country. I offer testimony today on behalf of our members and the
Congressional Sportsmen's Foundation.
In order to properly answer the question that has brought us here
today, ``Is NOAA Fisheries' lack of basic science costing jobs?,'' it
first necessary to describe the economics of marine recreational
fishing in America.
In 2006--the last year the National Marine Fisheries Service
generated national estimates of effort and participation--24.7 million
saltwater anglers took nearly 100 million recreational fishing trips
(97.7 million)--almost four trips per saltwater angler each year. The
fact that national estimates of effort and participation have not been
generated since 2006 speaks directly to the problem. Anglers tend to
get the short end of the stick when it comes to the basic science that
NOAA Fisheries and the Regional Fishery Management Councils are
required to conduct when managing recreational fishing. (The best data
in the country is in Alaska and the Pacific Northwest.)
While the 2006 effort and participation numbers are impressive,
even more impressive are their contribution to the economic
sustainability of our coastal communities. In 2006, the last time
economic data was collected from recreational fishermen nationally,
saltwater recreational anglers generated $92.2 billion in total sales
(in 2011 dollars). Of that total, anglers generated $15.2 billion in
total sales from trip expenditures that included food, lodging, fuel,
bait and charter fees, among other expenses. Trip expenditures are
dominated by the cost of fuel used in personal vehicles to travel to
and from the fishing site or marina followed closely by the purchase of
food and beverages. Additionally, those same anglers generated $76.9
billion from expenditures on durable goods that include tackle, gear,
boats, houses and vehicles used for saltwater fishing. This category of
spending is dominated by boat and vehicle purchases with boat purchases
generating $6.8 billion in economic impact and vehicle purchases
generating $5.3 billion in economic impact. The boat building business
is almost an exclusive U.S.-based industry. Both trip and durable goods
expenditures support 533,813 jobs across the U.S. In terms of economic
impact, Florida has the highest numbers at $14.2 billion in total sales
supporting 130,900 jobs followed in order by Texas, California,
Louisiana and North Carolina.
Actually, these recreational durable goods expenditures and impacts
would be higher, but the Marine Recreational Fisheries Statistical
Survey (MRFSS) and its successor survey, the Marine Recreational
Information Program (MRIP) are unable to determine if a non-resident
participant in one state is a participant from another coastal state or
an inland state. As a result, the agency was forced to remove all non-
resident durable goods purchases from their estimates. While this lack
of science isn't costing jobs directly, it means that any NOAA
Fisheries or Council analysis of policy impacts fails to account for
non-resident durable goods purchases. Non-residents are a huge part of
saltwater angler participation. The largest segment of the marine
recreational fishery is ``trailer-able'' boats. From the 2006 data,
non-residents represent over 37% of all participants. The amount not
being included by the agency is potentially huge.
In addition to expenditures on trip costs and fishing equipment,
anglers contribute a considerable amount to direct fisheries management
at the state level. Across all states, recreational anglers contribute
$621.5 million in license purchases and $329.8 million across just the
coastal states (2010 estimates). The vast majority of this money
returns directly to management and enhancement of recreational fishing.
In addition to license sales, recreational anglers contribute to
conservation through excise taxes on fishing equipment and fuel
purchases. In 2010, these excise taxes generated $650 million
nationwide and those monies are apportioned back to the states for
fishery management purposes.
As a matter of comparison, in 2006 commercial fishing in the U.S.
generated $102.5 billion in total sales and supported 1.5 million jobs.
This estimate includes impacts from the harvester right through to the
consumer.
While the economic impact of marine fishing is vast, it is not
reflected in the management process. The primary reason may simply be
the very nature of the two sectors. The number of commercial fishermen
is small relative to the number of recreational fishermen. The number
of businesses that commercial fishermen buy their supplies from and
sell their fish to is an even smaller number of operators. As a result,
the commercial activity moves through a smaller number of hands and is
a larger payday in those businesses' pockets. This makes it much easier
for the commercial sector to build a cohesive base that secures the
attention from the agency responsible for collecting the science
affecting their sector.
Recreational fishermen spend their dollars at thousands of gas
stations, grocery stores, marinas, marine dealers, mom-and-pop bait-
and-tackle shops, restaurants and hotels along with everybody else
buying those goods and services. The local gas station or convenience
store is not likely to band together with anglers to build a base of
support to represent them before NOAA Fisheries. You are not going to
see truck manufacturers clamor for better data for recreational anglers
even though the purchase of trucks to tow boats is the second biggest
durable goods expenditure made by anglers. As a result, policymakers do
not truly recognize the large economic impact of recreational fishing.
The result is you have a huge economic engine in recreational
fishing that gets largely ignored in the agency and Council scientific
process: from basic data collection to performing quality stock
assessments for species important to recreational fishermen and
everything in between. This neglect costs coastal economies jobs and
incomes.
To the credit of the leadership at NOAA, Eric Schwaab and Jane
Lubchenco, there has been a substantial effort to try to solve this
problem. But institutionally, the problem remains.
The perfect example of this is the concern over the primary tool
used to gather recreational harvest data, MRFSS/MRIP. In the
transformation from the MRFSS to MRIP, the agency has expended
substantial resources on improving the survey. Yet it is still a survey
based on two-month sampling time frames and is of limited use for in-
season quota monitoring, a tool to which the Councils are turning more
and more frequently to manage recreational fisheries. Thus inadequate
data is being used to shut down fisheries and reduce economic
activity--and the jobs supported by that economic activity. The new
MRIP will do little to address this problem, even if substantially more
resources are spent. If NOAA Fisheries and the Councils are going to
manage stocks with in-season quotas, they owe the economic
sustainability of our coastal communities a fair shake. NOAA Fisheries
and the Congress owe our communities a survey that can estimate
recreational harvest accurately so that jobs are not unnecessarily
sacrificed.
All the vast, positive effects of recreational fishing on the
American economy are based on three things: good management of marine
fisheries, a sustainable resource and access to that resource.
Currently there is no attempt by the Councils to maximize the net
benefit to society from fishery management. There are many ways
managers could increase the value of our fisheries. Unfortunately, the
lack of adequate science prevents moving in a direction that would
improve the sustainability of our coastal communities.
How has the agency managed the 24.7 million saltwater anglers who
take four trips a year (97.7 million recreational trips)? How has the
agency managed this great American business--marine recreational
fishing--that generates $92.2 billion in total sales? That employs
533,813 people? That contributes $621.5 million in license purchases
($329.8 million across just the coastal states)? That paid $650 million
nationwide in excise taxes to be apportioned back to the states for
fishery management purposes? How is NOAA Fisheries managing us?
In a word: Poorly.
I'd like to establish that fishing is good. Catching, cleaning and
eating fish with your family and friends is a good, healthy, all-
American pastime. So fishing is good.
I'd like to also establish that overfishing is bad. No one wants to
have overfished stocks. Recreational fishermen respect, support--even
propose--many of the classic fishery management tools to ensure healthy
fisheries. Those classic tools include things such as seasons, quotas,
time and area closures, size limits, creel limits...those tools work.
We want America's coastal waters and oceans to be teeming with
fish. . .because for recreational fishermen--and the inefficiencies of
a single hook in the Lord's vast ocean--we need a lot of fish out
there.
Any attempt to end overfishing is generally appealing to a
conservationist, but the ramifications of the provisions amending MSA
in 2006 were not truly appreciated at the time. Over the past few
years, it has become painfully apparent to anyone associated with
marine recreational fisheries that NOAA Fisheries does not have the
data to properly manage fisheries to the requirements of those
provisions. The terrestrial model of fish and wildlife management that
has been applied so successfully to ducks, geese, turkey, bass, trout,
deer, elk, etc., is not to be found in the nation's oceans.
To understand the magnitude of the discrepancy between current
federal marine resource management and most every other wildlife
management regime, we must acknowledge that the Magnuson-Stevens Act
allows for the management of fish stocks in the federal zone (three--
200 miles from shore generally). The term ``fish'' has been interpreted
to cover hundreds of species of finfish, corals, vegetation and
jellyfish. Of these the federal government has about 528 stocks of fish
or complexes of stocks under management. Only 114 of the stocks are
considered ``adequately assessed.''
For the past few years, the agency has been doing about 80 stock
assessments a year in Alaska and the North Atlantic on pretty much the
same (commercially important) species. But they've only been assessing
15 stocks a year in the Gulf of Mexico, South Atlantic and Caribbean
combined. And that's not annual assessments on the same stock. That's
different stocks of fish--and most of those assess commercial shrimp
stocks. For the charismatic sport fish that anglers pursue, the agency
does about six assessments per year.
MSA requires annual catch limits (ACLs) on all stocks by the end of
this year. And the agency and the Councils are moving to implement
these hard limits by the deadline. How are they arriving at hard limits
on the 80 percent of stocks that are not adequately assessed?
They're making estimates based on a mountain of poor data.
Terrestrial and freshwater wildlife resource management agencies
would not think of operating without standardized stock surveys and
assessments. Yet, for our marine resources, proponents of the status
quo say that ``readily available information such as biology'' is
adequate to replace a standardized, peer-reviewed stock assessment as
the foundation of management, even when the decisions based on it will
have drastic social and economic consequences. A hodgepodge of partial
bits of information that perhaps add up to an informed guess will
always fall short of the standards we as a nation have used for
managing our fish and wildlife resources.
We should reject the notion that a swag--a scientific wild ass
guess--is good enough to be the foundation of management for hundreds
of marine stocks that have either never had an assessment or have been
deemed inadequately assessed by NOAA Fisheries and for which there is
absolutely no evidence that the stock is being overfished.
The ramifications of the swag are far reaching and long term.
You could pick most any of the 528 stocks of fish. So let's call
one the ``widget-fish.''
When the Council and the agency take a swag and decide that the ACL
on the widget-fish shall be 1 million pounds this year, that is a hard
number. One million is a number that a federal judge will understand.
Even though a swag, it's still a number. Federal judges may have
trouble understanding Byzantine fishery management policies. But judges
have no trouble understanding numbers. When that hard swag-induced ACL
is exceeded (and it will be), the only jobs NOAA Fisheries will be
securing will be those of environmental lawyers intent on shutting down
fishermen who target the widget-fish. Environmental lawyers will have
gainful employment suing the government to enforce the hard ACL on each
of the 528 stocks--the vast majority of which are healthy stocks. In
most cases, the enforcement of the swag will unnecessarily keep
America's public fishery resources from American citizens. That will
reduce the positive economic impact of fishing and will cost real jobs
on our coasts.
So an artificially low ACL based on a swag, combined with current
statistical survey methods of recreational harvest, create the very
real possibility that a very few widget-fish popping up in a survey
will be extrapolated to project a total harvest number well in excess
of the swag-produced ACL, especially if the widget-fish is uncommonly
encountered by samplers. The result will be to not only shut down the
widget fishery, but if the situation is perceived as significantly
desperate, draconian management measures will be considered for other
species that may produce a bycatch of widget-fish. This is the domino
affect that occurred in the South Atlantic last year when managers were
within inches of shutting down all bottom fishing in thousands of
square miles to recover red snapper stocks. The shutdown was averted
when unprecedented pressure and protest from all quarters compelled
NOAA Fisheries to conduct a second full stock assessment on red
snapper, which revealed that the stock was not in need of such drastic
management measures.
The widget-fish described above is an example of one of the fish
stocks on which the agency has enough information to muster a swag
about ``management.'' For many other stocks, if the agency is not even
in a position to hazard a guess about an Annual Catch Limit, they are
simply removing those fish from all management protections: Taking
hundreds of species which are now under management and deleting them
from Fishery Management Plans. In the Gulf last month, they deleted 18
stocks. And in the South Atlantic next month, the Fishery Management
Council will be deleting 39 stocks from management.
When a stock is deleted from a Fishery Management Plan, it is
removed from federal management protections. So these particular stocks
are no longer protected for instance from prohibitions on taking them
with drift gill nets or fish traps in federal waters. For federal
managers: these stocks don't exist.
The practical effect? Giving management of those stocks to the
states. . .to perhaps manage with state landings laws. But the states
neither asked for the management responsibility nor received funding to
engage in management.
If the federal government can't manage them, why should anyone
think local jurisdictions are going to manage them? And what kind of
message does that send? Do we really think fish 100 miles offshore in
the Caribbean or Guam or North Carolina are going to have protections
if the federal government just casts them aside?
Focusing again on the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council: on
August 9, 2011, the Council will drop 39 of the 73 species from their
Snapper/Grouper Fishery Management Unit, which effectively removes them
from federal jurisdiction. The 39 are species 1) that are not directly
targeted; 2) that are usually caught as bycatch when fishing for other
species, and 3) on which stock assessments are unlikely to ever be
performed. Thus, under the current control rule for un-assessed stocks,
if one of these ``lesser'' species is ever judged to be undergoing
overfishing or in decline, the only mechanism the Council is likely to
have to remedy the decline is to prohibit the harvest of a more
valuable, managed stock, since the ``lesser'' species was caught as
bycatch in that fishery.
As noted earlier, responsibility for management would thus revert
to the states, which are unlikely to receive any additional management
funds in the near future. Management would be by landings laws.
Currently the Council has little choice in the matter: they are faced
with either keeping all the species in the fishery management unit or
face possible management restrictions on the more valuable managed
stocks or drop them. This is essentially management failure set in
motion by the agency's interpretation and implementation of the ACL
provisions in MSA.
When Congress reauthorized the Magnuson-Stevens Act in 2006, none
of us knew that NOAA Fisheries was so data-poor. NOAA Fisheries itself
may not have fully understood they were managing so many data-poor
stocks and complexes of fish. So the agency reports that it has these
528 stocks of fish and fish complexes ``under management.'' It has up-
to-date assessments on 114 of those. So roughly 414 of the 528 are a
mystery to the agency. They don't know how healthy they are. What is
the level of fishing pressure on each? What is the likelihood each is
overfished? Nonetheless, to comply with the year-end deadline by which
it must stop overfishing, the agency is now faced with two options:
apply highly restrictive ACLs based on very poor (or
in some cases non-existent) data, or
remove species of fish from management.
The eight Regional Fishery Management Councils are attempting--
pretty much in the dark--to amend fishery management plans to
accommodate the statutory deadline by which they must end overfishing.
As you know, your colleague Mr. Wittman has proposed to solve this
conundrum with H.R. 2304, the Fishery Science Improvement Act. The
legislation has three key provisions:
1. First, if the agency has not assessed a stock of fish in
the last five years and there is no indication that overfishing
is occurring, there is no requirement to set an Annual Catch
Limit.
2. Second, to avoid removing the fish species from management
and leave them in the jurisdiction of the agency, the bill
allows the agency to put certain fish into an ``ecosystem''
category. This classification is already informally in use by
the agency but without strong parameters. FSIA statutorily
authorizes the category and broadens the eligibility for stocks
of fish that can be placed in the category.
3. Finally, the Fishery Science Improvement Act gives NOAA
Fisheries three years to go back and work with the Councils to
figure out how to implement science-based overfishing measures
that are appropriate for each region and its fish.
The Wittman bill--already co-sponsored by two dozen of his
colleagues--is very concise, simple and targeted. There is a very big,
very specific problem with how NOAA Fisheries is implementing the
Magnuson-Stevens Act, and Congress must act accordingly. Without
Congressional action, arbitrary decisions affecting millions of anglers
and thousands of businesses will continue to be made, and we can't let
that happen to anglers on the coast of Virginia or Louisiana or
California or Alaska.
Today's hearing is a wakeup call beyond this Subcommittee. The
millions of Americans who responsibly utilize the nation's public
fishery resources and depend on them for jobs and recreation know this
Congress can and will solve this problem.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my testimony, and I would be happy to
take questions.
###
About our organizations. . .
The Center for Coastal Conservation (Center) is a coalition of the
leading advocates for marine recreational fishing and boating. It is
dedicated to promoting sound conservation and use of ocean resources by
affecting public policy through the political process.
The American Sportfishing Association (ASA) is the sportfishing
industry's trade association, committed to looking out for the
interests of the entire sportfishing community. The association invests
in long-term ventures to ensure the industry will remain strong and
prosperous as well as safeguard and promote the enduring economic and
conservation values of sportfishing in America. ASA also represents the
interests of America's 60 million anglers who generate over $45 billion
in retail sales with a $125 billion impact on the nation's economy
creating employment for over one million people.
The Coastal Conservation Association (CCA) is a national
recreational fishing membership organization of some 100,000 members
and is organized to do business in 17 States on the Atlantic, Gulf of
Mexico and Pacific Coasts. It has been actively involved in the
majority of the nation's marine resource debates since its inception in
1977. Its membership is composed of recreational fishermen who fish for
every important marine recreational fish available in the EEZ. CCA
brings not only an educated perspective on how to fish, but a
conservation ethic which recognizes the value of recreational fishing
as a pastime and obligation to take care of the resource and use it to
the best benefit to the nation.
The Congressional Sportsmen's Foundation (CSF) is the most
respected and trusted organization in the political arena promoting,
protecting and advancing the rights of hunters and anglers. CSF is the
leader in providing access and a voice for sportsmen with elected
officials, land and wildlife management agencies, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and sportsmen allied industry groups across the
nation. CSF is a 501(c)(3) non-profit governed by a Board of Directors
composed of leaders of the top conservation and outdoor industry
organizations in the nation.
The International Game Fish Association (IGFA), is a 70-year-old
world renowned not-for-profit organization committed to the
conservation of game fish and the promotion of responsible, ethical
angling practices through science, education, rule making and record
keeping. IGFA accomplishes its mission by enlisting the voice of over
300 official IGFA representatives in nearly 100 countries, and more
than 15,000 angler-members around the globe.
The National Marine Manufacturers Association (NMMA), the nation's
leading marine industry trade association, represents nearly 1,600 boat
builders, engine manufacturers, and marine accessory manufacturers who
collectively produce more than 80 percent of all recreational marine
products made in the United States. The U.S. recreational marine
industry contributes more than $30 billion in new retail sales and
300,000 jobs to the economy each year.
The Billfish Foundation (TBF) is dedicated to conserving and
enhancing billfish populations around the world. The non-profit
organization is an effective advocate for international change,
synthesizing science and policy into fishery management solutions. By
coordinating efforts and speaking with one voice, TBF is able to work
for solutions that are good for billfish and not punitive to
recreational anglers.
______
Mr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Angers, And let's see. Next up,
we have Mr. Nelson, I believe. Yes. You are recognized for five
minutes, sir.
STATEMENT OF DAVID NELSON, CHARTER/COMMERCIAL FISHING CAPTAIN,
PONCE INLET, FLORIDA
Mr. Nelson. Thank you. Chairman Fleming, Ranking Member
Sablan, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today concerning NOAA's
fishery science. I am Captain David Nelson, and I have been
fishing the South Atlantic region in Florida my entire life. I
represent all American fishermen, recreational and commercial,
as well as the American seafood consumer. Many of the people I
represent were here for the rally in February 2010, the
fishermen's rally on Capitol Hill.
Many coastal communities along the South Atlantic, from
North Carolina to Florida, are suffering an economic crisis
because of the chronic and well-documented lack of basic data
and flawed science that has been used to determine the health
of their fish stocks, as we have been talking about today. A
prime example of these problems is the current closure on red
snapper fishing in the South Atlantic, from North Carolina to
Florida.
Lack of data on red snapper in particular has led
scientists to make non-science based assumptions about the
stock. The evidence is clear in the first stock assessment
known as CR-15, completed in 2008. In this assessment,
scientists had to create catches or landings of fish that did
not happen so that the computer model results would fit the
minimal data that was available. I want to repeat that because
it is worth repeating. In this assessment, NOAA scientists
created catches or landings that did not happen.
In a quote directly from SEDAR 15 concerning outdated U.S.
Fish and Wildlife surveys--this is a quote from National Marine
Fisheries scientists in the South Atlantic. ``Data from these
reports--'' talking about the U.S. Fish and Wildlife surveys.
``Data from these reports were not supposed to be included
because the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service deemed these data
untrustworthy.'' But they were used anyways.
Since they were used anyways, despite their unreliability,
in SEDAR 15, over 30 million pounds of red snapper landings
were created from thin air using these outdated Fish and
Wildlife surveys. They were used regardless of their
unreliability, as I said before. In other words, red snapper
were deliberately killed off in the computer, not by fishermen.
Just two years later, the 30 million pounds of fabricated
landings were corrected in a new assessment, known as SEDAR 24,
after an independent review by Dr. Frank Hester found serious
flaws in SEDAR 15. However, these fabricated landings, the 31
million pounds that was created out of thin air, forced a
closure of the red snapper fishery in January 2010. This cost
many people their jobs, caused businesses to suffer severe
economic losses, and millions in lost tax revenue for the
States and Federal Government. This vital fishery is still
closed today.
Due to the many flaws that were found in SEDAR 15, the
National Marine Fisheries agreed to do another assessment on
red snapper called SEDAR 24, as I have already mentioned. This
was completed in 2010, with the full involvement of fishermen
and other stakeholders. The 31 million pounds of fabricated
landings were corrected, and it looked like an accurate
assessment would be produced with SEDAR 24.
Unfortunately, this did not happen because a computer model
was chosen that destroyed the stock before 1975, before there
was any data on red snapper, before any data on red snapper
even existed. In SEDAR 24, a computer model was deliberately
chosen that destroyed the stock with artificially created poor
recruitment, which has to do with spawning potential and the
number of offspring that the stock produces, based on zero
science.
This simply means that this stock of fish, one of the most
highly reproductive species known to science, did not produce
enough offspring to maintain its own existence. In other words,
the red snapper, according to the new assessment, was conducted
on a computer-generated path to extinction without any science
or data to support this ridiculous notion. This goes against
all available science on red snapper, and disregards the best
science available on the spawn or offspring relationship known
as the spawn or recruit curve.
What happens is you have a certain number of spawning fish
in the population, as many of you have heard, and then those
without data produce a certain number of offspring. If you have
no data, you go by the spawn or recruit curve, which they did
not. This is a complete violation of Magnuson-Stevens, MS-2.
Best scientific information available, as Mr. Schwaab mentioned
earlier, must be followed. Well, that wasn't followed in SEDAR
24. It was violated.
With only two years between SEDAR 15 and SEDAR 24, there
were no data changes regarding this recruitment or offspring
from spawning. However, between the two assessments, the number
of age one red snapper being produced from one assessment to
the other was reduced by almost 6 million fish in a 20-year
period, a complete fabrication with no data, because it is
supposed to follow the spawn or recruit curve.
Now, instead of fabricated landings destroying the stock,
the CDAR that happened in SEDAR 15, in SEDAR 24 it was
fabricated poor recruitment or lack of reproduction by the
stock, with no data.
Here is an explanation of the poor recruitment before 1976.
These are National Marine Fisheries scientists, a quote from a
National Marine Fisheries scientist involved in this
assessment. ``Without any data prior to 1976, there is little
information to estimate those historical recruitment deviations
with accuracy. Thus, the estimate of historic recruitment
should not be considered reliable.'' That's a National Marine
Fisheries scientist about a closure that is going to shut
down--make people lose jobs and shut down businesses. But he
says that this should not be considered reliable information
that we are give you here.
Red snapper fishing has been closed for a year and seven
months. And during this time, there has been a severe economic
hardship in the region that has been affected. This is due to a
stock assessment that their own scientists say should not be
considered reliable.
Now, because of the seriously flaws nature of the red
snapper science, the recreational and commercial fishing
industries are now calling for oversight hearings and have been
lobbying for oversight hearings on the red snapper science. An
investigation of fabricated landings and computer-generated
extinction of a healthy fishery is necessary. I will be happy
to answer any questions that you might have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nelson follows:]
Statement of Captain David Nelson, Charter/Commercial Fishing Captain,
Ponce Inlet, Florida
Chairman Fleming and members of the subcommittee: Thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today concerning NOAA's fishery
science. I am Captain David Nelson and I have been fishing the region
under the jurisdiction of the South Atlantic Council my entire life.
This area of water is from North Carolina to Florida from 3 miles out
to 200 miles and is referred to as the South Atlantic region for
management purposes. I represent all American fishermen, recreational
and commercial, as well as the American seafood consumers.
For fisheries managers to follow the law under the Magnuson-Stevens
Act the science that is being used must be accurate. When it comes to
fisheries science, nothing is more important than the data.
Unfortunately, the data that is being used to mange nearly all of our
fisheries in the South Atlantic are not adequate. Unfortunately, many
people involved in fisheries science continuously hide behind the
``Best science available'' clause in Magnuson and this has led to many
flawed assessments being produced by SEDAR in the South Atlantic
region. SEDAR is a process of creating assessments that stands for
Southeast Data Assessment and Review. Most of the problems in the
assessment results are the result of not having data, misuse of
unreliable data, and huge assumptions about many stocks.
The recent stock assessment work has been conducted through the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) SouthEast Data, Assessment and
Review (SEDAR) process. SEDAR science is under the leadership of the
NMFS Southeast Fisheries Science Center (SEFSC) located in Miami,
Florida effecting fishing from North Carolina to Texas and the
Caribbean Sea. The SEDAR process has a history of failed stock
assessment products resulting in thousands of lost fishing jobs during
recent years. Meanwhile the NMFS leadership does nothing to mitigate
the damages to the fishing communities.
A major problem in the southeast region is some of the best
available fishery data on species like Atlantic red snapper has been no
data at all. Some SEFSC scientists create assumptions amounting to a
best guess about historical participation before recorded catches and
landings were slowly mandated by the NMFS leadership. This
misrepresentation of the past fishing efforts being utilized as the
``best scientific information available'' should be considered a
violation of the National Standard 2 intentions for the basic fishery
sciences provided in the 2006 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Reauthorization Act (MSA).
Counting how many fish are in the ocean is a daunting task with the
best data. Regional science centers, such as New England, have decades
of fisheries data from multiple sources. Even with this excellent data,
the stock assessments in the New England region are still full of
uncertainty. We are finding out now, that many fisheries are much
healthier than their assessment results had claimed. In these cases
under fishing is occurring on many stocks. The regions, where under
fishing is occurring, costs the nation jobs and violates the Magnuson-
Stevens Act where maximum sustainable yield for the benefit of the
nation is required.
In the South Atlantic region, the problems with the science are
multiplied because the data sources are extremely limited and the data
that is available is often applied wrong due to lack of important data,
science, and knowledge about the fish that is being assessed. Another
problem in the South Atlantic is that the best available science and
data on species like red snapper has not been used, which is also a
violation of MSA. All of these problems with the science have led to
job losses, businesses failing, and loss of important tax revenue.
To accurately assess the status of a stock of fish, scientists need
high quality data from a variety of sources, including fishery
dependent and fishery independent data. Fishery dependent data comes
from landings of fish by fishermen, and these are tied to many factors
outside of actual abundance, such as effort and weather. This data can
be collected by portside samplers or from fish markets reporting
landings. Fishery dependent data really only shows the health of the
fisheries landings and not the health of the stock itself. According
to, Dr. Demaster of the NMFS, in his recent testimony before the Senate
he claims, ``Basing stock assessments just on fishery dependent data is
very risky''(Senate Testimony 56:45).
Fishery independent data is collected by scientists and are not
dependent on fishing, such as underwater video and diver observations.
These data are usually collected by research vessels in a very
controlled scientific manner. This type of data is extremely important
in determining the health of a given stock of fish. In fact, without
fishery independent data it is hard to know the true health of any
stock of fish.
In the South Atlantic region, all stock assessments with a few
exceptions, are based solely on fishery dependent data. For example,
fishery independent data on red snapper does not exist in the South
Atlantic region. Red snapper is arguably the most important bottom
species for all sectors in the entire region, and in over 30 years, the
National Marine Fisheries Service has collected zero fishery
independent data on them. This important species was assessed using
only hook and line landings data which can be effected by many factors
such as; regulations, effort, weather, current, cold water, economics,
fish prices, alternative target species, angler experience, fish
biology, feeding habits, available food, and many others. This limited
data creates a lot of uncertainty.
To add to this uncertainty the fishery dependent data that has been
collected on red snapper is very limited and in many cases was not
adjusted properly. For example, headboat data must be adjusted because
they only fish a limited area and do not catch older red snapper. This
data must be adjusted so that the computer model knows that the data is
biased.
The landings records and port sampling of catches come from four
states; NC, SC, GA, and FL. The area of highest abundance for red
snapper is North Florida and Georgia, from Cape Canaveral, FL to
Savannah, Georgia. This sampling can also be broken down into sectors;
commercial, recreational for-hire, and recreational private. The for-
hire sector includes head boats and charter boats. In this region, the
largest group or sector is the private recreational fishery or private
boat owners.
This being the case then sampling should be focused in Georgia and
North Florida and on the private recreational sector. In fact the
opposite is true. In the South Atlantic region from 1977 to 2008 a
total of 13 fishing trips were sampled in the entire state of Georgia
in the recreational sector and all of these were head boat samples. In
that same time period there were a total of five private recreational
boats sampled in all four states combined, the largest sector of the
red snapper fishery (Sedar 24 Table 2.6.2). From 1990 to 2001 headboat
sampling was also extremely limited with less than 1% of trips sampled
for the decade. (Table 2.6.2)
It can easily be seen that the landings in the South Atlantic have
not been properly sampled, especially in the private recreational
sector. Since 1977 the most frequently sampled sector is the head boat
sector. The sampling of this sector dropped off tremendously from 1990
to 2008 and then increased somewhat in 2009. However, there is a heavy
reliance on the headboat data in all assessments in the South Atlantic
even though there are huge problems with this data.
For data to be usable it should cover the entire range of the
species that is being assessed. For example, red snapper live from near
shore out to 100 miles from shore in many parts of the South Atlantic
in water up to 350 feet deep. In comparison ninety percent of all
headboats fish an extremely limited area inside of thirty miles and in
water less than 120 feet deep. To reach 120 feet of water out of
Jacksonville, Florida it is over 35 miles, too far for headboats and
most recreational anglers. Headboat landings data covers less than 1/3
of the red snapper habitat and does not cover the area of highest
abundance from 120 to 160 feet of water. Another problem with the
headboat data is that headboats are not able to target all age groups
of red snapper. This causes more bias in the data. The headboat index
for all species is overused and should not be relied upon to show the
health of fish that live beyond the areas that headboats fish.
In the case of red snapper this lack of quality data caused
scientists to create catches of fish out of thin air using 40 year old
data, so that the computer model would fit the data. In other words,
fish were deliberately killed off in the computer, that were not really
caught by fishermen. In Sedar 15 the reliance on the poor data from
headboats leads to the following discussion by the assessment panel
about getting the data to fit or fixing the problem, but never
questioning the data itself:
Sedar 15 Assessment Workshop Pages 8-10:
Catch-at-age model
The catch-at-age model gave a poor fit to the 1978--1983
headboat length composition data. The problem has to do with
large number of year classes that have similar size range -
confidence limits bound mean of 700mm. The model forces many
of older fish into that length range. The removal of those
predicted lengths during 1978-1983 requires either truncated
age classes from poor recruitment or removing those larger fish
using high fishing mortality prior to the 1978-1983 period.
The first attempt to fix this problem examined changes to
selectivity patterns on larger fish early in the time series
and then allowing selectivity parameter to change annually.
This did not 8 Assessment Workshop Report South Atlantic Red
Snapper SEDAR15 SAR1 SECTION III provide a better fit to
headboat length composition and was not retained in subsequent
model runs.
It was determined that the large number of recruits that were
artificially put into system with stock recruitment function
during 50s and 60s was carrying through into predicted length
composition during 1978-1983. To reduce this problem,
recruitment deviations were begun at earlier year (1971) in
model. Although this solution fixed the problem it may be doing
so at expense of missing a much higher F in the early years of
modeling period. Discussion also focused on fact that the
observed recruitment pattern may not be defensible. Next
attempt at fitting headboat length compostion data focused on
getting rid of larger fish using increased selectivities in
period 1. Assume in period 1 all selectivities are same across
fisheries and allow selectivities to change linearly (a50) each
year shifting towards left and getting steaper. This
effectively kills off the larger fish earlier. Also fix slope
of parameter in period 2. See Fishery selectivity section for
discussion of this approach. These changes in the fishery
selectivity functions did not improve fits to the headboat
length composition. The modifications of period 1 selectivities
was dropped.
The following model runs went back to modifications of stock
recruitment function to reduce recruitment of fish during early
period. The initial period of poor stock recruitment fits were
argued to be a ``burn in'' period and there was discussion that
this might be defensible given that it includes 1950s and
1960s. If the ``burn in'' period was dropped from S/R curve it
looks good and would be defensible. Is this satisfactory? It
was decided that this approach was not satisfactory because of
possibly missing high fishing mortality during early period
that was documented in literature.
The landings data from period 1 were re-visited. A new approach
of estimating MRFSS landings from 1946 to 1980 was attempted
using ratio of commercial to recreational from later periods
and applying that during period 1. These new MRFSS estimates
did not fix the headboat length composition fits; the increased
recreational landings in period 1 was not enough to remove
large fish predictions in the 1978-1983 headboat fishery.
Another approach allowed bias estimation of those earlier
landings which did fix headboat length fits.
In the following paragraph the assessment group talks about using
US Fish and Wildlife surveys that are 30 to 40 years old even though
they were deemed unreliable by the US Fish and Wildlife Service.
Data from these reports were not included in data workshop
because MRFSS? USFW? deemed these data untrustworthy. However,
the assessment group felt that creel surveys from the 1960s and
1970s could be considered trustworthy. Recreational landings
from these reports were much higher (order of magnitude) than
linear interpolation approach (from 1946 to 1980), ratio, and
bias estimation? approach. The next step was to linear
interpolate between red snapper landings data from USFW
reports; observed data for 1955, 1960, and 1965 was
interpolated through from 1945 to 1980. Results were similar
and a bias parameter on those new landings data. The base run
used these linear interpolations on the 1945 to 1980 for
recreational landings (headboat and private); this allowed
improvement of fits to headboat length compositions. Anchor
point years for linear interpolation of recreational landings
are 1946, 1960, 1965, 1970, and 1981. There are no head boat
landings before 1972 in base run. The biomass of the stock is
below 5% of virgin biomass at terminal year in base run but
also when setting recruitment at low levels in period 1. The
assessment group felt that high fishing mortality based on
survey from sportfishing report was more realistic and
defensible than low recruitment during period 1 and poor fit of
S/R relationship.
At no time in the above discussion does anyone in the group
question the data. The reason that the above discussion took place is
that the computer was forced to match the data from the headboats even
though the data was not a true picture of the red snapper in the SA. To
help the computer results match the data 30 million pounds of red
snapper were removed from the stock that were not actually caught by
fishermen. This was done by using data that was deemed untrustworthy by
the very group that had created them, the US Fish and Wildlife service.
This was an assessment that was going to force a 40,000 square mile
closure to all bottom fishing in the South Atlantic but was found to be
fatally flawed and a new assessment was completed. Once these landings
were corrected in the next assessment called Sedar 24, it was found
that a bottom closure was not necessary and the region was saved from
economic devastation that a bottom closure would have brought.
Landings Corrected
2008 Sedar 15 Inflated Landings 2010 Sedar 24 Actual Landings
1955-1975--80 million pounds 1955-1975--50 million pounds
Difference--30 million pounds of landings created from thin air due
to lack of data.
In response to the many problems found in Sedar 15 the NMFS did
another benchmark assessment on red snapper in the South Atlantic with
fishermen involved and the new assessment was much closer to reality in
every area except for red snapper productivity. Sedar 24 still resulted
in closing the red snapper fishery because of one glaring issue, how
many juvenile red snapper were produced annually from 1955 to 1975
before there was any data. Without any data the computer model is
supposed to follow the spawner-recruit curve, which means that on
average a stock must produce enough offspring or recruits, to cover
natural mortality. Following the spawner/recruit curve without any data
was the best science available. However, without any data on
recruitment in Sedar 24, the computer was allowed to destroy the stock
from 1955 to 1975 with no data or scientific basis. This is the
explanation in Sedar 24 about the reliability of these recruitment
numbers:
Sedar 24 Assessment Workshop page 18
http://www.sefsc.noaa.gov/sedar/
The initial recruitment in 1955 was assumed to be the expected
value from the spawner-recruit curve. For the remainder of the
initialization period (1955-1975), recruitment was permitted to
deviate from the spawnerrecruit curve. However, without CPUE or
age/length composition data prior to 1976, there is little
information to estimate those historic recruitment deviations
with accuracy. Thus, the estimates of historic recruitment
should not be considered reliable
The last line above is very troubling when thousands of jobs and
hundreds of businesses depend on these estimates being reliable. This
deviation from the spawner/recruit curve, was not the best science
available and allowed the computer to remove over 5,000,000 red snapper
from the stock by not allowing the stock to reproduce at a normal
biological level. All of the best scientific information available on
red snapper has shown that red snapper are the most productive bottom
species in the entire South Atlantic without exception. In fact
according to Brown-Peterson-, ``A single nine pound female can produce
60 million eggs in one year'' (152) Red snapper fall under the category
of fish known as ``Periodic strategists'' (Rose, Cowan, Winemiller,
Hilborn, Page 299).
``The longevity and high fecundity (egg production) of periodic
strategists should more than offset their low early
survivorship, resulting in periodic strategists having the
highest compensatory reserve'' (Rose, Cowan, Winemiller,
Hilborn, -Page 300)''
Compensatory reserve is the ability to offset high mortality either
natural or fishing. This means that of all of the bottom fish in the
South Atlantic, red snapper should be the healthiest in spite of
fishing. However, the computer model base run that was chosen shows red
snapper did not even produce enough offspring to make up for natural
mortality. This also violates the laws of nature according to the
following, ``Population stability, which can include bounded
fluctuations, implies that, averaged over a long enough time period,
reproduction is balanced by mortality'' (Rose, Cowan, Winemiller,
Hilborn- page 295)
The red snapper fishery in the SA is a hook and line fishery for
all sectors. According to all scientific information available this is
one of the most environmentally friendly and sustainable types of
fishing. In fact, line caught fish are recommended by most
environmental groups as good choices for the environment. The facts are
that you have an extremely productive species of fish that has been
harvested since the early 1900's by a very sustainable and
environmentally friendly method, hook and line. This is a fish that has
a broad range of habitat and before it was closed in 2009 was
rebuilding in a healthy manner.
According to Sedar 15 the stock collapsed in 37 years under fishing
pressure. When the fishing pressure was corrected in Sedar 24 the stock
collapsed because it did not produce enough offspring to even exist and
was on its way to extinction without fishing. An important question
that needs to be answered is how did red snapper in the SA, one of the
most highly productive species in the region being caught using a
sustainable method such as hook and line, completely collapse in 37
years under limited fishing pressure? Did the stock of fish really
collapse or is the science wrong? It should be obvious that the science
is wrong and the fishery should be opened immediately by emergency rule
to help save businesses barely hanging on by a thread.
According to the last assessment Sedar 24, there are only 511,000
red snapper left from North Carolina to Florida out to 100 miles from
shore. This would make it nearly impossible for anyone regardless of
experience to go out and catch just one red snapper. Over the past
three years an overwhelming number of people in the region have given
public testimony that the red snapper population in the region is
healthier than it has been in decades. In the recent tagging trips
conducted by the state of Florida every trip has been a huge success
with numbers near 70 to 100 red snapper tagged in a single day. In the
recent NMFS long line survey conducted for one year in 2010-2011 the
most prevalent reef species caught besides black sea bass was red
snapper. In fact, the ratio of red snapper to red grouper caught on the
NMFS long line trips was 100 to 1 and these fish share the same
habitat. According to NMFS red grouper outnumber red snapper 3 to 1 in
the computer models, however even their long line survey showed that
this is not true. In the last 3-5 years red snapper landings have
outnumbered red grouper more than 100 to 1 in the region between North
Florida and South Carolina, yet, we can still fish for and catch red
grouper but not red snapper. Red snapper outnumber mangrove snapper in
the offshore waters from North Florida to South Carolina and we can
keep mangrove snapper but not red snapper. It just does not make sense.
On a personal note my summer charter income is down 90% since the
red snapper closure. My winter commercial income is down 70% since the
closure. Headboat and charter boat revenues are all down in the region,
since the closure. Fish market revenue is down since the closure. If
this closure was actually necessary then all of these businesses would
be supportive and I would too. However, this crisis has been created by
lack of data and not lack of fish and the current plan is to keep red
snapper closed until 2014. This is completely unacceptable and there
needs to be an investigation into this matter. There needs to be an
emergency opening of red snapper so that the people who are left
standing can still make something with what is left of the summer
season. Open it for three years back to old regulations that were
working and during that three years make a concerted effort to collect
data. Then in three years, complete a benchmark assessment with the
best available data that is adjusted properly and everyone in the
region will accept the results gladly.
The problems with the science in the South Atlantic region are too
numerous to count; from lack of data and knowledge about species to
limited sampling and zero fishery independent data. These assessments
can cause huge economic hardships such as lost jobs and bankrupt
businesses. These assessments can destroy people's lives with their
results and no one is held accountable because it was the best science
available. If there is not sufficient data as is the case with red
snapper, there should be no changes to regulations until data is
collected that can accurately determine the status of this fishery.
Science should not be able to destroy people's lives unless that
science at least resembles reality. The science on red snapper is not
even on the same planet as reality. We need someone in Congress to step
up and help us to get this fishery open and put people back to work.
Two other committees that we hope to get involved in this are `Science
and Technology'' which investigates science that is produced by
government agencies and the Oversight and Investigations committee that
oversees the Commerce department under which NOAA and its' science
would be included.
Businesses are being destroyed and jobs are being lost because of a
crisis created in a computer. The red snapper population in the South
Atlantic region has been rebuilding in a healthy manner since 1992 and
thousands have testified to that fact. For the science to claim that
there are only 511,000 red snapper left from North Carolina to Florida
is an insult to the hard working Americans who have been denied access
to this healthy natural resource. Please help us get this extremely
healthy fishery opened.
Chairman Fleming and other members of the subcommittee, thank you
for allowing me to testify on this important matter. I will answer any
questions that you might have.
References and Sources
1. Regional Differences in Florida Red Snapper Reproduction
NANCY J. BROWN-PETERSON1, KAREN M. BURNS2, and ROBIN M.
OVERSTREET1
\1\Department of Coastal Sciences, The University of
Southern Mississippi,
703 East Beach Dr., Ocean Springs MS 39564, USA
\2\Mote Marine Laboratory, 1600 Ken Thompson Parkway,
Sarasota FL
34236, USA
SEDAR 15
SEDAR 24
http://www.sefsc.noaa.gov/sedar/
______
Mr. Fleming. Yes. Thank you, and let's see. Mr. DiDomenico,
you are next, sir.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY DiDOMENICO, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, GARDEN
STATE SEAFOOD ASSOCIATION
Mr. DiDomenico. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Subcommittee. My name is Greg DiDomenico. I represent a trade
association of commercial fishermen called the Garden State
Seafood Association.
I have several examples from the Mid-Atlantic, several
species, four actually, where the state of the science and the
system are failing us, along with several recommendations for
how we might improve the current situation for scientists,
fishermen, managers, consumers.
The first species is butterfish. The stock was assessed in
2004, and a rebuilding plan was required due to an overfished
status at that time. In 2010, an assessment was conducted, but
could not determine if the stock was in an overfished
condition. More importantly, it did determine that the 2004
assessment was not suitable for management purposes, yet a
rebuilding plan remains in place using that faulty data.
We also have learned that its natural mortality and
environmental factors are determining stock size and rebuilding
rates, not management, not the fishing industry. While
overfishing has never been determined for butterfish, and the
population strength has been underestimated by an inappropriate
survey, we are enduring precautionary management and are under
rebuilding plans that are not measurable.
Monkfish. In 1999, a permanent closure of the fishery was
pending due to an inaccurate abundance estimate. A closure was
avoided by a cooperative survey combining commercial fishing
expertise and a rigorous scientific methodology of the National
Marine Fisheries Service scientists. This joint effort
estimated the stock size to be two times as large as they once
thought.
Despite the scientific success, the industry had to pursue
earmarks from Congress since 2000 to fund the surveys, instead
of receiving funds from NOAA. While the fishery was worth $17
million in 2009, the assessment was considered data poor, and
the result is inconsistent management. Instead of making this
research a priority, NOAA will allocate money to catch share
programs.
Sturgeon. In 1998, the National Marine Fisheries Service
enacted a complete prohibition on the harvest of sturgeon. At
that time, the National Marine Fisheries Service did not list
the species as endangered. Today, currently, the Service is
reconsidering its status only 12 years into a 41-year
rebuilding plan. Yet, without a stock assessment, the Service
concludes in 2010 the stock has failed to recover since the
moratorium was put in place.
This conclusion is based upon an estimate of the Hudson
River population between 1986 and 1995. We have been told by
the National Marine Fisheries Service in this case 25-year old
data is the best available science.
During the last three years, two fishermen on one vessel
with scientists in 66 research days tagged and released 323
sturgeon, individual sturgeon, in Delaware Bay. 140 of these
were mature large fish, a size previously thought nonexistent.
This data has yet to be considered by the National Marine
Fisheries Service.
Atlantic mackerel. The National Marine Fisheries Service
encouraged the industry to Americanize its fishery in the
nineties, urging a million dollars in private investments. In
2006, the stock assessment recommended a combined U.S.-Canadian
quota of 186,000 metric tons, and concluded the resource was
not overfished, overfishing was not occurring.
In 2009, U.S. and Canadian scientists collaborated on an
assessment. The results were an overall quota reduction of more
than 100,000 metric tons and an unknown overfishing status. In
2001, the Mid-Atlantic Science and Statistical Committee
recommended an 80,000 overall metric ton quota, but to account
for additional scientific and management uncertainty, in
accordance with National Standard 1 guidelines, the U.S. quota
was reduced by another 15 percent by the Council.
I want to summarize with recommendations. For butterfish,
expand the current MSA--I am sorry, expand the current
Magnuson-Stevens Act short-lived exemption for monkfish.
Recommend the agency conduct a fourth monkfish cooperative
trawl survey. For sturgeon, recommend the National Marine
Fisheries Service conduct a stock assessment immediately to
determine the actual stock condition to inform the ESA listing
process. And for mackerel, recommend the U.S. implement a
research program with Canada and recommend the Service
implement an exemption from Magnuson-Stevens Act control rules
based on the shared stock characteristics of this resource.
In my last 10 seconds, I am going to try to do something
extremely difficult, but I am going to do it. One final
recommendation. In an attempt to briefly describe the general
Magnuson-Stevens quota-setting framework, you should know the
following. The annual catch limit is reduced from the
acceptable biological amount, which is reduced from the
overfishing limit, which is also known as the maximum
sustainable yield.
Remember, maximum sustainable yield is the national
objective of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. To put it in simpler
terms, under the new MSA requirements, we routinely reduce a
harvest potential to avoid overfishing by 25 percent. We
consider both scientific and management uncertainty to reduce
quotas further to compensate for the lack of science. We closed
directed fisheries at 80 to 90 percent of their target amounts.
And just in case we exceed one of these already conservative
quotas, we apply other provisions like accountability measures
to reduce and penalize future quotas.
To truly understand the effects of Magnuson-Stevens Act,
the quota-setting framework and impacts poor science has had on
our economy, we highly recommend the Subcommittee to request
from the National Marine Fisheries Service the specific quota-
setting calculations for each species managed by the regional
councils.
Thank you very much for your time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. DiDomenico follows:]
Statement of Gregory DiDomenico, Executive Director,
Garden State Seafood Association, Cape May, New Jersey
Chairman Fleming, Ranking Member Christensen, and distinguished
members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to speak with
you today about the implementation of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act of 2006 (``MSA'') and the affect it has
had on domestic fishery management and the industries under its
authority.
My name is Gregory DiDomenico, Executive Director of the Garden
State Seafood Association (GSSA). The GSSA membership is comprised of
commercial fishermen, vessel owners, seafood processors and associated
businesses in the State of New Jersey. GSSA and its members are
involved in all aspects of the fishery management process. Our members
occupy advisory panel seats on management councils, participate in
cooperative research, and have a healthy respect for the ocean
environment, all combined with a serious business acumen.
For today's hearing I intend to explain how two major policy
changes implemented via the 2006 MSA reauthorization are impacting the
U.S. fishing industry and ultimately our coastal economies. Those two
policy changes are: (1) the enhanced role of the Science and
Statistical Committee (SSC); and (2) the establishment of setting
annual catch limits to prevent overfishing. As a result of the
reauthorization, NOAA's NMFS revised guidance for implementing National
Standard 1and did so in February of 2009. The NS1 guidelines were
revised to provide guidance to the Councils on how to implement certain
provisions that are now required components of federal fishery
management plans to address scientific and management uncertainty when
setting quotas. The revisions were designed to prevent overfishing on
the managed resources, rebuild overfished stocks, and achieve optimum
yield (OY).
Unfortunately the new guidance manifested into an interpretation by
some SSC members that is overly precautious and risk averse and in the
worst case, an acknowledgement that in the absence of information, we
must reduce quotas. In addition, the Annual Catch Limit (ACL) and
Accountability Measure (AM) requirements of the MSA created standards
that are apparently beyond the capabilities of our current fisheries
science program, resulting in several layers of uncertainty buffers
that are reducing fishery yields and will continue to do so in the
future unless our science drastically improves.
In our opinion, the situation is preventing the fishery management
councils from meeting other important provisions of the NS 1 guidelines
such as achieving OY from each fishery for the benefit of the Nation.
The domestic commercial fishing industry believes strongly that the
ACL/ACM/SSC requirements under NS 1 are contrary to achieving OY and if
this approach continues, quotas will not be based upon the best
scientific information, but instead merely on what information is
available which will ensure that quotas will be reduced by scientific
uncertainties to compensate for avoiding overfishing at any cost and
achieving rebuilding in as short a time as possible.
Clearly, we must work to reduce scientific uncertainty by
increasing funding and ensuring that key stocks are assessed on a more
regular basis in every single region. We must support the councils and
ensure they have the necessary information so that quota decisions are
accurate and precise rather than exercises in precautionary management.
My testimony includes 4 species that are critically important to
our Mid Atlantic commercial fisheries. Each species is unique,
biologically and each is plagued by the same management issues stemming
primarily from a lack of adequate science. Those 4 species are;
butterfish, monkfish, Atlantic sturgeon and Atlantic mackerel. The
proper management of each of these stocks is crucial to the success of
our fishermen and the economies of our fishing communities.
1) Butterfish
2004 Stock Assessment and Mandated Rebuilding Program
In 2004, a Scientific Assessment Review Committee (SARC) was
convened to assess the status of the butterfish stock. The SARC is an
independent panel of experts that reviews the assessment. The SARC
concluded that the stock was not undergoing overfishing but was in an
overfished condition. The Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council
(MAFMC) was notified by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration's (NOAA) National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) on
February 11, 2005 that the butterfish stock was designated as
overfished and a rebuilding plan would have to be established requiring
rebuilding of the stock in a time as short as possible but not to
exceed 10 years.
2010 Stock Assessment
The conclusion of the 2010 SARC was that the stock was not
undergoing overfishing but could not determine if the stock is
overfished. The unfortunate aspect of this situation is that the SARC
also concluded that the results of in 2004 were inaccurate and not
suitable for management decisions. So a rebuilding program was set
forth for no reason and 6 years later the available data are still
insufficient to determine whether butterfish is overfished.
Unknown Status will persist due to unique biological characteristics
Given the fact that butterfish has a very short lifespan (1-3
years), high natural mortality, highly uncertain and variable survey
indices, and exceedingly variable catch estimates. It is possible even
in 10 years we will still not have an assessment that provides much
reliable information about the condition and productivity of the
butterfish stock. If we did have such an assessment, it would be out of
date upon completion because most of the butterfish that were alive
then will be dead before final review of the assessment, and even less
would be alive by the time that information worked its way through the
specification process.
Exemption for the Butterfish Stock
The 2007 MSA reauthorization provided an exemption for some marine
species with short life cycles. Abbreviated lifecycle characteristics
limit the ability of managers to forecast abundance, set control rules,
and achieve maximum sustained yield (MSY). The MSA allows for a
specific exemption from ACL for species with a life cycle of
approximately one year that are not overfished but requires an estimate
of MSY and a catch level that does not exceed MSY. However, the
application of the exemption is not clear when it comes to managing a
species with an extremely high natural mortality rate (M) that
essentially complete their life cycle within a year but have some
residual population remaining beyond the first year of life.
A simple example of the survival of butterfish is that if 1000
butterfish are born in a given year only 41% survive to a full Age 1.
Butterfish have been described to have great potential to rebuild in a
relatively short period of time because some reach maturity at in their
first year and nearly all are mature at Age 2.
Fishing Mortality is Not Affecting Butterfish
The available data for butterfish indicate that fishing has almost
no effect on butterfish abundance and it appears that enough fish
survive to maintain the reproductive potential of the stock. The
fishing mortality rate (F) applied to butterfish is exceptionally low.
The recent Stock Assessment Workshop (SAW) estimated that absolute
fishing mortality in 2008 was F=0.02, a very low rate compared to other
managed stocks.
Trawl Survey not Suitable to Estimate Abundance
Adding to our science problems is the difficulty of generating an
accurate estimate of butterfish abundance from the survey index. The
habits of butterfish make it difficult to sample accurately in the
standard federal trawl survey. It is increasingly clear that the survey
only partially samples the butterfish population, likely
underestimating abundance thereby generating scientific and management
uncertainty. These uncertainties force precautionary decision-making
when it comes to setting ACL which negatively impacts fishing
activities directed at other species, in particular the Loligo squid
fishery.
Allowable Biological Catch (ABC) Reductions
During the time between the two stock assessments the butterfish
ABC was reduced from 4,545 metric tons in 2004 to only 1,500 metric
tons in 2010.
Annual Biological Catch, Annual Catch Limits and Accountability
Measures
In 2012 the butterfish ABC is set equal to the ACL which allows for
a harvest of 3,622 metric tons. To account for management uncertainty
and other considerations the MAFMC applied a 10% buffer and an Annual
Catch Target (ACT) of 3,260 metric tons was approved. Despite an
apparent doubling of survey results, rigid uncertainty buffers continue
to reduce yield from this stock when it is likely that harvest could be
increased substantially on a sustainable basis.
Solutions
We recommend expanding the current short-lived species exemption in
the MSA to include species with brief life cycle characteristics (not
just one year) that also experience a high rate of natural mortality.
2) Monkfish
A Fishery Management Plan is developed
The directed commercial fishery for Atlantic monkfish did not begin
to develop until the 1980s and landings increased substantially through
the 1990s. In 1999, the New England Fishery Management Council
developed the initial fishery management plan for monkfish and under
pressure from NMFS, proposed to close the directed monkfish fishery
permanently, citing concerns that the stock was so small it could not
sustain a directed fishery.
NMFS Trawl Survey not suitable for estimating abundance
The primary problem was that the NMFS survey vessels did not catch
monkfish during the spring and autumn federal trawl surveys which were
the only fishery independent data sources available to managers. At
issue was the type of net being deployed on federal survey vessels (not
designed to catch monkfish) and the speed at which the nets were being
towed. Poor results from the survey resulted in inaccurate science
which forced managers to conclude that the monkfish stock was in dire
condition. Unfortunately, these data were being considered the best
available scientific information by the NMFS.
Cooperative Efforts Yields Best Available Science
In 1999, compelled by a pending permanent closure of the directed
fishery, the fishing industry approached NMFS requesting funding for a
pilot project to conduct a monkfish-specific cooperative trawl survey
using federal scientists onboard industry vessels working with monkfish
fishermen towing the appropriate nets at the correct speed.
The Agency agreed to a small scale NMFS-Industry cooperative pilot
project which proved successful. Based on the experience of the pilot
project a federally-funded coast-wide cooperative monkfish bottom trawl
survey was completed in 2001. The swept area biomass estimate
calculated from that survey proved that the monkfish stock was 2 times
larger than the estimate being used by NMFS to justify closing the
directed fishery. Based on the results of the cooperative research and
to NMFS and the New England Fishery Management Council's credit, the
directed fishery was not closed and the fishery management plan was
implemented with provisions that included a directed fishery.
Data Poor Status Persists
Despite monkfish becoming one of the top three most valuable
finfish species on entire the East Coast, ex-vessel value reported by
NMFS as high as $44M in some years during 1995-2004; and $17M in 2009,
the stock still remains on the Agency's ``data poor'' list. It is
inconceivable that a core stock of such value continues to suffer from
a lack of reliable scientific information.
Despite the success of the 2001 cooperative survey, NMFS was not
supportive of the monkfish survey and would not commit to a triennial
survey, even though it was scientifically sound. The position of the
NMFS was that a survey dedicated to monkfish was too expensive
(approximate cost is $1.5M every third year) and consumed excessive
staff time for data on just a single species.
In light of NMFS's disinterest in continuing the monkfish survey
the fishing industry was forced to seek earmarks from Congress to fund
subsequent cooperative trawl surveys and try to improve the level of
scientific understanding. Thankfully, Congress also recognized the
value of the data generated by the monkfish survey and funded two
additional surveys in 2004 and 2009 from the ``National Cooperative
Research'' line item in the NOAA/NMFS budget.
Inconsistent Quotas Resulting from Inconclusive Assessments
Due to the poor understanding of monkfish it has been difficult to
determine if and when the stock was overfished and if overfishing was
occurring. Annual quotas were set for the first 7 years of management
using catches from the unreliable federal autumn trawl survey as the
primary data input. Because the trawl survey was not suitable to
estimate abundance, the result was fluctuating quotas and inconsistent
fishing opportunities throughout the past decade.
For example, the days available for fishermen to target monkfish in
the directed fishery in the Southern Management Area (SMA), which
covers New Jersey to North Carolina whipsawed from 40 days a year in
2000 down to 28 in 2004, back to 39 in 2005, and down to a low of only
12 days allowed in 2006. Fishing days were increased to 23 per year
starting in 2007 and is set at 28 days for the current fishing season
2010-2011.
The monkfish quota fluctuated similarly since it was also linked to
effort and autumn trawl survey data. In the SMA, the quota was reduced
from a high of 21,325,318 pounds in 2005 to a low of 8,084,353 pounds
in 2006--a precipitous near 40% decrease in one year due solely to a
lack of reliable science and subsequent precautionary decision-making.
In 2010-2011 the quota was set at 11,243,562 pounds.
Best Available Scientific Information
Today, monkfish remains a data poor stock and no cooperative trawl
survey is being planned by NMFS. Sadly, NOAA requested the ``National
Cooperative Research'' line item contained in the FY2012 NOAA budget
request be parsed into funding for other programs (e.g. to fund
research in catch share fisheries and to develop eco-friendly fishing
gear) thereby reducing survey funding opportunities and highlighting
the agency's lack of commitment to improve monkfish assessment science.
Despite this, industry efforts continue in 2011 to seek funding for a
fourth and final monkfish survey to be conducted in spring 2012 but the
current earmark situation has effectively undermined those efforts.
Annual Catch Limits and Accountability Measures
The Secretary of Commerce recently implemented a final rule
(Amendment 5; See 76 FR 30265) to bring the monkfish fishery management
plan into compliance with the ACL and AM requirements contained in the
reauthorized MSA. Among these new measures are formal consideration of
both scientific and management uncertainties which, in the case of
monkfish, have not improved measurably since the plan was implemented
in 2000. Thus, we can expect more precautionary management decisions
and buffers in the future with no clear plan to address the root cause
of the problem which remains the lack of reliable scientific
information.
Solutions
We recommend the Agency conduct a fourth cooperative trawl survey
in 2012 to ensure that the monkfish catch rates on the R/V Bigelow,
NMFS' new vessel being used in the autum trawl survey, are calibrated
with previous cooperative survey results. This continuation of the
cooperative trawl survey will help to ensure that quotas are set based
upon the best available science and will help to remove monkfish from
the data poor list.
3) Atlantic Sturgeon
The Fishery and the Moratorium
Historically, there was a large commercial fishery for Atlantic
sturgeon during the early to mid 1990s. This directed fishery was by
far the largest source of fishing-related mortality, reaching a 90-year
peak of approximately 100 metric tons before being closed by the
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC) throughout the
entire range from Maine to Florida, in 1998.
The First Endangered Species Act (ESA) Debate
In September 1998, NMFS issued a ruling citing the entire suite of
state and federal protective measures already in place, including those
that were to be implemented, as reasons not to support an ESA listing
of Atlantic sturgeon at that time. In fact, NMFS indicated that by 1998
all state jurisdictions within in the U.S. range of the species had
implemented complete prohibitions on both harvest and possession. (See
63 FR 50189). In this same ruling, NMFS went so far as to honor the
pending closure of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as yet another
critical conservation benefit that mitigated any need for an ESA
listing. Consistent with the 1998 position, NMFS closed all federal
waters to sturgeon fishing in 1999. The Agency stated that ``the
duration of the moratorium is anticipated to be approximately 41 years
from its initiation.'' (See 63 FR 50189).
The Present ESA Debate
Today, just 12 years into a 41 year recovery plan, NMFS is
proposing to list Atlantic sturgeon under the ESA and the Agency has
never ever conducted a single sturgeon stock assessment. In fact, the
Agency has never produced a full population estimate for any sturgeon
DPS they propose to list on the entire East Coast. Instead, the NMFS
stated on January 6, 2010 that the stock has now ``failed to recover in
the time since a coastwise fishing moratorium was put in place in
1998'' (see 75 FR 838) despite previously acknowledging 41 years would
be needed to achieve full recovery. Proposing an ESA listing now, just
12 years into a 41 year plan, with no population assessment is both
disingenuous and remarkably unscientific.
Poor Data Persists
To justify the proposed ESA listing of 2010 the NMFS claims that
their ``best available scientific data'' is a single estimate of 870
adults from the Hudson River from 1986-1995. Thus, the entire East
Coast Atlantic sturgeon ESA listing is based on this ``best available
scientific information'' which is not a stock assessment at all, which
incorporates data points that are 25 years old, and which contains no
information on stock condition since the species was afforded full
protection in 1998-99. While the Agency has admitted they ``may likely
underestimate current conditions'' (See 75 FR 839), they are unwilling
to consider the recent scientific information collected by the New
Jersey fishing industry and University of Delaware scientists during
2009-2011.
Cooperative Science Yields New Data
A NOAA grant was used to fund sturgeon tagging activities in the
Mid-Atlantic Bight during 2009, 2010 and 2011. The work was conducted
by researchers and an experienced New Jersey commercial fisherman using
gillnets designed and fished in a specific manner to catch and release
sturgeon.
During 2009, researchers caught 55 individual fish in just 20 short
sampling events with a single 100 meter gillnet. There were no
recaptures and 54 of the fish were reported mature. The fish averaged
163 cm in length and ranged from 120-226 cm.and 12 of the fish (21.8%
of the total) were larger than 200 cm long. Of particular interest is
the existence of many very large fish which NMFS considers to be
exceedingly rare. The information being cited by NMFS to support an ESA
listing includes the opinion that fish larger than 200 cm are rarely
observed and corresponds to an age range of 11 to 20 years.
During 2010, researchers caught 54 individual fish in17 short
sampling events. There were no recaptures (of 2009 or 2010 tagged fish)
and 50 of those fish were also reported mature. The fish averaged 163
cm in length and ranged from 119-230 cm. At least thirteen of these
fish (24.1% of the total) were larger than 200 cm.
During 2011, researchers caught 214 individual fish in just 29 days
of sampling effort. There were 5 recaptures of fish tagged in 1994 and
no recaptures of fish tagged in 2009 or 2010. Thirty six of these fish
(16.8%) measured larger than 200 cm and ranged from 71-237 cm in total
length.
In just 66 sampling days during 3 brief spring seasons, scientists
and one NJ fisherman caught and released 323 individual sturgeon.
Genetic data indicate these fish represent approximately 16% of the
NMFS estimate of the entire Hudson River adult population. The highest
rate of catch recorded during the 3-year study was in 2011 when 20
individuals were caught in just a single day of fishing a 100 meter
gillnet. Also caught and released were at least 140 mature fish so
large (and old) they are considered to be virtually non-existent in the
report used by NMFS to justify the proposed ESA listing.
Old Data or Best Available Science
Despite having no reliable stock assessment on Atlantic sturgeon
and after industry has demonstrated that large fish previously thought
rare are actually relatively abundant, NMFS does not appear willing to
accept the results of the tagging research. The new tagging data were
submitted to NMFS during the public comment process. In fact, these
data may not even be considered in the peer review process of the
Agency's 2011 ESA listing process for reasons we simply cannot
comprehend.
ESA Impacts on Other Directed Fisheries
When commercial fishermen are harvesting Atlantic monkfish, in the
Mid-Atlantic region and elsewhere along the East Coast they may
inadvertently interact with Atlantic sturgeon. As sturgeon abundance
increases so too does the probability that sturgeon may come in contact
with fishing gear set for species other than sturgeon. Common sense and
sound fisheries management scientific principles dictate that as
Atlantic sturgeon benefit from full-scale management protection
throughout their range they naturally will rebound and become
numerically more abundant.
Our concern is that NMFS will once again gravitate toward
precautionary decision-making to the detriment of the fishing industry
and coastal economies. Unfortunately, this is precisely where NMFS is
headed regarding Atlantic sturgeon, all directly attributed to a lack
of scientific information and the lack of agency commitment to generate
it.
Solutions
We recommend NMFS be required to conduct a sturgeon stock
assessment immediately using the best available science to determine
the coast-wide condition and abundance of the stock and to inform the
ESA listing process.
4) Atlantic mackerel
The Mackerel Fishery and US Production
In 1976, the U.S. established control of the Atlantic mackerel
fishery with the enactment of the Magnuson -Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act. In the early 1980's landings were
about 3000 metric tons and increased to more than 30,000 metric tons.
In an effort to Americanize the fishery and with considerable
investment from U.S. shoreside companies, U.S. exports of all mackerel
products totaled 55,858 mt valued at $58.2 million in 2006. In 2007, US
exports of all mackerel products totaled 30,380 mt valued at $34.0
million. Recent catches have decreased dramatically due to lack of
availability, lack of effort and other unknown causes. A ``regime
shift'', due perhaps to climate change, is one suspected factor since
catches in Newfoundland are increasing while U.S. domestic catches are
a fraction of what they once were.
The Stock Assessment Process
In January of 2006 the Scientific Assessment Review Committee
(SARC) held its 42nd Northeast Stock Assessment Workshop (SAW) and
assessed the health of the Atlantic mackerel resource. At the time of
that assessment, the Status Stock Determination for Atlantic mackerel
was the stock was not overfished and that overfishing was not occurring
and that the annual total catch should not exceed 186,000 metric tons.
In 2009, due to the trans-boundary nature of the Atlantic mackerel
resource in the northwest Atlantic region, the NMFS decided to conduct
a joint stock assessment with the Canadian Department of Fisheries and
Oceans through the Trans-boundary Resources Assessment Committee (TRAC)
process, setting aside the U.S. SARC process that had been used in the
past. The TRAC concluded that the status of Atlantic mackerel is
unknown and also recommended that annual total catches not exceed
80,000 metric tons, for both countries, using average catches as a
proxy for an overfishing level (OFL).
The Disadvantage of a Trans-Boundary Resource to Domestic Fisheries
While US producers' opportunity to harvest Atlantic mackerel was
reduced by more than 140,000 metric tons, literally overnight, the
Canadian government ignored the TRAC advice, allowing the Canadian
industry to take as much as 65,000 metric tons, of the 80,000 metric
tons, for themselves. Furthermore, U.S. law requires Canadian catches
to be deducted from the U.S. ABC calculation and Canada's fishermen are
under no current obligation to fish within U.S.-established MSA
resulting in a preferred competitive position for Canada. While catches
off the Newfoundland shores are increasing, the potential for this
trans-boundary resource to be harvested solely by Canada is real and
will harm the interests of U.S. fishermen.
A Formal Sharing Agreement in Needed
Congressional action is necessary to require the U.S. government to
implement an Atlantic mackerel resource sharing agreement with Canada
and begin to budget and plan for the bilateral Atlantic mackerel
research program identified by the TRAC two years ago. The U.S. fishing
industry has requested that the NMFS pursue and secure a resource
sharing agreement with Canada which could implement a research agenda
between the two countries and make it possible for an exemption from
control rules that reduce potential U.S. quotas.
Science and Statistical Committee Quota Recommendation
This year, the Mid Atlantic Fishery Management Council's (MAFMC)
Science and Statistical Committee (SSC) again used the 2009 TRAC
results to set an Acceptable Biological Catch (ABC) of 80,000 metric
tons for both nations' fisheries, as best available science for the
2012 fishing year.
Annual Biological Catch, Annual Catch Limits and Accountability
Measures
Following the SSC's determination of the ABC, the MAFMC, citing
additional concerns about the stock beyond those already considered by
the SSC, decided to invoke a more conservative interpretation of the
National Standard 1 Guidelines concerning the application of scientific
uncertainty and further reduced the U.S. quota.
After considerable discussion and some confusion about where the
line between management uncertainty and scientific uncertainty should
be drawn, the MAFMC applied an additional 15% buffer to the commercial
quota for mackerel, which had the effect of further reducing the quota
to an Annual Catch Target (ACT) of 34,907 metric tons.
Due to rigid MSA requirements and confusion among fishery managers
about whether or not the law requires the production of sustainable
fishery yields or the application of layers of scientific uncertainty,
the U.S. mackerel fishery which has not been declared to be overfished,
has seen significant quota reductions.
Solutions
We recommend requiring the U.S. government implement the start of a
research agenda with Canada and also consider the shared stock status
of the Atlantic mackerel resource and implement an exemption from the
MSA control rules that reduce potential U.S. quotas.
Conclusions
Our written testimony is distilled from attending 7 years of
fishery management meetings regarding these species and from countless
documents provided by the NMFS, NEFSC and MAFMC. We have attempted to
provide the Subcommittee with the relevant information about these 4
stocks, the condition of the science, the real impacts on the
management and in some cases, the impacts on our fishing activities and
quotas.
The ACL and AM requirements of the MSA are creating standards that
are apparently beyond the capabilities of our current fisheries science
program, resulting in layers of uncertainty that are reducing fishery
yields. The National Standard 1 Guidelines (NS1) have evolved to
include such a level of precautionary decision-making that considers
both scientific and management uncertainty, that we believe prevents
the U.S. fishing industry from achieving optimum yield.
Furthermore, even for stocks not being overfished or where
overfishing is not occurring, or specifically when stock assessments
yield inconclusive results, we may never reach the optimum yield
benchmark. This is the true weakness of U.S. fisheries management
policy yet achieving optimum yields is the cornerstone objective of
MSA.
The U.S. fishing industry needs strong support from Congress to
increase the NMFS science budgets and require that research be of
stock-assessment grade quality. Furthermore, Congress needs to require
NMFS to produce the necessary information to meet its management
objectives or adjust the MSA implementation requirements to reflect a
better balance consistent with the state of our knowledge. If this is
not accomplished we are destined to continue this disturbing trend of
quota reductions and lost economic opportunity.
______
Mr. Fleming. OK. Thank you, sir. And next up is Mr. Gauvin.
STATEMENT OF JOHN GAUVIN, FISHERIES SCIENCE PROJECTS DIRECTOR,
ALASKAN SEAFOOD COOPERATIVE
Mr. Gauvin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Committee. For the record, I am John Gauvin. I am a fishery
economist, the Science Director for the Alaska Seafood
Cooperative, and I have been involved in fishery science in
Alaska since 1993.
The question today is whether NOAA's baseline science is
costing jobs in groundfish fisheries in Alaska. And I say the
answer is yes. It took me nine pages of testimony in written
form to get to that, and the answer is because it is
complicated.
The one area of concern I have for NOAA science in Alaska,
it is these duties to evaluate the effects of fisheries on
protected resources and listed species under the Endangered
Species Act. There, there is a lack of good, fundamental,
objective science. In my opinion, NOAA has relied on
substandard science, biased approaches, and faulty review
processes in its science related to--particularly to the
Steller sea lion and the biological opinions and recovery
plans.
The result has been that key fisheries in the Aleutian
Islands have been closed. We estimate $60 million annual loss
in revenues in those fisheries to fishing boats and the
processing sector, boats that are now tied up and processing
facilities that are idle for months when they normally would be
fishing for Pacific cod and Atka mackerel, and communities at
risk in Adak and Atka.
In my opinion, this didn't need to happen, and I think
application of good science would have prevented it. My remarks
cover extensively the good science that NOAA is doing, and the
Alaska Fishery Science Center's commitment to funding fish
surveys on an annual basis, the high quality stock assessments,
state-of-the-art research on ecosystems, and fish habitat.
I personally know that the agency has a willingness to
engage in cooperative research to find creative solutions to
issues like bycatch and reducing seafloor contactive trawling.
I think in the stock assessment process we have an open and
transparent review process. We have a plan team SSC process
that is comprehensive and allows outside scientific input in a
meaningful way.
I feel that this is a good story in Alaska. However, every
year there are threats to the funding in these surveys. When I
read about marine spatial planning and oceans councils and
regional ecosystem protection restoration initiatives from
headquarters, I am concerned that money will be pulled away
from these fundamental stock assessment surveys so critical,
and by critical I mean that with increased cost to us of
uncertainty, I would estimate that by just changing the stock
assessment to every other year in the Bering Sea, we might
reduce our annual catch limits by 30 or 40 percent. That is 30
or 40 percent of 2 million metric tons harvested annually.
My chief complaint on the NOAA science in Alaska is the
shortcomings with approach to applying science to protected
resources and ESA listed species. NMFS is responsible for
preparing biological opinions and recovery plans, and in this
process, I think they have used a very closed process, without
transparency, that lacks opportunities for meaningful public
input or input from outside scientists. They have used
timelines that are unrealistic and don't allow for meaningful
comment and input by the North Pacific Fishery Management
Council and the public.
And in their attempts to review these opinions using
scientific reviews, the agency is pushing for use of the Center
for Independent Experts, a NOAA-funded program, which I believe
is a closed process, has little opportunity for input from
outside scientists. And in this case, the agency is pushing for
a process that does not allow evaluation of the conclusions of
their biological opinion.
I feel the reforms that need to be made in Alaska are
simple. We need the agency doing protected resource analyses
and biological opinions to have a timeline that allows for
constructive review of drafts, not just final products, have a
requirement for outside review in the development stages of
biological opinions, use of a transparent, open process and
transparent standards for evaluating effects of fisheries on
listed species are needed.
We need an independent review process that uses a
transparent process similar to the one that the States of
Washington and Alaska are putting together for their review of
this biological opinion, and I think that NMFS could, you know,
open up their terms to match those of the State's independent
review.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to talk about one
example where I feel NMFS isn't doing research in Alaska where
it should be. The North Pacific Research Board and a private
foundation called the North Pacific Fisheries Foundation have
funded a project to tag active mackerel in the Western Aleutian
Islands. This project would elucidate key information on
mackerel movement and whether fishing in outside areas is
actually able to catch the fish inside near Steller sea lion
rookeries.
The project would use NMFS' own scientists for most of the
scientific methods and field work. It has been funded and was
scheduled to occur in 2011-2012. I learned recently that NOAA
is canceling this research. I haven't exactly ascertained the
reason for this, but I believe it has to do with their concern
over litigation in catching any fish at all in the Western
Aleutians. However, I believe this is not really a concern
because the research wouldn't involve much fish harvest. But
this is critical information to answering the questions about
whether fisheries are competing with Steller sea lions in this
area, and we are pushing the agency to take a hard look at
doing this research and following through with their commitment
to collect the data necessary to understand the sea lion
fisheries competition issue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gauvin follows:]
Statement of John Gauvin, Fisheries Science Director,
Alaska Seafood Cooperative
Thank you Mr. Chairman. For the record, my name is John Gauvin. I
am a resource economist and have been involved in both applied research
and the use of science in fisheries management in Alaska since 1993.
I would first like to express my gratitude to you Mr. Chairman and
to the members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to provide my
perspective on NOAA's science activities in support of the management
in federal waters groundfish fisheries in Alaska.
My area of specialization has been applied research on bycatch
reduction, effects of fishing on habitat, management systems to
increase economic efficiency, and approaches to implementation of
ecosystem management in Alaska fisheries. I am currently the fishery
science director for the Alaska Seafood Cooperative and also
simultaneously direct several cooperative research projects in Alaska
and the Pacific Northwest for clients including the North Pacific
Fisheries Research Foundation, Environmental Defense Fund, and other
governmental and non-governmental organizations. Finally, I have served
on the board of the North Pacific Research Board since 2001 and I was a
recipient of NOAA's Environmental Hero Award in 2000 for conservation
engineering extension work with the flatfish trawl industry in the
Bering Sea.
I would like to title my testimony today as: ``NOAA's science to
support fishery management in federal fisheries off Alaska: The Good,
the Bad, and the potentially Ugly''. To summarize my perspective today,
I would say that there is a lot of good that can be said about NOAA's
role in providing the fundamental science products needed to support
the economically important commercial fisheries in federal waters off
Alaska. This is not to say that NOAA's science in the North Pacific is
beyond reproach and I will talk about one important shortcoming where I
feel there is a great deal of room for improvement. But I will start
with where things are going well and outline the importance of
continuing that important work to support sustainable fisheries.
The Good:
The Alaska Fisheries Science Center (AFSC) plays a crucial role in
providing supporting science across an ever-increasing set of issues,
scientific domains, and regulatory mandates. AFSC's role in Alaska to
furnish baseline science has expanded in step with the complexity of
fishery management. This tracks the ever increasing set of demands by
public, industry, environmental, and governmental stakeholders who
insist that fisheries be managed sustainably based on the best peer-
reviewed science while providing food, employment, and recreation to
the nation.
If one peruses the Alaska Fishery Science Center's (AFSC) website,
the breadth of the Center's fishery science mission becomes evident.
The AFSC provides science products and services for everything from:
Fisheries Assessment Surveys; North Pacific Groundfish Observer
Program; Ecosystem Monitoring and Assessment; Habitat Assessment and
Marine Chemistry; Genetics- Stock Identification; Fishery Ecology Diet
and Zooplankton; Age and Growth; Stock Assessment and Multispecies
Assessments; Economic and Social Sciences Research; Bering Sea
Integrated Ecosystem Research Program; Resource Ecology and Ecosystem
Modeling; Conservation Engineering; Marine Mammal Research; and Studies
of loss of Sea Ice. All of these are important at some level to
managing sustainable fisheries in Alaska given the expectations at the
scientific and fishery management arena for everything bundled into the
concept of ``sustainability'' and management of the effects of fishing
on the ecosystem.
Of the above disciplines within fishery science at the AFSC, I work
closest with the Conservation engineering, Stock Assessment, and
Resource Ecology and Ecosystem modeling branches and I am pleased to
say that I think the AFSC does a remarkable job providing the science
needed to meet the ever-increasing mandates for sustainable management
of our fisheries in Alaska in those areas.
I can also tell you from experience that when we proposed 12
fisheries for flatfish and cod for certification by the Marine
Stewardship Council (MSC), the gold standard of independent
sustainability certification, I came to appreciate even more the solid
science that goes into our fishery management system. The standards for
certification for harvest strategy, fishery management, and management
of ecosystem effects of fishing embedded in the MSC certification
process could not have been met if we had mediocre baseline science
coming out of the AFSC. Meeting those standards, and obtaining MSC
certification, has allowed us to access a growing set of markets in
Europe and elsewhere that would otherwise not be available to our
industry.
From my numerous cooperative research endeavors with NOAA
scientists in its Resource Assessment & Conservation Engineering,
Groundfish Observer Program, and Resource Ecology and Fishery
Management divisions, it is my experience that these divisions have
eagerly made their scientists available to assist the fishing industry
in conducting research to modify fishing practices to address
sustainability concerns and environmental effects. This research has
been carried out through partnerships designed to take advantage of
relative skills of each party within a setting of mutual trust and
respect. This work has been successful in bringing fishermen's
knowledge of fish behavior, the environment, and fishing gear into
scientific exchanges with AFSC researchers. Impressive reductions in
bycatch, reduced impacts of fishing gear on habitat, other creative
solutions and even gains in catch efficiency/reduction in fuel use have
been accomplished through these partnerships.
As part of the work I do the Alaska Seafood Cooperative, I review a
wide set of NOAA's science products on a regular basis to ensure they
are sound and that the content is being correctly interpreted. From my
experience doing this work every year I can say that NOAA's fishery
stock assessment and ecosystem modeling studies in Alaska are generally
of the highest quality available. Several scientists at the AFSC are
world-renowned and in high demand internationally for workshops and
symposia. NOAA staff and scientists in these divisions work hard, and
we appreciate it.
In my view, this high quality science standard has been achieved
both through the funding commitment that NOAA has made through the
AFSC, and because the Center in most areas has not been afraid to open
its process to outside, independent peer review. Independent review in
the development stages of modeling and stock assessments is, in my
opinion, critical to achievement of a high quality science process. I
would like to touch on each of these.
First off, in order to successfully manage sustainable fisheries,
you have to have good basic data. In Alaska, the AFSC has conducted
annual trawl surveys in the Bering Sea and bi-annual surveys in the
Gulf of Alaska and Aleutian Islands for an impressive time series. The
annual trawl surveys in the Bering Sea are the basic underpinning of
stock assessments and ecosystem models for some of the nation's largest
fisheries. We are very fortunate to have had NOAA's commitment to
prioritize that work because it is this top-notch science that has
allowed the large scale fisheries of the Bering Sea to be managed
sustainably. Overall, Alaska produces over half the nation's seafood
landings, worth billions of dollars and tens of thousands of jobs on a
long term sustainable basis. Simply put good science means sustained
jobs and revenues for the nation.
One of the other important factors in good science is having a
trusted process that builds confidence in management. An open peer
review process is key to building this trust and critical to
maintaining the quality of the science. One of the best peer review
processes takes place through the North Pacific Fisheries Management
Council. Periodic outside review and annual review by both Plan Teams
and the North Pacific Council's Science and Statistical Committee are
key ingredients in what makes the Alaska management process work. The
success of this scientific peer review is that it is transparent, and
science driven. This review includes opportunities for non-governmental
scientists from academia, the industry, environmental organizations,
and other interests to participate in an open and public manner.
Transparency builds confidence in the science, and thus the management
decisions that are made based on the results of that science.
Unfortunately, both of these key factors are at risk. Every year
there are new threats to the funding for trawl surveys and other
scientific work that is fundamental to fisheries management in Alaska.
I cannot overemphasize the potential downside in terms of loss of
management precision for fishery resources in Alaska that would occur
if NOAA's funding for resource surveys is reduced, or redirected
elsewhere. As I read about NOAA's national priorities for a National
Ocean Council, Marine Spatial Planning, and Regional Ecosystem
Protection and Restoration Initiatives envisioned at the national
level, I grow increasingly concerned that the funding at the regional
level to support the AFSC, Alaska Regional Office, and the North
Pacific Fishery Management Council will be redirected to help fund
different priorities set by NOAA headquarters. In these times of
limited fiscal resources one has to question whether redirecting
baseline funding to the latest idea at the Headquarters level is an
appropriate use of tight federal funds.
I personally do not believe that moving funds needed for fishery
science to cover such initiatives at the national level will improve
our ability to conserve and manage resources sustainably in Alaska. The
simple fact is that with any reduction in the scope of these surveys or
their interval will result in more uncertainty. This could lead to a
reduction in yields even where groundfish populations are increasing.
With less frequent surveys, uncertainty increases and harvest
strategies must be reduced to avoid potential for overfishing. I have
little doubt that if the AFSC conducted the groundfish trawl surveys in
the Bering Sea every other year instead of every year, the allowable
catches in the Bering Sea pollock fishery and other important fisheries
for cod and flatfish would be reduced on average by at least 30 to 40%
in the absence of any change in the actual abundance of these stocks.
The downstream effect on fishery yields would have dramatic effects on
the economies of Alaska, Washington, and Oregon in terms of employment
losses, effects on coastal infrastructure that supports fishing, and
loss of domestic and export earnings for the nation.
The Bad:
With all the glowing examples above it is clear that for the most
part I believe NOAA is doing a great job providing the a high quality
science product to support fishery management in Alaska. But I am also
concerned with recent indications that NOAA is moving to closed door
peer reviews when it comes to review of the science it does pursuant to
the Endangered Species Act, protected resources, and marine mammals. As
I have mentioned above, I believe the open and transparent standards
for peer review process are critical and this is being undermined in
this area in particular.
For review of its recent sea lion biological opinion in Alaska,
NOAA has turned to a closed peer review with no public involvement
instead of the more open and transparent peer review normal to the
Council process. This closed process will take place through the Center
for Independent Experts (CIE), a NOAA funded process. The problem with
the CIE is that it is conducted without public involvement or any
opportunity for presentations of scientific information except that
provided by NOAA and the CIE is barred from commenting on the
conclusions reached by the agency in the BiOp.
Despite several overtures from the North Pacific Fishery Management
Council, as well as the States of Alaska and Washington, NOAA remains
steadfast in its determination to only use the CIE to review the
science in its recent sea lion Bi-op. The States of Alaska and
Washington are currently conducting an independent scientific review.
To their credit, they have held public sessions where experts from all
interests, including NOAA, were invited to present scientific
information on the topic. Instead of sending someone knowledgeable
about the BiOp to the first of two planned sessions, NOAA sent one
individual who played a relatively minor role in its development--in
essence they boycotted the session. The States just released a first
draft of their review of the sea lion Bi-op for public comment. Whether
or not NOAA will elect to participate in a cooperative or meaningful
manner in the final session and the remainder of the review is not
known at this time.
It is important to recognize that the States have set a new
standard for open peer review of controversial matters related to
science done for protected resources and ESA listed species. It is
unfortunate that NOAA is continuing to rely on an outdated process with
its lack of transparency, especially in matters that are controversial.
In my view, this lack of transparency will only serve to undermine
confidence in NOAA's science programs. NOAA should follow the example
of open process and transparency set by the States of Alaska and
Washington.
This leads me to the broader issue I have with NOAA's approach to
scientific work done to manage effects of fishing on marine mammals and
protected or ESA listed species. For whatever reason, NOAA tends to
move away from a scientific approach when it undertakes assessments of
effects of fishing on marine mammals. This shows up in its development
of biological opinions and other analyses in ESA Sec. 7 consultations,
recovery plans and other aspects of NOAA's Endangered Species Act
duties. I will provide a set of examples below.
As I mentioned above, the Alaska Regional Office of NMFS recently
developed a biological opinion on the Western Distinct Population
Segment (WDPS) of Steller sea lions. The area in question is the
Aleutian Islands, an island chain spanning roughly 1,200 miles from
east to west divided into three management areas: western Aleutians,
central Aleutians, and the eastern Aleutians. The resulting regulations
closed all fishing for Pacific cod and Atka mackerel in western
Aleutian Islands including vast areas outside of Steller sea lion
critical habitat. They also severely curtailed fishing for those
species in central Aleutians, and reduced areas open to fishing in the
eastern Aleutians. While sea lion numbers have decreased markedly in
the western Aleutians and to a lesser extent in the central Aleutians,
the science used in the development of this latest sea lion biological
opinion was highly controversial, and did not, in my opinion and the
opinion of many outside experts, consistently use the best available
data. Overall, the biological opinion at best suffered from a very
narrow perspective that appeared to be designed to justify a
predetermined conclusion that fishing had to be closed in these areas.
The comments of the Alaska Seafood Cooperative, University of
British Columbia, Adak Community Development Corporation, and several
other stakeholders/affected communities as well as the Science and
Statistical Committee of the North Pacific Fishery Management Council
pointed out some glaring shortcomings to NOAA's draft Biological
Opinion. Here are a few examples:
1. The use of scientifically inappropriate techniques in the
analyses of the effects of prey removals by commercial
fisheries as a percentage of local groundfish abundance. When
the standard techniques, those used by NOAA's own scientists in
the stock assessment process, were later applied in the final
draft Bi-op, these correctly done calculations essentially
removed the Bi-op's basis for asserting that cod and Atka
mackerel fishing was taking a higher percentage of local fish
populations in the Aleutian Islands. In acknowledgment of this
fundamental error, NMFS's final Bi-op listed the new
calculations in obscure tables in the document but ignored the
new findings and left the old estimates in its conclusions and
rationale for the closures NMFS finally adopted.
2. Analyses of how much sea lion food per individual sea lion
were done using inappropriate spatial comparisons. Again, when
the analysis was done correctly in the final Bi-op, it showed
that the ``forage ratios'' (amount of forage fish in the
Aleutian Island per individual sea lion) are actually higher in
the Aleutians than other areas where sea lions numbers are
increasing. As in the above example, this corrected analysis
was ignored in the final Bi-op's conclusions.
3. Use of data from just three individual tagged sea lions
(out of a population of approximately 50,000) to conclude that
offshore banks in the western Aleutians, well outside of SSL
critical habitat, were important to sea lions and therefore
should be closed to fishing. This assumption was roundly called
into question as not scientifically justified. Nothing was done
to correct this in the final Bi-op.
4. Single-species models runs in the draft and final Bi-op
used to show that fishing restrictions would increase the
amount of fish available to sea lions. These overly simplistic
estimates were used in favor of NOAA's own available multi-
species models and per-reviewed ecosystem modeling. In this
part of the Bi-op, NOAA also failed to take into account the
most recent information that Atka mackerel abundance which is
currently at high levels in the western Aleutian Islands. The
final Bi-op still asserts that mackerel abundance is at low
levels in the western Aleutians but the new survey results were
available well in advance of the drafting of the final Bi-op.
5. Premise that fishing is competing with foraging and
affecting SSL natal rates based on studies done outside the
Aleutian Islands. This was a glaring example of NMFS'
selectively choosing which scientific opinion would bolster its
preconceived determinations. NMFS chose to base its case on an
overridingly narrow selection scientific papers and results,
and specifically ignored, mischaracterized, or dismissed a long
list of other peer-reviewed science where conclusions differed
from those of NMFS Protected Resources division.
Biological opinions are required to use the best available science
and make a reasoned and balanced assessment of the available scientific
information to inform the opinion. The ESA does not give license to
subjectively choose which science to consider, to use non-standard
analytical methods, nor to dismiss out of hand the work of
internationally recognized experts. A big part of the problem is the
lack of concrete management standards, and a consistent and uniform
manner for implementation. An effective peer review in the development
of biological opinions is sorely needed to ensure balanced science is
applied. I am clearly not the only one who sees this shortcoming with
NMFS' role in assessing effects of fisheries on ESA listed species,
this has also been observed by NMFS' own former chief scientist as I
will point out below.
A big step in reshaping the process of development of biological
opinions for ESA listed species would be to make that process more open
and more subject to technical and scientific review from the outset. In
our experience, those involved in the development of biological
opinions are not required to engage in meaningful internal or external
peer review of the science used for development of their biological
opinions. It should be mandated that they work within the same review
standards that stock assessments, habitat effects analyses, and
ecosystem models operate under. An open process, with adequate time for
all parties to review the data and the analyses is totally lacking in
the current biological opinion process.
Additionally, implementing procedures for thorough and timely
review would avoid the problem that occurred in the recent sea lion Bi-
op where self-imposed agency deadlines and the fear of litigation (if
one reads the administrative record) trumped the need to correct
fundamental problems with the basic constructs of the biological
opinion. Some stakeholders believe the time schedule was developed
intentionally by the authors of the Bi-op to circumvent concrete
review. Whether that was the case or not, if the system was set up to
allow adequate transparent scientific review early on during the
development of the Bi-op, the ability to drive a pre-determined outcome
would be greatly reduced, and there would be more confidence in the
final result.
In making the above criticisms and suggestions, I should point out
that others have seen the same problems with NMFS' science in support
of protected species and ESA-listed species and marine mammals in
particular. Similar views were expressed in a January 2011 programmatic
review of the NOAA's science programs by Drs. Sissenwine and Rothschild
(NMFS' former chief scientist for many years and Dr. Rothschild is
professor emeritus at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth's
School of Marine Technology and Science). Their review, entitled:
BUILDING CAPACITY OF THE NMFS SCIENCE ENTERPRISE, states: (Page 68 with
emphasis added)
One important category of scientific product of the Alaska
Fisheries Science Center that is not subjected to a formal
process of quality assurance is scientific input to Agency
decisions under the Endangered Species Act (e.g., listing
decisions, recovery plans, jeopardy decisions). The science
underlying these decisions is often subjected to intense
scrutiny after the fact (for example, an NRC review of factors
that potentially threaten Alaskan Stellar Sea Lions), but this
is not an appropriate alternative to a credible (with some
independent experts, transparency, stakeholder buy-in) pre-
decisional quality assurance processes similar to the ones used
for fishery management decisions.
I believe that the recent SSL Bi-op in Alaska is the very
unfortunate outcome of a flawed process and is responsible for annual
revenue loss that NMFS' itself concluded was approximately $60 million.
Fishermen that depended on those fisheries unfortunately are now tied
up at times of the year when mackerel and cod fishing in the Aleutians
would be going on. There are fewer crew members employed and
communities such as Adak that are attempting to develop their economy
based on shoreside fish processing activities and vessel support
services in the Aleutian Islands are clearly in danger of permanent
failure and abandonment.
Most unfortunate in the process was that one of NMFS' own
scientific studies, which had undergone full peer review, could have
provided the basis for allowing some fishing in areas where the fishing
was known to harvest as little as 5% of the local abundance of Atka
mackerel. But that study was essentially ignored. Instead the Bi-op's
authors relied on their own non-standard methods to evaluate amount
harvested of local mackerel abundance. The methods used in the Bi-op
even departed from the prescribed stock assessments methods and with
this NMFS concluded that fishing was creating negative effects on SSL
feeding opportunities.
In its efforts to find a viable landing place short of closing
fisheries, during a special meeting held during the brief public
comment period for the draft SSL Bi-op, the North Pacific Fishery
Management Council developed an alternative for fisheries mitigation in
the western Aleutians. That alternative was based in part on the
results of several published scientific studies done by NMFS' own
Fisheries Interaction Team (part of the Alaska Fisheries Science
Center. The studies are available at the following url: http://
afsjournals.org/page/fidm/specialsections). The mackerel tagging
studies the Council used in its alternative were based on data from
recoveries of tagged Atka mackerel. These returns were evaluated to
characterize movement of mackerel and elucidate whether fishing in
areas open to the fishery affected mackerel abundance inside rookeries.
The tagging studies also developed estimates of local mackerel biomass
so that amounts removed in the fishery could be evaluated and
controlled to be under five percent (a benchmark in the Bi-op itself
that would prevent localized depletion). But the NPFMC's alternative
was thoroughly dismissed by NMFS along with all other ideas for
mitigating fishery effects save closing down fishing for mackerel and
cod in its entirety.
The Potentially Ugly:
I have already said that good management is founded on good basic
data. In order to get good data, there also needs to be a commitment to
do the field work to get it.
NOAA has said that it will conduct mark/recapture (branding) and
telemetry work on sea lions in the western Aleutians in 2011. This will
surely be a big improvement over the data used in the recent Bi-Op
where location information from three non-resident juvenile SSL was
used to as a rationale for extending the scope of the fishery closures
to include areas outside of critical habitat. NMFS' stated commitment
to do some branding and telemetry research on SSL in the western AI is
a good step forward in support of addressing the huge holes in the
science NMFS used to put the current closures in place. But that
information will only address one piece of the puzzle and information
on fish movement and local biomass is also needed.
Another critical piece of information was slated to be addressed in
research in 2011 and 2012 but NMFS has apparently decided to cancel or
postpone the research. That project was funded in part by the North
Pacific Research Board. The project was an extension of the mackerel
tagging work to the western Aleutians and it was slated to take place
in the summer and fall of 2011 and early 2012. At this point we are
unsure of the agency's rationale for this decision.
The Fisheries Interaction Team of the AFSC had been successful in
applying for North Pacific Research Board for funding to conduct an
Atka mackerel tagging and tag recapture experiment in the western
Aleutian Islands. Part of the reason this project was successful in
obtaining NPRB funding was that it is vital new information and it was
supposed to occur in the area where the management questions
surrounding effects of fishing on sea lions are the most critical. The
mackerel research was also partially supported by the North Pacific
Fisheries Foundation, which had committed to supply vessels for the
tagging and tag recovery as well as other logistics. The Foundation's
funding was specifically designed to help NMFS conduct research in this
critical area with minimal use of NMFS' limited resources.
The previous mackerel tagging research had progressed to cover
nearly all fishing areas in eastern and central Aleutians and a series
of peer reviewed publications had been generated which highlighted the
low exploitation rates in most the areas that used to be fished.
Although NMFS had largely ignored this information in the rush to do
the recent Bi-op, there was still some potential for consideration of
this type of information in the development of more surgical mitigation
measures in a trailing process through the NPFMC.
Now, with the biggest information needs clearly in the western
Aleutians, NMFS has apparently opted not to conduct the mackerel
tagging research that NPRB and an independent foundation had provided
funding for. The reason NMFS made this decision is not clear. Informal
dialogue with AFSC officials has generated one possible reason being
the agency's concern over litigation if any catch of mackerel is
allowed in the western Aleutians. This is a spurious issue, in our
view, as amounts of fish taken in the tagging studies are a very small
fraction of the harvest levels prior to the closures and would surely
have no negative effect. NMFS may also be concerned that the field
research would require a separate Section Seven formal consultation
under the ESA or this could just be a policy decision. We just don't
know.
However, from the perspective of the industry and affected
communities we know that a broader scientific baseline is needed to
evaluate the assumed effects of fishing on SSL in the western
Aleutians. NMFS' cancelation of the mackerel tagging study is very hard
to accept.
Until we have a concrete understanding of NMFS' reason for
derailing this important research, this incident falls into the
``potentially ugly'' category. At this point, even if we are successful
in getting them to reconsider allowing the research to occur, getting
the project resubmitted into the NPRB or other funding sources will
take time. So at a minimum, the cost will potentially be several more
years before information critical to reopening SSL critical habitat to
mackerel fishing in the western AI is likely to be available. This
means addition revenue forfeitures and fewer jobs in some of the
nation's healthiest fisheries.
In conclusion Mr. Chairman, I want to again thank you and the
subcommittee for this opportunity to testify today, and I stand ready
to answer any questions you may have.
______
Mr. Fleming. Thank you, sir. And then last, Mr. Geiger.
STATEMENT OF GEORGE GEIGER, OWNER/OPERATOR, CHANCES ARE FISHING
CHARTERS
Mr. Geiger. Thank you, Chairman Fleming, Ranking Member
Sablan, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting
me to testify on fishery science and NOAA Fisheries data. I am
George Geiger, owner of Chances Are Fishing Charters, and a
past chairman and outgoing member of the South Atlantic Fishery
Management Council, after three appointment terms. I am also a
retired U.S. Army officer, and it was an honor to serve our
country for 21 years, including being stationed in Daytona
Beach, Florida from 1971 to '72.
During those two years, I experienced fishing opportunities
in abundance heretofore undreamed of by me. Upon my retirement
from active duty and return to Florida in 1987, I was at first
shocked, increasingly disgusted, and even angered to see that
the fisheries, which lured me to my retirement Mecca, had
become virtual shadows of what I had experienced in the 1970s.
I was angered to the point of seeking out and joining the
Florida Conservation Association, now Coastal Conservation
Association of Florida. This association lasted almost as long
as my military career, and culminated in my rise through
leadership positions to the chairmanship of CCA Florida in
2007. My 19 years with CCA led me to an at-large seat on the
South Atlantic Council, and I have held that seat since 2002.
Like others on this panel, my business has been severely
impacted by the current economic recession. My decades of work
with CCA and on the Council provide me with firsthand knowledge
of exactly why Congress reauthorized the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act with the new
requirements to finally overfishing.
Through all the heated debates, nothing has been more clear
or important to me than the need to follow through with
science-based management, including the new requirements to set
annual catch limits and accountability measures to finally end
overfishing.
Over-fishing, catching fish more quickly than the
population can reproduce, is ultimately a losing proposition,
for the fish, but more importantly long term for fishermen.
Just like it is important to maintain fiscal discipline and
make hard choices, fishery managers must make difficult and
sometimes unpopular decisions to ensure that we don't overspend
by allowing more fish to be caught than the populations can
reasonably sustain.
Simply put, overfishing kills jobs, and science-based
management with requirements to end overfishing is indeed a
proven solution. When Congress reauthorized the Magnuson-
Stevens Act, with the intent of moving science ahead of short-
term economics, the South Atlantic region had 11 stocks that
were overfished, undergoing overfishing, or both, the highest
number of any region in the country.
The new catch limit requirements changed how the Council is
operated and forced action to address and prevent overfishing
with proven scientifically rigorous methods that stand up even
in situations with limited data.
As others on this panel have described, recreational
fishing is big business, and it is rapidly growing, with 2.75
million in Florida residents and visitors casting lines in 2006
alone. These days, with the widespread use of GPS and other
fish finding technologies, it is easy to get to and get on the
fish, which has led some populations to being fished to
dangerously low levels.
In the past, we managed fishing using indirect controls
like limits on the number of fish each angler could retain, or
size and trip limits. However, there was no cap on the total
amount of fish that could be taken out of the water each year,
so overfishing really continued. Implementing catch limits now
is a prudent and sensible and necessary approach to finally get
severely depleted species back to healthy levels and avoid past
mistakes.
As you have heard today, some believe that we should not
take management action if there is uncertainty. The notion that
we should ignore existing science and delay management
decisions in the face of uncertainty will only take us back to
the failed policies of the past, increasing the risk of
overfishing and further eroding fishing-related jobs.
Through my work with the Council Scientific and Statistical
Committee, I can tell you with certainty that we have basic
scientific data and information needed to establish catch
limits that are reasonable and have been extensively considered
through a public, transparent process that includes fishermen.
For every species we manage, some combination of data on catch
and fish landed at the dock, biology, reproduction, habitat,
and other life history characteristics are available to be
used, and used in unison to set catch limits.
Cobia is a great example of this commonsense approach to
management for stocks with limited information. In June, our
SSC recommended a catch limit for cobia roughly 25 percent
higher than the median catch for the past 10 years, based on a
number of factors, including landings, biological
characteristics, and if there is a directed fishery. This is a
completely reasonable approach, and none of the ACLs we have
set are based on guesstimation, but rather they reflect both
common sense and the use of high quality science, along with
input from fishermen and the public.
Temporary cuts in catch and closures, as difficult as they
may be for my business and others, they are necessary to
recover and prevent overfishing, which is the real job killer.
I am not alone in recognizing that the Magnuson-Stevens Act is
working in the South Atlantic now, and it is not the time to
back-peddle and return to the failed policies of the past.
The annual catch limit measures we have already put in
place and are nearly finished putting in place in the South
Atlantic are working and are going to work. It takes a strong
will to protect and rebuild fisheries.
Chairman Fleming, Ranking Member Sablan, and Members of the
Subcommittee, please have the courage to be patient while fish
stocks recover and confident that the '06 reauthorization was
the correct action, which will ultimately bring benefits for
fishermen and fishing businesses, and leave future generations
with even more fish and fishing opportunities than we have
enjoyed. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Geiger follows:]
Statement of George J. Geiger, Owner/Operator,
Chances Are Fishing Charters
Chairman Fleming and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to this oversight hearing to discuss fisheries science and
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). I am George
Geiger, a past Chairman and current member of the South Atlantic
Fishery Management Council (SAFMC), serving the final days of my third
appointment term. Along with my position on the South Atlantic Council,
I am a recreational fisherman with a Coast Guard 50 Ton Ocean Operator
License. I operated a for-hire service for offshore and inshore trips
until 1998, when I switched to guiding near shore and inshore clients
exclusively. This business has been severely impacted by the current
economic recession, like so many others. I still enjoy recreational
fishing offshore for coastal pelagic and benthic species. I am also a
retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel, privileged to have been stationed
in Daytona Beach, Florida from 1971--72. During those two years I
experienced fishing opportunities and abundance heretofore undreamed of
by me. I knew Florida was where my wife and I wished to retire, if I
was so privileged as to earn the right to remain on active duty.
Upon my retirement and return to Florida in 1986, I was at first
shocked, then increasingly disgusted, and eventually angered to see
that the fisheries which lured me to my retirement Mecca had become
virtual shadows of what I'd experienced in the 70's. I was angered to
the point of seeking out and joining the Florida Conservation
Association (now Coastal Conservation Association--Florida). This
association lasted almost as long as my military career and culminated
in my rise through leadership positions to the Chairmanship of CCA
Florida in 2007.
During my 19 years with CCA Florida, I worked extensively on
Florida inshore fishery issues and was appointed to multiple Federal
advisory panels, including the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries
Commission's bluefish advisory panel and the South Atlantic Council's
red drum advisory panel. That work led to me to apply for an At- Large
seat on the South Atlantic Council in 2003, and I have served on the
council ever since, including as Chairman. From this vantage point, I
understand exactly why Congress reauthorized the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), with the new
conservation requirements to finally end overfishing, and I've been in
the center of the heated debate about how to get the job done in the
South Atlantic.
This testimony will focus on my first-hand experience gained over
decades of work with the South Atlantic Council and other organizations
to implement the new requirement to set annual catch limits (ACLs) and
accountability measures (AMs), and the critical importance that
science-based management plays in achieving that goal.
Overfishing, or catching fish more quickly than the population can
reproduce, is ultimately a losing proposition for fish but more
importantly, for fishermen. Just like it is important to maintain
fiscal discipline and make hard choices in order to balance the federal
budget, managers must make difficult, and sometimes unpopular,
decisions to ensure that we don't ``overspend'' by allowing more fish
to be caught than populations can reasonably sustain. I think of it
like an investment account; you have to maintain the principle, and
only spend the interest or you will eventually end up with an account
that is overdrawn. Similarly, we need to leave enough fish in the water
to allow each species to reproduce from year to year so that they can
support a reasonable amount of harvest. Over the last few decades, it
has become increasingly apparent that science-based management combined
with requirements to end and prevent overfishing is the key to
preserving fish populations and fishing jobs.
It is also clear to me that we have the basic data and information
needed to establish catch limits that will ensure overfishing never
again decimates the fish populations that so many anglers and fishing-
related businesses depend upon. With this science-based framework in
place, new information can continually inform managers and we can make
adjustments to maximize the benefits for all participants in the
fishery. The notion that we should ignore existing science and delay
management decisions in the face of uncertainty will only take us back
to the failed policies of the past, increasing the risk of overfishing
and further eroding fishing-related jobs.
By 2004, Congress realized that overfishing had become a national
problem, and needed decisive action. After a few years of debating the
way forward, Congress passed what I think was a fundamentally positive
change to the way the law worked: science was moved ahead of short-term
economics, and the councils lost their discretion to continue inaction
on overfishing. The 2006 MSA reauthorization required that all U.S.
fish stocks have catch limits and accountability measures to end and
prevent overfishing by the end of 2011. At the time the MSA was
reauthorized, the South Atlantic region had 11 stocks that were
overfished, undergoing overfishing, or both--the highest number of any
region in the country.
The South Atlantic Council is responsible for the conservation and
management of fish stocks within the 200 nautical mile limit off the
coasts of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and east Florida to
Key West. We manage 98 species through 10 Fishery Management Plans
(FMPs), and we are still suffering from the ramifications of decades of
overfishing for a number of snapper and grouper species. The catch
limit requirements have changed how the councils operate and forced
real conservation actions. In the past, we generally managed fishing
using indirect controls like limits on the number of fish each angler
could retain per day, size limits intended to protect juvenile fish and
older fish that are often the best breeders, and trip limits that
capped how many fish commercial vessels could bring back to the dock at
any one time. However, very few of the nearly 100 species that we
manage were subject to a cap on the total amount of fish that could be
taken out of the water each year.
Fishing tournaments, charter fishing businesses, and individual
fishing trips are all big tourist draws and they contribute
significantly to the overall pressure on our region's fisheries. Over
the last few decades, the number of recreational anglers and the number
of fishing trips taken each year has increased rapidly since I first
visited Florida. According to the Census Bureau's National Survey of
Fishing, Hunting and Wildlife-Associated Recreation, over 2.75 million
residents and visitors cast a line somewhere along the state's coast in
2006, and it's probably a safe bet that this number has continued to
increase since then.
Another big change that has taken place over the last few decades
is the widespread use of GPS, sonar, and other fish finding
technologies that make it easy to ``get on the fish'', whereas in years
past, you really had to know the waters to know the best fishing spots
and how to get there. This combination has led to a significant
increase in fishing pressure and as a result, some populations have
been fished to dangerously low levels, far below what our science
advisors deem to be sustainable. For example, Warsaw grouper and
speckled hind are estimated to have just five and six percent of a
healthy population remaining, respectively. A population that is below
thirty to forty percent, depending on the species, is considered
overfished. Some of these very depleted snapper and grouper can live
for fifty years or more, and are slow to reach reproductive maturity.
Thus, it can take many years, sometimes decades, to rebuild the
population once it has been fished down to a very low level.
Implementing catch limits now is a prudent, sensible and necessary
approach to finally get severely depleted species back to healthy
levels and ensure that we don't make the same mistakes of the past by
setting some reasonable limits now.
To meet the MSA's new conservation requirements, the South Atlantic
Council has taken several crucial steps and we are on track to
implement science-based management, including annual catch limits and
accountability measures, for all of our federally-managed fisheries by
the end of 2011. In December 2010, we passed Amendment 17B to the
Snapper-Grouper Fishery Management Plan, which fulfilled the
Congressional mandate to set ACLs for 9 of the species in the region
subject to overfishing. In June of 2010, we passed Amendment 17A which
included a moratorium on red snapper catch, as that species was
hovering around 3--6% of a healthy level at that time. Later this
month, we will meet to consider approval of an Amendment to set ACLs
for thirty-nine additional species, and we have developed joint plans
with the Gulf of Mexico Council to set ACLs for species that occur in
both regions. In the South Atlantic, and nationwide, we are on the
verge of establishing science-based management for all of the species
under our jurisdiction. This is a major, precedent-setting
accomplishment and one that we should be very proud to have achieved.
However, getting to this point has required a significant
investment of time and resources on the part of the Council, NOAA
Fisheries and most importantly, the public who have weighed in on this
process. In the South Atlantic, we are faced with managing many species
for which limited scientific information is available. However, there
are no species that we know nothing about. For every species we manage,
some combination of data on catch and fish landed at the dock, biology,
reproduction, habitat, and other life history characteristics are
available and using this information, our science advisors developed a
sound methodology to establish the basis for annual catch limits.
Through the Southeast Fisheries Science Center, the South Atlantic,
Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Councils partner with NOAA Fisheries to
operate the Southeast Data, Assessment, and Review (SEDAR), which
conducts stock assessments and provides data and analysis on the status
of species we manage. Our stock assessment process is a collaborative
one that includes fishermen, stock assessment biologists, council
members and staff and provides extensive opportunity for public input
at each step in the process. Driven by the ACL requirements, we have
figured out rational scientific ways to set catch limits for stocks
when full stock assessments are not available.
As an example of how we have managed stocks with limited
information, I want to focus in on what we've done in coordination with
the Gulf Council to protect coastal migratory pelagic species including
cobia, Spanish mackerel, and king mackerel that spend most of their
lives from the surface to the middle of the water column. These fish
are very important for recreational fishermen and businesses like mine,
as well as commercial fishermen like my fellow Council member Ben
Hartig, who fishes commercially for Spanish mackerel. Although there is
no evidence they are in trouble, fishing effort has generally
intensified over the last decade, and so it makes sense to keep the
catch levels under control to prevent these fish from suffering a
decline in population before we have the resources to conduct a full
assessment. What we did with cobia is a good example of how we've
handled this ``data poor'' situation, and how good management has been
mischaracterized. In June of this year, our Scientific and Statistical
Committee recommended a catch limit for cobia roughly 25 percent higher
than the median catch for the past 10 years and this is what the South
Atlantic Council has used to guide our decision. Our science advisors
considered a number of factors in making this recommendation, including
trends in landings and whether there is a directed fishery for the
species. Their expert judgment is informed by consideration of
biological characteristics such as how often and prolifically each
species spawns, whether they are long-lived or short-lived, and whether
they are often caught accidentally by fishermen targeting other
species, among other things. This is a completely reasonable approach
and none of the ACLs we've set are based on ``guesstimation'', but
rather they reflect both common sense and the use of high-quality
science, along with input from fishermen and the public.
There are two philosophies when dealing with a lack of data: one
approach is to wait for more science before acting, which is the exact
path we took and resulted in dozens of severely depleted species
nationwide, and required sharply reduced catch levels, and sometimes,
total moratoriums, to put these populations on track for rebuilding.
The other approach, and the one I think is right and prudent, is to use
the best science available to set reasonable catch limits until new
science becomes available that makes it clear a population can support
an increase in catch. This is exactly what we are doing now in the
South Atlantic, and it makes sense because it is a lot better to deal
with a short period of reduced catch than suffer the years of painful
recovery after fish populations have crashed.
Even though the South Atlantic Council's management measures are
sensible, some of the strongest advocates for the MSA's conservation
provisions have backpedaled when good science has made it clear that
temporary cuts in catch and closures are necessary to recover from past
overfishing. I am attaching the written support we have received at the
South Atlantic Council within the past week supporting approval of the
ACL Amendment. An awful lot of people--business owners, anglers,
scientists and other--have written to us to say that they get why this
new path is critically important and more importantly, they support it.
Today, I am seeing several of our South Atlantic fisheries benefit
from implementation of catch limits and accountability measures. For
example, a recent assessment found that South Atlantic black grouper
are no longer undergoing overfishing for the first time in more than a
decade. This is a species that the South Atlantic Council took action
to restore back in 2004, based on what some at the time called ``in-
sufficient and non-definitive data.''
I'd like to offer one more example of why catch limits and
accountability measures are so crucial to good fisheries management.
Black sea bass are a popular recreational and commercial target species
and a mainstay for many charter operators in our region. Unfortunately,
they have been overfished for more than twenty years. Before the MSA
was reauthorized to close the loopholes that had allowed overfishing to
continue for decades, the South Atlantic Council approved not one, but
two plans to rebuild this species. Both of these plans failed to do so,
and nothing much changed because there was no accountability when
quotas were exceeded. Finally, a new rebuilding plan was initiated that
included accountability measures to make sure the catch limits were not
exceeded. So far, the new plan has kept the commercial fishery near its
limits, and the anecdotal evidence indicates that after decades of
overfishing, black sea bass is recovering. A stock assessment is
ongoing and the results should be completed by October. I hope the
assessment will show that black sea bass is finally making a recovery
after more than two decades and two failed rebuilding plans. However,
now is not the time to deviate from the course of recovery and prudent
management practices, which are proving to have been on target. South
Atlantic fisheries are benefiting from the wisdom of requirements in
the MSA reauthorization that pertain to ending overfishing.
We hear at every public hearing how good the fishing is getting,
and has become, in comparison to past decades. Unfortunately, that
success (which will only increase over time, creating more jobs and
fishing opportunities) translates to the majority of the public being
satisfied but not getting involved in the political process. However,
it's important for Congress to know that those improvements in
abundance are due to successful, science-based management. As I
mentioned, the South Atlantic Council is on the verge of meeting the
mandate from Congress to set catch limits that will end and prevent
overfishing. The process was long and deliberate, with extensive public
participation and scientific contributions, and I sense we are on the
verge of a great move forward toward actually achieving sustainability
for our marine resources in the Southeast. Now is not the time to
backpedal and return to the ineffective management practices that
existed before the 2006 reauthorization of the MSA and resulted in
depleted stocks.
I still remember Florida fishing in the 70's and the astounding
abundance and variety of fish that led me to retire in the state, start
a fishing business and to get involved in fisheries management. Even
back then, a lot of these fish populations were already a shadow of
their historic numbers. The conservation measures we've nearly finished
putting in place in the South Atlantic and around the country are going
to work but it takes a strong backbone to protect and rebuild
fisheries. That gives me hope because I know what we are working to
achieve through the MSA and I know it is possible. Now is the hardest
time for Congress, and even more so for the councils, to have the
courage to be patient while fish stocks that have been depleted
recover. That steadfast resolve will allow us to realize the benefits
this will bring for fishermen and fishing businesses, and leave future
generations with even more fish and fishing opportunities than we've
enjoyed.
______
Mr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Geiger. OK. At this point we
will begin Member questions of the witnesses. I want to point
out that we predict votes to begin in the next 15 to 30
minutes. The timing may work out just about right. Hopefully it
will. We have had a lot of input today, and we appreciate it.
And we want to be sure we get all the way to the very end and
get all the questions asked and answered.
As Members know, we are limited to five minutes for our
questions. If they have additional questions, we may be able to
do a second round. If not, we can certainly submit them in
writing and get responses offline.
I now recognize myself for five minutes. Mr. Angers, the
majority of witnesses here today seem to believe that the
amount of information available to fishery managers is
insufficient to meet the new requirements of the Magnuson Act.
How do you suggest Congress deal with this concern? And I will
just point out, particularly on this panel, I am just hearing
story after story, very credible, of how this is garbage in,
garbage out type of proposition. So I would love to get your
perspective on how you think we can improve that.
Mr. Angers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, I mentioned
earlier that Mr. Wittman and several bipartisan Members of the
full Resources Committee have set forth the Fishery Science
Improvement Act, H.R. 2304. You know, indeed we see some
garbage in and some garbage out. But I do want to give credit
where credit is due. Where there is a legitimate,
scientifically prepared stock assessment that comes up with
some good science, we all want science. I mean, goodness, Jane
Lubchenco, you know, a scientist's scientist, is the head of
NOAA. We want to make sure that there is good science there,
and we don't want to dog the actual stock assessments that are
out there.
But the 80 percent of the stocks of fish that the Federal
Government doesn't know anything about from a true scientific--
from a true quantitative method, that is what the members have
stepped up to tackle with the Fishery Science Improvement Act.
What Congressman Wittman's bill says is that when there is no
indication of overfishing, and the agency has not done a stock
assessment in the last five years, then let's suspend the
annual catch limit requirement on that particular stock.
We are not saying let's cast out good science with bad. I
heard my fellow panelist earlier comment about, you know, there
are other important sciences like biology. You know, that is
great, but that doesn't tell us a thing about the number of
fish that are out there, and we have the capability to discern
those scientific facts. We just don't have the facts, and then
we are rushing to meet a statutory deadline that was
arbitrarily--that is an arbitrary deadline.
So let's give science a chance to work. Let's figure out
how many fish are out there, how many fish can come out of a
fishery. I think everyone at the table would be fine with that.
Mr. Fleming. Well, thank you for that. You know, we have
had NOAA here testifying. We had a gentleman from NOAA here a
little earlier on the other panel. And one of the things we are
seeing is that NOAA wants to--and I mentioned this in my
original comments. NOAA wants to put more of their resources
into satellites to monitor climate change and that sort of
thing, significant amounts of money. And yet you know the way
things are up here. We are out of money. We are broke.
Washington is broke.
So I guess my question is, with this tight budget
situation, what do you suggest we do? What are some other
options that may be available?
Mr. Angers. Well, I think that the legislative proposal
that I mentioned earlier, H.R. 2304, really comes at a good
time, both for the agency and for the country. You know, these
next few years will not see increased budgets in pretty much
any Federal agency. And if we know that NOAA Fisheries is using
a SWAG, a scientific wild guess, to determine a hard number
that shall not be exceeded, this is probably a good time to
say, you know, we might have gone a little overboard.
You know, this whole push to establish a hard ACL is about
employment of a different type that we have not spoken of
today. It is about employment for environmental lawyers because
a Federal judge may not really be that interested in the
Byzantine fishery management discussion, but a Federal judge
understands a number. And once there is a number set forth that
the widget fish or whatever fish, the ACL on the widget fish
shall be X, once that number, that SWAG, that dart thrown at
the wall, once that number is exceeded, we are going to be
guaranteeing full-time employment for environmental lawyers to
be suing NOAA Fisheries for generations to come.
Now is a good time for us to take a breath and say let's go
forth with the science that we have got, and what we don't
have, let's stop guess.
Mr. Fleming. OK. Well, thank you. My time is up, so I will
yield to the gentleman, Mr. Sablan, the Ranking Member.
Mr. Sablan. Thank you very much. I appreciate it, Mr.
Chairman. Data is important. I am from the islands, and I know
what fishing is about. We fish for meals, and data is actually
so important. And I am going to sort of sidetrack here. There
are some people in the country who doubt climate change. And
for those who doubt the scientists, the scientific information
on climate, I actually can take you to my islands, where I will
show you land that is under water, and this can only be
attributed to climate change.
But, Mr. Geiger, you have been involved with fisheries
management in the South Atlantic, sir, for many, many years,
several decades actually. So can you tell us how successful the
Council was at ending and preventing overfishing prior to and
following the 2006 reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Act?
Mr. Geiger. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Sablan. Actually, the
Councils were abject failures at ending overfishing. If you
look at the South Atlantic Council, since 1984, the
implementation of the first snapper/grouper fishery management
plan and all subsequent plans, we are now up to fishery
management plans for snapper/grouper--I think we are on 21 or
22. Only three of them met the management objectives, and two
of the fisheries were closed, one for five years. Goliath
grouper was the one that was closed for--has been reclosed
since 1992.
In all cases, short-term economic considerations were
always used as a determinant in an effort to try and reduce the
effects of the regulation or reduce the regulations that needed
to be put in place. So if they knew they needed to something,
they received advice that said, well, you could back off it a
little bit, and it was always due because of the public outcry
based on short-term economics. And when we adjusted the bag
limits, the size limits, the trip limits, whatever the standard
methodology was used for that particular stock at the time,
those reductions resulted in a failed rebuilding or a failed
result from the management that we attempted to put in place.
And, I mean, the record stands for itself, which is exactly
why Congress put or reauthorized the Act in '06 as they did,
with the intent to finally get the Councils to end overfishing
and take that discretionary ability the Councils had to
consider short-term economics at the peril of the fish stocks.
Mr. Sablan. So how important have the new requirements for
annual catch limits and accountability measures been to the
success of the South Atlantic Management Council in ending and
preventing overfishing?
Mr. Geiger. Well, I think they are absolutely key to ending
overfishing, and it is because the standard methodologies that
have been in the toolbox and employed by the Councils limiting
anglers to a bag limit, season closures, trip limits, size
limits, those type of things, have proven they really are not
very effective because they don't cap the total number of fish
that can be taken out of the water on an annual basis in a
species.
So without limiting that cap or without limiting the amount
of mortality that occurs within that fishery, there is no way
to stop it. So overfishing will generally continue unless there
is a cap, you can stop it, and if you do go over it, there
needs to be an absolute payback to get back on track in the
rebuilding plan.
Mr. Sablan. And I can certainly understand it, Mr. Geiger,
because at one time where I come from, half a mile, a mile out
from the reef, you get your first tuna. Now, you have to go
three, four miles at least because of overfishing. And it is
not from us, actually. It is from other parts, I mean, you
know, commercial fishing that passes through the islands.
Mr. Geiger. And if I may add to the response to your
question, sir, we have seen successes, and we see successes.
One of the Congressmen mentioned black sea bass. You know,
black sea bass is one of those stories that is a success in the
South Atlantic, a failure and a success. We had two rebuilding
plans on black sea bass, both of which failed. Finally, in
amendment 13 in 2004, we put some very severe limits on black
sea bass. And, of course, the Council voted for a constant-
catch rebuilding strategy, which allows the removal of 104,000
pounds of fish annually, until you get to a certain point as
the stock recovers, then you can begin to increase those
removals as the stock demonstrates its recovery.
Mr. Sablan. I have one more question before--the House
Appropriations Committee has proposed cuts to fisheries
research and management, including funds to expand annual stock
assessments and for cooperative research with States. What do
you see as the consequences of such cuts for rebuilding stocks
and for fishermen? Mr. Geiger again.
Mr. Geiger. Well, I am opposed to any cuts and reductions
of any funding for stock assessments, and certainly for data
improvement. I came on the Council from Coastal Conservation
Association, and for 19 years, I fought this Federal process,
and we fought the Federal National Marine Fisheries Service
over the failed data that they used to manage the stocks. And
it is evident based on the condition of the stocks we see today
in the South Atlantic, and the fact that we have to take such
draconian measures to try and recover these stocks.
So I certainly am a supporter of improving data, but it
takes ten years to build a ten-year data set. And it takes
years to train stock assessment scientists. You don't just go
out on the street and put an ad in the newspaper and hire a
stock assessment scientist off the street. And to NOAA's
credit, they have a program at Virginia Tech in an effort to
try and recruit mathematicians and young mathematics majors who
have the abilities to perform these highly complex mathematical
models. And, you know, recognizing budget limitations, we are
where we are. If we don't put ACLs in place, and we go back to
what we were doing before, we are going to use the same data
that everybody is calling garbage or deficient or bad to do
what? Set bag limits and trip limits and all the things that
have failed in the past? We are going to go back to that
methodology?
ACLs are the answers. We need to have the courage to stay
with it, move forward. We actually are seeing benefits
resulting from ACLs that are put on stocks, and I think we will
see more if we just have the courage to stay the course.
Mr. Fleming. OK. The gentleman yields back. Votes have been
called, so we will try to get through another two or three
questioners, do the best we can to finish out, and then we will
have to adjourn because we will have votes for another hour,
hour-and-a-half, and then we have something after that.
So with that, I think next up is Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very quick.
Mr. Geiger, I heard you make a comment about ten-year data set
as being part of any study or any determination of closures.
And I just ask you, are you aware of any ten-year data set on
the red snapper that was included, that helped lead them to the
conclusion of closing the South Atlantic?
Mr. Geiger. Yes.
Mr. Duncan. So why aren't we making the decision based on
no data set----
Mr. Geiger. No. The head boat index is over ten years old.
It is the longest fishery-dependent index that we have, and it
was used in the red snapper stock assessment.
Mr. Duncan. How far do head boats go out?
Mr. Geiger. I think back to the eighties, maybe '86, '84,
'86. I don't have it in front of me, but I know it is our
oldest dependent data set. And that stock assessment--you know,
if we had the time, I could talk to you directly about that
stock assessment. That stock assessment reflected clearly the
condition of the stock that we heard based on the anecdotal
information of the fishermen that provided this testimony. We
knew there were a large number of fish out there. The problem
is they were all under the 20-inch size limit, and people were
wading through a large number of them to get to the 20-inch
fish that they could keep.
And when you look at a classic fishery, and you look at the
age structure of fish, prior to this they thought red snapper
only lived to be 24 years old. Based on aging studies that they
did in preparation for SEDAR 15, they found that the oldest
fish that they measured was 53 years old. And when you look at
the age of the over 8,000 otolitks that they sampled and aged,
when you look at that age curve, there was a precipitous,
straight-down decline after age four out to age nine, and then
basically from age nine out to 53, there were virtually no
representative samples of those age fish in that stock that was
sampled. And they took over 8,000 samples.
So then subsequent to that, and prior to doing SEDAR 24,
the science center actually went to the dock and cherry-picked
large fish that were caught that people suspected were older
than the average age that was portrayed in the stock
assessment, and they found that there was no real-age
correlation in red snapper between age and length. So you can
have young fish that appear to be large, and you can have older
fish that aren't as large as the younger fish.
So there is no direct correlation. And what they found when
they cherry-picked all these large fish, they found that the
age actually mirrored what was in the stock assessment based on
the 8,000 samples that they aged. And, oh, by the way, the
science center also conducted a longline survey offshore
because there was some stock that the commercial--or some
people felt was beyond where the current recreational fishery
prosecuted the fishery, and the commercial fishery prosecuted
it. They were deepwater fish, and that is where all the big
fish were, and were not considered.
Mr. Duncan. Not to cut you off, but I am on my time here
and about to run out. I would like for you, if you don't mind,
to provide this Committee with the sources and the data that
you are mentioning today because I have yet to see that.
Mr. Geiger. I would be absolutely delighted to do that.
Thank you.
Mr. Duncan. Because the captains I talk to basically
repudiate that. But, Captain Nelson, do you recognize this?
Could you tell me what this is?
Mr. Nelson. That is a series of emails, 73 I believe is--
you know, I think that is the number, 73 emails concerning the
red snapper science over a period of about 18 months that I
sent to National Marine Fisheries Service, the Council, South
Atlantic Council, and Eric Schwaab, you know, different groups.
Mr. Duncan. And I read through much of these. And, Mr.
Chairman, I would like to submit this as part of the record and
allow the other Committee members to look at it. But one of the
emails that I see here back in December of 2010, this was to
Dr. Roy Crabtree, and this is what Captain Nelson says, ``Are
we to believe that the red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico are
highly productive and that the same exact species in the
Atlantic is not? The only difference in that spawn or
recruitment science for the two assessments is one has data and
the other does not. Therefore, the people in the Gulf of Mexico
are fishing and making a living, and the people in the South
Atlantic are not because of lack of data, not lack of fish.''
And, you know, we can show based on the catch surveys that
Captain Nelson and I have talked about wouldn't differ from
what the fishery NMFS has. So I am going to submit this for the
record, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Mr. Fleming. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Fleming. We are down to eight minutes, 55 seconds. I
know Mr. Pallone has not had a chance to ask, so I am going to
basically make Mr. Pallone our last person to ask questions so
we can make it to our vote. So, Mr. Pallone, you have five
minutes, sir.
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to say
that in order to provide for a sustainable future and ensure
economic prosperity today, Magnuson-Stevens aimed to balance
conservation with fishing opportunities in an informed and
scientific way. But I am afraid, however, that because we can
build the lack of information into our scientific models, we
have lost the balance and instead fisheries managers use
uncertain and unreliable information as a scientific basis for
their decisions. And that is why I introduced the Coastal Jobs
Creation Act, because I am frustrated with the lack of
scientific data in management.
My bill would invest in successful programs that are
specifically targeted at aiding coastal communities and
creating jobs because without the scientific data collection
that my bill prioritizes, we would continue to reduce fishing
quotas not because the science tells us we must, but because we
are simply compensating for the unknown.
Now, I wanted to ask Mr. Greg DiDomenico--good to see you--
a couple of questions in this same regard. NMFS has had
closures in fisheries like snapper and black sea bass in
instances where the stock is not overfished, in other words, it
is a healthy stock. But the current rate of removal is too
high, in other words, overfishing is occurring. In these
particular instances, it makes intuitive sense that we should
allow a more tailored management response such as specifying a
reduced rate of fishing for a period of time rather than
requiring an outright closure that hurts jobs and coastal
economies.
What specifically needs to be changed in the Act to give
you this flexibility, and would you welcome such flexibility?
And I am going to try to get through a few of these, so if you
don't mind, Greg.
Mr. DiDomenico. Sure. Are you asking that specifically for
black sea bass?
Mr. Pallone. No, just in general. I mean, in other words,
closures are closures, whereas, you know, there should be some
flexibility in my opinion. But what do we need to do to change
Magnuson in order to accomplish that?
Mr. DiDomenico. Well, I would say that I am going to use
your example of black sea bass. It affects the recreational
community much more, especially the closures, than the
commercial industry. But I would say the first thing that we
should do is put back the $4 million that was taken--well, not
taken, but the NOAA budget, as you know, in 2012, their request
moved $4 million from cooperative research, to go to
cooperative research on catch shares. Now, some of the examples
that I used today rely or provide a very good example of where
cooperative research has helped. In my opinion, putting that
money back into cooperative research with recreational and
commercial fishermen would be the way to go.
Mr. Pallone. OK. Let me ask you this. Under current law,
the Regional Fishery Management Councils are required to
include a fishery impact statement for each management plan or
amendment to that plan, and this impact statement is supposed
to evaluate the economic impact of the plan or the amendment
and possible mitigation measures. Since these impact statements
are only done with a new management plan or amendment, do you
believe that NOAA and the Commerce Department have up-to-date
information on the impact fisheries management is having on
local fishermen, and do you believe--I mean, comment to me on
these impact statements and, you know, how valuable they are
and whether we need something else.
Mr. DiDomenico. They are valuable in time, but what has
occurred in the past is that the cumulative impacts of
regulations over time have not been accurately assessed. And
that is for both recreational and commercial industries.
Mr. Pallone. But, now let me ask a last thing. As you know,
I introduced in the last Congress--and we are going to do
another Flexibility in Rebuilding American Fisheries Act, a
Magnuson amendment. I have been hearing concerns from the
fishing community about the regional councils ratcheting down
quotas because of a lack of scientific certainty. Do you have
any other suggestions to how we can ensure fishermen have
access to healthy stocks that are not overfished in light of
the fact that fishery managers are I think compensating for
uncertainty, in effect.
Mr. DiDomenico. Yes. Have this Subcommittee make achieving
MSY, maximum sustainable yield, back-to-the-cornerstone of
Magnuson-Stevens Act. Make it a national policy. I briefly went
through the quota-setting process. And if you allow me 30
seconds, I will give you a good example. And I think my request
to have the agency provide you the numbers species by species,
which they can do, to show you the reductions--I am going to
give you approximate numbers.
We have a spiny dog fishery throughout the entire East
Coast. It is a shared stock with the Canadians. The OY is
approximately 20,000 metric tons. We reduced that by 25
percent. The OY or MSY, reduce it to 15, then we take off
another 6,000 metric tons for discards, both the fisheries and
the possible Canadian catch, leaving us with nine. That example
may not be perfect for every species, but when the agency shows
you where they start, where we could fish up to, I think we are
overly cautious and are risking reaching--missing reaching MSY
on many stocks. I think that will give you the information that
you need. Thank you.
Mr. Pallone. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Fleming. The gentleman yields back. Members of the
Subcommittee may have additional questions for witnesses, and
we ask that you respond to these in writing. The hearing record
will be open for ten days to receive these responses. Finally,
I want to thank Members and staff for their contributions to
this hearing. If there is no further business, without
objection, the Subcommittee stands adjourned. And thank you
again, witnesses.
[Whereupon, at 5:11 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]
[The prepared statement of Mr. Markey follows:]
Statement of The Honorable Edward J. Markey, Ranking Member,
Committee on Natural Resources
Thank you, Chairman Fleming. I come from Massachusetts, where, like
Louisiana, fishing is embedded into the cultural fabric of our state.
While the financial deficit has been the main focus in Washington
lately, this country is also suffering from a fish deficit. There might
not be consensus on how to fix the financial deficit but I hope we
share the same commitment to using science-based management to overcome
our fish deficit.
Congress first required the Councils to end overfishing and rebuild
stocks in 1996 and strengthened that resolve in 2006 when, in a bi-
partisan fashion and under the Bush Administration, we reauthorized the
Magnuson-Stevens Act. This reauthorization strengthened the role of
science in fishery management decision-making and required that fishery
management plans adopt annual catch limits and accountability measures
for stocks subject to overfishing.
Rebuilding fisheries can have a substantial impact on local
economies and jobs. The National Marine Fisheries Service estimated
that if we fully rebuild our stocks, dockside value for commercial
fisheries would increase by 54 percent, from $4.1 to $6.3 billion
annually. This potential increase could generate an additional $31
billion in sales and support an additional 500,000 jobs. A recent study
also found that in 2009, commercial fishermen in New England, the South
Atlantic, and the Gulf of Mexico regions lost $164.2 million and
realized only 25 percent of potential revenues because of chronic
overfishing. Clearly, rebuilding these fish stocks is critical to
creating jobs, supporting local economies, and revitalizing our coastal
communities.
Stocks are showing promise in rebuilding by using science-based
annual catch limits. In the past year, three New England stocks were
fully rebuilt and revenues have increased. After 15 years of rebuilding
efforts, there are now more fish in the sea.
We must continue to ensure that the best available science is used
in managing our fisheries to rebuild stocks and get fishermen back on
the water. That is why I cosponsored H.R. 2610, the Asset Forfeiture
Fund Reform and Distribution Act, which was introduced by my friend and
colleague, Congressman Barney Frank. This bill would eliminate the
incentive of NOAA law enforcement to levy fines for its own use and
distribute those monies to NOAA for high priority stock assessments and
to States for fisheries data collection, research, and monitoring.
Now is not the time to be cutting funding for fisheries science,
but that is exactly what the Republican's FY 2012 Commerce, Justice,
Science Appropriations bill does. In this bill, fisheries research and
management is cut 17% below the President's request, even after
Congressman Farr inserted an additional $3 million for cooperative
research to leverage the knowledge of fishermen within the scientific
process.
Choosing to make these cuts to fisheries science is like a
fisherman throwing all his navigation equipment overboard right before
a storm. We need not navigate blindly, but can choose to invest in the
fisheries science needed to rebuild stocks, fishing jobs, and coastal
communities.