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COORDINATING AFRICA POLICY ON SECURITY, COUNTERTERRORISM, HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

OF THE

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COORDINATING AFRICA POLICY ON SECURITY, COUNTERTERRORISM, HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT

TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock p.m., in room 2255 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will come to order. And good afternoon to everybody. Sorry for the delay. We did have a series of votes on the House floor so we're a little bit late, not too late, but a little bit.

We are meeting today to examine how the United States' policies are being coordinated in Africa from the security, counterterrorism, humanitarian, and development perspectives since the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command in 2008.

For decades, despite the wave of African independence in the 1950s through the 1970s, many American policy makers did not believe Africa held strategic importance to the United States. According to one defense analyst, "During the Cold War, the United States' foreign policy toward sub-Saharan Africa had little to do with Africa."

After the fall of the Soviet Union many U.S. policy makers continue to consider the U.S. military's role and responsibilities on the continent to be minimal. In 1995, the Department of Defense asserted in its U.S. security strategy for sub-Saharan Africa that "ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa." Oh, how they were wrong.

A look at current statistics amply demonstrates that the United States does have a strategic and a very strong one in sub-Saharan Africa. Over 90 percent of U.S. trade with African nations centers on American imports of African oil. Imports from Africa comprise of nearly a quarter of all American oil imports and promises to increase as new sources of oil continue to be found throughout Africa.

Similarly, African nations have abundant minerals on which our modern society depends. In recent years, the mineral coltan, largely from Africa, has enabled the development of computers, cell phones, and electronic devices. We would be hard pressed to construct jet aircraft, automobile catalytic converters, or iPods, with-

out the minerals found in Africa and, in some cases, almost nowhere else to be found in the world.

Since the 1998 bombings of the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, it has become clear that terrorism can strike the United States even in Africa. In fact, the presence of Africans on the list of planners of the 1993 and 2001 World Trade Center attacks demonstrates that terrorism in Africa is not confined to Africa itself and can reach out and strike us even in our homeland.

In a hearing that I chaired on March 12, 1999, on U.S. embassy security, Admiral William Crowe, then chairman of the Accountability Review Board, said the Kenya and Tanzania bombings demonstrated the inadequacy of resources to provide security against terrorist attacks as demonstrated by the lack of resources devoted to U.S. security at U.S. posts abroad. That resulted in what we then called the Embassy Security Act of 1999, and I offered it. It became known when it was finally enacted as the Admiral Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Act of 2000.

When I visited Sudan in 2005, government officials in Khartoum admitted they had harbored al-Qaeda in the past and Security Chief Salah Gosh bragged to me about how close his government was to the late Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda at one time. Clearly, we must remain vigilant concerning the existence of terrorist organizations that threaten our interests in Africa and of course, Africa's people.

As we have learned during our hearings on Somalia on July 7th, we are currently in the midst of a huge famine in the Horn of Africa as a result of severe drought that is affecting the entire eastern Africa region. The drought, said to be the worst in 60 years, has caused a severe crisis across Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya that threatens the livelihood of more than 12 million people. Other countries in and around the Horn of Africa including Djibouti, Sudan, South Sudan, and parts of Uganda also are affected by a food crisis.

Our Government certainly now realizes the importance of Africa, but remnants of our policy neglect remain. One example of the previous underestimation of Africa's significance was the division of American interests in Africa among three different combatant commands: The European Command, the Central Command and the Pacific Command. Because of their differing strategic objectives and goals, Africa was hardly ever a primary concern. The creation of the African Command or AFRICOM demonstrates the current awareness of the strategic importance of Africa, not only for the United States, but for the world in general.

During our country's growing engagement with the nations of Africa, our policy toward the continent has been managed by two civilian agencies, the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. It is therefore reasonable that AFRICOM contains a larger non-DoD civilian staff than has been the tradition with other combatant commands, but questions remain concerning whether an expanded military presence will overshadow the so-called soft power of diplomacy and humanitarian developmental assistance.

DoD officials emphasize that AFRICOM remains under development. Some details regarding the command structure and footprint

are still being reviewed. For example, a decision on AFRICOM's final headquarters' location has been postponed until 2012 and a move to the continent may not occur for several years, if at all. This new coordination during the past 3 years among the State Department, USAID, and Defense Department, and its implications for U.S. policy in Africa as a whole, will be the focus of this hearing.

A former EUCOM commander suggested that the Africa Command, with the interagency coordination, would be the pioneer for a new approach that other commands might adopt later. We look forward to examining the challenges and the success of this approach with our very distinguished witnesses.

I'd like to now yield such time as it may consume to my good friend and colleague, Don Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me commend you for calling this very important hearing. Today, I look forward to the hearing about the recent developments in AFRICOM and its mission to collaborate with state and USAID. I think that Africa has had its problems as it moved out of decolonization following World War II as it started to move for independence, but as that occurred, of course, the Cold War began. And countries then were judged on what side are you on, on the Warsaw Pact nations with the USSR or are you with democracy as we were fighting against the Iron Curtain countries. And so unfortunately, because of that, dictators were put into power not on how they govern, but where they stood. And we've seen people like Mobutu in Zaire and Santos in Angola and we can go on, so-called constructive engagement in South Africa with P. W. Botha, where we looked the other way because our main concern was where do you stand against the USSR. So unfortunately as democratization came about many countries felt all they had to do was to satisfy either the USA or the USSR and move along with brutal dictators, mostly military persons.

And so we have seen the difficult transition. We did see a wave of democracy move through in the '70s and '80s and '90s where countries had excellent elections and we saw the military people move out of the leadership of countries and democratically elected leaders. Of course, we know AFRICOM was first established in 2007, made operational in 2008 to promote the U.S. national security objectives in Africa and its surrounding areas. Prior to AFRICOM's creation there were, as we know, three Department of Defense combatant commands covering Africa, U.S. European Command, the U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Pacific Command. At that time, current U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice, then a Senior Fellow at Brookings Institute criticized the three command approach by stating that Africa had been the poor stepchild in each of these different commands and that it deserved full attention of a U.S. Command.

Given Africa's strategic importance and the prevalence of civil violence and the development challenges on the continent, it was felt that it was appropriate for the Department of Defense, State Department and USAID to have a coordinated approach to addressing security in the region. AFRICOM must also adhere to its stated

purpose to work with African nations and African organizations to build regional security and crisis response capacity.

When AFRICOM was first launched, I voiced concern regarding the role it would be playing and the motivation behind its creation and much of that came from African leaders. You may recall when AFRICOM was announced, General Ward, who we have so much respect for him as he recently retired, Four Star General, was appointed to lead AFRICOM and did visit a number of African countries to inform them about this new command.

Unfortunately, not much previous announcement was given. Meetings were short and quick. Had to do one or two countries every other day and I think that it was handled totally poorly. And therefore, Africa countries wondered what is this all about? And secondly, our Department of Defense, in my opinion, did a very poor job of introducing it. African Presidents with a number of them wondered well, what is this new thing? Is it just because U.S. has interests? Is it watch the Gulf of Guinea's oil? Is it fight al-Qaeda? All of these things are very positive for the United States of America, but well, secondly, what does it mean for us? It's great for you, but what about us?

And so I think that the debacle of the poor manner in which the introduction of AFRICOM to African nations was a setback. Every single country said thanks, but no thanks except Liberia who, as you know, is one of our staunchest allies. And of course, the President was looking for the AFRICOM to come to Liberia because they need to have additional income. I believe that was the main reason.

So it was handled poorly and it was a setback.

My primary concern was like I said, it was hastily created, although Department of Defense was thinking about it for a long time. However, they didn't let others know. Unclear mission and the potential of militarizing foreign aid. And that was one of the other misconceptions. You had to see the General to see whether you were going to get aid or not.

And as we talk about democracy all through the '70s and '80s and '90s and said do away with the generals, they shouldn't be in charge of government. They shouldn't be the ones you go to for assistance and for jobs and we looked like we were putting a general in charge of what agency should get the aid or the food or should the children get it or the adults? So it was just poorly conceived in my opinion. Of course, people in the Department of Defense tell me I'm all wrong. The State Department said it, too. However, that's just the way it is.

So we are where we are.

Another concern was that African nations have expressed unwillingness to house the Command with the notable exception, as I mentioned, of Liberia. In fact, just last month, Liberia's President, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, met with me and other Members of Congress and stated her desire once again to have AFRICOM headquartered in Liberia. I'm interested as we move along about whether the operations will move to Africa, will stay in Europe, and if Liberia is one of the countries that would be considered. Many others also questioned the Bush administration's intentions for AFRICOM and worried about the increased military presence and whether this

was a reaction to China's growing investment in the region and ways of securing Africa's valuable natural resources.

There is no doubt that the Department of Defense have resources and capabilities, that's for sure. If used in a collaborative way with the Department of State, USAID, as well as African military partners, can serve as a valuable contribution to the continent. Indeed, there are good examples for such collaboration. For example, AFRICOM has utilized USAID's conflict analysis of Southern Sudan to inform its planning efforts and is assisting in the interagency in determining the appropriate approach to supporting South Sudan's security sector reform and conflict mitigation activities.

In the DRC, AFRICOM collaborated with State and USAID to address sexual and gender-based violence issues which, as we know, is very prominent there. The Command used its resources to construct or renovate buildings where the government, the U.N. or local and international nongovernmental organizations delivered services. AFRICOM also oversaw training on preventing sexual and gender-based violence for the Congolese Army.

These successful interventions and training initiatives are good examples of how interagency cooperation on security assistance in Africa can be very effective and AFRICOM has the resources to be a valuable player on the continent. It is important, however, that AFRICOM seek to maintain equal partnership and does not over reach its mandate and attempt to become a leader in the U.S. diplomacy and development.

While I remain somewhat hesitant about aspects of AFRICOM with foreign assistance funds at a risk for significant cuts as we move to the next Congresses, I welcome AFRICOM as a partner to State and USAID since the Department of Defense is the only Department that seems to be able to not have serious cuts.

I hope to learn about, more about the interagency coordination between AFRICOM, USAID, and State Department and how this collaboration is benefitting African citizens while also advancing American interests. So I certainly look forward to the testimony and I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Mr. Marino.

Mr. MARINO. Mr. Chairman, I have no comment at this time.

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass?

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Once again, thank you, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Payne for convening this important hearing to discuss AFRICOM and its role in Africa. I'd also like to thank our witnesses who will present testimony today. I look forward to hearing more about the inter-departmental collaborations and coordinations between AFRICOM and USAID.

Throughout the hearing, I also look forward to hearing more about direct interaction and relationship between AFRICOM and African countries. I do understand, as Mr. Payne was describing, that many African leaders are concerned and some resistant to the idea of AFRICOM headquartered within the continent. And I'm interested in assessing the value of relocating AFRICOM to the continent both for Americans and Africans.

I would appreciate some additional information about the general posture of African leaders and the African Union toward AFRICOM

at this time. So thank you very much for the taking the time out today.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Ms. Buerkle.

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to thank you and the ranking member, Mr. Payne, for calling this very important hearing and I look forward to hearing the testimony from our witnesses, this afternoon.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Ms. Buerkle. Without objection, a full biography of each of our very distinguished witnesses will be made a part of the record, but I will just briefly introduce them to the panel, beginning—although none of you are strangers—beginning with Ambassador Donald Yamamoto who has testified before us as recently as March at a hearing on the DRC and another hearing just a few weeks ago on Somalia. He has served since 2009 as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau for African Affairs of the U.S. Department of State. His prior assignments included serving as U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia from November 2006 to July 2009, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau for African Affairs from '03 to '06.

We'll then hear from Ambassador Vicki Huddleston who currently serves as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Ambassador Huddleston began her public service career as a Peace Corps volunteer and has held a number of positions in the State Department including several in Africa where she served as Acting Ambassador to Ethiopia and Ambassador to Madagascar and Mali. Throughout her career in the State Department, Ambassador Huddleston has worked to advance democracy and to build peace. Prior to joining the DoD, she was a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution.

And finally we'll hear from Sharon Cromer who is currently serving as Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Africa Bureau for USAID, a position she has held since May 2010. Ms. Cromer is a Senior USAID Foreign Service Officer with more than 20 years of experience in the international humanitarian and development assistance area. Upon her return to Washington in 2009, Ms. Cromer served as Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance on a temporary basis before assuming the position of Deputy Administrator in the Bureau of Management.

Ambassador Yamamoto, if you would proceed.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD Y. YAMAMOTO, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Payne and distinguished members of this committee. I extend our deep appreciation to this committee for this hearing on AFRICOM's partnership with USAID and the Department of State in facing the challenges in Africa and forming important alliances with Africa's leaders and people.

AFRICOM's role is a paradigm shift, a new way of doing business that makes sense, promotes our national strategic interests, and accomplishes our goals and objectives by bringing the inter-

agency closer as a team in the most effective and innovative manner.

First, AFRICOM provides greater unity of command on a continent that DoD previously split between geographic combatant commands, a multiple, functional commands. Further, AFRICOM provides a command structure capable of coordinating and commanding a multitude of U.S. military components engaged in programs in Africa, enhancing DoD's operational effectiveness in cooperation with our Embassies, Ambassadors, and USAID mission directors.

In the past several years, DoD components have grown to become the largest non-State Department presence in several of our missions.

Second, AFRICOM is an important partner for USAID and State, as we seek to tackle problems, pursue solutions and expand partnerships in Africa. General Ward, and now General Ham, do not merely meet with their military counterparts, but also with national leaders, civilian policy makers and play an integral part in how we approach Africa, how we develop policy and how we execute programs.

Third, AFRICOM has a civilian Department of State official as its deputy commander, as well as other State and USAID officers directly integrated into its headquarter structures which improves coordinations between agencies which is a unique organizational arrangement, not commonly found in military formations. Duplicated in other commands, AFRICOM's unique approach is directly relevant to Secretary Clinton's launching of the QDDR process through which we are rethinking how we do business and integrate the interagency in achieving our common national goals and objectives.

AFRICOM, with USAID and State are working together to address a multitude of challenges including the conflict in Libya; implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan; stabilization, piracy challenges in Somalia; addressing violence in Congo; development in Liberia; promoting training and infrastructure development throughout Africa and transnational challenges.

In addition, we are directly collaborating on issues such as military professionalization, building counterterrorism capacity, disaster management, peacekeeping capacity building, humanitarian operations coordinated with USAID, de-mining ammunition handling training, nonproliferation of weapons and mass destruction, destruction of excess small arms, light weapons and ammunition, defense sector reform, maritime safety, a whole slew of activities that goes on and on.

If there's a downside to the level of engagement we have seen from AFRICOM, it is that the large number of AFRICOM's temporary assignment personnel deployed to the continent often present significant logistical challenges for our U.S. missions which sometimes find it difficult to maintain full visibility and provide adequate support given their own very limited staffing levels.

Additionally, the constant turnover of temporary military personnel working on 3 or 6 months' rotations can cause significant confusion with both a country team and the host nation it carefully manages. Nonetheless, we will continue to work together and co-

ordinate closely in order to mitigate and manage these challenges which are far outweighed by the positive gains that AFRICOM has made in the past 3 years.

I can report to you today that cooperation between AFRICOM and our African partners is at an all-time high, despite the lingering wariness toward AFRICOM on the part of some African nations.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you again for this opportunity to appear before this committee. And I submit a longer version for the record.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Yamamoto follows:]

Testimony by U.S. Department of State
Acting Assistant Secretary Donald Yamamoto
26 July 2011
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights
U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee

"AFRICOM: Promoting Partnership for Global Security in Africa"

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Payne, honorable Members of the Committee: Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on USG cooperation in Africa since AFRICOM was created. As you know, we are currently witnessing some of the greatest changes on the African continent since the era of independence. These changes present both challenges and opportunities, and since its inception in October 2008, AFRICOM has been a critical partner for the Department of State in addressing conflict and transnational issues across Africa, in addition to the prominent role it has played in traditional military operations, such as the conflict in Libya. Today I am here to tell you why AFRICOM matters and how we are working together to pursue our common foreign policy objectives.

Without effective cooperation within the U.S. Government, we will not be able to address the issues of terrorism, piracy and conflict in places like Sudan, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Before the creation of AFRICOM, the Department of State had to coordinate with three different Geographic Combatant Commands, each of which had varying priorities and security cooperation objectives. The Department of Defense was able to unify these efforts by placing all of the previous areas of responsibility for Africa under one command solely focused on Africa 365 days a year. We have seen how this new focus in places like Liberia can have success in building sustainable, indigenous African security capacity that respects civilian authority and human rights, and contributes meaningfully to economic and social development. Given the important role militaries play in the region, AFRICOM's work is critical to the success of our Administration's broader efforts to build a more peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Africa.

AFRICOM's previous and first commander, General Kip Ward, used to say that standing up a new Combatant Command was like trying to build an airplane in flight, and we appreciate that the State Department has been allowed to be part of this process of growth from the beginning. Since its inception, AFRICOM has strived to be a collaborative Combatant Command with a core function of not just overseeing U.S. forces on the continent, but also preventing and resolving armed conflict through building partner nation capacity. For the past three years, the U.S. Department of State has coordinated and collaborated with AFRICOM as it worked to achieve the Administration's highest priority goals related to democracy, good governance, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and transnational challenges. President Obama's speech in Accra in July 2009 laid out a clear framework for our Africa policy, and we believe that AFRICOM has played an important supporting role in implementing this framework. It is doing this by supporting efforts to build professional, capable militaries that respect human rights and civilian control, which in turn supports efforts to resolve armed conflicts, address transnational challenges, and safeguard democratic institutions.

AFRICOM has two co-equal deputy commanders – a civilian deputy and a military deputy. The Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA) is a senior U.S. diplomat, and provides direct policy input and advice to the Commander of AFRICOM. The State Department further augments the AFRICOM Headquarters staff with a Foreign Policy Advisor and five additional Foreign Service Officers, including a Senior Development Advisor provided by USAID who reports directly to General Ham. Most of the other Foreign Service Officers in the command have regional responsibilities. Additionally, each of AFRICOM's component commands also has a Foreign Service Officer serving as a Foreign Policy Advisor. The State Department currently has four other employees seconded to AFRICOM and is in the process of adding five additional officers. Similarly, AFRICOM has significantly expanded the number of DoD personnel who are integrated into embassies across the continent over the past three years. These personnel are valuable members of our country teams, as they provide direct and sustained support for both DOS and DoD-funded activities. AFRICOM has strived to not just do more, but do better in its activities on the continent and these expanded offices of security cooperation have enabled our embassies to increase the quality of our engagement on the continent. Effective collaboration is possible because the Department of State and AFRICOM are imbedded in each other's organizations. This structure has allowed us to work together effectively on a number of programs over the past three years, and I would like to outline these collaborative efforts for you today. I also want to discuss briefly AFRICOM's relationship with our partner nations.

The Department of State collaborates with AFRICOM on a long list of issues such as military professionalization; building counterterrorism capacity; disaster management; peacekeeping capacity building; humanitarian operations coordinated with USAID; demining and ammunition handling training; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; destruction of excess small arms and light weapons and unstable ammunition; reduction of excess and poorly secured man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS); Defense Sector Reform in Liberia, DRC, and South Sudan; counter-piracy activities off the Somali coast; maritime safety and security capacity building; and civil-military cooperation. AFRICOM elements at our embassies implement Department of State-funded Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, which further U.S. interests in Africa by helping to professionalize African militaries, while also assisting our African partners to be more equipped and trained to work toward common security goals.

In the realm of counterterrorism, AFRICOM plays a critical and central role in both the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), our primary programs to support the long-term counterterrorism (CT) capacity building of member countries in northwest and East Africa. Both programs are led by State, but are managed in close coordination with DoD and AFRICOM, as well as USAID. DoD launched Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) in 2007 to support TSCTP programming. OEF-TS adds both funding and essential staff to TSCTP, including military trainers and advisors.

State also collaborates with AFRICOM on a range of transnational issues. We continue to work together to develop U.S. maritime engagement in Africa from one of individual, isolated efforts to a more comprehensive and sustainable approach. Early and close coordination on

AFRICOM programs such as the Africa Partnership Station, which State provides funding to support the training of African maritime forces, and Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership, which provides operational support, both contribute to a whole-of-government approach. Non-proliferation and counternarcotics are two other key areas of cooperation. Recently, DoD began to design and implement cooperative threat reduction programs in East Africa, focused on improving security around sites housing potential biological threats. The AFRICOM Counternarcotics Office has been active in West Africa supporting maritime and airport interdiction efforts and funding the Federal Bureau of Investigation's and Drug Enforcement Administration's training activities throughout the region.

If there is a downside to this level of engagement, it is that the large numbers of AFRICOM temporary assignment personnel deploying to the continent often present significant logistical challenges for U.S. Missions, which sometimes find it difficult to maintain full visibility and provide support given their own very limited staffing levels. This large and growing AFRICOM presence and programming in Africa at times risks overwhelming the "soft power" of USAID and State programs and personnel. Additionally, the constant turnover of temporary military personnel working on three and six month rotations can cause significant confusion with both the country team and the host nation if not carefully and managed. Nonetheless, we will continue to work together and coordinate closely in order to mitigate and manage these challenges.

However, the downside of additional DoD personnel on the continent is far outweighed by the positive gains AFRICOM made in the past three years. I can report to you today that cooperation between AFRICOM and our African partners is at an all-time high despite a continuing lingering wariness towards AFRICOM on the part of some African nations. This cooperation begins at the highest levels, where AFRICOM assists the African Union Peace and Security Commission. It continues down through the African Standby Force regional brigades, and ends with extensive partnering at the bilateral level. The capacity that AFRICOM builds at the regional level improves the relationship not just between the United States and the AU, but between the African nations themselves, increasing overall cooperation exponentially. An example of this is AFRICOM's Exercise African Endeavor, which assists African nations and their regional organizations in communicating with one another over a variety of spectrums, making greater regional cooperation possible. AFRICOM exercises, like Natural Fire in East Africa, bring together biannually forces from Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda, and the United States to conduct interoperability training in a humanitarian response scenario. These specific examples demonstrate how AFRICOM is increasing cooperation and building trust bilaterally through its interactions with African regional organizations.

Engaging with regional organizations is just one way that AFRICOM is improving cooperation on the continent. Since its inception, AFRICOM has worked in concert with other U.S. government agencies and international partners to provide effective security engagement through military-to-military programs and activities designed to promote a stable and secure African environment. The Department of State applauds these efforts, and believes that, despite the difficult challenges it has faced, AFRICOM is on a positive trajectory of better cooperation with both other U.S. Government agencies and our partner nations. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions.

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, it will be made a part of the record and thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Huddleston?

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE VICKI HUDDLESTON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Payne, thank you, first of all, for your remarks. We very much appreciated them. And honorable members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to talk with you today about cooperation between the U.S. Africa Command, AFRICOM, the State Department, and the USAID on the African continent.

I also want to extend my thanks to my colleagues from State and USAID and other witnesses today.

Since its standup in 2008, AFRICOM has brought long-needed integration to the security dimension of our Africa policy. Up to that time, DoD had partitioned Africa among three co-COMs, EUCOM, CENTCOM, AND PACOM. As a result, Africa did not receive the attention it needed. The lack of one command focused exclusively on the continent meant that DoD lacked a coherent, consistent approach to and an understanding of the region's vast complexities. And both the chairman and the ranking member, mentioned that.

One immediate and fully expected outcome of the creation of AFRICOM has been the expanded DoD engagement in the U.S. Africa policy making and implementation policy. This should have come as no surprise. Secretary Clinton has spelled out the three legs of national security: Diplomacy, development, and defense. Strong diplomacy and robust development programs have served as hallmarks of U.S. Africa policy for a half century since the end of colonialism.

Less prominent, however, in that formulation was the third leg, defense. The Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and 9/11 brought home to all of us that we could no longer afford to place Africa on the periphery of national security.

Today, Africa is part of a struggle against violent extremism, notably against al-Shabaab in Somalia and al-Qaeda in Maghreb in the north and west of the African continent. Instability on the continent affects the U.S. homeland directly whether threats of terrorism, economic disruption, refugee flows or any host of other ways. We now all recognize the need to focus equally on the third D of Secretary Clinton's formulation.

We at the Pentagon work closely with AFRICOM and our interagency partners at the State Department and USAID to ensure that our nation's goals in Africa are well defined and our activities are closely coordinated from planning through implementation. And just as an aside, I can assure you that that has been my highest priority.

This close coordination occurs at all levels. I meet weekly via secure video link with my counterparts on the Joint Staff and with senior generals at AFRICOM including J2 Intelligence, J5 Strategy and J3 Operations and Logistics. And we meet bi-weekly with the State Department's Africa Bureau to coordinate our policies in se-

curity cooperation and our activities. And I attend, along with Assistant Secretary of State and my colleague, Sharon Cromer on my left, a weekly meeting at the National Security Council chaired by the Senior Director.

Coordination extends much deeper, however, than myself and senior staff. Every day action officers in my office, colonels, lieutenants, lieutenant colonels, commanders, and the civilians are on the phone, emailing and attending meetings on both sides of the Potomac River. Such is the frequency of these interactions that they are on a first-name basis with their State and USAID colleagues. There's extensive cross fertilization among agencies, the concrete result of years of planning. I have a permanent State

Department position on my staff and it is currently held by a veteran Foreign Service Officer. Likewise, the Regional Security Affairs Division of the Africa Bureau has two active military colonels on its staff.

DoD works closely with the State Department to implement broad security cooperation efforts, leveraging the complementary authorities and funding streams available to each department. And this, I think, is really the heart of the matter. The State Department, under its Title 2 authority, manages security assistance programs to promote U.S. foreign policy through diplomacy by building professional militaries that respect international law and human rights. These programs include the well-known examples of Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, IMET, Regional Security Initiatives, and Peacekeeping Operations capacity building. DoD plays a crucial role in all those programs in their implementation, through our U.S. AFRICOM personnel who are on the continent and also through our defense attaches that are assigned to the Embassies that are under the authority of the United States Ambassadors.

DoD's Title 10 activities expand and complement these Title 22 activities of the State Department, thereby furthering USG policy objectives set by the Department of State and the National Security Council. Title 10 programs fund exercises that give African militaries the opportunity to work together and often to provide assistance to their citizens. In addition, Section 1206 authority allows State and DoD to build counterterrorism capacity of our African partners.

These Title 10 activities reflect our over-arching goals of assisting African militaries to protect and defend their borders and their citizens. The proposed new Global Security Contingency Fund would further this collaborative approach by allowing DoD and State to pool resources, thereby facilitating our national response to complex crises that require a range of military and diplomatic assistance.

AFRICOM's security sector strategy ensures that our national interests are protected from potential threats on the African continent while contributing to the stability and security for the people of Africa. Ranking Member Payne mentioned what is in it for the people of Africa. AFRICOM achieves these objectives by building partner nation capacity so that our partners can counter extremism and provide for the security of their citizens and contribute to peacekeeping.

In the Horn of Africa, AFRICOM builds capacity of local militaries so they can effectively counter extremist threats. The State Department's regional program, Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism, PREACT, provides the framework under which AFRICOM's activities are carried out in the Horn of Africa. AFRICOM provides military trainers to the State Department's African Contingency Operation and Training and Assistance Program, ACOTA, that trains Ugandan and Burundian contingents that make up the bulk of AMISON peacekeepers in Somalia.

In West Africa, AFRICOM's Special Forces are building the capacity of Malian and Mauritanian forces to counter al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM. These efforts are conducted under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, TSCTP, that the State Department is responsible for and is in coordination with USAID as well. AFRICOM enhances the capacity of our key African partners to provide a secure environment for democracy, governance, and development. State contractors and USAFRICOM trained a battalion in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the new army of Liberia. By training professional military units that respect civilian control, these militaries become important contributors to stability and respect for the rule of law. AFRICOM's exercises provide opportunities for our African partners to continue perfecting their professional abilities.

The State Department and DoD are committed to helping African armed forces prevent and deter tragedies that result in humanitarian disasters. In response to congressional legislation, State, DoD, and USAID have developed a strategy to assist the governments and the armed forces in Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic to counter the atrocities that are being committed by the Lord's Resistance Army. AFRICOM's activities will improve the regional armed forces' ability to defeat the LRA. In parallel, USAID and State are working with local NGOs.

Today, we are facing a vast humanitarian crisis that you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, as a result of the severe drought in the Horn of Africa. While State and USAID are leading a significant humanitarian response on behalf of the U.S. Government, USAFRICOM has set up a task force and is prepared to assist in any appropriate way when requested.

In Libya, USAFRICOM worked closely with State and USAID to return thousands of Egyptians stranded in Tunisia to their homes. This air bridge complemented AFRICOM's leadership of

Odyssey Dawn, a coalition of 10 nations that, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, stopped the advance of the Libyan Army on defenseless civilians in Benghazi, and put into place a no-fly zone, and a sea embargo.

Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member, for the opportunity to discuss interagency security cooperation efforts in Africa. I believe that AFRICOM's success as a command will depend on its ability to coordinate its activities with State and USAID and indeed with its African partners and we have much improved, AFRICOM has much improved its initial roll-out which Ranking Member Payne pointed out was not as successful as we would have liked.

Over the past 2 years as AFRICOM has matured as a Command, this cooperation and communication with Africa, and indeed with my colleagues here, has improved AFRICOM's ability to build partner capacity, respond to the needs of the continent, and defend our nation's interests. USAFRICOM is proving the wisdom of establishing a single command for Africa that can provide rapid and appropriate assistance for a continent with many challenges and great possibilities.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Huddleston follows:]

Congressional Hearing to the
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights
House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC)
"AFRICOM: Promoting Partnership for Global Security in Africa"
July 26, 2011

Testimony of
Vicki Huddleston, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, DoD

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Payne, honorable members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to speak to you today about cooperation between U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), the State Department, and USAID on the African continent. I also want to extend my thanks to my colleagues from State and USAID and other witnesses today who are sharing the dais with me.

Since its stand-up in 2008, AFRICOM has brought long-needed integration to the security dimension of our Africa policy. Up to that time, DoD had partitioned Africa among three other COCOMS – EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM. As a result, Africa did not receive the attention it needed. The lack of one Command focused exclusively on the continent meant that DoD lacked a coherent, consistent approach to and understanding of this region's vast complexities. Thanks to AFRICOM, we at DoD are now much better at considering Africa on its own terms, not as an appendage to Europe, the Middle East, or Asia.

One immediate and fully expected outcome of the creation of AFRICOM has been expanded DoD engagement in the U.S.-Africa policymaking and implementation process. This should have come as no surprise. Secretary Clinton has spelled out the three legs of national security: diplomacy, development, and defense. Strong diplomacy and a robust development program have served as hallmarks of U.S. Africa policy for the half century since the end of colonialism. Less prominent in that formulation was the third leg – defense. The embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and 9/11 brought home to all of us that we could no longer afford to place Africa on the periphery of national security policy. Today, Africa is part of the struggle against violent extremism, notably against al-Shabaab in Somalia and al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) in the north and west of the continent. Instability on the continent affects the U.S. homeland directly, whether threats of terrorism, economic disruptions, refugee flows, or any of a host of other ways. We now all recognize the need in Africa to focus equally on that third "D" of Secretary Clinton's formulation – Defense.

Staff Coordination and Collaboration

We in the Pentagon work closely with AFRICOM and our interagency partners at the State Department and USAID to ensure that our nation's goals in Africa are well defined and our activities are closely coordinated from planning through implementation. This close coordination occurs at all levels. I meet weekly via secure video link with my counterpart on the Joint Staff and senior generals at AFRICOM, including the J-2 Intelligence & Knowledge Directorate, the J-5 Strategy Directorate, and the J-3 Operations & Logistics Directorate. The State Department's Africa Bureau leadership meets bi-weekly with my office to coordinate

policy, the National Security Staff's Africa Director hosts weekly meetings that I attend along with Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, USAID, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). These recurring sessions ensure that we stay closely linked—from Washington to Stuttgart to our embassies in Africa—for policy development, oversight of priorities and requirements, concept development and planning, and program implementation.

Coordination extends much deeper than myself and senior staff. Every day, action officers in my office -- colonels, lieutenant colonels, commanders, -- are on the phone, emailing, and attending meetings on both side of the Potomac River. Such is the frequency of these interactions that they are on first-name bases with their State and USAID counterparts. There is extensive cross-fertilization among agencies, the concrete results of years of planning. I have a permanent State Department position assigned to my office, filled currently by a veteran Foreign Service Officer. Likewise, the Regional Security Affairs Office in the Africa Bureau at State has two military active-duty officers. AFRICOM not only has a civilian Deputy Commander who is a Senior Foreign Service Officer, it has a several other positions held by senior and mid-level FSOs.

Leveraging Title-10 and Title-22 Authorities and Resources

DoD works closely with the State Department to implement broad security cooperation efforts, leveraging the complementary authorities and funding streams available to each Department. The State Department, under its Title-22 authority, manages security assistance programs to promote U.S. foreign policy through diplomacy by building professional militaries that respect international law and human rights. These programs include the following well known examples: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Regional Security Initiatives (RSI), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) capacity building. DoD plays a crucial role in the implementation of these programs. USAFRICOM personnel assist in the delivery of equipment purchased through security assistance funds and train and mentor African militaries with Title 22 resources. In our embassies, Defense Attachés and other DoD officials, under Chief of Mission authority, administer Title 22 bilateral programs.

DoD's Title-10 activities expand and compliment Title 22 activities thereby furthering USG policy objectives set by the Department of State and the National Security Council. Title-10 programs fund exercises that give African militaries the opportunity to work together and to provide services to their citizens. In addition, Section 1206 authority allows State and DoD to build the counterterrorism capacity of our African partners. These Title 10 activities reflect our over arching goals of assisting African militaries to protect and defend their border and their citizens. The proposed new Global Security Contingency Fund would further this collaborative approach by allowing DoD and State to pool resources, thereby facilitating the USG response to complex crises that require a range of military and other assistance in the security sector.

AFRICOM's Security Strategy

USAFRICOM's security strategy ensures that our national interests are protected from potential threats on the African continent, while contributing to stability and security for the people of Africa. USAFRICOM achieves these objectives by building partner nation capacity to counter extremism, provide for the security of their citizens and contribute to peace keeping.

In the Horn of Africa and North and West Africa, USAFRICOM builds capacity of local militaries so that they can effectively counter extremist threats. The State Department's regional program – Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism (PREACT) provides the framework for AFRICOM's activities throughout the Horn of Africa. AFRICOM provides military trainers to the State Department's African Contingency Operations Training & Assistance (ACOTA) program that trains Ugandan and Burundian contingents that make up the bulk of AMISOM peacekeepers in Somalia. In West Africa, AFRICOM's Special Forces are building the capacity of Malian and Mauritanian forces to counter al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). These efforts are conducted under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) – the State Department's regional counter-terrorism program.

AFRICOM enhances the capacity of our key African partners to provide a secure environment for democratic governance and development. State contractors and USAFRICOM trained battalions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the new army of Liberia. By training professional military units that respect civilian control, these militaries become important contributors to stability and respect for the rule of law. AFRICOM's exercises provide opportunities for our African partners to test their abilities and improve their cooperation and coordination with their neighbors. These exercises which often provide health services to poor and isolated communities and are carried out in close coordination with our embassies and the country teams.

The State Department and DoD are committed to helping African armed forces prevent and deter tragedies that result in humanitarian disasters. In response to Congressional legislation State, DoD, and USAID have developed a strategy to assist the governments and the armed forces in Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic to counter the atrocities that are being committed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). AFRICOM's activities will improve the regional armed forces ability to defeat the LRA. In parallel, USAID and State are working with local NGOs.

Today we are facing a vast humanitarian crisis as a result of the severe drought in the Horn of Africa. While State and USAID are leading a significant humanitarian response on behalf of the US government, USAFRICOM has set up task forces and is prepared to assist in any appropriate when requested to do so by State and USAID.

In Libya, USAFRICOM worked closely with State and USAID to return thousands of Egyptians stranded in Tunisia to their homes. This air bridge complimented USAFRICOM's leadership of Odyssey Dawn – a coalition of 10 nations that, in accordance with UNSCR 1973, stopped the advance of the Libyan Army on defenseless civilians in Benghazi, put into place a no-fly zone over Libya, and a sea embargo.

Closing remarks

Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss interagency security cooperation efforts in Africa. I believe that AFRICOM's success as a Command will depend on its ability to coordinate its activities with State and USAID and with its AFRICOM partners. Over the past two years as

AFRICOM has matured as a Command this cooperation and communications has deepened and broadened AFRICOM's ability to build partner capacity, respond to the needs of the continent, and defend our nation's interests. USAFRICOM is proving the wisdom of establishing a single command for Africa that can provide rapid and appropriate assistance for a continent with many challenges and great possibilities.

Mr. SMITH. Ambassador Huddleston, thank you so very much for your testimony.

Ms. Cromer.

STATEMENT OF MS. SHARON CROMER, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Ms. CROMER. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the invitation to speak with you today about how USAID works with AFRICOM to achieve common U.S. foreign policy goals. I would like to also thank Ambassadors Yamamoto and Huddleston for their work in collaboration. We really do meet on a bi-weekly basis and we see a lot of each other.

With the chairman's permission, I will submit my testimony in full for the record, but today I will make three brief points. The first point is that USAID and AFRICOM engagement is mutually supportive of U.S. foreign policy objectives. In other words, we have found common ground. Today's world is more interconnected and complex than ever. Instability, poverty, and disease travel with ease across oceans and borders. Problems abroad all too quickly become problems at home. A peaceful, healthy, and prosperous Africa benefits us all.

The link between security and development is as essential in Africa as it is elsewhere. War, terrorism, and violence threaten current progress and impede potential gains in health, education, democracy and economic growth. But with improved security, African nations can experience sustained economic growth, better living conditions and improved governance.

USAID coordination with the Department of Defense must not be perceived as contributing to specific military objectives, but rather as contributing to broad U.S. foreign policy goals. While we retain the essential humanitarian and development mission of USAID, we have also found mutually beneficial opportunities that support the interests of the United States and the beneficiaries in the countries in which we work.

For example, USAFRICOM had a prominent role in helping to stabilize Liberia following years of civil war. As a result, USAID has worked with the Government of Liberia to develop a long-term sustainable health program that is providing the essential package of basic health services to the Liberian people. This type of work is not possible amidst war and strife. The military's logistical capabilities can be invaluable assets in providing humanitarian assistance during emergencies. Fortunately, we have not had an opportunity to call upon them in recent years on the continent.

Likewise, USAID's unique skills in addressing a range of essential civilian needs during both times of peace and war substantially and strategically benefit the foreign policy of the United States. Thus, USAID's coordination with the military's assistance programs can lead to important synergies of effort. For example, in some countries where USAID is providing assistance and training to teachers in rural schools, the Department of Defense's humanitarian assistance teams have renovated school structures, including dining halls and latrines to improve hygiene and orderliness. This

combined effort creates a learning environment in which improved reading and math skills prevail.

The second point is that early coordination in the planning phase between USAID and AFRICOM has vastly improved since we established staffing structures which have been described in earlier testimony. This structure includes three officers who—USAID officers who work at AFRICOM's headquarters in Stuttgart, as well as staff—AFRICOM staff who work in our Office of Military Affairs in Washington.

Increased regular dialogue and joint planning helps us to align activities from the start, whereas in the past, misunderstandings and assumptions and lack of coordination could lead to problems in the implementation phase we're now planning from the start and avoiding some of those challenges.

USAID regularly engages with AFRICOM through ongoing participation in a variety of strategic visioning and planning processes and through regular briefings on particular countries and programs. This engagement has included an unprecedented level of USAID participation and development of AFRICOM's current theater campaign plan which directs AFRICOM's peacetime activities across the continent. In fact, just last week at USAID, we reviewed this plan with AFRICOM participants, identifying common visions and goals and objectives.

Our work in Djibouti presents an example of how strategic alignment produces mutually beneficial results. Previously, the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, CJTF–HOA, proposed projects and if USAID and the Embassy concurred, coordination with the Government of Djibouti would follow. Under that system, projects may or may not have been aligned with local development needs and priorities. Under the new framework, USAID works with the Government of Djibouti to develop a list of needed projects first. While CJTF–HOA, taking into account their own objectives and resources, can choose to contribute to any such project if it has the endorsement of the Ambassador.

For example, the opening of the Guistir Clinic near the Somali border was the first large-scale project carried out under this framework. For years, USAID had been building and refurbishing rural health clinics in Djibouti, at carefully selected sites. CJTF–HOA constructed the Guistir Clinic in a remote border area identified by the Government of Djibouti and USAID as a remaining gap in the health care system. USAID's assistance complemented CJTF–HOA's efforts by equipping and staffing the clinic which today provides access to health care for over 400 families.

The third and final point is that while USAID and AFRICOM have notable successes working together, challenges do remain. AFRICOM is still relatively new and so, too, is its cooperation and collaboration with USAID and other U.S. Government actors. USAID is able to program a sizeable amount of foreign assistance in Africa through a relatively small number of staff members, while AFRICOM has a smaller budget and more available staff.

While USAID is moving to move more resources to Africa, it is still difficult as Ambassador Yamamoto pointed out for us to engage fully with AFRICOM on the ground, given the fact that our staff are so stretched. Nonetheless, the payoffs that can result from

a comprehensive whole of government approach are so important that the effort to coordinate is worthwhile.

Gains made in civil military coordination need to be institutionalized to prevent stagnation and backsliding. We are committed to enhancing, monitoring, and evaluation so that we can learn from mistakes and amplify best practices.

The central point of our relationship is clear. Security, stability, and peace are essential for economic growth, poverty reduction and for development overall. We welcome the continued dialogue to ensure the solutions for short-term objectives are consistent with our shared long-term goals. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Cromer follows:]

Testimony by U.S. Agency for International Development
Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa Sharon Cromer
U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights

"USAID and U.S. Africa Command"

July 26, 2011

Good afternoon Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Payne, and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to speak with you today about how USAID works with the U.S. African Command (USAFRICOM) to achieve common U.S. foreign policy goals. I would also like to thank the witnesses from the Department of State and from the Department of Defense for their work and collaboration on this issue.

Interagency Cooperation Toward Shared U.S. Goals
Africa faces some of the most serious security challenges in the world. In a 2010 assessment of 162 countries, the University of Maryland found that no region in the world has greater potential for conflict than Africa. Of the 25 countries rated to have the highest risk of instability, only three are outside sub-Saharan Africa. Heightened instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea-Bissau, and Mauritania has pushed these countries into the top tier of those at risk. Furthermore, states with a mix of poor human security, unstable or inequitable political institutions, and limited or poorly managed resources are likely to contribute to a "bad neighborhood" of similarly vulnerable states. Many African countries require outside assistance to resolve major internal conflicts in their region and to absorb the inflow of refugees and displaced persons resulting from conflict. For many Africans in places such as Somalia, eastern DRC, Nigeria's Niger Delta region, and Darfur and the Three Areas of Sudan, conflict continues to be a daily reality.

Today's world is more interconnected and complex than ever. Instability, poverty, and disease quickly travel across oceans and borders. Problems abroad all too quickly become problems at home, while a peaceful, healthy, and prosperous Africa benefits us all.

USAID is proud to play the lead development role in promoting democracy and good governance, investing in the well-being of Africa's people, spurring economic growth on the continent, and delivering humanitarian assistance. We work in partnership with African countries to improve their economic prospects, strengthen their ability to govern, and provide brighter futures for their citizens. USAID also has a long and successful history of working in tandem with the Departments of State and Defense to advance peace and security in Africa. We do this because it's the right thing to do, and because development is a core pillar of our national security. Security is essential for long-term development to take place, and development is critical if security is to be sustained.

Our collaboration with the Department of State and the Department of Defense is fully operationalized at USAFRICOM. We support the interagency as we all work together toward the same goal while retaining our own distinct purposes, approaches, and strengths.

The National Security Strategy published by the White House just over a year ago states that "our long-term security will come not from our ability to instill fear in other people, but through our capacity to speak to their hopes." The strategy goes on to note that "sustained economic progress requires faster, sustainable and more inclusive development" in areas such as food security and global health—two of USAID's top priorities in Africa.

Implementing one of the Department of Defense's core missions—building partner capacity to provide for their own defense—USAFRICOM helps African states transform their militaries into operationally capable and professional institutions that are subordinate to civilian authority, respect human rights, adhere to the rule of law, and are viewed by their citizens as servants and protectors of the people. USAID is a prime beneficiary of this effort as security greatly enhances the prospect for sustainable development across the continent. For its part, USAID seeks to develop African legislative and civil societies so as to strengthen their roles in monitoring and oversight of armed and public security forces. The State Department ensures that our Ambassadors coordinate USAFRICOM's activities, which increases our ability to meet foreign policy priorities, maintain complementary programs and activities among all U.S. Government actors, and maximize overall effectiveness.

Security Supports Development, and Development Supports Security
USAID greatly values the work of USAFRICOM as the link between security and development is clear throughout Africa. War, terrorism, and violence threaten current progress and impede potential gains in health, education, democracy, and economic growth. But with improved security, African nations can begin to experience sound economic growth, better living conditions, and improved governance following years of devastating armed conflict.

For example, the Department of Defense, the then U.S. European Command, and African peacekeepers had a prominent role in helping to stabilize Liberia following years of civil war. As a result, USAID has been able to work with the Government of Liberia to develop a long-term, sustainable health program that will provide an essential package of basic health services to the Liberian people. We provided technical assistance to develop a national health policy and plan, supported a Demographic and Health Survey to understand population needs and track future progress, and helped to develop National Health Accounts to monitor trends in health spending. This type of work would not be possible amidst war and strife.

The military's logistical capabilities can be invaluable assets in providing humanitarian assistance during emergencies. Likewise, USAID's unique skills in addressing a range of essential civilian needs during times of both peace and war substantially and strategically benefit the foreign policy of the United States. Thus, USAID's coordination with the military's civic assistance programs can lead to important synergies of effort, resources, and expertise that support the interests of the United States and the beneficiaries of our work.

When we work with the military, maintaining the essential humanitarian and development character of USAID is vital. USAID coordination with the Department of Defense should not be perceived as contributing to specific military objectives, but, rather, as contributing to broad foreign policy goals. We work to ensure that USAID's and USAFRICOM's programs are

coordinated to use our resources effectively and avoid duplication of effort. We look forward to continuing this successful partnership to promote the security and health of our nation, our allies, and our friends throughout the world, and especially in Africa.

The Value of Development Expertise
USAID's development expertise and accumulated wisdom offer an enormous benefit to the command as it performs its mission of supporting the efforts of the U.S. Government to assist local populations and deter extremism on the continent. USAFRICOM has recognized, welcomed, and praised USAID's collective skill set and our ability to contribute to the long-term sustainability of their projects.

USAID has been working in Africa since the Agency was first established by President Kennedy 50 years ago. With our extensive experience in the region, our talented staff members are our most important asset. Many of our staff have advanced degrees focused on Africa, have spent large portions of their careers living and working in Africa, speak languages used on the continent, and have been involved in shaping U.S. policy in Africa. Similarly, our locally-hired staff have extensive training as well as detailed knowledge of the local issues and a steadfast dedication to working to improve their own countries. A combination of formal training and first-hand experience gives our staff a thorough understanding of both the challenges and also the opportunities for development.

Development experts are adept at considering broad, long-term perspectives and understanding how to align smaller, short-term gains with those larger objectives. They also know how to select priorities and sites for development, as well as how to measure if progress is being made and how much. Development plays a critical role in security sector reform, which involves not only building the capacity of partner nations' militaries, but also improving governance, civil and criminal authority, public safety, and disaster response capacity. This interagency cooperation was codified in 2010 when USAID, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense developed an interagency security sector assessment framework that emphasizes the importance of a whole-of-government approach to building security capacity. Even for traditional joint military activities such as contingency planning, the civilian agencies—which are experienced in identifying unintended second- and third-order consequences of proposed courses of action—can provide valuable real-world expertise that improves the likelihood of success when plans are executed.

A History of Collaboration
USAID has a history of collaboration with the U.S. Geographic Combatant Commands that provided support to Africa before USUSAFRICOM was established. We have collaborated on peacetime civil assistance projects as well as disaster assistance and preparedness. A typical example of collaboration is how USAID's missions in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya have worked on educational projects with Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). In these projects, the military built or refurbished schools while USAID furnished books and supported teacher training.

USAID has been deeply involved with USAFRICOM since its inception. USAID staff have worked side-by-side with the Implementation Planning Team, the Transition Team, and then

USAFRICOM staff to establish the command. To strengthen coordination with USAFRICOM and ensure that Department of Defense activities in Africa support U.S. development priorities, USAID has assigned and continues to assign bright, talented officers to USAFRICOM, who bring with them a wealth of field experience.

Staffing Structures That Promote Alignment

USAFRICOM and USAID have a positive, collaborative relationship. USAID regularly engages with USAFRICOM through a system of senior liaison officers, ongoing participation in a variety of strategic visioning and planning processes, and through regular briefings on particular countries and programs. This engagement has included an unprecedented level of USAID participation in the development of USAFRICOM's current Theater Campaign Plan, which will direct USAFRICOM's peacetime activities across the continent.

USAID has assigned a senior development officer to the Pentagon and to each of its geographic commands, including USAFRICOM. In Stuttgart, a USAID Senior Foreign Service officer serves as the Senior Development Advisor (SDA) to the Commander. The SDA works on a daily basis with the senior leadership and participates actively in the command's planning and operations activities. The SDA endeavors to ensure that USAID missions in Africa are fully aware of and coordinating with current and proposed USAFRICOM activities that may impact development programs.

A second USAID officer heads USAFRICOM's Health and Humanitarian Assistance Branch in the Strategy, Plans and Programs Division. This Chief is the only USAID officer in any Combatant Command that directly supervises military personnel and oversees military programs—for example, the Department of Defense's Excess Property program, which provides non-lethal property such as office supplies for disaster and development assistance purposes.

An officer from USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) serves in USAFRICOM's Operations and Logistics Division. This advisor received the Command's "Interagency Member of the Year" award for 2009, this first year the Command established its awards system. This honor is particularly significant as USAFRICOM was created with an increased role for the interagency community.

In Washington, USAID hosts a uniformed military liaison officer from USAFRICOM in its Office of Military Affairs, in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA). In addition, a development officer in our Africa Bureau conducts civil-military coordination full-time with USAFRICOM and other Defense Department organizations active on the African continent. Those two officers are responsible for articulating USAFRICOM and Defense Department policies and objectives to USAID (and vice versa) to ensure coherent whole of government programming related to national security affairs. They also serve as the initial point of entry that constantly assess and integrate planned collaborative efforts among defense and development activities in Africa.

Additionally, senior staff from USAID's Africa Bureau regularly interact with their counterparts in both USAFRICOM and in the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Africa, for Policy, and others as needed. For example, in the fall of 2010, Deputy Assistant

Administrator for the Africa Bureau Raja Jandhyala participated in an interagency forum to discuss mutually beneficial ways to optimize Defense Department resources to support security and development. We also actively engage in dialogue to develop coherent strategies in response to National Security or Presidential Directives on topics such as the Lord's Resistance Army, Somalia, and Sudan.

To ensure synchronization and improve communication at all levels, CJTF-HOA has in recent years assigned liaison officers at USAID missions in east Africa and invites USAID to advise and coordinate on civil affairs projects throughout the region. Recent discussions with Department of Defense officials have encouraged further interaction between senior staff at USAID missions and USAFRICOM and to increase USAID's Senior Development Advisor's attendance at visits and events.

From Ideas to Action: Examples of Our Work

The most direct evidence of civilian-military cooperation in Africa has been in counterterrorism including joint assessments, country level planning, and support to complementary program activities. Civil-military cooperation has also succeeded in planning whole-of-government responses in the event of a pandemic disease outbreak.

Selecting Sustainable Projects in Djibouti

In Djibouti, the U.S. Embassy, USAID Mission, and U.S. Military have collaborated to design a new framework that aligns CJTF-HOA projects with the local development needs identified by the Government of Djibouti. Previously, CJTF-HOA proposed projects and if USAID and the Embassy concurred, coordination with the government followed. Under that system, whether the projects aligned with local needs and priorities was sometimes a matter of chance. Under the new framework, USAID works with the Government of Djibouti to develop a list of needed projects, while CJTF-HOA, taking into account their own objectives and resources, can choose to contribute to any such project if it has the endorsement of the Ambassador.

USAID had been working for years to expand essential health services to all rural areas in Djibouti. From 2004 to 2008, USAID refurbished or built 23 of the 27 rural health clinics in the country, and the Government of Djibouti increased the budget share dedicated to health from 4 percent to 15 percent while also increasing the number of trained nurses, midwives, and technicians. The Guistir Clinic near the Somali border was selected by CJTF-HOA as the first large-scale project under the new framework coordinated by USAID to provide health care access to over 400 families. CJTF-HOA constructed the clinic in the remote border area, and our assistance helped to equip and staff the clinic. This cooperation encouraged efficient use of U.S. funds and is a prime example of inclusive work that simultaneously contributes to CJTF-HOA's military objectives and USAID's development objectives. Similar projects are slated to be completed in the future. In the words of CJTF-HOA's Deputy, General William Glasgow, "Civil military programming in Djibouti is a model of success and the U.S. military is honored to work with our [U.S. Government] colleagues in the U.S. Embassy and USAID and with the Ministry of Health to help foster a healthier society in Djibouti. We are proud of our efforts." USAID's leadership in this area was also recognized by the Government of Djibouti; the Prime Minister of Djibouti, Dileita Mohamed Dileita, awarded the USAID Djibouti Representative, Stephanie

Funk, the Officer of the National Order earlier this year in recognition of her contribution to health sector development.

We encourage replication of the process that led to the success of the Guistir clinic, where the partner nation proposes projects, USAID coordinates, and CJTF-HOA selects projects and locations endorsed by the Ambassador that would meet their objectives.

Preventing and Responding to Sexual and Gender Based Violence in the DRC
In 2009, USAFRICOM was asked to identify ways to support U.S. efforts in the DRC to prevent sexual and gender-based violence and support survivors. With its specialization in military-to-military interventions, USAFRICOM was positioned to help address the issue because the Congolese Army, local militias, and even U.N. peacekeepers had all been implicated as perpetrators of this violence. The challenge was to develop effective projects with existing resources and skill sets.

Working closely with the Embassy and USAID, USAFRICOM determined that many facilities supporting survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in the DRC—especially in the East where the abuses were the worst—were sub-standard. USAFRICOM's funds could be used to construct or renovate buildings where the government, the U.N., or local and international nongovernmental organizations delivered services. Upon consultation with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, USAFRICOM and the country team allocated $1 million annually for three years for facilities that support survivors. In addition, USAFRICOM oversaw training on preventing sexual and gender-based violence for the Congolese Army. The Command now is exploring how to expand this pilot program for more comprehensive training to the military, initially in the DRC and eventually elsewhere.

Better Understanding the Needs of the Emerging Nation of South Sudan
As part of our effort to prepare for potential humanitarian crises that could emerge in the lead-up to or during the course of the referendum in January, USAID collaborated with many different actors on an emergency contingency plan. That plan was activated when the recent Abyei crisis began, and it successfully utilized prepositioned humanitarian resources to respond to the needs of the thousands displaced by the conflict. South Sudan recently became the world's newest country, a landmark accomplishment for the South Sudanese people as well as the U.S. and international actors that have supported the peace process. USAFRICOM has utilized USAID's conflict analysis of southern Sudan to inform its planning efforts, and is assisting the interagency in determining the appropriate approach to supporting South Sudan's security sector reform and conflict mitigation activities.

Interagency Cooperation under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) was established in 2005 as a multi-year, interagency commitment to support partner efforts in the Sahel to constrain and ultimately eliminate the ability of terrorist organizations to exploit the region. TSCTP provides a broad interagency framework led by the Department of Defense, Department of State, and USAID to guide activities that seek to strengthen the capacities of Sahelian governments.

USAID supported youth empowerment, education, media, and good governance activities—the four areas where we see the greatest opportunity for local partnerships and progress. The first few years of the program demonstrated positive impact—as measured by surveys on attitudes toward extremism—in target communities through strengthening the resiliencies that help prevent extremism from taking root in the Sahel. The program provides tangible benefits to populations, particularly youth, at risk for recruitment by violent extremist organizations and communities in at-risk regions through youth employment and outreach programs, vocational skills training, and community development and media activities. The program also gathers beneficiaries from different communities, ethnic groups, and countries together through outreach events on topics related to religion and tolerance.

Challenges and Looking Ahead

While USAID and U.S. Africa Command have notable successes working together, challenges remain. USAFRICOM is still relatively new, and so too is its cooperation and collaboration with other U.S. Government actors. We differ from USAFRICOM in terms of our staffing sizes, financial resources available for development, and often our cultures, as reflected by our professional backgrounds, the way we speak, and the duration of assignments. An additional challenge is that much planning for USAID's activities occurs "on the ground," at our missions in each country with coordination and guidance coming from our headquarters; in contrast, military planning occurs regionally in a much more top-down fashion, flowing from Washington, D.C., directly to the regional Command in Stuttgart, Germany.

USAID is able to program a sizable amount of foreign assistance in Africa by leveraging a relatively small number of staff members, while USAFRICOM has a smaller budget and more staff available. Cooperation with the military is just one aspect of our staff's responsibilities in addition to already heavy workloads. Nonetheless, the payoffs that result from a comprehensive whole-of-government approach are so important that the effort to coordinate is worthwhile.

Our Office of Military Affairs currently provides a series of general and specialized training focused on working with the military to the new classes of Foreign Service Officers. USAID's Africa Bureau takes advantage of this opportunity and has requested a module designed specifically for our officers. The first workshop combined briefings, discussion with our Senior Development Advisors, and interactive exercises. It was a resounding success that we intend to replicate. Additional work is needed to train military personnel at all levels to better understand USAID, and to train USAID personnel, including locally hired staff, to better understand the military.

Gains made in civil-military coordination need to be institutionalized to prevent stagnation or backsliding. We are committed to understanding what works well and how we can amplify best practices. We are equally committed to identifying gaps, eliminating redundancy and improving our collaboration. The central point of our relationship is clear: security, stability, and peace are essential for the quality of human life, essential for economic growth and poverty reduction, and essential for development overall. We welcome the continued dialogue to ensure that solutions for short-term objectives are consistent with our shared long-term goals.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Let me just beginning the questioning.

Ambassador Yamamoto, you responded to, and Ambassador Huddleston as well, the largely negative reaction that met AFRICOM early on. And I'm wondering how that reaction has changed, and if so why? Was it a matter of a false impression as to what we were up to?

And if you could perhaps, Ambassador Huddleton, you as well answer that.

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. I think it's changed immensely and basically because the countries of Africa have seen AFRICOM at work. General Ward was an amazing diplomat for AFRICOM and he was all over the continent talking with Presidents as well as chiefs of staff of militaries and ministers of defense. General Ham has been absolutely the same. He is today, as we speak, in Ethiopia. And so they, themselves, have been very, very good Ambassadors.

But what we've done with Africa also makes a huge difference because we've done exercises such as Natural Fire in Uganda, where we bring the regional militaries together and then they carry out an exercise with us that builds a school and provides relief in a clinic. So these are things that Africans understand. They can see how it's helping their military not only to improve their skills, but to work with other militaries in the region.

And then they've seen what's going on, for example, the training of a Liberian Army battalion in Kisangani, which has now been deployed up into the region where the LRA is active and hopefully they'll be able to provide some additional protection for civilians in that area.

Where AFRICOM still runs into problems is on a political level, and in that regard, that's because some of the larger countries in Africa are worried about is AFRICOM actually becoming a competing military. And this is a wonderful opportunity just to say no. AFRICOM is on the continent to build the capacity of professional militaries under civilian control.

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that.

Ambassador Yamamoto?

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. I concur with Ambassador Huddleston. You know, everyone at the roll-out, everyone was talking about AFRICOM except AFRICOM. And until AFRICOM was able to articulate and define what AFRICOM was about, then we were able to engage and overcome a lot of misunderstandings. During the questions, we can go into greater detail.

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you with regards to the constant turnover, Ambassador Yamamoto, you mentioned in your testimony, causing confusion for the country team and the host nation. What are you talking about in terms of how long is the deployment and what can be done to remedy that situation?

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. I think it would be very difficult given the way we deploy forces, etcetera. My son is a first lieutenant with the 3rd ID and he was in Iraq and he has a set time and he has a set mission. For us in the Africa Bureau, we have 1100 officers manning 53 Embassies and consultates in sub-Saharan Africa.

Most of us are committed to the African continent and we're experts in the field.

When we were setting up Camp Lemonnier, as they were setting up the camp, we were very struck by the large number of different units, but they stayed for maybe 6 weeks or 2 months or 3 months, but never any longer. And I think we talked to General Franks and later General Abizaid to extend those assignments. And that helped a lot now at CJTF, we have 1-year assignments. So that is helping.

But again in other parts of the continent, the assignments are very short and so it takes a lot of onus for the Ambassador, the DMCs to work with these units to identify what are our common goals and objectives.

Mr. SMITH. Ambassador Huddleston, is that being looked at as perhaps an area for reform, or are you happy with the way it is today?

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. AFRICOM is very aware of the problem. Obviously the State Department is as well and as Ambassador Yamamoto said, it has improved significantly in that AFRICOM is now assigning for 1 year CJTF–HOA. But actually, one of the main problems is that AFRICOM has no assigned forces, so they rely on the components, they rely on the Army, they rely on the Special Forces, they rely on the Marines to provide them with forces to carry out the task on the continent. Obviously, our forces are engaged in other important tasks around the world and so they sometimes are not available for other than short periods.

We also rely upon the National Guard. Actually, the National Guard of Kansas in CJTF–HOA. And of course, their families don't want them to be gone for over a year, so these are some of the challenges involved in extending the period of time on the continent.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Let me ask you, you've testified that building professional militaries is a function of AFRICOM. How has that worked out—if you could perhaps give some examples? And in an area that is very close to my heart, human rights training, if you could elaborate on what kind of training we do provide to African militaries and with particular emphasis on trafficking in persons.

As you may know, I authorized the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 and in 2001, 1 year after that law went into effect, a Fox News reporter from Ohio walked into my office and said Congressman, you need to look at this. And he showed me a videotape of women who had been trafficked from Russia, Moldova, the Philippines, and indigenous South Koreans who were being abused by American service members. And the places of abuse were in absolute proximity to our military bases.

We handed that over to Joseph Schmitz, who was then the IG for the Department of Defense. He initiated, and we asked for, a global assessment of U.S. complicity, wittingly or unwittingly, in human trafficking. And he came back very, very disturbed with a very compelling report looking first at Bosnia and South Korea, and then the rest of the world. President Bush for his part issued a zero tolerance policy and went even a step further and changed the Uniform Code of Military Justice to include prostitution as an actionable offense. And word went out. I read them. I talk about

it to other militaries all the time and give them copies of it to see that America was serious about combating trafficking, that we want to be part of the solution, not part of the problem.

I went to NATO, talked to those folks, and we know Kofi Annan did the zero tolerance policy. I think everyone is trying, at least, to do a good job there. General LaPorte actually testified at two hearings that I co-chaired along with people like John McHugh and Duncan Hunter, John, obviously, over at the Secretary of the Army. And General LaPorte had a best practices which I know has been further refined and made even more efficacious, but he talked about the importance of having on-base recreation, making sure that the men are aware of who it is that they are seeing at 4 o'clock in the morning and that the woman is a slave. She cannot leave and if she does, she will be beaten. She will be raped again, and we need to be on the side of protection and not on the side of oppression.

And I thought he did an outstanding job. Every time I talk to a military person in any country, I bring DoD information with me and ask them what are they doing to combat human trafficking. The question—to make a long story short—is that there are 10 countries in Africa, as you know, on the Tier 3 list as egregious violators of sex trafficking. There are 13 African countries on Tier 2 watch lists, that could easily drop into Tier 3 because of on-going abuse, mostly against women and children.

The question is: Does AFRICOM train other militaries, especially their officer corps, on best practices, especially those that have been developed so magnificently by the Department of Defense so that they get it? The military should be on the side of protection, not on the side of exploitation.

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Yes sir. And what I often like to point out is when we train, when AFRICOM trains, we train to U.S. standards and to international law standards on human rights and on respect of civilians, whether women or men. And what I'd like to point out particularly is when you look at Tunisia and when you look at Egypt, both of those militaries have significant U.S. and Western training. And both of those militaries, as we all know in this room, stood up for the people in their country. In Liberia, there was no training by Western or U.S. forces and we have seen what has happened there.

The soldiers of AFRICOM and their components only follow the highest standards of conduct on the continent and they expect their counterparts who are training to do the same. We have Leahy vetting. as you're aware that that's those that we train. In addition, we provide DILS training and human rights training to all forces that we train on the continent.

And then you ask about what does our training do, can I point to some good examples? I recently visited the Liberians and I was very impressed with their discipline and also the fact that they had formed an engineering battalion. An engineering battalion is working with the Bangladeshi peacekeepers to do civil military projects. We'd like to see more of the militaries of Africa doing civil military projects.

On the more robust front, since AFRICOM trainers joined the ACOTA trainers for the State Department who are contract and

often former military, we have been able to do COIN training which is counter insurgency training. And by doing that training, as you can see, the AMISOM forces have actually been able to gain area in Mogadishu and also respect better civilians who might come into harm's way because they're in the conflict area.

Mr. SMITH. Yes, Ms. Cromer?

Ms. CROMER. Yes. I'd just like to add that in 2009, AFRICOM was asked to identify ways to support U.S. efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo to prevent sexual and gender-based violence and support survivors. And there, AFRICOM did oversee training, but they also in coordination with the Embassy and USAID, determined that the facilities that were supporting the survivors of gender-based violence was substandard and actually put in $1 million to help build up those facilities and otherwise support the survivors. So that's another example of our coordination.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Ambassador Yamamoto?

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Yes, and just to add. It's more than just DoD. And DoD does a great job. The Command and Staff College in Ethiopia does civil rights and human rights issues, but it's also a comprehensive approach in the U.S. Government, but also the host nations. And we share your outrage in many of the instances and cases that we've uncovered. And we've worked very hard with these countries on TR–3 and the other 13 countries. As you and Congressman Payne have so eloquently articulated, we need to stand up and work with these countries and host nations to support the development of not only legal affairs, but also going after trafficking and righting those wrongs.

As you know, our work in the Congo and other parts of Africa, we've done this to the best of our ability in an interagency process.

Mr. SMITH. I'll just ask you again on trafficking, could we be provided a copy of what it is, a curricular, if you will, of human rights training in general, but also with a particular emphasis on what it is that we're trying to convey to our friends in the African militaries with regards to human trafficking.

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Certainly.

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. Let me just ask one final question and that would be in the area of crises. It's been my experience, and I'm one of those who believes that the military are the ultimate peacekeepers. Without that, we know what chaos results, and how innocent victims are killed. But very often, even in the area of providing immediate and very effective intervention, almost like a trauma surgeon in an emergency room, the military have the capacity, the airlift and really the capability to go into a situation, stabilize it, pass the baton then on to the NGOs and everyone else. I saw it provide comfort when the Kurds literally during that first 2 to 3 weeks that I was there—5 days after the mass exodus to the Turkish-Iraqi border. Had it not been for Special Forces actually using PSYOPS to put on Meals Ready To Eat so that the MREs would be properly opened and eaten and immunizations, everywhere you looked you saw Kurds walking around with camouflage jackets which were essential to not dying because of the elements. They did not have cold weather clothing.

So the same thing happened in Tbilisi. A week after the Russians went in, it was the military that came in with food, nutrition—all kinds of nutritional support, medicines. So the same thing in Haiti and in the tsunami. I was on the Abraham Lincoln briefly. We went to several places, Phuket, Banda Aceh and Sri Lanka, but it seemed to me that the entire ship—everyone on the ship—wanted to go on to Banda Aceh and join with the helicopter crews and everyone else in assisting. It was unbelievable, the esprit de corps and the sense of humanitarianism which the military does not get the credit that it deserves for rolling up their sleeves and jumping in and helping to assist people who are sick or dying or at risk.

So my question is, you did mention, Ambassador Huddleston, that AFRICOM has set up task forces and is prepared to assist in any appropriate way when requested to do so by State or USAID with regards to the severe drought. Is it likely that there will be an East Africa task force? We know there's 750,000 people affected, and Ambassador Yamamoto and his team and others all testified just a few weeks ago that this crisis is huge and getting worse by the day. Are those plans likely to be implemented any time soon? Can you give any indication what it might look like in terms of airlift and the like to get food to people who are starving?

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank you so much for the kind remarks about all the wonderful activities and rescue and humanitarian operations at the U.S. military has done around the world. Let me just outline this a little bit for you and then I'll turn to my colleagues because they know it's a very important question.

Right now we have on our staff, as Ms. Cromer pointed out, USAID personnel at AFRICOM and they're staying in close coordination. In addition, AFRICOM has developed possibilities that it could do, should it be required to do so. But what is going on right now is that the U.N. agencies, the NGOs are actually already expanding the capacity. There are seven additional refugee camps for feeding and distribution in Ethiopia. There are two additional camps that can be opened, one already opened outside of Dadaab in Kenya.

So far, the rescue agencies, the international community, the NGOs have been able to respond to the situation in Ethiopia and Kenya. In Somalia, of course, as we know, that's more complicated, but of course, that would be an area that AFRICOM would not be welcome, but again, in that area, WFP, UNICEF are already pushing to get in there, talking to even al-Shabaab to see if they cannot work out ways in which they can get the food and water and medical assistance that's so desperately needed.

So at this point, USAID, State and NSS tell us that they have what they need and as we're here to talk about interagency coordination, so rest assured we've been attending all those IPCs and DCs at the National Security Council to make sure that we stay very much informed on what is happening and are prepared to assist should we be called upon to do so.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Would either of you like to——

Ms. CROMER. Mr. Chairman, USAID has been monitoring the situation in the Horn of Africa since the famine early warning system, which we support, alerted us to the onslaught of a potential

problem last summer. And we have been prepositioning food in the region to address the situation.

To date, we're one of the largest donors in the emergency assistance, helping more than 4.6 million people. We're working very closely, as Ambassador Huddleston mentioned, with the U.N. and other NGOs to address the crisis. The famine has been announced for Somalia which is an area, a region in Somalia that's very difficult for us, and other organizations, to access. And that's been a challenge. At one point this was called a traveling famine because of the number of Somalis that are moving out of the region into Ethiopia and other regions.

But to date, we are working very closely with the U.N. and other donors and we are coordinating in the interagency with our colleagues in defense and if the need should arise, I'm sure we would have the support we need.

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. And you're absolutely correct. There's the short-term crisis that we need to address immediately and the refugee flows over 2,000 or so or 1,500 a day into Dadaab, Kenya and over 1,000 into Ethiopia. But in the long term, because the area is chronically dry, there's not been rainfall in 2 years and very little in 5 years in many areas, and so how do you address a long-term problem. And those are things that we're addressing right now, the interagency process at which DoD, USAID and State are very much involved in that and our task force is looking at how we can effectively address these short-term and long-term problems.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Mr. Payne?

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. In regard to the drought, there was some negotiations, I think, that initially the al-Shabaab would not allow for humanitarian aid. Then they changed and said they were saying it was over played and all that business. Well, now that it's very clear as we knew all along that it was very serious. They then said yes, you can come in with food aid.

Have they changed again? I understand there may have been some withdrawal from the agreement that humanitarian food and supplies could come in. What is the—do you know what the status is at this time?

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. From what we understand, and it's still an evolving situation, is that we still cannot get into the areas to deliver food. As you know, 60 percent of the people who are at risk are still in al-Shabaab-held territories and so feeding those areas is very difficult.

What we're seeing now is not only the flow of refugees into Ethiopia and Kenya, but also internally displaced people. Right now, Mogadishu, you're seeing an equal number of people going into Mogadishu feeling from al-Shabaab-held territory. And so that is going to continue to be a problem. So what we're doing now is looking at how we can feed the people we have at hand in the refugee camps and also internally displaced. Al-Shabaab area is going to be a much more long-term problem.

Mr. PAYNE. What about the, as we mentioned, the Dadaab camp? It's always been over crowded, but now it's unbelievably over crowded. I last visited there a couple years ago, it was busting at the seams, so I can imagine what it is now. Are we getting food

aid or working with the U.N. agencies to assist in the Dadaab camps?

Ms. CROMER. Yes, we're getting pre-positioned food and other resources to the camp, but this is a large-scale multi-donor intervention which is underway and the scope is massive. We're prioritizing our aid to make sure that the most pressing needs are addressed. Our initial response is primarily focused on food and water. We're also concerned with the spread of disease in these camps as they grow and hygiene becomes an issue. So we're addressing all of these.

Mr. PAYNE. There's a mass amount of awareness growing and first page story on The Washington Post today and just yesterday we, 2 days ago, introduced Resolution 361 that certainly recognizes the effort that the U.S. is doing and we look, urge long-term intervention and in just 2 days we have over 50 co-sponsors just with it being known that it's out there. So there's certainly a tremendous amount of support here on Capitol Hill for what you're doing.

Just wonder in general, general, you said that the perception of AFRICOM is better now. Is it at the point where most of the countries are—I mean it's a reality, but what is the attitude currently? Is it at the point where you're comfortable that you can really move forward, full force in what your goals are?

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. We're quite comfortable with the situation as of right now. And as I said, it's even getting better because General Ham is following in the footsteps of General Ward in making it a point to visit every country. And even countries that have had some hesitation about AFRICOM, have been willing to work with the components and do exercises and development with the components.

One of the success stories is the African partnership station which sends U.S. vessels, Navy or Coast Guard along the coast and participates with Coast Guards and Navies in the coastal countries to do exercises and to do training. In fact, last year, and I forget the name of the vessel that was out there, it had seven mariners from various West African countries on board when we had the earthquake in Haiti and the vessel steamed to Haiti with the permission of the countries and that vessel with the officers from the West African countries provided assistance to the victims of the earthquake in Haiti.

Mr. PAYNE. Are there civilian or what percentage is there? Can you count a percentage of civilians that are involved in AFRICOM other than military or is it 100 percent military at this time? I know that they're working with USAID and working with State, but AFRICOM itself is strictly military without civilians?

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. As Ambassador Yamamoto and Ms. Cromer mentioned, AFRICOM has a Deputy Commander. It has two Deputy Commanders. One of the Deputy Commanders is a State Department active duty officer. He's a former Ambassador. AFRICOM also has a State Department officer who is the head of their Outreach Division which is one of the major divisions of AFRICOM.

AFRICOM also has several USAID officers embedded in their Planning and Strategy Division to include this very excellent

USAID person that is excellent on drought and humanitarian relief.

In addition, AFRICOM hires civilians so they have a number of civilian advisors. So they have a significant contingent of civilians in the command just as part, just like at DoD, myself, we have a significant portion of our workforce that are civilian and that is also the case for AFRICOM.

Mr. PAYNE. I had an opportunity to fly to Djibouti with General Ham and do think that he's certainly an adequate replacement although General—what was his name again, who just retired?

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. General Ward.

Mr. PAYNE. Ward, yes, he's got big feet so it's going to be a hard act to follow, even though I was not supportive. But the headquarters issue, how much of an issue is that? It's currently been talked about bringing it to the United States. Of course, the question of whether it should be on Africa soil, how much of a question is that and how is the logistics going as relates to its headquarters?

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. As you know, since its inception, AFRICOM has been stationed in Stuttgart and at this point there would be significant budgetary implications if AFRICOM were to pull up its roots which is to some degree in Stuttgart and move. AFRICOM, however, is very much aware that it has a study to complete about where would be the most appropriate location.

Mr. PAYNE. I think you mentioned it before, but what is the relationship with AFRICOM and AMISOM's mission in Somalia with the TFG and their military operation? And actually, is the AFRICOM looking at Somaliland or Puntland as it deals with the Horn and with Somalia, in general.

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Congressman. That actually gives me the opportunity to talk a little bit about Title 22 and Title 10. As you're aware, AFRICOM cannot do training or equipment with its own funds which are Title 10. Therefore, any training that AFRICOM is doing in Africa is being done either with 1206 which are combined funds or with PKO or State Department Title 22 funds. In other words, all training on the continent is with State Department funds, therefore, everything that's done in training is authorized by the State Department.

What we were very pleased about with AFRICOM is that State Department invited AFRICOM trainers, some Special Forces to come and train with the training that they were providing to the Ugandans and the Burundians because as you know, Mogadishu is a pretty violent place.

Mr. PAYNE. I know.

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. So some of the experience—yes, I guess you do know. I'm glad they missed you.

Mr. PAYNE. I am, too. I saw President Sheik Sharif in Djibouti at the celebration of South Sudan and he did ask me when I was coming back. I told him my send-off wasn't so hot, but I'll take another look at it.

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Yes, I imagine diplomatic security is not keen for you to return any time soon.

Mr. PAYNE. They didn't want me to go in the first place, as you know.

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Indeed. So that's what AFRICOM has done is to provide some trainers to work in parallel and with their ACOTA trainers to provide additional training for the Ugandans and Burundians that are deploying to Mogadishu.

Mr. PAYNE. Just a final question for you, there is a proposed cut in our peacekeeping budget here and I wonder, you know, how the security assistance would trickle down to what AFRICOM is intending to do or—not AFRICOM necessarily, but as you know, the mission in Somalia is under the U.N. and therefore it depends on U.N. peacekeeping allotments. How do you see some of our, and of course, the new one that we're trying to stand up in South Sudan on the borders around Abvei and other areas in question, South Coeur d'Enfant. How do you see that playing out?

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Since these are our Title 22 funds, I am going to ask my colleague, Ambassador Yamamoto, to answer.

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Just going back on PKO funding and others. As you know, we provide about $265 million with your approval on PKO, IMET, and FMF and of the PKO funding about 15–20 percent of that goes to DoD to help us send assistance levels in training programs, etcetera for AMISON and other programs. As you know, in the Somalia area, we have $42 million dedicated to AMISON training programs equipping safety, security, etcetera. And so a cut or a decrease in that amount would affect, obviously, the operations and also stabilization efforts.

The other issue, too, as you raise in Sudan is how do we address the recent deployment of 1600 troops from Ethiopia into Abyei and then the continuation of course, is in Darfur and also anticipated what do you do in the Coeur d'Enfant area to stabilize that area?

So right now the $265 million that we had in 2010, that's not a very large amount of money. So if we decrease that, then there's an ability to work with DoD and host nations and other groups to do training, equipping and security sector reform and stabilization will be affected.

Mr. PAYNE. My final question, Ms. Cromer, I think it's great and it's certainly with these various titles what you can do. I always felt the USAID, it would be great if they had an opportunity to dabble in education more, some of the physical facilities. We see that the Department of Defense can fix up a school, however. USAID can't, you know. And of course, we've been concerned about the educational situation in Africa, as we know many of the countries now have moved to so-called universal education where there may be some school fees, there is kind of universal education in most of the countries and the girl child, as you know, as been included which is a great step in the right direction. We're looking now at how can we assist in higher education which I mean secondary, of course, and higher education as Africa develops.

I wonder how do you see the interaction between the Department of Defense that can do things with USAID and your restrictions. And there's a second and final part and question, we've had some concern about the nutritional components of USAID's food and—there are two reports that have come out about—there's not a request for additional funds, but that they look at the nutritional value of the—who did that? Tufts? GAO also did a report on the nutritional values we find that there's some excellent recommenda-

tions and I would hope that you would take an opportunity to look at that and we would really like to talk to you about it.

I had a resolution to say that we should do something about it and it ended up 21 to 21, so I didn't win. Mr. Smith did vote with me on that resolution on the food, just trying to make it more nutritional. So if you could just answer those and I'll yield back to the chairman.

Ms. CROMER. Thank you, Congressman Payne. We have at USAID new education policy that we are trying to implement. The focus of the policy is on reading with understanding, primarily at the basic education level. This policy doesn't necessarily prohibit renovating structures, but it's with reduced funding. We find that we're not able to do very much of that. So we do relish the opportunity to work with AFRICOM and identify synergies where we have common goals and they can help us in renovating schools.

We do see that we as some of our education programs are diminished, due to lack of funding and a need to focus, it would be an opportune time to have a different dialogue with some of our African country partners about the funding they provide in their own development planning and programming. And taking what they do and trying to make it more efficient. We're looking at working with some of our African partners to look at their public financial management systems, trying to streamline those systems, make them more transparent, make them more robust so that all of the revenues going through our country partners are used to address key development challenges like education.

So if we can help those partners strengthen their own systems so their own resources are used more effectively, then we can see some achievement in education and the monies that we put into those sectors will go longer and for more sustained development objective.

On nutrition and the GAO report that you mentioned, I'm not familiar with that particular report, but we can get a response to you on that.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I yield back my time.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member for this hearing and for our panelists being here and special thanks to Ambassador Yamamoto for your hospitality in getting to see your work really on the ground firsthand when we visited Ethiopia a few years ago.

I want to start with really a question for all the panelists here today. I'm particularly interested to hear about our plans for post-conflict in Libya. I certainly want to acknowledge the significant variations in histories and cultures and size and scope of our recent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and I believe that insufficient and disjointed planning for post-conflict stabilization there set a poor precedent for NATO operations in Libya.

But as different parties come together on this issue, what is AFRICOM doing to prepare for a post revolution in Libya? What role does AFRICOM have after any political resolution? And finally and most importantly, how is AFRICOM working with State and USAID on this effort? And let's start with Ambassador Yamamoto?

Or Ambassador Huddleston, why don't you start?

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Mr. Carnahan, the only reason I'm starting is because normally it would be Ambassador Yamamoto, but he is responsible for sub-Saharan Africa and he is not responsible for North Africa because that falls under the Middle East Division. So ironically, I'm the only spokesperson here among the three of us who can speak to North Africa because AFRICOM was formed as a command for the whole continent, except for Egypt and Egypt remains in the CENTOM or the Middle East Command.

So I will have to apologize in that I'm sure that my State Department colleague, Ambassador Feldman, could do a better job of answering your question than I can, but let me give it a try.

Mr. CARNAHAN. We're happy to hear from you. Thank you.

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Thank you very much. Let me just go back for a moment to the beginning because I'd like very much to point out what President Obama said. President Obama said that we had an international mandate. We had a broad coalition. We had the support of the Arab League. And we had the pleas of the Libyan people to go into Libya. And we did and it was really quite an amazing thing in that the new commander of AFRICOM, General Ham, had only been in that position for less than 2 weeks. And AFRICOM became the leader of a coalition of 10 nations including two Arab nations that put in place the no fly zone, the sea embargo, and most importantly, protected 800,000 people in the city of Benghazi from certain deaths, certainly to many of them.

Now that coalition has been handed over to NATO and that, too, has been pretty amazing and pretty unique and impressive in that AFRICOM began the implementation of the no fly zone and protection of civilians on March 19th and they turned over all four missions to NATO on the 31st of March, 14 days later.

So AFRICOM is not a major player in any way now in the ongoing NATO operation. AFRICOM has retained responsibility for recovery, should that be necessary. So the U.S. forces that are contributing to NATO come directly from the components, most particularly from the dual-hatted Navy commander for Europe and Africa and that's Admiral Locklear. And as you know, Canadian General Bouchard is the responsible person for NATO.

So AFRICOM itself is not the major player it was at one time, but you ask what would AFRICOM do in a post-Gaddafi? Well, we have made it clear, as well as NATO, that we did not envision boots on the ground in Libya. So it would in a fairly far future post-Gaddafi Libya when the situation had returned to normal, Embassies were reestablished, that there might be something like a defense attache and an Office of Security Cooperation and that with the new democratic Libyan Government, we might have the opportunity then to do some training with our State Department colleagues and the State Department funds of a new and responsible and democratic Libyan Army.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. Mr. Cromer, did you have anything to add?

Ms. CROMER. Excuse me, like my State Department colleague, as Ambassador Huddleston said, we focus at USAID in the Africa Bureau on sub-Saharan Africa. So our operation doesn't cover North Africa.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. Also, I wanted to ask, getting back to Ms. Cromer, about Somalia with on-going drought in the Horn of Africa and the humanitarian crisis, the scope of which we haven't seen for decades. Last week, the U.N. officially declared a famine in two regions of Somalia.

Could you give me and the subcommittee an update on the response to the crisis as well as partnerships with other key organizations that you're working with?

Ms. CROMER. Yes. As you've stated, the scale and severity of the famine in southern Somalia represents a most serious food and security situation in the world today. And as a multi-donor response that's underway, we're prioritizing our aid to make sure that the most pressing needs are addressed. At this point, we are primarily focused on food and water and we're, as I mentioned earlier, concerned with the spread of disease and so we're working to expand our health and hygiene response.

In Somalia, the World Food Program is considering strategies to counter the deteriorating food situation. They're looking at various options to address the nutrition situation in southern Somalia. They're doing an in-depth food, urban food and nutrition security assessment in 16 districts of Mogadishu. And the assessment will seek to measure the number of food-insecure people by district. So with this information, the international community, particularly WFP, will be guided to program their interventions in a more targeted fashion.

The access to the most food-insecure populations is still an issue that's being worked out. But it is a serious concern.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Carnahan. Let me ask just a few final questions. First, on Friday, I chaired a hearing on the Helsinki Commission on Egypt, and I know none of you deal with Egypt, but you'll know why I raise it in a moment, and that is the barbaric practice that has gotten worse, according to our witnesses, that young Coptic Christian girls are being abducted and sold into modern-day slavery and forced marriages, again, thousands per year. It's been largely ignored, if not under-appreciated by many in the human rights community. We had a very credible panel that spoke to this egregious practice. And the women are forced to become Muslim, and then they're given to a man and then they and the children they bear are Muslim.

And I'm wondering: In Egypt today, the military does control that government. What kind of human rights training, Ambassador Huddleston, I think you're the one to speak to this when it comes to religious freedom, do the militaries get in terms of tolerance? We know that at the core of many of these conflicts it has been, including Sudan, the imposition of Sharia law, particularly with the invasion of the south of Sudan. That was a mainstay issue. It's also been a problem obviously in Darfur, but especially in southern Sudan.

I recently met with a Catholic bishop and an imam who couldn't make the meeting, but his representative was there from Nigeria, who spoke how they had gone from village to village preaching a sense of tolerance and respect for all religions, but in this case those two major religions, Christianity and Islam and I'm won-

dering if in our training on human rights if there's a religious freedom component to emphasize with exclamation points why all of us need to respect the other person's faith and that forced Islamization, the imposition of Sharia law or any creed is not following fundamental human rights policy. Is that something that's taught?

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry to hear about that situation that you were explaining in Egypt. I do not know the particulars of all the training and all the human rights training that is performed by our soldiers overseas, but I can get you the curriculum. And I can also say that I think that what you will probably see is what we teach is respect for human life, respect for human dignity, respect for the rule of law and the constitution and the people of a country, all of which, in essence, means respect for tolerance and different religious beliefs, but I'll be happy to get a transcript and provide it.

Mr. SMITH. And if you could, if it's not being done, if it's something that could have been considered when the International Religious Freedom Act was passed in 1998, and I chaired all the hearings on it. It was Congressman Frank Wolf's legislation, and there was profound pushback from many in the Department of State, including the White House, against that legislation, and one of the components that we wrote into it was the training of foreign service officers on religious freedom matters.

And I say without any fear of contradiction that the pushback was profound. The Assistant Secretary for Democracy of Human Rights and Labor testified at our hearing saying they were against the bill. I'm sure they're for tolerance, but they were against this legislation. So I would hope you could get back to us on that; it would be very helpful.

[NOTE:

The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Mr. SMITH. And finally, you cite, Ms. Cromer, in your testimony a 2010 assessment that shows that of the 25 countries having the highest instability, 22 are in Africa. And I'm wondering if there's any—now 3 years into AFRICOM—if there's been any improvement as a result of that combatant command being stood up?

Ms. CROMER. Well, we can certainly cite Libya as a very good example of the improvement in the security situation which allows for improved economic growth and development in health and education. I'm sure there are other examples that we can provide, but again, having a professional military that respects human rights and respects good governance and democracy is a profound effort to move forward in any development situation.

We really cannot proceed with our development interventions in good measure if we don't have peace and security. So what AFRICOM has done on the continent to enhance the professionalism of militaries and support human rights and good governance is absolutely essential to what we do in development.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Payne?

Mr. PAYNE. Just one last question. The fact that the LRA and Mr. Kony have been roaming around for 20 some years, it just seems to me that—not that it's AFRICOM's situation, but it would seem to me that there should be some more coordinated effort to

try to bring him to the International Court of Justice. And I just wonder if—and Mr. Yamamoto has had a lot of history in Africa and certainly has known about the LRA or you Ambassador Huddleston, could give a brief synopsis of any knowledge you have of a concerted effort to bring Mr. Kony to justice.

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. And that's a very tough issue that we have been addressing for years with you and other members. Right now, as DoD and State Department and USAID, all the interagencies is combined together to (a) support the UPDF in their operations against Kony, specifically in the CAR. They have distribution points in Obo and from there the UPDF is able to bring their equipment and supplies into the front lines to go after Kony's troops. We have provided on average in the last quarter about $3 million to support for supplies, fuel, rentals of equipment and helicopters to bring the supplies up to Obo and from there to transport them to the UPDF forces.

We're also working with the President Bozizé in CAR to look at training troops there to form a blocking force against Kony and then with other neighboring states particularly with MONUSCO and DRC FARDC troops and other troops as well. It's a very tough fight and it's going to continue until this is brought to conclusion.

Mr. SMITH. Would any of you like to conclude with any final remarks?

Yes, Ambassador Huddleston?

Ambassador HUDDLESTON. I didn't want to miss the opportunity just to say that first of all we appreciate very much that you're having the hearing, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and also to underline the fact because the ranking member began with this roll-out of AFRICOM was very difficult and really it's a great credit to our service men and women and to the leadership of AFRICOM that they've really turned that around because they've not only turned it around with the African governments, but they've turned it around with our colleagues, the State Department, and USAID as you have heard here today.

I think AFRICOM really is making a great difference on the continent because as we all know, it begins with security. And there can't be democratic governments or can't be human rights or can't be development unless there's security. And by giving the local militaries the ability to provide for security for their people it makes all the difference. So thank you very much for this opportunity.

Mr. SMITH. On that very encouraging note, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the hearing was concluded.]

APPENDIX

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515-0128

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), Chairman

July 26, 2011

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held jointly by the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights to be held in **Room 2255 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live, via the WEBCAST link on the Committee website at http://www.hcfa.house.gov):**

DATE: Tuesday, July 26, 2011

TIME: 2:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Coordinating Africa Policy on Security, Counterterrorism, Humanitarian Operations and Development

WITNESSES: The Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of African Affairs
U.S. Department of State

The Honorable Vicki Huddleston
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Office of the Secretary of Defense
U.S. Department of Defense

Ms. Sharon Cromer
Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Africa
U.S. Agency for International Development

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON *Africa, Global Health, And Human Rights* HEARING

Day *Tuesday* Date *July 26, 2011* Room *2255 Rayburn*

Starting Time *2:09 p.m.* Ending Time *3:51 p.m.*

Recesses *0* (____to ____) (____to ____) (____to ____) (____to ____) (____to ____) (____to ____)

Presiding Member(s)

Rep. Chris Smith

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session ☑
Executive (closed) Session ☐
Televised ☑

Electronically Recorded (taped) ☑
Stenographic Record ☑

TITLE OF HEARING:

Coordinating Africa Policy on Security, Counterterrorism, Humanitarian Operations, and Development

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Rep. Chris Smith, Rep. Tom Marino, Rep. Ann Marie Buerkle, Rep. Donald Payne, Rep. Russ Carnahan, Rep. Karen Bass

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: *(Mark with an * if they are not members of full committee.)*

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes ☑ **No** ☐
(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: *(List any statements submitted for the record.)*

Prepared statement from Amb. Yamamoto
Prepared statement from Amb. Huddleston
Prepared statement from Ms. Cromer
Prepared statement from Rep. Carnahan
Information requested by Rep. Smith
Information requested by Rep. Smith
Information requested by Rep. Smith
Information requested by Rep. Smith
Questions for the Record from Rep. Carnahan

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____
or
TIME ADJOURNED *3:51 p.m.*

Subcommittee Staff Director

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
THE HONORABLE RUSS CARNAHAN (MO-03)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
U.S. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Hearing on
Coordinating Africa Policy on Security, Counterterrorism, Humanitarian Operations and Development
Tuesday, July 26, 2011, 2:00 P.M.
2255 Rayburn House Office Building

Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Payne, thank you for holding this hearing to examine the role of AFRICOM in advancing U.S. policy in Africa. It is clear that the United States has a keen interest in promoting stability on the continent, and I look forward to discussing the key security challenges in Africa today.

In 2007, AFRICOM's establishment garnered concerns about its motives, particularly among African nations. I believe AFRICOM must remain committed to its mandate—to support and collaborate with State and USAID; and to build local capacity through partnerships with African nations and regional organizations. I look forward to hearing an update on current perceptions of AFRICOM, along with an evaluation of interagency processes.

This hearing most importantly reflects the interconnected roles that our diplomacy, development, and defense mechanisms play in U.S. foreign and national security policies. Essential components of our foreign aid to Africa—good governance, democracy and human rights promotion, food security, health system development, and capacity building—are *security* issues, as evidenced by unrest that has swept several North African nations and has impacted regional stability and global commodity prices. Similarly, African countries on the verge of failed statehood threaten our interests, particularly those that become breeding groups for al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.

AFRICOM's role must be to develop the military-unique portions of a larger inter-agency process, supporting diplomatic and development efforts to combat some of Africa's most vexing security challenges: terrorism, piracy, trafficking in illicit drugs and humans, illegal mineral trade, and sexual and gender based violence.

With last week's declaration of famine in southern parts of Somalia, the destabilizing impacts of global poverty, governance crises, and extremism are particularly acute. My district in St. Louis is home to a sizable Somali population. For these constituents, with families and friends still living in Somalia—in the midst of devastating food crisis and decades-long conflict—I am particularly anxious to hear about U.S. and international humanitarian response efforts to date.

In closing, I would like to thank the witnesses for their presence and testimony here today. I look forward to your expertise on the critical security challenges in Africa.

Hearing Date: Jul 26, 2011
Hearing: Coordinating Africa Policy on Security, Counterterrorism, Humanitarian Operations and Development
Member: Congressman Smith
Witness: DASD(ISA/AFR) Huddleston

(The information follows):

DoD conducts a range of human rights training for foreign militaries. This training is often conducted by the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS). You will find attached a sample curriculum from a DIILS seminar, which includes modules on respecting human rights, rules for the use of force, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and regional human rights agreements, which cover many of the topics discussing during this hearing.

You will also find attached the curriculum on SGBV that was used in training the 391st Battalion of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo, which demonstrates in additional depth the type of instruction that is incorporated in U.S. training of African militaries.

DEFENSE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES

1206 Human Rights & International Humanitarian Law Seminar

Time	Day 1- Observing & Respecting Human Rights	Day 2- International Humanitarian Law
0800 to 0850	**01** Seminar Opening Observing & Respecting Human Rights & Respect for Civilian Authority	**06** Internal Armed Conflict & the Law
0900 to 0950		**07** The International Law of Armed Conflict: An Overview
1000 to 1050	**02** Regional Human Rights Agreement	
1100 to 1150	**03** Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment	**08** International Armed Conflict & Terrorist Groups
Lunch		
1300 to 1350	**04** Sexual & Gender-Based Violence	**09** Rules of Engagement An Overview
1400 to 1450	**05** Rules for the Use of Force in Security and Law Enforcement	Small Group Discussion Problems
1500 to 1550	Small Group Discussion Problems	
1600 to 1700		Seminar Conclusion & Graduation

www.diils.org

Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) Training
Kisangani, DRC (Camp Base)
Program of Instruction (POI)
13 May 2010

Course: SGBV training for FARDC soldiers: core values

Course Description, Goals and Objectives: This course is intended to assist FARDC soldiers to decide individually and as a group to refrain from the commission of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in the context of military operations. The approach taken is to create an environment in which students discover for themselves that committing SGBV is incompatible with their goals, objectives and self-definition as professional soldiers and as men.

The approach, which is based on research carried out with FARDC soldiers, engages students in envisioning themselves and their culture in a positive manner. It then assists them in understanding that the commission of gratuitous violence against others – especially SGBV – is incompatible with this vision. The approach seeks to demonstrate that on the point of the commission of gratuitous violence against others – and especially against women – the western-style military training that they are receiving and the values taught in their own cultures are mutually reinforcing.

This training is intended to accompany and complement skills-based training.
It is intended for both literate students and students with limited formal educational experience.

The formal daytime class sessions focus on the commission of sexual violence in a military context.

The informal evening lab sessions, if approved, supplement but do not reiterate the daytime sessions. The lab sessions focus on the commission of sexual violence in non-military contexts. They introduce students to the legal logic, and the particular laws, pertaining to protection of women and children from rape and other sexually-based crimes. These principles will be taught through the acting out of scenes.

Formal daytime course sessions	Informal/supplemental evening lab sessions
Number of formal daytime sessions: 4	Number of informal evening sessions: 3 or 4
Length of each formal session: 2	Length of each informal session: 2
Total course hours (formal): 10	Total course hours (infor:
Number of iterations: 5	Number of iterations: one (?)
Class size (number of students) for each iteration:	Class size
Class times: during regular teaching hours	Class times: evenings

Pool of possible local facilitators: Emmanuel, Captain Risette, Major Yves (XO), Major Wasinga (XO)

Session One: Overall Introduction to the Course (by Majors Molengo and Sasa? Or by the S3s?)

Why we are here (roughed out here, continuing to be refined between now and the training, based on continuing interviews)

- assist in professionalizing you as your country's military … you are the future of your country
- military training is not only about developing skills… it is about developing the soldier
- you are a person … you are a man… and your education as a person is as important as your education in terms of military skills
- both kinds of education … in your thinking as a person and in your military skills… you will use to protect and defend yourself, your family and your country

- many of you entered into the military during a time of national crisis…and many of you were quite young when you began
- there are some things that your elders want you to learn about how to be a man, how to be a full adult in Congolese society and in the Congolese military.
- one of the most important things that your elders want you to learn is that when you are a man, you are strong, and when you are strong, you don't have to prove it
- strength is something deep inside you… it is something that you HAVE

- At the time when you were boys, when you were playing, you probably liked to show your friends how strong you were. You wrestled, ran races, etc.
- When you became older boys, you probably like to show your toughness, impress your friends, and impress girls as well
- Now you are men. You are soldiers. You ARE strong. You ARE tough. You have nothing to prove.
- Many times, when soldiers are not confident, they want to show their force – and they use it recklessly.
- For example, when they interact with civilians, they rape women, for no military reason.
- How does raping a woman show your strength? The answer is clear: it doesn't show strength. It shows weakness. It shows cowardice.
- How does attacking civilians, rather than the other combatants show strength? The answer is clear: it doesn't. It shows weakness.
- When you are strong, why would you attack unarmed people? When you are strong, why would you rape women?

- Strength – true strength – is a gift. It is a gift to use responsibly. Strength gives you the capacity to protect and defend. You protect and defend the people who love you. You don't rape them. You protect and defend the people who trust you.

You don't rape them. You protect and defend the people who need you. You don't rape them.

- Your country needs you. We are proud to give you this training to help you protect and serve your country.

Session One: Leadership (facilitators: Captain Risette and/or Emmanuel)
(objective: focus on the soldier as having volition, agency and responsibility – challenge the widespread self-description of a soldier being a passive instrument to be used by those above him. In most contexts, individual soldiers have latitude for agency, and can choose to act in a positive way.)

Initial Points:

- In a chain of command, everyone has a leader in the ranks above him. But everyone is the leader for those in the ranks below him.
- Everyone is a leader, since newer people will always come.
- Even if you do not think of yourself in a leadership position now, you can grow into leadership.
- A military career, like a man's life, is a journey toward leadership…

Leadership Activity Sets:

In pairs

- Think about the worst boss you ever experienced (5 mins to come up with descriptive words)
- Think of the best boss you ever experienced (10 minutes to come up with descriptive words)

Facilitator and class:

- Call on the class to give their descriptive words for bad leadership
- Call on class to give descriptive words for good leadership
- As facilitator writes word on the board, class member explains briefly
- Facilitator compiles list of descriptive words

In small groups:

- Come up with 7 most important characteristics of a good leader
- Groups report to the class and explain the reasons for their choices

In small groups:

- Choose the three most important characteristics of a good leader
- Groups report to the class and explain their choices
- Facilitator determines which characteristics have received the most votes (ranking them 1-5)

Leadership Activity Set Follow Up (Facilitator)

Reiterate initial points:

- Everything starts with good leadership
- leadership starts with every person
- everyone is a leader, since newer people will always come.
- even if you are not in a leadership position now, you will be
- a military career is a journey toward leadership

Take it one level deeper: (small discussion)

- Leadership is also INSIDE a person
  - Are you in control, focused, clear about your objectives, and moving forward?
  - Are you following the lead of parts of your character that you don't control, such as impatience, anger and frustration? (e.g., beating your wife because she didn't have your food ready quickly enough; beating a baby just for crying)
  - Or are you following the lead of things that you don't control – and instead, allowing them to control you? (e.g., alcohol, cannabis, sex)
- **Have the students relate this lesson to rape**

Out of class assignment …. Task each company to come up with a marching cadence with 5 leadership characteristics

Session Two: *Ubuntu* in the presence of war (facilitator: S3s or Emmanuel, with help from the S5s?)

Objective: in individual and private interviews, especially with former rebels, interviewees have frequently expressed the notion that war is the antithesis of organized human social life. In explaining why the most egregious rapes occur, soldiers have evoked "the spirit of war", depicting the realm of war as separate, and disconnected from, the realm of normal human interaction (Eriksson-Baaz and Stems, 2008, 2009). Imagining the realm of war as disconnected from the realm of human society (and social rules) allows combatants to act in a manner that is antithetical to acceptable human social behavior. It also allows them to imagine that the realm of war is one of chaos where no human rules apply. In this session, we point out that fundamental human concepts do apply. Professional soldiers do not inhabit the realm of chaos. Laws hold soldiers accountable. Moreover, soldiers, as humans, do ultimately themselves accountable. *Ubuntu* and war are not antithetical to each other.

Introduction (touching base and connecting to overall framework)

Yesterday we looked at leadership
We saw that it begins with a person
And we saw that it begins inside a person
Today we are going to look again inside a person
We will examine *ubuntu* (humanness)
The reason why we are talking about *ubuntu* is because soldiers ....

We will ask the question: as a soldier, what does *ubuntu* mean for me?

Teaching Point: what is *Ubuntu* (humanness)

- What is it?
- What do we know about *ubuntu* based on the elders of the past?

Story #1: very brief story introducing and explaining *ubuntu*
Question: what the story tells us about *ubuntu*

Facilitator talks about *ubuntu* (humanness, humaneness, the philosophy of being human, the realm of civilized society). Facilitator draws on proverbs and examples drawn from multiple regions of DRC. Facilitator elicits examples from the class.

Teaching Point: *Ubuntu* and armed conflict are connected

- Soldiers are humans and operate from a position of *ubuntu*
- Soldiers are professionals and professionalism is rooted in discipline
- Soldiers defend and protect people, and these objectives are within the domain of *ubuntu*

In society, there are differences in ideas, which sometimes lead to conflict. Conflicts can sometimes grow into armed conflicts. War is an activity that is rooted in society. Soldiers are members of society. Professional soldiers are organized and follow rules. Professional soldiers do not let go of *ubuntu*. The realm of armed conflict is not separate from the realm of society.

Story #2 contrasting pair: Brief story on soldiers inviting all villagers to a meeting to talk about protecting them, and then once the villagers are gathered, killing them all. Brief story about soldiers who gather villagers and create a corridor so that villagers can safely get out of the way of the war. Question: what do these two stories tell us about the possibility of drawing on *ubuntu* in armed conflict? What story would you prefer to tell as your own story when you later talk about history to your children?

Teaching Point: Soldiers defend and protect society – these behaviors are consistent with *ubuntu*

- soldiers protect and defend people
- soldiers are have the important responsibility of defending people who can't defend themselves
- society needs soldiers
- soldiers have a special role in society – "my job is to protect civilians so that they can keep society going"

Story #3: Soldiers defending a maternity hospital, protecting doctors and nurses, mothers and newborns. Question: what does the story says about *ubuntu* and soldiers?

Teaching Point: Strength and professionalism are gifts. Soldiers pass on the gifts by helping and protecting others.

- soldiers have "natural" gift of being strong
- soldiers develop this gift by learning to be capable
- it is a gift to be capable of protecting and defending people

Story #4: Scenario in which soldiers using maneuvers taught at Camp Base rescue a family which has been attacked by bandits high on drugs and prevent rape. As a result, soldiers are lauded and admired as trustworthy rescuers. Years later, one of the soldiers finds that he is remembered by the family. They have named a family member after him.

Follow up points from story:

- Soldiers are professional, not high on drugs
- Soldiers are highly trained to be able to organize and control situations
- Well-trained soldiers bring organization and control, not chaos
- Through organization and control, soldiers protect civilians
- It is normal that civilians can admire and respect soldiers.

Teaching Point: In crisis situations, civilian do not always understand what soldiers are doing. Soldiers remain professional anyway.

Story #5: In an non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO), some members of a group of civilians panic while being evacuated. This causes fear among all civilians who think that the soldiers may respond by killing them all. The leader of the soldiers remembers a similar situation he was once in when he was a *kadogo*, when his commander killed all the civilians. His commander later became a drunkard, haunted by this memory. The commander was never normal again, and died as a derelict. The leader orders his soldiers to remain professional and not to lose their cool. He knows that the civilians are afraid. One of his soldiers doesn't agree with this attitude, and wants to kill the civilians. But he doesn't kill the civilians, because he follows orders to protect them. When that soldier accompanies the civilians to safety, he finds that his little sister was mixed in the group of civilians. Had he lost his cool, he would have killed her. He is glad that he protected the civilians.

- Civilians, who are not trained to deal with war, often don't know what to do
- Civilians who are untrained and afraid can be difficult to deal with
- Soldiers are trained and can deal effectively with minimizing the impact of war on civilians
- There are many ways of minimizing the impact on civilians, and you have learned some of them
- Protecting civilians and keeping them out of the way is often the best way to deal with civilians
- Although civilians don't always understand it, soldiers operationalize *ubuntu*

A final thought

- When you win the war, you will inherit, and be responsible for, the population and even the former opponents
- The civilians and the former opponents that you inherit are human too
- *Ubuntu* is life-long.... And you will live with your conscience
- **Have the students relate this to rape**

Session Three: Soldiers and Civilians (facilitators:)

Objective: During visits to the FARDC officers' training school in Kinshasa, as well as during interviews, I have heard many definitions of the contrasting pairs combatant/non-combatant and soldier/civilian. It's clear that there is no consensus on how these categories are defined. It's also clear that the normative assumption is that everyone is a combatant unless irrefutably proven otherwise. Rape is tied to this because interviewees consistently assert that soldiers rape women because women are "instruments of war", "accomplices", semi-combatants (e.g., women acting as spies and reconnaissance agents), or deserving of punishment because they didn't flee the war zone. The decision to rape these women is implicitly regarded as "humane", given the other alternative for the treatment of enemies which is to kill them.

Review of Previous Lessons:

- Leadership means that you have leadership over yourself.
- Your behavior and choices set examples and standards for other people.
- *Ubuntu* doesn't disappear in war... discipline, laws, rules, organized behavior, and your conscience all still operate when you are carrying out your work as a soldier.
- Committing rape shows weakness, lack of leadership and control.
- Committing rape shows lack of discipline and professionalism.
- Committing rape remains in your conscience.

Teaching Point: Combatants and Non-Combatants
(note: further develop this by talking with instructors about what they have taught so far) (note: further develop this by talking with instructors about what they have taught so far)

So how does a soldier make decisions about how to interact with the people he encounters? The first question he needs to ask is: is this person a combatant or a non-combatant?

- To answer this question, a soldier needs to know: what is a combatant and what is a non-combatant? What have you learned about how to decide who is a combatant and who is a non-combatant?
- What is the difference between a non-combatant and a civilian?
- What does international law tell us?

Class Exercise: Based on the definition, are the following combatants or non-combatants?
(note: further develop this by talking with instructors about what they have taught so far)

- Villagers who aren't friendly to you
- Unarmed enemy soldiers who are lying in bed in a hospital
- Villagers who are afraid of you because they have been attacked by soldiers in the past
- Villagers who don't like or trust you because they have been attacked by FARDC in the past
- Villagers in villages from which the people fighting against you (rebels) have been recruited
- The wife of someone who belongs to the (rebel) group fighting against you
- Your old schoolmate who is in a bar, and you heard that he joined the rebels
- Women who are hiding inside a house when you approach a village
- Men who are hiding inside a house when you approach a village
- A woman hiding in a house in which you find an AK-47

- A woman out collecting firewood who you suspect has cooked food for enemy combatants
- A woman walking in a field who has an AK-47 strapped to her back
- A woman who sees you on the path early in the morning and starts screaming
- A little girl who sees you in the forest where you are hiding
- A little boy walking through a river who has an AK-47 strapped to his back
- A woman who sees you in the middle of her village and starts trying to hit you
- Children of enemy combatants who are out herding goats

Class exercise: In your training, what have you learned to do with the following people?
(note: further develop this by talking with instructors about what they have taught so far)

- A woman hiding in a house in which you find an AK-47
- A man collecting firewood who is holding a machete
- A woman walking in a field who has an AK-47 strapped to her back
- A woman who sees you on the path and starts screaming
- A woman who sees approaching a water source and starts trying to hit you
- Children of enemy combatants who are herding goats
- An enemy combatant whom you have taken prisoner

Note: expect to hear the following:
- you can't assume anything
- is that non-combatant going to do you bodily harm ?
- does the person have the means to do harm?
- gun-barrel poke and tie-up

Teaching Point: In military terms, attacking civilians – including raping them – is bad military strategy (note: further develop this by talking with instructors about what they have taught so far)

- Short term: Immediate waste of time and resources
- Short-term: sidetracks soldiers, leads to losing focus

Story #1 soldiers stop to rape women and get ambushed themselves

- Medium term: Doesn't reduce fighting capacity of hostile combatants
- Medium term: could send the message that you are weak… you are took weak to fight your opponent, so you are spending you time killing civilians instead

- Long term: Creates enemies, motivates civilians to move from neutral to hostile

Story #2 about interviewing former rebels who said that they decided to join the war when their family members were raped

Teaching Point: In political terms, attacking civilians – including raping them – destroys, rather than protects and defends, the nation

- Destroys the nation, makes peace more difficult

- Would you want enemy combatants to do this to your family?
- Incompatible with your job: your job is to protect civilians

Teaching Point: Discussion on Revenge
(note that this discussion will be further refined between now and the time that this material is taught. It is an important teaching point because revenge has featured prominently in many interviews)

- Revenge exists in Congolese culture, and based it has played a role in the context of armed conflict, but that role is a very negative one
- Revenge has motivated many unnecessary killings and atrocities

- Militarily, revenge killing is inconsistent with military professionalism
- Soldiers acting out of revenge tend to lose discipline and control

- Politically, the straightforward killing of enemies in war is not the same as revenge-based killing: is protecting your country the same thing as vengeance?
- Revenge-based killing is more personal – like murder

- Acting out of revenge puts you in an immediate position of weakness (you are acting out of loss, not strength)

- Morally, what motivates your behavior absolutely does matter to you when you confront your conscience… revenge-based murder affects you differently than war
- Since rape is NOT a professional military tactic, it can affect you morally in the same way that murder does

Deepen Discussion: Rape as Alternative to Killing
(note that this discussion will be further refined between now and the time that this material is taught. It is an important teaching point because rape has been presented as an alternative to killing – one that allegedly achieves the cultural goal of "protecting" women because through rape the women are "punished" but not killed)

Story #3: story of soldiers who encounter women going to the market – the soldiers have the stereotyped idea that the women are spies, because they assume, based on stereotypes, that women are spies – unable to determine if the women are spies, the soldiers aren't sure if they should think of the women as combatants or non-combatants – so just in case the women might be spies, and given that the women are attractive, they decide to rape them – as they rape the women, they tell the women that they are "lucky" just to be raped and not killed – but during the rape, one of the women is bleeding heavily and becomes unconscious – the soldiers panic, believing that she might have just bled to death – their panic grows when they can't find her pulse and the other women are crying that they have killed their sister – the panicked soldiers kill all the women

Teaching Points:

- Rape is NOT more morally acceptable or "better" than killing
- Rape is completely inconsistent with military professionalism
- Rape does not achieve any military goals
- Rape is inconsistent with leadership
- Rape is inconsistent with *ubuntu*
- Rape has NO PLACE in military engagement

Session Four: Strength and Restraint: I am a man (facilitator: respected FARDC officers/ncos)

(Objective: one of the key definitions of manhood that recurs in interviews is "one who has the ability/capacity/agency to do what he wants". In contrast to woman who are regarded as "vulnerable" and in need of guidance/assistance, men are regarded as autonomous and capable of doing what they want. In many cases, the fact of being male justifies/rationalizes a man acting to fulfill his volition – "I am a man, so I took her". The objective of this lesson is to demonstrate that having capacity/ power/strength doesn't necessitate –or justify – acting on it. Having the capacity to take someone by force – as a man or as an armed soldier – does not justify doing it. Men who are secure in their strength show restraint.)

This session will be facilitated by one or more men who are regarded by the soldiers with great respect. The way that this session will be conducted will develop from training to be conducted with the facilitators next week.

Teaching Points and Elements anticipated for this session

1. Strength in Skills

   You have been selected for this military training – at Camp Base, you have become stronger.

   Your military training is developing in you a special set of skills that prepare you for service.

2. Strength and responsibility

   With your training comes a responsibility to use these skills wisely and professionally to defend your country. (analogy of medical training that gives a person the ability to heal or to hurt, depending on how the person uses the skills)

   Strength is a gift. Men pass it on by helping and protecting others. Soldiers, too, pass it on by defending and protecting others.

   As a soldier and as a man, you know that you have strength, and that others are weaker than you. When you are secure with your strength, no don't need to flaunt it to intimidating and terrorizing others. You ARE powerful. And with power comes restraint.

3. Having capacity for force doesn't necessitate using it

   Power doesn't give you the right to force your will on others, simply because it is possible.

4. Force generates counter-force/ enemies

Forcing your will on others, intimidating them, terrorizing them, raping them, is oppression. Oppression creates enemies.

5. Rape generates broad counter-force/ many enemies/ danger for you

Rape is a special form of oppression because it is so morally repulsive. Think of how you, or people who you know, have felt when someone they were responsible to protect – and loved – their mother, their sister, their wife – was raped.

Think of how many people you know who joined military because someone they were responsible to protect, and loved, was raped.

In the context of war, using rape as a weapon – you might see it as punishing individual women, or as recreation for yourself – but it creates entire groups of enemies. It makes you the enemy of an entire family, an entire village, an entire region. It multiplies your enemies, putting you and your company in much greater danger than before.

6. Rape signals weakness

Rape is not a professional military tactic. Using rape in war shows weakness, and cowardice. It sends the message that you are too weak to take on your opponent so you are reduced to abusing women and children.

Rape is similar to witchcraft and poisoning – it is shameful to the person who initiated it. Poisoning is handling a problem in a weak and shameful way. You do it in secret. Why do you do it in secret? Because if you were strong, you would have brought it out in the open to talk about it. Poisoning is something that people do when they are jealous. Why are they jealous? Because somebody else is doing well, and next to that person they feel weak. So they attack secretly, the way a weak person does. By choosing this means of attack, they secretly accept their own weakness. If they were strong, they would compete openly. But they are weak, so they try to eliminate the strong person.

Similarly, by raping women, men show that they are weak. They are not men, or they would be handling their quarrel in a different way. But they are weak, and they direct their destruction at those who nurture and create… women.

7. Rape destroys future (you destroy what you inherit)

Rape shows your people that you are not thinking of the future, that you don't have a plan. You are trying to destroy the future by brutalizing those who produce the next generation.

8. Rape is a crime against the collectivity/ the nation

Rape shows that you do not think of your nation. When you think as a member of a nation, you think of women as OUR mothers, OUR sisters. If you thought this way, how could you commit rape? Can you rape your own sister, your own mother, your grandmother?

Rape signals that you don't have enough responsibility to inherit power over the nation.

And who will trust you? You have discredited yourself.

9. The weight of crimes rests on you personally

Many of you are young men, and you do not yet feel the weight of all the deeds of your life. But as you grow older, you begin to feel them, and you wonder how you can account for them.

Many of the grown men were have talked with – including retired soldiers – think about the things they have done in the past, and wonder how they could have done them.

They tell us that many of the (bad) things that they did were done when they were in a group of men. They say that it was easy to do these things in a group because one person started, then another went a bit further, and soon the group acting, not as individuals, but as a group, was making it easier for everyone to push beyond the limits of what they would have done by themselves. The problem with this is that later, when the other people are gone, and you are left alone confronting your deeds: you realize that YOU did them.

If you end up in arrested and in court facing the judge and justice – the fact is that YOU did it. Can you excuse yourself by saying that everyone else was going it too? No. The judge can say that he will find you guilty first, and then accuse the other people. But even if he never accuses the other people, the fact is that YOU did it.

And if are one of the people that the judge doesn't catch, does that mean that you have peace? The fact is that YOU did it.

"Don't blame me! I was just one of 15 men who raped that young girl. Don't blame me!" Does being just one of 15 rapists make you innocent? No!

Does being one of 15 rapists make you innocent in front of the girl you raped? No!

Does it make you innocent in front of yourself? No.

10. Rape by one company member has impact on every member of the company

Your individual behavior affects the reputation and safety of the other men who are sitting next to you.

You have been learning to work together as a team. You cover for your team-mates when they enter a dangerous zone.

Do you want your irresponsible behavior to put the people who are saving your life in danger?

Help each other to be professional. Don't rape. Don't let your company-members rape.

Hearing Date: Jul 26, 2011
Hearing: Coordinating Africa Policy on Security, Counterterrorism, Humanitarian Operations and Development
Member: Congressman Smith
Witness: DASD(ISA/AFR) Huddleston

(The information follows):

DoD conducts a range of human rights training for foreign militaries. DoD does not provide specific training related to religious freedom, but USAFRICOM does conduct a Chaplain's Conference, for example, which brings together African chaplains from across the continent to discuss ways to better cooperate, learn from each other, and to espouse religious tolerance.

USAFRICOM also conducts bilateral military-to-military chaplain engagement programs to help develop chaplain corps. USAFRICOM also conducts Chaplaincy Professionalization Symposiums, which regularly discuss issues like sexual harassment in the military, HIV/AIDS, gender equality, grief and trauma, etc. These chaplains then provide counseling on these topics to members of the militaries that they serve

QUESTIONS FOR THE PANEL
THE HONORABLE RUSS CARNAHAN (MO-03)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
U.S. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Hearing on
Coordinating Africa Policy on Security, Counterterrorism, Humanitarian Operations and Development
Tuesday, July 26, 2011, 2:00 P.M.
2255 Rayburn House Office Building

- I would like to take a moment to discuss Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya. I am particularly interested to hear about our plans for post-conflict in Libya. While I certainly acknowledge the significant variations in the histories, cultures, size and scope of our recent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, I also believe that insufficient and disjointed planning for post-conflict transitions in these conflicts sets a poor precedent for the NATO operation in Libya.
    - As different parties such as the French, Russians, United Nations, and African Union continue to work towards a solution that will allow for peace in Libya, what is the U.S. government doing to prepare for Libya post-revolution?
    - How is DoD working with State and USAID on these preparations? And what is the framework for these discussions among our NATO allies—particularly those leading the NATO operation?

Hearing Date: July 26, 2011
Committee: HFA
Member: Congressman Carnahan
Witness: DASD(ISA/AFR) Huddleston
Question: #1

Question: I would like to take a moment to discuss Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya. I am particularly interested to hear about our plans for post-conflict in Libya. While I certainly acknowledge the significant variations in the histories, cultures, size and scope of our recent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, I also believe that insufficient and disjointed planning for post-conflict transitions in these conflicts sets a poor precedent for the NATO operation in Libya.- As different parties such as the French, Russians, United Nations, and African Union continue to work towards a solution that will allow for peace in Libya, what is the U.S. government doing to prepare for Libya post-revolution?

Answer:

NATO continues to enforce the UN mandate successfully. Every day, our operations result in countless lives saved. We have damaged or destroyed over 3,600 military targets and the momentum is no longer in the regime's favor. We have seriously degraded Qadhafi's ability to attack his own people. His economic strength to sustain the war against his people is declining. His ministers and generals are deserting him and the international community has turned against him.

We support diplomatic initiatives to end this conflict in a way which fulfils the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people. The U.S. government, led by the Department of State, is working closely with the Transitional National Council (TNC), Allies, and partners to prepare for the eventual transition from over four decades of autocratic rule in Libya. This includes encouraging the TNC to establish an inclusive and representative democracy, to avoid reprisal attacks and ensure a commitment to human rights, and to secure arms depots and chemical weapons facilities.

Hearing Date: July 26, 2011
Committee: HFA
Member: Congressman Carnahan
Witness: DASD(ISA/AFR) Huddleston
Question: #2

Question: I would like to take a moment to discuss Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya. I am particularly interested to hear about our plans for post-conflict in Libya. While I certainly acknowledge the significant variations in the histories, cultures, size and scope of our recent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, I also believe that insufficient and disjointed planning for post-conflict transitions in these conflicts sets a poor precedent for the NATO operation in Libya.- How is DoD working with State and USAID on these preparations? And what is the framework for these discussions among our NATO allies-particularly those leading the NATO operation?

Answer:

Since the beginning of the crisis, DoD has been actively engaged with the interagency, our allies and partners on the full range of security issues related to Libya's transition, including helping to prevent the proliferation of Libya's conventional weapons. Our main concern is Libya's inventory of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, also known as Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems (MANPADS). The United States is working with NATO to provide all known locations of such weapons so that the TNC can secure and eventually dispose of these weapons.

The United States, as a member of NATO, is well connected with our NATO Allies and non-NATO contributing partners. Any possible future NATO role would be in support of wider international efforts. Once Qadhafi is overthrown, it will be for the UN to take the leading role to support the Libyan people build a new future.

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