[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SILVERTIP PIPELINE OIL SPILL
IN YELLOWSTONE COUNTY, MONTANA
=======================================================================
(112-47)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
RAILROADS, PIPELINES, AND
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 14, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/
committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey Columbia
GARY G. MILLER, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois CORRINE BROWN, Florida
SAM GRAVES, Missouri BOB FILNER, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
DUNCAN HUNTER, California RICK LARSEN, Washington
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
BILLY LONG, Missouri HEATH SHULER, North Carolina
BOB GIBBS, Ohio STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania LAURA RICHARDSON, California
RICHARD L. HANNA, New York ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida
JEFF DENHAM, California
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN,
Tennessee
(ii)
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
GARY G. MILLER, California CORRINE BROWN, Florida
SAM GRAVES, Missouri JERROLD NADLER, New York
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia RICK LARSEN, Washington
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
BILLY LONG, Missouri LAURA RICHARDSON, California
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
RICHARD L. HANNA, New York PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JEFF DENHAM, California NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin (Ex Officio)
CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN,
Tennessee
JOHN L. MICA, Florida (Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vi
TESTIMONY
Panel One
Hon. Jon Tester, a United States Senator from the State of
Montana........................................................ 14
Panel Two
Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration, United States Department of
Transportation................................................. 17
Panel Three
Douglas B. Inkley, Ph.D., Senior Scientist, Conservation
Programs, National Wildlife Federation......................... 29
Gary W. Pruessing, President, ExxonMobil Pipeline Company........ 29
PREPARED STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY MEMBER OF CONGRESS
Hon. Denny Rehberg, of Montana................................... 70
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Hon. Jon Tester \1\..............................................
Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman....................................... 74
Douglas B. Inkley, Ph.D.......................................... 79
Gary W. Pruessing................................................ 85
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Hon. Corrine Brown, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Florida, request to submit statement from Carl Weimer,
Executive Director, Pipeline Safety Trust...................... 7
Hon. Bill Shuster, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Pennsylvania, request to submit daily reports from the
Environmental Protection Agency about the Silvertip Pipeline
oil spill...................................................... 48
ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD
Letter from Hon. Nick J. Rahall II, a Representative in Congress
from the State of West Virginia, and Hon. Corrine Brown, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, to Gary
W. Pruessing, President, ExxonMobil Pipeline Company, July 19,
2011........................................................... 88
----------
\1\ Senator Jon Tester did not submit a written statement.
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SILVERTIP PIPELINE OIL SPILL
IN YELLOWSTONE COUNTY, MONTANA
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 14, 2011
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous
Materials,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in
room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Shuster
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Shuster. The hearing will come to order. Good morning
to everybody. Good morning, Senator. Thanks for joining us here
this morning, I look forward to hearing your testimony.
I ask for unanimous consent to allow Dennis Rehberg from
Montana to participate in today's hearing. Without objection,
so ordered.
Again, good morning. Welcome, everybody, to this morning's
pipeline hearing. We are going to make a little adjustment, I
believe, in the panels. The Senator will go first, then the
administrator will go by herself, and then we will have the
other few folks go next.
So, again, thank you all for being here. And today we are
going to receive testimony related to the July 1, 2011, release
of crude oil from the Silvertip pipeline in Yellowstone County,
Montana. And, as I said, we will be hearing from the Senator,
from Ms. Quarterman, the administrator of PHMSA, along with
Gary Pruessing, president of ExxonMobil Pipeline Company, and
Douglas Inkley, a scientist from the National Wildlife
Federation.
And also I would like to welcome Congressman Rehberg----
Mr. Rehberg. Thank you.
Mr. Shuster [continuing]. My good friend, for being here
today and for requesting the hearing, and of course, inviting
Senator Tester. We also invited Senator Baucus, at your
request. He is obviously tied up, but I am sure he is very
concerned, as we all are, about the situation in Montana.
I want to offer my heartfelt condolences to all those who
have been affected by the spill in Montana. And as chairman of
the subcommittee, I want to ensure that Congress is being
proactive and staying on top of these critical safety issues. I
also want to ensure that State, Federal, and local actors and
key stakeholders are working together and that the safety
concerns are being adequately addressed, and that the incidents
are subject to appropriate investigation by this committee and
Congress.
The United States has the largest network of energy
pipelines--2.5 million miles--the largest in the world, and the
pipelines remain critical to our energy life, and they power
nearly everything in our daily lives and activities. America's
pipeline network is the safest and most cost-effective means to
transport the extraordinary volumes of natural gas and
hazardous liquid products that fuel our economy.
Both Government and industry have taken numerous steps to
improve pipeline safety over the last 10 years. And while the
data shows that Federal pipeline safety programs have been on
the right track, recent pipeline incidents suggest there
continues to be room for improvement and, to quote Secretary
LaHood, these incidents are ``cause for concern, but not for
alarm.''
The pipeline companies have shown that they are
aggressively taking action to address safety concerns, and that
safety continues to be the top priority. In fact, incidents are
down 30 percent over the past several years.
Today we are focusing on gathering information regarding
the incident in Montana, and examining what went wrong. I am
committed to ensuring the continued safety and enhanced
reliability in the transportation of the Nation's energy
products by pipeline.
Additionally, I am committed to enhancing our already
strong pipeline system, by looking at ways to improve safety
and coordination between the Federal Government, State
regulators, and pipeline operators. We must ensure that we
proceed in a thoughtful and balanced way that keeps in place
regulatory measures that are working, and makes adjustments to
measures that are not working.
So, again, I thank everybody for being here. And with that,
I will yield to the ranking member, Ms. Brown, for an opening
statement.
Ms. Brown. I want to thank Chairman Shuster for holding
today's hearing on the ExxonMobil oil spill in Montana's
Yellowstone River. This is a very timely hearing, as the U.S.
has, unfortunately, experienced a high number of pipeline
ruptures over the last few years that have caused significant
environmental damage, health concerns, and death.
I want to begin by expressing my deepest sympathy to the
residents of Montana, who are dealing with the aftermath of
this tragedy. As a resident of Florida, I know all too well
that--the devastating economy and emotional effects these
spills can have on people. Most of the Gulf Coast is still
cleaning up after the damage that was taking place a full year
ago. And I can assure everyone here that the oil just doesn't
simply disappear, and could easily return to our shores, due to
another natural disaster.
Tomorrow will be the 1-year anniversary of capping the BP
spill, and I am sure that we can use what we have learned in
the spills to prevent the same mistakes from happening in
Montana. I think we need not only to ensure that ExxonMobil
protects its pipelines from the river that is known to be
moving fast, and is following the law as it relates to pipeline
safety, but that the company is also properly addressing the
health and economic concerns of the people impacted by the
spill.
During the Enbridge spill in Michigan, we saw cases of
people signing away all of their rights for air conditioners.
Unacceptable. We need to keep ExxonMobil's feet to the fire,
and we can't let things like this happen again to the American
people.
I want to also take this time to express my disappointment
that the chairman discharged this committee from consideration
of the bill that would force the President to make a key
decision on whether to allow the Keystone pipeline to be
constructed. This committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure is the committee of primary jurisdiction over
pipeline safety legislation, and is the primary committee to
refer for the Keystone legislation.
There is still major concerns with this project. And, at
the same time pipelines will be traveling around the
Yellowstone River, this is being affected today by the Exxon
spill. This should have been strongly vetted by this committee,
and I join Ranking Member Rahall in urging the committee to
hold a markup on the legislation prior to the floor
consideration. It would be a disaster if a spill occurred on
the pipeline, and this committee never held a hearing on it at
all.
When I was chair of the Subcommittee on Railroads,
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, I held a series of five
separate hearings concerning pipeline safety which highlighted
significant problems with reporting and inspection, as well as
the unhealthy relationship between the pipeline industry and
the agency regulating them.
In addition, much like the sewer and water infrastructure
in this country, much of the pipeline infrastructure is
reaching the end of its useful life, and we are going to need
to make significant investments in improving these assets, if
we are going to accomplish the goals of both delivering
critical petroleum to the States, and protecting citizens from
the danger of a hazardous pipeline spill and deadly explosions.
We also need to develop new technology and strategies for
improving safety in highly populated areas that are now located
above the aging pipeline.
With the high unemployment rate in this country it is
currently facing, we should be hiring and training inspectors,
and putting contractors to work replacing this aging pipeline
infrastructure in the United States. Gas and oil companies are
making record profit while the infrastructure with which they
are bringing this product to market becomes more and more
unstable.
I hope that those testifying today will have some good
ideas about how we can prevent future accidents and what
Congress can do to--immediately to improve the safety of the
Nation's pipeline.
With that, I welcome today's panelists, and thank you for
joining us. I am looking forward to the hearing and their
testimony. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Shuster. Thank the gentlelady. And no one on our side
has an opening statement. Yield to Mr. Larsen for 5 minutes for
an opening statement.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding the
hearing today. The July 1 Silvertip pipeline rupture resulted
in the release of approximately 31,000 to 42,000 gallons of
crude oil in the Yellowstone River. Although the causes of this
spill are still under investigation, its occurrence is alarming
to me and to this subcommittee.
The rupture occurred in a high-consequence area. ExxonMobil
inspected the line in 2005 and again in 2009, and PHMSA has not
found any integrity-threatening defects from these inspections.
However, there are several concerning facts that have arisen so
far.
First, PHMSA inspectors warned ExxonMobil several times
that heavy flooding in the Yellowstone River could have a
significant impact on the pipeline. It is not clear to me that
anything was done to respond to these concerns.
Second, the timing of the ExxonMobil's response to the
rupture is concerning. It took a total of 55 minutes to close
all the valves, and one of the valves was closed, reopened, and
then closed again. This doesn't make sense. And, frankly, I
just look forward to hearing clarification from the witnesses
today.
Finally, I want to take this opportunity to remind my
colleagues and our witnesses that the 2006 Pipeline Inspection,
Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act, or PIPES Act, has
expired. It is due for reauthorization. I was part of
reauthorizing that, I was part of writing the 2002 pipeline
safety bill, as well, because of a terrible tragedy in my own
district in 1999 that resulted in the death of three young men.
So, I hope this incident and the others that we have talked
about so far in opening testimony that have occurred will spur
this committee to reauthorize this important law, with the
changes that I think that need to be made. And I urge my
colleagues to work in a bipartisan manner to strengthen our
Nation's pipeline safety laws.
And with that, I want to thank you for holding this hearing
today, and look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
And, Mr. Chairman, just one more thing. Since we are
allowing Mr. Rehberg to sit in our committee, I am hopeful he
will allow us to sit in on the Appropriations Committee at some
time.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Shuster. I am working on that right now.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Mr. Shuster. I appreciate the gentleman's opening
statement, and your words. You have been a leader on pipeline
safety, and we are moving forward. We will be talking with our
colleagues on the other side here in the next coming days and
weeks to get a pipeline bill that we can reauthorize.
Mrs. Napolitano, do you have a statement?
Mrs. Napolitano. No statement, but thank you for holding
this hearing. I am very interested in what kind of safeguards
we may have, because what happens in one State is very prone to
happen in other States. So thank you.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you. And with that, I will yield 5
minutes to my colleague, Mr. Rehberg, and take Mr. Larsen's
words about letting us come on the Appropriations Committee and
help out there.
Mr. Rehberg. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really, truly
appreciate the opportunity to sit at the dais, and for the rest
of the committee, as well. When I left this committee in 2005,
I had built so much seniority I was almost sitting where Mr.
Tester is right this minute. And I would love to have you join
my committee, Rick. That would be great.
Right now, my sister-in-law is visiting. She is, of course,
from your home district. She is a Tea Partier. Do you want me
to keep her? So you make your choice. Do you want me to keep my
sister-in-law in Billings, or let you join my----
Mr. Larsen. I love all my constituents.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Rehberg. Good answer. I also want to welcome my
colleague, Jon Tester, who accepted my invitation to join us
here today from the lower chamber. And--that is actually an
inside joke in Montana, because he was a senator in Montana and
I was the representative, and we finally surveyed the floor and
found out that, in fact, the senate was, what, about a quarter
of an inch lower than the house. And so we always referred to
the senate as the lower chamber in Montana.
I look forward to working with Senators Tester and Baucus,
and the two agencies and companies represented on the panel to
accomplish two critical things today. First, we need to figure
out what went wrong, so we can determine what can be done to
prevent it from happening again. And, second, I want to be
absolutely certain that we are doing everything that can be
done to mitigate the environmental heath and economic impact
from this spill.
For many, it is just another news story about an oil spill.
But for Montanans, this is about our home. Water and rivers
play a big role in the lives of many Montanans. For the Maclean
family in the famous movie, ``A River Runs Through It,'' it was
the Big Blackfoot River. For me and my family, it is the
Yellowstone River.
I grew up in Billings, just a few miles from the river
banks of the Yellowstone. As a boy, I swam and fished that
river. I spent time with my family and friends floating down it
in inner tubes, and barbecuing on its banks. You could say
that, like thousands of other Montana families, the Yellowstone
is our family river. So this oil spill is a pretty big deal for
us. We have questions, and we deserve answers.
As Montana's congressman, I fly into Billings just about
every week. I fly over the Yellowstone River. But I also fly
over the oil refinery that provides good--many good jobs for
our community. Just like the river is a part of Montana's
culture, so is the energy industry. Montana is a warehouse of
energy options. We have got it all: wind, solar, geothermal,
biomass, oil, coal, gas, biofuels. This energy options helps us
provide the energy this country needs, and to end our energy
addiction on oil from foreign countries. It also provides good-
paying jobs.
While there might be some people out there who think we
should develop our resources without any regard for the
environment, that is not me. And there are others who think we
should stop all human impact on the environment whatsoever.
That is not me, either. Neither of these options works for
Montana.
Montanans demand a third option, a way to utilize our
natural resources, while doing everything we can to protect our
environment. It is a reasonable and responsible expectation.
The United States is leading the way in providing clean,
effective energy. We are not perfect, but when there is a spill
or a mistake, you won't find a more scrutinized response
anywhere in the world.
This is one of the reasons domestic energy production is
such a good idea. Our standard and expectations are so much
higher than countries that we import oil from. A kilowatt hour
of energy produced in the United States on balance is going to
be cleaner and safer than a kilowatt hour of energy we import.
In Montana, one of the most valuable resources is nature,
itself.
Montanans get it. We hunt, we hike, we don't just visit the
outdoors, we live there. That is why I have always said
Montanans are excellent stewards of the land, and that we don't
need Federal bureaucrats telling us how to manage our lands and
wildlife. This spill was a failure that did not live up to our
standards. And I want to know why. I want to know what is being
done, and what more needs to be done to prevent it from
happening again.
It is because energy is such an important part of our
economy that it is so important to acknowledge our mistakes, so
that we can learn from them.
I appreciate everyone for being here today. I look forward
to hearing your testimony, and asking some questions. I hope I
ask some tough questions. But that is only because it is so
important for Montana. And whether you are a part of the energy
industry or an environmental steward, you are a big part of our
Montana family.
Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much for having this
hearing today. It means a lot to me that you would care as much
about Montana as we care about Montana. And again, Mr. Tester,
welcome to testify, as well. Thank you.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much, Mr. Rehberg. And with
that, Senator----
Ms. Brown. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Shuster. Oh, 1 second.
Ms. Brown. Yes. I would like unanimous consent to include
in the hearing record a statement by the Pipeline Safety Trust.
[No response.]
Mr. Shuster. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
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Mr. Shuster. And with that, Senator, proceed, please.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JON TESTER, A UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF MONTANA
Senator Tester. Well, thank you, Chairman Shuster. I very
much appreciate the invitation. Congressman Brown, thank you
for Monday's invitation to this hearing to speak on behalf of
Montana and the recent oil spill in the Yellowstone River.
Congressman Rehberg, it is good to see you. Thank you for
your follow-up invitation request yesterday, albeit through the
Great Falls Tribune.
I agree on the importance of working together on this
critical issue. I am pleased to see people are being reasonable
on this issue. We could stand to have a little more working
together and being reasonable on other important issues.
I appreciate this committee's serious consideration and
work to make America's infrastructure safer and more secure.
You know, Ms. Alexis Bonogofsky was supposed to be here today
from Montana. I understand she couldn't make it because of
health concerns, and that is too bad. Because, like Ms.
Bonogofsky, I make a living in production agriculture. My wife,
Sharla, and I still farm the land homesteaded by my
grandparents 100 years ago. In fact, just last weekend I was
home plowing down peas and stacking hay. I am the only Member
of Congress who can say that.
My livelihood is a farmer, and my bottom line depends upon
clean water and healthy land. If either of those are
compromised, Montana's farmers and ranchers cannot produce the
high-quality feed, food, and fiber that we are so very famous
for.
Of course, it is not just agriculture. Many refinery jobs
in Montana are connected with the Silvertip pipeline. And when
incidents like this happen, those jobs are put in jeopardy.
I would like to thank Exxon for responding so quickly to my
request, to make sure that there would not be any layoffs while
this pipeline is shut down.
As chairman of the Congressional Sportsmen's Caucus, I also
know that the land, the rivers, the lakes where we hunt, fish,
hike, boat, and play make Montana the last best place.
Montana's tourism and recreation industry bring in about $3.4
billion to our State. It is Montana's second-largest industry,
behind agriculture.
So, as a farmer and as a sportsman, I have consistently
questioned the safety of our current and proposed pipelines in
Montana. In fact, when TransCanada had plans to lower safety
standards for sections of the proposed Keystone XL pipeline
through rural Montana, I put my foot down. They wanted to run
thinner pipe in Montana and across rural America, and a waiver
to run higher oil pressure. I said, ``No way,'' and they
changed their plans.
My message then and my message now is that there is no
cutting corners in rural America. When I commented about the
proposed Keystone pipeline to Secretary Clinton, I urged her to
assure that all safety precautions were taken when permitting
and building it. I also hinged my support on the fact that
safety must come first, and that property rights in rural
American must be respected and treated fairly in all
transactions.
Soon after the Yellowstone River spill on July 1st, I
called upon Exxon to pay for the full cost of recovery of this
cleanup. Taxpayers shouldn't have to pay one dime, in the end.
Exxon reported about $11 billion in profit in the first quarter
this year alone, and Montana taxpayers have already paid their
fair share.
I will continue to hold Exxon accountable through all
avenues, including legislation. When I found out about a
loophole in the Clean Water Act that lets companies like BP and
Exxon off the hook, I proposed a bill to fix it. My bill
requires companies that spill oil to pay whichever fine is
greater, whether the fine is based on the number of barrels
spilled, or the duration of the spill. We have real
consequences for polluters that harm jobs and our economy.
And finally, we expect and deserve full cooperation,
accountability, and transparency from America's biggest and
most profitable corporations in the wake of disasters like
this. Exxon has been ambitious in efforts to keep us informed,
and to respond to the needs of the communities affected by this
spill. That is a very good thing.
But I have been frustrated by the fact that Exxon hasn't
always been accurate. We have heard mixed messages about how
long it took to shut the pipeline down when the spill happened.
We have heard different stories about how far downstream the
oil has traveled. We have heard conflicting reports about how
deep the pipeline was buried.
And in this situation, Exxon was tasked with regulating
itself; regulators were not on the job. And now we are paying a
price for it. Does that sound familiar? Wall Street had no
regulators, either, and it led to the collapse of our Nation's
economy 3 years ago.
There are always things we can do to streamline and to
adjust regulation to make sure that they are still protecting
consumers and the public without strangling small business. But
without regulations, we will see more economic meltdowns and
oil spills and corporate takeovers that hurt small business.
Folks who say that we are over-regulated in this country are
speaking on behalf of Wall Street and big oil. I look these
folks in the eye and say, ``You are wrong.''
Here we are, nearly 2 weeks after the spill, and we still
haven't seen the spill response plan. Government regulators
haven't given us the plan. Exxon hasn't given us the plan. I,
along with this committee, have asked for a plan.
Furthermore, Exxon's cleanup plan was returned to them by
the EPA, because it was incomplete. I must ask this committee,
I must ask Exxon, and I must ask the Administration, what good
does a spill response plan do, if no one can access it to
actually respond? How do we validate that these companies are
well-prepared, if we are being stonewalled on getting the
information?
Are there other discrepancies which have yet to be
explained? Why did Exxon close the valves and then reopen them,
only to close them again? Why did Exxon cut the pipeline bed
instead of bore it, when boring would have been safer?
I hope we will get clear answers to these questions. There
are more than 13,000 miles of pipelines in Montana. This time
it was the Billings area. But there are dozens of other
communities that could easily face the same or worse conditions
without smarter strategies for pipeline safety. We must fully
recover and uncover exactly what happened before, during, and
after this spill for the sake of the folks that were impacted
by this spill up and down the Yellowstone River. And as we do,
it is just as important that we strive to build a culture more
committed to safety, transparency, and full accountability
among everyone involved.
Unfortunately, not everyone is committed to those values.
Yesterday, Senator Rockefeller tried to pass the Senate's
pipeline safety bill, and I hope it can happen today. We cannot
be in the business of saying ``no'' to safety transparency and
accountability. We are in the business of making those values
work for us, for the sake of our health, our safety, our
economy, and more importantly, for our kids and grandkids.
We are not out of the woods yet. But this hearing is a good
sign that folks are willing to work together to make sure
taxpayers are protected, to make sure that jobs are not lost at
the local refinery when supply is disrupted, to make sure that
the Yellowstone River and that the land that surrounds it are
returned back to the way God intended it, to make sure drinking
water downstream is clean and safe, and to protect our fish and
wildlife.
Looking forward, we need to make sure that all pipelines
and proposals for pipelines need to put a premium on safety, to
take every precaution to minimize risk. Make no mistake. We are
all for jobs. And I am not for--I am all for responsible energy
development using all of our Nation's resources. But above all,
we must do it safely.
I want to thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to
the committee. Thank you again, Congresswoman Brown, for
inviting me to the committee to speak on this important
subject. Thank you.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Senator. We appreciate your
testimony. And, again, we will do our due diligence over here,
and get to the bottom of this. So thank you very much.
Appreciate it.
Go ahead, Ms. Brown.
Ms. Brown. Senator? Senator? I also want to thank you for
coming over. It is very good to see someone come over from the
other body. And I am very excited that you all are close to
passing a bill on pipeline safety, and sending it over to the
House. Usually it is the other way around, and we send our
bills, and it just kind of hangs over there for 2 or 3 years.
But, seriously, thank you very much.
Senator Tester. Well----
Ms. Brown. Looking forward to you all sending bills over.
We are kind of stalemate over here a little bit in the House
right now.
Senator Tester. Thank you. As you guys know all too well,
and as we know in the Senate, it is never done until it is
done. But hopefully, this pipeline safety bill by Senator
Rockefeller will be done, and you guys can deal with it in a
way that I know will be appropriate. Thank you.
Ms. Brown. Thank you.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much. With that, we invite Ms.
Quarterman, the administrator, to take her place.
And again, we changed this up a little bit. We are going to
have Ms. Quarterman testify, and we will ask questions, and
then we will get the--I guess it will be the third panel.
So, whenever you are ready, Ms. Quarterman, you can
proceed. Welcome back for, what, about your 15th visit in the
last 2, 2\1/2\ years?
Ms. Quarterman. Good morning. Thank you for giving me the
record in the number of hearings.
Mr. Shuster. I think it is the record.
Ms. Quarterman. Probably for everybody at the department.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE CYNTHIA L. QUARTERMAN,
ADMINISTRATOR, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Ms. Quarterman. Chairman Shuster, Ranking Member Brown, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration's response to and investigation of the
July 1, 2011, ExxonMobil Pipeline Company oil spill in Laurel,
Montana.
Safety is the number one priority of Secretary LaHood,
myself, and the employees of PHMSA. We are all strongly
committed to reducing safety risks to the public and
environment. More than two-and-a-half million miles of
pipelines deliver energy to homes and businesses across
America. And of those, PHMSA oversees 174,000 miles of
hazardous liquids pipelines.
Despite recent improvements in pipeline safety, I am very
troubled by this oil spill, and its significant impact on the
surrounding communities. Let me join with the chair and the
ranking member in sending also my regrets to those families who
are affected, the communities in Montana.
I assure you that PHMSA is vigorously investigating this
incident, and will continue to do so. PHMSA personnel were on
the scene and directly engaged within 12 hours of notification
of the spill.
On July 5th, PHMSA issued a corrective action order
requiring ExxonMobil to directionally drill the Yellowstone
River crossing, and assess the risk of other major Silvertip
pipeline water crossings. Due to the high river flow, the
ruptured pipe is currently inaccessible for further
examination. However, I can assure you that once the failed
pipe becomes accessible, PHMSA will complete this investigation
as soon as possible.
Before the incident occurred, PHMSA and the City of Laurel
Public Works Department jointly reviewed rising river water and
river flow and erosion near the Yellowstone River crossing. We
were concerned with the risks to the Silvertip pipeline. In
response to our request, ExxonMobil performed a depth of cover
survey that confirmed that at least 5 feet of cover was over
the pipeline in the riverbed.
Subsequently, ExxonMobil indicated to us that the south
shore of the crossing, which was a cause of erosion concern,
had averaged over 12 feet of cover over the pipeline.
Historically, PHMSA has conducted routine inspections of
the Silvertip pipeline for many years. As recently as July of
2009, the agency conducted a standard inspection of the
pipeline. We issued three enforcement actions as a result of
this inspection. All of those were unrelated to the river
crossing that failed.
From June 6th to June 10, 2011, PHMSA personnel performed
an integrity management field inspection on the Silvertip
pipeline. At that time, no regulatory violations were found,
with respect to the integrity assessment.
Mr. Chairman, I assure you that PHMSA will remain vigilant
in ensuring the safety, reliability, and integrity of all
pipelines under its jurisdiction. We will also ensure that the
Silvertip pipeline is free of safety and environmental risks
before ExxonMobil is granted permission to restart this line.
PHMSA will investigate this incident fully, to ensure that the
line is operated safely, that the public is protected, and that
the violations of the Federal pipeline safety regulations are
swiftly addressed.
Thank you, and I am happy to respond to any questions you
may have.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much. And I am going to start
off yielding my time to Mr. Rehberg, if he has some opening
questions.
Mr. Rehberg. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Ms.
Quarterman, thank you for joining us today. Could you explain
to me just exactly what the investigation process is going to
be? And will you, from that investigation, be able to tell us
just the exact cause of the break, itself?
Ms. Quarterman. That is the purpose of the investigation.
Once the pipeline becomes accessible--at this point the flood
waters are still too high to remove it--we will review the
pipeline break to determine what the cause was.
Mr. Rehberg. So the process is you bring the pipe up. You
cut it, you bring it up, you inspect it.
Ms. Quarterman. Correct.
Mr. Rehberg. At the same time the permitting process is
going on for the replacement, so that they can possibly get
that pipeline up and running as soon as possible, so it
doesn't, on the other end, affect our economy and such?
Ms. Quarterman. That is up to ExxonMobil, in terms of the
permitting for the new pipeline, how they want to stage that.
We have asked Exxon to do a side scan of the area sonar, to
get a picture of what is happening at the bottom.
Mr. Rehberg. OK. Can you give us an indication of what kind
of timeframe, then, the investigation will take, once the river
recedes and you have the ability to bring the pipeline up?
Ms. Quarterman. I think it will take several months,
probably. And in terms of getting the pipeline up, that too may
take weeks, if not months, before we can----
Mr. Rehberg. Are you the one, then, that would be
responsible for working with Exxon to make a determination just
exactly how much was spilled into the river? You know, we hear
conflicting reports, although--and we seem to go back and forth
between barrels and gallons, and barrels and gallons. Clearly,
you know, whatever looks worst gets reported.
But ultimately, will you be able to make a determination,
getting the facts of just exactly how much was spilled into the
river?
Ms. Quarterman. We hope to be able to make that
determination once we review all the data that Exxon will
provide. We have visited the Houston control room. So once we
see what the pipeline looks like, we can determine pretty well
how much oil should have been spilled, given the flow during
that day.
Mr. Rehberg. To your knowledge, was there any outstanding
violations of the rules and regulations and laws, as you
enforce, at the time of the--I know there was concern, and
there were other violations that didn't have anything to do
with the break, itself. But, to your knowledge, was there any
outstanding violations that could have caused this----
Ms. Quarterman. Well, that will be the subject of the
ongoing investigation.
Mr. Rehberg. Well, it would seem fairly obvious, as to
whether there is a violation that is sitting there that had not
been addressed. I am not talking about something that you might
find that violates a rule or a regulation as you are doing the
inspection. I am suggesting, up until that point, is there any
violation that was pending----
Ms. Quarterman. Up until that point in time, I don't
believe there were any violations that were pending.
Mr. Rehberg. OK.
Ms. Quarterman. But----
Mr. Rehberg. Could you explain? What is the point of the
directional drilling immediately? Was that for the purposes of
determining where the stream bed is, or--I just don't
understand why.
Ms. Quarterman. We ordered them to do a horizontal
directional drill, which would make the pipeline go at a much
lower--a depth much below the riverbed, as opposed to being--in
this case, the pipeline was in what we call an open cut
situation. They cut the riverbed open, stopped----
Mr. Rehberg. But I thought the pipeline was shut off. What
is the purpose of the directional drill, if the valve on one
end is shut off and the valve on the other end is shut off?
Why----
Ms. Quarterman. Oh, the directional drill is for the new
pipeline, if they were to put one in. It would have to be
horizontally directionally drilled underneath the riverbed at a
much lower place than it was, initially.
Mr. Rehberg. Does that make the valves further away from
the river, so that there is an additional issue of whether it
can be shut off as fast as is necessary?
Ms. Quarterman. It will have no effect on the valves,
unless Exxon has a plan that we haven't seen that we would have
to approve to change the location of the valves. I know of no
reason why the location of the valves would need to change at
this point in time.
Mr. Rehberg. All right. OK. No further questions. Thank
you.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, and I yield to the ranking member
for 5 minutes for questions.
Ms. Brown. Thank you. Ms. Quarterman, obviously, DOT, city
of Laurel, had some concerns. And, according to the staff DOT,
inspectors warned ExxonMobil several times that the heavy
flooding in the river could have a significant impact on the
pipelines. Why, given the fact that there have been historical
flooding in the past, why were the inspectors concerned? And if
they warned Exxon several times, I mean, why was the problem
not dealt with upfront?
Ms. Quarterman. I think the original concern was associated
with the south river bank of the crossing, where there was a
concern that there was erosion there. But the City of Laurel
Public Works approached us. I think they had been trying to
figure out who is the regulatory authority here. They had
contacted FEMA and the Corps of Engineers, and eventually
discovered PHMSA. And when they contacted us, we went with them
to Exxon and said, ``You need to take a look at this and do a
depth of cover survey,'' which had not been done at that point
to determine the depth of the pipeline.
We were concerned, not just with this particular pipeline,
but with all the pipelines that were in flooded areas
throughout the United States, and in June had notified
operators on a regional basis, ``You need to be paying close
attention to your pipelines, because of the floods.''
Ms. Brown. Well, the Silvertip pipeline was built between
1949 and 1954. But the section closest to the failure was built
in 1991.
Ms. Quarterman. Correct. Correct.
Ms. Brown. I guess I don't understand. It was a concern
that the coverage wasn't enough. It wasn't proper.
Ms. Quarterman. Well, whenever there is flooding and
pipelines are nearby, it is incumbent upon the operators of
those pipelines to keep vigilant about the amount of cover that
is above their pipeline. They need to be monitoring it on a
regular basis. Our inspector, in fact, went out on a daily
basis and was monitoring this line because of the concerns that
had been raised.
Ms. Brown. Were you working with ExxonMobil? I mean were
you telling them--I saw that you verbally told them twice that
you were concerned.
Ms. Quarterman. Yes, we did.
Ms. Brown. And what was their response?
Ms. Quarterman. They gave us a depth of cover survey. They
performed the depth of cover survey, which showed us that there
were at least 5 feet of cover over the pipeline and the
riverbed--this is as of December of 2010--and that there was,
on average, I believe, 12 feet of cover on the south side of
the crossing.
But let me say it is the operator's responsibility to weigh
and assess the risks associated with its pipeline. We have--in
terms of construction requirements, a pipeline is required, at
a minimum, to have 4 feet of cover in a riverbed of this size,
which is more than 100 feet wide. But there are additional
requirements. When you design a pipeline, you have to be sure
that it is capable of dealing with stresses and external loads.
And this particular pipeline happened to be in an area that
could affect a high-consequence area, which means the integrity
management rules were implicated. Pursuant to those rules, an
operator is required, on a continual basis, to ensure that its
pipeline is meeting all local environmental requirements. And
by that, we include climatic, specifically.
So, the operator has an ongoing obligation to continually
reassess and assess the risks associated with its pipeline,
especially in conditions like that. That is why we kept saying
to them, ``You need to check this pipeline out and watch it.''
Ms. Brown. I guess the last question or concern--the
Senator raised the--who is responsible for the cleanup plan? Is
the plan on file? Who is responsible for implementing that? I
mean, do we have the oversight? How does it work?
And I mean it is the same thing that happened 1 year ago.
Ms. Quarterman. The oil spill response plan is filed with
PHMSA, and we do have Senator Tester's request. I signed a
letter to him yesterday, telling him that we will be getting
him a copy of that plan.
We do have an obligation to go through it and redact
certain personal information, and also certain security
information that TSA has asked us to not include for public
disclosure.
However, the folks who are at the scene--obviously, the
Environmental Protection Agency leads these kinds of cleanups--
they have a copy of the report, as does the Coast Guard. So the
response team has the oil spill response plan. It is not yet
publicly available, simply because we haven't gone through the
process of redacting whatever needs to be redacted. But it
should be available shortly.
Ms. Brown. Well----
Mr. Shuster. The gentlelady's time is expired.
Ms. Brown. OK.
Mr. Shuster. We will come back again if you have more
questions.
Ms. Brown. Yes.
Mr. Shuster. A question. First, I wanted to ask--Senator
Tester brought up that--why ExxonMobil shut off the pipeline
and turned it back on. My understanding--and I want to see if
it concurs with you, if you think it is reasonable--they shut
it off, they turned it back on to isolate and figure out
exactly where the leak was. Senator Tester brought that up,
that he had a question about that. Does that sound reasonable
to you, for them to shut it off, turn it back on, to try to
isolate and find where the leak is coming from?
Ms. Quarterman. Well, I--that is the subject of our
investigation, obviously.
They shut off a valve on the pipeline. The pipeline,
according to our timeline, at 10:04 there was a low-pressure
alarm. At 10:41--not 10:04, sorry, 10:40 p.m. Mountain Time. At
10:41, the Edgar Station went down, and the ExxonMobil control
center operation knew that there was a problem. At 10:47 the
control room operator shut down the pump station that would be
pumping crude through the line. At 10:57 the control room
closed the Laurel Station valve, which was north of the river.
Now, this is not the valve that would stop crude oil from
flowing into the river.
At 10:57 they closed the valve--I just said that. At 11:36
they ultimately closed the river valve that is south of the
river. Now, I understand that there may have been some opening
and closing of that northern valve. I don't know why. That will
be the subject of our investigation.
Mr. Shuster. All right. Thank you. And I know that in
October you started to actively monitor the pipeline. And, of
course, the failure that occurred last month. Those additional
warnings, have you--or those additional monitorings, have you
had a chance to go back and review your monitoring and try to
figure out what you could have done differently at PHMSA, or
you haven't had an opportunity to really do an after-action
report?
Ms. Quarterman. We haven't done an after-action report at
this time. We are still getting documents, not only internally,
but also from ExxonMobil, which will be a part of our review of
the investigation.
Mr. Shuster. And, additionally, I guess a month before the
pipeline failed, you did a review and discovered there was no
violation of Federal regulations, but you did discover an
anomaly in the pipeline.
Ms. Quarterman. That is correct.
Mr. Shuster. Can you talk about that anomaly? What----
Ms. Quarterman. Yes. Because of all the sensitivity
associated with this pipeline, I believe the inspectors wanted
to do an extra effort. So, in June of this year, they went to
ExxonMobil to look at the Silvertip pipeline in-line inspection
run. There had been two in-line inspections done in 2004, and
another in 2009.
With respect to the 2009 run, they looked at the entire run
of the river crossing, and looked at the raw data to verify
whether they agreed with the conclusions that were drawn there.
They did find one anomaly that was below the regulatory cut-off
for taking an action.
Obviously, once the pipeline is removed from the river, we
will take a close look----
Mr. Shuster. Yes.
Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. To see if anything--if that
anomaly is in place, as it was then, or if it contributed to
this in any way.
Mr. Shuster. All right. And I know additionally for several
years you--PHMSA--has been concerned about scouring and erosion
occurring in the Silvertip pipeline area of the Yellowstone
River. Are there other examples where scouring erosions
occurred, where maybe fast-moving debris has caused the damage
to the pipeline anywhere in the country that you have seen this
happen before?
Ms. Quarterman. This has happened before in the country in
the past. I believe there was a San Jacinto pipeline incident
in the 1990s, where eight pipelines burst in the Texas area on
the flood plain there. It is not a usual occurrence, but it is
something--obviously, when a flood occurs--that you have to be
cognizant of and vigilant about.
Mr. Shuster. Right, OK. Thank you. And I will yield to Mr.
Larsen. You have 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Larsen. Ms. Quarterman, the accessibility of the
pipeline, you say we have to wait until the river comes down.
Do we have a timeline on that? Are we looking August/September?
Or--yes, August/September timeframe?
Ms. Quarterman. I--this is a guess on my part----
Mr. Larsen. Yes, right.
Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. But based on what I have
heard, it would suggest August----
Mr. Larsen. OK.
Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. Is more likely than September.
Mr. Larsen. So it is going to be at least in the next
month, perhaps, before you can actually get into the river. And
the process for getting to the pipeline? Your--the agency's
process to actually get physically to the pipeline, once the
river is low enough?
Ms. Quarterman. Exxon will be responsible for exposing the
pipeline, and we will be there on site to take custody of it,
once it comes from the water into our examiner----
Mr. Larsen. And then will you remove all the pipeline just
within the riverbanks, or between the valves, do you know?
Ms. Quarterman. At this time I think it is too soon to say.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. And this is a--this was in a high-
consequence area, as defined by the law. Is that right?
Ms. Quarterman. By the regulation, yes.
Mr. Larsen. By regulation. And the requirements for testing
in an HCA for liquid fuel, can you remind us of that?
Ms. Quarterman. Once every 5 years.
Mr. Larsen. Once every 5 years. With a pig?
Ms. Quarterman. That is what was done in this instance.
That is the preferred, shall we say?
Mr. Larsen. Yes, sure. OK. And so--and that was last done
in 2009?
Ms. Quarterman. Correct.
Mr. Larsen. For this. And any visual inspection on the
pipeline--I don't know about--is this above ground when it is
not to the river, or is this all underground?
Ms. Quarterman. It is all underground, as far as I know.
Mr. Larsen. Yes, OK. So it wouldn't be visual. All right.
You said that there was no sign of integrity problems--
there were three violations, but none of those violations were
related to, as far as you can tell, to this particular problem.
Can you tell us why that is the case? Can you assure us that is
the case?
Ms. Quarterman. I am happy to give you a copy of our
findings from those particular inspections. I don't have a
catalog right now of everything that--what our findings were.
But I know they didn't relate to this particular river
crossing.
Mr. Larsen. If you could, follow up with us so that we
can----
Ms. Quarterman. Absolutely.
Mr. Larsen [continuing]. Be assured that that is the case
as well, as we look into this. I appreciate it.
So, where does NTSB fit into the investigation? Are they
doing their own separate investigation?
Ms. Quarterman. No, they are not doing an investigation.
The NTSB probably investigates a very small percentage of the
number of pipeline incidents that occur in the country. They
usually have to be of a certain size. They don't have as many
people as we do, who have expertise in this. And I think they
are pretty busy right now, investigating some of the earlier
incidents----
Mr. Larsen. OK.
Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. Around the country.
Mr. Larsen. I know they were involved with Olympic pipeline
that exploded in my district----
Ms. Quarterman. Yes.
Mr. Larsen [continuing]. About a decade ago. The process
that you all have right now is strictly investigation. And then
what are your options when your investigation is done?
Generally, what are your options?
Ms. Quarterman. We are investigating one for cause, but
also to determine whether there are any violations of the
pipeline safety regulations. At that point, we have brought
authority to issue all sorts of penalties, civil penalties,
compliance orders, violations, amendments to the plans. We will
be looking, obviously, at whatever needs to be done, based on
our findings.
Mr. Larsen. And strictly on the civil side?
Ms. Quarterman. If we see a potential criminal violation,
we would refer that.
Mr. Larsen. Yes, OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, appreciate
it.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you. And now Mr. Hanna from New York,
recognized for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Hanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You said that your
requirements for depth of these pipelines is roughly 4 feet?
Ms. Quarterman. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Hanna. And you said that the--in case I am mistaken--
that the report that was given to you was--showed that the
pipeline was 12 feet deep, is that right?
Ms. Quarterman. The report covered a span, both underneath
and to the sides of the crossing. The riverbed requirement is,
at a minimum, 4 feet for more than 100 feet across.
Mr. Hanna. Right.
Ms. Quarterman. And it was at least 5 feet. The 12 feet
comes in on the----
Mr. Hanna. Banks.
Ms. Quarterman. The banks of the river, yes. There was some
concern by the Public Works. I think a lot of their concern was
focused, really, on the south bank of the riverbed when we went
out there initially.
And so, some time earlier this year we got a request from
them to further follow up with ExxonMobil, and we asked them,
``What is the covering on that south bank?'' And they said, on
average, 12 feet.
Mr. Hanna. So--but to the best of your knowledge, it was
over 4 feet through the riverbed?
Ms. Quarterman. To the best of my knowledge. As of December
of 2010----
Mr. Hanna. And your goal, through horizontal drilling, is
to make it deeper than that, I take it?
Ms. Quarterman. Correct.
Mr. Hanna. And what are you proposing?
Ms. Quarterman. We haven't set a particular number of feet.
This is a process that, you know, Exxon will have to come with
us--come to us with a proposal.
Mr. Hanna. You have no idea yet whether it was a leak
caused by a lack of cathodic protection, or if it was a leak
that was a function of scouring, or if it was just mislaid----
Ms. Quarterman. Correct.
Mr. Hanna [continuing]. And rubbed against stones, or
something like that.
Ms. Quarterman. Correct.
Mr. Hanna. Are these lines cathodically protected?
Ms. Quarterman. They are.
Mr. Hanna. OK. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. Hanna. Mrs. Napolitano,
recognized for 5 minutes for questions.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Quarterman,
thank you for being here today. It is good to see you.
Ms. Quarterman. You too.
Mrs. Napolitano. According to your staff, the DOT
inspectors verbally warned ExxonMobil several times that heavy
flooding in the river would have a significant impact on the
pipeline. Question is: Why?
And, given the facts there have been historic flooding at
least twice--I believe it was in--I don't have the correct
years, I think it was 1996 or 1997, or the heavy flood years--
why--given the fact there is this historic flooding in the
past, nothing new in that area, why were the inspectors
concerned?
Ms. Quarterman. They wanted to be sure that Exxon had taken
all steps necessary--ExxonMobil had taken all the steps
necessary--to ensure that, given the high level of flooding,
there would not be a problem with this pipeline.
Mrs. Napolitano. OK. But I guess maybe I am trying to reach
why it--do they inspect it regularly? By law they have to
inspect the area--let's see. Each--Federal regs require each
operator, at intervals not exceeding 3 weeks, to at least
inspect 26 times each calendar year the surface conditions on
or adjacent to each pipeline right away.
Was there something that they saw that they--caused them
concern and asked Exxon to ensure that they inspected?
Ms. Quarterman. I think the source of their initial concern
was the call from the City of Laurel Public Works, who----
Mrs. Napolitano. OK.
Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. Were concerned about the south
crossing, the south bank of the river. Then, the flood waters
began to rage throughout the United States, and that added to
their concern, not only on this pipeline but on other pipelines
that were affected, to make sure that the operators were
actually paying attention, and----
Mrs. Napolitano. OK. Does PHMSA have copies of the--
ExxonMobil's integrity management plan and oil spill response
plan? Do you keep those on file? And when was the last time
these were reviewed?
Ms. Quarterman. We do not have a copy of the integrity
management plan. That is something that the inspectors view
when they go out to perform an inspection. We do have on file a
copy of the oil spill response plan. That is the document that
Senator Tester referred to earlier, and which we are readying
to produce to a number of people who have requested it.
Mrs. Napolitano. Mr. Chair, I don't know whether that is
proper to ask her, for us to be able to see what response plan
there was, and what the date of that plan would have been. Was
it updated? Was it upgraded, based on the findings after the
floods? Were there reviews to ensure that the erosion had not
been so bad that it was a cause of concern?
Ms. Quarterman. I am happy to supply you with a copy of
that. My recollection is that it was updated at the end of
2010, but perhaps the witness from ExxonMobil would be better
to answer the exact date.
Mrs. Napolitano. OK. Well, you know, I am going back to if
the river was as swift and mobile and USGS indicates, then
ExxonMobil should have been there annually, verifying the depth
of cover over the pipeline, due to the historical area. You can
do all the internal diagnosis and diagnostics. But if the
overburdened cover was thinning, then you are setting yourself
up for disaster, which may have been what happened here.
The DOT and the city of Laurel was clearly concerned about
the river score and bank erosion at Yellowstone River crossing
over the pipeline. In fact, DOT checked with ExxonMobil twice
on the depth of cover to confirm results December 1st, last
year, when the depth of cover survey was first completed, and
then again in June, to confirm the current depth of cover.
Was there a reason DOT kept checking back, besides the city
of Laurel being concerned?
Ms. Quarterman. Well, we were concerned, as well. And we
just wanted to make sure that they were paying attention.
Mrs. Napolitano. OK. And there is also talk about doing the
new laying of the pipe once--concurrent to the investigation.
Is this going to be bored? Is it going to be deeper? You talk
about lower, but you don't indicate how much lower.
Ms. Quarterman. In our corrective action order, we require
them to horizontally drill this pipeline beneath the riverbed.
We did not, the best of my recollection, set a depth number.
Exxon will be required to come in with a plan for us to
approve.
Mrs. Napolitano. Are there standards for the rivers that
have higher river flow than others for the amount of sediment
that is left, or, I mean taken away?
I am trying to figure out how much lower will that be,
enough to be able to allay some of the concerns the community
may have in the future about flooding? Or, I mean, about the
spills?
Ms. Quarterman. Yes. At this point I don't know how low it
will be. It could be as low as 20-some-odd feet below the
riverbed.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you. And Ms. Richardson, do you have
questions? We have no one left on our side, so go ahead.
Ms. Richardson. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms.
Quarterman, it is my understanding that committee staff has
requested information on the crude oil and other chemicals that
are transported in this Silvertip pipeline but have yet to
receive any response. What is the gravity of the rating of the
crude oil that was being transported in the pipeline at the
time of the rupture? What are the gravity ratings of other
crude oil, if any, are transported in that line? And will you
commit to providing to this committee the information
requested, including any materials, safety data sheets, or
shipping papers for the hearing record?
Ms. Quarterman. I am unaware of that request from the
committee. I do not know the gravity of the crude in that
pipeline. ExxonMobil, who will testify after, should be able to
provide that information for the record. We do not keep copies
of any shipping documents associated with, you know, the
movement of crude oil on pipelines.
Ms. Richardson. Would you be willing----
Mr. Shuster. Excuse me, just want to--we have that
information, and we can share it with you at another point. I
don't know if your side has access, but we have it, so----
Ms. Brown. Probably not.
Ms. Richardson. We don't have the information.
Mr. Shuster. We will get it to you.
Ms. Richardson. OK. My next question has to do with--also
last Friday, it is my understanding, on the Democratic side we
requested copies of all claim forms. Do you guys have those, as
well?
Mr. Shuster. I don't--repeat that again, please.
Ms. Richardson. It is my understanding we also requested
copies of all claim forms, including any forms dealing with
medical claims or reimbursement of expenses.
Mr. Shuster. We didn't request that, but I don't know if
you requested it--we didn't get it.
Ms. Richardson. OK. So, would you be able to assist us in
getting copies, or has your office determined the need to
request copies of all the claim forms, including any forms
dealing with medical claims and reimbursement of expenses? So
far we haven't received anything. Would you be able to assist
us in that effort?
Ms. Quarterman. That is not something that we collect. The
Environmental Protection Agency is the incident command leader
in this particular spill. They are the ones responding to the
spill and to claims. ExxonMobil, again, will probably have
copies of all those claims.
Ms. Richardson. OK. My last two questions--I have got about
3 minutes here--does the PHMSA have copies of ExxonMobil's--I
think Mrs. Napolitano asked this question--of the integrity
management plan, and you said no. And my question would be, is
it normal for you to have those?
Ms. Quarterman. No, it is not. It is something that is
intended to be a document that is kept alive, so continually
updated. And it is one that our inspectors review when they go
to visit and inspect an operator, and review it there for
accuracy.
Ms. Richardson. But it was not there, or not available at
the previous inspections?
Ms. Quarterman. As far as I know, it was there. I am sure
it was. There were no violations associated with not having
such a plan.
Ms. Richardson. And do you have any process in place, based
upon now these things that have happened, to consider, if it is
a living and breathing document, that you continue to get
updates throughout?
Ms. Quarterman. Well, we don't have the original plan. I
think it is an issue that we have been discussing internally,
how we can have more data associated with pipelines, and how we
might gather, store, protect that data.
Ms. Richardson. What is the reason why you wouldn't want to
have the information?
Ms. Quarterman. Certainly we would want to have as much
data as possible. It is not a question of want.
Ms. Richardson. OK. So are you officially requesting of
this committee that we would assist you in having that done?
Ms. Quarterman. I can't state a position on that at this
point without having it cleared throughout the Administration.
I would say that we are, as part of our reauthorization package
that was sent to the Hill in 2010, there was one initiative
that related to data and the need for data.
Ms. Richardson. OK. Could you forward that to the
committee? Because I don't recall seeing it. Yes.
Ms. Quarterman. Sure.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you. My last question. In your
opinion, should MobilExxon--ExxonMobil, excuse me--have
addressed the unique conditions of the flow of the Yellowstone
River in their design, construction, and maintenance of the
pipeline? And should that be--do you feel that that should be
addressed in their integrity management plan? And do you
believe that it should be annually verified, the depth of the
cover of the pipeline?
Ms. Quarterman. I believe that, yes, those things must be
considered. I mean it is the operator's obligation to consider
all the environmental aspects of where it is laying its
pipeline, including the location of a riverbed--river, the
historic flow levels, the expectations for floods. All that
should be considered in any design for any river crossing.
And in terms of depth of cover, you say once a year. I
would say as often as is necessary to ensure that that depth of
cover is sufficient.
Ms. Richardson. And are you aware if that was in the
current integrity management plan? And that is my last
question, I am sorry.
Ms. Quarterman. I don't know the answer to that question.
Ms. Richardson. Will you find out for us, and advise the
committee?
Ms. Quarterman. We don't have a copy of that on file. We
can try to ascertain that. Perhaps ExxonMobil can answer that
question, as well.
Ms. Richardson. Well, I would think, in light of what is
going on, you probably would want to know that as well, right?
Ms. Quarterman. Well, it will be part of our investigation,
obviously.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you. Yield back.
Mr. Shuster. Ms. Quarterman, thank you very much for being
here. I am confident we will see you again.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much, and you are----
Ms. Quarterman. Hopefully to reauthorize the pipeline
safety program.
Mr. Shuster. We are moving forward with that post-haste. So
thank you very much for being here today.
And I would like to invite Mr. Pruessing and Dr. Inkley to
come to the witness desk.
[Pause.]
Mr. Shuster. All right, again, thank you both, gentlemen,
for being here today. And, Dr. Inkley, we will start with you.
Dr. Inkley, as I said earlier, is a scientist from the
National Wildlife Federation. Thank you very much. And you can
proceed.
TESTIMONY OF DOUGLAS B. INKLEY, PH.D., SENIOR SCIENTIST,
CONSERVATION PROGRAMS, NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION; AND GARY
W. PRUESSING, PRESIDENT, EXXONMOBIL PIPELINE COMPANY
Mr. Inkley. Thank you, Chairman Shuster. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify this morning. I appreciate that you and
the ranking member and all of the committee members are here
today.
I am testifying in lieu of Ms. Alexis Bonogofsky, to whom
the invitation was originally extended. Her family farm, or
ranch, lies along the banks of the Yellowstone River, near the
site of the spill. Unfortunately, she had to be taken to an
emergency room earlier this week, where she was diagnosed with
acute hydrocarbon exposure, and is unable to be here today.
As we consider pipeline safety, it is important to keep
three facts in mind. The first of these is that the Yellowstone
River oil spill is America's third major oil spill in just 15
months. The second is that, in large spills, at best, only 10
to 15 percent of the total oil spilled is ever recovered. EPA
indicated yesterday that was only 1 to 5 percent in this spill.
And third, the effects of oil on the environment may not be
immediately obvious, but can last for years.
Crude oil from this pipeline is a serious threat to people
and wildlife. Drinking and irrigation water are at risk of
contamination. Relatively immobile wildlife, such as frogs and
salamanders, turtles, beavers, muskrats, and otters, they are
all in harm's way. Of greatest concern to me is the aquatic
food chain, including the many fish that have no place to seek
refuge. The endangered pallid sturgeon lives downstream from
the spill.
As I earlier noted, my colleague, Ms. Bonogofsky, fell ill
due to hydrocarbon exposure. But furthermore, her summer
pastures, which are critical for her livestock, are ruined by
the oil contamination, and she cannot allow her livestock to
feed in that.
The inadequacy of the response has been reported widely in
the press. Ms. Bonogofsky learned about the spill when she
discovered oil on her property, and then read about the
pipeline rupture in the local paper. She was never formally
notified. She had to discover it herself.
When she called the county health department, she was told
that the oil was ``just an irritant.'' Yet, in the Utah
Department of Health's response to a recent 33,000-gallon spill
near Salt Lake City, they had a long list of potential health
impacts, including lung, liver, and kidney damage, infertility,
and immune system suppression. Clearly, crude oil is far more
than ``just an irritant.''
When Ms. Bonogofsky was directed to State officials to
call--by State officials to call an ExxonMobil hotline,
initially they provided her with no information. They were
there just to take her information. A public relations person
from ExxonMobil would not tell her what chemicals were in the
oil, or if any had been added, and she still doesn't know.
Unfortunately, I am a veteran of previous oil spills,
including the Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster last year in
the Gulf of Mexico. Sadly, I believe that industry is using the
same play book to respond to this particular oil spill.
Industry assures everyone that operations were safe. Industry
responds slowly to the spill. Industry understates the size of
the spill.
Industry keeps the public in the dark. Governor Brian
Schweitzer pulled Montana out of the incident command center
because ``ExxonMobil was refusing to be transparent with the
public.''
And industry keeps the press out. Montana Governor
Schweitzer again stated, ``They have security guards that don't
let the press in.'' Same thing happened in the Gulf.
It is not surprising, though, that this is the industry
play book. There is a lot to hide. From 2000 to 2009, pipeline
accidents onshore accounted for more than 2,000 significant
incidents, and 161 fatalities in the United States. Since
January 2010, 2.3 million gallons of oil spilled, causing $46
million in damage to private property and to the environment.
Just weeks prior to the spill, this particular spill, a
Federal inspector assessed the pipeline to be in compliance
with Federal pipeline safety standards. So, clearly, industry
and the existing--the existing--pipeline safety standards are
failing to protect public health and the environment.
My written testimony contains a list of recommendations to
improve pipeline safety. These include, among others, requiring
incidents to be reported immediately to Federal and State
agencies, and to all people potentially affected. Require
accurate, independent assessment of spill size. Require long-
term monitoring of spills down river and in repairing zones,
and of impacts to fish and wildlife populations. Require
immediate public disclosure of the chemical composition of
spilled oil.
In closing, it is imperative that safety standards be
improved. Industry is now promoting its riskiest project yet:
nearly 20 times the capacity of the Silvertip pipeline, the
Keystone XL tar sands pipeline. Unfortunately, the House may
soon vote on a bill to fast-track the permitting of this new
pipeline. Instead, I believe that Congress should first focus
on enacting legislation to improve our Nation's pipeline safety
policies, not fast-track another pipeline.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to
testify.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Doctor. And now, Mr. Pruessing, who
is the president of ExxonMobil Pipeline Company.
Mr. Pruessing, please proceed.
Mr. Pruessing. Chairman Shuster, Ranking Member Brown,
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
discuss the pipeline incident that occurred on July 1st in the
Yellowstone River in Montana, and to update you on the progress
we have achieved to clean up the spill.
Before I begin, however, allow me to repeat our sincere
apologies to the people of Montana. We deeply regret that this
incident occurred, and are steadfastly committed to not only
complete the cleanup, but also to build the learnings from this
incident into our future operations.
This requires, first, that we understand exactly what
occurred. We do not yet know the precise cause of the apparent
breach in the Silvertip pipeline, and we will not likely know
until our investigation is complete.
We do know that the pipeline had met all regulatory
requirements, including a 2009 pipeline inspection and a
December 2010 depth of cover survey. Additionally, as recently
as last month, the United States Department of Transportation's
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, or
PHMSA, performed a field audit of the pipeline's integrity
management program.
And, of course, we do know the effects of the incident. The
pipeline lost pressure the night of July 1st. And within 7
minutes, our employees shut down the pumps. Shortly thereafter,
we began closing valves to isolate segments of the pipeline,
and minimize any release. We estimate that no more than 1,000
barrels of oil spilled.
We notified the national response center, and immediately
began implementing our emergency response plans, drawing upon
local resources at the ExxonMobil Billings Refinery, as well as
our experts across the country. A unified command center, led
by the Environmental Protection Agency, and involving almost
700 people now, directs the response.
This coordinated effort, combining the resources and
expertise of Government, industry, and others, is crucial to
effective cleanup and recovery. I speak on behalf of our entire
company in thanking the public servants at all levels of
Government, and the volunteers from nongovernmental
organizations contributing to this effort. This includes
professionals from PHMSA, the Environmental Protection Agency,
the United States Department of the Interior, the Montana
Department of Environmental Quality, Montana Fish, Wildlife,
and Parks, the Yellowstone County supervisors--or
commissioners, local response organizations, International Bird
Rescue, and many others.
As part of our cleanup strategy, we have divided the area
down river of the spill into four zones. In the first two
cleanup zones, covering a combined distance of about 19 miles,
we have deployed approximately 43,000 feet of boom, 260,000
absorbent pads, and several vacuum trucks, boats, and other
equipment to capture oil. Our priority is to ensure that the
cleanup is safe and effective, a task made more challenging by
the persistent high-water levels in the Yellowstone River. At
the same time, through the unified command, we continue to
conduct air and water quality monitoring of over 200 miles of
the river, as well as wildlife assessments and recovery
efforts. To date, EPA monitoring confirms there is no danger to
public health, and no reported water system impacts.
We have also brought in recognized experts to actively
monitor the impact on local wildlife. So far, a total of four
animals have received treatment: one garter snake, two--one
warbler, and two toads. In addition, International Bird Rescue
has identified several oiled birds, and they are assessing if
any require capture and cleaning. Monitoring and mitigating the
impact of the spill on wildlife will remain a priority of ours
throughout the cleanup.
The Silvertip pipeline plays an important role in supplying
energy to the Billings area and, therefore, helps sustain local
jobs and economic growth. We are committed to replace the
damaged pipe, using horizontal and directional drilling
techniques, with a new section that will lay approximately 30
feet below the riverbed, consistent with the PHMSA direction.
Of paramount concern to us is the impact on the local
communities. We established a community information line, and
have received more than 300 calls. A number of these calls are
claims related to property, agriculture, health, and we are
actively responding to more than 120 of those. We have also
sent 6 teams door to door to visit more than 150 residents in
the most impacted areas. It is our goal to respond to
individual concerns within 24 hours.
I am pleased to report that these outreach efforts have
mostly received a very positive response. In fact, more than
130 calls to the information line have been offers of help.
This outpouring of local volunteer support is immensely
helpful. It testifies to the resilience, industry, and
generosity of the people of Montana. We deeply appreciate their
understanding and support.
To repeat, ExxonMobil Pipeline Company takes full
responsibility for the incident and the cleanup. And we pledge
to satisfy all legitimate claims. But even then, our work will
not be done. We are equally committed to learn from this
incident, and to build those learnings into our future
operations. Thank you.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. Pruessing. And I will first go
to Mr. Rehberg for questions.
Mr. Rehberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Inkley, I was
listening to your testimony, and I missed the point. Were you
suggesting that there is water in--irrigation water violations
or damage now, or that you suspect there will be, or were you
talking about with a oil spill it happens, and it is something
we need to be cognizant of? I just missed that point, I am
sorry.
Mr. Inkley. The latter. With an oil spill of this
magnitude, we need to be cognizant that all of these natural
resources are at some risk. So the monitoring is appropriate to
be done intensely, and for a certain period of time.
Mr. Rehberg. OK. So I suspect that, at this point, there is
less likelihood of that occurring.
Mr. Inkley. At this time there is less likelihood of that
occurring. But the thing that concerns me is that the EPA has
said that there is no danger to public health, yet Ms.
Bonogofsky was diagnosed with hydrocarbon exposure, and we have
spread some 1,000 barrels of toxic chemicals across the
landscape.
Mr. Rehberg. Yes.
Mr. Inkley. It doesn't compute, for me, that there is no
risk or danger to public health. It seems to me that there very
much is a danger to public health, and we shouldn't----
Mr. Rehberg. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Inkley [continuing]. We shouldn't ignore that.
Mr. Rehberg. Mr. Chairman, for the record, I did have a
meeting, a conference call, that was public and the press was
invited, with CDC and the NIH. And they both said that there
was no health risk that they could verify at this time, as
well.
So, the evidence is starting to mount--that is not to
suggest that we don't want to continue to monitor, that there
aren't going to be problems. We want to be cognizant and
vigilant, to make sure what you are suggesting does not occur.
It is just so far, in hearing at least from the EPA and from
NIH and CDC to this point----
Mr. Shuster. Right.
Mr. Rehberg [continuing]. There is no----
Mr. Shuster. Right.
Mr. Rehberg [continuing]. No health risk at this time. You
had mentioned, then, Mr. Pruessing, in your testimony, drinking
water. How about irrigation? Because, of course, I have a lot
of friends along the river. They have pastures. They say that
the pastures are soiled, they cannot graze their cattle.
So, one, are you seeing any damage to irrigation water?
And, two, are your adjusters going to go in and remunerate for
the loss of use, in the particular case of somebody who is
trying to graze cattle, or whatever?
Mr. Pruessing. Well, first, through the unified command
there is sampling being done of the river water. That work was
initiated some time ago. The EPA has been the lead in that, and
they have already indicated to us that they have not found
anything in the water that would be a problem for irrigation.
So, actually, in one of the recent public meetings, I did hear
them say that it would be OK to use that.
That said, we are very anxious to respond to any claims
that people have, or any concerns they have. And we are
encouraging people to use the information line if they have
questions or concerns. And we want to respond to each one of
those on an individual basis.
To the extent that people cannot use their fields for feed,
or cannot use the water, we are going to respond to those and
provide that.
Mr. Rehberg. Does the EPA have a process where there is a
sign-off? Obviously, with the municipalities and the water
systems, you know, there is a turn-on date. But with
irrigation, is somebody out there signing something saying,
``Good to go, open your flood gate, or your head gate, go ahead
and irrigate''?
Mr. Pruessing. Certainly from our perspective, we are not
asking citizens to sign anything.
Mr. Rehberg. No. I mean some kind of a Governmental entity
that gives them the go-ahead after all the various assurances
and testing that EPA is doing.
Mr. Pruessing. Yes. The EPA is taking the lead in
communicating to the people of the community about the water.
But, again, as I know, and what I have heard them say, they are
not indicating there is any issue with the irrigation water.
Mr. Rehberg. OK. I had read somewhere that the EPA had
suggested a September 9th deadline for cleanup. Is that a hard
and fast rule? I mean is that even possible?
Mr. Pruessing. We have not put any end date on the cleanup.
We are committed----
Mr. Rehberg. But EPA?
Mr. Pruessing. I am not aware of any dates that the EPA has
set, as well. I do know that the EPA is in the leadership role,
but very integrated in the unified command. But we have said
many, many times that we are committed to do the cleanup until
it is finished, and we will be there as long as necessary.
Mr. Rehberg. Yes, I have seen the pictures of, you know,
where it has gone over the bank, it is in people's lawns. That
is the easy stuff to see, because you can see it when you fly
over or when you are walking.
But there is also some underbrush. What do you do? Are you
going to go in and mow? Do you have a chemical that eats it up?
How do you get--you know, think of a tumbleweed as an example,
with oil all over the tumbleweed. Now, it is a great, big bush
on the stream. How do you get in and clean up that tumbleweed,
so you know that everything is cleaned off?
Mr. Pruessing. You are correct that our early work has been
to get into the backwater areas where the river is not flowing
as quickly, to absorb any oil that may still be in that area.
As the river starts to recede, we will be able to access
additional areas to inspect, to make sure that there is not
damage there.
Again, the final decision on what is the proper cleanup
method so that we do not damage the environment, but also can
pick up the oil, is part of the unified command. And the EPA,
the State of Montana, and ExxonMobil will work together to make
sure that we have the right solution from an environmental
standpoint.
Mr. Rehberg. So you will stay until it is clean?
Mr. Pruessing. That is correct.
Mr. Rehberg. Thank you.
Mr. Shuster. With that, Ms. Brown, recognized for 5 minutes
for questions.
Ms. Brown. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to
say less than 2 weeks ago, people on this committee were trying
to wipe out EPA. I mean here today we understand the importance
of having EPA to monitor the system and someone to have
oversight.
Let me just first of all ask a question. They were trying
to wipe out EPA by cutting the funding. That is wiping it out.
I mean leaving something on the books, and not being able to
monitor this kind of situation is why we have EPA in the first
place. Do you know when EPA, Mr.--will you pronounce----
Mr. Pruessing. Pruessing.
Ms. Brown. Pruessing. Do you know when EPA started to
conduct their monitoring after the rupture?
Mr. Pruessing. Right after----
Ms. Brown. You know when they started? Because these
illnesses could be identified later, as opposed to sooner.
Mr. Pruessing. Actually, right after the event, we had
industrial hygiene people begin doing air monitoring within a
couple hours of the time we had identified where the incident
site occurred.
Shortly after that, the EPA was on site, and also began
doing their own monitoring. So we have monitoring data from
very early after the incident. And again, all of that data at
this point indicates that we're--have not created a public
health issue.
Ms. Brown. The Democratic staff has requested a lot of
information, information on several different things,
including, but not--request copies of all forms, including any
forms dealing with medical claims or reimbursement of expenses,
and other things. Have you--do you have that information, or
are we going to be able to get that information, so we can
monitor this situation, also?
Mr. Pruessing. I have not personally reviewed the claims,
but I can share with you the claims process that we have put in
place. We now have over 40 claims specialists on site to try to
work with the community. We try to respond to every claim
within 24 hours. We then set up a meeting with the individual.
Often times that includes a site visit, so we can see what the
actual issues are.
As I mentioned earlier, we are not asking anyone who files
a claim to sign anything. If they file a claim, that does not
mean that their claim is completed. All we are trying to do is
help individuals respond to the actual incident and any impacts
they may be feeling at this point. We will continue to be
there, and respond as necessary until the job is done.
Ms. Brown. I think it is--copy of the forms. But I do know
that we have several requests in to your office, and we have
not received any response as of yet.
Mr. Pruessing. I will have to get back to you on that item,
because I am not familiar with it.
Ms. Brown. I know you heard Ms. Quarterman's testimony. And
the situation had been monitored. What could we do to prevent
this from happening again? It was a lot of ill ease as to
whether or not it was adequate protection. So, as we move
forward----
Mr. Pruessing. Well, as Ms. Quarterman relayed to the
subcommittee, you know, we had done an inline inspection of
this line in 2009, and did not find integrity issues with it.
We had come back and done the depth of cover survey in the
end--at the end of 2010 and, again, felt that we had adequate
depth of cover, based on previous experience.
At this point in time, we do not know what occurred with
this line. That is troubling to all of us. And we realize that
we may have to wait for the water to recede before we can fully
understand what occurred here.
You know, there is certainly speculation that may be
related to the river flooding. But at this point in time, I do
not know what happened to this line. What does concern me,
though, is that we used a very good engineering analysis and
credible assessment, as we had done in the past, to look at
this line from a risk standpoint. We had actually taken a one-
day shut-down of this line in late May, as we worked with the
city of Laurel, to show them the data we had.
I know that a lot of their issues were associated with the
erosion of the south bank, as Ms. Quarterman has already
shared. But we shared that data with them, as well as with
PHMSA. Everything that we looked at at this point indicated,
from a risk assessment standpoint, that we had a safe line.
Again, we do not know what happened with this line, but we,
just as everyone, are very anxious to be able to complete that
investigation so that we can learn from it, and apply those
learnings to the other parts of our business.
Ms. Brown. We will have another round, I guess?
Mr. Shuster. Sure.
Ms. Brown. OK, thank you.
Mr. Shuster. I think we will. Dr. Inkley, it is--again,
appreciate you being here, in place of the witness that my
colleagues requested.
It is concerning to me, though, you are coming before the
committee coming from a well-known organization, questioning--
and we certainly want to, as Mr. Rehberg pointed out, to
continue to monitor the situation--but you are questioning the
safety, the quality of the air, when we have got three
organizations--the EPA, the NIH, and the CDC--that have said
they evacuated people but they tested the quality of the air
and let them come back in.
And you are here today, it seems to me, saying--you are
questioning whether it is safe out there, when we have got,
like I said, the CDC and the NIH, two very, very highly
respected health organizations saying it is fine to go back in.
Are you still questioning it, even based on what the CDC and
the NIH has said?
Mr. Inkley. Yes, I am. I am questioning how it is being
presented to the public.
We still know that there is a lot of oil out there. In
fact, when their cleanup is completed, and they leave the
scene, they will have recovered only some 5 or 10 percent of
the oil.
Mr. Shuster. Right.
Mr. Inkley. The other 90 percent will still be out there,
or have degraded.
Mr. Shuster. Right.
Mr. Inkley. The public needs to understand that they can
still be exposed. Fortunately, there has been--you know, there
has been Ms. Bonogofsky, who ended up in the emergency room----
Mr. Shuster. Right.
Mr. Inkley [continuing]. And there has been some impact to
wildlife. I am most concerned about the aquatic organisms.
Mr. Shuster. Right.
Mr. Inkley. But----
Mr. Shuster. And your----
Mr. Inkley [continuing]. You still have to be concerned.
Mr. Shuster. You----
Mr. Inkley. You know, when a grizzly bear is in an area,
that doesn't mean there is no risk. There is a risk. The risk
doesn't occur only when the grizzly bear attacks.
Mr. Shuster. Sir, I understand that. But when a very
respected organization says, ``We don't believe the risk is
raised to a level that people shouldn't be there,'' as stated
by the CDC and the NIH, I have real questions as to whether--
again, is your analysis coming--you have been on the ground out
there, and looked around.
Mr. Inkley. We do have people on the ground. You know, I do
question the appropriateness of not having independent
assessments. It wasn't until there was an independent
assessment of the oil spill size in the BP spill in the Gulf of
Mexico that the Government----
Mr. Shuster. Right.
Mr. Inkley [continuing]. And industry finally backed away
from a terrible underestimate of one-tenth the actual size, of
just 5,000 barrels per day in that spill.
Mr. Shuster. Right, right.
Mr. Inkley. Government said that.
Mr. Shuster. Well, this is----
Mr. Inkley. You are expecting me to believe that. It was
wrong.
Mr. Shuster. This is much smaller, and the CDC and the NIH
are, again, very highly respected organizations.
So, that being said, the next question to you is, is there
another way that we can transport hazardous materials that is
safer, in your view?
Mr. Inkley. I think that we need to have improved pipeline
standards. As I indicated in my testimony, as Mr. Pruessing
indicated, they do not know why it failed. It had passed
Federal inspection earlier. Obviously, the standards are
inadequate to prevent it from happening.
Mr. Shuster. But you dispute the past 20 years they have
improved, over the past 20 years we have 30 percent less of the
number of barrels of oil spilled, and the incidents have gone
down significantly. Do you dispute that?
Mr. Inkley. Well, I am greatly appreciative of the fact
that the number of oil spills seems to have declined since the
passage of that act. But we still have a long way to go. This
map shows the incidences that have occurred across the United
States in the last 10 years.
Mr. Shuster. Sure, I understand.
Mr. Inkley. It is very significant, still.
Mr. Shuster. But it has decreased, and we are getting
better. But my question is, when someone comes before this
committee and questions pipelines, in light of all the facts--
it is getting better--it seems to me that the only way to get
to zero incidents is just to stop doing it. Are you advocating
that we shouldn't be--
Mr. Inkley. No, no. We are advocating to protect public
health and safety----
Mr. Shuster. Well, and that is what we are doing here also.
But whenever you do anything--for instance, you drive a car--
there is a risk involved. And we try to mitigate and reduce
that, and I think we have done a good job of going in that
direction.
Do you oppose the Keystone pipeline?
Mr. Inkley. The National Wildlife Federation believes that
the Keystone pipeline should not be built, especially in light
of the fact that we have these current safety standards that
have been----
Mr. Shuster. Right, and so----
Mr. Inkley [continuing]. Devastatingly inadequate.
Mr. Shuster [continuing]. You would be advocating for
shipping hazardous materials by train or truck? Is that what
you would be advocating for, instead of pipeline?
Mr. Inkley. We are looking for improved pipeline safety
standards.
Mr. Shuster. And, in the meantime, let it be on trucks and
let it be on trains, is that----
Mr. Inkley. No, that is not what we are saying at all. We
are saying that we need to improve the safety standards.
Mr. Shuster. So that you would say that pipeline is
probably the most--it is the safest way to move hazardous
materials?
Mr. Inkley. Actually, I am not a biochemical engineer, so I
couldn't answer that question.
Mr. Shuster. Right, right. Well, thank you very much. Mr.
Pruessing, can you tell us why it took 2 hours for ExxonMobil
to report to the National Response Center about the incident
that occurred?
Mr. Pruessing. Thank you for asking me that question,
because there seems to be some misinformation about the actual
timeline. So, let me go through the process that occurred----
Mr. Shuster. Sure.
Mr. Pruessing. And some of this you heard from Ms.
Quarterman. But again, I want to make sure that everybody
understands.
At about 10:40 p.m. Mountain Time on July--the evening of
July 1st, we got a pressure indication in our control room,
where we monitor all of our pipelines on a 24/7 basis, that
something unusual was going on in the pipeline, there was a
pressure reduction. At that time we did not know if it was a
pump shutting down, or an instrument that malfunctioned, or
some other event.
The team in the control room pulled in additional
resources, tried to analyze the situation, and determined they
could not, at that point, know exactly what was going on. So,
they made the decision to shut down the pumps on the line, to
stop the line from pumping. That was done within 7 minutes. So,
at 10:47 p.m. Mountain Time, the pumps were shut down.
They then began a complex series of steps to actually start
closing valves that are along the pipeline to isolate various
segments of the pipeline.
There was a question earlier about why were some valves
opened and then later closed and then later reopened. That was
on the downhill section of the line, downstream of this river,
and flowing into one of the refineries that we provide crude
to. After that valve was closed, it was assessed that that was
a safe section of line, there was not likely any issue there,
the pressure reduction had been seen while upstream, and they
could reopen that valve to allow the oil to drain away, down
into the refinery.
So, that was done from a safety perspective, to try to get
the material into a safe spot which, in this particular case,
was the refinery we were delivering oil to. We later came back
and closed that valve, because we wanted to isolate all of the
line at that point.
The valve that we closed next to the Yellowstone River was
done at 11:36. So our period--it took a period of 49 minutes
before that actual valve was closed, from the time we started
closing those valves.
At that point in time, we did not yet know exactly where
the incident occurred. All we know was that something unusual
was going on in the lines, and we were shutting it down and
isolating it.
At 11:45 p.m. our control center in Houston received a call
from the local fire department in Laurel City, indicating they
had an odor of petroleum. That was really the first indication
that we had of where the actual site may have been. At 12:19 we
called the National Response Center. So, from the time we knew
we had an actual spill until the time we called the National
Response Center was certainly less than an hour.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much for that. Now I will go to
Mrs. Napolitano for 5 minutes for questions.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, Mr. Chair. One of the things
that comes to mind, Mr. Pruessing, is the emergency response
and corrosion control procedures. Your supervisor's knowledge
of these procedures, I understand it is self-certification of
the employees.
How does that happen? Does this--how do you address it? Are
they certified? If they are self-certified, how do we know that
they are properly trained in these procedures?
Mr. Pruessing. We have a very large and integrated plan to
maintain the integrity of all of our pipelines across the
country. And that involves----
Mrs. Napolitano. I am sorry, but I have to run.
Mr. Pruessing. Yes.
Mrs. Napolitano. I am talking about specifically here.
Mr. Pruessing. Yes.
Mrs. Napolitano. In this particular area. Do you have a
record of the self-certified employees, whether you trained
them, they were trained by video, or were they trained by
booklet? How were they trained, if they are self-certified?
Mr. Pruessing. All of the skills that we have with regard
to integrity management are part of the daily activities for
many of these operators on the line. As was mentioned earlier,
not only do we do the monitoring of this pipeline in a control
room with electronic equipment and pressure and flow rates, but
we also actually have employees in the field that visit the
pipelines on a regular basis. We measure the corrosion
protection. All of those are pieces of data that must be
reported to PHMSA.
Mrs. Napolitano. I know, but the----
Mr. Pruessing. And----
Mrs. Napolitano. The training to be able to recognize
these----
Mr. Pruessing. Yes.
Mrs. Napolitano [continuing]. Instances is what I am
concerned about.
Mr. Pruessing. And the operators on a pipeline must be OQ-
qualified, according to the regulations in PHMSA.
Mrs. Napolitano. Who records that qualification?
Mr. Pruessing. We do the training. We actually have the
tests on file. We record all of that, and then PHMSA will come
in on audits and actually look at all of those training
records, to make sure that they have been done properly.
Mrs. Napolitano. Does PHMSA conduct any follow-up on this
training, to ensure that the certification is proper?
Mr. Pruessing. PHMSA has the right to come in and audit us
in any aspect of our business.
Mrs. Napolitano. OK, but they don't. In other words, this
is self-certification.
Mr. Pruessing. We actually do the work. But as--again, as
Ms. Quarterman shared earlier, we have the responsibility to
meet the requirements. They come in and audit all of those
various requirements, to make sure we are meeting them.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you. One of the statements I believe
you might have made--and correct me if I am wrong--that you
were going to replace a pipeline to 30-feet depth.
Mr. Pruessing. That is correct, ma'am.
Mrs. Napolitano. Then you recognize that the previously
placed 5 feet of cover is inadequate. Why do you now believe
the 30 feet is adequate, and what are you basing it on?
Mr. Pruessing. Well, once again, we do not know the cause
of this incident at this time. It may be related to the river
conditions, but it may not be. So we will not know the answer
to that until the investigation is complete.
Mrs. Napolitano. But you will do it at a 30-foot depth?
Mr. Pruessing. PHMSA provided a corrective order to us,
asking us to use this technology when we do replace the line. I
have not actually seen the final drawings on that, but I have
talked with the engineers that are working on that. And they
have indicated to me that we are looking at drilling at about
30 feet, and it will not be in the rubble or the sediment of
the riverbed, it actually will be in rock.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you. In 1997, USGS recorded a flow
of 82,000 cubic feet per second at their gauge in Billings. Did
ExxonMobil go out and measure the impact then, the effect it
had on your pipeline? And, if so, what was found? And do you
have to perform--did you, at that time, have to perform any
remedial action?
Mr. Pruessing. We have not, in the past, had any issues
with our pipelines during periods of flood. Again, as I
mentioned earlier, we had gone back at this particular time,
just months ago, and done further risk assessment work to
confirm that we still had a safe pipeline. We had nothing that
would indicate that the line was not safe.
Mrs. Napolitano. Well, and my information tells me that
USGS indicates that anything over 50,000 CFS does move a lot of
the bedrock, a lot of the riverbed. Is this a problem you have
been noticing?
And when your inspectors look at this, do they gauge the
changes there are in actual movement? Because there have been--
in 1996, in 1997, and before that--have been in 1991, and I am
looking at historical records from USGS. And if this showing an
erosion, what steps are you taking in areas--and if you are
going to bury this one 30 under, what about other areas they
may be less than?
Mr. Pruessing. We are constantly looking to try to improve
our knowledge and improve our operations from a safety and
integrity standpoint. That is part of the way we try to address
our business each and every day. We do risk assessments on all
parts of our business, to make sure that we are comfortable
continuing the operations, no matter what the conditions.
I will share with you that when the Mississippi River was
flooding earlier this year, they were going to open the
Morganza Spillway for the first time since 1973. We had several
lines that crossed the Atchafalaya River, downstream of the
Morganza Spillway. We did a risk assessment on that work, on
those lines. We determined that, based on historical issues,
that we needed to shut those lines down.
So, when they opened that Morganza Spillway, our lines were
shut down, cleared of oil, and filled with water. We did that
as part of our normal risk assessment process to say, ``How do
we get ourselves comfortable that we are operating in an
appropriate way?''
Mrs. Napolitano. Yes----
Mr. Pruessing. We did that----
Mrs. Napolitano [continuing]. I am focusing on Billings,
sir. That is my focus.
Mr. Pruessing. We did that same type of activity here, at
the Billings crossing. We identified the potential risks, we
looked at all the data, the integrity data, the depth of cover
data, the recent PHMSA inspections. We felt like we had a safe
system.
Again, I do not yet know what the cause of this incident
was.
Mr. Shuster. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Shuster. I would like to recognize Mr. Hanna for 5
minutes of questioning.
Mr. Hanna. Thank you, Chairman. Couple things. The age of
the pipeline, do you have a rough idea?
Mr. Pruessing. The original line was--first was laid in
1949. But this particular crossing was relaid in 1991. It used
to run across the--underneath the bridge, going across the
river. And the State highway department had asked us to take it
off the bridge and relocate it in the river. So we relaid this
line in 1991.
Mr. Hanna. So it is 20 years old.
Mr. Pruessing. Yes.
Mr. Hanna. Do you have--you have sacrificial anodes on
this?
Mr. Pruessing. Yes.
Mr. Hanna. Cathodic protection----
Mr. Pruessing. Yes, we use cathodic protection----
Mr. Hanna. You stated that you have--you checked, and
that--they were intact, they were adequate?
Mr. Pruessing. Yes. One of the regular things that we do,
from a pipeline maintenance standpoint, is check the rectifier
readings, to make sure that we have current going appropriately
to protect the lines, and we have no indication that that was a
problem.
Mr. Hanna. OK. And the valves that you closed, they are all
hand-closed valves?
Mr. Pruessing. Some of those are hand-closed valves, some
of those are motor-operated valves that actually were operated
from the control center in Houston. And, in addition, at this
particular river crossing, on the downstream side there was
actually a check valve to prevent back flow.
Mr. Hanna. And this all happened--a lot of this happened in
the middle of the night?
Mr. Pruessing. Yes, it did.
Mr. Hanna. So--all right. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. Hanna. Ms. Richardson, you are
recognized for 5 minutes for questions.
Ms. Richardson. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all,
I want to say, Mr. Pruessing, thank you for being here and
addressing this in the serious manner that it deserves. The
fact that you have come and participated with this committee, I
think, is appreciated by all.
Sir, just wanted to recap a couple things that I had asked
Ms. Quarterman. One, would you be willing to submit your--
ExxonMobil's--integrity management plan to the committee?
Mr. Pruessing. Our integrity management plan, we would be
glad to review with the committee. I did not realize that that
request had been made. But certainly the plan that we have in
place that we use to monitor our pipelines is something that we
would be glad to share.
Ms. Richardson. OK. And then I think, building upon the
question of Ms. Brown, her question was would you provide the
committee information regarding the claims. And as I heard your
response, you said the work that you were doing with the
claims, but you didn't say you would supply the information to
the committee. So, would you be willing to include that, as
well?
Mr. Pruessing. I will need to get back to you on that,
because I certainly want to make sure that we protect the
privacy of the individuals that are making the claims. So that
would be my concern. I would have to get back to you on that
particular question.
Ms. Richardson. Well, I think it would be obvious to assume
that the committee wouldn't expect necessarily to have the
names of the individuals, but the fact if X amount of claims
have been submitted--I think you said 40 or so--you have talked
to approximately 120 people, what those claims have been
associated with, you know, whether it is environment or
property damage and so on, and where along the process you are
in responding.
Mr. Pruessing. We would be happy to provide that kind of
information.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, sir, because I think, when we
look at previous situations that have occurred, those have been
some of the big issues that have gotten the attention of this
committee and others, as well.
Mr. Pruessing. Well, it is certainly our intent to respond
to everyone's individual claims. And again, I want to reinforce
that we will honor all legitimate claims.
Ms. Richardson. OK. And I believe that is my last question.
Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much. And we are going to go to
a second round for the ranking member.
I just want to--EPA, we are trying to get EPA to be
rational in what they do. They are doing a great job here. I
see all the press releases coming out, EPA saying things are
moving in a positive direction, which I appreciate. But just to
respond to the ranking member's criticism of our side trying to
cut their funding, we are trying to cut their funding for new
stuff.
And in my State of Pennsylvania, they are wreaking havoc,
telling my Department of Environmental Protection, the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, how to do
their job, which they have been doing effectively and
efficiently for three or four decades. So we are trying to get
them to back away from overstepping their bounds when it comes
to the State of Pennsylvania, and a one-size-fits-all
regulation. So that is my--that is a big problem I have with
EPA.
So, with that----
Ms. Richardson. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Shuster. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Richardson. Would you yield for just a moment?
Mr. Shuster. Yes.
Ms. Richardson. I yielded back about 2 minutes----
Mr. Shuster. Yes.
Ms. Richardson [continuing]. And I forgot to say one thing.
Mr. Shuster. Sure.
Ms. Richardson. I just wanted to also note that the staff
immediately--when this incident occurred, I did receive an
email and received numerous updates. And although this is not a
good situation and we are looking to address it, I at least
want to commend the information that was provided in a timely
fashion.
Mr. Pruessing. Thank you very much.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you. And I recognize the ranking member
for 5 minutes for another round of questions.
Ms. Brown. Thank you. But I need to say something for EPA,
and I don't want it taken from my time. But let me just say
that I didn't call any names, but someone once told me the
squeaky wheels, or the squeaky pigs, or whatever, make a lot of
noise. I didn't say who was trying to cut EPA funding. I didn't
call any names.
Mr. Shuster. I wouldn't call anybody names, but I have
heard you squeak before.
Ms. Brown. Doctor--yes, sir, would you please tell us a
little about your background, and who you are, just quick?
Because I think people need to understand that you come here
with some knowledge of the situation, and you are not just
talking to be talking.
Monitoring depends on when you take the monitor. And if
people are sick, we need to analyze what caused it, and it is
the ongoing process.
Mr. Inkley. OK. Well, thank you very much----
Ms. Brown. You are my guest on this committee.
Mr. Inkley. Thank you very much. Thank you for the
invitation to be here today.
I usually tell people it took me 10 years to get through
college, but that is because it included a bachelor of science
degree, a master of science degree, and a Ph.D., as well. I
would add that the Ph.D.----
Ms. Brown. But is that--what is it in, your Ph.D.?
Mr. Inkley. My Ph.D. is in wildlife ecology from the
University of Wyoming. So I am quite familiar with western
ecosystems, and even directed a research project that covered
the Billings area, with respect to raptors, or birds of prey.
So, I have--since then, I have worked with the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, I have worked for the Florida Department
of Game and Freshwater Fish Commission, and now I have served
the National Wildlife Federation as their senior scientist for
a number of years.
Unfortunately, I was deeply involved over the past year in
response to the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, and have spent
more time than I wish dealing with that situation.
Ms. Brown. Thank you. And your recommendations, you are
going to give us in writing what you would recommend how we
could improve the system. We are not indicating that we don't
want to use the natural gas to move the oil, but we want to
make sure that we are protecting the environment for our
children and children's children.
Mr. Inkley. That is exactly what we are here for, is to try
to protect wildlife for our children's future. I know that
everyone here wants to do that. But it is very apparent to me,
to the National Wildlife Federation, that the current standards
are inadequate for doing that in an appropriate manner. And all
we are seeking to do is to strengthen those.
Ms. Brown. Yes, sir. Let me just move on. I am familiar
with what happened in Alaska with ExxonMobil. And the fact is,
I am probably the only person with institutional memory knowing
that it is not completely cleaned up, as we speak, even though
the people from Alaska want to act like it is cleaned up.
You indicated that you all have conducted surveys. Did you
all go down in the river to conduct those surveys, or--I am not
a scientist--so how did you all do it? I want to know not so
much as blaming this moment, but as we move forward, how can we
make sure it doesn't happen again? We are looking at a bill. I
want to make sure we include what we need to in the bill to
make sure that everybody stay and do what they supposed to do.
Mr. Pruessing. We certainly agree that we want to make sure
any learnings from this incident get built in to the future
procedures and the way we operate lines.
Again, we do not yet know what caused this incident. And so
we are very anxious to work with PHMSA and do our own
investigation as well, so that we can learn that, moving
forward.
Ms. Brown. Well, how did you conduct the indepth survey,
specifically?
Mr. Pruessing. The steps that we took over the last couple
of years, I think again, are important to understand.
First of all, we ran a smart pig in the line, which
actually measures thickness of the line and collects data about
the integrity of the line. We did that in 2009. In December
2010 we did soundings, electronic soundings, over the riverbed
to confirm the depth of cover. And that was 5 to 8 feet, as has
been mentioned earlier.
Then, in addition, we shut the line down in late May to do
an additional risk assessment. The city of Laurel was very
concerned about bank erosion. And that is also part of the data
that we provided, as far as the depth of cover on the bank,
which, as mentioned earlier, was between 11 and 13 feet.
In addition to those steps, we do aerial overflights of our
pipelines. It is required to do that 26 times a year, but we do
it every week. We do it twice as often as the regulation
requires, just so that we are getting eyes on all of our
pipelines, to make sure that there is not something going on,
or right of way encroachment that we are not aware of.
In addition, we have corrosion monitoring that goes on. It
was mentioned earlier about cathodic protection. That is the
method to basically cause another piece of metal that is buried
in the ground to corrode, and keep the pipeline safe. So we
have cathodic protection on all of our lines, we go out and we
measure to make sure that that current is moving appropriately,
so that there is no interruption in that.
And, in addition to all of those things, then, we have
PHMSA, who comes in and audits all of these activities on a
regular basis to make sure that we are meeting all those
requirements.
So, again, our integrity program is very broad. It covers
many different aspects, many different people. But again, as
we--even as we entered this period of time of high river flow,
we had assessed, from a risk standpoint, that we still had a
safe line. So, obviously, there is something that occurred that
we are not yet aware of, that we are very anxious to find out,
so that we can learn from that.
Ms. Brown. We had over five different hearings and
discussions. And, you know, people want to talk about what
happened. In the last 18 months we separated the agency from
the industry, and I am very pleased with that, so that
everybody could play their proper role.
And so, we still want to know--one of the problems was we
had indicated there are some areas that we need to rev up, put
additional security, and then there are some areas that, you
know, the--we need to put people--not just put people to work,
but to reinforce the pipelines. What are some of the
recommendations the industry--you--are making to us, that we
can include in the bill to make sure that we keep the public
safe from these kinds of accidents?
Mr. Pruessing. Thank you for that question. Probably the
single biggest item that the industry has been pushing on, and
is currently included in the proposed bill, is that we remove
the exemptions for one call for all parties.
Right now, if you are an individual that wants to do a dig
near a pipeline right of way, you have to call the State one
call and let people know you want to dig. It is the call-
before-you-dig----
Ms. Brown. Yes, I understand that. That is a very
successful program.
Mr. Pruessing. Yes. But, up to this point, municipalities,
State departments of transportation, have not been required to
make the one call. And so, protection of those pipelines, and
making sure that everyone has to make that call before they
begin digging, we believe, will be a major step forward in
improving pipeline safety. And to the credit of Congress, that
is included in the proposed bill right now.
Ms. Brown. OK.
Mr. Shuster. I didn't take away the gentlelady's time for
responding to me on EPA, and I gave her 2 minutes. If you have
one final question to wrap up, I would be happy to take that,
because we want to move along, and we want to get the----
Ms. Brown. You can go and come back to me.
Mr. Shuster. Well, we want to finish up. So go ahead. Final
question.
Ms. Brown. No, I understand what--that recommendation. I am
asking you specifically what can you all do, the industry, to--
we have--you are making billions of dollars. I mean it has
never been so well for your industry. How can we go in and make
sure that we are training, monitoring--you all are. What can
you do to up the safety? That is why I am asking.
Mr. Pruessing. Well, I certainly believe that one of the
things that we can do, as an industry, is make sure that we all
learn from the instances that do occur, that we share those
learnings across the industry, so that we do not repeat
mistakes.
Certainly the Association of Oil Pipelines, which we are a
member, has been trying to step up that, make sure that we do a
better job of sharing knowledge, as it is gained, so that
incidents or issues are not repeated. And that is something the
industry is working on very hard right now.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much. And a final question? Mr.
Rehberg, I think, has a follow-up.
Mr. Rehberg. Yes, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I
was remiss in not thanking your staff. They have been very easy
to work with. I really appreciate their desire to have this
hearing in a timely fashion. And it meant a lot to me that you
would be as timely, as well.
So, let me thank you for that; Dr. Inkley, for your kind
work and good work. I am, in fact, affiliated with the National
Wildlife Federation, as a result of my relationship with the
Billings Rod and Gun Club, and--which are my neighbor,
actually, on my fence line.
Mr. Inkley. Thank you for requesting the hearing.
Mr. Rehberg. Yes, I know your good work, and I appreciate
it as much.
Mr. Pruessing, first of all, thank you for being on the
ground in Billings, constantly. I am actually, frankly,
surprised and pleased you are out here, because you at once
promised all of us you would never leave Billings until it was
done. Clearly, your wife or someone has suggested you need to
get away from Billings a little bit.
But you have been on the ground. You know this issue inside
and out. When the Governor and I met with you--you made a
statement that you haven't repeated--and I just want to, for
clarification purposes--you know, one of the criticisms was,
well, why didn't you just shut the pipeline off, and I thought
your response at that time was particularly apropos for this
hearing.
Maybe you could restate why you don't just shut things
down, why you have a protocol for shutting this down and then
that down, and then there is a time lag, and such? Because I
think it really is an important point for the congressional
record.
Mr. Pruessing. Thank you very much for that question. When
you try to shut down a pipeline, you have a large amount of
mass flowing at very high velocities in a pipe. If you just
slam the valve shut, all that energy, the kinetic energy that
is moving with that mass, has to turn into some other form of
energy, and that becomes pressure.
So, if you have a very large line moving large amounts of
material, just slamming a valve shut means you could actually
over-pressure a line. So we have a process to avoid that. The
first thing we do is shut down pumps to get most of the
pressure off the line and stop it from flowing. But then we
have a very detailed plan to shut down individual valves, to
isolate it, so that we don't create a new problem.
And so, again, yes, it takes some time to fully isolate a
line. But it is done with safety in mind, to make sure that we
don't create other issues.
Mr. Rehberg. The other question that we talked about at one
of our hearings was about the 30-foot depth, and the fact that
it would, in fact, change where the valves are located. And
while Ms. Quarterman kind of moved beyond that, or said it
shouldn't, I don't think that is correct, is it?
Mr. Pruessing. No. If we go to a depth of 30 feet, we will
have to dig from farther back to make sure that we don't have
too steep a slope. So the valves actually will be moved back,
farther away from the river bank.
Mr. Rehberg. And the third question, then, that was brought
up at one of those meetings was--one of the requirements or
suggestions was a different kind of valve. And there was a
suggestion that perhaps that new valve, or a different kind of
valve, might actually create more of a problem than it solves.
Is that true, or was that just enough of--a throw-away line by
somebody?
Mr. Pruessing. There has been discussion about automatic
shut-down systems, or automatic shut-down valves. We still have
control of those valves, to make sure we don't create other
issues. So, while many of them are motor-operated, and can be
remotely moved by the control center, we do not have a single
button you push to shut down a line, because of that concern
about over-pressure.
Mr. Rehberg. OK. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. Rehberg, and thank you for
being here today. You bring depth of knowledge to this
particular incident that, of course, none of us have.
Mr. Rehberg. And you don't want to.
Mr. Shuster. I am sure. And I hope you don't have to do it
again.
But thank you for being here today. And thank you, too, to
our two witnesses, Dr. Inkley and Mr. Pruessing, for being here
today. We appreciate you taking the time. And, again, we are
going to be watching closely what is happening up there.
I would like to submit for the record the daily EPA
reports. They are the incident command there. And it appears to
me that things are getting done, in light of the fact we have a
spill. But EPA is reporting there on a daily basis what is
happening, so I want to have that for the record.
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Mr. Shuster. So again, thank you all very much, and this
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]