- [H.A.S.C. No. 112-38] NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 AND OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

[H.A.S.C. No. 112-38]

HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

__________

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

BUDGET REQUESTS FOR U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA

__________

HEARING HELD

APRIL 6, 2011

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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Twelfth Congress

HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland ADAM SMITH, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
DUNCAN HUNTER, California LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado BILL OWENS, New York
TOM ROONEY, Florida JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia TIM RYAN, Ohio
CHRIS GIBSON, New York C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
JOE HECK, Nevada KATHY CASTOR, Florida
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
MO BROOKS, Alabama
TODD YOUNG, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Jenness Simler, Professional Staff Member
William Johnson, Professional Staff Member
Lauren Hauhn, Research Assistant

C O N T E N T S

----------

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011

Page

Hearing:

Wednesday, April 6, 2011, Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense
Authorization Budget Requests for U.S. Pacific Command and U.S.
Forces Korea................................................... 1

Appendix:

Wednesday, April 6, 2011......................................... 39
----------

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2011
FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FOR
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2

WITNESSES

Sharp, GEN Walter ``Skip,'' USA, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea.... 5
Willard, ADM Robert F., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command..... 3

APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 43
Sharp, GEN Walter ``Skip''................................... 77
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 45
Willard, ADM Robert F........................................ 47

Documents Submitted for the Record:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

[The information is classified and retained in the committee
files.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

Ms. Bordallo................................................. 116
Mr. Forbes................................................... 113
Mrs. Hanabusa................................................ 117
Mr. Palazzo.................................................. 120
Mr. Scott.................................................... 119
Mr. Turner................................................... 117

FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FOR
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA

----------

House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 6, 2011.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Good morning.
The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive
testimony on the fiscal year 2012 President's Budget Request
for the U.S. Pacific Command [USPACOM] and U.S. Forces Korea
[USFK].
I welcome our witnesses, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command,
Admiral Bob Willard, and Commander of U.S. Forces Korea,
General Skip Sharp. Thank you both for being with us. It is a
pleasure to see you again.
I am sure you are much happier here than in the Pacific.
Just kidding.
First, on behalf of this entire committee, please allow me
to express my heartfelt sorrow to the people of Japan for the
terrible disaster which struck unexpectedly on March 11th.
Japan is not only an esteemed trading partner, but the military
alliance of our two nations forms the cornerstone of our mutual
security in the Pacific.
Admiral Willard, please convey to your counterparts in the
government of Japan that the U.S. Congress stands by them and
offers our support to continue to help its citizens rebuild and
recover.
In preparing for this hearing, I noted with amazement that
the physical damage from the earthquake and tsunami is
currently estimated at $250 billion to $309 billion. That is
more than 350 percent higher than Hurricane Katrina.
Admiral Willard, please let us know what type of assistance
the U.S. military has been able to offer Japan, what additional
help they may need, and what the status of U.S. personnel and
their families is right now.
Apart from Japan, however, our witnesses have
responsibility for one of the most geographically and
ethnically dispersed regions of the globe, which will present
some of the greatest opportunities and challenges to our
national security in the coming decades.
In its 2011 edition of The Military Balance, the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, or IISS, drew
ominous conclusions about global developments in defense policy
and our Armed Forces.
The IISS head, Dr. John Chipman, warned, ``The United
States, in the next few years it is going to have to make some
very significant decisions on what it does.''
The IISS highlighted the contrast between defense cuts in
the West and booming military spending and arms acquisitions in
Asia and the Middle East, concluding, ``there is persuasive
evidence that a global redistribution of military power is
under way.''
In particular, the rapidly expanding military power of
China continues to overshadow other Asian states' military
efforts and creates unease among American allies in the region.
The report further observes that ``the Korean Peninsula is
now as dangerous a place as it has been at any time since the
end of the Korean War in 1953,'' given the ``imminent and
possibly unclear leadership succession'' in North Korea and
that country's aggression towards the South.
In this context, it has never been more important to ensure
that our forces in the Pacific have the personnel, training,
equipment, and authorities they need to instill confidence in
our allies, deter aggression, and remain ready to respond
decisively to any contingency that may arise.
Admiral Willard, General Sharp, thank you for your many
years of service. Thank you to those who serve with you.
Please express to them our sincere appreciation for all
that they are doing.
We look forward to your testimony.
Ranking Member Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 43.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome Admiral Willard, General Sharp. I appreciate your
work on behalf of our country. You are in a very, very
important region.
I also want to begin by joining in the chairman's comments
about the terrible tragedy in Japan and the impact there, to
pass along our best wishes to a very strong partner and a very
strong nation, during a very difficult time.
And also, to thank the Pacific Command for all of their
work, to help with that disaster you have done an amazing job
and shown, I think, once again, what the reach of the U.S.
military can do in terms of humanitarian, in terms of being
able to help people when they need it most, throughout the
world, you have been a fine example of that in Japan, though I
know the challenges remain great.
So, thank you for your service on that.
More broadly speaking, I think the Pacific Command covers a
very vitally important region.
There are many challenges in that region, but I think also
there are great opportunities.
Some of the larger, strongest economies in the world are
there, as well as a lot of others that are emerging. These are
some of the central emerging markets in the world and a
positive relationship between the United States and these
countries can be critical towards our economic growth, towards
our economic opportunities and certainly towards creating a
more stable world. And I appreciate both of your work to try to
make that happen.
Obviously, in the region, beyond Japan, is a central
partner. China is a critical, critical country. And building a
more positive relationship with them, I think, is very
important as we go forward, and also very difficult, because
our interests do not always coincide. But I still believe that
what we have in common outweighs what is different and I think
with strong leadership, we can build positive partnerships so
that, hopefully, as we go forward, China works with us
occasionally to help the stability of the region and the
stability of the world, for that matter.
So, the relationship with China is critical; anxious to
hear what you gentlemen's take is on where that is at.
And then lastly, of course, is North Korea itself. I agree
with what the chairman said, very volatile area, very dangerous
and seemingly getting more so every day. So, I look forward to
your testimony about how we manage that very difficult
challenge to regional and global stability.
With that, I yield back and I look forward to your
testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 45.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Both of your testimonies will be included, completely, in
the record. We look forward to hearing what you have to say.
Admiral.

STATEMENT OF ADM ROBERT F. WILLARD, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral Willard. Thank you, Chairman McKeon.
And, Mr. Chairman, in order to accommodate the committee's
questions sooner, I will keep my remarks here brief and, as you
have already suggested, ask that my full statement be included
for the record.
Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, thank you for this
opportunity to appear before you and discuss the United States
Pacific Command and the Asia-Pacific region.
I would like to extend our best wishes to Representative
Giffords for a speedy recovery. As a Navy spouse, she is a key
member of our military family and our thoughts and prayers
remain with her and with her family.
I would like to begin by recognizing my wife, Donna, who
has been at my side for 37 years. She is an outstanding
ambassador for our Nation and a tireless advocate for the men
and women of our military and their families. She recently
accompanied me to Japan where she met with service spouses and
then traveled into the tsunami-stricken region to visit a
shelter for 1,200 displaced Japanese survivors.
On that note, I would like to begin by offering our deepest
sympathy for the people of Japan who have been affected by an
unprecedented confluence of earthquakes, tsunamis and
consequent nuclear accidents.
In the midst of tragedy, the people of northern Honshu have
demonstrated remarkable courage and resolve. Their ability to
endure, to assist one another through hardship, to clean up
their communities and recover their lives should be an
inspiration for us all.
The devastation Donna and I have observed from the 11th of
March natural disasters was staggering. And the significance of
the continuing nuclear crisis adds a level of disaster response
complexity and urgency that is without peer.
U.S. Pacific Command remains fully committed to supporting
response efforts by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. I
established a joint support force in Japan, whose mission
includes humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, including
support to the Japanese defense forces who are spearheading the
Fukushima nuclear accident response.
At the same time, we are guarding the safety of U.S.
service personnel and their families, whether they are
operating in direct support for the relief effort or carrying
out their normal duties at their home bases.
A second PACOM joint task force planned and executed the
voluntary departure of spouses and dependents, and maintains a
follow-on departure plan, should it be required.
The level of cooperation and collaboration between the
service men and women of the United States and Japan has been
remarkable, and the job they are doing together is inspiring.
Worthy of special recognition is General Oriki, Japan's
Chief of the Joint Staff, for his exceptional leadership of
nearly 100,000 Japanese service members who are engaged in this
effort.
Our ability to quickly and effectively support their work
is testimony to the maturity and strength of the U.S.-Japan
alliance.
No doubt, Japan will emerge from this terrible combination
of disasters a stronger nation. Our hopes and prayers continue
to go out to the Japanese people.
Natural disasters are but one of the many challenges facing
the United States Pacific Command throughout the Asia-Pacific.
This vast region that covers half the earth is unique both in
its size and diversity and the importance to the future of
every other nation in the world.
Containing the great populations, economies and militaries
along with more than $5 trillion of seaborne commerce per year,
this region has been and will continue to be of utmost
importance to the United States.
The United States Pacific Command's role is to oversee its
security and to help to keep the peace both in our Nation's
interests and in the interests of our five treaty allies and
many regional partners.
The security environment is never static. Rather, it is
characterized by a dynamic range of 36 nations, whose varying
personalities and influence more or less affect the
neighborhood.
Each of our four sub-regions--Northeast Asia, Southeast
Asia, South Asia and Oceania--contain unique challenges and
challengers that test our collective commitment to security and
peace.
Yet, in the face of actors such as North Korea,
transnational extremist organizations such as Lashkar-e
Tayyiba, Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf Group, and uncertainties
created by a rapidly expanding and assertive Chinese military,
multilateral organizations such as ASEAN [Association of
Southeast Asian Nations], the East Asia Summit, and bonds
between the United States, its allies and partners serve to
moderate the challenges, deter the challengers and provide
forums for advancing the collective security of the Asia-
Pacific region.
Overall, the prospects for continued peace, economic growth
and advancing security cooperation in the region remain
promising.
We are repeatedly reminded that only through the U.S.'s
ability and willingness to underwrite the security through our
continuous presence, extended deterrence and protection of the
global commons upon which the region's livelihood depends, will
regional peace and security endure.
Every day, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and
civilians work to advance security in the Asia-Pacific. Their
success has long been enabled by this committee's sustained
support. You have provided the service men and women of USPACOM
with the most technically advanced military systems in the
world and a quality of life worthy of the contributions of this
All-Volunteer Force.
On behalf of the more than 330,000 men and women of United
States Pacific Command, thank you and thank you for this
opportunity to testify on our defense posture in this most
critical region of the world.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Willard can be found in
the Appendix on page 47.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General Sharp.

STATEMENT OF GEN WALTER ``SKIP'' SHARP, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
FORCES KOREA

General Sharp. Chairman McKeon, Representative Smith and
other distinguished members of this committee; I welcome this
opportunity to discuss the current state of the United Nations
Command, Combined Forces Command and United States Forces Korea
and to answer your questions.
I also want to thank this committee for its support for our
service members, Department of Defense civilians, and family
members that are all working together in the Republic of Korea.
The Republic of Korea, a strong and enduring ally, is
located in Northeast Asia, where the world's largest militaries
and economies reside. The Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance
ensures security and stability in Northeast Asia.
The Republic of Korea is also a great global security
partner with a PRT [Provincial Reconstruction Team] in
Afghanistan, anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia
and several U.N. peacekeeping operations around the world and
they are assisting in tackling proliferation.
Most importantly, the Republic of Korea and the U.S.
alliance continues to face a North Korea that threatens both
regional and global security and peace.
Last year, the Republic of Korea was the victim of two
unprovoked attacks by North Korea. On 26th March, 2010, a North
Korean submarine attacked the Republic of Korea naval ship, the
Cheonan. And on 23rd November, 2010, a North Korea artillery
barrage on the Republic of Korea island of Yeonpyeong-do.
These brutal attacks resulted in the death of 48 South
Korean service members and 2 civilians and numerous other
casualties.
The command's mission is to deter North Korean provocations
and aggressions and if deterrence fails, to fight and win.
In support of this mission, forces are maintained on the
Korean Peninsula and operate closely with our South Korean
allies.
The command's first priority is to prepare to fight and
win. Maintaining a combined ``fight tonight'' readiness is a
key reason why U.S. forces are stationed alongside their Korean
counterparts in the defense of the Republic of Korea.
The alliance stands ready to address the full spectrum of
conflict that could emerge on the Korean Peninsula.
Maintaining this preparedness is accomplished through the
development and continual refinement of our bilateral plans to
deter and defeat aggression, while maintaining an ability to
respond to other destabilizing conditions that could affect the
Korean Peninsula.
Successful execution of these bilateral plans will require
a well-trained force; three annual, joint, combined and
interagency exercises, Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Key Resolve and
Full Legal Service, key enablers for maintaining the combined
command's ``fight tonight'' readiness, while also preparing for
the future transition of wartime operational controls.
The second priority of the command, to strengthen the
Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance, supports the June 2009 United
States-Republic of Korea Joint Presidential Vision Statement. A
strong alliance better deters North Korea's provocative acts
and promotes peaceful, secure and prosperous future for the
Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region and the world as a
whole.
Last year, President Obama agreed to the Republic of Korea
President Lee Myung-bak's request to adjust the timing of the
transition of wartime operational control from April 2012 to
December of 2015.
He also agreed to develop a plan to better synchronize all
of the ongoing transformation initiatives, of which OPCON
[operational control] transition is just one of the elements.
Called ``Strategic Alliance 2015,'' this plan was affirmed
and signed by the United States Secretary of Defense, Robert
Gates, and the then Republic of Korea Minister of Defense,
Minister Kim Tae-young, at the 42nd security consultant meeting
in October of 2010.
Strategic Alliance 2015 synchronizes multiple U.S. and
Republic of Korea transformation efforts that are designed to
build adaptive and flexible capabilities to deter and to defeat
aggression, should it occur.
Key elements of Strategic Alliance 2015 include refining
and approving combined defense plans, defining and developing
the new organizational structures and capabilities required by
the Republic of Korea to lead the war fight, implementing more
realistic exercises based upon the North Korean threat of today
and tomorrow, preparing for the transition of wartime
operational control in 2015 and consolidating U.S. military
forces in the Republic of Korea onto two enduring hubs, under
the Yongsan Relocation Program and the Land Partnership
Program.
This repositioning of U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea
improves force readiness and quality of life, my third
priority. It realizes stationing efficiencies and signals the
continued American commitment to the defense of the Republic of
Korea and engagement in the region more broadly.
Restationing also enhances force protection and
survivability.
Finally, normalizing tours in Korea was reinforced in
October of 2010, when Secretary of Defense Gates directed the
U.S. Forces Korea into services to proceed with full tour
normalization as affordable.
As a force multiplier, tour normalization keeps trained and
ready military personnel in place for a longer period of time.
It improves readiness, combat capability, lowers turbulence in
units and reduces the stress placed on troops, units and
families.
In closing, the men and women assigned to United Nations
Command, Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea remain
committed and stand ready. Our ongoing efforts to implement
Strategic Alliance 2015, the Yongsan Relocation and Land
Partnership Program and tour normalization demonstrate a long-
term U.S. commitment to not only security for the Republic of
Korea, but for the broader region of Northeast Asia as well.
I am extremely proud of the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, Department of Defense civilians and their families
serving in the great nation of the Republic of Korea. And your
support for them is truly appreciated.
This concludes my remarks, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Sharp can be found in
the Appendix on page 77.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Admiral Willard, the IISS Report I mentioned in my opening
statement is just the latest analysis that suggests there is
unease among American allies in the Pacific. What do you hear
about perceptions of the United States in this region and this
growing disparity between the growth of China's military and
plans to cut defense spending in the United States due to
budgetary pressures?
And what more can the U.S. military do to bolster
confidence in our allies and deter future aggression in the
region?
Admiral Willard. Yes. Thank you, Chairman McKeon.
The general perception, I think, within the Asia-Pacific
and, especially among Southeast Asian nations, when I took
command a year and a half ago, was of uncertainty regarding
U.S. commitment to the region overall and frankly uncertainty
regarding our presence in the region and whether or not, as a
consequence of the wars in the Middle East, that had been
diminished.
We have made a concerted effort, and I think Secretary
Clinton and Secretary Gates' commitment to the region and
statements made in Vietnam and Singapore, throughout 2010,
helped to reinforce and re-establish the United States'
commitment to the Asia-Pacific.
The presence of our forces has been made more noticeable.
Interestingly, in this region of the world, for many of
these nations, in order to know that we are present, we have to
tell them and so part of that message has been shared.
But I think that our allies in the region, in particular,
and Australia, to point out one, have been vocal regarding
their desire to help enhance U.S. presence throughout the
region, and especially in Southeast Asia, in and around the
South China Sea, by making overtures to the United States to
team more broadly with them and perhaps enable a rotational
force presence from regions closer to that particular area.
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Sharp, do you agree with the IISS assessment that
the Korean Peninsula is now as dangerous a place as it has been
any time since the end of the Korean War in 1953? And how do
the South Koreans view their relationship with the U.S. today?
The South Koreans have made significant strides in
developing a robust military capability, in light of the
existential threat they face from the north. This growth in
capability has enabled the United States to reduce its presence
on the peninsula, somewhat.
Please explain how tour normalization will help you
increase readiness, even with a smaller force. What else do you
need in terms of facilities and family services to achieve
these goals?
General Sharp. Sir, thank you.
If you look at, back, over last year, the two attacks that
I named and then look forward over the next couple of years, I
believe that there are some real challenges from North Korea
that we have to be prepared to deter and if deterrence does not
work, be prepared to respond to.
And as North Korea works through the succession that they
are ongoing now, as North Korea tries to become, as Kim Jong-Il
has claimed, to be a great and powerful nation in 2012, I do
worry that there are additional attacks and provocations that
are being considered within North Korea.
We call on North Korea, that those are not necessary and we
are working very hard with the Republic of Korea to deter any
future provocations, but be prepared if deterrence does not
work.
The way that we are working through that, as you said, is
to make sure that the alliance is as strong as it can be right
now and we are of one voice and one set of actions in order to
be able to prepare for North Korea.
We have 28,500 troops in North Korea at this time and it
has been that way for the last several years under Secretary
Gates and President Obama's leadership. They have said that
force level will be sustained for the foreseeable future.
And I believe that is about the right force level for Korea
to do what we need to deter and to respond across a wide range
of possible scenarios from North Korea.
U.S., specifically, help toward normalization has helped
increase the alliance together and increase our readiness. And
we have moved from, in the summer of 2008, about 1,700 command-
sponsored families to the point now where we have over 4,100
command-sponsored families in Korea.
All of those forces have moved from a force where you would
rotate one year at a time to troops that are now there for 2
and 3 years. You can imagine the increase in unit capability,
unit cohesion if you don't have to train new soldiers every
year.
I have seen, just in that short period of time, a great
increase of readiness of our units, a great, stronger desire
within units to make differences within units. If you stay
there one year at a time, you can stand on your head for a
year. You really don't focus on the long-term good for units
and the overall strength that your unit needs to be.
So as we move forward and toward normalization and as I
said in my opening statement, I and the services owe to
Secretary Gates an affordable plan to be able to move, where
all of our families can come to Korea and Korea can become a
tour, just like Germany, just like Japan, where you are there
for 2 and 3 years at a time, really focusing on not only your
unit, but also improving relationships on a personal basis
within the Republic of Korea.
That plan is going to the Secretary over the next month or
so. He will then make decisions on how to move forward, based
upon the budget and the importance of this initiative and that
will be presented to you all on the budget that comes forward
next January.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ranking Member Smith.
Or, Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. I don't think I look like Smith.
The Chairman. Not at all.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And first I would
like to say that as a representative from Guam, I too join the
rest of the world in sending our deepest sympathies to the
people of Japan.
The people of Guam, in their generosity, have organized
many fundraising drives on the island and at last count, when I
was home, we have raised several millions of dollars.
Admiral Willard and General Sharp, thank you for your
testimonies this morning. And Admiral, for your information,
with all the increased activities going on in Guam now, we are
still afloat.
Admiral Willard. Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. My first question is for you, Admiral. Can
you describe what progress the U.S. and Japan are making toward
achieving tangible progress? Tangible progress is often
portrayed as the time when we can move a single Marine off
Okinawa to Guam.
But I do know, in reality, much must be achieved before
tangible progress can be realized. MILCON [military
construction] on Guam must continue to achieve slow and steady
progress, so in due course, a Marine can move to fully
functioning facilities on Guam.
So, what are some of the immediate and medium-term steps
that must be taken to achieve tangible progress in Okinawa?
And further, Admiral, can you describe how this year's
military construction budget for Guam achieves our commitment
to the Guam international agreement?
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Congresswoman Bordallo.
The progress toward the Futenma Replacement Facility [FRF]
that occupied so much of our time with the Japanese last year,
we think has begun to move forward this year, as a consequence
of both Prime Minister Kan's commitment to seeing this forward,
to the conclusion of the local elections in Okinawa that took
place last fall, and most importantly the continued effort on
the part of both the Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD]
and the Ministry of Defense in Guam to continue their dialogue,
through working groups, in order to accomplish what we need to,
to move FRF forward.
And we are progressing toward the signed commitment by the
governor of Okinawa to begin to make the actual contracting and
movement of soil for the first time in the FRF location.
I think there are some issues to finalize with regard to
runway configuration and so forth, some items that we have
talked about in the past. But we feel that progress is being
made.
I think the overall budgetary commitment on the part of the
Government of Japan toward Guam remains strong. They continue
to carry a considerable amount forward for Guam, DPRI [Defense
Policy Review Initiatives] issues. And as you and I have
discussed, previously, they have continued to make overtures
that despite the crisis that is currently ongoing in Japan that
they will be able to continue to proceed with the tenets of
DPRI, of which Futenma Replacement Facility and the movement of
8,000 Marines to Guam is only one of 19 actions that DPRI
contains.
So, I feel confident that progress, tangible progress, is
in fact being made. There are uncertainties, unquestionably, as
a consequence of what else Japan is contending with now and the
scope of that disaster in terms of financial impact to Japan.
But with the commitments that you have heard and that I have
seen from the Japanese and the continued progress that we have
seen being made, at least in dialogue, if not in actual
construction, I am confident that we will continue to progress
towards the tenets of the defense review initiative.
Ms. Bordallo. Admiral, I also--the second part of that
question is how about this year's military construction budget
on our part?
Admiral Willard. I will have an opportunity next week to
discuss our military construction budget before the MILCON
committee. And we intend to discuss Guam initiatives in
particular.
I remain concerned that there be sufficient commitment
within the MILCON budget to proceed with the infrastructure
development in particular, attendant to the Marine Corps
facilities as they have been described.
So, the infrastructure in and around the area south of
Andersen Air Force Base, Finegayan and the infrastructure
needed on the defense posts themselves in the area of Andersen
Air Force Base, both very critical to precede the development
of housing and other military construction that comes later.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you very much, Admiral.
And my next question is for General Sharp. General, I
believe we share a common mission of layered defense against
potential North Korean aggression. In Guam, we are poised to
host the development of a ballistic missile defense system that
will be a key component of strategic deterrence in the Pacific.
What other elements of defense do you see as necessary to
demonstrate U.S. resolve in the Pacific theater? And how else
should the administration and the military illustrate that
regardless of events taking place around the world today, we
are still committed to assured access for us and our allies to,
and freedom of maneuver within, the Pacific global commons?
And I once heard a general officer recently at a hearing
who was stationed in Korea state that he felt more comfortable
when the B-52s or the B-2s were stationed in Guam. So do you
share that sentiment?
And can you explain the role of long-range strike on the
Korean Peninsula?
General Sharp. Thank you. I can answer from a Korean
Peninsula perspective and then the broader--the Pacific
perspective and I am sure Admiral Willard would like to comment
on that.
Within Korea, we are working very hard to make sure that
our missile defense both the Republic of Korea and the U.S.
alliance are strong and prepared for what North Korea could
throw at it. And so the Republic of Korea is moving forward,
buying and employing more radars and command-and-control
systems for their Patriots, which they have recently bought.
They just launched the third Aegis ship.
We are working in concert with them to establish a good
system within the Republic of Korea for missile defense in
order to protect the valuable assets that we would need if we
have to go a war fight there.
The deterrent value that comes from the B-52 and other
systems that Admiral Willard would send to the fight in Korea
is a huge--more than just a deterrent value, it is critical for
our war fight and it is key component in order to be able to
take down long-range systems, to include missiles that would be
coming towards South Korea.
But that is from a Korean perspective of what we are
working together to be able to do. I don't know if you want to
add any comment?
Ms. Bordallo. Admiral.
Admiral Willard. I would just comment that among five
treaty allies in the Asia-Pacific region, the Republic of Korea
is certainly an important one.
The systems at Andersen Air Force Base in Guam,
specifically the B-52s and B-2s, as you have mentioned, are an
element of the extended deterrents that the United States
affords our allies and partners in the region.
And certainly their ability to respond to contingency on
the Korean Peninsula is an important part of why they are
there.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I have one quick question, one more.
This is for you, Admiral Willard. We have had some
significant achievements in progress in reducing the
capabilities of extremists in the southern Philippines, thanks
to a number of initiatives with the Philippine military,
including the State Partnership Program.
Are there any lessons in this anti-insurgency strategy in
the Philippines that we could utilize in Afghanistan?
Admiral Willard. I think that is a good question.
The southern Philippines has been a relative success, we
believe. Over the past half dozen years, the 400 or 500 special
operators that Pacific Command has maintained in the southern
Philippines have done a credible job in working with the Armed
Forces of the Philippines in order to defeat and contain Abu
Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah extremists that were
operating there.
And we think we are at a point where planning can commence
for a next phase.
So in general, we consider this to have been successful.
I think one of the key comparisons between the southern
Philippines and Afghanistan has been the role that the Armed
Forces of the Philippines have played in the lead of this
counterterrorism effort.
And when you consider the work that is ongoing in
Afghanistan, in order to build up the Afghani security forces
and Afghan police forces, in order to make them as self-
sufficient and accomplished as the Armed Forces of the
Philippines has been, it points to the need for that work to
continue.
So, I think the idea of our Armed Forces being in support
of a self-sufficient host-nation armed force that can conduct
the counterterrorism in the lead is the lesson that we have
derived from our success in the Philippines.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much and thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
I would like you to take two questions for the record, if
you would, because I think that at the table, you may not have
the consultation necessary to formulate an adequate answer.
The first for Admiral Willard, the Chinese, as you know,
are buying oil reserves all over the world. We use 25 percent
of the world's oil. We produce--we have only 2 percent of the
world's reserves. We import about two-thirds of what we are
using and yet we are buying no oil reserves anywhere in the
world.
You might note that at the same time, the Chinese are
aggressively building a blue-water navy.
Why this difference in our national strategies, relative to
the purchase of oil? And how should this instruct us for our
future planning?
General Sharp, there is a nuclear detonation above the
atmosphere in--over Korea. The North Koreans, in a panic, call
and say, gee, I am sorry that bird got away from us, but we
detonated it in the atmosphere so it wouldn't produce any harm.
Of course, it will produce a huge electromagnetic pulse.
How much of your warfighting capability will be decremented
by this as compared to the North Koreans? And what will be the
effect of that on our warfighting capability?
I would like to read a couple of brief paragraphs from an
op ed piece in the April 4th commentary in the Washington
Times. It is called ``Dear Leader to Dead Duck.'' And it is
ostensibly written by Kim Jong-Il and he is admonishing Qadhafi
as to his failures.
``The imperialists call us both crazy men, but there is a
difference. They fear my craziness, not yours. This time last
year, our glorious North Korean military forces struck like a
hammer and sank a warship belonging to the puppet regime below
our southern border. What did the imperialist forces do?
Nothing. A few months later, we shelled the territory, right in
the middle of their war-game practices. What did they do this
time? Again, nothing.''
``You, on the other hand, have not raised a hand against
these sniveling hypocrites for many years. You played ball with
them, as they like to say. You allowed the yellow wind of
capitalism to blow through your country. You invited the giant
capitalist bloodsucker BP to siphon off your people's
birthright for its own profit, all so fat capitalists can ride
around in luxury vehicles.''
``Oh, what a mistake it was to give away your weapons of
mass destruction.''
And it goes on.
And my question is, how much of the world sees it this way?
General Sharp. Sir, I believe that--I can talk for the
Republic of Korea and our alliance there, is that we do believe
that North Korea is continuing to develop their nuclear
weapons.
Kim Jong-Il has said that. He has said the importance of
that to him; that he will--his plan is to continue to do that.
I do not believe that he will give that up.
What we worked to do is to be able to deter future attacks
that will come out of North Korea, like the two that are
mentioned in those articles.
The Republic of Korea and the U.S. since then have made
great progress in strengthening the defenses for the types of
provocations that North Korea has and could do in the future.
We are working very hard to have appropriate plans in place
to not only deter, but be prepared for a strong response
against North Korea.
I think that from a South Korean perspective, the attack on
YP-do, Yeonpyeong-do, on the 23rd of November changed the
Republic of Korea. At that time, the Republic of Korea,
everybody across the nation was watching that attack live on
their handheld devices.
It was clear evidence that North Korea was willing to
attack the Republic of Korea and kill civilians. And that
changed the Republic of Korea's view that if North Korea does
attack again, a very, very strong response, proportionate, but
strong response, in self-defense will be going back towards
North Korea.
There was a response on the 23rd of November, a fairly
rapid response that went back as far as artillery, back towards
the source of the provocation.
Since then, a lot of work has been done to really determine
what is the appropriate response and the accuracy of that for
future types of provocations.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much and I look forward to
your written responses to my questions for the record. Thank
you very much.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Willard, General Sharp, I want to thank you both
for your attendance here today and most especially for your
service to our Nation.
Let me begin by also thanking the sailors and marines who
have assisted with the recovery effort in Japan. They are
obviously--Japan is one of our Nation's most important friends
and allies in the region and, clearly as a sign of respect and
a sign of how important that friendship is, that we send our
best and brightest young men and women to their aid in their
time of their national need.
Gentlemen, I want to discuss several topics right now that
are of personal interest to me around two strategic issues vis-
a-vis our military posture in the region.
Over the past 10 years, China has made significant
investments in their ability to project regional sea power,
specifically a rapid increase in the size of their submarine
fleet.
In the U.S., we have begun the process of doubling our
production rate for the superior Virginia-class submarine.
However, we still face the near-term challenge of a declining
fleet.
So Admiral Willard, can you please discuss some of the
importance of the U.S. submarine fleet in the Pacific and
China's decision to increase its seapower projection
capabilities?
Admiral Willard. I think, unquestionably, China has made
tremendous investment in its maritime capabilities across the
board, to include the PLA [People's Liberation Army] Navy. And
we have no doubt that they have aspirations to make that a
blue-water navy that is deployable around the world and they
are demonstrating that today, with anti-piracy operations in
and near the Gulf of Aden. And they demonstrated it, to a
lesser extent, by moving some of their surface fleet into the
Mediterranean Sea during the Libya crisis in order to assist in
evacuating Chinese citizens.
So, they are expanding their fleet, patrolling more,
penetrating the first island chain and extending their
operations further into the Pacific on a fairly steady pace.
The importance of United States submarines to the Asia-
Pacific can't be overstated. The submarines afford us both a
covert and highly capable platform from which to characterize
the undersea environment and to help to dominate that domain.
The increased production of the Virginia-class submarine, I
think, was a critical national decision for the United States
and a very important one for the naval forces. And I think an
important one, at the end of the day, for U.S. Pacific Command.
And there is no question that within that PLA Navy
expansion, they have placed great emphasis on an expanding
submarine force in their own right. And we endeavored to watch
that development, that dimension of the PLA Navy development,
very closely.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral.
The second issue I wanted to discuss was the threat to the
U.S. and our allies from ballistic missile attack. The North
Korean government has proven time and again its willingness to
dangerously push the line of what is acceptable behavior in the
region.
Given their interest in developing missile technology and
nuclear capabilities, it is vitally important to retain a
serious missile defense capability in the region. Admiral
Willard and General Sharp, could you both please discuss our
regional defense--missile defense capabilities and their
importance, not only to our own forces, but to the long-term
security of our regional allies?
In addition, what challenges do we face, relying on
shipborne systems and is there any discussion of utilizing more
land-based systems, such as those proposed under the
President's European phased adaptive approach [PAA]?
Admiral Willard. I will begin if I may, to say that we
place great emphasis on what I would cast as a growing
ballistic missile defense capability in the Pacific.
There have been a number of investments, both on the
command and control side of missile defense as well as on the
platform and weapons side of missile defense.
Our Aegis fleet continues to grow in terms of its
capacities to provide for missile defense and the production
line of standard missiles that our missile defense capable
continues to produce.
That said, for the United States, recalling when ballistic
missile defense became a serious commitment, we continue to
grow the capacities that are required to contend with the
potential threats from sites such as North Korea.
We currently believe that we have an adequate missile
defense capability to contend with what we believe to be North
Korea's threat that is posed to the region and to the United
States.
We continue to work with allies and partners to see their
interest in developing their own missile defense capabilities.
As you are aware, the Japanese are investing substantially
there. And as General Sharp has already mentioned, the Korean
Peninsula is investing both in land-based and considerations
for sea-based tracking, if not ballistic missile defense
capabilities.
So this is a growing capability in the Asia-Pacific and a
growing capability, as you are aware, elsewhere. And yes, we
are considering the land-based systems that complement our sea-
based systems, such that we are not overly reliant on any
particular domain, but rather we have the defense and depth
that we think BMD [ballistic missile defense] demands.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral and General, thank you for your service to our
country and you have both done great jobs in helping to keep us
free.
And, Admiral, I particularly appreciate you mentioning your
wife, Donna. We know oftentimes our spouses have greater
sacrifices than we do. They just don't get to wear the medals.
So we appreciate you mentioning that.
Admiral, you have been great at talking about all the needs
that we have in the Pacific and we thank you for that.
In today's world, with all the gag orders we see coming
from the Pentagon and the prescreening that is going on,
oftentimes don't know what you can say and what you can't say,
and so the best we can do is throw out the questions we think
we need to ask for the defense of the country and then you can
either answer it or glance off of it.
But one of the things that I have been concerned about for
years is the growing modernization we see with the Chinese
military. It is unprecedented, I think, in terms of its speed
and the depth that we have seen.
And every time we ask about it, we always get the same
response. Well, we don't want a conflict with China.
None of us want a conflict with China.
I don't think they want a conflict with us.
Yet if you read all of their white papers, if you study
their literature, if you listen to their comments, everything
they do is focused upon us. Their modeling has our carriers in
their modeling. They look at our weapons systems to defend
against our weapon systems.
If we don't ask the same questions, we are not being smart.
We are being foolish.
And so when you look at our strategy, they always come down
to a number of things, but at the end, it is how long we can
withstand an intensified conflict.
If you look at some of their literature, they don't feel
that we can take a body blow and keep going for a long period
of time.
My question for you, this morning, is with the resources
you have under your command, if we did have an intense conflict
that were to develop, none of us want it, but if it were to
develop with the Chinese, given their growing modernization,
how long could we sustain that kind of conflict?
Admiral Willard. I think the question is a fair one. I
think the question is a very difficult one to answer when you
consider the vast number of scenarios that we may be discussing
here in terms of any contingency the United States Armed Forces
would face, depending on its intensity and the way in which we
would choose to deal with it.
There are obviously methods where United States Armed
Forces, together with the whole of government, can approach a
problem, not necessarily in the form of attrition warfare, in
the way that we have classically contended, at times, in the
past.
So, how symmetrical, how asymmetrical, we would choose to
approach a conflict matters and ultimately is part of the
answer to your question.
I think when you look around the world at what the United
States has contended with, in the Middle East, 10 years of
warfare and we remain pretty resilient and committed to
finishing the warfare that is currently ongoing in Afghanistan.
And at the same time, we are able to flex to issues like
Libya.
Or, in my case, flex to a large-scale disaster response in
Japan.
And continue to conduct an exercise series across the Asia-
Pacific, albeit, at a somewhat diminished rate. But
nonetheless, we meet our commitments throughout the region.
There is capacity in the Asia-Pacific that sometimes
belies, I think, the assumptions made regarding both the combat
power and the power to sustain operations there.
I am confident that I have got the force structure right
now postured forward and available to me to do the work that I
need to do, to include a next contingency, should I need to
confront one.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Admiral. And, General, thank you for
what you are doing.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I want to change the focus a little bit here and
go Down Under.
First, Admiral Willard, you mentioned New Zealand and
Australia in your written testimony and New Zealand's
contributions to supporting our common interests in a variety
of ways around the globe.
With regards to Australia, this is--I understand a
discussion going on with the Force Posture Review with
Australia and it is in discussion stage and I was curious about
PACOM's role and your assessment of the progress of these
discussions and the focus of these discussions?
Admiral Willard. Yes. Thank you.
The Australians have been extremely forward-leaning in
their overtures to the United States Government and to the
Department of Defense to consider whether or not increasing our
level of involvement with their armed forces, taking advantage
of some of the existing capacities in Australia would lend to
an improved Pacific Command posture, particularly in accessing
Southeast Asia and the South China Sea region.
And we have taken a hard look at that. I, myself, visited
Australia and nearly circumnavigated the continent. In viewing
areas in northern Australia, the prospects of an improving
force posture in those directions are very appealing.
I think that those ongoing between the United States
Government and Australia Government, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Ministry of Defense in Australia
will likely lead to fruitful opportunities for us to provide
for rotational forces in and out of Australia in the future. At
least I am hopeful for that.
As Secretary Gates made very clear, ultimately he will make
a proposal into the U.S. interagency and beyond his
recommendation. It will become a United States Government
decision at the end of the day, with the Australian Government,
obviously, in the ultimate discussion.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks.
And General Sharp, I sense you had some things to say with
regards to Mr. Langevin's comments on regional missile defense
and I had some questions about it too. So, I will give you the
opportunity to sort of build on what Admiral Willard said, with
regard to Mr. Langevin's question.
But just with regards to the regional aspect of missile
defense and how ROK [Republic of Korea] would fit into that?
General Sharp. That is right. Thank you for the opportunity
to say that.
Just real quickly, also, on New Zealand and Australia, they
are both, of course, key countries within the United Nations
[U.N.] Command in the Military Armistice Commission, and last
year were key components in the investigations of both of the
attacks on North Korea, and participate in our exercises. So
they are very important to my command also and what they would
do for U.N. sending states and work very closely with that part
of the alliance also.
The only thing I was going to mention, in addition, on
ballistic missile defense, is I think on a good defense, you
also need a very strong offense. And to be able to have the ISR
[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] type of
assets, to be able to look into North Korea, to see what they
are doing, I think what north--what the Republic of Korea is
doing now to buy a Global Hawk, what we have done in order to
be able to synchronize our ISR assets help in a ballistic
missile, overall, architecture also.
And then finally, on the proliferation side, PSI
[Proliferation Security Initiative] is a big element to get
nations to be able to work together to not allow proliferation
of missiles out of North Korea, that type of technology to
include nuclear technology and the Republic of Korea, being a
member of the PSI group now, and recently hosting a large
conference and exercise along those line are other things that
are being done in order to be able to help stop both the use
and the proliferation of missile technology and nuclear
capability.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. And then just quickly, I will see how
quickly you can answer this question.
In your testimony, you mentioned tour normalization as, I
think, as affordable, perhaps. Does that indicate the budget is
not big enough for tour normalization? Or how is that
progressing?
General Sharp. As I said, we are at the point now where we
have reached about our capacity for all of the facilities that
we have to bring families there now.
And the limiting factor, to be honest, is schools and the
building of more schools will be the next that go up.
As Secretary Gates has said on several occasions, the goal
is to be able to move to full tour normalization. But that
costs money in order to be able to build the schools, to be
able to build the apartments in order to be able to do that.
And that is what we yield back to Secretary Gates. What is
affordable? Over what time period in order to be able to
complete this very important initiative, so that, I mean,
today, as we sit here, there are 7,000 families that are
separated for a year because we don't have the infrastructure
in Korea to be able to afford to bring them.
Secretary Gates has directed that we work to be able to do
that at an affordable pace. As I said, in my opening earlier,
that is what we owe him back over the next several months, so
he can give direction to the service forces as they build their
POMs [Program Objectives Memoranda] for submission next year.
Mr. Thornberry [presiding]. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for your service.
You certainly have an incredibly important area of the world as
we look to the threats that are emerging.
As we look to the threats that are emerging from North
Korea and also from Iran, we turn to our issues of discussing
missile defense and I would appreciate if you could discuss how
the missile defense mission and the multi-mission capability of
the Aegis ballistic missile defense ships are affecting the
overall force structure requirements for the Aegis fleet.
In particular, can you describe how operational
considerations, such as the need for additional ships, for
force protection, influence PACOM's overall missile defense
force structure requirements, recognizing that an Aegis ship is
going to need assistance, while it is providing missile defense
capability?
And according to a Defense News article in June of 2010,
they stated that U.S. Aegis radar readiness plunges and
indicated that it is in the worst shape ever, raising questions
about the service fleets' ability to take on a high-profile new
mission next year, defending Europe from ballistic missiles.
Could you please discuss any Aegis readiness concerns that
you may have and how it may impact the Navy's ability to meet
missile defense mission requirements?
Admiral.
Admiral Willard. I will start with the second question
first, if I may, and discuss the readiness piece.
With the exception of all of our ships being steamed at a
very high pace, and by and large they have been for the last
decade, while we have been occupied in wars elsewhere and
moving forces around a great deal, also maintaining our forward
presence in the Asia-Pacific, there are not overarching
concerns about Aegis readiness in my fleet.
So, as far as Pacific Command is concerned, the readiness
of the Aegis fleet, in terms of conducting its ballistic
missile defense mission or any of its other multi-mission
tasks, is not a concern for me.
With regard to the multi-mission role of Aegis, and its
self-protection capability, these are very competent platforms.
As you allude, they have about a half a dozen missions that
they contribute to, to include the intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance mission that was previously mentioned, but
also an air defense mission, a surface defense mission, an
undersea warfare mission and so on.
So they are contributing to a great deal at any time when
they are at sea.
The ballistic missile defense capabilities that they have
are limited only by virtue of the capability of the missile
systems that they are employing.
So as we see advances in the SM-3 system and larger
envelopes, the freedom of action that the ships will have to
operate at extended ranges away from ballistic missile sites
where they can also perform that function will increase.
So, over time, the freedom of action of ships committed to
ballistic missile defense will improve as they also perform
their other functions.
I would have to understand the scenario you described to
say that they themselves have to be protected while they are
conducting BMD. The----
Mr. Turner. Well, certainly they have needs for additional
systems.
I mean, but that does provide some demand on your overall
ship force structure.
Admiral Willard. Well, we operate in a variety of modes,
you know, with other ships, sometimes singly. These ships,
again, are pretty self-sufficient.
So to understand the conditions under which they would be
operating in a surface action group or in a larger carrier
strike group as opposed to independently is something that is
probably worth discussion.
But, by and large, these ships are self-sufficient and, as
you suggest, multi-role. To the maximum extent possible, we
intend to keep them that way.
As the ballistic missile defense missile systems continue
to improve, the freedom of action to have these ships located
at extreme distances from the ballistic missile threat sites
will continue to improve as well.
Mr. Turner. I look forward to having additional
conversations about that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General and Admiral, for being here.
Mrs. Willard, thank you especially for your service. When
we consider our military personnel, their families are front
and foremost, also, with our considerations.
General, we had talked about and you had mentioned earlier
that South Korea has stated that, you know, if there are any
provocations from North Korea they will respond in kind, and
greater.
In your opinion, how much of an impression can they make on
North Korea? Can they--I am not asking for specifics, but,
also, you all discussed this and is there any concern that they
might overreact to provocation?
General Sharp. Thank you. South Korea has a very strong
military force that continues to grow stronger every day.
In fact, they recently just published their new defense
reform plan based upon a lot of lessons learned out of 2010 and
are really focusing on the ability to be a more joint type of
force that is optimized towards the North Korea threat that we
see for today and in the future.
Without getting into classified session, I have reviewed
the plans that the Republic of Korea, and we have worked
together on for a variety of different types of provocations.
They are strong, appropriate and meet the test of self-
defense. I am confident in General Han, the Republic of Korea's
chairman--who is a chairman for the Republic of Korea, and
Minister Kim's capability to make sure that they, the South
Koreans, do not unnecessarily escalate.
What North Korea will do is up to North Korea. But I am
absolutely confident that South Korea has the controls that the
response that goes back will be firm, but it will not force an
uncontrolled escalation from a South Korean perspective.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, sir.
Admiral, we had hearings in the previous Congress. At one
point in time, our ships as they were in international waters,
were being, for lack of a better word, harassed by the Chinese
fishing boats, whatever.
We had trouble just simply making our way through the
waters without, you know, fear of hitting other boats. You
know, memory doesn't serve perfectly, but there were a couple
of points where, you know, we did have interaction with some of
these other ships.
But I don't hear about that so much now at all. What is the
status of that?
Are they continuing to harass our movements in
international waters? Or what is this relationship now?
Admiral Willard. From the standpoint of the Chinese
maritime activities in and around the East China Sea and South
China Sea, Yellow Sea regions where we sometimes operate, we
have not had confrontations with the PLA Navy or with their
maritime security forces since the incidents that you allude
to.
The Chinese do continue to shadow some of our ships as they
conduct their missions in international waters that are
proximate to China.
The confrontations that have occurred have occurred with
our partners and allies in the region. You are, no doubt, aware
of the incidents that occurred with the Japanese over the
Senkakus and confrontations continue to persist in the South
China Sea, most recently, with a Philippine ship that was
operating there.
So we continue to observe for, watch over, the maritime
activities across the board that are occurring in the Southeast
Asia region and East Asia region in order to ascertain where
confrontations or conflict could emanate.
But, to date, this year, there have been no confrontations
with our forces.
Mr. Kissell. Admiral, at one time, these confrontations
were to the point where we had a hearing about it to talk about
it; and, now that has been withdrawn is there a particular
reason that you might know that they pulled back there? Or was
it just recognizing that maybe that wasn't the best policy?
Or just why do you think maybe that was negated in terms of
what they are doing in terms of the relationship with us?
Admiral Willard. Well, I think probably two things. One, I
think the assertions made last year by the United States, in
particular, Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton, very strong
statements within the ASEAN and the Shangri-La Dialogue series
I think had an effect.
I think the fact that the ASEAN nations themselves
coalesced, marshaled around one another to protest the very
assertive actions that we were seeing out of the Chinese over
various maritime activities in the South China Sea.
I think for those reasons they have at least tactically
withdrawn from any confrontations.
But, as well, we have resumed military-to-military
relations with China. We at U.S. Pacific Command hosted a
military maritime consultative agreement round of talks with
them which has to do with maritime safety and air safety.
And as you know, there had been visits in both directions
with the President Hu's visit that had been preceded by
Secretary Gates' visit to China.
I think any time that the military-to-military relationship
is ongoing and continuous, that the likelihood of confrontation
such as you suggest is diminished.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Willard, General Sharp, thank you so much for
joining us today. I enjoyed seeing you there at Newport News at
the USS California ceremony there.
Mrs. Willard, thank you so much for your effort there as
the ship's sponsor. That was a great, great day.
Admiral Willard, I did want to speak a little bit about
what is going on with China's efforts to modernize their naval
forces. As we know, there are some significant issues there.
They are expanding their capability both with carriers and
with other elements of their navy in being able to project sea
power across the world.
They are on the road to, I think, creating a fairly capable
navy. As we know, they certainly have the quantity elements
that begin to create some concern for us. They are working on
the quality side of things.
Right now, they are looking at it from a littoral zone
issue as far as creating that force. But they are also
projecting force out and beyond those particular areas and with
a focus to, I think, go well beyond the littoral zone around
China.
As you know, just this past year, we have seen a Chinese
presence in the Horn of Africa, also in the Mediterranean, the
Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.
So, that tells me that they are on track to do a little bit
more than just protecting their shipping lanes and their
littoral areas.
In going back and looking historically about how the
development of navies have occurred, I would like to go back to
historian Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan and his idea about
sea power.
And of course, he projected this structure that nations go
forthwith to be able to project sea power. As you know, at the
end of the 19th century, he wrote pretty eloquently about that.
In the years to come, Japan, the U.S., Germany and Britain
all followed that. I think they have been pretty successful in
projecting that particular seapower force.
I want to ask you a question. That is, from their efforts
in sustaining and executing sustained power projection through
a navy--and, granted, they have got a ways to go--but in the
21st century with the pace at which they are pursuing this, how
do you see that as a challenge to our naval and air forces
there at the Pacific Command?
And where do you think that we need to be in order to make
sure that we are countering that in that particular region in
addition to all the other places where we are pulled to as we
have humanitarian efforts that we are called to in that region?
Let me ask you in your estimation where you see the Chinese
future projection of naval power as a challenge and concern
there for Pacific Command.
Admiral Willard. I think, unquestionably, the Chinese have
aspirations to expand their naval presence and are expanding
their naval presence.
Your summary, I think, was a very good one in terms of
where they are operating today. We have no illusions that they
don't desire to operate further into the Pacific and likely
into the Indian Ocean region as well.
I think they are learning to sustain their forces
elsewhere. It takes time and training and persistence to
understand how to sustain forces logistically when they are
underway for long periods of time.
They have done an incredible job with their counter-piracy
effort. And I think, as a consequence, they are rolling the
lessons learned back into their other naval activities.
Most of their naval presence is in patrol activities in the
Bohai, Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea region and
will likely continue to be there for the foreseeable future as
they explore their ability to conduct business elsewhere.
In terms of concerns for Pacific Command, I think as long
as we remain uncertain regarding future Chinese intent, either
with their naval forces or any of their military forces, it is
important that we take the necessary steps and make the
necessary investments to pace those changes as we see them
occur and be able to contend with any possibility of something
other than a constructive Chinese navy or a constructive
Chinese military in the region.
That said, through the mil-to-mil dialogue that is
currently occurring and, I think, with patience and persistence
on the part of the United States in trying to work with China,
that at the end of the day, we may see a Chinese military,
including a Chinese navy, that is contributing to the broader
security of the region and not, instead, contending it.
Mr. Wittman. Okay.
Mr. Thornberry. Mrs. Hanabusa.
Mrs. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Aloha, Admiral and Mrs. Willard.
Welcome, General and Admiral. Thank you for testifying.
My question is, first, with the Admiral. Admiral Willard,
especially for those of us in Hawaii, we are watching what is
going on in Japan very critically.
But we also do know that prior to this there were issues
regarding the Democratic party and when they took over the
Japanese Government and what the relationships would be with
us.
I think we were just getting to the point where we were
getting a better understanding and then the tsunami and, of
course, the earthquake tsunami and now the problems with the
Fukushima-Daiichi has emerged.
First, can you explain to me how important a role Japan
plays as our ally in the Pacific area?
Secondly, with what we have now experienced in all these
different chains of events--and let's not also forget the
constitution of Japan, which has limitations as to their
military ability, what are we going to have to do, at least in
the short term, to compensate for what is going on in Japan,
assuming that their military role, with us, is critical?
Admiral Willard. Yes, thank you very much, Congresswoman.
We hear the alliance between the United States and Japan
often referred to as cornerstone. I think that probably
understates the importance of the alliance between the United
States and Japan.
In Northeast Asia, the ability to maintain a forward force
presence in Japan affords us access into the Asia-Pacific
region that otherwise would be very difficult to achieve.
I think that it is a mutually beneficial alliance. I think
the Japanese military, as a consequence of U.S. presence, has
grown to be formidable and capable and, as you have already
witnessed, extremely interoperable with our forces.
I think the combination of the forward forces in Japan and
the forward forces on the Korean Peninsula afford the United
States an unprecedented deterrent forward in Northeast Asia
that could be regarded as extended beyond that.
So, you can't understate the importance of the alliance, in
general.
In the short term, the Japanese defense forces are
committed to assisting in saving Northern Honshu and their
nation from the confluence of disasters that they have
experienced.
At the same time, they remain a very accomplished force.
They are continuing to conduct their military business in the
region, notwithstanding the 100,000 or so ground forces that
are committed to helping in Northern Honshu.
I think that at the conclusion of this, as we finish the
work of disaster response and humanitarian relief and turn it
back over to agencies and the Government of Japan to administer
to their people, you will see the U.S.-Japan alliance stronger
as a consequence of the support that we have provided and the
work that we have done together.
You will see a Japanese defense force that will emerge from
this stronger for having experienced it.
Mrs. Hanabusa. So, Admiral, you don't believe that the
change in the political party structure is going to interfere
with our future relationship with Japan?
Admiral Willard. I think that there were fits and starts as
the DPJ [Democratic Party of Japan] administration assumed
control of the Japanese Government. We saw that with one prime
minister that ultimately departed in the midst of the Futenma
Replacement Facility debate that was ongoing.
Prime Minister Kan has enumerated many times his commitment
to the U.S.-Japan alliance. I think he remains a strong
proponent.
I think after what has been witnessed following this
regretful disaster in Japan, he will remain a strong advocate
of the alliance and our way forward.
So, right now, I am encouraged by the government's position
with regard to alliance matters and the United States military
and support to it in general.
Mrs. Hanabusa. Mahalo, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Admiral Willard. Mahalo.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Sharp, I have a cousin under your command over
there right now. My wife's cousin has been over there.
And just a question on the Korea issue; the people in South
Korea and North Korea, is there a general desire that that be a
unified country? Or do you believe that that leadership is in
the way of the unification?
Or do you believe that even with different leadership we
would still see a South Korea and a North Korea?
General Sharp. Sir, from the people of the Republic of
Korea from South Korea from the president on down, there is a
strong desire for a peaceful unification over time. There is no
doubt in my mind about that.
From a North Korean perspective, I think Kim Jong-Il
focuses on regime survival, under any terms, in council and his
continued development of nuclear capability and these
provocative acts in order to be able to have his regime
survive.
Mr. Scott. So when the mortality tables catch him, is that
going to be an opportunity there for the peace and unification
of Korea? Is that----
General Sharp. Sir, as you know, you know, Kim Jong-Un is
his youngest son; we believe we see indications that he may be
becoming groomed to be the successor.
Now, what he does as he becomes the leadership in North
Korea is yet to be seen. Obviously, we call upon him and
whoever succeeds, you know, the succession process, within Kim
Jong-Il, within the regime, to take advantage of that
opportunity to be able to care more about their people and care
more about human rights and dignity. But we don't see the
indications of that happening, to be quite blunt.
That is why we as a Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance are
working very hard to make sure that we are prepared for a North
Korea of the future that could potentially continue the types
of acts that we have seen over the last couple of years and
that continue to work to develop nuclear weapons.
Again, there is another path that North Korea could take.
But we have not seen indications that they are willing or ready
or able to do that.
Mr. Scott. Are other countries, in your opinion, working to
nudge them down that path, to encourage that path? Or do you
think that they are standing in the way of that path?
General Sharp. I think that if you look at, really, the
entire world, after the actions that North Korea took, not only
last year, and the condemnation that they got from the United
Nations, but also in previous years after the Taepodong launch,
which was in direct violation of United Nations Security
Council [UNSC] and the nuclear test, the world has called on
North Korea to change their ways.
But, as I said before, we don't see any action from North
Korea headed in that direction at this time.
Mr. Scott. Okay. Thank you, sir.
Admiral Willard, the nation's 17th Joint STARS
[Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] aircrafts are based
out of my district, Robins Air Force Base.
With everything going on, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, I mean,
if something did start, if we got into an action with North
Korea, would we have the ISR capabilities that we need?
Or is that an area that we are stretched thin and with all
the actions that are occurring around the world right now?
Admiral Willard. Well, I would answer it in two ways. First
of all, the ISR capabilities on the Korean Peninsula are
probably as robust as they are anywhere in our military and
consistently are maintained as such because we are in armistice
and because we are constantly deterring the North.
So, General Sharp enjoys, you know, a capability and,
frankly, a priority and commitment from the United States in
order to meet his surveillance needs.
That has only been improved upon and has gained more focus
since the events last year and, particularly, since the crisis
on the Korean Peninsula on December 20th of last year.
When you consider the way in which we invest in our
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities,
where, at large, during peacetime we kind of spread those
capabilities around to the various combatant commands to meet
all of our requirements, whether they are space-based or air-
breathers or ground-based sensor systems.
Whenever we go to war, or whenever a contingency erupts
somewhere in the world, we tend to bias those capabilities
toward that contingency.
So, for 10 years, we have given over many of those
capabilities to the Middle East wars that have been fought.
When something like Libya erupts, ISR goes in that direction.
Frankly, when Japan and natural disasters occurred, ISR
came in our direction in order to meet the demand signal of
trying to characterize the Fukushima plants and the area that
was affected by the natural disaster.
So, we share in those assets, and they tend to move around
wherever they are in demand.
General Sharp. If I may just add to that from a coalition
perspective, we work very hard in Korea to take advantage of
the capabilities not only of U.S. ISR, but the Republic of
Korea ISR.
So, we have a combined intel center with analysts from both
the Republic of Korea and the United States that have been
working this problem on the Korean side for years and years.
It is not just about airborne, it is, again, all of the
different components of intel to make sure that we are getting
a full picture of what is going on inside North Korea.
So it is the U.S. assets that combine with the Republic of
Korea and the tactics, techniques and procedures that we
learned over the years give us that robust capability that we
really need.
And coalitions like what we have with the Republic of Korea
are key to be able to do that in our part of the world and,
really, around the world.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, both.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses for their service and their
testimony.
It is almost exactly a year ago to the day when the Cheonan
was attacked by North Korean mini-subs. The forensic evidence
is indisputable in terms of the analysis that was done.
Frankly, the denial of that evidence by the Chinese
Government, even to some degree the Russian evaluation of this,
I mean, frankly, when I listen to your answer, General, about
the sort of international isolation of Korea in terms of its
actions the last few years, I mean, frankly, in terms of at
least the Cheonan, that really hasn't been the case.
In terms of the mil-to-mil relationships, which you have
been talking about with China, Admiral Willard, I mean,
frankly, that is pretty discouraging because, I mean, that
action just falls so outside any acceptable norm in terms of
international law and, certainly, protection of sea lanes.
I mean, can you update us at least in terms of whether or
not you think there is any hope that we are going to get that
international consensus about how, again, they violated,
really, every level of law and decency in terms of what that
attack represented.
Admiral Willard. Are you referring to China----
Mr. Courtney. Yes.
Admiral Willard [continuing]. Russia not acknowledging
the----
Mr. Courtney. Correct.
Admiral Willard [continuing]. International investigation
report and so forth?
Mr. Courtney. Yes.
Admiral Willard. Unquestionably, there has been alignment
on the part of both China and to, as you suggest, to a somewhat
lesser extent, Russia, to moderate any condemnation of North
Korea's actions last year.
And that was disappointing. But it is important to realize
that the PRC [People's Republic of China] remains an ally of
North Korea. They maintain a mutual defense treaty together.
The longstanding philosophy of the PRC has been one of non-
interference and a very strong desire for status quo or
maintenance of just a stable condition on the Korean Peninsula
regardless of the provocation that may have caused a
disruption.
We saw evidence of that replay itself last year. It is
nothing new.
It is an area in which the U.S. view and Chinese view are
highly divergent. It is an area that I think between our two
governments continues to need work, to your point.
Mr. Courtney. I think that is a good answer. I just would
say that, in this case, I mean, what we are really talking
about just isn't about, sir, non-intervention. But it is really
about denial of the truth about what happened there.
I mean, that is what, again, in my opinion just raises a
series of questions about, you know, how healthy the
relationship is with the Chinese Government and military.
I have only got about a minute and a half.
I guess a follow-on question to that incident, you know, by
all sort of press and public accounts, I mean, there clearly
was a problem there for the Chinese Navy--excuse me--the South
Korean Navy in terms of being able to detect these mini-subs in
very shallow waters.
You know, we have talked a lot about sea-based deterrents.
I mean, if there is, it sort of raises a question about
whether or not sonar capability is a problem in terms of making
sure that we are going to have, you know, robust, sea-based
deterrents if there are all these mini-subs that are being able
to sort of hide in the noise of shallow waters.
I wonder if you can sort of comment on whether or not you
feel confident that we are okay and frankly, do we need to do
more to help the South Korean Navy to deal with that issue?
Admiral Willard. To your last point, we are doing more to
help the South Korean Navy with their ASW [anti-submarine
warfare] readiness and preparedness.
The U.S. 7th Fleet has a long-term goal and a series of
milestones to accomplish that. So we continue to train with the
ROK Navy in earnest to ensure that our readiness is maintained
at a very high level.
But I think, to your first point, it is important to
recognize that what occurred with Cheonan was an unprovoked,
surprise attack, unexpected, typical of the provocations that
we have experienced by Kim Jong-Il in the past.
So this was a sneak attack, as you suggest, by a mini-sub
with a torpedo in a shallow-water area when the relationship
between the two militaries and the relationship on the water
that particular night, you know, would not have caused their
sonar men or anyone else in the military to have expected an
egregious attack such as occurred. So very difficult to ever
predict or imagine preventing an unprovoked surprise attack,
one-off, such as occurred with Cheonan.
But I think, to your point, that there is certainly a view
inward that has been taken by the ROK Navy. We will continue to
support, and General Sharp will oversee, and that is the
improvement of readiness and elimination of vulnerabilities
across the board to the extent that we can among both--across
both sides, U.S. and Republic of Korea.
General Sharp. And the Republic of Korea has not just stood
idly by. They have aggressively gone after changes to their
tactics, techniques and procedures out in the Northwest Island
area in order to be able to counter that type of threat from
the future.
If you look in their defense reform, what they plan on
buying and positioning out to take the sub threat and to be
able to reduce their vulnerabilities, they are putting it
against that, also.
As Admiral Willard said, we work very aggressively in some
anti-sub warfare exercises in order to be able to have the
strongest both deterrent but then preparation if North Korea
decides to continue that in the future.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Sharp, Admiral Willard, thank you for your service
to our country.
General Sharp, first of all, I appreciate your time
yesterday and the information you shared with me on the great
job the men and women of U.S. Forces Korea do on a daily basis.
General, I understand that the Republic of Korea will
assume wartime operational control in 2015. Are you confident
their forces are ready to assume this role, and if not, what
action must be taken to ensure they become ready?
General Sharp. Thank you, sir. I did very much enjoy
visiting with you yesterday afternoon.
I am absolutely confident that by 1 December, 2015, the
Republic of Korea will be ready to take operational control and
leadership of a future war fight.
We are working very hard with the Republic of Korea as part
of, as I said in my opening statement, the Strategic Alliance
2015 Agreement that was signed by the Secretary and the
Minister last October to ensure that readiness.
Let me highlight just a couple important points that are in
that agreement. And it also includes the milestones in order to
be able to make sure that this event will occur and that,
actually, the alliance will be stronger because of it.
First off, we are working with the Republic of Korea to
develop what are the capabilities they need in order to be able
to lead the war fight after 2015 and--ensuring that once that
that is agreed that that is in their budget they are bought,
organized, trained and equipped with those capabilities.
Secondly, we are revising our war plans to account for the
fact that the Republic of Korea JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff]
will be in the lead of the war fight across the full range of
the different war plans that we have. Those will be complete by
December 2015.
We will then take and exercise all of those war plans in
our two annual theater-level exercises that we will have
multiple times between now and 2015.
Then the last thing I will say is that the professionalism
and the capability of the Republic of Korea military is
outstanding.
I have seen over the last 3 years the capability, the
decision-making ability, the willingness and the ability to be
able to make sure that we are one team as an alliance between
Combined Forces Command and the ROK chairman staff, which will
be in the lead of the war fight, and increase enormously as a
result of all these provocations that we talked about.
So, yes, sir, I am confident that the Republic of Korea
will be ready to lead the defense of their own country while
maintaining the full commitment that the United States has as
part of the alliance, not reducing our force and commitment.
But they will be ready for the leadership role in 2015.
Mr. Coffman. General Sharp, I know in our discussion
yesterday that you felt that any reduction in the 28,500 U.S.
military personnel on the peninsula would be the wrong message.
But let me ask this question, that I understand that the
intention of the Department of Defense was to draw down
manpower at U.S. Forces Korea to 20,000, but that in 2008 the
decision was changed to maintain manpower at 28,500.
What would be the impact on operational readiness and the
overall effectiveness of your command if this level was brought
down to 20,000?
General Sharp. Sir, as you correctly stated, when Secretary
Gates came and looked at the path that we were on to move to
20,000, at that time, my predecessor, General Bell, came to say
we need to stop at where we are right now, which at the time
was 28,500.
I agree with that assessment, and Secretary Gates and
President Obama, for that matter, have stated that that will be
the level that we continue at in the future.
To reduce from that level would critically reduce our
capabilities in the very beginning part of a war fight to
receive forces that come in to reinforce, to help with the NEO
[noncombatant evacuation operation] in order to be able to get
our family members and U.S. citizens out there; to reduce--on
the Air Force side would reduce our capability to rapidly
strike into North Korea with the long-range artillery; 28,500
is the right amount for the war plans that we have in place now
and will have for the next several years.
Mr. Coffman. Do you think that after 2015 when the South
Koreans take operational control that the numbers should be
reexamined?
General Sharp. Sir, I think 28,500, looking at the war
plans and how we are currently working through what they will
look like after OPCON transition in 2015, the current number,
28,500, I believe is the right number to maintain for that war
fight and in the future.
Again, the main thing that changes after OPCON transition
is the leadership of the war fight. How we physically maneuver
forces on the ground, who has the responsibility for different
aspects of the war fight, for the most part stays the same.
So again, we always evaluate this when we go through
different analyses of our war fights and what the capability of
the Republic of Korea is and what the threat from North Korea
is.
But from what I see right now, 28,500 is the right number
for after OPCON transition also.
Mr. Franks [presiding]. Mr. Garamendi is now recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Admiral, to you, your
men and women in your command, the work that you are doing in
Japan dealing with the disaster there is extremely important.
And, I think, really represents the very best of America. We
thank you for that and thank all of them that are involved,
some in a very dangerous situation.
In response to a question maybe 15, 20 minutes ago, you
had, and this may be the end of the queries, you mentioned
communications with China and the military-to-military
communications.
Could you expand on that, the current status, your goals,
how you see that developing?
I agree with what you said very briefly before. It is
extremely important; if you could cover that, please.
Admiral Willard. Yes, thank you.
Well, first of all, the commitment that we have and what we
believe is the right future between the United States Armed
Forces and the Chinese military is that we achieve, maintain
and sustain a continuous military-to-military dialogue at the
highest levels and some level of exchange and contributing to
trust-building at other levels within our respective
militaries.
We have done, or have been very challenged in seeing that
achieved.
As you know, our mil-to-mil relationship with the Chinese
has been characterized by fits and starts often due to
disagreements between our two nations.
We went through nearly a year of hiatus last year as a
consequence of the last round of Taiwan arms sales, though we
have been episodically selling defense articles and services to
Taiwan for the last 30 years.
So, China gets a vote in this. But we have attempted to
convince them and discuss with them the importance of these
two, very consequential militaries in the Western Pacific
having the ability to discuss both areas in which we converge
and areas of difference.
I think that is the most important thing. We are currently
back in a mil-to-mil sequence, but one that is relatively
modest.
I would offer, you know, the promises that, ultimately, the
mil-to-mil relationship will be one that we have envisioned,
you know, probably not entirely achievable.
But, rather, some modicum of that right now would satisfy
me that we are headed in the right direction.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. At any time, have we cut off the
discussions?
Admiral Willard. With the Chinese?
Mr. Garamendi. Yes.
Admiral Willard. Not in my experience, no.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. One further question; the flow of
oil seems to be a lot about all that we are talking here.
Could you briefly discuss the Chinese view of the flow of
oil from the Middle East to China and the role of the American
Navy in that?
Admiral Willard. Well, the United States Navy for more than
a century has been providing security on the high seas and in
the Asia-Pacific region both in the Western Pacific and Indian
Ocean regions.
Given the importance of Middle East oil to our allies and
friends in the regions, ourselves and to include the Chinese,
the United States has been providing safety on those sea lines
of communication ranging back to tanker wars, if you will
recall in the 1980s, where we were protecting the tanker ships
exiting the Persian Gulf.
The Chinese have been insatiable consumers of many
resources, oil included. They regard the flow of oil as a
national security concern, I think, from the Middle East.
They have built both port structures, and they are
establishing pipelines into Western China from locations on the
Indian Ocean side in order to relieve the amount of strain on
the sea lines of communication themselves.
Nonetheless, choke points like the Strait of Malacca remain
crucial. I think we all regard its security and safety as
critically important.
The nations that guard the security of the strait is very
important to both us as well as to the Chinese.
Mr. Garamendi. Finally, in 10 seconds, Mr. Chairman, I want
to commend the Navy for its enthusiasm to look for other
sources of fuel besides carbon oil, in other words, advanced
biofuels.
Admiral Willard. We hope to have a carrier strike group
operating on advanced biofuels very shortly.
Mr. Garamendi. You are to be commended.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Franks. I am going to go ahead and ask my questions
now, gentlemen.
Thank you for both being here. I appreciate your service so
very much.
This is a sort of a follow-on related to a couple of
earlier questions, Mr. Bartlett's question, Ms. Bordallo's
question. Mr. Bartlett pointed out the incontrovertible reality
that when a nation becomes a nuclear-armed nation that our
diplomacy is radically altered.
To that point, it occurs to me that we need to be very
aware of how much North Korea is cooperating with other nations
or potentially passing on nuclear technology to other rogue
nations like Iran.
We know there has been a lot of discussion between the two
countries and work between the two countries related to their
missile technology.
It appears that Iran is now beyond even North Korea's
capability in missile technology.
So tell me, if you can, what our ability and our actions
are related to preventing North Korea from sharing nuclear
technology with other rogue nations.
I will let you both take a look at it.
General Sharp. Sir, as you know, there are several Security
Council resolutions which require other nations to, on the
proliferation side, to work very hard to make sure North Korea
is not proliferating any nuclear missile technology.
We have seen in the past--you know, we know the assistance
that North Korea gave to Syria several years ago for the
nuclear plant that they were building there.
We have seen on some of the missile proliferation things
where countries have stopped some shipments recently because of
proliferation.
The specific nuclear exchanges and information flow between
North Korea and Iran I think we would have to take into a
classified session to go into depth on that, sir.
Mr. Franks. But we are working on it is what you are
saying. Yes.
Well, let me just shift gears, then, because I don't want
to take us in the wrong direction.
There were recent reports that North Korea is nearing the
completion of an EMP [electromagnetic pulse] type of weapon. I
understand that they are using a lot of old Soviet-style
jamming capabilities to jam the South Korean GPS [Global
Positioning System] and that South Korea believes that that is
a wake-up call that this may be a tactic that North Korea will
use more and more in terms of their jamming capabilities.
If they are already working on an EMP weapon, do you have
any indication that they might be working on some sort an
intentional mechanical electromagnetic interference, some type
of device based EMP jamming capability?
And what about this EMP weapon that they talk about, an EMP
bomb as it were? I am told that it is made to detonate at 25
miles up, which is a conflict in my mind since most effective
EMP weapons would be higher and the 25 miles would be within
the atmosphere.
It occurs to me that that would be a suppression of the EMP
emission itself.
Do you know where they are on their EMP capability in terms
of weaponizing in either device-based or any sort of a nuclear
explosive--or a nuclear warhead-based EMP?
General Sharp. Sir, unfortunately, on the EMP side, we we
are going to need to take that into a classified session.
I can say on the GPS jamming side we have seen North
Korea's use of GPS jammers up on the Northwest part of the
Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea government has called
on North Korea to stop that jamming.
Mr. Franks. Do you think it portends a widening of a
particular tactic? Do you think they intend to develop their
jamming capability, either EMP or radiofrequency or otherwise?
General Sharp. Sir, I think North Korea has continued to
develop a lot of different capabilities in the asymmetric
threat capability way.
I think it is one of the ways, it is where they have been
putting their money between ballistic missile capability,
nuclear and special operating forces to asymmetrically try to
force change in South Korea to send messages to other
audiences, the United States, in particular, that they are a
nation that cannot be challenged.
I think they look for many different ways to do that.
Mr. Franks. Well, last question, gentlemen; I always try to
ask the question; what is the most important, the most
significant challenge that we face that needs to be addressed
from North Korea?
If you can do it at the 50,000-foot level where it doesn't
enter into any sort of classified concern and maybe let you
both take a shot at it.
Admiral Willard, sir, I will start with you on this one.
Admiral Willard. Yes, I think the most significant is
nuclearization and the development of ballistic missile
delivery systems that have now reached the point of being
intercontinental.
So, we are obviously concerned by that development. A de-
nuclearized North Korea is both the commitment that the
international community has made and an imperative, I think,
given the nature of this regime.
General Sharp. I agree with Admiral Willard. I will say it
in a slightly different way.
The status quo is no longer acceptable. The status quo, I
think, that the world sometimes sees in North Korea and says,
``let's just return to the status quo,'' is a status quo that
killed many Republic of Korea citizens and service members last
year.
It is a status quo that has launched ballistic missiles in
contravention with U.N. Security Council resolutions. It is a
status quo that has continued to develop nuclear weapons.
I think at the 50,000-foot level for the world and all of
the leadership of the world to understand status quo is no
longer acceptable because where it is heading is not acceptable
to the world.
To force change in North Korea is the number one challenge
that we and the world have for the future.
Mr. Franks. Well, General, I don't know if it impresses
you, but I agree with you. Thank you, sir.
Thank you both.
Mr. Runyan is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Willard, General Sharp, thank you for your service
to this country. Thanks for being here today.
Admiral, I just wanted to thank you for your response to
Mr. Turner's question earlier about the Aegis missile defense
system.
That is actually manufactured in my backyard, and I am sure
those men and women that work to create that system and
maintain it would appreciate those kind words.
But as far as you were talking earlier, and we were talking
about terrorism threats around the world.
You were talking how you were complimenting the Philippines
for their active duty and their preparedness for it.
You know, as far as your command engaging with other
international partners in Southeast Asia, do you think you have
the appropriate level of funding and/or the authorities to make
sure that, you know, is upheld in that region?
Admiral Willard. Are you referring to counterterrorism in
particular?
Mr. Runyan. Yes.
Admiral Willard. Yes, thank you. It is a great question.
In South Asia, to use a different location as an example,
we are endeavoring to work with Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka,
the Maldives and the nation of India to contain Lashkar-e
Tayyiba, a Pakistani-based extremist organization that is
already established in South Asia and was responsible for the
attack in Mumbai.
In order to accomplish that, we have been working very
closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense in ensuring
that we have adequate resources, including authorities to be
able to accomplish that mission.
To date, in the way that support to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines was
developed, we have had the authorities commensurate with the
mission that we were on.
As we attempt to build capacities in other nations, it is
important that we continue to identify shortfalls both in
authorities and shortfalls in resources to be able to build the
capacities in these partner nations such that they can become
increasingly self-sufficient in dealing with the extremist
organizations that are present there.
So, that is currently our focus in Bangladesh and Nepal
and, to a lesser extent, Sri Lanka and the Maldives right now.
We are operating within authorities that are adequate, I
would offer. And we are constantly seeking increased
authorities to give us more latitude in order to be less
episodic and more continuous in our efforts to build the
capacities with, through, and by these partner nations.
Mr. Runyan. To what extent have relations improved between
China and Taiwan and its impact on the strait?
Admiral Willard. I think the, you know, the evolution
throughout the Ma administration with regard to Taiwan-mainland
China relations, has been one of constant improvement. I mean,
we have been encouraged by the relationships that have existed.
I would offer that there is an election on Taiwan scheduled
for 2012. And that is worth watching over, given the fact that
this administration will soon be, you know, coming to an end
and a reelection process will then be unfolding.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, gentlemen, and I yield to Mr.
Conaway for 5 minutes.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, gentlemen.
Obviously, I am the only thing that stands between you and
getting out of here.
Admiral Willard, this doesn't fall under your
responsibility, but the NDAA [National Defense Authorization
Act] requires an annual assessment of Chinese military
capabilities, strategies and intentions due March 1st of each
year, still not here, as of the 6th of April.
Your command, I suspect, would have a chance to look at it
and have some influence on that. Have you had a chance to look
at that this year's version?
Admiral Willard. You are referring to the NDAA?
Mr. Conaway. Well, the NDAA's requirement that the OSD
provide us, the committee, with a report on China's military
capacities, locations and those kinds of things that is due
March 1st of each year----
Admiral Willard. Yes, sir. I would offer that we have been
in continuous dialogue with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense on all issues pertaining to China and China's military.
Mr. Conaway. Well, I understand. But, particularly, with
the report itself, apparently it hasn't risen to your level in
terms of----
Admiral Willard. It has not risen to my personal level.
Mr. Conaway. Is it something that you and your team used,
last year's report? I mean, do you use that data or that
information in the report for anything?
Admiral Willard. Certainly. We definitely consume it and
add it to the portfolio of China knowledge that we will then
carry on with for the remainder of the year.
Mr. Conaway. Okay, well, obviously, the NDAA and other
pieces of legislation require this in different reports.
It means someone has to do it and in this age of trying to
cut costs we are looking for those that have a meaningful
impact to the way you run your business, but then also give us
an insight into how you run your business and how it is done
and how that--so we do the oversight.
Admiral Willard. Understand.
Mr. Conaway. So if you wouldn't mind, next time you bump
into Secretary Mabus, just say, ``Hey, by the way, the
committee is asking about that report,'' one more time because
we think it is reported.
If you look through the list of things that we ask to be
assessed, it would appear to be the exact same things that you
would need to think about day in and day out as to how you run
PACOM.
General Sharp, good to see you again. I went over there one
time with former Chairman Skelton. It was a great trip.
As you are coming towards the command-sponsored tours
increase in Korea, are you concerned at all about the
incidences on the economy where, you know, people do stupid
stuff from time to time, not necessarily the things that
happened in Okinawa that helped drive some of the changes
there?
Have you had enough experience now to know that our kids
and their kids can get along and that this doesn't become sort
of a problem with the Koreans?
General Sharp. Sir, I am very satisfied. We watch, of
course, our incident rates very, very closely as we have more
service members and family members over there.
Korea is an extremely safe place to live. It is a great
place for our service members and their families to be there
because of the love that the Korean people have and the respect
that they have for U.S. forces there.
There was a recent poll that just came out from the State
Department that said, when asked to the people of the Republic
of Korea, ``What is the importance of U.S. forces on the
peninsula,'' over 87% said, ``Important,'' or, ``Very
important.''
So the incidents, there is always one or two, we do take
the appropriate action to be able to take care there. But I am
very proud of our service members and their families.
They understand they are ambassadors of the United States
to the Republic of Korea. They are living up to that
responsibility.
Mr. Conaway. That is good to hear because we do want to be
good guests, even though we are there to help them and protect
them from a lot of bad stuff.
So, gentlemen, thank you for your service. Thanks for being
here this morning.
I will yield back.
General Sharp. Thank you.
Mr. Franks. Well thank you, Mr. Conaway.
As it happens, he has left an extra minute. Therefore, Mr.
Larsen here has a final question.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Conaway.
Admiral Willard, last year, I was out at PACOM and visited
with the Pacific Fleet and Army. I think I met with the Marines
and Air Force just talking about building partner capacity
projects. I think the assessment was that things were going
very well.
But the question I have for you is how you think the dollar
flow works. Does it work well enough? Do they have the right
authorities to use relative to the things that we have done
here developing 1206 and 1208 in addition to the other grab bag
of tools that exist in the Federal budget for you all to do
this effort?
Can you give me an assessment about that? Not about how
well the project is going, but on how the budgets work and if
you have the authorities?
Or should it be fewer barriers between these accounts? Does
the flexibility help or not help? Can you talk about that a
little bit?
Admiral Willard. For the past several years, we have been,
I think, all pushing to streamline these instruments that allow
us to work with our partners throughout the world.
I say we. Collectively, all the combatant commanders, I
think, have been very interested in having ready access to the
tools that we have come to rely on and that enable that work to
occur, whether that is 1206 funding, IMET [International
Military Education & Training], foreign military financing
[FMF], foreign military sales [FMS].
I mean, these are items that are crucial with regard to the
relations that we have with the many partners throughout the
Asia-Pacific; 36 nations, 34 of which have militaries or
security forces that we are working alongside.
So the less the impediments and difficulties with regard to
administering to these instruments, the better.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. As a principle, that is great.
Any particular problems that you or your folks have faced?
Admiral Willard. I guess I would offer that coming from the
customer base----
Mr. Larsen. Right.
Admiral Willard [continuing]. At times, the inability of
FMS to be as responsive as it needs to be is probably the
biggest criticism that we receive.
There are many, many requests to be educated in and work
more closely, be trained inside the United States. So, for
those reasons, our IMET funding is crucial.
But, at the end of the day, I think delays, and complexity
of process with regard to the exchange of materials with our
partners, is the one most serious complaint that we hear.
Mr. Larsen. All right. Great, great.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Franks. Gentlemen, thank you very much for coming to
this committee. We have no way to express to you our gratitude.
We do our best, but we know that you are the ones that
carry the load of freedom on your back. The Nation owes you
beyond any ability it might articulate.
Thank you very much.
Admiral Willard. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Franks. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
?

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A P P E N D I X

April 6, 2011

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April 6, 2011

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

April 6, 2011

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Mr. Forbes. The Chinese have an extensive conventional missile
capacity and range to strike many of our existing bases. a. How do you
assess the adequacy of the U.S. military's capacity to withstand a
Chinese air and missile assault on regional bases? b. What steps are
being pursued to further strengthen regional bases' capacity to survive
such an assault and continue or resume operation? c. How do our
existing basing arrangements in South Korea, Japan and Guam serve to
impede the growing Chinese extra-territorial ambitions?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Forbes. How does PACOM assess the adequacy of resources
available to Department of Defense programs that seek to defend
forward-deployed U.S. bases to include theater missile defense and
early warning systems, hardened structures and hangers, air defense
systems, and runway repair kits?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Forbes. Last week, China released its defense white paper. What
new opportunities or concerns do you have as a result of this latest
strategy publication?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Forbes. What are the implications of China's military
modernization for PACOM's posture?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.].
Mr. Forbes. What are the perceptions of regional allies with regard
to the United States' global leadership and effectiveness as a
deterrent against regional aggression?
Admiral Willard. With five of our nation's seven mutual defense
treaties in the Asia-Pacific, we continue to work with our allies--
Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic of the Philippines and
Thailand--to strengthen and leverage our relationships to enhance the
security within the region.
Australia. Australia remains a steadfast ally who works tirelessly
to enhance global and regional security and provide institutional
assistance throughout the Pacific. Australia continues to lead the
International Stabilization Force in Timor-Leste and the Regional
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. Their contributions to
global security are evident by the recently increased force presence in
Afghanistan. As the largest non-NATO force provider, Australia has
committed to contribute to our effort to stabilize Afghanistan.
Australia emphasizes advancing interoperability and enhanced
defense cooperation with the U.S. through well-coordinated acquisition
and training programs. TALISMAN SABER 2009 (a biennial and bilateral
exercise) saw unprecedented participation focusing on policies,
tactics, hardware, logistics, and infrastructure. We are also
collaborating to enhance our cooperation in Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster
Relief (HADR) efforts.
Japan. Our alliance with Japan remains the cornerstone of our
strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and despite the recent rhetoric, it
remains strong. The new political environment provides us an excellent
opportunity to recognize the region's achievements enabled through the
security provided by our Alliance. Japan remains a reliable partner in
maintaining regional and global stability. In the spring and early
summer of 2009, Japan deployed two JMSDF ships and two patrol aircraft
to the Gulf of Aden region for counter-piracy operations. Although
their Indian Ocean-based OEF refueling mission was recently ended,
Japan remains engaged in the region by providing civil and financial
support for reconstruction and humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan and
Pakistan for the next foreseeable future.
Japan contributes over $4 billion in Host Nation Support (HNS)
annually. Although the Japanese defense budget has decreased each year
since 2002, the Japan Self Defense Forces continue to interact
bilaterally with the U.S., and trilaterally with the U.S. and our
allies, such as the Republic of Korea and Australia. Last year
witnessed the completion of several successful milestones in our
bilateral relationship, including the completion of a year-long study
of contingency command and control relationships and the Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) testing of a third Japan Maritime Self Defense
Force Aegis destroyer.
Republic of Korea (ROK). The U.S.-ROK alliance remains strong and
critical to our regional strategy in Northeast Asia. General Sharp and
I are aligned in our efforts to do what is right for the United States
and the ROK as this alliance undergoes a major transformation.
The transformation of the U.S.-ROK alliance will also help ROK
better meet security challenges off the peninsula. The ROK maintains a
warship in the Gulf of Aden in support of counter-piracy and maritime
security operations, and has provided direct assistance to Operation
Enduring Freedom. Of particular interest is the development of
trilateral security cooperation between the U.S., ROK, and Japan.
Although policy issues currently prevent us from realizing its full
potential, the shared values, financial resources, logistical
capability, and the planning ability to address complex contingencies
throughout the region make this a goal worthy of pursuing.
Republic of the Philippines (RP). The RP continues to be a key
contributor in overseas contingency operations while simultaneously
conducting a force-wide defense reform, transforming internal security
operations, and developing a maritime security capability. These
efforts support important U.S. regional initiatives and contribute to a
stronger Philippine government capable of assuming a greater role in
providing regional security.
In close partnership with the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), U.S. Pacific Command continues to support Philippine Defense
Reform (PDR). Through an approved Defense Transformation program, the
AFP, in accordance with its defense planning guidance, will manage
those portions of PDR with end states beyond 2011 and provide a
framework for the development of the programs necessary to transition
from internal security operations to territorial defense by 2016.
Thailand. Thailand remains a critical ally and engagement partner.
We appreciate Thailand's important global security contributions in the
overseas contingency operations, counter-narcotics efforts,
humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations, such as their
upcoming deployment to Sudan. Co-hosted with Thailand, exercise COBRA
GOLD remains the premier U.S. Pacific Command multilateral exercise
with participants and observers from 26 countries.
The declining health of Thailand's King Bhumibol has elevated the
issue of royal succession. The King, currently the world's longest
reigning monarch (62 years), is beloved by the Thais. The eventual
leadership succession, which will be a significant event in Thailand's
history, has the potential to have a negative effect on the political
environment and pose serious challenges for the Thai political and
military leadership. This ally and partner is a key contributor to the
regional security environment and will need our support in the years to
come.
Mr. Forbes. How could potential developments in the U.S.-India
security relationship provide for greater stability on the sub-
continent and within the broader PACOM area of responsibility?
Admiral Willard. The United States and India are already in the
process of developing our security relationship to address common
threats in the maritime domain with the ultimate goal of extending this
cooperation into other realms of mutual and global interest such as
global transportation networks, space, and cyberspace. Providing for
the security of these ``global commons'' will allow anyone and any
country that uses them a better opportunity to pursue and achieve
economic development that can foster an improved quality of life and
better governance. A security relationship must also address the
threats to stability from violent extremist organizations and other
transnational threats. Economic development and responsible governance
provides the foundation for greater stability on the sub-continent and
within the broader PACOM area of responsibility and provides the
bastion from which to successfully interdict existing threats to this
stability.
The United States and India share the need for a secure maritime
domain to transport the raw materials and finished manufactured goods
that form the basis of our thriving market economies. The Indians have
begun to recognize the importance that maritime forces play in ensuring
freedom of navigation and protection of commerce and are now investing
more to develop these capabilities. The United States, primarily
through the United States Navy, has been promoting the concept of
global maritime partnerships to share the burden of assuring maritime
security along the vast sea lines of communication--essentially each
nation contributing a small piece that when taken collectively becomes
a potent stabilizing force. To this end, India has taken a more
proactive role in policing the Eastern Arabian Sea and working in
concert with United States Naval forces to detect, deter, and interdict
pirates operating out of Somalia. We are sharing information and
assisting the Indians in developing the tactics, techniques, and
procedures to better accomplish this mission. As a result of these
efforts, the Indian Navy has effectively halted the line of advance of
pirate incidents emanating out of Somalia some 400 nm from their
shores. This partnership and the ensuing stability it provides to the
sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean will directly benefit
the Republic of the Maldives and allow them to focus limited resources
to develop their tourist economy and for Sri Lanka to devote resources
to rebuild maritime infrastructure following decades of civil war.
Initial efforts to expand cooperation between the United States Coast
Guard and the Indian Coast Guard are underway to improve maritime
domain awareness along the Indian coastline in order to close off a
potential line of attack from terrorists that operate out of the tribal
areas in Pakistan bordering Afghanistan. This line of attack was used
by Lashkar-e-Tayyiba to enter India and carry out the attacks in Mumbai
in November 2008. Another successful terrorist attack emanating from
Pakistan would have serious and far reaching destabilizing effect on
the region to include the potential of full scale war between two
nuclear armed antagonists. In fact, a more robust, whole of government
approach to counterterrorism cooperation is needed. The Department of
Defense is doing its part through PACOM by assisting U.S. interagency
partners to engage with India's counterterrorism forces to address
security concerns that are common to most, if not all, South Asian
countries.
This assistance is not confined to counterterrorism but also
includes humanitarian assistance and disaster relief preparedness.
South Asia is the target of significant natural disasters--tsunamis,
earthquakes, flooding, droughts, and tropical cyclones. Scientists
assess that the frequency and severity of these natural disasters will
increase due to the effects of global climate change and the history of
these events over the past three decades bears this out. Cooperation
between the United States and India to organize, train, and stockpile
relief supplies for response to a natural disaster anywhere in the
region can mitigate the impact of these disasters which can overwhelm
an individual country's resources and lead to political unrest and
violence.
India's economic rise over the past 20 years has put her in a
position to be the benefactor for the other nations in South Asia.
However historical animosities and mutual distrust are significant
impediments to regional cooperation. A United States-India security
relationship has the potential to break down these impediments and
promote regional cooperation to overcome common security threats, both
man-made and natural, and provide for greater stability that will have
positive impacts within the region and globally.
The following are some examples of how India could increase its
role in enhancing regional and global stability by partnering with the
U.S.
1. India establishes linkages between its counter-piracy efforts
and the combined operations already underway in the Indian Ocean Region
(Combined Task Force 151, U.S. 5th Fleet's Shared Awareness and
Deconfliction [SHADE] meetings, etc.), resulting in increased
deterrence to piracy in the Indian Ocean Region. If India continues its
aggressive stance with respect to piracy in the western Indian Ocean
and chooses to cooperate more deeply with existing multi-national
efforts, the cumulative effect of counter-piracy efforts in the region
could be enhanced.
2. India deepens and regularizes its information sharing efforts
with the U.S. on counterterrorism and other items of mutual interest.
This could build greater confidence between law enforcement and
military intelligence counterparts in both governments and mitigate
risks and repercussions of possible future extremist attacks on India.
3. India purchases an increasing number and variety of weapons
systems from the U.S. to meet its military requirements. Although India
is likely to continue to seek diversity in its arms acquisitions, as
evidenced by the recent non-selection of U.S. tenders in their Medium
Multi-Role Combat Aircraft competition, successful U.S. weapons system
sales and associate technology transfers (C-130J, P-8I, C-17, etc.)
will significantly deepen the U.S.-India security partnership. The
long-term effect of the military-military links established through
these programs will be to strengthen India's defense capabilities and
gradually increase alignment of defense and security policies and
practices, making India a more effective security partner and more
capable provider of security to the region.
Mr. Forbes. How important is the current SSGN platform to PACOM
operations? a. Does PACOM have any concerns with the Navy's decision to
not replace the SSGN after the de-commissioning of the current Ohio-
class SSGNs? b. In addition to significant cruise missile strike
capabilities, the SSGN platform has provided COCOM commanders with a
significant amount of time on station, due to the two crew arrangement,
as well as a significant capacity for SOF missions and equipment and
versatility for other vital projects. Has PACOM assessed, or consulted
with the Navy in assessing, the number of Virginia class submarines
that would be necessary to provide the equivalent capability of one
Ohio class submarine to conduct vital missions in the PACOM AOR?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Forbes. Regarding the Navy and Air Force development of the
AirSea battle concept: Has PACOM had significant input on its
development? If yes, in what ways?
Admiral Willard. US Pacific Command is familiar with the Air Sea
Battle concept development, however, we have had little input on its
development. I anticipate being provided an opportunity to recommend
changes to it.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Ms. Bordallo. Can you describe what impact a continuing resolution
would have on the commencement of a PACOM-led EIS to address broader
training issues in the Pacific? a. Also, can you describe what this
proposed EIS will evaluate once it commences? b. How will PACOM ensure
the document takes a broad look at training requirements and balances
the needs of all services? c. Also, what are some of the key training
challenges in the Pacific and do we currently have an acceptable level
of risk for all our services' training in the Pacific?
Admiral Willard. The continuing resolution did delay the
solicitation and contract award to execute the Training in the Pacific
EIS. However, with the recent approval of the FY11 budget, the
solicitation for bids is expected to be released in mid-June with an
estimated contract award in Aug 11.
The EIS will evaluate options and alternatives to improve DoD's
training capabilities and mitigate training gaps in the Pacific AOR.
Although the primary proposed option is to develop new training ranges
and increase capabilities at existing ranges in the Marianas Islands
Range Complex (MIRC), other options will be developed and assessed as
required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to ensure a
complete and justifiable EIS.
The EIS will develop alternatives that meet requirements of all
Service Components and especially develop training alternatives that
can be utilized by multiple Services, such as combined use training
ranges. While the level of risk related to current capabilities for DoD
training in the Pacific is considered acceptable, it is prudent to
explore additional training capabilities with this EIS to complement
force posture realignment initiatives, such as the Marine relocation to
Guam.
Ms. Bordallo. I am very proud of the operational efforts that the
men and women in uniform have been providing to support relief efforts
in Japan. What else can we in Guam do to aid in the endeavors to get
the Japanese on the road to recovery and to a new state or normalcy? I
know we are hosting many men and women in uniform and their dependents
but is there anything else we can do to support rebuilding our very
close Japanese allies?
Admiral Willard. Government to government provision of relief items
is over. Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid Assistance
funding ended with the conclusion of Operation TOMODACHI on May 31,
2011. Although US Forces Japan/Joint Support Force-Japan continues to
monitor and support such things as consequence management for the
Fukushima reactors, the majority of direct support has concluded.
The best way for the people of Guam to aid our Japanese allies is
by making cash contributions to humanitarian organizations that are
working in the affected areas. Information on identifying humanitarian
organizations that are accepting cash donations for their efforts in
Japan is available at www.usaid.gov, www.interaction.org or by calling
the Center for International Disaster Information (CIDI) at 703-276-
1914.
It is a common misperception among the public that all types of
assistance are needed following a disaster. This often leads to
spontaneous collections of unsolicited commodities and offers of
volunteer services, which can impede relief efforts. Therefore, the
U.S. Government encourages those who wish to help to make a cash
donation to the humanitarian organization of their choice. Cash
donations: allow disaster relief professionals to procure the exact
commodities needed (often locally in the affected country); reduce the
burden on resources that tend to be scarce in disaster settings (such
as transportation routes, staff time, warehouse, space, etc.); can be
transferred very quickly without transportation costs (which often
outweigh the value of the donated commodities); support the economy of
the disaster-stricken region; and ensure culturally, dietary, and
environmentally appropriate assistance.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Mr. Turner. When an Aegis BMD ship (3.6.1 configuration currently
fielded) is operating in a missile defense mode, what percentage of its
radar energy is supporting missile defense versus other missions?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Turner. What impact does that radar utilization have on the
ship's ability to accomplish its other missions, including ship
protection? Are there missions that the Aegis ship cannot support when
it is in missile defense mode?
Admiral Willard. The BMD computer program is designed to ``favor''
use of resources for BMD applications when operating in BMD Engage or
Surveillance Modes and will use 100 percent of the resources if
required. There are no Aegis Weapon System design provisions which
allow, for example, ``setting aside'' a certain percentage of resources
to support any particular AAW self defense mission. Since radar
resources are often ``stretched thin'' during BMD search mission
operations such as Strategic Cueing, any concurrent Anti-Air or Anti-
Surface missions will have to rely on ``non-SPY'' systems such as CIWS,
the Gun Weapon System, or possibly NULKA. On the other hand,
simulations have shown that it may be possible to conduct certain Anti-
Air Warfare engagements using a very small percentage of SPY resources.
While there are scenarios where it is less than ideal and support
both BMD and Anti-Warfare, the majority of the BMD CG and DDG missions
can be conducted simultaneously and are dependent upon Joint Force
availability and JFMCC stationing. The BMD ships are multi-mission and
manned, trained and equipped to conduct the following missions in
conjunction with one another:

Command and Control
Ballistic Missile Defense
Anti-Air Warfare (to a lesser degree based upon above
considerations)
Anti-Surface Warfare
Undersea Warfare
Strike Warfare
Naval Surface Fires Support
Electronic Warfare \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Aegis BMD 3.6.1 Capabilities and Limitations

Mr. Turner. Discuss how operational considerations affect Navy
deployment and force structure requirements. For example, for a single
Aegis BMD ``shooter,'' how many additional ships are necessary to
address the radar resource challenge?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Turner. When the next Aegis BMD ship upgrade is fully fielded
(4.0.1 configuration), what percentage of the ship's radar energy would
be supporting missile defense versus other missions?
Admiral Willard. It depends on the situation. Aegis BMD ships are
multi-mission capable ships which can perform the following missions:
Limited Defense Operations (LDO)/Homeland Defense, regional missile
defense (both organic and Launch on Remote), Measurement and Signal
Intelligence (MASINT)/Non-Tactical Data Collection, Air Defense, Anti-
Surface Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare, Naval Gunfire Support, Strike
Warfare, Maritime Interdiction/Security Operations, Information
Operations, and Intelligence and Collection. The Joint Force Maritime
Component Commander will allocate Aegis assets, to include Aegis BMD
assets, to accomplish his highest priority missions. These may or may
not include BMD. SPY-1D radar usage is always determined by mission
requirements.
The 4.0.1 configuration provides improved target discrimination and
enhanced launch on remote tracking data. Coupled with the new SM-3
Block IB missile, the Aegis 4.0.1 system will provide longer range
engagements of more advanced threat missiles.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HANABUSA

Mrs. Hanabusa. Given the geographic coverage of PACOM, are five
aircraft carriers sufficient for the objectives of PACOM?
Admiral Willard. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mrs. Hanabusa. What is the objective of the Strategic Alliance 2015
plan?
General Sharp. The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan synchronizes
multiple U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) transformation efforts that
are designed to build adaptive and flexible capabilities to deter
aggression against the ROK and to defeat aggression should it occur.
The plan's objective is to sustain and enhance the U.S.-ROK Alliance's
combined defense posture and capabilities and to support the Alliance's
future vision and bilateral defense priorities as stated in the
Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation. Execution of the Strategic
Alliance 2015 plan ensures the effective synchronization of major
elements of Alliance restructuring while maintaining a strong combined
defense posture to deter or respond to the range of North Korean
security challenges throughout the transition process. Key elements of
the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan include: refining and improving
combined defense plans; defining and developing the new organizational
structures required for ROK lead of the war effort; implementing more
realistic exercises based on the North Korean threat of today and
tomorrow; preparing for the transition of wartime operational control
to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 2015; consolidating U.S.
military forces in the ROK onto two enduring hubs under the Yongsan
Relocation Plan and Land Partnership Plan; and force management. The
goal of all initiatives under the Strategic Alliance 2015 construct is
to build adaptive force capabilities that deter and defeat future
provocations against the ROK and fight and win on the Korean Peninsula
should deterrence fail. The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan as a whole
synchronizes ongoing transformation efforts to ensure they are aligned
and mutually supporting and better postures both nations to deter,
counter, and defeat North Korean provocations and aggression.
Mrs. Hanabusa. At page 33 of your testimony you point to 107 bases
to be reduced to two, how does this meet the objectives of the
Strategic Alliance 2015 Plan and/or the deterrence objective of the
United States Military?
General Sharp. The U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) governments
agreed to consolidate and relocate American forces stationed in the ROK
onto installations south of the capital city Seoul. Prior to the year
2005, the Command had 107 installations in Korea. Once relocation is
complete, the Command will utilize 49 sites, concentrated for the most
part around two enduring hubs: a southwest hub and a southeast hub. The
southwest hub is centered on Osan Air Base and U.S. Army Garrison
Humphreys. It will be the future centerpiece of U.S. military force
structure in Korea. The southeast hub will include installations
located in the cities of Daegu, Chinhae, and Busan. This hub will serve
as the logistics distribution center and storage location for wartime
and contingency prepositioned stocks.
The consolidation of forces onto two enduring hubs satisfies
Strategic Alliance 2015 and Command deterrence objectives by improving
warfighting capabilities in the following ways. First, the 2nd Infantry
Division and future Korea Command will be collocated at U.S. Army
Garrison Humphreys, improving coordination and planning between staffs
of the two organizations. Similarly, relocating 2nd Infantry Division
to U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys consolidates the Division's subordinate
units at a single location, increasing direct face-to-face contact
amongst unit personnel while reducing the physical span of control and
infrastructure needed to support the Division. The unit is better
postured to train and fight together.
Consolidation at two enduring hubs also enhances command and
control and coordination. In addition to strengthening relationships
between operational staffs of the 2nd Infantry Division and a future
Korea Command, 2nd Infantry Division is better positioned to affect
initial liaison and coordination during reception, staging, and onward
movement of deploying maneuver and sustainment brigades. Early liaison
and coordination sets the conditions to more reliable and effective
command and control during execution of later phases/stages of
conflict. Positioning of the 2nd Infantry Division at U.S. Army
Garrison Humphreys also improves tactical flexibility by posturing the
division in a better tactical location for rapid commitment in support
of either of the forward stationed ROK armies and corps. This position
also shortens logistical lines during the initial phases of conflict
that better postures the division for successful employment later.
Consolidation also enhances the execution of noncombatant
evacuation operations (NEO). By reducing the dispersion of
transportation assets, movement times are cut. By separating U.S.
forces from initial wartime threats such as North Korea's long-range
artillery and its ground forces threatening Seoul, the vulnerability of
these forces is reduced and their survivability enhanced. A 2nd
Infantry Division located at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys will be
better able to integrate follow-on maneuver and sustainment brigades
while not under the fire of North Korean long-range artillery. This
factor supports the Division's preparation for combat activities.
Finally, force consolidation enhances warfighting capabilities by
improving soldier quality of life, realization of stationing
efficiencies, optimizes use of land in Korea, and enhances force
protection and survivability.
Mrs. Hanabusa. Given the present complement of the Republic of
Korea forces, can it assume the control of leading the military
alliance on the Korean peninsula?
General Sharp. By 1 December 2015, the ROK will be ready and
capable of leading the U.S.-ROK Alliance in defense of the ROK in
wartime. In December 2015 wartime operational control (OPCON) will be
transitioned from the Combined Forces Command to the Republic of Korea
(ROK) Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under OPCON transition, the U.S. and ROK
will disestablish Combined Forces Command and stand up separate but
complementary national commands consistent with the Mutual Defense
Treaty that will focus on combined defense of the ROK. Once OPCON
transition is completed, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff will become the
supported--or lead--command, and the newly created U.S. Korea Command
(KORCOM) will be the supporting command. The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff
will have full control of ROK military forces while the KORCOM
commander will have control over U.S. forces.
The ROK military is a highly professional and competent force and
will be capable of leading the U.S.-ROK Alliance defense of the ROK in
wartime. Numbering over 633,000 active duty personnel, it ranks as the
world's 6th largest military in terms of personnel and is a modern,
mobile network centric warfare capable force that fields an array of
advanced weapon systems. The ROK military is led by a professional
officer corps that currently exercises daily command of its forces. It
has gained operational experience through recent deployments to places
such as Iraq, Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden, Lebanon, as well as
participating in a host of United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian
assistance operations. Initiatives to enhance force capabilities,
modernize weapon systems, and improve organizational structures and
force management are being implemented as part of the ongoing ``307''
defense reform program.
ROK military force capability is supplemented through the conduct
of a tough and realistic exercise program. In addition to participating
in the combined Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Key Resolve, and Foal Eagle
exercises with the U.S., the ROK military also conducts annually the
Taegeuk, Hoguk, and Hwarang exercises. These exercises derive
requirements for joint force and unit structure development, improve
interoperability between the military services, and practice inter-
agency coordination. Thus, by 2015 the ROK will be ready and capable of
leading the U.S.-ROK Alliance defense of the ROK in wartime.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

Mr. Scott. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard within Pacific
Command's area of responsibility?
Admiral Willard. The U.S. Coast Guard executes its eleven statutory
missions in the Pacific including: Search and Rescue; Marine Safety;
Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security; Illegal Drug Interdiction;
Undocumented Migrant Interdiction; Defense Readiness; Other Law
Enforcement; Marine Environmental Protection; Living Marine Resources;
Aids to Navigation; and Ice Operations.
Furthermore, the U.S. Coast Guard supports the Pacific Command's
Theater Campaign Plan by participating in Theater Security Cooperation
and Capacity building activities with allies and partners in the
Pacific Command's area of responsibility. Examples of such activities
include: professional exchanges; mobile training teams; multi-lateral
maritime surveillance operations; multi-lateral and bi-lateral
exercises; humanitarian and civic assistance events, and bi-lateral
ship rider operations with Pacific Island Nations. Most of the
activities are conducted in conjunction with normal Coast Guard
operations in the region. U.S. Coast Guard Theater Security Cooperation
activities reach beyond normal military-to-military relations to a
broader host nation maritime audience, including, but not limited to,
law enforcement agencies, maritime administrations, and transport
ministries. Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard participates in the
development of the Pacific Command's Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
directed contingency plan development, providing apportioned forces to
support contingency plans.
Finally, to meet Defense contingency planning and preparedness
activities under its Defense Readiness mission, the U.S. Coast Guard
provides Service-unique capabilities (e.g. ports, waterways, and coast
security capabilities; maritime intercept capabilities) in support of
Pacific Command's Operational Plans. U.S. Coast Guard planners support
development of Operational Plans to employ, maintain, and sustain U.S.
Coast Guard forces in support of homeland defense missions.
Mr. Scott. What is the relationship between U.S. Pacific Command
and the Mongolian Armed Forces?
Admiral Willard. Mongolia is an enthusiastic U.S. partner that
continues to support U.S. Northeast Asia regional objectives and
coalition Afghanistan operations; however, Mongolia must balance
engagement with the U.S. with their relationship with China and Russia.
U.S. Pacific Command is committed to assisting Mongolian Armed Forces
transform from a Soviet-era General Staff organization into a
professional and competent ``Napoleonic'' or western styled Joint Staff
structure. U.S. Pacific Command is assisting the Mongolian Armed Forces
enhance their capability to fully participate in international peace
support operations and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief efforts.
The Mongolian Armed Forces (MAF) has contributed extensively to
operations relative to its size and strength. Mongolia contributed over
1300 troops and ten troop rotations to OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM from
July 2003 until September 2008 when the United Nations Security Council
Resolution expired. The Mongolians were also early contributors to our
coalition in Afghanistan for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. The OEF
support began in October 2003 with 21 members providing advanced
artillery maintenance to the Afghan National Army. Recently, Mongolia
committed to doubling the current troop strength in Afghanistan to 400
troops. Mongolia also hosts the annual multinational peace operations
exercise KHAAN QUEST, which provides training and promotes positive
military-to-military relations with the U.S. and regional peace support
partners. U.S. Pacific Command Components U.S. Army Pacific and U.S.
Marines Forces Pacific rotate co-hosting KHAAN QUEST with the Mongolian
Armed Forces. This annual training occurs at the Five Hills Training
Center. KHAAN QUEST is designed to improve multinational responses,
effectiveness, interoperability and unity of efforts for peace support
operations. This training is provided to meet UN standards for peace
support operations. U.S. Pacific Command participates in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense for Policy, Asia Pacific Security Affairs-led
Bilateral Consultative Council and the Executive Steering Committee
meetings. These high level meetings underscore U.S. Pacific Command's
commitment to the Mongolian Defense Reform. Commander, U.S. Pacific
Command regularly meets the General Chief of Staff of the Mongolian
Armed Forces for strategic dialogue and engagement.
Mr. Scott. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard within U.S.
Forces Korea?
General Sharp. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO

Mr. Palazzo. My district has seen its share of devastation due to
natural disasters, most memorably Hurricane Katrina. Recently, we saw
another example of the destructive power of Mother Nature as Japan was
hit by a major earthquake followed by a devastating tsunami.
Almost exactly one year ago, in your testimony before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, you mentioned that ``In the Asia-Pacific, we
respond to natural disasters about every 60 days.'' Following the
recent devastation in Japan, could you comment on our military's
readiness to respond to natural disasters in the Pacific at this point?
Admiral Willard. In the wake of OPERATION TOMODACHI, USPACOM forces
remain ready to provide Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) and
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) throughout the PACOM
AOR. Operation TOMODACHI was unique due to both the scope and
complexity of the three overlapping disasters, even more complex than
the 2004-5 Southeast Asia Tsunami relief operation, Operation Unified
Assistance. Unlike most other disasters, Operation Tomodachi involved
the simultaneous execution of FHA, FCM, and Voluntary Authorized
Departure (VAD) of American citizens in response to the combined
effects of an 9.0 earthquake, catastrophic tsunami, and resultant
nuclear disaster. Despite these challenges, PACOM forces responded
quickly, adapting to the natural and man-made disaster while supporting
our Japan ally.
Although we do not organize and train for FHA/HADR, the inherent
capabilities and capacity of expeditionary military forces allow them
to adapt and respond quickly and effectively in support of the Host
Nation. Our ability to broadly task across available assigned forces
provided flexibility and in large part mitigated the impact normally
associated with the conduct of an operation of this scope. The
assignment of rotational forces ``tailored'' for rapid response ensures
our continued ability to respond to disasters, as well as mitigate the
strain on force readiness.
Mr. Palazzo. Do you feel that this high rate of humanitarian
missions, particularly in the Pacific, is hurting our ability to
respond or plan for other, more traditional threats in the region?
Admiral Willard. No. Participation in humanitarian missions are
``as is'' missions and provide valuable opportunities to conduct ``real
world'' rapid planning, execution of critical military skills, and
theater engagement. These missions provide benefits that are
complementary to the execution of more traditional military missions.
FHA and HA/DR are missions performed frequently by PACOM forces, while
preparing to respond to more ``traditional threats''. Although
humanitarian missions place additional demands on our forces, our
participation in humanitarian operations demonstrates to our Allies and
Partners our commitment to the region and often create more receptive
conditions for future engagements and relationships. The opportunity to
respond to humanitarian mission in the AOR sends a strong message
throughout the region, demonstrating our ability and willingness to
respond rapidly across the AOR. Execution of humanitarian mission in
addition to the execution of multiple scheduled conventional exercises
contributes to our ability to rapidly execute where a conventional
military response is required.
Mr. Palazzo. Who pays for these humanitarian responses?
Admiral Willard. Humanitarian Responses are paid for through USAID/
OFDA. They provide initial cost assessment through the Disaster
Response Team (DART). Funding clearly outlines the support that will be
provided by the PACOM and the tailored and scaled force vectored to the
affected host nation.
Mr. Palazzo. What Asia-Pacific countries concern you most at this
point and where are we lacking to respond (equipment, technology,
manpower, money) to realistic threats from potential hot spots in the
region?
Admiral Willard. Within Northeast Asia, North Korea has the most
potential need for FHA/HADR arising from natural or manmade disasters.
Disaster in this affected state would cause great concern because of
ability to interact, visibility, and other concerns that naturally
arise. Although disasters in China have occurred since 2009, The PRC
remains reluctant to accept our offers of help, though we have provided
mostly symbolic assistance in the past 2-3 years and typical requests
are in the form of funding or spare parts for military hardware. Within
Southeast Asia, we have seen significant improvement within the
Philippines and their ability to respond to FHA over the past decade.
Additional support is still required for Indonesia, but access is not
always guaranteed, granted, or requested. As seen in 2007, Burma and
associated relief is problematic. Lastly, within South Asia, current
concern and planning is focused on Nepal due to its geographical
isolation and recent predicative earthquake models that suggest
potential 100-year earthquake on the scale of Haiti 2010. PACOM is
assisting the Government of Nepal through our Embassy through planning
to help mitigate potential disaster through leveraging regional
neighbors, international and non-governmental organizations, and United
Nations support. In conclusion, countries that have adversarial
relationships with USG are the most problematic to support and provide
FHA and HA/DR.
Mr. Palazzo. In 2009 the U.S. imported over 220 billion dollars in
goods from China, over double the imports of any other western nation.
Do you believe that this U.S. consumer behavior is actually fueling
China's military buildup?
Admiral Willard. It is true that in 2009, according to China's
statistics, the U.S. imported $221.4 billion merchandise goods from
China; this supersedes, by more than four times, the next highest level
of Chinese exports to a Western nation (Germany, $49.9 billion). It is
expected that some of the revenues that accrue to Chinese firms that
sell goods to U.S. consumers comprise the firms' net income which is
taxed. These taxes are then available to fund Chinese Governmental
operations--including the People's Liberation Army (PLA). However,
based on PACOM analysis, we have determined that only a fraction of the
sales revenue (between 60% and 80%) accrue to Chinese firms (many
inputs to Chinese production are manufactured in other countries).
Moreover, some unknown fraction of sales revenue comprises net income
or profits. (Let us hazard a guess of say 25%.) Finally, China taxes
corporate profits at a 25% rate. Consequently, we would estimate that
about $10 billion of the $221 billion would be collected as corporate
profits taxes.
We are ignoring here the taxes that are collected from Chinese
citizens who helped produce the goods that the U.S. imported. But even
if we assume that wages comprised 50% of the cost of goods sold, and
assume a 25% tax rate, we would conclude that about $20 billion of the
$221.4 billion would be collected in the form of income taxes.
Therefore, a total of about $30 billion in tax revenue might be
available to disburse for PLA operations.
However, there is a flip side to the coin. What we know is that
dollars, which are received via export sales, are often recycled by
acquiring U.S. Treasury Securities. It is likely that much of the
$221.4 billion in sales were used to purchase U.S. Treasury Securities,
which, in turn, helped finance U.S. Government operations. Some of the
funds from Treasury sales may have very well been used to support U.S.
Department of Defense operations.
Summary: It turns out then that it is likely that U.S. imports of
Chinese goods serve to underwrite the cost of certain PLA operations.
But it is equally likely that those same dollars find their way back
into U.S. Governmental operations. It goes without saying that, if the
first flow is halted, then so is the second.