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HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
—
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
**BUDGET REQUESTS FOR
U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND**

HEARING HELD
APRIL 5, 2011



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FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FOR U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 5, 2011.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:23 p.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

I apologize for our tardiness. We had a vote and then a suspicious package, and I didn't think they were ever going to let us back.

The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive testimony from the commanders of the United States Transportation Command and the United States Africa Command on the posture of their respective commands. Although these are two combatant areas that sometimes fly beneath the radar, this hearing cannot be more relevant than it is today.

In AFRICOM's [the United States Africa Command's] area of responsibility, U.S. forces have been conducting active military operations against forces loyal to Libyan dictator Muammar Qadhafi in an effort to prevent a massacre of the civilian population of Libya. Although this humanitarian intervention is motivated by a noble impulse, there is a strong possibility of a strategic stalemate emerging in Libya. I fear we may find ourselves committed to an open-ended obligation through our participation in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organisation] operations, and that poses real opportunity costs, given the volatility of other unstable, more strategically important countries in the region.

Beyond Libya, this weekend, as many as 1,000 civilians were massacred in the Ivory Coast, as that nation's political standoff escalated violently. This brutality could be an ominous foreshadowing of future events in the Sudan, as the southern portion of that war-torn country becomes an independent nation in July. Further east, Somalia continues to be a source of instability, hosting both Al Qaeda and affiliated al-Shabaab terrorist organization and the various piracy networks that have intensified attacks in the Gulf of Aden and beyond over the past several years, recently killing four American citizens aboard a private yacht.

Just as it was virtually impossible to foresee the United States becoming militarily involved in Libya, at least at last year's posture hearings, this Congress may be called upon to fund a number of possible contingency operations or humanitarian missions in AFRICOM's AOR [area of responsibility]. I think when we made New Year's resolutions this year, we did not foresee Egypt, Libya, all of the other things that are happening.

Wherever U.S. forces may operate over the next year, TRANSCOM [the United States Transportation Command] will be charged with getting them there, sustaining them throughout their operations, and getting them home to their families. As General Omar Bradley famously said, amateurs talk strategy and professionals talk logistics. The events of the past 18 months are an instructive example as to the relevance of that quote today. Not only did TRANSCOM have to respond to the surge of forces in Afghanistan while they simultaneously orchestrated the drawdown of forces in Iraq, but they also had to respond to the devastating earthquake in Haiti.

Things have not gotten any easier for the men and women of TRANSCOM, as they are now supporting combat operations in Libya, in addition to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and are working desperately to assist the people of Japan following the horrific earthquakes of the past month.

What they do is not easy, and it oftentimes goes unnoticed, but the capabilities of TRANSCOM are truly unique among nations.

We are fortunate to be joined here today by two officers with long and distinguished records of service to their Nation: General Duncan McNabb, Commander of U.S. Transportation Command, and General Carter Ham, Commander of U.S. Africa Command.

Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before us here today, and thank you for your lifetime of service to our Nation. And please convey our thanks to those who serve with you in your combat areas. We look forward to hearing your testimony today.

Ranking Member Smith.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, General McNabb, General Ham. Appreciate you being here to testify this afternoon. Look forward to your comments and your answers to our questions.

Two very important commands within the military. Transportation Command, first, does an amazing job of what the chairman referred to as "logistics." You know, you can imagine all the capabilities we have and where we would like them, but General McNabb is the one who has to make sure that those two things match up. And it is not an easy job, when you consider our interests throughout the world and where we have had to move our equipment in recent years. You do an outstanding job, as do the men and women who serve in the Transportation Command. We appreciate that. We have the C-17s [Boeing Globemaster III mili-

tary transport aircraft] out of Joint Base Lewis-McChord and McChord Air Force Base who are a big part of that, so we are very proud of what they do, as well.

Going forward, I think, in this hearing, a number of issues we are going to be interested in, but, in particular, as we figure out how to downsize in Iraq, move equipment out of there, how does that work in terms of getting it back to the States or getting it back to where we want it based? How is that process progressing? What contingencies do you have in place if, for some reason, sometime in the next 7 to 8 months, it turns out that we are going to be leaving more equipment there than we expected? If the Iraqis make a request that we are able to grant for a continued U.S. presence of some, you know, very limited scope, I would anticipate, but, still, that will complicate the transportation of that equipment.

And then, second, of course, the ongoing challenge of providing for the warfighter in Afghanistan. And there are many logistical challenges. We bring a lot of our equipment in through Pakistan, not always a very stable place. Other countries to the north of Afghanistan also have their challenges, as we have heard. So I would be interested in your feelings about how we are doing on that and what the major challenges are going forward and how we can better make sure that we get the equipment to Afghanistan that we need.

In AFRICOM, as the chairman mentioned, you have a fair number of challenges in that region. I think the best way to summarize them is “instability.” Certainly, there is a lot of political unrest in a number of nations across the top of Africa, to varying degrees, from Tunisia and Egypt and Libya and Morocco. And then, also, further down in the Ivory Coast, there are major challenges right now. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has an ongoing challenge, particularly in the eastern Congo, with maintaining stability.

And that instability can have a very real impact on our national security interests. Al Qaeda is present both as, you know, AQAP, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, over close to Somalia, and then Al Qaeda in the land of the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, which is throughout the sort of Mali-Mauritania area. And they feed on instability—vast, ungoverned spaces, where they can operate without people being able to control them.

So AFRICOM has a strong interest not just, you know, in Libya, where we are very aware of what is going on, but throughout the continent in trying to figure out how we combat political unrest, combat poverty, which drives instability, to make sure that these unstable, ungoverned areas don't become a threat to us and that we can help make sure that the continent is a more peaceful and prosperous place for those who reside there.

So I appreciate the opportunity to have this hearing today. I look forward to your testimony, gentlemen.

With that, I will yield back to the chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 41.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
General McNabb.

Your full testimonies, without objection, will be inserted in the record, so you may tell us whatever you feel most appropriate.
General.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. DUNCAN J. MCNABB, USAF,
COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND**

General MCNABB. Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, and distinguished members of this committee, it is my distinct privilege to be here today with you, representing more than 145,000 of the world's finest logistics professionals.

Throughout 2010 and continuing today, the U.S. Transportation Command team of Active Duty, Guard, Reserves, civilians, merchant mariners, and commercial partners accomplish incredible feats in the face of historic challenges.

We have a saying at U.S. Transportation Command, "We view our success through the eyes of the warfighter." We have always been about support to the six regional combatant commands and their joint task force commanders. Working with the Defense Logistics Agency, the Joint Staff, the Services, and the combatant command staffs, our log-nation and trans-nation teams have provided unparalleled logistics superiority to the regional combatant commanders.

From the Services in the Joint Forces Command getting the forces ready to go, to the TRANSCOM team delivering the force, to the theater commanders receiving the force, this is the best overall performance I have seen in almost 37 years of service.

Sitting next to me is one of our finest warfighters and my good friend, General Carter Ham. I was proud to support him as he commanded military operations over the skies of Libya in Operation Odyssey Dawn. And I look forward to continuing to support him as he takes AFRICOM to new and even higher levels. It is he and the other commandant commanders that I am always supporting, and we view our success through their eyes.

I feel blessed to be the custodian of one of the Nation's greatest asymmetric advantages: our strategic ability to move. Since taking command of U.S. Transportation Command in the fall of 2008, I have been amazed to see some of the unique capabilities inherent in this command.

First and foremost is the power of the total-force team. Nobody matches up our Active Duty force with our Guard and Reserve partners like the U.S. Transportation Command. When we called for volunteers to help relieve some of the suffering in Haiti last January, the men and women of the Guard and Reserves stepped up in huge fashion. This included a Contingency Response Group from the Kentucky Guard that was just coming up to speed. During the surge of forces into Afghanistan, we relied heavily on activated C-5 [Lockheed Galaxy military transport aircraft] and C-17 crews, maintainers, and aerial porters, and they were crucial to meeting President Obama's deadline to complete the plus-up by 31 August of last year. Most recently, we saw their patriotism in action in responding rapidly to the air refueling requirements in support of the Libyan operations.

I am also in awe of the power of the U.S.-flag fleet in the air, on the seas, and over land. The U.S.-flag maritime fleet and their

outstanding merchant mariners stepped up during our historic surge last year into Afghanistan and out of Iraq, and we didn't have to activate one ship for either operation. And they delivered. They continue to be key to supplying our forces in Afghanistan, whether coming up through Pakistan or over the Northern Distribution Network. In the air, our commercial partners have continued to meet the demands of the surge in Afghanistan and, most recently, responded brilliantly to bringing Americans home from Japan following the recent earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear incident.

We know the combatant commanders around the world depend on us to deliver the forces and their sustainment day-in and day-out, from resupply of the South Pole, to air-dropping food, water, and ammo to a forward operating base in Afghanistan, to delivering fuel to our fighters and bombers enforcing the Libyan no-fly zone, U.S. TRANSCOM delivers. If we do this right, our warfighting commanders do not worry about their logistics lifeline.

This is what the Secretary of Defense intended when he made U.S. TRANSCOM the distribution process owner, or DPO, in 2003. He gave the DPO influence over the entire supply chain, from factory to foxhole. And we constantly look for more effective solutions for the warfighter while also being good stewards of the taxpayers' dollar. Since its inception, the DPO has realized over \$5.3 billion in savings, and we are still counting. Last year alone, that savings was \$1.7 billion.

A big part of the savings is taking advantage of lower-cost surface transportation whenever possible. When we match surface to air and commercial to military modes of transportation, we are leveraging our enterprise to maximum advantage for both the warfighter and the taxpayer. We recently saved over \$110 million a month moving lifesaving Mine Resistant All-Terrain vehicles to our forces in Afghanistan using a combination of commercial surface and military air. We continue to look for every opportunity to use multimodal operations throughout our global enterprise.

My final callout is to the power of the interagency and the joint team. President Obama, in ordering the plus-up of forces in Afghanistan and drawdown in Iraq, set a very tight timeline for our execution. We knew we would need some help increasing capacity on our existing supply lines and help in establishing new supply routes.

We took our recommendations to the interagency, and the whole of government came through with excellent results. The National Security Council, ambassadors around the world, the State Department, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Maritime Administration, the combatant commands, and the log-nation and trans-nation teams came together to make logistics magic.

This was at a time when we were asked to expand quickly and redirect flow due at an earthquake in the Caribbean that devastated Haiti, which the chairman alluded to; a volcanic eruption that shut down European airspace for 3 weeks; a coup in the country where we have our main passenger trans-load operation; the Deep Horizon oil spill in the gulf; and the worst floods in Pakistan history during the last month of the plus-up. And we still closed everything by 31 August that the President had asked us to do.

And our operations continue today at record-breaking pace. We continue to support our forces in Afghanistan and the drawdown in Iraq. We pivoted the transportation enterprise rapidly to support General Ham in the implementation of the no-fly zone over Libya. And we moved out urgently to help with disaster relief in Japan and provide immediate responses to the nuclear incident with special equipment and nuclear specialists from the United States.

I could not be more proud of the men and women of the United States Transportation Command. I have flown with our aircrews and loaded and moved containers with our stevedores. I have walked through the pallet holding areas with our aerial porters in Afghanistan and explored the cargo holds of our Ready Reserve Fleet with our merchant mariners. Daily, I am amazed and humbled by what our people accomplish.

Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, and all members of this committee, thank you for your continued superb support of U.S. TRANSCOM and our men and women in uniform. It is my distinct honor and privilege to appear before you today to represent the men and women who are the U.S. Transportation Command and to tell you their story.

Again, thank you for taking my written statement for the record, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General McNabb can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
General Ham.

**STATEMENT OF GEN CARTER F. HAM, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
AFRICA COMMAND**

General HAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, and members of the committee. And thanks for the opportunity to discuss with you today the accomplishments of the men and women of United States Africa Command.

I would like to introduce to the committee Command Chief Master Sergeant Jack Johnson, the command's senior enlisted leader. He and I have only just begun our service together at Africa Command, but I see already that he is exactly the right person to lead several important initiatives and to ensure our service members and their families are well-trained and well-supported.

And I am indeed honored to appear alongside General McNabb, a highly distinguished airman and joint force leader.

This is a historic time for United States Africa Command. We have completed a complex, short-notice operational mission in Libya and have now transferred control of that mission to NATO. The situation in Libya in the conduct of Operation Odyssey Dawn highlights some important matters about Africa.

First, this event illustrates the dynamics of the African political-military environment, one that has seen the growing threat of transnational extremists in Somalia, election crises, coups, the Southern Sudanese referendum, the scourge of the Lord's Resistance Army, to name just a few of the challenges to security on the continent.

In order for Africa Command to reduce threats to our citizens and interests both abroad and at home, we need to contribute to

operations, programs, and activities that help African states provide for their own security in a manner that is consistent with the rule of law and international norms. And we must continue our efforts to enhance regional stability through partnership, not only with African states, but also sustained, reliable support to African regional organizations.

Africa Command's programs are designed to help prevent conflict while simultaneously ensuring that the command is prepared to respond decisively to any crisis when the President so directs, as demonstrated in our conduct of Operation Odyssey Dawn.

Secondly, building the coalition to address the situation in Libya was greatly facilitated through the benefits of longstanding relationships and interoperability, this time within NATO. This is the kind of regional approach to security that U.S. Africa Command seeks to foster on the continent.

U.S. Africa Command's priority efforts remain building the security capacity of our African partners. We incorporate regional cooperation in pursuit of interoperability in all our programs, activities, and exercises so that our African partners are postured to readily form coalitions to address African security challenges as they arise.

Everything U.S. Africa Command has accomplished is the result of the professionalism and dedication of the uniformed and civilian women and men of the command and our many teammates from across the U.S. Government. Their dedicated efforts are a testament to the American spirit and determination and reflects our commitment to contributing to the wellbeing and security of the people of Africa.

Our guiding principles are, first, that a safe, secure, and stable Africa is clearly in the best interest of the United States and, secondly, that we seek to help Africans find solutions to African challenges.

I am cognizant that the command is only able to accomplish its missions with the enduring support of this committee. And I thank you for that and invite you to come visit us at our headquarters or, better yet, come see us at work in Africa.

Mr. Chairman, I would welcome your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Ham can be found in the Appendix on page 67.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

General McNabb, the ongoing combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the response to the earthquake in Japan, and the President's decision to engage combat forces in Libya are undoubtedly straining the mobility force.

Have you reached or are you approaching any redlines in mobility capabilities? What areas of operations concern you the most? And are there any additional resources or assets that could alleviate the stress on the forces and reduce your operational risk?

General McNABB. Sir, right now, I think one of the things that hits me is our ability to pivot the transportation enterprise and expand it and contract it using our U.S.-flag carriers and our total force. At this point, we have gotten tremendous support from our Guard and Reserve. A lot of them have volunteered to help wherever they can.

What I would do next, if we ended up—if that is not enough to handle what we are being asked to do worldwide, is then I would have to mobilize some folks. And, at this time, we do not think we have to do that, at the present level.

What we have been able to do is, as we have looked at kind of the urgent requirements that we had for Libya and the urgent requirements we had for Japan, we basically stayed in very good, close contact with CENTCOM [United States Central Command], and we looked for ways or things that we could slow down that they could take a little risk in, primarily sustainment.

A decision was made by General Petraeus and General Mattis to increase the sustainment stocks in Afghanistan, and that gave us a little bit of room to be able to say, “Can we slow this down a little bit until we take care of these emergencies? And then we will get right back to you.” That is the same way we handled Haiti.

And so, the ability to mix and match is one of the things that I think we bring to the table.

At this time, I will say that the Civil Reserve Air Fleet has stepped up to anything that we have asked. I would say that, this last couple of weeks, I didn’t quite understand how much spring break affects excess capacity, but I will say that that one hit us pretty hard. Next to Christmas and Thanksgiving, spring break is the busiest time for our carriers who are out there. So as we brought—on the order of departure, the voluntary departure coming out of Japan, in support of Admiral Willard, getting them back to the States and getting seats back to their homes was something that was worked very closely with NORTHCOM [United States Northern Command] and with TRANSCOM as we worked through that.

Right now, I think that, as the Libyan operation unfolds, we are watching that carefully. Obviously, if that expands in any way, that would be one where we would be looking to say, do we have enough? Right now, we don’t see that.

Obviously, there are some other places where there is turmoil. I will bring the Ivory Coast, you can bring Yemen. All of those operations, we work with CENTCOM or with AFRICOM to sit down and say, “Okay, how are we going to do this together,” doing lot of what-ifs.

At this point, I am looking forward to Afghanistan and Iraq, making sure that we can meet the timelines coming out of Iraq. As Congressman Smith asked me about how do we do that, I would say that, coming down from 130,000 to 50,000, that that work with General Austin and his people in Iraq, the Army Materiel Command under General Dunwoody, really that team has worked superbly, bringing out the extra equipment through Kuwait and through Jordan, getting it washed up, and then putting it on commercial vessels. That is what I was mentioning, that we didn’t have to activate any ships to do that.

I am confident that that system is working well. And, in fact, making sure which stuff we will leave there, which stuff that we will bring home, which stuff will we send to Afghanistan was what we went through last year. But I will tell you, the team, I think, did a superb job. And my portion was just moving it, which was not the hardest part of all of that.

When I think about Afghanistan, I would say that we have found the power of intermodal operations that I had mentioned, being able to take it by surface to ports much closer to Afghanistan, and then just jumping the last part using airlift. We are looking for that same capability to be able to bring stuff out of Afghanistan. In other words, same way: bring it out by air to a port nearby, and then bring it by surface mode from there.

We would like to get dual—be able to go both directions on the Northern Distribution Network. Right now, we can only take stuff in. Some countries have not given us permission to bring stuff out of Afghanistan through the Northern Distribution Network. So the interagency and the whole team is working that.

I continue to look to say, I would like to make sure that I have lots of options—the Northern Distribution Network, the Pakistan LOC [line of communication]. Working with General Kayani and the Pak [Pakistan] military, we are trying to make sure we do everything we can to make the Pak LOC as smooth as possible.

But our ultimate ace in the hole is air. And we are trying to make sure we have taken full advantage of that, working very closely with General Petraeus and his team there.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General MCNABB. So, sir, I think that kind of puts it in a nutshell, but I think we are getting there.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Ham, despite the numerous briefings we have received from the administration regarding our military operations in Libya, I think many areas of uncertainty still remain. One question I have is where AFRICOM fits into the command and control structure of NATO enforcement of the no-fly zone and attacks on regime ground targets.

General, does AFRICOM have a clear role in the chain of command or targeting boards of Operation Odyssey Dawn, or are you liaising with NATO's Joint Task Force Unified Protector, at this point?

And what has the reaction of Libya's African neighbors been to our intervention there? Will this operation affect our partnership efforts in the region—in particular, Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara and our efforts against Al Qaeda in the Maghreb?

General HAM. Chairman, first of all, on the command and control side, at present, with the transition of the operation from U.S. AFRICOM to NATO, NATO now has the full operational control of the forces that are actually conducting missions over Libya. So U.S. AFRICOM is presently in a supporting role to Admiral Stavridis, Admiral Locklear, General Bouchard in their efforts. So I don't, at present, have an operational responsibility.

There is always the potential for some U.S. unilateral military missions. One could think of, for example, a personnel recovery of a downed pilot or something like that. And if that were to occur, then that would fall to U.S. Africa Command to execute those responsibilities.

Sir, with regard to the regional reaction, it is—frankly, it is mixed, as we see that particularly play out in the African Union. Many members, many states in Africa have voiced their support for the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, the imposi-

tion and the execution of those responsibilities. But, frankly, there are other states who did not agree with that U.N. [United Nations] Security Council resolution.

I think, frankly, as we proceed, I am going to have the responsibility, as I engage with our African partners, of just having a very frank discussion about what U.S. Africa Command's role was, why we did what we did, and just be as truthful and forthright as I can, just to try to maintain the great relationships that we have with most African states as we move forward.

But your point is valid. There is an impact and there will be an impact within the region.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Ranking Member Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My first question on the Transportation Command, if you could play out a little bit, General McNabb, how things are going in terms of the logistical challenges in Afghanistan that I asked about earlier, working through Pakistan and some of the other areas. Are we able to get what we need in? I know there are major movements now of equipment for the Afghan National Security Force. How is that working, and what are the challenges going forward?

General MCNABB. Sir, we presently take in about 35 percent, and everything that is high-value we take in by air. Sometimes that is just that short hop that I was mentioning before from a port that is close in, sometimes that is all the way from the States, depending on the nature of the stuff going in.

It is about—on the surface side, it ends up being about 45 percent coming through the Pakistan LOC and about 55 percent of the surface move coming through the Northern Distribution Network. So we have actually adjusted more of the flow to the north, but we don't have—we are not able to bring military equipment through the NDN [Northern Distribution Network]; we can only bring that through the Pakistan LOC, which gets to your question about FMS [foreign military sales] for the ANA [Afghan National Army].

We have been working with the Pakistan military to make sure that we—I have stressed to them how important it is to maintain the velocity going through the Pakistan LOC. I continue to work with them to say—we can identify if there is any pilferage or attacks and show them where that is taking place and work with them to respond quickly. We still are at less than about 1 percent pilfered rate on the Pak LOC. And so I would say that—of course, if it is your stuff, the 1 percent is way too much.

Mr. SMITH. Right.

General MCNABB. So we continue to work that hard with Task Force Guardian, which General Petraeus and General Mattis put together.

General Thurman made sure—he is the Army Forces Command—he made sure the discipline of what goes on the ground is maintained. From my standpoint, I say, if it is really important to you, we put that on the air.

Mr. SMITH. And has the security situation in terms of the Pakistan route gotten better or worse? I know there were concerns about attacks against our supply line coming through Pakistan. What is the update on that?

General MCNABB. Sir, it has gone—it has kind of gone—there are periods where it goes a little higher. I will say, in December of '08 was the time when all of us very much worried that we did not have the Northern Distribution Network at that time. It was 11 percent, was the pilferage and attack rate on it.

Since then, it has come down below 1 percent, pretty much, for calendar years. But to give you a sense, in July of last year, when the floods were all happening and things started to get stacked up, that is when—you slow down the velocity, that is when you become more vulnerable. We went up to about 2 percent during that month. But, overall, for the last year, it was less than 1 percent.

Mr. SMITH. Okay.

General MCNABB. But, again, we keep working at that and making sure that we are looking for every possible way that we can smooth that. A lot of it is just maintaining the velocity on there so it doesn't slow down and become vulnerable.

Mr. SMITH. Right, and create a bigger target. Thank you.

General Ham, just a quick question about Africa. I mentioned that stability is a main challenge there, and in making sure that we do what we can to help create a more stable atmosphere, there is a strong interagency approach that is necessary—State Department, USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development], in particular, and elsewhere. I have done a trip across Africa to a variety of different countries a couple years ago, and I know that that is critical to being able to be successful, is to leverage your assets in cooperation with the State Department.

Can you talk to us a little bit about how that interagency process works country to country in Africa and how you see that as part of your mission there?

General MCNABB. Yes, sir, absolutely. With the design of United States Africa Command, there was a recognition, I think, early on that the problem set that you just identified was key, that it is about instability, and it does require a whole-of-government approach to advance U.S. interests on the continent. And, with that in mind, the command headquarters was designed as—or, with a considerable amount of interagency support.

So we look at our headquarters in Stuttgart, which is, not surprisingly, overwhelmingly Department of Defense, but we have 12 other Government agencies who are represented at some pretty senior levels, to include a deputy to the commander, who is a very experienced and senior foreign service officer, former ambassador. We have senior representatives from USAID, from Treasury, from Commerce and many other organizations to help us look at the challenges, the security challenges, in Africa through more than just a military lens.

And that helps us, first of all, better define the problem so that we can then, in concert with our interagency partners, bring to bear, you know, ideally, the whole of government, the various assets that different branches bring, to help African states build the secure environment that they need to build. Our aspect of that is, again, very largely weighted toward the military, but the other aspects of government are key.

The second point, Congressman, that I would say is we work very, very closely with the chiefs of mission in the countries. And,

of course, they are the senior Americans in each of those countries. We make sure that all of our efforts are nested with the Ambassador and with the country team, which are inherently interagency. And we think that that works to our best effect.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you both very much for your testimony, your long service, and your stellar performance.

I have a lot of questions about our Libyan involvement, which I believe is both unconstitutional and illegal. But these are policy questions, and I know yours is not to reason why, yours is but to do and die. So I will avoid the temptation to ask you questions which you cannot answer by yielding my time to our most junior member here at gavel fall, which was Mr. West.

Mr. WEST. Well, thank you, Mr. Bartlett.

And, also, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member.

And, Generals, it is good to see you.

And, General Ham, always great to see you.

First of all, General McNabb, strategic maneuverability has always been the great thing about our force and our country. But what I would like to do is look out ahead maybe about 5 years. And when you look at the fact that we are moving more so from a forward-deployed type of military force more so to a power-projection or a forceable-entry type of force, what do you see are the challenges, you know, 5 years and beyond, for the Transportation Command? Because I know one of the things I am very concerned about is our C-17 fleet.

General MCNABB. Well, Congressman, thanks for that. I couldn't agree more with the value of the strategic mobility capability. And I would say that we are being pushed, especially as you think about global operations and we think about how we are headed as a department.

I will tell you first and foremost, that new tanker was my number-one acquisition priority. And the fact that the tanker allows us to put global-on-global mobility reach in power is what that is all about. And that new tanker will allow us to make sure that we can extend out and we can really change the way we do our concept of operations and be much more efficient in that. So that is huge. And the faster we can get the tanker on board, the better, from my standpoint.

Right now, we do some things by brute force. For instance, do trans-load using C-17s, moving pallets and people, and that is not what C-17s do best. They do air assault or airdrop. And that has been—that has grown a lot as we have gotten into Afghanistan. We have gone from 2 million pounds of airdrop in 2005 to 60 million pounds last year, and we are headed toward 100 million pounds of airdrop. And what that allows us to do is to get out there to the forward operating bases and make sure they get what they need without having to put convoys at unnecessary risk.

I think that we are pushing very hard to be able to have some of these intermodal/multimodal locations, places like Rota, places like Souda, places like—or Souda Bay, places like Camp Lemonier

in Djibouti. As I look to the Pacific, the same thing—Guam, Singapore, Diego Garcia. And if I have those places where I can get large stuff into and then have theater response, whether that is the joint high-speed vessel, whether that is C-17s or 130s [Lockheed C-130 Hercules military transport aircraft] doing airdrop, or whether that is even as we look at hybrid airships, if we can get to the point where we can get that stuff to these major ports by surface and then have options for the theater commanders out there depending on the nature, we really will have gone a long way.

That is the part that I am looking at now, because that is big dollar savings and it is also very, very fast. That includes not only our float prepositioning but what do we preposition on the land. So you can imagine giving those options to the theater commanders out there, and I think that will be very useful to them.

So those are the things that I am looking at and really asking all the theater commanders, is, where do you want me to look at those intermodal locations, and let's work those now. The investments in places like Diego Garcia, like in Rota, like in Souda Bay, have already paid big dividends for us. And we are finding that the power of that has actually increased the velocity into the warfighter, because, oftentimes, in those small places, it is not the number of airplanes, it is what we can get in the throughput into those small bases. And that is where the C-17, as you mentioned, has really, really played well.

I get to fly the C-17, and I will tell you, it is an awesome airplane. When I go fly with those young guys at Altus and those young instructors—and, you know, I have 5,600 hours—they will come over and put their arm around me and say, “Come over here, son. Let me show you how we fly this airplane.” And so they really have taken this and taken it to a whole different level.

So, lots of great opportunities. The C-5M is performing very well; that is the re-engined C-5s. And as we get the C-130Js on board and the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program on the C-130H models, you know, you have really set us up with modern airplanes that we can really throw in there very quickly and really can make a difference.

Mr. WEST. Well, thank you, sir.

And if I could ask one other question.

General Ham, you know, as we sit back, as Ranking Member Smith talked about the unrest and the political instability in Africa, do you see an encroachment of any Al Qaeda type of elements? And, also, I would like to get your assessment of China's interventions into the African continent, as well.

General HAM. Thanks, Congressman.

If I could take the second piece first, the Chinese are very active across the continent, but primarily in an economic way. And I am learning more about that as I get further into the command. And I would note that tomorrow would be 4 weeks, so I have a lot yet to learn about this. But I see the Chinese influence primarily in an economic vein, with construction, with oil, and the like.

Your first point about Al Qaeda and, more broadly, violent extremist organizations in Africa is, indeed, the number one security challenge that we face in Africa, and I would say most notably in East Africa, where we see the efforts of al-Shabaab in Somalia at-

tempting to expand their reach more regionally, with linkages with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Yemen and, potentially, linkages with Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb.

All of those, I think, pose a very, very real strategic concern to the United States, our people, and our interests, both abroad and at home. So I take that as our number one mission and our number one area of emphasis.

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you both for your distinguished service.

I wanted to follow up a little on the interagency question, because I think, over the years, we have acknowledged that the military operations and interface probably will always overshadow, to a certain extent, in many of the areas in which we are engaged, we are involved.

Are there some metrics, are there some areas that you are really looking at to see whether, in fact, that has changed dramatically, and what has really contributed to that change? Are we, in fact, seeing that military operations or the activities per se are really not getting in the way of some of the diplomatic efforts that we have had ongoing?

General HAM. Yes, ma'am, I think for us in Africa Command, the operations in Libya were certainly a different nature, a different type of the operation, in that those were certainly an overwhelmingly military aspect of the U.S. application of power. More commonly throughout Africa, U.S. Africa Command is operating in a supporting role, in most cases supporting chief-of-mission initiatives or Department of State-led initiatives. It is principally through Department of State authorities that building partner capacity—security institution building is done through State authorities; though DOD [the Department of Defense], through U.S. Africa Command, has a supporting role in that regard. A good example is the development of forces from Uganda, Burundi, who operate in the African mission in Somalia under a State Department program that U.S. Africa Command supports.

So I think we have the balance about right, in terms of who is in charge. The Department of Defense, and, again, through U.S. Africa Command, we bring a lot of capacity and a lot of ability to enable those programs, but, by and large, we are doing so in support of others. And that seems to me to be about right for most of the programs in Africa.

Mrs. DAVIS. Uh-huh. Are you checking in, I guess, fairly frequently to be sure that everybody agrees, I think, that that balance, where it is appropriate—obviously, there are areas that you pointed out, of course, where the balance is not appropriate. But I think one of the—I think it was the trips that I took, actually, with our ranking chairman, where, despite the fact that we talked about how important it was, in fact, the people who were engaged in this effort didn't feel that they had the same seat at the table.

General MCNABB. I think that is a very real concern, and it is something that I would tell you that I will take a look at, as I get my feet under me in this new command.

I will, as I have told Assistant Secretary Carson of the Africa Bureau of State Department, that most of the time when I come back to D.C., I will make an effort to see him, as he has pledged to come see me on the continent or in Germany. I think it is very, very important that we have that very strong linkage to make sure that all of the assets of the Government get a voice, and an important voice, as we move forward.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, sir.

May I just—you noted, I think, two areas in which you are reaching out to military families, particularly in Stuttgart, I think, where they have had some questions and some problems. How else are you able to make certain that our military families feel that they have the support that they need in that command?

And some of those are accompanied, I believe. And the majority, I suspect, are probably not accompanied, certainly in Djibouti, where we have some forces there.

General HAM. Yes, ma'am, the quality of life for our service members who are at the headquarters in Stuttgart and in our service component commands who are largely based in Europe, with one here in the U.S., those families have excellent support.

I do worry more so about the small contingents that are either in our embassies, kind of separated away, that the military service members and families have the programs that they need. But, generally, that is pretty good.

And at places like Camp Lemonier, which is a pretty large deployment of unaccompanied service members, again, thanks to this committee, they actually have a very good quality of life. It is never as good as being separated, but it is quite good.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Generals, thank you for being here today.

And, General Ham, I am very familiar that the Southern Command is located in Miami. And we know that the people of my birthplace, Charleston, South Carolina, have a keen interest in the potential of AFRICOM being located in Charleston. And we would, if my colleagues, Congressman Tim Scott, Congressman Jim Clyburn, were here, they would want to make a few points to you.

And that is that Charleston is the transportation hub for the United States Transportation Command, as well as the primary seaport for container traffic between the United States and the South Atlantic. The Charleston Air Force Base provides all the strategic airlift support for Africa for our Government, to include embassy support. SPAWAR—Charleston [Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command—Charleston] is the leading provider for command, control, and communications for EUCOM's [United States European Command's] role in Africa.

The relationships for the Charleston medical community, which would be so helpful in the event of an emergency in Africa; the Medical University of South Carolina is located in Charleston, a world-class facility. We know that most of the rapid deployment forces that would be used in an African operation include special operations that are in the southeastern part of the United States.

Charleston is the hub for all military transportation, airlift, sealift, and prepositioning to Africa.

And then there is an extraordinary cultural linkage. I had the privilege of visiting in Monrovia, Liberia, and the great cultural association of West Africa to Charleston is very clear. It is a shared culture. In fact, we have the same accents, and I felt right at home when I was visiting with the people in Monrovia. And then I found out, to my pleasant surprise, that the diocese of the African American Methodist Church for South Carolina is actually South Carolina and Liberia, and it sponsors the AME [African Methodist Episcopal] university there in Monrovia.

And so, with that in mind, the decision, Secretary Gates has indicated, to be made for moving Africa Command or retaining it won't be considered until next year. But when the decision is made, what are the considerations that will be made as to quality of life or dependents' access to schools, jobs, medical care? What do you see?

General HAM. Well, Congressman, first, I would say I have only had the opportunity to visit Charleston once, but it was just a few years ago, and it was indeed a very enjoyable visit to a great city.

As you mentioned, the Secretary of Defense has asked me to take a look at and provide a recommendation back to him as to where the stationing of the Africa Command headquarters should be. And he has essentially asked me to start from a clean sheet of paper and look at the factors that you have identified: Security, suitability, quality of life, the transportation nodes, accessibility to the area of responsibility, a whole host of requirements that we would like to station our headquarters.

And so that process has begun, and we will look at, first of all, to make sure we have the methodology right, and then we will look at a wide variety of locations to see which we think would make the—be most suitable for the command to accomplish its missions.

But it will take us a little bit of time to do that study.

Mr. WILSON. Well, you indicated you have visited Charleston once. You are welcome back, obviously. And you will see such a symbiotic relationship with West Africa to the low country of South Carolina. And the people there are very proud of the shared culture, but then, obviously, all the other features that I told you. And I know that if Congressman Scott were here, or Congressman Clyburn, they would want to make that point.

And, General McNabb, as my final question, with regard to refitting railcars, what is the status of refitting old railcars as opposed to buying new?

General McNABB. Yes, sir, our Surface Deployment and Distribution Command has been looking at that and have basically decided that refurbishing old probably makes the most sense from a business case.

Right now, we have been asked by OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] to take a look and say, okay, given everything going on, what should that number be, 4,000, 5,000, you know, where should that be in there? And, right now, they are doing that study with OSD.

Mr. WILSON. And to conclude, there is a bit of history there, too. Where retrofitting occurs in South Carolina is in the community of

Hamburg, South Carolina. It was the site of the first scheduled railroad in the world, between Charleston and Hamburg in 1832.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And to Mr. Wilson, I would comment that when I have been to South Carolina, Charleston, I have enjoyed myself in that area.

But I would also point everyone out—or point everyone to the fact that I live in the Atlanta, Georgia, area, which is the transportation hub of the Southeast. We have the world's busiest airport; it is high-capacity. We have approximately—quite a few military aviation facilities. We have one of the country's largest diaspora communities from Africa; superb infrastructure to support the military's communication needs; world-class educational institutions—Georgia Tech, Emory, the Atlanta University Center. High quality of life for personnel who were assigned—or who would be assigned to that area.

And I think that it would be a great thing. I know that Ambassador Andrew Young is very much interested in AFRICOM choosing to locate its headquarters in Atlanta, and I certainly join in that desire. If not Atlanta, then someplace in Georgia would be great.

But I want to also congratulate you, General Ham, for your new assignment. Four weeks in, I know that you are still trying to get adjusted. And it seems like you came in at a time of great action going on in Africa, with the Libyan situation, we have the situation in the Ivory Coast.

Now, I understand that President Gbagbo has resigned and is asking for U.N. assistance, or U.N. protection actually. And that is good, that he will be moving on.

I would like to ask you, are U.S. personnel or equipment taking part in the U.N. operations in the Ivory Coast?

General HAM. Congressman, we are not. We are in very close dialogue with the U.S. Embassy and also with the French, who have a large presence in Côte d'Ivoire. As we typically do in the U.S. military, we plan for possible contingencies. And as the chairman mentioned, you know, the security situation in Côte d'Ivoire had been deteriorating for some period of time, so we looked at a whole range of possible military actions that might be necessary.

But we have—the people at the Embassy are present. The Ambassador has asked for a small coordinating team just to maintain communications, and we have got that available to him, as well.

Your information is probably a little more current than mine, but, as I was departing the Pentagon to come over here, we were at the situation where Mr. Gbagbo had indicated his apparent willingness to turn himself over, but that had not yet been accomplished by the time I left. But, hopefully, that will be accomplished and a calm returned to Abidjan and to the country. It is sorely needed.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir.

And would you also update us on the progress toward increasing the professionalism and accountability of the forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo?

General HAM. Yes, sir. It is an ongoing effort. We have trained one battalion. We think that one battalion will perform pretty well. But we think there is more that we can and should be doing to help Congo become a more professional military force, subordinate to civil control and responding under international norms.

But initial indications are pretty good, I think, but there is still, certainly, some work to be done.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

General McNabb, I had questions, but Congressman Wilson kind of threw me off track there, so I will get back to you at some point in the future.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to the Nation.

Mr. FORBES. [Presiding.] Thank you.

The chair recognizes Mr. Kline for 5 minutes.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And with all apologies to my colleagues from South Carolina and Georgia, most everybody knows that Minneapolis-St. Paul is roughly the transportation center of the entire world.

General McNabb, I have a copy of the letter that you sent to Mr. Babbitt, the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] administrator, where you were expressing some concerns about a proposed rule that will affect crew rest for our commercial partners.

Could you briefly outline what your concerns are and what impact this rule might have on our ability to move troops and personnel?

General McNABB. Sure. Yes, Congressman, actually, Mr. Babbitt did come out—Administrator Babbitt did come out and visit with me at TRANSCOM, also visited with the Air Mobility Command. And we chatted about what this impact would have on our Civil Reserve Air Fleet, especially the nonscheduled carriers—so, the legacy carriers, kind of a separate issue—but the nonscheduled carriers that primarily do the charter work not only for us but for others.

As I mentioned to him, I said, safety is paramount. There is no question that that—

Mr. KLINE. Yes, sir, but what would the impact be? What is your concern here?

General McNABB. Sir, the biggest concern has to do with, as you get modern airplanes, when you think about—basically, one size doesn't fit all. When you talk about regional carriers, they are doing a number of landings, versus long international legs, they have different levels of fatigue, and they require different approaches.

When you talk about the nonsecurity carriers, they are taking stuff directly from the United States and, ideally, with modern airplanes, going all the way to Afghanistan, not stopping on the way; it is taking advantage of that.

Ideally, I have been pushing hard for the modern airplanes that have the longer range. That increases velocity. It also means we don't have to worry about stopping in some of those locations. It allows this thing to go very rapidly.

So I asked them to, you know, take a look at that, take a look at better crew rest facilities, better operational risk-management-type things that say, let's look at this kind of unique part of this

mission, and make sure that we enhance safety but look at all the ways that we can do that.

Mr. KLINE. So if I may interrupt again just for a minute, this proposed rule would take away that flexibility. And what I am trying to get at, the impact would be, we would move fewer troops, it would take more time, we could move less equipment. What would the impact of this rule be?

General MCNABB. Well, certainly, it is time, and, certainly, it is dollars. And what I am probably the most—what I want to make sure is our U.S.-flag fleet stays competitive. And if we don't take full advantage of modern airplanes, especially on the international market, we will find ourselves not in that market. And I am very worried about that, because I depend on those.

Mr. KLINE. I am, too, General. Thank you very much. If there is anything this committee can do, I trust you will communicate that to us.

General Ham, I want to go back to the command structure for Operation Unified Protector. And I have a little thing here from Admiral Stavridis, I think, NATO, sort of a command structure outline. And it says that we have, apparently, Lieutenant General Jodice, American; Vice Admiral Rinaldo Veri—in fact, I should put my glasses on, I am sorry—an Italian; and we have a Canadian lieutenant general, and they are reporting to Admiral Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

You should have lobbied for a title like that.

The question is, do you see your relationship as the commander of AFRICOM as the same as General Mattis' is to General Petraeus and Admiral Stavridis? We are trying to fit—the chairman asked you about that relationship, and you said that there might be a uniquely American operation where, presumably, you insert yourself into this chain of command and take U.S. forces and use them for, in your example, it was a pickup of a downed pilot or something else.

I am just—help me understand what your relationship is to this—I know you don't have this—but to this command structure that I just described, which is a NATO command structure.

General HAM. Sir, it is quite analogous to what you described in Afghanistan, where in Afghanistan Admiral Stavridis, in his NATO role, overseeing General Petraeus, a NATO commander, supported by General Mattis, a United States geographic combatant commander. And so that relationship is very similar to what we have here.

I do not have a day-to-day operational role, but Libya is in the area of responsibility of U.S. Africa Command, so we have, obviously, an enduring interest. And when Operation Unified Protector is complete, when the alliance decides that its missions have been accomplished, then Libya is still in Africa Command's area of responsibility. So I remain very closely connected with Admiral Stavridis, Admiral Locklear, and, indeed, the Canadian, General Bouchard, who is a very competent commander.

Mr. KLINE. Okay. Thanks very much.

I yield back.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you.

The chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Mrs. Castor, for 5 minutes.

Mrs. CASTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Generals.

General McNabb, I think many of the personnel in U.S. Transportation Command are something of unsung heroes. I mean, they do it all, from the intricate and complex delivery of supplies across the globe, to air refueling, to deployment and redeployments, and then you have the disaster response and all of the aeromedical assignments that you have. I don't think you get enough kudos, so my hat is off to all of the personnel in U.S. Transportation Command.

General McNABB. Thank you, ma'am.

Mrs. CASTOR. I know that one of the primary issues for TRANSCOM has been the ongoing saga of the KC-X air refueling tanker. And we have finally reached a point now where we can all move ahead and they can focus on actually engineering and building those aircraft.

How do you keep the KC-X on time and on budget?

General McNABB. Yes, ma'am. Well, first of all, obviously, the Air Force will—you know, I depend on the Air Force, in their organize, train, and equip role, to be able to be overseeing that and making sure that it stays on time and on budget.

Mrs. CASTOR. But can you bring some added attention to General Schwartz and the Air Force? And I want to hear whether or not you have the ability to do that.

General McNABB. Yes, ma'am. And I think that, you know, right now, they have made that—that was their number-one acquisition priority, just like it was mine.

I really do appreciate the tremendous support on both sides of the Hill on getting us that new tanker. And I am absolutely excited about what it will bring.

I think that the fact that it is, you know, primarily off the shelf, in general, taking advantage of what is already commercial market, making sure that we are not asking for things that are beyond the reach in technology—I mean, a lot of the things that usually will drive something to increase cost or a delay in time, most of that stuff has been worked out. So I am pretty excited about that.

And it seems to me, as long as we keep a stable program, that we will be able to deliver that on time. And, you know, hopefully, we will be cranking those out at 15-plus a year, and then we can begin to replace those old 135s [Boeing C-135 Stratolifter military transport aircraft] that have done such a great job.

Mrs. CASTOR. Yeah, the mechanics that have worked on—that continue to work on some of the Eisenhower-era tankers are magicians, I think, sometimes.

What role has TRANSCOM played in support of the humanitarian relief to the earthquake victims in Japan? Could you give us a quick summary on that and whether or not it has placed stress on our mobility system?

General McNABB. Yes, ma'am. We have had 512 sorties, moved about 306 packs into there to help. Primarily, those were those radiological teams and other teams that went in. Moved—

Mrs. CASTOR. Are these teams and assets, are they in that area? Could you distinguish, how far are you having to travel? Do you have the ability to respond with assets that are close-in?

General MCNABB. Well, certainly, Admiral Willard is using his own forces that are already in-theater. And you have seen them. You have seen the amphibious groups. You have seen the Marines come up from Kadena. You have seen the Seventh Fleet, the naval assets come in. Obviously, we have a number of airmen that are over there at different bases, like Yokota and Misawa, and he is taking full advantage of all of that.

Where he has asked us to help is the stuff coming from the Continental United States or for emergency movement in-theater that they can't handle themselves. We have moved, for instance, crash rescue teams, the Fairfax rescue team from here, the L.A. crash rescue team. And this is not only to go into the rubble but also dog teams that deployed with them. We moved emergency generators, a planeload, 65 emergency generators, as the generators were taken out by the tsunami, for the nuclear plant. We also moved a planeload of boron to neutralize the radioisotopes.

So we have been doing things like that, kind of the emergency, "This is stuff that we need from the States." A lot of radiological teams, whether they were survey teams or chemical, biological, radiological teams, we brought those on.

And, basically, what Northern Command, Admiral Winnefeld, did when this came up, said, "Here are the teams that they might need." We leave that to Admiral Willard. I make sure that I have airplanes that are on standby alert and air refueling assets to take it as soon as it is identified. And, once it is identified, we go pick them up and take them.

We also did the—aided in the voluntary departure of all of the U.S. people—

Mrs. CASTOR. Has it provided any kinks in your ability to complete missions anywhere else?

General MCNABB. Ma'am, the only thing that we had a bit of discussion on is how quickly they needed to move the voluntary departure. We decided that we would do that all commercial. We went to our U.S.-flag carriers, like you were mentioning. Spring break did have a play, because there wasn't excess capacity. And they basically responded very quickly. That allowed us to keep the T-tail supporting General Ham in AFRICOM, General Petraeus and General Mattis in CENTCOM, at the same time of having those T-tails available to take any of that emergency nuclear response stuff immediately in there.

So, again, our commercial partners really stepped up magnificently and, by the time it was over, brought out about 5,000 passengers, over 400 pets. And then we also got commercial tickets on the scheduled missions that were coming out of Japan to get the folks home. And then we worked with NORTHCOM to get them to their final destination.

Mrs. CASTOR. Thank you very much.

General MCNABB. You are very welcome, ma'am.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you.

The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Coffman, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, General McNabb, thanks for the job that you are doing as the commanding general for U.S. Transportation Command.

A question about Afghanistan, and that is—you mentioned that you want to get the C-17 more in its primary mission, as you define it, to do the airborne drops for logistical support. But I understand that there have been some problems with accuracy, getting that inside the drop zone. Could you respond to that?

General McNABB. Sir, I think you are probably talking about the Precision Airdrop System, where we drop it at 10,000 or 15,000 feet, and it has a GPS [Global Positioning System] receiver and a square chute, and it comes in. And the biggest issue with that was the terrain and the winds. And, obviously, it has got to be able to keep up with those kinds of things. So we have worked with industry to make sure that we continue to drive in the accuracy that they need on the ground.

Because of the conditions, primarily we have been able to do Visual Flight Rule-type drops, low-altitude, low-cost, using disposable-type chutes. That has been the primary amount that we have done. And normal container delivery system, that is the primary way that we have been doing that.

I actually got to fly an airdrop, 40 bundles, where we dropped from a C-17 that we dropped up in the mountains at night. They use the night-vision goggles. They have worked out very well with the folks on the ground. And when you are coming in at 1,000 to 2,000 feet, the accuracy rule is within the standards that they need.

So we have been, you know, the 93 to 94 percent accuracy on putting the stuff on target. We are even looking at doing low-altitude, high-speed airdrop, much like the special operators do. The C-17 and the 130J are stressed to be able to do that, and that is where you would come in at 250 knots at 300 feet. But we have to make sure we design—and we are really looking for, you know, an ability to size this and keep the cost down. But it obviously has to do with the parachute and the opening shock.

Those are the kind of things that we continue to work to say, can we do it as cheap as possible, depending on the threat, all the way to putting a precision airdrop that, ideally, we would like to recover and reuse.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you.

And, General Ham, thanks for your service to our country. And congratulations on your recent command for—taking over U.S. Africa Command.

First of all, can you just share with me what the rationale was for putting it at Stuttgart, Germany, when Central Command was your predecessor? And it deals with an area geographically further away than Africa, and yet, they are in Florida.

General HAM. Yes, sir. Africa had been divided between European Command, which had the bulk of Africa; Central Command, which had the Horn of Egypt and the Horn of Africa; and Pacific Command, which had the island nations and Madagascar. So there actually were three geographic combatant commands, previously, that divided the continent.

But the majority was in European Command. And so, when the decision was made to stand up Africa Command as a separate geographic command, the bulk of the resources were already in Stuttgart, the facilities were already in Stuttgart. So, for purposes of getting the command off to an expeditious start, that seemed to make a lot of sense.

Mr. COFFMAN. I understand.

Now, in the situation in Ivory Coast right now, where you have a constitutionally elected government that is not being permitted to assume the government and you have a president-elect there that has not been allowed to assume his position in the government, that there has not been a peaceful transfer of power, were there any communications between that president-elect and you and your command in reference to any assistance?

General HAM. No, sir. Only through the U.S. Embassy. But it was specifically focused on U.S. missions, for example, planning for a noncombatant evacuation.

Mr. COFFMAN. I see. So there was virtually no communication whatsoever from that constitutionally elected government that was not able to assume power to provide any assistance whatsoever?

General HAM. Sir, not with Africa Command, to the very best of my knowledge.

Mr. COFFMAN. Well, you know, how would you define your mission in Africa? Because if you cannot influence that situation in any way, you know, tell me how you define your mission.

General HAM. Sir, in Côte d'Ivoire, there was already a very large United Nations presence, and focused on this clearly. There were efforts under way, through a variety of international and regional organizations, to try to seek a solution to this other than through the application of military force. My sense is that proceeded. Over the past couple of days, as violence escalated, we saw the United Nations take a more forceful role. And I think that is what perhaps compelled Mr. Gbagbo to decide that it was time to change.

I think the best role that Africa Command plays in these situations is to try to prevent them, to try to work with the militaries and security forces of African states so that they are loyal to their duly elected and constituted government, which is not something we saw play out in this situation, where we had forces loyal to both the duly elected president and to the man who would not relinquish power.

So I think we can be more preventive, rather than the application of military power, to displace—the application of U.S. military power to displace someone in an African state.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General.

The gentlelady from Hawaii is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Generals, for being here.

General McNabb, I was wondering, because of others who have testified before us, there always seems to be this interesting relationship between the National Guard and Reserves as making up your force. Do you also have that combination?

General MCNABB. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. HANABUSA. And do you know what your numbers are, in terms of how many are Active and how many of the Reserves or National Guard supplement you?

General MCNABB. It is about 60 percent in the Guard and Reserve and about 40 percent in the Active would be a, you know, rough, depending on what weapons system and—of course, you have a great team out there in Hawaii.

General Wong and his team have been superb in figuring out new ways that we can take full advantage of the total force, sharing airplanes and figuring out the best way to use the Guard and Active Duty. That has really been very positive.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. Thank you for saying that.

I am really curious about whether you have had any problems with, I think it is Article 10—or, I mean Title 10 and Title 32. Because, as you know, the Guard really is a State function, reports and appointed by the adjutant general, as appointed by the Governor. And how do you work out the chain of command, I guess, for lack of a better description?

General MCNABB. Certainly, when they are flying a Federal mission, obviously they get paid for that. And when they do that, they come on to our orders, and then they use our normal chain of command.

They do some Guard missions in which they stay under the Governors' command and control. I would say that, for especially on the mobility side, I am very, very happy with how that all works. But it is fairly simple, given the fact that we give them a mission, they fly it, and they get paid for that. It works out well overall, and it is a little easier for us, especially on the airlift side.

Tanker, the same way. For the most part, any time that we have had a national emergency, I have never once had a governor say, well, I am holding the tankers back, or the 130s, or the C-17s—not once. They always know that this is part of this.

Where we really get into—you really see the value is for a domestic disaster like Katrina. And, at that point, you know, how do we make sure that we are using not only the Guard bureau but our support to NORTHCOM, and making sure that that all comes together. And I would say that that has gone very well. We saw that in Haiti, really some very, very good work in making sure that General McKinley, as the National Guard Bureau chief, and us working through that. It really has not been a problem.

Ms. HANABUSA. You testified earlier about Japan and the amount of support that you have had to coordinate. Does any of that support correlate to the respective Guard units and/or Reserve units?

General MCNABB. We definitely had some of the people flying the missions. But they are flying there, they are flying back, and it is a specific mission in which they are doing that.

The rest of them, I am not sure how much of the Guard would be on those chemical, biological, and radiological teams that NORTHCOM, you know, has that we move. I would have to get that for the record for you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 103.]

Ms. HANABUSA. Have you also had occasion to call into service, like, commercial planes or commercial ships or anything like that? And what is the process that you would go through to do that?

General MCNABB. Yes, ma'am. In fact, we have a very robust process. And, in fact, if we can go first to our commercial industry, our U.S.-flag fleet, that is what I will do, if that can handle it, because they can do it cheaper than we can do for the military side.

So I try to focus the military on places where the threat or the conditions require military-type lift. And if commercial can do it, I will turn to them first. They have really helped us tremendously on the surge into Afghanistan, bringing the equipment out of Iraq. All of that has been done commercial, which is good for—

Ms. HANABUSA. How are they cheaper? I am curious.

General MCNABB. Pardon me?

Ms. HANABUSA. How are they cheaper?

General MCNABB. Well, if you look at fully burdened cost and you say, okay, here is how much it costs me to take a pallet of stuff on a C-17 versus a 747-400 freighter, you know, you look at the efficiencies that they have in the commercial world, it ends up being, you know, a cheaper way to do that. That frees the C-17 to go do airdrop.

So when I sit there and I think about that, that has been one of the real powers that I have seen in TRANSCOM, is the use of both the air and the maritime industry wherever possible. And what has allowed us to handle a lot of these surges that you all have asked about, is the fact that we have brought the U.S.-flag fleet to bear. We basically contract with them.

Ms. HANABUSA. And it is U.S.-flagged.

General MCNABB. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you.

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you.

General McNabb, General Ham, I represent Robbins Air Force Base. And just to the south of me, I have Moody, and just to the West, I have Fort Benning; just to the east, I have Stewart. Both of your—the Air Force and the Army are extremely important to us. And as you look for additional commands, I think Georgia will be—you will find open and welcome arms there.

I want to ask a question. The joint future theater lifter, is that going to be a vertical lift craft?

General MCNABB. Congressman, we are looking at all parts. Vertical lift is one of them. One is fixed-wing, which Air Mobility Command had brought in kind of a, you know, a much more modern C-17, -130-type aircraft.

We also are looking at airships under that, to say, you know, how does that fit in to the overall enterprise that we have. And what we are trying to do is sort that out. And I will say, we are going to look at, you know, what does it cost per pound delivered, and then how does that fit in to the rest of the fleets that we have. And I will use surface, I will use rail, we will use trucks, I will look at

airships, you know, and we will just see how that will fit in to the rest of those.

Vertical lift is one of those ways. Vertical lift, in the past, has been probably the most expensive way. So when we think about ways that we can help General Petraeus and General Mattis, one of the things is, if I can free up his vertical lift assets to go do the operational-type missions that only they can do, by doing whether it is airdrop or air land, that is what I try to do. Because, historically, that is just a much more expensive way.

When I look for the future, that may change, those dynamics, as technology takes over. And I think that is what we are looking for.

Mr. SCOTT. Okay.

Just looking at the history of things, it never made sense to me why we canceled the F-22 [Lockheed Martin/Boeing Raptor fifth-generation fighter aircraft] before the F-35 [Lockheed Martin Lightning II fifth-generation fighter aircraft] is ready. And the tanker, it takes us a decade to get through that. And now we have the C-17 and stopping the purchase of the C-17.

And, of all the decisions that I have seen—and, again, I don't pretend to think that I know as much as you do, General. But, of all the decisions I have seen made, the one that I question the most, as far as our abilities going forward, is cancelling the C-17.

And it is not manufactured in my district. I mean, it is not. But this is my question: If we cancel the C-17 buying altogether, knowing the history of the procurements and that it may be 20 years before there is an alternative to the C-17 that actually works—we have already paid for the technology costs of the plane—you know, what alternatives do you see for future airlift production if our last remaining wide-body military production program shuts its doors and closes?

And how would we replace those aircraft if we end up in a situation where they do come under fire and we do actually start to lose some of them?

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. Sir, I will tell you the C-17 has performed magnificently, and it really has changed the way we did airlift. Because it can swing between strategic and theater roles, and, as you mentioned, it has been tremendous.

Right now, we are set to have 222 C-17s. I would say that, when we did the MCRS [Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study], we figured we need about 300—it was 304—large strategic airlifters. And, right now, that was made up of C-17s, C-5Ms, which were re-engined, and C-5As that had the Avionics Modernization Program on there. And what I basically—from TRANSCOM's standpoint, we need about 32.7 million ton-miles. And as the Air Force looks at what is the best mix of those airplanes, that is where the C-17/C-5 mix came up.

From my standpoint, one of the things that I am very excited about is, as we get the new tanker—and, right now, I use C-17s in ways that I would rather be using the new multi-role tanker in—and that will free up C-17s to do some of the other work. I think that is going to be a positive all by itself. And it is one of those things that folks don't realize the impact that we have on having to use C-17s to trans-load from our Civil Reserve Air Fleet

both cargo and packs, because I can't take them all the way forward.

When I think about the future—and, you know, you make a very good point. One, I think they are planning to make sure that they keep the tooling. I mean, I think that gives you a hedge. The other portion I would say is, we look at these new—as you mentioned, as we look at the new study, what are the other things that we need to do, and then, again, how will that mix and match?

When I first was working as a major on the C-17 and talking about when we needed it, at that point we were going to buy 210 C-17s to replace the C-141 [Lockheed Starlifter strategic airlifter] fleet. We are at 222 now. I would say, we have the numbers. Most of the places that we go now, I would just say that we are not impacted by the numbers of airplanes; it is, how many airplanes can I get in there? And so that tends to be where I look at the C-17 fleet. It is versatile, and it has been superb.

The other portion where I think we are doing better than ever is using our Civil Reserve Air Fleet—again, modern airplanes—and making sure that we are using those to max advantage so, again, we free up the fleet to make sure that they do that.

But I do understand your concern. And, I mean, I would say that I have the same concern, to make sure that we have hedged those bets and we have options to be able to bring that back if we need to.

Mr. SCOTT. Well, my concern is that we start finding stress fractures and other things, that it takes us longer to repair them, and, at the same time, we can't bring new equipment in.

General MCNABB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, sir. Thank both of you.

Mr. FORBES. The gentlelady from Guam is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And I would also like to welcome General McNabb and General Ham. Thank you for your testimonies.

Well, earlier, you heard my colleagues speak about the great attributes of their States. Well, I represent the beautiful island of Guam. And if I were to tell you about all the advantages of living on a tropical island, it would take all day, so we will put it off for another time. But Guam is the home of Andersen Air Force Base and Naval Base.

I have two questions for you, General McNabb. The first is for you, in reference to ship repairs in U.S. shipyards. In a May 2004 report to Congress, MSC [Military Sealift Command] assured Congress that it was firmly committed to conducting the maximum amount of repair work practicable in domestic shipyards and ensuring that MSC ships are repaired in foreign shipyards only when directed by operational necessity and allowed by law.

How does TRANSCOM ensure that operational necessity exists before authorizing repairs in foreign shipyards?

An annual report to Congress indicates that there are still a tremendous amount of ships being repaired in Hong Kong or Singapore. So what more can be done to comply with congressional intent? Could you answer that for me?

General MCNABB. Yes, ma'am. One of the things that Military Sealift Command does, not only do they take care of our surge ships, they also take care of the Navy fleet. And the ships that they have forward, for instance, in the Pacific, are primarily under the Chief of Naval Operations' hats. In other words, it is support of the Navy.

The ships that they take care of for me are the large, medium-speed RO/RO [roll-on/roll-off] ships that we would activate if we can't, you know, get the commercial lift to be able to do that. And right now, we haven't had to be activating, you know, these large ships because the commercial capability has been there.

I know that they are committed to using Guam. I know Admiral Buzby, the MSC commander, has, I believe, talked with you and gone through this with you, and it had to do with the drydock, I think, there in Guam.

Ms. BORDALLO. That is correct.

General MCNABB. And so, whatever we can do to get that drydock up, because right now that is the constraint, you know, as I understand it, the big constraint in '11. We do \$40 million. Guam is probably the place that we do—he does most of the work. But not under my—you know, not under my umbrella. It is really under the CNO's [Chief of Naval Operations'] umbrella.

Ms. BORDALLO. I see. Well, I am very concerned, because we have, well, about 350 workers, employees there. It is a private shipyard. And, you know, it was one of the things that I fought for a few years ago, "Buy America."

General MCNABB. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. BORDALLO. So I want to be sure that that is being carried out.

Now, my final question is also for you, General McNabb, and it is in regards to rotating aircraft support on Guam. A rotating aircraft, which in the past has been called the Patriot Express, helps to enhance morale and welfare for service members in Guam by offering them flights to, say, Japan or Hawaii.

What steps is TRANSCOM taking with either the Navy or the Air Force to bring back this capability to Guam? And can you explain to me what is necessary to revisit this issue and validate the requirements for this important capability?

General MCNABB. Yes, ma'am. On the Patriot Express, what we have done with that—and that primarily was to move the U.S. military members around, and their families, when they are moving back and forth. It also has the other benefit that, if you have it, then there are space-available opportunities for dependents and families, which I think is one of the real advantages to that.

We have actually increased the number of Patriot Express missions, adding back Korea, adding back Misawa, adding back Iwakuni. And the promise that I have had with the commanders in those areas is that you have to make sure you fill those airplanes, because we have to break even at the end of all of this.

Guam is slated to be—and I will have to get you whether it is next year—it may even be—it is probably '12, but it might even be '11. But we said, especially as the Marines would come down there and we got an additional number of military folks on Guam, then

it will make sense to have Patriot Express come in there, rather than the normal commercial traffic.

So right now I have told them that is what we want to do as soon as we have enough military presence on Guam, and then we will get the Patriot Express coming in.

Ms. BORDALLO. So what you are saying, then, is that, by 2011, possibly, or '12, this capability will be returned.

General MCNABB. Yes, ma'am. And I will get you the exact date, because it had to do with the movement of the Marines coming down.

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am sitting here listening to some of my colleagues, and I feel like I have gone through a time warp, back when earmarks were okay, the monster earmark requests going on for General Ham to move his command. So I will refrain from doing that.

General McNabb, the requirement under the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] for some 330-plus planes includes 111 C-5s, of some configuration. The list I have is 36 C-5As that either have or will go through the AMP [Avionics Modernization Program] program and 52 Bs and Cs that have gone through both engines and the AMP program.

Where are the other 23—or what are the other 23?

General MCNABB. Sir, right now, we are asking for—the MCRS-2016 [Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016] said we needed 32.7 million ton-miles, which equates to about 301 total big airplanes. That is 222 C-17s, 52 C-5Ms, and 27 C-5As.

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. So you would be supportive of—I suspect, of that 23 that are missing off that list, they are parked someplace and may never get off the ground again. And we are maintaining airplanes that, in a commercial venue, you would never do, for a variety of reasons.

General MCNABB. Sir, what we were hoping for is the ability to, as we bring on the additional C-17s, that we can put them at places like McChord and Charleston, take our older C-17s and replace some of those old C-5As at some of the different bases. That will get them new airplanes, it will extend the service life on our C-17s—

Mr. CONAWAY. Speaking of the service life, the operational tempo that you are currently experiencing, I don't necessarily—none of us hope it is over the next 5 or 6 years, but—

General MCNABB. Right.

Mr. CONAWAY [continuing]. Given that each plane has a set useful life of some period of time, what impact does this current operational tempo have on that fleet? Will it last until 2025, 2030, whenever it is we will decide to replace the C-17?

General MCNABB. Yes, sir, we bought the C-17s for 30,000 hours, and we plan to do 1,000 hours a year. So, basically, 30 years is what we were trying to get out of that asset.

I would say that we were overflying that, especially early on in OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] and OEF [Operation Enduring

Freedom]. In fact, this committee and the Congress helped us with that. We said we need about 7 to 10 airplanes to make up that—you know, to get the flying hours back down.

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. In your analysis, you have addressed that operational tempo issue with respect to the life of that fleet.

General MCNABB. But if we keep—you know, we may have to address it again if we just keep—you know, we stay at this tempo. But, as I mentioned before, we are using a lot of commercial—

Mr. CONAWAY. Right. I understand that. But, at some point in time, if you come back to us and say, “We need C-17s,” it is going to be a whole lot more expensive, at that point in time, depending on what the circumstances are.

General MCNABB. Yes, sir.

Mr. CONAWAY. General Ham, congratulations on the new command.

Just a quick inference. When Gates was here last week, he said that one of the core missions of NATO that he would support would be the search and rescue. And maybe I misunderstood you to say that was an ad hoc thing that may occur, but it seemed to me that we were going to provide the search and rescue for the Libyan work. Did I misunderstand that?

General HAM. No, sir. You understood it correctly. It falls under the category of what we call “unique U.S. military capabilities.”

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay.

General HAM. And we thought we were the best suited to do that.

Mr. CONAWAY. Are those your assets?

General HAM. For the most part, they are, yes, sir—

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay.

General HAM [continuing]. With our Special Operations Command Africa.

Mr. CONAWAY. All right.

Your budget request for 2012 is \$289 million. How much out of hide is this Libyan operation going to cost you, assuming it goes past September or October 1st?

General HAM. Congressman, financially, it won't affect the headquarters very much. But where the cost is borne is with our service components, in this case particularly the Air Force and Navy service component commands for AFRICOM, who have sortied ships, aircraft, and personnel at a rate higher than they were anticipating to do.

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. So they will have to figure out some way to pay for that. That is not necessarily your responsibility.

General HAM. That is correct, sir. That burden will, through the service component commands, fall back to the Services.

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay.

One of the advantages that we were told about AFRICOM was that you would, in effect, create long-term relationships between the mil-to-mil kind of things that would go on in these developing countries.

Given it is a relatively young command still, at this point in time, are you experiencing the kind of opportunity or availability to send the folks back to the same countries on enough of a basis

so that we are building relationships there that can be used in a crisis if we need them?

General HAM. I am just learning about this, but in my first two trips to the continent, which were, admittedly, far too short, but to Djibouti and to Kenya, I, in fact, found exactly that circumstance, where U.S. service personnel had been back for repetitive assignments. And in those two cases, the Djiboutians and the Kenyans were very welcoming of that, because it is people they know and understand.

I think there is probably more that we can do in the future, and I will look to do just that.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Thanks, gentlemen.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Generals.

We are down now—it is two to two, and you have a much deeper bench than we do. So I am going to be very quick on just a couple of follow-up questions.

General McNabb, if I could follow up on a question that Mr. Kline asked. If the FAA goes forward with the rule on crew rest requirements, will it affect TRANSCOM's ability to execute the mission?

General MCNABB. Sir, as Mr. Babbitt went through it, he said that he would consider what I was worried about, which is that one size doesn't fit all, and our nonscheduled carriers are a bit unique, and to make sure that we have built in the proper safety program for them.

If they do the one-size-fits-all, it will impact us in how quickly we can do it, velocity, and it will also drive up the cost for our U.S. carriers fairly dramatically, to the point where I, again, start worrying about the competitiveness they will have in making sure that they can take advantage of modern airplanes.

That is probably my biggest concern. And I do think, between ORM [Operational Risk Management] and crew rest facilities and making sure that we look at what their mission is like, it is a little different than the legacy carriers. And I just hope that they will consider that there is a difference there.

Mr. FORBES. Can I just drill down on that question just a little bit more? I am aware of the Air Force Institute of Technology study that found that up to 70 percent of the missions flown for you by the civilian carriers may be impacted, depending on how the rule is implemented. That seems substantial to us, given how much you rely on them.

Can you just put that in context for us so the committee has a good feel of where that falls?

General MCNABB. Sure. When we set up our concept of ops and how we are going to base airplanes, especially when you talk to a far-off place like Afghanistan, and if you have to drive in some additional crew rest and changing crews, it drives in some perplexity into the system, that becomes a little bit tougher to manage.

Right now, we have that—you know, we have been driving very hard to get those modern airplanes. And, like I said, if 70 percent are affected, it means that they would have to have additional stops, they would have to lay in additional crews. The circadian rhythm, you know, the issue with making sure that if they are—

you know, as you are traveling around the world, Afghanistan is 12 hours out from here. So if you have—you know, when you think about the domestic here in the U.S., they don't have to deal with a 12-hour change in circadian rhythm every day.

So what we have to do is make sure that we think through all of those parts to the puzzle and make sure that one size doesn't necessarily fit all. Fatigue will affect everybody, but you need to come up with programs that adjust to that reality.

I have flown lots of missions and, you know, have 5,600 hours. I will say that there is a big difference from flying four to six sorties in the U.S., very quick stops, dealing with air traffic, all of the problems that you have on the ground, versus flying a one-hop on the same crew duty day and going all the way, for instance, to Incirlik and stopping for the night. I would just say the fatigue level is different and it takes different approaches, is my recommendation.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General.

General Ham, just a couple questions for you. Just a few weeks ago, I had the privilege of being over at your command. And I had just gotten back from visiting several of the countries in Africa. And one of the things on every briefing that you would find is that there would be a host of arrows that would be drawn from all of the different operations that are going on, some of them by State Department, some of them by DOD.

And the question that always puzzles me is, who is managing all the arrows? Who is the one authority that is making sure that we are not overlapping and that those missions are all coordinating in the right fashion? Can you shed a little bit of light on that for me, as we see that overlap between State and DOD and all the various operations that we have going on in Africa? Who is ultimately managing that to make sure the jointness is done right?

General HAM. Yes, sir. While there isn't, you know, an overarching command that is in fact directing that, this is our inter-agency process at work. And each of us who participates in that has a responsibility.

So me, at Africa Command, certainly Assistant Secretary Carson at State, the folks at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and USAID and other agencies, what I think we have to do is make sure we have a forum through which the most senior folks can collaborate and make sure that we have, in fact, synchronized our efforts to the highest degree possible.

My sense is probably a bit the same as yours, at least my initial blush at this, is that at least within the military side I am not sure that that is quite as tightly wound as it perhaps ought to be. And it is something that I would like to take a look at, as I begin my tenure.

Mr. FORBES. And if you do take a look at that, if you would give us that information back as you examine it.

Just two other quick questions. One of the other concerns I had was, in talking to the various players over there, one of the things we consistently heard from the State Department was, "Defense doesn't do anything unless we okay it." That gave some of us just a little bit of concern as to the role that the State Department had and the role that the Department of Defense had.

Can you tell us and explain a little bit about those two functions and how they are collaborating?

General HAM. Yes, sir, certainly. We would all agree that it is far better when State and Defense agree on a way ahead in a particular—in any particular matter.

Mr. FORBES. That is given. I—

General HAM. But sometimes that is just not the case.

Mr. FORBES. Right.

General HAM. But we have a mechanism, again, through our interagency process, through the national security staff, for the various departments to bring forward matters where there is, perhaps, some disagreement on the way ahead.

I am confident that, again, as I am able to get started in this command and build the relationships with Secretary Carson and with others in the interagency, that those times will be few and far between where we will have very strong disagreement.

But where we do, I don't feel any reservation whatsoever about saying, "I am sorry; I just can't get to agreement on this. We need to take it into the interagency deliberative process to have disagreements adjudicated." We know how to do that; we do it all the time in our Government. And I am very comfortable inside that process.

Mr. FORBES. Last question: What are the authorities granted to the U.S. chiefs of mission regarding combatant command activities in the countries to which they are posted? And do you believe that these authorities are sufficient?

General HAM. Sir, in general, they are. I mean, clearly, the chief of mission is the senior American representative, the representative of the President in those countries. And so our efforts are nested with the chief of mission.

There may be some very unique circumstances where there would be a military effort that might require an authority other than the chief of mission. Those are probably addressed in a—not in an open session.

Mr. FORBES. Okay.

Well, I think we have had all of our questions. Thank you so much for your service to our country and for your patience today and for sharing your experience and expertise with us.

And this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

APRIL 5, 2011

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

APRIL 5, 2011

Statement of Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization
Budget Requests for U.S. Transportation Command
and U.S. Africa Command
April 5, 2011

Good afternoon. The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive testimony from the commanders of the United States Transportation Command and the United States Africa Command on the posture of their respective commands.

Although these are two combatant commands that sometimes fly beneath the radar, this hearing could not be more relevant than it is today. In AFRICOM’s area of responsibility (AOR), U.S. forces have been conducting active military operations against forces loyal to Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi in an effort to prevent a massacre of the civilian population of Libya. Although this humanitarian intervention is motivated by a noble impulse, there is a strong possibility of a strategic stalemate emerging in Libya. I fear we may find ourselves committed to an open-ended obligation through our participation in NATO operations—and that poses real opportunity costs, given the volatility of other unstable, more strategically important countries in the region.

Beyond Libya, this weekend as many as one thousand civilians were massacred in the Ivory Coast as that nation’s political stand-off escalated violently. This brutality could be an ominous foreshadowing of future events in the Sudan, as the southern portion of that war-torn country becomes an independent nation in July. Further east, Somalia continues to be a source of instability, hosting both the Al Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab terrorist organization, and the various piracy networks that have intensified attacks in the Gulf of Aden and beyond over the past several years, recently killing four American citizens aboard a private yacht.

Just as it was virtually impossible to foresee the United States becoming militarily involved in Libya at last year’s posture hearings, this Congress may be called upon to fund a number of possible contingency operations or humanitarian missions in AFRICOM’s AOR.

Wherever U.S. forces may operate over the next year, TRANSCOM will be charged with getting them there, sustaining them throughout their operations, and getting them home to their families. As General Omar Bradley famously said, “Amateurs talk

strategy. Professionals talk logistics.” The events of the past 18 months are an instructive example as to the relevance of that quote today. Not only did TRANSCOM have to respond to the surge of forces in Afghanistan while they simultaneously orchestrated the drawdown of forces in Iraq, but they also had to respond to the devastating earthquake in Haiti.

Things have not gotten any easier for the men and women of TRANSCOM, as they are now supporting combat operations in Libya in addition to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and are working desperately to assist the people of Japan following the horrific earthquakes of the past month. What they do is not easy and it oftentimes goes unnoticed, but the capabilities of TRANSCOM are truly unique among nations.

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization
Budget Requests for U.S. Transportation Command
and U.S. Africa Command
April 5, 2011

General McNabb, General Ham, welcome. We have two separate subjects before us: The posture of U.S. Transportation Command and the posture of U.S. Africa Command. Welcome to you both. I look forward to your testimony.

Let me start with TRANSCOM. With the challenges on materiel distribution routes inside Pakistan growing because of insurgent attacks, border delays, weather, road conditions, labor issues, theft and pilferage, what options is TRANSCOM considering regarding the Northern Distribution Network? In light of increased requirements for transport into Afghanistan, I'd also like to hear how TRANSCOM is ensuring a steady flow of equipment retrograding out of Iraq and Kuwait at the same time.

Previously, the Air Force had stated that the minimum number of strategic airlift assets required was 316. Recently, the Air Force has reassessed that number and has concluded they now have an excess to need in regard to strategic airlift. I am interested in hearing what TRANSCOM's position is on what the appropriate number of strategic airlift assets are and what level of risk that assumes.

Turning to AFRICOM next, events of recent weeks have certainly put Africa at the forefront of our minds. The ongoing NATO operation in Libya, and before that, the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt (although technically not in AFRICOM's area of responsibility) are just the most recent reminders that turbulence on the continent can have international implications. General Ham, I want to commend you and the command on your performance in the Libya operation before you passed responsibility over to NATO.

Looking beyond Libya, AFRICOM's challenge is how to develop the military-unique portions of the larger inter-agency process that translates broad U.S. national interests on the continent into a policy appropriate across a widely diverse geo-political landscape, and then execute it with austere resources. It is clear that we have an interest in the wellbeing and stability of the continent. Global poverty, which affects hundreds of millions in Africa, is a major destabilizing force.

Developing countries are more likely to become mired in destabilizing conflicts, or worse, become havens or recruiting grounds for terrorists. Violent extremists have footholds stretching from the Maghreb to Somalia and points both north and south. International crime, including narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, trade in illegal weapons, and piracy destabilize countries and regions. Unchecked pandemics could spread across borders and oceans and

threaten entire populations and local conflicts can ignite wider conflagrations and destabilize entire regions.

There are any numbers of examples of war, or poverty, or human suffering in Africa. The ongoing conflict in Côte d'Ivoire and the fragile state of affairs in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo that is held together by a huge peacekeeping operation are but two illustrations. But we do not possess unlimited capability or an unlimited mandate.

Therefore, AFRICOM's approach, to largely work in concert with our African partners to identify mutual areas for security cooperation, is a proactive way to address national security concerns and prevent future conflicts in Africa. With American assistance, our African partners can professionalize their militaries, become more accountable to the people they protect, and strengthen the civilian governance structures that control them. In that way, they become more able to deal with the security challenges we share.

Without a robust inter-agency process in Africa, AFRICOM's efforts will never reap their true potential return so I hope you'll take the time today to discuss how you are building the security capacity of our partners within the framework of the inter-agency process.

Statement of
General Duncan J. McNabb, USAF
Commander, United States Transportation Command



Before the House Armed Services Committee

On the State of the Command

April 5, 2011

INTRODUCING THE UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND**Mission/Organization**

The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is a Total Force team of Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, civilian, commercial partners and contractors who lead a world class Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE). Through our component commands, the Army's Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), the Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC), the Air Force's Air Mobility Command (AMC) and our commercial partners, we execute military and commercial transportation, distribution process integration, terminal management, aerial refueling and global patient movement across the full range of military and humanitarian operations. We operate effectively and efficiently to deploy and sustain the warfighter...and 2010 was a banner year. Together with our Service, Combatant Command, Interagency and Coalition partners, the USTRANSCOM team responded superbly to the President's direction to increase forces by 30,000 in Afghanistan, to drawdown forces to 50,000 in Iraq and to an unprecedented series of world events and natural disasters. Whether delivering combat power to Afghanistan through logistics or humanitarian relief to the people of Pakistan, Haiti and Japan, our team kept our promises and delivered on time, on target and at best value to the taxpayer.

Our People

When faced with immediate and long-term world events, the men and women of our superb TRANSCOM team overcome colossal obstacles to support our Nation's objectives with world-class logistics. In the history of the command, we've never had a better group of experienced, dutiful and enthusiastic individuals to fulfill the promises we make to the Combatant Commanders and warfighters. As challenges arise, this team ignites their talent, insight, flexibility, and ingenuity to swiftly design a way to deliver, whenever, wherever. Simply

put, the spirit and work of the people who make up the Total Force TRANSCOM team has put the command on the world stage as the best of the best for delivering global logistics superiority.

SUPPORTING GLOBAL OPERATIONS

Over the past year, USTRANSCOM components moved near-record quantities of cargo and supplies and tens of thousands of service personnel to all parts of the globe. AMC and our Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) commercial partners airlifted more than 2 million passengers and 848,000 tons of cargo, while AMC's aging air refueling fleet delivered 202 million gallons of fuel to U.S. and coalition aircraft. Equally impressive, MSC, SDDC and our commercial sealift partners moved over 3.8 million tons of cargo worldwide. Finally, MSC's tankers delivered 1.5 billion gallons of fuel to support operations around the world.

Support to USCENTCOM

USTRANSCOM continued its focus on supporting operations in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). In 2010, we deployed and redeployed 48 Brigade Combat Teams, 75,000 Air Expeditionary Forces, 12 Security Force packages, and moved Marine Expeditionary, Stryker and Combat Aviation Brigades. The centerpiece of our efforts this year was the team's successful and on-time deployment of the 30,000 surge force into Afghanistan and drawdown from 130,000 to 50,000 service members in Iraq – both completed on our target date of 31 August 2010.

In Iraq, and in close coordination with USCENTCOM, we began the drawdown in earnest in May 2010 and redeployed 9,000 service members per week. We were able to achieve this remarkable volume of passenger movement by leveraging an additional strategic redeployment hub in Al Asad, Iraq. The addition of Al Asad to our existing hub in Kuwait, and the great flexibility and responsiveness of our CRAF partners, allowed us to nearly double our capacity to move military passengers and meet the President's 31 August 2010 deadline.

In Afghanistan, the lack of developed and robust infrastructure required close collaboration with other Combatant Commanders, the Joint Staff and our inter-agency partners to further expand capacity of our existing ground lines of supply in both Pakistan and the Northern Distribution Network, to increase through-put at airfields and to add further seaport and airfield capacity. The team was successful in our capacity-building efforts. In eight months, USTRANSCOM's components and our commercial partners delivered 30,000 troops and 60,000 tons of equipment and supplies to Afghanistan by 31 August 2010, again meeting the President's direction to increase the force by the end of August.

At the height of the drawdown in Iraq and surge in Afghanistan, an almost monthly occurrence of world events and natural disasters took place. Each of these events carried significant transportation and logistics implications, which challenged the USTRANSCOM team and our partners to both meet emerging requirements and stay on time in Iraq and Afghanistan. This demonstrated USTRANSCOM's flexibility to use its Total Force and U.S Flagged carriers to surge capacity to meet worldwide requirements.

In January of 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti and required an immediate response by all three TRANSCOM components and our commercial sealift partners in support of USSOUTHCOM and USAID. The team reacted magnificently providing aid and relief supplies within hours and days of the devastation. In February, a coup in Kyrgyzstan disrupted operations at our primary Operation ENDURING FREEDOM personnel transit hub at Manas Transit Center in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek. This required us to quickly reroute thousands of military passengers to Kuwait. Once again the system responded immediately, and deployment operations to Afghanistan continued without delay. Almost immediately after the return to normal operations in Kyrgyzstan, we were challenged in March by the month-long volcanic eruptions in Iceland which dramatically affected most, and sometimes all, of European airspace.

Again, TRANSCOM and our partners responded immediately and rerouted cargo, passenger and aeromedical evacuation missions around the affected airspace and vital cargo and passenger missions arrived with little or no delay. Finally, and as the drawdown in Iraq and the surge in Afghanistan were coming to a close, Pakistan experienced unprecedented devastation due to heavy rains which flooded over one fifth of the country and displaced 20 million people. USTRANSCOM, in coordination with USCENTCOM, responded by delivering 400,000 meals within 72 hours to those in greatest need. We also mobilized contingency response elements and delivered helicopters and boats to distribute over 8,500 tons of aid to remote provinces.

Improving throughput and expanding capacity in our surface networks which supply Afghanistan has again been a centerpiece of our efforts in 2010. The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) remains a priority for USTRANSCOM, and we have delivered over 30,000 containers via this network. In 2010, we added two additional routes through the Baltics and Central Asia and continue to improve the processes, facilitating a faster, less costly cargo flow.

In addition to the NDN improvements, we added capacity in intermodal Persian Gulf locations. Realizing we needed more capacity to support the surge of forces into Afghanistan and the movement of thousands of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAP), the team worked closely with CENTCOM and the Department of State to secure access to additional airfields and seaports in the Persian Gulf. Using a concept called multi-modal operations, we moved large volumes of cargo and thousands of vehicles by sea to locations in closer proximity to the CENTCOM area of operations, by truck from the seaports to the nearby airfields and then by air to Afghanistan. This concept was used with great success throughout 2010 as we moved almost 7,000 MRAP and MRAP all-terrain vehicles to Afghanistan. Utilizing the combination of air, land and sea modes of transportation resulted in increased velocity, better utilization of aircraft and ultimately reduced costs by almost \$400M in 2010.

The mountainous terrain and poor infrastructure in Afghanistan also required an increased reliance on aerial delivery, and 2010 was a record year with over 60 million pounds of cargo delivered by airdrop -- almost double the amount in 2009. The mobility air force continues to add new capabilities such as Low-cost, Low-altitude (LCLA) Delivery and Low-cost Aerial Delivery System (LCADS). USTRANSCOM is also exploring a high-speed container delivery system capability for the C-130J and C-17. This capability will improve both the survivability of the aircraft and accuracy of aerial delivery.

Finally, threats to our operations in USCENTCOM are not isolated to Afghanistan. Somali-based pirates continue to hazard our commercial sealift partners. USTRANSCOM and Military Sealift Command continue to actively engage with the Maritime Administration, the Coast Guard, the Navy and our industry partners to further reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. Flag commercial fleet. One tactic which has been extremely successful is the mindful use of contracted armed security teams aboard U.S. flag commercial vessels.

Support to Other Combatant Commands

The United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) was a very active AOR. As previously mentioned, Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE provided relief to Haiti after a massive earthquake on January 12, 2010, and USTRANSCOM was a key partner in that effort. Within two days of the earthquake, USTRANSCOM deployed its Joint Task Force -- Port Opening (JTF-PO) units to re-establish airfield and seaport operations after the earthquake had largely destroyed Haiti's existing infrastructure. This rapid response allowed USTRANSCOM and our commercial partners to deliver over 400,000 tons of lifesaving cargo, more than 2.5 million meals, and over 5 million liters of water to Haitians in need. Further, USTRANSCOM aeromedical evacuation teams safely moved 361 critically injured earthquake victims.

Support for the NATO security presence in Kosovo continued in the United States European Command (USEUCOM) AOR. USTRANSCOM moved over 2,500 service members into the Balkans in support of that mission, and provided strategic airlift support to five major USEUCOM and NATO exercises.

Our support to United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) continued to increase this year. We moved 1,476 service members and more than 16,000 tons of cargo for Exercise AFRICAN LION, USAFRICOM's largest combined exercise.

This past year, we began a close partnership with the newly constituted United States Cyber Command to improve information operations security and to counter cyber threats to our networks. Winning the cyber fight is critical to safeguarding the systems and information which enable our global logistics network to operate. USTRANSCOM not only moves cargo and people, we move information as well. Our vigilance will only increase as we work with our partners to defend our networks and information in this new battlespace.

In the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) AOR, USTRANSCOM deployed three Modular Aerial Spray System-equipped C-130 aircraft and over 60 personnel to begin immediate oil dispersant operations over the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Throughout the 33-day deployment, the team flew 92 sorties and released more than 156,000 gallons of oil dispersant over the spill. Additionally, USTRANSCOM airlifted over 259 tons of booms, skimmer boats and other oil spill containment equipment to support the clean-up.

USTRANSCOM also supported a series of USNORTHCOM exercises which provided realistic homeland defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities training for joint and interagency partners throughout the federal government.

The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) AOR is the largest and most diverse in the world, and USTRANSCOM supported operations from Alaska to Antarctica and around

the Pacific Rim and the Indian Ocean. In support of the National Science Foundation's Operation DEEP FREEZE (ODF), USTRANSCOM delivered more than 3,250 passengers, 10,000 tons of cargo, and 5.1 million gallons of fuel into McMurdo Station, Antarctica. In the Pacific Rim, USTRANSCOM provided humanitarian assistance and disaster response in the wake of Typhoon Fanapi in the Philippines and the Mount Merapi volcanic eruptions in Indonesia. Additionally, USTRANSCOM transported more than 687 passengers and 13,300 tons of cargo for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM—Philippines.

Support to the Warfighter

Global patient movement remains one of USTRANSCOM's most demanding missions as it requires 100 percent accuracy. Thanks, in large part, to rapid global patient movement, the wounded warrior survival rate has increased from 75 percent a decade ago to over 92 percent today. The survival rate increases to 98 percent if a wounded warrior makes it to a hospital alive. In 2010, USTRANSCOM completed more than 26,600 patient movements, all without incident. Additionally, USTRANSCOM rapidly deployed patient movement expertise all over the globe. Within 48 hours of the earthquake in Haiti, USTRANSCOM patient movement personnel were on-scene coordinating the movement of critically injured patients. When the Icelandic volcano erupted, USTRANSCOM rapidly altered aeromedical evacuation flight routing through the Mediterranean to ensure uninterrupted return of our wounded warriors from Southwest Asia.

USTRANSCOM support to the warfighter is not reserved solely for the battlefield. We recognize the need to care for families, including the effective and efficient movement of household goods. To that end, USTRANSCOM continued to field the Defense Personal Property System (DPS). DPS is a next generation, web-based system for management of personal property shipments and is helping to provide the best-value move for DOD families.

DPS executed more than 338,000 shipments in FY10 and will soon be used for nearly all shipments of household goods for DOD military and civilian personnel and their families.

Leading the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise

The ability of the U.S. to project and sustain our forces over global distances is one of our nation's greatest asymmetric advantages. Our success depends on our ability to synchronize deployment distribution planning and execution across DOD, the regional Combatant Commands, the Services and our coalition and interagency partners. To that end, upon the President's approval, USTRANSCOM is poised to assume an additional Unified Command Plan (UCP) mission as the "Global Distribution Synchronizer." In collaboration with our partners, this new mission will enable us to shape the distribution environment and gain greater access to distribution lanes that cross multiple theaters to project and sustain forces globally. Collectively, we will "knit the seams" between multiple Combatant Command theater distribution campaign plans and create a more robust and adaptive distribution network that reduces operational risk.

Enhancing DOD Supply Chain Management

USTRANSCOM is leading the transformation of the DOD supply chain through a series of Distribution Process Owner Strategic Opportunities (DSO) initiatives. These include five major opportunities to enhance readiness, improve velocity and reduce DOD supply chain cost.

Strategic Surface and Air Optimization lower the cost of shipments by consolidating surface cargo into single containers, as well as modifying pallet build rules and using "less-than-planeload" commercial freight services for air cargo. Through Strategic Network Optimization and Supply Alignment, USTRANSCOM optimizes the number, location and function of supply chain nodes to increase distribution effectiveness by positioning selected materiel in forward locations to reduce reliance on high-cost air transportation. Finally, through process

improvement, USTRANSCOM increases velocity across the enterprise by identifying and removing “dead time” throughout the supply chain process.

These initiatives are generating benefits to the warfighter by delivering higher levels of service at lower costs. To date, the DSO initiatives have generated savings of \$80 million and an improvement in delivery time of up to 34 percent.

Global distribution efficiency begins with the best value movement of DOD freight in the Continental United States (CONUS). This is the purpose of the Defense Transportation Coordination Initiative (DTCI). Using commercial best practices, DTCI improves the reliability, predictability, and efficiency of DOD materiel moving in the CONUS. Thus far, DTCI has saved \$182 million and meets or exceeds goals for on-time pickup, reduced damage claims and small business participation.

Business process reengineering and Corporate Services Vision are at the heart of USTRANSCOM’s transformation efforts. Agile Transportation for the 21st Century (AT21) is one such effort which uses industry best practices and government and commercial off-the-shelf optimization and scheduling tools to deliver best value, end-to-end distribution and deployment solutions. Business process reengineering improves transportation planning, forecast accuracy and on-time delivery of forces and sustainment to Combatant Commanders at a lower cost to the Services. Equally important, our Corporate Services Vision aligns information technology systems with these reengineered business processes with a one-stop information technology shop. We expect our AT21 to deliver a significant return on investment. We are also investigating industry-leading collaborative technologies, computer gaming, and social networking innovations to provide additional capability.

In cooperation with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), USTRANSCOM is improving visibility across the supply chain through the Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation

Network Convergence (IGC) initiative. The purpose of IGC is to collect supply, transportation and deployment data from disparate systems and allow access to that data from anywhere in the world. This capability provides warfighters access to real time, actionable logistics information and allows them to make informed decisions.

As DOD's lead proponent for radio frequency identification (RFID) and related automatic identification technology (AIT), our focus is on implementing the proper technologies to enhance supply chain business processes. While active RFID remains the primary AIT enabling in-transit visibility, this year we used satellite technology in high-threat areas where it is necessary to have near real-time location of critical assets while in transit. Additionally, we are exploring the use of sensor technology to enhance security of high-value cargo. Container intrusion sensors also provide a force protection layer, alerting the warfighter to take extra safety precautions due to a container breach. Finally, passive RFID will enable supply chain process improvements such as increased inventory accuracy and decreased time to receive, store and issue material.

Realigning the Organization and Personnel

Another notable achievement in 2010 was the completion of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) relocation of SDDC to Scott Air Force Base. The cornerstone of the project was the \$130 million BRAC-funded MILCON facility, which was operational well ahead of schedule. Coincident to the co-location of SDDC with AMC and USTRANSCOM, we reengineered business processes and consolidated functions to achieve operational and fiscal efficiencies. Operational benefits include fused operations and intelligence centers, a joint billing center and consolidated acquisition and analysis centers of excellence. The results have been impressive -- 470 fewer billets, a 20 percent reduction in contracts, elimination of two leased buildings, and a projected cost saving of \$1.2 billion over 20 years.

USTRANSCOM continues to emphasize professional development of our human capital. Our focus is to develop joint logisticians who can perform core functions inherent in the command's Distribution Process Owner (DPO) responsibilities. Innovative logistics solutions, like the NDN, require new ways of thinking about supply chains, developing sustainable infrastructure, running distribution networks in remote geographies, and building enduring international relationships. To develop that intellectual capital and critical thinking ability in our people, we added industry-leading courses from the University of Wisconsin, Pennsylvania State University, Carnegie Mellon University, Stanford University, University of Tennessee and Massachusetts Institute of Technology to our professional development curriculum.

Maintaining Air Mobility Readiness

Rapid global mobility is a key enabler to the effectiveness of the joint force. The ability to mobilize forces and materiel within hours, rather than days or weeks, depends on versatile, ready and effective air mobility forces.

In order to maintain our decisive global mobility advantage, we must have a viable tanker fleet. Therefore, the re-capitalization of the tanker fleet remains my top acquisition priority. The KC-46A will fulfill its primary refueling role and also have the flexibility to contribute to an array of mobility missions. It will dramatically improve our ability to do the air refueling mission and allow us to make the whole air mobility system much more efficient.

Likewise, our national defense strategy requires a viable fleet of about 300 strategic airlift aircraft. The C-17 Globemaster III will continue to be our premier airlifter, and our modernized C-5s are achieving their expected levels of mission readiness. However, in order to achieve the correct mix of C-17 and C-5 aircraft, and take full advantage of our critical aircrews and maintainers, the Air Force should be given the authority to retire the oldest, least capable C-5s.

C-17s will continue to meet USTRANSCOM's future requirements through currently funded purchases, upgrade programs, and fleet rotation. New C-17s arrive with improvements which increase the reliability of the weapon system. Older aircraft enter into the Global Reach Improvement Program to increase sustainability and reliability. Aircraft located in corrosive and training environments are monitored and analyzed for stress and rotated to maintain structural integrity of the fleet. Furthermore, two additional reserve component units will take on the C-17 mission as they retire their C-5s.

The C-5 is critical to our oversized and outsized air cargo capability. C-5 fleet management has two main focus areas: C-5 reliability and C-5A retirements. The Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engining Program (RERP) will increase the mission capable rate (MCR) of the C-5 fleet. All C-5B and C models and one C-5A model aircraft will undergo RERP resulting in a total of 52 C-5Ms in the inventory. Additionally, the new maintenance processes changed our focus from "fly to fail" on major components to preventative replacement. This has reduced the number of C-5s stranded off-station awaiting parts and will result in a seven percent increase in MCR. Finally, C-5A retirements will improve aircraft availability by removing maintenance intensive jets from the fleet and will allow us to focus our maintenance personnel and resources on the right sized fleet.

The intra-theater workhorse supporting the warfighter is the C-130. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study-2016 (MCRS-16) determined that 335 C-130s are required to perform general support intra-theater airlift missions. Follow-on analysis of the direct support mission determined that 20 additional C-130s and the 38 C-27Js already in the program can perform the direct support mission. Air Mobility Command's assessment is that a total of 355 C-130s and 38 C-27Js, in both general and direct support roles, will support the warfighter.

Finally, I support the Air Force's plan to acquire up to 134 C-130Js, modernizing 221 legacy C-130s with the Avionics Modernization Program (AMP), and fielding 38 C-27Js.

Our mobility aircraft routinely operate in threat areas across the spectrum of conflict from humanitarian relief to combat resupply. To operate safely in these environments, I strongly support continued defensive systems upgrades. These upgrades include equipping aircraft with the Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures system and beginning development of the Advanced Situational Awareness and Countermeasures capability for operations in low-medium threat environments.

Operational Support Airlift (OSA) is another key component of our mobility force. Our senior leaders require immediate airlift to carry out military and other missions in a fluid strategic environment. It is important that we not only right-size and modernize the OSA fleet, but we need to develop a management system with a common multi-Service database and operational picture. The goal is to achieve real-time visibility of worldwide senior leader and OSA movements to enable USTRANSCOM and Geographic Combatant Commanders to exercise command and control of the OSA fleet within their area of responsibility.

Just as command and control of OSA assets is critical, the leaders aboard the aircraft must be able to communicate while they travel. This requires secure, reliable communications for U.S. national leaders anywhere on the globe. USTRANSCOM continues to work with other DOD and U.S. Government stakeholders through the National Leadership Command Capability Executive Management Board to provide the proper level of Senior Leadership Command, Control and Communications – Airborne (SLC3S-A). The Senior Leader In-transit Conference Capsule (SLICC) is a transportable "office in the sky" that provides a secure, interconnected meeting place for Senior Leaders traveling aboard C-17, KC-10 and C-130 aircraft. Designed with flexibility and affordability in mind, the SLICC promises to reduce operating costs by

enabling Combatant Commanders to support DV missions using available theater assets and regularly scheduled airlift routes.

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is a critical component in our ability to rapidly deploy forces and equipment. In this past year, through discussions with our commercial industry partners, we made the most sweeping changes to the CRAF program in 15 years. These changes will result in a stronger, more viable program and address Congressional mandates to improve predictability of DOD commercial requirements and incentivize carriers to use modern aircraft. Perhaps the most profound change is the implementation of a “flyer bonus” which, for the first time in the history of the CRAF, rewards peacetime mission participation in addition to the traditional reward for wartime commitment. Our plan for FY12 is to amend the flyer bonus to provide increased reward to those carriers who fly peacetime CRAF missions with modernized aircraft.

To ensure the CRAF partnership remains strong, USTRANSCOM created the Executive Working Group (EWG), modeled after a similar venue with our sealift partners. The CRAF EWG brings together USTRANSCOM and AMC leaders with Chief Executive Officers, Presidents, and other representatives of the commercial airline industry to discuss issues with the CRAF program. Since its first meeting in March 2010, this group has met six times and proved instrumental in crafting the changes to the FY11 contract. The CRAF EWG will continue to meet on a regular basis to discuss additional changes to this vital program.

Maintaining Sealift Readiness

Sealift is the primary means for delivering ground forces and sustainment during major combat operations, and has been responsible for delivering over 90 percent of all cargo to Afghanistan and Iraq. Because of the superb volunteer participation of commercial U.S.-Flagged vessels in the Maritime Security Program (MSP), we did not have to activate a single ship in the

Surge Fleet or the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) to meet the President's aggressive timeline for the surge and drawdown of forces in Afghanistan and Iraq—a remarkable achievement.

The large, medium speed, roll-on, roll-off ships (LMSRs) in the Surge Fleet, the vessels of the RRF and the commercial U.S. Flag Fleet in the MSP and Voluntary Intermodal Support Agreement (VISA) are all required to meet the Nation's strategic sealift requirements. While cargo preference laws and national defense sealift policies ensure the viability of the U.S. flag commercial fleet, we must also continue to keep the Surge Fleet and Ready Reserve Force vessels at an equal state of readiness as well as our citizen mariners who man these vessels during operations in USCENTCOM and around the world. In fact, the Maritime Administration is conducting a thorough study of cargo preference laws to ensure that they most effectively support the delicate balance of commercial viability and readiness which is so critical to our sealift capability.

USTRANSCOM's partnership with the U.S. commercial sealift industry and the Department of Transportation has been vitally important in developing new routes for conveying cargo around the globe – particularly to regions with undeveloped infrastructure. Through programs like the Maritime Security Program (MSP), the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement and the Voluntary Tanker Agreement, the Department of Defense gains access to U.S. commercial capabilities and transportation networks while ensuring the continued viability of both the U.S. flag fleet and the pool of citizen mariners who man those vessels. Last year, Congress ensured the continuation of the MSP by extending it an additional 10 years to 2025. We look forward to working with Congress and this committee to refine this program between now and the MSP implementation date in 2015.

We also work closely with the DLA Energy office to meet DOD's fuel requirements. On October 7, 2010, MSC took operational control of the first of two U.S.-built, U.S.-flagged State-

Class tanker vessels. These new double-hulled 331,000-barrel ships will provide vital sealift capabilities. The MV EMPIRE STATE and her sister ship, MV EVERGREEN STATE, will carry refined petroleum products between commercial refineries and DOD storage and distribution facilities worldwide. While these two new tankers increase the total number of U.S.-flagged tankers with international trade rights to five, our nation would benefit greatly from even further increases in U.S.-flagged tanker capacity. Additionally, the Maritime Administration is currently examining the feasibility and potential benefit of developing a strategic access program outside of MSP solely for tankers.

Finally, we look forward to working with the Navy and Combatant Commanders to fully realize the logistics capabilities of the Joint High Speed Vessel across all its missions from Theater Security Cooperation to its use as an operational and tactical logistics platform.

Maintaining Surface Readiness

USTRANSCOM depends on our en route structure to rapidly support theater COCOMS. On August 9, 2010 USTRANSCOM submitted its inaugural En Route Infrastructure Master Plan (ERIMP) 2010 to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The purpose of the ERIMP is to guide the en route infrastructure investment decisions necessary to ensure we support the regional Combatant Commander Theater Campaign and Theater Posture Plans. The ERIMP frames the en route strategy by identifying our most important enterprise-wide infrastructure requirements. It includes recommendations from the Combatant Commands and takes an enterprise approach to global deployment and distribution.

Because en route infrastructure is key to global logistics, Rota, Spain; Camp Lemonier, Djibouti; Souda Bay on the island of Crete; and Guam remain USTRANSCOM near-term priorities as strategic locations. Similar to our multi-modal MRAP movement through the Persian Gulf, movement of Combat Aviation Brigade helicopters by ship to the intermodal port

at Rota, Spain, then flying them into Afghanistan significantly increases velocity. Camp Lemonier is the only en route node on the African continent with enduring presence; an unrefueled C-17 can reach two-thirds of the continent from Djibouti. Funding the expansion of the aircraft parking area and the taxiway will help ensure Camp Lemonier's continued viability as a critical strategic intermodal location. Located on the island of Crete in the central Mediterranean Sea, Souda Bay is key to the JDDE en route mission due to its proximity to the Black Sea, the Middle East, and Africa. Funding for a multi-access road, aircraft parking expansion, an air operations complex, and the Marathi logistics facility will help tremendously as we support three separate Geographic Combatant Commanders from Souda Bay. Guam is our intermodal crown jewel in the Pacific. The USTRANSCOM-led 2009 Global En Route Infrastructure Steering Committee identified two necessary military construction (MILCON) projects at Anderson Air Force Base, Guam: an Air Freight Terminal Complex and Air Passenger Terminal/Joint Personnel Deployment Center. Each of these projects will greatly enhance the effectiveness, efficiency and safety of the passenger and the cargo handling process.

At home, our Highways, Railroads, and Ports for National Defense Programs work in partnership with the Department of Transportation (DOT) to identify DOD's requirements for the civil sector infrastructure between our installations and ports and integrate these requirements into the civil sector planning cycle. These programs play a key role in ensuring our infrastructure in CONUS is ready to support DOD's deployment and distribution needs.

Developing New Capabilities

Global logistics is an incredibly fluid business. As the geopolitical, diplomatic and operational landscape changes, USTRANSCOM understands the need for innovative mobility and distribution strategies, processes and technology.

Our Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Program (RDT&E) searches for these emerging enablers to support the future force. Through this program, we leverage new technologies, cutting edge business processes and innovative logistics strategies to address mobility challenges before they arise.

Given the poor infrastructure in Afghanistan, much of our work focuses on new methods of aerial delivery. We are working with the Natick Soldier Center to develop the Helicopter Sling Load of the Joint Precision Airdrop System. The project integrates elements from various airdrop programs into a new capability that will allow for the delivery of payloads from a helicopter cargo hook. The system also ensures rapid distribution for both delivery over land and ship-to-shore applications.

We also continue to invest in intelligent unmanned aircraft technology to autonomously deliver critical supplies to forward points of need. Our intent is to address extended lines of communication susceptible to weather, degraded road conditions and enemy threats, such as improvised explosive devices, ambush, and sabotage.

Through the Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration program, we are supporting High Speed Container Delivery Systems (HSCDS) to improve airdrop accuracy, increase tonnage dropped, and enhance survivability of airlift and aircrews. HSCDS is a high-speed, low altitude airdrop system that provides the warfighter more cargo, more often and with more accuracy than any comparable delivery system. It optimizes aircraft threat avoidance and tactical maneuverability while enhancing our ability to deliver vital cargo to small combat units at the point of need.

Hybrid airships can revolutionize logistics by moving the supply chain above the battle space to deliver large volumes of cargo directly to the point of effect, without the need for an airfield or roads. By delivering directly, hybrid airships bypass many supply-chain "touches."

thereby reducing cost and risk. The continued exploration of the hybrid airship concept is essential to support future operations in austere and infrastructure-challenged locales where USTRANSCOM will likely be required to support military or humanitarian relief operations.

The Joint Recovery and Distribution System (JRADS) achieved tremendous success in its first demonstrations with the 101st Sustainment Brigade. The JRADS technology enables quick and efficient recovery of damaged MRAPs on the battlefield, which minimizes troop exposure to attack when recovering damaged vehicles.

USTRANSCOM is committed to innovative sealift solutions as well. Sea basing is one such innovation which affords alternatives to the traditional use of seaports of debarkation. It enables discharge, reception, staging and assembly at sea; and interfaces with both organic and commercial sealift assets. The Large Vessel Interface Lift-On/Lift-Off system provides the ability to load and offload containers between ships at sea with precision and in much higher sea states than is currently possible. In April 2010, the technology was successfully demonstrated in the Gulf of Mexico between Ready Reserve Fleet vessels SS FLICKERTAIL STATE and MV CAPE TEXAS. Together with the Navy, we will further develop this technology.

The Joint High Speed Vessel represents a transformational sealift capability. Bridging the traditional gap between high-speed, low-capacity airlift and low-speed, high-capacity sealift, it affords the promise of enhanced logistic response to military and civil contingencies around the globe. Forward deployment of the vessel in combination with warehoused stocks of equipment and supplies will leverage its speed and capacity to quickly deliver needed cargo.

Fiscal Stewardship

Good stewardship of the taxpayers' dollars is a USTRANSCOM hallmark. In everything we do, we are always effective, but mindful of cost. Since 2003, we and our enterprise partners have avoided costs in excess of \$5.2 billion through transformational distribution initiatives,

improving inventory and transportation alignment, optimizing strategic air and surface processes and effectively utilizing multi-modal transportation solutions; all while improving end-to-end velocity and effectiveness.

Given our global mission, the AMC Fuel Efficiency Office has been laser-focused on increasing fuel efficiency. The result is a significant cost decrease to the customer and taxpayer. For example, information technology (IT) improvements such as Mission Index Flying for the C-17 and C-5 reduce each sortie's fuel burn during mission execution. Other improvements, such as the Advanced Computer Flight Planning overlay, reduce the excess fuel carried which increases the amount of cargo the aircraft can carry -- again lowering the cost to the taxpayer.

USTRANSCOM continues to lead the certification effort for alternative fuels. Most aircraft in AMC's fleet are approved to fly on a synthetic blend of coal or natural gas-based Fischer-Tropsch fuel and JP-8 military grade jet fuel. The workhorse of AMC, the C-17, underwent flight tests and certification on a cutting-edge, renewable jet fuel blended with JP-8 this past August. In addition to allowing the DOD to target renewable sources, alternative fuels are more environmentally friendly than traditional jet fuel.

Final Thoughts

USTRANSCOM has the critical national responsibility to support the men and women who fight to preserve our liberty and security and to support those who provide lifesaving relief to those in need...and to do so in a global operating environment increasingly characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change. Looking to the future, USTRANSCOM, along with our enterprise partners, will continue to transform the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise to meet this challenging new environment and continue to provide effective and best value support to our nation. We will always, always deliver.



BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

GENERAL DUNCAN J. MCNABB

Gen. Duncan J. McNabb is Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill. USTRANSCOM is the single manager for global air, land and sea transportation for the Department of Defense.

General McNabb graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1974. A command pilot, he has amassed more than 5,400 flying hours in transport and rotary wing aircraft. He has held command and staff positions at squadron, group, wing, major command and Department of Defense levels. During operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, General McNabb commanded the 41st Military Airlift Squadron, which earned Military Airlift Command's Airlift Squadron of the Year in 1990. The general commanded the 89th Operations Group, overseeing the air transportation of our nation's leaders, including the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. He then served as Commander of the 62nd Airlift Wing. The wing's performance in 1996 earned the Riverside Trophy as the 15th Air Force's outstanding wing. He also commanded the Tanker Airlift Control Center and Air Mobility Command.



General McNabb's staff assignments have been a variety of planning, programming and logistical duties. These include serving as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs on the Air Staff and Chairman of the Air Force Board having oversight of all Air Force programs. He also served as the Director for Logistics on the Joint Staff where he was responsible for operational logistics and strategic mobility support to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. Prior to his current assignment, he was Vice Chief of Staff.

EDUCATION

1974 Bachelor of Science degree, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
 1977 Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
 1983 Air Command and Staff College, by correspondence
 1984 Master of Science degree in international relations, University of Southern California, Los Angeles
 1993 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
 1994 Air War College, by correspondence
 1995 Program for Senior Officials in National Security, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 1998 Executive Program for General Officers of the Russian Federation and the United States, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 2000 National Security Decision-Making Seminar, Center for Strategic Education, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. June 1974 - May 1975, student, undergraduate navigator training, Mather AFB, Calif.
2. August 1975 - April 1978, instructor navigator, 14th Military Airlift Squadron, Norton AFB, Calif.
3. April 1978 - April 1979, airlift director, 63rd Military Airlift Wing, Norton AFB, Calif.
4. April 1979 - April 1980, student, undergraduate pilot training, Williams AFB, Ariz.
5. August 1980 - August 1983, instructor pilot and chief pilot, 14th Military Airlift Squadron, Norton AFB, Calif.
6. August 1983 - July 1984, general's aide, Air Force Inspection and Safety Center, Norton AFB, Calif.
7. July 1984 - June 1986, Chief, Plans Integration Branch, Headquarters MAC, Scott AFB, Ill.
8. June 1986 - June 1988, aide to the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command and MAC, Scott AFB, Ill.
9. June 1988 - November 1990, chief pilot, later, operations officer, 17th Military Airlift Squadron, Charleston AFB, S.C.
10. November 1990 - January 1992, Commander, 41st Military Airlift Squadron, Charleston AFB, S.C.
11. January 1992 - August 1992, Deputy Group Commander, 437th Operations Group, Charleston AFB, S.C.
12. August 1992 - June 1993, student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
13. July 1993 - June 1995, Chief, Logistics Readiness Center, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
14. July 1995 - July 1996, Commander, 89th Operations Group, Andrews AFB, Md.
15. July 1996 - July 1997, Commander, 62nd Airlift Wing, McChord AFB, Wash.
16. August 1997 - June 1999, Commander, Tanker Airlift Control Center, Headquarters Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Ill.
17. June 1999 - December 1999, Deputy Director of Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
18. December 1999 - April 2002, Director of Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
19. April 2002 - July 2004, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
20. August 2004 - October 2005, Director for Logistics, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
21. October 2005 - September 2007, Commander, Headquarters Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Ill.
22. September 2007 - September 2008, Vice Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
23. September 2008 - present, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, Ill.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

1. June 1986 - June 1988, aide to the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command and Military Airlift Command, Scott AFB, Ill., as a major
2. July 1993 - June 1995, Chief, Logistics Readiness Center, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a colonel
3. August 2004 - October 2005, Director for Logistics, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a lieutenant general
4. September 2008 - present, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, Ill., as a general

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: Command pilot, navigator
 Flight hours: More than 5,400
 Aircraft flown: T-37, T-38, C-141, C-17, C-21, C-20 and UH-1H

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal
 Distinguished Service Medal
 Defense Superior Service Medal
 Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
 Defense Meritorious Service Medal
 Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
 Joint Service Commendation Medal
 Air Force Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters
 Air Force Achievement Medal
 Combat Readiness Medal with oak leaf cluster
 National Defense Service Medal with two bronze stars
 Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
 Southwest Asia Service Medal with two bronze stars

Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Humanitarian Service Medal
NATO Medal (Former Republic of Yugoslavia)
Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)
Kuwait Liberation Medal (Government of Kuwait)

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS

Commander's Trophy, Undergraduate Pilot Training, Air Training Command
Orville Wright Award for outstanding UPT graduate, Order of Daedalians
Order of the Sword, AMC

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant June 5, 1974
First Lieutenant June 5, 1976
Captain June 5, 1978
Major Oct. 1, 1985
Lieutenant Colonel June 1, 1989
Colonel Jan. 1, 1993
Brigadier General July 27, 1998
Major General Feb. 26, 2001
Lieutenant General April 19, 2002
General Dec. 1, 2005

(Current as of July 2009)

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL CARTER F. HAM, USA
COMMANDER



UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

5 April 2011

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE - WRITTEN STATEMENT
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INTRODUCTION

It is my privilege as Commander of United States Africa Command to present to Congress our Posture Statement for 2011. United States Africa Command protects American lives and promotes our national interests by advancing security and stability in Africa. We follow two main lines of effort: building the security capacity of our African partners and preparing for a wide range of potential crises. U.S. Africa Command's operations, programs, and activities contribute to reducing the threats to our citizens and interests both abroad and at home by helping African states provide for their own security. We seek to enhance regional stability through support to and partnership with African regional organizations. Our planning and training are designed to prevent conflict while simultaneously ensuring that U.S. Africa Command is prepared to respond decisively to any crisis when the President so directs.

A prosperous and stable Africa is strategically important to the United States. An Africa that can generate and sustain broad based economic development will contribute to global growth, which is a long-standing American interest. However, poverty in many parts of Africa contributes to an insidious cycle of instability, conflict, environmental degradation, and disease that erodes confidence in national institutions and governing capacity. This in turn often creates the conditions for the emergence of a wide-range of transnational security threats that can threaten the American homeland and our regional interests.

Our primary effort for increasing stability and deterring conflict is focused on building partner capacity—one of six core Department of Defense (DOD) mission areas identified in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The Command is helping African states transform their militaries into operationally capable and professional institutions that are subordinate to civilian authority, respect human rights, adhere to the rule of law, and are viewed by their

citizens as servants and protectors of the people. We assist our African partners in building capacities to counter transnational threats from violent extremist organizations; to stem illicit trafficking in humans, narcotics, and weapons; to support peacekeeping operations; and to address the consequences of humanitarian disasters—whether man-made or natural—that cause loss of life and displace populations. In many instances, the positive effects we achieve are disproportionate to the modest investment in resources.

Dramatic events taking place in Africa, as demonstrated by the unfolding situation across North Africa, have shown how quickly the strategic environment can change. It has also shown the value of the Nation’s investment in the Command. As of the writing of this report, the situation in Libya remains unclear. The Command is prepared to respond in a variety of ways pending National decisions. We will maintain our steady focus on security cooperation with our African partners, and stand ready to protect American lives and interests.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The challenges and opportunities in U.S. Africa Command’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) are dynamic and complex. Our AOR includes 52 African States more than 800 ethnic groups, over 1000 languages, and a diverse geography three and a half times the size of the continental United States.¹ Its rapidly growing population presents a complex mix of political, economic, social, and demographic challenges.

Continent-wide Trends

The global economic crisis disrupted a period of sustained economic growth in Africa. However, according to a 2010 report developed jointly by the African Development Bank, the

¹ Egypt is in U.S. Central Command’s AOR. The United States does recognize the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara); however, it is recognized by the African Union.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission on Africa, the continent's economies are resilient and the prospects for regaining economic momentum are good. Earlier debt relief and aid programs ensured that many African governments were not burdened with onerous financial obligations, and their commodity-based economies appear poised to rebound faster than countries that are more dependent on financial and manufacturing sectors.

Demographic trends highlight the urgent need for sustained and broad-based economic growth throughout Africa. High birth rates, a youth bulge, and urban congestion stress the ability of many governments to provide basic services, education and jobs. Forty-three percent of sub-Saharan Africa's population is below the age of 15. This population could provide further advances in developing and consolidating democracy; however, if unaddressed, this potential pool of undereducated and unemployed youth could present a possible source of instability and potential recruiting pool for violent extremist organizations or narcotics traffickers. The rapid expansion of already strained urban areas with limited infrastructure will increase competition for limited jobs, social services, housing, food, and water as Africa's population is expected to double to two billion by 2050.

A welcome development across the continent is that several African conflicts have ended in the last ten years—Liberia, Angola, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Chad, and the North-South Sudanese conflict. However, as recent events in Cote d'Ivoire and Darfur illustrate, many of these settlements and compromises remain fragile.

African states are working hard to meet their own security challenges. Today, Africans comprise 30 percent of UN peacekeeping forces worldwide and 50 percent of peacekeeping forces deployed across the African continent. At any given time there are approximately 25,000

African soldiers deployed in support of UN and African Union (AU) peacekeeping missions. Five African countries—Nigeria, Rwanda, Ghana, Ethiopia, and South Africa—rank amongst the top 15 UN troop-contributing nations, and Uganda and Burundi are the major contributors to the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Also, the development of the AU and its Regional Economic Communities, growing regional cooperation among neighboring states, the efforts to establish the African Standby Force, regional cooperation by Gulf of Guinea states to improve maritime security, and combined efforts to combat the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) demonstrate a growing continent-wide commitment to establishing stability.

Though much of Africa is peaceful today, conflict remains a significant problem that drains resources and saps the confidence needed for Africa to realize its potential. These lingering conflicts are predominantly driven by internal fissures rather than external interstate disputes. The conflict between the Nigerian federal government and a variety of alienated groups in the oil and gas rich Niger Delta region continues and is a concern as the 2011 elections approach. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continues to recover slowly from one of Africa's most devastating wars. With over 20,000 soldiers, the UN mission in the DRC is the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operation in the world. Additionally, the LRA, although diminished since Uganda began operations against it in 2008, continues its horrific actions, which threaten stability in central Africa.

Sudan remains a concern as the governments of the north and south implement the results of the January 2011 independence referendum. North and South Sudan will need to resolve contentious issues like oil wealth sharing, debt, and border demarcation before the end of the mandated Comprehensive Peace Agreement timeline set for July 2011. The new government of

Southern Sudan will face significant challenges uniting an ethnically disparate populous while building both state institutions and economic infrastructure.

Concerning elections, the positive democratizing trend that emerged in the 1990s has slowed somewhat during the last few years as some nations continue to suffer from constitutional tampering, rigged elections, and intimidation of opposition candidates. African elections in the near term are likely to produce mixed results for democratization. However, the proliferation of civil and political opposition groups enabled by social media, increased voter participation, local press coverage of political events, greater citizen access to information, and continued international attention will help promote transparent and democratic elections in the 22 national contests scheduled in 2011. The recent changes of government in Tunisia and Egypt vividly illustrate these trends, as the power of social media and greater citizen access to information has empowered ordinary citizens.

Good governance builds the trust and confidence necessary for regional cooperation and economic development, and provides the leverage for national and regional programs to foster growth and stability. The African states making progress toward free and fair elections, open regulatory practices, and the provision of essential services are, more often than not, reliable partners trusted by their neighbors. Those states with weak governments are less stable and less dependable.

Transnational Threats

There are numerous transnational threats in Africa, with violent extremism, piracy, and narcotics trafficking constituting three of the most dangerous. Many African states recognize these threats and are taking positive actions—often with Africa Command's assistance—to confront them.

Somalia remains a failed state: divided, weak, and fragile. Despite the intentions of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to establish the sinews of a functioning state, Somalia is unable to provide essential services or control of its territory on its own. It does not have a civil service, central bank, judicial system, police force, or functioning cross-clan military. Inter-clan rivalries and the Islamic extremist groups al-Shabaab and Hizbul al-Islam continue to challenge Somali's ability to form a functioning and stable government, and al-Shabaab controls much of southern Somalia. The survival of the TFG in Mogadishu depends, in large measure, on the presence of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the more than 8,000 troops supplied by willing African partners.

Linked to Somalia's instability is al-Qaida's dramatic increase in influence in east Africa over the last year. In early 2010, al-Shabaab announced their alignment with al-Qaida. This alliance provides al-Qaida a safe haven to plan global terror operations, train foreign fighters, and conduct global terror operations. The July 2010 attacks in Kampala, Uganda, demonstrate a willingness and capability to expand the conflict beyond Somalia. This situation poses a direct threat to the security of the United States.

Piracy remains a significant problem off the coast of Somalia. The murder of four U.S. citizens aboard the sailing vessel *Quest* this February demonstrates that piracy is a lethal threat—not just an economic inconvenience or acceptable business risk. The pirates have adapted to the increased international naval presence in the Gulf of Aden by extending their operational reach as far south as the Mozambique Channel and east into the Indian Ocean by hundreds of miles. The number of ships and hostages held by Somalia-based pirates is at an all-time high. The increasing operational reach of Somali pirates vividly illustrates that the dangers emanating from ungoverned spaces rarely remain local.

The Sahel region continues to experience attacks and kidnappings by al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, an Algerian-based group with relative safe haven in northern Mali. If al-Qaida affiliates grow unchecked in the Horn of Africa or across the Sahel, it may lead to further attacks against U.S. interests overseas or in the homeland.

Illicit trafficking of narcotics poses a significant threat to regional stability in both West and East Africa. Western Africa is a critical transshipment point for South American cocaine. Increasing European cocaine demand, transportation availability, and negligible risk of interdiction contribute to West Africa's importance in the narcotics trade. The cocaine transiting through this area constitutes from 30 to 60 percent of European demand, with relative wholesale values exceeding the gross domestic products of some affected West African states. East Africa is also facing trafficking challenges, but in the form of Afghan heroin via the Makran Coast of Pakistan pouring into world markets.

UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND'S APPROACH

U.S. Africa Command's approach to the continent is guided by our national interests and priorities, our theater objectives, and three operating principles.

- We listen and learn from our African partners;
- We understand and address the continent using a regional framework; and,
- We collaborate as part of an interagency team.

U.S. Security Interests, Priorities, and Theater Objectives

U.S. Africa Command's programs and activities directly support American national security interests. Our vital national security interest in Africa is protecting the lives and interests of the American people by reducing threats to the homeland and abroad. We support

the United States Government's (USG) five priorities in Africa: good governance, economic progress, preventing and resolving conflicts, strong public health programs, and helping our African partners develop the capacity to meet the demands of transnational challenges. In supporting these national priorities, U.S. Africa Command focuses on preventing and resolving conflict and helping our African partners develop their own security capacity.

To focus our efforts, U.S. Africa Command has established the following theater objectives:

- Ensure that the al-Qaida networks and associated violent extremists do not attack the United States;
- Maintain assured access and freedom of movement throughout our AOR;
- Assist African states and regional organizations in developing the will, capability, and capacity to combat transnational threats such as terrorism, piracy, and the illicit trafficking of weapons, people and narcotics;
- Assist African states and regional organizations in developing the capacity to execute effective continental peace operations and to respond to crises; and,
- Encourage African militaries to operate under civilian authority, respect the rule of law, abide by international human rights norms, and contribute to stability in their respective states.

Listening to Our African Partners

U.S. Africa Command values the views of our African partners and learns from them. Our partners have expressed four common defense-oriented goals consistent with American interests and the Command's theater objectives. These goals are:

- That they have capable and accountable military forces that perform professionally and with integrity;
- That their forces are supported and sustained by effective, legitimate, and professional security institutions;
- That they have the capability to exercise the means nationally and regionally to dissuade, deter, and defeat transnational threats; and,
- That they have the capacity to increase their support to international peacekeeping efforts.

These goals are in agreement with our emphasis on preventing conflict and enhancing regional stability to protect American lives and interests in Africa and in our homeland.

A Regional Perspective

To identify and analyze the relationships among crosscutting security issues on the vast continent, we view Africa regionally. The five regions—East Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, North Africa, and Southern Africa roughly correspond to the AU’s five primary Regional Economic Communities. The Command’s staff is responsible for establishing and supporting our African partnerships and developing programs and activities, and is organized along the same regional lines.

East Africa

The East African states include Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda, and the island states of Comoros and Seychelles. The interlocking security challenges of Somalia’s instability, Southern Sudan’s transition to statehood, al-Shabaab’s dangerous alignment with al-Qaida, which threatens not only the region but also the American homeland and interests, and the persistent threat from LRA require both

regional and bilateral solutions. East African states recognize these challenges and are taking steps to meet them. Uganda is a major troop contributor to AMISOM and is involved in operations against the LRA. Moreover, Djibouti has emerged as a stable partner in a dangerous region and provides our only enduring military infrastructure in continental Africa, Camp Lemonnier.

In East Africa, Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is essential to U.S. Africa Command's effort to build the partner capacity necessary to counter violent extremism and address regional security issues. It is the Command's element for conducting Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa. CJTF-HOA conducts engagement activities by employing small teams throughout the region. Typical military-to-military engagements include officer and non-commissioned officer mentoring, counter-terrorism training, peace support operations, and disaster response planning and preparation. Civil Affairs teams operating from Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti help partner nations improve civil-military relations in their communities. CJTF-HOA is a model for multinational and interagency collaboration, and plays a key role in supporting two important Department of State initiatives: the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program as part of the larger Global Peace Operations Initiative, and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PRACT).

West Africa

The countries of Senegal, Mali, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Niger, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe comprise West Africa. West Africa features a diverse population, straddles the transition zone between Christianity and Islam, and retains overlapping French, Portuguese, and British influences. Today West Africa experiences political instability and great disparities in

wealth. Recent election disputes in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire are indicative of stubborn regional problems. Liberia's revitalization, however, demonstrates that West African states can take positive steps to overcome violence, poverty, and disorder.

Nigeria, by virtue of its location, population, significant gross domestic product, and oil reserves is a major power in the region, and one of the continent's most politically and economically significant states. Nigeria provides regional leadership through the Gulf of Guinea Commission and Economic Community of West Africa States. Nigeria, along with Ghana and Senegal, are emerging in West Africa as critical partners essential to our efforts to enhance stability and security in this important region.

U.S. Africa Command assists in developing the capacity of individual West African states and encourages regional security cooperation. Exercise FLINTLOCK 11 in February and March 2011 was a special operations exercise focused on military interoperability and capacity building with partner nations in North and West Africa. Approximately 669 African, European and U.S. participants from 17 nations trained together in this 17-day exercise. In addition, 9 of the 15 West African countries participate in Africa Partnership Station, where their focus is on enhancing their maritime capabilities and developing multinational approaches to security in the Gulf of Guinea.

In support of Liberia's revitalization, U.S. Africa Command contributes to a sustained multi-year defense sector reform operation to help establish effective armed forces in Liberia: Operation ONWARD LIBERTY (OOL). OOL is a dedicated DOD and Department of State effort that follows three interrelated lines of operation that include security force assistance to the Armed Forces of Liberia, a U.S. Coast Guard effort to help establish a maritime law enforcement

capability in the Liberian Economic Exclusion Zone, and mentorship and advisor support to the Liberian Ministry of Defense.

Central Africa

The Central African states of Chad, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of the Congo, Angola, DRC, and Central African Republic extend from the middle of the continent east to the Great Lakes, and westward to the Atlantic Ocean. This is one of the most geographically diverse regions in the world and is wealthy in resources. For example, Angola is reaping the rewards of new oil wealth, but is still developing programs to generate broad-based, sustained economic growth. Corruption, weak political institutions, high instances of pandemic disease, and an inability to secure their maritime domain, borders, and natural resources hinder Central Africa's progress.

The lingering effects of the DRC conflict remain the primary challenge to peace and stability in the region. As part of the effort to help the DRC establish the rule of law and legitimate national institutions, U.S. Africa Command has been working with other U.S. agencies and international partners to improve the Congolese military's ability to serve its citizens. Specific examples of U.S. government efforts include strengthening the military justice system, improving training capacity, developing agricultural projects designed to reduce military personnel dependency on local populations, and improving indigenous training capacity.

The LRA continues to threaten vulnerable populations in northern Uganda and parts of the eastern DRC, Central African Republic, and Southern Sudan. The "Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Reconstruction Act of 2009" directed the United States Government to develop a strategy to "mitigate and eliminate the threat to civilians and regional stability" posed by the LRA. U.S. Africa Command is the key DOD participant in the

interagency effort to assist our regional partners in apprehending or removing the group's leaders, to protect civilians, to provide humanitarian assistance, and to promote justice and reconciliation in LRA-affected areas.

North Africa

The countries of North Africa are Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Separated physically and culturally from sub-Saharan Africa by the Sahara Desert, this region maintains strong links to Southern Europe and the Middle East. North Africa is a critical gateway to sea-lane choke points as well as air and sea routes into Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. Trafficking of all types (human, drugs, weapons), economic stagnation, and ungoverned space in the Sahel make the region vulnerable to extremist influences and activities. The political and social upheaval that erupted across North Africa has captured the attention of the international community. However, it is too early to assess properly either the myriad causes or the outcomes of these important events.

Al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb has emerged as a direct threat to the stability and security of North Africa as well as the West African Sahelian countries of Niger and Mali. To assist these countries in meeting this extremist challenge, U.S. Africa Command supports the Department of State led interagency Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership through Operation ENDURING FREEDOM – Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS). OEF-TS strengthens regional counterterrorism and security capabilities by employing small Mobile Training Teams, Civil Military Support Elements, Joint Planning and Assistance Teams, and through Senior Leader Engagements.

Southern Africa

Southern Africa comprises nine continental states including Namibia, South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and two island states—Madagascar and Mauritius. In many dimensions, Southern Africa is highly developed economically; yet, the region still has some significant problems. Governance challenges, inflation, and refugees from Zimbabwe present challenges to Southern African nations. Two states with great potential, Zimbabwe and Madagascar, have difficult internal political challenges and are under economic sanctions, while Botswana continues to rise from one of the world's poorest countries to middle-income status. South Africa and the United States recently institutionalized a steadily improving era of cooperation when Secretary Clinton and South Africa's Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, established an ongoing Strategic Dialogue to foster cooperation in areas of mutual concern. South Africa is an active participant in U.S. Africa Command's primary maritime security engagement initiative, Africa Partnership Station (APS).

Integrated Interagency Team

U.S. Africa Command is part of a diverse interagency team with abundant talents, expertise, and capabilities. An integrated interagency effort requires understanding the institutional perspectives of each agency, as well as each agency's statutory responsibilities and authorities.

U.S. Africa Command's contribution to an integrated approach starts in our Stuttgart headquarters, where the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities is a senior U.S. diplomat. In addition, a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Senior Development Advisor helps ensure that our military programs and activities support and

complement our government's development programs and activities. We have made progress in creating a collaborative interagency environment in U.S. Africa Command. While we welcome the skills and capabilities our interagency partners bring to our mission, we are still working toward fulfilling our vision of an integrated whole-of-government approach to the challenges in Africa. We would benefit from increased interagency support from other USG agencies and departments.

U.S. Africa Command also works closely with embassy country teams to ensure that our programs and activities support and complement their Mission Strategic and Resource Plans. To enhance this cooperative interagency effort, our annual Theater Security Cooperation Conference brings together over 300 stakeholders from U.S. embassies in Africa, USG agencies, and our component commands to ensure our programs and activities are synchronized and integrated with those of the other government agencies.

PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES

U.S. Africa Command is committed to the delivery and sustainment of effective security cooperation programs that build our partners' security capacity. At our partners' request, we design and develop programs, activities, and exercises that support their four common defense goals. When we complete an activity, we stay engaged with our partners to foster long-term gains and successes. Our intent is to achieve a persistent and sustained level of engagement.

Our Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine and Special Operations forces as well as CJTF-HOA set the conditions for the success of our security cooperation programs and activities on the continent.² They perform detailed planning, provide essential command and control, establish

² U.S. Africa Command has four component commands, one sub-unified command, and the Combined Joint Task Force — Horn of Africa. The four component commands are U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), U.S. Naval Force,

and sustain relations with our partners, and develop processes to provide timely operational assessments.

Partner security capacity building programs focus on three overlapping capacity building functions:

- Building operational capacity;
- Building institutional capacity; and,
- Developing human capital.

Building Operational Capacity

Building Operational Capacity is about more than the number of troops and pieces of equipment. It is about aligning the right military capabilities—ground, maritime, and air—against a partner’s unique mission requirements, as well as developing the necessary operational enablers that foster the independent sustainment of those capabilities. We work closely with our partners to align the right military capabilities against threat and mission requirements, as well as develop the necessary operational enablers. Examples of programs and activities that help our African partners build operational capacity, as mentioned earlier, include OEF-TS, exercise FLINTLOCK, PRACT, and the GPOI/ACOTA programs.

Beyond these important programs and activities, the National Guard State Partnership Program, APS, the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership, exercises AFRICA ENDEAVOR and NATURAL FIRE, Medical Capabilities and Readiness Exercises, and Africa Deployment Assistance Partnership Team all contribute to partner operational capacity.

The State Partnership Program connects a U.S. state’s National Guard to an African nation for military training and relationship building. This program builds long-term

Africa (NAVAF), and U.S. Air Forces (AFAFRICA/17AF). U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA) is the sub-unified command.

relationships, promotes access, enhances African military professionalism and capabilities, strengthens interoperability, and enables healthy civil-military relations. Our current National Guard partnerships are: Botswana and North Carolina, Ghana and North Dakota, Liberia and Michigan, Morocco and Utah, Nigeria and California, Senegal and Vermont, South Africa and New York, and Tunisia and Wyoming. Working closely with the National Guard Bureau, the Command will seek to expand this highly effective program.

Africa Partnership Station (APS) is U.S. Africa Command's primary maritime security engagement program. APS strengthens our partners' maritime security capacity by focusing on the development of planning skills, maritime domain awareness, response capabilities, and regional integration. In 2010, APS included representatives from nine European allies, 23 African countries, and Brazil. This was more than double the number of partners participating in the planning and execution in previous years.

African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) is a maritime partner program conducted with the United States Coast Guard that contributes to operational as well as institutional capacity. AMLEP develops partner capacity in maritime governance and maritime security by engaging partner nations at both the national interagency level and tactical enforcement level. AMLEP operations result in the apprehension of vessels engaged in illegal operations and enable U.S. diplomatic efforts that foster good governance.

AFRICA ENDEAVOR is our premier communications exercise designed to encourage interoperability, information exchange, and regional cooperation among African nations so they can coordinate with one another during natural disasters and emergencies. Last year in Ghana, communications experts from more than 30 African nations participated in the continent's largest communications interoperability exercise. A highlight was the direct satellite link and associated

command and control tactics, techniques, and procedures established between the African Union's Peace Support Center in Addis Ababa and the exercise main body in Accra, Ghana.

Joint and multinational exercise NATURAL FIRE seeks to improve interoperability and build partner capacity to respond to complex humanitarian emergencies, specifically planning for possible pandemic influenza outbreaks. The fiscal year 2010 (FY10) exercise included more than 500 U.S. soldiers training alongside more than 600 troops from Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. The FY11 exercise will be held for the first time in Tanzania and is scheduled for July and August 2011.

Medical Capabilities and Readiness Exercises, referred to as MEDFLAG, provide medical training to the host nation's medical personnel as well as offering clinics for residents in the local area. A September 2010 MEDFLAG bi-lateral exercise in Kinshasa, DRC, saw 90 service members from U.S. Africa Command and its components train more than 200 members of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in combat lifesaving skills, preventative medicine, and mass casualty procedures. As part of the exercise, doctors from the DRC worked side-by-side with their American counterparts to treat more than 1800 Congolese in a three-day clinic.

Africa Deployment Assistance Partnership Team assists African partners to build logistics capacity by training African partner non-commissioned officers how to deploy their equipment in support of peacekeeping operations. Of the eight partner nations who completed the training in 2009, the Ugandans were the first to get their 23 non-commissioned officers certified to plan, palletize, and load cargo on peacekeeping missions.

Building Institutional Capacity

To support the building of institutional capacity, we focus on developing and sustaining a government's ability to program and allocate security resources, establish national command and control, provide civilian oversight of military forces, and develop military and security recruiting, training, and sustaining programs and policies. These functions help to ensure the readiness and independent sustainability of our partners' military forces. An underlying premise of our building institutional capacity efforts is that military forces must be subordinate to civil authority and accepted as legitimate members of a civil society based on the rule of law.

We have learned from Operation ONWARD LIBERTY in Liberia that rebuilding a state's security institutions requires more than military means. Institutional capacity building is an inherently interagency endeavor. Success in this mission requires a long-term commitment by numerous USG agencies and sufficient resources in all departments to ensure success.

ONWARD LIBERTY illustrates how we can achieve positive effects that enhance the capability of our partners and support U.S. interests disproportionate to our modest investment in resources. With a small investment, the USG is helping Liberia transform their Ministry of Defense, Armed Forces, and Coast Guard. Liberia's progress will contribute to regional stability and provide a model for other African states transitioning from conflicts. Moreover, these lessons will inform how we approach Security Force Assistance in other areas of Africa, such as Southern Sudan.

Other programs and activities that are building institutional capacity include Partnership for Integrated Logistics Operations and Tactics, The Pandemic Response Program, Military Intelligence Security Cooperation, and special staff assistance and mentoring programs.

Partnership for Integrated Logistics Operations and Tactics is an operational-level seminar jointly designed and funded in partnership with the Canadian Ministry of Defense,

Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and the GPOI program. This program builds long-term operational logistics planning capacity within the AU Standby Force, and promotes interoperability with the U.S. military.

The Pandemic Response Program focuses on strengthening our African partners' military capacities to plan and respond to potential pandemics. Our efforts are reinforced with three years of funding from USAID, which cooperates with the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and other partner organizations in African countries.

Military Intelligence Security Cooperation develops not only institutional capacity, but also human capital by enhancing partner country military and security service professionalism and the development of military intelligence organizations that respond to civilian authority and respect the rule of law. Military intelligence operational capacity building is designed to support the execution of full-spectrum operations, including counter terrorism, intelligence support to peacekeeping operations, and intelligence support to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

To support the development of institutional capacity, we also conduct special staff programs. Through mentoring and exchanges, our inspector general, chaplain, legal counsel, surgeon, public affairs, and other special staff elements work closely with partners to improve readiness and professionalism. Additionally, our African partners recognize that the backbone of a professional military is an effective non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps. Depending on the need, we help develop doctrine, training plans, and facility plans while also engaging with partner leadership in developing their NCO corps.

Developing Human Capital

To develop human capital, we focus on developing the professional attributes and values that complement capacity and institution building efforts and enhance the standing of the

military among members of civil society. We encourage our partners to develop the capacity to take care of their military forces and their families, which increases readiness. Each positive engagement and activity alongside our forces helps our partners develop the professional attributes and values essential for an effective military.

The African Leader Development Initiative is a U.S. Africa Command program that assists in the strengthening of our African partner's warrant officer and noncommissioned officer corps. U.S. Africa Command and our components accomplish this by providing warrant and noncommissioned officer academies with curriculum development assistance, instructors, guest speakers, and familiarization visits for our African partners to our Services' premier NCO academies. Additionally, 2010 saw the first annual African Defense Joint Warrant Officer/Sergeant Major Symposium convene in Washington, D.C. This symposium brought together senior warrant and noncommissioned officers from seventeen African countries to collaborate on civil-military relations, regional security issues, peace support operations, Human Immunodeficiency Virus prevention, sexual and gender based violence prevention, and initiatives for women in the armed forces. This is an example of the outstanding support we receive from our Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), which co-hosted the 2010 symposium as well as many other events. U.S. Africa Command relies on the social, cultural, and academic expertise ACSS provides to inform our cooperative efforts with our sub-Saharan African partners.

The Military Intelligence Basic Officer Course-Africa, the Military Intelligence Professionals Course, and the Military Intelligence NCO Course-Africa are U.S. Africa Command-sponsored courses that assist partner nations in further developing fundamental military leadership and intelligence skills. They enhance capacity for intelligence analysis and

sharing among nations and to provide an environment designed to improve collaboration within the region's military intelligence community.

International Military Education and Training (IMET) is a long-standing and well-regarded program funded by the Department of State. IMET provides military course education and training for foreign military and select civilian personnel. Professionalizing militaries and reinforcing the democratic value of elected civilian authority are among the benefits of the Department of State-led IMET and Expanded-IMET programs. These comprise the most widely used military assistance programs in U.S. Africa Command's area of responsibility as almost every country in the AOR receives IMET. Sending African officers to our mid-level and senior staff colleges provides these officers an opportunity to not only learn about the United States and develop long-lasting professional relationships with our very best officers, but to assume greater responsibilities in meeting their security challenges upon return to their own country. Presently, 30 West and Central African flag and general officers have benefited from the IMET program. A notable IMET participant from Uganda is Major General Nathan Mugisha—the commander of the African Union's peacekeeping mission Somalia; a U.S. Army War College graduate.

RESOURCING FOR THE FUTURE

U.S. Africa Command maintains a long-term commitment to our partners to ensure that stability becomes self-sustaining on the continent. Simultaneously, there are potential crises requiring prompt, decisive action, and U.S. Africa Command must be ready for these contingency operations. As we assess our capacity to execute our operations, programs and activities, we continuously evaluate our progress in four key categories:

- Our ability to foster sustained engagement;

- Our ability to expand our operational reach;
- Our ability to respond rapidly to crisis; and,
- Our ability to take care of our people.

Fostering Sustained Engagement

The 2010 QDR identified building security capacity of partner states as one of six key DOD mission areas. U.S. Africa Command is developing, executing, and refining a range of programs and activities that help African states build capable, professional militaries.

Resourcing Sustained Engagement: Authorities

As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense highlighted on numerous occasions, the strict compartmentalization of engagement funding sources can impede unity of effort and progress. Authorities are often inflexible and processes too cumbersome for today's security challenges. For example, the at-sea training platform APS involved the cobbling together of over a dozen different funding sources from Title 10 to resource its first three years of this important program. This made establishing and administering this important program a challenge. We have had tremendous success with APS, and today the Department of State provides dedicated Title 22 funding to implement the training aspect of this program.

The Global Security Contingency Fund proposed by the President offers a new approach to funding important assistance activities in an effective manner—pooling the resources and expertise of the Department of State and DOD. The Administration has requested \$50 million in the State Department budget for this fund, and the Department of Defense has committed to contribute significant funding as well. This approach would create a new business model that we believe will lead to collaborative programs to respond to emergent challenges and opportunities.

Resourcing Sustained Engagement: Forces

Maintaining a predictable pattern of available operational forces for sustained engagement activity is critical to the success of our efforts on the continent and an ongoing challenge. U.S. Africa Command's components and subordinate commands are the primary implementers of our programs and activities on the continent. In an environment of competing global demands for forces, we rely on the Global Force Management process for the necessary support of our engagements in Africa.

Funding for the Foreign Military Financing Program

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is fundamental to our strategy of preventative rather than reactive response and represents an investment in critical relationships. Inadequate funding or inconsistent year-to-year distributions can compromise our efforts, turn our partners towards other sources, and inhibit peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations. The demand for FMF funds will always exceed resource availability. Therefore, U.S. Africa Command carefully prioritizes its FMF recommendations to the Department of State using a rigorous analytical process that considers national interests, DOD guidance, country team recommendations, host nation desires, and the host nation's capacity to absorb and effectively employ military equipment. For example, Senegal uses this program to maintain the fleet of U.S. military trucks they acquired for peacekeeping operations using the Excess Defense Article program.

Planning and Assessing Our Programs and Activities

U.S. Africa Command is a judicious steward of the resources provided to us by the American people to accomplish our theater objectives. With the fiscal challenges we face at home and the competing global demands on our military forces, we are dedicated to helping build partner nation capability at the lowest cost possible. In many instances, we achieve

positive effects that enhance the capability of our partners and support U.S. interests with a modest investment in resources. We do this through a detailed planning process that links our programs and activities to our theater objectives and carefully justifies resources.

While it is difficult to attribute improvements in our partners' security capacity to individual activities or engagements, the evidence indicates that we are moving in the right direction with regard to our direct engagements. In CJTF-HOA, for example, we measure our effectiveness in several ways: socio-cultural research teams, informal and formal feedback from partner nations, and through surveys. We take a broad view of our programs and activities with a robust annual command assessment process, which incorporates indicators from a range of quantitative and qualitative sources and helps guide our planning for future programs and activities.

Funding for Exercises

A key component of our capacity building is our Joint and Combined Exercise program. This program is dependent upon funding from the Combatant Commander's Exercise and Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2) Program. These exercises improve not only the readiness of our African partners, but also increase the capabilities of U.S. forces. As our exercise program expands to meet the readiness needs of U.S. forces and partner militaries, U.S. Africa Command will place increasing demands on limited CE2T2 funds. We seek Congress' continued support of the DOD's request for the Combatant Commander's Exercise, Engagement, and Training Transformation Program.

Though we face challenges in the previously mentioned areas, we are also entering into a new era of opportunities.

Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review

The Department of State's recent Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) is a laudable milestone on the pathway to improving interagency cooperation and collaboration. Following in the footsteps of the Department of Defense's QDR, the QDDR made a sweeping assessment of how the Department of State and USAID could advance our national interests and effectively partner with the U.S. military in support of these interests. The QDDR's elevation of conflict prevention and response to a core civilian mission is notable, as is the commitment to developing an integrated capability to reform security and justice sectors in fragile states. We look forward to working with our interagency partners at the Department of State and across the government as they implement the QDDR's recommendations.

African Cooperation Authority

U.S. Africa Command makes maximum use of Traditional Combatant Commander Activities authorities for military-to-military and other activities. Section 1050a, a new revision to Title 10, United States Code, will be an important additional authority enabling engagements with civilian elements of Ministries of Defense, the AU, and other security organizations. This authority, provided through the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, will open doors to broader cooperation and benefit both the United States and our African partners. We welcome this valuable addition and thank Congress for its support in creating this authority.

Enhancing Operational Reach and Ensuring Rapid Response to Crisis

U.S. Africa Command works to enhance our operational reach across the Command's AOR. This supports our ability to respond to crises promptly and our long-term efforts for security as well. U.S. forces are often employed in austere environments with limited to non-

existent infrastructure, port, and logistics networks. Improvements in these areas enhance our ability to respond to emergencies and threats and to meet the needs of sustained engagement.

Theater Infrastructure and Posture Requirements

U.S. Africa Command evaluates and refines its access needs on a regular basis, in close cooperation with the Department of State. This effort centers on gaining and maintaining the access and freedom of movement necessary to conduct day-to-day security cooperation activities and crisis response operations. We work with our components, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of State to update the network of Cooperative Security Locations and supporting agreements required to enable the Command to carry out its activities. As U.S. Africa Command's sole Forward Operating Site on the continent, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, serves as a critical operational and sustainment facility (a hub for lift, logistics, intelligence, and Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4)) in support of DOD activities in the region. It is critical for activities and operations across AOR boundaries in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Peninsula.

Camp Lemonnier's proximity to Djibouti's air and seaport make it ideal for supporting U.S. Africa Command operations throughout the region. Of equal importance is the Camp's ability to support DOD's global transportation infrastructure network as a key node. Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, is essential to U.S. security interests in East Africa and the Gulf of Aden. The FY12 military construction request contains a number of important projects that will allow us to continue to enhance the capabilities of this facility. We appreciate your attention to these requests.

Ensuring Rapid Response to Crisis

U.S. Africa Command conducts prudent operational planning for a range of possible humanitarian and security contingencies beyond fostering sustained engagement and working to expand our operational reach. This requires the staff to continually assess potential force requirements and the lift, logistics, C4, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance enablers required to support a range of contingencies. We share our assessments regularly with Joint Staff and the Office of Secretary of Defense.

Taking Care of Our People

U.S. Africa Command team members and their families serve in Stuttgart, Alconbury (Molesworth), and across Africa. Quality of Life (QoL) Programs affirm our commitment to our team members and their families wherever they serve. This Command is committed to providing a strong, supportive environment fostering growth and excellence, while providing the highest quality of resources and services to our U.S. Africa Command family consistent with their commitment and dedication to serve the Nation. To that end, we created a QoL office to manage and oversee activities at the Stuttgart headquarters, Alconbury, and on the African continent.

In order to understand the needs of our families stationed throughout the continent, U.S. Africa Command hosts the annual 'Africa Command Families on the African Continent' working group. This annual forum addresses emerging QoL issues and provides the foundation for our QoL Action Plan. This forum recently identified two issues that family members highlight on a regular basis. First, family members have requested changes that would allow expectant mothers to elect an alternate destination for obstetric care, providing an option to be with their families instead of alone at the nearest Military Treatment Facility. The second issue is the provision of student travel benefits for dependents attending accredited overseas colleges

or universities off the continent in locations such as Europe. We appreciate Congress' attention to these two important issues.

To further assist our team members and their families in solving problems resulting from deployment, reunions, and other family changes, U.S. Africa Command implemented the Military and Family Life Consultant Program to support the Command headquarters, remote locations and the African continent. We currently have three consultants supporting the Stuttgart and Alconbury communities, as well as CJTF-HOA in Djibouti. We continue to focus our efforts on our members and their families, both on and off the African continent, to ensure their quality of life remains a priority and is funded properly.

CONCLUSION

U.S. Africa Command is protecting American lives and promoting our national interests today by helping our African partners assume a continually increasing role addressing their own security concerns. Africa's long-term growth, stability, and economic prosperity is largely dependent on our partners' ability to develop capable and professional militaries that are subordinate to civilian authority, respect human rights, and adhere to the rule of law. There are no short cuts to growth and stability in Africa; we must shape our efforts with an understanding of the continent and patiently sustain our efforts over time.

A prosperous and stable Africa is strategically important to the United States. An Africa that can generate and sustain broad based development will contribute to global economic growth and vitality—a long-standing American interest. Prosperity and stability in Africa will ensure that it does not become a haven for those who wish to do harm to our citizens and our interests—both in the homeland and abroad.

In the coming year, we will continue to support African leadership in addressing shared security challenges, take advantage of opportunities, deepen our strategic partnerships—regionally, bilaterally, and with the AU—and refine our focus in our security cooperation efforts, while also ensuring the military readiness and operational capability of U.S. Africa Command.

I am grateful for the outstanding support U.S. Africa Command has received from the Congress. The continued support for our uniformed men and women, our DOD civilians and the other USG departments and agencies assigned to the command will allow their tremendous work to continue. I am proud to serve on the U.S. Africa Command team with these dedicated Americans.

General Carter F. Ham
Commander, United States Africa Command

General Carter F. Ham served as an enlisted Infantryman in the 82nd Airborne Division before attending John Carroll University in Cleveland, Ohio. He was commissioned in the Infantry as a Distinguished Military Graduate in 1976.

His military service has included assignments in Kentucky, Ohio, California, Georgia, Italy and Germany to name a few. He has also served in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Macedonia, and Iraq.

He has held a variety of positions to include Recruiting Area Commander; Battalion Executive Officer at the National Training Center; Advisor to the Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade; Commander, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry; Chief of Staff, 1st Infantry Division; Commander, 29th Infantry Regiment; commander, Multi-National Brigade, Mosul, Iraq; Commander, 1st Infantry Division; Director for Operations, J-3, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC.

His previous assignment was Commanding General of U.S. Army Europe and 7th Army.

His military education includes the Armor Officers Advanced Course, Naval College of Command and Staff, graduating with distinction, and the U. S. Air Force's Air War College.

General Ham's awards and decorations include Army Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters, the Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, the Bronze Star Medal, and the Joint Service Commendation Medal.



**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

APRIL 5, 2011

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA

General MCNABB. Congresswoman Hanabusa, the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) teams deployed to Japan by USNORTHCOM were all active duty teams. None of those particular teams were comprised of National Guard or Reserve personnel. [See page 24.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

APRIL 5, 2011

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Mr. TURNER. Following a briefing and demonstration last year on nuclear weapon transportation, I became concerned over some potential vulnerabilities.

a. How does TRANSCOM, NNSA and DoD share, synthesize, and evaluate potential threat information for transportation operations?

b. What evaluations have been conducted into air transportation of nuclear weapons and materials?

c. What is the process for identifying and examining options for incorporating new technologies or equipment in improving the safety or security of nuclear weapons and materials while in transit? At what interval are these analyses conducted?

General McNABB. USTRANSCOM's primary forum to evaluate threats to air transport of nuclear weapons is the Headquarters Air Mobility Command (AMC) Threat Working Group (TWG). The TWG provides integrated risk assessments in support of Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) missions and makes mission execution recommendations to senior leadership that mitigate threat and security vulnerabilities. Membership includes AMC Directorates, 18th Air Force, Air Force Office of Special Investigation, U.S. Transportation Command, Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. It is mandatory for this group to meet for every PNAF mission. Additionally, the TWG members work very closely with Headquarters Air Force Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration Directorate in supporting multiple agencies' nuclear forums. Specifically, AMC has supported the 2009 Air Transportation Study, conducted in accordance with the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY 09 and sponsored by National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) and Secretary of the Air Force. AMC has also provided assistance to the Nuclear Command and Control System Support Staff (NSS) during their recent assessment of movement operations, including the PNAF. AMC Nuclear Operations Division is an active participant with the NNSA in the semi-annual Nuclear Transportation Working Group. Additionally, AMC was actively engaged in the October 2010 Nuclear Weapons System Steering Group's Operational Safety Review of the PNAF program. This review is sponsored by the Air Force Safety Center and conducted once every five years under the provisions of *DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program Manual*, and *Air Force Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies, Operational Safety Reviews, and Safety Rules*.

Air Mobility Command maintains a robust inspection program through the Inspector General. AMC conducts a Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI) on AMC's sole PNAF-certified unit on an 18-month inspection cycle in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions (CJCSI) *Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspections*. To obtain certification, an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI) is conducted prior to the unit performing its nuclear mission. In addition to the CJCSI 18-month requirement, units receive a Limited NSI (LNSI) during the period between the 18-month inspection intervals. This results in a unit receiving an NSI or LNSI approximately every nine months at the very least, half of which are required to be no- or minimal-notice.

AMC's 62D Airlift Wing (AW) at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA is the sole PNAF-certified unit in the Air Force to conduct logistical air transport of nuclear weapons and related material. Since certification, the 62 AW has successfully passed every NSI or LNSI. Additionally, AMC Safety conducts Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits on an 18-month cycle as required by *Air Force Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit (NSSAV) Program*. This program allows functional experts from across the AMC staff to examine the processes in place at the 62 AW with respect to its nuclear mission. Furthermore, AMC has also implemented a Functional Expert Visit (FEV) program for the interim period between formal inspections. AMC Nuclear Operations Division leads the FEV programs and is able to provide subject matter expert review/focus on areas specified or requested by the 62 AW. These quarterly FEVs are conducted with a small footprint of two-to-four staff personnel and serve to continually maintain the highest state of proficiency required of this critical nuclear mission.

Through each of the agencies, assessments, inspections and evaluations, options for new technologies are discovered and examined. Specifically, the 2009 Air Transportation Study, the Nuclear Transportation Working Group, and the Nuclear Weapons System Steering Group's Operational Safety Review all examine the use of new technologies to improve the efficiency, safety and security of nuclear weapons transportation. In addition, the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters (DASD/NM) sponsors the Security Policy Verification Committee Technology Working Group, which gathers quarterly to address technology which would enhance the safety and security of weapons transport. Also, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, as directed by DASD/NM, conducts red team exercises to address current tactics and policy as well as new technologies.

Mr. TURNER. Have operations in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn impacted your ability to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq?

General MCNABB. USTRANSCOM was challenged providing concurrent emerging support to Japan relief, Operation ODYSSEY DAWN and Presidential support—all while maintaining normal passenger and cargo operations to Afghanistan and Iraq.

Over 95% of all personnel move into and out of theater on commercial carriers, and our Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) partners performed without any interruption of support. Passenger rotations continued, ensuring that all Relief in Place/Transfers of Authority (RIP/TOA) remained on schedule to meet US Forces-Afghanistan requirements.

Specifically addressing cargo support to Afghanistan and Iraq, the USTRANSCOM team partnered with USCENTCOM to prioritize all cargo and manage warfighter expectations during this period of heavy lift. As we synchronized and prioritized cargo movements with USCENTCOM to ensure that no RIP/TOA was delayed, we experienced some backlog of sustainment cargo as a result of concurrent operational requirements. USCENTCOM mitigates the risk of sustainment cargo delay by maintaining sufficient days of supply in Afghanistan and Iraq.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Ms. BORDALLO. With regard to ship repairs facilities on Guam, I understand the dry dock at our shipyard is only capable, right now, to do limited repairs. However, even before the incident with the dry dock a significant number of pre-positioned ships were being sent to Singapore or Hong Kong for repairs. What more can be done to comply with the law requiring ships to be repaired in American shipyards? What is the operational necessity for some of the repairs in foreign shipyards? The annual report is not clear on this point.

General MCNABB. Overseas shipyard repair of naval vessels, including Military Sealift Command (MSC) vessels, is a matter under the cognizance of the Department of the Navy.

Prior to the incident that placed the Guam Shipyard drydock out of service earlier this year, MSC had repair work done in Singapore on two T-AKE Class (dry cargo and ammunition) vessels. These were not prepositioning vessels. The repair work was emergency repairs requiring the vessels to be drydocked. At the time that these vessels were repaired in Singapore, the Guam Shipyard drydock was not certified to lift the T-AKE class ships. The drydock has now been refloated, but it has not yet been certified to resume repair work. Nearly all shipyard work, with the exception of voyage repairs, performed on government-owned prepositioning ships is done within the Continental United States during periodic overhaul periods after their cargo is discharged at U.S. military installations.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS

Ms. GIFFORDS. TRANSCOM's mission requires a massive energy footprint. To their credit each of the Services pro-actively developed strategic processes to make energy informed decisions. Recently, as part of the DoD efficiencies the Air Force stated it would annually save \$750 million dollars due to Air Mobility Command's due to reduced energy consumption generated via the Air Force Energy Plan. The Navy's "Green Hornet" Program successfully completed test flights using a 50/50 bio-fuel blend, is a perfect example of developing sustainable alternatives to current energy sources. Finally the Marines Corp's 3rd Battalion 5th Marines employment of the Experimental Forward Operating Base (ExFOB) in Afghanistan has been instrumental in demonstrating the utility of renewable in the battlefield.

1. Does TRANSCOM have a published Operational Energy strategy?
2. What is TRANSCOM's approach to energy efficiency, renewable and alternative fuel technologies?

3. Can you describe the strategic impact of access to a scalable bio-fuel on TRANSCOM's global roles and responsibilities?

General McNABB. Our service components, with their statutory role of organizing, training, and equipping forces, retain the primary responsibility for improving efficiency and reducing energy consumption. USTRANSCOM does not have a separate Operational Energy strategy document but incorporates Operational Energy considerations in our 2011 Strategic Plan.

One illustration of our encouragement of the service components' efforts was our recent investment of \$172 million into Air Mobility Command's aviation fuel efficiency initiatives, which are projected to yield \$237 million in savings and cost avoidance through the FYDP. Additionally, Air Mobility Command has certified a number of mobility aircraft on alternative fuels and continues to aggressively explore possibilities in this area. USTRANSCOM's 2011 Strategic Plan directs that "wherever possible, the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise must recognize and rapidly apply technological advances that reduce fuel consumption and enhance joint operations." Regarding process improvement in this area, USTRANSCOM is committed to identify ecologically-aware deployment and distribution concepts that improve performance while reducing energy consumption and costs. We are currently in the concept development phase of identifying ways to inventory USTRANSCOM's global supply chain carbon footprint and thereby find ways to reduce it in the future. A highly-successful example is our detailed planning and execution of multi-modal contingency operations—efficiently combining sealift, ground movement, and airlift of equipment—at Rota, Spain and elsewhere. These multi-modal operations not only reduce fuel consumption, they are considerably more cost-effective than reliance upon a single mode of movement (such as airlift) alone.

At this time, no bio-fuels are available in sufficient production quantities that would provide a truly viable alternative to the fossil fuels currently in use, nor does USTRANSCOM own or manage bulk petroleum assets. However, if a scalable bio-fuel was developed that met stringent jet and maritime fuel use specifications and could be mass-produced, at competitive cost, in quantities needed to support sustained combat operations as well as worldwide petroleum war reserve stockage requirements, USTRANSCOM would use such energy sources to accomplish our global mobility mission.

