    [House Hearing, 112 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S COUNTERTERRORISM OFFICE: BUDGET, REORGANIZATION,
                                    POLICIES

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

             SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 APRIL 14, 2011

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 112-12

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

     Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

                                     ______

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    65-798                    WASHINGTON : 2011
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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
    ELTON GALLEGLY, California           ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California             Samoa
    DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois         DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
    EDWARD R. ROYCE, California          BRAD SHERMAN, California
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    RON PAUL, Texas                      GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    MIKE PENCE, Indiana                  RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    CONNIE MACK, Florida                 GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska           THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             DENNIS CARDOZA, California
    TED POE, Texas                       BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
    GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida            BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio                   ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
    BILL JOHNSON, Ohio                   CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
    DAVID RIVERA, Florida                FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
    MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania             KAREN BASS, California
    TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas                WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
    ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
    RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
    VACANT
                       Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
                 Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

             Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    TED POE, Texas                       BRAD SHERMAN, California
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    BILL JOHNSON, Ohio                   GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas                BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York          ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
    RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                    WITNESS

    The Honorable Daniel Benjamin, Ambassador-at-Large, Coordinator
      for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State.................     6

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from
      the State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on
      Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade: Prepared statement.....     3
    The Honorable Daniel Benjamin: Prepared statement................    10

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    28
    Hearing minutes..................................................    29
    The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
      from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement..........    31

    THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S COUNTERTERRORISM OFFICE: BUDGET, REORGANIZATION,
                                    POLICIES

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, APRIL 14, 2011

                  House of Representatives,
                         Subcommittee on Terrorism,
                               Nonproliferation, and Trade,
                                  Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Royce. The hearing of the subcommittee will come to
    order.
        Today we are pleased to have with us Ambassador Daniel
    Benjamin, the State Department's top counterterrorism official.
    Welcome. This is an opportunity to review his office's budget,
    especially important given our dire financial straits.
        As part of a State Department reorganization, the
    administration would elevate the Ambassador's Office of the
    Coordinator for Counterterrorism to bureau status. Certainly,
    the counterterrorism portfolio is vital. Nevertheless, a
    certain skepticism is warranted in any reorganization in this
    town. What would the elevation have the office do better than
    it does today--or worse? Would the change portend a staffing
    and budget increase? Should an existing bureau be downgraded as
    an offset to this change? The administration requires
    congressional authorization for this. So we look to the
    Ambassador for answers on these questions.
        The State Department's request for counterterrorism
    activity is roughly $260 million. Its programs fund many small
    projects. For example, the administration is requesting
    $800,000 in antiterrorism assistance for Malaysia. The Obama
    administration stresses that counterterrorism must be
    strategic, attacking the political, social, economic and other
    ills abroad that the administration believes drive militant
    recruitment. But it is fair to ask whether these relatively
    small efforts can make a dent against these daunting
    challenges, and how do we measure their effectiveness?
        There are policy issues involved here, too. The Bush
    administration ill-advisedly removed North Korea from the state
    sponsors of terrorism list as part of a fruitless nuclear
    negotiation. Since its delisting, North Korea has proliferated
    to state sponsors of terrorism. And I have concerns about
    Sudan's likely delisting. We need to make sure its hands are
    clean.
        Subcommittee Member Poe has introduced legislation urging
    the Secretary of State to remove the People's Mujahadin
    Organization of Iran from the Foreign Terrorist Organization
    List, and we will be looking at that. This Iranian exile group
    lives in a precarious security situation, being harassed and
    assaulted by Iraqi troops.
        The Obama administration entered office committed to
    addressing terrorism differently. This was exemplified by its
    efforts to shutter Guantanamo Bay and bring 9/11 mastermind
    Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to New York for civilian trial. After
    bipartisan congressional action to prevent GITMO detainees from
    being brought to U.S. soil, most agree that GITMO will not be
    closed any time soon. And in a major reversal, Attorney General
    Eric Holder announced that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed would not be
    prosecuted in civilian courts but by a military commission at
    Guantanamo Bay. Good.
        The administration stressed that its predecessor's foreign
    policy drove anti-American militancy. But a 2009 USAID report
    notes the following. They say,

            ``We need to recognize that many violent extremists are
            moved primarily by an unshakeable belief in the
            superiority of certain values, by a perceived
            obligation to carry out God's command, or by an abiding
            commitment to destroy a system they view as evil or
            oppressive. In other words, variables located in the
            realm of identity, of faith, and spirituality matter a
            great deal.''

        Those were the words of that USAID reported in 2009. So
    extremism is about much more than U.S. foreign policy.
        Finally, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet
    Napolitano recently claimed that security along our southern
    border is better now than it has ever been. Frankly, that is
    laughable, given its rampant violence. One of my constituents
    was just kidnapped. I do want to thank the Ambassador for his
    help on this because we were in consultation yesterday with his
    office on this. But at the same time, the State Department
    rescinded a travel warning that U.S. citizens could be targeted
    by drug cartels in three Mexican states. Well, he was abducted,
    it looks like from the information we received, by members of a
    drug cartel. So I wonder about this judgment.
        And there is growing concern over illegal southern border
    crossings by individuals from Somalia, from Pakistan, from
    Yemen, and other countries home to active terrorist
    organizations. We had better start treating border security as
    national security.
        I will now turn to the ranking member for his comments, Mr.
    Brad Sherman from Los Angeles, California.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]

        Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these
    important hearings. The Obama administration's first
    Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review presented a plan
    for elevating the Office of Coordinator for Counterterrorism to
    a new Bureau of Counterterrorism, which would give our witness
    a major promotion. My hope is that if we were to take such
    step, that new bureau could combat the pernicious effect of
    what I call the Bureau of Kumbaya at the State Department. This
    bureau inspired us to take North Korea off the list on the
    theory that that would make them be nice. And the bureau also
    inspired us to put the MeK on the list on the theory that Iran
    would then ameliorate its proliferation and terrorism
    activities. One of the questions for our witness is: How is the
    that working out?
        This reorganization could give new heft to our efforts
    against terrorism, or it could be like rearranging the deck
    chairs on the Titanic; moving things around but not really
    accomplishing anything or, even worse, giving the appearance
    that we have done something when in fact we would continue to
    have the same policies that have been, I think, manifestly
    inappropriate over the last several years.
        There are increasing media reports that our efforts in
    Afghanistan include giving money to the Taliban; either to
    contractors who are actually a Taliban front or to contractors
    who find it convenient to pay off the Taliban and then brag
    about how successfully they carried out their development
    program. I look forward to seeing what the Ambassador's office
    can do to make sure that our antiterrorism efforts in
    Afghanistan are not undermined by those who just want to move
    the trucks as easily as possible, not looking at the real
    impact.
        In the early hours of Friday, last week, Iraqi forces
    entered Camp Ashraf, which houses members of the Iranian
    opposition group known as the MeK. Some 34 residents were
    killed, 300 wounded. In private discussions, the Iraqi
    Ambassador's office has said the blood is not on the hands of
    the Iraqi Government but is at least partially on the hands of
    the State Department because the MeK is listed as a terrorist
    group and accordingly Iraq doesn't feel that it has to respect
    the human rights of those in the camp.
        At a Foreign Affairs hearing on March 1, I pressed the
    Secretary of State to personally review the decision of the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which ordered the
    State Department to review its decision with regard to keeping
    the MeK on the list. A similar list is maintained by Europe,
    and they have removed the MeK. This court decision is
    unprecedented. Courts loathe to involve themselves in our
    foreign policy. And so I believe that the office represented
    here is the only office to have its processes and decisions
    questioned by the second most important court in the United
    States.
        I would point out for the record the MEK's usefulness in
    reporting what was going on in Natanz back in 2002, and what is
    going on in TABA today.
        The State Department's job is not just putting people on
    the list, and I think the MeK was put on the list not on the
    merits but rather to placate Tehran, but also to decide who
    stays on the list.
        On the other hand, we have got to put the right entities on
    the list. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula wasn't put on the
    list until days before their 2009 attempted attack. The
    Pakistani Taliban was not designated until months after the
    Times Square attack. The Afghan Taliban is still not on the
    list notwithstanding their brutal murders not only of American
    soldiers but American aid workers as well.
        Finally, with regard to Libya, when Deputy Secretary
    Steinberg was here I brought to his attention the fact that the
    forces in eastern Libya include those who have fought and
    killed Americans by fighting alongside al-Qaeda. I particularly
    brought to his attention Abdel-Hakim al-Hasidi, who brags of
    fighting us in both Pakistan and dispatching forces against us
    in Iraq. Yet there has been no serious attempt by the State
    Department to demand that the opposition council in Benghazi
    either turn these terrorists over to the United States or even
    disassociate themselves from these al-Qaeda-affiliated
    fighters.
        So I look forward to hearing our witness. I think one key
    question before our committee is whether we need a new bureau.
    And I hope very much if there is an opportunity to create a new
    bureau, that it will fight inside the State Department for a
    much stronger antiterrorism policy rather than simply being
    assigned by the State Department to come over to Congress and
    sing us lullabies and try to put us to sleep. I am sure that is
    not what the witness has in mind here today.
        Thank you very much.
        Mr. Royce. Mr. Poe of Texas.
        Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a few days ago, the
    Iraqi army charged into Camp Ashraf. Here we have on the top
    left-hand corner an Iraqi soldier coming in with an M-16,
    supported by an American-made Humvee. On the far top right-hand
    corner we have a member of Camp Ashraf being run over by one of
    those Humvees. And contrary to what the Iraqi Government says,
    that only three were killed, here are the victims of the
    assault and attack on Camp Ashraf. Thirty-three men and women.
    For some reason, the State Department sings the tune of the
    Iraqi Government and only says three were killed. Well, there
    are 30 more than three in these photographs. Real people, real
    victims of crime.
        I am very concerned, as my friend from California, Mr.
    Sherman is, about the people in Camp Ashraf. Every time we have
    a hearing on this issue, I ask the State Department Ambassador
    or whoever is present what is going to be done when America
    leaves. And we get the same song and dance: It will be fine.
    Well, it is not fine. The Iraqi Government wants these people
    removed. I think they are being supported by the Iranian
    Government. And we have an obligation in the United States to
    make sure these people are protected.
        One way to do that is to remove the MeK off of the list.
    Some of these people were members of the MeK. And I have been
    to every classified briefing I know of about the MeK and I am
    not convinced that they should stay on the Foreign Terrorist
    Organization List. I am waiting for the State Department to
    make its case or remove them. The State Department can't make
    their case and they won't remove them, in spite of a court
    order. I think that is appalling. And we have an obligation to
    make sure that something occurs to protect these people.
        The second note, I live in Texas. We have got a concern
    about the Los Zetas that come storming across the Texas border
    selling drugs. They are very violent, and I think that maybe we
    should continue putting them on the Foreign Terrorist
    Organization List.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you, Judge. Mr. Higgins of New York, I
    don't think you have an opening statement, do you?
        We will go to Ambassador Benjamin. Ambassador Daniel
    Benjamin is currently the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at
    the Department of State with the rank of Ambassador-at-Large.
    Prior to this, Ambassador Benjamin spent time at both the
    Brookings Institute as well as the Center for Strategic and
    International Studies. He served on the National Security
    Council during the Clinton administration, where he was the
    Director for Counterterrorism in the Office of Transnational
    Threats. Before entering government, Ambassador Benjamin worked
    as a foreign correspondent for Time Magazine and for the Wall
    Street Journal. He is an author of two books on terrorism. One
    is ``The Age of Sacred Terror'' and the other is ``The Next
    Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for
    Getting It Right,'' which was a Washington Post Best Book of
    2005.
        So, Ambassador, welcome. Thank you again for the assistance
    with my constituent yesterday. I appreciate it.

       STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL BENJAMIN, AMBASSADOR-AT-
      LARGE, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
                                 STATE

        Mr. Benjamin. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce, Ranking
    Member Sherman, distinguished members of the committee. I want
    to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
    have submitted testimony for the record that provides
    additional detail about the State Department's concept of
    strategic counterterrorism and our plans to work with Congress
    to transform my office, SCT, into a full-fledged bureau.
        Over the past 10 years, the United States has made great
    strides in tactical counterterrorism--taking individual
    terrorists off the streets, disrupting cells, and thwarting
    conspiracies. Yet if we look at the strategic level, we
    continue to see a strong flow of new recruits into many of the
    most dangerous terrorist organizations. A Bureau of
    Counterterrorism would continue to work aggressively with our
    interagency counterparts to stop imminent and developing
    threats, but it would also carry forward and expand the work
    underway to undermine the appeal of extremist ideologies and
    help many of our partners develop the tools to deal with the
    terrorist threats they face.
        Mr. Chairman, the wave of democratic demonstrations that
    began to sweep the Arab world at the end of 2010 hold both
    promise and peril. Because great numbers of citizens carried
    out their public demands for change without resort to violence
    or reference to al-Qaeda's incendiary world view, these events
    upended that group's longstanding claims that change would only
    come to the region through violence. At the same time, the
    political turmoil distracted security officials and led to the
    possibility that terrorist groups would exploit the new
    openness and find it easier to carry out conspiracies, a
    possibility with significant worrisome implications for states
    undergoing democratic transitions. But should the revolts
    result in democratically elected non-autocratic governments,
    al-Qaeda's single-minded focus on terrorism as an instrument of
    change could be severely delegitimized.
        I would like to review some key aspects of the current
    landscape, starting in South Asia, home to the group behind the
    September 11 attacks. Pakistan, particularly the Federally
    Administered Tribal Area region and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
    Province, continues to be used as a base for terrorist
    organizations operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan. While
    Pakistan has made progress on the counterterrorism front,
    specifically against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the challenge
    remains to make these gains durable and sustainable. To this
    end, Pakistan must sustain its efforts to deny al-Qaeda safe
    haven in the tribal areas of western Pakistan. We continue to
    press Pakistan for increased action against Lashkar-e-Tayyiba
    and other terrorist groups.
        Though the al-Qaeda core has become weaker, it retains the
    capability to conduct regional and transnational attacks. In
    addition, the affiliates have grown stronger. Over the last 2
    years, we have seen the AQ threat become more distributed and
    geographically diversified in Yemen, East Africa, and the
    Sahel, for example. Terrorist violence from al-Qaeda in the
    Arabian Peninsula has been directed inside and outside of
    Yemen, threatening the security and the well-being of the
    Yemeni people, the broader Arabian Peninsula, and the United
    States.
        Al-Qaeda in Iraq in recent months has adapted to changing
    conditions, diminished capacity, and dismantled leadership to
    continue to carry out large-scale and coordinated attacks
    against government officials, security forces, and even
    civilians inside Iraq.
        In Somalia, al-Shabaab has conducted frequent attacks on
    government, military, and civilian targets inside Somalia, and
    the group's leadership remains actively interested in attacking
    regional, U.S., and Western interests. Last July, we saw al-
    Shabaab demonstrate its ability and intent to carry out attacks
    outside of Somalia when it claimed responsibility for twin
    suicide bombings that killed 76 people in Kampala, Uganda
    during the World Cup.
        Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is another threat. No group
    has made a bigger name for itself in the kidnapping for ransom
    business than AQIM, which relies on ransom payments to sustain
    and develop itself in the harsh Saharan environment. AQIM also
    conducts small-scale ambushes and attacks on security forces
    throughout the region.
        Let me now turn to the three pillars of our comprehensive
    strategic counterterrorism work that will address these
    challenges, and particularly those that arise in the new
    political circumstances we find ourselves in: Reducing
    recruitment, building partner capacity, and multilateral
    engagement.
        Our countering violent extremism work focuses on three main
    lines of effort that will reduce terrorist recruitment:
    Delegitimizing the violent extremist narrative in order to
    diminish its ``pull''; developing positive alternatives for
    youth vulnerable to radicalization to diminish the ``push''
    effect of grievances and unmet expectations; and building
    partner capacity to carry out these activities.
        To counter AQ propaganda, we helped stand up the Center for
    Strategic Counterterrorism Communication, the CSCC, under the
    Bureau of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The CSCC,
    working with the interagency, focuses not only on the violent
    actions and human costs of terrorism but also on positive
    narratives that can help dissuade those who may be susceptible
    to radicalization and recruitment by terrorism organizations.
        Successful CVE involves more than messaging, however, and
    we are developing programs that address the upstream factors of
    radicalization in communities susceptible to terrorist
    recruitment. To be effective, CVE work needs to be driven by
    local needs, informed by local knowledge, and responsive to the
    immediate concerns of the community.
        Micro strategies customized for specific communities and
    even neighborhoods owned and implemented by local civil society
    or government partners have a better chance at succeeding and
    enduring.
        Another central part of the Bureau's CVE effort is
    strengthening our partners' capacity and engagement in CVE
    work, propagating best practices and building an international
    consensus behind the efforts to delegitimize extremists and
    their ideologies. Ultimately, host governments are best
    positioned to execute truly sustainable CVE efforts.
        For several years now, we have supported local law
    enforcement efforts to engage youth through police-led sports
    programs and have worked with Morocco and Indonesia to counter
    the spread of violence and extremist ideology in prisons.
        The second pillar is building the capacity of our partners.
    Weak states serve as breeding grounds for terrorism and
    instability. When those states have the political will, we can
    help with specific capacity-building programs to build
    effective law enforcement capacity, fair and impartial justice,
    and the rule of good law and governance. One of our most
    effective capacity-building programs is the ATA, Antiterrorism
    Assistance Program, which in 2010 was supported by $215 million
    in NADR funds and which provided 350 courses, workshops, and
    technical consultations that trained almost 7,000 participants
    from 64 countries.
        The third pillar is multilateral engagement. Building new
    and strengthening existing partnerships is a cornerstone of our
    CT policy. The U.N. And other multilateral bodies have
    resources and expertise that we are working to leverage to
    reduce the capacity-building burden on the United States. We
    have been working on a new multilateral initiative, the Global
    Counterterrorism Forum, that we believe is not only an
    important step forward but would provide a reliable
    intergovernmental platform for policymakers and practitioners
    from different regions to engage on a sustained basis. I would
    be happy to brief you further in private on this important
    initiative, which has strong support from the White House and
    Secretary Clinton.
        Mr. Chairman, I think my time is out. There are a number of
    other things I could say. We will talk about designations and
    about the Homeland Security counterterrorism nexus. But at this
    point I think it is probably best to open for your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Benjamin follows:]

        Mr. Royce. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ambassador. Let
    me ask you a couple of questions, if I could, and then we will
    go to Mr. Sherman for his questioning.
        Your congressional budget justification mentions that your
    antiterrorism assistance programs underwent 23 assessments last
    year. Is the Department willing to share those evaluations with
    Congress? Could we take a look at those reports? We would like
    a better sense of the effectiveness of the programs, and this
    will give us an opportunity to go through the 23 assessments
    that were done.
        Mr. Benjamin. Quite frankly, Chairman, I am not sure about
    the legal status of those documents or their classification and
    the like, but we will take that back and get you an answer.
        Mr. Royce. You have got about 100 personnel right now.
    Would you anticipate that changing in terms of the upgrading of
    the status of the bureau?
        Mr. Benjamin. Mr. Chairman, the important thing about the
    change to a bureau is that it will, I think, ratify and
    rationalize what we are doing already. And while we would
    expect perhaps marginal changes in personnel, we do not expect
    any major changes; any significant ones.
        Mr. Royce. I see. Thank you. Let me ask another question.
    The Christmas Day bomber, as he is called, was in a situation
    where his father warned us about his thoughts. I believe that a
    State Department official had in fact classified him as a P3B,
    which is possibly inadmissible on terrorism grounds. Despite
    that classification, he got a visa.
        Even though we obviously dodged a bullet on his attempt
    that day, I assume the administration did a thorough post-
    mortem on this. I was going to ask if your office was involved
    in that and what changes have been made should a situation like
    this arise again where a family member says that this
    individual is designated as possibly inadmissible on terrorism
    grounds, will he get that visa?
        Mr. Benjamin. Mr. Chairman, it is an excellent question. We
    are now in an era where our enemies are looking for people who
    have very limited derogatory information on them so that they
    can more effectively target us. This was obviously a very
    potent wake-up call and my office was integrally involved in
    the work in the interagency to ensure that we are protected
    against this tactic by the terrorists.
        We have issued new instructions to consular officers
    worldwide to use much more technically sophisticated search
    tools, advanced algorithms when researching watch-list
    nominations. We have now a much better system for informing the
    interagency about visa revocation processes. And we are working
    closely with the Terrorist Screening Center.
        We have done a lot to reevaluate the criteria upon which
    individuals are watch-listed and to ensure, for example, that
    the kind of information that you mentioned is mainstreamed into
    the pool of information that relates to potential watch listing
    much more efficiently and in a reliable manner.
        So we have taken a lot of different steps to do this. There
    have been a number of after-action reports that we would be
    happy to supply you with.
        Mr. Royce. I appreciate that.
        Mr. Benjamin. It has been a comprehensive effort.
        Mr. Royce. I think we can follow up. I appreciate that
    opportunity.
        Let me ask you another question. It has to do with al-
    Shabaab, which has been really moving and evolving its
    capabilities. The group has attracted, oddly enough, a number
    of Somali-Americans who have lived in communities in this
    country and have gone to the Horn of Africa. Now there are
    reports about al-Shabaab exploiting our own southern border.
    Last year, Texas law enforcement was ordered to be on the
    lookout for a member of al-Shabaab. Recently, Ahmed Muhammed
    Dhakane appeared in Federal court, where he has been accused of
    attempting to smuggle several East Africans with terror links
    into this country.
        I mentioned my concern about Mexico in my opening statement
    about the nature of the situation on the border today. How are
    groups like al-Shabaab exploiting the controls the cartels have
    along that border to their advantage?
        Mr. Benjamin. Mr. Chairman, of course, border security is a
    primary national security concern. The State Department,
    together with the Department of Homeland Security, law
    enforcement and the like, are looking very closely to ensure
    that we have the best possible border security. I am aware of
    the reports that you are discussing regarding attempted Somali
    infiltration, or I should say al-Shabaab infiltration. I would
    say we are much more alert on the Southern border than we have
    hitherto been. I think if you want to know about the very
    specific things that are being done on the border, the
    questions are appropriately handled by DHS, which is
    responsible for that. But we are, certainly in the
    counterterrorism community, very much aware of the danger
    there.
        I would point out that we have seen a lot of violence in
    Mexico, and the law enforcement situation is a matter of
    concern. We, of course, are very supportive of what President
    Calderon has been doing to try to diminish the support. To this
    point we have not seen a significant linkup between the drug
    cartels and terrorist groups themselves. But, of course, there
    are human smuggling groups that make this a worrisome
    situation.
        Mr. Royce. I am aware of individuals, one in particular in
    a Federal penitentiary, who was in fact part of a terrorist
    group and made a payoff and got into the U.S. over the border
    after illegally obtaining a visa to travel to Mexico. He then
    payed to have himself smuggled in and then managed to find his
    confederates or his cell group in the United States. He is now
    serving time along with the other members of that cell group.
    In fact, the border has been breached. And this latest
    reporting on al-Shabaab members, especially the fact that our
    law enforcement on the border has been told to be on the
    lookout for these individuals who have already made the trek is
    disconcerting.
        I am going to go to Mr. Sherman for his questioning.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have all seen the
    gruesome pictures of what the Afghan Taliban has done to Afghan
    girls, to aid workers. Why is the Afghan Taliban not on the
    terrorist list?
        Mr. Benjamin. Ranking Member Sherman, the Afghan Taliban is
    in fact listed under Executive Order 13-224.
        Mr. Sherman. I mean the terrorist list that you maintain.
        Mr. Benjamin. At the moment, there is a desire in the
    administration not to up-end President Karzai's reconciliation
    efforts by making it more difficult through a designation of
    the Taliban.
        Mr. Sherman. So when we find the terrorists not too
    objectionable--I mean, is this a principled list? The Afghan
    Taliban is certainly responsible for lots of terrorism. And yet
    you don't put them on the list that you maintain, not because
    they don't have lots of blood on their hands but because you
    hope to kiss and make up in the future.
        By that standard, since every terrorist group we hope
    redeems itself and renounces terrorism and does business with
    us, you would think that you would cancel all listings. You are
    not going to claim here that the Afghan Taliban doesn't have a
    lot more blood on its hands than some of the other groups that
    are listed. And when I say blood, I mean innocent blood through
    terrorist actions.
        Now, let's move on to the MeK. Your predecessor, Ambassador
    Dell Dailey, recommended that the MeK be removed from the list.
    Of course, he is not aware of information that has come out
    since 2008. But I arranged for this subcommittee to have a
    classified briefing. Your office was represented there but
    didn't speak. And none of the information presented at that
    classified briefing indicates that your decision to keep the
    MeK on the list is justified by information revealed to
    Congress but not available to Ambassador Dell Dailey.
        Is there secret information that neither Ambassador Dailey
    nor the members of this subcommittee are apprised of that
    justify keeping the MeK on the list?
        Mr. Benjamin. Well, first of all, listings have a certain
    amount of judgment involved in them. Secretary Rice, who was
    Ambassador Dailey's boss, disagreed with him, and that was why
    she agreed to the listing.
        Mr. Sherman. We already know that these are inherently
    political listings. North Korea is not on the list. The Afghan
    Taliban isn't on the list. It is whoever. But let me move on.
        The State Department has so far not completed the expedited
    review ordered by the court last summer. When will this
    committee be informed of your findings?
        Mr. Benjamin. You will be informed as soon as a decision is
    made.
        Mr. Sherman. When are you going to get the work done that
    the court directed you to get done quickly?
        Mr. Benjamin. In fact, we have just received new
    information from the MeK last week, and we are declassifying
    information to provide it to MeK counsel. So we are working as
    expeditiously as we can.
        Mr. Sherman. So it can take additional years?
        Mr. Benjamin. I don't have a timeline, sir.
        Mr. Sherman. Since you are the only State Department
    official ordered by the court to get your work done, I would
    hope that you could do that.
        I mentioned Mr. al-Hasidi, al-Qaeda terrorist and commander
    within the Libyan rebel forces. What steps has the State
    Department taken to demand that this gentleman be turned over
    to the United States or at least that best efforts be used to
    accomplish that goal or to take action against any of the other
    terrorists who are amongst the rebel forces?
        Mr. Benjamin. Mr. Sherman, the TNC has on a number of
    occasions, including in a public statement on March 30,
    announced its revulsion for terrorism and that it would not
    accept terrorists in its rank.
        Mr. Sherman. They are in the ranks. You can wave a press
    release in the air and say, look, the folks that are working
    with terrorists say that they are not working with terrorists.
    Next you will be telling me that you would like a press release
    from the Afghan Taliban. Other than self-serving press
    releases, again, what actions have we taken with regard to al-
    Hasidi and the other al-Qaeda terrorists amongst the rebels,
    other than read with joy these self-serving press releases?
        Mr. Benjamin. Sir, I suggest that self-serving press
    releases may not be any less reliable than self-serving news
    stories. We don't in fact know that much about Mr. al-Hasidi's
    involvement based on our own information. As a former
    journalist, I can tell you that there are many differing kinds
    of information that make their way into print.
        Mr. Sherman. So it is your belief that there just aren't
    any terrorists operating in eastern Libya or at least no
    reliable information, and even the people who claim to be
    terrorists shouldn't be classified as terrorists.
        Let's talk about the IHH out of Turkey. This is a group
    that has supported Hamas, in violation of U.S. law. Has the
    United States expressed to the Turkish Government our
    opposition to any future flotilla, given the reality that
    Israel and Egypt have both established channels through which
    humanitarian assistance can be delivered to Gaza. Given the
    IHH's support for a U.S.-designated terrorist group, why has
    the IHH not been sanctioned by the United States and designated
    a foreign terrorist organization?
        Mr. Benjamin. On the first question, I can assure you that
    those messages have been sent loud and clear, including by me
    personally but by many other interlocutors. On the second
    issue, we do not comment on prospective designations. We are
    looking at the IHH very closely.
        Mr. Sherman. You don't comment in public or you don't
    comment to Congress, private or public?
        Mr. Benjamin. We do not comment at all.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you for involving this subcommittee in
    your work. But I think that the Constitution calls for
    consultation. I realize that I haven't given you as long to
    answer each question as you would have liked. I invite you to
    provide longer answers for the record, and regret that the
    amount of time allocated is not as great as my interest in the
    subject. And I yield back.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. Why don't we go to
    Congresswoman Jackson Lee. I am pleased to welcome the
    Congresswoman today and would like to ask unanimous consent to
    allow her to ask a question. She is a nonmember of this
    subcommittee, but we are always pleased with her attendance.
    Your questions, please.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the chairman and the ranking
    member of this very, very important committee, and let me
    welcome the witness. We are near voting so let me try to be
    quick and acknowledge a number of individuals in the audience.
    They can acknowledge themselves. I know that the chairman has
    already established a protocol.
        I am appalled at what happened at Camp Ashraf with the
    allegations of murder and attack. My first question is: The
    U.S. military has completed an assessment of the carnage
    inflicted on the residents of Camp Ashraf. We understand that
    it is being either shared with the Iraqi Government but not
    shared with the public. When will it be shared? And if not,
    why? I am making a public request for that report to be made
    public.
        And let me, just before you answer a question, there are a
    number of women on this poster. But it is a shame this young
    lady that is only 28 was killed. This young lady that is only
    19 was killed. I am just really disturbed with what seems to be
    our Government's complacency with what is going on.
        If you could just answer that very quickly because my time
    is short, and I agree with the ranking member, we wish we could
    give you longer time.
        Mr. Benjamin. Of course, we all deplore the bloodshed, and
    there is nothing the United States has done that in any way
    condones or to my mind opens the way toward this bloodshed. The
    report that you are referring to, I think that we need to be
    clear. The U.S. military went in on a humanitarian mission. It
    has not filed any kind of evaluation or any report. U.N.
    Authorities have gone in. They have compiled a report. They
    have returned to Baghdad. We have not seen the report yet.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Can I make an official request that if our
    Government does any report, that they will make that public.
    Secondarily, I think it is important for our Government to ask
    that the United Nation's report be made public. Would you
    convey that message or would you make that request?
        Mr. Benjamin. We will make that request.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. The human rights violations, I think, is
    most glaring, particularly with Iran in the backdrop. Can I
    find out why the Iraqi Government--I know the history; I am not
    trying to suggest there is not history--but why the continued
    human rights violation. People have died of various diseases.
    They couldn't get to hospitals. I want to make sure that I ask
    that question.
        And then the fact that we lost 34 individuals living in
    Camp Ashraf who fled because of persecution; 34 in essence were
    murdered by individuals that we now fund and seek a peaceful
    democracy in Iraq. Why are we continuing to support those who
    would intrude into that camp and generate this loss of life?
        Mr. Benjamin. Ma'am, I fully understand your concern and we
    in the U.S. Government are also eager to get to the bottom of
    what happened. But I have to tell you that we simply do not
    know the facts of what happened. And that is what we are
    waiting to hear from the U.N. And from other investigators. The
    government in Baghdad has committed itself to a full and fair
    investigation, and we are pushing them to do so.
        Mr. Sherman. Will the gentlelady yield?
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes.
        Mr. Sherman. Yes. I think the Iraqi Government has been
    clear; they killed people at Camp Ashraf to make Tehran happy.
    And they knew they could get away with it because the MeK is
    still on the U.S. list. And the U.S. would not interfere. And
    our keeping them on the list gives the political cover. That is
    why there are 34 people dead in Camp Ashraf.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Royce. I remind the members we have 3 minutes left
    until the hammer comes down on the vote.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just finish on this. The chairman
    is right on the vote. The ranking member is right. My plea is
    to take them off of the list, but to stand up and be heard on
    the violence and the killing, and the Iraqi Government cannot
    get one more dime from me and this government if they don't
    stop this kind of violence.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you.
        Mr. Ambassador, thank you. We have got votes. We have got
    several issues to follow up with your office on. We will be
    giving close consideration to your office's status. We thank
    you for your testimony here today.
        This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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