[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
IMPROVING OIL SPILL PREVENTION AND
RESPONSE, RESTORING JOBS, AND ENSURING
OUR ENERGY SECURITY: RECOMMENDATIONS
FROM THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BP
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND
OFFSHORE DRILLING
=======================================================================
(112-4)
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 11, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Available online at: http://www.fdsys.gov/
----------
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey Columbia
GARY G. MILLER, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois CORRINE BROWN, Florida
SAM GRAVES, Missouri BOB FILNER, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
DUNCAN HUNTER, California RICK LARSEN, Washington
TOM REED, New York MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana HEATH SHULER, North Carolina
BILLY LONG, Missouri STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
BOB GIBBS, Ohio LAURA RICHARDSON, California
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
RICHARD L. HANNA, New York DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee
JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana
STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida
JEFF DENHAM, California
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
(ii)
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska RICK LARSEN, Washington
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland CORRINE BROWN, Florida
FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana, NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
Vice Chair (Ex Officio)
JOHN L. MICA, Florida (Ex Officio)
(iii)
Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment
BOB GIBBS, Ohio, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
GARY G. MILLER, California ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois Columbia
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan CORRINE BROWN, Florida
DUNCAN HUNTER, California BOB FILNER, California
TOM REED, New York EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington, JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania
Vice Chair STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota LAURA RICHARDSON, California
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
JEFF DENHAM, California (Ex Officio)
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
JOHN L. MICA, Florida (Ex Officio)
(iv)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vi
TESTIMONY
Allen (Ret.), Admiral Thad, National Incident Commander, BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.................................... 14
Boesch, Donald F., Member, National Commission on the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling.............. 14
Garcia, Terry D., Member, National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling........................ 14
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Johnson, Hon. Eddie Bernice, of Texas............................ 47
LoBiondo, Hon. Frank A., of New Jersey........................... 52
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Allen (Ret.), Admiral Thad....................................... 54
Boesch, Donald F. and Garcia, Terry D............................ 65
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
IMPROVING OIL SPILL PREVENTION AND
RESPONSE, RESTORING JOBS, AND ENSURING
OUR ENERGY SECURITY: RECOMMENDATIONS
FROM THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND
OFFSHORE DRILLING
----------
Friday, February 11, 2011
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation, joint with the
Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in
room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Frank A.
LoBiondo, [chairman of the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation] presiding.
Mr. LoBiondo. Good morning. The joint subcommittee hearing
will come to order. As this is the first meeting of the
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, I want
to welcome all of our members, and congratulate Mr. Larsen on
his selection as ranking member. I can't tell you how thrilled
I am that you have that position. Rick and I have a long-time
working relationship. We are going to be off to a great start,
and I think it's going to be a great session, working together.
And I certainly look forward to working closely with all the
Members of the Committee.
The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
is meeting in a joint hearing today with the Subcommittee on
Water Resources and Environment to hear testimony from members
on the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill, as well as Admiral Thad Allen, former Coast Guard
commandant and national incident commander for the oil spill.
The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill was unprecedented in
size and duration. It left a tremendous natural and economic
disaster in its wake. The joint Coast Guard and Department of
Interior investigation into the causes of the explosion and
sinking of the Deepwater Horizon, as well as the failure of the
blowout preventer to contain the spill is still ongoing. The
subcommittee will examine the findings of the official
investigation, once it is complete.
While we await the findings of the investigation, the
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, as
well as the report of the national incident commander has
helped highlight significant questions regarding the best
methods for the industry and the Federal Government to use to
prevent and respond to future oil spills.
This hearing provides the subcommittees with the
opportunity to hear recommendations of the Commission and the
national incident commander on the changes needed to Federal
laws and regulations to help reduce the likelihood of a similar
event happening in the future.
I am concerned with the findings of the Commission and the
national incident commander that officials at all levels of
government were unfamiliar with the national contingency plan,
our Nation's 42-year-old blueprint for how to respond to oil
spills. But I am particularly alarmed that the senior leaders
of the Department of Homeland Security were either unaware or
simply misunderstood how the plan functions.
I am troubled at the failure of the Department's leadership
to recognize, accept, and follow the plans, and--that slowed up
the command and the control in the days after the spill,
undermined public confidence in the government, and may have
impeded the response.
But this speaks to a larger issue this subcommittee has
been concerned about since the Coast Guard was transferred to
the Department of Homeland Security, and that is the Department
does not understand nor appreciate the traditional missions of
the Coast Guard, something we have talked about, something we
have worried about, and unfortunately, I think, something that
we see happening.
While critically important, port security accounts for only
20 percent of what the Coast Guard does on a daily basis. The
remaining 80 percent are traditional missions like oil spill
response. These missions require the Department's leadership to
understand that they need to commit adequate resources and
attention, as well as participate fully in training and
preparedness activities. Unfortunately, that was not the case
with the BP Deepwater Horizon incident.
Nearly 20 years ago, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was
created and was a national framework for preventing and
responding to oil spills in U.S. waters. Since the passage of
the act, there have been significant changes in the offshore
production, storage, and transportation of petroleum products.
And with these changes, the requirements to respond to
potential incidents have grown more complex. This bill
demonstrates that we may need to re-examine the requirements
under current law to ensure they are applicable to present-day
operations.
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not take this
opportunity to remember the 11 Transocean crew members who were
lost as a result of this tragedy, and to express my sympathy to
their families, friends, and their coworkers.
With that, I would like to yield to ranking member, Mr.
Larsen, for any comments you may have.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, as well, am
excited to be a ranking member here, and working with you. We
do have a good working relationship over the last several years
here in Congress, and I look forward to working here on the
Coast Guard Maritime Transportation Subcommittee with you.
Thanks, Frank.
I want to thank you for conducting this joint subcommittee
hearing, and I welcome the opportunity to discuss these
recommendations today. I think today the message is clear:
undertaking deepwater drilling requires a deeper understanding
of the risks that accompany the clear benefits of deepwater
drilling.
Now that we have these recommendations in hand, Congress
should act to ensure that our policies for offshore drilling
are rigorous, that they safeguard workers, they benefit the
economy, and they protect the environment. Too many lives are
at stake, and too many jobs are at risk for the Congress to
fail to act. If we cannot tap these offshore resources in a way
that protects lives and the environment, there will be pressure
to restrict the use of those resources. That would be
devastating to the maritime industry, the jobs they support,
and our economy, as a whole.
We also need to have Federal agencies with adequate
resources to prevent another tragedy such as this from
happening again, and to respond, should we have to respond.
I want to welcome Admiral Allen today to the subcommittee.
I have appreciated your willingness to serve the United States
as commandant of the Coast Guard, as well as the commander of
this response effort, even following your retirement. And I
look forward to hearing your observations and recommendations.
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was a major human and
environmental disaster of unprecedented proportions. As a
representative from the Puget Sound, I understand how
devastating oil spills would be to a coastal region, and I want
to do everything we can possible to prevent oil spills from any
sources occurring in my area of the country, or any other area
of the country.
The Commission report today clearly demonstrates that we
have a long way to go to prevent similar disasters from
occurring again. Unfortunately, Congress is proposing budget
cuts into the muscle and to the bone of investments needed for
economic growth, and to protect our environment. If nothing
else, the BP spill shows the need for more robust public
capacity to respond quickly and safely to oil spills, and
that's reflected in the report.
The public depends upon Federal agencies to ensure the
safety of deepwater drilling, and the safety of the men and
women who work on these platforms. Diminishing this capacity
through budget cuts is irresponsible, especially considering
the Commission's call for increased investment.
Now, some voices in Washington, D.C. argue that we must
reduce or eliminate regulatory burdens, and in some places I
agree. But, once again, the BP spill demonstrated that the oil
and gas industry was subject to too little regulation, and not
too much. Improved regulation is both necessary in how BP
implemented safety measures during drilling, and ensuring
effective, meaningful response plans once the spill occurred.
So, in fact, some of this does fall on the Federal Government.
No one is suggesting that we eliminate deepwater drilling
off our coast. Given what we know now about the risks of this
drilling, we should put pieces in place to ensure the highest
level of safety.
The report revealed what many of us expected to learn about
the spill. First, the Federal Government's oversight of
offshore and oil gas drilling was too lax. We didn't do the
job. Second, Federal agencies and the industry were
inadequately prepared to effectively stop, track, contain, and
clean up a spill of this magnitude. And third, we learned that
the Jones Act, the law which protects and supports a domestic
maritime industry, was not a hindrance to the Federal
Government's response to this environmental calamity, and we
will find--and we will hear this later. And I know that the
Commission report and Admiral Allen concur with this finding.
I proposed last year, along with many others, that--at the
committee's May 19th hearing on the spill, that the country
take a step back to ensure that any future offshore drilling in
the Gulf of Mexico lives up to claims of safety and
reliability. And, if anything, the National Commission's report
only reaffirms my convictions.
I look forward today to evaluating the Commission's
recommendations, and expect that our witnesses this morning
will provide additional insights on these points.
When the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in Alaska
in 1989, Congress responded with the Oil Pollution Act. Now, 22
years later, the BP spill demonstrated the need to amend and to
strengthen that act. And I stand ready to work with Chairman
LoBiondo and with Chairman Gibbs, with our ranking Democratic
member, Congressman Rahall, and with Mr. Bishop and the other
Members of this Committee in shaping legislation to strengthen
our Nation's oil spill response and prevention laws.
Mr. Chairman, the Deepwater Horizon spill exposed the real
risks and costs of energy production on the outer continental
shelf. We have before us an opportunity to make the necessary
course correction in our production of offshore energy. And I
urge that we not let the current debate on the Federal budget
or regulations deter us from making the necessary investments
to ensure that offshore drilling can be done safely,
efficiently, and with minimal harm to our environment and to
the workers who work on the platforms in the Gulf. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Larsen. I would now like to
yield to Chairman Gibbs of the Water Resources Subcommittee--
and Environment--for his statement.
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to
working on the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, and
also chair the Water Resources and Environment, as we work to
improve our infrastructure and oversight in those agencies that
work on the infrastructure issues dealing with water.
There are two major Federal laws that relate to oil spills
like the one in the Gulf of Mexico last year: The Oil Pollution
Act, and the Clean Water Act. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990,
OPA, was largely enacted in response to the Exxon Valdez oil
spill, and has improved the Nation's ability to prevent and
respond to oil spills. Under OPA, the Coast Guard takes the
lead in organizing Federal oil spill responses and prevention
efforts in tidal waters, while the EPA is responsible for
coordinating efforts in non-tidal and inland waters.
OPA authorized the use of the oil spill liability trust
fund, which is capitalized by a per-barrel tax paid by the oil
industry and penalties paid by responsible parties. That trust
fund is used to pay for the cost of responding to and removing
oil spills.
The second law is the Clean Water Act, which is the
principal Federal statute for protecting navigable waters and
adjoining shorelines from pollution. Specifically, section 311
of the Clean Water Act addresses pollution from oil and
hazardous substances releases, providing EPA and the Coast
Guard with the authority to establish a program for preventing,
preparing for, and responding to oil spills that occur in
navigable waters of the United States.
The Act clearly establishes the responsibilities of the
Federal Government, states, and the maritime transportation
industries to establish liability and to carry out clean-up,
restoration, and rehabilitation of natural resources that were
damaged as a result of the oil spill.
While the BP oil spill was a monumental disaster, and
caused the tragic loss of 11 dedicated oil field workers, we
must ensure that we do not use this as a catalyst to halt or
hinder domestic energy production. Rather, the Nation requires
a safe, secure, domestic supply of energy products, now more
than ever.
The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill has studied this recent oil spill and has made several
recommendations regarding the Federal response. Many of the
proposals by the Commission are worth careful review and
consideration as we move forward.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony of
the witnesses.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Gibbs. I would like to yield
now to Ranking Member Bishop for his statement.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
this important hearing to review the recommendations of the
National Commission on BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, in the last Congress this
committee held a series of hearings in the aftermath of the BP
Deepwater Horizon disaster to investigate what went wrong, what
actions were being undertaken by BP and other responsible
parties to stop the ongoing flow of oil, and to restore the
lives and livelihoods of those impacted by the spill, and what
measures were necessary to restore the Gulf Coast ecosystem.
These hearings also focused on what efforts needed to be
undertaken by the Federal agencies and the Congress to ensure
that a similar preventable disaster could not occur in the
future.
Last year, members of the Subcommittees on Water Resources
and the Coast Guard recalled a similar joint hearing of these
subcommittees on the 10th anniversary of the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990, and the warnings given by Federal agencies and other
stakeholders that our Nation was rapidly becoming unprepared to
address future oil spills.
Specifically, witnesses testified about the then-growing
concern that the technologies to extract, process, and
transport oil were well outpacing the development of
technologies to quickly and safely control and clean up
potential oil spills.
Over the intervening years, our subcommittees also receive
testimony from representatives of the Coast Guard that
currently liability limits for both vessels and facilities such
as the Deepwater Horizon were falling desperately behind the
levels necessary to adequately address a worst-case release of
oil. Unfortunately, this committee did not heed the warnings
given to it over a decade ago, and this Nation grew complacent
that a future oil disaster was unlikely to occur again.
Fast forward 10 years, and unfortunately, our complacency
proved wrong. In the summer of 2010, our Nation was again faced
with a massive oil spill, although this time the release was
not from the grounding of a ship, but from the seemingly
limitless release of oil directly from the sea floor. Again,
the questions arose on how this could have happened, why it was
taking so long to stop the flow of oil, and whether this
tragedy that resulted in 11 lives lost and impacted countless
families along the Gulf Coast should have been prevented.
Mr. Chairman, in the days following the Deepwater Horizon
disaster, this committee took aggressive action to understand
what happened and what changes were needed to take to prevent a
similar disaster in the future. This committee drafted and
moved legislation to address many of the shortcomings
identified in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.
This legislation reported from this committee by voice vote was
later combined with proposals from our colleagues on the
Natural Resources Committee under the then-leadership of our
new ranking member, Mr. Rahall, and was passed by the House in
early summer. Unfortunately, no further action was taken on
that bill.
However, with the beginning of the new Congress, we have
the opportunity to start anew. Today, Mr. Chairman, we will
hear testimony from two distinguished representatives from
President Obama's National Commission. In my opinion, we should
not be surprised by the findings of the Commission into the
likely causes of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, or the
systemic failures of the oil industry that contributed to this
incident. Many of these findings are consistent with what we
heard during hearings before this committee in the last
Congress.
Similarly, many of the statutory and administrative changes
recommended by the Commission are consistent with those
included in both this committee's bill and the Consolidated
Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2010, or the CLEAR
Act, that was approved by the House last year.
Mr. Chairman, in my view, the prudent choice is for this
committee to once again move legislation to address the
warnings raised by this Commission and other stakeholders on
the very real threat of future oil spill disasters. While some
of the recommendations of the Commission can be addressed
administratively, we all know that several critical issues,
such as the currently inadequate liability and financial
responsibility limits and issues related to maritime safety can
only be addressed by the Congress.
Preventing the next Exxon Valdez or Deepwater Horizon is
far too important to allow complacency to take over again. As
noted by one of the witnesses last Congress, ``We cannot let
the months that have passed without a massive oil spill give us
a false sense of security that everything is fine. We must
recognize that vulnerabilities remain, and take decisive action
to address the recommendations made by this commission this
year.''
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. Now I would like to
recognize Mr. Rahall, the ranking member of the full committee.
Mr. Rahall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I commend you and
Ranking Member Larsen for conducting this hearing today. We
will hear from the Presidential Commission examining the
Deepwater disaster and retired Admiral Thad Allen regarding the
recommendations for ensuring that offshore oil and gas
development in the U.S. is far safer now and in the future, and
that the devastation of the Deepwater Horizon is not repeated.
I certainly want to commend our witnesses--you, in
particular, Admiral Allen--and the Commission, all of the
people representing our government at all levels for the
around-the-clock work that they did, and for our country, in
trying to ensure the safety and return to well-being of so many
of our citizens.
While the round-the-clock television coverage of oil
spewing into the Gulf has long since faded to black, the
urgency we once felt to identify the causes of the disaster and
take the steps necessary to minimize the likelihood it would
happen again should not fade with the coverage. This truly
cannot become a case of out of sight, out of mind. We cannot
forget the 11 good men who lost their lives, and countless
families lost their incomes when fishing grounds were shut down
and tourists canceled their visits to the Gulf. We cannot
forget the environmental and economic impacts of the spill that
will last long after the oil can be seen floating on the
surface of the sea.
Yet, in the weeks since the Commission released its broad
range of recommendations for reforms and business practices,
regulatory oversight, and broader policy concerns, we have
heard an outcry of indignation from those who claim that it is
too soon to take action, that we must wait until every aspect
of every investigation has been completed.
But we do not need to wait to know that we were not
prepared for this type of blow-out, that our ability to clean
up oil spills is woefully inadequate, that regulators were too
cozy with the industry, and that a $70 million cap on liability
is too small.
That is why, in my former capacity as Natural Resources
chairman, to which Mr. Bishop has referred, I did lead the
House in writing and passing the CLEAR Act last summer. That
legislation would have provided for a major overhaul of
offshore drilling operations and regulations, decreasing the
chances that another blow-out would happen in the future, and
making sure that we could do a better job of containing one, if
it did.
Many of my friends who voted against that bill argued that
we should not act until the Presidential Commission had
completed its work. Well, the recommendations are now before
us. And again and again, they urge us to do the exact same
things we did in the CLEAR Act.
Recently, we introduced a new bill to implement all the
Commission recommendations. But again, we're told by some that
we need to wait. But we cannot wait. The Commission itself
said--and I quote--``Inaction runs the risk of real cost too,
and more lost lives, and broad damage to the regional economy
and its long-term viability, and its--and further tens of
billions of dollars of avoidable clean-up costs.''
We should not wait to reform the ranks of the inspectors
who were supposed to be keeping an eye on--not playing around
with--industry operators in the Gulf. We cannot wait to reform
the laws that govern containment, response, and clean-up of
spills, or to improve the technologies that these activities
rely upon. Nor should we wait to improve safety and
environmental protection provisions that will ensure the long-
term sustainability of this industry, as well as the other
industries that coexist in the Gulf and other areas of the
country, where offshore energy development continues.
We have a responsibility. We have a responsibility to the
families of those who lost loved ones in the Gulf, who lost
businesses in the aftermath of this disaster, and to the
American people. We need to act on these recommendations,
restore the economy and the ecosystems of the Gulf, and make
sure offshore drilling is done in an efficient and safe manner.
No one should have to risk their lives to earn a livelihood.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Rahall. We are going to--we
will entertain brief opening statements from Members, if they
so choose. I will try to limit them to three minutes. If you
can do it in less than that, I would appreciate it, so we can
get to the meat of the hearing.
Are there--Mr. Cravaack?
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Chairman LoBiondo and Gibbs, and
Ranking Members Larsen and Bishop, for holding this imperative
hearing. Welcome, Admiral Allen. It's good to see you, sir. And
thank you for your service to this country. Welcome, Dr.
Boesch, and Mr. Garcia, and I look forward to learning from
your testimony today, as well.
A lot of the difficulties our country has faced attempting
to cap the BP oil spill--it's an imperative that we improve our
ability to prevent future spills, and expand our country's
capability to respond and contain an oil spill in order to
prevent another region-wide catastrophe.
While understanding the immense technical difficulties
involved with capping BP's Deepwater blow-out, I am hopeful we
can apply the lessons learned from BP's oil spill and never
again have 87 days of oil spewing into our waters, and have a
government bureaucracy impede recovery in an extremist
situation.
In closing, I would just like to extend my sympathy and
concern for the American families on our Gulf Coast that have
suffered not only from the effects of BP's oil spill, but also
because of loss of jobs to the Federal Government's knee-jerk
reaction in initially banning offshore drilling, and its
disjointed response to the emergency situation.
Thank you again, and I do look forward to your testimony.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you. Now I would like to recognize Mr.
Cummings, former chair of the committee. And I want to publicly
thank you for your work and cooperation over the last couple of
sessions, and welcome your remarks.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
congratulations on your chairmanship. I want to thank the
chairman of the Subcommittee on the Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation and the Subcommittee on Water Resources,
Congressman LoBiondo and Congressman Gibbs, and certainly our
ranking members, Larsen and Bishop, for today's hearing to
enable us to examine the recommendations of the National
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore
Drilling.
Also, take a moment to thank Dr. Boesch, president of the
University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science, and
Mr. Terry Garcia for their service on the National Commission
on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.
Further, I take a moment to thank Admiral Allen for his
service managing the Deepwater Horizon incident, and of course
for service as commandant of the Coast Guard. It's good to have
Admiral Allen appear before us today.
And during the 111th Congress, as chairman of the Coast
Guard Subcommittee, I convened a subcommittee hearing to
examine foreign vessel operations in the exclusive economic
zone. And the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
convened two separate hearings to examine the Deepwater Horizon
accident. I also traveled to the Gulf and had the opportunity
to observe the on-scene operations at the Macondo site several
times. And I appreciate the thoroughness of the National
Commission's report, and the thoughtfulness of the Commission's
recommendations.
Last year, under the leadership of then-chairman Rahall and
former chairman Oberstar, the House passed the CLEAR Act, which
would have implemented many of the reforms which the Commission
is calling for today, including increasing the financial
responsibility requirements for offshore drilling facilities.
Responding to the issues we examined in the Coast Guard
subcommittee, this legislation would also have required that
vessels involved in resource development in the EEZ be owned by
U.S. citizens who would pay U.S. taxes. The legislation would
also have required such vessels to be crewed by U.S. citizens
who would be protected by U.S. safety regulations.
Further, to help those in the Gulf who were failed by the
BP claim processing system, the legislation included a
provision I authored that would have reduced from 90 days to 45
days the amount of time a responsible party has to settle
claims before claims could be presented to the oil spill
liability trust fund. I continue to believe that the CLEAR Act
is the kind of strong legislation we need to ensure that our
laws and regulations are equal to the risk involved in offshore
drilling. My belief is only reconfirmed by the Commission's
findings and recommendations.
And so, I look forward to our testimony--to the testimony
today. I thank the witnesses for being with us. And with that,
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. Master Chief Coble.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that
promotion. I will not take the three minutes. You and Mr.
Larsen have invited an outstanding panel. I'm looking forward
to hearing from them. Admiral, good to have you back on the
Hill. Thanks for what you did. Yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. You scored extra points. Good job.
Congresswoman Richardson.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
having this joint hearing this morning, and also our ranking
members. And I would like to thank our distinguished witnesses
who are here today, who are helping us as we progress through
this very difficult tragedy for this country.
I asked to speak because I had kind of a unique role. In
addition to being on Transportation, I was also, at the time,
chair of the emergency communications preparedness and response
with the Homeland Security Committee, and so I actually visited
the Gulf several times to observe the progress from multiple
areas.
Within those visits there were some key things that I would
like to acknowledge. One, I want to thank the Coast Guard and
the EPA and the other Federal and local agencies who were
involved in the response, who I thought took tremendous care
and, really, effort to preserve our coastline and to resolve
the problem of the millions of gallons of crude oil that was
streaming into our shores.
But I think, when we look at, overall, the observations of
the trip--and I made a report, myself, of that--I want to
underscore the large challenges that the response teams faced,
and the lessons that ought to be learned in the aftermath of
this catastrophe.
For example, the failure or the confusion about the number
of booms and skimmers that were located, and where they needed
to be placed. The confusion surrounding the chain of command
was exacerbated by the number of governmental agencies that
comprised the unified response. And, moreover, the magnitude of
the disaster rendered many of the Federal Government agencies'
contingency plans almost inoperable.
I represent California's 37th Congressional District. We
have offshore drilling in my district. And I am concerned about
what happened there, and how it can happen again.
Finally, I brought forward legislation, Securing Health for
Ocean Resources and Environment Act, called the SHORE Act, one,
to look at improving at NOAA's spill response and containment
and prevention capacity; two, better to define to the
coordination between Federal, state, and local responses--and I
am disturbed to say that the same problems we had with
Hurricane Katrina didn't seem to be resolved in our response
with Federal, state, and local elected officials--to clarify
the existing authority for NOAA to receive funds from the oil
spill liability trust fund, to double the amount that Coast
Guard may receive from the OSLTF each year, with a percentage
dedicated towards oil spill research and development; to
mandate the improvements in the frequency and quality of the
Coast Guard's safety inspections and certification
requirements; to require prompt posting by the Coast Guard
unified command of oil spill incident plans publicly, utilizing
all resources, not depending upon cable TV to tell the message;
and finally, to strengthen the coastal state oil spill planning
and response.
I plan on reintroducing this legislation. But, more
importantly, I am also very thankful for the report that all of
you did. And we look forward to working together. I yield back.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you. Congresswoman Miller.
Mrs. Miller of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, to all
the chairmen. And, you know, with all deference, sitting next
to a great Marine here, Duncan Hunter--and my dad was a Marine
and my son-in-law is a Marine, and my husband was in the Air
Force--hats off to the Coast Guard, and to our witness. I am
looking forward to hearing Admiral Allen because, as we all
know, if it's wet and impossible, always ready, send in the
Coast Guard. And I just want to echo what's been said here this
morning.
But just a quick comment, Mr. Chairman, in regards to the
Jones Act, which is, I think, going to be coming up in the
witnesses' testimony, and I'm sure there will be some questions
about that today. I personally believe that the Jones Act is a
very critical component of America's maritime heritage. And
during this tragic incident, and the terrible incident in the
Gulf, Jones Act suffered from an unfortunate, misguided, really
untrue sort of media campaign against the Jones Act. They were
saying that the Jones Act actually hindered the clean-up
efforts, and had a lot of--created a lot of the confusion in
the Gulf.
And actually, looking through the admiral's testimony here,
in regards, as he says, to the application of the Jones Act,
there was a misperception that the Jones Act impeded the use of
foreign flag vessels for Deepwater Horizon response operations.
In reality, the Jones Act had no impact on response operations.
And just one other quick quote from the report that we all
have in front of us. We did not reject foreign ships because of
Jones Act restrictions. These restrictions did not even come
into play for the vast majority of vessels operating at the
wellhead, because the act does not block foreign vessels from
loading or then unloading oil more than three miles off the
coast. And when the act did apply, the national incident
commander appears to have granted waivers and exemptions when
requested.
So, I just point that out. I think this hearing is a great
way to explore everything that happened in the Gulf, and in
particular set to rest a lot of misperceptions that many people
in our country and around the globe found out about the Jones
Act. As we see now, it had no negative impact.
Again, thanks for calling this hearing, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you. The gentlelady from Hawaii, Mrs.
Hirono.
Mrs. Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, would
like to thank the Coast Guard for everything that they do
there. They are a major part of our response teams in Hawaii.
And I also would like to echo the sentiments of
Congresswoman Miller in her explanation of the impact of the
Jones Act and the misinformation that arose about the Jones Act
as a result of this BP disaster.
What strikes me about the Commission's report, moving on to
that, is that this disaster could have been prevented. And the
companies that were involved did certain things--commissions
and omissions--that we really need to ensure never happens
again. And, as far as I am concerned, there should be some--
there should be major accountability of these companies in the
follow-up of the disaster.
And so, what I would like to see the committee do is move
forward in supporting the recommendations of the Commission.
And with that, I yield back.
Mr. LoBiondo. We have the gentleman from coastal Louisiana
wants to say something. Mr. Landry? There you are.
Mr. Landry. Yes.
Mr. LoBiondo. OK.
Mr. Landry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Chairman
Gibbs, for calling this hearing today. I also thank Dr. Boesch,
Mr. Garcia, for agreeing to serve on the President's
Commission, and for giving their time to testify today. Admiral
Allen, I thank you for your service to the country, and for
everything you have done for the Gulf Coast.
As our chairman and ranking members have already stated,
the accident that happened on April 20, 2010 was an economic,
environmental, and human tragedy that cannot be minimized or
forgotten now that the images of the accident have stopped
playing out on the news.
As the representative for coastal Louisiana, the Macondo
incident is still seen in every corner of my district. A
hundred thousand men and women of my district either work or
are affected by both the commercial fishing industry and the
oil and gas industry. And while our shrimpers, oystermen, and
fishermen are doing their best to return to work, my neighbors
in the oil and gas industry continue to sit at home, sidelined
by the President's de facto moratorium.
Every day we fail to utilize our own energy resources in
the Gulf of Mexico is a day America is held captive on ongoing
crises in the Middle East, the turmoil in the rest of the
world. And I wish the Commission's report would have addressed
the economic impacts of this moratorium.
I am also concerned with the Commission's recommendation to
increase the liability cap in financial responsibility
requirements. Make no mistake. I do not believe that any oil
and gas company should be able to cause massive damage to our
national economy and skate away into bankruptcy. However, I
also believe that small oil and gas producers have a role to
play in the Gulf of Mexico. And any action which drives these
producers away will ultimately hurt this Nation.
I am confident that the system--a system can be implemented
that protects the environmental health of the Gulf, while still
ensuring independent drillers are not pushed out of the
industry.
More broadly than the recommendations, I disagree with the
Commission's apparent stance that the entire offshore industry
can be characterized or quantified by the mistakes or failures
that happened on April the 20th. There have been more than
50,000 wells drilled in the Gulf of Mexico, 3,200 of which we
drilled in deep water. Of these wells, Macondo was the first
major incident.
I believe we should always keep in mind--I do agree with
the Commission's report that we should always keep in mind the
safety of the men and women who ply their trade in the Gulf of
Mexico. And with that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Thank you, Mr. Landry. Mr. Cohen?
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, first, appreciate
the opportunity to serve on this committee with you, and look
forward to working with you. And I am pleased to receive the
testimony that we will be having today from Admiral Allen, and
the distinguished members of the Commission here on this BP
Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
The spill spewed oil into the Gulf of Mexico for 86 days,
and was a human economic and environmental disaster,
unparalleled in our country's history, both--but it was both
foreseeable and it was preventable. Thanks to the swift
response of Admiral Allen, the administration, and the recovery
workers in the Gulf, the negative impacts were dramatically
reduced, yet still great. And as a result of the work performed
by this Commission, we have a better understanding of the--why
this spill occurred, and how we can prevent similar tragedies
in the future.
The Valdez taught us some things, but the Valdez was about
property damage, and environmental damage, and maritime damage,
ecological damage. But there were not a loss of lives. And in
this situation, we're dealing with the loss of human lives. We
lost 11 individuals on that rig, and we owe it to those
individuals and to the thousands of Americans who risk their
lives every day by stepping on to those type of rigs to heed
the warnings and try to prevent future tragedies by looking at
the recommendations and passing them.
There are tens of thousands of people in the Gulf area
whose economic livelihoods were devastated, and we owe it to
them as well. But the main thing is the lives that were lost.
If you don't learn from history, you're doomed to repeat it.
And if there are people that die in the future, and we don't do
things to protect those oil workers there, their blood will be
on our hands.
The recommendations laid out are reasonable and practical.
They're improvements and updates to outdated regulations that
no longer protect the health and well-being of American people
and our economies. So I thank the Commission for their work.
I hope that this Congress will heed the warning signs and
respond with legislation that will save lives in the future, as
well as the economies. I thank the witnesses for their work in
trying to safeguard the people and our environment, and I look
forward to hearing their testimony and working to try to see
that American vessels in the future are safer, and that they
are--approve their American vessels, and not necessarily ones
that were flagged in the Marshall Islands. Thank you. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Cohen. Were there any other
Members that we missed who wanted to say a few opening remarks?
[No response.]
Mr. LoBiondo. Seeing none, we will now go to our witnesses.
And our witnesses today include two members of the National
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore
Drilling. Dr. Donald Boesch is the president of the University
of Maryland's Center for Environmental Science, and he is
joined by fellow commissioner, Terry Garcia. Mr. Garcia is the
executive vice president for the mission programs for the
National Geographic Society.
Mr. Boesch, thank you, and please proceed.
TESTIMONY OF DONALD F. BOESCH, MEMBER, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING; TERRY
D. GARCIA, MEMBER, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BP DEEPWATER
HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING; AND ADMIRAL THAD ALLEN
(RET.), NATIONAL INCIDENT COMMANDER, BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL
SPILL
Mr. Boesch. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittees,
thank you for giving me and my colleague, Terry Garcia, an
opportunity to testify on behalf of the National Commission.
It's an honor to present the Commission's findings concerning
the explosion and spill, as well as our recommendations for
change in U.S. policy concerning offshore drilling.
As a native of Louisiana, and having lived for the
difficult decade of the 1980s in Houma, Louisiana, I understand
the importance of the oil and gas industry, both to the local
economy and the Nation's energy supply. Anyone familiar with
the region understands the need to maintain a thriving energy
industry, along with the healthy natural environment, and the
many benefits that both provide.
So, it was really deeply personal to me as I witnessed, as
you did, the damage that was done to our coast, our wetlands,
our economies, and communities as a result of this spill.
In May of last year, President Obama created our
Commission, and asked us to determine the causes of the
Deepwater Horizon disaster, evaluate the response, and advise
the Nation about how future energy exploration could take place
responsibly.
As you know, on January 11th, exactly 1 month from today,
we released our final report. As co-chairman Bob Graham has
previously noted, our report was completed on time, under
budget, and contains no dissents among our members.
Our final report includes recommendations directed at the
administration, at Congress, and at the industry that will help
to improve the safety of offshore drilling and substantially
reduce the risk of something like this happening again.
Today, however, I would like to focus my opening remarks on
the equally important portion of our recommendations: ways to
improve the government's oil spill response and containment
capabilities. In their response to the Deepwater Horizon
disaster, let's face it, both the government and the industry
fell short.
Although many responders acted quickly, and in some cases
heroically, and although Admiral Allen provided effective and
valuable leadership during this response, the Commission
concluded that neither BP nor the Federal Government was
adequately prepared to respond to a spill of this magnitude and
complexity. There was a failure to plan in advance, a failure
to coordinate effectively with state and local governments, and
a lack of information concerning what response measures would
be most effective.
In addition, neither the industry nor the Federal
Government has invested in the research and development needed
to improve spill response technology. Much of the technology
was the same as used during the Exxon Valdez spill 20 years
earlier.
Equally troubling at the outset of the spill, the industry
was unable to contain the flow of oil from the well, and
neither the government or the industry had sufficient expertise
to determine the rate at which the oil was flowing. The lack of
accurate knowledge impeded the efforts to determine the
appropriate control technology, and determine it quickly.
All of these factors together made for a long and costly
response effort that, at least in the early stages, did not
meet the standard of what the law presently requires. In our
report, the Commission makes a number of recommendations to
improve response and containment.
Among the recommendations: first, the Department of the
Interior, consulting with other agencies, should develop a more
rigorous set of requirements for industry response plans, and
should require companies to submit containment plans, along
with the oil spill response plans; second, EPA and the Coast
Guard should involve state and local governments as significant
players in the spill response planning; Congress should provide
mandatory funding for oil spill response research and
development; industry should fund a private organization to
develop, adopt, and enforce the standards of excellence to
ensure improvement and equipment for large-scale response and
containment and rescue; and finally, the Federal Government
should ensure that this has the needed expertise to oversee
these industry containment efforts.
The Commission's recommendations are far-reaching in this
area. There is a role for Congress, to be sure, the executive
branch, and the industry, in significantly improving
capabilities. There is also a role for Congress in conducting
oversight, as our government takes these actions.
I will conclude my remarks by noting that the drilling
offshore is inherently risky. The risk will never be reduced to
zero. But as a Nation we can take concrete steps that will
dramatically reduce the chances of another Macondo well blow-
out, and that will substantially improve our ability to
respond, should an oil spill like this occur again.
The Commission believes these steps are vitally necessary,
that people of the Gulf who have suffered so much deserve to
know that their government and industry are doing so. So, Mr.
Chairman, thank you for this opportunity. You have our written
testimony and our report for the record. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Boesch.
Mr. Garcia?
Mr. Garcia. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for giving us this opportunity to
testify concerning the findings and recommendations of the
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling.
Any severe catastrophe of national significance, like the
explosion of the Macondo well and the subsequent oil spill in
the Gulf of Mexico, strains public confidence, fosters
widespread concern and anxiety, and creates an urgent need for
candid explanation. But it can also create an opportunity to
bring a renewed focus to existing challenges. As tragic as this
disaster was, it can play a positive role in restoring one of
our Nation's most valuable ecosystems.
So, today I would like to focus my remarks on the
Commission's recommendations for the restoration of the Gulf of
Mexico.
As a result of the Deepwater Horizon spill, over 170
million gallons of oil went into the Gulf, with some portion
remaining in the ocean and possibly settling on the ocean
floor. But even before the highly visible damages caused by the
spill became clear, many crucial Gulf economic and ecological
resources--fisheries, transportation, tourism--faced long-term
threats.
First, more than 2,300 square miles of coastal wetlands, an
area larger than the State of Delaware, have been lost to the
Gulf. Powerful hurricanes, always a threat to the region,
struck the coast in 2005 and 2008, causing even more wetland
loss. Last summer, even before the spill, a massive dead zone,
extending up to 7,700 square miles, was forming in the Gulf.
And finally, the Deepwater Horizon disaster made matters
worse. Eleven rig workers were killed by the explosion,
seventeen were injured. Many thousands of people were exposed
to contaminated waters, coast, beaches, and seafood. Thousands
were out of work. Birds and sea animals killed and significant
habitats damaged or destroyed.
Restoring the Gulf to its condition just before the oil
spill would certainly improve the environment, but it is not
enough. Our goal here should not be to simply maintain an
already degraded environment. We believe the country must aim
higher, and that the region deserves better. That's why we have
recommended that the Federal Government, working closely with
the Gulf states, make a renewed and national commitment to the
Gulf of Mexico and its natural resources.
Currently, no funding source exists to support
comprehensive regional restoration efforts. Estimates of the
cost of Gulf restoration vary widely. But according to
testimony before the Commission, fully restoring the Gulf will
require $15 billion to $20 billion, or a minimum of $500
million per year over 30 years.
The litigation process related to the Deepwater Horizon
spill is likely to generate at least some of the needed
funding. But congressional action would be required to ensure
that those funds reach the Gulf. The Commission recommends that
80 percent of any Clean Water Act penalties and fines be
directed to Gulf restoration. Should Clean Water Act penalties
not be redirected to the Gulf, Congress should consider other
mechanisms for a dedicated funding stream not subject to annual
appropriations.
The Commission also recommends that Congress create an
effective state/Federal authority to administer Gulf ecosystem
restoration policy. This council should implement a restoration
strategy for the region that is compatible with existing state
restoration goals. If funding is to be efficiently directed at
long-term ecosystem restoration, a decision-making body should
see that binding priorities are set, and funding criteria are
adhered to.
Congress should also ensure that the priorities and
decisions of that council are informed by input from a citizens
advisory council that represents diverse stakeholders, and that
restoration decisions are rooted in sound science.
While coastal restoration is critical, we must also devote
greater attention to the marine environment. Scientists have
emerged from this incident with more precise questions to
investigate, as well as a better sense of the monitoring needs
in the Gulf of Mexico which, because of its multiple uses and
economic value, should be a national priority.
The Commission recommends that, as part of management and
restoration efforts, greater attention should be given to new
tools for managing ocean resources that have the potential to
improve overall efficiency and reduce conflicts among ocean
users.
This country's need for oil will continue for the
foreseeable future. The simple truth is that the bulk of new
finds are offshore and in the deep water of the Gulf. We simply
cannot walk away from these resources, even as we remain
cognizant of the very real risk. And because we know that
drilling will continue in the Gulf, it is vital that we take
this opportunity to invest in this valuable ecosystem, and undo
past damage, and improve its resiliency.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Garcia. We are now going to go
to Admiral Thad Allen. And, Admiral Allen, I want to take the
opportunity to publicly thank you for your service to our
country.
Very few people in our Nation's history have been called
upon to do what you have been called upon to do: one of the
largest disasters in the form of a hurricane with Katrina that
you were called in to, to oversee putting the pieces back
together, and got extremely high marks across the board;
commandant of the Coast Guard at a very critical time, when the
Coast Guard needed exceptional leadership, and you went above
and beyond the call with that; and then certainly the issue
that we're here with today, one of the disasters that our
Nation could never imagine it would deal with, and you were
asked and you responded to serve your country.
We owe you a great debt of gratitude, and we thank you for
being here today.
Admiral Allen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
Chairman Gibbs, Ranking Member Larsen, Ranking Member Bishop,
thanks for having me here today, and thanks for the opportunity
to speak.
I have a longer statement for the record, and I will limit
my remarks here this morning.
A couple of caveats before I begin, if I could. As the
subcommittee is aware, I am no longer in public service, having
retired from the Coast Guard on 1 July 2011, and having
departed government service as a senior executive on 1 October.
Accordingly, my association with spill response and recovery
activities, current legislation and regulatory reviews, and
policy discussions regarding offshore oil and gas development
has been limited to information pretty much contained in the
public realm.
I have been assisted by the Coast Guard in information that
has been held regarding my duties as a national incident
commander, but that assistance has been guided by the Anti-
Lobbying Act, and has been complied with fully.
I am currently employed as a part-time senior fellow at
Rand Corporation, and am teaching at George Washington
University. In my capacity here today I am representing myself
only, and none of those entities.
I have reviewed the findings of the Commission. I commend
the Commission for the detailed work and their rigor by which
they went about their business. I would say that there are a
number of other inquiries, as was noted by Ranking Member
Rahall earlier on, that are in progress, including the joint
investigation by the Department of Interior and the Coast
Guard, and other inquiries being done by the Department of
Justice.
I realize there will be attention between wanting to act on
what the Commission has reported, but I think there is
information that will be developed in those inquiries that
somehow should be taken into consideration, even if there are
two phases associated with this. And I would commend to both
committees it is my personal recommendation that the
subcommittees take advantage of these additional investigative
efforts to be included in any legislation that may be
considered, going forward.
For the purposes of my testimony here today I would like to
focus on eight areas. There will be a Federal on-scene
commander's report that will be coming out, as well. I am
trying to focus on issues that were related to my
responsibilities as national incident commander, which only
comes about when there is a spill of national significance, and
where we need to focus, moving forward, to make sure that we
have an effective way to do that, if it's needed in the future.
The first is oil spill governance and the role of the
national response team. Throughout the entire response, even
before I assume my duties as a national incident commander,
there was significant misunderstanding about what the national
contingency plan is and what it does. A lot of that was
juxtaposed against the statutory underpinnings of the Stafford
Act, and what is done pursuant to an emergency declaration,
especially in relation to state and local governments and their
authorities and jurisdictions.
I think we need to have an open, frank conversation, moving
forward, about what that means. And in the future, I think it's
undeniable that we will have to have greater participation at
the state and local level regarding our area contingency
planning process, and our oil spill exercising process.
Spills of national significance in the national incident
command. I believe, going forward, we need to consider having a
presidential declaration when these things are occurring. And
then, subsequent to that declaration, a number of things that
could kick in that would be automatic authorities would not
have to be sought during the actual event, itself. And these
would be things like giving an authority the jurisdiction to
act under the Clean Water Act and the national incident
commander, the authority to reduce stand-by requirements for
response equipment elsewhere in the country, and make that
available, should we need it in some other part of the country.
There has already been some comments made about oil spill
preparedness and research and development. Members, I can tell
you, as the national incident commander, the very worst time to
do oil spill R&D is in the middle of an oil spill.
And the atrophy of the R&D system following the passage of
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the inter-agency forum that
was set up to do that is something we really need to seriously
look at, and I highly commend the recommendations to establish
a recurring stream of fund, and to make sure we have a robust
search--I mean rescue--sorry, research and development program,
moving forward. We did not make consequential progress beyond
burning, skimming, and dispersant use from the legislation that
was passed after the Exxon Valdez.
There has been talk about the oil spill liability trust
fund. Obviously, we have to take a look at the overall limit,
what could be funded out of the oil spill liability trust fund,
which currently stands at $1 billion. That needs to be
seriously looked at, because there is a limiting factor on what
the government could do if there was no responsible party that
had the deep pockets that BP did.
Inter-agency coordination was key. My goal, as the national
incident commander, was to create unity of effort. I think we
need to seriously look at the role of the national response
team, moving forward, and how they are employed. We established
an inter-agency solutions group at the national incident
command to handle unique challenges that were presented to us,
like the flow rate problem. I think, in the future, that needs
to be institutionalized in the national response team, and made
part of the national contingency plan doctrine, moving forward.
Regarding the international offers of assistance, as was
previously stated, we accepted every reasonable offer of
assistance from foreign countries. And regarding the
application of the Jones Act, there was no impact of the Jones
Act on this response. There were seven waivers that were
requested for foreign vessels that were never utilized, and
those waivers were requested in the event that heavy weather
would require us to bring those foreign flag vessels inside
state waters. That was done as a contingency, but never
utilized. So the Jones Act, as was stated, was not a factor.
Two final issues. One, air space coordination. We took a
lesson learned from Haiti when we took control of the air space
to control the landing slots. Partially through the response,
we took control of the air space in the Gulf and it
substantially improved our performance. Had I to do it over
again, I would have done that on the first day.
And I would be glad to answer any questions you may have
for me regarding the implication of these lessons for future
operations in the Arctic. And I thank the chairman for inviting
me here today. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Admiral Allen. I am going to start
off by yielding my time to Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panel. I
especially thank the admiral.
In the aftermath of--the Deepwater Horizon spill response
was purely inadequate. But I say it was also inadequate with
the Exxon Valdez spill, and we learned from that spill. I am
not real excited about the Commission's recommendations. And I
do thank you, Admiral, for saying maybe we ought to look at the
rest of it, because it doesn't give us the answer to why the
explosion occurred, the Deepwater Horizon.
And I think that's what we ought to address, what human
factors were involved, and was there a mechanical, was there a
criminal action. And until we find that out, I don't believe we
should rush into write any legislation.
Actually, what we came--after the Valdez it was for
harbors. We had no protection for harbors until we had Exxon
Valdez. It worked. But it wasn't good in the deepwater area.
BioMar says they're going to require response capability of
400 percent of worst case scenario discharge, yet they're asked
how they are going to insure it, the plan to actually meet that
goal, and they say, ``That's not our job. We're not boat
people.''
And then, the Coast Guard--all due respect, Admiral, you're
no longer with them--says, ``That's not our job. Our job is not
to say how much oil gets picked up, or how it gets picked up.
Our job is to ensure that whatever method is employed is
safe.''
As you can see, there is a gap, a regulatory gap. And, as a
result, the industry is left to police itself, the very thing
that every report has concluded is a major part of the problem
of Deepwater Horizon. Some are proposing to have the American
Bureau of Shipping fill that gap. ABS already does work for
both agencies--as you know, Admiral--and it has expertise in
evaluating the specifications and maintenance of the equipment
and plan.
What would you think about the ABS taking over that
program? Either one or all of you. I don't care. Admiral?
Admiral Allen. Well, I'll take a stab at that. First of
all, I think it's clear and unequivocal there needs to be
third-party inspection of drilling systems. We shouldn't be
left to industry standards. And that can be done by a variety
of institutions. ABS does have a process whereby they drill
that--I'm sorry, inspect that--and then review the plans.
Several components of these drilling systems have to be the
subject, in my view, of third-party investigations: the
preventers, blue and yellow control pods, and the choke and the
kill lines, at a minimum. And I think this is something that
needs to be done.
Mr. Young. But right now it's not being done. So we could
do that. We could set that up, where there is a----
Admiral Allen. Right now there is a----
Mr. Young. Frankly, Admiral, I don't want the government to
do it right now.
Admiral Allen. Right now there is a certification industry
standard, sir.
Mr. Young. Let's get somebody--you guys agree with that?
Mr. Boesch. Yes, that's consistent with our
recommendations.
Mr. Young. OK, I'm glad to hear that, because that's one of
our biggest problems.
Last summer's spill in the Gulf of Mexico reminded us of
the risks associated--there are risks, by the way. This is the
first blow-out we had in deep water, I believe--42,000 wells
drilled in shallow wells and how many drilled in deep water?
This is the first blow-out we had. It was unexpected. And we
did not have the capability to do it.
But there was--in Mexico there was a number of vessels
nearby to assist in recovery and clean-up immediately. What
steps has the industry taken to mitigate the risks and effects
of a spill in rural areas of the Arctic? See, I'm from the
Arctic, guys. I want to drill in the Arctic. And your report is
not too enthusiastic on that.
And I heard some comments of the admiral--I'm not
enthusiastic about that, either--like, ``We can't do it until
we have proper ice breakers, et cetera.'' And, by the way,
Admiral, we're not going to get the ice breakers out of this
Congress. I helped build those three, and we got two in dry
dock right now are not working, and you're not going to get any
more ice breakers. We do it, we can have them leased, as they
should be, at a cheaper rate--I've been pushing that for a long
time--than buying them, because we're not going to get the
money for it. And we do need them in the Arctic.
But what steps have been taken by the industry, like Shell,
et cetera, in the Arctic that actually--it's different than the
Gulf--to work on it? Is there any steps that you know of?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Congressman Young. We do address the
Arctic in the report, and we do indicate in our report that
drilling can be done in the Arctic. We are suggesting that
there are certain steps that should obviously be taken before
drilling commences. You've noted most of them, which is that
industry should demonstrate it has the capacity to respond and
to contain a blow-out.
There are clear differences in the Arctic from the Gulf.
It's shallower water, it's much deeper in the Gulf. But we were
concerned about the government's and the industry's ability to
respond. If they can show that they have the capability of
adequately overseeing and responding to a spill, then drilling
may commence.
Mr. Young. But my problem is it is shallower. It's low
pressure, is that correct?
Mr. Garcia. Yes.
Mr. Young. So we--the chance of blow-outs are minimum,
and--because I don't believe we have ever had one in the
Arctic, anywhere. Now, maybe over--now I have Iceland drilling
now, I have China drilling now, I've got--I believe Russia is
drilling now. Greenland is drilling now. Everybody is drilling
in the Arctic but us.
And I want to suggest respectfully that--Mr. Chairman, if
we keep delaying this action, we're doing this country a
disservice, because they have done the job. As far as I can
tell--and I've reviewed their reports--now, we don't have the
ice breaker. We've got the Healy, which is on its last legs.
We need to figure out what can be done in the Arctic. It
may be easier to clean up in the Arctic if there was a spill,
because it's a much colder climate. And I don't want to keep
saying no, no, no, because it's not failsafe. You said that,
Mr. Garcia.
Mr. Garcia. Yes.
Mr. Young. Is there----
Mr. Garcia. Sir----
Mr. Young. Yes, go ahead.
Mr. Garcia. I agree. There are clear differences. But also,
as you know, in the Arctic there are challenges. The remoteness
of certain areas, the ability to stage equipment and personnel,
as well as the fact that--weather factors, ice, darkness
throughout much of the year. So all of that has to be factored
in. But nothing in our report has suggested that we should not
be drilling in the Arctic. We are only saying that the lessons
that we learned from this incident should be incorporated into
any decisions to move forward.
I would also--if I could just add one other thing, the
report--and I just commend it to the record and to your
reading--but the report does address the root causes and the
immediate causes of the blow-out, and our chief counsel is also
coming out with a report next week that will be highly
detailed, going through each of the factors that caused the
blow-out of the Macondo well.
Mr. Young. Well, that may be, but I know I've checked the
background of every one of the Commission, and their support in
the past, and I want you to know that. And I am --some got
critical. We had two people before the Natural Resources
Committee, and I did chew on them a little bit. I haven't
chewed on you.
Mr. Garcia. And I appreciate that.
Mr. Young. I might. I might. I just think there is a pre-
thinking process, and--for offshore drilling.
And, gentlemen, we have a problem in this country. As you
mentioned, we're not going to get off this kick for oil. There
is no way for a long, long period of time.
And I have--as you know, you talk about an economical
disaster in the Gulf. Really, it's because of the moratorium.
That's been the biggest hardship, other than the oil. The lack
of work. It's been lost--we're buying that oil from Venezuela.
Now all the ships that I know of are going down to Brazil. And
we, as a Nation, have to do where the oil is. We have to do it
and do it correctly.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Young. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just like to recommend
that we get Representative Young maybe some bear meat he can
chew on, and leave the folks alone that are testifying.
Mr. Young. You know me.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Larsen. I want to thank the folks for testifying. I
also want to be sure I thank the employees at the BP refinery
in Cherry Point Ferndale, the Coast Guard and Federal employees
out of the Coast Guard from district 13, and those from EPA,
the Federal employees from EPA region 10 out of Seattle for
being willing to take an assignment to go down to the Gulf and
help with response and clean-up during the response over the
summer, before we get started. Working side by side and hand in
hand, everybody pulling on the same oar last summer.
I have some questions with regards to something in my
opening statement, and that's about the costs and the budget.
And first off, for Admiral Allen, you know, this Congress is
exploring some fairly deep cuts to discretionary spending. Even
assuming that the Coast Guard funding remains constant, there
are recommended investments that would take funds from other
Coast Guard accounts.
In your--based on your experience with the Coast Guard,
would that allow the Coast Guard to still adequately perform
its existing missions, if we were to follow through on some of
the things we're looking at right now in congress?
Admiral Allen. Well, sir, as you rightly pointed out, I'm
not the commandant right now. So any comments I had would be
reflective on the experience I had in the last couple budget
years moving forward. And I would just say, as a general
statement, you get faced with a choice in any constrained
budget environment about what you're going to do with capital
investment and replacing your aging assets. If you don't do
that, you create a hollow force that collapses on itself.
I made some very difficult decisions, as commandant, to
make sure I sustained, to the extent it was possible,
acquisition funding to keep building our cutters, because we
need those desperately. If you're going to do that in a
constrained budget environment, then you're going to have to
look at your operating accounts as an offset to do that.
What is needed is a frank, open conversation about the
inherent opportunity costs of doing that. I talked last year in
the budget development inside the administration about risks
associated operations to be able to make capital investment.
There is nothing wrong with talking about that, you just need
to have a frank, open conversation and be clear about what it
is you're trading off.
But I think we have a real hesitance and reluctance to talk
about those things, and when they're actual realties that we
have to deal with in the budget. So my decisions, as it related
to budget, reflected my need to build Coast Guard cutters. And
if that was at the expense of some operating expenses, then you
take a short-term position when you're going to have to manage
with fewer resources to make sure you ensure the long-term
viability of the service.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks. And I know that current Admiral Papp
has made some comments recently about the budget environment in
the Coast Guard currently, and about what might have to occur
there at the Coast Guard coming in to the future.
For Mr. Garcia and Mr. Boesch, did--does the report--did
you look at the amount of the investments that would be needed
to implement your recommendations, but for the 80 percent of
the----
Mr. Boesch. Our staff has done a general appraisal. We're
obviously not in a position to cost out each of the activities
that we recommend, in terms of improving the review and
regulatory capacity in the Department of the Interior,
including the studies and the like.
But in a general estimation, just to put it in a context
that we can understand, I think, our estimate is that it might
induce a cost of somewhere between 7 and 12 cents on a barrel
of oil that's produced. And you put it into terms of a gallon
of gasoline, it's less than a quarter of a cent per gallon of
gasoline.
And we recommended that these fees not be recovered from
the general taxpayers, who are the landowners in this case and
are being paid by the oil companies for the right of exploiting
the land and the resources, but by the industry itself, much as
the Federal Communications Commission is funded by that
industry.
So, we think that this can be done in a cost-effective way
that would actually increase the efficiency of regulation.
Right now there are not enough folks to review the permits
under these new standards. But also, do it in a way that
doesn't affect the Federal tax situation and our own fiscal
health in this Nation, but also a very modest cost, which is
easily affordable for the industry.
Mr. Larsen. Admiral Allen, I only have a few seconds. I
will ask the question with the chairman's indulgence, and
perhaps have an answer.
In your report and testimony, you discuss the initial
difficulties of working with certain--well, with state and
local officials, perhaps because of the difference between how
people approach a natural disaster versus a disaster like we
see in the Gulf. Did you have specific recommendations that you
think we ought to be looking at, with regards to the Stafford
Act, or any other legislation?
Admiral Allen. I do. First of all, the area of contingency
plans that identify sensitive areas and how they will be
protected have been developed over the last 20 years, after the
revisions made from the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. I think it's
absolutely essential that we get state and local governments
more involved in that. Heretofore, those agreements have been
made with the states representing the counties or the parishes.
It was clear during this bill that the determinations that
were made and the priorities established in that planning
process were not understood by the local leaders in the areas
that were impacted. I can see no other way of moving forward to
solve that problem than to bring them in to the process, and
make sure they are consulted and have a role in it.
Mr. Larsen. OK. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. OK, thank you. Mr. Gibbs.
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I wanted
to thank Admiral Allen for his service to our country, and
appreciation of all he's done. Your eight points for response
coordination, I think that's something we should look at.
My first question that I wanted to address to the other two
witnesses, in your oral testimony you talked a lot about
ecosystem restoration. And obviously, that's important. But I
noticed in your oral testimony you didn't mention what was the
root cause of the disaster. Now, in your written report, you
do. The Commission talks about several key human errors,
engineering mistakes, and management failures.
Specifically, there was flaw design in the cement to seal
the bottom of the well. A negative pressure test was conducted
that identified the cementing was a failure. Flawed procedures
in securing the well with the mud, and getting the mud out of
the well door--apparent inattention by key initial signals for
an impending blow-out. And so it was obviously human errors;
management and engineering errors. You say that in your report.
Now, where I come from, we in Ohio don't have deepwater
drilling. But I know in instances--my experience in the Ohio
legislature--we have had problems. A lot of that was similar
problems, somebody didn't do the right thing. And what's really
been bothering me is when you think of all the challenges in
deepwater drilling and the technical challenges and all that,
and the amount of investment and all, compared to just drilling
a normal well in Ohio.
What is the function of the regulatory person? In one part
of the report it talks about creating a new regulatory
structure. Before I would want to support that, I need to know,
on a deal like that, there is no regulatory person on these
rigs, or--what's the oversight? Can you expound on that a
little bit?
Mr. Garcia. Sure. The--thank you for the question,
Congressman.
One of the findings of the Commission was that there was a
failure of oversight. There was a serious failure. You had an
agency that had an inherent conflict. Individuals who were
responsible for overseeing safety were also involved in the
collection of royalties and making leasing decisions. We've
suggested that we need to separate those functions, and the
Department of Interior is moving in that direction. We think
that they should probably go much further. So we've suggested
removing it from the political process within the Interior
Department.
Inspectors from MMS did go out and visit rigs. But clearly,
the oversight was inadequate. And we have made a number of
recommendations on how the government can be more effective, as
well as how the industry can be more effective in monitoring
its activities and policing itself, rather than having the
government be solely responsible for that.
Mr. Gibbs. OK. So I see independent agency--that's your
response for that, because you think for regulation----
Mr. Garcia. Well, independent agency within the new BOEMRE,
however they pronounce their new acronym.
But also we have suggested that the industry follow the
example of the nuclear industry, and set up an industry
watchdog that would police its members, would set standards of
excellence, so that an outlier would not be able to impact the
entire industry, as happened in this case.
Mr. Gibbs. OK. And my last question, Mr. Chairman, dealing
with the Commission's reasons why state and local authorities
were not more involved in spill planning. And I think that
would probably go to all three, with the recommendations on how
the Coast Guard can be more effective working with local
authorities for a response.
Admiral Allen. I don't think there is any disagreement
between the Commission's finding and at least where I stand as
the national incident commander, that if you're going to have
an effective local response, the local political leaders can't
feel they're disenfranchised and didn't have a say in the
priority.
There was an assumption made that when we approved the area
contingency plans with the state representatives, that they
reflected the representation of the state and the local
governments. That was not the case, especially in Louisiana.
And I think, moving forward, there has to be visibility of
what's going to be protected, and how it will be protected, the
tactics, including exercises in preparedness, that must involve
local governments.
Mr. Garcia. I would just add that we heard a lot about
this. I traveled throughout the Gulf, as did Dr. Boesch.
Clearly, a better job needs to be done of bringing elected
state and local officials into the planning process, so they
understand what's happening. And so that was one of the
disconnects in this incident.
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you. Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you all for your testimony. And, Admiral Allen, thank you for
your service. It's nice to see you again.
I want to focus in on the issue of financial liability,
because I believe this is an area that the Deepwater Horizon
disaster clearly demonstrates where our current law is
insufficient. Current liability limits for deepwater drilling
are--the responsible parties responsible for the cost of the
clean-up and the removal, 100 percent of that, and then for $75
million of other costs. That's the cap. Now, thankfully, and
responsibly, BP has indicated that they will not be constrained
by that cap.
The legislation that we passed last summer, the CLEAR Act,
had completely eliminated a cap. There was no cap that the
responsible party would be responsible for all costs associated
with the spill. The Commission has recommended an increase in
the liability cap, but without specifying it.
So, my question is, how exposed are we? What are the
consequences of our continued failure not to have passed
legislation that addresses just that one narrow issue? Dr.
Boesch?
Mr. Boesch. Well, there is pretty substantial exposure,
because if an incident like this, or even much less than this,
occurred, and the party didn't have the deep pockets of BP, and
did make the commitments that BP has, we would have been in a
difficult situation.
The Commission recommended raising the cap. The need to do
this is clear from what had gone on. We did not recommend
unlimited liability, nor a specific amount, because this
requires more analysis than we were able to do within the remit
that we had: specifically, the issues of insurance, and how
that insurance market would work; and secondly, as Mr. Landry
had pointed out, there are some smaller companies that are
involved in this industry, and we didn't want to, by making a
recommendation without further analysis, exclude the
participation of those companies in this industry.
Mr. Bishop. Understood. Admiral Allen, you have indicated--
I don't want to put words in your mouth, but I believe you have
indicated that we should take somewhat of a go-slow approach
with respect to legislation, wait until we have all of the
reports in hand, and so on.
But in this area of liability cap, isn't it fair to
conclude that we already know that the current liability cap is
insufficient, given the enormity of the tragedy in the Gulf,
and that at least that one area is an area that really demands
that we move much more quickly?
Admiral Allen. I think you can separate out what we know to
a certainty needs to be fixed right now, and what we need to
know from the detailed investigations and forensics that are
going on right now with the joint investigative team. I don't
know how that translates to the agenda that you have regarding
legislation, but there obviously is attention here. I think we
just need to recognize that it exists, and what is the best way
to move forward.
I don't think there is any issue regarding the liability
cap and the total overall amount that could be spent on a
response. I think the question is finding that right amount and
the balance between the impact on the insurance industry and
the small operators in the Gulf that Mr. Landry represents, and
others. I think there needs to be some serious research done in
that regard, and what the impacts would be on that liability.
We did have a case in the Delaware River several years ago
in LoBiondo's area, where we had a vessel ran against an object
in Delaware Bay. We had a significant spill. They reached the
limits of liability, and basically the company walked and the
government was insured. So, I think we need to go back and take
a look and understand what's going on.
And I would make one other comment. Under the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 we required certificates of financial
responsibility for vessels that are entering the U.S. waters
carrying crude oil. There was a lot of talk at the time that
that might have a significant negative impact on the tanker
business. It did not. They adjusted, and we moved forward.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you. I--just to put a--you know, make the
point even more pronounced, Mr. Garcia, your testimony was that
fully restoring the Gulf will require, over the next 30 years,
at least an expenditure of $15 billion to $20 billion, if we
have the existing cap in place, and the responsible party is
not being as responsible as BP is doing. That amount would very
quickly dwarf the amount of money available in the oil spill
liability trust fund, and so either the work would remain
undone or it would revert to the taxpayers to take on that
obligation. Is that right?
Mr. Garcia. Well, actually, what we're recommending is that
the penalties under the Clean Water Act, which are separate
from the natural resource damages--and those penalties could be
substantial; they're based on the amount of oil that is spilled
into the water per day----
Mr. Bishop. And those remain to be calculated, correct?
Mr. Garcia. Those remain to be calculated. But whatever
amount should be directed--80 percent should be directed to the
Gulf. Congress will need to take action to allow that to
happen. Because if you don't, those funds would then revert to
the treasury.
And so, what we're suggesting is that Congress authorize
that 80 percent of the Clean Water Act penalties from this
incident be directed to the Gulf for restoration.
Mr. Bishop. A, that would require legislation.
Mr. Garcia. Yes.
Mr. Bishop. And--thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield
back.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. Mr. Cravaack?
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the things
I'm concerned about is chain of command failure and breakdown.
One of the things that I was concerned about when I was reading
about this up in Minnesota, one of the things--I saw a governor
enlisting 16 barges, trying to save his shoreline--I will be
gentle--and they were shut down by the Coast Guard.
Admiral, I would like to know who made that command? Who
shut those barges down?
Admiral Allen. I'm not sure I know the specific incident,
but it might have to do with the barges that were used as a
protection----
Mr. Cravaack. Skimmers.
Admiral Allen [continuing]. And harbors that were moved
with incoming predicted weather associated with a potential
hurricane.
The Coast Guard has overriding jurisdiction regarding the
safety of Federal waterways, and this is separate from oil
spill responsibilities. With hurricanes approaching, decisions
had to be made about----
Mr. Cravaack. This wasn't for hurricanes, sir. It was
because they didn't have fire extinguishers on board. Or they
were checking--not they didn't have them.
Admiral Allen. Oh, I understand now. I was trying to figure
out which barges you were talking about.
Mr. Cravaack. OK.
Admiral Allen. What the state did is they brought in
barges, put vacuum trucks on the barges, and took the barges
out, and were going to try and skim oil with it. We were trying
to make sure that when they went out there, there wasn't a
maritime accident associated with the fact that you don't
normally put skimming trucks on barges and use that as an oil
spill response capability.
The company operators were completely supportive of making
sure the inspections were done correctly and they were safe to
operate before they did that. The state did not understand why
we were holding them up, but there was an overriding safety
need on those particular barges that you're talking about, sir.
Mr. Cravaack. Would you agree, sir, this was an extremist
situation the governor was trying to work in?
Admiral Allen. I believe that you don't complicate a
problem by putting people's lives at risk in the middle of the
response, sir.
Mr. Cravaack. Would you agree it was an extremist
situation, sir?
Admiral Allen. It was an extremist situation, but I would
not put people's lives at risk, and that's what we were looking
at, sir.
Mr. Cravaack. OK. In the--BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill
was the first spill designated as a spill of national
significance. Admiral Allen was the first national incident
commander. The national contingency plan does little to define
the roles of authority of the national incident commander, or
the additional resources and procedures necessary to mitigate a
spill of national significance.
What changes--and I can ask all of you--what changes to the
national contingency plan are necessary to better define the
authority and chain of command responsibilities during the
spill of national significance?
Mr. Boesch. We didn't get into the specifics of all of
that, other than to indicate that, obviously, there was not
sufficient forethought and definition of the complexities of
dealing with a spill of national significance.
Admiral Allen will note it in his written testimony that
there had been plans for an exercise that would engage the
government on a spill of national significance that took place
just a month before the incident. And there was not an adequate
involvement of the appropriate officers at the right level in
government to get learning from that experience.
So, it's not only the question of having the criteria that
would move it to that level of response, but also making sure
that the government is evergreen, is ready to actually exercise
and perform under those capacities in an incident which could
occur once every decade or so.
Mr. Garcia. As I mentioned a moment ago, one of the big
problems was the failure to involve in the planning process
state and elected officials who clearly need to be involved in
and understand the procedure when you have a spill of national
significance. And we have recommended that steps be taken to
make sure that all levels of government are familiar with it.
I would say, though, that the professional career oil spill
experts and responders at both state and Federal levels were
fully trained in responding. It's just that many of them had to
be moved aside, because this thing was so big that elected
state and local officials understandably wanted to be and had
to be involved.
Mr. Cravaack. I understand. One of the--I'm sorry, sir. Go
ahead.
Admiral Allen. I think you were specifically asking about
the national incident commander and the authorities that might
be needed. Currently, the protocol calls that the commandant
would designate a national incident commander. And it was
previously understood that would be one of our two or three-
star area commanders, either Atlantic or Pacific. We were in
the process of a succession change in the Coast Guard, and I
was designated.
First of all, I think the national incident commander
should be presidentially designated. I think there ought to be
a standing delegation of clean water authorities, once that
designation is made, and that that commander should have the
authority to redirect assets nationally, and drop stand-by
requirements to move response equipment where it's needed, sir.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, sir. And I am out of time, sir. I
yield back.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you. Mr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask a question
here. Admiral Allen, I guess, might be the appropriate party.
The vessel was flagged by--under rules in the Marshall
Islands, I guess, was it--the Marshall Islands. And they have
different standards than we have. Do you believe that that
was--that we should have all of these vessels under United
States safety regulations, and flagged by the United States
standards?
Admiral Allen. Sir, I would submit to you there is an
effect that we need to achieve, and it is this. Right now, for
those vessels to operate in our waters, they have to be
compliant with international standards that have been
promulgated through the International Maritime Organization. To
do that, the Coast Guard does a verification of whether or not
the country of registry has met those international standards,
and issues what's called a certificate of compliance, where we
would normally, for a U.S. flag ship, issue a certificate of
inspection.
I would submit that we need to take a look at the protocol
that we use for cruise ships that are foreign flagged that
carry a large number of U.S. passengers, and we do something
called a control verification exam, which actually involves a
physical inspection. There are two ways going forward. You can
have the discussion whether they should be U.S. flagged or not,
but they certainly should be held to a higher standard, and
inspected. And I would say that the current regime we use to
insure the safety of cruise ships is a good model to use for
offshore drilling units.
Mr. Cohen. The Marshall Islands was the standards, and I
think they had somebody perform the safety standards that was
from that area, and it was like a four to eight-hour
examination, if I'm correct. If I'm wrong, correct my premise.
But is that accurate? That was----
Admiral Allen. I'm not sure what you're referring to, sir.
But what we would do with a cruise ship, there would be an
extensive inspection while that ship was being built in the
shipyard. There would be initial exam when it entered into
service, and there would be quarterly inspections.
I have taken a part in those myself, as a field commander.
I think that type of regime should be applied to foreign flag
vessels operating in our waters, sir.
Mr. Cohen. You mentioned, I think in response to Mr.
Young's questions--and it might have been Mr. Garcia, I'm not
sure, but somebody--that the government should not be the one
that determines these standards. Is that what I understood?
What was it?
Mr. Garcia, it was something Mr. Young asked about, and he
didn't think the government should be the party, there should
be a third party doing this--I think it was the safety
inspections, and I think you----
Admiral Allen. I think what he was referring to was
certification of drilling systems. Right now, let's take a
blow-out preventer. That is built by industry to certain
standards that are issued by the American Petroleum Institute,
and that constitutes the level of due diligence that's applied
to the construction and operation.
I think what we're saying is, as with vessel inspection, an
independent third party such as American Bureau of Shipping or
other classification societies, should be the ones that come in
and verify especially blow-out preventers, killing choke lines,
and the blue and yellow pods on these operations.
Mr. Cohen. All right, that's--thank you for refreshing my
recollection.
But let me ask you this. Do you think that--are there
systems that make sure that there is not influences there that
would make those standards more to the industry's liking,
rather than maybe the public's needs?
And government--it's a bad rap, and government can and have
proper regulations and proper oversight. That's one of the
issues in this Congress, is about regulation and regulation
hurting the government, or hurting business. And yet there is a
lot of regulations here that need to be adopted and
implemented.
And these might cost--I don't know, what--there is
something about the Raines Act, $100 million, and whether or
not this would be determined as $100 million. I imagine it
would. And if you couldn't get the Senate to go along with what
the House had in some regulation on standards, we would have no
standards.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. If I could make a comment, there
is an issue that was raised in the Commission report. It hasn't
been alluded to in this hearing yet today, but it probably
needs to be discussed.
If you look at the rest of the world and how they manage
oil exploration off their coast, they do it through something
called a safety case regime, where there is a risk assessment
conducted. And as part of the regulatory process, the companies
have to produce a plan on how they will mitigate risk and
manage the overall process through a safety management system.
That is going to be the subject, I think, of some pretty
detailed discussion.
My personal view is you probably need a hybrid system,
where there is some command and control issues related to
inspection of drilling systems, and a way to assess risk and
have them present a plan on how they would manage risk. But the
commissioners may want to comment on that.
Mr. Garcia. And, in fact, that is exactly what we have
recommended, that there be a hybrid system where--we need to
obviously change and strengthen the regulations----
Mr. Cohen. Let me stop you for one minute, because I've got
12 seconds before a red light goes off, and then you can go on.
If we had some--passed this Raines Act, and you had
regulations from the government that couldn't go into effect
unless the House and Senate approved them, you could have a
disastrous oil spill, because we don't have regulations. And
how much would that cost business in the Gulf: fisheries,
tourism, et cetera? Would the lack of ability to promulgate and
enforce rules and regulations cost business a lot of money?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, sir. It would cost business a lot of
money.
Mr. Cohen. Great answer.
Mr. Garcia. If I could just answer one of your other
points, we did recommend a hybrid system. The regulations that
are governing the oversight of the offshore industry by the
Department of the Interior need to be strengthened. They need
to be brought into the 21st century, frankly. We should be
setting the standard for the world.
But we also suggested that we need to follow the lead of
the United Kingdom and Norway, who had their own catastrophic
events. And, following those events, they instituted a system
that is called a safety case approach. And what that requires
is that the operator and the driller must demonstrate on a
site-specific basis that they have put into place all of the
safeguards and measures necessary to properly drill in a
particular place.
And then, third, we recommended that the industry--it's in
the industry's interests that it should set up its own watchdog
that would be of and by and for the industry, to provide
oversight, similar to what the nuclear industry has done, and
which has been very effective.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you----
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you. We're going to try to be very
accommodating in this committee. But I think it's important in
the initial session--Mr. Cohen, you pointed out a good point.
You were in your last couple of sessions, I wasn't going to cut
off the witnesses. But that's really not fair to the folks who
don't squeeze in a question right at the last moment.
And if it's really important, we will go to a second round.
We won't cut you off if you have your questions. But I would
just ask the Members to keep that in mind. Mr. Coble?
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I've got
a Judiciary Committee hearing going on simultaneously, so I
missed some of the testimony. But I appreciate the contribution
that the panel has made.
Mr. Garcia, Mr. Boesch, let me put this question to you.
The President's moratorium on oil and gas drilling was
technically lifted mid-October, I think. But I'm told that
there have been very few permits granted.
Let me put to you all a three-part question. Did the
Commission conclude that deepwater energy exploitation can be
done safely? Did the Commission conclude that deepwater energy
exploitation should continue to ensure our energy independence
and national security? And, finally, how critical is offshore
oil and gas drilling industry to the economy in the Gulf?
Mr. Boesch. I think the answer to the first two questions
is yes. The first answer is yes, it can be done safely, and it
is important to our energy supply. And, finally, it is very
important to the economy of the northern Gulf of Mexico.
We did not partake in the moratorium. We didn't act on it.
In fact, two of our co-chairs spoke that it was ill-advised to
have a blanket moratorium. As I understand, though, the state
of play is that in deepwater drilling, one requirement, which
is actually in our recommendations and the Secretary of
Interior is applying now, is the need to demonstrate, certify,
that one has the capacity to control a blow-out if it occurs.
I understand, from a comment made just the day before
yesterday by the head of exploration and development of
Chevron, that they're just days away of coming to that
agreement, and on the basis of his comments, we anticipate that
these permits for deepwater drilling would be granted for those
companies that have actually met the standard pretty soon.
Mr. Coble. I thank you, sir. Admiral, let me put a three-
part question to you, as well, but playing Monday morning
quarterback.
Do you believe the Department of Homeland Security's senior
leadership was fully aware of how oil spill response is
supposed to function under the national contingency plan? And I
am told, Admiral, that some of the senior leadership at DHS in
some cases failed to adhere to the plan. And did their
misunderstandings of the process affect oil spill response
efforts?
Admiral Allen. Sir, let me start with a contextual comment.
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the national contingency plan
predate the development of the Homeland Security Act, and the
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. The major
incident command doctrine under which the Secretary operates is
Homeland Security Presidential directive number five.
From the start, we have never been able to align,
integrate, or deconflict the role of the Secretary of Homeland
Security and incident management across the entire country with
the specific doctrine that's called out in the national
contingency plan.
The first impulse by political leaders is to go with what
they understand and know. And, in this case, it is the role of
the Secretary under HSPD 5. Since that was never deconflicted,
there was never a determination of what supersedes and how
they're integrated.
Now, we worked that out. But one of the recommendations I
have made and continue to make is, going forward, the
differences in the two regimes and the authorities and the
accountability of senior leaders needs to be resolved, sir.
Mr. Coble. I thank you, sir. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
I yield back.
Mr. LoBiondo. OK. Mr. Larsen, you have a unanimous consent
request?
Mr. Larsen. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the
statement of Congresswoman Johnson be entered into the record.
Mr. LoBiondo. Without objection, so ordered.
The gentleman from coastal Louisiana has some questions
here.
Mr. Landry. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On a lighter
side, Admiral Allen, your favorite parish president, Bill
Nungesser, told me to tell you hello today.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Allen. I'm feeling the love.
Mr. Landry. I have three questions, and I would appreciate
your keeping the answers as short as possible. They are very
important.
A lot has been said about the Jones Act. And my question to
you, Admiral Allen, is do you feel that the waiver provisions
in the Jones Act provide sufficient flexibility during
emergencies, currently?
Admiral Allen. Yes, they do.
Mr. Landry. OK, great. After reviewing the Commission's
report--and this is for you, Admiral Allen, with you gentleman,
certainly--after reviewing the Commission's report, and based
upon my experience in listening to people back home who have
worked, you know, 50-plus years in the oil and gas industry,
it's apparent that there were regulations that were already in
place that were being supervised by MMS that seemed to have
been violated.
In comparison, I have not seen that there were any
regulations that were under the purview of the Coast Guard that
caused the accident. Would you agree with that?
Admiral Allen. Sir, that relates directly to my earlier
statement, that we need to understand the results of the joint
investigation team. If you think about it, what we had was a
vessel that was attached by a riser pipe to a well. At the
bottom of that riser pipe was a system that was regulated by
the Department of Interior. At the top of that riser pipe was a
vessel that was regulated by the Coast Guard.
Mr. Landry. Right.
Admiral Allen. There are issues with well control.
Mr. Landry. Right.
Admiral Allen. There were issues with the cementing job.
There were issues with the gas that came up. Once the gas was
released, then you have gas enveloping a vessel that was issued
a certificate of compliance by the Coast Guard to see that--to
ensure they complied with international standards.
So, what the joint investigative team is going to be doing
is not only looking at the cause of the loss of control of the
well, but, for instance, how did the gas that came up be
brought into the intake systems, into the engine room and
possibly--so you're looking at fire suppression systems and
safety issues related to the vessel itself. So it's a much more
complicated system, because you have a floating platform
connected to a well, and there are jurisdictional issues at
both ends of that.
And that's the reason I think we need to take a very, very
close look at everything associated with it, including the
performance of the fire suppression systems on the vessel,
itself.
Mr. Landry. Well, I hope not to have to get to the fire
suppression systems on a rig.
My only point to you all is that I have--it seems as though
the inspections done by the Coast Guard out on the Gulf of
Mexico are very, very sufficient, and MMS may have missed the
boat on this, I guess you could say--and the recommendations to
build additional bureaucracies within the same department that
held oversight of MMS, which is now the BOEM.
So, I don't have a lot of confidence in BOEM. I've got a
lot of confidence in the Coast Guard. I guess that's my point
here.
The last question, very quickly, the motor vessel was on
location at the time. And of course, this incident occurred in
the spring, when water temperatures were certainly starting to
warm up. But the Bankston--it's not required to be at that
platform while it's drilling. There is no regulation that
mandates that that vessel be there. If that vessel would not
have been there, and this would have been in the winter time,
and the men and women who had to jump off of that facility
would have ended up in the water, do you believe we would have
been able to recover all of those who did survive?
Admiral Allen. Sir, you're getting back to my original
point. I think we need to look at the entire event, including
the issue with the loss of life and the search and rescue----
Mr. Landry. If I may cut you--but, I mean, do you believe
that? It's like a yes or no----
Admiral Allen. I think we need to do an assessment of
whether the resources on the scene were capable of rescuing in
all conditions. I think that's a legitimate point.
Mr. Landry. OK, OK. But wait, wait, wait. On September 2nd,
the Mariner platform had an accident where 10 gentlemen ended
up in the water, one of them without a life preserver. Again,
in the summer. It took 10 hours--there was no stand-by vessel
there--it took 10 hours before we recovered them.
My question to you is this. If that would have happened in
the winter, would we have lost more--would all 10 of those men
have survived?
Admiral Allen. It would depend on their adherence to
procedures, their safety suits and the systems they're supposed
to use, sir.
Mr. Landry. No--well, evidently----
Admiral Allen. There are systems in place that will protect
them----
Mr. Landry. Well, evidently, one of the systems--one guy
ended up in the water without a life preserver.
My question is that you would agree that they are--that
they can be--that hypothermia can certainly affect them.
Admiral Allen. Yes, it can.
Mr. Landry. And ultimately lead to death.
Admiral Allen. Yes.
Mr. Landry. OK. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo. OK. Mr. Farenthold.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you. Just, first off, a real quick
follow-up from the question from the gentleman from the coast
of Louisiana.
You indicated that you felt like the waiver provision of
the Jones Act was adequate to deal with this situation. My
understanding was the waivers were taking 10 days to get
processed. You think 10 days is a reasonable enough time, in
the event of a disaster like this blow-out, or something like
Katrina?
Admiral Allen. Well, the waivers that were requested were
stand-by waivers in the event we had to move these vessels due
to heavy weather. So there wasn't an extremist or urgency
situation attached to that.
I have been involved in other environmental responses in my
career, where we needed timely waivers, and received them as
part of an environmental response, sir.
Mr. Farenthold. Great. I think one of the other points we
talked about, both in Arctic drilling and the Gulf of Mexico is
the United States isn't the only participant there, United
States oil companies, and there is land out there that isn't
regulated by the United States. In the Gulf of Mexico, you've
obviously got drilling from the state oil company of Mexico.
China is operating off the coast of Cuba. And what I see out of
this report is a plethora of new regulations and taxes on the
domestic oil company with no thought about what's going to
happen in the event of an accident like this occurring on a
foreign government-owned drilling platform or rig.
What contingencies do you gentlemen see there? And do you
think maybe the focus might be on developing more--on
developing better responses for anything that happens
regardless, as opposed to putting our domestic oil companies at
a competitive disadvantage?
Mr. Garcia. Well, Congressman, certainly there is a
challenge right now in international waters. You're right. The
Gulf of Mexico is shared by several nations. And the Arctic has
a number of nations whose companies are beginning to examine
the possibility of drilling. And we need to address that.
If there were a blow-out by one of these other companies--
and some of these companies are very safety-challenged--it
would be a serious problem for us. And the Commission did, in
its report, identify that as a problem. That's going to require
a transnational solution, though.
We did recommend changes for U.S. industry. Again, we think
that there are changes that can be done that would involve
minimal cost, and would make this industry safer. The
Commission's report was designed to get the industry back to
work. And I think that, if you have read it, hopefully you
would agree with that.
Mr. Farenthold. I have--I will admit it was a big report, I
was skimming during some of the opening statements, but have
not read it cover to cover. I look forward to reviewing it
thoroughly.
There was also a comment regarding fully restoring the
Gulf. And I would be interested to know how that is defined. As
you know, oil in the Gulf of Mexico is not strictly a result of
manmade operations. Obviously, we have got a huge point source
over a short period of time. But, I mean, fossil evidence
back--and arts and crafts of the Karankawa Indians indicate
there is an ecosystem in place to take care of that.
What do we define as fully restoring the Gulf, and what do
we leave to Mother Nature to restore?
Mr. Boesch. Sure. First of all, let me just, if I can,
amend Terry's comment, but also reflect on Mr. Young's point
about the oil and gas development taking place in many Arctic
nations. We have some recommendations specifically for the
Arctic, but also internationally, that it is in the U.S.'s
interest to work with the international industry, but also the
other nations, to develop common standards, both in terms of
safety, as well as response.
And in the Arctic, I want to point you to the last part of
Admiral Allen's written testimony, in which he says a really
key part of that is the ratification of the Law of the Sea, the
U.S. ratification of the Law of the Sea, which is greatly
supported by the industry, by the military, and we really need
to do it in order to have a level playing field in dealing with
these international issues.
Specifically with respect to restoring the ecosystems, I
think we recognize that you can't fully restore the evolving,
changing Gulf of Mexico to the way it was at a certain time.
What we are interested in, what we are recommending, is that
the environment be restored to the point where it recovers a
certain resilience. From the current state of dysfunction, it's
able to function so if you have future oil spills, it's in much
better capacity to withstand those impacts. And that's what we
recommend for this restoration program.
To restore the longer-term damages, there is the natural
resources damage assessment, which specifically addresses the
impacts of this oil spill, and to try to correct those to the
way it was----
Mr. Farenthold. All right. And finally, just for one
second, the Hart Institute at Texas A&M Corpus Christi, is very
active in coordinating state and local responses with the
Federal Government. I commend them to you as a resource. Thank
you very much.
Mr. Boesch. We have used them, right.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo. OK. Thank you. Mr. Bucshon.
Dr. Bucshon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a background
in medicine. I was a cardiovascular surgeon prior to doing
this. And one thing I have learned from medicine is that the
international community can be very valuable in understanding
health care.
And my question goes to the fact that there obviously have
been oil spills in other parts of the world that we have not
been involved in. And, other than from what the government
response has been from a regulatory standpoint or otherwise,
are there things that we have learned, or we could be learning
about their platforms, about how they actually handle their
clean-up afterwards? And were those countries offering advice,
in our case, that U.S. regulations prevented us from utilizing
those resources, and helping us?
Admiral Allen. I will make a short comment and pass it to
my colleagues here.
First of all, I think the two best examples are probably
Norway and the UK. In the 1980s there were 2 very serious
accidents with significant loss of life in Norway and the UK.
That resulted in a refinement of the regulatory environment to
move to the safety case-based system that we talked about
earlier, and safety management systems.
There was a recent blow-out of the Montera oil right off
the northwest coast of Australia in 2009. They operate under
that same system, and that was reviewed as part of their
response. And that still supports a safety case way to go
forward, as we said earlier, and I am supportive of a hybrid
system that would take advantage of what we learned overseas,
both with the requirement for third-party validation of their
drilling systems.
Mr. Garcia. Yes, I fully agree with the admiral. One of the
other things that we found was that the industry was not
sharing best practices and information. And so the industry
could do a better job of that.
And, Congressman Farenthold, if I could say I'm on the
board of the Hart Institute, so I agree with your assessment.
Dr. Bucshon. I think I--again, I understand the regulatory
changes and the structural changes from the government level,
but--and what you--your comment about the industry sharing
technology, were there--are there clean-up methods that they
have used that we could have used that our U.S. regulations
prevented? I am naive to those, that's not my area.
But--and if there were--like I said, in medicine, the
information from the international community is usually very
valuable. And I have always found, as a citizen of the United
States, that people always ask us to help, and we usually help.
But when people ask--we don't generally ask for as much help as
we can. And I think sometimes there are things to be learned
and things to take advantage of that maybe we don't properly
utilize. That's my overall assessment. Thank you.
Admiral Allen. Sir, the overwhelming majority of foreign
offers of assistance that we dealt with had to do with actual
physical equipment, and this had to do with more of how much we
could get and how we needed it and how fast we needed it. This
usually involved skimming equipment, a boom, especially a fire-
retardant boom, and dispersants, when we were using
dispersants.
Some of the more novel things we might have used, like
bioremediation and some of the new technologies, fall into the
comments that I made earlier, where, because of the paucity of
research and development that took place in the last 15 years,
we were at the point where we were trying to do research and
development and bring new products to market during the spill
itself. We can't allow that to happen again. And I think the
real challenge was, domestically, to bring those technologies
in and get them into the game.
Mr. Garcia. And, sir, I would just say that, you know, one
of the sad facts of this incident is that the industry simply
did not have the response and containment technology that was
adequate to contain this blow-out in a reasonable amount of
time. It took them almost three months.
Dr. Bucshon. Just a comment, and then I will finish. Again,
going back to medicine, I have learned that there is--
international studies in health care, especially in the heart
surgery area related to prosthetic devices and the like that
have been utilized in Europe and other areas around the world
for many, many years that, in the United States, are prevented
from being utilized by medical professionals, based on our very
slow and very onerous regulatory process.
And so, I guess I will--my question was directed at are
there things like that in your industry that are out there, but
that we want to do our own R&D, and we don't rely on
international data, and that our structure really prevents us
from using for decades when they have been found to be
effective in other areas?
Admiral Allen. I guess I would say, in regard to well
control and containment of the well, because it was operating
offshore and basically in waters outside state waters, and BP
and the industry were the ones that had the means to control
that well and cap it, that the free market was flowing just
about whatever was working and could be used there to that
site.
Mr. Boesch. Let me just say also on that issue, there are
two organizations which the industry is standing up to be able
to provide that capacity, to contain a blown-out well.
And so, they represent some substantial investment that
they know they now need, and they are going to be based right
there in the Gulf of Mexico, probably Mr. Landry's district,
this stand-by capacity. And the research and development
associated with it is part of that evolving economy in the new
world of how we do offshore oil and gas development.
Dr. Bucshon. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Harris?
Dr. Harris. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of
all, Admiral Allen, it's a--thank you very much for coming and
appearing. And you were a great face for the U.S. Government,
really, during this entire crisis. And I thank you for that.
Dr. Boesch, it's good to see you. Of course, sitting on the
environmental committee in the State of Maryland, I have seen
you many times, and I'm glad to see you here----
Mr. Boesch. I don't have to call you ``Senator'' now,
though.
Dr. Harris. That's right. Let me just ask a question. I had
the privilege of attending a briefing by Mr. Riley and Senator
Graham in the Natural Resources Committee, and my colleague
from Alaska suggested at that time that the Commission members
really all may have had an initial bias against offshore oil
exploration and drilling. And I was pleased to see that in the
forward to the report, it suggested on the last page that if
the offshore energy enterprise is threatened, that the Nation's
economy and security are threatened, and I couldn't agree more
wholeheartedly.
Off Maryland, which is one of the frontier areas that are
described in the last part of the book, you know, our coastal
counties have an unemployment rate between 10 and 18 percent.
It's seasonal employment, but it's high. And I personally feel
that perhaps we should be looking at offshore exploration,
drilling off the shore.
In the chapter where you talk about--chapter 10 of the
report--you do say that the biological and environmental
factors are well understood in those areas, unlike the Arctic.
And, therefore, my question is, do you think, if we
implement what's found here--and this is specifically for Dr.
Boesch and Mr. Garcia--do you think we should, in fact, because
of our Nation's economy and security, go forward with OCS
exploration off the mid-Atlantic coast?
Mr. Boesch. Well, we take no specific position about the
expansion of oil and gas exploration and production outside of
the two areas that we focused on, other than to indicate that
we need to approach this in a different way, where there is
more substantive analysis that engages the other agencies, in
addition to Interior. The potential environmental risks should
be judged in the context of the amount of economic gain and
benefit, with respect to the energy supplies that may be there.
One of the things that focused our attention so much on
Alaska, quite frankly, in addition to its unique and unusual
sensitivity, is that the industry and the USGS are saying
that's where most of the remaining oil is, outside of the Gulf.
And so there is going to be enormous pressure to develop it.
And we need those resources, if they can be developed safely.
Dr. Harris. Thank you.
Mr. Boesch. The other areas are less rich, in terms of
resources, and we have to do that analysis.
Dr. Harris. Mr. Garcia?
Mr. Garcia. I would just add that the Commission report was
designed to provide recommendations on how to drill safely.
Where that drilling might take place would be up to the
administration, and perhaps to the Congress.
Dr. Harris. Well, let me back into it, because, Dr. Boesch,
you kind of indicate that you don't--that you didn't take a
position, really, on the safety. I'm going to ask you not as a
commissioner, but personally to address Mr. Young's criticism.
Do you feel that if you implement these recommendations in
the Gulf, is it safe to do in the Gulf? And should we, in fact,
be doing it in the Gulf?
Mr. Boesch. If these recommendations are implemented, yes.
We have said that you can safely drill, and we believe this
report sets that out.
And I would also say, in response to Mr. Young's point
about whether there was bias, I believe Mr. Riley said that we
should let the report speak for itself. And our position is
contained in this report.
Dr. Harris. Thank you. Then let me take the next step. If
your position is that, yes, it's safe to do in the Gulf, and
perhaps should be done in the Gulf, and in chapter 10 you say,
``Well, you know, off the mid-Atlantic coast, the biology and
the environmental considerations are fairly well known, it's
not--it perhaps should be treated different than the Arctic,''
then if there are reserves found off the coast of Maryland, for
instance, or Virginia, both of which will help employment in my
area, in my district, then would you conclude that, therefore,
it should be done in those areas also, if there are reserves
that are proven to be economically beneficial?
Mr. Boesch. As I understand it, the President acted earlier
last year to the Congress's lifting the moratorium around a
larger area, by saying that the U.S. is going to evaluate these
very questions about whether the resources that are there are
worth the potential risks, evaluating whether the benefits are
there, as well as a more detailed analysis of the existing
data.
What our comments were meant to suggest is that in those
environments we're not talking about or suggesting that one
needs, you know, five years of intense study and data analysis,
that we already know a lot about those regions. And that
information, just as the proposal, should be brought into
consideration of making the determination.
Dr. Harris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Harris. Congresswoman Edwards.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Glad I made
it back in the nick of time. Thank you very much to the
witnesses.
The question that I have actually regards some oversight
issues that came up during the 111th Congress, and related to
the flow rate and the wide variations of flow rate estimates,
and the impact on response coordination. There were some
questions that came up in our oversight in the last Congress
about risk assessment and contingency planning. And
particularly, I raised issues related to the worst-case
scenarios, which didn't even seem to come close to the scenario
that was reached in the spill.
And so, I wonder if you can talk to me a bit about the
recommendation that you have made, and how we can improve the
independence of the assessments that are done, so that they
have a little bit more validity, because that's also related to
what the financial liabilities are, as well. And so, if you
could shed some light on that, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Boesch. Sure. Ms. Edwards, first of all, you're right.
We did address this issue of the flow rate. First of all, with
respect to the flow rate estimates, they probably had
relatively little effect on the spill response, in terms of the
assets and resources that could be deployed. That's more of a
function of where the oil is going.
However, what we concluded is that there were two important
lessons from the underestimation of the flow rate for so long.
First is that it became very important to right-size and design
the containment effort. So, the initial efforts to try to
control and contain the well were doomed to failure, because
they assumed a lower flow rate. So for containment, it's really
important.
Secondly, for confidence of everyone that the government is
on top of this thing, that confidence is not diminished. And
so, for that reason alone.
And then finally, as you pointed out, the flow rate becomes
important with respect to the assessment of damages under the
Clean Water Act.
Mr. Garcia. And, Congresswoman, if I could just add, the
good news is that there are some very simple fixes that we have
suggested in our report that would allow the government and the
industry to be able to accurately estimate flow rates so that
you don't have this problem in the future. It's just a matter
of adding some simple instrumentation to the blow-out
preventer. And it is a relatively inexpensive fix.
Admiral Allen. Could I add a comment, please, ma'am?
Ms. Edwards. Sure, thank you.
Admiral Allen. First of all, I agree--very low-cost
investment. And sensors on the blow-out preventer will give you
an accurate flow rate without any big dispute, I think, among
the people that are involved. We have never had to deal with a
well blow-out at 5,000 feet, and having to establish a flow
rate. That had never been presented to any response in this
country in its history.
Into the response--when this became a matter of public
concern and political concern, I basically took that function
and gave it to the flow rate technical group, which is a spin-
off of our inter-agency solutions group that I established in
the national incident command, to have an independent
government way to assess that, with the means we had, lacking
the sensor data that should be in there, and that was due to
using the high-resolution video and other means. Once we did
that, that allows us to have a baseline to tell BP what
capability they had to build out, in terms of a containment.
Ms. Edwards. And then lastly, if one of you could please
comment on this question of kind of risk assessment and
contingency planning, because both the estimates--and when I
looked at the standards for what was essentially rubber-stamped
from MMS regarding the risk assessments, it almost seems as
though the industry could kind of put a risk assessment in
front of MMS, there were a few questions that were asked about
it, and they were all pretty much the same. And that, in
itself, I would guess, had to contribute tremendously to the
ability to project what the risk might be, and to establish
mechanisms that would allow for appropriate contingency
planning.
Mr. Garcia. Congresswoman, you're right. We have suggested
in the report that a better review be done of response plans. I
think you're referring to the fact that most of the companies
essentially Xeroxed and submitted boiler-plate to MMS for their
response plans. And neither the government nor the industry
apparently were paying attention, since they referenced species
that did not normally make their homes in the Gulf, such as
walruses. So, yes, a much better job needs to be done.
And again, it indicates the widespread failure of
oversight, as well as a complacency within the industry.
Mr. Boesch. This is very important, because we've gotten
some criticism for the use of the words ``systemic problems.''
And by systemic, we don't mean that all companies were equally
negligent as BP was. By ``systemic,'' we mean all companies
were using those same irrelevant plans. None of the companies
had a containment capacity. Any number of things were
widespread problems throughout not only the industry, but also
the regulatory regime.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you to the witnesses, particularly for the thoroughness and the
expeditious manner in which you got this report done. With that
I yield.
Mr. LoBiondo. OK. Mr. Landry?
Mr. Landry. Thank you all. I just got some important
questions. I want to kind of--let me just make a comment.
I appreciate you all continuing to edit your comments on
systemic. I think you should go back and look. And not all oil
companies designed and engineered their wells the same. So
you're getting there, Mr. Boesch.
Admiral Allen--you know, and I am--there are parts of this
report that I am interested in helping these guys implement,
and one of them concerns the safety of the workers. So I just
simply want to go back to those scenarios and ask you do you or
don't you believe that having stand-by vessels or a vessel
within at least an hour's time where there are drilling
activities or manned platforms, does that or does that not
create a safer environment for those workers?
Admiral Allen. Well, obviously, having a vessel standing by
is a safer environment.
Regarding the threshold requirements on when you would have
a vessel, I think those are the types of determinations that
would be made by the current ongoing joint investigation.
That's not only looking at how the incident occurred itself,
but the performance of the systems on the vessel, and the life-
saving systems on the rig itself. And I think those are logical
areas for inquiry, and where they need to be adjusted, as they
should be.
Mr. Landry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Larsen?
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just quickly here,
page 142 and 143 of the Commission report discussed the Jones
Act. You said, ``These restrictions on the Jones Act did not
even come into play for the vast majority of vessels operating
at the well head, because the act does not block foreign
vessels from loading and then unloading oil more than three
miles off the coast. When the act did apply, the national
incident commander appears to have granted waivers and
exemptions when requested.'' Did I read that accurately?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Page eight of your testimony,
Admiral, ``In reality, the Jones Act had no impact on response
operations.'' Did I read that accurately?
Admiral Allen. Yes.
Mr. Larsen. Did my reading of those accurate statements
accurately reflect your thoughts, as well?
Admiral Allen. Yes.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. With regards to oil spill response
recovery organizations, the OSROs, this is sort of the flip
side of this argument about Jones Act, about wanting to get
equipment in there, but then not really needing the equipment,
where the OSROs had equipment here in the U.S. And I wouldn't
say it was a scramble, but it was briefed by our folks in
Washington State and at district 13, and just trying to
identify who had what, what would be useful, and how soon can
you get it there without impacting state-based needs and
operations.
Do you have recommendations about the OSROs and oil spill
recovery organizations, and how they can fit in better and
create an inventory to know where this equipment is when we
need it?
Mr. Boesch. Well, I think we certainly do. And we identify,
first of all, the lack of capacity to have responded to
something which was so wide-scale and lasted so long by the
OSROs.
But also, related to that is our observations and
conclusions about the diminution or the lack of advancement of
the technology that they have used, and the degradation of
their assets and capacity, if they were mainly dealing with
smaller-scale activities on a more routine basis to then deal
with something of this consequence. They were clearly out-
gunned in that sense. And so we need a more effective way to do
that. Perhaps Admiral Allen has----
Admiral Allen. Sir, I think what you're referring to is we
actually went through an emergency rulemaking that allowed us
to lower the stand-by requirements for the conduct of
operations at facilities that had oil spill response equipment,
but could not legally move it because it was a condition of
operations.
Mr. Boesch. Right.
Admiral Allen. This became very, very complicated, because
the only way we could do that was actually to issue an
emergency Federal rule. And, even then, there were residual
issues with state law and state requirement, in some cases,
personal liabilities for operators of facilities, and even
commanding officers of naval installations, were they to give
that equipment up, and something were to occur.
I think, moving forward, we need to look at this, because
if you have a spill and you want to bring all available means,
we have emergency compacts between states that allow movement
of resources when they need that. I think there needs to be a
measured discussion and an evaluation of how we can do that.
And that's the reason I said if there is a national
incident commander designated, there should be a presidential
designation. And with that should come the authority to move
those resources, if it is needed, without going through an
emergency rulemaking process. That said, I think we all need to
understand the threshold of what needs to stay behind, so you
have a minimum level to respond, if you do have an incident.
Mr. Larsen. Something along the lines of when the National
Guard might move from one state to the next for firefighting to
help with a mutual aid type of situation.
Admiral Allen. Exactly, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Yes, yes. With regards to the Arctic, I will
talk to Mr. Young afterwards, so I want to be sure I'm not--we
have a good relationship, and I want to be sure I talk to him
about these questions, so--I want to be clear about it.
But he mentioned the leasing of ice breakers. From whom
could we lease ice breakers for the Arctic operations, if we
had to lease?
Admiral Allen. Well, sir, if I could just take one step
back, there is a de factor implicit assumption in his statement
that we need ice breaking capability. How you source that,
whether you build an ice breaker or lease an ice breaker, is a
second step. We haven't even gotten to the point in this
country where we have recognized that there is a capability
requirement, and we need to do something about that. The lease
is just one way you could remedy that.
I tried unsuccessfully for four years to get this on a
national agenda to talk about this, because we have--we will
have no floating capability to exert command and control from
Point Barrow, unless we have an ship that's capable of doing
that. And a lease could be one way. I really think that we
probably need to have organic capability inside the United
States to do that.
But regardless of that, the real issue is nobody is talking
about the ice breaker capability problem, and it's sitting
there, staring us right in the face, sir.
Mr. Larsen. But just to be clear, I understand Russia,
China, Sweden all have ice breakers, probably none of whom
would be willing to loan them to us or lease them to us unless
they can recover the dollars for the lack of opportunity that
they would have to use them for the same functions we would
want to use them for.
Admiral Allen. The National Science Foundation routinely
leases foreign vessels to break out McMurdo for the annual
resupply, and to stop using U.S. ice breakers.
Mr. Larsen. Yes, yes. I have other questions.
Mr. LoBiondo. Blake, you have anything?
Mr. Farenthold. No.
Mr. LoBiondo. Go ahead, Rick.
Mr. Larsen. On the capacity of response in the Arctic, can
you comment on our capacity to respond to a situation in the
Arctic, separate from an ice breaker issue?
Admiral Allen. I would be happy to.
Mr. Larsen. Planes, trains, and automobiles. What do you
have? What's going on?
Admiral Allen. If I could specifically--I'm trying not to
infer from the fact of whether or not there is response
capability, there should be a decision on whether or not to
drill, and these gentlemen have already stated that themselves.
Mr. Larsen. Absolutely.
Admiral Allen. My premise has always been, in my four years
as commandant--because we moved assets to the north slope of
Alaska in the summer to see how they operate--is the lack of
infrastructure, footprint, and accessibility by equipment up
there to be able to stage a response and use command and
control that you need to do to do that.
If you were to go to Robert, Louisiana, New Orleans, Houma,
Louisiana, or Mobile, and looked at the command posts that were
established to try and deal with this oil spill, there is no
place on the north slope of Alaska to put something like that.
And I am differentiating what an oil exploration company might
have out there, in terms of response vessels. The oversight
that has to be done, the burning, access to airstrips, all-
weather aircraft, all those are issues that come into play on
the north slope of Alaska.
And, from my standpoint as a former commandant, my concern
was if I am held accountable to conduct a type of oversight
that was basically pulled through a knothole by this
Commission, there is a lack of a footprint up there to do that.
This is independent of the merits associated with the oil and
gas exploration.
Mr. Larsen. Absolutely. Thank you. I want to be clear. I
was not implying that trains and automobiles would be part of
the response up there. I was only trying to talk about the
broad range of infrastructure necessary for the response. For
the record, everybody. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo. Admiral Allen--and we talked about this a
little bit--the Oil Pollution Act required the Federal
Government to conduct exercises every three years to be
prepared, and we think that was a good idea.
Was the failure of these officials to participate in the
March 2010 a missed opportunity for them to better understand
how oil spill response functions under the national contingency
plans would work, in your view?
Admiral Allen. I do believe it was a missed opportunity,
but I think we need to take a look at whether or not this was a
problem of omission or commission.
You know, in Washington we are under siege of the--this was
not a tier one exercise and did not technically require the
participation of cabinet-level officers. So there was basically
no foul, but we gained no real benefit from having those folks
exposed to the doctrine.
My recommendation contained in my testimony is to hold
another drill within one year, have cabinet-level officials
involved, and let's immediately test the premises and the
notions that are contained in the Commission report, and what
comes out of these investigations. Let's not wait through the
cycle, let's do one and figure out whether or not we've fixed
the problem, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. I don't want to second-guess what you might
say, but if the officials, whoever these officials may be, had
participated, that could have affected in a more positive way
the response?
Admiral Allen. Well, you just have to look at who was
called in when this event occurred. When the rig sunk on the
22nd of April, 2 hours later myself, Secretary Napolitano, and
the cabinet were in the Oval Office, briefing the President on
what had happened.
The people that were in the office having that discussion
were not the people--because it was not a tier one exercise--
that would have been involved in the spill of national
significance drill in March. That's the reason my premise would
be moving forward to schedule another drill and make it a tier
one exercise in which cabinet-level officials would
participate.
Mr. LoBiondo. Ms. Edwards?
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To Commissioners
Boesch and Garcia, you have made some significant
recommendations that really go to what you have indicated--the
Commission had indicated--as deep failures in oversight and the
regulatory structure. And you've made some very significant
recommendations to improve the regulatory structure.
I wonder if you could comment, please, as we are in an
environment in which there are deep cuts proposed to some of
the agencies that you believe, in your report, need to step up,
in terms of their oversight of this industry and the process at
the Department of Interior, at NOAA, at EPA, and Coast Guard.
Do you believe there is any inconsistency in the deep cuts
that are recommended in these agencies and the ability of the
agencies then to fulfill the recommendations you have made to
prevent both the safety concerns and environmental concerns
that might come to pass if there were another spill of this
kind of national significance?
Mr. Garcia. We certainly have indicated that changes need
to be made in the agencies, and that they need to be adequately
funded. One of the problems for the MMS was that it was
underfunded and undermanned and, thus, incapable of effectively
and fully overseeing this industry.
Now, we have suggested that the new BOEMRE be funded
through fees that the industry pays--I mean right now, the
industry is paying just a tiny fraction of that agency's
relatively small budget. And it would not be unreasonable for
the industry, which is reaping large benefits from this
resource, to pick up the cost of a competent and effective
regulator.
Ms. Edwards. Dr. Boesch, do you have any comment?
Mr. Boesch. Yes, we have been through this together, we
think alike, and we just about finish each other's sentences,
but one thing just to add to that is that the Secretary of the
Interior had requested of Congress an appropriation for fiscal
year 2011 to enhance the capacity of BOEMRE to meet these high
standards and to process these applications.
And so, the lack of those funds obviously presents a
handicap, not only to implementing our recommendations, but to
getting the industry back to business.
Ms. Edwards. If the Congress is unable or unwilling to
impose the fees that you have--that are recommended, then
inevitably, the cuts that are proposed for the agencies that
would have oversight and responsibility in this regulatory
framework would simply be unable to implement the regulations
that you put forward, opening us up--if you could, comment on
it--opening us up to the possibility that we would have another
spill in deep water that we would be unable to clean up, and
that we will not have been able to properly project.
Mr. Garcia. Yes. Congresswoman, I would just say that this
spill has cost us tens of billions of dollars. And the final
price tab is not in yet. So, to the extent that a failure to
properly regulate the industry would result from inadequate
funding, that would be a tragedy.
Ms. Edwards. Yes, and just to conclude and I will yield my
time, I mean it does strike me that there is a very significant
inconsistency in our desire to make sure that both industry and
commerce are not impacted by a spill of this kind of
significance in the future, ff we are unwilling, in the
Congress, to do what it takes to make sure that the resources
are in place so that our agencies can fulfill their
obligations. And with that, I will yield.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Landry, are you looking for more time?
Mr. Landry. I just wanted to address the gentleman from
Washington's comment and ask Mr. Allen----
Mr. LoBiondo. Because if you have additional questions, I
am going to submit--I am going to suggest----
Mr. Landry. Sure.
Mr. LoBiondo [continuing]. You submit them for the record.
Mr. Landry. Sure.
Mr. LoBiondo. I don't want to cut anybody off, but we could
go on for a long time, and I think we need to wind it up.
[No response.]
Mr. LoBiondo. OK. I want to thank the panel very much. I
hope--well, we appreciate it. This was very informative.
The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]