[H.A.S.C. No. 112–11]

HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEARING HELD
MARCH 2, 2011

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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. “BUCK” MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Committee come to order. Good morning. Thank you for joining us as we consider the fiscal year 2012 budget request for the Department of the Army. Secretary McHugh, General Casey, thank you both for being here. As I have said before, we are very fortunate to have both of you serving our country. Secretary McHugh, once again you find yourself in the hot seat. Nine-term member of Congress and this committee’s former ranking member. I am sure glad you moved over there. General Casey said, “Me too.” So that is—

Secretary McHUGH. Mr. McKeon, not more than I.

The CHAIRMAN. I don’t know—oh.

Secretary McHUGH. I guess I should say I am glad as well. So it is all worked out fine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Without a doubt, whether a member of this committee or as the 21st Secretary of the Army, you are a staunch advocate for soldiers and their families. We on the Armed Services Committee are very proud of you and of your achievements and the things that you are doing there and we thank you for your public service.

General Casey, you are also no stranger to this committee. I want to take a moment to mention that this will be your last Army posture hearing. Thirtieth vice chief of staff, commander multinational force Iraq, 36th chief of staff, over 40 years of selfless military service to this Nation. Pretty good for a guy that wasn’t going to go into the Service.

I know you still have much that you want to accomplish in your time as Army chief of staff, but I thank you and your wife, Sheila, for your service to our country, for the leadership that you have provided for our Army and for all of the soldiers that have served under you during those 40 years and the ones that you served under. Great tradition. Thank you very much.

General CASEY. Thank you, Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. I would like to mention that the ranking member and I recently had the pleasure to visit with soldiers at Fort Lewis in Mr. Smith's District and the National Training Center in my district along with several members of our committee. While at the NTC [National Training Center], we were able to observe the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division as they trained for their upcoming deployment to Afghanistan.

I want to mention that one of the things that I have been very concerned about is IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] and I thought we just weren't doing enough no matter what we are doing, but I was very impressed both there and at Fort Lewis where we observed the 3rd and 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Teams for the 2nd Infantry Division. Excellent training they were getting to prepare them for IEDs and the things that are being done to interdict the—get rid of the financier or get rid of the builder or all the things that are being done by other—the Marines, also.

We went to the Mountain Warfare Center in the Sierras and saw them and it was a great visit, but the soldiers that we saw training were getting excellent training and I am sure it will save lives as they arrive in Afghanistan. It is on trips like these and similar trips to Iraq and Afghanistan that we are reminded why hearings such as this one are so important because you just don't go to war with the Army you have. You go to war with an Army who was resourced, hopefully properly, with personnel and equipment provided by the United States Congress, by the United States people.

As our former chairman, the great Ike Skelton used to say, “The buck stops here,” and I am sure he wasn’t talking about me. To that end, I remain concerned about the reduction of an additional $78 billion from the Department's funding top line including the $13 billion cut in 2012 ultimately leading to a zero-percent real growth within 3 years. The Army's share of the Department's efficiency savings is $29 billion including $2.7 billion in the 2012 budget request.

We are told that the Army has been allowed to reinvest all of the $2.7 billion. However, when you compare the Army's base budget and the supplemental budget request from 2011 to 2012, this budget request is almost $50 billion less.

I understand that the primary reason for the reduction is based on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by this year by the end of December. Clearly, there was a need to move overseas contingency operations funding into the base budget, but we need assurances that the Army was able to migrate everything they needed from the supplemental into the base, particularly as it relates to taking care of soldiers and the reset of equipment.

Likewise, as Congress must learn more about the proposed end strength reductions for the Army, the Army has borne the brunt of two wars for the past decade and hasn’t reached its objectives for Active Component dwell time of one-to-three. In fact, the proposed end strength reductions appear to force the Army to settle for only a one-to-two dwell time. I would like to know why.

In short, I cannot in good conscience ask the Army to do more with less. Again, I thank both of you for your service to our country and for being here today. Ranking Member Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 51.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to echo your comments in support of—and thanks for—our two men testifying today. Secretary McHugh, it is a great honor serving with you on this committee for a long time. It is great to have you over there. You certainly understand this committee and you understand the Pentagon as well. You are in the perfect position. You have been great to work with as Secretary of the Army and as a member of the committee, and it is a real asset for our country to have you there. It is great to see you back here today.

And General Casey, congratulations on a great, great term of service to your country. It has been great working with you. I know you will miss these hearings more than anything, but we appreciate your hard work on behalf of the Army and yes, I say that facetiously, but appreciate the work you do in presenting this. And it has been a great relationship, I believe, between this committee and yourself. You have always done a great job of reaching out to individual members, making sure that we are informed and, you know, giving us a chance to understand the issues that are so important.

So you will be missed and we appreciate your great service to your country. And also as I said, your work with this committee specifically has been outstanding and I have appreciated it as I know other members have as well. And as we go forward into this posture hearing, there are a lot of transitions coming. As the chairman mentioned, there is talk about what the future of force structure should be as drawdowns continue in Iraq and hopefully at some point begin to happen in Afghanistan.

What does that mean for the Army? But I want to assure you and all those listening to this committee—focusing on the fact that your Army is in the fight and protecting those who are in the fight is our top priority. We still have, you know, 50,000 troops overall in Iraq and in Afghanistan we still have 100,000 and they are, in many cases, in the midst of a very, very difficult fight and this committee's top priority is to make sure that they are equipped and have the support that they need to prosecute that fight to the best of their ability.

Now, the chairman mentioned what is, you know, our top priority and that is IEDs. That still causes the most casualties over there and I do want to also compliment both of you for the work you have done, you know? Every Army base that I have been to, you know, they take you to the IED training and they are everyday learning directly from what is happening over there taking it back, training the soldiers so that they will be best prepared when they get over there to deal with that threat. It is a constantly evolving threat, but you are evolving with it in a way that has unquestionably saved lives of our soldiers.

And we appreciate that work and this committee—well, again, anything we can do to help in that area we want to do. We know
how important it is. And then the major challenge going forward is the transition as we get back, as we begin to draw down. What does that mean for the size of the force? I think the chairman asks the appropriate questions. What is the mission set that is going to be asked of our soldiers and is the force the proper size to meet that? How do we get back into a more regular training mission for all the threats that come at us instead of just sort of responding as quickly as we have to the immediate threats?

Now, what should that look like? It is not easy to tell. How do we get the dwell times back up so we can deal with some of the stress on the force that I know, General Casey, you have talked about a great deal. Those are questions we need to answer and we look forward to hearing from you today on how we should go about meeting those threats.

In particular, we are also focused on PTSD [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder] and traumatic brain injury, some of the things that have more long-term impacts. How are we preparing to do that? And I will say that when I was down at Fort Hood a few weeks ago, I was very impressed with the overall preparation for how you deal with the stresses and strains on the force. I think you are making a great deal of progress on that and we look forward to being as supportive as we possibly can.

And lastly is the modernization of the force. I know we had some significant struggles with the future combat systems which I believe we are pulling our way out of and I thank both of you for your leadership on that. We do need to update, modernize and better equip our infantry brigades. Now, the core of that is the network.

How do we make sure that the soldiers get the information when they need it? How can we give them total situational awareness? You have to have the proper network to do that. I think we have learned a lot of hard lessons in the acquisition process about how to do that better, how to acquire equipment in the future, hopefully in a more cost-effective manner that gets there more quickly.

But I believe we are making progress on that. I thank both of you. I also thank General Crowley, whom I have worked with very closely on some of these issues, for making that progress.

I look forward to continuing to support that effort because unquestionably, you know, information warfare places a great deal more challenges on all of our services, but on the Army in particular to make sure they have the best equipment when they need it. You can’t go through a 2-year—the normal acquisition process in some cases to make sure you have that equipment because by the time you get to the end of it, it is already 2 or 3 years out of date.

So we have learned some good lessons there. I think we are making progress. And again, I look forward to working with you and this committee as always stands ready to support you in any way that we can. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 53.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The Honorable John McHugh, Secretary of the Army, and General George W. Casey, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Secretary McHUGH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of—from a somewhat prejudiced view what I believe is certainly the leading committee in the United States House of Representatives. It is great to be back here, although I enjoyed the view sitting up there looking down here better. It is terrific to see so many not old, but long-standing friends and colleagues and to see so many new members here who have stepped forward to serve on this great committee, and I commend them for that action and look forward to working with them as well.

I should note—on a sad comment. It pains all of us. I know that Congresswoman Gabby Giffords is not with us here today. I have to tell you from my experience working with her, she was one of the most determined and capable legislators in the House, but really a tireless champion for the men and women who wore the uniform of this Nation.

And, in fact, she was one of the first members of Congress to call me after I had been confirmed into this post and she offered her congratulations, but she just happened to take the opportunity to talk about the great men and women of Fort Huachuca, which is in her district, of course.

And I remember thinking very clearly that that is Gabby, always taking the opportunity to look out for soldiers and their families and certainly everyone in the Army family joins me in wishing her a speedy recovery and we look forward to seeing her back in her rightful place on this distinguished committee. And our thoughts and prayers go out as well to those innocent victims of that tragic day, and may they quickly find peace and comfort in the days ahead.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to join with you in recognizing this great soldier on my left. As you mentioned, this is the last time—at least he hopes it is the last time that he will appear before this committee as the chief of staff of our great Army. It is a career that has spanned four distinguished decades and he has held numerous positions at every level, but one thing has remained constant through all of those positions. He has done the right thing for our soldiers and their families and he has had a tireless determination to serve our Nation.

And I can tell you that over the last nearly 18 months, George and I have not only operated as partners, but I think we have become close friends in spite of the fact that he is a Boston Red Sox fan. So I do look forward to working with another exceptional leader, the presidential nominee, General Marty Dempsey, should the Senate so concur, but the Army, this Nation, and I will truly miss George and Sheila. They are great Americans.

I want to thank—

General CASEY. I thought you were going to propose. I get constructive credit for the hearing.

Secretary McHUGH. No, I wasn't, but nice try. I want to thank each of you for your steadfast support of our 1.1 million soldiers, 279,000 civilians and their families. With the leadership and great support of this Congress and particularly this committee, America's
Army continues to be at the forefront of combat counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and security assistance operations in nearly 80 countries around the world.

In Iraq, our soldiers and civilians began one of the largest and most complex logistical operations in our Nation’s history. As we continue to draw down our forces to meet the December 31, 2011, deadline, we have already closed or transferred over 80 percent of the bases that we maintained to the Iraqi authorities. We have reduced the number of U.S. personnel by over 75,000 and we have redeployed some 26,000 vehicles back to other operations.

Having recently visited Iraq for my 16th time just last January, I can validate firsthand the true enormity of the retrograde operations and the exceptionally high morale of the forces remaining as they continue to advise, assist, and train Iraqis to support that still-burgeoning democracy.

Simultaneous with the drawdown operations, the Army has surged an additional 30,000 soldiers to Afghanistan to defeat the Al Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban insurgency. This surge enabled our soldiers and our Afghan partners to seize multiple sanctuaries in the traditional insurgent heartland of Southern Afghanistan.

Additionally, during this past year, our forces have trained some 109,000 Afghan National Army soldiers as well as 41,000 Afghan National Police, yet overseas contingency operations are only one part of the Army’s diverse requirements. Our soldiers and civilians from all Army Components remain committed to protecting our homeland not only from the threat of enemies who would harm us, but also from the ravages of natural and manmade disasters.

From National Guard soldiers assisting with drug enforcement and border security to the Army Corps of Engineers responding to the catastrophic oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, America’s Army has been there to support local, State and Federal partners in saving, protecting and caring for our citizens.

Clearly, over the last year America’s Army has seen extraordinary success in one of the most dynamic, dangerous and complex operational environments in our Nation’s history, and yet our challenges have not been reserved solely for combat or the protection of disaster relief.

For just as our soldiers and civilians conducted multiple operations here and around the world, the Army simultaneously continued its far-reaching efforts to modernize equipment, transform units and complete the unprecedented consolidations required under the round of base closure and realignment.

As the Army continues to fight global terrorists and regional insurgents, we must be ever mindful of the future and future enemies such as—threats and hostile state actors that we may well face. It is vital, therefore, that we have a modernization program, one that provides our soldiers with a full array of equipment necessary to maintain a decisive advantage over the enemies we are fighting today and to also ensure that we can deter and defeat tomorrow’s threats at a price that we can afford.

Our fiscal year 2012 budget request is critical to achieving this goal by supporting the extraordinary strides being made in the Army state-of-the-art network tactical wheel vehicle and combat
vehicle modernization programs. Regarding the network, we are requesting $974 million in procurement and $298 million in research and development for the Warfighter Information Network–Tactical, WIN–T, which will become the cornerstone of our battlefield communication systems as the distinguished ranking member had mentioned.

This budget request also contains $2.1 billion in procurement for joint and combat communication systems including the Joint Tactical Radio System better known as JTRS. As we look to modernize our wheeled and combat vehicle fleets, we are asking for $1.5 billion for Tactical Wheeled Vehicle modernization and $1.04 billion in support of the Army's combat vehicle modernization strategy including $884 million for the Ground Combat Vehicle and $156 million for the modernization of the Stryker, Bradley and Abrams programs.

Along with advances and equipment, the Army is seeking new methods to use and secure our scarce energy resources. Clearly, future operations will depend on our ability to reduce dependency, increase efficiency and use more renewable or alternative sources of energy. We have made great strides in this area and we intend to do more.

The Army has established a senior energy council, appointed a senior energy executive, created an energy security office and adopted a comprehensive strategy for energy security. Based on this strategy, we are developing more efficient generators and power distribution platforms factoring in fuel cost as a part of equipment modernizations in developing a net-zero approach to holistically address our installation's energy, water and waste needs.

In May 2010, the chief and I commissioned an unprecedented blue ribbon panel review of the Army's acquisition systems from cradle to grave. We are currently reviewing the panel's insightful report and we will use it as a guide over the next 2 years to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Army acquisition process, but we didn't stop there.

To ensure that we purchased the right equipment to meet the needs of our soldiers, we instituted a series of capability portfolio reviews to examine all existing Army requirements and terminate programs that we judged to be redundant, didn't work or which are just too expensive.

These broad-based reviews have already helped us to identify key gaps and unnecessary redundancies while promoting good stewardship of our Nation's resources. We remain committed to using every effort to obtain the right systems, supplies and services at the right time and at the most cost-effective streamlined manner. Our soldiers and the taxpayers deserve no less. We look forward to working closely with this committee as we continue to implement these sweeping challenges.

Throughout it all, at its heart, the Army is people. Although our soldiers and civilians are better trained, led and equipped and more capable than ever before, our forces are clearly stretched and our personnel are strained from a decade of war. This is evidenced by yet another year of discouraging rates of suicide and high-risk behavior, not only among members of the regular Army, but the Reserve Components as well.
In response and in the direct supervision of our Vice Chief of Staff, General Pete Chiarelli, the Army completed an unprecedented 15-month study to better understand suicide and related actions amongst our soldiers. In July, we published the first-ever health-promotion, risk-reduction, and suicide-prevention report. Very, very candid assessment designed to assist our leaders in recognizing and reducing high-risk behavior as well as the stigma associated with behavioral health care.

The lessons from this holistic review have been infused into every level of command and incorporated throughout our efforts to strengthen the resiliency of our soldiers’ families and civilians.

Moreover, our fiscal year 2012 budget requests $1.7 billion to fund vital soldier and family programs to provide the full range of essential services to include Army campaigns for health promotion, risk reduction and suicide prevention, sexual harassment and assault response and prevention, and comprehensive soldier fitness.

In addition, this funding supports family services including morale welfare and recreation programs, the youth services and childcare. Survivor outreach services and education and employment opportunities for family members are funded in this manner as well. Caring for our personnel and their families goes beyond mental, physical and emotional health. We are also committed to protecting their safety both at home and abroad from internal and external threats.

As part of our continuing efforts to learn and adopt and adapt from the Fort Hood shooting, the Army has instituted a number of key programs to enhance awareness reporting prevention and response to such threats. Finally, I would be remiss if I didn’t mention the devastating impact of the continuing resolution on each of the programs that I have mentioned as well as dozens of others.

From modernization to MILCON [Military Construction] to family services and base operation support, the lack of a fiscal year 2011 budget is adversely affecting critical needs and projects that support our soldiers and their families, not to mention delaying long-term requirements of the Department writ large.

Let me close by mentioning my deep appreciation and admiration for all those who wear the Army uniform as well as the great civilians who work day in and day out to support them. Daily, I am reminded that these heroes make enormous sacrifices in defense of the Nation, sacrifices that simply can’t be measured accurately. Moreover, I know that each of you as members of this great committee play a key role in the success of that Army. Your efforts and your support ensure that our soldiers, civilians and Army families receive their critical resources and authorities they need. We cannot do it without you.

So from the bottom of my heart, thank you. I deeply appreciate the opportunity to be with you here today and I look forward to the rest of the hearing. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary McHugh and General Casey can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. General.
STATEMENT OF GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

General CASEY. Thank you, Chairman, Congressman Smith, members of the committee. I am trying to keep a straight face, but being here for the last time is not all it is cut out to be. I will just tell you that. But it is a great opportunity for me to talk to you about the progress that we have made in the Army over the last decade.

I would echo the Secretary’s comments on Congresswoman Giffords and add my wishes for her speedy recovery and her return to this chamber. And if you would indulge me, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce some guests here today who represent the men and women of this great Army. First of all, if you just would stand up there, if you would, Ruth. Ruth Stoneseifer. Ruth’s son, Christopher, was killed in a helicopter crash along the Afghan-Pakistan border in 2001 and Ruth has committed herself since to helping other surviving spouses.

She has recently completed a tour as the director of the Gold Star Mother’s Foundation for the last year. So thank you very much, Ruth. Sitting next to her is First Sergeant Damien Anderson. He is first sergeant from the old guard, but he has recently completed a 10-day master resilience trainer course at the University of Pennsylvania and master resilience trainers are part of our key program to give our soldiers, civilians and family members the skills they need to deal with the coming challenges of the next decade. So thank you very much, First Sergeant.

And lastly, Sergeant Joe Duasante. In 2007, Sergeant Duasante was severely wounded and lost his right leg. He has been working actually here in our legislative liaison office while he has been completing the 2-year recovery. The good news is he has completed that recovery and will leave this summer to go to our airborne school as a member of the cadre down at Fort Benning, Georgia. So thank you very much.

Now, if I may, Mr. Chairman, for the past 4 years, you have heard me say that the Army was out of balance, that we were so weighed down by our current commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan that we couldn’t do the things that we knew we needed to do to sustain this all-volunteer force for the long haul and to prepare to do other things. Today, thanks in large measure to the sustained support from this committee, I can tell you that we have made great progress toward the goals that we set for ourselves in 2007 and as an Army, we are starting to breathe again.

We are emerging from a decade of war and transformation with a well-equipped, combat-seasoned total force that, while still stretched by the demands and lingering effects of a decade at war, is able to begin preparing for the challenges of the second decade of the 21st Century. And let me just quickly update you on some of that progress. First, we have completed both the permanent end strength increase that was directed by President Bush in 2007 and the temporary end strength increase of 22,000 authorized by Secretary Gates in 2009.

This allowed us to meet the plus-up in Afghanistan before we departed Iraq without having to increase deployed time for our soldiers. I know there is a concern about the condition-based reduc-
tions planned for our end strengths that were announced by Secretary Gates a few weeks ago, but I can tell you that I believe that if the drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan go as planned, that it is prudent to begin planning to reduce the size of the Army in 2015 and we need to do that to facilitate sustaining a balanced force, one that is both the right size to meet our national security strategy at an appropriate deployment tempo, but that is also well trained, well equipped and well supported.

In a time of war, we just can’t afford anything less. Second, our growth plus the drawdown in Iraq enabled us to significantly improve dwell, and by dwell I mean the time at home between deployments. This is a critical component of sustaining an all-volunteer force in a protracted conflict. For the better part of 5 years, we were returning soldiers to combat after only 1 year at home and we knew that wasn’t sustainable and had been working to bring dwell to 2 years at home as quickly as possible.

I will tell you that beginning the 1st of October this year, given what we know about the projected demands, our Active units who deploy after the 1st of October will deploy with an expectation of having 2 years at home when they return. Our Guard and Reserve units will deploy with an expectation of having 4 years at home when they return. We have worked very hard to get to this point and it is a significant accomplishment because all of our studies tell us that it takes 24 to 36 months to recover from a 1-year combat deployment. It just does. We are human beings.

And turning faster than that accelerates the cumulative effects. I would tell you that we will continue to work toward our long-term goal of 3 years at home between combat deployments. Third, this year we will also complete the largest organizational transformation of the Army since World War II. We will finish the modular conversion of all but a handful of our 300 brigades and finish rebalancing soldiers out of Cold War skills into skills that are more relevant and more necessary today. That is to the tune of about 150,000 to 160,000 soldiers.

Taken together, it is a fundamentally different Army than it was on September 11, 2001, and we had a great Army then, but today, we are a much more versatile and experienced force. Fourth, to enhance this versatility, we have developed a fundamentally different way of building readiness in providing trained and ready forces to combatant commanders, and I think you have heard about it, but we call it the Army Force Generation Model.

It is an output readiness model that fully integrates the Guard and Reserve, that brings the kind of predictability we need to sustain our all-volunteer force, and that allows us to build the readiness we need to both meet current demands and to hedge against unexpected contingencies. ARFORGEN [Army Force Generation] is also a more effective and more efficient way of building the readiness we need when we need it.

So if you add all of these things up, accelerated growth, increased dwell, transformation and the ARFORGEN readiness model, together they begin to allow us to restore some strategic flexibility, the capability to provide trained and ready forces to all combatant commanders for operations across the spectrum of conflict.
So after a decade of very hard work, we have a force that is the right size, that is organized in versatile modular formations on a predictable rotational cycle, and that has sufficient time at home to begin training for the full range of missions and to recover from a decade at war. This would not have been possible without your support and the support of the American people. So thank you.

Now, this fiscal year 2012 budget marks a transition point in which we can begin shifting our focus from restoring balance to sustaining the balance that we together have so painstakingly restored to this force. Sustaining that balance is critically important because this war is not over by any stretch of the imagination. The fiscal year 2012 budget that we are presenting today enables us to maintain our combat edge, to reset and reconstitute our force, to continue to deal with the impacts of a decade at war, and to build the resilience into this force for the second decade.

I would like to say a few words about each of those, but in short, this budget enables us to sustain the balance that we have restored to this great Army. First, maintaining our combat edge. It is important that we maintain the edge that we have honed over a decade at war and we will do that through continuous adaptation, affordable modernization, tough, demanding training for the full range of missions, and by sustaining the gains that we have made in our Reserve Components.

Last week, Secretary Gates said that, “We were an institution transformed by war.” He is absolutely right and I talked about that transformation a few minutes ago, but I believe that we are in a period of continuous and fundamental change driven by rapid technological advances and adaptive enemies. Critical to our ability to maintain our edge will be an affordable modernization strategy that provides the equipment that gives our soldiers a decisive advantage over any enemy that they face.

This budget lays out such a plan and I would like just to highlight two key areas and reinforce what the Secretary said. No matter where our soldiers are operating, they need to know where they are, they need to know where their buddies are, they need to know where the enemy is and when they shoot at the enemy, they need to strike them with precision. They will also need protected mobility.

This budget contains funding that will begin the fielding of some key elements of the network that will enable our soldiers in any—enable our soldiers in any environment and these include the Joint Tactical Radio System and the Warfighter Information Network. It also includes funding for a new ground combat vehicle that provides protection against IEDs, that has the capacity to carry a nine-man squad and is capable of operating across the spectrum of operations, and we also hope that it can be developed in 7 years.

Maintaining our combat edge also requires training for the full spectrum of operations. This training is conducted both at home stations and at our combat training centers, and it will be critical to ensuring that we sustain our combat experience and restore the ability to rapidly deploy for the full range of missions. It will require moving operations and maintenance dollars from OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] to the base over the next several years.
It will also be important to consolidate the gains that we made in our Reserve Components. Think about it. Half of our guardsmen and reservists are combat veterans. Half of the general officers in the Guard and Reserve are combat veterans. I have never seen a relationship between the Active and Reserve Component forces better than it is now, and we are working together to establish an effective paradigm that allows us to leverage our substantial investments and the substantial experience of the Reserve Components.

Second point, reconstituting the force. I see two elements to this. One is the continuous reset of forces returning from Afghanistan and Iraq. We have got over 110,000 soldiers there today and they and their replacements and their equipment will need to be reset over time. Reset isn’t a one-time shot. It is a process that is necessary for every returning unit, and it will require sustained funding for 2 to 3 years after we are out of Iraq and Afghanistan to ensure that we reconstitute the force fully and restore readiness into our next to deploy forces. We haven’t had that ability in 5 or 6 years, and so it is important that we restore that readiness.

The third critical element for us is building resilience into the force for the long haul. We have been at war for almost a decade. The cumulative effects are still with us and they are going to be with us for a while. Think about it.

More than 4,000 soldiers killed, leaving more than 20,000 family members.

Over 29,000 soldiers wounded, 8,000 of them significantly enough to require long-term care.

Over 100,000 soldiers diagnosed with traumatic brain injury. Fortunately, greater than 90 percent are moderate or mild.

Forty thousand soldiers diagnosed with post-traumatic stress, and over 30,000 soldiers processed through our warrior transition units.

This budget contains funding for programs like the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness, health promotion, risk reduction, suicide prevention, the Army Family Covenant, survivor outreach services and sexual assault prevention that will allow us to continue to build resilience into this force for the second decade. We remain, as I know you do, committed to the well-being of our soldiers, families and civilians.

So in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to leave the committee with two thoughts as I complete over 40 years of service to this great country. First, we are at a key transition point here as we move from a decade of war and transformation to a decade of sustaining a force at war in a period of declining resources. Together, we have built a great Army, but it is an Army still stretched and recovering from the last decade of war and it continues to prosecute a war in two theaters.

It took us a decade to get where we are today and we recognize that the country is in a difficult fiscal position, and we have and will continue to work hard to use the resources that you provide us as effectively and as efficiently as possible, but we are at war and this war is not over. So we need to proceed with caution because the last thing any of us want to do is to create a hollow Army while we are fighting a war.
And second, Mr. Chairman, is to thank the members of this committee for your enduring support of our Army. You have visited our troops and their families at home and at war, you have helped us bury our dead and you have seen firsthand through all this change, hardship and demands of war. What has remained constant is the courage, the selfless service and the sacrifice of our soldiers, our families and Army civilians.

I couldn’t be more proud to have worn this uniform for the past 40 years and to have served alongside the men and women of this great Army. I am humbled and particularly proud to have led them in this last decade. It has been the greatest honor of my career. So thank you very much and I look forward to taking your questions.

[The joint prepared statement of General Casey and Secretary McHugh can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. General Casey, just a couple of things about the end strength. I would like to understand the relationship between the current requirement for BCTs [Brigade Combat Teams] and the cut to the end strength of 27,000 soldiers. Did the Army propose the cut or was it imposed on the Army? If it was the result of an in-depth Army analysis, I would like to hear when that analysis took place and what the results were. If the analysis has not yet taken place, does the Army have assurances that the Department of Defense will restore the funding required that the analysis suggests a lesser reduction is appropriate?

General CASEY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. First of all, we did not propose the cuts. They were given to us by—from the Department of Defense. We were informed of them before they were announced, but we did not participate in the development. But last July, I went to the Secretary of Defense and I laid out for him what I thought the Army needed to do in the next 5 years and the majority of that was in the next 3 years to get this force back and to reset it and reconstitute it.

And I told them that to do that, I needed to hold the end strength of the Army and the access of the Guard and Reserve constant through fiscal year 2014. And he basically supported me in that with this decision. Now, as I said in my testimony, I see this end strength reduction as conditions-based and the Secretary established those conditions. If the assumptions don’t hold, then I am sure the Secretary and my successor will feel very comfortable coming back to the Secretary and saying, “This won’t work.”

But I think it is important as we look at this to remember that we need a balanced Army coming out the other end and if we hold the end strength too high, we run the risk of having a big hollow force like the Army I came into. So it is going to take some good analysis and some good interaction between the committee and us as we go forward so that we come out of this with the right size Army that can meet demands at an appropriate tempo and is also well equipped, well trained and well maintained. John, you want——

Secretary McHUGH. If I may, Mr. Chairman, first of all, I associate myself with the comments of the chief. While we didn’t participate, certainly from my perspective, we were given ample opportunity to come in and to talk to both the programmers and the Secretary as to the way ahead and from my perspective, as I look at
the direction we are on a path to take, both with respect to a total
drawdown in Iraq at the end of this calendar year and the way for-
ward that the President has laid down in his responsibilities as the
Commander in Chief. Beginning to withdraw out of Afghanistan in
numbers yet to be determined beginning in 2014, this is a support-
able position and the budget that underpins it is appropriately
arrayed, particularly as the chief said with respect to ensuring that
we have an end strike number that is supported robustly by the
kinds of training equipment and support programs that are nec-
essary to keep it from being hollow, something that some of the
older amongst us in this room had gone through before in our over-
sight role and something we very much want to resist, and both
the Secretary of Defense and the President are ever mindful of
that.

The old adage, “Man plans, God laughs” is always true. I remem-
ber in my role early on, in listening to four administrations come
to this committee and lay out their 5-year programs, I told them
I just pray to God that someday before I die I am allowed to live
in an out-year. I mean, as the President has said and as the Sec-
retary endorsed in his comments at West Point just last week, we
are perfect in our record of prediction. We have always been wrong.

So the Secretary, the Administration and I assure you, Mr.
Chairman, I recognize that we have to be ever vigilant as to the
changing realities and demand on the force, but as we look ahead
to 2015 and 2016, this is very supportable and I think a very jus-
tifiable position.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. I know we are all con-
cerned that—and as you both stated, no one can see really over the
horizon. We have to put our best guesses and as you said, unfortu-
nately, many times we are wrong, but the—our job, I think, all of
us working together is to make sure that we are not wrong at the
detriment to the Nation.

And I know I have been around long enough to remember how
we cut back after World War II and after Korea and after Vietnam
and I just want to make sure that we don’t put ourselves in a posi-
tion that we—as Reagan said, we don’t—he never saw us get into
war that we were—because we were overprepared and that is a
fine line, I think, between a hollowed-out Army and one that is
lean and mean and ready to go and sufficient in size to handle all
of those eventualities that may hit us.

You mentioned, both of you, the CR [Continuing Resolution], and
I know we all have strong concerns there and I think all of the
committee here is unanimous in understanding and supporting the
prospect of getting an appropriation bill finished up. And I have
talked to the appropriators and they have assured me that they are
ready to go. They have got the bill done. I don’t know how much
of it has been coordinated yet at this point with the Senate. I know
they have been working on it.

I was hopeful that we would be able to tie it in to this CR that
is being voted on this week, but apparently there wasn’t time to
get it all done, but maybe, hopefully, it could be done at the end
of this 2-week extension that we are voting on this week because
everybody—you have all expressed to all the services, the Secretary
has expressed it, industry, everybody understands that if we don’t
get this done, stupid things are going to happen and it is going to end up costing us more money.

So we are unanimous in desire. It is just whether we are going to be able to pull it together and make it happen and I feel fairly confident that we will. The rest of the spending will probably just roll into one big omnibus bill to carry through September 30th, but defense will be, hopefully, separated out and should be able to move us forward. Ranking Member Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I share the chairman's concerns about the CR and the hope that we get there. I am a little less optimistic about the ultimate outcome and I think the members of this committee in particular should bear close scrutiny on that process and be as supportive as possible of getting us a defense appropriations bill once we get through this whole process. There are still a lot of differences between the House and the Senate to resolve to get there.

And if we don't get there, one of the consequences is the impact that it has on—certainly on the Army, on the entire DOD [Department of Defense]. So getting a defense appropriations bill, you know, getting a process that gets us to September 30th is critically important to what everybody on this committee does and I hope we all work hard in the next couple of weeks to try and make sure that we get that done.

I thank you gentlemen both for your kind words about Congresswoman Giffords. One of the things that her staff has been doing, if you are interested to know, she and her staff continue to be incredibly strong advocates for Fort Huachuca in particular and the military in particular and they work closely with my staff to make sure that while she is recovering, her questions and concerns about the military and about her district in particular get addressed.

So I have a couple of questions from her staff that have been sent to me and then a couple of my own. Fort Huachuca is a critical part of the Army. I have been down there to visit myself. Going back at the end of this month, as a matter of fact. It is where the Intelligence Center of Excellence is which provides, you know, great support for all the Intel operations and the training for our Intel officers. It is also where the Army's Network Enterprise Technology Command, or NETCOM is, and that is the focus of my first question.

How are you and the Army doing a better job of protecting our networks? Obviously, in the light of the whole WikiLeaks thing, there have been heightened concerns, but even before that we were aware of the challenges of protecting the Army's network and also protecting the entire DOD network because they all come together. And one of the things I have discovered is I visit military bases and there are a lot of Army bases that have a piece of that responsibility and it's never been clear to me who is ultimately responsible for network security. It is a multilayered thing, but having ultimate responsibility is a good place to start.

How are you pulling that together? What is your overall plan for the Army's network security?

Secretary McHUGH. I would just start and anything the chief wants to add, obviously, you mentioned WikiLeaks, Mr. Smith. You are absolutely right. That was a real lesson learned from—for us
and, in fact, for DOD writ large. We have really had a parallel effort at OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and DOD level. Their intelligence folks have taken a hard look at the processes and the procedures as to network protection. They have ordered a host of reforms and new measures including the tighter restrictions on readable media, et cetera, et cetera, that have already been implemented.

And while I can’t put a quantified number to it, I think we have already come a long way in ensuring that our network security systems particularly for the kinds of things that happen with respect to WikiLeaks does not happen again. Beyond that, at the Army level, we are coordinating, of course, with OSD, but are—we have stood up our cyber which in concert with Cyber Command. General Keith Alexander will be the combatant—is the combatant commander working together to ensure that we are installing the kinds of network protections across the Army, across the services in general are taken up.

The Secretary also directed me, asked me to go in and to take a hard look at what happened in WikiLeaks, not just what happened at that particular SCIF [Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility], but the processes by which we train, the processes by which we maintain security both at home, but, of course, in theater as well.

Mr. SMITH. Just a basic question, if I could on that, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary MCHUGH. Certainly.

Mr. SMITH. You know, one of the big concerns that was raised was the fact that this material was able to be downloaded and there were no alarm bells that went off. This was clearly protected. Maybe just—could you—why? Why was there not a situation where this was downloaded and it didn’t, you know, raise an alarm?

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, the study is still ongoing, but I think there were a couple of reasons. One, the controls on the SCIF were not up to standards.

Mr. SMITH. So it was the Army’s policy that that should have happened? It just didn’t? It wasn’t a——

Secretary MCHUGH [continuing]. We don’t have room for improvement because I——

Mr. SMITH. Okay.

Secretary MCHUGH [continuing]. I think it is going to come back that we do and, in fact, I am going to meet with General Caslan, and he is the officer who is the commander of our schoolhouse out at Fort Leavenworth, to pull together a team to look at that. I think we probably have a situation where we need to tighten up both our training and our standards, but it seems likely to me that where procedures did exist, where they were perhaps not as sufficient as we would like, they probably were not upheld as well as they should have been.

Mr. SMITH. And just one other specific question on that. You mentioned the Cyber Command. I think that is a great step. I am a big fan of General Alexander’s. Could not have a better person in that position. So you are confident now that in terms of who is ultimately responsible for network security, that even in the Army that will filter up directly through the Cyber Command, the Army
has a representative there and that representative is going to be the person who every day wakes up going, “It is my responsibility to make sure the network is protected”?

Secretary McHugh. That is the purpose of those two commands and I share your great admiration for General Alexander. His experience at NSA [National Security Agency] and now carried into Cyber Command, I think, will give us the kind of one-source authority that is necessary to make sure all the Services are pulling the oar in the same direction.

Mr. Smith. Okay. If I could move on to one other, the other areas—as you know, Congresswoman Giffords is very interested in energy security alternatives and efficiencies dealing with the energy challenges. There is a great quote in your written testimony, “The Army’s logistical tail of the operational energy pipeline is a handicap that must be overcome through technological advances.” A fancy way of saying getting energy to the troops is always a major challenge.

There have been examples. The Marine Corps has a forward-operating base that has used solar to dramatically reduce the amount of fuel that they have to use, which has dramatically reduced the number of convoys that need to run that fuel in and out, always at risk when you are running a convoy. So it has definitely been saving lives and definitely saving energy.

Two questions about that. I also know that you have set up a sort of a tech center at Bagram—which has a long complicated name that I won’t get into, but basically it is, you know, the problem solver. If you have a technological problem anywhere, you know, across the Army, the tech center is the place to go. Energy obviously is going to be one of those technological challenges.

How is the Army meeting those operational challenges in trying to reduce its dependency on energy and more deal with the challenges that were laid out there?

General Casey. Well, we just call it—I just call it—the technology village of Bagram—it is—than the longer term, but as you have stated very correctly, Congressman, that is the place where we bring in and fuse together the various elements of energy efficiency and energy consumption reduction that we think is so very important. It is a big cost saver. There is no question about it. But frankly, at least from my perspective, we look at this as a matter of soldier safety.

Convoying in fuel supplies is a very dangerous job and we would like to see that reduced as greatly as possible. We have already deployed some of the lessons learned in places like Fort Huachuca and places like Fort Irwin, the national training center, with respect to fuel cells, with respect to water purification systems. We are putting into the field higher efficiency generators. I would add as well that we have put a mark on the wall that we expect in the years ahead will reduce our energy consumption at FOBs [forward operating bases] through high-efficiency batteries, et cetera, et cetera, by 30 to 60 percent.

So the Marines and us and the Army are working hard to reduce that as a cost saver, but as I said, it is a saver of lives and we are very devoted and dedicated to that objective.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I won't ask for a comment on this. I just want to make a statement for the record. One of the big problems we have within the Department of Defense is the contractor issue which you remember from when you were here the, you know, excessive reliance on the amount of costs. We have contractor supervisors and contractors in some instances which, you know, drives up costs as well.

That is something this committee is going to be taking a close look at as we try to find efficiencies. I would be curious to get, for the record, an answer of sorts if you will—both of your take, not right now, but if you could submit something on how are we addressing that problem. How can we save money in the contractor world because, you know, that is something that many members of this committee are interested in.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 117.]

Mr. SMITH. So you can do that for the record if you had a quick comment. I had one other question I wanted to ask you.

Secretary MCHUGH. I do. I have a quick comment and——

Mr. SMITH. Right.

Secretary MCHUGH [continuing]. And I am glad you brought it up because this is, in our opinion, a place where we can save a lot of taxpayer dollars through common sense and a tighter rein. As I mentioned in my opening comments, we commissioned a blue ribbon panel. They have come back with, I think, some very exciting recommendations as to how we can tighten that up. I have asked both the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army and the acquisition executive to look at that, to come back to the chief and I with recommendations.

The other thing, just in closing, one of the bigger problems we have had in theater is we didn’t have enough CORs, contracting officer’s representatives. In fact, in 2007, we just had 200. Now, I am proud to say we have grown that COR body to 3,558 and that gives us an on-the-ground eyeball on the kinds of contract situations where we have not been as efficient as we should and we would not run as tight of a ship as we could and we are getting better, but clearly, we look forward to working with you and doing an even better job, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Yes, we will certainly take a closer look at that report and I look forward to work with you on that. The final question I have builds off of Secretary Gates' speech at West Point. He called into question the size of the Army’s heavy mechanized forces given the threats he foresees in the future. It is the most quotable line from the speech being, you know, you have to be insane to go into a war like we went into Iraq and Afghanistan anytime again in the future.

Now, some people have misunderstood that as a criticism of the existing fights that we are in, but I think it is looking forward to say, what are our needs? And I think your initial requests in the budget this year, you know, focus on helicopters, network communications, lighter, faster dealing with the asymmetric threats, but at the same time, you know, there is the beginning of the R&D [Research and Development] process for a new ground combat vehicle
which is ultimately, if we are lucky, going to cost $40 billion and that is a very high mechanized thing.

When you look out in the future in terms of how you meet the challenges with all the budget constraints that we have and how we have to choose between risks, I guess my one difference from some on the committee is I don’t think it is the job of this committee or your job to eliminate all risk. We can’t do that. We have to sort of manage the threats. We have to do triage, try to contain the threats and be most logical about what is coming. I think Secretary Gates is spot-on in what he said at West Point. So, you know, how does that blend in with continuing to build a heavier mechanized force with things like the ground combat vehicle, General?

General CASEY. Yes, I am glad you asked that because I don’t see the ground combat vehicle as a heavy mechanized vehicle. It may wind up being heavy because it requires a certain weight to protect soldiers from the blast, but we are purposely designing it as a full-spectrum vehicle, one that can be used in any environment that we go into and it is not specifically designed to fight mobile armored warfare which is what the tanks and Bradleys are very well designed to do.

This is the first vehicle that has been designed from the ground up to operate in an IED environment and we believe that IEDs are going to be part of any future environment that we are going to have to operate in. So I don’t see it as a heavy combat vehicle.

Mr. SMITH. Okay.

General CASEY. I see it as a full-spectrum vehicle that will protect our soldiers and connect them to the network.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, gentlemen, both very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much both of you for your service. Secretary McHugh, I continue to be concerned that we spend billions of dollars on weapon systems only to change the underlying requirement and terminate the program. While termination may be appropriate in certain instances, we must examine how these requirements get validated in the first place.

The Secretary of Defense coined a new phrase when he referred to programs as having exquisite requirements, yet these requirements were approved at the individual service level and validated by the joint community. I read with interest a recent article which stated that you had commissioned an acquisition reform study last May. According to the article, the study group concluded that cancelled Army programs had eaten up between $3 billion and $4 billion a year since 2004 and that, “The Army lacks a credible quantitative model and process for determining realistic achievable requirements for modernization and recapitalization given reduced budgets.”

I understand that a copy of this study was recently delivered to our committee. Can you share any of your observations from this study or follow-on actions? Do all of the weapons programs that are funded in this budget have valid requirements, or in 3 to 4 years will they be labeled exquisite?
Secretary McHugh. Well, I think the Secretary has been very clear in his perspective as to what he is looking for out of the services and fielding a new platform. And as you mentioned, Congressman Bartlett, he feels, and I couldn’t agree more, that the objective of single service exquisite is 100 percent, meaning the requirements can no longer be the standard by which we feel platforms and that we have to be more realistic.

And I would certainly tip my hat to the chief. One of the first things he started talking to me about when I walked into the Pentagon as the new service secretary was the fact that our requirements process simply does not reflect reality, that it just ends up being an add-on every little bell and whistle that you can think of and the result, as you mentioned was found in the acquisition study, has lost billions of dollars and through cancelled programs, a vast majority of which since 2004, of course, we are through the future combat system cancellation.

I would like to think we have learned that lesson. I wouldn’t come here today and tell you we can’t do better because we can, but to use for an example the ground combat vehicle, when that RFP [Request for Proposal] was first put out on the street, it had over 900 exquisite requirements embedded in it. We had at least the good sense to pull back from that to cancel that RFP, to revalidate the requirements and they were reduced to less than 200 and the RFP was refielded.

I think that beyond common sense though, we have to have systems changes, and the report by Lou Wagner and Gil Decker that you had mentioned is going to be, at least in large measure, our blueprint. I don’t want to prejudice our acquisition executive or our Deputy Under Secretary because I just tasked them last week to look at that and to analyze it, but I have reviewed this report very carefully.

I think it lays out in large measure a very common sense approach on both requirements and how we can be better acquirers of future platforms, and I look forward to working with the other executives in the Army to make sure that that happens. But I would like to hear the chief’s comments if that meets with your approval.

General Casey. Now, Congressman, as I said in my opening statement, you know, we are committed to using the resources you give us as effectively and as efficiently as possible. And as we look at what is happening with the budgets, there is no way that we can operate an acquisition system that doesn’t very efficiently acquire the systems that give us the most value and we are absolutely committed to doing that.

Our track record, as you know better than I, has not been good at this. And what the report found—one of the things the report found was that our requirements and acquisition core competencies have atrophied over the last couple of decades and we have got to build those back. And it is going to take us a little time, but we are absolutely committed to doing it.

Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. I think all of us want the very best equipment for our people and I think the challenge is to be able to develop a more open architecture so that the system can continue to be improved as it is in use. To have everything on the
front end just makes it prohibitively expensive and too long of a development time. Thank you very much and I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Reyes.

Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both. Good to see you here this morning. And General Casey, I want to congratulate you and thank you for your 40 years of service including your wonderful wife, Sheila. Thank you both for serving our Nation.

I would like to follow up on the ranking member's question regarding Secretary Gates' speech at West Point. In that speech, he was questioning the Army's heavy mechanized forces, while at the same time saying that he—that the Army should not be a constabulary peacekeeping force that can only do counterinsurgency, which I found curious because I think historically there has never been a closer working relationship between our military and our intelligence forces as we have taken on the challenge of Iraq and Afghanistan.

And as we prepare to face the future challenges of not so much nations, although they will always be on our radar scope, but these groups—these radicalized groups that work everywhere from the Middle East to the Horn of Africa and other places, to me the Secretary's comments send a very mixed message and I was curious to know—what is your view of the Army's role in future combats?

How does the Army strike the right balance between the different types of warfare that it may face including in partnership with the intelligence community? And as you and I have talked about before, you know, the answer isn't that we have to be prepared to do everything because that makes it, you know—if everything is a priority, then nothing is a priority.

So do you feel like you have had enough guidance from the civilian DOD leaders to make the kinds of choices the Army needs to make in the structure of the forces? And if not, your successor is going to have to work with this. How do you think that will take place? What will that look like and what kind of specific guidance will your successor need to be able to carry out what I think is a kind of conflicting priority?

General CASEY. Thank you, Congressman. You know, lots of different reporting on the Secretary's speech and what I found is if you sat down and read the speech, you had a different view than you usually got from the press reports of the speech. But what I saw the Secretary doing was telling us to start thinking about the future beyond Iraq and Afghanistan and I think that is the right thing to do and we had been doing that already.

You have heard me talk about we are at war. It is a long-term ideological struggle and that the trends out there in the global environment are more likely to exacerbate that struggle than they are to ameliorate it. And when I put all that together, I see us as a country in an error of what I call persistent conflict, protracted confrontation and not necessarily at the level we have been at in Iraq and Afghanistan, but at some levels and I would say for a decade or so.

And we don't have a choice. You know, I fought these folks in Iraq. They have a 100-year view and they are out to attack our way of life and establish their own. So, you know, we have to be very careful with that. As we looked at this, the two elements of this—
the future strategic environment—that are most pronounced to us are uncertainty and complexity, and Secretary Gates hit it exactly right. Our record is perfect. He never accurately predicted the future.

So it seems to us that we—versatility needs to be the primary operating principle for our Army. That is the—we need a versatile Army for the future that can do a range of things because we just don’t know which end of the spectrum we are going to be operating at. And as we look at that, we say then, okay. Well, we need a versatile mix of forces: Heavy, light, special operating, Stryker, aviation brigades and all of the supporting—all the supporting forces.

And we had been working for the last 6 months going back and look at—looking at every type of force and the design of every unit to take the lessons that we have learned in the last decade at war and say have we got this right. And, you know, even though since 2003, we have stood down 40 percent of our heavy brigade combat teams. We have stood down almost 70 percent of artillery units and we have stood down about 60 percent of the heavy sustainment units that supported those forces.

I mean, that is pretty significant, but we are also asking ourselves the question, was it enough? And so we are wrapping up the study here in the next few weeks and I think my successor will be well postured to take a look and figure out what this Army needs to look like 2015 and beyond and I think that is important. And I think that is where Secretary Gates is trying to push us.

Mr. REYES. Thank you very much. Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERY. Thank you, Chairman. Gentlemen, thanks for being here. I want to talk about a different part of the Secretary’s speech last week. It caught my attention primarily because this is something I have been interested in and concerned about for some time. He said that the third and greatest challenge facing the Army, and frankly, my main worry is how can the Army break up the institutional concrete, its bureaucratic rigidity in its assignment and promotion process?

And I am sure you both know that he went on to talk about a more merit-based, more individualized approach to officer evaluations, citing General Chiarelli’s proposal that evaluations include input from peers as well as subordinates rather than just superiors. He talked about maybe instead of moving people around every 2 or 3 years, we ought to have people apply for job openings like in the competitive system that a number of big organizations use, and essentially quoted Nagl and Yingling about how the Army will become more adaptive only when being adaptive offers the surest path to promotion.

And so I think that really gets at the heart of not just budgets, but the culture of the Army and my question is, number one, do you think he is right? That is the number one concern that we ought to have for the Army. And if you do think he is right, what are we doing about it?

Secretary McHUGH. Well, I would never say the Secretary of Defense is necessarily wrong and I would not hear either of—not just because he is the Secretary of Defense, but more to the point because I think he is right. When you are at war, it is tough to say...
what is the number one challenge, but the Secretary’s comments were directed, I believe, over time. This is a critical aspect of how the Army is structured and how it maintains itself that we have to address.

One of the first things I did when I walked in the building was to begin to look at and rewrite the memorandum of instructions. These are the qualities that are listed in the paper’s instructions to the promotion boards what we are looking for, the kinds of things that the Secretary mentioned, creativity, trying to get our promotion boards not to think about lifting up officers simply because they checked the boxes that they had checked on their OERs [Officer Evaluation Reports] when they were promoted.

And that is a cultural change that is a challenge, but I think we can begin to see it. I would argue that the selection of the next chief of staff, Marty Dempsey, should the Senate confirm him, is a great example of promoting someone who thinks outside the box and it will serve as a great example not just because it will help us to create the means by which we can achieve those kinds of new paradigms, but also because it sends the right message as to what kinds of officers ultimately succeed.

At the end of the day, we have to look at this very carefully and I think the Secretary has set the stage in an exciting way that will allow us to think in new ways about what we value in an officer. I think one of the equally big challenges we face, and the Secretary mentioned this in his speech, is that as we take today’s field grade officers, these majors and others who are given so much autonomy, so much authority in theater and bring them back into—and put them into what often times is a—garrison environment, how do we keep them from losing interest?

And there is a variety of things we have to work very hard to ensure that this Army forged through 10 years of war so well equipped with creativity and intelligence and flexibility is not lost in a garrison environment. And we are looking at that everyday in the schoolhouses and I won’t tell you we have the answers yet, but I think the Secretary has posed a critical issue for us to take up and to hopefully deal with effectively or we are going to lose the greatest Army, I think, the world has ever seen.

General CASEY. If I could just speak back on that, I agree that we need to make some significant advances in our personnel system. They have been up to their eyeballs just trying to man these units and get them into the fight properly manned, but we have some significant changes we need to make in our promotion and assignments policy. No question.

I don’t think that is a number one concern. It is certainly not my number one concern. What the Secretary just mentioned about retaining this generation of young combat season leaders who understand the environment that we are operating in, that is my number one concern and combating this, slipping back into a garrison mindset that a lot of the old folks can’t wait to get back to, you know, the good old days and we have been talking about this since last summer when I had all the two- and three-star commanders and their sergeants majors in for a training and leader development conference.
And I warned them about this because I saw it myself as a division commander in Europe. We brought units back from Kosovo. We would have a sergeant that we would let lead a patrol into the downtown Gnjilane in the middle of the night and we wouldn't let him turn in a deadline report when he got back. And that is our bias and that is my number one concern and we can't let that happen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, again, for being before us today. There are so many questions that I would really like to have with you. I was speaking earlier to our former colleague about how we protect the industrial base or how we get back to making things in America and how we use the military for that transformation, how we really get out of Iraq and Afghanistan. So many questions, but unfortunately, I really need to come back to an issue that, Mr. Secretary, you and I worked on, on this committee because it is still bothering me and it is still out there and we just had a—last week a lawsuit filed with respect to sexual assault in the military.

And because really nobody else brings it up, I am going to do that. You know, one of the things that I remember you said, Mr. Secretary, so firmly when we were working on trying to change and we did the UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice] with respect to sexual assault was a comment you made when you were the chairman of the Personnel Subcommittee and you said, “It has been 15 years and we have had 18 reports given to Congress from the Pentagon about sexual assault.”

And we are sort of—a lot of things haven’t changed. I know that they have changed in the way that you are trying to implement, but the fact of the matter is I get calls every single day about are military women being assaulted by our military men. And they get drummed out and the guys get to stay in. I mean, this is their main complaint.

So the task force in the 2009 December report for sexual assault in the military recommended that the secretaries of the military departments ensure that all commanders and senior enlisted leaders be actively involved in sexual assault prevention and response training and awareness programs.

I would like to ask you, Secretary McHugh, what steps have you taken to engage General Casey right next to you on the subject of sexual assault in the service?

Secretary MCHUGH. I want to make sure I understand your questions, Ms. Sanchez. What actions have I taken in respect to the issue or working with the chief?

Ms. SANCHEZ. Working with the chief. What is it from the top? How can you help us change this? I mean, I really don't want to get another report that says the same thing again. So I would like to know how actively—how do you think we can change that? Now, you are on the other side, you know, having to deal with this.

Secretary McHugh. Right. Fair point.

Ms. Sanchez. How do we do this?

Secretary McHugh. I view this problem very seriously and I really view it from two different perspectives. The first is a cultural one that I can't imagine anything more contrary to the basic core
values of being a member of the United States Army than sexually assaulting, abusing a fellow soldier be it male or female under any circumstances.

And what we have tried to do through the formation of the SHRP, Sexual Harassment Response Program, is to put into place the mechanism by which we can begin to change the perspective and the understanding particularly of our younger soldiers, but all through the cadre as to how volatile this is to Army core values. The main component of that SHRP effort is an initiative called, “I am strong; intervene, act and motivate” where we have placed in the schoolhouses at all levels of military education, the fact that this is unacceptable, what the responsibility of every soldier is and looking out for, protecting, reporting and participating and getting this better under control.

Obviously, as we saw last week, we have quite a long way to go. I mentioned it to you in our discussions earlier. One of the more recent initiatives was to produce two training films that I brought here to this House and previewed for a number of members who were able to drop by and take a look at it. My impression was they felt it was very effective. We give this now to—as part of our training aid. So all of our NCOs [Non-Commissioned Officers], those soldiers that are with our troops, our younger troops particularly that learn and look up to those soldiers, and we are going to continue that effort.

The other is to ensure that we have the resources and the personnel available to get out there and to make a difference. When this program began, it was funded at about $10 million. It has been a 500-percent increase and with those monies, we have hired 10 experts to go out and to train our trainers. They are experts in everything from sexual assaults to investigations to counseling to forensics to laboratory work. We have hired 15 investigators in addition to our base cadre to go out and to ensure that when a sexual assault occurs, we have the expertise to fully investigate.

We have hired prosecutors. We have hired 35 additional lab technicians. The Army is the central lab for investigating all cases of sexual assault and most importantly, we have placed into the Judge Advocate General Schools a specialist in sexual assault and we have 38 different programs through the JAG [Judge Advocate General] schools to ensure that every JAG officer coming out and ultimately going to every post, camp and station that we have Army forces on understands the nuances of investigating and prosecuting sexual assault.

So we are trying to take a holistic approach. Obviously one case is too many. I do think we are making good progress. I meet quarterly with the SHRP representatives and the chief and we take a full briefing and try to ensure that we understand exactly the outcome of those programs, but this is something that troubles us very deeply.

And as I started out, I will close with something that is totally contrary to our core values. Thank you.

Ms. SANCHEZ. I know my time is up. I will have some questions for the record to ask the general on that also. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Jones.
General CASEY. If I could just add just briefly to that because that, I think, is important, Congresswoman. It is a leadership issue. Prevention of sexual assault is a leadership issue and it is something that we from the top down have to force all the way down through our ranks.

Secretary Gerin and I started a program in 2008 designed to change the culture of the Army because as we assessed the programs we put in place in 2004, they were all focused on response and not prevention and we recognized that until we changed the culture, we weren’t going to be successful in the program and that is what this program that the Secretary mentioned is designed to do.

At the end of this month, we have our annual conference and the Secretary and I are going to put the goal at zero sexual assaults.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much and Secretary McHugh, it is good to see you as always and General Casey. I join my colleagues here in thanking you for your years of service to our Nation.

I want to go back. Last week we had Secretary Gates testifying and I might have misunderstood, but it seemed that he was saying, you know, before a significant drawdown, much must happen in Afghanistan and probably we are looking more at 2016 before there is a substantial—excuse me—drawdown. After I read his comments that he made in West Point, General Casey, I have a very dear friend—I gave him my word I wouldn’t use his name in a hearing on the floor—that you would know very well. And I hate playing that game, but you would. But I gave him my word.

I emailed him about Secretary Gates’ comments about the large number of troops in the Middle East, Africa, wherever it might be and this will lead to my question. I am going to read you just a sentence that he emailed me back. He said, “I have mixed feelings about the comments made by Secretary Gates. I think he is spot-on regarding the commitment of a large number of forces to conflicts in either Asia or the Middle East, but must qualify this statement with the thought that if the conflict is in a vital, national interest, we must never be afraid to take action to protect those interests.”

This general who is retired agrees with me and the American people that Afghanistan is really not in our national interest. It might have been 10 years ago, but it is 10 years later. My comment to you based on what I thought I heard from Secretary Gates—can you share with this committee what do you view as a realistic timeline for withdrawing the troops from Afghanistan?

Before I—you answer, would you please—we had been hearing for 10 years from different leaders of our military that it is going to be critical to be able to train the Afghans to do the police work. It is going to be critical to train the Afghanistan people to be the soldiers. And, you know, not you, sir, not Secretary McHugh, but I have been hearing that for 10 years and I think 10 years later they ought to be trained. And here we go again with the Secretary of Defense indicating that the significant drawdown might not happen until 2014 and yet, the President of the United States, I know
he meant what he said at the time, was saying a significant draw-down could happen beginning in July of 2011.

The American people want to know what is the end point of this strategy? What can they see that would say to the American people we have victory? So if you would share with me, if no one else cares, what you see as the timeline that we can significantly start bringing down our troops in Afghanistan.

General CASEY. Okay. Congressman, you are asking the wrong guy to make comments on policy.

Mr. JONES. Well, I am just asking your opinion because soon you will be a retired hero of this country. So if you can in the short period of time——

General CASEY. Then I can make all the—then I can make all the comments on policy that I want.

Mr. JONES [continuing]. Call you back then, I don't know, but we don't ever get a straight answer. And I am not talking about you here, but we don't ever seem to get the straight answer about what we are trying to accomplish in Afghanistan. What can we say to the American people that are spending billions of dollars breaking our soldiers' backs and legs and killing them? What can we say to them that looks like we can declare victory?

General CASEY. Okay. If I might just go back to your friend's comments there about not putting forces on the ground, I mean, one of the things that I have learned in 40 years is never say never.

Mr. JONES. I understand.

General CASEY. And especially in an environment as unpredictable as we are operating in. And so I would just take you back to the comments I made. We have to have a versatile mix of forces that can do a range of things and we ought not seal off or put off any options. I can tell you your—now to your question about when. I can tell you from my experience in Iraq and I was—I am sure I have come to this committee and sat before this committee and said we can't credibly hand off security in these countries until the local security forces can maintain domestic order and keep the terrorists out.

Otherwise, our long-term mission wouldn't be successful. We would just have to do it again. And one of the things I worry about as I look at the environment is safe havens. Countries or parts of countries where the local government can't or won't deny their country to terrorists. And this global extremist network has tried to attack us on our soil three times in the last year and they are not going to stop and they are not going to quit.

So for us to have the ability to go in and stop that, or better yet have the local security forces at a level that can prevent that, I think is the only way we are going to protect ourselves over the long haul.

Mr. JONES. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you and your family for the sacrifices you made for our country and the honor for which you serve. And Mr. Secretary, we are so proud of you and the dignity and quality of your work at the Department of the Army. Thank you for what you are doing as well.
I looked at the budget request for fiscal year 2012 as compared to the request for fiscal year 2011. I wish I could say it compared to the budget for fiscal year 2011. We are trying. And I see that there is about a $29.5 billion reduction for fiscal year 2012 compared to the request for fiscal year 2011. I also see that $23 billion of that $29 billion approximately is from the O&M [Operations and Maintenance] and procurement account.

To what extent is that drawdown, that reduction attributable to the drawdown in Iraq? Either of you.

Secretary McHugh. The theater operation differences between 2011 and 2012 are in large measure the cause of those drawdowns. There are a number of subfactors. For example, a rather noticeable cut in Warrior Transition Units that comes from OPA, Other Procurement Army, where we had a number of military construction projects under way to serve in the WTU [Warrior Transition Units] inventory. The IT [Information Technology] purchases have been made and we no longer need that level of expenditure.

But clearly as we draw out of Iraq, as the expenses associated with personnel while deployed, 42 cents of every dollar we spend is personnel-related on the infrastructure that had been supported. We are down to 73 bases or posts in Iraq, more than 400 have been turned back to the Iraqis or just closed up, we no longer have to support. So a large measure of that is theater-driven.

Mr. Andrews. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what the size of the force assumptions are for the fiscal year 2012 number? Size of the force in Iraq assumptions? In other words, what are they based on?

Secretary McHugh. The assumption is as we are now at 500,000 and the planning assumption in our operational assumption is we will be out of Iraq in entirety by the end of this calendar year.

Mr. Andrews. So am I correct that the present size of the force is a little bit in excess of 40,000 Army; is that correct?

Secretary McHugh. Fifty thousand roughly. We have six advise——

Mr. Andrews. Fifty——

Secretary McHugh [continuing]. And assist brigades and an advise and assist task force.

Mr. Andrews. And the assumption is at the end of fiscal year 2012 or the end of calendar 2011?

Secretary McHugh. Calendar 2011.

Mr. Andrews. At the end of calendar 2011, it is down to zero?

Secretary McHugh. Yes, sir.

Mr. Andrews. Okay. I also wanted to ask about the reports in today’s newspaper about a step-up of fitness standards. What was—I applaud that. It sounds like it makes an awful a lot of sense. If either of you could tell us, what was the cause of that decision?

General Casey. It is just—it is something that we have been working for a long time and the last test was 30 years old and we have been working at this for a while.

Mr. Andrews. Right.

General Casey. And it—finally, we got to the point where we had some concrete ideas and put it in their package and now, we are
going to pilot it at several installations. But it is designed to test this—the things that we see ourselves using.

Mr. ANDREWS. I don't expect you to have a specific number, but do you know an intelligent estimate of what percentage of those who attempt to enlist are obese or significantly overweight?

Secretary McHUGH. Seventy-five percent of the age knowledgeable population of this country are either—through weight, social background, criminal background or intelligence levels—unavailable for being accessed in the United States Army. And of that 75 percent, a very substantial number is because of obesity problems.

Mr. ANDREWS. So I assume if we could do a better job in the civilian world with diet, nutrition and exercise that the number of men and women eligible to serve would expand pretty significantly?

Secretary McHUGH. I think that is a fair assumption, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. And I see that you did a great job at 100 percent of your recruiting goals for this year which is extraordinary given the circumstances. How much easier would it be to hit those recruiting goals if we had more people who were physically eligible to serve?

Secretary McHUGH. I think our recruiting command and its cadre would be delighted, but they do a great job and it is not just numbers. The quality of our recruits is outstanding. Over 98 percent are high school grads that——

Mr. ANDREWS. Sure is.

Secretary McHUGH [continuing]. Far in excess of the population averages in this country and their intelligence levels are really unequalled in our Army’s history——

Mr. ANDREWS. We agree and please thank them all and we thank you. I yield back. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Next will be Mr. Forbes and at the conclusion of his questions, we will take a 5-minute break for the committee. Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Secretary and General, you know the enormous respect you have at this committee. Mr. Secretary, you have sat on this side. So you know our needs. And General, I don't know of any individual in the military who spends more time to talk with members and find out their concerns than you do.

So I have two questions for you. One is that it seems like over and over when we have people coming in to testify to us today we are hearing them say we are trying to give you a defense strategy that is driven by physical realities. When we hear that, it seems like we are saying there is this tension between what our defense needs are and what our budgetary wants are.

The first question I would have is do you have any recommendations for us as members of this committee about how we can be assured that we are getting the true defensive needs of the country that are not distorted by budgetary wants? That is one. And the second one, it seems like we are needing to use modeling and simulation a lot today for training, also for our testing and for jointness.

How important do you see modeling and simulation in the Army and what kind of future do you see for modeling and simulation?
Secretary McHugh. I think many of us have been through the times, as I mentioned earlier, where we had a very significant mismatch between what the National Defense Policy was and what the services were fielding.

And from my experience, I think we all intuitively knew it, but didn't press it. I sat through my first drawing up from the DOD side of the Quadrennial Defense Review and as I understand it, this was a landmark QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] and that it really did for the first time make an effort to purposely match available resources against the formulation of that defense policy.

And I wish I were a better attuned to the QDR both as a process and a document when I was a member of this committee and I think every member would find that helpful because it exposes the validity of what the National Defense Policy is and ultimately the resourcing of the individual services or the gaps that exist that you can discern from those.

So my humble suggestion was, you know, read the QDR, be familiar with the process and you can learn from it. I would say with respect to the 2012 budget, because I am mindful of the very circumstances that you spoke about, Congressman Forbes, that I look at this budget as really driven by policy, driven by what we expect the threat to be particularly in the out years.

I mentioned we can never get it right, but as we look at the drawdown in Iraq that we have already drawn down to just under 50,000 troops, as we look at what the President has said with respect to the drawdown as anticipated in Afghanistan, particularly beginning in 2015 and as the Secretary of Defense and the chief worked out in their conversations, this budget fields an Army.

Again, critically important that it isn’t just sufficient numbers, but it is robust in the equipment that is available to the training and program support initiatives for their families that we all know is so important in this volunteer force, but at all times, this committee plays a critical role to make sure that the services are getting it right and we don’t just look to you, we need you to keep a close watch and vigilance and that is why, in my opinion, this is such a great committee. Simulation is absolutely essential.

We do a great job in trying to give soldiers real role experiences. If you go out to the chairman’s district of the National Training Center, a little place called Medina Wasl, the replication of IEDs in a firefight in a simulated village either Iraq or Afghanistan is chilling, but clearly simulations are computer driven and are some of the best ways we can ensure that our soldiers are acclimated to what they are going to see and what they are going to experience once they get into theater.

And I see it, as robotics and such get better and better, I see it as an increasingly important part of our training lay-down.

General Casey. Congressman, I would just say that we are at war and I can't imagine that you would ever have anyone wearing this uniform sitting in this position not coming to you and telling you what the men and women of the United States Army needed to successfully prosecute that war and recover from it. And that really was the theme of my opening testimony that we have to be very, very careful here as fiscal pressures cause us to make deci-
isions about the size, the structure, the equipment, the training for your future Army.

We have been at war for a decade. It took us a decade to get where we are today and we can unhinge that in a couple of years.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will now stand in recess for 5 minutes and reconvene at 10 minutes to 12:00. Thank you.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to General Casey, I think that we are all grateful for your service to the country as our troops are and their families and I want to thank you very much for always being available as well. And, Mr. Secretary, good to see you as well. I wanted to follow up just very briefly on the issue that my colleague, Congresswoman Sanchez, raised because we do meet with victims quite frequently actually and I think the one message that I would relay from them is that until the perpetrators are held accountable and not promoted, nothing is going to change. All the education in the world is not going to make a difference. So it is the law enforcement piece that is really critical here and I think we need to continue to work on that. And I know you have been working on it. Thank you.

The other issue that I wanted to raise that a number of colleagues have mentioned is really the contracting issue and I don't know whether you happened to see the C.Q. [Congressional Quarterly] article in the middle of this month and we are very aware of these issues ongoing, but it feels as if, in addition to the Army Acquisition Review that is going on, the fact that we have hired a number more corps men to deal with the procurement that there is also a real cultural issue there in the way that contracts are led.

And I wanted to ask you, General, because the Secretary spoke to this. I mean, you see a lot of this. I can't imagine that this is not so frustrating from time to time because this is all about the troops. It is about their equipment. It is about the way that we train and a lot of the contracts that we know go on forever and don't have the kind of oversight that they should. How is this going to be different? How do we change business as usual?

General CASEY. Congresswoman, I come at this from two perspectives. One is the actual skills required to develop and monitor contracting, and you may recall back in 2007 the Army chartered what we called the Gansler Commission. Jack Gansler went out and we told him the same thing that we basically told Lou Wagner and Gil Decker about the acquisition, go out and give us a soup-to-nuts look at how we are doing contracting and tell us what we need to do to fix it.

He came back and gave us a blueprint and when we looked at it, it is getting the right leadership, you know? We have promoted 15 acquisition and contracting colonels to generals in the time that I have been here and that is putting people in the right rank in leadership positions that have the knowledge to deal with these things.

We also have set up a contracting command and seven expeditionary contacting brigades to provide the oversight. You might remember the charts where we started off with a couple of hundred
...million dollars worth of contracts in Kuwait and it went to $5 billion and didn’t increase the people monitoring the contract.

Mrs. Davis. I think partly what I am asking though are sole-source contracts. Now, maybe it is hard to generalize that. Is that a good idea? Is it a bad idea of data rights? Do you think those issues are going to be changed and what would you change?

General Casey. Some of those—yes. Well, some of those issues are really a case-by-case basis and there is not a cookie cutter way to say yes or no on any one of those. The other thing on contracting is how we actually develop the requirements—to go out and buy something for the troops and that is what the second study looked at.

And it comes down to you have got to have the right people with the right skills and that takes time to build them. And so I think we are going in the right direction. I think it is going to take us some time to get where we want to be.

Secretary McHugh. May I say just a couple of things about sole source? As the chief said, there are circumstances where you have no choice and in those circumstances are obviously an operational necessity, but they are few and far between or they should be. And I think your point is well taken that you don’t have to look in the far past—the too distant past to see where sole-source contracts may have been let as a matter of convenience, not as a matter of responsibility.

Probably the most prevalent example of areas where the Army and others have been criticized is—are in the LOGCAPd [Logistics Civil Augmentation Program] contracts, those service support contracts and principally in Iraq that over time in the past were sole-sourced. We have changed that. They are now—let. We have three, in fact, LOGCAP at the operators in LOGCAP IV. We had the issue recently of so-called ANC, Alaska Native Corporation, contracts where under the federal guidelines an Alaska Native Corporation duly constituted is eligible for a sole-source contract. That was the topic of some discussion in recent newspaper articles.

We have put out directives that if we indeed use those kinds of contracts, they have to be absolutely justifiable. We don’t want to diminish our support of the small business and minority objectives—

Mrs. Davis. Exactly.

Secretary McHugh [continuing]. And this Administration is very supportive of those, but I think we have got to be wise taxpayer stewards, and sole-sourcing is something that we can do a better job of.

Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis. I will submit questions for the record. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General Casey, Secretary McHugh, thank you very much for your visits to Fort Jackson which I am very grateful to represent in South Carolina. To me, it is a classic case of where new recruits are trained, military opportunity is provided and our military service where young people can achieve to their highest potential. And so I appreciate your service.
In my perspective, my dad served in the 14th Army Air Corps, Fighting Tigers, World War II. I was grateful, General, to serve actually beginning with you at Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, Pennsylvania, several years ago. Like, 1943. And so I served 31 years in Guard and Reserve, but most grateful I have got three sons currently in your command serving with the Army National Guard, one son served for you in Iraq, another has served in Egypt and the third guy will be commissioned May 12th.

With that background, I want to thank you. This committee has been bipartisan and I sent a letter with Congresswoman Davis and, General, you responded and I appreciate this. Our concern was dwell time, one that the goal is still one to three and I am still hopeful too that boots on the ground that we can work for 1 year to 9 months.

But my concern is about the drawdown and the impact of a 27,000 drawdown. I am concerned obviously for the morale of the troops, for the families, their concerns and expectations of a career that could be in jeopardy. I am also concerned that we may have an unintended message to our enemy that we are not understanding the threat to our country.

And so as to the impact, General, what do you see as to what study and what will be considered for a drawdown?

General CASEY. Thank you, Congressman. As I have—we have worked our way through this. I mean, there was a reason I picked the end of 2014 to hold our end strength in excess to the Guard and Reserve and that the reason was that got us through one full cycle at 1 year out, 2 years back and I felt that that was important to get that for the troops.

As we talked about earlier, you know, we have not yet begun to figure out how this drawdown will occur. I mentioned that we have had some ongoing work for about 6 months here looking at our force structure, figuring out what we need more of, what we need less of, those kinds of things and that work will come together, I would think, over the next 90 days to 180 days.

And so I think we are in a much better position to talk about that a little bit later. But I would assure you and the committee that we will work very closely with the committee and we want to make sure because we are at war. We have an appropriate end strength that both meets the demand and does it at a sustainable tempo. I can’t imagine knowingly bringing to this committee an end strength that wouldn’t give us at least one-to-two and we want to get to one-to-three and be able to surge to one-to-two. That has got to be the new benchmark. We can’t go back to one-to-one after a decade at war.

Mr. WILSON. And that would just be what we would—I know I would support. So I thank you for your commitment. Additionally, General, all the joint chiefs signed a letter supporting changes in the military health care plan and these changes affect the military, but they also go beyond that and affect our local hospitals such as Fort Drum, New York; Fort Huachuca in Arizona.

How will these hospitals be affected? I am going to ask the Secretary that.

Secretary McHUGH. If I may, in my old district, you mentioned one of the hospitals. When that special program was set up, the
original intention, as I recall, was to ensure that these hospitals had the opportunity to adapt to the needs of the military community and the assistance dollars were intended to provide that bridging opportunity.

If I could use the hospital outside of Fort Drum, New York and Carthage, New York, as an example, at the time their OB/GYN operations were probably not at a level that would allow them to take advantage and participate particularly in live birth deliveries for the—population and we would hope the monies provided gave them that chance to upgrade their infrastructure.

From my perspective, it was never intended to be an unending program and, in fact, it has been maintained now for a sufficient amount of time that the Department of Defense made the judgment that indeed we could withdraw that support and that the bridging should have been completed by now. I can’t speak to the condition of each and every hospital, but I think from a programmatic level, it was a reasonable planning and budgetary assumption.

I just want to point out when we are talking about the very modest increases to the TRICARE payments, they do not affect Active military. No Active military member nor their families would be affected by the very modest increases in the TRICARE enrollment increases which are $2.50 a month for an individual and $5 for a family.

Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Kissell.

Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. Good to see you again. And General Casey, we also wish you the best and if you could, pass on to your wife also our thanks for her service. I know you and I were at a meeting last spring. We were both there in service of our spouses who were in service of our military families and especially our military children in the light of education.

Our concern here, my concern is for the whole of the military, the whole of the Army and the Reserve Component. I am going to zero in a little bit towards Fort Bragg, the center of the universe, and General Mulholland and Special Forces. I am sure there is one or two people here that might be familiar with Robin Sage and the exercise that our special forces go through and they have trained to go into the field and they tell us it is the best training they get to actually be working and encounter insurgency and I have had the privilege because Robin Sage is mostly my district.

I have had the privilege of being a character actor there three times. I have met the Pine Lynn government official who will work with the insurgency and has been a great opportunity. But if you could, tell us a little bit about the Special Forces. I know Admiral Olson was talking about the special ops, they are starting to feel a little bit of the strain. What are our Special Forces doing, where are we heading, and what are our plans for Special Forces?

General Casey. We have been adding a Special Forces battalion a year here for the last several years and I think we finish up next year and it will be a total of five more Special Forces battalions that we have added to the force.

And I talked to General Mulholland frequently and he has done a wonderful job of putting us in a position to better support them.
I know you have heard a lot about—talk about enablers for Special Forces. We have worked out a system where they can request enablers from us through the normal force generation process that I described earlier and that is helping them out quite a bit.

I think one of the other things that we are looking at here, and I have discussed this with both General Mulholland and Admiral Olson is that—we are looking because of our experience of—with conventional forces working with other militaries that we have gained in the last 5 or 6 years. We are actually going to be in a position here next year to start taking some of the training requirements to ease the burden on the Special Forces.

And so that active conventional mix can go—active special mix can go the other way and actually we can wind up supporting them. And I am—the other thing that we are doing is for Special Forces aviation, building them some additional CH–47 [Boeing Chinook helicopter] battalions so that they increase their aviation capabilities.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, sir. And I would just like to quickly reiterate what my colleague, Mrs. Davis, said about the concerns about some of the—and that you all have talked about and working on that some of the procurement—down to some of the smaller levels of contracts. I am not talking about the big systems and the big monies, but just some of the things that people have that are better ideas, better cost. It just seems like the bureaucracy that there is such a comfort level of the people within the programs that they don't want to be bothered with having to consider something else.

And we get a lot of folks that we feel that have good ideas that just get frustrated with the process. We appreciate you all working on this and I will actually be sending a couple of questions in for the record. And thank you for your service and thank you for your time and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you for being here. Mr. Secretary, good to see you again. I appreciate you being here and I for one do miss you on the committee. So for all those who are happy that you are in that position, we certainly appreciate all the accomplishments that you had while you served on this committee.

General, you had made the point, you know, that we are a country at war and this is a Congress that is burdened by the issues of how we address this mounting debt and the deficits that our country is facing, but I think, you know, we know being a country at war that our greatest concern is, how do we ensure that the Department of Defense receives what it needs at the same time that we look for efficiencies?

And one of the concerns that I have as we look to this year's of reductions or cost-cutting in the Department of Defense is the issue of end strength reductions, both those that I looked at, at the Marine Corps and the Army. And in your opening statement, you made reference to the issues of dwell time ratios. We know that the Marine Corps and the Army neither have met the goal of one-to-three dwell time ratios.

According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' testimony to the committee on February 16th, the Army will not even achieve a one-
to-two dwell ratio until sometime in 2012. You made similar state-
ments of the goals of achieving it, but they are still just goals and
we have grave concerns as we look to what reductions and re-
sources you might have as to whether or not that is accomplish-
able.

And then so if you would comment on that, I would greatly ap-
preciate it. And then, Mr. Secretary and General Casey, I am also
interested in your thoughts on the issues of the HMMWV [High-
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle] reprogramming. I think
people are really concerned as to what extent there has been true
and accurate analysis of both the ability to field the type of vehicles
that are needed and to look at what the effects are going to be of
the account reprogramming and we would appreciate it if you
would comment on that, and I probably have a follow-up question
to the HMMWV comments.

Secretary McHugh. If I may, I will start with HMMWVs and
then if the chief would take over on end strength. The issue of how
carefully did considered this is a well studied one, and I can assure
you this is based on sound analysis. I directed early on in my ten-
ure as the Secretary that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen-
eral Pete Chiarelli, and the Under Secretary of the Army, Joe
Westphal, began what we are calling capability portfolio reviews.
Everything the Army does is compressed into a portfolio whether
it be our wheeled vehicles, our combat fighting fleet, et cetera, et

cetera.

And when that panel took a look at HMMWVs, they discovered
something very, very interesting. Not only have we met our re-
quirement, we in fact had exceeded it and we had come to the point
where we always knew someday it would be that our acquisition
objective had been achieved.

There are a couple of reasons that snuck up on us, I think, in
large measure because the HMMWVs were not being used to the
extent we thought they would be in theater. They were lasting
longer and we weren’t having to transition out through wear as
many as, I think, in the first instance were programmed. The other
thing is the commanders were concerned about their survivability
in an IED environment. So that too added to the fact that we had
more on-hand much, much sooner than we had originally planned.

So that analysis led us to the conclusion that the monies that
were scheduled in 2010 to procure more HMMWVs could be better
spent in other ways. And we worked with the Secretary of Defense
and Comptroller Hale to ensure that the proposed reprogramming
we put forward would utilize the monies should Congress approve
that reprogramming to meet the immediate threat that our soldiers
are facing in theater, counter IEDs, ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance], things that are necessary to save lives.

So it is a very careful calculation. We feel it is well founded in
the data and obviously a change of this nature causes concern
amongst some quarters. We understand that and we are willing to
do whatever we can——

Mr. Turner. Before, if I could——

General Casey. Sure.

Mr. Turner [continuing]. Before my time completely runs out,
but I appreciate your answer, and your explanation, you know, the
two concerns obviously in that switch you are taking a capital expenditure and shifting it to what is an operational expense. The other issue is the concern that the JLTV [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle] program may be delayed and what—a result if that program is delayed? Will you be able to meet all of your requirements?

Secretary McHugh. The question—your second question is we will. We have a recap program for the existing HMMWV that is being damaged right now frankly by the continuing C.R. We have had to lay off 200—on that recap program, but we feel we can buy a zero-miles-based, zero-hour-based recapped HMMWV for $100,000 versus $165,000 for an equal new. So we feel confident and we are going to require platforms with our reprogramming, as I said, counter IED and such, in the same fashion we are going to require HMMWV platforms.

The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Hanabusa.

Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman—my colleagues who liked you, thanks, General Casey, for his 40-plus years of service and to say that I have read a lot about you and I think we are losing someone with amazing foresight as to what we need to do.

Having said that, my questions are for the Secretary. Mr. Secretary, in looking at the budget, it is very evident that the base budget for the 2012 request is about $144 plus, almost $145 billion, and there is this interesting category—of course, the overseas contingency operations, the OCO, which then amounts to almost 50 percent of the $144 billion. For your total addition together, you would have about $216 billion.

I was really interested in the OCO category because my understanding from the power briefings is that that category is really one that is sort of tied to Iraq and Afghanistan and as we begin to draw down, I assume that that budget was also being looked upon as being drawn down. Now, how would that then impact what you need to do with your sustainability efforts for the Army in the future?

Secretary McHugh. Well, indeed the OCO budgets that used to be called supplemental budgets are designed to support theater operations. That is how historically Congress has funded wars, and it provides us an opportunity to fund, as you noted, a base budget this year just over $144 billion to sustain those things that we would buy whether we were at war or not, and at the same time to ensure we are doing the right things by the warfighters.

Indeed, as you noted, Congresswoman, OCO budgets do come down when theater operations and demands decrease. The $71 billion in this year's Army OCO request is down from about $120 billion in years past and we expect that that will continue as operations diminish.

We will need in terms of our long-term sustainment, as the chief had mentioned earlier, 2 to 3 years of reset monies, those dollars that in large measure, in fact, totally contained in OCO right now to bring back the major pieces of equipment to put them through the recap program to bring them back to standards for 2 to 3 years after we are no longer engaged in a name contingency.

So we need those reset monies as they are contained in OCO right now to transition with Congress' support into the base so we
can do over the next 2 or 3 years after cessation of hostilities the reset program that we need.

Ms. HANABUSA. I noticed that also part of the OCO budget is an increase of $9 billion for research and development and about $2.1 billion for procurement. I happen to be a great advocate of research and development and I was wondering, why is it in the OCO budget? Was there something unique about this research and development and the procurement that puts it in the OCO budget versus something that can be facilitated in the base budget?

Secretary McHUGH. I don't recall that exact line, but clearly if you look for example historically at joint IED defeat programs, the RTD&E [Research, Development, Test & Evaluation] had been in the OCO. I would note that we are purposely—and I think at the behest in urging of the Congress and this committee—moving those funds for IED defeat and providing a line in the base budget for that, but a generic response to your question be any time we are developing something such as an MRAP [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle] or something that is field-unique, it would not be unusual to have at least a portion of the research development monies in the OCO itself because that is a primarily war-driven process and cost.

Ms. HANABUSA. Let me ask you about one of the—probably the most disturbing parts of the testimony regarding General Chiarelli's report on the suicide. Now, how much of the reset or how much of this dwell time should—is going to cost—and how much of that should we really have in the base budget if it isn't already in the base budget? It seems to be something that is so result of the OCO operations.

So what do we want to ensure into the future that we have those kinds of costs written into your base?

Secretary McHUGH. Well, we pay a soldier whether that soldier is back and reset and going through—in his or her home base or if they are forward-deployed. When they are forward-deployed, there are certain wartime pays and bonuses that are available, but the cost when you are in CONUS [the continental United States] and garrison are calculated as part of our personnel expenses, as I mentioned earlier, about 42 cents of every dollar we spend are personnel-driven and it is something that we will have to build into our budget development process and we do that routinely.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you.

General CASEY. If I could, we are already putting some of those costs in the base. I mean, we have about $280 million in the base for psychiatric care and services and another $85 million for research in post-traumatic stress and mild traumatic brain injury. That is already in the base.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General Casey, may I just add my name to the list of all those who have lauded your noble service to humanity and just to the cause of human freedom. I know that there is no way to express the kind of service that you have done. I mean, a lot of us talk about freedom up here and people like yourselves carry it on your back everywhere you go and I appreciate it so much.
And Mr. Secretary, obviously it is wonderful to see you back again. You know, I don’t know if it is harder on that side of the lectern or not. It sounds like it might be. So my question is to both of you. DOD has recently decided to stop funding for the Medium Extended Air Defense System, or the MEADS system, and yet they have decided to complete the design and development phase of the program which requires an additional $804 million across fiscal 2012 and 2013.

And as you know, the MEADS program is intended to replace the aging Patriot and Hawk missile system that has been developed in cooperation with, of course, Italy and Germany. Admiral Mullen testified in a hearing before the Senate in 2007 that, “In view of the threats we face today and will face in the future, I believe the United States should deploy components of the ballistic missile defense system as soon as they become available, even as we improve their operational effectiveness.”

Now, significant amounts of time and research and development and testing have already gone into the MEADS system and at a time when the need for layered ballistic defense system is drastically increasing, I guess my question is kind of three-fold. First, does it make sense to end the program that will meet this need so near to its completion? And, secondly, if the program is terminated what course of action is the Army taking to replace the intended mission of the MEAD system and what kind of timeframe are we working on?

And finally, do we have a cost comparison between seeing the MEAD system go through the—to production and implementation and the alternative to replacing the Patriot and Hawk missile systems? That is a long set of questions, but it is——

Secretary MCHUGH. I will do my best to try to get through at least most of those. This was not an easy decision and it wasn’t a hasty decision. As I am sure you are aware, Congressman, the MEADS program has been under way for a decade. The Army has invested over $2 billion and that is only the partial cost of the program. Frankly, it was underperforming. You mentioned it was close to completion. We are not so sure that is true.

The decision to stick with the D&D [Design and Development] through the end of, I believe, 2014—the technology was one to provide our German and Italian partners an equal opportunity to harvest technology out of that. If there is any available information and gain out of this program, it is the technology package. We intend to put that on the shelf and to utilize it in trying to develop a program that can deliver the capability the MEADS was designed to deliver and do it in a more timely and affordable way.

In the interim, it is our intent to do upgrades to the pack three that you mentioned to—and other layered defenses that OSD has validated to us are available to meet the near-term needs. We just felt it was more good money after bad, but we remain committed to a system that is—that provides that kind of protection against the threat that is just not going to go away.

Mr. FRANKS. General, I might ask you to elaborate, too. I mean, as far as the cost comparison to any replacement that may occur, you are saying to me, it sounds like, that you think that the PAC–3 [Patriot Advanced Capability–3] and some of the other systems
can be upgraded to be able to meet that need; is that—was that what I was hearing?

Secretary McHugh. I said there is a bridge.

Mr. Franks. Okay. Where would the bridge go?

Secretary McHugh. Well, the bridge goes to the next system. We are not abandoning the project that—and one of the reasons for harvesting the technology is as the threat becomes more prevalent, we can take the technology off the shelf and develop a system that meets the threat when it appears. Right now, it is prospective.

Mr. Franks. Well, I guess I am—you know, I am hearing a little conflict here that the threat or the need is increasing, but you are—if I heard you right, Mr. Secretary, you are saying that the need right now is more prospective? Now, maybe I misunderstood.

Secretary McHugh. Well, what I am suggesting—and I defer to your expertise on missile defense, Mr. Franks. I have followed your lead on voting many times and I appreciate the insight and the understanding you bring to that.

Mr. Franks. You should keep that a secret, if you can.

Secretary McHugh. No, there are not many of us here. Perhaps they will hold it——

Mr. Franks. Nobody will know. You are safe.

Secretary McHugh. Yes. Yes.

But we felt there was a—use of money particularly with this program that was non-performing and we really did not see light at the end of the tunnel to invest the funds more wisely in an immediate threat that we know is out there that we feel and has as, again, I mentioned, validated by OSD and DOD that can be met by our PAC–3 upgrade programs, Aegis System and other available technologies.

Clearly, we need to ensure in the future as this threat that MEADS was intended to confront matures to have a response to it and that is why we are harvesting the technology to begin to develop a new program that will meet what we feel is a maturing threat somewhere down the road, it is not a threat right now that we believe we are indefensible against.

Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary and General, thank you. Let me beat this horse from a different side. It is going to cost about $800 million to finish MEADS to proof of concept. That is 800-and-something-million dollars. The request to bring it this next fiscal year 2012 is around $400 million, roughly half.

If you are not doing it for any particular purpose that meets a standing threat, then why put the money there at all? My question is actually for General Casey. Do you have any other thing you would like to put to almost half a billion dollars into in fiscal year 2012 or——

General Casey. As you both know, I mean, this is a very complex program. It is a development program with other countries that have interest in it. There are cancellation fees and things that had to be taken into consideration. And the Department has worked all of those issues and come to the conclusion that this is the best way to proceed with the program.
Mr. HUNTER. By spending almost a billion dollars on something we are not going to produce?

General CASEY. But that will allow us to meet our obligations to these other countries.

Mr. HUNTER. So we are doing it for these other nations’ interest?

Secretary McHugh. If I may, the $800 million proof of concept that you mentioned we are not convinced is viable. The history of this program has been one as it has been related to me were milestones that were set out and determined were rarely reached in the timeframe in which they were defined and proof of concept may well be yet another one of those. The investment of the $400 million was the—as the chief said, a decision as to how do we most wisely terminate this program.

If we withdrew this year, there are substantial withdrawal fees that the United States would have to bear and pay into the program that would not make it a wise decision.

Mr. HUNTER. Would you call it a bad deal then from the very beginning kind of? I mean, to——

Secretary McHugh. Well, I think the—I wasn’t there at the time, Congressman Hunter. Obviously anytime you—anytime you spend over $2 billion and dedicated a decade and you have little to show for it beyond the technology package was why the Department decided to spend the $400 million. It is probably not what you would want to design your procurement programs to be, but I think in the beginning you had three key allies—the Germans, the Italians, the Americans—working together to try to cooperatively do something that maybe they wouldn’t have taken up jointly and for a variety of reasons that I don’t pretend to totally understand. It has been a non-performing program.

Mr. HUNTER. Next question, something totally different having to do with Reserves, National Guard, Army drawdowns as we exit Iraq and hopefully victoriously leave Afghanistan in the next decade or so. How are we going to make sure this time that we don’t let our National Guard and Reserves fall into disrepair especially National Guard which are your shooters?

General CASEY. Yes.

Mr. HUNTER. I mean, it is just a huge burden—I wouldn’t call it a burden. I would call it a privilege that they have had to serve as main frontline soldiers especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. How are we going to make sure that they don’t fall into the same slump that they sink to every time we exit a war?

General CASEY. That is a great question because they have been full participants in this war. I mean, the Guard itself has over 600 killed, 5,000 wounded and I just talked to all of the tags a couple of days ago and we talked about exactly this.

We all believe that we do not want the Guard and Reserve to go back to being just a Strategic Reserve. We have invested $28 billion just in Guard equipment in the last 5 years. We have to figure out how to leverage that investment and we commissioned a study, the Secretary and I, oh, about a year ago now where we asked a former Chief of Staff of the Army, a former Chief of the Army Guard and former Chief of the Army Reserve to go back and tell us what should be the role of the Guard and Reserve in an area of persistent conflict when repeated deployments are the norm.
And they came back and gave us some great insights and one of the most important insights that they gave us was that we are going to have some forces that are going to deploy and those forces will be resourced and to do what they need to do and be well trained and equipped so they meet the needs of that deployment. And we have designed the Army since the early 1970s not to be able to go to war without the Guard and Reserve.

And I think you know our force structure is very heavily weighted with Guard and Reserve filling the combat supported combat service for functions. And so there is one level. They are going to get funded. They are going to go.

Now, the question then becomes, okay, how much readiness do you build in the next decade to deploy forces and we need a model that allows us to sustain their combat edge that they have built over the last decade, but then also only to build the readiness we need when we need it and we are actively working on that model with the Guard and Reserve, but we are absolutely committed that we don't want the Guard and Reserve to go back to being just a Strategic Reserve.

Mr. Hunter. Great. And please let me know how we can help. Mr. Walls and myself are the co-chairs of the National Guard Reserve Caucus now and any way that we can help you with that or work with you on that, we would be happy to. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Coffman.

Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Secretary McHugh. And especially General Casey, seeing that you are going to retire soon, thank you so much for your 4 decades of service to the United States Army.

First of all, Secretary McHugh, I share with you the condolences to the families that were killed in the Fort Hood shooting that happened last year—I am sorry, on November 5, 2009—and the report of Major Hasan is—I believe it is still restricted and it is merely an analysis of his personnel record with no references to the incident itself. And if it is still restricted, I would ask you to make that available to the American people. I think they have a right to know and I don't see anything relevant to national security nor relevant to the case that is in this report.

It is, in fact, embarrassing to the United States Army to have missed so many, I think, cues as to the radicalization of Major Hasan and I believe that corrective action is being taken in that regard. I certainly hope that it is, Secretary.

Secretary McHugh. The release of information is really controlled by the interpretation placed on it by the legal authorities as to the possible effect it might have at this time with respect to public release with the prosecution for the crimes allegedly committed by Nidal Hasan. That was a decision made by the Office of General Counsel, DOD and others, and at such time that I would assume that those circumstances no longer exist, release of appropriate redacted information I feel comfortable will occur. I just can't tell you when the lawyers——

Mr. Coffman. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. I just want to say that that is an abuse of the authority of the chief legal counsel of the
Department of Defense to have made that decision, which I believe is a political decision, and really has nothing to do with the case.

Let me go to a question concerning our—I believe we have four brigade combat teams still in Europe and General Casey, I think I was—you were second lieutenant when I was a private in the United States Army. And during the Cold War, you and I know it is pretty damn cold being on that border of Czechoslovakia—rotating on that border during that period of time in the early 1970s, but we still have four brigade combat teams and the Cold War has long since been over with.

And I know in the Quadrennial Defense Review, they supported keeping those troops there, but in a recent GAO [Government Accountability Office] study, it said that GAO concludes keeping two brigades in Germany costs $390 million more per year than basing them in the United States. And so I would really ask you to take a look at whether or not we ought to redeploy some of those forces back to the United States. Do you have a response to that?

General CASEY. I think you—you know, Congressman, this is something the Department of Defense has been working on for a while and I think they are getting relatively close to making a decision on what, if any, of those forces would return.

Mr. COFFMAN. Very well. Thank you. You know, my final question, for Secretary McHugh or General Casey, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program has been subject to cost overruns, milestone delays, ambiguous capability requirements, you know? I think that right now the projected base unit cost of the JLTV is $300 to $4,000—$300,000 to $400,000 per copy. And you know and I know historically these costs will rise over time. What is the future of this program and how will the army manage cost increases? What is the long-term ground vehicle strategy for the Army regarding HMMWVs, MRAPs and JLTVs?

Secretary McHUGH. A good question there. The Army is still committed and we are still working with the Marine Corps on the development of the JLTV. Your observations about cost overruns is accurate and it in large measure goes back to what we had discussed earlier in this hearing with respect to unrealistic requirements. I think they have reconfigured that.

We do expect a lot of the JLTV. It shares several hundred requirements with the MATVs, with the—MRAPs that we think are performing so magnificently, but it has its own unique aspects as well. We are trying our best to control that and we look forward to its fielding. It will be ultimately the replacement for the HMMWV with far more survivability with off-road capability that the HMMWV does not have and we see it as part of our future fleet.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Gibson.

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the witnesses being here today. I have learned a great deal and I want to thank you for your leadership. I also want to express my support and admiration for those you lead. I think it was particularly noteworthy that you brought these fine non-commissioned officers here to remind us to keep it real as we are going through this here today. Thank you for your service. And we remember the families too and
I thought it was very touching that you brought one of our Gold Star family leaders here today. We will always remember.

You know, I also want to appreciate the work that went into preparing the budget. This is really a different time over the last decade. We are doing more with less and we are all committed. I think everybody on this committee and beyond is committed to protecting our cherished way of life, but we also know that the deficit is a threat to our way of life.

So towards that end, the judgment that you showed to deal with the declining President’s budget numbers is appreciated. You know, my question has to do with the future of the Armed Forces and here today the Army and looking forward to 2014, 2015 and beyond at a time when we have accomplished our objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan and we think about the force that we are going to need.

I affiliate to some degree with the—he would—any future Secretary of Defense would be crazy if he gave a recommendation that we send a land army or send our Army to the land forces in Asia or to Africa, you know, I think to the degree that we avoid a decade-long counterinsurgency effort is something we ought to be trying to do.

I think there are better ways to neutralize the Al Qaeda threat, but having said that, so much of the international order is really based on deterrence and to have demonstrated capability to put together a con-op where the Nation has the ability from joint forcible entry to campaigning to sustaining and post-hostilities, I think, will go a long way to keeping peace, particularly when you think about the instability in the world and the potential interests of nations that may want to take advantage of certain circumstances.

So looking out in 2014 and 2015 and beyond, General, how do you assess our ability to conduct these kind of operations? Where do you think the risk is not only inside your formations and your institutions, but along the joint force for the country to be able to do this, and are you convinced that in the fight that we have, war gaming, exercises and other means to come to understanding in situational awareness on where our weakness and vulnerabilities are? Thanks.

General CASEY. Well, this kind of goes back to the discussion we were having earlier about what are we going to need and what kind of Army we are going to need in 2015, 2016. And as I mentioned, the two dominant characteristics of the future environment are uncertainty and complexity. And frankly, I believe that the Army we will have at the beginning of 2015 will be an Army that is versatile, that is combat-seasoned, that is well-equipped and ready to deal with a wide range of challenges.

The issue will be should we draw it down and if we draw it down, can we do that without damaging our capability to operate across the spectrum of conflict, to put together the types of operations that you mentioned? Because I think that is what we are going to need. We don’t know what we are going to be doing in 3 to 5 years from now.

I mean, Secretary Gates says our track record is perfect and I firmly believe that we will be doing something in 3 to 5 years that none of us are thinking about today. I don’t know what that is.
Mr. GIBSON. Are you convinced that in the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program] you have got the war gaming, the modeling, the simulation, the exercises to show that we have this capability? And, for example, to put a finer point on a couple of these things, are you convinced we have got enough C–17s [Boeing Globemaster military transport aircraft], vessels that we have got the command and control in the like that we are going to be able to put this together?

General CASEY. No, I appreciate what you are saying there and there are studies and models that do the kinds of things you are saying, but what I found in my 4 years here is they are still largely weighted toward a conventional military operation and we have been working with others over time to build models that actually reflect the kinds of operations that we are going to be doing—we think are hybrid-type operations. They are not—there will be a mix of conventional irregular criminal terrorists, all arrayed against us asymmetrically, but we don’t have good models for those to your point.

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thank you very much for that testimony, and I think to the degree that we demonstrate competency on that, I think it will reinforce what our diplomats are doing for us and we will be a strong Nation. And I think we can protect our cherished way of life in a manner that is consistent for a republic and not an empire. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I see no further members of the committee to ask questions. I thank you for your time here today. Thank you again for your service. I look forward to working with you as we move through the budget process and this committee will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 2, 2011
Statement of Chairman Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (R—California)

House Committee on Armed Services

Hearing on

Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Request from the Department of the Army

March 2, 2011

Good morning. Thank you for joining us as we consider the Fiscal Year 2012 budget request for the Department of the Army. Secretary McHugh, General Casey, thank you for being here. As I have said before, we are very fortunate to have each of you serving our country.

Secretary McHugh, once again you find yourself in the hot seat. Nine-term Member of Congress, and this Committee’s former Ranking Member. Without a doubt, whether a member of this committee or as the 21st Secretary of the Army, you are a staunch advocate for Soldiers and their Families. We on the Armed Services Committee are very proud of you. Thank you for your continued public service.

General Casey, you also are no stranger to this committee. I want to take a moment to mention that this will be your last Army posture hearing. Thirty-sixth Vice Chief of Staff, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, 36th Chief of Staff; over 40 years of selfless military service to this Nation. I know you still have much you want to accomplish in your time as the Army Chief of Staff, but I thank you and your wife Sheila for your service to our country.

I would also like to mention that the Ranking Member and I recently had the pleasure to visit with soldiers at Fort Lewis, in Mr. Smith’s district, and the National Training Center (NTC) in my district. While at NTC we were able to observe the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division as they trained for their upcoming deployment to Afghanistan. And while at Fort Lewis we observed the 3rd and 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, 2nd Infantry Division. It was a great trip and, of course, the Ranking Member and I were very impressed with the soldiers and what we saw.

It is on trips like these and similar trips to Iraq and Afghanistan that we are reminded why hearings such as this one are so important. Because you don’t just “go to war with the Army you have.” You go to war with an Army who was
resourced, hopefully properly, with personnel and equipment provided by the United States Congress. As our former Chairman, the great Ike Skelton used to say, “The buck stops here.”

To that end, I remain concerned about the reduction of an additional $78 billion from the Department’s funding topline, including a $13 billion cut in 2012—ultimately leading to zero percent real growth within three years. The Army’s share of the Department’s efficiency savings is $29 billion, including $2.7 billion in the 2012 budget request. We are told that the Army has been allowed to reinvest all of the $2.7 billion. However, when you compare the Army’s base budget and supplemental budget request from 2011 to 2012, this budget request is almost $30 billion less. I understand that the primary reason for the reduction is based on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by 31 December 2011. Clearly there was a need to move Overseas Contingency Operations funding into the base budget, but we need assurances that the Army was able to migrate everything they needed from the supplemental into the base; particularly as it relates to taking care of soldiers and the reset of equipment.

Likewise, this Congress must learn more about the proposed end-strength reductions for the Army. The Army has borne the brunt of two wars for the past decade and hasn’t reached its objectives for active component dwell time of 1:3. In fact, the proposed end-strength reductions appear to force the Army to settle for only a 1:2 dwell time. I would like to know why. In short, I cannot in good conscience ask the Army to do more with less.

Again, I thank both of you for your service to our country and for being here.
Statement of Ranking Member Adam Smith
House Committee on Armed Services Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Budget Request
from the Department of the Army
March 2, 2011

Today we examine an Army that is rebuilding its readiness as it draws down from the war in Iraq at the same time it continues to prosecute an armed conflict in Afghanistan. If the past decade has been about Army transformation, then the next decade appears to be about an Army in transition.

Just as a fighting force repositions itself to give it an edge over an enemy, the Army must structure itself, as Defense Secretary Gates stated last Friday at West Point, to train and equip for the extraordinarily diverse range of missions it will face in the future.

The fiscal year 2012 budget request under consideration today reflects an Army at a crossroads in a time of constrained federal funding.

While the readiness of non-deployed forces remains tenuous as manpower and resources are focused on Afghanistan, the Army is proposing, through a billion-dollar-plus investment in fiscal year 2012, to increase full-spectrum training through 24 combined arms Brigade Combat Team exercises, 33 sustainment and functional brigade warfighter exercises, and doubling of simulations exercises to 200 per year.

With dwell time increasing as Army troops draw down in Iraq, the Army is at the same time looking at force reductions. The size of the Army will be a major issue this year, with Congress evaluating the administration’s plan to bring down Army personnel levels by a combined total of 49,000 over the next six years. It is imperative that this discussion be requirements-based and not arbitrarily budget-driven. The Congress and the Department of Defense leadership need to engage in a full discussion of what the post-Afghanistan and future threat environment will dictate in terms of Army end strength and force structure.

I also think it is critical to look closely at what the Army would do with any savings that could be realized if a drawdown in troop strength should occur. If the Army is allowed to reinvest those savings in modernizing its equipment and increasing training funding, the Army will likely emerge just as strong as it is today. On the other hand, if the Army loses all the associated funding, then we could be left with an Army too small to support enduring overseas commitments and without fully modern equipment.

The FY12 budget includes almost $3 billion for the continued reset of equipment damaged or worn out through nine years of constant operations, the replenishment of Army prepositioned stocks, and maintenance for nine Heavy Brigade Combat Teams, 12 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, three Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, six combat Aviation Brigades, and one Fires Brigade and its enablers. But this past weekend Secretary Gates told the West Point cadets that the Army—and Army mechanized forces in particular—may play little role in the conflicts of the future. So this raises the issue of what exactly the nation wants its Army to be ready to do.
This debate is long overdue and needs to take place. For a long time, the Army has not received clear guidance on this critical issue from civilian leaders in the Department of Defense. But in the meantime the Army is required to be prepared to do everything from stability operations to counter-insurgency to high-intensity armored combat.

The FY12 budget must be examined in that context, regardless of what the longer-term future may hold for the Army.
STATEMENT BY

THE HONORABLE JOHN M. MCHUGH
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

AND

GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY JR.
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UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE

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Introduction

In the past decade, America’s Army has been challenged and prevailed in some of the most daunting tasks in the history of our military. Soldiers from the Active Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve demonstrate indelible spirit, sacrifice and sheer determination in protecting our national interests and supporting our friends and allies around the world.

In the coming years, our top priorities will be to maintain our combat edge while we reconstitute the force for other missions and build resilience in our people. The Army has made significant progress in restoring balance through the four imperatives we identified in 2007 - sustain, prepare, reset, and transform. We are on track to achieve a sustainable deployment tempo for our forces and restore balance to the Army beginning in FY 12. We successfully completed combat operations in Iraq, transitioning from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New Dawn while executing one of the largest wartime retrogrades in the Nation’s history. Operation New Dawn marks the beginning of a new mission for our Army while demonstrating our ongoing commitment to the government and people of Iraq. Concurrently, we surged Soldiers to Afghanistan in
support of a new strategic direction in this vital theater. Even with all we have done, there is still much work to do.

The war is not over yet, and we remain in an era of persistent conflict facing an uncertain and increasingly complex strategic environment. Hybrid threats made up of conventional, irregular, criminal and terrorist capabilities will continue to test our forces. These threats will avoid our strengths and attack us asymmetrically. Therefore, we must continue to organize our formations, update our doctrine and prepare our forces for the full spectrum of operations.

Additionally we remain aware of the difficult economic conditions at home. These conditions will drive our efforts to transform our generating force into an innovative and adaptive organization. We must adapt our institutions to effectively generate trained and ready forces for Full Spectrum Operations, while seeking ways to improve efficiency and reduce overhead expenditures that demonstrate wise stewardship of our taxpayers’ dollars. With the continued support of the American people and Congress, we remain committed to the readiness and well being of our Soldiers, Civilians and Family members. As the Strength of the Nation, the American Soldier is the centerpiece of everything we do.

Where We Have Been

For nearly a decade, the Army has been operating at an exhausting pace. High operational demands have stressed our ability to supply trained and ready forces during most of this period. The result was an Army out of balance, lacking strategic flexibility to respond to other
contingencies and lacking the ability to sustain the all-volunteer force. This past year the Army continued to make great strides toward restoring balance to the force.

The drawdown in Iraq and change of mission from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New Dawn on September 1, 2010 represented a significant accomplishment made possible by the extraordinary determination, hard work and sacrifice of American Soldiers, their Families and the Civilian workforce. During Operation New Dawn, the remaining 50,000 U.S. service members serving in Iraq will conduct stability operations focused on advising, assisting and training Iraqi Security Forces, all while engineering the responsible drawdown of combat forces in one of the largest and most complex logistical operations in history. The Army closed or transferred over 80 percent of the bases to Iraqi authorities, reduced the number of U.S. personnel by over 75,000 and redeployed more than 26,000 vehicles.

Concurrently, we implemented the President's direction to surge an additional 30,000 Soldiers to Afghanistan to defeat the al-Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban insurgency. This surge enabled our Soldiers and our Afghan partners to take back insurgent sanctuaries in the traditional insurgent Taliban heartland of southern Afghanistan. Additionally, during this past year our forces have trained 109,000 Afghan National Army Soldiers, as well as 41,000 Afghan National Police. As a result, we are beginning to see an improvement in Afghan National Security Force capability.
Last year, the Army responded to three major natural and environmental disasters while continuing to support homeland defense. The Army provided humanitarian relief in response to the devastating earthquake in Haiti, the summer floods in Pakistan and the catastrophic oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Additionally, our National Guard Soldiers were sent to the Nation’s southern border to help control increased illegal activity. They assisted federal law enforcement agencies responsible for drug enforcement and the security of our borders.

During this past year the Army continued to increase its knowledge and understanding of Full Spectrum Operations. Last October, the Army conducted the first full spectrum rotation against a hybrid threat at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA. This was the first time in five years that we have been able to conduct a training rotation focused on anything other than operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As we continue to build dwell and increase the time Soldiers have at home, more units will conduct full spectrum training rotations at the Combat Training Centers increasing our ability to hedge against the unexpected and restoring strategic flexibility to the force.

Though we remain heavily engaged, the Army is regaining balance. We are starting to be able to breathe again. We must continue efforts to fully restore balance while maintaining the momentum we have achieved over the past four years. The strategic environment continues to be complex, and the stakes are too high to become complacent or underprepared.
Restoring Balancing

Restoring Balance

Through the continued support of Congress and the American people, we will lessen the stress on America’s Army by focusing on the imperatives we established four years ago. We must continue to sustain the Army’s Soldiers, Families and Civilians; prepare forces for success in the current conflicts; reset returning units; and transform the Army to meet the demands of the second decade of the 21st Century.

Sustain

Our first imperative is to sustain our all-volunteer force. We must reduce the stress on Soldiers, Families and Civilians who have borne the hardship of nine and a half years of conflict. In addition to addressing this high level of stress, the Army invests time, energy and resources into quality of life programs. We must continue to inculcate resilience in the force, providing Soldiers, Families and Civilians the skill sets necessary to deal with adversity.

Goals

The most important component required to restore balance within our Army is to increase the time between deployments, known as dwell time. A study completed in 2009 confirmed what we already intuitively knew: Soldiers require at least two to three years to fully recover, both mentally and physically, from the rigors of a one year combat deployment.
Training and schooling necessary for a professional Soldier to sustain warrior and leader skills are also very important. With these critical considerations, our interim objective is to achieve and then maintain a dwell time of at least two years at home for every year deployed for the active component Soldier and four years at home for every year mobilized for the reserve component Soldier. In 2011 we will examine the cost and benefits of increasing dwell to 1:3 and 1:5 respectively with a nine month Boots on the Ground policy.

In addition to increasing dwell time, the Army must continue to recruit and retain quality Soldiers and Civilians from diverse backgrounds. People are our most important resource, and to sustain an all-volunteer force it is essential to attract those with an aptitude for learning and then retain them as they develop the tactical, technical and leadership skills the Army needs. To grow and develop the Army’s future leadership, we need appropriate incentives to encourage sufficient numbers of high quality personnel to continue to serve beyond their initial term of service.

Another important consideration is the health of the force. We must provide our Soldiers and Civilians, as well as their Families, the best possible care, support and services by establishing a cohesive holistic Army-wide strategy to synchronize and integrate programs, processes and governance. There are myriad programs available to accomplish this, such as Army Family Action Plan, the Army Family Covenant and other community covenants. Our focus is on improving access to and predictability of services. We will enhance support for the wounded, Families of the Fallen, victims of sexual assault and those with mental health issues. Our effort to build an entire spectrum of wellness —
physical, emotional, social, family and spiritual – will support achieving Army strategic outcomes of readiness, recruitment and retention. The Army is also building resilience in the force by addressing the cumulative effects of nine and a half years of war. We have designed a comprehensive approach that puts mental fitness on the same level as physical fitness by establishing a Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program, developing Master Resiliency Trainers and implementing a campaign for Health Promotion and Risk Reduction. The Army has a requisite duty to provide world class health care for our wounded, ill or injured Warriors and to successfully transition these Soldiers and their Families back to the Army or civilian life. This is coordinated through the Warrior Care and Transition Program and ably led by well resourced Warrior Transition Units. Our final and most solemn responsibility is to respect and honor the sacrifice of our fallen comrades by continuing to support the needs of their Families.

Progress

- Achieved 101 percent of recruiting goals for 2010, exceeding both numeric goals and quality benchmarks for new recruits. Over 98 percent of recruits had high school diplomas, the highest percentage since 1992.
- Exceeded reenlistment goals: 114 percent for the active component and 106 percent for the reserve component.
- Decreased accidents and mishaps in several key categories, to include:
  - Off-duty fatalities down by 20 percent
  - On-duty critical accidents down by 13 percent
o Army combat vehicle accidents down by 37 percent
  o Manned aircraft accidents down by 16 percent

- Expanded Survivor Outreach Services to over 26,000 Family members, providing unified support and advocacy, and enhancing survivor benefits for the Families of our Soldiers who have made the ultimate sacrifice.
- Graduated more than 3,000 Soldiers and Civilians from the Master Resilience Trainer course.
- Surpassed one million Soldiers, Civilians and Family members who have completed the Army’s Global Assessment Tool to begin their personal assessment and resilience training.

FY 12 Budget Highlights for Sustain

- Provides $1.7 billion to fund vital Soldier and Family programs to provide a full range of essential services to include the Army Campaign for Heath Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention; Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention; and Comprehensive Soldier Fitness. In addition, this funding supports Family services including welfare and recreation, youth services and child care, Survivor Outreach Services and education and employment opportunities for Family members.
- Provides Soldiers with a 1.6% military basic pay raise, a 3.4% basic allowance for subsistence increase and a 3.1% basic allowance for housing increase.
- Continues to fund the Residential Communities Initiatives program which provides quality, sustainable residential communities for
Soldiers and their Families living on-post and continues to offset out-of-pocket housing expenses for those residing off-post.

**Prepare**

Properly preparing our Soldiers for combat against a ruthless and dedicated enemy is critical to mission success. To do so, we must provide the appropriate equipment and training to each Soldier and ensure units are appropriately manned. Our generating force must continuously adapt – tailoring force packages and quickly readjusting training, manning and equipping – to ensure units have the tools necessary to succeed in any conflict. At the same time, we are aggressively pursuing efficiency initiatives designed to reduce duplication, overhead and excess as well as to instill a culture of savings and restraint.

**Goals**

The Army identified four key goals necessary to adequately prepare the force for today’s strategic environment. The first was to responsibly **grow the Army**. The Congressionally approved growth of the Army was completed ahead of schedule in 2009. However, after a decade of persistent conflict, a number of other factors – non-deployable Soldiers, temporary requirements in various headquarters and transition teams, our wounded Warriors, elimination of stop-loss – has impacted our ability to adequately man units for deployment. As a result, the Secretary of Defense approved an additional Temporary End Strength of 22,000 Soldiers, 7,000 of whom were integrated in 2010. The Army will return to
the Congressionally approved active component end strength of 547,400 by the end of FY 13. The second key goal addressed training. The Army will continue its commitment to leader, individual and collective training in order to remain mentally, physically and emotionally agile against a highly decentralized and adaptive foe. The third key goal is to provide the Army with effective equipment in a timely and efficient manner. We must implement a new materiel management approach to ensure a timely availability of equipment that not only protects our Soldiers and maintains our technological edge, but does so prudently.

The final and most critical goal is to fully embrace our rotational readiness model – a process we call Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). ARFORGEN will allow a steady, predictable flow of trained and ready forces to meet the Nation’s needs across the full spectrum of conflict. Drawing from both active and reserve components, the ARFORGEN process allows us to consistently generate one corps headquarters, five division headquarters, 20 brigade combat teams, and 90,000 enabler Soldiers (i.e., combat support and combat service support). When the current demand comes down, it will allow us to build and maintain the ability to surge one corps headquarters, three division headquarters, ten brigade combat teams and 40,000 enabler Soldiers as a hedge against contingencies. ARFORGEN also allows a predictable and sustainable dwell time for Soldiers. We are currently working to better align the generating force activities and business processes that support ARFORGEN.
Progress

- Trained and deployed seven division headquarters, 16 brigade combat teams, four combat aviation brigades, and eight multi-functional / functional brigades for deployments to Operation New Dawn and Operation Enduring Freedom in 2010.
- Increased Army inventory of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles to 20,000 vehicles.
- Deployed more than 4,300 Army Civilians to Iraq and Afghanistan to support operations in both theaters.
- Discontinued the Stop Loss program; last Soldiers affected by the policy will leave active duty in early 2011.

FY 12 Budget Highlights for Prepare

- Supports a permanent, all volunteer force end strength of 547,400 for the active component, 358,200 for the National Guard and 205,000 for the Army Reserve in the base budget. Provides for a 22,000 temporary increase in the active component in the Overseas Contingency Operations request (14,600 end strength on 30 September 2012).
- Includes $2.1 billion in procurement for Joint and Combat Communications Systems, including the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), and an additional $1.5 billion in Tactical Wheeled Vehicle modernization funding.
- Provides over $5.6 billion for the Army to implement training strategies in support of Full Spectrum Operations, designed to prepare units for any mission along the spectrum of conflict, i.e., to
perform the fundamental aspects of offense, defense, and stability operations against hybrid threats in contemporary operational environments.

- Invests $1.5 billion in 71 UH-60M/HH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters - a critical step in modernizing the utility helicopter fleet. Provides a digitized cockpit, new engine for improved lift and range, and wide-chord rotor blades.

- Devotes $1.4 billion to procure 32 new and 15 remanufactured CH-47F Chinook Helicopters with a new airframe, Common Avionics Architecture System (CAAS), digital cockpit and a digital advanced flight control system, as well as an additional $1.04 billion to modernize the AH-64 Apache.

**Reset**

In order to ensure a quality force and a level of readiness necessary for the complex range of future missions, we must continue to reset our units’ Soldiers, Families and equipment. This is especially critical given the tempo of deployments. It is a process that must continue for two to three years after the end of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

**Goals**

In order to achieve our reset goals, we continue every effort to **revitalize Soldiers and Families** by allowing them an opportunity to reestablish, nurture and strengthen personal relationships immediately following a deployment. This includes a review of our procedures for demobilization of reserve component Soldiers. We strive to make this
post-deployment period as predictable and stable as possible. The Army also seeks to repair, replace and recapitalize equipment. As we continue the responsible drawdown in Iraq while simultaneously building up capability to complete our mission in Afghanistan, it is critical that we efficiently replace all equipment that has been destroyed, and that we repair or recapitalize equipment impacted by extreme environmental conditions or combat operations. We will achieve this by adapting the production and manufacturing processes in our arsenals and depots, sustaining existing efficiencies, improving collaboration and eliminating redundancies in materiel management and distribution. This will save the Army money in equipment costs and lessen the strain on the supply lines into and out of combat theaters. We finished the reset pilot program which was designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the reset process, and we will continue to apply lessons learned. As we drawdown in Iraq and eventually in Afghanistan, we will continue to focus on retraining Soldiers, units and leaders in order to effectively reset the force.

Too often over the last nine and a half years, the Army had to prioritize deployment over certain education and training opportunities for Soldiers. Given the uncertain strategic environment we face in the future, it is critical that the Army focus on education and leader development as well as provide Soldiers, units and leaders training for full spectrum operations.

Progress

- Sponsored over 2,600 Strong Bonds events designed to strengthen Army Families with over 160,000 Soldiers and Family members participating
• Completed the reset of 29 brigades’ worth of equipment, and continued the reset of 13 more.

• Distributed 1.3 million pieces of equipment, closed or transferred 418 bases, drew down 16 Supply Support Activities and redeployed over 76,000 U.S. military, civilian and coalition personnel – all in support of the responsible drawdown of forces from Iraq.

• Deployed Army aircraft with Condition Based Maintenance plus (CBM+) technologies into combat theaters. CBM+ is a proactive maintenance capability that uses sensor-based health indications to predict failure in advance of the event providing the ability to take appropriate preventive measures. A cost-benefit analysis for CBM+ indicated that it has a Benefit-to-Investment Ratio of 1.2:1 given a ten year operations period.

FY 12 Budget Highlights for Reset

• Provides $4.4 billion to reset Army equipment through the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request.

• Continues to support training and sustainment of Army forces including individual skills and leader training; combined arms training toward full spectrum operations; and adaptable, phased training based on the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process.
**Transform**

In order to provide combatant commanders with tailored, strategically responsive forces that can dominate across the spectrum of conflict in an uncertain threat environment, the Army continues to transform our operating force by building versatile, agile units capable of adapting to changing environments. We continue to convert brigades to more deployable, tailorable and versatile modular organizations while rebalancing our skills to better prepare for the future. This process not only positions us to win today’s conflicts, but it also sets the conditions for future success.

To support the operating force, our generating force must become a force driven by innovation, able to adapt quickly and field what our Soldiers and their Families will require. We must transform the business systems of our generating force by developing a fully integrated management system, improving the ARFORGEN process, adopting an enterprise approach and reforming the requirements and resource processes that synchronize materiel distribution, training and staffing. Transformation of the generating force is key to our ability to effectively manage, generate and sustain a balanced Army for the 21st Century.

**Goals**

Our plan identifies five goals necessary for effective transformation. The first is completing our modular reorganization. Our plan calls for converting all Army brigades from Cold War formations to more deployable, tailorable and versatile modular formations. Our reorganized
units have proven themselves extremely powerful and effective on today's battlefields. The second goal involves accelerated fielding of proven, advanced technologies as part of our modernization of the force. The Army will develop and field versatile, affordable, survivable and networked equipment to ensure our Soldiers maintain a decisive advantage over any enemy they confront. In the Information Age, the Army must be networked at all times to enable collaboration with Joint, combined, coalition and other mission partners to ensure our Soldiers have a decisive advantage. Third, we must institutionalize the investment in our reserve component and obtain assured and predictable access to them, so that the Army can achieve the strategic flexibility and operational depth required to respond to emerging contingencies across the spectrum of conflict. We are systematically building and sustaining readiness while increasing predictability for reserve component Soldiers, Families, employers and communities through the ARFORGEN process. We must modify Army policies and update Congressional authorizations in order to fully realize the potential of an operationalized reserve component and capitalize on their significant combat experience. The fourth goal is the re-stationing of forces and Families around the world based on the Base Realignment and Closure statutes. The Army is in the final year of this complex and detailed five year effort that has created improved work and training facilities for our Soldiers and Civilians as well as new or improved housing, medical and child care facilities for our Families. The last aspect of transformation is Soldier and leader development, which is an important factor in maintaining the profession of arms. Today's Army has a tremendous amount of combat experience that must be augmented with continued professional education and broadening opportunities in order to develop agile and adaptive military and civilian leaders who are able to
operate effectively in Joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multi-national environments.

Progress

- Reached 98 percent completion of the modular conversion of the Army. The FY 12 Budget will support completion of this process.
- Restored nearly a brigade combat team’s worth of equipment and its entire sustainment package in the Army Pre-Positioned Stocks program for the first time since 2002, greatly enhancing the Army’s strategic flexibility.
- Provided identity management capabilities for the Department of Defense (DoD) and other U.S. Government and international partners through the DoD Automated Biometric Identification System. The nearly 1.3 million biometric entries enabled latent identification of approximately 700 Improvised Explosive Device (IED) events, 1,200 IED-related watch list hits, and 775 high-value individual captures in 2010.
- Issued Soldiers in the 10th Mountain Division and 101st Airborne Division the Soldier Plate Carrier System -- a lightweight vest that provides ballistic protection equal to the Improved Outer Tactical Vest in a standalone capacity while reducing the Soldier’s load, enhancing comfort and optimizing mobility.
- Fielded 20 million Enhanced Performance Rounds, providing our Soldiers with leap-ahead performance over the previous 5.56mm round. The Enhanced Performance Round provides excellent performance against soft targets, has an exposed penetrator that is
larger and sharper to penetrate hard targets and is more effective at extended ranges. The round is also lead-free.

- Educated over 300 General Officers and Senior Civilian Leaders in business transformation concepts and management practices through the Army Strategic Leadership Development Program.
- Disposed of over 24,000 acres and closed three active installations and five U.S. Army Reserve Centers and is on course to complete BRAC in FY 11.

FY 12 Budget Highlights for Transform

- Provides $974 million in procurement and $298 million in continued Research Development Test and Evaluation of the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) which will become the cornerstone tactical communications system by providing a single integrating framework for the Army’s battlefield networks.
• Provides $1.04 billion in support of the Army’s Combat Vehicle Modernization Strategy including $884 million for the Ground Combat Vehicle and $156 million for the modernization of the Stryker, Bradley and Abrams combat vehicles.

Strategic Context

As America enters the second decade of the 21st Century, the Army faces a broad array of challenges. First and foremost, we must succeed in Afghanistan and Iraq and continue to combat violent extremist movements such as al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. We must also prepare for future national security challenges that range across the spectrum of conflict. All of this must be accomplished within the context of challenging global economic conditions.

Global Trends

Global trends will continue to shape the international environment. Although such trends pose both dilemmas and opportunities, their collective impact will increase security challenges and frame the conflicts that will confront the United States and our allies.

Globalization has spread prosperity around the globe and will continue to reduce barriers to trade, finance and economic growth. However, it will also continue to exacerbate tensions between the wealthy and the poor. Almost 85 percent of the world’s wealth is held by ten percent of the population while only one percent of the global wealth is
shared by the bottom 50 percent of the world’s population. This disparity can create populations that are vulnerable to radicalization.

Globalization is made possible through significant technological advances that benefit people around the world. Unfortunately, the same technology that facilitates an interconnected world is also used by extremist groups to proliferate their ideology and foment terrorism. Additionally, there are an increasing number of foreign government-sponsored cyber programs, politically motivated individuals, non-state actors and criminals who are capable of initiating potentially debilitating attacks on the electronic infrastructure of our Nation and allies.

Population growth in the developing world creates new markets, but the accompanying youth bulge can create a population of unemployed, disenfranchised individuals susceptible to extremist teachings that threaten stability and security. Furthermore, the bulk of the population growth is expected to occur in urban areas. Future military operations are more likely to occur in densely populated urban terrain – among the people rather than around them.

The demand for resources such as water, energy and food will increase competition and the propensity for conflict. Even as countries develop more efficient uses of natural resources, some countries, particularly those with burgeoning middle classes, will exacerbate demands on already scarce resources.

Proliferation and failing states continue to be the two trends of greatest concern. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction increases
the potential for destabilizing catastrophic attacks. Meanwhile, failed or failing states that lack the capacity or will to maintain territorial control can provide safe havens for terrorist groups to plan and export terror. The merging of these two trends is particularly worrisome: failing states that offer safe haven to terrorists seeking weapons of mass destruction. Al-Qaida and affiliated terrorist groups already seek weapons of mass destruction and will use them against Western interests given the opportunity.

Persistent Conflict

Persistent conflict has characterized the environment in which the Army has operated over the last nine and a half years. This protracted confrontation among state, non-state and individual actors, using violence to further their ideological and political goals, will likely continue well into the second decade of the 21st Century. As a result, our commitments in the future will be more frequent and continuous. Conflicts will arise unpredictably, vary in intensity and scope and will be less susceptible to traditional means of conflict resolution. Concurrently, the Army’s Soldiers and Civilians will respond to natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies in support of civil authorities both at home and abroad. The Nation will continue to rely upon the Army to be ready to conduct a wide range of operations from humanitarian and civil support to counterinsurgency to general war.

Violent extremism in various forms will continue to constitute the most likely and immediate threat around the world. A more dangerous threat will come from emergent hybrid adversaries who combine the agility
and flexibility of being an irregular and decentralized enemy with the power and technology of a nation state. These security challenges, in whatever form they are manifested, constitute the threat that the Army and our Nation will face for the foreseeable future. Our Army must remain alert to changes in this volatile environment and build the agility to anticipate and respond to change by maintaining our combat edge.

The Next Decade

The Nation continues to be faced with persistent and ruthless foes that maintain a clear intent to attack us on our soil. Entering the future under these conditions, the Army remains a resilient but stretched force – one that has performed superbly while simultaneously transforming in the midst of a war. The high demand we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan will likely recede over the next few years, but other demands will surely arise. Our Soldiers and Civilians will have more time at home, and that will necessitate a different type of leadership at our garrisons between deployments. Given this future, the Army’s challenge in the second decade of the century is to maintain our combat edge while we reconstitute the force, and build resilience for the long haul.

Maintaining Our Combat Edge

Beginning in 2012 we anticipate having about as many BCTs available that are not earmarked for Iraq and Afghanistan as we will have of those deploying. It will be imperative that we remain focused on tough,
demanding training at home station and at our training centers to ensure that our Soldiers and units sustain their combat edge. This training must be accomplished at an appropriate tempo and while meeting the unique challenges associated with increased time at home. Those units who are not deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan will undergo full spectrum training and be available to combatant commanders for security cooperation engagements, exercises and other regional requirements as well as fulfilling our requirements for a Global Response Force and the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force. To do this, the Army will need to revitalize home station and leader development programs. We must continue to challenge our young, combat-seasoned leaders who will lead our Army into the second decade of this century and beyond.

Another aspect of maintaining our combat edge involves codifying our experience and lessons learned. Institutionally, we must refine our doctrine and warfighting concepts. While our understanding of Full Spectrum Operations has matured, we must continue to clarify how we define and how we conduct Full Spectrum Operations across the spectrum of conflict from stable peace to general war. As units have more time at home, we will train against the wider range of threats and in a broader range of environments. We will use these experiences to drive the continued adaptation of the Army.
Reconstituting the Force

The Army must reconstitute the force, ensuring excellence in core competencies while building new capabilities to support an uncertain and complex future operating environment. Reconstitution requires not only completely resetting redeploying units, but also continuous adaptation of our forces as we move forward in a period of continuous and fundamental change. While the Army has almost finished transforming to modular formations and balancing the force, we continue to integrate the lessons learned from nine and a half years at war with our expectations of the future. The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commenced an in-depth study of our force mix and force design to ensure that we have the right capabilities in the right numbers in the right organizations for the future. We are committed to continually transforming our force to retain the flexibility and versatility it will need for the uncertain future environment.

Another area that will require continual adaption is our mix of active and reserve component forces. The Nation has been at a state of national emergency for nine and a half years. As a result, the Army has had continuous access to the reserve component through partial mobilization. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve have performed magnificently, and the relationship between components is better than it has ever been. Our Soldiers have fought together and bled together, and more than ever, we are one Army - a Total Force. Our Nation cannot lose the enormous gains we have made.
Transforming the reserve component into an enduring operational force provides a historic opportunity for the Army to achieve the most cost effective use of the entire force. To that end, the Army recently completed a study of what the future role of our reserve component should be in an era of persistent conflict in which continuous deployment is the norm. The steady, consistent and recurring demand for reserve capabilities during this decade has posed significant challenges for a force organized and resourced as a strategic reserve. In response, the Army recast its reserve forces from the part-time strategic reserve role to a fully integrated and critical part of an operational, expeditionary Army. We are seeking changes to achieve affordable, predictable and assured access to the reserve component for the full range of assignments in the homeland and abroad. One thing is certain across every echelon of this Army; we cannot relegate the Army National Guard and Army Reserve back to a strategic reserve. The security of the Nation can ill afford a reserve force that is under-manned, under-equipped or at insufficient levels of training and readiness.

The other significant element of reconstitution – modernization – is designed to give our Soldiers a decisive advantage in every fight. The goal of our modernization strategy is to develop a versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations that operate on a rotational cycle. This enables us to routinely provide combatant commanders trained and ready forces to operate across the spectrum of conflict. This involves developing and fielding new capabilities while modernizing and recapitalizing old capabilities. Our top two modernization initiatives will be to develop, test and field the network and to field a new Ground Combat Vehicle in seven years. Throughout this process, our industrial base will
continue to identify and adopt improved business practices and maximize efficiencies to repair, overhaul, produce and manufacture in support of modernization and recapitalization efforts.

Building Resilience

As we look toward the next decade, we must also build resilience in our people. The last nine and a half years have taken a physical, mental and emotional toll on our Soldiers, Civilians and Family members. No one has been immune to the impacts of war. This decade of experience, combined with the reality that our Nation is in a protracted struggle, underscores how important it is that we take advantage of our time at home to strengthen our force for the challenges ahead, even as we continue to deal with the continuing impacts of war. Although off-duty, high risk behavior is a continuing challenge, we have made significant progress in the last ten years in reducing accidental fatalities. This highlights the resilience of our force as our Soldiers find healthier ways to handle the stresses of Army life. In addition to the Army Safety Program, last year the Army began two efforts designed to strengthen our Soldiers, Families and Civilians for the challenges ahead: Comprehensive Soldier Fitness and the Army Campaign for Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention. We will institutionalize the best of both of these programs into the force over the next year.
The Network

The last nine and a half years of war have demonstrated that the network is essential to a 21st Century, expeditionary Army. Networked organizations provide an awareness and understanding required by leaders who must act decisively at all points along the spectrum of conflict, and by Soldiers on the ground who are executing the mission. The network is also essential for planning and operating with Joint, coalition and interagency partners. The network, therefore, is the Army’s number one modernization effort.

The Army’s portion of the Department of Defense network, LandWarNet, must be able to provide Soldiers, Civilians and mission partners the information they need, when they need it and in any environment – from the garrison to the tactical edge. To do so, it must be a completely integrated and interoperable network, from the highest to the lowest echelon, forming a true enterprise network. The Army is pursuing critical initiatives to build this enterprise capability, including an enterprise email, calendar-sharing and ID management service (through a partnership with the Defense Information Systems Agency), data center consolidation and Active Directory consolidation. These initiatives will increase warfighting effectiveness, improve network security, save hundreds of millions of dollars over the next five years and reduce infrastructure. Additionally, the Army is transforming business systems information technology to better support our business operations and strategic leader decision making.
The Army is also changing the way it supplies network systems and capabilities to operational units by using an incremental approach to modernization. By aligning the delivery of new technology with the ARFORGEN process as it becomes available, we ensure the integration of network capability across our combat formations. This “capability set” approach will field enhanced performance in a more timely and efficient manner.

Ground Combat Vehicle

To operate in austere conditions against a lethal, adaptive enemy, our Soldiers need a fighting vehicle that is capable of full spectrum operations with better levels of protection than our current vehicles. To meet that need, the Army is focused on developing a versatile ground combat vehicle that will meet an array of anticipated future requirements and see its first delivery in seven years. It will provide the needed protection against a variety of threats, including that of Improvised Explosive Devices, and deliver Soldiers to the fight under armor. Even with the significant capabilities that a new ground combat vehicle will provide, it comprises only one element of the Army’s overall combat vehicle modernization strategy. Our strategy also addresses improvements to vehicles like the Paladin howitzer and Stryker combat vehicles, integration of the MRAP into our formations and prudent divestment of obsolete systems.
Strategic Crossroads

Our Nation and its Army are positioned at a unique point in history. This is not quite like any other year. We must now consider the hard-won lessons of recent combat experience, current and anticipated resource constraints and the uncertainty of the future. The decisions we make will have far reaching and long lasting implications. This calls for deliberate and thoughtful choices and actions as we determine where to best invest our Nation's precious resources.

Transforming the Generating Force

Over the course of the past decade, the operational Army has evolved dramatically. The need for change was driven by a fundamental reality: daily contact with a decentralized, adaptive, creative and deadly enemy. The Army's generating force, which prepares, trains, educates and supports Army forces worldwide, is also working to rapidly address the demands placed on the organization by both the current and future operating environments. It has performed magnificently to produce trained and ready forces, even while seeking to adapt institutional business processes.

Furthermore, the Army is working to provide “readiness at best value” in order to help us live within the constraints imposed by the national and international economic situation. In short, the need to reform the Army's institutional management processes and develop an Integrated Management System, while continuing to meet combatant commander
requirements, has never been more urgent. Thus, to enhance organizational adaptive capacity, while wisely stewarding our resources, the Army initiated a number of efforts along three primary business transformation objectives: establish an enterprise mindset and approach; adapt institutional processes to align with ARFORGEN; and reform the requirements and resource process.

To enable business transformation and foster an enterprise approach, we established the Office of Business Transformation and developed enterprise functions that are facilitated by teams of leaders who focus on the domains of Human Capital, Readiness, Materiel and Services and Infrastructure. At the most strategic level, we established the Army Enterprise Board to provide a forum for Army senior leaders to address organizational strategic choices and tradeoffs. Additionally, we established our Business Systems Information Technology Executive Steering Group to facilitate an enterprise approach to information technology investments.

We are working collaboratively to reform our requirements and resourcing process in order to create an organizationally aligned set of capabilities. As part of that effort, we have initiated an Army Acquisition Review. This review will provide a blueprint for actions over the next two years to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Army acquisition processes. We've also commissioned a short-term task force to analyze costs, establish credible benchmarks and help us better understand not only where our investment dollars go, but also what we get in return. We are developing a systematic approach to the Army's business processes
that will ensure that innovative ideas and efficiencies influence future budgets.

Furthermore, we instituted a portfolio review process that is bringing discipline to our acquisition programs by evaluating and realigning requirements with the reality of today and what we will need in years to come. This Capability Portfolio Review process is providing an overarching detailed analysis and set of recommendations to revalidate, modify or terminate each of our requirements, including research and development, procurement and sustainment accounts. These reviews are helping us identify gaps and unnecessary redundancies, while ensuring good stewardship of our nation's resources. We are building a foundation that will identify savings, manage strategic risks, maximize flexibility and posture us even more effectively for the future.

Civilian Workforce Transformation

There are approximately 279,000 Civilians in the Army. Adding the Army Corps of Engineers and personnel supported by non-appropriated funds, the number exceeds 335,000 Civilians. That is about 23 percent of our total Army force. Army Civilians live and work in communities throughout our 50 states and U. S. Territories and overseas theaters of operation. They comprise 60 percent of our generating force.

This generating force performs many of the essential tasks that support ARFORGEN so our Soldiers can concentrate on their missions. Army Civilians have deployed and stood in support of our Soldiers during
the most dangerous and difficult periods of conflict. In fact, over 4,300 Civilians deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan in 2010. The Nation's ability to sustain the all-volunteer force will be difficult and challenged if we do not prioritize development and investment in our most important institutional asset, our people. Now, as never before, we increasingly call upon our Civilian Corps to assume greater levels of responsibility and accountability at organizations throughout the Army, and we must invest in them accordingly. The goal is to become a generating force driven by innovation, able to adapt quickly and to field what our Soldiers and their Families will require. Therefore, the Army has embarked upon a Civilian Workforce Transformation initiative to pursue five lines of effort.

First, we will integrate requirements determination, allocation and resourcing processes that identify the civilian workforce capabilities. Second, we will improve civilian workforce lifecycle strategy, planning and operations to enhance mission effectiveness. Third, we will establish an integrated management system to support civilian human capital decision making. Fourth, we will deliberately develop Army civilian leaders. Fifth, we will reform the civilian hiring process. By the end of 2011, the Army will implement a comprehensive competency-based Civilian Leadership Development Program and fully implement the Civilian Talent Management Program. These programs will ensure that employees and management understand what is required for success, with realistic career paths and developmental opportunities to achieve success.

The pay-off for this program is four-fold. For Civilians, the transformation will provide an outline for success with the appropriate training and development opportunities to facilitate the achievement of
their career goals within the Army. For Commanders, the Civilian Workforce Transformation will provide the right workforce with the right training and development for the current and future mission requirements. For the Army, it will provide a predictable and rational method to articulate requirements and make decisions about resourcing in a fluid environment. Finally, for the Nation, the transformation will provide the investment in human capital required to effectively manage the institutional Army now and in the future.

**Stewardship, Innovation and Accomplishments**

**Fiscal Stewardship**

We take our responsibility to serve as good stewards of the financial resources the Nation has entrusted to our care very seriously, and we are taking action to improve our ability to manage those resources effectively.

To help our leaders and managers make better resource-informed decisions, we have placed renewed emphasis on cost management throughout the Army. At all levels, from installation to Army Headquarters, we have implemented training and professional development programs to give our people improved cost management skills and a greater understanding of the cost implications of their decisions. Training programs include a graduate-level Cost Management Certificate Course for carefully selected mid-level analysts, professional development courses for general officers and members of the Senior Executive Service, training incorporated into existing courses throughout the Army’s formal
schooling system and hands-on training in cost-benefit analysis. These programs have reached over 2,700 Soldiers and Civilians, and training continues.

In addition to providing training and professional development, we must give our people the essential tools that will enable them to carry out their cost management responsibilities. Toward this end, we have fielded the General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS) to more than 11,000 users at 14 major installations. As reported by the Government Accountability Office, GFEBS development is on schedule and on budget. Much more than an accounting system, GFEBS is the Army’s new business system. It gives managers a greatly improved capability to manage the cost, schedule and performance of their programs and, at the same time, is the centerpiece in our progress toward full auditability of our financial statements.

Energy Security and Sustainability

Energy security and sustainability are operationally necessary, financially prudent and are key considerations for Army installations, weapon systems and contingency operations. Energy security means that the Army retains access to energy and can continue to operate when catastrophe strikes and energy supplies are disrupted, cut off or just plain difficult to secure. To remain operationally relevant and viable, the Army must reduce its dependency on energy, increase energy efficiency, and implement renewable and alternate sources of energy.
The Army has established a Senior Energy Council, appointed a Senior Energy Executive, created an Energy Security Office, and adopted a comprehensive energy security strategy. This strategy will not only lead to energy cost savings but help create a more sustainable force with increased endurance, resilience, and force protection. We will enhance our stewardship of our nation’s energy resources and less dependent upon foreign sources of fuel. The Army’s logistical tail of the Operational Energy pipeline is a handicap that must be overcome through technological advances. We must leverage technology to improve our agility and flexibility against an irregular and decentralized enemy.

On Army installations, we are developing a holistic approach, called Net Zero, to address energy, water, and waste. Net Zero is a force multiplier enabling the Army to appropriately steward available resources, manage costs and provide our Soldiers, Families and Civilians with a sustainable future. In an era of persistent conflict, with a mission of stabilizing war-torn nations, a true stabilizing factor can be that of appropriate resource management. The Net Zero plan ensures that sustainable practices will be instilled and managed throughout the appropriate levels of the Army, while also maximizing operational capability, resource availability and well-being.

We have taken a significant step by incorporating all fuel costs throughout the lifecycle of the equipment as we analyze various alternatives for modernization programs such as the next ground combat vehicle, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and the Armed Aerial Scout. This
approach enables us to make informed decisions about various alternatives and define energy efficiency performance parameters in capability documents for our program managers and original equipment manufacturers. Of course, not all solutions will involve big pieces of equipment or new vehicles. We are also pursuing technologies on a much smaller scale, such as spray foam tent insulation and shower water recycle systems — investments from which direct energy savings pay off in a matter of months.

We are also working on more efficient generators and power distribution. Development of hardware, software and controls to perform micro-grid implementation is underway for buildings at the Field Artillery Training Center at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. This technology also has potential for use in a deployed operational environment. The Army is preparing to field “smart grid” capabilities for tactical command posts and forward operating base camps that will enable generators to support the larger grid instead of a single end user. As they become scalable and deployable, renewable energy technologies can also be integrated into these smart grids.

The Profession of Arms

The last nine and a half years of conflict have had significant impacts on the Army, its Soldiers, Families and Civilians. Many of these are well documented and are being addressed. There remain, however, other consequences that we seek to understand. We will examine the impacts of war on our profession of arms and take a hard look at
ourselves – how have we changed as individuals, as professionals and as a profession.

The Army is more than a job; it is a profession. It is a vocation composed of experts in the ethical application of land combat power serving under civilian authority and entrusted to defend the Constitution and the rights and interests of the American people. The level of responsibility is like no other profession – our Soldiers are entrusted to apply lethal force ethically and only when necessary. Also, unlike other professions, the profession of arms is practiced in the chaotic and deadly machinations of war. Along with that awesome responsibility comes both individual and organizational accountability, which we seek to examine as parts of our Profession of Arms.

The American Professional Soldier is an expert and a volunteer, certified in the Profession of Arms and bonded with comrades in a shared identity and culture of sacrifice and service to the Nation and Constitution. The Soldier adheres to the highest ethical standards and is a steward of the future of the profession. Contrasting this are state, non-state and individual actors who operate outside generally accepted moral and ethical boundaries. Because of this, the Army has received tremendous support from the American people and their elected representatives. We are forever grateful for that support, and we do not take it for granted. We understand that this generous support is predicated on the Army’s continued professionalism, guided by our Army creeds, our service oaths and the Army values that anchor our conduct (Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage).
In order to examine the impacts of our current experience on the Profession of Arms, the Army will continue a discussion at all levels in which we will ask ourselves three fundamental questions:

- What does it mean for the Army to be a Profession of Arms?
- What does it mean to be a Professional Soldier?
- After nine years of war, how are we as individual professionals and as a profession meeting these aspirations?

The dialogue will help inform our understanding on what it means to be a professional Soldier in an era of persistent conflict.

Conclusion

The professionalism, dedicated service and sacrifice of our all-volunteer force are hallmarks of the Army – the Strength of our Nation. Soldiers, their Families and Army Civilians continue to faithfully serve our country as we prevail in one of the most challenging times in our Nation’s history.

The Army is achieving its goals to restore balance in fiscal year 2011. We will be transitioning to a period where we must reconstitute the force for other missions; build resilience in our Soldiers, Families and Civilians and diligently maintain our combat edge. We are modernizing the force for the future by developing and fielding versatile, affordable, survivable and networked equipment to ensure Soldiers maintain a decisive advantage over any enemy they might face.

We are responding to the lessons our operating force learned and the changes it made over the past nine and a half years by adapting the
institutional Army to effectively and efficiently generate trained and ready forces for full spectrum operations. The sector of the Army that trains and equips our Soldiers, the generating force, must be driven by innovation and be able to adapt quickly and field what our Soldiers and their Families will require. We must continue to improve efficiency and reduce overhead expenditures as good stewards of our Nation's valuable resources. We recognize that institutional change is not only about saving money, and efficiencies are not simply about improving the bottom line. Institutional change is about doing things better, doing them smarter and taking full advantage of the progress, technology, knowledge and experience that we have available to us.

With the trust and confidence of the American public and the support of Congress with appropriate resources, America’s Army will remain the Strength of the Nation.
2011 Reserve Component Addendum to the Army Posture Statement

Sections 517 and 521 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 1994 require the information in this addendum. Section 517 requires a report relating to implementation of the pilot Program for Active Component Support of the Reserves under Section 414 of the NDAA 1992 and 1993. Section 521 requires a detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard (ARNG), including information relating to implementation of the ARNG Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (Title XI of Public Law 102-484, referred to in this addendum as ANGCRRRA). Section 704 of the NDAA amended Section 521 reporting. Included is the U.S. Army Reserve information using Section 521 reporting criteria. The data included in the report is information that was available 30 September 2010.

Section 517 (b) (2) (A). The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared with the promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the Army.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>AC in RC (%)</th>
<th>Army Average (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>FY 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>(56 of 63)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>85.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Col</td>
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<td></td>
<td>83.3%</td>
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*Active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

**Active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at the time of consideration.
Section 517 (b) (2) (B). The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared in the same manner as specified in subparagraph (A) (the paragraph above).

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AC in RC (%)</th>
<th>Army Average (%)</th>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major</td>
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<td>5.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>(0 of 7) 0.0%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
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</table>

*Below the zone active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

**Below-the-zone active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

Section 521(b)

1. The number and percentage of officers with at least two years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the US Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

ARNG officers: 21,725 or 51.5 percent of which 1,998 were FY10 accessions

Army Reserve officers: 21,378 or 58.8 percent of which 589 were FY10 accessions
2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least two years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

ARNG enlisted - 101,896 or 31.9 percent of which 8,281 were FY10 accessions

Army Reserve enlisted - 63,670 or 37.5 percent of which 5,592 were FY10 accessions

3. The number of officers who are graduates of one of the service academies and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

In FY10, there were two Service Academy graduates released from active duty before completing their obligation to serve in the Army Reserve.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

In FY10, under section 1112(a) (2) of ANGCRRA the Secretary of the Army granted no waivers to the Army National Guard.

In FY10, under section 1112(a) (2) of ANGCRRA the Secretary of the Army granted two waivers to the Army Reserve. The waivers afforded Soldiers the opportunity to play a professional sport and complete their service obligation.
4. The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Officers' Training Corps graduates and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:

   a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

   In FY10, there are no distinguished Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) graduates serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve.

   b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

   In FY10, the Secretary of the Army granted no waivers.

5. The number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRA by a combination of (a) two years of active duty, and (b) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year:

   In FY10, there were 20 ROTC graduates released early from an active-duty obligation. The following is a breakdown of the ROTC graduates that are completing the remainder of their service obligation in a Reserve Component.

   a. ARNG: 1
   b. USAR: 19
6. The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above first lieutenant, and of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were concurred in by an active duty officer under section 1113(a) of ANGCARRA, shown separately for each of the three categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCARRA (with Army Reserve data also reported).

There are no longer active and reserve component associations due to operational mission requirements and deployment tempo. Active component officers no longer concur or non-concur with unit vacancy promotion recommendations for officers in associated units according to section 1113(a). However, unit vacancy promotion boards have active component representation.

In FY10, the ARNG recommended 1,913 ARNG officers (Title 10; Title 32; ADSW; AD; M-Day) for a position-vacancy promotion and promoted 1,913. The number consists of 265 U.S. Army Medical Department, 1,595 Army Promotion List and 53 Chaplains. Of the 1,913 promoted officers, 1,053 were M-Day Soldiers consisting of 175 U.S. Army Medical Department, 844 Army Promotion List and 34 Chaplains.

In FY10, the Army Reserve recommended 63 officers for a position-vacancy promotion and promoted 63.

7. The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under section 1114(a) of ANGCARRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a military education requirement for non-commissioned officers and the reason for each such waiver.

In FY10, 1,607 ARNG Noncommissioned Officers received a promotion to the next rank without the required military education (based on a waiver
agreement that extends the time Soldiers have to complete the educational requirement). Of those, 648 completed their military education requirements. The majority of waivers were deployment related.

In FY10, 486 Army Reserve Noncommissioned Officers received a military education waiver (based on a waiver agreement that extends the time Soldiers have to complete the educational requirement). Of those, 257 waivers received approval based on deployment and/or operational mission requirements.

Waiver consideration is case-by-case. The criteria for waiver consideration are: (1) eligible for promotion consideration, (2) recommended by their State (for ARNG), (3) disadvantaged as a direct result of operational deployment conflict, and (4) no available training quota. This includes Soldiers deployed or assigned to Warrior Transition Units (WTU) (Medical Hold or Medical Hold-Over Units) with a medical condition. Some waiver requests did not meet the criteria.

The Secretary of the Army has delegated the authority for the waivers referred to in section 114(a) of ANGCRRRA to the Director, ARNG and to the Commander, U.S Army Reserve Command. The National Guard Bureau and the U.S. Army Reserve Command maintain details for each waiver.

8. The number and distribution by grade, shown for each State, of personnel in the initial entry training and non-deployability personnel accounting category established under section 1115 of ANGCRRRA for members of the Army National Guard who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment. (Included is a narrative summary of information pertaining to the Army Reserve.)
In FY10, the ARNG had 47,804 Soldiers considered non-deployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (e.g., initial entry training; medical issues; medical non-availability; pending administrative or legal discharge; separation; officer transition; non-participation or restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under the Lautenberg Amendment). The National Guard Bureau (NGB) maintains the detailed information.

In FY10, the Army Reserve had 48,229 Soldiers considered non-deployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (e.g., initial entry training; medical issues; medical non-availability; pending administrative or legal discharge; separation; officer transition; non-participation or restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under the Lautenberg Amendment). The U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) maintains the detailed information.

9. The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, that were discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the National Guard. (Army Reserve data also reported.)

The number of ARNG Soldiers discharged during FY10 pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment after entering the Army National Guard is 131 officers and 265 enlisted Soldiers from all U.S. states and territories. NGB maintains the breakdown by each state. The numbers represent improvement driven by the Recruit Force Pool (RFP) and by miscellaneous administrative actions. The RFP initiative changed the way ARNG accounts for Soldiers. ARNG does not count Soldiers until the accession process is complete and they have an assigned position. Administrative improvements included an aggressive effort to eliminate Negative End Strength (defined as Soldiers who have been on the NOVAL Pay list for three months or more, have expired ETS dates, in a Non-MOSQ status for 21 months or more, or in the Training Pipeline with no class reservation). These improvements helped the ARNG meet the End Strength Ceiling of 358,200 by the end of FY10 by moving those Soldiers into the Inactive National Guard (ING).

The number of Army Reserve Soldiers discharged during FY10 for not completing the minimum training required for deployment after entering the Army Reserve is 30 officers and 62 enlisted Soldiers. Under AR 135-175, Separation of Officers, separation actions are necessary for Officers who have not completed a basic branch course within 36 months after
commissioning. Under AR 135-178, Separation of Enlisted Personnel, separation actions are necessary for Soldiers who have not completed the required initial entry training within the first 24 months.

10. The number of waivers, shown for each State, that were granted by the Secretary of the Army during the previous fiscal year under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRA described in paragraph (9), together with the reason for each waiver.

In FY10, there were no waivers granted by the Secretary of the Army for the U.S. Army Reserve or the Army National Guard.

11. The number of Army National Guard members, shown for each State, (and the number of AR members), who were screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment and, of those members: (a) the number and percentage that did not meet minimum physical profile standards for deployment; and (b) the number and percentage who were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

   a. The number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment:

In FY10, 163,457 ARNG Soldiers underwent a Periodic Health Assessment (PHA). There were 7,936 or 4.8 percent of personnel identified for review due to a profile-limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

In FY10, 162,749 Army Reserve Soldiers underwent a Periodic Health Assessment (PHA). There were 15,025 or 9.2 percent of personnel identified for review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

   b. The number and percentage that transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).
In FY10, the ARNG identified 7,936 or 4.8 percent of Soldiers for a review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards; and transferred to a medically non-deployable status.

In FY 10, the Army Reserve identified 15,025 or 9.2 percent of Soldiers for a review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards; and transferred to a medically non-deployable status.

On 23 August 2010, the Department of Defense implemented a change to how the Army measures Individual Medical Readiness (IMR). The new way of measuring medical readiness by classifying Soldiers into Medical Readiness Categories (MRC) reduced the number of Soldiers considered medically non-deployable (MND) in the reserve component. This information is available through the Army’s medical readiness database, MEDPROS.

12. The number of members and the percentage total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a medical screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

13. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.
14. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State, over the age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRA.

15. The number of units of the Army National Guard that are scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization, and of those units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRA.

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1118 of ANGCRA.

16. The estimated post-mobilization training time for each Army National Guard combat unit (and Army Reserve unit), and a description, displayed in broad categories and by State of what training would need to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat units (and AR units) in a post-mobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRA.

Per January 2007 direction from the Secretary of Defense reserve component unit mobilizations are now limited to 400-day periods, including post-mobilization training time, a 30-day post-mobilization leave and five days out-processing. Timely alert for mobilization—at least one year prior to mobilization—is crucial. Many training tasks previously conducted during post-mobilization occurs in local training areas before mobilization. First Army, in CONUS, manages and directs post-mobilization training for reserve component conventional forces conducts the theater-specified training required and confirms the readiness of mobilized units to deploy. A unit’s
post-mobilization training time depends on how many of the pre-mobilization tasks they complete in pre-mobilization. Whatever pre-mobilization tasks they do not complete during pre-mobilization training, they will complete the remaining tasks at the mobilization station.

First Army Pre-Deployment Training in support of Combatant Commanders’ guidance identifies four categories of deploying units. CAT 1 includes units that rarely, if ever, travel off a Contingency Operating Base/Forward Operating Base (COB/FOB). CAT 2 includes units that will or potentially will travel off a COB/FOB for a short duration. CAT 3 includes units that will travel and conduct the majority of their missions off a COB/FOB. CAT 4 is maneuver units with an Area of Operations (such as BCTs). The pre-mobilization tasks per category increase up to CAT 4. A CAT 4 unit spends between 58-60 training days at mobilization station for post-mobilization training. The target is 45 training days. A CAT 4 unit is required to perform a Combat Training Center (NTC or JRTC) culminating training event (30 days) during post-mobilization in order to meet validation requirements and deploy.

Army goals for post-mobilization training for reserve component headquarters and combat support, and combat service support units range from 15 to 45 days, depending on the type/category of the unit, and does not include administrative and travel days. Post-mobilization training conducted by First Army typically consists of counterinsurgency operations; counter-improvised-explosive-device training; convoy live-fire exercises; theater orientation; rules of engagement and escalation-of-force training; and completion of any theater-specified training not completed during the pre-mobilization period. Below is an outline of typical post-mobilization periods for various units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Structure</th>
<th>Post-MOB TNG Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Police Battalion (I/R)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Company (Construction)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Truck Company</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Detachment</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expeditionary Sustainment Command</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
17. A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRR to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies for members and units of the Army National Guard (and the Army Reserve).

During FY10, the Army Reserve and Army National Guard continued to synchronize the use of existing and ongoing live, virtual, and constructive training aids, devices, simulations and simulators (TADSS) programs with the training requirements of the ARFORGEN training model. By synchronizing the use of TADSS with ARFORGEN, the ARNG continues to improve unit training proficiency prior to mobilization.

To support the training requirements of M1A1 Abrams and M2A2 Bradley equipped Brigade Combat Teams (BCT’s) the ARNG continued to use the Advanced Bradley Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer and Abrams Full Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer, which provide full crew-simulations training for M1A1 and M2A2 units. The ARNG continued fielding Tabletop Full-fidelity Trainers for the M2A2 units and cross leveling of the Conduct of Fire Trainer XXI for M1A1 units. When fully fielded, these devices, in addition to the Conduct of Fire Trainer-Situational Awareness (COFT-SA) and Conduct of Fire Trainer Advanced Gunnery Trainer System (CAGTS) will be the primary simulation trainers to meet the virtual gunnery requirements of M1A1 and M2A2 crews.

In order to train all ARNG units on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of convoy operations, the ARNG has fielded the Virtual Convoy Operations Trainer (VCOT). The VCOT with geo-specific databases provides commanders with unique and critical mission rehearsal tool. Currently, all 54 States and Territories have received this capability, providing a mobile training capability available to all Soldiers throughout the ARNG.

To meet basic and advanced rifle marksmanship requirements, the ARNG is continuing to field the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000). This system is the Army’s approved marksmanship training device. The ARNG is also continuing the use of its previously procured Fire Arms Training System (FATS) until EST 2000 fielding is completed. The EST 2000 and FATS also provides static unit collective gunnery and tactical training; and shoot/don’t shoot training. These systems also support units conducting vital homeland defense missions.

The Army Reserve has a number of low-density simulators it employs to reduce expensive "live" time for unique combat service support equipment. For example, Army Reserve watercraft units train on the Maritime Integrated Training System (MITS), a bridge simulator that not only trains vessel
captains but the entire crew of Army watercraft. Other simulators include locomotive simulators used by Army Reserve railroad units and a barge derrick simulator for floating watercraft maintenance units.

The reserve components supplement their marksmanship-training strategy with the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS). The use of LMTS helps to develop and maintain basic marksmanship skills, diagnose and correct problems, and assessing basic and advanced skills. The ARNG has over 900 systems fielded down to the company level. The LMRS is a laser-based training device that replicates the firing of the Soldier’s weapon without live ammunition. EST 2000 systems have been fielded to many Army Reserve Engineer and Military Police organizations to enable full use of its training capabilities by units with high densities of crew-served weapons their at home stations.

The Improvised Explosive Device Effects Simulator (IEDES) supports the training requirements for the detection, reaction, classification, prevention and reporting of Improvised Explosive Devices. The ARNG also continues to field IEDES kits. The configuration of IEDES kits are set to simulate Small, Medium, Large, and Extra Large Explosive signatures. The IEDES kits provide realistic battlefield cues and the effects of Explosive Hazards to Soldiers in both a dismounted and mounted operational status.

The ARNG continues to develop its battle command training capability through the Battle Command Training Capability Program (BCTCP). This program provides live, virtual, constructive and gaming (LVC&G) training support at unit home stations via mobile training teams. Units can also train at Battle Command Training Centers (BCTC). The BCTCP consists of three BCTCs at Camp Dodge, IA; Fort Indiantown Gap, PA; and Fort Leavenworth, KS, and a regional Distributed Mission Support Team (DMST). The Army Campaign Plan 2010 requires the ARNG to train 172 units (Brigade equivalents and above). The BCTCP synchronizes ARNG battle command training capabilities to help units plan, prepare and execute battle staff training. The objective is to develop proficient battle command staffs and trained operators during pre-mobilization training.

In order to provide the critical Culminating Training Event for the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Cycle, the ARNG has implemented the Exportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC) Program. The ARNG XCTC program provides Battalion Battle Staff training to the level organized, coupled with a theater immersed, mission focused training event to certify company level proficiency prior to entering
the ARFORGEN Available Force Pool Defined as Certified Company Proficiency with demonstrated Battalion Battle Staff proficiency, competent leaders, and trained Soldiers prepared for success on the battlefield.

18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State, (and for the Army Reserve), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system as required by section 1121 of ANGCRRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with:

   a. Explanations of the information:

   Readiness tables are classified. The Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information. The states do not capture this data.

   b. Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary's overall assessment of the deployability of units of the ARNG (and Army Reserve), including a discussion of personnel deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with section 1121:

   Summary tables and overall assessments are classified. The Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information.

19. Summary tables, shown for each State (and Army Reserve), of the results of inspections of units of the Army National Guard (and Army Reserve) by inspectors general or other commissioned officers of the Regular Army under the provisions of Section 105 of Title 32, together with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including display of:

   a. The number of such inspections;
b. Identification of the entity conducting each inspection;

c. The number of units inspected; and

d. The overall results of such inspections, including the inspector's determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of corrective actions.

During FY10, Army National Guard Inspectors General and other commissioned officers of the Regular Army conducted inspections of the Army National Guard. The total number of ARNG units that were inspected were 1,193, plus an additional 26 United States Property and Fiscal Offices (USPFOs), totaling 1,219 inspections. Regular Army Officers assigned to the respective States and Territories as Inspectors General executed the inspections. The Department of the Army Inspector General, 1st US Army, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM); Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM); and various external inspection agencies conducted the remaining 128 inspections. Because the inspections conducted by Inspectors General focused on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections did not receive a pass/fail rating. Requests for inspections results must go through the Inspector General of the Army.

During FY10, the Chief, Army Reserve, directed the Inspector General to conduct special assessments in the areas of Rear Detachment Operations (RDO) and Post Deployment Health Reassessment (PHDRA). Commissioned officers of the Army Reserve inspected 81 units. Because the inspections conducted by Inspectors General focused on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these assessments did not receive a pass/fail rating. Requests for inspections results must go through the Inspector General of the Army.
20. A listing, for each ARNG combat unit (and US Army Reserve FSP units) of the active-duty combat units (and other units) associated with that ARNG (and US Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRRA, shown by State, for each such ARNG unit (and for the US Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment of the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of that National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRA; and (B) the results of the validation by the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or US Army Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRA.

There are no longer formal ground combat active or reserve component associations due to ongoing theater operational mission requirements and deployment tempo.

First Army, as FORSCOM’s executive agent, and the 196th Infantry Brigade, as U.S. Army Pacific’s executive agent, executes the legislated active duty associate unit responsibilities through both their pre-mobilization and post-mobilization efforts with reserve component units. When reserve component units mobilize, they are thoroughly assessed in terms of manpower, equipment, and training by the appropriate chain of command, and that assessment is approved by First Army or USARPAC as part of the validation for unit deployment.

Validation of the compatibility of the Reserve Component units with the active duty forces occurs primarily during training and readiness activities at mobilization stations, with direct oversight of First Army, USARPAC, and FORSCOM.

21. A specification of the active-duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (10 USC. 261 note), shown (a) by State for the Army National Guard (and for the US Army Reserve), (b) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned, and (c) by unit or other organizational entity of assignment.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>ENL</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>97</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>215</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>2165</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>3245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARPAC</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1156</td>
<td>2327</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>3593</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<th>ENL</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Reserve</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>2296</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>3050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARPAC</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>759</td>
<td>2470</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of September 30, 2010, the Army had 3,314 active component Soldiers assigned to Title XI positions. Army G-1, and U.S. Army Human Resources Command carefully manages the authorizations and fill of Title XI positions. The states do not capture this data.
Mr. John M. McHugh was sworn in as the 21st Secretary of the Army on Sep. 21, 2009, following his nomination by President Barack Obama and confirmation by the United States Senate.

As Secretary of the Army, he has statutory responsibility for all matters relating to the United States Army: manpower, personnel, reserve affairs, installations, environmental issues, weapons systems and equipment acquisition, communications, and financial management. Secretary McHugh is responsible for the Department of the Army’s annual budget and supplemental of over $200 billion. He leads a work force of more than 1.1 million active duty, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve Soldiers, 221,000 Department of the Army civilian employees, and 213,000 contracted service personnel. He has stewardship over 14 million acres of land.

At the time of his appointment as Secretary of the Army, Mr. McHugh was a sitting member of Congress representing Northern and Central New York. During his nine terms in the U.S. House of Representatives, he earned a reputation as a staunch advocate for Soldiers and their Families, working tirelessly to ensure they have proper facilities, training, and the quality of life necessary to carry out wartime missions while caring for those at home.

As a Member of Congress, Mr. McHugh served as the Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) with responsibility to oversee the policies and programs for the Department of Defense and each of the Armed Forces. Before becoming Ranking Member, Congressman McHugh was first the Chairman of the Morale, Welfare and Recreation Panel and then Chairman and later Ranking Member of the Committee’s Subcommittee on Military Personnel. Mr. McHugh also served as a senior member of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and for six years as the Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Postal Service that significantly reformed the Postal Service.

From 1997 to 2004, Mr. McHugh was a member of the House International Relations Committee. Subsequently, from 2005 to 2009, he served on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. McHugh was also a 14-year member of the United States
Military Academy Board of Visitors. At the time of his nomination, Mr. McHugh was co-chair of the House Army Caucus, a bipartisan organization that works to educate fellow House Members and their staffs about Army issues and programs.

Secretary McHugh was born in Watertown, New York, where he began his public service career in 1971 as the Confidential Assistant to the City Manager. In 1976, he joined the staff of New York State Senator H. Douglas Barclay, with whom he served as Chief of Research and Liaison with local governments for nine years. Succeeding Senator Barclay in 1984, Mr. McHugh served four terms in the legislature’s upper house before his election to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1992.

Mr. McHugh received a B.A. in Political Science from Utica College of Syracuse University in 1970, and earned a Master’s Degree in Public Administration from the State University of New York’s Nelson A. Rockefeller Graduate School of Public Affairs in 1977.
General George W. Casey, Jr. became the 36th Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army on 10 April 2007. In his previous assignment, he was the Commander, Multi-National Force – Iraq, a coalition of over thirty countries, from 01 July 2004 until 10 February 2007. General Casey was commissioned a second lieutenant of Infantry from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in 1970. Throughout his career, he has served in operational assignments in Germany, Italy, Egypt, Southwest Asia and the United States. He has commanded at every level from platoon to Division.

His principal staff assignments have been as a Chief of Staff, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; Operations Officer and Chief of Staff, V (US/GE) Corps, Heidelberg, Germany; Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Joint Staff, Commander, Joint Warfighting Center/J7, US Joint Forces Command, Director Strategic Plans and Policy and Director of the Joint Staff and 30th Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army.

He commanded a mechanized infantry battalion at Fort Carson, Colorado; a mechanized infantry brigade at Fort Hood, Texas; served as Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver and Support in the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia and Germany; and commanded the 1st Armored Division in Bad Kreuznach, Germany. General Casey holds a Masters Degree in International Relations from Denver University and has served as a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States.
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

MARCH 2, 2011
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH

Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army has initiated several efforts to improve contracting practices and save taxpayer resources. In April 2009, we formally established solicitation and contract review boards and oversight thresholds to improve visibility and performance of our contracts across the entire Army. We have also strengthened the Headquarters, Department of the Army Procurement Management Review program to ensure the Army is effectively managing its resources. In addition, the Army continues to implement strategic sourcing initiatives to achieve the benefit of cost efficiencies by consolidating procurements where it makes good business sense. In November 2010, we appointed a Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Services) to place greater emphasis on the requirements generation, oversight, and management of service contracts, which account for a large share of DOD spending. As part of the DOD effort to achieve savings of $100 billion over the next five years, the Army has been a full partner in identifying cost savings of approximately $29 billion. Through comprehensive capability portfolio reviews, the Army has proposed savings by terminating or reducing weapons systems with declining relevance or unnecessary redundancy. Lastly, the Army is utilizing Section 852 funding to hire new Acquisition personnel, with the majority being contracting interns. The Army has hired over 1300 Acquisition personnel under Section 852 authority. [See page 18.]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

March 2, 2011
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON

Mr. MCKEON. With regard to end strength, what I would like to understand is the relationship between the current requirement for 45 Active Brigade Combat Teams and the cut to end strength of 27,000 between 2015 and 2016.

a. If this end strength reduction happens, what will be the impact on the total number of BCTs and what kind of mix of BCTs can we expect (Heavy, Light, and Stryker)?

b. From a force structure perspective, how do you budget in 2012, 2013 and 2014, for an anticipated end strength reduction in 2015/2016?

c. You have previously stated that it took ten years to grow and equip the force to current levels, have equipping funds already been reduced in the 2012–2014 timeframe that assumes that this reduction will take place?

d. From a total force structure perspective, how do you plan and program funds in the 2012–2014 timeframe if the plan assumes that this troop reduction will take place in 2015/2016?

e. What is the "knee in the curve" for making a decision to reverse this reduction and still not have a negative impact on the ability to train and equip?

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. a. No decisions have been made as to what types of units or what installations will be impacted by the Secretary of Defense's announcement. There are currently 73 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in the Army, 45 in the Active Component (AC) and 28 in the Army National Guard (ARNG). There are 24 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (17 AC/7 ARNG), 40 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (20 AC/20 ARNG), and 9 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (8 AC/1 ARNG).

b. Specific direction from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is to reduce end strength by 27,000, including about 5,000 officers and about 22,000 enlisted personnel. Reductions are expected to be phased in with approximately half of the 27,000 reduction occurring in FY15 and the other half no later than the second quarter of FY16. The Army is considering reducing accessions and implementing a myriad of voluntary and involuntary separation authorities to achieve the Secretary of Defense's direction.

c/d. We are conducting deliberate analyses now to determine which capabilities should be reduced and how the drawdown plan will proceed. Adjustments to the Army's program will be captured in our Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 14–18 submission.

e. Three assumptions must be achieved if the Army is to draw down its end strength as directed by OSD. The Army assumes that the drawdown in Iraq will continue and that it will be completed by 31 December 2011. The Army also assumes that forces in Afghanistan will be drawn down in accordance with current administration policy. Finally, while we cannot predict when and where crises may occur, we do expect that in an era of persistent conflict Army forces could be required for a variety of missions but at nothing approaching the levels seen in recent years. If these assumptions hold true, we believe the Army is capable of supporting Combatant Command requirements within an end strength of 520,400.

Mr. MCKEON. The Secretary of Defense said at our hearing that the force structure reductions he announced in January will be “conditions based.” a. Please give us your definition of what “conditions based” means? Is it AFG specifically? b. What assumptions must we make about our force presence after 2014 in AFG to implement the cut? How does this relate to your recent comments that you believe the Army will continue to have over 50K deployed after Iraq/AFG? c. Is the end strength decision reversible? d. If the decision is indeed conditions based, how will the Army ensure we have the force structure to support a higher end strength in case conditions do not allow for such reductions?

General CASEY. The term “conditions based” refers to global demand for land forces and does not refer to any one region specifically. The Army makes assumptions about future demand in order to inform its planning efforts, and while we cannot predict demand with absolute certainty, we are confident that it will not reach the levels seen in recent years. We assume that the drawdown in Iraq will continue and that it will be completed by 31 December, 2011 and we assume that forces in
Afghanistan will be drawn down in accordance with the current Administration’s policy. The Army is conducting deliberate analysis, and will develop a phased plan with opportunities to reverse course if assumptions prove incorrect. We will continue to ensure that force requirements are sourced with trained and ready units through a disciplined Global Force Management process.

Mr. McKeon. Secretary Gates recently spoke at West Point and said that he envisions a future ground force that will be smaller, pack less heavy firepower and will not engage in large-scale counter-insurgency wars like those in Iraq or Afghanistan. A. Do you believe that in the next ten years the Army will increasingly be asked to focus more on short-duration counterterrorism strikes and disaster relief? b. What size force do you believe will be required? c. In past, we have downsized after the war was over. But this budget puts us in unchartered waters. Does this concern you?

General Casey. Due to the complexity and dynamic nature of the strategic environment, it is impossible to predict with certainty exactly the types of conflicts in which the United States may become involved. The Army must maintain the capability to operate effectively across the full spectrum of conflict, with a continued emphasis on partner building and engagement activities to prevent conflicts from occurring or escalating. The Army is conducting deliberate analysis to determine the optimal force mix within authorized end strength, and will take into account the current fiscally constrained environment. The Army will continue to ensure the accomplishment of its assigned missions, improve operational readiness to meet future demands, and care for the well-being of its Soldiers and their Families.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH

Mr. Smith. The Committee understands that the USMC LAV program has experienced significant benefits associated with Side and Wheel-well Armor Kits added to the USMC fleet of LAVs. These kits were developed by Armatec and installed at the Barstow and Albany USMC Depots. Further, the Committee understands that several allied countries are incorporating, into their LAV fleets, additional technologies developed by this company such as Mine Blast floor and Underbelly Protection Kits, Roof Mounted Blast Attenuating Seats, Armored Self-sealing Fuel Tanks and RPG Protection Kits. The Committee believes that these technologies could improve Stryker vehicle and occupant survivability while not compromising mobility.

a. Could these kits be adapted for use on the Stryker vehicle? Has the Army worked with the USMC or ally countries to determine if these LAV armor solutions provide better protection than current Stryker armor solutions? If not, why not? b. If the Army has worked in coordination with the USMC LAV program and or ally countries to evaluate if any of these technologies could be incorporated into the Stryker vehicles during reset, provide the HASC with a summary of your findings. c. If the USMC and allied countries have armor solutions that provide better protection for their war fighters shouldn’t the Army develop a prototype to test these technologies?

Secretary McHugh. a. Yes, the kits could be adapted for use on Stryker. However, while vehicles may appear largely common, specific kits may not be easily applied to the other vehicles without significant redesign. Since the Stryker vehicles have a greater base vehicle protection against small arms than the USMC LAVs and the Canadian LAV IIIIs, the armor technologies optimized for their vehicle systems may not be optimized or as weight efficient on the Strykers.
b/c. Since 2002, the Army has participated and conducted technical exchanges with the USMC, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia under the Light Armor Vehicle User Nation Group that included meetings conducted annually in London and Ontario. In addition, the Army has conducted bi-lateral exchanges with the Canadian Project Manager Organization-Light Armored Vehicle III Office under a Data Exchange Agreement on the Light Armor Ground Combat Vehicles. Exchanges have included technical approaches to enhance the force protection and survivability of our respective ground vehicle systems. It should be noted that vehicle weight, configuration, and capacity play a significant role in the applicability of specific kits to other vehicle systems. We will coordinate with the HASC staff to provide a summary of our findings.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT

Mr. Bartlett. We understand that the U.S. Army has developed a three-phase strategy to upgrade M4 carbines with incremental improvements—ambidextrous fire control, bolt and bolt carrier, forward rail assemblies, and an upgraded operating
system—over the next few years. Given the importance of these weapons on the battlefield, this improvement process is essential to ensuring our Soldiers’ operational readiness and military capability in places like Afghanistan and elsewhere. But as we’ve witnessed with Secretary Gates’ Efficiency Initiatives and the on-going debate about trimming programs and getting our spending under control, this upgrade process needs to occur in a cost-effective manner. Procurement decisions must emphasize efficiency and effectiveness. And they need to recognize that competition is an essential component in achieving the best value—as highlighted so often by Under Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. It is in that context that I ask you gentlemen about the Army’s strategy for upgrading the M4. It appears that by choosing to approve only incremental upgrades that rely on one company’s product, you have foreclosed the possibility of a smarter way to do business. So my questions are threefold:

1. How aware are you of commercial off-the-shelf options in the M4 carbine upgrade area? Have you considered that there may be readily-available COTS solutions?

2. We understand that the Army is fielding incremental weapon improvements to the M4 in Phase I and Phase II of the upgrade strategy, but why is there no definitive budget or timeline for Phase III when COTS solutions will finally be evaluated? If there is a plan for Phase III, can you tell us how much is budgeted and when the Army will test those COTS solutions?

3. The Army recently released a draft RFP for a new individual carbine. That competition will take at least two years to down select to three potential vendors, for a competition that could ultimately cost $1B. At the end of that competition, the Chief of Staff of Army will decide between a new carbine and an upgrade. Does it make sense to spend 10’s of millions to run an individual carbine competition only to turn around and potentially decide only an upgrade is required? Why won’t the Army take the more cost effective option today and test commercially available kits (and individual carbines) to start by determining the best, most cost effective weapon, then developing a strategy to procure it?

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. 1. The Army has conducted several market surveys and is aware of the Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) components and weapons that could offer a substitute to the upgraded M4A1 carbine. We are pursuing a Small Arms dual approach to upgrade our current weapons while we simultaneously challenge industry through a Full and Open Competition for the next generation Individual Carbine (IC). The current M4A1 will be in the Army’s inventory for a number of years, even if a new weapon is selected through the IC Competition. We owe our Soldiers the best weapons we can provide and this dual approach will accomplish that.

2. There is currently no definitive Phase III within the M4 Product Improvement Program. Incorporation of a COTS solution for specific weapon components is planned for Phase II.

3. The Army selects its systems through an extensive requirements based test and evaluation process. The pending IC competition and testing is estimated to cost $321M. The Army developed a dual path strategy that would maximize the ability to upgrade the M4 by assessing available industry capability, while simultaneously developing a new requirement and conducting a full and open COTS competition for a new IC. The planned Business Case Analysis at the conclusion of the COTS competition will support the Army’s decision to determine the most prudent path forward for the Carbine program.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK

Mr. LOEBSACK. How much funding for psychological health and suicide prevention in the 2012 budget will be specifically targeted to the National Guard and Reserve?

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army Reserve’s FY12 budget for psychological health is $529K and Suicide Prevention is $3.8M.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Does the Army have a detailed plan to address the mental health needs of the Reserve Components? Will that plan specifically address the unique needs and circumstances of the Guard and Reserve?

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army has embarked on a holistic approach in addressing the mental health needs of the Total Force through the Comprehensive Behavioral Health System of Care (CBHSOC). However, challenges remain in providing care for Reserve Component Soldiers as they matriculate in and out of “beneficiary” status based on mobilization activities. Planning efforts to improve the CBHSOC include identifying those challenges that are unique to the Reserve Component.
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. AKIN

Mr. AKIN. In recent weeks, we have heard the Secretary of Defense and you General speak to the need to modernize the tank into the future. Specifically, in the Army’s budget material provided to this committee, the Army notes that the Abrams tank has “virtually reached its upper limits for space, weight and power.” However, there is less than $10 million in the FY 2012 budget request for research and development for Abrams Tank Modernization. This represents close to a $100 million reduction from previous budgets. In light of this significant research funding reduction, does the Army still support Abrams modernization?

Secretary MCHugh and General C ASEY. Yes. The Army is committed to the modernization of the Abrams. The $9.7M of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDTE) funds requested in the FY12 President’s Budget is sufficient for Abrams modernization because the Army anticipates that the majority of the $107.5M in FY11 RDTE funds will carry over to FY12, thereby providing sufficient funding to execute all anticipated FY12 RDTE efforts.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS

Mr. OWENS. MCEB–Joint Staff memo calls for “accelerating commercial JTRS solutions to the field” and setting standards to create a competitive environment. What actions is the Army taking to create a competitive environment for tactical radio market?

Secretary MCHugh. The Army is taking the following actions to create a competitive environment for the tactical radio market:

The Army is working to incentivize industry to invest and also direct internal corporate efforts toward developing products that can be made available off-the-shelf to meet Service capability needs.

The JTRS Enterprise Business Model enables companies outside the Programs of Record to invest/develop tactical radios according to technical standards determined by JTRS, and then compete to sell those radios to the Services.

Each JTRS Program Office, Airborne Maritime/Fixed, Ground Mobile Radio, and Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit is intended to have a Full and Open Competition for Full Rate Production.

The Army remains committed to ensuring that all capable radio vendors are given a fair and open opportunity to compete for the Department of Defense’s tactical radio communication needs.

Mr. OWENS. The President’s budget request for family programs is $200 million more than FY11, $8.3 billion in all. You yourself have been a particularly strong champion for Army family programs. Last year before our Committee you noted that if we wish to maintain our vibrant, all-volunteer force, “soldiers and their families must be our top priority.” Does this funding increase give your Department the latitude it needs to meet the commitments laid out by the President earlier this year, especially as they pertain to rural or underserved areas?

Secretary MCHugh. The Army is committed to providing the best possible Family Programs and services for Soldiers and Families. We have resourced FY12 Family Programs to provide Soldiers and Families with a quality of life commensurate with their level of service and sacrifice to the Nation. Army Family Programs serve Active and Reserve Component Soldiers and Families whether they reside on or near an installation, or are geographically dispersed. Because of their incredible sacrifices, the Army has committed to provide a full range of services to support readiness and retention and enhance resiliency.

Soldiers and Families appreciate the wide variety of available programs and services. To better serve them, the Army recently conducted a Holistic Review of Army Family Covenant programs and identified opportunities to rebalance resources to improve customer access to available programs and services. Our efforts will ensure a balanced portfolio of services that are fiscally sustainable to strengthen Soldier and Family programs for the long term.

Mr. OWENS. It is my understanding that the Army is providing our sniper teams with the XM2010, which is the upgraded M24 sniper rifle, with increased range and lethality. The success of this program has been well covered in the press. I note that the President’s Budget proposes $2M for the XM2010 in FY2012 and $2M in each of the following three years. It would seem to make sense to buy the XM2010 now, when the need by our sniper teams is the greatest, rather than spreading the procurement over four years. Is the $2M amount sufficient to meet the immediate needs of the Army? If not, should we accelerate the purchase of the rifles to meet the need?
Secretary McHugh. The President’s Budget requested $2M per year for sniper modifications beginning in FY12. This funding was not intended for conversion of any M24s to XM2010. Rather, it enables a number of improvements to the other weapons in the Army Sniper Rifle Portfolio: the M107 (.50 Caliber) and the M110 (7.62) Sniper Rifles. Planned improvements include: Lightening the M110 and procuring Sniper Weapon Tripods, Sniper Weapon Quick Fire Sights, Sniper Weapon Collimators and Sniper Mirage Mitigating Devices. The Army has sufficient funding programmed to meet the current requirement for the XM2010, and is considering additional procurements.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON

Mr. Wilson. I am interested in the Army’s effort to compete Contractor Logistics Sustainment and Support (CLSS) contract for Route Clearance Vehicles (RCV) and the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) family of vehicles which has been carried out by a single provider since 2003. It is concerning to learn the MRAP CLSS acquisition schedule is currently in its fourth delay with a new proposed date of April 8, 2011, for the release of a draft Request for Proposal (RFP). Can you tell me whether the Army is on schedule to release a draft RFP on April 8 and a final RFP on June 7? What do you intend to do to ensure the current schedule is not delayed for a fifth time?

Secretary McHugh. Yes, the Army is on track to release the draft RFP in April 2011. The final RFP is still planned for release in June 2011. There are many aspects of conducting a competitive acquisition, including documentation and peer reviews to ensure the RFP is fair to all competitors. It is imperative that the solicitation is properly scoped and the evaluation factors accurately reflect the criterion for best value during the initial planning stages of a source selection. The MRAP team continues to work towards a competitive procurement while maintaining key support to deployed forces. I have asked the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) to continue to monitor this competitive source selection.

Mr. Wilson. We appreciate your commitment to providing our soldiers with improved small arms at both close combat range and long distance shots in the mountains of Afghanistan.

a. I understand that the Army is conducting a competition that could determine the successor to the M-4. Please describe the competition and how the Army will determine whether to retain the M-4 or begin replacing it with the new carbine?

General Casey. a. The Individual Carbine (IC) program is being conducted as a full and open competition to ensure that the Soldier receives the best overall weapon at the best value to the Government. Full and open competition will permit the Army to exploit commercially available advances in small arms capabilities. On 31 January 2011 the Army released the initial draft “Request for Proposal” (RFP) to solicit input from industry. Industry was afforded approximately 60 days to review the initial draft and submit questions to Program Manager Soldier Weapons (PMSW).

PMSW will host an IC Industry Day on 30 March 2011 in which 35 weapons manufacturers are expected to attend. A panel of acquisitions experts and program managers addressed questions previously submitted by industry as well as questions submitted that day.

The Army expects to release the final RFP at the end of May/beginning of June 2011 and will give industry 90 (ninety) days to submit their single weapon design that best meets the Army requirement.

The IC Competition is a formal source selection and is expected to last two years, although the time frames will vary based upon the number of entrants received and qualified for each phase of the competition. The M4A1 will be tested alongside each of the competing designs in order to establish a baseline data set for performance comparison.

The Individual Carbine competition has three distinct phases:

Phase I consists of weapons inspections, non-firing characteristics, facility capability, and cost/price. The most highly qualified candidate system will proceed to the next phase.

Phase II: IC candidates will be evaluated against a number of factors, including accuracy, reliability/durability, fielding, facility capability, and supportability impacts, management, price, government purpose rights, and past performance. Three candidate systems will enter the final “down select” phase.
Down select Phase: The vendors of the three most highly rated candidate systems will be awarded contracts to produce limited number of test articles. The down select phase will include “user in the loop” testing where Soldiers will put the weapons through their paces in a Limited User Evaluation.

At the end of the competition a formal business case analysis (BCA) will be conducted to consider the performance, life-cycle cost, and terms and conditions (government purpose rights) of the selected system as compared to the current carbine. Based on the BCA, we will determine if it is in the best interest of the Army to procure the winning carbine, and if so, what the ultimate fielding plan would be.

b. The future of the M4 is to continue with our Product Improvement Program (PIP) as part of the Army’s “Dual Path Strategy.” The M4 PIP includes upgrading M4s to M4A1s by adding heavy barrels, full automatic trigger mechanisms and ambidextrous controls. Additionally, the Army plans to solicit industry for upgrades to specific components to further improve overall system performance. The combat-proven M4/M4A1 Carbine will remain in service for years to come. A competitive M4/M4A1 carbine solicitation will be published later this FY to complete the Army’s requirements for new M4A1 Carbines and to procure M4/M4A1 Carbines for other services and foreign military sales.

Mr. WILSON. Did the Army conduct an Analysis of Alternatives prior to initiating the new carbine competition? If so, will you provide the Committee a copy of the analysis?

General CASEY. The Army waived an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA). We determined that an AOA would not produce relevant information in support of the program since the Key Performance Parameters and Key Systems Attributes were baselined on the current M4 Carbine capability as directed by the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC). Instead the Army will conduct a Business Case Analysis using actual data collected during the test and evaluation of the Individual Carbine candidate at the conclusion of the Commercial-off-the-Shelf competition to determine the most prudent path forward.

Mr. WILSON. How will the Army guarantee it does not simply award the contract to the lowest bidder, but focuses rather on a combination of quality, cost (life-cycle included), and manufacturing capability?

General CASEY. The Secretary of the Army has directed that all actions be taken that allow the Army to conduct a best value, full and open competition for an Individual Carbine. We will evaluate a number of source selection factors, including, price, technical performance, past performance, and manufacturing capability. The evaluation criteria and the relative weighting of the criteria will be contained in the final Request for Proposals. When the technical evaluation is complete, the procurement team will conduct price evaluations against the Independent Government Cost Estimate and past performance evaluations.

Mr. WILSON. Is the infantry carbine competition fully funded in the proposed FY12 budget?

a. Is the M–4 Product Improvement Program (PIP) fully funded in the proposed FY12 budget?

b. Is the Continuing Resolution for FY2011 having any effect on the PIP or carbine competition?

General CASEY. a. Yes, the Individual Carbine (IC) competition is fully funded in FY12. The M4 PIP is not fully funded in the proposed FY12 Budget.

b. The Continuing Resolution (CR) has not yet begun to affect the M4 PIP or the IC Competition at this time but an extended CR could delay both programs three to six months.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUPPERSBERGER

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. As you are aware the Air National Guard wing in my District is transitioning from C–130s to the new C–27J Spartan, specifically to address the Army's Direct Support Mission. The Army is spending significant operations and maintenance funding on resupply missions using CH–47s. Once deployed, the C–27J will relieve the strain on the Army CH–47 fleet and reduce the amount of contracted airlift missions required in-theater. Can these missions be better performed using more C–27Js rather than CH–47s and contractor supported lift?

Secretary McHugh. We are anticipating that the C–27J will ease the burden on Army CH–47 helicopters and contracted airlift missions. We are working closely with the U.S. Air Force so that the operational commanders’ requirements for delivery of equipment, supplies, and personnel are met. Until the C–27J assumes this mission, and until the supported commanders gain sufficient experience with this
aircraft, the Air Force will support with C–130 Hercules aircraft, and the Army will continue to augment with CH–47 and contracted airlift missions.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Regarding the strategy for upgrading the M4. What is your strategy to use commercial-off-the-shelf options in the M4 carbine upgrade area? Are there readily-available COTS solutions? Could you outline the budget plan and timeline for each phase of the upgrade strategy?

Secretary MCHUGH. Upgrading the M4 consists of two phases. Phase I is underway and does not involve a Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS)/Non-Developmental Item solution. Phase I converts M4 Carbines to M4A1 carbines through new production and modification work orders. Delivery of the M4A1’s from the current production contract begins in mid-FY11 and is currently funded. The Army Acquisition Objective quantities will be met through an acquisition competition and new production contract award to the existing Technical Data Package. The competition and funding required to support the Army’s conversion of all fielded M4 Series carbines to the M4A1 is currently programmed for FY13–17.

During Phase II the Army will review potential COTS solutions to improve specific weapon components. Phase II production incorporating these improvements is subject to approval prior to proceeding. An engineering study to support the Army’s decision for Phase II is funded and currently underway with testing scheduled to begin towards the end of FY11.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Because of the 2005 BRAC, as well as standing up of CYBERCOM there is significant growth at Fort George G. Meade. Could you please provide me a status update and timeline on the replacement of displaced BRAC facilities as well as the impact to the MWR Fund at Meade if these facilities are not replaced?

Secretary MCHUGH. I have asked my staff to develop a legislative solution for the authorization and appropriation of limited funding to enable the replacement of a portion of displaced Soldier assets in FY 13. If the assets are not replaced (in addition to negative impact on community services) the MWR Fund will lose an important source of non-appropriated income, estimated at $200K per year, which is used to support other MWR programs on Fort Meade.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Regarding the modernization of the US Army’s ground vehicle fleet, please explain the obstacles to further reducing the Army’s and U.S. Marine Corps’ ground vehicle program budget expenditures by re-using the relevant portions of the mission systems software and architecture from current investments in the AH–64 Apache helicopter program.

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army continuously seeks to improve its ground vehicle fleet by cross-leveling relevant technology to include system software and architecture from other programs whenever possible. Typically, obstacles preventing cross-leveling of technology between programs include the lack of data rights, commonality between architectures, and the willingness of defense contractors for different platforms to collaborate. There are specific obstacles to re-using AH–64 software systems. For one, the systems used in aviation tend to be more complex and costly. Additionally, the cost of incorporating aviation systems into a truck fleet that currently exceeds 250,000 (and for which there is no system software requirement) would be cost prohibitive.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Mr. TURNER. In today’s austere budget environment, can the Army afford to procure the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) at a base unit cost of $300–400,000 and a total unit cost of $700–800,000? I understand the Army plans to procure about 50,000 JLTVs.

a. Will the additional capability provided by the JLTV over the HMMWV merit the significant difference in cost?
b. When were JLTVs originally supposed to go into production?
c. When are they expected to go into production now?
d. Does the Army still plan to procure 50,000 JLTVs?
e. How long is it anticipated that the Army and Marine Corps will use recapitalized vehicles before replacing them with JLTVs?
f. How much will the recapitalized unarmored HMMWVs cost per unit, per year, until the JLTV goes into production?

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. a. Yes, the Army can afford the JLTV. The total unit cost of $700K–$800K for JLTV is not accurate. The Army has established a cost target of $350K per-vehicle and budgeted an additional $60K for vehicle armor kits for a total program target cost of $410K per vehicle. At this target
cost, the Army can afford its strategy to replace roughly one-third of the Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) fleet with JLTVs.

The JLTV is the next generation LTV and is being designed to provide the necessary leap in protection, performance, and payload to fill the capability gap between High-Multi-Purpose Mobility Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Family of Vehicles. In addition to providing greater mobility than the current Up Armed HMMWV (UAH) and MRAPs, the JLTV will provide the following: (1) increased payload with armor installed (3,500 to 5,100 pounds), (2) greater underbody protection than UAH (equal to the MRAP—All Terrain Vehicle threshold), (3) on-board/exportable power, (4) the advanced "Victory" architecture for its Command, Control, Communications and Computers and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance systems, (5) increased reliability, and (6) increased fuel efficiency.

b. As of the Army's Program Objective Memorandum 12–16, the production of JLTV was scheduled to begin in FY14.

c. As a result of the requirement changes captured from lessons learned in the JLTV Technology Demonstration (TD) phase and operational lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase has been extended, moving the start of production to FY16.

d. The Army continues to refine the quantity requirement for JLTV. However, based on operational requirements and the Total Obligation Authority for the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (TWV) fleet, the Army's strategy is to replace roughly one-third of the LTV fleet with JLTVs over a 20 year period. The total number of HMMWVs to be replaced is projected to be approximately 40–46K after completion of the 15 percent reduction of the TWV fleet directed in the Army TWV Strategy.

e. The Army will not replace all of its recapitalized HMMWVs with JLTVs. The Army will first replace legacy vehicles that have not been recapitalized, and then will begin to replace recapitalized vehicles approximately eight years into JLTV production. At that point the Army will replace unarmored HMMWVs that will have accrued roughly 20 years of service life since their recapitalization.

f. The Army is still developing its HMMWV recapitalization strategy and has not made decisions about the recapitalization mix between unarmored and armored HMMWVs in the period FY13–15 before JLTV enters production.

Mr. Turner. With MEADS no longer planned as the replacement for Patriot in the 2017 timeframe, what actions and investments are required by the Army, and when, to operate and sustain the legacy Patriot system beyond 2017? Are any of these funded in the FY12 request? Does the Army see a need to improve or upgrade Patriot's capabilities? If so, what is the estimated cost of such improvements or upgrades as compared to the cost to complete MEADS development and production?

Secretary McHugh and General Casey. The Army is taking numerous actions and making multiple investments to operate and sustain Patriot in light of the decision not to continue the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). These actions include upgrades to the Patriot system to meet the evolving threat, improving both system performance and mean time between failures, extending the recapitalization program and accelerating Patriot integration into the Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense System of Systems architecture.

In the President's Budget 2012, the Army requested funding in support of this effort primarily for the Patriot improvement and sustainment efforts. Additionally, the Army will integrate the Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missile with the Patriot system to continue the capability evolution of Patriot's interceptor and expand the size of Patriot's engagement envelope. Additionally, the Army will procure Electronic Launcher Enhanced System ("ELES" launcher upgrades) to provide Combatant Commanders with additional Patriot Advanced Capability–3 and MSE hit-to-kill launch capability. In total, these efforts will keep Patriot relevant and ready well into the future.

The Army conducted a comprehensive analysis of cost to complete development, complete production, and operate and sustain MEADS compared to the cost to upgrade and sustain Patriot. The assessment concluded that, between FY12 and FY20, proceeding with Patriot is approximately one-third the cost of continuing MEADS. This difference is in large part attributable to the high cost of producing a full new force of MEADS equipment, versus upgrading and sustaining existing equipment to meet emerging threats.

Mr. Turner. During your testimony you were confident that the Army would meet the 1 to 2 dwell time ratio. When will the Army meet that ratio? Will the Army continue to meet that ratio given the proposed end strength reductions? Will the Army be able to meet the 1 to 3 dwell time ratio before the proposed Afghan-
stan reductions in 2014? What concerns do you have about the Army’s ability to meet and maintain the 1 to 2 dwell time ratio? The 1 to 3 dwell time ratio?

General CASEY. Based on the Joint Staff projections of demand for forces, which includes reductions in both Iraq and Afghanistan, we believe we will reach our goal of 1-to-2 in late 2012. The strength reductions in FY15 and FY16 also assume that the demand for forces will decrease enough to allow us to maintain at least the 1-to-2 ratio with the smaller force. However, it is unlikely that we will be able to achieve a 1-to-3 ratio under proposed Afghanistan reductions in FY14.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER

Mr. SHUSTER. The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) is a NATO-managed, cooperative development program that was conceived in the mid-1990’s to develop a ground-based air and terminal ballistic missile defense capability that would replace existing Patriot systems. On February 11, the Secretary of Defense made a decision not to proceed to procurement of the MEADS system. Instead, the Department plans to continue development though 2013 within the funding limits set forth under a 2005 Memorandum of Understanding (a $4B cap on total design and development costs). According to DOD, this would allow them to implement a “proof of concept” effort and avoid termination costs. However, under this scenario, the Department is still required to spend $804M. This raises the question of whether it is feasible in the current fiscal and threat environment to continue investing in MEADS. The Patriot system is currently fielded by the U.S. and 11 partner nations. It has been continuously upgraded and modernized over the years, much of it financed through FMS, resulting in a “Configuration 3+” system that already meets most of the envisioned requirements for MEADS. The OSD Memo clearly lists Department’s inability to afford to procure MEADS and make required Patriot upgrades as rationale for terminating the procurement of MEADS. Patriot modernization should be accelerated in light of the Department’s MEADS decision. I applaud you for your decision not to proceed to procurement of the MEADS missile defense system. As noted in the DOD memo, the program is substantially over budget and behind schedule. The Department made a decision to complete the design and development phase of the program, which will require an additional $804 million across FY12 and FY13. $406.6 million of this is included in the FY12 budget request.

a. If the MEADS program ends at the design and development phase and there are no plans to continue into production and fielding, why are we even continuing to fund design and development?

b. Why should the committee authorize the FY12 budget request of $406.6 million for MEADS? What is the pay-off?

c. Will DOD go back to the drawing board and try to find a way to ring out some additional savings out of this $800M for MEADS?

d. The DOD memo indicates that it will be necessary to allocate funds for Patriot upgrades. At a minimum, will DOD work to reallocate funds for Design and Development for upgrades to the Patriot system?

Secretary MCHUGH. a. The continued funding of the Proof of Concept is intended to complete prototypes of radar, battle manager, and launcher end items; demonstrate integration of the Missile Segment Enhancement interceptor; and complete ground testing and conduct two intercept flight tests. Information gained from the Proof of Concept will be used to inform future program decisions, and some MEADS technology developed in the Proof of Concept approach may be applicable to future U.S. systems. The MEADS partners will also take delivery of equipment and other hardware residuals from this contracted effort, as well as all information (including deliverable technical data) that the contractor is obligated to provide under the contract. Germany and Italy stated in discussions with the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) that they would like to proceed to completion of the Proof of Concept. Completing the Proof of Concept will enable our MEADS partners to field coalition missile defense capability. Our MEADS partner’s burden-sharing investment in MEADS will reduce future demands for U.S. investment to protect coalition forces in this “high-demand, low-density” force protection area. Additionally, the continuation and completion of the Design and Development will avoid the more costly termination cost required under the agreements in the Memorandum of Agreement.

b. The $406.6M in FY12 funds the Proof of Concept effort to reduce risk and invest in Technology Development rather than absorb the termination costs. The Proof of Concept will mature MEADS Major End Items and complete some system-level integration and testing within the existing Design and Development (D&D) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) cost constraints. This will be executed using re-
maining funds that would otherwise pay termination costs with no further benefit to the three MEADS partners. Collective work under the Proof of Concept offers pay-off benefits for all three MEADS partners, builds partner capacity in Air and Missile Defense, and positions Italy and Germany for possible future development, production, and fielding. We envision that the Proof of Concept development efforts will focus on completion of as many D&D tasks as possible within the funding limitations of the current D&D MOU, concluding with two flight tests of the MEADS system in late 2012 and mid 2013, and completion of all D&D MOU efforts by mid-2014.

c. Potential Proof of Concept revisions to the D&D prime contract are currently in negotiations with the Partners. The NATO MEADS Management Agency (NAMEADSMA) will develop and negotiate a contract amendment consistent with the Proof of Concept scope envisioned by the MEADS partners.

d. The Army is taking numerous actions and making multiple investments to operate, sustain and upgrade Patriot, in light of the decision to pursue the Proof of Concept approach and the decreased future funding requirement for MEADS. It should be noted, however, that the $804M for the MEADS Proof of Concept funding remains separate and does not directly sustain or upgrade Patriot.

Mr. SHUSTER. The Memo accompanying your recent decision not to proceed to procurement of MEADS, you specifically highlighted the Army’s inability to afford to procure MEADS and make required Patriot upgrades as rationale for the decision. I agree wholeheartedly with that assessment and commend you on your decision. It is vital that we continue to upgrade the Patriot system, which can provide added capability much sooner and at a fraction of the cost. With MEADS no longer planned as the replacement for Patriot in the 2017 timeframe, what actions and investments are required by the Army, and when, to operate and sustain the legacy Patriot system beyond 2017? Are any of these funded in the FY12 request? Does the Army see a need to improve or upgrade Patriot’s capabilities? If so, what is the estimated cost of such improvements or upgrades as compared to the cost to complete MEADS development and production?

Secretary McHugh. The Army is taking numerous actions and making multiple investments to operate and sustain Patriot in light of the decision not to continue the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). These actions include upgrades to the Patriot system to meet the evolving threat, improving both system performance and mean time between failures, extending the recapitalization program and accelerating Patriot integration into the Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense System of Systems architecture.

In the President’s Budget 2012, we requested funding in support of this effort primarily for Patriot improvement and sustainment efforts. Additionally, the Army will integrate the Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missile with the Patriot system to continue the capability evolution of Patriot’s interceptor and expand the size of Patriot’s engagement envelope. We will also procure the Electronic Launcher Enhanced System (‘’ELES’’ launcher upgrades) to provide Combatant Commanders with additional Patriot Advanced Capability–3 and MSE hit-to-kill launch capability. In total, these efforts will keep Patriot relevant and ready well into the future.

The Army conducted a comprehensive analysis of cost to complete development, complete production, and operate and sustain MEADS compared to the cost to upgrade and sustain Patriot. The assessment concluded that, between FY12 and FY30, proceeding with Patriot is approximately one-third the cost of continuing MEADS. This difference is in large part attributable to the high cost of producing a full new force of MEADS equipment, versus upgrading and sustaining existing equipment to meet emerging threats.

**QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY**

Mr. CONAWAY. I am pleased to read from your statement your thoughts on the importance of fiscal stewardship in the U.S. Army. Like you, I strongly support training leaders and managers to make better resource-informed decisions. I am happy to learn that in addition to better training and professional development, the Army has fielded the General Fund Enterprise Business System to more than 11,000 users at 14 installations. Along with the better training, this system is vital to ensuring Army is able to reach full auditability of its financial statements sooner rather than later. Investment from the Army leadership is important in accomplishing the full audit readiness goal. Like I have said in every budget posture hearing during this Congress and many previous Congresses, I cannot stress enough to you that making audit readiness a priority for the U.S. Army is a necessity. Would
you please provide for the Committee your thoughts on the Army’s audit program to date and how you see it moving forward?

Secretary McHugh. The Army has a solid, achievable, and resourced plan to be fully auditable by 2017. The Army’s plan is synchronized with the overall DOD Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan and provides detailed milestones and organizations responsible for ensuring the milestones are met.

Our plan provides necessary training to Army personnel to ensure these personnel understand how to manage the Army’s financial resources in a manner that is transparent and auditable. The plan stresses the importance of establishing and maintaining a compliant control environment that will meet or exceed audit standards, To meet the objective of establishing an effective internal control environment, we are implementing the General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS), evaluating existing internal controls, and implementing corrective actions where controls do not meet standards. Moreover, we are training personnel to maintain and operate within the required, disciplined control environment.

Additionally, our audit readiness plan includes a series of four successive financial statement audits, conducted by an independent public accounting firm (IPA) in FY11 through FY14. The IPA audits will validate the efficacy of our control environment, training and GFEBS implementation. The audits will disclose underperforming areas and recommend corrective actions. The cumulative effect of training, controls, GFEBS fielding and independent audit testing will enable an audit ready environment by FY17.

In executing this audit readiness plan, the Army has achieved several significant accomplishments. First, as of 30 Sep 2010, the Army asserted the audit readiness of the Appropriations Received line on the General Fund Statement of Budgetary Resources, which totaled $231.9 billion in FY10. OUSD(C) has validated this assertion package and on 27 Apr 2011 an independent public accounting firm began an audit of this line item. In addition, the Army asserted, as of 31 Mar 2011, the existence and completeness of eight aviation programs, which includes more than 2,400 mission critical assets. OUSD(C) and DOD IG are currently validating this assertion package and DOD IG will begin an audit of this assertion in in the fourth quarter of FY11. Finally, the Army is in the process of beginning the first of several interim audit readiness examinations of the funds distribution and budget execution processes at sites where GFEBS was first implemented, known as GFEBS Wave 1 installations. OUSD(C) and DOD IG are currently validating this assertion package and OUSD(C) is progressing through the procurement process to contract an IPA to begin this examination in June 2011.

By achieving these important milestones, the Army has demonstrated that its audit readiness plan will result in the appropriate outcomes, as defined by Congress and USD(C). These milestones are critical first steps in confirming the effectiveness of the Army’s plan and gaining the necessary momentum to enable future audit readiness success across the Army.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN

Mr. Coffman. General, various ground vehicle programs are currently being developed by the U.S. Army. Additionally, modernization efforts are also underway for some ground vehicle platforms, including the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Abrams Main Battle Tank, and the Stryker. How will the Army ultimately reconcile the existing ground vehicles, updated/modernized ground vehicles, and ground vehicles currently being developed into a comprehensive and cohesive ground vehicle strategy? Please specifically address the future of Abrams Main Battle Tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Ground Combat Vehicle, MRAP/MATV, Stryker, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and the HMMWV.

General Casey. The Army’s Combat Vehicle Modernization Strategy represents a holistic approach to the development of the Ground Combat Vehicle, replacement of the M113 Family of Vehicles and the incremental modernization of the Bradley, Abrams, Paladin, and Stryker. Modernization imperatives across the fleet include improved protection, mobility and sustainment, mitigation of existing Size, Weight and Power (SWaP) shortfalls and Network integration. In addition, the Army has developed and published a comprehensive Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy aimed at providing an affordable plan to achieve and sustain the capabilities that the Army will need through FY25.

The Ground Combat Vehicle will replace the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) and will be the cornerstone of modernization for the Combat Vehicle fleet. The four imperatives of the Ground Combat Vehicle are: 1) MRAP like protection, 2) a nine man squad carrying capacity, 3) full spectrum operations capability, and 4) de-
velopment in seven years. The Ground Combat Vehicle will be built with capacity to grow in weight and power requirements through modernization as future technologies mature.

The Army is considering options for the modernization of the M1A2SEP v2 tank and is currently evaluating technology alternatives. The application of new technologies will be synchronized with the next recapitalization opportunity for the oldest tanks in the fleet.

Bradley modernization will address buy-back of SWaP for Non-IFV Bradley variants (Cavalry, Fire Support and Engineer) to improve protection, mobility and integrate the emerging network.

M113 replacement will initially focus on Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCT) using a material solution that provides necessary protection, mobility, and interoperability to operate in the Ground Combat Vehicle-equipped formation.

Striker Modernization includes buy-back of SWaP and will leverage the development effort of the Double V Hull. Additionally, the Army will consider engine and drive train upgrades to improve mobility and enable network integration.

The Army plans to retain and use most of its MRAP/M–ATV fleet for the next 15 years and potentially beyond. A small number of MRAPs that are uneconomical to maintain and/or upgrade will be divested once they are no longer required for wartime service. The majority will be maintained by the Army, some as organic unit equipment and some in augmentation sets to be used when required. As requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan decline, MRAPs will be reset to eliminate maintenance deficiencies; when feasible and affordable, safety and automotive upgrades will also be applied.

The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is the Army’s next generation Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) and is being designed to provide the necessary capability in protection, performance and payload to fill the capability gap remaining between the HMMWV and MRAPs. The JLTV program is scheduled to enter the Engineering and Manufacturing Design phase of development in FY12 and begin Low Rate Production in FY16. The Army plans to replace approximately one-third of the HMMWVs in its LTV fleet over a period of 20 years.

The HMMWV is the Army’s current LTV and will continue to serve in the force for the foreseeable future. The Army TWV Strategy calls for an approximately 15% reduction in its Tactical Wheeled Vehicle fleet, which will result in an LTV fleet size of roughly 120,000 vehicles. HMMWVs will continue to make-up two-thirds of this fleet after the Army’s planned procurement of JLTV. HMMWVs will continue to be used for operational deployments as the mission and threat situation allows and will serve prominently in the Homeland Defense and Disaster Relief mission roles. The Army will continue to recapitalize its HMWMV fleet to extend its service life and is conducting research for a Competitive HMMW Recap program to potentially increase HMMVV protection to near-MRAP levels.

Mr. COFFMAN. General, how important are initiatives such as the Yellow Ribbon program at the state level in reintegrating National Guard soldiers when they return from combat operations?

General CASEY. At the state level, the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program has proven to be an invaluable resource and tool for our Warriors and Families. Programs like the Yellow Ribbon program are an integral part of our efforts to build resilient Families and Army Strong Soldiers who can endure the mobilizations, separations, and sacrifices we ask of them as part of their selfless service. We continue to work to provide Soldiers and Families, their employers and local communities some stability and predictability. This allows them to pursue both their military and civilian careers. Participating in Yellow Ribbon events provide attendees with information and services, opportunities for referral and proactive outreach from our commands and our communities. Our events rely on the support and involvement of command staffs, employers, community partners and a host of volunteers. The goal is to build skills in each Family member and Soldier to assure they are prepared and able to cope with the difficulties of extended separation and deployment. We help Families network together, connect with each other and keep the Families connected with their unit/command and Family Programs’ Office/staff during the deployment of their Soldiers. We concentrate on assisting Families and Soldiers to help with reuniting, reconnecting and reintegrating them into a “new normal.” Lastly, we attend to both the Family members’ and Soldiers’ physical, behavioral and mental health needs. We utilize trained professional speakers and briefers from federal agencies and local, state, and national agencies, to come to units or regional venues to educate and assist attendees with knowledge, skills and practical, hands-on participation to meet the goals stated above.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RIGELL

Mr. RIGELL. I would like to commend the Army on their quick and appropriate response to addressing the increased threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and other heat hazards facing our soldiers in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Notably, policies put in place to ensure that flame resistance is integrated into a soldier’s uniform have helped to greatly mitigate the number of soldiers suffering life altering or ending burn injuries.

a. To this end, it is my understanding that currently, only aviators and combat vehicle crewmen receive the Fire Resistant Environmental Ensemble (FREE) that protects soldiers from heat and burn threats, and provides critical warmth and mission readiness capabilities. Could you please clarify if this is correct?

b. Please also comment if the Army has a plan to provide this or a similar flame resistant cold weather clothing systems to all soldiers deployed in OEF.

General CASEY. a. Only aviators and combat vehicle crewmen are issued the FREE System, however, all Soldiers deploying in support of OEF are issued Flame Resistant (FR) Uniforms to include gloves, light-weight performance hood, FR boots, and FR Army combat shirts. Depending on the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and mission, all deploying Soldiers are fielded either the Flame Resistant Army Combat Uniform (FR ACU), the Army Aircrew Combat Uniform (A2CU), or the Improved Combat Vehicle Crewman (ICVC) uniform. All Soldiers are protected in their operating environments.

b. Yes, the Army has a plan to provide similar flame resistant cold weather clothing system to all Soldiers deployed in OEF. The Army is currently pursuing efforts to integrate FR capabilities into the outer layers of the Extended Cold Weather Clothing System (ECWCS) seven-layer system. The improvement is currently in research and development (R&D) and, when available, will be issued to all deploying Soldiers.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER

Mrs. HARTZLER. With the proposed repeal of the DADT policy, what changes to facilities are you contemplating to address the privacy and concerns of service members?

General CASEY. We are not contemplating any changes to facilities. This is supported by the Comprehensive Review Working Group (CRWG) recommendation that no “new construction or modifications to facilities beyond low-cost, unit-funded adaptations” to improve privacy was required to address the concerns of Soldiers. Although not related to the implementation of the repeal of DADT, the DOD Unified Facilities Criteria requires all new, unaccompanied, permanent housing be designed to afford Soldiers private bedrooms and a bathroom shared by not more than one person, which will provide greater privacy.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Will chaplains of all faiths be required to conduct diversity training programs that promote homosexual conduct as equivalent to heterosexual conduct, or will there be a right to refuse such responsibilities in educational programs?

General CASEY. Chaplains will continue to have freedom to practice their religion according to the tenets of their faith. In the context of their religious ministry, chaplains are not required to take actions that are inconsistent with their religious beliefs (e.g., altering the content of sermons or religious counseling, sharing a pulpit with other chaplains or modifying forms of prayer or worship).

Chaplains of all faiths care for all Soldiers and facilitate the free exercise of religion for all personnel, regardless of religious affiliation of either the chaplain or the individual.

Chaplains minister to Soldiers and provide advice to commanders on matters of religion, morals, ethics and morale in accordance with (and without compromising) the tenets or requirements of their faith. Chaplains faced with an issue contrary to their individual faith may refer the Soldier to other appropriate counsel.

Mrs. HARTZLER. If chaplains do have a right to refuse such responsibilities, will they suffer career penalties for exercising it?

General CASEY. Implementation of the repeal of DADT will require no change in chaplains’ responsibilities or flexibility in serving Soldiers. Chaplains of all faiths care for all Soldiers and facilitate the free exercise of religion for all, regardless of religious affiliation of either the chaplain or the individual; hence, chaplains will incur no career penalties for practicing the tenets of their faith.

Mrs. HARTZLER. What costs do you anticipate it costing to make these changes?

General CASEY. No funds will be separately requested for construction of facilities as a result of the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Repeal Act.
Mrs. HARTZLER. What is the estimated number of man-hours that will be needed to implement each phase of the three-tier training program?

General CASEY. Current analysis indicates that Tier 1 education sessions are taking an average of 1.5 hours to complete; Tier 2 education sessions require an average of 2.5 hours, and Tier 3 education sessions are taking about an hour. Using the most recent reporting numbers from the force: 66,093 Soldiers completed Tier 1 training; 44,894 completed Tier 2; and 1,019,013 completed Tier 3. We estimate Tier 1 man-hours at 99,140; Tier 2 man-hours at 112,235; Tier 3 man-hours at 1,019,013 with a grand total of 1,230,388 man hours to date.

Mrs. HARTZLER. What is the estimated number of military commanders likely to suffer career-ending consequences for disagreement with the repeal of the DADT law and policies?

General CASEY. The Army has no such estimate and has no way of knowing. Commanders are expected to emphasize Soldiers’ fundamental professional obligations and the oath to support and defend the Constitution that is at the core of their military service.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Given what is known about the normal human desire for privacy in sexual matters, why would policies requiring the constant cohabitation of mixed sexual orientation groups not undermine morale, discipline, and readiness, recruiting, and retention?

General CASEY. Service in the military makes it necessary at times for Soldiers to accept living and working conditions characterized by little or no privacy. The Army will not establish facilities, quarters, berthing or practices based on sexual orientation. Commanders retain the authority to address individual cohabitation concerns on a case-by-case basis regardless of the sexual orientation of the affected Soldiers.

The Army Guiding Principles for Implementation of the Repeal of DADT include: standards of conduct will apply to every Soldier; all Soldiers must treat each other with dignity and respect; our role as professional Soldiers is emphasized; and good order and discipline will be maintained at all times. The clear message is that respecting each other’s rights within a closed space is critical to maintaining good order and discipline. Standards of conduct apply equally to all Soldiers and inappropriate conduct should be corrected appropriately. If a Soldier has a concern with a billeting or work arrangement for any reason, he or she should address those concerns appropriately within the chain of command. Commanders may use discretion in personnel assignments to berthing, housing and other facilities to maintain morale, good order and discipline based on Army policies and space available.

Mrs. HARTZLER. How would these changes improve the All-Volunteer Force?

General CASEY. It is currently too early to determine its effects as the policy has not gone into effect. We have a training strategy/plan that should allow the transition to the new policy with minimal disruption. The policy as currently crafted, which is limited in scope (in that gays/lesbians are not a special class), should have a neutral impact during the training/transition period.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUNYAN

Mr. RUNYAN. Could you please give your assessments of the impact of proposed DOD and Army efficiencies on Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst?

Secretary MCHugh and General CASEY. It is too early in the process for an assessment regarding DOD and Army efficiencies at the Joint Base McGuire Dix Lakehurst (JBMDL). JBMDL reached Final Operational Capability (FOC) on 1 Oct 2009 with the Air Force as the lead. Projected efficiencies associated with Joint Basing will not be realized until two to five years after achieving FOC.

Mr. RUNYAN. As BRAC 2005 winds down, what is your assessment on whether Joint Basing is producing the operational benefits and cost efficiencies that were expected more than five years ago? Is the Army transferring funds to the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps to pay for valid Army Military Construction requirements at Joint Bases? How about the reverse—has the Army received any MILCON fund transfers from other Services?

Secretary MCHugh and General CASEY. Although we do not have enough data to conclude that Joint Bases are achieving the expected benefits and efficiencies, early indications show that some operational benefits are being realized. Joint Base Commanders are using ingenuity to optimize the delivery of installation support. The Army has transferred funds to the Service lead for valid Army Military Construction requirements.

Mr. RUNYAN. Are you confident that the budget cuts contained in the FY12 request will not force the Reserve Components to go back to the pre-September 11th
days of a hollow, “Strategic Reserve” force? What metrics or leading indicators will you be monitoring to ensure that the Reserve Components remain a viable, operational force that is fully part of the Total Army?"

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The steady, consistent, and recurring demand for Reserve capabilities during almost a decade of war required us to integrate our Reserve forces into our operational expeditionary Army. Congressional support for Overseas Contingency Operations resources enabled us to address incremental funding challenges. Most of the incremental costs were a result of needing additional man days (above the statutory 39 per year) to achieve higher readiness levels. During POM 12–16, the Army validated Operational Reserve training requirements in the base program for the first time. The majority of our Reserve Component units are still funded at the “Strategic Reserve” level in the FY12 Base Budget but have achieved higher levels of readiness using OCO funding. As part of the POM 13–17 build, the Army tasked the Reserve Chiefs to assess how much of the Operational Reserve requirements they can fund within existing resources. We need to determine which Army programs will be decreased or eliminated to fund the Reserve Components above the current “Strategic Reserve” levels, but we expect to make those decisions as part of the FY13 budget submission. We are working closely with OSD to determine what the future requirements will be for our Reserve Component and how to best achieve affordable access for the full range of assignments.

Mr. RUNYAN. How does the Army plan to integrate the Russian Mi–17 into the Army operational and logistical system? Have you established a separate program office?

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. There are no plans to integrate the Mi–17 into the Army Operational and Logistical System. The Army was designated as the lead Service for the Mi–17 and other Non-Standard Rotary-Wing Aircraft in an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) dated 19 January 2010. The lead Service responsibilities outlined in the ADM include procurement, training, and sustaining of Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft for partner nations in support of Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) enduring Security Force Assistance (SFA) requirements. In order to facilitate lead Service responsibilities, the Army established a Project Management Office to support DOD’s global Non-Standard Rotary Wing SFA programs. As identified in the Quadrennial Defense Review, building partner nation vertical lift capabilities through SFA programs will likely continue into the future. Building a partner Nation’s sustainment is a key capability and the primary method of building a Non-Standard Rotary Wing sustainment capability is through Contractor Logistics Support (CLS). The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, G–4, has identified CLS as the most cost effective and dependable means to sustain low density, high demand, critical components and repair parts that require airworthiness certification."

Mr. RUNYAN. Will the logistical support for the Mi–17 aircraft be integrated into the normal Army aviation logistics system?

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. Logistics support for the Mi–17 will not be integrated into the normal Army aviation logistics system. The logistics and sustainment support for each partner nation or customer will be accomplished through a Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) Contract executed through the Non-Standard Rotary Wing Program Manager’s Office with approved sources of supply. Each partner Nation/customer will determine the level of CLS required to support their Nation’s sustainment strategy. The Department of Defense’s assigned Security Force Assistance Team helps them develop their logistics and sustainment strategy through detailed capability and requirements analysis.

Mr. RUNYAN. Why was the Mi–17 program changed from NAVAIR to the Army?

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The Mi–17 program was not changed from NAVAIR to the Army. The NAVAIR was directed to procure 21 Mi–17 helicopters for Afghanistan in 2009, but was not assigned as a project office nor as the lead Service. This procurement was prior to the establishment of the Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aviation Program Management Office (NSRWA PMO) and a decision was made not to move the NAVAIR procurement to the Army after the NSRWA PMO was created. The Department of Defense did not want to impact the Mi–17 procurement. The NAVAIR procurement strategy was to procure commercial Mi–17 helicopters and modify them for military use. However, based on diplomatic communications between the U.S. Ambassador to Russia and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2010, it was determined that the NAVAIR procurement approach would not be feasible. Russian Federation Law requires that all military end use helicopters be procured through Rosoboronexport, a state owned organization responsible for the export of all military end use items from the Russian Federation. Based on this information, the Defense Acquisition Executive signed an Acquisition
Decision Memorandum directing NAVAIR to cancel its procurement and directing the Army to begin a new procurement for military Mi–17 helicopters for the Afghan Ministry of Defense in accordance with Russian Federation law.

Mr. RUNYAN. Is the Mi–17 program a government to government program with the Russian government?

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The current Mi–17 procurement effort for 21 helicopters and airworthiness assurances are being conducted between the U.S. Army’s Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aviation Program Management Office (NSWRA PMO) and the Russian Federation’s Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation. In addition, the NSWRA PMO is negotiating a contract with Rosoboronexport for the procurement of 21 military use Mi–17s for Afghanistan. This contract will include the procurement of 21 Mi–17’s, with an option for 12 additional Mi–17’s, critical Mi–17 spare parts and engineering services.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WEST

Mr. WEST. The recent developments across North Africa, the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and in the SOUTHCOM AOR have one common geographical aspect—the littorals. Is the Army looking ahead and considering how they can be deployed into the littorals using force projection and forcible entry from the seas? I specifically would like to know about training, equipment modernization, and joint coordination exercises.

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. Typically, the Army plays a limited role during forcible entry operations from the seas into the littorals. The Army maintains capabilities in general purpose forces to conduct forcible entry by air borne and air assault operations and these forces could support forcible entry operations in littorals. Seldom would airborne operations need to originate from ships. By exception, air assault operations could be executed from ships, but this capability is not expected of general purpose forces and requires qualification of pilots and compatible helicopters and ammunition. Army aviation units do not routinely train for over-water/shipboard operations until assigned that mission. For aviation units with assigned over-water/shipboard requirements (like some supporting Korea and U.S. Southern Command), the Army provides qualification training and equipment. Army aviation simulators include littoral training scenarios.

The Army has organized, equipped, and trained units to support force projection from the seas, to include specific units that supported port opening, water purification/distribution, and logistics-over-the-shore operations. Critical capabilities for logistics-over-the-shore operations include command and control; cargo documentation; Soldier “stevedores” to operate onboard cranes and to discharge equipment from strategic ships; waterborne transportation of personnel, cargo, and equipment to include the operation of small tugs, large tugs, vessels, floating cranes, “water taxi” service, floating platforms and causeways. Army training ensures these units are technically and tactically ready for employment when needed by combatant commanders. U.S. Transportation Command joint logistics-over-the-shore exercises provide an important training venue where these Army units can operate doctrinally in littorals as part of an interdependent joint team. There is a joint logistics-over-the-shore exercise in Morocco with U.S. Africa Command during the April-May timeframe and a joint logistics-over-the-shore exercise in Korea with U.S. Pacific Command in the Mar-Jun timeframe. The Army is also exploring with U.S. Transportation Command opportunities to integrate air borne forcible entry capabilities into a theater entry exercise.

Mr. WEST. Myself and a number of my colleagues are concerned about so-called invisible wounds, such as Traumatic Brain Injury. What can you tell me about the Department of the Army’s efforts with Hyperbaric Oxygen Therapy (HBOT) and Cognitive Stimulation?

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The Army is evaluating the use of hyperbaric oxygen for the treatment of persistent mild TBI symptoms. There is a multi-center study underway that will evaluate Active Duty military men and non-pregnant Active Duty military women who are residing in the United States. The military personnel in the study have been deployed one or more times and have been diagnosed with at least one mild brain injury with persistent symptoms. The study is being conducted at Fort Gordon, Fort Carson, Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton with research staff assistance from the Denver VA Medical Center and Salt Lake City LDS Hospital. It is important to note, however, that the use of hyperbaric oxygen to treat traumatic brain injury (TBI) is currently not approved by the Food and Drug Administration. Some civilian medical practitioners are using...
it as treatment for patients with brain damage from stroke, sports injury and trauma including chronic symptoms from mild traumatic brain injury.

The Army is providing Cognitive Rehabilitation Therapy (CRT) to a large number of Soldiers with TBI and the Department of Defense (DOD) is actively studying its effectiveness. CRT interventions for Service members are available at DOD Military Treatment Facilities, through the Supplemental Health Care Program, and through VA programs. CRT is not a single therapy as the name suggests, but a collection of individual treatment strategies, such as cognitive stimulation, that are designed to improve problems with memory, attention, perception, learning, planning and judgment brought about by a traumatic injury to the brain.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY

Mrs. ROBY. During the testimony, it was stated “As we continue to build dwell and increase the time Soldiers have at home, more units will conduct full spectrum training rotations at the Combat Training Centers.” To be fair to Soldiers and Families, can the dwell time ratio be modified to reflect time not spent at home station so that it better represents the amount of time that the Soldier is able to be at their home station?

Secretary MCHUGH. The current dwell time ratio was designed to account for significant, high-stress events that could have physical and psychological impacts on individual Soldiers. While time away from home station and family for any event can be stressful, routine training events are not likely to have the same impact on individuals as combat deployments.

Mrs. ROBY. In light of the Army budget allowing for $1.5 billion in adding 71 UH-60M/HH-60M Black Hawk helicopters, $1.4 billion to procure 32 new and 15 remanufactured CH-47F Chinook helicopters, and $1.04 billion to modernize the AH-64 Apache helicopter: What are the fielding plans for another UH-60M simulator and another Transportable Black Hawk Operations Simulator (TBOS) system for Fort Rucker, AL? Additionally, what impact will modernization of the UH-60 (Black Hawk), CH-47 (Chinook), and AH-64 (Apache) helicopters have on the USAACE’s ability to meet their mission goals in regards to training, maintenance, and facilities?

General CASEY. The United States Army Aviation Center of Excellence (USAACE) is slated to receive its third Transportable Black Hawk Operations Simulator (TBOS) by the end of FY11. The third TBOS will be operational no later than 1 OCT 11 in order to support the FY12 training requirement. USAACE will receive three UH-60M simulators by midyear 2013. To date, USAACE has received 10 CH-47Fs and will receive 4 additional CH-47Fs in 3rd and 4th quarter FY11. Every time we receive a CH-47F, we are required to turn in a legacy CH-47D to the remanufacture line. Currently, USAACE has 28 UH-60Ms on hand and is scheduled to receive 6 additional this year with an end state of 34 on hand for FY11. Due to the large training demand for the UH-60/M, USAACE has not been required to turn in any legacy UH-60s to the remanufacture line. The first arrival of AH-64D Block III helicopters is tentatively scheduled for FY14. USAACE will be required to turn in legacy AH-64Ds on a one for one basis with the Block III’s. The fielding of modernized aircraft will not impact USAACE’s mission goals in regards to training, maintenance, and facilities. Coordination has been conducted with Headquarters Training and Doctrine Command and all USAACE elements to insure timely integration of new aircraft to mitigate any training issues.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS

Mr. BROOKS. During the March 2, 2011, hearing you discussed the MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defense System) program with Rep. Franks and Rep. Hunter. a. You mentioned that MEADS was “underperforming”. Can you explain in what ways the systems is underperforming?

b. You also mentioned that MEADS was not close to completion. What was the original schedule for completion? How far behind is the program?

c. Is the additional $804 million over the next two years intended to wind down the program or complete the program?

d. How will ending the program affect our German and Italian partners in their development of MEADS? What inputs have you had from Germany and Italy on MEADS?

Secretary MCHUGH. a. The MEADS’ underperformance has been in the areas of cost and schedule, with additional concerns on oversight, program management, and
systems engineering. The Proof of Concept was designed to markedly reduce the risk of the remaining Design and Development work. It should be noted that since the MEADS independent review in 2008, there have been improvements in oversight, program management, and systems engineering in the MEADS program, although cost and schedule growth continue. By choosing to not pursue development of the full MEADS system, and to refocus the program as a Proof of Concept, the higher-risk integration and testing efforts included in the full scope program have been removed, resulting in substantially lower cost and schedule risk.

b. The original Design and Development program schedule was established as a 110 month effort, which is approximately 71 percent complete. The effort was originally to be completed in October 2013. However, in 2010, the Partners and the NATO MEADS Management Agency (NAMEADSMMA) determined that an additional 30 month effort was required to recover from delays in the program and to add Partner desired capabilities. These changes would have extended the total program effort to 140 months, with completion in March 2016.

c. The $804M will wind down the program.

d. Completing the Proof of Concept will enable our MEADS partners to field coalition missile defense capability. We believe that our collective work under the Proof of Concept offers significant benefits for all three MEADS partners, builds partner capacity in Air and Missile Defense, and will position Italy and Germany to continue future development, production, and fielding. Our MEADS partners have informed us that they intend to field MEADS capability in some form.

Mr. Brooks. If we are to end MEADS and harvest technology from the program in the future for other missile defense systems: Which technologies are you expecting harvest? What other systems do you expect to use the harvested technology? Are you expecting to use the MEADS 360 degree radar in the Patriot system? What are the expected costs of the integration of MEADS technology into legacy and future missile defense systems?

Secretary McHugh. The technology benefits are likely to be at the subsystem level, which makes it unfeasible to estimate the costs at this time. Some of the more attractive technologies from the U.S. perspective are contained in radar developments for the 360 degree surveillance radar. As part of the Proof of Concept approach, the U.S. expects to receive technical data packages providing detailed technology information. The U.S. will evaluate the potential incorporation of the MEADS technology in existing or future systems over the next several years as that data becomes available.

Mr. Brooks. Can you provide the committee with the cost comparison between fully completing the MEADS program and harvesting the technology for legacy and future systems?

Secretary McHugh. The cost comparison for completing the U.S. share of the MEADS design and development is approximately $2.8B in FY12–17, while the Proof of Concept will cost approximately $804M in FY12 through FY13, and may lead to harvesting technology. This does not include procurement costs for a full force of MEADS major end items, which would require additional funds beginning in FY13 and extending through FY30.