    [House Hearing, 112 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                        RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT AND
                   LEBANON: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY AND
                       ALLIES IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                            FEBRUARY 9 AND 10, 2011

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 112-32

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

     Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

                                     ______

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
    ELTON GALLEGLY, California           ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California             Samoa
    DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois         DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
    EDWARD R. ROYCE, California          BRAD SHERMAN, California
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    RON PAUL, Texas                      GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    MIKE PENCE, Indiana                  RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    CONNIE MACK, Florida                 GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska           THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             DENNIS CARDOZA, California
    TED POE, Texas                       BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
    GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida            BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio                   ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
    BILL JOHNSON, Ohio                   CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
    DAVID RIVERA, Florida                FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
    MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania             KAREN BASS, California
    TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas                WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
    ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
    RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
    VACANT
                       Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
                 Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

    Part 1, February 9, 2011.........................................     1
    Part 2, February 10, 2011........................................    67

                                   WITNESSES
                                   February 9

    The Honorable Elliott Abrams, senior fellow for Middle Eastern
      studies, Council on Foreign Relations..........................    10
    The Honorable Lorne Craner, president, International Republican
      Institute (former assistant secretary of state for democracy,
      human rights, and labor).......................................    17
    Robert Satloff, Ph.D., executive director, The Washington
      Institute for Near East Policy.................................    26

                                  February 10

    The Honorable James B. Steinberg, Deputy Secretary, U.S.
      Department of State............................................    77

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
                                   February 9

    The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress
      from the State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign
      Affairs: Prepared statements
      February 9.....................................................     4
      February 10....................................................    70
    The Honorable Elliott Abrams: Prepared statement.................    12
    The Honorable Lorne Craner: Prepared statement...................    19
    Robert Satloff, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................    28

                                  February 10

    The Honorable James B. Steinberg: Prepared statement.............    79

                                    APPENDIX
                                   February 9

    Hearing notice...................................................   120
    Hearing minutes..................................................   121
    The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
      from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement..........   123
    The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from
      the State of California: IFES Briefing Paper entitled
      ``Elections in Egypt: Key Challenges for Credible and
      Competitive Elections''........................................   124

                                  February 10

    Hearing notice...................................................   132
    Hearing minutes..................................................   133
    The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from
      the State of Missouri: Prepared statement......................   135
    The Honorable Joe Wilson, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of South Carolina: Prepared statement....................   136
    Written responses from the Honorable James B. Steinberg to
      questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Ileana Ros-
      Lehtinen.......................................................   137
    Written responses from the Honorable James B. Steinberg to
      questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Russ
      Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Missouri.......................................................   155

    RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT AND LEBANON: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
                 AND ALLIES IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST, PART 1

                                  ----------

                          WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2011

                      House of Representatives,
                                  Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:25 a.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
    Lehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The committee will come to order.
    Having been duly organized, this committee will now proceed to
    our first official hearing of the 112th Congress. After
    recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr. Berman, for 7
    minutes each for our opening statements, I will recognize the
    chairman and ranking member of our Subcommittee on the Middle
    East and South Asia for 3\1/2\ minutes each for their
    statements. We will then proceed directly to hear testimony
    from our distinguished witnesses, and I would respectfully
    remind them to keep their statements to no longer than 5
    minutes. I am rather ruthless with this gavel. After we hear
    from our witnesses, individual members will be recognized for 5
    minutes each to question our witnesses. The Chair now
    recognizes herself for 7 minutes.
        Recent developments in Egypt and Lebanon pose great
    challenges to U.S. policy, to our interest and to our allies in
    the Middle East. In Lebanon we have witnessed the takeover of
    the country by the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis. In Egypt we see
    destabilization of a government which has been a key U.S. ally
    and partner for over 3 decades. In both instances, successive
    U.S. administrations failed to develop and implement a longer
    term strategy to move beyond the status quo and prepare for the
    future.
        In both Egypt and Lebanon we have failed to effectively
    leverage U.S. assistance in support of peaceful, pro-democracy
    forces, and to help build strong, accountable, independent,
    democratic institutions as a bulwark against the instability
    that is now spreading throughout much of the region. Instead of
    being proactive, we have been obsessed with maintaining short-
    term, personality-based stability, stability that was never
    really all that stable, as the events of recent weeks
    demonstrate. Successive administrations have repeatedly opposed
    and obstructed efforts by Members of Congress to require
    accountability and ensuring Egypt met conditions for its
    economic assistance.
        The Mubarak government has been a reliable and valuable
    ally of the United States on security matters, but the
    relationship must extend well beyond Mubarak. It would be
    short-sighted and potentially dangerous for the United States
    to base its entire approach to another nation on the survival
    of one individual.
        In the early days of the current unrest the administration
    failed to seize the opportunity to press for reform, to address
    the demonstrators' frustrations and prevent chaos and violence.
        On January 25th, the first day of the demonstrations,
    Secretary Clinton stated, ``Our assessment is that the Egyptian
    Government is stable.'' Vice President Joe Biden, in an
    interview on January 27th, said, ``I would not refer to Mubarak
    as a dictator.''
        According to the Wall Street Journal, National Security
    Council officials admitted in a meeting on January 31 that they
    did not have a contingency plan in place should the Egyptian
    Government collapse. Now the White House is reportedly making
    matters worse by not only reexamining its position on dealing
    with the Muslim Brotherhood, but also stated that a new
    Egyptian Government should ``include a whole host of important
    non-secular actors.'' The Muslim Brotherhood had nothing to do
    with driving the protests, and they and other extremists must
    not be allowed to hijack the movement toward democracy and
    freedom in Egypt.
        Turning to Lebanon, we are again confronted by the absence
    of a long-term U.S. strategy. Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah have
    acted relentlessly to undermine Lebanon's sovereignty and the
    United States has largely adopted a reactive posture seeking to
    contain the advance of these hostile forces. Washington has
    also persisted in continuing to provide assistance to a
    Lebanese Government in which Hezbollah essentially had veto
    power. This included security assistance to the Lebanese Armed
    Forces, LAF, despite longstanding concerns over whether such
    aid could directly or indirectly benefit Hezbollah.
        Even now when the Lebanese Government has been overthrown,
    the United States has still failed to indicate that it will cut
    off assistance to a proxy government for Iran, Syria, and
    Hezbollah.
        There are lessons from the Lebanon debacle which are
    applicable to Egypt. In Lebanon, following the Hariri
    assassination, elections were immediately held under Syrian-
    inspired electoral law, laying the foundation for the political
    empowerment of Hezbollah. Therefore, shouldn't the United
    States insist that constitutional and administrative
    requirements concerning the electoral process in Egypt be
    revised to ensure that only responsible actors who meet certain
    basic standards participate in Egypt's future? Such criteria
    should include renouncing violent extremism, upholding the rule
    of law, recognizing and enforcing Egypt's international
    commitments, including its nonproliferation obligation and its
    peace agreement with the Jewish State of Israel.
        I would greatly appreciate if our witnesses this morning
    would address the following questions in their testimony: Can
    there be stability in Egypt if Mubarak remains in power? Do
    conditions enable a military control transition process? Would
    this buy time for legitimate opposition forces to organize and
    for constitutional modifications to take place? There are some
    who have suggested that Egypt could follow a Turkey model. How
    viable is that comparison? Given that patterns have recently
    developed in Turkey, could Egypt's adoption of this model lead
    to possible threats to U.S. interests and allies in the Middle
    East? Can the legitimate opposition assume a leadership role?
    Can the military transition to the civil arena? What changes in
    the Egyptian Constitution would be necessary to ensure that
    candidates for public office for political leaders are going to
    act and govern democratically? What criteria are necessary to
    ensure that radical Islamists are not empowered?
        And beyond Egypt and Lebanon the United States must have
    broader strategic plan for the region so that our interests and
    our allies are protected and destructive regimes in Tehran and
    Damascus and other extremists are unable to exert their
    influence over people yearning for democracy.
        These questions are particularly relevant as we commemorate
    the centennial of the birth of President Ronald Reagan. During
    his Westminster address Reagan stated, ``Any system is
    inherently unstable that has no peaceful means to legitimize
    its leaders. While we must be cautious about forcing the pace
    of change, we must not hesitate to declare our ultimate
    objective and to take concrete actions to move toward them. The
    objective I propose,'' according to Ronald Reagan, ``is quite
    simple to state: To foster the infrastructure of democracy.''
        We face an emergency in Lebanon and Egypt that could spread
    to the broader Middle East. With cautious determination, we
    thank our esteemed witnesses for appearing before our committee
    today and look forward to their testimony.
        With that, I am pleased to yield to our ranking member, Mr.
    Berman.
        [The prepared statement of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen follows:]

        Mr. Berman. Thank you, Madam Chairman. This hearing could
    not be more important or timely. The events of the past month
    across the Middle East have come at a head spinning pace. They
    are both exciting and daunting. A new dawn is breaking for the
    people of Egypt. The promise of a democratic transition brings
    with it new opportunities and freedoms. However, with this
    change comes uncertainty for our security and the security of
    our close ally, Israel. We must both ensure that the transition
    proceeds and seek to ensure that our shared interests are not
    compromised.
        When strongman Ben Ali fled Tunisia on January 14th, few
    guessed that the next country to be intoxicated by the Arab
    world's growing embrace of freedom would be Egypt, the long-
    time cornerstone of U.S. strategy and peacemaking in the Middle
    East. We had worried about Egypt's income gap, its illiteracy,
    its poverty, its denial of fundamental human rights. We had
    debated leadership succession issues as President Mubarak's
    health faltered, and we knew Egyptians, who often seemed to
    endure the unbearable and do so with good humor, have a history
    of rising up every other generation or so. But we never guessed
    that the next Egyptian revolution would begin in Tunis.
        The mass demonstrations in Cairo have already produced
    stunning results: The decision that neither Hosni Mubarak nor
    his son Gamal nor Omar Suleiman will run for President in
    September. They have also instigated talks on the future of
    Egypt between the government and various parties, including the
    Muslim Brotherhood, a moment which has formally been banned
    from politics in Egypt since its founding in 1928.
        Hosni Mubarak has been a friend of the United States,
    however flawed. We didn't put the Mubarak government in power,
    but we supported it because it pursued regional policies we
    generally supported. And with our large foreign assistance we
    incentivized it to pursue those policies.
        While we can't determine Egypt's future leader, we should
    use our influence to encourage a process of change that is
    orderly and a government whose foreign and security policies
    support our interests. As this change takes hold, we must keep
    firmly in mind that our goals include an Egypt that supports
    close relations with the United States, supports the welfare of
    the Egyptian people, democracy, universal human rights, is
    secular in orientation, and of course adheres to the peace
    treaty with Israel.
        In any transition the military will play a critical role,
    as it is already doing. That is why I think it is important
    that our military assistance program continue, so as long as,
    and only if, the military is playing a constructive role in
    bringing about a democratic transition. Based on their
    writings, I know there is disagreement among the panelists on
    this issue, and I look forward to the discussion.
        Egypt has long needed a more inclusive government,
    responsive to the desires of its citizens. If a stable
    democracy is to emerge, there must be participation by a wide
    array of political forces that are fully committed to
    democratic principles. Like many, however, I am skeptical about
    the Muslim Brotherhood's commitment to democracy. The
    Brotherhood wants Egypt to be governed by religious law rather
    than man-made law, a problematic position for a democrat. It
    has a bloody history and even after it renounced violence and
    endorsed democracy in the 1970s, some of its alumni joined the
    ranks of the world's most notorious murderers. Included in
    those ranks are Sadat's assassins and al-Qaeda's Ayman al-
    Zawahiri.
        Some Egyptians of impeccable democratic credentials say the
    Brotherhood has changed and that it is now truly democratic in
    its approach. But even if that is true, we shouldn't fool
    ourselves. Even in the best case scenario where the Brotherhood
    proves itself fully committed to democracy, there is every
    reason to believe it will try to influence the Egyptian
    Government in ways that undermine U.S. interests and it will
    make Egypt a regressive and less tolerant place.
        Mubarak has already made clear that his presidency will end
    in September and that his son Gamal will not succeed him. It is
    critical that Egyptians agree as soon as possible on relevant
    constitutional amendments and laws and a clear and certain
    timetable for their implementation if free and fair elections
    are to be held in September. The less time that the opposition
    has to prepare for elections, the more likely it is that the
    next President will be determined either by Mubarak's National
    Democratic Party or by the Muslim Brotherhood, by far the two
    most organized political forces as of now.
        I would like to say a few words about Lebanon, where a
    handpicked Hezbollah candidate is on the verge of becoming
    Prime Minister. It is a very troubling example of how
    democratic development can go off the tracks when a party
    doesn't respect democratic ground rules. Hezbollah's
    parliamentary faction is but a political front for a cut-throat
    militia. And more than anything else that has put the terrorist
    group in the political driver's seat. If you don't believe me,
    ask Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader who left Saad Hariri's
    March 14th Movement and threw his support to Hezbollah. It is
    an all but open secret that he did so in physical fear of
    Hezbollah.
        As Hezbollah gradually assumes control over more of the
    levers of power in Lebanon, we must be both wise and firm in
    our response. I will be introducing legislation called the
    Hezbollah Anti-Terrorism Act. Following on the Palestinian
    Anti-Terrorist Act, which passed Congress following Hamas'
    election to leadership in the PA in 2006, my bill will set
    rigorous requirements for the provision of foreign assistance
    to Lebanon during periods where Hezbollah is part of the
    Lebanese Government. The goal will be to ensure that none of
    our assistance to Lebanon benefits Hezbollah in any way. We
    certainly want to assist our friends in Lebanon, and we will.
    But we also want to make sure that we don't inadvertently help
    our enemies at the same time. My legislation leaves ample scope
    for both.
        I look forward to the testimony of our three witnesses and
    particularly their views on how the United States can encourage
    a responsible democratic transition in Egypt on the goals I
    previously laid out, what the chances are that such a
    transition will occur, and what they foresee is the role of the
    Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during that transition and beyond.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. I thank my good friend for his
    remarks, and now I will recognize Mr. Chabot for 3\1/2\
    minutes. He is the chairman on the Subcommittee on the Middle
    East and South Asia.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chairman. So we can get to the
    witnesses sooner I will not take the full 3 minutes. I will be
    very brief. I want to thank you for holding these very timely
    hearings this morning, and I know we all look forward to
    hearing from this very distinguished panel of witnesses.
        When I was recently appointed chairman of the Middle East
    and South Asia Subcommittee, having served on the subcommittee
    for a number of years, I knew we would be dealing with a host
    of important issues in a critical part of the world. I don't
    know that anyone, however, anticipated that we would be
    confronted with so many developments in the region quite so
    quickly, not just in Egypt and Lebanon, which we will be
    focusing on in the next 2 days, but in Tunisia and throughout
    the broader region. Clearly in the case of Egypt we have come
    to a crossroads. And while we do not yet know how the current
    volatile situation in that nation will play out, I think we all
    realize that we are going to have to reassess our bilateral
    relationship not only in terms of diplomacy but in the area of
    economic assistance as well.
        The current situation, however, is not limited, as I
    mentioned before, to Egypt. The widespread protests throughout
    numerous countries in the region raise broader concerns
    regarding U.S. foreign policy more generally as well as how we
    administer foreign aid.
        I look forward to being involved in these important
    discussions as we move ahead both here and in the full
    committee with you, Madam Chair, and in the subcommittee, both
    of which I am sure will be quite busy.
        So we can get to the witnesses, as I mentioned before, I am
    going to yield back the balance of my time.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. Now I would
    now like to recognize Mr. Ackerman, the ranking member of the
    Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, for 3\1/2\
    minutes.
        Mr. Ackerman. Thank you and congratulations, Madam Chair.
        In Egypt I fear we are snatching failure from the jaws of
    success. After progressively escalating pressure on President
    Mubarak, after rejecting regime-backed violence against
    peaceful protests, after denouncing the regime's assault on
    journalists, after carefully positioning the United States on
    the side of the protesters, the Obama administration now
    appears to be wavering on whether America really backs the
    demands of the Egyptian people or just wants to return to
    stability with a facade of change.
        The contradiction that is forming between the
    administration's rhetoric and its policy concerns the so-called
    national dialogue initiated by Egypt's new Vice President,
    General Omar Suleiman. General Suleiman is a strong, serious,
    and capable man, but it is still unclear whether his job is to
    lead Egypt's transition on behalf of the Egyptian people or to
    delay it, sidetrack it, flim-flam it into irrelevance on the
    part of President Mubarak.
        The major items on the Egyptian reform agenda are well-
    known: An end to restrictions on free speech and free press, an
    end to restrictions on the formation and operation of political
    parties, an end to the constantly abused emergency law, and an
    end to structural impediments to free and fair elections.
        What have the Egyptian people seen so far? A dialogue with
    the opposition that excludes major opposition leaders but does
    include regime allies, a proposed committee to report on the
    reforms that the government has no obligation to adopt or even
    consider, a promise to lift the state of emergency when the
    government considers that it is appropriate, a pledge to
    liberalize media and communication without any definition of
    what constitutes liberalization.
        The Secretary of State, to her credit, insists that with
    regard to the General Suleiman-led dialogue ``the people
    themselves and the leaders of various groups within Egyptian
    society will ultimately determine whether it is or is not
    meeting their needs,'' she warns. ``We are going to wait and
    see,'' she says, ``how this develops but we have been very
    clear about what we expect.'' I wish we were that clear.
        Respecting Egyptian sovereignty is one thing, maintaining a
    level of ambiguity so thick that ordinary Egyptians cannot
    discern whether or not we are on their side is something else
    altogether. Our national security interests require much
    greater clarity. The people yearn to be free.
        How refreshing is it to see people who are not trampling
    our flag in the streets as they raise theirs? How inspiring is
    it to see people in that part of the world ready to die for
    their children's future instead of sending their children off
    to die? The people yearn to be free. We must plant ourselves
    firmly on their side.
        Until there is evidence that a real transition is underway,
    with the exception of aid for humanitarian needs or with the
    transition, we need to suspend our aid to Egypt. We simply
    cannot afford to be viewed in Egypt as the bank-rollers of
    repression. The people yearn to be free.
        I cannot help but muse if Charlton Heston were to be
    appointed the Special Envoy to Egypt, he would stand there
    speaking softly with a big stick in hand and say to President
    Mubarak, ``Your people have let you go.''
        Thank you, Madam chair.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.
        In the interest of time and since our witnesses are well-
    known in their field, I will refrain from the lengthier bios
    and will proceed immediately to recognize Elliott Abrams,
    senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former
    deputy national security adviser, for his remarks.
        Elliot will be following by Lorne Craner, president of the
    International Republican Institute and former assistant
    secretary of state for democracy human Rights and labor. And
    rounding off our distinguished panel is Dr. Robert Satloff, who
    is the executive director of the Washington Institute for Near
    East Policy.
        Mr. Abrams, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

     STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELLIOTT ABRAMS, SENIOR FELLOW FOR
          MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

        Mr. Abrams. Thank you, Madam Chairman and members of the
    committee. It is a privilege and an honor to testify at this
    first Foreign Affairs Committee hearing of the new Congress,
    and it is a pleasure to return to this room where I first
    testified to this committee 30 years ago under, if I remember
    right, Chairman Zablocki's chairmanship, your predecessor here.
        There is enough ground here for about a dozen hearings, but
    I want to try to make six points this morning, and I would ask
    that my full statement be submitted for the record.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Without objection, they all will.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Abrams. First, the uprisings we have seen in Tunisia
    and Egypt are exciting proof that the thirst for freedom is
    indeed universal. The Middle East has lagged behind the rest of
    the world in moving toward democracy. There has been a freedom
    deficit.
        President Bush was right when he adopted a freedom agenda
    for the Middle East. He asked in 2003, ``Are the peoples of the
    Middle East somehow beyond the reach of liberty? Are millions
    of men and women and children condemned by history or culture
    to live in despotism? Are they alone never to know freedom,
    never even to have a choice in the matter?'' And he gave the
    answer, ``Sixty years of Western nations excusing and
    accommodating lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to
    make us safe, because in the long run stability cannot be
    purchased at the expense of liberty.''
        Supporting freedom is our best policy in the Middle East as
    it is in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and everywhere else.
    Dictators, Presidents for life, stolen elections, government-
    controlled press are all a formula for instability. And we can
    just see in Egypt, after 30 years of Hosni Mubarak, in fact
    there is great instability and the Muslim Brotherhood is
    stronger than ever.
        Second point, American policy in the region should
    accordingly favor democracy and countries that are moving
    toward reform. This means one building block for us should be
    our alliance with Israel, the region's only established
    democracy. We should value and enhance our relations with
    countries such as Jordan and Morocco where reform efforts are
    underway.
        It means that warming up to Syria sends exactly the wrong
    message, that we don't care about human rights and democracy.
    We don't even care when a country is very hostile to the United
    States. That we sent an ambassador to Syria at exactly the
    moment when Hezbollah is taking over the Government of Lebanon
    sends the wrong message. We must actively press for democracy,
    not only in Tunisia and Egypt, but in Iran and Syria as well.
    Democracy promotion cannot be a policy applied to American
    allies while America's enemies are forgotten.
        Third, the events in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Algeria and
    several other countries should persuade us once and for all
    that the linkage argument, that every problem in the Middle
    East is really tied to the Israeli-Palestinian, is false. None
    of those events had to do anything with Israel and the
    Palestinians.
        Fourth, we should use our assistance program, as you said,
    Madam Chairman, to promote democracy. There is often a
    disconnect. I think we should make clear to Egypt's military
    right now that the $1 billion a year they get is not owed to
    them. Their conduct will determine how much aid they get.
        The late Tom Lantos used to ask, ``What do you think Egypt
    actually needs, more tanks or more schools?'' And I think it is
    a question we need to ask today. If the Egyptian military
    blocks reform and democracy in Egypt, those aid dollars can be
    better spent in countries where the military in supporting
    progress.
        Fifth point, this aid question applies to Lebanon as well,
    and I would make the same point about our aid to the Lebanese
    military. If they are in fact fighting terrorism and guarding
    the border with Syria, then they should get our help, but if
    they are not, then that aid it seems to me should be suspended.
    It should be conditional, as in Egypt, on the actual
    performance of the military.
        Finally, how do we support democracy? I urge the committee
    to take a look at the National Endowment for Democracy, for the
    State Department and USAID programs, to the broadcasting that
    we do to see if we can do better and leverage the money that we
    spend more effectively.
        I will stop there, Madam Chairman. We have a number of
    speakers, and I look forward to your questions, and thank you
    again for inviting me here today.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Abrams follows:]

        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Abrams. Now
    we are pleased to recognize Mr. Craner for 5 minutes.

          STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LORNE CRANER, PRESIDENT,
    INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY
            OF STATE FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR)

        Mr. Craner. Chairman, Congressman Berman, members of the
    committee, thanks for the opportunity to testify today,
    especially at your first hearing.
        As has occurred all too often in the past, the United
    States today stands surprised by foreign revolutions. These
    events will have consequences for the region and, as I will
    argue later, further afield. Although a single wave of reform
    is unlikely, the spread of technology means citizens in Arab
    countries are no longer isolated. Most importantly, especially
    after events in Egypt, the historic center of the Middle East,
    any popular belief that the Arab regimes are too powerful to be
    overthrown should be ending.
        In the region subtle national differences means events will
    take on uniquely local flavors in each country. That said, we
    can categorize the region's nations helps in a way that helps
    us determine which may be the most problematic.
    Counterintuitively, problematic consequences are less likely in
    most of the regions monarchies than in the republics. Beginning
    about 15 years ago almost all the regions monarchies, mostly
    young kings who had been educated abroad, to one degree or
    another began to modernize their countries economically and
    politically.
        A second reason we are less likely to see consequences in
    monarchies is that they all project greater legitimacy by
    virtue of their hereditary, often tribal lineage. In
    combination with the nascent liberalization, this enables them
    to deflect economic and political complaints to new governing
    institutions. This is what we are seeing today in Jordan and
    Kuwait, where the object of protestors' ire is the Prime
    Minister and the government.
        It will be important for the region's monarchies to be able
    to show continued progress in opening up their political and
    economic systems. It is worrisome, for example, that some of
    the Gulf countries has slowed reforms or even backtracked the
    last few years, and of course reforms in Saudi Arabia have been
    so glacial as to make an exception to this rule.
        It is the region's republics that will be most affected by
    recent events. They are run by men who at best have rigged
    elections and now have decreasingly credible claims to
    leadership. The fate of these leaders is more directly
    dependent on their performance, which for most has been sorely
    lacking. The leaders have stalled economic and political
    reforms for decades, and we have already seen demonstrations in
    Yemen, a country run not unlike Egypt but with less stability
    and a serious al-Qaeda element.
        Clearly Israel, which had regarded its security threatened
    more by Iran than by countries with which it shared borders,
    will have to recalculate, and our closest ally in the region
    will require much reassurance and support from Washington.
        When I testified last June before this committee, I noted
    that the administration had not yet begun to implement a
    strategy to advance democracy abroad because it had to
    strategy. Since that time the beginnings of a strategy have
    been rolled out by Secretary Clinton in Krakow and by President
    Obama at the UNGA meeting. The administration is focusing
    democracy work on supportive civil society organizations
    working to achieve change from the bottom up, and Secretary
    Clinton deserves great credit for conceiving and then
    enunciating this policy.
        Despite these pronouncements, however, implementation lags.
    In Egypt, for example, the administration had responded to
    building pressure, not with increased support to civil society.
    Instead, it agreed to the Mubarak government demands for
    signoff on all USAID funded democracy assistance, which
    obviously precluded programmatic support to many of the NGOs
    that represent moderate secular interests committed to reform.
    This played into a decades-long dynamic that made the United
    States choose between Mubarak and the Brotherhood.
        U.S. democracy assistance to Jordan and Lebanon exhibits
    many of the same failings. IRI and our sister organization,
    NDI, constantly struggle to convince USAID of the value of
    assisting Jordan's fledgling political parties resulting in
    minimal assistance. In Lebanon, even as the United States
    pulled closer to Syria, our political party programming for
    March 14th coalition parties, the only counterweight to
    Hezbollah, was cut short.
        Now this failure to cultivate the generation of democratic
    leaders is not new. It was not until the Musharraf regime began
    to crumble in 2007 that the Bush administration scrambled to
    determine who might succeed him and establish relations with
    Pakistani figures they thought would help advance American
    interests. But this case was notable more as an exception. In
    places like Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan the U.S.
    Government had acidulously cultivated democratic successors.
        The Obama administration has already faced this issue in
    Kyrgyzstan last April. As the increasingly authoritarian
    government crumbled, dissidents outside complained that our
    Embassy had refused to meet them for months or years, and we
    feared the loss of our base at Manas. Realism valuing stability
    in our relations abroad gained currency after Iraq, but being
    so closely tied to authoritarians does not serve U.S. interests
    when a repressive government fails. As we are learning yet
    again, when we necessarily have relations with authoritarian
    governments we must plan for the day when they are no longer in
    power.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Craner follows:]

        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Craner. Thank you.
        Pleased to yield to Mr. Satloff. For 5 minutes.

      STATEMENT OF ROBERT SATLOFF, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE
               WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

        Mr. Satloff. Madam Chairman, thank you for the opportunity
    today. Yours has been a principled voice in support of
    democracy in Egypt and abroad, and I know that the people in
    Egypt and American interests are better for it. Also, Mr.
    Berman, I would like to congratulate you for your stalwart
    support for change and reform. I had the privilege of escorting
    Mr. Berman to the home of a prominent dissident in Cairo
    several years ago, and I know that had tremors throughout the
    regime. And if I may, would like to congratulate my hometown
    neighbor, Mr. Cicilline, on his election on joining this
    committee.
        To note the obvious, the events in Egypt have enormous
    implications for America's interests and role in the Middle
    East. For now a sober assessment for the Egyptian situation
    leads one to conclude that it is neither the disaster some fear
    nor the dawn of a new day that some hope. That story is not yet
    written. We can affect it only on the margins; it is of course
    the Egyptian people's decision to affect it most of all.
        In its handling of specifics of the Egypt crisis, my
    assessment is that President Obama and his advisers have
    generally adopted a sound approach. This is of course an
    evolving situation. Still the administration recognized early
    on that it was neither wise nor possible for the United States
    to back regime suppression of democracy protestors and that it
    did not serve U.S. interests to have its relationship with
    Egypt personalized by identification with an unflagging support
    for President Mubarak. Instead the administration correctly
    supported the idea of change and the democratic spirit at the
    heart of the protests while operating on the basis of the not
    unreasonable assessment that the Egyptian military was and
    perhaps remains the key to resolving a national crisis that pit
    millions of protesters against an increasingly isolated and
    stubborn President. Hence, the administration's belief, a
    rational belief but still unproven on the ground, that the
    military could be the agent of positive change. As I said, that
    change has not yet happened.
        For all the drama of the past 2 weeks, the regime has so
    far acceded to no major substantive or irrevocable change.
    Indeed, in some areas, the appointment of military men as Vice
    President and Prime Minister without clear and irrevocable
    decisions on the emergency law or other major changes in the
    Egyptian political system, there has been regression.
        Every day that passes in which the military does not
    definitively break from President Mubarak implicates them with
    the regime, which is bad for our interests, and every day that
    passes without that break further erodes an already weakened
    U.S. regional image. If the new leadership does show itself to
    be serious about lifting the emergency law, releasing prisoners
    and implementing constitutional, legal and administrative
    changes, this may suffice to launch Egypt on the path of
    orderly, peaceful, democratic reform. In this context I support
    the maintenance of U.S. aid and align myself with Mr. Berman's
    comment earlier.
        However, in my view United States needs to avoid being in
    the worst of possible situations; namely, a situation in which
    it is perceived to have broken with President Mubarak, which is
    what most of our allies fear is the case. But then to have
    President Mubarak still survive in the face of this only erodes
    the image of U.S. influence. Neither feared nor respected nor
    loved is not a healthy situation for American interests.
        As we approach the transitional period, I do believe deep
    concern should be expressed about the Muslim Brotherhood. The
    Brotherhood is not, as some suggest, simply an Egyptian version
    of the March of Dimes--that is, a social welfare organization
    whose goals are fundamentally humanitarian; it is a political
    organization that seeks to reorder Egyptian society in larger
    Muslim societies in an Islamist fashion. The Brotherhood will
    exploit whatever opportunities it is presented with. It has
    renounced its most ambiguous goals only as a result of regime
    compulsion, not by free choice.
        Therefore, we should express extreme caution in advocating
    for specific reforms that could advantage the Brotherhood at
    the expense of non-Islamist political parties. It would run
    counter to U.S. interests for the United States to advocate,
    for example, in favor of constitutional amendments to lift the
    prohibition of parties based on religion. Should Egyptians opt
    for such a change, that is their choice, but it is not in our
    interest to advance those parties at the expense of liberal or
    anti-Islamist parties.
        Two very specific ideas in the meantime: I urge you to
    discuss with the administration the idea of redirecting an
    appropriate sum to humanitarian and medical assistance to
    assist the thousands of Egyptians that have been hurt, injured,
    or suffered as a result of this oppression of the protests. And
    second, I hope that the administration is working closely with
    NDI and IRI on planning for massive engagement during the
    transition process.
        Madam Chairman, I have a series of telegraphic
    prescriptions on regional issues that are in my written
    testimony about strengthening partnerships, about promoting
    sustained efforts of reform, about directing the winds of
    change elsewhere, and they are in the testimony for your
    review.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Satloff follows:]

        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. We will read those. Thank
    you, Dr. Satloff. And thank you to all of our witnesses for
    excellent testimony.
        I would like to yield my 5 minutes of questioning to
    freshman Congresswoman Renee Ellmers of North Carolina. She is
    recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. Ellmers. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Dr. Satloff, in your writing today, one of your issues that
    you wrote about is that our U.S. policy toward Iran has only
    been a tactical success as there so far seems to have been
    little strategic progress in convincing Iran to change its
    behavior in the nuclear file.
        How have these recent events in Egypt, Lebanon, and
    elsewhere throughout the region altered Tehran's strategic
    calculus and cost-benefit analysis? Please elaborate because we
    have got to be watching everything, and this is a big concern.
        Mr. Satloff. Congresswoman, I couldn't agree with you more.
    I fear that the leaders of Iran are misreading our distraction
    on Egypt and are taking this as a moment of opportunity. I fear
    that they are seeing change in Lebanon, the events in Gaza, a
    serious emergence from isolation, and now the events in Egypt,
    I fear they are reading this as a series of body blows to U.S.
    interests and that they may be feeling that they are on a roll.
        I think we should be very careful to keep our eyes vigilant
    about efforts by Iranians to use fifth columnists against other
    American allies in the gulf and elsewhere, and maybe a
    reconsideration by Iran of the pace of its nuclear program,
    believing that perhaps we are distracted elsewhere.
        Now, on our side we do have assets. The administration, in
    my view, lost a great opportunity with the popular protests in
    Iran in the summer of 2009. And if you compare the Obama
    administration approach the summer of 2009 in Iran and January,
    2011, in Egypt, there is a stark contrast. I concur with my
    colleague, Mr. Abrams, that we should do our best to blow the
    winds of change to Tehran and Damascus. Far be it from us that
    we should be more supportive of democracy in countries that
    have historically been partners with us than historically that
    have been adversaries. And I think there is much we can do to
    advance that prospect.
        Mrs. Ellmers. Thank you very much, and I yield back my
    time.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Congresswoman.
        I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to our ranking member, Mr.
    Berman of California.
        Mr. Berman. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
        I would like, most particularly, because you addressed one
    issue that Congress is appropriately and directly involved in,
    is this whole issue of assistance to Egypt and how to handle it
    and what we should be calling for and what we should be doing
    and what the administration should be doing. My instinctive
    reaction because of wanting to incentivize the military using
    their authority to make this transition happen--and I agree, it
    is not clear to me that they have made that decision--was to be
    careful about messing around with the military assistance right
    now. Mr. Satloff, you sort of came down on that side, Dr.
    Satloff.
        Elliott, you think we should cut off both military and
    economic assistance--or at least the working group statement
    that you are part of said that. Did you include democracy
    promotion activities in that? But I would like to hear the two
    of you just develop that. You generally see this much the same
    way and disagree on this specific issue. I would like to hear
    more.
        Mr. Abrams. My view is that we need to tell the Egyptian
    military very clearly, Congress needs to tell them very clearly
    we are not going to pay for this suppression of democracy in
    Egypt. I agree, I think the army may not have made up its mind
    yet, so now is the time to signal them, this aid is
    conditional.
        I would agree with Rob Satloff, I wouldn't cut it off
    today. First I would send that message that we are watching,
    and it could be cut off any day if you guys do a Tiananmen
    Square in Cairo, or even much less than that, if you make it
    clear that your goal is to maintain Mubarakism without Mubarak.
        Mr. Satloff. I would say we are in violent agreement now.
        The United States doesn't have so many levers. It would
    seem to me a mistake to preemptively deny us leverage at a
    moment when perhaps that leverage could be determinative. I
    don't want to exaggerate the potential for this to be the case,
    but why we would throw away an arrow before it is absolutely
    apparent that the Egyptian Army has made a choice to suppress
    and refuse change seems to be unwise.
        Mr. Berman. And speak to the issue of how directly the
    administration should address Mubarak leaving office
    immediately, or how would you suggest they handle that issue?
    Any of you? All of you.
        Mr. Satloff. I will offer my view. Once the President, last
    Tuesday, offered the imagery of him appearing on television 2
    hours after President Mubarak had said he was going to stay 8
    months, and the President got on television saying the words
    ``now,'' even though there was some ambiguity in that
    statement, the ambiguity did not translate into Arabic. And
    everyone in the Middle East saw that Mubarak said 8 months, the
    President said ``now,'' and every day since then has been a
    victory for Mubarak.
        It is not as though he needs to resign or leave the
    country. There are alternative constitutional arrangements that
    President Mubarak could take advantage of.
        Mr. Berman. He could delegate his authority.
        Mr. Satloff. According to the Egyptian Constitution, he
    could delegate his executive authority to his Vice President,
    which is a major constitutional decision that would send us off
    on a new path. That is what I would hope would be the direction
    in which we head.
        Mr. Craner. I think on all these issues, whether it is
    Mubarak leaving, what do we need to do with the aid? We need to
    think about what we want to see in the end, what is our goal?
    And the goal is decent elections with, hopefully, moderates
    coming out very well in those elections. Then we need to work
    our way back and say, What is the best way to accomplish that?
        So on the issue of aid, I think that is our largest trump
    card. I don't think it is time to play it yet. On the issue of
    military, I would agree with Elliott that we need to be very,
    very clear on what we are expecting.
        On the issue of Mubarak, I think it is fair to ask if
    somebody who has led the kind of fraudulent elections that we
    have seen repeatedly over the last 30 years in Egypt is now
    capable of leading an effort for a fair and free election.
        Mr. Berman. My time is expired.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Excellent
    questions, Mr. Berman.
        I am pleased to yield to the chair of the Subcommittee on
    Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, Mr. Smith of New
    Jersey, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Madam Chair. And congratulations
    again on your chairmanship. I look forward to serving with you
    and Ranking Member Berman.
        Let me just begin by saying thank you to the three of you.
    I have known you; you are great leaders on behalf of human
    rights for decades.
        The administration seems to find its voice on human rights
    and democracy, it seems to me, only when events portend radical
    change. A few weeks ago President Obama rolled out the red
    carpet for Chinese President Hu Jintao, a brutal dictator whose
    rise to power was initially enabled or advanced by the murder
    of hundreds of people in Tibet in 1989. Many of us were
    frustrated and profoundly disappointed. Even the Washington
    Post editorial said ``President Obama makes Hu Jintao look good
    on rights'' in their January 19 editorial. It was a scathing
    editorial.
        Now that Mubarak is in trouble, this administration is
    making human rights demands--better late than never, but they
    are making them. Yet in its first year, the Obama
    administration cut democracy funding for Egypt by more than
    half. The democracy in governance total was $54.8 million in
    2008; it dropped to $23.5 million in 2009; and the request for
    2011 is $25 million. And the NGOs that are not registered,
    obviously don't even apply--a break with the Bush
    administration policy. As we all know, human rights groups that
    are not registered are usually the cutting edge in the avant-
    garde in terms of promoting human rights.
        My question is--a day late and a dollar short, I am glad
    they are making statements--but will this lead to a
    matriculation from bad to worse, as we saw with the Shah of
    Iran? We all know that SAVAK was not a good group, his secret
    police, during the Iranian crisis. But now we have something
    that potentially could be profoundly worse than the Muslim
    Brotherhood.
        Your thoughts on the Muslim Brotherhood. Are people being
    naive, somehow thinking that the Muslim Brotherhood will be
    benign and will have a nonviolent approach to politics?
        Secondly, last month, Frank Wolf chaired a hearing on the
    Coptic Church in response to the violence which killed about
    23, we think, Coptic Christians; 100 were wounded. My question
    is, how will the Coptic Church, about 10 percent of Egypt's
    population, fare going forward, especially with the potential
    ascension of the Muslim Brotherhood?
        And finally, Israel's profound concerns about the rise of
    the Muslim Brotherhood. I remember when President Bush kept
    saying we want free and fair elections, which brought in Hamas.
    Fattah was certainly a corrupt organization and had terrorists
    in its ranks, but it went from bad to worse when there was an
    election.
        Our fear is, I think on both sides of the aisle, that the
    Muslim Brotherhood's animosity toward Israel is well
    documented. Your views on that.
        Mr. Abrams. Thank you.
        A word on the Copts, I would just say I worry a lot about
    that, because as we look through the whole region, the
    situation of Christian communities throughout the region is
    very bad and worsening. On Copts, we should not glamorize how
    great the situation has been in Egypt. As you know, it has been
    impossible to build churches, to repair churches under Hosni
    Mubarak. There has been a lot of discrimination against Copts
    in his Egypt. But I think we do have to worry, in the context
    of the Muslim Brotherhood, about a more Islamic Egypt being
    even more discriminatory against them.
        On the Muslim Brotherhood takeover, that is something that
    has to worry all of us. And I agree with Rob Satloff that I
    think conditions that, for example, forbid religious parties
    are actually potentially quite useful. But I would just say the
    bulwark that keeps this from being Iran is the army, and that
    is why I worry, as he does. Every day that the army is
    associated with Hosni Mubarak today in suppressing these
    demonstrations diminishes the legitimacy and popularity of the
    army. Every day they are complicit with the police and the
    thugs, it makes it a lot harder for them to keep the revered
    position they have had in Egypt, and that is a great worry.
        Mr. Craner. You talked about the elections in the
    Palestinian territories. Some of us would argue it was because
    elections didn't occur for so long--and they were repeatedly
    delayed--that the Palestinian Authority had ample opportunity
    to demonstrate how corrupt and useless it was in terms of
    delivering services. And that only strengthened Hamas. You have
    to ask yourself if over time, if change is delayed in Egypt, if
    that only makes the Muslim Brotherhood stronger over time. I
    think that is a fair question to ask.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The gentleman's time has expired.
        I am pleased to yield for 5 minutes of questioning to the
    ranking member of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South
    Asia, Mr. Ackerman of New York.
        Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        I think it is more frustrating to see you guys in so much
    agreement than if you were disagreeing. At least we would be
    able to figure out where to push or not push our own
    administration. It is frustrating to see that they are not
    moving in the same direction. That, to me, makes great common
    sense with what the entire panel seems to be saying.
        We are not going to have a second chance to make a great
    impression on the people in the street who are at their most
    vulnerable point right now and probably a lot more malleable as
    to what the United States interests are and what our real
    intentions are here.
        While I am not sure I wholly agree with what Mr. Abrams
    said about sending an ambassador to Syria, not sending an
    ambassador I guess is a message in and of itself, but when you
    don't send a messenger, how do you send a second message is the
    question?
        We have messengers in Egypt, and one of the messengers that
    we should be using is the military. We have paid a lot of money
    to help in the formation of the virtues that the military seems
    to possess and the restraint that they have apparently been
    demonstrating in the streets. Should we not be more closely
    using that tie to have a Nixon moment to deliver a message via
    the military to Mr. Mubarak? Should not they be the ones that
    help impact? Because the longer this thing takes, the worse the
    position is for the United States to influence the opinions in
    the street.
        My second question is about the Muslim Brotherhood, which I
    think is critical here; how we deal with that and how we help
    the leadership deal with that and the military. It is my view
    that if you over-pesticide your garden, only the weeds are
    going to survive. And that is what we have here as far as
    looking at who the leaders of the opposition are. We have
    killed all the flowers--he has killed all the flowers, I should
    say, Mubarak--and the Brotherhood is left. They are not the
    March of Dimes--Mr. Satloff is right--neither are they the
    ``march of the benign,'' but are they the ``march of demons''?
    How concerned should we be and how do we get the military to
    keep up the bulwark of the opposition to him in the formation
    of any new government?
        Dr. Satloff.
        Mr. Satloff. In terms of the military, I think the thrust
    of your comment is correct. The President, and just yesterday
    Secretary Gates, had very laudatory words for the military.
    What is unclear is whether in private our political and
    military leadership--Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, et
    cetera--are being as tough in private as they are being
    complimentary in public. In private, the Egyptian military
    should know very clearly what actions or inactions it takes or
    doesn't take would trigger the end of aid that you spoke about
    earlier. I don't know if that is happening. That is essential.
        In terms of the Muslim Brotherhood, I think we should
    recognize and be vigilant about the danger, not exaggerate the
    danger. There is no inevitability that the Muslim Brotherhood
    is going to come to power in Egypt, and we can't have a self-
    fulfilling prophesy here; that would be a mistake. There is a
    huge range of non-Islamist political forces that deserve our
    assistance and support. And indeed, one of the things that we
    should be pressing for urgently is a change in the Egyptian law
    that prevents our direct assistance to so many important
    nongovernmental organizations in that country. Don't
    exaggerate, but also don't be naive. I think that is the right
    approach.
        Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Craner.
        Mr. Craner. Egypt would not be the first military that was
    starting to lose, as Rob noted, is starting to lose its good
    reputation in a country because it was sticking too close to a
    dictator. This happened in Pakistan where the military, which
    was the most revered institution in the country, started
    descending in people's opinions. I think that is something we
    ought to remind them of. I think certainly American assistance
    is something we ought to remind them of. I am sure the Chinese
    would be happy to supply tanks and aircraft, but they are not
    American tanks and aircraft and tactics.
        In terms of the Brotherhood, I would agree with Rob, I am
    afraid to say. I would agree with Rob. We need to stop
    presenting ourselves with the choice that Mubarak gave us and
    understand that there are people in the middle. This is why I
    personally do not favor quick elections; I think some time is
    needed to be able to work with those folks. But we shouldn't
    repeat to ourselves Mubarak's choice.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Burton, chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and
    Eurasia, is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Burton. Elliott, it is good seeing you again. You and I
    go back all the way to Central America and the problems back
    there in the early eighties during Reagan's administration, so
    it is good seeing you.
        I would like to broaden the discussion just a little bit.
    The problems in Egypt seem to be manifesting itself in some of
    the other states, not to the degree that you see in Egypt, but
    there is concern about the Persian Gulf area, the Straits of
    Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and what that means for the United
    States of America. And I am very concerned about that. We are
    not moving toward energy independence. Our dependency on
    Venezuela and the Middle East is even greater now than it has
    been in the past. We get about 30 percent of our energy from
    the Middle East and about 20 percent, or thereabouts, from
    Venezuela. We have got some people that don't like us very much
    that we are getting our oil from.
        So my concern is what is likely to happen in these other
    countries, and whether or not there is a possibility that we
    could see a bottling up of the Suez Canal, the Straits of
    Hormuz, and the Persian Gulf, what that means to the United
    States. If we don't drill here in the ANWR and drill off the
    Continental Shelf and in the Gulf of Mexico and use some of the
    300 or 400 years of natural gas and coal shale that we have
    while we are transitioning to these other new technologies,
    windmills and solar and nuclear and so forth, what is going to
    happen in the United States? What is your prognostication on
    whether or not this sort of thing could happen over there and
    how can we deal with that?
        Right now I am sure you all know that there are some
    rumblings going on in the Persian Gulf States, there are some
    minor rumblings going on in Syria; we have already heard some
    minor rumblings in Jordan, as well as Egypt. And also we have
    our good friend, Israel, that is right in the middle of all
    this. And if that thing blows up, they are certainly going to
    defend themselves, which could be a catalyst for a major
    problem.
        So I know this is a very broad question, but I would like
    to know how this affects the United States and our security,
    both economically and militarily.
        Elliott, why don't we start with you?
        Mr. Abrams. Thank you, Mr. Burton. Thank you for the kind
    words. It is great to see you again.
        So far, the Suez Canal is open for business, and it is
    certainly in the interests of the Egyptian military to keep it
    open. I think if we see any sign of Iranian reactions to this,
    taking advantage of this, it would be timely for America's
    military leaders to stop talking about how catastrophic it
    would be if there were ever a strike on Iran, and to start
    saying that if Iran closes the Straits of Hormuz, we will open
    them; we will open them fast, and they will pay the price. I
    think we should make that very, very plain to the Iranians.
        I also would just say I agree with you that we have an
    incredible development in shale gas that gives us an
    opportunity to be independent of Middle Eastern oil, not
    tomorrow morning, but not 50 years from now either. To me it
    seems that we ought to be moving as fast as we can to develop
    that resource and make ourselves energy independent.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Craner.
        Mr. Craner. The one allied country in the Persian Gulf that
    I think ought to be of some concern is Bahrain, where they have
    rolled back a lot of the openings that they had made, where you
    have got a heavy Shiite population. Obviously, once you get
    beyond that--Qatar, Oman, et cetera, I think are going to be
    pretty stable. And again, it is Iran that I would worry about.
    I would worry a lot about Iran trying to take advantage of all
    these events far afield from where they are. They have got to
    be happy watching some of these newscasts.
        Mr. Satloff. Just very briefly, not all rumblings are the
    same, not all rumblings are bad news. I would hope that we
    would see more rumblings in Syria and Iran. It advantages our
    interests. And if we could help propel the winds of change to
    Damascus and Tehran, that would be good.
        Secondly, I do think that the situation in Jordan is
    different than what we have seen in Egypt and Tunisia. The
    Jordanians--it is a serious situation, but I don't think that
    it is by any means approaching the crisis point that we saw in
    Egypt and Tunisia. I think in general we have to caution
    against the concept of dominoes falling from one country to
    another. It is a very different situation in some of these
    countries.
        Mr. Burton. Thank you.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Burton.
        I am pleased to yield to our friend from American Samoa,
    Mr. Faleomavaega, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Madam Chair. Congratulations
    on your attainment of the chairmanship of this committee. I am
    looking forward to working with you and your colleagues on the
    other side of the aisle.
        I do want to thank the gentlemen for their testimonies this
    morning.
        It is quite obvious that there are so many undercurrents
    and crosscurrents now developing as far as the crisis that we
    are facing in Egypt at this time. Some 350 million Arabs live
    in this part of the world. I wanted to know how difficult the
    problem is now that we are confronted with it.
        Would you agree that our general policy toward Egypt has
    been never mind about democracy as long as there is stability?
    And is there a sense of resentment among the Egyptians that
    say, Oh, now the United States wants to look for another
    Mubarak to continue the policy of stability, more importantly,
    than that of democracy--as I think our good friend, my
    colleague from New York, has given concern as to whether or not
    our Government is going to allow the Egyptian people ultimately
    to make that decision for themselves and to their future. I
    would like your comments on that.
        Mr. Abrams. Thank you. I think you are right. I think that
    except for some brief periods--2004, 2005, especially--we have
    basically been uninterested as a country in democracy in Egypt.
    We have taken--and we have exaggerated, I would also say--the
    benefits we get from President Mubarak, and there are a lot of
    Egyptians who I think do resent it. I think we could overcome
    that resentment if we make it clear right now that we really do
    hope their revolution succeeds. And I think the administration
    has not been clear about that. I think it has been straddling
    the fence. It is time for the United States to make it very
    clear that we think what is going on is really terrific and
    that we hope for nothing more than democracy in Egypt.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Craner.
        Mr. Craner. I have no question that what you just said is
    absolutely true. I think we do have a chance to redeem
    ourselves. I think if we look back at our experiences in Chile
    and in the Philippines under President Reagan, they provide
    good guides about how to move.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Satloff.
        Mr. Satloff. Sir, over just the last week, my organization
    funded a poll in Egypt through the Pechter Middle East polling
    firm, which is the first polling data to come out of Egypt
    since the crisis. One of the findings is this crisis is not
    anti-American. It is anti-Mubarak, but it is not anti-American.
    That is a good sign, and that gives us a good foundation on
    which to move forward. I don't know if it will last, and we do
    have to make important decisions to ensure that it doesn't fall
    backward, but we have a surprisingly strong foundation on which
    to move forward in Egypt.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. For the past 30 years we have given Egypt
    well over $65 billion in assistance, and $36 billion of that
    went to the military to prop up Egypt's military defense
    forces.
        Would you agree that if this crisis really comes to a
    boiling point where there is going to be riots and all of that,
    that the military definitely will have to step in and take
    control of the government?
        Mr. Satloff. Sir, I think the military has already stepped
    in to take control of the government. We have two military Vice
    Presidents and a military Prime Minister and still a military
    President. What we hope for is a military to chart the
    transition and to take irrevocable decisions toward change.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. And even if we make threats toward the
    military, saying that we are going to cut off your funding, I
    am quite sure that there are going to be other sources out
    there that are more than willing to compensate for whatever
    restrictions or whatever decisions that we make, and say we are
    not going to fund you, they are going to find other sources.
        So isn't it ultimately that this is going to be one of the
    most critical points where the military definitely is going to
    be the real power behind whatever is going to happen in the
    coming weeks and even months as far as Egypt's future is
    concerned?
        Mr. Abrams. It will. And I think they are in charge right
    now. And even if we grant that they could find the money
    someplace else--I am not sure, $1 billion is still a lot of
    money--but even if we grant that, the question is about us more
    than about them: Where do we stand? What do we want our money
    going for? What record will be compiled in this crisis created
    in Egypt? I think that is even more important in a sense.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I think my time is up.
        Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Faleomavaega.
        I now would like to yield 5 minutes to the chairman of the
    Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, Mr. Rohrabacher of
    California.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. These witnesses have
    been excellent witnesses today. I thank each one of you for
    sharing your expertise and also for your service to our country
    in the past years and the service to the cause of democracy.
        I would like to identify myself with this commitment to
    democracy as articulated by our witnesses. I do think that we
    could have been giving advice to the regime and to the military
    and perhaps forcing more democratic reform over the years. That
    certainly is important, not just looking forward but looking
    back.
        However, let me just note where we are today. I find it
    very disturbing that there is such a contrast between the
    administration's muffled and restrained response to the brutal
    repression of demonstrators against the anti-American Mullah
    regime in Tehran as compared--and that is in stark contrast to
    the embracing of the demonstrators against a less than
    democratic friendly government in Egypt. I think that sends
    exactly the wrong message to many people in power.
        This administration's response to events in Egypt has
    basically been responding to these events with a confused and
    unreliable voice that will have, I believe, serious
    consequences, long-term consequences for the cause of freedom
    and stability in this volatile region. And it does a
    disservice, I might add, to American security interests as
    well.
        President Mubarak has been a force for stability, even
    though his rule has been very imperfect and less than
    democratic. Improving that does not mean making decisions that
    could well result in the empowerment of radical Islamic forces
    like the Muslim Brotherhood.
        Specifically, President Mubarak reached out to his people
    and to democratic countries throughout the world with an
    announcement that neither he nor his son would run for
    President and that he would work with those to try to ensure
    free and fair elections. Well, giving the moderates and the
    democratic forces in Egypt 8 months, until September, to
    organize and to participate in a democratic process seems to be
    a responsible strategy and something that we should have
    embraced and worked to make sure that it was indeed ensuring
    free and fair elections. Instead, the Obama administration
    began calling for immediate change, the alternative to
    President Mubarak must be put in place now.
        Well, what would that result in? By immediately installing
    a new government could well mean that we are installing a
    government that has not been elected to anything. And while
    Mubarak is imperfect, the people that we are saying should be
    installed now wouldn't have any legitimacy in terms of
    democratic base work for their power, especially if those
    people who end up--because we are demanding immediate leaving
    power of Mubarak now--end up to be anti-democratic in their
    very nature, or so radically Islamic that they wouldn't permit
    real freedom in their country.
        I would argue that the administration's actions have been
    contrary to the long-term interests of democracy and stability
    in Egypt. So I would hope that we would work with the
    administration, all of us would try to do our part. And I would
    hope that the United States does not in any way compromise our
    long-term commitment to the Egyptian people that we side with
    democracy, but we need to do this in a responsible way that
    will not in the long term result in less democracy and less
    freedom.
        You wonder about some of these young women who are marching
    down the streets complaining about Mubarak, whether or not they
    are going to end up with a regime that forces them to wear
    burqas and cover their face and shut up and not be involved in
    national politics, like we have seen in other radical Islamic
    countries.
        We have been doing more than just throwing Mubarak under
    the bus, we have been throwing him to the wolves. And perhaps
    the future of democracy and freedom in that part of the world
    will be eaten up as well.
        I just went on a rambling rave myself. You have 40 seconds
    to make your comments.
        Mr. Abrams. Just a very quick one. I think it is important
    to distinguish what can be done tomorrow and what can't. There
    can't be elections tomorrow, not anything that we would regard
    as free and fair and reasonable ones. They could lift the
    emergency law tomorrow. After 30 years, it is time. Omar
    Suleiman said, yes, it should be lifted as soon as security
    conditions permit. He has been saying that for 30 years. It is
    time.
        Mr. Craner. I think the best judge is whether they are
    moving forward with the kind of conditions that could lead to
    free and fair elections. When the Vice President says his
    people aren't ready for democracy, that answers the question.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. The gentleman's
    time has expired.
        I am pleased to yield to Mr. Payne of New Jersey, the
    ranking member on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights, for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Payne. Thank you very much.
        As you know, we have a history of supporting dictators.
    Usually our foreign policy has very little to do with the
    manner that they treat their people--the Mobutus in Zaire to
    the Savimbis in Angola, the F.W. Botha in South Africa. We can
    go on and on--the Shah of Iran; Marcos in the Philippines.
        How do you see us moving in the future? Are we going to, in
    your opinions, still back bad guys that we know they are bad
    but they are okay to us, or are we going to sort of have
    democracy to try to have a process going in those countries
    where you can have the will of the people expressed? How do you
    see us going in the future? Because this Egypt thing is not
    over. It is not the Obama administration that fouled up
    somewhere. This thing, as you know, goes way back to Britain
    wanting to block up the Suez Canal back in the fifties. So what
    do you think about our relationship to dictators in the future?
        Mr. Craner. Obviously, it is important right now to spend a
    lot of time on Egypt. What happens in Egypt is going to have
    huge consequences for the region. But I hope that this
    experience with Egypt, where the conventional wisdom was it was
    going to be stable--certainly the conventional wisdom was that
    Tunisia was going to be stable--will lead to us look around the
    world at other countries that we think are important to the
    United States where we are currently muting ourselves on
    democracy and human rights. It doesn't mean you have to push
    one or the other; you can have a relationship, if you need to,
    with an authoritarian government. But you can't believe the
    dissidents and the democrats who we have learned time and again
    will one day inevitably come to power on their own, and when
    they do come to power they are looking around and saying,
    ``America did nothing for us.''
        So whether it is in Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan or China, we
    need to be looking at these countries and thinking about what
    we are doing whenever change may come to those places.
        Mr. Satloff. Just to add a specific word about where we
    might ensure our focus in the broader Middle East, events in
    Egypt have obscured our attention from Tunisia, and I think we
    need to make sure that the Tunisian example actually leads to a
    good outcome. It is on a positive path, but it is by no means
    assured that Tunisia will lead to the right endgame. I think we
    can't lose focus on that.
        And secondly, sir, I would suggest that in the Palestinian
    Authority, certainly in the West Bank, it is important that our
    partner have greater popular legitimacy, in talking about the
    leadership for the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abass. And
    there is no better way to have popular legitimacy than through
    the popular support of elections.
        And so I think we should consider talking with our friends
    there about ways to enhance their popular legitimacy through
    elections. We don't want the type of change that we have seen
    in Egypt and Tunisia to be the norm of how change happens in
    our friendly countries.
        Mr. Abrams. Yes, I agree with both my friends here, Mr.
    Payne.
        I think one of the things we have learned is that the so-
    called ``realism'' that led us to support these dictators is
    not so realistic in the end after all, and a policy of
    supporting democracy may actually turn out to be more
    realistic.
        Mr. Payne. Well, there is a situation going on in Cote
    d'Ivoire, which not much attention of course is being paid to
    right now, but the current President was defeated, everyone
    agrees he has been defeated, but he is refusing to leave. With
    16 elections coming up and after this year, if this person who
    lost the election, Gbagbo, remains to stay in, that simply
    sends a bad message for these 16 elections coming, and also, it
    might even have impact on the police in the Middle East,
        Let me just ask one last question. Both you, Mr. Abrams,
    and you, Dr. Satloff, have different opinions on the support
    from your Egypt group about military support and assistance
    continuing. You both have opposite positions. Could you, in
    about 15 seconds each, tell your position and why?
        Mr. Satloff. My position is that we should use whatever
    leverage we have to try to convince the Egyptian Army to make
    the right decision. Positive conditionality. There is always a
    time in the future that we can cut off aid when it is apparent
    that the Egyptian military has taken the path solely of
    repression and suppression of popular protests.
        Mr. Abrams. I think we actually do agree on that. I
    wouldn't cut it off today, but I would send a very strong
    message today to the Egyptian military that it is in jeopardy.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. The gentleman's
    time has expired.
        If I could ask Mr. Royce, before I recognize you, if you
    could take over as chair for me. I have to meet some
    constituents. And I will recognize Mr. Royce, the chair of the
    Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade for 5
    minutes of questioning. Thank you, Mr. Royce.
        Mr. Royce [presiding]. Mr. Craner, I had an opportunity
    over the weekend to meet with seven Egyptians from Cairo and
    Alexandria, who recently traveled here from Egypt. Here is what
    they shared with me. Their observation was that the Muslim
    Brotherhood did not start this uprising, as they called it. It
    came from young professionals. But they said that if the
    Brotherhood gets the upper hand, eventually it would be a
    bloody terror for those who did not subscribe to the
    fundamentalist approach of the Brotherhood. They said if you
    want to see how this will play out, think of what happened to
    the Baha'i in Iran; think of what happened to the students and
    to the young democratic enthusiasts that went to the streets
    against the Shah and then ultimately found themselves in prison
    or shot when the fundamentalist regime came to power. They said
    it is the fate of the guillotine if the revolution goes the
    wrong way afterwards.
        Here was their point: They said the Brotherhood is a group
    that does not believe in pluralism. There is no equality for
    women; there is no equality under their conception of Islam for
    non-Muslims or for Muslims who deviate from their viewpoint. So
    they say they have embraced elections as a means to power,
    basically. And given their past history, in their view, why
    shouldn't there be qualifications on candidates that don't
    support pluralism? Because otherwise it is going to be a
    situation where you are going to have one free election one
    time, because they view this group as hell bent on this path.
    So I was going to ask you about that.
        I was going to ask you, should they not be allowed to
    participate? And maybe you could tell us a little bit about the
    Brotherhood's lack of democratic bona fides.
        Now the other thing that I wanted to ask you about is the
    effort that the United States made some years ago with Hernando
    de Soto. This is the other issue they wanted to share with me,
    the utter corruption in that society. Hernando de Soto, the
    Peruvian economist, went to Egypt in 2004, did a massive study,
    and found that gaining the legal title to a vacant piece of
    land takes 10 years; to open a bakery takes about 500 days. You
    have 56 government agencies you have to go through. They were
    telling me about this process in Egypt, you know, 20 bribes to
    open a small company.
        So they said, ``Look at the consequences of that.''
    Hernando de Soto brought that plan forward to the Egyptian
    Cabinet to unlock an amount of capital in Egypt 100 times
    more--more than that of what we give Egypt in support, right?
    And they have a Minister in Egypt that supports a reform to
    bring transparency to the legal system, and this guy was
    sacked. And as a consequence, as de Soto said, hidden forces of
    the status quo blocked crucial elements of the reform. You
    cannot get reform under the current system.
        And this is something else I wanted to ask you to respond
    to. In the United States, here we have a U.S.-funded study that
    helps institute crucial legal and institutional reforms that is
    blocked by the government. Do we object, do we protest, do we
    register a complaint, do we threaten to cut off aid? Do
    situations like this even get the Ambassador's attention? What
    do we do about this level of corruption in the regime? If you
    can respond.
        Mr. Craner. In a place that is so corrupt as Egypt, I don't
    think a plan like Hernando de Soto's could move forward. I
    think it would take a different kind of system. Here I would
    point to Georgia, which under Shevardnadze was one of the most
    corrupt countries in the former Soviet Union, which is quite a
    claim. They have moved forward dramatically under their new
    government to end corruption. I think when Saakashvili came
    into power, over 90 percent of the people reported they had had
    to pay a bribe within the previous 3 months. Now it is exactly
    the opposite. But I don't think in a system like Egypt that on
    corruption is rotten to the core you are going to see any kind
    of change. There are too many people that have their hand in
    the till under this system. It is changeable, as Georgia has
    shown, but not under this regime.
        I think on the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood, you and I
    faced this issue in South Africa almost 20 years ago, about
    whether certain parties were going to be allowed to run. At
    that time, the issue was whether or not they were committed to
    nonviolence. I think those kind of conditions are very, very
    fair. It shouldn't be that people who are against pluralism or
    are pro-violence are allowed to be violent on a Tuesday and
    stand for election on a Thursday.
        Mr. Royce. Well, I thank you, Mr. Craner. I am going to go
    to Mr. Satloff for any observations on that as well.
        Mr. Satloff. Two brief observations about the political
    system and its potential evolution vis-a-vis the Muslim
    Brotherhood. There is currently a constitutional clause in
    Egypt that no party based on religion is allowed. It will be
    for the Egyptians to determine whether that gets amended.
    Should they ask the United States or the U.S. Embassy for its
    advice, I would urge that we should not advocate for changing
    that fundamental principle.
        Secondly, there is some discussion about the order of
    elections, Presidential, parliamentary, et cetera. It makes
    much sense that there be a Presidential election before there
    is a new parliamentary election. Under the Egyptian
    Constitution, the chances of a moderate, liberal-minded
    Presidential victor are far greater than a parliamentary
    outcome that would lead similarly to that end.
        Mr. Royce. I would like to yield to Mr. Berman for a point.
        Mr. Berman. I would very much agree, except for one issue.
    Will this Parliament that is in place as a result of a
    manipulated election make the changes that we think are
    necessary to ensure the legalized parties create a process?
        Mr. Satloff. I think the short answer is this Parliament
    will do what the political leadership of the country tells it
    to do. So I would not make changing the composition of this
    Parliament the be-all and end-all of Egyptian political reform.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Satloff.
        I would like to go now to Mr. Engle of New York for your
    questioning.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you. I would like to ask a question about
    Egypt and also do Lebanon as well, because I wrote the Syria
    Accountability Act. And one of the things that we used in that
    act--I did it with the current chair, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen--we
    wanted Syria to get out of Lebanon. And we know that there has
    been a lot of change and uproar in Lebanon. First of all, the
    pro-Western government fell, there is a new Prime Minister
    Designate Mikati.
        I would like to ask anyone who would care to answer, what
    is your assessment of him? Is he qualified for the position? He
    was obviously nominated by Hezbollah, so that makes me worried.
    So I would just like you to answer that.
        I would also like to speak about the Special Tribunal in
    Lebanon. Hezbollah bitterly opposes the Special Tribunal
    because that is the international body investigating the 2005
    assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri. It is
    widely expected that the Special Tribunal will indict some
    members of Hezbollah.
        And what should the administration do if that happens and
    the Lebanese Government decides to withdraw its material and
    verbal support from the STL? Should we at that point attempt to
    pick up the financial slack? So let me ask that Lebanese
    question first.
        And then my question on Egypt is: What are the similarities
    that you see between the uprising in Iran and the revolution of
    1979 and this? Many people have said it is very similar, many
    people have said no because of differences. I would like to
    hear your analyses on it. Anybody who would care to answer
    either question, I would be grateful.
        Mr. Abrams. Mr. Engel, I will just start.
        I think that Mr. Mikati is, in the technical sense,
    qualified to be Prime Minister of Lebanon, but as you said, he
    was put there by Hezbollah. This is supposed to be, under their
    Constitution, a Sunni seat, but the Sunni community did not
    choose him. He is a cat's-paw for Hezbollah. This is, in a
    sense, a soft coup by Hezbollah. And I would argue that if
    Prime Minister Mikati does not support this Special Tribunal
    for Lebanon, I hope our relations with him reflect that. I
    would, for example, suggest he not be invited to the United
    States to meet the President, to go to the White House, to come
    up here on the Hill, if that is the position that he is taking.
        Just very quickly, I would draw two distinctions between
    the Iran situation and that of Egypt. One, there is no
    Khomeini. There is no great opposition leader that we have to
    fear, let's say, on the Muslim Brotherhood side; nor is there,
    unfortunately, a Walesa, a Havel, on the democratic side.
        The second difference is the army collapsed in Iran, and of
    course it hasn't collapsed in Egypt. And one of the things that
    we are all saying here today is we don't want it to collapse.
    We want it, however, not to try to maintain the old regime
    forever or people will lose faith in it.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you.
        Mr. Craner. I think that was an important point, that there
    is no central religious figure to fear in Egypt. And I think
    that things have not gotten so rotten and so bad in Egypt that
    you really have people accruing to that religious leader or
    religious party and leaving almost no room for what we used to
    call moderates in Iran.
        Mr. Satloff. First, I think we should remember how fresh
    and new the Egyptian situation is. Less time has passed in
    Egypt than what took Ben Ali to leave in Tunisia, and that was
    so fast. We should not rule out the idea that leaders will
    emerge, whether it is this Google executive, or someone else
    may emerge to be the face of the faceless revolution, and that
    would be important.
        I do concur with the sentiments that were expressed by
    Elliott on Lebanon, Congressman. I would just add that there
    are Security Council requirements, both regarding the Special
    Tribunal on Lebanon and regarding security in the south, that
    the Government of Lebanon is required to maintain. And it would
    be appropriate for the United States not to have to act alone,
    but to act in concert with its Security Council partners to see
    that either this government in Lebanon fulfills its
    requirements or is censured. And that would be a great
    embarrassment to Lebanon, to the Hezbollah-backed government.
        Mr. Engel. I just think, and let me conclude, that the
    violation in Lebanon of the cease-fire in the war with Israel,
    with all these missiles and weapons which were supposed to be
    not allowed to come back in the country, is really alarming and
    it is something we really need to take very seriously.
        Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Engel.
        I am pleased to yield to the chairman of our Subcommittee
    on the Middle East, Mr. Chabot, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Mr. Crane, you stated in your testimony that as a
    democratic form of government slowly begins to take shape in
    Iraq, having similar political developments in Cairo could have
    great consequences for the region. Conversely, given the
    violent birth of and halting steps toward democracy in Iraq,
    chaos or a more repressive government in Egypt will discourage
    and further delay much needed reform in the region.
        Could you elaborate on the implications for our efforts in
    Iraq of the events currently unfolding in Egypt and how will it
    affect U.S. leverage?
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. And Mr. Craner, if you could put the
    microphone a little closer to your mouth. Thank you.
        Mr. Craner. I said that, because if you look historically
    over the last 5,000 years, the two centers of learning and
    intellect in the region have been principally Cairo, but also
    Baghdad. And so if you are a Syrian or an Algerian or a Yemeni,
    you have traditionally looked to or you may have gone to school
    in the old days in one of those two places. Today, you may also
    have gone to the American University in Beirut. But those are
    the kind of two traditional intellectual leader cities and
    countries in the region. So if you had democracy in those two
    principle pillars for Arab culture, then it would be difficult,
    if you are in another Arab country, to say democracy is not
    going to work here.
        Alternatively, if things were to go badly in Egypt, you
    would then be in a position in another country to say, is that
    what they mean by democracy? You had all that violence in Iraq
    and look what happened in Egypt. So the stakes are very, very
    high in Egypt, I think.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
        Mr. Abrams, over the past decades, the United States has
    given the Mubarak regime billions of dollars in nonsecurity
    assistance, and such assistance has, unfortunately, not led to
    significant political or economic reforms, as we all know. How
    should the executive branch and Congress going forward leverage
    our economic assistance to encourage real reforms?
        Mr. Abrams. Mr. Chabot, I think there have been changes in
    the Egyptian economy, and the rich have gotten a lot richer.
    There are now Egyptian billionaires on the Forbes list, but
    there has not been much trickle down and the poor remain
    desperately poor.
        I would hope that what we would try to do in our economic
    assistance is, first of all, help those who are poorest. And
    secondly, see if we can encourage the new government that is
    going to be coming in to adopt economic reforms that are not
    simply about increasing foreign direct investment or getting
    the stock market to rise, but about helping people in the lower
    middle class, working class, and the poorest people.
        One of the problems we have with our aid program in Egypt
    is Egyptians don't know it exists. Some other countries have
    built stadiums and things like that that are very visible, but
    an awful lot of Egyptians don't know that we have given
    billions of dollars in aid to Egypt.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
        Dr. Satloff, I was struck by your comment that you made
    that basically the worst of all worlds for the United States to
    be in was to be neither feared, nor respected, nor loved. I
    would invite yours, and if there is any time left, the other
    members--how can we avoid that hereon?
        Mr. Satloff. Generally, the rule in the Middle East is
    reward your friends and punish your adversaries, and it is
    usually a smart policy to follow. The Egyptian case cuts
    through the middle of it because we have a partner who is both
    friend to us and adversary to us in different respects. Clarity
    here is important. I think, as I said earlier, that the longer
    that there is no visible change at the top, the more our
    influence wanes.
        If I could add just one brief comment, sir, about the
    economic question, I suspect that the leaders of Egypt view it
    a bit differently. They probably see that all these protestors
    have cell phones, Facebook pages, access to computers; they
    can't be so poor. And they are probably saying to themselves,
    my gosh, all that work that we did to advance the Egyptian
    economy only led to popular protests, only led to more
    opposition. I think we should be wary elsewhere that leaders
    will find ways to limit the sort of growth that led to the
    popular protest. Egypt has had 5 percent growth for years, and
    this is an outcome that authoritarians will be fearful of in
    the future.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you. I have 15 seconds, if either one of
    the other gentlemen would like to--okay. I yield back, Madam
    Chair. Thank you.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot.
        I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to Mr. Meeks of New York,
    the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia.
        Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And congratulations
    to you, also.
        Let me just say this and throw out a question. I, too, over
    the weekend have had the opportunity to sit down with some
    young people, some who just came back from Egypt who reside in
    my district, et cetera. And I have got to tell you, I have come
    away tremendously impressed in all of the conversation that we
    have been having today.
        I have confidence in the Egyptian people. They have gone to
    the streets and said what they want and what they don't want.
    They clearly want to move into a more free society, something
    that I don't think anybody could have ever done for them. They
    did it for themselves. And as a result of that, I know we can
    talk and we have our interests, of course, but ultimately they
    are going to decide their own Constitution. And I think that to
    the degree that we try to say, well, this should be in there or
    this should not be in there, then--it is not anti-American now,
    but if we try to tell them what should or should not happen,
    just as they are revolting against Mubarak, that then I think
    becomes the danger that we have because they are clear.
        Now, one of the things that they were not as clear on when
    I asked them, is who could rise from among them to be a leader,
    who could be the candidate; because clearly there is no clear
    leader within the opposition. And my question to them was then,
    in all of this, in doing a new Constitution, et cetera, it
    takes individuals to sit down, to talk, to negotiate. I
    referenced our Constitution, our men at that time, and
    hopefully now men and women will be sitting down and talking.
        Have you any idea who is in that group that will be talking
    to help rewrite the Constitution so that whoever comes up, we
    will then have an entree to try to continue the kind of
    relationship that we have had in the past but in a democratic
    forum?
        Mr. Satloff. Congressman, yesterday the Egyptian Government
    appointed a panel of constitutional experts--judges, lawyers,
    et cetera--many of whom are very loyal to President Mubarak,
    some have been vocal opponents of the President over the last
    number of years. It is not clear that this group will have
    popular legitimacy.
        There are other groups that are out there as well. There is
    a group called the Wise Men, public figures, both businessmen
    and civic leaders. There are the leaders of the youth. They
    have tried to organize themselves into an important coalition
    of leaders. There are the traditional parties that the regime
    has tolerated; they are small, they have been around for many
    years. They don't have much popular support. But they do
    understand the Constitution and they do understand Egyptian
    law.
        There is no coalescing yet, they don't all agree, except
    almost all of them seem to agree on the idea that the
    President, either in his person or in his authorities, must go.
    That important, visible, irrevocable change seems to be a
    common feature of the opposition.
        Mr. Craner. I think there are leaders out there. You have
    El Baradei, you have Ayman Nour, you have others. There are
    many people whose names are not household words in the United
    States or maybe even in Egypt because of the repression all
    these years. I think what will be important is to note, number
    one, if you have an election soon nobody is going to know those
    leaders' names. And number two, if the good people in the
    middle are not able to come together to form a coalition and
    perhaps to come up with a common candidate, then you could have
    things going badly.
        Mr. Meeks. What--go ahead.
        Mr. Abrams. I agree with that, and I think there are people
    who will come to the fore, because like Ayman Nour, who ran
    against Mubarak in 2005, they are known to be opponents of the
    old regime.
        Mr. Meeks. And within those groups what are you hearing in
    regards because when we do talk about U.S. interests I am also
    concerned about our ally, Israel. Is there any kind of
    consensus because at least there have been a peace, might have
    been a cold peace, and you talk about the Suez Canal, you talk
    about--and I know that President Netanyahu is concerned. Is
    there any conversation that you have heard on the ground in
    regards to Israel?
        Mr. Satloff. There is no doubt that the Muslim Brotherhood
    has gone on record as seeking the cancelation of the peace
    treaty. They have opposed it from the beginning, and they will
    oppose it to the very end. Other organizations have publicly
    said this isn't about Israel. Thankfully this is not about
    Israel. This is what Elliott said earlier; this is not about
    America even giving our support. This is about their desire for
    change.
        We have to be vigilant that a situation doesn't come, that
    it becomes about Israel and America. And I think we should all
    be quite worried that elements of the regime just last week
    tried to play the Israel card and the Jewish card, putting on
    Egyptian national television so-called Israeli spies, that
    evidently were provocateurs in the protest, or protestors that
    admitted to being trained by American Jewish organizations to
    overthrow Mubarak. This is all obviously poppycock, but it
    plays to the conspiratorial mindset, which many may have, and
    it is a sign of desperation on the part of the regime.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. The gentleman's
    time has expired. I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to Mr.
    Fortenberry, the vice chair of Africa, Global Health, and Human
    Rights Subcommittee.
        Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you
    gentlemen for coming today. I believe it is very important that
    we stand by any people who are pursuing their highest
    aspirations. Now with that said, the doorway to a vibrant and
    sustainable democracy rests really on two pillars
    fundamentally. First is an inculturated understanding of the
    dignity and therefore rights of every person and secondly an
    understanding of the nature of responsible citizenship as it
    seeks to uphold the rule of law. Then from there flow the
    institutions of society that give rise to civil capacity and
    can sustain things like freedom of speech and freedom of
    religion and freedom of assembly and a vibrant democracy with
    free and fair elections.
        The delicate question that is before us is, where is Egypt
    on that spectrum? Because without sufficiently developed
    institutions the danger or probability increases that this
    situation is exploitable by those who would use democracy to
    undermine it to pursue other ends. We had a discussion earlier
    as to what happened in Gaza. I heard your point, Mr. Craner,
    but at the same time, if you are allowing democracy to be used
    by those who are going to act antithetically to it, you may end
    up in a situation which is much worse off.
        With that said, again we want to stand by people as they
    are pursuing their highest aspirations, but I think that is the
    narrow issue here. Where is Egypt in terms of civil capacity so
    that we increase the probability that this type of hopeful and
    good outcome can occur.
        Mr. Abrams. Just one brief comment, Mr. Fortenberry, this
    is the measure of a terrible legacy of Hosni Mubarak, who had
    30 years to slowly, steadily build this civic culture and
    instead built a culture of suspicion and suppression and leaves
    soon, even on his own timetable, with having done none of it.
        Clearly Tunisia is in a better situation. Tunisia, with
    $8,500 per capita income and roughly 85-80 percent literacy.
    But I guess I would say we are who we are. I mean the people of
    Egypt are rising up and demanding this. And what perhaps we can
    help advise with is the kind of institutional protections that
    after all our own founders put in because they wondered whether
    we had the civic culture to do this yet and they were very
    mistrustful of majorities. So maybe we can help as they think
    through what a new Constitution would look like.
        Mr. Craner. In terms of civil capacity, there are many
    countries less developed that have become democratic. And I
    always use the example of Mongolia, quite an isolated place,
    with not a lot of civil capacity, Mali in Africa. The list--I
    could cite you a long list, but in terms of civil capacity----
        Mr. Fortenberry. Are a comparable in terms of----
        Mr. Craner. Much less, much less, what would you call civil
    capacity in terms of the understanding of the issues you were
    talking about that have been able to come to the fore and
    become democratic. I think one of the issues in Egypt is from
    where we sit it is going to be hard to slow what is going on in
    Egypt. I think we can help shape it as it moves forward. We can
    even hasten it moving forward. But at the least we can do is
    shape it. But I think it will be very, very hard for us to slow
    it.
        Mr. Fortenberry. One of the problems with analogies and
    this is clear is that perhaps you didn't have entities as well
    organized as the Muslim Brotherhood is going to reject
    fundamental aspects of what are going to provide the foundation
    for vibrant democracy as we project on it. I think that is
    where it falls short, but I understand your point.
        Mr. Craner. I would also point you, however, to some of
    the--Muslim Brotherhood is unique certainly in Egypt, but there
    have been other countries where there have been well organized
    entities that went into elections and were defeated. And I
    think here of the former communist parties.
        Mr. Fortenberry. I just picked up your language when you
    said hopefully moderates will come out well. Again that points
    to this delicate situation that we are now in and we don't
    exactly know where we are.
        Mr. Craner. But we need to get in and shape it and not just
    be passive spectators, which is essentially what we are doing
    right now.
        Mr. Satloff. Just one brief analytical distinction.
    Egyptians are generally religiously conservative, but we should
    not equate that with membership in the Muslim Brotherhood,
    which is an ideological party with political goals. We
    shouldn't believe that all Egyptians if they are not liberals
    they are necessarily Brotherhood members. We would fall into
    their trap.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. The gentleman's time has
    expired. I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to my Florida
    colleague, Mr. Deutch, for his questions.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chair. Dr. Satloff, you said
    just a couple minutes ago that this is not about Israel or
    America, this is about what is happening in Egypt. But I would
    like to focus on what is happening in Egypt as it relates to
    the two, particularly for people, for Egyptian citizens. If you
    could discuss the implications on the ground, not just with
    regard to the border with Egypt, but the broader implications
    should the next government choose to abrogate that peace treaty
    with Israel. What does it means in terms of trade, what does it
    mean in terms of exports and qualifying industrial zones? If
    you could speak to that so that we have a better sense of what
    the thinking is and how it might play out.
        Mr. Satloff. Thank you, Congressman. I think we have gotten
    quite used to the idea of Egypt and Israel linked in peace,
    even if it is a cold peace, and the world in which we live is
    shaped by that. But to take that out and change that is huge.
    Israel for the last 30 years has operated on the assumption it
    didn't need to deploy a single soldier on the Egyptian border.
    That has opened up huge opportunities for Israel. It has
    enabled them to lower their defense spending, enabled them to
    move elsewhere, take other risks for peace. A change such as
    this, if it convinces the Israelis they have to rethink border
    security with Egypt, if they have to worry that the Egyptians
    are goings to militarize the Sinai, if they have to worry that
    the Gaza border is now going to become free flow for weapons
    with the Egyptian connivance instead of against Egypt's
    efforts, this changes everything that is possible for peace and
    security in this region.
        Egypt obviously will lose its American support if it severs
    its relationship. It will look for other partners, probably
    more nefarious partners than the United States. The Suez Canal
    becomes subject to possible closure or selective opening to
    various partners. The Egyptians, for example, have permitted
    the Israelis to transit their own submarines through the Suez
    Canal. The idea that in an era beyond peace that this would be
    possible is difficult to imagine.
        So there is a longer list, I could go on.
        Mr. Deutch. Well, if could you speak first to the nefarious
    partners that might be out there should this decision be made
    and secondly to the specific statement by the Muslim
    Brotherhood over the weekend that they recognize why it is in
    Egypt's interest to continue the peace treaty. Do we take them
    at their word as well? If not, again speak to who else might be
    out there that would be looking for this opportunity?
        Mr. Satloff. The statements I have seen by representatives
    of the Muslim Brotherhood are not supportive of the peace
    treaty. Actually I think the official position is they want the
    peace treaty to be up for a new vote by a new Parliament and a
    national referendum on whether it should be sustained.
        In terms of more nefarious possible partners for Egypt,
    well, there are plenty of candidates of countries that wouldn't
    have our conditionality, wouldn't have our desire for popular,
    for civic rights. Whether they are--they may be friends of ours
    even, like the Saudis and others, but they are not going to
    have democracy as part of their portfolio. And then there are
    more nefarious characters, whether it is the Chinese, the
    Venezuelans or other, that would come up with $1 billion to
    pluck the prize of Egypt from us, and I think it would be a
    price for them well spent.
        Mr. Deutch. Mr. Craner, you are nodding. Other thoughts, if
    you could broaden that discussion.
        Mr. Craner. I think Rob was very, very comprehensive in his
    answer to you. I think the other thing Egyptians would have to
    think about as they move that is their own economy. Nobody is
    going to want to invest in an area that looks like a war zone,
    which that may if that happens.
        The second thing the Egyptian military has to think about
    is whatever else you can say about the United States economy
    versus China and all this stuff, we continue to have the
    world's best military, and they would have to decide if they
    wanted to take Iranian weapons, Russian weapons, Chinese
    weapons, and Chinese-Russian training and then try to go to war
    with Israel.
        Mr. Deutch. And then finally, Mr. Abrams, if you could just
    speak again to the Muslim Brotherhood and the relationship with
    Hamas, funding for Hamas, those direct ties and our concerns as
    this goes forward.
        Mr. Abrams. Hamas is part of the Muslim Brotherhood
    internationally and the Mubarak regime has always been quite
    afraid of the link between the two. The question would really
    be about the Hamas border with Egypt, which is the Sinai-Gaza
    border. The Egyptian Government has done a mixed job. I mean,
    if you ask Israelis, there are tons of weapons that float in
    through those tunnels. It is hard to say the Egyptian
    Government couldn't have stopped more of them had it really
    been trying to. So it isn't as if we go from a golden age now
    to an age of trouble. But there is no question that one of the
    questions that the Muslim Brotherhood is going to have to
    answer is what do you want the relationship between the new
    Government of Egypt and Hamas to be?
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. Thank
    you, Mr. Abrams.
        Mr. Rivera, my Florida colleague, is recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Rivera. Thank you so much, Madam Chair. One of my
    concerns or one of my main concerns in this crisis is the
    impact on U.S. interests vis-a-vis Israel. I have one question
    first for Dr. Satloff and Secretary Abrams. Obviously the
    situation in Egypt is very much in flux, but regardless of what
    emerges American interests remain constant. It is imperative
    that Egypt today and throughout any political transition
    continues to honor its international obligations and play a
    positive role in the region. Specifically, Egypt must honor its
    commitment to peace with Israel as enshrined in the Camp David
    Accords and ensure the integrity of the Egyptian-Israel and
    Egyptian-Gaza borders.
        So for Dr. Satloff, my question, what message should the
    United States be delivering to the parties regarding Egypt's
    peace with Israel?
        Mr. Satloff. Very simply, Congressman, the United States
    should be public and private in saying the type of Egypt that
    we can support is only the type of Egypt that fulfills its
    international commitments, that we cannot support an Egypt that
    flouts or violates its fundamental international commitments.
    That applies to the military, it applies to economic. This is
    the foundation of our relationship.
        With the Israelis, we need to begin serious security
    conversations now about upgrading the United States-Israel
    strategic partnership. There are many things that we can do in
    concert in terms of border security, in terms of intelligence,
    and in terms of other items, and it should be seen that we are
    doing this so that the region understands that we recognize the
    shock to the Israeli security system and that we can do what we
    can to help cushion and assist the Israelis through the shock.
        Mr. Rivera. And for Secretary Abrams, over the years the
    United States has sold a great deal of military equipment to
    Egypt. At the same time we are deeply committed to Israel's
    qualitative military edge, essentially Israel's ability to
    defend itself against any combination of conventional threats.
    Part of the calculus in providing weapons to Egypt was that it
    was committed to peace with Israel.
        If Egypt's commitment toward peace with Israel changes, how
    should that affect future decisions about the sale and
    maintenance of weapon systems to the Egyptians?
        Mr. Abrams. Mr. Rivera, I think we should be very clear
    with the new Government of Egypt that the building block for us
    is their international obligation, their support of peace in
    the region, and if they move away from that, our aid program is
    impossible. I think that we can do that privately at first,
    rather than browbeating them, but I think we need to make it
    very, very clear and make sure that the Egyptian army
    understands that it has been obligation to tell the civilians,
    to persuade the civilians, to talk to the new Parliament so
    that the national debate shows that it is in Egypt's interest,
    they are not doing this as a favor to us, not doing this as a
    favor to Israel. It is in Egypt's interest to keep those
    commitments.
        Mr. Rivera. Mr. Craner, anything to add on either front?
        Mr. Craner. Just that this large assistance package began
    with the Camp David Accords. If the Camp David Accords are no
    longer going to be operative, there is no need for the
    assistance.
        Mr. Rivera. Thank you so much, Madam Chair. I yield back
    the remainder of my time.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Rivera. Mr.
    Cicilline of Rhode Island is recognized for 5 minutes. Welcome.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and
    congratulations to you and thank you to the panel for a great
    presentation. A special welcome to Dr. Satloff; it is wonderful
    to see you.
        I have really two issues that I would ask the panel to
    address. The first is just yesterday in the Providence Journal
    there was a headline, Egypt's Unrest Raises Oil Prices. And
    this seems to be another example of where our national security
    interests and our ability to wean ourselves from dependence on
    foreign oil intersect. And so my first question is really is
    there any reason to believe in the short term that there will
    be consequences to the oil supply here in this country, knowing
    that Egypt is not a big producer, but that lots of oil is
    transported.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Cicilline, can I interrupt you
    for 1 second?
        Mr. Cicilline. Certainly.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, and we won't take away
    from your time. Mr. Berman and I have to go to the floor to
    handle the debate. And I will ask Mr. McCaul of Texas to take
    over the chair. And if we could start Mr. Cicilline's time
    again. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Cicilline. So in light of this uncertainty in the
    region in the short term, is there likely to be any impact, and
    then add to that that 40 percent of natural gas consumed by
    Israel comes from Egypt, which I know the Muslim Brotherhood
    has already spoken out against, what are the implications in
    terms of energy? And I hope there will be a call to action on
    behalf of our country to develop a comprehensive energy policy
    that is serious about investing in clean energy and the
    development and production of renewable energy.
        The second area I would like to hear your thoughts on is
    the issue of leadership of the revolution. It seems as if it is
    really organic and it is really the people of Egypt that are
    leading this revolution. And I think we have to be careful that
    even if we could identify the emerging leaders we have to walk
    this tightrope where we want to be sure that this is a decision
    of the Egyptian people, and so we can't be seen to have
    selected or endorsed new leadership.
        On the other hand, it sounds like investments in democracy
    promotion would be a useful tool to help fuel that kind of
    development. The question really is, is it too late for this
    country in terms of our playing in that area because they are
    now in the midst of the revolution, or are there some
    strategies that can support the emerging democratic leadership,
    whoever that is?
        Mr. Abrams. To say a word about energy, Mr. Cicilline, so
    far no, obviously the prices have risen because of uncertainty.
    But so far the Canal is intact and the Egyptian army seems to
    want to keep it that way.
        There was a terrorist attack on the gas pipeline to Israel,
    and it is not working right now. It will take several more days
    to get it back online. The Israelis I think need to worry that
    Egyptian domestic politics may interfere in the medium term
    with their supplies. They do have supplies offshore and one of
    the things that has happened is it has changed a little bit the
    debate within Israel about the importance of those supplies and
    the need to get them online a lot faster.
        I yield to my colleagues on the question of how we can help
    this democratic transition.
        Mr. Satloff. Just a word about energy before that,
    Congressman, I think that now is the moment when we need to be
    talking very clearly with the Saudis and our Gulf partners
    about their excess capacity, which is significant and would be
    quite helpful right now to help ensure that oil prices, which
    is really speculation on the sense of fear and uncertainty,
    that oil prices don't take a dynamic of their own. Those
    governments are very angry at the United States for their
    perception that we threw Mubarak under the bus, which I think
    is incorrect, but so be it. We need to have a real serious
    strategic conversation with the Saudis and their partners about
    their use of excess capacity.
        Mr. Craner. On the question----
        Mr. Cicilline. And Dr. Satloff, on the balance of the
    question is it too late for us to implement some strategies to
    support emerging democratic leadership in Egypt?
        Mr. Satloff. I will let my colleague Lorne comment in just
    a moment. I don't think it is ever too late for us to do what
    we can. And we have great institutions, such as the one Lorne
    directs and others, that have people on the ground that have
    been working quietly for years. Now is the moment really where
    we should be more active and do what we can to help liberals,
    moderates, anti-Islamists capture the political space which is
    beginning to open for them.
        Mr. Craner. I wish we had more time on this before
    elections occur. The one good thing is that we and other
    groups, the National Democratic Institute included, have been
    able to have contact with folks there for a couple of years,
    less lately because our budgets were cut. So I don't think it
    is too late. One of the things I always tell folks to address
    the delicacy issue you are talking about is we have to
    understand it is their country and it is their fight. We cannot
    be leading them.
        What we can do when we do this kind of work is to talk
    about how coalitions are formed without saying and here is your
    leader or what issues do you need to address without saying
    these are the issues and here are the solutions. One of the
    interesting things that has happened in the last 10 years is
    that many new democracies are interested in doing this kind of
    work. So, for example, the Tunisians are very interested in
    having people from Portugal, which began its democracy in 1975,
    and Serbia, which began its democracy in 1998. So it is not so
    much regarded as an American thing anymore when you are
    bringing in people from all over the world. It can be done. We
    can't do it passively, we need to get in there and start doing
    it.
        The final thing I would say is for the opposition to
    understand what issues it is that the Egyptian people want
    addressed. I think if you go out there and say let's be more
    aggressive toward Israel or you go out there and say let's fix
    this economy, you are going to get different reactions.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you very much. I yield back the
    balance of my time.
        Mr. McCaul [presiding]. The Chair now recognizes himself
    for 5 minutes. We all support democracy. I think the concern a
    lot of us have is a power vacuum and who is going to fill that
    void in that power vacuum. There is also a great concern I know
    from other nations in the Middle East of what is going to
    happen to them and what ripple effect could potentially take
    place across the Middle East. Certainly countries like Jordan,
    Saudi Arabia, Yemen.
        When you look at the history of who is to fill this void I
    think obviously the young intellectual, secular model is what
    we want, but then there is, as we have discussed the Muslim
    Brotherhood. When you look at the history, Mr. Qutb, the
    literary scholar, trained in the United States but then
    advocating violence. Mr. Zawahiri, the number two man to bin
    Ladin. Those are the elements that we are talking about. That
    raises great concern to me in terms of--I think we know the
    answer to this question, how it is going to play out, but that
    is a great cautionary concern I think that all of us have.
        Dr. Satloff, you talked about Iran as well with the vacuum.
    So I have got a couple more questions. I just want to throw
    that out and see what response or commentaries you had on that.
        Mr. Satloff. Congressman, in the current environment no one
    is suggesting that any other institution but the army fill that
    void. Actually our hope is that the army separates itself from
    the President and then fills the void and then opened up a
    transition, an irrevocable transition. But no responsible
    person is suggesting to hand over the keys of the country to a
    leaderless, amorphous group. Everyone hopes for an
    institutional change, and that is why if this does happen, if
    the army makes the choice, which it so far has been reluctant
    to do, then we may be on the right path.
        Mr. McCaul. Any other comments? Mr. Abrams.
        Mr. Abrams. You asked about the ripple effects. I would say
    about that is there have been some good ones in the sense that
    the Governor of Algeria announced that after 19 years the
    emergency law would be ended. The Government of Jordan, the
    King, announced that he has appointed a new Prime Minister with
    a mandate for reform. In Yemen the President announces he won't
    run again. So they are not going have a President for life,
    which is what they feared.
        So to the extent that people can get ahead of the curve
    this will prove to be positive.
        Mr. McCaul. Mr. Craner.
        Mr. Craner. I think you are not yet seeing negative effects
    in any of the countries. I noted earlier if you are going to
    see effects it will probably be in the republics, not the
    monarchies for a variety of reasons. But I think these events
    drive home the point that President Bush made and that
    Secretary Clinton made in a speech in UAE and another one in
    Munich, that not only do they need to get ahead of the events,
    but we need to get ahead of these events.
        Mr. McCaul. I agree with that. Is there something to learn
    from that? When we look the Turkey they have a secular model of
    government. Do we have--is there any benefit to examine that
    model in terms of applying it to Egypt?
        Mr. Abrams. I would say it is a mixed model in the sense
    that for years and years it looked like the right model, the AK
    Party, democratic, moderate, but we have seen in the last year
    real steps by the Prime Minister against freedom of the press
    in Turkey. And so I think Turkey now becomes a worrying model
    for the direction of Egypt.
        Mr. McCaul. And last question, El Baradei has been, and I
    was at a meeting with him in Vienna. He is a very impressive
    man and he seems to be the type that could be a consensus
    builder. What are your thoughts in terms of him emerging as a
    potential leader in Egypt?
        Mr. Satloff. In the polling that we did just last week in
    Cairo, El Baradei came up quite negligible in public opinion
    support. The top ranked person was for better or for worse the
    current Secretary General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, who
    supports peace but isn't always such a friend of American
    interests in the broader Middle East.
        Mr. McCaul. Mr. Craner.
        Mr. Craner. Mr. El Baradei would be a transitional figure
    at best.
        Mr. McCaul. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    Virginia, Mr. Connolly.
        Mr. Connolly. I thank my friend. And welcome. I know it has
    been a long morning, and thank you all for being patient.
        I have two questions. First, Mr. Abrams, to you. You quoted
    Tom Lantos: ``Does Egypt need more tanks or more schools?''
    Obviously a rhetorical question. You sound like a liberal
    Democrat. Thank you, in raising the question. But you also
    bemoaned a little bit the fact that other donors have visible
    projects they can point to, and the people can see the
    assistance is helping and we don't have so much of that.
        The administration in which you served and the Senate in
    which I served actually consciously moved a lot of project-tied
    aid in Egypt to cash transfer because it made the client
    happier, but we paid a political price. I wonder if you want to
    comment on that in terms of in retrospect, did we make a
    mistake? And moving forward do we need to resist the temptation
    even though it takes long and it is clunky and it requires more
    people at USAID, but we pay a political price every time
    someone doesn't see the tangible benefit, in this case of the
    peace dividend.
        Mr. Abrams. I agree and I think it was a mistake to do
    this. And we almost made an even larger mistake. The Mubarak
    regime has been pushing for probably 3 or 4 years now for
    some--sort of an endowment where the aid would be put into a
    giant pot where you and the Congress would lose all control
    going forward and for a while that was a popular proposal. I
    think it was blocked here on the Hill.
        But I think what we see now is the error of having been so
    supportive of the Mubarak government. I would only add the
    usual statement is they were such great allies. Yes and no, you
    know there are Emirati forces fighting alongside us in
    Afghanistan. There are no Egyptian forces. There are others in
    the Arab world who have been much more helpful about bringing
    peace and democracy to Iraq after the war. President Mubarak
    was not helpful, and of course it is a very cold peace with
    Israel, under a regime, his regime, that propagated, not just
    anti-Israel, but terrible anti-Semitic feelings in Egypt.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Mr. Craner, you talked about the
    consequences of in a sense the vacuum. When you have an
    autocratic regime and you don't allow political space to be
    created for legitimate opposition that is capable of governing,
    this is what happens. And we aided and abetted that, maybe
    through circumstances, whatever. I would argue clearly it is
    also a legacy of the Cold War where we saw the world in such
    stark bipolar terms, we kind of lost a lot of stuff in the
    antithesis.
        But moving forward, it is easier said than done, isn't it?
    I mean, you have got a friendly allied government, it may be
    autocratic, and here you are, whether it is the Republican
    Institute or the Democratic Institute or the U.S. State
    Department, mucking around with the opposition that they don't
    want you mucking around with. How do we forge a coherent policy
    that allows us to help create political space, especially when
    the governing regime does not want us to?
        Mr. Craner. Because with every country, with every
    government there is what I would call an equation of relations
    with the United States. You have an X, Y, Z quotients. If X is
    the trade relationship, if Y the military relationship, you
    want to insert another quotient called democracy and human
    rights. And we shouldn't underestimate the power and how much
    attention people pay to us. And when they understand that the
    President and the Secretary of State highly value a particular
    quotient in the equation then they will pay attention to it.
    And skilled diplomats are able to use that. This is something I
    saw repeatedly in both the Bush-Baker and the Bush-Powell State
    Departments. Skilled diplomats can do both quite easily.
        Mr. Connolly. Mr. Satloff, did you want to comment?
        Mr. Satloff. No, I defer.
        Mr. Connolly. Oh my gosh, I have 50 seconds left.
        Elliot, I hope I see you at the synagogue. Thank you very
    much. You go to the synagogue in my neighborhood. Thank you all
    very much, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. McCaul. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New
    York, Mr. Higgins.
        Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I think the Egyptian experience of the past several weeks
    raises a number of questions, a lot of contradictions. But also
    I don't know that enough has been made out of the generational
    influence, not only in Egypt but throughout the Middle East and
    North Africa, and I think in Egypt 25 or 50 percent of the
    population is under the age of 25. What is different today is
    that these regimes have been very good at repression. And there
    are now tools of collaboration, of organization that have are
    available to everybody in the world in this Web enabled world,
    and it is interesting that the Egyptian Government shut down
    the Internet, but so much information was out there before they
    did it, it essentially drove people into the streets, because
    that level of curiosity had been raised to a point where it was
    uncontrollable. I supposed that is both a good thing and a bad
    thing.
        Mr. Satloff, you had indicated that the Muslim Brotherhood,
    you talk about contradictions, is an ideological party with
    very specific goals. Could you elaborate a little bit?
        Mr. Satloff. Yes, Congressman. The Muslim Brotherhood was
    founded and retains its intention to Islamize society, to make
    Egyptian society first and other Muslim majority countries
    second, governed under Sharia law, Sharia law being the
    codified Muslim legal code. Now in some places the Muslim
    Brotherhood has spread. It started out in Egypt, it has spread
    in countries around the world. It takes different names in
    different places, like Hamas in the Palestinian arena, but it
    retains that ultimate goal. It has a variety of means toward
    that goal. At times it has used direct violence trying to
    assassinate Presidents and Prime Ministers. At other times it
    uses electoral politics, at other times is uses social welfare
    efforts to promote popularity, but it has never given up the
    goal. And the goal has only been compromised because of actions
    of the state. Namely, the state has repressed, thrown in jail
    its leaders, and it has been forced to give up certain aspects
    of its goal publicly and certain aspects of its means publicly.
    But I would argue that there is no fundamental change in the
    objective of the Muslim Brotherhood and we should be quite
    clear eyed about what that goal is, and it is very antithetical
    to our strategic interests and to our human rights and
    democracy interests.
        Mr. Higgins. Is it possible to gauge the support for the
    Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt itself amongst the population? Is
    there a percentage that could be accurately applied relative to
    support amongst the popular----
        Mr. Satloff. There is a common view among experts that it
    is somewhere about 20 or 30 percent. But none of us really know
    because the government has set up an electoral system which
    deprives all options other than supporting the brotherhood or
    supporting the regime. So we don't really know what the
    Brotherhood support is. I suspect it is in that ballpark, but
    it is certainly not a majority support among the Egyptian
    population. Here I just want to reaffirm the point I made
    earlier, we need to make a distinction between religiosity,
    people who pray and people who ascribe to a political ideology
    of compelling their compatriots to live under Islamic law. That
    is a very different approach.
        Mr. Higgins. It seems like one of the reasons Egypt has
    historically supported the blockade of Gaza is because they
    wanted to ensure that Hamas remains Israel's problem and not
    their problem, which is indicative of a history of fearing, I
    presume, the Muslim Brotherhood which makes up Hamas.
        This power vacuum, where do we suspect this thing is going
    to--how is this going to be filled? Anybody?
        Mr. Abrams. The power vacuum in Cairo of course none of us
    know, and this is a key question as to whether the army can
    lead a steady but real transition to a new democratic system or
    not.
        I do think one thing about Gaza: Initially the Egyptians
    wanted to have a lot more influence in Gaza and prevent a Hamas
    takeover. Once Hamas took over, they were very much afraid of a
    kind of infection between the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and
    the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, Hamas. And they then began to
    enforce somewhat, haphazardly, they began to enforce a border.
    And there were some incidents where they arrested Hamas people
    and pushed them back over the border. But Mubarak I think was
    quite afraid of what the Hamas-Muslim Brotherhood cooperation
    could do.
        Mr. Higgins. My time is up. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Mr. McCaul. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
    Arkansas, Mr. Griffin.
        Mr. Griffin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Abrams, my
    understanding is that the movement in Egypt is an organic one
    for the most part and there is potentially a power vacuum there
    and that Egypt historically has done a good job in dealing with
    some of the extreme groups, fringe groups. With all of that in
    mind, looking forward to the intermediate term, 5 years or so
    down the road, what do you see al-Qaeda trying to do, if
    anything? And I mention this, I know there hasn't been a lot of
    discussion of al-Qaeda, but clearly some critical people in the
    al-Qaeda organization have ties to Egypt. And then I see this
    Wall Street Journal editorial, could al-Qaeda hijack Egypt's
    revolution? And I know it is all sort of speculation, but I
    would like for you to comment on how credible that speculation
    is. It seems to me if we did have incomplete knowledge, looking
    in hindsight, that this was coming and it did sort of
    organically bubble up, if you will, looking forward, what do we
    know about al-Qaeda and their interests? And I would assume
    that there is no question they would have a desire to
    capitalize and exploit this, but there may be structural
    resource limitations on their ability to do that. Do you want
    to comment on that? I don't know if you've seen this article
    but just on the general premise.
        Mr. Abrams. Mr. Griffin, I think it is something we should
    be worrying about because al-Qaeda tends to thrive when there
    is an ungoverned space, Somalia, Yemen, or when the hand that
    suppresses it is lifted. I am sure they are looking at Egypt
    and wondering whether the security forces that have been
    fighting them will start being--will start pulling back, and
    that could happen now. It can happen in the medium term if you
    get new governments of Egypt where it is not so popular to
    suppress al-Qaeda, where the people who are running the country
    are telling the security forces don't be so tough or make
    trouble, I don't want any incidents. Because if they move back
    and I am thinking about things like guarding their borders or
    airports and seaports, if they lessen or lower their guard
    against al-Qaeda, we know enough of al-Qaeda to know that they
    are constantly looking around and they will move into Egypt.
        So I think it is something to worry about. It is one of the
    reasons that I think it is so important the army not sacrifice
    its position in Egypt to save Hosni Mubarak and get him a few
    more months, because we will need them to prevent exactly what
    you are I think rightly worried about.
        Mr. Griffin. What I would also be interested in is to hear
    your comment on if al-Qaeda is looking at northern Africa as a
    whole and not just Egypt as a potential opportunity. Are they
    looking to recruit there for their fights elsewhere or do you
    believe they would be looking to infiltrate there and establish
    themselves? It seems to me we have done such a good job, the
    United States has, in fighting them, particularly in terms of
    depleting their operational resources that they may not have
    the ability to do everything that they might like to do. Would
    they be recruiting there for fights in Afghanistan and Iraq or
    would they be trying to move into these countries?
        Mr. Abrams. I think the answer is both. There is now a
    thing called al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, and I think we have seen
    or we have seen arrests in Morocco or arrests in Algeria. And
    they are both trying to recruit there and clearly have tried
    and succeeded in some cases in doing terrorist attacks in North
    Africa. So this is very much on their radar screen.
        Mr. Griffin. I see that I am about out of time. I have
    about 30 seconds, if there is anything you would like to add.
        Mr. Satloff. A couple of quick points. One, al-Qaeda has
    proved quite opportunistic. I am sure they are seeing the
    situation in Tunisia and Egypt as the fall of their enemies,
    not so much a rise of democracy, and this will invite their
    activity in these countries.
        Secondly, we should note that even such people as the
    assassin of Sadat up at Zamur escaped from jail in Egypt over
    the last 2 weeks, and I think we should be quite concerned
    about the potential for these fringe movements taking hold
    again.
        Mr. Griffin. Thank you.
        Mr. McCaul. I want to thank the witnesses for their
    excellent testimony here today. Our members may have additional
    questions, and we ask that our witnesses consider follow-up
    answers to any questions that may be forwarded. Without
    objection, by unanimous consent members will have 5 days to
    submit questions in writing, which the committee will then
    forward to our witnesses.
        Again, thank you, and this hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

    RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT AND LEBANON: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
                 AND ALLIES IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST, PART 2

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2011

                      House of Representatives,
                                  Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
    Lehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. We thank the folks in the audience
    with the yellow T-shirts. They have loved ones or relatives or
    interested folks about what is going on in Camp Ashraf and the
    many violations against the freedom-loving Iranians there. And
    we certainly will keep working so that they get the protection
    they deserve from the Iraqi Government and from our U.S.
    Government as well. So we welcome you today.
        After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr.
    Berman, for 7 minutes each for our opening statements, I will
    recognize the chairman and the ranking member of our
    Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia for 3\1/2\ minutes
    each for their statements.
        We will then hear from our witness Deputy Secretary
    Steinberg. Thank you, sir, for joining us.
        Following Mr. Steinberg's testimony, we will move to
    questions and answers from members under the 5-minute rule.
        Without objection, the witness' prepared statement will be
    made a part of the record, and members may have 5 days to
    insert statements and questions for the record subject to
    length limitations of the rules. Thank you very much. So if we
    could have the clock begin now.
        Yesterday, as you know, we heard from a distinguished panel
    of experts and former administration officials on the dramatic
    transformation that is currently taking place in Cairo, in
    Beirut, and beyond. There was general agreement on the need for
    the United States to send a clear signal of support to those
    freedom-loving Egyptians who renounce violence, who are
    committed to democratic governance, who respect the security
    and the sovereignty of all Egypt's neighbors. There were echoes
    of statements by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger from
    this past weekend that the U.S. relationship is not just with
    one person, but rather with all of the Egyptian people as a
    whole.
        Former Deputy National Secretary Advisor Elliot Abrams
    reiterated that Mubarak created the very situation that Israel
    and the United States now fear, and that Mubarak's statements
    that he will not run in Egypt's scheduled elections is too late
    to enable a smooth transition.
        America's role should be to facilitate a post-Mubarak
    transition in order to avert future violence, and restore calm,
    and guard against the use of the transition process by
    nefarious elements such as the Muslim Brotherhood to directly
    or indirectly undermine Egypt's evolution to a democratic
    republic.
        There is no evidence that a well-thought-out contingency
    plan existed in the event that Mubarak's government became
    unstable or collapsed. The Wall Street Journal reported that
    Middle East experts at a January 31 meeting asked National
    Security Council officials, ``Please tell me that you have
    contingencies in case Mubarak's regime collapses.'' The
    National Security Council reportedly admitted there were no
    such plans.
        A February 2 report by foreignpolicy.com cites a senior
    administration official telling ABC that the administration was
    being compelled to change its strategy ``every 12 hours. First
    it was negotiate with the opposition. Then events overtook
    that. Then it was orderly transition. Then it was, you,
    Mubarak, and your son can't run, and now it is the process has
    to begin now.''
        Turning to the Muslim Brotherhood, the New York Times
    reported on February 2 that ``White House staff members made
    clear that they did not rule out engagement with the Muslim
    Brotherhood as part of an orderly process according to one
    attendee.''
        Engaging the Muslim Brotherhood must not be on the table.
    This also has implications for U.S. policy toward Lebanon,
    given statements last year by John Brennan, assistant to the
    secretary for homeland security and counterterrorism,
    describing Hezbollah's evolution from ``purely a terrorist
    organization'' to a militia, to what Mr. Brennan refers to as
    an organization that now has members within the Parliament and
    the Cabinet.
        Has the State Department evaluated whether Lebanon now
    meets the statutory definition of a state sponsor of terrorism
    or a terrorist strength sanctuary, given Hezbollah control of
    that government? And what is the administration's stance on
    continuing to provide assistance to such a Lebanese Government?
    From Lebanon to Egypt, what is the administration's stance on
    the Muslim Brotherhood? Beyond the general parameters
    referenced in Deputy Secretary Steinberg's written statement
    that is in our packet, what are the specific components and
    contingencies of the U.S. strategy toward Egypt and for aiding
    in the transitional process? If a key U.S. goal is to prevent
    the Muslim Brotherhood from taking over, and the Muslim
    Brotherhood is well funded, then shouldn't U.S. policy seek to
    shift economic aid away from the Mubarak government and focus
    it on strengthening responsible, peaceful democratic voices?
        The administration's initial approach to Egypt was clearly
    not keeping up with the priorities in its first years. While
    driving increases in the international affairs budget, the
    administration made significant cuts to total bilateral funding
    for democracy and governance programming. USAID even reportedly
    adopted a policy of only funding those organizations officially
    approved as NGOs by the Mubarak government. Repeated U.S.
    failure to enforce its own conditions and requirements on
    nonsecurity assistance to Egypt has compounded the problem.
        So, Mr. Steinberg, what tangible economic or democratic
    reforms has the Government of Egypt undertaken as a result of
    the billions of dollars that we have provided in nonsecurity
    assistance throughout the last decades? What have we received
    in exchange?
        This brings to mind two lessons on the Lebanese debacle
    that we are currently facing. The first is that the elections
    themselves are meaningless unless they are supplemented with
    democratic institutions. Hezbollah's ascendance in Lebanon was
    facilitated by the failure of responsible nations to insist on
    changing a Syrian-dictated electoral law and subsequent
    regulation prior to holding elections in the aftermath of the
    2005 Cedar Revolution. Clearer standards for participation in
    elections and institutions must be both articulated and
    implemented to ensure that destructive actors are not afforded
    the opportunity to hijack an incipient democratic process.
        The second lesson is we cannot afford to continue to pursue
    a myopic, personality-based policy that relies on stability
    over institutional reform. In Lebanon, we had a short-term
    policy based on maintaining stability, and we vested
    significant political capital with both Rafiq Hariri and, in
    the wake of his assassination and ascendance of the pro-Western
    March 14 bloc, his son Saad Hariri. Basing the next round of
    elections on existing Egyptian law and regulations without
    clear standards for participation and a democratic
    institutional framework is a recipe for disaster.
        And turning lastly to the role of the Egyptian Army, it has
    been reported that the United States is working behind the
    scenes to impress upon the Egyptian military the need to
    protect protestors and support a peaceful government
    transition. And I will be asking you questions on the
    administration's view on the security assistance to Egypt.
        So thank you very much for being here.
        And I am so proud and pleased to turn to my ranking member,
    Mr. Berman of California.
        [The prepared statement of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen follows:]

        Mr. Berman. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
        I am just getting word that probably a lot of people are
    getting that--except possibly the Deputy Secretary of State--
    that according to NBC News and a number of other sources,
    including quotes from the new Prime Minister of Egypt, that
    Hosni Mubarak is to step down following an all-day meeting of
    the country's Supreme Military Council. The army said all of
    the protestors demands would be met and a further statement was
    expected to be made later Thursday clarifying the situation.
    Mubarak was also due to address the nation.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. If I can interrupt. We will start
    your time again.
        The Chair would like to remind the audience members that no
    disturbance of the committee proceedings are allowed, and if
    there is no order, we will ask for you to be removed from the
    room according to House rules.
        Mr. Berman's time will now begin.
        Mr. Berman. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Yesterday I made a fairly detailed opening statement on the
    rapidly evolving events in Egypt as well as developments in
    Lebanon. Today I would like to focus on just one aspect, the
    most immediately relevant aspect of the democratic transition
    in Egypt, and that is the issue of when that transition will
    actually begin. We may have just had an answer on that.
        But on February 1, President Obama said that a transition
    in Egypt must be meaningful, peaceful and begin now. At this
    point, however, prior to my reading about this, I felt that we
    were still waiting for that beginning. There have been some
    important announcements, the decision that neither Hosni
    Mubarak, Gamal Mubarak, nor Omar Suleiman would run for the
    Presidency in September, but nothing meaningful up until now
    has actually happened, nothing that could be considered a break
    with business as usual as seen by the Egyptian regime.
        Madam Chairman, the transition needs substance. If current
    Egyptian leaders are reluctant to give it that substance, then
    the administration needs to give it a major push by setting out
    its own timetables and targets. The transition needs to be
    orderly, to be sure, but foremost it actually needs to happen.
        Both the regime and the opposition need to see defining
    actions so that each begins to make what President Obama called
    the psychological break from the past. Any number of tangible
    actions would serve that purpose, whether it be ending the
    emergency law, the decision by President Mubarak to hand over
    effective power to his Vice President, a decision by the regime
    to bring credible opposition members into a transition
    government, clear indications that a new Constitution will be
    written and implemented and will ensure the provision of free
    and fair elections, the ability of secular parties to organize,
    the presence of monitors, the presence of international
    observers, and the kind of both print and television freedom
    that allows all parties and all voices to be heard during that
    kind of a campaign.
        This type of concrete action needs to happen for many
    reasons, but primarily for the benefit of the Egyptian people.
    The Egyptian regime needs to know that it cannot dawdle or
    simply go through the motions of democratic change without any
    intention of genuinely transitioning to democracy. If delay is
    its tactic, it will reap a whirlwind at home, and it will leave
    Congress little choice but to take action. In other words, no
    slow walking.
        When this crisis broke out, I emphasized that I favored
    continuing our security assistance program, but the duration of
    that program depended on whether the military played a
    constructive role in the democratic transition. That is still
    my position. But our patience, mine, that of my colleagues, has
    limits. Given the military's influence over the regime, a
    regime that was born in the military and whose entire
    leadership is composed of military men, the democratic
    transition will happen if and only if the military plays that
    constructive role.
        So, Mr. Secretary, we are very glad to see you here. We
    have great respect for what you have been doing in a number of
    areas, but I am hoping when we finish this hearing, we will
    have a sense from you of when you think the democratic
    transition in Egypt will begin--it may have been helped by some
    of this news--and how we know it has begun, and what our
    administration intends to do to make sure that it begins if not
    now, then very, very soon.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Berman.
        And I am pleased to yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the chairman of
    our Middle East Subcommittee, Mr. Chabot.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you for
    holding these timely and important hearings again today.
        I look forward to hearing from our distinguished guest
    Secretary Steinberg about the situation in the Middle East,
    which continues to unfold even as we speak, as the ranking
    member indicated, with the news on Mubarak today.
        I think it is safe to say that the developments that
    continue to sweep across the Middle East and North Africa
    really did surprise many, but for years analysts had called
    attention to the ills of the region--a lack of respect for even
    the most basic human rights in many instances, like freedom of
    speech, freedom of assembly, and fair and free elections--as a
    potentially dangerous source of discontent, but it was ignored.
    They pointed to the widespread poverty and the aggressive
    economic policies instituted by dictators who were out of touch
    with the plights of their respective populations.
        They did not, however, predict that one 26-year-old street
    vendor's desperate act of defiance would initiate a wave of
    antiregime protests that are shaking the very foundations of
    the political order in the Middle East. Even those countries in
    which protests have not yet erupted look at countries like
    Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan, nervously wondering if they
    themselves will be next.
        For years we have also been told something else. We have
    been told that the Middle East is a region that is not ready
    for democracy. Indeed, save a handful of exceptions, the
    democracy deficit in the region had all become but a permanent
    assumption upon which far too much U.S. policy was based. I say
    ``had'' because over the past weeks, the people of the Middle
    East by taking to the streets, have proclaimed loudly to the
    leaders and to the world that they share the same principles
    that we cherish. They have told us that the right to life,
    liberty, and the pursuit of happiness does not stop at the
    water's edge.
        While these developments are very exciting, there is a dark
    side, which is a cause for concern. The specter of radical
    Islamist groups which exploit every opportunity to seize power
    is lost on no one. In Egypt, for over 30 years President
    Mubarak has crushed every moderate secular political party that
    could pose a challenge to his party, the National Democratic
    Party. The only movement which managed to survive is the Muslim
    Brotherhood, which, among other aspirations, has declared its
    desire to reconsider Egypt's peace treaty with Israel as well
    as its desire to impose Sharia law on the Egyptian population.
        President Mubarak, however repressive he may have been, was
    a close ally to the United States in the region and was
    especially helpful to us in fighting the global war on terror.
    In his absence, and as Egypt enters a period of transition, we
    must do all that we can to ensure that Egypt emerges from its
    current crisis with strong and democratic institutions of
    government, institutions that will respect the rights of women,
    uphold past treaties and agreements like those with our ally
    Israel, and not exploit the pillars of democratic governments
    like elections to assume the power only to abolish those very
    pillars. We must do all we can to help support the development
    of these institutions and to avoid one man, one vote, one time.
        Preventing the Muslim Brotherhood from coming to power must
    be a leading priority as we revisit our policy toward Egypt.
    The quiet diplomacy that the United States has been engaging in
    so far may be helpful in dealing with the Mubarak regime, but
    it does nothing to assure the people of Egypt that we
    sympathize with their cause. As one of our witnesses yesterday
    pointed out, many Egyptians are totally unaware of the
    nonmilitary aid that we have given them.
        So again, I commend you, Madam Chair, for holding this
    hearing. We obviously want to avoid a situation in which the
    Egyptian population looks at us as having bankrolled President
    Mubarak while completely ignoring them.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
        And the ranking member, Mr. Ackerman, for 3\1/2\ minutes.
        Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Until recently, and unlike its Arab neighbors, Lebanon had
    a democratically elected government that should have had a
    mandate to govern, but like all of its regional neighbors
    except Israel, Lebanon has suffered from a powerful and
    unaccountable element of its society acting above and beyond
    the law.
        What was different in the Lebanese case was that this
    unaccountable few didn't occupy or use the institutions of the
    state in order to coerce, in order to repress, in order to
    dominate their political opponents. Instead, they just
    threatened them and then killed them.
        No one should forget that before the current crisis, before
    the insurrection of May 2008, before the Presidential
    succession crisis and the lockout of Parliament, Hezbollah and
    its Iranian and Syrian allies engaged in a campaign of
    assassinations against Lebanese parliamentarians and
    journalists that began in 2005 with the murder of former Prime
    Minister Rafiq Hariri.
        Long before the recent backroom coup, Hezbollah set itself
    above the law and outside the reach of the government.
    Hezbollah has for years systematically weakened Lebanon's
    Government and continually undermined Lebanon's sovereignty. It
    has made Lebanon a regional time bomb by deploying more than
    40,000 Syrian and Iranian artillery rockets and advanced
    surface-to-surface missiles all aimed at Israel and all in
    order to shield Iran's illicit nuclear weapons program.
        Tragically, the people of Lebanon are now hostages. Like
    the captive nations of Eastern Europe during the Cold War,
    their hearts are free, but their government has colluded with a
    foreign power to put them in chains.
        The United States must continue to advocate for Lebanon's
    sovereignty and for the restoration of a legitimate government.
    We must continue to support and sustain the Special Tribunal
    for Lebanon and keep faith with all of the Lebanese people who
    want justice for their murdered countrymen and their former
    Prime Minister. America must continue to insist on the
    implementation of all relevant U.N. Security Council
    resolutions, and we must speak out clearly against the flood of
    illegal and destabilizing Syrian and Iranian arms going into
    Lebanon.
        And finally, we need to be clear with the Government of
    Lebanon that it bears the burden of demonstrating that it truly
    serves the people of Lebanon, and that it will keep peace
    inside Lebanon and on Lebanon's borders, and that it is not and
    will not either be a flunky for the ayatollahs in Tehran or for
    the dictator in Damascus. Until there is clear evidence that
    Beirut has made these choices, I believe we have no other
    alternative but to suspend all of our assistance programs to
    Lebanon. We have many urgent priorities in the Middle East.
    Helping Iran, helping Syria, and helping Hezbollah maintain a
    facade of Lebanese independence is not one of them.
        Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back the balance.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.
        The Chair is now pleased to welcome our witness. James B.
    Steinberg is the Deputy Secretary of State, serving as the
    principal deputy to Secretary Clinton. Appointed by President
    Obama, he was confirmed by the Senate on January 28, 2009, and
    sworn in by the Secretary the next day.
        Prior to his appointment in the Obama administration, Mr.
    Steinberg served as the dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of
    Public Affairs and the vice president and director of the
    foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institute.
        From December 1996 to August 2000, Mr. Steinberg served as
    Deputy National Security Advisor to President Bill Clinton. Mr.
    Steinberg also has held numerous other posts in the State
    Department and on Capitol Hill.
        Deputy Secretary Steinberg, thank you for attending, and I
    would kindly remind you to keep your oral testimony to no more
    than 5 minutes. And without objection, your written statement
    will be inserted into the record.
        Welcome.

         STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES B. STEINBERG, DEPUTY
                  SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

        Mr. Steinberg. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And let me begin
    on behalf of Secretary Clinton to congratulate you on taking
    the gavel here and to express how much we look forward to
    working with you and Ranking Member Berman and all of the
    members of the committee, and express appreciation for holding
    this timely hearing.
        Last month in Doha, Secretary Clinton challenged the
    leaders of the Middle East to give greater voice to their
    people. As the region confronts a potent combination of
    demographic and technological changes, rampant unemployment,
    and in too many cases the denial of universal rights and
    freedoms, she warned the status quo was unsustainable.
        In recent weeks this dynamic has given rise to
    demonstrations across the region and changes in Tunisia,
    Jordan, and Yemen, and, of course, sparked the dramatic
    developments in Egypt that, along with the events in Lebanon,
    are the focus of today's hearing.
        In such an environment, it is more important than ever that
    America works both with the people and the governments to
    democratize and open up political systems, economies, and
    societies. As the Secretary said just a few days ago in Munich,
    these are her words, ``This is not simply a matter of idealism.
    This is strategic necessity.''
        Change will emerge differently in response to different
    circumstances across the region, but our policies and our
    partnerships are guided by a few consistent principles. We
    stand for universal values, including freedom of association,
    assembly, and speech. We oppose violence as a tool for
    political coercion, and we have spoken out on the need for
    meaningful change in response to the demands of the people.
        American administrations of both parties have been
    conveying this message to Arab leaders publicly and privately
    for many years, and have also sought cooperation on crucial
    priorities such as counterterrorism, Iran's nuclear program,
    and the peace process. But these are not mutually exclusive or
    even contradictory. Recent events have reinforced the fact that
    absent freedom and democratic progress, the public support
    needed to sustain progress on common goals cannot be achieved.
    Changes must come, but we must be mindful the transitions can
    lead to chaos and new forms of intolerance or backslide into
    authoritarianism.
        We are working wherever we can to ensure that political
    transitions are deliberate, inclusive and transparent, and we
    expect all who take part to honor certain basic commitments,
    because, as President Obama said in his Cairo speech, elections
    alone do not make true democracy.
        One constant in a changing region is unwavering support for
    Israel's security. We continue to believe that the best path to
    long-term security for Israel and the region is the committed
    pursuit of comprehensive peace. By working for orderly
    transitions, we believe we can help ensure Israel's long-term
    security, and we will be vigilant against attempts to hijack
    the legitimate impetus for domestic reform to advance
    extremism.
        Egypt today is undergoing a remarkable transition, and
    given Egypt's leadership and influence, its peace with Israel,
    and our long-standing partnership, the stakes are high. We have
    all been transfixed by the heroic images from Tahrir Square of
    young and old, rich and poor, Muslim and Christian, gathering
    to lay claim to universal rights enjoyed in democratic
    societies around the world. And as the President has said,
    Egypt is not going back to the way it was.
        We have declared publicly and privately that a peaceful,
    orderly, and prompt transition must begin without delay, and it
    must make immediate, irreversible progress toward free and fair
    elections.
        We set out key principles to ensure that the transition
    remains peaceful. We made clear our support for human rights,
    including expression, association and assembly, freedom of the
    press. We have condemned violence against peaceful protestors,
    reporters and human rights activists, and we have underlined
    the need for Egypt's military to remain a force for stability.
    We are urging Egypt's Government and opposition to engage in
    serious, inclusive negotiations to arrive at a timetable, game
    plan, and path to constitutional political reforms. And as they
    do, we will support principles, processes, and institutions,
    not personalities. The desire for an orderly transition may not
    be a pretext for backsliding and stalling.
        Another vital message we are sending to all who take part
    in Egypt's political future is the fundamental need to honor
    Egypt's historic peace treaty with Israel. As Egypt builds
    democratic institutions after the recent unrest and also
    contends with the economic challenges that helped to cause it,
    we will continue to extend a hand in partnership and friendship
    to the American people, and we will act now, as we have done in
    the past, to support civil society, nongovernmental
    organizations, democracy groups, and economic recovery. As the
    transition unfolds, we will tailor our support to engage and
    nurture it.
        In Lebanon, a very different situation is unfolding. Last
    month Hezbollah, backed by Syria, used threats of violence to
    undermine the collapse of the Lebanese Government. We have
    worked with the international community with one voice to urge
    the next Lebanese Government to support the Special Tribunal,
    to honor its international obligations, and refrain from
    retribution against former officials.
        We intend to judge the next Lebanese Government by its
    deeds, mindful of the circumstances that brought it about. We
    will be watching Prime Minister Mikati to see whether he makes
    good on his public pledge to build a broad-based government
    that represents all sections of Lebanese society. The Lebanese
    people deserve better than a false choice between justice for
    the murder of their Prime Minister and stability for their
    country.
        If I could just conclude, Madam Chairman, by observing,
    without commenting specifically on the recent reports that you
    have referenced, that what is critical as we see this unfolding
    dynamic is that we remain consistent in our principles and the
    values of interest that we bring forward, while remaining
    nimble to adapt to emerging circumstances. It is a little bit
    like having a good game plan for the game, but also knowing
    when to call an audible. And I think that is what we are seeing
    as we go forward here, a consistent approach that identifies
    U.S. interests and values, but adapts to the circumstances and
    preserves our long-term interests.
        And I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Steinberg follows:]

        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so very much, sir.
        And before yielding my time to Congresswoman Buerkle, I
    wanted to bring to your attention, sir, a problem that we had
    regarding the YouCut debate on the floor yesterday not related
    to the subject of this morning's hearing.
        But yesterday morning, less than 2 hours before floor
    consideration, we received a letter from the State Department
    opposing the YouCut proposal to instruct the U.N. to return
    $179 million to the United States because of overpayments we
    had made to the U.N. Tax Equalization Fund, a surplus that the
    U.N. itself admitted that was payable to the United States.
        Your Department's letter stated for the first time ever
    that the current TEF surplus is now approximately 80 million,
    so there is a discrepancy there. So if it is true, that means
    the Department of State had already given away $100 million
    owed back to the U.S. taxpayers. And we have been asking for
    this information for the past 3 months and have been
    stonewalled by the State Department. The U.N. cannot redirect
    this surplus fund without instructions from the United States.
        So I have some questions that I would like to get written
    responses from you by Thursday, February 17, about how this was
    handled, because the way that this matter was handled raises
    serious concerns in my mind about the management and the candor
    of the Department of State. So I would appreciate it when my
    staff hands you that letter, if we could get that written
    response.
        Mr. Steinberg. I would be happy to provide that.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        I am so pleased to yield to Congresswoman Buerkle of New
    York, who serves on the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
    Nonproliferation, and Trade as the vice chair.
        Ms. Buerkle. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for
    the opportunity this morning to address Mr. Steinberg.
        Mr. Steinberg, thank you for being here this morning.
        Throughout the course of the opening statements, we have
    heard from many of the members talking about the concern that
    the Muslim Brotherhood will step in if and when President
    Mubarak steps down. And really the key being is this something
    that the administration is making a priority of, preventing the
    Muslim Brotherhood from stepping in when that void occurs? And
    then beyond that, if it is a priority, what is the strategy of
    this administration to prevent that from happening?
        Mr. Steinberg. Thank you very much for the question.
        I think that what we have focused on is some set of
    principles that we apply to what we expect to happen during
    this transition, because as I said, we recognize that these
    transitions can be difficult, and they can lead to
    unpredictable results. And so by focusing on those expectations
    and conditions, the need for an inclusive process that respects
    not only the need for elections, but also the institutions that
    protects the rights of minorities, that makes sure that, as
    things move forward, that individuals of different religions,
    of different perspectives are allowed to be part of the process
    is quite critical. And we want to make sure that the process is
    not hijacked by extremists or those who do not deeply believe
    in the open and tolerant and democratic process that we want.
        The process itself is one for the Egyptians to decide, but
    as we engage with whatever government emerges there, we will be
    guided by those principles.
        Ms. Buerkle. If you could, Mr. Steinberg, can you elaborate
    a little bit on this inclusive process, some of the specifics,
    the strategy that the administration will put forward?
        Mr. Steinberg. Again, I think what is important is that
    this be a process that is driven by the Egyptians themselves.
    But what we made clear to the Government of Egypt is that we
    expect that the full range of voices, not ones that are simply
    friendly to the government itself, are allowed to participate,
    and particularly the voices of the individuals who have been
    protesting peacefully on the street and are asking for
    democratic change are brought in and that different voices are
    heard, that legitimate perspectives from civil society
    participate in these discussions. The format is one that the
    Egyptian people themselves have to develop. But that is the
    kind of approach that we support.
        Ms. Buerkle. And if I may just follow up with that. How do
    you anticipate the United States of America being engaged in
    that process? How do you see that unfolding? Where will you be
    involved in the process?
        Mr. Steinberg. I think our first role has been to support
    those voices, and we have done that through our assistance
    programs. I think that it is important to recognize, as a
    number of others have raised this question, that we have a
    variety of ways of being involved in supporting civil society
    voices, and that while there has been a focus on some of our
    assistance programs under the ESF, there are other programs
    through our democracy programs and through our Middle East
    Peace Initiative and metric programs that we have other ways of
    supporting these democratic voices, which we have done.
        So we want to support them and give them the capacity to
    participate effectively, and then we want to make clear in our
    advocacy with the Egyptian Government that these are voices
    that need to be heard. But I think it is not for the United
    States to be in the meetings themselves. We want this to be a
    process that is driven by the Egyptian people, by the
    legitimate forces in Egyptian society.
        Ms. Buerkle. One last question. Do you believe if you
    follow this process that you just outlined for us that that
    will be sufficient for the United States--or to keep the Muslim
    Brotherhood from stepping in? Is that going to be a sufficient
    strategy to prevent that from happening?
        Mr. Steinberg. I think the key here, as I said in my
    opening remarks, is to have a clear set of principles which
    says what we expect and what, from our perspective, is an
    acceptable outcome for a new government moving forward, not
    just for our interests, although our interests are critical
    here, but also for the interests of the Egyptian people, and
    then to judge that as events emerge. And I think we need to,
    rather than trying to anticipate potential outcomes, be
    adaptive enough and responsive enough so we recognize, as we
    say, so we can identify concerns as they emerge, be vigilant,
    and make sure there we flag potentially dangerous emerging
    trends.
        And I think that is what we have tried to do here, which is
    part of the reason why we focused on the need for an orderly
    process, to make sure that it is not hijacked by voices which
    in the name of democracy are going to set up an intolerant
    regime.
        Ms. Buerkle. Thank you, Mr. Steinberg.
        I yield back, Madam Chairman.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Congressman.
        I am pleased to yield to my friend, the ranking member, Mr.
    Berman of California.
        Mr. Berman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        And thank you, Secretary Steinberg, for your testimony and
    your leadership here.
        I would like to follow up on Ms. Buerkle's initial
    question: What is the administration's position regarding the
    participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the transition and
    then subsequent governance? I certainly agree that in the end
    the Egyptian people are going to decide this question.
        There is an article in the current Egyptian Constitution
    requiring that religion be kept out of politics. Turkey has had
    a similar provision in its Constitution.
        Does the administration have a view as to whether Egypt
    should retain that principle in the next phase of its
    governance?
        Mr. Steinberg. Mr. Berman, I think what is important is
    that the next government respect the kind of democratic
    principles that we talked about, which is a commitment to
    democracy, but not just for one election, but for all of the
    fabric of democracy. Open institutions. Open debate. Tolerance
    of diversity and religious minorities. An ability of people to
    pursue different paths free of harassment. A recognition that
    you have to have a vibrant civil society.
        There are different ways the Constitutions can embody that,
    different ways in which countries allow religion to play a role
    in our lives. We know, for example, even in our friends and
    allies in Europe, some have roles for religion in societies.
        So I think you can't have an absolute rule about exactly
    how that applies, but it is very clear that we need to have--
    and we will be clear in our own mind that allowing this to
    become a state or a government that is intolerant, that does
    not provide an opportunity for the free, full expression of
    religious rights, of minority rights, or freedom for all of the
    different voices in Egyptian society is very important.
        And what is encouraging is if you look at the people who
    are out in Tahrir Square, what you are seeing is exactly that,
    Christians and Muslims, people from different religions and
    backgrounds and different viewpoints on the role of Islam in
    society. And that is what needs to be preserved, and that is
    something that we feel would be important in any Constitution
    that would be adopted by a future government.
        Mr. Berman. I have supported the administration's decision
    not to suspend the assistance program up until now, but I
    noticed that White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs back on
    January 28 said the United States will be reviewing our Egypt
    assistance posture based on events that take place in the
    coming days.
        Is that review ongoing, and what is the nature of that
    review? Under what circumstances would the administration
    consider suspending aid to Egypt?
        And then just an observation that I would recommend that
    the administration look toward the whole issue of export
    controls on things like tear gas canisters, items that are
    mostly relevant to the suppression of peaceful protestors. I
    think there would be some value in reviewing and perhaps
    eliminating licenses on those kinds of items for the interim
    period.
        Mr. Steinberg. Mr. Berman, I think you would expect and we
    do always keep under constant review our assistance programs
    not just for Egypt, but elsewhere. Congressman Ackerman raised
    concerns about Lebanon, and I want to assure him that we do the
    same there because we have to be able to be responsive to
    ongoing events. And I won't suggest that there aren't some
    circumstances where events may arrive where we would have to
    change our approach, but what we have focused on here as events
    have been emerging in Egypt is how to encourage this
    transition, how to use our influence to try to move the process
    in a direction that we would like to see it go and it meets the
    needs and wishes of the Egyptian people. And I think we have to
    be prepared to deal with events as they emerge, but we don't
    want to try to anticipate bad outcomes in a way that would make
    it less likely to achieve.
        Mr. Berman. I agree with that. I just in the end don't want
    the notion of the ensurance of that assistance become a basis
    for the slow walking of the orderly transition.
        One last question. With all of the focus on Egypt, I just
    want--I would like you to take one moment to sort of discuss
    how the situation may be affecting situations outside of Egypt,
    such as Iran. And my specific question is whether the State
    Department is on track to make determinations on their
    investigations for those violating CISADA, our Iran sanctions
    legislation, next month.
        Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, as you know, this is an issue
    that I spent a lot of time on. And the Secretary has asked me
    to put a lot of specific attention to make sure that we have a
    very vigorous implementation of CISADA. We think it has been an
    enormously helpful tool, and it has had enormous impact in
    helping us to galvanize the international community to take
    steps to put additional pressure on Iran, and I think we have
    had enormous success. This continues in a comprehensive way to
    affect Iran, the Iranian economy, and also keep in the sense of
    isolation.
        So we understand the importance of making sure we have full
    enforcement on that. We have an ongoing effort that is looking
    at activities as they emerge, and I continue to pledge to you
    that we will do everything that we need to do both to enforce
    it, but also to use the statute in a broader way to engage with
    other countries to make clear that we need to remain vigilant
    not only about the letter of the law, but also the broader
    desire to make sure that we don't have companies trying to
    skirt those provisions.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
        Now for the next round of questions. Mr. Smith, the
    chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and
    Human Rights.
        Mr. Smith. Madam Chair, thank you very much.
        Mr. Steinberg, welcome to the committee.
        You know, he is the administration dictator until his
    utility and usefulness erodes or evaporates or diminishes, and
    then the administration finds its public voice on human rights
    and democracy and calls on the former friend to get out of
    town.
        You mentioned, Mr. Steinberg, a moment ago about the
    consistency of principles, and I frankly have some concerns
    about that.
        A few weeks ago, President Obama rolled out the red carpet
    as President Hu Jintao came into Washington, a brutal dictator
    who has murdered, tortured, and repressed countless Chinese,
    Tibetans, and Uighurs. The press conference with Hu Jintao was
    so disturbing--I watched it, and I couldn't believe my ears--
    and even the Washington Post wrote an editorial on January 19.
    It said, ``President Obama makes Hu Jintao look good on
    rights.''
        The President defended his friend, his dictator friend, and
    said the Chinese had a ``different culture,'' which I found to
    be an absolute insult to the Chinese people, especially those
    who are suffering in Lao Gai, who are being tortured for
    demanding their fundamental human rights.
        He also said he had a different political system, as if
    that was a defense, and that is what the Washington Post picked
    up on. Yeah. It is a different system. It is a dictatorship.
        My question is--you know, so I think we need to be very
    cautious, and I would respectfully submit to you be cautious
    when you talk about consistency and principles. Even Liu Xiaobo
    is languishing in prison, as we all know, right now. And then
    something was said behind the scenes. But we need public
    statements, not when it is--when that dictatorship is in its
    final hour, but consistently, and in a very transparent
    fashion, to let them know that we know.
        I read all of the Chinese press after the fact on the
    People's Daily, at least what was carried there. They called Hu
    Jintao's trip to Washington a tour de force, that he just took
    over Washington, and we were sitting there enfeebled by the
    effort that we showed. So I am very concerned when you talk
    about consistency.
        I do have a question about freedom of press and reporters
    in particular. Reporters Without Borders suggests that as many
    as 79 journalists have been attacked in Egypt, 76 detained, 1
    has been killed. Do we know how high up in the command, whether
    or not the Army, whether or not the military, whether or not
    Mubarak, ordered that, or did it come from the Muslim
    Brotherhood, or was it just an outgrowth of the chaos of the
    day each day?
        And secondly, I would like to ask about a very disturbing
    report that an American company, Narus, has sold the Egyptian
    Government what is called deep packet inspection technology,
    highly advanced technology that allows the purchaser to search
    the content of e-mails as they pass through the Internet
    routers. The report is from an NGO called Free Press, and it is
    based on information Narus itself has revealed about its
    business.
        Now, there is no way of knowing whether the information the
    Egyptian Government gleaned from its Narus technology enabled
    it to identify, track down, and harass or detain some of the
    journalists or anybody else in Egypt.
        I would like to know what we know about this company. And
    it is part of Boeing. It was recently bought. And what can you
    tell us about Narus and this invasion of privacy on the
    Internet?
        Mr. Steinberg. Thank you, Congressman.
        Obviously we had an extended conversation about China,
    which I would welcome the chance to discuss with you. But I
    just would make one point that in addition to the very public
    remarks that President Obama made, my boss, Secretary Clinton,
    made an extensive speech the week before President Hu came here
    in which she specifically identified our concerns about Liu
    Xiaobo and other specific dissidents and, I think, gave a very
    clear and very unequivocal statement about the importance that
    we attach to human rights in China.
        So I certainly appreciate the importance of consistency,
    and I think it is something that we have made a part of our
    engagement with China.
        With respect to the journalists, we have made clear we have
    many priorities that we are focusing on as this transition goes
    forward. But we have been explicitly very clear about the
    unacceptability about the way the journalists have been
    treated, the harassment, the imprisonment and the like.
        I think it is difficult to know--to answer fully your
    question about who is behind it. What is encouraging, though,
    is that because of the intervention of us and others, the
    journalists have been released, and it is important that we
    keep a focus on that because it has been the critical voice
    that has kept public eyes and ears on that.
        On your second question, obviously I am unfamiliar with the
    company that you identified, but I will be happy to see what we
    know about that.
        Mr. Smith. Could you dig into that and get back to the
    committee, because it is very important. It goes to the whole
    issue of increasingly that U.S. corporations are enabling
    dictatorships. We saw it in Iran with a German corporation. We
    have seen it in China. We have seen it in Belarus where the
    Internet was used and is used to track down dissidents, to
    invade their e-mails, find out who they are talking to. It is
    an awful tool of repression, and Narus, according to these
    reports, has been enabling that kind of invasion of privacy.
        So thank you very much.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. We would appreciate
    answers to that.
        Mr. Ackerman, the ranking member of the Middle East
    Subcommittee.
        Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much.
        Good to see you, Mr. Secretary.
        Consistency is important, especially in foreign policy. A
    foolish consistency is something much to be avoided.
        There is a question that keeps asking itself, and some of
    us are asking it, and it demands a real answer. We can agree on
    the principle of freedom of speech and freedom of
    communication, and we can agree how important it is to
    democratic and civil societies. But when you pose a question,
    that there is information out there that is in a virus, would
    you say that that would be welcome in your computer if the
    purpose of the virus was to bring down the system?
        My question is about the Muslim Brotherhood. They are an
    element of society for sure, and we have principles that all
    elements of societies are welcome, and everybody has a right to
    freedom of religion, and et cetera.
        Now, I believe in treating my neighbor as myself, but that
    doesn't tell me that I should invite Jeffrey Dahmer to my house
    for dinner. Nothing good will come of that.
        How do you form a government and welcome in as an element
    of it a party that would destroy the government itself and
    expect stability? This is a tough question, and we really have
    to think about it. In being civil and democratic and welcoming,
    we also have to avoid being foolish.
        Mr. Steinberg. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.
        Obviously, this is an important question, and I will just
    make two observations. Which is, one, some of you know I am a
    lapsed lawyer, but I do remember from my constitutional law
    that even for free speech, there are limits to free speech. And
    we know we can't cry ``fire'' in a crowded theater and the
    like. Even in our own system, we recognize that speech has to
    support civil society and be part of that.
        Mr. Ackerman. Are you saying that the Muslim Brotherhood is
    an exception?
        Mr. Steinberg. No. What I am saying is that if there were
    actual acts that were threatening to people, that that would
    not be acceptable. I want to make clear that we don't think
    that threatening acts of violence would be an acceptable form
    of speech. And I think that is why we made an important
    statement about the need for lack of violence.
        But even more important, I think what we are focused on and
    you have raised the question is not so much the dialogue that
    is going on now, but what kind of government emerges once this
    transition takes place. And I think we have had a consistent
    record in saying that there are circumstances in which parties
    fail to respect democracy, fail to be an acceptable participant
    in government, that we could not be supportive of that
    happening. Obviously a very clear case of that is the Hamas and
    the Palestinian Authority. We made our position very clear on
    that.
        I don't want to try to anticipate what is going to be the
    outcome of this process of democratization in Egypt, but I do
    think we will bring those same sets of principles together,
    which is that a government that will have our support is one
    that respects open society.
        Mr. Ackerman. My concern is that we be as wise as we could
    be considering the alternatives.
        Lebanon. What happens if the new Government of Lebanon
    rejects whatever the results of the tribunal might indicate?
        Mr. Steinberg. I think two points about this, which is,
    one, we attach enormous importance to the continuation of the
    tribunal, and we will do what we can to sustain that effort
    irrespective of what the decisions are of the Lebanese
    Government. It is our clear expectation that whatever
    government is formed, it meet its international obligations
    with respect to the tribunal, and that is what we will expect
    to hold them to. I think we----
        Mr. Ackerman. If Lebanon pulls its financial support for
    the tribunals, some think it would collapse. Are we considering
    withholding aid from Lebanon?
        Mr. Steinberg. As I mentioned earlier in response to Mr.
    Berman's question, I think we obviously keep questions of
    assistance under review. Right now we are focusing on trying to
    encourage all of the parties, including the Prime Minister
    designate, to make sure we have an inclusive government that
    meets its obligations. So long as that continues, and at least
    up until now the tribunal has not been undermined, we are
    continuing our assistance. But obviously we will have to keep
    that under review and look at the circumstances as they emerge.
        Mr. Ackerman. I thank the chair for the extension of time.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Ackerman.
    Great questions.
        So pleased to yield 5 minutes to the chair of the
    Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia, Mr. Chabot, for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Secretary, I have a number of questions. Some of them have
    already been talked about to some degree. But clearly we all
    want democracy. We want the people of Egypt to improve their
    conditions and their freedoms. Our overriding concern is that
    what we all want is going to end up with the folks that we--and
    I don't think the Egyptians themselves, the vast majority, want
    to be in control--and that is the Muslim Brotherhood or Islamic
    Jihadists or whatever terminology one wants to use.
        They said a lot of things, and they are, I think, trying to
    portray themselves to some degree as being, well, we are more
    moderate now. And could you talk a little bit about Sharia law
    and what they said and what you really think their position is
    on that with respect to Egypt if they would gain control?
        Mr. Steinberg. I think there is a lot of speculation as to
    what their goals or objectives are, and I think I would prefer
    to leave that to the analysts.
        What I would say from the perspective of the policymakers'
    point of view is that we have to be clear about what anybody
    joining the government would be expected to be committed to,
    and that commitment is to an open, tolerant society that allows
    for religious diversity, for differences of opinion; that
    doesn't undermine civil society; that supports an open
    discourse among all elements of society; and, rather than
    trying to anticipate what any particular member organization
    is, that we hold to those principles, and we certainly make
    clear to anybody who is joining a future government must commit
    themselves to those principles, and if they do not, then we
    would be clear about what our position is.
        Mr. Chabot. Do you know what they are saying about Sharia
    law at this point in time?
        Mr. Steinberg. I am familiar with their writings, and I
    think what we know is that there are different instances in
    which Sharia law has been used in different societies. Some
    have been tolerant; some have been very intolerant. And what we
    need to focus on is what will protect basic civil liberties,
    and will this next government, and if this organization cannot
    support and subscribe to those things, we believe that it would
    be inconsistent with the very efforts that are going on right
    now.
        Mr. Chabot. You said some of them tolerant and some of them
    intolerant. Can you give me an example of tolerant Sharia law?
        Mr. Steinberg. What I am saying, Mr. Chairman, is that
    there are examples of where in domestic law like Sharia law has
    been a part of societies. But what we are focusing on is what
    political law is and what are the political circumstances under
    which a government should govern. And that government has to
    meet these basic principles that we are identifying.
        So I think that is what we want to focus on: What are the
    political rights? What are the opportunities for the society?
    What are the opportunities for citizens to exercise their
    rights? What are the opportunities for religious minorities?
        One of the strengths of Egyptian society is the fact that
    Christians play such an important role, and that there is a
    small Jewish community there and other religious minorities. So
    if Sharia law means no tolerance for that, then that would not
    be something that we support.
        Mr. Chabot. Let me ask you this on a different topic.
    Relative to the Turkish model, there are obviously some
    parallels and some differences between Turkey and Egypt,
    obviously, but in Turkey the military plays a particularly
    important stabilizing historic role there. What are the
    comparisons with that in Egypt, and are there differences?
        Mr. Steinberg. I think what has been encouraging, and I
    think it has been a positive aspect of our engagement, is that
    thus far as events have unfolded in Egypt, that the military
    has respected the right for peaceful assembly, and it has not
    tried to suppress the legitimate rights of people to express
    their views, to assemble and the like. And we would hope that
    in any society, any government that emerges in Egypt, that we
    would have the same commitment from the role of the military,
    which is to support legitimate constitutional human rights. And
    that is something that we would look to in any society to see
    that as the role of the military.
        Mr. Chabot. I have only got a short period of time. Let me
    comment on something that is kind of frustrating to the
    policymakers here in Washington, I am sure to the American
    people to some degree, and that is with the considerable
    resources that we have invested in those two countries, Egypt
    and Turkey, when you do public opinion polls of the people of
    those countries, the United States isn't particularly well
    thought of or popular. I don't know if you want to comment on
    that. I have been told that is because we are so close, that
    they expect more, et cetera, et cetera. Do you have any comment
    on that?
        Mr. Steinberg. I think it is a challenge to us, and I think
    it is an important challenge to us, because I think that it is
    critical as we go forward that we find ways to understand why
    that is and, to the extent that we can be consistent with our
    own principles and values, that we try to do that.
        Now, obviously there may be circumstances in which we are
    unpopular for things that we believe in, and we will stand up
    for them. But I think if we can do a better job of
    communicating and indicating that we do share the aspirations
    of people all around the world for a better life and better
    opportunity, that that is important, and it has been a major
    purpose of what Secretary Clinton has tried to do with the
    State Department.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
        And I would like to recognize Mr. Gregory Meeks of New York
    for the next round of 5 minutes.
        Thank you, Gregory.
        Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Good to see you, Mr. Secretary.
        Let me ask this question. One of the things that I do get
    concerned about, and I know a lot of my colleagues, et cetera,
    and I talk about the Muslim Brotherhood, et cetera. However,
    if, in fact, we seem too heavy-handed, sometimes it is like the
    kid, the child; you tell them don't date this person, don't
    date that person, and they date the person just to spite you at
    times. I want to make sure that we don't get into that
    scenario. And I have tremendous faith in the Egyptian people
    from what I have seen thus far. They want freedom. They want to
    make sure that they have democracy, which they have been denied
    for 30 years.
        That being said, what you don't want to happen is there to
    be a vacuum so that someone like the Brotherhood steps up. And
    what concerns me is with the opposition, and I don't know what
    leaders can evolve or will evolve because it seems as though
    they are leaderless. And when you begin these negotiations and
    conversations, you know, there has to be someone that is
    talking.
        So I was just wondering, and I had asked this question
    yesterday, who are the leaders that we can expect to emerge,
    and is there anything that you can tell us about them, and can
    the protesters achieve their goals basically without a leader?
        And so and I want to tie that in as quickly as I could to
    the fact that there was a lack of a clear leadership in the
    Tunisia revolution also. And how that is going because I am
    concerned about this--going to Tunisia real quickly about the
    assessments of a security situation there. There was some more
    violence this weekend, a protest, and in your view, what course
    of action toward holding the formal regimes internal security
    services accountable for past abuses would be conducive to a
    greater political openness without contributing to greater
    destabilization.
        Mr. Steinberg. Thank you, Congressman. I think there are--
    and we shouldn't underestimate a lot of important and we well-
    respected civil society voices in Egypt from the NGOs, from
    legal professionals and the like who may well form a part of
    the future Egyptian Government. I think it is both difficult to
    prevent and not on a roll to sort of anoint individuals to be
    the ones. But I do think that that is why we so much have
    focused on urging Egyptian Government to create a process to
    allow these voices to come together, the wise men's group that
    is meeting and others, which do include a variety of well
    respected voices in the society, but also to make sure that the
    younger people who are on the streets also have a chance to
    express their views and to have those perspectives heard.
        I think the nature of democratic process is not to try to
    preselect the leaders, but to establish some institutions and
    processes that then will allow for good, free and fair
    competition elections where individuals will stand for
    election, and the Egyptian people will pick. And I think we
    have a real belief that that process can take place. And that
    what needs to happen now is to take the institutional decisions
    to repeal the emergency law, to take the steps to allow for
    parties to register, for there to be a full debate, and to have
    an election, and to have those very important voices that are
    being heard throughout Egyptian society now, have a chance to
    put their views forward in their candidacy.
        On Tunisia, I would just say that we do think
    accountability is very important. Different societies have
    different ways of doing it, and different conflict situations,
    that has been done. But I think it is something that the
    interim government is focusing on is to establish an approach
    to accountability and understanding both of what happened
    during the past regime and during the transition, and we would
    certainly support that.
        Mr. Meeks. Are we dealing with, Tunisia again, is the
    administration reviewing Tunisia's aid package which is
    currently focused on military assistance. And is it more
    assistance needed by Tunisia for democratic institutional
    building as Tunisia's new government requested technical
    assistance from the United States for the purpose of supporting
    the reform agenda? And will the continuation of military
    assistance programs be contingent upon human rights benchmarks
    or other benchmarks?
        Mr. Steinberg. Well, clearly on the last, we are under a
    mandate from you to make sure that it does. And so that would
    be an important part of what we do. More broadly, we have been
    engaged in conversations with the interim government in terms
    of how we can support and help that transition. And I think
    that is, as I say, part of the flexibility and adaptability
    that we are trying to show now is to look for opportunities to
    support that process going forward.
        Mr. Meeks. And finally, let me just ask, what level of
    electoral success would you anticipate from the Tunisian
    Islamic groups, if they are allowed to compete in the national
    elections that they had promised within the next 6 months?
        Mr. Steinberg. Again, Congressman, we have basic a
    principle that guides us, which is that we will support and
    encourage governments that meet the basic tests of tolerance,
    inclusiveness and openness. And rather than trying to prejudge
    what these groups will do, we will judge them by their deeds.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. And before
    yielding 5 minutes to my Florida colleague, Mr. Rivera, I would
    like, without objection, the ranking member to be recognized
    for an announcement.
        Mr. Berman. We have just learned that, and I think on
    behalf of the chair and the entire committee wants to extend
    our condolences and the condolences of the entire committee to
    the loved ones and friends of Khairy Ramadan Aly. This is a
    fellow who was a U.S. Embassy Cairo staff employee for 18
    years. He went missing from his home on January 28th and just
    today has been confirmed as dead. And so on behalf of all of
    us----
        Mr. Steinberg. Thank you, Mr. Berman. It is obviously a
    tribute to the dedicated, locally employed staff and the risks
    that they take, and I appreciate that. And on behalf of all of
    us, we appreciate that.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Steinberg. Mr.
    Rivera.
        Mr. Rivera. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Secretary, thank
    you so much for being here. I am heartened by your testimony
    regarding the impact of the crisis in Egypt, vis-a-vis Israel.
    I am glad you agree that irrespective of whatever emerges out
    of the uncertain circumstances in Egypt that U.S. interests
    remain constant. And specifically that Egypt continue to honor
    its commitment to peace with Israel.
        So I am wondering if you can elaborate, and please be as
    specific as possible, as to what exact message the United
    States is delivering, has been delivering, will be delivering
    to all the parties regarding Egypt's commitment to peace with
    Israel?
        Mr. Steinberg. I thank you, Congressman. The message has
    been very clear, which is the peace treaty between Israel and
    Egypt is not just in the interest of Israel, it is in the
    interest of Egypt and the region as a whole. And therefore, we
    would expect any government to honor its international
    commitments, and to honor a treaty that was signed by that
    government, and to remain committed to it not just in letter
    but in spirit.
        This is a foundation for Egypt's future success. The
    prospect of the conflict with Israel would serve no interest of
    Egypt's, and it would certainly not be consistent with our
    interests. So I think we are very unequivocal about both our
    own position but also making fair that this is not a favor to
    anybody else. That if Egypt should continue it and the reason
    we would expect Egypt to continue it is because it is in
    Egypt's interest.
        Mr. Rivera. Over the years, Mr. Secretary, the United
    States has sold a great deal of military equipment to Egypt,
    and at the same time, we have been deeply committed to Israel's
    qualitative military edge, and essentially, Israel's ability to
    defend it. And part of that calculus in providing weapons to
    Egypt was that it was committed to peace with Israel. If
    Egypt's commitment toward peace with Israel changes, how will
    that effect future decisions about the sale and maintenance of
    weapon systems to the Egyptians?
        Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, any time there would be a
    dramatic change in circumstances, we would have to take that
    into account in making our decisions, but I think our focus now
    on the positive message, which is the benefits of engagement
    that we have had with Egypt and the Egyptian military, and
    therefore would expect them to see the benefits of continuing
    this and continuing that basic process, which has led to this
    long period of peace between Israel and Egypt.
        Mr. Rivera. Based on your experience and developments that
    you are seeing occurring right now, do you see Egypt continuing
    to play a positive role on issues in general regional
    stability, for example, opposition to Iran's nuclear program,
    standing up to Islamic radicalism, et cetera?
        Mr. Steinberg. I would have every reason to expect that a
    more democratic Egypt would be at least as much committed to
    those principles, because in a democratic society, all the
    things that you have talked about are inimical to a democratic
    society. And some of the kind of intolerance, the support for
    terrorism and the things that we would be concerned about are
    something that a strong and vibrant democratic government in
    Egypt would also share. I think that has been our experience.
        If you look around the world, who are our strong partners
    on all of these global challenges? Not just the shared values,
    but the shared interest. When we are dealing with Iran, who are
    our strong partners? Our strong partners in Europe, the
    democratic societies there. We are working with Japan, we are
    working with Korea. So I think we believe very strongly that in
    terms of the interests, whether it is sustaining peace in the
    Middle East, dealing with terrorism, dealing with Iran's
    nuclear program. That an open vibrant Egyptian Government would
    be very much in sync with those views and those perspectives.
        Mr. Rivera. And up to this moment here today, you see no
    indications whether that be from any elements of Egyptian
    society, the military or otherwise, civil society, other
    elements of the government that any of these prospects could
    change in the negative fashion?
        Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, we have to be vigilant.
    Obviously, we have seen events sometimes not fully predictable.
    But I think what we need to do is encourage and support those
    forces to reduce the chances of those things happening. And our
    whole strategy is to try to do that by engaging in supporting
    this process to reduce the risks that these dangers which you
    rightfully identify, and which we do have to be alert to, don't
    emerge.
        Mr. Rivera. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I yield back the
    remainder of my time.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. And now I would
    like to yield to another Florida colleague, Congressman Deutch
    for 5 minutes of questioning.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chair. I would like to pick up
    where my colleague from Florida left off and broaden from
    there. Starting with the issue of aid, not just to Egypt but
    aid to Israel as well. It gives us a good jumping off point for
    a broader debate that is taking place right now on Capitol
    Hill, and that has to do with foreign aid more generally.
        There are proposals that have been floating around that
    have suggested that State Department and foreign aid requests
    should be lumped in with non security spending and as such,
    should be subject to cuts, reductions anywhere between 10 and
    30 percent. Given the State Department's role in Pakistan, and
    in Afghanistan, and in the war on terror, given the national
    security concerns that we have, and further, given the role
    that foreign aid plays not just in the Middle East, not just in
    helping Israel to ensure that Israel has a qualitative military
    edge, but in the role that foreign aid plays in global health
    and maternal care, children's health, the role that foreign aid
    plays fighting global hunger. The role of foreign aid in
    fighting narcotraffickers in Latin America and in continuing
    President Bush's signature achievement in combating AIDS in
    Africa.
        Reconstruction, counterterrorism. And finally, given some
    of the suggestions that have been made on the Hill to eliminate
    foreign aid altogether, and suggestions from some outside, some
    prominent outside groups that all foreign aid should be on the
    table, is it appropriate, do you believe, Mr. Secretary, for us
    to look to what is 1 percent or less of the Federal budget in
    finding ways to balance the budget by eliminating foreign
    assistance altogether? And wouldn't the elimination of foreign
    aid put our Nation at greater risk?
        Mr. Steinberg. Well, thank you, Congressman. As you can
    well imagine the Secretary and all of us feel very strongly,
    and the President that this is a critical part of assuring our
    national interest. Our ability to engage in the world, to
    support democratic institutions, to build economic opportunity,
    to deal with the problems of health and hunger are all critical
    questions we asked earlier about how the world looks at
    America. This is part of the positive engagement of American
    that allows us to build friends and to have support on our
    interests and they touch our national interests ourselves. If
    we don't deal with the problem of global public health, those
    things could come home to us.
        It is having a strong, balanced strategy of smart power of
    engagement in the world, that has a strong defense, but also
    supports development and diplomacy that allows the United
    States to pursue its interests over the long term, and to have
    the kind of partners that we need to move forward.
        We have had important successes in Iraq, we need to sustain
    that. It would be a tragedy right now with all that has been
    achieved and the sacrifice that has taken place not to be able
    to continue the progress they are creating, a good example of a
    democratic tolerant society in Iraq, which is a very powerful
    signal throughout this region, including to Egypt, to continue
    to make sure that the extremists don't come back in
    Afghanistan.
        We know what had happened before and we have a critical
    issue that, again, echoes so much of what you all have been
    discussing this morning about how do we assure that extremism
    doesn't come back? It is by supporting tolerant, more open
    political societies and good governance and the rule of law.
    These are the things we do with our assistance programs, with
    our engagement with civil society. They are critically
    important to our national interests and this is, as we think
    about our long-term future and the role of the United States in
    the world, this is an absolutely indispensable part.
        And so, we do hope that as we understand the fiscal
    challenges, but this is a very small part of the budget, but it
    is a critically important one for fundamental national security
    interests of United States.
        Mr. Deutch. And just again, Mr. Secretary, am I correct
    that the foreign assistance budget is about 1 percent of the
    overall budget?
        Mr. Steinberg. That is about right.
        Mr. Deutch. And if you could speak to what a cut of 10 to
    30 percent across the board might mean? How would that impact
    American foreign policy?
        Mr. Steinberg. I think it would affect us across the board.
    It would mean that we would not be able to sustain our
    engagement on the civilian side in Iraq because it's so
    important that we make sure that this transition moves forward,
    that the reconciliation that is taking place through these two
    elections continues.
        It would affect our ability to support civil society and
    democracy. It would affect our ability to deal with the
    problems of hunger and creating sustainable agriculture. It
    would affect our ability to deal with the problem of global
    public health. It would affect our ability to support the kind
    of work that we need to do around the world to build strong
    institutions.
        And we are, right now, having good opportunities where we
    are engaged. But the opportunities are even greater if we see
    and smartly apply those resources.
        We have an obligation to you to make sure that they are
    well-targeted, that they are well-conceived, and that they are
    well-managed. But in return, we think we deliver a benefit, and
    I think no one more articulate than Secretary Gates has made
    clear about how important that is to our national security.
        Mr. Deutch. And finally, Mr. Secretary, to those who
    suggest that we ought to eliminate foreign aid all together, I
    suggest to them that they would be putting our Nation at risk.
    Would you agree with that?
        Mr. Steinberg. I think, as I say, it is a critical part of
    our smart power engagement of the world. The three legs of that
    stool that all the present survivors recognized are critical to
    our national security. And over our history, we go back to the
    Marshall Plan and so many other examples of how we sustained
    our long-term influence and protected our interest by the wise
    use of our resources in this area.
        Our military cannot protect our national interest alone. We
    have seen that in Iraq, and we see it in Afghanistan. It has to
    be a balanced effort. And our contribution, the part that goes
    to the State Department and assistance is very small compared
    to Defense. But has a huge multiplier effect, it has a huge
    positive impact on the well-being of the American people.
        Also on the economic side it helps open up economic
    opportunities. It creates opportunities for American jobs and
    American exports. That is what our diplomats do every day,
    advocating for American interests, opening markets and the
    like. So there are many ways in which U.S. interests are being
    protected by this rather modest investment.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And I yield back,
    Madam Chair.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch.
        Mr. Rohrabacher, the chairman of the Subcommittee on
    Oversight and Investigations.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Now following up on my last colleague's
    line of questioning, putting America in jeopardy, let me just
    note putting us at a risk at a much greater level than what we
    are talking about is $1.5 trillion worth of deficit spending a
    year that we have to borrow from China. And we cannot maintain
    that. And if we continue to do that, our economy will collapse
    under a burden of debt that we have never experienced before.
        So this is not, Oh boy, we would love to do this, we would
    love to do that. No, there are certain things that we are going
    have to come to grips with and be serious about. And I will
    tell you, borrowing more money from China in order to give it
    to other people in different countries is not something that I
    consider to be a positive option. It is crazy, it is insane.
        We have been providing aid to Egypt over all of these
    years. And now we have people who seem to be high and mighty
    about how bad Mr. Mubarak is, but have supported this aid
    program to Egypt all of these years.
        It seems to me that American foreign policy is not based on
    principle, as you have suggested today, it should be or has
    been, but instead it is based on juggling. What can we do for
    the moment not to create a crisis, rather than have a long-term
    principled policy and a policy aimed not at what we can do for
    the world but what is best for the people of the United States
    of America? And let me get to----
        Mr. Ackerman. Would the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Rohrabacher. No, I won't. I have got a line of
    questioning I would like to ask. I have got a very fine
    diplomat. Let me just note, we have so much juggling going on,
    that we can't have someone like yourself answer a straight
    question about the nature of Sharia law. Now, if we can't do
    that, how do we expect to have the American people and the
    people of the world understand where we draw the line?
        Yeah. We can have people jump up and applaud that Mr.
    Mubarak is gone, yeah. But what is going to happen 2 years down
    the road when we have an administration in Egypt that puts
    women in jail, much less permitting them to participate in the
    system, if they try to go on the street without wearing a veil?
    Is that what we are going to end up with Mubarak gone? We are
    trying not to end up with that.
        Let me just note that I have been dismayed that for all of
    these years, we have taken an administration in Egypt, which is
    less than democratic, less than honest, we have known that, but
    we have treated them well, and then as soon as--but they have
    been basically a pro-stability and a pro-Western government.
    And as soon as they are vulnerable, we turn on them with a
    vengeance, as compared to an anti democratic regime in Iran
    when there are demonstrators in the streets against them, we
    have sort of a muffled response. Well, we can't really go in
    and side with the demonstrators against this anti-American
    Mullah regime dictatorship in Iran.
        We can't do that because that would be just too intrusive.
    But in Egypt where you have a friendly regime--as I say, we
    don't just toss Mubarak, a guy who has tried to be a force for
    stability, we don't just toss him under the boss, we toss him
    to the wolves, and then we are surprised when the wolves end up
    eating our lunch.
        Let's get to some basics here. The administration Mubarak--
    President Mubarak offered to say that he would not be a
    candidate, and his son would not be a candidate and he would
    oversee a basically a caretaker regime until the September
    elections were held, and the people of Egypt were permitted to
    make their decision as to what direction their country should
    go. What was wrong with that?
        Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, let me just briefly comment on
    your first point first, and then I'll----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Sure.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. You have 30 seconds.
        Mr. Steinberg. I understand.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Pardon me.
        Mr. Steinberg. But having had it raised, I think our
    position on Sharia law is very clear. And it was illustrated
    very dramatically in the case of a proposal for the institution
    of Sharia law in Afghanistan, which would have deprived women
    of their rights and which would have been unacceptable to the
    United States. And we made clear to President Karzai in the
    Afghan Parliament that that was unacceptable to us.
        So I don't think there was any lack of clarity or lack of
    understanding on our part about where the red lines are and our
    principals are. So I understand your question, but I want to
    make clear from our perspective that we do understand that
    point. And we do understand----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. It did seem that you were dodging the
    question earlier.
        Mr. Steinberg. I apologize if I appeared to be dodging, but
    I hope----
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. That was a good
    exchange. Thank you for those excellent questions.
        Mr. Keating is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for
    being here, Secretary Steinberg. During the Iranian protest 2
    years ago, Americans saw how the Iranian people used the social
    media, it is no longer in dispute, the effect of the Internet
    on the Egyptian uprising. And they use Twitter, Facebook,
    texting, YouTube, to gain a following in the country. And
    exacting admiration in much of the world process.
        However, many American people were shocked to know years
    ago that the Iranians were using the social media, you know, to
    monitor protests and to down opposition leaders and even worse,
    we discovered that companies, as was mentioned by Congressman
    Smith, with the presence in the United States were helping the
    Iranian regime exploit technology and turn innovation into
    violence.
        So when the Egyptian Government commenced its cyber
    crackdown, frankly no one was surprised. I don't think they
    followed that. But it seems that American company is involved
    in this instance as well. A company in California sold the
    Egyptian state-run Internet provider the technology to monitor
    the Internet, allowing the Egyptian Government to crack down in
    dissent. And I also understand that the Pakistani Government, a
    telecom company and the Saudi Government's telecom company have
    this technology. It is no secret, I think, to anyone, that
    neither has a glowing record on human rights.
        I would like to know what the Department is doing to work
    with American companies that are selling their technology and
    these products around the world to ensure that these products
    are not an obstacle to human rights at best or a tool of
    violence at worst. When we sell weapons to other countries, we
    require an end-use monitoring agreement. Do you think that such
    an agreement to make sure that U.S. technology is not abused is
    in order at all? Is that being considered, thank you.
        Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, as I mentioned to Congressman
    Smith, I am not familiar with the specific case, but we will
    get back to you on that. I think, more generally, one of the
    things that we have tried to do as we work with civil society
    is both to promote openness and to support their access to
    alternative media when it has been deprived. But frankly, also,
    to help them understand the dangers and the risk to them too.
    And I think it is two sides to the coin, and that we have to be
    alert to the dangers that will be used by people for the wrong
    reasons.
        So part of our educational effort in our work with them is
    to help groups in civil society protect themselves and to take
    measures to be sensitive to these things.
        In terms of the specific technologies, again, without
    knowing the specifics, it is hard to make a general
    observation, but I think it is something we should take under
    advisement.
        Mr. Keating. I would ask if there is any discussion along
    those lines, I would like to know myself, and I am sure that
    many members of the committee would like to know that because,
    indeed, people are losing their lives based on this technology.
    And it is not a stretch to say it is being used as a weapons by
    some of these other countries, and as such, should be treated
    that way in end-use monitoring agreements so it would be
    curious to know anything on that. Thank you.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, do get back to us on
    that.
        Mr. Keating. I yield the rest of my time.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Without objection, I would just like
    to yield myself 30 seconds of time to welcome back and
    congratulate and say thank you to a member of our Foreign
    Affairs family, a member of our majority staff, Matt Zweig, who
    has just returned from a year of military service in Kandahar,
    Afghanistan. So thank you, Matt. Good to have you back.
        And with that, I would like to yield 5 minutes of
    questioning to our subcommittee chairman on Europe and Eurasia,
    Mr. Burton.
        Mr. Burton. I thank the gentlelady for yielding, and I
    appreciate you being here, Mr. Steinberg. My big concern is the
    United States first, and our very close ally, Israel in the
    Middle East, and toward that end, it appears to me there is
    still a great deal of uncertainty right now. We are getting all
    kinds of reports on what is going on and nobody knows for sure
    what is happening. But we do know there has been upheaval, not
    only in Egypt, but in other countries over there. And we get
    about 30 percent of our energy from that part of the world.
        And although the decision on exploring for energy here in
    the United States will not rest with the State Department, the
    State Department does have a role to play in deciding where our
    national security interests lie.
        And right now if we have problems over there in the Suez
    Canal, and Egypt is the Suez Canal, or if things get bad over
    in the Persian Gulf states, or if, and we see some people
    concerned about things in Iraq. If things go awry in Iraq
    because of Iran, we can see our supply of energy diminished
    dramatically. And I think the State Department's obligation is
    that they need to start expressing that to the administration.
    The administration has--and we get about 30 percent of our
    energy from the Persian Gulf region. We get about 20 percent
    from Venezuela who is in league with Tehran right now.
        So there is half of our energy. And we can't get permits to
    drill in the Gulf now. We can't drill off the Continental
    Shelf, we can drill in the ANWR. We can't drill for natural
    gas. We had T. Boone Pickens here the last couple of days
    talking about that.
        And we have the ability to be energy independent within a
    decade. There is no question about it. We have more energy in
    this country collectively, including gas and oil, coal shale
    that can be converted into oil, that any place in the world,
    there is no question about it. But we are not moving in that
    direction, so we are still dependent on the Middle East and
    they have a life and death grip on us if everything goes awry.
        And so I would like for you to answer the question, why is
    it there is not more attention being paid by this
    administration and the State Department to the security of this
    Nation, both economically and militarily, because we are not
    moving toward energy independence? Not only that, but if you
    talk to the average person who is paying $3.50 a gallon for
    gasoline knowing it is going to go to $5 or $6 if things get
    out of control in a little bit, they are saying, you know, if
    we have that ability, why don't we do something about it?
        So where is the State Department on this issue? And why
    isn't the State Department and Secretary Clinton talking to the
    President about the long-term issue of what happens if things
    go in the wrong direction in that part of the world?
        And make no mistake about it, if you look at history and
    there is a book from 1776 to now, which I hope you read and the
    people at the State Department, you will see upheaval in that
    part of the world is a constant, and our security depends on
    it. So while we are concerned about that area and democracy and
    everything else, why in the world isn't State and
    administration talking about moving toward energy independence.
        Mr. Steinberg. Mr. Chairman, it is a complex issue for the
    whole administration.
        Mr. Burton. It is not that complex.
        Mr. Steinberg. In terms of the other parts of the
    administration that are engaged. And I am not the spokesman
    from that respect, but I can talk about some other things.
        Mr. Burton. Before you go to other things. What I would
    really like for you to do is go back to the State Department
    and tell them to talk to the administration about our national
    security. We are supposed to work with other nations in the
    world, to bring about stability and we use foreign policy and
    foreign aid to do all that. But the number 1 responsibility of
    government, according to the Constitution of the United States,
    is to protect this country, economically and, militarily. And
    we are risking that right now, all you have to do is look at
    what is going on not only in Egypt, but in other countries in
    the Middle East.
        Mr. Steinberg. I think if you look at our energy strategy,
    one, the President has indicated the importance of developing
    domestic sources. Two, we have talked about, in addition to oil
    and gas, there are other energy sources like the efforts we are
    doing to revive nuclear energy. We also are working to
    diversify so that we are not dependent on these dangerous
    areas. For example, a new agreement that we are negotiating
    with Mexico to have access to activities on the boundary in the
    Gulf. I was just in Africa and looking at opportunities to have
    access with Ghana, a democracy in Africa which has----
        Mr. Burton. I am talking about energy we have here in the
    United States.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Steinberg. Your time
    has run out. Mr. Burton, I think you have made your point clear
    and we would appreciate it if you would get back to Mr. Burton
    about energy independence and the administration's plan.
        Mr. Steinberg. Certainly.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island is
    recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I too want to
    welcome our guest and thank you for being here. And thank you
    Mr. Secretary for being here. The first question I have is a
    follow up on Mr. Berman's question, is it the administration's
    position that with respect to the constitutional provision in
    the Egyptian Constitution with respect to religious parties
    that it is possible to repeal that provision, but have a
    sufficiently--a government which is sufficiently tolerant to
    satisfy you or satisfy the Department that it will protect the
    interest of the Egyptian people and our international
    interests, or is it the administration's position that that
    prohibition ought to remain as part of the Egyptian
    Constitution? It sounded as if you weren't committed or the
    administration was not committed--at least to advocating for
    the preservation of that.
        Mr. Steinberg. I think we are committed to advocating for
    the principle. I think it would be a bit perilous for us to try
    to write the Constitution in the context they are doing it.
    There may be other formulations that are consistent with that
    principle, but I don't want to have any ambiguity about the
    importance of the principle.
        Again, that is why, in our conversation earlier, I
    mentioned some cases where we have advocated very vigorously
    where that principle was inconsistent with basic values. And so
    that is what we will focus on going forward, is it consistent,
    that would be a way we would judge.
        Mr. Cicilline. Also, would you tell me, it seems as if
    there is tremendous concern from everyone that has spoken
    really to us about the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in a
    future Egyptian Government. And I am just wondering what your
    impression is with respect to the likelihood of that happening.
    Interestingly, of course, when President Mubarak met, he had
    met first with them really in response to the protest which
    suggested to those of us from the outside that they may have a
    more significant role in a future government in Egypt than we
    might have first thought. So what do you think is a likely role
    they would play? And then second, do we have strategies or an
    approach which would help to ensure that funding doesn't go
    from the Muslim Brotherhood to Hamas moving forward?
        Mr. Steinberg. Well, we are very focused and we are very
    vigilant because of the risk that this process become hijacked
    by extremists, by individualist groups that don't reflect or
    respect the very principles that we think people are
    demonstrating for. And we are obviously going to have to judge
    that by what emerges. There are an infinite number of
    possibilities that might come forward. But what we have to be
    clear on is that we expect the next Egyptian Government to have
    and advance the values of openness, tolerance, allowing people
    to pursue an open life with their human rights respected, with
    diversity respected, particularly on issues like religious
    freedom, on women's rights, on a right to have freedom of
    expression, of the press, of assembly. And we will apply those
    criteria with a real recognition from the history that we have
    seen in this region of the dangers that a process which might
    begin with good impulse might not end up that way.
        So I think our challenge right now is rather than trying to
    say specifically now what will happen if it goes wrong, is to
    focus on what we can do to help it go right, and to support
    that process, and to be prepared to deal with it, and be clear
    that there would be consequences if the outcome is one that is
    not consistent with our values and our interest.
        But right now, I think what it is critical is for us to
    talk about what we are for. And I think by articulating those
    principles and by identifying what we expect and what we
    believe is in the interest of the Egyptian people and what we
    think they are out there on the streets for. I think that
    creates a positive engagement for us, not one of--again being
    vigilant, but not based on the fear of the worst, but also an
    opportunity to achieve this good result.
        Again, we must remain vigilant and have seen this go awry.
    And we will be prepared to both make clear what we are going to
    do and to deal with those circumstances.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. And I wanted to say finally,
    thank you for your very articulate testimony with respect to
    our responsibility to really approach our foreign policy in a
    very balanced way. It is clear to me that it is in the national
    security interest of our country to make the kind of
    investments that we are making around the world, both to avoid
    greater costs for our failure to become fully engaged. But also
    to retain our moral authority so that we can do the work on
    behalf of the American people, both in supporting our economy
    and supporting our security.
        And so I think this question about foreign aid is an
    important one, but it is not simply done to help other nations,
    but it is really done principally to help the United States
    maintain its position internationally and to protect our
    economy and to protect our national security and I thank you
    particularly for those comments as well. I yield back the
    balance of my time.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. And now we
    would like to hear from Chairman Ed Royce, the chair of the
    Foreign Affairs' Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation,
    and Trade.
        Mr. Royce. Mr. Steinberg, I met with a group of seven
    Egyptians from Cairo and Alexandria who had recently came to
    the United States, many of them young professionals, and I
    asked them to give me their opinions on what needs to be done.
    I would like to share with you sort of their list from the
    front lines.
        The first observation they made is they shared with me that
    we need strict implementation of international human rights
    laws in this country and that there should be some discussion
    of this in the United States. A guarantee of basic freedoms by
    holding accountable those who violate international human
    rights laws.
        The second thing they see missing from the discussion is an
    end to all discriminatory acts that are based on ethnicity and
    sex and religion throughout all sectors of society. And most
    important, some kind of discipline for those who violate that
    prohibition.
        They asked for eradication of all ideologies in the
    education system because those installed discrimination and
    hatred among students starting at the preschool level and all
    the way up to the university level. This is partly because they
    say the Muslim Brotherhood has gotten control in the
    educational system and it is using it for that purpose.
        The fourth thing, these are the young students that were in
    the streets--they want awareness of the imminent danger of
    radical religious groups in Egypt, such as the Muslim
    Brotherhood, which, to some extent, they say is funded by Iran.
    And one of the things they report is there is walking around
    money, and food, that has been provided by the Iranians, and it
    is annoying to those that are leading the charge to have on the
    streets a foreign influence, and they would like that known.
        They say that this group has already infiltrated the
    backbone of some Egyptian society. They also ask for a
    reformation to the judicial system, a reformation to a system
    which currently supports a corrupt regime and does not provide
    justice to the citizens through the implementation of the laws.
        They say bribery and corruption are the norm within most of
    the judicial branch and report--the young professionals told me
    they pay as much as 25 bribes in order get a little business
    going or in order to be professionals. We heard it from
    Hernando de Soto's report, right? The Finance Minister or
    former Finance Minister, I think it was of Egypt, supported
    Hernando's work. Hernando does his study, shows how you can
    unleash all of this potential growth in Egypt because you only
    know who owns 10 percent of the property. Nobody can start a
    business without doing payoffs.
        So he lays out the reforms and the first thing the
    government does is sack their Minister who supported these
    reforms. That shows us how much has to be done here. So I would
    just add to your talking points when you talk about this, a
    government that respects its people, that is what we want from
    Egypt. A government that respects its people and isn't corrupt;
    let's add that to our talking points about what we want done. I
    just wanted your opinion about what the students and the young
    professionals had told me.
        Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, I think that is an enormously
    constructive agenda. I think it is an important one that should
    be a shared agenda of all of us. I think the issues that you
    have raised are issues that should be of concern and that are
    important to the long-term success of Egypt. So if we haven't
    been clear enough that that is what we hope to see, we will do
    a better job. But it is one of the things. Especially, I want
    to agree especially with you on the point of rule of law and
    corruption, which is a big concern and it is really critical to
    the future. So thank you for those suggestions.
        Mr. Royce. Well, there is one other point that they wanted
    to make. They said there are a lot of good voices such as the
    Council of the Wise, which was formed after January 25th
    revolution, as well as many other voices in Egyptian society
    that are well-known, that are admired by the people and are not
    part of the Muslim Brotherhood. And every one of them was
    absolutely in terror of what might happen if we end up
    negotiating and help putting the Muslim Brotherhood in
    positions of responsibility because, as they shared with me,
    that is an organization that only exists to take power, put in
    place an Islamic society and then carry out of the rest of the
    agenda, which, as one of them told me, the next thing you know
    we will be at war with Israel if they get control of the
    government. If you talk to young people in the Muslim
    Brotherhood, that is where they are driving the cadres on the
    street, that is the ideology.
        So can you keep them out of the equation? I know we
    discussed this earlier, but can you do something to help those
    voices in Egypt that are so frightened of that consequence?
        Mr. Steinberg. I think that should be our objective and
    that is what we are trying to do.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        Mr. Steinberg. As I said, we have a program to address this
    and we can and will do more.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. My colleague from New York. It is
    good to see you, Elliot, recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I want to first of
    all welcome the Secretary. I was here for his remarks and I
    have known him for many years and we are lucky to have him. He
    does a great job. Thank you for the job you are doing.
        As you know, for the past 4 years, I chaired the Western
    Hemisphere Subcommittee on this committee, and now I am the
    ranking member. And one of the things that has been irking me,
    and I am sure irking you and a lot of us, is that a lot of the
    South American governments are recognizing Palestine. And why
    it especially irks me is that the Palestinians are refusing to
    sit down with the Israelis and negotiate without all these
    ridiculous preconditions which actually shouldn't be
    preconditions at all. That is what you negotiate about.
        And I look at it, it is rewarding the Palestinians for
    their intransigence. And I think that is the wrong thing to do,
    because rather than tell them they should go to the negotiating
    table, it sort of rewards them for not going to the negotiating
    table. Now we have this resolution before the Security Council
    which condemns Israel for the settlements, and makes it seem
    that the settlements are the reason why there is no peace,
    which I think is a bunch of nonsense. I think that if the
    Palestinians would negotiate with the Israelis that the
    settlement issue, along with other issues would be taken care
    of.
        I would hope that if that happens, the administration would
    strongly and forcefully veto such a resolution as we have in
    the past. And I believe that the administration so far has not
    yet unequivocally indicated that it would do so. So I would
    like to ask you is that a fact, and if it is, I would strongly
    urge the administration to veto this resolution of the Security
    Council if it comes up.
        Mr. Steinberg. I thank you, Congressman Engel. First just,
    if I comment on your first point about your recognitions we
    have made very clear to a lot of countries, including in the
    region that you talked about that you have had and continue to
    have responsibility for that we think this is
    counterproductive. I am disappointed frankly that we haven't
    had more success, but it has been in our engagement at the
    highest levels with each those governments. I, myself, have had
    several of those conversations. And so our position is well-
    known on that.
        With respect to the Security Council, we have made very
    clear we do not think the Security Council is the right place
    to engage on these issues. I have had some success, at least
    for the moment, in not having that arise there. We will
    continue to employ the tools that we have to make sure that
    that continues to not happen. And we made clear both to the
    Palestinians and our key partners that there are other venues
    to discuss these issues, but the most important one of which is
    the one that you identified, which is the only way that this is
    going to be resolved is through engagement between the two
    parties, and that is our clear consistent position.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you. Yesterday I asked the two questions
    to our panelists and I want to ask you the same two questions
    and so what your answer is vis-a-vis what they said to me. And
    I know some of this has been discussed in the past hour or so.
    But what are the differences you see between 1979 Iran
    revolution and 2011 Egypt? What are some of the differences
    that make us hopeful that perhaps the results that we saw in
    Iran wouldn't happen in Egypt?
        And then, I know that another question I asked yesterday
    which I understand Mr. Ackerman touched upon is what do we do
    if Lebanon rejects the special tribunal? Mikati--the answer
    from the panelists yesterday from that question of mine is that
    Mikati should be shunned. He should not be invited to the
    United States, he should be told that this is unacceptable, and
    we should shun him.
        As you know, I wrote the Syria Accountability Act, passed
    in 2004, and with our now chairman, she and I were on a crusade
    for many years to do this. And now Syria is still doing the
    same kind of nasty things it has always been doing in the
    region. We now have an ambassador there, but I don't see any
    positive things from their side. I would like to you comment on
    those three things if you could.
        Mr. Steinberg. Thank you. Both obviously complicated
    questions, especially the first. I got my start in government
    working on the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979. And so I
    reflected a lot on that. I would simply say, first no two
    circumstances are identical. But also our engagement in Iran
    prior to the revolution was very different. The revolution of
    Iran was much more associated with our engagement with the
    prior regime.
        Here I think we are seen as a positive force on the
    Egyptian side, so I think we can have a positive influence and
    I would be happy to go into more detail with you in less than 5
    seconds.
        With respect to Lebanon, let me just say that we believe
    the continuation of the tribunal is essential, we made clear to
    Mikati in direct conversations that we had through the Embassy
    that that is our expectation. Again, I don't want to assume the
    worst now and say the precise consequences of it not going
    forward. But we have made clear that is what our expectation
    is, it is the international obligation of any government in
    Lebanon to meet those obligations. And we have made clear to
    Mr. Mikati that we expect him to do so as well.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Engel.
        I am pleased to recognize Mr. Manzullo, the chairman of the
    Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Manzullo. Thank you, Madam Chair. In the summer of
    2009, many of us in this country were very dismayed over the
    fact that when the demonstrations broke out in Iran in the
    streets on day 1, our President said nothing. On day 2, our
    President said nothing. Finally, on day 3 he said something to
    the effect that we need a continued dialogue with the clerics.
    That was extraordinarily disappointing.
        When the people started marching in Egypt, it didn't take
    the President that long to undermine President Mubarak and say
    he has got to go. I would like to know what the basis of the
    President's decision making was. At that time, you were Deputy
    Secretary of State and doing nothing in Iran 1\1/2\ years ago.
    Why didn't he do something?
        Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, I obviously have a different
    view on what took place both in terms of the statements that we
    made in support of the people in the streets in Iran, and the
    support that we have continued to give for that, as well as our
    continued focus on the problem of the depravation of human
    rights in Iran.
        Mr. Manzullo. No, I am talking about the response, not the
    focus. Don't tell me that the people in the streets were
    supported by the U.S. Government because they were not.
        Mr. Steinberg. We made clear our strong support for them,
    but at the same time----
        Mr. Manzullo. But you didn't, that is not correct. They
    were not supported.
        Mr. Steinberg. I think we gave the support that the
    President articulated and the Secretary articulated about our
    strong commitment to their rights to peacefully demonstrate and
    to assemble, the need for the government there to engage with
    them.
        Mr. Manzullo. Nothing on the order that was given to the
    people in Egypt specifically saying that Mubarak has got to go.
        Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, I also do not--on that side, we
    have not used that expression.
        Mr. Manzullo. Wait a second, wait a second. You are telling
    me that President Obama has not said in one way or the other
    that Mubarak must go? Is that what you are telling this
    committee?
        Mr. Steinberg. What the President has said and what the
    Secretary has said is that change has to come, that a
    transition has to come.
        Mr. Manzullo. Can you give me a yes or no answer to my
    question?
        Mr. Steinberg. We have not used the expression that you
    identified, sir.
        Mr. Manzullo. So you said events must go into action and--
    --
        Mr. Steinberg. Correct.
        Mr. Manzullo. Everybody in the world understands that
    President Obama's position is to push Mubarak out of office.
    And I am just really astonished that you think that that is an
    amazing statement. So, why didn't we do anything more in Iran?
        Mr. Steinberg. Again, I think our position has been clearly
    to support of the rights of the people to demonstrate. We have
    made clear that we thought that the election was not conducted
    fairly, openly, that we spoke out against the oppression, we
    spoke out against the violence.
        Mr. Manzullo. It was clearly not enough. I mean, I don't
    think anybody in this country was interested in Iran turning
    around, was satisfied with the statement of the President of
    the United States. So, what are you going to do now in light of
    the President's involvement in Egypt? What happens if
    demonstrations break out in Tehran? What are you going to do
    now?
        Mr. Steinberg. We will do as we have done. We have said
    about demonstrations whether they are in Syria or in Iran.
        Mr. Manzullo. You see, that is the problem, the answer that
    you gave, that you are giving, I know it is well-intended and
    it is obviously factual, but it is weak. And it is the message
    of weakness that gets sent abroad as to what the United States
    is doing. President Obama and the Secretary of State have been
    very clear about what is going on in Egypt, granted the
    demonstrations there have lasted longer than in Tehran. And
    either they said directly or inferentially that Mubarak has to
    leave. And apparently that is going on right now. But it was so
    weak in Iran. Don't you think that the President's statements
    go a lot toward formulating public policy when people take to
    the streets such as they did in Tehran?
        Mr. Steinberg. Again, I think the President spoke clearly
    to this. But I also think there are other things that we did,
    and partially using tools that you give us, we have identified
    members of the Iranian Government who are human rights abusers
    and imposed sanctions on them. We have taken measures to work
    to appoint a special human rights rapporteur in Iran.
        Mr. Manzullo. Well, they put three hikers on trial for
    treason.
        Mr. Steinberg. As we have made very clear and worked very
    hard, including----
        Mr. Manzullo. Well, nothing is working, so are you going to
    change something in Iran?
        Mr. Steinberg. We have a very comprehensive strategy in
    Iran which not only deals with the human rights abuses there
    which are substantial, but also the Iranian nuclear program,
    which has led us with the leadership of the Congress working
    together with us to impose the most comprehensive sanctions on
    Iran that have ever been imposed. And have led us to help
    mobilize the international community. And I think the two have
    gone together because the fact of the democratic repression----
        Mr. Manzullo. Well, in my remaining time, I just want to
    let you know how disappointed we were with the President and
    the very weak response to the people demonstrating for
    democracy in the streets of Tehran back in the summer of 2009.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank, you Mr. Manzullo. And I very
    much agree with you. Mr. Murphy of Connecticut is recognized
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Murphy. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And thank
    you, Mr. Steinberg, for sticking around with us. I know we are
    jumping all over the map a bit here, but I want to bring us
    back to one of the subjects at hand today. We are obviously
    continuing to monitor the events as they play out today in
    Egypt. But if what we believe is happening is happening today,
    as you hint at in your testimony, one of the stories of success
    will be the potentially very positive role that a secular,
    independent, well-respected military has played in this ongoing
    transitional process in Egypt.
        And I mention that as a segue to talk about Lebanon. The
    LAF is at a very different point in its military developmental
    history. We still have members of the Armed Forces there
    communicating via cell phones with each other across the
    Nation. And I want to ask you about how the United States
    continues to play a constructive role in what is really the
    nascent developmental stages of the LAF, and how we make sure
    that our assistance to the Lebanese army continues in the
    tradition of achieving both our goals and the Lebanese
    military's goal going forward in that nation?
        Mr. Steinberg. Thank you, Congressman. I think you have
    identified obviously an enormously important issue because we
    have seen the possibility and the prospect of development of a
    professional LAF that is responsive to a constitutional
    democratic government as critical to the success of Lebanon and
    particularly to deal with the challenge of Hezbollah and armed
    groups in that society.
        We want to see a professional civilianly controlled
    military that can exert control over the country on the behalf
    of a democratic government. And we have been encouraged by some
    of the progress that the LAF has made. So we would like to
    sustain with that, and yet we recognize the situation is fluid
    in Lebanon. And we are very vigilant to the possibility that a
    change in the political circumstances might undermine that
    objective.
        So we focused on two things, which is one, a very vigorous
    commitment to end use monitoring to make sure that none of our
    assistance to the LAF falls into inappropriate hands other than
    the LAF itself. And the record is very strong on that in terms
    of the LAF's ability to monitor and implement that.
        Also, as we see the political developments move forward, to
    make sure that the independence and the role of the LAF is not
    compromised and that any implication that that might have for
    our assistance.
        We would hope that we would see a continuation of the
    strong support for the LAF. It is a critical component of the
    sovereignty and the integrity of the country as long as it is
    associated with a democratic transparent open, a government
    that is not the products of outside interference.
        Mr. Murphy. Can you talk a little bit more about benchmarks
    and milestones? How do we moving forward--I understand that our
    military aid there is obviously interdependent with the
    political developments in Lebanon. You talk a little bit about
    how we make sure that the military and the LAF are hitting
    benchmarks and milestones that assure that we are making a wise
    investment?
        Mr. Steinberg. Well, we have a very robust engagement with
    the leadership. I believe it was just 2 or 3 weeks ago that
    General Mattis of CENTCOM was out there meeting with the
    Lebanese leadership. And I think that is that engagement. The
    training that we do with them, the professional development
    that we do with them that allows us to watch their progress, to
    identify programs that continue to help develop their
    professionalization. And clearly, it is linked to the political
    developments because their ability to do this requires the
    strong support of the political institutions that allow them to
    not only develop their professional capabilities and to use
    this equipment but also to have the mandate to extend their
    authority throughout the country.
        Mr. Murphy. And just finally, to the Prime Minister
    designate, you talk about, in your testimony, making sure that
    he makes good on his pledge to build an inclusive government.
    How do we judge that inclusiveness? What do we look to as the
    keys to know whether we have an inclusive government that
    continues to be a recipient of U.S. economic and military aid?
        Mr. Steinberg. I think we look both to the
    representativeness of that government to make sure that no
    important constituency in the Lebanese society is cut out,
    particularly obviously a concern with the evolution that the
    Sunni population is appropriately represented. But also to make
    sure across the political spectrum, that we have an inclusive
    government that includes the March 14th coalition, and it
    includes the voices that have been the progressive voices in
    Lebanon, and which, I think, it will be something that we
    supported strongly. So we believe that those voices need to be
    included in any government going forward.
        Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
        So pleased to yield 5 minutes to the vice chair on the
    Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, Mr. Pence of
    Indiana.
        Mr. Pence. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to thank you
    for calling this, what turns out to be extraordinarily timely
    hearing. I always want to make a point, I want to thank the
    Secretary for his service to the country, for his distinguished
    career, it is an honor to you have back before the committee.
        For some reason, this feels a little bit like deja vu all
    over again, I am sure it does to you, Mr. Secretary, with your
    long career in these matters. And frankly, with word of the
    potential eminent and historic change that could take place in
    Egypt before the turn of the clock today, on that part of the
    world, this conversation is extremely important.
        I must say, as the ranking member knows, as we partnered
    together in the summer of 2009 to author a resolution that
    passed this Chamber nearly unanimously and passed the Senate
    unanimously, my first inclination is to stand with the people,
    to stand with those who are clamoring for basic human rights,
    for freedoms, for more access to the democratic process. And I
    carry that bias into this conversation.
        I support those who continue to call for democratic
    reforms, I am grateful for the State Department and for the
    administration broadly, expressions of support for an orderly
    transition and the recognition of universal human rights.
        Let me, though, by way of raising an issue to you, let me,
    though, express a word of caution. One of the first things that
    I learned as a member of this committee traveling into that
    part of the world was the enormous importance of Egypt, and to
    the history of the region, not just at this time, but obviously
    through the millennium. The developments in Egypt are of
    enormous consequence to U.S. strategic interest, and I would
    say, most especially, to the interest of what I like to refer
    to fondly as our most cherished ally, Israel.
        And so while I know the folks at the administration has
    largely been and your remarks have largely been on insuring an
    orderly transition, I am concerned about an orderly transition
    to what, or an orderly transition to whom? And specifically, I
    find my mind drifting back to history, and to lessons of
    history. Edmund Burke, famously a member of Parliament, one of
    the strongest supporters of the revolution that took place in
    the colonies, here in the United States, but also one of the
    harshest critics of what happened in France. Edmund Burke
    warned that different from the American Revolution, which was
    largely born on a reach for democracy and a foundation of
    respect for the rule of law, the French Revolution was
    something different. And he warned of nefarious factions which
    could have opportunity, his words now, ``to become master of
    your assembly and the master of your whole republic.''
        And with the news the CIA Director, I am told just moments
    ago told a public meeting of the House Intelligence Committee
    that he expects President Hosni Mubarak to step down this
    evening.
        I guess my question to you, Mr. Secretary, very sincerely
    is where is that leading us? Who is that leading us to? I know
    that the new Vice President has expressed and demonstrating a
    willingness to engage the Muslim Brotherhood in a dialogue, an
    organization that has largely outlawed in Egypt for decades.
    But I guess my first question is, do you expect President
    Mubarak to step down, does the State Department anticipate
    that?
        And secondly, what is the effect of that? Where is that
    leading us? And thirdly, can you speak to are we sending a
    message sufficiently to this transition authority dominated as
    it is by the military in Egypt, that we expect not only an
    orderly transition, but we expect order at the end of it. We
    expect, if we are to continue that nearly a minimum of $1
    billion a year in foreign aid that goes directly to Egypt, the
    military coordination support that we provide, that we expect a
    successor government to respect the treaties and the alliances
    and the allies and the interests of the United States if we are
    to continue to go forward with that foreign aid and with the
    nature of the alliance that we have had with Egypt.
        So I would love your responses in whatever time the
    chairman will allow.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. 7 seconds. Plenty of time.
        Mr. Steinberg. ``Yes'' is probably a good answer. But to
    the last question, the answer is yes. We made clear what we do
    expect--and I think that is the way we tried to engage
    throughout this process is to set down a set of principles that
    we expect the process to embody and the outcome to embody, and
    that that is what we will judge it by.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Pence.
        Mr. Faleomavaega, our colleague from American Samoa.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        And, Mr. Secretary, I do personally want to welcome you
    before the committee. And I also want to express my deepest
    appreciation to the service that you have given to our country.
        And I want to offer my personal welcome to one of our
    committee staffers who have just returned from his tour in the
    military. I wish I had the same reception when I came back from
    Vietnam, Madam Chair. That wasn't my experience, for those of
    us who had the unfortunate experience of having served in
    Vietnam.
        Mr. Secretary, I have often heard people say how important
    the Golden Rule is; the Golden Rule, meaning that treat your
    fellow men as you would like to be treated. I have also heard
    another interpretation of the Golden Rule, and that is, he who
    has the gold makes the rule.
        What I am getting at, Mr. Secretary, for some 30 years
    now--and it has been one way of keeping the peace especially
    and what took place historically between Israel and Egypt, and
    for the 30-year period we have given well over $65 billion in
    financial assistance to Egypt, and $36 billion of that went to
    Egypt's military defense system.
        I am curious if--and I suspected from what my friend from
    Indiana has just given his concerns for which I share that same
    concern with Mr. Pence, but it seems that more and more that it
    is coming out in the current crisis in Egypt is that the
    military and the Muslim Brotherhood seem to be the two main
    factions that are going to have a lot of influence and impact
    on the future of where Egypt is going as far as its future is
    concerned.
        Now, I have noticed that you have given in your statement
    that has been part of the administration's policy we want the
    people of Egypt to determine their own future. But would it be
    correct for me to say that in that mix, the military and the
    Muslim Brotherhood definitely are going to be very important
    factors in determining Egypt's future.
        Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, I think what is important is
    that the military play the kind of role we expect the military
    to play in a democratic society, which is to support democratic
    governance and to respect the rights of the people. And I think
    we have been encouraged over the past several weeks that the
    military has played a constructive role. But it is not for the
    military to make the government, it is for the people to make
    the government, and that is what we would expect. And we would
    expect as we move forward with the democratic, inclusive
    government that the military would be in service of that.
        We have obviously talked a lot today about the Muslim
    Brotherhood. I can only reiterate the critical view that we
    have, which is that we will look to what government is formed,
    and we will hold it to a set of principles, and we will expect
    the members of the government to uphold those principles, and
    we will expect that they are responsive to what we believe is
    the yearnings of the people on the street. And that is the way
    we will judge our relationship going forward.
        I don't think we want to be naive, but I think we are
    hopeful that what we have seen is a strong sense that there is
    elements of civil society of the people, the Council of Wise
    Men and others, the people that Congressman Royce talked about,
    that can form a strong, stable, democratic government there,
    and we need to do everything we can to support them.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I know my time is running, but I just
    wanted to share another irksome situation as I want with my
    friend from New York. The fact that 350 million people in the
    Arab community's future rests on the fact that these two
    countries, Saudi Arabia and Egypt--that if these two countries
    falter, there is definitely going to be some very serious
    problems coming out of that.
        I say irksome to the fact that one of the main issues that
    always seems to come into the equation when we talk about the
    Middle East is oil. My sense of irksome is the fact that we
    have spent almost $1 trillion in getting rid of Saddam Hussein,
    and expenditures of lives of our own soldiers, and the amount
    of energy and resources, and yet when it came time to divvy up
    the fortunes, some 30 major oil companies that conducted
    biddings of the contracting and the oil to be extracted from
    Iraq, to my surprise China was the winner of the bidding
    process.
        Now, correct me if I am wrong on this, but the fact that it
    was our blood, our money, our resources, and supposedly having
    some sense of benefit as well for our country, but as it turned
    out, China was the beneficiary. Am I correct on this?
        Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, there are a number of American
    firms who are there. Exxon for sure, and Shell probably. We
    have worked with them to encourage them to participate. We have
    worked with the Iraqi Government to create the conditions that
    would make this attractive to American firms.
        One of the problems, and it is an ongoing problem with the
    Iraqi Government, is that they haven't really opened this up to
    the kind of investment that we would like to see. It is a big
    priority of the engagement, and as the new government is formed
    there, we will continue to push this to make it because we
    think American firms have a lot to contribute to the economic
    and energy future of Iraq.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
        I am pleased to yield to Mr. Duncan of South Carolina for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I hope that I have
    more than 30 seconds than you gave me the other day.
        Thank you so much, Mr. Steinberg, for being here. A lot of
    great questions have been asked today, and you all have really
    delved into a lot of the subjects that are concerning for me.
    So I am just going to piggyback on Mr. Burton's comments
    earlier about energy independence.
        Instability in the Middle East. When I was a young boy, I
    remember the gas shortages. I remember the crisis that we had
    in Iran. I remember countries around the world where you had
    revolutionary factions, and you had groups that weren't
    friendly to the United States step into the void. So it is very
    concerning to me and the folks that I represent back in the
    State of South Carolina that we have stability in the Middle
    East.
        We have a port in Charleston that receives shipments that
    come through the Suez and the Panama, so it is important that
    for trade and economic prosperity in this country that
    stability in the Suez region is maintained, stability in not
    only the North Africa and Middle East, but also East Africa. So
    there are a lot of different things that are concerning here.
        So who steps into the void in this process is interesting.
    And you stated that the administration would adhere to
    consistent principles regardless of who was in power. And the
    question I have for you, and taken in the light of stability,
    and taken in the light of what our energy independence needs
    are--and let me just segue to that for just a second because
    you mentioned other sources of energy.
        I think it is imperative that the United States and the
    administration's policies look at American emergency
    independence and use American resources that lessen our
    dependence on foreign sources, because we are seeing rising gas
    prices which affect input costs, which affect commodity prices.
    So it is a huge trickle-down effect.
        So let me segue back into is the administration actively
    working to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from being involved
    in this process of new governance in Egypt.
        Mr. Steinberg. Congressman, I would say that we are
    actively working to make sure that the government that emerges
    is an inclusive, tolerant, democratic one that respects the
    rights of women, minorities, religious minorities and the like.
    It is not focused on one particular group; it is on all groups.
    We want the principle of anybody participating in a future
    Egyptian Government to sustain those values. And anybody and
    any group that isn't consistent with that, we would not support
    their being a part of the government.
        Mr. Duncan. So along those lines, what specific steps is
    the State Department or this administration taking along those
    lines?
        Mr. Steinberg. That is precisely why we have been so active
    in pushing the Egyptian Government to engage in a prompt,
    orderly transition, because we believe the best chance of
    getting that tolerant outcome that we want with the kinds of
    people that Congressman Royce talked about is to move forward
    with the process and to engage with those forces, because those
    are the forces that can come together and create both democracy
    and stability in Egypt.
        Mr. Duncan. Has the administration, in your support for
    clear and consistent principles, stated to Egypt that you would
    not support the Muslim Brotherhood in any shape, form, or
    fashion?
        Mr. Steinberg. Again, Congressman, I don't think we single
    out any individual group. We say what we would support, and we
    would not support those who are not consistent with those
    principles.
        Mr. Duncan. I would hope that the State Department policy
    would be to support factions that are friendly to the United
    States, friendly to the United States' economic interests, and
    friendly to the United States as far as national security
    interests.
        Mr. Steinberg. I think we feel comfortable, if you look at
    history, that democratic governments where people really have a
    voice, and they get to choose, and they are not intimidated,
    and there is diversity are friendly to the United States. If
    you look at the democracies around the world, almost to a
    country those are our friends.
        So I think that is why we are so committed to moving
    forward with this process, because we do think it achieves
    exactly what you have identified.
        Mr. Duncan. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
        And to round out the question-and-answer period, I am so
    pleased to yield as our last interviewer Mr. Griffin for the
    Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, the vice chair of that
    subcommittee.
        Thank you, Mr. Griffin.
        Mr. Griffin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        We had some testimony yesterday regarding the potential for
    al-Qaeda to exploit some of the instability in northern Africa,
    particularly in Egypt, and I just wanted to get your comments
    on that. There was a Wall Street Journal op-ed by Kenneth
    Pollack on this yesterday, and understanding that this may be
    down the road a bit, sort of intermediate term and not
    immediate, and also understanding that Egypt has a history of
    doing a pretty good job of keeping some of the more extreme
    elements under control, could you comment on whether al-Qaeda
    is looking to recruit or take advantage of the power vacuum in
    the region?
        Mr. Steinberg. Without making a specific reference to that,
    because I don't know specifically that they are, but I would
    have to--I think we have to be alert to the possibility that
    they would. I think that we know that they are looking for any
    opportunities to advance their agenda in any place that they
    can find it. And certainly places where there are real vacuums,
    like we see in Somalia, are very dangerous places, which is
    precisely why we do believe it is so important to have this
    orderly, sustained process, because we think it is the best
    antidote about giving extremists and terrorist groups the
    opportunity to make inroads.
        Mr. Griffin. Well, the article that I was looking at
    yesterday tends to say that this may not be the most likely
    course, particularly in the short term. But as we know, al-
    Qaeda has roots even at the highest echelons in Egypt. So you
    don't know of any specific, identifiable antidotes or
    information that you can share with regard to al-Qaeda in that
    region? You just identify it as a possibility.
        Mr. Steinberg. I think it is something we have to be alert
    to. Obviously to get into a little more detail, we would
    probably have to do this in a closed session. But I would say
    the most important thing is to be vigilant to it and to take
    the steps now to not to let the circumstances arise, because I
    feel very confident that the voices in the streets in Tahrir
    Square are not voices that are--voices that are looking to al-
    Qaeda as their salvation. So we need to make sure that they are
    the ones that prevail in this situation.
        Mr. Griffin. Thank you for that.
        Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much for your excellent
    testimony. We look forward to getting some of those questions
    in writing from you. And I would especially appreciate your
    responses and the Department of State's responses to the U.N.
    overpayment issue and the refund.
        Thank you so much. And this committee is now adjourned.
        Thank you, sir.
        [Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

                                  ----------

                   Material Submitted for the Hearings Record

                                   __________
     IFES Briefing Paper, ``Elections in Egypt: Key Challenes for Credible
    and Competitive Elections,'' submitted for the record by the Honorable
       Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from the State of
                                   California