[Senate Hearing 111-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



 
    ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011

                              ----------                              


                       WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 2010

                                       U.S. Senate,
           Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met at 10:15 a.m., in room SD-116, Dirksen 
Senate Office Building, Hon. Byron L. Dorgan (chairman) 
presiding.
    Present: Senators Dorgan, Feinstein, and Bennett.

                          DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

                National Nuclear Security Administration

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR
ACCOMPANIED BY:
        ADMIRAL KIRKLAND H. DONALD, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR OF NUCLEAR 
            REACTORS
        STEVEN BLACK, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, OFFICE OF DEFENSE 
            NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
        BRIGADIER GENERAL GARRETT HARENCAK, PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT DEPUTY 
            ADMINISTRATOR FOR MILITARY APPLICATIONS

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BYRON L. DORGAN

    Senator Dorgan. I'm going to call the hearing to order.
    I was giving a speech just down the hall, and therefore, 
showed up early, and it was most uncomfortable, because I'm 
never anywhere early.
    So, if it appeared to all of you I didn't know what to do, 
that's the reason.
    Mr. D'Agostino, you appear to be in a good mood this 
morning, and I assume that's because your budget request, 
coming from the administration, suggests increased funding. 
There's always a relationship in the mood, and we're 
appreciative, very much, of your being here, and we 
congratulate you on your extension and continued work in these 
areas. The work of the National Nuclear Security Administration 
is very, very important.
    This year's budget request of $11.2 billion for NNSA is up 
$1.3 billion, or 13.5 percent above the fiscal year 2010 
appropriation. This would make it the largest increase to 
NNSA's budget since the agency was established, 10 years ago.
    Over the past years, I've expressed some concern about the 
lack of funding to maintain the Nation's nuclear weapon 
stockpile and to achieve the nonproliferation goals, which I 
think are very important. I'm pleased to see, in this budget 
request, a clear commitment in increasing NNSA's ability to 
assess the safety, security and reliability of nuclear weapons. 
Furthermore, I'm pleased that the NNSA plans to accelerate 
efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world, 
within the coming 4 years.
    I have two main concerns, which I hope you will address 
today, and I'll ask some questions about them.
    First, can the NNSA sustain new initiatives and 
construction projects of the size that we're talking about in 
the out years? Before we approve very expensive new 
initiatives, we need to be confident that NNSA has a clear 
strategy to manage very complex projects concurrently. Further, 
we need to know that NNSA has sound cost and schedule 
estimates.
    What you're asking for in the fiscal year 2011 request is 
to ramp up the production of refurbished W76 warheads; begin 
life extensions for the B61 and W78; increase surveillance 
activities of retired nuclear weapons; build three major new 
nuclear facilities, that would each exceed $3 billion in cost; 
the Chemistry and Metallurgical Facility at Los Alamos, the 
Uranium Processing Facility at Y-12, and the Pit Disassembly 
and Conversion Facility at Savannah River; and expand naval 
reactor projects, such as designing a new reactor for the Ohio-
class ballistic missile submarine.
    What I've not seen, and what I want to see, is a plan or a 
strategy that shows how NNSA will be able to manage this many 
complex projects at once, and pay for them, in the coming 
years. We want cost and schedule estimates. Both the GAO and 
the IG and other independent reviewers have raised questions 
about NNSA, for cost and schedule estimates, in years past. We 
believe NNSA--and I know Mr. D'Agostino would agree--just needs 
to do better.
    Despite sizable projected increases in funding, we are also 
concerned about whether there is an underestimating of budget 
needs. For example, out-year funding for the three major 
facilities does not reflect cost increases that could likely 
exist because of design changes or schedule delays. The second 
major concern is the rate of increase for the nonproliferation 
program, which is an increase of $550 million, or 26 percent, 
compared to fiscal year 2010. I'm not convinced that that 
amount of money will be able to be spent quite so quickly, 
effectively, or efficiently. So, we want to talk a little about 
that today.
    I applaud the efforts to date--for example, through the 
nonproliferation program, 2,300 kilograms of highly enriched 
uranium and plutonium, enough material to make 90 nuclear 
weapons has been removed and disposed of from civilian nuclear 
sites worldwide. That's a good record. These efforts rely on 
the cooperation, however, of foreign countries that do not 
always share our nuclear security concerns. The NNSA needs to 
show that it has or will produce, or can produce, agreements 
with countries that justify such a large increase in material 
retrieval.
    I think the NNSA also needs to demonstrate that Russia and 
other countries will continue to maintain the close to $3 
billion in security upgrades that the United States has funded 
over 17 years as the United States withdraws financial support. 
As we have funded these facilities, in the order of safety, 
just building them and leaving does not necessarily give us the 
assurance that those upgrades will last and will continue to be 
supported by the host countries.
    Finally, NNSA needs to demonstrate that nonproliferation 
funds are being spent effectively and efficiently. They've 
installed radiation detection equipment at more than 350 
borders, in dozens of countries, to prevent smuggling of 
nuclear materials. But, the GAO has found that the corruption 
of foreign border security officials, along with technical 
limitations of radiation detection equipment, inadequate 
maintenance of some equipment, and the lack of supporting 
infrastructure at some sites, has hindered the full 
effectiveness of these activities. Now, we know that the NNSA 
will address those issues so that we can understand the 
investment of these funds is leading to real and significant 
security improvements.
    Again, Mr. D'Agostino, we appreciate your being here with 
your colleagues.
    And let me call on Senator Bennett for any opening 
statements he may have.

             OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT F. BENNETT

    Senator Bennett. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    And I welcome all of you here.
    And, as I listen to the chairman, I find myself in 
agreement with him. I very much applaud your top-line budget 
request. You need the money; you've shown the courage of asking 
for it. And I think we'll do the very best we can to give it 
you. That's the good news.
    The bad news is that the agency's track record in managing 
large construction projects is not encouraging. And the 
chairman has outlined that.
    And just to underscore what Senator Dorgan has said, you're 
going to have four major projects underway at once: the Uranium 
Processing Facility; the CMRR Nuclear Facility, at Los Alamos; 
two projects at Savannah, the Pit Disassembly and Conversion 
Facility, and the MOX Fuel Facility. And, these, I understand, 
are the biggest construction projects NNSA has ever taken on. 
And then, while you're doing that you're talking about two 
life-extension programs being carried on simultaneously. And 
you have never conducted two LEPs at once. And those that you 
have conducted in the past--not necessarily you, specifically, 
but the agency--have been over-budget and over-schedule.
    So, the money is needed, the repairs are needed, the 
updating is needed. Everybody agrees with that. But, one thing 
to say, ``Okay, here's the money.'' It's another thing to say, 
``How's it going to be spent?'' And we need to pin down a lot 
of items, schedules, who the contractors are going to be, what 
the track record is that--those who're going to be involved. 
And we obviously are very interested in your answers to those 
questions.
    And then there's the question of how you spend the 
tremendous increase you're asking for in nonproliferation area. 
That's critical to the--ensure international nuclear safety. 
And with a requested increase of 68 percent for the Global 
Threat Reduction Initiative, and a past history of large 
unobligated balances, these are questions that we need to go 
into.
    Now, the chairman has gone into all of these in detail, and 
I'm simply underscoring my support for his concern in these 
areas. You're going to find a very unified subcommittee, both 
in support for the money and in support for the details that we 
need to look at.
    Senator Dorgan. Senator Bennett, thank you very much.
    Senator Feinstein.

                           PREPARED STATEMENT

    Senator Feinstein. I will put my statement in the record.
    [The statement follows:]

             Prepared Statement of Senator Dianne Feinstein

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you Mr. D'Agostino for taking 
the time to see us today.
    As you know, I have worked with colleagues in the House and Senate 
to stop the re-opening of the nuclear door and the development of new 
nuclear weapons.
    Together, we have eliminated funding for the Advanced Concepts 
Initiative, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, the Modern Pit 
Facility and the Reliable Replacement Warhead program.
    Now, we are working with a new president, one who believes in 
reclaiming a leadership role for the United States in nuclear non-
proliferation issues and shares the vision of a nuclear free world.
    In his April 5, 2009 Prague speech, President Obama called for ``an 
end to cold war thinking'' and declared that the United States will 
``reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security 
strategy.'' Before and after his inauguration, he pledged that he 
``will not authorize the development of new nuclear weapons.''
    I am hopeful he will use the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review to 
craft a new nuclear weapons policy that will help stop the spread of 
nuclear weapons and chart the course for their elimination from the 
Earth.
    We are in the final stages with Russia on new agreement to make 
additional cuts to each nation's nuclear arsenal. This is welcome news 
and I look forward to the conclusions of those talks.
    I also appreciate President Obama's support for ratification of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a critical component of any U.S. nuclear 
nonproliferation regime.
    In his fiscal year 2011 budget for the National Nuclear Security 
Administration, the President has requested $11.2 billion, a 13.4 
percent increase from fiscal year 2010.
    This marks a substantial commitment to maintaining the safety and 
reliability of our nuclear weapons arsenal and the nuclear weapons 
complex.
    We must ensure that these funds compliment, rather than detract 
from, the President vision on nuclear weapons policy and nuclear 
nonproliferation issues.
    I stand ready to work with my colleagues and the administration to 
craft a sensible, bi-partisan nuclear weapons policy that will keep 
Americans safe and will reduce the danger of a nuclear war or a nuclear 
attack.

    Senator Feinstein. I have a number of questions, but let me 
just say this, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for your 
chairmanship of this subcommittee. I guess this is your final 
appropriations bill. And we've worked together on several 
items. I think you've brought about, really, sterling 
leadership, and very impressive--I will miss you. I believe the 
ranking member will miss you. And I know you will have bright 
horizons ahead of you, but you darken our skies by leaving.
    Senator Bennett. Yes, I want to associate myself with that. 
I was just getting settled into the pleasure of working with 
you, and now you're going to go off to greener pastures. So, we 
will do our best to carry on your tradition after you've gone, 
assuming, of course, that I get to stay, as well.
    Senator Dorgan. Well, this year will end 30 years in the 
United States Congress. It's a great privilege, but there are 
other things I wish to do, and--but, enough of that. You're 
making me sound like Gabby Hayes, here.
    Mr. D'Agostino, thank you for your leadership, thanks for 
the work you do. Why don't you proceed.
    Your entire statement will be part of the permanent record 
so you may summarize.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO

    Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Bennett, 
Senator Feinstein.
    It's a pleasure to be here. It's a real honor for us to 
have the opportunity to testify on the President's budget, 
particularly for the National Nuclear Security Administration.
    As you note, I'm accompanied here by folks that have a lot 
of history and understanding of the program. Admiral Kirk 
Donald, for naval reactors; Steve Black, who's a chief 
operating officer in our nonproliferation program; and 
Brigadier General Gary Harencak, for defense programs.
    So, Mr. Chairman, under your leadership, the subcommittee 
has been a proponent of our NNSA programs and initiatives, and 
I thank you for the support. The subcommittee's backing will 
become even more critical as we seek to move forward on 
programs to implement the President's nuclear security vision. 
And moving the program in the right direction for many years 
out in the future, of course, since these programs last many 
years, it has to be done in a way that makes sense, in a 
bipartisan sense, because it's important for national security.
    Last year when I appeared before you, the focus of my 
testimony was the continuing of the transformation of this 
outdated cold war nuclear-weapons complex and moving it into a 
21st century national security enterprise and our initial 
efforts on implementing, the President's announcement, securing 
the most vulnerable materials worldwide. Since that time, we've 
identified and defined portfolio programs to meet the 
President's emerging nuclear security agenda.
    Our 2011 budget request, as you've noted, is $11.2 billion, 
a 13.4-percent increase from the prior year's appropriation. 
And in developing this program, Secretary Chu has worked--and 
I--have worked very closely with Secretary Gates to make sure 
that we had a program that was integrated across both 
departments. And, that reflects not just the nuclear weapons 
program itself, but the nonproliferation program and the naval 
reactors' activities.
    Our request can be summarized, essentially, into four 
components. Collectively, we ensure that the President's 
overall nuclear security agenda, as outlined in his April 2009 
Prague speech and reinforced during his State of the Union 
Address--first, our requests describe NNSA's crucial role in 
implementing this nuclear security vision and its call to 
secure vulnerable material worldwide within 4 years. The $2.7 
billion request for nonproliferation programs includes key 
programs related to the President's agenda: nearly $560 million 
for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to secure vulnerable 
material around the world; over $1 billion for a fissile 
material disposition program to permanently eliminate 68 metric 
tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium and more than 200 
metric tons of surplus highly-enriched uranium; and over $350 
million for the nonproliferation verification research and 
development programs; provide technology support to the 
President's arms control and nonproliferation agenda, including 
a new capability at our Nevada site to fully integrate treaty 
verification in arms control experiments.
    The second component is our investment in the tools and 
capabilities required to effectively manage the stockpile 
itself. Based on preliminary analysis in the draft Nuclear 
Posture Review, we concluded that maintaining the safety, 
security, and effectiveness of the enduring nuclear deterrent 
requires increased investments to strengthen an aging physical 
infrastructure and sustain depleted technical human-capital 
base across our enterprise. Our request includes more than $7 
billion to ensure that the capabilities are required to 
complete ongoing weapons life-extension activities; to 
strengthen the science and technology and engineering base; and 
reinvest in the scientists, technicians, and engineers who 
perform this mission.
    These activities are very consistent with the NNSA's 
stockpile stewardship and management responsibilities, as 
outlined in the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act. Vice 
President Biden recently noted the need to invest in a modern 
sustainable infrastructure that supports the full range of 
NNSA's mission, not just stockpile stewardship. He said, ``This 
investment is not only consistent with a nonproliferation 
agenda, it is essential to it.''
    And there is an emerging bipartisan consensus that now is 
the time to make these investments to provide the future 
foundation for our U.S. security. A key example of that 
consensus was reflected in the January Wall Street Journal 
article by Senator Sam Nunn and Secretaries George Shultz, 
Secretary Henry Kissinger, and Secretary William Perry.
    That leads me to the third component of our investment in 
recapitalizing our nuclear infrastructure and deterrent 
capability into a 21st-century nuclear security enterprise. As 
the Vice President said last month, some of the facilities we 
use to handle uranium and plutonium date back to the days when 
the world's great powers were led by Truman, Churchill, and 
Stalin. The signs of age and decay are becoming more apparent 
every day.
    Our request includes specific funds to continue the design 
of the Uranium Processing Facility at our Y-12 Facility and the 
construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 
Replacement Facility, at Los Alamos.
    Our Navy's nuclear fleet includes all of our submarines and 
aircraft carriers spread over the globe to protect America's 
interests. The naval reactors budget shows a steady increase 
over the future year national security plan--our 5-year 
program, essentially. To meet the operational requirements of 
the Ohio-class replacement, we will need to provide a new 
reactor plan, using improved materials that we've not used 
before. This effort dovetails well into our need to refuel one 
of our land-based prototypes, which provides the platform to 
demonstrate the manufacturability of the Ohio replacement core 
and also to realistically test systems and components. Finally, 
this prototype serves a key role as an operating reactor plant 
for training our Navy sailors.
    Mr. Chairman, investing now in a modern sustainable nuclear 
security enterprise is the right thing to do. Investment will 
support a full range of nuclear security missions to ensure 
future security. The range of missions includes stockpile 
stewardship, nonproliferation and disarmament, arms control and 
treaty verification, counterterrorism and emergency response, 
nuclear forensic and naval nuclear propulsion. It's the whole 
gambit.
    Finally, the fourth component, one that ties all our 
missions together, is our commitment to aggressive management 
reforms across the NNSA. And I look forward to questions on 
this. I can go into some detail. But, as you know, with 
increased resources comes an increased responsibility to be 
effective stewards of our taxpayers' money and to ensure that 
we effectively and efficiently manage this. We take this 
responsibility very seriously.
    Take, for example, the costs associated with our physical 
security posture. As you are well aware, each year the costs of 
these efforts have risen. We initiated a zero-based security 
review to implement greater efficiencies and to drive down 
costs while sustaining, and sometimes even improving, our 
security capabilities. We recently concluded a review at our 
Nevada site and identified some potential savings. We will be 
reviewing other sites shortly.
    Next, our supply chain management center has already saved 
taxpayers more than $130 million, largely through electronic 
sourcing and strategic sourcing, essentially tying our 
enterprise together; instead of having eight separate 
procurement centers, to try to focus these things together and 
leverage our purchases. That saved us significant resources.
    And, as you may be aware, our Kansas City plant recently 
won a Malcolm Baldrige Award for manufacturing and quality, for 
their innovations and performance excellence. We're working to 
implement that Kansas City model of best business practices 
across the whole nuclear security enterprise.
    And finally, we emphasize performance and financial 
accountability at all levels of our operation. In 2009, our 
programs met or exceeded 95 percent of their performance 
objectives, and over the past 2 years, NNSA has successfully 
executed large funding increases in several nonproliferation 
programs while reducing, at the same time, the percentage of 
carryover, uncosted, and uncommitted funds. We'll be glad to 
provide details of those, as well.
    Importantly, for the subcommittee's consideration, we have 
the people and process in place to initiate immediately the 
mission work and increased mission work in this area.
    Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, we will 
ensure that our stockpile, our infrastructure, and our missions 
are melded together into a comprehensive, forward-looking 
strategy that protects America and its allies. Investments in 
nuclear security are now providing the tools to tackle a broad 
range of nuclear security challenges. Now we must continue to 
cultivate the talents of our people to use these tools 
effectively, because essentially, in the end, people are the 
key to our success here.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and we all look forward to your 
questions.
    [The statement follows:]

            Prepared Statement of Hon. Thomas P. D'Agostino

    Thank you for the opportunity to present the fiscal year 2011 
President's budget request for the National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA). This budget request will allow the NNSA to meet 
its commitments to the American people to provide for nuclear 
deterrence, to reduce nuclear dangers around the world, and to provide 
the capabilities to address the broader national security challenges of 
the 21st century.
    At this time last year, the focus of NNSA efforts was the 
continuing transformation of the cold war-era weapons complex to a 21st 
century Nuclear Security Enterprise, and transformation of the 
composition and size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. 
Simultaneously, we were in the very early stages of defining the 
efforts necessary to address the President's policy statements on 
securing the most vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide.
    During the first 14 months of the Obama administration, we have 
been fully engaged with the Department of Defense (DOD) and the 
Interagency on the Nuclear Posture Review, and with the Department of 
State on a new START Agreement and a broad menu of nonproliferation 
agreements with our international partners.
    NNSA efforts this past year defined a portfolio of programs to meet 
the President's nuclear security agenda for the future. The fiscal year 
2011 President's budget request for this portfolio is $11.2 billion, an 
increase of more than 13 percent from last year. In the development of 
this portfolio, Secretary of Energy Chu and NNSA Administrator 
D'Agostino worked closely with Secretary of Defense Gates and other DOD 
officials to ensure that we remain focused on meeting the DOD's 
requirements. As a result, the budget request for Weapons Activities 
increases nearly 10 percent to a level of $7 billion; Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation increases nearly 26 percent to a level of $2.7 
billion; Naval Reactors increases more than 13 percent to a level of 
$1.1 billion; and, the request for Federal oversight and staff included 
in the Office of the Administrator account increases by 6.5 percent to 
a level of nearly $450 million. NNSA's budget request also includes 
associated outyear projections in a Future-Years Nuclear Security 
Program (FYNSP) that identifies resources needed to meet the continuing 
requirements for significant long term investments in the Nuclear 
Security Enterprise deliverables, capabilities and infrastructure.
    The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request for the NNSA can be 
summarized in four core components that, collectively, ensure that the 
NNSA implements the President's overall nuclear security agenda, 
introduced in his April 2009 Prague speech, re-enforced during the 
State of the Union Address on January 27, 2010, and will, we believe, 
be embodied in the soon to be completed Nuclear Posture Review.
    Implementing the President's Nuclear Security Vision.--The budget 
request highlights NNSA's crucial role in implementing President 
Obama's nuclear security vision, including his call for an 
international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around 
the world within 4 years. The request for these efforts is $2.7 billion 
(an increase of 25.8 percent over the current year). Key 
nonproliferation programs reflect significant increases from last year, 
including;
  --Nearly $560 million for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (an 
        increase of 68 percent over the current year) to secure 
        vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within 4 years, 
        and to provide a comprehensive approach to deny terrorist 
        access to nuclear and radiological materials at civilian sites 
        worldwide;
  --Over $1 billion for our Fissile Materials Disposition program (an 
        increase of 47 percent over the current year) for construction 
        of the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility and the 
        Waste Solidification Building, design of the Pit Disassembly 
        and Conversion Facility, and meeting our commitment to support 
        Russian plutonium disposition activities;
  --More than $590 million for Material Protection, Control, and 
        Accounting and Second Line of Defense activities to accelerate 
        securing nuclear materials in the Former Soviet Union and other 
        Asian states, as well as worldwide efforts to deter, detect, 
        and respond to nuclear smuggling events; and
  --Over $350 million for the Nonproliferation and Verification 
        Research and Development programs (an increase of 10 percent 
        over the current year) to provide the key technical support for 
        the President's arms control and nonproliferation agenda.
    Managing the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.--Based on a preliminary 
analysis of the draft Nuclear Posture Review, the Department concluded 
that maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear 
deterrent without nuclear testing--especially at lower stockpile 
numbers--requires increased investments to strengthen an aging physical 
infrastructure and to sustain a depleting technical human capital base 
across the Nuclear Security Enterprise. As such, we are requesting more 
than $7 billion (an increase of 9.8 percent over the current year) in 
the Weapons Activities appropriation to:
  --Ensure the capabilities required for stockpile management and for 
        the completion of ongoing Life Extension Programs are 
        available;
  --Strengthen the Science, Technology, and Engineering base 
        capabilities that underpin stockpile stewardship, without 
        nuclear testing, as well as all other NNSA nuclear security 
        activities; and
  --Reinvest in the scientists, technicians, and engineers who perform 
        the mission across the Nuclear Security Enterprise.
    The President's Budget Request is consistent with the principles of 
the Stockpile Management Program outlined by Congress in the fiscal 
year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act.
    Recapitalizing Our Nuclear Infrastructure and Deterrent 
Capability.--These increases represent an investment in transforming 
our outdated nuclear weapons complex into a 21st century Nuclear 
Security Enterprise. This request includes funds to continue the design 
of the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 facility; the design and 
construction of the replacement for the Chemistry and Metallurgy 
Research facility at the Los Alamos National Laboratory; and, 
conceptual design for the recapitalization of Naval Reactor's Expended 
Core Facility at the Idaho National Laboratory. Investing in a modern, 
sustainable nuclear security infrastructure supports the full range of 
NNSA's nuclear security missions, including:
  --Stockpile stewardship;
  --Nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament;
  --Arms control treaty monitoring;
  --Nuclear forensics;
  --Counterterrorism and emergency response; and
  --the nuclear Navy.
    Additionally, the request supports the recent Department of Defense 
decision to recapitalize the sea-based strategic deterrent. The OHIO-
class ballistic submarines, the most survivable leg of the Nation's 
strategic deterrent, are reaching the end of their operational life. 
The request will enable Naval Reactors to continue reactor plant design 
and development efforts begun in 2010 for procurement of long-lead 
reactor plant components in 2017, in support of Navy procurement of the 
first OHIO-class submarine replacement in 2019. Providing the OHIO-
class replacement a life-of-the-ship reactor core will require 
substantial advances in manufacturing technology to provide a new 
cladding and a new fuel system. The request also supports the refueling 
of a land based prototype reactor, providing a cost effective test 
platform for these new technologies.
    Continuing NNSA Management Reforms.--With the increased resources 
provided by the Congress comes an increased responsibility to be 
effective stewards of the taxpayer's money. NNSA will continue to 
promote proactive, sound management reforms that save money, improve 
the way we do business, and increase efficiency. Following are a few of 
the efforts already underway:
  --A Zero-Based Security Review initiative has led to efficiencies in 
        our site security programs, helping drive down those costs 
        while sustaining core physical security capabilities.
  --An Enterprise Re-engineering Team is implementing ideas for 
        improving the way NNSA does business, such as:
    --A Supply Chain Management Center has already saved the taxpayers 
            more than $130 million since its inception in 2007 and is 
            expanding its focus. Two key elements of the Center are:
      -- eSourcing.--an electronic sealed-bidding and reverse auction 
            function; and
      -- Strategic Sourcing.--where our Management and Operating 
            contractors use their combined purchasing power to 
            negotiate multi-site commodity contracts with vendors.
    --A moratorium on new, NNSA-initiated Reviews and re-direction of 
            those resources to improve Contractor Management Systems 
            and operations and oversight across the Nuclear Security 
            Enterprise.
    --Issuing new NNSA Operating Principles to guide the priorities and 
            decision processes of entities that perform NNSA work 
            consistently across the Nuclear Security Enterprise.
    --Applying a new performance-based model, best business practices, 
            and lessons-learned across the Nuclear Security Enterprise. 
            The model, pioneered at our Kansas City Plant, provides 
            greater contractor flexibility and accountability; better 
            focused, risk-based oversight; eliminates redundant and 
            non-value-added reviews; and improves efficiencies and 
            availability of Federal and contractor resources to support 
            the full scope of NNSA missions.
    --Reducing contractor expenses through renegotiation of health and 
            dental plans, using common contracts for administration and 
            supplies, and converting plant shifts for five 8-hour days 
            to four 10-hour day shifts.
  --Retaining the critical Federal workforce.
    --Piloting for the Department a 5 year Office of Personnel 
            Management Demonstration Project on Pay-for-Performance and 
            Pay Banding to test new Human Resource concepts to recruit 
            and retain a high caliber staff by providing faster pay 
            progression for high-performing employees, and to build on 
            the workforce planning system to better identify competency 
            needs and gaps.
    --Conducting a Future Leaders Program and sponsoring Historically 
            Black Colleges and Universities, Hispanic Serving 
            Institutions, Native American Serving Institutions, and 
            other intern and fellowship programs to bring into 
            government the best and brightest talent in science, 
            engineering, business, and other technical positions to 
            ensure that when our aging workforce retires, it is 
            replaced with competent, well-trained, and experienced 
            professionals to carry on the mission work of the NNSA.
    Finally, NNSA continues to emphasize performance and financial 
accountability at all levels of our operations. NNSA needs to assure 
the subcommittee and the taxpayers that the we are an excellent steward 
of the programs and funds the Congress entrusts to us to carry out the 
President's nuclear security vision. In 2009, NNSA met 95 percent of 
its stated program performance objectives, and, over the past 2 years, 
NNSA successfully executed consecutive, large annual funding increases 
in several of our nonproliferation programs while reducing uncosted, 
uncommitted balances. We are ready to meet the challenge of executing 
the additional program increases supported by the fiscal year 2011 
President's budget request. Our Federal and contractor staff and our 
contracting processes are in place to initiate immediately the 
increased mission work both in the United States and abroad. The NNSA 
will be a leader in successful program and financial execution for the 
Department of Energy and for the U.S. Government.
    The NNSA is not operating on a ``business-as-usual'' basis. The 
budget request represents a comprehensive approach to ensuring the 
nuclear security of our Nation. NNSA will ensure that our strategic 
posture, our nuclear weapons stockpile, and our infrastructure, along 
with our nonproliferation, arms control, emergency response, 
counterterrorism, and naval propulsion programs, are melded into one 
comprehensive, forward-looking strategy that protects America and its 
allies.
    Maintaining the nuclear weapons stockpile is the core work in the 
NNSA. However, the science, technology, and engineering capabilities, 
which enable the core work, must also continue to focus on providing a 
sound foundation for ongoing nonproliferation and other threat 
reduction programs. The investment in nuclear security is providing the 
tools that can tackle a broad array of national security and energy 
challenges and in other realms. NNSA now has the tools, but must 
continue to cultivate the talents of the people to use them 
effectively.
    The NNSA is developing the next generation of scientists, 
engineers, and technicians required to meet our enduring deterrence 
requirements as well as the critical work in nonproliferation, nuclear 
counterterrorism, and forensics. People are ultimately our most 
important resource. We are working closely with our national 
laboratories to develop and retain the necessary cadre of the best and 
the brightest to successfully carry out all of our technically 
challenging programs into the foreseeable future.
    Following are more detailed descriptions of each of the four 
specific NNSA appropriations.

        NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION BUDGET OVERVIEW

    The President's budget request for the NNSA contains budget 
information for 5 years as required by section 3253 of Public Law 106-
065, entitled Future-Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP). The FYNSP 
projects $57.9 billion for NNSA programs through fiscal year 2015. 
While the funding necessary to support the President's commitment to 
lead an international effort to secure vulnerable nuclear materials 
throughout the world is focused in the near term, major longer term 
funding commitments are needed in other NNSA programs. The Secretaries 
of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE) 
agree that it is necessary to modernize the nuclear security 
infrastructure of the United States, and this will require the 
investments over the long-term reflected in the FYNSP. Modernization of 
the infrastructure, including major capital projects, is needed to 
ensure safe, secure, sustainable and cost-effective operations in 
support of scientific and manufacturing activities. It is also 
necessary to bolster key scientific, technical and manufacturing 
capabilities needed to ensure that the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile 
remains safe, secure and effective while avoiding the requirement for 
new nuclear tests. Increased outyear resources are also included for 
major new deliverables in support of the nuclear navy, including 
reactor plant development for the OHIO-class replacement submarine, 
core manufacturing for and refueling of the technology demonstration 
land-based prototype, and initial planning for the recapitalization of 
spent nuclear fuel infrastructure.

                         NNSA PROGRAM SUMMARIES

    The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request for the NNSA is 
$11.2 billion, a 13.4 percent increase over the fiscal year 2010 
appropriated level. Out-year projections meet the requirements for 
significant long-term investments in the nuclear security enterprise 
deliverables, capabilities and infrastructure.
 Weapons Activities Appropriation
    The request for this appropriation is $7.0 billion; an increase of 
9.8 percent over the fiscal year 2010 appropriated level. This level is 
sustained and increased in the later out-years.
    Although no change to the existing program budget structure within 
this appropriation is proposed in this budget, we will address the 
current programs within the Weapons Activities appropriation in four 
related components:
  --Stockpile Support (Directed Stockpile Work, Readiness Campaign);
  --Science, Technology and Engineering (Science Campaign, Engineering 
        Campaign, Inertial Confinement Fusion and High Yield Campaign, 
        Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign, Science, Technology 
        and Engineering Capability);
  --Infrastructure (Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities, Secure 
        Transportation Asset, Facilities and Infrastructure 
        Recapitalization Program, Site Stewardship); and
  --Security and Nuclear Counterterrorism (Defense Nuclear Security, 
        Cyber Security, Nuclear Counterterrorism Incident Response).
    Increased funding is requested for programs in Stockpile Support, 
for Scientific, Technology and Engineering activities related to 
maintenance assessment and certification capabilities for the 
stockpile, and for critical infrastructure improvements. The Security 
and Nuclear Counterterrorism component decreases about 3 percent from 
the fiscal year 2010 appropriated levels, attributable to continuing 
efficiencies in the Defense Nuclear Security programs budget.
    This multi-year increase reflects the President's commitment to 
maintain the safety, security and effectiveness of the nuclear 
deterrent without underground nuclear testing, consistent with the 
principles of the Stockpile Management Program outlined in section 
3113(a)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act of fiscal year 
2010 (50 U.S.C. 2524). The nuclear security requirements driving this 
budget request include improvements to the safety and security of the 
enduring stockpile; a strengthened science, technology, and engineering 
base; and a recapitalized physical infrastructure. The enterprise must 
also be responsive to an arguably more complex future national defense 
environment than the singular cold-war context within which the legacy 
deterrent was built.
    The President's budget request provides funding necessary to 
protect and advance the scientific capabilities at the U.S. national 
security laboratories--including the ability to maintain the nuclear 
deterrent as well as development and engineering expertise and 
capabilities--through a stockpile stewardship program that fully 
exercises these capabilities.
    This budget request is responsive to fiscal year 2010 Congressional 
direction to carry out a Stockpile Management Program in support of 
stockpile stewardship that provides for effective management of the 
weapons in the nuclear weapons stockpile. This program will strengthen 
the stockpile activities, including life extension programs and 
surveillance; strengthen science, technology and engineering, including 
the workforce; and modernize the aging infrastructure, particularly 
special nuclear materials capabilities. The key objectives of the 
Stockpile Management Program include:
  --Increase the reliability, safety, and security of the stockpile;
  --Further reduce the likelihood of the need to resume underground 
        nuclear testing;
  --Achieve further reductions in the future size of the stockpile;
  --Reduce the risk of an accidental detonation; and
  --Reduce the risk of an element of the stockpile being used by a 
        person or entity hostile to the United States, its vital 
        interests, or its allies.
    The Stockpile Support component of this appropriation includes 
Directed Stockpile Work and the supporting Readiness Campaign. The 
President's budget request is $2.0 billion, an increase of 25.2 percent 
over the fiscal year 2010 appropriation. This provides for the 
Stockpile Management Program, including surveillance, maintenance, 
assembly, disassembly and dismantlement activities, and will fully 
support the ongoing Life Extension Programs for the W76 warhead and the 
refurbishment of the B61 bomb. The budget request will enhance 
surveillance efforts, and ensure that capabilities and capacity are 
available so that future warhead life extension programs will allow for 
increased margin and enhanced warhead safety, security and control. The 
request will initiate a study in fiscal year 2011 to evaluate future 
options and approaches to maintaining the W78, consistent with the 
principles of the Stockpile Management Program defined in section 
3113(a)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act of fiscal year 
2010 (50 U.S.C. 2524).
    The Science, Technology and Engineering (STE) component of this 
appropriation includes the Science Campaign, Engineering Campaign, 
Inertial Confinement Fusion and High Yield Campaign, Advanced 
Simulation and Computing Campaign, and Science, Technology and 
Engineering Capability. The President's budget request of $1.6 billion 
is an increase of 10.4 percent over the fiscal year 2010 appropriation 
and will restore sufficient funds for the science and technology base 
that supports stockpile assessment and certification in the absence of 
nuclear testing. Within this request, the Inertial Confinement Fusion 
and High Yield Campaign is requested at $481.5 million. Construction of 
the National Ignition Facility (NIF) was completed in fiscal year 2009, 
and the first in a series of ignition experiments beginning in the 
summer of 2010 will attempt to compress, implode, and ignite a layered 
deuterium-tritium capsule with a 1.3 megajoule energy pulse from the 
NIF. Regardless of the specific status of ignition, fiscal year 2011 
will present a very demanding agenda of work in the ignition effort. 
Results from the first ignition experiments in 2010 will be analyzed in 
detail, and the intensive process of tuning laser and target parameters 
for optimum performance will continue toward development of a robust 
ignition platform by the end of 2012. The NIF is designed to provide 
critical scientific data to support the stockpile without underground 
nuclear testing.
    Computation and simulation underpin all of our science, technology 
and engineering, and are pervasive throughout the activities in the 
nuclear security enterprise. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget 
request of $616 million for the Advanced Simulation and Computing 
Campaign will enable a stronger simulation program and inject a renewed 
scientific rigor back into the program. Developing robust peer review 
among the national security laboratories as we move away from the test 
base experience is essential to being able to maintain a stockpile 
without underground testing. Comprehensive uncertainty quantification 
calculations in 3D will provide the confidence necessary to make 
reliable progress toward the predictive capability necessary to address 
stockpile aging issues. In the next decade, predictive capability and 
specific warhead simulation deliverables will demand ever more powerful 
and sophisticated simulation environments. This request will position 
the national security laboratories to take advantage of future platform 
architectures to more efficiently steward the stockpile.
    Also within the STE component, the new subprogram to provide 
collaborative efforts in intelligence analysis, which was created in 
response to congressional funding in the Supplemental Appropriations 
Act, 2009, continues in fiscal year 2011. This subprogram provides a 
focal point for science, technology and engineering in NNSA, and will 
facilitate a point of entry for the wider national security community 
into NNSA's programs and facilities. The fiscal year 2009 supplemental 
funding provided for laboratory efforts in intelligence analysis. The 
fiscal year 2011 request will support NNSA's commitment to a 5 year 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
for national security research and development of mutual interest. At 
this time, the defined focus areas of mutual interest are: Advanced 
Science and Forensics, Experimental Capabilities, Science Based Output, 
Active Interrogation of Special Nuclear Material, and Nuclear Weapons 
Effects Modeling and Simulation.
    The Infrastructure component of the appropriation includes 
Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities, Secure Transportation 
Asset, Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program, and Site 
Stewardship. The President's budget request is $2.3 billion, a 4.8 
percent increase over the fiscal year 2010 level. Transformation and 
maintenance of supporting physical infrastructure for the nuclear 
security enterprise is a high priority in the upcoming FYNSP. Along 
with the funding to support the ongoing operations of the Government-
owned, contractor operated laboratories and manufacturing facilities, 
the President's budget request includes funding for major long-term 
construction projects needed to restore critical capabilities in 
plutonium and uranium essential to the Stockpile Management program.
    The President's budget request includes funding to complete the 
design and begin construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 
Facility Replacement--Nuclear Facility at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory. This facility conducts plutonium research and development 
and provides analytical capabilities in support of pit surveillance and 
production. The facility will also support the broad range of NNSA's 
nuclear security missions, including: (1) stockpile stewardship; (2) 
nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament; (3) arms control treaty 
monitoring; (4) nuclear forensics; and, (5) counterterrorism and 
emergency response. Current planning schedules full operation in 2022. 
A related project is requested to improve the safety profile at the 
adjoining PF-4 facility. The budget request also includes funding for 
continuing the design and construction planning of the Uranium 
Processing Facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex to support 
production and surveillance of highly-enriched uranium components. This 
facility is also planned to achieve full operations by 2022.
    Maintaining and improving the current infrastructure is also an 
important priority for NNSA. The Facilities and Infrastructure 
Recapitalization Program is continuing to reduce the deferred 
maintenance backlog as it proceeds toward its planned conclusion in 
2013. Increased funding is provided for the Site Stewardship program 
that integrates institutional/landlord functions for our sites, 
including regulatory-driven long-term Stewardship, Nuclear Materials 
Consolidation, and energy efficiency projects.
    The Security and Nuclear Counterterrorism component of the 
appropriation includes Defense Nuclear Security, Cyber Security, and 
Nuclear Counterterrorism Incident Response. The President's budget 
request for these programs is $1.1 billion, which, except for a 5 
percent increase in Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response, 
represents an overall 3.2 percent decrease from fiscal year 2010 
appropriated levels. The decrease reflects efficiencies expected to be 
gained from risk-informed decisions identified through the Defense 
Nuclear Security program's Zero-Based Security Review, consistent with 
implementation of the Graded Security Protection Policy.
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Appropriation
    The request for this appropriation is $2.7 billion; an increase of 
25.8 percent over the fiscal year 2010 appropriated level. The increase 
is driven by the imperative for U.S. leadership in nonproliferation 
initiatives both here and abroad, including the consolidation of 
fissile materials disposition activities into this account. In addition 
to the programs funded solely by the NNSA, our programs support the 
Department of Energy mission to protect our national security by 
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials to 
terrorist organizations and rogue states. These efforts are implemented 
in part through the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons 
and Materials of Mass Destruction, formed at the G8 Kananaskis Summit 
in June 2002, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, 
launched in Rabat, Morocco, in October 2006.
    The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request reflects support 
for the President's direction to secure vulnerable nuclear materials 
around the world in 4 years. The International Nuclear Materials 
Protection and Cooperation (MPC&A) program increases by 3 percent to 
support selective new security upgrades to buildings and areas that 
were added to the cooperation after the Bratislava summit, additional 
Second Line of Defense sites, sustainability of MPC&A upgrades, and 
continued expansion of nuclear and radiological material removal. The 
Global Threat Reduction Initiative increases by 68 percent to support 
an increase in reactor conversions and shutdowns, acceleration of 
domestic production capability of Molybdenum-99, and an acceleration of 
the removal and disposition of high-priority, vulnerable nuclear 
materials in full support of the President's nuclear security agenda. 
The Fissile Materials Disposition program increases by 47 percent 
reflecting continuing domestic construction on the MOX Fuel Fabrication 
Facility, and the design and construction of two major supporting 
facilities.
    The NNSA's nonproliferation programs seek to secure nuclear 
materials worldwide that could be used for weapons and to convert such 
materials for peaceful applications, and, through the Second Line of 
Defense Program, provide the tools for partner countries to detect and 
interdict smuggling of these materials across international borders.
    The Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (R&D) 
activities seek to improve detection of nuclear material production and 
movement through advanced R&D. The program draws on the vast technical 
expertise of the NNSA and DOE national laboratories, as well as 
academia and industry, the program delivers solutions to the hardest 
technical nuclear security challenges. Focusing on nuclear detection 
instrumentation development that is tightly coordinated across Federal 
and international agencies, these advanced detection techniques are a 
significant contributor to the U.S. ability to detect foreign nuclear 
materials production as well as the illicit movement of those 
materials. Further, the R&D program provides the backbone for advances 
in U.S. and international capabilities to monitor nuclear-related 
treaty obligations. In keeping with the President's commitment for 
verifiable treaties, the R&D program's fiscal year 2011 budget request 
increases by 10 percent over the current year to include a more robust 
set of testing and evaluation activities to demonstrate new U.S. treaty 
monitoring capabilities.
    The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request has consolidated 
all of the funding requests for the Fissile Materials Disposition 
activities within the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation appropriation. 
The current funding for both the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility and 
Waste Solidification Building projects were moved in the fiscal year 
2010 appropriation, and the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility 
project has been moved back to Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 
appropriation starting in fiscal year 2011. The DOE has decided to 
explore a proposed combination of the Office of Environmental 
Management Plutonium Preparation Project and the Pit Disassembly and 
Conversion Project in a single project located in an existing K-Area 
Facility at the Savannah River Site. This activity will be evaluated 
using the Department's project management order, DOE O 413, and will 
move toward a Critical Decision 1 (approval of alternative selection 
and cost range).
    The United States continues to work with the Russian Federation on 
plutonium disposition in Russia pursuant to the Plutonium Management 
and Disposition Agreement reached in September 2000. Congress had 
appropriated $200 million in a fiscal year 1999 Supplemental 
Appropriation to support Russian plutonium disposition activities; 
however, $207 million of this and other funding for this program was 
rescinded in fiscal year 2008 due to lack of progress in Russia. The 
fiscal year 2011 request includes $100 million of the U.S. commitment 
to provide $400 million to support plutonium disposition in Russia once 
a Protocol amending the 2000 Agreement, related liability provisions, 
and a monitoring and inspection regime is signed. The balance of more 
than $2 billion in remaining cost associated with Russian plutonium 
disposition would be borne by Russia and non-U.S. contributions.
Naval Reactors Appropriation
    The request for this appropriation is $1.1 billion; an increase of 
13.3 percent over the fiscal year 2010 appropriated level. The program 
directly supports the U.S. Navy's nuclear fleet, which encompasses all 
Navy submarines and aircraft carriers. The nuclear fleet is comprised 
of 54 attack submarines, 14 ballistic missile submarines, 4 guided 
missile submarines, and 11 aircraft carriers. These ships, and their 
consistent forward presence, are relied on every day, all over the 
world, to protect our national interests.
    Naval Reactors has a long history of providing safe and reliable 
Naval nuclear propulsion. This requires continual analysis for prompt 
identification of leading indicators from fleet operations and careful 
engineering to assure prudent, yet timely modernization, and scrupulous 
maintenance. Over the last decade, funding for these successful 
endeavors has been relatively constant. The onset of unavoidable, 
nondiscretionary requirements for spent reactor fuel processing and 
replacement, and maintenance and disposal of an aging support 
infrastructure has required continued rebalancing of funding 
priorities. Those priorities coupled with new challenges necessitated 
the additional funding included in the budget request. Increases in the 
fiscal year 2011 President's budget request support three key 
deliverables--the OHIO-class submarine replacement reactor plant, the 
refueling of the land-based prototype located in New York, and the 
Expended Core Facility at the Naval Reactors Facility located on the 
Idaho National Laboratory.
    The most survivable leg of the Nation's strategic deterrent, the 
OHIO-class ballistic missile submarines are reaching the end of their 
operational life. Propulsion plant design and development efforts began 
in 2010 to support Navy procurement of reactor plant components in 
2017, for ship construction starting in 2019. This schedule for 
development is consistent with previous designs. Key technical 
challenges include an effort to lower total ownership costs while 
maintaining the traditionally high operational availability of this new 
ship. The most important challenge to meet this is a life-of-the-ship 
reactor core.
    The DOE land-based prototype reactor, which has served the 
Program's needs for R&D and training since 1978, requires refueling in 
2017. The reactor provides a cost-effective test platform for new 
technologies and components before they are introduced for Fleet 
applications, supports testing and evaluation of materials, and 
provides a vital training platform for reactor plant operators. The 
land-based prototype refueling will also provide key technical data for 
the OHIO-class submarine replacement, since the reactor core work to 
support the refueling will also support the core manufacturing 
development for the OHIO-class replacement. This approach is based on 
Naval Reactors' extensive experience in reactor design--taking 
advantage of the prototype refueling opportunity to proof-test new 
manufacturing techniques for reactor fuel cladding material never 
previously used by the Navy. This will reduce technical risk in 
manufacturing the OHIO-class replacement life-of-the-ship core.
    The Expended Core Facility (ECF) is the central location for naval 
spent nuclear fuel receipt, inspection, dissection, packaging, and 
secure dry storage, as well as detailed examination of spent cores and 
irradiated specimens. The existing facility is more than 50 years old, 
and its mission has evolved significantly over time. While serviceable, 
it no longer efficiently supports the nuclear Fleet or the work 
required to meet the agreements we have with the State of Idaho for 
naval spent fuel. To minimize risks associated with an aging facility 
and support the timely refueling and defueling of nuclear-powered 
warships, construction is targeted to begin by 2015. Uninterrupted ECF 
receipt of naval spent nuclear fuel is vital to the timely, constant 
throughput of ship refuelings and return of these capital warships to 
the Fleet. The mission need statement for this project has been 
approved, and conceptual design and alternative analysis efforts began 
in 2010.
Office of the Administrator Appropriation
    The request for this appropriation is $448.3 million; an increase 
of 6.5 percent over the fiscal year 2010 appropriated level. This 
appropriation provides for the Federal staff and related support for 
the NNSA Headquarters and field organizations. The Federal personnel 
level for fiscal year 2011 is projected at 1,970 Full Time Equivalents, 
essentially level with the expectation for fiscal year 2010. Implicit 
in the request is a 1.4 percent cost of living adjustment and a 3.3 
percent increase for performance-based salary increases, awards, and 
benefit escalation associated with the Federal workforce. Other 
increases reflect full funding for NNSA site office space requirements 
across the Nuclear Security Enterprise, funds for new building 
maintenance and lease requirements, and expansion of NNSA international 
offices for the NNSA's nonproliferation programs.
  national nuclear security administration--appropriation and program 
summary tables--out-year appropriation summary table--fiscal year 2011 
                             budget tables

                    NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION--OVERVIEW--APPROPRIATION SUMMARY
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       Fiscal Year 2009    Fiscal Year 2010
                                                            Actual              Current        Fiscal Year 2011
                                                         Appropriation       Appropriation          Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Nuclear Security Administration:
    Office of the Administrator.....................            439,190              420,754             448,267
    Weapons Activities..............................          6,410,000            6,384,431           7,008,835
    Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation................          1,545,071            2,136,709           2,687,167
    [non-add MOX Project funded in other                       [278,879]             ( \1\ )             ( \1\ )
     appropriations]................................
    Naval Reactors..................................            828,054              945,133           1,070,486
                                                     -----------------------------------------------------------
      Total, NNSA...................................          9,222,315            9,887,027          11,214,755
                                                     ===========================================================
Transfer of prior year balances--OMB scoring........  ..................             -10,000  ..................
                                                     -----------------------------------------------------------
      Total, NNSA...................................  ..................           9,877,027  ..................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ N/A.


               OUT-YEAR APPROPRIATION SUMMARY--NNSA FUTURE-YEARS NUCLEAR SECURITY PROGRAM (FYNSP)
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                     2011         2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NNSA:
    Office of the Administrator................      448,267      426,424      430,726      435,069      448,498
    Weapons Activities.........................    7,008,835    7,032,672    7,082,146    7,400,966    7,648,200
    Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation...........    2,687,167    2,507,191    2,715,191    2,833,243    2,956,328
    Naval Reactors.............................    1,070,486    1,099,734    1,171,178    1,226,017    1,310,530
                                                ----------------------------------------------------------------
      Total, NNSA..............................   11,214,755   11,066,021   11,399,241   11,895,295   12,363,556
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                     OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR--OVERVIEW--APPROPRIATION SUMMARY BY PROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       Fiscal Year 2009    Fiscal Year 2010
                                                            Actual              Current        Fiscal Year 2011
                                                         Appropriation     Appropriation \1\        Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of the Administrator:
    Office of the Administrator.....................             415,878             418,074             448,267
    Congressionally Directed Projects...............              23,312              13,000  ..................
    Use of Prior Year Balances......................  ..................             -10,320  ..................
                                                     -----------------------------------------------------------
      Total, Office of the Administrator............             439,190             420,754             448,267
                                                     ===========================================================
Transfer of Prior Year Balances.....................  ..................             -10,000  ..................
                                                     -----------------------------------------------------------
      Total, OMB Scoring............................             439,190             410,754             448,267
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In accordance with Public Law 111-85, $10,000,000 of Office of the Administrator prior year balances have
  been transferred to Non-Defense Environmental Cleanup for cleanup efforts at the Argonne National Laboratory.

Public Law Authorization
    Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act, 2010 (Public Law 111-85).
    Fiscal year 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (Public Law 111-8).
    National Nuclear Security Administration Act (Public Law 106-65), 
as amended.

                                         OUT-YEAR APPROPRIATION SUMMARY
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of the Administrator.................................      426,424      430,726      435,069      448,498
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


          OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR--CONGRESSIONALLY DIRECTED PROJECTS--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                       2009            2010            2011
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congressionally Directed Projects...............................          23,312          13,000  ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                           WEAPONS ACTIVITIES--OVERVIEW--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weapons Activities:
    Directed Stockpile Work.....................................       1,590,152       1,505,859       1,898,379
    Science Campaign............................................         316,690         295,646         365,222
    Engineering Campaign........................................         150,000         150,000         141,920
    Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Campaign         436,915         457,915         481,548
    Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign..................         556,125         567,625         615,748
    Readiness Campaign..........................................         160,620         100,000         112,092
    Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities..................       1,674,406       1,842,870       1,848,970
    Secure Transportation Asset.................................         214,439         234,915         248,045
    Nuclear Counterrorism Incident Response.....................         215,278         221,936         233,134
    Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program......         147,449          93,922          94,000
    Site Stewardship............................................  ..............          61,288         105,478
    Environmental Projects and Operations.......................          38,596  ..............  ..............
    Defense Nuclear Security....................................         735,208         769,044         719,954
    Cyber Security..............................................         121,286         122,511         124,345
    Science, Technology and Engineering Capability..............          30,000  ..............          20,000
    Congressionally Directed Projects...........................          22,836           3,000  ..............
    Use/Rescission of Prior Year Balances.......................  ..............         -42,100  ..............
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Weapons Activities.................................       6,410,000       6,384,431       7,008,835
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Public Law Authorization
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 
111-84).
    Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act, 2010 (Public Law 111-85).
    National Nuclear Security Administration Act, (Public Law 106-65), 
as amended.

                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weapons Activities:
    Directed Stockpile Work.................................    1,900,736    1,999,470    2,240,139    2,346,254
    Science Campaign........................................      397,460      418,823      416,199      394,766
    Engineering Campaign....................................      149,737      134,996      144,920      145,739
    Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield           480,451      475,597      470,994      484,812
     Campaign...............................................
    Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign..............      622,940      616,257      615,420      633,134
    Readiness Campaign......................................       81,697       70,747       69,854       72,584
    Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities..............    1,872,546    1,841,325    1,926,568    1,997,764
    Secure Transportation Asset.............................      251,272      249,456      252,869      261,521
    Nuclear Counterrorism Incident Response.................      222,914      222,508      235,300      237,986
    Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program..       94,000       94,000  ...........  ...........
    Site Stewardship........................................      101,929      103,536      174,071      205,802
    Defense Nuclear Security................................      730,944      729,609      728,925      740,649
    Cyber Security..........................................      126,046      125,822      125,707      127,189
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Weapons Activities.............................    7,032,672    7,082,146    7,400,966    7,648,200
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                             DIRECTED STOCKPILE WORK--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Directed Stockpile Work:
    Life Extension Programs:
        B61 Life Extension Program..............................           1,854  ..............  ..............
        W76 Life Extension Program..............................         203,189         223,196         249,463
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
          Subtotal, Life Extension Programs.....................         205,043         223,196         249,463
                                                                 ===============================================
    Stockpile Systems:
        B61 Stockpile Systems...................................          90,204          91,956         317,136
        W62 Stockpile Systems...................................           1,500  ..............  ..............
        W76 Stockpile Systems...................................          63,219          56,554          64,521
        W78 Stockpile Systems...................................          40,347          48,311          85,898
        W80 Stockpile Systems...................................          30,712          27,398          34,193
        B83 Stockpile Systems...................................          26,938          33,502          39,349
        W87 Stockpile Systems...................................          40,949          48,139          62,603
        W88 Stockpile Systems...................................          43,928          51,940          45,666
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
          Subtotal, Stockpile Systems...........................         337,797         357,800         649,366
                                                                 ===============================================
    Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition:
        99-D-141-01 Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility--SRS          24,883  ..............  ..............
        99-D-141-02 Waste Solidification Building--SRS..........          40,000  ..............  ..............
        Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition...................          52,695          96,100          58,025
        Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility--O&M............          69,351  ..............  ..............
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
          Subtotal, Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition.......         186,929          96,100          58,025
                                                                 ===============================================
    Stockpile Services:
        Production Support......................................         308,806         300,037         309,761
        Research & Development Support..........................          35,049          37,071          38,582
        Research & Development Certification and Safety.........         169,403         166,523         209,053
        Management, Technology, and Production..................         192,072         183,223         193,811
        Plutonium Capability....................................         155,053  ..............  ..............
        Plutonium Sustainment...................................  ..............         141,909         190,318
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
          Subtotal, Stockpile Services..........................         860,383         828,763         941,525
                                                                 ===============================================
          Total, Directed Stockpile Work........................       1,590,152       1,505,859       1,898,379
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Directed Stockpile Work:
    Life Extension Programs:
        W76 Life Extension Program..........................      255,000      255,000      255,000      255,000
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
          Subtotal, Life Extension Programs.................      255,000      255,000      255,000      255,000
                                                             ===================================================
    Stockpile Systems:
        B61 Stockpile Systems...............................      337,851      394,027      437,518      512,296
        W76 Stockpile Systems...............................       56,418       58,312       55,396       54,038
        W78 Stockpile Systems...............................      104,964      156,340      346,923      345,359
        W80 Stockpile Systems...............................       31,627       34,566       35,974       36,621
        B83 Stockpile Systems...............................       37,160       38,294       42,621       42,059
        W87 Stockpile Systems...............................       67,754       64,924       51,898       50,433
        W88 Stockpile Systems...............................       61,229       65,094       69,777       68,648
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
          Subtotal, Stockpile Systems.......................      697,003      811,557    1,040,107    1,109,454
                                                             ===================================================
    Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition...................       53,327       48,446       58,102       60,089
                                                             ===================================================
    Stockpile Services:
        Production Support..................................      288,227      271,067      265,429      274,509
        Research & Development Support......................       35,044       34,667       35,497       36,711
        Research & Development Certification and Safety.....      207,133      213,923      214,632      222,777
        Management, Technology, and Production..............      202,020      196,676      198,660      205,454
        Plutonium Sustainment...............................      162,982      168,134      172,712      182,260
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
          Subtotal, Stockpile Services......................      895,406      884,467      886,930      921,711
                                                             ===================================================
          Total, Directed Stockpile Work....................    1,900,736    1,999,470    2,240,139    2,346,254
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                 SCIENCE CAMPAIGN--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Science Campaign:
    Advanced Certification......................................          19,400          19,400          76,972
    Primary Assessment Technologies.............................          80,181          83,181          85,723
    Dynamic Plutonium Experiments...............................          23,022  ..............  ..............
    Dynamic Materials Properties................................          83,231          86,617          96,984
    Advanced Radiography........................................          28,535          28,535          23,594
    Secondary Assessment Technologies...........................          76,913          77,913          81,949
    Test Readiness..............................................           5,408  ..............  ..............
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Science Campaign...................................         316,690         295,646         365,222
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Science Campaign:
    Advanced Certification..................................      104,704      129,481      129,978       98,908
    Primary Assessment Technologies.........................       86,253       85,248       84,327       87,165
    Dynamic Materials Properties............................       97,114       95,980       94,945       98,144
    Advanced Radiography....................................       27,132       26,816       26,528       27,421
    Secondary Assessment Technologies.......................       82,257       81,298       80,421       83,128
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Science Campaign...............................      397,460      418,823      416,199      394,766
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                               ENGINEERING CAMPAIGN--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Engineering Campaign:
    Enhanced Surety.............................................          46,111          42,000          42,429
    Weapon Systems Engineering Assessment Technology............          16,593          18,000          13,530
    Nuclear Survivability.......................................          21,100          21,000          19,786
    Enhanced Surveillance.......................................          66,196          69,000          66,175
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Engineering Campaign...............................         150,000         150,000         141,920
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Engineering Campaign:
    Enhanced Surety.........................................       44,019       43,699       48,851       50,523
    Weapon Systems Engineering Assessment Technology........       16,533       15,199       19,730       20,404
    Nuclear Survivability...................................       20,627       18,550       10,334       10,687
    Enhanced Surveillance...................................       68,558       57,548       66,005       64,125
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Engineering Campaign...........................      149,737      134,996      144,920      145,739
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


           INERTIAL CONFINEMENT FUSION IGNITION AND HIGH YIELD CAMPAIGN--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Campaign:
    Ignition....................................................         100,535         106,734         109,506
    NIF Diagnostics, Cryogenics, and Experimental Support.......          66,201          72,252         102,649
    Pulsed Power Inertial Confinement Fusion....................           8,652           5,000           5,000
    Joint Program in High Energy Density Laboratory Plasmas.....           3,053           4,000           4,000
    Facility Operations and Target Production...................         203,282         269,929         260,393
    NIF Assembly and Installation Program.......................          55,192  ..............  ..............
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield         436,915         457,915         481,548
       Campaign.................................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield
 Campaign:
    Ignition................................................      110,222       74,410       71,479       73,886
    Support of Other Stockpile Programs.....................       17,240       39,637       35,522       49,154
    NIF Diagnostics, Cryogenics, and Experimental Support...       74,104       83,878       82,921       76,117
    Pulsed Power Inertial Confinement Fusion................        5,000        5,000        5,000        5,000
    Joint Program in High Energy Density Laboratory Plas-           4,000        4,000        4,000        4,000
     mas....................................................
    Facility Operations and Target Production...............      269,885      268,672      272,072      276,655
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High        480,451      475,597      470,994      484,812
       Yield Campaign.......................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                    ADVANCED SIMULATION AND COMPUTING CAMPAIGN--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign:
    Integrated Codes............................................         138,917         140,882         165,947
    Physics and Engineering Models..............................          49,284          61,189          62,798
    Verification and Validation.................................          50,184          50,882          54,781
    Computational Systems and Software Environment..............         156,733         159,022         175,833
    Facility Operations and User Support........................         161,007         155,650         156,389
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign.........         556,125         567,625         615,748
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign:
    Integrated Codes........................................      167,327      163,752      163,887      168,143
    Physics and Engineering Models..........................       66,541       65,019       64,626       66,438
    Verification and Validation.............................       54,168       52,879       52,300       53,835
    Computational Systems and Software Environment..........      175,833      175,833      175,833      180,912
    Facility Operations and User Support....................      159,071      158,774      158,774      163,806
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Advanced Simulation and Computing Cam-  paign..      622,940      616,257      615,420      633,134
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                READINESS CAMPAIGN--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Readiness Campaign:
    Stockpile Readiness.........................................          27,869           5,746          18,941
    High Explosives and Weapon Operations.......................           8,581           4,608           3,000
    Nonnuclear Readiness........................................          32,545          12,701          21,864
    Tritium Readiness...........................................          70,409          68,246          50,187
    Advanced Design and Production Technologies.................          21,216           8,699          18,100
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Readiness Campaign.................................         160,620         100,000         112,092
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Readiness Campaign:
    Tritium Readiness.......................................       81,697       70,747       69,854       72,584
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Readiness Campaign.............................       81,697       70,747       69,854       72,584
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                    READINESS IN TECHNICAL BASE AND FACILITIES--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities:
    Operations of Facilities:
        Kansas City Plant.......................................          89,871         156,056         186,102
        Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory..................          82,605          86,670          80,106
        Los Alamos National Laboratory..........................         289,169         311,776         318,464
        Nevada Test Site........................................          92,203          79,583          80,077
        Pantex..................................................         101,230         131,602         121,254
        Sandia National Laboratory..............................         123,992         104,133         117,369
        Savannah River Site.....................................          92,762         128,580          92,722
        Y-12 National Security Complex..........................         235,397         229,774         220,927
        Institutional Site Support..............................          56,102         120,129          40,970
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
          Subtotal, Operations of Facilities....................       1,163,331       1,348,303       1,257,991
                                                                 ===============================================
    Program Readiness...........................................          71,626          73,021          69,309
    Material Recycle and Recovery...............................          70,334          69,542          70,429
    Containers..................................................          22,696          23,392          27,992
    Storage.....................................................          31,951          24,708          24,233
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Subtotal, Operations and Maintenance......................       1,359,938       1,538,966       1,449,954
                                                                 ===============================================
    Construction................................................         314,468         303,904         399,016
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities.........       1,674,406       1,842,870       1,848,970
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities:
    Operations of Facilities................................    1,178,512    1,129,208    1,061,276    1,097,791
    Program Readiness.......................................       48,492       47,998       63,541       65,713
    Material Recycle and Recovery...........................       61,678       63,673       63,386       65,554
    Containers..............................................       22,043       23,100       22,971       23,757
    Storage.................................................       19,535       21,425       21,942       22,693
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Subtotal, Operations and Maintenance..................    1,330,260    1,285,404    1,233,116    1,275,508
                                                             ===================================================
    Construction............................................      542,286      555,921      693,452      722,256
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities.....    1,872,546    1,841,325    1,926,568    1,997,764
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                       SECURE TRANSPORTATION ASSET--OVERVIEW FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secure Transportation Asset (STA):
    Operations and Equipment....................................         127,701         138,772         149,018
    Program Direction...........................................          86,738          96,143          99,027
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Secure Transportation Asset........................         214,439         234,915         248,045
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operations and Equipment:
    Operations and Equipment................................      149,274      144,398      144,660      150,066
    Program Direction.......................................      101,998      105,058      108,209      111,455
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Operations and Equipment.......................      251,272      249,456      252,869      261,521
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


              SECURE TRANSPORTATION ASSET--OPERATIONS AND EQUIPMENT--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operations and Equipment:
    Mission Capacity............................................          70,107          75,038          84,010
    Security/Safety Capability..................................          20,617          26,472          27,001
    Infrastructure and C5 Systems...............................          25,978          23,217          23,681
    Program Management..........................................          10,999          14,045          14,326
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Operations and Equipment...........................         127,701         138,772         149,018
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operations and Equipment:
    Mission Capacity........................................       82,966       76,764       75,672       79,699
    Security/Safety Capability..............................       27,541       28,092       28,654       29,227
    Infrastructure and C5 Systems...........................       24,155       24,638       25,131       25,633
    Program Management......................................       14,612       14,904       15,203       15,507
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Operations and Equipment.......................      149,274      144,398      144,660      150,066
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                  SECURE TRANSPORTATION ASSET--PROGRAM DIRECTION--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                             [Dollars in thousands]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program Direction:
    Salaries and Benefits.......................................         $75,226         $81,225         $83,311
    Travel......................................................         $10,188        $411,331          $7,746
    Other Related Expenses......................................          $1,324          $3,587          $7,970
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Program Direction..................................         $86,738         $96,143         $99,027
                                                                 ===============================================
      Total, Full Time Equivalents..............................             570             647             637
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                             [Dollars in thousands]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program Direction:
    Salaries and Benefits...................................      $85,781      $88,323      $90,943      $93,641
    Travel..................................................       $7,980       $8,218       $8,465       $8,719
    Other Related Expenses..................................       $8,237       $8,517       $8,801       $9,095
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Program Direction..............................     $101,998     $105,058     $108,209     $111,455
                                                             ===================================================
      Total, Full Time Equivalents..........................          637          637          637          637
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                     NUCLEAR COUNTERRORISM INCIDENT RESPONSE--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                           [In thousands for dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear Counterterrorism Incident Response (Homeland
 Security):\1\
    Emergency Response (Homeland Security) \1\..................         132,918         139,048         134,092
    National Technical Nuclear Forensics (Homeland Security) \1\          12,557          10,217          11,698
    Emergency Management (Homeland Security) \1\................           7,428           7,726           7,494
    Operations Support (Homeland Security) \1\..................           8,207           8,536           8,675
    International Emergency Management and Cooperation..........           4,515           7,181           7,139
    Nuclear Counterterrorism (Homeland Security) \1\............          49,653          49,228          64,036
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Nuclear Counterterrorism Incident Response.........         215,278         221,936         233,134
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Homeland Security designations.


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear Counterterrorism Incident Response:
    Emergency Response (Homeland Security) \1\..............      137,715      138,359      139,504      141,107
    National Technical Nuclear Forensics (Homeland Security)       11,589       11,694       11,577       11,828
     \1\....................................................
    Emergency Management (Homeland Security) \1\............        7,129        6,629        6,505        6,694
    Operations Support (Homeland Security) \1\..............        8,691        8,799        8,749        9,000
    International Emergency Management and Cooperation......        7,129        7,139        7,032        7,275
    Nuclear Counterterrorism (Homeland Security) \1\........       50,661       49,888       61,933       62,082
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Nuclear Counterterrorism Incident Response.....      222,914      222,508      235,300      237,986
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Homeland Security designations.


              FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAM--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program:
    Operations and Maintenance (O&M):
        Recapitalization........................................          69,226          69,377          79,600
        Infrastructure Planning.................................          10,324           8,982           9,400
        Facility Disposition....................................  ..............           5,600           5,000
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
          Subtotal, Operations and Maintenance (O&M)............          79,550          83,959          94,000
                                                                 ===============================================
    Construction................................................          67,899           9,963  ..............
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization              147,449          93,922          94,000
       Program..................................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program:
    Operations and Maintenance (O&M):
        Recapitalization....................................       79,600       86,600  ...........  ...........
        Infrastructure Planning.............................        9,400        2,400  ...........  ...........
        Facility Disposition................................        5,000        5,000  ...........  ...........
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
          Subtotal, Operations and Maintenance (O&M)........       94,000       94,000  ...........  ...........
                                                             ===================================================
    Construction............................................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization        94,000       94,000  ...........  ...........
       Program..............................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                 SITE STEWARDSHIP--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Site Stewardship:
    Operations and Maintenance..................................  ..............          61,288          90,478
    Construction................................................  ..............  ..............          15,000
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Site Stewardship...................................  ..............          61,288         105,478
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Site Stewardship:
    Operations and Maintenance..............................      101,929      103,536      174,071      205,802
    Construction............................................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Site Stewardship...............................      101,929      103,536      174,071      205,802
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                      ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS AND OPERATIONS--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Environmental Projects and Operations:
    Long-Term Stewardship.......................................          38,596  ..............  ..............
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Environmental Projects and Operations..............          38,596  ..............  ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                             SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safeguards and Security (S&S):
    Defense Nuclear Security (Homeland Security):
        Operations and Maintenance..............................         689,510         720,044         667,954
        Construction............................................          45,698          49,000          52,000
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
          Total, Defense Nuclear Security.......................         735,208         769,044         719,954
                                                                 ===============================================
    Cyber Security (Homeland Security)..........................         121,286         122,511         124,345
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Safeguards and Security............................         856,494         891,555         844,299
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safeguards and Security (S&S):
    Defense Nuclear Security (Homeland Security):
        Operations and Maintenance..........................      675,229      672,344      671,671      681,259
        Construction........................................       55,715       57,265       57,254       59,390
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
          Total, Defense Nuclear Security...................      730,944      729,609      728,925      740,649
                                                             ===================================================
    Cyber Security (Homeland Security)......................      126,046      125,822      125,707      127,189
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Safeguards and Security........................      856,990      855,431      854,632      867,838
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                             DEFENSE NUCLEAR SECURITY--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense Nuclear Security:
    Operations and Maintenance (Homeland Security):
        Protective Forces.......................................         418,694         453,000         414,166
        Physical Security Systems...............................          77,245          74,000          73,794
        Transportation..........................................             420  ..............  ..............
        Information Security....................................          25,880          25,300          25,943
        Personnel Security......................................          31,263          30,600          30,913
        Materials Control and Accountability....................          35,929          35,200          35,602
        Program Management......................................          71,364          83,944          80,311
        Technology Deployment, Physical Security................           9,431           8,000           7,225
        Graded Security Protection Policy (formerly DBT)........          19,284          10,000  ..............
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
          Total, Operations and Maintenance (Homeland Security).         689,510         720,044         667,954
                                                                 ===============================================
    Construction (Homeland Security)............................          45,698          49,000          52,000
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Defense Nuclear Security...........................         735,208         769,044         719,954
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense Nuclear Security:
    Operations and Maintenance (Homeland Security):
        Protective Forces...................................      422,221      414,432      414,617      421,346
        Physical Security Systems...........................       71,405       73,987       71,165       72,297
        Information Security................................       26,202       26,464       26,729       26,996
        Personnel Security..................................       31,222       31,534       31,849       32,167
        Materials Control and Accountability................       35,958       36,318       36,681       37,048
        Program Management..................................       80,924       82,239       83,186       83,887
        Technology Deployment, Physical Security............        7,297        7,370        7,444        7,518
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
          Total, Operations and Maintenance (Homeland             675,229      672,344      671,671      681,259
           Security)........................................
                                                             ===================================================
    Construction (Homeland Security)........................       55,715       57,265       57,254       59,390
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Defense Nuclear Security.......................      730,944      729,609      728,925      740,649
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                  CYBER SECURITY--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cyber Security (Homeland Security):
    Infrastructure Program......................................          93,776          99,011          97,849
    Enterprise Secure Computing.................................          25,500          21,500          21,500
    Technology Application Development..........................           2,010           2,000           4,996
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Cyber Security (Homeland Security).................         121,286         122,511         124,345
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cyber Security (Homeland Security):
    Infrastructure Program..................................       99,550       99,326       98,211       99,693
    Enterprise Secure Computing.............................       21,500       21,500       22,500       22,500
    Technology Application Development......................        4,996        4,996        4,996        4,996
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Cyber Security (Homeland Security).............      126,046      125,822      125,707      127,189
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                  SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ENGINEERING CAPABILITY--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operations and Maintenance......................................          30,000  ..............          20,000
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Science, Technology and Engineering Capability.....          30,000  ..............          20,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operations and Maintenance..................................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Science, Technology and Engineering Capabil-     ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
       ity..................................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


              WEAPONS ACTIVITIES--CONGRESSIONALLY DIRECTED PROJECTS--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congressionally Directed Projects...............................          22,836           3,000  ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                    DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--OVERVIEW--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation:
    Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development..         356,281         317,300         351,568
    Nonproliferation and International Security.................         150,000         187,202         155,930
    International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation..     \1\ 460,592         572,050         590,118
    Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production...........         141,299          24,507  ..............
    Fissile Materials Disposition...............................          41,774         701,900       1,030,713
    Global Threat Reduction Initiative..........................     \2\ 404,640         333,500         558,838
        Congressional Directed Projects.........................           1,903             250  ..............
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
          Subtotal, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation............       1,556,489       2,136,709       2,687,167
                                                                 ===============================================
Use of Prior Year Balances......................................         -11,418  ..............  ..............
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation...................       1,545,071       2,136,709       2,687,167
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Fiscal year 2009 amount includes international contributions of $4,067,065 from Government of Canada,
  $387,335 from New Zealand, $837,600 from Norway, and $300,000 from South Korea.
\2\ Fiscal year 2009 amount includes international contributions of $3,918,000 from the Government of Canada,
  and $5,722,212 from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

NOTES.--Fiscal year 2009 funds appropriated in Other Defense Activities for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication
  Facility, and in Weapons Activities for the Waste Solidification Building and Pit Disassembly and Conversion
  Facility (fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010) are not reflected in the above table.

Public Law Authorization
    Energy and Water and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 
(Public Law 111-85).
    National Nuclear Security Administration Act, (Public Law 106-65), 
as amended.
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 
111-84).

                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation:
    Nonproliferation and Verification Research and                315,941      317,558      328,194      351,145
     Development............................................
    Nonproliferation and International Security.............      161,083      165,275      169,861      181,741
    International Nuclear Materials Protection and                570,798      561,790      558,492      623,670
     Cooperation............................................
    Fissile Materials Disposition...........................      859,375    1,010,642      789,558      743,600
    Global Threat Reduction Initiative......................      599,994      659,926      987,138    1,056,172
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation...............    2,507,191    2,715,191    2,833,243    2,956,328
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


            NONPROLIFERATION AND VERIFICATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonproliferation and Verification R&D:
    Operations and Maintenance (O&M):
        Proliferation Detection.................................        195,400         181,839         225,004
        Homeland Security-Related Proliferation Detection [Non-         [50,000]        [50,000]        [50,000]
         Add]...................................................
        Nuclear Detonation Detection............................        142,421         135,461         126,564
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
          Subtotal, O&M.........................................        337,821         317,300         351,568
                                                                 ===============================================
    Construction................................................         18,460   ..............  ..............
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Nonproliferation and Verification R&D..............        356,281         317,300         351,568
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonproliferation and Verification R&D:
    Operations and Maintenance:
        Proliferation Detection (PD)........................     182,614      183,549      189,696      202,962
        Homeland Security-Related Proliferation Detection        [50,000]     [50,000]     [50,000]     [50,000]
         [Non-Add]..........................................
        Nuclear Detonation Detection........................     133,327      134,009      138,498      148,183
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
          Total, Nonproliferation and Verification R&D......     315,941      317,558      328,194      351,145
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                   NONPROLIFERATION AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonproliferation and International Security:
    Dismantlement and Transparency..............................          47,529          72,763          49,207
    Global Security Engagement and Cooperation..................          44,076          50,708          47,289
    International Regimes and Agreements........................          40,793          42,703          39,824
    Treaties and Agreements.....................................          17,602          21,028          19,610
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Nonproliferation and International Security........         150,000         187,202         155,930
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonproliferation and International Security:
    Dismantlement and Transparency..........................       50,832       52,155       53,602       57,351
    Global Security Engagement and Cooperation..............       48,852       50,124       51,514       55,117
    International Regimes and Agreements....................       41,141       42,210       43,383       46,417
    Treaties and Agreements.................................       20,258       20,786       21,362       22,856
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Nonproliferation and International Security....      161,083      165,275      169,861      181,741
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


            INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS PROTECTION AND COOPERATION--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation:
    Navy Complex................................................          30,316          33,880          34,322
    Strategic Rocket Forces/12th Main Directorate...............          51,767          48,646          51,359
    Rosatom Weapons Complex.....................................          76,070          71,517         105,318
    Civilian Nuclear Sites......................................          45,542          63,481          59,027
    Material Consolidation and Conversion.......................          21,560          13,611          13,867
    National Programs and Sustainability........................          54,901          68,469          60,928
    Second Line of Defense......................................         174,844         272,446         265,297
    International Contributions.................................       \1\ 5,592  ..............  ..............
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, International Nuclear Materials Protection and              460,592         572,050         590,118
       Cooperation..............................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Fiscal year 2009 amount includes international contributions of $4,067,065 from Government of Canada,
  $387,335 from New Zealand, $837,600 from Norway, and $300,000 from South Korea.


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation:
    Navy Complex............................................       31,764  ...........  ...........  ...........
    Strategic Rocket Forces/12th Main Directorate...........       37,830  ...........  ...........  ...........
    Rosatom Weapons Complex.................................       52,000  ...........  ...........  ...........
    Civilian Nuclear Sites..................................       18,502  ...........  ...........  ...........
    Material Consolidation and Conversion...................       14,306       14,627       14,627       16,433
    National Programs and Sustainability....................       61,967       39,006       39,006       43,623
    Second Line of Defense..................................      354,429      508,157      504,859      563,614
    International Contributions.............................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, International Nuclear Materials Protection and       570,798      561,790      558,492      623,670
       Cooperation..........................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                ELIMINATION OF WEAPONS-GRADE PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production (EWGPP):
    Zheleznogorsk Plutonium Production Elimination (ZPPEP)......         139,282          22,507  ..............
    Crosscutting and Technical Support Activities...............           2,017           2,000  ..............
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production           141,299          24,507  ..............
       (EWGPP)..................................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                          FISSILE MATERIALS DISPOSITION--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                   2009 Current    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fissile Materials Disposition (FMD):
    U.S. Surplus Fissile Materials Disposition:
        Operations and Maintenance (O&M):
            U.S. Plutonium Disposition..........................  ..............          90,896         278,940
            U.S. Uranium Disposition............................          39,274          34,691          25,985
            Supporting Activities...............................           1,500           1,075  ..............
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
              Subtotal, O&M.....................................          40,774         126,662         304,925
                                                                 ===============================================
        Construction............................................  ..............         574,238         612,788

                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
          Total, U.S. Surplus FMD...............................          40,774         700,900         917,713
                                                                 ===============================================
Russian Surplus FMD:
    Russian Materials Disposition...............................           1,000           1,000         113,000
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Fissile Materials Disposition......................          41,774         701,900       1,030,713
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fissile Materials Disposition:
    U.S. Surplus Fissile Materials Disposition (O&M)........      302,276      482,185      478,897      459,827
    Construction............................................      556,099      527,457      309,661      282,773
    Russian Surplus Fissile Materials Disposition...........        1,000        1,000        1,000        1,000
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Fissile Materials Disposition..................      859,375    1,010,642      789,558      743,600
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                  GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE (GTRI)--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM \1\
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Global Threat Reduction Initiative:
    Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Reactor Conversion............          76,706         102,772         119,000
    Nuclear and Radiological Material Removal:
        Russian-Origin Nuclear Material Removal.................         123,083          94,167         145,191
        U.S.-Origin Nuclear Material Removal....................           8,331           9,889          16,500
        Gap Nuclear Material Removal............................           4,982           9,111         108,000
        Emerging Threats Nuclear Material Removal...............           7,600           5,556          16,000
        International Radiological Material Removal.............          21,702           8,333          45,000
        Domestic Radiological Material Removal..................          17,063          17,778          25,000
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
          Subtotal, Nuclear and Radiological Material Removal...         182,761         144,834         355,691
                                                                 ===============================================
Nuclear and Radiological Material Protection:
    BN-350 Nuclear Material Protection..........................          50,977           9,109           2,000
    International Material Protection...........................          42,909          41,463          57,000
    Domestic Material Protection................................          41,647          35,322          25,147
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Subtotal, Nuclear and Radiological Material Protection....         135,533          85,894          84,147
                                                                 ===============================================
      Total, Global Threat Reduction Initiative (appropriation).         395,000         333,500         558,838

Funds from International Contributions..........................           9,640  ..............  ..............
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Global Threat Reduction Initiative Funds Available.         404,640         333,500         558,838
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Fiscal year 2009 amount includes international contributions of $3,918,000 from the Government of Canada,
  and $5,722,212 from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.


                                     OUT-YEAR FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Global Threat Reduction Initiative:
    HEU Reactor Conversion..................................      176,000      210,000      245,000      293,000
    Nuclear and Radiological Material Removal:
        Russian-Origin Nuclear Material Remov-  al..........       96,000       70,000       82,000       83,000
        U.S.-Origin Nuclear Material Removal................        1,000        3,000        1,000        1,000
        Gap Nuclear Material Removal........................       22,000       16,000       27,000        1,000
        Emerging Threats Nuclear Material Removal...........       16,000       16,000      194,000      188,000
        International Radiological Material Removal.........       44,000       39,000       10,000       10,000
        Domestic Radiological Material Removal..............       31,000       31,000       33,000       34,000
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
          Subtotal, Nuclear and Radiological Material             210,000      175,000      347,000      317,000
           Removal..........................................
                                                             ===================================================
Nuclear and Radiological Material Protection:
    BN-350 Nuclear Material Protection......................        2,000  ...........  ...........  ...........
    International Material Protection.......................      100,000      125,000      130,000      143,000
    Domestic Material Protection............................      111,994      149,926      265,138      303,172
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Subtotal, Nuclear and Radiological Material Protec-         213,994      274,926      395,138      446,172
       tion.................................................
                                                             ===================================================
      Total, Global Threat Reduction Initiative.............      599,994      659,926      987,138    1,056,172
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                        CONGRESSIONALLY DIRECTED PROJECTS--FUNDING PROFILE BY SUBPROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congressionally Directed Projects...............................           1,903             250  ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                           NAVAL REACTORS--OVERVIEW--APPROPRIATION SUMMARY BY PROGRAM
                                            [In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
                                                                    2009 Actual    2010 Current     Fiscal Year
                                                                   Appropriation   Appropriation   2011 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naval Reactors Development:
    Operations and Maintenance (O&M)............................         771,600         877,533         997,886
    Program Direction...........................................          34,454          36,800          40,000
    Construction................................................          22,000          30,800          32,600
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, Naval Reactors Development.........................         828,054         945,133       1,070,486
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Public Law Authorizations
    Public Law 83-703, ``Atomic Energy Act of 1954'' ``Executive Order 
12344'' (42 U.S.C. 7158), ``Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program''.
    Public Law 107-107, ``National Defense Authorizations Act of 
2002'', title 32, ``National Nuclear Security Administration''.
    John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 
2007, (Public Law 109-364).
    Fiscal Year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Public Law 110-
161).
    National Nuclear Security Administration Act, (Public Law 106-65), 
as amended.
    Fiscal Year 2009 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Public Law 111-
8).
    Fiscal Year 2010 Energy and Water and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act (Public Law 111-85).

                                    OUT-YEAR APPROPRIATION SUMMARY BY PROGRAM
                                             [In thousands dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year
                                                                  2012         2013         2014         2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naval Reactors Development:
    Operations and Maintenance..............................    1,018,634    1,102,978    1,177,817    1,240,430
    Program Direction.......................................       41,200       42,400       43,700       45,000
    Construction............................................       39,900       25,800        4,500       25,100
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total, Naval Reactors Development.....................    1,099,734    1,171,178    1,226,017    1,310,530
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Senator Dorgan. Mr. D'Agostino, thank you very much. Would 
you like to identify, for the record, those who are 
accompanying you today?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Steven Black, to my right, is going to be representing 
the nonproliferation program. Mr. Black has been the chief 
operating officer in--we call the NA-20 organization, and has 
been--essentially, has very deep knowledge of all levels of the 
program. And we're fortunate to be with him.
    Admiral Kirk Donald, to my left, runs the naval reactors 
program; for many years, has demonstrated significant success 
in implementing these programs. It's really, quite an 
impressive organization.
    And Brigadier General Gary Harencak, to my left, runs the 
defense programs activities. General Harencak joined our 
operation about a year ago--little less than a year ago. It's a 
great find for us, from the Air Force. It's the Air Force's 
demonstration of their commitment to these types of programs.

                     5 YEAR BUDGET ESTIMATE DETAILS

    Senator Dorgan. Well, thank you very much for your 
testimony.
    Let me ask a couple of questions of the type that I raised 
and Senator Bennett raised, as well. We have a 5-year out-year 
budget from NNSA that shows an average of about $300 million 
per year increase for NNSA needs. But, my understanding is that 
that budget doesn't include the current $3 billion estimated 
cost of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility 
replacement, at Los Alamos; the Uranium Processing Facility, at 
Y-12--that's expected to cost $1.4 to $3.5 billion; the Pit 
Disassembly and Conversion Facility at Savannah River--that's 
to cost between $2.4 and $3.2 billion.
    My understanding is the cost estimates are not completed on 
those buildings, so they are not a part of your 5 year 
estimate. Is that right? Will the subcommittee expect to see 
higher cost estimates and more requirements for those three 
buildings?
    Mr. D'Agostino. The resources for the design work are in 
our FYNSP. We feel--we're limited, in providing a 5 year plan, 
sir. Most of these facilities will take, in many cases, 9 or 10 
years to build. What we've looked at in the Department--to 
address the concerns, raised by you sir, as well as the 
Government Accountability Office, which has been very clear on 
how we want to move forward--is, it's important to spend more 
time up front in understanding what you're going to design 
before you commit to a cost--you know, what we call a 
``critical decision 2,'' which is a final cost, scope, and 
schedule that we say we sign our names up to.
    So, what we have in the first few years of this future-
year--5-year national security plan are our projections on what 
the out years might be. The real numbers are going to start 
coming in, in the years 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018, as we get 
into the heavy construction pieces of those particular 
projects. So, in order to address the project management 
concern, which is a very valid concern, the Deputy Secretary 
recently issued a revised project management policy to address 
those specific points.
    Senator Dorgan. I'm sorry to interrupt you, but let me just 
ask the admiral a question that is similar. We're talking about 
three facilities, each of which are going to cost probably 
close to a couple billion dollars each, rather $3 billion, 
potentially; $2 billion; $2.5 billion. So, three very large 
facilities that will be built over a long period of time.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
    Senator Dorgan. At the same time, my understanding is, that 
we're going to do three things, we're going to have three 
projects. One is developing a new reactor core for the Ohio-
class submarine; refueling the prototype reactor in New York; 
and new spent-fuel facilities in Idaho. The first, I think is 
going to cost, I'm told, up to $1.5 billion; the second, $1.3 
billion; the third, probably $1.3 or $1.4 billion. So, you're 
talking about three very large programs, here; three very large 
facilities. Then, I think we asked the question earlier, can 
you effectively do all these in reasonably the same period of 
time, effectively manage them, and, especially, control costs?
    Mr. D'Agostino. I believe the answer is, firmly yes, we can 
do that. We can do it because--for a number of reasons. In many 
cases, these are activities that have started already. They 
won't be starting from a zero stop and then going to full steam 
ahead. Well, all the facilities on the weapons side and 
operations side have started, already.
    What we've realized on large projects is spending the right 
amount of money early on the design allows us to lock in and 
have a good understanding of the actual costs before we begin 
construction. So, we do--our 5 year plan does have the 
resources to do the design work that we think is absolutely 
critical. The last 2 years of the 5 year plan, for example, the 
years 2014 and 2015, show bump-ups of about $300 million in 
each of those years to address when we start to actually expect 
doing construction work, because we think that's when the 
dollars will be needed.
    But, the important thing is that we haven't yet committed 
to the actual design cost schedule yet, because we haven't 
finished our design work. And one of the commitments in our 
policies is to do the design early. Once you have the design 
early--and we have authorization and appropriations to 
proceed--is to make sure that the President's request requests 
the right amount of money in each year--not try to shortchange 
those things. In the past, we've gotten into trouble, because 
it always seemed like a convenient pool to go to, to go solve 
other problems that come up throughout the year. And the 
commitment is that once the cost, scope, and schedule is 
understood on the project, we fund it.
    I'd like to turn to Admiral Donald, who can talk a little 
bit about the naval reactors piece.
    Admiral Donald. Sure. Thank you very much. It's good to be 
here and thank you for the opportunity to appear before the 
subcommittee.
    There are two points I would make about our ability to 
execute these significant projects. There are two that involve 
reactor design--the reactor plant design for the replacement 
for the Ohio-class, and then the reactor design that goes into 
the prototype up in New York for training and--or research and 
development. The third one, while not a reactor design, is 
similar, in the sense that it's a complex nuclear project that 
we would be undertaking.
    The first point I would make to you, sir, is that we have a 
history of designing reactor plants. This would be the 30th--
over the 30th reactor design that naval reactors has made. 
We've made over two dozen reactor plant designs that include 
the entire propulsion plant, over the history of the program, 
the most recent being the design of the reactor plant for the 
Gerald R. Ford class of aircraft carrier, which we're on 
schedule, all of our components are being delivered or are in 
delivery to the shipyard right now, on time, and on the budget 
that we had demonstrated, or we had planned for in the past.
    These projects are very similar, in that regard, so I 
think--I am confident that we know how to do this. We 
understand what the difficulties are, what the challenges are, 
and we've carefully mapped those out.
    The key, however, as we've learned, to success in these is, 
you have to get the design matured, as Mr. D'Agostino pointed 
out. History has shown that if you can get designs complete to 
about 40 to 50 percent, you have a very good opportunity--a 
very good chance of delivering on time and on budget. That's 
what we demonstrated in the Virginia-class submarine program. 
That's the target that we're going for now for these projects. 
And the key to that is the early upfront funding so that we can 
do the design, the concept development, and be prepared to 
start construction.

                     ENSURING CONTRACT COMPETITION

    Senator Dorgan. All right. Last year, we expressed some 
concern in this subcommittee about the sole-source awarding of 
target production for the NIF and other laser facilities, which 
we indicated we felt was inconsistent with policy guidelines. 
With the cost of target production expected to increase 
significantly, competition will be needed to lower costs and to 
spur innovation. We believe the NNSA's recently released 
request for information to award a new contract is more 
oriented toward one contractor. We've also had complaints about 
that, as well.
    To what extent, if you can tell me, Mr. D'Agostino, does 
the request for information preclude multiple vendors from 
effectively competing for the contract?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Mr. Chairman, we're very much interested in 
competition across a broad range of activities. I'm not aware 
of any complaints, but I'd be happy to make sure we take a look 
at that.
    If our request for information appears to be focused to a 
single contractor, that was an oversight on our part. We'll 
have to--I'll take a look into that and get back to the 
subcommittee.
    Senator Dorgan. All right because it seems to me, 
especially on these kinds of projects, the more you can get 
contractors involved in competition, the lower you're going to 
experience pricing on these major contracts.

                             JASON'S REPORT

    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
    Senator Dorgan. Let me just ask, on the issue of nuclear 
weapons design, my understanding is that the plan is to modify 
the design of nuclear weapons. Reconcile that, if you would, 
that is the need for changes, with JASON's conclusion, in its 
2009 report, that the lifetimes of today's nuclear warheads 
could be extended for decades without significant changes to 
their design and without any significant deterioration.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
    Senator Dorgan. So, can you tell us how you see the JASON's 
report--related to the discussions about changing design?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely, and at the end, if General 
Harencak wants to join, if it's okay----
    Senator Dorgan. All right.
    Mr. D'Agostino [continuing]. We'll ask him to do it. I'll--
I can't start off on that.
    The JASON's report, the unclassified executive summary, 
basically talked about: If we don't want to improve the safety, 
if we don't want to improve the security, if we don't want to 
improve the reliability, and just keeps things the way they are 
and have cold war nuclear weapons, they felt, ``just keep 
making things the way you used to make them.''
    There's a couple--okay. I'll take that statement.
    Senator Feinstein. That's not what it says.
    Mr. D'Agostino. It's--it talks about----
    Senator Feinstein. I have it in front of me.
    Mr. D'Agostino [continuing]. We can maintain, out into the 
future----
    Senator Feinstein. Excuse me.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. Well, I don't have it in front of me 
right now, but if it says we can--I think it says, we can 
maintain, out into the future, using current life-extension 
approaches----
    Senator Feinstein. Yes.
    Mr. D'Agostino [continuing]. To safety, security----
    Senator Feinstein. That's right.
    Mr. D'Agostino. I think--what I'm interested in--there's a 
couple of problems with what I would say, to this high-level 
summary statement. One is, in many cases we can't make things 
the way we used to make them 30, 40 years ago. We just don't 
have the people; we don't have the processing techniques; many 
of the chemicals, and many of the materials that were used back 
then are prohibited from us for being able to use them; they 
have grave environmental damages and a very expensive 
infrastructure to be able to build that stuff. And so, I'm 
thinking about--decisions that get made now are going to have 
long-term impacts. These are, like, multi-decade facilities, so 
why would I want to, kind of, lock in the way we used to make 
things, when you know, we've progressed a lot in manufacturing 
approaches and we know a lot more about material, and the 
damage that beryllium does, and acetyl nitrate does. These are 
specific components.
    Because those have costs, those have real costs, and they 
have long-term costs in dollars and in people--so, the approach 
is: In order to overcome the problem that we have in 
manufacturing, that there are different ways to do business. In 
order to address what I would say is 21st century security 
problems and 21st century safety approaches and not lock in the 
way we did safety, 30 years ago. There are features that we can 
put inside of these devices that will essentially make them 
safe.
    And I think that would be my approach.
    Senator Dorgan. I want to call on my colleagues in a 
moment, but my understanding was, in this discussion, which was 
RRW and this discussion had a number of components.
    My understanding was that, for some while, there was a 
belief that pit degradation would mean that we would not have 
reliability of our nuclear deterrent, and therefore, a new 
class of nuclear weapons was required. The JASON's report, I 
think, among other things, has indicated, ``No, that worry 
about degradation is not a concern.'' They believe that these 
nuclear weapons will be reliable, well out into the future.
    And your point about designing safety, I understand.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes.
    Senator Dorgan. But, my point is that the design changes 
originally were driven by a notion that you would have a 
degrading of the deterrent, and therefore, you had to replace 
them. I think the JASON's report is at odds with that. So, that 
was what I was trying to ask.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Okay.
    Senator Dorgan. Let me call on my colleagues for questions.
    Senator Bennett.

                       INDEPENDENT COST ESTIMATES

    Senator Bennett. Thank you very much.
    Again, the chairman has talked about many of the things 
that I want to talk about. Let's discuss the whole issue of 
independent cost estimates.
    Senator Alexander and I sent a letter to Secretary Chu last 
month to request the Department to obtain an independent cost 
estimate for the UPF Facility. He has not responded. Were you 
aware of that request?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir, I'm aware of that request.
    Senator Bennett. And, as part of your reforms for contracts 
and project management, do you like the idea of independent 
cost estimates?
    Mr. D'Agostino. I absolutely love the idea. I think it's a 
great idea. We have to have it, and we have to do it much more 
frequently than we've done in the past. The policy the Deputy 
Secretary signed out last week on project management will 
require independent cost estimates more frequently, 
particularly at the critical decision points. So, before the 
Department would propose, in a budget request--that the 
President proposes in the budget request to Congress, on a 
critical decision--we would have an independent cost estimate, 
outside of my organization, to go validate that--you know, 
check independently that we have a good understanding of what 
the project's going to cost. There are a couple of other pieces 
to that, as well, that I'd be willing to describe, on project 
management.
    Senator Bennett. That means you'll have a solid cost 
estimate and schedule for each one of the multiple projects I 
described in my opening statement?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir. We will--the key is, providing 
that solid cost estimate and schedule when we have the data to 
say we actually understand it. And, as Admiral Donald said, an 
example of this new policy will require much more significant 
design maturity then we've ever had in the past on these 
projects. What I'm looking at, in the NNSA for example, is to 
try to get as close as possible to 90 percent design maturity 
before we go off and authorize the construction of an activity, 
because then we will have a good idea--we will say, ``We 
absolutely know what this design is.'' We've run down all of 
the technology readiness-level issues that typically come up 
and bite you if you don't--if you try to get started too soon. 
So, that's an element of this----
    Senator Bennett. Okay.
    Mr. D'Agostino [continuing]. Design maturity.
    Senator Bennett. Yes. I outlined the series of things that 
you're trying to do simultaneously----
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
    Senator Bennett [continuing]. Plus the two life-extension 
programs. Now, does the activity we need to do on the life 
extension programs hinge on the timely completion of the other 
four projects?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Two of the projects are nonproliferation 
projects. So, there's a clear answer to ``no''--no, on that 
activity. The two life-extension programs in question are the 
W76 and the B61. The W76 work, General, is underway right now, 
we're into production mode on that, so it doesn't hinge on the 
completion of those projects. The B61 work is--particularly in 
the first few years, we're in the design maturity stage of the 
study, and then we'll come back and request authorization to 
actually proceed with the production. So, it doesn't hinge 
directly on that, because the idea is to get--when is the date 
for the B61, Gary?
    General Harencak. By 2017, sir.
    And, if I might----
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes.
    General Harencak [continuing]. Make a point about our life-
extended--while we will have a time where there are dual life-
extended--the way it's laid out is, the majority--overwhelming 
majority of the work will be done for the W76 as we start the 
core of the majority of the work of the B61. And then, that 
would be completed, should we need to do any other life-
extensions time. So, while certainly on paper you're doing two 
life extensions, we've already de-conflicted the major 
facilities with that, our workforce and its plan to complete 
the W76 on time, on schedule, prior to the main heavy lifting 
that'd be required for the B61 in our production facilities.

                PIT DISASSEMBLY AND CONVERSION FACILITY

    Senator Bennett. When do you anticipate requesting funds 
for the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility? And do you 
have any idea what the full cost is likely to be? Is that 
included in your 5-year budget, or is that something we can 
expect at some future time?
    Mr. Black. The cost of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion 
Facility will be determined after we do some study. You may 
know that the Deputy Secretary decided, this past fall, to 
direct the Department to explore the possibility of combining 
the original standalone Pit Disassembly and Conversion 
Facility, which you've been discussing, with an existing 
project to deal with non-pit plutonium at Savannah River, 
that's currently run by the Office of Environmental Management, 
EM. So, we formed a working group with EM--an NNSA-EM working 
group--to evaluate what the possibilities are to combine these 
two projects. And part of the reason we're doing this is 
because the working group that was already stood up felt that 
there were a number of potential advantages to combining them; 
in particular, cost avoidance. We can't promise that, but 
initially it looks like we might be able to avoid the cost of 
building a new facility, because we would use the shell of the 
old K-Reactor, which currently exists, rather than building a 
new one. We would also avoid the costs of decontaminating and 
decommissioning a second category-1 facility at the end of the 
mission. And we might be able to smooth out such things as 
transportation costs, in terms of shipping pits from Pantex to 
Savannah River, and the like. So, there's a variety of ways 
that we might be able to avoid some costs and come in with a 
project that will actually satisfy both missions. But, we're 
not at CD1 yet. We don't have a cost estimate, and we expect 
that it will take 12 to 18 months. So, we would imagine, 
perhaps by the end of fiscal year 2011, we would be able to 
come in with a more reasonable--a more specific cost estimate 
and proposal.
    Senator Bennett. So, you have nothing in your 5 year budget 
now.
    Mr. Black. Not right now, no. We have funds that were 
transferred from the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility 
that came over from another part of the budget, when it was 
reconfigured and realigned this year. And that funding will be 
used to continue work that would need to be done, irrespective 
of which path we take on the building. Whether we do the pit 
disassembly and conversion functions in the K Area, in the K-
Reactor, or whether we do it in a standalone facility that we 
build, we're still going to have to have glove boxes and hot 
cells and process equipment and the like. So, we're continuing 
to do the work and the long-lead procurement that would be 
required to do this mission. The mission has to be done. The 
question is whether we do it in this kind of a facility or that 
kind of facility. And, we feel that we can save some money in 
the long run if, as the Administrator said, we can do more 
complete design work over the next 12 to 18 months, and come 
back to you and to the Secretary with another estimate.

                      PROPOSED BUDGET ALLOCATIONS

    Senator Bennett. Okay. Now, in spite of all of the talk 
about the top line going up so dramatically, your request for 
day-to-day operations is down 7 percent, or $1.3 billion. And 
can you talk about that--why there's the decrease in this area? 
Was this a tradeoff as you negotiated with OMB? I've negotiated 
with OMB. And, while administrations come and go, and change, 
OMB always remains the same, it seems to me, and always 
difficult when you're in a department or an agency and trying 
to deal with them. You're forced to make budget cuts to deal 
with the other activities that go in the areas we've talked 
about our support for? I know that's a very blunt question, and 
you----
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
    Senator Bennett [continuing]. Probably can't give me a 
blunt answer, but hint around at it as best you can.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Senator Bennett, every year, there will be 
changes to our budget. And in many cases the message that I've 
been working to drive over the past few years is we have to 
continue to look at ways to be more efficient. There are always 
ways, I believe, to be more efficient. I believe there continue 
to be ways to be more efficient. We have to do it, for a number 
of reasons; obviously, healthcare costs and benefits and things 
like that, which impact all of us, are part of that. The area 
that I'm most particularly concerned about is our--you know, 
what I call some of the physical infrastructure.
    And I want--well, I have a meeting with the board of 
governors, actually, for two of our laboratories, Los Alamos 
and Livermore, this afternoon. I'm going to emphasize that this 
budget looks like great news, and it's important, because the 
country recognizes what's important, but we have to sharpen our 
pencils and reduce the fixed costs of doing our work in the 
enterprise. I believe there are more opportunities there. It 
certainly presents some challenges in maintenance of old 
facilities. I will readily admit that. You know, Brigadier 
General Harencak knows about this; he can probably add some 
detail to what I'm saying.
    But, in general, I'm always going to push to drive 
efficiencies and try to get out of those facilities that we 
don't need and to take them down, because they do add to the 
fixed costs. I support the President's budget, of course. There 
will always be program managers in my organization that would 
like more, in order to do more. But, I try to look at it, not 
just--well, look at what's an increment from what we had last 
year, but what's in the base of what we had last year that we 
can try to get out of the program. In this program--or, the 
request that we have before us reflects some of my leanings 
toward looking into the base of the program and trying to drive 
those costs down.
    Will it cause problems out there? Yes, because change is 
always hard. I think there will be challenges. There'll be some 
folks out in the field that'll say, you know, ``I need more and 
more--I need more.'' But, I think, in order to change from this 
kind of large cold war nuclear weapons complex, to an 
efficient, trim nuclear security enterprise that addresses not 
just weapons, but all these other areas, that's a necessity.
    General, would you want to add?
    General Harencak. Yes, sir. I----
    Mr. D'Agostino. Feel free to disagree with me, as well. 
So----
    General Harencak. Well, sir.
    Mr. D'Agostino. I mean, you're testifying, not me.
    General Harencak. I will not disagree with you. What I will 
say, though, is a caveat, perhaps----
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes.
    General Harencak [continuing]. That we still, even with 
this much needed budget increase--and, you know, last year, I 
believe, the testimony was--I told you that we could not 
sustain this enterprise. My best military advice was--I was new 
to the enterprise and--we could not sustain it with the type--
with the number of resources we had. This goes a long way, 
obviously, to fixing those problems and doing the work that we 
have to do.
    That being said, all budgets are going to have some areas 
that need, perhaps, still a little bit more attention. 
Facilities, is one, readiness and testing are some others.
    We do believe, though, that we could internally--through 
the great efforts of Mr. D'Agostino and all the great Americans 
that work in this organization that are trying to turn this 
into a 21st century nuclear security enterprise--that we can 
make some internal adjustments, and we're working it. As we 
speak right now, our best--some of our best people are meeting 
to look at how we're going to, internally, specifically in 
defense programs, fix some of the short-term concerns that we 
have, specifically where it comes to some facilities.
    We're confident that, as an enterprise, we're all going to 
work together, and we're going to say, ``Hey, perhaps we can 
move some work here, we can move some money here to fix 
those.''
    So, I'm not going to sit here and tell you that we 
absolutely have no problems with this budget, that there's--you 
know, we got everything we need, but I will tell you we are 
aggressively managing those areas; we'll do what's necessary in 
the coming years to adjust and, when we come back to you, say, 
``Hey, perhaps now--in retrospect, we should've put x number to 
this facility, and we're going to adjust those.'' But, overall, 
as Mr. D'Agostino said, we are absolutely committed to making 
this organization more efficient, more responsive.
    And, along those ways, since I have the opportunity, if you 
don't mind, I certainly agree that, in the past, our management 
of some projects has not been sterling. I mean, there's no 
other way around that. But, you have a team in place now that 
Mr. D'Agostino has put into place, that is--job one is to fix 
that. And, while certainly we could come up with things that we 
have done wrong in the past, I also point to some things that 
we are doing extremely well now and--because we do have the 
capacity to learn, and we're demonstrating that.
    Certainly, the NIF project, this is an incredible success 
story. While, granted, it had problems in the past, long before 
our time here, it's now incredibly well run and it's making 
great, great positions.
    KCRIMS is another example where we've taken, in a very 
complex thing, which is moving an in-operation plant to a much 
more efficient, much more cost effective, much more a green 
place, if you will. And we're doing that superbly, I believe, 
because we've instituted a formal risk-management process, 
where we're identifying the sources of risks, assessing those 
risks, but, more importantly, looking at how that affects 
overall project performance, and coming up with alternatives, 
real time, to fix it. And the KCRIMS program is a perfect 
example of contractors and Feds working together to actually 
produce a project on time and on schedule.
    And so, I just offer that up to you, sir, that we are 
aggressively working on how to manage projects correctly.

                        NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

    Senator Bennett. Okay. Thank you. Let me go, my last 
question, in the other direction. You want to secure all the 
vulnerable nuclear material around the world within 4 years and 
the budget increase has gone up 68 percent. This is one very 
heavy increase. And I've learned, in my business world, it's 
tough to deal with a cut, and sometimes it's even tougher to 
deal with an increase. And do you have the capacity to execute 
these funds in fiscal 2011, let alone significant increases of 
up to a billion dollars over the 5 year project plan?
    Mr. Black. Sir, I would say that we do have the ability to 
get this mission done. If I may, the President laid out a very 
ambitious agenda for us last April, and again in the State of 
the Union Address. We're not the only part of the solution of 
this problem, though; he said, ``This is work for the world,'' 
so we have international partners and we have interagency 
partners.
    The portion of the task that we have essentially carved out 
for ourselves is the part that is consistent with our 
expertise, our authorities, and the budget that we believe we 
can manage. And so, we've requested the amount that we think we 
can use effectively. We are looking to commit all of the money, 
for the fiscal year 2011 work that we've requested in the 
budget, and we believe we can do it, for several reasons. One 
is we are much better staffed this year than we were at this 
time last year. Last year at this time, we had an 83-percent 
staffing rate, 17-percent vacancy rate. And we have dropped 
that now to a 5 percent vacancy rate. We have a lot more Feds 
on board. These are young, energetic people who have experience 
working overseas. They speak the language, they know the 
culture, and they're certainly enthusiastic about the mission, 
and they know they have the support of both ends of 
Pennsylvania Avenue.
    We've also put in place contracts and vehicles, such as the 
IDIQ, the indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract that 
supports our GTRI work, Global Threat Reduction Initiative 
work, and a DICCE contract that will help us execute work in 
second line of defense. These two contract vehicles make it 
possible for us to contract out work overseas and greatly 
simplify what is otherwise a very complicated and long process 
to getting work done in other countries.
    And we've done a very good job with our uncommitted 
balances, as well. The last 5 years, despite an increase in our 
overall nonproliferation budget, every year--our uncommitted 
balances have come down every single year. And the last 4 
years, our balances have been under the 13-percent departmental 
threshold for uncosted balances. So, in particular, in the two 
programs that have to bear the greatest brunt of the burden for 
the 4-year plan, what we nominally call the 4-year plan, Global 
Threat Reduction and MPC&A, those two programs' uncommitted 
balances have come in under 9 percent. They're very well 
positioned to make good use of the funds that we are 
requesting. So, on balance, we feel that we're committed and 
able to execute this work very effectively.
    Senator Bennett. Thank you very much.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you. Thank you very much.
    Senator Bennett, good to see you again.
    And, Mr. D'Agostino, good to see you again, I want to say 
that you have always been a straight-shooter with me. I very 
much appreciate that. You spent several times briefing me on 
the RRW. We did not see, with the same eyes, the same thing, 
and I found myself opposing the nuclear bunker buster, the 
advanced weapons concepts, the new plutonium pits, and the RRW. 
And I just want to say why.
    I strongly believe that the United States of America should 
not be a nuclear proliferator. And when I sat down with Sid 
Drell on the bunker buster and on the laws of physics and what 
would happen if one of these things exploded, I couldn't 
believe that my country was proposing it. And so, I have begun 
to look very critically at weapons programs. And, of course, 
what I find is that Russia and the United States have a huge 
arsenal, which is in the process, through START and hopefully 
through the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, of being weaned down 
and better controlled over the years so that there is the kind 
of information, on both sides, about what the other side does 
that gives true mutual deterrence some real credibility.
    I'd like to ask the clerk that the 4 pages of the September 
9, 2009, JASON report be included in the record.
    [The information follows:]

          Lifetime Extension Program (LEP)--Executive Summary
                          1 executive summary

1.1 Study charge
    This study of the Life Extension Program (LEP) for deployed U.S. 
nuclear weapons responds to the following charge.
    ``NNSA requests that JASON study LEP strategies for maintaining the 
U.S. nuclear deterrent in the absence of underground nuclear testing. 
This should include:
  --``Study the certification challenges associated with changes, to 
        include accumulation of changes, made to a warhead \1\ during 
        its life.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ In this study ``warhead'' refers to the nuclear explosive 
package and associated non-nuclear components.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  --``Compare the assessment and certification challenges of different 
        LEP strategies ranging from refurbishment to replacement.
  --``Study proposed methods to measure the evolution of risk due to 
        multiple changes during warhead life and initiated in LEPs.
  --``Study how NNSA can mitigate risks while maintaining a safe, 
        secure and reliable nuclear deterrent. Comment on how the 
        overall balance and structure of science, technology, 
        engineering and production activities can be made to minimize 
        future risk to the stockpile.
  --``Study the accumulated risks and uncertainties of the current Life 
        Extension Program strategy. As already identified by a previous 
        JASON study, risk areas include:
    --``Linkage to UGT data,
    --``Manufacturing changes that may unavoidably result in 
            differences from the as-tested devices,
    --``Increased surety \2\ features, and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Surety encompasses safety, security and use control.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    --``Thresholds to failure.''
    NNSA provided the following definitions:
    ``Refurbishment (current implementation of LEP).--Very generally, 
individual warhead components are replaced before they degrade with 
components of (nearly) identical design or that meet the same `form, 
fit, and function.'
    ``Warhead Component Reuse.--Refers specifically to the use of 
existing surplus pit and secondary components from other warhead types. 
Approach may permit limited warhead surety improvements and some 
increased margins.
    ``Warhead Replacement.--Some or all of the components of a warhead 
are replaced with modern design that are more easily manufacturable, 
provide increased warhead margins, forego no longer available or 
hazardous materials, improve safety, security and use control, and 
offer the potential for further overall stockpile reductions.''

1.2 Findings
    JASON was asked to assess the impacts of changes to stockpile 
warheads incurred from aging and LEPs. In response:
  --JASON finds no evidence that accumulation of changes incurred from 
        aging and LEPs have increased risk to certification of today's 
        deployed nuclear warheads
      This finding is a direct consequence of the excellent work of the 
        people in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex supported and 
        informed by the tools and methods developed through the 
        Stockpile Stewardship program. Some aging issues have already 
        been resolved. The others that have been identified can be 
        resolved through LEP approaches similar to those employed to 
        date. To maintain certification, military requirements for some 
        stockpile warheads have been modified. The modifications are 
        the result of improved understanding of original weapon 
        performance, not because of aging or other changes. If desired, 
        all but one of the original major performance requirements 
        could also be met through LEP approaches similar to those 
        employed to date.
  --Lifetimes of today's nuclear warheads could be extended for 
        decades, with no anticipated loss in confidence, by using 
        approaches similar to those employed in LEPs to date.
      The report discusses details and challenges for each stockpile 
        system.
    For each warhead, decisions must be made about including additional 
surety features. Findings regarding surety features are:
  --Further scientific research and engineering development is required 
        for some proposed surety systems.
  --Implementation of intrinsic \3\ surety features in today's re-entry 
        systems, using the technologies proposed to date, would require 
        reuse or replacement LEP options.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ i.e. inside the nuclear explosive package.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  --All proposed surety features for today's air-carried systems could 
        be implemented through reuse LEP options.
  --Implementation of intrinsic surety features across the entire 
        stockpile would require more than a decade to complete.
    Concerning methods for assessing evolution of risk and assessing 
the effects of multiple changes to a weapon, we find that:
  --The basis for assessment and certification is linkage to 
        underground test data, scientific understanding, and results 
        from experiment.
  --Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties (QMU) provides a 
        suitable framework for assessment and certification.
  --Increased scientific understanding enables reduced reliance on 
        calibration, enhanced predictive capability, and improved 
        quantification of margins and uncertainties.
    Regarding certification challenges for LEP strategies ranging from 
refurbishment to replacement, we find that:
  --Assessment and certification challenges depend on design details 
        and associated margins and uncertainties, not simply on whether 
        the LEP is primarily based on refurbishment, reuse, or 
        replacement.
    Concerning the overall balance and structure of science, 
technology, engineering and production activities, and how to mitigate 
risk to the stockpile, we find that:
  --Certification of certain reuse or replacement options would require 
        improved understanding of boost.
  --Continued success of stockpile stewardship is threatened by lack of 
        program stability, placing any LEP strategy at risk.
    Surveillance of stockpile weapons is essential to stockpile 
stewardship. Inadequate surveillance would place the stockpile at risk. 
We find that:
  --The surveillance program is becoming inadequate. Continued success 
        of stockpile stewardship requires implementation of a revised 
        surveillance program.
    We conclude this section with a concern. All options for extending 
the life of the nuclear weapons stockpile rely on the continuing 
maintenance and renewal of expertise and capabilities in science, 
technology, engineering, and production unique to the nuclear weapons 
program. This will be the case regardless of whether future LEPs 
utilize refurbishment, reuse or replacement. The study team is 
concerned that this expertise is threatened by lack of program 
stability, perceived lack of mission importance, and degradation of the 
work environment.

1.3 Recommendations
    Our recommendations are as follows:
  --Determine the full potential of refurbishment, as exemplified by 
        LEPs executed to date, for maintaining or improving the legacy 
        stockpile.
  --Quantify potential benefits and challenges of LEP strategies that 
        may require reuse and replacement, to prepare for the 
        possibility of future requirements such as reduced yield or 
        enhanced surety.
  --Strengthen and focus science programs to anticipate and meet 
        potential challenges of future LEP options, including 
        challenges associated with boost and surety science.
  --Revise the surveillance program so that it meets immediate and 
        future needs.
  --Assess the benefits of surety technologies in the context of the 
        nuclear weapons enterprise as a system, including technologies 
        that can be employed in the near term.

                     NATIONAL LABORATORY PERSONNEL

    Senator Feinstein. And I want to just read, quickly, the 
finding, one of them, ``JASON finds no evidence that 
accumulation of changes incurred from aging and LEPs' lifetime 
extension have increased risk to certification of today's 
deployed nuclear warheads.'' And it goes on to say that, ``The 
finding is a direct consequence of the excellent work of the 
people of the nuclear weapons complex, supported and informed 
by the tools and methods developed through the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program. Some aging issues have already been 
resolved. The others that have been identified can be resolved 
through LEP approaches similar to those employed to date.'' 
And, it goes on, and then it makes the statement, 
categorically, ``Lifetimes of today's nuclear warheads could be 
extended for decades with no anticipated loss in confidence, by 
using approaches similar to those employed in LEPs to date.''
    Now, what I'd like you to do, because you've raised the 
question several times with me, on beryllium and other things 
that are a hazard to the workforce, I'd like to get together 
with some of these technical JASONs, with you, and really 
explore that one issue. None of us want to put workers in 
danger----
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
    Senator Feinstein [continuing]. Of working around these 
warheads with chemicals in them that are highly toxic or are 
highly destructive. So, I want to understand that part of the 
issue better, if you would agree to that.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely, Senator. That would be great.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you. The other thing that I've had 
occasion to do is visit the--some of the labs. And I would like 
to sit down with you on what you see the future mission of our 
labs to be----
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
    Senator Feinstein [continuing]. And particularly now that 
the private sector is heavily involved, and with some 
considerable cost, that has forced the layoff of nuclear 
scientists in large numbers at Los Alamos and in the other 
labs, as well. So, if we could have that meeting, as well, I 
would appreciate it very much.
    Mr. D'Agostino. That would be great, Senator, I'd love to.
    Senator Feinstein. Okay.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you.

                       NATIONAL IGNITION FACILITY

    Senator Feinstein. Now, I want to talk about the NIF, if I 
might, a little bit. I had the pleasure of going.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
    Senator Feinstein. And, as you know, it's a very 
impressive----
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
    Senator Feinstein [continuing]. Plant. And the prototype 
for a fission nuclear powerplant was obviously there and was 
mentioned by people who were briefing me. It's also my 
understanding that the National Academy of Science, and the 
National Academy of Engineering, are conducting a study on 
inertial fusion energy.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
    Senator Feinstein. And the question is, whether this 
facility has the resources to provide the Academy with support 
and collateral information.
    So, my question is this. I am told that the NIF will not 
have funding to operate the facility, 24/7, that it is being 
reduced to 16 hours a day, 5 days a week, which obviously 
limits the type of research it can do. So, here's the question. 
Do you believe that Lawrence Livermore would need additional 
funding to develop a baseline design for the technologies 
required to translate successful demonstration of ignition, on 
NIF, into a practical powerplant for supplying sustainable, 
carbon-free baseload electricity?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Our program does not have--first of all, we 
don't have a baseline level of funding to do that, to convert 
what could come out of the NIF Facility into a powerplant. That 
is not part of our budget. However, the key on NIF is, get to 
ignition first, because that is the most important thing, for a 
number of reasons you pointed out--potential energy benefit--
there's a tremendous scientific benefit that that draws. I 
mean, being able to explore what happens to the materials under 
these extreme pressures and temperatures will be important, not 
just for weapons physics, but also for basic science. And 
third, we believe it's critical to get to ignition in order to 
effectively be able to provide that proof test on the stockpile 
itself. It will allow us to solve some very specific problems, 
that we can describe in a classified setting.
    But, the budget that we have before us doesn't have an 
aggressive inertial fusion energy component, as it's laid out 
before you. What we are doing, though, because--as we've 
committed to Congress for close to a decade now--is to conduct 
a credible ignition experiment this year. And ``credible'' 
means that we have no reason to believe it's not going to work. 
So, we're going to do that this year. And what we are working 
very closely on is that work plan once you achieve this, just, 
unbelievable scientific milestone--is both the scientific work 
that has to lay out--layer out on top of that to explore that 
energy pipeline that could potentially come out of this 
facility.
    Senator Feinstein. Is that included in the $481 million----
    Mr. D'Agostino. The----
    Senator Feinstein [continuing]. Amount.
    Mr. D'Agostino. The $481 million piece is to support the 
types of experiments--stockpile stewardship experiments that we 
need to have in order to make sure it addresses the science and 
the stockpile part of the NIF facility. There are components of 
that----
    Senator Feinstein. Is that a yes, or a no?
    Mr. D'Agostino. So, it's--no, it does not include inertial 
fusion energy--an aggressive inertial fusion energy program 
right now. What I will say is the Under Secretary for Science, 
Steven Koonin and I have talked about, you know, ``This is a 
big deal, this National Ignition Facility. How do we look at 
this, as a department--not just as NNSA, but as a department--
to address the energy piece of that?''
    Senator Feinstein. Yes, so was fusion energy.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right. And the fusion energy sciences group 
in the basic science area--we do have an international 
commitment on the ITER project, out in France. But, we 
recognize that ignition changes lots of things; success at 
Livermore changes lots of things. So, we're going to be looking 
very closely at, how does the Department bring the Office of 
Science and the NNSA together in a way that can capitalize on 
this tremendous capability? We literally had the meeting----
    Senator Feinstein. So----
    Mr. D'Agostino [continuing]. Yesterday.
    Senator Feinstein [continuing]. What does that mean, in 
terms of this year and the budget? If I understand you, you're 
saying we can't do it under the $481 million.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Well ma'am, no, no I think--you've got it--
the $481 million gets us to that first milestone.
    Senator Feinstein. The first test?
    Mr. D'Agostino. That gets us to the test and running 
experiments. Because there's no way that, you know, inertial 
fusion energy makes any sense at all if you can't get to 
ignition and you can't understand it better. And so, the $481 
million a year, plus whatever the year-by-year, goes out on 
that--I don't know if I have the specifics in front of me 
here--will actually operate that facility, will exercise our 
scientists, will prove ignition works, will address stockpile 
stewardship problems. And in order to do the component that 
we're all interested in, as well, this energy piece, which I 
think has the great potential, we have to put together a 
program on top of that. But, to say we know what it's going to 
be, on--for energy purposes, right now, is--it's just way too 
early, because we haven't achieved ignition yet.
    Senator Feinstein. So, this cutback on hours for operation 
of the lab, how does that help achieve what you're trying to 
achieve?
    Mr. D'Agostino. I wasn't aware of a 24/7 versus a 5/16. I'm 
going to look into that----
    Senator Feinstein. Okay.
    Mr. D'Agostino [continuing]. Though, after this testimony--
--
    Senator Feinstein. Right.
    Mr. D'Agostino [continuing]. And try to get a better--I'll 
get an----
    Senator Feinstein. Could----
    Mr. D'Agostino [continuing]. Answer----
    Senator Feinstein [continuing]. You let me----
    Mr. D'Agostino [continuing]. To that.
    Senator Feinstein [continuing]. Know?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely.
    Senator Feinstein. I'd appreciate that----
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Feinstein [continuing]. Very much. Let me see----
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. I'd like----
    Senator Feinstein [continuing]. What else----
    Mr. D'Agostino [continuing]. To do that.
    Senator Feinstein [continuing]. Because--when I went to the 
lab and actually looked and actually talked to people there, 
you know, the spark that's just turned on. I mean, ``What 
if''----
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
    Senator Feinstein [continuing]. ``It's possible?''----
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
    Senator Feinstein [continuing]. Is a very thrilling ``what 
if.''
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes.
    Senator Feinstein. So----
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Feinstein [continuing]. I think it's worth pursuing 
to see whether it's possible or not.
    Mr. D'Agostino. We'll do that. And I think it may be 
worth--if you're amenable to both Under Secretary Koonin and I 
giving you a full-up integrated response on this question of 
inertial fusion energy, and NIF, and what does it mean in the 
out years--we'll write that up, as well as--we'd be happy to 
come up and talk to you or members of the staff--subcommittee 
staff.
    Senator Feinstein. All right. It just--bottom line, my 
interest, on the military side, is really to see that we do not 
become proliferators----
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
    Senator Feinstein [continuing]. That we, by our actions, do 
not give anyone else the ability to develop new nuclear 
weapons.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, ma'am. That's right. And the great 
thing about NIF is, it allows us to test--excuse me--to test 
the small components in a laboratory, and not do underground 
testing. That's why we----
    Senator Feinstein. That's right.
    Mr. D'Agostino [continuing]. That's why we want the NIF.
    Senator Feinstein. That's right.
    Mr. D'Agostino. So, we want to stay away from this question 
of underground testing, as far away as we can.
    Senator Feinstein. Great. Thank you very much.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you, ma'am.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you, gentlemen.
    Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

                        NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

    Senator Dorgan. Senator Feinstein, thank you very much.
    Let me ask a question that I referred to briefly in my 
opening statement, and it is about the sums of money that we 
spend on security upgrades and radiation detection equipment, 
for example, in Russia and other countries. What happens after 
we withdraw? We make the investment, we help that country 
provide some additional security, and then we withdraw. What 
kind of concern do we have about sustaining these upgrades? Can 
you give me some notion of where we are on that?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Sure. Why don't I start, and then I'll ask 
Mr. Black to provide some additional detail.
    This question of sustainability of security upgrades has 
been on the forefront, particularly as we get closer to 
completing our overall job in Russia, at least from the 
implementation standpoint. The job is never really going to 
ever end, because it will require, just like any type 
infrastructure investment, constant observations and looking at 
it, the like.
    The fiscal year 2011 request that you have in front of you 
gets us to finishing the installation. I believe we have 19 
more sites. We're about 92 percent done in Russia with, kind 
of, that baseline plan.
    Senator Dorgan. Can you describe to me what you're doing at 
a site; just generally.
    Mr. D'Agostino. It will involve--generally, it involves 
doing a security assessment, with the Russians, of what's 
required at a particular site, what the vulnerabilities are, 
whether there's an insider threat or whether we have an 
external physical security threat; and then working with them 
to design upgrades, whether they're cameras, fences, you know, 
technology, and integrating those; and purchasing that and then 
working with them to install.
    Steve, do you want----
    Senator Dorgan. These are the production sites, right?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Well, I wouldn't call them ``weapons 
production sites.'' We don't have access to those, just yet. 
But, the material sites, yes.
    Senator Dorgan. Weapon materials.
    Mr. Black. Right. These are all in the--in what's called 
the Rosatom Weapons Complex. We're working at seven large 
facilities right now, as the Administrator said; 19 buildings, 
in particular. And the sorts of things we're doing is 
increasing the strength of doors; we're putting in central 
alarm stations; we're putting in PIDASs, Perimeter Intrusion 
Detection Alarm Systems, helping strengthen guard forces, 
reactive forces, and the like. Those are fairly typical 
security upgrades.
    And, in terms of sustainability, what we are doing is, we 
are turning over--developing, with each site individually, 
individualized sustainability plans, because some of these 
sites have their own revenues. They may be factories and they 
produce other things for the Russian economy, and they may have 
their own revenue stream. But, in some cases, these facilities 
don't have enough budgets. And so, what we're trying to do is 
develop with them a clear understanding of all of the things 
that are needed to maintain that security investment at that 
particular site, so each site has its own joint sustainability 
plan, there are specific milestones, and we're working with the 
Russians to make sure that they develop regulations----
    Senator Dorgan. What is the number of sites?
    Mr. Black. Total?
    Senator Dorgan. Yes.
    Mr. Black. So, let me----
    Mr. D'Agostino. We've done 221 in Russia----
    Mr. Black. Well, those are the second line of defense 
sites.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Oh, right, right.
    Mr. Black. Let me get the information for you and bring it 
back, because I want to give you an accurate answer. It's 
readily available, it's just not in my head and----
    Senator Dorgan. All right.
    Mr. Black [continuing]. Won't be able to find it quickly.
    Senator Dorgan. All right.
    Mr. Black. I do want to make the point, though, that we 
have variable degrees of cooperativeness with our Russian 
partners. They're not all the same. In the case of the Russian 
Customs Service we have a cost-sharing agreement with the 
Customs officials. And so, the Russians bear half the cost of 
all of the second-line-of-defense facilities that are being put 
in Russia; 170, 175 of those facilities will be paid for 
completely by the Russians.
    The reason the cost-sharing is important is because it's an 
indication of how committed to the task, in the first place, 
the Russian host is. In the case of the Ministry of Defense 
nuclear sites, they have been far more receptive to maintaining 
security upgrades at roughly two dozen facilities than has 
Rosatom. But, we're working very closely with Rosatom, as I 
said, and we're making some progress.
    Senator Dorgan. All right.
    Mr. Black. Does that help?

                    MANAGING LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAMS

    Senator Dorgan. Finally, let me ask about the B61 life-
extension programs there. It's, as I'm told, three times the 
number of components that need to be replaced than the W76; 
there's about $190 million requested to study the reuse or 
remanufacture of nuclear components. You're considering a 
compressed schedule for it. My understanding is, the first 
refurbished B61 would be completed by 2017.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
    Senator Dorgan. So, it's complicated, complex. You know, we 
went down the road, with the W80, and spent a fair amount of 
money on refurbishment activities--I think, close to $500 
million--before canceling that program. So, you think the B61 
is a critically important program, and you think that, as 
complicated as it is, we're not going to make the same mistake 
that we had with the W80?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir. I think it's--it is a critically 
important program. It--you know, the early analysis, from our 
NPR and working with the Defense Department and folks in the 
interagency, have said that that will be a component. I'll ask 
the General at the right--when I'm done with my comments--
maybe, to jump in and provide some specifics, if he could.
    Absolutely, you're right. There are more components than 
the W76. That's because the 76--I mean, just the warhead, the 
bomb, is--we're responsible for the whole device. The 
approaches that we're looking at, though, will allow us to--and 
I believe--and the key is, exercising the people and getting 
them into the work necessary to maintain the stockpile. And so, 
I believe, by--my discussions with Tom Hunter, at Sandia 
National Laboratories, which have the majority of the work 
here, and talking with Los Alamos director, Mike Anastasio, 
they feel very comfortable that their workforce is up to the 
task.
    In essence, we've started some of this thinking already, in 
the study phase. And this is what we're asking for, is to 
continue and finish that study phase on the B61 bomb. When 
we're done with that study phase, just like a construction 
project, we will want to lock down with commitments on both the 
laboratory's part, as well as my part, as representing the 
NNSA, on the exact cost, scope, and schedule for that facility. 
The important thing is the 2017 date.
    And then, General, if you can talk to some of the specifics 
there.
    General Harencak. Yes, sir.
    That's one of the major requirements of the Department of 
Defense, is ASAS--NNSA to accomplish the life-extended B61 by 
2017. That is an aggressive, yet certainly--we are committed to 
it, and we will get it done. A key to that, though, is a 
complete and full study of it, and that's what we're asking to 
complete as soon as possible.
    Our entire enterprise is going to be focused in defense 
programs. Amongst all the things we do our top two priorities 
of getting things done is going to be the completion of W76, as 
we said, and getting this life-extended B61. This is an analog 
bomb. It's the cornerstone of our air-delivered weapon. It is 
essentially our only one. It needs to become a digital weapon 
so it could mate with the F35 for extended-deterrence reasons. 
That's the 2017 date on that. It's a first-production unit. The 
F35, regardless of when there are initial operating dates for 
that program, is irrespective of what we need to do. Our 
milestone that we must complete is to deliver a life-extended 
B61 by 2017. In order to do that, we have to start yesterday. 
And we started yesterday. But, we need to complete this study. 
It is very large--as you see in our budget, that we're 
requesting a big lift for B61. And that essentially gets to 
very quickly locking down how we're going to take this analog 
bomb and make it digital; also, how we're going to improve its 
surety and its safety features, which are vitally important.

                     ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

    Senator Dorgan. All right. We are going to submit a number 
of written questions to you.
    Senator Feinstein, do you have additional questions?
    Senator Feinstein. I don't believe so, at this time.
    Senator Dorgan. All right.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you, though.
    Senator Dorgan. Well, then we will be submitting additional 
questions, Mr. D'Agostino. We appreciate very much your team 
being here, and your being here. And obviously this is a lot of 
money.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
    [The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but 
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the 
hearing:]

             Questions Submitted by Senator Byron L. Dorgan

                     NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN CHANGES

    Question. Increases in funding for nuclear weapons science, 
technology and engineering point to developing capabilities to modify 
the design of existing weapons and understand the changes. For example, 
a $48 million increase for plutonium sustainment allows NNSA to 
manufacture pits for primaries and quadrupling of funding for advanced 
certification will develop NNSA's tools to certify changes to the 
nuclear package of existing nuclear weapons.
    Does NNSA have plans to modify the design of nuclear weapons? If it 
does, what is driving the needs for those changes?
    Answer. NNSA will give strong preference, when proceeding with 
engineering development for Life Extension Programs (LEPs), to options 
for refurbishment or reuse. Replacement of nuclear components would be 
undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management Program goals could 
not otherwise be met, and if specifically authorized by the President 
and approved by Congress. LEPs will use only nuclear components based 
on previously tested designs, and will not support new military 
missions or provide for new military capabilities. Upgrading and/or 
replacing limited life components (LLCs), such as the neutron 
generators, is considered a relatively routine maintenance activity to 
preserve the weapons' viability. Numerous aging mechanisms, including 
corrosion and adhesive bonding failure, raise concerns relative to non-
nuclear components and weapon system performance. Often times, 
replacing materials, which are no longer attainable or usable because 
they have been deemed unsafe or environmentally damaging are included 
as part of an LEP. Other drivers include replacing or adding features 
to improve the safety and security of the stockpile, such as by 
replacing conventional high explosives with insensitive high 
explosives.
    Question. How do you reconcile the needs for changes with the 
JASONs conclusion in its 2009 report that the lifetimes of today's 
nuclear warheads could be extended for decades without significant 
changes to their designs?
    Answer. NNSA is in agreement with the JASON's conclusion that the 
lifetimes of today's nuclear warheads could be extended without 
significant changes to their designs. To increase the safety, security, 
and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal, NNSA plans to upgrade limited 
life components (LLCs) and materials, and incorporate more surety--
safety, security, and use control--technology, whenever possible, 
through LEPs. LLCs reaching their end-of-life will be upgraded with 
LLCs that have longer expected lifetimes, Certain materials will be 
upgraded with more attainable materials. Each weapon system will be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis and the best technological approach, 
from a full spectrum of options, will be applied.
    Question. To what extent would modifying the design of primaries 
and secondaries introduce more risk than maintaining them in their 
current condition?
    Answer. NNSA, through LEPs, will use only nuclear components based 
on previously tested designs. Any modifications to the Nuclear 
Explosive Package (NEP) would allow for the introduction of surety 
features, if feasible, to reduce the risk of accidental or deliberate 
unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon.
    Question. To what extent are potential design changes consistent 
with the congressionally authorized Stockpile Management Program?
    Answer. The congressionally authorized Stockpile Management Program 
allows for the extension of the effective life of nuclear weapons. 
NNSA, through LEPs, plans to increase the reliability of our nuclear 
weapons stockpile by upgrading to longer life LLCs and more readily 
available and compatible materials. Increases in safety, security, and 
use control through the incorporation of additional surety features 
whenever possible, and if feasible, will reduce the risk of accidental 
detonation and also reduce the risk of an element of the stockpile 
being used by a person or entity hostile to the United States, its 
vital interests, or its allies. Because the Nuclear Posture Review 
directs that strong preference be given to options for refurbishment or 
reuse, upcoming and future LEPs will produce modified weapons that 
remain comparable to their original underground nuclear tested designs 
to ensure certifiability, and will consider the possibility of using 
the resulting warhead on multiple platforms allowing NNSA to achieve 
reductions in the future size of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

                       B61 LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM

    Question. Mr. D'Agostino, the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP) is 
going to be very challenging. The B61 has three times the number of 
components that need to be replaced than the W76. In fiscal year 2011, 
NNSA is asking for about $190 million to study the reuse or 
remanufacture of nuclear components. Despite these challenges, NNSA is 
considering a compressed schedule for engineering and design work to 
manufacture the first refurbished B61 by 2017.
    Given the complexity of the program, is the 2017 date realistic?
    Answer. The Nuclear Weapons Council, in 2008, established the 2017 
first production unit (FPU) date based on the need to replace several 
non-nuclear components that are approaching end-of-life and to prevent 
capability gaps in the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. The Nuclear 
Posture Review later recommended that the full range of options, 
including safety and surety enhancements, be considered to extend the 
life of a given warhead. The 2017 FPU is achievable provided time-
critical technology maturation activities are funded in fiscal year 
2010 and fiscal year 2011 prior to the start of Phase 6.3 engineering 
development work in fiscal year 2012. To address B61 technology risks, 
NNSA is requesting $252 million in fiscal year 2011, which is split 
between the non-nuclear and nuclear study activities ($136 million) and 
B61 first use, technology maturation work targeted to advance readiness 
levels to enable the 2017 FPU ($116 million).
    Question. Are you confident that you are not introducing 
unnecessary risk with this accelerated schedule?
    Answer. Yes. The NNSA augments the weapon system acquisition 
process with Integrated Phase Gates (IPGs). IPGs use a systems-
engineering approach to bring rigor, accountability, and cross-
functional integration by using management reviews at key decision 
points and involving production agencies early in the design process. 
NNSA incorporated IPGs based on lessons learned from previous life 
extension programs (LEPs) and to address GAO findings and Congressional 
concerns about LEP management.
    NNSA can manage the risk for the B61 schedule if required 
technologies are brought to the appropriate level of readiness prior to 
beginning engineering development in fiscal year 2012. Furthermore, in 
fiscal year 2012, the Nuclear Weapons Council will review the readiness 
of key technologies and associated risks prior to authorizing the next 
phase of development.
    Question. Is there a clear nuclear deterrent mission need for the 
B61 life extension program?
    Answer. The recently-released Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) affirms 
the importance of the B61 in fulfilling air-delivered strategic and 
extended deterrent capabilities.

                    MANAGING LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAMS

    Question. Mr. D'Agostino, a number of GAO reports have found that 
NNSA has not effectively managed cost, schedule, and technical risks 
for the last three life extension programs--the W87, B61, and W76--and 
that NNSA has not established realistic schedules to complete these 
projects.
    To what extent has NNSA improved its ability to manage cost, 
schedule and technical risk?
    Answer. NNSA is applying corrective acquisition management measures 
to the current B61 Life Extension Program (LEP) Phase 6.2 Study. These 
measures were communicated in NNSA's Management Decision letter of 
March 12, 2009, in response to the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) report GAO-09-152C, ``Nuclear Weapons: NNSA and DOD Need to More 
Effectively Manage the Stockpile Life Extension Program.'' NNSA has 
made progress on improving the approach to requirements, risk, cost, 
and schedule management through an improved implementation of the joint 
DOD-NNSA acquisition process for nuclear weapons refurbishments.
    Question. Based on NNSA's current plans, by 2017, NNSA will be 
completing the W76 life extension, starting the B61 life extension, 
preparing for the W78 life extension, possibly increasing weapons 
dismantlement based on treaty obligations, and continuing surveillance 
of aging nuclear weapons. How does NNSA plan to manage these many 
activities concurrently, especially when it has not previously managed 
more than one life extension at one time?
    Answer. Trade studies are conducted to assess the need for specific 
NNSA capabilities and facilities. As part of these trade studies, DOD 
is involved in assessment of life extension priorities. NNSA is also 
currently assessing workload in technical maturation and life extension 
studies across the nuclear complex and will likely be making workload-
balancing assignments to optimize execution of multiple life extension 
activities. Through the early 2000s, NNSA managed the B61 ALT 357, W76, 
and W80 life extension programs concurrently.
    Question. To what extent will the nuclear weapons production 
plants--Pantex, Y-12, and Kansas City--be able to manage this increase 
in workload when they already face resources and infrastructure 
constraints?
    Answer. In conjunction with the life extension studies, trade 
studies are being conducted to assess the refurbishment options, along 
with overall workload evaluations on the NNSA production facilities and 
their capacities. For instance, a Canned Subassembly (CSA) reuse study 
is currently underway for the B61 life extension study that may 
ultimately minimize the amount of work and resources that will be 
needed at Y-12 for this LEP. Also, as part of the enhanced acquisition 
risk management approach to the B61 life extension study, production 
readiness risks have been identified at the Kansas City Plant and 
funding priority has been given to minimize these risks by the B61 LEP 
program management team.
    Question. To what extent does the fiscal year 2011 budget help the 
production plants prepare for increased activities?
    Answer. As part of the fiscal year 2011 budget request, the 
Science, Technology, and Engineering Campaigns and stockpile services 
were funded at a level to mature the development and manufacturing of 
technologies needed for Life Extension Programs. In addition, the life 
extension program management team has given priority to the 
complementary funding needed for technical maturation at the national 
laboratories and plants.

                          NUCLEAR SURVEILLANCE

    Question. Mr. D'Agostino, the fiscal year 2011 budget request adds 
about $50 million to increase surveillance activities for each weapon 
system in the stockpile.
    To what extent is this increase in funding sufficient to address 
the JASON's concerns?
    Answer. Based on the National Laboratory Directors and the JASON 
recommendations for a more robust surveillance program, an increase of 
$50 million was added for each year split among the weapon programs to 
sufficiently enable the accomplishment of weapons systems surveillance 
requirements.
    Question. How have you modified the surveillance program and how do 
you maintain confidence that the new approach will identify any 
emerging problems as weapons age?
    Answer. In 2007, NNSA modified the surveillance testing approach 
through the Surveillance Transformation Project. NNSA took action to 
reduce the number of system test activities across all weapon programs, 
while increasing the actual number of component tests that look for 
age-related degradations. The design agencies reviewed their component 
testing programs and increased requirements in that area. NNSA also 
experienced new requirements for non-destructive evaluations and 
modeling and simulation techniques and capabilities. In prior fiscal 
years, NNSA was able to identify some funding within the base program 
to support the increase in component testing and development of new 
surveillance diagnostic techniques and capabilities; however, the $53 
million in increased funding included in the fiscal year 2011 request 
for surveillance activities will allow NNSA to make significant 
progress on the Surveillance Transformation Project.
    In addition, NNSA reorganized the surveillance enterprise structure 
to improve the alignment of the organizations responsible for the 
development of surveillance requirements all the way up to those 
responsible for programmatic and budgetary decisions. Emphasis has been 
placed on better integration and communication of requirements and 
prioritization of activities across weapon programs and all sites. This 
was another issue raised by the JASON study.

                       NATIONAL IGNITION FACILITY

    Question. Mr. D'Agostino, in January 2009, the JASONs criticized 
NNSA for failing to implement a ``critical recommendation'' they issued 
in 2005 to improve oversight and management of the National Ignition 
Campaign.
    Has NNSA implemented the recommendation by establishing both an 
advisory committee to review scientific and technical issues and an 
advisory committee to review how NIF will be shared by different users?
    Answer. As recommended by the JASON review and endorsed by NNSA, 
LLNL has formed an advisory group (Chaired by Dr. Alvin Trivelpiece) to 
review the progress of the National Ignition Campaign. This group has 
had one meeting and will be producing a preliminary report soon. NNSA 
has also taken initial steps to form a Federal Review Committee with a 
charter that will include all of weapons science and technology. This 
committee will review the use of NNSA facilities as shared national 
resources. Finally, NNSA has also formed a Planning Council whose 
purpose is to formulate a detailed plan for weapons experimental 
activities for all users at all NNSA facilities.
    Question. If not, why has it taken more than 5 years to implement 
this recommendation?
    Answer. The NNSA is implementing the recommendation.

                 WEAPONS DISMANTLEMENT AND DISPOSITION

    Question. Mr. D'Agostino, funding for weapons dismantlement and 
disposition is declining in fiscal year 2011.
    Is NNSA reducing the pace of dismantlements?
    Answer. No, the pace of dismantlements remains consistent with our 
commitment to dismantle all currently retired weapons by 2022. However, 
the dismantlement rate varies depending on the complexity of the weapon 
types scheduled for dismantlement. Some weapons require considerably 
more effort and time than others to dismantle. In recent years, NNSA 
exceeded its planned dismantlement rates due to investments in 
efficiencies and additional funding from Congress. Consequently, NNSA 
has some flexibility in adjusting resource commitments in the near 
term. NNSA remains committed to dismantle all currently retired weapons 
by 2022.
    Question. Is a funding decrease consistent with the backlog of 
retired weapons awaiting dismantlement and potentially more after the 
START treaty is signed?
    Answer. NNSA's planned fiscal year 2011 dismantlement funding 
aligns with our schedule to dismantle all currently retired weapons by 
2022. The NNSA will review the details of the New START treaty and 
ensure we take appropriate action to support the commitments made by 
the President. The schedule and planning through 2022 will need to be 
adjusted if additional dismantlements are to be added to the workload 
within that timeframe.

                            NONPROLIFERATION

    Question. From fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 2010, DOE has 
spent more than $2 billion to provide security upgrades and other 
related assistance to nuclear weapon sites in Russia and other 
countries. In fiscal year 2011, NNSA requested more than $200 million 
to complete this work with the last year of funding for these programs 
in fiscal year 2012.
    How will NNSA ensure that Russia will maintain these security 
upgrades once the United States withdraws?
    Answer. The funds requested will be used to support nuclear 
security improvements to areas where NNSA has recently been granted 
access, continue to maintain the systems we have installed over the 
period of our program, and tackle the challenge of reducing the risk to 
theft by an insider.
    At the same time, NNSA is doing all it can to help Russia take over 
financial responsibility. For the past several years, NNSA has been 
working with our Russian partners, primarily the State Corporation for 
Atomic Energy, ``Rosatom,'' to ensure that they are prepared to sustain 
our sizeable investment in the long-term. NNSA and Rosatom have agreed 
to a Joint Transition Plan which identifies the fundamental 
requirements for sustainable nuclear security programs, and joint 
projects that will be undertaken over the next few years to ensure 
these fundamental requirements are in place. Rosatom officials have 
told NNSA counterparts repeatedly that they understand maintenance of 
these systems in the long run is their responsibility, however, we 
believe the added costs for maintenance are being passed on to sites 
and are not being funded through Russia's Federal budget. Regarding the 
Ministry of Defense, it has informed us that it will take over full 
financial responsibility for sustaining permanent warhead sites (11 
sites with DOE-funded upgrades, 18 sites with DOD-funded upgrades), and 
that the Kremlin has promised necessary funds will be made available. 
MOD is expecting to receive funding in April 2010 for this 
sustainability work.
    The success of these efforts ultimately depends on Russia's 
willingness and ability to devote the necessary resources. We hope that 
the Russian Government will increase its nuclear security budget and 
ensure that these funds are efficiently distributed to the hundreds of 
nuclear facilities across the vast Russian territory. The Russian 
nuclear security budget is classified and we have not yet seen much 
evidence of increases in funding at sites where we are working.
    Question. Funding for the gap nuclear material remove program jumps 
from $9 million to $108 million or 12 times more funding than fiscal 
year 2010. How does NNSA plan to spend this significant increase in 
funding for this program and what are the challenges in spending this 
money?
    Answer. This activity supports the removal and disposal of 
vulnerable, high-risk nuclear materials that are not covered by the 
Russian-origin and U.S.-origin Nuclear Material Remove activities. This 
includes U.S.-origin HEU other than TRIGA and MTR fuel, HEU of non-
U.S.- and non-Russian-origin, and separated plutonium. These activities 
collectively support President Obama's April 5, 2009 Prague speech in 
which he called for an international effort to secure all vulnerable 
nuclear material around the world within 4 years, which was further 
strengthened in the July 2009 Joint Statement resulting from the Moscow 
Summit and the September 2009 UNSC Resolution 1887. In accordance with 
these goals, GTRI is accelerating the return of Gap material from third 
countries.
    In fiscal year 2011, GTRI will remove or facilitate disposition of 
an additional 161 kilograms of Gap HEU and plutonium from several 
countries, resulting in a cumulative total of 301 kilograms of HEU and 
plutonium removed, enough material for more than 10 nuclear weapons. 
Funds will also be used for preparatory activities for removals planned 
for 2012.
    Additionally, in fiscal year 2011 GTRI will focus a large portion 
of its funding on HEU spent fuel removals since we have completed most 
of the HEU fresh fuel removals. Spent fuel removals are more expensive 
than the fresh fuel removals because the radioactivity of the fuel 
requires specialized casks and remote operations.

                         SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE

    Question. Funding for the Second Line of Defense (SLD) core 
program, which involves installing radiation detection equipment at 
borders in Russia, former Soviet states, Eastern Europe and other key 
countries is doubling to $140 million to complete another 55 sites.
    Have countries at these 55 sites already agreed to install this 
equipment?
    Answer. The 55 sites are based on our current planning and 
represent our best projection of the sites at which we will be working. 
We already have agreements in place to partner with all but two of the 
countries, and we have every reason to believe that we will sign these 
additional agreements in the near future, certainly before fiscal year 
2011.
    Question. Are these sites the highest priority sites to combat 
nonproliferation?
    Answer. Based on our threat analysis, we believe that all these 
sites are high priority for receiving SLD support.
    Question. How will the United States ensure that these countries 
will properly maintain the equipment after it is installed?
    Answer. SLD's Sustainability Program is designed to ensure the 
long-term operation of SLD systems by Host Country Partners. To this 
end, SLD works closely with Host Country Partners to develop their 
indigenous capabilities so that we may fully transition SLD systems to 
their support. SLD and Host Country Partners agree on joint transition 
plans in which milestones for the turnover of training, maintenance, 
and oversight responsibilities (including budget planning) are 
formalized.
    During this transition phase, the SLD Program provides maintenance 
technicians, training experts, and Sustainability leads to work with 
Host Country Partners to develop their indigenous capabilities. For 
maintenance, SLD provides training, tools, and spare parts to ensure 
equipment remains operable. Maintenance is usually performed by local 
contractors and includes scheduled maintenance and calibration as well 
as urgent or unscheduled repairs. In addition, Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory (PNNL) provides support on training transition to 
the Host Country Partners. PNNL has also established a Help Desk to 
provide support to local maintenance providers and host nation 
counterparts in the event of an issue with a system that cannot be 
resolved at the local level. Through the Help Desk, the program can 
provide remote expertise or deploy experts from the United States if 
needed to repair a system if needed.
    Question. Has DOE addressed GAO's concerns about corruption of some 
foreign border security officials, technical limitations of some 
radiation detection equipment, inadequate maintenance of some 
equipment, and the lack of supporting infrastructure at some border 
sites?
    Answer. The Second Line of Defense Program addresses corruption 
through two main approaches. First, radiation portal monitors are 
networked to central alarm stations (CAS) at the sites. Should an alarm 
sound or a monitor be disabled, the CAS operator is automatically 
notified. In most sites, this means that more than one individual is 
engaged in resolving alarms and would be aware if a monitor were 
disabled or ignored. This increases the chance that corrupt actions 
could be observed and countered. In addition, the SLD Core Program has 
begun integrating the sites into nationwide networks reporting to 
central officials (usually in the nation's capital). Should a high-
priority alarm be generated at a site, or a monitor disabled, other 
border security officials would become aware and could investigate and 
validate the actions of the officials at the border crossings. 
Integration projects are underway in Russia (where the Customs Service 
is paying for half the installation) and Georgia. Networking is planned 
to begin in one more country in 2011.
    SLD also collaborates with other international organizations, 
notably the EU and IAEA on training, in addition to the extensive 
training that SLD provides directly to the partner country as part of 
the implementation process. SLD believes that this training contributes 
to strengthening the recipient organizations and building a strong 
cadre of committed customs and border management officials.
    The radiation detection equipment SLD Core provides has been proven 
over time to be robust, relatively easy to maintain, and effective in 
detecting special nuclear material (SNM) under limited shielding 
scenarios. A knowledgeable individual can shield SNM from the passive 
radiation detection equipment we provide. However, we believe that the 
equipment that SLD provides is the best and most appropriate detection 
system currently available for the type of detection activities being 
carried out. The equipment is carefully installed and its settings 
optimized to maximize its effectiveness against SNM.
    The SLD Program funds maintenance and sustainment contracts that 
provide for calibration of the equipment it provides. Responsibility 
for funding maintenance and sustainability transitions to the recipient 
country after an agreed upon period of time, generally 3 years but 
longer if necessary. A description of how SLD maintains equipment is 
provided in the answer to the previous question.
    In most cases, infrastructure exists to provide electricity and 
security for the radiation portal monitors. In many cases, back up 
power generators are provided to ensure that short-term power outages 
do not adversely impact the monitors. In cases where sites are not 
manned year round, or there is insufficient infrastructure, SLD may 
provide handheld devices in lieu of permanently installed systems.

                 U.S. AND RUSSIAN PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION

    Question. The United States is negotiating an agreement with Russia 
in which the United States would provide $400 million to support 
plutonium disposition in Russia and Russia would pay the other $2 
billion. The fiscal year 2011 budget asks for the first $100 million 
U.S. commitment.
    What is the status of the U.S.-Russia protocol to dispose of 
weapons grade plutonium?
    Answer. On March 11, the U.S. and Russian lead negotiators 
initialed the conformed English and Russian texts of a Protocol to 
amend the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA). A 
set of associated monitoring and inspections key elements was also 
approved in mid-March. The United States and Russia are scheduled to 
sign the Protocol in mid-April.
    Question. What are the terms of U.S. financial support and what 
would Russia have to do before we release the first $100 million and 
the other $300 million?
    Answer. The United States will spend the $100 million in the fiscal 
year 2011 budget request once the amended PMDA and associated liability 
provisions enter into force (expected in fall 2010 once the Russian 
Duma ratifies the amended PMDA). DOE has developed a notional plan for 
spending $300 million of the $400 million based on a ``milestone 
approach'' to move Russia toward beginning disposition in 2018. Under 
the ``milestone approach,'' the United States would provide funding 
once Russia has fully completed a milestone and U.S. experts have 
verified such completion. The remaining $100 million will be paid to 
Russia on a pro rated basis for each metric ton of plutonium verified 
to have been irradiated and disposed (e.g., approximately $2.7 million 
per metric ton).
                                 ______
                                 
            Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein

                            NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    Question. The President has requested $11.2 billion for the 
National Nuclear Security Administration, a 13.4 percent increase from 
fiscal year 2010. This includes a request of $7 billion for Weapons 
Activities, an increase of $624 million from fiscal year 2010. In your 
testimony and in the recent op-ed by Vice President Joe Biden, the 
administration has argued that the funding requests reflects the 
President's vision of a nuclear free world and his commitment to 
stopping the spread of nuclear weapons efforts and maintaining the 
safety and security of our arsenal without nuclear testing.
    Are you concerned that our allies and adversaries will view the 
massive increase in spending on our nuclear weapons arsenal as an 
indication that the United States is not serious about a nuclear-free 
world?
    Answer. As President Obama articulated in his April 2009 speech in 
Prague, the United States is committed to achieving a world without 
nuclear weapons. While this is a long-term objective, the President 
expressed his intent to take concrete steps to make it possible. 
Several of these steps have already been taken.
  --Critically, the United States and Russia have already reduced the 
        number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads by about 75 
        percent, and the signing of New START agreement will take these 
        numbers even lower.
  --Moreover, the Nuclear Posture Review deemphasizes the role of 
        nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy.
  --However, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States is 
        committed to maintaining safe, secure, and effective nuclear 
        forces in order to deter potential adversaries and assure U.S. 
        allies and partners.
  --The increase in spending will allow NNSA to modernize the 
        infrastructure and sustain the science, technology, and 
        engineering base. By revamping the complex, we will be able to 
        consolidate activities, and respond more effectively to 
        unanticipated future threats. This will not only assure that 
        our stockpile remains safe, secure and effective, but the 
        reinvestment will in fact also facilitate further nuclear 
        reductions by sustaining the confidence in the active weapon 
        systems and lower the need for a large reserve stockpile. 
        Continued investment in the nuclear complex will also enhance 
        our ability to stem nuclear proliferation and nuclear 
        terrorism.
    Question. How does the President's request square with his view 
that the United States should lessen the importance of nuclear weapons 
in our national security strategy?
    Answer. The President's request is consistent with his view that 
investments in the nuclear security enterprise are required to lessen 
the importance of the nuclear weapons in our national security 
strategy.
  --By maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforcing 
        regional security architectures with missile defenses and other 
        conventional military capabilities, we can reassure our non-
        nuclear allies and partners worldwide of our security 
        commitments to them and confirm that they do not need nuclear 
        weapons capabilities of their own.
  --By pursuing a sound Stockpile Management Program for extending the 
        life of U.S. nuclear weapons, we can ensure a safe, secure, and 
        effective deterrent without the development of new nuclear 
        warheads or further nuclear testing.
  --By modernizing our aging nuclear facilities and investing in human 
        capital, we can substantially reduce the number of nuclear 
        weapons we retain as a hedge against technical or geopolitical 
        surprise, accelerate dismantlement of retired warheads, and 
        improve our understanding of foreign nuclear weapons 
        activities.
    Question. How will the President's request impact our efforts to 
strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at the May 2010 review 
conference?
    Answer. The President's request for increased investment 
demonstrates our commitment to nuclear nonproliferation efforts. This 
bolstered the United States' position to lead the effort to strengthen 
the Nonproliferation Treaty at the May 2010 review conference.
    In last year's Prague speech, the President laid out his vision for 
ultimately achieving a world without nuclear weapons, supported by a 
system of enhanced nonproliferation controls and a new international 
civil nuclear framework. The President's budget request enhances DOE's 
efforts to strengthen both the U.S. nuclear disarmament record of 
achievement and the credibility and reliability of the U.S. nuclear 
deterrent as a stabilizing influence as we proceed toward a nuclear 
weapon free world. The President's budget request will, among other 
benefits, allow the Department of Energy to continue with its planned 
nuclear dismantlement activities and support the provisions of the 
recently completed New START Treaty. The budget request will also help 
the Department to continue to transform the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex 
to a smaller weapons complex that consolidates activities at fewer 
sites while allowing the United States to better respond to existing 
and credible potential challenges. These changes will provide the 
framework to allow the United States to go to lower numbers of nuclear 
warheads in the stockpile.
    Question. Mr. D'Agostino, as you know, I have long opposed the 
production of new nuclear weapons by the United States. It is 
unnecessary and harms our nuclear nonproliferation efforts. During the 
presidential campaign President Obama said: ``I will not authorize the 
development of new nuclear weapons.'' The President did not request any 
funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program in fiscal year 
2010 and on a conference call with reporters last month you said that 
``RRW is dead, it is over.''
    Can you confirm that the fiscal year 2011 budget request does not 
contain any funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program or any 
new-design warheads?
    Answer. Yes. I can confirm that the fiscal year 2011 budget request 
does not contain any funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead 
program or any new-design warheads. Per the Nuclear Posture Review, the 
administration is focused on maintaining the stockpile through Life 
Extension Programs.
    Question. If the NNSA fiscal year 2011 budget does not include any 
funding for new-design nuclear weapons, is it accurate to say that you 
and the directors of the national labs agree that for the foreseeable 
future the effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal can be maintained into 
the indefinite future through Life Extension Programs?
    Answer. Yes, the Laboratory Directors and I agree that our nuclear 
arsenal can be maintained into the indefinite future through Life 
Extension Programs (LEPs). The full range of LEP approaches will be 
considered on a weapon-by-weapon basis. The Nuclear Posture Review 
states, ``In any decision to proceed to engineering development for 
warhead LEPs, the United States will give strong preference to options 
for refurbishment or reuse. Replacement of nuclear components would be 
undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management Program goals could 
not be otherwise met, and if specifically authorized by the President 
and (funding is) approved by Congress.''
    Question. Mr. D'Agostino, I was pleased to see the recent report of 
the JASONS, the independent scientific body, which found that the 
United States can maintain our existing nuclear arsenal for decades 
with our existing Life Extension Programs. This is great news.
    In your view, does this report close the door, once and for all, on 
a Reliable Replacement Warhead-like program that would produce a new 
nuclear warhead?
    Answer. NNSA does not foresee the need to develop a new nuclear 
warhead. Each weapon system will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis 
in order to determine which Life Extension Program option best 
preserves the weapon's effectiveness, safety, and security. The Nuclear 
Posture Review makes the point very clearly, ``The United States will 
not develop new nuclear warheads. Life Extension Programs will use only 
nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and will not 
support new military missions or provide for new military 
capabilities.''
    Question. How will the Nuclear Posture Review influence the size of 
the reductions in each nation's stockpile?
    Answer. The Nuclear Posture Review conducted detailed analysis to 
determine an appropriate limit on nuclear warheads and strategic 
delivery vehicles.
  --As an initial step, the administration is committed to working with 
        Russia to preserve stability at significantly reduced nuclear 
        force level, through the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
        (New START), which will replace the expired 1991 START I 
        Treaty.
  --New START sets significant mutual limits in deployed strategic 
        nuclear warheads, well below that 2,200 allowed under the 
        Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, also known as the Moscow 
        Treaty, which expires in 2012.
  --The United States agreed with Russia to New START limits of 1,550 
        accountable strategic warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery 
        vehicles, and a combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed 
        strategic launchers.
  --The Nuclear Posture Review also calls for reinvesting in the 
        nuclear security enterprise's intellectual and physical 
        infrastructure. This additional investment will not only assure 
        that our stockpile remains safe, secure and effective, but will 
        also facilitate further nuclear reductions by sustaining the 
        confidence in the active weapon systems and lower the need for 
        a large reserve stockpile.
    Question. Given the substantial commitment to maintaining the 
safety and reliability of the nuclear arsenal as reflected in the 
President's budget request for the NNSA, can we go even lower?
    Answer. The New START Treaty has been signed. The President has 
directed a review of potential future reductions in U.S. nuclear 
weapons below New START levels, but the pace of further reductions has 
yet to be determined. The Nuclear Posture Review states, ``Russia's 
nuclear force will remain a significant factor in determining how much 
and how fast we are prepared to reduce U.S. forces. Following 
ratification and entry into force of New START, the administration will 
pursue a follow-on agreement with Russia that binds both countries to 
further reductions in all nuclear weapons. Because of our improved 
relations, the need for strict numerical parity between the two 
countries is no longer as compelling as it was during the cold war. But 
large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on both 
sides and among U.S. allies and partners, and may not be conducive to 
maintaining a stable, long-term strategic relationship, especially as 
nuclear forces are significantly reduced. Therefore, we will place 
importance on Russia joining us as we move to lower levels.'' \1\
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    \1\ Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, Page 30.
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                    NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS

    Question. I firmly believe that ratification of the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty is critical to reclaiming U.S. leadership in the 
nuclear nonproliferation field and bringing us closer to a world free 
of nuclear weapons. I am pleased that the Obama administration has made 
ratification of this treaty a priority.
    How does the President's budget request support ratification of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? Is there sufficient funding for 
implementation and verification?
    Answer. The President's budget request reflects his commitment to 
maintaining the nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing and is 
consistent with the principles of the Stockpile Stewardship Management 
Plan submitted to Congress. This budget reinvests and recapitalizes the 
nuclear security infrastructure--including in its science, technology 
and engineering human capital base--essential for assuring that the 
stockpile is safe, secure and effective. The President's arms control 
and non-proliferation policies require these investments so that the 
Nation is confident that its reduced nuclear stockpile is safe, secure, 
and effective, without having to resort to nuclear testing.
    The President's budget request also supports CTBT ratification 
because it invests in a robust, science-based Stockpile Stewardship 
Program (SSP). SSP is the key program that provides the Nation the 
assurance that the stockpile is safe, secure, and effective without 
underground nuclear testing. SSP is also the essential program for 
managing long-term risks to the stockpile as it ages, protecting 
against technological surprises, and supporting nuclear 
nonproliferation technology development. The SSP sustains the science, 
technology, and engineering expertise and exercises the talent for the 
development of next-generation technologies for proliferation 
prevention-related nuclear missions, including nuclear forensics, 
detection, and verification technologies. A sustained science base will 
provide the ability to respond to the challenge of meeting requirements 
that may result from the New START or CTBT treaties.
    While today's SSP capabilities are supplanting--and even 
surpassing--the role that nuclear tests once played in understanding 
our nuclear weapons, the President's fiscal year 2011 budget request 
will also allow us to revitalize the workforce, sustain the stockpile, 
and modernize key parts of the physical infrastructure.
    Question. I applaud your commitment to supporting President Obama's 
goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material from around the world 
within 4 years.
    What do you need from Congress to meet this goal? What programs 
will be involved? What are the key challenges?
    Answer. Congressional support for our budget requests is a critical 
element to ensuring that we meet the President's goal of leading an 
international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within 
4 years.
    A number of programs within the Office of Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation play a direct role in implementing the work necessary 
to meet this goal. The Offices of International Material Protection and 
Cooperation and Global Threat Reduction lead the effort to secure 
vulnerable nuclear materials from theft or sabotage worldwide. The 
Global Threat Reduction Initiative seeks to permanently eliminate the 
threat by converting research reactors and isotope production 
facilities from the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low 
enriched uranium (LEU) and by removing or permanently disposing of 
excess nuclear material. Finally, the Office of Nonproliferation and 
International Security plays a vital role in strengthening the 
international system that ensures that nuclear sites worldwide have 
adequate safeguards measures in place.
    The primary challenge that NNSA faces is cooperation of foreign 
governments. The United States cannot unilaterally eliminate the threat 
posed by dangerous materials and we therefore rely heavily on 
cooperation from many international partners. In addition to the 
activities outlined above, the Office of Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation has been actively involved in various initiatives 
undertaken to bolster U.S. leadership in nonproliferation and arms 
control, such as the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, the Joint Statement 
from the Moscow Summit in July 2009, and the September 2009 United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1887.

                       NATIONAL IGNITION FACILITY

    Question. Mr. D'Agostino, some assert that the National Ignition 
Facility may be a prototype for a fusion nuclear powerplant some day. I 
understand that the National Academy of Sciences and the National 
Academy of Engineering are conducting a study on Inertial Fusion Energy 
in part to explore the viability of that vision.
    Do you agree that the results of this study could be enhanced if 
the National Ignition Facility is able to provide the Academy with 
extensive analysis and testing?
    Answer. While I agree that the National Ignition Facility (NIF) 
will ultimately play a central role in any program designed to evaluate 
concepts for inertial fusion energy, I do not believe that specific new 
experimental work will be required for the current National Academies 
study. The National Academies panel has been asked to assess the 
prospects for Inertial Fusion Energy (IFE) as a power source; to 
identify scientific and engineering challenges, cost targets and 
research and development objectives associated with developing an IFE 
demonstration plant; and to advise the DOE on an R&D roadmap aimed at 
creating a conceptual design for such a demonstration assuming success 
in ignition at NIF as a starting point. This will be a wide-ranging 
assessment that will look at various schemes for target physics and 
component technologies beyond those currently being investigated as 
part of the National Ignition Campaign and will depend primarily on 
existing computational and experimental studies of the various 
approaches. The most important task for NIF, in support of the study, 
is to achieve ignition as soon as possible since the prospects for 
development of inertial fusion for energy applications is dependent 
upon achievement of this critical milestone. The current schedule for 
this is already quite aggressive.
    Question. Do you believe that Lawrence Livermore National Lab would 
need additional funding to provide the Academy with such testing and 
analysis?
    Answer. Specific funding has not been provided to the laboratories 
to support such studies in the past, but they may use their 
discretionary research funding to support work they deem necessary for 
their participation. If funding was directed to support analysis and 
testing in support of the National Academies study, a mechanism would 
have to be identified to ensure equitable access to all potential 
participants and thus all potential IFE alternatives in the study.
    Question. Could the NAS's ability to make sound technical judgments 
on the potential of Inertial Fusion Energy be impaired due to the lack 
of technical development of the trade-offs of various design approaches 
if it does not have full access to NIF testing?
    Answer. Because the NAS has been asked to help establish an R&D 
roadmap for IFE based upon the current state of maturity of the 
relevant science and technology, it is not likely that their 
conclusions could be impacted by testing prior to the achievement of 
ignition. The most important question that NIF will address relevant to 
the National Academies study is the demonstration of ignition, which is 
already the focus of the National Ignition Campaign. All of the nascent 
international efforts on IFE are also planning based on the U.S. 
Inertial Confinement Fusion program being the lead on the actual 
demonstration of ignition.
    Question. Do you believe that developing Inertial Fusion Energy 
should be part of the mandate of the NNSA, the DOE Office of Science, 
or both? Why do you believe this?
    Answer. Through leadership of the three Department of Energy Under 
Secretaries, and reporting through Under Secretary Koonin, we have an 
internal DOE study to assess several areas of research and development 
that currently cut across departmental organizations. We have chosen to 
include inertial fusion energy in those assessments because of its 
potential, and we will use this process to consider when and how to 
recommend to Congress that a modified program might be established.
    Question. Mr. D'Agostino, a year after completion of construction 
of the National Ignition Facility, NNSA has proposed an operations 
budget that may not permit Lawrence Livermore National Lab to run this 
facility full time.
    Do you agree that after making this sort of capital investment, 
NNSA should provide the resources necessary to operate the facility 24 
hours a day, 7 days a week?
    Answer. NNSA's requested funding provides for 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-
a-week (24/7) operations at NIF. A very careful experimental plan has 
been formulated for the period through the first attempts at ignition. 
In this plan, the most efficient experimental shot sequence was deemed 
to be about 16 hours-per-day/5 days-per-week (16/5) with the overall 
NIF operations staff remaining on a 24/7 status. This plan is also more 
compatible with the continuing installation of sophisticated equipment 
since the facility operations schedule must allow adequate time to 
ensure safety during maintenance and installation of experimental 
equipment.
    In the early experimental operation of NIF, the shot sequence was 
10 hours-per-day/7 days-per-week. NIF is currently in the process of 
installing sophisticated cryogenic (and other) equipment that will 
enable DT-layered target operation. After this installation period, NIF 
will begin the 16/5 shot sequence that is believed to be optimum for 
the very complex targets that will be utilized for many of the shots.
    Question. Mr. D'Agostino, at our hearing, you emphasized that it is 
very important to focus on getting to ignition at NIF, before putting 
too much work into next steps predicated on successful ignition. 
However, I am told that scientists in other countries are barreling 
ahead with their work ``assuming ignition,'' and that we risk falling 
behind as a result.
    Are you concerned that we could fall behind other countries in this 
area due to our caution? Please explain.
    Answer. The Department of Energy is a world leader in inertial 
confinement fusion research, and the National Ignition Facility gives 
the United States an unparalleled capability to undertake this 
research. Our aggressive plan for ignition will lay the basis for the 
rest of the world to pursue research in inertial fusion energy, with 
reliance on U.S. development of critical technology such as diode-
pumped laser systems. A similar facility called Laser Mega Joule is 
expected to eventually provide a French capability to pursue ignition, 
but the United States is in the unique position to pursue this major 
scientific achievement now. Current European plans for Inertial Fusion 
Energy are at a formative stage and will not involve significant 
activity until about 2020. Our scientists are certainly aware of the 
worldwide activities in this area, and I am not concerned that we could 
fall behind other countries is this area in the foreseeable future.
    The U.S. ICF Program is actively pursuing the application of 
ignition to the crucial needs of the weapons program. With respect to 
the Inertial Fusion Energy application, the National Academy of 
Sciences has been asked to provide an analysis of the best directions 
to follow after the achievement of ignition. We anticipate using the 
NAS Panel report (an early draft will be available in less than 1 year) 
as a key component in planning for the application of ignition to 
energy issues.

                               LLNL STUDY

    Question. Mr. D'Agostino, in 2007 a private consortium began 
operating Lawrence Livermore National Lab. I still question the logic 
of having a private contractor run national nuclear labs as for-profit 
corporations. Is NNSA willing to conduct a thorough review of whether 
this privatization effort has produced significant benefits to the 
productivity of our national labs''?
    Answer. Yes. NNSA is currently sponsoring the study that was 
mandated in the fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act to 
be conducted by the National Academies of Science. The study, to be 
conducted in two phases, each by a separately appointed committee, will 
provide an independent external review of the following for the 
Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories:
  --The quality of the scientific research being conducted at the 
        laboratory, including research with respect to weapons science, 
        nonproliferation, energy, and basic science.
  --The quality of the engineering being conducted at the laboratory.
  --The criteria used to assess the quality of scientific research and 
        engineering being conducted at the laboratory.
  --The relationship between the quality of the science and engineering 
        at the laboratory and the contract for managing and operating 
        the laboratory.
  --The management of work conducted by the laboratory for entities 
        other than the Department of Energy, including academic 
        institutions and other Federal agencies, and interactions 
        between the laboratory and such entities.
    Phase 1 will address elements 4 and 5 of the Statement of Task and 
aspects of element 3. A separate committee will be formed for Phase 2, 
which will address elements 1 and 2 of the Statement of Task and 
aspects of element 3.
    The report from the NAS is expected to be complete in January 2012.
                                 ______
                                 
            Questions Submitted by Senator Robert F. Bennett

                           WEAPONS ACTIVITIES
                              SURVEILLANCE

    Question. Mr. D'Agostino, the budget request states that funding 
has been restored to fully execute the surveillance program.
    What is the budget for surveillance, and how does that amount 
compare to fiscal year 2010? Is this enough to make the surveillance 
program ``whole''?
    Answer. In fiscal year 2011, NNSA requests $66 million directly for 
Enhanced Surveillance. Within Directed Stockpile Work (DSW), there is 
over $300 million dedicated to surveillance activities, including the 
DSW base capability for conducting surveillance in stockpile services 
and the specific weapon surveillance activities in stockpile systems. 
For comparison, the fiscal year 2010 appropriation authorized $69 
million directly for Enhanced Surveillance and approximately $200 
million dedicated to surveillance activities in DSW.
    Based on NNSA's actions to do surveillance smarter and more 
efficiently, the fiscal year 2011 request provides an adequate and 
balanced surveillance portfolio.

                         PLUTONIUM SUSTAINMENT

    Question. Mr. D'Agostino, the budget request includes a $50 million 
increase for Plutonium Sustainment to restore the capability to produce 
10 pits per year.
    What happened to this capability? Wasn't it achieved in fiscal year 
2007?
    Answer. The NNSA successfully produced 11 W88 pits in fiscal year 
2007. The funding in 2007 was $165 million which was the level 
necessary to attain and maintain the capability to produce up to 10 
pits per year. However, fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 funding 
levels were $135 million and $143 million, respectively, which resulted 
in the capability not being fully maintained as intended and necessary 
infrastructure investments to be deferred. The increase of $50 million 
will restore the funding levels to maintain this capability back to its 
required level and will also support development of a Defense Programs 
power supply mission. The increase will support upgrades and new 
equipment items. Additionally, as part of our Plutonium Sustainment 
mission, NNSA will work with LANL to revise and update equipment layout 
in Plutonium Facility 4 to streamline the pit production process that 
is co-located with existing Research and Development activities.

                                  FIRP

    Question. When Congress authorized the Facilities and 
Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP) to buy-down legacy 
deferred maintenance backlog, it was designed as a finite program with 
a congressionally-mandated end in fiscal year 2013. Yet the full scope 
of legacy deferred maintenance has not been bought down and newly 
deferred maintenance has accumulated. Why has adequately maintaining 
infrastructure been such a problem for NNSA? What would NNSA do with 
additional FIRP funds if the program were extended or succeeded?
    Answer. When FIRP was authorized, NNSA determined that an 
acceptable goal for deferred maintenance reduction was on the order of 
$1.2 billion, which was 5 percent of the value to replace the physical 
infrastructure. This level should provide a facility condition 
equivalent to the best managed Federal and private sector campuses.
    FIRP was designed to be completed by fiscal year 2011. Annual 
funding for FIRP remained on track through fiscal year 2005 and 
resulted in sizable reductions of deferred maintenance across the 
complex through the completion of high priority projects supporting the 
Stockpile Stewardship Mission. Thereafter, weapons activity funding for 
facility maintenance and deferred maintenance reduction struggled in 
the face of reduced appropriations. The direct impact of fewer annual 
dollars slowed the progress of deferred maintenance reduction. In light 
of these challenges Congress authorized in the extension of FIRP to 
fiscal year 2013 and the $1.2 billion goal was reduced to $900 million.
    If additional funds were provided, the NNSA would continue its goal 
of to reduce deferred maintenance to industry standards based on the 
annual increases furnished. Additional funds would be prioritized to 
address unfunded deferred maintenance projects, as well as to further 
support the Facility Disposition subprogram, which has been restarted 
this year because of the growing need to dedicate resources 
specifically to dismantle and dispose of excess deactivated facilities. 
When the FIRP Facility Disposition subprogram ended in fiscal year 
2008, it had successfully demolished more than 3,100,000 gross square 
feet of excess facilities.

                           TRITIUM READINESS

    Question. Mr. D'Agostino, NNSA is facing significant technical 
challenges in its Tritium Readiness Program that have caused the 
Tennessee Valley Authority to limit the number of Tritium Producing 
Burnable Absorber Rods in its reactor (thus affecting the amount of 
Tritium produced for extraction).
    Is NNSA taking any action to develop alternative Tritium production 
processes to the current plan to produce tritium at commercial light 
water reactors?
    Answer. No other alternative to producing tritium in commercial 
light water reactors is being considered at this time. NNSA and TVA 
entered into an interagency agreement in the year 2000 which called for 
TVA to perform irradiation services for NNSA using any of the following 
reactors; Watts Bar Unit 1, Sequoyah Units 1 and 2. Under the 
interagency agreement, NNSA notifies TVA of its irradiation 
requirements and TVA decides how best to accomplish the irradiation, 
specifically, which reactors will be used to accomplish the irradiation 
services. To date TVA has met all requirements through the use of Watts 
Bar Unit 1 only. TVA has taken and will continue to take steps to get 
Sequoyah ready for potential future irradiation services.
    TVA produces tritium for NNSA through the irradiation of Tritium 
Producing Burnable Absorber Rods (TPBARs). Although TPBARs have been 
experiencing higher than expected permeation rates of tritium into the 
reactor coolant system, TVA has maintained levels below its regulatory 
limits to ensure public health and safety. NNSA and TVA are developing 
plans to continue to meet NNSA tritium requirements using only the 
Watts Bar reactor, however, the Sequoyah reactors would also be 
available as backups, if necessary.
    Even with the challenges the program faces, the production of 
tritium at commercial light water reactors remains the best means to 
produce tritium.

                        PHYSICAL SECURITY BUDGET

    Question. The budget request calls for a decrease for Defense 
Nuclear Security by $49 million or 6 percent. The decrease is 
attributed to implementation of the Graded Security Protection (GSP) 
Plan and to ``The Deputy Secretary's Security Reform Initiative.''
    How has implementation of the GSP already effectuated security cost 
savings and what are they?
    Answer. The issuance of the Department's 2008 GSP Policy, which 
replaced the 2005 Design Basis Threat (DBT) Policy, has enabled the 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to take advantage of 
cost avoidances tied to the DBT implementation plans, as well as cost 
savings associated with ongoing site security operations. In terms of 
cost avoidances, the 2008 GSP Policy allowed NNSA to eliminate 
approximately $195.6 million in unnecessary one-time security upgrades 
that were contained in the site DBT implementation plans. In addition, 
NNSA was able to avoid over $30.2 million in recurring annual costs 
associated with unneeded additional protective force personnel 
connected to 2005 DBT implementation plans. This has yielded a total 
cost avoidance of over $419.6 million from the startup period of the 
DBT implementation plan in 2008, through the duration of the fiscal 
year 2012-2016 Future Years Nuclear Security Program. In addition to 
these cost avoidances, NNSA is working to find efficiencies for current 
Category I nuclear security operations through the Zero-Based Security 
Review (ZBSR) initiative. Under the ZBSR, NNSA is collaborating with 
other organizations within the Department of Energy (DOE) and the 
Department of Defense (DOD) to pilot an innovative GSP Implementation 
Assistance Visit (GSP-IAV) approach that provides a strong Federal-
Contractor partnership in developing and implementing robust security 
programs that provide an acceptable level of risk and are consistent 
across the NNSA nuclear security enterprise and with others that have 
similar security missions. In our first field trial of the GSP-IAV, 
conducted at the Nevada Test Site, we have identified significant 
potential cost savings associated with protecting the Device Assembly 
Facility (DAF)--while maintaining exceptionally high protection levels 
for the facility. We are in the process of more fully evaluating these 
proposed changes before making any final decision on implementation. 
Our plans are to conduct GSP-IAV activities at all Category I NNSA 
sites by the end of this fiscal year. We are confident that 
efficiencies we expect to gain through the NNSA ZBSR initiative will 
enable us to meet fiscal year 2011 funding targets for safeguards and 
security while providing a strong security posture consistent with the 
Department's GSP policy.
    Question. What is ``The Deputy Secretary's Security Reform 
Initiative''--is this the ``Zero-Based Security Review'' you discussed 
in your testimony? How does this generate cost savings?
    Answer. The Deputy Secretary's Security Reform Initiative and the 
ZBSR are separate but closely connected activities. The Deputy 
Secretary issued a challenge to the Department to reform the security 
program and develop innovative approaches to security that were capable 
of maintaining high levels of security but also eliminated unnecessary 
costs and productivity drains associated with low-value security 
requirements and/or security administration activities. The ZBSR is the 
NNSA's answer to the Deputy's challenge and since June 2009, NA-70 has 
been working closely with NNSA field sites and the Office of Health, 
Safety and Security (HSS) to comprehensively reexamine our security 
requirements and implementation expectations. The ZBSR has identified 
and will implement improvements to reduce both security costs and 
mission impacts, while maintaining very high levels of protection for 
our critical national security assets. The NNSA ZBSR approach is 
consistent with DOE management reform principles and is strongly 
supported by both the Federal and contractor communities.
    NNSA's security reform initiative is built along three main tracks: 
(1) reforming security policy; (2) reforming the Category I nuclear 
security program; and (3) improving the governance of the Federal and 
contractor security assessment programs.
  --Using field-led teams, NNSA has developed four draft security 
        ``standards'' covering Information Security, Physical 
        Protection, Protective Forces, and Program Management & 
        Planning. The standards will document NNSA expectations for 
        implementing existing DOE directives that are tailored to our 
        nuclear security enterprise.
    --The ZBSR teams used a ``first-principles'' approach to ensure 
            that security requirements meaningfully contribute to the 
            goal of protecting national security assets and actually 
            reduce security risks. The teams also focused on driving 
            consistency with current national standards into the core 
            set of NNSA security requirements.
  --For high-consequence nuclear security operations, NNSA is working 
        closely with HSS and DOD in piloting an innovative risk 
        assessment approach that is fully consistent with the new DOE 
        Graded Security Protection (GSP) policy. The pilot will focus 
        on a peer-reviewed assessment of adversary scenarios and risk 
        informed security response options.
    --NNSA is working to improve the management structure for our 
            nuclear security operations. This includes developing new 
            approaches for making senior-level, risk-informed decisions 
            on matching security capabilities to meet credible threats 
            and determining the necessary and sufficient investments 
            for nuclear security operations. This initiative is closely 
            aligned with the Committee of Principals (CoP) task to more 
            closely align DOD and NNSA nuclear security approaches.
    --As a compliment to improving our risk management processes, the 
            Office of Defense Nuclear Security (DNS) is also working on 
            a standardization initiative to improve the efficiency of 
            NNSA nuclear security operations. This effort will involve 
            the use of the NNSA Supply Chain Management Center (SCMC) 
            as a common sourcing and procurement mechanism, and will 
            provide cost savings through the standardization of 
            protective force uniforms, shields, and select items of 
            security equipment. In addition to the SCMC approach to 
            leveraging larger buys, DNS has coordinated with DOD's 
            Joint Munitions Command to be able to buy ammunition from 
            their contracts. Savings are realized both in unit price as 
            well as avoidance of site overhead taxes--which can exceed 
            50 percent at some sites. For ammunition not available 
            through DOD, the Service Center will set up contracts with 
            commercial vendors at pre-negotiated prices for all sites 
            to be able to order from.
  --Due to the self-regulatory nature of the NNSA security program, 
        both line management oversight and Independent Oversight will 
        be needed in this new model to provide feedback on performance 
        and provide assurance to all stakeholders that NNSA can 
        effectively perform its vital national security missions. 
        Enhancing contractor assurance systems are a major focus in 
        improving our performance assurance processes. We will all 
        continue to ensure that we have the right level of Federal 
        oversight provided by NNSA Site Offices. Additionally, NNSA is 
        working with HSS to ensure that the Office of Independent 
        Oversight will continue to provide us with extremely valuable 
        feedback on the effectiveness of our security program.
    Question. Can you assure us these cost savings measures do not have 
a detrimental effect on security?
    Answer. Absolutely, physical security remains a core NNSA mission 
capability and we will continue to focus on this area in the future. 
NNSA is working closely with the Department to ensure our security 
reform initiatives are carefully targeted to eliminate unnecessary 
costs and remove barriers to improving the productivity of our national 
security mission, while maintaining the highest standards for the 
protection of our critical national security assets. We intend to 
carefully monitor the implementation of our reform efforts and will be 
working to improve the capabilities of our site office Federal staff to 
provide comprehensive oversight of the contractor's implementation of 
our security program requirements. In addition, we are partnering with 
the HSS organization to find innovative ways to strengthen Independent 
Oversight activities as well as improve our ability to apply inspection 
lessons-learned across the NNSA enterprise.

                    DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

    Question. In the fiscal year 2011 budget the significant funding 
increase requested for U.S. Surplus Fissile Material Disposition is 
largely due to the consolidation of 3 major construction projects in 
this account: the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MOX), the Pit 
Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF), and the associated Waste 
Solidification Building (WSB) for these facilities.
    What are the technical reasons for combining this project with the 
Office of Environmental Management Plutonium Preparation project?
    Answer. Potential programmatic, life cycle, and schedule advantages 
that would result from combining NNSA's PDCF project with EM's 
Plutonium Preparation (PuP) project include:
  --Cost avoidance for surplus plutonium disposition program;
  --Avoidance of expenditures for the design, construction, operation, 
        and decontamination and demolition of an additional secure, 
        Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility;
  --Greater program and schedule flexibility through an incremental 
        approach to project execution;
  --Cost avoidance at PANTEX by establishing early surplus pit storage 
        at SRS; and
  --Load leveling of Secure Transportation resources.
    Question. Will PDCF be operational in time for the MOX facility to 
operate without pause?
    Answer. DOE has planned for PDCF to begin operations several years 
after the start-up of the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility 
(MFFF). To fill the feedstock gap, DOE is relying on several options 
including: (1) disassembling surplus pits at LANL (ARIES) in order to 
produce at least 2 metric tons of plutonium oxide for MFFF; (2) 
processing 7.8 metric tons of additional non-pit material suitable for 
MFFF feedstock currently under the jurisdiction of the Office of 
Environmental Management at the Savannah River Site; (3) working with 
nuclear utilities interested in irradiating MOX fuel to adjust the 
quantity and timing of initial fuel deliveries; and (4) planning to 
start-up limited processes in the PDCF to produce early feedstock for 
MFFF.
    Question. The fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $100 million 
for Russian Surplus Fissile Material Disposition to meet a portion of 
the U.S. $400 million pledge. Additional funds to fulfill this pledge 
are not included in the FYNSP. When are requests anticipated? How did 
NNSA determine that $100 million was needed this year? What will it pay 
for and over how long?
    Answer. DOE is requesting $100 million in fiscal year 2011 to 
demonstrate to Russia that the United States is serious about 
fulfilling our $400 million commitment and to begin work that will 
enable Russia to start disposition in 2018 as called for in the amended 
Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA). Work to be 
undertaken includes removing part of the BN-600 reactor that breeds 
plutonium, configuring the BN-800 reactor to operate as a burner rather 
than a breeder of plutonium, establishing a capability to fabricate 
surplus weapon-grade plutonium into MOX fuel, and establishing a 
monitoring and inspection regime. Additional funding will be sought 
once DOE and Rosatom reach agreement on areas of U.S. assistance and 
once the majority of the initial $100 million has been costed. We 
anticipate that the last $100 million increment of the $400 million 
will be requested over a number of years beginning in fiscal year 2018 
timeframe to be paid to Russia on a pro rated basis for each metric ton 
of plutonium disposed of (e.g., approximately $2.7 million per metric 
ton).

                             HUMAN CAPITAL

    Question. How does NNSA ensure that the nuclear enterprise (Federal 
and management and operation contractors) sustains the skills needed 
for current and future missions-including those skills needed for 
currently inactive missions, such as test readiness?
    Answer. The NNSA and its Management and Operating (M&O) contractors 
proactively pursue the development of the next generation nuclear 
security enterprise workforce.
  --A robust Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) provides key 
        opportunities to attract and retain the science, technical, and 
        engineering workforce. SSP promotes skill-building and 
        exercising of talent by conducting, for example, complex 
        integrated experiments at the Nevada Test Site, and on the 
        major NNSA facilities, such as the National Ignition Facility 
        (NIF), Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydro-test Facility (DARHT), 
        Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER), 
        and Z--the pulsed power machine.
  --In addition, active life extension programs, such as the B61 LEP, 
        further exercise the full spectrum of development work, from 
        advanced and exploratory concepts through product realization, 
        and develop the critical intuition, judgment and confidence 
        present only in experienced scientists and engineers who have 
        applied their skills to real nuclear weapons design and 
        development work. This work is essential to attracting and 
        retaining the scientists and engineers necessary to sustain the 
        Nation's nuclear deterrent.
  --Critical skills for less active missions must also be maintained. 
        The Underground Nuclear Weapon Test readiness program is an 
        example. Test-readiness skills are exercised through major 
        science experiments at the Nevada Test Site and the Sub-
        Critical experiments that take place in U1a, an underground 
        tunnel system.
  --Further, knowledge preservation programs have been in place since 
        the end of nuclear testing, archiving underground test data, 
        countless documents, and hundreds of videotaped interviews to 
        ensure that should a decision be made to resume nuclear 
        testing, the skill mix needed will be readily reconstituted.
    Question. How have external programs and activities (``work for 
others'') helped or hindered the enterprise to sustain critical skills?
    Answer. The nuclear complex has a long history of performing 
strategically aligned work for others (WFO) programs with the express 
intent of maximizing the technical value to the NNSA and to other 
agencies in meeting their national security mission requirements. NNSA 
and WFO programs not only help sustain existing critical competencies 
and technologies, but enable the development and maturation of new 
leading edge science, technology, and associated critical skills that 
would otherwise not be possible. Examples of NNSA mission critical 
capabilities that provide benefit to and receive benefit from aligned 
WFO programs include:
  --Materials (including energetic and non-energetic material design, 
        synthesis, testing, and characterization from the nano- to the 
        macro-scale);
  --Information science & technology (including the full range of 
        modeling, simulation, visualization, and knowledge-creating 
        integration of large data sets to maintain exquisite 
        situational awareness, perform intelligence assessments, or 
        make science-based predictions of complex systems);
  --Science of signatures (including nuclear forensics, integrated 
        systems for remote modeling, detection of nuclear and 
        radiological material, and the prevention of technological 
        surprise); and
  --Systems engineering (low volume production against stringent 
        safety, security, and reliability requirements throughout an 
        extended service life, robust command and control, exacting 
        performance in challenging diverse environments).
    Regardless of funding source, work such as advanced supercomputing, 
fundamental material science, design and production of unique 
microelectronics and subsystems, and deployment of fully engineered 
systems (e.g., B61 LEP, nonproliferation systems, satellites) exercises 
the full spectrum of science, technology, and engineering skills of the 
Nuclear Security Enterprise on an ongoing basis to the joint benefit of 
NNSA and WFO agencies. Additionally, the diverse and demanding 
technical work portfolio enables the Nuclear Security Enterprise to 
attract and retain the best talent in many critical skill areas.
    Question. To date, how does NNSA identify critical skill gaps at an 
enterprise-wide level?
    Answer. Each M&O contractor identifies the critical skill gaps. A 
comprehensive, enterprise-wide inventory of these skills and 
capabilities is being developed to pinpoint capabilities at risk, 
identify gaps, and develop productive recruitment/retention strategies.
    Question. What assistance does NNSA provide to management and 
operation contractors for recruiting and retention efforts? What 
changes, if any, is NNSA planning to make regarding its role sustaining 
critical skills enterprise-wide?
    Answer. NNSA and M&O contractors encourage the development of the 
next generation workforce with succession planning programs in the form 
of institutes, fellowships, internships, capstone projects, and post-
doctoral appointments. Among other outcomes, these institutes and 
collaborations build relationships with students to improve their 
recruitment potential, and they also offer educational programs to 
personnel to strengthen their individual critical skills. Beneficial 
temporary reassignments, including detail assignments, job swaps, and 
acting management roles, have been found to benefit the ``sending'' as 
well as the ``receiving'' organization.
    One key program NNSA uses to address critical skill gaps is 
Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD). The LDRD program 
promotes highly innovative exploratory research among the scientists, 
technicians, and engineers to respond to present national security 
mission needs and to anticipate future ones. The program funds projects 
that pursue technological solutions to the most urgent challenges 
facing our Nation or that promote science and engineering foundations 
that will lead to new research and development.

    Senator Dorgan.  It is an increase in funding for some very 
important programs. And the questions that have been raised, I 
think, are questions you, as a manager, I'm sure, raise every 
day. How do we do this? How do we do it effectively and 
efficiently?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
    Senator Dorgan. How do we give the taxpayer full value for 
their money on these important security issues?
    Mr. D'Agostino. Right.

                          SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

    Senator Dorgan. So, we thank all of you for your 
willingness to be here.
    Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you.
    Senator Dorgan. This hearing is recessed.
    [Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., Wednesday, March 10, the 
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of 
the Chair.]
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