    [Senate Hearing 111-1195]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                          S. Hrg. 111-1195

                           NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE AND
                     FLOOD PROTECTION AND COASTAL LOUISIANA
                        RESTORATION: STATUS AND PROGRESS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                          ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JUNE 16, 2009

                                   __________

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                   COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
                                 FIRST SESSION

                      BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman
    MAX BAUCUS, Montana                  JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
    FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey      DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
    BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
    BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont             MIKE CRAPO, Idaho
    AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota             CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
    SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island     LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
    TOM UDALL, New Mexico
    JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
    KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York
    ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania

                        Bettina Poirier, Staff Director
                     Ruth Van Mark, Minority Staff Director
                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                 JUNE 16, 2009
                               OPENING STATEMENTS

    Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California...     1
    Vitter, Hon. David, U.S. Senator from the State of Louisiana.....     3
    Landrieu, Hon. Mary L., U.S. Senator from the State of Louisiana.     4
    Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma,
      prepared statement.............................................   140

                                   WITNESSES

    Walsh, Michael, Brigadier General, Commander, Division Engineer,
      Mississippi Valley Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers......     7
        Prepared statement...........................................    11
        Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer.........    22
        Response to an additional question from Senator Klobuchar....    26
        Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe........    26
    Jacobs, Jeffrey, Scholar, National Research Council and Study
      Director, Committee on New Orleans Regional Hurricane
      Protection Projects............................................    46
        Prepared statement...........................................    49
        Response to an additional question from Senator Inhofe.......    55
    Rault, Joseph M., Executive Committee Board Member, Pump to the
      River..........................................................    56
        Prepared statement...........................................    59
        Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe........    73
    Peyronnin, Steven, Executive Director of the Coalition to Restore
      Coastal Louisiana..............................................    78
        Prepared statement...........................................    81
        Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe........    88
    Twilley, Robert R., Professor, Department of Oceanography and
      Coastal Sciences, Vice Chancellor, Research and Economic
      Development, Louisiana State University........................    92
        Prepared statement...........................................    95
    Jackson, Thomas L., P.E., D.WRE, Commissioner and Past President,
      Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority--East...........   105
        Prepared statement...........................................   108
        Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe........   119

       NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE AND FLOOD PROTECTION AND COASTAL LOUISIANA
                        RESTORATION: STATUS AND PROGRESS

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, JUNE 16, 2009

                                           U.S. Senate,
                     Committee on Environment and Public Works,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The full Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in
    room 406, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barbara Boxer
    (chairman of the full Committee) presiding.
        Present: Senators Boxer, Vitter, and Udall.
        Also present: Senator Landrieu.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
               U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

        Senator Boxer. Thank you. Welcome everybody. We are going
    to get started with my opening statement. Then, as soon as
    Senator Landrieu and Senator Vitter arrive, I assume--Senator
    Vitter is here. Great. So, next we will turn to them and their
    opening statements and then we will turn to the Corps.
        Good afternoon. We are meeting today to examine progress
    made on hurricane protection and coastal restoration since the
    devastating hurricanes that struck Louisiana in 2005.
        After becoming Chair of this Committee, the very first
    field hearing that I held was in New Orleans to address post-
    hurricane clean up, hurricane protection and restoration of the
    wetlands. These issues remain top priorities of this Committee,
    and I want to thank Senators Landrieu and Vitter for making
    sure that we keep our eye on the ball here because nothing is
    going to be done unless we keep our eye on the ball.
        Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were a wake-up call about the
    life and death role played by our flood control systems and the
    dire consequences of not properly designing this critical
    infrastructure, and also the consequences of not executing well
    in the aftermath of a hurricane or any natural disaster.
        In my State, obviously we do not deal with hurricanes. We
    deal with earthquakes, flood, fire, and anything else that you
    can imagine. So, I think the wake-up call to America,
    regardless of political party, was A, are we doing enough to
    prevent, in this case, the flooding, and B, if we have an
    emergency and we need to evacuate folks and we need to do the
    job right, we better make sure we are prepared.
        To me, these storms showed why we must invest in restoring
    Louisiana's natural hurricane protection system, the wetlands.
    For centuries, the protective wetlands of the Louisiana coast
    blunted the force of countless storms, absorbing their energy
    and softening their impact. But those wetlands have been
    rapidly disappearing and they require our constant attention.
        We have learned a great deal over the past few years about
    why the New Orleans Hurricane Protection System failed. Groups
    of experts have identified important lessons from the disaster
    so that we are better prepared for the next hurricane, the next
    storm, the next flood. So, I think we are making progress in
    improving protections.
        In 2007, we took a major step forward.
        Senator Landrieu, please sit right there and then we will
    invite you to join us on the dais. Senator, sit right there.
    You are our first witness once I am finished and Senator Vitter
    is finished. They we turn to you.
        I was just saying that my very first field hearing, Madam
    Senator, was in New Orleans and it was just a few months after
    I took the gavel, so it must have been about March.
        Senator Landrieu. It was February.
        Senator Boxer. It was February, actually, after I took the
    gavel. And I was telling everybody that your constant pressure,
    your constant concern, along with Senator Vitter's, certainly
    has ensured everyone in this Country that I am not going to
    take my eye off of this. And I stated that we are making some
    progress. But we have a long, long, long way to go. You know,
    when the cameras are all there, it is one thing. When the
    cameras leave, we have got to do the rest of the hard work.
        In 2007, we took a major step forward in this Committee. We
    passed out of the Committee the Water Resources Development
    Act, for the first time in 7 years. This landmark legislation
    authorized critical water resources projects around the
    Country, including a comprehensive program to restore Louisiana
    wetlands and other important hurricane protection projects.
        Congress has invested nearly $14.5 billion for hurricane
    protection projects in Louisiana over the past 3 years. Because
    of this investment, there has been great progress to upgrade
    the New Orleans Hurricane Protection System. Nearly 4 years
    after Hurricane Katrina, we can take some comfort in that. But
    I think the three of us know, and lots of others know and they
    will be here coming forward, the experts who have come here
    from your home State, Senators, we know there is a lot more to
    do.
        Now, I understand that the Corps has stated that some
    hurricane protection projects preferred by local citizens are
    too costly and they have not been adequately studied. We are
    here to examine those decisions and to make sure the right
    choice is made that puts the safety of the citizenry first.
        And let me point this out. We know what the American people
    saw when they saw the mishandling in the aftermath of Katrina.
    It is in our minds until the day that we die. We see those
    images. And we know how we felt. Would it not be tragic if, at
    this moment, we chose the wrong fix? And I think it is very
    important, and I commend both Senators, for working together on
    this. It is essential that we do the right thing at this stage.
    Frankly, I am not into wasting hundreds of millions of dollars.
    I would rather spend more and get a project that I know meets
    the need.
        So, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the
    progress that has been made and the steps that we must take to
    be prepared in the future.
        My time is expired, so I will call on Senator Vitter and
    then Senator Landrieu.
        Senator Vitter.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER,
                U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

        Senator Vitter. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
        Several months ago, I asked for this update hearing and you
    were very kind and generous to immediately agree. Thank you for
    that. Thank you for this hearing. You agreed to a similar
    request for that field hearing in early 2007 in the New Orleans
    area, and thank you very much for that, and for all of your
    continuing interest.
        Katrina certainly was, as we all know, a historic event.
    But I think it is important that we refocus about why it was.
        First of all, it is the only instance in our history that
    involved the complete and total evacuation of a major
    metropolitan area and the complete cessation, for some
    significant period of time, of all life and economic activity
    there.
        Second, we talk about it as a natural disaster. Of course,
    a hurricane is. But it was also a manmade disaster because most
    of the flooding we are talking about in the New Orleans area
    was directly due to design failures in the levee system, most
    notably the walls of the outflow canals, which we are going to
    talk a lot about today.
        So that is why it is so important that we get the fix
    right, as you said, so that we never have to repeat that sort
    of history.
        Now, I do want to say at the beginning that there is a lot
    that is good and there is a lot that is right that is going on
    in terms of the Corps' work and our overall recovery. Since
    Katrina, and then Rita, and more recently Gustav and Ike, we
    have had a truly unprecedented level of taxpayer support and
    that has come through this Committee and through this Congress,
    and everyone in Louisiana wants to say thank you. It has been
    absolutely unprecedented. It matched an unprecedented event.
    They have been unbelievably generous and unprecedented. And
    that is leading to important work that is moving forward, most
    notably building true what we call 100-year protection in the
    greater New Orleans area in time for the 2011 hurricane season.
    So that is good and that is very important.
        But I do want to underscore two big concerns I have as that
    very important work moves forward. First, Congress asked the
    Corps, mandated that the Corps look at and issue clear reports
    about what the next step might look like after we finish the
    100-year level of protection and asked them to be very focused
    and quite specific in coming up with project ideas for
    something called the Louisiana Coastal Area Study.
        My first big concern, and disappointment, is that in
    responding to that mandate, the Corps has been exceedingly
    general and exceedingly vague with their analysis rather than
    giving us the much more specific, project specific list of
    ideas that we asked for. That, obviously, is a big impediment
    to moving forward in terms of active consideration for the next
    step and that impacts all of coastal Louisiana.
        My second big, big concern is the one I think we are going
    to focus on in discussions with the witnesses today. That is
    that we are in the process of perhaps moving forward, I hope
    not, but perhaps moving forward with the wrong fix for the
    outfall canals.
        Madam Chair, you have been there. You know that what we are
    talking about is three what we call outfall canals, 17th Street
    Canal, Orleans Avenue Canal and London Avenue Canal. Most of
    the flooding of New Orleans after Katrina was a result of
    breaches in these canals. All of the flooding in New Orleans
    west of the Industrial Canal was essentially the result of
    that.
        These breaches were manmade in the sense that we now have
    the engineering analysis that says there were design flaws.
    These walls breached from below. They gave in from below. They
    were not over-topped, except in some limited instances. They
    gave way because they were not deep enough and they were not
    strong enough.
        The Corps right now is moving forward with Option 1 in
    terms of addressing that situation, rather than Option 2 or 2a.
    Option 1 is to close off the canals at the lake so that storm
    surge does not come into the canals and lead to a breach as it
    did with Katrina. But then, to artificially keep at a low level
    the water level in the canals rather than rebuilding the walls
    so that they are strong enough to accommodate a normal water
    level, which you can get in events.
        In contrast, Option 2, and 2a, is to actually fix the
    problem, which is the poorly designed walls, and rebuild those
    correctly. And so my second big concern, which will be the
    subject of at least most of my questions, I think of lot of our
    overall discussion, is that we are choosing the wrong fix for
    the biggest thing that went wrong, that caused catastrophic
    flooding in New Orleans.
        I do not want to repeat the mistakes of history. After
    Hurricane Betsy, all of us, the Country, made a big mistake and
    chose the wrong path forward in terms of our protection system
    in greater New Orleans. And that led to the devastation of
    Katrina. The Country chose that, basically, because it was the
    cheaper alternative.
        Right now, the Corps wants to move forward with Option 1
    and I think there is a push in that direction basically because
    it is a cheaper alternative. I do not want to repeat that grave
    mistake in history and save pennies on the front end and pay
    hundreds of billions of dollars on the back end with another
    catastrophic event.
        So, thank you for your leadership on this and I also thank
    my colleague, Senator Landrieu, for all of her leadership on
    these issues.
        Senator Boxer. Thank you, Senator. Senator Landrieu.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARY L. LANDRIEU,
                U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

        Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I have a long and very detailed report for the Committee. I
    would like to submit it to the record.
        Senator Boxer. Without objection.
        [The referenced material was not received at time of
    print.]
        Senator Landrieu. Thank you. I will summarize my remarks in
    the 5 minutes provided.
        I want to thank you, Madam Chair, for your continued focus
    on this very critical issue, not just for Louisiana and South
    Louisiana, but for the whole Gulf Coast and in many coastal
    areas in America. The fact that you, at the request of Senator
    Vitter and me, have continued this focus and others, is truly
    commendable. Thank you for your visits, thank you for flying
    over the wetlands, thank you for walking the levees, and that
    hands-on approach, I think, will be very valuable as we move
    forward.
        I want to speak, just for a moment, about the bigger
    picture, as Senator Vitter has outlined some of the specifics
    about the project before us. I want to say that discussing the
    status of hurricane protection and critical coastal restoration
    underway in South Louisiana is of extreme importance.
        This area, Madam Chair, is one of the most unique and
    fragile delta landscapes in the world, a landscape that drains
    over 40 percent of the North American continent. Positioned at
    the mouth of one of the largest and most powerful rivers in the
    world, Coastal Louisiana and the delta hold a tremendous bounty
    of natural and human resources. Our coast is a working coast
    that contributes 90 percent of America's off-shore energy
    production, 30 percent of overall oil and gas supply, and 30
    percent of its seafood in the lower 48 States. And that is not
    counting the navigation that comes into this as well.
        But the coast is in a state of crisis, losing 25 to 35
    square miles of wetlands per year and, as we pointed out a
    number of times on the maps, Madam Chair, putting dozens of
    cities, not just New Orleans, but dozens of cities, suburban
    areas, mid-size cities, and villages and agricultural
    communities at risk.
        This Committee bears an immense responsibility to the
    Nation as it relates to flood control and the ecosystem. I
    thank this Committee for its work, primarily through the WRDA
    bills, and we look forward to working with you on WRDA bills in
    the future.
        But as you said, Madam Chair, we have a long way to go. We
    are not nearly where we need to be. We have got to change our
    direction. We have a long way to go to ensure that the entire
    coast of Louisiana can thrive with safer cities, vibrant
    communities and more sustainable landscapes.
        Of particular concern today, as Senator Vitter pointed out,
    is the decision by the Corps of Engineers to proceed with a
    plan for storm surge protection that will neglect a critical
    piece of the puzzle, in my opinion.
        The Greater New Orleans Area averages one of the rainiest
    cities in the United States. The heaviest and most intense
    rainfalls occur during hurricane season. If Hurricane Katrina
    taught us anything, we must coordinate and manage our outer
    hurricane protection with the interior drainage and flood
    control of the city. If we fail to properly design the system,
    we will fail the people of New Orleans and the region again and
    likely repeat the same mistake that killed over 1,400 people in
    Louisiana and brought a major American city to the brink of
    collapse.
        I urge this Committee to take swift action to address the
    concerns of our State, the city of New Orleans, Jefferson
    Parish and the New Orleans Sewage and Water Board. You will
    hear from them later. But let me go on.
        While the subject today is focused on this project, I want
    to say that we need a new direction. The piecemeal approach
    that we have used for over the last really 40 or 50 years is
    what I now call a patch and pray model. Madam Chair, this model
    has failed our Nation. It failed the people of New Orleans and
    our region, it has failed South Louisiana. Our coastal
    communities can no longer afford the backlogs, the delays, the
    inefficient process of overlapping and confusing Federal
    authorization, and delayed appropriations.
        We must build a better model. We must move in a new
    direction. We must find a new way to focus our efforts at the
    Federal, State and local levels so we can construct the best
    water infrastructure and a more natural landscape that keeps
    communities safe and strong.
        I went in search of a new model, Madam Chair, and I believe
    that I found one, not in its identical form, but in The
    Netherlands, with EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson and members of
    your own staff. What we learned from the Dutch model, I believe
    we can learn a great deal.
        I will not go into the details. They suffered a
    catastrophic flood, but through reorganization, professional
    water management districts, by securing a permanent funding
    source and the gathering of political will and planning, Madam
    Chair, not just for 6 months or a year, but for decades. They
    are now planning almost for centuries. How refreshing. This is
    what our Government needs to aspire to.
        I know that my time is at end, but let me just----
        Senator Boxer. I will give you another minute to close.
        Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
        Let me just conclude with this. What I learned in The
    Netherlands is that people can live, safely and securely, below
    sea level and near the water. What a novel idea. Because many
    people in America, Madam Chair, including maybe some members of
    this Committee, do not believe that people can live safely
    below sea level and near the water. Well, we have a problem
    since we have 20 million or more people living below sea level
    in America, maybe more, it is a rough estimate, including in
    the Sacramento Valley, as well as 50 percent of the American
    people living within 50 miles of the coast. We need a new
    model.
        So that is what my testimony is about today. I am going to
    supply some more materials from the ongoing dialogs with the
    Dutch. The Dutch Deltaurus Institute, I believe, is the finest
    in the world. And I believe this Committee, under your
    leadership, Madam Chair, can provide the extraordinary
    leadership necessary to change direction, to seek a new model,
    a safe model, not just for Louisiana and the Gulf Coast, but
    for coastal communities throughout this Nation. I pledge to
    work with you and your Committee every step of the way in a
    bipartisan manner to accomplish this.
        Again, I thank you very, very much and look forward to the
    testimony and I will be staying to hear the specifics on the
    proposal Pump to the River today.
        Senator Boxer. Please join us right up here.
        At this time, we call to the table Brigadier General
    Michael Walsh, Commander, Division Engineer, Mississippi Valley
    Division, U.S. Army Corps. Welcome, Commander. I should say
    General. Welcome, General, and please read your statement or
    place it in the record and summarize it and then we will ask
    questions.

       STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL WALSH, COMMANDER,
    DIVISION ENGINEER, MISSISSIPPI VALLEY DIVISION, U.S. ARMY CORPS
                              OF ENGINEERS

        General Walsh. Thank you, Madam Chair and members of the
    Committee.
        I am Brigadier General Mike Walsh, Commander of the
    Mississippi Valley Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and
    also the President-Designee of the Mississippi River
    Commission.
        Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Corps'
    ongoing reconstruction, restoration and improvement efforts on
    the Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk Reduction System for the
    Greater New Orleans area.
        Just a quick pause. We are engaged in multiple fronts, from
    supporting engineering work for our armed forces here in the
    United States as well as overseas, to water resource
    engineering from Canada to the Gulf Coast. We have recently
    been reminded by our sacrifice of some of our teammates when we
    lost three civilians during Memorial Day to an IED that hit one
    of our convoys in Fallujah. Our civilians and soldiers are
    engaged in harm's way today.
        The Federal projects for Greater New Orleans were
    extensively damaged, as you mentioned, by Hurricane Katrina in
    2005. With quick action from Congress to provide authority and
    appropriations, the Corps repaired and restored 220 miles of
    the system to the pre-Katrina level of protection.
        Our immediate operational goal is to provide risk reduction
    from hurricanes and storm surge that have a 1 percent chance of
    occurring in any given year by June 1, 2011. We are using the
    overall resources of the entire Mississippi Valley Division and
    other Corps expertise across the Nation to deliver, including
    the Engineer Research and Development Center, also known as
    ERDC. It is an award winning research facility recognized
    worldwide. We are also using folks from the Northwest Division,
    Walla Walla District, Kansas City District, Portland, North
    Atlantic Division, the Baltimore and Philadelphia Districts,
    the Great Lakes and Ohio River Division, the Chicago District,
    and many others.
        But even beyond this internal effort, we are also
    leveraging the knowledge and capabilities of our partners in
    industry, architectural firms, members of academia, and
    international counterparts to develop and apply state-of-the-
    art engineering solutions.
        Our overarching goal is to provide a reliable Storm Surge
    Risk Reduction System that will deliver in compliance to
    authorities and appropriations to meet the needs of Southeast
    Louisiana. I plan to highlight a few to date and provide an
    overview of the ongoing efforts to restore the coastal
    ecosystem of Louisiana.
        More details are provided in my written testimony, Madam
    Chair, and I will be happy to answer questions afterwards.
        With regard to the Hurricane Storm Damage Risk Reduction
    System status, the risk reduction systems in the New Orleans
    area include about 350 miles of levees and floodwalls,
    navigable floodgates, canal closure structures, pump stations
    and other structures. The threat of a 100-year storm surge is
    being addressed through improvements to the perimeter system
    composed of the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity and the West
    Bank and Vicinity projects that protect major areas of
    Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard and St. Charles
    parishes.
        There are also interior drainage systems that provide for
    the removal of rainfall that is being addressed through
    improvements on the Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Damage
    Reduction Project, also known as SELA.
        Major features of the work include erecting surge
    protection barriers, building levees and floodwalls, replacing
    I-walls with stronger T-walls, adding scour protection, making
    repairs to existing pump stations, storm proofing pump
    stations, improving interior drainage, and restoring,
    completing and improving components of the existing perimeter
    protection system.
        The authorized and funded work also includes incorporating
    the Plaquemines Parish non-Federal levee system into the
    existing New Orleans to Venice hurricane risk reduction project
    and improving levees in Terrebonne Parish and work in Grand
    Isle as well.
        Today, we are more than one-third through with the
    construction of improvements. The system is stronger and more
    resilient than prior to Katrina or at any other time in
    history. Extensive modeling, lessons learned and risk informed
    processes have enhanced our design criteria for on-the-ground
    construction and the progress continues.
        The contracting effort to accomplish this massive
    construction project in a short timeframe is immense. We are
    maintaining our aggressive obligation schedule originally laid
    out in 2007, and we have awarded over 190 contracts and
    obligated $4.2 billion for the program.
        The majority of the funds are planned for obligation by the
    end of year 2009. Current obligations include over $1.2 billion
    directly to small and disadvantaged businesses. About 37
    percent of the obligations are going directly to small and
    disadvantaged businesses.
        With the assistance of the Office of the Federal
    Coordinator for the Gulf Coast Rebuilding and in close
    partnership with Governor Jindal, we have signed all three
    major partnership agreements with the State of Louisiana
    necessary to proceed with construction.
        We have also signed all deferred payment agreements with
    the State of Louisiana that extend the State's payments for
    cost-shared portions of the work over a 30-year period,
    supporting the policy announced by the Federal Government in
    the State of Louisiana in August 2008.
        We have implemented a robust independent external peer
    review of the Hurricane Storm Damage Risk Reduction System.
    This includes the overall design criteria and their application
    during design and construction, the armoring manual and the
    quality management plan. The most complex projects will receive
    additional peer review during construction and the design
    process.
        Recognizing the need and the fundamental responsibility to
    reach out to stakeholders and to inform our decisionmaking with
    the public's input, the Corps has hosted more than 110 public
    meetings in Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard and
    St. Charles parishes to listen and to consider public comment
    and include critical information into the development of the
    system.
        Last year during Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, we coordinated
    with the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans to close the
    gates of the Interim Closure Structure at the outfall canals of
    Lake Pontchartrain, and then pumped the storm water out of the
    canals. The 12-foot surge from Hurricane Gustav tested the
    system and the Nation watched as waves overlapped the flood
    walls on the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal. The system
    performed as designed. No damages to the floodwalls occurred
    due to the new T-wall designs and the armoring and splash pads
    installed at the existing I-walls.
        In regard to other efforts in addition to the previously
    described ecosystem restoration, higher levels of storm risk
    reduction measures are also being studied in coastal Louisiana
    as part of the authorized Louisiana Coastal Area Program and
    the ongoing Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Study.
        The ecosystem restoration activities are conducted under
    multiple authorities with funding from various sources and
    several different cost-sharing formulas. They include the
    Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act, also
    known as CWPPRA, the Louisiana Coastal Area ecosystem
    restoration program, a related effort to restore wetlands
    affected by the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, and the science
    that is needed to support all of these related restoration
    efforts.
        The Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Final
    Technical Report is currently undergoing agency and public
    review and is scheduled to be provided to the Assistant
    Secretary of the Army in August 2009. This report contains an
    analysis of Category 5 risk reduction and identifies an array
    of viable comprehensive plans that include structural, non-
    structural and coastal restoration measures. The report also
    establishes the opportunity to move forward on report
    components for our State partner, the Coastal Protection and
    Restoration Authority.
        In addition, regarding the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet,
    the comprehensive plan for deauthorizing the deep draft
    navigation was completed in 2008. The MRGO channel was
    officially closed to all navigation on April 22, 2009 and
    construction crews are in the final stages of placing over
    300,000 tons of rock to complete the MRGO closure structure by
    July of this year.
        We are in the process of constructing an 18,500-foot long
    rock dike along the bank of the eastern lobe of Lake Borgne to
    help maintain the lake as a separate ecosystem. A study to
    identify the best way to restore wetlands affected by the MRGO
    is also ongoing. Feasibility scoping meetings for this study
    were held in April and May of this year, and we plan to release
    the draft to public comment and external review by May 2010.
        Madam Chair, this concludes my testimony and I thank you
    for allowing me to present the ongoing efforts of the U.S. Army
    Corps of Engineers in the New Orleans area. It is my pleasure
    to serve the Army and the Nation. I am prepared to take your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Walsh follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Boxer. Thank you, General.
        General, I am going to ask you a big favor. If you could,
    after we have asked you our questions, is it possible for you
    to stay and hear the panel? Senator Landrieu had suggested that
    would be a good idea. Is that possible?
        General Walsh. Yes, Madam Chair.
        Senator Boxer. Thank you so much. Because I think it is
    important.
        General, how long have you been on this particular beat?
        General Walsh. I took over about 14 months ago. Previous to
    that, I was General Petraeus' engineer in Iraq.
        Senator Boxer. Oh, boy. So you took over 14 months ago. And
    how long will this assignment run, if it runs its normal
    course?
        General Walsh. I work at the pleasure of the Chief, Ma'am.
        Senator Boxer. So, you never know.
        General Walsh. Yes, Ma'am.
        Senator Boxer. The reason I ask this is, I found in my own
    State, when I work on major flood control projects, one of the
    problems is we have great people and then you look over your
    shoulder, they have the whole history and they are gone. So, I
    mean I am hoping for some stability here because it makes it
    really difficult. That is not in your control, but let the
    record reflect that it is a concern that I have in any of these
    big projects. I think we really need to have consistency.
        General, while the Corps has made significant progress in
    rebuilding the hurricane protection system of New Orleans,
    important issues need to be resolved. As we have heard today,
    local interests, we are going to hear that, object, and so do
    my two colleagues here, object to the Corps' current plans for
    the replacement of pumps in the New Orleans outfall canal known
    as Option 1. The Corps claims other options will need
    additional study and authorization.
        Could you describe to us why the Corps is proceeding with
    Option 1 and what actions the Corps will take to determine if
    other options are feasible and to determine which option
    provides the greatest protection for New Orleans?
        General Walsh. Ma'am, we have put together a technical
    report that we submitted to Congress in 2007 and we had put
    together a team of both locals and people from academia that
    laid out a number of different options on how to address the
    closure structure. They came up with a number of options for us
    to look at. We have looked at them and there are three options
    that currently----
        Senator Boxer. I am just asking you, why did you pick
    Option 1 and, in the face of all the disagreement, it seems to
    me from the two Senators here and, I do not know about the
    congressional delegation, but it looks unanimous. Plus, the
    community. Do not give the whole history. Explain to me why you
    picked Option 1. Is it because it was the cheapest?
        General Walsh. No, Ma'am----
        Senator Boxer. So what reason?
        General Walsh. We are looking at Option 1 as it meets the
    intent of the authorization and looking at reducing the risk
    due to storm surges.
        Senator Boxer. OK. Well, I am going to let my two
    colleagues go forward on this in a minute. Not yet, David.
    David's ready to go.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Boxer. Just wait. I want to ask a couple of other
    questions. And I am going to give my colleagues more time than
    I have taken because they are the true experts here.
        General Walsh, following the hurricanes of 2005, there was
    a recognition that coastal wetlands work in tandem with levees
    and other infrastructure to provide hurricane protection. There
    was a need to do that. Congress directed the Corps to complete
    a study of how to provide Category 5 hurricane protection that
    includes but structural elements and wetlands restoration. This
    study has not been submitted to Congress, as required. Is this
    the study that is coming to us in August 2009 that you referred
    to?
        General Walsh. Ma'am, we will be submitting it to the
    Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works in August 2009.
        Senator Boxer. When it is going to come here?
        General Walsh. I do not know if I can answer that, Ma'am.
        Senator Boxer. Well, we need an answer because this is a
    very, very critical report dealing with the coastal wetlands.
    So, who is going to make the decision as to when we get to see
    that report?
        General Walsh. The report is being reviewed now by the
    public and by the National Academy of Sciences. We will be
    addressing those comments and sending it back through my office
    and the Chief of Engineers' Office to make sure of its
    technical completeness and then we will be sending it over to
    the Assistant Secretary.
        Senator Boxer. OK. Now, is that the report that you
    referred to when you said we will see a report in 2009, or that
    someone will get a report. Was that the report that you were
    referring to?
        General Walsh. Yes, Ma'am.
        Senator Boxer. OK. Well, why has it been delayed?
        General Walsh. Ma'am, The LACPR----
        Senator Boxer. Do me a favor. Could you say Senator instead
    of Ma'am?
        General Walsh. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Boxer. It is just a thing. I worked so hard to get
    that title, so I would appreciate it. Thank you.
        General Walsh. Yes, Senator. The LACPR is an unprecedented
    and complex study in looking at that much of a coastal area.
    What we looked at was breaking down the 26 coastal parishes
    into five planning units, and we spent a large amount of time
    working with the public and academia on coming up with
    solutions in those five areas. We have gone through one
    National Academy of Science review of that draft report and we
    continue to submit and work with the public and make some
    changes to that report. We have completed that report and left
    about four or five options in each one of the five planning
    units on the way to move forward.
        Senator Boxer. Well, I can just say, these deadlines that
    are asked of you are not just pulled out of the air. There are
    reasons for it. Do you know how long it takes us to make a case
    to our colleagues that we need to take action? We need these
    reports or we are just going to lose time, time, time.
        General Walsh, my last question. I am sure you are happy to
    know. While the Corps has made great progress, I give you that
    for sure, on rebuilding much of the hurricane protection system
    in New Orleans, progress has been significantly slower in
    coastal Louisiana restoration projects that were authorized in
    WRDA, the Water Resources Development Act of 2007. We had
    important milestones required in WRDA, such as establishment of
    a task force to guide restoration and completion of a
    comprehensive restoration plan. That has not begun. Why are
    those projects not moving forward more rapidly and what needs
    to be done to expedite these projects?
        General Walsh. Senator, I think we are talking about LCA
    and we just signed the final four partnership agreement letters
    with the State. We are proceeding forward and should have
    those, at least six of those LCA reports completed by December
    2010.
        Senator Boxer. And you will have that task force appointed
    to guide the restoration? That was a milestone that we laid
    out. We said an establishment of a task force to guide
    restoration and completion of a comprehensive restoration plan.
    Our understanding is that you have not done that, and it is
    2009. We passed this is 2007.
        General Walsh. The recommendation for what to do with that
    task force has been submitted through the Chief's Office and is
    at the Assistant Secretary's Office----
        Senator Boxer. Well, it looks like we are going to have to
    go up a little higher----
        General Walsh. In the timeframe, we have put together a
    science and technology board and we have hired a science and
    technology director to help look at some of the science needed
    to inform those projects as they come due.
        Senator Boxer. Well, we are going to stay on it because
    when we pass a law here we expect the law to be followed. This
    is not a blame thing. It is just that we need to move forward.
    We cannot wait until another disaster strikes. You know, if
    anything I have learned from these two Senators here, and I
    know from my own State of California and Sacramento, you know,
    we do not control Mother Nature. We are trying to, but we had
    better do a better job because no one in this Country wants to
    see so many thousands and hundreds and millions of people be
    dislocated.
        So, here is the thing. I am going to give Senator Vitter 12
    minutes. I am going to give Senator Landrieu 12 minutes. So,
    they can go unimpeded for that long.
        General Walsh. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Vitter. Thanks, Madam Chair, and thank you again
    General for your leadership.
        As I said in my opening statement, I want to focus a lot on
    the outfall canal issues and Pump to the River, which is
    critically important to getting this fixed right.
        Now, I just want to point out. This is greater New Orleans.
    These are the three outfall canals we are talking about. These
    three stars are the breaches in the outfall canals that caused
    most of the catastrophic flooding east of the Industrial Canal.
        Now, General, those walls of the outfall canals were part
    of a Federal Corps-led project, correct?
        General Walsh. Some of those walls were designed and
    constructed by the Corps of Engineers and some were done by the
    local Levee Board.
        Senator Vitter. They were all, either originally or made
    part of, a Federal Corps project, right?
        General Walsh. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Vitter. OK. With about a 70 Federal, 30 local cost
    split. Correct?
        General Walsh. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Vitter. Now, where those breaches occurred, the
    walls have obviously been repaired, correct?
        General Walsh. Yes, sir.
        Senator Vitter. And a completely new, better design was
    used. Is that right?
        General Walsh. That is right.
        Senator Vitter. Where there were not breaches, the walls
    have not been redesigned or rebuilt. Correct?
        General Walsh. That is correct.
        Senator Vitter. So, wherever there is not a breach, which
    is 99 percent of the walls we are talking about, there is the
    same old faulty design that led to the breaches. Is that fair
    to say?
        General Walsh. Design of those walls was based upon a
    standard hurricane coming through. Hurricane Katrina was much
    larger than what the walls were designed for and so what you
    see was the original designs are showing at about 12 to 14 feet
    on what those walls were originally designed for on a standard
    hurricane. We are now looking at something larger than a
    standard hurricane and, therefore, you hear the discussion of a
    water elevation that we have agreed to with the Sewerage and
    Water Board as to where we should allow the water to rise.
        Senator Vitter. OK. So, those walls where it did not breach
    are not being redesigned or not being rebuilt under Option 1.
    Is that correct?
        General Walsh. Right now, Senator, we have an engineer
    study going on and looking at the walls in all three canals
    and----
        Senator Vitter. But under Option 1, which you want to move
    forward with, they would not be redesigned, they would not be
    rebuilt?
        General Walsh. That is right. Yes, sir.
        Senator Vitter. They would be under Option 2?
        General Walsh. They would be redesigned, sir.
        Senator Vitter. And I assume rebuilt? We would not just
    redesign them? We would build them that way?
        General Walsh. Yes, sir.
        Senator Vitter. OK. So, under Option 1, the solution is to
    lower the water level allowed in the canal to a lower ``safe
    water level.'' Is that right?
        General Walsh. Right now, as we have worked with the
    Sewerage and Water Board, certainly with Gustav, they are
    evacuating the rainwater out of the city, they will put it into
    the canal, and it will run freely into Lake Pontchartrain. And
    so, those few times when the water level of the lake gets high
    enough, we will be working with the Sewerage and Water Board,
    we will close the gates and, as they continue to put water into
    the outlets, we will pump that into Lake Pontchartrain.
        Senator Vitter. And you will monitor the water so that it
    is below this new ``safe water level.'' Correct?
        General Walsh. That is correct. And we worked very closely
    with the Sewerage and Water Board. We had our canal captains
    work very closely with the very professional staff that they
    have at the Sewerage and Water Board during Gustav and----
        Senator Vitter. In the case of the 17th Street Canal, that
    ``safe water level'' is seven or eight feet below the top of
    the wall. Is that correct?
        General Walsh. It is seven or eight feet below the top of
    the wall. Yes, sir.
        Senator Vitter. Now, General, just a real sort of common
    sense question. Let us say you hired a carpenter to build a
    bookcase for your home, a tall bookcase, and he builds it and
    moves it into your home. It looked beautiful and you started
    putting books on it. Once you put books above, say, the fourth
    shelf from the floor, it started careening over on you and you
    could not do that. So you called the carpenter up and explained
    the problem and he came into your home and took measurements
    and looked at the design and called in experts. Then a week
    later he said we figured out what is wrong and we figured out
    the solution, and the solution is do not put any books above
    the fourth shelf from the floor. Would that be a satisfying
    answer to you?
        General Walsh. Sir, I would be looking at what the design
    was. Certainly, the 12-foot wall was built and designed off of
    a standard hurricane scenario. What happened was a much larger
    scenario than what we looked at. So during the process, with
    IPET and others, we looked at multiple, thousands of
    hurricanes, that could come into that particular area, which
    would require us to look at that design and reestablish what
    the safe water levels----
        Senator Vitter. Let me just underscore. The safe level is
    seven or eight feet below the top of the wall. Clearly, that is
    diminished capacity from the original design. Clearly, you all
    did not build a wall eight feet higher than you needed to for
    no good reason, right?
        General Walsh. Yes, sir, it was built toward the standard
    hurricane design and not to what we learned after Katrina. And
    certainly we would want to use what we learned from Katrina.
    Again, to use an analogy, it would be taking a bag that could
    hold 12 pounds of apples and then putting 15 in it. What we are
    looking for is not putting 12 into that bag. We are looking at
    putting eight into that bag because we now know that bag can
    only hold eight pounds of apples.
        Senator Vitter. Your August 30, 2007 report to Congress
    asked you to look at these different options and report on
    them. It concluded ``Option 2 is generally more technically
    advantageous and may be more effective operationally over
    Option 1 because it would have greater reliability and further
    reduces risk of flooding.''
        And more recently, just on May 20, 2009, Chris Accardo,
    your Chief of Operations in New Orleans, at a public meeting
    said very forthrightly at the public meeting, ``So when you
    compare Option 1 to Option 2, this is a no brainer, folks. I
    heard one politician after another come up and say they want
    Option 2 over Option 1. Well, that is obvious. We all want
    Option 2 over Option 1.''
        So the Corps, in two different instances, clearly has said
    Option 2 and 2a is better than Option 1. What do we tell the
    residents in the area why you want to move forward with Option
    1?
        General Walsh. Senator, in the same report it shows that
    Option 1 could be more advantageous considering the engineering
    challenge and the construction complexities of Option 2.
        Senator Vitter. OK, to me that means it is cheaper. What am
    I missing?
        General Walsh. What I think it means to me is that it meets
    the criteria in regards to providing perimeter protection to
    what we learned from Katrina.
        Senator Vitter. Do Options 2 and 2a not meet that criteria,
    provide that protection?
        General Walsh. Neither 2 nor 2a provide any additional
    protection from surge.
        Senator Vitter. But they provide a heck of a lot more
    protection from flooding.
        General Walsh. From interior drainage, you may be able to
    get some more benefits out of 2 or 2a. What we are looking at
    from the authorizations and the funding that is set aside for
    it is for storm surge.
        Senator Vitter. Well, I just point out that the initial
    program included the canal walls and that was a Federal program
    under Corps leadership and that was about both. So you cannot
    just ignore one whole side of the equation now.
        General Walsh. And that is why, sir, we established safe
    water elevations in working with our partners so that as they
    evacuate the water out of the city from normal rain events, it
    will pump directly into Lake Pontchartrain.
        Senator Vitter. Now, General, as you know, one of the
    things you all are arguing is that Option 2 and 2a are not
    authorized. I never understood this. I continue not to
    understand this. This is authorization language, the language
    and the only language that Congress passed. And it says the
    relevant part is used to modify the 17th Street, Orleans Avenue
    and London Avenue drainage canals and install pumps and closure
    structures at or near the lakefront. Why does that not describe
    2 as well as it describes 1?
        General Walsh. Sir, I believe we have the authority to do
    the study to see if that is a feasible option, but we are not
    funded to do the study.
        Senator Vitter. This is the authorization language to do
    it. This is the authorization language to actually do the
    permanent fix. My question is: Does this language not cover
    Option 2 just as surely as it covers Option 1?
        General Walsh. We believe that it covers a study but the
    study is not funded.
        Senator Vitter. OK, can you point to the language that says
    that? Because I am missing it. I have read this about 100 times
    and I do not know what you are talking about in terms of study
    does not cover Option 2. I mean, the language is pretty simple
    and I do not understand why it does not cover Option 2.
        General Walsh. Yes, sir, I would have to answer that for
    the record. I am certainly not trained as a lawyer to give you
    that background.
        Senator Vitter. OK. Well, I just point out that, in fact, I
    believe this language covers Option 2 more clearly than it
    covers Option 1 because it says you can modify the drainage
    canal. Right? Option 1 does not modify the drainage canals. You
    just said that a few minutes ago. How does Option 1 modify the
    drainage canals?
        General Walsh. Option 1 is looking at perimeter protection,
    sir.
        Senator Vitter. So, is it not correct that Option 1 does
    not modify the drainage canals?
        General Walsh. Option 1, at this point, does not modify the
    canal, but as I----
        Senator Vitter. Option 2 does modify the drainage canals.
    Correct?
        General Walsh. Option 2 does modify the drainage canal.
        Senator Vitter. The authorization language says modify the
    canals. Now to me, this fits Option 2 better than it fits
    Option 1 because of that word. What am I missing?
        General Walsh. Sir, I would have to have the legal counsel
    give you that discussion.
        Senator Vitter. Well they have and I still do not
    understand it. I went to 3 years of law school and maybe I need
    to go back. But it is useful to focus on the plain language
    and, again, modify is not even a part of Option 1.
        Senator Boxer. Senator Landrieu.
        Senator Landrieu. Thank you. I would like to follow up on
    that excellent line of questioning by Senator Vitter because it
    is not just puzzling, but it is aggravating, frustrating and
    frightening, actually, General, to the people that we represent
    that whether you are a lawyer or not, this is written in pretty
    plain vanilla English. And we are having a hard time
    understanding, as you can just see, why the language that we
    have read and re-read continues to be blocked by the Corps of
    Engineers when clearly the language says that Option 2 is
    legal.
        Now, I think Senator Vitter, in his line of questioning,
    proved that point or as authorized. But let me ask you this
    question. What amount of study funding do you think is standing
    between you and doing Option 2? What is the general amount of
    study funding?
        General Walsh. To study Option 2 or 2a would be about $15.8
    million.
        Senator Landrieu. $15 million to do a study?
        General Walsh. That is correct.
        Senator Landrieu. OK. Now, we are spending $14 billion on a
    project. So, relatively speaking, $15 million would not be that
    much money. But I think that people would argue greatly with
    you that it would cost that much money. But, even if it did,
    even if it did cost $15 million, in light of the billions of
    dollars that we are spending, it might be wise to conduct such
    a study, particularly because we think we have already
    authorized a different approach. Would you agree to that?
        General Walsh. No, Ma'am. I believe that the funding that
    was set aside by Congress was to look at surge----
        Senator Landrieu. I did not ask you that. I said, would you
    oppose additional funding? Let us not get focused on whether it
    is $5 million, or $10 million or $15 million to do the study.
    Would you or the Corps oppose an additional study if it was
    required to try to reach a better option?
        General Walsh. Senator, if it was funded by Congress, we
    would proceed with the study.
        Senator Landrieu. OK. I want to say that I believe the
    language is very clear. And I believe that we have already
    authorized you to choose Option 2. I believe that is very
    clear. But if it is not, Madam Chair, one way forward if it is
    determined ultimately that it is not, one way forward is to
    reauthorize a study, fund it and move past this issue.
        Let me get to the heart of the matter. Senator Vitter used
    the bookcase analogy. I would like to use a brake analogy on an
    automobile. If my family and friends were in a fatal automobile
    accident and it was brought in for review, the automobile, and
    it was told to me that the reason is that the brake system did
    not work, there was something wrong with it, and then the
    company proceeded to install the same brake system in the
    automobile, do you think that I would let one member of my
    family step in that automobile again? I do not think so.
        But that is what you are asking the people of Louisiana and
    South Louisiana. You are just fixing the same system that broke
    in the first place, General. And you are only fixing the parts
    of the canal that broke. There are other parts of the canal
    that were basically at the same level. And that is what has us
    angry and more than befuddled.
        Let me ask you to clarify this. This Committee, as you
    know, that you are testifying before, is responsible for
    climate change issues and regardless of the debate about what
    is causing it, we all know storms are going to intensify and
    levels of sea level are rising. When you said that the people
    of New Orleans were now building a system for the region and
    Jefferson, St. Bernard, Plaquemines and Southeast Louisiana,
    under the system that you plan to build with the money that we
    have given you, there is a 1 percent chance per year. What does
    that mean for someone's lifetime? Can you translate that to
    lifetime, assuming someone lives 80 years? Is that an 80
    percent probability that they are going to be, in their
    lifetime, catastrophically--what is the 1 percent a year?
    Explain that in a lifetime for me.
        General Walsh. Yes, Ma'am, if I could just go back to the
    brake analogy and then I will get to that. Certainly, what we
    have put together in the past was parallel protection for the
    city. What we are looking at now is perimeter protection for
    the city. So, we are putting in a different type of brake
    system to follow the same analogy.
        Senator Landrieu. Well, I do not necessarily agree with
    that, a different kind of brake system. You are putting in the
    same canals. You are basically building, because you testified
    that you are not modifying. You have testified that you are
    basically constructing the same system and you are just hoping
    that the coordination that you might put into place with the
    Sewer and Water Board, or in the process of putting into place,
    works. But if you backed up from it, talk about this 1 percent
    chance in a year. What comfort does that give the people of our
    region, that there will be no catastrophic flooding in
    someone's lifetime?
        General Walsh. Yes, Ma'am, we are putting closures out in
    front of the canals which were not in place prior to--I do not
    know what an 80-year plan is, but I do know roughly what it is
    on a 30-year mortgage and you have a 25 percent chance of
    flooding in a 30-year mortgage. It is 1 percent chance of
    flooding in any given year.
        Senator Landrieu. It is a 25 percent chance on a 30-year
    mortgage. Now, you know that people in St. Bernard Parish have
    lost their homes, in some instances three times in the last 40
    years. So, I am not sure that standard is necessarily accurate
    or something that we would agree with that you have outlined.
    But the point is that we want to build a better, stronger
    system with integrated flood control, not just on our canals,
    but the interior drainage of this low-lying area. And the
    coastal restoration that is necessary to protect people from
    catastrophic flooding.
        So, you have testified that the language for the option
    that we choose is language that will modify according to what
    our language says in this document here, and you have testified
    that you would not oppose the funding of a study if it came to
    that issue. Is that correct?
        General Walsh. That is correct, Ma'am.
        Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
        General Walsh. And as we proceed with Option 1, we are
    looking at putting in adaptable features, a heavier foundation,
    a lower sill, so that if there is an opportunity for Congress
    to do something in the future, it will not frustrate those
    changes in the future.
        Senator Landrieu. Let me just, as I have a few minutes
    left, I just want to go over this particular point again
    because this has been what has frustrated our delegation. Your
    staff has indicated that the Corps lacks the authorization to
    implement Options 2 and 2a. Would you specify the exact
    legislative language that is missing?
        General Walsh. Ma'am, I will have to add that for the
    record and have our folks who work on legislative language
    submit that.
        Senator Landrieu. OK. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Boxer. Thank you. Before I take it back to Senator
    Vitter, I have given him another 5 minutes and you, Senator
    Landrieu if you want additional time. Senator Udall, would you
    like to make a comment or two?
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Madam Chair, very much. I just
    wanted to come by and support my colleague, Senator Landrieu,
    on her efforts here. I know that she is very interested in
    seeing that restoration is done in such a way that it is
    environmentally sensitive and takes into consideration all of
    the industries in the area.
        I toured this area when I was in the House with
    Representative Toussaint, who is very familiar with the
    problems down there. We spent several days, flew over the area
    in a helicopter and got to see things on the ground also. So I
    know that we have some real, real serious issues.
        I have had several visits with my good friend, Mary
    Landrieu, and I know she takes this very seriously. General
    Walsh, I hope that I can be here for all of your testimony but
    I have got a couple of other things to do. I hope that I will
    be able to get back. But I wanted to say I think this is an
    important hearing and it is something that I know that she has
    worked hard at. And I think part of this has to do, Senator
    Landrieu, does it not, with your trip that you just took to The
    Netherlands with the Staff Director, trying to collect
    information and see what the best way is to tackle this
    problem, looking for solutions that are out there.
        So with that, thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Landrieu. Well, I appreciate that. And I want to
    say, not to take up too much more time, but the attention that
    members of this Committee, Madam Chair, have given, both
    Democrats and Republicans as well, has been so encouraging to
    the people of our State because we do not think that this is
    just about Louisiana. We think this is about looking for a new
    engineering model that will work for the whole Country, of
    which we happen to be basically the canaries in the mine at
    this particular point.
        It is only going to be a matter of time until a major storm
    hits Florida or some catastrophic flooding occurs in California
    and I am waiting for the Corps of Engineers to get to the point
    where they admit that the model that we have, Senator, is not
    sufficient in any way to protect people from catastrophic
    flooding in this Nation. Thank you for being here.
        Senator Boxer. OK, so we are going to close this panel by
    asking Senator Vitter to ask his remaining questions. Then we
    will move on and hear from the people of New Orleans.
        Senator Vitter. Thanks, Madam Chair.
        General, you said in your statement that all of your
    important work in South Louisiana has gone through extensive
    peer review and similar review. Has the analysis of Option 1
    versus Option 2 and 2a gone through any sort of outside peer
    review?
        General Walsh. Yes, sir. As we were putting together the
    report that we submitted to Congress in 2007, it goes through
    the evaluation process and the methods that we are looking at
    and getting multiple comments from many different people. Then
    we put together a senior review panel that looked at the
    documents in 2007. That senior peer review had members not only
    from the Corps of Engineers, but we had members from academia
    and six members from private architect-engineer firms. Many
    folks provided input to this report.
        Senator Vitter. So, presumably, they validated the
    comparative analysis I referenced a few minutes ago?
        General Walsh. As I understand your question, yes. Yes,
    sir.
        Senator Vitter. OK. Go back to this frustrating
    authorization, General. You all are now modifying Option 1 to
    lower the sills, to do other things that would be required if
    Option 2 is built in the future. Correct?
        General Walsh. We are reviewing that, yes, sir.
        Senator Vitter. The Corps has told me that is the new
    Option 1, that Option 1 is modified for that. My question is
    simple. If you do not have the authority to do all of Option 2,
    how do you have authority to do part of Option 2 which is
    modifying the sills and doing what you are talking about doing
    to be consistent with Option 2? Because that is not necessary
    for Option 1.
        General Walsh. Sir, what we are looking at is for Option 1
    to protect the city from perimeter protection and surge.
        Senator Vitter. Right, but the modifications I am talking
    about would only be required for Option 2. So how do you not
    have authority for Option 2, but have authority to do that,
    which is part of Option 2?
        General Walsh. Sir, the Chief has some minor discretionary
    authority to make those changes.
        Senator Vitter. OK. To me, that means because you all can
    do what you want. In terms of the dollars, you have also said
    you have only been given the dollars to do Option 1. Did
    Congress not give you the dollars, the Corps and the then Bush
    administration, asked for?
        General Walsh. Yes, sir.
        Senator Vitter. And the Corps did not say, Congress you
    have a choice. Option 1 costs this much. Option 2 costs this
    much. The Corps said, we want these dollars.
        General Walsh. What we were looking for is to provide
    perimeter protection again surge. Yes, sir.
        Senator Vitter. I am just pointing out that when you say
    you only have the money to do Option 1, it is because you only
    asked for the money to do Option 1. There was no discussion
    with this Committee or Congress about those choices. Certainly,
    serving on this Committee, if I had understood at the time that
    your position 2 years later would be this authorization, this
    money, excludes Option 2, I would have thrown a fit. But there
    was no discussion about that. I just put that for the record.
        Finally, Pump to the River is a very important component of
    all of this. That is the a of 2a. It would send a lot of
    important drainage that goes into the 17th Street Canal in a
    whole other direction so we do not impact and further stress
    the 17th Street Canal. Is that a fair statement? A fair
    description?
        General Walsh. As I understand it, yes, Senator.
        Senator Vitter. Well, this is a statement, not a question.
    I think that is very reasonable, given that we are artificially
    lowering the capacity of the outfall canals with this safe
    water level. We are saying that the water cannot be allowed to
    get above seven feet lower than the top of the wall, which is
    way lower than what it was built for. So, would it not be
    reasonable, in light of that, to build a supplementary project
    like Pump to the River that sends some volume of water in
    another direction to compensate for that lowering of capacity?
        General Walsh. Right now, Senator, the Sewerage and Water
    Board pumps the water out of the city for rain events and
    tropical events. We do not need to close the gates and provide
    perimeter protection unless Lake Pontchartrain gets within one
    foot of the safe water elevation. That did happen in Gustav and
    Ike, and we sent our canal captains to work with them and we
    were able to provide just the right amount, or more than the
    right amount, of coordination to make that happen.
        Senator Vitter. General, let me just end with a statement.
    Again, my big overarching concern is that we could be repeating
    a grave mistake of history.
        After Hurricane Betsy, all of us moved forward and built a
    protection system that was the cheapest but not the best. And
    we disregarded the Wrigley's--[phonetically]-protection system
    that would have prevented water from coming into the lake and
    we built this system instead. I do not want to repeat that
    mistake of building something because it is cheaper, but not
    better.
        And again, in this regard, Chris Accardo of the Corps
    agrees with me. He said at that May 20, 2009 public hearing,
    referring to that previous episode in the 1950s and 1960s,
    ``That is why you do not have it place today. And if you would
    have had it in place for Katrina, you would not have had the
    mess that we have.'' So, that is what I want to avoid for the
    future.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Boxer. OK. Well, Senator Vitter's questioning has
    brought some other questions to our Senator Landrieu. So, why
    do you not take 5 minutes?
        Senator Landrieu. Thank you. It will really only be 2
    minutes.
        Are you aware that in expert testimony before the Courts,
    General, on the issue of damage related to the storm, that it
    has been identified that there was $40 billion worth of damage
    caused by the failure of this system?
        General Walsh. I am not familiar with that.
        Senator Landrieu. Well, the record will reflect that, and
    perhaps it may be in the testimony, but $40 billion of
    additional damage was created by the failure of this levee
    system. So, when Senator Vitter and I keep pressing for the
    best project, this is why. We cannot afford another $40 billion
    or $50 billion or $80 billion mistake. Pinching pennies to be
    penny wise but pound foolish is the point here.
        I just want to ask the final question. You say you talked
    with the Sewage and Water Board. We are at a point, middle of
    the storm, storm surge, perimeter protection, the gates come
    down. What amount of flooding do you think is acceptable in the
    city?
        Have you talked with the Sewage and Water Board about the
    rain event? How much rain can be absorbed when your gates are
    closed for your perimeter? Do you know that? Can you testify on
    that to the record? Is it two feet in Broadmoor or is it five
    feet in Broadmoor? Or is it three feet in Mid-City? How much
    rain can we absorb with your gates closed if the storm sits
    over the city as it has not done in either Katrina or Gustav
    but it has done in other lifetime in other storms?
        General Walsh. Senator, the pumps are built so they can
    handle the water as the city pumps it out.
        Senator Landrieu. Currently. At any level of rainfall?
        General Walsh. Yes, Ma'am.
        Senator Landrieu. OK. I am looking forward to the
    testimony, Madam Chair, of the next panel because that is the
    issue here. With the canals closed under this plan and a storm
    sitting over the city dropping heavy rainfall, Orleans and
    Jefferson, which is about 1 million people roughly, close to 1
    million people, are at risk of catastrophic flooding not from
    the perimeter, but from the rain internal flooding, which is
    what we are trying to point out here in this testimony.
        I thank the Chair. She has been very gracious. And thank
    you, General, for agreeing to stay because I think it is
    important for you to hear this next panel.
        Senator Boxer. General, I want to thank you. I know this
    has not been very pleasant but, again, I have to say the Corps
    works so hard. But I get frustrated sometimes because you have
    a turnover and one individual finally learns everything, like
    today you learned about the $40 billion in damages. That is an
    important piece of information because that should drive what
    we spend to fix this.
        It does not make any sense, it seems to me, to choose an
    option that is like $1 billion instead of $2 billion, I am just
    throwing a number out, when you could spend $1 billion and have
    $40 billion worth of damages and spend $2 billion and not have
    any damage. I am just pointing this out.
        And I think my colleagues have used very important
    examples, the carpenter example and the brakes example. You
    know, fool me once, OK, but do not fool us twice here. I do not
    mean you personally. I mean the Corps as an institution has got
    to work with us. And I just would beg you to, at some point,
    think about this. We need to know if you are picking, and I
    believe you are picking, an option because it is less money. I
    do believe that. I really do believe that.
        We are all in a terrible bind here because we have so much
    of a problem with our budget, with our debt. But we have to be
    honest. Look, if you told us that and we decided that is all we
    can do, then it is on us. But it is so hard for me to accept
    the fact that this option, in light of what I have been told by
    my colleagues who have nothing to gain by having to push us for
    more money, this is their worst nightmare in the world. They
    have had to push so hard. They do not want to.
        But if they, and the next panel, and again you are very
    gracious to stay, if they are really clear on it, all I can say
    is do not rush to fund an inadequate project. I am concerned.
    Senator Vitter has said you may be in the process of signing
    some agreements to move forward with this. That is a terrible
    idea.
        I would think that you would think enough of this
    Committee, these colleagues here, and the community, as well as
    the congressionals, to at least take a pause here and take
    another look. If I have a message for you, even before hearing
    the panel, it is that. Do not rush to undertake the expenditure
    of a lot of funds that might not be adequate for the task.
        So, I know it has not been a very pleasant experience for
    you but I am appreciative of your time and appreciative that
    you will stay.
        With that, we will call up our panel. Jeff Jacobs, Scholar,
    National Research Council, Committee on New Orleans Regional
    Hurricane Protection. Steven Peyronnin, I know I did not say
    that right. Did say that badly? How do I pronounce it?
    Executive Director, Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana. Dr.
    Robert Twilley, Vice Chancellor of Research and Economic
    Development, Professor, Department of Oceanography and Coastal
    Sciences, Louisiana State University. Joseph Rault, President,
    Rault Resources Group of New Orleans, Executive Committee Board
    Member, Pump to the River. Thomas L. Jackson, Commissioner and
    Past President, Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection
    Authority--East, retired civil engineer and Past National
    President of the American Society of Civil Engineers.
        Let me just say, this is quite an amazing panel. Because we
    went so long with our first panel, but I think, I am sure you
    appreciate the fact that we did in order to get to the bottom
    of all of these issues, my own schedule means that I need to
    leave. I will try to stay for as many as I can hear. I am going
    to hand the gavel, when I leave, over to Senator Vitter and he
    can run this and include Senator Landrieu. I think with the two
    of you Senators here, we should be able to get a lot of
    clarity.
        So, why do we not start with Jeff and we will go right
    through this way. OK?
        Go ahead, Jeff Jacobs.

    STATEMENT OF JEFFREY JACOBS, SCHOLAR, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
    AND STUDY DIRECTOR, COMMITTEE ON NEW ORLEANS REGIONAL HURRICANE
                          PROTECTION PROJECTS

        Mr. Jacobs. Good afternoon, Madam Chair, members of the
    Committee, and others.
        My name is Jeffrey Jacobs. I am a Scholar with the National
    Research Council and I served as the Study Director for the
    National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council's
    Committee on New Orleans Regional Hurricane Protection
    Projects. The Council is the operating arm of the National
    Academy, which operates under an 1863 congressional charter to
    provide independent advice to the Federal Government on
    scientific and technical matters.
        Our committee was convened in December 2005 at the request
    of Mr. J.P. Woodley, then-Assistant Secretary of the Army for
    Civil Works, to review reports from the Interagency Performance
    Evaluation Task Force, or IPET. The IPET was established by the
    Corps of Engineers to evaluate the performance of the New
    Orleans hurricane protection system during Hurricane Katrina.
        Our committee's fifth and final report was issued in April
    2009 and it reviewed the IPET draft final report and also
    commented on lessons learned during Hurricane Katrina. My
    comments this afternoon summarize those lessons as identified
    in our report.
        One lesson regards the limits of protective structures.
    Hurricane Katrina illustrated undue optimism about the ability
    of structures such as levees and floodwalls to provide absolute
    flood protection. Post-Katrina strengthening of the system has
    reduced some vulnerabilities but the risks of inundation and
    flooding in New Orleans never can be fully eliminated by
    protective structures.
        Another lesson regards the future footprint of the
    hurricane protection system. Many reconstruction activities
    apparently are taking place largely according to the system's
    pre-Katrina footprint, without consideration of whether this
    configuration is optimal. We recommend that there should at
    least be some discussions of the pros and cons of different
    configurations of protective structures.
        Another lesson regards relocations. Regardless of future
    levee construction, it likely will not be possible to provide
    equal levels of flood protection across the city. Plans for
    system upgrades should discourage settlement in areas most
    vulnerable to hurricane storm surge, and voluntary relocation
    of people and neighborhoods out of particularly vulnerable
    areas should be considered as a public policy option.
        Another lesson regards flood proofing. Where it is not
    feasible to relocate people and buildings out of vulnerable
    areas, significant improvements in flood proofing will be
    essential. To provide adequate protection against flooding in
    vulnerable areas, we recommend that the first floor of houses
    be elevated to at least the height associated with the 100-year
    storm event.
        Another lesson regards the 100-year level of flood
    protection. The 100-year flood defines areas with a 1 percent
    chance of flooding. Each year, it is a crucial national flood
    insurance standard. For areas where levee failure is not a
    major safety concern, the 100-year standard may be appropriate
    for developing regulations and setting insurance rates.
        However, for heavily populated urban areas where failure of
    protective structures would be catastrophic, such as New
    Orleans, the 100-year standard is inadequate. By comparison,
    the Association of State Floodplain Managers recommends that
    the 500-year flood be used as a minimum safety standard for
    urban areas.
        Another lesson regards evacuation. Although the disaster
    response plan for New Orleans successfully evacuated much of
    the city before Katrina, it was inadequate. Future plans should
    consider options such as improved local and regional shelters
    to make evacuations less imposing and locating facilities for
    the ill and elderly away from more vulnerable areas subject to
    frequent evacuations.
        Another lesson regards risk communication. Before Katrina,
    there unfortunately was a limited appreciation of the risk
    associated with living behind levees. Risks posed by hurricanes
    and storm surge to New Orleans should be more consistently and
    effectively communicated to residents and decisionmakers.
        And a final lesson from our report regards periodic
    assessment and independent review. The level of protection
    provided by the New Orleans hurricane protection system has
    changed over the years because of factors such as geologic
    subsidence. It thus is important to conduct regular assessments
    that evaluate environmental and other factors that affect
    system performance. It also is important to provide an
    independent, second opinion of major engineering and design
    plans to help ensure that calculations are reliable and methods
    employed are appropriate.
        The post-Katrina setting poses many challenges and open
    questions. There is no model for post-hurricane recovery for
    New Orleans. Building a protection system to higher standards
    and making wise choices about future development should help
    create a safer city. But there is no clear agreement about the
    path forward.
        What does seem clear, however, is that information
    regarding the risk of hurricane storm surge and damages to New
    Orleans should be more widely acknowledged and appreciated than
    in the past and accorded a higher priority in future
    development plans and decisions.
        Madam Chair and members of the Committee, that concludes my
    remarks. I thank you for inviting me to speak with you today. I
    would be happy to discuss questions you may have about our
    committee's report.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Jacobs follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Boxer. Thank you very much. I am going to amend
    what I said before, just because I am very interested in this
    Pump to the River issue. Mr. Rault, would you mind going next?
    And then we will go to Steve.

    STATEMENT OF JOSEPH M. RAULT, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE BOARD MEMBER,
                           PUMP TO THE RIVER

        Mr. Rault. Thank you very much, Madam Chair and
    distinguished Members of the Committee. It is really a pleasure
    to be here on behalf of the citizens of New Orleans and
    Jefferson, particularly with the widespread catastrophic
    problems caused by the breaches of the 17th Street Canal.
        My name is Joseph Rault. I am a native of New Orleans. I am
    representing a non-profit citizens group of 100,00 people who
    live in the Hoey's Basin as pointed out by Senator Vitter on
    the chart up front, 85,000 of which are in Orleans Parish or
    County, and 15,000 of which are in adjoining Jefferson Parish
    or County.
        We have 24 neighborhood groups who are listed on the map in
    the back of my testimony and, Madam Chair, I would like to ask
    that my written testimony be introduced in the record.
        Senator Boxer. Without objection. So ordered.
        Mr. Rault. Thank you so much.
        These 100,000 people are from all walks of life and all of
    them suffered tremendous problems.
        I am a graduate of MIT, for my background. I attended
    Georgetown Law here in Washington. I graduated from Tulane Law
    in New Orleans. I served in the United States Navy from 1943
    until 1946 and ended up as the commander of the USS LCI 549 at
    the Bikini atomic bomb test. I am a private businessman. I own
    my own business in medium high-rise development of office
    buildings, two of which are in Jefferson Parish.
        I have met over the last 3 years with the Corps at all of
    their partnering meetings, as described by the General. At
    every one of them where there were stakeholders involved, Pump
    to the River, Option 2 and Option 1 were all discussed and at
    each one, the consensus was that Option 2 was the way to go and
    Option 2a, known as Pump to the River, was an acceptable option
    and should be explored.
        My wife and I lived in Jefferson Parish for the last 30
    years. We raised our children and our grandchildren in a very
    happy environment. We lost our home, as did thousands of
    others. We want to restore that area. And speaking for that
    100,000 people, really representing the million people in the
    combined area, we would like to move forward.
        What did those people do? They immediately got on their
    horse and looked at all options and whether they could find a
    solution so we could go forward. And that was in the Corps' own
    record, where shortly after the storm the Corps engaged a study
    by DMJM Harris Company. And what did it say? This was just
    months after the storm. It said Pump to the River was a
    feasible option and should be explored.
        From that point on, we, the citizens in Jefferson Parish
    and Orleans, agreed to engage private engineers who came,
    verified, studied and saw that this was a real option.
        What is Pump to the River? As Senator Vitter said, it is
    very simple. You build a pipeline to the close-by Mississippi
    River, add a pump, and take the water from the source of where
    it is collecting in the lowest part of the basin. What does it
    do? It would take 25 percent of the water out of the 17th
    Street Canal system and would cost very competitively by the
    Corps' own statements, $205 million.
        They have linked a to 2, but it is an independent, self-
    standing project that could be done with or without any other
    support. But I want to make it clear, we do support Option 2
    for the safety of the people. The advantage of this is that
    $205 million is only 6 percent of what the Corps is going to
    spend on the pumps at the mouth. The $205 million is only 20
    percent of what Option 2 would be. By reducing the water volume
    in the 17th Street Canal, this would be a significant, a
    significant, saving in any alterations and expenditures to the
    canal under Option 2.
        Similarly, this would reduce the costs of the pumps at the
    mouth of the canal at the Lake Pontchartrain side because there
    would be less water to handle at that end. And the most
    important part, as Senator Vitter pointed out and Senator
    Landrieu concurred, it is safer. It would simply take the water
    out of the system and avoid the huge risk of the collapse of
    the walls again. Again, this is independent system. It is not
    dependent on any other system.
        With due respect to the General's comments about storm
    surge, while it is nice to say that we are going to do the sill
    deep enough to accommodate either 1 or 2, this is not just
    about storm surge, it is about hurricane protection, whether it
    is from storms, storm surge, heavy rain, lightning, whatever
    might cause flooding to the citizens of that area.
        Now, who is for this? Everyone in the State unanimously is
    with this. The State of Louisiana, the city of New Orleans, the
    City Council of New Orleans, represented here by Joe Sherman,
    Jefferson Parish, represented here by Councilman John Young who
    has handed me resolutions that I would like put in the record
    from Jefferson Parish, and from the Regional Planning
    Commission of seven Parishes, that is seven counties,
    supporting Pump to the River and supporting 2 or 2a.
        May I have permission----
        Senator Boxer. Yes. Absolutely. Put it in the record. And
    if you could finish in the next minute or so.
        Mr. Rault. Thank you very much. I appreciate, Madam Chair--

        Senator Boxer. No, you are doing great. You are doing just
    fine.
        Mr. Rault. Who is against this? Nobody. The Corps has
    admitted, as Senator Vitter pointed out twice, once in writing
    in the 2007 report and again 3 weeks ago when Mr. Accardo
    voluntarily said it to a group of 400 people who were there to
    protest what the Corps was doing. I was one of them and my ears
    almost fell off when I heard it. And here today are other
    members of our committee who similarly were there: Lisa Ludwig,
    our project manager, John Baus, Joe Sharman and Dr. Shirley
    Laska of UNO, who prepared one of these.
        So, in conclusion, I can only say, Madam Chair and members
    of the Committee, thank you for seeing us. Pump to the River is
    the answer. In addition to Option 2, the safety is obvious. It
    is a stand-alone project. It can be done for a very competitive
    price of $205 million and it does not have to be bundled into
    any of the other options. It can stand alone and start
    immediately.
        We need help now, today, and not over an 8- or 10-year
    period as was suggested by the Corps as it might take for 2,
    which I seriously question. I also seriously question their
    estimate of the cost.
        Finally, the flood insurance claims paid by the U.S.
    Government in this area alone were $4.2 billion. Pump to the
    River is only 20 percent of that. It would pay for itself over
    and over again, not to mention the redundancy of all of the
    problems from the private insurance companies and so forth.
        Last, the biggest hospital in the area, Ochsner, is in this
    area and would be accommodated in its security and safety
    during a storm.
        Thank you so much for this opportunity on behalf of the
    100,000 people.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rault follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Rault.
        I just want to take a personal privilege here as the Chair
    to say how much I appreciate our witnesses today, particularly
    Mr. Rault. Because I have to leave, I wanted to say that I have
    been having cross conversations with my two colleagues here.
    Having lived through so many floods in my area, a lot of folks
    say hey, why is Senator Boxer so interested? Because I
    understand what is at stake here.
        One of the first things I did when I was a member of the
    House, a long time ago, is to work on getting an appropriate
    flood control project for, believe it or not, a creek that
    would overflow to such a degree that it would absolutely flood
    many, many, many houses. Sometimes we actually had to have
    people evacuate to their rooftops. That is true. I remember
    that once. That was when I was on the County Board of
    Supervisors. So I get what water can do, what water can do.
        I am so persuaded that this Pump to the River project makes
    sense that I have asked my colleagues to work with me. We may
    not be able to wait for the next Water Resources Development
    Act. We may just have to go to our colleagues on the Committee
    and say, this is an urgent need. I think between Senator Vitter
    and myself, and Senator Landrieu, we can cover the Committee
    and see what they think about this. I am very worried that we
    are going to miss an opportunity here to authorize something
    that seems to make a lot of sense.
        I would just ask you, Mr. Rault, if you, working with my
    colleagues and the members of the community, would you see that
    the Committee gets copies of any studies that have been done
    that you are aware on Pump to the River? Studies either by the
    cities, the counties, and the flood control districts, all of
    the various agencies, the citizens. Do you have some of those?
        Senator Vitter. Madam Chair, actually Joe gave me a list of
    seven of exactly what you are talking about to submit to the
    record.
        Senator Boxer. Good. We have those in the record, so we
    will read those. But it seems to me if we can move forward with
    seven studies behind us with an authorization, and then have
    some hearings on it to just flesh it out further, and get our
    colleagues to go with us, I think we can persuade them. And
    then, of course, Senator Landrieu goes to her magic committee,
    the Appropriations Committee, and tries to get the thing
    moving.
        It just seems to me to make so much sense that if you are
    pumping everything into this lake, it is just common sense that
    if there is another place to put it that is deeper and wider
    and broader, then let us do that. We have got to get rid of the
    water and get rid of it fast.
        Look, obviously I respect the Corps. But I would like to
    say to the good General, without asking him to take the
    microphone again because the poor guy has done enough of that,
    if you would please respond to me in writing as to the Corps'
    view on the Pump to the River Project. If you could write to us
    about what you think the consensus is on that project.
        Here is the thing. I think Mr. Rault makes the case. It is
    a stand alone. So, this other fight over 1 and 2 goes on. But
    this, to me, it seems to me that we could do this and it does
    not do damage to our other discussion on Options 1 or 2 or 2a,
    or b or c or d.
        Mr. Rault. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I offered the seven
    engineering reports and other studies for the record and the
    engineers are ready to roll.
        Senator Boxer. Well, that is good. And at this point, I am
    going to hand the gavel over to my colleague. You know, there
    is a lot of trust in this, Senator Vitter, because Lord knows
    what you could do with me out of the room on other issues.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Boxer. So, this is just for the purpose of this
    hearing. It is not for the purpose of writing global warming
    legislation, or Clean Air Act amendments. I have your word.
        I have really, frankly, learned so much from the people of
    your State and I have such respect for them and admiration for
    them and friendship with them. So, I hope you will consider me
    part of your team as we move forward.
        I know that things are going to get better. The reason is
    that you have people who are hearing you, are listening to you
    and you also have within your community the intelligence and
    the drive to save what James Carville says is a very special
    culture. And we in America cannot afford to lose that culture,
    that tradition, that history. And as long as I am Chairman of
    this Committee, you are not going to lose it. We are going to
    work very hard to get this done.
        I thank you and I will run on to my other meetings because
    California calls. I will turn the gavel over to my friend,
    Senator Vitter.
        Senator Vitter [presiding]. Thank you, Madam Chair, and you
    certainly have my commitment about the gavel today. We look
    forward to working with you, in the very near future, along the
    lines you have outlined. I would just suggest that we include
    in that clarification because I honestly do not think that this
    is anything new, that 2 is covered just as surely as 1, and
    then leave it up to the appropriators and others to study both.
        Thank you very much. Thank you for all your leadership.
        And now we will go back to the order and Mr. Steven
    Peyronnin.

       STATEMENT OF STEVEN PEYRONNIN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
                 COALITION TO RESTORE COASTAL LOUISIANA

        Mr. Peyronnin. On behalf of the members and partners of the
    Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, I thank you very much
    for the opportunity to be here today.
        I am sure it will come as no surprise to the members of
    this Committee that in the past 75 years, coastal Louisiana has
    lost more than 2,300 miles of coastal wetlands and that,
    without immediate and decisive action, Louisiana could
    potentially lose an additional 800 square miles by the year
    2050.
        Decades of science and planning have made it clear that we
    possess the scientific, technical and engineering expertise to
    restore sustainability to this landscape, and at the same time
    enhance reliable hurricane protection. What is lacking is a
    clear sense of urgency to pursue the projects, the plans and
    the tools authorized by Congress in the LCA.
        The LCA authorized the construction of five initial
    projects recommended in the Chief of Engineers report because
    of their advanced investigations and the ability to implement
    them expeditiously. Despite the clear path articulated in the
    authorization, only one project is scheduled to begin
    construction prior to 2012.
        Under the LCA, Congress also authorized the development and
    delivery of a comprehensive restoration plan by January 2008.
    This plan has not been initiated.
        Among the most critical elements of the restoration plan
    were the requirements for specific, measurable success criteria
    and a prioritized list of projects. Many scientists agree that
    it is not possible to restore the landscape of coastal
    Louisiana to historic conditions. This leads to the critical
    question of exactly how much of Louisiana's coast can be
    restored and which areas are the most essential?
        Without the most basic understanding of what a successful
    program should achieve, and what elements or projects are the
    most important, it is nearly impossible to prioritize limited
    resources to implement an effective and efficient program.
        Without a restoration plan, there is no framework for
    integrating restoration projects with storm protection
    projects. Despite technical modeling that indicates that the
    existing coastal landscape reduces storm surge, the Corps of
    Engineers has not analyzed how expanded restoration efforts
    would enhance hurricane protection.
        Without a restoration plan, there also is no framework for
    integrating restoration projects with navigation activities.
    Under the current management priorities for the Mississippi
    River, levees harness the river to prevent flooding and then
    funnel the trapped sediment beyond the continental shelf to
    maintain navigation. The result is the elimination of
    desperately needed sediment and fresh water from the
    surrounding ecosystem, exposing river levees to the full brunt
    of storms and hurricanes.
        This narrow management focus has created a system that is
    not sustainable. Recognizing restoration as an equal priority
    is not simply a matter of economic incentive or public safety.
    It is a matter of maintaining the sustainability of the entire
    lower river system.
        Comprehensive restorations will have implications that
    expand across the missions and capacities of multiple Federal
    agencies. The LCA authorization addressed this in two ways.
    First, by requiring the comprehensive plan to describe the role
    of other Federal and State agencies in a long-term restoration
    program, and second by establishing a task force of Federal and
    State entities to make recommendations and contribute financial
    support.
        With neither a comprehensive plan nor a task force in
    place, the Federal resources concentrated in coastal Louisiana
    are often disconnected and isolated. The result has been a
    segmented process that lacks critical input and resources from
    multiple agencies, negating the full leverage of a coordinated
    Federal effort.
        The LCA authorization created a number of tools, as I have
    described, for pushing forward with a programmatic restoration
    plan. The Corps has not used these tools, and has instead
    relied on a traditional project development process that is
    ill-suited to urgently respond to this crisis.
        The hurricanes of 2005 demonstrated that we cannot wait
    until after a disaster to insist on accountability. Scientists
    estimate that restoration efforts in coastal Louisiana have
    less than a decade before our chances of success are
    significantly reduced.
        Accountability simply must be a perpetual element of any
    effective program. But accountability must be balanced with the
    capacity to succeed. Given the shear scope and complexity of
    comprehensive restoration in coastal Louisiana, we must
    recognize that a true commitment will constitute the largest
    ecosystem restoration ever in the world.
        The issue before this Committee today has been described as
    the most preventable environmental crisis in America. Without a
    strong sense of urgency and commitment, we face the almost
    certain collapse of the largest delta on this continent, taking
    with it the very heart and soul of Louisiana.
        I thank you for your time to be here today and I welcome
    any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Peyronnin follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Vitter. Thank you very much, sir. Now we will here
    from Dr. Robert Twilley, who is a professor with the Department
    of Oceanography and Coastal Sciences at LSU.
        Thank you, Doctor.

       STATEMENT OF ROBERT R. TWILLEY, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF
     OCEANOGRAPHY AND COASTAL SCIENCES, VICE CHANCELLOR, RESEARCH
          AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY

        Mr. Twilley. Thank you very much. I appreciate this
    opportunity of lending some comments to the Committee on the
    Environment and Public Works.
        Let me start out just by saying that the sustainability of
    coastal Louisiana, as we have been hearing here today, is
    critical to the Nation. However, this is not just a Louisiana
    issue. The challenges facing the Gulf Coast reflect a national
    inability to come to grips with the need to deal with neglected
    infrastructure, both natural and built, and the realization
    that both of these natural and built environments provide
    security to coastal communities and to the Nation. It will not
    be possible to protect and restore coastal Louisiana without
    significant changes in the way the Federal and State
    governments deal with these issues.
        It is alarming that, even though the Nation's largest port
    and energy complex, a metropolitan area of 1 million residents,
    and coastal wetlands of immense value are at risk, that funds
    to support the restoration and protection of coastal Louisiana
    have been slow in coming. And I want to offer three major
    points around that theme.
        First, we have to, and it is urgent that, we devote our
    attention to finding solutions. There is much interest in
    solutions in the Gulf Coast that have been proposed by the
    Dutch in their efforts to protect The Netherlands. There are a
    couple of key points that the Dutch have learned that nearly
    three centuries of trying to live in a region largely below sea
    level that are relevant to our national priorities here in the
    United States.
        First and foremost, civil engineering has been replaced by
    the principles of ecological engineering. Working with nature
    is a first principle of the new Dutch system. The Dutch have
    learned that shortening the coast using hardened structures,
    such as barriers which disrupt the natural hydrology, can have
    major adverse environmental impacts. This includes the
    realities of how a changing climate must be part of any new
    design features.
        Second, water quality issues can limit the sustainable
    solutions to more comprehensive water management. Thus,
    strategies to reduce nutrients have to be in concert with water
    management solutions.
        The Gulf Coast region has been attempting to deal with
    similar comprehensive approaches to watershed management,
    recognizing that the problems of Southern Louisiana are not
    solely those of our State.
        First, sediment required to replenish the wetlands will
    come down the Mississippi River and much of the original
    sediment load of the Mississippi is trapped behind major dams
    in the Missouri River system. Thus, a more comprehensive
    approach to sediment buffers is required.
        Second, a major dead zone, an area where marine life is
    stressed because of lack of oxygen, now exists in the Gulf of
    Mexico along Louisiana and parts of Texas as a result of
    excessive nutrients traveling the Mississippi from the farmland
    of the Midwest. Although sediments are critical to rebuilding
    the wetlands of the Mississippi River Delta, additional
    nutrients flowing through the river divergent structures could
    potentially impair inland waters of the State, shutting down
    our most critical strategy of restoring the Mississippi River
    Delta. Therefore, we must find practices and political will to
    reduce nutrients to the Gulf Coast hypoxic zone.
        Third, the specter of climate change is adding to the
    coastal and water management challenges. Existing projects will
    have to be modified to accomplish the purposes for which they
    originally were designed and additional attention will be
    required to deal with the already significant strain on
    recovering ecosystems.
        Only through rethinking how we manage the Mississippi
    River, not only to provide for navigation and flood control but
    also as a critical source of sediments to stabilize the
    degrading wetlands, will restoration be realized in a 100-year
    project cycle given the projected rates of sea level rise.
        To do this, we have to urgently look for ways to fund these
    solutions. The largest source of funds for dealing with major
    water projects is found in the budget of the Corps.
    Unfortunately, priority setting is tied to a rudderless system
    for allocating Federal funds and assessing national needs.
        Is it difficult to justify a national priority when
    objectives at the national level are not clear? Developing on a
    needs assessment is dependent upon national policies that are
    perfectly defined national goals for water use. Whom do we
    protect from flooding? What infrastructure is at risk? What
    losses and risks are most valuable to the economic, ecological
    and social well-being of this Nation? How important are our
    ports to the economy of this Country?
        Recent National Research Council studies of the Corps'
    planning process and projects have indicated that the Corps is
    faced with conflicting laws and regulations that make
    prioritization and description needs difficult to manage.
        I will end with what I find to be one of the most important
    parts of this issue which is that not only do we have to find
    solutions, not only do we have to fund solutions, we have to
    coordinate solutions. In the past, the United States
    successfully established processes that deal with challenges of
    developing priorities and funding to deal with water issues of
    national significance.
        In 1879, Congress established the Mississippi River
    Commission with the mission of providing a navigable
    Mississippi and reducing the ravages of frequent floods. After
    the 1927 flood, Congress passed the Flood Control Act in 1928
    which created the comprehensive Mississippi River and
    Tributaries project. This permitted the commission to deal with
    the lower valley as a whole: one mission, one entity and,
    therefore, a very successful cooperative project among
    interested parties to integrate resources to meet the
    challenge.
        Although times are much different today, the need to deal
    with issues in the lower Mississippi River Valley in a
    comprehensive manner remains. The continuous funding on the
    work of the lower Mississippi River Valley for nearly 80 years
    and the comprehensiveness of the effort show the utility of
    developing a separate Federal project, similar to the MR&T, for
    restoring and protecting coastal Louisiana.
        Now, I will finish with this comment. Protection and
    restoration of coastal Louisiana should be a major priority for
    the United States. The Nation cannot live without its water
    resources and deltaic coast. It cannot continue to watch
    Louisiana disappear. Sooner or later, it will have to address
    the problem. The longer we wait, the more difficult the problem
    will become and the more money the eventual solution will cost.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Twilley follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Vitter. Thank you, Dr. Twilley.
        And now we will hear from Thomas L. Jackson. He is
    Commissioner and past President of the Southeast Louisiana
    Flood Protection Authority East and 2003 National President of
    the American Society of Civil Engineers.
        Welcome.

     STATEMENT OF THOMAS L. JACKSON, P.E., D.WRE, COMMISSIONER AND
         PAST PRESIDENT, SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA FLOOD PROTECTION
                            AUTHORITY--EAST

        Mr. Jackson. Thank you, Senators.
        I will skip my first part, which repeated what you just
    said. I will add that I am a registered professional civil
    engineer with specialty certification in water resources, was
    educated at Tulane University, and am also a lifelong resident
    of New Orleans and Jefferson Parish. So, I do have a vested
    interest.
        My report to you today will focus on the selection of
    options for the pumping stations planned by the Corps of
    Engineers for the three outflow canals at the lakefront in
    Orleans Parish. The 17th Street, London and Orleans outfall
    canals drain the central part of the city of New Orleans and a
    portion of Jefferson Parish.
        Following Hurricane Betsy flooding, the Corps raised the
    canal levees to 12.5 feet. While the Corps own engineers
    recommended T-walls to raise these canal levees, the Corps
    insisted that I-walls be used because they were cheap and
    within their budget for the project. Sound familiar?
    Unfortunately, during Hurricane Katrina, sections of these
    cheaper I-walls failed along the 17th Street and London Avenue
    Canals, flooding the city and a portion of Jefferson Parish.
        Temporary pump stations and floodgates have been built at
    the lakefront to prevent hurricane tidal surges from entering
    these canals at this time. Levees and floodwalls along the 17th
    Street Canal have only been declared to be safe up to a level
    of 6 feet, not 12.5 feet as built by the Corps in the 1960s,
    and I think that was brought out earlier. Rainwater pumping at
    local stations will raise these canal levels at or near these
    maximum water levels every time we have a hard rainfall.
        Permanent pumping stations and floodgates at the lakefront
    are planned by the Corps under Option 1. Local pumping stations
    would then pump directly into Lake Pontchartrain during non-
    hurricane events, only utilizing the new lakefront pumping
    stations when lake levels approach maximum safe water levels in
    the canals.
        The Corps contends that only Option 1 is within the
    congressional authorization and budget, even though they have
    admitted that Option 2 is technically superior to Option 1.
        Option 1 will leave the responsibility for the Corps'
    defective levees and floodwalls to local interests. The bottom
    line is that the Corps built poorly designed floodwalls and now
    they want to put the responsibility for their errors on local
    interests. They say protection can only be provided at the
    lakefront in accordance with their congressional authorization.
        An extremely crucial consideration in this selection of
    options at issue is that safe water levels in these canals are
    not static. During each rainfall, silt from urban runoff
    settles to the bottom of the canals every time the pumps are
    shut off, further restricting the canals. From time to time,
    the canals must be dug out to remove this silt. This cleaning
    will further deteriorate the levees and floodwalls and reduce
    the safe water levels to a point that local pumps cannot be
    operated at full capacity, resulting in flooding the city.
        In addition, the stability of the levees and I-walls will
    continue to deteriorate because of poor soil conditions beneath
    these levees. It is incomprehensible that an agency of the
    Federal Government would be allowed by Congress to only
    partially correct such a serious error and dump the
    responsibility on local government as would happen under Option
    1.
        So what is the solution? Option 2, as shown by the Corps in
    its 90-day report to the Congress, would provide a full time
    pump station at the lakefront on each of these canals, removal
    of the interior local pump stations and conversion of the
    canals to low level, which would negate the need for the
    existing defective interior levees. The Corps has not
    adequately studied Option 2 and has rejected it outright saying
    they are not authorized to do any work that is not along the
    new hurricane protection alignment along the lakefront. The
    Corps has even publicly admitted that Option 2 is technically
    superior for overall needs.
        What are the advantages of Option 2? First and foremost,
    the elimination of the intrusion of high water levels into the
    heart of the city. Second, the elimination altogether of the
    need for the defective levees and floodwalls. Third,
    improvements to local drainage. And fourth, drainage systems in
    Jefferson and Orleans could be interconnected for use during
    emergency situations.
        In an attempt to reduce the volume of rainwater in the 17th
    Street Canal, Jefferson Parish suggested building a pumping
    station in Jefferson to pump rainwater directly into the
    Mississippi River. Option 2a would be helpful because it would
    decrease the load on the overburdened levees along the 17th
    Street Canal, as we discussed earlier.
        What are we asking the Congress to do for us today? We ask
    that, as soon as possible, the Congress re-write the
    authorization, if necessary, to provide protection along the
    lakefront as well as any work necessary to eliminate the
    defective and inadequate protection along these outfall canals.
        Second, we ask that the Congress authorize and require that
    the Corps conduct a thorough study of Option 2.
        Third, we ask that Congress require that the Corps include
    the services of at least two external peer review experts for
    this evaluation.
        Last, we ask that Congress create a panel of local
    interests and instruct the Corps and the peer review experts to
    provide monthly reports.
        The interim pump stations and gates can provide protection
    while the best solution is studied and constructed. Additional
    studies are necessary because this is a situation where
    complete studies have not yet been conducted and the wrong
    solution is underway post haste by the Corps.
        The people in this community deserve the best solution.
    Please do not allow the Corps to fail us again based on the
    Corps' short-sighted and unnecessarily restrictive
    interpretation of congressional authorization for hurricane
    protection.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Jackson follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Vitter. Thank you very much, Mr. Jackson. Thanks to
    all of you.
        As we begin questions, let me just submit for the record
    the seven items, reports, petitions, engineering studies
    supporting Pump to the River, a statement of Congressman Steve
    Scalise on all of these topics, and a list of further questions
    for the Corps of Engineers which, General, I will get to you in
    writing and you can have any reasonable amount of time to
    submit answers in writing.
        [The referenced documents follow:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Vitter. The first one, I will just alert you, are
    20 different significant items under the last WRDA bill which
    were mandated by the bill to track progress on those and, by
    our account, there has been little to no progress on those 20
    items. But I will submit all of that for the record without
    objection. That is made part of the record.
        Senator Landrieu, why do you not start with a 12-minute
    round and I will do that and, if we need to go further, we will
    do that.
        Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Senator Vitter.
        I think the testimony on Pump to the River has been
    substantial and quite clear. I just have a question, either to
    Mr. Rault or to Mr. Jackson. When you evaluated the Pump to the
    River model, Mr. Rault, what about the London Avenue Canal? Is
    that the same situation as the 17th Street Canal or is that
    different? Obviously, it is not the same geography exactly, but
    I guess it contributes to the draining of the city. I do not
    hear that mentioned at all. Is there a reason, Tom?
        Mr. Jackson. Senator Landrieu, under an agreement right
    after my retirement from AECOM, the company I worked for, I was
    under a consulting agreement with that firm and that firm was
    hired by the Corps to look at all potential discharge sites
    other than what was planned for the lakefront.
        We looked and found very little, I must admit. We really
    kind of got out of the box in terms of looking at things that
    initially we would have normally dismissed. Of the two that
    appeared to have some possibility, the best possibility was
    Pump to the River at the southern end of the 17th Street Canal
    for the issues that Mr. Rault talked about.
        The London Avenue Canal, there are a couple of options that
    we offered in that report, one of which was the New Orleans
    Sewage and Water Board station which pumps its ``headwaters''
    of the London Avenue Canal and also has a feature built into it
    right now that can pump into the Florida Avenue Canal, which
    flows east and is pumped into the Industrial Canal. The
    recommendation there was, while that canal was being improved
    under a SELA project, to increase the capacity so as to relieve
    some of the flow in the London Avenue Canal.
        Another alternative on the London Avenue Canal, there was a
    second pumping station, it sits on the east bank of the London
    Avenue Canal about halfway between its headwaters and the lake,
    and there is perhaps a potential, with further study, that that
    could also drain and then be pumped into the Industrial Canal.
    So, there are two possibilities on the Industrial Canal.
        The Orleans Avenue Canal is a very light flow by comparison
    to the other two, and we found no reason, although we did look
    at a number of options, including using Bayou St. John which, I
    think all of us who live there know that would be suicide. But
    we even looked at that and we looked at pond storage of water
    in the wide median on the Pontchartrain Expressway, at the end
    of the Pontchartrain Expressway, Pontchartrain Boulevard.
        So, we looked at a lot of different issues. But those three
    were the only three, one on 17 and two on London, which showed
    some potential.
        Senator Landrieu. Well, I am glad that you mentioned that
    and I am going to submit in writing some questions to our levee
    boards because, while the focus today is really on the Pump to
    the River option and pressing the Corps of Engineers to admit
    that it is either in their authorization to proceed or to get
    them to support a new authorization to get that done,
    ultimately, and I think Senator Vitter and our whole delegation
    share this, we want a comprehensive system that keeps people in
    this area free from flooding to the greatest degree possible,
    regardless of whether it is from storm surge or rain. And it is
    from all of Orleans Parish, Jefferson, St. Bernard,
    Plaquemines, and, frankly, into the river parishes and
    ultimately to all of South Louisiana.
        So, I am going to ask the levee boards to submit for the
    record of this hearing some additional options in that regard
    such as the retaining ponds. And do you know for the record, or
    does anyone want to testify to, the number of drainage canals
    in this metropolitan area either exposed or buried? Do we even
    have a comprehensive number that we talk about to the public?
    When you say the public should be made aware, this is part of
    the public becoming aware. Do we have a universal number that
    we agree to?
        Mr. Jackson. I am sure the Sewage and Water Board could
    give us a record, as well as Jefferson Parish and, of course,
    St. Bernard Parish. But it is in hundreds of miles----
        Senator Landrieu. Well, I am going to ask for that to be
    submitted because it is important for our community but also
    for the Nation to realize that, while the focus has been on the
    17th Street, the London and the Industrial, I do not want
    anyone to think there are just three canals in this region.
    That would be a huge mistake. I think we must get on the record
    the complexity and extent that we are talking about. So, Mr.
    Jackson, if you would try to do that in your time, I would
    appreciate it. And if the Corps can be of any help on that,
    even though you are not yet exactly focused on internal and we
    hope to get you more focused on.
        [The information follows:]

        Orleans--100 miles, Jefferson--60 miles, and St. Bernard--
    60 miles.

        Senator Landrieu. Mr. Jacobs, a question I have wanted to
    ask you for a while. The report, and I understand that you all
    have been doing this for quite some time, the National Academy
    of Sciences. I think you said it was 1860, what was it?
        Mr. Jacobs. The National Academy of Sciences was
    established in 1863.
        Senator Landrieu. Eighteen sixty-three. All right. Either
    since 1963, or maybe to make it more relevant let us say in the
    last 25 years or 30 or so years, has the United States
    successfully moved any city or small community? And if so, how
    small or how large? What is the experience that you, or the
    engineers, have? Because that is basically what you all, part
    of your recommendation, was that people would just move. So,
    when did we do that in the last 25 years and to what extent?
        Mr. Jacobs. Well, it is a very good question. And, of
    course, the situation in New Orleans is very unique, it is a
    very vexing challenge given the number of people there and the
    unique hydrology topography----
        Senator Landrieu. But I want you to answer, if you can,
    when in the experience of either you, personally, or the
    organization that you are representing, has the United States
    relocated any significant amount of people for flooding?
        Mr. Jacobs. The best example I can think of is the city of
    Valmeyer, Illinois. Are you aware of this one?
        Senator Landrieu. How large was that city?
        Mr. Jacobs. I think it was about 2,000 people.
        Senator Landrieu. Two thousand people. And what year was
    it?
        Mr. Jacobs. I do not know the year of the relocation but it
    was after the 1993 Mississippi River floods.
        Senator Landrieu. OK and it was 2,000. Do you recall if all
    2,000 of those people were relocated?
        Mr. Jacobs. To my understanding, they have not all been
    relocated. The vast majority of them have.
        Senator Landrieu. OK. Well let us, for the record, find out
    because this is one of the core issues that I am going to focus
    on. Let us just say 2,000 people and let us say 2 people per
    house. That is 1,000 houses. I would like to know how many of
    those houses were actually moved and if it was less, it might
    be 3 people per house, but let us say it was 1,000 homes. Do
    you know that we lost 250,000 homes in Louisiana?
        Mr. Jacobs. Yes, I am aware of some of those statistics.
        Senator Landrieu. So, do you all want to stand on your
    suggestion that we just move the 250,000 people?
        Mr. Jacobs. Well, in our report we did not use that number.
    The point that we were making is that relocations, where
    viable, should just be considered.
        Senator Landrieu. I realize that. The reason I am pointing
    that out is, with all due respect to your very prestigious
    organization, it is really what has the people of my community
    quite troubled and anxious. If you start from throwing out just
    an idea that one of the solutions is that people can just move,
    and you only have moved 1,000 homes at the most in the last 25
    years, and we have 250,000 plus that need to be protected, it
    just leaves us really scratching our heads.
        We are searching for another more realistic, cost
    effective, in the real world solution, such as building levees
    and internal flood control and restoration of wetlands and
    diversion projects, that will help the people of not just this
    delta, but all over the coast, live safely.
        The other issue that you all point out in here is about
    reducing the footprint. To people that hear that, that means
    that they are going to build a levee on the wrong side of my
    house and I am outside the levee protection. So where is the
    levee going to be built? What neighborhoods are going to be in?
    What neighborhoods are going to be out?
        Again, in the last 25 or 30 years, has a whole system been
    designed that actually reduced a footprint by, let us say, 15
    percent or 20 percent or 25 percent? To your knowledge, has
    this ever been done?
        Mr. Jacobs. No, Senator, I do not know of any other similar
    experience to New Orleans and Katrina.
        Senator Landrieu. OK. Well, I would just hope that people
    who continue to refer to this study will call to this testimony
    that, in the last 25 years, this organization is only aware
    that one town was partially moved of 2,000 people or less, and
    they do not testify that at any time there was actually a
    smaller footprint actually adopted.
        I want to say that my intention is to expand the footprint
    of this city and this region. My intention is that this region
    will have a flood control protection system that is safe and
    secure for future economic growth and development. I reject the
    notion that either Jefferson Parish or Orleans Parish or St.
    Bernard Parish or Plaquemines Parish will never have a greater
    footprint or a higher density or a greater population. I
    realize that expanding a footprint is different that expanding
    the population.
        As the Senator from this State, I want to say that I am not
    going to lead the retreat. I will not lead the retreat. We are
    going to reclaim our land and reclaim our safety.
        My time is almost at an end here. But I do want to say that
    one of the startling things, and I say startling, things that I
    learned in the delta in The Netherlands is that this country
    does not even have flood insurance. Think about that. They do
    not even carry flood insurance in Amsterdam or Rotterdam. It is
    unavailable and it is unnecessary. Well, I am not sure it is
    unavailable but it is not carried by a broad number of people
    because their system of protection is so strong and guaranteed
    to such levels of safety that it is quite unnecessary. Instead
    of the money they are using to pay premiums, for better or
    worse, they invest in a flood control system.
        Now, I am not suggesting that we can move from where we are
    to that system entirely or that anyone should give up their
    insurance that they are probably happy to have. But I am
    suggesting that this retreat and pulling up is not the
    direction that we should move into.
        I am happy for the testimony today and look forward to
    continued questioning at a later date.
        Senator Vitter. Thank you, Senator.
        I want to follow up on the outfall canal and the Pump to
    the River discussion.
        As we were discussing with the General, Option 1 requires
    the artificial lowering of the water level in the 17th Street
    Canal, well below what we thought was normal and safe before
    Katrina. Is that fair to say, Mr. Rault and Mr. Jackson?
        Mr. Rault. That is correct. We have only got 6 feet
    permitted out of a 12.5 foot levee.
        Senator Vitter. So, the wall was built 12.5 feet and now we
    are told that you cannot allow it to go higher than 6 feet. Is
    that right, Mr. Jackson?
        Mr. Jackson. Yes. Let me try to clarify a little bit. The
    Corps has closed off and plans to, with Option 1, close off
    tidal surge at the lakefront so that the canal levels in 17,
    Orleans and London would then be maintained at what would be
    considered approximately normal during a non-hurricane or a
    non-storm or a non-strong wind event. That may sound good if
    the levees on either side of the canals were substantial,
    dependable, and that we would not have to worry about
    excavating the canals and removing silt and so forth in order
    to maintain that stability.
        One of the things that I have said to people is that maybe
    a failure of the canal wall during a hurricane would not dump
    Lake Pontchartrain and the Gulf of Mexico into the city of New
    Orleans. But if you lived anywhere in the vicinity of that
    breach, there is still a lot of water in that canal up to
    elevation six and it would ruin a whole bunch of people's
    lives. It would not be as extensive a disaster as it would have
    been prior, and I give the Corps credit for that.
        Senator Vitter. So, part of what you are saying, let me ask
    it this way: as an engineer, are you confident that maintaining
    that safe water level or lower will avoid any chance of a
    breach in those walls as we saw after Katrina?
        Mr. Jackson. I am absolutely not confident in the levees
    that are built, the floodwalls, the I-walls and sheet piles
    that were built. The section that failed may have been in a
    particularly bad soil. However, there has not been sufficient
    investigation to know if that was the only spot that there were
    terrible soils. For instance, the old Burried Beach Ridge,
    which was the primary failure point along London Avenue Canal,
    also passes across the 17th Street Canal south of Interstate
    10. There is potential for the same kind of failures under the
    same kind of conditions there as there was on London.
        Senator Vitter. So, just to underscore this, where the
    canal walls breached have been replaced with a whole new
    design. Correct?
        Mr. Jackson. T-walls.
        Senator Vitter. But everywhere where they did not breach,
    which is 99 percent of the length of the walls, we have the
    same design and the same walls as we had before Katrina. Is
    that correct?
        Mr. Jackson. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator Vitter. And under Option 1, that would not change?
        Mr. Jackson. That would not change. Under Option 2, there
    would be no need for either levees on the Orleans or the
    Jefferson side. I would recommend that we leave the levees on
    the Jefferson side of the canal to act as a polder separation,
    i.e., a safety valve.
        Senator Vitter. So again, under Option 1, that would not
    change. Under Option 2, it would completely change for the
    better.
        Mr. Jackson. The system, I know you are all both familiar
    with Jefferson Parish, the system would look just like the
    Jefferson Parish outfall canals with a pump station at the
    lake.
        Senator Vitter. Right. Right.
        Mr. Rault. Senator, if I might add to that?
        Senator Vitter. Sure, Mr. Rault.
        Mr. Rault. Thank you. Our research and due diligence in
    developing our support of 2 and Pump to the River reflects that
    as recently as mid-March of this year, just a few months ago,
    the safe level was threatened in one of the outfall canals so
    much so that the Corps of Engineers asked the Sewage and Water
    Board to stop the pumps. Now, that was just in a rain event. It
    was not a hurricane, just a normal, New Orleans rain event.
        So I think it underscores the problem that all of us have,
    including you and Senator Landrieu, as to how this choreography
    of keeping under that safe level, particularly in a hurricane
    event, could work out where you have two pump stations working
    together, supposedly.
        Senator Vitter. Right. Right. Let me ask you both also if
    under Option 1 we have to keep the water level at six feet
    instead of 12.5, apart from the pumping capacity, that is a
    huge amount of water storage capacity, is it not, that is
    essentially lost? That is water that is going to have to be on
    the street instead of being put in the canal. Is that not
    correct?
        Mr. Jackson. Yes, Senator. However, we are under a pump
    system and, if we are open to the lake, we are pushing the
    water into the lake----
        Senator Vitter. But my point is, if under Option 1 you
    cannot allow the water to get past 6 feet, you are giving up a
    lot of safe storage between 6 feet and 12.5 feet, which we
    thought we had, which the system was designed to include?
        Mr. Jackson. What we are giving up is a tremendous amount
    of hydrologic capacity, how much water can flow through that
    canal. That is what we are giving up by lowering the water
    surface.
        Senator Landrieu. So that stays on the street?
        Mr. Jackson. Right. Absolutely. Or in someone's living
    room.
        Senator Vitter. So, given that, is not the general concept
    of Pump to the River to move a significant volume of water in a
    whole other direction and avoid the 17th Street Canal, a
    reasonable compensation for that enormous loss from the
    capacity we thought we had before Katrina?
        Mr. Jackson. Yes. I would recommend strongly that both the
    Pump to the River, as well as the diversion of water off of
    London Avenue Canal, the two suggestions I made earlier, be
    investigated to reduce the flows in those outfall canals.
    Everything we can do to reduce those flows will help the whole
    situation and it will help the ultimate cost of Option 2 on
    each of those canals, or even Option 1 for that matter.
        Senator Vitter. Mr. Rault.
        Mr. Rault. That is correct. I agree with Tom. We think that
    the lack of, the missing storage capacity, would end of on the
    streets and in the living rooms. It has happened before. The
    famous May 15th flood was strictly from the rainfall. There was
    no hurricane. How many times have we seen that? That is why I
    do not understand, we thought this was for hurricane
    protection, not just storm surge.
        Senator Vitter. I guess one of the points I am trying to
    make is that the Corps will say, well, under Option 1 we are
    going to match at the lake the pumping capacity that the city
    has in the center of the city. We have some debate about
    whether that is true. But even if it is true, that ignores the
    storage issue, does it not? There is a whole lot of volume for
    storing water off the streets out of homes that we were
    supposed to have that is now being taken away from us. And that
    volume of water is represented by the length of the canal times
    the width of the canal times the difference between 6 feet and
    12.5 feet. That is a lot of water.
        Mr. Rault. Yes, sir, it certainly is. As a homeowner would
    say, water is water. If my home is damaged by this kind of
    water or that kind of water, hurricane water, floodwater,
    whatever, it is still damaged. There is no question that the
    lack of using that capacity between 6 feet and 12.5 feet in the
    London Canal is going to be dumped on the streets in Louisiana,
    so much so that Jefferson Parish has already had to go and
    create ponding areas, like in playgrounds, in try to avoid
    that.
        Senator Vitter. Right. Right.
        Mr. Rault. Pump to the River would definitely be the
    answer, as you have clearly pointed out, to eliminate that
    problem and at a very competitive price.
        Senator Vitter. Well, again, I would make the point that
    not only is it an answer, all it would be doing is compensating
    us for what is being taken away in the safe water level, for
    the capacity we were told we had.
        Mr. Jackson. Which, in fact, we do not have in a safe way.
        Mr. Rault. It is a replacement, that is correct.
        Mr. Jackson. And that we paid for. We paid our local share
    and our Federal tax dollars paid for the Federal share.
        Senator Vitter. Let me ask the other witnesses. In my
    opening statement, I expressed a frustration, also, with some
    of the ways the Corps is moving forward with the overall
    Louisiana coastal plan in being very general in terms of
    decision matrixes and other things versus far more specific
    with regard to possible future projects. That obviously impedes
    our ability to move some specific, concrete project forward
    beyond the 100-year plan. Do you all have any reaction to that
    critique or that concern?
        Mr. Peyronnin. Senator, I think that it an accurate
    assessment. From a restoration perspective, our concern is
    that, similar to the levee criteria right now, there is no
    mechanism through which we can reflect the urgency of need
    under the traditional policy and guideline Corps process that
    has guided the Corps decisionmaking process for quite some
    time. That is currently up for revision at this point in time.
    I think a draft was submitted in 2008 and it is moving toward a
    final copy.
        I think that an essential component of looking at how the
    Corps makes decisions is recognizing that all of the decisions
    we need to make about our environmental projects, our
    protection projects, are not equal. They certainly are all very
    important. But clearly, in coastal Louisiana, we are facing
    projects that have severe implications for the loss of life,
    the protection of significant property infrastructure, and
    there simply must be an expedited framework.
        For example, I know that there has been an expedited
    framework for levee construction in greater New Orleans areas
    where the need for process has been reviewed. Clearly, there
    are opportunities within the Corps' process. If we can look at
    NEPA, and expedite NEPA processes, certainly there is an
    opportunity within the Corps' process that we could expedite
    absolutely critical and essential projects.
        Senator Vitter. Dr. Twilley.
        Mr. Twilley. I would just like to make one comment. I think
    it is critical that we focus. And the focus has to be on the
    river. This is a delta. This delta has to have its river. We
    have abandoned the delta by managing the river, in the proper
    situation, for flood control and navigation.
        Again, as I stated in my comments, we need a national
    agenda, a national priority, by which this delta not only
    includes, under the present Mississippi River Tributary Act,
    the responsibilities of navigation and flood control, but under
    a multipurpose scenario, you have to include ecosystem
    restoration and protection.
        And that has to be at the national level with a commitment
    of what that region means to the Nation. Without managing the
    river and putting the river back in these flood plains, this
    system will not be able to sustain itself.
        Senator Vitter. Thank you. Senator Landrieu.
        Senator Landrieu. This is very final. I would just like to
    close by reading again into the record what the language
    clearly says about the $3 billion that we allocated in this
    Congress with a tough battle, a hard fought battle, $3 billion
    of which $530 million is focused on this project.
        But, to the Corps of Engineers that is still here, I want
    to read the controlling language. It says to provide hurricane
    and storm damage reduction and flood damage reduction in the
    greater New Orleans and surrounding areas, $530 million shall
    be used to modify the system that we clearly saw in front of us
    was not functioning correctly, resulting in the damage,
    catastrophic damage, in the loss of 250,000 homes.
        So, I think this hearing has been very good, Senator
    Vitter, and I thank you for your leadership. It is hard for me
    to believe we have to go through this hearing, though, based on
    the clear language that is in the law now. However, we are
    going to pursue whatever it takes to the Corps of Engineers to
    get this project done correctly.
        And Pump to the River should be included and some
    additional options, Mr. Jackson, to the London Avenue Canal and
    perhaps some other canals. Dr. Twilley, thank you for your
    comments about the coast and the urgency of moving toward
    better management of the river itself to help with this
    project, and Mr. Peyronnin, for your focus on the comprehensive
    nature.
        I will finally end with the requirements of a comprehensive
    plan. I would like to just ask you all, particularly Mr.
    Jacobs, Mr. Peyronnin and Dr. Twilley, are you all familiar
    with the Dutch model? While I know that are situation is
    somewhat different in many, many aspects, we are a much larger
    Country, they are much smaller, they have 16 million people, we
    have more, their whole country could fit inside of the bottom
    third of Louisiana. What similarities do you see and what are
    the one of two things that you think we could really appreciate
    from the Dutch model? I ask you to be very brief, 30 seconds or
    less.
        Mr. Jacobs.
        Mr. Jacobs. Thank you, Senator. I will be brief. I think
    the one point I would note is the higher level of flood
    protection for urban areas.
        Senator Landrieu. It is one every what, 10,000 years?
        Mr. Jacobs. Well, I think they have something like that in
    The Netherlands, do they not, a 10,000-year level of
    protection? Whereas in New Orleans and other parts of our
    Country, we are generally using the one in 100-year level of
    protection. Obviously, a great discrepancy and I mention the
    Association of State Floodplain Managers and their
    recommendation for a minimum 500-year standard for urban areas.
        Senator Landrieu. Mr. Peyronnin.
        Mr. Peyronnin. Yes, Senator. While I am not immediately
    familiar with the entire Dutch system, I will note that my
    experience is that they have taken on a perspective that they
    have to live with water. They understand the implications of
    trying to necessarily trying to control water and in fact I
    believe have launched a recent campaign about educating their
    citizens and looking at that from a water resource perspective.
        The government structure is such that it understands that
    the commitment they have made to structural flood protection is
    extremely demanding from a financial perspective and has no
    guaranty of sustainability long into the future. They have
    started to look at other methodologies through which they can
    accomplish significant long-term sustainable flood protection
    that include better water resource management from a
    comprehensive perspective.
        Senator Landrieu. Dr. Twilley.
        Mr. Twilley. Simply, a national mandate. I mean, it is
    evident that they have a national priority of protecting the
    coast and with that, they marshal, as you saw at Deltaurus,
    some of the top engineering and science and coastal science
    related to these new principles which they call Give the River
    Room and in which they actually try to combine engineering
    design with ecological and coastal realities. And I think that
    comes from a national agenda, a national priority, and they put
    the fiscal resources into it to achieve it.
        Senator Landrieu. Thank you. And thank you, Senator Vitter.
        Senator Vitter. Thank you to all of our witnesses.
        Just to summarize, my personal goal coming out of this
    hearing, which I think is shared by Senator Landrieu and Chair
    Boxer, is to first urge the Corps again to reconsider their
    position on authorization of 2 versus 1. I believe it very
    clear that they are both authorized.
        But as we do that, to work with Chair Boxer and this
    Committee to pass authorization as quickly as possible for Pump
    to the River and the clarification on the 2 is included as well
    as 1 issue. So, we are going to be working in a very focused
    way on that in the next few weeks and we were literally talking
    to Chair Boxer about it during this hearing and have a clear
    path forward and we thank her for that.
        Thank you all for your very valuable testimony and the
    hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m. the full Committee was adjourned.]
        [An additional statement submitted for the record follows:]

                Statement of Hon. James M. Inhofe, U.S. Senator
                           from the State of Oklahoma

        Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding this hearing, and
    thank you to all the witnesses for agreeing to discuss these
    important issues with us today. I would also like to commend
    Senator Vitter for his tireless efforts on behalf of the people
    of Louisiana, particularly on issues related to the Corps of
    Engineers. EPW has not held a hearing dedicated to these
    Louisiana issues since a field hearing in February 2007. Both
    this hearing and that field hearing were prompted by Senator
    Vitter. He has worked very diligently to educate his colleagues
    here in the Senate on the importance of taking action, as well
    as on the details of what Congress needs to do to ensure proper
    protection for his State.
        The issues surrounding how to provide hurricane and flood
    protection for New Orleans as well as appropriate coastal
    restoration activities are numerous and complex. The projects
    themselves are also very expensive. Oversight hearings like
    this one are an important step in ensuring that these things
    get done right. The people of Louisiana are counting on it for
    their very existence and way of life. The American taxpayers
    are counting on knowing that their tax dollars are being spent
    wisely, and not wasted on things that won't work technically or
    that won't provide all the benefits promised as justification
    for the costs.
        This Committee previously has held several hearings
    establishing the reasoning for a Federal role in coastal
    restoration activities in southern Louisiana. Unlike the
    situation with the Florida Everglades in 2000, the fact that we
    had a Chief's Report for this project meant that I was able to
    support the authorization included in the Water Resources
    Development Act of 2007. Since a Federal role is no longer in
    question, I hope our witnesses will focus more on the details
    of this effort. As the committee of jurisdiction, we need to
    hear specifics about what is proceeding well and what the
    challenges and obstacles are. We need to hear if congressional
    action is needed to better focus or prioritize the Corps'
    activities in this area. My opinion is that the Everglades
    restoration effort is not going particularly well, and I hope
    we can avoid similar mistakes in coastal Louisiana restoration.
        My understanding on the pump to the river issue is that we
    are basically discussing two options for reducing or preventing
    flooding in New Orleans. The first option, the one that is
    currently authorized and the Corps is constructing, combines
    the existing interior drainage system with the ability to pump
    water from the city's three outfall canals to Lake
    Pontchartrain. Previous reports from the Corps tell us that
    this component within the larger system being constructed will
    provide a 100-year level of protection for the city.
        The second option would also contribute to providing a 100-
    year level of protection, but it involves redesigning the
    interior drainage system to eliminate the need for interior
    pumps on the outfall canals, instead relying on pumping water
    just at the lakefront or in combination with pumping to the
    Mississippi River. Preliminary estimates indicate that this
    option may be significantly more expensive and complex to
    construct. Operationally, however, it may be more reliable than
    the first option.
        I look forward to the discussion with the witnesses of the
    pros, cons and tradeoffs of each option, and I again thank
    Senator Vitter for prompting this hearing.

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