[Senate Hearing 111-1180]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-1180
THREE MILE ISLAND_LOOKING BACK ON
30 YEARS OF LESSONS LEARNED
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR
AND NUCLEAR SAFETY
of the
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 24, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys
_____________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
94-022 PDF WASHINGTON : 2015
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman
MAX BAUCUS, Montana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont MIKE CRAPO, Idaho
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
Bettina Poirier, Staff Director
Ruth Van Mark, Minority Staff Director
----------
Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman
MAX BAUCUS, Montana DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma (ex
BARBARA BOXER, California (ex officio)
officio)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
MARCH 24, 2009
OPENING STATEMENTS
Carper, Hon. Thomas R., U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware.. 1
Vitter, Hon. David, U.S. Senator from the State of Louisiana..... 4
Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma... 6
Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio... 7
WITNESSES
Klein, Dale E., Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.......... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Inhofe........................................... 40
Senator Vitter........................................... 44
Jaczko, Gregory B., Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.. 47
Response to an additional question from Senator Boxer........ 49
Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe........ 50
Response to an additional question from Senator Vitter....... 51
Lyons, Peter B., Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission..... 52
Response to an additional question from Senator Boxer........ 54
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Inhofe........................................... 56
Senator Vitter........................................... 57
Svinicki, Kristine L., Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission..................................................... 59
Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe........ 60
Response to an additional question from Senator Vitter....... 63
Bradford, Peter A., Adjunct Professor, Institute for Energy and
the Environment, Vermont Law School............................ 77
Prepared statement........................................... 80
Response to an additional question from:
Senator Boxer............................................ 85
Senator Inhofe........................................... 86
Responses to additional questions from Senator Vitter........ 87
Denton, Harold, former NRC employee.............................. 88
Prepared statement........................................... 90
Responses to an additional question from:
Senator Inhofe........................................... 95
Senator Vitter........................................... 95
Thornburgh, Dick, of counsel, K&L Gates LLP; former Governor of
Pennsylvania................................................... 98
Prepared statement........................................... 100
Fertel, Marvin S., President and Chief Executive Officer, Chief
Nuclear Officer, Nuclear Energy Institute...................... 121
Prepared statement........................................... 123
Response to an additional question from Senator Inhofe....... 133
Responses to additional questions from Senator Vitter........ 134
THREE MILE ISLAND--LOOKING BACK ON
30 YEARS OF LESSONS LEARNED
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 24, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m. in
room 406, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R. Carper
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Carper, Inhofe, Voinovich, Vitter, and
Merkley.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. CARPER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE
Senator Carper. Welcome everybody. My voice sounds fuzzy up
here. How do I sound out there? OK, all right, good. I don't
feel fuzzy. I feel good. In fact, I have been looking forward
to this hearing. We have a great lineup, two panels, and we are
going to learn a lot. Welcome back, and maybe help us to look
forward as well.
We will be joined by Senator Vitter here in a little bit.
We're going to go ahead and start. He doesn't want us to hold
up, and so we will just go ahead and kick it off.
I want to thank our staff, both Democrat and Republican,
for your help in putting together today's hearing. And we are
just grateful for all of our witnesses to be here.
Today's hearing is focused, as you know, on 30 years of
lessons learned since the Three Mile Island nuclear plant
accident. Senators will have 5 minutes or so, for opening
statements. Then I am going to recognize our first panel of
witnesses, the Nuclear Regulatory Commissioners themselves, in
living color, and you are all here and we are grateful that you
are here.
Chairman Klein, we will ask you to speak for maybe 5
minutes or so. We will ask each of your colleagues to try to
limit your remarks to close to 3 minutes. And then we will go
about our first round of questions. I think we just have one
round of questions for each of these panels.
And then we will invite our second panel of witnesses to
come forward, and we will follow their testimony with one round
of questions as well.
We will probably finish up about dinner time tonight.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. No, we will finish up. We have a caucus
lunch and it starts at about 12:30 or 12:45, so we will finish
up in due course.
Thirty years ago, a nuclear accident occurred at the Three
Mile Island nuclear power plant in Middletown, Pennsylvania
that would shake America's confidence in nuclear power. The
accident was a cooling malfunction that caused a partial
meltdown of the reactor core, releasing a small amount of
radioactivity. The accident was determined to be caused by a
combination of several things: equipment failure, and the
inability of the plant's operators to understand the reactor's
condition during the event.
Unlike the Chernobyl disaster that occurred I think about 8
years later, the Three Mile Island reactor vessel did not fail.
The leaked radioactive gases were vented into the atmosphere
through specially designed filters under operator control.
No immediate deaths occurred, and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission estimated that approximately one additional cancer
in the area would result from the accident. Although any
increases of the cancer death rate is unacceptable, I think we
would all agree it could have been much worse.
This accident had a profound impact on the public, on the
nuclear industry, and on the NRC. Public confidence in nuclear
power generation was, if not shattered, greatly damaged. The
cleanup effort took nearly 14 years and some $1 billion to
complete.
Three Mile Island served as a wake-up call that we had
become complacent on nuclear safety. After the accident, the
NRC, Congress, and the nuclear industry took a long, hard look
at what we needed to do to make this industry safer and to gain
back, to regain the public trust.
Under the direction of the NRC, the industry made sweeping
changes. Today, our Nation's 104 operating nuclear reactors
maintain high levels of safety and reliability. Our plants have
also become more efficient over the past 30 years. As a result,
we have been able to almost double our generating capacity, I
call it our operating capacity, since 1979. These changes have
given the nuclear industry one of the best safety records,
really, of any industry in the United States.
Now, Americans realize that nuclear power can provide
reliable energy and can do it without polluting. To reduce our
Country's dependence on fossil fuels, we need to do a number of
things. We need to harness the winds off the shore of Delaware
and other places along our coast. We need to harness the sun's
rays in Nevada and other places like that. We will need to
capture the CO2 coming off of coal-fired plants in
West Virginia and other place around the Country. And we are
going to need to build plug-in cars in Detroit and other places
around America, and drive them.
We are also going to need, in the end, we are going to need
if we are going to reduce the threat of climate change, our
dependence on foreign oil, harmful emissions into our air, we
are going to need nuclear power. But broad support for the
nuclear industry will vanish if another nuclear accident
occurs. Without a safe nuclear industry, there will be no
nuclear industry.
I like to tell the story, we have a pilot here, our
colleague Jim Inhofe, who flies his plane, I think, all over
the Country, maybe all over the world, but I like to, for the
record, the plane, the plane. This is cool.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. I also have pictures of my kids.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. And he's got a bunch of them. You have one
or two grandchildren, too, don't you? But not as many as Jim
Bunning. Jim Bunning has 37 or 38 grandchildren, he and his
wife. I said to him, how do you remember all their names? And
he says, if they're with their parents, I can remember them.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. But we will look at your grandchildren
pictures later, but thanks for sharing that airplane picture.
I was a naval flight officer, 5 years of active duty, and
18 years reserve, mission commander. And our jobs were to hunt
for Red October, track Soviet nuclear submarines in all the
oceans of the world, try to catch the bad guys coming into
South Vietnam to resupply the Viet Cong, in our airplanes. It
was interesting, we did mining operations and all kinds of
stuff with our planes.
Our skippers, our commanding officers would always say to
us, the most important thing you are doing today is not
tracking Soviet nuclear subs. The most important thing you are
doing is not surveillance of the oceans, it's not a mining
missions, it's not trying to catch the bad guys slipping into
South Vietnam or Cambodia. The most important thing you are
doing today is to take off safely, to fly safely, to land
safely.
And we tried to create a culture of safety in my squadron.
We tried to do it in every naval aviation squadron. And we need
a culture of safety, as I have said once or twice before,
including to some of you, we need a culture of safety in every
single nuclear power plant that we have now and those that we
are going to build.
As the oversight Subcommittee on nuclear safety, it is our
job to make certain that the NRC and everyone who works in a
nuclear power plant knows that safety is our No. 1 priority.
Only with a safety-focused nuclear industry can America reap
the benefits of clean, safe nuclear power, not just now, but
for a long time to come.
[The prepared statement of Senator Carper follows:]
Statement of Hon. Thomas R. Carper, U.S. Senator
from the State of Delaware
Thirty years ago, a nuclear accident occurred at the Three
Mile Island nuclear power plant in Middletown, Pennsylvania
that would shake America's confidence in nuclear power.
The accident was a cooling malfunction that caused a
partial melt-down of the reactor core, releasing a small amount
of radioactivity.
The accident was determined to be caused by a combination
of equipment failure and the inability of the plant operators
to understand the reactor's condition during the event.
Unlike the Chernobyl disaster that occurred a few years
later, the Three Mile Island's reactor vessel did not fail. The
leaked radioactive gases were vented into the atmosphere
through specially designed filters under operator control.
No immediate deaths occurred, and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) estimated that approximately one additional
cancer in the area would result from the accident.
Although any increases in the cancer rate is unacceptable--
I think we would all agree--it could have been much worse.
But this accident had a profound impact on the public, the
nuclear industry and the NRC.
Public confidence in nuclear power generation was
shattered.
The clean-up effort took nearly 14 years and $1 billion.
Three Mile Island served as a wake-up call that we had
become complacent on nuclear safety.
After the accident, the NRC, Congress, and the nuclear
industry took a hard look at what we needed to do to make this
industry safe and gain back the public's trust.
Under the direction of the NRC, the industry made sweeping
changes.
Today the Nation's 104 operating nuclear reactors maintain
high levels of safety and reliability.
Our plants have also become much more efficient over the
past 30 years. As a result, we have been able to almost double
our generation capacity since 1979.
These changes have given the nuclear industry one of the
best safety records of any industry in the United States.
Now Americans realize that nuclear power can provide
reliable energy, and can do it without polluting.
Reducing our country's dependence on fossil fuels--we will
need to capture the winds off the shores of Delaware, the sun
rays in Nevada, and the CO2 off the coal plants in
West Virginia. We will need to plug-in our cars in Detroit. But
we will also need nuclear power.
We will need nuclear power to help us meet our clean air
goals and our climate goals.
But broad support for the nuclear industry will vanish if
another nuclear accident occurs.
Without a safe nuclear industry, there will be no nuclear
industry.
As the oversight committee on nuclear safety, it is our job
to make certain that the NRC and everyone who works in a
nuclear power plant knows safety is the No. 1 priority.
Only with a safety-focused nuclear industry can America
reap the benefits of clean, safe nuclear power.
Senator Carper. And that ends my statement, and the ending
of my statement coincides with the arrival of a couple of my
colleagues. They wanted to wait until I finished. They have
heard me give these statements before. But we have a new
Ranking Member here, and it is David Vitter from Louisiana.
Senator Vitter, would you like to proceed?
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will
specifically not say it was perfect timing on our part. The
thought never crossed my mind.
It is great to be with you and great to be a new partner
with you on this Subcommittee. We had a very good initial
discussion last week, a few days ago, which I really enjoyed,
and look forward to this work.
I will simply say that I appreciate this hearing because we
do have the opportunity, an enormously positive opportunity,
for a nuclear renaissance in our Country. We need to pursue
that aggressively and effectively to meet all of our energy and
related environmental goals. And obviously, we need to pursue
that in a context of safety. That is not only the right way to
do it. That is the only way it will effectively happen, is to
have the proper confidence of the American people in that
regard.
We are very active in all these pursuits in Louisiana, and
we will continue to be in this nuclear renaissance. I look
forward to hearing from all of our witnesses about this.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Vitter follows:]
Statement of Hon. David Vitter, U.S. Senator
from the State of Louisiana
I'd first like to thank the Chairman, Senator Carper, for
holding this hearing as an opportunity discuss what we have
learned and to look forward and advance the future of the
nuclear power industry. I enjoyed our conversation last week
and believe there is an excellent opportunity on this
subcommittee to work in a bipartisan manner to get some good
things done. And for that I want to thank you.
Second, I'd like to thank all the witnesses here today to
discuss everything we have learned over the last 30 years. We
have a distinguished panel here today that includes current and
past NRC commissioners, as well as a former Governor and the
head of the foremost institute on nuclear energy and safety.
Thanks to all of you for your time.
The accident at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2)
nuclear power plant near Middletown, Pennsylvania, on March 28,
1979, was the most serious in U.S. commercial nuclear power
plant operating history.
Fortunately, the accident caused no injuries or deaths. In
addition, experts concluded that the amount of radiation
released into the atmosphere was too small to result in
discernible direct health effects to the population in the
vicinity of the plant.
Several independent studies have also been conducted.
Estimates are that the average dose to about 2 million people
in the area was only about 1 millirem. To put this in context,
exposure from a chest x-ray is about 6 millirem. In other
words, a chest x-ray exposes you to about 6 times the amount of
radiation people were exposed to during the most significant
nuclear accident in U.S. history.
However, the accident was still an accident and did more to
hurt public opinion of nuclear power than it did to the
environment. Fortunately, the increased scrutiny came with
increased vigilance by the NRC and other organizations.
An important positive impact of the accident was that it
brought about sweeping changes involving emergency response
planning, reactor operator training, human factors engineering,
radiation protection, and many other areas of nuclear power
plant operations. It also caused the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to tighten and heighten its regulatory oversight.
Resultant changes in the nuclear power industry and at the NRC
have had the ultimate effect of enhancing safety.
Within 9 months of the accident, the industry had formed
the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), whose mission
is to promote the highest levels of safety and reliability in
the operation of nuclear power plants.
To improve training, INPO in 1985 formed the National
Academy for Nuclear Training. The academy reviews and accredits
nuclear utilities' training programs for all key positions at
each plant.
INPO has had a profound impact on the way nuclear plants
are managed and operated. The proof is the steady improvement
in plant performance in the nearly 30 years since the accident
at TMI.
Today, the Nation's 104 operating reactors maintain high
levels of safety and reliability, as evidenced by the NRC's
reactor oversight program and performance indicators tracked by
the World Association of Nuclear Operators.
Finally, I believe it is also important to note that
universities and students across this Country are very excited
about the potential of nuclear energy. On August 14, 2008, a
U.S. News and World Report article was titled The New Hot Job:
Nuclear Engineering. The article stated, ``After decades of
declining interest in the field, universities are scrambling to
keep up with the newfound demand'' and ``Not only are the
existing programs growing near capacity, but departments that
shuttered years ago are finding new life.''
As well, Louisiana State University, which of course is in
my home State, advertises that ``at the present time, demand
for nuclear engineers and health physicists exceeds the supply,
so that graduates in these areas have excellent prospects for
obtaining well paid jobs in some phase of the nuclear field.''
Indeed, these are very exciting times for an industry that
is quite capable of providing high-paying jobs to American
workers as well as providing consistent and reliable energy for
decades. Thank you for your time and I look forward to
questions.
Senator Carper. Welcome aboard. We are delighted to have
you as my seatmate here.
Senator Inhofe chaired this Subcommittee for a number of
years, and he began chairing the Subcommittee at a time that I
don't know that Congress was providing especially good
oversight over the nuclear industry. That changed under his
leadership, and he continues to have a strong interest in this,
and I am delighted that he is with us today.
Senator Inhofe.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Senator Inhofe. Well, I appreciate that, Senator Carper. It
is true, too. I recall, we were just talking back here trying
to remember just when it was I became Chairman of this
Subcommittee. I think it was 13 years ago. And at that time,
there had not been an oversight hearing in years. And you know,
the interesting thing was that the NRC was very anxious to
start having oversight hearings. So we had oversight hearings,
and then we kind of put down goals and deadlines, and we got
some things really started at that time, I believe.
And of course, at that time it was just 17 or 18 years
after Three Mile Island. Our concern was always, you know, did
we really learn something from that. And you point out very
well, although for different reasons than I would have, nuclear
energy in the future, it is going to have to be there. We
cannot run this machine called America without the nuclear
component.
And it seems to me that it shouldn't take as long as it
does take to get new applications working. I hope that we are
going to be able to improve that.
Studying the past is useful in so far as it guides
improvement for the future, and I am glad that you are having
this hearing because it is one that is certainly necessary now.
No one should be pleased that the accident did happen, but I am
very pleased that the Commission and industry have spent the
last 30 years improving the safety of our existing plants and
preparing to build new reactors.
So I think that we have done a good job. I think you are
certainly carrying this leadership on, Senator Carper, and it
is something that, I can't think of anything more important
that is happening in America today in terms of our future
capability to run this machine than to be talking about nuclear
energy.
I would like also to hear in the opening statements from
all of you how we can improve the timeframe that it takes to
get these applications handled and perhaps something that we
will be able to do to reach our goals a little quicker than we
otherwise would. I appreciate your having this hearing.
[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]
Statement of Hon. James M. Inhofe, U.S. Senator
from the State of Oklahoma
The accident at Three Mile Island was a culmination of
several mistakes. As with any mistake, there are lessons to be
learned. Critics of the nuclear industry frequently point to it
and say neither the industry nor the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission have learned anything from it and plants are just as
risky today as Three Mile Island was then. Mr. Chairman, I
strongly disagree.
My first observation is that this accident validated the
defense-in-depth concept which is the basis for nuclear safety.
In spite of equipment malfunctions, design flaws, and human
errors, radiation exposure to the public was within regulatory
limits and was proven to have produced no discernable health
effects.
My second observation is that 30 years have passed and we
haven't had another accident like this one, which partially
melted a nuclear reactor core. That doesn't mean that the
industry and the Commission can sit back and relax--they can't.
It is our responsibility in this Committee to ensure that they
do NOT become complacent.
However, studying the past is useful insofar as it guides
improvement for the future. I'm glad that Chairman Carper has
chosen to focus this hearing on the constructive ways that the
Commission and the industry have addressed those shortcomings
rather than simply Monday-morning-quarterbacking a 30-year-old
event.
Even though there were no discernable health effects, the
Three Mile Island accident was a transformational event. Many
analyses of this accident were done, cataloging the various
equipment malfunctions, design flaws, human errors, and poor
communication. The analyses formed the basis for the NRC to
impose many new regulatory requirements and for the industry to
establish a more coordinated effort to improve safety and
performance. The most important lesson is the need for both the
industry and the regulator to be vigilant about improving the
safety of nuclear energy. As Senator Carper is fond of saying,
``If it isn't perfect, make it better.''
This vigilance is very evident in the effort to license new
plants. The NRC has indicated to this Committee that it will
spend approximately 5 years reviewing new reactor designs
before granting certifications. While I'm not thrilled with how
long that process takes, the current process will be more
predictable and is clearly an improvement over how new plant
licensing was conducted in the '70s and '80s. Modern technology
has also yielded great improvements in plant equipment
reliability and control rooms that reduce the potential for
human error.
No one should be pleased that the accident happened. But I
AM very pleased that the Commission and the industry have spent
the last 30 years improving the safety of our existing plants
and preparing to build new reactors that are even safer. This
vigilance will ensure that our Country will continue to benefit
from clean and reliable nuclear energy for years to come. This
is the true legacy of Three Mile Island.
Senator Carper. Senator Inhofe, thanks very much, thanks
for your leadership and your continued strong participation.
Another former Chair of this Subcommittee has bailed on me
and gone over to be the Ranking Republican on, what is it, the
Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee, George
Voinovich of Ohio, but it has been great working with Senator
Voinovich on these issues and a bunch of others.
Senator Voinovich, you are recognized.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OHIO
Senator Voinovich. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman and
Ranking Member Vitter.
I want to welcome Senator Vitter to this Subcommittee. I
served on it for 8 years, either in the chairmanship or Ranking
Member, and Brother Carper and I have had some fun together.
Mr. Chairman, I take great pride in the fact that this
Committee has helped transform the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission into one of the best and most respected regulatory
agencies in the world. We worked very hard placing the right
people on the Commission, providing the Commission with the
resources and tools necessary to do its job, and holding them
accountable for the results.
We have held more than 20 hearings involving the NRC in the
past 8 years. A good number of those hearings were related to
the Davis-Besse incident in 2002, and we took the NRC to task
as it was initially reluctant to address the issue of safety
culture. So it is no accident that we have seen dramatic
improvements in both the safety records and reliability of the
104 operating reactors today, compared to 2002.
And I would like to take this opportunity to thanks and
recognize each member of the Commission for the outstanding job
that you do day to day. Being a regulator often is a thankless
job, whether it is the NRC, FAA, FDA, or the Federal Reserve
Board. It seems as though the only time people care about what
you do is when something goes wrong, and it is almost always to
criticize what you did or didn't do. And you should be very,
very proud of your record.
Indeed, a regulator's job is a complex and difficult one.
It is like a high wire balancing act. You can't be too far to
the left or too far to the right. It has to be just right. The
Fed has to keep the interest rates just right, otherwise it
will result in either recession or inflation. Similarly, the
NRC has to be vigilant at all times to keep its regulatory
threshold just right. It should be tight enough to prevent
complacency, both within the agency and the industry it
regulates, but not overly restrictive to a point of stifling
the growth of nuclear power in this Country at a time when it
is most needed.
I think today's hearing provides us with an opportunity to
reflect upon the past, present and future of the industry.
Clearly, the nuclear power industry has come a long way since
the 1960s and 1970s. The Three Mile Island accident in 1979,
however unfortunate, provided an experience through which both
the industry and the NRC were humbled, and have matured into
stronger, safer entities.
There were many lessons learned from TMI, as we will hear
from the witnesses today. But one that resonates with me the
most as a policymaker is something that Admiral Rickover said,
``Nuclear power is not to be feared, but to be respected.''
I recently met with Mr. Andre Lacoste, the Chairman of the
French Nuclear Regulatory Agency, and he said something very
interesting. He said that many European countries that adopted
a policy of phasing out nuclear power following Chernobyl in
1986, countries like Italy, Sweden, UK, and perhaps even
Germany, are now re-embracing nuclear power.
I was at the German Marshall Fund this last week and heard
again that they are really thinking about really getting back
into nuclear power. He thought there were two main reasons for
this. One is the recognition that the newly adopted carbon
reduction mandate cannot be achieved through energy efficiency
and renewables alone. And the other is the recognition of the
improved safety records and reliability of nuclear power
plants, and maybe the jobs that are created in the nuclear
power industry that nobody is talking about. They are
tremendous jobs. In fact, in my opinion, we have had more jobs
created in this Country in the area of nuclear power than we
have in windmills and solar.
And for the benefit of my colleagues on this Committee, I
would like to share with you a portion of a speech given by
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown last week. The speech is
entitled, Nuclear Energy and Proliferation. And I quote Brown's
speech. He said, ``Because whether you like it or not, we will
not meet the challenges of climate change without far wider use
of civil nuclear power. Given the scale of global emissions
reductions required and the like cost, no cost-effective low
carbon technology must be off limits.''
And the International Energy Agency estimates that we must
build 32 nuclear reactors globally every year, every year, if
we are going to meet the emissions standards that they have
laid out for 2050.
So he goes on to say, ``So however we look at it, we will
not secure the supply of sustainable energy on which the future
of our planet depends without a role for civil nuclear power.''
Mr. Chairman, as you know, this is exactly the message that
you and I have tried to convey to the Senate during the climate
change debate last year. We conducted four roundtables in the
last Congress to identify solutions to making the nuclear
renaissance a reality in this Country. And I hope we continue
this effort during this Congress through the formation of a
Senate Caucus on Nuclear Energy. We have to do that if we are
to continue to have this nuclear renaissance that I think is so
necessary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Carper. Senator Voinovich, thank you so much.
Our first panel of witnesses, I think you folks have been
here once or twice before. It is good to see you again. We are
grateful for your service and grateful for your preparation and
participation today.
Chairman Dale Klein will speak first, and be followed by
each of his three colleagues, Mr. Greg Jaczko, Peter Lyons, and
Kristine Svinicki.
It is great to see all of you. Thank you for being here.
Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF DALE E. KLEIN, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Vitter, and
Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me and my
fellow Commissioners to appear before you today to discuss the
lessons learned from the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant
30 years ago.
My written testimony provides some historical background on
the accident, addresses the NRC's response, and outlines some
of the regulatory improvements that have been implemented, and
mentions one ongoing challenge.
In my brief summary, let me just say that the NRC has come
a long way in 30 years. We have an excellent team of highly
competent staff who are very focused on the agency's mission.
In fact, I should draw your attention to the results of the
Office of Personnel Management's human capital survey of 2008
which was reported in The Washington Post on March 13. The NRC
ranked first in leadership and knowledge management; second in
results-oriented performance culture; first in talent
management; and just for the sake of completeness, let me also
mention, first in job satisfaction.
On the matter of Three Mile Island, let me assure you that
the Commission has not forgotten about the accident that
occurred there. Last week, we distributed to all Members of the
Committee a recent paper by NRC's historian, Three Mile Island
After 30 Years, which was developed as part of an effort to
ensure that current and future NRC employees learn from what
happened.
In addition, the agency will hold a seminar tomorrow for
NRC employees to explain what happened and what lessons the
agency learned. A number of our presenters, including former
Pennsylvania Governor Richard Thornburgh and former NRC
Director for the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Harold
Denton, are participating at this hearing during the second
panel of witnesses.
One of the most important changes that has occurred over
the last 30 years is an intensive focus on what we call a
strong safety culture, both in industry and internally within
the NRC. The agency's wide-ranging safety improvements include
personnel training, internal processes and procedures,
infrastructure and planning, technological upgrades, oversight
and risk assessment methodologies, and safety culture
expectations.
The results of these efforts by the NRC and by industry are
evident in the handout which shows in quantifiable terms the
significant improvements in safety at nuclear power plants that
have been achieved. And these are shown on two posters to my
right and to my left.
In addition to safety improvements, the agency has also
implemented a variety of enhancements in the area of security,
especially since 9/11. In recent years, the NRC has required
increased patrols, stronger and more capable security forces,
additional physical barriers, enhanced emergency preparedness
and response plans, and many other heightened security
measures.
With all this, however, the NRC still faces one ongoing
challenge, which is something that confronts every industry and
every regulator that is concerned with safety. I am referring
to the danger of complacency. Guarding against complacency must
involve a rigorous and conscientious commitment to maintaining
high standards of safety and security. That effort includes
remembering the past, learning from where we have been, and
ensuring that past mistakes are not repeated.
This hearing contributes to all of these goals, and I
appreciate the Committee's interest in understanding the
lessons that have been learned and implemented at the NRC.
To answer Senator Inhofe's question about efficiency, I
should point out, and we can talk more of this, we are looking
at Lean Six Sigma to make sure that we can be more efficient
with no compromise on safety, and we can talk more about that
as we go forward.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes
my opening statement. Thank you for having me and my colleagues
today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Klein follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Senator Carper. Chairman Klein, thank you for your
testimony. Thank you for your leadership at the NRC as well.
Commissioner Jaczko. Welcome, thank you. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY B. JACZKO, COMMISSIONER, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mr. Jaczko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to thank
you for having us here today to discuss the lessons of the
accident at Three Mile Island.
I would like to focus on what I see as the larger lesson
learned from this event, which, as the Chairman indicated, is
the danger of complacency. Three Mile Island and Davis-Besse,
which happened decades later, happened in large part because of
complacency. There was a fundamental belief at the time of
these accidents that they could not occur. The challenge that
remembering Three Mile Island raises for us is the need to
continue to work to minimize risks, never rest on success, and
always be on the lookout for new information and for the
unexpected.
We did learn important lessons from Three Mile Island, and
I would like to briefly mention three areas where tremendous
progress has been achieved. Those would be in the areas of
performance assessment, emergency preparedness, and
enforcement.
After the accident at Three Mile Island, we developed
methods of measuring the performance of operating reactors and
making our assessments accessible to the public. We first
developed the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance and
now have the Reactor Oversight Process, which was an
improvement on the original systematic assessment of licensee
performance.
The ROP was developed to look objectively at licensee
safety performance across three broad areas: reactor safety,
radiation safety, and protection of the nuclear power plant.
While I think the ROP is a very strong program for oversight,
we must remember not to get complacent, but rather to look for
opportunities to further improve how we assess plant
performance, and in particular to continue to look at new ways
to measure performance to ensure that we are truly getting an
understanding of what safety is at any particular facility.
Another area that I think has shown dramatic improvements
directly from the aftermath of Three Mile Island is in the area
of emergency preparedness. Following the accident, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission now works closely with the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, with licensees, and with State and
local officials from around the Country to better prepare and
respond to any kind of incident at a nuclear facility.
These programs and the partnerships between all levels of
government built the foundation upon which all hazards
preparedness work is done in this Country. And when the
Commission talks about these issues with members of the public,
we are often told by people who live in the communities that
have nuclear power plants that their emergency preparedness
initiatives are better than any other community because of the
preparedness activities that they do with the nuclear power
plant.
Finally, I would like to turn to one area which I think was
a very important change that came out of the Three Mile Island
incident, and that was in the area of enforcement. Substantial
changes were made in the NRC's enforcement authority, and I
think this continues to be an important change in an important
area as we continue to execute our mission of being an
effective regulator.
I would just like to close with a comment and a quote from
one of the reports that was issued following the Three Mile
Island accident. This is from the Rogovin report, which was a
study that was commissioned by the NRC following the Three Mile
Island incident. And it stated, ``Before March 28, 1979, an
attitude of complacency pervaded both the industry and the NRC,
an attitude that the engineer-designed safeguards built into
today's plants were more than adequate, that an accident like
that at Three Mile Island would not occur, and in the
particular jargon of the industry, that such an accident was
not a credible event.'' I think that the danger of complacency
is as true for us today as it was in 1979, and true in the
sense that those are the lessons and the things we need to keep
our focus on as regulators.
And briefly, then, if I could just add in response to
Senator Inhofe's question, I think an area where we can improve
the process for new reactor applications and one which I think
the industry has made some comments to the agency about, is in
trying to better prioritize the applications that we review,
rather than the approach right now where we review all
applications that come in based on when they come in. Perhaps
we could take our resources and focus first on those
applications that are most likely to be completed in the near
term, and focus our work there to complete those, and then on
the other applicants at a subsequent time.
Thank you.
[Mr. Jaczko's answers to questions for the record follow:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Senator Carper. Mr. Jaczko, thanks so much for that
testimony.
Is it Dr. Lyons? It is, isn't it?
Mr. Lyons. Yes.
Senator Carper. Yes, Dr. Lyons.
Is it Dr. Klein? It's not Dr. Jaczko, is it? All right. Dr.
Svinicki? All right. One mere mortal among all these doctors.
That's good.
Senator Inhofe. Is it Dr. Carper?
Senator Carper. No, I don't think so. I don't think so.
All right. We have plenty of doctors here.
Dr. Lyons, you are on. Thanks for joining us.
STATEMENT OF PETER B. LYONS, COMMISSIONER, NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Mr. Lyons. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to
all of you for holding today's hearing to discuss the 30 years
of experience in applying the lessons learned from TMI. These
vital lessons, fundamental to safe reactor operation, must
never be forgotten if we are to maintain the hard-earned
confidence of the American public and the safety of the
Nation's nuclear power plants.
I support Chairman Klein's testimony and I would like to
offer just a few additional comments.
Evaluating events and learning from them is a simple
concept, but an enormous challenge. Until I studied the TMI
event, I had not realized that virtually the same situation
occurred at the Davis-Besse plant in September 1977. Then, the
operators correctly diagnosed the problem. Unfortunately,
information from that occurrence was never shared with TMI. If
it had been and if the TMI response had duplicated the operator
response at Davis-Besse, the Nation would not have experienced
TMI.
I visited TMI and discussed the event with Mr. Ed
Frederick, who was a controller and operator during that
accident. Prior to that visit, I believed that a simple
explanation of operator error largely covered the event. But by
hearing his explanation of the actions he took that evening, it
became clear to me that the design of the control room and the
instrumentation available to him dramatically limited his
ability to comprehend the situation.
After TMI, far more attention was given to the interface
between operators and the reactor. Today's operators have a
clear understanding of key plant parameters. After TMI, the
operational experience program was strengthened, and the
industry and the NRC thought that we had a solid program.
Nevertheless, in March 2002, the cavity in the reactor vessel
head at the Davis-Besse nuclear plant was discovered. Although
this was a near miss and not an actual event, the magnitude of
the cavity and the potential significance of that event again
sent shock waves through NRC and industry.
That corrosion also had precursors, such that the industry
and the NRC, which were aware of this area of concern, should
have been even more alert to the potential for that type of
problem. Much like the event at TMI, Davis-Besse once again
suggested that the NRC and industry failed to adequately use
operational experience.
Today, our operational experience program is a strong,
solid contributor to reactor safety. Through discussions with
operators at our plants, I am assured that the reports
generated by our program are viewed as very important and taken
very seriously. It is my hope and expectation that no future
event will be partially ascribed to a failed opportunity to
learn from our experiences.
We have come a long ways from TMI. Safety at our nuclear
plants has improved dramatically because of TMI and other NRC
and industry initiatives. But the recent Davis-Besse incident
shows that we must remain ever vigilant that the TMI lessons
are never forgotten.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[Mr. Lyon's answers to questions for the record follow:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Senator Carper. Thank you so much, Dr. Lyons.
Commissioner Svinicki, welcome.
STATEMENT OF KRISTINE L. SVINICKI, COMMISSIONER, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Ms. Svinicki. Thank you, Chairman Carper, Ranking Member
Vitter, Senator Inhofe and Senator Voinovich, for the
opportunity to appear before you at today's hearing.
I support Chairman Klein's testimony as well, and add my
voice to those of my colleagues in supporting the commemoration
of this significant event in our Nation's nuclear history.
Today's hearing and the seminar to be held tomorrow for all
employees at the NRC are important opportunities for the
community of nuclear safety professionals to pause, reflect on
this historic event, and remain vigilant against technical
complacency or overconfidence.
Since I am one of the NRC employees who was not involved in
the nuclear profession at the time of the Three Mile Island
event, in preparation for this hearing I have studied a number
of the written histories and other critical reviews. The
President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island is
mentioned in Chairman Klein's written testimony. In developing
its final report to President Carter on the event, that
Commission took more than 150 formal depositions and
interviewed an even larger group of individuals. At public
hearings, it took testimony and collected documentary material
that it estimated filled about 300 linear feet of shelf space.
In analyzing all this detail, however, their strongest
conclusions were sometimes startlingly simple. Among their
conclusions was the following statement, which I would like to
conclude by quoting briefly from their report. It is as
follows: ``In the testimony we received, one word occurred over
and over again. That word is mind set. At one of our public
hearings, the director of NRC's Division of System Safety used
that word five times in a span of 10 minutes.
``The most serious mind set is the preoccupation of
everyone with the safety of equipment, resulting in the
downplaying of the importance of the human element in nuclear
power generation. We are tempted to say that while an enormous
effort was expended to assure that safety-related equipment
functioned as well as possible, and that there was backup
equipment in depth, what the NRC and the industry have failed
to recognize sufficiently is that the human beings who manage
and operate the plants constitute an important safety system.''
Chairman Carper, in my work at the NRC over the past year,
I have found an organization of dedicated safety professionals
who are ever mindful of this important fact, and who are
committed to its enduring lessons.
I thank you again for this opportunity, and I look forward
to answering your questions.
[Ms. Svinicki's answers to questions for the record
follow:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Senator Carper. Commissioner Svinicki, thank you very much
for your testimony and for your service.
I would just say, before I ask a question, just an
observation. This is a busy time for the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. This is a very busy time. You have 104 nuclear
power plants that require your close supervision. A number of
those plants are in the relicensing process to be relicensed to
operate for another 20 years. I believe there are either 16 or
17 applications to build maybe 26 or 27 new nuclear power
plants. And you have a number of companies that have designed
state-of-the-art nuclear power plants and have presented them
to you for your review, to determine whether or not they are
worth going forward with. I mean, that is a lot. That is a lot.
You have a great agency. It is well known and regarded as
one of the best places for people in the Federal Government,
and probably in any place in this Country. I think you can be
justifiably proud of that.
Chairman Klein, in your testimony you warn against the
dangers of complacency when it comes to nuclear safety. I have
said as much. Others here have said as much. Other
Commissioners have repeated this theme to us. This is not a
time to rest on our laurels. Great progress has been made since
that day almost 30 years ago, but obviously we have to guard
against complacency, and frankly, we can do better.
You say that overconfidence was a factor in the Three Mile
Island accident and in the more recent Davis-Besse episode. How
are you ensuring, you are you, Mr. Chairman, Commissioners of
the NRC, how are you ensuring that your new generation of
employees, folks who weren't around, at least not with NRC, 30
years ago, but many of which are new, how do you ensure that
they too guard against complacency, particularly when it comes
to safe operations?
Mr. Klein. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have a large program that
reminds people about their self-responsibility and their
importance. We do that every time we give our speeches. We do
it in training. We do it in our knowledge management catch-up
program. And so we demonstrate by our actions that we believe
what we say and that they should always be vigilant.
We also have a rotation program where people are able to
rotate within the agency. That challenges them so they don't
get locked into one mind set, as Commissioner Svinicki had
indicated. So what we try to do is continuously reinforce the
importance not only to our employees, but also to the
licensees, that every individual has the authority they need to
carry out their assigned tasks, and we monitor and maintain and
check that.
Senator Carper. OK. You may have said this, but I want to
ask specifically, how are you bridging the education gap
between the older generation at the NRC and the newer
generation of employees?
Mr. Klein. A lot of our individuals who have retired still
want to work, they just don't want to work the 80 hours a week
that sometimes it seems like they do. So they come back and
they are training this next generation. And we basically have
an entire cadre of people that are making sure that we keep our
best practices and our best techniques available.
Senator Carper. Good. I understand that the NRC is again
looking at new license applications, similar to the time up to
Three Mile Island. I think there were a lot of applications in
at that time as well. But how is the NRC making sure that we
don't take our eye off of our current fleet of 104 nuclear
power plants, while preparing for what we hope and expect will
be a new fleet in the years to come?
Mr. Klein. Mr. Chairman, I think one of the ways that we
did that was fundamentally in our structure. We created an
Office of New Reactors, separate from the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, so that individuals in the one division
understand very clearly their role is to monitor and maintain
those 104 plants that are running today. That is their full-
time responsibility, so they don't get distracted with the new
reactors that are underway.
So we created two divisions, one which looks at the new
reactors; one which looks at the existing fleet.
Senator Carper. And do you feel, two questions, do you feel
that the new license process is effective? Do you think you
have enough resources, employees to meet all these jobs that
you are asked to take care of?
Mr. Klein. Well, Senator Carper, I appreciate yours and the
Committee's support on giving us the finances we need to make
our decisions to protect the American people, to ensure that
these plants are safe and secure. And I believe that we do have
a work force that is adequate to carry out that mission. We
work at it very hard. In 2007, for example, we hired 441
people, for a net gain of 219. Sixty percent, six zero, were
women and minorities. And so we have a very aggressive
recruiting campaign. We have gotten very talented individuals,
and I believe we have the resources that are necessary for us
to do our job.
Senator Carper. All right. And a question for Commissioner
Jaczko, and then I will yield to Senator Vitter.
But let me go back to the issue of transparency and
miscommunication that were problems during the Three Mile
Island accident, and just ask, how has the NRC improved, made
improvements in those areas? And what do you think we could do
better? What do you think the NRC could do better?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, I think some of the areas where we have
made real improvements in transparency in particular, as I
mentioned in my initial statement, is in the area of emergency
preparedness. We have much more clearly defined plans for the
plants. We exercise those plants in a significant way, with the
local communities, so that provides a much better avenue for
communication. Because one of the areas of tremendous
challenges for information flow during the accident was what
exactly the response needed to be to deal with the evacuation,
and who needed to be evacuated, and in what time.
So I think there have been a lot of improvements made in
that area in particular, where we have established better
processes and better exercise those processes now so that
begins to share information.
We just fundamentally live in a much different world now,
where information flow is much easier than it used to be, with
the Internet, with outreach to individuals. We have a much, I
think, more transparent program. I guess I would just finally
add that the new oversight program that we have is also much
more geared toward transparency and geared toward providing
more information to the public about what the status is of any
particular power plant or any particular facility that we
regulate.
So I think those are some of the specific areas where we
have made real progress in the area of transparency.
I think one area that we can make improvements on, and it
was an item that was addressed, I believe, in the Kemeny
Commission report, and that is to continue to improve on our
ability to communicate in plain English, I guess is the phrase
we like to use, where we are communicating complex technical
information in a way that the public can understand without
necessarily having a background in nuclear engineering or
nuclear science.
So that's an area where I think we could continue to
improve, and that probably means more training and continuing
to train our individuals, not just in their technical
expertise, but in how to communicate that to an audience that's
not technically educated.
So I think those are some areas where we have done well and
where we can work on getting a little bit better.
Senator Carper. Good. Thanks for those responses.
I think I have consumed 7 minutes. Let's just say each of
our colleagues have 7 minutes.
Senator Vitter, you are up next.
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is to anyone who cares to answer. Could you give any
specific examples since Three Mile Island, not so much Three
Mile Island, but since then, of how operating experience has
improved plant operations today, including your guidelines for
that?
Mr. Klein. Senator Vitter, I think there are a lot of
examples that we have that can demonstrate that. I think one of
those is the sharing of information. It is much more openness
between the industry and among the industry. I think the
creation of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations has
helped to share good practices and good techniques, and also
bad practices and bad techniques, so those are not repeated.
So I think communication is an area that we have really
improved on. The success rate, as seen by these two charts,
demonstrates that we cannot become complacent, but the trends
are positive.
Senator Vitter. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lyons. Senator Vitter, as the Chairman said, there
could be a number of examples, but if I can give you just two.
One would be an issue that occurred several years ago in
cracking of dissimilar welds at the Wolf Creek Plant. That has
led to a concerted effort that the NRC has carried out with
industry to evaluate any potential for such cracks at other
plants. That would be one example of how operational experience
is being used directly to improve safety today.
If I could give you one other example, which is sort of a
cross between operational experience, as well as addressing
questions on complacency. There is now in the lobby of the NRC
a model of the Davis-Besse cavity, the corrosion cavity that
occurred in the vessel head. It is not only a constant reminder
to our staff of the need to avoid complacency, but also an aid
in operational experience of the importance of being ever
conscious of the concern for corrosion.
So those would be two examples.
Senator Vitter. Great. Thank you very much.
Again, this is to each of you, and I would love each of you
to give at least a brief response. A lot of folks have
suggested, broadly speaking, that in the U.S. we should have
more standardization within our nuclear industry of design and
operation. What would your comment be on that with regard to
both safety improvements and efficiency improvements,
particularly in getting new plants online?
Mr. Klein. Senator Vitter, I think all of us have commented
at one time or another that standardization is very important.
When I talk to the industry, and I talk about standardization,
I want the walls to even be painted the same colors. And we
really do need to standardize. It would make our job as a
regulator easier, and it would make lessons learned easier for
the industry. And the industry is moving in that direction. We
have several different vendors, but within each vendor we
expect standardization.
Mr. Jaczko. If I could add, and I certainly agree with the
comments of the Chairman. I would perhaps just expand that a
little bit by saying that I think standardization is certainly
an enhancement for efficiency, and ultimately in the end can
allow us to deal with generic issues, generic safety issues
that may arise, in a more straightforward manner, because we
don't have to tailor the solution to 104 unique plants, which
is what we find ourselves in with the situation today with
several generic issues that we are wrestling with, that the
solutions are so unique and so specific to each plant that it
consumes a tremendous amount of resources to have to analyze
those individually. So there is, I think, an enhancement,
certainly from the safety perspective.
I think the biggest challenge is how we actually achieve
that. We don't impose standardization as a safety requirement.
We encourage it, and we encourage it very strongly right now
because if the designs that we are reviewing are not truly
standardized, we simply won't have the resources to review all
the applications that we have in a timely manner. So that has
been a good incentive from the licensing review perspective to
get standardization.
The challenge will be if plants are licensed and then
built, how we maintain standardization among different
utilities that may all have a similar design. That is not a
requirement that we have, as I said, from a safety perspective,
so that is where it will be much more incumbent upon the
industry to police that initiative themselves, to ensure that
plants that were licensed the same are operated and ultimately
modified in the same way as we go forward, so that we don't
branch out and modify them in unique ways in the future.
Thank you.
Mr. Lyons. I certainly agree with the comments made by each
of my colleagues. Standardization is very, very important. It
is important not only to the regulator, but also to industry.
We can be more efficient. We can better assess safety issues
across the fleet. I concur with Commissioner Jaczko that the
main way that we can encourage standardization is when we tell
industry that if you standardize, we can be far more efficient
and effective in our reviews of your application. That is the
main tool we have toward standardization, and maintaining
standardization, as my colleague said, is also vital.
Thank you.
Ms. Svinicki. Senator, I know you don't have much time for
questions if you get four answers to each, but I agree with my
colleagues. Clearly, standardization holds the potential of a
lot of increases in efficiency. The timeframes for review that
Senator Inhofe was talking about, more standardization allows
us as a regulator to capture the efficiencies in those reviews.
And also as Commissioner Jaczko said, it has an enduring
benefit as new reactors would be added to the current fleet.
Standardization would continue to provide efficiencies for us.
Thank you.
Senator Vitter. Let me end with this follow up question.
Given all of your answers, shouldn't we or you or both of us
consider actually mandating more standardization than we do at
present?
Mr. Klein. Well, Senator Vitter, I think the industry has
the message. I think we as regulators have the message. In the
United States, we support the concept of free enterprise. It
was easier for France to standardize when they had one vendor
and one utility. We have multiple vendors and multiple
utilities. And so, I think the way we will encourage
standardization, as opposed to mandate it, is by the review
process. If someone comes in with a non-standard design, it
will take us a very long time to look at it.
Senator Vitter. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Carper. Good questions.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first of all kind of go back a little ways. I am one
of the few who actually remembers Three Mile Island and all the
hysteria and the public clamor that came out of that thing.
Would you, Chairman Klein, describe to us any public health
impacts that resulted from that accident 30 years ago?
Mr. Klein. Well, Senator Inhofe, I think the concern that
people typically have is concern about cancer. And there is no
data that shows there has been any negative impact of cancer
from that accident.
Senator Inhofe. Is there any data that shows that there was
any resultant public health impairment as a result of that
accident?
Mr. Klein. No evidence of that, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. You know, I think that's significant,
because you talk to most people and they don't realize that.
They assume that. And yet, I would have to say, and I think
that each of you in the Commission would agree that because of
that incident 30 years ago, that did retard our efforts to move
forward with nuclear energy. And I wonder, any thoughts about
where we would be today if that had not happened?
Mr. Klein. You know, that's a difficult question. One could
speculate about that, but as you indicated, I think Three Mile
Island should have shown that the safety systems were fairly
robust, and that there were no negative health impacts. But
certainly the public confidence was shaken, but that also
occurred at the same time that we were undergoing a transition
into reduced baseload demand of electricity. So there were,
after Three Mile Island, there were a lot of coal-fired plants
that were canceled as well due to the lower baseload demand.
But my guess is that had Three Mile Island not occurred, we
would likely have had more reactors today than we have.
Senator Inhofe. Well, and we didn't anticipate back at that
time 30 years ago that we would be having the energy problems
that we have today. I mean, here we are with 20 percent of our
energy coming from nuclear and some of the Western European
countries, France, I believe is 80 percent.
I have never heard anyone talk in any of these hearings
about the performance of whatever the counterpart is called in
one of these other countries like France. Are they going
through about the same things that we are right now, even
though they are way in advance of us? Are they as concerned
with safety? Are they concerned with the same concerns that you
folks have? How do you compare us to them?
Mr. Klein. I think, Senator, if you look at the performance
of the plants, in general our plants perform better than a lot
of countries. I believe that as the regulatory body, we are
still viewed as the world's best regulator. We have more
people, a lot more technical details. But we also have things
we can learn from other countries, and so we share.
We have a very large international program where we try to
share information among various regulators. And I know that
Andre Lacoste, the head of the French regulator, is also going
through and trying to beef up their regulatory capabilities.
But I think for most countries, they are similar. I think
our job as a regulator in an international arena is to share
best practices worldwide because, as we learn, even though we
have no reactors like Chernobyl in the United States, there was
still a lot of uncertainty and apprehension from Chernobyl. So
we need to be proactive in the international community.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Lyons.
Mr. Lyons. Senator Inhofe, France certainly has a very
strong safety regulator, a very effective one. But I think it
is interesting to note that within the last, I would say, 2
years there have been legislative changes within France that
have moved their regulatory system much closer to ours, in that
their regulator now has a substantially greater degree of
independence, and basically is now an independent regulator, as
we are, and in addition has mandates for transparency and
public information.
If I were to look across the world, I think that two
important trends would mirror what has happened in France, that
more countries are recognizing the importance of an independent
regulator, of strong public input, and public information as we
have. In addition, a quest that I would say that we have been
on in many of our international discussions, is to encourage
more countries to look at both safety and security as two
integrated functions, two very important integrated functions.
Many countries handle these completely separately.
Senator Inhofe. You know, I hesitate even getting into the
thing on the 5 years that it takes the NRC, as indicated to
this Committee, that it takes about 5 years reviewing new
reactor designs before granting certifications, because safety
is the most important thing. I understand that.
Commissioner Jaczko, you said when I was saying, you know,
if there is a way that we could reduce that 5 years down, move
a little bit faster, you talked about prioritizing
applications. I would like to ask each of you in my time
remaining of any ideas you might have that might shorten that
5-year period of time and maintain the same level of safety
that we enjoy today.
I will start with you, Commissioner Svinicki.
Ms. Svinicki. Senator, one of the practices that Chairman
Klein brought from the Pentagon was referred to as Lean Six
Sigma, which is a process whereby our staff has gone through
and looked at all of the procedural steps for reviewing these
applications. The Commission has received some suggestions from
the staff of how to better coordinate their internal work and
the coordination that needs to occur between offices. So they
are looking at it, Senator, if they could take some months off
of that process. The Commission has received some
recommendations that we are looking at now.
Senator Inhofe. Good, good.
Mr. Lyons.
Mr. Lyons. Senator Inhofe, at least one suggestion I would
make would be the hope that industry in the future could follow
more directly the path that we anticipated when Part 52 was
created. We anticipated that a site would go first for an early
site permit, that they would be using a certified design, and
only then would be going for the construction and operating
license. I believe it is correct that no licensee, no applicant
right now is following that exact path. There certainly are
other areas where we can look for efficiency, but having that
process followed would help us.
Senator Inhofe. I see.
Commissioner Jaczko.
Mr. Jaczko. Well, as I talked about, I think the area of
prioritization, as Commissioner Svinicki mentioned, the staff
has talked about areas where we could improve our review a
little bit, but we are talking about months perhaps. And the
biggest challenge that I see right now is really getting the
design reviews completed. And for most of the designs that we
have right now, there are some challenges in getting those
reviews completed.
So once we can have that completed, the licensing review
will be a much more straightforward process. But right now,
there are challenges, I think, with getting the design review
complete. And as I said, I think our focus would be better on
taking a few, maybe a smaller number of those designs and a
smaller number of licensees or applicants, focusing on getting
those through the process once, demonstrate how it will work
effectively, and then turn to the other applications.
Senator Inhofe. So we would effectively be getting them
online faster by doing that, but not as many of them.
Mr. Jaczko. Not as many.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
Chairman Klein, any last comments on that?
Mr. Klein. Well I think, Senator Inhofe, on the design
certifications, those are fairly unique. One thing I have
learned is that a good application takes less time than an
incomplete one. And so it is a two way street, I think. I think
industry needs to give high quality applications and we need to
be responsive in the review of that application.
I think on the license applications, once we go through a
few of those and we practice the Lean Six Sigma activities, I
think we will become more efficient with no compromise on
safety.
Senator Inhofe. Good.
Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Carper. You are welcome. Thank you.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I
didn't say a few words on the Davis-Besse incident, because
that facility is located in the State of Ohio. I was Chairman
of the Subcommittee when that occurred, and as I said in my
opening remarks, we took the NRC to task, as well as First
Energy. We devoted three oversight hearings to follow up on the
NRC's corrective actions stemming from the GAO and inspector
general reports.
We also met with Nils Diaz, the NRC chair at the time, and
Ed McGaffigan privately on a quarterly basis to get updates. It
took a little while and some pushing, but I was pleased to see
NRC formally incorporating safety culture into its inspection
and regulatory oversight process.
As you all know, we are trying to launch the nuclear
renaissance in this country. We need to get into it for
reducing, providing baseload energy. We need it also to meet
the emissions caps that we will be seeing probably with new
legislation being passed to deal with climate and global
warming. And also it is an area of large job creation.
But I still run into people out there that are saying,
well, what about safety? What about the security of these
plants? Aren't they, you know, vulnerable right now to
terrorist attack? That is one thing. Then you hear another
story out there about all this nuclear waste that is all over
the United States being held in dry and wet storage, and how
safe is that stuff?
And also, if something would happen, you know, what kind of
insurance do they have? They have no idea about Price Anderson
and the way the insurance if something would happen. All of the
insurance carried by all of the 104 would be used to deal with
a situation.
And I still think, and it is a complaint I have, is that
you are not doing a good enough job getting information out
there in the country. There is still a lot of stuff that is
floating around, and these same people that are out there, you
know, talking about this are the ones that are standing in the
way of our moving forward right here in Congress in some areas
that we should be going forward with.
I would be interested in your commenting on these.
Mr. Klein. Well, Senator Voinovich, I believe that as an
agency, we can be more proactive on education. We have to walk
that fine line, as Senator Carper indicated. We have to
remember we are the regulator, and not a promoter.
I would like to see the Department of Energy be more
proactive in their roles and responsibilities. The area of
communication, though, is one in which I believe the NRC can do
better. I think we would like to modernize our Web sites so
that we become the site of first choice if someone has a
question.
As Commissioner Jaczko indicated, we do need to train our
individuals to communicate clearly and succinctly. As I
oftentimes say, I am an engineer, so if you ask an engineer
what time it is, they will tell you how to build a watch.
So I believe we can do a better job on communication and we
are working on it.
Senator Voinovich. How about the whole issue of the nuclear
waste that we are generating, and the fact that we continue to
have it located in dry and wet storage, and people are
concerned about that all over the Country? What do we say to
them about that? How long can that last?
Mr. Klein. Dry cask storage is safe. We license those
facilities. We currently have made a determination that we can
safely secure and store that material onsite for as long as 100
years. But as a Nation, it would be good to come forward with a
long-term waste solution.
For us, as a regulator, we make sure that the dry cask
storage is done safely, properly and securely. As you know, we
have the application before us for the Yucca Mountain site. We
by law are required to look at that application and we will do
that in a very effective manner, depending on the resources
that we have available.
Senator Voinovich. So what you are saying to me and saying
to the public is that the current way of holding that waste at
the facilities around the Country is safe. And second of all,
that there is some extended life in terms of it being stored in
that fashion. Because most people today believe Yucca ain't
going to happen, and so there is a concern about that. And some
of us are considering doing something as an alternative to
that.
So you are telling me and telling the public that the waste
that is out there today being stored in dry storage is safe,
and that we can continue to do this for some time in the future
without being concerned about it?
Mr. Klein. Yes.
Mr. Jaczko. Senator, if I could add, the NRC did a study
about dry cask storage several years ago, and that study found
that the risks from any of the spent fuel, particularly in dry
cask storage, was about a million times less than the risk from
the power plant itself. So what you often find is communities
that are very accepting of the power plant, may have concerns
about the waste. And in fact, I think the waste, we have shown
through our analysis, is much, much, much less of a risk.
So I think that is a message that we can communicate. I
think the licensees themselves can do a better job
communicating that message as well in the communities that do
have facilities, about really what the areas of focus from our
perspective really should be from a safety standpoint.
Senator Voinovich. And also security.
Mr. Jaczko. And security as well.
Senator Voinovich. In terms of, you know, terrorist attack,
you hear that. Oh my goodness, if something happens there that,
you know, we will have calamity.
Do you want to comment on that, the security aspect of
this? We are talking about safety and security.
Mr. Jaczko. Senator, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has
one of the most longstanding programs in security. It goes back
to the 1970s, our ideas of how we deal with facilities and deal
with security. And I think the agency was in a very good
position, in particular, following September 11 because we had
a well established program, that we were able to quickly make
changes, make modifications to deal with that new issue.
We have a very rigorous program right now where we do
exercises at facilities on an ongoing basis to test their
security programs. We have put in place new requirements for
the existing fleet of reactors to ensure that they can mitigate
the effects of any kind of 9/11 type incident. And we put in
place very strong requirements for new reactors to ensure that
they will be able to deal with some of the 9/11 type incidents
and things that could happen in the future.
So I think we have a very robust program in security. We
are continuing to make that better. We are continuing to
improve our communication in our work with other members of the
Federal family, including the Department of Homeland Security,
the FBI, to ensure that we have security covered from all the
different angles, whether it is from the facility itself,
whether it is from responding to an event at a facility, or
developing the emergency preparedness and training and
interface that is necessary to successfully deal with an
incident.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Ms. Svinicki. Senator, if I could just draw together your
last two questions on communications and security. I would like
to add that one of the unfortunate outgrowths of the enhanced
security at reactors post-9/11 is that so many had to close
their visitors centers and their information centers. As I
visit reactor sites now, I often notice that along the
roadside, the entrance to the plant, they have large signage
for a visitors center with a big placard across it that says
now closed to the public.
I am heartened that some of the new reactor applicants are
considering how they are able to site some sort of public
information center that they can put far enough away from the
reactor at new sites so that they could once again be
communicating with the public.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Mr. Lyons. If I could just suggest, Senator, that one way
of perhaps reinforcing in the public's mind the safety and
security of dry cask storage, and this would be something that
industry could do, would be to make some of those casks
available for public inspection.
I think anyone who has had the opportunity to view those
casks, to simply stand beside them, realizes the number of tons
of concrete and steel that are in those things. I think they
would develop a very healthy respect for both the safety and
security of dry cask storage.
But I also agree with your point and I personally hope that
the Congress would be looking toward development of a long-term
spent fuel policy that would give the American public a clear
view of where we would be going far into the future.
Senator Carper. Senator Voinovich introduced me to the
concept of roundtables, as opposed to committee hearings,
several years ago. And I like them a lot, and we are going to
hold a roundtable in Cambridge, Massachusetts on Monday
morning, May 18, and invite some very smart people up there to
come and share with us what they know about spent fuel.
We talk about it as nuclear waste, but actually I
understand there is a fair amount of energy still unrealized
and unextracted from this spent fuel. So we are going to find
out their ideas, hear a little bit about what is going on in
other places around the world, and tape the brains of some
very, very bright people, and also have an opportunity to bring
in maybe a person or two to talk with us about clean coal and
sequestration of CO2.
The responsibility of this Subcommittee is dual in purpose.
One is clean air, and the other is nuclear safety, and they are
related, but we want to make sure we have an opportunity while
we are there that morning, and my hope is that Senator Vitter
and Senator Voinovich and others on the Subcommittee, Senator
Merkley, can join us for that time.
All right. Speaking of Senator Merkley, he has joined us
here, and we are delighted you are here. He is not a new Member
anymore. He is an old veteran, and we are happy he is here, and
welcome to our hearing.
Senator Merkley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
And thank you for your testimony. I will just have a couple
of quick questions. One is, I believe that there are some
facilities that still have nuclear rods stored in pools,
whether they are in dry cask. But if you could just kind of
characterize, if you could, the amount of storage that is still
done, wet storage if you will, and does that pose greater
risks, and is there a strategy for moving to a dry cask system?
Mr. Klein. All nuclear power plants use wet pools. In fact,
we require the ability to offload the entire core of a reactor,
if need be, into the adjacent spent fuel pool that is in water.
So every commercial reactor that is running has a wet pool.
They typically want to utilize that one first, and then they
only go to dry casks once that wet pool is filled. Both are
safe.
Senator Merkley. And why is it they want to utilize the wet
pool first?
Mr. Klein. It was a part of the initial design. That was
the initial concept. It also has decay heat removal, so you
will remove the decay heat from the spent fuel for several
months before you would ever consider putting it into dry casks
for decay heat removal.
Senator Merkley. I had the experience a few years ago of
being up at Hanford, and walking on the metal grating on top of
a pool. And it is a strange feeling, with the nuclear rods down
at the bottom. And I asked the question, well, what happens if
an earthquake comes through here and this water is lost? And
the answer was just summarized as, well, that would be bad.
But could you kind of give us a better sense of kind of the
safety issues related to the wet pool storage?
Mr. Klein. Well, Senator, as you might expect, all of those
facilities have to meet earthquake requirements. They typically
are robust. There are very thick walls. Some have liners. And
so in the event that there could be a crack in that pool that
water would leak out, and again these are very thick pools,
several feet of concrete, it is important that the plant has
the ability to quickly add water.
Senator Merkley. Turning to another safety issue, in terms
of the dry cask above-ground storage, are there issues there
related to potential terrorist actions? What happens if a dry
cask is blown up in terms of radioactivity in nearby areas? Is
there a terrorist risk? How do we address it?
Mr. Klein. Well, Senator, we have analyzed the terrorist
risk on those dry casks. You know, there are a lot of factors
that go into that, much of which we can't say publicly, but we
have analyzed a lot of what if scenarios, what kinds of
attacks, and how they might occur. These are very robust
canisters, and so we believe that from all of our analyses that
it is a minimal risk.
Senator Merkley. Thank you.
Senator Carper. Thank you, Senator Merkley. Thanks for
joining us.
Let me just conclude as this first panel wraps up, with a
couple of thoughts. One point I made earlier, folks at the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission are busy these days, very busy.
You are always busy, but especially these days, saying grace
over the safe operation of 104 active nuclear power plants;
relicensing probably I think a couple dozen of them right now;
reviewing the applications for I think 26 or 27 new nuclear
power plants which could be built in the years to come; and
examining carefully, closely the new designs for nuclear
reactors that are being presented to you. And you are doing it
all at once.
And trying to provide a good working environment for
people, and providing diversity in your work force. That is a
lot. That is a lot to do well. It is a lot to manage. And we
are counting on you to continue to do that work and to do it
well. It is important. Our Nation needs safe nuclear energy as
much now as we ever have.
I have been reminded several times in this economic
calamity that we are going through in the last year or so,
especially the last several months, of the words of Franklin
Roosevelt, who said to the American people a long time ago,
``We have nothing to fear but fear itself.''
We have, oh gosh, earthquakes to fear. We have terrorist
attacks, I suppose, to fear. We have most I think to fear
complacency, complacency. If we think that, oh, we have come a
long way, we haven't had an accident, a major incident for all,
lo, those many years. We have done a much better job in terms
of raising the operating capacity to realize more nearly the
full capacity of the generation of electricity by these nuclear
reactors. We have come a long ways in the last 10 or 20 years.
Here is what we have to fear. We have to fear complacency.
To sit back and rest on our laurels, that would be the worst
thing that could happen. This is a time to remain vigilant.
Several of you have used that word, vigilant. And this is
indeed a time to remain vigilant. And if we do, then the future
for nuclear energy in this Country, along with it the prospect
of cleaner air, the prospect of less dependence on fossil
fuels, the prospect of maybe even smaller trade deficits is
actually enhanced.
So all that would be great news for our Country, which
right now needs some great news.
All right. That is it for this panel. Again, our thanks to
each of you for your service, for being with us today. We will
provide probably for the record some additional questions. We
will ask that you respond to those promptly.
Thank you so much.
Mr. Klein. Thank you for your support.
Senator Carper. You are quite welcome.
Gentlemen, welcome, one and all. We are delighted that you
are here. We are very much looking forward to your testimony.
It is great to see some of you for the first time, and to be
able to welcome others back. Thank you for joining us today.
Just a real short review of your bios, and we will start
with Hon. Peter Bradford. Mr. Bradford was an NRC Commissioner
during the Three Mile Island accident, served at the age of,
what, 12, I think he told me? He was 12 years old at the time.
Today, he is an Adjunct Professor from the Institute for Energy
and the Environment at the Vermont Law School. Welcome.
Is it Dr. Bradford? Yes, it is. Thank you.
He is a former Chair of the New York and Maine Utility
Commissions and has advised many States on utility
restructuring issues and he is also on the board of the Union
of Concerned Scientists. I think in reading Governor
Thornburgh's testimony, I think he alluded to calling on the
Union of Concerned Scientists to help out during the time that
that was most helpful.
Mr. Harold Denton, it is great to see you, sir. I read all
about you in Governor Thornburgh's testimony and the kind of
role, the key role that you played all those years ago, 30
years ago. And I understand you were onsite directing NRC's
staff activities and served as the Federal Government's
spokesperson for the Three Mile Island accident. You were also
the first, in the first group of Americans allowed to visit the
Chernobyl site. And after retiring from the NRC, you consulted
on other nuclear safety matters and retired and currently live
in Knoxville, Tennessee, where my wife went to graduate school.
Welcome. We are glad you are here.
Governor Dick Thornburgh, Governor Thornburgh was Governor
of Pennsylvania for, what was it, 72 days or so before this
incident?
George, can you imagine that? Senator Voinovich, a former
Governor like you imagine being Governor of Ohio or Governor of
my State of Delaware and having something like this dropped on
you 72 days into your first term. That would be quite an
experience.
But not only, I call guys like you and Senator Voinovich
and me recovering Governors, but not only are you a recovering
Governor, but you had a public career spanning some 25 years,
including Attorney General for not one, but two Presidents, and
currently of counsel to the national law firm of Kirkpatrick
and Lockhart here in Washington, DC.
Thanks for joining us.
Finally, Dr. Marvin Fertel. Mr. Fertel is President and
Chief Executive Officer of the Nuclear Energy Institute, with
35 years of experience consulting for electric utilities.
We are delighted that you are all here. We would ask you, I
have read your testimony, wonderful testimony. We would ask you
to try to limit your comments to about 5 minutes.
Mr. Bradford, I think, has to leave around 12:30. We have a
Caucus luncheon that starts just after that, so we will try to
get us out the door close to that time. But Mr. Bradford, if
you need to leave right at 12:30 and we are not quite done,
feel free to slip out. But you go first, and we are just
delighted that you are all here. Thank you so much for coming.
STATEMENT OF PETER A. BRADFORD, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, INSTITUTE
FOR ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, VERMONT LAW SCHOOL
Mr. Bradford. Thank you very much, Senator Carper. I
apologize to you and my fellow panelists for the scheduling
constraint. The consolation I can offer Governor Thornburgh is
that I am inconveniencing him less this morning than I did on
the morning we were on opposite ends of the phone line between
Washington and Harrisburg 30 years ago.
I appreciate the opportunity to reflect on the lessons of
Three Mile Island. With all of the interest in new nuclear
power reactors in the U.S., as well in extending the licensed
lives and increasing the output of the existing plants, getting
the lessons right is crucial, just as important as not learning
the wrong lessons.
The principal conclusion of the Kemeny Commission was,
``After many years of operation of nuclear plants, with no
evidence that any member of the general public has been hurt,
the belief that nuclear power plants are sufficiently safe grew
into a conviction. This attitude must be changed to one that
says nuclear power is by its very nature potentially dangerous,
and therefore one must continually question whether the
safeguards already in place are sufficient to prevent major
accidents.''
The Kemeny Commission also found, ``That the NRC is so
preoccupied with the licensing of plants that it has not given
primary consideration to safety issues.''
Occasional mishaps in the 1980s and 1990s notwithstanding,
the NRC and the industry made many significant improvements
after the accident at Three Mile Island. Then at the Davis-
Besse Plant in Ohio in 2002, complacency and excessive concern
for the finances of the power plant owner very nearly cost them
all the ground that they had gained.
Davis-Besse had received the NRC's highest safety ratings
throughout 2001, even as boric acid was eating away the reactor
vessel head. Only a three-eighths of an inch thick steel liner
performing a function for which it was not designed avoided a
hole in the pressure vessel, an event not analyzed in NRC
licensing because it was considered impossible.
Among the lessons of Three Mile Island is that nuclear
power is least safe when complacency and pressure to expedite
are highest. A key corollary to this lesson is the importance
of congressional oversight, emphasizing that safety must be the
NRC's highest priority.
Of course, this goal is always stated verbally, but at
times the message has been mixed. Senator Pete Domenici wrote
that he changed the NRC's priorities in a 1998 meeting with the
NRC Chair in which he threatened to cut the agency's budget by
one-third if the NRC did not modify its adversarial attitude
toward the industry.
If, when the NRC regulates seriously, it is hammered for
delay or indifference to cost, as the NRC was in the weeks
before the Three Mile Island accident, that message will have
an impact. Today's hearing can be a very useful antidote to the
dangers that lie on that road.
Finally, avoiding the wrong lessons is as crucial as
learning the right ones. An oft-repeated Three Mile Island
story line goes something like this. ``The most important
lessons is that the safety systems worked as intended.
Interveners exploited the accident to tie up nuclear reactors
in interminable and costly hearings. These problems have
largely been solved. If Congress will further streamline the
licensing process and shift financial risk from investors to
taxpayers, nuclear construction can resume its rightful place
in furthering national energy goals''.
But this story line is a harmful fantasy, inviting the
wasting of a lot of money and effort in solving problems that
nuclear power never had, while repeating the cycle that caused
Forbes Magazine to proclaim in 1985 that the failure of the
U.S. nuclear power program ranks as `` the largest managerial
disaster in business history''.
When TMI is seen together with the fire at Browns Ferry 4
years earlier, and with other expensive mishaps such as fuel
cladding failures, emergency core cooling system shortcomings,
seismic design retrofits, and absence of offsite emergency
plans, a clear picture emerges of a technology pushed far ahead
of its operating experience.
In 1968, the largest nuclear plant in operation was half
the size of the smallest plant under construction. This was as
if the airline industry had gone from Kitty Hawk to jumbo jets
in 15 years. In 1972, the Atomic Energy Commission forecast
that the Country would need 1,000 nuclear power reactors by the
year 2000. This would have required the regulators to issue a
license every week for the next 28 years, a pace that could not
possibly have been sustained. In hindsight, trouble and
disappointment were inevitable.
The nuclear regulatory problem culminating in the accident
at Three Mile Island was not that the United States had
licensed too few nuclear plants too slowly. The Country had in
fact licensed too many reactors too quickly. That is why within
a decade of the TMI accident, we had a landscape dotted with
nine figure cost overruns. Every State in a crescent from
Mississippi to Washington, and in a line across the northern
tier from Illinois to Maine, was touched by at least one event
involving the waste of more than $100 million.
NRC hearings did not close Three Mile Island. NRC hearings
had nothing to do with the quality assurance breakdowns at
Diablo Canyon and Zimmer. NRC hearings did not cause the diesel
generator building at Midland to sink into the soil, or the
tenfold cost overruns at the never-operated Shoreham Nuclear
Plant in New York.
Indeed, study after study made clear that NRC hearings have
little to do with nuclear power's real problems. The reasons
for nuclear power's inability to compete in U.S. power markets
are beyond the scope of this hearing. But they have not been
fixed by measures that assume that they were caused by Three
Mile Island or by an overly cautious regulatory process.
Indeed, they have not been fixed at all.
Again, my thanks to the Subcommittee for the chance to
expand on some of real and some wrong lessons of Three Mile
Island. Undertakings such as this hearing as the way for the
U.S. to learn history, rather than repeat it.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bradford follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Senator Carper. Dr. Bradford, thanks very much for those
comments and for your presence here today.
Mr. Denton, welcome. Glad to see you. Thank you for joining
us.
STATEMENT OF HAROLD DENTON, FORMER NRC EMPLOYEE
Mr. Denton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Committee. I am glad to have this opportunity to meet with you.
On Friday morning following the accident, Chairman Hendrie
requested I go to the site and take charge of the NRC response.
I would be President Carter's contact and work closely with
Governor Thornburgh. A few hours later, the White House sent a
helicopter to take me and Members and our staff to the site. On
arrival, I asked the utility to inform us in advance of any
changes they made in the status of the plant so that we could
review them, and we began around the clock coverage of all the
operations at the plant.
Within a few days, we had over 100 NRC people at the site.
The President asked during that time to be kept fully informed
and had specific times that he wanted to be called in the
morning and night. In addition, he indicated that all the
resources of the Federal Government would be made available to
bring the situation to a safe conclusion. I briefed Governor
Thornburgh each evening and as events required, and he and I
held press conferences nightly for many days there.
I had never met President Carter or Governor Thornburgh
before, but they appreciated the gravity of the situation. They
were personally involved every day, and it was just remarkable
cooperation that occurred during that whole crisis, between the
Federal Government and State government.
For example, I hadn't signed any paperwork through those
weeks. I did not approve or request any formal assistance that
required paperwork. The military provided logistical support.
They brought in plane loads of equipment from around the
Country and people. The Department of Energy did environmental
surveillance around the plant with all their capability.
We were not an operational agency. We were a paperwork
review agency, so we had very little capability, operational
capability. So someone found phones available for the fire
service, so they served as our phones for communicating within
our staff members. I stayed there for 3 weeks. The event was
hectic and challenging and at times surreal.
We were not sure and did not understand the full
consequences of that accident for a long time afterwards. We
originally knew that there had been a severe accident. That was
inferred from measurements made outside the containment. When
the core was finally accessible and people were able to look
inside the core, the examination showed a drastically different
appearance than most people thought.
The uppermost fuel assemblies were completely destroyed,
and research showed that about 45 percent of the core had
melted. The critical phase of the accident was actually over
Wednesday morning in looking at this accident in retrospect.
Operators turned off redundant emergency core cooling systems,
although the reactor was losing water continuously through a
failed valve. No core damage would have resulted if the
emergency pumps, which were started automatically had been left
running, instead of being shut off.
About 100 minutes into the accident, the water level
dropped below the top of the core and the fuel began to
overheat. As the water level continued to drop, more and more
of the central core melted and flowed downward and solidified
when it reached the bottom of the reactor vessel.
Approximately 4 hours later, nearly 20 tons of molten core
material had reached the bottom of the reactor vessel. The
circular area at the bottom of the reactor vessel experienced
extremely high temperatures for about 30 minutes before
cooling.
At 16 hours into the accident, the operators managed to re-
start pumps and provided a way of getting water back into the
core and providing subsequent cooling. A robust reactor
containment structure proved valuable during this accident. The
offsite radiological consequences were minimal.
The history of containments is kind of interesting to me.
The first containment was in use proposed back in 1947 by a
blue ribbon committee of the Atomic Energy Commission. Since
that time, containment structures have always been a safety
feature of commercial reactors.
During the TMI accident, the total amount of iodine
released, which is a particularly hazardous material, was about
one million times less than that released as a result of the
uncontained Chernobyl accident in the Ukraine. Also, we found
that as a result of studies after the accident that the
possibility of the penetration of the containment basemat by a
molten core, commonly referred to as the China Syndrome, which
had not been studied since prior to the accident, is very
unlikely to have penetrated the containment basemat even if the
hot core had reached the basemat.
A second topic that was subject to a lot of review at the
time was the possibility of a hydrogen explosion within the
containment. There had been a hydrogen explosion in the
containment, but that led people to start thinking about could
there be a hydrogen explosion within the reactor vessel.
Calculations had been done, but they had neglected a reported
factor that indicated that oxygen would recombine with the
hydrogen in the water essentially as soon as it was generated,
so there never was a chance for a hydrogen explosion in the
reactor.
As you mentioned before, the accident was comprehensively
examined by a number of investigations, including the
President's Commission.
Senator Carper. Mr. Denton, you are a little bit over 6
minutes. I am going to ask you to try to wrap it up here very
shortly if you can, please.
Mr. Denton. All right.
My conclusion is that the safety of power plants today is
better than ever as a result of all the lessons learned.
Federal and State preparations for emergency planning are
better than ever, coping with new standard designs, and coping
with the fact that the nuclear technology doesn't really exist
in the U.S. today as it did back in those days, there will be
continuing challenges for the NRC Commission.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Denton follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Senator Carper. Thanks. Your entire statement will be made
part of the record. When we add new questions, I am going to
come back and ask you to kind of go back and revisit that last
part of your testimony for us, if you would. Thanks so much.
Governor, General Thornburgh, we are delighted that you are
here. I don't know how many people have been both a Governor
and Attorney General for two Presidents, but not too many. So
it is a real honor for us that you are here. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DICK THORNBURGH, OF COUNSEL, K&L GATES LLP, FORMER
GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLVANIA
Mr. Thornburgh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
Subcommittee. My full written statement attempts to recount on
a day by day, hour by hour basis the events of March 28, 1979,
and the days immediately following, from my vantage point as a
newly minted Governor of Pennsylvania.
Senator Carper. I think we all found it just very
interesting. All the testimony is very good, but it was just
riveting the way you documented it. So it was very interesting.
Mr. Thornburgh. Thank you.
The statement addresses a couple of things that I want to
emphasize about the emergency management side. One is the
constant frustration that existed concerning the inability to
acquire reliable information about what was transpiring at the
damaged reactor, and the difficulty in communicating between
various centers of activity.
Remember, this was an era before we had cell phones, the
Internet, BlackBerrys, video conferencing and the like. Land
lines, which were the exclusive way to communicate, were
frequently jammed, even the so-called hot line which had been
established between the White House and President Carter and
myself.
Reliable information concerning potential threats to health
and environment were equally hard to come by. Experts
proliferated, but most of them were of little use. They either
exaggerated the safety or exaggerated the threat of the
situation.
I would be remiss if I didn't pay particular tribute to
Harold Denton, who proved to be the real hero of this episode.
He had an ability to translate nuclear jargon into plain
English. He had a calm demeanor that built confidence and
credibility, and he served as an effective antidote to the
coincidental opening of the movie The China Syndrome in the
Harrisburg area just prior to the accident. Talk about surreal
events. That had to be one at the top of the list.
We have seen 30 years pass since the time of the event, and
I want to offer some brief observations on the future of
nuclear power in light of present day circumstances.
Energy independence is a byword today. A familiar litany
has developed about the need to rely more on alternate sources
of energy, but most people acknowledge that the prospects of
substantial and timely relief from hydro, wind, solar, biomass,
et cetera, is highly unlikely.
As a result, there is a growing and renewed interest in
nuclear energy, which is now supplying in many countries around
the world more than the majority of their energy needs.
There is more and more interest in all non-carbon producing
sources, such as nuclear, even among some environmentalists who
are traditional opponents of nuclear energy. Concerns about
global warming have made strange bedfellows indeed.
The predictions of a comeback for nuclear power must be
tempered, however, by major concerns that exist, and I will
refer to those briefly. Nuclear technology, as has been
referred to today, has become increasingly complex and
demanding, and more expensive, and we have to rely more and
more on foreign component manufacturers. Even the pioneer in
this area, Westinghouse Electric in my State of Pennsylvania is
now owned by Toshiba.
The costs of construction are going to go up, increased
financing costs, the $18.5 billion loan guarantee program
authorized in 2005 has been underfunded and understaffed, and
now must compete with other priority needs.
The safety record that has been referred to this morning,
and it is certainly improved since pre-1979 times. Emergency
management capabilities at the State and local level, while
they have no doubt been upgraded, have not been tested, and
with the passage of time no doubt have not been the high
priority that they were in the immediate aftermath of TMI.
I think the most important and sizable barrier to a
vigorous development of nuclear power in the U.S. is the
inability thus far to solve the problem of the disposal of
spent nuclear fuel. President Obama's scuttling of the Yucca
Mountain site is only the most recent setback in the effort to
tackle this vexing challenge.
Surely, this has to be a high priority in the expenditure
of Federal research and development funds, even to the point of
committing to a Manhattan Project type undertaking, to call
upon our technological expertise to remove a significant
barrier to helping to solve our energy problems and contribute
to a better quality of life for all of our citizens.
Thirty years after the Nation's most serious nuclear
accident, we have yet to address many of these key issues in a
systematic way, and I compliment you, Mr. Chairman, and your
Members, in calling this hearing to spotlight some of these
issues.
If we continue on our present path, we threaten to deprive
ourselves of a potential green source of much-needed electric
power.
Many thanks. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornburgh follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Senator Carper. Governor, thank you so much.
Mr. Fertel, Marvin Fertel, welcome. We are happy that you
are here. Thanks.
STATEMENT OF MARVIN S. FERTEL, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, CHIEF NUCLEAR OFFICER, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE
Mr. Fertel. Chairman Carper and Members of the Committee,
thank you for holding this hearing today.
As you know, this month marks the 30th anniversary of the
accident at Three Mile Island. Since then, the nuclear energy
industry and the Federal Government have dramatically increased
safety and reactor operating standards and developed a safety
culture that we believe is demonstrably among the best in
American industry and worldwide.
The accident at Three Mile Island has had profound and
lasting effects on virtually every aspect of nuclear power
plant safety and operations. Lessons learned from the accident
are permanently ingrained in the nuclear industry's training,
procedures, regulations, and culture.
The Kemeny Commission, which has been referred to earlier,
recommended two things that we took very seriously. First,
``that the nuclear power industry should establish a program
that specifies appropriate safety standards, including those
for management, quality assurance, and operating procedures and
practices, and that conducts independent evaluations.'' And
second, ``that there must be a systematic gathering, review and
analysis of operating experience at all nuclear plants, coupled
with an industry-wide international communications network to
facilitate rapid flow of information to affected parties.''
The industry took those recommendations and formed the
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 9 months after the
accident, and charged it with promoting the highest levels of
safety and reliability in the operation of our plants.
The institute drives operational excellence, open
communications, and continuous improvements among all U.S.
nuclear plant operators. All U.S. energy companies that own and
operate nuclear plants are members of INPO and they are driven
by INPO to continuously strive for excellence in reactor
operation.
INPO has had a profound impact on the way nuclear plants
are managed and operated. The proof, we believe, is in the
steady improvement in plant performance over the last three
decades since the accident. To improve training, INPO in 1985
formed the National Academy for Nuclear Training to focus and
unify industry efforts to continuously improve training and
qualification programs and to promote professionalism of
nuclear plant personnel. The academy reviews nuclear utilities
training programs for key positions at each plant.
Since TMI, the industry also introduced the use of plant-
specific reactor control room simulators at every site. In
1979, there were only four simulators for the use of all
nuclear plant operators. The number of operating crews was
expanded, and each crew spends a week in training in the plant-
specific simulator every 6 weeks.
INPO also provides a unique form of self-regulation and
recognition that the nuclear industry's standard is excellence.
INPO teams conduct onsite 2 week inspections at each plant once
every 2 years to assess the knowledge and performance of plant
personnel, the condition of systems and equipment, the quality
of programs and procedures, and the effectiveness of plant
management. Each year, INPO conducts meetings with all of the
industry chief executive officers, in which both the good and
poor performance is openly discussed, providing accountability
for plant performance at the highest level of management.
INPO also reviews significant events at nuclear plants and
communicates lessons learned and best practices throughout the
industry. INPO provides assistance with specific technical and
management issues in areas related to plant operations and
support.
And as mentioned by the Governor, although emergency
preparedness procedures had been in place prior to the TMI
accident, it was clear from the event that additional action
was required. As a result, the industry developed comprehensive
emergency preparedness and response programs in cooperation
with Federal, State and local leaders, and additional
requirements were imposed by NRC and FEMA.
The TMI-2 accident caused no injuries to workers or the
public, but there was emotional distress as a result of the
event and related evacuation of residents near the plant. A
dozen epidemiological studies conducted since 1981 have found
no discernible direct health effects in the population in the
vicinity of the facility, and these studies are all summarized
in my written testimony.
Since TMI, one of the nuclear industry's tenets is to
never, and this is a term you have heard from everybody so far
today, become complacent in our vigilance for safe operations
of nuclear facilities. To prevent complacency, the industry is
taking proactive actions to identify and resolve any emerging
issues promptly and effectively, and to communicate operating
experience broadly across the industry.
The goal is to identify equipment or human performance
problems well in advance of any significant impact on plant
operations.
Mr. Chairman, to conclude I would want to assure this
Committee that the accident at Three Mile Island has had
profound and lasting effects on virtually every aspect of
nuclear power plant safety and operation. Today, the industry
is more efficient, more productive, more professional and above
all, more committed to safety. We continue to share operating
experience and lessons learned because we will not allow
history to repeat itself.
Safety is and will continue to be our highest priority. The
safety of our reactors today is evident in the world class
performance of the facilities, and the exemplary worker safety
record across our industry.
Thank you for this hearing, and thank you for your interest
in our industry.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fertel follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Senator Carper. Mr. Fertel, thank you for joining us today
and for your testimony again today.
Dr. Bradford, I would just ask my colleagues to direct
their first questions to you, and then we will come back and
ask questions of our other three guests.
The question, the first question I would like to ask of
you, if I could, I am reminded, I think it was Harry Truman who
used to say, ``The only thing that is new in the world is the
history we never learned or have forgotten.'' And I like to
think of Three Mile Island in the context of lessons that we
learned, lessons that we didn't learn, and maybe lessons that
we learned, but we have forgotten.
Let me just ask you, thinking back, taking that approach of
lessons learned, lessons never learned, and maybe lessons
learned, but forgotten, just kind of tell us what you think in
those three broad categories.
Mr. Bradford. Well, I probably can't do much with the
learned but forgotten category because I have forgotten it.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Bradford. But in the context of the push for a nuclear
renaissance, it does seem to me that one lesson that at least
has faded from the forefront is the difficulty of maintaining a
strong, clear focus on safety at a time when the rest of the
Government seems entirely focused on licensing additional
plants. That was very much the concern at the time of the
accident at Three Mile Island. The pace of new applications had
fallen off, review times had gotten longer. And many of the
congressional hearings and much of the media's focus was why
can't we get this process started up again.
And in some ways, that pressure did contribute, I think, to
the combination of complacency and haste that led to the
accident.
So my concern today in a context in which the industry is
seeking your support for all of, essentially financing all of
the plants that they see in the pipeline, is similar to the
concern that Commissioner Jaczko echoed, or articulated well in
the last panel, that there really is a need to prioritize, to
pay attention to the pace at which the NRC can license and the
taxpayer can afford to build the new plants. It may be
different from the pace that the industry would like to move
forward at.
And that the setting of limits based on what the process
can handle, rather than what the industry would like might make
a significant contribution to safety. So maybe that one lesson,
in a way, answers all three of your questions. It seems to me
to have been an important lesson at the time of Three Mile
Island, and there is a danger of its being overlooked and
forgotten in the climate that exists today.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you.
One last question from me, and then I will yield to Senator
Voinovich.
I think you expressed concerns in your comments, or at
least in your testimony, about the streamlining of the license
process. What are your views on the current new and renewal
license process? And do you feel public input is adequate on
those?
Mr. Bradford. I am glad you asked that question, Senator.
In the context of your discussion with the previous panel on
communication, I was running through in my mind all the areas
in which I agreed that communication has improved.
But there is one respect in which I think communication has
regressed, and that is that the public has far less access to
the licensing process today, not just because of the one step
process. In many ways, that change is constructive. But the NRC
has also adopted a number of rule changes that drastically
curtail the ability of people participating in their process,
first to raise contentions effectively, and second, to pursue
them.
Attorneys can no longer cross examine directly in many
situations. They have to submit questions through a panel
chair. And that's really an area of the Kemeny Commission and
the NRC's own Special Inquiry Group Report that has just been
ignored in the years that went by.
The Kemeny Commission recommended that the NRC create an
Office of Special Counsel to represent the public in its
hearings. The Rogovin Group actually went further and
recommended intervener funding. None of that has happened. In
fact, the NRC hearing process in some ways has become almost a
show trial in terms of the public's ability to be heard
effectively.
So I think the reforms in the direction of one-step
licensing posed difficulties, but they also offer benefits. The
exclusionary regulations that the NRC has adopted seem to me to
be a mistake, an unfortunate one.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you, sir.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. One of the things that we try to
concentrate on during the last number of years is human
capital. And I have found because of my experience on the
management side of government that so often regulatory agencies
aren't able to do the job that you would like them to do
because they don't have the resources to get the job done.
I would be interested, Mr. Denton, in your reaction to what
Mr. Bradford said earlier, and that is that there was a
movement in the Country of having too many, too fast, that by
2000, 1,000. I don't know who predicted that, but that was
pretty ambitious.
And then contrast that today with the situation where the
Nuclear Regulatory Agency is probably the only Federal agency
that has been able to replace the retirees that they have had,
and in addition to that bring on new people to take care of the
challenge of the new licenses that are coming before it.
Mr. Fertel, you are watching this, too, and I might be
interested in your comment in regard to that because the
impression that you have, Mr. Bradford, is that they are not
able to get the job done.
I have to tell you that Senator Carper and I have worked
very, very hard to create an environment there where they can
replace their people. We have given them flexibilities that
other agencies don't have. They are No. 1 in the Federal
Government in terms of job satisfaction with their people. We
have reached out to MIT, even Ohio State in Ohio, Cincinnati,
to get the schools back on track in terms of producing the
people that we are going to need for this renaissance that we
hope takes place.
So I would just throw that up, a jump ball, and give you
all a chance to comment on it.
Senator Carper. Dr. Bradford, feel free to go first if you
would like.
Mr. Bradford. My concern is less with resources directly,
because I agree that you have been very supportive of the NRC
with regard to getting people for processing additional
licenses. The concern is, that I have is more that when the
Commission comes before various congressional committees and if
the message is constantly one of are you meeting the licensing
deadlines, are you avoiding delays, how can we squeeze a few
more months out of the process, and they are never asked about
the resolution of generic safety issues, and never asked to
put----
Senator Voinovich. But you see, that is not the case, Mr.
Bradford. Have you followed the numerous hearings that we have
had? Twenty of them over the last number of years. That is not
the case.
Mr. Bradford. No, sir. I have only been here this morning.
Senator Voinovich. Well, I think it would have been good
for you to maybe check in to see what has happened during the
last 8 years.
Mr. Bradford. Well, you know, if you have put the same
emphasis on getting a schedule for the generic issues, getting
them on a track, being sure that the resources are available,
that is terrific. And if all the other committees that they
come before have done the same thing, that is terrific, too.
But if that isn't the balanced communication that they are
getting, then there is the possibility, indeed the likelihood,
that in trying to be responsive to the Congress, people will be
shifted into the areas that the Congress is most concerned
about.
It happened certainly at times in the 1970s. That is the
era that I am familiar with.
Senator Voinovich. Can I ask you something? Do you believe
that we should go forward with a nuclear renaissance? Do you
believe that nuclear energy is something that we should
increase in this Country in terms of baseload generation? Do
you believe that nuclear power is something that is available
to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions?
You know, or are you just, I mean, where do you stand on
that?
Mr. Bradford. You know, I spent 20 years in positions of
responsibility for the power supply to two States, and by the
end of that time, my effort was devoted to creating processes
that made the wisest economic choice essentially through the
kinds of competitive market processes that we use in every
other area, with the investors responsible for taking the risks
and the customers responsible for paying off the costs once the
plants are serving them.
When those processes were put in place, nuclear power never
bid. The investors would not take those risks. I would be glad
to see nuclear power be part of a climate change solution
package when it reaches the point in time that it is able to
compete effectively in those power supply markets. And those
markets have made sure that more than half of the customers in
the U.S. in the regions that have gone to power supply markets,
have had adequate electric supply for the 25 years now that we
have been relying on them.
But nuclear power can't play in those markets. And it
troubles me greatly to see the Congress asked to pick this one
technology and favor it heavily in financial terms.
Senator Voinovich. Do you know something, that nuclear
power has, in terms of, if you look at solar and wind power and
see where the money that we have spent during the last several
years is going, that is where the money is going.
I think the only thing that the industry is concerned about
is the issue of loan guarantees that would be necessary to go
forward, and of course a little bit more important today
because of the fact that the financial markets are in such bad
shape.
But if you look at where we have spent money, it is
amazing. You know, if I were somebody out there today, I would
invest in solar and wind power because of the subsidies that
are coming out of the Federal Government in that regard.
Mr. Bradford. When it comes to government support, they
have a long way to go to catch up with nuclear.
Senator Carper. I am going to have to interrupt here. I
will call on Senator Voinovich here in just a moment, but I
want to yield to Senator Merkley for any questions you have of
Dr. Bradford, and then he will be free to leave.
Senator Merkley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Professor, I thank you for your service as a Commissioner
and the other work you have done. I find it very interesting to
see the story, the history of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant,
and essentially a leaky nozzle eroded the carbon steel,
multiple inches of carbon steel over a series of 4 years, and
then there was a football-sized hole in that, and the inner
lining, stainless steel lining, was deformed by the pressure of
the vessel into that hole.
And the role of the NRC in this was multiple. First, they
had been requested to require inspections of these nozzles
because they had been known to leak. After 4 years of debating
that, they decided not to require those inspections.
Then fast forward to 2001, they did take much stronger
action and require plants to inspect those nozzles. The Davis-
Besse Plant was one of two plants they decided not to do that,
and resist that requirement. And the NRC did relent at that
point and decided it would be safe to wait until the plant
inspection in 2002. They decided that, no, it should really be
done, and ordered the plant shut down for emergency inspection,
but the plant resisted and then they went back to the position
of waiting until the safety inspection. It is when they had
that February inspection they discovered this football-sized
hole.
Does kind of this story give us any sense of insight into
the role of the Commissioners, the pressure they are under to
keep plants operating? And do we have an adequate system in
place to be able to address the real safety risk? Because I
think this is believed by all to have been a substantial safety
risk. Do we have a system now? Have we learned from that enough
to restructure the way NRC operates in order to have them be
able to stand up and really ensure that inspections take place,
even when it involves shutdowns and costs and so forth? Have we
figured out that balance? Or is there more we need to do?
Mr. Bradford. I wish you had asked that question of the
previous panel, of course, because I am not there today and
can't----
Senator Merkley. But they are in the middle of it, whereas
you get the objective experience to----
Mr. Bradford. It is, you know, it is clear certainly that
the licensee made its concerns known at the Commission level,
and that would probably happen today, too.
On the other hand, I assume the Commissioners with the
benefit of what happened at Davis-Besse would almost certainly
push back perhaps more than occurred at that time.
At the end of the day, the public's greatest safeguard in
this area lies in the process of the appointment of
Commissioners, the questions and decisions you make in
confirming Commissioners, and the practices and procedures the
Commissioners themselves put into place to protect the staff's
technical judgments from any political or financial intrusions.
The protection that the public will get in these kinds of
situations will be just as good as the standards that you
insist on in confirming and that the President insists on in
making the appointments.
Senator Merkley. Thank you. I think you have summarized
that it remains an inherent challenge. We have to protect the
integrity of the staff judgments and try to insulate the
Commission from political or economic pressures that might
overrule the safety judgments of the technical staff. Is that a
fair way to summarize your point?
Mr. Bradford. It is. Yes.
Senator Merkley. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Bradford. I think there is perhaps some encouragement
to be had in the study that Chairman Klein cited regarding the
high staff morale in the agency, because that is not suggestive
of a place where the staff feels beaten down at the moment in
its ability to raise concerns. At least that is my hope that
that is what that study is suggesting.
Senator Merkley. Thank you.
Senator Carper. Thank you, Senator Merkley.
And then Dr. Bradford, it is 12:30. Thank you so much for
joining us.
Mr. Bradford. Thank you very much. Again, my apologies to
the Committee.
Senator Carper. We are glad that you could come, and thank
you very much for your input.
A question, if I could, for Governor Thornburgh, and
perhaps for Harold Denton as well.
Governor, how important was it looking back 30 years, how
important was Harold Denton's ability to communicate
complicated technical information to the lay public, to
ordinary people during an event of this nature?
Mr. Thornburgh. It was crucial. It was crucial because this
was a technology not known to the general public or to those of
us in public office. The so-called experts were beleaguering us
with conflicting advice, and we really, I told President
Carter, I said send us one good person who could provide us
with reliable information upon which we could make judgments
with regard to emergency management.
And without embarrassing him, I have to say that when
Harold showed up, it was clear that he filled the bill.
Senator Carper. Mr. Denton, how did you feel when you were
tapped for this assignment? It is not every day that a
President calls and says, Harold, I have a job for you.
Mr. Denton. Well, I was shell-shocked probably at getting
this assignment. When I went up, I thought that perhaps the
White House would have a staff member up there and I would
report to that person, and then this person would report to
Governor Thornburgh. But I found out the moment I landed at the
site the word had come in to us somehow that I was to call the
White House, and I remember turning to my secretary, who had
gone up with us, and I said, call the White House. And she
replied, well, how do I do that? And I said, I don't know,
Doris, that is your problem.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Denton. And I must have been under a lot of stress to
snap at her like that, but she did get the White House, and the
fact that the President was so willing to commit the resources
of the Federal Government and so concerned about our relations
with Governor Thornburgh and others, I felt pretty confident at
the time that we would make every effort to bring things to a
safe conclusion, and that is what we did.
And there was just unparalleled cooperation among all the
Federal agencies. I had never participated in any of the
training for public affairs or public speaking sort of thing,
but I did hold a press conference every day, and I think that
was part of the secret that I came away with from that is that
you need both technical people, subject matter specialist I
will say, and elected officials to properly talk to the public.
Technical people don't really communicate well. They are
not elected. They don't necessarily understand the local
context. The Governor brought that aspect to the communication
process. Without that, people would probably still be
evacuating.
Senator Carper. The two of you made a good team.
Let me ask both Governor Thornburgh and you, Mr. Denton, do
you believe that the NRC has gone some way toward rectifying
their communications problems? Doing a better job at it now or
not?
Mr. Denton. You mean in operation of reactors or in
licensing reactors?
Senator Carper. Just being able to communicate their work,
their role, their concerns, their efforts to focus on safety.
Some of these issues are pretty technical. Most people in the
Country aren't all that good at understanding some of that
stuff. I struggle with it as well.
Mr. Denton. I don't think there has been a real advance in
that area. I have wondered at times if Commission meetings held
out in the region of the plant might be, you know, one way to
do that. Not all meetings have to happen in Washington, for
example.
We would hold staff meetings in regional areas when there
were problems, but usually the Commission didn't feel willing
to move Commission decisionmaking out to a region.
We have also been very uneasy about appearing to take sides
on these arguments about should the plant be licensed or not,
except through formal mechanisms. So a lot of people who are
unhappy with Commission decisions never get a chance to see
their decision challenged, so to speak, outside of a courtroom.
Senator Carper. One last question for Governor Thornburgh,
and perhaps for you, Mr. Denton. But do you feel that the
States are better prepared? Do you think they have more of the
tools that they need to meet an accident of this nature today,
than maybe 30 years ago?
Mr. Thornburgh. That is still an item of concern to me.
Thirty years have gone by, really a whole generation has grown
up without having fresh in their memory the experiences of
Three Mile Island. I think one would hope that those lessons
have been learned. I did a lot of yapping about it when I was a
Governor. We spent a lot of time focusing on emergency
management issues.
But it really bears substantial repeating, because the
first lesson that I set forth in my written statement was
expect the unexpected. And I think sometimes we are not as good
at that as we would like to be.
I would just add one thing to Harold Denton's observations.
Mercifully, I haven't since 1979 had occasion to deal with the
NRC in an emergency situation. But I don't think there is any
question but what at the very least that got their attention.
I think that one of the things that both Harold Denton and
I agreed upon in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island
incident was you can't manage this kind of an emergency
situation away from the site. And most of the problems that
evolved during this experience resulted from a failure to
observe that.
And I think his observations about getting the Commission
and its staff out among the folks is good for any government
agency, and I would second that motion as well.
Senator Carper. Thank you.
Mr. Fertel. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Carper. Just very briefly. My time has expired and
I want to go to Governor Voinovich. Just very, very briefly. Go
ahead, very briefly. Thank you.
Mr. Fertel. OK. The only thing I would add to what the
Governor just said to your question is that there are exercises
around every site every 2 years, which has gone on very, very
rigorously. Where I think there has been significant
improvement, not only in analytical tools like dose assessments
and communication things and siren systems, is in relationships
among the site people who interface on drills and everything
else with the local and State people.
Where I actually think what we do around our sites is
negative training goes a little bit the other way. You heard
the Governor and you heard Harold talk about how long this
event took to evolve, and how it went. Well, when we do an
exercise, we get to a general emergency as severe, if not much
more severe, than what happened at Three Mile Island in a half
a day.
And we are conditioning people in decisionmaking in the
State and local government to think that this happens that
fast, and it doesn't. So I think we have improved a lot, but we
may be doing negative training in certain respects.
Senator Carper. OK. Thanks for that comment.
Governor Voinovich. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. I am thinking about the security at
these facilities. Several years ago, someone asked if we were
going to have a terrorist attack or something in Cleveland,
where would you go? And Davis-Besse is about 20 minutes from my
house, and I said I am going to Davis-Besse. It is just amazing
what they are doing out there. I have even said I visited other
Federal facilities in the United States, and the security just
is really not up to what it should be, and I said, why don't
you get in a car or fly a plane and get out and see how we are
securing our nuclear facilities around the Country.
I think it is important for everyone to understand that not
only has this Committee, Subcommittee, had 20 hearings in 8
years. That is two and a half a year. But I can tell you that
Senator Carper and I have met, and I personally have met with
Nils Diaz and now with Dale Klein, who I believe is really
doing an outstanding job, in my office. I think sometimes
people think that the oversight that is getting done by
Congress is done at these hearings. And yes, they are very
important, but it is that special time that a Senator spends
with the people that run the agency and the Commissioners that
make a difference.
Senator Carper, since he has taken over the chairmanship,
has also had these groups of people together, and getting their
input. We are going to be going up to MIT to get their slant on
things.
So I think it is real important that people understand that
we are pretty sincere about what we are doing, and I think it
is important. Maybe Mr. Fertel you could comment on the
fastidiousness now that we have at the NRC since Davis-Besse.
There is no question that they weren't getting the job done.
There were lessons learned there. The industry wasn't doing the
job. And they weren't doing the job.
But I think there is, and I would like to share with you
some of the things that they have done since then to really
demonstrate that if there is anything that looks like it's not
where it should be, they just shut them down. It is a very
interesting difference of the way they are handling it.
Plus one other thing, and that is INPO, your organization,
that I think the people that run these places understand today
that they really have to be on their toes. I have had some
people tell me that this peer pressure is enormous in terms of
getting them to do the things that they should be doing.
So Mr. Fertel, would you like to comment on that?
Mr. Fertel. I had the distinct pleasure of sitting here
before you after Davis-Besse and saying how it was a failure
not only on the company's part, and the NRC's part to some
degree, but also on INPO's part from an industry standpoint.
And INPO has dramatically modified its assessment process, with
safety culture being a core portion of it now.
In every INPO evaluation, safety culture is considered and
in addition the plants do self-assessments on safety culture
biannually. So from an industry standpoint, to some degree
Davis-Besse had a real ground-breaking change for us, just like
TMI did 30 years ago for operational safety.
At the NRC, they did a very significant lessons learned. As
you said, Senator Voinovich, they now look at safety culture as
part of their reactor oversight process, which they didn't
before. They are looking at improving how they do that, and
they have implemented, I think, on the order of 18 to 20
different lessons learned that came out of the Davis-Besse
experience.
So we have seen a dramatic change within our own industry
in how we look at it. And NRC has implemented a pretty dramatic
change within their own oversight the way they look at it. So
it has had a big impact.
Senator Carper. All right.
Senator Merkley, the last word here.
Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Governor Thornburgh, in your testimony, you noted that the
added cost and increased scrutiny by regulatory authorities
since the accident, together with decreasing costs from
competing sources, have added up to an uncertain future for the
industry.
I am assuming you are describing a situation in which the
process of responding to the risk of human error, the risk of
natural catastrophe, the risk of terrorist attack have driven
up costs, while some other non-carbon sources, we have new
innovations that are reducing the cost of solar, wind, or so
forth.
When you see these things through the picture of a non-
subsidized competition, if you will, is there a clear hierarchy
in terms of the most cost-effective strategies to produce
carbon dioxide-free electricity?
Mr. Thornburgh. It would take a wiser man than me to answer
that question, I think. It's not an area that I feel
comfortable in. I think the point that is made here is that
given the enormous concern about safety and the experience of
the Three Mile Island accident, the regulatory overburden is
bound to be greater for the nuclear industry than for other
competing sources of energy.
Now, how that breaks down quantitatively and what kind of a
box score you come up with in making that comparison, I am
really not qualified to say. But I think it is without doubt
that that regulatory overburden varies directly with the amount
of public concern over safety and threat to the environment,
both of which have underscored a lot of the opposition to
nuclear power over the years.
Senator Merkley. Mr. Fertel, did you want to?
Mr. Fertel. Yes, I mean, what I would say in response to
your question, Senator, is that right now our 104 plants are
basically the lowest cost electricity in our Country outside of
hydro. So with the burden of the regulation, which is
appropriate in most cases, both security and safety, we are
still after hydro the least expensive cost to consumers.
With regard to new plants, our capital costs are certainly
higher than others, but we think the electricity will be
competitive. With regard to Peter's comments about subsidies,
the loan guarantee program that we are in, we pay for. So it is
not a subsidy. We actually pay the government money for a loan
guarantee that we would get, just like you would pay the bank
money for a loan that you would get. So I am not quite sure
where the subsidy comes in.
Senator Merkley. Could I follow up on that point?
Senator Carper. Sure. Go ahead.
Senator Merkley. So my understanding was that there is a
cap on liability of $10 billion, with the estimate of a single
major incident being perhaps up to $300 billion, and that the
private cost of providing that kind of insurance is so high
that essentially investors would not invest if the government
didn't provide that cap.
Is that the subsidy you are referring to?
Mr. Fertel. No, that may be something Peter refers to, and
he's totally wrong. To just be straight about it, Price
Anderson, which is a law that Congress enacted and has renewed
I think five times, doesn't cap our liability. It imposes a
liability. There is no other industry in the world, chemical
industry, nuclear industry, elsewhere, anywhere, that has a $10
billion liability for an accident that might happen.
The most severe accident that we have ever had is Three
Mile Island, and basically Price Anderson ended up paying out
money to people around there on the order of about $100
million. So we have a liability of $10 billion, which is a
pooled liability for our industry, no taxpayer money. There is
insurance for the first primary coverage of $300 million, but
you have a pooled liability. It's not that you can't purchase
liability insurance. But if you look at 64 sites with $10
billion at each site, it is $640 billion worth of third party
liability, which I believe is much greater than all of the
third party liability insurance in the country though I
honestly have never been able to get an answer from the
insurance companies on what the capacity is.
But I don't think there is that much liability capacity in
the country to try and do it. So we would argue, we have the
best liability program in the world, that other countries try
to copy, as opposed to a subsidy.
Senator Merkley. I will just look forward to following up
with you, because my understanding was that you are required to
buy insurance, but at the same time the law caps your exposure
to $10 billion. So we can follow up and get more information.
Mr. Fertel. Sure. What Price Anderson does is it requires
us to buy $300 million, whatever is in the market at the time,
and that's what everybody has. And then it requires, escalating
with inflation, each site, if I have an accident at my site and
I have to basically go into bankruptcy, all the other plants
have to pay the rest of the liability up to $10 billion.
If we ever got to $10 billion, and keep in mind we have had
no accident that gets you anywhere near it, if you ever got
there, the way the law is written, Congress would then decide
whether or not the industry should continue to pay more, or
Congress would intervene and decide that, no, the industry
shouldn't, but it would be a decision by the Congress.
Senator Merkley. Thank you.
Senator Carper. Well, gentlemen, this has been an
enlightening morning and early afternoon. I want to really
thank you for joining us today.
Governor Thornburgh and Mr. Denton, it is just really
heartening for me and I think to all of us to see the two of
you sitting together side by side, arm in arm, still trying to
help get us through some tough, challenging times.
Mr. Thornburgh. A mutual admiration society.
Senator Carper. Oh, it's a good one there.
Mr. Thornburgh. We saved each other's necks.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. And you saved some other people's necks as
well.
I want to conclude just by saying that we may have some
follow up questions that we will submit in writing, and if you
could respond in a timely manner, we would very much appreciate
that.
With that having been said, to my colleagues and to our
staff who worked on this hearing today, thank you all.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m. the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[all]