[Senate Hearing 111-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 3, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 9:31 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Inouye (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Inouye, Dorgan, Shelby, and Brownback.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Department of the Army
Office of the Secretary
STATEMENTS OF:
HON. JOHN M. McHUGH, SECRETARY
GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY, CHIEF OF STAFF
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DANIEL K. INOUYE
Chairman Inouye. The hearing will come to order.
This morning, we welcome the Honorable John McHugh,
Secretary of the Army, along with General George Casey, the
Chief of Staff of the United States Army.
Gentlemen, we thank you for being here with us today as we
review the Army's budget request for fiscal year 2011.
Before proceeding, I'd like to announce that, because of
illness, the vice chairman will not be with us this morning. In
his place, we have the gentleman from Alabama.
The Department of the Army's fiscal year 2011 budget
request is $143.4 billion, an increase of $2.5 billion over
last year's enacted budget, excluding funding appropriated to
the Army in the fiscal year 2010 supplemental.
The Army also has requested $20 billion for overseas
contingency operations for the remainder of this fiscal year,
primarily to fund surge operations in Afghanistan. In April of
last year, President Obama and Secretary Gates announced
substantial initiatives within the Department of Defense to
strengthen our All-Volunteer Force, change how and what the
Department buys, and rebalance military capabilities.
After an overhaul of the Army's modernization effort last
year, fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $3.2 billion for
the Army's revamped Brigade Combat Team Modernization Program
and provides $6 billion for Army aviation. The fiscal year 2011
budget request builds upon the reform agenda set by Secretary
Gates last year and supports the final year of a 5-year plan to
restore balance to an Army that has experienced the cumulative
effects of years upon years of conflict.
The subcommittee is looking forward to hearing not only
about these efforts, but also about the Department's vision to
rebalance and reshape, as directed in the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) completed this past January. One of the central
themes of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review is balance. The
Department needs to find balance between providing capabilities
to prevail in today's wars, while building the capabilities
needed to counter future threats. The Army is shouldering a
very heavy burden, since it has been conducting combat
operations in two theaters while transforming and modernizing
at the same time. However, budget pressures to support current
operations have made it very difficult to allow for the
investment in modernization.
Not only is balance included and needed between meeting the
demands of today and the threats of the future, it is also
needed within each of the military services, and the Army has
continued to answer the Nation's call, but it has been at the
expense of maintaining a well-balanced force.
We are aware of the demands created by more than 8 years of
continuous war. Repeated and lengthy deployments have stressed
our soldiers, their families, and our support systems and
equipment. Currently the Department is managing a shift in
focus in our overseas contingency operations. While the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq has begun, an additional
30,000 troops have been committed to supporting operations in
Afghanistan.
Since the Army is the service most heavily engaged in these
operations, the Secretary of Defense has permitted the Army to
retain 22,000 soldiers, temporarily, above the authorized end
strength of 547,000. This decision was made to acknowledge the
fact that future readiness is dependent upon restoring balance
and lessening the strain upon the force.
Finally, there is one other type of balance that this
subcommittee will be looking for during the budget review, the
balance between risk and resources. The Quadrennial Defense
Review has set the agenda and defined requirements, and
presumably the Department has budgeted for those priorities.
However, there will never be enough resources to eliminate all
risk. It is our hope that today's hearing will help illuminate
how the Army's fiscal year 2011 budget request addresses the
recommendations of the Quadrennial Defense Review while
maintaining balance among a number of valued, yet equally
important, priorities.
Gentlemen, we sincerely appreciate your service to our
Nation and your dedication and sacrifices made daily by the men
and women in our Army. We could not be more grateful for what
those who wear our Nation's uniform do for our country each and
every day.
Gentlemen, your full statements will be made a part of the
record.
And I would now wish to turn to the Senator from Alabama.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief. I
just want to join you in welcoming Secretary McHugh and General
Casey to this subcommittee. They're no strangers here.
Thank you.
Chairman Inouye. I thank you very much.
Now, with that, Secretary, we are depending on you, sir.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MC HUGH
Mr. McHugh. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
As you noted, we'll enter, with your permission, our full
statements into the record. And I know time is of some concern
here this morning, so I just would like to summarize a few of
those points.
First of all, I want to, at the risk of stating the
obvious, say what an honor it is to be here today. I had the
distinct honor of serving for 17 years on the House Armed
Services Committee, and in that time I gained a great
appreciation for the great work this subcommittee does, for the
enormous support that it has, historically, and certainly under
the leadership of you, the vice chairman, and the current
members, have continued in support of not just our Army, but
all of our services. I certainly want to take this opportunity
to express my personal appreciation and thanks for all that you
do, and all that you will continue to do.
If I may, Mr. Chairman, just a few comments on my now 5
months as the 21st Secretary of the Army. And while it's been a
crash course of learning, I think some things are obvious. And
I would add, Mr. Chairman, in listening to your opening
comments, I think you've encapsulated very well the key
questions, the key challenges that lie before us.
As you've said, Mr. Chairman, and as I have seen from the
first day I walked into that hallowed building on the other
side of the Potomac, this is an Army that clearly is fatigued,
is stressed by nearly 9 years of combat. But, it is still an
Army that is amazingly resilient, that is amazingly effective.
Today, as you know, this is an Army that has more expertise,
more education, it has more capability and lethality than any
Army in our Nation's history. That is, in no small measure,
because of the great support and leadership that has come out
of this great subcommittee.
Those are significant gains, but, in spite of those gains,
this is, quite simply, an Army that is, and remains, out of
balance. The Chief of Staff--General Casey--and my predecessor,
Pete Geren, the Army leadership, along in partnership with the
Congress have made great progress in bringing that balance
back. I think, one of the key assets and key attributes of the
President's proposed budget is that it allows us to continue
the regaining of balance, and, in fact, should allow us to
finish it. But, this is a very delicate balance, and we need to
stay focused on that objective.
You noted, Mr. Chairman, the variety of appropriations that
take us toward that goal, the $1.7 billion in requests to
continue to fund our vital family programs in support of those
amazing families, and other initiatives. I won't continue to
repeat those, but a couple of other points, I think, do bear
noting.
We remain extraordinarily committed to our wounded
warriors. Tomorrow, I will have the opportunity to pay my
regular visit to Walter Reed, and I know what I will see. I
will see a cadre of individuals who have stepped forward, who
have given more in their time on the battlefield than most
Americans could possibly imagine, and who will ask one simple
question, ``What can I do to serve more?'' We recognize the
obligation we have to provide world-class transition, world-
class healthcare services to those heroes. This budget provides
us with that opportunity and allows us to go forward in that
solemn obligation.
It also allows us to do something very important, in terms
of recapitalizing, rebalancing, and modernizing our equipment
systems that require those kinds of adjustments. And, as you
noted, Mr. Chairman, that's a significant challenge under the
best of circumstances, but clearly, at time of war, becomes
even more problematic. But, with your support, we will continue
to do that. The funding is there--$3.1--$31.7 billion in
research and development, brigade combat team modernization
funds, et cetera, et cetera.
The other thing--and it's something that this Congress
recognized last year--that we need help in is acquisition
reform. I think it's necessary to give our acquisition people,
who have also been at war for nearly 9 years, their due. Over
the last 10 years, they've had a 15-percent cut in personnel
and a 500-percent increase in their dollars to bring under
contract. And in spite of that, in that time, 1,000 protests
brought against the decisions that they made, and only 8 of
those 1,000 protests upheld. Still, they would be the first to
recognize they need help. We need to continue to redevelop the
acquisition rules and regulations to allow us to be more
effective in support of the warfighter, and, equally important,
more efficient in support of our taxpayer dollars. We look
forward in engaging with this Congress, with this great
subcommittee, in bringing that about.
PREPARED STATEMENT
In the end, I would tell you, we have an Army that is
strong in spirit, it is strong in ability and in results. But,
as I said in my opening comments, and as you noted, Mr.
Chairman, it is an Army that is greatly stressed. We can do
better by them. We feel that's our obligation and what this
budget brings to the table and allows us the opportunity to do.
And, in partnership with you, we look forward to pursuing that
very worthy goal.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I'd yield back.
Chairman Inouye. I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of John M. McHugh and General George W. Casey, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
America's Army continues to answer the Nation's call, as it has
since it was established nearly 235 years ago. Today our Army is
fighting two wars, assisting other nations as they build their own
security capacity, supporting civil authorities at home, helping the
people of Haiti rebuild after a devastating earthquake, and preparing
to deter and defeat new threats. The Army's Soldiers, Civilians, and
Families faithfully shoulder the load that our Nation asks of them.
With the support of the Congress, we are on track with our 4-year plan
to put the Army back in balance.
Though their sacrifices can never be fully repaid, the Nation
continues to recognize and honor our Soldiers and their Families by
supporting them before, during, and following deployments. Our Soldiers
rely upon the best training and equipment that our Nation can provide
to accomplish their mission. Yet even with this continued support, the
demands of 8 years of war weigh heavily on our Army. The strain of
multiple deployments is evident on Soldiers and their Families.
Equipment is used at a pace that seriously challenges our maintenance
and replacement capabilities and resources. The stress is present in
our institutions as we change 20th century systems and processes to
meet the demands of the 21st century.
Our Nation faces the difficult challenge of balancing when, where,
and how to engage in a dynamic and uncertain world while meeting
important priorities at home. However, when the security of our
citizens or allies is threatened, the Nation can depend on America's
Army--the Strength of the Nation.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
The United States faces a complex strategic landscape with an array
of diverse security challenges. We are fighting wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan while preparing for future challenges to our national
security. For the foreseeable future, violent extremist movements such
as Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations comprise the most
immediate threats. Current global economic conditions, changes in
demographics, cultural pressures associated with globalization, and
competition for scarce resources exacerbate the uncertainty and
volatility of the strategic environment. Within this setting, the
American Soldier stands as our Nation's most visible and enduring
symbol of commitment in an era of persistent conflict.
PERSISTENT CONFLICT
For the near future, persistent conflict--protracted confrontation
among state, non-state, and individual actors that are increasingly
willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological
ends--will characterize the global security environment. Security
crises will arise unpredictably, vary in intensity and scope, and last
for uncertain durations. These challenges will take place in all
domains: land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Natural disasters and
humanitarian emergencies will continue to be frequent and unpredictable
missions, requiring the commitment of Soldiers and resources. In this
dynamic environment, the Army will conduct operations that span the
spectrum of conflict from humanitarian and civil support to
counterinsurgency to general war, often simultaneously.
GLOBAL TRENDS
Several global trends will continue to shape the international
security environment and the conflicts confronting our Nation.
Globalization may increase prosperity, but it can also spread
destabilizing influences. The unequal distribution of benefits creates
societies with divisions between ``haves'' and ``have nots''--divisions
that can be exploited by extremist ideologies and lead to conflict.
Fault lines reflecting protracted competition and friction can erupt
unpredictably as societies struggle to adjust to the move toward
modernity and greater interdependence. Meanwhile, increasingly
available and affordable technology provides our adversaries
sophisticated tools to enable a networked approach to recruiting the
disenfranchised and exporting terror.
Shifting demographics and rapid population growth that is
increasingly urbanized can continue to break down traditional,
localized norms of governance, behavior, and identity, and further
strain already stressed governments. This is especially true where a
lack of economic opportunity increases the potential for instability
and extremism. Those who are disaffected may rebel against perceived
Western interference, challenges to traditional values, and ineffective
governments. Increased resource demand, in particular energy, water,
and food, is a consequence of growing prosperity and populations. The
growing global competition for resources will continue to produce
friction and increase opportunities for conflict. In this environment,
climate change and natural disasters will compound already difficult
conditions in developing countries by igniting humanitarian crises,
causing destabilizing population migrations, and raising the potential
for epidemic diseases.
The two trends of greatest concern are the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and failed or failing states. A catastrophic
attack utilizing WMD has the potential to be globally destabilizing.
Failed or failing states, lacking the will or capacity to maintain
effective territorial control, contribute to regional instability and
provide ideal environments for terrorist groups to plan and export
operations. The merging of these two trends constitutes a significant
and compelling threat. Together, these trends make conflict in the
decades ahead more likely.
CHARACTER OF CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Global trends and recent conflicts--such as those in Lebanon and
Georgia--and our own recent combat experience indicate the evolving
character of conflict in the 21st century.
Conflicts will be waged among diverse actors--state and non-state--
with the latter employing capabilities that, during the last century,
remained largely the purview of nation-states. Motives, objectives, and
often the identities of these actors will be difficult to discern, and
are likely to shift as some act covertly and others use proxies. The
battle to gain influence over, and support from, populations will be
central to our success. Therefore, conflict will be unavoidably waged
among the people.
The initiation, location, duration, and intensity of conflicts are
increasingly unpredictable. In an interdependent world, conflicts are
more susceptible to the potential for spillover, creating regionally,
and potentially globally, destabilizing effects. All of this will occur
under the unblinking scrutiny of the 24-hour global media cycle and the
Internet. Details of conflict as well as misinformation will flow
equally across social, communications, and cyber networks. Our
adversaries will exploit these media and communication sources locally
and globally.
We are more likely to face hybrid threats--diverse and dynamic
combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal
capabilities employed asymmetrically to counter our advantages. Hybrid
threats require hybrid solutions--adaptive military forces that can
function in a variety of situations with a diverse set of national,
allied, and indigenous partners. Given the strategic environment,
enduring global trends, and the character of 21st century conflict, the
Army will operate as part of a Joint, interagency, inter-governmental,
and multi-national team to fulfill its global commitments.
ROLES OF LAND FORCES
More than one million of our men and women have served in the
ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over 3,900 American Soldiers
have given their lives, and more than 25,000 others have been wounded
during this longest period of sustained conflict ever fought by an all-
volunteer force. Today, America's Army has over 255,000 Soldiers and
more than 18,500 Army Civilians serving in nearly 80 countries around
the world--with the remainder stationed within the United States
supporting domestic missions, resetting from recent deployments, or
preparing for an upcoming deployment.
Our Soldiers are performing magnificently around the world every
day, and the roles for land forces in this environment are becoming
increasingly clear.
First, the Army must prevail in protracted counter-insurgency
(COIN) operations. Not only must we prevail in our current missions in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines, we must be prepared to prevail
in any future COIN operation.
Second, the Army must engage to help other nations build capacity
and to assure our friends and allies. Through security force
assistance, we can increase the capacity of other nations' military and
police to uphold the rule of law, ensure domestic order, and deny
sanctuary to terrorists--thereby helping avoid future conflicts that
might otherwise develop. American Soldiers are currently deployed to
Central America and the Balkans, building the capacity of indigenous
security forces. Additionally, the Army has established an Army Service
Component Command for U.S. Africa Command to assist partner nations and
humanitarian organizations in Africa.
A third role that the Army fulfills is to provide support to civil
authorities at home and abroad. In the past year alone, American
Soldiers have fought fires in the west, conducted search and rescue
operations in the Rockies and Alaska, and assisted with tsunami relief
in American Samoa, in support of civil authorities. The Army has also
provided a sizeable force to support the relief efforts in Haiti
following the catastrophic earthquake that destroyed its capital. Army
units from both the active and reserve components remain prepared to
react to a variety of crises as consequence management and response
forces. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is a lead organization in
providing DOD support to civil authorities for disaster relief at home
and engineering support to USAID overseas. Abroad, the Army has also
supported civil authorities in many ways, such as sending Agribusiness
Development Teams from the Army National Guard to Afghanistan.
Finally, the Army must deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile
state actors. As an Army, we recognize that we must remain prepared to
meet and defeat hostile state actors that threaten our national
security. But we recognize that the probability of facing a nation that
will challenge America's military head-on is lower than it was during
the Cold War and other periods in our history. Our readiness and
capability to confront near-peer competitors also deters war by raising
the stakes for nation-state and hybrid actors who would threaten our
security interests.
To meet these threats, Army units continue to participate in Joint
and international training exercises around the world, ensuring that
military skills and cooperative partnerships remain strong. The Army
continues to position forces in Korea and at various missile defense
sites in order to discourage actors who seek to disrupt regional
stability and security.
TWO CRITICAL CHALLENGES
The Army has operated at a demanding pace for the last 8 years, and
while it has met each challenge, the strain has placed the Army out of
balance. Demand for Army forces continues to exceed the sustainable
supply. Against that backdrop, the Army continues to meet the wartime
requirements of our Nation while it addresses the two major challenges
facing our force--restoring balance and setting conditions for the
future. In 2007, we established a 4-year plan to restore balance to an
Army that had experienced the cumulative effects of years of conflict.
The fiscal year 2011 budget supports the final year in that plan. As we
continue to restore balance to the force, we are also setting the
conditions for the Army of the 21st century--an Army that fulfills our
strategic role as an integral part of our Joint Force.
RESTORING BALANCE: THE ARMY'S FOUR IMPERATIVES
With the help of Congress, we have made significant progress over
the past 3 years in our plan to restore balance--a plan founded on four
imperatives. Yet today the Army remains out of balance. We've improved
our ability to sustain the Army's Soldiers, Families, and Civilians;
prepare forces for success in the current conflict; reset returning
units to rebuild the readiness consumed in operations and to prepare
for future deployments and contingencies; and transform to meet the
demands of the 21st century. As a result of this progress we now are in
a better position to achieve balance than we were 2 years ago. Critical
to this was the growth in the size of the Army.
The security agreement with Iraq that transferred security in urban
areas to Iraqis was a momentous and welcomed accomplishment. The hard
work and sacrifice of our Soldiers with the support of Congress helped
make this achievement possible and set the conditions for our
responsible drawdown of combat forces in Iraq this year. Coupled with
our growth, the drawdown in Iraq allowed for our increased commitment
of forces to Afghanistan to stem the rising violence, and disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda while reversing the momentum of the
Taliban insurgency. However, the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan
continue to create demands that have our Army operating beyond
sustainable capacity. In fact, in 2009 more Soldiers were deployed in
Iraq and Afghanistan combined than during the height of the Iraq surge.
Presently, and for the short term, we lack sufficient strategic
flexibility, and we continue to accumulate risk. We continue to stress
our Soldiers, Families, Civilians, equipment, and institutional
systems, so our efforts to restore balance must not waiver.
Sustain
Sustaining our all-volunteer force is our first imperative. Nowhere
is the stress on our force more profound than in the toll it takes on
our people, as is tragically evident in the rising number of suicides
and increasing need for counseling among our Soldiers and Families. We
are aggressively addressing the causes of stress on individuals
resulting from the cumulative effects of multiple deployments, and
seeking to build resilience in Soldiers, Families and Civilians. The
Army is committed to ensuring that the quality of life of those who
serve the Nation is commensurate with the quality of their service.
Goals
To sustain the force, the Army continues to pursue four major
goals. Our first goal is to Recruit and Retain quality Soldiers and
Civilians dedicated to service to the Nation. Next, we are committed to
furnishing the best Care, Support, and Services for Soldiers, Families,
and Civilians by improving quality of life through meaningful
initiatives such as the Army Family Action Plan, the Army Family
Covenant, Army Community Covenants, and the Comprehensive Soldier
Fitness Program. It is our solemn obligation to provide world-class
Warrior Care and Transition to our wounded, ill, and injured Warriors
through properly led and resourced Warrior Transition Units. Finally,
by Supporting the Families of our Fallen Comrades we honor their
service and sacrifice.
Progress and Accomplishments
The Army met 104 percent of its recruiting goals for 2009, and
achieved both numeric goals and quality benchmarks for new recruits.
All components exceeded 105 percent of their reenlistment goals.
We reduced off-duty fatalities by 20 percent, to include a 15
percent reduction in overall privately-owned-vehicle fatalities and 37
percent reduction in motorcycle fatalities.
In collaboration with the National Institute of Mental Health, the
Army began a seminal study into suicide prevention that will inform the
Army Suicide Prevention Program and society's approach to suicide.
We began instituting Comprehensive Soldier Fitness--an all-
inclusive approach to emotional, social, spiritual, family, and
physical fitness--as the foundation to building resiliency within the
Army.
We initiated an unprecedented series of construction projects at
five major hospitals as part of our commitment to modernize our
healthcare system.
The Army established the Warrior Transition Command and reorganized
Warrior Transition Brigades to provide centralized support,
rehabilitation, and individualized transition planning to our
recovering Warriors.
We expanded Survivor Outreach Services to over 26,000 Family
members, providing unified support and advocacy, and enhancing survivor
benefits for the Families of our Soldiers who have made the ultimate
sacrifice.
We implemented the Post 9/11 GI Bill, significantly increasing
educational benefits for active duty Soldiers, Veterans, and Family
members.
The Army Reserve established Army Strong Community Centers to
support geographically-dispersed Soldiers and Families. Together with
Army National Guard Family Assistance Centers and Soldier and Family
Assistance Centers on active duty installations, these centers provide
help to Soldiers' Families near their hometowns.
Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Highlights
Provides $1.7 billion to standardize and fund vital Family programs
and services to include welfare and recreation; youth services and
child care; Survivor Outreach Services; and expanded education and
employment opportunities for Family members.
Provides a 1.4 percent military basic pay raise and Civilian pay
raise, a 3.9 percent basic allowance for housing increase, and a 3.4
percent basic allowance for subsistence increase.
Warrior Transition Units for our wounded Soldiers will continue to
receive strong support in fiscal year 2011 with $18 million in Military
Construction funds allocated to resource construction of barracks
spaces.
Supports Residential Communities Initiatives program, which
provides quality, sustainable residential communities for Soldiers and
their Families living on-post, and continues to offset out-of-pocket
housing expenses for those residing off-post.
Prepare
Our Soldiers face determined enemies--so preparing the force for
our current conflict is complex and time-consuming, but essential for
success. Our units must have the people, training, and equipment they
need to prevail. Meanwhile, our institutions and systems must adapt to
provide those critical capabilities in a timely manner and in
sufficient quantities.
Goals
To prepare the force, we have four key goals. First, we accelerated
the pace at which we needed to Grow the Army to our end strength and to
grow our modular brigades to 73 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and nearly
230 Support Brigades. Second, the Army is committed to improving
individual and collective Training to better prepare Soldiers and
leaders for a complex and challenging operational environment. Next, we
continuously work to provide our formations with effective Equipment in
a timely manner that maintains our technological edge and protects our
most critical resource--the Soldier. Finally, we must transform the
Army to a rotational model--Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)--the core
process for generating trained, ready, and cohesive units on a
sustained and rotational basis--to meet current and future strategic
demands.
Progress and Accomplishments
We began the phase-out of stop-loss, starting with the Reserve
Component in August 2009 and the Army National Guard in September 2009,
and followed by the Active Army in January 2010. Today, no mobilizing
or deploying units have stop-loss Soldiers in their ranks.
The force achieved its ``Grow the Army'' end strength goal of 1.1
million in 2009. The active component continues to grow toward its
additional authorized Temporary End Strength in order to improve unit
manning within the already existing Army structure as we eliminate
stop-loss.
Fifteen month tours effectively ended in November 2009, when the
last Soldiers on those extended deployments returned.
We completed fielding nearly 12,000 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
(MRAP) vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan and delivered the first MRAP
All-Terrain Vehicles (M-ATVs) to Afghanistan--just 15 months after
identifying the need for that capability. As of the beginning of
February, we have provided nearly 800 M-ATVs to Afghanistan.
This year, we successfully manned, trained, equipped, and deployed
67 brigade equivalents.
The Army exceeded fleet readiness of 90 percent for ground
equipment, to include MRAPs, and 75 percent for aviation.
We established Army Training Network (ATN)--a 21st Century Approach
to Army Training. This revolution in training knowledge access is now
providing a one-stop portal to share training best practices,
solutions, and products across the Army.
The Army increased its employment of biometric technologies
enabling the Army to better identify the enemy among the populace.
Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Highlights
Funds permanent, active component end strength at 547,400; Army
Reserve at 205,000; and National Guard at 358,200 in the base budget
and supports a 22,000 temporary increase in the active component
through the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request.
Procures and upgrades the Army's UH-60 Black Hawk, CH-47 Chinook,
and AH-64 Apache helicopters, which are vital to operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
Provides over $1 billion for flight crew training in all components
to fund flying hours, maintenance, fuel, airfield operations, and
specialized skill training.
Reset
With the pace of continuous combat operations in two wars for the
past 8 years, we are consuming our readiness as fast as we can build
it. Reset restores returning units--their Soldiers, Families, and
equipment--to a level of readiness necessary for future missions.
Goals
Our Reset plans include four goals. Our efforts to Revitalize
Soldiers and Families seek to reestablish and strengthen relationships
following deployments. The Army's comprehensive efforts to Repair,
Replace, and Recapitalize Equipment affected by the harsh environments
of the war are essential to resetting units. In particular, achieving
responsible drawdown in Iraq while increasing our commitment of forces
and equipment to Afghanistan will require an unprecedented reset
effort. The Army must Retrain Soldiers, Leaders, and Units to build
critical skills necessary to operate across the spectrum of conflict in
the current security environment. Lastly, we are identifying and
applying the lessons learned from the Reset Pilot Program that was
designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Reset
process. Army Reset is a necessary process that must continue not only
as long as we have forces deployed, but an additional two to three
years after major deployments end.
Progress and Accomplishments
The Army completed the reset of 29 brigades' worth of equipment in
fiscal year 2009 and continued the reset of 13 more. In total, we have
reset more than 98,000 pieces of equipment as depot production has
doubled since September 11, 2001.
We began executing a responsible drawdown in Iraq which will
redistribute, transfer, or dispose of 3.4 million pieces of equipment;
redeploy 143,000 military and Civilian personnel, and 147,000
contractors; close 22 supply support activities; and consume or dispose
of over 21,000 short tons of supplies.
In 2009, more than 160,000 Soldiers and Family members participated
in over 2,600 Strong Bonds events designed to strengthen Army Families.
The Army continues to revise its approach to training by
emphasizing doing fewer tasks better, making judicious use of field
time, and maximizing the use of mobile training teams and distributed
learning.
We completed our Reset Pilot Program and will begin instituting the
full Reset model across the Army in 2010.
The Army fostered partnerships by executing more than $24 billion
in new foreign military sales.
Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Highlights
Provides $10.8 billion to reset Army equipment through the Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) request.
Supports training and sustainment of Army forces to include
individual skills and leader training; combined arms training toward
full spectrum operations; and adaptable, phased training based on the
ARFORGEN process.
Transform
Since 2004, the Army has been transforming our force to provide the
combatant commanders tailored, strategically responsive forces that can
dominate across the spectrum of conflict. Transformation is a
continuous process that sets the conditions for success against both
near-term and future enemies.
Goals
Our goals for transformation include continued Modular
Reorganization to standardize our formations to create a more
deployable, adaptable, and versatile force. We will accelerate fielding
of Advanced Technologies to ensure our Soldiers retain their
technological edge. The Army will Operationalize the Reserve Components
by systematically building and sustaining readiness while increasing
predictability for these Soldiers, Families, employers, and
communities.
Completing the requirements of the Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) statutes is central to Restationing Forces. Soldier and Leader
Development will ensure that we produce the next generation of agile
and adaptive military and Civilian leaders who are supremely competent
in their core proficiencies and sufficiently broad enough to operate
effectively in the Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-
national environments.
Progress and Accomplishments
The Army is 88 percent complete on the modular conversion of its
brigades. The fiscal year 2011 budget will support the near completion
of this process.
The Army consolidated existing aviation force structure to create a
12th active component combat aviation brigade (CAB) forming an
additional deployable CAB without adding force structure.
The Army activated the 162nd Infantry Brigade at Fort Polk,
Louisiana, providing a dedicated and enduring capability to prepare
combat advisors to train and build capacity in foreign security forces.
Trainers from the brigade are now deployed to Afghanistan to assist
with the training and development of the Afghan Security Forces.
The Army developed a new incremental capability package approach to
modernization which will allow technologically mature, Soldier-tested,
proven technologies to be prioritized, bundled in time, and fielded to
the force more quickly than ever before.
We provided combatant commanders with dedicated, regionally based
network operations support, and integrated cyber security capability in
the form of Theater Network Operations and Security Centers, unique
within the Department of Defense.
This past year, the Army closed three active installations and five
U.S. Army Reserve Centers and is on course to complete BRAC in fiscal
year 2011. To date, we have awarded 265 major military construction
projects, of which 59 are complete.
The Army built a Leader Development Strategy that balances
experience, greater opportunities for professional education, and
training in full spectrum operations.
Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Highlights
Invests nearly $3.2 billion in BCT modernization programs that
include procurement of the first incremental changes packages for
Infantry BCTs and additional research, development, testing, and
evaluation funding for subsequent change packages as well as initial
development of the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).
Provides funds to begin equipping a 13th Combat Aviation Brigade.
Supports the increase in ISR platforms to include the Extended
Range/Multi-Purpose, Raven, Shadow unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and
the Extended Medium Altitude Reconnaissance and Surveillance System.
SETTING CONDITIONS FOR THE FUTURE
21st Century Army
The second critical challenge facing the Army is setting the
conditions for the future through a continuous process of
transformation. We must ensure that our Nation has the capability and
range of military options to meet the evolving challenges we face in
the 21st century. We need an Army that is a versatile mix of tailorable
and networked organizations, operating on a rotational cycle, to
provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for full spectrum
operations and to hedge against unexpected contingencies--at a tempo
that is predictable and sustainable for our all-volunteer force.
Versatility is the central organizing principle of a balanced Army.
It enables our forces and institutions to effectively execute
operations across the spectrum of conflict. Our modular heavy, Stryker,
and light brigades provide a versatile mix of forces that can be
combined to provide multi-purpose capabilities, and sufficient capacity
to accomplish a broad range of tasks from peacetime engagement to major
combat operations.
Our modular units are designed to be tailorable. Brigades now have
capabilities previously found at division level and higher. These
brigades can be tailored for specific missions and combined with
support units and key enablers such as ISR, communications, civil
affairs, psychological operations, public affairs capabilities, and
expanded logistics support, to accomplish a wide variety of missions
and increase the land options available to combatant commanders.
The network is essential to a 21st century Army. Networked
organizations improve the situational awareness and understanding
leaders need to act decisively at all points along the spectrum of
conflict, while providing connectivity down to the individual Soldier.
The network allows dispersed Army organizations to plan and operate
together, and provides connectivity to Joint, combined, and interagency
assets. To support this objective, the Army will use the Global Network
Enterprise Construct (GNEC) as our strategy to transform LandWarNet to
a centralized, more secure, operationalized, and sustainable network
capable of supporting an expeditionary Army.
To provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces at a tempo
sustainable for our all-volunteer force, we will put the whole Army
under a rotational model--ARFORGEN.
The ARFORGEN process includes three force pools--Reset, Train-
Ready, and Available. Each of the three force pools contains a
versatile force package, available at varying time intervals based on
its readiness level. Each force pool consists of an operational
headquarters (a corps), five division headquarters (of which one or two
are National Guard), twenty brigade combat teams (three or four are
National Guard), and 90,000 enablers (about half of those are Guard and
Reserve). Each will be capable of full spectrum operations once we
reach a steady-state, ratio of time deployed (known as ``boots on the
ground'' or BOG) to time at home (dwell) of 1:2 (BOG:dwell) for active
component forces and 1:4 for reserve component forces. This versatile
mix of land forces could sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. At
lower demand levels, a sustainable BOG:dwell ratio of 1:3 for active
component forces and 1:5 for reserve component forces provides ready,
global reaction forces and regionally-oriented forces for engagement in
support of Theater Security Cooperation Programs. This process also
allows strategic flexibility to surge in response to unexpected
contingencies across the spectrum of conflict, and provides operational
depth with more forces available for longer commitment times.
The increased demands of our combatant commanders, coupled with the
size of our active component (AC) force, require that we continue to
integrate reserve component (RC) forces as part of our operational
force. Continued and routine access to our RC forces is essential to
sustaining current operations, and is improving the overall operational
experience and quality of our RC forces. Additionally, sufficient Army
National Guard (ARNG) forces must be ready and immediately available to
their state and territorial authorities to respond to domestic crises.
We are building an integrated Army in which our RC forces are included
in the rotational cycle, but at a deployment rate of about half that of
their AC counterparts.
The ARFORGEN process increases predictability for Soldiers,
Families, employers, and communities, and enables our RC to remain an
integral element of the operational force while providing the Nation
with the strategic depth (i.e. those non-deployed units which are 2 to
3 years from commitment) and operational flexibility to meet unexpected
contingencies.
The Army has undergone significant changes in recent years, and we
must continue to change in order to keep pace with an environment of
uncertainty and complexity in this era of persistent conflict. The same
requirements that drive the imperative to change also drive our
modernization efforts and need for institutional adaptation.
Realizing Change
To become the Army the Nation needs in the second decade of the
21st century, we are transforming the Army and prioritizing programs
and efforts that show the most promise for today and tomorrow.
Similarly, we are transforming business processes across the Army,
including how we identify requirements, acquire, and provide materiel
capabilities to our Soldiers, and how we adapt our institutions to
align with the ARFORGEN process.
On April 6, 2009, Secretary Gates announced his adjustments to the
defense program as part of the President's budget proposal for fiscal
year 2010. The Secretary's decisions had an immediate and major impact
on our FCS-centric Army modernization effort. He terminated the MGV
portion of FCS, directing that we ``reevaluate the requirements,
technology, and approach--and then re-launch the Army's vehicle
modernization program. . . .'' He further directed the Army to
``accelerate the initial increment of the program to spin out
technology enhancements to all combat brigades,'' and retain and
deliver software and network development program in increments, and
incorporate MRAP into our force structure. Secretary Gates' intent for
these bold adjustments was clear--to better reflect the lessons that we
were learning from ongoing operations and better posture Army forces
for a broader range of future challenges.
To fully implement the Secretary of Defense's direction, the Army
has developed a comprehensive plan. We refer to this new program as the
Army's ``Brigade Combat Team Modernization Plan,'' which is a subset of
our overall Army Modernization Strategy.
BCT Modernization Plan
We will leverage the lessons learned from the last 8 years to
provide effective and affordable equipment now, while reducing the time
it takes to develop and field new and updated materiel solutions. BCT
Modernization includes four elements: modernizing the network over time
to take advantage of technology upgrades, while simultaneously
expanding it to cover ever increasing portions of the force;
incorporating MRAPs into our force; rapidly developing and fielding a
new Ground Combat Vehicle that meets the requirements of the 21st
century Army; and incrementally fielding Capability Packages that best
meet the needs of Soldiers and units as they train and then deploy.
Army Network.--Central to the Army's modernization efforts is an
enhanced and interoperable communication network that gives the Army a
decisive advantage across the spectrum of conflict. The network
supports leaders in making timely, informed decisions, and supports
organizational agility, lethality, and sustainability. It allows our
Soldiers to know where the enemy is, where other friendly forces and
civilian populations are, and what weapon systems are available for
them at any given time. The network links Soldiers on the battlefield
with space-based and aerial sensors, robots, and command posts--
providing unprecedented situational awareness and control and enabling
the application of precise lethal fires on the modern battlefield.
Maintaining our technological advantage is a constant challenge.
The Army's battle command network must be continuously upgraded to
ensure security and provide improved capability, capacity, connectivity
and operational effectiveness. The Warfighter Information Network
(Tactical) (WIN-T) is designed to extend the network ultimately to the
company level for BCTs and provide real-time information, such as high
definition imagery, from surveillance sources. The Joint Tactical Radio
System (JTRS) was born Joint with the specific requirement to resolve
radio interoperability among the services. It will provide Soldiers at
the tactical level with connectivity at extended ranges, including
voice, data, and video, enabling them to move information from platoon
to higher-level command posts in complex terrain (including urban and
mountainous areas).
MRAP Strategy.--In response to deadly IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan,
the Nation made a tremendous investment in fielding MRAPs that have
saved lives by providing significantly improved protection for our
Soldiers. The Army is incorporating these vehicles throughout its unit
formations. Additionally, we used the basic design of the MRAP as the
foundation for the M-ATV, modifying it for the mountainous terrain in
Afghanistan and in other regions around the world. The MRAP family of
vehicles provides the versatility our forces need to rapidly move
around the battlefield, particularly in an IED environment, with the
best protection we can provide.
Ground Combat Vehicle.--Combining the lessons learned from the
survivability of the MRAP, the tactical mobility of the Bradley
Fighting Vehicle, and the operational mobility of the Stryker, the Army
is developing a Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) that possesses all of these
qualities. Providing Soldiers protected mobility is our top design
criteria. The first combat vehicle designed from the ground up to
operate in an IED environment, the GCV will have enhanced mobility that
will allow it to operate effectively in both urban and off-road
environments. It will be designed to host the Army's network. And
perhaps most importantly, it will have the capacity available to accept
future upgrades incrementally as technologies mature and threats
change.
The GCV will be versatile enough to support our expeditionary
requirements and be capable of carrying an infantry squad. It will
combine sustainability features that match the availability rates of
the Stryker while consuming less fuel than current vehicles of similar
weight and power. The pace of change and the operational environment
demand an expedited acquisition timeline, so the Army is pursuing a GCV
program timeline that provides the first production vehicles in seven
years.
Capability Packages.--Capability packages provide the Army a
regular, timely process to enable our deployable units with the latest
materiel and non-materiel solutions based on the evolving challenges of
the operating environment. The best available capabilities will go to
the Soldiers who need them most, based on the threats they are likely
to face. These bundles of capabilities will include materiel, doctrine,
organization, and training to fill the highest priority requirements
and mitigate risk for Soldiers. This incremental packaging approach
will enable leaders to make timely, resource-informed decisions, and
will help ensure that we provide the best available technologies to
fulfill urgent needs to Soldiers in the fight--all driven by the cyclic
readiness produced by ARFORGEN. These capability packages will upgrade
our units as they prepare to deploy by providing them improved
capabilities such as precision fires and advanced Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).
The Army Modernization Strategy
The Army's Brigade Combat Team Modernization Plan is a key element
of our overall Army Modernization Strategy. The Army Modernization
Strategy reflects our overarching vision of how we will achieve our
ends, which is to:
--Develop and field an affordable and interoperable mix of the best
equipment available to allow Soldiers and units to succeed in
both today's and tomorrow's full spectrum military operations.
The Army Modernization Strategy relies on three interrelated lines
of effort:
--Develop and field new capabilities to meet identified capability
``gaps'' through traditional or rapid acquisition processes. In
support of this Line of Effort in fiscal year 2011 we have
requested $934 million to develop the Army's new Ground Combat
Vehicle (GCV), which will overcome critical capability gaps in
both current and future operations. It is envisioned to have
the tactical mobility of a Bradley, the operational mobility of
a Stryker, and the protection of an MRAP. We are also
requesting $459 million to procure the Extended Range Multi-
Purpose Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. This extraordinarily capable
platform, which is already making a difference in Operation
Enduring Freedom, gives commanders longer dwell ISR
capabilities across a joint area of operations.
--Continuously modernize equipment to meet current and future
capability needs through upgrade, replacement,
recapitalization, refurbishment, and technology insertions.
Army efforts in this Line of Effort include our request for
$887 million for the procurement of 16 Block III AH-64 Apache
Helicopters, as well as the upgrade of 13 AH-64 Helicopters to
Block II. Block III Apache is part of a long-term effort to
improve situational awareness, performance, reliability, and
sustainment of the Apache. Block II upgrades continue our
commitment to modernize the Army National Guard Aviation Fleet.
Additionally, in this line of effort, we have requested $505
million to upgrade Shadow RQ-7 UAVs. This key upgrade will
increase the payload capacity and enhance the performance of
this key ISR asset for our BCT Commanders.
--Meet continuously evolving force requirements in the current
operational environment by fielding and distributing
capabilities in accordance with the Army Resource Priorities
List (ARPL) and Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model. Meeting
the constantly evolving needs of theater commanders and the
demands of persistent conflict will require unprecedented
agility in our equipping and modernization programs. One
example of this agility can be found in our Kiowa Warrior
fleet. We are currently maneuvering our fleet of OH-58D Kiowa
Warrior Light Helicopters to meet Army and COCOM requirements
based on the ARFORGEN model. As Air Cavalry Squadrons return
from conflict, their OH-58D helicopters are placed into Reset.
Units in Reset have very few aircraft, if any. Because the
Kiowa Warrior fleet is short 35 aircraft overall, when the
squadrons transition into the Train/Ready Phase of ARFORGEN,
they are provided a number of helicopters sufficient to conduct
training (25), but less than what they are fully authorized
(30). When the units move into the Available phase, they are
provided their full complement of aircraft. It is this agility
that has allowed Army forces to meet the needs of theater
commanders for over eight years of sustained combat.
What do we need? Congress has been very supportive of Army
Modernization needs in the past. Their tremendous support has ensured
that the Army Soldier is the best equipped and most respected combatant
in the world. In order to execute Army Modernization and ensure the
continued success of Soldiers and units, we depend on a variety of
resources, not the least of which is predictable funding. For fiscal
year 2011, we have requested $31.7 billion for procurement and
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) efforts.
Adapting the Institution and Transforming Business
Practices
In addition to modernizing our operating force, we are transforming
our institutional Army. As required by Section 904 of the 2008 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the appointment of the Under
Secretary of the Army as the Army's Chief Management Officer (CMO) has
allowed the Army to develop a series of initiatives to adapt the
institutional Army and transform our business practices. In accordance
with Section 908 of the 2009 NDAA, these efforts will result in the
development and implementation of a comprehensive program that
establishes a series of measurable performance goals and objectives.
Specifically, the comprehensive program will address the following:
--Developing and implementing a business transformation plan focused
on running the Army as effectively and efficiently as possible.
--Continuing the Army's business process reengineering activities, led
by OSD's Business Transformation Agency.
--Developing an integrated business systems architecture that
emphasizes transparency and seamless access to data, and
provides timely and accurate information to decision makers.
--Preparing Army leaders to take a greater role in inculcating the
Army with a cost-conscious culture.
While the Army transformed its operating force--building versatile,
agile units capable of adapting to changing environments--the
institutional Army continued to use processes and procedures that were
designed to support a pre-9/11 Army based on tiered levels of
readiness. To support this new operating force, the Army must have an
updated institutional Army--our generating force.
Once the mission is defined, our institutions must seamlessly and
continuously adapt--tailoring force packages and quickly adjusting
training, manning, and equipping--to ensure units have all of the
physical and mental tools necessary to succeed.
Institutional agility allows us to adapt to the realities that
present themselves. To that end, the CMO and Office of Business
Transformation will build upon progress that has already been made
toward the Army's institutional adaptation, specifically:
--Improvement of the ARFORGEN process--aligning the generating force
and its processes to better support Soldiers, Families, and
units within the operating force.
--Adoption of an Enterprise Approach--developing civilian and military
leaders who take a collaborative, holistic view of Army
objectives and resources to make better decisions for the Army.
--Reformation of the requirements and resource processes--delivering
timely and necessary capabilities at best value.
This transformational approach will overlay everything that the
institutional Army does, with the unwavering goal of effectively and
efficiently providing trained and ready forces to meet combatant
commander requirements.
STEWARDSHIP AND INNOVATION
The Army remains devoted to the best possible stewardship of the
resources it is provided by the American people through Congress. The
establishment of the CMO and initiatives related to the transformation
of Army business practices represent the Army's effort to act as a
responsible steward. Several other initiatives serve to conserve
resources and to reduce waste and inefficiencies wherever possible.
The Army achieved full operating capability of the new Army
Contracting Command, Expeditionary Contracting Command, and Mission and
Installation Contracting Command in 2009. These organizations are
dedicated to ensuring professional, ethical, efficient, and responsive
contracting.
Civilians are assuming increased responsibilities within the Army.
The Army is recouping intellectual capital by in-sourcing former
contracted positions that were associated with inherently governmental
functions. In fiscal year 2009, the Army saved significant resources by
in-sourcing more than 900 core governmental functions to Army
Civilians. We plan to in-source 7,162 positions in fiscal year 2010,
and are programmed to in-source 11,084 positions during fiscal year
2011-2015, of which 3,988 are acquisition positions. These positions
were identified in the Army's ongoing contractor inventory review
process.
In the Employer Partnership program, the Army Reserve works with
public agencies and private employers to leverage their shared
interests in recruiting, training, and credentialing highly skilled
Citizen-Soldiers. The Army Reserve has signed more than 800 partnership
agreements with corporations, state agencies, and local police
departments.
Energy security is a key component of Army installations, weapons
systems, and operations. The Army has developed a comprehensive energy
security strategy, and is acting now to implement initiatives to make
us less dependent on foreign sources of fuel and better stewards of our
nation's energy resources. In support of these goals, we fielded the
largest hybrid vehicle fleet within the Department of Defense. Energy
will continue to be a key consideration in all Army activities in order
to reduce demand, increase efficiency, seek alternative sources, and
create a culture of energy accountability, while sustaining or
enhancing operational capabilities.
The Army is committed to environmental stewardship. Through
cooperative partner agreements and the Army Compatible Use Buffer
Program, the Army protected more than 28,000 acres of land at 14
locations in fiscal year 2009. Through creative solutions, the Army
continues to conduct realistic training on its installations while
protecting threatened and endangered species on Army lands.
AMERICA'S ARMY--THE STRENGTH OF THE NATION
The professionalism, dedicated service, and sacrifice of our all-
volunteer force are hallmarks of the Army--the Strength of our Nation.
Our Soldiers and their Families quietly bear the burdens of a
Nation at war. Our Civilians stand with them, dedicated to the Nation
and the Army that serves it. Despite the toll that 8 years of combat
has taken, these great Americans continue to step forward to answer our
Nation's call. In an environment in which we must make hard choices,
they deserve the very best we can offer, commensurate with their
dedication and sacrifice.
To continue to fulfill our vital role for the Nation, the Army must
sustain its efforts to restore balance and set conditions for the
future. We have made significant progress this year, but challenges
remain. The continued support of Congress will ensure that the Army
remains manned, trained, and equipped to protect our national security
interests at home and abroad, now and in the future. America's Army--
the Strength of the Nation.
ADDENDUM A--THE FISCAL YEAR 2011 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget asks for $245.6 billion for
the Army. This budget, which includes $143.4 billion for the Base and
$102.2 billion for the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request,
is necessary to: support current operations, increase forces in
Afghanistan, responsibly drawdown in Iraq, sustain the all-volunteer
force, and prepare for future threats.
Amounts requested by major appropriation category in the fiscal
year 2011 President's budget include:
Military Personnel
The fiscal year 2011 budget requests $71.0 billion, a $300 million
increase over fiscal year 2010. Military Personnel funds support Army
end-strength requirements for a Nation at war. This includes $1.2
billion for the temporary wartime increase in personnel, an increase of
$684 million over fiscal year 2010.
This amount funds pay, benefits, and associated personnel costs for
1,110,600 Soldiers: 547,400 Active, 358,200 Army National Guard,
205,000 Army Reserve and funds an active component temporary end
strength increase of 22,000.
The OCO request will fund special pays, incentives, and the
mobilization of reserve component Soldiers.
Compelling Needs
Support the Army's base endstrength and the temporary end strength
increase in fiscal year 2011 to reduce strain on the force.
Sustain authorities and funding of programs in support of wounded,
ill, and injured Warriors and their Families as they transition back to
duty or to civilian life.
Provide recruiting and retention incentives and benefits to sustain
the quality of our all-volunteer force, allow the Army to meet end-
strength objectives, and achieve Army standards for recruit quality.
Enable the transition of the reserve component to an operational
force by systematically building and sustaining readiness across the
force and fund mobilization of RC units to support growing demand.
Operation and Maintenance
The fiscal year 2011 budget requests $107.3 billion--a $7 billion
increase from fiscal year 2010. Operation and maintenance funds Soldier
and unit training; ground and air vehicle operating costs; depot
maintenance; base operations, sustainment, restoration, and
modernization; and a 1.4 percent Civilian pay raise.
The OCO portion of the request includes $628 million for the
training and sustainment of the temporary wartime increase in
personnel--an increase of $242 million from fiscal year 2010.
The budget request works to restore balance to the force by
recognizing $587 million of enduring requirements for training and
depot maintenance in the base rather than in OCO. The base funds home
station training for 59 brigade combat teams, 24 rotations through the
Army's combined arms training centers, and an increased investment of
$154 million in scholarships, language and individual training. It
improves network security; operationalizes the LandWarNet; supports
continued development and fielding of administrative systems; and
provides funding for improvements in financial audit readiness (as
required in NDAA 2009) by requesting an additional $578 million above
the fiscal year 2010 levels for these activities. The base budget also
increases funding for facilities sustainment restoration and
modernization by $320 million and includes one-time requests to support
BRAC and the transition out of NSPS.
The OCO request will fund the day-to-day cost of the wars, training
to prepare units for deployment, force protection, in-theater
maintenance and repair, drawdown of equipment from Iraq, and reset of
Army Prepositioned Stocks and equipment returning from deployment.
Compelling Needs
Sustain readiness through Soldier and unit training, including
realistic, full spectrum training at the Army's three combat training
centers.
Fund the reset of 30 brigades, other enabling units, and equipment.
Resource installation services worldwide and support the Army
Family Covenant to provide Soldiers and their Families the quality of
life they deserve and to enhance the health of the force.
Procurement
The fiscal year 2011 budget requests $30.3 billion--a $200 million
decrease from fiscal year 2010. Procurement funds the Army's future
force equipment requirements; sustains modernization and
recapitalization; and fills equipment shortages. The OCO request will
fund procurement of weapon systems to replace battle losses,
replacement of equipment taken for current operations from the reserve
components, and to fill urgent operational needs for deployed forces.
Compelling Needs
Fund the fielding of the first Capability Packages to two more Army
brigades.
Enhance Army command and control by providing an initial on-the-
move networking capability resident in the Warfighter Information
Network--Tactical (WIN-T), Increment 2.
Increase the Army's tactical agility through an aviation
modernization strategy that highlights the increasing importance of
unmanned aerial systems (ERMP, Shadow and Raven) and rotary wing
aviation (AH-64D Block III Apache, UH-60M Black Hawk and CH-47F
Chinook).
Improve lethality and precision fires by modernizing the Patriot
PAC-3 missile, the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System, the High
Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and the Paladin howitzer.
Sustain access to training and war reserve ammunition by restoring
stocks and the selective repair, upgrade and replacement of key
ammunition production base equipment and facilities.
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
The fiscal year 2011 budget requests $10.5 billion, approximately
the same amount requested last year.
Compelling Needs
Fund Brigade Combat Team modernization including initial Ground
Combat Vehicle development and further development of the second set of
Capability Packages.
Support Network modernization including continued development of
WIN-T increment 2 and increment 3.
Continues the international partnership to develop the Patriot
Medium Extended Air Defense systems (MEADS)
Construction, Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), and Army Housing
Fiscal year 2011 is a critical year for BRAC since this will be the
final budget executed to meet the statutory deadline for many of the
BRAC actions. fiscal year 2011 will be a particularly challenging year
for BRAC as four of our major command headquarters and many of our
military schools will be moving to new locations. The fiscal year 2011
budget requests $7.9 billion--a $2.5 billion decrease from fiscal year
2010. This funding supports the construction of facilities to support
the growth and re-stationing of Army forces. The OCO request will fund
construction in Afghanistan.
Compelling Needs
Fund BRAC requirements to meet fiscal year 2011 statutory
timelines.
Support construction of new family housing and improvements to
existing housing.
Support construction of permanent party and training barracks.
Other Accounts
The Army is the executive agent for a variety of critical functions
within the Department of Defense, to include the Chemical Agents and
Munitions Destruction Program. Funding for this account is $1.6 billion
in fiscal year 2011--a decrease of $100 million from fiscal year 2010.
The Army also has responsibility for the Iraq Security Forces Fund
(ISFF), Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), and Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) appropriations. The Army
budgets for recurring sustainment costs of JIEDDO with fiscal year 2011
funds at $200 million--an increase of $100 million from fiscal year
2010. The OCO Request will fund JIEDDO initiatives. The ISFF and ASFF
are funded entirely through the OCO request.
Compelling Needs
Fund the Afghan Security Forces Fund and the Iraq Security Forces
Fund to enable building essential security capacity.
Support JIEDDO appropriations and initiatives to combat the most
dangerous threat to U.S. forces.
Continue the safe destruction of chemical agents and munitions and
the closure activities at selected chemical demilitarization sites.
Restoring Fiscal Balance
Timely and full funding of the Army's fiscal year 2011 request of
$245.6 billion will help ensure the Army is ready to meet the needs of
the Nation and continue the process of restoring balance while setting
the conditions for the future. Over the last 8 years, the Army has
received significant portions of its funding for combat readiness
through OCO appropriations. This recurring reliance on OCO funds and an
overlap between base and OCO sustainment programs means that the Army's
base budget does not fully cover the cost of both current and future
readiness requirements. Because of this reliance, a precipitous drop or
delay in OCO funding does not fully fund the readiness of our Army for
the current conflict. Army continues the orderly restoration of the
balance between base and OCO requirements in its fiscal year 2011 base
budget request. This request fully funds Army authorized end strength
and brings $965 million in O&M expenses back into the base rather than
finance those requirements in OCO.
ADDENDUM B--RESERVE COMPONENT READINESS
Sections 517 and 521 of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) 1994 require the information in this addendum be reported.
Section 517 requires a report relating to implementation of the pilot
Program for Active Component Support of the Reserves under Section 414
of the NDAA 1992 and 1993. Section 521 requires a detailed presentation
concerning the Army National Guard (ARNG), including information
relating to implementation of the ARNG Combat Readiness Reform Act of
1992 (Title XI of Public Law 102-484, referred to in this addendum as
ANGCRRA). Section 521 reporting was later amended by Section 704 of
NDAA 1996. U.S. Army Reserve information is also presented using
Section 521 report criteria.
Section 517(b)(2)(A).--The promotion rate for officers considered
for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving as active
component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready
Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared with the promotion
rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the
promotion zone in the same pay grade and the same competitive category,
shown for all officers of the Army.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2008 Fiscal year 2009
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the Zone AC in RC Army Average AC in RC Army Average
\1\ Percent (percent) \2\ Percent \1\ (percent) \2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major................................. 0 of 1 ......... 92.8 56 of 63 88.9 94.1
Lieutenant Colonel.................... 1 of 1 100 89.1 16 of 20 80.0 87.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.
\2\ Active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at the time of consideration.
Section 517(b)(2)(B).--The promotion rate for officers considered
for promotion from below the promotion zone who are serving as active
component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready
Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared in the same manner
as specified in subparagraph (A) (the paragraph above).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2008 Fiscal year 2009
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Below the Zone AC in RC Army Average AC in RC Army Average
\1\ Percent (percent) \2\ Percent \1\ (percent) \2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major................................. 0 of 4 ......... 4.9 2 of 4 50.0 6.0
Lieutenant Colonel.................... 0 of 0 ......... 13.5 0 of 1 ......... 7.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Below the zone active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.
\2\ Below-the-zone active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at time of
consideration.
Section 521(b)
1. The number and percentage of officers with at least 2 years of
active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the
U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.
ARNG officers: 14,760 or 36.3 percent
Army Reserve officers: 19,573 or 59 percent
2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least 2
years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National
Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.
ARNG enlisted: 85,255 or 26.8 percent
Army Reserve enlisted: 63,311 or 41.6 percent
3. The number of officers who are graduates of one of the service
academies and were released from active duty before the completion of
their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:
--The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-
duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve
pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:
--In fiscal year 2009, 10 graduates from Service Academies were
serving in the Army National Guard to complete their
service obligation.
--In fiscal year 2009, 0 graduates from Service Academies were
serving in the Army Reserve to complete their service
obligation.
--The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the
Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the
reason for each waiver:
--In fiscal year 2009, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of
the Army.
4. The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished
Reserve Officers' Training Corps graduates and were released from
active duty before the completion of their active-duty service
obligation and, of those officers:
--The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-
duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve
pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:
--In fiscal year 2009, no distinguished Reserve Officers' Training
Corps (ROTC) graduate was released before completing their
active-duty service obligation.
--The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the
Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the
reason for each waiver:
--In fiscal year 2009, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of
the Army.
5. The number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve
Officers' Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum
period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of
ANGCRRA by a combination of (a) 2 years of active duty, and (b) such
additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder
of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those officers,
the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of
obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during
the preceding fiscal year:
--In fiscal year 2009, one ROTC graduate was released early from
their active-duty obligation. The officer is serving the
remainder of his/her obligation in the ARNG
6. The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during
the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above
first lieutenant, and of those recommendations, the number and
percentage that were concurred in by an active duty officer under
section 1113(a) of ANGCRRA, shown separately for each of the three
categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRA (with
Army Reserve data also reported).
--There are no longer active and reserve component associations due
to operational mission requirements and deployment tempo.
Active component officers no longer concur or non-concur with
unit vacancy promotion recommendations for officers in
associated units according to section 1113(a). However, unit
vacancy promotion boards have active component representation.
--In fiscal year 2009, 2,223 ARNG officers from units were
recommended for position-vacancy promotion and promoted. This
number consists of 319 U.S. Army Medical Department, 1,864 Army
Promotion List and 40 Chaplains.
--In fiscal year 2009 the estimated percentage of Unit Vacancy
Promotions CPT through COL in which an active component
representation was on the state unit vacancy promotion board is
as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AMEDD........................................................ 12
APL.......................................................... 10
Chaplain..................................................... 13
------------------------------------------------------------------------
--In fiscal year 2009, 59 Army Reserve officers from units were
recommended for position-vacancy promotion and promoted. This
number consists of 9 U.S. Army Medical Department, 47 Army
Promotion List, and 3 Chaplains.
7. The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under
section 1114(a) of ANGCRRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary
establishing a military education requirement for non-commissioned
officers and the reason for each such waiver.
--In fiscal year 2009, the ARNG had a total of 201 Noncommissioned
Officers receive a military education waiver. As of September
30, 2009 all those waiver recipients were eligible for
promotion to the next rank, but none have obtained the military
education requirement that was previously waived.
--In fiscal year 2009, the Army Reserve had a total of 331 Soldiers
receive a military education waiver. Of these, 124 were SGTs in
need of a waiver for Warrior Leader Course (WLC) as a result of
being deployed or assigned to Warrior Transition Units (WTU)
(Medical Hold or Medical Hold-Over Units) whose medical
condition was incurred in direct support of Overseas
Contingency Operations and who were otherwise eligible for
promotion, if recommended. Furthermore, eligible Soldiers
lacking the prerequisite level of military education due to
operational deployment conflicts or the inability of the Army
to schedule the course, were granted waivers. This included 173
Soldiers who were granted waivers for the Basic NCO Course (Now
Advanced Leader Course) and 34 Soldiers who were granted
waivers for the Advanced NCO Course (now Senior Leader Course).
--The Secretary of the Army has delegated the authority for the
waivers referred to in section 1114(a) of ANGCRRA to the
Director, ARNG and to the Commander, U.S. Army Reserve Command.
A majority of these waivers were approved due to the Soldiers
being deployed and/or performing operational missions. Each
reserve component maintains details for each waiver.
8. The number and distribution by grade, shown for each State, of
personnel in the initial entry training and non-deployability personnel
accounting category established under section 1115 of ANGCRRA for
members of the Army National Guard who have not completed the minimum
training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for
deployment. (A narrative summary of information pertaining to the Army
Reserve is also provided.)
--In fiscal year 2009, the ARNG had 61,812 Soldiers considered non-
deployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit
Status Reporting (e.g., pending administrative/legal discharge
or separation, medical non-availability, incomplete initial
entry training, officer transition, unsatisfactory
participation, or restrictions on the use or possession of
weapons and ammunition under the Lautenberg Amendment).
--In fiscal year 2009, the Army Reserve had 49,330 Soldiers
considered non-deployable for reasons outlined in Army
Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (e.g., pending
administrative/legal discharge or separation, medical non-
availability, incomplete initial entry training, officer
transition, unsatisfactory participation, or restrictions on
the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under the
Lautenberg Amendment).
9. The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each
State, that were discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to
section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA for not completing the minimum training
required for deployment within 24 months after entering the National
Guard. (Army Reserve data also reported.)
--The number of ARNG Soldiers discharged during fiscal year 2009
pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA for not completing
the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months
after entering the Army National Guard is 141 officers and
15,105 enlisted Soldiers from all U.S. states and territories.
The breakdown by each state is maintained by the NGB.
--The number of Army Reserve Soldiers discharged during fiscal year
2009 for not completing the minimum training required for
deployment within 24 months after entering the Army Reserve is
63 officers and 2,910 enlisted Soldiers. Soldiers who have not
completed the required initial entry training within the first
24 months are discharged from the Army Reserve under AR 135-
178, Separation of Enlisted Personnel. Officers who have not
completed a basic branch course within 36 months after
commissioning are separated under AR 135-175, Separation of
Officers.
10. The number of waivers, shown for each State, that were granted
by the Secretary of the Army during the previous fiscal year under
section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1)
of ANGCRRA described in paragraph (9), together with the reason for
each waiver.
--In fiscal year 2009, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of
the Army for the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve.
11. The number of Army National Guard members, shown for each
State, (and the number of AR members), who were screened during the
preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical
profile standards required for deployment and, of those members: (a)
the number and percentage that did not meet minimum physical profile
standards for deployment; and (b) the number and percentage who were
transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel
accounting category described in paragraph (8).
--The number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile
standards required for deployment:
--In fiscal year 2009, 242,777 ARNG Soldiers underwent a Periodic
Health Assessment (PHA) physical. Of these personnel 18,830
or 7.7 percent were identified for review due to a possible
deployment limiting condition or failure to meet retention
standards.
--In fiscal year 2009, 115,133 Army Reserve Soldiers underwent a
PHA physical. Of these personnel 21,505, or 18.68 percent
were identified for review due to a possible deployment
limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.
The fiscal year 2008-2009 increase is most attributable to
PHA physicals now being required annually.
--The number and percentage that were transferred pursuant to section
1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described
in paragraph (8).
--In fiscal year 2009, 18,830 ARNG Soldiers were transferred from
deployable to nondeployable status for failing to meet
medical deployability standards. This number includes
Soldiers returning from a mobilization with a new medical
condition and reflects an increase in the accuracy of
electronic databases.
--In fiscal year 2009, 21,505 Army Reserve Soldiers were considered
non-available for deployment for failing to meet medical
deployability standards. The new PHA physicals being
required annually may account for the increase in those
being found to be non-deployable.
12. The number of members and the percentage total membership of
the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a medical
screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117
of ANGCRRA.
--Repealed. Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div. A, Title VII,
Section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of
ANGCRRA.
13. The number of members and the percentage of the total
membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who
underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as
provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.
--Repealed. Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div. A, Title VII,
Section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of
ANGCRRA.
14. The number of members and the percentage of the total
membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State, over the
age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous
fiscal year for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRRA.
--Repealed. Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div. A, Title VII,
Section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of
ANGCRRA.
15. The number of units of the Army National Guard that are
scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization, and of
those units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in
accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRRA.
--Repealed. Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div. A, Title VII,
Section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1118 of
ANGCRRA.
16. The estimated post-mobilization training time for each Army
National Guard combat unit (and Army Reserve unit), and a description,
displayed in broad categories and by State of what training would need
to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat units (and AR units)
in a post-mobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRA.
--Per January 2007 direction from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
reserve component unit mobilizations are limited to 400-day
periods, including a 30-day post-mobilization leave and all
post-mobilization training.
--The most significant impact of this policy change is that many
training tasks previously conducted during the first 3 to 6
months of mobilization have been identified for premobilization
training, and units are training to standard on as many of
these tasks as resources permit. Information on the type of
training required by units during postmobilization is
maintained by First Army. The data are not captured by state.
--ARNG units strive to train in accordance with the Army Force
Generation (ARFORGEN) process in order to prepare for
operational missions and reduce post-mobilization training
time. The ARFORGEN process requires increased resources for
company-level training proficiency prior to mobilization. This
training generally consists of individual warrior training
tasks, weapons qualification and gunnery, battle staff
training, and maneuver training. This is followed by theater-
specific tasks and higher level collective training to complete
the predeployment requirements for the unit's specific mission.
The goal for post-mobilization training time for a brigade-size
organization is approximately 60 days.
--Post-mobilization training time is contingent upon the amount of
certified pre-mobilization training conducted, the type of
unit, and its assigned mission. In order to reduce post-
mobilization training time, the ARNG has developed programs and
products such as the ARNG Battle Command Training Capability,
the eXportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC), training
devices, and range complexes for our units.
--The combination of programs and products, provide units with the
capability to accomplish more during pre-mobilization training
and therefore reduce post-mobilization training time.
--The Army Reserve developed the Regional Training Center (RTC)
concept in response to the SECDEF decision to restrict RC
mobilizations to 1 year. These centers provide the capability
for Army Reserve units to conduct training on Theater Specific
Required Training (TSRT) to theater standards and conditions.
The majority of training is on individual tasks but some
collective training is also conducted. Because of certification
by unit commanders, most of the training is not repeated in
post-mobilization status. Exceptions are for tasks incorporated
into other required training events and for convoy operations
training.
--The TSRT training is for units that will deploy to theater,
including non-rotational forces (MTOE and TDA). Units
mobilizing for CONUS based missions do not require this
training.
--Each RTC conducts standard rotations throughout the year although
each has the capability to adjust training for selected large
unit participation. Initially the Army Reserve provided a staff
projection to DA that the training would require 17 days, but
in actual implementation the training has required 21 days.
--Army goals for post-mobilization training for Army Reserve
headquarters and combat support/combat service support units
range from 30 to 60 days. Post-mobilization training conducted
by First Army typically consists of counterinsurgency
operations, counter-improvised-explosive-device training,
convoy live-fire exercises, theater orientation, rules of
engagement/escalation-of-force training, and completion of any
theater-specified training not completed during the pre-
mobilization period.
17. A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal
year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRA to
expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training
devices and technologies for members and units of the Army National
Guard (and the Army Reserve).
--During fiscal year 2009, the ARNG continued to synchronize the use
of existing and ongoing live, virtual, and constructive
training aids, devices, simulations and simulators (TADSS)
programs with the training requirements of the ARFORGEN
training model. By synchronizing the use of TADSS with
ARFORGEN, the ARNG continues to improve unit training
proficiency prior to mobilization.
--To support the training requirements of M1A1 Abrams and M2A2
Bradley-equipped Brigade Combat Teams (BCT's), the ARNG
continued the fielding of the Advanced Bradley Full-Crew
Interactive Simulation Trainer, which provides full crew-
simulations training for M2A2 units, Tabletop Full-fidelity
Trainers for the M2A2, and the Conduct of Fire Trainer XXI for
M1A1 and M2A2. When fully fielded, these devices, in addition
to the Abrams Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer XXI,
will be the primary simulations trainers to meet the virtual
gunnery requirements of M1A1 and M2A2 crews.
--In order to meet the virtual-maneuver training requirements in the
ARFORGEN process, M1A1 and M2A2 units use the Close-Combat
Tactical Trainer (CCTT) and the Rehosted Simulations Network
(SIMNET) XXI, in addition to the Rehosted SIMNET CCTT Core. The
CCTT, SIMNET XXI, and SIMNET CCTT provide a mobile training
capability to our dispersed units.
--In order to train all ARNG units on the tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTPs) of convoy operations, the ARNG is fielding
the Virtual Convoy Operations Trainer (VCOT). The VCOT, through
the use of geo-specific databases, provides commanders with a
unique and critical mission rehearsal tool. Currently, 32 VCOT
systems are positioned in the ARNG force to train units on the
fundamentals of convoy operations.
--In order to meet basic and advanced rifle marksmanship
requirements, the ARNG is fielding the Engagement Skills
Trainer (EST 2000). This system is the Army's approved
marksmanship-training device. The ARNG is also continuing use
of its previously procured Fire Arms Training System (FATS)
until EST 2000 fielding is complete. The EST 2000 and FATS are
also used to provide unit collective tactical training for
dismounted Infantry, Special Operations Forces, Scouts,
Engineer, and Military Police squads, as well as combat support
and combat service support elements. These systems also support
units conducting vital homeland defense missions.
--The ARNG supplements its marksmanship-training strategy with the
Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS). The ARNG currently
has over 900 systems fielded down to the company level. The
LMTS is a laser-based training device that replicates the
firing of the Soldier's weapon without live ammunition. It is
utilized for developing and sustaining marksmanship skills,
diagnosing and correcting marksmanship problems, and assessing
basic and advanced skills.
--The ARNG has further developed its battle command training
capability through the three designated Battle Command Training
Centers (BCTCs) at Fort Leavenworth, Camp Dodge, and Fort
Indiantown Gap, and the Distributed Battle Simulation Program
(DBSP). BCTCs provide the backbone of the program as collective
hubs in the battle command training strategy. The DBSP provides
Commanders assistance from Commander's Operational Training
Assistants, TADSS facilitators, and Technical Support Teams.
BCTCs and the DBSP collectively help units in the planning,
preparation, and execution of simulations-based battle staff
training that augments the Department of the Army-directed
Warfighter Exercises and greatly enhances battle staff and unit
proficiency.
--In order to provide the critical culminating training event of
ARFORGEN, the ARNG has implemented the XCTC. The XCTC program
provides the method to certify that ARNG combat units have
achieved company-level maneuver proficiency prior to
mobilization. The XCTC incorporates the use of advanced live,
virtual, and constructive training technologies to replicate
the training experience until now only found at one of the
Army's Combat Training Centers. The centerpiece of the XCTC is
the Deployable Force-on-Force Instrumented Range System
(DFIRST). DFIRST utilizes training technologies that allow for
full instrumentation of the training area from major combat
systems down to the individual Soldier, role player, and
Civilian on the battlefield.
--The most important part of every training exercise is the After-
Action Review (AAR). By full instrumentation of the units,
Soldiers, and training areas, units receive an AAR complete
with two-dimensional, three-dimensional, and video playback of
the actual training exercise. This allows Commanders and
Soldiers to see what occurred during the training exercise from
a different perspective, further enhancing the training
experience.
--The Army Reserve continues to leverage--to the extent resources
permit--TADSS into its training program. Implementation of Army
Campaign Plan Decision Point 72 continues with establishment of
the 75th Battle Command Training Division (BCTD) (Provisional).
This division, with five battle command training brigades,
employs legacy constructive simulations to provide battle
command and staff training to Army Reserve and Army National
Guard battalion and brigade commanders and staffs during pre-
mobilization and post-mobilization. The concept plan as well as
requirements for supporting Army battle command systems and
simulations drivers for the 75th BCTD is pending Headquarters
Department of the Army (HQDA) approval.
--The Army Reserve continues to partner with the Program Executive
Office, Simulations, Training and Instrumentation; Training and
Doctrine Command agencies; and HQDA to define TADSS
requirements for combat support and combat service support
units. The 75th BCTD is on the Entity-level Resolution
Federation (ERF) fielding plan. The ERF provides a high-
resolution (e.g., individual Soldier-level fidelity aggregated
to unit resolutions) joint constructive battle staff training
simulation.
--The LMTS and EST 2000 remain essential elements of Army Reserve
marksmanship training. LMTS procurement continues, and
distribution throughout the Army Reserve force continues to
increase. The LMTS has also been adapted to support convoy
operations training. In either individual pre-marksmanship
training or convoy modes, the system allows the Soldier to use
an assigned weapon, as well as crew-served weapons, in a
simulation/training mode. EST 2000 systems have been fielded to
many Army Reserve Engineer and Military Police organizations to
enable full use of its training capabilities by units with high
densities of crew-served weapons their at home stations.
--The Army Reserve also has a number of low-density simulators it
employs to reduce expensive ``live'' time for unique combat
service support equipment. For example, Army Reserve watercraft
units train on the Maritime Integrated Training System (MITS),
a bridge simulator that not only trains vessel captains but the
entire crew of Army watercraft. In 2007 the Army Reserve
invested in communications infrastructure so that the MITS at
Mare Island, California can communicate and interact with
another Army MITS at Fort Eustis, Virginia. This provides the
capability to conduct distributed multi-boat collective
training among all the simulators. Of note, the MITS is also
used by U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, and harbor management
agencies. Other simulators include locomotive simulators used
by Army Reserve railroad units and a barge derrick simulator
for floating watercraft maintenance units. Other simulator
requirements are being identified in requirements documents.
18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State, (and
for the Army Reserve), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system
as required by section 1121 of ANGCRRA, including the personnel
readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment
information required by that section, together with:
--Explanations of the information: Readiness tables are classified.
This information is maintained by the Department of the Army,
G-3.
--Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary's
overall assessment of the deployability of units of the ARNG
(and Army Reserve), including a discussion of personnel
deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with
section 1121:
--Summary tables and overall assessments are classified. This
information is maintained by the Department of the Army, G-
3.
19. Summary tables, shown for each State (and Army Reserve), of the
results of inspections of units of the Army National Guard (and Army
Reserve) by inspectors general or other commissioned officers of the
Regular Army under the provisions of Section 105 of Title 32, together
with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including
display of:
--The number of such inspections;
--Identification of the entity conducting each inspection;
--The number of units inspected; and
--The overall results of such inspections, including the inspector's
determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met
deployability standards and, for those units not meeting
deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the
status of corrective actions.
--During fiscal year 2009, Inspectors General and other
commissioned officers of the Regular Army conducted 947
inspections of the ARNG, inspecting 1,403 ARNG units. The
bulk of these inspections, 711, were executed by Regular
Army officers assigned to the respective States and
Territories as Inspectors General. First Army and the
Department of the Army Inspectors General conducted 96 of
the inspections, and the remaining 140 by the U.S. Army
Forces Command (FORSCOM); Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC); Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM); and
the U.S. Army Audit Agency. Because the inspections
conducted by Inspectors General focused on findings and
recommendations, the units involved in these inspections
were not provided with a pass/fail rating. Results of such
inspections may be requested for release through The
Inspector General of the Army.
--Operational Readiness Evaluation data for the Force Support
Package and expanded separate brigades are unavailable, as
inspections thereof were eliminated as requirements in
1997. Data available under the Training Assessment Model
(TAM) relates to readiness levels and is generally not
available in an unclassified format. TAM data are
maintained at the state level and are available upon
request from state level-training readiness officials.
--In accordance with AR 1-201, Army Inspection Policy, the U.S.
Army Reserve Command (USARC) conducts inspections of
regional readiness commands and direct support units within
requirements of the USARC Organizational Inspection Program
(OIP). Per the Army Regulation, OIPs at division levels and
above mainly comprise staff inspections, staff assistance
visits, and Inspectors General. Staff inspections are only
one aspect by which Commanding Generals can evaluate the
readiness of their commands. The Inspector General conducts
inspections and special assessments based on systemic
issues and trends analysis with emphasis on issues that
could impede the readiness of the Army Reserve.
--The Chief, Army Reserve, directed the Inspector General to
conduct special assessments in fiscal year 2009 prompted by
concerns over systemic issues. One was the Special
Assessment of Training Management. Its objective was to
determine if units in the Army Reserve were in compliance
with Command Training Guidance for Training Years 2008-
2010, with emphasis on the execution of weapons training,
remedial training, qualification, and ammunition
availability. This assessment also encompassed an annual
regulatory review of compliance with and effectiveness of
the Army Voting Assistance Program, a program of special
interest to the Department of the Army. Another was the
Special Assessment of the Impact of Army Reserve Equipment
Shortages (Funding/Availability/Modernization) and Training
with the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), which evaluated
training issues due to equipment shortages and the affect
it had on our Soldiers' morale.
--The Army Reserve is meeting regulatory requirements through a
combination of Battle-Focused Readiness Reviews (BFRRs) and
staff assistance visits, with the assistance visits
conforming to regulatory requirements of AR 1-201. The BFRR
is the tool used by major subordinate Commanders to provide
the Army Reserve Commanding General a status on resources
and readiness of their commands, and resolve systemic
issues/trends in order to achieve continuous improvements
in readiness. The Army Reserve conducted 19 BFRRs in fiscal
year 2009, while inspecting 65 units. The staff assistance
visits were more oriented to a particular topic in the
staff proponent's area.
20. A listing, for each ARNG combat unit (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP
units) of the active-duty combat units (and other units) associated
with that ARNG (and U.S. Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section
1131(a) of ANGCRRA, shown by State, for each such ARNG unit (and for
the U.S. Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment of the commander of that
associated active-duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training
resource requirements of that National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in
accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRA; and (B) the results
of the validation by the commander of that associated active-duty unit
of the compatibility of that National Guard (or U.S. Army Reserve) unit
with active duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of
ANGCRRA.
--There are no longer ground combat active or reserve component
associations due to operational mission requirements and
deployment tempo.
--As FORSCOM's executive agent, First Army and U.S. Army Pacific
(USARPAC) for Pacific based Reserve Component units, execute
active duty associate unit responsibilities through both their
pre-mobilization and post-mobilization efforts with reserve
component units. When reserve component units are mobilized,
they are thoroughly assessed in terms of manpower, equipment,
and training by the appropriate chain of command, and that
assessment is approved by First Army or USARPAC as part of the
validation for unit deployment.
--Validation of the compatibility of the Reserve Component units with
the active duty forces occurs primarily during training and
readiness activities at mobilization stations, with direct
oversight by First Army, USARPAC, and FORSCOM.
21. A specification of the active-duty personnel assigned to units
of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (10 U.S.C. 261
note), shown (a) by State for the Army National Guard (and for the U.S.
Army Reserve), (b) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted
members assigned, and (c) by unit or other organizational entity of
assignment.
TITLE XI (FISCAL YEAR 2009) AUTHORIZATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
OFF ENL WO TOTAL
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Army Reserve........... 97 110 8 215
TRADOC...................... 50 3 0 53
FORSCOM..................... 979 2,165 101 3,245
USARPAC..................... 30 49 1 80
-------------------------------------------
TOTAL................. 1,156 2,327 102 3,593
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TITLE XI (FISCAL YEAR 2009) ASSIGNED
------------------------------------------------------------------------
OFF ENL WO TOTAL
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Army Reserve........... 28 77 7 112
TRADOC...................... 5 5 0 10
FORSCOM..................... 659 2,119 85 2,863
USARPAC..................... 28 53 1 82
-------------------------------------------
TOTAL................. 720 2,254 93 3,067
------------------------------------------------------------------------
--As of September 30, 2009, the Army had 3,067 active component
Soldiers assigned to Title XI positions. In fiscal year 2006,
the Army began reducing authorizations in accordance with the
National Defense Authorization Act 2005 (NDAA 2005, Public Laws
108-767, Section 515). Army G-1 and U.S. Army Human Resources
Command (HRC) carefully manage the authorizations and fill of
Title XI positions. The data is captured at the command level.
The actual duty location for each position is not captured down
to the state level of detail.
Chairman Inouye. And, may I now call upon General Casey.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY
General Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators. I'll give
you my whole statement for the record, and just try to
summarize here for you, because of time.
What I'd like to do, Mr. Chairman, is give you a short
update on where we are on restoring balance, and then talk
briefly about three areas that are priorities for the Army and,
I would hope, for this committee, and that's sustaining our
soldiers and families, reset, and our modernization efforts.
Now, if I might, just to give you a quick update on
balance, I've been saying, since 2007, that we were out of
balance, that we were so weighed down by our current
commitments that we couldn't do the things we knew we needed to
do to sustain this force for the long haul, this All-Volunteer
Force, and to prepare ourselves to do other things. And, with
you, we have been working steadily at this since 2007.
I will tell you, this budget, this 2011 budget, plus the
drawdown in Iraq, gives us the resources and the time to
complete the efforts that we began in 2007 to get ourselves
back in balance.
Let me just give you an update on some key parameters:
First of all, growth. We completed the personnel growth
that President Bush directed in January 2007, late last summer.
And that is a huge boost for us. But, even as we completed that
growth, it was clear that, for a number of reasons, we needed
to continue to grow. And, as you mentioned in your opening
statement, Mr. Chairman, the Secretary of Defense did authorize
us to grow by another 22,000, and we can talk a little bit more
about that in the questions and answers.
The second element of balance is probably the most
important, and that's ``dwell,'' the amount of time the
soldiers spend at home. We have intuitively known that it takes
about 2 or 3 years to recover from a 12-month combat
deployment, yet we have been returning soldiers to combat in
about 12 months, because we've been too small. Well, we've now
documented that with a scientific study that we finished last
year that shows it takes 2 to 3 years to recover from a 12-
month combat deployment. And so it is critically important that
we continue to make progress to our dwell goals of 1 year out,
2 years back, for the Active force; 1 year out, 4 years back,
for the Guard and Reserve.
Because of our growth and the drawdown in Iraq, even with
the plus-up in Afghanistan--and our portion of that plus-up is
about 20,000--we will get 70 percent of the Army to our goal
of--Active Army to our goal of 1 to 2 by 2011; and 80 percent
of the Guard and Reserve to 1 to 4 by 2011. The rest will get
there in 2012. So that's critically important for us.
MODULARITY AND REBALANCE
Third element I'd update you on is modularity. And you'll
remember, back in 2004, we came to the subcommittee and said we
were a cold war Army. We weren't organized into formations that
could be organized to deal with the threat that presented
itself. We were designed to face a Warsaw Pact threat. And we
have been progressing ever since. Well, we are 90 percent of
the way through converting all 300 brigades in the Army to
modular designs, and we will largely finish that by 2011, which
was our goal.
The other element of organizational change is rebalancing.
We had a lot of skills that were needed in the cold war, but
were not necessarily as needed today. And we've converted over
200 tank companies, artillery batteries, air defense batteries,
into civil affairs, psychological operations, special forces
companies. So that change has been going on.
So together, modularity and rebalancing--largest
organizational change of the Army since World War II, and done
while we've been deploying 150,000 soldiers over and back to
Iraq and Afghanistan every year.
Next element of balance, we feel we can get more out of our
force if we organize it on a rotational model, much like the
Navy and Marine Corps have been on for years. And we're moving
toward that, and it'll pay great benefits.
And last, restationing. With the base realignment and
closure and the growth, we're moving 380,000 soldiers,
civilians, and family members all around the world, here, over
the next few years, to complete that. But, the end result will
be much better facilities for our soldiers and families.
So, that's an update on rebalancing. With your support, we
expect to largely complete what we set out to do in 2007, and
be in a much different position by the end of 2011. And this
budget is what gets us there. Still got stresses and strains,
as the Secretary said, and not out of the woods yet.
Now, if I could, just three quick priorities:
Sustaining soldiers and families. They're the heart and
soul of this force. Two years ago, we doubled the amount of
money we were putting toward soldiers and family programs.
We've sustained that, and this budget continues that effort.
Second, reset. This budget contains almost $11 billion to
reset about 30 brigades worth of equipment. That's, one,
absolutely critical to sustaining the operational ready rates
in the field in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to the long-term
health of the force. And as we come down--draw down in Iraq,
all that equipment has to go through the depots and get
reconditioned before it's put back in the force. And I worry
that people will say, ``Yes, okay, we're out of Iraq, we don't
need money for reset anymore.'' That's not the case.
MODERNIZING
And then, last, modernization. As you mentioned in your
statement, the FCS--future combat systems--program was
terminated. And we have, in this budget, the beginning of a
brigade combat team modernization strategy that we believe is
both affordable and achievable. And that's based on four
elements:
First of all, incrementally modernizing our network. And we
do that incrementally so that we can take advantage of
continuing growth in information technology.
Second is incrementally fielding capability packages. In
the future combat systems, we talked about spinouts, about
capabilities that we could put into the force, ahead of the
full system. We've refined that concept into capability
packages, where we will incrementally put ready capabilities
into the force as they're ready, rather than wait for the whole
system to be developed.
Third, we've incorporated the MRAP, the mine resistant
ambush protected, vehicles into our forces. There's a
significant investment in those vehicles, and we've
incorporated them into the force. And then, last, this budget
includes just under $1 billion of research and development
effort for a new ground combat vehicle. And this vehicle will--
is designed as a replacement for the Bradley. It is an infantry
fighting vehicle, and it is the first infantry fighting vehicle
designed, from the ground up, to operate in an improvised
explosive device (IED) environment. And it will become a very
important element for us.
I'll close with saying that I share your pride in what the
men and women of this Army are doing around the world every
day. I couldn't be prouder of them.
And so I'd look forward to taking your questions.
Thanks very much.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you.
Senator Brownback.
Senator Brownback. No, Mr. Chairman, I don't have a
statement to make. I would like to put one into the record.
And I certainly thank our two presenters here today. And I
look forward to making a couple of questions when my turn
comes.
Chairman Inouye. Without objection, your statement will be
made part of the record.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Sam Brownback
Mr. Chairman, I thank you and am pleased to attend my first Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense hearing. I welcome Secretary
McHugh and General Casey and look forward to your testimonies. On
behalf of my state, I would like to thank the Secretary and General
Casey for their commitment to the military men and women in Kansas,
particularly at Fort Riley and Fort Leavenworth.
The Army faces a number of major challenges covered in the prepared
statements of today's witnesses. In particular, however, I would like
to focus on the subject of warrior care and our commitment to soldiers
and families.
First, I applaud the Army's new Comprehensive Soldier Fitness
program, an all-inclusive approach to emotional, social, spiritual,
family, and physical fitness, to build resiliency within the Army.
Recently the Army began a brain mapping program and I encourage these
types of efforts to more fully understand the effect that trauma and
injury can have on the functionality of the brain. These efforts could
be a huge step in the right direction in suicide prevention and drug
and alcohol abuse prevention. I also want to commend the Army for their
collaboration with the National Institute of Mental Health on suicide
prevention and I look forward to the benefits we as a society can gain
from the research and programs the Army implements.
Next, I would note that the budget provides $1.7 billion to family
programs and services and I commend the Army for making these programs
an important part of its budget. The Army is built on the backs of the
families of its soldiers. I am pleased with the commitment the Army has
made to the military family and I encourage the continued investment in
support services to these families. The implementation of the Army
Strong Community Centers is a needed service for those family members
of the Army Reserve who so often do not have a physical base to call
home.
In particular, I want to highlight a couple of items worth of
additional attention from the Army. First, following the example in
Illinois and other facilities, I encourage the Army to look at joint
VA/DOD hospitals to streamline care and provide the best medical
services to military members, their families, and military retirees. A
related issue involves transitioning our active duty soldiers into the
VA system. There are several pilot programs that attempt to seamlessly
transition active duty soldiers into the VA system but they have had
limited success. Obviously, the new electronic medical records will be
a huge step in help transition a soldier from DOD to the VA. However,
the disability rating system is still too slow and behind the times. I
ask that you work closely with the VA to ensure these soldiers are
getting the proper care and benefits they are entitled to.
I also want to highlight an emerging problem at Fort Riley, in my
state, as well as other Army posts: school overcrowding. Fort Riley is
again the home of the headquarters of the First Infantry Division and
the combination of that move with other BRAC and Grow the Force
decisions has led to a dramatic expansion of this post. I am very proud
that the surrounding communities stepped up to the plate to prepare for
the thousands of soldiers and family members arriving in the area. But
after exhausting their bonding capacity to provide classroom space off-
post (which has already been filled), the local communities lack the
ability to handle a much larger than anticipated on-post student
population. I know that the Army and the Department of Defense are not
usually in the business of school construction, but I also know that
Fort Riley is not the only installation facing this problem. Other
posts are now or will soon face similar issues, and we have to find a
way to make sure these children have a place to go to school.
It is a huge concern in the Fort Riley school district, a top
priority of Major General Brooks, who commands the First Infantry
Division, and something that I intend to prioritize during the upcoming
appropriations process. I hope to learn more from the Army about what
can be done to address this concern.
Again, I thank the panel for their time and look forward to hearing
how the Army plans to use this budget to meet the needs of our nation's
military.
Chairman Inouye. Gentlemen, I have a few questions. I'd
like to submit the rest because of the technological nature of
the questions. They refer to the Stryker, the cargo ship, and
your program on balance.
STRESS ON THE FORCE
But, at this stage, may I ask--as noted by all the
witnesses and everyone that has gone to Iraq and Afghanistan,
if they would say that the troops are under great stress? And,
as such, we have noted suicide rates rising, alcohol abuse, and
divorce rates. And you have provided additional mental health
providers and launched a suicide prevention education program.
Can you give us an update, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. McHugh. I can, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate your
starting with this question, because obviously it goes to the
core of the stress and the pressure under which these brave
soldiers have been for the last 8 years, but it also shows, I
think, the extent to which it reaches beyond the soldier into
the family structure. I think it is one of the most important
things we've done--I want to start by giving a tip of the hat
to the Chief, and to my predecessor Pete Geren--who helped
establish the program called comprehensive soldier fitness.
This is a program that was started to try to provide
resiliency training--to provide resiliency trainers to go out,
throughout the force. And perhaps the Chief would like to
comment further. But it allows people the opportunity, on an
anonymous basis, through computer technology, but in a very
real way, to find particularly tailored programs to help them
cope. And that's a great start.
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH
But we have to get down on the ground on a one-to-one
basis. And, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, we're working very hard
to try to expand the wide range of programs, including a
dramatic plus-up in behavioral health specialists. In fact, now
we see, in forward-deployed positions, the availability of
behavioral health specialists, which is rated, generally, the
ideal of one to every 700 troops. We're actually below that
level now, but we're continuing to grow to that. Like what
happens in the private sector, of course, growing that cadre of
specialists has been a challenge, but I think we're making good
progress.
With respect to suicide, the Vice Chief of Staff, General
Pete Chiarelli, has taken that under his wing and, I think, has
done a terrific job in establishing a way forward to try to
provide stress release, to try to keep a better assessment, the
pre- and during and post-assessment surveys that are required
now, as mandated by this Congress, for each soldier, so we can,
hopefully, identify problems that--as they emerge, to engaging
in a pretty revolutionary 5-year longitudinal study, for the
cost of $55 million, with suicide specialists and the National
Academy of--National Institute of Mental Health, rather, to try
to understand the causes of suicide. The specialists tell us
that the exciting thing about this is, they feel it will have
application to the factors behind those who find themselves in
a position of choosing suicide in the civilian sector, as well.
We will receive reports, on a quarterly basis, to try to
make sure that we're implementing hopeful and developing
procedures to try to do a better job.
So, whether it's alcohol abuse programs, with more money,
more counselors, more availability; mental health; military
life; family consultants; people to talk to; people to go to,
to try to receive more help--we've taken a very holistic
approach to this. We're doing a better job, but, as you noted,
Mr. Chairman, the stresses continue, and those stressor
indicators, across the board, continue to be troubling to us.
Chairman Inouye. General, would you care to add to that?
SUICIDE
General Casey. If I could, Chairman Inouye. Frankly, I'm
personally frustrated with the effort that we have put on this
over the last 3 years, and then particularly over the last
year, that we haven't stemmed the tide. And we've increased by
about 18 suicides a year since 2004. In this past year, with
all the effort we made, we increased by about 20. And as I
looked at this over the past years, it was clear that we were
shooting behind the target with a lot of these programs. And
that's why we instituted the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness
Program, to give the soldiers and family members and civilians
the skills they need on the front end to be more resilient and
to stay away from suicide to begin with. It's a long-term
program, but I think that is the only way that we are
ultimately going to begin to reduce this.
And the last thing I'd say is this is not just an Army
problem. There was an op-ed in The Washington Post this morning
talking about the impact of suicide in society; we all have to
go at this together. I think this National Institute of Mental
Health study that we've done is going to help everybody.
Thank you.
Mr. McHugh. Mr. Chairman, can I add just one point? We
know, both intuitively and, as the chief mentioned in his
comments, by the findings of the mental health advisory teams
that we employ, that the operations and personal tempo--OPS and
PERSTEMPO--and the boots on the ground (BOG)/dwell inadequacies
are critical, across the board, to all of those stressor
indicators, and suicide is primary amongst them. So, as we
continue to do a better job on keeping people back home between
deployments, we're hopeful that'll have a positive effect on
the suicide rates, as well.
Chairman Inouye. I thank you very much.
STRYKER
General, I'd like to ask a few questions on the Stryker.
We've been watching media reports from Afghanistan that suggest
that these Strykers are quite vulnerable to the explosive
devices; and also they suggest that the Strykers' weight may be
a bit too heavy to give it the necessary mobility it needs in
this Afghanistan theater. What are your thoughts on this?
General Casey. Well, as you can imagine, Mr. Chairman,
we've been watching this very carefully for some time. And, the
Stryker Unit that went into southern Afghanistan ran into some
pretty heavy IEDs--I mean, hundreds of pounds of explosive
weight--and, it did suffer some significant casualties. We've
been working very hard on this, over time, to increase the
survivability of the Stryker. I will tell you, it is more
survivable than the up-armored Humvee and less survivable than
the mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP), and we knew that,
going in there.
Before we sent it in, we implemented a number of
survivability enhancements to the vehicle, and we are in the
process of evaluating whether those are enough to operate in an
IED environment. We are actually in the process of exploring a
V-shaped hull kit, much like we were developing for the manned
ground vehicle with the Future Combat Systems Program, that
could enhance the survivability of the Stryker against
underbelly improvised explosive devices. But, again, we've
implemented a range of different options to enhance the
survivability.
I'm less concerned about the weight and the decrease in
mobility. The Strykers have been remissioned, actually, to a
mission of road security that actually takes advantage of the
mobility that they provide.
Last thing I'll say is, they served for me in Iraq in an
IED environment, and we were not nearly as challenged in that
environment as we were in Afghanistan. So, it's still a very
important vehicle in an element of our force mix.
Mr. McHugh. Well, the only thing I would add is that, as
we're finding in these theaters, not all equipment fits in all
circumstances. The Stryker, something that I was a big
supporter of when I was on the Armed Services Committee, has
proven to be enormously effective. It's had 11 successful
deployments in these two theaters, and we expect more. In terms
of the feedback from the commanders forward-deployed, they view
it as a very valuable resource. Can we make it better, more
survivable? As the Chief mentioned, we're doing that on a
variety of R&D programs. And the V hull--double V hull is
preeminent amongst them. But, we think this is a very important
program, and we have a great deal of confidence in it.
RECRUITMENT
Chairman Inouye. Mr. Secretary, we'd like to congratulate
you on your recruiting program. You have recruited all the
numbers you need, and the quality of personnel. My question
would be, can you maintain this trend? And are you funded
sufficiently?
Mr. McHugh. The answer to the first question, sir, is, we
hope so, and we're working to try to make sure that happens.
General Ben Freakley, who's the head of our Accessions Command,
I think has done an amazing job. But, the most effective thing
he's done is to try to recognize that we, in our recruiting and
retention efforts, are, to a very significant degree, the
beneficiaries of this economy. As Americans, we hope the
economy turns around quickly, but that will change the
environment in which we send out these recruiters and bring
people--young people into the force. And we're trying to
prepare and revamp and refigure our efforts and our programs to
be prepared for that.
The money, for the moment, is significant. One of the major
complaints I had, when I was chairman of the Personnel
Subcommittee in the other body, was that we had an up-and-down
on recruiting resourcing. And you have to maintain, in my
humble judgment, a certain level of consistency to make sure
you're not eroding away your base, not eating your seed corn.
Now, it's totally appropriate, in this environment, that we cut
back on some of the inducements, some of the bonuses we're
paying. They're not necessary in this environment. But, we have
to maintain that. I'm hopeful we're going to do that, I think
we're poised to do it, but we'll have to keep a very close eye
on it in the future.
Chairman Inouye. I thank you, sir.
General Casey. If--Mr. Chairman, if I could.
Chairman Inouye. Yeah.
General Casey. To your point about stress on the force we
measure a lot of things to tell us about whether the force is
under stress. And it is. But, also to alert us that we may
break the force. Last year, over 260,000 men and women enlisted
or reenlisted in the Army, the Army Guard, or the Reserve.
That's a very positive indicator of their commitment and their
willingness to continue to serve.
Chairman Inouye. Mr. Secretary and General, I'll be
submitting for your consideration questions on the brigade
combat team modernization, on the future role of the MRAP, the
Aerial Scout helicopter; the question on SDS, and the question
on joint cargo aircraft.
As you know, we are attending the memorial services for our
great friend, and a great patriot, the Congressman from
Pennsylvania.
So, if I may, at this stage, call upon Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
STRYKER
I'd like to pick up on the area dealing with the Strykers,
and so forth, that the chairman was getting into. It's been my
understanding, from serving on this subcommittee many, many
years, and the Armed Services Committee, before this, when they
were developing, you know, the Stryker.
The Stryker has been very good in a lot of areas, as the
Secretary alluded to. The question, I guess, now, General
Casey, is, How long would it take, if we do go a double V-, or
something like that, -shaped hull on the Stryker, to give them
the MRAP-like protection, give them more protection? Because
our troops need that in Afghanistan. And where are you in that
regard?
General Casey. I can't tell you exactly how long it's going
to take----
Senator Shelby. Okay.
General Casey [continuing]. Because we're in the early
design stages of it. But, we are moving rapidly to get it
built, tested, and into the hands of the forces as quickly as
we can.
Senator Shelby. But, from an engineering standpoint, it
looks to me, from what I've been briefed on, that that could be
a probability, more than a possibility, to do this stuff. In
other words, to reequip and make the Stryker more safe.
General Casey. Absolutely. In fact, as I said, we developed
a V-shaped hull kit for the manned ground vehicle, the future
combat systems vehicle. So, the technology is out there, and
it's available. And, I think it has great promise.
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
Do you agree with that Mr. Secretary? I know you--you've
been a supporter of the Stryker----
Mr. McHugh. Yeah----
Senator Shelby [continuing]. As I have.
Mr. McHugh [continuing]. I have, and--although the
environment has changed dramatically. That's not a step----
Senator Shelby. You have to----
Mr. McHugh [continuing]. Back----
Senator Shelby [continuing]. Change with it----
Mr. McHugh [continuing]. From----
Senator Shelby [continuing]. Though, don't you?
Mr. McHugh. Yes, you--absolutely, sir.
I think it's worth noting that the manufacturer stepped out
and recognized this early on, and has been working--not
extrajudiciously, but been working on this and studying it for
some time. And, that's a great compliment to them, to recognize
they want to keep this platform as relevant and as safe as
possible.
I'm optimistic, at this time, that we can field this. We've
done it with the MRAP as a start-from-the-ground-up system, we
have the Stryker out in the field. I'd like to think, and have
enough faith in our engineering capability, that we can pull
this off, and do it in a timely fashion.
Senator Shelby. If we can do that, though--the Stryker has
a lot of utility that some of the other vehicles don't have,
right?
Mr. McHugh. The commanders have told us, time and time
again--and I just got back from my 15th visit to Iraq and 4th
to Afghanistan--that they like and value this platform.
Senator Shelby. Yeah. We all do.
General Casey. If I--sorry. Could I just add----
Senator Shelby. Yes, sir, General.
General Casey [continuing]. Something to this, because I
think it's important. I mentioned that the ground combat
vehicle that we're putting in this budget is the first vehicle
designed from the ground up to operate in an IED environment.
Senator Shelby. That would take----
General Casey. Each----
Senator Shelby. That would take the place of the----
General Casey. The Bradley.
Senator Shelby. That would succeed the Bradley.
General Casey. That's correct. But the issues that we're
having with the Humvee and the Stryker are all because they
were developed not necessarily to operate in IED environments.
So, we're adapting as we go.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Senator Shelby. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to get in the area
of the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), if I could, which is
very important to the Army and to our soldiers. One issue that
continues to be of concern is the Army's ability to continue
utilizing unmanned systems when and where our soldiers want to
control them. I continue to hear, from our commanders on the
ground, about the importance of the Army--of our commanders--
retaining control of tactical UAVs. We've been through this
before. I know that a great deal of our success in the theater
hinges upon this capability, command and control. And I'm
pleased that the Army has not lost many of these systems, due,
in part, to the fact that the unmanned systems can land
themselves.
What I'm concerned about, Mr. Secretary--and I'll bet
you've been through this--you and General Casey--is enemies
being able to back into these systems, like we saw with the Air
Force Predator system last year. Could you describe what the
Army is doing to mitigate this threat, if you can talk about it
here, and also talk a little about the cyber initiatives that
the Army's pursuing in this area? Without getting into
classified.
Mr. McHugh. I appreciate your sensitivity there----
Senator Shelby. Yeah.
Mr. McHugh [continuing]. Senator. I think I can say,
generically--first of all, the Army greatly values, and, as you
noted, sir, correctly, the commanders feel very strongly about
the Army's need to have these capabilities, particularly at a
strategic level. The Army's----
Senator Shelby. And control, too, isn't it?
Mr. McHugh. Yes, sir. The Army is going forward with an
unmanned systems program that starts with the extended range
multi-purpose (ERMP), which is provided for in this budget,
future development, right down to the Raven, which provides
command-and-control opportunities for us, as well.
As to what we read about in the press, I think I can say
that all the services recognized that potential vulnerability
early on, and have reacted very aggressively to it. And, for
the moment, we feel comfortable as to the security systems in
place. I'd be happy to go into closed session----
Senator Shelby. Sure.
Mr. McHugh [continuing]. And provide you----
Senator Shelby. Whenever the chairman wants to get into
that, sure.
MI-17 HELICOPTER
One last question, Mr. Secretary. The Mi-17 helicopters.
The Department of Defense, as you well know, has spent about $1
billion of funding to noncompetitively purchase nearly 50
Russian Mi-17 helicopters for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
I've expressed to the Secretary of Defense, not to you yet, as
well as this subcommittee, my grave concerns regarding the use
of U.S. taxpayer dollars for Mi-17s, based on what we believe
are false assumptions, a total lack of requirements and no
analysis of alternatives.
The Army has been very involved with the procurement of
these helicopters. And until I raised this concern, last fall,
it appeared that the Army was completely fine with funneling
millions of dollars to the Russians to equip the Iraqis and
Afghans, based on nothing more, as we understand it, than the
fact that these militaries had once seen an Mi-17 in the area.
I'd like to point out that the Mi-17s have an exceptionally
high, as you well know, maintenance requirement, parts and
services, and they're not ready available for in theater. And
the U.S. trade sanctions, I believe, were violated in the
initial procurement.
Finally, it's also my understanding that this platform
specifically violates the U.S. Army airworthiness requirements,
document AR 70-62. The question--I'm getting to it, Mr.
Secretary, slowly--now, that the Army has been designated as
the lead service for the Mi-17 procurement and has established
a nonstandard rotary-wing program management office, why are
there still no requirements or analysis of alternatives to
this?
And, if I could, Mr. Secretary, I'd like to just remind the
subcommittee--our subcommittee, here--that the 2010 Defense
appropriation bill requires a report detailing the current and
anticipated demand for Mi-17s for Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan; the anticipated availability or shortage of
additional airframes; the sustainability of the airframe slated
for use; an analysis of alternative airframes; and the future
cost and funding sources available for procuring Mi-17--C-17s
within 60 days of the enactment of the bill. That was 74 days
ago, Mr. Secretary. Where are we, here?
Mr. McHugh. After 5 months----
Senator Shelby. That was a----
Mr. McHugh [continuing]. In the----
Senator Shelby [continuing]. Long statement----
Mr. McHugh [continuing]. Building, I've had a----
Senator Shelby [continuing]. I know that.
Mr. McHugh [continuing]. Great time to analyze what your
question suggests is a very complex problem, Senator. And, I
would answer in this way.
First, I would beseech you for the opportunity to sit down
with you and to go into----
Senator Shelby. Absolutely.
Mr. McHugh [continuing]. Greater detail.
Second of all, as I--as you stated correctly, and as I
think it needs to be further expanded upon, this is a DOD-
directed program. The Army has been--as you again correctly
noted, been designated the lead agent and administrator on
this, but that is to implement DOD policy. The procurement
program is intended, and has been explained to me, to meet
current and near-term needs on the battlefield. And both the
Iraqis and Afghanistans have seen the Mi-17s. It's been
explained to me----
Senator Shelby. Probably flying around.
Go ahead.
Mr. McHugh. It's been explained to me that those pilots--
and I know you understand the development of the personnel and
the specialists to serve in both the Iraqi and the Afghan
security forces, to actually pilot and to do other specialty
military occupational specialists (MOSs), in their ranks, is
somewhat strained. But, in the near term, those who have seen
it have also flown it and are prepared to operate in those
particular platforms.
You're correct, as well, their maintenance scheduled needs
are somewhat of high operations tempo, but in complexity they
are somewhat simple, in that--and I'm probably the last person
in the world to be talking about this, but--in that the
mechanics and the opportunities for repair and maintenance are
relatively routine.
Having said that, and as a Buy American kind of individual,
I think it's totally appropriate, as we go forward, that we
continue to assess the program. And at such time as it's
appropriate, when perhaps the theater needs growth, we
reexamine exactly which way should--we should go in future
platforms. But----
Senator Shelby. Well, that would include alternatives as
you analyze the needs, right?
Mr. McHugh. As directed by the Department of Defense. And
as everybody in theater, including the Iraqis and Afghanistans,
get more sophisticated across the board, I assume their needs
and their capabilities will expand.
Senator Shelby. Well, I'd like to meet with you sometime,
and we'll expand this a little bit further.
Mr. McHugh. I'd be honored to.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you.
Senator Brownback.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary, General, good to see you.
Let me start off just thanking you for your work you're
doing on the--both the suicide and post traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD)--traumatic brain injury (TBI)--work. I think
it's--one of the startling things to me, when I came in as
Congressman, was the number of veterans that we were having in
our office and coming by that were having a lot of long-term
difficulties from the Vietnam war and era.
And I think one of the things we didn't get on top of was
what was happening to them mentally after they came back from
combat. And I--boy, I see that thing playing out again, if we
don't get on top of it. And, it seems like the military's
recognizing that and saying, ``No, something's going on here,
and we need to get on top of this.'' Because, otherwise, you're
going to get a lot of long-term problems, difficulties. And
it's like almost anything, the sooner you get on top of it, the
more likely you are to be successful with your options, and the
more options you generally have available. So, I really applaud
that.
And I also applaud that I think we can find things out,
here, that could be helpful to the broader society. Suicide
rates in our young people is the third highest cause of death
in teenagers. And you're going, ``You know, why on Earth is
that?'' You know, when you live in a great country like this,
and opportunities that are here. But, you know, people really
develop a thought that there's just no hope. And when they get
to that point in time, then options for doing very drastic,
dramatic, self-harmful things grows, and the more likelihood
there is that it happens.
You're doing some work on brain mapping studies, that I'm a
big fan of, because I think that may teach us what's going on
mentally, inside of a person. And the brain is the final
frontier for us as a--as an organ. I mean, it's just
phenomenal, and it's complex, and we don't understand it very
well. But, you guys' work on this could really help us
understand a lot of those complex inputs, and how they're
processed, and what happens. So, I really want to urge you, and
support that effort.
A final thought in this area, my own personal experience
and view has been that the resources are available, but it's
that there are plenty of resources that are there, but
generally when a person gets into this stage, they've blown
through most of their relationships. They've blown through,
maybe, a spousal relationship, family relationship, friends,
and they're on their own now. They're alone in it.
SUICIDE PREVENTION
And that's when you get in trouble, in that if there's a
way that we can look at encouraging those, or spotting the
people when they start moving to a loner status, I'd--that's,
to me, the whole key of it. And that's very hard to do. I think
it's on a front-end basis, where we try to encourage the
building of more relationships, and be very systematic about
it. You know, you've got a buddy program in the military,
you're always watching for the guy next to you. If there's a
way we expand that, get the volunteer community around these
bases, around Fort Riley and places like that to do it; faith
communities, very happy to step in and work in a relationship-
building setting because I think that, at the core, is where we
lose it. It's not technology, it's old fashioned ``I care for
you.'' And having somebody there that actually cares for them,
and through thick and thin, and when--this is generally when
it's getting really thin, and people self-treating places and
ways, and I've seen plenty of it. And that's at the core, but
what you've got to get at is that relationship building.
So, I really want to support that effort, because I think
you can help us out in the broader society, and we need to
address it as a military.
I've got two narrow Kansas issues I want to push out to
you. And this is, by virtue of the things you've identified
here today, this is very small potatoes. So, you can look at it
as such. They're important to us. We've got two major Army
installations, a number of Guard installations in the State.
Fort Leavenworth, Fort Riley, we're very proud of in our State,
and we love them. And we really are very appreciative of those
installations, those units.
NEW MILITARY/VA HOSPITAL
At Fort Leavenworth, there's not a military hospital there.
And I know we've looked at the numbers on this and said,
``Well, it's not a size, yet.'' We do have the disciplinary
barracks that's there, we do have a small Veterans
Administration (VA) that's there. And I think it may be one, if
you look into your future plans, that you may look at and
decide a combined military/VA hospital might be the way to go
with this, because it's got a large military community, a large
military retiree community. I understand, in Chicago, you've
done a combined Army/VA center. And in our future, I think
we've just got to be less stovepipe and a lot more
interconnected. And I think this may be a classic one where it
actually could work pretty well and also fit the disciplinary
barracks that's there, too.
[The information follows:]
Recapitalization of the Munson Army Health Center, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, is in the very early phases of planning.
The next planning visit is scheduled for March 22-26, 2010 to
clarify requirements and determine full replacement costs or
program amount. The replacement project will compete in the
Department of Defense's Capital Investment Decision Making
(CIDM) process for likely programming in the fiscal year 2012-
17 Defense Health Program Future Years Defense Plan. While the
Army Medical Command and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
have opened dialogue at the local level, the currently
developed project that will be presented in this year's CIDM is
a modern 175,000 gross square foot replacement Army Health
Center. Collaborative efforts between the Army and the VA
concerning this project are not ready for consideration in this
year's CIDM process.
Senator Brownback. A second issue--and this, again, is a
narrow one--at Fort Riley, with bringing the Big Red One back,
which we are delighted to have--the community, the area, is
just delighted their headquarters is back from Germany. We're
busting at the seams on our grade school, middle schools, with
the numbers coming back in. And if you can look at if there's
any way to help out with that, because we want to make sure we
provide a good family experience for these young men and women
in uniform, and their families. And we're having difficulty
meeting that.
So, as I say, those are small potatoes, relative to the
other things.
And overall, I want to commend you for what you're doing in
Iraq and Afghanistan. I think this military has performed very,
very well. It has been tough circumstance, difficult to do, but
I'm really proud of what you're doing. I'm proud of how the
military is operating.
Thank you, Chairman.
[The information follows:]
The Army has no specific authority to fund public school
construction.
Chairman Inouye. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Dorgan.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary and General, thank you for being here.
Let me ask a couple of questions. First, the issue of the
Sky Warriors. I know that my colleague is very interested in
that issue, and has been for some while. I have wondered aloud
and questioned why we have almost identical programs run by
both the Army and the Air Force: Sky Warriors, the Warriors,
and the Predators.
DUPLICATION OF SYSTEM
And when I came to Congress, several decades ago, I joined
a group then, with Senator Gary Hart, talking about trying to
change the procurement process and try to stop the duplication.
Because every level of service wants to do everything that
everybody else does, and they're pretty successful in making
that happen. And as I watched the growth of the Predator and
the Warrior program, it looked to me like you've got two
branches of the service that have done exactly the same thing.
And I've been enormously frustrated by that.
So, the question is, How will the Army Sky Warrior's UAVs
integrate with the 50 Air Force UAV caps that are planned for
2011? I mean, are you working with the Air Force trying to--
tell--try to----
Mr. McHugh. We are, Senator. In fact, we have been for some
time. In fact, I started working with ``Buzz'' Moseley on UAV
employment a couple years ago. It's not only the procurement
side of it, it's the employment side of it. And as we sat down,
we realized that we were talking past each other a bit. If you
look at the levels of war, it was pretty clear to us that the
Air Force had the strategic UAV requirement. That was their
baby, nothing for the Army in there.
At the tactical level, that was really the Army's purview,
because we need to maintain pretty tight control so we can
shift them around based on changing tactical situations.
At the theater level, the operational level is where we
were bumping up against each other. We worked with the Air
Force to build a--we call it a CONOP, concept of operations--
that gave the Air Force the higher--not altitude, but the
higher-level requirements for the theater commander; and the
Army had the lower-level operational requirements for the core
commanders. I think we've done a good job of differentiating
that. Probably not as much progress on the procurement side, in
differentiating that.
Now, we--these ERMP, that are basically enhanced Predators,
that are in this budget, 26 of them, are somewhat different
than the Predator. But, I ask myself the same question you do,
Is it so much different that it ought to be a different
program? And could we not gain efficiencies working with one
program? And I have not cracked that one with the Air Force
yet.
Senator Dorgan. I hope you will, because I have thought
there should be an executive agency for UAVs in the Pentagon so
that we don't have different levels of service doing the same
thing, and duplicating the research, duplicating the management
of the program, and so on. I--it is frustrating to see. And I
understand that most services want to do everything, and even
some things another service is doing. It's been a battle we've
fought for 30 years; mostly unsuccessfully, I'm afraid. But,
thank you for that answer.
I want to just mention to you that I'm going to ask the
chairman, at some point--I've not had a chance to visit with
him--but, in this appropriations bill, to include an amendment
that will take a new and completely fresh look at whether
deciding in LOGCAP to, essentially, contract everything out
instead of doing it in the service, whether that has been an
effective thing for the country--whether it's producing food
for troops, you know, under a contract, or buying towels for
troops, or moving water to base. I happen to think that the
LOGCAP, and the contracts under LOGCAP, have produced the
greatest waste, fraud, and abuse, perhaps in the history of our
country. I've done 20 hearings in the policy committee on this.
Let me just go through a couple of them quickly.
The contract to provide water to the military bases in
Iraq, that contract resulted in nonpotable water at a number of
the military bases being more contaminated than raw water from
the Euphrates River. And I had the internal documents of KBR
that said this was a near miss, could have caused mass sickness
or death. Both KBR said it didn't happen and the Army said it
didn't happen. And yet, I got an e-mail from a commander, a
woman, a physician with the U.S. Army in Iraq, saying, ``No.
No. I read these things. It did happen. I'm here. I'm treating
patients as a result of that nonpotable water that is
contaminated.'' And I got the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) to do--or the inspector general, rather, to do an
investigation. He said, ``Yes. In fact, it did happen.''
BAD CONTRACTS
And it kind of bothers me that--it bothered me then, and
does now, that the contractor said it didn't happen, the Army
says it didn't happen, and, in fact, when you investigate, it
did happen. The sodium dichromate. We now have the Indiana
National Guard and several others testing troops. Again, we had
the person who worked for KBR on the site, who was a safety
inspector, said he warned the contractor. Contractor denies all
these issues.
Electrocutions, you're well familiar with. The contractors
work on providing electricity. And wiring had to be redone, and
we found massive mistakes. Soldiers have died. Mr. Maseth died,
taking a shower, because of incompetence, hiring third-country
nationals, that could barely speak English, to do the work.
A man showed up, who worked in Saudi Arabia, who was doing
part of what the Army used to do, he was ordering the supplies.
He was ordering towels. And he held up a towel, he said, ``Here
is a towel I was going to order. My boss said no, that towel is
not the one to order, I want you order this towel. It has our
company logo on it.'' He said, ``Well, that'll cost three to
four times more.'' His boss said, ``Doesn't matter. I mean,
this is a cost-plus contract. We're going to make more money.''
So, he ordered the towel with the logo.
And the list goes on and on. I mean, 22-year-old Mr.
Diveroli gets $300 million in contracts. He's a 22-year-old
president of his dad's shell company, and he hires a 26-year-
old masseuse as a vice president, and gets $300 million in
contracts.
I had the head of your Army Sustainment Command in my
office, and we had quite a talk. He said, ``You know what? I'd
do the same thing today, knowing what I knew then.'' I said,
``Well, then you wouldn't--if I were running the Army, you
wouldn't remain in my Army.''
But, all of those things suggest to me that there's been
something fundamentally broken in the procurement process, in
the contracting process. In some cases, we even have contracted
out contractors to supervise other contractors. I know some of
that's now going to change.
I'm going to ask that we include an amendment, in this
year's bill, to take a fresh look at all that's been done and
evaluate if there is a better way to have done that, perhaps
bringing some of those functions back into the Army? But, give
me your assessment of all that, General Casey, and perhaps
Secretary McHugh.
RESPONSE TO BAD CONTRACTS
General Casey. Well, first of all, I think your efforts
have shined the light on some things that needed a light shined
on them. And all those things that you said, happened. But, I
think we have learned from them, in advance. I mean, we're not
where we were 3 years ago, with contracts today. We actually--
Pete Geren, in 2007, had an independent assessment of our
contracting capability, and it was striking how much work we
had to do. And since we've set up an Army Contracting Command
with an Expeditionary Command and a Mission and Installations
Command, and we have more than doubled the number of trained
contractor representatives that are out there to supervise
these contractors. And we're actively training soldiers in
units before they deploy to give them the skills they need to
do some of the oversight that was clearly missing in the cases
that you saw.
My sense is, your call to re-look this is timely. And it--
I'm not sure how much of this is folklore, but when I talk to
folks about this, what they tell me is, when we took the Army
down, back in the late 1980s early 1990s, from 780,000 to
480,000, some--the mitigation for that was to be able to go to
contractors to the logistical support. And way back then, they
did--I'm sure they did cost-benefit analysis and costed the
cost of a logistics soldier out over the lifecycle of the
soldier, and they figured it was going to be cheaper to do
contract for some of those logistical tasks. I think it's high
time that we go back and see if those assumptions are still
valid.
CONTRACTING CAPABILITY
Mr. McHugh. Let me echo the Chief's comments to you,
Senator. And having served a number of years, and watching your
efforts while I was in Congress, and a big fan of the military
and the Army, I deeply appreciate it. And I think I can speak
with some validity in saying that so do the men and women in
uniform and their families.
I agree with the Chief. We have taken steps to try to do
the best we can within the framework that is provided. As you
know, we're transitioning to a LOGCAP IV that is different. I
don't want to suggest, at this early date, it is perfect, but
it does do away with the sole-source and range of potential
abusive practices that LOGCAP III did, but it may not be the
perfect answer. And I assure you, the Army will administer and
implement, to the best of its ability, whatever oversight
structure that this Congress, in its wisdom, decides to place
before us.
I agree. Your final comment was about insourcing. We went
far--too far, in my humble judgment. And I was part of the
Armed Services Committee that supported those outsourcing
initiatives that, perhaps well-intended, I think had difficult
results. We've already re-brought into house, insourced, some
900 core capabilities that have provided the Army and the
taxpayers $41 million in savings and, I would argue, better
oversight. And we have an objective that is, in large measure,
supported in this budget, to, by the end of 2015, insource to
the Army another nearly 4,000.
Chief mentioned our efforts at the brigade and battalion
level to provide well-trained and more sufficient numbers of
CORs, contract oversight officers, and we're going to continue
to do that.
But, my experience has been, there's always a better way;
the challenge is to find that. And to the extent we can be
supportive in that search, we want to do that.
Senator Dorgan. I know that the chairman wants to end the
hearing; I think we have another engagement. But, I--let me
just make one final point.
First of all, thank you for your answers. I described some
negatives; there are many, many positives. And I finished
reading a book recently, and I think the title was ``A
Soldier's Life,'' and it is an extraordinary book about what
soldiers do every day, and what our military does every day.
And while I talked today about my concerns of some things, let
me add what I'm sure you've heard from my colleagues, we are
enormously grateful for the work both of you do on behalf of a
lot of people today who got up this morning to face danger on
our behalf. So, General Casey, thanks for your long service.
Secretary McHugh, I'm glad you're where you are.
And thank you very much.
Chairman Inouye. I thank you very much, Secretary McHugh
and General Casey, for your testimony.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
I have two questions here, submitted by Senator Cochran,
who cannot be with us, so I will submit them for your
consideration.
We look forward to working with you in the coming months.
And I can assure you that we will do our utmost to make certain
that the men and women in uniform are given whatever is needed
to make certain that their service to our country is not only
one that our Nation would appreciate, but it will be good for
them. And I commend you for the effort being made now to look
into matters, such as stress, which is very important.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to Hon. John M. McHugh
Questions Submitted by Chairman Daniel K. Inouye
BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (BCT) MODERNIZATION
Question. Secretary McHugh, the Army's Future Combat Systems
program, FCS, has been terminated and replaced with a program to
incrementally field many of the technologies that were developed under
the FCS program. However, a recent Limited User Test showed that
despite an investment of almost $21 billion in the last 7 years, many
of these technologies are unreliable and do not work as intended. This
raises serious questions about the acquisition strategy pursued by the
Army for FCS. What lessons has the Army learned from its FCS program
acquisition strategy and how will you incorporate them into future Army
acquisition programs?
Answer. After cancellation of the FCS program, the Army conducted
an analysis of requirements based on the lessons learned from the last
8 years of war. We retained the family of systems knowledge base
acquired during the FCS program as well as technologies related to the
network, and unmanned/ground vehicles developed during the program.
This analysis will now support the BCT Modernization Strategy.
We found that modeling, simulations and scenarios depicting FCS
capabilities and operations became increasingly complex over time,
which resulted in fewer scenarios that limited our ability to analyze
across a wide range of relevant operating conditions. A key lesson
learned from this experience was that the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI)
was contracted to produce analytical deliverables that were duplicative
of what the Army was doing and that were more advocacy than analysis.
These products were therefore of questionable value. Additionally,
during critical early program stages, the unique technical expertise
and capabilities resident within the Army were not leveraged by the
Program Manager/LSI team, especially for platform survivability and the
network. The Army has moved away from the LSI model and restructured
the contract, establishing a Prime Contractor to deliver Increment 1
capabilities to our Brigade Combat Teams.
While retaining the effort to integrate, develop and field
capabilities as a system, the Army is also fully embracing competition
and Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2 to support our BCT
Modernization strategy. For example, the Ground Combat Vehicle program
will be competitive beginning at a Milestone A and using best
practices, including competitive prototyping through its acquisition
process.
Further, FCS did not adequately revalidate operational concepts at
regular intervals to address lessons learned or reassess technology
development. The BCT Modernization Plan will focus on technologically
feasible and affordable solutions, address lessons learned, allow for
incremental technological development, and have appropriate mitigation
plans in place. For example, the Army will field Increment 1
capabilities only when they are mature and will structure the program
to allow for technological upgrades and refinements even during the
fielding process.
Early in development, the Army decided to let Soldiers test and
evaluate the systems through the Army Evaluation Task Force. As a
result, Soldier feedback has played a key role in optimizing designs
throughout the development phase--ultimately leading to a better end
product. Increment 1 capabilities are now in their third year of the 4
year test cycle.
FUTURE ROLE OF MRAP VEHICLES
Question. Secretary McHugh, a success story from the wars has been
the rapid development and fielding of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
Vehicles, ``MRAPS''. The Army has taken receipt of 12,000 MRAPs and has
a requirement for about 5,800 light-weight MRAPs. But despite the
MRAP's unquestioned success, I get the feeling that these vehicles are
treated like the ``ugly step-child''. The Army has no funded plan to
integrate them into its force structure, and you are developing another
tactical vehicle that won't deliver for several years.
Mr. Secretary, given the difficult fiscal times and Secretary
Gates' guidance to focus on the 80 percent solution that can be
provided immediately instead of developing gold-plated exquisite
systems that don't show up for years to come, what is the future role
of MRAPs in the Army?
Answer. The Army has developed an allocation plan for MRAPs as they
return from theater. This plan, and associated courses of action, was
briefed to the Under Secretary of the Army (USA) and the Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army (VCSA) on December 22, 2009. The plan included
placing MRAPs in task organized sets, select units, and the training
base. The USA and VCSA directed the proponents to conduct a detailed
cost benefit analysis on two courses of action for task organized set
placement. The results of this cost benefit analysis will be presented
to the USA and VCSA on March 25, 2010.
ARMED AERIAL SCOUT HELICOPTER
Question. The fiscal year 2011 budget continues to modernize Army
aviation units at a rapid pace. However, one key program, the
replacement of the aging Kiowa Warrior helicopter, has been set back by
the failures of the Comanche and the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter.
The Army is conducting new studies on how to replace the Kiowa
Warrior and the studies are reportedly examining new concepts of
``teaming'' helicopters with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). However,
it is not currently known how many years it will be before a prototype
Armed Aerial Scout helicopter will fly.
Secretary McHugh, the Secretary of Defense has warned about the
dangers of pursuing exotic and costly weapons systems, while ignoring
the 80 percent solution. Do you feel the Army is taking the right
approach to the Armed Aerial Scout helicopter?
Answer. In July 2009, the Defense Acquisition Executive directed
the Army to conduct an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to meet Armed
Aerial Scout capabilities and to determine a replacement for the OH-58D
Kiowa Warrior. This AoA will determine the appropriate materiel
solution(s) to address any capability gaps and meet Army requirements.
The base for analysis is the current Kiowa Warrior, but the review will
also include ongoing improvements to the Kiowa Warrior as an option.
The AoA will be conducted in two non-sequential phases with the
preliminary results completed in December 2010 and final results
published in April 2011.
On April 14, 2009, the Secretary of the Army approved a strategy to
reinvest in the Kiowa Warrior helicopter to address obsolescence and
sustainment issues until a viable replacement is ready. The strategy
includes a funded ACAT II program called the Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade
Program (CASUP). The CASUP addresses obsolescence, safety and weight
reduction so the aircraft performs better in the current combat
environment. The Army expects to sustain the Kiowa Warrior until 2025.
ARMY FUNDS RUNNING OUT IN FISCAL YEAR 2010
Question. In fiscal year 2010, the Department of the Army was
appropriated $141 billion in baseline funds and an additional $78
billion for an entire year of Overseas Contingency Operations. When the
budget request was submitted last month, it included a fiscal year 2010
supplemental to send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan. Much
of those expenses are for Army operating costs and in total, the Army's
request to support the new policy is $20 billion. Secretary McHugh,
with the current resources available to the Army in fiscal year 2010,
how far do you think you can make it into the fiscal year before
running out of funding?
Answer. A critical portion of the fiscal year 2010 supplemental
request is the Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) funding for
increased operations in Afghanistan. Because OMA comprises the majority
of the Army's funding, this account becomes the measure by which we
project a run-out date at the end of June, beginning of July. Passage
of the supplemental prior to Memorial Day would make funds available in
June, and would minimize the risk of impact on theater operations, base
operations support, readiness and family programs. It would enable the
Army to maintain required execution flexibility across all
appropriations.
JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT
Question. Secretary McHugh, I have a couple of questions on the C-
27 Joint Cargo Aircraft--the plane that will replace the Army's fleet
of C-23 Sherpas. Last March, the Congress was told that the Army needed
54 of the 78 aircraft planned for procurement. In May, the Department
announced that it would procure just 38 aircraft, less than half the
number in the original plan, and transferred management to the Air
Force. Has your staff reviewed the analyses which produced the lower
requirement and are you satisfied that the Army's lift needs will be
satisfied with the planned buy of 38 aircraft?
Answer. The Army has a validated requirement for 75 cargo aircraft,
per the Joint Cargo Aircraft Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) and
addendum. Office of the Secretary of Defense Program Analysis and
Evaluation (OSD PA&E) completed a sufficiency review validating the
Army's acquisition objective of up to 75 aircraft. The Army's initial
procurement was for 54 Joint Cargo Aircraft (C27J). However, in April
2009, the SECDEF directed the Joint Cargo Aircraft (C27J) program be
transferred from a joint Army led program to a single service Air Force
program. He further reduced the initial joint procurement from 78
aircraft (54 for Army and 24 for Air Force) to 38 aircraft. The SECDEF
has directed that the lift requirements be met by the Air Force,
leveraging their entire fleet mix.
TACTICAL RADIOS
Question. Secretary McHugh, the Army successfully incorporated
commercial radio technology into the Joint Network Node system in the
last decade. Is the Army planning to leverage other commercial
technologies as part of the Joint Tactical Radio System? In particular,
has Army looked at commercial technologies to meet the wide band
networking requirements?
Answer. The Army has leveraged commercial technologies to fill
urgent operational capability gaps; however, there are no commercial
alternatives to the JTRS programs that meet all the Joint Service
requirements. Commercial off-the-shelf alternatives may offer an
attractive up-front price over the JTRS programs; however, they only
provide limited solutions and potentially make it more difficult for
the DOD to achieve interoperability of our joint secure communications.
Question. Secretary McHugh, what is the Army's position on fielding
additional AN/PRC-117G radios to meet contingency needs?
Answer. In certain situations and missions, forces in contingency
operations have expressed urgent operational requirements for a
wideband networking radio capability. The Army Staff is currently
analyzing each request carefully to determine the proper materiel
solution for validated requirements. In some cases, the AN/PRC-117G is
the best solution available to satisfy these needs. The Army has
sufficient stocks of AN/PRC-117G on hand to meet all known contingency
operations requests, and plans to resource/field any approved requests
from these stocks only. The Army is not currently planning to purchase
additional AN/PRC-117G to meet contingency needs. The preferred
approach is to accelerate Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)
capabilities, wherever possible, to satisfy wideband networking radio
requirements.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
ARMY GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT
Question. How much funding is included in the President's fiscal
year 2011 for Army Guard and Reserve Equipment? How does this compare
to the relative size of the Army Guard and Reserve compared to the
active duty Army? Does the Army support a separate budget line item
that annotates equipment procurement for the Guard and Reserves?
Wouldn't this provide greater transparency?
Answer. Funding requested for equipment procurement is as follows:
$15 billion (76 percent) for the Active Component (AC); $3.6 billion
(18 percent) for the Army National Guard (ARNG); and $1.1 billion (6
percent) for the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). There are some deviations of
funding versus size (based on requirements). However, a more telling
comparison is requirements versus equipment on hand, which shows that
we are funding to increase readiness in all components equally.
The Army does not support a separate budget line item, as it would
limit the Army's fiscal flexibility, which is required in a constantly
changing world.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has provided the Services with
implementation instructions on how to attain transparency. The
instructions direct the Services to provide component-level funding
data for the AC, ARNG, and USAR on annual budget exhibits. The Army has
complied with this by providing the data on the P-40 (Budget Item
Justification) and the P-21 (Production) budget exhibits for both the
fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 budget requests.
The DOD instructions also direct the Services to provide quarterly
reports that track the execution of Reserve Component funding and
procurement. The DOD intends to provide those reports to Congress on a
semiannual basis. The Army fully supports and is in compliance with the
DOD implementation instructions and has provided the required reports
for fiscal year 2009 and 1st Quarter fiscal year 2010.
DIRECTOR OF THE ARMY GUARD
Question. In what stage of the nomination process are we for the
position of the Director of the Army Guard? When can the Senate
anticipate receiving a new nominee for this position?
Answer. Currently, the Army and the National Guard are in the
selection phase of the nomination process. The Senate can anticipate
receiving a nominee as soon as the selection phase is complete, which
is estimated to be within a few weeks.
HOMELAND RESPONSE FORCE
Question. How will the Department of Defense organize Emergency
Management Assistance Compacts between the state that owns a Homeland
Response Force and the other states in the region that share it? Under
what emergency circumstances would you envision Federalizing the
Homeland Response Force and taking command and control away from the
Governor in favor of U.S. Northern Command? Was the decision to
establish the Homeland Response Forces made jointly by DOD and DHS?
Answer. Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMACs) are
arranged and entered into by the states and territories in order to
provide mutual assistance and support of one another. They are not
compacts with the Department of Defense.
The Department is drawing on existing National Guard forces to
build a Homeland Response Force (HRF) in each of the ten Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions. Creation of HRFs within the
existing National Guard force structure recognizes the need for
increased Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield
Explosives (CBRNE) response capabilities and capacity in the event of
catastrophic CBRNE incidents. It also takes into account the
operational experience states and territories have in supporting each
other using National Guard forces in either State Active Duty (SAD) or
Title 32 statuses.
As is the case for the states that currently maintain National
Guard CBRNE Enhance Response Force Packages (CERFPs), the Adjutant
General of the state or territory that gets an HRF agrees in writing
that the HRF is a national response capability, which can be employed
outside of the state to provide support within the FEMA region or in
other FEMA regions, as necessary. The 17 existing CERFPs are employed
in state, out of state, regionally and nationally to respond to CBRNE
incidents regardless of the unit's location.
The HRF will have the same early, life-saving capabilities of the
CERFPs (e.g., Search and Extraction, Decontamination, Emergency
Medical, and Command and Control (C\2\)), as well as security and
Brigade level C\2\ for synchronizing multiple CBRNE units. Each HRF
will have approximately 566 personnel.
States generally have jurisdiction over the welfare of their
citizens. However, in many circumstances the President, by law, has
preeminent jurisdiction to handle certain incidents (e.g., terrorism,
most nuclear or radiological events and/or environmental impacts). He
or she also may have the political/moral obligation to assist
regardless of the nature/size of incident. Accordingly, it is essential
to facilitate a unity of effort as Federal forces integrate with
ongoing State responses.
The HRF is designed to be employed in SAD or Title 32 statuses.
Only in an extreme situation, such as a state's incapacitation to
govern and/or control the emergency situation (continuity of
government/continuity of operations), is it possible that the President
would Federalize the HRF and place it under the command and control of
the Commander, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).
Historically, over 90 percent of all incidents are handled at the
local level; approximately 6 to 8 percent involve state level
engagement, and an even smaller percentages have a Federal response. As
such, the Department does not envision the likelihood of placing the
HRF into a Title 10 status under the command and control of USNORTHCOM.
However, USNORTHCOM will command the follow-on CBRNE Consequence
Management Response Forces (CCMRF) when requested to augment the
consequence management efforts of State and local first responders,
National Guard forces and Federal agencies by providing complementary
and unique capabilities when the effects of a CBRNE event exceed their
capabilities.
The Department of Homeland Security participated in both the
initial consequence management study and observed the Quadrennial
Defense Review. FEMA provided information about Federal, state, and
local consequence management capabilities for inclusion in the
consequence management study. State involvement, in the form of the
Adjutants Generals, was facilitated by the National Guard Bureau.
TITLE 32 LINE ITEM
Question. In each of the past several years, the Department of
Defense has paid for Title 32 funding requests for domestic disaster
relief missions as requested by State Governors and approved by the
Secretary of Defense. Naturally, paying for these much needed
operations out of regular Army Operations and Maintenance accounts
shortchanges other programs. Does the Army have plans to create a Title
32 line item in its Operations and Maintenance accounts? If not, why
not? If such a line item already exists, please provide the
identification numbers used in the Army budget justification documents.
Answer. Under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act, Public Law 106-390, October 30, 2000, DOD may be
required to provide assistance to Federal agencies and state and local
governments in response to major disasters or states of emergency
declared by the President.
In fiscal year 1990, Congress established the Defense Emergency
Response Fund (DERF) to reimburse DOD for providing disaster or
emergency assistance to other Federal agencies and to state and local
governments in anticipation of reimbursable requests. The Treasury
index symbol for the DERF is 97X4965 and was initially funded at $100
million. The purpose of DERF is to allow DOD to provide disaster and
emergency relief assistance in response to natural or manmade disasters
without depleting the funds it needs to accomplish its mission. DOD
Financial Management Regulation (DODFMR), Volume 12, Chapter 6 provides
for the policy and procedures governing the Defense Emergency Response
Fund.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patty Murray
NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
Question. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the National Guard
and Reserves have been called upon to support the efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Despite their dedicated service they often come home to
hardships, especially in the current economy. In the state of
Washington, National Guard unemployment is over 14 percent vice the 9.5
percent unemployment rate statewide. In the last year there have been
seven suicides with 70 percent of those tied to the Guardsman's
financial situation. 2,100 Washington National Guardsmen live at or
below the poverty line as a result of their employment situation. I am
concerned for these soldiers mental and emotional well-being as they
are returning from serving their country to possible unemployment and
financial instability instead of a happy family reunion. What is the
Army doing across the nation to help these National Guard and Reserve
soldiers and their families when they return from deployment to
financial hardship?
Answer. The Army Reserve Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program (YRRP)
provides information, services, referral, financial planning and
assistance, and other proactive outreach programs to Soldiers of the
Army Reserve and their Families through all phases of the deployment
cycle.
The goal of the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program is to prepare
soldiers and families for mobilization, sustain families during
mobilization, and reintegrate soldiers with their families,
communities, and employers upon redeployment.
When a soldier or family member contacts the Army Reserve Family
Programs Office for financial counseling or assistance, the staff will
support the soldier or family member by providing the appropriate
assistance and/or connect them to community resources based on
individual needs. Local Army Reserve Family Programs personnel also
provide referrals to professional financial counseling services for
deploying soldiers and their family members.
In-person financial counseling is now available in most locations
through Military OneSource in partnership with National Foundation for
Credit Counseling (NFCC). NFCC provides financial education and
counseling services at hundreds of local offices nationwide. Military
OneSource arranges for soldiers and family members to meet face-to-face
with a financial consultant in their community. This program is
specially designed to provide short-term, solution-focused financial
counseling for service members and families, who may be experiencing a
financial setback. Up to 12 counseling sessions per issue, per calendar
year are allowed for each National Guard or Reserve soldier (regardless
of activation status) and families located in the continental United
States. For those unable to attend in-person counseling or who are in
locations where in-person counseling is not available, Military
OneSource will provide telephone consultations.
Additional assistance for returning Reserve Component soldiers is
available through the Employer Partnership Office portal. The U.S. Army
Reserve created the Employer Partnership Office (EPO) of the Armed
Forces with the goal of assisting soldiers and family members with
access to employment when they return from deployment. Launched in
2007, the program expanded in 2009 to include the Army National Guard.
EPO regularly participates in Yellow Ribbon Reintegration events,
job fairs, Wounded Warrior events and visits to units to advise
soldiers and family members of the hundreds of thousands of jobs
available to them. Through EPO, service members have access to more
than 500,000 jobs listed by nearly 1,000 employers who have partnered
with EPO. Additional assistance includes personal contact with EPO's
Program Support Managers who serve as caseworkers, advising service
members not only about employment listed on the EPO portal, but about
in-kind services offered by many of our partners and military service
organizations. Services include mentoring and career development, job
counseling, resume writing assistance, how to negotiate salaries, how
to dress for success, tips on how to succeed in positions which are
competitive and how to find jobs that compliment their military
service.
Question. How has this affected the readiness of our National Guard
and Army Reserves?
Answer. Financial hardships, caused by possible unemployment for
redeploying Reserve Component (RC) Soldiers, have not had a measureable
impact on readiness. During the beginning OIF and OEF, RC readiness did
decline. With the implementation of the ARFORGEN model and the
additional resources provided by Congress for RC units, however,
overall readiness has been steadily improving since early 2009.
Question. How is the Army assisting these soldiers to improve their
job skills to make them relevant and competitive in the current job
market?
Answer. In addition to the highly valued skills Soldiers learn in
the military, the Army has a number of programs to assist Soldiers as
they transition into the civilian workforce. One of the newest, and
most innovative programs is the Employer Partnership Office (EPO)
launched in 2007 by Lt. Gen. Jack C. Stultz, Chief, Army Reserve. The
program was designed as a collaborative effort between employers and
the Army Reserve to provide a continuum of career for our service
members. In July 2009, the Army National Guard joined the EPO.
Currently nearly 1,000 companies have signed non-legally binding
memorandums of agreement with the EPO. Many of our partners are Fortune
500 and Fortune 1000 companies; others are nonprofit organizations who
contribute in-kind support to our service members as they transition
into or back to the civilian job market.
Through EPO, service members have access to program support
managers and business partners who can assist with resume writing in
order to capture the skills and talent these men and women earn while
they're serving in the military. Other services include interviewing
skills and how to dress for success. EPO program support managers can
identify partners who offer internships and apprenticeships or offer
assistance with relocation or continuing education. EPO also regularly
briefs Soldiers and families at events such as Yellow Ribbon
reintegration events, Veterans events, Wounded Warrior events, job
fairs and briefings to individual units. Many of the skills that reside
in the Reserve Components are shared skills Soldiers use in their
civilian employment such as the medical field, transportation, city
planning, management and military police. Due to these shared skills,
through the EPO, we are currently developing pilot programs that would
provide cross-training opportunities. One such program to be unveiled
in the coming months represents a partnership between a major American
automotive manufacturer and EPO to offer RC Soldiers an opportunity to
train on the manufactures' fleet training package. In the second phase
of this pilot, the partnership will embed Soldiers in industry to train
as mechanics on hybrid vehicles before hybrid vehicles are used on the
battlefield. Additionally, we are reviewing ways in which a Soldier can
earn credit towards a Commercial Drivers License (CDL) while learning
to be a truck driver.
FAMILIES
Question. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, I applaud your
efforts in making the families of our soldiers a top priority. Family
readiness and support is crucial for the health of the Army. The
health, mental health and welfare of Army families, especially the
children has been a concern of mine for many years. This also includes
education, living conditions, and available healthcare. How are you
meeting the increased demand of healthcare and mental health
professionals to support the families? If not, where are the
shortfalls?
Answer. The Army listens to Family members who want easier access
to care. Attempts to improve access to care include two new Army
programs associated with the new Child, Adolescent and Family
Behavioral Health Proponency (CAF-BHP). The CAF-BHP focuses on two new
innovative clinical programs to bridge the access gap: School
Behavioral Health and Child and Family Assistance Centers (CAFAC).
Breaking tradition, the School Behavioral Health program proactively
brings care to the children rather than requiring them to travel to the
clinic in the military treatment facility. Similarly, the Military and
Family Life Consultant program provides care closer to where Soldiers
work and Families live. Clinicians provide short-term, situational, and
problem-solving consultation services outside the walls of the clinic,
which breaks down some of the traditional barriers to care. The CAFAC
is a model designed to be established at the installation level. The
CAFAC brings together under one ``roof'' all the services on an
installation providing for Army Families who are experiencing the
stress of multiple deployments. This model creates a single point of
entry for family members seeking help, thus allowing for more effective
triage and efficient allocation of behavioral health resources while
increasing access to care and reducing the associated stigma.
However, due to the national shortage in Child Psychiatry,
shortfalls remain and we are having difficulty filling the numerous
Child Psychiatry provider vacancies throughout the Army. As a result of
these shortages, some locations experience an inadequate number of
therapists to help Families during the deployment cycle. The Army is
continuously working to improve both military and civilian provider
recruitment and retention. Recent incentives, including bonuses and
relocation allowances, aid in these efforts.
Question. What improvements have been made with respect to the
children of soldiers and meeting their special requirements? What
programs have you implemented to assist the children of servicemembers
with coping with frequent deployments, re-integration, and other
stresses of military families?
Answer. The health and welfare of our children is tremendously
important to the Army, and we recognize the difficulties frequent
deployments cause. As a result, the Army has taken great strides by
creating and bolstering numerous Child, Youth, and School Services
infrastructures, programs and services to help our children cope with
the full spectrum of the deployment cycle.
Army Families receive reductions in child care fees during the
deployment cycle and Child Development Centers have extended operating
hours. They offer many options to support Family Readiness Groups and
the Chaplains' Strong Bonds program. No-cost respite child care has
increased from 5 to 16 hours per child, per month.
Operation Boots On and Operation Boots Off help children understand
and prepare for their parents' deployment and redeployment. Child
Behavioral Health Consultants are embedded in our programs to provide
social, emotional, and behavioral support for both children and staff.
Military Family Life Consultants provide non-medical, short term,
situational, problem-solving counseling services in schools with high
military-connected populations. Army School Liaison Officers serve as
advocates for military-connected students and assist them through
school transitions and with school-related issues. Academic support
services help students compensate for parental absences with on-post
homework centers, and 24/7 online tutoring support for students
regardless of where they live.
Army-sponsored Community Child Care Programs such as Operation
Military Child Care and Military Child Care in Your Neighborhood
provide fee assistance to geographically dispersed Families to reduce
out-of-pocket child care expenses. Operation Military Kids coordinates
networks of citizens and organizations in every state to support
military children impacted by deployment.
Detailed information about these programs is available at the Army
OneSource website, www.myarmyonesource.com.
Question. Jobs have also been a concern of military spouses of
deployed soldiers or who transition because of a Permanent Change of
Station (PCS). Especially in the current job market, what is the Army
doing to assist family members seeking employment after a PCS? What
about spouses who must quit their job or reduce the number of hours
worked caused by a deployment and the demands of the family?
Answer. Families are important to the Army, a priority to soldiers,
and a vital factor in the Army's overall readiness. A prepared family
is better able to manage deployment, long-term separations and Army
life in general. The Army has a myriad of employment support programs
that are geared towards our spouses, both Active and Reserve Component.
The Employment Readiness Program provides assistance to family
members in acquiring skills, networks and resources that will allow
them to participate in the workforce and to develop a career plan.
Employment services are available to all Army Components, regardless of
location. Services include: career counseling and coaching; employment
training classes; job fairs; Army Spouse Career Assessment Tool; job
listings and information and assistance on the Military Spouse Career
Advancement Account.
The Army Spouse Employment Partnership (ASEP) is an expanding
partnership that is mutually beneficial to the Army and corporate
America. ASEP consists of a small group of committed partners from the
private sector, military and Federal government that have pledged their
best efforts to increase employment and career opportunities for
military spouses. The partnership provides spouses the opportunity to
attain financial security and achieve employment goals through career
mobility and enhanced employment options.
The Dependents' Educational Assistance (DEA) Program provides
education and training opportunities to eligible dependents of deceased
and/or permanently disabled veterans. DEA reduces tuition by offering
up to 45 months of education benefits.
The Stateside Spouse Education Assistance Program (SSEAP) is a
need-based education assistance program designed to provide spouses of
active duty and retired Army Soldiers, and widows(ers) of Army Soldiers
who died either on active duty or in a retired status, and residing in
the United States, with financial assistance in pursuing educational
goals. The program assists spouses/widows(ers) in gaining the education
required to allow them to qualify for increased occupational
opportunities. SEAP provides for up to $2,500 maximum per academic year
for fees, supplies, or books.
In addition to these Army programs, many communities partner with
their local installations through the Army Community Covenant and host
job fairs and job centers to help spouses with employment searches,
resume writing, interviewing techniques and other services to help them
find meaningful employment.
More detailed information on all of these programs may be found at
the Army OneSource website, the Army's online resource for information
on programs, services and support available to soldiers and their
families.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
RESILIENCY OF THE FORCE
Question. Secretary McHugh, I have been informed that a third of
the suicides this year have occurred at Fort Hood and Fort Carson. What
measures are being taken alongside the Army Campaign Plan for Health
Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention to address additional
stressors at these two forts?
Answer. As of March 2010, Fort Carson and Fort Hood each had 4
suicide deaths. These two posts account for 24 percent of Active Duty
suicide deaths this year (33). At this point last year, the Army had 53
suicide deaths. The Army's senior leadership is committed to sustaining
our current emphasis on this problem.
The Army conducts an extensive review of every suicide death to
improve our understanding of why Soldiers choose to take their lives.
The Army's Suicide Prevention Task Force has created a standardized 37
line report that units use to analyze the factors surrounding each
Soldier's suicide. Within 30 days after a Soldiers death, this report
is sent to Headquarters Department of the Army for review, and a
General Officer must ``back brief'' the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
during a monthly senior review board meeting. This back brief is done
via a world-wide video teleconference, so that leaders across the Army
can share lessons learned and improve early recognition of at-risk
Soldiers.
Additionally, the Army Public Health Command (Provisional) has
created the Army Behavioral Health Integrated Data Environment (ABHIDE)
database. This database provides a standardized, enterprise-wide
capability designed to integrate information from legal, medical and
personnel databases into a comprehensive health surveillance system to
support mental, behavioral, social and public health activities.
By increasing Soldiers' access to behavioral health (BH) care and
the reducing stigma associated with seeking such care, the Army hopes
to positively impact the delivery of BH services in garrison. At Fort
Carson, Mobile Behavior Health Teams (MBHT) were created to meet this
need. Each MBHT, which provides Soldiers with expedited BH evaluations
and community-level treatment, can support a full Brigade Combat Team
(BCT) (3,000-5,000 Soldiers) and has a licensed BH provider assigned
exclusively to each battalion (500-600 Soldiers) (BCT). This system
provides a single point of entry into BH care for Soldiers and a single
point of contact for leaders with questions. The U.S. Army Public
Health Command (Provisional) has evaluated similar BH outreach
initiatives at other Army installations, such as Fort Sill's Outreach
Program in Oklahoma, and is currently conducting a full program
evaluation of MBHT.
Preliminary results suggest a downward trend in off-post referrals,
wait times for Senate Appropriations Committee appointment and key
suicide indicators. Efforts to measure the impact of MBHT on BH
accessibility, provider trust, stigma and mission readiness are
ongoing. A final report is expected in January 2011.
Fort Hood's Resiliency Campus focuses on wellness for its soldiers,
families, and retirees. The campus is dedicated to integrating the
body, mind, and spirit by aiding visitors in reaching individualized
and measurable wellness goals through education and comprehensive
programs. The Resiliency Campus is based on the idea of helping the
soldier and the family before the crisis begins. Through a network of
support services, the campus hopes to train and empower all soldiers
and their families to be resilient, to continue fighting in spite of
life's challenges.
Question. Secretary McHugh, are resources available to Guardsmen
and Reservists after they come off of active duty to help build
resiliency? Is there outreach for their families when these soldiers
return to a traditional Reservist role?
Answer. The Army, Army Reserve and Army National Guard (ARNG) are
working diligently to increase the range and quality of services
provided to soldiers throughout the deployment cycle and beyond.
Currently, there are limited resources available through the Yellow
Ribbon Reintegration Program and the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness
(CSF) Program. The Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program contains
outreach activities to help soldiers and their families with
transitioning to a traditional role. In CSF, Master Resilience Trainers
are being trained to teach resiliency to these soldiers. Soldiers and
families can also use the ARNG's Family Assistance Centers to help with
reintegration. The ARNG is looking to increase its capability to train
Master Resilience Trainers.
ARMED SCOUT HELICOPTER
Question. Secretary McHugh, Secretary Gates has been critical of
recent modernization efforts and has stated that too often we seek a 99
percent solution over a period of years rather the 75 percent solution
over a period of months that's required for stability and
counterinsurgency missions. I don't know what program or programs
Secretary Gates had in mind when he expressed that view, but the last
two Army efforts to replace the Kiowa Warrior helicopter fleet--the
Comanche and the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter programs--resulted in
program terminations due to requirements growth, cost overruns and
schedule delays. In response to these program replacement missteps,
this Committee recommended the Army consider upgrades to existing in-
service rotorcraft as a low-risk path to a Kiowa replacement.
Mr. Secretary, I know you have been in your job for less than 6
months, so you may not have had time to consider the Committee's
recommendation. If you have had the time to consider the merits of
upgrading existing in-service rotorcraft, would you share with the
Committee your thoughts, and if you have not had time to consider this
approach, would you personally look at this and get back to us with
your thoughts?
Answer. Considering the rapidly changing battlefield and new
developments in Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, existing in-
service rotorcraft are receiving extensive modifications.
Unfortunately, modifications often add weight, which has a negative
effect on overall aircraft performance. An example is the aging OH-58D
Kiowa Warrior fleet. Although the Kiowa Warrior has performed
outstandingly in theater, there are materiel limitations. There are
technology improvements, however, which are available to help address
capability gaps on a new platform.
On April 14, 2009, my predecessor approved a strategy to reinvest
in the Kiowa Warrior until a viable replacement is procured. The
strategy involves executing upgrades to the fielded fleet, weight
reduction efforts and the Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade Program. This
funded ACAT II program will address obsolescence, safety, weight issues
in order to improve the aircraft's performance in the current combat
environment. We expect to sustain the Kiowa Warrior until 2025.
The Army is also exploring all options to leverage existing and
potential developmental solutions. In July 2009, the Defense
Acquisition Executive directed the Army to conduct an Analysis of
Alternatives to meet the Army's aerial reconnaissance mission and
determine a replacement for the Kiowa Warrior. The AoA will be
conducted in two non-sequential phases with the preliminary results
completed in December 2010 and final results published in April 2011.
BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (BCT) MODERNIZATION
Question. Secretary McHugh, what are the lessons learned from the
terminated Future Combat System program, and what steps are being taken
to ensure they are incorporated in other Army modernization efforts?
Answer. After cancellation of the FCS program, the Army conducted
an analysis of requirements based on the lessons learned from the last
8 years of war. We retained the family of systems knowledge base
acquired during the FCS program, as well as technologies related to the
network and unmanned/ground vehicles. This analysis will now support
the BCT Modernization Strategy.
We found that modeling, simulations, and scenarios depicting FCS
capabilities and operations became increasingly complex over time. This
resulted in fewer scenarios that limited our ability to analyze across
a wide range of relevant operating conditions. A key lesson learned
from this experience was that the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) was
contracted to produce analytical deliverables that were duplicative of
what the Army was doing and that were more advocacy than analysis.
These products were therefore of questionable value. Additionally,
during critical early program stages, the unique technical expertise
and capabilities resident within the Army were not leveraged by the
Program Manager/LSI team, especially for platform survivability and the
network. The Army has moved away from the LSI model and restructured
the contract, establishing a Prime Contractor to deliver Increment 1
capabilities to our Brigade Combat Teams.
While retaining the effort to integrate, develop, and field
capabilities as a system, the Army is also fully embracing competition
and Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2 to support our BCT
Modernization strategy. For example, the Ground Combat Vehicle program
will be competitive beginning at Milestone A and using best practices,
including competitive prototyping through its acquisition process.
Further, FCS did not adequately revalidate operational concepts at
regular intervals to address lessons learned or reassess technology
development. The BCT Modernization Plan will focus on technologically
feasible and affordable solutions, address lessons learned, allow for
incremental technological development, and have appropriate mitigation
plans in place. For example, the Army will field Increment 1
capabilities only when they are mature; but they will be part of an
incremental process that will allow for technological upgrades and
refinements even during the fielding process.
Early in development, the Army decided to let soldiers test and
evaluate the systems through the Army Evaluation Task Force. As a
result, soldier feedback has played a key role in optimizing designs
throughout the development phase--ultimately leading to a better end
product. Increment 1 capabilities are now in their third year of the 4
year test cycle.
MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLES
Question. Secretary McHugh, considering Mine Resistant Ambush-
Protected vehicles are being incorporated into unit formations and the
Army may maintain a presence in Afghanistan for a very long time, do
you foresee an increasing production requirement for MRAP vehicles, and
do you plan to look at maintaining a production capability instead of
cycling production and the workforce between full production and idle
production lines?
Answer. Current MRAP production will end in December 2010, and no
follow-on production is planned at this time. This will satisfy every
known MRAP requirement received to date. However, given the evolving
nature of the MRAP warfighting requirements, the Department is
confident in the industrial base's capacity and ability to respond to
any future requirements. As of December 2010, 25,700 MRAP vehicles will
have been produced to meet Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)-
validated requirements from all Services (19,368 for the Army). This
includes 8,104 MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles (M-ATV), the latest MRAP
variant designed specifically for the OEF environment. Of the 8,104 M-
ATVs to be produced, 5,776 will be for the Army.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mitch McConnell
SUICIDES
Question. Congress has established a national suicide hotline for
returning troops, as well as increased funding for mental health
programs for active duty military personnel. However, there remain a
high number of soldier suicides. For example, at least 11 suicides
occurred last year at Fort Campbell. What preventative measures are the
Department of Defense taking to address this problem? What, if any,
legislative action would the Department need Congress to take to expand
suicide awareness and education on posts?
Answer. The Army has taken unprecedented steps to reduce suicidal
behavior in both the Active and Reserve Components. Every day, the
Army's senior leaders address the issue of suicide prevention. For
example, we conducted an Army-wide Suicide Prevention Stand-Down and
Chain Teach (March thru July 2009), released an interactive and
awareness training video and partnered with the National Institute of
Mental Health to begin a 5-year study into risk and resilience factors.
In 2010, we are continuing this effort by expanding the training for
``peer to peer support'' using the Ask-Care-Escort and other
nationally-recognized suicide intervention models, developing new
interactive and awareness training videos and increasing access to
behavioral healthcare thru telemedicine initiatives.
The Army fully supports the requirement set forth in the 2010 NDAA,
which requires ``person to person'' behavioral health assessments for
every Service Member upon their redeployment from an overseas
operation. Finally, the Army is fully engaged with the Congressionally
directed ``DOD Task Force for the Prevention of Suicide by Members of
the Armed Forces,'' which is required to submit a report to Congress
this summer providing recommended legislative recommendations to
improve suicide prevention and awareness training and education.
Army actions in 2009 to combat increasing suicide rates included
the following:
--Produced the interactive ``Beyond the Front'' training video.
--Produced the ``Shoulder to Shoulder: No Soldier Stands Alone''
training video.
--Updated AR 600-63 (Army Health Promotion) and DA Pam 600-24 (Health
Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention).
--Published Suicide Awareness Pocket Guide for all Soldiers.
--Increased access to behavioral health and substance abuse
counseling.
--National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) grant for the Army Study
to Assess Risk and Resilience in Service Members (STARRS), $50
million/5 year study--quarterly updates to VCSA to accelerate
lessons learned.
--Tele-Behavioral Health screening pilot project with 25th ID, 100
percent screening thru face to face, VTC, or Computer Skype-
like counseling.
--Approved nationally-recognized best-practice suicide intervention
skills training for Army use to assist in early recognition of
at-risk individuals
Army actions for 2010 include the following:
--Developing interactive ``Home Front'' training video.
--Developing sequel to ``Shoulder to Shoulder'' training video.
--Developing an Additional Skill Identifier for certified suicide
intervention skills trainers.
--Expanding Tele-Behavioral Health pilot project, evaluate
effectiveness, and determine feasibility for using Army wide.
--Developing program effectiveness measures.
--Utilizing the Suicide Specialized Augmentation Response Team/Staff
Assistance Team to support commanders by assessing programs,
policies, and resources, and identify gaps to improve local
suicide prevention programs.
COUNSELING SERVICES
Question. With the current deployment schedule, a heavy toll is
being placed upon the spouses and children of servicemembers. How
accessible are counseling services for deployed servicemembers' spouses
and children? Are these services available on all major military
installations? What programs are available for those living away from
major military installations?
Answer. Counseling services are available for deployed service
members' spouses and children on all major military installations.
Spouses and children may access Military and Family Life Consultants
through the Army Community Service by self referral, without having to
provide a reason for seeking these services, or via Military OneSource.
Military and Family Life Consultants are Licensed Clinical Social
Workers, Professional Counselors, Marriage and Family Therapists, and
Psychologists. They provide six free informal and confidential
counseling sessions. No records are kept and flexible appointment times
and locations are offered. Military and Family Life Consultants are
also available to assist soldiers who are experiencing difficulty
coping with daily life concerns and issues.
For those family members who do not live near a military
installation, the Department of Defense developed Military OneSource.
Military OneSource is a free information center and website where
family members can seek assistance 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
Counseling is provided by phone or in person by Masters-level
consultants on issues such as family support, emotional support, debt
management and legal problems for up to 12 sessions at no cost to the
soldier. Military OneSource can also assist with the identification of
a consultant in the family's local area. Military OneSource does not
release information about users of the services, with the exception of
issues of child abuse, elder abuse, spousal abuse and/or risk of harm
to self or others. Military OneSource can be accessed at
www.militaryonesource.com or 1-800-342-9647.
Family Members may complete a free, voluntary online behavioral
health self-assessment, and obtain referrals at
www.MilitaryMentalHealth.org. This is an approach to assist soldiers
and family members with identifying symptoms and getting assistance. It
provides confidential and immediate feedback, as well as referrals to
TRICARE, Veterans Administration Centers, and Military OneSource.
In addition to the behavioral healthcare services offered at our
military treatment facilities, the Army Medical Command recently
established the Child, Adolescent and Family Behavioral Health
Proponency (CAF-BHP). CAF-BHP, located at Joint Base Lewis McChord
(JBLM), addresses Army-wide family behavioral health needs. Its mission
is to support and sustain a comprehensive, integrated, behavioral
health system of care for military children and their families. The
CAF-BHP collaborates with national subject matter experts and
professional organizations to develop and promote evidence-based
behavioral health treatments for military children and their families.
The CAF-BHP is developing media-driven information campaigns to address
military culture and the stigma associated with seeking behavioral
healthcare.
HOSPITAL
Question. Ireland Army Community Hospital at Fort Knox is one of
the oldest hospitals in the Army. With the new Brigade Combat Team
stationed at the post, I am concerned over the state of the current
hospital and its ability to meet the increased demands placed upon it.
What is the status of the Army's decision on whether and when to build
a replacement?
Answer. The Army ranks the Fort Knox Hospital replacement as our
second highest priority, behind a significant addition/alteration
project at Tripler Army Medical Center, Fort Shafter, Hawaii. However,
the final decision to replace the 52-year old facility will be made by
the Department of Defense (DOD). DOD Health Affairs uses a Capital
Investment Decision Model (CIDM) process to rank order the consolidated
military medical construction priorities for all three Services. The
CIDM determines the Services' priority projects according to weighted
and scaled criteria, and by assigning scores by a 12 member Tri-service
Capital Investment Review Board. The results of the most recent CIDM
for the fiscal year 2012-17 POM are expected in mid to late May, and
will determine if and when Ireland Army Community Hospital is
programmed for replacement.
PTSD/TBI
Question. What are the typical steps taken to identify soldiers who
may have post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain
injuries (TBI) to ensure they get the proper care? Are there any
further legislative steps that Congress could take to improve screening
and the delivery of care to soldiers with PTSD and TBI?
Answer. Screening Army Soldiers for PTSD and TBI is intensive. The
Army recently implemented new guidelines for identification and
treatment of TBI in Theater. Upon return from deployment, there is 100
percent screening for PTSD and TBI exposure using the Post-Deployment
Health Assessment (PDHA). The PDHA is mandatory within 30 days
following deployment. An enhanced version of the PDHA replaced the
April 2003 version in January 2008. A panel of mental health experts
constructed the PDHA questions, and periodically reviews it to ensure
it meets the intent.
Many soldiers experience an initial ``honeymoon'' period when
returning from a combat tour, when symptoms do not manifest themselves
immediately. Accordingly, we initiated the Post Deployment Health Re-
Assessment (PDHRA) in 2005. The PDHRA occurs between 90 and 180 days
post-deployment. A review and enhancement process has been underway for
the PDHRA, and the January 2008 edition replaced the original 2005
version. In addition to the PDHA and PDHRA, the Army requires soldiers
to complete a Periodic Health Assessment annually, which again screens
for TBI and PTSD. Army Knowledge Online (AKO) now integrates all of
these screening requirements with a readiness stoplight (i.e. red,
green, amber) status, so both the soldier and his or her commander are
aware when a screening is overdue. All primary care providers receive
training in the identification of PTSD and TBI. As part of the Respect-
Mil Program (http://www.pdhealth.mil/respect-mil/index1.asp) all
enrolled soldiers are screened for PTSD and depression.
In summary, the typical soldier is assessed and reassessed for TBI
and PTSD at several points throughout his or her first year back from
combat, and periodically thereafter. The Army is fully engaged in
screening, as well as research to improve early detection, care, and
treatment. Additionally, we are working to further de-stigmatize help
seeking behaviors and to protect Service Members from adverse career
consequences. We do not request any legislative action.
BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
Question. With the recent addition of the Brigade Combat Team at
Fort Knox, what is the Army doing to ensure that the installation is
capable of deploying the unit with dispatch?
Answer. Fort Knox is currently designated as a power support
platform (PSP) with the mission of strategically deploying individuals
and units from all Services to include Department of Defense civilian
employees and Reserve Components. Even with the addition of an Infantry
Brigade Combat Team, Fort Knox has sufficient capacity to support all
deploying units.
The Army is working on several methods to maintain Fort Knox's
ability to support deploying units, including Forces Command providing
additional resources to support movement/deployment operations under
Title 10 requirements. Additionally, future military construction
projects will be programmed to improve Fort Knox's services,
infrastructure and deployment readiness as part of the Army Power
Projection Upgrade Program (AP3).
HOUSING BARRACKS
Question. In light of heavy deployments, I am concerned that many
installations, including Fort Campbell, are still housing soldiers in
Korean War-era barracks. What is the Department of Defense doing to
ensure housing is brought up to date to help increase morale for our
already overly taxed troops?
Answer. At Fort Campbell the Army presently has barrack
construction projects underway and programmed for fiscal year 2011,
2012 and 2013. Completion of these projects will eliminate the need to
occupy Korean War-era barracks at the installation.
In 2008, the Army completed the Permanent Party Barracks Upgrade
Program (BUP) using Army Sustainment, Restoration, & Modernization
funding. BUP eliminated many inadequate barracks through modernization
of existing facilities where feasible.
Additionally, the Permanent Party Barracks Modernization Program
(BMP) is scheduled for completion in the fiscal year 2013 MILCON
program. BMP Military Construction eliminates the Army's barracks
shortfall and eliminates inadequate barracks where modernization with
Restoration and Modernization funding was not feasible.
However, neither BUP nor BMP specifically address buyout of certain
types of buildings. Facility modernization not included in BUP or BMP,
typically involves gutting the building to its structural slab and
columns then reconfiguring it to a 1+1 standard and adds approximately
30 years to the life of the facility.
The Army continuously reviews its capital investment strategy to
validate the plans for replacement and sustainment of barracks
facilities, a major feature in the Army Campaign Plan. These plans
address Korean-War era, Vietnam-War era and any other barracks built
before 1980.
BLUE GRASS ARMY DEPOT
Question. Why is the Blue Grass Army Depot chemical weapons
stockpile in central Kentucky not being monitored around the clock?
Answer. The Blue Grass Chemical Activity (BGCA), which is
subordinate to the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, is in charge of
the safe storage of chemical weapons at Blue Grass Army Depot. The
stockpile is stored in earth covered steel reinforced concrete bunkers.
The bunkers are in a secured area with intrusion detection, and armed
guards on roving patrols providing surveillance 24 hours a day.
The BGCA relies on multiple safeguards to monitor the chemical
munitions stockpile to ensure public and workforce safety. These
safeguards include monitoring in accordance with our Kentucky
Department of Environment Protection permit, visual inspections and
application of munitions lot leaker data from both BGCA and other
chemical agent storage sites. These safeguards, as well as an active
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Response Program have been in place at
BGCA and all Army chemical stockpile storage sites for decades. History
has proven their effectiveness at protecting both the workforce and the
public.
Question. It is my understanding a directive, FRAGO 10-041, was
recently promulgated mandating that several restaurant concepts at
military bases in Afghanistan be closed. What is the policy
justification for this action? Why were some concepts chosen but not
others? Might this limitation on food options have a negative impact on
morale among our warfighters?
Answer. FRAGO 10-041 was issued on February 3, 2010 by the United
States Forces--Afghanistan Commander to implement a 60-day closure plan
for specific commercial activities available in Afghanistan. This
included all commercial fast food restaurants brought in by the Army
and Air Force Exchange Service. Afghanistan is a war zone, which has
very limited ground routes into and within it. The Commander's intent
is to eliminate all non-mission essential traffic, because of higher
priority cargo needing to be transported over those routes.
Our forces have access to various high quality meals in military
dining facilities and therefore commercial fast food restaurants are
considered as non-mission essential. Furthermore, those fast food
restaurants were only available to our forces operating on the larger
bases. This decision levels the unequal lifestyle between those forward
deployed and those living on fixed bases. We do not expect a
significant morale issue to result.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Sam Brownback
SCHOOLS
Question. Secretary McHugh, I wrote to you in December to raise the
issue of overcrowding in schools on Fort Riley. The Army's response to
that question was that the issue is being studied, but in the meantime,
the problem is getting worse.
The community around Fort Riley has spent all of its available
resources but can't keep pace with the influx of students. For that
reason, General Brooks, the First Infantry Division Commander,
requested help from the Army and from the Department of Defense to
address the overcrowding problem.
I also understand other installations that gained forces under the
most recent round of BRAC, such as Fort Lewis in Washington, face
similar problems.
What is the Army's plan to handle this issue?
Answer. The Army has no specific authority to fund public school
construction. However, we recognize that some of the school districts
serving our military children are experiencing school construction
funding challenges, specifically, Fort Riley and Joint Base Lewis
McChord (formerly named Fort Lewis), in Washington.
To better understand the issues for all school districts serving
our military Families, the Army recently completed a comprehensive
condition and capacity inventory of all on-post schools in the United
States. Results indicate that over 50 percent of the 122 on-post
schools are in need of renovation or replacement. Our plan is to work
with the Department of Defense, the Department of Education and the
Congress to develop solutions for those districts that have exhausted
local and state funding options. Please note that, although operated by
the local school district, six of the seven schools at Joint Base Lewis
McChord are owned by the Department of Education. Department of
Education has the responsibility to fund necessary renovation or
reconstruction for these schools, hence our need to work with them to
develop solutions. Army owns the remaining school.
Question. Does the Army require additional money to handle the
issue of over-crowded schools at posts that gained forces through BRAC
and Grow the Force? Was such funding included in the fiscal year 2011
budget request, and if not, why not?
Answer. Public school construction is normally a state and local
responsibility. Because the Army has no specific authority to fund
public school construction, we have not included such funding in the
fiscal year 2011 budget request. Additional authorization and
appropriation legislation would be needed for the Department of Defense
to construct public schools.
Question. Does the Army need any statutory changes to facilitate
on-post school construction or modification?
Answer. Yes, the Army would need a legislative change to assist
local public school districts with school construction. One potential
avenue would be through the use of American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act funds specifically targeted to school districts that have been
significantly impacted by Base Realignment and Closure or Grow the Army
stationing decisions.
______
Questions Submitted to General George W. Casey
Question Submitted by Chairman Daniel K. Inouye
EQUIPMENT IN THEATER
Question. General Casey, the Army has massive amounts of equipment
in Iraq which, as U.S. forces withdraw, require evaluation and transfer
for reset, use in Afghanistan or disposal. We hear that the drawdown is
well underway and that over 300,000 containers are moving equipment out
each month. General, what is the prospective timeline for retrograde
and who is in charge of this effort?
Answer. The Commanding General, USARCENT (the Army component of
U.S. Central command), is in charge of orchestrating the retrograde of
Army materiel from Iraq. He has considerable support from the Army
Materiel Command, which has a substantial presence in both Kuwait and
Iraq. As directed by the President, the timeline for the drawdown in
Iraq is to reduce our military presence to 50,000 U.S. forces by August
31, 2010 and to have all U.S. forces out of Iraq by the end of December
2011. We have developed synchronized and coordinated plans for the
drawdown of personnel and for the redistribution and disposition of the
equipment and supplies in Iraq. As you noted, that process is well
underway. In fact, we are ahead of schedule against the our established
monthly targets in every measurable area (e.g., personnel drawdown,
vehicles, supplies, base closure, etc.).
______
Question Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
RECAPITALIZATION
Question. As the Army undertakes its recapitalization program, are
there any differences in the rates of recapitalization for Army
National Guard and Reserve units and the recapitalization of active
duty Army units? Can you explain the rationale for the discrepancy if
one exists?
Answer. The Army recapitalizes equipment based on equipment type,
not Army components. There is no difference in recapitalization of
equipment between Reserve Components and Active Duty units.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patty Murray
COMPREHENSIVE SOLDIER FITNESS AND MENTAL HEALTH
Question. General Casey, I received a brief on Comprehensive
Soldier Fitness by General Cornum early last year (February 2009) year
and you spoke about it earlier today. This program is a valuable tool
for equipping and training our soldiers and family members to maximize
their potential and face the physical and psychological challenges of
sustained operations. What is the status of this program?
Answer. Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) is a rapidly maturing
program designed to develop psychological and physiological resilience
across the entire Army community, including soldiers, family members
and Department of the Army civilians. To date, over 420,000 soldiers
have taken the Global Assessment Tool, which is a web-based strengths
assessment. Eight web-based training modules that target resiliency
skills are currently available to soldiers once they complete the
Global Assessment Tool, and 20 modules will be available by the end of
fiscal year 2010. Additionally, CSF has trained 829 Master Resilience
Trainers at the University of Pennsylvania and satellite locations,
with a goal of training at least 1,800 trainers by the end of fiscal
year 2010. These Master Resilience Trainers lead resilience development
training in their units and local communities. CSF is currently
budgeted for $42 million annually over the next 5 years.
MENTAL HEALTH
Question. General Casey, your efforts to reduce the stigma of
mental health has been worthwhile. I understand that the number of
soldiers who feel there is a stigma has been reduced from 80 to 50
percent. However, there is a difference between those who feel there is
a stigma versus those who are actually coming forward to seek mental
health treatment. Despite the reduced number of soldiers who feel there
is a stigma, are more soldiers coming forward to seeking treatment?
Answer. Yes, more soldiers are coming forward to seek treatment.
Our behavioral health utilization data shows that active duty
utilization of behavioral health services has nearly doubled from 2005
to 2009.
Question. What actions is the Army taking to continue to reduce the
embarrassment around seeking mental help and encourage soldiers to seek
treatment?
Answer. The Army is aggressively working to address perceived
stigma and/or fear of negative repercussions associated with seeking
behavioral healthcare. We have developed programs not only to help
decrease stigma, but to also provide an increased layer of privacy.
The Re-Engineering Systems of Primary Care Treatment in the
Military is a program designed to decrease stigma by placing these
services within primary care facilities. Through this program, any
visit a soldier makes to his/her primary care physician for any reason
is an opportunity to screen the Soldier for symptoms associated with
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and/or other behavioral health
diagnoses. This program is also accessible via the web, where soldiers
can self-refer. Services provided are confidential, with the exception
of the determination that a Soldier is at risk of harm to self or
others.
The Soldier Evaluation for Life Fitness program incorporates
behavioral health as a routine component of the health readiness
process for all soldiers returning to their home stations following
deployment. Since every soldier receives a consultation on-site, no one
is stigmatized when seen by a behavioral healthcare practitioner.
Through the Soldier Evaluation for Life Fitness program, soldiers first
complete a computer-based self-assessment. On-site clinicians review
the results of the assessments immediately, allowing them to tailor
their consultations to meet each soldier's unique needs. Soldiers can
then be evaluated for individual health risks that may range from PTSD
and other behavioral health diagnoses to physical health conditions.
Military OneSource is a free information center and website, where
soldiers can seek assistance 24 hours/day, 7 days/week. Counseling is
provided by phone or in person by Masters-level consultants on issues
such as family support, emotional support, debt management, and legal
issues at no cost to the soldier for up to 12 sessions. Military
OneSource does not release information about users of the services,
with the exception of issues of child abuse, elder abuse, spousal
abuse, and/or risk of harm to self or others. Military OneSource can be
accessed at www.militaryonesource.com or 1-800-342-9647.
Soldiers may complete a free, voluntary online behavioral health
self-assessment, and obtain referrals at www.MilitaryMentalHealth.org.
This is an approach to assist soldiers and family members with
identifying symptoms and getting assistance. It provides confidential
and immediate feedback, as well as referrals to TRICARE, Veterans
Administration Centers, and Military OneSource.
Military and Family Life Consultants are also available to assist
soldiers who are experiencing difficulty coping. Military and family
life consultants are licensed clinical social workers, professional
counselors, marriage and family therapists, and psychologists. They
provide six free informal and confidential counseling sessions. No
records are kept, and flexible appointment times and locations are
offered. Soldiers may access military and family life consultants
through the Army Community Services by self referral, without having to
provide a reason for seeking these services, or via Military OneSource,
which can assist Families with the identification of consultants in the
local area.
Question. Does your plan include the mental health of families, and
if so what is that plan?
Answer. The Army is committed to the Army Family Covenant, which
recognizes the strong commitment and many sacrifices that families
make. The Army also knows that the strength of soldiers is largely
dependent upon the strength of their families. To address the
behavioral health needs of families, the Army supports many deployment-
related programs. For example, two well-developed programs include the
Exceptional Family Member Program, which focuses on assistance for
families with special needs; and the Family Advocacy Program, which
strengthens family relationships and provides assistance and referral
to victims of domestic violence and sexual assault.
The Army also supports the Military and Family Life Consultant
Program (MFLC), which provides deployment-related problem-solving
consultation services for families and children in schools on post and
in the local community. The Army has instituted Soldier and Family
Assistance Centers (SFAC) at all the Warrior Transition Units. The SFAC
is a soldier and family-friendly environment that has become a popular
location for Warriors in Transition and their Families. The Center
provides individualized, integrated support services.
To augment the Military Treatment Facility's behavioral healthcare
services, the Army Medical Command recently established the Child,
Adolescent and Family Behavioral Health Proponency (CAF-BHP) at Joint
Base Lewis McChord, Tacoma, Washington. This new Proponency
specifically addresses family behavioral health needs; its mission is
to support and sustain a comprehensive, integrated, behavioral health
system of care for military children and their families.
The CAF-BHP collaborates with national subject matter experts and
professional organizations, including the American Academy of
Pediatrics, American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and
American Psychological Association, to develop and promote evidence-
based behavioral health treatments for military children and their
families. The CAF-BHP focuses on two new innovative clinical programs,
the School Behavioral Health (SBH) and Child and Family Assistance
Center (CAFAC). CAFACs are being developed and deployed to help
mitigate traditional stove piping of behavioral health services. The
CAFAC will provide adult and child family members with 24/7 telephone
triage and to mental health services at a single location. Services
include psychiatric, psychological, social services and community
resourcing. This integrated, comprehensive behavioral healthcare
delivery system promotes military readiness, wellness, and resilience
in Army children and Families.
Schofield Barracks has an established CAFAC and we are pursuing
initiatives at JBLM and Fort Carson. In the next couple of years, we
expect to establish the program at Fort Hood, Fort Bragg, Fort Bliss,
Fort Campbell, Fort Sill, and Fort Drum. To promote evidence-based
treatments and best practices, the CAF-BHP trains primary care
providers and their staff in screening, diagnosing and treating common
behavioral health concerns. The CAF-BHP also designs marketing
strategies to decrease the stigma associated with seeking behavioral
healthcare.
STRYKER V HULLS
Question. General Casey, as you well know, three Stryker brigades
from Fort Lewis Washington are on deployment today. Two are in Iraq and
another in Afghanistan. It is my understanding the Army has gone to
great lengths to enhance the safety of these troops by adding armor
kits to the vehicles to defeat various threats. It is also my
understanding that a so-called double-V hull--something similar to the
MRAP vehicle--has been developed for the Stryker to further increase
the protection of our soldiers. Can you explain the utility of the
double-V hull and if this is something we should be doing to protect
those brave Stryker brigade soldiers?
Answer. The Double V-hull enhancement shows great potential for
increasing survivability and mitigating the blast effects of Improvised
Explosive Devices. The Double V-hull is an accelerated portion of the
current Army acquisition strategy for Stryker modernization. The
Double-V shaped hull will potentially provide Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected vehicle-like protection to a proven fighting vehicle in the
Army's most highly demanded Brigade Combat Team.
If testing proves successful, the Army anticipates fielding an
initial capability of Double V-hulled Strykers in late fiscal year
2011, with a complete brigade set (minus Mobile Gun System and Nuclear
Biological Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle) to Operation Enduring
Freedom by late fiscal year 2012.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
RESTORING BALANCE/RISK
Question. General Casey, over the past few years, we have heard
about efforts to restore balance to the Army. In your prepared
testimony, restoring balance is discussed, and it is noted that the
Army lacks sufficient strategic flexibility and continues to accumulate
risk to meet the challenges you may face in the future. Can you expand
on this statement and explain what it means, and over time, how much
risk has accumulated and is now being accepted by the Army. Does the
Army and our Armed Forces find themselves in the same situation as the
proverbial frog in a pot of water--the frog is cozy as the water slowly
heats-up and doesn't recognize the danger it is in?
Answer. The Army's forces are committed to prevailing in the
current fight by ramping up in Afghanistan as we responsibly draw down
in Iraq. Thanks to the support of Congress and the American people, the
Army is receiving the resources it needs to restore readiness, but the
continuing pace of operations means we are consuming that readiness as
fast as we produce it. The commitment of the Army to Iraq and
Afghanistan limits the choices available to our national leadership if
another crisis--whether humanitarian or armed conflict--arises. It also
means the Army cannot train all units to standard on full spectrum
operations, which is necessary to provide a trained and ready force for
the variety of possible missions in a world of persistent conflict.
We are making progress in restoring balance, reaching a sustainable
and predictable force rotational cycle in 2012 of 2 years at home
station for every year deployed for our Active Component, and 4 years
at home station for every year mobilized for our Reserve Component.
However, even after the end of major combat operations in Afghanistan,
we expect a few challenging years of recapitalizing and repairing
equipment, re-integrating with our families, and training forces for
full spectrum operations, before we can provide true strategic
flexibility to our leaders.
With Congress' continued support, the Army will restore balance by
achieving sustainable deploy-to-dwell ratios; adequately providing for
soldiers, civilians, and families; and with reliable, timely, and
consistent funding, resetting our equipment and pre-positioned stocks.
These measures will restore readiness and the strategic flexibility
necessary to provide trained and ready forces for full spectrum
operations and future contingencies at a tempo that is predictable and
sustainable for our All-Volunteer Force.
ARMY UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Question. General Casey, I am informed that the Army plans to
modify the Shadow Unmanned Aerial Vehicle to meet requirements that the
terminated Fire Scout program was expected to fulfill. The fiscal year
2011 budget request includes over a half billion to begin this work.
General Casey, can you share with the Committee the thought behind the
Fire Scout termination, and will this $500 million investment in Shadow
provide your soldiers with the full capability needed to conduct their
missions?
Answer. With the termination of Future Combat Systems, we
determined that the Fire Scout did not fulfill a requirement in the
modular Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). The improvements that we are making
to our Shadow fleet will sufficiently address the most critical
capability gaps in the BCTs. Some of these improvements include
retrofit kits to increase endurance while adding reliability, laser
designation capability and NSA Type I encryption. Our BCTs, Fires
Brigades, Battlefield Surveillance Brigades and Special Forces
formations will benefit from the additional capabilities funded in the
fiscal year 2011 President's budget. This improvement effort will
continue beyond fiscal year 2011 to provide full capability to our
soldiers.
RESILIENCY OF THE FORCE
Question. General Casey, does the fiscal year 2011 budget continue
to fully support Army Resiliency initiatives? What other efforts are
included in this year's budget which was not part of the fiscal year
2010 program?
Answer. Yes. Comprehensive Soldier Fitness is fully funded in
fiscal year 2011 at $42.5 million. Future efforts include expanding the
Master Resilience Trainers (MRT) program by establishing an MRT course
at Fort Jackson, South Carolina; reaching out to family members through
voluntary participation in the Global Assessment Tool; and increasing
the online Comprehensive Resilience Modules.
BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (BCT) MODERNIZATION
Question. General Casey, over $20 billion has been invested in
technologies developed under the terminated Future Combat System
program. The Army now plans to field some of these technologies to Army
brigades under the Brigade Combat Team Modernization program. What
systems or technologies are going to be fielded under this effort, and
how have they performed in recent testing?
Answer. Increment 1 of Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Modernization
contains systems from the FCS program. It provides enhanced war fighter
capabilities to the Current Force in two primary areas. First, it
provides enhanced situational awareness, force protection and lethality
through the use of unattended and attended sensors and munitions.
Second, it provides a communications network backbone for Infantry BCT
and Battalion Command Networks. Increment 1 capabilities consist of the
following systems: Unattended Urban and Tactical Ground Sensors, Small
Unmanned Ground Vehicle, Class I Block 0 Unmanned Air Vehicle, Non Line
of Sight-Launch System, and Network Integration Kit (for the HMMWV).
During the 2009 Limited User Test, Increment 1 capabilities met or
partially met 14 of 15 Army test criteria. The systems did not meet
reliability criteria. User tests revealed issues with equipment and
software reliability, availability and maintainability. The program
office, in coordination with the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation command
and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, is taking steps to correct
these issues. To date, more than 94 percent of the hardware issues have
been corrected and the program is continuing to integrate software
changes and increased capability in preparation for the 2010 test
cycle.
MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLES
Question. General Casey, when Secretary Gates announced his
adjustments to Defense acquisition programs last year, he terminated
the manned ground vehicle portion of the Future Combat System. One of
reasons cited for the termination was that the Army's current vehicle
program did not include a role for the Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected
vehicles which has received more than $30 billion of investment. What
is the Army plan for incorporating Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected
vehicles across your unit formations?
Answer. The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) family of
vehicles has performed well in theater and provides critical protection
to soldiers against mines and improvised explosive devices. The Army
plans to place over 15,000 MRAPs and M-ATVs in the force structure.
Vehicles will be allocated to task organized sets, and deployed when
MRAP levels of protection are required; used by units to fill existing
capability gaps; and used in a robust training fleet to assist soldiers
in maintaining proficiency.
We will place 9,284 vehicles in the following task organized sets:
11 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams; 6 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams, 3
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams and a Multifunctional Support Brigade. The
Army is currently analyzing set positioning options.
The Army will place 3,631 vehicles on Transportation, Explosive
Ordnance Disposal and echelon above brigade Medical unit MTOEs. We will
also place 1,755 vehicles in training sets around the world and 495 in
Sustainment Stocks and War Reserve. TRADOC will determine allocation of
the additional 1,460 MRAP All Terrain Vehicles and 1,300 MRAPs placed
on contract in February 2010.
RESET OF ARMY EQUIPMENT
Question. General Casey, resetting or recapitalization of Army
equipment used in operations the past 8 years is requiring
unprecedented funding levels. It's pointed out in the prepared
testimony that resetting Army equipment will need to continue an
additional 2 to 3 years after major deployments end. How does the Army
plan to maintain equipment reset funding levels and complete this
necessary process considering the 5 year budget plan projects only 1
percent annual real growth and an annual Overseas Contingency
Operations budget that is more than $100 billion less than it is today?
Answer. The Army will continue to request reset funding levels to
meet the incremental costs of war in our Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) budget. Since 2001, Congress has fully funded the
reset of Army equipment returning from contingency operations and the
Army used these funds to reset units for full spectrum operations.
Reset funding for fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 is adequate to
complete the reset of 25 brigades this year, 31 brigades in fiscal year
2011 and represents approximately $11 billion per year.
Current funding ensures that equipment can be rapidly repaired or
replaced to meet operational requirements. We will continue to use our
Reset Cost Model to forecast future reset costs based on force
structure and equipping scenarios. Enduring requirements that are no
longer part of the OCO will transition to our base budgets. This
approach, with corresponding budget request adjustments, will align
with the 5-year budget plan projections and OCO budget.
If OCO Reset needs are not resourced in the year required, it would
cause either the deferral of requirements or impact other programs
resulting in equipment not being reset (repaired or replaced). The net
result would be less reliable equipment or equipment shortages that
would impact readiness and potentially put soldiers at risk. Equipment
Reset and the associated funding is essential to maintaining equipment
readiness and restoring balance to the Army. In partnership with
Congress, the Army will continue to identify equipping Reset
requirements that are cost effective, timely, and ensure readiness for
future operations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Christopher S. Bond
MODERNIZE THE FORCE
Question. Tell me about the Army's plan to modernize the force and
what this means for soldiers in the next 2-3 years, specifically
regarding the ``spin-outs'' and the priority delivery plan for the Army
Infantry Brigades and others. Were any specific ``spin-outs'' cut as a
result of the changes to Future Combat Systems (FCS)?
Answer. After cancellation of the Future Combat Systems (FCS)
program, the Army transitioned to a Brigade Combat Team (BCT)
Modernization Plan. The Army now refers to ``spin-outs'' as
``capability packages.'' This plan is supported by comprehensive
lessons learned from more than 8 years of war, focuses on the evolving
needs of our warfighters in a rapidly changing security environment and
exploits the knowledge and technologies developed under the FCS
program.
The BCT Modernization Plan aligns the fielding of capabilities with
the Army Force Generation Model, so that soldiers will have the right
capabilities at the right time to accomplish their mission. In the next
3 years, the Army plans to field the first increment to three Infantry
Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs). We anticipate fielding the first brigade
set of Increment 1 equipment in 2011 and two additional sets in 2012.
Rather than making one modernization decision and applying it over
two or more decades (as typically done in the past), the BCT
Modernization Plan recognizes that modernization decisions must be made
incrementally to stay ahead of the demands of the security environment
and the needs of our warfighters.
After the program's cancellation, we reevaluated FCS systems in
light of our evolving needs. This led to the cancellation of the Class
IV Unmanned Air System, the Multifunction Utility/Logistics and
Equipment Transport (MULE-T) and the MULE-Countermine (MULE-CM)
unmanned ground vehicles. Our analysis concluded that the Class IV UAS
was no longer a cost-effective solution because current UAS, with some
improvements, can sufficiently meet most requirements. Likewise, the
two large robots (MULE-T and MULE-CM) did not meet rapidly changing
threats or address critical future mission needs.
Question. What is the Army's plan to integrate the Guard into its
modernization efforts with respect to a proportional and concurrent
delivery of the equipment needed to modernize?
Answer. Because the Army has operationalized the Reserve Components
to support Combatant Commanders, the Active Component (AC) is no longer
a major factor in determining the order in which we field modernized
systems. The goal of this strategy, which is based on the Army Force
Generation Model, is to provide units with the equipment they need to
perform their next mission. The Army's equipping strategy provides the
most modern, capable equipment to deploying units without regard to
whether they are AC, Army National Guard (ARNG), or Army Reserve.
Additionally, we remain committed to ensuring ARNG units are equipped
to at least 80 percent of their critical dual use items (despite
significant overseas contingency operations and reset requirements)
with a goal of reaching 100 percent. This is designed to ensure ARNG
preparedness to support civil support missions.
Between September 2008 and September 2010, ARNG equipment on hand
percentages will increase by approximately 6 percent, and ARNG
equipment modernization levels will increase by approximately 4
percent. Both of these increases surpass the ACs improvements over the
same time period.
The Army is continuing to invest in ARNG modernization by procuring
equipment that will complete ARNG modernization in several key areas
over the next year or two. For example, the Army will soon complete the
ARNG fielding of Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below and the
M777 howitzer system. We will also complete 96 percent of the ARNG
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical systems.
For ARNG aircraft, the Army is working toward modernizing the
fleet. The Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) is a key element of this
strategy. The Army will field 88 of 210 LUHs by fiscal year 2011. The
ARNG has the first two HH-60M equipped Medical Evacuation companies in
the Army, as well as the second UH-60M equipped assault battalion. The
ongoing modernization of the UH-60A series aircraft (A-A-L) will
continue to reduce the number of non-modernized Blackhawks fleetwide in
all components. We have already modernized four of the eight ARNG
attack battalions with AH-64D model Apaches and plan to convert the
remaining four battalions in fiscal year 2013-14. The ARNG is receiving
three CH-47F models for its training base, and will begin receiving CH-
47Fs for their operational units in fiscal year 2011.
Question. If the current rotary wing modernization plan for the
Army Guard is any indication of how the effort is going, I am not
hopeful. It is my understanding the President requested funding for
only 2 upgraded Blackhawk ``M'' models for the Army Guard in fiscal
year 2011? Is that enough?
Answer. Yes, two aircraft are sufficient in fiscal year 2011. The
two HH-60Ms MEDEVAC aircraft included for the Army Guard in the fiscal
year 2011-base budget will be paired with 10 HH-60Ms procured in the
fiscal year 2010 base. This will provide enough aircraft to equip one
Army Guard 12-ship MEDEVAC Company. This MEDEVAC Company is to be
fielded in fiscal year 2011-12 (1 year after the procurement funding),
and will bring the ARNG total UH/HH-60Ms to 70 aircraft. The UH-60M is
the standard configuration for the Assault and General Support units.
The HH-60M is the Medical Evacuation configuration for the MEDEVAC
units.
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
Question. The fiscal year 2011 Army budget request for military
construction increased by almost $300 million, so our Guard soldiers
and their families thank you for that. I have voiced concern in the
past that the military construction funding has not kept pace with the
essential needs at Guard installations across the country for
modernization and replacement of aging facilities. I applaud the
increase in funding from $246 million to $374 million to replace the
Guard's aging facilities. In your view, is this amount appropriate to
support Army Guard training and readiness requirements?
Funding spent on the renovation and creation of new armories across
the country spurs economic growth and enhances the Guard's and the
Reserves' ability to carry out their missions. The benefit of these
construction projects are two-fold because they serve as both military
readiness spaces and public locations for community gatherings. As you
know, training, maintenance and readiness is hampered by inadequate,
unsafe and unhealthy facilities. The high level of mission readiness
required of Guard soldiers needs to be supported by functional
facilities, so I thank you for your support.
Answer. The fiscal year 2011 level of funding provides for 48
projects nationwide. At this level of funding, the average age of an
Army National Guard (ARNG) Readiness Center will increase from 41 to 49
years over the next decade. The current level of funding provides for
major renovation of ARNG facilities every 30 years. Accordingly, at
this level of funding, the ARNG will continue to be challenged in
meeting its readiness requirements.
TRANSIENTS, TRAINEES, HOLDEES AND STUDENTS (TTHS) ACCOUNT
Question. The Army National Guard is the only service component
that doesn't have a Transients, Trainees, Holdees and Students (TTHS)
Account. As such, units continue to witness taxing instances of
personnel and equipment ``cross-leveling'' when they are mobilized.
Would creating such an account decrease some of the pressure placed
upon soldiers' dwell-time and help the force get ``back in balance?''
Answer. Yes. In fact, the Army is creating an 8,000 slot TTHS
account in the ARNG. Although this is a relatively small account, it is
a significant step forward. It will allow the ARNG to place non-
deployable soldiers in the TTHS account, thereby freeing spaces in
units for trained, deployable personnel. The Army Training and Doctrine
Command has worked extensively with the ARNG to increase the number of
training seats available to Guard soldiers when recruits are available
for training. The result has been a much smaller number of untrained
soldiers occupying deployable unit positions.
Question. Can a TTHS account be implemented without increasing Army
Guard end-strength?
Answer. Yes. Because of certain force design updates, the Army
National Guard (ARNG) Force Structure Allowance is approximately
350,000. The Congressionally mandated end strength of 358,200 personnel
provides a deviation of approximately 8,000 soldiers. The ARNG can
manage a small 8,000 soldier Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students
account (TTHS) with this deviation. This will allow the ARNG to remove
non-deployable soldiers from operational units, as well as to reduce
the untrained recruit population in mobilizing formations. Reducing
force structure allowance any further, however, would destabilize the
readiness of formations, increase the rate of unit rotations overseas,
reduce the ARNG's accessibility to the Active Component and reduce its
ability to function as an operational force.
Question. Do Army leaders believe the end-strength is adequate in
the ARNG?
Answer. Yes, the Army Senior Leaders believe the end strength of
the ARNG is adequate.
Question. Is the ARNG experiencing commensurate, or
``proportionate'' troop growth as compared to the active-component?
Answer. Since 2005, the Army National Guard (ARNG) has done a
tremendous job of increasing its end strength within authorized levels.
Over the past 3 years, the ARNG has met its accession mission 35 out of
36 months (in September 2009 it achieved a 99.6 percent accession
rate), and increased its total end strength by approximately 12,000
(from an End Strength Mission of 346,165 in March 2007 to 358,200 in
February 2010). During this period, the total ARNG End Strength
remained between 100-103 percent of the End Strength Mission (only in
August 2008, did the end strength reach 103.1 percent).
In 2006, as part of the Grow the Army Initiative, the ARNG's end
strength authorization grew by 8,200. The current temporary end
strength increase in the Active Army will benefit the Army National
Guard by allowing an increased dwell for all Army units.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Chairman Inouye. This subcommittee will reconvene on
Wednesday, March 10, at 10:30. And at that time, we will
consider health programs of DOD.
And, with that, the subcommittee stands in recess.
[Whereupon, at 10:35 a.m., Wednesday, March 3, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a.m.,
Wednesday, March 10.]