

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 3, 2010

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 9:31 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Inouye (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Inouye, Dorgan, Shelby, and Brownback.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

STATEMENTS OF:

HON. JOHN M. McHUGH, SECRETARY

GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY, CHIEF OF STAFF

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DANIEL K. INOUE

Chairman INOUE. The hearing will come to order.

This morning, we welcome the Honorable John McHugh, Secretary of the Army, along with General George Casey, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

Gentlemen, we thank you for being here with us today as we review the Army's budget request for fiscal year 2011.

Before proceeding, I'd like to announce that, because of illness, the vice chairman will not be with us this morning. In his place, we have the gentleman from Alabama.

The Department of the Army's fiscal year 2011 budget request is \$143.4 billion, an increase of \$2.5 billion over last year's enacted budget, excluding funding appropriated to the Army in the fiscal year 2010 supplemental.

The Army also has requested \$20 billion for overseas contingency operations for the remainder of this fiscal year, primarily to fund surge operations in Afghanistan. In April of last year, President Obama and Secretary Gates announced substantial initiatives within the Department of Defense to strengthen our All-Volunteer Force, change how and what the Department buys, and rebalance military capabilities.

After an overhaul of the Army's modernization effort last year, fiscal year 2011 budget request includes \$3.2 billion for the Army's

revamped Brigade Combat Team Modernization Program and provides \$6 billion for Army aviation. The fiscal year 2011 budget request builds upon the reform agenda set by Secretary Gates last year and supports the final year of a 5-year plan to restore balance to an Army that has experienced the cumulative effects of years upon years of conflict.

The subcommittee is looking forward to hearing not only about these efforts, but also about the Department's vision to rebalance and reshape, as directed in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) completed this past January. One of the central themes of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review is balance. The Department needs to find balance between providing capabilities to prevail in today's wars, while building the capabilities needed to counter future threats. The Army is shouldering a very heavy burden, since it has been conducting combat operations in two theaters while transforming and modernizing at the same time. However, budget pressures to support current operations have made it very difficult to allow for the investment in modernization.

Not only is balance included and needed between meeting the demands of today and the threats of the future, it is also needed within each of the military services, and the Army has continued to answer the Nation's call, but it has been at the expense of maintaining a well-balanced force.

We are aware of the demands created by more than 8 years of continuous war. Repeated and lengthy deployments have stressed our soldiers, their families, and our support systems and equipment. Currently the Department is managing a shift in focus in our overseas contingency operations. While the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq has begun, an additional 30,000 troops have been committed to supporting operations in Afghanistan.

Since the Army is the service most heavily engaged in these operations, the Secretary of Defense has permitted the Army to retain 22,000 soldiers, temporarily, above the authorized end strength of 547,000. This decision was made to acknowledge the fact that future readiness is dependent upon restoring balance and lessening the strain upon the force.

Finally, there is one other type of balance that this subcommittee will be looking for during the budget review, the balance between risk and resources. The Quadrennial Defense Review has set the agenda and defined requirements, and presumably the Department has budgeted for those priorities. However, there will never be enough resources to eliminate all risk. It is our hope that today's hearing will help illuminate how the Army's fiscal year 2011 budget request addresses the recommendations of the Quadrennial Defense Review while maintaining balance among a number of valued, yet equally important, priorities.

Gentlemen, we sincerely appreciate your service to our Nation and your dedication and sacrifices made daily by the men and women in our Army. We could not be more grateful for what those who wear our Nation's uniform do for our country each and every day.

Gentlemen, your full statements will be made a part of the record.

And I would now wish to turn to the Senator from Alabama.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief. I just want to join you in welcoming Secretary McHugh and General Casey to this subcommittee. They're no strangers here.

Thank you.

Chairman INOUE. I thank you very much.

Now, with that, Secretary, we are depending on you, sir.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCHUGH

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

As you noted, we'll enter, with your permission, our full statements into the record. And I know time is of some concern here this morning, so I just would like to summarize a few of those points.

First of all, I want to, at the risk of stating the obvious, say what an honor it is to be here today. I had the distinct honor of serving for 17 years on the House Armed Services Committee, and in that time I gained a great appreciation for the great work this subcommittee does, for the enormous support that it has, historically, and certainly under the leadership of you, the vice chairman, and the current members, have continued in support of not just our Army, but all of our services. I certainly want to take this opportunity to express my personal appreciation and thanks for all that you do, and all that you will continue to do.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, just a few comments on my now 5 months as the 21st Secretary of the Army. And while it's been a crash course of learning, I think some things are obvious. And I would add, Mr. Chairman, in listening to your opening comments, I think you've encapsulated very well the key questions, the key challenges that lie before us.

As you've said, Mr. Chairman, and as I have seen from the first day I walked into that hallowed building on the other side of the Potomac, this is an Army that clearly is fatigued, is stressed by nearly 9 years of combat. But, it is still an Army that is amazingly resilient, that is amazingly effective. Today, as you know, this is an Army that has more expertise, more education, it has more capability and lethality than any Army in our Nation's history. That is, in no small measure, because of the great support and leadership that has come out of this great subcommittee.

Those are significant gains, but, in spite of those gains, this is, quite simply, an Army that is, and remains, out of balance. The Chief of Staff—General Casey—and my predecessor, Pete Geren, the Army leadership, along in partnership with the Congress have made great progress in bringing that balance back. I think, one of the key assets and key attributes of the President's proposed budget is that it allows us to continue the regaining of balance, and, in fact, should allow us to finish it. But, this is a very delicate balance, and we need to stay focused on that objective.

You noted, Mr. Chairman, the variety of appropriations that take us toward that goal, the \$1.7 billion in requests to continue to fund our vital family programs in support of those amazing families, and other initiatives. I won't continue to repeat those, but a couple of other points, I think, do bear noting.

We remain extraordinarily committed to our wounded warriors. Tomorrow, I will have the opportunity to pay my regular visit to Walter Reed, and I know what I will see. I will see a cadre of individuals who have stepped forward, who have given more in their time on the battlefield than most Americans could possibly imagine, and who will ask one simple question, "What can I do to serve more?" We recognize the obligation we have to provide world-class transition, world-class healthcare services to those heroes. This budget provides us with that opportunity and allows us to go forward in that solemn obligation.

It also allows us to do something very important, in terms of recapitalizing, rebalancing, and modernizing our equipment systems that require those kinds of adjustments. And, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, that's a significant challenge under the best of circumstances, but clearly, at time of war, becomes even more problematic. But, with your support, we will continue to do that. The funding is there—\$3.1—\$31.7 billion in research and development, brigade combat team modernization funds, et cetera, et cetera.

The other thing—and it's something that this Congress recognized last year—that we need help in is acquisition reform. I think it's necessary to give our acquisition people, who have also been at war for nearly 9 years, their due. Over the last 10 years, they've had a 15-percent cut in personnel and a 500-percent increase in their dollars to bring under contract. And in spite of that, in that time, 1,000 protests brought against the decisions that they made, and only 8 of those 1,000 protests upheld. Still, they would be the first to recognize they need help. We need to continue to redevelop the acquisition rules and regulations to allow us to be more effective in support of the warfighter, and, equally important, more efficient in support of our taxpayer dollars. We look forward in engaging with this Congress, with this great subcommittee, in bringing that about.

PREPARED STATEMENT

In the end, I would tell you, we have an Army that is strong in spirit, it is strong in ability and in results. But, as I said in my opening comments, and as you noted, Mr. Chairman, it is an Army that is greatly stressed. We can do better by them. We feel that's our obligation and what this budget brings to the table and allows us the opportunity to do. And, in partnership with you, we look forward to pursuing that very worthy goal.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I'd yield back.

Chairman INOUE. I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN M. MCHUGH AND GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.

INTRODUCTION

America's Army continues to answer the Nation's call, as it has since it was established nearly 235 years ago. Today our Army is fighting two wars, assisting other nations as they build their own security capacity, supporting civil authorities at home, helping the people of Haiti rebuild after a devastating earthquake, and preparing to deter and defeat new threats. The Army's Soldiers, Civilians, and Families faithfully shoulder the load that our Nation asks of them. With the support of the Congress, we are on track with our 4-year plan to put the Army back in balance.

Though their sacrifices can never be fully repaid, the Nation continues to recognize and honor our Soldiers and their Families by supporting them before, during, and following deployments. Our Soldiers rely upon the best training and equipment that our Nation can provide to accomplish their mission. Yet even with this continued support, the demands of 8 years of war weigh heavily on our Army. The strain of multiple deployments is evident on Soldiers and their Families. Equipment is used at a pace that seriously challenges our maintenance and replacement capabilities and resources. The stress is present in our institutions as we change 20th century systems and processes to meet the demands of the 21st century.

Our Nation faces the difficult challenge of balancing when, where, and how to engage in a dynamic and uncertain world while meeting important priorities at home. However, when the security of our citizens or allies is threatened, the Nation can depend on America's Army—the Strength of the Nation.

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

The United States faces a complex strategic landscape with an array of diverse security challenges. We are fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan while preparing for future challenges to our national security. For the foreseeable future, violent extremist movements such as Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations comprise the most immediate threats. Current global economic conditions, changes in demographics, cultural pressures associated with globalization, and competition for scarce resources exacerbate the uncertainty and volatility of the strategic environment. Within this setting, the American Soldier stands as our Nation's most visible and enduring symbol of commitment in an era of persistent conflict.

PERSISTENT CONFLICT

For the near future, persistent conflict—protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors that are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends—will characterize the global security environment. Security crises will arise unpredictably, vary in intensity and scope, and last for uncertain durations. These challenges will take place in all domains: land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies will continue to be frequent and unpredictable missions, requiring the commitment of Soldiers and resources. In this dynamic environment, the Army will conduct operations that span the spectrum of conflict from humanitarian and civil support to counterinsurgency to general war, often simultaneously.

GLOBAL TRENDS

Several global trends will continue to shape the international security environment and the conflicts confronting our Nation. Globalization may increase prosperity, but it can also spread destabilizing influences. The unequal distribution of benefits creates societies with divisions between “haves” and “have nots”—divisions that can be exploited by extremist ideologies and lead to conflict. Fault lines reflecting protracted competition and friction can erupt unpredictably as societies struggle to adjust to the move toward modernity and greater interdependence. Meanwhile, increasingly available and affordable technology provides our adversaries sophisticated tools to enable a networked approach to recruiting the disenfranchised and exporting terror.

Shifting demographics and rapid population growth that is increasingly urbanized can continue to break down traditional, localized norms of governance, behavior, and identity, and further strain already stressed governments. This is especially true where a lack of economic opportunity increases the potential for instability and extremism. Those who are disaffected may rebel against perceived Western interference, challenges to traditional values, and ineffective governments. Increased resource demand, in particular energy, water, and food, is a consequence of growing prosperity and populations. The growing global competition for resources will continue to produce friction and increase opportunities for conflict. In this environment, climate change and natural disasters will compound already difficult conditions in developing countries by igniting humanitarian crises, causing destabilizing population migrations, and raising the potential for epidemic diseases.

The two trends of greatest concern are the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and failed or failing states. A catastrophic attack utilizing WMD has the potential to be globally destabilizing. Failed or failing states, lacking the will or capacity to maintain effective territorial control, contribute to regional instability and provide ideal environments for terrorist groups to plan and export operations. The merging of these two trends constitutes a significant and compelling threat. Together, these trends make conflict in the decades ahead more likely.

CHARACTER OF CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Global trends and recent conflicts—such as those in Lebanon and Georgia—and our own recent combat experience indicate the evolving character of conflict in the 21st century.

Conflicts will be waged among diverse actors—state and non-state—with the latter employing capabilities that, during the last century, remained largely the purview of nation-states. Motives, objectives, and often the identities of these actors will be difficult to discern, and are likely to shift as some act covertly and others use proxies. The battle to gain influence over, and support from, populations will be central to our success. Therefore, conflict will be unavoidably waged among the people.

The initiation, location, duration, and intensity of conflicts are increasingly unpredictable. In an interdependent world, conflicts are more susceptible to the potential for spillover, creating regionally, and potentially globally, destabilizing effects. All of this will occur under the unblinking scrutiny of the 24-hour global media cycle and the Internet. Details of conflict as well as misinformation will flow equally across social, communications, and cyber networks. Our adversaries will exploit these media and communication sources locally and globally.

We are more likely to face hybrid threats—diverse and dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal capabilities employed asymmetrically to counter our advantages. Hybrid threats require hybrid solutions—adaptive military forces that can function in a variety of situations with a diverse set of national, allied, and indigenous partners. Given the strategic environment, enduring global trends, and the character of 21st century conflict, the Army will operate as part of a Joint, interagency, inter-governmental, and multi-national team to fulfill its global commitments.

ROLES OF LAND FORCES

More than one million of our men and women have served in the ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over 3,900 American Soldiers have given their lives, and more than 25,000 others have been wounded during this longest period of sustained conflict ever fought by an all-volunteer force. Today, America's Army has over 255,000 Soldiers and more than 18,500 Army Civilians serving in nearly 80 countries around the world—with the remainder stationed within the United States supporting domestic missions, resetting from recent deployments, or preparing for an upcoming deployment.

Our Soldiers are performing magnificently around the world every day, and the roles for land forces in this environment are becoming increasingly clear.

First, the Army must prevail in protracted counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. Not only must we prevail in our current missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines, we must be prepared to prevail in any future COIN operation.

Second, the Army must engage to help other nations build capacity and to assure our friends and allies. Through security force assistance, we can increase the capacity of other nations' military and police to uphold the rule of law, ensure domestic order, and deny sanctuary to terrorists—thereby helping avoid future conflicts that might otherwise develop. American Soldiers are currently deployed to Central America and the Balkans, building the capacity of indigenous security forces. Additionally, the Army has established an Army Service Component Command for U.S. Africa Command to assist partner nations and humanitarian organizations in Africa.

A third role that the Army fulfills is to provide support to civil authorities at home and abroad. In the past year alone, American Soldiers have fought fires in the west, conducted search and rescue operations in the Rockies and Alaska, and assisted with tsunami relief in American Samoa, in support of civil authorities. The Army has also provided a sizeable force to support the relief efforts in Haiti following the catastrophic earthquake that destroyed its capital. Army units from both the active and reserve components remain prepared to react to a variety of crises as consequence management and response forces. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is a lead organization in providing DOD support to civil authorities for disaster relief at home and engineering support to USAID overseas. Abroad, the Army has also supported civil authorities in many ways, such as sending Agribusiness Development Teams from the Army National Guard to Afghanistan.

Finally, the Army must deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors. As an Army, we recognize that we must remain prepared to meet and defeat hostile state actors that threaten our national security. But we recognize that the probability of facing a nation that will challenge America's military head-on is lower than it was during the Cold War and other periods in our history. Our readiness and capability to confront near-peer competitors also deters war by raising the stakes for nation-state and hybrid actors who would threaten our security interests.

To meet these threats, Army units continue to participate in Joint and international training exercises around the world, ensuring that military skills and cooperative partnerships remain strong. The Army continues to position forces in Korea and at various missile defense sites in order to discourage actors who seek to disrupt regional stability and security.

TWO CRITICAL CHALLENGES

The Army has operated at a demanding pace for the last 8 years, and while it has met each challenge, the strain has placed the Army out of balance. Demand for Army forces continues to exceed the sustainable supply. Against that backdrop, the Army continues to meet the wartime requirements of our Nation while it addresses the two major challenges facing our force—restoring balance and setting conditions for the future. In 2007, we established a 4-year plan to restore balance to an Army that had experienced the cumulative effects of years of conflict. The fiscal year 2011 budget supports the final year in that plan. As we continue to restore balance to the force, we are also setting the conditions for the Army of the 21st century—an Army that fulfills our strategic role as an integral part of our Joint Force.

RESTORING BALANCE: THE ARMY'S FOUR IMPERATIVES

With the help of Congress, we have made significant progress over the past 3 years in our plan to restore balance—a plan founded on four imperatives. Yet today the Army remains out of balance. We've improved our ability to sustain the Army's Soldiers, Families, and Civilians; prepare forces for success in the current conflict; reset returning units to rebuild the readiness consumed in operations and to prepare for future deployments and contingencies; and transform to meet the demands of the 21st century. As a result of this progress we now are in a better position to achieve balance than we were 2 years ago. Critical to this was the growth in the size of the Army.

The security agreement with Iraq that transferred security in urban areas to Iraqis was a momentous and welcomed accomplishment. The hard work and sacrifice of our Soldiers with the support of Congress helped make this achievement possible and set the conditions for our responsible drawdown of combat forces in Iraq this year. Coupled with our growth, the drawdown in Iraq allowed for our increased commitment of forces to Afghanistan to stem the rising violence, and disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda while reversing the momentum of the Taliban insurgency. However, the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to create demands that have our Army operating beyond sustainable capacity. In fact, in 2009 more Soldiers were deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan combined than during the height of the Iraq surge.

Presently, and for the short term, we lack sufficient strategic flexibility, and we continue to accumulate risk. We continue to stress our Soldiers, Families, Civilians, equipment, and institutional systems, so our efforts to restore balance must not waiver.

Sustain

Sustaining our all-volunteer force is our first imperative. Nowhere is the stress on our force more profound than in the toll it takes on our people, as is tragically evident in the rising number of suicides and increasing need for counseling among our Soldiers and Families. We are aggressively addressing the causes of stress on individuals resulting from the cumulative effects of multiple deployments, and seeking to build resilience in Soldiers, Families and Civilians. The Army is committed to ensuring that the quality of life of those who serve the Nation is commensurate with the quality of their service.

Goals

To sustain the force, the Army continues to pursue four major goals. Our first goal is to Recruit and Retain quality Soldiers and Civilians dedicated to service to the Nation. Next, we are committed to furnishing the best Care, Support, and Services for Soldiers, Families, and Civilians by improving quality of life through meaningful initiatives such as the Army Family Action Plan, the Army Family Covenant, Army Community Covenants, and the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program. It is our solemn obligation to provide world-class Warrior Care and Transition to our wounded, ill, and injured Warriors through properly led and resourced Warrior Transition Units. Finally, by Supporting the Families of our Fallen Comrades we honor their service and sacrifice.

Progress and Accomplishments

The Army met 104 percent of its recruiting goals for 2009, and achieved both numeric goals and quality benchmarks for new recruits.

All components exceeded 105 percent of their reenlistment goals.

We reduced off-duty fatalities by 20 percent, to include a 15 percent reduction in overall privately-owned-vehicle fatalities and 37 percent reduction in motorcycle fatalities.

In collaboration with the National Institute of Mental Health, the Army began a seminal study into suicide prevention that will inform the Army Suicide Prevention Program and society's approach to suicide.

We began instituting Comprehensive Soldier Fitness—an all-inclusive approach to emotional, social, spiritual, family, and physical fitness—as the foundation to building resiliency within the Army.

We initiated an unprecedented series of construction projects at five major hospitals as part of our commitment to modernize our healthcare system.

The Army established the Warrior Transition Command and reorganized Warrior Transition Brigades to provide centralized support, rehabilitation, and individualized transition planning to our recovering Warriors.

We expanded Survivor Outreach Services to over 26,000 Family members, providing unified support and advocacy, and enhancing survivor benefits for the Families of our Soldiers who have made the ultimate sacrifice.

We implemented the Post 9/11 GI Bill, significantly increasing educational benefits for active duty Soldiers, Veterans, and Family members.

The Army Reserve established Army Strong Community Centers to support geographically-dispersed Soldiers and Families. Together with Army National Guard Family Assistance Centers and Soldier and Family Assistance Centers on active duty installations, these centers provide help to Soldiers' Families near their hometowns.

Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Highlights

Provides \$1.7 billion to standardize and fund vital Family programs and services to include welfare and recreation; youth services and child care; Survivor Outreach Services; and expanded education and employment opportunities for Family members.

Provides a 1.4 percent military basic pay raise and Civilian pay raise, a 3.9 percent basic allowance for housing increase, and a 3.4 percent basic allowance for subsistence increase.

Warrior Transition Units for our wounded Soldiers will continue to receive strong support in fiscal year 2011 with \$18 million in Military Construction funds allocated to resource construction of barracks spaces.

Supports Residential Communities Initiatives program, which provides quality, sustainable residential communities for Soldiers and their Families living on-post, and continues to offset out-of-pocket housing expenses for those residing off-post.

Prepare

Our Soldiers face determined enemies—so preparing the force for our current conflict is complex and time-consuming, but essential for success. Our units must have the people, training, and equipment they need to prevail. Meanwhile, our institutions and systems must adapt to provide those critical capabilities in a timely manner and in sufficient quantities.

Goals

To prepare the force, we have four key goals. First, we accelerated the pace at which we needed to Grow the Army to our end strength and to grow our modular brigades to 73 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and nearly 230 Support Brigades. Second, the Army is committed to improving individual and collective Training to better prepare Soldiers and leaders for a complex and challenging operational environment. Next, we continuously work to provide our formations with effective Equipment in a timely manner that maintains our technological edge and protects our most critical resource—the Soldier. Finally, we must transform the Army to a rotational model—Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)—the core process for generating trained, ready, and cohesive units on a sustained and rotational basis—to meet current and future strategic demands.

Progress and Accomplishments

We began the phase-out of stop-loss, starting with the Reserve Component in August 2009 and the Army National Guard in September 2009, and followed by the Active Army in January 2010. Today, no mobilizing or deploying units have stop-loss Soldiers in their ranks.

The force achieved its “Grow the Army” end strength goal of 1.1 million in 2009. The active component continues to grow toward its additional authorized Temporary End Strength in order to improve unit manning within the already existing Army structure as we eliminate stop-loss.

Fifteen month tours effectively ended in November 2009, when the last Soldiers on those extended deployments returned.

We completed fielding nearly 12,000 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan and delivered the first MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles (M-ATVs) to Afghanistan—just 15 months after identifying the need for that capability. As of the beginning of February, we have provided nearly 800 M-ATVs to Afghanistan.

This year, we successfully manned, trained, equipped, and deployed 67 brigade equivalents.

The Army exceeded fleet readiness of 90 percent for ground equipment, to include MRAPs, and 75 percent for aviation.

We established Army Training Network (ATN)—a 21st Century Approach to Army Training. This revolution in training knowledge access is now providing a one-stop portal to share training best practices, solutions, and products across the Army.

The Army increased its employment of biometric technologies enabling the Army to better identify the enemy among the populace.

Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Highlights

Funds permanent, active component end strength at 547,400; Army Reserve at 205,000; and National Guard at 358,200 in the base budget and supports a 22,000 temporary increase in the active component through the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request.

Procures and upgrades the Army’s UH-60 Black Hawk, CH-47 Chinook, and AH-64 Apache helicopters, which are vital to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Provides over \$1 billion for flight crew training in all components to fund flying hours, maintenance, fuel, airfield operations, and specialized skill training.

Reset

With the pace of continuous combat operations in two wars for the past 8 years, we are consuming our readiness as fast as we can build it. Reset restores returning units—their Soldiers, Families, and equipment—to a level of readiness necessary for future missions.

Goals

Our Reset plans include four goals. Our efforts to Revitalize Soldiers and Families seek to reestablish and strengthen relationships following deployments. The Army’s comprehensive efforts to Repair, Replace, and Recapitalize Equipment affected by the harsh environments of the war are essential to resetting units. In particular, achieving responsible drawdown in Iraq while increasing our commitment of forces and equipment to Afghanistan will require an unprecedented reset effort. The Army must Retrain Soldiers, Leaders, and Units to build critical skills necessary to operate across the spectrum of conflict in the current security environment. Lastly, we are identifying and applying the lessons learned from the Reset Pilot Program that was designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Reset process. Army Reset is a necessary process that must continue not only as long as we have forces deployed, but an additional two to three years after major deployments end.

Progress and Accomplishments

The Army completed the reset of 29 brigades’ worth of equipment in fiscal year 2009 and continued the reset of 13 more. In total, we have reset more than 98,000 pieces of equipment as depot production has doubled since September 11, 2001.

We began executing a responsible drawdown in Iraq which will redistribute, transfer, or dispose of 3.4 million pieces of equipment; redeploy 143,000 military and Civilian personnel, and 147,000 contractors; close 22 supply support activities; and consume or dispose of over 21,000 short tons of supplies.

In 2009, more than 160,000 Soldiers and Family members participated in over 2,600 Strong Bonds events designed to strengthen Army Families.

The Army continues to revise its approach to training by emphasizing doing fewer tasks better, making judicious use of field time, and maximizing the use of mobile training teams and distributed learning.

We completed our Reset Pilot Program and will begin instituting the full Reset model across the Army in 2010.

The Army fostered partnerships by executing more than \$24 billion in new foreign military sales.

Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Highlights

Provides \$10.8 billion to reset Army equipment through the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request.

Supports training and sustainment of Army forces to include individual skills and leader training; combined arms training toward full spectrum operations; and adaptable, phased training based on the ARFORGEN process.

Transform

Since 2004, the Army has been transforming our force to provide the combatant commanders tailored, strategically responsive forces that can dominate across the spectrum of conflict. Transformation is a continuous process that sets the conditions for success against both near-term and future enemies.

Goals

Our goals for transformation include continued Modular Reorganization to standardize our formations to create a more deployable, adaptable, and versatile force. We will accelerate fielding of Advanced Technologies to ensure our Soldiers retain their technological edge. The Army will Operationalize the Reserve Components by systematically building and sustaining readiness while increasing predictability for these Soldiers, Families, employers, and communities.

Completing the requirements of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) statutes is central to Restationing Forces. Soldier and Leader Development will ensure that we produce the next generation of agile and adaptive military and Civilian leaders who are supremely competent in their core proficiencies and sufficiently broad enough to operate effectively in the Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-national environments.

Progress and Accomplishments

The Army is 88 percent complete on the modular conversion of its brigades. The fiscal year 2011 budget will support the near completion of this process.

The Army consolidated existing aviation force structure to create a 12th active component combat aviation brigade (CAB) forming an additional deployable CAB without adding force structure.

The Army activated the 162nd Infantry Brigade at Fort Polk, Louisiana, providing a dedicated and enduring capability to prepare combat advisors to train and build capacity in foreign security forces. Trainers from the brigade are now deployed to Afghanistan to assist with the training and development of the Afghan Security Forces.

The Army developed a new incremental capability package approach to modernization which will allow technologically mature, Soldier-tested, proven technologies to be prioritized, bundled in time, and fielded to the force more quickly than ever before.

We provided combatant commanders with dedicated, regionally based network operations support, and integrated cyber security capability in the form of Theater Network Operations and Security Centers, unique within the Department of Defense.

This past year, the Army closed three active installations and five U.S. Army Reserve Centers and is on course to complete BRAC in fiscal year 2011. To date, we have awarded 265 major military construction projects, of which 59 are complete.

The Army built a Leader Development Strategy that balances experience, greater opportunities for professional education, and training in full spectrum operations.

Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Highlights

Invests nearly \$3.2 billion in BCT modernization programs that include procurement of the first incremental changes packages for Infantry BCTs and additional research, development, testing, and evaluation funding for subsequent change packages as well as initial development of the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).

Provides funds to begin equipping a 13th Combat Aviation Brigade.

Supports the increase in ISR platforms to include the Extended Range/Multi-Purpose, Raven, Shadow unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and the Extended Medium Altitude Reconnaissance and Surveillance System.

SETTING CONDITIONS FOR THE FUTURE

21st Century Army

The second critical challenge facing the Army is setting the conditions for the future through a continuous process of transformation. We must ensure that our Nation has the capability and range of military options to meet the evolving challenges we face in the 21st century. We need an Army that is a versatile mix of tailorable

and networked organizations, operating on a rotational cycle, to provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for full spectrum operations and to hedge against unexpected contingencies—at a tempo that is predictable and sustainable for our all-volunteer force.

Versatility is the central organizing principle of a balanced Army. It enables our forces and institutions to effectively execute operations across the spectrum of conflict. Our modular heavy, Stryker, and light brigades provide a versatile mix of forces that can be combined to provide multi-purpose capabilities, and sufficient capacity to accomplish a broad range of tasks from peacetime engagement to major combat operations.

Our modular units are designed to be tailorable. Brigades now have capabilities previously found at division level and higher. These brigades can be tailored for specific missions and combined with support units and key enablers such as ISR, communications, civil affairs, psychological operations, public affairs capabilities, and expanded logistics support, to accomplish a wide variety of missions and increase the land options available to combatant commanders.

The network is essential to a 21st century Army. Networked organizations improve the situational awareness and understanding leaders need to act decisively at all points along the spectrum of conflict, while providing connectivity down to the individual Soldier. The network allows dispersed Army organizations to plan and operate together, and provides connectivity to Joint, combined, and interagency assets. To support this objective, the Army will use the Global Network Enterprise Construct (GNEC) as our strategy to transform LandWarNet to a centralized, more secure, operationalized, and sustainable network capable of supporting an expeditionary Army.

To provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces at a tempo sustainable for our all-volunteer force, we will put the whole Army under a rotational model—ARFORGEN.

The ARFORGEN process includes three force pools—Reset, Train-Ready, and Available. Each of the three force pools contains a versatile force package, available at varying time intervals based on its readiness level. Each force pool consists of an operational headquarters (a corps), five division headquarters (of which one or two are National Guard), twenty brigade combat teams (three or four are National Guard), and 90,000 enablers (about half of those are Guard and Reserve). Each will be capable of full spectrum operations once we reach a steady-state, ratio of time deployed (known as “boots on the ground” or BOG) to time at home (dwell) of 1:2 (BOG:dwell) for active component forces and 1:4 for reserve component forces. This versatile mix of land forces could sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. At lower demand levels, a sustainable BOG:dwell ratio of 1:3 for active component forces and 1:5 for reserve component forces provides ready, global reaction forces and regionally-oriented forces for engagement in support of Theater Security Cooperation Programs. This process also allows strategic flexibility to surge in response to unexpected contingencies across the spectrum of conflict, and provides operational depth with more forces available for longer commitment times.

The increased demands of our combatant commanders, coupled with the size of our active component (AC) force, require that we continue to integrate reserve component (RC) forces as part of our operational force. Continued and routine access to our RC forces is essential to sustaining current operations, and is improving the overall operational experience and quality of our RC forces. Additionally, sufficient Army National Guard (ARNG) forces must be ready and immediately available to their state and territorial authorities to respond to domestic crises. We are building an integrated Army in which our RC forces are included in the rotational cycle, but at a deployment rate of about half that of their AC counterparts.

The ARFORGEN process increases predictability for Soldiers, Families, employers, and communities, and enables our RC to remain an integral element of the operational force while providing the Nation with the strategic depth (i.e. those non-deployed units which are 2 to 3 years from commitment) and operational flexibility to meet unexpected contingencies.

The Army has undergone significant changes in recent years, and we must continue to change in order to keep pace with an environment of uncertainty and complexity in this era of persistent conflict. The same requirements that drive the imperative to change also drive our modernization efforts and need for institutional adaptation.

Realizing Change

To become the Army the Nation needs in the second decade of the 21st century, we are transforming the Army and prioritizing programs and efforts that show the most promise for today and tomorrow. Similarly, we are transforming business proc-

esses across the Army, including how we identify requirements, acquire, and provide materiel capabilities to our Soldiers, and how we adapt our institutions to align with the ARFORGEN process.

On April 6, 2009, Secretary Gates announced his adjustments to the defense program as part of the President's budget proposal for fiscal year 2010. The Secretary's decisions had an immediate and major impact on our FCS-centric Army modernization effort. He terminated the MGCV portion of FCS, directing that we "reevaluate the requirements, technology, and approach—and then re-launch the Army's vehicle modernization program. . . ." He further directed the Army to "accelerate the initial increment of the program to spin out technology enhancements to all combat brigades," and retain and deliver software and network development program in increments, and incorporate MRAP into our force structure. Secretary Gates' intent for these bold adjustments was clear—to better reflect the lessons that we were learning from ongoing operations and better posture Army forces for a broader range of future challenges.

To fully implement the Secretary of Defense's direction, the Army has developed a comprehensive plan. We refer to this new program as the Army's "Brigade Combat Team Modernization Plan," which is a subset of our overall Army Modernization Strategy.

BCT Modernization Plan

We will leverage the lessons learned from the last 8 years to provide effective and affordable equipment now, while reducing the time it takes to develop and field new and updated materiel solutions. BCT Modernization includes four elements: modernizing the network over time to take advantage of technology upgrades, while simultaneously expanding it to cover ever increasing portions of the force; incorporating MRAPs into our force; rapidly developing and fielding a new Ground Combat Vehicle that meets the requirements of the 21st century Army; and incrementally fielding Capability Packages that best meet the needs of Soldiers and units as they train and then deploy.

Army Network.—Central to the Army's modernization efforts is an enhanced and interoperable communication network that gives the Army a decisive advantage across the spectrum of conflict. The network supports leaders in making timely, informed decisions, and supports organizational agility, lethality, and sustainability. It allows our Soldiers to know where the enemy is, where other friendly forces and civilian populations are, and what weapon systems are available for them at any given time. The network links Soldiers on the battlefield with space-based and aerial sensors, robots, and command posts—providing unprecedented situational awareness and control and enabling the application of precise lethal fires on the modern battlefield.

Maintaining our technological advantage is a constant challenge. The Army's battle command network must be continuously upgraded to ensure security and provide improved capability, capacity, connectivity and operational effectiveness. The Warfighter Information Network (Tactical) (WIN-T) is designed to extend the network ultimately to the company level for BCTs and provide real-time information, such as high definition imagery, from surveillance sources. The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) was born Joint with the specific requirement to resolve radio interoperability among the services. It will provide Soldiers at the tactical level with connectivity at extended ranges, including voice, data, and video, enabling them to move information from platoon to higher-level command posts in complex terrain (including urban and mountainous areas).

MRAP Strategy.—In response to deadly IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Nation made a tremendous investment in fielding MRAPs that have saved lives by providing significantly improved protection for our Soldiers. The Army is incorporating these vehicles throughout its unit formations. Additionally, we used the basic design of the MRAP as the foundation for the M-ATV, modifying it for the mountainous terrain in Afghanistan and in other regions around the world. The MRAP family of vehicles provides the versatility our forces need to rapidly move around the battlefield, particularly in an IED environment, with the best protection we can provide.

Ground Combat Vehicle.—Combining the lessons learned from the survivability of the MRAP, the tactical mobility of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and the operational mobility of the Stryker, the Army is developing a Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) that possesses all of these qualities. Providing Soldiers protected mobility is our top design criteria. The first combat vehicle designed from the ground up to operate in an IED environment, the GCV will have enhanced mobility that will allow it to operate effectively in both urban and off-road environments. It will be designed to host the Army's network. And perhaps most importantly, it will have the capacity avail-

able to accept future upgrades incrementally as technologies mature and threats change.

The GCV will be versatile enough to support our expeditionary requirements and be capable of carrying an infantry squad. It will combine sustainability features that match the availability rates of the Stryker while consuming less fuel than current vehicles of similar weight and power. The pace of change and the operational environment demand an expedited acquisition timeline, so the Army is pursuing a GCV program timeline that provides the first production vehicles in seven years.

Capability Packages.—Capability packages provide the Army a regular, timely process to enable our deployable units with the latest materiel and non-materiel solutions based on the evolving challenges of the operating environment. The best available capabilities will go to the Soldiers who need them most, based on the threats they are likely to face. These bundles of capabilities will include materiel, doctrine, organization, and training to fill the highest priority requirements and mitigate risk for Soldiers. This incremental packaging approach will enable leaders to make timely, resource-informed decisions, and will help ensure that we provide the best available technologies to fulfill urgent needs to Soldiers in the fight—all driven by the cyclic readiness produced by ARFORGEN. These capability packages will upgrade our units as they prepare to deploy by providing them improved capabilities such as precision fires and advanced Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).

The Army Modernization Strategy

The Army's Brigade Combat Team Modernization Plan is a key element of our overall Army Modernization Strategy. The Army Modernization Strategy reflects our overarching vision of how we will achieve our ends, which is to:

- Develop and field an affordable and interoperable mix of the best equipment available to allow Soldiers and units to succeed in both today's and tomorrow's full spectrum military operations.

The Army Modernization Strategy relies on three interrelated lines of effort:

- Develop and field new capabilities to meet identified capability “gaps” through traditional or rapid acquisition processes. In support of this Line of Effort in fiscal year 2011 we have requested \$934 million to develop the Army's new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV), which will overcome critical capability gaps in both current and future operations. It is envisioned to have the tactical mobility of a Bradley, the operational mobility of a Stryker, and the protection of an MRAP. We are also requesting \$459 million to procure the Extended Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. This extraordinarily capable platform, which is already making a difference in Operation Enduring Freedom, gives commanders longer dwell ISR capabilities across a joint area of operations.
- Continuously modernize equipment to meet current and future capability needs through upgrade, replacement, recapitalization, refurbishment, and technology insertions. Army efforts in this Line of Effort include our request for \$887 million for the procurement of 16 Block III AH-64 Apache Helicopters, as well as the upgrade of 13 AH-64 Helicopters to Block II. Block III Apache is part of a long-term effort to improve situational awareness, performance, reliability, and sustainment of the Apache. Block II upgrades continue our commitment to modernize the Army National Guard Aviation Fleet. Additionally, in this line of effort, we have requested \$505 million to upgrade Shadow RQ-7 UAVs. This key upgrade will increase the payload capacity and enhance the performance of this key ISR asset for our BCT Commanders.
- Meet continuously evolving force requirements in the current operational environment by fielding and distributing capabilities in accordance with the Army Resource Priorities List (ARPL) and Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model. Meeting the constantly evolving needs of theater commanders and the demands of persistent conflict will require unprecedented agility in our equipping and modernization programs. One example of this agility can be found in our Kiowa Warrior fleet. We are currently maneuvering our fleet of OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Light Helicopters to meet Army and COCOM requirements based on the ARFORGEN model. As Air Cavalry Squadrons return from conflict, their OH-58D helicopters are placed into Reset. Units in Reset have very few aircraft, if any. Because the Kiowa Warrior fleet is short 35 aircraft overall, when the squadrons transition into the Train/Ready Phase of ARFORGEN, they are provided a number of helicopters sufficient to conduct training (25), but less than what they are fully authorized (30). When the units move into the Available phase, they are provided their full complement of aircraft. It is this agility that has allowed Army forces to meet the needs of theater commanders for over eight years of sustained combat.

What do we need? Congress has been very supportive of Army Modernization needs in the past. Their tremendous support has ensured that the Army Soldier is the best equipped and most respected combatant in the world. In order to execute Army Modernization and ensure the continued success of Soldiers and units, we depend on a variety of resources, not the least of which is predictable funding. For fiscal year 2011, we have requested \$31.7 billion for procurement and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) efforts.

Adapting the Institution and Transforming Business Practices

In addition to modernizing our operating force, we are transforming our institutional Army. As required by Section 904 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the appointment of the Under Secretary of the Army as the Army's Chief Management Officer (CMO) has allowed the Army to develop a series of initiatives to adapt the institutional Army and transform our business practices. In accordance with Section 908 of the 2009 NDAA, these efforts will result in the development and implementation of a comprehensive program that establishes a series of measurable performance goals and objectives. Specifically, the comprehensive program will address the following:

- Developing and implementing a business transformation plan focused on running the Army as effectively and efficiently as possible.
- Continuing the Army's business process reengineering activities, led by OSD's Business Transformation Agency.
- Developing an integrated business systems architecture that emphasizes transparency and seamless access to data, and provides timely and accurate information to decision makers.
- Preparing Army leaders to take a greater role in inculcating the Army with a cost-conscious culture.

While the Army transformed its operating force—building versatile, agile units capable of adapting to changing environments—the institutional Army continued to use processes and procedures that were designed to support a pre-9/11 Army based on tiered levels of readiness. To support this new operating force, the Army must have an updated institutional Army—our generating force.

Once the mission is defined, our institutions must seamlessly and continuously adapt—tailoring force packages and quickly adjusting training, manning, and equipping—to ensure units have all of the physical and mental tools necessary to succeed. Institutional agility allows us to adapt to the realities that present themselves. To that end, the CMO and Office of Business Transformation will build upon progress that has already been made toward the Army's institutional adaptation, specifically:

- Improvement of the ARFORGEN process—aligning the generating force and its processes to better support Soldiers, Families, and units within the operating force.
- Adoption of an Enterprise Approach—developing civilian and military leaders who take a collaborative, holistic view of Army objectives and resources to make better decisions for the Army.
- Reformation of the requirements and resource processes—delivering timely and necessary capabilities at best value.

This transformational approach will overlay everything that the institutional Army does, with the unwavering goal of effectively and efficiently providing trained and ready forces to meet combatant commander requirements.

STEWARDSHIP AND INNOVATION

The Army remains devoted to the best possible stewardship of the resources it is provided by the American people through Congress. The establishment of the CMO and initiatives related to the transformation of Army business practices represent the Army's effort to act as a responsible steward. Several other initiatives serve to conserve resources and to reduce waste and inefficiencies wherever possible.

The Army achieved full operating capability of the new Army Contracting Command, Expeditionary Contracting Command, and Mission and Installation Contracting Command in 2009. These organizations are dedicated to ensuring professional, ethical, efficient, and responsive contracting.

Civilians are assuming increased responsibilities within the Army. The Army is recouping intellectual capital by in-sourcing former contracted positions that were associated with inherently governmental functions. In fiscal year 2009, the Army saved significant resources by in-sourcing more than 900 core governmental functions to Army Civilians. We plan to in-source 7,162 positions in fiscal year 2010, and are programmed to in-source 11,084 positions during fiscal year 2011–2015, of

which 3,988 are acquisition positions. These positions were identified in the Army's ongoing contractor inventory review process.

In the Employer Partnership program, the Army Reserve works with public agencies and private employers to leverage their shared interests in recruiting, training, and credentialing highly skilled Citizen-Soldiers. The Army Reserve has signed more than 800 partnership agreements with corporations, state agencies, and local police departments.

Energy security is a key component of Army installations, weapons systems, and operations. The Army has developed a comprehensive energy security strategy, and is acting now to implement initiatives to make us less dependent on foreign sources of fuel and better stewards of our nation's energy resources. In support of these goals, we fielded the largest hybrid vehicle fleet within the Department of Defense. Energy will continue to be a key consideration in all Army activities in order to reduce demand, increase efficiency, seek alternative sources, and create a culture of energy accountability, while sustaining or enhancing operational capabilities.

The Army is committed to environmental stewardship. Through cooperative partner agreements and the Army Compatible Use Buffer Program, the Army protected more than 28,000 acres of land at 14 locations in fiscal year 2009. Through creative solutions, the Army continues to conduct realistic training on its installations while protecting threatened and endangered species on Army lands.

AMERICA'S ARMY—THE STRENGTH OF THE NATION



The professionalism, dedicated service, and sacrifice of our all-volunteer force are hallmarks of the Army—the Strength of our Nation.

Our Soldiers and their Families quietly bear the burdens of a Nation at war. Our Civilians stand with them, dedicated to the Nation and the Army that serves it. Despite the toll that 8 years of combat has taken, these great Americans continue to step forward to answer our Nation's call. In an environment in which we must make hard choices, they deserve the very best we can offer, commensurate with their dedication and sacrifice.

To continue to fulfill our vital role for the Nation, the Army must sustain its efforts to restore balance and set conditions for the future. We have made significant progress this year, but challenges remain. The continued support of Congress will ensure that the Army remains manned, trained, and equipped to protect our national security interests at home and abroad, now and in the future. America's Army—the Strength of the Nation.

ADDENDUM A—THE FISCAL YEAR 2011 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET

The fiscal year 2011 President's budget asks for \$245.6 billion for the Army. This budget, which includes \$143.4 billion for the Base and \$102.2 billion for the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request, is necessary to: support current operations, increase forces in Afghanistan, responsibly drawdown in Iraq, sustain the all-volunteer force, and prepare for future threats.



Amounts requested by major appropriation category in the fiscal year 2011 President's budget include:

Military Personnel

The fiscal year 2011 budget requests \$71.0 billion, a \$300 million increase over fiscal year 2010. Military Personnel funds support Army end-strength requirements for a Nation at war. This includes \$1.2 billion for the temporary wartime increase in personnel, an increase of \$684 million over fiscal year 2010.

This amount funds pay, benefits, and associated personnel costs for 1,110,600 Soldiers: 547,400 Active, 358,200 Army National Guard, 205,000 Army Reserve and funds an active component temporary end strength increase of 22,000.

The OCO request will fund special pays, incentives, and the mobilization of reserve component Soldiers.

Compelling Needs

Support the Army's base endstrength and the temporary end strength increase in fiscal year 2011 to reduce strain on the force.

Sustain authorities and funding of programs in support of wounded, ill, and injured Warriors and their Families as they transition back to duty or to civilian life.

Provide recruiting and retention incentives and benefits to sustain the quality of our all-volunteer force, allow the Army to meet end-strength objectives, and achieve Army standards for recruit quality.

Enable the transition of the reserve component to an operational force by systematically building and sustaining readiness across the force and fund mobilization of RC units to support growing demand.

Operation and Maintenance

The fiscal year 2011 budget requests \$107.3 billion—a \$7 billion increase from fiscal year 2010. Operation and maintenance funds Soldier and unit training; ground and air vehicle operating costs; depot maintenance; base operations, sustainment, restoration, and modernization; and a 1.4 percent Civilian pay raise.

The OCO portion of the request includes \$628 million for the training and sustainment of the temporary wartime increase in personnel—an increase of \$242 million from fiscal year 2010.

The budget request works to restore balance to the force by recognizing \$587 million of enduring requirements for training and depot maintenance in the base rather than in OCO. The base funds home station training for 59 brigade combat teams, 24 rotations through the Army's combined arms training centers, and an increased investment of \$154 million in scholarships, language and individual training. It improves network security; operationalizes the LandWarNet; supports continued development and fielding of administrative systems; and provides funding for improvements in financial audit readiness (as required in NDAA 2009) by requesting an additional \$578 million above the fiscal year 2010 levels for these activities. The base budget also increases funding for facilities sustainment restoration and modernization by \$320 million and includes one-time requests to support BRAC and the transition out of NSPS.

The OCO request will fund the day-to-day cost of the wars, training to prepare units for deployment, force protection, in-theater maintenance and repair, drawdown of equipment from Iraq, and reset of Army Prepositioned Stocks and equipment returning from deployment.

Compelling Needs

Sustain readiness through Soldier and unit training, including realistic, full spectrum training at the Army's three combat training centers.

Fund the reset of 30 brigades, other enabling units, and equipment.

Resource installation services worldwide and support the Army Family Covenant to provide Soldiers and their Families the quality of life they deserve and to enhance the health of the force.

Procurement

The fiscal year 2011 budget requests \$30.3 billion—a \$200 million decrease from fiscal year 2010. Procurement funds the Army's future force equipment requirements; sustains modernization and recapitalization; and fills equipment shortages. The OCO request will fund procurement of weapon systems to replace battle losses, replacement of equipment taken for current operations from the reserve components, and to fill urgent operational needs for deployed forces.

Compelling Needs

Fund the fielding of the first Capability Packages to two more Army brigades.

Enhance Army command and control by providing an initial on-the-move networking capability resident in the Warfighter Information Network—Tactical (WIN-T), Increment 2.

Increase the Army's tactical agility through an aviation modernization strategy that highlights the increasing importance of unmanned aerial systems (ERMP, Shadow and Raven) and rotary wing aviation (AH-64D Block III Apache, UH-60M Black Hawk and CH-47F Chinook).

Improve lethality and precision fires by modernizing the Patriot PAC-3 missile, the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and the Paladin howitzer.

Sustain access to training and war reserve ammunition by restoring stocks and the selective repair, upgrade and replacement of key ammunition production base equipment and facilities.

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

The fiscal year 2011 budget requests \$10.5 billion, approximately the same amount requested last year.

Compelling Needs

Fund Brigade Combat Team modernization including initial Ground Combat Vehicle development and further development of the second set of Capability Packages.

Support Network modernization including continued development of WIN-T increment 2 and increment 3.

Continues the international partnership to develop the Patriot Medium Extended Air Defense systems (MEADS)

Construction, Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), and Army Housing

Fiscal year 2011 is a critical year for BRAC since this will be the final budget executed to meet the statutory deadline for many of the BRAC actions. Fiscal year 2011 will be a particularly challenging year for BRAC as four of our major command headquarters and many of our military schools will be moving to new locations. The fiscal year 2011 budget requests \$7.9 billion—a \$2.5 billion decrease from fiscal year 2010. This funding supports the construction of facilities to support the growth and re-stationing of Army forces. The OCO request will fund construction in Afghanistan.

Compelling Needs

Fund BRAC requirements to meet fiscal year 2011 statutory timelines.

Support construction of new family housing and improvements to existing housing.

Support construction of permanent party and training barracks.

Other Accounts

The Army is the executive agent for a variety of critical functions within the Department of Defense, to include the Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction Program. Funding for this account is \$1.6 billion in fiscal year 2011—a decrease of \$100 million from fiscal year 2010. The Army also has responsibility for the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF), Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), and Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) appropriations. The Army budgets for recurring sustainment costs of JIEDDO with fiscal year 2011 funds at \$200 million—an increase of \$100 million from fiscal year 2010. The OCO Request will fund JIEDDO initiatives. The ISFF and ASFF are funded entirely through the OCO request.

Compelling Needs

Fund the Afghan Security Forces Fund and the Iraq Security Forces Fund to enable building essential security capacity.

Support JIEDDO appropriations and initiatives to combat the most dangerous threat to U.S. forces.

Continue the safe destruction of chemical agents and munitions and the closure activities at selected chemical demilitarization sites.

Restoring Fiscal Balance

Timely and full funding of the Army's fiscal year 2011 request of \$245.6 billion will help ensure the Army is ready to meet the needs of the Nation and continue the process of restoring balance while setting the conditions for the future. Over the last 8 years, the Army has received significant portions of its funding for combat readiness through OCO appropriations. This recurring reliance on OCO funds and an overlap between base and OCO sustainment programs means that the Army's base budget does not fully cover the cost of both current and future readiness requirements. Because of this reliance, a precipitous drop or delay in OCO funding does not fully fund the readiness of our Army for the current conflict. Army continues the orderly restoration of the balance between base and OCO requirements in its fiscal year 2011 base budget request. This request fully funds Army authorized end strength and brings \$965 million in O&M expenses back into the base rather than finance those requirements in OCO.

ADDENDUM B—RESERVE COMPONENT READINESS

Sections 517 and 521 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 1994 require the information in this addendum be reported. Section 517 requires a report relating to implementation of the pilot Program for Active Component Support of the Reserves under Section 414 of the NDAA 1992 and 1993. Section 521 requires a detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard (ARNG), including in-

formation relating to implementation of the ARNG Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (Title XI of Public Law 102-484, referred to in this addendum as ANGCRRA). Section 521 reporting was later amended by Section 704 of NDAA 1996. U.S. Army Reserve information is also presented using Section 521 report criteria.

Section 517(b)(2)(A).—The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared with the promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the Army.

In the Zone	Fiscal year 2008			Fiscal year 2009		
	AC in RC ¹	Percent	Army Average (percent) ²	Percent	AC in RC ¹	Army Average (percent) ²
Major	0 of 1		92.8	56 of 63	88.9	94.1
Lieutenant Colonel	1 of 1	100	89.1	16 of 20	80.0	87.9

¹ Active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

² Active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at the time of consideration.

Section 517(b)(2)(B).—The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared in the same manner as specified in subparagraph (A) (the paragraph above).

Below the Zone	Fiscal year 2008			Fiscal year 2009		
	AC in RC ¹	Percent	Army Average (percent) ²	Percent	AC in RC ¹	Army Average (percent) ²
Major	0 of 4		4.9	2 of 4	50.0	6.0
Lieutenant Colonel	0 of 0		13.5	0 of 1		7.2

¹ Below the zone active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

² Below-the-zone active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

Section 521(b)

1. The number and percentage of officers with at least 2 years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

ARNG officers: 14,760 or 36.3 percent

Army Reserve officers: 19,573 or 59 percent

2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least 2 years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

ARNG enlisted: 85,255 or 26.8 percent

Army Reserve enlisted: 63,311 or 41.6 percent

3. The number of officers who are graduates of one of the service academies and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:

—The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

—In fiscal year 2009, 10 graduates from Service Academies were serving in the Army National Guard to complete their service obligation.

—In fiscal year 2009, 0 graduates from Service Academies were serving in the Army Reserve to complete their service obligation.

—The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

—In fiscal year 2009, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

4. The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Officers' Training Corps graduates and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:

—The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

- In fiscal year 2009, no distinguished Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) graduate was released before completing their active-duty service obligation.
- The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:
 - In fiscal year 2009, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.
- 5. The number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRRA by a combination of (a) 2 years of active duty, and (b) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year:
 - In fiscal year 2009, one ROTC graduate was released early from their active-duty obligation. The officer is serving the remainder of his/her obligation in the ARNG
- 6. The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above first lieutenant, and of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were concurred in by an active duty officer under section 1113(a) of ANGCRRRA, shown separately for each of the three categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRRA (with Army Reserve data also reported).
 - There are no longer active and reserve component associations due to operational mission requirements and deployment tempo. Active component officers no longer concur or non-concur with unit vacancy promotion recommendations for officers in associated units according to section 1113(a). However, unit vacancy promotion boards have active component representation.
 - In fiscal year 2009, 2,223 ARNG officers from units were recommended for position-vacancy promotion and promoted. This number consists of 319 U.S. Army Medical Department, 1,864 Army Promotion List and 40 Chaplains.
 - In fiscal year 2009 the estimated percentage of Unit Vacancy Promotions CPT through COL in which an active component representation was on the state unit vacancy promotion board is as follows:

	Percent
AMEDD	12
APL	10
Chaplain	13

- In fiscal year 2009, 59 Army Reserve officers from units were recommended for position-vacancy promotion and promoted. This number consists of 9 U.S. Army Medical Department, 47 Army Promotion List, and 3 Chaplains.
- 7. The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under section 1114(a) of ANGCRRRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a military education requirement for non-commissioned officers and the reason for each such waiver.
 - In fiscal year 2009, the ARNG had a total of 201 Noncommissioned Officers receive a military education waiver. As of September 30, 2009 all those waiver recipients were eligible for promotion to the next rank, but none have obtained the military education requirement that was previously waived.
 - In fiscal year 2009, the Army Reserve had a total of 331 Soldiers receive a military education waiver. Of these, 124 were SGTs in need of a waiver for Warrior Leader Course (WLC) as a result of being deployed or assigned to Warrior Transition Units (WTU) (Medical Hold or Medical Hold-Over Units) whose medical condition was incurred in direct support of Overseas Contingency Operations and who were otherwise eligible for promotion, if recommended. Furthermore, eligible Soldiers lacking the prerequisite level of military education due to operational deployment conflicts or the inability of the Army to schedule the course, were granted waivers. This included 173 Soldiers who were granted waivers for the Basic NCO Course (Now Advanced Leader Course) and 34 Soldiers who were granted waivers for the Advanced NCO Course (now Senior Leader Course).
 - The Secretary of the Army has delegated the authority for the waivers referred to in section 1114(a) of ANGCRRRA to the Director, ARNG and to the Commander, U.S. Army Reserve Command. A majority of these waivers were approved due to the Soldiers being deployed and/or performing operational missions. Each reserve component maintains details for each waiver.

8. The number and distribution by grade, shown for each State, of personnel in the initial entry training and non-deployability personnel accounting category established under section 1115 of ANGCRRRA for members of the Army National Guard who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment. (A narrative summary of information pertaining to the Army Reserve is also provided.)

—In fiscal year 2009, the ARNG had 61,812 Soldiers considered non-deployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220–1, Unit Status Reporting (e.g., pending administrative/legal discharge or separation, medical non-availability, incomplete initial entry training, officer transition, unsatisfactory participation, or restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under the Lautenberg Amendment).

—In fiscal year 2009, the Army Reserve had 49,330 Soldiers considered non-deployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220–1, Unit Status Reporting (e.g., pending administrative/legal discharge or separation, medical non-availability, incomplete initial entry training, officer transition, unsatisfactory participation, or restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under the Lautenberg Amendment).

9. The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, that were discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the National Guard. (Army Reserve data also reported.)

—The number of ARNG Soldiers discharged during fiscal year 2009 pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the Army National Guard is 141 officers and 15,105 enlisted Soldiers from all U.S. states and territories. The breakdown by each state is maintained by the NGB.

—The number of Army Reserve Soldiers discharged during fiscal year 2009 for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the Army Reserve is 63 officers and 2,910 enlisted Soldiers. Soldiers who have not completed the required initial entry training within the first 24 months are discharged from the Army Reserve under AR 135–178, Separation of Enlisted Personnel. Officers who have not completed a basic branch course within 36 months after commissioning are separated under AR 135–175, Separation of Officers.

10. The number of waivers, shown for each State, that were granted by the Secretary of the Army during the previous fiscal year under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRRA described in paragraph (9), together with the reason for each waiver.

—In fiscal year 2009, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army for the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve.

11. The number of Army National Guard members, shown for each State, (and the number of AR members), who were screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment and, of those members: (a) the number and percentage that did not meet minimum physical profile standards for deployment; and (b) the number and percentage who were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

—The number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment:

—In fiscal year 2009, 242,777 ARNG Soldiers underwent a Periodic Health Assessment (PHA) physical. Of these personnel 18,830 or 7.7 percent were identified for review due to a possible deployment limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

—In fiscal year 2009, 115,133 Army Reserve Soldiers underwent a PHA physical. Of these personnel 21,505, or 18.68 percent were identified for review due to a possible deployment limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards. The fiscal year 2008–2009 increase is most attributable to PHA physicals now being required annually.

—The number and percentage that were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

—In fiscal year 2009, 18,830 ARNG Soldiers were transferred from deployable to nondeployable status for failing to meet medical deployability standards. This number includes Soldiers returning from a mobilization with a new medical condition and reflects an increase in the accuracy of electronic databases.

—In fiscal year 2009, 21,505 Army Reserve Soldiers were considered non-available for deployment for failing to meet medical deployability standards. The

new PHA physicals being required annually may account for the increase in those being found to be non-deployable.

12. The number of members and the percentage total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a medical screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

—Repealed. Public Law 104–106 (NDAA 1996), Div. A, Title VII, Section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

13. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

—Repealed. Public Law 104–106 (NDAA 1996), Div. A, Title VII, Section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

14. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State, over the age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

—Repealed. Public Law 104–106 (NDAA 1996), Div. A, Title VII, Section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

15. The number of units of the Army National Guard that are scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization, and of those units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRRRA.

—Repealed. Public Law 104–106 (NDAA 1996), Div. A, Title VII, Section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1118 of ANGCRRRA.

16. The estimated post-mobilization training time for each Army National Guard combat unit (and Army Reserve unit), and a description, displayed in broad categories and by State of what training would need to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat units (and AR units) in a post-mobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRRA.

—Per January 2007 direction from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) reserve component unit mobilizations are limited to 400-day periods, including a 30-day post-mobilization leave and all post-mobilization training.

—The most significant impact of this policy change is that many training tasks previously conducted during the first 3 to 6 months of mobilization have been identified for premobilization training, and units are training to standard on as many of these tasks as resources permit. Information on the type of training required by units during postmobilization is maintained by First Army. The data are not captured by state.

—ARNG units strive to train in accordance with the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process in order to prepare for operational missions and reduce post-mobilization training time. The ARFORGEN process requires increased resources for company-level training proficiency prior to mobilization. This training generally consists of individual warrior training tasks, weapons qualification and gunnery, battle staff training, and maneuver training. This is followed by theater-specific tasks and higher level collective training to complete the predeployment requirements for the unit's specific mission. The goal for post-mobilization training time for a brigade-size organization is approximately 60 days.

—Post-mobilization training time is contingent upon the amount of certified pre-mobilization training conducted, the type of unit, and its assigned mission. In order to reduce post-mobilization training time, the ARNG has developed programs and products such as the ARNG Battle Command Training Capability, the eXportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC), training devices, and range complexes for our units.

—The combination of programs and products, provide units with the capability to accomplish more during pre-mobilization training and therefore reduce post-mobilization training time.

—The Army Reserve developed the Regional Training Center (RTC) concept in response to the SECDEF decision to restrict RC mobilizations to 1 year. These centers provide the capability for Army Reserve units to conduct training on Theater Specific Required Training (TSRT) to theater standards and conditions. The majority of training is on individual tasks but some collective training is also conducted. Because of certification by unit commanders, most of the training is not repeated in post-mobilization status. Exceptions are for tasks incorporated into other required training events and for convoy operations training.

—The TSRT training is for units that will deploy to theater, including non-rotational forces (MTOE and TDA). Units mobilizing for CONUS based missions do not require this training.

- Each RTC conducts standard rotations throughout the year although each has the capability to adjust training for selected large unit participation. Initially the Army Reserve provided a staff projection to DA that the training would require 17 days, but in actual implementation the training has required 21 days.
- Army goals for post-mobilization training for Army Reserve headquarters and combat support/combat service support units range from 30 to 60 days. Post-mobilization training conducted by First Army typically consists of counter-insurgency operations, counter-improvised-explosive-device training, convoy live-fire exercises, theater orientation, rules of engagement/escalation-of-force training, and completion of any theater-specified training not completed during the pre-mobilization period.

17. A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRA to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies for members and units of the Army National Guard (and the Army Reserve).

- During fiscal year 2009, the ARNG continued to synchronize the use of existing and ongoing live, virtual, and constructive training aids, devices, simulations and simulators (TADSS) programs with the training requirements of the ARFORGEN training model. By synchronizing the use of TADSS with ARFORGEN, the ARNG continues to improve unit training proficiency prior to mobilization.
- To support the training requirements of M1A1 Abrams and M2A2 Bradley-equipped Brigade Combat Teams (BCT's), the ARNG continued the fielding of the Advanced Bradley Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer, which provides full crew-simulations training for M2A2 units, Tabletop Full-fidelity Trainers for the M2A2, and the Conduct of Fire Trainer XXI for M1A1 and M2A2. When fully fielded, these devices, in addition to the Abrams Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer XXI, will be the primary simulations trainers to meet the virtual gunnery requirements of M1A1 and M2A2 crews.
- In order to meet the virtual-maneuver training requirements in the ARFORGEN process, M1A1 and M2A2 units use the Close-Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) and the Rehosted Simulations Network (SIMNET) XXI, in addition to the Rehosted SIMNET CCTT Core. The CCTT, SIMNET XXI, and SIMNET CCTT provide a mobile training capability to our dispersed units.
- In order to train all ARNG units on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of convoy operations, the ARNG is fielding the Virtual Convoy Operations Trainer (VCOT). The VCOT, through the use of geo-specific databases, provides commanders with a unique and critical mission rehearsal tool. Currently, 32 VCOT systems are positioned in the ARNG force to train units on the fundamentals of convoy operations.
- In order to meet basic and advanced rifle marksmanship requirements, the ARNG is fielding the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000). This system is the Army's approved marksmanship-training device. The ARNG is also continuing use of its previously procured Fire Arms Training System (FATS) until EST 2000 fielding is complete. The EST 2000 and FATS are also used to provide unit collective tactical training for dismounted Infantry, Special Operations Forces, Scouts, Engineer, and Military Police squads, as well as combat support and combat service support elements. These systems also support units conducting vital homeland defense missions.
- The ARNG supplements its marksmanship-training strategy with the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS). The ARNG currently has over 900 systems fielded down to the company level. The LMTS is a laser-based training device that replicates the firing of the Soldier's weapon without live ammunition. It is utilized for developing and sustaining marksmanship skills, diagnosing and correcting marksmanship problems, and assessing basic and advanced skills.
- The ARNG has further developed its battle command training capability through the three designated Battle Command Training Centers (BCTCs) at Fort Leavenworth, Camp Dodge, and Fort Indiantown Gap, and the Distributed Battle Simulation Program (DBSP). BCTCs provide the backbone of the program as collective hubs in the battle command training strategy. The DBSP provides Commanders assistance from Commander's Operational Training Assistants, TADSS facilitators, and Technical Support Teams. BCTCs and the DBSP collectively help units in the planning, preparation, and execution of simulations-based battle staff training that augments the Department of the Army-directed Warfighter Exercises and greatly enhances battle staff and unit proficiency.

- In order to provide the critical culminating training event of ARFORGEN, the ARNG has implemented the XCTC. The XCTC program provides the method to certify that ARNG combat units have achieved company-level maneuver proficiency prior to mobilization. The XCTC incorporates the use of advanced live, virtual, and constructive training technologies to replicate the training experience until now only found at one of the Army's Combat Training Centers. The centerpiece of the XCTC is the Deployable Force-on-Force Instrumented Range System (DFIRST). DFIRST utilizes training technologies that allow for full instrumentation of the training area from major combat systems down to the individual Soldier, role player, and Civilian on the battlefield.
 - The most important part of every training exercise is the After-Action Review (AAR). By full instrumentation of the units, Soldiers, and training areas, units receive an AAR complete with two-dimensional, three-dimensional, and video playback of the actual training exercise. This allows Commanders and Soldiers to see what occurred during the training exercise from a different perspective, further enhancing the training experience.
 - The Army Reserve continues to leverage—to the extent resources permit—TADSS into its training program. Implementation of Army Campaign Plan Decision Point 72 continues with establishment of the 75th Battle Command Training Division (BCTD) (Provisional). This division, with five battle command training brigades, employs legacy constructive simulations to provide battle command and staff training to Army Reserve and Army National Guard battalion and brigade commanders and staffs during pre-mobilization and post-mobilization. The concept plan as well as requirements for supporting Army battle command systems and simulations drivers for the 75th BCTD is pending Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) approval.
 - The Army Reserve continues to partner with the Program Executive Office, Simulations, Training and Instrumentation; Training and Doctrine Command agencies; and HQDA to define TADSS requirements for combat support and combat service support units. The 75th BCTD is on the Entity-level Resolution Federation (ERF) fielding plan. The ERF provides a high-resolution (e.g., individual Soldier-level fidelity aggregated to unit resolutions) joint constructive battle staff training simulation.
 - The LMTS and EST 2000 remain essential elements of Army Reserve marksmanship training. LMTS procurement continues, and distribution throughout the Army Reserve force continues to increase. The LMTS has also been adapted to support convoy operations training. In either individual pre-marksmanship training or convoy modes, the system allows the Soldier to use an assigned weapon, as well as crew-served weapons, in a simulation/training mode. EST 2000 systems have been fielded to many Army Reserve Engineer and Military Police organizations to enable full use of its training capabilities by units with high densities of crew-served weapons their at home stations.
 - The Army Reserve also has a number of low-density simulators it employs to reduce expensive "live" time for unique combat service support equipment. For example, Army Reserve watercraft units train on the Maritime Integrated Training System (MITS), a bridge simulator that not only trains vessel captains but the entire crew of Army watercraft. In 2007 the Army Reserve invested in communications infrastructure so that the MITS at Mare Island, California can communicate and interact with another Army MITS at Fort Eustis, Virginia. This provides the capability to conduct distributed multi-boat collective training among all the simulators. Of note, the MITS is also used by U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, and harbor management agencies. Other simulators include locomotive simulators used by Army Reserve railroad units and a barge derrick simulator for floating watercraft maintenance units. Other simulator requirements are being identified in requirements documents.
18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State, (and for the Army Reserve), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system as required by section 1121 of ANGCRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with:
- Explanations of the information: Readiness tables are classified. This information is maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3.
 - Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary's overall assessment of the deployability of units of the ARNG (and Army Reserve), including a discussion of personnel deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with section 1121:
 - Summary tables and overall assessments are classified. This information is maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3.

19. Summary tables, shown for each State (and Army Reserve), of the results of inspections of units of the Army National Guard (and Army Reserve) by inspectors general or other commissioned officers of the Regular Army under the provisions of Section 105 of Title 32, together with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including display of:

- The number of such inspections;
- Identification of the entity conducting each inspection;
- The number of units inspected; and
- The overall results of such inspections, including the inspector's determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of corrective actions.
- During fiscal year 2009, Inspectors General and other commissioned officers of the Regular Army conducted 947 inspections of the ARNG, inspecting 1,403 ARNG units. The bulk of these inspections, 711, were executed by Regular Army officers assigned to the respective States and Territories as Inspectors General. First Army and the Department of the Army Inspectors General conducted 96 of the inspections, and the remaining 140 by the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM); Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC); Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM); and the U.S. Army Audit Agency. Because the inspections conducted by Inspectors General focused on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections were not provided with a pass/fail rating. Results of such inspections may be requested for release through The Inspector General of the Army.
- Operational Readiness Evaluation data for the Force Support Package and expanded separate brigades are unavailable, as inspections thereof were eliminated as requirements in 1997. Data available under the Training Assessment Model (TAM) relates to readiness levels and is generally not available in an unclassified format. TAM data are maintained at the state level and are available upon request from state level-training readiness officials.
- In accordance with AR 1-201, Army Inspection Policy, the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) conducts inspections of regional readiness commands and direct support units within requirements of the USARC Organizational Inspection Program (OIP). Per the Army Regulation, OIPs at division levels and above mainly comprise staff inspections, staff assistance visits, and Inspectors General. Staff inspections are only one aspect by which Commanding Generals can evaluate the readiness of their commands. The Inspector General conducts inspections and special assessments based on systemic issues and trends analysis with emphasis on issues that could impede the readiness of the Army Reserve.
- The Chief, Army Reserve, directed the Inspector General to conduct special assessments in fiscal year 2009 prompted by concerns over systemic issues. One was the Special Assessment of Training Management. Its objective was to determine if units in the Army Reserve were in compliance with Command Training Guidance for Training Years 2008-2010, with emphasis on the execution of weapons training, remedial training, qualification, and ammunition availability. This assessment also encompassed an annual regulatory review of compliance with and effectiveness of the Army Voting Assistance Program, a program of special interest to the Department of the Army. Another was the Special Assessment of the Impact of Army Reserve Equipment Shortages (Funding/Availability/Modernization) and Training with the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), which evaluated training issues due to equipment shortages and the affect it had on our Soldiers' morale.
- The Army Reserve is meeting regulatory requirements through a combination of Battle-Focused Readiness Reviews (BFRRs) and staff assistance visits, with the assistance visits conforming to regulatory requirements of AR 1-201. The BFRR is the tool used by major subordinate Commanders to provide the Army Reserve Commanding General a status on resources and readiness of their commands, and resolve systemic issues/trends in order to achieve continuous improvements in readiness. The Army Reserve conducted 19 BFRRs in fiscal year 2009, while inspecting 65 units. The staff assistance visits were more oriented to a particular topic in the staff proponent's area.

20. A listing, for each ARNG combat unit (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP units) of the active-duty combat units (and other units) associated with that ARNG (and U.S. Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRRRA, shown by State, for each such ARNG unit (and for the U.S. Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment of the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of that National Guard (and Army Re-

serve) unit in accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRRA; and (B) the results of the validation by the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or U.S. Army Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRRA.

—There are no longer ground combat active or reserve component associations due to operational mission requirements and deployment tempo.

—As FORSCOM's executive agent, First Army and U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) for Pacific based Reserve Component units, execute active duty associate unit responsibilities through both their pre-mobilization and post-mobilization efforts with reserve component units. When reserve component units are mobilized, they are thoroughly assessed in terms of manpower, equipment, and training by the appropriate chain of command, and that assessment is approved by First Army or USARPAC as part of the validation for unit deployment.

—Validation of the compatibility of the Reserve Component units with the active duty forces occurs primarily during training and readiness activities at mobilization stations, with direct oversight by First Army, USARPAC, and FORSCOM.

21. A specification of the active-duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (10 U.S.C. 261 note), shown (a) by State for the Army National Guard (and for the U.S. Army Reserve), (b) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned, and (c) by unit or other organizational entity of assignment.

TITLE XI (FISCAL YEAR 2009) AUTHORIZATIONS

	OFF	ENL	WO	TOTAL
U.S. Army Reserve	97	110	8	215
TRADOC	50	3	0	53
FORSCOM	979	2,165	101	3,245
USARPAC	30	49	1	80
TOTAL	1,156	2,327	102	3,593

TITLE XI (FISCAL YEAR 2009) ASSIGNED

	OFF	ENL	WO	TOTAL
U.S. Army Reserve	28	77	7	112
TRADOC	5	5	0	10
FORSCOM	659	2,119	85	2,863
USARPAC	28	53	1	82
TOTAL	720	2,254	93	3,067

—As of September 30, 2009, the Army had 3,067 active component Soldiers assigned to Title XI positions. In fiscal year 2006, the Army began reducing authorizations in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act 2005 (NDAA 2005, Public Laws 108–767, Section 515). Army G–1 and U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) carefully manage the authorizations and fill of Title XI positions. The data is captured at the command level. The actual duty location for each position is not captured down to the state level of detail.

Chairman INOUE. And, may I now call upon General Casey.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY

General CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators. I'll give you my whole statement for the record, and just try to summarize here for you, because of time.

What I'd like to do, Mr. Chairman, is give you a short update on where we are on restoring balance, and then talk briefly about three areas that are priorities for the Army and, I would hope, for this committee, and that's sustaining our soldiers and families, reset, and our modernization efforts.

Now, if I might, just to give you a quick update on balance, I've been saying, since 2007, that we were out of balance, that we were so weighed down by our current commitments that we couldn't do the things we knew we needed to do to sustain this force for the long haul, this All-Volunteer Force, and to prepare ourselves to do other things. And, with you, we have been working steadily at this since 2007.

I will tell you, this budget, this 2011 budget, plus the drawdown in Iraq, gives us the resources and the time to complete the efforts that we began in 2007 to get ourselves back in balance.

Let me just give you an update on some key parameters:

First of all, growth. We completed the personnel growth that President Bush directed in January 2007, late last summer. And that is a huge boost for us. But, even as we completed that growth, it was clear that, for a number of reasons, we needed to continue to grow. And, as you mentioned in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, the Secretary of Defense did authorize us to grow by another 22,000, and we can talk a little bit more about that in the questions and answers.

The second element of balance is probably the most important, and that's "dwell," the amount of time the soldiers spend at home. We have intuitively known that it takes about 2 or 3 years to recover from a 12-month combat deployment, yet we have been returning soldiers to combat in about 12 months, because we've been too small. Well, we've now documented that with a scientific study that we finished last year that shows it takes 2 to 3 years to recover from a 12-month combat deployment. And so it is critically important that we continue to make progress to our dwell goals of 1 year out, 2 years back, for the Active force; 1 year out, 4 years back, for the Guard and Reserve.

Because of our growth and the drawdown in Iraq, even with the plus-up in Afghanistan—and our portion of that plus-up is about 20,000—we will get 70 percent of the Army to our goal of—Active Army to our goal of 1 to 2 by 2011; and 80 percent of the Guard and Reserve to 1 to 4 by 2011. The rest will get there in 2012. So that's critically important for us.

MODULARITY AND REBALANCE

Third element I'd update you on is modularity. And you'll remember, back in 2004, we came to the subcommittee and said we were a cold war Army. We weren't organized into formations that could be organized to deal with the threat that presented itself. We were designed to face a Warsaw Pact threat. And we have been progressing ever since. Well, we are 90 percent of the way through converting all 300 brigades in the Army to modular designs, and we will largely finish that by 2011, which was our goal.

The other element of organizational change is rebalancing. We had a lot of skills that were needed in the cold war, but were not necessarily as needed today. And we've converted over 200 tank companies, artillery batteries, air defense batteries, into civil affairs, psychological operations, special forces companies. So that change has been going on.

So together, modularity and rebalancing—largest organizational change of the Army since World War II, and done while we've been

deploying 150,000 soldiers over and back to Iraq and Afghanistan every year.

Next element of balance, we feel we can get more out of our force if we organize it on a rotational model, much like the Navy and Marine Corps have been on for years. And we're moving toward that, and it'll pay great benefits.

And last, restationing. With the base realignment and closure and the growth, we're moving 380,000 soldiers, civilians, and family members all around the world, here, over the next few years, to complete that. But, the end result will be much better facilities for our soldiers and families.

So, that's an update on rebalancing. With your support, we expect to largely complete what we set out to do in 2007, and be in a much different position by the end of 2011. And this budget is what gets us there. Still got stresses and strains, as the Secretary said, and not out of the woods yet.

Now, if I could, just three quick priorities:

Sustaining soldiers and families. They're the heart and soul of this force. Two years ago, we doubled the amount of money we were putting toward soldiers and family programs. We've sustained that, and this budget continues that effort.

Second, reset. This budget contains almost \$11 billion to reset about 30 brigades worth of equipment. That's, one, absolutely critical to sustaining the operational ready rates in the field in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to the long-term health of the force. And as we come down—draw down in Iraq, all that equipment has to go through the depots and get reconditioned before it's put back in the force. And I worry that people will say, "Yes, okay, we're out of Iraq, we don't need money for reset anymore." That's not the case.

MODERNIZING

And then, last, modernization. As you mentioned in your statement, the FCS—future combat systems—program was terminated. And we have, in this budget, the beginning of a brigade combat team modernization strategy that we believe is both affordable and achievable. And that's based on four elements:

First of all, incrementally modernizing our network. And we do that incrementally so that we can take advantage of continuing growth in information technology.

Second is incrementally fielding capability packages. In the future combat systems, we talked about spinouts, about capabilities that we could put into the force, ahead of the full system. We've refined that concept into capability packages, where we will incrementally put ready capabilities into the force as they're ready, rather than wait for the whole system to be developed.

Third, we've incorporated the MRAP, the mine resistant ambush protected, vehicles into our forces. There's a significant investment in those vehicles, and we've incorporated them into the force. And then, last, this budget includes just under \$1 billion of research and development effort for a new ground combat vehicle. And this vehicle will—is designed as a replacement for the Bradley. It is an infantry fighting vehicle, and it is the first infantry fighting vehicle designed, from the ground up, to operate in an improvised explo-

sive device (IED) environment. And it will become a very important element for us.

I'll close with saying that I share your pride in what the men and women of this Army are doing around the world every day. I couldn't be prouder of them.

And so I'd look forward to taking your questions.

Thanks very much.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you.

Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACK. No, Mr. Chairman, I don't have a statement to make. I would like to put one into the record.

And I certainly thank our two presenters here today. And I look forward to making a couple of questions when my turn comes.

Chairman INOUE. Without objection, your statement will be made part of the record.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK

Mr. Chairman, I thank you and am pleased to attend my first Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense hearing. I welcome Secretary McHugh and General Casey and look forward to your testimonies. On behalf of my state, I would like to thank the Secretary and General Casey for their commitment to the military men and women in Kansas, particularly at Fort Riley and Fort Leavenworth.

The Army faces a number of major challenges covered in the prepared statements of today's witnesses. In particular, however, I would like to focus on the subject of warrior care and our commitment to soldiers and families.

First, I applaud the Army's new Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program, an all-inclusive approach to emotional, social, spiritual, family, and physical fitness, to build resiliency within the Army. Recently the Army began a brain mapping program and I encourage these types of efforts to more fully understand the effect that trauma and injury can have on the functionality of the brain. These efforts could be a huge step in the right direction in suicide prevention and drug and alcohol abuse prevention. I also want to commend the Army for their collaboration with the National Institute of Mental Health on suicide prevention and I look forward to the benefits we as a society can gain from the research and programs the Army implements.

Next, I would note that the budget provides \$1.7 billion to family programs and services and I commend the Army for making these programs an important part of its budget. The Army is built on the backs of the families of its soldiers. I am pleased with the commitment the Army has made to the military family and I encourage the continued investment in support services to these families. The implementation of the Army Strong Community Centers is a needed service for those family members of the Army Reserve who so often do not have a physical base to call home.

In particular, I want to highlight a couple of items worth of additional attention from the Army. First, following the example in Illinois and other facilities, I encourage the Army to look at joint VA/DOD hospitals to streamline care and provide the best medical services to military members, their families, and military retirees. A related issue involves transitioning our active duty soldiers into the VA system. There are several pilot programs that attempt to seamlessly transition active duty soldiers into the VA system but they have had limited success. Obviously, the new electronic medical records will be a huge step in help transition a soldier from DOD to the VA. However, the disability rating system is still too slow and behind the times. I ask that you work closely with the VA to ensure these soldiers are getting the proper care and benefits they are entitled to.

I also want to highlight an emerging problem at Fort Riley, in my state, as well as other Army posts: school overcrowding. Fort Riley is again the home of the headquarters of the First Infantry Division and the combination of that move with other BRAC and Grow the Force decisions has led to a dramatic expansion of this post. I am very proud that the surrounding communities stepped up to the plate to prepare for the thousands of soldiers and family members arriving in the area. But after exhausting their bonding capacity to provide classroom space off-post (which has already been filled), the local communities lack the ability to handle a much

larger than anticipated on-post student population. I know that the Army and the Department of Defense are not usually in the business of school construction, but I also know that Fort Riley is not the only installation facing this problem. Other posts are now or will soon face similar issues, and we have to find a way to make sure these children have a place to go to school.

It is a huge concern in the Fort Riley school district, a top priority of Major General Brooks, who commands the First Infantry Division, and something that I intend to prioritize during the upcoming appropriations process. I hope to learn more from the Army about what can be done to address this concern.

Again, I thank the panel for their time and look forward to hearing how the Army plans to use this budget to meet the needs of our nation's military.

Chairman INOUE. Gentlemen, I have a few questions. I'd like to submit the rest because of the technological nature of the questions. They refer to the Stryker, the cargo ship, and your program on balance.

STRESS ON THE FORCE

But, at this stage, may I ask—as noted by all the witnesses and everyone that has gone to Iraq and Afghanistan, if they would say that the troops are under great stress? And, as such, we have noted suicide rates rising, alcohol abuse, and divorce rates. And you have provided additional mental health providers and launched a suicide prevention education program. Can you give us an update, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. MCHUGH. I can, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate your starting with this question, because obviously it goes to the core of the stress and the pressure under which these brave soldiers have been for the last 8 years, but it also shows, I think, the extent to which it reaches beyond the soldier into the family structure. I think it is one of the most important things we've done—I want to start by giving a tip of the hat to the Chief, and to my predecessor Pete Geren—who helped establish the program called comprehensive soldier fitness.

This is a program that was started to try to provide resiliency training—to provide resiliency trainers to go out, throughout the force. And perhaps the Chief would like to comment further. But it allows people the opportunity, on an anonymous basis, through computer technology, but in a very real way, to find particularly tailored programs to help them cope. And that's a great start.

BEHAVIORAL HEALTH

But we have to get down on the ground on a one-to-one basis. And, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, we're working very hard to try to expand the wide range of programs, including a dramatic plus-up in behavioral health specialists. In fact, now we see, in forward-deployed positions, the availability of behavioral health specialists, which is rated, generally, the ideal of one to every 700 troops. We're actually below that level now, but we're continuing to grow to that. Like what happens in the private sector, of course, growing that cadre of specialists has been a challenge, but I think we're making good progress.

With respect to suicide, the Vice Chief of Staff, General Pete Chiarelli, has taken that under his wing and, I think, has done a terrific job in establishing a way forward to try to provide stress release, to try to keep a better assessment, the pre- and during and

post-assessment surveys that are required now, as mandated by this Congress, for each soldier, so we can, hopefully, identify problems that—as they emerge, to engaging in a pretty revolutionary 5-year longitudinal study, for the cost of \$55 million, with suicide specialists and the National Academy of—National Institute of Mental Health, rather, to try to understand the causes of suicide. The specialists tell us that the exciting thing about this is, they feel it will have application to the factors behind those who find themselves in a position of choosing suicide in the civilian sector, as well.

We will receive reports, on a quarterly basis, to try to make sure that we're implementing hopeful and developing procedures to try to do a better job.

So, whether it's alcohol abuse programs, with more money, more counselors, more availability; mental health; military life; family consultants; people to talk to; people to go to, to try to receive more help—we've taken a very holistic approach to this. We're doing a better job, but, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, the stresses continue, and those stressor indicators, across the board, continue to be troubling to us.

Chairman INOUE. General, would you care to add to that?

SUICIDE

General CASEY. If I could, Chairman Inouye. Frankly, I'm personally frustrated with the effort that we have put on this over the last 3 years, and then particularly over the last year, that we haven't stemmed the tide. And we've increased by about 18 suicides a year since 2004. In this past year, with all the effort we made, we increased by about 20. And as I looked at this over the past years, it was clear that we were shooting behind the target with a lot of these programs. And that's why we instituted the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program, to give the soldiers and family members and civilians the skills they need on the front end to be more resilient and to stay away from suicide to begin with. It's a long-term program, but I think that is the only way that we are ultimately going to begin to reduce this.

And the last thing I'd say is this is not just an Army problem. There was an op-ed in The Washington Post this morning talking about the impact of suicide in society; we all have to go at this together. I think this National Institute of Mental Health study that we've done is going to help everybody.

Thank you.

Mr. MCHUGH. Mr. Chairman, can I add just one point? We know, both intuitively and, as the chief mentioned in his comments, by the findings of the mental health advisory teams that we employ, that the operations and personal tempo—OPS and PERSTEMPO—and the boots on the ground (BOG)/dwell inadequacies are critical, across the board, to all of those stressor indicators, and suicide is primary amongst them. So, as we continue to do a better job on keeping people back home between deployments, we're hopeful that'll have a positive effect on the suicide rates, as well.

Chairman INOUE. I thank you very much.

STRYKER

General, I'd like to ask a few questions on the Stryker. We've been watching media reports from Afghanistan that suggest that these Strykers are quite vulnerable to the explosive devices; and also they suggest that the Strykers' weight may be a bit too heavy to give it the necessary mobility it needs in this Afghanistan theater. What are your thoughts on this?

General CASEY. Well, as you can imagine, Mr. Chairman, we've been watching this very carefully for some time. And, the Stryker Unit that went into southern Afghanistan ran into some pretty heavy IEDs—I mean, hundreds of pounds of explosive weight—and, it did suffer some significant casualties. We've been working very hard on this, over time, to increase the survivability of the Stryker. I will tell you, it is more survivable than the up-armored Humvee and less survivable than the mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP), and we knew that, going in there.

Before we sent it in, we implemented a number of survivability enhancements to the vehicle, and we are in the process of evaluating whether those are enough to operate in an IED environment. We are actually in the process of exploring a V-shaped hull kit, much like we were developing for the manned ground vehicle with the Future Combat Systems Program, that could enhance the survivability of the Stryker against underbelly improvised explosive devices. But, again, we've implemented a range of different options to enhance the survivability.

I'm less concerned about the weight and the decrease in mobility. The Strykers have been remissioned, actually, to a mission of road security that actually takes advantage of the mobility that they provide.

Last thing I'll say is, they served for me in Iraq in an IED environment, and we were not nearly as challenged in that environment as we were in Afghanistan. So, it's still a very important vehicle in an element of our force mix.

Mr. MCHUGH. Well, the only thing I would add is that, as we're finding in these theaters, not all equipment fits in all circumstances. The Stryker, something that I was a big supporter of when I was on the Armed Services Committee, has proven to be enormously effective. It's had 11 successful deployments in these two theaters, and we expect more. In terms of the feedback from the commanders forward-deployed, they view it as a very valuable resource. Can we make it better, more survivable? As the Chief mentioned, we're doing that on a variety of R&D programs. And the V hull—double V hull is preeminent amongst them. But, we think this is a very important program, and we have a great deal of confidence in it.

RECRUITMENT

Chairman INOUE. Mr. Secretary, we'd like to congratulate you on your recruiting program. You have recruited all the numbers you need, and the quality of personnel. My question would be, can you maintain this trend? And are you funded sufficiently?

Mr. MCHUGH. The answer to the first question, sir, is, we hope so, and we're working to try to make sure that happens. General

Ben Freakley, who's the head of our Accessions Command, I think has done an amazing job. But, the most effective thing he's done is to try to recognize that we, in our recruiting and retention efforts, are, to a very significant degree, the beneficiaries of this economy. As Americans, we hope the economy turns around quickly, but that will change the environment in which we send out these recruiters and bring people—young people into the force. And we're trying to prepare and revamp and refigure our efforts and our programs to be prepared for that.

The money, for the moment, is significant. One of the major complaints I had, when I was chairman of the Personnel Subcommittee in the other body, was that we had an up-and-down on recruiting resourcing. And you have to maintain, in my humble judgment, a certain level of consistency to make sure you're not eroding away your base, not eating your seed corn. Now, it's totally appropriate, in this environment, that we cut back on some of the inducements, some of the bonuses we're paying. They're not necessary in this environment. But, we have to maintain that. I'm hopeful we're going to do that, I think we're poised to do it, but we'll have to keep a very close eye on it in the future.

Chairman INOUE. I thank you, sir.

General CASEY. If—Mr. Chairman, if I could.

Chairman INOUE. Yeah.

General CASEY. To your point about stress on the force we measure a lot of things to tell us about whether the force is under stress. And it is. But, also to alert us that we may break the force. Last year, over 260,000 men and women enlisted or reenlisted in the Army, the Army Guard, or the Reserve. That's a very positive indicator of their commitment and their willingness to continue to serve.

Chairman INOUE. Mr. Secretary and General, I'll be submitting for your consideration questions on the brigade combat team modernization, on the future role of the MRAP, the Aerial Scout helicopter; the question on SDS, and the question on joint cargo aircraft.

As you know, we are attending the memorial services for our great friend, and a great patriot, the Congressman from Pennsylvania.

So, if I may, at this stage, call upon Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STRYKER

I'd like to pick up on the area dealing with the Strykers, and so forth, that the chairman was getting into. It's been my understanding, from serving on this subcommittee many, many years, and the Armed Services Committee, before this, when they were developing, you know, the Stryker.

The Stryker has been very good in a lot of areas, as the Secretary alluded to. The question, I guess, now, General Casey, is, How long would it take, if we do go a double V-, or something like that, -shaped hull on the Stryker, to give them the MRAP-like protection, give them more protection? Because our troops need that in Afghanistan. And where are you in that regard?

General CASEY. I can't tell you exactly how long it's going to take—

Senator SHELBY. Okay.

General CASEY [continuing]. Because we're in the early design stages of it. But, we are moving rapidly to get it built, tested, and into the hands of the forces as quickly as we can.

Senator SHELBY. But, from an engineering standpoint, it looks to me, from what I've been briefed on, that that could be a probability, more than a possibility, to do this stuff. In other words, to reequip and make the Stryker more safe.

General CASEY. Absolutely. In fact, as I said, we developed a V-shaped hull kit for the manned ground vehicle, the future combat systems vehicle. So, the technology is out there, and it's available. And, I think it has great promise.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you.

Do you agree with that Mr. Secretary? I know you—you've been a supporter of the Stryker—

Mr. MCHUGH. Yeah—

Senator SHELBY [continuing]. As I have.

Mr. MCHUGH [continuing]. I have, and—although the environment has changed dramatically. That's not a step—

Senator SHELBY. You have to—

Mr. MCHUGH [continuing]. Back—

Senator SHELBY [continuing]. Change with it—

Mr. MCHUGH [continuing]. From—

Senator SHELBY [continuing]. Though, don't you?

Mr. MCHUGH. Yes, you—absolutely, sir.

I think it's worth noting that the manufacturer stepped out and recognized this early on, and has been working—not extrajudiciously, but been working on this and studying it for some time. And, that's a great compliment to them, to recognize they want to keep this platform as relevant and as safe as possible.

I'm optimistic, at this time, that we can field this. We've done it with the MRAP as a start-from-the-ground-up system, we have the Stryker out in the field. I'd like to think, and have enough faith in our engineering capability, that we can pull this off, and do it in a timely fashion.

Senator SHELBY. If we can do that, though—the Stryker has a lot of utility that some of the other vehicles don't have, right?

Mr. MCHUGH. The commanders have told us, time and time again—and I just got back from my 15th visit to Iraq and 4th to Afghanistan—that they like and value this platform.

Senator SHELBY. Yeah. We all do.

General CASEY. If I—sorry. Could I just add—

Senator SHELBY. Yes, sir, General.

General CASEY [continuing]. Something to this, because I think it's important. I mentioned that the ground combat vehicle that we're putting in this budget is the first vehicle designed from the ground up to operate in an IED environment.

Senator SHELBY. That would take—

General CASEY. Each—

Senator SHELBY. That would take the place of the—

General CASEY. The Bradley.

Senator SHELBY. That would succeed the Bradley.

General CASEY. That's correct. But the issues that we're having with the Humvee and the Stryker are all because they were developed not necessarily to operate in IED environments. So, we're adapting as we go.

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to get in the area of the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), if I could, which is very important to the Army and to our soldiers. One issue that continues to be of concern is the Army's ability to continue utilizing unmanned systems when and where our soldiers want to control them. I continue to hear, from our commanders on the ground, about the importance of the Army—of our commanders—retaining control of tactical UAVs. We've been through this before. I know that a great deal of our success in the theater hinges upon this capability, command and control. And I'm pleased that the Army has not lost many of these systems, due, in part, to the fact that the unmanned systems can land themselves.

What I'm concerned about, Mr. Secretary—and I'll bet you've been through this—you and General Casey—is enemies being able to back into these systems, like we saw with the Air Force Predator system last year. Could you describe what the Army is doing to mitigate this threat, if you can talk about it here, and also talk a little about the cyber initiatives that the Army's pursuing in this area? Without getting into classified.

Mr. MCHUGH. I appreciate your sensitivity there——

Senator SHELBY. Yeah.

Mr. MCHUGH [continuing]. Senator. I think I can say, generically—first of all, the Army greatly values, and, as you noted, sir, correctly, the commanders feel very strongly about the Army's need to have these capabilities, particularly at a strategic level. The Army's——

Senator SHELBY. And control, too, isn't it?

Mr. MCHUGH. Yes, sir. The Army is going forward with an unmanned systems program that starts with the extended range multi-purpose (ERMP), which is provided for in this budget, future development, right down to the Raven, which provides command-and-control opportunities for us, as well.

As to what we read about in the press, I think I can say that all the services recognized that potential vulnerability early on, and have reacted very aggressively to it. And, for the moment, we feel comfortable as to the security systems in place. I'd be happy to go into closed session——

Senator SHELBY. Sure.

Mr. MCHUGH [continuing]. And provide you——

Senator SHELBY. Whenever the chairman wants to get into that, sure.

MI-17 HELICOPTER

One last question, Mr. Secretary. The Mi-17 helicopters. The Department of Defense, as you well know, has spent about \$1 billion of funding to noncompetitively purchase nearly 50 Russian Mi-17 helicopters for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. I've expressed to the Secretary of Defense, not to you yet, as well as this sub-

committee, my grave concerns regarding the use of U.S. taxpayer dollars for Mi-17s, based on what we believe are false assumptions, a total lack of requirements and no analysis of alternatives.

The Army has been very involved with the procurement of these helicopters. And until I raised this concern, last fall, it appeared that the Army was completely fine with funneling millions of dollars to the Russians to equip the Iraqis and Afghans, based on nothing more, as we understand it, than the fact that these militaries had once seen an Mi-17 in the area.

I'd like to point out that the Mi-17s have an exceptionally high, as you well know, maintenance requirement, parts and services, and they're not readily available for in theater. And the U.S. trade sanctions, I believe, were violated in the initial procurement.

Finally, it's also my understanding that this platform specifically violates the U.S. Army airworthiness requirements, document AR 70-62. The question—I'm getting to it, Mr. Secretary, slowly—now, that the Army has been designated as the lead service for the Mi-17 procurement and has established a nonstandard rotary-wing program management office, why are there still no requirements or analysis of alternatives to this?

And, if I could, Mr. Secretary, I'd like to just remind the subcommittee—our subcommittee, here—that the 2010 Defense appropriation bill requires a report detailing the current and anticipated demand for Mi-17s for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; the anticipated availability or shortage of additional airframes; the sustainability of the airframe slated for use; an analysis of alternative airframes; and the future cost and funding sources available for procuring Mi-17—C-17s within 60 days of the enactment of the bill. That was 74 days ago, Mr. Secretary. Where are we, here?

Mr. MCHUGH. After 5 months—

Senator SHELBY. That was a—

Mr. MCHUGH [continuing]. In the—

Senator SHELBY [continuing]. Long statement—

Mr. MCHUGH [continuing]. Building, I've had a—

Senator SHELBY [continuing]. I know that.

Mr. MCHUGH [continuing]. Great time to analyze what your question suggests is a very complex problem, Senator. And, I would answer in this way.

First, I would beseech you for the opportunity to sit down with you and to go into—

Senator SHELBY. Absolutely.

Mr. MCHUGH [continuing]. Greater detail.

Second of all, as I—as you stated correctly, and as I think it needs to be further expanded upon, this is a DOD-directed program. The Army has been—as you again correctly noted, been designated the lead agent and administrator on this, but that is to implement DOD policy. The procurement program is intended, and has been explained to me, to meet current and near-term needs on the battlefield. And both the Iraqis and Afghans have seen the Mi-17s. It's been explained to me—

Senator SHELBY. Probably flying around.

Go ahead.

Mr. MCHUGH. It's been explained to me that those pilots—and I know you understand the development of the personnel and the

specialists to serve in both the Iraqi and the Afghan security forces, to actually pilot and to do other specialty military occupational specialists (MOSs), in their ranks, is somewhat strained. But, in the near term, those who have seen it have also flown it and are prepared to operate in those particular platforms.

You're correct, as well, their maintenance scheduled needs are somewhat of high operations tempo, but in complexity they are somewhat simple, in that—and I'm probably the last person in the world to be talking about this, but—in that the mechanics and the opportunities for repair and maintenance are relatively routine.

Having said that, and as a Buy American kind of individual, I think it's totally appropriate, as we go forward, that we continue to assess the program. And at such time as it's appropriate, when perhaps the theater needs growth, we reexamine exactly which way should—we should go in future platforms. But—

Senator SHELBY. Well, that would include alternatives as you analyze the needs, right?

Mr. MCHUGH. As directed by the Department of Defense. And as everybody in theater, including the Iraqis and Afghanistans, get more sophisticated across the board, I assume their needs and their capabilities will expand.

Senator SHELBY. Well, I'd like to meet with you sometime, and we'll expand this a little bit further.

Mr. MCHUGH. I'd be honored to.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you.

Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary, General, good to see you.

Let me start off just thanking you for your work you're doing on the—both the suicide and post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)—traumatic brain injury (TBI)—work. I think it's—one of the startling things to me, when I came in as Congressman, was the number of veterans that we were having in our office and coming by that were having a lot of long-term difficulties from the Vietnam war and era.

And I think one of the things we didn't get on top of was what was happening to them mentally after they came back from combat. And I—boy, I see that thing playing out again, if we don't get on top of it. And, it seems like the military's recognizing that and saying, "No, something's going on here, and we need to get on top of this." Because, otherwise, you're going to get a lot of long-term problems, difficulties. And it's like almost anything, the sooner you get on top of it, the more likely you are to be successful with your options, and the more options you generally have available. So, I really applaud that.

And I also applaud that I think we can find things out, here, that could be helpful to the broader society. Suicide rates in our young people is the third highest cause of death in teenagers. And you're going, "You know, why on Earth is that?" You know, when you live in a great country like this, and opportunities that are here. But, you know, people really develop a thought that there's just no hope. And when they get to that point in time, then options for doing

very drastic, dramatic, self-harmful things grows, and the more likelihood there is that it happens.

You're doing some work on brain mapping studies, that I'm a big fan of, because I think that may teach us what's going on mentally, inside of a person. And the brain is the final frontier for us as a—as an organ. I mean, it's just phenomenal, and it's complex, and we don't understand it very well. But, you guys' work on this could really help us understand a lot of those complex inputs, and how they're processed, and what happens. So, I really want to urge you, and support that effort.

A final thought in this area, my own personal experience and view has been that the resources are available, but it's that there are plenty of resources that are there, but generally when a person gets into this stage, they've blown through most of their relationships. They've blown through, maybe, a spousal relationship, family relationship, friends, and they're on their own now. They're alone in it.

SUICIDE PREVENTION

And that's when you get in trouble, in that if there's a way that we can look at encouraging those, or spotting the people when they start moving to a loner status, I'd—that's, to me, the whole key of it. And that's very hard to do. I think it's on a front-end basis, where we try to encourage the building of more relationships, and be very systematic about it. You know, you've got a buddy program in the military, you're always watching for the guy next to you. If there's a way we expand that, get the volunteer community around these bases, around Fort Riley and places like that to do it; faith communities, very happy to step in and work in a relationship-building setting because I think that, at the core, is where we lose it. It's not technology, it's old fashioned "I care for you." And having somebody there that actually cares for them, and through thick and thin, and when—this is generally when it's getting really thin, and people self-treating places and ways, and I've seen plenty of it. And that's at the core, but what you've got to get at is that relationship building.

So, I really want to support that effort, because I think you can help us out in the broader society, and we need to address it as a military.

I've got two narrow Kansas issues I want to push out to you. And this is, by virtue of the things you've identified here today, this is very small potatoes. So, you can look at it as such. They're important to us. We've got two major Army installations, a number of Guard installations in the State. Fort Leavenworth, Fort Riley, we're very proud of in our State, and we love them. And we really are very appreciative of those installations, those units.

NEW MILITARY/VA HOSPITAL

At Fort Leavenworth, there's not a military hospital there. And I know we've looked at the numbers on this and said, "Well, it's not a size, yet." We do have the disciplinary barracks that's there, we do have a small Veterans Administration (VA) that's there. And I think it may be one, if you look into your future plans, that you may look at and decide a combined military/VA hospital might be

the way to go with this, because it's got a large military community, a large military retiree community. I understand, in Chicago, you've done a combined Army/VA center. And in our future, I think we've just got to be less stovepipe and a lot more interconnected. And I think this may be a classic one where it actually could work pretty well and also fit the disciplinary barracks that's there, too.
[The information follows:]

Recapitalization of the Munson Army Health Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is in the very early phases of planning. The next planning visit is scheduled for March 22–26, 2010 to clarify requirements and determine full replacement costs or program amount. The replacement project will compete in the Department of Defense's Capital Investment Decision Making (CIDM) process for likely programming in the fiscal year 2012–17 Defense Health Program Future Years Defense Plan. While the Army Medical Command and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) have opened dialogue at the local level, the currently developed project that will be presented in this year's CIDM is a modern 175,000 gross square foot replacement Army Health Center. Collaborative efforts between the Army and the VA concerning this project are not ready for consideration in this year's CIDM process.

Senator BROWNBACK. A second issue—and this, again, is a narrow one—at Fort Riley, with bringing the Big Red One back, which we are delighted to have—the community, the area, is just delighted their headquarters is back from Germany. We're busting at the seams on our grade school, middle schools, with the numbers coming back in. And if you can look at if there's any way to help out with that, because we want to make sure we provide a good family experience for these young men and women in uniform, and their families. And we're having difficulty meeting that.

So, as I say, those are small potatoes, relative to the other things.

And overall, I want to commend you for what you're doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. I think this military has performed very, very well. It has been tough circumstance, difficult to do, but I'm really proud of what you're doing. I'm proud of how the military is operating.

Thank you, Chairman.

[The information follows:]

The Army has no specific authority to fund public school construction.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Dorgan.

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary and General, thank you for being here.

Let me ask a couple of questions. First, the issue of the Sky Warriors. I know that my colleague is very interested in that issue, and has been for some while. I have wondered aloud and questioned why we have almost identical programs run by both the Army and the Air Force: Sky Warriors, the Warriors, and the Predators.

DUPLICATION OF SYSTEM

And when I came to Congress, several decades ago, I joined a group then, with Senator Gary Hart, talking about trying to change the procurement process and try to stop the duplication. Because every level of service wants to do everything that everybody else does, and they're pretty successful in making that happen. And as I watched the growth of the Predator and the Warrior program, it looked to me like you've got two branches of the service that have

done exactly the same thing. And I've been enormously frustrated by that.

So, the question is, How will the Army Sky Warrior's UAVs integrate with the 50 Air Force UAV caps that are planned for 2011? I mean, are you working with the Air Force trying to—tell—try to—

Mr. MCHUGH. We are, Senator. In fact, we have been for some time. In fact, I started working with "Buzz" Moseley on UAV employment a couple years ago. It's not only the procurement side of it, it's the employment side of it. And as we sat down, we realized that we were talking past each other a bit. If you look at the levels of war, it was pretty clear to us that the Air Force had the strategic UAV requirement. That was their baby, nothing for the Army in there.

At the tactical level, that was really the Army's purview, because we need to maintain pretty tight control so we can shift them around based on changing tactical situations.

At the theater level, the operational level is where we were bumping up against each other. We worked with the Air Force to build a—we call it a CONOP, concept of operations—that gave the Air Force the higher—not altitude, but the higher-level requirements for the theater commander; and the Army had the lower-level operational requirements for the core commanders. I think we've done a good job of differentiating that. Probably not as much progress on the procurement side, in differentiating that.

Now, we—these ERMP, that are basically enhanced Predators, that are in this budget, 26 of them, are somewhat different than the Predator. But, I ask myself the same question you do, Is it so much different that it ought to be a different program? And could we not gain efficiencies working with one program? And I have not cracked that one with the Air Force yet.

Senator DORGAN. I hope you will, because I have thought there should be an executive agency for UAVs in the Pentagon so that we don't have different levels of service doing the same thing, and duplicating the research, duplicating the management of the program, and so on. I—it is frustrating to see. And I understand that most services want to do everything, and even some things another service is doing. It's been a battle we've fought for 30 years; mostly unsuccessfully, I'm afraid. But, thank you for that answer.

I want to just mention to you that I'm going to ask the chairman, at some point—I've not had a chance to visit with him—but, in this appropriations bill, to include an amendment that will take a new and completely fresh look at whether deciding in LOGCAP to, essentially, contract everything out instead of doing it in the service, whether that has been an effective thing for the country—whether it's producing food for troops, you know, under a contract, or buying towels for troops, or moving water to base. I happen to think that the LOGCAP, and the contracts under LOGCAP, have produced the greatest waste, fraud, and abuse, perhaps in the history of our country. I've done 20 hearings in the policy committee on this. Let me just go through a couple of them quickly.

The contract to provide water to the military bases in Iraq, that contract resulted in nonpotable water at a number of the military bases being more contaminated than raw water from the Euphra-

tes River. And I had the internal documents of KBR that said this was a near miss, could have caused mass sickness or death. Both KBR said it didn't happen and the Army said it didn't happen. And yet, I got an e-mail from a commander, a woman, a physician with the U.S. Army in Iraq, saying, "No. No. I read these things. It did happen. I'm here. I'm treating patients as a result of that non-potable water that is contaminated." And I got the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to do—or the inspector general, rather, to do an investigation. He said, "Yes. In fact, it did happen."

BAD CONTRACTS

And it kind of bothers me that—it bothered me then, and does now, that the contractor said it didn't happen, the Army says it didn't happen, and, in fact, when you investigate, it did happen. The sodium dichromate. We now have the Indiana National Guard and several others testing troops. Again, we had the person who worked for KBR on the site, who was a safety inspector, said he warned the contractor. Contractor denies all these issues.

Electrocutions, you're well familiar with. The contractors work on providing electricity. And wiring had to be redone, and we found massive mistakes. Soldiers have died. Mr. Maseth died, taking a shower, because of incompetence, hiring third-country nationals, that could barely speak English, to do the work.

A man showed up, who worked in Saudi Arabia, who was doing part of what the Army used to do, he was ordering the supplies. He was ordering towels. And he held up a towel, he said, "Here is a towel I was going to order. My boss said no, that towel is not the one to order, I want you order this towel. It has our company logo on it." He said, "Well, that'll cost three to four times more." His boss said, "Doesn't matter. I mean, this is a cost-plus contract. We're going to make more money." So, he ordered the towel with the logo.

And the list goes on and on. I mean, 22-year-old Mr. Diveroli gets \$300 million in contracts. He's a 22-year-old president of his dad's shell company, and he hires a 26-year-old masseuse as a vice president, and gets \$300 million in contracts.

I had the head of your Army Sustainment Command in my office, and we had quite a talk. He said, "You know what? I'd do the same thing today, knowing what I knew then." I said, "Well, then you wouldn't—if I were running the Army, you wouldn't remain in my Army."

But, all of those things suggest to me that there's been something fundamentally broken in the procurement process, in the contracting process. In some cases, we even have contracted out contractors to supervise other contractors. I know some of that's now going to change.

I'm going to ask that we include an amendment, in this year's bill, to take a fresh look at all that's been done and evaluate if there is a better way to have done that, perhaps bringing some of those functions back into the Army? But, give me your assessment of all that, General Casey, and perhaps Secretary McHugh.

RESPONSE TO BAD CONTRACTS

General CASEY. Well, first of all, I think your efforts have shined the light on some things that needed a light shined on them. And all those things that you said, happened. But, I think we have learned from them, in advance. I mean, we're not where we were 3 years ago, with contracts today. We actually—Pete Geren, in 2007, had an independent assessment of our contracting capability, and it was striking how much work we had to do. And since we've set up an Army Contracting Command with an Expeditionary Command and a Mission and Installations Command, and we have more than doubled the number of trained contractor representatives that are out there to supervise these contractors. And we're actively training soldiers in units before they deploy to give them the skills they need to do some of the oversight that was clearly missing in the cases that you saw.

My sense is, your call to re-look this is timely. And it—I'm not sure how much of this is folklore, but when I talk to folks about this, what they tell me is, when we took the Army down, back in the late 1980s early 1990s, from 780,000 to 480,000, some—the mitigation for that was to be able to go to contractors to the logistical support. And way back then, they did—I'm sure they did cost-benefit analysis and costed the cost of a logistics soldier out over the lifecycle of the soldier, and they figured it was going to be cheaper to do contract for some of those logistical tasks. I think it's high time that we go back and see if those assumptions are still valid.

CONTRACTING CAPABILITY

Mr. MCHUGH. Let me echo the Chief's comments to you, Senator. And having served a number of years, and watching your efforts while I was in Congress, and a big fan of the military and the Army, I deeply appreciate it. And I think I can speak with some validity in saying that so do the men and women in uniform and their families.

I agree with the Chief. We have taken steps to try to do the best we can within the framework that is provided. As you know, we're transitioning to a LOGCAP IV that is different. I don't want to suggest, at this early date, it is perfect, but it does do away with the sole-source and range of potential abusive practices that LOGCAP III did, but it may not be the perfect answer. And I assure you, the Army will administer and implement, to the best of its ability, whatever oversight structure that this Congress, in its wisdom, decides to place before us.

I agree. Your final comment was about insourcing. We went far—too far, in my humble judgment. And I was part of the Armed Services Committee that supported those outsourcing initiatives that, perhaps well-intended, I think had difficult results. We've already re-brought into house, insourced, some 900 core capabilities that have provided the Army and the taxpayers \$41 million in savings and, I would argue, better oversight. And we have an objective that is, in large measure, supported in this budget, to, by the end of 2015, insource to the Army another nearly 4,000.

Chief mentioned our efforts at the brigade and battalion level to provide well-trained and more sufficient numbers of CORs, contract oversight officers, and we're going to continue to do that.

But, my experience has been, there's always a better way; the challenge is to find that. And to the extent we can be supportive in that search, we want to do that.

Senator DORGAN. I know that the chairman wants to end the hearing; I think we have another engagement. But, I—let me just make one final point.

First of all, thank you for your answers. I described some negatives; there are many, many positives. And I finished reading a book recently, and I think the title was "A Soldier's Life," and it is an extraordinary book about what soldiers do every day, and what our military does every day. And while I talked today about my concerns of some things, let me add what I'm sure you've heard from my colleagues, we are enormously grateful for the work both of you do on behalf of a lot of people today who got up this morning to face danger on our behalf. So, General Casey, thanks for your long service. Secretary McHugh, I'm glad you're where you are.

And thank you very much.

Chairman INOUE. I thank you very much, Secretary McHugh and General Casey, for your testimony.

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

I have two questions here, submitted by Senator Cochran, who cannot be with us, so I will submit them for your consideration.

We look forward to working with you in the coming months. And I can assure you that we will do our utmost to make certain that the men and women in uniform are given whatever is needed to make certain that their service to our country is not only one that our Nation would appreciate, but it will be good for them. And I commend you for the effort being made now to look into matters, such as stress, which is very important.

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN DANIEL K. INOUE

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (BCT) MODERNIZATION

Question. Secretary McHugh, the Army's Future Combat Systems program, FCS, has been terminated and replaced with a program to incrementally field many of the technologies that were developed under the FCS program. However, a recent Limited User Test showed that despite an investment of almost \$21 billion in the last 7 years, many of these technologies are unreliable and do not work as intended. This raises serious questions about the acquisition strategy pursued by the Army for FCS. What lessons has the Army learned from its FCS program acquisition strategy and how will you incorporate them into future Army acquisition programs?

Answer. After cancellation of the FCS program, the Army conducted an analysis of requirements based on the lessons learned from the last 8 years of war. We retained the family of systems knowledge base acquired during the FCS program as well as technologies related to the network, and unmanned/ground vehicles developed during the program. This analysis will now support the BCT Modernization Strategy.

We found that modeling, simulations and scenarios depicting FCS capabilities and operations became increasingly complex over time, which resulted in fewer scenarios

that limited our ability to analyze across a wide range of relevant operating conditions. A key lesson learned from this experience was that the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) was contracted to produce analytical deliverables that were duplicative of what the Army was doing and that were more advocacy than analysis. These products were therefore of questionable value. Additionally, during critical early program stages, the unique technical expertise and capabilities resident within the Army were not leveraged by the Program Manager/LSI team, especially for platform survivability and the network. The Army has moved away from the LSI model and restructured the contract, establishing a Prime Contractor to deliver Increment 1 capabilities to our Brigade Combat Teams.

While retaining the effort to integrate, develop and field capabilities as a system, the Army is also fully embracing competition and Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2 to support our BCT Modernization strategy. For example, the Ground Combat Vehicle program will be competitive beginning at a Milestone A and using best practices, including competitive prototyping through its acquisition process.

Further, FCS did not adequately revalidate operational concepts at regular intervals to address lessons learned or reassess technology development. The BCT Modernization Plan will focus on technologically feasible and affordable solutions, address lessons learned, allow for incremental technological development, and have appropriate mitigation plans in place. For example, the Army will field Increment 1 capabilities only when they are mature and will structure the program to allow for technological upgrades and refinements even during the fielding process.

Early in development, the Army decided to let Soldiers test and evaluate the systems through the Army Evaluation Task Force. As a result, Soldier feedback has played a key role in optimizing designs throughout the development phase—ultimately leading to a better end product. Increment 1 capabilities are now in their third year of the 4 year test cycle.

FUTURE ROLE OF MRAP VEHICLES

Question. Secretary McHugh, a success story from the wars has been the rapid development and fielding of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles, “MRAPs”. The Army has taken receipt of 12,000 MRAPs and has a requirement for about 5,800 light-weight MRAPs. But despite the MRAP’s unquestioned success, I get the feeling that these vehicles are treated like the “ugly step-child”. The Army has no funded plan to integrate them into its force structure, and you are developing another tactical vehicle that won’t deliver for several years.

Mr. Secretary, given the difficult fiscal times and Secretary Gates’ guidance to focus on the 80 percent solution that can be provided immediately instead of developing gold-plated exquisite systems that don’t show up for years to come, what is the future role of MRAPs in the Army?

Answer. The Army has developed an allocation plan for MRAPs as they return from theater. This plan, and associated courses of action, was briefed to the Under Secretary of the Army (USA) and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) on December 22, 2009. The plan included placing MRAPs in task organized sets, select units, and the training base. The USA and VCSA directed the proponents to conduct a detailed cost benefit analysis on two courses of action for task organized set placement. The results of this cost benefit analysis will be presented to the USA and VCSA on March 25, 2010.

ARMED AERIAL SCOUT HELICOPTER

Question. The fiscal year 2011 budget continues to modernize Army aviation units at a rapid pace. However, one key program, the replacement of the aging Kiowa Warrior helicopter, has been set back by the failures of the Comanche and the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter.

The Army is conducting new studies on how to replace the Kiowa Warrior and the studies are reportedly examining new concepts of “teaming” helicopters with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). However, it is not currently known how many years it will be before a prototype Armed Aerial Scout helicopter will fly.

Secretary McHugh, the Secretary of Defense has warned about the dangers of pursuing exotic and costly weapons systems, while ignoring the 80 percent solution. Do you feel the Army is taking the right approach to the Armed Aerial Scout helicopter?

Answer. In July 2009, the Defense Acquisition Executive directed the Army to conduct an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to meet Armed Aerial Scout capabilities and to determine a replacement for the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior. This AoA will determine the appropriate materiel solution(s) to address any capability gaps and meet Army requirements. The base for analysis is the current Kiowa Warrior, but

the review will also include ongoing improvements to the Kiowa Warrior as an option. The AoA will be conducted in two non-sequential phases with the preliminary results completed in December 2010 and final results published in April 2011.

On April 14, 2009, the Secretary of the Army approved a strategy to reinvest in the Kiowa Warrior helicopter to address obsolescence and sustainment issues until a viable replacement is ready. The strategy includes a funded ACAT II program called the Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade Program (CASUP). The CASUP addresses obsolescence, safety and weight reduction so the aircraft performs better in the current combat environment. The Army expects to sustain the Kiowa Warrior until 2025.

ARMY FUNDS RUNNING OUT IN FISCAL YEAR 2010

Question. In fiscal year 2010, the Department of the Army was appropriated \$141 billion in baseline funds and an additional \$78 billion for an entire year of Overseas Contingency Operations. When the budget request was submitted last month, it included a fiscal year 2010 supplemental to send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan. Much of those expenses are for Army operating costs and in total, the Army's request to support the new policy is \$20 billion. Secretary McHugh, with the current resources available to the Army in fiscal year 2010, how far do you think you can make it into the fiscal year before running out of funding?

Answer. A critical portion of the fiscal year 2010 supplemental request is the Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) funding for increased operations in Afghanistan. Because OMA comprises the majority of the Army's funding, this account becomes the measure by which we project a run-out date at the end of June, beginning of July. Passage of the supplemental prior to Memorial Day would make funds available in June, and would minimize the risk of impact on theater operations, base operations support, readiness and family programs. It would enable the Army to maintain required execution flexibility across all appropriations.

JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT

Question. Secretary McHugh, I have a couple of questions on the C-27 Joint Cargo Aircraft—the plane that will replace the Army's fleet of C-23 Sherpas. Last March, the Congress was told that the Army needed 54 of the 78 aircraft planned for procurement. In May, the Department announced that it would procure just 38 aircraft, less than half the number in the original plan, and transferred management to the Air Force. Has your staff reviewed the analyses which produced the lower requirement and are you satisfied that the Army's lift needs will be satisfied with the planned buy of 38 aircraft?

Answer. The Army has a validated requirement for 75 cargo aircraft, per the Joint Cargo Aircraft Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) and addendum. Office of the Secretary of Defense Program Analysis and Evaluation (OSD PA&E) completed a sufficiency review validating the Army's acquisition objective of up to 75 aircraft. The Army's initial procurement was for 54 Joint Cargo Aircraft (C27J). However, in April 2009, the SECDEF directed the Joint Cargo Aircraft (C27J) program be transferred from a joint Army led program to a single service Air Force program. He further reduced the initial joint procurement from 78 aircraft (54 for Army and 24 for Air Force) to 38 aircraft. The SECDEF has directed that the lift requirements be met by the Air Force, leveraging their entire fleet mix.

TACTICAL RADIOS

Question. Secretary McHugh, the Army successfully incorporated commercial radio technology into the Joint Network Node system in the last decade. Is the Army planning to leverage other commercial technologies as part of the Joint Tactical Radio System? In particular, has Army looked at commercial technologies to meet the wide band networking requirements?

Answer. The Army has leveraged commercial technologies to fill urgent operational capability gaps; however, there are no commercial alternatives to the JTRS programs that meet all the Joint Service requirements. Commercial off-the-shelf alternatives may offer an attractive up-front price over the JTRS programs; however, they only provide limited solutions and potentially make it more difficult for the DOD to achieve interoperability of our joint secure communications.

Question. Secretary McHugh, what is the Army's position on fielding additional AN/PRC-117G radios to meet contingency needs?

Answer. In certain situations and missions, forces in contingency operations have expressed urgent operational requirements for a wideband networking radio capability. The Army Staff is currently analyzing each request carefully to determine the proper materiel solution for validated requirements. In some cases, the AN/PRC-

117G is the best solution available to satisfy these needs. The Army has sufficient stocks of AN/PRC-117G on hand to meet all known contingency operations requests, and plans to resource/field any approved requests from these stocks only. The Army is not currently planning to purchase additional AN/PRC-117G to meet contingency needs. The preferred approach is to accelerate Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) capabilities, wherever possible, to satisfy wideband networking radio requirements.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

ARMY GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT

Question. How much funding is included in the President's fiscal year 2011 for Army Guard and Reserve Equipment? How does this compare to the relative size of the Army Guard and Reserve compared to the active duty Army? Does the Army support a separate budget line item that annotates equipment procurement for the Guard and Reserves? Wouldn't this provide greater transparency?

Answer. Funding requested for equipment procurement is as follows: \$15 billion (76 percent) for the Active Component (AC); \$3.6 billion (18 percent) for the Army National Guard (ARNG); and \$1.1 billion (6 percent) for the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). There are some deviations of funding versus size (based on requirements). However, a more telling comparison is requirements versus equipment on hand, which shows that we are funding to increase readiness in all components equally.

The Army does not support a separate budget line item, as it would limit the Army's fiscal flexibility, which is required in a constantly changing world.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has provided the Services with implementation instructions on how to attain transparency. The instructions direct the Services to provide component-level funding data for the AC, ARNG, and USAR on annual budget exhibits. The Army has complied with this by providing the data on the P-40 (Budget Item Justification) and the P-21 (Production) budget exhibits for both the fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 budget requests.

The DOD instructions also direct the Services to provide quarterly reports that track the execution of Reserve Component funding and procurement. The DOD intends to provide those reports to Congress on a semiannual basis. The Army fully supports and is in compliance with the DOD implementation instructions and has provided the required reports for fiscal year 2009 and 1st Quarter fiscal year 2010.

DIRECTOR OF THE ARMY GUARD

Question. In what stage of the nomination process are we for the position of the Director of the Army Guard? When can the Senate anticipate receiving a new nominee for this position?

Answer. Currently, the Army and the National Guard are in the selection phase of the nomination process. The Senate can anticipate receiving a nominee as soon as the selection phase is complete, which is estimated to be within a few weeks.

HOMELAND RESPONSE FORCE

Question. How will the Department of Defense organize Emergency Management Assistance Compacts between the state that owns a Homeland Response Force and the other states in the region that share it? Under what emergency circumstances would you envision Federalizing the Homeland Response Force and taking command and control away from the Governor in favor of U.S. Northern Command? Was the decision to establish the Homeland Response Forces made jointly by DOD and DHS?

Answer. Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMACs) are arranged and entered into by the states and territories in order to provide mutual assistance and support of one another. They are not compacts with the Department of Defense.

The Department is drawing on existing National Guard forces to build a Homeland Response Force (HRF) in each of the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions. Creation of HRFs within the existing National Guard force structure recognizes the need for increased Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) response capabilities and capacity in the event of catastrophic CBRNE incidents. It also takes into account the operational experience states and territories have in supporting each other using National Guard forces in either State Active Duty (SAD) or Title 32 statuses.

As is the case for the states that currently maintain National Guard CBRNE Enhance Response Force Packages (CERFPs), the Adjutant General of the state or territory that gets an HRF agrees in writing that the HRF is a national response capability, which can be employed outside of the state to provide support within the

FEMA region or in other FEMA regions, as necessary. The 17 existing CERFPs are employed in state, out of state, regionally and nationally to respond to CBRNE incidents regardless of the unit's location.

The HRF will have the same early, life-saving capabilities of the CERFPs (e.g., Search and Extraction, Decontamination, Emergency Medical, and Command and Control (C²)), as well as security and Brigade level C² for synchronizing multiple CBRNE units. Each HRF will have approximately 566 personnel.

States generally have jurisdiction over the welfare of their citizens. However, in many circumstances the President, by law, has preeminent jurisdiction to handle certain incidents (e.g., terrorism, most nuclear or radiological events and/or environmental impacts). He or she also may have the political/moral obligation to assist regardless of the nature/size of incident. Accordingly, it is essential to facilitate a unity of effort as Federal forces integrate with ongoing State responses.

The HRF is designed to be employed in SAD or Title 32 statuses. Only in an extreme situation, such as a state's incapacitation to govern and/or control the emergency situation (continuity of government/continuity of operations), is it possible that the President would Federalize the HRF and place it under the command and control of the Commander, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).

Historically, over 90 percent of all incidents are handled at the local level; approximately 6 to 8 percent involve state level engagement, and an even smaller percentages have a Federal response. As such, the Department does not envision the likelihood of placing the HRF into a Title 10 status under the command and control of USNORTHCOM. However, USNORTHCOM will command the follow-on CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF) when requested to augment the consequence management efforts of State and local first responders, National Guard forces and Federal agencies by providing complementary and unique capabilities when the effects of a CBRNE event exceed their capabilities.

The Department of Homeland Security participated in both the initial consequence management study and observed the Quadrennial Defense Review. FEMA provided information about Federal, state, and local consequence management capabilities for inclusion in the consequence management study. State involvement, in the form of the Adjutants Generals, was facilitated by the National Guard Bureau.

TITLE 32 LINE ITEM

Question. In each of the past several years, the Department of Defense has paid for Title 32 funding requests for domestic disaster relief missions as requested by State Governors and approved by the Secretary of Defense. Naturally, paying for these much needed operations out of regular Army Operations and Maintenance accounts shortchanges other programs. Does the Army have plans to create a Title 32 line item in its Operations and Maintenance accounts? If not, why not? If such a line item already exists, please provide the identification numbers used in the Army budget justification documents.

Answer. Under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 106-390, October 30, 2000, DOD may be required to provide assistance to Federal agencies and state and local governments in response to major disasters or states of emergency declared by the President.

In fiscal year 1990, Congress established the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) to reimburse DOD for providing disaster or emergency assistance to other Federal agencies and to state and local governments in anticipation of reimbursable requests. The Treasury index symbol for the DERF is 97X4965 and was initially funded at \$100 million. The purpose of DERF is to allow DOD to provide disaster and emergency relief assistance in response to natural or manmade disasters without depleting the funds it needs to accomplish its mission. DOD Financial Management Regulation (DODFMR), Volume 12, Chapter 6 provides for the policy and procedures governing the Defense Emergency Response Fund.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATTY MURRAY

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Question. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the National Guard and Reserves have been called upon to support the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite their dedicated service they often come home to hardships, especially in the current economy. In the state of Washington, National Guard unemployment is over 14 percent vice the 9.5 percent unemployment rate statewide. In the last year there have been seven suicides with 70 percent of those tied to the Guardsman's financial situation. 2,100 Washington National Guardsmen live at or below the poverty line as a

result of their employment situation. I am concerned for these soldiers mental and emotional well-being as they are returning from serving their country to possible unemployment and financial instability instead of a happy family reunion. What is the Army doing across the nation to help these National Guard and Reserve soldiers and their families when they return from deployment to financial hardship?

Answer. The Army Reserve Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program (YRRP) provides information, services, referral, financial planning and assistance, and other proactive outreach programs to Soldiers of the Army Reserve and their Families through all phases of the deployment cycle.

The goal of the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program is to prepare soldiers and families for mobilization, sustain families during mobilization, and reintegrate soldiers with their families, communities, and employers upon redeployment.

When a soldier or family member contacts the Army Reserve Family Programs Office for financial counseling or assistance, the staff will support the soldier or family member by providing the appropriate assistance and/or connect them to community resources based on individual needs. Local Army Reserve Family Programs personnel also provide referrals to professional financial counseling services for deploying soldiers and their family members.

In-person financial counseling is now available in most locations through Military OneSource in partnership with National Foundation for Credit Counseling (NFCC). NFCC provides financial education and counseling services at hundreds of local offices nationwide. Military OneSource arranges for soldiers and family members to meet face-to-face with a financial consultant in their community. This program is specially designed to provide short-term, solution-focused financial counseling for service members and families, who may be experiencing a financial setback. Up to 12 counseling sessions per issue, per calendar year are allowed for each National Guard or Reserve soldier (regardless of activation status) and families located in the continental United States. For those unable to attend in-person counseling or who are in locations where in-person counseling is not available, Military OneSource will provide telephone consultations.

Additional assistance for returning Reserve Component soldiers is available through the Employer Partnership Office portal. The U.S. Army Reserve created the Employer Partnership Office (EPO) of the Armed Forces with the goal of assisting soldiers and family members with access to employment when they return from deployment. Launched in 2007, the program expanded in 2009 to include the Army National Guard.

EPO regularly participates in Yellow Ribbon Reintegration events, job fairs, Wounded Warrior events and visits to units to advise soldiers and family members of the hundreds of thousands of jobs available to them. Through EPO, service members have access to more than 500,000 jobs listed by nearly 1,000 employers who have partnered with EPO. Additional assistance includes personal contact with EPO's Program Support Managers who serve as caseworkers, advising service members not only about employment listed on the EPO portal, but about in-kind services offered by many of our partners and military service organizations. Services include mentoring and career development, job counseling, resume writing assistance, how to negotiate salaries, how to dress for success, tips on how to succeed in positions which are competitive and how to find jobs that compliment their military service.

Question. How has this affected the readiness of our National Guard and Army Reserves?

Answer. Financial hardships, caused by possible unemployment for redeploying Reserve Component (RC) Soldiers, have not had a measureable impact on readiness. During the beginning OIF and OEF, RC readiness did decline. With the implementation of the ARFORGEN model and the additional resources provided by Congress for RC units, however, overall readiness has been steadily improving since early 2009.

Question. How is the Army assisting these soldiers to improve their job skills to make them relevant and competitive in the current job market?

Answer. In addition to the highly valued skills Soldiers learn in the military, the Army has a number of programs to assist Soldiers as they transition into the civilian workforce. One of the newest, and most innovative programs is the Employer Partnership Office (EPO) launched in 2007 by Lt. Gen. Jack C. Stultz, Chief, Army Reserve. The program was designed as a collaborative effort between employers and the Army Reserve to provide a continuum of career for our service members. In July 2009, the Army National Guard joined the EPO. Currently nearly 1,000 companies have signed non-legally binding memorandums of agreement with the EPO. Many of our partners are Fortune 500 and Fortune 1000 companies; others are nonprofit organizations who contribute in-kind support to our service members as they transition into or back to the civilian job market.

Through EPO, service members have access to program support managers and business partners who can assist with resume writing in order to capture the skills and talent these men and women earn while they're serving in the military. Other services include interviewing skills and how to dress for success. EPO program support managers can identify partners who offer internships and apprenticeships or offer assistance with relocation or continuing education. EPO also regularly briefs Soldiers and families at events such as Yellow Ribbon reintegration events, Veterans events, Wounded Warrior events, job fairs and briefings to individual units. Many of the skills that reside in the Reserve Components are shared skills Soldiers use in their civilian employment such as the medical field, transportation, city planning, management and military police. Due to these shared skills, through the EPO, we are currently developing pilot programs that would provide cross-training opportunities. One such program to be unveiled in the coming months represents a partnership between a major American automotive manufacturer and EPO to offer RC Soldiers an opportunity to train on the manufactures' fleet training package. In the second phase of this pilot, the partnership will embed Soldiers in industry to train as mechanics on hybrid vehicles before hybrid vehicles are used on the battlefield. Additionally, we are reviewing ways in which a Soldier can earn credit towards a Commercial Drivers License (CDL) while learning to be a truck driver.

FAMILIES

Question. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, I applaud your efforts in making the families of our soldiers a top priority. Family readiness and support is crucial for the health of the Army. The health, mental health and welfare of Army families, especially the children has been a concern of mine for many years. This also includes education, living conditions, and available healthcare. How are you meeting the increased demand of healthcare and mental health professionals to support the families? If not, where are the shortfalls?

Answer. The Army listens to Family members who want easier access to care. Attempts to improve access to care include two new Army programs associated with the new Child, Adolescent and Family Behavioral Health Proponency (CAF-BHP). The CAF-BHP focuses on two new innovative clinical programs to bridge the access gap: School Behavioral Health and Child and Family Assistance Centers (CAFAC). Breaking tradition, the School Behavioral Health program proactively brings care to the children rather than requiring them to travel to the clinic in the military treatment facility. Similarly, the Military and Family Life Consultant program provides care closer to where Soldiers work and Families live. Clinicians provide short-term, situational, and problem-solving consultation services outside the walls of the clinic, which breaks down some of the traditional barriers to care. The CAFAC is a model designed to be established at the installation level. The CAFAC brings together under one "roof" all the services on an installation providing for Army Families who are experiencing the stress of multiple deployments. This model creates a single point of entry for family members seeking help, thus allowing for more effective triage and efficient allocation of behavioral health resources while increasing access to care and reducing the associated stigma.

However, due to the national shortage in Child Psychiatry, shortfalls remain and we are having difficulty filling the numerous Child Psychiatry provider vacancies throughout the Army. As a result of these shortages, some locations experience an inadequate number of therapists to help Families during the deployment cycle. The Army is continuously working to improve both military and civilian provider recruitment and retention. Recent incentives, including bonuses and relocation allowances, aid in these efforts.

Question. What improvements have been made with respect to the children of soldiers and meeting their special requirements? What programs have you implemented to assist the children of servicemembers with coping with frequent deployments, re-integration, and other stresses of military families?

Answer. The health and welfare of our children is tremendously important to the Army, and we recognize the difficulties frequent deployments cause. As a result, the Army has taken great strides by creating and bolstering numerous Child, Youth, and School Services infrastructures, programs and services to help our children cope with the full spectrum of the deployment cycle.

Army Families receive reductions in child care fees during the deployment cycle and Child Development Centers have extended operating hours. They offer many options to support Family Readiness Groups and the Chaplains' Strong Bonds program. No-cost respite child care has increased from 5 to 16 hours per child, per month.

Operation Boots On and Operation Boots Off help children understand and prepare for their parents' deployment and redeployment. Child Behavioral Health Consultants are embedded in our programs to provide social, emotional, and behavioral support for both children and staff. Military Family Life Consultants provide non-medical, short term, situational, problem-solving counseling services in schools with high military-connected populations. Army School Liaison Officers serve as advocates for military-connected students and assist them through school transitions and with school-related issues. Academic support services help students compensate for parental absences with on-post homework centers, and 24/7 online tutoring support for students regardless of where they live.

Army-sponsored Community Child Care Programs such as Operation Military Child Care and Military Child Care in Your Neighborhood provide fee assistance to geographically dispersed Families to reduce out-of-pocket child care expenses. Operation Military Kids coordinates networks of citizens and organizations in every state to support military children impacted by deployment.

Detailed information about these programs is available at the Army OneSource website, www.mymilitaryonesource.com.

Question. Jobs have also been a concern of military spouses of deployed soldiers or who transition because of a Permanent Change of Station (PCS). Especially in the current job market, what is the Army doing to assist family members seeking employment after a PCS? What about spouses who must quit their job or reduce the number of hours worked caused by a deployment and the demands of the family?

Answer. Families are important to the Army, a priority to soldiers, and a vital factor in the Army's overall readiness. A prepared family is better able to manage deployment, long-term separations and Army life in general. The Army has a myriad of employment support programs that are geared towards our spouses, both Active and Reserve Component.

The Employment Readiness Program provides assistance to family members in acquiring skills, networks and resources that will allow them to participate in the workforce and to develop a career plan. Employment services are available to all Army Components, regardless of location. Services include: career counseling and coaching; employment training classes; job fairs; Army Spouse Career Assessment Tool; job listings and information and assistance on the Military Spouse Career Advancement Account.

The Army Spouse Employment Partnership (ASEP) is an expanding partnership that is mutually beneficial to the Army and corporate America. ASEP consists of a small group of committed partners from the private sector, military and Federal government that have pledged their best efforts to increase employment and career opportunities for military spouses. The partnership provides spouses the opportunity to attain financial security and achieve employment goals through career mobility and enhanced employment options.

The Dependents' Educational Assistance (DEA) Program provides education and training opportunities to eligible dependents of deceased and/or permanently disabled veterans. DEA reduces tuition by offering up to 45 months of education benefits.

The Stateside Spouse Education Assistance Program (SSEAP) is a need-based education assistance program designed to provide spouses of active duty and retired Army Soldiers, and widows(ers) of Army Soldiers who died either on active duty or in a retired status, and residing in the United States, with financial assistance in pursuing educational goals. The program assists spouses/widows(ers) in gaining the education required to allow them to qualify for increased occupational opportunities. SEAP provides for up to \$2,500 maximum per academic year for fees, supplies, or books.

In addition to these Army programs, many communities partner with their local installations through the Army Community Covenant and host job fairs and job centers to help spouses with employment searches, resume writing, interviewing techniques and other services to help them find meaningful employment.

More detailed information on all of these programs may be found at the Army OneSource website, the Army's online resource for information on programs, services and support available to soldiers and their families.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

RESILIENCY OF THE FORCE

Question. Secretary McHugh, I have been informed that a third of the suicides this year have occurred at Fort Hood and Fort Carson. What measures are being taken alongside the Army Campaign Plan for Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention to address additional stressors at these two forts?

Answer. As of March 2010, Fort Carson and Fort Hood each had 4 suicide deaths. These two posts account for 24 percent of Active Duty suicide deaths this year (33). At this point last year, the Army had 53 suicide deaths. The Army's senior leadership is committed to sustaining our current emphasis on this problem.

The Army conducts an extensive review of every suicide death to improve our understanding of why Soldiers choose to take their lives. The Army's Suicide Prevention Task Force has created a standardized 37 line report that units use to analyze the factors surrounding each Soldier's suicide. Within 30 days after a Soldier's death, this report is sent to Headquarters Department of the Army for review, and a General Officer must "back brief" the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army during a monthly senior review board meeting. This back brief is done via a world-wide video teleconference, so that leaders across the Army can share lessons learned and improve early recognition of at-risk Soldiers.

Additionally, the Army Public Health Command (Provisional) has created the Army Behavioral Health Integrated Data Environment (ABHIDE) database. This database provides a standardized, enterprise-wide capability designed to integrate information from legal, medical and personnel databases into a comprehensive health surveillance system to support mental, behavioral, social and public health activities.

By increasing Soldiers' access to behavioral health (BH) care and the reducing stigma associated with seeking such care, the Army hopes to positively impact the delivery of BH services in garrison. At Fort Carson, Mobile Behavior Health Teams (MBHT) were created to meet this need. Each MBHT, which provides Soldiers with expedited BH evaluations and community-level treatment, can support a full Brigade Combat Team (BCT) (3,000–5,000 Soldiers) and has a licensed BH provider assigned exclusively to each battalion (500–600 Soldiers) (BCT). This system provides a single point of entry into BH care for Soldiers and a single point of contact for leaders with questions. The U.S. Army Public Health Command (Provisional) has evaluated similar BH outreach initiatives at other Army installations, such as Fort Sill's Outreach Program in Oklahoma, and is currently conducting a full program evaluation of MBHT.

Preliminary results suggest a downward trend in off-post referrals, wait times for Senate Appropriations Committee appointment and key suicide indicators. Efforts to measure the impact of MBHT on BH accessibility, provider trust, stigma and mission readiness are ongoing. A final report is expected in January 2011.

Fort Hood's Resiliency Campus focuses on wellness for its soldiers, families, and retirees. The campus is dedicated to integrating the body, mind, and spirit by aiding visitors in reaching individualized and measurable wellness goals through education and comprehensive programs. The Resiliency Campus is based on the idea of helping the soldier and the family before the crisis begins. Through a network of support services, the campus hopes to train and empower all soldiers and their families to be resilient, to continue fighting in spite of life's challenges.

Question. Secretary McHugh, are resources available to Guardsmen and Reservists after they come off of active duty to help build resiliency? Is there outreach for their families when these soldiers return to a traditional Reservist role?

Answer. The Army, Army Reserve and Army National Guard (ARNG) are working diligently to increase the range and quality of services provided to soldiers throughout the deployment cycle and beyond. Currently, there are limited resources available through the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program and the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) Program. The Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program contains outreach activities to help soldiers and their families with transitioning to a traditional role. In CSF, Master Resilience Trainers are being trained to teach resiliency to these soldiers. Soldiers and families can also use the ARNG's Family Assistance Centers to help with reintegration. The ARNG is looking to increase its capability to train Master Resilience Trainers.

ARMED SCOUT HELICOPTER

Question. Secretary McHugh, Secretary Gates has been critical of recent modernization efforts and has stated that too often we seek a 99 percent solution over a period of years rather the 75 percent solution over a period of months that's re-

quired for stability and counterinsurgency missions. I don't know what program or programs Secretary Gates had in mind when he expressed that view, but the last two Army efforts to replace the Kiowa Warrior helicopter fleet—the Comanche and the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter programs—resulted in program terminations due to requirements growth, cost overruns and schedule delays. In response to these program replacement missteps, this Committee recommended the Army consider upgrades to existing in-service rotorcraft as a low-risk path to a Kiowa replacement.

Mr. Secretary, I know you have been in your job for less than 6 months, so you may not have had time to consider the Committee's recommendation. If you have had the time to consider the merits of upgrading existing in-service rotorcraft, would you share with the Committee your thoughts, and if you have not had time to consider this approach, would you personally look at this and get back to us with your thoughts?

Answer. Considering the rapidly changing battlefield and new developments in Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, existing in-service rotorcraft are receiving extensive modifications. Unfortunately, modifications often add weight, which has a negative effect on overall aircraft performance. An example is the aging OH-58D Kiowa Warrior fleet. Although the Kiowa Warrior has performed outstandingly in theater, there are materiel limitations. There are technology improvements, however, which are available to help address capability gaps on a new platform.

On April 14, 2009, my predecessor approved a strategy to reinvest in the Kiowa Warrior until a viable replacement is procured. The strategy involves executing upgrades to the fielded fleet, weight reduction efforts and the Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade Program. This funded ACAT II program will address obsolescence, safety, weight issues in order to improve the aircraft's performance in the current combat environment. We expect to sustain the Kiowa Warrior until 2025.

The Army is also exploring all options to leverage existing and potential developmental solutions. In July 2009, the Defense Acquisition Executive directed the Army to conduct an Analysis of Alternatives to meet the Army's aerial reconnaissance mission and determine a replacement for the Kiowa Warrior. The AoA will be conducted in two non-sequential phases with the preliminary results completed in December 2010 and final results published in April 2011.

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (BCT) MODERNIZATION

Question. Secretary McHugh, what are the lessons learned from the terminated Future Combat System program, and what steps are being taken to ensure they are incorporated in other Army modernization efforts?

Answer. After cancellation of the FCS program, the Army conducted an analysis of requirements based on the lessons learned from the last 8 years of war. We retained the family of systems knowledge base acquired during the FCS program, as well as technologies related to the network and unmanned/ground vehicles. This analysis will now support the BCT Modernization Strategy.

We found that modeling, simulations, and scenarios depicting FCS capabilities and operations became increasingly complex over time. This resulted in fewer scenarios that limited our ability to analyze across a wide range of relevant operating conditions. A key lesson learned from this experience was that the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) was contracted to produce analytical deliverables that were duplicative of what the Army was doing and that were more advocacy than analysis. These products were therefore of questionable value. Additionally, during critical early program stages, the unique technical expertise and capabilities resident within the Army were not leveraged by the Program Manager/LSI team, especially for platform survivability and the network. The Army has moved away from the LSI model and restructured the contract, establishing a Prime Contractor to deliver Increment 1 capabilities to our Brigade Combat Teams.

While retaining the effort to integrate, develop, and field capabilities as a system, the Army is also fully embracing competition and Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2 to support our BCT Modernization strategy. For example, the Ground Combat Vehicle program will be competitive beginning at Milestone A and using best practices, including competitive prototyping through its acquisition process.

Further, FCS did not adequately revalidate operational concepts at regular intervals to address lessons learned or reassess technology development. The BCT Modernization Plan will focus on technologically feasible and affordable solutions, address lessons learned, allow for incremental technological development, and have appropriate mitigation plans in place. For example, the Army will field Increment 1 capabilities only when they are mature; but they will be part of an incremental process that will allow for technological upgrades and refinements even during the fielding process.

Early in development, the Army decided to let soldiers test and evaluate the systems through the Army Evaluation Task Force. As a result, soldier feedback has played a key role in optimizing designs throughout the development phase—ultimately leading to a better end product. Increment 1 capabilities are now in their third year of the 4 year test cycle.

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLES

Question. Secretary McHugh, considering Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles are being incorporated into unit formations and the Army may maintain a presence in Afghanistan for a very long time, do you foresee an increasing production requirement for MRAP vehicles, and do you plan to look at maintaining a production capability instead of cycling production and the workforce between full production and idle production lines?

Answer. Current MRAP production will end in December 2010, and no follow-on production is planned at this time. This will satisfy every known MRAP requirement received to date. However, given the evolving nature of the MRAP warfighting requirements, the Department is confident in the industrial base's capacity and ability to respond to any future requirements. As of December 2010, 25,700 MRAP vehicles will have been produced to meet Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)-validated requirements from all Services (19,368 for the Army). This includes 8,104 MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles (M-ATV), the latest MRAP variant designed specifically for the OEF environment. Of the 8,104 M-ATVs to be produced, 5,776 will be for the Army.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL

SUICIDES

Question. Congress has established a national suicide hotline for returning troops, as well as increased funding for mental health programs for active duty military personnel. However, there remain a high number of soldier suicides. For example, at least 11 suicides occurred last year at Fort Campbell. What preventative measures are the Department of Defense taking to address this problem? What, if any, legislative action would the Department need Congress to take to expand suicide awareness and education on posts?

Answer. The Army has taken unprecedented steps to reduce suicidal behavior in both the Active and Reserve Components. Every day, the Army's senior leaders address the issue of suicide prevention. For example, we conducted an Army-wide Suicide Prevention Stand-Down and Chain Teach (March thru July 2009), released an interactive and awareness training video and partnered with the National Institute of Mental Health to begin a 5-year study into risk and resilience factors. In 2010, we are continuing this effort by expanding the training for "peer to peer support" using the Ask-Care-Escort and other nationally-recognized suicide intervention models, developing new interactive and awareness training videos and increasing access to behavioral healthcare thru telemedicine initiatives.

The Army fully supports the requirement set forth in the 2010 NDAA, which requires "person to person" behavioral health assessments for every Service Member upon their redeployment from an overseas operation. Finally, the Army is fully engaged with the Congressionally directed "DOD Task Force for the Prevention of Suicide by Members of the Armed Forces," which is required to submit a report to Congress this summer providing recommended legislative recommendations to improve suicide prevention and awareness training and education.

Army actions in 2009 to combat increasing suicide rates included the following:

- Produced the interactive "Beyond the Front" training video.
- Produced the "Shoulder to Shoulder: No Soldier Stands Alone" training video.
- Updated AR 600-63 (Army Health Promotion) and DA Pam 600-24 (Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention).
- Published Suicide Awareness Pocket Guide for all Soldiers.
- Increased access to behavioral health and substance abuse counseling.
- National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) grant for the Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in Service Members (STARRS), \$50 million/5 year study—quarterly updates to VCSA to accelerate lessons learned.
- Tele-Behavioral Health screening pilot project with 25th ID, 100 percent screening thru face to face, VTC, or Computer Skype-like counseling.
- Approved nationally-recognized best-practice suicide intervention skills training for Army use to assist in early recognition of at-risk individuals

Army actions for 2010 include the following:

- Developing interactive “Home Front” training video.
- Developing sequel to “Shoulder to Shoulder” training video.
- Developing an Additional Skill Identifier for certified suicide intervention skills trainers.
- Expanding Tele-Behavioral Health pilot project, evaluate effectiveness, and determine feasibility for using Army wide.
- Developing program effectiveness measures.
- Utilizing the Suicide Specialized Augmentation Response Team/Staff Assistance Team to support commanders by assessing programs, policies, and resources, and identify gaps to improve local suicide prevention programs.

COUNSELING SERVICES

Question. With the current deployment schedule, a heavy toll is being placed upon the spouses and children of servicemembers. How accessible are counseling services for deployed servicemembers’ spouses and children? Are these services available on all major military installations? What programs are available for those living away from major military installations?

Answer. Counseling services are available for deployed service members’ spouses and children on all major military installations. Spouses and children may access Military and Family Life Consultants through the Army Community Service by self referral, without having to provide a reason for seeking these services, or via Military OneSource.

Military and Family Life Consultants are Licensed Clinical Social Workers, Professional Counselors, Marriage and Family Therapists, and Psychologists. They provide six free informal and confidential counseling sessions. No records are kept and flexible appointment times and locations are offered. Military and Family Life Consultants are also available to assist soldiers who are experiencing difficulty coping with daily life concerns and issues.

For those family members who do not live near a military installation, the Department of Defense developed Military OneSource. Military OneSource is a free information center and website where family members can seek assistance 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Counseling is provided by phone or in person by Masters-level consultants on issues such as family support, emotional support, debt management and legal problems for up to 12 sessions at no cost to the soldier. Military OneSource can also assist with the identification of a consultant in the family’s local area. Military OneSource does not release information about users of the services, with the exception of issues of child abuse, elder abuse, spousal abuse and/or risk of harm to self or others. Military OneSource can be accessed at www.militaryonesource.com or 1-800-342-9647.

Family Members may complete a free, voluntary online behavioral health self-assessment, and obtain referrals at www.MilitaryMentalHealth.org. This is an approach to assist soldiers and family members with identifying symptoms and getting assistance. It provides confidential and immediate feedback, as well as referrals to TRICARE, Veterans Administration Centers, and Military OneSource.

In addition to the behavioral healthcare services offered at our military treatment facilities, the Army Medical Command recently established the Child, Adolescent and Family Behavioral Health Proponency (CAF-BHP). CAF-BHP, located at Joint Base Lewis McChord (JBLM), addresses Army-wide family behavioral health needs. Its mission is to support and sustain a comprehensive, integrated, behavioral health system of care for military children and their families. The CAF-BHP collaborates with national subject matter experts and professional organizations to develop and promote evidence-based behavioral health treatments for military children and their families. The CAF-BHP is developing media-driven information campaigns to address military culture and the stigma associated with seeking behavioral healthcare.

HOSPITAL

Question. Ireland Army Community Hospital at Fort Knox is one of the oldest hospitals in the Army. With the new Brigade Combat Team stationed at the post, I am concerned over the state of the current hospital and its ability to meet the increased demands placed upon it. What is the status of the Army’s decision on whether and when to build a replacement?

Answer. The Army ranks the Fort Knox Hospital replacement as our second highest priority, behind a significant addition/alteration project at Tripler Army Medical Center, Fort Shafter, Hawaii. However, the final decision to replace the 52-year old facility will be made by the Department of Defense (DOD). DOD Health Affairs uses a Capital Investment Decision Model (CIDM) process to rank order the consolidated military medical construction priorities for all three Services. The CIDM determines

the Services' priority projects according to weighted and scaled criteria, and by assigning scores by a 12 member Tri-service Capital Investment Review Board. The results of the most recent CIDM for the fiscal year 2012–17 POM are expected in mid to late May, and will determine if and when Ireland Army Community Hospital is programmed for replacement.

PTSD/TBI

Question. What are the typical steps taken to identify soldiers who may have post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injuries (TBI) to ensure they get the proper care? Are there any further legislative steps that Congress could take to improve screening and the delivery of care to soldiers with PTSD and TBI?

Answer. Screening Army Soldiers for PTSD and TBI is intensive. The Army recently implemented new guidelines for identification and treatment of TBI in Theater. Upon return from deployment, there is 100 percent screening for PTSD and TBI exposure using the Post-Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA). The PDHA is mandatory within 30 days following deployment. An enhanced version of the PDHA replaced the April 2003 version in January 2008. A panel of mental health experts constructed the PDHA questions, and periodically reviews it to ensure it meets the intent.

Many soldiers experience an initial "honeymoon" period when returning from a combat tour, when symptoms do not manifest themselves immediately. Accordingly, we initiated the Post Deployment Health Re-Assessment (PDHRA) in 2005. The PDHRA occurs between 90 and 180 days post-deployment. A review and enhancement process has been underway for the PDHRA, and the January 2008 edition replaced the original 2005 version. In addition to the PDHA and PDHRA, the Army requires soldiers to complete a Periodic Health Assessment annually, which again screens for TBI and PTSD. Army Knowledge Online (AKO) now integrates all of these screening requirements with a readiness stoplight (i.e. red, green, amber) status, so both the soldier and his or her commander are aware when a screening is overdue. All primary care providers receive training in the identification of PTSD and TBI. As part of the Respect-Mil Program (<http://www.pdhealth.mil/respect-mil/index1.asp>) all enrolled soldiers are screened for PTSD and depression.

In summary, the typical soldier is assessed and reassessed for TBI and PTSD at several points throughout his or her first year back from combat, and periodically thereafter. The Army is fully engaged in screening, as well as research to improve early detection, care, and treatment. Additionally, we are working to further de-stigmatize help seeking behaviors and to protect Service Members from adverse career consequences. We do not request any legislative action.

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

Question. With the recent addition of the Brigade Combat Team at Fort Knox, what is the Army doing to ensure that the installation is capable of deploying the unit with dispatch?

Answer. Fort Knox is currently designated as a power support platform (PSP) with the mission of strategically deploying individuals and units from all Services to include Department of Defense civilian employees and Reserve Components. Even with the addition of an Infantry Brigade Combat Team, Fort Knox has sufficient capacity to support all deploying units.

The Army is working on several methods to maintain Fort Knox's ability to support deploying units, including Forces Command providing additional resources to support movement/deployment operations under Title 10 requirements. Additionally, future military construction projects will be programmed to improve Fort Knox's services, infrastructure and deployment readiness as part of the Army Power Projection Upgrade Program (AP3).

HOUSING BARRACKS

Question. In light of heavy deployments, I am concerned that many installations, including Fort Campbell, are still housing soldiers in Korean War-era barracks. What is the Department of Defense doing to ensure housing is brought up to date to help increase morale for our already overly taxed troops?

Answer. At Fort Campbell the Army presently has barrack construction projects underway and programmed for fiscal year 2011, 2012 and 2013. Completion of these projects will eliminate the need to occupy Korean War-era barracks at the installation.

In 2008, the Army completed the Permanent Party Barracks Upgrade Program (BUP) using Army Sustainment, Restoration, & Modernization funding. BUP elimi-

nated many inadequate barracks through modernization of existing facilities where feasible.

Additionally, the Permanent Party Barracks Modernization Program (BMP) is scheduled for completion in the fiscal year 2013 MILCON program. BMP Military Construction eliminates the Army's barracks shortfall and eliminates inadequate barracks where modernization with Restoration and Modernization funding was not feasible.

However, neither BUP nor BMP specifically address buyout of certain types of buildings. Facility modernization not included in BUP or BMP, typically involves gutting the building to its structural slab and columns then reconfiguring it to a 1 + 1 standard and adds approximately 30 years to the life of the facility.

The Army continuously reviews its capital investment strategy to validate the plans for replacement and sustainment of barracks facilities, a major feature in the Army Campaign Plan. These plans address Korean-War era, Vietnam-War era and any other barracks built before 1980.

BLUE GRASS ARMY DEPOT

Question. Why is the Blue Grass Army Depot chemical weapons stockpile in central Kentucky not being monitored around the clock?

Answer. The Blue Grass Chemical Activity (BGCA), which is subordinate to the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, is in charge of the safe storage of chemical weapons at Blue Grass Army Depot. The stockpile is stored in earth covered steel reinforced concrete bunkers. The bunkers are in a secured area with intrusion detection, and armed guards on roving patrols providing surveillance 24 hours a day.

The BGCA relies on multiple safeguards to monitor the chemical munitions stockpile to ensure public and workforce safety. These safeguards include monitoring in accordance with our Kentucky Department of Environment Protection permit, visual inspections and application of munitions lot leaker data from both BGCA and other chemical agent storage sites. These safeguards, as well as an active Chemical Stockpile Emergency Response Program have been in place at BGCA and all Army chemical stockpile storage sites for decades. History has proven their effectiveness at protecting both the workforce and the public.

Question. It is my understanding a directive, FRAGO 10-041, was recently promulgated mandating that several restaurant concepts at military bases in Afghanistan be closed. What is the policy justification for this action? Why were some concepts chosen but not others? Might this limitation on food options have a negative impact on morale among our warfighters?

Answer. FRAGO 10-041 was issued on February 3, 2010 by the United States Forces—Afghanistan Commander to implement a 60-day closure plan for specific commercial activities available in Afghanistan. This included all commercial fast food restaurants brought in by the Army and Air Force Exchange Service. Afghanistan is a war zone, which has very limited ground routes into and within it. The Commander's intent is to eliminate all non-mission essential traffic, because of higher priority cargo needing to be transported over those routes.

Our forces have access to various high quality meals in military dining facilities and therefore commercial fast food restaurants are considered as non-mission essential. Furthermore, those fast food restaurants were only available to our forces operating on the larger bases. This decision levels the unequal lifestyle between those forward deployed and those living on fixed bases. We do not expect a significant morale issue to result.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK

SCHOOLS

Question. Secretary McHugh, I wrote to you in December to raise the issue of overcrowding in schools on Fort Riley. The Army's response to that question was that the issue is being studied, but in the meantime, the problem is getting worse.

The community around Fort Riley has spent all of its available resources but can't keep pace with the influx of students. For that reason, General Brooks, the First Infantry Division Commander, requested help from the Army and from the Department of Defense to address the overcrowding problem.

I also understand other installations that gained forces under the most recent round of BRAC, such as Fort Lewis in Washington, face similar problems.

What is the Army's plan to handle this issue?

Answer. The Army has no specific authority to fund public school construction. However, we recognize that some of the school districts serving our military children

are experiencing school construction funding challenges, specifically, Fort Riley and Joint Base Lewis McChord (formerly named Fort Lewis), in Washington.

To better understand the issues for all school districts serving our military Families, the Army recently completed a comprehensive condition and capacity inventory of all on-post schools in the United States. Results indicate that over 50 percent of the 122 on-post schools are in need of renovation or replacement. Our plan is to work with the Department of Defense, the Department of Education and the Congress to develop solutions for those districts that have exhausted local and state funding options. Please note that, although operated by the local school district, six of the seven schools at Joint Base Lewis McChord are owned by the Department of Education. Department of Education has the responsibility to fund necessary renovation or reconstruction for these schools, hence our need to work with them to develop solutions. Army owns the remaining school.

Question. Does the Army require additional money to handle the issue of overcrowded schools at posts that gained forces through BRAC and Grow the Force? Was such funding included in the fiscal year 2011 budget request, and if not, why not?

Answer. Public school construction is normally a state and local responsibility. Because the Army has no specific authority to fund public school construction, we have not included such funding in the fiscal year 2011 budget request. Additional authorization and appropriation legislation would be needed for the Department of Defense to construct public schools.

Question. Does the Army need any statutory changes to facilitate on-post school construction or modification?

Answer. Yes, the Army would need a legislative change to assist local public school districts with school construction. One potential avenue would be through the use of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds specifically targeted to school districts that have been significantly impacted by Base Realignment and Closure or Grow the Army stationing decisions.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN DANIEL K. INOUE

EQUIPMENT IN THEATER

Question. General Casey, the Army has massive amounts of equipment in Iraq which, as U.S. forces withdraw, require evaluation and transfer for reset, use in Afghanistan or disposal. We hear that the drawdown is well underway and that over 300,000 containers are moving equipment out each month. General, what is the prospective timeline for retrograde and who is in charge of this effort?

Answer. The Commanding General, USARCENT (the Army component of U.S. Central command), is in charge of orchestrating the retrograde of Army materiel from Iraq. He has considerable support from the Army Materiel Command, which has a substantial presence in both Kuwait and Iraq. As directed by the President, the timeline for the drawdown in Iraq is to reduce our military presence to 50,000 U.S. forces by August 31, 2010 and to have all U.S. forces out of Iraq by the end of December 2011. We have developed synchronized and coordinated plans for the drawdown of personnel and for the redistribution and disposition of the equipment and supplies in Iraq. As you noted, that process is well underway. In fact, we are ahead of schedule against the our established monthly targets in every measurable area (e.g., personnel drawdown, vehicles, supplies, base closure, etc.).

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

RECAPITALIZATION

Question. As the Army undertakes its recapitalization program, are there any differences in the rates of recapitalization for Army National Guard and Reserve units and the recapitalization of active duty Army units? Can you explain the rationale for the discrepancy if one exists?

Answer. The Army recapitalizes equipment based on equipment type, not Army components. There is no difference in recapitalization of equipment between Reserve Components and Active Duty units.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATTY MURRAY

COMPREHENSIVE SOLDIER FITNESS AND MENTAL HEALTH

Question. General Casey, I received a brief on Comprehensive Soldier Fitness by General Cornum early last year (February 2009) year and you spoke about it earlier today. This program is a valuable tool for equipping and training our soldiers and family members to maximize their potential and face the physical and psychological challenges of sustained operations. What is the status of this program?

Answer. Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) is a rapidly maturing program designed to develop psychological and physiological resilience across the entire Army community, including soldiers, family members and Department of the Army civilians. To date, over 420,000 soldiers have taken the Global Assessment Tool, which is a web-based strengths assessment. Eight web-based training modules that target resiliency skills are currently available to soldiers once they complete the Global Assessment Tool, and 20 modules will be available by the end of fiscal year 2010. Additionally, CSF has trained 829 Master Resilience Trainers at the University of Pennsylvania and satellite locations, with a goal of training at least 1,800 trainers by the end of fiscal year 2010. These Master Resilience Trainers lead resilience development training in their units and local communities. CSF is currently budgeted for \$42 million annually over the next 5 years.

MENTAL HEALTH

Question. General Casey, your efforts to reduce the stigma of mental health has been worthwhile. I understand that the number of soldiers who feel there is a stigma has been reduced from 80 to 50 percent. However, there is a difference between those who feel there is a stigma versus those who are actually coming forward to seek mental health treatment. Despite the reduced number of soldiers who feel there is a stigma, are more soldiers coming forward to seeking treatment?

Answer. Yes, more soldiers are coming forward to seek treatment. Our behavioral health utilization data shows that active duty utilization of behavioral health services has nearly doubled from 2005 to 2009.

Question. What actions is the Army taking to continue to reduce the embarrassment around seeking mental help and encourage soldiers to seek treatment?

Answer. The Army is aggressively working to address perceived stigma and/or fear of negative repercussions associated with seeking behavioral healthcare. We have developed programs not only to help decrease stigma, but to also provide an increased layer of privacy.

The Re-Engineering Systems of Primary Care Treatment in the Military is a program designed to decrease stigma by placing these services within primary care facilities. Through this program, any visit a soldier makes to his/her primary care physician for any reason is an opportunity to screen the Soldier for symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and/or other behavioral health diagnoses. This program is also accessible via the web, where soldiers can self-refer. Services provided are confidential, with the exception of the determination that a Soldier is at risk of harm to self or others.

The Soldier Evaluation for Life Fitness program incorporates behavioral health as a routine component of the health readiness process for all soldiers returning to their home stations following deployment. Since every soldier receives a consultation on-site, no one is stigmatized when seen by a behavioral healthcare practitioner. Through the Soldier Evaluation for Life Fitness program, soldiers first complete a computer-based self-assessment. On-site clinicians review the results of the assessments immediately, allowing them to tailor their consultations to meet each soldier's unique needs. Soldiers can then be evaluated for individual health risks that may range from PTSD and other behavioral health diagnoses to physical health conditions.

Military OneSource is a free information center and website, where soldiers can seek assistance 24 hours/day, 7 days/week. Counseling is provided by phone or in person by Masters-level consultants on issues such as family support, emotional support, debt management, and legal issues at no cost to the soldier for up to 12 sessions. Military OneSource does not release information about users of the services, with the exception of issues of child abuse, elder abuse, spousal abuse, and/or risk of harm to self or others. Military OneSource can be accessed at www.militaryonesource.com or 1-800-342-9647.

Soldiers may complete a free, voluntary online behavioral health self-assessment, and obtain referrals at www.MilitaryMentalHealth.org. This is an approach to assist soldiers and family members with identifying symptoms and getting assistance. It

provides confidential and immediate feedback, as well as referrals to TRICARE, Veterans Administration Centers, and Military OneSource.

Military and Family Life Consultants are also available to assist soldiers who are experiencing difficulty coping. Military and family life consultants are licensed clinical social workers, professional counselors, marriage and family therapists, and psychologists. They provide six free informal and confidential counseling sessions. No records are kept, and flexible appointment times and locations are offered. Soldiers may access military and family life consultants through the Army Community Services by self referral, without having to provide a reason for seeking these services, or via Military OneSource, which can assist Families with the identification of consultants in the local area.

Question. Does your plan include the mental health of families, and if so what is that plan?

Answer. The Army is committed to the Army Family Covenant, which recognizes the strong commitment and many sacrifices that families make. The Army also knows that the strength of soldiers is largely dependent upon the strength of their families. To address the behavioral health needs of families, the Army supports many deployment-related programs. For example, two well-developed programs include the Exceptional Family Member Program, which focuses on assistance for families with special needs; and the Family Advocacy Program, which strengthens family relationships and provides assistance and referral to victims of domestic violence and sexual assault.

The Army also supports the Military and Family Life Consultant Program (MFLC), which provides deployment-related problem-solving consultation services for families and children in schools on post and in the local community. The Army has instituted Soldier and Family Assistance Centers (SFAC) at all the Warrior Transition Units. The SFAC is a soldier and family-friendly environment that has become a popular location for Warriors in Transition and their Families. The Center provides individualized, integrated support services.

To augment the Military Treatment Facility's behavioral healthcare services, the Army Medical Command recently established the Child, Adolescent and Family Behavioral Health Proponency (CAF-BHP) at Joint Base Lewis McChord, Tacoma, Washington. This new Proponency specifically addresses family behavioral health needs; its mission is to support and sustain a comprehensive, integrated, behavioral health system of care for military children and their families.

The CAF-BHP collaborates with national subject matter experts and professional organizations, including the American Academy of Pediatrics, American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and American Psychological Association, to develop and promote evidence-based behavioral health treatments for military children and their families. The CAF-BHP focuses on two new innovative clinical programs, the School Behavioral Health (SBH) and Child and Family Assistance Center (CAFAC). CAFACs are being developed and deployed to help mitigate traditional stove piping of behavioral health services. The CAFAC will provide adult and child family members with 24/7 telephone triage and to mental health services at a single location. Services include psychiatric, psychological, social services and community resourcing. This integrated, comprehensive behavioral healthcare delivery system promotes military readiness, wellness, and resilience in Army children and Families.

Schofield Barracks has an established CAFAC and we are pursuing initiatives at JBLM and Fort Carson. In the next couple of years, we expect to establish the program at Fort Hood, Fort Bragg, Fort Bliss, Fort Campbell, Fort Sill, and Fort Drum. To promote evidence-based treatments and best practices, the CAF-BHP trains primary care providers and their staff in screening, diagnosing and treating common behavioral health concerns. The CAF-BHP also designs marketing strategies to decrease the stigma associated with seeking behavioral healthcare.

STRYKER V HULLS

Question. General Casey, as you well know, three Stryker brigades from Fort Lewis Washington are on deployment today. Two are in Iraq and another in Afghanistan. It is my understanding the Army has gone to great lengths to enhance the safety of these troops by adding armor kits to the vehicles to defeat various threats. It is also my understanding that a so-called double-V hull—something similar to the MRAP vehicle—has been developed for the Stryker to further increase the protection of our soldiers. Can you explain the utility of the double-V hull and if this is something we should be doing to protect those brave Stryker brigade soldiers?

Answer. The Double V-hull enhancement shows great potential for increasing survivability and mitigating the blast effects of Improvised Explosive Devices. The Dou-

ble V-hull is an accelerated portion of the current Army acquisition strategy for Stryker modernization. The Double-V shaped hull will potentially provide Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle-like protection to a proven fighting vehicle in the Army's most highly demanded Brigade Combat Team.

If testing proves successful, the Army anticipates fielding an initial capability of Double V-hulled Strykers in late fiscal year 2011, with a complete brigade set (minus Mobile Gun System and Nuclear Biological Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle) to Operation Enduring Freedom by late fiscal year 2012.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

RESTORING BALANCE/RISK

Question. General Casey, over the past few years, we have heard about efforts to restore balance to the Army. In your prepared testimony, restoring balance is discussed, and it is noted that the Army lacks sufficient strategic flexibility and continues to accumulate risk to meet the challenges you may face in the future. Can you expand on this statement and explain what it means, and over time, how much risk has accumulated and is now being accepted by the Army. Does the Army and our Armed Forces find themselves in the same situation as the proverbial frog in a pot of water—the frog is cozy as the water slowly heats-up and doesn't recognize the danger it is in?

Answer. The Army's forces are committed to prevailing in the current fight by ramping up in Afghanistan as we responsibly draw down in Iraq. Thanks to the support of Congress and the American people, the Army is receiving the resources it needs to restore readiness, but the continuing pace of operations means we are consuming that readiness as fast as we produce it. The commitment of the Army to Iraq and Afghanistan limits the choices available to our national leadership if another crisis—whether humanitarian or armed conflict—arises. It also means the Army cannot train all units to standard on full spectrum operations, which is necessary to provide a trained and ready force for the variety of possible missions in a world of persistent conflict.

We are making progress in restoring balance, reaching a sustainable and predictable force rotational cycle in 2012 of 2 years at home station for every year deployed for our Active Component, and 4 years at home station for every year mobilized for our Reserve Component. However, even after the end of major combat operations in Afghanistan, we expect a few challenging years of recapitalizing and repairing equipment, re-integrating with our families, and training forces for full spectrum operations, before we can provide true strategic flexibility to our leaders.

With Congress' continued support, the Army will restore balance by achieving sustainable deploy-to-dwell ratios; adequately providing for soldiers, civilians, and families; and with reliable, timely, and consistent funding, resetting our equipment and pre-positioned stocks. These measures will restore readiness and the strategic flexibility necessary to provide trained and ready forces for full spectrum operations and future contingencies at a tempo that is predictable and sustainable for our All-Volunteer Force.

ARMY UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Question. General Casey, I am informed that the Army plans to modify the Shadow Unmanned Aerial Vehicle to meet requirements that the terminated Fire Scout program was expected to fulfill. The fiscal year 2011 budget request includes over a half billion to begin this work. General Casey, can you share with the Committee the thought behind the Fire Scout termination, and will this \$500 million investment in Shadow provide your soldiers with the full capability needed to conduct their missions?

Answer. With the termination of Future Combat Systems, we determined that the Fire Scout did not fulfill a requirement in the modular Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). The improvements that we are making to our Shadow fleet will sufficiently address the most critical capability gaps in the BCTs. Some of these improvements include retrofit kits to increase endurance while adding reliability, laser designation capability and NSA Type I encryption. Our BCTs, Fires Brigades, Battlefield Surveillance Brigades and Special Forces formations will benefit from the additional capabilities funded in the fiscal year 2011 President's budget. This improvement effort will continue beyond fiscal year 2011 to provide full capability to our soldiers.

RESILIENCY OF THE FORCE

Question. General Casey, does the fiscal year 2011 budget continue to fully support Army Resiliency initiatives? What other efforts are included in this year's budget which was not part of the fiscal year 2010 program?

Answer. Yes. Comprehensive Soldier Fitness is fully funded in fiscal year 2011 at \$42.5 million. Future efforts include expanding the Master Resilience Trainers (MRT) program by establishing an MRT course at Fort Jackson, South Carolina; reaching out to family members through voluntary participation in the Global Assessment Tool; and increasing the online Comprehensive Resilience Modules.

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (BCT) MODERNIZATION

Question. General Casey, over \$20 billion has been invested in technologies developed under the terminated Future Combat System program. The Army now plans to field some of these technologies to Army brigades under the Brigade Combat Team Modernization program. What systems or technologies are going to be fielded under this effort, and how have they performed in recent testing?

Answer. Increment 1 of Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Modernization contains systems from the FCS program. It provides enhanced war fighter capabilities to the Current Force in two primary areas. First, it provides enhanced situational awareness, force protection and lethality through the use of unattended and attended sensors and munitions. Second, it provides a communications network backbone for Infantry BCT and Battalion Command Networks. Increment 1 capabilities consist of the following systems: Unattended Urban and Tactical Ground Sensors, Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle, Class I Block 0 Unmanned Air Vehicle, Non Line of Sight-Launch System, and Network Integration Kit (for the HMMWV).

During the 2009 Limited User Test, Increment 1 capabilities met or partially met 14 of 15 Army test criteria. The systems did not meet reliability criteria. User tests revealed issues with equipment and software reliability, availability and maintainability. The program office, in coordination with the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation command and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, is taking steps to correct these issues. To date, more than 94 percent of the hardware issues have been corrected and the program is continuing to integrate software changes and increased capability in preparation for the 2010 test cycle.

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLES

Question. General Casey, when Secretary Gates announced his adjustments to Defense acquisition programs last year, he terminated the manned ground vehicle portion of the Future Combat System. One of reasons cited for the termination was that the Army's current vehicle program did not include a role for the Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles which has received more than \$30 billion of investment. What is the Army plan for incorporating Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles across your unit formations?

Answer. The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) family of vehicles has performed well in theater and provides critical protection to soldiers against mines and improvised explosive devices. The Army plans to place over 15,000 MRAPs and M-ATVs in the force structure. Vehicles will be allocated to task organized sets, and deployed when MRAP levels of protection are required; used by units to fill existing capability gaps; and used in a robust training fleet to assist soldiers in maintaining proficiency.

We will place 9,284 vehicles in the following task organized sets: 11 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams; 6 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams, 3 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams and a Multifunctional Support Brigade. The Army is currently analyzing set positioning options.

The Army will place 3,631 vehicles on Transportation, Explosive Ordnance Disposal and echelon above brigade Medical unit MTOEs. We will also place 1,755 vehicles in training sets around the world and 495 in Sustainment Stocks and War Reserve. TRADOC will determine allocation of the additional 1,460 MRAP All Terrain Vehicles and 1,300 MRAPs placed on contract in February 2010.

RESET OF ARMY EQUIPMENT

Question. General Casey, resetting or recapitalization of Army equipment used in operations the past 8 years is requiring unprecedented funding levels. It's pointed out in the prepared testimony that resetting Army equipment will need to continue an additional 2 to 3 years after major deployments end. How does the Army plan to maintain equipment reset funding levels and complete this necessary process considering the 5 year budget plan projects only 1 percent annual real growth and an

annual Overseas Contingency Operations budget that is more than \$100 billion less than it is today?

Answer. The Army will continue to request reset funding levels to meet the incremental costs of war in our Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget. Since 2001, Congress has fully funded the reset of Army equipment returning from contingency operations and the Army used these funds to reset units for full spectrum operations. Reset funding for fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 is adequate to complete the reset of 25 brigades this year, 31 brigades in fiscal year 2011 and represents approximately \$11 billion per year.

Current funding ensures that equipment can be rapidly repaired or replaced to meet operational requirements. We will continue to use our Reset Cost Model to forecast future reset costs based on force structure and equipping scenarios. Enduring requirements that are no longer part of the OCO will transition to our base budgets. This approach, with corresponding budget request adjustments, will align with the 5-year budget plan projections and OCO budget.

If OCO Reset needs are not resourced in the year required, it would cause either the deferral of requirements or impact other programs resulting in equipment not being reset (repaired or replaced). The net result would be less reliable equipment or equipment shortages that would impact readiness and potentially put soldiers at risk. Equipment Reset and the associated funding is essential to maintaining equipment readiness and restoring balance to the Army. In partnership with Congress, the Army will continue to identify equipping Reset requirements that are cost effective, timely, and ensure readiness for future operations.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER S. BOND

MODERNIZE THE FORCE

Question. Tell me about the Army's plan to modernize the force and what this means for soldiers in the next 2–3 years, specifically regarding the “spin-outs” and the priority delivery plan for the Army Infantry Brigades and others. Were any specific “spin-outs” cut as a result of the changes to Future Combat Systems (FCS)?

Answer. After cancellation of the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program, the Army transitioned to a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Modernization Plan. The Army now refers to “spin-outs” as “capability packages.” This plan is supported by comprehensive lessons learned from more than 8 years of war, focuses on the evolving needs of our warfighters in a rapidly changing security environment and exploits the knowledge and technologies developed under the FCS program.

The BCT Modernization Plan aligns the fielding of capabilities with the Army Force Generation Model, so that soldiers will have the right capabilities at the right time to accomplish their mission. In the next 3 years, the Army plans to field the first increment to three Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs). We anticipate fielding the first brigade set of Increment 1 equipment in 2011 and two additional sets in 2012.

Rather than making one modernization decision and applying it over two or more decades (as typically done in the past), the BCT Modernization Plan recognizes that modernization decisions must be made incrementally to stay ahead of the demands of the security environment and the needs of our warfighters.

After the program's cancellation, we reevaluated FCS systems in light of our evolving needs. This led to the cancellation of the Class IV Unmanned Air System, the Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment Transport (MULE-T) and the MULE-Countermining (MULE-CM) unmanned ground vehicles. Our analysis concluded that the Class IV UAS was no longer a cost-effective solution because current UAS, with some improvements, can sufficiently meet most requirements. Likewise, the two large robots (MULE-T and MULE-CM) did not meet rapidly changing threats or address critical future mission needs.

Question. What is the Army's plan to integrate the Guard into its modernization efforts with respect to a proportional and concurrent delivery of the equipment needed to modernize?

Answer. Because the Army has operationalized the Reserve Components to support Combatant Commanders, the Active Component (AC) is no longer a major factor in determining the order in which we field modernized systems. The goal of this strategy, which is based on the Army Force Generation Model, is to provide units with the equipment they need to perform their next mission. The Army's equipping strategy provides the most modern, capable equipment to deploying units without regard to whether they are AC, Army National Guard (ARNG), or Army Reserve. Additionally, we remain committed to ensuring ARNG units are equipped to at least

80 percent of their critical dual use items (despite significant overseas contingency operations and reset requirements) with a goal of reaching 100 percent. This is designed to ensure ARNG preparedness to support civil support missions.

Between September 2008 and September 2010, ARNG equipment on hand percentages will increase by approximately 6 percent, and ARNG equipment modernization levels will increase by approximately 4 percent. Both of these increases surpass the ACs improvements over the same time period.

The Army is continuing to invest in ARNG modernization by procuring equipment that will complete ARNG modernization in several key areas over the next year or two. For example, the Army will soon complete the ARNG fielding of Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below and the M777 howitzer system. We will also complete 96 percent of the ARNG Warfighter Information Network-Tactical systems.

For ARNG aircraft, the Army is working toward modernizing the fleet. The Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) is a key element of this strategy. The Army will field 88 of 210 LUHs by fiscal year 2011. The ARNG has the first two HH-60M equipped Medical Evacuation companies in the Army, as well as the second UH-60M equipped assault battalion. The ongoing modernization of the UH-60A series aircraft (A-A-L) will continue to reduce the number of non-modernized Blackhawks fleetwide in all components. We have already modernized four of the eight ARNG attack battalions with AH-64D model Apaches and plan to convert the remaining four battalions in fiscal year 2013-14. The ARNG is receiving three CH-47F models for its training base, and will begin receiving CH-47Fs for their operational units in fiscal year 2011.

Question. If the current rotary wing modernization plan for the Army Guard is any indication of how the effort is going, I am not hopeful. It is my understanding the President requested funding for only 2 upgraded Blackhawk "M" models for the Army Guard in fiscal year 2011? Is that enough?

Answer. Yes, two aircraft are sufficient in fiscal year 2011. The two HH-60Ms MEDEVAC aircraft included for the Army Guard in the fiscal year 2011-base budget will be paired with 10 HH-60Ms procured in the fiscal year 2010 base. This will provide enough aircraft to equip one Army Guard 12-ship MEDEVAC Company. This MEDEVAC Company is to be fielded in fiscal year 2011-12 (1 year after the procurement funding), and will bring the ARNG total UH/HH-60Ms to 70 aircraft. The UH-60M is the standard configuration for the Assault and General Support units. The HH-60M is the Medical Evacuation configuration for the MEDEVAC units.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Question. The fiscal year 2011 Army budget request for military construction increased by almost \$300 million, so our Guard soldiers and their families thank you for that. I have voiced concern in the past that the military construction funding has not kept pace with the essential needs at Guard installations across the country for modernization and replacement of aging facilities. I applaud the increase in funding from \$246 million to \$374 million to replace the Guard's aging facilities. In your view, is this amount appropriate to support Army Guard training and readiness requirements?

Funding spent on the renovation and creation of new armories across the country spurs economic growth and enhances the Guard's and the Reserves' ability to carry out their missions. The benefit of these construction projects are two-fold because they serve as both military readiness spaces and public locations for community gatherings. As you know, training, maintenance and readiness is hampered by inadequate, unsafe and unhealthy facilities. The high level of mission readiness required of Guard soldiers needs to be supported by functional facilities, so I thank you for your support.

Answer. The fiscal year 2011 level of funding provides for 48 projects nationwide. At this level of funding, the average age of an Army National Guard (ARNG) Readiness Center will increase from 41 to 49 years over the next decade. The current level of funding provides for major renovation of ARNG facilities every 30 years. Accordingly, at this level of funding, the ARNG will continue to be challenged in meeting its readiness requirements.

TRANSIENTS, TRAINEES, HOLDEES AND STUDENTS (TTHS) ACCOUNT

Question. The Army National Guard is the only service component that doesn't have a Transients, Trainees, Holdees and Students (TTHS) Account. As such, units continue to witness taxing instances of personnel and equipment "cross-leveling" when they are mobilized. Would creating such an account decrease some of the pressure placed upon soldiers' dwell-time and help the force get "back in balance?"

Answer. Yes. In fact, the Army is creating an 8,000 slot TTHS account in the ARNG. Although this is a relatively small account, it is a significant step forward. It will allow the ARNG to place non-deployable soldiers in the TTHS account, thereby freeing spaces in units for trained, deployable personnel. The Army Training and Doctrine Command has worked extensively with the ARNG to increase the number of training seats available to Guard soldiers when recruits are available for training. The result has been a much smaller number of untrained soldiers occupying deployable unit positions.

Question. Can a TTHS account be implemented without increasing Army Guard end-strength?

Answer. Yes. Because of certain force design updates, the Army National Guard (ARNG) Force Structure Allowance is approximately 350,000. The Congressionally mandated end strength of 358,200 personnel provides a deviation of approximately 8,000 soldiers. The ARNG can manage a small 8,000 soldier Trainees, Transients, Holders and Students account (TTHS) with this deviation. This will allow the ARNG to remove non-deployable soldiers from operational units, as well as to reduce the untrained recruit population in mobilizing formations. Reducing force structure allowance any further, however, would destabilize the readiness of formations, increase the rate of unit rotations overseas, reduce the ARNG's accessibility to the Active Component and reduce its ability to function as an operational force.

Question. Do Army leaders believe the end-strength is adequate in the ARNG?

Answer. Yes, the Army Senior Leaders believe the end strength of the ARNG is adequate.

Question. Is the ARNG experiencing commensurate, or "proportionate" troop growth as compared to the active-component?

Answer. Since 2005, the Army National Guard (ARNG) has done a tremendous job of increasing its end strength within authorized levels. Over the past 3 years, the ARNG has met its accession mission 35 out of 36 months (in September 2009 it achieved a 99.6 percent accession rate), and increased its total end strength by approximately 12,000 (from an End Strength Mission of 346,165 in March 2007 to 358,200 in February 2010). During this period, the total ARNG End Strength remained between 100–103 percent of the End Strength Mission (only in August 2008, did the end strength reach 103.1 percent).

In 2006, as part of the Grow the Army Initiative, the ARNG's end strength authorization grew by 8,200. The current temporary end strength increase in the Active Army will benefit the Army National Guard by allowing an increased dwell for all Army units.

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Chairman INOUE. This subcommittee will reconvene on Wednesday, March 10, at 10:30. And at that time, we will consider health programs of DOD.

And, with that, the subcommittee stands in recess.

[Whereupon, at 10:35 a.m., Wednesday, March 3, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a.m., Wednesday, March 10.]