[Senate Hearing 111-1111]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-1111
TRANSITION AND IMPLEMENTATION:
THE NASA AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2010
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 1, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
_____
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
TOM UDALL, New Mexico SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Ann Begeman, Republican Staff Director
Brian M. Hendricks, Republican General Counsel
Nick Rossi, Republican Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on December 1, 2010................................. 1
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 1
Prepared statement of Hon. Orrin G. Hatch.................... 2
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 4
Statement of Senator Vitter...................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Statement of Senator Begich...................................... 7
Statement of Senator Warner...................................... 33
Statement of Senator LeMieux..................................... 35
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 36
Witnesses
Hon. John P. Holdren, Ph.D., Director, Office of Science and
Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President of the
United States.................................................. 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Hon. Elizabeth M. Robinson, Chief Financial Officer, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration........................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Cristina T. Chaplain, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management; and Susan A. Poling, Managing Associate General
Counsel, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)........... 21
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Appendix
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV, U.S. Senator from West Virginia,
prepared statement............................................. 47
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. John P. Holdren,
Ph.D. by:
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison.................................... 47
Hon. David Vitter............................................ 49
Hon. Orrin G. Hatch.......................................... 50
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Elizabeth M.
Robinson by:
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison.................................... 51
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 59
Hon. Mark Begich............................................. 63
Hon. Roger F. Wicker......................................... 63
Hon. Orrin G. Hatch.......................................... 64
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey
Hutchison to Cristina T. Chaplain.............................. 65
Letter dated December 7, 2010 to Hon. David Vitter, from John P.
Holdren, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy,
Executive Office of the President.............................. 67
TRANSITION AND IMPLEMENTATION:
THE NASA AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2010
----------
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:33 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Nelson,
presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Good morning. I am going to invite all the
witnesses to come up to the table.
And without objection, a statement from Senator Hatch on an
opening statement will be entered.
[The prepared statements of Senators Nelson and Hatch
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Bill Nelson, U.S. Senator from Florida
We are here this morning with a plan in hand--the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010--a plan agreed to unanimously by this body,
overwhelmingly in the House, and with a signature from the President.
OUR collective plan builds upon our fundamental national drive to
explore, discover, and expand a human presence across new frontiers.
For our nation's civil space program, this has indeed been a
challenging year. We are in the midst of a major transition to retire
the Space Shuttle and develop a new architecture for the human
exploration of space. One thing has become very clear during this
transition: people care passionately about our nation's space program
and we have channeled our collective passion for NASA into a clear
blueprint for the agency's future.
With competing national interests and a difficult fiscal
environment, now, more than ever, is the time for a new way of doing
business--a results-oriented and cost-effective way forward. This law
gives NASA the tools it needs to do just that. Building off of existing
resources and knowledge, NASA can fulfill our nation's aspirations
while avoiding the management and financial pitfalls of the past.
The bipartisan NASA Authorization Act of 2010 codifies our shared
vision. The Act directs NASA to develop a new heavy-lift launch vehicle
and multipurpose crew vehicle to explore beyond low-Earth orbit;
extends the mission of the International Space Station through at least
2020; adds a Space Shuttle mission to reduce the gap in our access to
and from the space station; makes use of American innovation in the
commercial rocket industry; and maintains our commitment to
aeronautics, scientific research, and educating the nation's future
explorers.
NASA itself has two sayings that I think are relevant to the topic
of today's hearing. The first is to ``show results soonest.'' The
Authorization Act is the roadmap to get us moving out on the new plan.
The second is ``hardware wins.'' This means that action trumps studies
on paper. We have studied, we have reviewed, we have evaluated. Now
it's time to DO. I would like to welcome our witnesses and thank them
for joining us here today to discuss what needs to be done for the most
effective transition and implementation of the Authorization Act.
Dr. Holdren is the President's Science Advisor and Director of the
Office of Science and Technology Policy. Dr. Holdren, I look forward to
hearing from you on how the administration intends to implement our
shared vision outlined in the Authorization Act. Consistent top-level
leadership is vital during this transition period.
Dr. Beth Robinson is NASA's Chief Financial Officer. Dr. Robinson,
this is the first time you have testified in front of this committee
since your confirmation hearing over a year ago. As NASA moves forward
with the implementation of the Authorization Act under a Continuing
Resolution, yours is a most difficult task indeed. It is critical that
the Administrator receive the best financial advice, and while we are
encouraged by improvements in the agency's most recent independent
audit, the major cost and schedule overruns for the James Webb Space
Telescope program are of great concern. I hope to hear your perspective
as NASA's CFO how the Agency intends to improve its financial
management for successful implementation of the new law.
Ms. Cristina Chaplain is the Director of Acquisition and Sourcing
Management at the U.S. Government Accountability Office, and she is
joined by Ms. Susan Poling, the Managing Associate General Counsel at
GAO. Ms. Chaplain and Ms. Poling, your work over the past few years has
provided guidance and recommendations for NASA to improve continuing
financial and management difficulties. For that, this committee thanks
you. I look forward to your latest assessment and expertise.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Senator from Utah
Senator Nelson, Senator Hutchison and members of the Senate
Commerce Committee, thank you for affording me this opportunity to
share my thoughts regarding the implementation of the 2010 NASA
Authorization Act.
First, I want to reiterate my gratitude to Chairman Rockefeller,
Senator Nelson, and Senator Hutchison, for all of their hard work in
making the NASA Authorization Act a reality. I also wish to thank the
Committee's staff members: Ann Zulkosky, Brian Hendricks, Tom Cremins,
and Jeff Bingham, for their tireless efforts ensuring all stakeholders
concerns were addressed.
The NASA Authorization Act might not be the perfect solution to all
of the issues surrounding manned space flight, but it provides our
nation with a strong plan--a plan embedded in law--which will define
the future of our nation's exploration of space.
Implementation of the law will not be an easy task--it never is.
However, the law is clear. NASA will build a new heavy-lift Space
Launch System which can ``access cislunar space [the region between the
Moon and Earth] and the regions of space beyond low-Earth orbit.''
Public Law 111-267 specifies the minimum capabilities for the Space
Launch System. These legal requirements include ``[t]he Space Launch
System shall be designed from inception as a fully-integrated vehicle
capable of carrying a total payload of 130 tons or more into low-Earth
orbit in preparation for transit for missions beyond low-Earth orbit.''
The law also states, ``[p]riority should be placed on the core elements
with the goal for operational capability for the core elements not
later than December 31, 2016.''
In addition, Section 304 of the NASA Authorization Act seeks to
maximize taxpayers' previous investments when developing and building
the new launch system. Therefore, it directs NASA ``to the extent
practicable, [to] utilize existing contracts, investments, work force,
industrial base, and the capabilities for the Space Station . . . Ares
1 projects, including . . . Space Shuttle-derived components and Ares 1
components that use existing United States propulsion systems including
. . . solid rocket motors . . .''
These are the Space Launch Systems legal requirements. They are the
law of the land. The requirements were crafted by the members of the
Senate Commerce Committee after careful and thoughtful consideration
and consultation. The law must be implemented as written.
In addition, I have consulted with preeminent rocket experts about
these requirements. They concluded these articulated directives for the
development of the Space Launch System could only be realistically met
by using solid rocket motors.
The use of solid rocket motors in the new Space Launch System is
also the intent of Congress. The report, which was written by the
Senate Commerce Committee's staff, and accompanied the NASA legislation
clearly states:
The Committee anticipates that in order to meet the specified
vehicle capabilities and requirements, the most cost-effective
and ``evolvable'' design concept is likely to follow what is
known as an ``in-line'' vehicle design, with a large center
tank structure with attached multiple liquid propulsion engines
and, at a minimum, two solid rocket motors composed of at least
four segments being attached to the tank structure to form the
core, initial stage of the propulsion vehicle. The Committee
will closely monitor NASA's early planning and design efforts
to ensure compliance with the intent of this section.
In sum, the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 was a carefully crafted
piece of legislation. I have no doubt the members of the Commerce
Committee, and Congress as a whole, will insist a piece of
legislation--which passed the Senate by unanimous consent, voted on by
the House under the suspension of the rules and signed by the
President--should be fully and faithfully executed.
Therefore, over the past several weeks I have been concerned by a
number of ``trial balloons'' where it appears, some have argued, that
NASA has been seeking alternatives to the Space Launch Systems' legal
requirements. Accordingly, I asked NASA Administrator Bolden and Deputy
Administrator Garver to attend a meeting of the Utah Congressional
Delegation 2 weeks ago.
During the meeting, Administrator Bolden stated that NASA was going
to be in ``full compliance'' with the NASA Authorization Act. In a
previous phone call I received a similar assurance from Deputy
Administrator Garver. I take them at their word, and I trust that they
will honor their word.
Yet, I must admit I found some of Administrator Bolden's comments
troubling. He cited funding as a concern. Yet, I believe this issue has
been robustly addressed by the Commerce Committee. Specifically, the
law authorizes $1.63 billion in Fiscal Year 2011, $2.65 billion in
Fiscal Year 2012; and $2.64 billion in Fiscal Year 2013. Furthermore,
my staff has been assured by the Commerce Committee's staff these sums
are more than sufficient to begin the development of a heavy-lift
system which meets the legal requirements of the law, including
achieving an initial operational capability by December 31, 2016.
On a related matter, I was surprised to learn some still question
the cost of solid rocket motors as compared to other technologies.
However, I have been assured by industry experts that solid propellant
rocket motors, by their nature, are relatively simple in design and
construct. Solid rocket motors provide a high energy density/high
thrust-to-weight stage which yields an effective solution for the
initial boost phase which is comparatively lower in cost than a liquid
system of equivalent performance.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I believe the Commerce Committee has
crafted an important law--that law must be implemented in a full and in
a timely manner. Nothing less will be acceptable to me and I know
nothing less will be acceptable to the members of this Committee.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you again for the
opportunity to discuss these matters with you.
Senator Nelson. Again, I want to say publicly my
appreciation to Senator Hutchison. There are moments in your
Congressional life that you enjoy, and at the end of the day,
you have some degree of success in achieving a legislative
goal. And the opportunity, the privilege that I had to work
with Senator Hutchison, where the two of us worked seamlessly
together back in the summer, first to get the NASA
authorization bill through this committee, and then as one of
the last agenda items, to be able to have it pass with
unanimous consent late at night on the last night of the
session in August.
And then in September, one of the last things to pass in
the House of Representatives--I give great credit to Steny
Hoyer who put it on the consent calendar. At the beginning of
that last day of the House of Representatives' deliberations,
people did not think we had the required two-thirds vote in
order to pass the NASA bill. When the vote was tallied late
that night, one of the last items in the House of
Representatives, it was a three-quarters vote.
And again, I give great credit to Senator Hutchison, as I
have stated many times before, the sheer pleasure of working
with her and trying to correct the misstatements, the incorrect
information, sometimes the mischief that was directed at the
NASA authorization bill.
And so now we have a bill that has been signed into law. It
is the law, and the purpose of this hearing is to have these
very erudite folks explain to us the implementation of the law.
We do this in this full Commerce Committee hearing not only in
our oversight capacity to oversee the implementation of laws in
the Executive Branch of government, but we do it also given
some of the uncertainties that we face, the uncertainty of the
actual funding level since we are well into the new Fiscal
Year. And yet, we have a road map. We have a blueprint of what
NASA can, should, and will do over the course of this fiscal
year. And we are going to flesh that out in the course of this
hearing. We are going to flesh it out as we see what is done in
appropriations with a continuing resolution or an omnibus
appropriations or whatever it is because something has to be
passed because the U.S. Government has to continue to function.
But this authorization bill is more than that. It is a 3-
year authorization because on a program like the space program,
you simply have to give direction over a long period of time.
And that direction is now law.
So with that, let me turn to the lady who has been such a
great partner. Thank you, Senator Hutchison.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
certainly appreciate what you have said and agree that we
worked hand-in-hand, hand-in-glove, completely together in a
bipartisan way, helped by Senator Vitter, Senator Landrieu from
Louisiana, from many of our colleagues, Senator LeMieux from
Florida, Senator Hatch who has submitted a statement, and
Senator Bennet, Senator Shelby, and Senator Sessions, and
Senator Cochran, of course, and Senator Wicker. So many people
came together on a very bipartisan basis, and the law was
passed overwhelmingly, overwhelmingly in the House and
unanimously in the Senate.
And it started, of course, when a plan came out from the
President that really did not have Congressional consultation.
That is the President's right to lay out his vision, of course.
But we worked then from that proposal, took some parts of it,
and rejected some parts of it, and I think came together,
working with the Administration, in a productive way for a way
forward that would have both Congressional support and with the
consent of the President, who did sign the bill.
I think that the Chairman and I and many others are
concerned about some of the delays in implementation, and if I
had to summarize my view, it would be that delay could cost
success. If we are going to succeed in the new launch vehicle,
we have to have a design based on as much of the technology
that has already been developed and tested as possible, and
certainly the heavy lift booster and capsule design has to be
the first priority. And if there are any concerns about that
implementation or if there are impediments to it, we want to
know right now because we do still have the opportunity to put
other words in the law if that is what it takes. But in order
to succeed, we must be able to count on the Administration
fulfilling the requirements of the law and working with
Congress in a collegial spirit, I hope, to do what the
direction is that has been passed overwhelmingly by Congress
and, of course, signed by the President.
We are going to have hearings. We are going to have
oversight, and I would say that any of us are available, going
forward, to hear the impediments, if there are impediments,
right up front as opposed to getting reports from other sources
that there are some in the industry who would like to only
implement the original plan of the President and some within
the agency who might have that view. The original plan is not
now the law of the land. And so we want to work in a spirit of
cooperation.
I will just end by saying that space exploration is part of
the golden history of this country. It is also essential to our
future. If we are going to use the International Space Station
in a productive way, if we are going to innovate, create, have
the capability to look into things like sources of energy, that
can best be done at the space station or beyond, and we are
going to have to go forward with the plan that has been put
forward by Congress and signed by the President for us to be
successful. If it is dragged out and we do not have a design
and we do not have a budget that would meet the test of the
design, we could lose the whole thing and see other countries
take precedence over America in the exploration of space.
So, I hope that we learn something today that either says,
yes, we are all full steam ahead, yes, we are going to use all
the brains in the agency to put together the budget that will
allow our new design and our goals that I know are similar to
go forward and succeed, or if there are impediments, what are
they? Let us work on them together.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Senator Vitter?
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly join
in your and Senator Hutchison's remarks and thank you both for
your leadership on this issue. It has been a pleasure for me to
work with you all and others, including on the authorization
bill.
I was very pleased with that outcome as well, but now we
need to implement that bill, and really the question at this
hearing is, is the Administration going to be a full, active,
positive partner in implementing that bill? That is the
question. I think that is exactly what Senator Hutchison was
talking about.
From my perspective, the evidence so far is that the answer
is no, and I hope to God that changes, and I hope to God I am
wrong. But quite frankly so far, the evidence is not there that
the Administration wants to be a full, active, positive
partner.
Now, I know from reading your testimony, that there is
concern specifically about language in last year's
appropriation bill prohibiting the cancellation of
Constellation programs and starting new programs. Let me say
that all of us are working on language to correct that and to
take away any impediment that provides what we hope to insert
in a CR or an omnibus bill or whatever. So I think we are all
on the same page working on clarifying language.
Having said that, I really think pointing to that language
and justifying a lot of inactivity so far on that--I am not
saying that language is irrelevant, but I really think it is
largely an excuse. I mean, the irony is pretty clear. Before
this new authorization bill, the Administration was doing
absolutely everything it could administratively to shut down
Constellation programs. Now, after the new authorization bill
has passed, the Administration is pointing to that language
saying, oh, we cannot possibly end Constellation and stop those
programs, essentially arguing exactly the opposite.
Now, again, I am not saying that language does not have
some effect, does not impose some limits, but I think the
Administration could be doing a whole lot more implementing the
vision of the new authorization bill if it were really
committed to do that. And I think what we are here today to
talk about is that level of commitment and how we move forward
on the same page to implement that vision in the authorization
bill. Again, I think so far the evidence is that the
Administration is not there, but I hope that is wrong and I
hope that changes. And I am eager for that to change and
certainly committed to working on anything we need to work on
legislatively to clear away any remaining hurdles like the
language from last year's appropriation bill.
So that is what I came to talk about and to hear from these
key Administration officials.
Thank you for calling the hearing, and I look forward to
the discussion.
[The prepared statement of Senator Vitter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. David Vitter, U.S. Senator from Louisiana
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing today. And thank
you to our witnesses for appearing before this committee. I hope that
we can have a forthright and open dialogue, and I'd like to place
particular emphasis on those words, about what NASA is doing to move
forward with implementing the provisions of the 2010 Authorization Act,
and what, if anything, Congress needs to do to address any possible
contradictions in existing law impeding that implementation.
Reading the written testimony of our witnesses, it is clear that
they believe they are hindered from moving forward with implementing
the programs outlined in the Authorization Act by language in last
year's appropriations bill prohibiting the cancellation of
Constellation programs and the starting of new programs. If that is
indeed the case, then let me assure NASA now that my colleagues and I
will work together to find a solution to fix that discrepancy.
That being said, I want to brace those here today from NASA, and
all those at NASA HQ who are not present, for what I am about to say,
because I intend to speak quite frankly and quite harshly.
I mentioned earlier that I want these proceedings to be forthright
and open, and I stress that because, quite frankly, in the course of
the past year the NASA leadership has been anything but forthright and
open in its dealings with Congress. I would, in fact, argue that there
are those within NASA's senior management who have done everything
within their power to thwart the will of Congress and the word of law
and instead advance their own agenda. I am deeply concerned that what
we are witnessing here today, and the arguments being made about why
NASA has not moved forward with implementing the programs the
Authorization Act directs them to--even if technically correct--are
simply more of the same stonewalling and recalcitrance to follow
Congress' direction that we have sadly become all too accustomed to in
the past year.
I find the fact that NASA is now claiming that it cannot currently
move forward with the development of the Space Launch System prescribed
in the Authorization Act because it cannot terminate existing
Constellation programs particularly bemusing. I say that because, as
everyone here well knows, in the time between the President's announced
FY 2011 budget for NASA and the passage of the Authorization Act, NASA
was doing everything it could to shut down Constellation programs,
despite Congress giving them no approval to do so, without technically
terminating them. I am of course referring to the agency's excuse of
using the Anti-Deficiency Act and the tool of termination liability,
mentioned often before in this chamber, to effectively shut down
production on Constellation programs without technically terminating
them. The GAO report on the matter may have found that doing so was
within the limits of the law since the programs were not technically
terminated, but the intent behind the actions was clear--to kill
Constellation before Congress had given its blessing to do so.
Now here we are, with an Authorization Act specifically describing
NASA's way forward for developing our next generation of human space
flight, an act that was passed by an overwhelming majority of Congress
and endorsed by the President and is now law, and NASA is now claiming
that it cannot move forward because it cannot legally terminate
Constellation programs, the very programs it has been using termination
liability in the past several months to try and stop production on. You
can see how one could find this amusing, if it wasn't also so
infuriating.
It's infuriating because it shows, I believe, a troubling pattern.
It shows me that there are those within NASA's leadership that will do
anything and use any excuse available to them to do anything but what
Congress directs them to do, who believe that they simply know better
than anyone else what the way forward should be, and whose ideas for
what NASA's role should be do not necessarily even include human space
flight and space exploration as a priority, even though that is the
founding mandate of the agency.
I fear that what we have is a cabal within NASA that is determined
to do everything possible to prevent the development of the Space
Launch System the Authorization Act directs them to proceed with within
the timetable the law clearly stipulates. I would point to the reports
we are now hearing that NASA is assessing acquisition strategies for
the multi-purpose crew vehicle defined in the Authorization Act.
This is concerning on a number of levels, first and foremost
because the Act clearly defines and identifies--and I know this because
I personally insisted on this language--the multi-purpose crew vehicle
as being a continuation of the Orion Crew Capsule. The law also states
that NASA shall extend and modify existing contracts to facilitate the
timely development of the Space Launch System. What purpose then could
beginning a new procurement process for the crew vehicle serve,
especially when Orion is so far along in development and, as recently
announced, will be ready for an unmanned test flight in 2013? It only
serves one purpose, to indefinitely delay the development of the Space
Launch System so as to make meeting the conditions of the Authorization
Act impossible. Besides being a gross violation of the law that clearly
states that Orion is the crew vehicle for the Space Launch System, it
shows, at best, a gross incompetence on the part of NASA management,
and, at worse, a willful attempt to thwart the law and the direction of
Congress.
Having said all that, I would now like to call on the
Administration to take these things into consideration and decide if it
is indeed serious about supporting the path set forward in the
Authorization Act. If it is, then I would recommend that the
Administration take a long hard look at NASA management and take into
consideration that changes are in order. There are a group of people
within NASA management whose continual attempts to outflank Congress
and the law has created, at best, a strained relationship with its
members, and, at worst, a toxic one. Their actions and attitudes have
simultaneously led to a precipitous drop in the morale of the NASA
workforce to historically low levels. In order for NASA to come back
strong again, restore morale, move forward unhindered with the
development of the Space Launch System defined in the Authorization
Act, and repair the relationship with Congress so that this body and
the agency are working together, not against one another, I believe it
is imperative that the persons within the agency's management
responsible for causing all this discord be immediately identified and
removed. Only then can the agency be prepared to move forward to a
brighter future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Senator Begich?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK BEGICH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Begich. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any comments. I
am anxious to hear how they are doing the implementation and
their presentations.
Senator Nelson. Well, I just want to comment, Senator
Vitter, that unfortunately I think your comments are well
founded. Your concerns are well founded because there were too
many times in the course of building consensus to pass it in
this committee with the legislative clock running out, pushed
up against the August work recess; and then the same thing
repeating itself again in the House of Representatives running
up against the legislative clock, going right up to the end,
that we found too many times in the attempts of building
consensus that there was too much evidence that the
Administration was not helping. Now, I might say that was not
from the highest levels of the White House. To the contrary, I
found it elsewhere.
And that brings us to the table today to--now that the
President supported this bill, in the Committee, on the floor,
and then through the situation in the House where we had run
out of time, we did not have time to sit down and negotiate
differences between the House and the Senate, and they ended up
being in the position of having to accept the Senate bill or no
bill. And I give great credit to Chairman Bart Gordon and
Ranking Member Ralph Hall. Without their leadership, this never
would have happened. And yet, we were finding forces that were
trying to undo us.
Now, this is history. We passed it. The President signed it
into law, and now we want that law implemented. And given the
uncertainties of the funding, which I think at the end of the
day is going to be less uncertain than you would think because
this authorization bill authorizes $19 billion in Fiscal Year
2011, and if we just get a continuing resolution of Fiscal Year
2010, NASA's funding there is $18.7 billion. That is, in this
context of this economic recession that we are in, $300 million
less than a $19 billion authorization. That is 1.67 percent
less than the total authorization. We want to see this law
implemented without a lot of griping and moaning and groaning
if we are able to get that kind of appropriation.
So it is in that spirit that we come here to the table for
this hearing, and we are very honored to have the President's
Science Advisor, Dr. Holdren; Beth Robinson, the Chief
Financial Officer of NASA; Cristina Chaplain, Director of
Acquisition and Sourcing Management from GAO, accompanied by
Ms. Susan Poling. So we are going to ask for your comments. If
I could ask you all to keep your comments somewhere around 5
minutes, and then we can get into the give-and-take that this
committee likes to do.
So, Dr. Holdren, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN P. HOLDREN, PhD., DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Dr. Holdren. Well, Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member
Hutchison, members of the Committee, I am happy to be here
today to discuss America's future in space and how to maximize
the probability of success following the recent passage and
signing of the 2010 Authorization Act for NASA.
Under the direction provided by that legislation, NASA will
be entering a new era of innovation, of exploration, of
discovery. And I want to commend and thank Chairman Nelson and
Ranking Member Hutchison and, indeed all of the members of the
Committee and your staffs for the work you did in forging the
key agreements that were necessary to get this legislation done
and for the work you did to bring it into effect.
When I testified before this committee in May, I talked
about the President's strategy for U.S. human exploration
activities in space as reflected in his Fiscal Year 2011 budget
request and further elaborated in the speech he gave in Florida
at the Kennedy Space Center on April 15. That new approach, as
you know, included fostering the development of path-breaking
new technologies, partnering with industry in new and more
effective ways, advancing innovation and scientific discovery,
pursuing human exploration of space with a more flexible,
achievable, and affordable set of goals, and of course,
addressing the overarching need to match program goals with
resources. That approach was developed in order to take us to
more places sooner but also more affordably, while spurring the
creation of new industries, new technologies, and jobs.
The 2010 NASA Authorization Act that you folks worked so
hard to bring about represents a crucial step forward toward
achieving the President's goals and I think the country's goals
in this arena, including extending the International Space
Station effort until at least 2020 and supporting the goal of
using that research outpost effectively; including helping to
advance a U.S. commercial crew transportation industry that can
become the primary means of access to the International Space
Station, thereby harnessing the nation's entrepreneurial
energies in more effective ways, and creating new jobs while at
the same time, of course, meeting a critical national need;
including accelerating the development of a heavy lift vehicle
relative to what was planned under the Constellation program;
including reinforcing an approach to human space exploration
that will enable us to reach a range of destinations, including
near-Earth asteroids, the moons of Mars, and eventually Mars
itself; including initiating a new space technology program to
increase our capability and decrease the cost of these
activities; including supporting the President's proposal to
modernize the space launch complex in Florida which will help
those facilities more effectively support future NASA, other
government, and commercial launches; including supporting a
revitalized program in earth science, enabling NASA to develop
new satellites and other capabilities that are priorities in
our efforts to enhance U.S. leadership in global climate change
research; including authorizing a robust aeronautics research
program that will invest more in green aviation and in a more
efficient national air transportation system which will help to
promote both the economic and the environmental health of this
country.
This important change in direction not only helps to chart
a new path forward in space, it also helps us invest in the
foundation for the skilled jobs and industries of the future.
At the same time, it furthers our goal of placing NASA's
programs on a more stable footing and enhancing the long-term
sustainability of those efforts. As with any space-related
endeavor of the scope and complexity of those outlined in the
Authorization Act, there will be, of course, technical, cost,
and programmatic challenges going forward as the projects are
undertaken and future appropriations are provided.
Indeed, obviously, a lot of work lies ahead in terms of
translating this important new law into programmatic success.
One immediate challenge, as has already been noted, is the
current lack of appropriations for Fiscal Year 2011, and the
Administration very much hopes that Congress will act swiftly
to provide the funding and budgetary guidance that will enable
NASA to fully implement the direction provided in the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010 and bring that new plan to fruition.
Whatever the challenges that may be faced, I am confident
that Administrator Bolden and the dedicated men and women of
NASA's workforce have the commitment, the wherewithal, and the
passion that will be needed to pursue those initiatives and
continue to make progress toward achieving our ambitions in
this renewed journey of innovation and discovery in space. I am
looking forward to continuing to work with Administrator Bolden
and the other involved offices and agencies in the government
as NASA moves to develop more detailed implementation and
acquisition approaches in the months ahead.
Let me close by reiterating that this Administration,
starting with President Obama himself, remains steadfast in our
commitment to space exploration and to NASA's mission. As the
President said in his speech at the Kennedy Space Center--and I
now quote, ``I am 100 percent committed to the mission of NASA
and its future. Because broadening our capabilities in space
will continue to serve our society in ways that we can scarcely
imagine. Because exploration will once more inspire wonder in a
new generation--sparking passions and launching careers. And
because, ultimately, if we fail to press forward in the pursuit
of discovery, we are ceding our future and we are ceding that
essential element of the American character.''
The Administration looks forward very much to continuing to
work with this committee and the rest of Congress to achieve
our shared goals and ambitions in space as we move forward with
these programs.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Holdren follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John P. Holdren, Ph.D., Director, Office of
Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President of the
United States
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hutchison, and members of the
Committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss America's
future in space and our ability to maximize the probability of success
following the recent signing of the 2010 Authorization Act for the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Under the
direction provided by this legislation, NASA will be entering a bold
new era of innovation, exploration, and discovery. I would like to
commend Chairman Nelson and Senator Hutchison in particular for your
efforts in forging the key agreements necessary for this legislation
and ultimately helping to bring it into effect.
When I testified before this Committee in May, I laid out the
President's ambitious new strategy for U.S. human exploration
activities, as reflected in his FY 2011 budget request and further
elaborated in his landmark speech at the Kennedy Space Center in
Florida. This new approach included fostering the development of path-
breaking new technologies; partnering with industry in new and more
effective ways; advancing innovation and scientific discovery; pursuing
human exploration with a more flexible, achievable, and affordable set
of goals; and of course addressing the over-arching need to match
program goals with resources. This new approach was developed in order
to take us to more places sooner but also more affordably, while
spurring the creation of new industries, technologies, and jobs that
will be vital for long-term economic growth.
The 2010 NASA Authorization Act represents a critical step toward
achieving the President's goals in this arena, including:
Extending the International Space Station (ISS) effort until
at least 2020 and supporting the goal of using this research
outpost effectively; as the President proposed, the ISS can be
a platform to further science and technology innovation, foster
the creation of new industries, and help advance human
exploration;
Helping to advance a U.S. commercial crew transportation
industry that can become the primary means of access to the
ISS, thus harnessing our nation's entrepreneurial energies in
more effective ways and creating new jobs, while also meeting
an important national need;
Accelerating a heavy lift vehicle development effort
relative to what was planned under the Constellation program;
Reinforcing an approach to human space exploration that will
enable us to reach a range of destinations including Lagrange
points, near-Earth asteroids, the moons of Mars, and eventually
Mars itself;
Initiating a new space technology program to increase the
capability and decrease the cost of NASA, other U.S.
government, and commercial space programs;
Endorsing the Summer of Innovation education initiative
proposed by the Administration;
Supporting the President's proposal to modernize the space
launch complex in Florida, which will help these facilities
more effectively support future NASA, other government, and
commercial launches;
Supporting a revitalized program in Earth science, enabling
NASA to develop new satellites and other capabilities that are
priorities in our efforts to enhance U.S. leadership in global
climate change research; and
Authorizing a robust aeronautics research program which will
invest more in green aviation and in a more efficient national
air transportation system, thus helping to promote both the
economic and environmental health of this country.
This important change in direction not only helps chart a new path
forward in space, it also helps us invest in the foundation for the
skilled jobs and industries of the future. At the same time, it
furthers our goal of placing NASA's programs on a more stable footing
and ultimately enhancing the long-term sustainability of these efforts.
As with any space-related endeavor of the scope and complexity of those
outlined in the 2010 NASA Authorization Act, however, there will be
technical, cost, and programmatic challenges going forward as these
projects are undertaken and future appropriations are provided.
Indeed, much work lies ahead in terms of translating this new law
into programmatic success. One immediate challenge is the lack of
appropriations for FY 2011. We urge Congress to act swiftly to provide
the funding and budgetary guidance that will enable NASA to implement
the direction provided in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 and bring
this new plan to fruition. As we move further into FY 2011, it is my
hope that we can work with you in resolving this situation as quickly
as possible.
Whatever the other difficulties that may be faced over the long
run, I am confident that Administrator Bolden and the dedicated men and
women of NASA's workforce have the commitment, wherewithal, and passion
necessary to pursue these initiatives and continue making progress
toward achieving our boldest ambitions in this renewed journey of
innovation and discovery in space. I look forward to working with
Administrator Bolden, and other involved offices and agencies in the
U.S. Government, as NASA moves to develop more detailed implementation
and acquisition approaches in the months ahead.
Finally, let me reiterate that this Administration remains
steadfast in its commitment to space exploration and to NASA's mission.
As the President said in his speech at the Kennedy Space Center:
I am 100 percent committed to the mission of NASA and its
future. Because broadening our capabilities in space will
continue to serve our society in ways that we can scarcely
imagine. Because exploration will once more inspire wonder in a
new generation--sparking passions and launching careers. And
because, ultimately, if we fail to press forward in the pursuit
of discovery, we are ceding our future and we are ceding that
essential element of the American character.
I think all of us here fully understand the space program's
singular capacity to inspire future generations of scientist and
engineers, and we recognize the crucial role that it plays in advancing
scientific discovery, stimulating technological innovation, enhancing
international leadership, and buttressing our economic vitality and
strength. The Administration looks forward to continuing to work with
Congress to achieve our shared goals and ambitions in space as we move
forward with these programs.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Dr. Robinson?
STATEMENT OF HON. ELIZABETH M. ROBINSON,
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER,
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Robinson. Thank you. Chairman Nelson and members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity today to discuss how
NASA is implementing the Authorization Act under the continuing
resolution, otherwise known as the CR.
Most importantly, due to the enactment of the Act, NASA has
clear direction and has begun to move forward, and we are very
excited and committed to the path that we are on. NASA
appreciates the significant effort that advanced this
bipartisan legislation, particularly efforts by the leadership
and members of this committee. There are still details that the
final appropriations outcome will provide, but broad outlines
are now clear in law and that makes the road ahead much easier
and clearer. And this is a time of excellent opportunity for
NASA to shape the promising future for the nation's space
program.
There is also no doubt that this year has been challenging
to the NASA workforce, both the civil service and contractors.
They have put in long hours planning new missions for which
funding was uncertain, while at the same time continuing to
work on missions for which the future was uncertain. And still,
NASA's workforce rose to the challenge. They always do, and it
is to be commended for the outstanding accomplishments over
this year. Moreover, now with the Authorization Act, the
workforce can look forward to many more accomplishments yet to
come.
For the immediate future, as with other federal agencies,
NASA is operating under a CR which can be a complex juggling
act. First, we must read the Authorization Act and the CR in
concert wherever possible. For example, NASA program funding
levels below the account level are generally controlled by the
Authorization Act.
Second, NASA must take heed of the pending appropriations
bills because when the final appropriation is adopted, NASA
must apply its constraints in funding levels back to the
beginning of the--throughout the entire Fiscal Year.
And finally, there are specific restrictions in the CR,
which we have already discussed. In particular, the CR
continues any restrictions that were present in last year's
appropriation including, in NASA's case, the prohibition on
termination of components of the Constellation program.
Moreover, the CR requires that work not begin on new starts,
which is a legal term of art about which GAO has given us
guidance in their May report, and using that guidance, we have
been working through what is and is not a new start. And we
have not yet found anything in the Authorization Act on which
we cannot proceed, but we are not done with our analysis, this
unfortunately lengthy analysis, and we are working the issue
daily.
However, there are some areas in which we can clearly
proceed. For example, planning efforts for the heavy lift and
multipurpose crew vehicle activities, both authorized in the
Act, are proceeding and are assessing the transition from the
Constellation efforts to the new programs. Moreover, on
November 8, NASA announced the results of a broad agency
announcement under which NASA selected 13 companies to conduct
studies on various heavy lift technologies. These studies are
focused on achieving affordability, operability, reliability,
and commonality at the system and subsystem levels with
multiple users, including other government, commercial, science
and international partners.
Further, although requirements for the multipurpose crew
vehicle have not yet been fully vetted, NASA expects this
vehicle to be based on the existing Orion work. The ground test
article for Orion will be completed within the coming months,
which is very exciting, and in early 2011, the GTA will be
shipped to Denver for performance testing that will help
validate the cabin design.
Additional effects of the CR on NASA's programs are
detailed in my written statement, but for now, Chairman Nelson
and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you. NASA is at the beginning of a path that will
create opportunities and discoveries for generations, and so
like you, NASA is very eager to get started on implementing the
Act. Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Robinson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Elizabeth M. Robinson, Chief Financial
Officer, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman Nelson and members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010 and how NASA is implementing direction in
that Act, while NASA is operating under a FY 2011 continuing
resolution.
With the President's signing the NASA Authorization Act of 2010
(P.L. 111-267), NASA has a clear direction and can begin making plans
for moving the Agency forward. NASA appreciates the significant effort
that has gone into advancing this bipartisan legislation, particularly
efforts by the leadership and Members of this Committee. There are
still details that the final FY 2011 appropriations outcome will
provide but broad guidelines have now been enacted into law, making the
road ahead much clearer. This is a time of excellent opportunity for
NASA to shape a promising future for the nation's space program. Today
it is no longer a question of IF we will explore, but how.
The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 represents an important step
forward in that, among other things, it:
Authorizes continued investment in Science and Aeronautics,
including an increase to accelerate deployment of important
Earth Science observation satellites.
Extends the International Space Station (ISS) to 2020 and
makes funding available for the NASA Launch Support and
Infrastructure Modernization Program.
Supports current commercial cargo efforts and supports
expanding commercial crew development activities. Facilitation
of the nation's commercial spaceflight sector is a key
component of the U.S. strategy to maintain safe and affordable
space exploration capabilities throughout the next century.
Authorizes development of a heavy-launch vehicle and
continues the development of a crew capsule that will transport
astronauts to many exciting destinations beyond low-Earth orbit
(LEO).
Authorizes a new space technology program that will provide
cutting-edge, transformative technologies to support our future
space exploration endeavors.
There is no doubt that this year has been a challenging one for the
NASA work force, both civil service and contractors. These men and
women have been asked to put in long hours planning new missions for
which funding was unknown, while at the same time, they were asked to
steadfastly continue work on missions for which the future was
uncertain or which were soon to be retired. Still, NASA's workforce
rose to the challenge because they are people who make the impossible
happen every day. They are to be commended for their outstanding
accomplishments over this past year. And, based on enactment of the
NASA Authorization Act of 2010, the NASA workforce can look forward to
many accomplishments yet to come.
FY 2011 Continuing Resolution
As noted earlier, NASA is looking forward to the completion of the
FY 2011 appropriations process, so that the Agency can begin the
important new work authorized by Congress.
As with other federal agencies, NASA is operating under the
restrictions set forth by the FY 2011 Continuing Resolution (CR). While
NASA is funded to continue work that was already underway on programs
and projects across the Agency, work may not begin on ``new starts,''
which may prevent NASA from moving forward on elements of the new
programs and projects outlined in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010.
Implementation of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 provisions during
the period of the current CR must, as a general rule, rely on existing
authority. Each of these must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and
must be individually and specifically tied to prior authorization and
appropriations acts, legislative history, and budget requests. The NASA
Office of General Counsel (OGC) is conducting this analysis on an
ongoing basis, and we will keep the Committee informed of our progress.
Attached to my testimony is an assessment by the OGC which outlines the
legal issues that need to be considered, the conclusions that have been
reached to date, and a timeline for evaluating and reaching a
conclusion on the critical initiatives in the NASA Authorization Act.
To-date, however, NASA has not identified any particular activity
authorized in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 that would be
considered a new start under guidelines set forth in the Government
Accountability Office legal opinion issued on July 26, 2010 (B-320091).
While work within Exploration may begin to address the provisions
of the Authorization Act, the CR restrictions maintain prohibitions on
program element terminations within the Constellation Program, which
may eventually limit application of funding needed for key Exploration
activities.
In general, NASA is following several principles as we proceed
under the FY 2011 CR:
1. The current FY 2011 CR directs funding at the FY 2010
``current rate.'' As such, NASA has released funds to all
programs in proportion to FY 2010 enacted controls, generally
at the appropriations account level.
2. Since a CR generally provides a lump sum for each
appropriations account, the sub-allocations outlined in the
Authorization Act become the controlling factor, and would
continue to govern unless specifically modified by the final FY
2011 appropriations act.
3. Any provisions of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 that
affect NASA operations must be followed unless or until
modified by an Appropriations Act. The one exception is
Authorized provisions deemed to be ``new starts,'' if any, that
were not funded by a previous appropriations bill, i.e., FY
2010 appropriations. (See item 4 below.)
4. All administrative and other provisions from the FY 2010
appropriation continue to apply and NASA cannot begin or resume
activities that were not funded the previous year. The FY 2010
Appropriations Act (Section 505) and the CR itself prohibit new
starts and, other than continuing low-level planning
activities, NASA is not providing funding for any activity that
may be deemed a new start until a final FY 2011 appropriations
bill is enacted.
5. Exploration work can begin to address direction included in
NASA Authorization Act of 2010, so long as no program element
terminations prohibited in the FY 2010 Omnibus Appropriation
occur, and as long as NASA meets the restrictions outlined in
item 4 above.
As programs proceed under CRs, NASA has been cognizant of what the
House and Senate have included in their legislation with regard to the
Agency, and we are reading the Authorization Act and the CR in concert
wherever possible. NASA also continues to observe the FY 2010 Omnibus
Appropriations limitations with regard to continuing work on
Exploration activities during the period of the CR. When the final
bills are adopted, NASA will have to apply constraints and funding
levels in the final bill to the CR period. Therefore, during a long-
term CR, NASA must generally reserve funding to accommodate potential
new starts and differing funding levels in the final FY 2011
appropriations bill.
It should be noted that NASA is also working to complete reporting
requirements outlined in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 as soon as
possible. However, due to the lack of a final FY 2011 appropriations
act, NASA's ability to complete some of those reports may be hampered
and, as such, interim reports may become necessary. NASA will continue
to keep this Committee apprised about our status on these reports,
particularly if interim reports are required.
The FY 2011 CR and NASA's Exploration Programs
As noted earlier, the FY 2011 CR is especially challenging for
NASA's human spaceflight programs, particularly those currently managed
by the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD), as well as those
that will be stood up once a final FY 2011 appropriation is received. A
low-level planning effort is underway for robotic precursor and
flagship missions, and commercial crew development efforts have been
limited. Further complicating the matter is that the planning teams are
working multiple planning scenarios for FY 2011, in anticipation of
final appropriations outcomes.
On August 6, 2010, initial CR guidance was provided to ESMD
programs. At that time, the most complete programmatic and funding
information available for FY 2011 was contained in the pending Senate
Appropriations Report. For that reason, NASA looked to the report to
determine priorities and funding allocations at the program/project
levels, while capping the total budget at the $3.746B FY 2010 enacted
level, consistent with the terms of the CR.
For the period of the FY 2011 CR, the Agency determined that the
monthly funding distribution during the CR period through December 3,
2010 should support spend rates consistent with fourth quarter FY 2010
estimated cost levels. The Constellation Program was directed to place
the additional funding on the prime contracts. (To date, all funds have
been or are in the process of being placed on contracts.) Note that
this monthly funding distribution during the CR will require
significant adjustments post-CR to meet annual marks for FY 2011.
When the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 became law, the Agency
adjusted CR guidance to reflect authorized priorities and funding
distribution, while continuing to use the FY 2010 enacted
appropriations level to set the overall spending rate for exploration.
Also at this time, ESMD performed a reassessment of labor allocations
across the portfolio of authorized programs, resulting in a shift
between ``Large Developments'' (i.e., current Constellation and
authorized Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle
development) and ``Other Exploration'' (i.e., current and authorized
technology, research and commercial capability development), resulting
in a revised labor allocation for Constellation, and an increase in the
program's annual mark from $2.265B to $2.308B (without labor).
On October 18, 2010, ESMD issued the following guidance to the
Constellation Program:
The Constellation Program should not exceed a monthly rate
of $243M a month through the period of the FY 2011 CR for
procurement and travel. However, Constellation should plan to
an annual control of $2.308 billion (the authorized level, less
labor) for procurement and travel.
In FY 2011 execution during the CR, the following priorities
that have been in place since the June re-plan are being used:
Avoid termination of prime contracts and sustain
current operations (and avoid workforce dislocations) to
the maximum extent practicable;
Continue development of critical capabilities,
technologies, and commercial services; and,
Prioritize investments that support the initiatives
under FY 2011 President's budget request and the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010.
Since the $243M monthly funding level (without labor) for the
current CR period was established, actual Constellation/Large
Development spending during September and October has been $40M lower
than planned. This means that the program faces no funding shortfall as
the end of the initial CR period approaches. Under a full year CR
scenario, to meet the total authorized level, monthly funding for
Constellation/Large Developments would need to average $182M (without
labor) for the remaining 10 months of the fiscal year.
Work on the heavy lift launch vehicle and multi-purpose crew
vehicle was authorized by the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, and can
proceed without a FY 2011 appropriations bill because it is associated
with NASA's current Constellation Program. For example, on November 8,
2010, NASA announced the results of a Broad Agency Announcement issued
in May with regard to Heavy Lift and Propulsion. As part of this
competitive solicitation, utilizing approximately $7.5M in FY 2010
dollars, NASA selected 13 companies to conduct studies examining the
trade space of potential heavy-lift launch and space transfer vehicle
concepts. The BAA is focused on achieving affordability, operability,
reliability and commonality at the system and subsystem levels with
multiple users, including other government, commercial, science and
international partners.
Additionally, work on NASA's successful Commercial Crew Development
(CCDev) initiative, which was begun in FY 2010, continues. On October
25, 2010, NASA released a solicitation for CCDev2, seeking proposals to
further advance commercial crew space transportation system concepts
and mature the design and development of elements of the system such as
launch vehicles and spacecraft. Proposals are due December 13, 2010,
and award of multiple Space Act Agreements is planned for March 2011
for terms of 12-14 months. However, the awards are contingent on FY
2011 appropriations.
Together, the CCDev1 and CCDev2 efforts will stimulate efforts
within the industry to develop and demonstrate human spaceflight
capabilities, which could lead to the development of commercial crew
transportation systems--one of the highest priorities in the
President's FY 2011 budget request. NASA is cognizant of the
restrictions included in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 before we
are authorized to proceed with a full-up commercial crew development
competition, and we are developing our commercial crew plans based on
those directives. We also are working in an expeditious manner to meet
the associated reporting requirements outlined in the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010.
Other FY 2011 CR Implications
The following is a summary of how other NASA programs are operating
under the restrictions imposed by the FY 2011 CR:
Space Operations:
Space Shuttle: Because the Shuttle continues to
operate based on the FY 2010 rate under the FY 2011 CR, the
program is able to meet all of its funding requirements
during the first half of the fiscal year.
STS-135: If NASA is provided the funding, it would be
able to support the flight of the STS-135 logistics mission
to the International Space Station (ISS) as authorized
under the NASA Authorization Act of 2010. To best manage
workforce impacts, the Shuttle program needs to confirm
approval to add the STS-135 mission by December 2010.
NASA Launch Support and Infrastructure Modernization
Program: Although the NASA Authorization Act of 2010
authorizes upgrades of the launch complex at Kennedy Space
Center (KSC), NASA is waiting for the enactment of an FY
2011 appropriations bill to fund this activity. A team at
KSC is preparing to startup this program upon receipt of
funding. They will select and initiate a set of projects
consistent with the Authorization Act direction to support
the Space Launch System. A report outlining the
implementation plan for this modernization program is due
to Congress no later than February 2011.
ISS: Both the President's FY 2011 budget request and
the Authorization Act extended the ISS until at least 2020.
Required activities to support ISS life extension will be
performed under the FY 2011 CR and ISS research based on
the FY 2010 budget also will continue during the CR.
However, activities to increase ISS functionality will be
delayed until FY 2011 funding is received. During the CR,
SOMD will continue to plan to ramp up ISS user operations
and to complete assembly of the ISS. Additionally, the
Directorate will restructure the existing ISS utilization
program into three primary components: (1) international
partner uses; (2) NASA uses to enable future exploration;
and, (3) U.S. uses by organizations other than NASA. This
restructuring does not represent new research program
content given that NASA has been pursuing ISS utilization
in all three of these domains throughout the assembly
period. Finally, SOMD plans to conduct a competitive
acquisition for a cooperative agreement to manage a portion
of the research on ISS. This initiative is a continuation
of the existing research program under an alternate
management structure that includes a ``single Point Of
Contact'' for ISS research, consistent with specific
Administration and Congressional guidance. The schedule for
this initiative would lead to award of a cooperative
agreement in the May 2011 time-frame pending the
availability of funds within the FY 2011 appropriation.
Science: Plutonium-238 (Pu-238) has provided power for 26
different NASA missions that have flown over the years,
missions that have been enabled with radioisotope power systems
that require this particular fuel. The NASA mission to explore
the solar system depends upon spacecraft that rely on Pu-238 to
fuel their energy needs because solar power is not a practical
option for many missions. NASA's access to secure and reliable
sources of Pu-238 is endangered. Russia has suspended
implementation of its contract with the Department of Energy
(DOE) for purchase of Russia's remaining supplies of Pu-238.
Our existing domestic stockpile of Pu-238 is not being
replenished and is expected to be depleted before the end of
the decade. NASA and DOE have submitted to the Congress a plan
for restarting domestic production to provide a reliable and
secure supply of Pu-238. Specifically, the President's FY 2011
budget request proposes $30M for this purpose, $15M in the
request for DOE and $15M in the request for NASA. The NASA
Authorization Act of 2010 authorizes NASA to pursue a joint
approach with DOE beginning in FY 2011 toward restarting and
sustaining the domestic production of Pu238. However, the FY
2011 CR does not fund NASA or DOE to initiate the authorized
restart of domestic Pu-238 production. NASA and DOE will
require appropriation of funds for FY 2011 and beyond in order
to keep the supply of Pu-238, and with it the nation's
Planetary Science program, on track.
Space Technology: While Space Technology planning continues
during the FY 2011 CR, the Office of the Chief Technologist
cannot fund this work until FY 2011 appropriations are enacted.
This may have an impact on schedule given the time required to
make awards once a final appropriation is received. NASA
recently completed an analysis of the content of six Space
Technology initiatives in the FY 2011 budget request: Space
Technology Research Grants; NASA Institute for Advanced
Concepts; Game-Changing Development; Franklin Small Satellite
Subsystem Technology; Technology Demonstration Missions; and,
Edison Small Satellite Missions. The NASA Office of the General
Counsel concluded that they are continuations of existing
initiatives from prior budget requests and program
descriptions, with management consolidated in the Office of the
Chief Technologist rather than managed across other Mission
Directorates as was the prior practice. As such, continuation
of these initiatives is not subject to the current CR
restriction on ``new starts,'' and NASA could issue
solicitations for these efforts, subject to final FY 2011
appropriations.
Per direction contained in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, the
Office of the Chief Technologist has initiated a technology
roadmapping activity to guide the agency's long-term technology
needs and inform the National Space Technology policy called
for in this Act. NASA will complete development of this
strategic guidance through a national dialogue with industry,
academia and other government agencies facilitated through the
National Research Council. The Office of the Chief Technologist
anticipates the release of 14 draft technology area roadmaps to
the NRC and the public in December 2010.
Aeronautics: The Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate
(ARMD) has two new activities planned for FY 2011 that we are
eager to move forward with: the Unmanned Aerial System (UAS)
Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) Project and
the Verification and Validation (V&V) of Flight-Critical
Systems sub-project, which is under the Aviation Safety
Program's System-Wide Safety and Assurance Technologies
Project. Since these activities are new, ARMD can only engage
in low-level planning activities until there is an enacted FY
2011 appropriation. These programs will benefit two segments of
the aviation community: the segment involved with UAS access to
the NAS, and the Joint Planning & Development Office. Although
there is stakeholder interest in both of these research
activities, lasting detrimental effects are not expected as a
result of a FY 2011 CR due to the long-term nature of the work.
To address near-term issues, ARMD remediation options include
delaying the start of these activities, which will in turn
delay the benefits of research results. Additionally, ARMD may
have to re-scope activities for FY 2011, depending on how long
NASA must operate under a CR.
Human Exploration Planning Efforts
As noted earlier, the agency is reading the NASA Authorization Act
of 2010 and the CR in concert, and we are continuing to observe any
restrictions on new starts. However, NASA is also continuing prudent
planning efforts to integrate new Exploration work across the Agency so
that we are ready to move out once FY 2011 appropriations are received.
In particular, NASA is continuing the efforts of the Human Exploration
Framework Team (HEFT).
HEFT was chartered in April 2010 for the purpose of establishing a
framework for human space exploration that defines the knowledge,
capabilities and infrastructure that NASA needs to send people to
explore multiple destinations in the Solar System in an efficient,
sustainable way. HEFT is not a decisionmaking body; it is intended to
provide decision support to NASA senior leaders as they plan the
spaceflight activities for human exploration beyond LEO. HEFT will
inform NASA senior leadership by providing credible, consistent,
coherent, and transparent analyses of all aspects of potential human
spaceflight architectures. In addition to its Steering Council, HEFT
includes an Integration Team and domain experts drawn from across NASA.
The near-term objective for HEFT is to provide analysis to NASA
leadership for consideration; this analysis will integrate the options,
related priorities, and architecture implications of potential
decisions. Per the Administrator's direction, HEFT is following three
important principles in developing and analyzing architecture options;
architectures must be:
(1) Affordable during development and operations;
(2) Sustainable over multiple years; and,
(3) Feasible so that, in consultation with its international
partners and our contractors, NASA knows that it can be
achieved.
HEFT is seeking one or more human spaceflight architectures that
``close'' by satisfying key stakeholder expectations, including fitting
within projected human spaceflight budget limits. This will enable NASA
to proceed with developments that enable human exploration beyond LEO
as soon as affordable, open up the inner solar system to human
presence, and preserve planning flexibility deep into the future. The
realization of any architecture option is, of course, subject to the
availability of appropriated funds.
The first phase of HEFT concluded in early September 2010, and the
second phase will conclude in December 2010. A smaller HEFT effort may
continue indefinitely since the human spaceflight technical and
programmatic environment will continue to evolve. Ultimately, the goal
for HEFT is to generate a process that evolves into a long-term,
permanent NASA activity to support human spaceflight strategic
planning.
Conclusion
Chairman Nelson and members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010 and how NASA plans to implement that
direction. NASA appreciates all the hard work and effort that has gone
into enacting this legislation.
In the end, one thing is clear; even with the tremendous
accomplishments of our past, NASA's best days are still ahead. NASA is
at the beginning of a great adventure that will create opportunities
and discoveries for generations and so, like you, NASA is eager to get
started on that journey of exploration, both on our home planet and in
the stars above.
I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you or the
other Members of the Committee may have.
Attachment
December 1, 2010
NASA General Counsel Assessment
Implementation of P.L. 111-267, the NASA Authorization Act of 2010
During the Current Continuing Resolution
Summary
Under the current Continuing Resolution, the government is
generally prohibited from commencing new projects or activities. NASA
is therefore continuing work that was already underway on programs and
projects across the agency, many of which were highlighted in the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-267). However, full implementation
of the direction provided by that Act will be challenging if the
restrictive language in the FY 2010 Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117)
and FY 2011 Continuing Resolution (P.L. 111-242) remains in effect
throughout FY 2011. In the Exploration account under these authorities,
NASA is strictly limited to continuing projects or activities for which
funds were available in FY 2010. In addition, NASA is further
prohibited from terminating Constellation program elements, or even
contracts, meaning that NASA must, for example, continue the Orion
program. These provisions are carried forward into FY 2011 by the
Continuing Resolution.
NASA is currently assessing the status of specific programs case-
by-case, and has concluded that existing authorities are sufficient to
allow several to be funded under the CR. NASA will continue to conduct
these assessments for purposes of implementing Authorization Act
direction, but the outcomes will depend on the specific provisions of
appropriations legislation enacted and in effect after the expiration
of the current P.L. 111-242 on December 3, 2010.
Implementation of P.L. 111-267, the NASA Authorization Act of 2010
The NASA Authorization Act provides significant new authority and
direction for the Agency. However, as the Comptroller General has long
maintained:
The mere authorization of an appropriation does not authorize
expenditures on the faith thereof or the making of contracts
obligating the money authorized to be appropriated. 16 Comp.
Gen. 1007, 1008 (1937).
No regular Appropriations Act has been passed, and the government
is operating under a Continuing Resolution, P.L. 111-242. As a general
rule, agencies are constrained from undertaking new programs, projects,
and activities under Continuing Resolutions. Thus, NASA may not
currently implement ``new starts'' under the Authorization Act in most
cases.
A. Statutory Framework
There are several relevant provisions. The Continuing Resolution
itself provides restrictions on new starts, as well as carrying forward
substantive provisions from the prior year's appropriations. For
example, Section 101 provides:
Such amounts as may be necessary, at a rate for operations as
provided in the applicable appropriations Acts for Fiscal Year
2010 and under the authority and conditions provided in such
Acts, for continuing projects or activities (including the
costs of direct loans and loan guarantees) that are not
otherwise specifically provided for in this Act, that were
conducted in Fiscal Year 2010, and for which appropriations,
funds, or other authority were made available in the following
appropriations Acts: [List omitted].
Thus, funds provided under the Continuing Resolution are to be used
for ``continuing projects or activities . . . for which . . . funds . .
. were made available'' by FY 2010 appropriations. The Continuing
Resolution does not provide funding for new projects, since the purpose
of the CR is to be a stop-gap measure enacted to keep existing federal
programs functioning after the expiration of previous budget authority
and until regular appropriation acts can be enacted. This principle is
reinforced by Section 104, which states:
Except as otherwise provided in section 102, no appropriation
or funds made available or authority granted pursuant to
section 101 shall be used to initiate or resume any project or
activity for which appropriations, funds, or other authority
were not available during Fiscal Year 2010.
Further, the Continuing Resolution amounts are provided ``under the
authority and conditions provided in such Acts,'' P.L. 111-242 Section
101, meaning that the provisions of the listed Acts continue to apply.
The Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, is one of the Acts listed in Section
101 of the Continuing Resolution. It contained the following general
provision applicable to NASA:
SEC. 505. (a) None of the funds provided under this Act, or
provided under previous appropriations Acts to the agencies
funded by this Act that remain available for obligation or
expenditure in Fiscal Year 2010, or provided from any accounts
in the Treasury of the United States derived by the collection
of fees available to the agencies funded by this Act, shall be
available for obligation or expenditure through the
reprogramming of funds that----
(1) creates or initiates a new program, project or activity. .
. .
It also contained an appropriation for Exploration, which
appropriated about $3.7 billion for ``exploration research and
development activities.'' The appropriation made the funds available
until September 30, 2011, with the following limitation:
``Provided, That notwithstanding section 505 of this Act, none
of the funds provided herein and from prior years that remain
available for obligation during Fiscal Year 2010 shall be
available for the termination or elimination of any program,
project or activity of the architecture for the Constellation
program nor shall such funds be available to create or initiate
a new program, project or activity, unless such program
termination, elimination, creation, or initiation is provided
in subsequent appropriations Acts.''
This provision was amended by P.L. 111-212 to read:
The matter contained in title III of division B of Public Law
111-117 regarding ``National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Exploration'' is amended by inserting at the end
of the last proviso ``Provided further, That notwithstanding
any other provision of law or regulation, funds made available
for Constellation in Fiscal Year 2010 for `National Aeronautics
and Space Administration Exploration' and from previous
appropriations for `National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Exploration' shall be available to fund
continued performance of Constellation contracts, and
performance of such Constellation contracts may not be
terminated for convenience by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration in Fiscal Year 2010.''
Thus, the general limitation on new starts has been recently
emphasized by Congress with respect to Exploration funding; NASA is
further prohibited from terminating Constellation program elements, or
from terminating contracts for convenience. These provisions are
carried forward into FY 2011 by the Continuing Resolution.
B. GAO Report B-319488
Earlier this year, numerous Members of Congress requested that GAO
assess NASA's planning activities to determine whether NASA had
violated the new starts prohibition contained in P.L. 111-117.
Specifically, NASA had set up several teams to study aspects of the
President's Budget Request. On May 21, 2010, GAO released a report
finding that NASA's activities were in full compliance with the new
start prohibition, primarily because NASA only engaged in planning
activities, and did not take steps to implement any new programs,
projects, or activities. In reaching that conclusion, GAO set forth the
analytical framework to be used when assessing this and other similar
provisions. Comparing the NASA activities with a prior case, GAO
stated:
NASA's actions thus far are in contrast to those of the
Department of Energy (DOE) when it began to implement a loan
guarantee program. B-308715, Apr. 20, 2007. GAO was asked
whether DOE had violated an appropriations prohibition against
implementing or financing a new loan guarantee program. Id.
There, DOE had staffed and operated a program office, drafted
regulations, and solicited and evaluated ``pre-applications.''
Id. We found that DOE had taken concrete measures to implement
the loan guarantee program and, therefore, that DOE's action
violated a statutory provision that barred DOE from using funds
to ``implement or finance'' the loan guarantee program. Id.
DOE's activities went beyond those of NASA's study teams. At
this time, NASA has not created or initiated a new program,
project, or activity. Unlike DOE, NASA has not created a new
office or drafted any regulations. In addition, NASA has not
initiated any procurement actions. B-319488, p. 6.
GAO also found that NASA's action in releasing certain Exploration-
related solicitations did not violate the restriction, since those
solicitations related to existing, authorized programs. Id., fn. 7. GAO
concluded with the following cautionary note:
However, going forward, NASA should be mindful of the
appropriations provision and ensure that its preliminary
planning activities do not evolve into activities that would
create or initiate a new program, project, or activity.
NASA has been and will continue to be mindful of the new starts
restrictions. Following the logic of footnote 7, NASA will also
continue to undertake activities for which funding was available in FY
2010. As noted above, this provision is carried forward by the
Continuing Resolution, and the analysis is applicable to the other
relevant new starts prohibitions as well.
C. Existing Authority
Because of the numerous and binding restrictions on NASA's ability
to initiate new programs, projects, or activities, NASA is strictly
limited to continuing activities for which funds were available in FY
2010. Thus implementation of Authorization Act provisions during the
period of the current Continuing Resolution must, as a general rule,
rely on existing authority. Each of these must be assessed on a case-
by-case basis, and must be individually and specifically tied to prior
authorization and appropriations acts, legislative history, and budget
requests. For example, NASA recently concluded that it could issue a
follow-on to the agency's Commercial Crew Development (CCDev) activity,
called CCDev2. This was permissible because NASA had the authority for
CCDev in FY 2010, not because P.L. 111-267 authorizes an expansion of
CCDev.
Senator Nelson. Ms. Chaplain?
STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR,
ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT; AND
SUSAN A. POLING, MANAGING ASSOCIATE GENERAL COUNSEL,
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO)
Ms. Chaplain. Mr. Chairman, Senator Hutchison, and members
of the Committee, thank you for inviting us here today to
discuss issues NASA faces as it implements the direction
outlined in the Authorization Act of 2010.
Today we will be briefly discussing how the continuing
resolution continues restrictions on NASA's Fiscal Year 2010
appropriations and what steps NASA should take to increase the
likelihood of success as it implements its new direction.
As you know, I am accompanied by Susan Poling, Managing
Associate General Counsel at GAO, who can answer questions
related to the appropriations restrictions.
As you know, NASA's Fiscal Year 2010 appropriations contain
a restriction prohibiting NASA from terminating any program,
project, or activity--that is, PPAs--of the Constellation
program or creating new ones until provided for in a subsequent
appropriations act. These restrictions remain in place today
because NASA is operating under a continuing resolution.
Continuing resolutions are temporary appropriations acts that
Congress enacts to keep existing programs functioning after the
expiration of previous budget authority. What this means for
NASA's implementation of the Authorization Act is that NASA
must carry out the Authorization Act but without terminating or
eliminating any PPA of the Constellation program and without
creating or initiating new ones.
Our opinions from earlier this year may offer NASA some
guidance as it moves forward. We found that NASA did not
violate the prohibition when it convened study teams to conduct
planning activities. Agencies may conduct planning activities
as part of the budget process, and NASA's planning activities
earlier this year did not create a new PPA.
NASA also continued to obligate funds to all the existing
PPAs of the Constellation program. As long as NASA did not
improperly create or terminate a PPA, NASA has discretion in
how it carries out the Constellation program consistent with
the Congress' statutory direction. Shifts in priority do not,
in and of themselves, constitute the termination or elimination
of a PPA.
With regard to our perspectives on steps NASA needs to take
to increase the likelihood of success as it implements the
authorization, I would like to highlight recommendations
related to how NASA manages its largest investments. Recently
it has been reported that the James Webb Telescope may now cost
$6.5 billion or more while its baseline estimate set just 2
years ago was about $5 billion. Our studies have highlighted
similar cases of large costs and schedule overruns in recent
years, for example, with Mars Science Lab, the Glory Mission,
and the National Preparatory Project.
Further, more than a decade of studies have consistently
pointed to weaknesses and cost estimating contractor oversight,
funding stability, management reserves, as well as technology
and design problems that manifest late in the acquisition
process. Thus, we would like to see NASA commit to the
following key practices.
First, base decisions to move programs forward on tangible
knowledge about requirements and resources. NASA's policies
have incorporated many of the best practices GAO has advocated,
but we still do not always see these policies translated into
decisions. Some of the most expensive efforts are allowed to
proceed in the more complex phases of development while there
are still considerable unknowns about requirements, time needed
to execute programs, cost, available funding, and available
technology.
Second, NASA needs to prioritize investments so projects
can be fully funded and it is clear where projects stand in
relation to the overall portfolio. When funding profiles do not
match up with the real needs of projects like James Webb or
Constellation, higher risk development paths often become the
only way to keep projects alive. Moreover, projects within NASA
are often not prioritized until a large cost overrun is
discovered and good programs are left to pay for poor
performers.
Third, NASA still needs to instill greater accountability.
The recent study on James Webb found that lines of authority
and accountability are not clear and that ongoing, regular
independent assessment and oversight processes at the agency
are missing. Our view is that until accountability is
instilled, NASA will struggle in its implementation of the good
practices it has embraced in recent years.
I would like to note that aspects of the practices detailed
in our written statement are reflected in the authorization for
the new space launch system. We would like to see such measures
extend across the acquisition portfolio. At the same time, it
is important that Congress enable NASA to be realistic about
what it can do and cannot do under the direction of the
authorization and to support and assist the agency as it makes
difficult trade-off decisions between resources, that is time
and money, and requirements.
This concludes our opening statement, and Susan and I are
happy to answer any questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cristina T. Chaplain, Director, Acquisition and
Sourcing Management; and Susan A. Poling, Managing Associate General
Counsel, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting us here today to discuss issues NASA faces
as it transitions to and implements the direction outlined by the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010.\1\ The steps that NASA takes to implement
the direction in the Authorization Act will set the stage for whether
it can accomplish the goals of the authorization within the timeframes
and resources as directed. NASA projects have produced ground-breaking
research and advanced our understanding of the universe. However, our
work shows that another common theme binds most of the projects--they
cost more and take longer to develop than planned. Frequently they are
approved without evidence of a sound business case that ensures a match
between requirements and reasonably expected resources. In today's
fiscal environment, it is clear that this condition cannot be
sustained.
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\1\ Pub. L. No. 111-267, 124 Stat. 2805 (Oct. 11, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In March, several members of the House of Representatives asked us
for information and our views on, among other things, whether NASA
complied with restrictions in the 2010 Exploration appropriation when
it took certain actions pertaining to the Constellation program. Based
on that request, we issued two legal opinions this summer.\2\ The NASA
Authorization Act of 2010, as signed into law by the President in
October 2010, challenges NASA to develop new human spaceflight systems
and use the commercial space industry and international partnerships to
develop new technologies for space exploration, but NASA must still
comply with the restrictions in the Fiscal Year 2010 Exploration
appropriation. Regardless of the changes resulting from the
Authorization Act, one thing that will remain constant is NASA's need
to efficiently and effectively manage programs and projects. Against
this backdrop, our testimony today will focus on: (1) how the
Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011 \3\ continues the restrictions in
the Fiscal Year 2010 Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act,\4\ and how they relate to the recently enacted NASA
Authorization Act and (2) steps NASA should take to reduce its
acquisition risk and increase the likelihood of success as it
implements its new direction outlined in the NASA Authorization Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ B-320091, July 23, 2010; B-319488, May 21, 2010.
\3\ Pub. L. No. 111-242, 124 Stat. 2607 (Sept. 30, 2010).
\4\ Pub. L. No. 111-117, div. B, tit. III, 123 Stat. 3034, 3113
(Dec. 16, 2009).
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In preparing this statement, we relied on completed and ongoing
work. Our audit work examining best practices for system development
and assessing NASA's major projects was performed in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
Appropriation Restrictions Remain in Effect
In October 2009, the Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans
Committee issued a report which concluded that the human spaceflight
program is on an ``unsustainable trajectory.'' \5\ The conference
report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 stated
that ``the Committee's work raises issues requiring thoughtful
consideration by the Administration and the Congress'' but that ``it is
premature for the conferees to advocate or initiate significant changes
to the current program absent a bona fide proposal from the
Administration and subsequent assessment, consideration and enactment
by Congress.'' \6\ Accordingly, Congress appropriated about $3.7
billion for ``exploration research and development activities,'' but
provided that none of the funds from 2010 or prior years
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee, Seeking a
Human Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation, available at
www.nasa.gov/offices/hsf/home/index.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
The Committee is commonly known as the Augustine Commission, after its
Chairman, Norman R. Augustine.
\6\ H.R. Rep. No. 111-366, at 755 (2009).
``shall be available for the termination or elimination of any
program, project or activity of the architecture for the
Constellation program nor shall such funds be available to
create or initiate a new program, project or activity, unless
such program termination, elimination, creation, or initiation
is provided in subsequent appropriations Acts.'' \7\
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\7\ Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, div. B, title III, 123 Stat. 3034,
3113, 3143 (Dec. 16, 2009).
These are the restrictions that we addressed in our recent legal
opinions. Currently, NASA is operating under the Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2011 (Continuing Resolution), which Congress
enacted on September 30. Continuing resolutions are temporary
appropriations acts that Congress enacts to keep existing programs
functioning after the expiration of previous budget authority. Most
continuing resolutions, including the one under which NASA is currently
operating, incorporate by reference the conditions and restrictions
contained in prior years' appropriations acts or the appropriations
bills currently under consideration. In this case, the Continuing
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Resolution provided amounts to NASA
``at a rate for operations as provided in the applicable
appropriations Acts for Fiscal Year 2010 and under the
authority and conditions provided in such Acts, for continuing
projects or activities . . . that are not otherwise
specifically provided for in this Act.'' \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Pub. L. No. 111-242, 101.
(Emphasis added.) Like most continuing resolutions, the current
Continuing Resolution also prohibits new activities and projects for
which funds were not available in the prior fiscal year.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Pub. L. No. 111-242, 104.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
About a month ago, Congress enacted the NASA Authorization Act of
2010 (Authorization Act),\10\ which provided specific direction on a
number of issues related to human space flight and space technology.
The Authorization Act requires that NASA undertake a number of
initiatives, but NASA still needs appropriations to carry out these
activities. As you know, under the Constitution, ``no Money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law.'' \11\ The Continuing Resolution provides funds for NASA, but only
``under the authority and conditions provided'' in the Fiscal Year 2010
Exploration appropriation.\12\
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\10\ Pub. L. No. 111-267.
\11\ U.S. Const. art. I, 9, cl. 7.
\12\ Pub. L. No. 111-242, 101.
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One of the conditions in the Fiscal Year 2010 NASA appropriation is
the limitation discussed in our recent opinions that funds are not
available ``for the termination or elimination of any program, project
or activity of the architecture for the Constellation program'' nor are
they available to ``create or initiate a new program, project or
activity, unless such program termination, elimination, creation, or
initiation is provided in subsequent appropriations Acts'' (emphasis
added). Thus NASA must still comply with the restrictions contained in
the Fiscal Year 2010 Exploration appropriation. What this means for
NASA's implementation of the Authorization Act is that NASA must carry
out the Authorization Act \13\ but without terminating, eliminating any
program, project, or activity of the Constellation program and without
creating or initiating a new program, project, or activity.\14\
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\13\ ``[W]hen two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the
duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention
to the contrary, to regard each as effective.'' Andrus v. Glover
Construction Co., 446 U.S. 608, 618-619 (1980).
\14\ In addition to the restriction pertaining specifically to the
Constellation program, the Continuing Resolution also bars the use of
funds ``to initiate or resume any project or activity for which
appropriations, funds, or other authority were not available during
Fiscal Year 2010.'' Pub. L. No. 111-242, 104.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because the continuing resolution subjects NASA's current
appropriation to the Fiscal Year 2010 restriction, our two opinions
this year may offer NASA some guidance as it goes forward since we
analyzed various actions related to the Constellation program to
determine if NASA was complying with the restriction. In both opinions,
we concluded that NASA did not violate the restrictions in the Fiscal
Year 2010 Exploration appropriation. In May,\15\ we noted that Congress
prohibited NASA from using Exploration funds to bring into being a new
program, project, or activity.\16\ We concluded that NASA did not
violate this restriction when it convened study teams to conduct
planning activities. Agencies must conduct planning activities as part
of the budget process, and the prohibition in the Exploration
appropriation did not preclude the use of funds for planning purposes.
Further, NASA's planning activities did not result in the use of funds
to create or initiate a new program, project, or activity.\17\
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\15\ B-319488, May 21, 2010.
\16\ A ``program, project, or activity'' is ``[a]n element within a
budget account. For annually appropriated accounts, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and agencies identify [programs, projects,
or activities] by reference to committee reports and budget
justifications.'' GAO, A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget
Process, GAO-05-734SP (Washington, D.C.: September 2005).
\17\ NASA's actions differed from those of the Department of Energy
(DOE) when it began to implement a loan guarantee program. B-308715,
Apr. 20, 2007. There we found that DOE had staffed and operated a
program office, drafted regulations, and solicited and evaluated ``pre-
applications.'' Therefore, we concluded that DOE violated a statutory
provision that barred it from using funds to ``implement or finance''
the loan guarantee program. In contrast, NASA had not created a new
office or drafted any regulations; instead, NASA staff developed
preliminary plans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In July,\18\ we considered whether NASA improperly terminated or
eliminated any program, project, or activity of the Constellation
program. We determined that NASA had five programs, projects, or
activities within the ``Constellation Systems'' category:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ B-320091, July 23, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program Integration and Operations,
Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle,
Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle,
Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle, and
Commercial Crew and Cargo.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ NASA, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Estimates, at EXP-2, available
at www.nasa.gov/news/budget/FY2010.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
We concluded that NASA did not terminate or eliminate any program,
project, or activity of the Constellation program because NASA
continued to obligate Exploration appropriations to all five of the
Constellation programs, projects, and activities. NASA diverted no
Exploration funds to create a new program, project, or activity. We
also noted that as long as NASA does not improperly create or terminate
a program, project, or activity, the agency has discretion in how it
carries out the Constellation program consistent with Congress's
statutory direction. Shifts in priority do not in themselves constitute
the termination or elimination of a program, project, or activity.
Steps NASA Should Take to Reduce Acquisition Risk and Increase the
Likelihood of Success as it Implements the Authorization Act
Regardless of its current restrictions, once NASA begins to
implement the new direction outlined in the Authorization Act, it will
need to adopt new ways of doing business--particularly with respect to
matching requirements to resources, managing costs, increasing
transparency into the most critical phases of development, and
strengthening accountability--to reduce acquisition risk and increase
likelihood of success. Our work has consistently shown that NASA's
projects cost more and take longer to develop than planned. This year,
for example, we reported that 10 NASA projects that had their cost and
schedule baselines set within the last 3 years experienced cost growth
averaging $121 million, or 18.7 percent, and schedule growth averaging
15 months.\20\ Many of the projects we reviewed experienced challenges
developing new or retrofitting older technologies, stabilizing
engineering designs, and managing the performance of contractors and
development partners. These challenges, and the significant cost growth
experienced by NASA projects after they were baselined, occurred as a
result of projects being approved with considerable unknowns about
requirements, technologies, costs, or other resources. Our reports have
highlighted the risk that the Constellation Program was headed in this
same direction. For example, in 2009 we reported that Constellation
program had significant technical and design challenges that until
resolved would hinder NASA's ability to reliably estimate the time and
funding needed to execute the program. In addition, the Constellation
program's poorly phased funding plan has affected the program's ability
to deal with technical challenges.\21\ Similarly, the Review of U.S.
Human Spaceflight Plans Committee reported that ``the U.S. human
spaceflight program appears to be on an unsustainable trajectory. It is
perpetuating the perilous practice of pursuing goals that do not match
allocated resources.'' \22\
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\20\ GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects, GAO-
10-227SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2010).
\21\ GAO, NASA: Constellation Program Cost and Schedule Will Remain
Uncertain Until a Sound Business Case Is Established, GAO-09-844
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 26, 2009).
\22\ Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee, Seeking a
Human Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation, available at
www.nasa.gov/offices/hsf/home/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While space development projects are complex and difficult by
nature, and most are one-time efforts, the nature of the work should
not preclude NASA from being accountable for achieving what it promises
when requesting and receiving funds. Moreover, measures can be taken to
better position programs for success, which we believe should be
emphasized as the Authorization Act is implemented. Specifically, our
past work has shown that developing a sound business case, based on
matching requirements to available and reasonably expected resources--
including time, dollars, technology, and people--before committing to a
new development effort, reduces risk and increases the likelihood of
success.\23\ GAO's work has shown that how well an agency matches
resources with requirements sets the stage for the eventual outcome--
desirable or problematic--of the project. The match is ultimately
achieved in every development project, but in successful development
projects, it occurs before significant commitments and investments are
made.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Key Decisions to Be Made on Future
Combat System, GAO-07-376 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2007); Defense
Acquisitions: Improved Business Case Key for Future Combat System's
Success, GAO-06-564T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2006); NASA:
Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework Could Lead to
Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes, GAO-06-218
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 21, 2005); NASA's Space Vision: Business Case
for Prometheus 1 Needed to Ensure Requirements Match Available
Resources, GAO-05-242 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have reported that steps agencies should take prior to
undertaking new projects include:
Prioritizing investments so projects can be fully funded and
it is clear where projects stand in relation to the overall
portfolio.
Following an evolutionary path toward meeting needs rather
than attempting to satisfy all needs in a single step.
Matching requirements to resources--that is, time, money,
technology, and people--before undertaking a new development
effort.
Researching and defining requirements before projects start
and limiting changes after they start.
Ensuring cost estimates are complete, accurate, and updated
regularly.
Committing to fully fund projects before they begin.
Ensuring critical technologies are proven to work as
intended before projects start.
Assigning more ambitious technology development efforts to
research departments until they are ready to be added to future
generations (increments) of a project.
Using systems engineering to close gaps between resources
and requirements before launching the development process.\24\
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\24\ GAO, Space Acquisitions: Major Space Programs Still at Risk
for Cost and Schedule Increases, GAO-08-552T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 4,
2008).
Our work has shown that projects that have not attained the level
of knowledge needed to support a sound business case that proceed to
development have been plagued by cost overruns, schedule delays,
decreased capability, and overall poor performance. This phenomenon is
not unique to NASA--the Department of Defense and the Department of
Homeland Security experience the same outcomes with many of their
acquisition programs. If the knowledge the project has attained does
not confirm the business case on which the acquisition was originally
justified, the best practice organizations we have studied do not allow
the project to proceed.
Critical to success is performance and requirements flexibility in
early phases of development. NASA needs to be open to reducing
expectations, deferring them to future projects, or to investing more
resources up front to eliminate gaps between resources and
expectations. In successful projects we have studied, requirements were
flexible until a decision was made to commit to development given the
desire to obtain the capability as soon as possible. This makes it
acceptable to reduce, eliminate, or defer some capabilities so the
project's requirements could be matched with the resources available to
deliver it within the desired time frame.
In addition to ensuring projects establish a business case before
they are approved for long-term financial commitments, both program
officials and senior leaders need to be held accountable for executing
the project by the most efficient and effective means. To that end, the
NASA projects need to be structured to ensure that decisionmakers,
including NASA and Congress, have the insight necessary to make
informed, knowledge-based decisions and hold project managers
accountable for managing projects effectively and efficiently. We have
reported that during development, NASA should ensure its decisionmakers
do the following:
Use quantitative data and demonstrable knowledge to make go/
no-go decisions, covering critical facets of the project such
as cost, schedule, technology readiness, design readiness,
production readiness, and relationships with suppliers.
Establish consistent metrics to measure design readiness and
ensure they are met before development proceeds.
Empower project managers to make decisions about the
direction of the project and to resolve problems and implement
solutions and hold them accountable for their choices.
Ensure contractors are holding suppliers accountable to
deliver high-quality parts for their products through such
activities as regular supplier audits and performance
evaluations of quality and delivery, among other things.
Encourage project managers to share bad news, and promote
collaboration and communication.
Over the past several years NASA has moved to incorporate a more
knowledge-based approach to managing its development projects and
instill a stronger focus on managing costs. For example, NASA has taken
steps to enhance cost-estimating methodologies and ensure that
independent estimates are used to provide decisionmakers with an
objective representation of likely project cost and schedule. As a
result, NASA has begun to budget its projects at a higher degree of
confidence. Broader steps NASA is taking focus on strengthening program
and project management, facilitating monitoring of contractor cost
performance, improving agency-wide business processes, and improving
financial management.\25\
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\25\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-09-271 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While NASA has laid out a broad plan for reducing acquisition risk,
more needs to be done as the Authorization Act is implemented. For
example,
NASA does not use a common measure to assess design
stability before allowing programs to move from the design
phase to the test and integration phases of the development
process. At the same time, our studies and others have found
that significant cost growth occurs in these phases and, in
some instances, has tied these problems to issues related to
design. Moreover, a recent study by the National Research
Council found that the critical design review milestone for
many missions may be held prematurely--driven by schedule
rather than driven by design maturity. GAO reports and this
study have found that critical design review approval of an
immature design can cause downstream problems for complex
acquisitions such as integration difficulties and late changes.
NASA does not provide enough transparency in the early,
critical phases of development to help Congress identify risks
and inefficiencies and ensure earlier accountability.
Currently, NASA only begins to publicly share cost and schedule
information for projects that have been formally approved to
enter development. To add some perspective to this timing,
neither the Ares nor Orion projects have reached this point,
despite having spent over $9 billion dollars combined; and the
James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) just reached this point in
2008, despite having spent nearly $2 billion prior to that
time. While there is a need to allow projects a period of time
for discovery and to pursue different concepts--particularly
highly complex efforts such as JWST--inadequate transparency
into their progress for what sometimes amounts to 5 or more
years can preclude effective oversight and accountability and
make it even more difficult to stop projects that are not on
track to meet the agency's goals with available resources.
An independent study released just last week of problems
affecting the James Webb Telescope program concluded that
significant changes are still needed in NASA's oversight and
accountability functions to ensure that programs base their
decisions on sound knowledge, noting that NASA's governance
policy is not consistent with accountability for project
execution. In particular, the study found that lack of clear
lines of authority and accountability contributed to a lack of
executive leadership in resolving the broken JWST life-cycle
cost baseline. The study found that JWST's flawed budget should
have been discovered as part of the Goddard Spaceflight
Center's execution responsibility, but the interpretation of
the agency's governance policy on the role of the center in
this regard is ambiguous and not uniformly interpreted within
NASA. The study also noted that ongoing, regular independent
assessment and oversight processes at the agency are missing.
Because NASA is pushing the exploratory envelope, it is reasonable
for unexpected problems and discoveries to occur. Not all projects will
go as planned. On the other hand, it is clear from recent findings from
the JWST Independent Review, the National Research Council (NRC), and
GAO's continued assessments of major projects that inherent risks to
spacecraft development are being exacerbated by poor management and
oversight practices. While NASA still needs to make fundamental changes
to how it plans, manages, and oversees its major investments, it will
be a challenging endeavor as the agency is faced with implementing a
new direction for its human spaceflight programs, retiring the space
shuttle, and balancing investments among its science portfolios. Our
reports, as well as recent studies by the NRC and the JWST Independent
Review Team, however, provide a map that can help NASA adopt best
practices and more effectively manage investments. As stressed in our
2009 high-risk report, to maximize NASA's investment dollars,
implementation of these steps needs to be complemented by vigorous
executive leadership to foster the expansion of a business-oriented
culture and a sustained commitment to identify and take action on
projects that are not achieving cost, schedule, or performance goals
upon which they were based when they were initiated.\26\
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\26\ GAO-09-271.
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Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be
glad to answer any questions that you or members of the Committee have
at this time.
Senator Nelson. I thank all of you for your testimony and
thank all of you for your public service.
Dr. Holdren, do you intend to follow the law in the NASA
authorization bill?
Dr. Holdren. Absolutely, we are committed to following the
law. The President signed it. The Congress passed it. We will
follow it, and we will execute it and implement it to the best
of our ability.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Robinson, as the Chief Financial
Office, are you intending to follow the law?
Dr. Robinson. Most definitely.
Senator Nelson. I want to ask you about a statement that
you made on page 4 of your testimony that would indicate
otherwise. In speaking about the implementation, the following
guidance to the Constellation program at the top of page 4, you
note in the execution under the existing appropriations of the
law that the following priorities have been in place since the
June replan. And you go on to list avoid termination of prime
contracts and continue development of critical capabilities.
And then you list prioritize investments that support the
initiatives under the 2011 President's budget request and the
NASA Authorization Act of 2010.
The President's budget request is history. The law is now
the authorization bill. So are you suggesting in this testimony
that you intend to follow the President's budget request
instead of the law?
Dr. Robinson. No, not at all. To us the end is very
important. What we were trying to convey there is there are
some elements in the Authorization Act which were discussed and
presented in the budget. And so to the extent that there was
guidance there and parameters, we wanted to make sure that the
program was looking at those because that is the basics of
budgeting. Right? We present a proposal and if you say yes,
then you expect us to follow our proposal, and that is all we
are saying there.
Senator Nelson. The reason I bring this up is exactly what
Senator Vitter had raised in his comments, that there have been
plenty of messages that have been sent to the overseers--which
is this committee--that certain elements of NASA and other
parts of the Administration intend to follow their own
directions instead of the law. And as a matter of fact, you
would lend to that by this statement. So I am glad that you
clarified that for the record.
Dr. Holdren, how would you characterize the
Administration's support for the entire Authorization Act?
Dr. Holdren. We support it wholly, sir. Again, you passed
it. The President signed it. It is the law of the land. We
intend to implement it. We support it. We are looking forward
to working with this committee and the rest of the Congress in
getting that done. We are looking forward to the additional
guidance and the resources that will come with appropriations
that will make it easier to move forward rapidly with all of
the elements of the Authorization Act. But we support it fully.
Senator Nelson. What direction have you as the Science
Advisor to the President given to the agency to assure what you
just said: the full, faithful, and timely implementation?
Dr. Holdren. I have spoken with Administrator Bolden, with
Deputy Administrator Garver, with the CFO, the Honorable Beth
Robinson, who is here with me, and we have had no trouble
coming to complete agreement, that NASA is in full support of
the law that has been passed and signed. And we will implement
it. We are in complete agreement on that. I did not need to
offer any particular further guidance because that was already
NASA's position, but I have been very clear it is the
President's position. I have been assured that it is NASA's
position.
Senator Nelson. As you know, the President's initial
proposal, as referenced by Dr. Robinson in her statement on
page 4, as Senator Hutchison had said, was met with a great
deal of resistance to some of its elements. I think part of it
was in some cases a poor choice of words: the President's
budget request, for example, utilizing the word ``cancel'' the
Constellation program instead of using the word ``redirect''
the Constellation program. And it gave perceptions and
impressions that did not reflect the President's true intention
about a manned space program.
And yet, since then we have seen that some people, whether
it be that or it be the question of the appropriations on the
commercial crew program, whatever it was, feel strongly that
the President's proposal was the only way to go. I think you
have sufficiently given the authority as the President's
Science Advisor what this committee needs now in stating that
the President's signature on the law is now the President's
proposal. And that is what we are going to proceed with.
Dr. Robinson, do you concur with what Dr. Holdren said?
Dr. Robinson. Definitely. We are very committed to moving
forward on all aspects of the law. From our perspective, we are
doing that. I regret if there have been any messages to the
contrary because we are very excited at NASA about this new
path and implementing as fast as we can.
Senator Nelson. Last June, a national space policy was
articulated. It is broader. It has goals and objectives.
What do you think about--Dr. Holdren, is the Authorization
Act that is now signed into law the new national space policy?
Dr. Holdren. Well, Senator, it is the authorization for
NASA. It is the law, and we will follow it. As far as I can
see, it is consistent with the national space policy which
also, however, addresses some additional issues related, for
example, to national security and homeland security and the
role of space in that domain, issues that are not specifically
addressed in the Authorization Act. I think these two documents
coexist nicely.
Senator Nelson. Senator Hutchison?
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
Let me say I am very pleased to hear both of you being very
clear and very supportive, and that is what we all are looking
for to go forward.
Let me ask Dr. Robinson. There is a specific part of the
law which I will read. Section 101 of the law that passed this
year states, after providing an authorized funding level for
the space operations line: ``. . . of which $1,609,700,000
shall be for the Space Shuttle to support Space Shuttle flight
operations and related activities.''
Further, in section 503 of the same law, it states: ``The
Administrator shall fly the launch-on-need shuttle mission
currently designated in the shuttle flight manifest, dated
February 28, 2010.''
Finally, in section 503, it says: ``Amounts authorized to
be appropriated by section 101 shall be available for the
mission authorized by paragraph 1.''
So given that precise language, is it your understanding,
Dr. Robinson, that the law requires NASA to conduct that
mission subject, obviously, to safety certifications and that
type of requirement?
Dr. Robinson. The law definitely does. The only caveat that
I would put forth is that we still do not have the final
appropriations. So we do not know if we have the money to carry
it out. But it is NASA's complete intention to fly the third
flight.
Senator Hutchison. But if we pass a long-term CR--we are
not sure yet if it will be a short-term/long-term CR. But if
there is the long-term CR and it would provide, as the Chairman
has stated earlier, $18.7 billion at least, it would cover,
given the priorities of the bill, that capability to go
forward, which we will know in the next few weeks? I mean, time
is running out.
Dr. Robinson. Right. Definitely. If we were operating on a
long-term CR, we would have enough funding to fly the third
flight.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you. Of course, the reason that we
were so specific is that we are looking for the reports now on
the needs of the station and trying to forecast any equipment,
any kind of emergency capability that we might need to keep the
station operative to fulfill the investment that we have made
in it for research. So it is essential that we have that report
so that we are able to know what is needed in the last shuttles
because that will be our last chance.
Now, I would ask Dr. Holdren, as well as you, Dr. Robinson.
If we are all on the same wavelength here, that we have got to
get the report--and what we are hearing is that there might be
an interim report, with the President's 2012 budget request.
But we need a full-steam-ahead effort to determine what is
going to be needed for the Space Station because we are moving
up on the last two shuttles next year. So could I hear from
both of you on your view of that priority and on the reports?
Dr. Robinson. We fully agree with you, and the reports are
on track. I do know this is also an issue of the manifest that
Space Operations Mission Directorate works consistently. And so
we fully expect to have those reports up on time.
Dr. Holdren. Yes. I would just add I completely agree with
what the CFO has just said. Certainly the future of the Space
Station and how we manage that and how we provide for it is one
of those areas where the President's initial proposal and the
bill that is now law, the Authorization Act, are in complete
agreement. We are completely with you.
Senator Hutchison. Well, I am pleased that the President
does focus on the need to use the station for this purpose and
has extended its capability or, hopefully, the use of it beyond
the original end date that we had because, of course, there has
been such a lag time in the development of the next crew launch
vehicle and so we have to deal with that. But I think that
going forward on a quicker timeline than was in the President's
for the next vehicle so that we know we have that capability,
hopefully, quicker is something that we have got to all work
together to do.
Let me ask this. The holding back of funds that might be
made available to begin the development for the space launch
system and the multipurpose crew vehicle--obviously in our bill
the highest priority is in the Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate, ahead of things like space technology initiatives
which the law clearly states are activities expected to be
undertaken in later years.
Can you give our committee assurances that the
Congressional intent to aggressively pursue immediate
initiation of the space launch system and crew exploration
vehicle development activities will be followed? Both of you--
Dr. Holdren?
Dr. Holdren. Senator, we are going to follow the law. I
cannot emphasize that enough. It is the law. We are going to
follow it.
Dr. Robinson. I would further say we have already begun
those efforts, the planning and design efforts.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Senator Vitter?
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to go back to this issue of the restrictive language
in the continuing resolution from the 2010 Appropriations Act
because I think if we really want to solve that problem, it is
easily, easily solved. I think the almost certain next step, in
terms of funding, is going to be another CR for some length of
time. As the Chairman indicated, that would put NASA funding
extremely close to what is outlined in our new Authorization
Act, less than a 2 percent difference. In the grand scheme of
things, that difference is trivial. So, therefore, for that
next step, it seems to me it should be easy to all agree on
clarifying language saying that anything from that 2010
Appropriations Act inconsistent with the new 2010 Authorization
Act will have no force and effect, except the overall funding
level which should not be a big deal to come down $300 million
out of however many billion.
Given that the Authorization Act passed unanimously in the
Senate and by a three-fourths vote in the House, it should not
be a big hurdle to insert that language in a new CR. Maybe I am
missing something, but if we are really trying to accomplish
that, it should be a no-brainer.
Have you developed language to accomplish that for the new
CR, and have you told Congressional leaders that the President
absolutely wants that language included?
Dr. Robinson. We have developed that language. We have been
working with staff on the authorization committees and
appropriations committees. As you point out, it is a relatively
simple matter in terms of legislative language, and we do fully
support it at NASA.
Senator Vitter. As Administration policy, have you said the
President absolutely wants this language included so that we
can fully, without any restriction, accomplish the new
Authorization Act?
Dr. Holdren. I cannot say for sure to whom that message has
been communicated up until now because legislative affairs is
not something I can keep track of to that detail. But certainly
that message will be communicated if it has not already been
communicated to the key folks.
Senator Vitter. Can you put that message in writing, and
can I get a copy?
Dr. Holdren. Sure.
Senator Vitter. And can I get a copy of your drafted
language that you think will do the trick?
Dr. Robinson. Sure.
Senator Vitter. OK, great.
I am a recovering lawyer. So that is dangerous. It seems to
me it should be pretty simple, something like no language in
the Fiscal Year 2010 NASA Appropriations Act inconsistent with
the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, except the overall NASA
funding level, shall continue to have force and effect.
Something like that. Maybe that is not the perfect language,
but something like that. Do you have any reaction to the
general notion?
Dr. Robinson. That sounds like it would work. I think the
draft that we have is more forward-looking, basically saying
anything that is in the Authorization Act NASA is allowed to
do, and we also remove the specific restrictions. It is a
different approach. Same idea.
Senator Vitter. OK. Well, again, if you all could send me--
and I am sure the others would like to see it--both the draft
language and the letter to appropriate leadership, committee
chairmen, stating that it is the Administration's position that
this really needs to be included. Thank you.
And I would like to ask the folks from GAO if they have a
reaction to that solution to the problem that your report
highlights.
Ms. Poling. I think it is important that there be an
anomaly in any continuing resolution so that there is no
question that NASA can move forward, and the form that that
takes--as you just discussed, there are probably many forms
that it could take. You might also want to include in it that
the no new starts provision of the continuing resolution also
would not apply.
Senator Vitter. I mean, you can do it different ways, but
my language would clearly cancel that out because that is
inconsistent with the Authorization Act.
Ms. Poling. Perhaps, but you referenced it back to the 2010
appropriations which has its own set of restrictions. The
continuing resolution has a different set of restrictions.
Senator Vitter. OK, good point. So we would have to include
any language in the CR----
Ms. Poling. I think so, yes.
Senator Vitter.--that is inconsistent would not have force
and effect.
Ms. Poling. Yes. You want to relate it back to both Acts
and to the amendment that was passed in late July that also had
to do with termination of contracts.
Senator Vitter. OK. Well, I just wanted to focus on this.
But let me underscore quickly I think we are going to have
another CR. As the Chairman said, that funding level for the
next Fiscal Year will be right about at where it is in the
authorization bill. So this should be a simple task if we
really all want to accomplish it. And so the proof will be in
the pudding if it gets done. And so I look forward to getting
that done in the next CR.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. And Senator Vitter, it is actually even
closer. I was rounding it, the $300 million difference. It is
actually a difference of $276 million. The funding level in
last year's 2010 appropriations was $18.724 billion.
Senator Warner?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK WARNER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start by
thanking you for working with me and others on another, I
think, critical piece of NASA's program, the commercial
development side and the private sector side. And I was happy
to hear in Dr. Holdren's comments a recommitment to that part
of the program.
I wanted to make a couple of quick comments and then ask
reflection from Dr. Holdren and Ms. Robinson.
It appears the commercial spacecraft side of the house
seems to have accomplished quite a few milestones for basically
small--less than $50 million so far in the commercial crew
development. I was pleased to see today, for example, on a
related--but something I think will dominate, I hope, all of
our efforts going forward--that the President's Deficit
Commission final report which in the preliminary report had
said perhaps this investment in the commercial side of the
house from the public dollars should not be included--that part
was actually dropped out. So I think the Deficit Commission
concurred with those of us who believe that the commercial
side, both in terms of a viable, new worldwide industry for
America to take a lead in and for more public/private
partnerships with NASA--I think it is going to be a critical
part of our space future. And I just want to--again, in
recognizing that the Chairman helped build this into the 2010
authorization, I would like to get a couple of quick comments
from Dr. Holdren or Ms. Robinson on that subject.
Dr. Holdren. Well, first of all, let me join you, Senator
Warner, in welcoming the fact that the Deficit Commission
dropped from their report that was just released, the
proposition that this would not have been a good investment. We
think it is a terrific investment. We think we are going to get
great value for the money invested in terms of the future of a
commercial space industry and the jobs and opportunities that
will provide and, as I noted in my testimony, meeting at the
same time a critical national need. So we are grateful that
this element is in the authorization bill. We are grateful that
the Deficit Commission did not put a bull's eye on it, and we
are very optimistic about progress in that domain.
As you probably know, the SpaceX launch of Falcon 9 with
the Dragon spacecraft is now scheduled for December 7. This
will be the first time that a commercial craft has actually
reentered, and we are very excited about it. We think that the
industry has terrific prospects, and I agree with you that it
has made a substantial amount of progress so far with rather
modest resources. We are going to see a lot more progress.
Dr. Robinson. You also pointed to the commercial crew
development effort that was begun last year, and I also just
wanted to point out that the Authorization Act encouraged us to
continue that effort in 2001, and we have done that. We are
going out with another round of--to seek another round of
proposals because we do think tremendous things came of that
effort, and we hope it will continue in this year.
Senator Warner. Let me raise one other issue with my
remaining time which is a little off subject and candidly not
an area that is a huge piece of the NASA budget, but that is
the NASA aeronautics program. I am blessed to have a large
piece of that in my state at NASA Langley.
But I would like a comment from you all, that it seems to
me that one of the real growth areas again from an industry-
wide standpoint is the development of a more fuel-efficient
aeronautics program worldwide. I think no one sees a
diminishment of the amount of air traffic. Obviously, in other
parts of this committee, we have looked at the enormous needs
we have to upgrade our aviation control system with NextGen,
but actually redesigning 21st century airplanes in a more fuel-
efficient way to my mind is one of the great next frontiers.
I would like, again, either one of you to make a brief
comment on how you see the NASA aeronautics program. We saw a
small increase in the authorization in Fiscal Year 2010. What
kind of potential do you see for growth in that field?
Dr. Holdren. Well, first of all, I can only agree that
there is tremendous potential in the domain of more fuel-
efficient aircraft and the development of those. And there is
also tremendous potential, as you have noted, in upgrading our
national air traffic control system to a 21st century standard.
NASA's role in advancing these goals is an important one, and
we intend to pursue it vigorously.
Senator Warner. And Mr. Chairman, I would just add that
this is an area in which I think there has yet to be a hub.
Whether this will be America leading the way or Europe or
elsewhere on the development of next generation aeronautics and
aviation I think is an open question. And I hope in this coming
year we will get a chance to look at this issue more deeply and
make sure that America takes an appropriate leadership role in
this field.
Senator Nelson. And Senator Warner, you might note that
there was a huge plus-up in the aeronautics part of this
budget, some $422 million, which was a substantial percentage
increase for the aeronautics. And of course, it all plays into
the skies of the future, all the needs on upgrades that we are
seeing there in the FAA.
Senator Warner. Great leadership by the Chairman.
Senator Nelson. And Senator Hutchison.
Senator Warner. And Ranking Member.
Senator Nelson. My colleague, Senator LeMieux.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE S. LeMIEUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this hearing. Thank you all for being here. Thank you
for your public service.
As I know you know from my colleague from Florida, these
issues of NASA are very important to our state, and it is a
very emotional issue because where America first reached for
the stars was from Florida. And we have this huge investment in
our communities in the space coast, and we have a lot of folks
now who are worried about losing their jobs and who will be
losing their jobs in an area that is already economically
depressed.
When I first came to the U.S. Senate and learned sort of
the process, it gave me a lot of consternation about where we
are with manned space travel. And it was described that the
Constellation program was vision without funding. And it
occurred to me that the Administration's original proposal was
funding without vision. But we came to a consensus on this
committee, and with the good work of the people on this
committee, we came to this authorization bill. It is not my
first choice. I would have liked more, but it was a good
consensus-building product I think.
Now, I have read--Madam CFO--I have been reading your
statement, and I am concerned that Congress has gotten in the
way of you implementing this bill. You have made very positive
statements today, all of you, about you are going forward, it
is the law of the land, and you support it. But in your
testimony on page 2, specifically in points 4 and 5--5 goes
over to page 3--you talk about the fact that because an
appropriations bill has not been passed, that you are
continuing to apply the previous appropriations bill. Now, I
want you to tell us, because of the failure of Congress to act,
what have you not been able to do to move forward on the
authorization bill that was passed and signed by the President.
Dr. Robinson. There are a number of ways to look at it. One
is that there is a tremendous amount of uncertainty, and there
is uncertainty about what our legal basis is to move forward
with specific authorized efforts, and we are working through
that. And without clarity, it is a long task to be able to
buttress that, the argument that we can move forward.
Also, the funding levels. In the various acts, we have seen
different funding levels, and so there is uncertainty around
that and then also, of course, whether or not there will be
reductions taken further from those bills or even further in a
full-year CR.
And so in that kind of environment, it is just very
difficult to put your foot firmly on the path and start walking
because you are still trying to make sure that you are going in
the right--that you will have the resources to get there. And
so it is mainly that, that just puts a damper on the system
from being able to move forward quickly.
Senator LeMieux. Can you give us some examples of things
that you cannot do because the funding is in question?
Dr. Robinson. We have moved forward in select areas. The
real issue is not whether or not a specific activity is one we
can pursue. It is how much we can pursue it. For example, will
we get funding at a specific level for heavy lift? What will
that funding level be? You will have a different program if you
start out at a different funding level in the first year and
thereabouts. And so it is not a specific activity. It is more
you just cannot finalize your plans until you have the overall
funding and other terms and conditions set so that you can move
forward.
Senator LeMieux. Dr. Holdren, can you speak to this topic?
Dr. Holdren. Well, I guess I cannot speak to it as
accurately or with as much information as CFO Robinson can do.
I am the Science and Technology Advisor. I cannot really speak
to the details of the constraints of existing legislation and
lack of appropriations on exactly what NASA does. I think that
expertise resides both to my right and to my left.
Senator LeMieux. Well, it is my hope that this will get
resolved and the language that Senator Vitter proposed or
others have suggested can get done. It seems time and time
again this Congress' dysfunctionality and failure to move on
things is causing paralysis out in the world. And for my
colleague from Florida and I, this is a big issue because this
is not just an abstract issue and it is not just manned space
flight which is an essential part of being exceptional in this
country, all important things, but it is people's lives. There
is an article today from the Orlando Sentinel about NASA's
human space flight program, that it is adrift. You know, there
is all this uncertainty. What is it going to mean for the
people of our state?
So working with Senator Vitter, with the Chairman, with our
Ranking Member, and others to get this done, helping us get
this done I think is very important. So I appreciate your
statements today that you will do that.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Senator Cantwell?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for holding the hearing and the witnesses for being here and
their input on these important issues.
I want to bring up the issue of solar electronic propulsion
demonstration with you, Ms. Robinson, if you could. The NASA
Reauthorization Act calls for a balance between human
spaceflight using and building upon existing capabilities and
then investing in new capabilities. One such technology is
solar electronic propulsion.
So what is the current status of the research on that, and
how much is NASA budgeting for that demonstration in the next
5-year time window, 2011 to 2015?
Dr. Robinson. Well, I will have to get back to you on the
specifics of how much we are spending now and how much we have
carved out in the future lines. Again, given the uncertainty
that we have, some of the lines that would support solar
electric propulsion are the ones that are most in question.
But NASA is very excited about that technology and is
pursuing it in a number of laboratories and certainly in a
concerted research effort. That was one of the technologies
that we want to bring forward and bring to a higher technology
readiness level so that we can start demonstrating its effects.
Senator Cantwell. Well, it obviously factors into the human
exploration framework team for space missions.
Dr. Robinson. Right.
Senator Cantwell. I guess a budget number is what we are
really after for Fiscal Year 2011 to Fiscal Year 2015.
Dr. Robinson. We will do that for the record.
Senator Cantwell. Great.
Another thing that is of lots of interest, I think, across
the country is the site selection process for the retired
shuttles. Obviously, the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 stated
that these space orbiters shall be available and located for
display and maintenance through a competitive process. Could
you describe for the Committee what that competitive procedure
or process is and what is being undertaken?
Dr. Robinson. Well, the process that we have at NASA--it
will be the Administrator's decision where the orbiters go. We
have put out several requests for information. We have been
contacted. It has been wonderful. We have been contacted by
hundreds of potential applicants, and we have been looking--the
team, which I am not on, but the team has been looking through
and evaluating those proposals from potential museums and sites
as to some of the key factors that the authorization bill and
other places have stressed for us in terms of how many students
can see it, do people around the country have access to them.
And so that evaluation is ongoing.
Senator Cantwell. When you say a team, is that a site
selection committee?
Dr. Robinson. No. It is just a team that is looking at the
information and advising the Administrator.
Senator Cantwell. And so what will the Administrator make
his decision on?
Dr. Robinson. He will make his decision based on several
criteria that have been set forth and talked about in the
request for information. I will have to get those for you for
the record. I cannot list them all.
Senator Cantwell. And is there going to be geographic
diversity as part of the consideration?
Dr. Robinson. That is part of the consideration, yes.
Senator Cantwell. Will the White House be involved?
Dr. Robinson. We will have to get back to you for the
record. I am not involved in the process. I do not believe they
are. It is the Administrator's decision.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I think there are a lot of
different people who are very interested in this, and I think
the RFI has stipulated that $28 million was required to be
interested. Anyway, I think there are lots of different
changing things here, and I think what people are looking for
is a process that people really understand, that it is
transparent, that people know what the requirements are, and if
the Administrator is going to make the decision and on what
basis is the Administrator going to make the decision. So if it
is not an official RFP with a site selection process and it is
just advice, a little more framework--obviously, communities
like ours have already built an entire infrastructure around
the public access to our space and flying history and obviously
would like to build on that further, but certainly want to
understand that the western part of the United States is not
going to be overlooked in the assets that it has brought as
part of this history.
So anyway, I mean, is NASA considering the Smithsonian for
one of these sites?
Dr. Robinson. As regards to the Smithsonian, the
Smithsonian has the right of first refusal.
Senator Cantwell. Why do they have the----
Dr. Robinson. Why? Because they are the--I do not actually
know the term of art, but they are the nation's--it is an MOU.
It is a Memorandum of Understanding with them. The orbiters are
one class of NASA artifacts that we have interacted with the
Smithsonian. If you go to the Air and Space Museum, you see
lots of NASA hardware, and so we have an ongoing MOU with them.
Senator Cantwell. Are they required to pay the $28 million?
Dr. Robinson. Yes. At this point, yes. NASA does not have
the funds to cover transportation and making the orbiters ready
for using them in public exposure.
Senator Cantwell. OK. Well, I will look forward to more
specifics about how the Administrator is going to make the
decision. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
Dr. Robinson, you say in your testimony that, ``to best
manage workforce impacts, the shuttle program needs to confirm
approval to add the third shuttle flight, STS-135 mission, by
December 2010.'' Well, we are at December the 1st today, and
given the Administration's emphasis that we want to supply and
equip the International Space Station, can you tell me where
NASA is in the approval process for that third shuttle flight?
Dr. Robinson. As I said, we have every intention of flying
that flight. With the continuing Continuing Resolutions, we
still have some uncertainty about the ultimate funding level,
and we are trying to quantify what it means to hedge our bets,
in other words, in case there is a drastic change in funding
level. But we have every intention of moving forward on that.
Senator Nelson. Do you concur, Dr. Holdren?
Dr. Holdren. I do. The only challenge would be is, as Ms.
Robinson just indicated, if there were a funding level
drastically different than the one we have been talking about
here. That would clearly pose challenges. But as we have stated
here already, we are committed to fly it and with the funding
levels that have been discussed here, we will certainly be able
to do so.
Senator Nelson. Back to the issue of implementing the law,
you all in NASA already have a general counsel opinion on
implementing two parts of the authorization law: one, space
technology; and two, commercial crew. And you have a legal
opinion that says that you can pursue that. The question is,
why do we not have a legal opinion on pursuing the part of the
new authorization law on the Space Launch System, which is the
heavy lift vehicle, and the multipurpose vehicle, which is the
crew capsule?
Dr. Robinson. Well, as I referred several times here, it is
a lengthy thing to generate these opinions. We actually have a
third now. We have a third for the ISS NGO, the nongovernmental
organization, that will be doing the research which was
authorized in the act. So they have cleared that too.
I think the issue of priority was which program needed
clarity first, and space technology was driven primarily by the
cycle for graduate students, that they wanted to be able to
tell potential graduate students that there would be funding
available for that graduate program. I already know that they
are working on the one for heavy lift and the Orion Multi-
Purpose Crew Vehicle.
The other thing about those activities is that they have
been able to go forward with a whole host of things that are
just in line with setting priorities among the Constellation
activities and have not really needed any buttressing to be
able to make progress, and that is the only reason that they
were further down in the list.
Senator Nelson. Do you know when we might expect those
legal opinions to be produced on those two items?
Dr. Robinson. I do not know exactly when, but I know they
are working them as we speak.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Holdren, I want to come back to this
theme of consensus building. The perception of the President's
position did not, in this Senator's opinion, do justice to the
President in the way that the budget was rolled out on the
President's budget for NASA. And in order to avoid the disaster
of that perception in that budget rollout, can you express to
this committee the intent of collaboration between the Congress
and the Administration and the Agency to be improved as we are
now looking to next February in the rollout of the next
President's budget which is the 2012 budget request?
Dr. Holdren. The short answer, Senator, is yes. The
slightly longer answer in support of that is that I think we
are in a much better position now with the Authorization Act
passed and signed by the President giving direction. This
provides a basis for our consultations and collaboration going
forward, which I think will be very beneficial, and it is
certainly our intention to collaborate and cooperate with this
committee and others in the Congress as we move toward a Fiscal
Year 2012 budget proposal.
Senator Nelson. So, is the new law being incorporated into
the Fiscal Year 2012 planning process of the budget?
Dr. Holdren. Of course, it is. It has to be. There is no
way that we could meaningfully think about the 2012 budget
without taking into account the guidance of that legislation
which is now law.
Senator Nelson. And in the spirit of collaboration, of
which there has been some paucity in the past--and I refer back
to specifically the previous budget--are you going to seek--and
by the way, the paucity is not directed at you personally, but
you are the Science Advisor. And so my question is, will you
seek Congressional input before the rollout of that budget in
February?
Dr. Holdren. Well, sir, again the answer is yes. And as you
will recall, even in the circumstance of the 2011 budget, you
and I met on a number of occasions to discuss the priorities
and the issues there. I met with Senator Vitter on one occasion
to discuss issues around the space program and the budgets
going forward. So I would not quite agree that there was--there
may have been a paucity in the sense that it was not
sufficient, but there was consultation before and there will be
more consultation going forward.
Senator Nelson. Well, it was certainly insufficient in the
rollout of the budget with the use of the words ``cancel the
Constellation program'' because that was not the intent that
the President was trying to convey. And that is why I keep
harping on the issue of collaboration.
Dr. Holdren. We will do better this time.
Senator Nelson. Senator Hutchison?
Senator Hutchison. Could I be added to your list of people
with whom you consulted?
Dr. Holdren. Yes. I did also consult with Senator
Hutchison. That is true. I apologize for omitting that.
Senator Hutchison. All right.
I think the point is that we would like to all be on the
same page because it will just be more expedited if we are. I
think you all have been forthcoming and I appreciate it very
much. Just know that if we can all agree on language and all
put our collective weight behind getting it into the CR so that
we can move forward--we need the design to be done so that we
can fully fund that because it is our highest priority in order
to shorten the gap that we would have to depend on Russia to
get our people into the Space Station and, second, to fully
utilize the Space Station. So I think that going forward, we
just have to collaborate right away on the CR language that
would satisfy all of the potential legal hurdles to going full
force toward the design of the next launch vehicle with the
crew capsule.
Dr. Holdren. I agree.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Senator Vitter?
Senator Vitter. Yes. Just as a quick follow-up to something
the Chairman mentioned, Ms. Robinson, the three opinions that
you have--were those three activities all activities included
in the President's budget proposal and submission plan?
Dr. Robinson. Two of them definitely were. The commercial
crew one--they were cleared to do a different activity than
what was proposed in the President's budget. It was not the
full-up crew activity that was proposed there.
Senator Vitter. But he certainly had a lot of commercial
activity in the budget that was similar or consistent.
Dr. Robinson. Yes.
Senator Vitter. Well, my point is simply this. You have
three opinions. They are all basically about activity that the
President wanted as reflected by his budget submission. You
have no opinions yet about the changes Congress made. That is
sort of a perfect example of the sort of thing to date that has
us skeptical and concerned, and that is what really needs to
change so that we come together around what is law and move
forward aggressively around every aspect, not just certain
favored aspects about what is law.
And I think this CR language discussion is very useful.
First of all, it is the next step in terms of what we all need
to accomplish. Second, I think it will be a very useful test. I
mean, if the Administration wants that to happen, it will
happen. If the Administration is not committed to really coming
together and aggressively implementing the new authorization
language, it will not happen. So I consider it an immediate and
useful test because it should not be difficult, particularly
considering the President's leverage of--in any CR discussion
it should not be difficult to accomplish. So I am certainly
hopeful it will happen and we will see.
Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Do not worry, Ms. Chaplain. We are going to
get to you.
Dr. Robinson, if we are under a CR at the 2010 funding
level which was the $18.724 billion level, what recommendations
would you provide to the Administrator of NASA for the
necessary $276 million funding reduction from what was
authorized in the NASA bill, which is $19 billion?
Dr. Robinson. Well, the Administrator has already
considered that, and he decided that the best place to take
that money would be the 21st Century Launch Complex Initiative
for 2011. The fact that we are already a quarter in--the fact
that the bulk of that money is being spent on things like
construction and things like that, we thought that it would be
difficult at this point, once we get clearance, to actually
obligate all that money. And so he wanted to take the reduction
there with the thought that we would make it up later.
Senator Nelson. Even though some of those projects are
already underway?
Dr. Robinson. No. Some of the projects are definitely
underway, but for the full $429 million program, all of that is
not planned and underway.
Senator Nelson. By that, is the implication of your answer
that you would pick up that full funding for the 21st century
launch center in fiscal year--it would be 2012, starting in
October of 2011?
Dr. Robinson. Right. The commitment to that initiative is,
I believe, $1.9 billion over 4--5 years. And so we would
rephase it. We would look and see when we needed to obligate
money for the various projects, but that would be our intent if
NASA is blessed with having the funding levels continue in the
out-years.
Senator Nelson. Well, if you would pass on to the
Administrator that I would like to know the specifics of that.
One of the President's major goals that he stated in the speech
down at the Kennedy Space Center is that in order to be able to
have the NASA of the future, you have got to modernize the
facilities that in fact are used to launch the space vehicles.
And that we cannot lose any time on. So I want to see the
implementation of what the Administrator would be proposing
there.
Dr. Robinson, how would the agency prioritize the funding
cuts if they are more dramatic?
Dr. Robinson. Well, I have agreed we will look to the
Congress to provide us guidance on how to do that. For example,
one level that is talked about is the 2008 funding level which
for NASA was about $17.4 billion, a $1.6 billion cut from the
numbers that we have talked about. We are already a quarter
into the fiscal year basically, and so it is even more of a
magnitude cut for the remainder of the year. And we would have
to look very hard at places where we could instigate those
kinds of savings on that kind of timetable. It would be a truly
drastic situation at that point and we would be looking to be
able to share the expenses wherever we could. But most of our
programs are long-term. Most of them have long-term contracts,
and so we would be limited in many different areas to
implementing a cut that quickly.
Senator Nelson. You have heard this recent Casani report,
and Dr. Holdren, I will ask this to you as well. It documents
the major financial problems with the James Webb Space
Telescope. It is going to cost more money, and it is going to
add another year to the development on a schedule for a launch
somewhere around 2014. So how is NASA responding to the
reports, and will the funds from other programs have to be
shifted to allow the telescope to move forward in a timely
manner? Dr. Holdren?
Dr. Holdren. Well, I would start by saying that I was
certainly very disappointed to read the findings of the Casani
report indicating the dimension of the problems with the James
Webb. We think the James Webb is a very important component of
our ability to understand the universe going forward. It is a
very important successor to the Hubble. And given its
importance and given the difficulty that we now understand that
program is in, I can assure you that a very hard look is being
taken in NASA at how those challenges are going to be addressed
and ameliorated. It is possible that CFO Robinson can add
something about that process that is going on, but I know from
my own direct interactions with Administrator Bolden that this
is now a very serious focus of his attention.
Dr. Robinson. I wanted to add to that too that when we all
read the Casani report, we were heartened to see that the
program is making its technical milestones, but from a
budgeting and planning perspective and a lot of the work that
we have done with GAO, it simply had not followed those. It was
somewhat shocking actually that it had just not followed the
normal NASA procedures. And so we are taking a look at that.
The Casani report gave us a parametric look, a broad scale
look at the money that was going to be needed. Also, they were
looking at the quickest route to get there which would involve
changes this year. Of course, we are already a quarter into
this year and we are unlikely to be able to implement increased
funding this year to the level that Casani was recommending
earlier. And so we are doing a bottoms-up analysis trying to
get a more detailed cost estimate, looking at the phasing in
the budget for that program, and we will be presenting more
details in the 2012 budget.
Senator Nelson. If the newspaper accounts are accurate that
I have read, this could be a hit of something like $200 million
in 1 year in order to make up for the deficiencies in the
telescope project. Is it the position of the CFO to recommend
to the Administrator a place to take that $200 million if that
is the Administrator's decision?
Dr. Robinson. The way we do this at NASA is a very
collaborative effort. The Science Mission Directorate, which
owns JW and a whole host of other programs, will be looking
hard at that funding profile. The Casani report was about $200
million a year. So that is in line with what they said. And we
will just have to do an analysis throughout the entire budget
of where to make those kinds of changes.
Senator Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, could you comment on behalf
of GAO on this Casani report?
Ms. Chaplain. We were very disappointed to see the findings
of the report. In my own mind, it kind of has to re-baseline my
thinking about the improvements NASA has been making because we
have been hearing for several years now that we have a plan, we
are trying to incorporate those practices, we are trying to
reflect them where we can. And James Webb was actually one
program where you did see those practices reflected in the
technology development portion of it. But then to have this
kind of news come out so late in the game after so much has
been spent is very disconcerting and disappointing. I think
NASA really needs to pay attention to the report and really
examine the accountability processes it has, the oversight
processes it has to make sure they are the most effective as
possible.
Senator Nelson. And this was at the same time that NASA got
some good news that it achieved a qualified opinion from the
auditors for the first time since 2002. So, Ms. Chaplain, what
issues does NASA need to address in order to continue this
forward progress?
Ms. Chaplain. I think NASA is making good progress on the
financial statement side of things and the accounting side of
things. I think where progress really needs to be made is
translating the good practices that are embedded in their
policies and procedures into real decisions and getting more
insight into programs early in their development. In the case
of James Webb, we will not have official cost estimates or a
lot of information until they have been in development for
quite a long time, years maybe. So the more we could have some
insight up front to see if programs are really being set up for
success and we have more indicators about whether management
reserves are sufficient or not and have more insight into
things like cost estimates, the better off everybody will be
because we can see what kind of path a program is headed down.
So it is a matter of gaining more insight up front and also
getting more accountability and attention to actually
implementing the policies that are on paper.
Senator Nelson. Your written statement, Ms. Chaplain, puts
emphasis on the design stability prior to proceeding. The new
law adopts a proven heritage approach to development of the new
launch system which requires maximum use of design elements
with a large body of experience and knowledge behind them. Do
you think that if the law is implemented by NASA in this way,
that it is going to contribute to an increased chance for a
successful space launch system development?
Ms. Chaplain. I think there were a lot of good practices
reflected in the authorization, including an emphasis on
evolutionary development. That way you are putting off some of
the more challenging and costly aspects to later on, relying on
heritage, as you said, encouraging earlier design knowledge
than would normally be attained, and also scaling requirements
to a minimum and being flexible.
That said, I still have concerns when I see any effort like
this. There is a tendency across NASA and, as you know, the Air
Force, to consistently underestimate--or overestimate--how much
heritage technology you can actually use in your next project.
So while it seems like we can use a lot of the stuff that is
already around, we do not always have realistic estimates of
the engineering and integration needed to make that happen.
Also, when we have dates set out in a bill or anywhere else
that are kind of set out there in stone, you have to be careful
because sometimes it can encourage an agency to take higher
risk development paths. They may do more concurrent
development. They may skip testing and things like that if
their progress is not going well. And that is why it is just
very important to have a lot of insight into the progress NASA
is making. Do not just accept what they tell you up front about
what can be done and not done. You really have to have checks
along the way to see what is that progress, is what they are
saying really happening, and get back the knowledge that you
need about technology design, production, and all those other
issues.
Senator Nelson. We were pressing for a focus on
transparency and accountability, and that has certainly been
the theme of a lot of your recommendations. And that is what we
were looking for in section 309 of the law. It is a reporting
requirement on launch vehicle design and development, both for
the initial launch system design and the subsequent annual
reporting requirement. We anticipate an initial 90-day report
to result in what they call a baseline program.
What else do you believe that we as the oversight committee
should be looking for to ensure the transparency and
accountability?
Ms. Chaplain. I think as the program proceeds, you probably
want to get knowledge indicators, things like technology
maturity readiness levels, design stability readiness levels.
It is one thing to have an architecture kind of laid out in the
beginning, but as the program proceeds, you actually want to
see the number of design drawings that are releasable so you
can see the progress the program is making on that.
Also, you need to look at things like management reserves,
the funding that is available to the program, and things just
like how is the contract working. In the Constellation program,
the contract was undefinitized for a very, very long period of
time, meaning a lot of things were still in flux and you could
not set baselines down early on to manage contractor progress.
So there are a lot of just key knowledge indicators that I
think are typical in any type of review of a program that you
want to keep following as the program proceeds.
Senator Nelson. Senator Hutchison?
Senator Hutchison. Thank you all very much.
Senator Nelson. Yes.
Senator Hutchison. This has clarified a lot and I think we
can all go forward now very productively. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. To put it in the vernacular, we can all get
hitched up in a harness all pulling in the same direction. What
is at stake is very, very important, and that is the future of
our American space program. And we are at a critical juncture
here for everybody that has helped us get to this point, which
I believe the President is--this is his vision for a vigorous
space program, both human and robotic. So, I hope we have
brought to light some clarity on the future direction as a
result of this hearing.
And with that, the hearing is adjourned, and thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
U.S. Senator from West Virginia
The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 was signed into law nearly two
months ago. The bill was the culmination of a spirited year-long debate
between members of Congress, the Administration, the space community,
and the American public on the future of America's space agency. We
were able to find a sensible center, and the resulting bill signed into
law will help refocus and reinvigorate NASA, while making key
investments in aeronautics, science and human space flight missions.
For this achievement, I again want to thank my Committee
colleagues--the Committee's Ranking Member, Senator Kay Bailey
Hutchison, and the Science and Space Subcommittee Chairman, Senator
Bill Nelson--who worked day-in and day-out to get this bill passed and
sent to the President's desk.
Passing the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 into law was the first
step. We're now in the implementation process. This transition is an
opportunity to chart a clear course forward for NASA, but we must
remain vigilant to ensure implementation throughout the authorization
period. Objectives must be achieved in a fiscally responsible manner. I
intend to fully exercise this committee's oversight role throughout the
transition and implementation of the NASA Authorization Act.
With proper implementation of the law, I believe NASA can continue
to lead the world in innovation and discovery, and inspire future
generations of scientists. Dr. Holdren, the Director of the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, joins us today to discuss these
opportunities, as well as the Administration's plans for implementing
the NASA Authorization Act. Also joining us is Dr. Beth Robinson,
NASA'S Chief Financial Officer. This is Dr. Robinson's first time
testifying before the Committee since her confirmation hearing.
I have made my concerns about NASA's fiscal and program management
clear. At the first hearing we conducted on NASA this year, I stated
that I wanted strong financial accountability from NASA's Chief
Financial Officer. Dr. Robinson, you have been on the job now for just
over a year. I look forward to hearing what advice and options you have
provided to the NASA Administrator, and what actions you have taken to
strengthen the agency's financial management.
Finally, we have two experts from the Government Accountability
Office here today. Ms. Cristina Chaplain, Director of Acquisition and
Sourcing Management, and Ms. Susan Poling, the Managing Associate
General Counsel, will provide guidance on how NASA can improve its
financial and acquisition management to ensure effective implementation
of the NASA Authorization Act.
I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today. I look
forward to your testimony.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Hon. John P. Holdren, Ph.D.
Question 1. I have long believed that in the operations of the
government, the national policy should serve to drive the allocation of
resources. The Budget should not drive the policy. Certainly, there are
times of limited resources--I am one who believes the government should
always be the consumer of limited resources--but that is one of the
considerations that policymakers must take into account in defining the
policy. All too often, it seems, we have seen the Office of Management
and Budget drive the policy for the U.S. Space Program. As the Director
of a White House Policy office, how do you view the distinction between
policy and budget?
Answer. As you indicate, budgetary issues must be considered in a
careful and realistic way by policymakers, and the same is also true in
reverse. One cannot take a linear approach to these considerations,
that is to say, considering policy before budget or budget before
policy. Instead they must be addressed concurrently, in an integrated
manner, in order to identify a stable and achievable plan.
Question 1a. Did OMB, for example, have to review and approve your
testimony before this Committee today?
Answer. As you are aware, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
Circular A-11 requires all budget-related materials to be reviewed by
OMB. This guidance applies to testimony before Congress as well.
Question 2. As you know, the past 9 months has seen a vigorous
debate regarding the correct ``policy'' for moving forward with human
space flight programs in this country, whether government, commercial,
or some blending of both. The NASA Authorization Act of 2010, agreed to
in principle by the President, as communicated to the Chairman of this
Committee and others before we marked up and reported that bill,
established what was clearly a compromise among the many diverse views
on that subject. The President signed that Act into law. In your view,
does that unqualified signature represent, in effect, the President's
agreement with--even his adoption of--the policy embodied in that law
as the new policy of his Administration?
Answer. I believe the President's signature demonstrates the
Administration's strong support for the NASA Authorization Act, which
will help put the nation on track for an ambitious and sustainable
future space program.
Question 3. What have you done to ensure that your relevant
deputies, chief of staff and supporting staff have a clear
understanding of the President's acceptance of the direction provided
by the NASA Authorization Act of 2010?
Answer. I have communicated clearly to my staff, and also with
NASA's senior leadership, that the Administration is committed to
following the law in pursuing these and all other programs, as I have
previously stated.
Question 4. What would your response be to information that any
member of your staff were acting in a manner contradictory to that
direction?
Answer. I would work with my staff to address such a situation and
correct any misunderstandings or errors.
Question 5. There appears to be a focus only on implementing those
portions of the law that were a part of the President's request. That
was not the expectation of this Committee in accepting those portions
of the request as part of the authorization bill. In fact, the
Committee--and the Congress--placed a higher priority through numerous
expressions in the act of moving forward quickly on the development of
a new replacement set of vehicles for the Shuttle. What steps will you
take to ensure the full intent and purposes of the Act are carried out?
Answer. I believe the Administration and Congress share the goals
both to assure timely U.S. access to the International Space Station
after the retirement of the Space Shuttle, and to swiftly assure a
worthwhile beyond-Earth-orbit human spaceflight and exploration program
that initiates a new era of discovery for the next generation in a
cost-effective and timely manner. I am confident that NASA will
implement its programs consistent with these goals, and both I and my
staff intend to continue coordinating with NASA regarding these
activities going forward.
Question 6. Timing is one of our significant enemies in the
situation in which we find ourselves. The Administration is already
pulling together the content of the FY 2012 Budget Request. We expect
it will be rolled out--this time with a markedly improved pre-briefing
to the Hill--in early February. Yet we are being told we may expect to
see only an interim report on the design for the Space Launch System by
the middle of January--and that, in fact, the target date for
completion of three studies currently underway is mid-February--after
the FY 2012 Budget submission. The Congress has made it clear we need
to begin immediate development of the Space Launch System. . . . . . .
As a reference point, I note that the Administration indicated it would
offer an amended budget request for Exploration Systems when you
released the FY 2010 Budget Request with the requirement for the
Augustine Report. In the end, you did not do that, and chose to come
back, instead, with the FY 2011 request which ultimately was
unacceptable to the Congress. Can you commit to us today that the
Administration will be willing to offer an amended budget request for
this portion of NASA to reflect the needed funding levels for
expeditious development of the Space Launch System?
Answer. The President's budget will be released on February 14, and
we look forward to working with you throughout the budget process. Any
amended budget request for NASA, or any other agency for that matter,
would be transmitted by the President.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. David Vitter to
Hon. John P. Holdren, Ph.D.
Question 1. During the hearing, I requested copies of two items to
be provided to myself and to the other members of the Committee:
a. A copy of a letter from the President or a senior official
within the White House to the appropriate Senate and House
leadership, stating the Administration's support for clarifying
language in any FY 2011 appropriations legislation to remove
any constraint from initiating full and active development of
the Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle, as
provided in P.L. 111-267, and
b. A copy of the draft language that would accomplish the above
objective, which Dr. Robinson said had been prepared.
I received a letter from you dated December 7,*
addressed to me, stating the support of the Administration for
clarifying language, and noting that such language had been forwarded
to the Congress requesting government-wide permissive language to
initiate new programs. That letter will be included for the record.
However, to date, I have seen neither the language referred to by Dr.
Robinson in that conversation, nor the language mentioned in your
referenced letter as having been sent subsequent to the hearing. Nor
have I received a copy of any communication to the appropriate Senate
and House leadership requesting consideration of either set of
language. Can you please provide these materials for the hearing
record?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\*\ The letter referred to is printed at the end of the appendix of
this hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. I was pleased to send you the referenced letter regarding
the Administration's support for clarifying language on new FY 2011
programs under a CR. Further, as I indicated in that letter, quickly
advancing the new initiatives reflected in the Act is a goal we share.
As is custom, the Administration provided informal technical assistance
to the Appropriations Committees to assist them in drafting the CR.
There is no official public list. With respect to your request of Dr.
Robinson, I must refer you to her and to NASA Administrator Bolden.
Question 2. As you know, in the end, following the hearing, neither
the proposed omnibus appropriations or the ``instructional'' Continuing
Resolution were adopted, both of which did include the necessary
clarifying language, and a relatively ``clean'' CR was adopted to fund
the government through March 4, 2011. There will then be another
opportunity to address this issue with a request for clarifying
language as the Congress considers a successor to the current CR prior
to March 4, 2011. Please provide both the assurance that the
Administration will pursue the required language change, if still
deemed necessary, as well as supporting correspondence and
documentation.
Answer. As I noted to you in my letter of December 7, and as you
quote immediately below, making immediate progress in advancing the
goals and requirements contained in the 2010 NASA Authorization Act is
a goal we all share. That is and will remain a fundamental priority of
the Administration.
Question 3. In the letter referenced above, there appears to be a
discrepancy between part of the content and statements made by Dr.
Robinson during the hearing. Specifically, the letter states:
``Making immediate progress in advancing the goals and
requirements contained in the 2010 NASA Authorization Act is a
goal I believe we both share. However, as both you and the U.S.
Government Accountability Office noted at the hearing, the FY
2010 NASA appropriations contains limitations on the transfer
of funds from certain programs, and also contains limitations
on using funds to `create or initiate a new program, project or
activity, unless such program termination, elimination,
creation, or initiation is provided in subsequent
appropriations Acts.' ''
During her oral statement, Dr. Robinson stated, with respect to the
appropriations restrictions and limitations noted in your letter:
``. . . we have not yet found anything in the Authorization Act
on which we cannot proceed, but we are not done with our
analysis, this unfortunately lengthy analysis, and we are
working the issue daily. However, there are some areas in which
we can clearly proceed. For example, planning efforts for the
heavy lift and multipurpose crew vehicle activities, both
authorized in the act, are proceeding and are assessing the
transition from the Constellation efforts to the new
programs.''
There appears to be a difference in interpretation between these
two statements and their representation of whether the FY 2010
appropriations language is, in fact, an impediment to moving forward
with the ``redirected'' program. Note my use of that term, or the term
``modified'' which would be equally applicable; neither of which were
included in the restrictions put in place by the appropriators before
the Congress had completed its consideration of the FY 2011 Budget
Request. Could you explain the precise situation as you see it, and
whether or not NASA is in any way being hampered in moving forward with
implementation of the Act in the current appropriations situation?
Answer. My letter to you accurately reflected the views expressed
by both Members of the Committee and the U.S. Government Accountability
Office on this subject, i.e., that some restrictions were in fact in
place and that these restrictions could be an impediment to significant
progress for various programs. I was pleased, as I am sure you were, to
hear Dr. Robinson describe what is apparently a deliberate, case-by-
case approach to assessing how or if one of those limitations--that on
``new starts''--applies to the initiatives of the 2010 NASA
Authorization Act, and that perhaps the actual impacts of that
restriction will be more limited than initially feared in many cases.
In this context, it appears that NASA is able to move forward
productively in several efforts, but I must defer to Administrator
Bolden and his legal experts on the specifics.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Orrin G. Hatch to
Hon. John P. Holdren, Ph.D.
Question 1. Dr. Holdren, in your testimony before the Commerce
Committee you stated ``We are committed to following the law [the 2010
NASA Authorization Act]. The President signed it. The Congress passed
it. We will follow it and we will execute it and implement it to the
best of our ability.''
a. Will the Administration and NASA fully, faithfully and timely
implement the provisions of the 2010 NASA Authorization Act, including
Sections 302 and 304 which, in part, direct the agency to build a new
heavy-lift Space Launch System with the following minimum capabilities?
``The Space Launch System shall be designed from inception
as a fully-integrated vehicle capable of carrying a total
payload of 130 tons or more into low-Earth orbit in preparation
for transit for missions beyond low-Earth orbit.''
``Priority should be placed on the core elements with the
goal for operational capability for the core elements not later
than December 31, 2016.''
In developing the Space Launch System, NASA ``to the extent
practicable, [will] utilize existing contracts, investments,
work force, industrial base, and the capabilities for the Space
Station . . . Ares 1 projects, including . . . Space Shuttle-
derived components and Ares 1 components that use existing
United States propulsion systems including . . . solid rocket
motors . . .''
b. If not, under what legal authorities does the Administration and
NASA cite and argue justify violating the law?
c. Will the Administration and NASA fully, faithfully and timely
implement the intent of Congress, which was written by the Senate
Commerce Committee and included in the legislation's report, including
the following section?
The Committee anticipates that in order to meet the specified
vehicle capabilities and requirements, the most cost-effective and
``evolvable'' design concept is likely to follow what is known as an
``in-line'' vehicle design, with a large center tank structure with
attached multiple liquid propulsion engines and, at a minimum, two
solid rocket motors composed of at least four segments being attached
to the tank structure to form the core, initial stage of the propulsion
vehicle. The Committee will closely monitor NASA's early planning and
design efforts to ensure compliance with the intent of this section.
Answer. NASA has recently transmitted to Congress its interim 90-
day report describing its progress in assessing designs and acquisition
approaches for the Space Launch System (SLS) and the Multi-Purpose Crew
Vehicle (MPCV). In that report NASA clearly indicated that its
baseline, reference design for the SLS is consistent with the technical
requirements spelled out in the 2010 NASA Authorization Act (i.e., the
Act). Specifically, this reference design reflects a launch vehicle
with an ``in-line'' configuration that uses the Space Shuttle main
engine, the Shuttle/Ares solid rocket boosters, and the Space Shuttle
external tank and that can ultimately be capable of lifting 130 tons or
more to low-Earth orbit. As you know, that report indicated that there
are challenges associated with meeting the combined cost and schedule
restraints in the Act for this reference design. Therefore, NASA has
indicated that it will continue to study affordability initiatives and
approaches for addressing these challenges in an effort to achieve the
goals of the Act in an affordable and sustainable manner. We believe
that this is an appropriate and prudent exercise and look forward to
NASA's conclusions.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Hon. Elizabeth M. Robinson
Question 1. Can you describe a summary of your role and
responsibility as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) Chief Financial Officer (CFO)? Who do you work for? What is your
reporting chain?
Answer. The CFO reports to the Administrator and Deputy
Administrator of NASA, and is an employee of NASA. NASA's CFO is also
appointed by the President and is confirmed by the Senate; and she
reports to the Administrator of NASA. The role as CFO is summarized in
NASA Policy Directive 1000.3D which states, in part, that the NASA CFO
``a. Oversees all financial management, budget, strategic planning, and
performance activities relating to the programs and operations of the
Agency[; and] m. Leads the Agency's effort in financial reporting under
the CFO Act and coordinates on the Annual Performance Plan and
Performance Report in accordance with the Government Performance and
Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 (Public Law 103-62), as amended, and other
relevant legislation.''
Question 2. I assume you believe it is your sworn duty to uphold
the laws of the United States, so I won't ask that direct question. But
do you see it as your role, in upholding those laws, to seek every
means possible to ensure the resources available to the Agency are
effectively marshaled to enable the fulfillment of the requirements of
the law?
Answer. Yes. In carrying out duties under the CFO Act, part of the
CFOs responsibilities includes oversight and effective financial
management of Agency resources and their strategic alignment with
Agency mission--in collaboration with the Administrator, NASA
leadership, and the applicable programs--consistent with all applicable
laws, regulations and national policies.
Question 3. Would you agree that it is not your role to second-
guess, or impose your own judgment on the wisdom of the applicable laws
governing NASA programs and policies?
Answer. Yes. The CFO, like any other NASA employee, always attempts
to faithfully carry out the law. Without questioning the wisdom of any
particular law, part of that role as CFO includes working closely with
the Administrator, NASA leadership, other Agencies, and Congressional
Committees on proposals for new statutory provisions, which may include
improvements or clarifications to existing laws.
Question 4. Your statement notes the constraints against moving
forward with some of the requirements of the new NASA authorization law
(P.L. 111-267) that result from restrictive language contained in prior
Appropriations Acts in 2009 and 2010 and continued in effect by blanket
restrictive language carried over into the current Continuing
Resolution making appropriations through December 3, 2010. Can you
provide the Committee with a specific list of those activities
authorized and directed by the law and which you believe continue to be
constrained by that restrictive language? Include in your accounting,
the specific legal analysis which supports your belief of the
continuing restrictions.
Answer. The FY 2010 Appropriations Act states: ``none of the funds
provided herein and from prior years that remain available for
obligation during Fiscal Year 2010 shall be available for the
termination or elimination of any program, project or activity of the
architecture for the Constellation program.'' In addition, the 2010
Supplemental Appropriations Act inserted additional restrictions. These
provisions continue to apply, despite the fact that the 2010
Authorization Act makes no reference to the Constellation Program.
While many aspects of the Constellation Program have applicability to
the MPCV and SLS authorized in the Authorization Act, resources cannot
be fully brought to bear on these new programs without the flexibility
to terminate Constellation projects and contracts when necessary.
Regarding programs authorized in the NASA Authorization Act of
2010, NASA has found no program to date on which we cannot proceed with
required activities during the remainder of FY 2011. However, until the
NASA FY 2011 appropriation is finalized, many of these authorized
activities are not proceeding, due to lack of funding certainty. For
example, the Act authorized $580M in FY 2011 for Aeronautics
activities, including several program initiatives. However, the
annualized CR amount at the FY 2010 level is approximately $501M. At
this time Aeronautics is not beginning its new initiatives, except for
prudent preparatory activities.
In addition, the FY 2011 President's Budget request for Space
Technology programs is $572M (including Innovative Partnerships
Program) and the authorized level is $350M; programs have been
formulated and stand ready for implementation. While not considered
``new starts,'' without a final FY 2011 appropriation key authorized
NASA Space Technology (non-IPP) activities will not be awarded.
Question 5. Below are two charts I understand to be related to the
HEFT exercise--the Human Exploration Framework Team--so I recognize
they are not charts that relate directly to the development of plans
for a Space Launch System, per se. What they seem to reflect, though,
is a mind-set within the Agency--and particularly within your
organization--regarding the priority for Human Space Flight programs
within NASA--a priority that would appear less than that given to those
areas of activity by the new law. The charts include a number of items
that would be part of a broader ``Exploration Architecture''--items
which the law places as downstream initiatives to be undertaken at a
point subsequent to the development of a new heavy-lift launch
capability. I want to illustrate the kinds of questions raised by these
charts to underscore why we are holding this hearing--and why we will
undoubtedly be holding many more of these kinds of oversight hearings
in the next Congress.
First is what is called a ``sand chart'' showing relative funding
levels across a number of program activities within a given category of
funding--in this case, it appears, the NASA human spaceflight programs.
The second chart was provided as partial interpretation of the sand
chart, in that it describes guidance and budget assumptions--including
some specifically from your office, the OCFO, or Office of the Chief
Financial Officer--as of November 3--provided to the Human Exploration
Framework Team (HEFT).
Separate information we have been provided along with these charts
raise a number of questions:
Question 5a. All categories on the sand chart show declining
numbers starting in FY 2014--after the period covered by the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010. What is the basis for that projection?
Answer. The sand chart does not represent the position of NASA or
the Administration regarding NASA's budget. It is one early estimate
from an internal study team of the costs of a specific Design Reference
Mission (DRM) for a complete exploration architecture, including the
additional elements required for a deep-space mission. This estimate
shows numerous elements of the program expanding after 2014. The
decline for SLS and MPCV starting about 2015 was based on an estimate
that costs for SLS and MPCV would peak about 2014 during development,
and then fall off as development completes and the programs shift to
operations. As SLS and MPCV costs fall off, development of the
additional elements required for a deep-space mission begins. (Without
those additional elements, a deep-space mission cannot be performed,
and MPCV and SLS will have limited utility.)
Question 5b. NASA Authorization items outside of human spaceflight
(Science, Cross Agency Support, etc.) are projected to escalate at 2.4
percent for inflation. Human Spaceflight is escalated only at 1.7
percent. (This would result in a net reduction in spending power in
this account of almost a billion dollars per year by 2030.) Can you
explain why a different escalation projection is used?
Answer. In past budgets, an escalation projection of 2.4 percent
was used per A76 guidance for the NASA top-line budget. However, the
guidance for the HEFT study was to initially use a rate of 1.7 percent
budget escalation, although this was later changed to 1.4 percent,
based on the Authorization Act increase from 2012 to 2013 for the
combined ESMD and SOMD budget projections. Budget escalation is how the
real year dollars of succeeding budgets change. Thus, when budget-
escalation is less than cost-inflation, which is the case assumed in
these estimates based upon input guidance, the associated ``buying
power'' is reduced.
Question 5c. The 21st Century Launch Complex has to pay for its own
facility recapitalization costs, rather than be included in the Cross-
Agency Support line item. Assumption of sustaining ISS through 2030
removes about $30-35B of funds that might otherwise be available to
Exploration post 2020, if no increase in top line is available through
that period (which is assumed). Using a 2030 assumption for sustaining
ISS (while in principal I would not oppose that notion) seems an
artificial means of constraining our-year funding to force near-term
design concessions. Can you explain the basis for this?
Answer. ISS to 2030 was a budget planning assumption for HEFT.
Based on technical estimates of ISS lifetime and the program of
maintenance and in-place spares, NASA anticipates that ISS can be
operated well beyond 2020, and possibly to 2030. The estimate of
funding available for HEFT prudently assumes that ISS will operate
through 2030, rather than build a HEFT case that requires arbitrary
early ISS termination to close financially. If ISS were terminated
before 2030 but after 2020, the primary effect on this DRM would be to
advance the schedule of the additional elements required for a Near-
Earth Asteroid (NEA) mission.
Question 5d. Commercial Crew Transport to ISS was not submitted as
a costed-effort in the summer to OMB, meaning funding comes from within
the Exploration line, at an amount estimated at $400-$500M per year
after 2017. That seems to pose a potential negative impact to Space
Launch System (Upper Stage) development and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle
operations. Can you explain the reason for not submitting anticipated
Commercial Crew development as a separate, costed-element within the
Exploration line? Does that in effect reduce funds otherwise planned
for Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle development?
Answer. Commercial Crew Development is included in the Exploration
budget requests for both FY 2011 and FY 2012. Operational support to
the ISS program, including crew transportation through spring 2016 and
cargo delivery, is included in the Space Operations budget. Costs for
ISS crew transportation after spring 2016 are not included in the ISS
budget request, pending better cost estimates. However, an estimate to
purchase crew transportation after spring 2016 is included in the HEFT
analysis. The estimate is based on the projected cost of purchasing
transportation services from the Russians beyond spring 2016. Although
commercial transportation services likely will be available in that
timeframe, NASA at this time does not have high fidelity estimates for
the cost of those services, so estimates are based on an extrapolation
of Russian charges for these services.
Question 5e. Combined result is a decreasing Real Year Budget wedge
which makes every optional Exploration Plan undoable. Last planning
exercise to the Black line on the chart reflected an HLV available in
2018 and a Near-Earth Object mission in 2031. These planning
assumptions obviously do not reflect what is contemplated by the
requirements of the Act. Can you explain the basis and justification
for these planning assumptions being made by your office?
Answer. The Act authorizes NASA to develop an SLS and an MPCV and
provides performance, cost and schedule instructions. Beyond the time-
frame of the Authorization Act, NASA presumes the intention of the Act
is to continue ISS operation and utilization, and to conduct missions
of exploration. Conducting such missions requires that NASA develop the
mission payloads that justify the heavy lift and crew vehicles.
NASA is actively determining the details of programs that comply
with this direction and assessing the architecture options to meet the
cost, schedule, safety, and performance requirements as outlined in the
Act. NASA's planning assumptions are based on what it believes will be
the funding available from future appropriations in consonance with the
amounts authorized for the FY 2011 through FY 2013 by the Act. NASA has
endeavored to properly budget for mandatory and projected expenses such
as a continuation of ISS. The development of the MPCV and the SLS would
realistically be funded with the remainder of the total Human Space
Flight future appropriation. NASA believes that its approach including
funding assumptions for complying with the Authorization Act is
fiscally sound and prudent.
Question 5f. Did you coordinate with Mission Directorates in
establishing these guidelines, taking into account the requirements of
the law?
Answer. Yes, the guidelines were coordinated among Agency
leadership, including the Mission Directorate elements, taking into
account the strictures contained in the Act.
Question 6. Your statement, on pages 2 and 3, describes the need to
reserve funding under a long-term CR to accommodate potential new
starts and differing funding levels in the final 2011 appropriations
bill. What criteria are you planning to apply to the determination of
those reserves?
Answer. The FY 2011 funding posture is still unknown. There is a
likely and potentially substantial risk of further FY 2011 reductions.
Section 109 of the Continuing Resolution instructs all agencies to
spend the minimum amount necessary so as to avoid ``imping[ing] on
final funding prerogatives.'' With the possibility of reductions below
current CR (FY 2010) levels being considered by the new Congress, care
should be given to limit spending before the resolution of FY 2011
appropriations.
The Agency has been prudent in setting the appropriate rate of
spending in its accounts within the totals allowed by the FY11
Continuing resolution. As programs go forth under CRs, NASA is
cognizant of what the House and Senate have included in their bills for
the agency. When the final bills are adopted, they will retroactively
apply constraints and funding levels covering the CR period. Thus, as
with other Agencies, NASA must generally reserve funding to accommodate
potential new starts and differing funding levels in the final bill.
Aggressive pursuit of SLS/MPCV development activities means that
NASA must start out with credible plans and budgets that will assure
development efforts will be affordable and sustainable. Much work
remains to be accomplished over the next few months in terms of the SLS
and MPCV development effort, such as in-depth planning to synchronize
the schedules and budgets for both vehicles and supporting capabilities
such as Ground Operations such that each capability is successfully
delivered during the right timeframe. Since an integrated schedule for
the SLS and MPCV vehicles is an essential product of our planning
efforts, NASA must gain reliable information from on-going SLS trade
studies, obtain a better understanding of budget requirements and
constraints, and develop acquisition strategies that can put
development on an affordable and sustainable path.
NASA recognizes it has a responsibility to be clear with the
Congress and the American taxpayers about our true estimated costs and
schedules for developing the SLS and MPCV. NASA is committed to keep
Congress informed about our planning efforts. To this end, NASA will
acquire independent (outside of the Agency) cost and schedule
assessments for SLS and MPCV design options as part of its decision
process this Spring or Summer. Furthermore, NASA will make these
assessments public.
Question 7. I am concerned that you will use that protect strategy
to hold back funds that might otherwise be made available to begin
development activities for the Space Launch System and the Multi-
Purpose Crew Vehicle ongoing development. It should be clear to you
from even a cursory reading of the law that those activities have the
highest priority in the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate--ahead
of things like Space Technology initiatives, which the law clearly
states are activities expected to be undertaken in later years, when
better definition is obtained from the required Decadal Survey of Human
Space Flight programs. What assurances can you give the Committee that
its intent to aggressively pursue immediate initiation of SLS/MPCV
development activities will be followed?
Answer. NASA is spending all the money allowed to us under the CR.
Work is continuing on Ares and Orion contracts and hardware, software,
& tooling that enables SLS and MPCV scenarios at a pace of
approximately $200M per month.
It is important to emphasize that NASA currently has the
flexibility to concentrate its spending on those aspects of the
Constellation Program that may have applicability to the new SLS and
MPCV programs, and is doing so, thus maximizing the effective use of
taxpayer dollars.
The NASA Authorization Act calls for development of specific
systems for the SLS and MPCV, including associated program and other
necessary support. NASA has taken steps to concentrate its spending on
those aspects of the Constellation Program that may have applicability
to the new SLS and MPCV programs. In fact, NASA has already scaled back
funding for some elements of the Ares program that are unlikely to be
applicable to the SLS Program. At the same time, NASA senior management
have also deemed it necessary to allow other Ares work that may have a
higher applicability to the SLS program to continue, albeit at a lower
level, while NASA works to finalize a development and acquisition
strategy for the SLS.
NASA expects to finalize an acquisition strategy and other key
development decisions as early as the spring 2011. In the meantime,
NASA has initiated several industry study contracts to help inform
decisions on the final detailed design concept and acquisition details
for the SLS. In parallel, NASA will conduct studies on concepts that
were competitive in our internal trade studies to validate, support, or
challenge our current thinking in an effort to ensure an affordable
design that meets Authorization Act requirements.
Additionally, NASA is assessing requirements in the NASA
Authorization Act for SLS against contract language for each element of
Ares (first stage, upper stage, upper stage engine, and avionics) to
determine whether the new SLS requirements are within scope of the
current contract. That determination is expected to be completed within
the next few months.
Question 7a. In your statement, you refer to the reporting
requirements outlined in the new law, and indicate that the lack of a
final resolution of FY 2011 appropriations may hamper NASA's ability to
meet those reporting requirements. Yet you state--and GAO has
stipulated--that planning activities are not hampered by the
restrictive language in prior appropriations. What, then, is the basis
for delaying the required reports? In addition, you state that interim
reports may be required in lieu of the final reports. The law does not
provide for ``interim reports.'' By what assumption or authority do you
state that ``interim reports'' may be needed, when that is not what the
law requires? Do you believe the law must be followed only if it is
convenient for you to do so?
Answer. On January 10, 2011, NASA provided to Congress an interim
report on our SLS and MPCV efforts to date, with a commitment to
provide more extensive details in the FY 2012 Presidential Budget
Request and in a follow-on report to Congress as early as spring 2011.
We recognize that Congress wanted more information than we were able to
provide in the 90-day report. Unfortunately, such a deadline did not
afford NASA sufficient time to make significant acquisition and
development decisions for a major programmatic evolution of the kind
authorized by Congress, especially given the challenge of not having
final FY 2011 appropriations by the time the report was due to
Congress. Therefore, in an effort to be as responsive to Congress as
possible, NASA developed an interim report which noted the progress we
had made--in particular the definition of two reference vehicle
designs--with a commitment to provide a follow-on report with more
extensive details, once finalized, as early as next spring.
To be clear, much work remains to be accomplished over the next few
months in terms of the SLS development effort, such as in-depth
planning to synchronize the schedules and budgets for SLS, MPCV and
Ground Operations efforts such that each delivers its capability during
the right timeframe. Since an integrated schedule for the SLS and MPCV
vehicles is an essential product of our planning efforts, NASA requires
additional time to gain reliable information from on-going SLS trade
studies, obtain a better understanding of budget requirements and
constraints, and develop acquisition strategies that can put
development on an affordable and sustainable path. NASA feels that
these activities are essential to provide a responsible response to the
final report and is pursuing these activities as expeditiously as
possible.
NASA recognizes it has a responsibility to be clear with the
Congress and the American taxpayers about our true estimated costs and
schedules for developing the SLS and MPCV. NASA is committed to keep
Congress informed about our planning efforts. To this end, NASA will
acquire independent (outside of the Agency) cost and schedule
assessments for SLS and MPCV design options as part of its decision
process this Spring or Summer. Furthermore, NASA will make these
assessments public.
Question 8. On page 3 of your statement, you describe the
development of monthly funding allocations, and state that ``to date,
all funds have been or are in the process of being placed on
contracts'' in the Constellation Program. Yet we continue to hear
reports of funds being held back from certain contracts. Please provide
for the record a complete and detailed accounting of the allocations
made to date, or pending, under the current CR and its replacement
legislation, expected within the 2 or 3 weeks following this hearing. I
am especially interested in a complete accounting of any funds being
held back from active work directly applicable to the major project
activities, the amounts involved, and the rationale and justification
for holding or redirecting the funds, in each particular instance.
Answer. The only Exploration funds held back from distribution to
the Constellation Program are those for two Boeing contracts comprising
the $81M in potential termination liability for the Upper Stage
Production and Upper Stage Instrumentation Avionics contracts. In
response to recurring inquiries by Boeing, a Special Termination Cost
(STC) clause was inserted into the Boeing Avionics and Upper Stage
contracts on January 21, 2010, and January 25, 2010, respectively.
These STC clauses delineated that potential termination liability costs
would not be funded on the contract; identified the funding process to
cover potential termination costs; and set forth the maximum amount of
termination liability under the contract. In this case, the maximum
amount of termination liability under the Avionics and Upper Stage
contracts was set at $29M and $52M, respectively, based upon estimates
provided by Boeing.
Under the Continuing Resolutions for FY 2011, NASA has received
$1,149M for the Constellation Program. Of that amount, $116.8M covers
civil service costs through March 4, 2011, and $3.1M covers civil
service travel costs, also through March 4. The remaining $1,029.1M is
available for use on contracts.
Of the $1,029.1M available for use on contracts, $144.3M has not
been issued to projects as of the end of January--$81.0M of that
$144.3M is withheld to be in compliance with a Special Termination
Clause (STC) for the two Boeing contracts discussed above. The
remaining $63.3M of the $144.3M is being held as a prudent contingency
for late-arising requirements in the current Continuing Resolution
through March 4.
As of the end of January, $745.2M of the Constellation CR funding
has been obligated on contracts and is available to the contractors to
perform work. Setting aside the legally-required hold-back of $81M for
in compliance with a Special Termination Clause in two contracts, but
including the $63.3M contingency, there is $203M available but not yet
obligated onto contracts.
However, the $203M not yet on contracts is not preventing
contractors from performing work. As of the end of January, contractors
had sufficient funds to both cover their potential termination
liabilities (and similar items) and to perform new work. Obligating the
$203M at this time would only add to funds on contract and extend the
forward funding even further beyond March 4, which is not necessary at
this time.
Question 9. On page 4 of your statement, you describe the recent
Broad Area Announcement and award of Space Act agreements for 13
companies to conduct studies examining the trade-space of potential
heavy-lift launch and space transfer vehicle concepts. We understand
these contracts are subject to available appropriations, and that they
include completion dates in the six-month range. Yet you are required
under the law to provide a heavy-lift launch concept definition by the
middle of January. How do you explain the relationship between that
near-term requirement and these extended studies which would not be
available to provide input to the near-term definition? It sounds like
a further effort to delay a decision on a heavy-lift vehicle design,
which is in direct conflict with the requirements of the law.
Answer. NASA is actively developing and executing plans for
implementing the Space Launch System (SLS) and Multi-Purpose Crew
Vehicle (MPCV), programs, including efforts to transition the design
and development efforts of the Constellation Program. We have selected
a Reference Vehicle Design. We also have a multi-layered approach we
are using to conduct systems trades and analysis to meet the objectives
of the Authorization Act.
In FY 2011, the SLS formulation phase will pursue multiple parallel
activities to help drive down the development and operations costs for
the SLS. NASA plans to transition relevant work from the Space Shuttle
Program and Ares Project to the new SLS Program, while also continuing
to define the requirements for the new SLS system.
NASA is performing its analyses using a government Requirements
Analysis Cycle (RAC), in which ESMD, with support from the SLS Center
Planning Team at Marshall Space Flight Center, will develop a set of
SLS requirements by early Spring 2011. These requirements will be
informed by NASA analysis of the direction in the Authorization Act,
needed SLS safety, performance, existing national capabilities, and
Administration priorities. The RAC study team results will be used to
develop and refine the vehicle design concepts and to determine whether
the NASA Reference Vehicle Design meets the SLS mission requirements as
well as the Administrator's goals that the design be affordable,
sustainable, and realistic. To this end, NASA commits to obtaining
independent (outside of the Agency) assessments of cost and schedule
for SLS and MPCV design options as part of its decision process this
Spring or Summer.
In parallel with the RAC teams, on November 8, 2010, NASA announced
the results of the heavy lift and propulsion study contracts that were
awarded as part of a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) issued in May
2010. As part of this competitive solicitation, utilizing approximately
$7.5M in FY 2010 dollars, NASA selected 13 companies to conduct six-
month studies examining the trade space of potential heavy-lift launch
and space transfer vehicle concepts.
While the Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) solicitation was issued
before the Authorization Act was enacted into law, inputs from the BAA
study contracts will apply directly to our SLS efforts. For example,
NASA will use the BAA study contracts to continue to study
affordability initiatives and approaches for addressing these
challenges in an effort to achieve the goals of the Act in an
affordable and sustainable manner. These trade studies will provide a
``fresh look'' at innovative launch vehicle concepts, propulsion
technologies and processes that can be infused into the development of
the new human exploration missions--information that will be used to
help inform the overall selection and development of the final SLS
vehicle detailed design.
In summary, together, these internal and external study efforts
will be used to conduct systems trades and analysis to meet the
objectives of the Authorization Act, and information from these efforts
will be contained in our follow-on report to Congress as early as
Spring 2011.
Question 10. On page 5 of your statement, you note the extension of
the ISS until at least 2020. You indicate that ``activities to increase
the ISS functionality'' will be delayed until FY 2011 funding is
received.'' What exactly does that term ``increase the ISS
functionality'' include, and what is the basis--and impact--of delaying
those activities?
Answer. The FY 2011 President's budget request provided additional
funding to increase ISS functionality and enable utilization of the
International Space Station (ISS) as a National Laboratory. This is an
investment to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Space
Station facility itself. It will support ISS upgrade efforts while
supporting the development of, and proving, new technologies. Projects
selected will meet one or more of the following objectives:
Reducing demands on crew time;
Lowering ground-based costs;
Mitigating capabilities lost when the Shuttle retires;
Improving ISS software capabilities;
Improving ISS safety;
Benefiting future human spaceflight programs; and/or
Increasing ISS payload throughput capacity.
Candidate projects under evaluation fall into the following major
themes:
Upgraded environment systems (air and water)
Upgraded communications (data, audio, and video)
Pressurized volume improvements (space-savers)
Flight and ground crew time optimization tools (automated
locaters and links)
Payload operations upgrades and scope expansions (control
centers, apparatus and non-profit organization participation)
EVA and robotics enhancements (productivity improvements)
International standards (interface complexity reductions)
This initiative is contingent upon the availability of appropriated
funds. Delaying these activities would result in less efficient ISS
operations than could be achieved through the implementation of the
efforts noted above.
Question 11. I also note that nowhere in your statement, when
referring to the ISS, do you refer to the designation of the U.S.
Segment as a National Laboratory; nor do you specifically acknowledge
the legal requirement for allocation of half of that U.S. research
capability to the independent management entity you refer to, in
passing, on page 5. Are you fully aware of what the congressional
intent--and requirements of the law--are regarding that designation of
a National Laboratory?
Answer. NASA continues to support the use of the ISS as a National
Laboratory, as reflected by the Agency's ongoing efforts to expand its
partnerships with organizations interested in conducting microgravity
research aboard the Station. Currently, NASA has five Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs) with other federal agencies for the use of ISS as
a National Laboratory, two Space Act Agreements with universities, and
seven Space Act Agreements with private firms.
In addition, NASA is moving ahead with a Cooperative Agreement
Notice (CAN) to implement the use of a Non-Profit Organization (NPO) to
manage the National Laboratory aspect of ISS, including the allocation
of 50 percent of Station's U.S. research capability to the National Lab
partners. The Agency released the CAN on February 14, 2011, and
anticipates an award in late Spring.
Question 12. On pages 6 and 7 of your statement, you describe the
HEFT studies . . . the Human Exploration Framework Team. The function
of the HEFT studies--as we highlighted in the other questions about
that effort previously--appears to be rather misunderstood. It also
appears to ignore the requirement in the law for a Decadal Survey of
the Human Exploration of Space as outlined in Section 204 of the law--a
study for which HEFT is specifically called out in the law as one of
several inputs to that study. Is it clear to you that HEFT is not a
definitive study effort; that it reaches beyond the scope of the
activities authorized by the law at the present time? Given the kinds
of budget assumptions and guidance you have provided to the current
HEFT activities, it seems that the role of HEFT is being over-stated in
the internal planning at NASA and is, in effect, under the terms of the
law enacted since its initiation, a premature activity which is having
an unwarranted influence in determining the planning assumptions for
definition of Space Launch System development. Can you provide an
explanation or assurances that this characterization is not correct?
Answer. HEFT studies and analyses are part on an on-going and
continual human exploration architectural analysis effort that are
vital for prudent planning and responsive execution of the requirements
outlined in the law. As such, they were initiated prior to the current
NASA Authorization Act of 2010 and remain on-going cross-Agency
activity led by the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, with the
information intended to objectively inform agency decisionmaking and
serve as input to any future national studies or assessments. The
planning assumptions for the definition of the SLS are part of a larger
system of systems architecture assessment, and important program
planning and implementation preparatory work is being guided by the
current law and informed by the technical analysis conducted in several
on-going Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle assessment efforts. The study effort
is important because it integrates the essential analysis necessary to
consider and plan for the direction outlined in the law.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Hon. Elizabeth M. Robinson
Question 1a. Section 603 of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010
states that the retiring space orbiters ``shall be made available and
located for display and maintenance through a competitive procedure''
established pursuant to the disposition plan outlined in the 2008 NASA
Authorization Act. The 2010 law also specifies that certain conditions
must be met by eligible applicants. Could you describe the competitive
procedure NASA is undertaking to make the site selections?
Answer. The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-422, Section
613(a)) directed the Agency to ``submit to Congress a plan describing
the process for the disposition of the remaining Orbiters and other
Space Shuttle program-related hardware after the retirement of the
Space Shuttle fleet.'' NASA submitted the Space Shuttle Program
Transition and Retirement Personal Property Disposition Plan to
Congress in November 2008. The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L.
111-267, Section 603) restated the direction that Orbiter vehicles
shall be made available and located for display and maintenance through
procedures established pursuant to that plan. The Agency's efforts to
appropriately place the Orbiters remain consistent with that plan.
The Agency has conducted two Request for Information (RFI)
inquiries to obtain market research from educational institutions,
science museums, and other appropriate organizations regarding the
community's ability to acquire, maintain and display a Space Shuttle
Orbiter. The first was issued on December 17, 2008, and closed on March
17, 2009. NASA subsequently updated requirements, detailed tasks to
safe each Orbiter following its final mission, and determined that NASA
will no longer ask recipients to provide the Agency the funds for
Orbiter safing. NASA's estimate of the total cost of receiving an
Orbiter to a recipient is now $28.8M. In an effort to ensure that: (1)
all interested parties were made aware of the opportunity to obtain an
Orbiter for display, and (2) respondents to the previous RFI were aware
of the revised cost projections and schedule changes, NASA issued a
follow-on RFI on January 15, 2010, which included cost and delivery
schedule changes, as well as revised financial milestones. The RFI
closed on February 19, 2010.
The Administrator has broad authority to determine the best way to
meet the Agency's outreach and educational objectives, consistent with
the priority considerations listed in the NASA Authorization Act of
2010. Some factors considered include: financial aspects of transfer
process; quality and availability of facilities; options for
transporting Orbiters; attendance levels at prospective recipient
organizations; size of regional population; access to domestic and
international transportation; and, other factors. However, there is no
one criterion or combination of criteria that will be used to determine
the ultimate selection of recipients. The Administrator's decisions
will be informed by responses to the two RFIs and additional research.
Question 1b. While I am aware that NASA has released two Requests
for Information to assist the agency in identifying interested sites,
has the agency released a Request for Proposal? Does the agency intend
to release a Request for Proposal? What is the reasoning behind the
decision?
Answer. NASA has not released a Request for Proposal (RFP), and has
no plans to do so. The Administrator has the authority to determine the
disposition of the Space Shuttle Orbiters. Data gathered from
interested parties through the RFIs, as well as additional research and
analysis, will inform the Administrator's decisions.
Question 1c. Will the Administrator establish a formal site
selection committee? If there is a selection committee, what will be
the process by which members are chosen? What is the time-frame for
this committee member selection to occur?
Answer. Please see response to Question 1b, above. A formal
selection review committee was not established. NASA's Office of
Strategic Infrastructure's (OSI), which is charged with addressing
Space Shuttle Program property disposition, did market research,
developed two RFIs, coordinated with museum consortia, and evaluated
responses from all interested organizations. A proposal was made to the
Assistant Administrator for OSI that was fully vetted with NASA offices
including: the Space Operations Mission Directorate, Office of the
Chief Financial Officer, Office of the General Counsel, Office of
Communications, and Office of Legislative and Intergovernmental
Affairs. A coordinated staff recommendation was made to the
Administrator. The Administrator's announcement is pending, currently
scheduled for April 12, 2011.
Question 1d. Will geographic diversity be a consideration in the
site selection process?
Answer. Yes, geographic diversity is a consideration in the site
selection process, especially those factors pertaining to attendance at
a prospective recipient organization, the size of the regional
population and access to domestic and international transportation.
There is no single criterion that will determine the placement of the
Space Shuttle Orbiters.
Question 1e. Will the White House be involved in making the final
decisions?
Answer. No, the White House is not involved in making the final
decisions on Orbiter placement; that authority rests with the NASA
Administrator.
Question 1f. What is the time line for the final decisions to be
made?
Answer. NASA is currently targeting April 12, 2011 for announcing
the selection of Orbiter recipient organizations.
Question 2a. Section 603 of the Act authorizes federal funds to
cover the costs of decommissioning the shuttles. Congress's rationale
behind this provision was to enable NASA to choose the best site
candidates rather than those with the deepest pockets.
However, I understand that in the Request for Information that the
agency provided to museums and interested locations subsequent to the
NASA Authorization Act of 2008 but prior to the NASA Authorization Act
of 2010, it was stipulated that $28.8M was required by any interested
site to cover NASA expenses for decommissioning a shuttle. Could you
please comment on the $28.8M price tag and NASA's basis for that
figure? As you may recall, the initial estimate was $42M.
Answer. In the initial 2008 RFI, it was assumed that the recipient
organization would pay for the safing of the Orbiter, as well as for
display preparation tasks and ferry costs, and NASA projected the cost
to the recipient at $42M. One reason for the release of the second RFI
in 2010 was to inform interested parties that NASA would be paying the
costs to safe the Orbiters (safing tasks remove from Orbiters systems
and materials that would present hazards for long-term storage or
disposition of the vehicles).
In addition to NASA paying for the cost of safing the vehicles, the
Agency also generated a new estimate for display preparation and ferry
costs. The revised estimate for total cost to the recipient
organizations was $28.8M. The $28.8M cost is the sum of two component
costs: $20.5M for ``Display Preparation'' and $8.3M for ``Ferry.'' NASA
defines these two tasks as mandatory work to provide an Orbiter to a
recipient.
$20.5M is required for Display Preparation which includes the
reinstallation of safed orbiter vehicle systems or substitutes for
orbiter vehicle systems; provision of new special hazard notices and
controls; and configuration of the vehicle to allow it to be
transported to and reside in its final destination. Tasks include set
up of the Crew Module in flight configuration, installation of
structural shells and skins for the previously removed Orbital
Maneuvering System pods, Forward Reaction Control System, and internal
cabin structural panels, as well as final closeout of the payload bay,
wings and the aft compartment. Display preparation also includes costs
for NASA to configure the orbiter for ferry flight per existing Space
Shuttle Program ferry flight requirements; preparation and sign-off of
the Ferry Flight Readiness Statement, as well as preparation and
delivery of the NASA display site ``kit.''
The $8.3M ``Ferry'' cost is the work to fly the orbiter to an
airport near the display site. The airport must meet specific criteria
that allow landing the Shuttle Carrier Aircraft (SCA) with attached
orbiter. The orbiter will remain in Ferry Flight Configuration. The
major tasks include: actual ferry of orbiter, offload & tow to final
location; positioning the orbiter on jack stands and deservicing
Hydraulic System #1; renting two NASA approved mobile cranes, on-
loading/off-loading the orbiter to/from the SCA; shipment of Ground
Support Equipment (GSE) required from and to NASA KSC; travel cost and
rentals of hi-lifts, access stands, etc.; and Shuttle Carrier Aircraft
and Shuttle Landing Facility costs to conduct the ferry operation.
Also included is the ground support equipment (GSE) required to
support final NASA public display site requirements, including ``Data''
packs (MSDS equivalent for remaining passive hazards; orbiter system
configuration summary).
Question 2b. Is NASA still requiring applicants to cover this
expense when doing so appears to contradict language in the NASA
Authorization Act? Won't NASA have to decommission the shuttles for
safety reasons, regardless of where the shuttles are ultimately stored
or displayed?
Answer. The large majority of the $28.8M to be paid by recipients
supports work that NASA would not do in order to place the Orbiters in
storage. Requiring the recipient organizations to pay display
preparation and ferry costs does not contradict language in the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-267). Having the recipient
organizations provide funding for display preparation and ferry costs
of their Orbiter is an appropriate way to defray the cost to the
taxpayer of retiring and displaying the Orbiters to ensure that these
historic vehicles are retained in facilities properly equipped to
maintain and display them.
Question 2c. Will the ``safing'' work be performed by NASA
personnel or by NASA contractors? Does NASA envision the work to be
performed in parallel or in series? If the work is performed serially,
should NASA expect savings through gains made from the learning curve?
Answer. Activities associated with safing the Orbiters are
conducted after each Shuttle mission, and are carried out primarily by
contractor personnel, with NASA personnel providing safety and
assurance oversight.
Activities associated with display preparation and ferrying the
Orbiters to the recipient organizations will be paid for by the
recipients, and will be carried out primarily by NASA contractor
personnel with NASA personnel providing safety and assurance oversight.
Display preparation tasks will be performed in parallel, for the most
part, and NASA does not expect savings to accrue based on experience
gained from processing the Orbiters.
Question 3a. NASA has publicly indicated an interest in placing one
of the retiring shuttles at the Smithsonian. Section 603 of the Act
provides the Smithsonian with the authority to ``determine any new
location for the Enterprise,'' the orbiter test vehicle currently
housed at the National Air and Space Museum. It would be my assumption
that if the Smithsonian were chosen as the recipient of a retiring
shuttle, the Smithsonian would then determine a new location for the
Enterprise. Has the Smithsonian responded to the Requests for
Information issued by the agency?
Answer. NASM was not required to respond to the RFIs as addressed
in the NASA Space Shuttle Program Transition and Retirement Personal
Property Disposition (T&R) Plan as submitted to Congress in November
2008. The T&R plan suggested that one flight Orbiter would be
transferred to NASM and that an RFI would be issued to inform decisions
on subsequent Orbiter placement. The RFI additionally addressed a joint
effort by NASA and NASM to subsequently place the Orbiter Enterprise.
Question 3b. Is NASA requiring the Smithsonian to pay $28M for a
shuttle--an amount that equals the National Air and Space Museum's
total annual budget?
Answer. NASA intends to fund the cost of providing Discovery to
NASM. NASM has the unique responsibility of being the curator of the
national collection. Given this unique responsibility, the NASA
Administrator decided it is in the best interests of the Nation to
ensure NASM received a flight orbiter, and that NASA assume the costs
for ensuring that this happened so as not to detract from NASM overall
responsibilities in safeguarding its historic collection.
NASM and NASA have agreed to discuss the appropriate placement of
Enterprise. The costs to prep and ferry the Enterprise will be paid by
the recipient of the Enterprise.
Question 4a. The Act calls for ``a balance between human space
flight using and building upon existing capabilities and investing in
and enabling new capabilities'' What is the current status of solar
electric propulsion research at NASA?
Answer. During FY 2011, ESMD has accelerated their solar electric
propulsion (SEP) investment strategy because of its potential
performance benefits as an in-space transportation option to a variety
of deep space destinations. The Human Exploration Framework Team (HEFT)
identified SEP as a necessary and enabling technology for future deep
space missions due to its ability to significantly reduce the mass and
cost of such missions. The underlying technologies including, solar
power arrays, hall thrusters and power management, have completed
ground testing to the extent that the next logical step is an in-space
technology-focused flight demonstration. Current plans call for
initiation of a 30 kW class SEP technology demonstration mission as a
precursor to an operational human exploration vehicle in the 300 kW
class. With the movement of a large portion of the Exploration
Technology development effort to Space Technology in FY 2012 and
beyond, the Office of the Chief Technologist (OCT) plans to pursue an
in-space SEP Technology Demonstration Mission as one of the first two
Exploration-specific projects in this line.
Question 4b. How much is NASA budgeting for the solar electric
propulsion demonstration in FY 2011--FY 2015 time-frame since it
factors strongly into the Human Exploration Framework Team architecture
for future space missions?
Answer. In FY 2011 (under ESMD), NASA plans to invest approximately
$8M in planning for the SEP flight demonstration. In FY 2012 through FY
2015 (under OCT), NASA plans to invest an additional $75-200M subject
to the results of an FY 2011 Phase A (Conceptual Design) study, and the
conclusion of technology partnership discussions initiated with other
government agencies.
Question 5. Last month, it was reported that China has efforts
underway to develop a 1M pound force liquid hydrocarbon engine. For
purposes of comparison, the current Russian built engine used on the
Atlas 5 rocket has 860 thousand pounds of thrust at sea level.
I am told that these types of high performance hydrocarbon engines
essentially burn kerosene and are more environmentally friendly than
shuttle derived technology. My understanding is that the U.S. Air Force
has a small program to look into these types of engines to meet its
needs, but NASA has chosen not to invest in advanced liquid hydrocarbon
engines.
(a) Is it the case that NASA is not investing in the
technology? If so, why not?
(b) Does NASA see any potential benefits in this technology in
comparison to shuttle derived technologies?
(c) Are there potential downsides if the U.S. is not actively
engaged in this specific area of advanced rocket engine design
and development?
Answer. The rocket propulsion industry in all phases (production,
testing and launching) involve the use of hazardous and/or toxic
chemicals therefore all systems have environmental impacts. However,
during the design phase of the rocket, engineers consider the potential
environmental impact and design the system to meet the regulatory
requirements, thus mitigating or minimizing the environmental impact to
an acceptable risk level.
(a) The FY 2011 NASA Budget proposed the development of a large
liquid hydrocarbon rocket engine as part of the Heavy Lift and
Propulsion Technology efforts. However, in the NASA Authorization Act
of 2010 enacted on October 11, 2010, NASA has been directed to develop
a SLS that ``to the extent practicable utilize existing contracts,
investments, workforce, industrial base, and capabilities from the
Space Shuttle, and Orion and Ares projects.'' The liquid engines within
these systems are based on a liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen and do
not use liquid hydrocarbon (typically kerosene).
(b) There are positive attributes to both the large hydrocarbon
(kerosene) engine development as well as using Shuttle-derived systems.
Kerosene systems tend to be less expensive to operate however the
upfront development costs for a new engine may be large. The Shuttle-
derived systems, although likely more costly to operate, would allow
the Agency to take advantage of previous investments and leverage the
heritage workforce knowledge and assets at a reduced development cost
upfront.
(c) Currently there are only two domestic vendors that are actively
developing kerosene engines but nowhere near the thrust levels that
China is reportedly pursuing. Engine development of a large (1M pounds
thrust or greater) kerosene engine is not considered advanced
development, but there are challenges that need to be overcome such as
combustion stability issues, material compatibility as well as low-cost
produce-ability challenges. The U.S. liquid propulsion system
industrial sector is under significant stress due primarily to the low
demand of launch services, hence the decrease in the need for liquid
propulsion skills and manufacturing capabilities. Development of a
domestically manufactured large hydrocarbon engine would provide the
liquid propulsion industrial base with additional work, relieving some
of the stress on the sector.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
Hon. Elizabeth M. Robinson
Question. The Kodiak Launch Complex in Alaska is a state-of-the-art
facility that provides a flexible, efficient and economical launch
capability to its customers. On November 19, 2010, the Kodiak Launch
Complex successfully launched STP-S26, which contained two NASA
satellites as part of its payload. Are you familiar with Kodiak Launch
Complex facility? How do you see commercial facilities like Kodiak
Launch Complex playing a role in space access especially as NASA
retools its mission under the recently passed NASA Authorization Act of
2010?
Answer. NASA is very familiar with the Kodiak Launch Complex.
Moreover, the Agency had responsibility for the first orbital launch
utilizing the Complex. NASA's Launch Services Program purchased and
assured the launch service for the Kodiak Star Mission, which launched
in September 2001 carrying four satellites into Earth orbit: the NASA-
sponsored Starshine 3, and three satellites sponsored by the Department
of Defense Space Test Program (STP): PICOSat, Prototype Communications
Satellite (PCSat), and Sapphire. This was the last launch of the
heritage Athena launch vehicle. The Kodiak Star and STP-S26 campaigns
utilized the Wallops Flight Facility's Mobile Range.
NASA encourages the development of commercial launch ranges for
increased space access for an array of mission types for their
potential to reduce costs and increase our nation's launch capability.
In the case of uncrewed science missions, NASA procures commercial
launch services from launch providers under the NASA Launch Services
(NLS) contracts. Each provider offers services from one or more launch
sites. The specific vehicle type and launch location is selected
through a best-value determination depending upon mission requirements.
Lockheed Martin, with its yet-to-be-flown Athena IC and IIC, is the
only current NLS provider who offers NASA launches from Kodiak. From
this launch site, Athena is suited to meet performance requirements for
smaller spacecraft missions recommended in the National Research
Council's Earth Science Decadal Survey.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
Hon. Elizabeth M. Robinson
Question. Can you provide the construction timeline of the A-3 test
stand NASA will adhere to in order to comply with section 304(b)(3) of
the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, and provide quarterly updates on
progress through completion?
Answer. The A-3 Test Stand currently being constructed at Stennis
Space Center was approximately 70 percent complete at the end of
January 2011. NASA is committed to completing the A-3 Test stand,
contingent on available funding.
The 2010 NASA Authorization Act sets a goal for the A-3 completion
by September 30, 2013. However, NASA does not anticipate being able to
meet that goal. Funding available in the current Continuing Resolution
(CR), which expires March 4, will likely delay the completion and
acceptance of the test stand by as much as 8 months. Additional delays
are likely if NASA were to operate under a full-year CR.
The table below identifies the major construction milestones and
their estimated completion dates, contingent on available funding. The
estimated completion dates do not account for delays in funding due to
a CR.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major Construction Milestone Estimated Date of Completion
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Construct Upper level Signal 08/31/2011
Conditioning Bldg
Construct Tool Crib 07/29/2011
Installation and Calibration of Run 07/29/2011
Tank and Gauge Float
Fabrication and Installation of the 03/20/2012
Cooling Elbow Water Piping
Fabricating and Installation of 03/20/2012
High Pressure Industrial Water
Filters and Isolation Valves
Procurement and Installation of 09/03/2012
Monitoring, Measuring Control
System (MMCS)
Installation of Isolation Valve, 07/06/2011
Thrust Measurement System and
Chemical Steam Generator (CSG)
System Skids
Activation of MMCS 09/06/2013
Activation of CSG System 09/30/2013
Site Work and Paving 01/17/2013
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NASA would be willing to provide the Senator with a current status
briefing about the A-3 test stand, at his convenience, and we will, of
course, keep our committees apprised of future major developments
regarding the A-3.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Orrin G. Hatch to
Hon. Elizabeth M. Robinson
Question 1. Dr. Holdren and Dr. Robinson, senior NASA officials
have recently stated ``solid [rocket motors] are too expensive.''
However, pre-Columbia accident production costs for all the elements
associated with Space Shuttle liquid propulsion systems, including
engines, external tank, fuel, and pre-flight testing is approximately
$800M per year. By comparison, the costs for a solid propulsion system,
including motor and booster elements is approximately $550M per year.
This less expensive cost is also reflected in the Fiscal Year 2010
development amount of $940M for the Ares I Upper Stage propulsion
system; whereas the system's solid rocket motor First Stage cost only
$460M.\1\ Therefore, how does NASA's data substantiate the claim
``solids are too expensive''? How recent is NASA's data on the cost of
solid rocket motors?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ However, it goes without saying an upper stage and a solid
rocket motor first stage are essential to meeting the legal parameters
articulated in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. NASA recently performed a study identifying attributes and
characteristics of both solid and liquid propulsion systems and found
that the data does not indicate that one system is inherently more cost
effective than the other. Furthermore, the research found that there
was no statistical difference between the non-recurring costs of a
liquid system versus a solid propulsion system. Not knowing the
pedigree of the figures cited above in the question, NASA cannot
respond or defend those figures. The current contract values (FY 2011
first quarter data) for the Design Development Test and Evaluation
contracts for upper stage engine and first stage respectively are $1.3B
and $2.0B for a period of performance of September 2014 and June 2015,
respectively.
Question 2. Dr. Robinson, as defined by the Anti-Deficiency Act,
how many ``uncosted'' funds does NASA currently have for Fiscal Year
2011? What is the amount of NASA termination liability if NASA canceled
Project Constellation in Fiscal Year 2011?
Answer. The Anti-deficiency Act (ADA) greatly limits NASA's options
for dealing with termination liability. NASA uses cost-reimbursement
contracts for most of the Constellation program, which require a
Limitation of Funds clause to comply with the ADA. The Limitation of
Funds clause (Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.232-22), in paragraph
(h), states, ``the government is not obligated to reimburse the
Contractor for any costs incurred in excess of the total amount
allotted by the government to this contract, whether incurred in the
course of the contract or as a result of termination'' (emphasis
added). Accordingly, it is the responsibility of the contractor, in the
first instance, to manage all of its costs and obligations within the
allotted funding under this Limitation of Funds clause. And, on July
26, 2010, the GAO issued the opinion, which found that NASA's actions
are in full compliance with the Impoundment Control Act and the 2010
Appropriations Act. GAO further found that NASA's interpretation of the
Anti-Deficiency Act is, in fact, correct. Both rulings can be found at
http://www.gao.gov.
Potential term liability for Constellation prime contracts is
approximately $920M. This includes $500M for ATK, who has stated to
NASA that they are planning to cover their termination liabilities, if
they occur, from amounts not dedicated to the contract. All other
contractors over the past several months have reduced their level of
activity to accommodate their potential termination liability. ESMD
uncosted at the end of FY 2010 was approximately $900M for FY 2004-2010
funds.
At the end of FY 2010, NASA's total uncosted balance for Program
Year 2004-2010 funds was $5.6B.
Question 3. Dr. Holdren and Dr. Robinson, Section 309 of the NASA
Authorization Act requires NASA to provide a report to Congress which
articulates the design of the new Space Launch System by mid January
2011. Will NASA fully complete a final version of such a report by that
date? If not, will the report be sufficient to establish a program of
record, or baseline program, to begin the development of the Space
Launch System?
Answer. On January 10, 2011, NASA provided to Congress an interim
report on the our SLS and MPCV efforts to date, with a commitment to
provide more extensive details in the FY 2012 Presidential Budget
Request and in a follow-on report to Congress as early as Spring 2011.
We recognize that Congress wanted more information than we were able to
provide in the 90-day report. Unfortunately, such a deadline did not
afford NASA sufficient time to make significant acquisition and
development decisions for a major programmatic evolution of the kind
authorized by Congress, especially given the challenge of not having
final FY 2011 appropriations by the time the report was due to
Congress. Therefore, in an effort to be as responsive to Congress as
possible, NASA developed an interim report which noted the progress we
had made--in particular the definition of two reference vehicle
designs--with a commitment to provide a follow-on report with more
extensive details, once finalized, as early as next Spring.
As noted in the report, in choosing a Reference Vehicle Design for
the SLS, NASA took a significant step forward in the SLS development
process. Consistent with direction in the Act, the Agency has decided
to use a Reference Vehicle Design for the SLS that is derived from Ares
and Shuttle hardware. The current concept vehicles would utilize a
liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen core with five RS-25 Space Shuttle Main
Engine-derived engines, five-segment solid rocket boosters, and a J-2X
based Upper Stage for the SLS. This would allow for use of existing
Shuttle and Ares hardware assets in the near term, with the opportunity
for upgrades and/or competition downstream for eventual upgrades in
designs needed for affordable production.
More specifically, NASA has developed a process to make progress on
the Reference Vehicle Design for the SLS while the Agency determines
whether the design is sufficiently affordable, sustainable, and
realistic, and also while the Agency studies other options to solicit
innovative ideas and ensure the best value for the American taxpayers.
By spring of 2011, NASA expects to have completed several key
analytical steps--information that will be contained in our follow-on
report to Congress:
Analysis of the current Ares and Shuttle contracts for their
applicability to the future development program;
Analysis of the cost and benefits of the Reference Vehicle
Design and other vehicle designs;
Analysis of potential initial procurement approaches (in the
case when procurements are required, NASA will follow
applicable procurement regulations, including the March 4,
2009, Presidential Memorandum on Government Contracting).
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Cristina T. Chaplain
Question 1. Has your office been contacted regarding its
participation in, or oversight of, the ISS sustainability study
required in Section 503(b) of P.L. 111-267?
(NOTE: The pertinent language is at Section 503(c)(2) and states:
``(2) GAO Report.----
(A) Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after the submittal to
Congress under paragraph (1) of the assessment required by subsection
(b), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report on the assessment. The
report shall set forth an evaluation of the assessment by the
Comptroller General, including an evaluation of the accuracy and level
of confidence in the findings of the assessment.
(B) Cooperation with GAO.--The Administrator shall provide for the
monitoring and participation of the Comptroller General in the
assessment in a manner that permits the Comptroller General to prepare
and submit the report required by subparagraph (A).
(Emphasis added showing portion which directs NASA Administrator to
provide for GAO to monitor and participate in the required NASA
assessment of ISS sustainability requirements)
Answer. Yes, my office has been coordinating with the ISS program
office since December. The ISS Program office has shared the report and
supporting information and has met extensively with my staff to discuss
the data, methodology for analysis, and the findings of the study. We
anticipate delivering a preliminary report on April 11, 2011.
Question 2. Your statement places emphasis on design stability
prior to proceeding to implementation. The recent new law adopts a
``proven-heritage'' approach to SLS development, requiring maximum use
of design elements with a large body of experience and knowledge behind
them. Do you agree that, if implemented by NASA in his way, it will
contribute to an increased chance for successful Space Launch System
development?
Answer. Adopting a ``proven heritage'' approach to SLS development,
in which the program is based on heritage elements, if done correctly,
can reduce risk and build off of the hard work that has been done to
date on the Constellation Program. However, our work has shown that
NASA frequently employs heritage technologies that have to be modified
from their original form, fit, and function and frequently
underestimates the time and money it will take to allow them to operate
in a modified design. NASA's Systems Engineering Handbook states that
particular attention must be given to heritage systems because they are
often used in architectures and environments different from those in
which they were designed to operate. Further, the Handbook states that
modification of heritage systems is a frequently overlooked area in
technology development and that there is a tendency by project
management to overestimate the maturity and applicability of heritage
technology to a new project. Likewise, our work has shown that NASA's
cost estimates generally underestimate the cost of adopting heritage
technologies. Thus, while building off the progress made on prior
programs can benefit the new SLS program, Congress should take steps to
ensure that NASA is realistic in how it is estimating the applicability
of these heritage designs to the SLS program.
Question 3. The focus on early transparency and accountability in
our recommendations is exactly what we are looking for in the Section
309 reporting requirement, both for the initial SLS conceptual design
and the subsequent annual reporting requirement. We anticipate the
near-term outcome of the initial 90-day report to result in a
``baselined'' program. What else do you believe we should be looking
for in our oversight of NASA to ensure transparency and accountability?
Answer. The reporting requirement outlined in Section 309 of the
NASA Authorization Act is a positive step for ensuring that NASA is
held accountable for delivering what it promises and that the Congress
is well informed of the status of the program. Additional information
that could enhance oversight and help to ensure greater accountability
could include requiring NASA to report information to the Congress on
early planning cost baselines and how the agency is or is not
maintaining those cost projections. As I mentioned in my written
statement, currently NASA shares very little cost information prior to
formally baselining a project. This puts Congress in the position of
approving a long term effort with only the benefit of a five-year
budget projection.
Of course NASA needs time for discovery and to pursue different
options, but the Congress can be provided earlier indication to how the
project is doing based upon how well the project is meeting its
planning baselines. Deviations from these baselines should easily be
explained by the information required by Section 309, for example
information on trades, modifications, schedule changes, changes in
assumptions, and justifications for deviations from requirements.
Attaching a dollar figure to the information required to be reported
will ensure that the reason behind any change is presented in a
transparent way to Congress such that it can fully understand the basis
behind any cost increases and make its funding decisions accordingly.
As I discussed in the hearing, there are other knowledge-based
metrics that should be used to gauge NASA's progress in the earlier
phases of SLS development. They include: requirements stability,
technology readiness and design maturity, which assess the level of
unknowns being carried forward into development. Based on experiences
of prior programs, it is also important to assess: (1) the level and
use of management reserves and (2) contract-related activities,
specifically whether high risk approaches are being used--such as
undefinitized contracts.
Question 4. Your statement makes a strong point about matching
resources and requirements (see page 7) and also emphasizes the need
for ``performance and requirements flexibility in early phases of
development,'' and the acceptability to ``reduce, eliminate, or defer
some capabilities so the project's requirements could be matched with
the resources available to deliver it within the desired time fame.''
(page 8). We believe the ``evolvable'' nature of the SLS development
approach required by the law, and the upper stage and advanced
technology developments for beyond-Low Earth Orbit capabilities are
tailored to be in line with what your are recommending. Do you believe
that is an important ``success-oriented'' feature of the provisions and
approach taken by the law?
Answer. The requirement for the SLS to be evolvable in nature is in
line with our prior reviews of stable programs, where requirements are
scaled to a minimum. Through this approach, projects are encouraged to
incorporate known, proven technologies, while work is completed on more
advanced technologies to meet future requirements. While the stable
programs we studied pursued capabilities through evolutionary or
incremental acquisition strategies a number of other things had to be
in place, or in practice, for this approach to work. Specifically, the
projects also had clear and well-defined requirements, received stable
funding, leveraged mature technologies and production techniques, and
established realistic cost and schedule estimates that accounted for
risk. In addition, they executed their business plans in a disciplined
manner and resisted pressures for new requirements. As I mentioned
before, NASA has a history of not following through on some of these
aspects or underestimating the risks associated with their approach.
The reporting requirements from Section 309 will help the Congress
ensure that these other aspects are in place. The bulk of the
responsibility, however, will fall on NASA leadership to instill a
disciplined management approach to the project that encourages a
realistic identification of risks and progress and that holds managers
accountable for project decisions.
______
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Executive Office of the President
Washington, DC, December 7, 2010
Hon. David Vitter,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Vitter:
I am writing to follow up on our discussions at the December 1
hearing regarding implementation of the 2010 National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) Authorization Act and your specific request
for a letter addressing the Administration's support for language in a
Continuing Resolution (CR) that would enable NASA to move expeditiously
forward.
Making immediate progress in advancing the goals and requirements
contained in the 2010 NASA Authorization Act is a goal I believe we
both share. However, as both you and the U.S. Government Accountability
Office noted at the hearing, the FY 2010 NASA appropriation contains
limitations on the transfer of funds from certain programs, and also
contains limitations on using funds to ``create or initiate a new
program, project or activity, unless such program termination,
elimination, creation, or initiation is provided in subsequent
appropriations Acts.''
At the hearing, you specifically asked whether the Administration
would support the inclusion of language in an FY 2011 CR (or other
appropriations vehicle as applicable) that would address these
limitations and facilitate NASA's ability to proceed with full and
timely implementation. I would like to take this opportunity to
reiterate the Administration's support for language in either an FY
2011 CR or other relevant FY 2011 appropriations measure that would
enable NASA to move forward in executing the full range of programs and
initiatives described in the 2010 NASA Authorization Act, without the
restrictive language contained in the FY 2010 appropriation or current
FY 2011 CR. Enabling transfers and new starts, as required by the 2010
NASA Authorization Act, will enable NASA to more effectively implement
the direction provided in this Act, which will in turn help us chart a
new path forward in space and help to ensure that America's space
program remains a shining beacon of American ingenuity and discovery.
Indeed, immediately following the hearing, the Administration sent
a request to Congress for a broadly applicable, U.S. government-wide
provision that would enable both the initiation of new projects and the
transfer of funds from existing projects in the event of a FY 2011 CR,
and this request would of course be applicable to NASA.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Senate Commerce
Committee and share with you and other members of the Committee the
Administration's views on how we and the Congress can work together to
make implementation of the 2010 NASA Authorization Act an unqualified
success. As we continue our collective efforts to help NASA advance
this bold new era of innovation, exploration; and discovery, I look
forward to any future discussions with you or other members of the
Committee on this important topic.
Sincerely,
John P. Holdren,
Director.
Cc: The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV
The Honorable Bill Nelson
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison
The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski
The Honorable Richard C. Shelby