[Senate Hearing 111-1085]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-1085
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION
SCREENING STANDARDS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 2, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
70-645 PDF WASHINGTON : 2011
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
TOM UDALL, New Mexico SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Ann Begeman, Republican Staff Director
Brian M. Hendricks, Republican General Counsel
Nick Rossi, Republican Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota, JIM DeMINT, South Carolina,
Chairman Ranking Member
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
BILL NELSON, Florida ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK WARNER, Virginia
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on December 2, 2010................................. 1
Statement of Senator Dorgan...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 3
Statement of Senator Johanns..................................... 4
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 33
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 41
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 45
Witnesses
Hon. David Heyman, Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security................................ 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Vicki Reeder, Director of Global Compliance, Office of Global
Strategies, Transportation Security Administration, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security................................ 14
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Gregory Principato, President, Airports Council International--
North America.................................................. 26
Prepared statement........................................... 28
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. David Heyman by:
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 51
Hon. Roger F. Wicker......................................... 52
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Frank R.
Lautenberg to:
Stephen M. Lord.............................................. 52
Gregory Principato........................................... 53
Letter, dated December 1, 2010, to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
Hon. Byron Dorgan, Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison and Hon. Jim
DeMint from Scott Boyland, Vice President and General Counsel,
Morpho Detection, Inc.......................................... 53
Letter, dated December 1, 2010, to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
from Kate Hanni, Executive Director, FlyersRights.org.......... 55
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION
SCREENING STANDARDS
----------
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and
Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:16 p.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Byron L.
Dorgan, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA
Senator Dorgan. We're going to call the hearing to order
this afternoon. This is a hearing of the Aviation Subcommittee,
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. I'm
Senator Dorgan, Chairman of the Subcommittee. I'm joined by the
Chairman of the full Committee, Senator Rockefeller. Senator
Rockefeller, thank you for being here.
Let me provide a brief opening statement and then call on
my colleague Senator Rockefeller, after which we will hear from
four witnesses today. First of all, let me say that I am really
pleased that during this Congress under the leadership of
Senator Rockefeller we've considered a significant number of
aviation issues in our Subcommittee and full Committee. I know
that these efforts ultimately are going to make the skies safer
for the traveling public, and there is much work yet to do.
The largest piece of legislation that we accomplished,
however, the FAA reauthorization bill, is still awaiting a
final vote after many, many months of negotiation. It is a
great disappointment to me, and I know the Chairman of the full
Committee, that we have not yet seen that completed by the
Senate. It's completed by this committee, but we have not yet
had completion of a conference report and get it to the
President for signature.
I hope that my colleagues in the Senate--I know I speak for
Senator Rockefeller--would join us in working seriously to try,
even at this late date, to get the FAA reauthorization bill
completed. It deals with air traffic control modernization and
so many issues that are important. I still remain hopeful that
there might be some crevice, some narrow crevice through which
we can get that legislation passed at long last.
We've had 16 extensions of the FAA reauthorization bill.
That to me is failure. And the work that we have done is
excellent work, I think, and the country would be well served
if we can get the bill to the President for signature.
With that said, the hearing that we have today touches on
something that we've been talking about a lot, particularly
since the last Christmas period, when a man got on an airplane
in a foreign land and attempted to bring down an aircraft
loaded with passengers, with a bomb sewn in the underwear. It
is the Christmas Bomber.
Fortunately, that bomb did not detonate, despite the fact
that the passenger attempted to detonate that bomb. We know
from that plot and other bomb plots over the past year that
aviation security screenings are important, not just at our
airports, but at every airport in this world.
We also know that every nation is expected to meet aviation
security protocols that have been set out by the
[International] Civil Aviation Organization, the ICAO. But the
methods by which many countries meet these protocols is largely
at the discretion of each country.
We also know that over the past year the Department of
Homeland Security and the Transportation Security
Administration have worked extensively with international
partners to try to update existing aviation security protocols.
I applaud and appreciate the work the agencies have done, but
clear standards that all airports in this world should meet and
must meet are still lacking.
The Christmas Day incident that I just referenced is an
incident in which the suspect departed from Nigeria, where he
in fact was subject to walk through a metal detector, a metal
scanner, which meets existing security protocols in that
country. Nonetheless, a person with a bomb in their underwear
boarded the airplane and could very easily have brought that
plane down and killed all of the passengers.
The thwarted bombing suspect was able to get through with
explosives on his body because those standards and that scanner
did not pick up those explosives.
This occurrence has led some nations, including our
country, to use advanced imaging technology. Those machines
have generated a great deal of discussion and news stories in
recent weeks especially. Those machines are at commercial
airports in many cases in this country, not all cases, while
other countries continue to use other methods to screen
passengers.
I know that these new machines are designed to catch types
of explosives that are difficult, and I know that these are
controversial screening techniques. We are very anxious to get
to the advanced technology, which we discussed in this
committee not long ago, where imaging technology would have the
human figure as a stick figure, detecting only that which would
be on the stick figure that would be difficult or represent a
threat to the airplane.
So we're working very hard on advanced technology. The
companies and the agencies are working together to have a more
secure system while still respecting all of the civil rights of
passengers.
A couple more points. It's clear that the most significant
threats to the U.S. aviation system are consistently foreign-
based. I say that not suggesting there aren't internal threats.
Indeed there are. But if we take a look at what we have
confronted--the shoe bomber, the underwear bomber, the
cartridge toners, the liquids in bottles--all of those are
foreign-based plots that in many ways were trying to put
explosives on airplanes that would fly over our territory.
That's why it's critically important that we work so
closely with other countries and corporations to cooperate on
improving this system.
Now, it's in the best interests, it seems to me, of
commercial air carriers, of our manufacturers and homeland
security representatives to come together on security solutions
and push for consistency in their application. That's the
purpose of this hearing today, to determine not just what is
happening at our airports--we've certainly read enough about
that in recent weeks--not what is happening in our airports to
keep someone off a commercial airplane who may have a bomb on
their person, but what is happening at every other airport and
the world in which passengers who may well come to this country
or will be traveling elsewhere are boarding an airplane that
may well be unsafe because the screening technology and the
screening capability was not meeting standards that we would
expect.
This is a very important, a very controversial, and a very
complicated subject, and the members of this committee
appreciate a great deal all of the work that's been done by
TSA, by Homeland Security, and by so many others, private
companies that are working on new technologies as well.
Let me call on the Chairman of the full Committee, Senator
Rockefeller, for an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before we begin, I want to say that this is, after 25 years
of public service in the Congress, this is the last hearing
that Senator Dorgan will chair. To me that's worthy of comment,
because he has been absolutely superb. He's going--he's not
going to retire. He doesn't know how to do that. I don't know
what he's going to do. But I think it's an enormous loss to the
Senate.
Byron Dorgan can talk on any subject any time, at great
length or short length, whatever is required. He can be on
three different television stations at the same time--I don't
know how he does that--talking passionately about jobs going
overseas and tax incentives for that to happen. He cares so
deeply about manufacturing. He's the quintessential what I
would call--North Dakota and West Virginia aren't similar. One
is sort of flat and the other is sort of not. But we are very
similar in our people, in our work ethic. And Byron Dorgan
exemplifies that.
He makes me incredibly proud just to serve with the guy, to
watch him. He never stops moving. I think he has already spoken
on the floor twice this morning. I know I saw him once, and I
didn't watch the floor very much, so probably twice.
He always has his thoughts in order. He's always right. I
can't think of a single time when he and I have disagreed. I'm
sure it has happened, but it certainly doesn't come to mind.
So I think this is going to be a weaker committee, this is
going to be a weaker Senate, without Byron Dorgan, and I mourn
that because what we need in this place are people with passion
and people who are not gripped by politics first of all or
theology first of all, but who are gripped by issues, and
particularly putting people to work, fair trade, not exporting
jobs, but creating more jobs, somebody who's just totally
working middle-class-oriented, and he is that.
I'm so proud to serve with him and I'm so sorry that I'm
not going to be able to any more. So I would like to put that
into the record. He cares about these things, good wages, good
benefits. He even wrote a book about it. I haven't read it yet,
but it's ``Take This Job and Ship It.'' It ought to be on your
bedside table.
I just feel privileged to have served with him, and he's
what a Senator ought to be. Everything is serious, nothing is
frivolous, but he has a very good sense of humor, but you have
to know him well. And he's a fighter.
That's what this place should be about, somebody who loves
public policy, and that's Byron.
Senator Dorgan. Your time has expired.
The Chairman. No, it hasn't.
[Laughter.]
Senator Dorgan. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. My thoughts about you have expired. But I've
got to say one quick word.
Senator Dorgan. Thank you very much. You're very generous.
The Chairman. Well, I am very generous. I am very generous,
but I'm also very honest. You're good, Byron, and you need to
know that.
So we're here to talk about the aviation security matters.
As Byron said, there have been a lot of significant steps
taken. This whole question of invasion of private security
versus the security of the country, the security of airports,
is huge. Everything is global now. Everything is in an
international environment, and are others doing what we want
them to do. If they're not, what do we do about that?
So I look forward to this hearing and I look forward to
hearing our witnesses, and I thank the Chair.
Senator Dorgan. Thank you very much.
Senator Johanns.
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE JOHANNS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Johanns. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Chairman: Let me, if
I might, just offer a word also. I want to say to Chairman
Dorgan how much I've appreciated the opportunity to be in the
Senate with you over the last 2 years. As a former Secretary of
Agriculture who interfaced with you a lot when I was in the
Cabinet, I always knew that when I had a meeting with you I
better darn well be prepared, because I knew you were going to
be prepared.
Even though there were probably many times where we were on
opposite sides of issues, I want you to know that you're one of
the members when you pop up on the TV screen and I'm in my
office going through paperwork or whatever, I tend to listen to
what you're saying because you're so articulate and you have so
much experience that you bring to bear.
So I join with what Chairman Rockefeller has said. You have
brought a lot to this body and you will be missed.
I also wanted to offer just a word or two if I could about
the subject of our hearing. The first thing I want to say--and
I really feel I speak for everybody when I say this--and that
is to just recognize how important airline security is. We all
watched in horror on
9/11 as those planes were flown into the tower and into the
ground and into the Pentagon, and we certainly don't want to
ever, ever see that again. We want to do everything possible.
I fly a lot, like every member. I have flown a lot
internationally because various jobs that I have had have
required me to do that. My experience with the traveling public
has been good. I think if we explain to them the need for the
security and what we're doing and why we're doing it, the
public has been more than willing to go along.
It has been an evolutionary process, as we all know. I
think we can all remember the days when you could arrive at the
airport 20 minutes ahead of the flight, make a mad dash for the
ticket counter, and make a mad dash for the gate, and run on
the airplane. Well, those days are over, and the public has
been understanding.
As security has evolved and as we have explained the need
for security, the public has evolved. So if I were to just
offer one thought, whether it's international flights or
domestic flights, I think if we can communicate to the public
this is why this is needed, this is why we're taking this new
step, it will go a long way to calming the concerns of people.
The last thing I wanted to mention on international flying,
an important piece of the security puzzle for me is baggage:
What are we doing about baggage? Can we be assured that that
bag that is put into that airplane is safe, that it has been
checked, that again that piece of the security puzzle is dealt
with?
We can ask our travelers to go through a lot, whether it's
advanced screening, whether it's a patdown, whatever it is. But
if we're not getting the job done on the cargo, then very
simply we've got a problem. So I'll be anxious to hear about
that. I'll wrap up and just say I believe it is so terribly
important that we get this right, that we communicate with the
public, and that we continue to let them know why these
measures are important.
Thank you.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Johanns, thank you very much. As
you were mentioning it, I came here 30 years ago at a time when
you could rush to the airport, rush to the ticket counter, and
rush on the airplane, and then sit back and have a cigarette,
not that I smoked at the time. But things have changed very
dramatically, and the first change was to make certain that
people who boarded an airplane did not have a gun. The reason?
People were using guns on airplanes to hijack the airplane,
mostly to fly to Cuba, but in some cases to fly elsewhere. If
you could simply separate a potential passenger from a gun, you
had the security you needed.
Things have changed so dramatically since then, the shoe
bomber, underwear bomber, and very sophisticated threats. So
that's why we find ourselves in a very different situation, not
just with American or U.S. airports, but with airports all
around the world.
So I'm really pleased today to welcome the Honorable David
Heyman, the Assistant Secretary for Policy at the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; Ms. Vicki Reeder,
Transportation Security Administration Office of Global
Strategies, International Operations, at the Department of
Homeland Security; and Mr. Stephen Lord, the Director of
Homeland Security and Justice Issues at the GAO, Government
Accountability Office.
Is it ``HAY-man''? Mr. Heyman, thank you for being with us
and why don't you proceed. The full statements of all of the
witnesses will be made part of the permanent record and you may
summarize. Mr. Heyman.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID HEYMAN,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF POLICY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Heyman. Thank you, Chairman and distinguished members,
for having us here today. Let me thank you and join in thanking
you for your service, the support for the Department over the
years and for our economic security for even longer, so thank
you for that.
The topic today continues to be one of great importance. As
you know, the attempts over the past year to attack the United
States make the international dimensions of the aviation system
quite clear. In both cases, terrorists looked to strike at
America by using the international aviation system, the
structures and operations across multiple countries in
international airports, to attack us here at home.
The key lesson in both of these incidents is that if you
have access to one part of the system you have access to the
entire system. These attempted attacks highlight the fact that
the terrorist threat is a global challenge and ensuring
aviation security is a shared responsibility. Consequently,
efforts to protect Americans at home must extend beyond our
shores, to include partnerships with industry and governments
abroad.
In fact, America's security relies in part on a robust
system comprised of many layers operated by many partners
across many continents. The system of collective security
relies in part on the competency and capabilities of each
individual partner. As such, maintaining effective standards
and best practices is critical, and so I commend you on this
hearing and shedding light on this important topic.
We will talk today about our response to the October 28
cargo plot, the work we've done over the last year, and, as you
said, we have submitted a full statement for the record.
The October cargo plot represents an evolution of the
threat beyond passenger planes to cargo. Our enemies continue
to try to penetrate our security. Senator Dorgan, as you said,
we separated the gun from the passengers, but now--and we tried
to separate the bomb from the passengers. Now the bombs are
going elsewhere.
The Department and its partners need to continue to adapt
and innovate as well in terms of addressing these threats. It's
that ability to adjust, to anticipate, to craft new strategies
with our partners and to secure the flows of people and cargo
around the world that will allow us to prevail.
The Department, both as a matter of response to these
failed attacks and as part of our larger strategy already under
way, has undertaken a number of measures to increase aviation
security. We augmented existing protocols for screening inbound
cargo, including temporarily grounding all packages originating
from Yemen destined to the United States. With constant
communication and coordination with the private sector and with
international and government partners, we were able to support
the larger effort by the U.S. government to disrupt the plot on
October 28 before it did any harm.
DHS has also issued additional directives to the airline
industry on the nonacceptance or extra screening of high-risk
packages on passenger and all cargo flights. Those directives
are in effect today.
In terms of our broader efforts, since 12/25 and the
attempts of Abdulmutallab to detonate a device on an aircraft
from The Netherlands to Detroit, we have accelerated efforts to
enhance and harmonize international and domestic aviation
security standards, with a focus on four key priorities: first,
strengthening aviation security measures and standards; second,
developing and deploying new security technologies and
measures; third, enhancing information gathering and sharing;
and fourth, coordinating international technical assistance.
In terms of strengthening aviation security standards,
immediately following the events of 12/25 we initiated a broad
international campaign to strengthen the global aviation system
against the evolving threats posed by terrorism. The Deputy
Secretary and I traveled to and consulted with nearly a dozen
countries, touching on every continent and region. The
Secretary then participated in five regional summits and
meetings, engaging nearly 90 countries in consultations and
discussions.
That effort culminated in a declaration by ICAO as you
mentioned on aviation security that was signed onto by 190
nations. Following that, at the assembly meeting of ICAO in
October the council updated its standards and recommended
practices for security to include updates on cargo security.
This is a major accomplishment.
In terms of developing and deploying new technologies, more
than a dozen nations have joined the United States in
strengthening their aviation systems by boosting their budgets
on security and the use of new technologies, to include
advanced imaging technology and an expansion of Federal Air
Marshals and screening of air cargo.
In terms of enhancing information gathering, we have this
week as part of Secure Flight Initiative, we now vet and have
taken over the responsibility for vetting 100 percent of
passengers on flights within or bound to the United States
against the watch lists--a number of other technology
initiatives, information sharing initiatives, and coordination
on technical assistance that my colleague will touch upon in
her opening statement.
Let me conclude by recalling a strategic document that we
put forth this year. The first ever Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review was developed by the Department and released
earlier in February of this year. In it we set forth the
mission of a safe, secure, and resilient homeland where
American interests, aspirations, and way of life can thrive.
That is our vision. We articulated clear missions, goals, and
objectives to accomplish this mission.
In the end, we concluded rightly that America--that this
nation can protect itself, but we must all play a role. In the
commitment of each, we will secure the homeland for all. That
same conclusion is true for all of those who comprise the
international aviation system. In the commitment of each, we
will secure the system for all.
I look forward to the discussion today. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Heyman and Ms. Reeder
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. David Heyman, Assistant Secretary, Office of
Policy and Vicki Reeder, Director of Global Compliance, Office of
Global
Strategies, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security
Introduction
Chairman Dorgan, Ranking Member DeMint, and distinguished members
of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today
about the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) ongoing efforts to
improve aviation security standards in the wake of two failed terrorist
attacks on the aviation system--on December 25, 2009 and October 28,
2010.
As you know, both of these attempted attacks involved exploiting
the international aviation infrastructure to attack America. It is
clear, however, that while the targets were domestic, the mechanisms
that set these plots in motion were decidedly international. In both
cases, terrorists sought to strike at America using the global aviation
system, including the structures and operations across multiple
countries and international airports, with little regard for the threat
or potential consequences to a multitude of countries and citizens.
America's security--and the threats to it--does not exist in a
vacuum. Consequently, protective efforts must extend beyond our shores.
America's security relies in part on a robust international aviation
security system, comprised of many layers and operated by many
partners, across the globe. This system of collective security measures
depends in part on the competency and capabilities of each individual
partner. As such, maintaining effective standards and best practices is
critical.
The recent attempts to attack the United States--the plot aboard
Northwest Airlines (NWA) Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, and the
October 28, 2010 cargo plot using aircraft to conceal and ship
explosive devices--highlight the fact that the terrorist threat is a
global challenge and ensuring aviation security is a shared
responsibility.
In our testimony today, we would like to discuss DHS's role in
responding to the October 28 cargo plot and some of the initiatives we
are looking to implement in the long term, followed by a broader
discussion of our efforts post-12/25 in enhancing international
aviation security. We will conclude with some observations on the way
forward.
The October 28 Plot
Similar to the NWA 253 plot, as the events of October 28 unfolded,
DHS took a number of actions to immediately ensure the safety and
security of the American people. The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
immediately took measures to enhance existing protocols for screening
inbound cargo, including temporarily grounding all packages originating
from Yemen destined for the United States. With constant communication
and coordination with the private sector, and with international and
government partners, we were able to support the larger effort by the
U.S. government to successfully disrupt this plot before it did any
harm. As we continue to address the threat to air cargo, DHS continues
to gather and analyze information and develop intelligence on the
packages intercepted from Yemen.
In the days immediately following the attempted plot, at the
direction of President Obama and Secretary Janet Napolitano, TSA
deployed a team of security specialists to Yemen to provide assistance
and guidance to the Government of Yemen regarding its cargo screening
procedures. TSA also conducted significant outreach with more than 100
foreign governments, more than 200 foreign air carriers, and several
industry organizations to discuss the common transportation security
threats we all face and the cooperative actions we could take to
address security vulnerabilities.
On November 2, Secretary Napolitano spoke with leaders of the
international shipping industry, including UPS, DHL, FedEx, and TNT,
about enhancing air cargo security. During that discussion, Secretary
Napolitano underscored her commitment to partnering with the shipping
industry to strengthen cargo security through enhanced screening and
preventative measures, including terrorism awareness training for
shipping industry personnel.
Following her dialogue with shipping industry leaders, Secretary
Napolitano spoke with International Air Transport Association (IATA)
Director General Bisignani about the Department's continued
collaboration with our private sector and international partners to
secure the global supply chain through a layered security approach that
is designed to identify, deter, and disrupt threats at the earliest
possible point. The Secretary also reiterated her commitment to ongoing
coordination with the airline and shipping industries to uphold TSA
security standards, including the vetting of personnel with access to
cargo, employee training, and cargo screening procedures.
DHS also issued additional directives to the airline industry on
the non-acceptance or enhanced screening of high-risk packages on
passenger and all-cargo flights. Specifically, on November 8, Secretary
Napolitano announced that:
The ban on air cargo from Yemen will continue and has been
expanded to all air cargo from Somalia;
No high-risk cargo will be allowed on passenger aircraft;
Toner and ink cartridges weighing 16 ounces or more will be
prohibited on passenger aircraft in both carry-on bags and
checked bags on domestic and international passenger flights
in-bound to the United States, as well as certain inbound
international air cargo shipments; and
All cargo identified as high-risk will go through additional
and enhanced screening, including inbound international mail
packages, which must be screened individually and certified to
have come from an established postal shipper.
DHS Initiatives
Beyond the immediate actions taken as a result of the directives
discussed above, DHS is working to develop a range of longer-term and
sustainable security solutions to address this real and constantly
evolving threat.
First and foremost, DHS will accelerate work that has been ongoing
since early this year to obtain critical information on the goods,
conveyances, and entities involved in the shipment of air cargo to the
United States prior to the loading of that cargo on an aircraft. The
Department relies upon a risk-based and layered approach to security
that allows us to focus our resources on the greatest threats and helps
us speed delivery of lawful shipments. This approach is only as good as
the data we gather about each shipment; and DHS is constantly striving
to improve the quality and timeliness of the data we receive.
We are exploring additional pilot programs to augment several of
the pilots that have been operational since early 2010 to better
understand the type, quality, and timeliness of the pre-departure
information we may require in the future. These pilots will ensure that
we derive the most security benefit from any additional requirements
and have considered the wide range of policy and operational factors
that will need to be addressed. For instance, while some entities may
be in a position to provide the necessary information now, others may
need time to develop the appropriate technical systems or business
processes. In addition, procedures for further inspecting and
adjudicating suspicious cargo will need to be refined, as DHS does not
currently have a physical presence in many airport locations where air
carriers and host nation partners conduct the inspections. DHS is
committed to moving forward with a pre-departure initiative and is
developing a more detailed timeline and work plan.
In addition to seeking pre-departure information, we are also
working with our international and private sector partners to expand
and strengthen other important layers of security including:
prioritized engagement with worldwide cargo hubs and high-
risk/high-threat shipping locations;
development and sharing of intelligence and information
gathering capabilities to target high risk cargo;
continued promotion and development of next-generation
technologies that can identify threat material; and
coordination and mutual recognition of processes and
programs among federal partners and also, where possible, among
private and public sector partners with a role in aviation
security.
It is critical that DHS and other federal stakeholders work closely
with the variety of private sector entities that own and operate the
air cargo system to ensure that strong and sensible security measures
are developed that both protect the aviation system and facilitate the
movement of legitimate trade that is so essential to our economic
prosperity. To highlight the crucial role of the private sector in this
area, it is important to note that FedEx, UPS, DHL, and TNT together
employ more than 1 million people around the world, and own or operate
more than 1,700 aircraft. Each of these companies has operations in
more than 200 countries. In 2008, air merchandise trade comprised
almost 30 percent of U.S. exports by value, totaling approximately $390
billion, and almost 20 percent of U.S. imports by value, totaling more
than $417 billion. Combined, that represents more than $800 billion of
U.S.-international merchandise trade.
DHS and Aviation Security Post-12/25
Over the past 11 months, DHS has embarked on an unprecedented
international campaign to elevate the importance of aviation security
worldwide, with a focus on four priorities: strengthening aviation
security measures and standards; developing and deploying new security
technologies and measures; enhancing information gathering and sharing;
and coordinating international technical assistance. Today we would
like to highlight the advancements made in each of these categories.
Strengthening Aviation Security Measures and Standards
The global dimensions of the attempted attacks in December 2009 and
October 2010 highlight the importance of international partnerships in
mitigating evolving threats to our security. Over the past year, under
the leadership of Secretary Napolitano, DHS and its components,
including TSA, CBP, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), have
accelerated efforts to enhance and harmonize international and domestic
aviation security standards.
In order to enhance global aviation security measures and
standards, DHS initiated a broad international campaign to strengthen
the global aviation system against the evolving threats posed by
terrorism. After initial outreach following the December 2009 attempted
attack that laid the groundwork for improved aviation security
standards, Secretary Napolitano participated in four Regional Aviation
Security Conferences hosted by Mexico, Japan, Nigeria, and the United
Arab Emirates while working in concert with the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) to increase international awareness and
strengthen global aviation security measures. Secretary Napolitano also
traveled to Spain and met with European ministers during the Justice
and Home Affairs Informal Meeting on January 22, 2010, to promote
enhanced global aviation standards. These five regional conferences and
meetings included broad participation from elected leaders, security
ministers, and airline officials across Europe, the Western Hemisphere,
the Asia Pacific region, Africa, and the Middle East and resulted in
the signing of historic joint declarations on improved aviation
security standards in each region.
The ICAO General Assembly, held from September 28 to October 8 in
Montreal, Canada, is a significant and essential global forum for
advancing aviation security. Secretary Napolitano participated in this
forum along with leaders from the majority of ICAO's 190-member states.
Among the important security initiatives adopted by the General
Assembly was the ICAO Declaration on Aviation Security, which was
derived from the priorities and resulting Declarations endorsed at the
five regional conferences and meetings held earlier in the year. The
Declaration contains language on a number of key DHS aviation security
priorities to help bolster global aviation security, including:
increased screening technology, improved information sharing, enhanced
cargo and airport security, expanded onboard flight protection, and
increased transparency of ICAO audits. ICAO has also developed the
Comprehensive Aviation Security Strategy (ICASS) that establishes the
strategic framework for ICAO's aviation security efforts for the next 6
years. As President Obama noted, ``the extraordinary global
collaboration demonstrated by the nearly 190 ICAO countries during the
ICAO General Assembly helped to bring about a truly 21st century
international aviation security framework that will make air travel
safer and more secure than ever before.'' The efforts taken by ICAO
renew focus on aviation security and promote innovative, effective, and
efficient security approaches, information sharing, and compliance and
oversight, and emphasize the importance of security among sovereign
states and stakeholders, as well as within ICAO.
Annex 17 to the ICAO Convention on International Civil Aviation has
included cargo screening and security controls provisions well before
September 11, 2001, and the provisions have been further updated in the
most recent iteration, Amendment 12, adopted in November 2010. As with
other aspects of aviation security, there is still a need to improve
performance internationally. In order to advance this concept, on
November 16, 2010, TSA leadership met with the ICAO Secretary General
and representatives from several countries and industry to discuss
near-, mid-, and long-term actions informed by the most current threat
information and intelligence. Discussions focused on implementing a
graduated approach, led by ICAO, to identify ways to enhance cargo
security worldwide.
This endeavor must be a collaborative mechanism for international
counterparts from governments and industry to come together to discuss
the threat from a risk perspective and identify actionable mitigation
options. As this undertaking evolves, it will also serve as a model for
the establishment of a mechanism for timely incident management led by
ICAO, and also help to unify the global response as incidents occur.
We anticipate that this effort will encourage collaboration among
international partners including both industry and organizations. Key
priorities include the prioritized engagement with key cargo hubs and
high threat cargo shipment countries; the establishment of a standard
definition of high-risk cargo; development of chain of custody
requirements and compliance requirements; development of multinational
compliance teams and technology teams; information sharing; training;
and development of ICAO guidance related to air cargo security. This
guidance will be built upon the consensus of the international
community along with outreach to industry and governments. Longer-term
options under consideration include development of fortified devices to
ensure minimal impact to the aircraft in addition to more rigorous
standards for air cargo security at the international level.
The Department continues to support ICAO's Universal Security Audit
Program (USAP), an essential tool for overseeing the implementation of
the security measures set forth in Annex 17 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation. DHS supports the use of audit results to
prioritize technical cooperation and capacity development as well as
the greater transparency of audit results among member states when
significant security concerns are found and verified.
Immediately following the air cargo incident, TSA participated in
the ICAO Points of Contact Network and communicated directly with all
countries with flights to the United States from the Western
Hemisphere, Asia-Pacific, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. In
addition, TSA coordinates closely with the European Union (EU) on all
transportation security issues of mutual concern, including through
formal meetings twice per year of the U.S.-EU Transportation Security
Coordination Group (TSCG). Immediately after we learned of the air
cargo threat, TSA consulted with EU officials as new requirements were
developed for flights to the United States and participated via video
teleconference in the EU Aviation Security Emergency meeting on
November 5, 2010, to specifically discuss air cargo.
Additionally, we encourage the continuance of regional aviation
security conferences to improve aviation standards amid evolving
threats. In her opening remarks at the ICAO General Assembly, Secretary
Napolitano encouraged other member states to continue to hold these
conferences after the ICAO Assembly concluded. All of these priorities
have and will continue to help strengthen aviation security standards
and measures worldwide.
Developing and Deploying New Security Technologies
Since January 2010, DHS and its components have facilitated the
development and deployment of new security technologies and measures
around the world. Already, more than a dozen nations have joined the
United States in strengthening their aviation systems by increasing
their aviation security budgets and accelerating the use of new
technologies. Today we would like to highlight several of these
security enhancements:
Increased Deployment of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT):
AIT machines bolster security by safely screening passengers
for metallic and non-metallic threats including weapons,
explosives, and other objects concealed under layers of
clothing. To date, 13 countries have joined the United States
in utilizing AIT. The Netherlands and Nigeria, two countries
through which Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab traveled before his
flight to Detroit, are deploying AIT. The Netherlands has
specifically announced the deployment of AIT units for all
U.S.-bound flights from Schiphol Airport. Additionally, Canada,
Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Korea, Russia, Spain,
Ukraine, and the United Kingdom have all either deployed or
announced plans to conduct trial runs of AIT units in their
major airports. Domestically, TSA's deployment of AIT machines
incorporates vigorous privacy controls to protect passenger
privacy and ensure anonymity while ensuring operational
effectiveness.
Expansion of Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS): The FAMS
deploys Federal Air Marshals on U.S. carrier flights worldwide
to detect, deter, and defeat hostile acts targeting U.S. air
carriers, airports, passengers, and crews. This past year, TSA
has finalized numerous Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) between
the United States and foreign countries to allow FAMS coverage
on U.S. carrier flights into and out of those countries.
Additionally, more than a dozen foreign countries have
developed their own air marshal programs for their national
carriers, including for flights to and from the United States.
We can expand on this initiative in a classified setting, and
we are happy to arrange a briefing for you or your staff.
Screening Air Cargo: As of August 1, 2010, 100 percent of
air cargo loaded on passenger flights originating in the United
States is screened for explosives. CBP and TSA are currently
working to address international inbound air cargo through a
combination of additional program requirements and coordination
with key partners on comparability of national cargo security
programs.
All of these security enhancements have contributed substantially
to bolstering international aviation security and mitigating threats to
the nation.
Enhancing Information Gathering and Sharing
Over the past 11 months, DHS has also worked to enhance information
gathering and sharing processes to diminish vulnerabilities and
mitigate threats to global aviation security. The following are several
examples of enhanced information-gathering and sharing programs and
processes:
100 percent Watchlist Screening/Expansion of Secure Flight:
At the end of November, DHS achieved a major aviation security
milestone, and fulfilled a key 9/11 Commission recommendation
by assuming responsibility from the airlines for terrorist
watchlist screening for 100 percent of aircraft operators
covered by the Secure Flight Final rule for flights within,
from, or bound for the United States--a month ahead of
schedule. In addition to facilitating secure travel for all
passengers, the program helps prevent the misidentification of
passengers who have names similar to individuals on government
watchlists. Prior to Secure Flight, airlines held
responsibility for checking passengers against watchlists.
Improved Information Sharing: In April 2010, DHS launched a
new initiative to expand information-sharing capabilities among
its components on smuggling techniques and tactics. This
includes daily briefings to TSA frontline officers on
concealment techniques and tactics through a collaborative
information sharing process established among CBP, TSA, and
other DHS components. Additionally, TSA is in the process of
granting secret-level clearances to a greater number of TSA
employees, significantly enhancing TSA's ability to leverage
the best intelligence and maximize the benefits of information
sharing.
Expansion of CBP's Global Entry Program: Global Entry is a
program operated by CBP to allow for the expedited clearance of
pre-approved low-risk air travelers into the United States. The
Global Entry vetting process includes checking applicant data
against law enforcement databases and terrorist watchlist
(Terrorist Screening Data base) records, an in-depth interview
with a CBP officer, and an electronic collection of biometrics
that are checked against FBI and DHS biometric databases.
Participants are re-vetted every 24 hours to ensure no new
derogatory information has arisen. CBP is currently working
with several foreign customs/immigration administrations
(United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, Korea, Canada, and
Mexico) to develop agreements and arrangements supporting
expanded participation in Global Entry.
Expansion of Immigration Advisory Program (IAP): CBP works
with foreign governments to sign IAP arrangements to allow the
posting of CBP officers at international airports to review the
documents of U.S.-bound passengers to inform the boarding
decisions of airlines or foreign officials. Currently, IAP is
operational at 11 locations in nine countries, including the
Joint Security Program in Mexico.
Enhanced Science and Technology (S&T) Partnerships: DHS
continues to build upon and effectively leverage S&T agreements
with the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Sweden, Singapore,
Mexico, Germany, Israel, France, New Zealand, and the European
Commission to ensure that we have identified the most promising
aviation security technologies and techniques around the globe.
Expanded Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA)
and Visa Waiver Program (VWP): The VWP, which allows citizens
from participating countries to travel to the United States for
up to 90 days without a visa, requires travelers to apply and
be screened for and receive travel authorization via ESTA
before boarding a U.S.-bound flight. As of November 30, 2010, a
total of 27,931,088 applications have been processed, with
approximately 0.33 percent denied.
All of these initiatives have enhanced information-gathering and
sharing processes to help improve international and domestic aviation
security measures and diminish threats to global aviation security.
Coordinating International Technical Assistance
Finally, in collaboration with ICAO and the Department of State,
DHS continues to conduct extensive training with foreign counterparts
to strengthen identified areas of weakness within a nation's aviation
security environment. TSA has provided more than 30 training courses to
30 foreign governments in the areas of cargo security, screening
techniques for passengers and baggage, security management, and quality
control. TSA also established the Aviation Security Sustainable
International Standards Team initiative to provide the full spectrum of
in-depth training and technical assistance. Successful programs have
been conducted with Liberia and Saint Lucia, and an initial training
needs assessment was performed in Yemen as part of a proposed project
under the oversight of ICAO. TSA is also working with the European
Civil Aviation Conference on a capacity development project with
Georgia. Serving as an ICAO-approved training center, TSA provides
several security workshops throughout the year on behalf of ICAO. An
additional effort underway through ICAO involves coordination among
contracting states to better identify capacity development needs around
the world, leverage resources where possible, and ensure better overall
collaboration and coordination within the international community for
all training and capacity development activity.
This past year, TSA collaborated with more than 100 foreign
governments and more than 200 foreign air carriers to address aviation
security threats and strengthen joint aviation security measures. TSA
also conducted 133 airport assessments, including 14 surveys; 793 air
carrier inspections, including 68 passenger cargo inspections; and 75
cargo visits at international airports with flights to the United
States. All of these initiatives have contributed to bolstering global
aviation standards and mitigating threats to the nation.
Items for Consideration on the Way Forward
Effectively responding to a global challenge like aviation security
requires trust and collaboration between nations. Among our remaining
challenges is the false notion that privacy and data protection
standards in the United States and the European Union (EU) are
irreconcilable. As a result, several bilateral agreements that would
improve information sharing on known offenders remain unsigned and some
EU officials are now looking to restrict one of the most powerful tools
we have for identifying risks to our aviation system, the review of
data from passenger name records (PNR)--information that passengers
give to travel agencies and airlines to book flights and that is
provided to CBP in advance of a flight to prescreen passengers who may
pose a risk to our nation's security. This data is invaluable as
evidenced by the fact that the United States has successfully used PNR
more than 3,000 times in 2008 and 2009, including in the investigation
of many of the most notable terrorist plots in the United States over
the last year. Likewise, our ability to protect it has been proven
through multiple reviews by U.S. authorities and with the EU.
The United States is firmly committed to strong privacy protections
that govern how we collect, store, and share information. At DHS, our
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and our Privacy Office are
involved in every step of the policymaking process, building in civil
rights, civil liberties, and privacy protections to new security
measures from the very beginning. For example, compliance documentation
on all the DHS programs I have mentioned today is publicly available on
our website. These Privacy Impact Assessments and Systems of Records
Notices are a comprehensive review of new or proposed Department
programs, systems, technologies or rule-makings that assess privacy
risks, and recommend privacy protections and alternative methods for
handling personally identifiable information (PII) to mitigate those
risks. Additionally, privacy protections are not only included, but are
central to every information-sharing agreement and program that we
carry out with partner countries.
DHS also continues to prioritize and improve the redress program
for passengers who believe they have been misidentified or improperly
delayed or prohibited from boarding an aircraft. All DHS aviation
security programs use the results of the redress process to help
prevent future misidentifications.
In discussions with our foreign counterparts, we have continued to
stress that stronger coordination with international allies will allow
the United States to share information about terrorists and other
dangerous individuals more effectively. This exchange will make all
passengers safer. In a time of rapidly evolving threats from terrorism,
we have to leave behind the false notion that civil liberties and
security are opposing values.
Conclusion
Over the past 11 months, we have made substantial progress in
improving aviation security standards around the world. DHS has
strengthened international partnerships, enacted key domestic and
international security enhancements, and established benchmark
international aviation security guidance. Evolving aviation security
threats against the United States will continue to present new
challenges. While we cannot eliminate all threats to aviation, we can
mitigate these threats as we continue to improve domestic and
international aviation security measures.
This past year, DHS concluded our nation's first ever Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review. In it we set forth a vision of a safe,
secure, and resilient homeland where American interests, aspirations,
and way of life can thrive. We articulated clear missions, goals, and
objectives to accomplish this vision. In the end, we concluded that we
all must play a role to protect our nation--and in the commitment of
each, we will secure the homeland for all. That same conclusion is true
for all of those who comprise the international aviation system: in the
commitment of each, we will secure the system for all.
DHS appreciates the support that this Committee has shown for our
work on improving aviation security measures internationally and
domestically. We have been able to make the progress we have in part
because of your steadfast support to enhance aviation security
standards and we look forward to working with you further on these
efforts. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. We are happy
to take any questions you may have.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Heyman, thank you very much for your
testimony.
Next we will hear from Ms. Vicki Reeder, TSA Office of
Global Strategies. Ms. Reeder, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF VICKI REEDER, DIRECTOR OF GLOBAL
COMPLIANCE, OFFICE OF GLOBAL STRATEGIES,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Reeder. Chairman Dorgan, Chairman Rockefeller, Senator
Johanns, and Senator Lautenberg: Thank you very much for the
opportunity to testify before you today on the topic of efforts
to improve aviation security standards.
The Transportation Security Administration is a component
agency within DHS charged with protecting the nation's
transportation systems. In addition to travel within and from
the United States, TSA ensures that robust security is applied
to all U.S. airlines regardless of where they're flying and to
all flights operating directly to the U.S. With a daily network
of thousands of flights linked across the globe, the security
and performance of our individual operations are only as strong
as those of our international partners.
Within TSA, the Office of Global Strategies, or OGS, works
with the international partners to ensure that that security is
established and maintained. OGS conducts these efforts through
three primary missions. The first one is compliance, which I'll
explain, and that's the one of which I'm the director. We
conduct outreach and engagement and we conduct capacity
development.
We use a risk-based approach that looks at the threat, the
vulnerability, and the consequence in place for each of the
flights and at each of the airports that provide the service
that we evaluate. In compliance, my group identifies and
evaluates the risk that is in place, the threat and the
vulnerability that's in place at each of the airports that
we've been charged to evaluate. We look at all airports, all
300-plus airports, from which U.S. air carriers operate, those
from which foreign air carriers operate to the United States,
those that pose a high risk to international air travel, and
those that we've been informed to do so by the Secretary of
Homeland Security.
OGS has five regional operations centers and approximately
65 inspectors who perform all this work. The 300 airports are
visited on a 1- to 3-year interval depending on the amount of
risk that has been identified associated with those airports.
The evaluations at those airports are based on International
Civil Aviation Organization, or ICAO, standards and recommended
practices. So these are the international requirements for the
airport assessments.
OGS also conducts inspections of every air carrier that
flies to the United States and every U.S. air carrier operation
around the world, regardless of where they're flying. Our
evaluations of those operations are based on TSA regulations.
Those regulations are codified in the standard security
programs, the security directives, and the emergency
amendments. These are the mechanisms through which TSA is able
to regulate, able to direct activities be taken at foreign
countries and foreign airports.
Through our outreach and engagement efforts, we work with
international counterparts at the global, the regional and at
the bilateral levels. At the global level, we work very closely
with the International Civil Aviation Organization and our
focus is on enhancing baseline international security
standards. At the regional and bilateral levels, we deploy TSA
representatives at locations throughout the world to work on
developing effective transportation security measures, share
best practices, and coordinate implementation of appropriate
responses when new and emerging threats arise.
OGS also conducts outreach and engagement with the airline
industry, especially with the foreign air carriers. Other
components of TSA work with the U.S. carriers. OGS works with
the foreign carriers and with the associations. We ensure that
the necessary security requirements are implemented and that
airlines are alerted to the threats as best we can.
Finally, capacity development is the third leg of our stool
at TSA. We help partners build sustainable aviation security
practices through this capacity development effort. We have a
team of instructors and inspectors who are able to go to
various countries, to various airports, evaluate their security
posture, identify areas where they need additional help, and
then we work with State Department, Organization of American
States, and other funding sources to get the mechanisms to be
able to pay for extended support to various locations.
Two such locations were St. Lucia and Liberia, but we've
been working extensively with Yemen. In fact, we have a team in
Sanaa that leaves tomorrow. They had been there for 2 weeks
early in November working with the Yemenese and we have a
program that will be starting up in the very near future that
will be an 18-month program with Yemen.
In the past 11 months, we've taken a number of initiatives
that have enabled us to make gains on compliance, in outreach
and engagement, and in capacity development. For example, we've
deployed personnel to the Winter Games in Vancouver, to the
FIFA World Cup, and to Haiti following the earthquake.
In areas of outreach and engagement, we've signed
agreements with ICAO for additional seconded positions and
we've exchanged liaison officers with foreign governments. In
the area of capacity development, we have concluded the efforts
in St. Lucia and we're about to conclude the efforts in
Liberia.
We look forward to your questions and I defer to Mr. Lord
for the additional GAO comments.
Senator Dorgan. Ms. Reeder, thank you very much for your
testimony.
Next we will hear from Mr. Stephen Lord. He represents the
Government Accountability Office and he is the Director of
Homeland Security and Justice Issues in that office. Mr. Lord.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD, DIRECTOR,
HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES,
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Lord. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I as well am honored to
appear at your last hearing that you chair, and we also wanted
to thank you for your years of service.
Today I would like to discuss U.S. efforts to harmonize
aviation security standards with those of other nations. As the
other witness mentioned, the December 25 terrorist incident in
Detroit and the recent air cargo incident in Yemen underscore
the importance of undertaking efforts to harmonize these
standards. Today I'd like to do essentially two things: discuss
DHS and TSA's progress in harmonizing international aviation
standards and practices, as well as discuss some of the related
challenges they encounter in doing so.
One of the key messages I wanted to convey today is TSA and
DHS have taken several important steps over these last few
weeks and months. At the same time, I think it's important to
point out that harmonization is not a new concept. These
efforts have been ongoing for many years and progress has been
incremental and deliberate.
For example, the first amendment to the ICAO annex on
aviation security was adopted in 1976. The latest amendment,
Amendment 12, was approved last month after 3 years of patient
negotiation. In terms of progress and as noted by Mr. Heyman,
the Secretary of Homeland Security has participated in five
regional summits since the beginning of the year. The security
principles espoused during these regional summits form the
basis for ICAO's September Declaration on Aviation Security.
This is a very significant achievement.
In this declaration, all ICAO participants agree to
undertake efforts to strengthen security screening procedures,
utilize modern technologies to better detect explosives and
dangerous items, as well as provide technical assistance to
those in need.
It's also worth noting that TSA plays a very important role
in these harmonization efforts. For example, TSA has been at
the forefront of efforts to encourage other countries to adopt
advanced imaging technology, the so-called body scanners, and
at least 13 other nations are now testing or deploying these
scanners or have committed to deploying them in the near
future.
The agency has also worked closely with foreign governments
in drafting the latest amendment to the ICAO annex on aviation
security. A major focus of the recent negotiations is air
cargo. As GAO recently reported, however, harmonizing air cargo
standards is extremely difficult because of the global nature
of the air cargo supply chain as well as other regulatory and
logistical challenges and the number of players involved. As
the TSA Administrator noted in a recent hearing before this
committee, TSA is going to need several more years before it
can effectively ensure that all inbound air cargo--that's air
cargo coming, flying into our country--is fully screened in
accordance with 9/11 Act requirements.
It's important--I'd like to give Ms. Reeder a nod. It's
important that the TSA's foreign airport assessment program
helps achieve these broad harmonization goals through the
foreign airport assessment program she manages. Through the
program, TSA reviews the security practices of foreign airports
and they help identify where a country might need additional
security training and technical assistance. We think that's a
very useful expenditure of TSA resources. We'll have more to
say about this program next year. We're currently doing a
comprehensive audit and we expect to report out on this
probably the middle of next year.
At the same time, I'd like to also highlight a number of
challenges that DHS and TSA face in their efforts to harmonize.
First, harmonization depends on the voluntary participation of
foreign countries, which as sovereign nations cannot be
compelled to implement specific security standards. Second,
many developing countries do not have the financial resources
or human capital to enhance their security programs in a manner
that's consistent with our expectations.
And third, legal and cultural factors sometimes inhibit
harmonization efforts. I think a great example is some of the
recent concerns that countries across the world have expressed
about adopting body scanners. They've expressed concerns
related to privacy and health.
In closing, the recent air cargo plot demonstrates that
enhancing aviation security is a shared responsibility among
U.S., foreign, and industry stakeholders. The harmonization
efforts we're discussing today should be considered part of our
nation's strategy for improving aviation security and deterring
future threats. However, other elements include timely
intelligence, effective technology, well trained and capable
staff, and regular oversight such as conducted by this
committee.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lord follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and
Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to work
with foreign partners to enhance international aviation security. The
December 25, 2009, attempt to detonate an explosive during an
international flight bound for Detroit, and the October 2010 discovery
of explosive devices in air cargo packages bound for the United States
from Yemen, provide vivid reminders that civil aviation remains a key
terrorist target and highlight the importance of working with foreign
partners to enhance international aviation security. In response to the
December 2009 incident, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) mandated enhanced security measures for air carriers at United
States airports and for all international flights--prior to departure--
bound for the United States.\1\ Additionally, the President directed
DHS to take a number of steps to enhance aviation security including
strengthening international coordination on aviation security issues
and pursuing enhanced screening technology, protocols, and procedures.
Following the October 2010 bomb attempt in cargo originating in Yemen,
TSA also implemented additional security requirements to enhance air
cargo security.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See, for example, TSA, SD 1544-09-06E (Apr. 2, 2010); EA 1546-
09-01D (Jan. 3, 2010).
\2\ On November 8, 2010, DHS announced security measures in
response to the Yemen incident. Specifically, TSA banned cargo
originating from Yemen and Somalia from transport into the United
States; banned the transport of cargo deemed high-risk on passenger
aircraft; prohibited the transport of toner and ink cartridges weighing
16 ounces or more on passenger aircraft in carry-on and checked
luggage; and required additional screening of high-risk cargo prior to
transport on an all-cargo aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To this end, DHS has increased its ongoing efforts to work with
foreign partners to coordinate security standards and practices among
nations--a process known as harmonization. Harmonization, as defined by
DHS, refers to countries' efforts to coordinate their security
standards and practices to enhance security as well as the mutual
recognition and acceptance of existing security standards and practices
aimed at achieving the same security outcome.\3\ TSA also facilitates
compliance with existing international standards and practices by
coordinating assessments of foreign airports with foreign nations.
Through its foreign airport assessment program, and using international
standards and recommended practices, TSA determines whether foreign
airports that provide service to the United States are maintaining and
carrying out effective security measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ For the purposes of this statement, ``standards and practices''
refers to statutory, regulatory and other requirements as well as any
measures or practices imposed or followed by a country to secure its
civil aviation system. This general term encompasses the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) ``standards and recommended
practices'' also referred to in this statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted into
law shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
established TSA and gave the agency responsibility for securing all
modes of transportation, including the nation's civil aviation system,
which includes air carrier operations (domestic and foreign) to, from,
and within the United States.\4\ For example, ATSA requires that TSA
provide for the screening of all passengers and property, including air
cargo, transported on passenger aircraft.\5\ ATSA further requires that
a system be in operation to screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the
security of the cargo transported by all-cargo aircraft--aircraft that
carry only cargo and no passengers--to, from, and within the United
States.\6\ TSA also assesses the effectiveness of security measures at
foreign airports served by a United States air carrier, or from which a
foreign air carrier serves the United States, at intervals deemed
appropriate by the Secretary of Homeland Security.\7\ TSA further
requires that domestic and foreign air carriers with operations to,
from, or within the United States establish and maintain TSA-approved
security programs and comply with any applicable security directives or
emergency amendments to air carrier security programs.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
\5\ See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 110(b), 115 Stat. at 614-15 (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C. 44901). The U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) also plays a role in securing inbound cargo by
selectively screening cargo upon its arrival in the United States. CBP
has primary responsibility for preventing terrorists and implements of
terrorism from entering the United States. CBP is currently
coordinating with TSA to determine the feasibility of using CBP's
Automated Targeting System--a system used by DHS to match travelers and
goods against certain screening information and intelligence--to
support TSA's efforts toward screening 100 percent of inbound air
cargo. In discussing how a system to target certain shipments for
screening will fit into TSA's overall plans to screen 100 percent of
inbound air cargo, officials stated that ATS would provide an
additional layer of scrutiny for all cargo entering the United States.
\6\ See 49 U.S.C. 44901(f) (requiring the system to be in
operation as soon as practicable after the date of enactment--November
19, 2001--but without establishing a firm deadline).
\7\ See 49 U.S.C. 44907. While 44907 requires that TSA conduct
foreign airport assessments at intervals deemed necessary, in practice
TSA may not perform an assessment of security measures at a foreign
airport without permission from the host government.
\8\ See 49 U.S.C. 44903, 44906; 49 C.F.R. pts. 1544-46. TSA also
conducts security inspections of foreign and United States-based air
carriers with service to the United States from foreign countries to
ensure compliance with applicable security requirements, including
those set forth in the air carriers' TSA-approved security programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On a global basis, the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), a specialized agency of the United Nations representing 190
countries, has established security standards and recommended practices
to help ensure a minimum baseline level of international aviation
security among member nations.\9\ These international aviation security
standards and recommended practices are detailed in Annex 17 to the
Convention on International Civil Aviation, as adopted by ICAO.
Although TSA security requirements generally encompass (and in several
instances exceed) the ICAO standards and recommended practices, the
ICAO standards and recommended practices are broad and open to
different interpretations. As such, there are wide variations among the
aviation security practices adopted by ICAO member nations. For
example, some nations require passengers to remove their shoes for
screening at airport passenger checkpoints while others do not. TSA
officials stated that countries may utilize different approaches to
achieve the same outcome and that DHS and TSA work closely with their
international partners and with other U.S. agencies, such as the U.S.
Department of State (State), to enhance existing international
standards and practices through harmonization efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ ICAO is responsible for the safe, orderly, and efficient
development of international civil aviation. ICAO was formed following
the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago
Convention). Signatory nations to the ICAO convention agree to
cooperate with other member states to meet standardized international
aviation measures. An ICAO standard is a specification for the safety
or regularity of international air navigation, with which member states
agree to comply; whereas, a recommended practice is any desirable
specification for safety, regularity, or efficiency of international
air navigation, with which member states are strongly encouraged to
comply. Member states are expected to make a genuine effort to comply
with recommended practices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
My testimony today discusses DHS's progress and challenges in
enhancing international aviation security standards and practices
through harmonization efforts and facilitating compliance with ICAO
standards and recommended practices. My comments are based, in part, on
our prior reports and testimonies issued from April 2007 through June
2010 addressing the security of the passenger and air cargo
transportation system.\10\ For these reports, we reviewed relevant
documents related to the programs reviewed and interviewed cognizant
DHS and TSA officials. In addition, we obtained updated information in
September 2010 on TSA's efforts to address recommendations we made in
2007 to improve its foreign airport assessments program. More detailed
information on our scope and methodology appears in our published
reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See GAO, Aviation Security: Progress Made but Actions Needed
to Address Challenges in Meeting the Air Cargo Screening Mandate, GAO-
10-880T (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 30, 2010); Aviation Security: TSA Has
Made Progress but Faces Challenges in Meeting the Statutory Mandate for
Screening Air Cargo on Passenger Aircraft, GAO-10-446 (Washington,
D.C.: Jun. 28, 2010); Aviation Security: TSA Is Increasing Procurement
and Deployment of the Advanced Imaging Technology, but Challenges to
This Effort and Other Areas of Aviation Security Remain, GAO-10-484T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2010); Homeland Security: Better Use of
Terrorist Watchlist Information and Improvements in Deployment of
Passenger Screening Checkpoint Technologies Could Further Strengthen
Security, GAO-10-401T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 27, 2010); Aviation
Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and Begun Deploying
Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but Continue to Face
Challenges, GAO-10-128 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2009); Aviation
Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA's Progress and Challenges in
Meeting the Statutory Mandate for Screening Air Cargo on Passenger
Aircraft, GAO-09-422T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 18, 2009); Aviation
Security: Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections Help
Enhance Security, but Oversight of These Efforts Can Be Strengthened,
GAO-07-729 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2007); and Aviation Security:
Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages
and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30,
2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This statement is also partly based on observations from our work--
conducted from April 2010 through November 2010--assessing the progress
that DHS and its component agencies have made in enhancing
international aviation, and ongoing work assessing TSA's foreign
airport assessment program, which will be issued next year. To conduct
this work we reviewed relevant documents related to TSA's passenger
screening, air cargo security, and foreign airport assessment programs
including TSA aviation security policies and procedures, as well as
ICAO aviation security standards and recommended practices, and working
group documents. We also interviewed cognizant DHS and TSA program
officials, foreign aviation officials from Australia, Canada, the
European Union (EU), France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands,
and representatives from international organizations such as ICAO and
international aviation industry associations. While information
obtained from our interviews with foreign aviation officials and
aviation industry representatives cannot be generalized beyond those
contacted because we did not use a probability sampling method to
select these officials for interviews, the officials we interviewed
provided important perspectives on efforts to enhance international
aviation security. All of our prior work, as well as the results of our
ongoing work, used for this statement was conducted in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
DHS Has Made Progress in Its Efforts to Harmonize International
Aviation Security Standards and Practices and to Facilitate
Compliance through Foreign Airport Assessments, but Can Further
Strengthen Assessment Efforts
DHS Has Made Progress in Its Efforts to Harmonize International
Aviation Security Standards and Practices
DHS has increased its global outreach efforts. Historically, DHS
and its components, working with state, have coordinated with foreign
partners on an ongoing basis to promote aviation security enhancements
through ICAO and other multilateral and bilateral outreach efforts. For
example, DHS and TSA have coordinated through multilateral groups such
as the European Commission and the Quadrilateral Group--comprising the
United States, the EU, Canada, and Australia--to establish agreements
to develop commensurate air cargo security systems. On a bilateral
basis, the United States has participated in various working groups to
facilitate coordination on aviation security issues with several
nations, such as those that make up the EU, Canada, and Japan. The
United States has also established bilateral cooperative agreements to
share information on security technology with the United Kingdom,
Germany, France, and Israel, among others.\11\ In addition, TSA has
finalized agreements with ICAO to provide technical expertise and
assistance to ICAO in the areas of capacity building and security
audits, and serves as the United States' technical representative on
ICAO's Aviation Security Panel and the panel's various Working Groups.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ For example, in January 2010 the United States signed an
Agreement on Science and Technology Cooperation with New Zealand to
establish a framework to encourage, develop, and facilitate bilateral
coordination in science and technology by means that include, but are
not limited to, facilitating a systematic exchange of technologies,
personnel, and information, as well as collaborating to develop
technologies and prototype systems that assist in countering present
and anticipated terrorist actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the wake of the December 2009 incident, DHS increased its
outreach efforts. For example, to address security gaps highlighted by
the December incident, DHS has coordinated with Nigeria to deploy
Federal Air Marshals on flights operated by U.S. carriers bound for the
United States from Nigeria. Further, in early 2010, the Secretary of
Homeland Security participated in five regional summits--Africa, the
Asia/Pacific region, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western
Hemisphere--with the Secretary General of ICAO, foreign ministers and
aviation officials, and international industry representatives to
discuss current aviation security threats and develop an international
consensus on the steps needed to address remaining gaps in the
international aviation security system.\12\ Each of these summits
resulted in a Joint Declaration on Aviation Security in which,
generally, the parties committed to work through ICAO and on an
individual basis to enhance aviation security. Subsequently, during the
September 2010 ICAO Assembly, the 190 member states adopted a
Declaration on Aviation Security, which encompassed the principles of
the Joint Declarations produced by the five regional summits.\13\
Through the declaration, member states recognized the need to
strengthen aviation security worldwide and agreed to take nine actions
to enhance international cooperation to counter threats to civil
aviation, which include, among other things:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Regional summits were held in Abuja, Nigeria; Tokyo, Japan;
Mexico City, Mexico; Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, and Toledo,
Spain. In addition, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the ICAO
Secretary General met with industry representatives from the
International Air Transport Association (IATA) in Geneva, Switzerland.
\13\ ICAO's member nations--the Assembly--meet at least once every
3 years, at which time member states establish ICAO policy for the
following 3 years.
strengthening and promoting the effective application of
ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, with particular focus
on Annex 17, and developing strategies to address current and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
emerging threats;
strengthening security screening procedures, enhancing human
factors, and utilizing modern technologies to detect prohibited
articles and support research and development of technology for
the detection of explosives, weapons, and prohibited articles
in order to prevent acts of unlawful interference;
developing and implementing strengthened and harmonized
measures and best practices for air cargo security, taking into
account the need to protect the entire air cargo supply chain;
and
providing technical assistance to states in need, including
funding, capacity building, and technology transfer to
effectively address security threats to civil aviation, in
cooperation with other states, international organizations and
industry partners.
TSA has increased coordination with foreign partners to enhance
security standards and practices. In response to the August 2006 plot
to detonate liquid explosives on board commercial air carriers bound
for the United States, TSA initially banned all liquids, gels, and
aerosols from being carried through the checkpoint and, in September
2006, began allowing passengers to carry on small, travel-size liquids
and gels (3 fluid ounces or less) using a single quart-size, clear
plastic, zip-top bag. In November 2006, in an effort to harmonize its
liquid-screening standards with those of other countries, TSA revised
its procedures to match those of other select nations. Specifically,
TSA began allowing 3.4 fluid ounces of liquids, gels, and aerosols
onboard aircraft, which is equivalent to 100 milliliters--the amount
permitted by the EU and other countries such as Canada and Australia.
This harmonization effort was perceived to be a success and ICAO later
adopted the liquid, gels, and aerosol screening standards and
procedures implemented by TSA and other nations as a recommended
practice.
TSA has also worked with foreign governments to draft international
air cargo security standards. According to TSA officials, the agency
has worked with foreign counterparts over the last 3 years to draft
Amendment 12 to ICAO's Annex 17, and to generate support for its
adoption by ICAO members. The amendment, which was adopted by the ICAO
Council in November 2010, will set forth new standards related to air
cargo such as requiring members to establish a system to secure the air
cargo supply chain (the flow of goods from manufacturers to
retailers).\14\ TSA has also supported the International Air Transport
Association's (IATA) efforts to establish a secure supply chain
approach to screening cargo for its member airlines and to have these
standards recognized internationally.\15\ Moreover, following the
October 2010 bomb attempt in cargo originating in Yemen, DHS and TSA,
among other things, reached out to international partners, IATA, and
the international shipping industry to emphasize the global nature of
transportation security threats and the need to strengthen air cargo
security through enhanced screening and preventative measures. TSA also
deployed a team of security inspectors to Yemen to provide that
country's government with assistance and guidance on their air cargo
screening procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ According to ICAO officials, ICAO member nations have yet to
vote on final approval of Amendment 12. If approved by ICAO members,
Amendment 12 to Annex 17 will become effective in March 2011 and
applicable in July 2010.
\15\ IATA is an international trade body that represents 230
airlines comprising 93 percent of scheduled international air traffic.
IATA's approach, called Secure Freight, is an attempt to create an air
cargo industry comprising certified secure operators in secure supply
chains operating to international cargo security standards recognized
by relevant state authorities. A pilot test of the Secure Freight
program began in the first half of 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, TSA has focused on harmonizing air cargo security
standards and practices in support of its statutory mandate to
establish a system to physically screen 100 percent of cargo on
passenger aircraft--including the domestic and inbound flights of
United States and foreign passenger operations--by August 2010.\16\ In
June 2010 we reported that TSA has made progress in meeting this
mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, but faces several challenges
in meeting the screening mandate as it applies to inbound cargo,\17\
related, in part, to TSA's limited ability to regulate foreign
entities.\18\ As a result, TSA officials stated that the agency would
not be able to meet the mandate as it applies to inbound cargo by the
August 2010 deadline. We recommended that TSA develop a plan, with
milestones, for how and when the agency intends to meet the mandate as
it applies to inbound cargo. TSA concurred with this recommendation
and, in June 2010, stated that agency officials were drafting
milestones as part of a plan that would generally require air carriers
to conduct 100 percent screening by a specific date. At a November 2010
hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, the TSA Administrator testified that TSA aims to meet
the 100 percent screening mandate as it applies to inbound air cargo by
2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1602, 121 Stat. 266, 477-80 (2007)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. 44901(g)).
\17\ For the purposes of this statement, domestic cargo refers to
cargo transported by air within the United States and from the United
States to a foreign location by both United States and foreign-based
air carriers, and inbound cargo refers to cargo transported by air from
a foreign location to the United States.
\18\ GAO-10-446; GAO-10-880T.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In November 2010, TSA officials stated that the agency is
coordinating with foreign countries to evaluate the comparability of
their air cargo security requirements with those of the United States,
including the mandated screening requirements for inbound air cargo on
passenger aircraft. According to TSA officials, the agency has begun to
develop a program that would recognize the air cargo security programs
of foreign countries if TSA deems those programs provide a level of
security commensurate with TSA's programs. In total, TSA plans to
coordinate with about 20 countries, which, according to TSA officials,
were selected in part because they export about 90 percent of the air
cargo transported to the United States on passenger aircraft. According
to officials, TSA has completed a 6-month review of France's air cargo
security program and is evaluating the comparability of France's
requirements with those of the United States. TSA officials also said
that, as of November 2010, the agency has begun to evaluate the
comparability of air cargo security programs for the United Kingdom,
Israel, Japan, Singapore, New Zealand, and Australia, and plans to work
with Canada and several EU countries in early 2011. TSA expects to work
with the remaining countries through 2013.
TSA is working with foreign governments to encourage the
development and deployment of enhanced screening technologies. TSA has
also coordinated with foreign governments to develop enhanced screening
technologies that will detect explosive materials on passengers.
According to TSA officials, the agency frequently exchanges information
with its international partners on progress in testing and evaluating
various screening technologies, such as bottled-liquid scanner systems
and advanced imaging technology (AIT).\19\ In response to the December
2009 incident, the Secretary of Homeland Security has emphasized
through outreach efforts the need for nations to develop and deploy
enhanced security technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ AITs produce an image of a passenger's body that security
personnel use to look for anomalies, such as explosives. See GAO-10-
484T.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following TSA's decision to accelerate the deployment of AIT in the
United States, the Secretary has encouraged other nations to consider
using AIT units to enhance the effectiveness of passenger screening
globally. As a result, several nations, including Australia, Canada,
Finland, France, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Germany, Poland, Japan,
Ukraine, Russia, Republic of Korea, and the UK, have begun to test or
deploy AIT units or have committed to deploying AITs at their airports.
For example, the Australian Government has committed to introducing AIT
at international terminals in 2011. Other nations, such as Argentina,
Chile, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Kenya, New Zealand, Singapore,
and Spain are considering deploying AIT units at their airports on a
limited basis. In addition, TSA hosted an international summit in
November 2010 that brought together approximately 30 countries that are
deploying or considering deploying AITs at their airports to discuss
AIT policy, protocols, best practices, as well as safety and privacy
concerns. However, as discussed in our March 2010 testimony, TSA's use
of AIT has highlighted several challenges relating to privacy, costs,
and effectiveness that remain to be addressed.\20\ For example, because
the AIT presents a full-body image of a person during the screening
process, concerns have been expressed that the image is an invasion of
privacy.\21\ Furthermore, as noted in our March 2010 testimony, it
remains unclear whether the AIT would have been able to detect the
weapon used in the December 2009 incident based on the preliminary TSA
information we have received.\22\ We will continue to explore these
issues as part of our ongoing review of TSA's AIT deployment, and
expect the final report to be issued in the spring of 2011.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ GAO-10-484T.
\21\ In October 2010, TSA adopted ``enhanced patdown'' procedures
for passengers who decline to be screened using the AIT, which have
also raised privacy concerns.
\22\ GAO-10-484T.
\23\ Our ongoing review of TSA's procurement and deployment of AIT
units is requested by Senator George V. Voinovich and Representative
John Mica, Ranking-Republican Member, House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS Has Made Progress in Its Efforts to Facilitate Compliance with ICAO
Standards through Foreign Airport Assessments but Can Further
Strengthen Its Efforts
TSA conducts foreign airport assessments. TSA efforts to assess
security at foreign airports--airports served by U.S. aircraft
operators and those from which foreign air carriers operate service to
the United States--also serve to strengthen international aviation
security. Through TSA's foreign airport assessment program, TSA
utilizes select ICAO standards to assess the security measures used at
foreign airports to determine if they maintain and carry out effective
security practices.\24\ TSA also uses the foreign airport assessment
program to help identify the need for, and secure, aviation security
training and technical assistance for foreign countries. In addition,
during assessments, TSA provides on-site consultations and makes
recommendations to airport officials or the host government to
immediately address identified deficiencies. In our 2007 review of
TSA's foreign airport assessment program,\25\ we reported that of the
128 foreign airports that TSA assessed during Fiscal Year 2005, TSA
found that 46 (about 36 percent) complied with all ICAO standards,
whereas 82 (about 64 percent) did not meet at least one ICAO
standard.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ For the purposes of this testimony we refer to both standards
and recommended practices as standards. TSA officials said that when
conducting airport assessments they focus on 17 ICAO standards the
agency deems most critical. TSA assessment teams coordinate with State
to arrange briefings for host government and airport officials at the
beginning of an assessment and to schedule exit briefings for the
officials at the end of the assessment, during which a synopsis of the
assessment results is presented. TSA also coordinates with State to
provide aviation security training to host nations. For example, State
uses TSA instructors to teach an airport security course that is
provided to officials from host nations through the department's Anti-
Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program.
\25\ GAO-07-729.
\26\ For the 82 foreign airports that did not meet at least 1 ICAO
standard, the average number of standards not met was about 5, and the
number of standards not met by an individual airport ranged from 1 to
22. The most common area of noncompliance for foreign airports was
related to quality control--mechanisms to assess and address security
vulnerabilities at airports. After the Secretary of Homeland security
determined that 2 of the 128 foreign airports TSA assessed were not
maintaining and carrying out effective security measures, DHS notified
the general public of these determinations by the Secretary in
accordance with 49 U.S.C. 44907(d). In 2007 TSA assessed security
against 86 of 106 ICAO aviation security standards and practices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In our 2007 review we also reported that TSA had not yet conducted
its own analysis of its foreign airport assessment results, and that
additional controls would help strengthen TSA's oversight of the
program. Moreover, we reported, among other things, that TSA did not
have controls in place to track the status of scheduled foreign airport
assessments, which could make it difficult for TSA to ensure that
scheduled assessments are completed. We also reported that TSA did not
consistently track and document host government progress in addressing
security deficiencies identified during TSA airport assessments. As
such, we made several recommendations to help TSA strengthen oversight
of its foreign airport assessment program, including, among other
things, that TSA develop controls to track the status of foreign
airport assessments from initiation through completion; and develop a
standard process for tracking and documenting host governments'
progress in addressing security deficiencies identified during TSA
assessments. TSA agreed with our recommendations and provided plans to
address them. Near the end of our 2007 review, TSA had begun work on
developing an automated database to track airport assessment
results.\27\ In September 2010 TSA officials told us that they are now
exploring ways to streamline and standardize that automated database,
but will continue to use it until a more effective tracking mechanism
can be developed and deployed. We plan to further evaluate TSA's
implementation of our 2007 recommendations during our ongoing review of
TSA's foreign airport assessment program, which we plan to issue in the
fall of 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ GAO-07-729.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Challenges Related to the Harmonization Process and TSA's Foreign
Airport Assessment Program May Affect DHS's Progress
Challenges Related to Harmonization
A number of key challenges, many of which are outside of DHS's
control, could impede its ability to enhance international aviation
security standards and practices. Agency officials, foreign country
representatives, and international association stakeholders we
interviewed said that these challenges include, among other things,
nations' voluntary participation in harmonization efforts, differing
views on aviation security threats, varying global resources, and legal
and cultural barriers. According to DHS and TSA officials, these are
long-standing global challenges that are inherent in diplomatic
processes such as harmonization, and will require substantial and
continuous dialogue with international partners. As a result, according
to these officials, the enhancements that are made will likely occur
incrementally, over time.
Harmonization depends on voluntary participation. The framework for
developing and adhering to international aviation standards is based on
voluntary efforts from individual states. While TSA may require that
foreign air carriers with operations to, from, or within the United
States comply with any applicable U.S. emergency amendments to air
carrier security programs, foreign countries, as sovereign nations,
generally cannot be compelled to implement specific aviation security
standards or mutually accept other countries' security measures.\28\
International representatives have noted that national sovereignty
concerns limit the influence the United States and its foreign partners
can have in persuading any country to participate in international
harmonization efforts. As we reported in 2007 and 2010, participation
in ICAO is voluntary.\29\ Each nation must initiate its own involvement
in harmonization, and the United States may have limited influence over
its international partners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ See 49 U.S.C. 44906; 49 CFR pt. 1546.
\29\ GAO-07-660 and GAO-10-446.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Countries view aviation security threats differently. As we
reported in 2007 and 2010, some foreign governments do not share the
United States government's position that terrorism is an immediate
threat to the security of their aviation systems, and therefore may not
view international aviation security as a priority.\30\ For example,
TSA identified the primary threats to inbound air cargo as the
introduction of an explosive device in cargo loaded on a passenger
aircraft, and the hijacking of an all-cargo aircraft for its use as a
weapon to inflict mass destruction.\31\ However, not all foreign
governments agree that these are the primary threats to air cargo or
believe that there should be a distinction between the threats to
passenger air carriers and those to all-cargo carriers. According to a
prominent industry association as well as foreign government
representatives with whom we spoke, some countries view aviation
security enhancement efforts differently because they have not been a
target of previous aviation-based terrorist incidents, or for other
reasons, such as overseeing a different airport infrastructure with
fewer airports and less air traffic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ GAO-07-660 and GAO-10-446.
\31\ For the purposes of this statement, inbound air cargo refers
to cargo transported by both U.S. and foreign air carriers from a
foreign location to the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Resource availability affects security enhancement efforts. In
contrast to more developed countries, many less developed countries do
not have the infrastructure or financial or human resources necessary
to enhance their aviation security programs. For example, according to
DHS and TSA officials, such countries may find the cost of purchasing
and implementing new aviation security enhancements, such as
technology, to be prohibitive. Additionally, some countries
implementing new policies, practices, and technologies may lack the
human resources--for example, trained staff--to implement enhanced
security measures and oversee new aviation security practices. Some
foreign airports may also lack the infrastructure to support new
screening technologies, which can take up a large amount of space.
These limitations are more common in less developed countries, which
may lack the fiscal and human resources necessary to implement and
sustain enhanced aviation security measures. With regard to air cargo,
TSA officials also cautioned that if TSA were to impose strict cargo
screening standards on all inbound cargo, it is likely many nations
would be unable to meet the standards in the near term. Imposing such
screening standards in the near future could result in increased costs
for international passenger travel and for imported goods, and possible
reductions in passenger traffic and foreign imports. According to TSA
officials, strict standards could also undermine TSA's ongoing
cooperative efforts to develop commensurate security systems with
international partners.
To help address the resource deficit and build management capacity
in other nations, the United States provides aviation security
assistance--such as training and technical assistance--to other
countries. TSA, for example, works in various ways with state and
international organizations to provide aviation security assistance to
foreign partners. In one such effort, TSA uses information from the
agency's foreign airport assessments to identify a nation's aviation
security training needs and provide support. In addition, TSA's
Aviation Security Sustainable International Standards Team (ASSIST),
comprised of security experts, conducts an assessment of a country's
aviation security program at both the national and airport level and,
based on the results, suggests action items in collaboration with the
host nation. State also provides aviation security assistance to other
countries, in coordination with TSA and foreign partners through its
Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program. Through this program, State
uses a needs assessments--a snapshot of a country's antiterrorism
capability--to evaluate prospective program participants and provide
needed training, equipment, and technology in support of aviation
security, among other areas.\32\ State and TSA officials have
acknowledged the need to develop joint coordination procedures and
criteria to facilitate identification of global priorities and program
recipients. We will further explore TSA and State efforts to develop
mechanisms to facilitate interagency coordination on capacity building
through our ongoing work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ The needs assessment, performed by State personnel along with
a team of interagency subject-matter experts, is conducted at several
levels, including tactical capabilities (people and resources),
operational management capabilities (overall management and ability),
and strategic capabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legal and cultural factors can also affect harmonization. Legal and
cultural differences among nations may hamper DHS's efforts to
harmonize aviation security standards. For example, some nations,
including the United States, limit, or even prohibit the sharing of
sensitive or classified information on aviation security procedures
with other countries. Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which
limits the data it can collect and share with other nations,
demonstrates one such impediment to harmonization. According to TSA
officials, the United States has established agreements to share
sensitive and classified information with some countries; however,
without such agreements, TSA is limited in its ability to share
information with its foreign partners. Additionally, the European
Commission reports that several European countries, by law, limit the
exposure of persons to radiation other than for medical purposes, a
potential barrier to acquiring some passenger screening technologies,
such as AIT.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ According to the European Commission, these countries are the
Czech Republic, France, Germany, and Italy. GAO has not independently
verified these potential legal impediments. Both TSA and the European
Commission report that use of the two types of AIT units deployed will
expose individuals to low doses of radiation. For example, the X-ray
dose received from the backscatter system is equivalent to the
radiation received in 2 minutes of airplane flight, while the energy
projected by the millimeter wave system is 100,000 times less than a
cell phone transmission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cultural differences also serve as a challenge in achieving
harmonization because aviation security standards and practices that
are acceptable in one country may not be in another. For example,
international aviation officials explained that the nature of aviation
security oversight varies by country--some countries rely more on trust
and established working relationships to facilitate security standard
compliance than direct government enforcement. Another example of a
cultural difference is the extent to which countries accept the images
AIT units produce. AIT units produce a full-body image of a person
during the screening process; to varying degrees, governments and
citizens of some countries, including the United States, have expressed
concern that these images raise privacy issues. TSA is working to
address this issue by evaluating possible display options that would
include a ``stick figure'' or ``cartoon-like'' form to provide enhanced
privacy protection to the individual being screened while still
allowing the unit operator or automated detection algorithms to detect
possible threats. Other nations, such as the Netherlands, are also
testing the effectiveness of this technology.
Although DHS has made progress in its efforts to harmonize
international aviation security standards and practices in key areas
such as passenger and air cargo screening, officials we interviewed
said that there remain areas in which security measures vary across
nations and would benefit from harmonization efforts. For example, as
we reported in 2007,\34\ the United States requires all passengers on
international flights who transfer to connecting flights at United
States airports to be rescreened prior to boarding their connecting
flight.\35\ In comparison, according to EU and ICAO officials, the EU
has implemented ``one-stop security,'' allowing passengers arriving
from EU and select European airports to transfer to connecting flights
without being rescreened. Officials and representatives told us that
although there has been ongoing international discussion on how to more
closely align security measures in these and other areas, additional
dialogue is needed for countries to better understand each others'
perspectives. According to the DHS officials and foreign
representatives with whom we spoke, these and other issues that could
benefit from harmonization efforts will continue to be explored through
ongoing coordination with ICAO and through other multilateral and
bilateral outreach efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ GAO-07-729.
\35\ For example, a passenger traveling from Frankfurt, Germany, to
Chicago, Illinois, and changing planes in New York City, must be
rescreened, along with the passenger's checked baggage, prior to
boarding the connecting flight to Chicago. See 49 U.S.C. 44901(a),
which requires that TSA provide for the screening of such passengers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Challenges Related to TSA's Foreign Airport Assessment Program
Our 2007 review of TSA's foreign airport assessment program
identified challenges TSA experienced in assessing security at foreign
airports against ICAO standards and recommended practices, including a
lack of available inspector resources and host government concerns,
both of which may affect the agency's ability to schedule and conduct
assessments for some foreign airports.\36\ We reported that TSA
deferred 30 percent of its scheduled foreign airport visits in 2005 due
to the lack of available inspectors, among other reasons.\37\ TSA
officials said that in such situations they sometimes used domestic
inspectors to conduct scheduled foreign airport visits, but also stated
that the use of domestic inspectors was undesirable because these
inspectors lacked experience conducting assessments in the
international environment.\38\ In September 2010, TSA officials told us
that they continue to use domestic inspectors to assist in conducting
foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections--approximately
50 domestic inspectors have been trained to augment the efforts of
international inspectors. We also previously reported that
representatives of some foreign governments consider TSA's foreign
airport assessment program an infringement of their authority to
regulate airports and air carriers within their borders. Consequently,
foreign countries have withheld access to certain types of information
or denied TSA access to areas within an airport, limiting the scope of
TSA's assessments. We plan to further assess this issue, as well as
other potential challenges, as part of our ongoing review of TSA's
foreign airport assessment program, which we plan to issue in the fall
of 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ GAO-07-729.
\37\ This included visits for both airport assessments and air
carrier inspections. See GAO-07-729.
\38\ Domestic inspectors are inspectors who typically conduct
security inspections at U.S. airports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I look forward
to responding to any questions you or other members of the Committee
may have at this time.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Lord, thank you very much, and thanks
for the work that the Government Accountability Office
routinely does.
I'd like to ask the cooperation of the three witnesses if I
might for a moment. We have a second panel of only one
presenter and I would like to ask your cooperation if I might
ask that presenter to come forward to the end of the table and
make this presentation.
It is Mr. Greg Principato, who is the President of the
Airports Council International. If we could have Mr.
Principato's testimony on the record, then when I call on
members of the Committee we can ask questions of all of them.
So thank you for your cooperation in allowing that to happen,
but we do have some time restraints and I want to handle it
that way.
Mr. Principato, you are the President of the Airports
Council International, and your full statement will be made a
part of the record, and if you would be willing to summarize
we'd appreciate that. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY PRINCIPATO, PRESIDENT, AIRPORTS COUNCIL
INTERNATIONAL--NORTH AMERICA
Mr. Principato. Thank you very much, Senator Dorgan. Let me
begin as well by adding my appreciation for a career well
served and for all you've done for the country, for the Senate,
for the aviation industry. As my colleagues here have said it,
I'm honored to be part of your last hearing. So thank you very
much.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee: On behalf of the
members of Airport Council International--North America, thank
you for allowing me to testify here this afternoon. It's
important that industry and government work together to find
solutions to secure our aviation system and passengers. Close
coordination yields positive results. After discovering a bomb
threat using liquid explosives in 2006, TSA coordinated closely
with airports and airlines to ban liquids, aerosols, and gels.
Airports were instrumental in reaching out to their communities
to explain the new checkpoint procedures, which helped to
mitigate confusion at airport security checkpoints.
In the aftermath of the attempted attack on Christmas Day
2009, TSA imposed new security requirements which required
passengers boarding flights to the U.S. be subject to
additional screening and enhanced searches of carry-on luggage.
The new procedures caused significant wait times at security
checkpoints and in many cases flights to the U.S. were delayed
or canceled. Toronto Airport, for example, had no choice but to
work with its airlines to cancel 25 percent of all of its U.S.-
bound flights due to the delays caused by the increased
screening requirements.
These new mandates were particularly cumbersome for
European airports, which, unlike the U.S., are actually
responsible for screening passengers and baggage.
Unfortunately, while the Department of Homeland Security and
TSA worked closely with the airlines on December 25, they did
not coordinate with airports. So we pressed for a meeting with
Secretary Napolitano, which she graciously gave us, where we
offered to assist DHS in working with airports both
domestically and internationally to develop sustainable
security measures.
Since then, DHS and TSA have begun to better coordinate
with foreign governments and global industry stakeholders to
strengthen aviation security standards. In addition, we
routinely encourage TSA, Canada, and the European Union to
develop mutually recognized standards for security screening
technology. Having similar standards will allow passengers,
baggage, and cargo to be screened once, which will enhance the
efficiency and effectiveness of the security process.
As a result of the Christmas Day bombing incident, TSA
announced its plans to install advanced imaging technology
(AIT), units to replace current metal detectors. Although
supportive, we stressed to TSA the need to consider the
throughput of screening with AIT versus metal detectors and the
space available at airport checkpoints.
In response to these concerns, TSA has begun installing AIT
at airports that can readily accommodate the machines. We
remain concerned that future AIT installations will pose
significant challenges at airports, where major facility
modifications may be necessary to accommodate the equipment.
Along with installing AIT, TSA has implemented enhanced
patdown procedures. In advance of the implementation of these
patdowns, we strongly urged TSA to conduct a public awareness
campaign to educate travelers on the rationale and necessity
for the new procedures. Unfortunately, TSA launched its public
awareness campaign only after the public backlash.
It's critically important for airports to receive timely
and actionable intelligence information from DHS and TSA. As
the Christmas Day bombing incident showed, this is not always
the case. Yet receiving this intelligence allows airports to
make risk-informed decisions to help mitigate threats by
effectively using their limited resources to ensure the
security of their facilities and passengers.
Finally, TSA's use of security directors as a way to issue
security regulations for airports has become increasingly
challenging. We understand TSA must be able to issue security
directives in response to intelligence involving in imminent
threat, as with the liquid plot 4 years ago. However, TSA has
used security directives to push out costly regulations that do
not meet that threshold, with little or no industry
coordination or input.
We're pleased, however, with TSA's willingness to examine
some outdated security initiatives through the In-Depth
Security Review Task Force, an initiative by ACI North America
which has allowed TSA and airport industry representatives to
have an open discussion about sustainable security measures.
And we commend TSA for this coordination with the airport
industry.
ACI North America and its member airports stand ready to
partner with TSA to help maintain a secure aviation system. You
might be interested to know that yesterday representatives from
key commercial aviation stakeholders got together in our
offices to discuss all this and the best ways to move forward,
and we're prepared to work with you, your colleagues in
Congress, with DHS and TSA and others, on continuing
improvements to the system.
We remain optimistic that DHS and TSA will more closely
coordinate with the airport industry and with the international
community on future aviation security measures. I look forward
to taking your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Principato follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gregory Principato, President,
Airports Council International--North America
Chairman Dorgan, Ranking Member DeMint, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you today
to offer the views of airport operators on airport security and
improvements to enhance the current system. As the President of
Airports Council International--North America (ACI-NA), I am testifying
today on behalf of the local, regional, and state governing bodies that
own and operate commercial service airports in the United States and
Canada. ACI-NA member airports enplane more than 95 percent of the
domestic and virtually all the international airline passenger and
cargo traffic in North America. Nearly 400 aviation-related businesses
are also members of ACI-NA.
Mr. Chairman, we commend you for holding this important hearing.
Each day, airports work to ensure the safety and security of our
passengers, employees and facilities. To this end, airports partner
with airlines, tenants, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), Customs and Border Protection and federal, state, and local law
enforcement to maintain and develop a comprehensive, layered security
system that can quickly adapt and respond to new threats.
Christmas Day Bombing Attempt
In the immediate aftermath of the attempted attack on Christmas Day
2009, TSA imposed additional security requirements on domestic and
international airlines with flights to the United States. Some of the
measures included restrictions placed upon passenger access to carry-on
and service items as well as limitations on the ability to get out of
their seats during the last hour of flight. In addition, airlines were
required to turn off the moving map displays, coincidentally the most-
watched channel on in-flight entertainment systems. The measures also
called for passengers boarding flights to the U.S. to be subjected to
secondary screening at boarding gates and searches of their carry-on
items.
On the day of the event, many airports in the U.S.--including
Detroit--learned of the attempted terrorist attack from the media. As
the new measures were being implemented, many flights were delayed and
passengers endured significant wait times at security checkpoints,
especially in Canada. Although TSA coordinated closely with the
airlines in the immediate aftermath of the attempted bombing, it did
not coordinate as effectively with airports and the impact of the
enhanced passenger screening requirements--particularly at Canadian
airports--was significant. In order to reduce wait times at security
checkpoints, which had exceeded 2 hours, Toronto Pearson International
Airport had no choice but to work with airlines to cancel 25 percent of
their flights to the United States. As a result, ACI-NA worked with its
counterparts in Europe and Canada to share information and provide
updates on the evolving security measures.
It is important to understand that the TSA mandates requiring
airlines to provide enhanced security and screening of passengers on
flights departing international airports for the U.S. could not be
implemented absent coordination with the airport operators and foreign
governments. European airports are largely responsible for screening
passengers and baggage, paying for new screening technology and, after
ensuring that the requirements could be conducted in accordance with
local regulations, had to hire and deploy security staff to gates to
conduct enhanced passenger screening on flights departing to the U.S.
Absent the necessary funding and manpower at many airports to perform
the new requirements and in an attempt to develop sustainable measures
that provided an adequate level of security while minimizing passenger
and flight delays, TSA worked closely with airlines, and ultimately
dispatched teams of senior executives to meet with foreign governments
and airports. As a result of the coordination, TSA modified the
measures in order to use data to target certain passengers for
additional screening, thus enhancing security while minimizing the
burden on airports.
Although Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet
Napolitano had several meetings with airline representatives and their
associations after the Christmas Day bombing attempt, there was little
coordination or information sharing between DHS and the airport
industry. To ensure DHS understood the important role airports
throughout the world play in aviation security, ACI-NA pressed for a
meeting with the Secretary. ACI-NA offered to assist the Secretary in
identifying sustainable aviation security measures through the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), given that Airports
Council International (ACI World) serves as the officially accredited
airport representative to ICAO. Since that time, DHS and TSA have
worked extensively with foreign governments and through ICAO to
strengthen aviation security standards and encourage the use of the
latest screening technology. As a result of these efforts, ICAO
recently issued a Declaration on Aviation Security which recognizes the
need to strengthen aviation security world-wide through the uniform
application of aviation security standards and available screening
technologies while putting a priority on the research and development
of explosive detection technology.
In furtherance of our objective to coordinate on aviation security,
ACI-NA invited TSA Administrator John Pistole, Daniel Calleja, Director
of Air Transport for the European Commission and Kevin McGarr,
President and CEO of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, to
a joint board of directors meeting of the North American and European
regions of Airports Council International (ACI-NA and ACI Europe) this
past September. In addition to discussing the need for coordination
between governments and industry to develop sustainable aviation
security measures, the boards expressed concern that the EU has
unrealistic deadlines for loosening the restrictions on liquids, gels
and aerosols, which cannot be met and are out of sync with similar
initiatives in the U.S.
To continue our effort to educate our member airports on
international aviation security measures, I am leading a delegation of
airport directors and security staff on a mission to Israel this month
which will allow participants to hear presentations from Ben-Gurion
Airport security professionals and to learn first-hand the procedures
the Israelis use to keep their passengers and facilities secure. In
addition to encouraging all of our member airports to participate in
our 4th annual mission, we also invited senior TSA representatives to
join us.
Advanced Imaging Technology
In the wake of the attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Airlines
Flight 253 on Christmas Day, TSA announced its plan to install advanced
imaging technology (AIT) at security checkpoints to replace current
walk-though metal detection devices. AIT units had been tested at
several airports in the United States over the last several years; and
unlike the metal detection devices AIT units can detect prohibited
items with little or no metallic content.
ACI-NA generally supports the TSA's continued evaluation, testing
and deployment of this technology. In doing so, however, we identified
three key considerations:
1. Throughput--the deployment of AIT technology at airports
should not result in increased wait times;
2. Space--in accordance with the old adage ``when you have seen
one airport, you have seen one airport,'' AIT technology may
not fit at every checkpoint absent significant and costly
facility modifications, the cost of which should be borne by
TSA;
3. Privacy--the TSA continues to adhere to the strict privacy
principles it put in place when the technology was originally
pilot tested:
Images cannot be stored, downloaded or copied.
Operators are stationed in separate rooms with no view of
the individual being screened.
Passengers are given the option of going through a walk
through metal detector and being subjected to a patdown
inspection.
Additionally, ACI-NA has encouraged TSA to pursue enhancements to
AIT technology that will increase effectiveness, efficiency and
passenger throughput while continuing to provide passengers the option
of alternate screening methods. TSA's proposed solution is Automated
Target Recognition (ATR), an algorithm that can be loaded on AIT units
and readily identifies items of concern for TSOs by highlighting
certain areas on a stick figure image for further inspection. Since ATR
produces only a stick figure image, it not only addresses concerns
about privacy, but it also negates the need for the image operators to
be located in separate, isolated viewing rooms, thereby reducing the
space needed at airport security checkpoints. Even with these
advancements, airports continue to have concerns about the larger
footprint of this technology, which takes more space than walk-through
metal detectors and could necessitate costly facility modifications in
order to accommodate the units. Of the airports that responded to a
survey conducted by ACI-NA, about half reported having limited
checkpoint space. ACI-NA raised these issues at a meeting with DHS
Secretary Napolitano in February.
In response to the concerns raised by airports, Secretary
Napolitano asked TSA to constitute a working group comprised of airport
and TSA representatives to develop a coordinated plan for AIT
deployment that considers passenger throughput and the costs associated
with facility modifications. Although TSA, at a working group meeting,
confirmed that it plans to deploy the first 500 AIT units only to
airports that have available checkpoint space and do not need facility
modifications, the costs associated with facility modifications is
something that should be borne by TSA and is especially challenging for
smaller airports. TSA has now deployed over 385 units to more than 68
airports and is on track to reach its goal of deploying a total of 500
AIT units in the remainder of 2010.
So far, the working group has facilitated a collaborative approach
that will allow TSA and airports to resolve the identified challenges
and result in coordinated deployment of AIT at checkpoint locations
where the technology can be readily accommodated. Given the lack of
available funding necessary for facility modifications at checkpoint
locations where space is limited, airports remain optimistic that the
working group process will result in a cooperatively developed
deployment plan that identifies airport checkpoint locations where AIT
can be readily deployed. ACI-NA continues to work with TSA to ensure it
coordinates all security technology deployments with airports, as TSA
plans to have a total of 1,000 AIT units installed at airports across
the country by the end of 2011.
TSA recently invited ACI-NA to participate in an International
Policy Summit on AIT to better educate representatives from other
countries, answer questions and discuss the security benefits of the
technology. The forum also provided an opportunity for foreign
government representatives to present on their experiences in using the
technology, including the use of ATR, which is installed and
operational on all AIT units at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam.
Enhanced Pat Down Procedures
Along with installing AIT units, TSA has also implemented enhanced
patdown procedures. According to TSA, only individuals who trigger an
alarm during screening, or those who opt out of screening by AIT would
be subject to these new patdown procedures. In advance of the
implementation of these enhanced patdowns, ACI-NA strongly encouraged
TSA to conduct a public awareness campaign to educate travelers on the
rational and necessity for the new procedures. Unfortunately, the
public awareness campaign was only launched after significant public
backlash over the enhanced patdown procedures.
Concerns of passengers must be taken seriously, and we need to find
the delicate balance between providing the appropriate level of
security while ensuring efficient checkpoint screening and airport
operations. This continues to be a substantial challenge. A system that
achieves a balance between optimal security and customer service is
achievable, provided that government and industry work together. ACI-NA
stands ready to work with DHS, TSA and Congress to reach this goal and
hosted a meeting on December 1 with the heads of airport and airline
associations to discuss the principles of a future aviation security
system that achieves that delicate balance.
Technology
While there have been significant advances in the research and
development of cutting edge passenger and baggage screening
technologies, a cohesive screening technology research and development
plan that leverages government and industry expertise has yet to be
formulated. Similarly, adequate funding and prioritization is essential
to ensure that new technology is deployed to airports where outdated
technology is in need of replacement. With the significant focus on
screening passengers and baggage, the development of next generation
screening technology, as well as that for screening air cargo, has
suffered and should also be a priority. The research and development of
next generation security technologies could be further advanced through
the introduction of government-administered grant programs that provide
incentives to manufacturers.
We routinely encourage TSA and the European Union to
collaboratively develop mutually recognized standards for security
screening technology. The identification of mutually recognized
standards will allow manufacturers to develop screening technologies
that can be used in different countries while stimulating competition
between manufacturers, and resulting in technology enhancements and
lower costs. Further, the deployment of screening technology developed
in accordance with the standards will allow passengers, baggage and
cargo to be screened once, thus paving the way for true harmonization,
something that is essential to further enhance the efficiency and
effectiveness of the security process, especially as we prepare for the
anticipated increase in the number of passengers in the coming years.
One area that technology development and inter-governmental
coordination could readily address is the current process of re-
screening connecting baggage from Canada at U.S. gateway airports. This
requirement is redundant and unnecessarily drains limited TSA and
industry resources as the checked baggage has been inspected by CBP
officials, is screened prior to departing Canada, and has flown at
least one segment upon arrival in the U.S. TSA should work with the
Canadian authorities to develop mutually agreeable checked-baggage
screening procedures or technologies at Canadian airports, which would
eliminate the need for re-screening at U.S. locations. This would not
only free up limited TSA resources but also reduce the operational
burden on airports, decrease flight delays and minimize misconnecting
checked baggage.
Although biometric employee identification and access control
offers some potential security benefits, implementation is very costly
and should not be the result of an unfunded federal mandate. Given the
significant cost to outfit an airport with biometrics, and in
accordance with sound risk-management, an investment of this magnitude
in this type of evolving technology, something that would further
deplete limited resources, must be weighed against the security
benefits of other systems. While a few airports have begun to test and
install biometrics in accordance with existing TSA technology
standards, a federally-funded pilot program is necessary to evaluate
the capabilities of biometric employee identification and access
control. Subsequent to a pilot test, results must be scrutinized to
determine which systems should be included on a government-developed
qualified products list. In consideration of the limited availability
of resources, funding must be provided to airports for the installation
of biometric employee identification and access control systems.
Intelligence Information and Sharing
The importance of timely and actionable intelligence information
cannot be understated and is essential for TSA and airports to
appropriately adjust the aviation security posture. While information
sharing has expanded, more can and should be done. Of concern to ACI-NA
is the timeliness of actionable intelligence information which is used
by airports to immediately develop countermeasures to respond to the
identified threat. Proactive security professionals realize the
importance of preparedness; information outlining threats to airports
can be used to help reduce identified risks.
The government should undertake an effort to conduct a risk-based
analysis of all threats. Once this has been completed, each should be
prioritized, based on the latest intelligence information and the
relative risk, taking into consideration the effectiveness of measures
already in place. The development of a threat matrix will permit
government officials and airport security professionals to mutually
identify areas that necessitate additional security measures and
importantly, provide a methodology for the most effective allocation of
limited resources.
An example of the critical importance of intelligence information
is the recent attempted bombing of cargo airplanes. This plot was
disrupted because TSA readily conveyed actionable intelligence
information to the all-cargo airlines.
Sustainable Aviation Security Measures
One of the key challenges for airports is TSA's use of Security
Directives to promulgate regulations. In most cases, procedures
mandated through Security Directive must be implemented immediately,
with little consideration for the fact that each airport is different
and boiler plate measures may not work, given facility constraints and
more importantly, limited resources. Although TSA has changed its
posture somewhat, to allow the opportunity for a coordinated review of
some Security Directives prior to issuance, others have been issued
recently absent industry input.
While airports agree that TSA needs the ability to avoid the formal
rulemaking process and issue Security Directives, that regulatory
option should be strictly reserved for situations involving an
immediate threat, as was stipulated by Congress and in TSA security
regulations. Rather than routinely regulating through a Security
Directive, TSA should use the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), a
proposed change to airport security programs or a similar coordinated
rulemaking process, which affords industry an opportunity to identify
other procedures that provide the same level of security while
minimizing unintended costs and operational impacts. Although TSA
ultimately issued Security Directives in response to the liquids
explosives plot in August 2006, it was only after extensive
coordination and collaboration with industry to review the intelligence
information that sustainable measures were developed. By working
together, government and industry transformed the aviation security
system overnight maintaining security but also taking into account the
needs of the traveling public.
Although there has been much discussion about the need to conduct
an ``Orange Level Review,'' to evaluate the heightened security
requirements that the aviation industry had to put in place and comply
with since August 2006, some in government and industry are loathe to
rescind measures--even when doing so means that limited resources can
be freed up to bolster other areas--out of concern that it might be
perceived as weakening security. In reality, many aviation security
measures are out-of-date, contradictory and requiring the application
of staff and funding to areas that have long since been addressed by
technology or other security layers.
As a proactive measure and in consideration of the significant
security costs borne by airports, ACI-NA constituted an In-Depth
Security Review Task Force, comprised of staff and several airport
representatives, to conduct a thorough review of current security
measures. In conducting the review, ACI-NA evaluated all existing
security requirements to identify those which are duplicative, stale or
no longer make sense given the evolution of the threat and/or
implementation of countermeasures. In order to ensure a coordinated
approach, ACI-NA involved American Association of Airport Executives
and TSA representatives in the process and is working to ensure the
near-term modification of existing requirements to provide additional
flexibility for airports through the development of sustainable
security measures. Recently, as a result of this process, TSA
eliminated a long-standing requirement for employment history
verifications, something that was no longer necessary when airports
began conducting fingerprint-based criminal history records checks on
all employees in 2006.
Conclusion
Although there are aspects of the current aviation security system
that are effective, there are others which need to evolve to keep pace
with the projected increase in the number of passengers and volume of
cargo in the United States and abroad. Only through an effective
partnership where government coordinates with industry to apply
appropriate security measures can we ensure the long-term
sustainability of the aviation system.
Through an effort in which government works to prioritize threats,
adjusts the security posture based upon credible intelligence
information and allocates resources accordingly, while at the same
time, collaborating with the airport industry to mutually address
security issues, we can better achieve our mutual goal of enhancing
security while minimizing unnecessary operational impacts.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Principato, thank you very much for
your perspective on these issues.
I have a good number of questions, but I think I will defer
questions until others have been able to ask their questions.
So I'll call on Senator Rockefeller.
The Chairman. I yield to the Senator from New Jersey.
Senator Dorgan. All right. Senator Lautenberg, why don't
you proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. I'll just take a couple minutes, Mr.
Chairman, because we're called back to something else. I want
to thank the witnesses. I feel that we've got a very good team
at Homeland Security and TSA and I thank them for their work.
But I particularly did not want to miss a moment to say
that we're going to miss you, Mr. Chairman. We've served
together for a great number of years, about 16. I left for a
couple of years, and I'm hoping you'll have a chance to think
about that and maybe we'll see you again.
But it has been an honor and a privilege to work with Byron
Dorgan. Thoughtful, articulate, loved his job, and he gave it
his best. You will be missed and we wish you and your family
all good things in the future. Don't be afraid to give us
advice. You haven't been until now, so why should you stop at
this point.
Thank you very much, thank the witnesses. I'll put my
questions to them in writing.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Lautenberg, thank you very much.
You're all too generous.
Let me call on Senator Johanns, after which I'll call on
Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Johanns. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Principato, let me start with you. I offered the
observation in my opening statement, as you know, that if
passengers can be forewarned about what's coming, if possible,
it just seems to work better. Give us your perspective on that?
As we think about the next generation of security and what
might be required, what's the best way to roll these things
out, if you will?
Mr. Principato. Senator Johanns, I think the point you
made, it just can't be overstated. It's critical. As I
mentioned, in 2006 we had the liquid plot. Many of us in this
room were on those conference calls late that night, and no one
knew anything. It was all going to be rolled out the next
morning. I think the government, the airlines, and the airports
just did a magnificent job getting together, with absolutely no
lead time, to educate the public on what was going on.
There were people who went to bed that night figuring they
were going to show up at the airport an hour and a half before
their flight, everything would be fine, they'd be off to see
their family, and they got there and it was much different.
But because of the efforts of all three players in this,
the government, the airports, and the airlines, when passengers
arrived at the airport there were folks there at the airport
giving them pieces of paper, telling them what was going on,
explaining why. There was a lot of excellent work done with the
press overnight to make sure that when people woke up the story
was out.
Really, it's worth looking back on that particular case and
seeing how in a situation where you had no lead time at all it
really worked very well.
Given that, it's a little bit frustrating that the patdowns
and so forth were rolled out without that kind of effort. I
know TSA Administrator John Pistole, for whom I have a great
deal of regard, by the way--I think he's going to do a terrific
job there and he is--has already indicated that he wished he
could have this one back.
But I think passengers want information, and whether
they're delayed on the tarmac, whether they're in the security
line, or whatever it is, they want information and they want to
know that you've got their best interests at heart. I think if
we can do that, all working together, that that's really the
model for the way forward.
Senator Johanns. Great. I appreciate those thoughts.
I don't know which witness would be best equipped, but I
would like just a little education here. In my foreign travels,
my observation has been that, for example, if you fly from,
let's say, a Third World country and you fly from the interior
of that country, the security is quite honestly kind of so-so.
But it seems like in foreign operations they have kind of a hub
system, too. Where you fly into a more major airport city,
whatever it is, security really ramps up at that point. It
looks more like U.S. security. And then you come over the
ocean, wherever you're coming from.
Is that a correct observation? Is that what we're dealing
with? And if that is a correct observation, what are the key
elements in terms of bringing security to that system, if you
will?
Mr. Heyman. Maybe we'll split the question. I'll take the
first part.
So the observation is probably--is possibly correct. The
difference that you may be observing is that 250 or so
countries or places around the world represent a last point of
departure, where you're coming directly from another country to
the United States. At those last points of departure we have
programs through our security programs and our security
directives to ensure that the level and standards are adhered
to that are critical for our own domestic interests.
Those are regulated through the 9/11 Act and are overseen
by my colleague here in terms of auditing them and ensuring
that they maintain those standards. So you will see--you may
see that type of difference. Part of the reason that we've just
gone through this last year's efforts to increase standards
globally is so that we can actually raise the bar across all
points of departure.
Ms. Reeder. To provide a little background, the program
that I manage now actually began with the TWA flight back in
1985 where the Navy diver was taken off and assassinated by the
terrorists. That was the genesis of the foreign airport
assessment program, which has gained momentum over the years.
The challenge we face is that ICAO Annex 17 focuses on
international airports. Countries are encouraged to apply those
same standards to their internal airports, but they're not
obligated to do so. So if you're taking off from a small
airport, say in Poland, and then you go to Warsaw, that's all
within the EU and, fortunately, that is subject to pretty
strict standards.
But the same situation in, say, Kenya doesn't apply. So you
take off from a small airport in Kenya and you go to Nairobi
and you depart from--well, Nairobi's not a good example because
we don't have direct flights. But those airports that have
direct service to the United States, as Mr. Heyman explained,
they are monitored by my inspectors. We go there at least once
a year to look at the air carrier inspection activities, and we
go and do an airport assessment at least every 1 to 3 years to
ensure that they are fully complying with the standards. When
they're not fully complying, we take actions with the
government or even at the airport to provide additional
training.
Senator Johanns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Johanns, thank you very much.
Senator Rockefeller.
The Chairman. First just a quick agreement with Senator
Johanns on the public's adjusting to more security. There
really isn't any choice, and it has been--the patdowns, which
actually only affect about 3 percent of the people who go onto
airplanes, and they have to fail another test to get that--you
know, it's sensationalized. It makes everybody nervous. In fact
it is necessary, and others have learned how to live with this
and I think we can, too. So I really agree with you, and I
think TSA is doing a terrific job at it.
In fact, on most trips I'll find a TSA person, particularly
in rural areas, where they're dealing with a family that
doesn't speak the English language all that well, but they
handle them very nicely. What I routinely do is just sort of
find out the supervisor of that TSA person and I write them a
letter saying what a good job they did. I mean, I think they're
doing a great job and I think the adjustment is part of the
responsibility of the media and most importantly the American
people themselves to face reality.
I was very interested in what you said, Mr. Principato,
about Canada and 25 percent of their flights being canceled.
That raises a question that really affects all of you. It would
be--not knowing what their security procedures are, I would
assume that they'd be pretty rigorous, and then I would
potentially falsely go on to assume that once they took off
from Canada and landed in the United States and were then
departing from that airport to some other destination that they
would be allowed to go through our security system without
special attention because they'd been through the Canadian one,
because I would assume that the Canadian one had been good.
But what you say is really stunning, that they've canceled
25 percent to this country because of long lines of waiting,
which doesn't make sense to me, because I only travel from the
busiest airports in the country and they don't take that much
time.
Several questions. One is, do we have those kind of
arrangements, to all of you, with other countries, that if they
do have good security that they can not get a pass, but
whatever the proper word is, within America as they change to
another destination? That's number one.
Number two: The very fine line--and you've talked about it,
Ms. Reeder, and also you, Mr. Heyman--the line on a Third World
country where some say, OK, the rural airport's not so good,
but the main airport is good, that's very tricky. And it is
hard to get a Third World country to upgrade. It's expensive.
They don't have that. They don't have the experience. They
don't have the mentality and the resources that we do in the
West.
So how do you judge in your audits, Ms. Reeder, which you
do of these countries, how much they need to do to be
satisfactory in order for us to trust them? How do you make
those judgments?
And then the Canada question, too. But you go ahead, Ms.
Reeder.
Ms. Reeder. Yes, sir. In fact, going to the Canada question
first, there are I think 13 now airports around the world that
are preclearance airports. There are eight in Canada, there are
four in islands in the Caribbean and the Atlantic, and then
there's one in Ireland, soon to be two. At these preclearance
facilities, there are Customs and Border Protection officers
who do the customs, the immigration, and the agricultural
screening of all the passengers.
We've entered into agreements with those countries wherein
they conduct screening that is equivalent to what is done in
the United States. So they use ETDs on the passengers the same
way we do. They do patdowns the same way we do. They do
everything, perhaps not identically, but certainly very
comparable to what is done in the United States at U.S.
airports.
This was a very complicated legal matter that--it took us
several years to go through the development of the standard
operating procedures to ensure that the alignment was there and
that the passengers were all being screened physically upon
departure, the same way that they would be screened at the
United States. As a result, upon arrival those passengers do
not have to go back through--they don't enter the Federal
Inspection Station, the FIS. They don't have to go back through
TSA screening because we've already verified, and we regularly
inspect them to ensure that they are complying with TSA SOPs,
not with their own host government SOPs.
There are 24 airports in Canada that provide service to the
United States. Eight of those are preclearance. The other 16
are not preclearance and they comply with Transport Canada's
requirements, not with TSA's requirements. So persons that
depart from those other 16 airports----
The Chairman. Could you explain that difference to me,
because this is actually very interesting, because if Canada is
having these problems----
Ms. Reeder. Yes, sir. And In fact the airport that Mr.
Principato referred to, Toronto, is a preclearance airport. So
it may have been that there were issues with them understanding
the complexities that we had been working on. They are not
always the very first one in the line of SOPs that get
generated. So that may be what led to it, and I'll let him
explain more about that particular instance.
But the agreements that we have reached with the different
countries, with Ireland, Aruba, the Bahamas, Bermuda, and with
Canada are such that CBP has--their roles and responsibilities
are fulfilled at those forward locations, rather than being
fulfilled at the U.S. locations. Then we ensure that the
passengers themselves and their accessible property are
screened exactly the same way that they would be here.
Now, the other departures--for example, there are ten
islands in the Bahamas that have service to the United States.
Those measures are not the same as what's done in Freeport and
Nassau. The 16 airports in Canada, it's not as rigorous a
screening as what we require from those preclearance airports,
because we do require a certain percentage of passengers that
get randomly selectee screened, the ETD usage, et cetera. So
that's where the difference lies from the passengers experience
perspective.
There are no other countries whose measures have been
deemed to be identical, because we have to comply with ATSA.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires that very
specific things be done by TSA for all flights that depart from
the United States, whether it's an internal domestic flight or
it's an outbound flight. ATSA has very specific requirements,
and that's where we get into the challenges with baggage that
arrives from Canada and from the other preclearance locations,
because that baggage is not being screened using the same kind
of equipment that we require for screening here in the United
States. So we continue to have those discussions.
Now, as to the Third World countries----
The Chairman. My time is out and we'll continue in the next
round. There aren't too many of us up here.
Senator Dorgan. You can continue.
The Chairman. OK, you go ahead.
Ms. Reeder. As to the Third World countries, as I
mentioned, I have a cadre of 60, 65 inspectors--I have turnover
at any given time--who are very skilled and very--they have a
lot of knowledge and expertise.
The Chairman. And they are doing the audits around the
world?
Ms. Reeder. They are the ones who are going to these
foreign airports and looking at them. They will look at an
airport that's the size of this room, for example, and they
will look at are the doors locked? Yes, the doors are locked.
They don't have swipe codes, but there are only two keys. OK,
so it's not as arduous perhaps as DFW, but there are a limited
number of doors, there are a limited number of keys, and they
have good key control. So they determine that access control
for that facility is strong.
They may not have a fence, but they have a lake full of
crocodiles. There are different ways that they ensure that
there is access control. So it's not that you have to have a
ten-foot wall with triple concertina wire at the top. There are
different ways of accomplishing this.
So we ensure that the inspectors are familiar with what are
best practices, what are ways that can meet these requirements
without having to have all the bells and whistles that we may
have at a U.S. airport.
Mr. Principato. If I could just--I know that--I guess we'll
pursue some of this later, but on the Canadian issue just a
little bit of quick perspective. And if you'd like, Senator
Rockefeller, I'd be delighted to bring in the airport director
from Toronto and other airports the next time they're in town,
or even fly them down, to give you further perspective on this.
Toronto, to use the example I used in the testimony, has
more departures to U.S. cities than all but about 34 or 35 U.S.
airports have to U.S. cities. There are a couple hundred
departures each day. Even the busiest European gateways don't
have that kind of traffic. So all the extra requirements are
sort of multiplied in a situation like that.
They had some, I guess they would call it, constitutional
questions with taking people whose passports had been stamped
in one of those 14 countries that DHS had identified and
treating them differently, so they had to treat everybody the
same. They ended up just banning carry-ons because they
couldn't screen everything at the gate and they had to screen
all carry-ons by opening them up. There's a lot of things that
add up very quickly when you have that many departures.
I want to give TSA some credit here. We worked very closely
with TSA and with the folks in Toronto and some of the other
Canadian airports to help alleviate some of this and find some
solutions to it.
But from the get-go I think when these requirements were
first put in, there was a sense that all foreign traffic is the
same, and it really isn't. The airports in Canada have so many
more departures, especially Toronto, Montreal, Calgary and
Vancouver. So it just sort of multiplied, multiplied out.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Dorgan. Let me ask a couple of questions. The
question I think that was asked earlier about the hub and spoke
system in other countries or other continents, for that matter,
that hub and spoke system is very much like ours, a
circumstance where I assume terrorists would look for the
weakest link to enter the system, because once into the system
you're not going to be screened and rescreened, generally
speaking.
So what, for example, in Africa does the hub and spoke
system look like? Am I right that we generally would fear that
the terrorists would try to find the weakest link in that hub
and spoke system in order to get into the system? And how are
we responding to that?
Ms. Reeder. Yes, sir. There are a very limited number of
airports in Africa that provide direct service to the United
States. But from every airport except those preclearance
airports that I mentioned previously, at every airport everyone
has to be rescreened. The passengers are rescreened, their
accessible property is rescreened, and their checked baggage is
rescreened. So, it's not as though if a person gets on an
aircraft in Uganda and flies to Dakar, Senegal, that the Uganda
threat is what we're concerned about as much as ensuring that
Dakar is as strong as possible, which is why TSA focuses the
majority of our efforts on those last points of departure or
from those places where U.S. carriers depart.
Now, places like Yemen and Pakistan, there are other areas
where we focus attention as well because we want to ensure
that, because there are so many flights that are coming from
those locations or because there is an incident that has
occurred, we want to ensure that at the very beginning that
security is being implemented. So we will do that at the
direction of the Secretary.
Senator Dorgan. If we were holding this hearing at the exit
airport for the Christmas bomber, what kind of security would
we find at that airport at this moment?
Ms. Reeder. Actually, he departed from Amsterdam direct to
the United States. At that time Amsterdam did have whole-body
imagers. They were not in the terminal that had the direct
flights to the U.S. They have since placed AIT at all of the
departure points for the U.S.
But the security in place at Amsterdam, I can provide to
you an SSI briefing on exactly what the posture is. We had a
team there very recently. But that would not be an area of
concern for me.
Senator Dorgan. You mentioned a number of--a universe of
300 airports, and then you also mentioned a universe of, what,
60 or 65 inspectors, 65, 60 inspectors?
Ms. Reeder. Yes, sir.
Senator Dorgan. Go over again what those 300 airports
represent?
Ms. Reeder. Those 300 airports, there are about 270 of them
that have direct service to the United States. Another 30 or so
have all-cargo service to the United States, but no passenger
service to the United States. Recognizing that we do have
limited resources, we've gone through and done a very
comprehensive evaluation of the threat, how much terrorist
activity has been documented, how many terrorist screening
database matches go through those airports, et cetera.
We look at historical vulnerabilities as a result of
assessments we conduct. Then we look at the size and the number
of the aircraft that depart from those locations. So if we're
looking at an airport that has two flights of a 19-seater a
week to the United States and there has never been a TSDB match
coming from that location, that's not real high on the list. A
place that has two 777s with three TSDB matches per thousand
passengers, that's very high on the list.
So those are the ways that we look at where we should send
people and ensure that we get to all of those locations in a
reasonable amount of time to ensure that the security posture
at those locations continues to meet the standards that we've
identified.
Senator Dorgan. Now, the other issue--and, Mr. Principato,
perhaps you can respond to this--is you represent airports in
the United States, correct?
Mr. Principato. Yes.
Senator Dorgan. We understand that we have standards here
that we expect to be implemented across the country in a
similar fashion. It is also the case, with respect to aviation
safety or environmental standards or any number of things that
you can have whatever standards you want on paper, in writing;
the question is how are they implemented and how are they
enforced.
Can you give me your assessment, based on the meetings that
you have held with international airports and partners abroad,
what's the notion of the enforcement of standards as you see
it? What should we believe exists out there with respect to the
enforcement of the standards?
Mr. Principato. I think in talking to airport leaders all
over the world, of course, there isn't a single one who wants
to run an insecure airport. They all want the best security
they could possibly have. In many cases, as has already been
described by Ms. Reeder and others, they lack the resources or
maybe the training in some cases to do that. So they're
certainly looking for that.
But there are plenty of places around the world, as has
already been discussed, in Europe and elsewhere where the
standards are as good as what we have here. I think the main
thing--I think the main point I want to make about this is that
the Department of Homeland Security's impulse to work through
ICAO and to harmonize and to work with other countries is
exactly the right way to go. I think early on when we were
responding in the middle of the decade, for example, to liquids
and gels plot, there were airport folks in Africa and elsewhere
who were just frustrated. They were just, OK, now we've got to
do this, now we've got to do that; we're not part of this. And
now they are.
I think there's a genuine desire around the world to meet
the highest standards they could possibly meet. You've got
Boeing and Airbus building planes that can now go point-to-
point to lots of different places we didn't have before. People
want in on that and they know they can't get in on that unless
they're part of the solution.
So I'm very pleased actually that the U.S. government is
working so hard through ICAO with our international partners to
try to develop these standards, get them on board, so that we
can have a more uniform approach throughout the world.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Lord, what progress has TSA made from
your perspective in establishing a system to screen 100 percent
of the inbound air cargo on passenger aircraft?
Mr. Lord. We issued a report in June of this year on that
very subject and, while we gave TSA good marks for establishing
a system to meet the 9/11 Act requirements on domestic air
cargo carried on passenger flights, we pointed out they did not
meet 9/11 Act requirements on inbound air cargo on passenger
flights.
Again, there are a multitude of reasons why. You're
essentially working with a number of foreign governments to
help harmonize standards and, sure, they have the systems in
place, but it's an incredibly complex proposition. And the TSA
Administrator indicated recently before this committee it
probably will take until 2013 to come up with a system. I don't
think they're ever going to have identical screening systems. I
think the operative word is ``commensurate with.'' So TSA's
currently in the process of evaluating a certain number of
other countries' systems to ensure they're commensurate with
TSA requirements. It's going to take some time to do that. It's
an evaluative process. They have to collect information, and
it's difficult.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Thune.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for calling
the hearing. I want to express my appreciation to the panel of
witnesses that have joined us today to talk about a very
serious matter. It's a question that's on the minds of more and
more Americans as a result of recent events and the increase in
air travel that always happens this time of the year.
Whether it was Abdulmutallab's attempt to detonate a bomb
while traveling to Detroit last December or the recent
terrorist plot that was uncovered regarding suspicious packages
that originated in Yemen, there's no question that Al Qaeda and
other groups continue to explore weaknesses in our air
transportation system when it comes to passenger flights and
shipments of cargo.
So I will just try and keep my remarks brief and let the
witnesses respond to a couple of questions. Maybe this has been
asked. If it has, I apologize. But with all the recent public
concerns regarding the use of advanced imaging technology--and
I guess I would direct this first to Ms. Reeder and then
whomever else would like to respond to it--could you explain
what makes TSA's deployment of this technology different from
other countries?
Ms. Reeder. In our testing of the technology, I think that
it's important to look at what Mr. Pistole had talked about
with regard to the automated target recognition software,
because I suspect that that's part of the question. There are
other countries that have deployed AIT. Some countries have now
deployed their own version of ATR, which really mollifies many
of the concerns about the privacy.
However, our concern remains the number of false positives
and then the amount of patdown that is required to resolve
those false positives. So we continue to work with the other
countries to encourage them to procure AITs, hopefully AITs
similar to what we've already procured since we've been doing
so much of the testing.
We're cooperating with them in identifying what the
measures are that--or the standards we used. We hosted a big
conference last November, 3 weeks ago, where we had numerous
countries that were represented. We had I believe about 85
people from all over the world who attended, in our attempts to
ensure that they understood fully what the benefits are of AIT,
and helped to ameliorate some of the concerns about the
drawbacks of AIT.
Senator Thune. Mr. Lord.
Mr. Lord. I think it's important to note there's a
significant difference in the scale, the magnitude, of the
deployment. As of today, I believe TSA has deployed about 385
units in 70 airports. Based on the information we collected as
part of our current audit, it's our observation, even though 13
other countries are either testing or deploying it, that the
quantities, the numbers of machines, they're actually deploying
are rather small.
As you probably know, TSA plans to have 500 machines
deployed at the end of this year, 1,000 by the end of next
year, and 1,800 at full deployment. So I think that's really
important to understand. Just the scale of the deployment in
our country vastly exceeds what other countries are currently
considering.
Mr. Heyman. Let me just add one other thing in terms of one
of the things that we do in an exceptional way is the privacy
protections we've put in place to ensure the privacy of the
public. There are a number of procedures that are in place. To
begin with, all images are viewed in a walled-off area by
somebody who's remote, not where the screening is taking place.
The officer who's assisting the passenger can't view the
images. The images cannot be stored, printed, or transmitted.
In fact, they're deleted. The officer can't go to the next
image until the image is deleted. They're not allowed to bring
any cameras or anything into the room. They will be fired if
they do, so that they can't retain those images. The images are
blurred in an appropriate way.
So there are a number of privacy protections that we put in
place to ensure that the traveling public understand that we
take that seriously.
Mr. Principato. If I can, just very quickly from the
airport point of view. We very, very much are interested in the
development of the automated target recognition technology. The
image comes up, it looks like a Gumby character, if you
remember the character Gumby. As Ms. Reeder said, they're
concerned about the false positives and the actual patdowns and
all the time that that takes. If we can get that technology
over the finish line, then you don't have to have that person
sitting in that room who can't see you and me and who we are,
our wives, or anybody else. You can put that person to doing
something really important and take them away from looking at
that screen, if we can get that technology there. It's really,
really worth looking at, investing in, and pushing.
I just want to pat TSA on the back a little bit, too, for
the meeting that Ms. Reeder talked about from a few weeks ago,
for the fact that they included stakeholders as well, the
airline and airport community. It's really important that
airlines and airports are involved in these solutions.
Senator Thune. So basically what you're saying is that is
some sort of a software application. And is it a cost issue, or
is it just not fully developed yet?
Ms. Reeder. It is a technology issue; it's not a cost issue
at all. In fact, it will be an addition to the existing
hardware. But it's just that the technology has not evolved
that far yet.
Mr. Principato. Somebody explained it to me on a third
grade level, they said that you want to get the machine to
where they're at least as good as the human in looking at the
image. That the machine is as good as that, then we want to get
beyond that point. And for me to understand it, that really
rang home with me.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Thune, I think, if you'd yield, I
think Mr. Pistole when he was here indicated that the
programming and the technology would be usable on the existing
frame of the imaging systems they now have. So it's a matter of
plugging it in. We were asking the question, are you going to
have to buy all new machines. The answer is no, which I think
is going to be helpful.
Senator Thune. It's like a new little card or something on
our computers, right?
Mr. Principato. Software upgrade.
Senator Thune. A chip or something, yes.
To get to that goal of having 1,000 of the machines by the
end of 2011--and again, I would direct this, I guess, to either
Assistant Secretary Heyman or Ms. Reeder--could you give the
Committee a sense of the percentage of these machines--that the
machines would cover, versus existing walk-through
magnetometers?
Ms. Reeder. We can get that for you.
Senator Thune. OK, that's not something that's readily
available.
Mr. Lord. Actually, I believe I know the answer to that
question. There's about, from my understanding, 2,300
checkpoints. So if you acquire 1,800 machines, it's still not
going to be enough to ensure 100 percent coverage. TSA's
strategy is to focus it, the use of these machines, on the
highest volume airports.
Senator Thune. And by the end of 2011 you'd have almost
half of them covered, if there are 2,300.
When it comes to separating the machine from the actual TSA
screener, can you tell the Committee how much training is
required when it comes to operating those new machines?
Mr. Heyman. It does require training. Each of the officers
who are required to go through mandatory training and updates
are also overseen by supervisors who see the same training and
continue to ensure the integrity of the program.
Senator Thune. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Thune, thank you very much.
Senator Rockefeller.
The Chairman. A final question from my point of view. We
talked about machinery. We need to talk about information. That
is, about passengers. You had, I believe, an incident where the
European Parliament rejected the continuation of the passenger
name record IE information on passengers. That can be as
important as the machinery itself and can reveal things that
the machinery never could, such things as intent.
I think machinery is the final passage and ought to be. But
the sharing of information about passengers surely has to be
extremely controversial. Why did they turn it down, the
European Parliament, number one?
Second, who sets the standard on information? Do we have
the best way in the United States of delineating information? I
wouldn't think that would be necessarily the case because I
think the Germanys and the Englands and the Amsterdams, et
cetera, in many cases might feel more threatened because they
have a higher at-risk, so to speak, population.
But anyway, can you enlighten me on that?
Mr. Heyman. Happy to, Senator. The European Parliament did
not vote down our PNR agreement. We have a bilateral agreement,
the United States and the European Union, for the sharing of
passenger name records, PNR. These are the records that
travelers provide to their travel agents when they purchase a
ticket and they are forwarded, a number of discrete fields,
names and----
The Chairman. So, it's not security?
Mr. Heyman. It is for security. The purposes of that
information--we get that information. That information is then
sent forward to CBP 72 hours before the departure of a flight
to the United States. Having that information 72 hours in
advance allows us to check against our watch lists and to do
the kind of screening that we need to do to make sure that
people are either not on the flight who shouldn't be on the
flight because they're a known or suspected terrorist, or that
they are in fact--that we need to take a second look and we
have to do some additional screening.
So the PNR record is extremely important. It has helped us
on a number of occasions, recent occasions, to identify or
through the data PNR provides us to do analysis that allows us
to find co-
travelers, for example, who may be of concern--we did that in
the case of Zazi--and to identify individuals who may be trying
to flee the country, as the case was with Shahzad.
So a very valuable tool. The information sharing is
critical. Parliament has not rejected that agreement. They have
said that they've got questions about it; they want to
strengthen the privacy protections in it and a number of other
elements, and they have consequently said they were going to
withhold their voting it down until the Commission negotiates a
new agreement with the United States.
So the Commission received today their mandate to negotiate
with the United States, and that will be a forthcoming
negotiation starting very soon.
The Chairman. OK. So what information needs to be there?
Mr. Heyman. So you asked about standards. The United States
has--there are 19 different types of data that we require, and
that requirement is different from country to country. That is
to say, other countries who have PNR systems do not necessarily
have the same standard as the United States. You mentioned
Germany and the Europeans. The Europeans do not have a PNR
system for analysis at this point. A number of countries want
to have it. There is no agreement----
The Chairman. Is that because of the European Union factor?
Mr. Heyman. The European Commission has not at this point
taken that on, and a number of countries are waiting to get
that, an equivalent of a mandate for the Commission to have a
uniform union PNR system. At this point that does not exist, so
they do not have that tool.
The Chairman. I would think that the European Union
factor--i.e., they don't have passports; they all have the same
passports, et cetera--would actually be quite a risk when it
comes to information for airplane travel and potential
terrorism.
Mr. Heyman. Well, there are, as you know, ongoing threats
that have been discussed in public, in Europe. Having all of
the tools that we need to avert those threats is critical. We
very much would support a European PNR system. We find it an
invaluable tool----
The Chairman. Do the Europeans--their PNR system, is it
one--is it the same for all the members of the European Union?
Second, is it--I think you indicated it's not satisfactory or
compatible with our own.
Mr. Heyman. They do not have one at this point, and so
that's to be determined. Member states seek to have their own
systems and the European Commission will seek to have a
European-wide one for all member states.
The Chairman. That sounds like 2 decades worth of work. I
mean, what's the problem here?
Mr. Heyman. I'll defer those questions to the European
Commission.
The Chairman. Europe is Europe?
Mr. Heyman. Look, they have their own process by which they
go through to develop the tools. I think just this week the
counterterrorism coordinator for the European Commission, Giles
de Kerchove, stated quite emphatically that more investment
needs to go into terrorist, counterterrorist programs, in
particular transportation security, and that Europe needs to
come up to speed on that, to include better coordination on
understanding the threat.
So I think they are having discussions and we would
encourage that.
The Chairman. OK. Then finally, if they don't come up to
the standards we think they should have, if they ever get to
have the standards, ever can agree on anything--surely they
should, but Europe is Europe. What if they don't come up to our
standards? What do we do?
Mr. Heyman. Well, we have our own--as I said, we have an
agreement with the Europeans today. We have in place a highly
effective operational arrangement.
The Chairman. That I stipulate. But just as machinery has
to in some way be compatible, so does information, I would
think, to satisfy us.
Mr. Heyman. So what the Europeans don't have right now is,
for flights flying into Europe from outside of Europe, they do
not have the same advance passenger information which we get in
our PNR arrangement. So they at this point would be lacking a
tool to do the kind of screening that we do, which we find
quite useful.
The Chairman. OK. Thank you.
Senator Dorgan. We've been joined by Senator Klobuchar.
Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you for holding this hearing on international aviation
screening standards.
Regrettably, recent terror attempts against the U.S. have
once again highlighted both the risks that we face through our
aviation system and also our dependency on our international
partners. We are lucky in this case that we were alerted to
these attempts by our allies and this step in the process shows
that there are some good things happening in terms of the
sharing of information, but there is clearly more work to be
done.
I actually wanted to start with something I know Chairman
Rockefeller discussed and that was the issues with--some issues
with Canada. This is kind of a side point, but it's the
requirement--I discussed this with Secretary Napolitano--of the
rescreening for passengers arriving from Canada. I don't know
if you're aware of this, since their baggage must be physically
transported from the arrival aircraft to a baggage screening
facility in the U.S.----
I see you're nodding your head, Ms. Reeder, Mr.
Principato--and it causes a lot of delays on our end for
passengers who, by the way, have already flown in from Canada
over our airways, with their screening.
Could you just discuss if there's any progress on that
issue because of the delays it's causing in the U.S.? Ms.
Reeder?
Ms. Reeder. Senator, as I believe that we've answered in a
couple of your letters, we do continue to work with the
Canadians on this topic. As you're aware, the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act is very specific in what kind of
screening has to be done on those checked bags. We continue to
encourage the Canadians to purchase the same kind of explosive
detection systems for screening the checked bags that we use,
and that's in accordance with ATSA.
However, given space constraints, given financial
constraints, et cetera, they've not been able to move forward.
Once they're able to purchase those types of equipment, install
them, and begin using the same SOPs as we do, we anticipate
that we'll be able to move forward very quickly in eliminating
the need for the rescreening of the bags upon arrival in the
United States.
Senator Klobuchar. Mr. Principato?
Mr. Principato. If I could, as we have Canadian members
too, the Minneapolis-St. Paul airport in your state, there's no
airport in the country with higher costs that are caused by
this particular requirement. Denver is rising quickly as is
Chicago and a number of others.
The example I often use, you can fly from Montreal--I
apologize for not using Minneapolis in this example----
Senator Klobuchar. That's all right.
Mr. Principato. But this is geographically--you can go from
Montreal to Denver with your bag screened in Montreal and
you're fine, going over two-thirds of the country. And then you
transfer to Grand Junction, a couple hundred miles, and you
have to have your bag rescreened, and your bag may not make it
with you to Grand Junction.
I understand the requirements of ATSA. Perhaps--just two
thoughts. Perhaps, number one, as we look at hopefully maybe
reforming ATSA, maybe we could deal with that provision in
ATSA, because it just doesn't make any sense.
Number two, in the meantime we're looking for Winnipeg as a
possibility for an airport in Canada where we could do maybe a
pilot. I've talked to Jeff Hamiel, your Airport Director in
Minneapolis about this, and perhaps we can work with CATSA and
TSA and others to do a pilot to show how this might work.
Senator Klobuchar. Very good. Thank you.
Then just on the issue that we've been focused on here, the
partnership with the international partners on the cargo
screening. Can you talk about what is happening with that in
terms of the international partners, and I guess specifically
if you've worked with private industry on this, on the
expansion of layered detection systems, to strengthen security?
Mr. Heyman. We have a number of activities underway. One is
obviously following the events of October 28 and working with
industry, with carriers, government, United States Postal
Service, the State Department, a number of different actors
involved, in making sure that we have in place a regime that is
both operationally effective and maintains the security that we
need.
That will continue to evolve over the next weeks to months.
In terms of the specific requirement that we have for 100
percent screening of air cargo, we have, as you know, succeeded
in doing 100 percent screening within the United States and we
are now incrementally moving toward 100 percent
internationally. That will be achieved by 2013.
We have done that in two ways. One is to increase the
requirements through our security standards, standard security
programs; and two is to develop national cargo security
programs that are commensurate with screening programs that we
would have. That's to say, third parties that can validate or
screen the cargo in advance.
There are quite a bunch of challenges associated with
that--different systems, different laws, different regulations
throughout the world. But we are making steady progress on
that.
Senator Klobuchar. What steps is TSA, Ms. Reeder, taking to
offer guidance to other partners--this is countries--
particularly high-risk nations? And can you talk at all about
the training efforts that are going on, when it's so clear that
this is a global issue?
Ms. Reeder. Well, in terms of the cargo outreach, as Mr.
Heyman mentioned, we are working on national cargo security
program reviews. There are a number of countries--in fact, the
top 20 exporters to the United States, the majority of them
have very robust security programs. We have a program through
which we're going to each of those countries, we are receiving
their programs, evaluating them, going to the countries,
looking at the actual process, following a box from the point
at which the shipper hands it in to the point at which it gets
on the aircraft to determine whether that is meeting what our
needs are as far as the 100 percent screening requirements.
For training, we have developed a pretty comprehensive
cargo training program. We have two actual approaches with it.
One is looking at cargo screening based on ICAO requirements.
Currently ICAO requirements focus simply on implementing
security controls. It does not dictate that you screen the
cargo. With Amendment 12, it opens the door--and that's the
most recent iteration of International Civil Aviation
Organization's Annex 17. That does open the door to more
stringent activities regarding cargo.
But our cargo training has been focusing very much on using
actual technology, not just physical screening but the use of
X-rays, the use of explosive trace detectors. Looking at what
we've been doing at specific countries, high-risk countries, we
have a team that is departing Yemen tomorrow who's been working
with them on the use of ETDs, explosive trace detectors, for
cargo, for passengers, for checked baggage. We also provided to
them on a long-term loan portable ETDs, both portable ETDs and
the stand-alones that you would see at a U.S. airport.
So we've been identifying those locations where they pose
the greatest concern to us, going there and providing the
training, and in some cases doing the long-term loans of the
ETDs.
Senator Klobuchar. Anyone want to add anything to that?
[No response.]
Senator Klobuchar. I just wanted one other thing, if you
could just pass on to the Secretary--I know this isn't the
focus today, but I was talking to some of our TSA people when I
came home from the holidays to come back here, and I just want
to pass on the good work that they do. I think they went
through quite a public brouhaha last week. I think there were
some issues with education of the public on this policy. I
understand the concerns raised by people that called me, but I
think this idea that it should somehow be taken out on these
front-line employees who are simply doing their job--I think
what they told me, which is good, was that the passengers were
appreciative of their work. But I think they were through the
wringer and I think appreciated the support that they got from
the Department. So I want to just put my appreciation for their
work, whatever the policy changes may be.
All right. Thank you.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Klobuchar, thank you very much. I
think that's an important statement to understand, that the
folks who are at our airports who are doing the day to day
screening, they're working under the orders of a process and
procedures and supervision. They by and large do a really
outstanding job.
I mean, like everyone else, you can find one that's crabby
or had a bad day and probably not doing quite as well as you
would hope. But by and large, I've watched a lot of it because
I've traveled a lot, and I think they day in and day out do a
pretty good job. Given the patdown issue, given the advanced
imaging issues and the
24/7 news about the----
Senator Klobuchar. And the Saturday Night Live commercial.
Senator Dorgan. All of that. I think it has been a pretty
tough time, and I think--I know Mr. Pistole wishes, and the
Department wishes, that perhaps they had done a lot more
advance work to explain to people what they're doing.
Given a choice of getting on an airplane with a large
number of passengers who have not been properly screened and
who could possibly have an explosive device, or getting on an
airplane in which passengers have been screened sufficiently so
that there's no possibility of flying with a bomb, I think most
passengers would choose the latter by far. That's what we
expect and want.
I want to just say that the sum total of all that we've
been talking about is for here and around the world to try to
keep people and luggage off of airplanes and other methods of
transportation, but especially airplanes, keep people and
luggage off of airplanes that would be containing a bomb or a
weapon.
It's not easy to do, especially inasmuch as in recent years
what has happened is we now have people that are perfectly
willing to kill themselves while they commit an act of terror.
That's a change and we haven't always seen that in our
lifetime.
So it seems to me kind of a race between offense and
defense. Who are the terrorists? How do you identify them? How
do you keep them and the things they would want to carry with
them onto an airplane? They want to kill people, we want to
protect people. It's that simple. And yet it's that complicated
as well.
So the purpose of this hearing is to once again get a
status report of where we are, what we're working on trying to
do, as I said at the outset, not just with respect to an
airport in Fargo or Minneapolis or somewhere else in this
country, but the network of airports and the network of
screening around the world by which someone can enter the
system and move around the world. The process for providing
security in those circumstances for both people and luggage is
enormously complicated and a very big undertaking.
One thing I don't quite understand for sure is, have the
good fortunes that we have experienced, and that is being able
to at least see the prevention of the bombs that we're aware
of, that they didn't detonate and so we've been fortunate, and
we haven't seen other acts, is that good government or is it
just good fortune? I don't know the answer to that, but I know
there's a lot of work under way and a lot more is necessary to
provide the kind of protection I think the traveling public
demands and deserves.
So I want to thank all of you for preparing testimony and
being with us, and I know that you'll be asked again and again
to come before this committee and give us status reports on the
work that you're doing.
Thank you very much. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Hon. David Heyman
Question 1. Some people have called for the United States to adopt
the Israeli airport security model. The Ben Gurion Airport in Israel
had nearly eleven million passengers pass through it last year. In
contrast, the three airports in the northern New Jersey region alone
saw more than one hundred million passengers in 2008. What would be the
costs to adopt an Israeli airport security model here in the United
States?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not
conducted a formal analysis of the cost to implement a United States
airport security system modeled after Israel's system. The
substantially higher passenger volumes and the comparative complexity
of the U.S. commercial aviation systems with its 450 geographically
dispersed locations would likely pose considerable operational and
financial challenges for transplanting the Israeli system in this
nation.
TSA has consulted extensively with Israel and adapted key
techniques to meet U.S. aviation security needs. In particular, TSA
already operates a behavior detection program that is based on Israel's
model, and continues to increase the direct human evaluation of
passengers during screening. Still, an analysis of Israel's system must
take into account not only differences in scale regarding passenger
enplanement but also the differences in U.S. policy toward privacy and
civil rights and civil liberties.
Question 2. Airlines have been charging passengers fees for
checking their bags, leading more passengers to carry bags onboard and
causing significant strain at airport checkpoints. Airlines are
required to pay an annual security fee, but that fee is based on costs
from 10 years ago. Yet, the administration has proposed an increase to
passenger security fees. Shouldn't the security fee for airlines be
increased instead of shifting this burden onto passengers?
Answer. The Aviation Security Infrastructure Fee was imposed on
certain air carriers beginning in February 2002. In accordance with
requirements from Congress in the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act (ATSA) (codified at 49 U.S.C. 44940 et seq.), the total amount of
fees imposed on the air carriers may not exceed the aggregate cost that
the air carriers incurred for passenger and property screening during
calendar year (CY) 2000, as determined by the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). TSA has imposed the fee at this overall limit
since February 2002 based on its determinations regarding CY2000 costs.
The statutory cap on the fee precludes TSA from implementing any upward
adjustment of the fee.
Question 3. In the U.S. we now require all cargo placed on
passenger aircraft to be screened and we have stepped up security
significantly on cargo-only flights since the bomb plot in October.
International cargo security standards currently focus on protecting
the packages themselves, rather than screening for terrorist threats.
Shouldn't the international community place more emphasis on protecting
the public against what might be in packages?
Answer. The international aviation security standards established
by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and set forth
in Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, require
all ICAO Contracting States to ensure the safety of passengers, crew,
ground personnel, and the general public from acts of unlawful
interference with civil aviation. The Annex 17 standards on air cargo
security have recently been updated by ICAO and specifically address
the screening of cargo and mail, and the establishment of a supply
chain security process, as well as ensuring that security controls are
applied to cargo being transported on all-cargo aircraft. After the
October 2010 incident, ICAO and its Contracting States realized that
more attention to air cargo security standards and practices is
necessary. To that end, ICAO, its Contracting States to include TSA,
and industry partners participated in a multilateral study group on
cargo and supply chain security in December 2010 with the ultimate goal
of developing additional amendments to the Annex 17 Standards and
Recommended Practices to further strengthen air cargo security with
emphasis given to the most recent and evolving threats.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
Hon. David Heyman
Question 1. What actions has DHS taken on outreach efforts to
assure the public of the safety of the scanners currently being
implemented throughout the country?
Answer. The Transportation Administration (TSA) has conducted
dozens of press conferences, at more than 70 airports that currently
have Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT), reaching thousands of
passengers to inform the traveling public of the importance of the
technology, advising them that the technology is safe, and reminding
them that it remains an option to all passengers. TSA has worked with
third party health and safety groups to verify the safety of the
technology. TSA continues to work with local and national media outlets
to provide the latest information on the technology with regards to its
safety and effectiveness. The Office of Public Affairs has responded to
and conducted interviews for more than 4,000 press inquiries. TSA
communicates with the traveling public on an ongoing basis through the
TSA website (www.tsa.gov), the TSA Blog, Twitter, fact sheets, and
brochures. In addition, TSA has installed multiple signs informing
passengers about the technology, including sample images, in plain
sight at airport security checkpoints, in front of the AIT, and on the
AIT itself.
Question 2. What plans does DHS have to expand public outreach and
education on this issue?
Answer. The Transportation Administration (TSA) will continue to
conduct press conferences in each media market that receives Advanced
Imaging Technology (AIT) to educate the traveling public about this
critical screening tool used to ensure the safety of air travel. TSA
will also continue to educate and inform the public through traditional
media and social media about the safety and privacy protections in
place for travelers.
Question 3. What efforts is DHS undertaking to work with industry
to develop improvements to further protect the privacy of individuals
screened with advanced imaging technology?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is working
closely with Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) manufacturers as they
develop Automated Target Recognition (ATR) software. ATR software is
used with AIT and displays a gender-neutral stick figure-like image on
the monitor attached to the AIT machine. This generic image shows
potential threats concealed on a passenger; however, it does not
display the actual image of the passenger. It will provide strong
privacy protections and will eliminate the need to staff an extra
officer in a private room. Software development is currently underway
and will be followed by testing to ensure it meets our screening
requirements.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Stephen M. Lord
Question. In 2007, GAO issued a report that found of the one
hundred twenty-eight foreign airports inspected by TSA in Fiscal Year
2005, only thirty six percent complied with all security standards.
What should the Department be doing to require foreign airports to meet
all security standards for passenger aircraft entering the United
States?
Answer. In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 44907, TSA assesses the
effectiveness of security measures at foreign airports served by a U.S.
air carrier, from which a foreign air carrier serves the United States,
or that pose a high risk of introducing danger to international air
travel, and at other airports deemed appropriate by the Secretary of
Homeland Security. Section 44907 also identifies measures that the
Secretary must take in the event that he or she determines that a
foreign airport is not maintaining and carrying out effective security
measures based on TSA assessments. However, it is important to note
that while TSA is authorized under U.S. law to conduct foreign airport
assessments at intervals it considers necessary, TSA may not perform an
assessment of security measures at a foreign airport without permission
from the host government. (In contrast, foreign air carriers with
service to or from the United States must adopt and carry out security
programs against which TSA may assess compliance at its discretion. See
49 U.S.C. 44906 and 49 C.F.R. pt. 1546.) As part of our ongoing
review of TSA's efforts to assess the security measures at foreign
airports, we plan to evaluate the results of TSA assessments at foreign
airports, including how TSA uses the results of its assessments to help
enhance foreign airport efforts to implement effective security
measures consistent with international aviation security standards. We
also plan to review the extent to which any Secretarial actions have
been taken in response to TSA assessments at foreign airports.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Gregory Principato
Question 1. Airlines have been charging passengers fees for
checking their bags, leading more passengers to carry bags onboard.
What has been the security impact on airports as a result of these
baggage fees?
Answer. The increase in carry-on baggage after the airlines began
charging a fee for checked baggage has caused a backlog at the X-ray
machines at airport security checkpoints. The fees have prompted
passengers to bring more carry-on baggage, packed full of personal
items, including multiple electronic devices. Therefore, it takes
additional time for TSA Transportation Security Officers to thoroughly
screen individual items, something that creates bottlenecks of
passengers waiting for their carry-on baggage to be screened. This has
contributed to an increase in wait times at many airport security
checkpoints.
Question 2. Cargo manifest information entering our country by air
must be provided just 4 hours prior to arrival--which could be too late
to stop a bomb before it enters one of our airports. Shouldn't we
require more advance notice for air cargo, particularly high-risk
cargo, entering the United States?
Answer. This is an interesting point, and as I stated in my
testimony, our security system should be much more risk-based. A
government/industry working group should be created to look at a number
of things, including the manifest data requirement, coupled with the
latest intelligence information, in order to achieve that goal.
______
December 1, 2010
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
Chairman,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Byron Dorgan,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison,
Ranking Member,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Jim DeMint,
Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
RE: International Aviation Screening Standards Hearing
Dear Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, Chairman Dorgan
and Ranking Member DeMint:
On behalf of Morpho Detection, thank you for your continued
leadership and efforts to improve aviation safety and security in the
U.S. and for inbound flights to the United States.
As a market leader in explosives and narcotics detection equipment,
Morpho Detection is working closely with the Transportation Security
Administration and international aviation security agencies throughout
the world to enhance aviation security and improve screening standards
across all aircraft access points. Enclosed is our latest white paper
on Aviation Screening Standards. I respectfully request that it be
submitted to the hearing record as part of Aviation Subcommittee's
December 2, 2010 hearing on International Aviation Screening Standards.
We welcome the opportunity to discuss these ideas with you further
at your convenience. In the meantime, should you have any questions I
can be reached at 202-256-1235.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Scott Boylan,
Vice President and General Counsel.
About Morpho Detection, Inc.
Morpho Detection, Inc.--part of Morpho, a business of the Safran
group (PAR: SAF)--is a leading supplier of explosives and narcotics and
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) detection
systems for government, military, air and ground transportation, first
responder, critical infrastructure and other high-risk organizations.
Morpho Detection integrates computed tomography (CT), Raman
Spectroscopy, trace (ITMSTM technology), X-ray and X-ray
Diffraction technologies into solutions that can make security
activities more accurate, productive and efficient, With industry-
leading products such as the Itemiser DX trace detection system, the
CTX line of explosive detection systems (EDS), and the StreetLab*
Mobile hand-held chemical and biological substance identification unit,
Morpho Detection's solutions are deployed to help protect people and
property in some of the most important and sensitive world locations.
Additional information can be found at www.morphodetection.com.
Attachment
December 2010
Improving U.S. Aviation Security through High Standards--Not by the
Selection of Specific Technologies
Based on twenty years of experience developing and producing
aviation security solutions, Morpho Detection, Inc., recommends the
U.S. adopt a policy of establishing high security standards, as opposed
to selecting specific technologies that seem promising at a particular
moment in time.
Such a standards-based approach would stimulate the development of
technologies or combinations of technologies that provide the best
possible levels of true threat detection, reduce false alarm rates and
speed passenger, baggage and cargo flows. This approach, feasible both
in terms of policy and cost, will not only lead to higher security
levels but also provide a much needed boost to the airline industry
with higher throughput and greater trust in the security provided U.S.
aviation.
The Way Forward for Aviation Security
Setting high and non-technology-specific standards would result in
a consistent approach to solving the nation's aviation security
challenges. Further, it would better leverage the uniquely American
government-industry collaborative relationship to develop new
technology-based screening solutions necessary to detect threats and
achieve ever higher screening performance.
Creating such standards would incentivize manufacturers to invest
in the development of solutions to the nation's aviation security
threats by providing them an established baseline that equipment must
meet. Manufacturers would be empowered to work with the government to
develop the right long-term solutions in support of clearly established
standards.
A Disproportionate Focus on Specific Technologies
Although many screening technologies for aviation security exist,
the policy debate is focused largely on specific technologies instead
of the desired security level.
For example, the debate about passenger screening is currently
focused on Advanced Imaging Technology (``AIT'') body scanners. While
body scanners have a role to play in a layered approach to aviation
security, they are by no means a silver bullet. AITs do not actually
detect threats. Instead, AITs are designed to indicate the presence of
physical anomalies on a person's body for identification by an operator
and further inspection to determine if the anomalies are in fact actual
threats. Moreover, the machines cause passenger concern and anger, are
expensive and time-consuming to operate, have high false alarm rates,
and do not effectively detect well-concealed items such as explosives
hidden in hard-to-detect locations or in passengers' bodies.
A Better Technology-neutral Approach Based on High Standards
Rather than continuing to add new technologies to the list of
authorized screening methods, the government should set clear standards
for threat detection that would apply to any security system used to
scan people or things going onto aircraft. A single set of standards
would encourage competition among equipment manufacturers, and
stimulate investment in more accurate and efficient systems that allow
TSA to scan passengers, crew, baggage and cargo more thoroughly and
quickly.
The potential of such standard setting is demonstrated by the
technology-neutral approach taken for screening of passengers' checked
baggage that has been highly successful in raising security levels
since 9/11. The checked baggage standard has spurred the improvement of
existing technologies, such as faster and smaller Computed Tomography
(CT) explosives detection systems, and the development of new
technologies, such as X-ray Diffraction. Today, checked baggage loaded
onto passenger planes is screened to a single high detection standard
by a variety of technologies appropriate for individual airport size
and configuration.
The U.S. should adopt a similar standards-based approach for all
aspects of aviation security, including the screening of passengers,
carry-on bags, checked baggage and cargo.
______
FlyersRights.org
Napa, CA, December 1, 2010
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
Chairman,
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On behalf of the American traveling public thank you for examining
the current policies being employed by the Transportation Security
Agency (TSA) at our airports.
We understand that preventing terrorist acts in a travel system as
complex as ours presents an enormous challenge. The dedicated men and
women that work in our airports to keep us safe are often never thanked
fully or appreciated--we also thank you for your continued strong
support of these brave and dedicated men and women.
What is at stake in this debate is nothing less than the civil
liberties we all hold dear in this nation. In other less democratic
nations, imposing highly invasive searches upon citizens is a lot
easier, or should be a lot easier, than doing it in this country. Yet
it seems TSA is willing to cut corners on civil liberties with these
new tactics. We believe that in America, implementing policies that
clearly impact our civil liberties must be a balancing act--even when
national security is at stake. Our concern is that when it comes to the
recent policies initiated at our airports, these policies are not
appropriately balanced and not in keeping with the traditions and
precedents set by our Constitution.
We wish to make clear that the current debate should not be about
``more'' security or ``less security'' at our airports. Our
organization is not advocating for less security at airports. What we
are advocating for is smarter security. This means that all the
national security and law enforcement agencies must do a much better
job of sharing and using information, and getting it in a timely
fashion to those that are on the operational front lines such as
airport security checkpoints. It means wider use of less invasive
biometric technologies. In the age of real time global data and a smart
energy grid, we believe this is difficult but achievable. We recognize
and appreciate your continuing efforts and leadership to make our
transportation the safest and most efficient in the world and have
every confidence you will work to ensure our security system is also.
Secondly, we believe that the successes of others who have faced
more severe daily threats than we do in the U.S. over a longer period
of time--namely Israel, is instructive. Israel, as you know, has been
highly effective in recent years at preventing terrorist actions at
their airports by using a tiered system of security. The Israelis
leverage an enormous amount of coordinated effort and manpower is used
to identify suspects before they go through security so that the more
suspicious a person is, the greater the level of security they receive.
While Israel may have slightly different values than we do in terms of
how it profiles suspects, we must pursue a system that effectively
targets threats and applies the appropriate level of security
accordingly. We feel that few, if any, would protest using highly
invasive techniques on individuals that are suspected on some
reasonable basis of being a threat. The problem is that right now it
seems we have a dragnet that does not appear to discriminate between an
84-year-old grandmother and a highly-suspicious individual.
Additionally, if Americans are going to be forced to stow their
civil liberties in the overhead bin, they should at least be doing so
for a comprehensive set of tactics that work. Recent reports and data
demonstrate that the current suite of techniques being used would not
detect the Underwear Bomber or weapons hidden in body cavities. We are
hopeful that this information will be used by the Committee and brought
to bear in your questioning and follow up with TSA officials. Current
security gaps must be addressed, and new tactics employed--hopefully
only on those that are reasonably suspected.
We also urge you to take a hard look at the security being imposed
on airport workers including those who clean the planes and have access
to aircraft. In many cases these workers, some of whom come from
countries on terrorist watch lists, are not subjected to the same level
of screening or security as passengers and crew. Despite this, some of
these workers may have unfettered access to aircraft on the ground
while the rest of us are effectively under arrest for purposes of
search and seizure. This information has been imparted directly to us
by those who have direct knowledge of security lapses and gaps in this
area.
Americans will sacrifice a great deal to ensure they are and their
families are safe when they fly. Ensuring their safety, as Chairman, is
an enormous responsibility. In the coming weeks and months we are
hopeful that you will chart a course that implements real time security
at airports that is tiered, targeted and efficient and in keeping with
our most sacred traditions of civil liberty. We urge you to ensure that
the sacrifices travelers do make are not overly invasive, without cause
and that they are not made in vain. We are confident that as Americans
we can do better.
Sincerely,
Kate Hanni,
Executive Director.