[Senate Hearing 111-1075]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-1075
PIPELINE SAFETY: ASSESSING
THE SAN BRUNO, CALIFORNIA EXPLOSION
AND OTHER RECENT ACCIDENTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
AND MERCHANT MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE,
SAFETY, AND SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 28, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
----------
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
TOM UDALL, New Mexico SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
Ann Begeman, Republican Staff Director
Brian M. Hendricks, Republican General Counsel
Nick Rossi, Republican Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT MARINE
INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey, JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking
Chairman Member
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BARBARA BOXER, California ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
TOM UDALL, New Mexico SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on September 28, 2010............................... 1
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 6
Statement of Senator Boxer....................................... 7
Article, dated September 28, 2010, from USA Today, entitled
``8th Victim of San Bruno Pipeline Blast Dies''............ 8
Article, dated September 25, 2010, from the San Francisco
Examiner, entitled ``Family Members Remembered in
Aftermath of San Bruno Explosion''......................... 8
Article, dated September 17, 2010, from the Associated Press,
entitled, ``Friends, Neighbors Share Memories of Blast
Victims''.................................................. 9
Article, dated September 14, 2010, from the Los Angeles
Times, entitled ``81-Year-Old Widow Identified As Fourth
Fatality in San Bruno Gas Explosion........................ 10
Article, dated September 10, 2010, from the Los Angeles
Times, entitled ``Coroner Identifies 3 Victims in San Bruno
Explosion''................................................ 11
Statement of Senator Johanns..................................... 12
Witnesses
Hon. Dianne Feinstein, U.S. Senator from California.............. 1
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of
Transportation................................................. 13
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Hon. Christopher A. Hart, Vice Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board................................................... 19
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Hon. Jim Ruane, Mayor, City of San Bruno, California............. 36
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Paul Clanon, Executive Director, California Public Utilities
Commission..................................................... 40
Prepared statement........................................... 43
Christopher Johns, President, Pacific Gas and Electric Company... 53
Prepared statement........................................... 54
Rick Kessler, Vice President, Pipeline Safety Trust.............. 58
Prepared statement........................................... 60
Appendix
Letter, dated September 13, 2010, from Senators Barbara Boxer and
Dianne Feinstein, to Honorable Cynthia L. Quarterman,
Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration................................................. 79
Letter, dated September 27, 2010, from Honorable Cynthia L.
Quarterman, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration to Honorable Barbara Boxer............... 79
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Cynthia L.
Quarterman by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 87
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 90
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Christopher A.
Hart by:
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 90
Letter, dated March 25, 2011, to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV, and
Hon. Barbara Boxer from Paul Clanon, Executive Director, State
of California, Public Utilities Commission..................... 91
Response to written questions submitted to Christopher Johns by:
Hon. Barbara Boxer........................................... 92
Response to written questions submitted to Rick Kessler by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 119
PIPELINE SAFETY: ASSESSING
THE SAN BRUNO, CALIFORNIA EXPLOSION
AND OTHER RECENT ACCIDENTS
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and
Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:05 p.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank R.
Lautenberg, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. My apologies for the delay in starting,
because today was the funeral service at Arlington for Senator
Stevens, who was Chairman of this committee at one point--
Chairman of many things in his career, but he was at this
committee, as well.
I understand that Senator Feinstein has a heavy calendar,
which we know always exists here. And I'd be pleased to let you
make your statement, and we'll make ours. And we'll send you a
copy, so you don't miss anything.
[Laughter.]
Senator Lautenberg. Please, take your time----
STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Feinstein. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I very much appreciate that. I'm chairing an Intelligence
Committee hearing, and it's of some importance, and so, I
doubly appreciate this courtesy.
Senator Lautenberg, Senator Thune, my friend and colleague
Senator Boxer, on September 9, at 6:11, I was watching
television in my home in San Francisco, and onto the tube
flashed this explosion. The initial reports--because the
location was northwest of San Francisco International Airport,
in the foothills, was that there was possibly an airplane
crash. Initial witnesses on the television said that the Earth
shook. It was apparent, after watching this on TV for at least
a half hour, that the fire did not diminish, that it pumped
out, that it became almost an incinerator-type fire, and that
it burned very hot and heavy.
This was a quiet residential zone. And suddenly it was
turned into something that resembled a war zone. The
firefighters actually were powerless. The water main in the
area had burst in the blast. CAL FIRE helicopters were then
brought in. This inferno burned for 1 hour and 29 minutes
before the gas to the 30-inch transmission pipe could be turned
off at two different locations.
One of the turn-off valves was a mile from the blast and
the other was one and a half miles away. Both were in secured
locations. To shut each valve, a worker needed to drive through
rush-hour traffic, use a key to get into the area, and attach a
handle to the valve to crank it. It took more than 5 hours to
turn off the gas-distribution pipelines to the homes on fire
because of the gas residually in the pipeline.
The blaze damaged or destroyed 55 homes, injured 66, and
killed, at this time, 7 people. It consumed 15 acres.
The next day, I called the National Transportation Safety
Board, spoke to its Chairman, who suggested that I meet and
talk with the Vice Chairman, Chris Hart, who is sitting
directly behind me. Sunday morning, I did that, and visited San
Bruno. I know that my friend and colleague Senator Boxer had
already been there, as had Representative Speier. I walked
through the devastation with Mr. Hart, Vice Chairman of the
NTSB. I saw homes and cars totally incinerated. It was like a
bomb had struck. Sections of pipeline that exploded, now a key
part of the investigation, appeared to have ripped apart--
appeared to have ripped apart--along longitudinal and circular
welds, now 60 years old.
A gaping crater demonstrated the size of the initial blast.
This crater was located at the low point in the valley. This
has to be explained. The street went slightly down, like this,
and then rose. The pipeline went down the middle of the street.
The explosion was at the low point in the valley.
This tragedy, I believe, shows the heavy toll in death and
destruction when high-pressure natural gas pipelines fail. And
this risk, candidly, is unacceptably high. So, last week I
joined with my colleague, a distinguished member of this
subcommittee, Senator Boxer, to introduce the Strengthening
Pipeline Safety and Enforcement Act. This bill strengthens and
expands legislation proposed by U.S. Transportation Secretary
Ray LaHood.
Here's what the legislation does:
First, it doubles the number of pipeline safety inspectors
from the current number of 100, responsible for 217,000 miles
of Interstate pipeline, to 200. Each inspector is responsible
for over 2,000 miles of pipeline. That's the distance from San
Francisco to Chicago. The NTSB recently recommended, and I
quote, ``Inspectors must establish an aggressive oversight
program that thoroughly examines each operator's decisionmaking
process.'' Doubling the number of inspectors will make this
possible.
Second, the bill requires deployment of electronic valves
capable of automatically shutting off gas in a fire or other
emergency. Manually-operated valves must be located, accessed,
and physically turned off in an emergency. Automatic valves
could dramatically reduce damage caused by a pipeline breach.
Third, the bill mandates inspections by what are called
``smart pigs''--we call this an ``electronic robot''--that goes
through the pipe, or the use of an inspection method certified
by the Secretary of Transportation as equally effective at
finding corrosion. I've been told it isn't possible to use
``smart pigs'' everywhere. But, there can be an equally
efficient method, as approved by the Secretary. Accident
statistics over the past decade identify corrosion as the
leading cause of all reported pipeline accidents.
Fourth, it would prohibit natural gas pipelines from
operating at high pressure if they cannot be inspected using
the most effective inspection technology. This is important.
This was a 30-inch pipeline operating at well over 300 psi.
There was a lot of gas coming through this pipeline. It was 60
years old. So, I think this precautionary approach to pipeline
operations assures that they are more likely to not have
undetected problems operating at risk.
Finally, it prioritizes old pipelines in seismic areas for
the highest level of safety oversight. Today, regulators
consider a pipeline's proximity to homes and buildings. Other
risk factors are not a defined consideration, although pipe age
and seismicity have a clear impact on the risk of a
catastrophic incident.
And it directs the Department of Transportation to set
standards for natural gas leak detention equipment and methods.
Today, there are no uniform standards how to detect leaks. I
think that's a big problem throughout the United States.
And finally, we adopt a number of common sense provisions
proposed by Secretary LaHood to improve pipeline safety. These
include: increasing civil penalties, expanding data collection,
closing jurisdictional loopholes, and requiring consideration
of a firm safety record when considering its request for
regulatory waivers.
I think this is a basic bill. Senator Boxer and I submit it
to you and urge--it's a work in progress. We don't pretend to
know all the answers. These seem to us to be the common sense
answers. We know what state-of-the-art pipeline inspection is.
We simply don't have it. And I think we need to have it. It's
going to cost additional people. It's going to cost additional
money. But, I actually do believe that the utilities using this
understand this.
Also, I want to say a word about PG&E. They have truly
stepped up. They have recognized the liability. They have
recognized the costs. They have indicated they will make every
homeowner come out of this--you can't come out equally, but
they well reimburse every homeowner to the extent of the loss
if they don't have insurance. They have provided funding and
hotel rooms, and have made a generous contribution to the city.
The Mayor is here. I know he's going to testify.
And so, I think the best way to approach this, really, is
to listen to the NTSB. I had the privilege of listening to all
of Chris Hart's press statements, and I can tell the three of
you, we can be very proud of the National Transportation Safety
Board. The releases have all been factual, they've all been
practical. And I think that this is one part of government that
really is functioning very well on behalf of the people it
represents.
So, I want to thank you for taking my testimony. And I
appreciate the courtesy extended to me.
[The prepared statement of Senator Feinstein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Dianne Feinstein, U.S. Senator from
California
Good afternoon Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune, and other
members of the Committee. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to
testify on this very important legislation.
On September 9, at 6:11 p.m., a natural gas pipeline in San Bruno,
California, just south of San Francisco, exploded, turning a quiet
residential area into something resembling a war zone.
The blast in the Crestmoor neighborhood shook the ground like an
earthquake.
The first reports suggested it was a plane crash, as the blast site
was only two miles from San Francisco International Airport. But as the
fire raged on it became clear that something was fueling it.
Firefighters were powerless, as the water main in the area had been
burst in the blast. Cal Fire helicopters were brought in.
The inferno burned for one hour and twenty-nine minutes before the
gas to the 30-inch transmission pipe could be turned off at two
different locations.
One of the valves was 1 mile from the blast, and another was 1.5
miles away.
They were both in secured locations. To shut each valve, a worker
needed to drive through rush hour traffic, use a key to get into the
area, and attach a handle to the valve to crank it.
It took more than 5 hours to turn off the gas distribution
pipelines to the homes on fire.
The blaze damaged or destroyed 55 homes, injured 66, and killed 8
people. It consumed 15 acres.
The next day I called the National Transportation Safety Board
Chair. Two days later, I visited San Bruno. I walked through the
devastation with Christopher Hart, Vice Chairman of the NTSB.
I saw homes and cars totally incinerated. It was like a bomb had
struck.
The sections of pipeline that exploded--now a key part of the
investigation--appeared to have ripped apart along longitudinal and
circular welds, now 60 years old.
A gaping crater demonstrated the size of the initial blast.
This crater was located at the low point in the valley, where the
street and pipeline, that ran down the middle of the street, dipped and
rose.
This tragedy shows the heavy toll, in death and destruction, when
high pressure natural gas pipelines fail. The risk is unacceptably
high.
So last week I joined with my colleague, Senator Barbara Boxer, to
introduce the Strengthening Pipeline Safety and Enforcement Act of
2010.
This bill strengthens and expands legislation proposed by U.S.
Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. The legislation:
Doubles the number of Federal pipeline safety inspectors.
The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
currently has 100 pipeline inspectors, responsible for 217,306
miles of interstate pipeline. Each inspector is responsible for
2,173 miles of pipeline--the distance from San Francisco to
Chicago. NTSB has recently recommended that inspectors ``must
establish an aggressive oversight program that thoroughly
examines each operator's decision-making process.'' Doubling
the number of inspectors will make this possible.
Requires deployment of electronic valves capable of
automatically shutting off the gas in a fire or other
emergency. Manual operated valves must be located, accessed,
and physically turn off in an emergency. Automatic valves could
dramatically reduce damage caused by a pipeline breach.
Mandates inspections by ``smart pigs,'' or the use of an
inspection method certified by the Secretary of Transportation
as equally effective at finding corrosion. Accident statistics
over the past decade identify corrosion as the leading cause of
all reported pipeline accidents.
Prohibits natural gas pipelines from operating at high
pressure if they cannot be inspected using the most effective
inspection technology. This precautionary approach to pipeline
operations assures that pipelines more likely to have
undetected problems are operated at lower risk.
Prioritizes old pipelines in seismic areas for the highest
level of safety oversight. Today, regulators consider a
pipeline's proximity to homes and buildings. Other risk factors
are not a defining consideration, even though pipe age and
seismicity have a clear impact on the risk of a catastrophic
incident.
Directs the Department of Transportation to set standards
for natural gas leak detection equipment and methods. Today
there are no uniform national standards for how to detect
leaks.
Finally, the legislation adopts a number of common-sense provisions
proposed by Secretary L aHood to improve pipeline safety, including:
Increasing civil penalties for safety violations;
Expanding data collection to be included in the national
pipeline mapping system;
Closing jurisdictional loopholes to assure greater oversight
of unregulated pipelines; and
Requiring consideration of a firm's safety record when
considering its request for regulatory waivers.
Senator Boxer and I introduced this legislation in order to
initiate quick action to make our pipeline system safer.
We have put forward our best ideas to improve inspection, address
old pipes, and advance modern safety technology. We hope to improve
these ideas as new information comes forward about the San Bruno
tragedy.
We look forward to working with the Senate Commerce Committee to
move and improve this legislation expeditiously. Thank you Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, we deeply appreciate your
commentary, the closeness--the proximity to where you live,
apparently, and the fact that you and Senator Boxer were
immediately on the site. It's a very important bit of knowledge
that you gained in a very short period of time.
So, we thank you.
And if my colleagues will forego any questions for the
moment, permit Senator----
Senator Feinstein. May I be excused?
Senator Lautenberg. Certainly.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you.
Well, we learned a good deal from the recommendations that
Senator Feinstein and, obviously, Senator Boxer have in
development of their response to this issue.
The issue has taken on much-added urgency in the wake of
the tragic accident in San Bruno, California. Our thoughts go
out to all who lost loved ones or were injured as a result of
this tragedy, as well as to those whose homes were destroyed.
San Bruno, a natural-gas line ruptured, as we heard, below the
ground, igniting a blaze that sent fireballs into the sky and,
as we also learned, residents scurrying into the streets. The
blast did terrible damage--killed 7 people, injured 52 others,
and destroyed 37 homes.
And the San Bruno incident followed two pipeline accidents
in the Midwest this summer, including one leak that spewed more
than 1 million gallons of oil into a waterway in Michigan.
These incidents have raised understandable concerns about the
safety of those who live near pipelines, both existing and
planned for the future.
Now, in my state, New Jersey, we've been long concerned
about these issues, especially since 1994, when a natural gas
pipeline exploded in Edison, New Jersey, destroying 14
apartment buildings and leaving more than 100 people homeless.
Now a company called Spectra Energy Corporation of Texas wants
to build a natural gas pipeline through Bayonne--a city in New
Jersey--and Jersey City, one of the more populated areas in my
state. And we're going to watch this proposal and the project
very carefully.
By and large, pipelines are a safe form of transportation.
But, as we've seen, when accidents do occur, the consequences
can be catastrophic. And it's very obvious that, though there's
an improved safety record over transportation of oil and gas
and other forms, the fact of the matter is that we must
exercise as much in the way of safety for our communities and
our families.
We made significant progress in 2006 when we passed the
Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act,
known as the PIPES Act. This law includes a provision, that I
authored, which requires service lines to single-family homes
to be fitted with excess flow valves that can be automatically
shut off if a sudden change in pressure is detected in a
pipeline.
The PIPES Act also improved excavation safety by
strengthening the One-Call system, which makes it easier for
construction companies to notify utility companies about
digging projects and, therefore, dramatically reduce the risk
of injury.
Yet, there's more work to do, which is why I've introduced
legislation to build on the improvements in the PIPES Act. This
new bill, in addition to the work that has been done already,
will require everyone to comply with ``Call Before You Dig,''
the requirements under the PIPES Act, by eliminating exceptions
for State and local governments and their contractors. It will
also expand the use of excess flow valves to apartment
buildings and small commercial facilities, as well as require
the installation of automatic shut-off valves in new pipelines.
Unfortunately, such a device was missing on the pipeline that
ruptured in the San Bruno tragedy.
This bill will also increase the amount of information
available to the public on inspection results and industry
standards in high-consequence areas.
And finally, the bill that I propose will put more pipeline
inspectors on the job and require the Federal Government to
establish standards for leak detection on pipes.
And I look forward to working with my colleagues to pass
this legislation and make our country's pipelines safer and
more efficient at the same time.
So, I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses, but
we're going to first turn to other members for their opening
statements.
And I'll call on Senator Thune and then Senator Boxer.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is the second hearing the Subcommittee has held this
year to examine pipeline safety. And today's hearing is going
to focus on the devastating and just incredibly tragic accident
that occurred earlier this month in San Bruno, California. The
San Bruno accident, as has already been pointed out, caused
extraordinary damage and devastation in the area, claiming
seven lives and destroying more than three dozen homes.
I hope that the representatives from the National
Transportation Safety Board and the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration will also update the
Subcommittee on the accident that occurred in July in Marshall,
Michigan. That accident caused significant environmental damage
to Talmage Creek and the Kalamazoo River. We owe it to those
who lost their families, friends, or homes in San Bruno, and to
those affected by the oilspill in Marshall, to find out what
caused these accidents and to take steps to prevent them from
ever happening again.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, the current authorization for
the Pipeline Safety Program will expire on Thursday. I want to
thank you and your staff for working diligently over the past
week to try to develop a bipartisan reauthorization bill.
Significant progress has been made. I'm particularly pleased at
the interest, on both sides, in addressing the number-one cause
of pipeline accidents, which is damage caused by excavation,
although I hope we will carefully consider the views of the
states as we move ahead.
I remain concerned, however, about the approach of the
Administration's reauthorization proposal, which is the basis
for the Committee's deliberations. It seems that the overriding
goal of the Administration is to regulate any and every type of
pipeline, even some that don't even exist today. And where the
Administration does not propose to assert jurisdiction
directly, it seeks authority to collect information which could
then be used to justify regulation.
I'm also concerned about the level of resources requested
by the Administration. It is asking for an additional 40
inspectors, even though it has yet to fill the 25 positions
that were authorized by Congress in 2006.
Mr. Chairman, I hope we can continue to work together to
craft a proposal we can all support without reservation. Thank
you for your leadership on this important issue. And I, also,
look forward to hearing from our witnesses today.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Senator Thune, for
your willingness to participate in developing a system that
makes sure that our communities are safer and that this very
efficient way of moving gas is improved.
And, with that, I call on Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer is someone known for her tenacity and
determination to make sure that, whatever we do in our society,
we respect the sanctity of family and life. And she has always
there when the issues call for attention, and makes sure--I can
tell you, having worked with Senator Boxer for a long time--all
the time that she has been here, I've been here--and very few
people will not pay very sharp attention to proposals put
forward by Senator Boxer. And we're delighted to have her here
with us.
Please, Senator Boxer.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Senator Lautenberg, thank you so much. And,
Senator Thune, thank you so much, as well.
I asked for this hearing because we can't move forward
until we really look at what happened here. This has
implications for every one of us and every one of our
communities.
And as we said, on September 9, a 30-inch transmission gas
pipeline exploded beneath a densely populated neighborhood,
creating a massive fireball and a crater 26 feet in diameter.
So, you might say, ``Well, what the heck was a 30-inch
transmission gas pipeline doing so close--within reach of the
homes?'' Well, that original pipeline was laid down in the
1940s. And this was not a developed area. So, I'm sure if you
each go back in your communities, you'll find that this is the
case. And it seems to me--and I think it's common sense--that
we have to take a look at where these pipeline are, related to
how close they come to our people that we are sworn to protect
and defend.
And tragically, 7 people lost their lives. Another 66 were
injured, according to my latest statistics. And, of course, all
of our thoughts and prayers are with their families and their
loved ones.
I did go to the neighborhood as soon as I could get there.
It was a shocking sight. And I would ask my staff if they could
come over here and, as I'm talking, hold up some photos.
Large sections, completely demolished, as if the
neighborhood had been hit by a bomb, as Senator Feinstein said.
More than three dozen homes completely destroyed.
And I saw cars in driveways, colleagues, that were
literally melted. The fire was 2,000 degrees. And when one of
the fire people started to describe what happened to the people
in 2,000 degrees, I just said, ``Don't go any further. I
understand.''
I am so grateful that San Bruno Mayor Ruane will join us
later in the hearing to provide his perspective on this
horrible tragedy.
I'd like to put in the record some of the family stories.
And, Mr. Chairman, the reason I want to do this is, I don't
want us to forget. We talk about seven people, but every story
here is so important. So, I'd like to put these stories into
the record, if I might.
Senator Lautenberg. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
USA Today--September 28, 2010--05:29 PM
8th Victim of San Bruno Pipeline Blast Dies
(Posted by Michael Winter)
A 58-year-old man has succumbed to burns suffered when a gas
pipeline exploded Sept. 9 in San Bruno, Calif., the eighth person to
have died from the blast, the San Mateo County coroner reports.
James Emil Franco was in his rented room in the upstairs of a two-
story home about 200 feet from where the Pacific Gas & Electric main
blew up in a residential neighborhood. An autopsy is scheduled.
Federal investigators are looking into whether an electrical
failure hours earlier at the origin of the 30-inch-diameter pipeline
played a role in the accident, which injured more than 50 people and
destroyed 37 homes.
______
San Francisco Examiner--September 25, 2010
Family Members Remembered in Aftermath of San Bruno Explosion
Hugh Patterson
With all investigatory accusations against PG&E, made by state
regulators and consumer groups in the wake of the September 9th
explosion that killed seven San Bruno residents, the media has
forgotten the emotional agony suffered by those who lost a loved one to
the devastation. For a little over 2 weeks, relatives of those who lost
their lives in the horrible fire have had to deal will a grief only
known by those who have experienced such a loss.
Among those killed in the pipeline explosion were three generations
of the Bullis family, 87-year-old Lavonne Bullis, her son Greg Bullis
and his son, Will Bullis. The three were remembered on Friday during a
two-hour memorial and funeral at Burlingame's First Presbyterian
Church. The church was packed to capacity, with overflow rooms
accommodating additional members of the community who came to say
farewell to the well loved Bullis family. In the wake of headlines
packed with estimated dollar figures regarding the cost of this
terrible accident, the Burlingame service served as a sad reminder of
the emotional cost paid by those left behind.
Lavonne Bullis was the matriarchal head of the family, also serving
as an elder and deacon at the Burlingame church where the services were
held. Her 50-year-old son Greg, while suffering from chronic back pain,
put his suffering aside whenever a friend or neighbor needed a helping
hand. Greg's son, 17-year-old Will, dreamed of becoming a chef. He was
involved in his school's culinary arts program, loving to share recipes
with his classmates. The three had been highly regarded by family and
friends.
The three died in the seconds just after the ruptured pipeline
exploded and were only recently identified by the San Mateo County
Coroner's Office. The explosion also took the lives of mother and
daughter Jacqueline and Janessa Greig, their neighbor, 81-year-old
Elizabeth Torres and 20-year-old Jessica Morales. In an ironic twist of
fate, Jacqueline Greig had been a member of the California Public
Utilities Commission that was reviewing a PG&E plan for pipeline work
in the area.
When terrible accidents befall a community, emphasis is placed on
the physical devastation and destruction. However, the long and often
never ending emotional pain suffered by those injured or by those who
have lost a loved one goes on quietly, lost in a swirl of media
headlines. While the physical rebuilding of a home takes places
quickly, the emotional reconstruction of a life takes far longer and
comes at a greater cost.
Those badly burned, recovering at the Saint Francis Burn Center in
San Francisco; face a long and extremely painful ordeal. Third degree
burns require painful skin grafts and many months of equally painful
physical therapy. The emotional suffering of those burned includes
living with the physical scars that can destroy self confidence. For
them, the ordeal may never be over. Those who lost a loved one must
face the upcoming holidays knowing that their loved one's won't be
there to celebrate. The tears they shed will cost them emotionally and
no financial settlement can replace those who were killed.
While Committees are formed and investigators close in on the cause
of the devastating explosion, those left behind, having lost property,
family or friends, have to start the long process of healing. That
process continues long after the last home is rebuilt and the last
lawsuit is settled.
______
Associated Press--Fri September 17, 7:43 pm ET
Friends, Neighbors Share Memories of Blast Victims
By Juliana Barbassa, Associated Press Writer
SAN FRANCISCO--The five women grew up together and shared high
school and college graduations, weddings, the births of their children
and family vacations.
Four of them gathered to mourn the one who was missing--Jacqueline
Greig, 44, who was killed with her 13-year-old daughter Janessa in a
natural gas pipeline blast that tore through their house and destroyed
almost 40 homes in their neighborhood.
``She had integrity, poise. She wanted to set a good example, and
that is what she did,'' said Monica Medina-Campos, one of those
friends.
Medina-Campos and Greig had met at St. John Ursuline High School
for Girls and went on to attend San Francisco State University
together.
The friends gathered at a Thursday night vigil that was followed
Friday by a funeral Mass at Saint Cecilia Catholic Church.
The caskets of the mother and daughter were covered by a single
pall and topped by a cross. Jacqueline Greig's husband James and their
16-year-old daughter Gabriela sat in the front row during the service
in English and Spanish.
Children in uniform from Janessa Greig's 8th grade class at the
church filled several pews.
Monsignor Michael Harriman told those in attendance that Janessa
Greig, as student body president, had a role in choosing ``don't stop
believing'' as the school motto for the year.
``So I say to all of you here today, as you are struggling with
this horrific tragedy, don't stop believing,'' he said.
Friends said Jacqueline Greig's devotion to family was reflected in
the achievements of her daughter Janessa, who was remembered by her
classmates at the vigil as friendly, focused and dedicated to her
faith.
The girl with a big smile also found time to write for the school
paper, act in the drama club, play the piano, take traditional Mexican
folk dancing classes and volunteer with the Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals.
``She was wise beyond her years,'' Medina-Campos said.
Many in the standing-room-only crowd at the vigil knew the mother
and daughter, who made and kept friends easily and lived a life many
said served as an example.
Like her mother, Janessa Greig was remembered for being the first
to say hello to a newcomer.
``She was the only person you can say everyone liked,'' said
Daniela Zarich, 14, a classmate at St. Cecilia School who knew Janessa
since kindergarten.
``She was always friendly, smiling. That's how I always think of
her,'' said Jazmin Gonzalez, 12, who took Ballet Folklorico classes
with Janessa.
In a recording of a confirmation speech played after the
congregation said the rosary, Janessa Greig appeared to be a
thoughtful, well-spoken teen.
``In today's society there is so much wrong and so much evil, but
our faith strengthens us,'' she said during the speech.
Ironically, Jacqueline Greig worked as an analyst for the
California Public Utilities Commission and was a member of the natural
gas committee of the National Association of State Utility Consumer
Advocates.
She spent time during the summer looking into a Pacific Gas and
Electric proposal to replace out-of-date pipes, with no idea that one
of those pipes ran through her own neighborhood, said Pearlie Sabino,
one of Greig's co-workers.
Two other women died in the explosion that occurred just behind the
home of the Greigs. Three people were missing--all members of the
Bullis family, who lived just yards from the source of the blast.
During a vigil for Jessica Morales, 20, nearly 300 family and
friends gathered at a Daly City mortuary Friday evening to pay tribute
to the woman who died in her boyfriend's home. Family and friends
described Morales as a cheerful person with a constant smile.
``She was a bubbly person, always happy no matter what she was
going through,'' said Pastor Mike Allen, who led the service. Eleven-
year-old Isiah Morales, Jessica's younger brother, cried and tried to
choke back tears as he remembered his big sister.
``I'll really, really miss her and I can't believe what happened,''
he said.
``She was the best sister you could have wished for.''
Morales was with her boyfriend Joseph Ruigomez when the explosion
ripped his house apart. He escaped and remained in critical condition.
Elizabeth Torres, 81, lived next door to the Greigs in a house she
had occupied for the past 40 years. When the pipeline exploded, Torres,
a mother of nine children, was with a daughter she lived with and one
who was visiting. The two daughters and a son-in-law survived and were
recovering from severe burns in a hospital.
Associated Press Writer Trevor Hunnicutt contributed to this report
from Daly City
______
L.A. Now--September 14, 2010/11:35 am
81-year-old Widow Identified as Fourth Fatality
in San Bruno Gas Explosion
John Hoeffel and Maria L. La Ganga in San Bruno
The San Mateo County coroner Tuesday identified a fourth victim
killed in the pipeline explosion that tore through a hilly San Bruno
neighborhood.
Elizabeth Torres, 81, was among the seven killed in the blast,
officials said, adding that at least three people are still missing.
Coroner Robert J. Foucrault said his office is working to determine
whether additional bone fragments retrieved from the disaster site are
human. He said it would probably take at least a week to complete that
work.
Torres was a widow who lived at 1660 Claremont Drive with her son,
daughter and son-in-law in the Crestmoor neighborhood. The gas pipeline
exploded Thursday evening behind her house, and flames ripped across a
street and through a wooded lot before igniting her home of decades.
Her home burned to the ground.
A mother of nine children, Torres had recently returned from a
gambling trip to the Napa Valley with another daughter, who also was at
the house Thursday. Torres was at home watching the NFL season opener
on television when the blast occurred, said a family friend. Three
family members remain hospitalized with extensive burns at St. Francis
Hospital in San Francisco.
Foucrault said the first three victims were identified by dental
records. They are Jacquelin Greig, 44, her daughter, Janessa Greig, 13,
and Jessica Morales, 20.
He said it took longer to confirm Torres was the fourth victim
because his office had to wait for hospital records. He said Torres was
identified by a serial number on a therapeutic device that he declined
to describe.
Gregory Bullis, 50, his son William, 17, and his mother, Lavonne,
85, have been reported missing. Bullis' wife was not at home and his
daughter did not live at home. The Bullis family lived at 1690
Claremont Drive, three houses from the Torres family.
Foucrault said the remains were being examined by a forensic dental
expert and a forensic anthropologist and would be tested at the state
DNA lab in Richmond.
______
L.A. Now--September 10, 2010/10:08 pm
Coroner Identifies 3 Victims in San Bruno Explosion
Jill-Marie Jones
The San Mateo County coroner's office late Friday confirmed the
identities of three of the four people killed in Thursday's explosion
and fire in San Bruno.
They are Jacqueline Greig, 44; her daughter Janessa Greig, 13; and
Jessica Morales, 20.
Jacqueline Greig was an employee of the California Public Utilities
Commission. She worked for an independent branch of the commission
called the Division of Ratepayer Advocates, which provides input to
regulators in defense of consumers.
``She lived right at the spot where it blew,'' said commission
President Michael Peevey. ``She and a younger daughter were in the
house. Her husband and the older daughter were at the daughter's
school.''
Relatives of Elizabeth Torres, 81, told the San Francisco Chronicle
that she is missing and they believe she is the fourth victim.
They said her house on Claremont Drive was two doors from the site
of the explosion. A body was found at the home, according to the
Chronicle, but the coroner's office has not made a positive
identification.
More than 50 people were injured in the explosion and fire. Eight
remain hospitalized. A total of 37 homes were destroyed.
Senator Boxer. So, the investigation is ongoing, and it
will take a while. And the NTSB is phenomenal, and I share
Senator Feinstein's confidence, but it will take them up to 18
months to come up with an answer here that they can be sure of.
So, I don't think we can wait. We know, if there was an
automatic shut-off valve, we wouldn't be here today. We would
be mentioning, ``Isn't it amazing how all these automatic shut-
off valves work?'' So, that's why Senator Feinstein and I got
together and we built on a proposal by the Administration. It
includes additional provisions that were raised by the
incident. And I won't repeat what Senator Feinstein said. She
did talk about the number of Federal inspectors. I'm interested
in Senator Thune's comments; if we're behind in filling 20
inspectors, we ought to get that done, because we have
thousands of miles of pipeline that we're responsible for in
the Federal Government--interstate, rather than intrastate. And
they need to be inspected, clearly. And we're looking to DOT to
promulgate these regulations for the installation of automatic
and remote shut-off valves in high-consequence areas, meaning
areas where these pipelines are running close to where people
live.
We have taken action over the past decade to improve the
safety of our pipelines. But, the San Bruno tragedy makes it
clear we must do more. It's critical that confidence be
restored and that the utilities and the regulatory agencies
responsible for pipelines are held accountable for the safety
of their pipelines. And I look forward to working with all of
my colleagues. This is not a partisan issue. This could happen
anywhere, anytime, to anyone. And it is our job, first and
foremost, to make sure that we have regulations in place that
make sense.
This isn't a battle between regulation and no regulation.
It's a question of smart regulation. And that's what I'm
looking for here.
So, I'm so pleased to see that both Senators Lautenberg and
Thune are here, that Senator Johanns is here. Senator Feinstein
and I look forward to working with all of you.
Thank you very much.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
Senator Johanns, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE JOHANNS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Johanns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me also express my condolences to the families
involved.
And, to the two Senators from the State of California,
thank you for pushing for this hearing. I think it's very
important. Obviously, a terrible, terrible tragedy.
And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your leadership on this.
I was reviewing the materials that the staff prepared for
this hearing. In our materials, there's a map of hazardous
liquid pipelines in the United States, and a map of gas
transmission pipelines. And if there's one thing that's very,
very clear from those maps, it's this: pipelines are
everywhere. I was studying the maps, and I don't believe any
State is unaffected by what's going on in this hearing today.
And that just underscores the importance, but it also brings to
us the reality that pipelines are a fact of life in the United
States. We can't do without them. We need them to heat our
homes and to run our factories, and all of the other important
uses. But, the reality is, somehow, someway, we've got to get a
handle on how best to manage the safety concerns--and, I might
add, the environmental concerns--involved with the pipelines.
In my own State, we are dealing with a company from Canada
that wants to put a pipeline through the State. It's the
Keystone XL project. We're trying to get a better understanding
of why this pipeline was sited where it was, because it is
sited right through the most sensitive environmental area in
the entire State. It goes right through the Ogallala Aquifer--
very, very sandy soil. This pipeline will sit in water. So,
literally, the day it's installed, because the water table is
so high, a portion of this pipeline will literally sit in
water.
I am here today to try to make the case that some how, some
way, recognizing that pipelines are a fact of life, we've got
to figure out how to do a better job of managing this.
You know, I look at the statistics, and it is nearly
overwhelming. We have a situation where I think we have 104
inspectors today, authorized to go a bit higher than that. In
2009, there were 884 inspections. There are 400 State
inspectors and about 8,000 inspections. And I'm sure people are
working as hard and as smart as they can, but the reality is,
with the tens of thousands of miles of pipeline, it just
appears to me we're only scratching the surface. Now, we can't
send a human being to inspect every foot of our Nation's
pipelines every year, nor would that, probably, be necessary,
but I would suspect that there's vast mileage here that is left
uninspected for years and years. And I'm anxious to hear more
about that.
I raise those concerns, but I know those are concerns
shared by everybody that is here, so I'll just wrap up and say
again how much I appreciate the opportunity to be here.
And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for pulling this hearing
together.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you for your comments, Senator.
And thank you for raising a concern about the material from
which this oil is going to be extracted--tar sand. And that's
dirty oil, and requires a lot of energy to cleanse it before it
gets into the pipeline, and the consequences for the
environment are really quite a matter of great concern. So, we
thank you and look forward to working with you on our
legislation.
Now, I'd like to call our second panel of witnesses, Ms.
Cynthia Quarterman, Administrator for Pipeline and Hazardous
Material Safety Administration.
And, Ms. Quarterman, welcome. We've had a chance to talk to
you before and hear your comments. We look forward to that.
Mr. Hart, Vice Chairman of the National Transportation
Safety Board. We look forward also to your expertise.
And we ask you to hold your comments to 5 minutes. Without
any invitation to extend, there is a little bit of tolerance,
but it mounts steeply into control.
So, we thank you, and ask you, Ms. Quarterman, to give your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. CYNTHIA L. QUARTERMAN,
ADMINISTRATOR, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Ms. Quarterman. Thank you. Good afternoon.
Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune, and members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today
and discuss the oversight responsibility of the United States
Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration and the Obama Administration's
legislative proposal for the Department's Pipeline Safety
Program.
Before I discuss these topics, I would like to once again,
send my sincere condolences to the families who have been
severely affected by this recent incident in San Bruno.
Following the incident, I joined PHMSA investigators on the
scene in San Bruno who were supporting the NTSB's efforts and
the California Public Utility Commission. I saw firsthand the
devastating impact this incident is having on that community.
Incidents such as this and the recent oil pipeline failure in
Marshall, Michigan, must not happen.
As the sole Federal agency with regulatory oversight for
the safety of pipelines, we must do our part to keep
communities free of risk and exposure to pipeline failures and
enhance public confidence in the safety of the Nation's energy
pipelines.
To ensure that safety is not only the Department's top
priority, but also the top priority of those we regulate,
Secretary LaHood unveiled a legislative proposal this month
that would strengthen the Department's regulatory authority and
oversight capabilities for pipelines. The proposal is designed
to hold all operators accountable for operating their pipelines
in a safe and environmentally sound manner.
Among other things, the proposal would raise the maximum
penalty for the most serious violations from 1 million to 2 and
a half million dollars. It would authorize 40 additional
Federal inspection and enforcement personnel over 4 years. The
legislative proposal would complement additional regulatory
initiatives that are under consideration to continue to improve
pipeline safety.
Specifically, PHMSA is considering: identifying additional
areas along pipelines that should receive extra protection;
establishing minimum requirements for point-to-point leak
detection systems for all pipelines; and requiring the
installation of emergency flow-restricting devices that would
isolate leaking pipeline sections, minimizing the amount of
product released, among other initiatives.
Mr. Chairman, ensuring the safety and reliability of the
Nation's hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline network is
an enormous task. The recent pipeline failure in California and
in Michigan show that prompt passage of this legislation is
more important now than ever. The Department and PHMSA look
forward to working closely with this subcommittee to ensure the
Nation's pipeline network is safe, reliable, and subject to the
most stringent oversight feasible.
Thank you. I'd be pleased to answer any questions you might
have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Quarterman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator,
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department
of Transportation
Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the U.S.
Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration's (PHMSA) legislative proposal, reauthorization
priorities, and regulatory initiatives.
Safety is the number one priority of Secretary Ray LaHood, myself,
and the employees of PHMSA. On behalf of all of us, I would like to
extend condolences to the families of all those whose lives were
forever changed by the Pacific Gas and Electric natural gas pipeline
failure on September 9, 2010. The Department is actively working to
ensure the safety and reliability of the Nation's pipeline
transportation infrastructure and prevent releases on the 2.5 million
miles of pipelines it oversees. Over the past 20 years, all the
traditional measures of risk exposure have been rising--population,
energy consumption, pipeline ton-miles. At the same time, the number of
significant incidents involving pipelines has declined 50 percent.
While our safety record continues to improve with the incidence of
fewer pipeline accidents, failures such as the recent pipeline
incidents in San Bruno, California and Marshall, Michigan are
unacceptable. Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, I assure you
that PHMSA, through aggressive regulation and oversight, will use its
full enforcement authority to ensure that operators meet pipeline
safety standards. We respectfully request your support in this regard.
The Department's pipeline oversight program is based on three
fundamental tenets:
First, PHMSA must establish safety standards that are both
prescriptive and risk-based, verify that operators perform to
these standards, and take enforcement actions against operators
if they are not in compliance with these standards.
Second, PHMSA can impact safety culture and operator
performance beyond minimum compliance with the regulations.
Third, pipeline operators must understand and manage the
risks associated with their pipelines, including taking actions
to prevent pipeline failures and minimizing the impact of any
releases should they occur.
However, as recent pipeline failures have shown, the Department
needs stronger authority in several key areas of its pipeline safety
program. To ensure safety is not only our top priority, but also the
top priority of those we regulate, the Department submitted a
legislative proposal to strengthen pipeline safety through new
regulatory authority, increased penalties, and authorization levels
that will strengthen our state partnerships and expand our inspection
staff. In addition, the Department is working on significant
rulemakings to increase regulatory oversight and improve guidance to
operators as well as other efforts to increase coordination with
partners and to support research and development.
I. Strong Legislation
This month, Secretary LaHood presented to Congress the
Administration's legislative initiative for the reauthorization of the
Department's pipeline safety program entitled, ``Strengthening Pipeline
Safety and Enforcement Act of 2010.'' This legislative proposal is
designed to hold all pipeline operators accountable for operating their
pipelines in a safe and environmentally sound manner. It strengthens
enforcement authority and increases inspection and enforcement
resources, closes regulatory gaps, lays the groundwork for expanding
integrity management programs beyond existing high consequence areas to
additional areas, improves pipeline infrastructure data collection, and
advances safety in other important ways.
The proposal provides significant updates to the inspection and
enforcement program. The Administration's proposal provides for forty
(40) additional inspection and enforcement personnel to allow a greater
frequency of inspections. The additional inspectors will also improve
oversight of new pipeline construction that is critical given the
significant increase in pipeline construction that has occurred in
recent years. The proposal also increases the maximum administrative
civil penalties for violations of the pipeline safety regulations by
250 percent for the most serious incidents involving fatalities,
injuries, or environmental harm. Finally, the proposal makes
obstruction of an inspection or investigation punishable by the
assessment of penalties and clarifies the Department's authority to
refer pipeline enforcement cases to the Department of Justice for
penalty actions.
The Administration is proposing that Congress remove the statutory
exemptions in current law for gas and hazardous liquid gathering lines
that operate upstream of transmission lines. While gathering lines were
once considered to be low risk due to being remotely located near
production areas, the ever-increasing growth of business and
residential areas means that communities where people live and work are
now located closer to gathering lines than ever before. Should Congress
remove the statutory exemptions, the Department would then be able to
review the corresponding exemptions in the regulations and remove them
as necessary. The proposal also authorizes data collection on
transportation-related oil flow lines. These pipelines transport
product from a production facility to another pipeline and the
Department needs additional data to determine the need to install its
safety regulations on these pipelines, which are often located in
environmentally sensitive areas. These facilities and associated piping
are currently considered non-transportation-related pursuant to
Executive Order 12777 and are regulated by the Environmental Protection
Agency.
With respect to integrity management programs, the proposal would
include a review of whether pipeline safety would be improved by
expanding and revising the integrity management program requirements
beyond existing high consequence areas to additional areas. The
Administration believes that the time has come for pipeline operators
to apply the latest in-line inspection technologies over the widest
possible areas of their systems to ensure safety and environmental
protection.
The proposal enhances data collection beginning with data on design
specifications for new pipeline construction projects. In addition, the
Department will collect pipeline infrastructure data on formerly
unregulated pipelines such as the gathering and transportation-related
flow lines already discussed as well as additional geospatial, mapping,
and incident data on existing pipelines. The Department is committed to
ensuring that strong regulatory action is taken where incident data
shows it is needed. The proposal also provides a cost recovery
mechanism for design and construction reviews and will facilitate
better coordination with the State of Alaska and other agencies on
pipeline construction and expansion projects.
II. Reauthorization Priorities
1. PHMSA's Reauthorization Proposal Strengthens Its Assistance to
States and First Responders
State pipeline safety agencies are PHMSA's most important asset in
assuring the safety of pipelines in American communities. PHMSA's
partnership with state pipeline safety agencies have always been the
cornerstone of the program. States oversee the bulk of the pipeline
infrastructure. Specifically, states are responsible for oversight of
virtually all gas distribution pipelines, gas gathering pipelines and
intrastate gas transmission, as well as 88 percent of intrastate
hazardous liquid pipelines and 20 percent of the interstate gas
pipelines. PHMSA maintains primary responsibility for the remaining
pipelines, including all interstate hazardous liquid pipelines and 80
percent of the interstate gas pipelines. States employ approximately 63
percent of the inspector work force. The recent expansion of Federal
pipeline safety initiatives, such as Distribution Integrity Management
(DIMP) has increased the resource demands on both Federal and state
pipeline safety agencies.
In 2006, Congress increased PHMSA's ability to provide grants to
state pipeline safety agencies to offset the costs associated with the
statutory requirements for their inspection and enforcement programs.
In addition, Congress gave PHMSA considerable resources to expand its
relationship with state pipeline safety agencies, enabling increased
policy collaboration, training, information sharing, and data quality
and collection. In FY 2010, PHMSA's $40.5 million appropriation to
support state programs will fund 54 percent of state pipeline safety
programs. Additionally, the President's FY 2011 request includes an
increase in funds to support state programs totaling approximately
$44.5 million, which would reflect a 65 percent funding of the state
pipeline safety programs.
The importance of these programs was made clear on September 9,
2010 when a 30-inch transmission line, known as Line 132, that carries
natural gas to San Francisco ruptured and caught fire. The San Bruno
pipeline accident involved an intrastate transmission line regulated by
the California Public Utilities Commission (CA PUC). The National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has launched an investigation into
the causes of the accident, and PHMSA immediately dispatched two
additional investigators to support NTSB and CA PUC efforts. The
pipeline is currently shut down in the immediate area of the rupture.
The remaining portions of Line 132 have been reduced in pressure by 20
percent to increase safety until the causes of the accident are
identified. At that time, any additional necessary safety mandates can
be ordered. The CA PUC regulates the line pursuant to an agreement with
PHMSA. The pipeline safety statute allows states to regulate intrastate
pipelines provided that PHMSA certifies that the states have adopted,
and are enforcing, the pipeline safety regulations. PHMSA has a
certification agreement with CA PUC and under this framework the state
agency inspects intrastate natural gas lines that are operated by
public utilities and enforces the pipeline safety regulations, and
PHMSA conducts annual reviews of CA PUC's performance in this regard
and provides funding for California's pipeline safety program. PHMSA
provided CA PUC with $1,405,282 (including $516,120 of suspension
funding) for its 2009 gas pipeline safety program.
PHMSA has learned that the success of its efforts to constantly
improve safety is multiplied by sharing responsibility and
accomplishments with pipeline safety stakeholders, both within the
Federal family and with states and communities. PHMSA proposes to
continue supporting strong relationships with other organizations
involved in responding to pipeline incidents and emergencies. When
PHMSA responds to an incident, its primary concerns are the public's
safety and determining an operator's compliance with PHMSA's
regulations. PHMSA is often requested to share information and support
the investigations of other agencies. In addition, PHMSA has a long
history of working closely with local emergency officials in response
to pipeline emergencies and its staff effectively participates in
incidents where there is an Integrated Command Post. Still, the
Department must do more. The Department has reached out to
Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Coast Guard suggesting a
new Memorandum of Understanding to ensure coordination during oil spill
response.
2. PHMSA's Reauthorization Proposal Strengthens Damage Prevention
Efforts
The vast majority of America's pipeline network is underground
making pipelines vulnerable to ``dig-ins'' by third-party excavators.
While excavation damage is 100 percent preventable, it remains a
leading cause of pipeline incidents involving fatalities and injuries.
Three-quarters of all serious consequences from pipeline failures
relate to distribution systems and more than one-third of these
failures are caused by excavation damage. PHMSA's goal is to
significantly reduce excavation damage with strong outreach and public
awareness programs. As evident in the chart below, PHMSA is making
progress.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of
2006 authorizes PHMSA to award State Damage Prevention (SDP) grants to
fund improvements in damage prevention programs. Each state has
established laws and procedures shaping its state damage prevention
program. Since 2008, PHMSA provided over $4 million in SDP grants to 30
distinct state organizations. Eligible grantees include state one call
centers, state pipeline safety agencies, or any organization created by
state law and designated by the Governor as the authorized recipient of
the funding.
SDP grants reinforce nine specific elements that make up the
components of an effective damage prevention program, under the PIPES
Act:
1. Enhances communications between operators and excavators;
2. Fosters support and partnership of all stakeholders;
3. Encourages operator's use of performance measures for
locators;
4. Encourages partnership in employee training;
5. Encourages partnership in public education;
6. Defines roles of enforcement agencies in resolving issues;
7. Encourages fair and consistent enforcement of the law;
8. Encourages use of technology to improve the locating
process; and
9. Encourages use of data analysis to continually improve
program effectiveness.
PHMSA's Technological Development Grants program makes grants to an
organization or entity (not including for-profit entities) to develop
technologies that will facilitate the prevention of pipeline damage
caused by demolition, excavation, tunneling, or construction
activities. A total of $500,000 was appropriated for the program in
2009. Two awards have been made to date.
PHMSA also uses the authority in the PIPES Act to promote public
education awareness with national programs such as, ``811--Call Before
You Dig Program'' through the Common Ground Alliance (CGA). PHMSA has
provided over $2.2 million in funding assistance for CGA's 811
advertising campaign since 2002.
PHMSA is proud of its continued and steady leadership in supporting
national and state damage prevention programs. In March 2010, we
participated in the CGA's annual meeting highlighting the importance of
the National ``811--Call Before You Dig Program.'' In April 2010,
Transportation Secretary LaHood acknowledged the importance of calling
before you dig by establishing April as ``National Safe Digging
Month.'' The U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives both
introduced resolutions designating April 2010 as ``National Safe
Digging Month.'' At our urging, forty states, including those
represented by the members of this committee, also followed suit. The
efforts driven and supported by PHMSA, involved the CGA, many states,
and damage prevention stakeholders from around the country, who are
advocates for safe excavation practices.
3. PHMSA's Proposal Strengthens the Pipelines and Informed Planning
Alliance Advances Smart Growth along Pipelines in Our
Communities
PHMSA has conducted numerous activities to inform the public and
engage public interest and participation in all of its initiatives. We
funded publicly accessible, Internet broadcast viewing of two pipeline
events sponsored by the Pipeline Safety Trust, including a focus on
safer land use planning. We have made one grant and may make others to
professional associations of county and city government officials to
represent the public in the Pipelines and Informed Planning Alliance
(PIPA). PIPA is an initiative organized by PHMSA to encourage the
development and use of risk-informed land use guidelines to protect
pipelines and communities.
A companion effort is helping communities understand where
pipelines are located, who owns and operates them, and what other
information is available for community planning. Following the passage
of the PIPES Act, PHMSA worked with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)/Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to resolve concerns
about sensitive security information. Vital information that
communities need for land use, environmental, and emergency planning
around pipelines is now publicly available through PHMSA's National
Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS). We continue to work with states,
industry, and other stakeholders to make the NPMS information more
accurate and useful.
4. PHMSA's Proposal Continues to Invest in Research and Development
PHMSA proposed to continue investing in research and development,
as well as community involvement. PHMSA recently announced it is
awarding seventeen research contracts totaling $5.9 million to
companies and institutions for the development of new projects that
provide innovative solutions to improving pipeline safety and
protecting the environment. The awards will support the development of
research projects targeted at addressing the associated challenges of
pipeline safety with the detection, prevention, and characterization of
threats and leaks, and construction quality. To date, PHMSA has
invested over $57 million for 161 projects focused on providing
solutions for detecting pipeline leaks, preventing damages to
pipelines, improvements in pipeline materials, and improved pipeline
system controls, monitoring, and operations.
III. Regulatory Initiatives
Under the Obama Administration, PHMSA has begun a comprehensive
review of the existing pipeline safety regime and developed initial
solutions, through legislation, potential rulemaking, and other
actions, to ensure that all pipelines are adequately regulated and that
operators put safety first.
The Department's legislative proposal will complement its
additional planned regulatory initiatives to continue to improve
pipeline safety. In addition to finalizing the DIMP, Control Room
Management and Low Stress Pipeline rules, the Department intends to
propose additional regulatory actions to further strengthen and improve
the pipeline safety regulations in light of the lessons learned from
the recent pipeline failure incidents. As a result, the Department is
considering a number of important regulatory actions. Specifically, the
Department will consider:
Removing regulatory exemptions for certain unregulated
pipelines;
Identifying additional areas along pipelines that should
receive extra protection or be included in the high consequence
area category for integrity management protection;
Establishing minimum requirements for point-to-point leak
detection systems;
Requiring the installation of emergency flow restricting
devices in certain areas that can rapidly isolate a leaking
section of pipeline and minimize the volume of product
released;
Revising valve spacing requirements on new construction or
existing pipelines to specify the maximum allowable distance
between valves and/or require that valves be used in certain
locations;
Strengthening criteria for repairs and establishing repair
requirements and time frames for pipeline segments located in
areas outside high consequence areas that are assessed as part
of an operator's integrity management program; and
Adopting standards and procedures for improving the methods
of preventing, detecting, assessing and remediating stress
corrosion cracking.
PHMSA also issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on
September 10, 2010, proposing to move up the deadlines in the Control
Room Management rule. This rule addresses human factors, including
fatigue and other aspects of control room management for pipelines
where controllers use supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems. Controllers play a key role in preventing accidents and the
rule addresses controller responsibilities, training, alarm management,
changing pipeline equipment or configurations, and incident response.
The final rule set a program development deadline of August 1, 2011,
and a subsequent program implementation deadline of February 1, 2013.
The NPRM proposes to expedite the program implementation deadline for
most standards to August 1, 2011.
PHMSA has also conducted a thorough review of its inspection and
enforcement related regulations, procedures, and guidance, as well as
its data collection and transparency efforts, and has taken the
following actions:
October 2009--Provided grants and other assistance to
strengthen state damage prevention programs and issued an ANPRM
to solicit comment on establishing criteria for state damage
prevention enforcement. This will satisfy the prerequisite for
direct Federal enforcement against excavators who violate one
call requirements in those states with inadequate damage
prevention enforcement programs. PHMSA is working to issue a
follow-up NPRM and final rule.
December 2009--Required operators of gas distribution pipelines
to develop and implement integrity management programs similar
to those required for gas transmission and hazardous liquid
pipelines.
December 2009--Issued a Final Rule to address human factors and
other aspects of control room management for pipelines where
controllers use SCADA systems. This rule addressed several NTSB
recommendations.
January 2010--Issued an Advisory Bulletin reminding hazardous
liquid pipeline operators of the importance of prompt and
effective leak detection capability in protecting public safety
and the environment.
March 2010--Notified owners and operators of recently
constructed large diameter natural gas pipeline and hazardous
liquid pipeline systems of the potential for girth weld
failures due to welding quality issues.
June 2010--Issued an Advisory Bulletin to operators of onshore
hazardous liquid pipeline facilities required to prepare and
submit an oil-spill response plan, requiring them to ensure
full compliance.
June 2010--Issued a NPRM regarding the regulation of the
remaining population of unregulated rural hazardous liquid low
stress pipelines as required by the Pipeline Inspection,
Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of 2006.
Summer/Fall 2010--Reviewed its regulatory oversight of offshore
transportation platforms.
We are confident that these enhancements to PHMSA's safety
regulations will improve safety and reduce the likelihood of
significant spills.
IV. Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, safety is the Department's highest priority. I assure
you that the Department will remain vigilant in ensuring the safety and
integrity of all pipelines under its jurisdiction.
Thank you and I am happy to respond to your questions.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Ms. Quarterman.
Now, Mr. Hart, thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. HART, VICE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Mr. Hart. Thank you very much.
Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune, members of the
Subcommittee, thank you very much for the opportunity to
address you regarding the pipeline explosion in San Bruno. I
also want to start by thanking Senators Boxer and Feinstein,
for their very kind compliments about the National
Transportation Safety Board. I am honored to be at the NTSB,
because it's an agency with a lot of smart people who are
vigorous detectives. They don't stop until they find the
answer; and they're not going to stop until they find the cause
of this accident.
On behalf of the NTSB, I offer my condolences, to the
family and friends of the victims, and a speedy recovery for
those who were injured. I extend my thoughts to those who have
suffered loss or damage to their homes or property.
As we've heard, on September 9, at about 6:11 p.m., a 30-
inch Pacific Gas and Electric natural gas transmission line in
San Bruno, California, operating at just under 400 psi,
ruptured. The NTSB launched to that accident the next day. The
reason the Committee asked me to be here today is because I was
the Board Member on-scene.
The rupture was along line 132, and as you see on the
slide, it runs from Milpitas to Martin, and the rupture
occurred just south of San Francisco. The explosion blew a 28-
foot section of the pipe from under the ground 100 feet away.
As you've already heard, the explosion and fire resulted in
eight fatalities, and some 55 homes were destroyed or damaged.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
We're still developing the timeline on the response to this
event. Our latest information is that a few minutes after 6
p.m., PG&E received a high-pressure alarm at the Martin
station, the station that's shown on the north side of the
slide, followed a few minutes later by a low-pressure alarm at
the Milpitas Station. So, after PG&E received calls about a
fire, they dispatched technicians, who closed the upstream
valve, which is .84 pipeline miles from the rupture, at 7:20
p.m.; and they closed the downstream valve, which is .72
pipeline miles from the rupture, at 7:40 p.m.
Our team arrived the next day. We began by documenting
information, talking with first responders, taking pictures and
measurements, taking 28-foot section of pipe and the adjacent
sections back to D.C., where they are now, for further
metallurgical examination. We were trying to do the on-site
work first, in order to release the site back, to help enable
the return of families to their houses.
The crater from which the 28-foot section of pipe was blown
is shown in this slide. The next slide shows the 28-foot
section of pipe on the street, where it landed. The next slide
shows the 28-foot section of pipe in our D.C. facility, where
it will undergo a very detailed metallurgical examination. We
will be looking at all the possible causes of this mishap,
including corrosion, and whether there was damage from a nearby
excavation. We'll be looking at all the potential causes to
determine exactly what caused this burst.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
We aim to produce a final report in 12 months, and that's
because it's a very detailed, exhaustive investigation.
Meanwhile, let me emphasize if we see anything that needs
immediate attention before the final report comes out, we will,
and have done so in the past, issue urgent recommendations
without waiting for the completion of the report.
The reason it's going to be a challenge for us to complete
the report in 12 months is because, as you've heard, we've had
three other pipeline mishaps since June. In July, there was the
30-inch Enbridge Energy Partners oil pipeline, in Marshall,
Michigan, that spilled nearly 100 million gallons of oil into
the Talmage Creek and the Kalamazoo River. In addition to that
accident, this month, another Enbridge oil pipeline, in
Romeoville, Illinois, ruptured. And then, in addition to that,
there was a gas pipeline struck by a contractor in Cleburne,
Texas, that resulted in a fatality. As a result, our pipeline
folks are busy.
The typical issues that we look into in these
investigations start with monitoring and control through the
supervisory, control, and data acquisition operations--the
acronym for that is SCADA, that you've seen. We will be looking
at pipeline controller performance--the specifics regarding the
individuals who were involved in operating the pipeline; the
operator's notification and spill response--how quickly people
were notified, and how quickly they responded, as well as the
response by the nearby local emergency responders, including
the San Francisco Airport. We will be looking at the
inspection, maintenance, and history of this pipeline, to
determine if there were historical problems that could have led
to this rupture. We will also be looking at how well the
system, the operator, and its integrity management plan were
overseen by the regulator; and we will be looking, generally,
at aging pipelines, because several of the pipeline explosions
we've investigated in the last several years have involved
pipelines more than 30 years old.
We will also be looking at the issue of urban development
around already existing pipelines, because I agree with what
we've heard before, that there's probably a lot more of that
around. We need to consider the fact that these pipelines were
installed in times when they were not in densely populated
areas, but today they are.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. I will
be happy to respond to any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hart follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher A. Hart, Vice Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board
Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune, members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address you today on the
pipeline rupture in San Bruno, California. This accident is truly a
tragedy, and I would like to begin by expressing condolences on behalf
of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to the families and
friends who lost loved ones in this accident. For those who were
injured, we offer our hopes for a speedy recovery, and we extend our
thoughts to those whose suffered loss or damage to their homes and
property.
San Bruno
At approximately 6:11 p.m. Pacific Daylight Time on September 9, a
pipeline rupture occurred in a residential area in San Bruno,
California. On September 10, the NTSB launched a team to California to
investigate this tragedy. I was the NTSB Board Member on scene in San
Bruno.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E) 30-inch diameter pipeline
(Line 132), with 0.375 inch steel thick wall, ruptured at the
intersection of Earl Avenue and Glenview Drive in the City of San
Bruno, CA. This line is regulated by the California Public Utilities
Commission (CPUC). Approximately, 115 million cubic feet of natural gas
were released. The released natural gas was ignited sometime afterwards
with the resultant explosion and fire destroying or damaging nearby
homes. The rupture created a crater approximately 72 feet long by 26
feet wide, and a pipe segment approximately 28 feet long was blown
about 100 feet away from the crater.
Seven people were fatally injured in this tragedy. Additionally,
numerous people were injured, and many more were evacuated. Ultimately,
37 homes were destroyed and 18 more were damaged. The immediate
response by local emergency responders, as well as three strategic
drops of fire retardant and water by airplane and helicopter before
dark, assisted in stopping the spread of the fire.
PG&E personnel responded to the scene and isolated the ruptured
pipe section by closing the nearest mainline valves. The upstream valve
was closed at about 7:20 p.m. and the downstream valve at Healy Station
was closed at about 7:40 p.m. The distance between these two valves is
approximately 2\1/2\ miles. Once the ruptured section was isolated, the
gas flow stopped, and the resulting fire from the ruptured line self
extinguished. Later that evening, PG&E isolated the natural gas
distribution system serving residences in the area, and within a minute
of stopping the gas flow in the distribution system (about 11:30 p.m.),
fires from escaping natural gas at damaged houses went out.
At about the same time as the rupture, in the Control Center in San
Francisco, controllers observed an increase in pressure on Line 132.
This increase was observed to occur at the Martin Station, which is
downstream of the rupture location. A ``Hi-Hi'' pressure alarm
indicating 386 pounds per square inch (psig) was received on line 132
at Martin Station.
Subsequently, at 6:15 p.m. a ``Lo'' pressure alarm was received on
line 132 at Martin Station indicating 186 psig and within the same
minute, a ``Lo-Lo'' alarm was received indicating 144 psig. At
approximately the same time that the pressure drop was noticed, calls
came in to the Control Center with reports on television and radio of a
potential plane crash in the City of San Bruno. Within minutes, people
realized that there was no plane crash but that the fire was due to a
large release of gas.
PG&E dispatched their crew at 6:45 p.m. to isolate the transmission
line. Some PG&E personnel arrived at the site before they were
requested to respond, and they offered their services to the Incident
Commander at the Incident Command trailer, set up by the local fire
department. The CPUC engineer arrived at the Incident Command by 9:00
p.m. on September 9.
When the NTSB arrived on scene, the investigation began immediately
with visual examination of the pipe and the surrounding area and
through discussions with first responders, PG&E and CPUC personnel, and
others. The investigators measured, photographed, and secured the 28-
foot ruptured pipe segment. On Monday, September 13, the ruptured
pipeline and two 10-foot sections of pipe from either side of the
rupture were crated for transport to an NTSB facility in Ashburn, VA.
An initial examination of the ruptured pipe started at the Ashburn
facility on September 23, and will continue with a detailed laboratory
examination this week.
As data analysis begins, if investigators identify a systemic
problem that should require immediate attention, the NTSB is prepared
to issue urgent safety recommendations. Regardless, our goal is to
produce the final report in 12 months.
There are several recommendations the NTSB has issued previously
regarding gas pipelines which I will outline for the Subcommittee.
Integrity Management Programs for Distribution Systems and the Use of
Excess Flow Valves
The Pipeline, Inspection, Protection and Enforcement and Safety
(PIPES) Act of 2006 mandates that the Department of Transportation
(DOT) prescribe minimum standards for integrity management programs for
distribution pipeline systems. On June 25, 2008, the Pipeline Hazardous
Materials and Safety Administration (PHMSA) published a notice of
proposed rulemaking (NPRM) entitled, ``Integrity Management Program for
Gas Distribution Pipelines,'' with proposed regulations that would
require operators of gas distribution pipelines to develop and
implement integrity management programs with the same objectives as the
existing integrity management programs for hazardous liquid and gas
transmission pipelines.
Integrity management programs for hazardous liquid and gas
transmission pipelines typically require operators to assess the
condition of their pipelines by using ``in-line'' inspection tools that
travel through the pipeline to determine the nature and extent of any
defects, or pressure testing that yields information about the
integrity of the pipeline. Such techniques are not feasible for typical
distribution pipeline systems because of the differences in the design
and operating parameters between distribution pipeline systems and
hazardous liquid and gas transmission pipelines.
Further, the failure of a distribution pipeline is often initially
detected from reports of a gas leak. As a result, development and
implementation of an effective leak management program is an important
element of an integrity management program for a distribution pipeline.
PHMSA acknowledged these differences in the NPRM and properly
emphasized the importance of various leak detection methods as
essential elements of an integrity management program for distribution
pipeline systems.
In its comments on the NPRM, the NTSB emphasized that while an
effective leak detection program is a crucial element of the overall
leak management program, the use of equipment that prevents or
mitigates leaks is equally important. One such device that mitigates a
gas pipeline leak is an ``excess flow valve.'' An excess flow valve is
a device installed on the distribution line that detects an abnormally
high flow rate on a line usually serving a user residence or facility.
When an excess flow is detected, the valve automatically closes, thus
shutting off the flow of gas through the distribution line. The NPRM
did not adequately address this aspect of leak management, other than
incorporating the mandate for PHMSA to require excess flow valves on
new or replacement distribution lines serving single family residences.
PHMSA complied with this provision of the PIPES Act on December 4,
2009, when it published the final rule on integrity management programs
for distribution pipeline systems.
The NTSB has long advocated the use of excess flow valves in gas
distribution pipeline systems as an effective means of preventing
explosions caused by natural gas leaking from distribution systems. On
July 7, 1998, a natural gas explosion and fire destroyed a newly
constructed residence in South Riding, Virginia. The accident caused
one fatality and one serious injury. The NTSB determined that the gas
service line to the home had failed and that an uncontrolled release of
gas had accumulated in the basement and subsequently ignited. The NTSB
concluded from its investigation that had an excess flow valve been
installed in the service line, the valve would have closed shortly
after the hole in the service line developed and the explosion likely
would not have occurred. The NTSB recommended that PHMSA require excess
flow valves be installed in all new and renewed gas service lines,
regardless of a customer's classification, when the operating
conditions are compatible with readily available valves. The NTSB
believes that apartment buildings, other multifamily dwellings, and
commercial properties are susceptible to the same risks from leaking
gas lines as single-family residences, and we believe this gap in the
law and the regulations should be eliminated.
Oversight of Integrity Management and Other Risk-Based Pipeline Safety
Programs
Over the past decade or more, PHMSA has adopted a risk-based
assessment approach for regulating the DOT pipeline safety program.
PHMSA has successfully built a partnership with various facets of the
pipeline industry to develop, implement and execute a multi-part
pipeline safety program. All stakeholders, including PHMSA, have, in
the NTSB's view, come to rely heavily upon this approach. The NTSB
believes that a risk-based approach can be an effective method to
develop and execute the pipeline safety program, and there are many
positive elements to PHMSA's approach.
The DOT pipeline safety regulations based on risk assessment
principles provide the structure, content, and scope for many aspects
of the overall pipeline safety program. Within this regulatory
framework, pipeline operators have the flexibility and responsibility
to develop their individual programs and plans, determine the specific
performance standards, implement their plans and programs, and conduct
periodic self-evaluations that best fit their particular pipeline
systems. PHMSA likewise has the responsibility to review pipeline
operators' plans and programs for regulatory compliance and
effectiveness.
The NTSB believes that along with the risk-based assessment there
should be increased responsibilities on both the individual pipeline
operators and PHMSA. Operators must diligently and objectively
scrutinize the effectiveness of their programs, identify areas for
improvement, and implement corrective measures. Likewise, PHMSA, as the
regulator, must also do the same in its audits of the operators'
programs and in self-assessments of its own programs. In short, both
operator and regulator need to verify whether risk-based assessments
are being executed as planned, and more importantly, whether these
programs are effective.
In its recent pipeline investigations in Kingman, Kansas,
Carmichael, Mississippi, and Palm City, Florida, the NTSB discovered
indications that PHMSA and operator oversight of risk-based assessment
programs, specifically integrity management programs and public
education programs, has been lacking and has failed to detect flaws and
weaknesses in such programs. As a result of these investigations, the
NTSB is concerned that the level of self-evaluation and oversight
currently being exercised is not adequately applied by some pipeline
operators and PHMSA to ensure that the risk-based safety programs are
effective. The NTSB believes that to ensure effective risk-based
integrity management programs are employed throughout the pipeline
industry, PHMSA must establish an aggressive oversight program that
thoroughly examines each operator's decision-making process for each
element of its integrity management program.
Recent Pipeline Accidents
In addition to the accident in San Bruno, the NTSB has been
investigating three other pipeline accidents that occurred this summer.
In Cleburne, Texas, a 36-inch natural gas pipeline was struck by a
contractor excavating the area. One person was killed and 6 others were
hospitalized.
In July, a 30-inch diameter crude oil pipeline operated by Enbridge
Energy Partners ruptured in Marshall, Michigan, spilling between
800,000 to 1,000,000 gallons of oil into Talmadge Creek and the
Kalamazoo River. The NTSB dispatched a team of more than 10
investigators to the scene. This investigation is continuing and we are
examining the pipe segment in our Materials Laboratory.
In September, another Enbridge crude oil pipeline ruptured in
Romeoville, Illinois. A segment of this pipeline was recently
transported to our facilities in Ashburn, Virginia for testing and
further study.
The NTSB is in the early stages of our investigations in each of
these accidents. We have much information to collect and analyze, but
areas of interest to investigators may include:
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) operations.
As a result of the NTSB's 2005 Safety Study, Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)in Liquid Pipelines, the
NTSB issued Safety Recommendations P-05-1 through -3 which
called on PHMSA to: (1) require hazardous liquid pipeline
operators to follow the American Petroleum Institute's
recommended practice for the use of graphics on SCADA computer
screens, (2) require pipeline companies to have a policy for
the review and audit of SCADA alarms, and (3) require training
for pipeline controllers to include simulator or non-
computerized simulations for controller recognition of abnormal
operating conditions, particularly leak events. These three
recommendations were also incorporated directly into the PIPES
Act. PHMSA published a final rule on December 4, 2009, that
included the recommended requirements and applied them to all
pipeline systems.
Pipeline controller performance. NTSB investigators are
examining the work experience, health, work/rest schedule,
qualification, training, and activities of each control room
operator involved in the accidents.
Operator notification and spill response. The NTSB is
gathering and evaluating information from interviews and
electronic sources to further determine the timeline of events.
This information will accurately reflect when the spill
occurred, when notification was made, and how the operator
responded.
Emergency response and oil spill response. The team will
review the notifications and actions of emergency responders
and the pipeline operators to the release of natural gas in San
Bruno and the oil spill in Marshall.
Inspection and Maintenance History. The NTSB will review and
evaluate the pipeline inspection and maintenance history of the
operators, including but not limited to integrity management
plans, risk-based programs, and inspection history.
Oversight Activities and Actions. Federal and state
regulators have a role in overseeing the integrity of the
pipeline system and ensuring the safety of our national
pipeline system. The NTSB will evaluate the oversight exercised
by state regulators and PHMSA of the pipeline operators in the
San Bruno and Marshall accidents.
Aging Pipelines. The NTSB has noted that the many of the
major pipeline accident investigations it has conducted in
recent years have involved pipeline systems that exceed 30
years or more of age. The NTSB is uncertain whether this is a
trend, but will examine the issue in on-going investigations
and pursue this issue with PHMSA.
Urban Development. Hand-in-hand with aging pipelines is
urban development. At the time of pipeline installation, an
area may not have been developed. Today, however, many areas
have realized population growth. The NTSB will evaluate
notification, location, integrity management, and other factors
impacted by urban development.
Closing
The accident in San Bruno is a tragic event, and the NTSB dedicates
itself to determining the cause of the accident and proposing
recommendations to prevent these types of accidents from happening in
the future.
This concludes my testimony and I would be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much, Mr. Hart.
You know, when we look back, it always raises questions on
what might have been done, what would effects have been if the
equipment was equipped with an automatic or remote-control
shut-off valve. If this pipeline had been equipped with such a
device, what effect would it have had on the consequences of
the explosion?
Mr. Hart?
Mr. Hart. That is certainly one of the issues we will be
looking at, because the integrity management plans say that
pipelines that run through high-consequence areas need to
determine whether it's appropriate to have automatic or remote
shut-off valves. That is ultimately the decision of the
operator, that's then approved or disapproved by the regulator.
We'll be looking at that entire process of overseeing the
integrity management plan, because that's a part of our
investigative process.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, let me ask you this. You know,
the study may continue, but the fact of the matter is, that
there had to be some judgment as to what the effectiveness of
these basic tools for pipeline safety might have been. Is there
not enough in the evidence that we see in front of us--the loss
of life, the destruction of facility--would there not have been
an effect? Does it require study to say, ``Well, we're still
looking at what there might have been?'' Because implicit in
your response, Mr. Hart, is the fact that, ``Well, we're not
sure it's going to do so much good, or that much good.'' Is
that the way you see it?
Mr. Hart. It took an hour and a half to turn off the
valves--there's no question that turning them off sooner would
have resulted in less damage. What we will be looking at in
this investigation is, what factors were used by the operator
in deciding not to have automatic or remote valves? What
factors were considered by the regulator in approving that
decision? And the reason we're looking at that closely is
because there have been several other recent accidents where
we've seen that the process of overseeing the integrity
management plans hasn't worked as well as it should, and we are
looking at whether that's a----
Senator Lautenberg. Yes.
Mr. Hart.--systemic issue that we need to address----
Senator Lautenberg. OK.
Mr. Hart.--systemically.
Senator Lautenberg. Because the cut-off valves--they're
kind of basic things. The absence of these things is what I
believe presents us with the prospect of the kind of damage
that occurred here and in other places--in my State, New
Jersey. And it's a fairly basic piece of equipment, and
hopefully--that I thought we would even accept that as being a
necessity. But, other technological improvements might have
come along the same time.
Mr. Hart. We made a recommendation for such valves back in
1995, and we closed that recommendation as ``acceptable,'' on
the grounds that the regulator at the time--RSPA--agreed to
incorporate this into the Integrity Management Program. We're
looking at whether the integrity management process is working.
Senator Lautenberg. Ms. Quarterman, the pipeline that
ruptured in San Bruno was an intrastate pipeline, not under the
jurisdiction of PHMSA. And while PHMSA sets the minimum Federal
safety standards for such pipeline, it is the responsibility of
State agencies--the California Public Utilities Commission, in
this case--to conduct oversight of intrastate pipeline. In the
light of the tragedy at San Bruno, is this division of
responsibility providing enough oversight, do you think, of
pipeline safety?
Ms. Quarterman. Well, let me just say that I think the
provision in the legislation that Congress has put forward in
the Pipeline Safety Act, to have States involved in oversight
of pipeline safety is an important one. Because of that, rather
than having 113 inspectors, we have an additional 300
inspectors throughout the States, many of whom are very close
to pipeline facilities.
Having said that, I think it is always an opportune time to
take a closer look at regulatory authorities and how we might
improve the State and Federal programs and the oversight of
those programs. It is certainly, in the first instance, the
responsibility of the States. With respect to the California
Public Utility Commission, they have been overseeing these
pipelines for at least two decades, perhaps even before there
was a Federal Pipeline Safety Act, and that they are doing a
good job of that. But, we are there as the backstop. In my
view, even though this authority has been delegated to the
States, the buck stops here.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you.
Mr. Hart, third-party excavation activities are the leading
cause of injuries and fatalities involving pipeline. Congress
mandated the One-Call system so that companies, individuals,
call to have underground lines and pipes marked before they
start digging. However, some States exempt certain agencies and
contractors from using a One-Call system. How would removing
all exemptions from the One-Call safety system improve pipeline
reliability?
Mr. Hart. We will be looking at the issue of nearby
excavation. We know, that there was no contemporaneous
excavation. We will be looking at the history of this pipeline
to make sure that that--to see if there was any damage, over
the history of the pipeline, resulting from excavation. Once we
determine that, then we'll be in a better position to look at
whether that system is working.
Senator Lautenberg. Are you satisfied with the examination
of the tragedy in San Bruno has been reviewed quickly, and
appropriately done?
Mr. Hart. I'm very satisfied with what we've done. We tried
to move as quickly as possible, consistent with doing a
thorough investigation, because we wanted to return the
infrastructure to normalcy as quickly as possible. We're also
very pleased with the efforts of the first responders. They
obviously did all of the work at the outset, before we arrived,
and they've been very helpful every step of the way since we
arrived.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes. OK. I thought that there were
conclusions drawn, not just from this particular devastating
accident, but experienced over the years. And I would urge that
we get moving as quickly as possible, because these things came
about without warning, and the result was, again, so giant that
we can't afford to lose any time to get things changed.
Senator Boxer?
Senator Boxer. You can go first this time----
Senator Lautenberg. Oh, I appreciate it. OK.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Quarterman, when you testified in front of this
committee in June, I asked you about the fact that PHMSA does
not require emergency response plans for natural gas pipelines.
And you responded, at the time, that PHMSA was looking into the
issue. How will the San Bruno incident impact your decision?
Ms. Quarterman. We, in fact, do require emergency response
plans for both oil and gas. And if I testified to that effect,
I misspoke. I think we were talking, at the time, about
oilspill response plans, which is something, required under the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, that only applies to oil pipelines.
But, there are emergency response plans required for both oil
and gas operators.
Senator Thune. I want to come back to the point I made
earlier about the positions authorized by the PIPES Act,
because the Administration's reauthorization proposal requests
an additional 40 positions, yet it is my understanding that
there are still 25 authorized positions not filled. Could you
speak to that issue?
Ms. Quarterman. There are currently 113 inspection
positions authorized. There are currently 96 inspectors on
board. We have hired 4 people, who should arrive within the
next 2 months; and there are 13 positions being advertised.
This is something that, when I came into this position, was a
huge problem for the agency. We had, essentially, 72 vacancies,
almost a quarter of the PHMSA staff. I have made it a high
priority within PHMSA, meeting on a monthly basis with my
managers, and including this as one of their performance
measures, that they fulfill the requirement and fill these
positions. We received additional positions in Fiscal Year
2010. We have hired, since I've been there, close to 80 people,
I believe. The goal was to get to 10-percent vacancy rate. I
think we were about 10.1 by the end of the fiscal year, 10-
point-something at the end of the fiscal year. I will ratchet
that up, for the next fiscal year, to get as close to 100
percent as possible. Should the Committee or the Congress add
additional positions, we will be all over them.
We just hired a new head of administration. That position
had been empty for several years. That person is young and is
dedicated to getting those positions filled as quickly as
possible.
The ability to short-circuit some of the hiring
requirements would be nice, if we could hire people directly.
We don't have that authority at the moment, but we're looking
into the possibility of doing that.
Senator Thune. Do you need the additional 40 positions?
Ms. Quarterman. Yes, we do.
Senator Thune. The Pipeline Safety Program is funded
through user fees. The pipeline operators oppose the
Administration's proposal to charge separate fees for the
review of design plans and special permit applications, arguing
that they already pay for those services. Now, given that the
existing user fee covers the cost of the pipeline safety
program, why do you propose adding an additional type of fee?
Ms. Quarterman. This fee, in my view, would offset the user
fees and would decrease the amount that companies have to pay
in user fees.
Currently, within the past 4 years, or, at least in the
mid-2000s, there was a huge increase in the number of new
pipelines constructed. And the number of inspections that were
done from new construction went up from a few hundred days, at
the beginning of the 2000s, up to close to 2,000 days our
inspectors were spending going on construction sites. Those
people were not doing regular inspections on the rest of the
pipeline system. In my view, the people who are proposing new
construction projects should bear the cost associated with
having inspectors out there to do that, so that we still have
the same number of inspectors available to look at the rest of
the pipeline system. Right now, the new construction is
bleeding off oversight of the existing infrastructure.
Senator Thune. Well, you said those fees would offset
existing fees. There would not be additional----
Ms. Quarterman. They would be an offset, to the extent
we're all capped by the number of people that we have. To the
extent that the cost of new design or construction is taken out
of the existing pool of inspections, it would decrease the
amount of the user fee.
Senator Thune. Time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much.
Senator Boxer?
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hart, I again want to compliment you. You were out on
the scene, you were there, you were out there asking all the
questions. You're looking at the response plan of the utility?
Mr. Hart. That's correct.
Senator Boxer. OK. It's my understanding--correct me if I'm
wrong--this was an intrastate problem.
Mr. Hart. That's correct.
Senator Boxer. This was not interstate. So, we're dealing
with the California PUC and the operator, PG&E.
Mr. Hart. And PHMSA, as well. There's a Federal oversight
layer.
Senator Boxer. And the oversight of PHMSA.
Mr. Hart. Yes.
Senator Boxer. So, my understanding is--and I'm reading
from the Mayor's testimony--he says, ``More than 400 first
responders gallantly battled the six-alarm inferno by dragging
3,000 feet of fire lines from an adjoining neighborhood where
our water department was able to locate water. The heat was so
intense, it cracked the windshield of one firetruck, with the
wall of fire stopping veteran responders in their tracks. As
the fire spread rapidly into the adjacent Crestmoor Canyon,
airstrike teams sprayed fire retardant foam to prevent the fire
from engulfing the canyon and the neighborhoods on the other
side. Citizen responders drove those with second-degree burns
to nearby hospitals so that emergency crews could focus on the
most severely burned and on preventing more lives from being
lost.'' That is straight from the Mayor and straight from the
ground.
Now, my understanding is, it took PG&E about a half hour to
get to the site. Is that your understanding?
Mr. Hart. The timeline that I have is that from the time of
the pressure disruption at the Martin Station until the time of
the first valve shutoff was about an hour and 30 minutes.
Senator Boxer. An hour and 30 minutes. But, my
understanding is, they arrived on the scene in about 30
minutes. That is not your understanding?
Mr. Hart. I don't remember that event on the timeline.
Senator Boxer. OK. Well, if you're right----
Mr. Hart. We'll find that out.
Senator Boxer. We'll find out from PG&E.
Mr. Hart. OK.
Senator Boxer. But, the point is, if the operator, PG&E, is
responsible for a response plan--and I'm not picking on them--
or, I don't know what their response plan was, or whether it
worked or it didn't work; we'll find out. But, in a crisis like
this, where there are no shut-off valves, where there's no way
to get this under control, is it acceptable for it to take 30
minutes, an hour, an hour and a half, while the local people
are taking over this and stealing water from neighboring
jurisdictions? I mean, it just doesn't sound to me that there
was a response plan in place that actually functioned.
Mr. Hart. We will certainly be looking at the response
plan, both of the operator and of the emergency responders. We
know that gas fires are difficult to fight. They can't be
fought effectively with water, and that's why they brought the
airport fire personnel, because they know how to fight gas
fires.
Senator Boxer. Well, they did everything right.
Mr. Hart. Right.
Senator Boxer. But, if PG&E is responsible--and the PUC and
PHMSA, for approving the response plan--I don't know--if it
wasn't for the local people, I don't even want to think about--
now, maybe the local people are part of the response plan, and
maybe it was part of the effort. I don't know all the answers.
But, it just seems like, if it took PG&E a half hour to an hour
and a half to get there--it worries me. But, you are looking at
that.
Mr. Hart. That's affirmative.
Senator Boxer. OK. And I would like to ask PHMSA this
question: In your response--and I appreciate your response to a
letter I sent you on September 13--you stated that all
interstate pipelines within high-consequence areas in
California had been inspected since 2008, with the exception of
two areas scheduled to be inspected this fall. Where are those
two locations? And when do you expect to complete those
inspections?
Ms. Quarterman. I don't recall the two particular pipelines
that are scheduled for inspections in the fall. I will have to
get that for you for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Answer. The first location is operated by Plains Exploration and
Production Company (PXP) The system is a jurisdictional gas gathering
system in Los Angeles County used to transport produced gas from two
production sites to the Inglewood Plant where the natural gas is sold.
The second location is operated by Rosetta Resources, Known as the
Rio Vista Gas line. This unit is an intrastate gas transmission line
and consists of a 4.33 mile long natural gas transmission line near Rio
Vista, CA in Sacramento County. Gas is collected in a gas field east of
Rio Vista and sent to a processing plant. The line begins at the
processing plant and connects to the CPN Pipeline.
Senator Boxer. I need that information.
Ms. Quarterman. OK.
Senator Boxer. How soon can you get it to me?
Ms. Quarterman. I believe it was in the letter that was
sent to you yesterday.
Senator Boxer. You didn't specify.
Ms. Quarterman. No? OK.
Senator Boxer. You just said that there were two areas, but
you didn't say where they were. So, I need to know where they
were.
Is that correct?
So, can you get me that information ASAP, please?
Ms. Quarterman. Certainly.
Senator Boxer. OK.
You stated that PHMSA is developing plans for interstate
inspections for Fiscal Year 2011, and that only two inspections
had tentatively been scheduled. What percentage of high-
consequence pipelines in California will be inspected in 2011,
according to your plan?
Ms. Quarterman. I don't think the plan is fully developed
at this point. This is the time of year when we begin to
develop a plan for Fiscal Year 2011.
Senator Boxer. OK.
Ms. Quarterman. The two that are indicated there are the
only two, so far, on the plan.
Senator Boxer. OK, when will you have your final
inspections set? It's almost the end of 2010, so, at what point
would you have it? Before the end of the year, I assume?
Ms. Quarterman. I assume so. I know the regional directors
were in a meeting a week ago to discuss the----
Senator Boxer. Well, I would ask that you please get that
answer to me, as well, as soon as possible.
[The information referred to follows:]
Answer. The PXP pipeline was recently inspected in October 2010.
The Rio Vista line will be inspected in December 2010.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, can I ask one more question at
this point?
Senator Lautenberg. Sure.
Senator Boxer. Your letter also stated that more than 3,600
miles of interstate and intrastate gas transmission lines in
California are located in densely populated areas. What
immediate steps are you taking, along with your State partner,
the CPUC, to ensure the safety of all 3,600 miles of
transmission lines?
Ms. Quarterman. Well, it's our job, along with CPUC, to
ensure that those lines are inspected, and we work with them on
a regular basis to ensure that inspections are being done
appropriately, and review those that have been----
Senator Boxer. I know. But, that's an answer that I
appreciate, but look what happened. And we don't know yet when
all that was inspected, but we've got lines that were laid in
the 1940s and the 1950s. I need to know more than just a
general answer.
So, would you get back to me on what immediate steps you're
taking, along with your State partner on intrastate lines, the
PUC in California, to ensure the safety of all 3,600 miles of
transmission lines?
Those are the high-consequence lines. Those are the ones
where the people are living very close by. And we just can't
wait. We don't--it's on our collective shoulders now, after
this happened. We have been warned. So, I need to have more
specificity from you. And I would appreciate it if you could--I
will give you another letter, in writing, asking for all these
three answers. But, I need to have the answers. If, you know,
this is not--this can't be guesswork. We have 3,600 miles of
transmission lines in densely populated areas. What are your
plans to make them safe--specifically? Not, ``We will do this
or that.'' What's your schedule? What's your timeline? We need
to know that.
[The information referred to follows:]
Answer. All federally-regulated gas operators with high consequence
area (HCA) mileage will have Integrity Management Plan inspections in
2011 followed by standard inspections on all units in 2012, except one
idle line which will only have a standard inspection in 2011. For
operators without HCA mileage, standard inspections will be performed
on all units in either 2011 or 2012 (prioritized by date of last
inspection). federally regulated gas lines in CA include gas
transmission, jurisdictional gathering, offshore, and municipal
distribution.
For state-regulated gas pipelines, total and HCA mileage as well as
inspection history was provided by the CA-PUC. Inspection history
includes both standard and integrity management inspections. Inspected
HCA mileage for PG&E and Standard Pacific standard inspections was
estimated based on CA-PUC's inspection cycle. At this time, the state
office plans to continue with their current inspection cycle, but may
be able to increase inspection frequency if regulation to allocate
additional funding is approved.
The following tables summarize pipeline mileage and inspections in
California:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federally Regulated Gas
(CA) 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspected In HCA (mi) 47 40 79 169 166
Inspected Outside HCA (mi) 723 898 1,438 1,717 2,429
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total OPS Inspected 770 938 1,517 1,886 2,595
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Planned inspections including both I01 and O07.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federally Regulated Gas Pipeline in California
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Mileage In HCA (mi) 169
Total Mileage Outside HCA (mi) 3,023
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulated Mileage 3,192
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
State Regulated Gas (CA) 2008 2009 2010 2011
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspected In HCA (mi) 1,624 1,624 2,321 1,622
Inspected Outside HCA (mi) 6,778 4,890 8,614 4,558
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total CA-PUC Inspected 8,402 6,514 10,935 6,180
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
State Regulated Gas Pipelines in California
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Mileage In HCA (ml) 2,323
Total Mileage Outside HCA (ml) 8,679
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulated Mileage 11,002
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Quarterman. As a result of this accident, we will
certainly be working closely with the NTSB to find out what the
cause is so that we can put into effect, as soon as possible,
any regulations that may be appropriate if the transmission
lines are not adequately covered by the existing regulations,
including looking at one thing the Chairman mentioned, which is
the notion of remote shut-off valves.
Senator Boxer. I believe that the NTSB is going to take a
year to 18 months. Meanwhile, we know we have 3,600 miles of
transmission lines in California, close to where people live.
So, we can't wait for more regulations. You already have the
authority to inspect. If you need more help doing that, please
let us know. But, we cannot wait. We need to act on these--I
mean, I'm just speaking for my State. Senator Lautenberg will
speak for his. And each of us can speak for ours. But the fact
is, we now know, because of your cooperation with us, which we
greatly appreciate, how many lines we have that are of
consequence. So, we can't wait for a year or 18 months to
figure out what NTSB is recommending. We need to have
inspections. So, we need PHMSA to take the lead.
Now, I've talked to PG&E and off the record, we chatted;
and I think they're ready and willing to do more inspections.
But, I think you need to be proactive on this one, and not wait
for new legislation. You have the authority. That's your job.
And I think we want to help you get it done.
Ms. Quarterman. Right.
Senator Boxer. So, I need to know the answers to my
questions: What are your plans? Where are those two areas, you
wrote to me, and are they going to be inspected right away?
What are your plans for the 3,600 miles? I just need to have
some answers, because I can't go home when people ask me,
``Well, what's going to happen? Where is all the--where are
these pipelines?''--I can say, ``I now know that there are
3,600 miles that are close to people, and that's a priority.''
I can tell them that Senator Feinstein and I, with the help of
the Chairman, and hopefully Senator Thune and Johanns and
others, are writing some new regulations.
But, in the meantime, we need inspections. We have to have
inspections. And we need to know whether there's corrosion. We
need to know whether there was any excavation. We need to know
how old these pipelines are. And we need to move forward
together.
So, I'm looking forward to your response, very much,
because I want to help you. I'm not challenging you because I
don't trust that you do the right thing. I want to tell you
that you need to tell me what your plans are and what you need
to do to get this job done now, not waiting until there's a
report, because we just can't wait. Something else could
happen.
We know, from the NTSB, they're looking at other problems.
And now this happened. So, we can't wait for another accident.
This one cut deep into a community. You were there. It stops
your heart. So, we don't want this to happen to any community
in the country. So, we need you to work with us now and
understand that it's going to be a while until we get the
legislation. Let's use your authority now. That's just my
message.
Ms. Quarterman. I absolutely agree with you, Senator. I
assure you that we are taking the incident very seriously. It
was a sobering experience to go out to San Bruno, and one that
pulls at the heart of all the folks at PHMSA and particularly,
inspectors who have to go on these scenes on a daily basis and
have lost colleagues, in the California Public Utility
Commission, as well.
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Ms. Quarterman. And we will be working on inspections, in
California and throughout the country, I assure you.
Senator Boxer. Thank you. I look forward to your response.
Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg. I want to say that we'll keep the
record open and expect prompt responses to questions that will
be submitted to you in writing.
We thank you for your testimony, and call the next panel to
the table.
That's Mr. Paul Clanon, Executive Director of the
California Public Utilities Commission; Mr. Christopher Johns,
President, Pacific Gas and Electric; Mr. Jim Ruane, Mayor of
San Bruno; and Mr. Rick Kessler, Vice President of the Pipeline
Safety Trust.
And I'm called to another meeting, and Senator Boxer will
continue with the witnesses--and it will be up to her as to
when we finish the questions and listen to the testimony.
So, thank you.
Senator Boxer [presiding]. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
I'm delighted to take the gavel from you, just as you've done
it for me in the PW Committee. Thank you very much.
Panel three, we welcome you here. It's a very, very
important panel.
I would like to start off with the Mayor, if you don't
mind, because I think the Mayor needs to bring us back to the
picture of the moment.
And so, Mayor Ruane, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM RUANE, MAYOR,
SAN BRUNO, CALIFORNIA
Mr. Ruane. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Lautenberg----
Senator Boxer. Make sure your microphone is turned on.
Mr. Ruane. All right. That's better.
Thank you, Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune, and,
in particular, Senators Boxer and Feinstein, for inviting me to
testify.
My name is Jim Ruane, and I am the very proud Mayor of the
wonderful City of San Bruno. I'm here today to give you--voice
to the residents of San Bruno, whose hearts were broken on the
awful evening of September 9, 2010, but whose spirit remains
strong and resilient.
Let me tell you just a little bit about San Bruno. We're a
solid working-class community of nearly 44,000, located in the
sophisticated urban environment of the San Francisco Peninsula,
immediately adjacent to San Francisco International Airport. We
have a unique identity in the region as a somewhat old-
fashioned, unassuming community with a positive, can-do
attitude about life. I often tell people that San Bruno is the
closest thing to a slice of American pie you could ever
experience.
The Glenview area where the explosion occurred is a
hillside neighborhood of nearly 400 homes, built around the
Crestmoor Canyon open space.
The explosion occurred at dinnertime on a Thursday evening,
just as residents were settling in for another typical night at
home, and perhaps to watch the first NFL game of the season.
The neighborhood was shaken out of its routine with a
thunderous disturbance that some mistook, at first, as an
earthquake or an airline crash, the deafening sound of a
fireball roaring 100 feet overhead, and 2,000-degree flames
overtook their homes.
Our residents ran for their lives with just the clothes on
their back. What we now know is that a 30-inch high-pressure
natural gas transmission line running through the Glenview
neighborhood exploded. Police and fire first responders from
all over our region converged on the area, only to discover
that the explosion had knocked out the main water line.
I immediately drove to the scene and then helplessly
watched from afar as the gas line spewed unabated for over an
hour until it could be capped. One observer later said, ``It
looked like Hell on Earth.''
More than 400 first responders gallantly battled the six-
alarm inferno by dragging 3,000 feet of lines from an adjoining
neighborhood, where our Water Department was able to locate
water. As the fire spread rapidly into the adjacent Crestmoor
Canyon, airstrike teams sprayed fire-retardant foam to prevent
the fire from engulfing the canyon and the neighborhoods on the
other side.
Citizen responders drove those with second-degree burns to
nearby hospitals so that emergency crews could focus on the
most severely burned and on preventing more lives from being
lost.
Within the first hour of the explosion being reported, we
had set up an Incident Command Center at the site, evacuated
nearly 1,000 residences, and activated our Emergency Operations
Center at City Hall. Fortunately, we received a flood of
assistance, not only from our own city workers, but our
residents, San Mateo County and State emergency officials,
dozens of surrounding police and fire agencies and relief
agencies.
We opened an Evacuation Center for displaced residents that
night, had a one-stop Local Assistance Center set up and
running by the next day, and soon were inspecting the impacted
homes in the Glenview neighborhood for damage.
Some have said our response was a textbook example of how
to handle a crisis of epic size like this. I want to say that
it was a team effort involving the tremendous expertise and
passion of so many people and agencies coming together to
support San Bruno.
We now know that the most devastating outcome of the
explosion and fire was the loss of eight lives that night. And
yes, I said ``eight.'' The last fatality was just confirmed to
us within the last hour.
There were other awful consequences, as well. Sixty-six
persons were reported burned and injured, including four
firefighters who suffered smoke inhalation. At least four
residents remain in critical condition today from their burns,
and they all face long and difficult recoveries. Thirty-seven
homes were destroyed, 18 remain uninhabitable, and another 32
suffered less serious damage.
A large crater and dirt road now cut through Glenview, with
a fence surrounding the exposed pipeline. The sad rubble of a
children's playground and the dozens of charred homes and their
barren chimneys sitting as a grim reminder of the tragedy we
experienced.
Within 48 hours, teams of building inspectors had completed
inspection of the 377 evacuated homes in the blast zone. That
Saturday, we convened a Town Hall meeting that drew over 600
residents. By Sunday morning, less than 72 hours from the
explosion, we had coordinated a neighborhood re-entry program
that allowed 299 families to return home.
Over the next few days, those who lost their homes were
allowed to return and sift through the rubble for any personal
items they could find.
The following days were surreal for our community: funerals
and vigils, potlucks, fundraising events, press conferences,
and a nationwide offering of condolences. People from across
the world contacted us to lend their support. While this became
an international news story about pipeline safety, for us it
was always about getting our hometown, San Bruno, back on its
feet.
Today, crews are clearing the debris so that the rebuilding
process can begin. This week, we are beginning a new program to
give even more targeted one-on-one assistance to those 55
families who will be displaced from their homes and their
neighborhood for some time to come.
We will leave it to the experts, including investigators
from the National Transportation Safety Board, to determine how
and why this happened. These investigations will be vital to
ensuring that this type of tragedy never occurs again and that
no other community will be subjected to the horror that we
continue to experience.
For now, we know that this incident cost precious lives,
incinerated a neighborhood, caused over $50 million in physical
damage--and counting--and forever changed San Bruno. I can also
say that it has made a determined and resilient town even more
determined and resilient. As one retired firefighter who lost
his home in the blaze said, ``I'm going to be the first person
to move back in--with the city's help, of course. The faster I
can move forward, the less I think of the past.''
You may be asking yourself, what can the Federal Government
do to help San Bruno? First and foremost, the Federal
Government should take all necessary actions to assure that
this never happens again. The City of San Bruno, already
struggling, does not have the resources to cover the cost of
the response and the long-term consequences of this disaster. I
am very disappointed with the recent determination by FEMA to
deny Federal resources. Your support for our appeal is vital to
San Bruno's future.
Thank you for your time today, and thank you for your
continued prayers for the City of San Bruno.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ruane follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jim Ruane, Mayor,
City of San Bruno, California
Thank you, Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune, our esteemed
U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer and members of the Subcommittee for inviting
me to testify on the matter of ``Pipeline Safety: Assessing the San
Bruno Explosion.'' My name is Jim Ruane, and I am the proud Mayor of
the wonderful City of San Bruno, California.
I am here today to give voice to the residents of San Bruno whose
hearts were broken on the awful evening of September 9, 2010, but whose
spirit remains strong and resilient. We are a determined town that will
triumph over this tragedy because of the special sense of family,
neighborhood and community that San Bruno was known for long before
this tragic incident. I can tell you with great certainty that the
explosion did not tear San Bruno apart but has brought us closer
together than ever.
A Place Called San Bruno
Let me tell you a little bit about San Bruno. We are a solid
working-class community of nearly 44,000 located, as one newspaper
article said, ``between the glitz of San Francisco and the wealth of
Silicon Valley.'' While we are located in the sophisticated urban
environment of the San Francisco Peninsula, immediately adjacent to the
San Francisco International Airport, we have a unique identity in the
region as a somewhat old-fashioned, unassuming community with a
positive, can-do attitude about life.
Most of our homes were built post-World War II, with one-car
garages and well-kept yards. We have many beautiful parks in our town,
and a community event almost every weekend. We have decorum at our City
Council meetings, pride in the American flag and a legacy of civility
in an increasingly uncivil world.
I often tell people that San Bruno is the closest to a slice of
``American pie'' that you could ever experience.
The Glenview area where the explosion occurred is a hillside
neighborhood of nearly 400 homes built around the Crestmoor Canyon Open
Space and the little Glenview Tot Lot popular with local families with
small children.
The Night of September 9, 2010
The explosion occurred at dinnertime on a Thursday evening, just as
residents were settling in for another typical night at home and
perhaps to watch the first NFL game of the season. The neighborhood was
shaken out of its routine with a thunderous disturbance that some
mistook at first for an earthquake or an airplane crash. The deafening
sound of a fireball roaring 100-feet overhead and 2,000-degree flames
overtook the homes. Our residents ran for their lives with just the
clothes on their back.
As one resident said, ``My wife and children ran screaming barefoot
from the house . . . with a ball of fire behind them.''
What we now know is that a 30-inch Pacific Gas & Electric Co. high-
pressure natural gas transmission line running through the Glenview
neighborhood exploded. Police and fire first-responders from all over
our region converged on the area, only to discover that the explosion
had knocked out the main water line. I myself, who saw the first plumes
of smoke as I was driving home from a city reception, immediately drove
to the scene and then helplessly watched from afar as the gas line
spewed unabated for over an hour until it could be capped.
One observer later said, ``It looked like hell on Earth.''
The Response
More than 400 first-responders gallantly battled the six-alarm
inferno by dragging 3,000 feet of fire lines from an adjoining
neighborhood where our water department was able to locate water. The
heat was so intense it cracked the windshield of one fire truck, with
the wall of fire stopping veteran responders in their tracks. As the
fire spread rapidly into the adjacent Crestmoor Canyon, air strike
teams sprayed fire retardant foam to prevent the fire from engulfing
the canyon and the neighborhoods on the other side. Citizen-responders
drove those with second-degree burns to nearby hospitals so that
emergency crews could focus on the most severely burned and on
preventing more lives from being lost.
Within the first hour of the explosion being reported, we had set
up an incident command center at the site, evacuated nearly 1,000
residences and activated our emergency operations center at City Hall.
Our city has a staff of only about 75 police and fire officers.
Fortunately, we received a flood of assistance not only from our own
city workers, but our residents, San Mateo County and state emergency
officials, dozens of surrounding police and fire agencies, and relief
agencies.
We opened an evacuation center for displaced residents that night,
had a one-stop local assistance center up and running by the next day
and soon were inspecting the 377 impacted homes in the Glenview
neighborhood for damage. Some have said our response was a ``textbook''
example of how to handle a crisis of epic size like this--and I just
want to say that it was a team effort involving the tremendous
expertise and passion of so many people and agencies coming together to
support San Bruno.
We now know that the most devastating outcome of the explosion and
fire was the loss of seven lives that night:
A 44-year-old mother and her 13-year-old daughter, leaving
behind a father and another daughter;
An 81-year-old woman who was a long-time resident of the
Glenview neighborhood;
A 20-year-old woman who was visiting her boyfriend during
her short break from work and whose boyfriend remains
hospitalized with critical burn injuries;
And nearly an entire household with an 82-year-old
grandmother, a 50-year-old husband and 17-year-old son survived
by the mother and daughter of the household.
There were other awful consequences as well:
Sixty-six persons were reported burned and injured including
four firefighters who suffered smoke inhalation. At least 4
residents remain in critical condition today from their burns,
and they face long and difficult recoveries.
Thirty-seven homes were destroyed, 18 remain uninhabitable
and another 33 suffered less serious damage.
A large crater and dirt road now cut through Glenview, with
a fence surrounding the exposed pipeline. The sad rubble of a
children's playground and the dozens of charred homes and their
barren chimneys sit as a grim reminder of the tragedy we
experienced.
The Aftermath
The City moved quickly to help our displaced and frightened
residents, staffing a special 24-hour hotline and reaching out with
one-on-one assistance. Within 48 hours of the explosion, teams of
building inspectors had completed inspection of the 377 evacuated homes
in the 10-acre blast zone. That Saturday we convened a Town Hall
meeting that drew over 600 residents.
By Sunday morning, less than 72 hours from the explosion, we had
coordinated a neighborhood re-entry program that allowed 299 families
to return home. Over the next few days those who lost their homes were
allowed to return and sift through the rubble for any personal items
they could find. We dealt with the deluge of national and international
interest by setting up a 24-hour public information line and posting
daily updates on the city website.
The following days were surreal for our community--funerals and
vigils, church potlucks, fundraising events, press conferences and a
nationwide offering of condolences. People from as far away as Kansas
and Arkansas, Japan and Australia and others across the world contacted
us to lend their support. While this became an international news story
about pipeline safety, for us it always was about getting our hometown,
San Bruno, back on its feet.
Today our recovery efforts continue, with crews now clearing the
site of debris so that the rebuilding process can begin. We are having
regular meetings with those still displaced, and this week we are
beginning a new program to give even more targeted, one-on-one
assistance to those 55 families who will be displaced from their homes
and their neighborhood for some time to come.
We will leave it to the experts, including investigators from the
National Transportation Safety Board, to determine how and why this
happened. These investigations will be vital to ensuring that this type
of tragedy never occurs again and that no other community will be
subjected to the horror that we continue to experience.
For now we only know that this incident cost precious lives,
incinerated a neighborhood, caused over $50 million in physical damages
and counting, and forever changed San Bruno.
I have been asked countless times what the impact has been, and I
can only say that it has made a determined and resilient town even more
determined and more resilient. San Bruno will honor those who have lost
their lives, lost their homes and lost their way by rebuilding
Glenview. That's just how it is in San Bruno, California.
As one retired firefighter who lost his home in the blaze said,
``I'm going to be the first person to move back in, with the city help,
of course. The faster I can move forward, the less I think of the
past.''
And as our City Manager said, ``This incident will not define San
Bruno. San Bruno will define the incident and our future.''
Thank you for your time today, and thank you for your prayers for
San Bruno.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Mayor, I want to thank you very much.
You have my full support, as you have Senator Feinstein's, to
help you though this, meaning helping with that appeal and also
making sure this never happens again.
Mr. Ruane. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Boxer. And you have been an amazing leader, and you
are a great representative of San Bruno.
Mr. Ruane. Thank you.
Senator Boxer. All the qualities that that town has, you
have.
Mr. Ruane. As I said, it's a team effort.
Senator Boxer. Yes, but you exemplify it, and I thank you
very much.
Mr. Paul Clanon, Executive Director, California Public
Utilities Commission. Welcome, sir.
STATEMENT OF PAUL CLANON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION
Mr. Clanon. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
The now eight stories--the now eight people who died--two
of those were members of the PUC family, and I want to just
begin--as you know, Senator Boxer----
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Mr. Clanon.--you know their names--I just want to begin by
putting them in the record and saying a word about them.
Jacki Greig worked with us at the Commission. I've known
her for 21 years. She worked in natural gas issues. Jacki lived
with her two daughters, Janessa and Gaby, and her husband,
James. Right about in the center-left of the photo that you
have up there, I can see the spot where Jacki's house was. At
the time of the accident, at the time of the explosion, Jacki
and her youngest daughter, Janessa, were at home. Fortunately,
her husband, James, and their older daughter, Gaby, were at a
school event. Jacki and Janessa were killed. We got the news
during the morning of the day after, began our mourning process
and our grieving process at the same time as we were getting
our investigation into full swing.
That investigation had started, the night before. We had a
PUC--a Public Utilities Commission--engineer onsite within a
couple of hours of the explosion. Our function really at that
time is to start the preservation of evidence, to make contact
with the first responders, and to do the job that the National
Transportation Safety Board needs us to do until they can
arrive on scene.
Once the NTSB folks arrived on scene, very shortly after--
the next day--we joined in with their investigation. We are the
enforcement arm for the Federal regs at the State level. We
actually have incorporated those into the regs at the State
level, and we enforce them.
And, of course, we regulate Pacific Gas and Electric, in
the broadest sense, and are the ones who can help implement the
changes, Senator Boxer, that we, as a community--San Bruno and
the larger community in California--decide are the right ones
to do.
We didn't wait for the results of that investigation.
Beginning on Sunday, a directive--from the PUC president,
Michael Peevey, to me--began a process whereby I ordered PG&E,
the next day, to take several significant efforts. The first
one was to reduce the pressure in the pipeline system there by
80 percent. I give PG&E credit. PG&E had already lowered the
pressure. We directed them to lower it more. That made people
on the peninsula safer, until we could find out what happened.
We ordered them to assess all their facilities in the
immediate area. You know that it took until almost midnight to
turn off the distribution lines. I know we're going to talk
about automatic valves and remote valves. We ordered an
immediate assessment of the whole area around San Bruno, around
the accident site, to make sure that when people moved back
into that neighborhood, it was safe for them to be there. And
PG&E had already begun that assessment.
Look, nobody can be satisfied with the efforts that had
happened before September 9. We're all going to talk about the
inspections that occurred, and the State oversight that
occurred, and the stringent Federal regulations. Something went
wrong, and we were all doing our jobs, and the explosion
happened anyway. That means that something else has to happen.
Starting on Monday, we directed PG&E--and PG&E has now
begun this--an accelerated leak survey of its whole
transmission network, not waiting for the schedule that had
been laid out, which is a good schedule, and had always seemed
adequate until September 9--but an accelerated leak survey and
a plan, that's due in to the Commission soon now, for them to
do an indepth safety survey of their entire natural gas
system--not just transmission, but also distribution. We're not
waiting for the results of anything. We're getting PG&E, the
good folks at PG&E who know how to operate that system, out
there to do a full safety survey of the system. And not just
PG&E; we've also started discussions with the other two large
natural gas utilities in California, as you well know, Senator
Boxer.
We also immediately understood the role of the manual
valves in continuing the damage that happened after the
explosion. I don't think we're going to know, until the
National Transportation Safety Board's investigation is
complete, exactly how much extra damage the fact that it took
so long for the gas to be fully turned off caused. But,
clearly, it caused more damage. So, also, on the Monday after
the Thursday accident, we directed PG&E to do an assessment of
its system--of its transmission system--and tell us where
automatic valves, where remote valves--remotely operable valves
by their controllers--makes sense. We're not waiting for the
results of the investigation for things that seem clearly
within the realm of things that we're going to want to order.
I said that the explosion's happening means that all the
work that we did leading up to September 9 was inadequate. I
include the PUC in that. The Public Utilities Commission needs
to look at itself, at its oversight of PG&E and the other gas
utilities--in the design and maintenance, in the siting, in the
inspections, in the renovations of the natural gas pipeline
systems--to make sure that our regulation is doing what we're
supposed to do for the people of California, which is: keep
them safe. It's hard to look at yourself in the mirror, but
that's what we're going to do. And to help us do that, the PUC,
last Thursday, now 2 weeks after the accident, established an
independent review panel. It's going to be made up of people
from outside the PUC world, looking hard at what happened, why
it happened, making recommendations so that it doesn't happen
again, both within the realm of PG&E actions and management and
systems, and Public Utilities Commission regulation. We're
going to look at ourselves hard in the mirror, because what
we're about is preventing pictures like that from going up in
Senate hearing rooms ever again.
I'm just going to close. I know we'll get to discussions. I
want to say that you've got written testimony from the PUC.
It's actually in the name of Rich Clark, who's here with me.
Rich is the Director of the Relevant Division at the PUC that
oversees safety, and he has been on the front lines of the
investigation from right near the beginning. I want to
acknowledge that he's here, and he may help us with the
discussion later.
I'll just close, Senator, by saying, we need to make some
changes together at the State level, possibly at the Federal
level. We need to do that based on good information. We need
not to rush into things that don't make sense. But, we clearly
need to make some changes.
And I look forward to your questions and to the discussion.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Clanon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul Clanon, Executive Director,
California Public Utilities Commission
Thank you, Chairman Lautenberg and Ranking Member Thune, for the
opportunity to testify before you and the other Committee Members about
the investigation of the September 9, 2010 explosion and fire that
occurred on Pacific Gas and Electric's (PG&E) natural gas transmission
pipeline explosion in San Bruno, California, the implications of that
explosion and fire, current pipeline safety legislative efforts and how
improvements to pipeline safety can be made to decrease the risk of
accidents. You've asked that I focus my testimony on these issues,
highlighting matters in which I have particular expertise and bringing
before the Committee any other related matters that the California
Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and I wish to bring to your
attention.
Lastly, I'd like to thank all of the members of the Committee, the
staff and the members of the public who have expressed their
condolences to the families and friends of all of the victims of the
San Bruno tragedy, including CPUC employee, Jacki Greig and her 13-
year-old daughter, Janessa--both of whom perished in the September 9th
conflagration.
Along with me today is Richard Clark, the Director of the Consumer
Protection and Safety Division of the California Public Utilities
Commission, who has the responsibility of influencing and implementing
the Commission's consumer protection and safety policies relative to
California's electric system, natural gas system, communications
system, freight rail system, inter-city passenger rail system, commuter
rail system, rail transit systems, plus household goods carriers and
passenger carriers. He has also been appointed to Secretary LaHood's
Transit Rail Advisory Committee on Safety (TRACS).
The Investigation
As you know, the NTSB has asserted primacy in this investigation
and, as a Party to that investigation, I am limited in what I can
discuss about that investigation. What I can say is as follows: The
explosion happened at approximately 6:15 p.m. at milepost 39.33 on
PG&E's intrastate natural gas transmission Line 132, a line which is
mostly constructed of 30-inch steel pipe that was installed in 1948.
Line 132 is one of three intrastate transmission lines that run from
Milpitas, California north along the Peninsula and terminate in San
Francisco. Line 132 transitions to 24-inch diameter pipe just north of
the section that failed in San Bruno. The section of the 30-inch pipe
that failed was installed in 1956. The explosion that occurred ripped a
28-foot section from the 1956 vintage pipe and propelled it some 100
feet away from the location where it was previously buried
approximately 4 feet beneath an asphalt paved street. A huge fire
ensued, and it took PG&E approximately 1 hour and 48 minutes to close
the manual valves located approximately one mile and one and one-half
miles to the north and south of the ruptured section of pipe. It has
not yet been determined how long it took for the fire to burn all of
the residual gas left in the then closed off sections of Line 132. The
explosion and fire killed 7 people, injured 66 people, destroyed 34
homes, caused major damages to 3 homes, moderate damage to 16 homes and
minor damage to 32 homes. The failed section of pipe has been
transported to the NTSB lab here in Washington, D.C., where it will
undergo metallurgical testing later this week. A CPUC utility safety
engineer was on-site the evening of the explosion, and an investigative
team was present throughout, and integrally involved in the NTSB's
week-long on-site investigation. We continue to participate fully in
the NTSB's investigation, and will be present during the metallurgical
testing. We are also conducting a separate and parallel investigation,
and will issue our own report after the NTSB issues its report in
approximately 12-15 months.
On Monday, September 12, 2010 and Tuesday, September 13, 2010, CPUC
President Michael Peevey, acting through me, the CPUC's Executive
Director, Paul Clanon, called for the creation of an expert independent
review panel and directed Pacific Gas and Electric to:
1. Reduce the operating pressure on PG&E's Line 132 to a
pressure level of 20 percent below the operating pressure at
the time of the failure and retain that lower pressure level
until such time as the Commission allows PG&E to return to Line
132's normal operating pressure;
2. Ensure that there are no additional risks to the residents
of San Bruno by conducting an integrity assessment of all gas
facilities in the impacted area;
3. Conduct an accelerated leak survey of all transmission lines
in PG&E's service territory, giving priority to segments in
class 3 and class 4 locations, and take corrective action as
required and report the results to the CPUC on or before
October 12, 2010;
4. Evaluate records of customer leak-complaint response times
and response effectiveness system-wide, take immediate
mitigation measures if deficiencies are found, and report the
results to the CPUC;
5. Prepare a plan for a complete safety inspection of PG&E's
entire natural gas transmission pipeline system and provide the
plan to CPUC no later than September 23, 2010;
6. Make all employees and contractors available for interviews
with Federal and state investigators, including if requested,
examinations under oath;
7. Preserve all records related to the incident, including work
at the Milpitas Terminal during the month of September 2010;
8. Preserve all records related to the maintenance or
modification of Line 132 by PG&E and/or its contractors
performed within the City of San Bruno over the past ten (10)
years;
9. Review the classification of natural gas transmission lines
and determine if the classification has changed since the
initial designation and report the results to the Executive
Director;
10. Investigate and report to the Executive Director PG&E's
forecasted versus actual levels of spending on pipeline safety
and pipeline replacements from 2005 to the present; and
11. Conduct a review of all gas transmission line valve
locations in order to determine locations where it would be
prudent to replace manually operated valves with automated
valves and report the results to the CPUC.
On September 23, 2010, in Resolution Number L-403 (copy attached)
the Commission voted unanimously to open a fact-finding investigation,
to establish an independent review panel of experts to assist in the
fact-finding investigation, and to ratify and approve the September
13th mandates of the Executive Director.
The charter for the Independent Review Panel is as follows:
The investigation shall include a technical assessment of the
events and their root causes, and recommendations for action by
the Commission to best ensure such an accident is not repeated
elsewhere. The recommendations may include changes to design,
construction, operation, maintenance, and replacement of
natural gas facilities, management practices at PG&E in the
areas of pipeline integrity and public safety, regulatory
changes by the Commission itself, statutory changes to be
recommended by the Commission, and other recommendations deemed
appropriate by the Panel. The latter shall include examining
whether there may be systemic management problems at the
utility and whether greater resources are needed to achieve
fundamental infrastructure improvements.
Specific Questions to Guide the Fact-Finding Investigation:
What happened on September 9, 2010?
What are the root causes of the incident?
Was the accident indicative of broader management challenges
and problems at PG&E in discharging its obligations in the area
of public safety?
Are the Commission's current permitting, inspection,
ratemaking, and enforcement procedures as applied to natural
gas transmission lines adequate?
What corrective actions should the Commission take
immediately?
What additional corrective actions should the Commission
take?
What is the public's right to information concerning the
location of natural gas transmission and distribution
facilities in populated areas?
The Implications of the Pipeline Failure, Explosion and Fire and How
Improvements to Pipeline Safety Can Be Made to Decrease the
Risk of Accidents
While all of the implications of the explosion and fire will not be
known until the investigation is completed, the CPUC and the public
cannot wait until then to begin improving the safety of the state's
122,217 miles of hazardous liquid, natural gas transmission and natural
gas distribution pipelines.
The PG&E/ San Bruno explosion and fire, may be the largest
transmission explosion in an urban/suburban setting in U.S. history. It
is certainly the most catastrophic in California history. The CPUC,
working independently, with its Independent Panel of Experts, with the
NTSB, and with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA), will examine the physics of the September 9th
pipeline failure. Among other things, we will also examine, make
recommendations, issue directives and take enforcement actions when
necessary with respect to:
1. The safety culture of PG&E and the other utilities operating
natural gas transmission and distribution pipelines in
California;
2. The natural gas utilities' plans for the replacement of
manual shut off valves with automatic and/or remotely
controlled valves;
3. The natural gas utilities' use of ``smart pigs'' and other
methods of in-line corrosion and damage assessment, the use of
ultrasonic testing and other methods of external corrosion and
damage assessment, and the development of new technologies that
will improve the ability of pipeline owners to identify
internal and external corrosion and other pipeline integrity
issues before they result in failures;
4. Strengthening the requirements of the natural gas
transmission and distribution pipeline integrity management
programs required by state and Federal laws, and developing an
oversight program which more thoroughly examines the utilities'
risk management decisionmaking processes;
5. Requiring more regular reporting of utilities' planned and
actual expenditures on pipeline maintenance and replacement
projects.
The CPUC views this event as a system accident (an accident that
has had serious consequences and has caused a major system disruption
for natural gas transmission operators, legislators, regulators and the
general public). Obviously, a system accident in an industry with a
significantly safe operating record is cause for us taking a new look
at the elements of the safety system and fixing those elements which
failed. This is why the CPUC has convened an independent panel of
experts to review all elements of the natural gas safety system that
exists at the Federal level and in California and make recommendations
for improvements to that system. I personally believe that all those
who seek an improvement in pipeline safety would do well to pay close
attention to the significant body of work developed by numerous
scholars and practitioners in developing a systems approach to safety
and that done in developing high reliability operations.
I want to thank the Committee for inviting me to testify today. I
look forward to answering your questions.
______
Public Utilities Commission of the State of California--
Legal Division
San Francisco, CA, September 23, 2010
Resolution No. L-403
Resolution
Directives of the California Public Utilities Commission pursuant
to California Constitution, Article 12, Sections 1-6, Public Utilities
Code Sections 315, 451, 701, and 702, to investigate the facts
surrounding the explosion and fire of Pacific Gas and Electric
Company's natural gas transmission line no. 132, to make an immediate
assessment of the safety of PG&E's other gas transmission lines, to
establish an independent review panel to assist in the fact-finding
investigation of the San Bruno explosion and the overall safety of
PG&E's gas transmission lines in California, to ratify the mandatory
instructions of the executive director's previous emergency mandates to
investigate the San Bruno incident (including, reduction of pressure in
line 132, required inspections and, surveys, and the preparation of
plans), to make all of the utility's employees and contractors
available for fact-finding investigatory interviews, and to preserve
accident records and general records regarding the safety and integrity
of line 132.
Summary
This Resolution is issued to ensure the immediate safety of the
residents of the City of San Bruno and the people of California in
connection with the operation of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company
(``PG&E'') natural gas transmission system. The orders within this
Resolution provide, among other things, for an investigation into the
explosion of PG&E's natural gas transmission line 132 in the City of
San Bruno on the evening of September 9, 2010 (``San Bruno
explosion''), and into the general safety risks associated with PG&E's
other gas transmission lines in the State. This investigation will be
limited to fact-finding only. Adjudicatory or rulemaking proceedings
may follow but are not part of the ordered investigation in this
Resolution. The Resolution also creates an Independent Review Panel of
experts (``Independent Review Panel'' or ``Panel'') to gather facts,
review these facts and make recommendations to the Commission for the
improvement of the safe management of PG&E's natural gas transmission
lines. The costs of the Panel will be funded by PG&E. A memorandum
account is authorized to track the costs of the Panel for cost recovery
purposes, but the Commission defers any decision on the allocation of
such costs between PG&E's shareholders and customers. The President of
the Commission is authorized to select the members of the Panel,
subject to confirmation by a vote of the Commission.
Background
At approximately 6:15 in the evening of September 9, 2010, a
portion of PG&E's natural gas pipeline 132 ruptured and exploded in the
City of San Bruno near Skyline Boulevard, killing seven residents and
injuring numerous others, some of them severely. The San Bruno
explosion resulted in a large fireball which ultimately destroyed 37
homes. It took PG&E approximately one and a half hours to shut off the
gas flow on the ruptured line, by closing two manually operated
pipeline valves--one of them a mile away from the rupture, and the
other one and a half miles away. The San Bruno explosion may be the
largest transmission pipeline explosion in an urban/suburban setting in
U.S. history, certainly the most catastrophic in California history.
Jurisdiction and Authority
The Commission issues the directives in this Resolution pursuant to
its plenary and broad powers under, inter alia, the California
Constitution and the Public Utilities Code section 451, which mandates
the following: ``Every public utility shall furnish and maintain such
adequate, efficient, just, and reasonable service, instrumentalities,
equipment, and facilities . . . as are necessary to promote the safety,
health, comfort, and convenience of its patrons, employees, and the
public.'' (Pub. Util. Code, Sec. Sec. 451.) In our broad grant of
jurisdiction over public utilities in California, we are authorized to
``do all things, whether specifically designated in . . . [the Public
Utilities Code] or in addition thereto, which are necessary and
convenient'' to our regulation of public utilities, including, though
not limited to, adopting necessary rules and requirements in
furtherance of our constitutional and statutory duties to regulate and
oversee public utilities operating in California. (Pub. Util. Code,
Sec. 701.) This Commission has comprehensive jurisdiction over
questions of public health and safety arising from utility operations.
(San Diego Gas & Electric v. Superior Court (``Covalt'') (1996) 13
Cal.4th 893, 923-924.) Our jurisdiction to regulate these entities is
set forth in the California Constitution and in the Public Utilities
Code. (Cal. Const., art. XII, Sec. Sec. 1-6; see generally, Pub. Util.
Code, Sec. Sec. 216, 701, 768, 1001.) Public utilities are required to
``obey and comply with every order, decision, direction, or rule made
or prescribed by the Commission. . . .'' (Pub. Util. Code, Sec. 702;
see also, Pub. Util. Code, Sec. Sec. 761, 762, 767.5, 768, 770.)
Under Federal statutes, the Commission is certificated by the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (``PHMSA'') in
the U.S. Department of Transportation to adopt the Federal pipeline
safety standards, to enforce those standards, order the preservation
and maintenance of records, and enforce these powers through injunctive
relief. (See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60105, subds. (b)(1) through (b)(7)).
Ratification and Approval of the Mandates of the Executive Director
Because of this unforeseen emergency, the Commission's Executive
Director ordered PG&E to perform certain duties in a letter dated
September 13, 2010. By this Resolution, the Commission hereby approves
those mandates. Specifically, those mandates included the following:
1. Reduce the operating pressure on PG&E's Line 132 to a
pressure level of 20 percent below the operating pressure at
the time of the failure and retain that lower pressure level
until such time as the Commission allows PG&E to return to Line
132's normal operating pressure;
2. Ensure that there are no additional risks to the residents
of San Bruno by conducting an integrity assessment of all gas
facilities in the impacted area;
3. Conduct an accelerated leak survey of all transmission lines
in PG&E's service territory, giving priority to segments in
class 3 and class 4 locations, within one month of the date of
this letter and take corrective action as required and report
the results to the Executive Director on or before October 12,
2010;
4. Evaluate records of customer leak-complaint response times
and response effectiveness system-wide, take immediate
mitigation measures if deficiencies are found, and report the
results to the Executive Director;
5. Prepare a plan for a complete safety inspection of PG&E's
entire natural gas transmission pipeline system and provide the
plan to me no later than September 23, 2010;
6. Make all employees and contractors available for interviews
with Federal and state investigators, including if requested,
examinations under oath;
7. Preserve all records related to the incident, including work
at the Milpitas Terminal during the month of September 2010;
8. Preserve all records related to the maintenance or
modification of Line 132 by PG&E and/or its contractors
performed within the City of San Bruno over the past ten (10)
years;
9. Review the classification of natural gas transmission lines
and determine if the classification has changed since the
initial designation and report the results to the Executive
Director;
10. Investigate and report to the Executive Director PG&E's
forecasted versus actual levels of spending on pipeline safety
and pipeline replacements from 2005 to the present; and
11. Conduct a review of all gas transmission line valve
locations in order to determine locations where it would be
prudent to replace manually operated valves with automated
valves and report the results to the Executive Director.
Mandate #1, above, which required PG&E to reduce the operating
pressure on PG&E's Line 132 to a pressure level of 20 percent below the
operating pressure at the time of the pipeline rupture and to retain
that lower pressure level until such time as the Commission allows PG&E
to return Line 132 to a higher operating pressure, is consistent with
PHMSA's Corrective Action Orders in similar emergency situations,
including the following recent example:
``Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60112, I hereby order BP to take
the following corrective actions . . . The terms of the restart
plan must include provisions for . . . Reducing the MOP of the
Affected Pipeline Facility to 80 percent of the highest
operating pressure experienced at the White Oak Station (MP 0)
and Crete Station (MP 19.95) in the 60 days prior to August 17,
2010.''
In the Matter of BP Pipelines (North America), Inc., Respondent,
(Aug. 26, 2010) CPF No. 3-2010-5010H, at p. 4; see also Evaluation of
the Effectiveness of a 20% Pressure Reduction After a Pipeline Failure
(May 1997) Report No. DTRS56-96-C-0002-001, U.S. Department of
Transportation.
With respect to mandates #7 and #8, PG&E is required to maintain
its gas transmission pipeline records and make them available for
review under 49 CFR Part 192.947.
In this Resolution, the Commission approves the foregoing mandates
of the Executive Director in his letter to PG&E of September 13, 2010,
and adopt these mandates in this Resolution, but with minor
modifications as set forth in the Ordering Paragraphs below.
Waiver of Comment Period
The tragic San Bruno explosion is an unforeseen emergency of local
and statewide importance requiring immediate action by the Commission.
The normal 30-day comment period for the issuance of an order or
resolution may be waived in circumstances such as these. (Pub. Util.
Code Sec. Sec. 311, subds. (d) and (g)(2); see also Resolution E-3731,
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (April 3, 2001) 2001 Cal. PUC LEXIS
659.) The Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure also permit such
a waiver.\1\
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\1\ ``In an unforeseen emergency situation, the Commission may
reduce or waive the period for public review and comment on proposed
decision, draft resolutions, and alternates.'' ``Unforeseen emergency
situation'' means a matter that requires action or a decision by the
Commission more quickly than would be permitted if advance publication
were, made on the regular meeting agenda. Examples include, but ``are
not limited to . . . [a]ctivities that severely impair or threaten to
severely impair[,] public health or safety[,] . . . [c]rippling
disasters that severely impair public health or safety[,] . . .
[u]nusual matters that cannot be disposed of by normal procedures if
the duties of the Commission are to be fulfilled.'' (Cal. Code of
Regs., tit. 20, Sec. 14.6 subds. (1), (2) and (8).)
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Establishment of an Independent Review Panel to Assist in the Fact-
Finding Investigation
The Commission will establish, within 60 days of the date of this
Resolution, an Independent Review Panel of experts to gather facts and
make recommendations based on the facts to the Commission as to whether
there is a need for the general improvement of the safety of PG&E's
natural gas transmission lines, and if so, how these improvements
should be made. The Panel will be retained by the Commission and funded
by PG&E. The President of the Commission will select the experts on the
Panel. The Commission establishes this Panel pursuant to its powers
under Public Utilities Code sections 451, 701 and 702. The Charter of
the Panel is appended to this Resolution and incorporated herein by
reference.
PG&E shall provide full cooperation to Commission staff and the
Panel during the investigation into the cause of the San Bruno
explosion and the safety of PG&E's gas transmission pipelines in
general. In this regard, upon request, PG&E shall provide Commission
staff and/or the Panel: (i) any factual or physical evidence under the
utility or utility agent's physical control, custody, or possession
related to the San Bruno explosion; (ii) the name and contact
information of any known percipient witness; (iii) any employee or
agent of PG&E, who is a percipient witness or expert witness; the name
and contact information of any person or entity that has taken
possession of any physical evidence removed from the site of the San
Bruno explosion; (iv) any and all documents under the utility's control
that contain facts related to the San Bruno explosion; any additional
information deemed relevant and necessary by Commission staff and/or
the Panel to the investigation of the San Bruno explosion; and (v) any
and all information related to the safety and integrity of PG&E's gas
transmission pipelines. In obtaining information from PG&E and other
sources, the Panel shall coordinate as necessary with Commission staff
as their respective investigations proceed.
The Commission observes that Public Utilities Code sections 311,
313, and 314, authorize each of the Commissioners, the Executive
Director, the Assistant Executive Directors and the Administrative Law
Judges to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of witnesses and
production of documents for examinations under oath even prior to the
initiation of formal proceedings, which is similar to the investigatory
authority, prior to hearings under Government Code sections 11180-
11191. In this regard, even without the compulsion of a subpoena, the
Commission hereby confirms that under Public Utilities Code
Sec. Sec. 313, 314, 314.5, 315, 581, 582, 584, 701, 702, 771, 1794, and
1795, the Commission staff may obtain information from utilities and is
already deemed to have the general investigatory authority of the
Commission. Because the Commission staff already has the authority,
there is no need to grant this authority to Commission staff. However,
inasmuch as the Panel is newly established, it is necessary that the
Commission confer the same investigatory authority as the Commission
staff already possesses to the Panel, for purposes of the fact-finding
investigation of the San Bruno explosion and the safety of PG&E's
natural gas transmission pipelines.
The Panel, like the Commission staff, may review documents that are
marked ``Confidential under Sec. 583'' subject to the provisions of
Public Utilities Code section 583. This statute requires such documents
to be kept confidential (unless the utility waives the confidentiality
requirement, the Commission orders the release, or a Commissioner
orders release in the course of a proceeding). However, in order to
ensure that documents are not withheld from the public without legally
valid justification, we will require that in order for PG&E to maintain
the confidentiality of documents produced to the Commission in this
pre-adjudicatory investigation, PG&E must comply with the following
procedures: (1) each page of the confidential documents must be marked
``Confidential under Sec. 583''; (2) for each document marked
``Confidential under Sec. 583,'' the utility must provide a
justification for treating it confidentially; and (3) any document
designated for protection as confidential must not already be available
to the public. In addition, unless or until a formal proceeding is
initiated, the Commission authorizes the Commission's President to act
on behalf of the Commission to release for public inspection documents
marked by PG&E as ``Confidential under Sec. 583,'' if he finds that
PG&E has not sufficiently justified its confidentiality or that the
public interest warrants its release to the public.
Since we are in a fact-finding stage and are not interested in the
thoughts, opinions or communications of PG&E's attorneys, we expect
that PG&E will not withhold facts or expert opinions under the guise of
attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine. Indeed, public
utilities in California are statutorily required to report any facts or
expert opinions as to the cause of accidents to the Commission under
the Public Utilities Code section 315.\2\ Similarly, we put PG&E on
notice that it must promptly make available its employees and
independent contractors for interviews requested by Federal
investigators (e.g., the National Transportation Safety Board
(``NTSB'')) and state investigators (e.g., Commission staff or the
Panel), including examinations under oath pursuant to Public Utilities
Code section 314. Under analogous statutory provisions, such as
Government Code sections 11180-11191, courts have recognized the
differences between examinations under oath, which are conducted prior
to formal hearings, and depositions. (See, e.g., People v. West Coast
Shows, Inc. (1970) 10 Cal. App. 3d 462, 470.) Moreover, as the U.S.
Supreme Court explained in Hannah v. Larche (1960) 363 U.S. 420, 446,
``[w]hen agencies are conducting nonadjudicative, fact-finding
investigations, rights such as appraisal, confrontation, and cross-
examination generally do not obtain. While the person summoned may have
the advice of counsel, counsel may not, as a matter of right, otherwise
participate in the investigation.'' The Supreme Court further
recognized that the lack of counsel participation or other parties was
necessary for agencies to conduct efficient investigations, and that
this would not violate the due process rights of a party, because the
party, if ultimately charged, would be accorded all of the traditional
judicial safeguards at a subsequent adjudicative hearing. (Id.) For all
of these reasons, the Commission interprets very broadly the
investigatory authority of Commission staff, and the investigatory
authority granted to the Panel.
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\2\ It is also the Commission's understanding that although the
utilities have an attorney-client privilege, that privilege does not
extend to the underlying facts as they have been communicated to the
attorney. (See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (2000) 22
Cal.4th 201, 210; see also Martin v. Workers Compensation Appeals Board
(1997) 59 Cal. App. 4th 333,345.) Moreover, it is not clear that the
work product doctrine, Code of Civil Procedure section 2018.030, is
applicable to pre-adjudicatory administrative fact-finding. However to
the extent it does apply, except for the attorney's own thoughts and
mental impressions, the work product doctrine is considered a qualified
privilege. We find that the public interest in ensuring the safety of
California citizens from potential disasters, such as the San Bruno
Explosion, clearly outweighs PG&E's need for its experts' opinion to be
withheld from the Commission. (See Kizer v. Sulnick (1988) 202
Cal.App.3d 437, 441 [``Appellant cannot fulfill his statutory duty to
investigate the possible health hazards posed by the waste facility
without access to all relevant information. . . .''].)
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Findings of Fact
1. The Commission finds that the San Bruno explosion of September
9, 2010, is an ``unforeseen emergency'' under Public Utilities Code
sections 311(d) and 311(g)(2).
2. The mandates issued by the Commission's Executive Director set
forth in his letter to PG&E dated September 13, 2010, were necessary to
immediately address the unforeseen emergency of the San Bruno
explosion.
3. The Commission finds that the normal 30-day comment period for
the issuance of an order or resolution should be waived. (Pub. Util.
Code Sec. 311(d) and 311(g)(2).)
4. The Commission finds that the establishment of an Independent
Review Panel is reasonable and necessary under these emergency
circumstances, and that the authority to select the members of such
Panel shall be exercised by the President of the Commission, subject to
confirmation by a vote of the Commission.
5. The Commission finds that it is reasonable and necessary for the
expenses of the Panel to be paid by PG&E. Issues regarding the
allocation of the costs and expenses of the Panel between shareholders
and customers shall be determined in a later proceeding. PG&E is
instructed to pay the costs and expenses, and record those costs and
expenses in a memorandum account.
6. The Commission finds that the Charter of the Panel, appended
hereto, is reasonable and appropriate.
7. The Commission finds that it is necessary for the Panel to have
access to information involving the investigation of the San Bruno
explosion and the safety and integrity of PG&E's natural gas
transmission pipelines, and such access should be pursuant to Public
Utilities Code sections 313, 314, 314.5, 315, 581, 582, 584, 701, 702,
771, and 1795.
8. In order to ensure that documents are not withheld from the
public without legally valid justification during this pre-adjudicatory
investigation, PG&E must comply with the following procedures: (1) each
page of the confidential documents must be marked ``Confidential under
Sec. 583''; (2) for each document marked ``Confidential under
Sec. 583,'' the utility must provide a justification for treating it
confidentially; and (3) any document designated for protection as
confidential must not already be available to the public.
9. The Commission finds that it is reasonable and necessary under
these emergency circumstances that the Commission authorize the
Commission's President to act on behalf of the Commission to release
for public inspection documents marked ``Confidential under Sec. 583''
if he finds that PG&E has not sufficiently justified its assertion of
confidentiality or that the public release of such documents is in the
public interest.
Conclusions of Law
1. The San Bruno explosion is an ``unforeseen emergency'' under
Public Utilities Code sections 311(d) and 311(g)(2).
2. The mandates issued by the Commission's Executive Director in
his letter to PG&E dated September 13, 2010, were reasonable and
necessary to immediately address the unforeseen emergency of the San
Bruno explosion.
3. The Commission's ratification of the mandates set forth in the
Executive Director's letter to PG&E of September 13, 2010, is a
reasonable, necessary and appropriate means of immediately addressing
the unforeseen emergency of the San Bruno explosion.
4. It is reasonable and necessary to waive the normal 30-day
comment period for the issuance of this Resolution pursuant to Public
Utilities Code sections 311(d) and 311(g)(2).
5. It is reasonable and necessary to establish an Independent
Review Panel of experts to gather facts regarding the San Bruno
explosion and PG&E's natural gas transmission pipeline system, and to
evaluate these facts and make recommendations regarding the overall
safety of PG&E's transmission pipelines in order to address this
unforeseen emergency.
6. It is reasonable and necessary that the President of the
Commission select the members of the Panel, under these emergency
circumstances, subject to confirmation by a vote of the Commission.
7. It is reasonable and necessary that PG&E fund the costs and
expenses of the Panel because of these emergency circumstances. PG&E is
instructed to pay the costs and expenses and to record those costs and
expenses in a memorandum account. Issues regarding the allocation of
costs and expenses of the Panel between shareholders and customers
shall be determined later.
8. The Charter of the Panel, appended hereto, is reasonable and
appropriate under these emergency circumstances.
9. The Panel is given the same investigatory authority as the
Commission staff has under the Public Utilities Code. Access by the
Panel to information shall be limited to the investigation of the San
Bruno explosion and the safety and integrity of PG&E's natural gas
transmission pipelines.
10. In this fact-finding and investigatory process, in order for
PG&E to maintain the confidentiality of documents produced to the
Commission in this pre-adjudicatory investigation, PG&E must comply
with the following procedures: (1) each page of the confidential
documents must be marked ``Confidential under Sec. 583;'' (2) for each
document marked ``Confidential under Sec. 583,'' the utility must
provide a justification for such confidential treatment; and (3) any
document designated by PG&E for protection as confidential must not
already be available to the public.
11. It is reasonable and necessary under these emergency
circumstances to authorize the Commission's President to act on behalf
of the Commission and to release to the public documents PG&E has
marked ``Confidential under Sec. 583'' if he finds that PG&E has not
sufficiently justified its assertion of confidentiality or that the
public release of such documents is in the public interest. This
authorization will remain in effect until a formal proceeding is
initiated.
12. It is in the best interests of this investigation that PG&E
make PG&E employees or independent contractors available for
examinations under oath by the Commission staff or by the Panel.
13. Examination under oath prior to adjudicatory hearings are
different from depositions and, for purposes of efficiency in
conducting the Commission's investigation, the participation of counsel
for the witness or other parties shall not be allowed at this early
stage of investigation.
Order
1. The normal 30-day comment period for the issuance of the
Executive Director's letter to PG&E of September 13, 2010, and this
Resolution shall be waived pursuant to Public Utilities Code sections
311(d) and 311(g)(2), Resolution E-3731, Pacific Gas and Electric
Company (April 3, 2001) 2001 Cal. PUC LEXIS 659, and Cal. Code of
Regs., tit. 20, Sec. Sec. 14.6 subd. (1), (2) and (8).
2. In response to this unforeseen emergency, an Independent Review
Panel shall be established to gather information regarding the San
Bruno explosion and the overall safety of PG&E's natural gas
transmission pipelines, and to review and evaluate such information, as
well as make recommendations to the Commission.
3. The President of the Commission shall select the members of the
Panel, subject to confirmation by a vote of the Commission. The Panel
shall operate under the Charter appended to this Resolution.
4. PG&E shall pay for the costs and expenses of the Panel and shall
establish a memorandum account to record those costs and expenses.
5. PG&E shall provide cooperation to Commission staff and the Panel
during the investigation into the cause of the San Bruno Explosion and
safety of PG&E's transmission lines in general. In this regard, upon
request, PG&E shall provide Commission staff and/or the Panel: (i) any
factual or physical evidence under the utility or utility agent's
physical control, custody, or possession related to the San Bruno
Explosion; (ii) the name and contact information of any known
percipient witness; (iii) the name and contact information of any
employee or agent of PG&E who is a percipient witness or an expert
witness; (iv) the name and contact information of any person or entity
that has taken possession of any physical evidence removed from the
site of the San Bruno explosion; (v) any and all documents under the
utility's control that contain facts related to the San Bruno
explosion, and (vi) any and all information related to the safety and
integrity of PG&E's gas transmission pipelines.
6. For the limited purpose of this investigation in the San Bruno
explosion and the general safety and integrity of PG&E's natural gas
transmission pipelines, the Commission authorizes the Panel to have the
same investigatory authority and access to information as the
Commission staff possesses under Public Utilities Code sections 313,
314, 314.5, 315, 581, 582, 584, 701, 702, 771, 1794, and 1795.
7. In order to maintain the confidentiality of documents produced
to the Commission in this pre-adjudicatory investigation, PG&E shall
comply with the following procedures: (1) each page of the confidential
documents must be marked ``Confidential under Sec. 583''; (2) for each
document marked ``Confidential under Sec. 583,'' the utility must
provide a justification for its confidential treatment; and (3) any
document designated by PG&E for protection as confidential must not
already be available to the public.
8. The Commission authorizes the Commission's President to act on
behalf of the Commission to determine whether documents that PG&E has
marked ``Confidential under Sec. 583'' shall be released to the public.
The President may release such a document if he finds that PG&E has not
sufficiently justified its assertion of confidentiality or that its
public release is in the public interest.
9. PG&E shall make available for examinations under oath by the
Commission staff or by the Panel, PG&E employees or independent
contractors. Neither PG&E's counsel, nor any other person other than
the person being examined, may ``participate'' in the examination under
oath.
10. PG&E shall reduce the operating pressure on PG&E's Line 132 to
a pressure level of 20 percent below the operating pressure at the time
of the failure and retain that lower pressure level until such time as
the Commission allows PG&E to increase the pressure in Line 132.
11. PG&E shall ensure that there are no additional risks to the
residents of the City of San Bruno by conducting an integrity
assessment of all gas facilities in the impacted area.
12. PG&E shall conduct an accelerated leak survey of all natural
gas transmission pipelines, giving priority to segments in class 3 and
class 4 locations, within one month of the date of this letter and take
corrective action as required and report the results to the
Commission's Executive Director on or before October 12, 2010.
13. PG&E shall evaluate records of customer natural gas leak-
complaint response times and response effectiveness system-wide, take
immediate mitigation measures if deficiencies are found, and report the
results to the Executive Director within ten (10) days of the date of
this Resolution.
14. PG&E shall prepare a plan for a complete safety inspection of
PG&E's entire natural gas transmission pipeline system and provide the
plan to the Executive Director immediately.
15. PG&E shall make all employees and independent contractors who
performed work on Line 132 prior to the San Bruno explosion available
for interviews with Federal and state investigators, including if
requested, examinations under oath.
16. PG&E shall preserve all records related to the San Bruno
explosion, including work at the Milpitas Terminal during the months of
August and September 2010.
17. PG&E shall preserve all records related to the inspection,
maintenance or modification of Line 132 by PG&E and/or its contractors
performed within the City of San Bruno over the past ten (10) years.
18. PG&E shall review the classification of its natural gas
transmission pipelines and determine if those classifications have
changed since the initial designation.
19. PG&E shall report the results of its review of the
classification of its natural gas transmission lines and any subsequent
changes to those classifications since PG&E's initial designation to
the Executive Director within ten (10) days of the date of this
Resolution.
20. PG&E shall investigate and report to the Commission PG&E's
forecasted versus actual levels of spending on pipeline safety and
pipeline replacements from 2003 to the present within ten (10) days of
the date of this Resolution.
21. PG&E shall conduct a review of all natural gas transmission
line valve locations in order to determine locations where it would be
prudent to replace manually operated valves with remotely operated or
automated valves and shall report its results to the Commission within
thirty (30) days of the issuance date of this Resolution.
22. In all other respects, PG&E shall fully cooperate with the
Commission's investigation into the San Bruno explosion, including a
general investigation into the safety and integrity of PG&E's gas
transmission lines, and respond expeditiously to the Commission's
request for information.
This Order is effective today.
I certify that this Resolution was adopted by the Public Utilities
Commission at its regular meeting of September 23, 2010. The following
Commissioners approved it:
Paul Clanon,
Executive Director.
______
Charter of the Independent Review Panel
Independent Review Panel--September 9, 2010
San Bruno Explosion
Charter
On behalf of the California Public Utilities Commission, an
Independent Review Panel of experts shall be retained for the purpose
of conducting a comprehensive study and investigation of the September
9, 2010, explosion and fire along a Pacific Gas and Electric Company
(``PG&E'') natural gas transmission pipeline in San Bruno, CA. The
investigation shall include a technical assessment of the events and
their root causes, and recommendations for action by the Commission to
best ensure such an accident is not repeated elsewhere. The
recommendations may include changes to design, construction, operation,
maintenance, and replacement of natural gas facilities, management
practices at PG&E in the areas of pipeline integrity and public safety,
regulatory changes by the Commission itself, statutory changes to be
recommended by the Commission, and other recommendations deemed
appropriate by the Panel. The latter shall include examining whether
there may be systemic management problems at the utility and whether
greater resources are needed to achieve fundamental infrastructure
improvements.
Specific Questions to Guide the Fact-Finding Investigation
What happened on September 9, 2010?
What are the root causes of the incident?
Was the accident indicative of broader management challenges
and problems at PG&E in discharging its obligations in the area
of public safety?
Are the Commission's current permitting, inspection,
ratemaking, and enforcement procedures as applied to natural
gas transmission lines adequate?
What corrective actions should the Commission take
immediately?
What additional corrective actions should the Commission
take?
What is the public's right to information concerning the
location of natural gas transmission and distribution
facilities in populated areas?
Membership and Support
The membership of the Panel shall consist of no fewer than three
experts, and no more than five, selected by the President of the
Commission, and confirmed by a vote of the Commission. The President of
the Commission shall select a leader for the Panel. The Panel shall
exercise investigatory powers as granted by the Commission. Commission
staff shall provide administrative support to members of the Panel. The
Panel also shall be free to seek opinions and recommendations from
expert consultants.
Compensation and Expenses
Members of the Panel shall be paid a nominal sum. Reasonable
expenses incurred by members will be paid. Expert consultants to the
Panel shall be paid reasonable compensation.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much. Very helpful.
Mr. Johns, we welcome you, President of Pacific Gas and
Electric. We saw each other on the scene, and you were right
there, and I'm glad to see you here again.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER JOHNS, PRESIDENT,
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
Mr. Johns. Well, thank you, Senator.
I'd like to thank Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member
Thune, you, Senator Boxer, and the members of the Subcommittee,
for giving us the opportunity to be here today. And thank you
for your focus on safety of our Nation's natural gas
infrastructure.
For Americans who live or work around our industry's
pipelines and facilities, the potential stakes around this
issue could not be higher. We were forcefully reminded of this
fact again on the evening of September 9, when tragedy struck
in San Bruno. The explosion there claimed eight lives. It
resulted in many others being injured and hospitalized for
burns. It left many families homeless, and it seriously damaged
the homes of many more.
Those of us who have been to the scene in San Bruno, as I
have on several occasions, including the night of the fire, and
who have spoken with the residents, won't ever forget what they
saw in these experiences. It's absolutely heart-wrenching. And
yet, it can't begin to compare with what the residents,
themselves, experienced that night and in the difficult days
that followed. My heart and prayers goes out to all the
families and all the members of the community of San Bruno.
Since that night, our thoughts and our focus at PG&E have
been on doing the right thing in three critical areas:
First, above all, getting immediate support and assistance
to the people affected by this tragedy.
Second, taking responsible action to assure everyone that
our gas system is safe.
And finally, learning that--what led to this tragedy, so
that no other community in the United States has to experience
this kind of ordeal.
These priorities have guided everything we've done for the
past several weeks. Even before the first responders had
finished their heroic work in the hours after the explosion, we
said clearly that PG&E would step up and do what's right for
the families and the City of San Bruno. We gave Mayor Ruane and
all the residents of San Bruno PG&E's commitment to stand with
them, to rebuild the community and help people rebuild their
lives.
Mr. Mayor, I am reaffirming that commitment again today to
you. Your leadership has been phenomenal throughout this. You
and your entire team have just exemplified what leadership
should be in America.
Mr. Ruane. Thank you.
Mr. Johns. To date, PG&E's assistance has taken several
forms, from providing basic food, shelter, and clothing to
establishing a relief fund of up to $100 million to help the
folks in San Bruno. Through the Rebuild San Bruno Fund, we
provide direct financial assistance to hundreds of households;
we've covered costs of losses not covered by people's
insurance; and we're reimbursing the city for certain costs it
incurs to respond to this accident and to rebuild.
In parallel with assisting the community, we've also taken
steps to assure everyone that our gas system is safe.
Individually and collectively, as an industry, every company
that operates national--natural gas facilities shares a
profound responsibility to protect public safety. It is, bar
none, the highest duty that we are entrusted with.
When a tragedy shakes the foundations of that trust, it is
critical that we reach out and assure everyone that our system
is sound. We've begun that process, and I know the industry is
committed to doing that, as well.
PG&E has met with public officials in dozens of cities and
counties throughout our service territory over the past few
weeks. We're keeping them apprised of the work we are now doing
to reinspect our entire pipeline system. We're making sure they
have the latest information about the location of any of PG&E's
gas facilities in their communities. We're sharing detailed
information about the maintenance standards and practices that
we and the industry follow. And when we ultimately learn what
led to this tragedy, we will be sharing with them whatever
actions we need to take in response. While no one yet knows how
this accident occurred, we know for certain that a tragedy like
this should never happen.
Finally, we recognize that, as an industry, we have a
responsibility to make sure we are operating in accordance with
the highest standards when it comes to pipeline safety.
Moreover, we know these standards must be continually evaluated
and updated to reflect any lessons learned.
In this regard, I'd like to acknowledge, Senator Boxer,
you've worked with Senator Feinstein to introduce new
legislation on pipeline safety, and we look forward to working
with you and your staffs to move that forward.
Learning what happened at San Bruno will be an important
part of that process, and PG&E is fully committed to
cooperating with the various investigations that are now going
on. We will continue to do so until all the questions are
answered. And at that point, I know that PG&E and every company
in our industry will focus on those findings and move swiftly
to take whatever action is necessary to prevent another tragedy
like this from every happening again.
Thank you for having me.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Johns follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher Johns, President,
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune and members of the
Subcommittee. My name is Chris Johns and I am President of Pacific Gas
and Electric Company or PG&E. PG&E is one of the largest combined
natural gas and electric utilities in the United States. Based in San
Francisco, with nearly 20,000 employees, the company delivers
electricity and natural gas to approximately 15 million people in
Northern and Central California. PG&E's extensive natural gas system
integrates more than 42,000 miles of natural gas distribution lines and
more than 6,700 miles of natural gas transportation (or transmission)
pipelines.
I first want to thank you for providing me with the opportunity to
be here today to participate in a hearing on the safety of our Nation's
natural gas infrastructure.
For Americans who live or work around natural gas pipelines and
facilities, the potential stakes around this issue could not be higher.
The events of the evening of September 9th are a stark reminder of
that. On that evening, a rupture occurred on PG&E's natural gas
transmission line running through the Crestmoor Canyon neighborhood of
San Bruno, California resulting in an explosion. The results of that
explosion were tragic. Seven people lost their lives. According to
reports, dozens of people were taken to local hospitals and treated for
serious burns and injuries. Fifteen acres burned. A large crater was
created. Thirty-seven homes were destroyed and many more experienced
damage. In total, 376 households were forced to evacuate. The days
since have been an ordeal for the community; most of us cannot truly
comprehend what the people of San Bruno went through that night, and
continue to go through today. We are working with the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to learn the cause of this tragic
explosion.
Those of us who have been to the scene of the accident, as I have
on several occasions including the night of the fire, and who have
spoken with a number of families from the neighborhood, will not ever
forget these experiences.
They are heart-wrenching. And yet, they can not begin to approach
what the residents in that neighborhood witnessed and felt the evening
of the disaster--and in the difficult days that have followed.
My heart goes out to all the families and people affected by this
tragedy.
We know there is a long road to recovery ahead. We want to
reiterate PG&E's commitment to stand by the people and community of San
Bruno. We will do what's right to help rebuild the community--and to
help people rebuild their lives.
PG&E's attention and resources have been focused on three
priorities:
1. Getting help to the families and individuals affected.
2. Assuring everyone that our system is safe.
3. Cooperating fully with any and all investigations into the
causes of this terrible accident.
Helping the Community
In the weeks since the tragedy, PG&E has been focused on helping
the families affected by this accident and the City of San Bruno. On
behalf of PG&E, I want extend our personal appreciation to San Bruno
City Mayor Jim Ruane and all of the city officials whose heroic efforts
and tremendous leadership are helping San Bruno to begin to recover
from this tragedy.
Some of the steps we have taken include:
Providing affected residents with immediate support in the
form of housing, clothing and financial assistance, such as
$1,000 pre-paid debit cards to help meet immediate needs;
Establishing the Rebuild San Bruno Fund, which is making up
to $100 million available to:
Provide direct emergency assistance, in the form of cash
disbursements for immediate expenses not covered by
insurance.
Ensure that residents are reimbursed for costs or losses
that may not be covered by insurance.
Provide financial assistance to the City of San Bruno for
certain costs it incurs as it responds to this accident and
to rebuild or repair public infrastructure and facilities.
Restoring power and gas service to the neighborhood and
conducting in-home safety checks.
With regard to the Rebuild San Bruno Fund, PG&E has already
provided San Bruno officials with an initial $3 million to help
compensate the city for certain of its estimated expenses incurred to
date.
We have also now distributed checks to hundreds of households, in
the amounts of $15,000, $25,000, or $50,000 each, depending on the
extent of damage incurred. Residents have not been asked to waive any
potential claims in order to receive this assistance. Also, these funds
are being provided in addition to the company's ongoing provision of
funds to ensure affected residents continue to have access to temporary
housing and other basic necessities.
Restoring Public Confidence
We recognize that the accident has shaken customers' confidence in
the safety and integrity of our system both in the areas surrounding
San Bruno and across PG&E's service area. We take these concerns very
seriously and have taken steps to help restore that confidence. First,
we re-inspected the three major pipelines that serve the San Francisco
Peninsula. We also reduced the operating pressure of the transmission
lines serving the area by 20 percent.
In addition to these efforts we are conducting aerial inspections
of our entire natural gas transmission system. In addition, we have
begun the ground leak survey of the entire gas transmission system
beginning with the high consequence areas.
And, this past week we publicly released detailed information about
PG&E's gas pipeline safety and maintenance practices, including some of
the tools that we use in our engineering analyses and planning for
future preventative maintenance work on transmission pipelines.
In those communities throughout Northern and Central California
where PG&E's gas transmission facilities are located, we have been
meeting--and will continue to meet--face to face with public officials.
These meetings give officials the opportunity to ask questions about
our pipeline system and understand the steps we are taking to ensure
its integrity and safety. We are also reviewing safety procedures
concerning our natural gas system with first responders in those
communities, and we are leaving behind detailed maps to ensure they
know where our facilities are located.
We are doing the same for our individual customers. In fact,
customers can now go online and log in to their individual account to
see whether or not any of PG&E's gas transmission lines run near their
homes, and if so where the lines are located.
As noted previously, we operate approximately 6,700 miles of
natural gas transmission pipeline. We divide these pipelines into about
20,000 pipeline segments. A segment is a length of contiguous pipe with
the same specifications, e.g., class location, wall thickness,
diameter, material. As part of normal operations, we regularly assess
our pipelines. Among other steps, this work includes ongoing
inspections, leak surveys, pipeline patrols, preventative, corrective
and condition-based maintenance and 24-hour monitoring of system
conditions.
In the course of these efforts, any time we identify a threat to
public safety, whether because of a customer's report or through our
own ongoing assessments, we take action to address it. This includes
priority dispatch of our first responders and crews. If there is an
imminent hazard, we will not leave the site in question until proper
safety conditions have been established.
We also continue to invest significantly in our system, with the
majority of these investments aimed at enhancing safety and
reliability. In fact, over the past 5 years we have spent $30 million
more on our gas transmission system than the amount authorized by the
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC).
These investment decisions are informed and guided, in part,
through PG&E's ongoing assessment and consideration of a number of
factors for each of the approximately 20,000 segments of pipeline. Our
engineers consider such criteria as the potential for third-party
damage to the line, like what may occur if there is digging or
construction in the area; the condition of the pipe, corrosion risk,
and its specific design and physical characteristics; how close the
particular segment is to areas that may be prone to ground movement;
and how close it is to densely populated or environmentally sensitive
areas. The data used in this assessment are updated regularly
throughout the year to reflect the latest engineering evaluations,
field tests, hands-on inspections and maintenance work.
This procedure, which is part of our overall integrity management
program, is followed in some form by almost every gas transmission
pipeline operator in the United States.
Nationwide, the natural gas industry operates 2.4 million miles of
distribution and transmission pipelines. In total, companies in the
industry spend an estimated $7 billion each year in safety-related
activities. Moreover, the design, construction, operation, inspection
and maintenance of all operating pipelines are subject to rigorous
oversight by Federal and state regulators.
Federal pipeline safety regulations apply to natural gas
transmission and distribution pipelines in the United States and
through annual certifications and agreements, nearly all individual
states have enforcement responsibility for pipelines within their own
state, including California. These agreements with Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) require that each
state adopt and enforce the Federal regulations.
This includes the adoption and implementation of a pipeline
integrity management rule that adds a layer of protection for pipelines
in certain areas that, for example, have 20 or more dwellings or a site
such as a playground or religious facility in a specified area, which
are referred to as high consequence areas, in addition to the multitude
of periodic inspections and repairs performed on all pipelines
throughout the system.
Additionally, states may establish and enforce their own
regulations in addition to the Federal regulations, provided they are
consistent with, and at least as strict as, the Federal regulations.
For example, the CPUC has adopted rules for natural gas distribution
systems that require annual leak surveys for facilities in the vicinity
of schools, hospitals and churches, which are not specifically required
in Federal regulations. The CPUC also performs audits of our pipeline
policies and practices.
In an effort to summarize the industry's safety practices and
information on current regulatory oversight, the American Gas
Association (AGA), a trade association that represents natural gas
distribution companies, has gathered relevant data in one place on its
website and has also developed a Frequently Asked Questions document,
which is included as an attachment to this written testimony.
We will continue to work with our regulators, AGA, the Interstate
Natural Gas Association of America, which represents natural gas
transmission companies, and others to assess and update industry best
practices. We recognize that, as an industry, we have a responsibility
to make sure we are operating in accordance with the highest standards
when it comes to pipeline safety and integrity. Moreover, we know these
standards must be continually evaluated and updated to reflect any
lessons learned as a result of tragedies like the San Bruno accident
and those that have occurred around the country over the past years.
Cooperating with the Investigation
We are all committed to identifying and learning from the root
cause or causes of the tragic events in San Bruno. Once the causes are
understood, Congress, the CPUC, our industry and others can take what
has been learned to improve policies, procedures and best practices.
However, this can only happen if the NTSB, the CPUC and other agencies
have the information they need to conduct their investigations.
During the past weeks we have, therefore, been making every effort
to be fully responsive to all requests connected with the ongoing
investigation. The information provided by the NTSB as a result of
their investigation will allow us and others to understand whether the
accident was isolated or has broader implications for policies
surrounding pipeline safety. Until the NTSB has concluded its
investigation, however, we cannot speculate about the causes of the
accident and possible changes going forward. Once the results of the
investigation are known, we will act on its findings to take the
appropriate action.
Supporting Efforts to Improve National Pipeline Safety Regulations
We also recognize that Congress and the Administration are focused
on making our Nation's natural gas system the safest it can be. As
Congress moves to reauthorize the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of
2006, we know that improvements will be made to pipeline safety that
will bring about a safer national pipeline system. Toward that end,
Senators Boxer and Feinstein have introduced legislation to enhance
public safety, strengthen oversight and improve accountability. We
support this effort and look forward to working with the Senators and
other Members of Congress on legislation that achieves these important
and necessary goals.
Among the areas we believe warrant additional discussion in
addition to those proposed in current legislative packages are
providing for formalized benchmarking of safety practices among
pipeline operators, reassessing the adequacy of current in-line and
external testing methodologies and technologies, creating a national
standard for set-backs of high-pressure pipes from residential areas,
and conducting a broader review of the impacts of urbanization on the
safe operation of the Nation's gas transmission system.
Conclusion
Again, thank you for the opportunity to participate in today's
hearing. We want to reiterate PG&E's firm commitment to stand by the
people and community of San Bruno. We are committed to help rebuild the
community--and to help the people of San Bruno rebuild their lives. We
also want to acknowledge the importance of restoring the confidence of
all the communities we serve in the safety and integrity of our
pipeline system. We owe it to the public to ensure that they can feel
confident in the gas and electric service we provide. And, we
understand that in order to take action to prevent future tragedies,
answers are needed as to what caused this horrible accident. We will
continue to work cooperatively with those investigating the accident so
that we, policymakers and others have the information needed to improve
pipeline safety.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, Mr. Johns.
Now we will hear from Mr. Rick Kessler, Vice President of
the Pipeline Safety Trust.
STATEMENT OF RICK KESSLER, VICE PRESIDENT,
PIPELINE SAFETY TRUST
Mr. Kessler. Thank you, Senator Boxer. And I also want to
thank Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune, and the
members of the Subcommittee.
My name is Rick Kessler, and I'm testifying today in my
purely voluntary and uncompensated role as Vice President of
the Pipeline Safety Trust.
The Trust was born from a tragedy in Bellingham,
Washington. And riding on the facts of other tragedies in
places like Edison, New Jersey; Carlsbad, New Mexico; Walnut
Creek, California; and Carmichael, Mississippi, we've testified
to Congress for years about the improvements needed in Federal
regulations to help prevent further tragedies. We've also long
talked about the need for more miles of pipeline to be
inspected by ``smart pigs.'' We've pleaded for clear standards
for leak detection, requirements for the placement of automatic
and remotely controlled valves, closing the loopholes that
allow some pipelines to remain unregulated, and for better
information to be available so innocent people will know that
if they live near a large pipeline--and whether that pipeline
is safe.
Yet, here we are again, after the most recent tragedies, in
Michigan and California, asking again for the same things we've
asked for in previous hearings, following previous tragedies.
Clearly, little of our message has been heard, particularly by
the Obama Administration, which has put out a proposal for
reauthorization that didn't address any of the issues raised by
San Bruno, and which we can only refer to as ``too little, too
late.''
We were pleased, however, to see some of our
recommendations included as part of the legislation that you
recently introduced with Senator Feinstein, and have been
working with Chairman Lautenberg to include some of these pro-
safety provisions in his bill. We commend all of you for your
efforts.
But, we also caution that none of these bills are a
panacea, and we hope that, this time, Congress and the
Administration will pay close attention and provide a strong,
comprehensive solution to pipeline safety, instead of offering
a bandaid for a broken bone. It's our sincere desire not to be
back here again in the future, saying the same things, after
another tragedy.
Sixteen years ago, when I first began working on pipeline
safety, we were debating a requirement for remote shut-off
valves on natural gas pipelines, in the wake of the Edison, New
Jersey, incident and the 2-and-a-half-hours it took to shut off
the flow of gas that fed the fireball, due to a lack of a
remote-controlled shut-off valve. In San Bruno, in 2010, it's
unacceptable that the only way to shut off a large pipeline
spewing fire into a populated neighborhood, is to find someone
with a key to a locked valve, have them drive to the valve, and
shut it down by hand. Please, require remote valves in law for
high-consequence areas this time.
In San Bruno, we also learned that, because of old
construction practices, this more-than-half-century-old
pipeline couldn't accommodate an internal inspection device,
known as a ``smart pig.'' Clearly, ``smart pigs'' are the best-
available technology for assessing the true condition of a
pipeline. Again, this is another debate that should have been
settled years ago. I know Chairman Lautenberg made a big push
for this, back in the mid 1990s, in our home State. But, in
consideration to the pipeline industry, lesser and cheaper
forms of technology were allowed to be substituted. That was
penny wise and pound foolish, in terms of the loss of life and
property that ensued. Please require companies to upgrade their
pipelines in populated areas to accommodate this in-line
inspection technology.
Now, just this Summer, over 800,000 gallons of crude oil
spilled into the Kalamazoo River, and over 30,000 gallons
spilled into a stream near Salt Lake City. Both spills showed
that current leak detection system requirements for liquid
pipelines aren't up to the task. This is another long-standing
debate with the industry that needs to be put to rest by
adopting a clear standard for leak detection systems along the
lines of the one Alaska already has.
People shouldn't be in the dark about whether they live
near a high-pressure pipeline and what condition that pipeline
is in. They have a right to know, and they should have access
to that information. It will save lives, injuries, and
property.
Please mandate a complete review of the effectiveness of
the industry-written, PHMSA-adopted program for public
awareness, and require that basic information, such as the
location of a high-consequence area, when pipelines were last
inspected, what was found, and the content of spill response
plans is easily available to the public.
Also, please ensure the continued funding of the community
technical assistance grants so local governments, like San
Bruno and community organizations, can take a more active role
in the oversight of pipelines that traverse their communities.
These are just a few of the areas that we believe must be
addressed forcefully in any reauthorization effort. In all,
there are seven areas we believe Congress and the
Administration must improve for the benefit of the American
people: require remote or automatic shut-off valves for gas
transmission pipelines and emergency flow-restriction devices
on hazardous liquid pipelines; enhance requirements for
accommodating internal inspection devices, or ``smart pigs,''
for inspection--and for inspection generally, including on
currently unregulated lines; develop and implement enhanced
standards and requirements for leak detection on hazardous
liquid lines--we also support enhanced reporting of leaks on
all lines, as required by H.R. 6008, the bipartisan CLEAN Act,
sponsored by reps Schauer and Upton in the House--make more
pipeline safety information publicly available; continue
implementing funding and enhancing the technical assistance
grants; make public awareness programs meaningful and
measurable; and finally, ensure adequate distribution and
promotion of the Pipelines and Informed Planning Alliances
Report. This contains recommended practices for local
government to adopt for greater safety when development is
proposed near pipelines.
Thank you again, Senator Boxer, for the opportunity to
testify today. Our hearts go out to the citizens of San Bruno.
The Pipeline Safety Trust stands ready to work with all or you,
on both sides of the aisle, to ensure that such a tragedy never
happens again and that our Nation's pipeline safety transport--
or, pipeline transport system is as safe as it could and should
be.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kessler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rick Kessler, Vice President,
Pipeline Safety Trust
Good afternoon, Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune and
members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to speak today
on the important subject of pipeline safety. My name is Rick Kessler
and I am testifying today in my purely voluntary role as the Vice
President of the Pipeline Safety Trust. My involvement and experience
with pipeline safety stems from my years as staff for the House Energy
and Commerce Committee on such issues, starting in 1994 after a natural
gas explosion in Edison, New Jersey--all too similar to what just
occurred in San Bruno, California--destroyed a whole apartment complex
and left 1 person dead and many, many people homeless.
The Pipeline Safety Trust came into being after another pipeline
disaster--the 1999 Olympic Pipeline tragedy in Bellingham, Washington
that left three young people dead, wiped out every living thing in a
beautiful salmon stream, and caused millions of dollars of economic
disruption. While prosecuting that incident the U.S. Justice Department
was so aghast at the way the pipeline company had operated and
maintained their pipeline, and equally aghast at the lack of oversight
from Federal regulators, that they asked the Federal courts to set
aside money from the settlement of that case to create the Pipeline
Safety Trust as an independent national watchdog organization over both
the industry and the regulators. We have been trying to fulfill that
vision ever since, but the spate of recent disasters makes us question
whether our message is being heard.
Born from a tragedy in Bellingham, but also riding on the emotion
and facts of other tragedies in places like Edison, New Jersey;
Carlsbad, New Mexico; Walnut Creek, California; and Carmichael,
Mississippi; we have testified to Congress for years in response to
such tragedies about the improvements needed in Federal regulations to
help prevent more such tragedies. For years we have talked about the
need for more miles of pipelines to be inspected by smart pigs. We have
pleaded for clear standards for leak detection, requirements for the
placement of automatic and remotely controlled valves, closing the
loopholes that allow some pipelines to remain unregulated, and for
better information to be available so innocent people will know if they
live near a large pipeline and whether that pipeline is maintained and
inspected in a way to ensure their safety.
So here we are again after the most recent tragedies in Marshall,
Michigan, and San Bruno California asking again for the same things we
have asked for in previous hearings following previous tragedies. While
we were pleased to see some of our recommendations included as part of
legislation recently introduced by Senators Boxer and Feinstein, we
hope this time Congress and the Administration will pay close attention
and provide a strong, comprehensive solution to pipeline safety instead
of offering a Band-Aid for a broken bone. It is our sincere desire not
to be back here again in the future saying the same things after
another tragedy.
Overview
The availability of natural gas, oil and other fuels are vital to
our economic well being and transporting those fuels through pipelines
is without a doubt the safest way to move these highly dangerous
substances. So the question isn't whether pipelines are a safe mode of
transportation compared to other ways to move fuel, the real question
is whether they are as safe as they could and should be and the
secondary question is whether they are being regulated in the most
efficient, effective and protective manner they could or should be.
Unfortunately, the answer to both questions is: no.
Today we will keep our testimony to the lessons that should be
learned from the Marshall, Michigan and the San Bruno, California
disasters. While bills have already been introduced to address some of
the issues coming out from these most recent incidents Congress should
not lose sight of the fact that there are other issues not related to
these incidents that can have significant effects on those in more
rural areas from Alaska to the Dakotas, and from New Mexico to
Nebraska. We have provided information about these other issues in
previous testimony to this committee this past summer, and we hope all
that testimony will be reviewed to ensure a comprehensive pipeline
safety bill emerges.
Today we would like to focus on seven areas. They are:
Requiring remote or automatic shut off valves for gas
transmission pipelines and emergency flow restricting devices
on hazardous liquid pipelines.
Enhancing requirements for accommodating internal inspection
devices or ``smart pigs.''
Developing and implementing enhanced standards and
requirements for leak detection on hazardous liquid lines.
Making more pipeline safety information publicly available.
Continuing implementation and funding of Technical
Assistance Grants to Communities and boosting the Pipeline
Safety Information Grant Program.
Making public awareness programs meaningful and measurable.
Ensuring adequate distribution and promotion of the
Pipelines and Informed Planning Alliances report on recommended
practices that local government can adopt to provide greater
safety when development is proposed near transmission
pipelines.
Requiring Remote or Automatic Shut-Off Valves for Gas Transmission
Pipelines
Sixteen years ago, when I first began working on pipeline safety,
we were debating a requirement for remote or automatic shutoff valves
on natural gas pipelines in the wake of the Edison, NJ accident and the
two and a half hours it took to shut off the flow of gas that fed the
fireball due to the lack of a remote controlled shut off valve. It is
both puzzling and sad that we have to again debate the benefits of
requiring remote or automatic shut off valves after another tragedy,
this time in San Bruno, California.
In 2010, it is unacceptable that the only way to shut off a large
pipeline spewing fire into a populated neighborhood is to find someone
with a key to a locked valve, have him or her drive to the valve and
operate it manually. In good weather in San Bruno that method took an
hour and a half to shut off the flow of fuel. How long would that
method take after an earthquake? We ask that you direct the Secretary
of Transportation to immediately begin a study to determine the type,
placement, feasibility and phase in period for installation of more up-
to-date valves, and that a rule-making for such installation is
accomplished by December 31, 2012.
For liquid pipelines in 1992, 1996, 2002, and 2006, Congress
required OPS to ``survey and assess the effectiveness of emergency flow
restricting devices . . . to detect and locate hazardous liquid
pipeline ruptures and minimize product releases'' \1\ with the first
such requirement having a deadline in 1994 (16 years ago!). Following
this analysis, Congress required OPS to ``prescribe regulations on the
circumstances under which an operator of a hazardous liquid pipeline
facility must use an emergency flow restricting device.'' \2\ (emphasis
added)
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\1\ See 49 U.S.C. 60102(j)(1).
\2\ See 49 U.S.C. 60102(j)(2).
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OPS/PHMSA never issued a formal analysis on emergency flow
restricting device (EFRD) effectiveness. Instead, in its hazardous
liquid pipeline integrity management rule,\3\ OPS rejected the comments
of the NTSB, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Lower
Colorado River Authority, the City of Austin, and the Environmental
Defense Fund and chose to leave EFRD decisions up to pipeline operators
after listing in the rule various criteria for operators to consider.
Such an approach to EFRD use does not appear to meet Congressional
intent, partly because the approach is essentially unenforceable and
not protective of important environmental assets such as rivers and
lakes including those not considered High Consequence Areas.
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\3\ See 49 CFR 195.452(i)(4).
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Congress needs to reiterate its previous mandates to PHMSA on EFRD
use on liquid pipelines and ensure they are followed to mitigate the
extent of future pipeline releases.
Enhanced Requirements for Accommodating Internal Inspection Devices or
``Smart Pigs''
In San Bruno, we've learned that because of the old construction
practices, this more than half a century old pipeline could not
accommodate internal inspection devices, known as ``smart pigs.''
Clearly, smart pigs represent the best available technology for
assessing the true condition of a pipeline. Again, this is another
debate that should have been settled years ago, but in consideration to
much lobbying by the pipeline industry, lesser and cheaper forms of
technology were allowed to be substituted for the best available
technology. While the cause of the San Bruno failure is still unknown,
it is clear that problems on pipelines like the one in San Bruno would
have a far better chance of being identified early enough to prevent
tragedies if in-line inspection was required. Isn't it finally time to
require operators to present the Secretary with plans by a date certain
for upgrading, at a minimum, the segments of their lines in High
Consequence Areas to be able to accommodate these devices to help
prevent future disasters like San Bruno?
Developing and Implementing Enhanced Standards and Requirements for
Leak Detection on Hazardous Liquid Lines
In its hazardous liquid transmission pipeline integrity management
rule, PHMSA requires that operators have a means to detect leaks, but
there are no performance standards for such a system.\4\ This is in
contrast to the State of Alaska, for example, which requires that all
crude oil transmission pipelines have a leak detection system capable
of promptly detecting a leak of no more than 1 percent of daily
throughput.\5\ PHMSA listed in the integrity management rule various
criteria for operators to consider when selecting such a device. Again,
such an approach is virtually unenforceable and not protective of
important environmental assets such as rivers and lakes including those
not considered High Consequence Areas.
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\4\ See 49 CFR 195.452(i)(3).
\5\ See 18 AAC 75.055(a)(1).
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The recent Enbridge spill in Michigan and the Chevron pipeline
release near Salt Lake City are examples of what can go wrong when a
pipeline with a leak detection system has no performance standards for
operations. In both those incidents the pipelines had leak detection
systems as required by regulations, but neither system was capable of
detecting and halting significant spills.
The Trust's position is that Congress needs to direct PHMSA to
issue performance standards for leak detection systems used by
hazardous liquid pipeline operators by a date certain to prevent damage
from future pipeline releases.
Continuing to Make More Pipeline Safety Information Publicly Available
Perhaps the key issue regarding increasing public awareness and
education is to ensure that the information in which the public already
has an interest is easily available.
Over the past two reauthorization cycles, PH MSA has done a good
job of providing increased transparency for many aspects of pipeline
safety. In the Trust's opinion, one of the true successes of the 2006
PIPES Act has been the rapid implementation by PHMSA of the enforcement
transparency section of the Act. It is now possible for affected
communities to log onto the PHMSA website (http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/
comm/reports/enforce/Enforcement.html) and review enforcement actions
regarding local pipelines. This transparency should increase the
public's trust that our system of enforcement of pipeline safety
regulations is working adequately or will provide the information
necessary for the public to push for improvements in that system. PHMSA
has also significantly upgraded its incident data availability and
accuracy, and continues to improve its already excellent ``stakeholder
communication'' website.
One area where PHMSA could go even further in transparency would be
to create a web-based system providing public access to basic
inspection information about specific pipelines. An inspection
transparency system would allow the affected public to review when
PHMSA and its state partners inspected particular pipelines, what types
of inspections were performed, what was found, and how any concerns
were rectified. Inspection transparency should increase the public's
trust in the checks and balances in place to make pipelines safe, and
make clear inadequacies that need to be addressed. Just as Congress
required PHMSA to institute Enforcement Transparency in PIPES, The
Trust hopes you will require similar Inspection Transparency this year.
There is also a need to make other information more readily
available. This includes information about:
High Consequence Areas (HCAs). These are defined in Federal
regulations and are used to determine what pipelines fall under
more stringent integrity management safety regulations.
Unfortunately, this information is not made available to local
government and citizens so they know if they are included in
such improved safety regimes. Local government and citizens
also would have a much better day-to-day grasp of their local
areas and be able to point out inaccuracies or changes in HCA
designations.
State Agency Partners. States are provided with millions of
dollars of operating funds each year by the Federal Government
to help in the oversight of our Nation's pipelines. While there
is no doubt that such involvement from the states increases
pipeline safety, different states have different authority, and
states put different emphasis in different program areas. For
example just this past weekend the New York Times reported that
``the California Public Utilities Commission, which oversees
most of the state's gas pipelines, told Federal regulators
several years ago, in documents, that it ``rarely'' fines any
gas pipeline operation for violations.'' The story \6\ went on
to say ``Records show that Michigan, Illinois, Arizona,
Colorado, New Jersey and Missouri rarely issue fines. And even
when other states issue fines, collections are uneven. In
places like Ohio, Georgia and Kentucky, records show, half or
less of all fines are paid.''
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\6\ http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/25/us/
25pipeline.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&hp.
Each year PHMSA audits each participating state program, yet the
results of those program audits are not easily available. We
believe that these yearly audits should be available on PHMSA's
website and that some basic comparable metrics for states
should be developed. Citizens have a right to know what the
priorities of their state pipeline safety agencies are, and how
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well they are using that inspection and enforcement authority.
Emergency Response Plans. The recent Gulf of Mexico tragedy
shows that it is crucial that these types of spill response
plans are well designed, adequately meet worst-case scenarios,
and use the most up-to-date technologies. While 49 CFR 194
requires onshore oil pipeline operators to prepare spill
response plans, including worst case scenarios, those plans are
difficult for the public to access. As has been made clear by
the huge Marshall, Michigan spill, those Federal plans are not
public documents, and they certainly were not created with
involvement and expertise of local government and interested
citizens.
The review and adoption of such response plans also misses a great
opportunity to educate and increase awareness among the public.
Currently the process is closed to the public. In fact, PHMSA
has argued that it is not required to follow any public
processes, such as NEPA, for the review of these plans. If the
Gulf tragedy has taught us nothing else, it should be that the
industry and agencies could use all the help they can get to
ensure such response plans will work in the case of a real
emergency.
It is always our belief that greater transparency in all aspects of
pipeline safety will lead to increased awareness, involvement,
review and ultimately safety. That is why we believe Congress
should make citizen right to know provisions a priority for
inclusion in this pipeline reauthorization. There are many
organizations, local and state government agencies, and
academic institutions that have expertise and an interest in
preventing the release of fuels to the environment. Greater
transparency would help involve these entities and provide
ideas from outside of the industry. The State of Washington has
passed rules that when complete spill plans are submitted for
approval the plans are required to be made publicly available,
interested parties are notified, and there is a 30-day period
for interested parties to comment on the contents of the
proposed plan. We urge Congress to require PHMSA to develop
similar requirements for the adoption of spill response plans
across the country, and that such plans for new pipelines be
integrated into the environmental reviews required as part of
the pipeline siting process.
Increasing Awareness and Education by Continuing Implementation and
Funding of Technical Assistance Grants to Communities
Over the past year and a half, PHMSA has finally started the
implementation of the Community Technical Assistance Grant program
authorized as part of the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 and
clarified in the PIPES Act. Under this program, more than a million
dollars of grant money has been awarded to communities across the
country that wanted to hire independent technical advisors so they
could learn more about the pipelines running through and surrounding
them, or be valid participants in various pipeline safety processes.
After the rash of pipeline tragedies from Texas to Michigan to
California this year we suspect that many communities may be more
interested than ever in finding out more about the pipelines in their
midst.
In the first round of grants, PHMSA funded projects in communities
in seventeen states from California to Florida. Local governments
gained assistance so they could better consider risks when residential
and commercial developments are planned near existing pipelines.
Neighborhood associations gained the ability to hire experts so they
could better understand the ``real'' versus the imagined issues with
pipelines in their neighborhoods. And farm groups learned first-hand
about the impacts of already-built pipelines on other farming
communities so they could be better informed as they participate in the
processes involving the proposed routing of a pipeline through the
lands where they have lived and labored for generations. All of the
examples of local government implanting the PIPA recommendation we
mentioned earlier were funded through these technical assistance
grants. Overall--despite the unacceptably long delay in
implementation--we view the first round of this new grant program as a
huge success.
However, ongoing funding for these grants is not clear, so the
Trust asks that you ensure the reauthorization of these grants to
continue to help involve those most at risk if something goes wrong
with a pipeline. We further ask that you consider doubling the cap on
the amount of an individual grant to $100,000, removing the limitation
on funding sources for the grants, ensuring funds do not go to pipeline
operators, and--most importantly--do whatever is necessary to ensure
that the authorized funds are actually appropriated.
Making Public Awareness Programs Meaningful and Measurable
Since the San Bruno disaster people in that neighborhood have asked
why they had no idea they had such a pipeline in their midst. That is a
good question since Federal regulations require pipeline operators to
have a program that includes ``activities to advise affected
municipalities, school districts, businesses, and residents of pipeline
facility locations.'' Similarly in Marshall, Michigan it appears that
emergency response personnel had little knowledge of a large oil
pipeline in their community. It is becoming increasingly clear that the
implementation of these required programs has not been effective.
The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 required pipeline
operators to provide people living and working near pipelines basic
pipeline safety information, and gave PHMSA the authority to set public
awareness program standards and design program materials. In response
to this Congressional mandate, PHMSA set rules that incorporated by
reference the American Petroleum Institute's (API) recommended practice
(RP) 1162 as the standard for these public awareness programs.
According to RP 1162's Foreword (page iii) of API recommended practice,
the intended audiences were not represented in the development of RP
1162, though they were allowed to provide ``feedback.'' The omission of
representatives from these audiences from the voting committee reduces
the depth of understanding the RP could have had regarding the barriers
and incentives for such programs, and undercuts the credibility of the
recommended actions. The public awareness program regulations--49 CFR
192.616 and 49 CRF 195.440--mandate that operators comply with RP
1162. In essence, this amounts to the drafting of Federal regulations
without the equal participation of the stakeholders the regulations are
meant to involve. With non-technical subject matter, such as this
recommended practice deals with, it is difficult to justify excluding
the intended audiences from the process and allowing the regulated
industries to write their own rules.
This public awareness effort represented a huge and important
undertaking for the pipeline industry, and as such the effectiveness of
it will evolve over time. We were happy that the rules included a
clause that set evaluation requirements that require verifiable
continuous improvements. While we understand that the initial years of
this program have been difficult, we have been disappointed in some of
these efforts as they were clearly farmed out to contractors to meet
the letter of the requirement instead of the intent of the requirement.
Recently, the National Transportation Safety Board cited the failure of
these programs in the investigation report of a deadly pipeline
explosion in Mississippi that killed a girl and her grandmother. And
again, the recent disasters in California and Michigan have well
publicized the failure of the current industry developed system to
adequately inform those it was meant to.
An evaluation of the first 5 years of this program is due this
year, and API has been working on an update of this recommended
practice for some time now. One of the draft proposals from API is to
remove the requirement to measure whether the programs have led to
actual changes in behavior. We hope that Congress will make clear that
the intent of this program is to change the behavior of the intended
audiences to make pipelines safer, not to count how many innocuous
brochures can be mailed. After tragedies like the one in San Bruno we
should not have people asking why they didn't know about the pipelines
in their neighborhoods, and we should not have emergency response
professionals surprised to find out they have large dangerous pipelines
in the jurisdictions.
Ensuring Adequate Distribution and Promotion of the Pipelines and
Informed Planning Alliances Report on Recommended Practices
That Local Government Can Adopt to Provide Greater Safety When
Development Is Proposed near Transmission Pipelines
Section 11 of the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 included
a requirement that PHMSA and FERC provide a study of population
encroachment on and near pipeline rights-of-way. That requirement led
to the Transportation Research Board's (TRB) October 2004 report
Transmission Pipelines and Land Use, which recommended that PHMSA
``develop risk-informed land use guidance for application by
stakeholders.'' PHMSA formed the Pipelines and Informed Planning
Alliance (PIPA) in late 2007 with the intent of drafting a report that
would include specific recommended practices that local governments,
land developers, and others could use to increase safety when
development was to occur near transmission pipelines.
Most large pipelines were placed in rural areas years ago, but as
the populated areas around our cities expand it has led to a growing
encroachment of residential and commercial development near large high-
pressure pipelines. This increases the risk to the pipelines from
related construction activities, as well as to the people who
ultimately live and work nearby if something should go wrong with the
pipeline.
After more than 2 years of work by more than 150 representatives of
a wide range of stakeholders, the draft report and the associated 46
recommendations are finally due to be released any minute. This will be
the first time information of this nature has been made widely
available to local planners, planning commissions, and elected
officials when considering the approval of land uses near transmission
pipelines. We fully agree with the sentiment of Congress in the
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 that,
``The Secretary shall encourage Federal agencies and State and
local governments to adopt and implement appropriate practices,
laws, and ordinances, as identified in the report, to address
the risks and hazards associated with encroachment upon
pipeline rights-of-way . . .''
A recent statewide survey of local government planning directors
conducted by the Pipeline Safety Trust showed that to successfully
implement these needed ``practices, laws, and ordinances'' will take a
good deal of well targeted education and promotion by a wide range of
stakeholders outside of the pipeline industry and PHMSA. In order to
make this effort successful, the Trust asks that this year Congress
authorize, just as was authorized in PIPES for the successful promotion
of the 8-1-1 ``One Call'' number, $500,000/year to promote,
disseminate, and provide technical assistance regarding the PIPA
recommendations.
Across the Nation neighborhoods are being built closer and closer
to dangerous pipelines just like the recently impacted neighborhood in
San Bruno was. Only if Congress gives PHMSA the resources it needs,
along with a clear mandate, will the information local governments need
to start considering these best land use practices near pipelines start
to be instituted in time to prevent future San Brunos.
Conclusion
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify today. The Pipeline
Safety Trust hopes you will closely consider the ideas and concerns we
have raised today and move a comprehensive pipeline safety reform and
reauthorization bill forward soon. If you have any questions about our
testimony, the Trust would be pleased to answer them and, of course, we
stand ready to work with you and your colleagues on reauthorizing the
pipeline safety laws that are so important to ensuring the well-being
of millions of Americans and the environment that is their birthright.
For any bill to be comprehensive we hope you will also review of
testimony to you from June of this year and include the important fixes
necessary to address these other outstanding issues:
Expanding the miles of pipelines that fall under the
Integrity Management rules.
Moving forward to address unregulated pipelines and
clarifying regulations of gathering and production pipelines.
Continuing to push state agencies on damage prevention.
Implementing expansion of Excess Flow Valve requirements.
Correcting the pipeline siting vs. safety disconnect, and
ensuring PHMSA's ability to provide adequate inspections when
pipelines are being constructed.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Kessler.
I'm going to start with you. Did you say that your group
has already suggested and recommended that there be remote
shut-off valves in high-consequence areas?
Mr. Kessler. Yes, Senator.
Senator Boxer. Do you know when that was?
Mr. Kessler. I don't, offhand, but it--I believe it was--we
started recommending that--the group formed in 1999--I believe
we started recommending it not long after.
Senator Boxer. OK. So, it could be as many as 10 years ago.
Mr. Kessler. Absolutely. And I know, from my work with the
New Jersey delegation--I started with Senator Lautenberg--that
he has been pushing for these since the Edison accident.
Senator Boxer. I'm going to ask some tough questions to the
PUC and to PG&E. So--I'm just saying they're hard questions,
but I think they're important.
According--this is to the CPUC--according to the New York
Times, the CPUC reported, several years ago, that it, quote/
unquote, ``rarely fines gas pipeline operators for
violations.'' Is this still the case? Can you provide, for the
record, the annual total of fines levied over the past 5 years?
Mr. Clanon. I don't know that off the top of my head,
Senator, but I can get to the underlying point. And that is,
how effective is the Public Utilities Commission's oversight of
PG&E and of the other utilities? Just a couple of facts. The
first----
Senator Boxer. Well, I'm asking specifically about the
fines. Is it true that you rarely fine the people you oversee?
Is that still the case?
Mr. Clanon. No, ma'am. That's not true at all. In fact----
Senator Boxer. OK.
Mr. Clanon.--since 1999, the PUC has levied about half a
billion--$500 million in fines and restitution against the
people that we regulate, including some tens of millions of
dollars in fines and restitution from PG&E.
Senator Boxer. OK. So, that article----
Mr. Clanon. That's not even----
Senator Boxer.--in the----
Mr. Clanon.--close to----
Senator Boxer.--New York Times is no longer true. That's
good.
Mr. Clanon.--hasn't been true since forever at the PUC, and
certainly not since 1999.
Senator Boxer. ``Forever at the PUC.'' Well, what year was
that story? Well, the quote is in the story that was just
printed, that several years ago they said they rarely fine any
gas pipeline operator for a violation--but, you'll get me the
details, will you not, for that?
[The information referred to is contained in the appendix.]
Mr. Clanon. I will. And I just want to lay this to rest
right now, Senator. The PUC is a vigorous enforcer on the
people that we regulate, to the tune of half a billion
dollars----
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Mr. Clanon.--in fines and----
Senator Boxer. That's why I----
Mr. Clanon.--restitution.
Senator Boxer.--was asking the question.
Mr. Clanon. Yes.
Senator Boxer. Because the New York Times said something
other than that. It said, ``The CPUC, which oversees most of
the State's pipelines, told Federal regulators several years
ago, in documents, that it rarely fines any gas pipeline.'' So,
that's why I'm just asking you, for the record, the fines on
these gas pipelines.
And for the CPUC, according the PHMSA, the CPUC only
conducted inspections on 787 out of 935 inspection days for
Fiscal Year 2010, which makes California rank just above
Arkansas and Puerto Rico on its certification scores. These
certification scores help determine grant funding for
California. Are you aware of this low score, and can you
explain it?
Mr. Clanon. I don't know about that particular year. I know
that, over the course of the last several years, we've actually
been rated high by PHMSA. I don't know about that particular
year.
Senator Boxer. Well, this is this year.
Mr. Clanon. Yes. So, I don't know the specifics of this
year. But, I do know that, over the last several years, we've
actually been rated very high, in terms of our PHMSA-
certified----
Senator Boxer. OK.
Mr. Clanon.--oversight.
Senator Boxer. But, I'm asking you about Fiscal Year 2010,
because this is getting to the current time. So, if you could
respond to that in writing, as to why you think that was the
case--maybe it's an aberration in Fiscal Year 2010--we'd like
to know that.
Mr. Clanon. I'd be happy to do that.
[The information referred to is contained in the appendix.]
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much.
And, to Mr. Johns of PG&E, the Contra Costa Times recently
reported that PG&E has failed to spend millions of dollars it
designated for pipeline safety repairs over the past two
decades--and this is a quote from the paper--``collecting $80
million more than it spent for its gas pipeline replacement
program.'' Is that accurate?
Mr. Johns. I don't believe that that is accurate. In fact,
we have spent $30 million more on the gas transportation side
of our business than what we've been authorized to spend by the
California Public Utilities Commission over the last 5 years.
Senator Boxer. OK. So, you disagree with the Contra Costa
Times?
Mr. Johns. I didn't do any work to validate what their
numbers were, but I do know that what we've spent over the last
5 years is what I acknowledged.
Senator Boxer. OK. They're talking about the past two
decades. And we'll put that article in the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
PG&E Collected Millions More for Pipeline Repair than it Spent
Saturday, September 18, 2010--Contra Costa Times, Walnut Creek, Calif.
By Mike Taugher
For the past 20 years, PG&E has failed to spend tens of millions of
dollars it told regulators it would use to replace aging gas pipelines,
documents show.
Between 1993 and 1995 alone, the company collected $80 million more
than it spent for its gas pipeline replacement program.
That sum easily would have been enough to replace gas transmission
segments in Livermore and Fremont that the utility identified as the
two highest risk pipelines in the Bay Area--with enough left over to
fix a pipeline segment near the site of the San Bruno pipe identified
as being an ``unacceptably high'' risk, according to regulatory
documents.
Those three projects would cost a total of $53.5 million, according
to PG&E estimates.
Regulators expressed concern about underspending on pipeline
replacement as recently as 2007, when the California Public Utilities
Commission required--possibly for the first time--that PG&E spend money
collected for its pipeline replacement program for the originally
stated purpose.
Regulators said Friday that PG&E continued in recent years to spend
less than forecast on pipeline replacement.
``It's the whole regulatory game. You come up with these very
appealing things to spend on and it becomes a slush fund to spend on
other purposes,'' said Mike Florio, a senior attorney for the consumer
advocacy group TURN: The Utility Reform Network.
In an e-mailed statement, PG&E said it has the flexibility to use
the pipeline replacement money for other priorities.
``When we file our rate cases, we forecast to the best of our
ability at the time what work we think will need to be done, and ask
the Commission for funding to do that work,'' according to the
statement from spokesman Paul Moreno. ``The Commission then gives us a
budget and gives us the flexibility to spend that budget based on our
assessment of priorities.''
``Because it is a forecast, things often change (emergencies,
different pipes become priorities, etc.), so we redirect our allowed
spending based on assessment of priorities.''
Moreno said that between 1985 and 2009, the replacement program
installed 2,111 miles of distribution and transmission pipelines at a
cost of $1.5 billion. He said all of the pipeline replacement money
spent elsewhere went to capital projects.
In the aftermath of the Sept. 9 explosion in San Bruno, regulators
are focusing again on PG&E's pipeline replacement spending.
Earlier this week, the utilities commission asked the power company
to compare how much it told regulators it would spend on pipeline
safety since 2005 and how much it actually spent.
Then on Friday it asked for information about any repairs scheduled
on Line 132, which included the segment that exploded in San Bruno, and
``a detailed explanation as to why any replacements or upgrades have
not been completed.''
But the concern about how PG&E spends money it collects to replace
gas pipelines goes back to at least 1995, when regulators admonished
the utility for collecting more than it needed during the previous 5
years.
``Despite consistent underspending in previous years, we granted
PG&E's full funding request . . . on the basis that PG&E should
continue replacing old pipelines `as quickly as possible' in the
interest of safety,'' utility commission members wrote in a 1995
decision on PG&E's gas and electric rates.
``We stated our expectation that PG&E should use the authorized
funds for their intended purpose and even accelerate the pace of the
program,'' the decision continued. ``Between the time we issued the
last general rate case decision and the filing of this one, PG&E has
fallen short of our stated expectations.''
In that decision, Commissioners noted that despite underspending,
the pipeline replacement program appeared to be on schedule, and
suggested they were awarding PG&E more than it needed.
But regulators continued to grant the company's spending requests
in hopes it would speed up pipe replacement, according to the 1995
decision.
The 1995 rate requests referred specifically to replacing
neighborhood gas distribution lines, not the larger transmission lines
like the one that exploded in San Bruno.
But the funds were intended for a program that was used to replace
both distribution and transmission lines.
According to PG&E, that program was split at the end of 2009 so
that transmission line replacements are now funded from a different
program.
Regulators said it is the utility's job, not theirs, to make
decisions about specific projects, but they are likely to scrutinize
more closely PG&E's spending.
``What you're identifying is a pattern,'' said Julie Fitch, Energy
Division Director for the utilities commission, in response to a Bay
Area News Group query. ``It's likely we're going to be asking them for
more detail on what they are spending on and why.''
Florio, the TURN attorney, said it is difficult to track how
program money is spent.
``They collect money and they spend money, but there aren't any
tags on the dollars to say it's earmarked for one thing or another,''
he said.
Assemblyman Jerry Hill, D-San Mateo, said he was angered to hear
earlier this week that PG&E had charged the public $5 million in rate
increases several years to upgrade the transmission line 2.8 miles
north of the line that exploded in San Bruno, yet still has not done
the repairs.
That section of line is in Hill's district, he said, just like the
part that blew up.
``I'm not happy at all about that, and now I'm hearing there are
other cases like that,'' Hill said. ``What it shows is a lack of proper
oversight.''
Amid demands by lawmakers that PG&E release its list of 100 high-
risk gas-line segments because of the disastrous San Bruno explosion,
state regulators on Friday asked the utility for that list and other
information about how the company compiled it and what it has or hasn't
done to upgrade those risky pipelines.
The letter from utilities commission Executive Director Paul Clanon
to PG&E President Christopher Johns, seeks ``maps showing the location
of each pipeline segment'' on the list as well as ``detailed
description of the criteria PG&E uses in deciding which pipeline
segments to characterize as high-priority projects.''
The agency, which regulates PG&E, particularly sought information
about high-risk pipes along gas-Line 132, where the explosion occurred.
The Commission asked the company for ``a detailed explanation of the
factors PG&E took into account in deciding to include such segment(s)
on the list, and a detailed explanation to why any replacement or
upgrades have not yet been completed.''
The agency also asked the company to explain how long it would take
to prepare a list of where on its gas transmission lines manual shut-
off valves can be replaced with remotely operated or automatic shut-off
valves. Many experts believe automatic or remote values allow utilities
to more quickly halt the flow of gas after explosions.
Utilities commission spokeswoman Terrie Prosper said investigators
with the agency and the National Transportation Safety Board, who are
looking into the explosion, probably had asked for and received all of
the information sought in the letter. However, she added, ``By Mr.
Clanon asking for it, he can obtain the information as well and make it
available to the public.''
Bay Area News Group reporters Steve Johnson and Paul Rogers
contributed to this story. Mike Taugher covers the environment. Contact
him at 925-943-8257.
Senator Boxer. So, if you could just answer that,
specifically, ``over the past two decades,'' if they're right
or wrong on $80 million being left on the table on its gas
pipeline replacement program.
Mr. Johns. I will have to get you the last----
Senator Boxer. Oh, yes.
Mr. Johns.--two decades. I can----
Senator Boxer. I understand.
Mr. Johns.--I can provide you with that.
[The information referred to is contained in the appendix.]
Senator Boxer. Yes. That's what we're asking. Thank you.
Now, the San Francisco Chronicle reported that PG&E
requested $5 million in 2008 to replace a different segment of
the transmission pipe that exploded in San Bruno, but that the
repair work on that segment was never completed. Is that
accurate?
Mr. Johns. That particular segment of pipeline, which was
not the pipeline in question for today, was originally part of
our rate filing in the 2007 time frame. And that request, at
that time, was based on initial analysis, as part of our
preventive maintenance program. When we did further analysis of
that pipeline, we realized that the pipeline was still in--was
in good order and did not require any immediate attention. And
so, it was rescheduled, and other higher-priority work was done
instead.
Senator Boxer. OK. Well, here's what they said. They said--
I'll read it again--``PG&E requested $5 million in 2008 to
replace a different segment of the transmission pipe that
exploded in San Bruno, but that the repair work on that segment
was never completed. It was also reported that PG&E requested,
again, another $5 million in 2009 for that same segment. But
now, that segment won't be replaced until 2013.''
So, is the newspaper right? You requested $5 million, you
didn't spend it. Then you went back and requested another $5
million, and you're not going to spend it until 2013. Why were
those repairs never completed?
Mr. Johns. Senator, what we do is, is that we have over
20,000 different pipeline segments that we constantly analyze
and look out into the future as to potential needed repairs,
preventive maintenance. And things will move up and down on
that list, as far as priorities are concerned.
So, for instance, if you have a pipeline in an area where
maybe somebody's going to do some construction, that might move
it up on the list of potential need for watching, because
somebody might be able to dig into it. If they then complete
the construction and move on, then that would move down the
list. So, we are constantly reevaluating the need.
So, the specific item that you looked at was originally on
our list of things to do. And as we went out and did further
work, we realized that we did not need to do that at that point
in time, could do that later, but, instead, could do other
high-priority work. And, as I said, in total over the last 5
years, including the years that this particular pipeline
segment was involved, we actually spent more that what was
authorized by the CPUC. So, we took that $5 million and spent
it on higher-priority items during that time.
Senator Boxer. OK. By the way, this is the San Francisco
Chronicle. I'm just asking you questions that were raised by
these investigative reporters. So, I'm trying to understand it.
So, what you're saying is, you asked the CPUC for $5
million for this segment of pipe--not the one that exploded,
but another segment of that same pipeline, to repair it. You
didn't repair it, because it didn't need it. But, then you went
right back and asked for another $5 million for the same
segment. I'm confused. And you raised rates to cover that. Is
that correct?
Mr. Johns. We include not just this $5 million, but all of
our segments that we plan to do work, in our filings with the
Public Utilities Commission, to make sure we're doing our
preventive maintenance. So, what we did with the $5 million in
that year was--is, we worked on higher-priority work. And, as I
said, we actually spent more than what was authorized.
Senator Boxer. OK.
Well, let me ask Mr. Clanon this question. What is your
agency doing to ensure that repairs that are paid for by
increased rates--in other words, they asked for a specific
segment. You said yes. They didn't do it. Then they come back
the next year, ask for it again. They still haven't done it.
Are you checking and balancing this? Do you have a list of
these areas they're supposed to fix? Do you check on them, that
they're supposed to do it? Or how does that work? Do they send
you an amended request and say, ``By the way, we decided not to
do this, but we're going to use this $10 million for other
things?'' How do you work it?
Mr. Clanon. Senator, they request an overall budget for all
their pipeline work. Let's say it's $200 million. They come in
to the PUC; they say, ``We need $200 million to do pipeline
work.'' And at the time of that filing, they say, ``And these
are the projects that we think we need to do.'' There is a
process--you've seen this process in action, I know, many
times--at agencies like the PUC, outside interveners.
Eventually, the Public Utilities Commissioners decide on an
overall budget. The PUC doesn't say, ``You've got to fix this
milepost right here.'' We're looking at an overall budget.
There's a really important reason for that. It's so that
folks, like Mr. Johns here, can exercise their professional
judgment about where the money should be placed in an
individual year.
It's not surprising that individual projects can move up
and down on that list. And it doesn't mean that the ratepayers
are paying twice. What it means is that the utility managers
are the ones responsible for deciding where the money that they
get through the regulatory process should be spent.
Does the regulator then come along later and say, ``OK,
where was it spent? Was it spent wisely?'' Absolutely. That
happens the next time that the utility comes in to ask for a
budget. There's actually one of these proceedings every 2 or 3
years at the PUC, and that's the kind of oversight that is
levied.
I think this particular charge by the San Francisco
Chronicle is just based on a misunderstanding of the way that
utilities are regulated. You don't want public utilities
commissions deciding which particular fix has to be made in
which particular year. You want the competent people at the
utilities held accountable for those decisions. And that's the
way it works.
Senator Boxer. I guess my concern is, they come in and they
say, ``We need to fix it.'' And they don't fix it, and then
they say, ``Oh, let's ask for the same money again.'' And then
they don't fix it until 2013. If you're only looking at that
every 2 years, my own opinion is, I think you need to
scrutinize these lists a little bit better. That from afar,
seems to me, especially in light of what's happening here--
because they may decide to go ahead and fix something else
that's not in a highly-populated area, and you may think it's
more important to take care of those fixes.
Mr. Clanon. I think you're very right, ma'am. And actually,
there has been a step forward in this, just in the last 10
days. PG&E actually made public, for the first time, in a
broadcast way, a week ago yesterday, the list of the top 100
transmission replacement and maintenance projects, and
immediately went out and spoke to the local officials, folks
like the mayor and the--and--in San Bruno--so that the local
people also now understand, in PG&E service territory, where
this list of projects is, so that they can help the PUC
scrutinize those projects, help keep PG&E's management's feet
to the fire, which is the appropriate thing when work that is
scheduled is put off, probably for good reasons--but,
increasing the public scrutiny by putting the information out
there. I applaud PG&E for doing that.
Senator Boxer. Well, it may be for good reason, but it
could be wrong, too.
Mr. Clanon. Absolutely.
Senator Boxer. We need a check and balance.
Mr. Clanon. Absolutely. And----
Senator Boxer. OK. Let me ask you this. Why has the CPUC
not required automatic or remote shut-off valves for
transmission pipelines in high-consequence areas? And are you
considering mandating the use of remote or automatic shut-off
valves on all high-risk transmission lines?
Mr. Clanon. We are, yes. In my testimony, as I mentioned,
we've already asked PG&E for an analysis of PG&E's system to
tell us where remote and automatic cutoff valves make sense.
So, that's going to be an active issue for us, not 18 months
from now, but actually right now. We're beginning that review
already.
As to why it hasn't been done to this point, I don't know
that any State has been requiring that. I don't know that
there's an example of it.
Senator Boxer. Well, that's----
Mr. Clanon. These valves are----
Senator Boxer.--coming from California, you know we're
always the leader.
Mr. Clanon. Well, I'm with you on that. And maybe we'll be
ahead of the curve on this one, too.
Senator Boxer. I would hope so.
Mr. Clanon. We need to talk about----
Senator Boxer. Let me just say, this is the most serious
accident in the country, in terms of lives lost. Am I correct?
Mr. Clanon. I think that's absolutely right.
Senator Boxer. All right. So, we have to take action and
set the pace here. So, what I would like to see you do is work
swiftly as you can. We now know, because we've gotten the
information, how many miles we have of these high-consequence
lines. And you know how close your friend lived to that line.
Mr. Clanon. Yes.
Senator Boxer. And that's just a disaster waiting to
happen, now that we look at it, you know? So, it seems to me,
we've been--we've not only been warned, we've been told that we
have to take action. So, I'm going to ask you to submit in
writing to me, What is the PUC's plan for moving ahead with
these automatic shut-off valves? And let's be a leader on this.
[The information referred to is contained in the appendix.]
Senator Boxer. Now, when utilities request a rate increase
for repairs of a line that's designated as high-consequence,
how long do they have to complete those repairs? I suppose you
don't have any distinction, here, whether it's high-consequence
or not. You don't put a time limit on it?
Mr. Clanon. We don't, yes. It's a thing that gets reviewed
over time as the utility comes in for rate requests. It gets
scrutinized by experts within the PUC process. It'll now also
be scrutinized by folks at the local level and by the media,
now that that----
Senator Boxer. OK.
Mr. Clanon.--that information is actually public. I think
that will help us provide that kind of oversight.
Senator Boxer. Well, if I could recommend this, just as a
thought, what's the total number of lines that you oversee,
intrastate?
Mr. Clanon. It's a lot. It's something like 6,000 miles,
just in PG&E's own----
Senator Boxer. Well, what about all of them?
Mr. Clanon.--territory. And double that, plus a little bit
more----
Senator Boxer. Twelve thousand.
Mr. Clanon.--for the whole State, yes.
Senator Boxer. OK. But, then if you look at that, and then
approximately 3,000 miles--is that right?--is high-
consequence?--3,600. So, you have, let's just say,
approximately, 12,000 miles of line and about 3,600 high-
consequence. Would you think about taking that 3,600 miles and
just making that a priority, and separating it out from
everything else you do? I mean, God help us if something
happens in a community like this. If it's in a remote area,
it's bad. But, here it's a disaster. So, will you take a look
at that idea of changing your rules for the high-consequence
lines?
Mr. Clanon. Of course.
Senator Boxer. That's good.
Have you mandated a time-frame for PG&E to complete
inspections and repairs on the top 100 high-risk segments list
that the company recently released?
Mr. Clanon. No. And, as I said--so, they're--now we have
all the folks at the local level scrutiny--scrutinizing that
list, along with folks at the PUC. So, the amount of oversight
that that list is getting now will provide a strong feet-to-
the-fire for PG&E to make sure that the ones that are related
to public safety are up at the top of the list. And I'm sure
that's the way PG&E would want it anyway. But, now we've got
much stronger public oversight, along with the PUC.
Senator Boxer. OK.
And, Mr. Johns, is PG&E complying with the directive issued
by the CPUC on September 12, including immediate inspection of
all natural gas lines? And what date is PG&E expected to fully
comply with that directive?
Mr. Johns. Senator, we have been immediately implementing
all of the items that were directed by the CPUC, and they're--
depending on which item, some of them are already completed,
some of them are moving forward to meet the dates that the CPUC
put forth in their order last week. So, we have--as Mr. Clanon
said, we have already reduced the pressure in the pipelines,
the three pipelines in the peninsula. We have already completed
the resurvey of those three pipelines. We've begun the aerial
survey and the foot survey of the rest of our system, starting
first with those high-consequence areas.
Senator Boxer. OK. And, Mr. Johns, why did it take nearly 2
hours to shut the gas off?
Mr. Johns. Our team had to go through the process of
getting to--get the tools and equipment, go through--6-o'clock-
in-the-evening traffic to get to those things. They did, and
got there as quickly as they could, in order to turn the valves
off and stop the gas flow. In fact, the team that went out
there--and it was--the first responder actually went out before
they were even called, because they could see that there was an
incident out there. And, as I would expect them to, and as the
great team members that they are, that they saw an accident
that was occurring that required response immediately, and they
got out there as quickly as they could.
Senator Boxer. But, I'm assuming that you're not in any way
saying that that's a good enough response--2 hours.
Mr. Johns. What I'm saying is, is that I believe they got
there----
Senator Boxer. No, I'm not----
Mr. Johns.--as quickly as they could.
Senator Boxer.--asking you to--in other words, we all
support everybody who was on the scene. But, you're not
suggesting that that's an adequate situation, are you, for a
future disaster like that, to take 2 hours to shut off this
ball of fire?
Mr. Johns. What I will say is, is that we will look at
every way we can to make sure that responses are as quick as
possible----
Senator Boxer. OK, but that's----
Mr. Johns.--and quicker than that.
Senator Boxer.--not the--you--it's 6 o'clock at night, and
you're in traffic. Don't you think we ought to have shut-off
valves in place?
Mr. Johns. What I believe is, is that we will work in--with
the CPUC to put--to look where it makes sense, because shut-off
valves, in that instance, would--assuming that they work---
would have turned it off faster than what we got there.
Senator Boxer. Assuming they work, of course.
Mr. Johns. Yes.
Senator Boxer. So, you would agree that, had there been a
shut-off valve, we could have averted the worst disaster, if
those valves worked.
Mr. Johns. What I will agree with is, is that if there were
an automated shut-off valve or a remote-control----
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Mr. Johns.--shut-off valve in there, that the gas flow
would have stopped faster than by the time our people got
there. As you heard the Vice Chair say, he is investigating
what the ramifications are, as far as the timing of it, in
terms of the disaster----
Senator Boxer. What's your understanding of how a shut-off
valve works? Do you have some out there in place?
Mr. Johns. What type of shut-off valve?
Senator Boxer. I'm asking you. Do you have shut-off
valves--remote shut-off valves, automatic shut-off valves? Do
you work with those?
Mr. Johns. We have those throughout our system.
Senator Boxer. You do.
Mr. Johns. We have manual valves----
Senator Boxer. And have they ever worked for you?
Mr. Johns. The remote shut-off valves?
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Mr. Johns. And the automatic shut-off valves? Yes, they
have.
Senator Boxer. OK. Could you get a letter to me, as to--
just to give me an example of where they've worked, and how
they've worked?
[The information referred to is contained in the appendix.]
Mr. Johns. Yes, I can----
Senator Boxer. Thank you. That would be very, very helpful.
I know these are hard questions. Mr. Johns, the LA Times
reported that PG&E's leak rate is at 6.2, annually, per 1,000
miles of transmission pipes serving high-consequence areas.
This is more than six times the average leak rate for the
Nation's six other large operators. Can you explain why PG&E's
leak rate is so high? And what actions are you taking to
address this problem of leakage?
Mr. Johns. Senator, I understand that the LA Times wrote
that article.
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Mr. Johns. I do not know how they came up with the numbers.
What I can tell you is, is that, when we compare ourselves
across the industry on the leak rate per pipeline mile for
high-concentration areas, our rate is .0057, and the industry's
rate is .0049. Those are very close together. I don't know
where the LA Times got their information.
Senator Boxer. Well, we understand the reported leak rates
at Southern California Gas--it's 2.3 per 1,000 miles, compared
to 6.2 per 1,000 miles for you. That's for all your lines.
Mr. Johns. Again, they referred to high-concentration
areas. I have the information, that's on PHMSA's website that
says, ``Here's what it is for high-concentration areas for the
entire country,'' and the average is .0049.
Senator Boxer. Well, I'm just talking about Southern
California Gas.
Mr. Johns. Yes, and I'm not familiar with what their----
Senator Boxer. OK.
Mr. Johns.--their rate is.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Clanon, are you familiar with the leak
rate of PG&E, compared to Southern California Gas?
Mr. Clanon. I've seen some of those numbers. And one point
to make about those numbers, without saying that they're not
important, is that they vary pretty wildly during--from year to
year. They're also pretty small. They go from 2 or 3 up to 9 or
so in a year. So, the experience of 2 or 3 bad years can really
skew those numbers.
I don't want to pooh-pooh these numbers. I think that we
have to look at them hard. But, it is important not to try to
reduce something like gas pipeline safety to one number. I
don't want to pooh-pooh that analysis. I think we have to look
at it hard. But, the analysis of gas pipeline safety, in
general, I think the Committee understands how complex that is,
and so do we all, working in it.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Johns, what methods does PG&E use to
inspect transmission lines that are not able to use ``smart
pig'' technology?
Mr. Johns. Yes, there are three approved methods, by the
Federal regulation. One of them is the ``smart pig''
methodology. The other one is referred to as ``external
corrosion direct assessment,'' or ECDA, and the other one is
high-pressure testing. And so, we utilize all three of those
methodologies. We use the pigging where we possibly can. And if
not, then we use, generally, the external corrosion detective
methodology. And then we use the high-pressure testing,
generally when we're putting in new lines.
Senator Boxer. OK. And you recently released a list of the
top 100 high-risk pipeline segments. When will inspections and
repairs be completed on those segments?
Mr. Johns. Yes, we did release those, as--Senator, as you
and I talked about----
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Mr. Johns.--at your conference. We wanted to make those
available to the public. And, in fact, starting just over the
weekend, we made it available so that all of our customers
could go online, in a secure----
Senator Boxer. Good.
Mr. Johns.--area, to see how far away they are from any of
those.
As far as our top 100 lines, as you refer to them, again,
that is----
Senator Boxer. Well, I think that was your list of the top
100 high-risk pipeline segments.
Mr. Johns. Our--it's our list of the top 100 planning
segments. It's part of our risk-management process. It's for
our future preventive maintenance programming. And I think,
when people look at that list, what they will find is, is that
there are some instances where there's planned replacement,
because we want to make sure that we get ahead of that. There's
other places where all we need to do is monitor it, or maybe
other areas where we need to do just more testing. So----
Senator Boxer. Well, when will----
Mr. Johns.--there are dates associated with each one of
those segments.
Senator Boxer. So, can you tell me when those inspections
and repairs will be completed on those top 100?
Mr. Johns. We have made public when each one of those
areas--and on there is a date as to, if there is construction
to be done, when that construction is expected to be completed.
Otherwise, it would be ongoing monitoring and further analysis.
And that's also on that list. I'll be glad to give you that
list.
[The information referred to is contained in the appendix.]
Senator Boxer. And before you're ordered to do this by
CPUC, if they do order you, will you commit to installing
remote access or automatic shut-off valves on those high-risk
pipelines?
Mr. Johns. I will work with the CPUC to put them in where
everybody believes that they make sense to put in.
Senator Boxer. So, you won't decide it. They'll decide it?
Mr. Johns. No, we will work with them.
Senator Boxer. OK.
Mr. Johns. They've asked us to put together a list and an
analysis of where and how to implement these, where they would
make sense. We will complete that analysis and provide that to
them by their deadline. And we will work with them--and, quite
frankly, with the industry as a whole, because this is
something that I think all companies need to be looking at, as
to, ``Where do these make sense?'' so that we can run the
safest pipelines possible.
Senator Boxer. Well, again, where it makes sense is where
the people live. I mean, that's clear. And if we have 10,000
miles--12,000 miles of pipeline, and 3,600 are by people,
that's where you've got to look first. So, that should guide
you.
Has PG&E found any leaks on transmission lines since CPUC
ordered an immediate inspection of all gas lines following the
explosion? Have you discovered any leaks?
Mr. Johns. We completed the leak survey on the three
pipelines in the peninsula. We found one leak, not on the
pipeline, but at a valve. We immediately fixed it.
Senator Boxer. Good. And you're continuing that----
Mr. Johns. We are.
Senator Boxer.--and make those improvements as soon as you
can, not waiting until anyone smells any gas; you're just
going.
Mr. Johns. Senator, we have a very robust program, where
we're constantly doing leak----
Senator Boxer. Good.
Mr. Johns.--surveys, we're walking our pipelines. And what
I want to do is--make sure that you are aware is that--I assure
you, if something is potentially endangering the public, we fix
it immediately.
Senator Boxer. OK.
Mr. Johns. We do not put it on a list. We do not wait until
later.
Senator Boxer. Good.
Mr. Johns. We fix it immediately.
Senator Boxer. OK. You know, we're going to see what
happened with this, and we don't know the answer yet.
But, Mayor, I want to ask you something. Under the Pipeline
Safety Improvement Act of 2002, each pipeline operator is
required to develop and implement a continuing public education
program to increase awareness for the public, and training for
emergency response agencies. How often have you and your first
responders worked with PG&E to ensure that our first responders
are knowledgeable in the most up-to-date layout of your
pipeline system, and ensure that you had accurate maps on hand
and knew how to respond?
Mr. Ruane. Senator, I'm not aware of any workings along
with PG&E. Now, I may be just not up on the information, but
I'm not aware of any.
Senator Boxer. OK.
Well, I just want to thank the panel. I think that we got
very clear answers here. I think we got some ideas on how to
move forward. And I hope we will work closely together.
We did learn of the eighth victim. When you said it, Mr.
Mayor, we had gotten a notification from the Governor that that
was confirmed.
We have to take steps, as the Mayor said, to ensure this
never happens again, and that San Bruno is made whole. I mean,
that's key.
For me, it seems there are obvious things we have to do:
immediate thorough inspections on these high-risk areas, and
action to address any problem that is noted; shut-off valves in
areas like this; better reporting so that we know the results
of inspections; and greater oversight.
We need a good bill. I think the Feinstein-Boxer bill is
good, but you may have ideas to make it better, and I would
look forward to everyone's help on that; we may have left
something out. Mr. Kessler, Mr. Johns, Mr. Clanon, and Mayor,
I'd like you to look at this bill, because we want to make it
workable, and we want to make sure that people can look back to
this time and say, ``That was the time they said, 'This won't
happen again.''' Because Mr. Kessler is right, if we don't move
these pipelines are not getting younger, you know. We know what
causes these problems--corrosion, excavation, all these--we
know. This isn't a mysterious thing. We need to take the
information we have, and we need to make sure that we move
forward and we fix the problem.
And all of you have been invaluable to me and, I know, to
Senator Feinstein, Senator Lautenberg, Senator Thune, and
Senator Johanns, all who are really interested. This is a
problem that we face nationwide, and I want to see California
be the leader here. We have to do that, because we suffered
this loss and we need to take action.
So, I thank every single one of you for being here. I know
this wasn't an easy time for any of us, but I think it was
important to do this. As we try to make this right, there are a
lot of people for whom their world can never be made right. So,
we owe it to everybody to make sure nobody goes through what
these families, these victims and their families, are going
through.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 5:06 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
United States Senate
Washington, DC, September 13, 2010
Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman,
Administrator,
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration,
Washington, DC.
Dear Administrator Quarterman:
This weekend, we witnessed the devastating damage in San Bruno,
California where a natural gas pipeline explosion claimed the lives of
at least four people and injured 60 others. More than three dozen homes
were destroyed.
Californians must feel confident that their communities are safe
and that the regulatory agencies responsible for maintaining natural
gas pipelines arc doing everything possible to guarantee their safety.
It is critical that the public's confidence is restored and that
utilities are held accountable for the safety of their pipelines.
While this particular pipeline was an intrastate pipeline under the
jurisdiction of the California Public Utilities Commission, we request
that you immediately begin inspections of the 1,500 miles of interstate
natural gas transmission pipelines in California that fall under
Federal jurisdiction--with priority given to those near residential
areas. We also ask that you provide us with the following information:
1. The total number of miles of all interstate natural gas
transmission and distribution pipelines located within the
State of California and a list of those pipelines located in
residential areas.
2. A list of California cities and counties in which these
pipelines are located.
3. The installation dates for these pipelines and the dates any
upgrades or improvements were completed.
4. The schedule by which these pipelines are inspected. Please
list the dates of the most recent inspections and any scheduled
future inspections.
Given the seriousness of this matter, we request that this
information be provided to us within the next few working days.
Sincerely,
Barbara Boxer,
United States Senator.
Dianne Feinstein,
United States Senator.
______
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
U.S. Department of Transportation
Washington, DC, September 27, 2010
Hon. Barbara Boxer,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Boxer:
Thank you for your letter of September 13, co-signed by Senator
Dianne Feinstein, regarding the tragic events in San Bruno and your
safety concerns about the natural gas transmission pipelines in
California. All Californians as well as all Americans should feel
confident that their communities are safe and that the State and
Federal pipeline safety regulators are doing what is necessary to
protect our citizens.
As overseers of the Nation's 2.5 million miles of pipelines, the
United States Department of Transportation (Department) holds the
people's trust to ensure that pipeline operators are in compliance with
pipeline safety regulations. I am committed to ensuring both human and
environmental safety. Like all Americans, I am concerned by the recent
tragedy in San Bruno and have directed my staff to fully support the
National Transportation Safety Board in its investigation and the
California Public Utility Commission in its enforcement actions.
You asked that we immediately begin inspections of the 1,500 miles
of federally regulated interstate natural gas transmission pipelines in
California with priority to those near residential areas. Department
engineers in the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA) inspect gas transmission, gas gathering and gas distribution
(municipal) pipeline operators in the State of California. PHMSA
regional personnel are currently in the process of developing their
inspection plans for Fiscal Year 2011. These inspection plans take into
consideration risks that each pipeline poses to the public and the
environment as well as when an operator was last inspected. Higher risk
pipelines are inspected more frequently than less risky pipelines. In
general, the PHMSA Western Region schedule for inspecting pipelines is
at least once every 2 to 3 years. So far for Fiscal Year 2011, two
inspections that have already been tentatively planned in California
are for Plains Exploration and Production Company and Rosetta
Resources. Our current plan is to inspect all pipelines inspected in
2008 in 2011, as well as many pipelines inspected in 2009, as resources
permit.
You asked for additional information about the number of pipeline
miles in California, where the pipelines intersect residential areas,
when the pipelines were installed and dates of recent inspections. I
have enclosed the information you requested in your letter. An
identical response has been sent to Senator Feinstein.
I hope this information is helpful to you. If I can provide further
assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me or Julia P. Valentine,
Associate Administrator for the Office of Governmental, International
and Public Affairs, at 202-366-4831.
Regards,
Cynthia L. Quarterman,
Administrator.
Enclosure
______
Enclosure
PHMSA Responses to September 13, 2010 Request
From Senator Boxer and Senator Feinstein
1. The total number of miles of all interstate natural gas transmission
and distribution pipelines located within the State of
California and a list of those pipelines located in residential
areas.
1,209 miles \1\ of active interstate natural gas transmission
pipelines in the State of California have been reported to the National
Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ With the inclusion of Idled and inactive pipes (not currently
operating but not removed from the system), the interstate mileage in
NPMS Is about 1,500. The interstate mileage is only available through
the National Pipeline Mapping System.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
102,659 miles of gas distribution main pipelines in the State of
California were reported on calendar year 2009 Annual Reports.\2\
Distribution mileage is generally residential in nature.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Source: Distribution main mites from PHMSA Form F7100.1-1 Data
as of 9/17/2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
8,572,075 gas distribution service lines in the State of California
were reported on calendar year 2009 Annual Reports.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Source: Number of Services from PHMSA Form F7100.1-1 Data as of
9/17/2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHMSA does not maintain information on local land use and therefore
we are unable to identify which of the gas transmission and
distribution pipelines are specifically located in residential areas.
However, based on computations of proximity of the mileage in the NPMS
to densely populated areas from census information, we can say that
there are about 3,636 miles of gas transmission miles within densely
populated areas in California. Regardless, all of the active inspection
units both within and outside of high consequence areas (HCAs) in
California have been inspected since 2008 with the exception of two
units scheduled for inspection this Fall.
2. A list of California cities and counties in which these pipelines
are located.
Interstate and Intrastate Gas Transmission Pipelines by California
Urbanized Area
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Urbanized Area OPID Operator Name Mileage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Antioch,CA 2731 Chevron Pipe Line Co. 8.6
Antioch, CA 31477 CPN Pipeline Company 28.9
Antioch, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 27.6
Antioch, CA 18608 Standard Pacific Gas Line 12.3
Inc.
Antioch,CA 31296 Venoco, Inc. 6.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atascadero--El Paso de 2731 Chevron Pipe Line Co. 2.7
Robles
(Paso Robles), CA
Atascadero--El Paso de 31684 ConocoPhillips 0.0
Robles
(Paso Robles), CA
Atascadero--El Paso de 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 0.5
Robles
(Paso Robles), CA
Atascadero--El Paso de 18484 Southern California Gas 11.2
Robles Co.
(Paso Robles), CA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bakersfield, CA 2731 Chevron Pipe Line Co. 5.7
Bakersfield, CA 32116 Dick Brown Technical 5.0
Services
Bakersfield, CA 840 Mojave Pipeline Operating 1.2
Company
Bakersfield, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 24.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Camarillo, CA 18484 Southern California Gas 9.5
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chico, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 4.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Concord, CA 2731 Chevron Pipe Line Co. 4.2
Concord, CA 31477 CPN Pipeline Company 1.4
Concord, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 35.3
Concord, CA 18608 Standard Pacific Gas Line 3.8
Inc.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Davis, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 9.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
El Centro, CA 18484 Southern California Gas 7.3
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fairfield, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 11.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fresno, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 32.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gilroy--Morgan Hill, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 10.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hemet, CA 18484 Southern California Gas 17.4
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indio--Cathedral City-- 18484 Southern California Gas 3.9
Palm Springs, CA Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lancaster--Palmdale, CA 18484 Southern California Gas 30.1
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Livermore, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 15.3
Lodi, CA 31697 Lodi Gas Storage, LLC 0.3
Lodi, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 8.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lompoc, CA 18484 Southern California Gas 2.9
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Los Angeles--Long Beach-- 117 Air Products & Chemicals 14.1
Santa Ana, CA Inc.
Los Angeles--Long Beach-- 31610 BP West Coast Products LLC 18.6
Santa Ana, CA
Los Angeles--Long Beach-- 2731 Chevron Pipe Line Co. 19.6
Santa Ana, CA
Los Angeles--Long Beach-- 32083 DCOR, LCC 1.3
Santa Ana, CA
Los Angeles--Long Beach-- 26134 ExxonMobil Oil Corp.--West 47.8
Santa Ana, CA Coast
Los Angeles--Long Beach-- 31068 Seal Beach Gas Processing 1.1
Santa Ana, CA Venture
Los Angeles--Long Beach-- 18484 Southern California Gas 567.1
Santa Ana, CA Co.
Los Angeles--Long Beach-- 32253 Tesoro Los Angeles 0.7
Santa Ana, CA Refinery
Los Angeles--Long Beach-- 19410 Thums Long Beach Co. 4.1
Santa Ana, CA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Madera, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 13.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manteca, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 3.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Merced, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 14.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mission Viejo, CA 18484 Southern California Gas 33.0
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Modesto, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 61.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Napa, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 8.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oxnard, CA 26134 ExxonMobil Oil Corp--West 0.9
Coast
Oxnard, CA 18484 Southern California Gas 51.0
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petaluma, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 14.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Porterville, CA 18484 Southern California Gas 4.0
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Redding, CA 32304 City of Redding 0.9
Redding, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 27.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Riverside--San Bernardino, 18484 Southern California Gas 118.2
CA Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sacramento, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 140.7
Sacramento, CA 30749 Sacramento Municipal 10.1
Utility District
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Salinas, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 30.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
San Diego, CA 18112 San Diego Gas & Electric 193.9
Co.
San Diego, CA 18484 Southern California Gas 29.6
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
San Francisco--Oakland, CA 2731 Chevron Pipe Line Co. 12.0
San Francisco--Oakland, CA 32308 Northern California Power 0.7
Authority
San Francisco--Oakland, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 199.2
San Francisco--Oakland, CA 18608 Standard Pacific Gas Line 8.3
Inc.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
San Jose, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 87.4
San Jose, CA 32054 Silicon Valley Power 2.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
San Luis Obispo, CA 18484 Southern California Gas 10.2
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
San Rafael--Novato, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 31.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Santa Barbara, CA 32083 DCOR, LLC 0.1
Santa Barbara, CA 18484 Southern California Gas 75.5
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Santa Clarita, CA 26134 ExxonMobil Oil Corp.--West 0.1
Coast
Santa Clarita, CA 18484 Southern California Gas 42.5
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Santa Cruz, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 22.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Santa Maria, CA 18484 Southern California Gas 22.4
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Santa Rosa, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 24.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seaside--Monterey--Marina, 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 16.1
CA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stockton, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 27.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Temecula--Murrieta, CA 18484 Southern California Gas 33.4
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thousand Oaks, CA 18484 Southern California Gas 40.1
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tracy, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 4.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Turlock, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 9.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vacaville, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 8.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vallejo, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 16.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Victorville--Hesperia--App 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 0.4
le Valley, CA
Victorville--Hesperia--App 18484 Southern California Gas 1.5
le Valley, CA Co.
Victorville--Hesperia--App 18536 Southwest Gas Corp. 8.7
le Valley, CA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Visalia, CA 18484 Southern California Gas 3.8
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Watsonville, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 12.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yuba City, CA 31477 CPN Pipeline Company 1.9
Yuba City, CA 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 32.8
TOTAL: 2,546.6
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Please note: PHMSA was unable to identify a comprehensive, reliable
source for California political city boundaries. These statistics use
the U.S. Census' Urbanized Area boundaries. Urbanized areas are based
on population density and correspond closely to city boundaries.
Source: National Pipeline Mapping System, 09/10.
Interstate and Intrastate Gas Transmission Pipelines by California
County
------------------------------------------------------------------------
County OPID Operator Name Mileage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alameda 32308 Northern California Power 0.7
Authority
Alameda 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 170.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amador 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 21.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Butte 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 117.4
Butte 31287 Wild Goose Storage Inc. 13.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calaveras 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 17.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Colusa 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 186.6
Colusa 31287 Wild Goose Storage Inc. 20.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contra Costa 2731 Chevron Pipe Line Co. 45.1
Contra Costa 31477 CPN Pipeline Company 56.7
Contra Costa 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 206.0
Contra Costa 18608 Standard Pacific Gas Line 40.8
Inc.
Contra Costa 31296 Venoco, Inc. 27.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
El Dorado 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 4.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fresno 31394 California Gas Gathering 33.8
Inc.
Fresno 2731 Chevron Pipe Line Co. 45.0
Fresno 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 485.2
Fresno 18484 Southern California Gas 32.3
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Glenn 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 150.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Humboldt 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 97.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Imperial 31891 North Baja Pipeline LLC 57.8
Imperial 18484 Southern California Gas 143.2
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kern 2731 Chevron Pipe Line Co. 179.4
Kern 31477 CPN Pipeline Company 13.9
Kern 32116 Dick Brown Technical 12.0
Services
Kern 26134 ExxonMobil Oil Corp.--West 1.7
Coast
Kern 997 Midway Sunset Cogeneration 3.8
Co.
Kern 840 Mojave Pipeline Operating 227.7
Company
Kern 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 377.9
Kern 18201 Seneca Resources Corp. 3.8
Kern 18484 Southern California Gas 466.0
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kings 2731 Chevron Pipe Line Co. 36.1
Kings 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 74.7
Kings 18484 Southern California Gas 137.2
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lassen 30838 Tuscarora Gas Transmission 101.2
Company
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Los Angeles 117 Air Products & Chemicals 14.1
Inc.
Los Angeles 31610 BP West Coast Products LLC 18.6
Los Angeles 2731 Chevron Pipe Line Co. 17.9
Los Angeles 26134 ExxonMobil Oil Corp.--West 48.0
Coast
Los Angeles 18484 Southern California Gas 675.9
Co.
Los Angeles 32253 Tesoro Los Angeles 0.7
Refinery
Los Angeles 19410 Thums Long Beach Co. 4.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Madera 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 118.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marin 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 40.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mendocino 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 49.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Merced 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 160.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Modoc 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 80.6
Modoc 30838 Tuscarora Gas Transmission 86.9
Company
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monterey 2731 Chevron Pipe Line Co. 26.5
Monterey 26134 ExxonMobil Oil Corp.--West 0.9
Coast
Monterey 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 208.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Napa 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 49.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevada 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 16.6
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orange 2731 Chevron Pipe Line Co. 1.7
Orange 32083 DCOR, LLC 1.8
Orange 26134 ExxonMobil Oil Corp.--West 1.1
Coast
Orange 31068 Seal Beach Gas Processing 1.1
Venture
Orange 18484 Southern California Gas 181.7
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Placer 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 72.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Riverside 4280 El Paso Natural Gas Co. 43.2
Riverside 32093 Ex El Pipeline Services 14.1
LLC
Riverside 31891 North Baja Pipeline LLC 24.0
Riverside 18484 Southern California Gas 780.0
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sacramento 31477 CPN Pipeline Company 7.1
Sacramento 31697 Lodi Gas Storage, LLC 13.6
Sacramento 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 166.0
Sacramento 32203 Rosetta Resources 3.9
Sacramento 30749 Sacramento Municipal 39.7
Utility District
Sacramento 18608 Standard Pacific Gas Line 13.5
Inc.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
San Benito 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 184.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
San Bernardino 4280 El Paso Natural Gas Co. 50.3
San Bernardino 844 Kern River Gas 237.1
Transmission Co.
San Bernardino 840 Mojave Pipeline Operating 234.3
Company
San Bernardino 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 528.6
San Bernardino 20044 Praxair, Inc. 2.2
San Bernardino 12874 Questar Pipeline Company 36.2
San Bernardino 18484 Southern California Gas 730.8
Co.
San Bernardino 18536 Southwest Gas Corp. 20.6
San Bernardino 19610 Transwestern Pipeline 0.9
Company LLC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
San Diego 31477 CPN Pipeline Company 2.1
San Diego 18112 San Diego Gas & Electric 256.1
Co.
San Diego 18484 Southern California Gas 43.0
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
San Francisco 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 19.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
San Joaquin 31697 Lodi Gas Storage, LLC 23.6
San Joaquin 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 262.6
San Joaquin 31296 Venoco, Inc. 8.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
San Luis Obispo 2731 Chevron Pipe Line Co. 45.8
San Luis Obispo 31684 ConocoPhillips 9.6
San Luis Obispo 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 43.4
San Luis Obispo 18484 Southern California Gas 131.2
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
San Mateo 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 104.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Santa Barbara 32083 DCOR, LLC 0.1
Santa Barbara 4908 ExxonMobil Production 1.4
Company
Santa Barbara 18667 Plains Exploration & 7.4
Production Company (PXP)
Santa Barbara 18484 Southern California Gas 203.7
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Santa Clara 31477 CPN Pipeline Company 0.9
Santa Clara 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 178.1
Santa Clara 32054 Silicon Valley Power 2.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Santa Cruz 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 55.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shasta 32304 City of Redding 2.8
Shasta 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 184.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Siskiyou 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 41.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Solano 31477 CPN Pipeline Company 29.6
Solano 31697 Lodi Gas Storage, LLC 6.7
Solano 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 284.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sonoma 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 126.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stanislaus 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 198.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sutter 31477 CPN Pipeline Company 23.0
Sutter 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 131.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tehama 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 181.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Trinity 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 36.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tulare 18484 Southern California Gas 151.4
Co.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ventura 31067 Aera Energy LLC 1.2
Ventura 26134 ExxonMobil Oil Corp.--West 0.9
Coast
Ventura 18484 Southern California Gas 293.8
Co.
Ventura 32178 Vintage Production 1.6
California LLC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yolo 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 177.0
Yolo 30749 Sacramento Municipal 35.9
Utility District
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yuba 15007 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 62.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL: 11,989.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: National Pipeline Mapping System, 09/10; mileage represents in-
service miles.
3. The installation dates for these pipelines and the dates any
upgrades or improvements were completed.
Operators are required to report the decade of installation for
pipelines jurisdictional to PHMSA on a yearly basis. Below is a summary
of the total miles reported in California on calendar year 2009 Annual
Reports:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pre- 1940- 1950- 1960- 1970- 1980- 1990- 2000-
Unknown 1940 1949 1959 1969 1979 1989 1999 2009 TOTAL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transmission
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Onshore 72 553 998 3,363 2,151 823 1,051 2,044 874 11,930
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Offshore 0 0 0 0 10 0 8 0 0 18
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gathering
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Onshore 14 0 0 40 59 20 81 10 3 228
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Offshore 0 0 0 0 40 0 45 3 0 87
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
System Total 86 553 999 3,403 2,260 843 1,185 2,057 877 12,263
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: 2009 Gas Transmission and Gathering Annual Reports PHMSA F7100.2-1.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gas Distribution Unknown Pre- 1940 1940- 1949 1950- 1959 1960- 1969 1970- 1979 1980- 1989 1990- 1999 2000- 2009 TOTAL
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Miles of Main 147 4,929 6,356 15,828 14,949 16,425 17,480 12,705 13,840 102,659
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Services 2,490 178,763 344,058 1,173,203 1,174,889 1,521,456 1,770,891 1,193,827 1,212,498 8,572,075
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: 2009 Gas Distribution Annual Reports PHMSA 7100.1-1.
4. The schedule by which these pipelines are inspected. Please list the
dates of the most recent inspections and any scheduled future
inspections.
PHMSA uses a risk-based inspection planning approach to prioritize
which companies and which segments of pipeline should be inspected and
what type of inspection is needed. The risk-based inspection planning
process, which annually occurs in the fall for the subsequent year,
considers company inspection and compliance history as well as
performance indicators such as leaks, reported incidents and safety
related condition reports. Additional safety factors are considered
such as the proximity to populated or environmentally sensitive areas
and the material properties of the pipeline itself. The process
considers how long it has been since the last inspection to assure that
every pipeline company is inspected on a regular basis. PHMSA also
factors in any safety concerns we might have that are not otherwise
accounted for. There are many types of inspections, from a standard
inspection, which focuses on shorter segments of pipeline, to a
comprehensive company-wide integrated inspection. We inspect for
compliance with operator qualification requirements and drug prevention
and alcohol misuse regulations. PHMSA may also perform special
inspections targeted on specific safety concerns and investigates all
public complaints. Because of the nature of our planning process, it is
not possible to provide a list of all scheduled future inspections. We
have provided below the information that we currently have available.
The most recent (or scheduled) inspection date for each federally
inspected unit is shown below.\4\ Plans at this time are to include the
units inspected in 2008 in the 2011 inspection schedule as well as some
of the units inspected in 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Source: PHMSA Safety Monitoring & Reporting Tool (SMART); Data
as of 9/17/2010; Unit lists may include inactive/idled pipes that are
not operating currently but not vacated and removed from the system so
they are still considered inspection units by PHMSA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pipeline systems inspected by the California Public Utilities
Commission are scheduled by their office and not included below.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gas Transmission and Gathering Systems Most Recent or
------------------------------------------------ Scheduled Inspection
OPID Name Date
------------------------------------------------------------------------
117 Air Products & Chemicals Inc. 2/4/2010
Unit 72616
Unit 34285 2/2/2010
Unit 10785 1/21/2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
840 Mojave Pipeline Operating Company
Unit 8325 4/27/2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
844 Kern River Gas Transmission Co.
Unit 53735 2/9/2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
997 Midway Sunset Cogeneration Co.
Unit 71425 2/19/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
999 Breitburn Energy Corp.
Unit 4335 6/18/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2731 Chevron Pipe Line Co.
Unit 3495 9/18/2008
Unit 35105 9/17/2008
Unit 65045 3/12/2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
4280 El Paso Natural Gas Co.
Inspected with Unit 8325 4/27/2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
4908 ExxonMobil Production Company
Unit 4525 3/31/2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1287 Questar Pipeline Company
4
Unit 25745 4/4/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1866 Plains Exploration & Production Company
7 (PXP)
Unit 4305 8/31/2009
Unit 8105 Scheduled: 10/2010
Unit 16465 9/3/2009
Unit 30165 9/1/2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1941 Thums Long Beach Co.
0
Unit 4365 6/18/2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Praxair, Inc.
4
Unit 4105 7/24/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2608 Plains Marketing, L.P.
5
Unit 29355 11/3/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2613 ExxonMobil Oil Corp--West Coast
4
Unit 3425 (idle line not in use but 8/29/2007
not
abandoned, therefore still on record)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3074 Sacramento Municipal Utility District
9
Unit 12655 8/3/2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3083 Tuscarora Gas Transmission Company
8
Unit 13265 5/9/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3096 Bulldog Gas & Power LLC
5
Unit 72395 3/10/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3106 Aera Energy LLC
7
Unit 3415 7/14/2009
Unit 4565 9/13/2010
Unit 5205 8/24/2010
Unit 5305 8/25/2010
Unit 60935 6/3/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3106 Seal Beach Gas Processing Venture
8
Unit 58735 6/16/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3122 Occidental of Elk Hills, Inc.
8
Unit 28805 7/7/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3129 Pacific Operators Offshore
5
Unit 14165 9/12/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3129 Venoco, Inc.
6
Unit 3345 3/12/2008
Unit 8135 5/12/2008
Unit 8585 5/15/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3139 California Gas Gathering Inc.
4
Unit 70875 3/25/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3147 CPN Pipeline Company
7
Unit 3445 4/19/2010
Unit 4375 4/20/2010
Unit 48015 4/22/2010
Unit 71285 10/15/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3154 Greka Energy
1
Unit 30185 5/12/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3161 BP West Coast Products L.L.C.
0
Unit 58335 8/16/2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3168 ConocoPhillips
4
Unit 67495 8/19/2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3180 Linn Western Operating, Inc.
6
Unit 4545 7/7/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3189 North Baja Pipeline LLC
1
Unit 44375 11/7/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3190 Edison Mission Operations and Maintenance
4
Unit 54935 11/17/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3191 Inergy Propane, LLC
9
Unit 70895 1/28/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3195 City of Vernon
5
Unit 56735 8/16/2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3198 Scholl Canyon Landfill Gas Limited
6
Unit 57335 8/14/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3205 Silicon Valley Power
4
Unit 62755 1/19/2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3208 DCOR, LLC
3
Unit 4555 7/13/2010
Unit 4635 6/21/2010
Unit 4765 6/7/2010
Unit 10755 8/18/2008
Unit 10765 10/21/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3209 Ex El Pipeline Services LLC
3
Unit 50425 5/23/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3211 Dick Brown Technical Services
6
Unit 18745 3/11/2009
Unit 31765 5/26/2009
Unit 64635 3/25/2009
Unit 67065 5/27/2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3217 Vintage Production California LLC
8
Unit 51295 5/5/2009
Unit 69595 8/23/2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3220 Rosetta Resources
3
Unit 69835 Scheduled: 12/2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3230 City of Redding
4
Unit 73017 3/15/2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3225 Tesoro Los Angeles Refinery
3
Unit 10775 3/24/2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3230 Northern California Power Authority
8
Unit 72516 5/20/2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Municipal Distribution Systems Most Recent or
------------------------------------------------ Scheduled Inspection
OPID Name Date
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1171 Long Beach Gas Dept, City of
2
Unit 1205 3/29/2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1508 Palo Alto, City of
4
Unit 555 3/16/2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3109 Island Energy
7
Unit 15255 12/14/2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3159 City of Susanville
9
Unit 62155 7/19/2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3211 City of Victorville
9
Unit 67505 4/14/2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman
Question 1. What steps will PHMSA be taking in the next 6 months to
address the aging and corroding infrastructure of our oil and natural
gas pipelines to prevent future spills and environmental damage? What
steps will PHMSA take in the next year?
Answer. PHMSA plans to take a number of steps in the next six to
twelve months to further improve pipeline safety, address aging
infrastructure issues and prevent future spills and environmental
damage.
1. PHMSA is in the process of finalizing the Administration's
rulemaking that accelerate the compliance deadlines contained
in the Control Room Management final rule published in December
2009 (RIN 2137-AE64). The Control Room Management Rule is broad
reaching and addresses not only the hardware and process
improvement aspects of control room operations, but it also
focuses on the corrosive effects of human fatigue. The
deadlines contained in the original rule would require
operators to fully implement these requirements by February
2013. On September 17, 2010, PHMSA published a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that proposed to expedite the
program implementation deadline to August 1, 2011, for most of
the requirements, except for certain provisions regarding
adequate information and alarm management, which would have a
program implementation deadline of August 1, 2012. PHMSA
proposed this rule so that the Control Room Management rule's
safety benefits to the public, property, and the environment
will be realized sooner. The comment period for this NPRM will
close on November 16, 2010. PHMSA is also accelerating joint
planning with our State pipeline safety partners so that we can
begin compliance inspections as soon as the first deadlines
elapse next fall.
2. PHMSA is in the process of finalizing rules impose
regulatory protections governing lower pressure (aka, low
stress) hazardous liquid pipelines operating in more rural
areas; these pipelines have been regulated under PHMSA
hazardous liquid regulations (49 CFR Part 195) near populated
areas for many years.
3. PHMSA is preparing to expand the scope of its inspection and
enforcement efforts through two major new initiatives that are
intended to improve pipeline safety. PHMSA and its many State
partners are preparing to begin inspections and enforcement for
two major new regulatory initiatives: public awareness programs
and distribution integrity management programs (DIMP). Starting
later this year and extending into next year, PHMSA and its
State partners will conduct public awareness inspections and
carry out enforcement actions where non-compliance is
identified. And beginning in fall 2011, PHMSA and its State
partners will begin inspections of integrity management
programs of natural gas distribution operators. PHMSA has
worked with its State partners to develop a nationally
consistent safety oversight program supported by joint training
of State and Federal inspectors. This effort takes a
substantial commitment of resources by both State and Federal
regulators.
PHMSA issued a Final Rule creating the DIMP regulations on
December 4, 2009. These regulations require operators of gas
distribution pipelines to develop and implement integrity
management programs. The purpose of DIMP is to enhance safety
by identifying and reducing pipeline integrity risks. The
requirements of DIMP are similar to those required for gas
transmission pipelines, but tailored to reflect the differences
in and among distribution pipelines. PHMSA believes that DIMP
will provide substantial improvements to the safety of gas
distribution pipelines. DIMP, for the first time, requires
installation of excess flow valves in single family homes for
all new connections and when major rehabilitation is done to
existing connections.
4. PHMSA plans to issue new reporting requirements for all
pipeline operators that will expand the amount of information
required to be provided on reports filed annually. This
expanded information includes new requirements for operators to
include state-by-state information on their hazardous liquid
pipelines and other specific information about an operator's
system that can help improve safety. PHMSA makes all this data
immediately available to its State pipeline safety partners,
and expects increased data to improve pipeline safety.
5. PHMSA plans to issue an NPRM proposing to amend the
regulations to give PHMSA the authority to pursue enforcement
against third party excavators who damage energy pipeline
infrastructure because they violated State and Federal
requirements for safe digging practices. (PHMSA already has
this authority with respect to operators and their
contractors.) Under the proposed regulations, PHMSA would be
able to take such enforcement action only where a State partner
was shown to have an inadequate enforcement program with
respect to violations of damage prevention laws. PHMSA believes
that this proposed regulatory change will encourage States to
strengthen their excavation damage prevention laws and to
adequately enforce those laws.
6. In November, PHMSA plans to issue final consensus best
practices on land use management near hazardous liquid and
natural gas transmission pipelines. These best practices
emanate from a multi-year effort led by PHMSA, and were
developed in partnership with a wide range of stakeholders
including the National League of Cities, the National
Association of County Officials, home builders, community
officials, and energy pipeline operators. PHMSA expects these
best practices to reduce the likelihood and impacts of pipeline
accidents.
7. PHMSA published an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(ANPRM) (RIN 2137-AE66) on hazardous liquid pipelines on
October 18, 2010, and will collect comments in response to it
in the coming months. PHMSA is considering whether changes are
needed to the regulations covering hazardous liquid onshore
pipelines. In particular, through the ANPRM, PHMSA is seeking
comments on whether it should extend regulation to certain
pipelines currently exempt from regulation; whether other areas
along a pipeline should either be identified for extra
protection or be included as additional high consequence areas
(HCAs) for integrity management (IM) protection; whether to
establish and/or adopt standards and procedures for minimum
leak detection requirements for all pipelines; whether to
require the installation of emergency flow restricting devices
in certain areas; whether revised valve spacing requirements
are needed on new construction or existing pipelines; whether
repair timeframes should be specified for pipeline segments in
areas outside the HCAs that are assessed as part of the IM; and
whether to establish and/or adopt standards and procedures for
improving the methods of preventing, detecting, assessing and
remediating stress corrosion cracking in hazardous liquid
pipeline systems. PHMSA will evaluate public comments in
response to the ANPRM as it determines whether and how to
improve the regulations covering hazardous liquid onshore
pipelines.
In addition to taking the steps described above, PHMSA will
continue in the coming year to implement its broad safety oversight
program, including in the areas of integrity management, public
awareness, operator qualification inspection, and enforcement.
Additionally, we will analyze risk factors relative to the age of the
Nation's pipelines and determine what action is needed to mitigate any
identified issues.
Question 2. The importation of oil from the oil sands of Canada has
been increasing and is becoming a more significant source of oil for
the U.S. However, this product is far more corrosive than standard
crude. The sulfur content can be over 200 times higher than light
crude, which can be severely damaging to pipelines. What steps is PHMSA
taking to assure the American public that this highly-corrosive product
is safe to move through pipelines into and through the U.S.? Should
there be additional regulations and inspections required for pipelines
transporting this more-corrosive product?
Answer. The crude oil streams being transported in our crude oil
pipelines from Canada are a mix of product from numerous domestic and
Canadian oil production fields. The operator has a regulatory
requirement to ensure that the crude oil is not corroding the pipe by
monitoring the characteristics of the oil, evaluating the need for
using corrosion inhibitors to minimize the deleterious effects of the
oil, and periodically assessing the condition of the pipeline through
the use of internal inspection devices to ensure that the corrosion
control program is working.
PHMSA has not identified any specific pipeline safety concerns
regarding transport of Canadian crude oil. In general, we are
not aware of any study indicating sulfur levels in crude oil
would specifically cause concern with pipelines. Sulfur derived
compounds can add to concerns over stress related corrosion
cracking (SCC); however, the concern for SRCC arises if there
is a gaseous condition with the crude. As long as the oil
remains in liquid form, the sulfur does not affect the
pipeline. The Canadian crude oil does not have a tendency to
create a gaseous condition and such issues to date have not
been identified.
If PHMSA sees systemic corrosion problems stemming from the
transport of Canadian crude oil that cannot be addressed by the current
regulations, further consideration will be given to additional safety
regulations. PHMSA would appreciate any research on this issue the
Committee may have that indicates pipeline safety concerns.
Question 3. Recognizing the need to balance national security
considerations, what changes is PHMSA going to make to allow state and
local government officials access to response plans, in order to make
sure that these plans are adequate to ensure the safety of the
individuals living along those pipelines? If on-site-only reviews are
the extent of the review that the government has, what additional
training and follow-up is PHMSA planning to ensure that all inspectors
have the proper skills and expertise to thoroughly review these plans?
Answer. PHMSA receives, reviews, and approves facility response
plans (FRPs) for onshore oil pipelines, required by the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act and the Oil Pollution Act. PHMSA also provides
Federal and State agencies responsible for coordinating emergency
response and spill clean-up with plans applicable to an emergency
situation as requested. Earlier this year, PHMSA issued an Advisory
Bulletin reminding operators of their responsibilities to review and
update their oil spill response plans and to comply with other
emergency response requirements to ensure the necessary response to a
worst case discharge from their pipeline facility.
Since the focus of the hearing for the San Bruno incident was
natural gas pipelines, the discussion below focuses on ``Emergency
Plans,'' also required by PHMSA regulations.
PHMSA requires that natural gas and all hazardous liquid pipeline
operators have written procedural manuals for operations, maintenance
and emergency procedures. These manuals arc the emergency plans that
PHMSA engineers review during their periodic inspections of the
operators. While PHMSA does not normally receive or keep copies of
those plans, operators are required to establish and maintain
procedures for responding to pipeline emergencies. The plans include
the liaison with public officials concerning the location of their
pipelines and other facilities, and the procedures, roles, and
responsibilities that are assigned to those officials during
emergencies. PHMSA has issued an Advisory Bulletin to remind operators
of these requirements and that PHMSA and its State Partners will be
stepping up our inspection and enforcement regarding emergency response
and planning,
Additionally, pipeline operators are required to implement public
awareness plans to inform people living and working near a pipeline how
to recognize and react to an emergency situation.
To assist agencies that need to contact pipeline operators in their
jurisdiction, State and local first response agencies can enter into an
agreement to receive pipeline geospatial information from PHMSA's
National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS). The NPMS public viewer shows
major pipelines mapped on a county-by-county basis, as well as points
of contact for each pipeline operator. PHMSA provides maps to other
Federal agencies such as EPA and USCG.
There are specialists in each PHMSA region, the Community
Assistance and Technical Services inspectors, who conduct outreach to
State and local officials concerning the benefits and risks that
pipelines pose to their community. These specialists can provide
valuable assistance for local officials who must consider safety,
emergency response and land use in their jurisdictions.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman
Question. You have testified that ``there are currently 113
inspection positions authorized, and there are currently 96 inspectors
on-board. We have hired 4 people who should be in within the next 2
months, and there are 13 positions being advertised,'' and that PHMSA
will quickly act to hire new inspectors if Congress authorizes them.
However, the 2006 PIPES Act authorizes 135 inspectors for Fiscal Year
2010, not 113. How do you account for this contradiction?
Answer. The 2006 PIPES Act, Section 18(e) requires the Secretary to
``ensure that the number of positions for pipeline inspection and
enforcement personnel'' at PHMSA does not fall below 135 for Fiscal
Year 2010. In Fiscal Year 2010, PHMSA allocated 138 positions for
pipeline inspection and enforcement personnel. To further explain the
comment made during testimony, the 138 positions include an allocation
of 113 positions for inspection personnel, PHMSA's field presence
conducting daily examinations of pipeline operators' facilities and
records to verify compliance. The remaining 25 positions are allocated
for enforcement personnel which include attorneys, technical
specialists, and other individuals who work in tandem with PHMSA's
inspectors to process violations, civil penalties, and other
enforcement actions. As of November 17, 2010, PHMSA has 119 of its 138
inspection and enforcement staff on board-100 inspectors and 19
enforcement staff. We are currently in the process of hiring 8
additional inspection and enforcement staff-6 inspectors and 2
enforcement personnel.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Hon. Christopher A. Hart
Question 1. NTSB has been critical of PHMSA's auditing procedures
when evaluating an operator's integrity management program. Does the
NTSB believe PHMSA is doing a good job in overseeing its state
partners?
Answer. The integrity management program concept is responsive to
the fact that one size does not necessarily fit all, and each program
can be more precisely tailored to the needs of each situation. However,
individual tailoring places increased responsibility on the individual
pipeline operators, who must develop their programs, and on PHMSA, who
must approve and oversee the programs.
We have found in past pipeline accidents that individual operators
did not adequately implement their integrity management programs and
that PHMSA did not adequately oversee them. In these two recent
pipeline accidents--San Bruno, CA, and Marshall, MI--we will be looking
at whether those issues need to be addressed again, and we will examine
the level of oversight of the pipeline operators exercised by PHMSA and
the California Public Utilities Commission.
Question 2. How extensively used are automatic or remote-controlled
shut-off valves compared to valves that are manually controlled? Are
there any technical or practical limitations on the installation of
automatic or remote-controlled shut-off valves and what do they cost?
Answer. As part of a pipeline operator's integrity management
program, the location and existence of remote control or automatic
shut-off valve information should be available to PHMSA, and PHMSA
should have accurate information on the use of these types of valves.
The NTSB is on the record supporting automatic and remote controlled
shut-off valves, especially in urban and environmentally sensitive
areas.
The NTSB is not aware of any specific limitations in using
automatic or remote controlled shutoff valves in pipelines in either
urban or rural areas. Currently, operators are not required to install
these valves as a prescriptive regulation. As seen in San Bruno, the
use of an automatic or remote controlled valve could have made a
difference in the response time and stopped the flow of gas sooner.
______
State of California--Public Utilities Commission
San Francisco, CA, March 25, 2011
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV, Chair
Hon. Barbara Boxer, Member
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Re: September 28, 2010 Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation hearing on Pipeline Safety: Assessing the
San Bruno, California Explosion and Other Recent Accidents
Dear Senators Rockefeller and Boxer:
I am writing to respond to questions Senator Boxer asked of me
during the above hearing on September 28, 2010. Please accept my
sincere apology for only now responding to these questions.
On March 11, 2011, your staff forwarded the questions below, my
responses to which immediately follow:
1. On pages 79 and 80 of the [hearing] transcript, Senator Boxer
requested the Federal document filed by CPUC and mentioned by the New
York Times where CPUC confesses to regulators that they rarely fine any
gas pipeline operator for a violation. Do you have that document?
We were unable to locate any specific document stating that the
CPUC rarely issued fines to gas pipeline operators for violations.
However, as documented on the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) website, it is clear that the CPUC has not
issued as many fines as some other states have. In the past, the CPUC
has tried to work cooperatively with gas utilities to encourage them to
voluntarily report violations of state and Federal rules. This practice
was motivated by the assumption that fining the pipeline companies for
self-reported violations would act as a disincentive to report future
violations. As part of the CPUC's review of our own regulatory
procedures following the San Bruno explosion, it is clear that this
approach may not be the most effective approach in promoting pipeline
safety. In fact, yesterday, the CPUC issued an order to show cause
directing Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) to appear at a
hearing to show why it should not be found in contempt for failing to
comply with a CPUC pipeline records search order. A proposed stipulated
resolution of that order would impose a $6 million fine on PG&E.
The CPUC recently opened a rulemaking (Order Instituting Rulemaking
on the Commission's Own Motion to Adopt New Safety and Reliability
Regulations for Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution Pipelines and
Related Rulemaking Mechanisms, R.1102-019) to revise its General Order
112-E, Rules Governing Design, Construction, Testing, Operation, and
Maintenance of Gas Gathering, Transmission, and Distribution Piping
Systems. As part of this rulemaking, the CPUC will explore establishing
an expedited enforcement process for issuing penalties to gas pipeline
operators for violations of all applicable laws, rules, and
regulations.
2. On page 81 of the transcript, Senator Boxer requested a written
explanation from CPUC as to why their FY 2010 inspection record was
below their average and the industry's. Mr. Clanon agreed to this
request. Can you please provide this in writing?
In recent years, California has experienced severe budget deficits
that have adversely affected the CPUC's ability to conduct inspections
and investigations. As a result, the CPUC has not been able to maintain
the number of field days required by PHMSA in order to receive the
maximum grant it is entitled to. In response to the San Bruno accident,
the CPUC hired four new utilities engineers. This will allow our Gas
Safety Program to increase the number of inspections and investigations
it conducts annually. The CPUC will continue to make every effort to
ensure that it meets the required number of field days suggested by
PHMSA.
3. On page 90, Senator Boxer asked the CPUC to submit their plan in
writing for moving ahead with more automatic shut off valves.
As mentioned above, the CPUC recently opened a rulemaking to
address gas safety issues and to revise its General Order 112-E. As
part of the Rulemaking, the CPUC will consider adopting modifications
to General Order 112-E requiring gas utilities to develop criteria for
installing either automatic or remotely-controlled valves on pipelines
located in high consequence areas. The CPUC's Rulemaking will address a
pipeline's location, accessibility, and an operator's emergency
response capability in weighing the advantages of these valves. The
CPUC will require that Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) establish a list
of recommended locations where manual valves could be replaced with
remotely-controlled or automatic valves on its natural gas transmission
pipelines. PG&E provided the CPUC with a preliminary analysis which it
plans to use as part of its pipeline 2020 Program.
I want to assure you that we are fully committed to improving
pipeline safety in California. Since the tragic San Bruno explosion, we
have ordered pressure reductions on certain pipelines in high
consequence areas, and directed PO&E to implement the National
Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) Safety Recommendations and conduct
a complete and comprehensive records search of pipeline documents in
order to determine valid Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure levels.
In February, the CPUC opened the rulemaking mentioned above to
establish new rules for the safe and reliable operation of natural gas
pipelines in California.
We have upcoming public participation hearings in San Bruno, Santa
Rosa, and Los Angeles in order to hear public testimony related to gas
pipeline safety and the CPUC's regulation of natural gas transmission
and distribution pipelines. We also continue to aggressively pursue
answers as to why the pipeline in San Bruno ruptured. Yesterday, our
Commissioners began consideration of a $6 million fine against PG&E
solely for not responding to our pipeline records search request, and
we have entered a penalty phase in our case involving PG&E's
recordkeeping. We expect that the NTSB's report on the pipeline
rupture, as well as that of the Independent Review Panel the CPUC
commissioned, will offer insight into other ways the CPUC and the
utilities it regulates can improve pipeline safety. We welcome your
interest and input into this very important process.
Please do not hesitate to contact me or my staff if you need us to
clarify these responses or if you have any other questions or concerns.
Sincerely,
Paul Clanon,
Executive Director.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Christopher Johns
Question 1. Senator Boxer requested further information on whether
the Contra Costa Times article was correct as to PG&E leaving $80
million dollars of pipeline safety money on the table.
Answer. An article in the Contra Costa Times sparked public
scrutiny into PG&E's spending on its Gas Pipeline Replacement Program
(GPRP). PG&E initiated the GPRP in 1985 as a multi-year program to
upgrade its gas distribution facilities. From the beginning of the
program in 1985 through the end of 2009, PG&E replaced over 2,100 miles
of pipeline system-wide, and spent approximately $1.7 billion
(including replacement of copper services). Although the GPRP included
some gas transmission facilities in the early phases of the program, it
is now entirely focused on gas distribution pipeline. The segment of
pipe that ruptured in San Bruno on September 9 was classified by PG&E
as a transmission pipeline.
The Contra Costa Times article focused in particular on PG&E's
spending on the GPRP in comparison to the General Rate Case (GRC)
targets. The article stated that ``[b]etween 1993 and 1995 alone, the
company collected $80 million more than it spent for its gas pipeline
replacement program.'' This discussion in the article is based on the
California Public Utility Commission's (CPUC) 1996 GRC Final
Decision.\1\ As the article itself noted, the Commission's decision
explains that, ``[n]otwithstanding PG&E's underspending of budgeted
funds in this program [GPRP] in every year since 1985, PG&E has kept
the program on target.'' \2\ Furthermore, in the subsequent 1999 GRC
decision, the CPUC expressly found that the GPRP ``has been and remains
on schedule.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Decision 95-12-055 (Dec. 20, 1995).
\2\ Id. (mimeo) at 56.
\3\ Decision 00-02-046 (Feb. 17, 2000), Finding of Fact No. 107.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The GPRP is only one part of PG&E's broader pipeline safety and
maintenance efforts and, as noted, no longer includes work on gas
transmission pipelines. To provide a more complete picture of PG&E's
spending on transmission pipelines, the charts below show recorded
expense and capital for the entire Gas Transmission line of business
from 2000-2009.\4\ For context, PG&E's recorded spending data is
compared to the imputed targets from the company's rate case decisions
for this 10 year period. This data shows that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ We are providing data starting in 2000 in part because PG&E's
recent spending on safety and maintenance is more directly relevant to
its current practices. Furthermore, changes in PG&E's method of
accounting for and grouping categories of work prior to 2000 make
comparisons with the pre-2000 period challenging.
In total, PG&E spent $2.107 billion on gas transmission
capital and expense work during 2000-2009. This reflects total
spending of $202 million more than the imputed target for that
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
period.
PG&E spent $1.3 billion on gas transmission capital work
during 2000-2009. This represents $178 million more than the
imputed target.
During the same period, PG&E spent $892 million on pipeline
safety, replacement, and maintenance work (in the work
categories for Integrity Management, Pipeline Reliability,
Systems Maintenance, and Mark & Locate). This represents $65
million more than the imputed target for 2000-2009 in those
work categories.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question 2. Senator Boxer requested a letter describing instances
in which remote and automatic shut off valves have worked in PG&E's
operation.
Answer. PG&E has hundreds of automatic over pressure protection
control valves that protect pipelines from exceeding their maximum
operating pressure. PG&E also has some lines with rupture control
valves for specific needs and the 24 hour control center has the
ability to shut down some pipeline systems via remote control.
Automatic valves are fully automated valves that will operate
without human intervention when specific operating conditions on the
pipeline arise. Remote-controlled valves can be remotely operated from
a control center. It is possible to have automated, remote-controlled
valves.
The process for turning off automated valves is different for each
type of valve:
Remotely controlled valves: these are valves operated by remote
control from our 24-hour manned Gas Control Center
Automatic valves: these are valves with control programs
triggered to operate via a specified change in pipeline
conditions and do not require remote control or personnel
onsite
PG&E has identified an instance in which mainline valves on L-300
equipped with automatic shut-off capability were activated. Between
milepoints 299 and 328, approximately 1 month after L-300 had been hit
by an agricultural soil ripper, the line ruptured. The automatic shut-
off valves that were activated operated successfully.
PG&E is committed to further deploying automated valve technology
throughout our natural gas pipeline system. As part of our Pipeline
2020 Program, PG&E has committed to install more than a dozen automated
or remote shut-off valves as part of a pilot program. To execute this
pilot program effectively, it will be necessary to have a pipeline
system that offers the greatest flexibility, or redundancy, to reroute
supplies while those valves and their related infrastructure are
installed on other sections. In addition, we continue to work on the
systems necessary to support this automated technology, such as
software systems, to ensure that these automated valves operate
effectively and safely.
Question 3. Senator Boxer requested a list of when inspections and
repairs are to be completed on the top 100 high-risk pipelines in
PG&E's network.
Answer. Attached, please find PG&E's March 9, 2011 submission to
the California Public Utilities Commission regarding our Updated Long
Range Gas Transmission Pipeline Planning Input Top 100 Segments 2007--
2009. The document identifies pipeline segments that the company has
prioritized for engineering analysis, monitoring or, in some instances,
future repair or replacement. The document also provides a status
update regarding where these segments are in terms of monitoring,
inspections, replacements and repair of the segments.
Attachment
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
San Francisco, CA, March 9, 2011
Paul Clanon, Executive Director
California Public Utilities Commission
San Francisco, CA 94102-3298
Re: Updated Long Range Gas Transmission Pipeline Planning Input
Top 100 Segments--2007-2009
Dear Mr. Clanon:
On February 11, 2011, PG&E provided a combined list of the segments
included on PG&E's 2007, 2008 and/or 2009 Top 100 lists for long-range
evaluation and planning, along with updated notes on their status as of
February 10, 2011.
Attached to this letter is an update to the combined list provided
on February 11, 2011. The changes, which mostly reflect location
information, are summarized in the table below.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page Map No. Deletion Addition/Revision
------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 Map 2(a) City: Livermore
------------------------------------------------------------------------
7 Map 4(e-f) City: Fremont
------------------------------------------------------------------------
9 Map 5(o-q) City: Manteca
------------------------------------------------------------------------
11 Map 8(a-e) City: Stanford
------------------------------------------------------------------------
11 Map 8(f) Mile point: 20.43 City: Mile point: 19.72
Palo Alto City: Woodside
------------------------------------------------------------------------
12 Map 12(a) County: Contra Costa
------------------------------------------------------------------------
14 Map 15 County: Contra Costa
------------------------------------------------------------------------
17 Map 19(b) City: Roseville
------------------------------------------------------------------------
18 Map 23 Description: near Description: in
------------------------------------------------------------------------
20 Map 27(a-c) City: Clovis
------------------------------------------------------------------------
21 Map 27(d-j) City: Clovis
------------------------------------------------------------------------
25 Map 36(d-e) City: Jersey Island City: Bethel Island
------------------------------------------------------------------------
28 Map 43 Description: through
the rural area
------------------------------------------------------------------------
30 Map 53 Description: in Description: near
------------------------------------------------------------------------
30 Map 56 City: West Sacramento
------------------------------------------------------------------------
30 Map 57(a) City: Marysville
------------------------------------------------------------------------
31 Map 57(b) City: Olivehurst
------------------------------------------------------------------------
33 Map 63 Description: 100 Description: 101
------------------------------------------------------------------------
33 Map 66 City: Morgan Hill
Description: Morgan
Hill and San Martin
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Please contact me should you have any questions.
Sincerely,
Brian K. Cherry,
Vice President,
Regulatory Relations.
cc: Michael R. Peevey, President
Timothy A. Simon, Commissioner
Mike Florio, Commissioner
Catherine Sandoval, Commissioner
Julie Fitch, Energy Division
Richard Clark, Consumer Protection Safety Division
Julie Halligan, Consumer Protection Safety Division
Frank Lindh, General Counsel
Harvey Y. Morris, Legal Division
Patrick S. Berdge, Legal Division
Joe Como, Division of Ratepayer Advocates
______
March 9, 2011
Long Range Gas Transmission Pipeline Planning Input
Top 100 Segments--2007, 2008 and Updated 2009
PG&E's top priority is to ensure the safety of our natural gas
system. PG&E employs a comprehensive inspection and monitoring program
to help achieve this goal. PG&E monitors system status in real time on
a 24-hour basis, and regularly conducts leak surveys, patrols and
maintenance of all of its natural gas pipelines. Any issues identified
as a threat to public safety are immediately addressed.
PG&E also uses the data it collects daily on its gas transmission
pipeline system to help plan and prioritize future work as part of its
long-term risk management planning. As described below, PG&E's ``Top
100'' lists have been a component of this risk management program. As
part of our efforts to enhance operations, PG&E has begun developing
our Pipeline 2020 program, which is focused on modernizing our pipeline
infrastructure, spurring development of next-generation pipeline
inspection technologies, enhancing public safety awareness and
emergency response planning, and developing industry-leading best
practices, including state-of-the-art risk assessment techniques. Going
forward, PG&E will use these new risk management techniques to guide
its future work.
PG&E's risk management tools include a program that evaluates data
on each of the approximately 20,000 pipeline segments within PG&E's
natural gas transmission pipeline system based on the following
criteria:
the potential for third party damage like dig-ins from
construction,
the potential for corrosion,
the potential for ground movement, and
the physical design and characteristics of the pipe segment.
PG&E also considers the proximity of a pipeline segment to high-
density populations and environmentally-sensitive areas, as well as
potential reliability impacts.
Based on all of these factors, PG&E determines which segments
warrant further evaluation, monitoring or other future action.
Historically, these segments have been included each year on a Top 100
list to help guide the development of future plans. As conditions
changed from year to year, PG&E reevaluated which segments were
included on the list.
The Top 100 lists were used as engineering planning tools. Their
primary function has been to highlight segments for further engineering
investigation, monitoring or other long-term follow-up, but they do not
determine which segments are designated for immediate repair or
replacement.
PG&E has taken a range of appropriate actions depending on
circumstances specific to each segment referenced on a Top 100 list.
For example, if a segment was listed due to a high level of
construction activity in the area, PG&E might have enhanced the surface
markings of the pipeline and conducted additional outreach to help
avoid accidental dig-ins. In other circumstances, where, for example, a
segment was on the list due to its physical design and characteristics,
PG&E may have increased its monitoring, patrolling or proposed to
replace the segment.
The list below includes the segments on PG&E's 2007, 2008 and/or
2009 lists for long-range evaluation and planning, along with updated
notes on their status as of February 10, 2011. As shown in the status
summary below, 86 percent of pipeline segments that were listed only in
2007 or 2008 have been completed. For segments on the 2009 list, 56
percent have been completed and the rest are in various phases of
action.
For ease of reference, PG&E has retained the same map numbers used
in the 2009 list submitted in September 2010. This list also is
available on PG&E's website at http://www.pge.com/planninginput/, along
with maps to assist customers with specific questions about the
location of PG&E's natural gas transmission lines.
Factor Key
A pipeline segment is identified for further study and long-range
planning based upon its risk for one or more of five unique factors:
Potential for Third-Party Damage: Third-party damage is the
number one risk to PG&E's pipeline system. Indications that a
pipe segment may be at risk for third-party damage include
third-party construction activity in the immediate area of the
pipeline's location, whether or not the line segment has a
history of third-party damage, the depth of cover over the
pipeline, the pipe diameter, the degree of surface marking
available for the location of the pipe segment, and local
awareness of the potential for third-party damage in the
immediate area of the pipeline's location. Some of the actions
PG&E would take to reduce this risk factor include additional
marking of the pipeline location (when possible), additional
education in the immediate area for the 811 system to call
before digging, and monitoring of construction activity and/or
permits in the area around the pipeline.
Potential for Corrosion: Factors include items such as the
external coating design, the resistivity of the soil, and other
ground-based factors which could reduce the thickness of the
pipe wall. Some of the actions PG&E would take to reduce this
risk include regular and ongoing monitoring (PG&E monitors both
electronically and by physically checking its cathodic
protection system every 2 months at over 6,000 locations in its
natural gas transmission system), increasing or replacing the
external protective coating of the pipe, or replacement of the
pipe itself.
Potential for Ground Movement: Factors include the proximity
to seismically active areas, and the potential for soil erosion
or landslides around the pipeline. Some of the actions PG&E
would take to reduce this risk include increased monitoring,
changing the soil material in which the pipe segment is buried,
changing the alignment of the pipe segment, or burying the pipe
segment at a greater depth beneath the ground level (for
erosion prevention).
Physical Design and Characteristics: Factors include items
such as the age of pipe, the type of welding performed on the
pipe, the fittings used in the pipeline, and the materials used
to manufacture the pipe. Some of the actions PG&E would take to
reduce this risk factor include replacement of the pipe or
fittings in order to upgrade or improve the design or
characteristics of the line segment or reducing pipeline
pressure.
Overall: A pipeline segment with an ``Overall'' factor is
included on the list based upon its ranking in more than one of
the factors outlined above but not based upon any single
factor.
Rank
PG&E's Top 100 list for a particular year was composed of the
segments that ranked highest in each of the above five categories. It
is important to note the ``rank'' that PG&E previously included in its
2009 Top 100 list and has also included in this combined 2007-2009 list
is a relative ranking of these segments. PG&E has provided this
``rank'' as a means of comparing the total risk management score of a
segment on a particular Top 100 list against the other segments on that
list.
Status Key
Monitoring: PG&E is monitoring and reviewing these pipeline
segments to see if they need to be addressed through a specific
project.
Initiated: PG&E has determined that the pipeline segment
merits further study and analysis.
Engineering: PG&E is defining the scope of the project and
readying it for construction.
Construction: PG&E has a project that is under construction.
Completed: PG&E has determined that no further action is
warranted on this segment due to the completion of an
investigation that results in improved/updated pipeline
information or the completion of an evaluation or construction
project.
Regardless of status, every segment identified below remains within
PG&E's comprehensive inspection and monitoring program discussed above.
Any issues identified as a threat to public safety are immediately
addressed.
Status Summary
The following table provides a brief summary of the current status
of the pipeline segments on PG&E's 2007, 2008 and 2009 Top 100 lists.
Note that there are 78 pipeline segments on the 2007 and/or 2008 lists
that do not also appear on the 2009 list. Also, note that the total
number of individual segments on an annual list varies because some
segments qualify for the list in more than one risk factor category
(e.g., both for Potential for Ground Movement and Potential for
Corrosion), reducing the total number of unique segments to less than
100. Conversely, in some years segments rank the same in a risk factor
category, with these ``ties'' increasing the total number of segments
to more than 100. For this reason, the 2007 list contains 85 segments
and the 2008 list contains 110 segments. In total, there are 178 unique
pipeline segments on the 2007-2009 Top 100 lists.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Segments Only on 2007 and/or 2008 Current 2009 Segments
Lists ---------------------------------------
Status as of February 2011 ----------------------------------------
Count % Count %
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Completed 67 86% 56 56%
Construction or Engineering 8 10% 27 27%
Initiated or Monitoring 3 4% 17 17%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTALS 78 100% 100 100%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PG&E's goal is to be the best in class nationally on gas safety as
we work to earn back the trust and confidence of our customers. Our
current programs and the improvements that will come through our
Pipeline 2020 program are key elements to achieving that goal.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year
Map No. Pipeline Segment Location: County On Description as of February 2011 Factor Status as of Rank
(City) List February 2011
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1(a) L103 Segment 117.1, San Benito 2007 Segment 117.1 is located in an Potential for Engineering 2007: 71
Mile Points 2008 unpopulated area on steep Ground Movement 2008: 94
11.00-11.42 2009 terrain which is particularly 2009: 71
susceptible to ground motion.
It will be replaced as part of
a project to relocate 6 miles
of pipe between Hwy 156 and
Crazy Horse Rd. near San Juan
Bautista due to exposure to the
San Andreas fault line and
through hillsides which are
susceptible to landslides and
soil erosion problems.
1(b) L103 Segment 117.3, San Benito 2007 The ground movement risk for Potential for Comple2007: 77
Mile Points 2008 segment 117.3 was reduced based Ground Movement 2008: 94
11.42-11.42 on PG&E's system-wide
assessment of U.S. Geological
Survey data on the severity of
erosion, including in the area
in which this segment lies,
causing this segment not to
appear on the 2009 list.
(Notwithstanding its removal
from the list, this segment of
pipe is part of the project to
relocate 6 miles of pipe
between Hwy 156 and Crazy Horse
Rd. near San Juan Bautista
discussed at Map No. 1(a).
Status: Engineering.)
1(c) L103 Segment 117.5, San Benito 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Engineering 2007: 72
Mile Points 2008 1(a). Ground Movement 2008: 92
11.42-11.65 2009 2009: 72
2(a) L107 Segment 127.1, Alameda 2008 This section of Line 107 is Physical Design & Engineering 2008: 90
Mile Points (Livermore) 2009 located across the open hills Characteristics 2009: 74
14.00-14.82 from south Livermore to Arroyo
del Valle. Based upon a
recently completed engineering
analysis, PG&E plans to convert
this section from transmission
pipeline to distribution feeder
main.
2(b) L107 Segment 127.5, Alameda 2008 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Engineering 2008: 107
Mile Points 2009 2(a). Characteristics 2009: 89/90
14.82-15.12
2(c) L107 Segment 127.57, Alameda 2009 See description for Map No. Physical Design Engineering 2009: 89/90
Mile Points 2(a). &Characteristics
15.13-15.36
2(d) L107 Segment 127.6, Alameda 2008 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Engineering 2008: 104
Mile Points 2009 2(a). Characteristics 2009: 91
15.36-15.36
2(e) L107 Segment 127.7, Alameda 2008 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Engineering 2008: 100
Mile Points 2009 2(a). Characteristics 2009: 79/80
15.36-15.70
3(a) L107 Segment 129, Alameda 2008 This section of Line 107 is Physical Design & Engineering 2008: 101
Mile Points (Livermore) 2009 located across the open hills Characteristics 2009: 79/80
15.89-16.40 south of Livermore from Arroyo
del Valle to the Vallecitos
Valley. Based upon a recently
completed engineering analysis,
PG&E plans to convert this
section from transmission
pipeline to distribution feeder
main..
3(b) L107 Segment 131.5, Alameda 2009 See description for Map No. Potential for Engineering 2009: 82
Mile Points 3(a). Ground Movement
17.11-18.00
3(c) L107 Segment 132.2, Alameda 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Engineering 2007: 69
Mile Points 2009 3(a). Ground Movement 2009: 73
18.00-18.67
4(a) L107 Segment 139, Alameda 2007 This section of L107 is located Potential for Engineering 2007: 78
Mile Points 2008 across the open hills through Ground Movement 2008: 93
21.07-22.29 2009 the Vallecitos Valley to Potential for 2009: 77
Calaveras Rd in Sunol. Based Corrosion (2007
upon a recently completed and 2008)
engineering analysis, PG&E
plans to convert this section
from transmission pipeline to
distribution feeder main.
In addition, the external
corrosion risk for segment 139
was reduced based on inspection
of its coating condition,
causing this segment not to
appear on the 2009 list for
potential corrosion (though the
segment remained on the list
for ground movement).
4(b) L107 Segment 140, Alameda 2008 The external corrosion risk for Potential for Compl2008: 109
Mile Point segment 140 was reduced based Corrosion
22.29 on inspection of its coating
condition, causing this segment
not to appear on the 2009 list.
4(c) L107 Segment 141, Alameda 2008 See description for Map No. Potential for Compl2008: 108
Mile Points 4(b). Corrosion
22.29-22.301
4(d) L107 Segment 141.8, Alameda 2008 See description for Map No. Potential for Compl2008: 103
Mile Points 4(b). Corrosion
22.34-22.79
4(e) L107 Segment 150, Alameda 2007 The ground movement risk for Potential for Comple2007: 81
Mile Points (Fremont) 2008 this segment was reduced based Ground Movement 2008: 99
25.73-26.01 on PG&E's system-wide
reassessment of U.S. Geological
Survey data on the severity of
erosion, including in the area
in which this segment lies,
causing this segment not to
appear on the 2009 list.
4(f) L107 Segment 151, Alameda 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2007: 61
Mile Points (Fremont) 2008 4(e). Ground Movement 2008: 77
26.01-26.509 (Notwithstanding its removal
from the list, PG&E plans to
replace this segment in 2011 or
2012 in order to accommodate
the work described on L131
below. See Map No. 14. Status:
Engineering.)
5(a) L108 Segment 111, San Joaquin 2007 This segment consists of 2,897 Potential for Comple2007: 45
Mile Points feet of pipe near Airport Way Corrosion
6.25 -6.82 and S Kasson Rd in Manteca. The
external corrosion risk for
this segment was reduced based
on investigation of pipe
strength and wall thickness,
causing this segment not to
appear on the 2008 and 2009
lists.
5(b) L108 Segment 122.1, San Joaquin 2008 PG&E replaced this segment as Physical Design & Comple2008: 81
Mile Points part of a project that replaced Characteristics
11.74-12.14 2.5 miles of pipe from Woodward
Rd to West Ripon Rd (MP 11.74
to 14.15) due to the design
materials used. Construction
was completed in 2010.
5(c) L108 Segment 122.3, San Joaquin 2008 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Comple2008: 82
Mile Points 5(b). Characteristics
12.14-12.16
5(d) L108 Segment 123, San Joaquin 2007 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Comple2007: 64
Mile Points 2008 5(b). Characteristics 2008: 78
12.16-12.47
5(e) L108 Segment 123.7, San Joaquin 2008 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Comple2008: 67
Mile Points 5(b). Characteristics
12.47-12.51
5(f) L108 Segment 123.8, San Joaquin 2008 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Comple2008: 53
Mile Points 5(b). Characteristics
12.51-12.59
5(g) L108 Segment 124, San Joaquin 2008 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Comple2008: 54
Mile Points 5(b). Characteristics
12.59-12.69
5(h) L108 Segment 124.3, San Joaquin 2008 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Comple2008: 46
Mile Points 5(b). Characteristics
12.69-12.70
5(I) L108 Segment 124.6, San Joaquin 2008 See description for Map No. Physical Design Comple2008: 38
Mile Points 2009 5(b). &Characteristics 2009: 43/44
12.70-12.72
5(j) L108 Segment 125, San Joaquin 2008 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Comple2008: 49
Mile Points 2009 5(b). Characteristics 2009: 43/44
12.72-12.76
5(k) L108 Segment 125.05, San Joaquin 2008 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Comple2008: 68
Mile Points 5(b). Characteristics
12.76-12.79
5(l) L108 Segment 125.1, San Joaquin 2008 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Comple2008: 83
Mile Points 5(b). Characteristics
12.79-13.19
5(m) L108 Segment 125.3, San Joaquin 2008 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Comple2008: 84
Mile Points 5(b). Characteristics
13.19-13.21
5(n) L108 Segment 126, San Joaquin 2008 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Comple2008: 85
Mile Points 5(b). Characteristics
13.21-13.71
5(o) L108 Segment 126.3, San Joaquin 2008 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Comple2008: 86
Mile Points (Manteca) 5(b). Characteristics
13.71-13.73
5(p) L108 Segment 127, San Joaquin 2007 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Comple2007: 65
Mile Points (Manteca) 2008 5(b). Characteristics 2008: 87
13.73-14.13
5(q) L108 Segment 127.3, San Joaquin 2008 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Compl2008: 106
Mile Points (Manteca) 5(b). Characteristics
14.13--14.15
6(a) L108 Segment 140.9, San Joaquin 2008 PG&E plans to replace this Potential for Engineering 2008: 50
Mile Points segment as part of a project to Third Party Damage
37.04-37.14 enable an in-line inspection
assessment to be performed.
PG&E plans to commence
construction in 2011.
6(b) L108 Segment 144, San Joaquin 2007 The external corrosion risk for Potential for Comple2007: 50
Mile Points segment 144 was reduced based Corrosion
38.00-38.17 on inspection of its coating
condition, causing this segment
not to appear on the 2008 and
2009 lists.
6(c) L108 Segment 145, San Joaquin 2007 The external corrosion risk for Potential for Comple2007: 51
Mile Points 2008 segment 145 was reduced based Corrosion 2008: 47
38.17-39.00 on inspection of its coating
condition, causing this segment
not to appear on the 2009 list.
6(d) L108 Segment 146.35, San Joaquin 2007 Replace 8,000 feet of pipe Physical Design & Initiated 2007: 30
Mile Points 2008 through the rural area near Characteristics 2008: 29
39.18-39.21 2009 Armstrong Rd near Lodi due to Overall (2009) 2009: 2/3/4
the design materials used.
6(e) L108 Segment 146.6, San Joaquin 2007 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Initiated 2007: 31
Mile Points 2008 6(d). Characteristics 2008: 30
39.21-39.23 2009 Overall (2009) 2009: 2/3/4
6(f) L108 Segment 147, San Joaquin 2007 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Initiated 2007: 32
Mile Points 2008 6(d). Characteristics 2008: 31
39.23-39.47 2009 Overall (2009) 2009: 2/3/4
6(g) L108 Segment 147.05, San Joaquin 2008 The external corrosion risk for Potential for Comple2008: 33
Mile Points segment 147.05 was reduced Corrosion
39.47-39.60 based on inspection of its
(33) coating condition, causing this
segment not to appear on the
2009 list.
6(h) L108 Segment 159, San Joaquin 2007 Replace 12,900 feet of pipe near Physical Design & Initiated 2007: 76
Mile Points W Peltier Rd, east of Lodi due Characteristics
44.9-45.93 to the design materials used.
7(a) L108 Segment 179.5, Sacramento 2008 Replace 8,000 feet of pipe from Physical Design & Engineering 2008: 34
Mile Points (Elk Grove) 2009 Laguna Blvd to Dwight Road in Characteristics 2009: 15
62.57-63.29 Elk Grove due to the design
materials used. Construction is
currently planned to commence
in 2011.
7(b) L108 Segment 179.7, Sacramento 2007 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Engineering 2007: 60
Mile Points (Elk Grove) 7(a). Characteristics
63.29-63.50
8(a) L109 Segment 137, Santa Clar2007 PG&E has adjusted the cathodic Potential for Comple2007: 57
Mile Points (Palo Alto/ 2009 protection system to better Corrosion 2009: 56
15.00-15.38 Stanford) protect these pipeline segments
from corrosion. More recent
analysis has shown marked
improvement. No further action
relative to the potential for
external corrosion is
contemplated at this time.
8(b) L109 Segment 137.19, Santa Clar2009 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2007: 59
Mile Points (Palo Alto/ 8(a). Corrosion 2009: 60/61/
15.38-15.65 Stanford) 62
8(c) L109 Segment 137.2, Santa Clar2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2007: 56
Mile Points (Palo Alto/ 8(a). Corrosion
16.80-16.93 Stanford)
8(d) L109 Segment 137.32, Santa Clar2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Com2009: 60/61/
Mile Points (Palo Alto/ 2009 8(a). Corrosion 62
15.65-16.01 Stanford)
8(e) L109 Segment Santa Clar2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2007: 58
137.8,\1\ (Palo Alto/ 2009 8(a). Corrosion 2009: 60/61/
Mile Points Stanford) 62
16.19-16.33
8(f) L109 Segment 148, San Mateo 2008 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2008: 79
Mile Points (Woodside) 8(a). Corrosion
19.71-19.72
9(a) L114 Segment 106, Solano/Sacramento 2009 PG&E has conducted an Potential for Engineering 2009: 84/85
Mile Points engineering review of the Ground Movement
3.18-3.80 potential for ground movement
along this segment, crossing
the Sacramento River and
adjacent levees from Sherman
Island north. This project
includes L114-2, segment 101,
discussed at Map No. 24(b).
Based on this review, PG&E is
planning to replace this
crossing in 2013.
9(b) L114 Segment 120, Sacramento/Cont2009 PG&E has evaluated the potential Potential for Engineering 2009: 88/87
Mile Points Costa of rerouting gas to allow the Ground Movement
7.32-7.69 removal of 7,500 feet of three
pipeline segments (L-114,
segment 120; L114-1, segment
103, discussed at Map No.
24(a); and SP4Z, segment 112,
discussed at Map No. 24(c))
crossing the San Joaquin River,
underwater, near the Antioch
Bridge due to the potential for
ground movement. Based upon
this evaluation, PG&E plans to
remove these pipeline segments
from service in 2011.
10 L114 Segment 153.2, Alameda 2009 Evaluate the potential Potential for Initiated 2009: 69
Mile Points replacement of 7,000 feet of Ground Movement
28.00-28.87 pipe between Vasco Rd and
Dalton Crossover, located on
steep slopes from the North
Livermore Valley to Vasco Rd
due to the potential for ground
movement.
11 L130 Segment 101, Solano/Sacramento 2009 PG&E has completed an Potential for Engineering 2009: 34
Mile Points engineering analysis of 4,000 Ground Movement
0.00-0.50 feet of pipe crossing the
Sacramento River near the Rio
Vista Bridge due to the
potential for ground movement.
This section of pipeline is
located underwater. In
conjunction with the Army Corp.
of Engineer's dredging project
planned for 2013, PG&E, plans
to replace this crossing in
2013.
12(a) L131 Segment 134.2, Alameda 2007 PG&E has evaluated the Physical Design & Initiated 2007: 79
Mile Points replacement of this section of Characteristics
27.02-27.05 L131, which is located over the
steep hills north of Livermore,
and plans to replace this
segment.
In addition, as part of PG&E's
transmission integrity
management program, an in-line
inspection assessment is
planned for 2011.
12(b) L131 Segment 151, Alameda 2009 PG&E has evaluated the Potential for Initiated 2009: 70
Mile Points (Pleasanton) replacement of 4,990 feet of Ground Movement
37.89-38.49 pipeline between Ruby Hills to
Foleys Crossover in Pleasanton
and Sunol due to the potential
for ground movement, and plans
to replace this segment. This
pipeline is located on the
steep slopes over the Pigeon
Pass near Hwy 84 south of
Livermore.
In addition, as part of PG&E's
transmission integrity
management program, an in-line
inspection is planned for 2011.
13 L131 Segment 157.2, Alameda 2007 Replace 1,350 feet of pipe at Potential for Comple2007: 53
Mile Points (Sunol) 2008 Calaveras Rd, Sunol due to the Ground Movement 2008: 60
42.16-42.35 2009 potential for ground movement. 2009: 59
This segment of L131 is located
on a steep hillside in the
Sunol Valley immediately
northeast of the Calaveras
Fault and Road, just southeast
of I-680. Construction was
completed in October 2010.
14(a) L131 Segment 164, Alameda (Fremont) 2007 The ground movement risk for Potential for Comple2007: 84
Mile Points 2008 segment 164 was reduced based Ground Movement 2008: 105
46.34-46.84 on PG&E's system-wide
reassessment of U.S. Geological
Survey data on the severity of
erosion, including in the area
in which this segment lies,
causing this segment not to
appear on the 2009 list.
(Notwithstanding its removal
from the list, this segment is
part of the project to remove
22,363 feet of pipe between the
Vargas Rd and Irvington Station
from transmission service
discussed at Map No. 14(b).,
Status: Engineering)
14(b) L131 Segment 165, Alameda (Fremont) 2007 PG&E plans to remove 22,363 feet Potential for Engineering 2007: 42
Mile Points 2008 of pipe between the Vargas Rd Ground Movement 2008: 45
46.96-48.23 2009 and Irvington Station from 2009: 31
transmission service, either by
converting the pipe to a
distribution main or into an
outer, unpressurized casing in
which a new pipeline would be
inserted. This section of L131
is located over the steep
slopes from the Vargas Rd to
Mission Blvd and through a 10-
15 foot easement through
central Fremont to I-880.
Construction to permanently
remove this from transmission
service currently is planned
for 2012.
In addition, as part of PG&E's
transmission integrity
management program, an in-line
inspection assessment is
planned for 2011.
14(c) L131 Segment 167.9, Alameda (Fremont) 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Engineering 2007: 33
Mile Points 2008 14(b). Ground Movement 2008: 21
48.94-49.36 2009 Overall 2009: 12
14(d) L131 Segment 169, Alameda (Fremont) 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Engineering 2007: 37
Mile Points 2008 14(b). Ground Movement 2008: 44
49.38-50.46 2009 2009: 22
15 L131 Segment 115, Sacramento 2009 PG&E plans to complete an Potential for Initiated 2009: 75
Mile Points engineering review of 2,066 Ground Movement
7.39-7.75 feet of pipe located in the
rural area near Sherman Island
Levee Rd and the Antioch Bridge
on Sherman Island in 2011.
Based on this review, PG&E will
determine whether any repair,
replacement or other action is
warranted.
16(a) L132 Segment 106, Santa Clar2007 The ground movement risk for Potential for Comple2007: 24
Mile Points (San Jose) segment 106 was reduced based Ground Movement
1.27-1.34 on PG&E's system-wide Overall
reassessment of U.S. Geological
Survey data, including on the
ground movement risk associated
with this segment, causing this
segment not to appear on the
2008 and 2009 lists.
(Notwithstanding its removal
from the list, PG&E currently
plans to replace this segment
as part of a project to replace
pipe due to the potential for
ground movement. PG&E plans to
commence construction in 2012.
Status: Engineering.)
16(b) L132 Segment 106.7, Santa Clar2007an PG&E plans to replace this Potential for Engineering 2007: 34
Mile Points Jose) 2009 segment as part of a project to Ground Movement 2009: 26
1.35-1.87 replace pipe due to the
potential for ground movement.
PG&E plans to commence
construction in 2012.
16(c) L132 Segment 112.7, Santa Clar2007 This segment is part of a Overall Engineering 2007: 19
Mile Points (Santa Clar2008 project to replace pipe and 2008: 11
3.05-3.067 install other facilities in
order to internally inspect
L132 through the urban areas
between Milpitas and Crystal
Springs reservoir. PG&E plans
to commence construction in
2012 and to complete the in-
line inspection assessments in
2013.
16(d) L132 Segment 113, Santa Clar2007 See description for Map No. Overall Engineering 2007: 16
Mile Points (Santa Clar2008 16(c). 2008: 6
3.067-3.3
16(e) L132 Segment 189, San Mateo 2007 The replacement of this segment Overall Engineering 2007: 21
Mile Points (South San in South San Francisco had been
42.13-43.55 Francisco) planned for 2009. However,
analysis by PG&E's pipeline
engineers in early 2008 showed
that the segment did not need
replacement at that time. This
updated analysis was
subsequently confirmed by a
March 2009 direct assessment of
this segment. PG&E currently
plans to replace this segment
in 2012.
17(a) L138 Segment 116, Fresno 2007 PG&E has completed an Potential for Monitoring 2007: 36
Mile Points (Riverdale) 2008 engineering review of 6,061 Corrosion 2008: 23
22.70-23.40 2009 feet of pipe between Elkhorn 2009: 49
Ave and Hwy 99 near Caruthers
and Fresno for susceptibility
to external corrosion. Based on
cathodic protection survey
results, the cathodic
protection was determined to be
satisfactory. Due to the
presence of an outer pipe
casing, which is required for
railroad crossings but also
increases the potential for
corrosion, PG&E will continue
to monitor these segments to
determine whether future action
is warranted.
17(b) L138 Segment 129, Fresno 2007 PG&E reassessed this segment Potential for Comple2007: 46
Mile Points (Easton) from 2007 to 2008 due to the Corrosion
38.08-38.42 relocation of a nearby highway
to a greater distance from
segment 129, lowering the risk
associated for this segment.
This segment does not appear on
the 2008 and 2009 lists.
17(c) L138 Segment 130,\2\ Fresno 2007 PG&E plans to replace this Physical Design & Initiated 2007: 28
Mile Points 2008 segment due to the design Characteristics 2008: 35
38.42-38.58 2009 materials used. Construction is 2009: 16
planned to commence in 2012.
17(d) L138 Segment Fresno 2007 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Initiated 2007: 28
130.11,\3\ 2008 17(c). Characteristics 2008: 41
Mile Points 2009 2009: 20
38.59-38.59
17(e) L138 Segment 145, Fresno 2009 The third-party damage risk Potential for Comple2009: 18
Mile Points (Fresno) assessment for this segment Third Party Damage
48.29-48.64 increased in 2009 due to
previous damage on a pipeline
near this location. A
subsequent engineering
investigation concluded that
this segment is not exposed to
any elevated third party damage
risk, that surface marking of
the segment is adequate and
therefore that no further
action is warranted.
18 L147 Segment 110.6, San Mateo 2009 PG&E has completed an Physical Design & Comple2009: 46
Mile Points (San Carlos) engineering review of the Characteristics
3.26-3.28 design materials of 105 feet of
pipe near Brittan Ave and El
Camino Real in San Carlos.
Based upon the results of this
review, PG&E has determined
that no repair, replacement or
other action is warranted.
19(a) L173 Segment 102.1, Placer 2007 An engineering review of this Potential for Comple2007: 41
Mile Points (Roseville) 2008 pipeline segment near Hwy 65 Third Party Damage 2008: 39
1.01-1.11 2009 and Washington Blvd in 2009: 38
Roseville has been conducted to
assess risk for potential third-
party damage. One third-party
dig-in occurred nearby. Most of
the area has been fully
developed and the Blue Oaks
overpass has been completed.
The risk of third- party damage
has been reduced and no further
action is warranted.
19(b) L173 Segment 102.6, Placer 2008 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2008: 42
Mile Points (Rocklin/ 2009 19(a). Third Party Damage 2009: 29
1.45-1.50 Roseville)
20(a) L187 Segment 154.2, Monterey 2007 This segment is located in a Potential for Comple2007: 54
Mile Points rural area near Hwy 101, south Third Party Damage
58.47-58.48 of Salinas. It was assessed as
having a potential for third-
party damage. However, this
assessment was revised in 2008
after PG&E conducted an
additional public information
program in the area and
concluded that the risk of
future third party damage was
no longer as high, causing the
segment not to appear on the
2008 or 2009 lists.
20(b) L187 Segment 160, Monterey 2009 PG&E has completed an Potential for Comple2009: 39
Mile Points engineering review of 1,320 Third Party Damage
61.75-62.00 feet of pipe through the rural
area near Hwy 101 across from
Hartnell Rd near Salinas for
the potential for damage by
third parties. Based on this
review, PG&E has performed
notifications and installed
additional line markers. No
further action is warranted.
21(a) L215 Segment 104, Stanislaus 2008 PG&E conducted an engineering Potential for Comple2008: 75
Mile Points 2009 review of 3,310 feet of pipe Corrosion 2009: 65
3.00-3.43 between Hwy 33 in Patterson and
Hwy 99 in Turlock based on
corrosion monitoring data from
segments 122.3 and 123. Three
areas around the pipe were dug
up to permit physical
examinations of the pipe. Based
on this review, no further
action is warranted at this
time.
21(b) L215 Segment 122.3, Stanislaus 2008 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2008: 69
Mile Points (Turlock) 2009 21(a). Corrosion 2009: 63/64
19.46-19.48
21(c) L215 Segment 123, Stanislaus 2008 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2008: 66
Mile Points (Turlock) 2009 21(a). Corrosion 2009: 63/64
19.56-19.74
22(a) 0401-01 Segment 104, Marin 2007 PG&E has completed an Overall Complet2007: 8
Mile Points (San Rafael) 2009 engineering review of 1,887 2009: 99
2.40-2.48 feet of pipe through the
suburban area along Lindaro St
near Albert Park Ln in San
Rafael. Based upon the results
of this review, PG&E has
determined that no repair,
replacement or other action is
warranted.
22(b) 0401-01 Segment 104.8, Marin 2008 See description for Map No. Overall Complet2008: 4
Mile Points (San Rafael) 2009 22(a). 2009: 14
2.48-2.76
23 0407-01 Segment 104.8, Napa 2009 PG&E replaced 247 feet of pipe Physical Design & Comple2009: 45
Mile Points (Napa) near Foster Rd and Saint Characteristics
1.83-1.88 Francis Cir in Napa in 2009.
24(a) L114-1 Segment 103, Solano/Sacramento 2009 PG&E has evaluated the potential Potential for Engineering 2009: 87/88
Mile Points of rerouting gas to allow the Ground Movement
7.33-7.73 removal of 7,500 feet of three
pipeline segments (L114-1,
segment 103; L-114, segment
120, discussed at Map No. 9(b);
and SP4Z, segment 112,
discussed at Map No. 24(c))
crossing the San Joaquin River,
underwater, near the Antioch
Bridge due to the potential for
ground movement. Based upon
this evaluation, PG&E plans to
remove these pipeline segments
from service in 2011.
24(b) L114-2 Segment 101, Solano/Sacramento 2009 PG&E has completed an Potential for Engineering 2009: 84/85
Mile Points engineering review of the Ground Movement
3.18-3.80 potential for ground movement
along this segment, crossing
the Sacramento River and
adjacent levees from Sherman
Island north. This project
includes L114, segment 106,
discussed at Map No. 9(a).
Based on this review, PG&E
plans to replace this crossing
in 2013.
24(c) SP4Z Segment 112, Solano/Sacramento 2009 See description for Map No. Potential for Engineering 2009: 83
Mile Points 24(a). Ground Movement
7.45-7.82
25(a) L118A Segment 166.1, Madera 2008 The third-party damage risk for Potential for Comple2008: 96
Mile Points segment 166.1 was revised in Third Party Damage
30.38-30.38 2009 after PG&E conducted an
additional public information
program in the area, causing
the segment not to appear on
the 2009 list. In addition,
PG&E has confirmed that surface
marking of the location is in
place. Therefore, the risk of
third- party damage has been
reduced and no further action
is warranted at this time.
25(b) L118A Segment 166.13, Madera 2007 An engineering review of this Potential for Comple2007: 75
Mile Points 2008 pipe segment near Avenue 18 \1/ Third Party Damage 2008: 97
30.38-30.40 2009 2\ near Madera has been 2009: 76
conducted to assess risk for
potential third party damage.
One third party dig-in occurred
nearby. However, farming
operations over the pipeline
have since changed, and the
pipeline now lies beneath a
farm road. In addition, PG&E
has confirmed that surface
marking of the location is in
place, and conducted an
additional public information
program in the area. Therefore,
the risk of third-party damage
has been reduced and no further
action is warranted at this
time.
25(c) L118A Segment 166.17, Madera 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2007: 55
Mile Points 2008 25(b). Third Party Damage 2008: 63
30.40-31.06 2009 2009: 55
26 L119B Segment 101, Sacramento 2009 PG&E has completed an Physical Design & Comple2009: 54
Mile Points (Sacramento) engineering review of the Characteristics
0.00-0.01 design materials of 1,437 feet
of pipe near Lampasas Ave and
Grove Ave in Sacramento. Based
upon the results of this
review, PG&E has determined
that no repair, replacement or
other action is warranted.
27(a) 1202-16 Segment 100, Fresno 2008 The third-party risk on this Potential for Comple2008: 22
Mile Points (Fresno/Clov2009 line is elevated due in part to Third Party Damage 2009: 19
0.00-0.08 a third-party dig-in in the
local area, which elevates the
risk of nearby segments under
PG&E's integrity management
program. A subsequent
engineering investigation
concluded that this segment is
not exposed to any elevated
third-party damage risk, that
the segment lies beneath
pavement or developed surfaces,
and therefore that no further
action is warranted.
27(b) 1202-16 Segment 101, Fresno 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2007: 38
Mile Points (Fresno/Clov2008 27(a). Third Party Damage 2008: 24
0.08-0.19 2009 2009: 23/24/
25
27(c) 1202-16 Segment 101.1, Fresno 2008 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2008: 25
Mile Points (Fresno/Clov2009 27(a). Third Party Damage 2009: 23/24/
0.19-0.27 25
27(d) 1202-16 Segment 101.2, Fresno 2009 All segments (10,331 feet) of Potential for Monitoring 2009: 27
Mile Points (Fresno/Clovis) pipe along N Clovis Ave between Corrosion
0.27-0.49 E Shields Ave and E Ashlan Ave
in Fresno and Clovis have been
evaluated. Seven excavations
were performed to examine the
pipe for potential corrosion.
Four of the sites examined
showed no corrosion, and the
remaining three showed a
minimal amount of corrosion.
Additional investigation in
2010 indicated that while this
segment is not exposed to any
elevated external corrosion
risk, minor adjustments to the
cathodic protection levels may
be appropriate. PG&E will
continue to monitor cathodic
protection levels in 2011 and
make adjustments when
necessary.
27(e) 1202-16 Segment 102, Fresno 2008 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2008: 26
Mile Points (Fresno/Clov2009 27(a). Third Party Damage 2009: 23/24/
0.49-1.03 25
27(f) 1202-16 Segment 103, Fresno 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Monitoring 2007: 28
Mile Points (Fresno/Clov2008 27(d). Corrosion Overall 2008: 17
1.03-1.05 2009 2009: 13
27(g) 1202-16 Segment 103.1, Fresno 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Monitoring 2007: 44
Mile Points (Fresno/Clov2009 27(d). Corrosion 2009: 35
1.05-1.11
27(h) 1202-16 Segment 103.3, Fresno 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Monitoring 2007: 39
Mile Points (Fresno/Clov2009 27(d). Corrosion 2009: 33
1.11-1.20
27(I) 1202-16 Segment 115, Fresno 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Monitoring 2007: 23
Mile Points (Fresno/Clov2008 27(d). Corrosion Overall 2008: 15
1.67-2.42 2009 2009: 21
27(j) 1202-16 Segment 117, Fresno 2007 See description for Map No. Overall Monitoring 2007: 20
Mile Points (Fresno/Clov2008 27(d). 2008: 14
2.58-2.59 2009 2009: 97
28 L142S Segment 114, Kern 2009 PG&E conducted an in-line Potential for Monitoring 2009: 28
Mile Points (Bakersfield) inspection of 7,425 feet of Corrosion
7.30-8.70 pipe along S Union Ave between
Watts Dr and 3rd St in
Bakersfield due to the
potential for external
corrosion, and made all
necessary repairs. As part of
its monitoring effort, PG&E
will conduct another in-line
inspection of this line in
September 2011.
29 1509-04 Segment 106, Sutter 2009 PG&E has conducted an Potential for Comple2009: 47
Mile Points (Yuba City) engineering review of 531 feet Third Party Damage
0.78-0.88 of pipe through the suburban
area near N Walton Ave and
Bridge St in Yuba City for the
potential for damage by third
parties. Two third-party dig-
ins occurred nearby. However,
development around the pipeline
has since been completed; the
pipeline is now under a roadway
and a landscape easement.
Therefore, the risk of third-
party damage has been reduced.
30(a) 1509-05 Segment 120.1, Sutter 2007 PG&E has conducted an Potential for Comple2007: 49
Mile Points (Yuba City2008 engineering review of 1,371 Third Party Damage 2008: 61
6.23-6.28 2009 feet of pipe through the 2009: 36/37
suburban area near N Walton Ave
and Bridge St in Yuba City for
the potential for damage by
third parties. Two third-party
dig-ins occurred nearby.
However, development around the
pipeline has since been
completed; the pipeline is now
under a roadway and a landscape
easement. Therefore, the risk
of third-party damage has been
reduced.
30(b) 1509-05 Segment 120.2, Sutter 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2007: 52
Mile Points (Yuba City2008 30(a). Third Party Damage 2008: 65
6.28-6.29 2009 2009: 48
30(c) 1509-05 Segment 120.3, Sutter 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2007: 40
Mile Points (Yuba City2008 30(a). Third Party Damage 2008: 62
6.29-6.33 2009 2009: 36/37
30(d) 1509-05 Segment 121, Sutter 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2007: 43
Mile Points (Yuba City2009 30(a). Third Party Damage 2009: 40
6.33-6.49
31 1815-15 Segment 130.3, Monterey 2007 PG&E plans to complete an Overall Initiated 2007: 5
Mile Points 2008 engineering review of 437 feet 2008: 9
2.04-2.13 2009 of pipe through the suburban 2009: 5
area near Hwy 68 and Aguajito
Rd near Monterey by June 2011.
Based on this review, PG&E will
determine whether any repair,
replacement or action is
warranted.
In addition, as part of PG&E's
transmission integrity
management program, an external
corrosion direct assessment is
planned for 2011.
32(a) L195A 3-1 Segment 100, Sacramento 2009 In 2010 PG&E isolated this Potential for Com2009: 57/58
Mile Points (Isleton) segment (i.e., capped the pipe Third Party Damage
0.00-0.00 at both ends to prevent gas
supply from reaching this
segment) to mitigate the risk
of damage by third-parties. No
further action is warranted.
32(b) L195A 3-1 Segment 102, Sacramento 2009 See description for Map 32(a). Potential for Com2009: 57/58
Mile Points (Isleton) Third Party Damage
0.00-0.04
32(c) L195A 3-1 Segment 102.1, Sacramento 2009 See description for Map 32(a). Potential for Comple2009: 42
Mile Points (Isleton) Third Party Damage
0.04-0.17
33(a) L210A Segment 116, Solano 2008 The third-party damage risk Potential for Comple2008: 37
Mile Points (Fairfield) assessment for this segment Third Party Damage
14.15-16.00 increased in 2008 due to
previous damage on a pipeline
near this location. A
subsequent engineering
investigation concluded that
this segment is not exposed to
any elevated third party damage
risk, that surface marking of
the segment is adequate and
therefore that no further
action is warranted.
(Notwithstanding its removal
from the list, PG&E plans to
perform an internal line
inspection on this segment in
2011. See Map No. 33b. Status:
Initiated.)
33(b) L210A Segment 117.5, Solano 2008 Construction has been completed Overall Potential Comple2008: 20
Mile Points (Fairfield) 2009 to install equipment and modify for Ground (Constru2009: 1
18.73-18.86 the pipeline to allow an in- Movement Initiated (In-
line inspection to be Line Insp.)
conducted. An in-line
inspection assessment is
scheduled for 2011.
33(c) L210A Segment 117.6, Solano 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2007: 47
Mile Points (Fairfield) 2008 33(a). Third Party Damage 2008: 51
18.86-18.96
33(d) L210A Segment 118.1, Solano 2007 See description for Map No. Overall Complet2007: 4
Mile Points (Fairfield) 2008 33(b). (Constru2008: 1
18.97-19.47 2009 Initiated (In- 2009: 10
Line Insp.)
34(a) L300A Segment 240.3, Kern 2008 PG&E has conducted an Potential for Comple2008: 36
Mile Points (Bakersfield) 2009 engineering review of this Third Party Damage 2009: 30
277.85-278.01 pipeline segment located in the
suburban area between Buena
Vista Rd and Pacheco Rd in
Bakersfield for the potential
for damage by third parties.
This segment was relocated due
to the widening of the road and
no further action is warranted.
34(b) L300A Segment 240.61, Kern 2009 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2009: 32
Mile Points (Bakersfield) 34(a). Third Party Damage
278.01-278.10
35(a) L300B Segment 193, San Bernardino 2009 PG&E has completed an Physical Design Com2009: 67/68
Mile Points engineering review of the &Characteristics
161.02-161.07 design materials of 843 feet of
pipe through the rural area.
Based on this review, PG&E
determined that no repair,
replacement or other action was
warranted.
In addition, as part of PG&E's
transmission integrity
management program, an external
corrosion direct assessment is
planned for 2011.
35(b) L300B Segment 194, San Bernardino 2009 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Com2009: 67/68
Mile Points 35(a) Characteristics
161.43-161.48
36(a) L316A Segment 111, Cont2009ostPG&E has completed an Potential for Comple2009: 92
Mile Points engineering review of 7,777 Corrosion
0.61-0.78 feet of pipe between Jersey
Island Rd on Jersey Island and
Taylor Rd on Bethel Island.
Based on cathodic protection
survey results, the cathodic
protection was determined to be
adequate. No further assessment
or work is planned at this
time.
36(b) L316A Segment 112, Cont2009ostSee description for Map No. Potential for Comple2009: 94
Mile Points 36(a). Corrosion
0.79-1.000
36(c) L316A Segment 113, Cont2009ostSee description for Map No. Potential for Comple2009: 86
Mile Points 36(a). Corrosion
1.00-1.09
36(d) L316A Segment 115, Cont2009ostSee description for Map No. Potential for Comple2009: 81
Mile Points (Bethel Is) 36(a). Corrosion
1.19 -1.23
36(e) L316A Segment 116, Cont2009ostSee description for Map No. Potential for Comple2009: 78
Mile Points (Bethel Is) 36(a). Corrosion
1.23 -2.05
36(f) L316A Segment 117, Cont2009ostSee description for Map No. Potential for Comple2009: 93
Mile Points (Bethel Is) 36(a). Corrosion
2.05 -2.31
37 DCUSSegment 100, Humboldt 2007 PG&E has conducted an Potential for Comple2007: 14
Mile Points (Ferndale) 2008 engineering review of 28 feet Ground Movement 2008: 2
0.00 -0.01 2009 of pipe through the rural area Overall 2009: 6
near Fernbridge Dr and Depot St
near Ferndale. Based upon the
results of this review, PG&E
has determined that no repair,
replacement or other action is
warranted.
38 DFDS 3543 Segment 100, Marin 2007 PG&E has completed an Overall Complet2007:18
Mile Points (Novato) 2009 engineering review of 3 feet of 2009: 11
10.91-10.91 pipe near Redwood Blvd and
Atherton Ave in Novato. Based
the results of this review,
PG&E has determined that no
repair, replacement or other
action is warranted.
39(a) DRIP 7966 Mile Points Santa Clar2007 PG&E has completed an Potential for Complet2009: 7
0.00-0.00 (San Jose) 2009 engineering review of the Ground Movement 2007: 7
potential for ground movement
along 10 feet of pipe near
Milpitas-Alviso Rd and Ranch Dr
in San Jose. Based upon the
results of this review, PG&E
has determined that no repair,
replacement or other action is
warranted.
39(b) DRIP 7970 Segment 651, Santa Clar2007 PG&E completed an engineering Physical Design & Complet2007: 7
Mile Points (San Jose) review of the physical design Characteristics
0.00-0.00 and characteristics of this 10 Overall
foot pipeline segment located
near Yerba Buena Rd in San
Jose. Based upon the results of
this review, PG&E determined
that no repair, replacement or
other action was warranted.
40 DRIP 7971 Segment 651, Santa Clar2007 PG&E has completed an Potential for Complet2007: 1
Mile Points (Milpitas) 2009 engineering review of the Ground Movement 2009: 17
0.00-0.00 potential for ground movement
along 10 feet of pipe near
Milpitas-Alviso Rd and Ranch Dr
in Milpitas. Based upon the
results of this review, PG&E
has determined that no repair,
replacement or other action is
warranted.
41(a) SP3 Segment 160.3, Cont2008ostReplace approximately 300 feet Potential for Engineering 2008: 48
Mile Points (San Pablo) 2009 of pipe inside PG&E's San Pablo Ground Movement 2009: 41
198.49-198.49 Station and crossing Rumrill
Blvd in San Pablo due to the
potential for ground movement.
Construction is planned for
2012. The small section of
pipeline that includes this
segment has been isolated
(i.e., closed valves at both
ends to prevent gas supply from
reaching this segment) from the
rest of PG&E's system, reducing
its overall risk.
41(b) SP3 Segment 160.36, Cont2008ostSee description for Map No. Potential for Engineering 2008: 56
Mile Points (San Pablo) 2009 41(a). Ground Movement 2009: 50/51/
198.49-198.49 52/53
41(c) SP3 Segment 160.4, Cont2008ostSee description for Map No. Potential for Engineering 2008: 57
Mile Points (San Pablo) 2009 41(a). Ground Movement 2009: 50/51/
198.49-198.49 52/53
41(d) SP3 Segment 160.5, Cont2008ostSee description for Map No. Potential for Engineering 2008: 58
Mile Points (San Pablo) 2009 41(a). Ground Movement 2009: 50/51/
198.49-198.52 52/53
41(e) SP3 Segment 160.6, Cont2008ostSee description for Map No. Potential for Engineering 2008: 59
Mile Points (San Pablo) 2009 41(a). Ground Movement 2009: 50/51/
198.52-198.55 52/53
42(a) X6337 Segment 100, Marin 2007 PG&E has completed an Physical Design & Comple2007: 12
Mile Points (Novato) 2009 engineering review of two 30- Characteristics 2009: 8/9
10.84-10.84 foot segments of pipe near Overall
Redwood Blvd and Atherton Ave
in Novato. Based upon the
results of this review, PG&E
has determined that no repair,
replacement or other action is
warranted.
42(b) X6337 Segment 101, Marin 2007 See description for Map No. Physical Design & Comple2007: 13
Mile Points (Novato) 2009 42(a). Characteristics 2009: 8/9
10.84-10.84 Overall
43 X6526 Segment 505, Kings 2009 PG&E has conducted an Physical Design & Comple2009: 66
Mile Points (Kettleman City) engineering review of the Characteristics
0.24-0.24 design materials of about 9
feet of pipe south of Kettleman
City. Based upon the results of
this review, PG&E has
determined that no repair,
replacement or other action is
warranted.
44 DREG 4197 Segment 801, San Mateo 2007 PG&E has completed an Overall Comple2007: 22
Mile Points (East Palo Alto) 2008 engineering review of 18 feet 2008: 19
0.00-0.00 2009 of pipe near Dumbarton Ave. and 2009: 95
Donahoe St. in East Palo Alto.
Based upon the results of this
review, PG&E has determined
that no repair, replacement or
other action is warranted.
45(a) 7221-15 Segment 101, Stanislaus 2007 PG&E has completed an Overall Physical Complet2007: 3
Mile Points (Modesto) 2008 engineering review of 6,709 Design & 2008: 40
0.04-1.31 2009 feet of pipe along Dale Rd Characteristics 2009: 96
between Standiford Ave and
Bangs Ave. Based on this
review, PG&E determined that no
repair, replacement or other
action was warranted.
45(b) 7221-15 Segment 102.3, Stanislaus 2007 See description for Map No. Overall Comple2007: 17
Mile Points (Modesto) 2008 45(a). 2008: 32
1.44-1.51
46 DREG 3875 Segment 101, Marin 2009 PG&E has completed an Overall Comple2009: 98
Mile Points (Novato) engineering review of 285 feet
0.00-0.00 of pipe near Redwood Blvd and
Atherton Ave in Novato. Based
upon the results of this
review, PG&E has determined
that no repair, replacement or
other action is warranted.
47 STUB 7912 Segment 551, Stanislaus 2007 PG&E has completed an Overall Complet2007: 6
Mile Points (Modesto) 2009 engineering review of 2 feet of 2009: 100
0.04-0.04 pipe near Dale Rd and Bangs Ave
in Modesto as part of the
effort described at Map No.
45(a). Based on this review,
PG&E determined that no repair,
replacement or other action was
warranted.
48(a) L150 Segment 118.3, Yolo 2008 PG&E plans to remove this Overall Engineering 2008: 12
Mile Points (Davis) segment of pipe near Olive Dr.
17.51-17.89 and Richards Blvd. in Davis
from transmission service by
converting the pipe to a
distribution main or retiring
it. Construction to permanently
remove this segment from
transmission service currently
is planned for 2011.
48(b) L150 Segment 118.8, Yolo 2007 See description for Map No. Overall Engineering 2007: 25
Mile Points (Davis) 2008 48(a). 2008: 10
18.08-18.09
48(c) L150 Segment 119, Yolo 2007 See description for Map No. Overall Engineering 2007: 15
Mile Points (Davis) 2008 48(a). 2008:3
18.09-18.0913
49 L220 Segment 134.2, Yolo 2007 This segment consists of 154 Overall Comple2007: 27
Mile Points (Davis) feet of pipe near Olive Dr in
22.14-22.17 Davis. This segment was
assigned a lower risk value in
2008 based upon improved
external corrosion information,
causing it not to appear on the
2008 list. The risk value of
the segment was lowered further
in 2009 based upon improved
geophysical information. No
repair, replacement or other
action is warranted.
50 L314 Segment 127, San Bernardino 2008 PG&E inspected the coating Potential for Comple2008: 74
Mile Points (Victorville) condition of this segment Corrosion
28.11-28.83 (4,446 feet of pipe through the
rural area along N D St and Hwy
15 in Victorville) in 2008 and
reduced the external corrosion
risk as a result of this
inspection, causing it not to
appear on the 2009 list.
51 L402 Segment 130, Shasta 2008 The third-party damage risk Potential for Comple2008: 43
Mile Points assessment for this segment Third Party Damage
24.00-25.00 increased in 2008 due to
previous third-party damage to
this segment. A subsequent
engineering investigation
concluded that this segment is
not exposed to any elevated
third party damage risk, that
surface marking of the segment
is adequate and therefore that
no further action is warranted.
52 0126-01 Segment 101, Cont2007ostThis segment consists of 745 Potential for Comple2007: 73
Mile Points (Richmond) feet of pipe near W Gertude and Corrosion
0.00-0.1409 McKosken Rd in Richmond. Its
potential for corrosion was
reduced after PG&E determined
that the segment lay in soil
which was less corrosive than
previously assessed and did not
have an outer pipe casing. This
reassessment caused the segment
not to appear on the 2008 and
2009 lists.
53 L057A Segment 103, Cont2007ostPG&E conducted a survey of this Potential for Comple2007: 80
Mile Points (Brentwood) pipeline segment near Fallman Corrosion
7.48-9.04 Rd near Brentwood to assess its
potential susceptibility to
external corrosion. Based upon
the information obtained from
that survey regarding the
adequacy of the cathodic
protection system and the
pipeline coating condition,
PG&E determined that no repair
or replacement of this segment
was warranted.
54 0603-01 Segment 101.2, Solano 2008 PG&E conducted an investigation Overall Comple2008: 16
Mile Points (Fairfield) of this segment of pipe through
0.005-0.20 the suburban area along
Illinois St. in Fairfield.
Based upon the results of this
investigation, PG&E determined
that no repair, replacement or
other action was warranted.
55 0646-01 Segment 115.3, Yolo 2008 This segment consists of 302 Potential for Comple2008: 98
Mile Points feet of pipe in a rural area Corrosion
10.25-10.31 along County Rd 97A and Hwy 5
near Woodland. PG&E improved
the cathodic protection of this
segment, reducing the external
corrosion risk and causing it
not to appear on the 2009 list.
56 L119A Segment 109.7, Yolo 2007 The third-party damage risk Potential for Comple2007: 62
Mile Points (West Sacramento) 2008 assessment for this segment Third Party Damage 2008: 72
8.57-8.58 increased in 2007 due to
previous third-party damage to
this segment. A subsequent
engineering investigation
concluded that this segment is
not exposed to any elevated
third party damage risk, that
surface marking of the segment
is adequate and therefore that
no further action is warranted.
57(a) L124B Segment 123.5, Yuba 2008 The external corrosion risk for Potential for Comple2008: 76
Mile Points (Marysville/ this segment was reduced based Corrosion
20.04-20.10 Olivehurst) on an inspection of its coating
condition, causing this segment
not to appear on the 2009 list.
57(b) L124B Segment 125, Yuba 2008 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2008: 89
Mile Points (Marysville/ 57(a). Corrosion
20.35-20.55 Olivehurst)
58(a) L126B Segment 103, Humboldt 2007 The fault crossing in this area Potential for Comple2007: 85
Mile Points (Eureka) 2008 (16,197 feet of pipe near New Ground Movement 2008: 110
1.43-2.16 Tompkins Hill Rd. in Eureka)
was assigned a lower risk value
in 2009 based upon improved
geophysical information,
causing it not to appear on the
2009 list.
58(b) L126B Segment 104, Humboldt 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2007: 83
Mile Points (Eureka) 2008 58(a). Ground Movement 2008: 102
2.17-2.73
58(c) L126B Segment 105, Humboldt 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2007: 48
Mile Points (Eureka) 2008 58(a). Ground Movement 2008: 55
2.73-4.00 The external corrosion risk for Potential for
this segment was reduced based Corrosion (2007)
on inspection of its coating
condition, causing this segment
not to appear on the 2008 and
2009 lists for potential for
corrosion.
58(d) L126B Segment 106, Humboldt 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2007: 74
Mile Points (Eureka) 2008 58(c). Ground Movement 2008: 95
4.00-4.69 Potential for
Corrosion (2007)
58(e) L126B Segment 106.85, Humboldt 2007 The external corrosion risk for Completed2007: 82
Mile Points (Eureka) segment 106.85 was reduced
4.70-4.71833 based on inspection of its
coating condition, causing this
segment not to appear on the
2008 and 2009 lists.
Potential for Corrosion
58(f) L126B Segment 107.6, Humboldt 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2007: 35
Mile Points (Eureka) 2008 58(a). Ground Movement 2008: 27
5.093-5.133
59 1301-01 Segment 124, Sonoma 2008 The third-party damage risk Overall Comple2008: 18
Mile Point 0.00 (Petaluma) assessment for this segment
increased in 2008 due to
previous third-party damage to
this segment. This segment is
now located inside a fenced
PG&E station. A subsequent
engineering investigation of
this area confirmed that this
segment is not exposed to any
elevated third party damage
risk and therefore that no
further action was warranted.
60(a) L138C Segment 105.3, Fresno 2008 PG&E conducted a survey of this Potential for Comple2008: 52
Mile Points (Fresno) pipeline running along North Corrosion
44.72-44.81 and Cedar in Fresno for
susceptibility to external
corrosion. Based upon the
information obtained from that
survey regarding the adequacy
of the cathodic protection
system, PG&E determined that no
repair, replacement or other
action was warranted.
60(b) L138C Segment 105.6, Fresno 2008 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2008: 64
Mile Points (Fresno) 60(a). Corrosion
44.81-44.90
61 L142S Segment 116.3, Kern 2007 This segment consists of 65 feet Potential for Comple2007: 68
Mile Points (Bakersfield) of pipe along V St north of Corrosion
8.9927-9.01 Brundage Ln, in Bakersfield.
The external corrosion risk for
this segment was reduced based
on inspection of its coating
condition, causing the segment
not to appear on the 2008 and
2009 lists.
62 L162A Segment 113.2, San Joaquin 2007 This segment consists of 814 Overall Complet2007:26
Mile Points (Tracy) 2008 feet of pipe near Grant Line 2008: 7
7.07-7.22 and Macarthur in Tracy. In
2009, PG&E updated its system-
wide risk assessment of certain
properties relative to the
external corrosion risk which
reduced the relative risk for
this segment, and the risk due
to third party damage for this
segment in particular was
reduced due to an additional
public information program.
This segment does not appear on
the 2009 list.
63 L177A Segment 215.1, Humboldt 2008 The fault crossing in this area Potential for Comple2008: 28
Mile Points (Fortuna) (2,251 feet of pipe near Hwy 36 Ground Movement
170.57-171.00 and Hwy 101 near Fortuna) was
assigned a lower risk value in
2009 based upon improved
geophysical information,
causing it not to appear on the
2009 list.
64(a) L181B Segment 104.6, Monterey 2007 The third-party damage risk Potential for Comple2007: 67
Mile Points 2008 assessment for this segment Third Party Damage 2008: 88
2.17-2.18 increased in 2007 due to
previous third-party damage to
this segment. A subsequent
engineering investigation
concluded that this segment is
not exposed to any elevated
third party damage risk, that
surface marking of the segment
is adequate and therefore that
no further action is warranted.
64 (b) L181B Segment 104.8, Monterey 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Comple2007: 66
Mile Points 2008 64(a). Third Party Damage 2008: 80
2.18-2.21
65 L197B Segment 105, San Joaquin 2008 The third-party damage risk Potential for Complet2008: 5
Mile Points assessment for this segment Third Party Damage
4.14-4.40 increased in 2008 due to Overall
previous damage on a pipeline
near this location. A
subsequent engineering
investigation concluded that
this segment is not exposed to
any elevated third party damage
risk, that surface marking of
the segment is adequate and
therefore that no further
action is warranted.
66 L300A Segment Santa Clar2008 This segment consists of 4,780 Potential for Comple2008: 73
369.051, (Morgan Hill/San feet of pipe near Foothill Rd. Third Party Damage
Mile Points Martin) and Maple Rd. in Morgan Hill
473.09-473.99 and San Martin. The risk of
third- party damage was reduced
based on analysis of the depth
of cover over this segment,
which found the cover to be
adequate.
67(a) L300B Segment 336.0, Fresno 2007 This segment is located near Potential for Comple2007: 70
Mile Points Gale Ave. and S. Butte Rd. near Corrosion
362.7061-362.7 Coalinga. In 2007, PG&E
087 conducted a survey of these
pipeline segments to assess
their potential susceptibility
to external corrosion. Based
upon the information obtained
from that survey regarding the
functioning of the cathodic
protection system and the
pipeline coating condition,
PG&E determined that no repair
or replacement of these
segments was warranted.
67(b) L300B Segment 336.5, Fresno 2007 See description for Map No. Potential for Complet2007:63
Mile Points 67(a). Corrosion
362.8785-362.8
83
67(c) L300B Segment 336.9, Fresno 2008 This segment consists of 69 feet Potential for Comple2008: 70
Mile Points of pipe near Gale Ave. and S. Corrosion
362.89-362.90 Butte Rd near Coalinga. In
2007, PG&E conducted a survey
of pipeline segments in this
area to assess their potential
susceptibility to external
corrosion. Based upon the
information obtained from that
survey regarding the
functioning of the cathodic
protection system and the
pipeline coating condition,
PG&E determined that no repair
or replacement of these
segments was warranted.
68 L302W Segment 107.5, Yolo 2008 This segment consists of 594 Potential for Initiated 2008: 71
Mile Points feet of pipe near Hwy 5 and Corrosion
5.01-5.13 Road 2A, north of Woodland.
PG&E plans to complete an
assessment of an adjacent
segment for susceptibility to
external corrosion in 2011.
Based on this assessment, PG&E
will determine whether any
repair, replacement, or other
action is warranted.
69 DREG 4102 Segment 801, Yolo 2007 PG&E conducted an engineering Overall Physical Complet2007: 2
Mile Points (Davis) 2008 review of this pipeline segment Design & 2008: 8
0.00-0.02 located near 2nd St in Davis. Characteristics
Based upon the results of this (2007)
review, PG&E determined that no
repair, replacement or other
action was warranted.
70(a) Stub 8484 Segment 301, Alameda 2007 PG&E conducted an engineering Overall Comple2007: 10
Mile Points (Union City) review in 2008 of this 2 foot
0.0034-0.0042 segment located near Alvarado-
Niles Rd & Decoto Rd in Union
City. Based on review of pipe
characteristics, this segment
does not appear on the 2008 and
2009 lists.
70(b) Stub 8485 Segment 301, Alameda 2007 PG&E has conducted an Overall Comple2007: 11
Mile Points (Union City2008 engineering review of this 2008: 13
0.00-0.002 pipeline segment located near
Alvarado Niles Rd & Decoto Rd
in Union City. Based on review
of pipe characteristics, this
segment does not appear on the
2009 list.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This segment number is referred to as segment number 137.08 in the 2007 Top 100 list.
\2\ In 2007, a portion of segment 130 was identified as segment 129.6. In 2008, that portion was renamed as segment 130.
\3\ In 2007, segment 130.11 was identified as segment 129.6. In 2008, it was renamed as segment 130.11.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Rick Kessler
Question 1. As you mention in your written testimony, some in
industry are calling for a risk based approach to pipeline safety
rather than being required to perform routine inspections every 5 years
for pipelines carrying liquid fuel and every 7 years for pipelines
carrying natural gas. What do you believe are the potential risks in
taking a risk-based approach to natural gas pipeline safety?
Answer. Since nearly the time integrity management was passed for
natural gas transmission pipelines as part of the Pipeline Safety
Improvement Act of 2002 some within the natural gas industry have
lobbied for a relaxation of the 7-year re-inspection interval that
Congress set. The Pipeline Safety Trust continues to support the
statutory minimum re-inspection periods currently in law and opposes
any relaxation of these re-inspection intervals in favor of a more
risk-based approach for the following reasons:
1. The baseline inspection period has not even been reached
yet, and we believe that it is necessary to go through several
re-inspections to determine whether the system is actually
working and if it makes sense to change the re-inspection
interval. Some companies have not even completed one round of
inspections yet. During the first round, many anomalies with
the pipelines were identified and repaired. The early data also
clearly indicate that there have been problems determining the
correct risks to be looking for and then using the correct
tools and assessment methods to Inspect for those risks. it may
take three or four rounds of re-inspections before all these
early lessons are learned, and before these lessons are learned
we should not risk the public's safety. Subsequent rounds of
inspections should also tell us how quickly new anomalies
appear and at what rates they are growing. Without that
information from ongoing re-inspections it is too early to
propose changing the re-inspection interval.
2. A segment of the industry also argues that instead of a
standard re-inspection interval that would allow all companies'
results to be compared, each company, based on its own internal
findings, should be allowed to design its own re-inspection
program for each individual segment of its pipelines. This
engineered, risk-based approach places much of the authority to
draft the inspection requirements with each company. PHMSA
clearly does not have the extensive resources necessary to
review each program to ensure it is no less protective than the
current respective five or seven-year re-inspection intervals
and we doubt that pipeline companies would support the
additional, significant increases in user fees necessary for
PHMSA to attain such resources and maintain them as pipeline
mileage expands. This proposed system also includes no way for
the public to review and comment on the proposed engineered,
risk-based re-inspection proposals and thus removes another
public safety backstop.
3. There is also increasing mileage of large high-pressure
natural gas pipelines in areas with very high-density
populations. The consequences if one of these pipelines should
fail in such an area would dwarf the event that occurred in San
Bruno on a relatively low-pressure line. Rather than relax
inspection requirements, PHMSA should reassess the safety
protocols in place to ensure that it is impossible for a
pipeline to fall in such an area from any cause that Is within
the operator's controls (corrosion, materials, operation,
maintenance, inspections, etc.).
This year alone there have been major failures (San Bruno,
Marshall, Salt Lake City) on pipelines that are required to be doing
integrity management programs. This alone shows that it would be
irresponsible to even consider allowing companies to expand the
interval between inspections. For these reasons, we continue to oppose
any change to the re-inspection intervals for transmission pipelines.
Question 2. In Washington State, there were 19 significant
incidents of pipeline failure reported over the past decade. PHSMA
considers a significant incident as one reported by pipeline operators
when any of the following conditions are met: (1) fatality or injury
requiring in-patient hospitalization; (2) $50,000 or more in total
costs, measured in 1984 dollars; (3) highly volatile liquid releases of
5 barrels or more or other liquid releases of 50 barrels or more; or
(4) liquid releases resulting in an unintentional fire or explosion. Do
you believe the thresholds that PHSMA uses in its definition of
significant incidents are reasonable?
Answer. We believe for the data to be of value in assessing
progress being made toward greater safety the definitions for what is
reported needs to be consistent, or at least ensure that same type of
data can be gathered from what is submitted. Since it is hard to update
historical reports, it is important that all reports made on into the
future have the same information for comparison purposes.
That being said, the more incident data that is available the
better the quality of our understanding of what safety issues really
are, and where greater pipeline safety emphasis needs to be focused.
The two criteria that we think could be tightened are the requirements
that only injuries that require ``in-patient hospitalization'' and the
$50,000 threshold for property damage be included in the significant
incident database.
In these days of cost control on health care, many significant
injuries can occur that do not require hospitalization. We think a more
inclusive measure would be anytime a pipeline incident occurs that
causes a person who is not an employee of a pipeline company to seek
medical attention that incident should be reported.
The $50,000 property damage threshold also leads to a significant
underreporting of incidents, especially incidents on natural gas
distribution systems where even the current limited data shows the
majority of deaths and injuries occur. With tens of thousands of
incidents on distribution systems falling to be reported at the same
time millions of dollars are being spent on damage prevention programs,
better incident data collection could almost certainly lead to a better
understanding of integrity management needs and better targeting of
program expenditures.
Question 3. Does PHSMA receive information from pipeline operators
on all pipeline incidents? If not, should they? Do state commissions
collect that information? And if so, what are the essential data fields
required so that the process can be made quick and easy for the
pipeline operator but still provide useful information for PHSMA?
Answer. We would define an incident as any time a pipeline fails,
leaks to the point that it requires repair (some natural gas pipelines
leak in ways that do not require repairs), or is damaged in a manner
that may lead to a failure or leak in the future. Certainly neither
PHMSA, nor any state regulators we are aware of, require reporting of
all these types of incidents. PHMSA just completed a rulemaking on
reporting requirements that helps clarify and expand many of the data
fields. We support these new requirements, but believe expansion of the
criteria for reporting as outlined above would provide even better data
for decisionmaking and trend tracking.
Question 4. Do you have any sense of the proportion of all
incidents that are considered significant incidents?
Answer. Based on data reviewed from the Common Ground Alliance, the
Texas Railroad Commission and recent statements from PHMSA that they
are aware of as many as 90,000 incidents/year that are not included in
their database, it is clear that less than 1 percent of all pipeline
incidents are currently included within the significant incident
definition.
Question 5. Nationally, the top three causes of pipeline failures
are excavation damage, corrosion, and material/weld/ equipment failure.
Do you believe that Washington state's ``Call before you dig'' law has
contributed to the reduction of all incidents of pipeline failures due
to excavation damage in the state over the past decade? Are there
things that can be done to strengthen the current state law?
Answer. Washington State's current ``Dig Law'' is very weak and
does little to reduce the number of incidents caused by excavation
damage. The main weaknesses in the current law include the lack of any
agency with administrative authority over the law, no legitimate
enforcement authority, and no requirement for reporting excavation
incidents so education and enforcement can be targeted, and
effectiveness and progress can be measured.
The Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission has
certainly recognized these weaknesses and has tried over the past 10
years to increase enforcement and effectiveness, but until these
weaknesses are fixed by the state legislature progress will be nearly
impossible. Luckily, PHMSA's recent push to require states to increase
the effectiveness of their excavation damage prevention programs has
caused a multi-stakeholder group in Washington State to work together
to draft a much improved version of the State's Dig Law. It appears
this proposed draft will be introduced in the state legislature this
coming session. Any support the state's Congressional Delegation can
provide to help ensure the passage of this bill would certainly help
increase pipeline safety throughout the state.
Question 6. Which states do you believe have the most effective
programs for promoting pipeline safety?
Answer. We have not undertaken any sort of comparison of the
different states' regulatory programs so our answer to this question is
not based on any real analysis. It also should be noted that state
program's effectiveness varies a good deal depending on which parts of
the program is being looked at. For example, Washington State's
program, overseen by the Washington Utilities and Transportation
Commission, is very good for inspections, enforcement, transparency,
and citizen involvement, but the state's damage prevention program is
poor because of the reason noted above.
Other states that seem to do an overall good job are Virginia,
Minnesota, and New York.
Question 7. Do you believe PHSMA has adequate resources in-house to
develop all of the standards associated with pipeline safety? What are
the dangers for PHSMA to rely on industry developed standards for
minimum Federal pipeline safety regulations?
Answer. PHMSA has incorporated by reference into its regulations
standards, or parts of standards, developed by organizations made up in
whole or in part of industry representatives. A review of the Code of
Federal Regulations under which PHMSA operates finds the following
numbers of incorporated standards:
Standards Incorporated by Reference in 49 CFR Parts 192, 193, 195
(As of 6/9/2010)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CFR Part Topic Standards*
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
192 Natural and Other Gas 39
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
193 Liquefied Natural Gas 8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
195 Hazardous Liquids 38
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 85
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Note: Some standards may be incorporated by reference in more than one CFR Part.
Those standards were developed by the following organizations:
American Gas Association (AGA), American Petroleum Institute (API),
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), American Society of
Civil Engineers (ASCE), ASME International (ASME), Gas Technology
Institute (GTI), Manufacturers Standardization Society of the Valve and
Fittings Industry, Inc. (MSS), NACE International (NACE), National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA), Pipeline Research Council International,
Inc. (PRCI), Plastics Pipe Institute, Inc. (PPI)
While the Pipeline Safety Trust has not done an extensive review of
these organizations or their standard setting practices, It is of great
concern to us--and we believe it should be to Congress as well--
whenever an organization whose mission is to represent the regulated
Industry is--in essence--writing regulations that the dues-paying
members of the organization must follow. A very quick review of the
mission statements of some of these organizations reveals statements
like these below that show, at a minimum, a conflict between the best
possible regulations for the entire public and the economic interests
of the industry they represent.
API--``We speak for the oil and natural gas industry to the
public, Congress and the executive branch, state governments
and the media. We negotiate with regulatory agencies, represent
the industry in legal proceedings, participate in coalitions
and work in partnership with other associations to achieve our
members' public policy goals.''
AGA--``Focuses on the advocacy of natural gas issues that are
priorities for the membership and that are achievable in a
cost-effective way.'' ``Delivers measurable value to AGA
members.''
PPI--``PPI members share a common interest in broadening
awareness and creating opportunities that expand market share
and extend the use of plastics pipe in all its many
applications.'' ``the mission of The Plastics Pipe Institute is
to make plastics the material of choice for all piping
applications.''
PRCI--``PRCI is a community of the world's leading pipeline
companies, and the vendors, service providers, equipment
manufacturers, and other organizations supporting our
industry.''
The pipeline industry has considerable knowledge and expertise that
needs to be tapped into to draft standards that are technically correct
and that can be implemented efficiently. But we also know the
industry's standard setting practices exclude experts and stakeholders
who can bring a broader ``public good'' view to standard setting. We
also know that when a regulatory agency needs to adopt industry-
developed standards, it is a ``red flag'' that the agency lacks the
resources and expertise to develop these standards on Its own.
It should be noted that the development of such standards Is not an
open process where Interested members of the public or experts outside
the industry (such as those in universities and colleges) can review
the material and comment. One of the most ridiculous examples of this
one-sided process was the development of the Public Awareness standard
(API RP 1162) which now governs how pipeline companies have to
communicate with the affected public. The process was controlled by
industry, even though industry has no particular expertise in this type
of public awareness or communication. The many possible independent
experts and organizations in the field of communications and education
were not sought and ultimately were not a part of the development of
this standard.
Even once the standards are incorporated by reference into Federal
regulations, the standards remain the property of the standard setting
organization and are not provided by PHMSA in their published
regulations. If the public, state regulators, or academic institutions
want to review the standards they have to purchase a copy from the
organization that drafted them. In many cases, this further removes
review of the standards from those outside of the industry. Below are
just a handful of examples of the cost to purchase for review the
standards that are part of the Federal pipeline regulations. The
American Petroleum Institute has started to change this policy of
charging for their standards and now makes safety standards available
for viewing (but not downloading) online, but the others still have not
to our knowledge.
Sample Cost of Pipeline Safety Standards Incorporated by Reference Into Federal Regulations
(As of 6/8/2010)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Code of Federal Regulations
Standard Organization (Incorporated by Reference) Cost
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ANSI/API Spec 5L/ISO 3183 API 49 CFR 192$245.00192.112,
``Specification for Line Pipe'' 192.113, 195.106
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASME B31.4 -2002 ``Pipeline ASME 49 CFR 195$129.00
Transportation Systems for Liquid
Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids''
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GRI 02/0057 (2002) ``Internal Corrosion GTI 49 CFR 192$295.00
Direct Assessment of Gas Transmission
Pipelines Methodology''
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NACE Standard RP0502-NACE ``Pipeline 49 CFR 192.$83.00 192.925,
External Corrosion Direct Assessme192.931, 192.935, 192.939,
Methodology'' 195.588
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
``A Modified Criterion for EvaluPRCIg 49 CFR 192$995.00 192.485,
the Remaining Strength of Corroded 195.452
Pipe''
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We do not believe that PHMSA currently has the resources in-house
to handle the development and updating of all these standards. We do
not have the solution to this problem, and it is a problem with much
broader bounds than just PHMSA, but at a minimum PHMSA should be able
to choose what organization develops a standard, set the parameters for
the standard, ensure broad stakeholder involvement (by funding state
and outside participation if necessary), and ensure complete
transparency of the process and product.
Question 8. You advocated to the Whatcom County Planning Commission
that they should amend the county zoning code so that no construction
of schools, hospitals, police, or fire facilities, stadiums or other
``high-consequence'' uses would be allowed within 500 feet of the
pipelines. Additionally, you raised the idea of a 660 foot
``consultation zone'' on either side of a pipeline. Locally, what has
been the reaction to these ideas? Have other communities within
Washington or in other states shown interest in these ideas? As you
know, Enbridge's Olympic Pipeline runs down the I5 Corridor, which is
heavily populated by both residential and commercial enterprises.
Answer. After some minor changes to our proposed modifications to
Whatcom County's land use regulations to ensure greater safety when
development occurs near transmission pipelines, the County Planning
Commission and the County Council adopted the proposal in July and it
is now part of the Whatcom County Code. We received unanimous support
for our proposal from the pipeline companies that operate in the county
as well as the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission
(WUTC). There were some initial concerns raised by individuals
concerned about protecting their property rights and values with the
idea of the ``consultation zone.'' Those concerns for the most part
went away once the idea of the consultation zone was fully understood
and people realized that it did not change what they could do on their
property it just ensured good communication with the pipeline company
to make sure that both the pipeline and the neighborhood was protected.
To our knowledge four communities in Washington State (city of
Redmond, City of La Center, Benton County, Whatcom County) have adopted
land use rules better defining how development can occur near
transmission pipelines. Every one of these ordinances is slightly
different reflecting local concerns, but they all share the common goal
of increasing public safety. Those four ordinances, along with four
from other states, can be found on the Washington Municipal Research
and Services Center (MRSC) website at: http://www.mrsc.org/Subjects/
PubSafe/transpipeords.aspx.
PHMSA is supposed to release the Pipelines and Informed Planning
Alliance's (PIPA) report on these types of issues any day now.
Washington State has been out in front of the effort for some time now
because of a coalition made up of the WUTC, the Association of
Washington Cities, The Washington State Association of Counties, the
pipeline industry, and the Pipeline Safety Trust. Presentations have
been made to local government planners and elected officials across the
state, and technical assistance is available to those jurisdictions
that want to move forward on ordinances to increase safety around
pipelines. The MRSC has an entire website devoted to these planning
near pipeline issues, which can be found at: http://www.mrsc.org/
Subjects/PubSafe/transpipes.aspx.
This type of coordinated effort is what will be needed across the
country once PHMSA releases the PIPA report. Unfortunately, it does not
appear that PHMSA has the resources to spearhead such a national effort
to inform local governments about their options, so we have asked that
as part of reauthorization money be made available to PHMSA to
specifically address this need.