[Senate Hearing 111-1036]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-1036
TURNING IDEAS INTO ACTION:
ENSURING EFFECTIVE CLEAN UP
AND RESTORATION IN THE GULF
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS, ATMOSPHERE, FISHERIES, AND COAST GUARD
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 21, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
TOM UDALL, New Mexico SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Ann Begeman, Republican Staff Director
Brian M. Hendricks, Republican General Counsel
Nick Rossi, Republican Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS, ATMOSPHERE, FISHERIES, AND COAST GUARD
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine, Ranking
Chairman ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
BARBARA BOXER, California DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on July 21, 2010.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Snowe....................................... 3
Statement of Senator Begich...................................... 20
Statement of Senator Wicker...................................... 26
Statement of Senator Udall....................................... 68
Letter dated July 20, 2010 to Anthony Sedillo c/o Office of
Senator Tom Udall, from Joseph P. McEnaney, St. Cloud
Mining..................................................... 68
Witnesses
Captain Matthew J. Sisson, Commanding Officer, Coast Guard
Research and Development Center................................ 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Douglas Helton, Incident Operations Coordinator, Office of
Response and Restoration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Dennis Yellowhorse Jones, President, U-Mate International, Inc... 29
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Frederick R. (Fritz) Stahr, Ph.D., Research Scientist, School of
Oceanography, University of Washington......................... 37
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Scott Pegau, Ph.D., Research Program Manager, Oil Spill Recovery
Institute (OSRI)............................................... 43
Prepared statement........................................... 44
Cynthia Sarthou, Executive Director, Gulf Restoration Network.... 48
Prepared statement........................................... 50
Dr. Nancy E. Kinner, Co-Director, Coastal Response Research
Center, and Professor of Civil/Environmental Engineering,
University of New Hampshire.................................... 56
Prepared statement........................................... 57
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Douglas Helton by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 81
Hon. Olympia J. Snowe........................................ 82
Hon. Roger F. Wicker......................................... 84
TURNING IDEAS INTO ACTION:
ENSURING EFFECTIVE CLEAN UP
AND RESTORATION IN THE GULF
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 21, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and
Coast Guard,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room 253 of the Senate Russell Office Building, Hon. Maria
Cantwell, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. The Senate Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries,
and Coast Guard Subcommittee of the Commerce Committee will
come to order.
I thank the witnesses for being here today. We are going to
have two panels. First panel will be Captain Matthew Sisson--
Sisson?
Captain Sisson. Sisson.
Senator Cantwell.--Sisson, who is the Commanding Officer of
Research and Development Center for the United States Coast
Guard; and Mr. Doug Helton from the Office of Response and
Restoration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
And then we'll have a second panel of people who have been
involved in ocean research.
As the single-largest marine oil spill in our Nation's
history, the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico is both an
environmental and human tragedy of monumental proportions.
Virtually no part of the Gulf region's economy has gone
unscathed, and the devastation facing the environment is
unprecedented.
In 1989, the Exxon Valdez showed us just how unprepared we
were for the massive oil tanker that ran aground in Prince
William Sound spilling over 11 million gallons of crude oil,
and, today, the BP oil spill is showing us just how unprepared
we still are in 2010.
Since the Exxon Valdez oil spill, there has been very
little investment in the research and development of cleanup
technologies by industry, academia and government agencies.
Private companies, in their pollution-response plans, must
cite the technology and equipment that they will use to respond
to a spill, but to save time on research, however, they are
often outsourced to non-profit groups such as the oil-spill
recovery organizations that provide contract services during an
oil spill, and simply the list that the contract is in place as
a response plan is a way of compliance.
Our primary response technology of today--skimmers, in-situ
burns, boom and chemical dispersants--were all developed
decades ago.
Meanwhile, exploration and drilling technology has advanced
at a meteoric pace due to heavy investment by oil and gas
industry and the drive to drill in deeper waters with extremely
sophisticated equipment.
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill has revealed a huge
disparity between our nation's ability to extract oil versus
our ability to respond to an oil spill.
There are several promising technologies and techniques--
such as solidifiers, remediation techniques, absorbent-fiber
membranes--but these innovations have not yet been fully
developed or assessed or made operational as part of oil-spill
response.
For example, today, we will hear from Dr. Fritz Stahr of
the University of Washington, who has worked to develop sea-
glider technology for sophisticated underwater scientific
monitoring, a tool that could easily be used to detect
underwater plumes in the Gulf of Mexico.
And we will also be hearing from Dennis Yellowhorse Jones,
a geologist and entrepreneur, who has developed an organic
remediation method for breaking down oil using a unique mineral
compound, a method that could be used to clean up the Gulf's
shorelines.
Thousands of ideas and proposals have been submitted to the
government and BP. The Coast Guard has received over 3,500
technology proposals so far, I think something like 77 of which
have been approved or forwarded to the incident command for use
in the Gulf.
And BP has received over 100,000 submissions, which the
company has only, I think, been able to process through about
12,000.
We need to do everything possible to assure that oil-spill
response is the best response that we can make it. Recognizing
BP's inability to respond to the many proposals and the Coast
Guard's Research and Development Center, established the
Interagency Alternative Technology Assessment Program, and I'm
sure we're going to hear, Captain Sisson, about that today.
But while the alternative technology and assessment program
process is in place, I think it shows that we are still
struggling to face, in the midst of an emergency, the
desperately needed solution to a permanent process for vetting
and evaluating oil-spill technology.
This process is only a temporary fix, and we need a
permanent process so that we are in the same place now in the
future in case of another big spill.
So we are going to hear today about what needs to be done
to help jumpstart oil-spill-technology research and
development, provide further incentives and structure. We need
to turn new technologies into reality and to develop protocols
and standards that will provide us a 21st century oil-spill
safety net.
I have introduced legislation, the Oil Spill Technology and
Research Act. Many of these pieces we have proposed in the past
and have been parts of various pieces of legislation, and we
will be proposing them again as legislation moves through the
legislative process.
Twenty-one years ago, we saw the devastating cost of
complacency, and now we are living that nightmare again.
This oil spill is not a Louisiana tragedy. It's not a
Florida tragedy or a Mississippi tragedy or Alabama. It is an
American tragedy, and it's up to us to ensure that America's
waters and shores are protected in the most rigor that we can
muster.
So we have to ask ourselves, when this history is written,
will we say that we rose to the occasion and made sure that we
had a better response plan in place for the future? I know that
we are going to do our part here on the Subcommittee and on the
full Committee.
So I thank my colleague for being here today, the Ranking
Member, Senator Snowe, for having this hearing and bringing
attention to the fact that we need to upgrade our technology.
Senator Snowe.
STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Chair Cantwell, and thank you,
most importantly, for holding this hearing today on, without a
doubt, the worst oil spill in the history of our country.
Last week, nearly 3 months after the explosion that
destroyed the Deepwater Horizon rig--claiming, tragically, the
lives of 11 men--and left as much as 60,000 barrels of oil
pouring into the Gulf every day, responders finally have
managed to affix a temporary cap and hopefully halt the flow.
In hindsight, we can look back and see, without a doubt,
that the industry and the Nation were simply unprepared for a
disaster of this magnitude.
As the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, I see it as our
primary responsibility to ensure we close the loopholes that
allowed this travesty to occur in the first place and that we
dedicate all appropriate available resources to restoring the
devastated ecosystems and the economy of the Gulf Coast.
Just over a month ago, as Ranking Member of the Senate
Committee on Small Business, I and Chair Landrieu held a
hearing as well to address the approval process for the new
technologies that could assist with the clean up and response
effort.
During that discussion, it became clear to me that
inefficiencies remained in the process, notably that the
Federal Government and BP had set up a duplicative track for
individuals and businesses to apply for approval of their
technology.
Today, I hope to hear from our panel how that procedure has
been streamlined, how it has contributed to the response effort
and what steps the administration is already taking to vet new
technologies and methods that can contribute to a restoration
of the marshes, the beaches, the shorelines, in the face of
more than 100 million gallons of oil spilled from this ruptured
well.
I am pleased as well to welcome our two panels of witnesses
here today.
Captain Sisson and Mr. Helton, your agencies are on the
front lines of this battle and must work proactively and
aggressively to transition from first response to long-term
restoration, an effort likely to take years, if not decades.
On our second panel, we'll hear from three representatives
of the academic community, Drs. Pegau, Kinner and Stahr, who
will speak from their years of experience responding to spills,
developing response partnerships and defining the importance of
baseline research in response efforts such as this one.
We'll also hear from Mr. Dennis Yellowhorse Jones who has
developed a new organic response methodology, and Ms. Cynthia
Sarthou, who has in-depth, first-hand perspective on the
efforts undertaken to date to respond to this crisis.
From the first days of this spill, I was particularly
concerned with the pace and tenor of the response. In a letter
to the president last month, I urged him to seize control from
BP and establish a single point of accountability for approving
new technologies.
Since that time, we've seen some improvement, and I know
there have been a number of proposals that have been
submitted--more than 3,600 to the Coast Guard--but none is now
in use at this point.
Yet the fact is the first of these were not even tested
until more than 2 months had elapsed. So we've had very few
proposals that have even begun to be implemented. I will
appreciate hearing from the Coast Guard today exactly what is
the status of all those proposals that have been submitted and
where we stand today on any of them having been implemented.
We must act now to ensure that a similar process for
vetting suggestions that may expedite the restoration of
critically damaged ecosystems does not experience the same
delay we experienced in the response process. Carving out a
more substantive role for NOAA will be integral to that effort.
In May, after learning from Dr. Lubchenco at a hearing
before the full Commerce Committee that NOAA's comments on the
Department of Interior's latest 5-year drilling program
garnered no formal response, I filed an amendment to the
defense supplemental appropriation bill that would have given
both NOAA and the Coast Guard a voice in the permitting
process.
This amendment, along with numerous other provisions
enhancing NOAA and the Coast Guard's role, will be considered
by this committee during executive session tomorrow, and it
doesn't come a moment too soon.
Relegating our Nation's preeminent ocean-related agencies
to the back bench is part of what has gotten us where we are
today in the wake of this catastrophe with problems we don't
know how to solve and consequences no one ever anticipated.
The use of chemical dispersants is a prime example of an
area in which NOAA's involvement has been tragically lacking.
These compounds, designed to break down oil into minute
particles, certainly have value in preventing large clots of
oil from forming and ultimately impacting sensitive areas like
the marshes that comprise the majority of the Louisiana
coastline.
As part of the response to this bill, nearly two-million
gallons of dispersants have been applied. Much of that is in an
unprecedented fashion, at the source of this leak, nearly a
mile below the surface.
While the dispersants have been used in close consultation
with the Environmental Protection Agency, which is tasked with
clearing the products for inclusion on the National Contingency
Plan's list, even the EPA admits they know next to nothing
about the short- or long-term impacts on the marine environment
or the safety of the seafood harvested from areas in which they
have been used.
NOAA's scientific expertise must be brought to bear on this
issue and across the board NOAA should assist in preparing
response plans and activities that more accurately reflect the
threats posed by the activities being carried out in our
oceans.
This past Monday, BP announced it has spent more than $4
billion responding to this catastrophe. Over a third of the
Gulf of Mexico remains closed to fishing. An entire tourist
season has been lost to businesses and homeowners on the
beaches along the coast.
The tragedy here is that for all of our vast expertise, we
have still allowed this event to occur that has had such a
dramatic impact on our culture, our environment and our
economy.
It is vital that we take the lessons learned over the
course of the last 3 months and apply them not just to future
response efforts, but to the work that remains to set the Gulf
Coast right back on a path toward recovery, and as soon as
possible.
So I thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this hearing
today, because it is critical to give attention to these vital
issues so we can expedite this process because of the profound
effect that it's having on the Gulf Coast. Thank you.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Senator Snowe, and thank you
for your leadership on the Small Business Committee on similar
hearings that were held on this and related subjects to small
businesses being impacted from the Gulf, and for your voice in
making sure that NOAA's voice is actually heard as a scientific
agency giving concern to various project proposals and yet not
getting a response.
The fact that you are helping to lead the charge on that or
leading the charge on that, I think, will really make NOAA's
scientific concerns heard in the process. Very, very important.
So I thank you for that leadership.
Captain Sisson, we're going to start with you. Thank you
for being here. I am sure your job has been very taxing, but we
appreciate you coming to help us think through this process of
how we can improve on getting better technology for the future
on oil-spill cleanup. So thank you.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN MATTHEW J. SISSON, COMMANDING OFFICER,
COAST GUARD RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER
Captain Sisson. Madam Chair, Senator, good morning. I am
Captain Matt Sisson. I am Commanding Officer of the Coast
Guard's Research and Development Center in New London,
Connecticut.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss how the public can propose their ideas for oil-spill
response on the Gulf Coast, the R&D center's role in that
process and how to turn ideas into action.
From the initial days of the Deepwater Horizon spill, the
Coast Guard and other Federal agencies were receiving thousands
of ideas. We owed it to the public to create a fair, equitable
and transparent system to track, evaluate and respond to them.
On May 17, the R&D center, at the request of the Federal
on-scene coordinator and the national incident commander, stood
up the Interagency Alternative Technology Assessment Program,
or IATAP, with six Federal agency partners.
We issued a broad agency announcement, or BAA, on June 4,
which calls for a three-page white paper describing proposed
ideas in five categories--oil sensing, wellhead control and
submerged oil response, traditional oil-spill response
technologies, alternative oil-spill response technologies and
oil-spill damage and restoration.
Following feedback from Congress last month, we are
simplifying and clarifying the deepwaterhorizonresponse.com
webpage and to explain how to submit your idea to the Federal
Government.
This process is open to all sources, not just large
companies, but also small businesses, academia, nonprofits,
individuals. It is not a competition. Our criteria are simple:
Technical merit, effectiveness and deployability.
Once a white paper is received, the submitter is sent an e-
mail receipt and a tracking number and they continue to receive
automated notifications throughout each stage of the process.
IATAP performs an initial triage to see whether the idea
shows immediate promise, merits further investigation or is not
applicable to the spill.
If an idea has potential, immediate benefit, we recommend
it to the Federal on-scene coordinator, who determines whether
to procure the technology based upon his operational need.
Ideas that appear to have merit but need more information
undergo a more detailed evaluation.
Now, we have received nearly 3,600 submissions through the
BAA, and we have performed initial triage on nearly all of
them; 1,400 have received an official notification of our
determination. Of those 1,400, 87 were forwarded to the Federal
on-scene coordinator, 28 are undergoing further evaluation and
more than 1,100 were informed that their idea did not support
this incident.
Recommendations the FOSC is currently evaluating including
a holographic laser system for deep-ocean oil-droplet
detection; an automatic information system, or AIS; transmit
capability for vessels of opportunity, or VOOs; a small, self-
propelled beach-sand cleaning machine; and as you may have seen
on television, a large airship or blimp to gauge its
effectiveness as a reconnaissance vehicle, a command-and-
control platform and to detect distressed wildlife.
This is not the total of our interagency efforts. With the
U.S. Navy supervisor of salvage, we assess the capabilities of
A Whale, a 1,100-foot-long supertanker reconfigured as an oil
skimmer.
We have tested whether our radars that we recently
purchased for the Deepwater program and our Coast Guard
aircraft can properly detect and map oil in the Gulf.
Through the national incident commander's flow-rate
technical group, we have partnered with Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institute and MIT Experimental Hydrodynamics
Laboratory to conduct sonar and Doppler readings, collect
samples from the leak source and measure riser openings to
accurately estimate the total amount of oil spill to date.
Funding from the Oil Spill Pollution Act led to the
development of in-situ burning by the R&D center in the early
1990s, a technique which has already consumed as much oil in
the Gulf as the Exxon Valdez spilled in 1989.
Eighty of the R&D center's 94 personnel are now working
Deepwater Horizon response exclusively, including occupying
positions at the Unified Area Command.
The spill requires the largest environmental disaster
response in our history, and we need good ideas from all
sources. We continue to refine the IATAP process, but it has
performed its mission to provide the Federal on-scene
coordinator with response ideas that have been systematically
evaluated from the widest possible pool of human ingenuity.
Thank you for your opportunity to testify today. I look
forward to answering any questions and ask that my full written
statement be submitted for the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sisson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Matthew J. Sisson, Commanding Officer,
Coast Guard Research and Development Center
Good morning, Madam Chair and distinguished members of the
Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on the
process for submitting Gulf Coast cleanup proposals to the Federal
Government.
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) and applicable Federal
legislation and regulations provide the United States Coast Guard with
broad responsibilities and authorities regarding oil spill response
oversight on U.S. navigable waters. These responsibilities and
authorities include conducting, in coordination with other Federal
agencies, research on innovative oil spill-related technology. In order
to best leverage the numerous offers of innovative technology
assistance to the Deepwater Horizon spill response, the Coast Guard, at
the request of the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) and the National
Incident Commander (NIC), established the Interagency Alternative
Technology Assessment Program (IATAP).
The IATAP is a documented, systematic, government-managed process
to solicit, screen and evaluate alternative or new technologies in
support of ongoing Deepwater Horizon spill response activities. This
government interagency process provides for fair and consistent
evaluation of each and every idea. The system is designed to provide
submitters with timely acknowledgement notifications upon receipt of
their proposal, as well as determination notifications as their
proposal progresses through the evaluation process.
The IATAP workgroup is comprised of subject matter experts from the
Coast Guard, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Minerals
Management Service (MMS), National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), Fish and Wildlife Service, Maritime
Administration, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers. Other agencies or entities may be added to the workgroup as
required depending upon the technology under evaluation. The IATAP
objectively evaluates proposals with technical rigor, and provides
potentially effective solutions to frontline responders.
On May 21, 2010, the Coast Guard R&D Center initiated an interim
system prior to the formal stand-up of the IATAP to handle ad hoc
submissions received via phone and e-mail.
On June 4, 2010, a formal IATAP process began with the issuance of
a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) on the Federal Business Opportunities
(FedBizOpps) website soliciting requests for oil spill response
technology. The BAA calls for the submission of white papers describing
proposed technology solutions with applicability in five distinct
problem areas:
Oil sensing improvements to response and detection;
Oil wellhead control and submerged oil response;
Traditional oil spill response technologies;
Alternative oil spill response technologies; and
Oil spill damage assessment and restoration.
This BAA is open to all sources and is available from the front
page of FedBizOpps. Through this process, the Coast Guard recognizes
the potential for novel, highly innovative solutions from small
businesses, individuals and non-traditional sources. Submissions may
include those from single or team entities such as academia, private
sector organizations, government laboratories and federally funded
research and development centers. The government also encourages non-
profit organizations, educational/academic institutions, small
businesses, small disadvantaged businesses, historically black colleges
and universities/minority institutions, women-owned businesses,
service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses and historically
underutilized business zone enterprises to submit concepts for
consideration and/or to join others in a submission.
BAA Process
The BAA white paper submissions are screened based upon overall
scientific and technical merit, feasibility, the availability of
proposed solution and submitted cost information.
The IATAP workgroup, as managed by the USCG R&D Program, and in
consultation with other interagency partners, is screening and sorting
submissions based on technical feasibility, efficacy and deployability.
The initial screening of the BAA responses will result in a
determination that either the concept:
Has a discernible benefit to the spill response effort;
Needs more detailed investigation or evaluation and will be
forwarded to the appropriate government agency overseeing that
portion of the Deepwater Horizon response (EPA, MMS, NOAA,
USCG, etc.); or
Does not have immediate applicability to support this event.
All submissions will be provided with a response and tracking
number identifying the initial screening determination. All submissions
are managed in the order they are received regardless of origin to
ensure fairness in evaluation.
If the initial screening determines that the concept has
applicability and potential immediate benefit to the spill response
effort, the technical portion of the proposal and the IATAP
recommendation is forwarded to the Deepwater Horizon response FOSC for
further action under its authority, in consultation with the
responsible parties and/or other Federal agencies. If the initial
screening determines that a more detailed investigation or evaluation
is required it will be forwarded to the appropriate government agency
overseeing that portion of the Deepwater Horizon Response (EPA, MMS,
NOAA, or USCG), and that agency is responsible for further action.
To date, we have received 3,596 submissions from the BAA and 1,376
have completed the initial screening process. We are testing
submissions that have cleared the initial screening process for
potential deployment.
Conclusion
Through the IATAP, the Coast Guard is ensuring all applicable
capabilities and resources--government, private, and commercial (to
include small business) will be considered for use in developing and
improving solutions to secure the environment and facilitate a rapid,
robust clean-up effort.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to
your questions.
Senator Cantwell. Do we have your full written statement,
Captain? How many pages is it?
Captain Sisson. Four, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. OK. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Mr. Helton, welcome. Thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS HELTON, INCIDENT OPERATIONS COORDINATOR,
OFFICE OF RESPONSE AND RESTORATION, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Mr. Helton. Thank you, Chairwoman Cantwell and Senator
Snowe, for the opportunity to testify today about NOAA's roles
in response to the Deepwater Horizon incident and NOAA's ideas
for activities to improve future oil-spill-response activities.
My name is Doug Helton. I'm the Incident Operations
Coordinator in NOAA's Office of Response and Restoration.
During spills, I help to manage emergency response efforts
focusing on NOAA's role as the primary science advisor to the
U.S. Coast Guard.
This event started with a tragic loss of life of the 11
crew members. And, like the rest of the public, I'm saddened by
the events and frustrated as the spill continues to disrupt
communities and injure natural resources in the Gulf.
As you know, NOAA responds to spills all over the country.
We have responded to thousands of spills in our history and
have a long history of science-based response decisions. My
office was called over 200 times last year to provide emergency
scientific support.
NOAA has three critical roles during spills. We serve as
the science advisor to the Coast Guard, provide trajectory
predictions, conduct over flights, identify sensitive areas and
conduct surveys to guide cleanups. We also conduct damage
assessments and restore natural resources injured by the spill.
And, finally, we represent the Department of Commerce in
spill-response decisionmaking activities through the National
Response Team.
My written testimony includes information on NOAA's roles
in response to the Deepwater Horizon spill, and so I'll focus
today in my oral statement about oil-spill research needs.
Spill research and development has been in a boom-and-bust
cycle for many years. After a major spill, such as the Exxon
Valdez, there's a national resurgence in interest in spills,
but then this interest wanes.
Recent spills in Washington State, California, and
Massachusetts raised awareness and concerns about the adequacy
of response technologies at the state and local levels.
But, now, with the Deepwater spill, we're faced again with
an incident that has captured the national attention, and
research gaps that we have--such as mechanical recovery
technologies, oil sensors, dispersant use, modeling of
deepwater releases, seafood safety and the social and human
dimensions of spills--are all painfully obvious gaps.
I'd like to talk about additional oil-spill research needs.
The public has high expectations for a prompt and effective
response, and responders must be equipped with the appropriate
tools to meet those expectations. A robust research and
development program can improve how we respond.
And Congress recognized that need for research on oil
pollution when they passed the Oil Pollution Act, but the R&D
envisioned by the Oil Pollution Act has not been achieved. With
fewer large spills, and competing national priorities, there
has been a decline in oil-spill research in both the public and
private sector.
Achievement of the comprehensive research and development
program by OPA can only increase our effectiveness of our oil-
spills research and response technologies.
While existing research has resulted in advancements of
some technologies, more must be done to strengthen our Nation's
capabilities. A renewed R&D commitment to focus on the most
pressing needs, particularly now with the Deepwater releases
and releases elsewhere in cold, icy waters of the Arctic is one
place to start.
An effective response, based on science and smart
decisionmaking reduces environmental and social impacts, and it
also reduces the cost of spills.
As the Deepwater Horizon spill is demonstrating, there's a
need to understand how oil behaves, moves and disperses both on
the surface and in the water column. Research is needed for the
rapid and accurate detection of oil and water and the effects
of oil and dispersants on deepwater habitats and species, such
as deepwater corals.
And the research on long-term effects of spilled oil would
also improve cleanup. More than 20 years later, there's still
oil in Prince William Sound from Exxon Valdez.
Research is needed to improve our understanding of the
long-term effects of this oil on species and habitats. And
while oil-spill research has focused on physical sciences, for
the most part, social-science research is also needed on the
human dimensions of spills.
How can we minimize the impacts on communities? And what
can be done to make them whole? Better communication and
sharing of information with impacted communities and
incorporating their concerns is key.
The Deepwater Horizon spill will impact the Gulf for years
to come. We can't prevent impacts, but with good science, we
can improve response decisions. When spills happen, there's a
rush of funding for science, but quality research takes time as
well as support and sustained resources.
While we're working with all haste, it's important to
understand that we have to take the time to ensure that the
science is accurate and meaningful. It's important that we
continue this work between spills, so that we can develop the
tools and understanding before, rather than during, the next
spill.
Thank you for allowing me to testify today on NOAA's
response and areas of future R&D. I'm happy to answer any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Helton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Douglas Helton, Incident Operations Coordinator,
Office of Response and Restoration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
Thank you, Chairwoman Cantwell and members of the Committee, for
the opportunity to testify on the Department of Commerce's National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) role in the response to
the Deepwater Horizon BP oil spill and NOAA's ideas for activities to
improve future response and resource assessment efforts.
My name is Doug Helton and I am the Incident Operations Coordinator
for the Emergency Response Division in NOAA's Office of Response and
Restoration (OR&R). I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the
critical roles NOAA serves during oil spills and the importance of our
contributions to protect and restore the resources, communities, and
economies affected by this tragic event. Before I move on to discuss
NOAA's efforts, I would first like to express my condolences to the
families of the 11 people who lost their lives in the explosion and
sinking of the Deepwater Horizon platform.
NOAA's mission is to understand and predict changes in the Earth's
environment and conserve and manage coastal and marine resources to
meet our Nation's economic, social, and environmental needs. NOAA is
also a natural resource trustee and is one of the Federal agencies
responsible for protecting, assessing, and restoring the public's
coastal natural resources when they are impacted by oil spills,
hazardous substance releases, and impacts from vessel groundings on
corals and seagrass beds. As such, the entire agency is deeply
concerned about the immediate and long-term environmental, economic,
and social impacts to the Gulf Coast and the Nation as a whole from
this spill. NOAA is fully mobilized and working tirelessly to lessen
impacts on the Gulf Coast and will continue to do so until the spill is
controlled, oil is cleaned up, natural resource injuries are assessed,
and restoration is complete.
My testimony today will discuss NOAA's role in the Deepwater
Horizon response and natural resource damage assessment process
associated with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, for which BP is a
responsible party, and opportunities to strengthen the Federal response
to future events through research and development.
NOAA's Roles During Oil Spills
NOAA has three critical roles mandated by the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 and the National Contingency Plan:
1. During the emergency response, NOAA serves as a conduit for
scientific information to the Federal On-Scene Coordinator.
NOAA provides trajectory predictions for spilled oil, conducts
overflight observations of oil on water, identifies highly
valued or sensitive environmental areas, and conducts shoreline
surveys to determine clean-up priorities.
2. As a natural resource trustee, NOAA conducts a joint Natural
Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) with co-trustees to assess
and restore natural resources injured by the oil spill. NRDA
also assesses the lost uses of those resources, such as
recreational fishing, canoeing, and swimming, with the goal of
implementing restoration projects to address these injuries.
3. Finally, NOAA represents the Department of Commerce in spill
response decision-making activities through the National
Response Team.
Response
The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is the Federal On-Scene Coordinator and
has the primary responsibility for managing coastal oil spill response
and clean-up activities in the coastal zone. During an oil spill,
NOAA's Scientific Support Coordinators deliver technical and scientific
support to the USCG. NOAA's Scientific Support Coordinators are located
around the country in USCG Districts, ready to respond around the clock
to any emergencies involving the release of oil or hazardous substances
into the oceans, shorelines and related areas. Currently, NOAA has all
of its Scientific Support Coordinators located throughout the country
working on the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
With over thirty years of experience and using state-of-the-art
technology, NOAA serves the Nation by providing its expertise and a
suite of products and services critical for making science-based
decisions. Examples include trajectory forecasts on the movement and
behavior of spilled oil, overflight observations, spot weather
forecasts, emergency coastal survey and charting capabilities, aerial
and satellite imagery, and real-time coastal ocean observation data.
Federal, state, and local entities look to NOAA for assistance,
experience, local perspective, and scientific knowledge. NOAA's Office
of Response and Restoration (OR&R) was called upon for scientific
support 200 times in 2009.
Natural Resource Damage Assessment
Stewardship of the Nation's natural resources is shared among
several Federal agencies, states, and tribal trustees. NOAA, acting on
behalf of the Secretary of Commerce, is the lead Federal trustee for
many of the Nation's coastal and marine resources, and is authorized by
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) to recover damages on behalf of the
public for injuries to trust resources resulting from an oil spill.
Regulations promulgated by NOAA under the Oil Pollution Act encourage
compensation in the form of restoration of the injured resources, and
appropriate compensation is determined through the NRDA process. Since
the enactment of OPA, NOAA, together with other Federal, state, and
tribal co-trustees, has recovered approximately $500 million for
restoration of natural resources injured by releases of oil or
hazardous substances, as well as injuries to national marine sanctuary
resources, including vessel groundings.
National Response Team
The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan, more commonly called the National Contingency Plan, is the
Federal Government's blueprint for responding to both oil spills and
hazardous substance releases. The purpose of the National Contingency
Plan is to develop a national response capability and promote overall
coordination among the hierarchy of responders and contingency plans.
NOAA represents the Department of Commerce on the National Response
Team and works closely with regional response teams and local area
committees to develop policies on dispersant use, best clean-up
practices and communications, and to ensure access to science-related
resources, data, and expertise.
NOAA's Response and Damage Assessment Efforts
NOAA's experts have been assisting with the response to the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill from the beginning, providing coordinated
scientific services when and where they are needed most. NOAA's support
includes daily trajectories of the spilled oil, weather data to support
short- and long-range forecasts, and hourly localized ``spot''
forecasts to determine the use of weather dependent mitigation
techniques such as oil burns and chemical dispersant applications. NOAA
uses satellite imagery and real-time observational data on the tides
and currents to predict and verify oil spill location and movement. To
ensure the safety of fishermen and consumer seafood safety, NOAA
scientists are in the spill area taking water and seafood samples, and
NOAA has put fisheries closures in place to maintain consumer
confidence in the safety of consuming seafood from the Gulf of Mexico
region. In addition, NOAA experts are providing expertise and
assistance regarding sea turtles, marine mammals, and other protected
resources such as corals.
To facilitate on-the-ground understanding of the spill's impacts,
NOAA is awarding grants for rapid response projects to monitor the
impacts of the oil spill on Louisiana's coastal marshes and fishery
species through the Sea Grant Program. To support the local communities
as they deal with the economic, social, and environmental impacts of
the spill, the Gulf Coast Sea Grant Programs are hosting a series of
open forums across the Gulf where citizens have the opportunity to
interact with industry, government, and university representatives.
NOAA-organized volunteer beach clean-ups to remove debris from state
beaches are helping to facilitate the cleanup of oil along the
shoreline.
With multiple agencies supporting a diverse array of research
projects in response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico, it is important to coordinate research activities to ensure the
best use of limited resources. NOAA's Gulf Coast Sea Grant Programs
developed a website (http://gulfseagrant.tamu.edu/oilspill/index.htm)
to serve as a central database listing ongoing research activities and
identifying funding opportunities for oil-spill related research,
whether conducted by government, academic, or privately-supported
scientists. The website's intent is to provide a single, comprehensive
view of research activities in the Gulf that are being undertaken in
connection with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and to foster
coordination of these efforts.
At the onset of this oil spill, NOAA quickly mobilized staff from
its Damage Assessment Remediation and Restoration Program to begin
coordinating with Federal and state co-trustees and the responsible
parties to collect a variety of data that are critical to help inform
the NRDA. NOAA is coordinating the NRDA effort with the Department of
the Interior (another Federal co-trustee), as well as co-trustees in
five states and representatives for at least one responsible party, BP.
NOAA and the co-trustees are in the initial phase of this process and
are currently gathering data on resources such as fish, shellfish,
birds, and turtles, and mammals; their supporting habitats such as
wetlands, beaches, and corals; and human uses of affected resources,
such as fishing and recreational uses across the Gulf of Mexico. The
trustees will then quantify the total losses and develop restoration
projects that compensate the public for their losses.
NOAA is also involved in many activities to assess the presence of
subsurface oil from the Deepwater Horizon spill. Since the beginning of
May, NOAA has been conducting and coordinating sampling of the sub-
surface region around the Deepwater Horizon well-head and beyond to
characterize the presence of subsurface oil. The sub-surface search
involves the use of sonar, UV instruments called fluorometers, which
can detect the presence of oil and other biological compounds,
submersible laser-scattering instruments to determine oil concentration
and distribution and collection of water samples from discrete depths
using a series of bottles that can be closed around a discrete water
sample.
NOAA, Federal partners, academics, and others in the research
community have mobilized to research and quantify the location and
concentration of subsurface oil from the spill. NOAA Ships Gordon
Gunter Thomas Jefferson, Nancy Foster, Delaware II, and Pisces have
conducted and continue to conduct missions to collect water samples
from areas near the wellhead as well as further from the wellhead and
in the coastal zone. Water samples from many of these missions are
still being analyzed and additional missions are in progress or being
planned to continue the comprehensive effort to define the presence of
oil below the surface and understand its impacts.
For both the response and the NRDA, offices throughout NOAA are
mobilized and hundreds of NOAA personnel are dedicating themselves to
assist with this unprecedented effort.
Opportunities to Strengthen Federal Response Through Research and
Development
When passed in 1990, OPA envisioned a robust oil spill research and
development program coordinated by the Interagency Coordinating
Committee (ICC) on Oil Pollution Research. OPA recognized the need for
research and created the ICC to coordinate and direct a dedicated
program on oil pollution research, technology development, and
demonstration among industry, universities, research institutions and
Federal agencies, state governments and other nations, if appropriate.
To date, funding has been provided through various state and Federal
agencies and industry for oil pollution research. While coordinated
interagency research activities are occurring, important research
questions remain.
Achievement of the comprehensive and collaborative research and
development program envisioned by OPA can only increase the
effectiveness of our Nation's oil spill response and restoration
capabilities. While existing research has resulted in advancement of
some research technologies, more must be done to strengthen our
Nation's response capabilities. A renewed commitment of the ICC to
focus on the most pressing research needs--particularly deepwater
releases and releases in cold/icy waters--is one place to start. The
Administration is committed to this effort.
Activities to Improve Future Response and Resource Assessment Efforts
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill is a grave reminder that spills of
national significance can occur despite the many safeguards and
improvements that have been put into place since the passage of OPA.
Although the best option is to prevent oil spills, the risk of oil
spills remains a concern given the offshore and onshore oil
infrastructure, pipes, and vessels that move huge volumes of oil
through our waterways. If a spill does occur, responders must be
equipped with the appropriate tools and information. An effective
response, based on solid science and smart decision-making reduces
environmental and socioeconomic impacts, as well as clean-up costs.
Research and development and technological innovation by the public or
private sector in the following areas would greatly enhance the tools
and technologies available in the event of a spill.
Oil Fate and Behavior from Deepwater Releases--Our ability
to know where the oil is located is limited by what we can see
and detect. As the Deepwater Horizon oil spill is
demonstrating, there is a need to understand how oil behaves
and disperses within the water column when released at deep
depths. The emerging advancement in modeling three
dimensionally can greatly enhance response operations and
mitigation efficacy. NOAA's surface trajectory models predict
where the oil on the surface is going based upon wind,
currents, and other processes, and visual overflights validate
where it is now. NOAA is currently employing facets of deep
water oil spill models that were developed in part from the
findings of the MMS DeepSpill Joint Industry Research Project
done in 1999-2000 with international participation. However, we
still understand little about the movement of oil deep in the
ocean or the movement of dispersed oil that is suspended in the
water column. The enhancement of three dimensional models will
improve our ability to predict the movement of oil at depth and
allow us to direct precious resources to validate the model's
accuracy. Currently, NOAA is working to implement FY 2010 funds
to enhance three-dimensional models.
Technology for Oil Detection in the Water Column and on the
Seafloor--Research on new technologies for rapid and accurate
detection of oil in deep water and plumes in the mid-water is
needed. This would include the development of technologies to
enhance our understanding of the fate and transport of oil, and
to better understand the effects of oil on benthic habitat.
There also appears to be some utility in applying existing
technologies in a new and unique way to reach these same goals.
For example, in limited research applications, modern multibeam
echo sounders have been able to detect oil in the water column
and on the seafloor. In addition, sensors on autonomous
underwater vehicles and gliders are capable of detecting the
presence of oil and gas in the water column. Whether provided
by new technologies, or through re-examining the capabilities
of current technologies, highly accurate information on the
precise location of spilled oil would be of significant benefit
to a spill response, such as Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
Timely understanding of the precise location of the spilled oil
would allow responders to position their activities and better
utilize limited resources to maximize our contributions to
protect and restore the resources, communities, and economies
affected by these tragic events.
Surface Observations and Trajectory Models--Real-time data
on currents, tides, and winds as well as sustained observations
of physical and chemical parameters of the whole water column
are important in driving the models that inform the trajectory
forecast for the spilled oil. As the Integrated Ocean Observing
System generates more data from technological advances like
high frequency radar, the prediction of oil location can be
improved by pulling these observations into trajectory models
quickly. Through the collaborative efforts of the U.S.
Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS), two of the three
radars along the northern Gulf of Mexico coast were quickly re-
established and made operational and now all three are
delivering surface current data. Because we cannot predict
where a spill will occur, data delivery from high frequency
radars is envisioned to be part of a seamless national system.
Data collected by space-based synthetic aperture radar can be used
to produce high resolution images of the Earth's lands and
oceans and can also be used in all types of weather, as it can
``see through'' clouds and darkness. Current use of NOAA-
generated experimental products suggest that data from space-
based synthetic aperture radar can assist in detecting and
refining the areal extent of oil, which would provide valuable
information to help determine where response efforts and
resources should be deployed.
Current hydrographic surveys carry out sustained observations of
the whole water column in the Gulf of Mexico, Florida Bay, and
Florida Keys, and will be extended if the oil or dispersant
spread through the Strait of Florida and into the Gulf Stream.
These surveys, along with satellite observations and numerical
models, allow monitoring of currents and features responsible
for the transport of oil and dispersant. A sustained observing
system for this region would allow NOAA to provide predictive
information about how the spill may impact the East Coast of
the United States.
Long-Term Effects on Species and Habitats--Spilled oil can
remain in the sediments along the shoreline and in wetlands and
other environments for years. More than twenty years later,
there are still toxic levels of sub-surface oil in Prince
William Sound from the Exxon Valdez spill. Research is needed
to improve our understanding of the long-term effects of oil on
sensitive and economically important species and habitats.
Continued research is also needed to determine the effects of
oil and dispersants that are suspended in the water column on
pelagic species, as well as research on the effects of oil on
deep water corals, chemosynthetic communities (animal
communities living in the deep sea on dissolved gases and
benthic habitats) and benthic habitats. Important interagency
studies are currently underway that will provide valuable
information on the sensitivity and resilience of these
deepwater communities, and will inform response actions.
Data Management Tools for Decision Making--The key to
effective emergency response is efficiently integrating current
science, information technology, and real-time observational
data into response decision-making. NOAA has developed the
Emergency Response Management Application (ERMA), a web-based
information management application, to facilitate preparedness,
response, and restoration decision-making for oil spills and
for other coastal hazards. ERMA integrates observations (e.g.,
NOAA National Buoy Data Center data, weather data, shoreline
data, vessel traffic information, etc.) with archived data
sources (e.g., NOAA's National Oceanographic Data Center's
historical data) in an easy to use, Google-based format to aid
in evaluating resources at risk, visualizing oil trajectories,
and planning rapid tactical response operations, injury
assessment and habitat restoration. Having access to
retrospective data is critical to bring value to real-time
observational data being collected. NOAA is working with the
Department of the Interior (DOI) and state trustees to assure
that data management tools can be integrated.
NOAA is currently using the Gulf of Mexico ERMA for the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill response to help manage the common
operational picture for all command posts (http://
www.geoplatform.gov/gulfresponse/). The Gulf of Mexico ERMA is
updated daily to provide a dynamic and automated tool allowing
for greater access, more layers of data, and high-resolution
photography. ERMA allows users to navigate through different
layers of information to reveal actual data and magnify areas
of geographic interest--ultimately improving decisionmaking. In
addition to the Gulf of Mexico, ERMA is operational in the U.S.
Caribbean and New England.
Natural Resource Protection Tools--Environmental Sensitivity
Index (ESI) database and map products provide information that
helps reduce the environmental, economic, and social impacts
from oil and hazardous substance spills. ESI maps include
information on biological resources (such as birds, shellfish
beds, and endangered species), sensitive coastal and nearshore
habitats (such as marshes, tidal flats, and sea grass beds,
National Estuarine Reserves and National Marine Sanctuaries),
and human-use resources (such as public beaches, parks, and
drinking water intakes). ESI maps are one tool that spill
responders can use to identify priority areas to protect from
the spreading oil, develop cleanup strategies to minimize
impacts to the environment and coastal communities, and reduce
overall cleanup costs. NOAA's goal is to update ESI maps
approximately every 10 years to ensure responders have up-to-
date information.
Research to Improve Tools for Assessment and Restoration--
Current techniques to assess and restore injured natural
resources need to be constantly updated and refined. As our
understanding of complex ecosystems evolves, so should our
modeling tools and restoration techniques. For example,
currently, site-specific protocols for assessing injuries to
unique, high-value habitats such as those found in the Arctic
are needed. In addition, research and tools to better assess
and quantify natural resource services--such as water
filtration and capture, flood protection, carbon sequestration,
recreation, and education--across a range of habitat types can
help ensure the public is fully compensated and the environment
is fully restored.
Air Quality Impacts--In addition to its marine
responsibilities, NOAA assists in predicting the air quality
impacts from oil and hazardous substance spills. The
characteristics of pollution released from large areas of
burning oil and the widespread evaporation of oil are
significantly different from routine air quality/atmospheric
dispersion scenarios. Research and development of improved
tools to estimate the characteristics of compounds entering the
atmosphere, and integration of those tools with NOAA's existing
atmospheric modeling capabilities, would significantly improve
NOAA's ability to predict smoke and chemical concentrations in
the atmosphere resulting from such incidents.
Oil in Arctic Environments--Continued acceleration of sea-
ice decline in the Arctic Ocean as a consequence of global
warming may lead to increased Arctic maritime transportation
and energy exploration that in turn may increase the potential
of oil spills in the Arctic. Recent studies, such as the Arctic
Monitoring and Assessment Programme's Oil and Gas Assessment,
indicate that we currently lack the information to determine
how oil will behave in icy environments or when it sinks below
the surface. We also lack a basic understanding of the current
environmental conditions, which is important for conducting
injury assessments and developing restoration strategies.
Research is needed to better understand the challenges of spill
response in Arctic waters and the most effective tools and
techniques to utilize in such environments.
Human Dimensions--Research is needed on how to incorporate
impacted communities into the preparedness and response,
restoration and recovery processes to help to address the human
dimensions of spills, including social issues, community
effects, risk communication methods, and valuation of natural
resources. Transparency and communications can be improved to
share information with impacted communities on how and why
decisions are made, and the breadth of response and NRDA
activities that have been and will be undertaken for the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
Conclusion
As this committee is well aware, research takes time. A major
research cruise can take a year to plan. A model can take years to
develop and validate. A report can take months to get right. The
Deepwater Horizon oil spill is causing harm that will impact coastal
environments for years to come. Applying the latest science and
continued research and development efforts in the public and private
sectors can improve our response decisions, thereby reducing injury to
our Nation's economy and environment.
I would like to assure you that we will not relent in our efforts
to protect the livelihoods of affected Gulf Coast residents and
mitigate the environmental impacts of this spill. In the wake of such
an event, we are reminded of the fragility of our coastal ecosystems
and the dependence of coastal economies on the health and prosperity of
our seas. Thank you for allowing me to testify on NOAA's response and
damage assessment efforts and areas for future research. I am happy to
answer any questions you may have.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, and thank you both for your
testimony.
Captain Sisson, you have over 3,500 different proposals
that have been through the Alternative Technology Assessment
Program, 77 of which have been forwarded to the Incident
Command. Is that Admiral Allen? Is that----
Captain Sisson. No, senator. That is directed to the
Federal on-scene commander, who, at the time, until recently,
was Admiral Watson. It is now Admiral Zukunft.
Senator Cantwell. OK. And do they have a process there for
reviewing those?
Captain Sisson. Right now, those ideas are forwarded to the
Critical Resources Unit, who arraigns them with the other
operational needs and requirements of the spill response.
Senator Cantwell. So have any of those 77 proposals been
given final approval and are in current use?
Captain Sisson. There are two right now that are being
used. The U.S. Navy's blimp is one, and it's in a test-and-
evaluation phase, but it is being used in the Gulf.
The other is a sorbent boom made by AbTech, called Smart
Sponge. That has been approved for use both by the IATAP
reviewers and the BP reviewers, and it's waiting for an
opportunity to deploy.
There are several others that are being tested right now.
Senator Cantwell. And where are they being tested?
Captain Sisson. They're being tested down on the beaches in
Alabama, Florida and Louisiana.
Senator Cantwell. This boom, is that what you're referring
to or do you mean other technologies?
Captain Sisson. Other technologies. There's a Gravely Rapid
two-wheel tractor. It's a self-propelled beach cleaner that's
smaller, more mobile than the current beach cleaner that's
being used. It was authorized through a request for funds
yesterday, and we're seeking to buy that and put it to work on
the beaches, as it can go closer to the water than the current
sand cleaner.
Senator Cantwell. So everything that has been submitted
through the Coast Guard--77 proposals have been submitted on.
Two have actually or one is actually in use. The other one's
approved, but not in use, and a third one you've just taken
action in the last 24 hours. Is that right? The tractor I'm
saying.
You're saying the Navy blimp and the boom--The Navy blimp
is in service, limited. The boom you're saying you're going to
be testing. You've made a decision to use that technology. And
the third one, you've started the acquisition process. Is that
right?
Captain Sisson. Yes, senator. We've also approved the
automatic information system transmit capability. That's an AIS
transmitter that'll be put on vessels of opportunity for
greater command and control and message-receiving and
transmittal from those vessels. It's been approved also, but
it's still undergoing its initial purchase and deployment. We
haven't tested it yet.
Senator Cantwell. So out of those proposals, you can say
four are--out of 77 proposals, four have made it through the
process and the Coast Guard is deciding to use them.
Captain Sisson. Yes, senator, and also I'd like to add that
we did test the supertanker, A Whale. So it would be considered
a fifth.
Senator Cantwell. And decided not to use it, is that what
you're----
Captain Sisson. Yes, senator. The A Whale, although it's a
compelling engineering feat, is not suitable to this particular
type of spill, and that was the finding of our test team.
Senator Cantwell. And I know the Coast Guard has access to
the ideas that BP has submitted, but are you going to be going
through that process? Are you going to be reviewing those
submissions at some point?
Captain Sisson. We review the BP database on a daily basis
to make sure that there are no duplications or if there are
duplications what the actions are between BP and the IATAP.
But, at this time, we are not going through each and every
BP submission and analyzing it on its own merits. We're
strictly going through the BAA process for submissions.
Senator Cantwell. Well, if you have about 3,500 submissions
and they have over 100,000, how do you know that the process is
working, that some of the things aren't falling through the
cracks going through the BP process?
I get the point of looking for duplication, but isn't the
point that you might be missing some--somebody's getting stuck
in a process of viability on their technology?
Because I think it's probably safe to say the BP process is
not working as well, in the context of their--If you just look
at the sheer volume, I doubt that they've been able to process
that information.
Captain Sisson. Yes, Senator. We set up this process
because of complaints received from the public about the BP
database's difficulty in getting feedback. And we also felt
that the government should have a standalone capability in this
regard.
Access to the BP database is not the same as reviewing each
and every one, yes, senator, but we're not currently staffed to
get that--It is possible, if we put on enough effort, but we
don't have the staff for that right now.
Senator Cantwell. Well, but, again, I think it draws the
point that there is this much public interest and potential for
technology and yet we're here at this point where we don't even
have the capabilities of reviewing it. Is that correct?
Captain Sisson. Well, Senator, we have the opportunity to
look at that, and many of the inputs to the process from BP are
more, I'd say, vituperative than they are helpful.
There are many submissions that aren't exactly submissions.
It's difficult to get through that database, and I think that
that was one of the reasons why we went to a BAA submission, so
that we could have an actual proposal with a technical approach
and a rough-order-of-magnitude cost associated with it. It's
easier for us to handle that.
Senator Cantwell. And so you think you're getting the best
of the ideas out of that BP database?
Captain Sisson. Ma'am, I don't know that I have the best
ideas from the BP database.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
Senator Snowe.
Senator Snowe. Captain Sisson, can you tell me, you have
received 3,600 submissions, 87 of which were deemed worthy to
be forwarded, correct?
Captain Sisson. Yes, Senator.
Senator Snowe. And there are five that are currently being
tested. None have been fully implemented at this point.
The five that are being currently tested includes a Navy
airship, and a foreign-flag skimmer, meaning only three are
from U.S. businesses.
Now, the Navy ship had to go through the process, correct?
Why would they have to go through the process?
Captain Sisson. Actually, there were multiple tracks on the
Navy airship. It's actually the Navy who contracted a
corporation, the American Blimp Company of Oregon. They own the
blimp. It was offered up on several different tracks to the BAA
process, also directly to the Coast Guard. And we were actually
contacted by CG-53 to see if we could assist in testing this
vehicle.
So we each went out to our interagency partners--South and
NAVAIR--and we worked with them to get the blimp up and running
as soon as possible.
Senator Snowe. We've been told for months now that all
available assets have been brought to bear on this crisis. Is
that true?
Captain Sisson. I don't know the answer to that, Senator.
Senator Snowe. Yes. I think that's the concern. I mean, I
just don't sense an element of urgency in this process.
I've been involved in a number of hearings now, and I feel
like it's the status quo, that there's no synchronization
between BP and the Federal Government and all of the agencies.
I mean, what is it that we don't know? We need to have all
the assets available down there to contain the spill, to
disperse the oil, to do everything we can to implement new
technologies. And it doesn't sound like we are giving this the
kind of energy that this process requires, given the nature of
the calamity at stake.
I just think it's a bureaucratic process that has gotten so
bogged down that we're just not making any headway. And it is
not synchronized with BP to understand exactly what
technologies are being rejected, what assets are being
rejected, what ships are being rejected. We don't even know
what they're rejecting. Do we?
Captain Sisson. Well, since we have access to that
database, we know when we send our ideas down that we think are
good ones, we have a discussion----
Senator Snowe. But are they overruling our ideas, given
what's at stake for us as a country, I mean, our national
interests?
This really is a crisis of epic proportion for this
country. So what's at stake is the public interest now. And so
I just can't imagine that a corporate interest would be
overriding the national interest and making those decisions.
Captain Sisson. Senator, I can only speak for the work that
I do, and in the case of the A Whale, the initial response from
BP is that they were not interested.
The initial response from the IATAP technical evaluation
team was that it was worth a look.
We had a basic disagreement and we settled that with a
face-to-face meeting at Sector New Orleans on Lake
Pontchartrain.
On a sit-down meeting between the owners of the vessel, BP
and the Coast Guard, we came up with a way ahead that they
could deploy the ship close to the source, that we would put a
combined Navy, Coast Guard and BP observation team aboard to
test whether or not that ship could take aboard much in the way
of oil and water and then give it several days on scene.
We did that on two occasions over the Fourth of July
weekend and then later on on the 12 and 13 of July. And I think
that that was a case or template by which further cooperation
is necessary.
Senator Snowe. Well, I don't doubt that you're trying to do
your very best, and I know it's not a decision that you would
make.
But I do think that the process is so complex, and the fact
is that if BP can override any of our decisions, or make
decisions that are contrary to our interests as a nation,
that's problematic and deeply disturbing. I think that's the
point here. That's what concerns me above all else. And the
corporate interests are not necessarily the public's interest.
They have decisions to make for their own interest. I
understand that. They're a company. They're going to make
decisions. They're going to make business decisions, but they
don't necessarily square with the public-interest decisions,
and that's what concerns me.
The fact is that you have to go through a convoluted
process because BP has rejected something outright. The Coast
Guard should be making that decision, in the final analysis,
based on what's in the best interest of the Nation--cleaning up
and doing everything that we need to do to bring the very best
to bear in that process, frankly, and so that's what's
disturbing to me.
There are only five of the 87 technologies and
methodologies referred to the IATAP that are being tested and
evaluated, so what is the status of the remaining 82?
Captain Sisson. They are currently being reviewed by the
Critical Resources Unit. Some of them are being lined up but
are not being employed at this time because of other
operational needs.
Senator, I would like to point out that the Federal on-
scene coordinator can direct the use of technology. It is not
BP's call.
Senator Snowe. Have they?
Captain Sisson. To date, I am not aware that they have.
But I think we were talking about the other ideas. We're
trying to refine the IATAP process. It's kind of like working
behind a guy who's hanging drywall, but you're handing him a
sledgehammer. We have to put the right tool in the hands of the
people who are busily engaged in this effort, and that's a
process that needs refinement.
We've ended up sending members from the R&D and the IATAP
down to the UAC on a permanent basis, so that they can advise
the Critical Resources Unit. And that has actually done us a
lot of good the last few days. We have to make sure that the
tools that we offer to the Federal on-scene coordinator are
what he needs.
Senator Snowe. Do you have enough personnel to vet all
these technologies?
Captain Sisson. It is a large and daunting task, senator,
and we are busily engaged with the bulk of the R&D staff to
execute this work. All effort is scalable.
Senator Snowe. So you don't have enough. That's obvious.
Well, it's regrettable. I mean, someone is obviously making
decisions that aren't in the best interests of fulfilling, I
think, an urgent need here. What's at stake for the country and
for the Gulf Region and for the people who live there and have
to work there is losing their livelihoods and we are not
helping them in a way that they deserve, in that sense.
That's what's regrettable about this. There's just not a
level of urgency involved here to amass all the resources that
are absolutely essential and vital to getting this done.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Cantwell. Senator Begich.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK BEGICH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and thank
you to the Coast Guard. I know every day in Alaska we value the
Coast Guard and the work they do. We have the largest space up
there in Kodiak, as you know, and it's just a great resource.
But I want to follow up on a couple of points, I think, the
Senator just went through. And, first off, you know, as I watch
and listen--and I hope to be in Louisiana on Monday--but, you
know, I look at the skimming and dispersants and booming, this
is the same technology they used in 1989 when we dealt with the
Exxon Valdez. So I'm trying to understand, in all these years,
where is the technology advancement?
I mean, back then, we didn't have a cell phone. Today, we
have incredible technology around just using our phone and
iPads and everything else. Where has the improvement occurred,
if there has been any improvement? Honestly, I don't see it.
Help me or clarify it for me.
Captain Sisson. Well, the greatest outcomes of the Exxon
Valdez, in my opinion, were the double-hull requirement on
supertankers that drove down the oil incidents greatly.
Senator Begich. That's a preventative spill issue. I'm
talking about cleanup.
Captain Sisson. Yes, Senator, the in-situ burn was
developed post-Exxon Valdez largely by the Coast Guard's
Research and Development Center.
I worked on that project as a lieutenant back in the early
1990s, and we actually had to use oranges instead of oil to
pour onto the water because we couldn't put oil on the water.
And then we got reports that a vessel had sunk off of
Galveston, obviously because they had lost their cargo.
These efforts were actually very successful, but had never
been tried in the United States on any scale until now.
And so we at the R&D Center are very proud of the fact that
the in-situ burn is actually underway and working very well.
Senator Begich. Let me ask you, if I could follow up on
that, I know in Norway they actually do controlled spills to
test their technology. They haven't done it in some time, but
that has been their method.
We are not allowed to do that in this country for a variety
of reasons. It makes people very nervous. But would it help to
advance with some controlled spills to really understand
disbursements, understand controlled burns and other things?
I mean, Norway, which, in a lot of ways, has perfected
drilling in very hostile environments and also cleanup
capacity. Can you give me a comment on that?
Captain Sisson. Well, senator, we work within the laws that
we're given, and we----
Senator Begich. That's not what I'm asking you. I'm asking
you your view on how Norway has approached this on controlled
spills and management of that to determine the best use of
dispersants and other technologies, in real-life experience,
rather than waiting for a disaster to happen. Do you think
that's a good idea or a bad idea?
Captain Sisson. I think that's an idea worth considering,
senator.
Senator Begich. That's fair.
Captain Sisson. But I would want to make sure that whatever
I did to the ocean was fixable.
Senator Begich. Absolutely. No, that's fair. I mean, I hear
it all the time, but I just wanted to test that and check with
you.
Let me ask you--if I can follow up just on a question of
personnel--earlier last week, I introduced a piece of
legislation that deals with Arctic spill and research and
technology. I think tomorrow we're going to do some markup on
it here in this committee, in the broader committee.
And one of the funding sources--because I think I want to
expand an answer for you, I know it's hard when you're sitting
up here to answer budgetary questions. You do not have enough
money--I'm going to tell you that--from the research and the
capacity to research and develop oil-spill technology.
And so one of the pieces of legislation we've laid on the
table is a three-cents, seven-cents. In other words, three
cents per barrel on domestic-produced oil and seven cents on
foreign oil--higher price for them, because I don't like
foreign oil--produces about $300 million a year for NOAA and
Coast Guard and other activities to really develop what we
should be doing and should have been doing for the last 20
years.
Do you think those kind of resources would be--I'm asking
in a positive way, so you cannot get in trouble with whoever is
watching on the screen. Do you think that's a positive thing,
that kind of resource? Would that help in developing and
utilizing that kind of resource for you?
Captain Sisson. Senator, the R&D Center has been involved
in past years in oil-remediation and oil-spill response
technologies. Yes.
Senator Begich. Good. I'll leave it at that.
Let me ask you, if I can just--again, a quick one. You had
mentioned that BP or the discussion--you know, there has been a
rejection and debate on some of the utilization, and you can
direct the use of technology through--because you have that
statutory right. And you had mentioned or you had assumed or
thought that that has not been done yet.
Expand on that, because I would think that if you all
thought it was important, at the end of the day, you need to
just do it and make the force of technology advancement or
utilization of that technology despite the company's maybe
question, because their track record hasn't been very good on
their analysis of what works, to be very frank with you, and
I'd rather put my hands, my trust in you guys.
So why have you been hesitant to just say, We're doing
this, and, BP, we're going to send you the bill later, and
we're trying this new technology?
Captain Sisson. At the R&D Center and the IATAP, senator,
we create tools for the Federal on-scene commander to use. We
hand them off to him to use in the OPTEMPO that he is working
at.
For instance, we immediately took a look at all the
submissions and tried to divide them up into what could be
immediately useful, but we didn't do that regards to what he
may have needed that particular day. So the ideas that we've
triaged and sent down may not fit his needs. That's the extent
of my knowledge of the process.
Senator Begich. Does your--And I'll end on this because I'm
well over time here, but how aggressively do you promote the
technology that you are bringing to the table?
In other words, I understand the military structure, to a
certain extent. You kind of move it and someone else moves it,
someone else moves it, but you guys are developing it. You know
the reality of how it'll work or not work. How aggressive are
you? Are you able to step out of the command structure and say,
Look, this is what you need down there, rather than, Well,
we'll let it go to the next department to make that
determination. How aggressive are you in that arena?
Captain Sisson. Well, senator, I think that the IATAP
process is a very clean and a great operating organization, in
the sense that we have a direct line to the Federal on-scene
commander. There is no chain of command between myself and
Admiral Zukunft. The recommendations that we make have to be in
light of what he needs at the time.
That said, if they make a decision that they don't want to
pursue a particular technology at this time, we're not to get
in their way. They've got a battle to fight.
Senator Begich. OK. I'll stop there, Madam Chair.
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Helton, isn't the issue that we have
lack of protocols or standards in place to evaluate technology?
And, as in your testimony, you mentioned the fact that we
really have not done the level of research to say what is best
technology of today, and so, consequently, here we are with
this crisis in place and now we're trying to do catch up for
basically 20 years of lack of focus on this technology?
Mr. Helton. Yes, I agree that we, as a Nation, have not
invested in the R&D that we need, and NOAA has tried to move
the ball forward with limited support in the sense of we have
some base funding that we've put toward R&D. We had a very
strong partnership with the University of New Hampshire, and
you'll hear about that from the second panel, I'm sure.
But some of the work that was done there actually has been
directly relevant to this spill, including things like
deepwater oil and gas and how that behaves and how quickly
those plumes surface and how they behave. So there definitely
is a need to do that.
It's just that the challenges that we go from having a
trickle to a fire hose of interest and how do we maintain an
R&D effort in between those spills, so that we can develop the
tools we need with the time it takes to properly test and vet
these technologies.
Senator Cantwell. Well, shouldn't it be more scientific
than that? We see now--This committee has had oversight
hearings over the number of large vessels, the growth in large
vessels outside of oil tankers carrying large amounts of fuel,
and so that has posed the question to us: Don't we need to have
better regulations because of the large amount of oil that
these ships are carrying? So we've had that discussion.
Shouldn't the discussion have been: We are now doing more
and more deep-sea exploration and that raises the risk of
challenge to the kind of spill or catastrophe that would
happen, and you would have thought that that kind of permitting
process would have put you on pace to do the kind of research
and development on what kinds of dangers might exist there and
what kind of technologies would be needed.
Mr. Helton. Yes, and we're looking at----
Senator Cantwell. So it's not really a guess. I mean, we're
not sitting here going to guess about what's the shape of the
next catastrophe. It's more: What are the practices that we are
doing and what kind of safeguards do we need to have against
those practices?
Because, obviously, boomers and skimmers, at this point in
time, are totally inadequate to deal with the catastrophe.
Mr. Helton. And we are continuing to explore in more and
more remote locations, and we're continuing to propose
navigation in places that are more and more remote potentially
with the opening up of the Arctic for more navigation. So those
are obviously very much a concern for my agency.
We have put forward some of those concerns. You mentioned
them in your opening statement, I believe, about some of the
comments that NOAA's made in the past about are we prepared.
And so I think those are on the record already that we share
those concerns.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I'm sure my colleague disagrees
with me, but it's one of the reasons why I don't support
opening up more of the Arctic, because if this catastrophe
would have happened in the Arctic, we don't have any of the
resources there. We wouldn't have had any ability to get the
level of resources that we've been able to amass in the Gulf up
to that particular area.
But my question is the level of research that NOAA has been
involved with so far has shown some promise in evaluating what
is the crisis at hand today, which is the response to large
volumes of oil moving about in the ocean. Is that correct?
There's some basic technology that we could have, if we put
our foot on the accelerator, been at a better place right now
to understand where these plumes would be going, the types of
information we could have achieved from them and better helped
our response plan. Is that correct?
Mr. Helton. Yes, and NOAA's focus in this regard has been
improving things like our three-dimensional modeling, so we
understand how oil behaves in the water column, not just from
subsurface releases, but when you have a surface release and
that oil disburses into the water column where does that oil go
relative to the surface. We have----
Senator Cantwell. Which is very different technology and
focus than saying let's look at single-hull tankers or let's
look at vessels that have now, because they're carrying so much
cargo, become larger carriers of fuel.
Mr. Helton. Yes, I agree that NOAA's role is much less on
the prevention and design of safer vessels or platforms and
more on improving our understanding of how oil behaves and
moves and what we can do to do a better job of cleaning up
shorelines, how we can make better decisions about tradeoffs of
things like dispersants and burning.
The other area that we've done a lot of work on recently
has been on information technology. Everyone wants the
information right away, and we've suffered for not being able
to get information out as rapidly as possible.
And we have developed some prototype information systems
that are up and running for this spill where all members of the
public can go and see what the latest trajectory is, where the
contaminated shorelines are, where the fishery closures are. So
we're working on that information technology as well, so that
the information that we do collect and learn we can share more
rapidly.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
Senator Snowe, do you have further questions?
Senator Snowe. Yes, thank you.
Mr. Helton, did NOAA have any contingency plans in place
with respect to a response to an oil spill in the aftermath of
Exxon Valdez? What has been learned from that and what types of
technologies or chemicals were used in the process? What was
tested that would have been considered in a contingency plan in
the event of another oil spill?
Mr. Helton. Yes, NOAA participates as a member of the
National Response Team and the regional response teams around
the country to help plan for and prepare for spills and other
kinds of events like this.
Senator Snowe. And was one developed since Exxon Valdez in
that sense of with the use of chemical dispersants?
Mr. Helton. Dispersants are an accepted and approved tool
by the U.S., and they're pre-approved in some areas of the
country where the regional response teams have evaluated their
use and put terms and conditions on when it could be and should
be used.
Senator Snowe. Has NOAA had any discussions with EPA
regarding the use of these chemical dispersants? I understand
they're using a sub-sea application that has never been used
before. Was that even tested in the past?
Mr. Helton. There has never been--I don't think it was even
envisioned to do subsea dispersants. All the dispersant work
that we're aware of has focused on dealing with a leaking
vessel or platform at the surface and dispersing oil in the
surface waters, not at that depth.
Senator Snowe. I see. So the response teams that were
developed never used a subsea application.
Mr. Helton. No, that was a novel application for this
incident.
Senator Snowe. I see. So it's never been tested in that
sense.
Mr. Helton. No----
Senator Snowe. Very unusual.
Mr. Helton. Yes.
Senator Snowe. So we're using something that has never been
done before.
It is remarkable that in 20 years since Exxon Valdez that
we have not been able to put certain technologies or carry out
testing of chemicals. There were no chemicals ever used in the
Exxon Valdez, nor in-situ burning, for that matter. It is a
terrible oversight that we wouldn't have had all this tested in
the interim in response to the plan.
And I raise this because, before the Small Business
Committee, there was an individual who has a small business,
had a technology that has been developed for 20 years, which
had been used in other types of oil spills, and it's surprising
to me that a lot of these technologies that have already been
vetted could have been used in this instance.
So I'm just wondering why--and I'm going to ask you the
same thing, Captain Sisson--in these contingency plans, some
things that have been used before were omitted. Obviously, in
this case, a subsea application wasn't used, but has Corexit
ever been used?
Mr. Helton. That's a standard dispersant that's stockpiled
for use in the U.S., and it has been used on other incidents,
but never to this scale.
Senator Snowe. This scale of the approximately two-million
gallons, I understand. So that amount has never been used.
So it's really shocking to think that, in the last 20
years, we haven't developed either the methods or the
technology as part of a contingency plan.
Mr. Helton. Well, there has been work on dispersants on a
number of levels, from the efficacy of how they work and the
biological effects, but, again, never envisioned at the scale
that they're being used here.
But there have been--of the chemical countermeasures that
we have available, dispersants are fairly well studied, but,
again, studying them and using them in a small scale is
different than using them at depth and using them in such large
volumes.
Senator Snowe. Captain Sisson, have any technologies been
incorporated in the contingency plans for the Coast Guard in a
response plan? Because it's surprising to me that we have to go
through this arduous process perhaps even re-vetting technology
that has already been demonstrated to be effective, has been
used in other types of oil spills in the past.
Captain Sisson. To get the details of the contingency-plan
responses, I'd have to get back to you, Senator.
Senator Snowe. OK. So we don't know whether or not we're
going through a duplicative process in some instances that
already could have been part and parcel of a plan. Is that
correct?
Captain Sisson. Well, senator, I don't have personal
knowledge of it.
Senator Snowe. What?
Captain Sisson. I don't have personal knowledge. I'd have
to check and get back with you.
Senator Snowe. Well I think that, again, it sounds like a
massive bureaucracy and not at the level that's commensurate
with the catastrophe at hand, frankly.
I just cannot imagine that we would not have prepared for
the worst-case scenario. Would it have made it different, had
we prepared for the worst-case scenario at the outset or at
least known the rate of flow from the oil?
Because, obviously, what was predicted initially ended up
being less than one-tenth of what exactly happened and what has
happened. Would it have made a difference in the deployment of
assets and personnel and anything else that we would have
required?
Captain Sisson. That's a question best answered by the
Federal on-scene commander, Senator.
I know that the flow-rate question came up fairly early.
The videography was an issue very early on, and we worked very
hard to fix that flow-rate technical question.
Senator Snowe. Well, it could have made a difference. The
interagency task force wasn't developed until June, early June.
When you think about the lethargic response to this by the
Federal Government, it is stunning, frankly. It is stunning.
Not to mention how the rate of flow was soft pedaled and
underestimated, instead of saying, ``we need to get everything
out there that's possible.'' It was better to have it all out
there and then decide whether or not you've got too much. But
the reverse was true and could not contain the oil, and,
ultimately, the damage. That's going to take years to rectify.
Thank you.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Senator Snowe.
Senator Wicker, do you have questions for this panel?
And after your questioning, I think we'll move to the next
panel.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. WICKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I have to agree
with my colleague, Senator Snowe, about the bureaucratic
cumbersomeness of the response.
I'm going to try to remember this entire saga the next time
I'm asked to vote for a huge Federal expansion or a huge
Federal solution to problems that might exist out there in the
United States of America.
Big bureaucracies do seem to be cumbersome and inefficient
and the senator has pointed that out very capably today.
Let me ask either of you about weathered oil. It's
certainly to our advantage that the skimmers get the oil
immediately, before it washes to shore.
I'm told that once the oil has been on the surface for a
while--and it has been on the surface, in many instances, many
places for 3 months--that it is not as capable of skimming or
burning right there onsite. Is my information correct there?
And, if so, are there technologies or effective ways of
removing weathered oil from the surface before it washes onto
shore?
Mr. Helton. Well, when oil is spilled, it starts to weather
immediately, and this oil, being released from depth, is
already starting to degrade before it even reaches the surface.
The challenges are that----
Senator Wicker. How long does it take to reach the surface,
Mr. Helton?
Mr. Helton.--it depends on the droplet size, but our models
indicate that it's several hours, 2 or 3 hours, but the smaller
droplets are much slower to rise and the larger droplets rise
faster.
Senator Wicker. OK. Go ahead with your answer.
Mr. Helton. So many of the technologies we have, such as
burning and dispersants, work best on fresh oil, and when oil
starts to mix with water and emulsify, it becomes less able to
burn, has a higher water content. When it mixes and ages, it's
less vulnerable to dispersants because the surface
characteristics are different.
But that weathering process is also a good thing in the
sense that that's the sign that the oil is beginning to degrade
and ultimately biodegrade.
So what we're seeing on the shorelines of the Gulf is oil
that might be as little as a week and maybe several weeks or
months old by the time it drifts ashore. So we're dealing with
weathered oil, mechanically picking it up.
There are some skimmers that have the ability to pick up
that material, but some of the technologies, like I said, like
burning and dispersants, are less appropriate for that
weathered oil.
Senator Wicker. Are these technologies under further
review, to your knowledge?
Mr. Helton. I think that there's work being done on this
incident as well as general R&D for oil-skimming technologies
in trying to improve the effectiveness.
And, as Senator Cantwell said, we're seeing the same
technologies we had in the Exxon Valdez, but there have been
improvements on the margins, in the sense of improving the
recovery rates and the efficacy of some of these technologies
in dealing with different kinds of oil, dealing with heavier
oils. So there is some progress in those regards.
Senator Wicker. Captain Sisson, do you have anything to
add?
Captain Sisson. I think that answers the question very
well, senator. I know of one particular skimmer that's in an
evaluation phase that has a sort of parachute--looking device
behind it to catch those globs of weathered oil that lie about
a foot or two beneath the surface. That's a new development
that I hadn't seen before.
Senator Wicker. So it's something that hasn't been used
until the last few days, is that what you're telling us?
Captain Sisson. It's still under development, senator.
Senator Wicker. And where is the development center?
Captain Sisson. It's part of our BAA submission process,
sir.
Senator Wicker. I see. So it has not actually been used
yet----
Captain Sisson. No, sir, not that I know of, sir.
Senator Wicker.--to capture the weathered oil.
All right. And, finally, let me ask you this, Mr. Helton:
With regard to streamlining the testing of seafood for oil
contamination, would it be fair to say that it's helpful if we
can do that locally, to the extent we can? Would it be more
efficient and take less time?
Mr. Helton. I think it's important that it be done in a way
that encourages confidence in the markets and that we're
closing the right areas and we're opening the right areas and
we're allowing seafood harvesting to occur in places where it's
safe to do so and prohibiting it if we're not certain that it's
safe.
I am not aware of the logistics causing a significant delay
in the testing. I know that some of the laboratory work takes
time to process in the sense of getting the results back from
the laboratories on what kinds of chemicals are detected in the
analytical tests.
But some of the sensory testing can be done, and is being
done, locally in Pascagoula to ensure that the seafood passes
the sensory testing.
Senator Wicker. Is there more capacity at Pascagoula for
more sensory testing, if we could get the work to them?
Mr. Helton. I'd have to check with the Fishery Service to
see what their capacity issues are. I know that, NOAA, as an
agency, is stretched on this spill. We have brought in a lot of
people from other labs and there are colleagues of mine in
Seattle that have gone down to the Gulf, to Pascagoula, to
assist in the sensory-testing efforts there, but I'd have to
get back to you on specific----
Senator Wicker. OK. Please do that, and is there any reason
why we couldn't do chemical testing there at the Pascagoula
facility also?
Mr. Helton. I'm not sure if they have the analytical
capacity to do that. I know some of the NOAA labs have those
kinds of petroleum-testing equipment. I know that the
laboratory in Seattle has some of that work. I'm not sure if
Pascagoula has that.
Senator Wicker. OK. Thank you very much.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you for your
testimony.
Obviously, this is something the Committee is going to be
dealing with in very near term. Obviously, tomorrow, we're
going to have a markup and legislation is going to be moving
through the Senate.
So we appreciate your testimony, and if members have
follow-up questions, obviously, we'll leave the record open. So
thank you.
We're going to move to our second panel, and I'd like to
welcome up Dr. Fritz Stahr, Manager of Seaglider Fabrication
Center, which is at the University of Washington; Mr. Dennis
Yellowhorse Jones, President of U-Mate International
Corporation; Ms. Cynthia Sarthou, who is Executive Director of
the Gulf Restoration Network; and Dr. Nancy Kinner, Director of
the Coastal Response Research Center; and Dr. Scott Pegau,
Executive Director of the Oil Spill Recovery Institute.
I know that there are people who are clearing out from the
first panel, but if you could move outside as quickly as
possible that would be great, so that we could get the next
hearing witnesses underway.
Thank you. Thank you all for being here. We appreciate your
making time to give testimony to the Committee on this
important issue, and we're just going to start with you, Mr.
Yellowhorse Jones. Is that how you pronounce your name?
Mr. Yellowhorse Jones. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. And start with you and just go right down
the panel. So thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF DENNIS YELLOWHORSE JONES, PRESIDENT, U-MATE
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Mr. Yellowhorse Jones. Thank you. It's an honor to be here
today to represent my company in conjunction with me here, I'm
with Dr. Mark Nanny from the University of Oklahoma and an
extreme colleague.
My company is based out of Northwest New Mexico. We produce
an organic material, humate, H-U-M-A-T-E. It's an organic
mineral that's found in Northwest New Mexico and it's used for
a variety of purposes. One is agriculture. Two is soil
remediation.
We have been working on extensive agricultural processes
for the past 15 years, and we sell our product all over the
world. Our largest customer is the Dole Food Company, and they
use it on different plantations and various different crop
types.
We also sell it to the largest organic farm in Saudi
Arabia, Al Khalediah Farm. It's owned by the royal family, and
there, again, it's used as an organic medium and also to
restructure contaminated soils.
Over the past several years, we've been working closely
with the University of Oklahoma and the gentleman behind me,
Dr. Mark Nanny, to come up with solutions to use our product
for soil remediation.
It's environmentally safe. It's certified organic. It
improves the soil structure and adds nutrients.
Dr. Nanny has received EPA funding over the past several
years to study our product there in Norman, Oklahoma, for
strictly soil remediation and oil-contaminated soils.
To date, we have been working very, very hard to try to
have the Coast Guard and BP and different organizations review
our proposal, which is called the Organic Solution. This was
supplied to the Coast Guard as a white paper approximately 2
months ago.
We have heard back from the Coast Guard and we're told that
we are in the screening process, and we really want to try to
enlighten the American public, enlighten this committee that we
are ready, willing and able to implement this technology.
I would like to talk a little bit about what is humate.
Humate is decomposed animal and plant life, and it's loaded
with trace minerals. It's like a multiple vitamin to the soil.
Everything that a multiple vitamin has in it, our humate has in
it--calcium, iron, phosphorus, selenium, magnesium, in trace
amounts. We consider this simple technology for a complex
problem.
And, in closing, I'd like to say that we are, again, ready,
willing and able to implement this.
Thank you very much.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you very much for your----
Mr. Yellowhorse Jones. I'll take any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Yellowhorse Jones follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dennis Yellowhorse Jones, President,
U-Mate International, Inc.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Attachment
Title Page
Deepwater Horizon Response
Solicitation Number: HSCG32-10-R-R00019
Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Office: United States Coast Guard (USCG)
Location: Contracting Office, USCG Research and Development Center
BAA Technology Gap Area Addressed: 4. Alternative Oil Spill Response
Technologies
Offeror:
U-Mate International, Inc. (A Native American Company)
Dennis Yellowhorse Jones, President
P.O. Box 4131
Scottsdale, AZ 85261
Website: www.HUMATE.com
Teaming Partner:
Dr. Mark A. Nanny, Professor, Environmental Chemistry
School of Civil Engineering and Environmental Science, and
Institute for Energy and the Environment
The University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK 73019
Oil Remediation Proposal--An Organic Solution (Unclassified)
Copyrighted 2010, U Mate International, Inc. with the following
license: The Government is granted a paid-up, nonexclusive,
irrevocable, worldwide license in this White Paper to reproduce,
prepare derivative works, distribute copies to the public, and perform
publicly and display publicly, by and on behalf of the Government.
We are proposing a solution for oil contamination along the Gulf
Coast where beaches, marshes and other lands by applying our humate to
the affected areas. Our humate is a non-toxic, natural organic mineral
that contains 60-90 percent humic and fulvic acids and other humic
substances. We are fortunate to have large tracts of land with humate
deposits estimated at 10,000,000 tons. Our humate is bagged under the
product name, New Mot U-Mate and is OMRI (Organic Material Review
Institute) Listed. It is also a U.S. Government (Federal Highway
Administration) approved product. Humate has been found effective for a
number of purposes: a soil conditioner. a fertilizer used by organic
farms, a decontaminate for hard metals, an oil remediation component,
etc. Our Company will solely utilize the expertise of the University of
Oklahoma to implement and control our solution, which includes six
applications of our humate tilled into the affected areas over a one-
year period, testing and modifying our initial concept for maximum
results for dollars spent. Our plan initially calls for approximately
3,250 tons of our humate per application over a five-mile contaminated
beach area. Our humate can be mined on an as needed basis and the
volume increased as necessary. The following is a brief outline of a
plan put together by Dr. Mark Nanny of the University of Oklahoma and
our Company:
This study will characterize how humate application to petroleum
contaminated shoreline sediments impacts the fate and resulting
biodegradation of petroleum. It is proposed that humate, in the form of
a finely ground powder, applied to petroleum contaminated shoreline
sediments will facilitate in-situ remediation of petroleum through the
sorption of petroleum to humate and stimulation of microbial
degradation. Enhancement of these two processes will result in the
improved remediation and restoration of the shoreline sediment quality
relative to similar, but untreated, sediments. It is recommended that
the humate-enhanced remediation process be examined over 2 years so
that: (1) comparison of the degradation rate of labile petroleum
components can be evaluated, and second, (2) so that the fate of
recalcitrant organic molecules that are of environmental concern, such
as thiophenes and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, can be monitored
for biodegradation and/or sorption to humate.
The research goals of this project are:
1. To demonstrate, over a 2-year period, that the application
of humate stimulates and enhances in-situ remediation of
petroleum-contaminated shoreline sediments relative to
untreated sites.
2. To illustrate that the petroleum components are indeed
biodegraded and/or strongly adsorbed to humate.
3. To determine an appropriate application rate and amount of
humate necessary to enhance in-situ remediation.
4. To identify additional application methods that may be
necessary to further stimulate the humatc enhanced in-situ
remediation, e.g., application of fertilizer.
It is proposed that application of humate will enhance the in-situ
remediation of petroleum impacted shorelines sediments through multiple
physical, chemical, and biological processes. (1) Humate will sorb
petroleum components thereby; decreasing toxicity of the petroleum to
indigenous microflora responsible for petroleum biodegradation; (2)
humates may provide nutrients, act as a carbon substrate, and/or
provide specific organic compounds stimulating microbial growth; (3)
humates may provide a viable physical substrate surface for microbial
growth and that allows access to sorbed petroleum; (4) humates provide
moisture necessary for microbial growth in petroleum saturated
environments; and (5) humates improve soil texture thereby allowing
aeration which facilitates aerobic biodegradation. This later point is
of importance because in the case of crude oil, which sometimes does
not contain high concentrations of toxic components but rather is
comprised mostly of saturated hydrocarbons, drastic changes in the
physical characteristics of the contaminated soil (e.g., porosity,
water retention capability, permeability) may impede vegetation growth,
inevitably leading to a decrease in soil quality.
Furthermore, humate-induced remediation is environmentally
significant not only for the fact that it appears to stimulate
remediation of crude oil contamination through hydrocarbon adsorption
and biodegradation enhancement, but also because humates: (1) are a
component of the natural organic carbon cycle, i.e., they are a
naturally produced material; (2) are environmentally benign; (3) help
improve soil characteristics that encourage and foster vegetation
growth; and (4) may stimulate indigenous microbial growth that may
initiate and enhance intrinsic bioremediation.
Dr. Nanny has performed two oil remediation studies for the
Integrated Environmental Petroleum Consortium (IPEC) who funded his
research (with flow through funds from EPA). You can find his reports
on the EPA website. He was held to strict protocols for QA/QC,
methodology, sampling, and analysis.
Additional technical information is available upon request.
Rough Order of Magnitude
Estimated costs:
Cost of New-Mex Humate ultra $21,500,000
fine
University of Oklahoma (including 1,584,000
Dr. Mark)
Shipping 1,955,000
Application equipment and labor 500,000
On-site storage 20,000
---------------
Estimated* $25,559,000
===============
Cost per mile of beach $5,111,800
===============
Coverage:*
5 miles of beach
20 foot width
6 applications at average of 2
inches
Time frame:
Applications--12 months
Follow-up--12 months
* Subject to specific identified area and testing protocol
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
We're going to go through the panel, then we'll take
questions at the end.
Mr. Yellowhorse Jones. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. So thank you for your testimony.
Dr. Stahr, welcome. Thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF FREDERICK R. (FRITZ) STAHR, Ph.D.,
RESEARCH SCIENTIST, SCHOOL OF OCEANOGRAPHY,
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
Dr. Stahr. Thank you for inviting me to testify today. My
name is Fritz Stahr. I'm a Physical Oceanographer at the
University of Washington, a research scientist and engineer
there. I manage a group that makes an underwater robot called
the ``SeagliderTM.''
There are actually three Seagliders observing the plume of
oil under the sea surface in the Gulf of Mexico right now, two
of those owned by the Naval Oceanographic Office that we built
for them about 3 years ago and still maintain for them, and one
owned by iRobot Corporation, which is our sole licensee for the
technology to be built for outside customers, outside the
University of Washington now.
They volunteered to put one of their engineering units in
service to--everybody, really, in looking at this plume, and
all that data is available online. And the written testimony,
which I've submitted, contains the URL link to those data
available from the Seagliders.
So I'm here today to testify about that, in some respect,
but also, in some respect, just as an outside scientist, an
oceanographer looking at what has been going on, and having
some experience with undersea vents.
I'm also a mechanical engineer and a member of the Marine
Technology Society. Members of the Marine Technology Society
are in the oil and gas business as well as in science
endeavors. They represent really the cadre of people who invent
the ROVs, invent the specialized tools and instruments that are
used both by the industry and by the scientists to explore the
oceans and to use the ocean resources.
And that organization contains a lot of members in the
Seattle area, actually, and I'm the local section chair, the
Puget Sound Section Chair of the Marine Technology Society.
So, as an engineer, I'm a mechanical engineer also. I have
some background in trying to understand things like blowup
preventers with rams that don't work, which was very
interesting to me.
I think the most important part of what I'd like to say
here today has to do with the fact that this was not a
traditional spill. Spill implies containment in a vessel or a
tank of some sort before it comes out and onto the ocean or
onto the land.
In this case, this was an oil vent. In deep-ocean science,
we look at things called hydrothermal vents, which are places
in the sea floor. You may know them as black smokers. This is
where very hot fluid comes out of the sea floor at mid-ocean
ridges and they act incredibly like what we have seen here,
lots of oil, in this case, instead of hot water, but oil and
gas coming out of the sea floor as a vent.
And I think that one of the things that was difficult for
many of us who have worked in the science of vents to
understand was that there seemed to be little attention to
those who are in that community in terms of turning to them for
their expertise.
So it wasn't surprising to me that someone I know in that
community, Dr. Tim Crone, who's at Columbia University's
Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, was one of the first of what
I would consider sort of the general public of scientists who
put out an estimate of what the flow rate really was.
And we all really wanted to know that number for a lot of
reasons, and the initial numbers, none of us could believe,
particularly after we saw the first 30-second video clip.
So Dr. Crone has experience in doing that, and, in fact,
there were estimates quite early on at NOAA that matched much
more closely to what we believe now to be something like 50,000
to 100,000 barrels a day coming out of that undersea vent.
The other thing that I wanted to talk about--and this is
where the Seagliders come in--is that that venting process
creates an undersea plume of oil droplets that may never come
to the surface. So there is a plume that has now been
established, I believe pretty well, between 800 and 1,300
meters deep. The sea floor there is roughly 1,900 meters deep
where the oil well is.
This plume can be observed by things like the Seaglider,
although we don't have perfect instrumentation on the Seaglider
to do so, and that's where some development effort would be
useful is to add instrumentations to really tell whether or not
this was oil that the gliders are intersecting in their path up
and down through the water column.
And that plume--the nature of that plume is very much like
what comes out of hydrothermal vents. So, again, the folks who
research hydrothermal vents would be able to help in
researching that plume and where it is and where it's going.
And I think that that--the fundamental difference between a
spill that comes out of a tanker on the surface and oil that
comes in from a vent at the sea floor--is one of the things
that was missed early on, and for quite a while about this. So
we have lots of plans for dealing with vessels, but none for
dealing with oil vents.
And I think, last, but not least, I'd like to just mention
that the observing technologies available to coastal
communities, such as high-frequency radar, that NOAA's IOOS
program, Integrated Ocean Observing System, are slowly, but
surely, trying to get going around the country, some of those
were not available because of funding.
And I think the IOOS program, in general, is a great one.
It gives us the ability to observe and monitor the ocean sort
of 24/7, but they're operating on a relative shoestring of a
budget right now.
And I think that that would have helped the responders a
lot in having some of those facilities available, not only at
present for watching the ocean--in fact, those high-frequency
radars have been turned on, due to money from the incident
commander--but, in the past, so that we could better model
where these oil slicks, et cetera are going to go.
So that's the gist of my testimony, and I thank you very
much and I would like to submit my written testimony for the
record.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Fritz Stahr follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frederick R. (Fritz) Stahr, Ph.D., Research
Scientist, School of Oceanography, University of Washington
Good morning Madam Chair, Ranking Member Snowe, and members of the
Committee. My name is Fritz Stahr. I am a physical oceanographer at the
University of Washington's College of the Environment School of
Oceanography. Presently I run the Seaglider Fabrication Center within
the School, which makes, and helps owners use an autonomous underwater
vehicle (AUV, or more simply, underwater robot) called a
Seaglider.TM Three Seagliders are presently deployed in the
Gulf of Mexico around the Deepwater Horizon oil well observing various
ocean properties, some which may show the presence of an underwater oil
plume which comes from the seafloor oil well-head. Two of those units
are owned and operated by the U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office
(NAVOCEANO), which purchased them from us about 3 years ago, and for
which we provide maintenance. The third is owned and operated by iRobot
Corporation, which has a sole-license from the UW to make, sell, and
maintain Seagliders for all parties outside the UW. You may see the
data from all these Seagliders, as well as other ocean gliders, at a
webpage sponsored by NOAA's Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS):
http://rucool.marine.rutgers.edu/deepwater/.
I am also a mechanical engineer, and Chair of the Puget Sound
Section of the Marine Technology Society (MTS--https://
www.mtsociety.org/home.aspx). MTS has many members in the business of
designing, building, and operating a wide range of research and
operational marine equipment and instruments, including for both the
oil industry and basic ocean research. My testimony today will touch on
aspects of this Nation's capacity for better use of basic research-
related technologies, and observations as an engineer of the series of
equipment failures that gave us 80+ days of crude oil venting from the
seafloor.
An Oil ``Vent'', Not ``Spill'', and the Connection to an Active Ocean
Research Community
To call this incident a spill implies the oil was in a container at
one time, such as a ship or tank on land. But it actually comes
directly from the Earth at 1,500 meters below the ocean surface in a
fashion analogous to deep-sea hydrothermal vents, often called ``black-
smokers'' for their appearance of venting black smoke underwater
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hydrothermal_vent). Hydrothermal vents
are found on or near mid-ocean ridges at depths from 700 to 3000+
meters beneath the ocean's surface. The terrestrial analogy to calling
this a vent holds as well--oil ``gushers'' from uncontrolled well heads
on land spew tall jets of oil into the air much like geysers at
Yellowstone spew jets of water--both geysers and oil wells vent high-
pressure, low-density fluids from the Earth into either the atmosphere
or ocean. I will continue to use the phrase ``oil vent'' throughout
this testimony to distinguish this oil-generating seafloor feature from
a spill (which is limited in scope to the size of the container) and
emphasize its similarity to naturally occurring hydrothermal vents.
In considering a response to an accidental seafloor oil vent,
particularly at this depth and of this strength, it seems natural to
turn to one of the two communities used to working at there--ocean
researchers and engineers who measure and explore hydrothermal vents.
(The other community now accustomed to working at that depth are oil
drilling and well-head engineers, but they are relative newcomers to
this extremes of the environment). To work safely at the high pressures
and extreme fluid temperatures and corrosive compositions found at
seafloor vents one requires well designed, specialized equipment and
instruments such as custom Remote Operated Vehicles (ROVs), high-
pressure instrument housings, ultra-robust probes and tools--all things
basic researchers have been inventing and using for decades. As a post-
doctoral researcher, I measured hydrothermal-vent generated heat from
groups of black-smokers in the northeastern Pacific with Dr. Russ
McDuff (UW). There exists a very active community of vent researchers
at universities and laboratories around the world, including UW, all of
whom understand the technological and scientific demands of working at
ultra-high pressure with fluids that are extremely acidic, toxic, hot,
and volatile--very much like the oil from the DeepWater Horizon vent.
Therefore it was reasonable that one of the first independent
scientists to estimate the true flow rate of the oil vent based on the
30-second video clip BP finally released was a colleague who worked on
exactly that problem with hydrothermal vents as part of his doctoral
dissertation--Tim Crone, now at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty
Earth Observatory. His work, along with that of three colleagues of
diverse expertise, on this flow-rate estimate was published in an Op-Ed
piece in The New York Times on May 21, 2010, (about a month after the
original blow-out) titled ``Measure of a Disaster,'' in which they
conclude:
Taking all this into account, our preliminary estimates
indicate that the discharge is at least 40,000 barrels per day
and could be as much as 100,000 barrels. Certainly, our
assessments suggest that BP's stated worst-case estimate of
60,000 barrels has been occurring all along. What matters most
is that we take the steps to find out if it has.
All the oceanographers I know, and much of the general public,
agreed with the last statement--we wanted to determine what the real
flow-rate was. But no one could do so for two reasons: First, access to
the well-head for such a direct measurement was controlled entirely by
BP and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); and, second, neither BP nor the
onsite incident commander (USCG) took steps to learn how much oil was
actually entering the environment from this vent. This willful
ignorance on BP's part is understandable as they have a pecuniary
interest in that number. Current Federal law will use that rate, and
the time it flowed, to help determine how much oil was vented, and
therefore what clean-up cost BP will incur. However, it is unclear why
the USCG did not turn to natural partners in the ocean science
community to gather that information and put it ahead of the
containment and clean up efforts.
Frustration of Research Oceanographers at NOAA's Public Stance
Regarding Flow-Rate
BP, the USCG, and NOAA either were ignorant of, or missed entirely,
an opportunity early on in this crisis to employ existing basic-
research techniques, and scientists knowledgeable in them, to determine
the flow rate from this oil vent. Knowing that number (or at least an
accurate range for it) may have guided a more meaningful and focused
containment and clean up effort. The fact that public statements by the
USCG and NOAA indicated no real interest in knowing the flow rate for a
long time into the disaster frustrated me and fellow oceanographers. We
were deeply disappointed that the government agencies nominally
responsible for protecting our oceans, shorelines, and fisheries took
the same stance that BP did in this respect. Further, we were baffled
by a failure to employ tools and techniques we already have to
determine flow rate from deep-water hydrothermal vents, or to contact
members of the ocean science and technology community who were speaking
out on behalf of all the rest of us with estimates based on publicly
available data. The situation left many of us wondering whether we were
the only ones who cared or believed that knowing the oil vent flow-rate
was important to the response.
As a bit of raw data on what people inside NOAA thought, or knew, I
recently found and watched a 10-minute video clip created sometime on
or shortly after April 22, 2010, taken in various rooms at NOAA's
HazMat office in the Western Regional Center in Seattle. The video
records people meeting in-person and by phone, with images of
whiteboards, notepads, and audio, in which one can see and hear
estimates for oil flow-rate from various sources. The numbers are the
likes of ``64k to 110k barrels a day'', and ``52-110,000 barrels a
day''. (Clip available at http://blog.al.com/live/2010/05/
video_shows_Federal_officials.html, published May 1, 2010--NOAA credit
slide at the end of clip.) Given that the NOAA HazMat group's job is to
envision the worst case for a spill and help the affected area cope
with it in a response they term ``least regrets,'' I can understand why
NOAA would not necessarily release those numbers to the public.
I believe that no oceanographer, however, would be surprised that
the flow-rate estimates generated by Dr. Crone and his colleagues
correlate well to those generated (or gathered) almost a month earlier
by NOAA HazMat. But once this correlation was apparent, it became
scientifically embarrassing that NOAA continued to maintain publicly
the original extremely low flow-rate estimate of 5,000 bbls/day. As the
op-ed piece authors said, ``what matters most is that we take steps to
find out'' whether the flow rate has been higher all along.
Perhaps sensing that frustration, the Flow Rate Technical Group
(FRTG) was finally formed by the Incident Commander and is led by an
experienced and technically savvy ocean scientist, Dr. Marcia McNutt.
Some had high hopes for a quality result from a 32-member strong team,
many in academia and others from Federal agencies such as the U.S.
Geological Survey, the Department of Energy, and Minerals Management
Service. Divided along lines of different scientific approaches to the
question, it appeared promising to those of us on the outside. On May
27, they published a ``consensus'' number of 12-19,000 bbls/day for
flow rate. But the press release did not make it clear what
subsequently was revealed--that those numbers really represented the
low-end of the range as none of the groups could agree on the high-end
of the range. Some of the FRTG groups estimated up to 40,000 bbls/day
and others wouldn't say what the high-end could be, so no value for
that was published and the press (and public) believed the high-end to
be 19,000 bbls/day. In a later report FRTG released (June 10, 2010),
the FRTG noted that a group led by scientists from the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institute with an ROV that was allowed access to the
well-head estimated the flow rate after the top-kill attempt failed
(May 29, 2010), but before the riser was cut, to be 65-125,000 bbls/
day--certainly much higher than anything the FRTG published 2 days
before or subsequently, but in line with NOAA HazMat's original
estimates made in the days just after the rig sank. All of this just
served to cause those of us on the outside further doubt of the Federal
Government's intent or ability to protect us, and the ocean
environment, from the ravages of an out-of-control seafloor oil vent.
Lack of knowledge means lack of control--clearly where the country has
been put by this incident.
The Underwater Oil Plume
Another parallel to hydrothermal vents exhibited by this oil vent
is the creation of an underwater plume at a level of neutral density
for some of the vented fluid. As they leave the seafloor, both types of
vent fluids have momentum (from pressure) and buoyancy (from being
lower density than the surrounding seawater). The momentum typically
dissipates within a short distance by draining into turbulence all
around the plume (typically seen as billows and vortices on the edges).
But the buoyancy persists and drives the plume higher off the seafloor.
In the case of a hydrothermal vent, this buoyancy is due to the high
temperature of the venting water, often as much as 400+ C. But it mixes
with surrounding 2-4+ C water and becomes neutrally buoyant a few
hundred meters above the bottom, rarely rising all the way to the
surface except in the case of an underwater magma eruption. From this
oil vent, some fluid will be buoyant enough to rise all the way to the
surface creating the large slicks being observed, mapped, skimmed, and
washing ashore. But some of the oil will become so small as to become
neutrally buoyant only part way to the surface. (A numerical and lab
study of this process was conducted in May by professors at the
University of North Carolina--video at http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=6Cp6fHINQ94.)
These subsurface plumes are then subject to the currents and
microbial breakdown processes at depth, away from sunlight and surface
wave effects. Such plumes were detected by Dr. Samantha Joye
(University of Georgia) and Dr. Vernon Asper (University of Southern
Mississippi) in their ship-board cruises during May and June. The
plume(s) appear in a depth range of 800 to 1,300 meters. Dr. Joye
discussed this, and many other important effects on the natural
environment and oil from Deepwater Horizon vent in her testimony on
June 9 to the House of Representatives Committee on Science and
Technology, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment. Dr. Asper was
instrumental in getting iRobot Corporation to launch and fly their
Seaglider on the west side of the oil vent to look for this plume.
Gliders, unfortunately, can only help track this neutrally buoyant
plume down to 1,000 meters, as none of those currently on the market
are capable of diving deeper. Further, they do not as yet, carry any
sensors that directly detect oil, only detecting parameters that are a
proxy for oil, such as Colored Dissolved Organic Matter (CDOM)
fluorescence and oxygen concentration. So, while gliders, and other
AUVs, can currently help somewhat, there is significant room for
improvement in that technology to monitor oil-vent plumes. Two
developments are underway with promise. Professor Charlie Eriksen at
the University of Washington's School of Oceanography is in the process
of testing a Deepglider* that has a dive depth and operational capacity
to 6,000 meters below the sea surface. This will cover to the deepest
place an oil well has ever been drilled 93,000 m) or is ever likely to
be drilled. And second, a German company, Contros Systems and Solutions
GmbH, makes a fluorometer-type sensor for polyaromatic hydrocarbons
(oil) but it is too large and power-hungry to be integrated onto a
glider. Pushing either of these technologies along will likely assist
us in really measuring the next oil vent plume that occurs from deep-
sea drilling incidents.
And last, in the ``frustrated ocean scientist'' arena again, I was
outraged that both BP and NOAA denied the existence of these subsurface
plumes long after conclusive physical evidence came aboard research
vessels in the form of oil-coated filters from water collected at plume
depths. Once more, it seemed that the agency charged with helping us
measure and understand what was happening in the ocean due to this oil
vent spent whatever potential it had for positive impact on obscuring
the facts.
Ocean Observing Facilities Unavailable Due to Lack of Funds, but Needed
to Understand Fate of Oil Slick
NOAA has been slowly building an ocean observing system around the
country known as the Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS). It is
intended to benefit all sectors of our society--business, agencies,
general public, and science--and is a system of systems building on
many facilities and instruments already installed and taking data for
other projects. We hope that someday it will help us observe the ocean
like we do the atmosphere--continuously and everywhere along the coasts
and Great Lakes. But at present it operates on a shoestring budget so
in some cases is not sustainable on a full-time basis. (Legislation
authorizing IOOS passed in early 2009, but a prototype system funded by
a consortium of fisheries and academia in the Gulf of Maine was
operational as early 2001.) When the White House asked for a list of
ocean observing assets available in the Gulf of Mexico at the outset of
this event, it was the Gulf of Mexico Coastal Ocean Observing System
(GCOOS) of IOOS that responded. The list delivered contained some high-
frequency radars (HFRs) that can track surface currents far out to sea.
But those HFRs had been shut down months earlier due to lack of
operational funding. They are running now thanks to funding from the
Incident Command, and are critical to tracking the currents pushing the
oil slick around. But knowing what the currents were before the
disaster, and for years before that, could have helped greatly in
understanding the system into which this oil vent erupted. (See http://
www.cencoos.org/sections/news/Gulf_oil_spill_2010.shtml) for HRF data
from the Gulf.) The general lack of funding for basic ocean
observations and research in the Gulf was well covered in a New York
Times article by Paul Voosen published June 3, 2010, titled ``Federal
Funding Cuts Leave Oceanographers, Spill Responders in Dark''. What we
need in terms of fund for IOOS and its regional associations pales in
comparison with many other demands on tax dollars. Even the equivalent
of one ``inexpensive'' NASA robotic mission of $200 million would make
IOOS a functional reality.
Opportunities for Action in Measuring, Monitoring, and Evaluating
Accidental Oil Vents
What is clear from all this is that our country has put little
effort into creating tools and instruments to measure, monitor,
evaluate, and clean up a deep-sea oil vent caused by a well-head
incident such as the Deepwater Horizon rig explosion and sinking. While
oil company engineers do amazing work to create drills, rigs and
methods to work in deep water, it is apparent from this event that no
one can design, build, and operate a one-hundred-present fail-safe
system for deepwater oil wells. A national effort, that includes work
on both engineering and scientific challenges, is critical if we are to
be truly prepared for another such event. We must take some action and
several paths forward are offered in two bills proposed to this
committee by members.
Senator Cantwell proposes the ``Oil Spill Technology and Research
Act of 2010'' which creates a committee to oversee research and
development spanning a wide range of concerns revealed by this
disaster--from surface and sub-surface current prediction capability
(typically a pure research endeavor), to containment and removal
technology (typically done by agencies and oil companies), to
rehabilitation methods (often handled by concerned citizen volunteers).
The Committee will act through NOAA and the National Academy of
Sciences, which is important as it provides a balance necessary to make
these efforts move forward with transparency and attention to
impartiality. Though funded at a relatively small scale, the fact-
finding part of this effort alone may be worth it--as Socrates pointed
out, knowing what we do not know is the critical first step to true
learning.
Senator Rockefeller proposes the ``Securing Health for Ocean
Resources and Environment Act,'' or the ``SHORE Act,'' which invests in
a variety of improvements to NOAA and the Coast Guard to better monitor
and respond to oil spills, indentify aging oil infrastructure that puts
us at risk, provides grants to states and other regional organizations
to improve their readiness to respond, and establishes a long-term
environmental monitoring system for the Gulf of Mexico where most deep
offshore oil is being pursued. The funds for this are greater, but so
is the scope and duration. And those funds come from industry-paid
fees, which at present, are popular with the public given what has
happened in the last 90 days.
Both of these bills are good steps forward in turning ideas into
action and adding to our clearly weak arsenal of oil vent (and oil
spill) response, monitoring, clean up, and restoration technologies.
Even wider recognition of the important role basic oceanographic
research plays in this field will be a welcome addition to the mandate
of NOAA and the Coast Guard.
Thank you for inviting me to testify today.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Dr. Stahr. Thank you for that
testimony and we definitely will have questions for you about
the Seaglider. So thank you.
Dr. Pegau, thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF SCOTT PEGAU, Ph.D., RESEARCH PROGRAM MANAGER, OIL
SPILL RECOVERY INSTITUTE (OSRI)
Dr. Pegau. Good morning, and thank you for the opportunity
to speak with you today.
My name is Scott Pegau. I'm the Research Program Manager
for the Oil Spill Recovery Institute. OSRI is a
Congressionally-mandated organization that was developed after
the Exxon Valdez oil spill. We bring together Federal, state
agencies and local peoples to guide where our research and
technology development should go.
As the Research Program Manager, I'm responsible for
ensuring that OSRI's funding goes toward the best science and
technology in trying to get it transferred into the applied
world, and we use a research plan to guide where we're going
for the next 5 years.
The subject before us today has many aspects, given time
constraints, how focus on issues related to adoption of new
cleanup technologies, although there are overlaps with other
areas.
In developing new technologies, there are some obstacles
that won't ever change, but there are some that we can address,
such as improving the process for getting new technologies
adapted. We've got to keep in mind that an underlying issue
that we have to deal with is that spill response is conducted
by a large number of small businesses. For instance, there are
at least six spill-response organizations in Alaska alone.
The decentralized approach limits the technologies that can
be purchased or maintained. High-end technologies, like spill-
surveillance aircraft with cutting-edge sensors are outside the
capabilities of small businesses. To purchase and operate those
highly specialized equipment would require being done by a
national spill-response group.
Developing and adapting new technologies could be made much
easier by developing a clear set of standards that equipment
must meet, providing facilities that allow for testing
opportunities and clearly outlining how to become approved for
use during a spill.
We all want proven technologies during a spill response.
This requires us to actually have tested them prior to the
spill. So we need to look at testing, from bench-top tests,
large-scale laboratory tests and field testing.
For instance, as an example for bench-top testing, the
access of oil or other materials needed, you can go to the
National Institute of Standards and Technologies and buy 50-
millileters--you know, a little cube of oil--for 380 bucks,
that's about $300,000 a gallon, if you want to buy crude oil
for developing your new sensor. Obviously, that's not feasible
for larger things.
Large-scale national test facilities are expensive to rent.
They're expensive to operate, and getting permission for field
testing runs into issues of regulation and approvals that few
can figure out.
Similarly, testing is critical for transitioning scientific
products, such as circulation models and ocean-observing
capabilities.
During a spill, there's rarely time to ensure that new
scientific data can be incorporated into the spill-response
model or that the response personnel understand the limitations
to the information being provided. This testing must be
accomplished ahead of time as part of a clear transition
effort.
Funding is obviously an obstacle. Currently, new
development is primarily left to industry. They're doing some
really neat things, but it does lead to other issues. They
don't often align with the people's desires necessarily.
Otherwise, we generally require pooling of the limited assets
of the non-industry groups to try to move our field forward.
Keep in mind that there will always be a gap between
current science and its application in spill cleanup. This gap
is natural, and it's actually desirable, as science is out
there to go down many wrong paths in identifying the best path.
When we look at funding, it's critical that the funding
organizations bridge between the scientific and the applied
worlds. Like others here, I rely heavily on the input from
spill-responders. I need their reality check. We've been
supporting several different things, and some of them have gone
through very fast because the spill responders said, Yes, I
need that.
We developed a balloon surveillance system that was a
scientific idea that came out 2 years ago. A year ago, we
tested it, and BP has purchased it for operation.
We've had some failures, which are quite happily not in the
field at this point.
As well as the input from the responders, we require input
from the scientists to keep us aware of the new directions in
improving opportunities we must consider. It's only by bridging
these two worlds that we can efficiently ensure best technology
transfer.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Scott Pegau follows:]
Prepared Statement of Scott Pegau, Ph.D., Research Program Manager,
Oil Spill Recovery Institute (OSRI)
My name is Scott Pegau and I am the Research Program Manager for
the Oil Spill Recovery Institute (OSRI) in Cordova, Alaska. OSRI's
mission is to support research, education, and demonstration projects
designed to respond to and understand the effects of oil spills in the
Arctic and sub-Arctic marine environments. As the Research Program
Manager I am responsible for guiding OSRI's funding toward the best
ecological and technological research and development related to oil
spill recovery. OSRI is one of a very small group or organizations that
fund this type of research. I also have experience as a researcher who
has submitted proposals for conducting oil spill related research and
development.
My comments focus on trying to develop new cleanup technologies
that are likely to be utilized. I address the issue from the funding
organization's perspective, however, there are many similarities faced
by businesses that are trying to develop new technologies. Issues
associated with restoration can be different, although they have some
similarities.
When considering on the issues that impede introduction of new
technology and approaches into spill response I find that there are
several causes, but primarily there are three root issues that come
into play.
1. Oil is a toxic substance. This creates numerous difficulties
in proving a system works by making it difficult to test the
system.
2. Oil spill response in the U.S. is conducted by a large
number of small businesses. There are six spill response
organizations in Alaska alone. Because they are small
businesses there are generally limitations to the types of
equipment they can afford or operate. The relatively small
spill response community can create difficulties for outside
approaches to be adopted.
3. The spill response efforts are highly scrutinized with high
probability of litigation. This leads to wariness in using
unproven technologies during spill response.
Note the Catch 22 situation between the first and third root issue.
When looking at developing new technologies the first issue to
consider is ``What type of technology is needed?'' Most development is
in response to lessons learned at an earlier spill. I am closely
watching events in the Gulf to help inform me of gaps in our response
capabilities. Unfortunately, the degree of information control being
applied in the Gulf is making that job extremely difficult.
When dealing with situations that haven't occurred before this is a
little trickier. Often issues are fairly obvious, like needing to
improve the abilities in inclement weather conditions, or the ability
to operate in different sea ice conditions. Based on experience we can
guess at a majority of issues that need to be addressed, but our
experience only provides us with a theoretical model of the situation.
As with any model there are differences between the model and reality.
These differences lead to adapting our approaches on the fly. Such an
example in the Gulf is the use of dispersants at the well head, which
is an application outside of what they were designed for. The way to
reduce these unexpected issues is to conduct the appropriate
experimental spills so we can learn in a more controlled set of
conditions and extent than relying on spills-of-opportunity. Such
controlled spills have not been possible since the early 1980s in the
U.S., which is probably one of the greater factors in preventing the
advancement of spill response capabilities. We can't fix problems we
are not aware of.
Another issue regards knowing whether a new technology works or is
any better than the existing systems. Standards are needed against
which new equipment can be tested. How can a manufacture invest in
developing new equipment if they don't know what the measures of
success are? Or how can a responder be confident that a new piece of
equipment works if there are no standards? There are now testing
standards for skimmers, but I don't think many of the skimmers have
been actually tested using the standards. Additional standards need to
be developed so manufacturers are aware of the tests their equipment
must pass if it is to be considered for spill response. This will also
provide a measure that demonstrates the equipment is proven technology
to the response organizations that are the potential adaptors of the
technology.
This can become more complicated if protocols are written with one
technology named rather than listing the required capabilities. If the
measurement protocols require a Turner fluorometer then there is no
incentive for other companies to develop competing equipment because it
cannot break into the market.
Beyond developing standards there must also be an ability to
demonstrate that the technology meets those standards. This means there
must be an ability to test the design, potentially at several different
levels. Benchtop testing is needed during development, large scale
laboratory tests are needed to show it may work in the environment, and
in the end actual field tests must occur. There are many difficulties
in conducting these tests.
One example to consider is the development of a new oil detection
sensor. Among the first things needed is a sample of oil to work with.
I am involved in such a project so I am learning the difficulties
involved. The Advisory Board and Scientific and Technical Committee
that guide OSRI funding includes members from the oil industry, and I
work with a number of other individuals in the industry so I have a
much better starting point than most, but here is what I am finding.
Based on recommendations from my Board I made a request for two
liters of oil from the North Slope. I was put in contact with a couple
of very cooperative people who thought it would be no problem to
provide a couple liters of oil, but they had to check with the lawyers.
The latest response is that they expect that it will take two to 3
months to get a decision whether my request can be filled. I could go
to the National Institute of Standards and Technology and purchase oil
for $379 for 50 ml (over $300,000 per gallon). This is not an option
for someone who needs to test a large piece of equipment. A much more
clearly defined means is needed for people to access affordable samples
of oil and other materials, such as dispersants, for use in the
development of new technology.
Once a new technology is developed it must be tested either in the
lab or in the field. There is a strong reluctance to apply an unproven
technology during an actual spill response so the preference is to
operate in a laboratory environment. However, there are very few large
scale testing facilities. The Minerals Management Service Ohmsett
facility is the large national facility. It is fairly expensive to
rent, which creates difficulties for small businesses trying to prove
their approach. The last quote I saw for operating the facility was for
approximately $40,000 for 3 days of testing of a new large skimmer.
There is a lot of work involved in being able to conduct these tests so
I don't think the cost is unrealistic, but it can be prohibitive to
smaller organizations. The funding for testing of this new skimmer was
provided by a partnership of four organizations including OSRI. MMS has
been very willing to let people test equipment when other tests are
running, but it is difficult to figure out how to properly schedule
these tests. Small businesses would greatly benefit if a small number
of days were made available at the national facilities for testing
their technologies at lower costs. For Arctic issues this means being
able to work at the U.S. Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering
Laboratory ice facilities.
In the end we still need to prove the technology in the field.
Currently that is done by waiting for a spill-of-opportunity. When a
spill occurs there may be a reluctance to use newer technologies in
case it fails. It is also very difficult to arrange a test in a timely
manner. There are a large number of potential technologies that are
being marketed to the spill responders during a spill. The volume of
new techniques may inhibit any being selected for testing. There are
several ways that the issue of field testing may be overcome. One way
is to develop a list of technologies waiting for testing during a
spill-of-opportunity. Most importantly, have a clearly defined approach
to get technologies on the list.
At this point most of improvements are incremental because they are
easiest to get into the field. Another method to get equipment field
tested is to allow controlled releases. The U.S. hasn't had controlled
spills since the mid-1980s. I believe that lack of testing our
knowledge is one of the biggest factors in our not moving forward in
spill response capabilities.
Finally, consider developing a national testing and training
facility associated with a natural seep. While natural seeps don't
provide all the conditions necessary to test all equipment they do
provide an opportunity to test equipment in the field.
The biggest issue facing field testing is regulatory. Regulations
often prevent the newest technologies from being tested. For example,
there is a lot of interest in using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for spill
response. These vehicles face significant hurdles in getting FAA
permits to be used. This is not to say the hurdles are not appropriate
and if people keep the regulations in mind there are still
opportunities for advancement. OSRI tested a balloon-based surveillance
system for spill response because tethered balloons have a simpler
regulatory environment. This system allows for spill responders to get
a greater view of the spill around them and gets the information
directly to them instead of waiting for reports from aircraft, when
they are flying.
At other times the regulatory environment is more difficult to work
with, for example getting permission for a controlled spill. An
alternative to using oil in the environment is to develop an oil
simulant to use in testing and training. Oranges and popcorn have been
used as simulants, but have very limited application for actual testing
of equipment. More appropriate simulants have been developed, but
cannot get approval for use. Even normally benign and natural
substances can have negative impacts when used at higher
concentrations. It is becoming difficult to get permission to even use
oranges or popcorn because they are not natural to the marine
environment.
Most of my comments so far have focused on the development of new
response technologies, but there are a number of other aspects of
research that may transition from the scientific world to the spill
cleanup and restoration activities. One issue that must be overcome is
that the scientific research needs to be cutting edge to get funding.
This generally means very specialized equipment or training that is not
ready or appropriate for transition into everyday use. Remember spill
response organizations are generally small businesses that cannot
afford to hire people with the skills needed to apply the cutting edge
science that may not be used for a decade.
It is difficult to incorporate cutting edge science during a spill
response because people are extremely busy and don't have time to learn
how to integrate the science into their current tools. This not true
for restoration, which has more time to develop in its approach and has
to be flexible in approach because of the range of species and
environments that may be damaged. One thing OSRI tries to accomplish is
to provide a bridge between the science and response world. It is
critical to develop organizations that can bridge these worlds. By
working to identify potential transitions and testing their application
for spill response before a spill occurs we can help transition new
science into cleanup and restoration efforts.
OSRI works closely with the Alaska Ocean Observing System and spill
responders to provide opportunities for the newest models and observing
capabilities to be used by spill responders and for the scientists to
understand how to provide their data in a manner that can readily be
incorporated by responders. Being a bridge between science and the
applied world is not easy. I am trained as a scientist and often think
that I have some great idea. Fortunately, I work with a number of spill
responders that help me understand the issues with applying those
ideas. It is important to have groups that bring responders together
with scientists to see where overlaps between capabilities and needs
exist.
Finally, we need to consider funding for bringing on the new
approaches and equipment. There is little funding dedicated to spill
recovery outside of industry. Minerals Management Service, U.S. Coast
Guard, the Coastal Response Research Center (with NOAA), and Oil Spill
Recovery Institute are primary funding organizations. Budgets are
commonly under one million a year and organizations like OSRI funds
improvements in environmental knowledge along with development of new
equipment. Over the past few years the funding level has continued to
decline. This may be in part because there hasn't been a major spill in
years so people did not think that this type of research was necessary.
The lack of a national oil pollution research plan makes it more
difficult to sell the need for particular research. There is also a
very appropriate focus on improvements in spill prevention. It is
important to remember that no matter how much prevention is in place we
still must be able to respond if those measures fail. The Deepwater
Horizon accident is emphasizing that need.
Funding from national programs, such as from the National Science
Foundation, is difficult to obtain. This is largely because the needs
are not cutting edge science. I submitted proposals for improvements in
spill detection systems to national requests-for-proposals and
generally the comments indicate the reviewers are looking for more
complex systems than are needed in a spill response. Dedicated
opportunities with required application are the approach that has
succeeded.
The standard peer-review funding process generally does not promote
innovation. Reviewers examine a proposal with the thought ``Will this
work succeed?'' and if there is doubt the proposal won't be funded. For
innovative improvements the reviewers need to ask: ``Will this work
fail?'' and ``If it fails, what will we learn from the attempt?''. The
best approach to funding is through organizations that bridge the
response and science worlds. However, with limited funding these
organizations will also tend to fund the work most likely to succeed,
which tends to be incremental changes. The advantage of limited funding
is that industry, government, and non-governmental organizations must
partner together, which provides for coordination between the funders.
The bridge between industry and science also must bridge national
and regional interests. Without a doubt there are many issues common
between the Gulf of Mexico and Alaskan waters, but there are important
differences as well. OSRI has an advantage in that we can focus on
issues that are consistent with the desires of people in Alaska. At the
same time the need to partner with other groups means many of our
projects have applications nationally. National funding organizations
generally do not have a means to address issues that are regionally
important.
Industry is the largest funder of new developments and are
supporting some pretty amazing projects. The disadvantage with industry
being the leaders of development is that their interests may not align
well with the people living in the area where spill response may occur.
For example, there is an emphasis on research on dispersants, which are
controversial to people in Alaska. They also tend to respond primarily
to regulatory requirements and financial advantages. These drivers do
not necessarily focus research in the most appropriate directions.
This leads us back to research and development by other businesses.
These are the businesses that need the improvements in standards and
testing opportunities described earlier. Funding organizations often
get requests for help supporting new developments by these businesses.
It is an area that remains difficult for me. I believe that we should
provide opportunities for any business to tackle a defined problem
rather than supporting a single business to develop their approach. At
the same time there are definitely times when opportunities arise to
assist in the development of particularly promising technologies that
we should not pass up. If the process for businesses to get
technologies tested and approved it should reduce pressure on the
funding organizations.
Even if an approach is approved for use there is no guarantee it
will be adopted by oil spill response organizations. In Alaska, the
largest spill response organizations are industry supported
consortiums. This gives an advantage to industry supported developments
and makes it a bit more difficult for outside industries to break into
the field. I suspect that this is one of the reason there has been more
interest in developing dispersants versus developing solidifiers.
In conclusion there are some issues that we cannot deal with, such
as the fact we are working with a toxic substance, and others that we
can, such as improving the process for getting new technologies
adapted. We must remember that spill response is conducted by a large
number of small businesses. The decentralized approach limits the
technologies that can be afforded. Oil spill response organization
cannot afford to purchase and maintain high end technologies like spill
surveillance aircraft with cutting edge technologies that many other
countries operate. To purchase and operate highly specialized equipment
would best be done by a national spill response group. This could be a
duty of NOAA, MMS, or U.S. Coast Guard.
Transitioning of newer technologies could be made easier by
developing a clear set of standards that equipment must meet, providing
facilities that provide testing opportunities, and clearly outlining
how to take advantage of spills of opportunity, or better yet develop
field testing opportunities through controlled releases or potentially
using natural seeps.
It is important that research is coordinated. Currently this is
primarily done informally by looking for opportunities to partner with
other organizations for funding projects and sharing research plans.
The Interagency Coordinating Committee for Oil Pollution Research,
which was formed under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, has increased its
activity, even before the current spill, but hasn't reached the point
where they have a research plan that helps to guide the efforts of the
member agencies.
It is important to renew funding opportunities. Additional funding
should go through organizations that can bridge the worlds of science
and spill response. MMS, U.S. Coast Guard, Coastal Response Research
Center/NOAA, and the Oil Spill Recovery Institute all are organizations
that have established that bridge. It is also important to realize that
there are regional differences in spill response needs that should be
accounted for when funding new research.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you very much.
Ms. Sarthou.
Ms. Sarthou. Thank you, Senator----
Senator Cantwell. Is that right? I got Dr. Pegau's name
wrong the first time, so I want to make sure. Is it Ms.----
Ms. Sarthou. Sarthou.
Senator Cantwell. Sarthou----
Ms. Sarthou. It is Sarthou.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF CYNTHIA SARTHOU, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
GULF RESTORATION NETWORK
Ms. Sarthou. My name is Cynthia Sarthou, and I am Executive
Director of the Gulf Restoration Network or the GRN, which is a
15-year-old environmental advocacy organization exclusively
focused on the health of the Gulf of Mexico.
And I have to say, at the beginning of my testimony, that
in talking to some people from Alaska, the experience in the
Gulf of Mexico may be slightly different than that of Alaska,
possibly because they suffered the Exxon Valdez and there was
some recognition of a potential disaster.
Throughout my tenure with the GRN, I have tried to monitor
the efforts of the work of the MMS, and much of my research and
focus has been on the MMS. And during that period of time,
we've seen a lot of research on many things, none of which have
been technology development for purposes of oil-spill response.
I have not worked on the Coast Guard as much, so I don't
know quite where their status was, but my experience with this
spill tells me that there has been very little research done by
them as well, in the long term, on how to effectively respond
to an oil spill.
This despite the fact that oil spills are relatively common
in the Gulf, which is why I'm kind of surprised that anybody
would need to create a spill in order to do research.
We have had over 167 spills in the last 10 years of 50
barrels or more, which is 2,100 gallons, and 58 larger spills
of 10,000 gallons or more, plenty of opportunity for, I think,
efforts to use new oil-spill technologies.
Of course, the failure, I believe, to really press for oil-
spill technologies may lie in MMS and the Federal Government's
acceptance of the oil industry's, I guess, position that a
large spill was actually technically impossible because they
were too far advanced in their technology to ever let it
happen, an assumption that I think we have found, by this
disaster, to be false.
What has become very clear from day one of the BP Horizon
disaster is that there has been a total failure of MMS, the
Coast Guard, the oil industry or even Congress, for that
matter, to invest in research and development to improve oil-
spill-response capabilities.
The OPA required that that research occur. It was never
fully funded and has never gone forward, and although MMS has
spent millions of dollars annually on research, most of that
research has focused on the effectiveness of booms, skimmers
and burns, such as the best possible weather conditions to use
those measures and the extreme difficulty in capturing and
stopping oil from blowout preventer failures in deeper waters.
Few studies looked at the existence and effectiveness of new
response technologies.
As a result, the response to the BP Horizon disaster has
involved the inadequate technologies used during the Exxon
Valdez, with the exception, I now learn, of burning, which,
although potentially effective in capturing oil, carries its
own consequences, including burning turtles alive and releasing
VOCs, et cetera, into the air, which are now getting complaints
from some people on land who are trying to figure out why
certain things are dying because of potential acid rain.
Technology that has been allowed has not really stopped the
spread of oil throughout the waters of the Gulf and onto state
beaches and coastal wetlands, and, as you pointed out, that's
not to say that there aren't potential technologies out there.
We alone received hundreds of calls from people after the
spill asking us why they were not allowed to deploy these
technologies, despite the fact that these technologies had been
approved in Delaware, after a spill, that they had been
approved for Santa Barbara's use in Santa Barbara.
Many of those, I might add, were bioremediation
technologies that would have broken down the oil, and, from
what I heard today of the Coast Guard's testimony, it seems
like none of those technologies are moving forward. Most of
what is moving forward are technologies for viewing or
determining where the oil is or how to better find it or, you
know, additional or new skimmers.
An additional complaint that I have to tell you I've heard
from entrepreneurs is if you don't know a Governor or somebody
at high levels of government, you are not getting your
technologies to go through.
Now, I haven't been able to verify that, but I will tell
you that two of the technologies I've heard tested were Kevin
Costner's technology and the Whale, both of which got a lot of
PR and seemed to have a lot of politics behind them.
Additionally, even with regard to existing technologies,
the Coast Guard and the oil companies have not had sufficient
of those technologies in place before this spill to address a
worst-case scenario, despite the fact that many of the plans,
if you look at them, by the oil companies showed that expected
worst-case scenario could be from 300,000 gallons a day, in one
instance, which was pretty surprising, we found it, but most of
them were 30,000 gallons a day, but, nonetheless--or 30,000
barrels a day.
So, nonetheless, it was predicted that there could be
significant releases of oil from deep-water drilling, and when
we look, none of that equipment was actually deployed in the
area or stockpiled in the area for very quick response. So, I
mean, our, I think, conclusion from that, and possibly yours,
is that they clearly weren't ready for a disaster.
My testimony also speaks to the absolute failure in this
response to allow public access to information. We have had
significant trouble getting any of the data. We have had a
3,000-foot limit on our aerial deployment to try to monitor
what's going on, despite the fact that they can't tell us what
the real safety concern is.
The Coast Guard recently put in a 65-foot barrier to any
response. They subsequently lifted it for the press, but still
are not allowing scientists within that 65-foot area. So we're
not having an ability to really see or monitor the impacts.
And the other issue which--I know I need to stop--is that
on animal rescue, some of the groups that have the most
expertise on animal rescue have, in fact, not been allowed to
actually get engaged or to even give advice on it.
So we're being told things like we cannot capture an oiled
bird that can still fly, despite the fact that scientists are
telling us that they can do that. It's just that the people who
are doing it don't know how.
So I thank you for allowing me to testify.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Cynthia Sarthou follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cynthia Sarthou, Executive Director,
Gulf Restoration Network
I am Cynthia Sarthou, the founding Executive Director of the Gulf
Restoration Network. I have been working on ocean and coastal issues
for over three decades, with the last xx years spent in the Gulf. The
Gulf Restoration Network or GRN is a 15-year-old environmental advocacy
organization exclusively focused on the health of the Gulf of Mexico.
Our mission is to unite and empower people to protect and restore the
natural resources of the Gulf for future generations. Our primary
efforts have focused on ensuring healthy waters, protecting and
restoring coastal wetlands, and defending marine fisheries and
ecosystems. Our board members hail from all five Gulf States.
Since our founding in 1994, the GRN has followed activities related
to oil and gas development in the Western and Central Gulf of Mexico,
attending hearings and filing comments. Throughout that time period, I
continually heard from representatives of the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, (``BOEMRE'') formerly the
Minerals Management Service (``MMS''), and various oil companies that
my concerns about the potential impacts to marine species and habitats
from oil and gas exploration and development were negligible. The
reason given was generally that the industry was so far advanced in its
technological ability and its technology so fail safe that a major
accident could never happen. As the BP drilling disaster has shown all
too clearly, they were wrong.
I. Research and Development and Its Effectiveness in Preparing for the
BP Horizon Disaster
What has been equally evident is that BOEMRE failed, as did
Congress, to invest in research and development intended to improve oil
spill response capabilities because of their belief that an oil spill
of any significant magnitude was improbable. As a result, the response
to the BP Horizon disaster has involved antiquated technologies, such
as skimming, burning and the use of dispersant. Because of this lack of
preparedness a significant amount of oil has spread across the waters
of the Gulf and onto Gulf state beaches and coastal wetlands.
After the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989, the Minerals Management
Service (MMS), the Coast Guard and NOAA, had reason to believe that
research into oil spill response technology was necessary to improve
oil spill response efforts. In fact, Section 2761 of the OPA
established the Oil pollution research and development program.
However, monies needed to support the research under Section 2761 were
not appropriated.
Since 1995 the MMS has spent between $6 and $7 million annually on
research,\1\ however, little, if any, of that research focused on
developing new oil spill response technologies that could more safely
and effectively contain oil either at the surface or subsurface. The
MMS did conduct research on the effectiveness of booms,\2\ burns,\3\
dispersants \4\ and skimmers,\5\ looked into the best possible weather
conditions to apply the respective measures,\6\ published many studies
showing the extreme difficulty in capturing and stopping oil spills
from blow out preventer failures in deep depths, and researched the
formation of subsea oil plumes. However, even though dispersants are an
approved method of addressing oil spills, neither the MMS nor EPA has
completed research regarding the long-term impacts of chemically
dispersed oil on the marine ecosystem. Yet, in response to the BP
Drilling Disaster, they have approved the application of approximately
2 million gallons of dispersant--the largest amount applied in U.S.
history. Additionally, the MMS has not required that oil companies have
sufficient amounts of other existing oil spill technologies in place to
respond to a worst-case scenario oil spill. Instead, the MMS trusted
oil companies to have the resources available and in place. As the BP
Deepwater Horizon disaster illustrates, the companies are grossly
unprepared to deal with a spill the magnitude of the current
disaster.\7\ If the companies had sufficient booms and skimmers in
place prior to the BP-Deepwater Horizon disaster, they could have
prevented more of the oil from spreading along the Gulf coast.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Le, Phuong. ``Little Money, Study Devoted to Oil Spill Cleanup
Technology--The Boston Globe.'' Boston.com. 27 June 2010.Web..
\2\ Air Jet Atomization and Burning of Oil Slicks, S. L. Ross
Environmental Research Limited, 1991. http://www.mms.gov/tarprojects/
152.htm (see also Technology Assessment and Concept Evaluation for
Alternative Approaches to In-Situ Burning of Oil Spills in the Marine
Environment, Final Project Report, Marine Research Associates, North
Stonington, Connecticut, September 1998. ).
\3\ S.L. Ross Environmental Research, Ltd., and Applied Fabrics
Technologies, Inc., The Effect of Buoyancy to Weight Ratio on Oil Spill
Containment Boom Performance, Final Report, May 2003. (see also Screening Test for Fire
Resistant Booms in Waves and Flames, SL Ross Environmental Research,
Ltd, April 1998. ).
\4\ Identification of Window of Opportunity for Chemical
Dispersants on Gulf of Mexico Crude Oils, November 2007, By Randy
Belore, S.L. Ross Environmental Research Ltd., Ottawa, ON, Canada
.
\5\ Investigation of the Ability to Effectively Recover Oil
Following Dispersant Application--Final Report, SL Ross Environmental
Research Ltd., 21 pp., December 2007. .
\6\ See Identification of Window of Opportunity for Chemical
Dispersants on Gulf of Mexico Crude Oils, November 2007, By Randy
Belore, S.L. Ross Environmental Research Ltd., Ottawa, ON, Canada
.
\7\ (page
7-1) (BP's exploration plan stating that they could address a 300,000
barrel a day spill); http://www.gomr.mms.gov/PI/PDFImages/PLANS/25/
26601.pdf> (see page F 1) (Shell claiming that they can respond to an
oil spill of 80,000 barrels per day).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the MMS did conduct research into certain aspects of oil
spill response technology, the response to the BP Deepwater Horizon
disaster illustrates that BOEMRE failed to complete necessary research
on or support development of new oil spill response technologies. Our
research has revealed that BOEMRE has received little, if any, funding
to verify the effectiveness of technologies developed by the private
sector to address oil spills or support research and development of
more effective oil spill response technologies. This is not to say that
technologies have not been developed. GRN's staff received hundreds of
calls and e-mails, as did BP and all of the state and Federal agencies
involved, pressing for the use of new oil spill response technology.
However, because there had been no research and approval of these
technologies prior to the BP disaster, the agencies were faced with the
impossible task of trying to effectively sort out the truly effective
technologies, approve and begin use of them to address oil already
spewing from the BP Horizon well. With the exception of the higher
profile media worthy technologies, such as that pressed by Kevin
Costner, this led BP and the Coast Guard to simply revert to the less
than effective, but better known, techniques of booming, skimming,
burning, and dispersing.
If MMS had fulfilled its duty to increase the effectiveness of oil
spill response technology, more oil would have been captured near the
site of the blowout and the impacts associated with the Deepwater
Horizon's would probably be much less severe.
II. Public and Scientist Involvement in Federal Government Response
The Federal Government's response efforts have largely excluded
members of the public and the independent scientific community. From
the beginning, even obtaining information about response planning and
deployment of equipment and manpower has been difficult. Additionally,
the FAA imposed a 3,000 foot requirement on all over flights, which
severely limited monitoring of response efforts or verification of
impacts to coastal barrier islands and the like. Similarly, the Coast
Guard recently issued a rule prohibiting the public from coming within
a ``safety zone'' which encompasses 65 feet of any response vessels or
booms on the beach or the water.\8\ The Coast Guard recently modified
the rule to allow representatives of the press to obtain credentials
that allow them within the safety zone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See Appendix A: Times Picayune Editorial, July 5, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although Administrator Jackson and Secretary Lubchenco have met
with local groups throughout the Gulf to discuss their concerns, the
knowledge of local organization's on existing contamination or others
issues that could affect water sampling have not been solicited or
incorporated into sampling plans. Equally concerning, EPA and NOAA have
not required BP to make the monitoring data that they have collected
available to the public. This significantly impairs the ability of
independent and academic scientists to perform detailed analyses of the
impacts of this disaster.
Similarly, in bird rescue efforts, private non-governmental
organizations, such as the Wildlife Rehabilitation and Education Center
(Texas), although having significant experience with the rescue of
brown pelicans and other birds, have been excluded from the rescue
process efforts. These groups have asserted concerns that there has
been no effort by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USF&WS) and BP's
contractor, Tri-State Bird Rescue & Research (Tri-State), to share best
techniques, discuss innovative approaches, and realistically evaluate
changing needs and break-downs in the effort. Similarly, the U.S. F&WS
and Tri-State rescue team currently lacks input from the non-profit
groups and rescuers with the most extensive field rescue experience on
the most-refined field capture techniques. As a result, there is a
concern that bird mortality is higher than it might otherwise have
been.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See Appendix B; Letter to Acting Director Rowan W. Gould from
the Atchafalaya Basinkeeper, Gulf Restoration Network, Lake
Pontchartrain Basin Foundation, Louisiana Environmental Action Network,
Lower Mississippi Riverkeeper, and Natural Resources Defense Council
(July 14, 2010) (attached).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
To ensure that the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation,
and Enforcement and the Coast Guard are better able to address the next
major oil spill, they must greatly expand their support of research and
development and push the oil industry to adopt the best possible oil
spill response technology. The Congress must greatly increase the
funding available for necessary research into the efficacy and
environmental impacts of developing technologies. Moreover, oil
companies should be required to invest significant monies on: (1)
production of oil spill response equipment, including the construction
of ``caps'' and the like needed to stop the release of oil from
deepwater wells should a blowout occur, in advance and have them at the
ready in each region, and (2) oil spill response technology research
and development to ensure that we move into the twenty-first century in
terms of our response capability.
Finally, national contingency planning for oil spills must
incorporate better methods for involvement of the public and
independent scientists in oil spill response activities.
Appendix A: Editorial on Coast Guard ``Safety Zone''
Is the Coast Guard working for the public or BP? An editorial
Published: Monday, July 05, 2010, 6:24 AM Updated: Tuesday, July 06,
2010, 9:30 AM
Editorial page staff, The Times-Picayune
The Coast Guard says that rules aimed at keeping the public and
news media away from the oil spill response are necessary to protect
the environment and the people and equipment involved in the cleanup.
But the new ``safety zone'' that the agency has set up within 65
feet of any response vessels or booms on the beach or the water mostly
protects BP from bad PR.
Since booms are often placed more than 40 feet outside of islands
or marsh grasses, this additional buffer will make it difficult to
document the effect of oil on the land or wildlife.
That's not in the best interest of the Gulf Coast. Reporters and
photographers, including those who work for The Times-Picayune, serve a
vital function in documenting the disaster and the response.
This decision isn't the only one that has hampered media coverage
of the oil spill. The Federal Aviation Administration has ordered that
no media flights to photograph the spill can go below 3,000 feet
without special permission.
Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen, national incident commander for the
spill, said that the safety zone restrictions are not unusual. He said
BP didn't bring up the issue, but that local officials in Florida and
elsewhere had raised safety concerns.
But plenty of local officials understand the need to inform the
public. ``Anytime you all want, you all can come in there wherever we
go on our boats,'' Plaquemines Parish President Billy Nungesser told
reporters.
At this point, the Coast Guard has not justified its position. In
fact, its reasons keep changing. First the restrictions were needed to
protect civilians. Now the claim is that workers and equipment are at
risk. But what's clearly at risk is the public's right to know, and
that deserves protection, too.
2010 NOLA.com. All rights reserved.
Appendix B: Letter to Fish and Wildlife Service
Atchafalaya Basinkeeper, Gulf Restoration Network, Lake Pontchartrain
Basin Foundation, Louisiana Environmental Action Network, Lower
Mississippi Riverkeeper, and Natural Resources Defense Council
July 14, 2010
Acting Director Rowan W. Gould
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Washington, DC.
Dear Acting Director Gould:
The undersigned groups write to express our concerns about several
elements of the ongoing response to the BP drilling disaster. Our
concerns stem both from the efforts to clean-up the oil on barrier
islands and areas used by birds as rookeries and our concern that
little is being done to rescue fledglings from nests abandoned by oiled
birds.
First, we have received reports from volunteers monitoring response
efforts that cleanup crews are negatively impacting nesting areas. For
example, cleanup crews working on islands off the Louisiana coast
crushed nests and eggs of birds nesting on that island. Similarly,
crews on beaches have been disturbing least tern nests along the water
edge and, at times, crushing or otherwise endangering fledglings.
In relation to beaches, the environmental/conservation community
are willing to work with USFWS to establish a beach steward volunteer
program. These volunteers could help to flag and then monitor beach-
nesting bird colonies, educating contractors and other people about the
risk to the birds and the need to not encroach on colonies. Of course,
to be effective, beach stewards would need either some authority to
interact with/direct BP contractors, or would need to simply document
and report encroachment on colonies, preferably directly to Louisiana
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) biologists in Joint
Incident Command (JIC). The state of Louisiana has maps of the
colonies, and has indicated a willingness to have this kind of help.
Although we understand that USFWS has indicated an interest in getting
a beach steward program, this effort appears stalled. Forward movement
must occur quickly, as time is of the essence if we are to ensure
maximum action to protect nesting birds.
Additionally, there must be improvement in communication from JIC
to BP field supervisors regarding this issue--supervisors must be
trained to recognize risks and better control access to dune and back
beach areas by their workers. This will only occur if Department of
Interior directs BP to make training available and take the necessary
action to reduce interactions between cleanup crews and nesting birds.
Second, while efforts are being made to rescue adult oiled birds;
similar attention is not being paid to abandoned fledglings. We have
the following suggestions for action that can be taken to increase
survival of oiled birds and fledglings:
1. Evaluation Teams: Small evaluation teams should be formed in
each state to assess, at least weekly, the oiled bird situation
in the field and recommend improvements to the field rescue
effort. The teams should consist of one lead person from IBRRC,
USFWS, the appropriate state wildlife agency (i.e., LDWF) and
one or two individuals from uninvolved NGO's with experience in
wildlife rescue. . These teams should focus on sharing best
techniques, discussing innovative approaches, and realistically
evaluating changing needs and break-downs/logjams in the
effort, not critiquing past efforts.
2. Oiled Bird Capture Experts with the most Field Experience
Should Guide/Provide Training: The field rescue team currently
lacks input from the non-profit groups and rescuers with the
most extensive field rescue experience, who likely know the
most refined field capture techniques. USFWS has asked that
International Bird Rescue and Research Center (IBRRC) conduct
classroom training for incoming field rescue personnel from
USFWS and LDWF. Having IBRRC provide this requested basic
training, and including a field training rescue component to
demonstrate the more effective techniques that they employ
should improve the rescue effort. (E.g., IBRRC has methods of
baiting birds that allow them to draw birds out of a colony so
that they can single out the oiled birds and capture them
without risk to the nestlings in the colony.
We recognize that the professionals involved are caring and
doing difficult work under trying conditions. To improve this
difficult environment and strengthen the efforts of USFWS we
recommend decreasing territoriality among the various agencies/
organizations, while also providing training, enhancing
communication, boosting teamwork and supplying expert oversight
where appropriate.
3. Increase Efforts to Rescue Orphaned birds: USFWS personnel
routinely capture and band all fledgling chicks, including
royal terns, pelicans and others, on colonies. However,
currently little effort is being made to monitor colonies at
night to identify nests not incubated by an adult pelican. The
orphaned chicks could then be collected and forwarded to
available rescue centers. There is likely much more mortality
of adults than we are seeing through the rescue effort, and
there needs to be more effort to identify orphaned chicks and
forward them to centers that have the capacity to rear and
release orphaned chicks. If orphaned chicks are not heavily
oiled and may have better survival rates than oiled birds, this
may be an effort that helps at more of a population level. If a
lack of personnel for night monitoring is a problem,
experienced volunteer rescue groups could be drafted for this
purpose.
4. Rehabilitated Chick-rearing: Many chicks have been rescued
and rehabilitated, and need to be raised on islands until they
are ready to fledge in the presence of wild birds. Standard
practice is to put them on a grassy island that is not a
nesting colony, feed them, and allow them to begin to follow
wild pelicans as they are ready.\10\ Planning for this type of
release has been ongoing for most of a month with little
result. This is a serious logjam, and holding these chicks too
long is not improving their odds of surviving and fledging
well. We understand that concerns about where to raise the
chicks is the central obstacle. For example, we understand that
Louisiana has stated a preference for rearing chicks on
Louisiana islands, because adults tend to return to nest on or
near the islands from which they fledged. At this point we feel
that the central consideration in choosing the location should
be protection from re-oiling. Given the oil now reaching
Florida, locations in far-western Louisiana or Texas would seem
to make sense from the standpoint of increasing the likelihood
that these birds would not be re-oiled. Whatever site is
chosen, there are several experienced rehabilitation groups
that are well-qualified to handle the on-site rearing process.
These groups should be identified and subcontracted through the
current lead rescue groups as appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ There is precedence for this type of rearing and release from
the Louisiana Brown Pelican restoration plan from the 1970s, and this
technique was also used successfully to rear and release 250 pelican
chicks in 2005 after the Breton Island oil spill. This technique
results in comparable survival rates to naturally-reared pelican
chicks.
5. Improvement Needed to Oiled Wildlife Hotline: This hotline
functions, but does not inspire confidence in callers. The
hotline is located in Houston, TX, and is run by BP. Many of
the operators do not speak English very clearly, and none of
them are familiar with birds or the areas from which oiled
birds are being rescued. This results in a need to repeat all
information very clearly, several times, and to spell the names
of every bird, usually several times. Also, operators seem to
be following a script, resulting in them repeatedly asking
where the nearest town or city is, and at what intersection a
bird is located. The process is causing increasing concern for
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
people calling in to the hotline.
We concede that the information does go directly to a wildlife
biologist in Joint Incident Command, and is relayed to a field
team that goes to the site and evaluates the rescue potential
for the bird. So, the system seems to work. But the
communication difficulty has caused concern about whether
reported birds will actually be rescued.
This problem could easily be solved by putting local people, or
birders, in the call centers. There are many potential
volunteers through Audubon and other bird advocacy groups who
may be able to fulfill this function. At the very least,
someone with good knowledge of the landscape and birds should
be assigned to each of the centers. Further, the script being
used by operators must be re-evaluated and more training given
to operators to make the process of collecting information more
efficient. Large, well-labeled maps in the centers might also
help.
Third, I understand that all birds are being banded prior to
release. However, rehabilitation is expensive, survival studies are
few, and the oil in this spill has weathered more than most before it
hits shore. We should take advantage of the opportunity to learn more
about survival for future oil spills. Color-marking Brown Pelicans is a
logical first effort, as they are most commonly captured and should
return to areas where they could be more easily re-sighted next year.
As Laughing Gulls are also being rehabilitated in large numbers, they
too would be a logical choice as a second study species using color-
banding. We should also be working in advance to design studies to look
at survival of migratory shorebirds, since little is known about how
they survive oiling. The study plan should specify how survival will be
estimated, and frequency of re-sighting efforts, if color-banding
studies are the method of choice.
Conclusion
While we recognize the many pressures imposed on the USFWS by the
ongoing disaster, we believe that through implementation of the above
suggestions and more effective use of well trained volunteers, more
birds can be saved. We request that the actions/approaches suggested
above be implemented immediately to increase the protection of both
adult birds and chicks. We would appreciate a written response to this
letter. Moreover, if you have questions or concerns, please contact us
to set up a meeting. We would like to have an opportunity to meet with
you to discuss our concerns and suggested solutions.
Sincerely,
Dean Wilson,
Atchafalaya Basin Keeper.
Cynthia Sarthou,
Executive Director,
Gulf Restoration Network.
John A. Lopez, Ph.D.,
Director--Coastal Sustainability Program,
Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation.
Richard Bryan, Jr.,
Vice President,
Louisiana Audubon Council.
Marylee Orr,
Director,
Louisiana Environmental Action Network,
Lower Mississippi Riverkeeper.
Lisa Speer,
Director of Ocean Programs,
Natural Resources Defense Council.
Barry Kohl,
Vice Chair,
Sierra Club Delta Chapter.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you very much.
Dr. Kinner. Thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF DR. NANCY E. KINNER, CO-DIRECTOR,
COASTAL RESPONSE RESEARCH CENTER, AND PROFESSOR OF CIVIL/
ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING, UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Dr. Kinner. Chairman Cantwell, Ranking Members Snowe and
distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for giving me
the opportunity to appear before you today.
My name is Nancy E. Kinner, and I am a Professor of Civil
and Environmental Engineering in the Environmental Research
Group at the University of New Hampshire, and I am the UNH Co-
Director of the Coastal Response Research Center.
The center is a partnership between NOAA's Office of
Response and Restoration and the University of New Hampshire.
It acts as an independent, honest broker to oversee research on
oil-spill response and restoration and serves as a hub for the
spill-response R&D community.
In my testimony that I have submitted for the record, I
discuss several products created during center-funded research
that are being used in the Deepwater Horizon spill, including
the Environmental Response Management Application, ERMA, which
manages and displays information about the spill to responders,
and, now, to the public.
Today, I will focus on what I see as the major obstacles
impeding transformation of spill response and restoration
research into practice and possible solutions going forward.
The first and most significant obstacle is that there has not
been enough funding to address oil-spill R&D needs.
The two pieces of proposed legislation that accompanied
Chairman Rockefeller's invitation to speak before you today,
and a number of other bills pending before Congress, address
Federal spill R&D and would markedly increase the amount of
funding available.
Unfortunately, technology development is often very time
consuming and costly, and most R&D funding ends before the
technology becomes part of standard practice.
Compounding this, oil spills are relatively infrequent and
the payback on a commercial venture is a very long process, if
it ever occurs.
The key is to ensure that the R&D funding is authorized and
is consistent and long term and does not follow a boom-and-bust
cycle similar to the one that occurred after the Exxon Valdez,
when much of the money was never appropriated and certain key
response agencies did not receive an annual R&D budget for
spill-response research.
Put simply, response research and development must be
conducted to develop new and enhanced approaches to spill
response and restoration so that we can limit the impacts of
future spills when they occur. In order to reap the benefits of
that R&D, we must provide consistent and sufficient funding.
Second, R&D needs must be identified by more than Federal
agencies involved in spill response and restoration. For
example, workshops should be held on spill-related topics to
identify R&D needs and develop research plans to address them.
These workshops should include stakeholders from Federal and
state agencies, industry and NGO's, as well as international
entities.
Once the research plans are established, the funding
entities must work together to coordinate which projects each
one will fund, sharing the findings produced and identifying
new R&D needs when they arise. This kind of extensive
coordination must occur among the spill-response community to
prioritize research and translate that research into practice.
Third, while R&D can develop solutions to address a variety
of oil-spill response and restoration issues, there is always a
problem adapting these technologies to specific spill scenarios
and local environmental conditions.
While there must be some direct investment in site-specific
technologies, the better overall approach must be to build
flexibility into a technology, so that it can be developed and
rapidly adapted and deployed.
Fourth, it is important to address spill-related human
dimensions R&D issues, most of which have been largely ignored.
Topics such as risk communication, valuing natural resources
and social impacts are always major factors in spill-response
and restoration.
One major problem is the frequent disconnect between the
metrics used by responders and those used by the public to
judge success of a cleanup. Seeking a consensus on these
metrics for success must be addressed as part of spill-response
planning and preparedness.
Fifth, it is critically important that the research undergo
rigorous peer review and be widely available to maximize its
ability to improve spill response and restoration.
Finally, as the discussions and activity surrounding R&D
evolve in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon, there must be
coordination among all of the stakeholders and funding
entities, if we are to avoid duplicating efforts, overlooking
critical R&D needs and having valuable research results sit on
the shelf.
In summary, I believe we do have a chance to overcome the
problems conducting and implementing R&D that have occurred in
the 20 years since OPA 1990 became law, but, in order to do
this, we must coordinate our efforts to make it happen.
Thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak before
you today. I would be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Nancy Kinner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Nancy E. Kinner, Co-Director, Coastal
Response Research Center, and Professor of Civil/Environmental
Engineering,
University of New Hampshire
Chairman Cantwell, Ranking Member Snowe, and distinguished members
of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation's
Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard, thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of the
Coastal Response Research Center and the Environmental Research Group
at the University of New Hampshire. My perspective on the use of the
applied research during the Deepwater Horizon (DWH) spill response, and
obstacles that impede transforming research results into practice, is
highly influenced by my work with the Coastal Response Research Center
(CRRC). In order to make that perspective clear, I will first give you
an overview of the Center's history, mission, activities and its
approach to oil spill research and development (R&D).
1. Overview of Coastal Response Research Center
In 2002, NOAA's Office of Response and Restoration (ORR) became
increasingly aware of the lack of oil spill R&D in its areas of primary
responsibility: fate and behavior of spills and their impacts on
natural resources and human activities. ORR recognized the role that a
research university could play in addressing these needs, and started
working with the University of New Hampshire to address this problem.
The CRRC (http://www.crrc.unh.edu), a partnership between NOAA ORR and
the University of New Hampshire, was created to address the need for
improved spill response and restoration. The Center oversees and
conducts independent research, hosts workshops, and leads working
groups that address gaps in oil spill research in order to improve
response, speed environmental recovery, and reduce the societal
consequences of spills. In 2004, the partnership was codified by a
memorandum of agreement between the University of New Hampshire and
NOAA. CRRC acts as an independent, non-partisan entity to bring
together members of the oil spill community, as well as those in
relevant fields outside the spill community, including industry, local
stakeholders, and state, Federal and international agencies to address
the many technical, economic, social, and environmental issues
associated with oil spills in marine environments. Funding for the
Center has been largely by Congressional appropriation (Table 1) with
some allocations from ORR's base budget.
Table 1.--CRRC Funding History
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Appropriation Grant to UNH [Other funding; specify]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002 $750,000 $701,997
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 $750,000 $714,580
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 $2,000,000 $1,978,955
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 $2,000,000 $1,694,312
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 $3,000,000 $2,481,900 $75,000 (Marine Debris/NOAA, ORR) \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 $1,800,000 $1,435,249
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 0 0 $49,000 (eSCAT/NOAA, ORR) \1\
$60,000 (ERMA /NOAA, ORR) \1\
$36,000 (In-situ/API) \2\
$145,000 (2008 Subtotal)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 0 0 $25,000 (Workshop/ExxonMobil) \2\
$63,000 (Workshop/NOAA OCRM) \3\
$162,000 (ERMA /NOAA, ORR) \1\
$250,000 (2009 Subtotal)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 0 $200,000 $220,000 (ERMA /for Gulf/NOAA) \1\
$30,000 (eSCAT for Gulf/NOAA) \1\
$65,000 (NOAA, OCRM) \3\
$139,000 (NOAA, ORR)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 02-10 $10,300,000 $9,206,993 $924,000
($139,000 for CRRC's Direct Oil Spill R&D
Use)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ eSCAT and ERMA funding is primarily for the UNH Research Computing Center to work on computer programming.
Marine Debris funding was for an Environmental Research Group project.
\2\ $61k to the Center for Spills in the Environment from API ($36k for In Situ Burning) and $25k from Exxon
Mobil for partial support of the 2009 R&D Workshop).
\3\ Funding for workshop on Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC) from NOAA OCRM--not oil spill related.
The Center is served by a multi-agency advisory board, comprised of
members from U.S. EPA, NOAA, USCG, state-based R&D programs, and
industry that provide guidance on program direction. The board, in
conjunction with the UNH and NOAA co-directors, developed five
objectives for CRRC: (1) funding and oversight of relevant, peer-
reviewed research that is able to be developed into practical
improvements in oil spill response; (2) hosting topical workshops and
working groups that include representatives of all spill community
stakeholders to focus research efforts, and ensure that crucial real-
world experience from oil spill practitioners is considered; (3)
educating the next generation of spill responders through outreach and
support of undergraduate and graduate student projects; (4) involving
members of the international oil spill community to tap into expertise
from around the world; and (5) develop response tools to aid
responders.
Funding of relevant, peer-reviewed research is accomplished through
a periodic request for proposal (RFP) process. Proposals are reviewed
by three to four experts in the area of the proposed research. They are
ranked by their scientific validity and how well they address key
research needs related to the fate, behavior and effects of oil in the
environment, and is likely to lead to practical improvements in oil
spill response and restoration. A panel of leading scientists and
practitioners then review the peer-reviewed and ranked proposals and
recommend which should be funded. Each funded research project is
assigned a NOAA liaison to ensure the research can be transformed into
practice, and, in addition, CRRC's Science Advisory Panel meets
annually to review progress of the research and provide feedback to
improve the quality and efficacy of the research.
2. Use of Applied Research Available and Implemented During DWH
Incident
There are numerous examples of information and technology created
during applied oil spill R&D being used during the DWH incident. I will
highlight a few that CRRC has been involved with.
A. CDOG/GNOME Model Linkage
One of the first projects that the Center funded was conducted by
Dr. Poojitha Yapa of Clarkson University. Dr. Yapa developed a computer
model to predict the fate and behavior of oil and gas as it rises to
the surface from a deepwater well blowout. The development of the
Clarkson Deepwater Oil and Gas (CDOG) model was funded by the Minerals
Management Service (MMS). NOAA's Office of Response and Restoration
(OOR) uses its GNOME model to predict the fate and behavior of oil in
surface water. A key issue, identified by NOAA modelers, was the
inability to input data from the CDOG model into the GNOME model. This
link is essential to the understanding of the fate, behavior and
trajectory of the oil from a leaking deepwater well, as well as
developing impact predictions (i.e., where the oil from a leaking
deepwater well would appear on the surface and what resource it would
potentially impact). With this information, responders can determine
the best response strategy to protect these critical resources. During
the DWH response, ORR modelers used the CDOG/GNOME predictions to
generate daily trajectories for the Unified Command to aid in decision-
making.
B. Environmental Response Management Application (ERMA ')
In the Spring of 2006, the Center began funding a collaboration
between NOAA ORR scientists and UNH computer researchers to display
spill related information in a graphical and user-friendly manner. Data
visualization can increase situational awareness during a large spill,
especially when many of the decisionmakers are in different locations
(e.g., for the DWH incident: Houma, LA; Mobile, AL; Tyndall, MS; St.
Petersburg, FL; Washington, D.C.). In addition, it is important that
the application is in a common format that allows most individuals to
easily use it. The common way to display geographical data (referenced
by its latitude/longitude) uses GIS software that requires special
expertise and high-end computers to operate.
The NOAA/UNH collaboration resulted in the Environmental Response
Management Application (ERMA '), a web-based platform that
displays data (e.g., spill trajectories, current and predicted wind
direction and strength) on a map that is familiar to most people. In
this way, data can be overlaid on a common geospatial grid (e.g., the
Gulf of Mexico) to see resources at risk of oiling, the predicted
trajectory, and the assets available to protect oil from contacting the
sensitive resources.
ERMA ' is a good example of how a data management and
visualization tool used in one field (wastershed management) can be
applied to another (oil spill response) as a result of interactions
between scientists and spill response practitioners. The method in
which ERMA ' evolved was crucial to its development and
successful transfer from academia to the DWH Incident Command systems.
In June 2006, after a very basic prototype was developed for
Portsmouth, NH harbor. CRRC hosted a workshop that brought together
Region I spill responders to demonstrate how ERMA ' could
aid in spill response. The workshop helped identify a team of
practitioners who were willing to work with ORR and UNH researchers to
develop a more detailed version of ERMA '. During the next
several months, development continued, as did demonstrations of ERMA's
' capabilities to various agencies and the private sector.
EPA Region II then funded an ERMA ' for the Caribbean which
was fully developed and used in a spill exercise in 2009.
When the DWH blowout occurred, the base platform of ERMA
' was used to create and populate a Gulf of Mexico ERMA
(GOMEX ERMA) specific to the incident, and has been in use ever since.
A public site (www.geoplatform.gov) was created, and much of the
information is also available to the public.
C. Other Applied Research Being Used During the DWH Incident
CRRC facilitated a webinar the third week of June hosted by the
Interagency Solutions Group (IASG) of the National Response Team (NRT).
The purpose of the webinar was to determine what data is available and
being collected regarding the efficacy and effects of surface and
subsurface dispersant use during the DWH incident. Over 70
representatives from Federal and state partners participated, and data
was presented by USGS, USCG, NOAA, U.S. EPA, and DOE scientists and
practitioners. Much of the data was being collected using techniques
developed and modified for use in oil spills during the last decade
(e.g., Tier II/III SMART dispersant monitoring protocols, LISST
particle counter, holographic imagery to determine particle size and
distribution). While many of these tools are in use, they are not at a
stage where the interrelationships among them and the ability to use
their output in a quantifiable manner are possible. This is in large
part because the resources to fund such research and development have
not been available.
I would be remiss if I did not also acknowledge that as is typical
during most prolonged environmental events, technology has also been
developed and applied during the spill. Some noteworthy examples
include the work of the Flow Rate Technical Group (FRTG) where members
used mass balance, plume analysis, and nodal and reservoir analyses
methods to estimate the flow of oil from the wellhead. Their work has
refined the estimate of the size of this leak from its initial
estimated 1,000 to 5,000 barrels/day (BPD) to the range of 35,000 to
60,000 BPD. Additional post-spill R&D will improve the ability to
predict the flow and yield a more precise estimate. Another example is
the Oil Budget tool being developed by USGS, NOAA, and the USCG which
will help estimate the mass of oil that is naturally weathered (e.g.,
evaporated, biodegraded, dispersed) as well as that mechanically
recovered and chemically dispersed or burned. Again, the tool is a
prototype and will need further development, testing, and refinement
before it is part of the standard package of a response, but it is well
on its way.
Obviously, it is not desirable to have to build tools or response/
restoration technologies during a spill, but as has been demonstrated
over history, ``necessity is the mother of invention.'' This is
especially true because oil spill R&D has been typically under-funded
since the mid-1990s.
3. Obstacles that Impede Transformation of Research into Practice
There are several obstacles that impede the transformation of
research results into practice, but the most significant among them is
that much of the necessary oil spill response and restoration research
is not funded. I was delighted to read the two pieces of legislation
that accompanied the invitation from Chairman Rockefeller to speak
before you today. The establishment of a Federal Oil Spill Research
Committee and improvement of NOAA's, USCG's, and the coastal states'
abilities to sustain healthy ecosystems through the spill preparedness,
prevention, response, restoration, and research will help address the
lack of adequate resources to do the R&D needed. As you clearly know,
the existing R&D structure codified in OPA 90 has not been adequate to
address the gaps in data, tools, and techniques that have been
highlighted in the DWH incident and in many of the workshops the CRRC
has held since 2003. (Table 2).
Table 2.--CRRC-led R&D Needs Workshops
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Response--April 23, 2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRDA in Arctic Waters: The Dialogue Begins--April 20-22, 2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sea Grant and NOAA ORR Collaboration--January 25, 2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ocean Uses Atlas--January 12-14, 2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Response to Liquid Asphalt Releases in Aquatic Environments--October 21,
2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Research and Development Needs--March 17-19, 2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oil Spill Modeling Working Group Meeting--September 16-17, 2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Opening the Arctic Seas: Envisioning Disaster and Framing Solutions--
March 18-20, 2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
HEA Metrics Workshop--December 4-6, 2007
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Environmental Response Data Collection Standards--September 25-27, 2007
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Modelers' Summit--June 26, 2007
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Submerged Oil Workshop--December 12-13, 2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 2.--CRRC-led R&D Needs Workshops--Continued
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Innovative Coastal Modeling for Decision Support: Integrating Physical,
Biological, and Toxicological Models--September 26-28, 2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Toxicology Working Group Summit--August 15-16, 2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Workshop on Research Needs: Human Dimensions of Oil Spill Response--June
13-15, 2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Research and Development Needs for Making Decisions Regarding Dispersing
Oil--September 20-21, 2005
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fact, the Center, in its workshop reports has outlined consensus
R&D plans for dispersants, dispersed oil, submerged oil, modeling,
Arctic response, National Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA), and human
dimensions, as well as a 5-year overall R&D plan that includes
proposals for oil forensics, geospatial data management, and spill
response during disasters. These workshops have included participants
from Federal, state and international agencies, NGO's, industry,
academia, and private sector researchers. The issue is not identifying
the needed R&D, but rather it is having the funds to support this work.
The Center maintains five working groups (Table 3) that consist of
members of oil spill R&D community. These working groups coordinate
which agency funds specific R&D projects to help avoid duplication of
effort and best use of scarce financial resources. In addition, these
working groups help to disseminate results among practitioners and
monitor which research needs have been addressed. The CRRC typically
works in concert with other working group members to hold educational
sessions at conferences such as Clean Gulf where practitioners meet to
learn about recent developments in oil spill R&D. Some examples are
found in Table 4.
Table 3.--CRRC-led Working Groups
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dispersants Working Group
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Modeling Working Group
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Submerged Oil Working Group
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Toxicity Working Group
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ephemeral Data Working Group
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 4.--Conferences Where CRRC Hosted/Co-Hosted 1/2 Day Technology
Transfer Sessions for Practitioners
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conference Date Title of Session Sponsors
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clean Gulf November 17-19, Applied Research LOSCO, OSRADP,
2009 for the Spill TGLO, and CRRC
Response
Community
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clean Gulf October 28-30, Applied Research LOSCO, OSRADP,
2008 for the Spill TGLO, and CRRC
Response
Community
------------------------------------------------------------------------
International May 4-8, 2008 Efficacy and CRRC
Oil Spill Effects of
Conference Dispersants in
Oil Spill
Response:
Progress since
the 2005 NRC
Report
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clean Gulf November 15-16, Applied Research LOSCO, OSRADP,
2007 for the Spill TGLO, and CRRC
Response
Community
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another key issue with R&D funding is that it follows a ``boom and
bust'' cycle, usually centered only spurred by major oil spills. A
large infusion of funding for oil spill preparedness, prevention, and
response came after the Exxon Valdez in 1989, encouraged in part by
implementation of OPA 90. While R&D funding was authorized and
appropriated for USCG, MMS, and EPA, as well as the two Alaska regional
citizen's advisory councils (RCACs) and the Oil Spill Recovery
Institute (OSRI), the budgets have not grown commensurate with
inflation, resulting in less R&D as time goes on. For example, the MMS
full-scale oil spill research tank in Leonardo, NJ (OHMSETT) has run a
number of equipment and training studies with mechanical recovery
devices and dispersants. However, these tests are expensive and
maintenance on such a facility is high. A fixed budget has diminished
what can be tested at OHMSETT, and many research and development
budgets cannot accommodate the costs of doing full-scale testing there,
even though it would be desirable.
Technology transfer is an arduous process and is often very costly
and time consuming. It requires linking the researcher and the end user
together, so that the goals and capabilities of each party are
identified clearly so that the technology can be best adopted to meet
their final goals. It is not only the researcher who must continually
modify and adapt, but often also the practitioner who begins to ``see''
the potential and weaknesses of the new technology and revises his/her
understanding of its application. The CRRC addresses this by assigning
NOAA liaisons to each funded project to help ensure the project remains
focused on the end user. As with ERMA ', this may evolve
into interactions with teams of end users as the technology matures.
For example, several CRRC staff and students worked with NOAA
Assessment and Restoration Division (ARD) scientists/practitioners to
develop a field manual on acute toxicity data for polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons (PAH), a common contaminant during release of oil to the
environment. The information and format of the manual was presented to
a cross-section of private sector and Federal and state end users on
several occasions via webinar. Each time, the end users have excellent
recommendations for improving the product, some of which were addressed
in subsequent editions of the manual. The toxicity manual is currently
being used as a source of toxicity information during the DWH incident
because each data point included has met the most rigorous quality
control standards (i.e., the data have all been carefully validated)
and it is in format available and useful to practitioners.
A significant obstacle to continued oil spill R&D is the infrequent
nature of oil spills. The last major well blowout in the Gulf of Mexico
was the IXTOC in 1979. In the interim, drilling and production
technology for offshore oil and gas has grown tremendously and allowed
work to proceed at water depths greater than 5,000 feet, tapping
reservoirs many miles below the sea floor. R&D for the requisite
response technology needed to address such a deepwater accident as the
DWH has not occurred.
The Center is currently involved in organizing a series of meetings
with a broad spectrum of stakeholders on the R&D issues identified
during the DWH incident, using models we have used for similar topics
in the past (e.g., dispersants R&D workshops followed by working
groups) including Federal, state, and local stakeholders, NGO's and the
private sector. These workshops will also involve a commensurate effort
to identify and collect existing literature on related topics to ensure
research efforts are not being duplicated. The stakeholders involved in
the spill as a result of BP's funding of LA, MS, AL, and FL researchers
at universities and institutes will also be included. This is
absolutely necessary and must be done immediately to avoid duplication
of effort, insure that the practitioners' research needs are addressed
and the research is transferred to end users for incorporation in
future spill response and restoration.
Even if the needed spill response or restoration technology is
developed as a result of an R&D effort, the incentive for a private
sector partner to produce it for commercial sale is minimal. This is
less true if use of the technology is mandatory. For example, if the
DWH incident results in regulations requiring caps to be available for
immediate deployment in case of a blowout, there will be a fairly major
incentive to manufacture the caps (i.e., there are roughly 4,000
platforms of production platforms alone in the U.S. waters of the GOM).
The incentive to manufacture large numbers of technology-enhanced
skimmers and booms is less clear. The reality is that a fleet of such
devices is expensive to maintain, especially when the likelihood they
will be used more than a few times, if at all during their useful life.
Even then, the ``fleets'' will likely be regional and not site specific
as it is almost impossible to predict where and when a spill will
occur. In this regard, the Arctic poses an even more difficult
challenge, as assets may only need to be deployed seasonally when there
is open water.
While R&D can develop solutions to address a variety of oil spill
response and restoration issues, there is always the problem of
adapting those technologies to a specific spill and the prevailing
environmental conditions. Each spill is unique in its timing, location
(e.g., water depth), and variables (e.g., flow rate, type of oil) as
well as the habitats and resources that must be protected. While this
dictates some direct investment in site-specific technologies (e.g.,
skimmers designed to collect and process oil in broken sea ice), it
often can be addressed by building in flexibility in devices or
developing robust templates, as with ERMA ', that can be
used and adapted quickly to a given spill. These are details that must
be addressed in the initial stages of an R&D project.
Finally, it is important to address human dimensions-related
issues, a topic that, with the exception of how to incorporate
volunteers in response, has been largely under-funded for oil spill
response and restoration. Human dimensions R&D relates to risk
communication, valuing natural resources, social impacts, coordination
in response and restoration, subsistence, and environmental ethics. It
is a factor in every spill. It involves regional and local culture and
can render a ``successful'' spill response in the perspective of the
local community a ``disaster.'' One major problem is the frequent
disconnect between the metrics used by responders to assess success of
a clean-up vs. those used by the local community. For example, the
number of gallons of oil recovered per day in on-sea activity by
skimmers and in-situ burning may be meaningless to local residents or
fishermen if the beaches are fouled or commercial fisheries are closed.
Likewise, in Alaska, responders who do not incorporate local knowledge
of currents and seasonal migration may find that they are greeted
suspiciously. Indeed, this may turn to scorn if generated oil
trajectory is incorrect and the oil goes where the local fisherman
predicted it would. Going forward, human dimensions research, such as
that conducted by Tuler and Webler for CRRC, must become a R&D priority
(Table 5).
Table 5.--Socio-economic research by SERI (Thomas Webler, Seth Tuler)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Establishing Performance $229,362 Completed 2007
Metrics for Oil Spill
Response, Recovery and
Restoration''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Social Disruption from Oil $239,335 Fall, 2010
Spills and Spill Response:
Characterizing Effects,
Vulnerabilities, and the
Adequacy of Existing Data to
Inform Decision-Making''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
There are several impediments to translating oil spill R&D into
practice:
The lack of adequate, sustained, funding for R&D on a long-
term basis.
The need for rigorous peer review at all stages of the R&D
process.
The need for coordination between Federal, state, and
international governmental agencies and other critical
stakeholders (e.g., NGO's, industry) regarding oil spill R&D.
The need to facilitate the translation of the results of
spill R&D into practice.
The infrequency of major spill events and the resulting
disincentive for the private sector to produce technologies
that may be in low demand.
The site specific nature of most spills that dictates
specialized technologies (e.g., for use in the Arctic) and/or
robust templates that can be adapted quickly to a given spill.
The issues of diverse and specific human dimensions related
aspects to a given spill involving: (a) the ecological role of
humans as proximate causes of ecosystem stress, and underlying
social drivers of those causes; (b) consequences of ecosystem
stress for the achievability, sustainability, and trade-offs
among diverse societal objectives; and (c) human mitigation and
adaptive responses to ecosystem stress, that must be addressed
to insure productive interactions with local and regional
stakeholders.
Going forward, R&D needs can be identified using an inclusive
stakeholder approach with specific R&D workshops and coordination of
subsequent efforts by working groups.
R&D must incorporate rigorous peer review by scientists, engineers
and practitioners and end users as well as human dimensions related
stakeholders to ensure the technologies developed will meet the needs
identified. This may include assigning practitioners as liaisons during
R&D and in using the team approach to review as the technology matures.
There must be coordination of R&D across the stakeholder groups for
the U.S. to succeed in spill response and restoration technology
development and implementation. This requires cross-agency Federal
coordination, as addressed in legislation being considered in Congress,
but must also encompass other governmental agencies (e.g., state,
local, international), as well as NGO, academia, industry and the
private sector.
Federal R&D funding must be authorized and appropriated on a
consistent, long-term basis.
Federal R&D funding should require the research to address:
existing data and appropriate literature on the topic, technology
transfer by incorporating end users in all aspects of the process,
flexibility to adapt to spill specific conditions, and consideration of
human dimensions.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Dr. Kinner, and thank you for
your testimony.
I want to go first to you, Dr. Stahr, because you talked
about these Seagliders and the fact that some of them were
deployed.
I thought the issue is that they could be much more
technological, sophisticated in the information that they could
gather and we could be deploying many more of them. Is that
correct?
Dr. Stahr. That's correct. You know, as is usual in a
crisis situation, people pick up the phone and say, you know,
What have you got available?
The Navy was charged with putting a couple of their
Seagliders into the Gulf right away. They had some ship
problems, so they didn't get them out there right away.
But the issue--There are two issues. One is gliders can
only go to 1,000 meters. Currently available gliders can only
go to 1,000 meters. This wellhead is at about 1,800 meters. So
we cannot actually look at the bottom end of this plume, which
we believe from shipboard data to be down around 1,300 meters.
There is in development right now a deep glider. Professor
Charlie Eriksen of the University of Washington is actually
going out this week or next week to the Puerto Rico Trench to
test that. That glider will be capable to 6,000 meters. It will
cover anywhere and deeper than you can put an oil well,
basically.
The other issue is instrumentation. What we have for
instrumentation on the gliders right now are measuring proxies
for oil, oxygen utilization. So microbes break down oil and
they use oxygen in the water column in that process, and the
measurement of something called Colored Dissolved Organic
Matter in a fluorescence capacity.
That's not oil, but it acts--Oil fluoresces somewhat like
CDOM. So from our CDOM fluorescence measurements we can guess
that what we're looking at is oil, but we don't know.
There are actual oil sensors for polynucleic aromatic
hydrocarbons, but they're all too big and too power hungry to
actually put on a glider, so more development in that respect
would help in terms of getting gliders that could be used to
observe oil plumes under water.
Senator Cantwell. And let's just envision that for a second
that that kind of technology and research, again, was--somebody
said let's make that investment. Somebody was making a decision
that, given the level of deep-sea drilling that we were doing,
that kind of information might be valuable and that we actually
were at that stage of having Seagliders that were capable of
measuring the hydrocarbons, what would our response plan look
like today then? What would we have been able to take advantage
of?
Dr. Stahr. I think that probably one of the most important
issues is to know where the plume is. And it's being pushed
around by currents that are different than the surface
currents, and the oil in that plume will affect different
things, because it's not coming to the surface.
It's not being weathered by the sun or the air, and it is
being absorbed by animals--deep shrimp, et cetera--that we
don't really know how it's going to move up the food chain.
But there's a plume of toxic oil and dispersant--we assume
the dispersant is still with it in some respect--but we don't
really know how big it is or where it is. And this plume is
likely to hang out in that environment for much, much longer
than the surface oil.
So I don't know that the response--The response plan could
have been to get more gliders into service more quickly and to
have a better idea of where the edges of this plume were.
Although, there was some debate about whether the plume
contained oil at all up until probably the end of May when I
think it was pretty well proven with the shipboard data that,
in fact, this was as well, an oil plume.
Senator Cantwell. And, Dr. Kinner, can't we, in coming up
with standards and protocol, look at what kind of activities
are most--that basically are putting forth the most risk to us
and then make sure that the R&D is going there?
I appreciate your comments about vessel and human safety,
because I know that on these large cargo container ships we
have seen a lot of confusion or let's just say not good
communication among various commands on the ship and then,
consequently, incidents occurring, so that very important
issue.
But can't we look at the risks for oil spill, or, as Dr.
Stahr is saying, oil vents, and say that these are our big
risks and this is where R&D should be applied?
Dr. Kinner. Yes, I think we can do that, Senator, and if
you look at some of the topics that have been addressed in the
last couple of years--for example, dispersants. There have been
a number of workshops, the first of which happened in 2005,
looking at a whole array of R&D needs for dispersants, and many
of those issues are still the ones that we are facing today in
this particular spill.
Of that about $40 million of R&D that was identified that
needed to be conducted, there was a dispersants working group
formed of the different funding entities. They decided we have
these resources. This is what we can fund and prioritize. But a
total of only $8.4 million was available to do that research.
So a whole range of questions, all of which would be very vital
to know today, have not been answered.
So I think by getting together practitioners, as Dr. Pegau
said, and scientists we can get the questions addressed that
need to be addressed. It's just getting them into the R&D
pipeline and then into implementation.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
Senator Snowe.
Senator Snowe. Dr. Stahr, what surprised you most about our
response?
Dr. Stahr. I think what surprised me the most was this
notion of it being a vent very similar to a hydrothermal vent
didn't seem to register with the agencies in charge of dealing
with it.
I did learn later that, in fact, some folks from Woods
Hole, at that time between the attempted top kill, but before
they sliced the riser--I think it was late May--were there with
an ROV and they took some measurements, and, from video,
basically, came up with a number of like 60,000 to 100,000
barrels a day of discharge.
So I was surprised, one, at the almost denial of what the
flow rate really could be or actually was with numbers like
5,000 barrels a day, and the fact that the hydrothermal-vent
research community was not really engaged in trying to make
better measurements of that.
And I think perhaps a lot of people were frustrated by
that, and perhaps that was one of the causes of the formation
of the flow-rate technical group that Admiral Allen finally put
together in late May.
So that it really sort of took me by surprise, and I was
very happy to see that some folks just completely
independently, like Dr. Crone, actually wrote an op-ed piece in
The New York Times--it was published on May 21--with their best
estimates based on the little bit of--you know, the thirty-
second video clip that finally got released.
Senator Snowe. Well, it was a huge issue at the time:
trying to determine the true flow rate. That could have made a
huge difference in our response, could it not?
Dr. Stahr. I think so.
Senator Snowe. In terms of tenor and pace of the response?
Dr. Stahr. I agree, and I believe that's what I felt in my
community, in the oceanographic community, and I believe the
public was feeling also, that being prepared for a lot more
oil, which really there was a lot more oil coming out, would
have been important.
I found a very nice little video clip that was taken at the
NOAA operations center in Seattle, their hazmat offices,
sometime shortly after April 22, may have even been on April
22. And in that video clip, you see on white boards, in
people's notebooks and you hear audibly estimates of 50,000 to
110,000 barrels a day. This is what they were thinking about at
that time, and yet it wasn't until June, I believe, that the
rest of the public ever heard any figure to that effect.
So I guess, to me, what was disappointing, and perhaps it's
because us in the physical oceanographic sciences hold NOAA to
a high standard, it was just disappointing that we didn't get
that kind of robust--well, what we thought was robust numbers.
Senator Snowe. Well, at one point prior to our last hearing
there was an article in the paper that somebody from NOAA was
even dismissing the idea that we needed to know the true flow
rate.
Dr. Stahr. Yes, that was disappointing as well, and I
understand the idea that--I mean, their job is to create a
response that is, in the terms of Dr. C.J. Beegle, who used to
be there--quote--least regrets, and that's important. They also
have to envision what the--sort of the worst case was. And,
truly, doing everything you can, regardless of what the flow
rate is, right. That's the right thing to do.
But just not knowing that number felt like a lack of
control, you know. Yes, I agree. It was frustrating.
Senator Snowe. Mr. Jones, where are you in the process
right now with respect to your method?
Mr. Yellowhorse Jones. Senator, we submitted our proposal
and we have heard back via e-mail from the Coast Guard that we
are in the screening process.
Other than that, that's all we have heard.
Senator Snowe. How long have you been in this process now?
Mr. Yellowhorse Jones. Probably 60 days.
Senator Snowe. Sixty days.
Mr. Yellowhorse Jones. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Snowe. And is there anything you would like to tell
us about your experience with respect to this process or
recommendations on how to improve it?
Mr. Yellowhorse Jones. Well, it's a tedious, long, drawn-
out government process. I expected a faster response. We had
submitted our proposal, our whitewater paper to our elected
officials in New Mexico and Arizona, and it has just been a
tough road.
You know, it's like the lady said there, if you don't have
any political connections, you're just kind of one of many.
You're just out there in a big stack of proposals and hoping
some way, somehow, some day you will make it to the top where
people will take an objective review.
And that's what we're asking for our proposal is just an
objective review of what we're telling the Coast Guard on our
product.
Senator Snowe. Yes, I understand your frustration. We've
heard from others in that regard, and it's unfortunate that
there hasn't been, as I said earlier, a level of urgency moving
this process along.
Your organic methodology--Is it a liquid product?
Mr. Yellowhorse Jones. It's both liquid and dry, but what
we have approached here is strictly on shore, so it will be a
dry product that will be dispersed on shore in lagoons,
marshes, beaches.
Senator Snowe. So it's an absorbent?
Mr. Yellowhorse Jones. Yes, ma'am. It will absorb and
eventually break down the contaminated oil and increase the
microbial activity.
Senator Snowe. Has it been used before in any way?
Mr. Yellowhorse Jones. Yes.
Senator Snowe. It has been. So----
Mr. Yellowhorse Jones. Yes, Senator.
Senator Snowe. How long----
Mr. Yellowhorse Jones. And that has been in conjunction
with my colleague here from the University of Oklahoma, who's
received EPA funding and have studied exactly what my product
does in terms of soil remediation for several years.
Senator Snowe. Well, hopefully, it's going to get attention
now, from the Coast Guard via Captain Sisson.
Mr. Yellowhorse Jones. I do, too. I really do.
Senator Snowe. [Laughter.] I do. I do. I know. We need to
bring everything to bear in this process that's workable, and I
just feel very sorry for people in the region, the families----
Mr. Yellowhorse Jones. So do I.
Senator Snowe.--and the businesses, the livelihoods. Both
of us, the Chair and I live in the coastal regions, and it's a
way of life for generations. It's heartbreaking.
Mr. Yellowhorse Jones. It's sad.
Senator Snowe. That's why it just seems we must move heaven
and earth, literally, to get this done in a way that is
commiserate with the level of this destruction, and what it
means and what it portends for the future.
Thank you.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
Senator Udall.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Udall. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I thank both you
and the Ranking Member for allowing me to participate today,
and I very much appreciate the questions directed to Mr.
Yellowhorse Jones, and I want to welcome him here today.
I believe you're a geologist from Gallup, New Mexico, and
it's great to have you here, and I've been staying very
involved in your procedure that you've put forward. I've read a
number of the slides and things. And I think you've put forward
the idea that is really the focus of this hearing: How can we
take an idea like yours, and, as our chair has outlined, have
it be effective cleanup and a restoration, and this is what
this material that you've come up with does is it not only
helps in the cleanup, but it restores the environment and the
ecosystem to where it was before.
So we need to find a way, and I think it's being emphasized
in this hearing, to take these ideas and take them early on and
get them into the process, so that we can have an effective
cleanup.
I also want the record to reflect that Mr. Jones is here
testifying based on the recommendation, and you said it, of the
Oil Spill Recovery Institute. And your proposals have been
backed by engineers and scientists at the University of
Oklahoma. So it's had a good deal of vetting.
And I'd also like to take the opportunity to briefly
highlight some of the other proposals New Mexico and New
Mexicans have put forward. We have the Sierra County Economic
Development Organization has proposed another New Mexico
material called Zeolite for oil-spill cleanups. Zeolite is a
mineral with a number of uses, including as an absorbent for
oil.
Other New Mexicans have also made proposals for oil
containment and skimming devices, including engineers from Los
Alamos, Santa Fe and Albuquerque. And, Madam Chair, I'd ask
unanimous consent to include these proposals in the Committee
record----
Senator Cantwell. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
St. Cloud Mining
Winston, NM, July 20, 2010
Mr. Anthony Sedillo,
c/o Office of Senator Tom Udall,
110 Hart Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Via E-mail
Dear Mr. Sedillo:
It was a pleasure speaking with you today and we thank you and
Senator Udall for your willingness to take a few minutes to understand
the benefits St. Cloud zeolite could bring to the environmental
rehabilitation efforts underway in the wake of the BP--Deepwater
Horizon calamity.
St. Cloud Mining Company is in the business of locating,
developing, mining, producing and selling industrial minerals in North
America. We are currently the largest natural zeolite producer in North
America producing from our mine located near Winston, NM. St. Cloud is
in the early stages of producing and selling dolomite from its mine
located near Deming, NM, where the company also produces industrial
aggregates. We also provide mine reclamation and civil construction
services throughout the Southwest United States. St. Cloud Mining
Company has been in continual operation in Sierra County since 1970 and
currently employ 65 full-time employees. We enjoy an outstanding
reputation within the public and private sectors and have received
numerous awards and recognition for our environmental stewardship by
the State of New Mexico.
Attached please find a very brief summary of the applications and
benefits of St. Cloud Zeolite for the remediation of petroleum
contaminants and spills. If you have additional questions or concerns,
please feel free to contact me. In the meantime, you can learn more
about St. Cloud and our products by visiting our websites at
www.stcloudmining.com and www.stcloudreclamation.com.
We thank you for your efforts on our behalf and we are confident
the natural mineral resources of New Mexico can help address this
problem of national concern.
Very Truly Yours,
Joseph P. McEnaney,
Vice President.
______
St. Cloud Zeolite,
Winston, NM.
St. Cloud Mining Company
Produces environmentally inert, highly absorbent/adsorbent
natural zeolites from its operations in southwest New Mexico.
Has strategic, collaborative relationships for the
development of proprietary sorbtion technology for specialty
filtration/separation/environmental remediation applications.
Has working relationships with marine service providers
currently operating in the Gulf of Mexico.
Products/Technology
Our natural zeolites are lightweight alumino-silicates widely used
for their high cation exchange capacity in filtering and adsorbing
harmful cationic compounds such as heavy metals and ammonia. Industrial
applications encompass hazardous waste clean up and radionuclide
remediation, as well as waste water, mine water, industrial process
water, and agricultural effluent treatment. Our specialty chabazite
products are used for mercury removal in coal fired boilers as well as
additives in down hole cement applications.
Our zeolite material will absorb 100-125 percent of their weight in
water and 80-85 percent of their weight in petroleum products. Because
of their open lattice structure, high surface area, and pore sizes
ranging from 4-7 angstroms, zeolites are also widely used as molecular
sieves in separation technologies.
St. Cloud manufactures specialized sorbents (surfactants) for use
in spill remediation which when applied to the zeolite media chemically
bond complex anionic molecules, which once reacted, will not separate
from the sorbent/zeolite structure.
Our products can be produced and packaged according to customer
specification in particle sizes ranging from <325 mesh (44 microns) to
percent inch material. Packaging is available in bulk, supersack or 50
lb bags. Production and shipping facilities are located near major
interstate highways. Rail trans-loading is also available.
Land/Sea Oil Spill Remediation
Lightweight and highly sorbent
GRAS Products--Generally Recognized as Safe
Catalytic mineral surfaces to help breakdown the oily wastes
Porous to allow the organic contaminants to enter as well as
allow natural or inoculated bacteria access to the oil for more
rapid decomposition
Modified (surfactant treated) or unmodified products
available
Cost effective with multiple modes of application and
treatment (Sorbent, Catalyst, Bioremediation, Solidification)
Effective as on shore beach or tidal barrier; or in near
shore waters as sorbent and sink agent
Immediately available
Proven
Continuous technical assistance provided
Upper Production/Drilling Conduit Support System and Equipment Shield
Inventor: Kenneth Cain
Background of the Invention
Recent off shore environmental disasters were caused by off shore
oil well operations that were in part not controllable at the surface.
The loss of the risers and drilling stem also has resulted problems in
the recovery operations thereby producing excessive loss of
hydrocarbons on the sea floor and in the water column. The lack of
upper sub sea control also has resulted in problems in follow-up
operations to regain well control.
The loss of a drilling ship recently resulted in the loss of
property and life. The environmental damage due to lack of well control
at or near the surface has resulted in hydrocarbons from the accident
being dispersed over a large area of the water*. This and other major
disasters have been devastating to the environment and have cost
billions of dollars to partially rectify.
These events alone have demonstrated that a need exists for an
effective and easily deployable system for the support of the drilling
and/or production conduit used in the drilling and/or production of
hydrocarbons to be controlled at or near the surface.
There is also the potential loss of control of drilling and/or
production facilities due to the present time consuming process of
deploying and redeploying of drilling and/or production surface
facilities when conditions require deployment and redeployment such as
storms at sea. This process also results in loss of production,
drilling time and adds additional expense in drilling and/or production
operations.
References
Shearable completion riser joint
United States Patent 5979943
The following list includes some of the major oil spills involving
off shore drilling and production since 1977. The circumstances
surrounding the spill, amount of oil spilled, and the attendant
environmental damage is also given.
1977--April, North Sea: blowout of well in Ekofisk oil field
leaked 81 million gallons.
1979--June 3, Gulf of Mexico: exploratory oil well Ixtoc 1 blew
out, spilling approximately 140 million gallons of crude oil
into the open sea. Although it is one of the largest known oil
spills, it had a low environmental impact.
1980--March 30, Stavanger, Norway: floating hotel in North Sea
collapsed, killing 123 oil workers.
1983--February 4, Persian Gulf, Iran: Nowruz Field platform
spilled 80 million gallons of oil.
1988--July 6, North Sea off Scotland: 166 workers killed in
explosion and fire on Occidental Petroleum's Piper Alpha rig in
North Sea; 64 survivors.
November 10, Saint John's, Newfoundland: Odyssey spilled 43
million gallons of oil.
1990--June 8, off Galveston, Tex.: Mega Borg released 5.1
million gallons of oil some 60 nautical miles south-southeast
of Galveston as a result of an explosion and subsequent fire in
the pump room.
1991--May 28, Angola: ABT Summer exploded and leaked 15-78
million gallons of oil off the coast of Angola. It's not clear
how much sank or burned.
1992--March 2, Fergana Valley, Uzbekistan: 88 million gallons
of oil spilled from an oil well.
2010--*April 24, Gulf of Mexico: The Deepwater Horizon, a semi-
submersible drilling rig, sank on April 22, after an April 20
explosion on the vessel. Eleven people died in the blast. When
the rig sank, the riser--the 5,000-foot-long pipe that connects
the wellhead to the rig--became detached and began leaking oil.
In addition, U.S. Coast Guard investigators discovered a leak
in the wellhead itself. As much as 25,000 barrels (1,050,000
gallons) of oil per day were leaking into the water,
threatening wildlife along the Louisiana Coast. Homeland
Security Secretary Janet Napolitano declared it a ``spill of
national significance.'' BP (British Petroleum), which leased
the Deepwater Horizon, is responsible for the cleanup, but the
U.S. Navy supplied the company with resources to help contain
the slick. Oil reached the Louisiana shore on April 30,
affected about 125 miles of coast. By early June, oil had also
reached Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi.
It is the largest oil spill in U.S. history.
The Ixtoc off shore oil well blow out in the Gulf of Mexico off
the coast of Mexico and the sinking of the BP Deepwater Herizon
simi-submersible drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico off the
Louisiana coast resulted in unprecedented environmental
destruction to the water, shore line, habitat and the
livelihood of thousands of people receiving the brunt of the
aftermath of these events.
One object of this invention is to establish a system to protect
the drilling and/or production conduit and hold it at or near the
surface to allow for more expedient well recovery operations.
Another object of this invention is to establish a platform and
shield for at or near the surface for safety equipment for greater
safety for drilling and production surface facilities.
Another object of this invention is to allow for the quick
disconnect of the upper portion of the drilling and/or production
conduit for rapid deployment and redeployment of surface operations.
Yet another object of this invention is to allow for greater
protection from willful destruction of surface operations.
This invention is cost effective, easily constructed and deployed
at the site without interruption of existing surface operations.
This invention meets other objectives, advantages and capabilities
that are apparent from the following detailed description and
accompanying drawings illustrating a preferred embodiment of this
invention.
Description of the Invention
The Upper Production/Drilling Conduit Support System and Equipment
Shield consists of an upper safety shield for equipment and lower
vessels for buoyancy of the safety shield and the drilling and/or
production conduit.
The Upper Production/Drilling Conduit Support System and Equipment
Shield can be configured and constructed to meet any water depths and
drilling and/or production conduit configurations and safety equipment
in all equipment configurations. The system is deployable by surface
operations and/or subsurface vessels such as ROVs as an onsite
component assembly system.
The equipment shield is deployable by surface operations and/or
subsurface vessels such as ROVs after the drilling and/or production
conduit and the safety equipment are in place. The safety equipment can
also be installed after the Upper Production/Drilling Conduit Support
System and Equipment Shield is in place. The safety equipment should
consist of at least two stacked shear rams. A quick disconnect system
included in the safety equipment should be included as outlined in the
referenced patent United States Patent 5979943 would also be desirable.
In one embodiment, the invention relates to a riser support system
and BOP shield at or near the surface for off shore drilling and
production of hydrocarbons where there exists a riser and/or drilling
stems and/or production tubing or similar apparatus for the exploration
and production of hydrocarbons in water comprising:
a. An upper portion having a submersible member for the
shielding of safety equipment;
b. A lower portion(s) connected below the upper portion, said
lower portion(s) having a plurality or singularity of
substantially vertical vessels providing buoyancy to support
the safety equipment and the drilling and or production
apparatus.
These and other embodiments of the present invention will also
become readily apparent to those skilled in the art from the following
detailed description of the embodiments having reference to the
attached figures, the invention not being limited to any particular
embodiment(s) disclosed.
The following drawings below outline some preferred embodiments of
the Production/Drilling Conduit Support System and Equipment Shield
``System'':
a. Fig. 1 depicts the view of various configurations for
deployment of the System. The System has no configuration
limitation in its deployment and can be deployed around any
apparatus for the exploration and/or production of
hydrocarbons.
b. Fig. 2 depicts one embodiment of the equipment shield of the
System which provides shielding for the safety equipment.
c. Fig. 3 depicts the plan view of one embodiment of the
equipment shield of the System.
d. Fig. 4 depicts one embodiment of the floatation vessel(s) of
the System that extends downward in the water column from the
equipment shield of the System to provide support and buoyancy
for the System.
e. Fig. 5 depicts the plan view of one embodiment of the
floatation vessel(s) of the System.
The elements of the drawings arc not necessarily to scale, emphasis
instead being placed upon clearly illustrating the principles of the
invention. Furthermore, reference to ``an embodiment,'' ``one
embodiment,'' ``various embodiments,'' or any variant thereof means
that a particular feature or aspect of the invention described in
conjunction with the particular embodiment is included in at least one
embodiment of the present invention. Thus, the appearance of the
phrases ``in one embodiment,'' ``in another embodiment,'' or variations
thereof in various places throughout the specification are not
necessarily all referring to its respective embodiment. All embodiments
disclosed may be provided in other specific forms and embodiments
without departing from the essential characteristics as described
herein. The embodiments described below are to be considered in all
aspects as illustrative only and not restrictive in any manner.
While particular embodiments of the invention have been described,
it will be understood, however, that the invention is not limited
thereto, since modifications may be made by those skilled in the art,
particularly considering the teachings herein. It will be, therefore,
contemplated by any claims in an ensuing non-provisional application
claiming priority to this document to cover any such modifications that
incorporate those features or those improvements that embody the spirit
and scope of the present invention
Deployment of the System:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The System has no configuration limitation to its deployment.
The configurations for the deployment of the System can be at or
near the surface and deployed either by ship or ROV. The depth of
deployment can be at the surface or below the surface to meet the
various requirements of need. The deployment can be for drilling, work
over of existing wells and/or production. The deployment of the System
is not limited to drilling and/or production platforms but may be
deployed under any surface operation vessels and around any sub-sea
conduit apparatus employed in the operations involving hydrocarbons.
The System may be used any or no safety equipment for the operation
involving hydrocarbons as necessary.
The deployment of the System can be accomplished in an assembled
configuration or in any various assembled components to meet the
deployment situation.
The System is constructed from readily available materials and is
cost effective and easily deployed. The materials used in the
construction of the System can be, but not limited to, steel, PVC,
cables, cable connectors, rope, and other subsystems.
One embodiment of the equipment shield of the System:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The equipment shield of the System consists of an open to the water
vessel providing a shield to any safety equipment and a support for the
lower buoyancy vessel(s) below.
The top of the equipment shield preferably is at or below the
surface of the water and to allow for ingress and egress by service
equipment and to prevent damage to the System from surface conditions
such as storms and surface structure failure or other surface dangers
to the System.
A support column at the floor of the equipment shield provides
attachment of the drilling and/or production conduit to the System and
to secure the drilling and/or production conduit to the System.
A key locking system as shown provides further securing of the
drilling and/or production conduit to the System.
One embodiment of the plan view of the equipment shield of the
System is shown below:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
A slot is provided to guide the drilling and/or production conduit
into position during deployment of the System.
A cut-out that is appropriate for the equipment is provided to
allow for the placement of the equipment durning deployment of the
System.
Grappling rings are provided for deployment of the System by
surface vessels and or sub-surface vessels such as ROVs.
One embodiment of the floatation vessel(s) of the System:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
A slot is provided to guide the drilling and/or production conduit
into position during deployment of the floatation vessel(s) of the
System.
A cut out that is appropriate for the equipment is provided to
allow for the placement of the equipment dunning deployment of the
floatation vessel(s) of the System.
Grappling rings are provided for deployment of the floatation
vessel(s) of the System by surface vessels and or sub-surface vessels
such as ROVs.
Valves are provided to control the buoyancy floatation vessel(s) of
the System for deployment. Negative buoyancy is achieved for deployment
by allowing water to inter the floatation vessel(s) through the water
valve and exit the floatation vessel(s) through the check valve. Once
the floatation vessel(s) is (are) fully deployed with the key locked
into place, complete buoyancy is achieved by introducing compressed air
for the surface into the floatation vessel(s) and discharging all of
the water from the floatation vessel(s).
In one embodiment of the plan view of the floatation vessel(s) of
the System:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
A slot is provided to guide the drilling and/or production conduit
into position during deployment of the System.
A key locking system as shown provides further securing of the
drilling and/or production conduit to the System.
Grappling rings are provided for deployment of the System by
surface vessels and or sub-surface vessels such as ROVs.
Claims
What is claimed is:
A system for the support of production and/or drilling conduit for
any and all operations involving hydrocarbons and for the shielding of
equipment for any and all operations involving hydrocarbons at or near
the surface of the water for all operations involving hydrocarbons
including:
a. An upper portion having a shielding system for equipment for
any and all operations involving hydrocarbons.
b. Lower protions that provide for support vessels for the
shielding system and production and/or drilling conduit and for
any and all equipment for all operations involving
hydrocarbons.
______
Title Page
Solution to the Gulf Oil Leak Problem--Broad Agency Announcement (BAA)
HSCG32-10-R-R00019
Oil Wellhead Control and Submerged Oil Response
Offeror: Melvin L. Prueitt
Contact person: Melvin L. Prueitt,
Address: See above
Solution to the Gulf Oil-leak Problem
This proposal is different than other tank solutions that have been
proposed. The solution used so far at the Gulf oil spill was a
relatively small tank or cap that they put over the well. Turbulence
and ocean currents caused much of the oil to miss the tank, and the oil
did not have a chance to separate completely from the water. Natural
gas leaking from the well also created turbulence. The mixing of the
gas with the cold ocean water produced hydrates, which formed a semi-
solid slush that clogged the exit from the cap. Since the cap (tank)
was small, the slush had only a few seconds to harden. It hardened in
the tank exit.
The drawing below illustrates a solution to the leaking oil well at
the seafloor. A large steel tank is suspended above the leaking well.
The tank is suspended from a ship. The tank is open at the bottom so
that materials flowing up from the broken well pipe will be caught.
Since oil has a lower density than water, the oil will float up into
the tank and float up to the inside top of the tank. There will be a
separation of the oil and the water as the oil forms a thick layer in
the top of the tank. Since the gas is lighter than the oil, it will
form a gas layer above the oil. Gas vent pipes allow the gas to escape.
Float valves below the bottom of the vent pipes control the thickness
of the gas layer in the tank. The hydrate slush will not have a chance
to plug vent pipes, because the gas layer prevents the slush from
reaching the pipe openings. That is, the pipe opening is next to the
top of the tank, but the float that controls the opening is below the
opening so that the slush cannot reach the opening.
The gas will provide buoyancy to the tank so that extra mass may
need to be added to the tank to prevent its rising. Cables with anchors
or weights could be attached from the tank to the seafloor.
A pump above the tank pumps the oil out of the tank into a large
hose that transports the oil to an oil tanker. When the tanker is full,
it can transport the oil to a shore where the oil can be processed and
sold. The oil pipe that extends from the pump down into the tank should
extend down below the gas layer into the oil. To prevent rising slush
from entering the oil pipe, there can be a U-shaped curve in the pipe
at its bottom.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The tank should be high enough above the well so that equipment may
move below the tank to perform work on the well without interference
from the tank. The drawing is not to scale. The tank may be 100 feet in
diameter and 30 feet tall.
To get the tank from the shore to the leaking well, the tank can be
towed from the shore to the leaking well by a ship. By having air in
the top part of the tank, it will be buoyant and will float as it is
towed. When it reaches the destination, the air can be drained so that
the tank will sink while it is supported by cables from the ship. The
gas vents will need to be closed until the tank reaches its
destination.
This method of oil collection can be used for the Gulf oil spill,
or if there are future similar oil leaks on the bottom of the ocean, it
can be used for those.
This paper does not cover all the details.
If there are questions, please call Melvin Prueitt.
This paper is non-proprietary.
ROM
The cost of constructing and installing the large tank and
collecting oil will depend on the speed with which the work is done. By
collecting and selling the oil, revenue will be provided so that the
total cost of the operation may be negative.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Udall. And I'd also like to highlight the
contributions of New Mexico's national laboratories, both
Sandia National Laboratory and Los Alamos, which are both in
New Mexico, and the other national security laboratory,
Livermore in California, have dedicated over 200 scientists to
this oil-spill cleanup effort.
And they have not all been down in Houston. Some of them
have. One of the national directors has been down there, and
these scientists have been very actively involved in overseeing
what BP is doing in making sure that they have the very, very
best science.
These scientists have contributed modeling, simulation,
engineering and complex risk analysis of the oil spill on
various attempts to contain the spill.
Now, one of the things, Mr. Jones, I wanted to ask you
about, you, in one of your slides I saw you had a comparison of
cleaning up one mile of shoreline, and I think you had a cost
of $5.1 million per mile, is that correct?
Mr. Yellowhorse Jones. Yes, Senator.
Senator Udall. Tell me how that compares with other cleanup
materials that do the same thing that are bioremediation, not
only do they clean up, but then they have microbes that
organically get rid of the toxics.
Mr. Yellowhorse Jones. Well, from what I have been told by
people that work for me who has done some comparison studies,
we're economically and viable and competitive in doing this.
And depending on the different areas that we would be
looking at, that scale could go down or in--That was probably
like the worst-case scenario, doing 20-feet wide, five miles
long, and we made notations in our supplemented material that
that can be adjusted accordingly.
But from what I've been told, the comparison to the SR 200s
and some of the other things that's out there--and this is just
what I've been told by the people that work for me--that our
product is very competitively priced.
Senator Udall. Great. Well, thank you very much.
And thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this hearing and
being such an advocate for our oceans. Thank you.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you. I was wondering if you were
joining the Coastal Caucus with New Mexico. So thank you.
[Laughter.]
Senator Udall. Well, all we really have is ancient oceans
over a million-years old, and so we're a little bit dry right
now as a desert. So if I qualify, I would love to join----
Senator Cantwell. Absolutely. And we need all the advocacy
we can get.
So that's all the questions we have. I thank the witnesses
for their testimony and for their actions in this area. It's
very helpful to us.
I can see, if we had this panel engaged on an ongoing basis
about the latest and important technology investments we should
be making, and we had the resources to be making them, we would
be further ahead. So, obviously, we will be pushing legislation
to do so. Hopefully, you can review that legislation and give
us feedback on it.
So thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Douglas Helton
Question 1. NOAA's 2011 budget request for the Office of Response &
Restoration is the lowest that it has been in the past 6 years. This
office is responsible for modeling oil spill movements and tracking the
slick based on satellite data. Under the proposed 2011 budget, will
your office within NOAA have the resources to:
Completely eliminate the multi-year backlog of outdated oil
spill Environmental Sensitivity Index (ESI) maps?
Conduct advanced three-dimensional modeling of deep-water
releases of oil into the water column?
Conduct a thorough program of research to study the effects
of oil and dispersants on open-ocean species and ecosystems?
Under the proposed 2011 budget, what are some of the ``lower-
priority'' oil spill efforts that will not be funded?
Answer. The President's FY 2011 Budget Request includes $19.5M for
the Office of Response and Restoration (OR&R). This level of funding
would allow OR&R to conduct priority response and restoration
activities (pending final appropriations) and would allow NOAA to
update at least one Environmental Sensitivity Index (ESI) map (however
this will not eliminate the backlog of outdated ESI maps). OR&R has
already begun to develop three-dimensional modeling and this effort
will also continue in FY 2011.
OR&R does not currently have a formal research program to study the
effects of oil and dispersants on open-ocean species and ecosystems.
However, NOAA and co-trustees (Department of the Interior (DOI) and
states of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida) have
been collecting data across the Gulf of Mexico that will be useful to
determine what natural resources have been injured due to the BP
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Several technical working groups composed
of state and Federal natural resource trustees and representatives from
BP are gathering historical information and developing and implementing
baseline (pre-spill) and post-impact field studies for multiple
resource categories. Open-ocean resources being assessed include fish
and shellfish, bottom dwelling biota, birds, marine mammals, turtles,
and the water column, including bottom sediments. In addition, other
Federal agencies (e.g., the National Science Foundation, Environmental
Protection Agency) support research with respect to the effect of oil
and dispersants.
Question 2. As a result of the threat of the oil spill to the Gulf
of Mexico ecosystems, there has been and will continue to be an
increase in scientific research, both government and non-government
(academic, private, etc.), in order to assess the full environmental
damage and the steps to recovery. This event will also be highly
litigated, both by the government and private entities. I am concerned
that these scientific data, which will be needed to direct recovery
efforts, may get caught up in judicial tape and not be publicly
available. What is the Administration's current policy for sharing and
disseminating scientific data that may be used by the Department of
Justice in litigation? What are the mechanisms currently in place for
the Department of Justice to interact and coordinate with NOAA and
other scientific agencies, in regards to scientific data and
information on the oil spill that might be used in criminal or civil
prosecution of the responsible parties? What efforts will NOAA make to
ensure that these data remain publicly available for review and for use
in the recovery efforts?
Answer. As the response to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and
the natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) continue, NOAA is
honoring our commitment to openness and transparency, both with our co-
trustees and other Federal and state agencies, and externally with the
American public, the media, and our various partners and stakeholder
groups. For example, through ERMA ', a web-based GIS
platform developed by NOAA and the University of New Hampshire, we are
working to make information available to the public as quickly as
possible in an accessible and user-friendly format at
www.geoplatform.gov/gulfresponse. Additionally, with our partners and
co-trustees, we are developing new policies to make our NRDA data
available to the public. As of July 8, the Federal trustees agreed to
make public NRDA ``pre-assessment'' science data--once collected,
analyzed, and properly quality checked--available in the interest of
transparency. Releasing NRDA ``pre-assessment'' science data is rarely
done in the NRDA process, but it was decided in the interest of
transparency, and because of the heightened interest in this particular
spill, that this information would be made public. Initial data has
already been made available to the public.
We recommend referring the question mechanisms currently in place
to interact and coordinate with NOAA and other scientific agencies, in
regards to scientific data and information on the oil spill that might
be used in litigation to Department of Justice who can provide
information on this topic.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Olympia J. Snowe to
Douglas Helton
Question 1. How would you characterize the current state of
collaboration between NOAA's Office of Response and Restoration (ORR)
and your partners in the Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS)
office? How has the data gathered by the system and its regional
component, the Gulf of Mexico Coastal Ocean Observing System, enhanced
your ability to respond to, track, and clean up this spill? As NOAA-ORR
is likely to see more responsibilities during oil spill responses in
the future, what enhancements to the current IOOS system would improve
the amount, type, or quality of data you receive from the system?
Answer. NOAA's Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS) Office
works closely with NOAA's Office of Response and Restoration (OR&R). An
example of past collaboration between the two offices includes the Safe
Seas Exercise in San Francisco Bay in August 2006. This exercise
established data formats and data exchange between high frequency radar
data providers and OR&R trajectory modelers. This was then used in the
actual San Francisco Cosco Busan spill in November 2007. IOOS and OR&R
continue to coordinate during other oil spill exercises. In addition,
IOOS coordinates with OR&R to provide additional observational and
modeling capabilities. IOOS identified an on-staff expert to coordinate
between the IOOS Regional Associations and OR&R to allow for quick
coordination of modeling, imagery, observation platforms, and products
to be made available quickly and used effectively.
In the wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the framework
and communication was in place so that high frequency radar data was
automatically ingested into OR&R trajectory models. During the BP
Deepwater Horizon spill response effort, OR&R used data from IOOS
assets including high frequency radar, drifters and other data
collection devices like Airborne Expendable Bathy-Thermograph sensors
(AXBTs). These assets are used to understand the large scale
circulation patterns in the Gulf of Mexico to inform our understanding
of where the oil is and where it is going to aid response efforts.
Models from Texas A&M, University of South Florida and the University
of North Carolina were also incorporated into the information evaluated
to develop the daily spill trajectory model provided by OR&R and used
in planning response activities. Imagery was also made available from
Center for Southeastern Tropical Advanced Remote Sensing at the
University of Miami. These entities are a part of IOOS' partners, the
Gulf of Mexico Coastal Ocean Observing System (GCOOS) and the Southeast
Coastal Ocean Observing Regional Association (SECOORA). This imagery
was used by OR&R, as well as the U.S. Geological Survey and the
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency.
NOAA envisions a national network that delivers high-frequency
radar data as an important step in enhancing the Nation's response
capabilities. Because we cannot predict where a spill will occur, data
delivery from high-frequency radars is envisioned to be part of a
seamless national system that will ensure observational information is
available. To detect the presence of subsurface oil and estimate its
movement beneath the surface, one needs a suite of observing assets
combined with three-dimensional ocean circulation models. In addition
to the high-frequency radars to monitor the surface currents, high-
resolution circulation models informed by three-dimensional fields of
temperature and salinity are needed. While ship surveys have been the
conventional method for observing three-dimensional fields of
temperature, salinity, and other properties, such as chlorophyll and
nutrients, this method is slow and costly.
Question 2. Despite NOAA being the Nation's primary oceanographic
research agency, there is no official NOAA role in approving use of
dispersants, nor any mandate for EPA to consult with NOAA before
approving the novel use of dispersants in subsea applications. To what
degree has NOAA been involved in conversations with EPA or other
agencies regarding the use of dispersants, including subsea
applications, and the amount, duration, and frequency of their use?
What specific testing has NOAA carried out regarding the potential
impact of the 1.8 million gallons of dispersant will have on the living
marine resources of the Gulf of Mexico? What tests can NOAA continue to
do in the wake of this disaster to help us better understand the impact
of these unprecedented volumes of chemical dispersants on the
environment?
Answer. The National Contingency Plan (NCP) establishes the
framework for use of dispersants in an oil spill response. The NCP
requires the Regional Response Teams (RRT) and Area Committees to plan
for the use or non-use of dispersants in advance of spills. This
collaborative process, which brings together expertise from both
Federal agencies and state governments, ensures that the tradeoff
decisions between water column and surface/shoreline impacts are
deliberated. The RRT consists of designated representatives from each
Federal agency participating in the National Response Team (NRT),
including NOAA as a representative of the Department of Commerce, and
state representatives.
NOAA does not have a regulatory role in approving dispersant
products, but NOAA has three main roles with respect to dispersant use:
(1) NOAA serves on behalf of the Department of Commerce in spill
response preparedness and decision-making activities through the NRT
and RRT. As a trustee agency on the RRT, NOAA must approve any
preauthorization for the use of dispersants in that region; (2) as a
trustee agency on the RRT, NOAA must be consulted by the Federal On-
Site Coordinator (FOSC) on any incident-specific use of dispersants
within the region; and (3) NOAA participates in monitoring for the
efficacy of dispersants via the Special Monitoring of Applied Response
Technologies (SMART) program. NOAA's Scientific Support Team is
designated as a special team by the National Contingency Plan and
provides a broad array of scientific services to the response,
including recommendations to the FOSC on the appropriate use of
dispersants. NOAA is also a member of the SMART program, an
interagency, cooperatively designed program, which includes the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Coast Guard, and other
agencies, to monitor the efficacy of dispersant and in situ burning
operations. SMART relies on small, highly mobile teams that collect
real-time data using portable, rugged, and easy-to-use instruments
during dispersant and in situ burning operations. Data are channeled to
the Unified Command to help address critical questions. NOAA also uses
SMART data to inform 24, 48 and 72 hour oil fate and trajectory models
as dispersants can affect the behavior of the spilled oil.
EPA has conducted studies to determine the toxicity of different
dispersant products. On June 30, 2010, EPA released the results of
initial screening tests to assess cytotoxicity (cell death), endocrine
activity, and acute toxicity of eight available dispersants.
The second phase of EPA's testing, released on August 2, 2010. The
dispersant-oil mixtures can be generally categorized in the moderately
toxic range.
On June 30, 2010, EPA released the results of initial screening
tests to assess cytotoxicity (cell death), endocrine activity, and
acute toxicity of eight available dispersants. The second phase of
EPA's testing, released on August 2, 2010 demonstrated that the
dispersant-oil mixtures can be generally categorized in the moderately
toxic range.
Research on the effectiveness and effects of dispersants and
dispersed oil have been underway for more than three decades, but vital
gaps still exist. The Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2010 provides
EPA with an investment of $2 million to study the potential human and
environmental risks and impacts of the release of crude oil and the
application of dispersants, surface washing agents, and other
mitigation measures listed in the National Contingency Plan Product
Schedule and directs EPA to coordinate with the Secretary of Commerce
and the Secretary of the Interior. One area of focus has been on
determining the toxicity and long-term effects of dispersants and
dispersed oil on sensitive marine life. It is now clear that
effectively dispersed oil declines rapidly in concentration due to
ocean mixing, and degrades faster than untreated surface or shoreline
oil.
NOAA is currently undertaking testing of the uptake and depuration,
or cleansing, of dispersants in Gulf species, including fish, shrimp,
and oysters. The results from these studies will guide any further
testing of the toxicity of dispersant and dispersant plus oil.
NOAA continues to evaluate whether dispersants are bioavailable
(physiologically absorbed) in different marine species, environments
and conditions. In addition, NOAA continues to evaluate whether
exposure to the combination of oil and dispersants affects toxicity in
a range of species relative to exposure only to oil.
The effects of the dispersed oil on marine life depend on
concentration and duration of exposure of organisms to the dispersed
oil. At the sea surface, early life stages of fish and shellfish are
much more sensitive than juveniles or adults to dispersants and
dispersed oil. This increased sensitivity coupled with the fact that
these organisms reside just below the surface of the ocean where
concentrations of the dispersed oil are initially greatest means that
these organisms are most likely to be impacted. There are no data on
the toxicity of dispersed oil to deep-sea biota at any life stage, so
we have to extrapolate based on existing knowledge. However, at both
the surface and subsurface level, modeling and monitoring is confirming
that dispersed oil concentrations decline rapidly with distance from
the well head as the oil mixes with sea water and, with the currents,
moves away from the treatment areas.
Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), state and Federal
Natural Resource Trustee agencies are responsible for assessing the
injury, loss or destruction of natural resources due to spills--
including ecological services and lost human uses of those resources.
The trustees are also assessing impacts from the response, including
burning, and dispersant use at the surface and at bigger depths. While
it is still too early in the process to know what the full scope of the
damage assessment will be, NOAA and co-trustees continue to collect
data in the Gulf and across the five affected states. These data will
be used to determine what natural resources have been injured and what
human uses have been diminished or lost due to the spill.
Question 3. The IATAP process has unfortunately made only a few new
technologies operational during this spill response. Given the fragile
nature of much of this shoreline, for example, extensive wetlands, and
beaches with sensitive bird and turtle nests, development of new,
environmentally sensitive restoration methods and technologies will be
vital to the longterm success of this effort. How can NOAA and the
Coast Guard adapt the IATAP process to avoid the delays and duplication
that has resulted in approval of so few new response technologies?
Answer. This question is outside NOAA's area of expertise as NOAA's
role in the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill is to provide scientific
support to the Unified Command and National Incident Commander, to
conduct a natural resource damage assessment pursuant to the Oil
Pollution Act with co-trustees to assess and restore natural resources
injured by the oil spill, and to represent the Department of Commerce
in spill response decision-making activities through the National
Response Team. We recommend the Committee contact the Coast Guard for a
response to this question.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
Douglas Helton
Question 1. In your written testimony you speak at length about the
activities to improve future response efforts by NOAA to future oil
spills, including new technologies to study the movement of oil
subsurface. What resources are available to NOAA through partnerships
with the private sector and academic institutions to enhance response
activities to future oil spills?
Answer. NOAA has built strong relationships with the academic
sectors, which prove to be a valuable resource in quickly leveraging
expertise and resources in response to environmental disasters.
Currently, NOAA supports 18 Cooperative Institutes consisting of 42
universities and research institutions across 23 states and the
District of Columbia. Because many Cooperative Institutes are co-
located with NOAA research laboratories, there is a strong, long-term
collaboration between scientists in the laboratories and in the
university. Cooperative Institute scientists in all of NOAA's
scientific mission areas can be quickly mobilized through cooperative
agreements. NOAA's National Sea Grant Program also awards grants to
state Sea Grant College programs which are co-located at universities
in coastal states. In addition, NOAA also supports the Undersea
Research Program (NURP), which is comprised of six regional Centers and
one National Institute, all located at universities. NURP provides NOAA
with the unique ability to access the undersea environment, either
directly with submersibles and technical diving, or virtually using
robots and seafloor observatories.
The use of the U.S. Integrated Ocean Observing System (U.S. IOOS),
a Federal, regional, and private-sector partnership working to enhance
our ability to collect, deliver, and use ocean information, was
successfully demonstrated in the response effort to the BP Deepwater
Horizon oil spill. Information on surface currents of the ocean is a
key input to the models that generate estimates of the extent and
trajectory of an oil spill. This information is provided from the Gulf
of Mexico Coastal Ocean Observing System (GCOOS) and the Southeast
Coastal Ocean Observing Regional Association (SECOORA), regional
associations that are part of U.S. IOOS.
NOAA also partnered with several private firms (e.g., Roffers Ocean
Fishing Forecasting Service, WET Labs, and Turner Designs) to provide
rapid, high-tech solutions to detect, monitor, and analyze the presence
of oil in the Gulf.
NOAA was able to provide rapid response to the oil spill through
academic and private sector partnerships. These collaborations
leveraged personnel, research vessels and ship time, aircraft, cutting-
edge technology, and other resources to:
Conduct multiple research cruises to:
Collect and analyze water and tar ball samples
Study the physical properties of the Gulf and
Catalog impacted organisms
Better understand and monitor the Gulf's circulation in
order to predict the surface and subsurface oil movement
Monitor oil plumes in the water column
Develop new sensors for detecting oil in the water column
Fund rapid response projects to study impacts of the oil
spill on marine and coastal ecosystems
Fund community extension activities, including:
Identifying and communicating crucial stakeholder needs
to authorities and researchers
Providing guidance and coordination regarding seafood
safety, fisheries closures and approaches to re-opening
closed fisheries
Explaining the types of legal claims available to the
public
Model air quality impacts from the oil burning and
evaporation
Provide surface current data for NOAA's spill trajectory
models
Assist with collecting data below the surface of the water
through autonomous underwater vehicles, or gliders
Within the NMFS, limited resources are available under NMFS Product
Quality and Seafood Safety Program for partnerships on oil spill
response for seafood safety. NMFS does work with many partners to
rescue, study, and respond to injured or health-impaired marine mammals
and sea turtles. NMFS Southeast Region has a close relationship with
the Northern Gulf Institute (NGI), a NOAA Cooperative Institute with
five university partners along the northern Gulf of Mexico. NGI has a
formal relationship with the Institute for Marine Mammal Studies, one
of the participants of the Marine Mammal Stranding Network. NGI
partners perform post-mortem analyses and NGI-member universities have
the capability and capacity to collaborate and participate in a NOAA-
led stranding and response network.
Question 2. Has NOAA identified areas in response to this spill
where services provided by private sector operations or academic
institutions could be further utilized?
Answer. NOAA has always utilized private sector services for
response and assessment activities, and has standing working
relationships with academic institutions, such as Louisiana State
University and University of New Hampshire. These are key members of
our team who participate in regular meetings and trainings to be ready
to respond. NOAA welcomes the opportunity to continue to work with the
private sector and academic institutions in the future.
Question 3. What makes the IOOS partnership work successfully? What
is the potential for more specific partnerships between NOAA and the
private sector, such as that of IOOS?
Answer. The IOOS partnership is successful because it is a
collective partnership between the Federal Government and non-Federal
partners collecting and managing ocean, coastal and Great Lakes data. A
key element of this partnership is using ocean, coastal and Great Lakes
data that both meets regional needs and supports national priorities.
This regional component, known as the Regional Coastal Ocean Observing
System (RCCOS) structure has matured over the last 3 years under the
U.S. IOOS office in NOAA. This arrangement positions the United States
to take advantage of a coherent collection, management and open
availability of data in usable formats to support the development of a
variety of products and services to assist coastal managers and
decisionmakers in need of information.
Industries participate in and benefit from IOOS in a number of
ways:
As providers of observing system components (for example,
design and manufacture of ocean sensors, instruments, buoys and
satellites);
As providers of observing system data and communications
infrastructure (for example, designing and building data
assembly, data analysis and data/information dissemination
systems);
As operators of some system components and infrastructure
providing maintenance and support functions (For example,
maintaining buoy systems and hosting data systems);
By providing privately funded data/information to the IOOS
endeavor;
As intermediate service providers who use IOOS data/
information as an input to the creation of value added products
for use in specific applications;
As end-user beneficiaries whose business operations and
business decisions benefit directly or indirectly from IOOS
data, which includes quality controlled, real time hourly
observations.
Question 4. Is there capacity for more seafood testing to be
performed in Pascagoula?
Answer. Capacity in Pascagoula, Mississippi has been expanded to
increase timely sample processing and sensory testing of seafood in
order to reopen areas to fishing when it is shown that seafood is not
exposed to oil at levels that are of concern to human health. In
addition, NOAA is currently adding capacity in Pascagoula to allow for
additional chemical testing for both the seafood safety program and for
future monitoring of the Gulf of Mexico in the aftermath of the BP
Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
Question 5. Can the NOAA facility in Pascagoula perform chemical
testing?
Answer. The National Seafood Inspection Laboratory in Pascagoula is
currently establishing the capacity to perform the chemical screening
test recently developed by the Food and Drug Administration, in
addition to the chemical test for polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons.
Analytical chemical testing requires both specialized equipment and
staff with a high level of analytical chemical expertise and experience
with oil spills. This specialized expertise and equipment currently
exists at the Northwest Fisheries Science Center laboratory in Seattle
and the scientists there have been involved in multiple oil spill
events starting with the Exxon Valdez spill. Moreover, staff from
Seattle have been on rotational assignments to assist the Pascagoula
lab to meet the demands of this spill of national significance. NOAA is
evaluating the chemical testing capacity in Pascagoula to determine the
appropriate expansion to increase efficiency and complement existing
capacity in Seattle.
Question 6. What seafood tests related to this oil spill are being
performed at other NOAA facilities outside the Gulf Coast region that
could be performed at the Pascagoula facility?
Answer. There are no other seafood tests currently being conducted
at other facilities that can be carried out in Pascagoula. As noted
above, NOAA is currently establishing chemical seafood testing capacity
in Pascagoula based on what exists in Seattle.
Question 7. How much time would be saved if this testing was
performed by the locally-equipped and capable NOAA facility?
Answer. Currently, all samples are prepared for both sensory and
chemical testing in Pascagoula, but the chemical analyses is done in
Seattle. The sensory tests are performed on-site in Pascagoula the same
day the samples are prepared. Once the samples are prepared they are
then shipped overnight to Seattle for chemical analyses, thus the
savings in time of having capacity in Pascagoula would be 1 to 1.5
days. The advantage of chemical testing capacity in Pascagoula would
not necessarily reduce the time required for analysis, but would
increase the capacity for additional samples to be analyzed on a weekly
basis.
Question 8. What steps is NOAA implementing to increase seafood
testing capabilities along the Gulf Coast?
Answer. NOAA is confident in the sensory and chemical testing
currently being conducted to detect possible contamination in seafood.
In response to ongoing public concerns about seafood safety and
dispersants, we have been working together with our scientific partners
at FDA to develop a chemical test to detect dispersant in seafood. This
test, once validated, will provide additional public confidence in the
safety of Gulf seafood. NOAA is also evaluating the efficacy of
establishing the comprehensive analysis method which is currently used
in Seattle in Pascagoula. This requires more sophisticated equipment
and analytical chemistry expertise.
Question 9. Is the speed of testing holding up the re-opening of
fishing grounds?
Answer. The reopening of fishing grounds is not being delayed by
NOAA's capacity to conduct both the sensory and chemical testing
required. Capacity to both process and conduct sensory analysis has
been increased and additional chemical testing capacity is being
implemented currently.