[Senate Hearing 111-1013]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-1013
RESPONSE EFFORTS TO THE
GULF COAST OIL SPILL
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 18, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
TOM UDALL, New Mexico SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Ann Begeman, Republican Staff Director
Brian M. Hendricks, Republican General Counsel
Nick Rossi, Republican Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on May 18, 2010..................................... 1
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 1
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 3
Statement of Senator Snowe....................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 7
Statement of Senator Wicker...................................... 8
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Statement of Senator LeMieux..................................... 11
Letter, dated May 25, 2010, to Hon. George S. LeMieux, from
Doug Suttles, Chief Operating Officer, Exploration &
Production--BP America Inc................................. 83
Statement of Senator Vitter...................................... 12
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Statement of Senator Pryor....................................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Statement of Senator Begich...................................... 15
Statement of Senator Kerry....................................... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 53
Witnesses
Hon. Jane Lubchenco, Ph.D., Under Secretary of Commerce for
Oceans and Atmosphere and NOAA Administrator, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.... 20
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant, United States Coast Guard and
National Incident Commander on the Deepwater Horizon Fire and
MC 252 Oil Spill............................................... 28
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Lamar McKay, Chairman and President, BP America.................. 55
Prepared statement........................................... 58
Steven Newman, Chief Executive Officer, Transocean, Ltd.......... 62
Prepared statement........................................... 64
Deborah French-McCay, Ph.D., Director of Impact Assessment
Services, Applied Science Associates, Inc...................... 65
Prepared statement........................................... 68
Appendix
Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, U.S. Senator from Hawaii, prepared
statement...................................................... 105
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Jane Lubchenco
by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 105
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 106
Hon. John F. Kerry........................................... 107
Hon. Claire McCaskill........................................ 108
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 109
Hon. David Vitter............................................ 112
Hon. Roger F. Wicker......................................... 113
Response to written questions submitted to Admiral Thad Allen by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 117
Hon. Claire McCaskill........................................ 119
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 122
Hon. David Vitter............................................ 125
Hon. Roger F. Wicker......................................... 125
Response to written questions submitted to Lamar McKay by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 126
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 128
Hon. Claire McCaskill........................................ 130
Hon. Mark Warner............................................. 131
Hon. Roger F. Wicker......................................... 133
Response to written questions submitted to Steven Newman by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 137
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 139
Hon. Claire McCaskill........................................ 141
Hon. Mark Warner............................................. 142
Hon. Roger F. Wicker......................................... 143
Response to written questions submitted to Deborah French-McCay,
Ph.D. by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 146
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 148
Hon. Roger F. Wicker......................................... 149
RESPONSE EFFORTS TO THE
GULF COAST OIL SPILL
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 18, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D.
Rockefeller IV, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Members will be arriving. I'll give the opening statement,
and then I believe Senator Hutchison's on her way, and we will
have some opening statements. And you will, hopefully, be
patient, because I know there's--you've never had to answer any
questions on this subject before, right?
On April 20, an explosion occurred on the Deepwater
Horizon, a mobile offshore drilling unit in the Gulf of Mexico.
Eleven workers were killed, 17 were injured, and--setting into
motion, therefore, an environmental disaster of virtually
unprecedented proportions. It's estimated that millions of
gallons of oil have leaked to date--and, in fact, who really
knows?--causing irreparable harm to our economy, coastal
communities, fragile wetlands, and workers' livelihoods.
Our goal at today's hearing is to learn more about why BP,
Transocean, and Federal regulators were so unprepared for this
accident. Why did they rely on a single type of technology--in
this case, I'm looking at companies--that might prevent a
blowout? Perhaps there is more than one, or research is being
done on more than one; I don't know, but I want to find out.
And, once the blowout happened, why weren't they ready to
respond?
And, to be honest, I'm curious as to whether the companies
took shortcuts. I'm familiar with shortcuts, because I come
from West Virginia, where there are a lot of coal mines, and,
in bad times, people take shortcuts. ``Profits before safety''
is just the way the world works.
A lot of pressure on workers--pressures for profits, and so
on. That disturbs me.
Unfortunately, it seems to me that drilling has always come
first, and that safety and disaster planning came only second.
It has been 4 weeks since the accident, and BP has finally
figured out how to capture just a very small portion of the
thousands of barrels of oil that continue to pour into the Gulf
each day. It will be many more days, many more weeks, many more
months--who knows, at this point?--before the devastation can
be brought fully to a halt.
Safety and responsibility are enormously important in every
industry. And when workers' lives, entire regional economies,
and vast fragile ecosystems are at stake, safety, good
practice, best practice, must never come second to production
or profit.
Under the Coast Guard's exceptional leadership and
coordination, a widespread search-and-rescue response involved
numerous helicopters, airplanes, ships, saving crewmembers
after the explosion. More than 10,000 personnel--and, in fact,
I--it may be well more than that, I'm not sure--are responding
to this crisis, deploying miles upon miles of oil booms to
protect vulnerable areas. In some cases, they are working to
dilute the oil; in others, they're burning it off the surface
of the water. A joint investigation, from the Coast Guard and
Minerals Management Service, into the cause of the explosion,
and subsequent spill, is underway.
I want to be very clear about my views on this oil spill.
The people who created this terrible mess must be fully
responsible for cleaning it up. And the American taxpayers
should not be asked to foot the bill. On that, I see no
compromise. We deserve a complete and transparent accounting of
exactly what went wrong, and why.
Today, and in the days and months ahead, the American
people will expect full and honest answers from BP, Transocean,
and Halliburton.
I want to close by saying that it's no secret that drilling
on the Outer Continental Shelf has been a subject of heated
debate for several decades. Today, there are approximately 278
active offshore drilling pieces at work.
The Administration's proposal to increase energy
exploration in--on the Outer Continental Shelf will likely lead
to more offshore drilling units in the future, and that does
concern me. If left unchecked and uncorrected, we may very well
see another terrible disaster of this magnitude. And if they
happen once every 10 years--it takes 10, 15, 20 years to
recover from the last one, so--you know, saying it doesn't
happen very often doesn't carry a lot of water with me--if it
happens at all, that's what matters.
And until we can fully investigate this instance, I will
have a hard time supporting any future offshore drilling.
I want to welcome our witnesses today, two of them before
us in the first panel. And that is: Admiral Thad Allen, a
Commandant of the Coast Guard for whom I have enormous respect,
and the national incident commander for the Gulf oil spill, who
is meant to retire, but I hope is going to stay on a little bit
longer.
With only 1 week left as Commandant, Admiral Allen--you're
kind of the combatant commander. You're facing this challenge
with the same strength and vision that have been the hallmark
of your service to our Nation. It's a very military effort, in
some ways, and a--very scientific, in others.
Dr. Jane Lubchenco, the superb Administrator of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, is our other
witnesses on the first panel, and we're very proud of her.
Mr. Lamar McKay, Chairman and President of BP America; and
Mr. Steven Newman, President and CEO of Transocean; and Dr.
Deborah French-McCay, a Zoologist and Biological Oceanographer,
by training, with extensive expertise on the effects of oil and
other pollutants on open-ocean and coastal ecosystems. The last
three will be our second panel.
Thank you all for coming.
And I turn now to my partner on this committee, Senator
Hutchison.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I certainly appreciate that we are holding this hearing
today, because this is a story that is continuing to grip the
American public and all Members of Congress, as well.
As we examine the responses to this spill, I want to make
sure we do not forget the 11 individuals who lost their lives
in this accident.
This hearing is an important step in sorting through the
lessons, from the accident, that we have learned since April 20
and to ensure that all appropriate actions are being taken to
respond to the ongoing spill. Equally important, it is critical
that everyone involved in the offshore oil industry learns from
this tragedy so that we can prevent any such accidents in the
future.
Naturally, we are all concerned about the potential
environmental and economic impacts caused by the oil spill. We
expect that the responsible parties will stand by their
commitments to pay for both the clean-up costs and economic
damages. I agree with the Chairman's statement that taxpayers
should not be asked to spend any part of the Treasury of the
United States in this clean-up.
But, we also cannot be shortsighted. Offshore oil and gas
development is vital to both our current and future economic
and national security. The drilling operations in the waters
off our Nation's shores currently account for about 27 percent
of America's total oil production, and 15 percent of our
domestic natural gas production.
Not only does this generate billions of dollars in economic
activity and thousands of jobs for Americans, it significantly
reduces our dependence on foreign oil. This oil spill should
serve as a clarion call for safer drilling, but not as a reason
to halt development of this critical energy source that helps
us reduce our reliance on foreign sources of energy.
According to the Congressional Research Service, the Outer
Continental Shelf is rich in natural resources, containing over
85 billion barrels of undiscovered, recoverable oil. This
represents over half of the Nation's entire endowment of
recoverable oil. Additionally, the OCS contains 420 of the
1,400 trillion cubic feet of undiscovered recoverable, clean-
burning natural gas in the United States. These figures
represent significant resource potential for our country. This
energy translates into jobs and will enhance economic and
national security. Development of these resources can mean more
revenue for cities, states, and the Federal Government, and
less reliance on foreign energy sources. These energy resources
are critical for our country, and it is our responsibility to
ensure safe and responsible environmental pursuing of these
resources.
Let me just say that I also agree with the Chairman
regarding Admiral Allen. Admiral, you have presided over the
transformation of the Coast Guard. It has become a more
military, more nationally security-based part of our defense
structure. And you have done yeoman's service.
I am afraid that you are going to be extended in the
position--I know--looks resigned on your face--but I know that
you'll answer the call of the President to stay as the
coordinator of this particular accident, because you have done
a great job, so far, under very grueling circumstances. But, we
must continue until this oil spill is stopped, and you are the
one who has the experience to do it. So, I do hope that you
will stay and see it through, even though I know it will be a
personal sacrifice for you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hutchison.
Senator Cantwell, not being here, as head of the Oceans
chair--Subcommittee Chair--Senator Snowe.
And might I just inform my colleagues that, after Senator
Snowe and Senator Cantwell, if she comes, which I'm sure she
will speak, then everybody will have a chance to speak, but we
have to exercise what we call 3-minute restraint. Otherwise,
our witnesses will get up and walk out.
STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
convening this hearing on this catastrophe that has tragically
claimed 11 lives, could devastate an entire ecosystem for
decades, and has been characterized by an abundance of failure,
of staggering proportions.
As Ranking Member of the Subcommittee that oversees the two
lead agencies that are before us today--represented by Admiral
Allen, as Commandant of the Coast Guard, and Dr. Lubchenco, as
NOAA Administrator--it's astonishing that these two key
agencies, the most knowledgeable, and with the most expertise
in a variety of areas, including marine biology, and
environmental sensitivities--have not had a mandatory statutory
role in the permitting process of offshore oil and gas
development. Unfortunately, this process has relegated these
two agencies, and in my opinion, to the back bench--an
egregious mistake that could have ultimately averted this
catastrophe.
According to the New York Times, the Minerals Management
Service, the Federal agency that does the permitting on
offshore oil and gas activity, rubber-stamped 346 permits since
January of 2009, including the one for the Deepwater Horizon
well, even though they lacked the environmental assessments and
permits required by NOAA.
Meanwhile, Dr. Lubchenco--and I want to commend her for
this--provided accurate comments on the future drilling plans
of the Minerals Management Service between 2010 and 2015. She
stated that that MMS had underestimated the environmental
impacts, had cherry-picked the data to understate the risks as
well, and blatantly ignored 12 million gallons of oil that was
spilled during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in its risk
assessment, all of which went unheeded.
Dr. Lubchenco, you and the Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral
Allen, who is very well versed in managing disasters off the
Gulf Coast, and has demonstrated exceptional leadership--and we
appreciate your willingness to continue, Admiral Allen, in the
capacity of overseeing and managing this disaster, as well--I
want to commend both of you, because we know these are very
difficult circumstances, in trying to understand the
ramifications and the dimensions of this oil spill.
Meanwhile, the reactions of BP and Transocean to this
calamity have been severely understated. They have attempted to
downplay the extent of this calamity, and certainly soft-
pedaled the potential worst-case scenario when they first filed
their exploration plan.
Just a few weeks ago, on April 28, in the Wall Street
Journal, a BP spokesman called the spill ``stable,'' and said
it was moving farther away from the coastline, a claim that now
seems preposterous, as oil is now washing ashore in Louisiana
and Mississippi, and possibly as far afield as Key West,
Florida, where 20 tar balls have been found. I know it hasn't
been determined yet, but this points to the serious concern:
that oil could enter the Loop Current which would then carry it
into the Gulf Stream and then up the Atlantic coast.
Mr. Chairman, I truly think that what is going to be
required in this instance is to ensure that NOAA and the Coast
Guard have an integral role in the decisionmaking process. I
will propose that they are at the table during the permitting
process and the development so that the Minerals Management
Service cannot turn a blind eye to the vital input from these
critical agencies. They're integral to this process.
We should have the best of the ocean scientists analyzing
this situation, which I understand BP is now preventing, in
terms of understanding the dimensions of this problem, and the
amount of oil that has been spilled.
So, I think that it is critical for both of these agencies
to be involved, from day one. And, it has to be required
through statute. The Coast Guard is the lead response agency in
the Federal Government to oil spills to the marine environment,
and to oil spills from vessels, but not for underwater sea
operations, like the Deepwater Horizon rig, which is tasked to
the Minerals Management Service.
As we now know, the MMS approved a response plan that did
not provide for any mitigation or any solution to a potential
problem like we have today, the failure of this blowout
preventer, in the depths that we're talking about. In fact,
Secretary Napolitano indicated yesterday that the Federal
Government doesn't even have a solution or the capability to
deal with a spill at this depth.
Also, I believe the expertise embedded in both of these
agencies is also derived from the oil spill drills that are
required every 3 years, the most recent of which occurred in my
home State of Maine--in Portland, Maine--just 2 months ago. I
happen to think that all of the information and the responses
that are developed through these drills should be incorporated
and brought to bear in the regulatory process.
Similarly, I think we should apply it to industry. The
industry should be working out true worst-case scenarios so
that, if the worst-case scenario should arise, they're not
solving the problem by trial and error.
So, these are the things that I'm going to be proposing,
Mr. Chairman, because I happen to think it's very critical that
we have available to us all of the expertise that's embedded
and incorporated throughout our Federal agencies, and certainly
most represented by the two agencies before us today, so that
we can, one, immediately take any and all actions necessary to
literally turn the tide on this epic spill; and then, second,
overhaul our practices and review our statutes so that we can
prevent a reoccurrence in the future.
I share your position, with respect to liability.
Absolutely, the taxpayers should not be on the hook for
assuming the financial responsibilities of this clean-up and to
mitigate this serious crisis.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Snowe follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Olympia J. Snowe, U.S. Senator from Maine
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This catastrophe that claimed eleven lives
and could devastate an entire ecosystem for decades has been
characterized by an abundance of failure and an ineffectiveness of
truly staggering proportions. As Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on
Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard, I find it astonishing
that NOAA and the Coast Guard have not been given a mandatory statutory
role in permitting offshore oil and gas development. Relegating them to
the back bench is an egregious mistake that could have helped avert
this devastation.
According to the New York Times, the Minerals Management Service--
the Federal agency that permits offshore oil and gas activity--has
rubber-stamped 346 drilling plans since January 2009, including one for
the Deepwater Horizon rig, even though they lacked the environmental
permits required by NOAA. Meanwhile, Dr. Lubchenco, the accurate
comments you submitted on the MMS's proposed 5-Year offshore drilling
program for 2010 through 2015--saying MMS understated environmental
impacts, and that it cherry-picked its data to understate risk,
blatantly ignoring the nearly 12 million gallons of oil that spilled
during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in its risk assessments--have gone
unheeded. Now you and the Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral Allen, who is
regrettably well-versed in managing disasters along the Gulf Coast, are
left to manage what is rapidly becoming one of the worst offshore oil
spills the world has ever seen.
Meanwhile, the reactions of BP and Transocean to this calamity have
been little more than a series of efforts to downplay its severity.
Notably:
In an article in the Wall Street Journal on April 28, BP
called the spill ``stable'' and said it was moving farther away
from the coastline--a claim that now seems preposterous as oil
is fouling shores in Louisiana and Mississippi and possibly as
far afield as Key West Florida where 20 tar balls were found
potentially brought by a current that could carry the oil into
the Gulf Stream and up the Atlantic coast.
In the face of suggestions that the actual amount of oil
leaking may be as high as 80,000 barrels per day, sixteen times
the current estimate, BP is stonewalling, with a spokesman
saying to scientists requesting to do an assessment ``the
answer is no to that.''
A ``60 Minutes'' report that aired this weekend quoted a
worker from the rig asserting that prior to the accident, BP
and Transocean were pushing to drill faster, ignoring potential
problems with their most vital piece of equipment, the blowout
preventer, including the appearance of shards of rubber from a
key safety device that were shot to the surface in drilling
fluid.
A 2007 report by former Secretary of State James Baker--
commissioned in the aftermath of a 2005 refinery fire in Texas
City, Texas, that took the lives of 15 employees--found that
``BP did not effectively incorporate safety into management
decisionmaking'' and ``tended to have a short-term focus . . .
without defining safety expectations, responsibilities, or
accountabilities.
Frankly, BP's response to this spill shouldn't be surprising since
the company has continuously soft-pedaled the potential extent of
damage. When the company first filed its exploration plan for this
well, it stated that the ``worst-case scenario'' would not exceed
162,000 gallons spilled per day. Now the estimate is, of course,
210,000 gallons per day. And earlier this month, BP executives
themselves said this spill could be a release of up to 2.5 million
gallons per day, more than fifteen times the estimate provided in its
exploration plan.
As the agency tasked with managing our living marine resources and
carrying out fundamental oceanographic research, NOAA clearly
understands the dangers inherent in offshore oil and gas activities.
The Coast Guard is also well-versed in spill response, serving as the
lead agency for the Federal response to oil spills in the marine
environment and approving all oil spill response plans from vessels,
but not undersea operations like the Deepwater Horizon well--this task
falls to the MMS. I see no reason why these two inherently similar
practices should be handled by different agencies, particularly when
MMS is willing to approve response plans--as it did in this case--
despite the fact that it contained no description of how a blowout of
this magnitude would be dealt with, and as the Secretary of Homeland
Security admitted yesterday, the government does not have the
capability to deal with a spill at this depth.
Yet, there has been no Federal mandate for NOAA or the Coast Guard
to be an integral part of developing from the ground up the assessments
that govern offshore exploration. I find it shocking that our Nation's
best ocean scientists would be relegated to the sidelines during
development of such a strategy instead of being involved from day one.
I intend to make it a requirement for NOAA and the Coast Guard to be at
the table when these permits are approved so MMS will not be able to
simply turn a blind eye to the vital input of these agencies.
Part of this expertise comes from spill response drills held every
3 years, the most recent of which took place in Portland, Maine, 2
months ago. Lessons learned from these drills must be brought to bear
on the regulatory and response processes. The industry must take
similar actions to demonstrate to the satisfaction of regulators and
the American public that when true worst-case scenarios arise, we will
not be left to solve the problem by trial-and-error.
I cannot put into words my horror at the extent of this tragedy
that could change the fundamental makeup of Gulf Coast communities for
generations. This is a failure on innumerable levels, and we must do
all in our power to ensure that those responsible are held to account
and we bring all available expertise to bear on future decisions about
offshore drilling activities. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Snowe.
Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, it took Senator Boxer and me
several days of insisting before BP would release any
additional video. They have. I have put it on my website. And
yet, it is video only of the leaks coming out of the riser, not
out of the main wellhead. So, we look forward to additional
video being released so that we can get the scientific
community to give us a more accurate estimate of how much is
actually going in.
Now, Dr. Lubchenco just told me that the aerial surveys
show that some of the oil is getting into the Loop Current. She
will know by the end of the day whether that is confirmed, or
not.
But, I want to show the Committee what this does. In 5
days--this, of course, being the spill, and this portion coming
to the south--it gets--this is the Loop Current, coming up past
the Yucatan Peninsula, up into the northern Gulf of Mexico,
looping around, and then coming around here to the Florida
Keys. This is the southern tip of Florida. This is the Keys of
Florida.
Now, this is an estimate, by the researchers at the
University of South Florida which are some of the best in the
world on currents, of where this oil will go in only 5 days
from now. Now, look where it's going to be in 8 days from now.
On the 26th of May, it has come all the way and is just off
of--past Dry Tortugas, past Key West, and is coming up the Gulf
Stream.
And look where it is in 10 days, Mr. Chairman. In 10 days--
the Gulf Stream, here, hugs the coast of Florida within a mile
of the beach, and it's coming right on up, will continue up,
north of West Palm; right about, Fort Pierce, Florida, it's
about 10 miles offshore. And then the Gulf Stream continues and
parallels the eastern seaboard all the way to Cape Hatteras,
North Carolina, where it leaves and goes across the Atlantic to
Scotland.
Mr. Chairman, this is what we are looking at. It is--my
worst nightmare is apparently becoming reality.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. WICKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. Two points and a brief
statement.
I was told 3 minutes, but I see 2 on my clock. I guess
that'll be a warning.
Humans have been flying for a long time. You'd think by now
we would know how to prevent an airliner from crashing, but
occasionally it happens. You would think, as much as we know,
we'd be able to prevent a levee from breaking, a bridge from
collapsing, or a coal mine disaster; and yet, these things
continue to occur, and continue to be tragic.
Now, if you think we need to shut down all offshore
drilling in the United States of America, perhaps you're not as
concerned about how to make offshore drilling and deepwater
drilling completely safe. But, if you believe, as Senator
Hutchison does, that it's vital for our economy, it's vital for
the standard of living of Americans, as well as other people on
the face of the Earth, that we continue this, then we'd better
learn what we can at these hearings, and in other venues, and
continue the practice of finding out how to make offshore
drilling as safe as humanly possible, realizing there's always
going to be a human involved and there's always going to be a
chance of that.
Now, the other point I want to make, by way of this opening
statement: I noticed that there was a lot to be said about
previous hearings with industry, and a lot of criticism of the
finger-pointing. President Obama had harsh words, Friday, for
the ``ridiculous spectacle,'' those are his words, of all the
industry finger-pointing.
Let me just take issue with my President on that. It may be
embarrassing to listen to. It may make us cringe. But, I think,
to the extent that Congress is here with different viewpoints
at the table, particularly with panel two, Mr. Chairman, I
think the finger-pointing is actually instructive.
If, indeed, one party is more responsible than the other
about this blowout preventer, we need to hear what the rules
are on that, what the practices are, and what they've done
before on that.
If someone was pouring a new kind of concrete down inside
the steel tubing, and that concrete caused extra heat which
caused a problem for the people on the rig; if a premature
decision was made to put saltwater down in that well, rather
than the mud, which would have been a better preventer, then I
appreciate the fact that industry hasn't huddled together and
``gotten their story straight'' and kept it from us.
So, to that extent, it's OK, today, from my point of view,
if industry continues to tell the truth; and if that amounts to
pointing the finger at regulators, at themselves, at others, I
think it helps it all come out in the wash, and helps us arrive
at the truth.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
The Chair of the Oceans Subcommittee is here now.
Senator Cantwell.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
for holding this hearing.
And it's good to see both Dr. Lubchenco and Admiral Allen
here, because there are probably no two people who have dealt
more with the impacts from this than those two individuals. And
I thank you both for your service.
Like my colleagues, I'd like to begin, this afternoon, by
recognizing the most tragic part of the Deepwater Horizon
accident: the 11 workers, who lost their lives. And I'd like to
express my condolences to their families and friends, and say
that, while much of the media attention has moved beyond that,
that it is the loss of those 11 lives that we shouldn't forget.
Whether one chooses to focus on those 11 lives, the oil
spill continues to spread, and the consequences to the economy
and the environment of the coastal region of the Gulf of
Mexico. There is no doubt that the Deepwater Horizon accident
will be, and is continuing to be, devastating.
We must work tirelessly to contain the oil spill and the
damage, because the future of the coastal region depends on it.
But, while we must work tirelessly to figure out what went
wrong, we should also do things differently in the future.
The Exxon Valdez oil spill taught us a great deal. And
while this spill is very different, the warning of the Exxon
Valdez can be very instructive. It taught us that oil spills
can be devastating to many sectors of the economy, tourism and
commercial fisheries. It taught us that the damage can last for
decades, as the oil can still be found on the beaches of Prince
William Sound, even today. And it has taught us that some parts
of the environment may not recover at all. The herring fishery
was wiped out by the Exxon Valdez, and still has not recovered.
I have here a jar of oil rocks that was just given to me,
that was collected last February from the Prince William Sound
beaches, by a fisherman there. Clearly, the legacy of the Exxon
Valdez still lives with us.
Oil spills, like the Exxon Valdez, and now BP and
Transocean's deepwater incident, aren't just a one-time event.
They are destructive, both environmentally and economically,
and last for generations.
So, as we try to get to how we're going to deal with this
particular situation, Mr. Chairman, I hope that we'll also look
for solutions on how we're going to wean ourselves off of our
over-addiction on fossil fuels and continue to look for ways to
create what we're doing now in the safer environment.
The real short-, mid-term, and long-term solution here is
to move beyond petroleum and transition away to other sources,
and to make sure what we're doing today continues to be done in
a safe and effective manner.
I know that my colleagues and I are going to continue to
have hearings in other committees. And I hope that we optimize
on making sure that we are getting a solution to the
environmental impact that is going to be felt from the Gulf for
many years to come.
I thank the Chair.
[The prepared statement of Senator Cantwell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Maria Cantwell, U.S. Senator from Washington
Like many of my colleagues, I'd like to begin this afternoon by
recognizing the most tragic part of the Deepwater Horizon accident--the
eleven workers who lost their lives.
I'd like to express my condolences to their families and friends,
and say that while much of the media attention has moved to the oil
spill and longer-term aftermath of this accident, it is the loss of
those eleven lives that we must never forget.
Whether one chooses to focus on the loss of those eleven lives, the
oil spill that continues to spread, or the looming consequences for the
economy and environment of the coastal Gulf of Mexico, there is no
doubt that the Deepwater Horizon accident has been--and will continue
to be--devastating.
We must work tirelessly to contain the spill and its damage,
because the future of these coastal regions depends on it.
But we must also work tirelessly to figure out what went wrong and
what we should do differently in the future.
The Exxon Valdez oil spill taught us a great deal, and while this
spill is very different, the warnings of Exxon Valdez can be very
instructive:
It taught us that an oil spill can be devastating to many
sectors of the economy, from tourism to commercial fisheries;
It taught us that the damage can last for decades, as oil
can still be found on the beaches of Prince William Sound even
today;
And it taught us that some parts of the environment may not
recover at all, as the herring fishery wiped out by Exxon
Valdez has still not recovered.
I have here a jar of oiled rocks that was collected last February
from Prince William Sound's beaches. Clearly, the legacy of the Exxon
Valdez is still with us.
Oil spills like Exxon Valdez and now BP and Transocean's Deepwater
Horizon incident aren't just a one-time event. Their destruction--both
environmental and economic--lasts for generations.
But we also have to remember a much larger point: the need to wean
America off our unsustainable and increasingly destructive addiction to
fossil fuels.
This slow-motion Katrina must be a wake-up call, and I hope this
time Congress doesn't just hit the snooze button.
The fact is, no amount of drilling will lower our dependence on
foreign oil or lower the prices families pay at the pump.
The real short-, mid-, and long-term solution here is to move
``beyond petroleum'' and transition away from oil to other ways to
power our economy. The only truly fail-safe blowout preventer is not
disturbing the thousands of feet of rock covering highly pressurized
pockets of oil and natural gas.
For this reason, and so many others, we need to put a price on
carbon. It should be gradual. It should be predictable. It should be
reasonable. But we need to do it now.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
Senator LeMieux.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE S. LeMIEUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this hearing.
Thank you both for being here today.
I share the comments of colleagues, Admiral Allen, that we
look forward to your continued service, at least for a short
period of time. Thank you for the good job that you've been
doing.
Just as oil and water do not mix, neither do tar balls and
tourism. We are very concerned, in Florida, as to the effects
of this oil spill upon an industry that brings in more than 80
million people to Florida and is responsible for more than $65
billion worth of economic impact.
My colleague just showed you the charts of the Loop Current
and what that could do to Florida. If it is true the 20 tar
balls that were found in Key West yesterday afternoon are from
this spill, then unfortunately, the oil is further along than
we projected. Unfortunately, that means what we're seeing on
top of the water might not be as bad as what's going on beneath
the water.
I am very concerned, as all my colleagues are, about what
caused this problem and what could have been done. I'm going to
have a lot of questions for you today about what we could have
done better in our government to try to prevent and mitigate
this problem and lessened its environmental impact.
I also want to make sure that we are addressing every
effort possible to prevent this oil from coming ashore, and to
mitigate the damage that it could have to our coasts, along all
the Gulf States, but especially, parochially, for Florida.
I have called upon British Petroleum to set up a billion-
dollar fund that the five states can draw down upon. They have
contributed, I think, now $50 million to each state. That's
good, it is not enough.
I don't want to wait until the oil comes on our shores and
then do something about it and pay claims. I want to do
everything we can to get folks out there--local community
folks--cities, counties, businesses, volunteers, state
government--to try to do everything we can to stop this oil
from coming ashore.
I just saw something, Mr. Chairman, from OSHA, saying that
volunteers should not approach the tar balls, that they should
have hours of training before approaching a tar ball, which
seems a little ridiculous to me. We need to get folks involved
in trying to clean up this spill.
What this could do to Florida, if all of this oil washes
along our shores; what it's going to do to our tourism
industry, what it's going to do to our fishing business, what
it's going to do to recreational boating, what it's going to do
to our environment? It cannot be over-estimated.
I'm going to ask some questions today about why, in my
opinion, it appears that we outsource the responsibility for
cleaning this up. Why should we just rely upon British
Petroleum?
My friend from Mississippi gave instances of a lot of other
things that can go wrong in society: bridges falling, coal
mines incidents, and all sorts of things. Planes falling out of
the sky. I'm not sure, in any of those other situations, we
look for only the party responsible to help solve the problem.
In those other situations, the government takes a leading role.
I would think that we shouldn't outsource our responsibility
for cleaning this up. I would hope that we would have the
ability, within the inside of government, if needed, to help
stop or contain these emergencies to our best of ability.
So, I look forward to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Vitter.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As everyone has stated, this is an ongoing tragedy,
starting with the loss of 11 lives and the horrible impact on
those folks' families, as well as pollution and economic impact
all along the Gulf Coast.
Of course, unfortunately for us, the epicenter right now is
Louisiana. I've visited all of those coastal parishes, met with
fishing communities and others, and have certainly seen that
ongoing impact.
I wanted to focus my participation in this hearing on five
questions. I'm going to outline them here, because we're going
to have a vote soon. I also have a similar hearing in the EPW
Committee, on which I serve. I hope the participants here can
respond to these questions today and/or through follow-up
written answers.
Number one, what is the most up-to-date, precise
information about the flow of oil? We are capturing some of it
now. Presumably, that gives us more ability to measure that.
So, what is the most up-to-date information about the volume of
flow, and the most up-to-date estimate of using the pipe, which
has been successfully connected, to stop the flow?
Number two, why hasn't a fisheries failure been officially
declared under the Magnuson-Stevens Act? It's hard for me to
imagine an event which is a more obvious candidate for the
cause of a fisheries failure. This would give immediate help to
our fisheries, not letting BP off the hook, but would offer
some immediate help.
Number three, under the OPA Act, Section 2713(f) mandates
that the President set up a loan program to help fisherman and
fishery-dependent businesses. This is not an option, it is a
mandate. It is not to get BP off the hook for any damages, it's
to get more immediate help, in the meantime, to our fisherman
and fisheries as those damages are being settled. So, I'd urge
the President to act on this mandate, and I'd like your
response to that.
Number four, I'm concerned about the deployment of boom
being inequitable between states, and still only ramping up.
I've talked, several times, with Admiral Allen, and I
appreciate his work, which has made it better. But, I'd love an
update on that.
And, number five, what is the timeline along which,
Admiral, you and the Corps and others will make a decision
regarding the emergency dredging buildup of Barrier Island
proposal, that we have talked about, that I think could be a
considerable help in protecting the Louisiana coastline?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
And now, Senator Thune.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Hutchison, for holding this hearing today.
And I, too, want to express my condolences to the families
who lost loved ones. This was a tragedy on so many levels.
Today's hearing, of course, along with the hearings that
are being held in the other committees of jurisdiction, is an
important part of learning why this disaster happened, and what
can be done to make sure that this type of oil spill never
happens again.
We also, I think, need to closely scrutinize the response
of our Federal agencies. Obviously, BP is the responsible party
for this oil spill, but the Federal Government has the ultimate
responsibility to ensure that all the appropriate safety
measures were followed and all the available resources are,
indeed, being deployed in response to this spill.
As we speak, there are a few thousand, and potentially tens
of thousands, of barrels of oil that are leaking into the Gulf
of Mexico each day, and this leak is going to continue for the
foreseeable future, causing environmental and economic damage
that will last for several years to come.
About one-third of our U.S. oil production comes from the
Gulf. In coming years more of the Gulf Coast oil production
will come from deepwater wells, such as the well that was
drilled by BP and its partner companies. So, clearly we cannot
remove deepwater oil production from our current or future
energy supply. And clearly we can't continue with business as
usual, either, in terms of regulating offshore energy
production.
While continuing an aggressive response to the oil spill,
we must move forward as quickly as possible with reasonable and
effective measures that will protect our environment, our
coastal communities, and our supply of domestic energy.
I want to, Mr. Chairman, thank our witnesses for being with
us today. And I look forward to working with members of this
committee.
I do think, and to the degree that I've got a gazillion
questions here, like I think everyone else does, and it's going
to be hard, probably, for us to get them all in today but, I,
too, am interested in knowing, Admiral, about the issue about
fire-resistant boom, and how much was pre-positioned, and how
that, even now, is working, and what we're doing to try and
prevent the oil from leaking further. I'm interested in knowing
what BP has publicly stated, I think, that it'll cover all
legitimate claims of economic damage associated with the oil
spill, but I'm very interested in knowing what is the
historical standard for determining what a legitimate claim is
for economic damages associated with an oil spill.
As I said, Mr. Chairman, I have a series of other
questions, that, if I can't get them in today, will try and get
them asked for the record.
But, I do appreciate the opportunity to hear from our
witnesses today and to get to the bottom of why this occurred
and what we can do to prevent it in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Thune follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John Thune, U.S. Senator from South Dakota
I would like to thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for holding
today's hearing.
Today's hearing, along with hearings in the other committees of
jurisdiction, is an important part of learning why this disaster
happened and what can be done to make sure this type of oil spill never
happens again.
We must also closely scrutinize the response of our Federal
agencies. Although British Petroleum is the responsible party for this
oil spill, the Federal Government has the ultimate responsibility to
ensure that all the appropriate safety measures were followed and all
the available resources are indeed being deployed in response to this
spill.
As we speak, a few thousand to potentially tens of thousands of
barrels of oil are leaking into the Gulf of Mexico each day.
This leak will likely continue for the foreseeable future causing
environmental and economic damage that will last for several years to
come.
About one-third of U.S. oil production comes from the Gulf of
Mexico. In coming years, more of the Gulf Coast oil production will
come from deepwater wells such as the well drilled by BP and its
partner companies.
Clearly we cannot remove deep water oil production from our current
future energy supply, and clearly we cannot continue with business as
usual in terms of regulating offshore energy production.
While continuing an aggressive response to the oil spill, we must
move forward as quickly as possible with reasonable and effective
measures that will protect our environment, our coastal communities,
and our supply of domestic energy.
I thank our witnesses for joining us today, and I look forward to
working with the members of this committee as we improve our approach
to offshore oil and gas exploration.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Pryor.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Hutchison. Thank you all for doing this hearing.
Stopping the gush of the oil spill has been marred by
guesswork, failures, frustration, and now a partial solution.
Cleaning up this mess will be an even more daunting challenge.
This is not the first hearing that has been held in the
Senate on the response efforts, and I'm sure it won't be the
last. And BP and other companies involved in this spill, of
course, will have their feet held to the fire.
But, today I want to just make a few points. And I'd love
to hear from the witnesses very soon.
I understand that BP has agreed to pay all legitimate
claims for the clean-up costs and personal business losses.
During the hearing, I hope that we get a better understanding
of what constitutes a legitimate claim. BP should be prepared
to go beyond the $75-million statutory cap. BB--BP should pay
the cost of oil spills in full, with no equivocation. And, if
you think that the taxpayers are upset about the Wall Street
bailout, just wait until they learn that they may have to pay
for cleaning up this economic and ecological disaster on our
coastline.
Second, I'm also troubled by Transocean's decision to try
to limit its liabilities to the $27 million in salvage value
for the destroyed rig. Several newspapers are reporting that
Transocean had insured the rig for $560 million, but apparently
never spent that much money actually building it. Since the rig
collapsed and is now on the ocean floor, the company said it
has already received $401 million for their--or, from their
insurance policy.
And finally, I'm disturbed by the February 2009 document
that BP submitted to the Minerals Management Service. It
states, ``A blowout, resulting in an oil spill is unlikely to
have an impact, because industry equipment, technology, and
response plans were up to the task.'' And we need to not only
look at the failures here, but to ensure that this company, and
others in the future, don't make these same series of mistakes
in the future.
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I really look forward to
having this hearing today.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Pryor follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Mark Pryor, U.S. Senator from Arkansas
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Hutchison, on April 20, 2010, an
explosion occurred at the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform in the
Gulf of Mexico. The explosion killed 11 workers, caused a significant
fire disabling the facility and lead to a full evacuation. The fire
continued to burn until the platform sank into the Gulf on April 22.
I regret the loss of life and my condolences go out to the families
of these people.
At last week's hearings, BP, Transocean and Halliburton pointed
fingers at each other. Just 2 weeks ago, I questioned Goldman Sachs
executives who came before Congress and gave excuses, parsed words, and
declared they had no responsibility for the mortgage market meltdown
and global financial crisis. Whether it be a bank or an oil company,
shifting the blame is not acceptable.
I understand that BP has agreed to pay all legitimate claims for
the clean-up cost and personal and business losses. However, BP's costs
should not be limited to the $75 million statutory cap.
I am also troubled by Transocean's decision to try to limit its
liabilities to the $27 million salvage value of the destroyed rig.
Several newspapers are reporting that Transocean had insured the rig
for $560 million, but apparently never spent that much money actually
building it. Since the rig collapsed, the company said they've already
received $401 million from their insurance policy.
The American taxpayers should not have to pay for cleaning up this
ecological disaster. The ``blame game'' must stop. Congress will get to
the bottom of this accident and, when we do, we will know who is at
fault.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And Senator Begich.
And, Senator Begich, I'm going to be voting now, so that--
you will chair----
Senator Begich. Yes.
The Chairman.--until Senator Nelson comes back.
Senator Begich [presiding]. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much. I'll make some comments, and then
we'll--I'm assuming, go right to you folks for your comments.
I'll look to staff to help me--direct me; if not, that's the
way it's going to be.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK BEGICH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Begich. First, thank you both for being here.
Thanks, for the next panel, also.
And someone from Alaska--as a Senator from Alaska, you
know, we have experienced a spill of incredible magnitude
before, so we understand what this may entail, and what it
could entail over the long haul.
But, first, to the 11 workers that perished, and to the
families, we express--I express my condolences for their loss
and their tragedy that they're going through as we're dealing
with the larger issue of the clean-up, but not to forget the
families, but also the many future impacts of the families and
the businesses and individuals' livelihoods that, again, from
Alaska's experience, we have seen it, still, 20 years later and
beyond, that are having an incredible impact.
I also--I want to just put on the record, I want to thank a
lot of Alaskans, from the businesses as well as the Air Force
and many of our Department of Defense folks, that have stepped
up to the plate, in an enormous amount of resource and effort.
Admiral Allen, I'm--I know you're stepping down as
Commandant soon, but your experience and understanding of these
types of tragedies is a valuable asset. And I thank you for
continuing to be the incident commander in this situation.
It is a tragedy. And I think these hearings, may they be
plentiful as we go through the next process--part of this is to
learn and understand what went wrong, what kind of resources we
need to have on our side of the equation, but, also, from the
industry side, what they need to be doing better.
There is no question in my mind that, when it comes to
offshore development, this country needs to be the best of the
best. There should be no hesitation in utilizing whatever
resource we can, ensuring that the agencies that are in the
Federal Government have the investment in research and other
issues.
I know, Administrator Lubchenco, we've talked about that a
lot, about NOAA's role, not only here, what's going on down in
the Gulf, but in the Arctic, and the future potential of what's
going to go on up there. So, I'm anxious to hear, as we go
through this testimony, but also through the efforts we're
going to have over the next several months, is my guess, of
what we can do to improve our technology and advance our
technology.
It is realistic--it is not realistic to think that we will
not have OCS. There will be OCS development. The question is,
How do we manage that in the right way in our overall energy
plans and energy structure for this country?
So, first, again, I want to thank you for all the efforts
you all are doing with ``all hands on deck,'' is the way I
describe it. So, thank you for your participation today, even
though the spill is moving forward very aggressively, and the
efforts down there. So, thank you very much.
I'm going to close my comments.
And, Senator Kerry--have you spoken already, Senator Kerry?
Senator Kerry. No, I'm going to----
Senator Begich. I will turn it to you next.
Senator Kerry. Thank you.
Have you voted?
Senator Begich. I have voted the first one.
Senator Kerry. OK.
Senator Begich. Have you----
Senator Kerry. All right.
Senator Begich. You've done that also?
Senator Kerry. Beg your pardon?
Senator Begich. You've done the first vote, too?
Senator Kerry. Yes.
Senator Begich. Yes.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Kerry [presiding]. Dr. Lubchenco and Admiral Allen,
thanks for being here with us today. We appreciate it. We know
you've been unbelievably busy and enormously concerned and
involved in trying to manage this challenge.
This an important hearing to try to understand, not just
the current status of the clean-up efforts, obviously, but
really to explore what policies and requirements are needed to
prevent this from happening again, to stop history from
repeating itself.
And this committee has an important jurisdiction, an
important oversight role to play. We have jurisdiction over the
two Federal agencies that hold the primary responsibility for
the oil spills--that is, the clean-up and the, sort of,
management of them--as well as understanding the impact of
those spills on marine and coastal environment.
I agree with Senator Begich and others, you know, given our
dependency on oil, given the nature of our economy and life in
America and the world, it's just unrealistic for anybody to
assume that suddenly drilling is going to stop. It's not. And
for the next 20, 30, 40 years, even if we make our very best
efforts, with respect to alternative and renewable and
efficiency and clean coal technology or whatever the options
are going to be--nuclear, et cetera--we're still going to be
drilling, and we're still going to be reliant on some fossil
fuels.
The President has already made it clear that change is
needed, at the agency level. And he has accepted Secretary
Salazar's judgment to split the MMS into two pieces so that
regulators are no longer also making the deal with the industry
on the leasing itself, but they're making changes to the
leadership itself. And it's going to be up to this committee to
exercise the oversight and ask the tough questions to find out
whether other changes are required, as well.
Over the past 72 hours, we are pleased to note that it
seems that significant progress has been made in slowing the
flow of oil in the--to the surface, by inserting the tube into
the pipe from which most of the oil has been leaking. And BP
has indicated plans to seal off the well, hopefully as early as
this weekend. And we obviously wish them well and hope that
that will happen.
So, while I'm encouraged by that progress, obviously the
chart showed by our colleague Senator Nelson has always been of
concern with respect to the potential of the spills in the
Gulf. And we all have very significant concerns about what went
wrong on board Deepwater Horizon that has resulted in economic
and environmental harm to the Gulf and to the coastal
communities. And some of that is not even yet capable of being
fully measured.
I'm also deeply concerned, personally, as the former Chair
of the Ocean Subcommittee, and a continued member of it for
some 26 years here, about the potential disruption of the
underwater ecosystem, particularly due to the application of
toxic underwater dispersants. I think there are serious
questions about the impact of those dispersants on living
organisms in the Gulf and perhaps even, depending on what
happens with currents, elsewhere.
As we work to develop the legislation that's going to
create a vibrant clean energy future for our Nation--and let me
just say, I want to recognize this, that BP and other oil
companies have been an important and constructive part of
working toward that with us, and we're grateful for that--but,
we have to get serious about the management and oversight of
our energy resources, overall.
I'm frustrated by the finger-pointing that appears to have
dominated the public discourse over the disaster. That's the
easy stuff, folks. What's harder is to bear down and figure out
what the options are, and execute on them. We need to quickly
and honestly clarify what went wrong, determine whether there
was carelessness or negligence, evaluate the extent of the
damages, identify who's responsible to cover what costs.
And on this point, let me say, I'm encouraged by BP's
statements, which I think have been forthcoming and direct,
that they will provide full compensation.
But, Mr. Chairman, one point, which I feel very strongly
about, is that, no matter what BP does, no matter what any oil
company does, on our current course, so long as we are
dependent on fossil fuels imported from elsewhere for the bulk
of our energy needs, we will continue to run a set of risks--
not always the same as what we've just witnessed in the Gulf,
but some may even be riskier, in some ways.
Today, as we speak, tankers are moving through narrow
straits around the globe, some of them bordering dangerous
countries with dangerous intentions, in order to bring oil to
our shores, from abroad. These are also oil spills waiting to
happen, as we've seen in the past.
And it seems to me that we need to understand that there is
a huge impact to the downside to America's economy in sending
$1 billion a day, or more, abroad to other nations, some of
which are not particularly friendly to the United States. I
don't know how many Americans know it, but we pay an Iran tax
for our current policy. Every day, $100 million goes to Iran
today, even as we are poised to sanction them with respect to
nuclear proliferation. We do that because of our dependency on
oil for transportation in this country. So, the risks should
surprise no one.
I was, frankly, amazed to hear some people, in the wake of
what happened in the Gulf, say that this spill made passing
energy independence legislation this year even more difficult.
I honestly don't understand that kind of reasoning. I don't
know where the connection to common sense is in that statement.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
If the Gulf events tell us anything, it ought to be the
opposite. This disaster ought to force Congress and the
Administration to revisit our existing laws governing
liability, safety, permitting, preparedness, and environmental
review when it comes to offshore exploration. But, make no
mistake, above all else, it ought to drive a serious national
dialogue and a debate and action on legislation this year to
advance our energy independence, which strengthens our national
security; create jobs here at home, that can't be exported, by
producing our energy here at home--the jobs stay here, and the
energy stays here; and finally, we will advance our Nation's
clean energy future by doing something that we used to do and
take for granted, which was called reducing pollution.
Hopefully, that will be the outcome of what happened in the
Gulf.
Senator LeMieux, have you--you've had your opening?
Senator LeMieux. I have.
Senator Kerry. And, Senator Begich, you've had your
opening.
So, I think what we should do is go into the questioning,
then----
Voice: When do the witnesses give statements?
Senator Kerry. Oh. Excuse me. We have the witnesses. Oh,
well, the heck with the witnesses. Let's just question them.
[Laughter.]
Senator Kerry. You're absolutely correct.
So, Dr. Lubchenco, if you would lead off.
And, Admiral Allen, thank you for your patience, we
appreciate it.
If you want to summarize your statement, we'll put the full
text in the record as if read in full. And then--you saw a lot
of Senators here. They will be coming back after this vote, and
there'll be a fairly significant amount of questions, I'm sure.
[The prepared statement of Senator Kerry follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John F. Kerry,
U.S. Senator from Massachusetts
Mr. Chairman, this is a critical hearing for both the short-term
and the long haul, both to help us understand the current status of
clean-up efforts in the Gulf, but also to explore what policies and
requirements are needed to prevent history from repeating itself.
This committee has an important oversight role to play. We have
jurisdiction over the two Federal agencies represented here today,
which hold primary responsibility for responding to oil spills, as well
as understanding the impact of those spills on the marine and coastal
environment. Already, the President has made it clear that change is
needed at the agency level--accepting Secretary Salazar's judgment to
split MMS into two pieces so that the regulators are no longer also
making deals with the industries on leasing, but also making changes in
the leadership itself. It will be up to this committee to exercise
oversight and ask tough questions to find out whether other changes are
required as well.
Mr. Chairman, over the past 72 hours, it seems that significant
progress has been made in slowing the flow of oil to the surface by
inserting a tube into the pipe from which most of the oil has been
leaking. In addition, BP has indicated plans to seal off the well as
early as this weekend.
While I am encouraged by this progress, I have significant concerns
regarding what went wrong aboard the Deepwater Horizon, resulting in
economic and environmental harm to the Gulf and its coastal communities
which is not yet even capable of being measured. I also am deeply
concerned about the potential disruption of the underwater ecosystem--
particularly due to the application of toxic underwater dispersants.
As we work to develop legislation that would create a vibrant clean
energy future for our Nation, we must get serious about the management
and oversight of our energy resources. I am frustrated by the finger-
pointing that has dominated the public discourse over this disaster. We
need to quickly and honestly clarify what went wrong, determine whether
there was any carelessness or negligence, evaluate the extent of the
damages, and identify who is responsible to cover what costs. On this
final point, I am encouraged by BP's statements that they will provide
full compensation.
But Mr. Chairman, one point about which I feel very strongly, is
that no matter what BP does, no matter what any oil company does, so
long as we're dependent on fossil fuels for the bulk of our energy
needs, we're in danger. Today--as we speak--tankers are moving through
narrow straits around the globe to bring oil to our shores from abroad.
Those are oil spills waiting to happen. So long as we're so dependent,
we'll be drilling deeper and deeper and shipping oil farther and
farther. The risk should surprise no one.
I was stunned to hear some say the spill made passing energy
independence legislation this year more difficult. Nothing should be
further from the truth. Quite the opposite--this disaster should force
Congress and the Administration to revisit our existing laws governing
liability, safety, permitting, preparedness and environmental review
when it comes to offshore exploration--but make no mistake, above all
else, it should also drive a serious national dialogue and a debate on
legislation this year to advance our Nation's clean energy future.
STATEMENT OF HON. JANE LUBCHENCO, Ph.D.,
UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR OCEANS AND
ATMOSPHERE AND NOAA ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Dr. Lubchenco. Thank you, Senator.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify on behalf of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration about NOAA's
role in the response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
I greatly appreciate the opportunity to discuss the
critical roles that NOAA serves during oil spills, and the
importance of maximizing our contributions to protect and
restore the resources, communities, and economies that are
affected by this tragic event.
Before I move to discuss NOAA's efforts, I want to first
express my condolences to the family--families of the 11 people
who lost their lives in the explosion and the sinking of the
Deepwater Horizon. This is, indeed, a difficult time, and our
thoughts are with them as we work aggressively to deal with the
aftermath of the explosion.
NOAA's mission is to understand and predict changes in the
Earth's environment, and conserve and manage coastal and marine
resources to meet our Nation's economic, social, and
environmental needs.
NOAA is also a natural resource trustee and one of the
Federal agencies responsible for protecting and restoring the
public's coastal natural resources when they are affected by
oil spills or other hazardous-substance releases. As such, the
entire agency is deeply concerned about the immediate and long-
term environmental, economic, and social impacts to the Gulf
Coast and the Nation, as a whole, from the Deepwater Horizon
oil spill.
NOAA's experts have been assisting with the response from
the very beginning of this oil spill, providing coordinated
scientific weather and biological response services when and
where they are needed most. Offices throughout the agency have
been mobilized, and hundreds of NOAA personnel are dedicating
themselves to assist.
Over the past few weeks, NOAA has provided 24/7 scientific
support to the U.S. Coast Guard in its role as Federal on-scene
coordinator, both on scene and through our Seattle operations
center. This NOAA-wide support includes twice-daily
trajectories of the oil spill, information management,
overflight observations and mapping, weather and river flow
forecasts, shoreline and resource risk assessment, and
oceanographic modeling support.
NOAA has also been supporting the Unified Command in
planning for open-water and shoreline remediation and analyses
of various techniques for handling the spill, including open-
water burning, and surface and deepwater application of
dispersants.
Hundreds of miles of coastal shoreline were surveyed to
support clean-up activities. NOAA's National Marine Fisheries
Service is addressing issues related to marine mammals, sea
turtles, seafood safety, and fishery resources, which includes
the closure of commercial and recreational fishing in oil-
affected portions of Federal waters in the Gulf, and updating
the dimensions of the closed area, as necessary, to ensure
fisher and consumer safety without needlessly restricting
productive fisheries in areas that are not affected by the
spill.
As the lead Federal trustee for many of the NOAA's--many of
the Nation's coastal and marine resources, the Secretary of
Commerce, acting through NOAA, is authorized, pursuant to the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, to recover damages on behalf of the
public to address injuries to natural resources resulting from
an oil spill. OPA encourages compensation in the form of
restoration, and this is accomplished through the Natural
Resources Damage Assessment Process by assessing injury and
service loss, then developing a restoration plan that
appropriately compensates the public for injured resources.
NOAA is coordinating the damage assessment effort within the
Department of the Interior as a Federal co-trustee, as well as
co-trustees in five states and representatives for at least one
responsible party, BP.
This event is a grave reminder that spills of national
significance can occur, despite the many improvements that have
been put in place since the passage of the Oil Pollution Act.
Although the best remedy is prevention, oil spills remain a
grave concern, given the offshore and onshore oil
infrastructure, pipes, and vessels that move huge volumes of
oil through our waterways.
To mitigate environmental effects of future spills,
responders must be equipped with sufficient capacity and
capabilities to address the challenge. Response training and
exercises are essential to maintain those capabilities.
Continuous training, improvement of our capabilities,
maintenance of our capacity, and investments in high- priority
response-related research-and-development efforts will ensure
that the Nation's response to these events remains effective.
Training and coordination with other Federal, state, and local
agencies that might have response and restoration
responsibilities is also critical to success in mitigating
effects of future spills.
There are a number of improvements to our ability to
quickly respond to, and mitigate damages from future oil spills
that would benefit the Nation.
One such activity is increasing our response capacity. If
another large spill was to occur simultaneously in another
location in the United States, NOAA would have difficulty
providing the level of response needed. In addition, the use of
simulated drills and the continued development of tools and
strategies can only increase the effectiveness of oil spill
response.
Specific activities that would increase response
effectiveness include updating environmental sensitivity index
maps, data management tools for decisionmaking, use of relevant
technologies, and real-time observation systems.
Research and development is also critical to ensure the
latest scientific--response efforts. Priority areas for future
research and development include fate and behavior of oil
released at depth, long-term effects of oil, responding to
potential oil spills in the Arctic, mapping oil extent, oil
detection in the water column and sea floor, and human
dimensions, including social issues, community effects, and
risk communication methods.
Finally, I would like to assure you that we will not relent
in our efforts to protect the livelihoods of Gulf Coast
residents and mitigate the environmental impacts of the spill.
From the outset, our efforts have been aggressive, strategic,
and science-based. We will continue along that path.
Thank you for the opportunity to focus on NOAA's response
efforts. And I'm happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lubchenco follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jane Lubchenco, Ph.D., Under Secretary of
Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and NOAA Administrator, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
Thank you, Chairman Oberstar and members of the Committee, for the
opportunity to testify on the Department of Commerce National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) role in the response to the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. My name is Dr. Jane Lubchenco and I am the
Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and the
Administrator of NOAA. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the
critical roles NOAA serves during oil spills and the importance of
maximizing our contributions to protect and restore the resources,
communities, and economies affected by this tragic event. Before I move
to discuss NOAA's efforts, I would first like to express my condolences
to the families of the 11 people who lost their lives in the explosion
and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon.
NOAA's mission is to understand and predict changes in Earth's
environment and conserve and manage coastal and marine resources to
meet our Nation's economic, social, and environmental needs. NOAA is
also a natural resource trustee and is one of the Federal agencies
responsible for protecting and restoring the public's coastal natural
resources when they are impacted by oil spills, hazardous substance
releases, and impacts from vessel groundings on corals and seagrass
beds. As such, the entire agency is deeply concerned about the
immediate and long-term environmental, economic, and social impacts to
the Gulf Coast and the Nation as a whole from the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill. NOAA is fully mobilized and working tirelessly 24/7 to lessen
impacts on the Gulf Coast and will continue to do so until the spill is
controlled, the oil is cleaned up, the natural resource damages are
assessed, and the restoration is complete.
My testimony today will discuss NOAA's role in the Deepwater
Horizon response, natural resource damage assessment, and restoration;
NOAA's assets, data, and tools on-scene; the importance of
preparedness; and necessary future actions.
NOAA's Roles During Oil Spills
NOAA has three critical roles mandated by the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 and the National Contingency Plan:
1. Serves as a conduit for scientific information to the
Federal On-Scene Coordinator to provide trajectory predictions
for spilled oil, overflight observations of oil on water,
identification of environmental areas that are highly valued or
sensitive, and shoreline surveys of oil to determine clean-up
priorities.
2. Conduct a joint natural resource damage assessment with
other trustees with the goal of restoring any ocean and coastal
resources harmed by the spill. This includes fulfilling the
role of Natural Resource Trustee for impacted marine resources.
3. Represent Department of Commerce interests in spill response
decisionmaking activities through the Regional Response Team.
The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has the primary responsibility for
managing coastal oil spill response and clean-up activities in the
coastal zone. During an oil spill, NOAA's Scientific Support
Coordinator delivers expert scientific support to the USCG in its role
as Federal On-Scene Coordinator. NOAA's Scientific Support Coordinators
are located around the country in USCG Districts, ready to respond
around the clock to any emergencies involving the release of oil or
hazardous materials into the oceans or atmosphere.
Using experience, expertise, and state-of-the-art technology, NOAA
forecasts the movement and behavior of spilled oil, evaluates the risk
to resources, conducts overflight observations and shoreline surveys,
and recommends protection priorities and appropriate clean-up actions.
NOAA also provides spot weather forecasts, emergency coastal survey and
charting capabilities, aerial and satellite imagery, and real-time
coastal ocean observation data to assist response efforts. Federal,
state, and local entities look to NOAA for assistance, experience,
local perspective, and scientific knowledge.
NOAA serves the Nation by providing expertise and a suite of
products and services critical for making science-based response
decisions that prevent further harm, restore natural resources, and
promote effective planning for future spills. Federal, state, and local
agencies across the country called upon NOAA's Office of Response and
Restoration (OR&R) for scientific support 200 times in 2009.
NOAA's Response Efforts for Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
NOAA's experts have been assisting with the response from the
beginning, providing coordinated scientific weather and biological
response services when and where they are needed most.
At 2:24 a.m. (central time) on April 21, 2010, NOAA's OR&R was
notified by the USCG of an explosion and fire on the Mobile Operating
Drilling Unit (MODU) Deepwater Horizon, approximately 50 miles
southeast of the Mississippi Delta. The explosion occurred at
approximately 10:00 p.m. on April 20, 2010. Two hours, 17 minutes after
notification by the USCG, NOAA provided our first spill forecast
predictions to the Unified Command in Robert, Louisiana. NOAA's
National Weather Service Weather Forecast Office in Slidell, LA,
received the first request for weather support information from the
USCG at 9:10 a.m. on April, 21, 2010 via telephone. The first graphical
weather forecast was sent at 10:59 a.m. to the USCG District Eight
Command Center in New Orleans. Support has not stopped since that first
request for information by the USCG. Over the past few weeks, NOAA has
provided 24/7 scientific support, both on-scene and through our Seattle
Operation Center. This NOAA-wide support includes twice daily
trajectories of the spilled oil, information management, overflight
observations and mapping, weather and river flow forecasts, shoreline
and resource risk assessment, and oceanographic modeling support. NOAA
has also been supporting the Unified Command in planning for open water
and shoreline remediation and analyses of various techniques for
handling the spill, including open water burning and surface and
deepwater application of dispersants. Hundreds of miles of coastal
shoreline were surveyed to support clean-up activities.
Offices throughout the agency have been mobilized and hundreds of
NOAA personnel are dedicating themselves to assist. In addition to
these activities, I would like to highlight several of NOAA's assets
that are assisting with the overall oil spill response and assessment
efforts:
NOAA's National Weather Service is providing critical 24/7
weather support dedicated to the spill, as well as on-site
weather support at multiple command centers. Special aviation
marine wind and wave forecasts are being prepared to support
response activities. A marine meteorologist was deployed to the
Joint Operations Center in Houma, LA, on April, 27, 2010.
Beginning on April 28, 2010, hourly localized ``spot''
forecasts were requested by USCG and NOAA OR&R in support of
oil burns and eventually chemical dispersion techniques. Longer
range forecasts are a critical component to plan containment
and response actions. NOAA's National Data Buoy Center data is
also being incorporated into oil trajectory forecasts.
NOAA's National Ocean Service is providing: custom
navigation products and updated charts to help keep mariners
out of oil areas; updates from NOAA's extensive network of
water-level, meteorological, and near-shore current meters
throughout the Gulf; in-situ observations data; economic
assessment expertise; aerial photo surveys to assess pre- and
post-landfall assessments; and pre- and post-oil contamination
assessments of oysters at Mussel Watch sites.
NOAA's Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research (OAR)
dispatched the R/V Pelican ship along with National Institute
for Undersea Science and Technology cooperative scientists to
collect samples as soon as possible. OAR is advising on
airborne and oceanic dispersion modeling. NOAA and university
scientists are also flying NOAA's P3 hurricane hunter aircraft
to drop expendable probes to map the ocean current, salinity,
and thermal structure from 1,000 m depth to the surface that
will refine and calibrate loop current modeling. These
deployments will be critical for helping to track where the oil
might be headed and whether other areas of the United States
will be impacted by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. In
addition, NOAA-funded Sea Grant programs in Louisiana and other
Gulf Coast states will be awarding grants for rapid response
projects to monitor the effects of the oil spill on Louisiana's
coastal marshes and fishery species.
NOAA's National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is
addressing issues related to marine mammals, sea turtles,
seafood safety, and fishery resources. On May 2, 2010, NMFS
closed commercial and recreational fishing in oil-affected
portions of Federal waters in the Gulf for 10 days. NOAA
scientists are on the ground in the spill area taking water and
seafood samples to ensure the safety of seafood and fishing
activities. On May 7, NMFS made effective an amendment to the
emergency closure rule which adjusted the shape of the closed
area to be more consistent with the actual spill location. On
May 11, 2010, NMFS filed an emergency rule to establish a
protocol to more quickly and effectively revise the closing and
opening of areas affected by the oil spill. Due to the shifting
currents and winds, rapid changes in the location and extent of
the spill are occurring, which requires NMFS to update the
dimensions of the closed area, as necessary, to ensure fisher
and consumer safety without needlessly restricting productive
fisheries in areas that are not affected by the spill. In
addition, NOAA's Marine Animal Health and Stranding Response
Program is assisting the Wildlife Operations Branch of the
Unified Command to provide expertise and support for the
response efforts to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
Established protocols and procedures for treating marine
wildlife impacted by oil have been developed by NOAA and its
partners and are being adapted to address the particular needs
of this event.
NOAA's National Environmental Satellite, Data, and
Information Service is providing satellite imagery from NOAA's
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites and Polar
Operational Environmental Satellites, and is leveraging data
from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and
international satellites to develop experimental and customized
products to assist weather forecasters and oil spill response
efforts. NOAA's National Data Centers are also providing data
from its archives that are being used to help provide mapping
services for the impacted areas, and temperature, salinity,
current, and surface elevation (tides) with forecasts up to 72
hours out from the Navy Global Ocean Coastal Model.
NOAA's Office of Marine and Aviation Operations has 3
aircraft providing support for overflights that are being
conducted on a near daily basis.
The NOAA General Counsel's Office is working closely with
state and Federal co-trustee agencies to undertake a natural
resource damage assessment and other steps to prepare claims
for response costs and damages for natural resource injuries
associated with the oil spill. The Office is also addressing a
wide range of legal questions that arise in conjunction with
the spill.
The NOAA Communications office has provided two to three
communications specialists to assist in the Joint Incident
Center with press and all communications efforts. Within NOAA,
the staff has been facilitating scientist interviews with media
and working with the Office of Response and Restoration to
update daily a dedicated NOAA Deepwater Horizon response
website with the latest information and easy-to-use fact sheets
on topics ranging from oil and coral reefs to an explanation of
the booms being used.
NOAA's Role in Damage Assessment and Restoration
Oil spills affect our natural resources in a variety of ways. They
can directly impact our natural resources, such as the oiling of marine
mammals. They can diminish the ecological services provided by coastal
and marine ecosystems, such as the loss of critical nursery habitat for
shrimp, fish, and other wildlife that may result from oiled marshes.
Oil spills may also diminish how we use these resources, by affecting
fishing, boating, beach going, and wildlife viewing opportunities.
Stewardship of the Nation's natural resources is shared among
several Federal agencies, states, and tribal trustees. NOAA, acting on
behalf of the Secretary of Commerce, is the lead Federal trustee for
many of the Nation's coastal and marine resources, and is authorized
pursuant to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) to recover damages on
behalf of the public for injuries to trust resources resulting from an
oil spill. OPA encourages compensation in the form of restoration and
this is accomplished through the Natural Resource Damage Assessment
(NRDA) process by assessing injury and service loss, then developing a
restoration plan that appropriately compensates the public for the
injured resources. NOAA scientists and economists provide the technical
information for natural resource damage assessments and work with other
trustees and responsible parties to restore resources injured by oil
spills. To accomplish this effort, NOAA experts collect data, conduct
studies, and perform analyses needed to determine whether and to what
degree coastal and marine resources have sustained injury from oil
spills. They determine how best to restore injured resources and
develop the most appropriate restoration projects to compensate the
public for associated lost services. Over the past 20 years, NOAA and
other natural resource trustees have recovered over $500 million worth
of restoration projects from responsible parties for the restoration of
the public's wetlands, coral reefs, oyster reefs, and other important
habitats.
The successful recovery of injured natural resources depends upon
integrated spill response and restoration approaches. The initial goals
of a response include containment and recovery of floating oil because
recovery rates for floating oil can be quite high under certain
conditions. As the oil reaches the shoreline, clean-up efforts become
more intrusive and oil recovery rates decline. At this point, it
becomes important to recognize that certain spill response activities
can cause additional harm to natural resources and actually slow
recovery rates. Such decision points need to be understood so that cost
effective and successful restoration can take place. NOAA brings to
bear over 20 years of experience and expertise to these issues.
Continued research on clean-up and restoration techniques and the
recovery of environmental and human services after oil spills may
improve such decisionmaking.
NOAA's Damage Assessment and Restoration Efforts for the Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill
At the onset of this oil spill, NOAA quickly mobilized staff from
its Damage Assessment Remediation and Restoration Program to begin
coordinating with Federal and state co-trustees and the responsible
parties, to begin collecting a variety of data that are critical to
help inform the NRDA. NOAA is coordinating the NRDA effort with the
Department of the Interior as a Federal co-trustee, as well as co-
trustees in five states and representatives for at least one
responsible party (BP).
Although the concept of assessing injuries may sound relatively
straightforward, understanding complex ecosystems, the services these
ecosystems provide, and the injuries caused by oil and hazardous
substances takes time--often years. The time of year the resource was
injured, the type of oil or hazardous substance, the amount and
duration of the release, and the nature and extent of clean-up are
among the factors that affect how quickly resources are assessed and
restoration and recovery occurs. The rigorous scientific studies that
are necessary to prove injury to resources and services may also take
years to implement and complete. The NRDA process described above
ensures an objective and cost-effective assessment of injuries--and
that harm to the public's resources is fully addressed.
While it is still too early in the process to know what the full
scope of the damage assessment will be, NOAA is concerned about the
potential impacts to fish, shellfish, marine mammals, sea turtles,
birds, and other sensitive resources, as well as their habitats,
including wetlands, beaches, bottom sediments, and the water column.
This may include national estuarine research reserves and national
marine sanctuaries. The natural resources co-trustees may also evaluate
any lost value related to the use of these resources, for example, as a
result of fishery and beach closures.
Value of Readiness
This event is a grave reminder that spills of national significance
can occur despite the many safeguards and improvements that have been
put in place since the passage of the OPA. Although the best remedy is
to prevent oil spills, oil spills remain a concern given the offshore
and onshore oil infrastructure, pipes and vessels that move huge
volumes of oil through our waterways.
To mitigate environmental effects of future spills, responders must
be equipped with sufficient capacity and capabilities to address the
challenge. Response training and exercises are essential to maintaining
capabilities. Continuous training, improvement of our capabilities,
maintenance of our capacity, and investments in high priority,
response-related research and development efforts will ensure that the
Nation's response to these events remains effective. Training and
coordination with other Federal, state and local agencies that might
have response and restoration responsibilities is critical to success
in mitigating effects of future spills.
Just 2 months ago, NOAA participated in an oil spill exercise that
focused on a hypothetical spill of national significance. This type of
exercise is held every 3 years to sharpen the Nation's ability to
respond to major oil spills at all levels of government. Led by the
USCG, this exercise included more than 1,000 people from 20 state and
Federal agencies as well as industry. This year's exercise centered on
a simulated tanker collision off the coast of Portland, ME resulting in
a major oil spill causing environmental and economic impacts from Maine
to Massachusetts. Lessons learned from this and similar drills have
improved our readiness to respond to oil spills. One tool that was
successfully incorporated into this recent exercise is called the
Environmental Response and Management Application (ERMA). This tool was
developed by NOAA to streamline the integration and sharing of data and
information, and certain components of this tool are now being used in
the Deepwater Horizon response effort. ERMA is a web-based Geographic
Information System tool designed to assist both emergency responders
and environmental resource managers who deal with events that may
adversely impact the environment. In the recent drill, ERMA allowed for
the integration of current science, information technology, and real-
time observational data into response decisionmaking. It allowed the
latest information that was collected from a variety of efforts related
to spills of national significance to be integrated, displayed on a map
and shared for use across the Incident Command structure. Although not
fully functional in the Gulf of Mexico, ERMA is providing benefits for
the Deepwater Horizon response, many of which were first tested during
the recent oil spill exercise. This recent drill also incorporated the
damage assessment efforts of the trustees, which resulted in improved
communications and leveraging of resources and information.
Activities to Improve Future Response Efforts
Activities that would benefit the Nation by improving our ability
to quickly respond to and mitigate damages from future spills include:
Response capacity--NOAA's Office of Response and Restoration
is fully engaged in responding to the Deepwater Horizon spill.
Although unlikely, if another large spill was to occur
simultaneously in another location across the United States,
NOAA would have difficulty responding to its complete ability.
Additional expertise in analytical chemistry, environmental
chemistry, biology, oceanography, natural resource damage
assessment, administrative functions, and information
management would help plan and prepare activities between
spills including training, development of area plans and
response protocols, drafting and reviewing response job aids,
and coordinating with regional responders.
Response effectiveness--The use of simulated drills and the
continued development of tools and strategies can only increase
the effectiveness of oil spill response. Specific activities
that would increase response effectiveness include:
Environmental Sensitivity Index Maps--Environmental
Sensitivity Index (ESI) maps provide information that helps
reduce the environmental, economic, and social impacts from
oil and chemical spills. Spill responders are utilizing
NOAA's ESI maps to identify priority areas to protect from
spreading oil, develop cleanup strategies to minimize
impacts to the environment and coastal communities, and
reduce overall cleanup costs.
Data Management Tools for Decisionmaking--The key to
effective emergency response is efficiently integrating
current science, information technology, and real-time
observational data into response decisionmaking. NOAA has
developed the ERMA, which integrates real-time observations
(e.g., NOAA National Buoy Data Center data, weather data,
shoreline data, vessel traffic information, etc.) with
archived data sources (e.g., NOAA's National Oceanographic
Data Center's historical data) to aid in evaluating
resources at risk, visualizing oil trajectories, and for
planning rapid tactical response operations, injury
assessment and habitat restoration. Having access to
retrospective data is critical to bring value to real-time
observational data being collected. For the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill, certain components of the Gulf of Mexico
ERMA are functional and being used on an ad hoc basis. The
only fully functional ERMA are in the U.S. Caribbean and
New England.
Use of Relevant Technologies--Better use of remote-
sensing technologies, unmanned aerial vehicles, and an
improved ability to access and use real-time observation
systems would optimize clean-up operations. For example,
when oil spreads across the water it does not do so in a
uniform manner. Oil slicks can be quite patchy and vary in
thickness. The effectiveness of response options--the
booms, skimmers, and dispersants--depends on whether they
are applied in the areas of the heaviest oil. NOAA's
trajectory modeling and visual observations obtained
through overflights are helping direct the application of
spill technologies, but remote sensing technology could be
used to more effectively detect oil, determine areas of
heaviest amounts of oil, and then this information could be
used to direct oil skimming operations and increase the
recovery of spilled oil. Traditional methods of visual
observation can be difficult at night or in low visibility
conditions, as is the case with Deepwater Horizon. In such
situations, enhanced remote sensing technology would allow
NOAA to improve the trajectory models it produces for the
Unified Command.
Real-time Observation Systems--Real-time data on
currents, tides, and winds are important in driving the
models that inform us on the likely trajectory of the
spilled oil. As the Integrated Ocean Observing System
generates more data from technological advances like high
frequency radar, the prediction of oil location can be
improved by pulling these observations into trajectory
models in real-time.
Research and Development--Research and development is
critical to ensure the latest science informs response efforts.
Priority areas for future research and development include:
Fate and Behavior of Oil Released at Deep Depths--A
better understanding is needed of how oil behaves and
disperses within the water column when released at deep
depths, such as happened with the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill. This is also true regarding the use of dispersants
in deep water. This information is critical to develop oil
spill trajectory models and improve our understanding of
the potential short- and long-term effects of dispersants
on the environment.
Long-Term Affects of Oil--Spilled oil can remain on
the shoreline and in wetlands and other environments for
years. More than twenty years later, there is still oil in
Prince William Sound from the Exxon Valdez spill. Research
is needed to improve our understanding of the long-term
effects of oil on sensitive and economically important
species. This understanding will improve decisionmaking
during a response and allow us to determine the best
approach to clean up.
Arctic--Continued acceleration of sea-ice decline in
the Arctic Ocean as a consequence of global warming may
lead to increased Arctic maritime transportation and energy
exploration that in turn may increase the potential of oil
spills in the Arctic. Recent studies, such as the Arctic
Monitoring and Assessment Programme's Oil and Gas
Assessment, indicate that we currently lack the information
to determine how oil will behave in icy environments or
when it sinks below the surface. We also lack a basic
understanding of the current environmental conditions,
which is important for conducting injury assessments and
developing restoration strategies.
Mapping Oil Extent--Current use of NOAA-generated
experimental products suggest that data from space-based
synthetic aperture radar could assist us in detecting and
refining the areal extent of oil and provide information in
the decisions about where resources could be deployed.
Oil Detection in Water Column and Seafloor--In
addition to depth data, modern multibeam echo sounders
record acoustic returns from the water column and acoustic
backscatter amplitude returns from the seafloor. In limited
research applications, these systems have been able to
detect oil in the water column and on the seafloor. Sensors
on autonomous vehicles that detect the presence of oil and
gas in the water column are another detection technology.
If these technologies could be used to provide highly
accurate information on where oil is, and where it isn't,
such information would be of significant benefit to a spill
response such as Deepwater Horizon, where timely and
precise placement of limited resources are critical to
mitigate spill impacts. This developmental effort could
provide very useful data for later response and restoration
efforts.
Human Dimensions--Research on how to incorporate
impacted communities into the preparedness and response
processes could help to address the human dimensions of
spills, including social issues, community effects, risk
communication methods, and valuation of natural resources.
Conclusion
NOAA will continue to provide scientific support to the Unified
Command. NRDA efforts in coordination with our Federal and state co-
trustees have begun. I would like to assure you that we will not relent
in our efforts to protect the livelihoods of Gulf Coast residents and
mitigate the environmental impacts of this spill. Thank you for
allowing me to testify on NOAA's response efforts. I am happy to answer
any questions you may have.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Dr. Lubchenco.
Admiral Allen.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THAD ALLEN, COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES
COAST GUARD AND NATIONAL INCIDENT COMMANDER ON THE DEEPWATER
HORIZON FIRE AND MC 252 OIL SPILL
Admiral Allen. Thank you, sir.
I'd like to submit my statement for the record and actually
provide an operational update this morning that takes us----
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much.
Admiral Allen.--to the current----
Senator Kerry. Without objection, the full statement will
be in the record.
Admiral Allen. Senator, I'd like to start with just a brief
discussion of the life cycle of this event, and then move in to
the current status of our response operations.
As you know, this event occurred on the night of the 20th
of April. This started out as a massive explosion and a search-
and-rescue operation.
I add my condolences to the families of the men who were
lost.
I'd also like to just point out the extraordinary response
of industry vessels that were in the area, offshore supply
vessels who came under that rig while it was on fire, and were
instrumental in saving well over a hundred people. And I think
it's often not well understood how much they had to do with it.
I'm also pleased to be here with my very good friend, Dr.
Jane Lubchenco, who I've worked with, well over a year now. And
you need to know we are committed partners in this effort.
Right after we were aware of the incident itself, and I got
notified personally about an hour and a half after the Coast
Guard was notified, we immediately sent rescue units to the
scene--helicopters, cutters--and, over a multi-day search,
covered about 5,000 square miles, with about 30 sorties,
ultimately suspended the search when there was no indicated
chance that there would be survivors. And again, we pass our
condolences to the family.
Early on, we brought salvage experts into Morgan City and
Houma to take a look at the structural issues associated with
the mobile drilling unit and, at that time, started mobilizing
resources for what we thought might be a worst-case discharge
associated with the event.
As it turned out, the drill sunk on the 22nd of April.
Several hours later, I was in the Oval Office, along with
Secretary Napolitano and Secretary Salazar, briefing the
President on the implications of that.
In the time in between that, we raised the level of command
from the local Coast Guard captain of the port to Rear Admiral
Mary Landry, who has led the response since then, as the
Federal on-scene coordinator for the entire area. She's done a
terrific job down there, with all the Federal partners, working
with the private industry to make sure we optimize this
response.
What we have found, over the course of attacking this
spill, is that now we are dealing with something that's much
more complicated in many ways than any spill I've ever dealt
with. The first spill I actually was involved in was actually
in 1980, so I've been doing this for quite a while. And we'll
get into this in the--in some of the questions. But, we are not
dealing with a large monolithic spill anymore.
Depending on when the oil came to the surface, whether or
not dispersants were being used, in situ burning, or mechanical
skimming, we now have a very, very wide perimeter, with
different concentrations of different types of oil, which
covers a vast area, but there is not a single, large monolithic
spill. For that reason, there are--there's a chance that some
of it could get in the Loop Current. We can talk about that.
Some of it has come ashore in Louisiana. Tar balls are
impacting Alabama. We've seen tar balls, actually, in Texas.
So, what we're doing is fighting an omnidirectional and
almost indeterminate threat, here. And the reason I bring that
up, it's creating severe challenges for where to employ
resources, where we might need them as the oil comes ashore.
And this has manifested itself mostly in the booming
requirements for the various states that could be impacted. And
I'd be glad to go into that in greater detail.
But, as we sit here today, there are probably about 20,000
people that are employed down in the Gulf that are both Active-
Duty Coast Guard, Federal partners, state and local volunteers,
and private sector.
Regarding the boom, we have about 1.9 million--I'm sorry--
1.3 million feet of boom deployed. We believe, to cover
everything that we need, including some of the parishes in
Louisiana to the west, we need about 1.9 million feet of boom.
The delta is being covered with a boom that is on order. When
we get everything that we have currently on order in pipeline,
we will have over 3 million feet of boom available. This is
important as we start to look at the potential implications of
the Loop Current, and what might be needed in South Florida.
And we are staying right on that.
We continue to attack this spill on the surface through
mechanical skimming, in situ burning, when conditions allow,
and application of dispersants. There is some evaporation of
the oil, as well. These are conditions-based. You have to have
good weather for in situ burning, you have to have the right
air conditions to meet the protocols, and in order to be able
safely do that. And----
Senator Kerry. Admiral, do you mind if I interrupt there?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Allen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant, United States
Coast Guard and National Incident Commander on the Deepwater Horizon
Fire and MC 252 Oil Spill
Good afternoon Chairman Rockefeller, Senator Hutchison, and
distinguished members of the Committee. I am grateful for the
opportunity to testify before this committee on the subject of the BP
Deepwater Horizon oil spill currently ongoing in the Gulf of Mexico.
On the evening of April 20, 2010, the Transocean-owned, British
Petroleum-chartered, Marshall Islands-flagged Mobile Offshore Drilling
Unit (MODU) Deepwater Horizon, located approximately 72 miles Southeast
of Venice, Louisiana, reported an explosion and fire onboard. This
began as a Search and Rescue (SAR) mission--within the first few hours,
115 of the 126 crewmembers were safely recovered; SAR activities
continued through April 23, though the other 11 crewmembers remain
missing.
Concurrent with the SAR effort, the response to extinguishing the
fire and mitigating the impacts of the approximate 700,000 gallons of
diesel fuel onboard began almost immediately, in accordance with the
operator's Minerals Management Service (MMS)--approved Response Plan,
oil spill response resources, including Oil Spill Response Vessels
(OSRVs), were dispatched to the scene. After 2 days of fighting the
fire, the MODU sank into approximately 5,000 feet of water on April 22.
On April 23, remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) located the MODU on
seafloor, and, on April 24, BP found the first two leaks in the riser
pipe and alerted the Federal Government. ROVs continue to monitor the
flow of oil.
As the event unfolded, a robust Incident Command System (ICS)
response organization was stood up in accordance with the National
Response Framework (NRF) and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). ICS is utilized to provide a common
method for developing and implementing tactical plans to efficiently
and effectively manage the response to oil spills. The ICS organization
for this response includes Incident Command Posts and Unified Commands
at the local level, and Unified Area Commands at the regional level. It
is comprised of representatives from the Coast Guard (Federal On-Scene
Coordinator (FOSC)), other Federal, state, and local agencies, as well
as BP as a Responsible Party.
The Federal Government has addressed the Gulf Oil Spill with an
all-hands-on deck approach from the moment the explosion occurred.
During the night of April 20--the date of the explosion--a command
center was stood up on the Gulf Coast to address the potential
environmental impact of the event and to coordinate with all state and
local governments. After the MODU sank on the 22nd, the National
Response Team (NRT), led by the Secretary of Homeland Security and
comprised of 16 Federal agencies including the Coast Guard, other DHS
offices, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Department of Interior (DOI), as
well as Regional Response Teams (RRT), were activated.
On April 29, Secretary Napolitano declared the event a Spill of
National Significance (SONS), which enhanced operational and policy
coordination at the national level and concurrently allowed my
appointment as the National Incident Commander (NIC) for the
Administration's continued, coordinated response. The NIC's role is to
coordinate strategic communications, national policy, and resource
support, and to facilitate collaboration with key parts of the Federal,
state and local government.
The NIC staff is comprised of subject matter experts from across
the Federal Government, allowing for immediate interagency
collaboration, approval and coordination. While the FOSC maintains
authorities for response operations as directed in the National
Contingency Plan, the NIC's primary focus is providing national-level
support to the operational response. This means providing the Unified
Command with everything that they need--from resources to policy
decisions--to sustain their efforts to secure the source and mitigate
the impact. This will be a sustained effort that will continue until
the discharges are permanently stopped and the effects of the spill are
mitigated to the greatest extent possible. Beyond securing the source
of the spill, the Unified Command committed to minimizing the economic
and social impacts to the affected communities and the Nation.
Unified Recovery Efforts
The Unified Command continues to attack the spill offshore. As of
May 13, 2010, over 5 million gallons of oily water have been
successfully recovered using mechanical surface cleaning methods.
Further, approximately 475,000 gallons of dispersants have been applied
to break up the slick, and controlled burns have been used as weather
conditions have allowed. In addition to the ongoing offshore oil
recovery operations, significant containment and exclusion booms have
been deployed and staged strategically throughout the Gulf region.
These booms are used to protect sensitive areas including:
environmental and cultural resources, and critical infrastructure, as
identified in the applicable Area Contingency Plans (ACPs). To date,
more than a million feet of boom have been positioned to protect
environmentally sensitive areas. Fourteen staging areas have been
established across the Gulf Coast states and three regional command
centers. The Department of Defense has activated National Guard troops;
over 1,000 are currently deployed, and up to 17,500 have been approved
for deployment.
Volunteerism and Communication with Local Communities
A critical aspect of response operations is active engagement and
communication with the local communities. Several initiatives are
underway to ensure regular communications with the local communities.
1. Active participation and engagement in town hall meetings
across the region with industry and government involvement.
2. Daily phone calls with affected trade associations.
3. Coordination of public involvement through a volunteer
registration hotline (1-866-448-5816), alternative technology,
products and services e-mail ([email protected]), and
response and safety training scheduled and conducted in
numerous locations.
4. More than 7,100 inquiries received online via the response
website (www.deepwaterhorizonresponse.com) with more than 6,121
inquiries completed, with 4-hour average time of response.
5. Over 568,000 page hits on response website.
6. Over 110 documents created/posted to response website for
public consumption.
7. News, photo/video releases, advisories to more than 5,000
media/governmental/private contacts.
8. Full utilization of social media including Facebook,
YouTube, Twitter and Flickr.
9. Establishment of Local Government hotlines in Houma, LA
(985-493-7835); Mobile, AL (251-445-8968); Robert, LA (985-902-
5253).
MODU Regulatory Compliance Requirements
43 U.S.C. 1331, et seq. mandates that MODUs documented under the
laws of a foreign nation, such as the Deepwater Horizon, be examined by
the Coast Guard. These MODUs are required to obtain a U.S. Coast Guard
Certificate of Compliance (COC) prior to operating on the U.S. Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS).
In order for the Coast Guard to issue a COC, one of three
conditions must be met:
1. The MODU must be constructed to meet the design and
equipment standards of 46 CFR part 108.
2. The MODU must be constructed to meet the design and
equipment standards of the documenting nation (flag state) if
the standards provide a level of safety generally equivalent to
or greater than that provided under 46 CFR part 108.
3. The MODU must be constructed to meet the design and
equipment standards for MOD Us contained in the International
Maritime Organization Code for the Construction and Equipment
of MODUs.
The Deepwater Horizon had a valid COC at the time of the incident,
which was renewed July 29, 2009, with no deficiencies noted. The COC
was issued based on compliance with number three, stated above. COCs
are valid for a period of 2 years.
In addition to Coast Guard safety and design standards, MMS and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) also have safety
requirements for MODUs. MMS governs safety and health regulations in
regard to drilling and production operations in accordance 30 CFR Part
250, and OSHA maintains responsibility for certain hazardous working
conditions not covered by either the Coast Guard or MMS, as per 29
U.S.C. 653(a) and (b)(1).
Coast Guard/MMS Joint Investigation Responsibilities
On April 27, Secretary Napolitano and Secretary of the Interior Ken
Salazar signed the order that outlined the joint Coast Guard-MMS
investigation into the Deepwater Horizon incident.
Information gathering began immediately after the explosion--
investigators from both agencies launched a preliminary investigation
that included evidence collection, interviews, witness statements from
surviving crew members, and completion of chemical tests of the crew.
The aim of this investigation is to gain an understanding of the causal
factors involved in the explosion, fire, sinking and tragic loss of 11
crewmembers.
The joint investigation will include public hearings, which--have
already begun in Kenner, LA. The formal joint investigation team
consists of equal representation of Coast Guard and MMS members. The
Coast Guard has also provided subject matter experts and support staff
to assist in the investigation.
Lessons Learned from Past Responses
The Coast Guard has been combating oil and hazardous materials
spills for many years; in particular, the 1989 major oil spill from the
Exxon Valdez yielded comprehensive spill preparedness and response
responsibilities.
In the 20 years since the Exxon Valdez, the Coast Guard has
diligently addressed the Nation's mandates and needs for better spill
response and coordination. For example, a SONS Exercise is held every 3
years. In 2002, the SONS Exercise was held in New Orleans to deal with
the implications of a wellhead loss in the Gulf of Mexico. In that
exercise, the SONS team created a vertically integrated organization to
link local response requirements to a RRT. The requirements of the RRT
are then passed to the NRT in Washington, D.C., thereby integrating the
spill management and decision processes across the Federal Government.
The response protocols used in the current response are a direct result
of past lessons learned from real world events and exercises including
SONS.
Although the Exxon Valdez spill shaped many of the preparedness and
response requirements and legislation followed to this day, other
significant events since 1989 have generated additional lessons learned
that have informed our response strategies. For example, the M/V Cosco
Busan discharged over 53,000 gallons of fuel oil into San Francisco Bay
after colliding with the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge in heavy fog.
Through the recovery of over 40 percent of the spilled product, the
Unified Command recognized improvements were needed in some areas. As a
result, new guidance and policy was developed to better utilize
volunteers in future responses. Additionally, standard operating
procedures for emergency notifications were improved to ensure better
vertical communications between the Federal responders and local
governments. Furthermore, steps were taken to pre-identify incident
command posts (ICPs) and improve booming strategies for environmentally
sensitive areas.
Most recently, the Coast Guard led a SONS exercise in March, 2010.
Nearly 600 people from over 37 agencies participated in the exercise.
This exercise scenario was based on a catastrophic oil spill resulting
from a collision between a loaded oil tanker and a car carrier off the
coast of Portland, Maine. The exercise involved response preparedness
activities in Portland, ME; Boston, MA; Portsmouth, NH; Portsmouth, VA;
and Washington, D.C. The response to the SONS scenario involved the
implementation of oil spill response plans, and response organizational
elements including two Unified Commands, a Unified Area Command, and
the NIC in accordance with the National Contingency Plan and national
Response Framework. The exercise focused on three national-level
strategic objectives:
1. Implement response organizations in applicable oil spill
response plans.
2. Test the organization's ability to address multi-regional
coordination issues using planned response organizations.
3. Communicate with the public and stakeholders outside the
response organization using applicable organizational
components.
The SONS 2010 exercise was considered a success, highlighting the
maturity of the inter-agency and private oil spill response
capabilities and the importance of national-level interactions to
ensure optimal information flow and situational awareness. The timely
planning and execution of this national-level exercise have paid huge
dividends in the response to this potentially catastrophic oil spill in
the Gulf of Mexico.
Role of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund
The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF), established in the
Treasury, is available to pay the expenses of Federal response to oil
pollution under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) (33
U.S.C. 1321(c)) and to compensate claims for oil removal costs and
certain damages caused by oil pollution as authorized by the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) (33 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.). These OSLTF
uses will be recovered from responsible parties liable under OPA when
there is a discharge of oil to navigable waters, adjoining shorelines
or the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
The OSLTF is established under Revenue Code section 9509 (26 U.S.C.
9509), which also describes the authorized revenue streams and
certain broad limits on its use. The principal revenue stream is an 8
cent per barrel tax on oil produced or entered into the United States
(see the tax provision at 26 U.S.C. 4611). The barrel tax increases
to 9 cents for 1 year beginning on January 1, 2017. The tax expires at
the end of 2017. Other revenue streams include oil pollution-related
penalties under 33 U.S.C. 1319 and 1321, interest earned through
Treasury investments, and recoveries from liable responsible parties
under OPA. The current OSLTF balance is approximately $1.6 billion.
There is no cap on the fund balance but there are limits on its use per
oil pollution incident. The maximum amount that may be paid from the
OSLTF for any one incident is $1 billion. Of that amount, no more than
$500 million may be paid for natural resource damages. 26 U.S.C.
9509(c)(2).
OPA further provides that the OSLTF is available to the President
for certain purposes (33 U.S.C. 2712(a)). These include:
Payment of Federal removal costs consistent with the NCP. This
use is subject to further appropriation, except the President
may make available up to $50 million annually to carry out 33
U.S.C. 1321(c) (Federal response authority) and to initiate
the assessment of natural resource damages. This so-called
``emergency fund'' amount is available until expended. If
funding in the emergency fund is deemed inadequate to fund
Federal response efforts, an additional $100 million may be
advanced from the OSLTF when the emergency fund is inadequate
subject to notification of Congress no later than 30 days after
the advance. See 33 U.S.C. 2752(b). Additional amounts from
the OSLTF for Federal removal are subject to further
appropriation.
Payment of claims for uncompensated removal costs and damages.
Payments are not subject to further appropriation from the
OSLTF. 33 U.S.C. 2752(b).
Payment of Federal administrative, operating and personnel
costs to implement and enforce the broad range of oil pollution
prevention, response and compensation provisions addressed by
the OPA. This use is subject to further appropriation to
various responsible Federal agencies.
National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC) Funding and Cost Recovery
The NPFC is a Coast Guard unit that manages use of the emergency
fund for Federal removal and trustee costs to initiate natural resource
damage assessment. The NPFC also pays qualifying claims against the
OSLTF that are not compensated by the responsible party. Damages
include real and personal property damages, natural resource damages,
loss of subsistence use of natural resources, lost profits and earnings
of businesses and individuals, lost government revenues, and net costs
of increased or additional public services that may be recovered by a
State or political subdivision of a state.
In a typical scenario, the FOSC, Coast Guard or EPA accesses the
emergency fund to carry out 33 U.S.C. 1321(c), i.e., to remove an oil
discharge or prevent or mitigate a substantial threat of discharge of
oil to navigable waters, the adjoining shoreline or the EEZ. Costs are
documented and provided to NPFC for reconciliation and eventual cost
recovery against liable responsible parties. Federal trustees may
request funds to initiate an assessment of natural resource damages and
the N PFC will provide those funds from the emergency fund as well.
Claims for OPA removal costs and damages that have been denied or
not settled by the responsible party after 90 days may be presented to
the NPFC for payment from the OSLTF. State claims for removal costs can
be presented directly to the NPFC against the OSLTF. General claims
provisions are delineated in 33 U.S.C. 2713 and the implementing
claims regulations for claims against the OSLTF in 33 CFR 136.
OPA provides that all claims for removal costs or damages shall be
presented first to the responsible party. Any person or government may
be a claimant. If the responsible party denies liability for the claim,
or the claim is not settled within 90 days after it is presented, a
claimant may elect to commence an action in court against the
responsible party or to present the claim to the NPFC for payment from
the OSLTF. OPA provides an express exception to this order of
presentment in respect to State removal cost claims. Such claims are
not required to be presented first to the responsible party and may be
presented direct to the NPFC for payment from the OSLTF. These and
other general claims provisions are delineated in 33 U.S.C. section
2713 and the implementing regulations for claims against the OSLTF in
33 CFR Part 136. NPFC maintains information to assist claimants on its
website at www.uscg.mil/npfc.
NPFC pursues cost recovery for all OSLTF expenses for removal costs
and damages against liable responsible parties pursuant to Federal
claims collection law including the Debt Collection Act, implementing
regulations at 31 CFR Parts 901-904 and DHS regulations in 6 CFR Part
11.
Aggressive collection efforts are consistent with the ``polluter
pays'' public policy underlying the OPA. Nevertheless, the OSLTF is
intended to pay even when a responsible party does not pay.
OSLTF and the Deepwater Horizon
On May 12, the Administration proposed a legislative package that
will: enable the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill response to continue
expeditiously; speed assistance to people affected by this spill; and
strengthen and update the oil spill liability system to better address
catastrophic events. The bill would permit the Coast Guard to obtain
one or more advances--up to $100 million each--from the Principal Fund
within the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund to underwrite Federal
response activities taken in connection with the discharge of oil that
began in 2010 in connection with the explosion on, and sinking of, the
mobile offshore drilling unit Deepwater Horizon. To deal more generally
with the harms created by oil spills as well as to toughen and update
these laws, the bill would, for any single incident, raise the
statutory expenditure limitation for the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund
from $1 billion to $1.5 billion and the cap on natural resource damage
assessments and claims from $500 million to $750 million.
The emergency fund has been accessed by the FOSC for $65 million as
of May 11, 2010. BP, a responsible party, is conducting and paying for
most response activities. The Coast Guard requested and received an
advance of $100 million from the OSLTF principal fund to the emergency
fund as authorized by 33 U.S.C. 2752(b), because the balance
remaining in the emergency fund was not adequate to fund anticipated
Federal removal costs. The BP and Transocean have been notified of
their responsibility to advertise to the public the process by which
claims may be presented. As of May 13, 8160 claims have been opened
with BP, and nearly $5.3 million has been disbursed; though Transocean
has also already been designated as a responsible party, all claims are
being processed centrally through BP.
Conclusion
Through the National Incident Command, we are ensuring all
capabilities and resources--government, private, and commercial--are
being leveraged to protect the environment and facilitate a rapid,
robust clean-up effort. Every effort is being made to secure the source
of the oil, remove the oil offshore, protect the coastline, include and
inform the local communities in support of response operations, and
mitigate any impacts of the discharge.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to
your questions.
Senator Kerry. I apologize for doing that. But I'm going to
have to go vote in a minute. So, let me just ask you this,
quickly.
Admiral Allen. Sure.
Senator Kerry. I understand that the--one--the principal
dispersant chosen is COREXIT.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Senator Kerry. And I've seen some reports suggesting that
COREXIT is, in fact, more toxic than other alternatives that
are available. Is that true?
Admiral Allen. There are a range of dispersants that are
available. The decision on the use of dispersants is based on
the response plans and what has been stored for use. As we go
forward, we're going to need to look at the relative toxicity
of the different dispersants.
Senator Kerry. My question is, Is it more toxic than other
alternatives?
Admiral Allen. There are other alternatives that are less
toxic. There's quite a range, and we could answer that for the
record, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The product specified is more toxic than some products, but less
toxic than others.
In accordance with 40 CFR 300 Subpart J, EPA approves dispersants
for use in U.S. waters based on tests for toxicity and effectiveness.
Any product listed on the schedule must meet a threshold minimum for
effectiveness and test for, and report on, toxicity. No states have
expressed reservations about the use of these dispersants in the past,
as long as the dispersant is employed in accordance with the Regional
Response Team Dispersant-Use pre-authorizations agreements established
between the states and their Federal partners at the regions around the
country.
The toxicity data table at (http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/content/
ncp/tox_tables.htm) provides toxicity data for the dispersants listed.
Toxicity values should not be interpreted as absolute values, but
rather, relative to one another in a general sense. For example, an
LC50 of 4.49 should not be viewed as significantly different from an
LC50 of 5.95. But, the LC50 of 4.49 can be viewed as significantly
different from the LC50 of 42.00. Therefore, the toxicity values can be
used to group dispersants (2 or 3 groups of similar toxicity), but
should not be used to list dispersants according to toxicity (1 to 20).
All products on the National Contingency Plan Product Schedule are
selected based on volume availability, specifics of the site, and
concerns of the Federal On-Scene Coordinator. Toxicity tests are
methods for determining the impact of a chemical or an effluent on
living organisms and measure the degree of response using commonly
tested species. Many different kinds of tests can be used to identify
potential toxic effects, but since toxic effects differ, comparing the
toxicity of one to another may not be appropriate.
In environmental studies, LC stands for ``Lethal Concentration''
and is the concentration of the chemical, given all at once, in the
water that causes the death of 50 percent of a group of test animals in
a given time (for example, during a 96-hour period). In general, the
smaller the LC50 value, the more toxic the chemical. The opposite is
also true: the larger the LC50 value, the lower the toxicity. For
example, a chemical with an LC50 of 2 parts per million (ppm) would be
more toxic than a chemical with an LC50 of 20 ppm. The LC50 is the
measure of the immediate (or acute) toxicity of a chemical for the
particular animal species being tested. The LC50 was not designed nor
intended to give information on the long-term exposure effects of a
chemical. It is also important to note that the LC50 value may be
different for a given chemical depending on the route of exposure
(e.g., skin contact, ingested, inhaled) and can be different for
different animal species, ages and sexes. The LC50 is only one source
of toxicity information and only provides information for the species
and concentrations of chemical being tested under laboratory
conditions. Toxicity tests resulting from controlled laboratory
experiments may not accurately represent the degree of toxicity seen in
the environment because of factors such as breakdown of the chemical,
different species, different routes of exposure, age, sex, and stage of
development (e.g., adult versus larval).
Senator Kerry. Do we know what the impact of this toxicity
is, with respect to organisms in the water?
Admiral Allen. I might refer that to my colleague, Dr.----
Senator Kerry. Dr. Lubchenco?
Admiral Allen.--Lubchenco.
Dr. Lubchenco. Senator, the dispersants that are approved
by EPA for use in an oil spill have been through extensive
testing, and they are rated for their toxicity, relative to
different species.
They have been approved by EPA, and then if--once they are
on the list, they are available to be used.
Senator Kerry. My question is--you know, lists and prior,
sort of, plans are one thing. We've just heard testimony that
this is omnidirectional. If it's omnidirectional, it's also
Omni-species capable of having an impact. Has it been tested
with respect to every species it may come into contact with?
Dr. Lubchenco. Senator, that would probably be impossible
to do. But, there are species that are considered to be
indicator species, which have been used in tests.
Senator Kerry. They are?
Dr. Lubchenco. And--there are indicator species----
Senator Kerry. Like what? What are the indicator species?
Dr. Lubchenco. There's a shrimp that has been used in the
tests. There are other species that are planktonic species that
are typically used. And I think it's fair to say that there is
legitimate concern about use of dispersants.
This is a situation where--this is a question of tradeoffs.
The dispersants are less toxic than the oil. Even though some
dispersants are more toxic than others, they are considerably
less toxic than the oil. And the purpose of the dispersants is
to break the oil up into smaller droplets so that they can
biodegrade naturally.
And this is a question, I believe, of tradeoffs. We do not
have complete information about the likely impact of the
dispersants on every species in the ecosystem. We have never
used dispersants, in the amounts that we're using now, within
U.S. waters.
Senator Kerry. It's my understanding we've never used it
underwater in the way that we've used it now. We've used it on
the surface, but not shooting out with the plume itself
underwater. Is that accurate?
Dr. Lubchenco. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Kerry. And some of that----
Dr. Lubchenco. And----
Senator Kerry.--clearly, does not touch the oil. Some of it
floats free and goes off into the ocean. Does it sink to the
bottom?
Dr. Lubchenco. The--because the dispersants had never been
used subsurface at depths which were being considered, EPA and
NOAA required extensive testing before there was permission
given to apply the dispersants. That testing was done, and
indicates that the dispersant is being--it is doing what it was
intended to do, which is to break up the oil----
Senator Kerry. What happens----
Dr. Lubchenco.--and considerably----
Senator Kerry.--to the dispersant that doesn't connect to
the oil? Does it sink to the bottom? Does it float free?
Dr. Lubchenco. It--the--it's inserted in a way that it goes
right into the stream of oil that is coming out, but it
biodegrades relatively rapidly. And I think that's one of the
important messages.
The other is that there is continual monitoring that is in
place as the subsurface dispersants are being used. So, I think
this is a situation where there are tradeoffs. There was a
decision made that this is the lesser of the evils. But, there
are a lot of questions that remain about exactly what the
impacts are, long term. And that's why we are being very
aggressive in our monitoring, to try to get a better
understanding of what those tradeoffs are.
There's also a mechanism if the dispersants are not doing
what is intended, that they be--we can stop using them
immediately. So, there is ongoing monitoring and a turnoff
switch that can be activated immediately.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much.
I need to go and vote.
And I thank the Chair. And it's all yours.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. I would like to address this to both of you.
And this is the MMS question.
To be honest with you, I don't think most Americans have
ever heard that. The name--what MMS is, and what it does. And
it appears to me, at least from an outside view, that they
haven't been very attentive. That could be recently, that could
be over the last 10 years. I mean, I just don't know.
But, I have a lot of faith in the Coast Guard, and I have a
lot of faith in NOAA. And it just seems to me--and this was
brought up by--in some of the opening statements--that when it
comes to permits, designs, approval of things to be done, not
to be done, et cetera, that they ought to be sharing this with
you, in order to be a--tripartite, so to speak, type of
situation. And Senator Snowe, I think, said that that ought to
be put into law, which I would tend to agree with.
You have experience, both of you, I admit--I suppose they
do have experience, but it certainly hasn't surfaced, to this
point. What is your view on that?
Dr. Lubchenco. Go ahead.
Admiral Allen. Senator, I'd like to address three areas, if
I could. The first one is an inspection issue. The second one
is a Coast Guard regulatory issue. And the third one is a
response-plan issue.
If I could, as it relates to the regulatory
responsibilities, MMS has responsible--responsibility for the
drilling apparatus, itself. And in this case, the Coast Guard
issues what's called a ``Certificate of Compliance'' for the
mobile drilling unit, which is actually a floating ship
connected by the riser pipe.
Regarding the mobile drilling unit itself, we regulate that
under Title 46 of the U.S. Code. We have taken a look at the
current set of regulations, and we think there are five areas
where we might be able to do a better job with regulatory
reform inside the Coast Guard. I would submit that they are:
take a look at the current electrical standards on board the
mobile drilling units, the machinery standards. Probably a real
important one is dynamic positioning reliability. This is the
system by which the ship is held in place while the operations
are going on. That technology has probably gotten out in far--
of the--ahead of the regulations. We probably need to take a
look at certifying the reliability against a set of standards
for dynamic positioning.
And we need to look at the difference between floating
production units and mobile drilling units--floating production
units are basically vessels or ships that are involved in
production, as mobile drilling units actually are pontoon-
based, and--looking at the standards related to that.
And, finally, lifesaving and firefighting equipment. And
we'd like to engage in a conversation about those areas, if we
could.
Regarding the actual drilling equipment itself, the blowout
preventers that are down there right now are not under any
regulatory regime. They're actually built to American Petroleum
Institute specifications. There are three that are out there
for industry to use. One is the ram operations and the blowout
preventer, the choke-and-kill lines, and the control systems
that control all of that.
API kind of goes out and issues a license to the
manufacturers, and they do testing. MMS accepts those licenses
in lieu of an inspection. I think there's an opportunity,
moving forward, to take a look at whether or not we need a
regulatory regime for the blowout preventers and the control
systems associated with that, sir.
The Chairman. So, what you're saying, then, is that API,
the American Petroleum Institute, is the regulator of some very
sensitive machinery--the approver of.
Admiral Allen. They're not a regulator, sir. They set
industry standards. Those are----
The Chairman. Yes.
Admiral Allen.--taken as----
The Chairman. Well----
Admiral Allen.--specifications for production.
The Chairman. But----
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
The Chairman.--nobody else is regulating. They're the only
one----
Admiral Allen. There is no regulatory regime for blowout--
--
The Chairman. Right.
Admiral Allen.--preventers at this time. Yes, sir.
And, finally, on response plans. As you know, MMS approves
their response plans for the drilling units in the Gulf of
Mexico. We think there needs to be a closer integration in the
review of those plans with the local--Federal on-scene
coordinators that are responsible for developing protection
plans for the coastal resources, and make sure that there's a
match there, sir.
The Chairman. Dr. Lubchenco?
Dr. Lubchenco. Mr. Chairman, NOAA's role includes providing
comments to MMS on their plans, their programs, and their NEPA
documents. We do not have final approval authority for MMS
leasing plans. We simply provide comments.
We also have responsibility to provide certification for--
or authorization for incidental take, if, in fact, there is
reason to believe that marine mammals might be harmed, for
example, for specific activities.
The Chairman. Dr. Lubchenco, can I interrupt? I apologize,
but I--I'm about to run out of time, and I want to ask you one
question.
You have the sensitivity--environmental sensitivity index
maps, and they are very crucial for judging exposure and the
rest of it. My understanding is that these maps are outdated
at--even to the extent of 10 years. Is that the case? And if it
is, what are we doing about it?
Dr. Lubchenco. Mr. Chairman, those maps--the numbers that
we have are that 21 of 50 atlases are more than 10 years old.
So, it is a--the case that many of them are--do not reflect
current information. It would--the--we have not had the
resources to continually update those. This is a--primarily a
resource issue. It's my understanding it would cost around $11
million to update those maps that are more than 10 years old.
The current request in our President's budget includes updating
of only one of those. So, this is a question where it's simply
a matter of not having had the resources.
The Chairman. Well, that will certainly be taken for the
record. I mean, if the lack of resources are causing that to
happen, that's really bad. So, we have to attend to that.
I thank you.
Senator Hutchison.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you very much.
Admiral Allen, do you believe that BP is doing everything
that is within its power, and that it can do, that could be
done to clean up this spill?
Admiral Allen. Ma'am, the way I've been characterizing
this, I think BP has been relentless in their responsibilities,
but we've been relentless in our oversight. When you get to an
anomalous situation like this, some of the things we're facing
haven't been faced before. And there's a matter of translating
our intent to what they can do, because they're the ones that
have access to the discharge area.
I think one of the things that's--that sets this situation
apart from anything I've ever dealt with is, there is no human
access to the point of discharge. Everything we know is through
remotely operated vehicles and remote sensing. And, as I think
was indicated earlier, the entire elements of production and
capacity to do anything with the sea floor rests in the private
sector here. And so, the role of government is really to
conduct oversight to make sure that we're doing everything we
can.
I would say this. There has been a collection of folks in
Houston, at the BP command center, which I have visited
personally, including people, representing the National Labs,
that have been inserted in there. There's a vigorous
conversation going on. And I would say, it's--I--it's less a
matter of responsiveness than resolving the issues on how to
move forward, and making sure critical information is available
and the assumptions are known to everybody--as they're looking
at this ``top kill'' shot, for instance--to make sure we know
the assumptions associated with the integrity of the casing and
critical pressures, so we don't create a worse problem by
putting mud into the pipeline there.
So, I would say it's a matter of coordination. And, at that
point, it becomes an accountability issue and oversight issue
for the Coast Guard, as well, ma'am.
Senator Hutchison. Well, let me just ask both of you, Dr.
Lubchenco as well as Admiral Allen, in looking at this group
that is trying to determine what to do, what is the right thing
to do, and what are the consequences, do you feel like every
bit of information, and the decisions that are being made, are
truly collaborative between the two of you, your agencies, and
the BP group?
Dr. Lubchenco. Senator, we have had very positive
collaborative relationships with everyone at the incident
command, led by the Coast Guard. And there have been really
good exchanges of information across the agencies. And I think
the Coast Guard has done a spectacular job of providing
leadership for that.
One of the things NOAA does is to provide the scientific
support coordinator for each of the incident commands. And so,
they have immediate access to the wealth of scientific
information that resides within NOAA. But, there is a lot of
interaction across the agencies, as well.
Admiral Allen. Ma'am, if I could follow up.
I think an instructive event took place on Sunday. There
was a conference call, headed by Secretary Salazar and
Secretary Chu, that was actually entitled a ``Scientific
Summit.'' It involved all of the engineers that are working in
Houston, the embedded folks from the National Labs. And there
was a step-by-step review of the current interventions that are
being planned by British Petroleum, especially in regard to the
top kill, which will be the injection of mud into the well that
will basically seal it until the relief well can be drilled.
That was a 2-hour phone call. And I can tell you the
questions were exhaustive, that the BP engineers were put on
the spot to come up with their assumptions and provide
information that would lead them to believe that a certain
tactic would work. And they were grilled very, very hard over
those 2 hours, ma'am. So, if that's any indication or way to
explain to you the amount of involvement that's going on as
these tactics are being developed, I think that's emblematic.
Senator Hutchison. Let me ask you, Dr. Lubchenco. In
addition to the beaches, which we're seeing the pictures of,
there are the wetlands. The coastal wetlands are an important
part of the Gulf Coast ecosystems, as you know, I'm sure. If
they are impacted by the oil spill, down the road, can NOAA do
anything that would help in restoration of the wetlands? And is
BP going to be responsible for funding wetland restoration as
well as the beach and clean-up efforts that they are also
committed to making?
Dr. Lubchenco. Senator, you're absolutely right to focus on
the key role that those wetlands play in the entire Gulf
region. And our efforts have been devoted, primarily, to
keeping the oil from reaching them, because it does have the
potential to have very serious impacts, not only on the
wetlands, but on many of the species that reside in the Gulf
but use the wetlands as nursery areas.
Around 80 to 90 percent of the fisheries in the Gulf--the--
of the--80 to 90 percent of those fisheries have life stages
that spend part of their life in those wetlands. And so, they
are absolutely critical.
It's my understanding that part of the Natural Resources
Damage Assessment process is intended to identify what--and
quantify--what the impact is, and to remediate that, to the
extent that it's possible. But, once oil gets into those
marshes, it's very, very difficult to remove, and has to be
done or--it's very difficult to remove it, let me say.
Senator Hutchison. Just one quick question.
Oh, did you have a comment?
Admiral Allen. Yes.
Senator Hutchison. Go ahead.
Admiral Allen. Just a quick footnote, ma'am. One of the
significant changes made in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,
following the Exxon Valdez, was something called Natural
Resources Damage Assessments, which are required, and are
funded and recoverable, to assess the damages and mitigation
plans, moving forward. That has been institutionalized since
OPA-90, and we work very closely together. That process will
start shortly in relation to this spill.
Dr. Lubchenco. Senator, could I add, just really quickly,
that one of the things that NOAA has done immediately is to
mobilize coastal surveys throughout the region to get very
precise information about areas--wetlands and other areas
before they are impacted, so we have the latest, most current,
baseline information, both from the air coastal surveys, on the
ground, water samples, species samples, taking chemical
background information, et cetera. So, we've had sort of a
blitzkrieg along the coast to do that.
Senator Hutchison. Well, I appreciate that, because it will
be more complicated, even, than the beach, which is clearer.
So, I'm glad that both of you are committed to, first,
preventing, but, if that doesn't work, then going into the
mitigation. And it will be difficult, I know. But, it's
important. Thank you.
Can I just ask one quick question? Admiral Allen, are you
going to stay on as the national incident commander after the
change of command?
Admiral Allen. My change of command is scheduled for the
25th of May. My actual retirement date, because I was going to
take leave, was 1 July. I am available to the Secretary and the
President until my--I'm not needed any further, ma'am.
Senator Hutchison. Is that a July 1 cutoff?
Admiral Allen. If it wouldn't be on 1 July, it would have
to be under a different set of circumstances, because I would
no longer be in the Coast Guard, ma'am, on Active Duty.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hutchison.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Admiral, I have a letter here from Rear
Admiral Landry, of which--she sent it to BP, asking for full
access to all information related to the oil discharge rate.
Why is it necessary for her to send that letter? Was BP not
providing full access to the video footage?
Admiral Allen. Sir, we've had full access to the video
footage, in our command centers, since the event started. I
think what she was looking for was archival information. We're
trying to put together what we're calling a flow-rate technical
team to try and establish what is exactly flowing out of the
riser pipe right now, and try and get an estimate of the
overall amount of oil that has been released. To do that, we do
need some historical and archival information.
That--it has been fed to us real-time; we just wanted
complete access to it. And she ensured that with her letter,
sir.
Senator Nelson. So, you feel satisfied that you're having
access to all the video footage?
Admiral Allen. It has been coming into the command centers
real-time for us since the start of the event, sir.
I would say one other thing. At the Scientific Summit that
was held with Secretary Salazar on Sunday, he made the same
request regarding technical data associated with the
assumptions on the integrity of the casing in the well, as it
relates to the top kill option that's being considered.
Senator Nelson. Well, on the basis of this recent footage
that you just released to Senator Boxer and me today--``you''
the Coast Guard--maybe it was BP that released it after we
wrote to you--have you made a new estimate?
Admiral Allen. Sir, the reason we need all that information
is, we're pulling an interagency group of experts in. There has
been a lot of prognostications about what the discharge rate
is. As you know, it started out at 1,000 barrels-a-day. We are
currently using 5,000 barrels-a-day.
One of our problems, I noted earlier, is that we're dealing
with a discharge point that has no human access, and we're
trying to make estimates from two-dimensional video from the
remotely operated vehicles. And what we're trying to do is
gather the best minds in the country in see how to--we can
synthesize this information and come up with a more refined
product, with higher fidelity, on the discharge rate, sir.
Dr. Lubchenco. Senator, could I add to that, just briefly?
I think it's important to note that the efforts of the
Federal Government have not been constrained by the estimates
of flow. We have, all along, assumed that we may be dealing
with considerably more oil than is currently the estimate. And
the efforts have been very aggressive and mobilized to deal
with the possibilities that it might be more than that. That
doesn't mean it's unimportant to get the flow rate right. It
is.
Senator Nelson. Doctor, you and I talked about these
flights. Is that costing NOAA, or is BP reimbursing for those
flight expenses?
Dr. Lubchenco. Senator, we are currently funding those
flights, with the expectation that they will be reimbursable by
BP. And there is a special--specific process for documenting
and requesting--you know, for making sure that all the right
things are done to get that reimbursement.
Senator Nelson. And----
Admiral Allen. Senator, if I could maybe----
Senator Nelson. Let me----
Admiral Allen.--provide some more----
Senator Nelson. I'm running out of time. I want to follow
up on that.
Doctor, have you confirmed the existence of the origin of
the deep sea plumes?
Dr. Lubchenco. Have we confirmed the existence of the
origin of the deep sea plumes?
Senator Nelson. Have you confirmed the existence of the
deep sea plumes?
Dr. Lubchenco. Are you talking about the oil coming out of
the riser?
Senator Nelson. No, I'm talking about those long--100 yards
thick, 10 miles long, 3 miles wide.
Dr. Lubchenco. The researchers that were on the research
vessel Pelican, that just got back into port, identified an
anomaly that is subsurface that may be oil, but that has not
yet been confirmed. They took samples of that oil, and those
samples are in the process of being analyzed. But, we won't
know for a number of days yet whether it is oil or not. This is
in the very early stages of identifying and characterizing what
that actually is.
Senator Nelson. I see. So, you don't know whether or not
the dispersants that have been released have affected that oil
at those depths.
Dr. Lubchenco. If the plume that they discovered is indeed
oil, we do not know what its origin may be. It's highly
unlikely that it could be dispersants that had been used at the
source of the leak, because there has not been much use of
dispersant yet. It's only a very small amount that has been
used. So, the mechanism for where--how that plume came to be is
yet unknown. And I think we will be in the discovery phase of a
lot of things as this event plays out, and that will be one of
them.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, obviously what I'm trying to
get at is--what we see on the surface is one thing--how much of
it is underneath, that we don't see, that we're going to have
to deal with for years.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Snowe.
Senator Snowe. Thank you.
Dr. Lubchenco, just to follow up on that--truly the
determination of the size of the spill can make a material
difference, in terms of mitigation, could it not?
Dr. Lubchenco. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Snowe. OK. And that's the difficulty when we see
the wide ``spanse'' and variations in estimates; 80,000
barrels-a-day, as opposed to 5,000 barrels, which could mean
210,000 gallons of oil. And the highest figures indicate the
amount of oil already spilled could be as much as 2.3 million
barrels, nearly seven times what was spilled during the Exxon
Valdez crisis. So----
Dr. Lubchenco. Senator, we----
Senator Snowe.--that's the ambiguity here, and the wide
discrepancy, I think is a serious issue. And how to grapple
with the question, and also for the mitigation efforts.
Dr. Lubchenco. Senator, we believe it is important to get a
good estimate of what that--the flow rate is, and what the
total amount of oil is, and where it is. That's not an easy
thing to do, which is why Admiral Allen has set up a new flow-
rate team, within the National Incident Command, to bring the
best possible minds together, to try to nail this down. It is
important. It's just very, very difficult to do.
Senator Snowe. You know, it's interesting, what I find
confounding about this entire crisis is the fact that these
are, sort of, fundamentals that should have already been
established. You know, having a response plan for the worst-
case scenario. But, the worst-case scenario really wasn't
established in the exploration plan. I mean, that was
sidestepped, as I said earlier, understating the amount of oil
that could be spilled, to the high estimates that we
potentially have today.
Admiral Allen, in the response plan that you require of
vessels within your realm of responsibilities, can you give us
some idea as to what you would have done differently, or what
should be done differently? What do you require of vessels?
Would you consider this adequate in a worst-case scenario?
Admiral Allen. Ma'am, for a vessel response plan, we have
several scenarios, including average most-probable discharge
and a worst-case discharge, and then the resources identified
that would be able to deal with those spills, given the
operating area where the vessels are in. That then is
reconciled by something called an ``area committee,'' which is
set up under the captain of the port, who's a Federal on-scene
coordinator. And there's a reconciliation of the worst-case
discharge, the resources to be protected, and the resources
needed to do that.
As I mentioned earlier--and I think you were, maybe, out on
a vote--one of the things we need to do is reconcile the
development of the response plans, that are now approved by
MMS, back to those area contingency plans and the resources to
be protected, and make that linkage actually in the plans.
Right now, they--the plans are focused on a discharge rate, not
necessarily connected to the resources to be protected on the
coastal zones.
Senator Snowe. Well, for example, the use of a containment
dome was listed as part of their strategy in the exploration
plan for response to a failure of a blowout preventer, would
you have approved a response plan for a vessel that did not
acknowledge the possibility of a complete failure of the
system? I mean, in terms of a worst-case scenario?
Admiral Allen. Well, ma'am, under the vessel plans, we do
have worst-case scenario. I would--on the MMS plans that
include a containment dome, the real difference here was that a
containment dome has never been tried at the depth of water,
and whether that was feasible or not. And I think that the
significant issue is, What is feasible at 5,000 feet without
human access? And I think that is the source of a lot of the
challenges we're dealing with right now, including trying to
determine the flow rate when you don't have access.
Senator Snowe. Right. But, that is also possible in
developing a plan and having a response that's viable, in a
worst-case scenario, both in the amount, in terms of the
exigencies; and, of course, it must have indicated in the plan
how far they're going to go.
Admiral Allen. Yes, ma'am. The current planning process did
not envision the situation we're having to deal with on the
ocean floor right now.
Senator Snowe. Dr. Lubchenco, following your comments on
the permitting process, did you ever get any response from the
Minerals Management Service during the environmental process on
the permits, including the Deepwater Horizon? That specific one
was approved in February 2009. Did you ever have any
communications with the Service with respect to the
environmental assessments, or environmental permitting that was
required?
Dr. Lubchenco. So, I'm uncertain which ones you're asking
about, Senator.
Senator Snowe. On any of the ones that were approved since
January 2009 that required permits.
Dr. Lubchenco. The permits----
Senator Snowe. And including this one in the Deepwater
Horizon.
Dr. Lubchenco. So, I don't know the answer to that. And I
will get back to you on that.
Senator Snowe. Because I think we need to understand the
relationship that exists between the agencies. I know it's not
in statute, which I think we have to correct, frankly.
And I think the Coast Guard, frankly, also ought to
oversee, inherently, the same practices, both for vessels and
for oil spills to the marine environment, also underwater
operations like the Deepwater Horizon--but also with respect to
your agency. So, I think it is important to submit to the
Committee exactly what responses, if any, you received from the
Minerals Management Service, with respect to your assessments--
because how did they go forward with any of the permits,
without getting your approval on the exploration plans on
environmental issues?
Dr. Lubchenco. Senator, it was my understanding that the
permits that were issued for this, for the Deepwater Horizon,
were done quite a few years ago. But, I will look into that,
and let you know. We will get back to you on that.
Senator Snowe. OK. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Snowe.
I want to point out to my colleagues, before I call on
Senator Wicker, that we are moving at a pace that, by the time
we get through the second panel it'll be time for breakfast.
Now, that's fine with me, because this subject is of that
dimension. But, I think we're--we are going to have to exercise
some restraint here.
And Senator Johanns and Senator Klobuchar have not given
opening statements, and they will have questions. And I would
hope that perhaps they could kind of blend those into one--
let's say, putting 5 minutes on, as a total.
But, we have to proceed and ask our questions, but we have
to keep our eye on the next panel.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you. I'll try to stay within my
allotted time.
Dr. Lubchenco, when should you have the information that
would allow you to get back to us with authority on the
existence of the plumes?
Dr. Lubchenco. Senator, are you asking when will we know if
the plumes have--are composed of small mists of oil? Is it oil
that's in it? Is that what you're asking?
Senator Wicker. Yes. Right.
Dr. Lubchenco. The samples that were collected have been
sent for analysis. I think--within a week, I am told, we should
have information on that.
Senator Wicker. OK. At that point, would you be able to
speak with a relatively high degree of certainty on whether
these are oil plumes or something else?
Dr. Lubchenco. Yes, Senator. We expect to be able to know
if it is oil. I think what the instruments are showing is a
very fine mist of something.
Senator Wicker. So, it's a mist of something.
Dr. Lubchenco. It----
Senator Wicker. It's not a----
Dr. Lubchenco. It----
Senator Wicker.--glob of----
Dr. Lubchenco. It's not a glob.
Senator Wicker. All right.
Dr. Lubchenco. It's not big balls. It's not big drops. It's
a fine mist.
Senator Wicker. What is the relative size of this mass of
``mist''?
Dr. Lubchenco. I haven't seen all of the data from the
crews. It's a relatively large area, but I can't give you the
dimensions. The researchers are still working up those data.
And we would be happy to share with the----
Senator Wicker. OK.
Dr. Lubchenco.--that information with you, as soon as we
have it.
Senator Wicker. Well, I hope you'll do that. I'll ask you
to do that on the record. I'm certain that you'll be making it
available.
Now, with regard to the NOAA maps that had not been updated
since before Katrina, had NOAA requested funds from Congress
for the purpose of updating those environmental maps?
Dr. Lubchenco. Senator, I don't know the full history of
our requests, going back that far. I--we could look that up and
get that to you.
Senator Wicker. OK.
Dr. Lubchenco. I know that there have been very significant
cuts to that program over the years that have significantly
reduced ability to stay current with those maps.
Senator Wicker. OK.
Dr. Lubchenco. And it's pretty clear we need to play catch-
up, here.
Senator Wicker. Now, you say the dispersant biodegrades. In
response to Senator Rockefeller's question, once the dispersant
biodegrades, what's the byproduct? Does the byproduct come to
the surface, or does it sink?
Dr. Lubchenco. The dispersant are chemicals that are
intended to--it's like a detergent that breaks up oil into
very, very small drops so that they can be naturally
biodegraded faster than they would if they were in a solid
surface.
Senator Wicker. Do they come to the surface to do that or
do they sink to the----
Dr. Lubchenco. No.
Senator Wicker.--bottom?
Dr. Lubchenco. They--neither. They are--they stay in the
water----
Senator Wicker. OK.
Dr. Lubchenco.--column. And if the dispersant is just
injected into pure seawater, without the oil, which I think is
part of what Senator----
Senator Wicker. No. Rockefeller.
Dr. Lubchenco.--Kerry was asking, it actually----
Senator Wicker. Was that who I said it was?
Dr. Lubchenco.--biodegrades within 4 to 5 days.
Senator Wicker. I see.
Dr. Lubchenco. And so, it's benign, then. It would not be
any substance to worry about.
Senator Wicker. OK. And you're right, that was Senator
Kerry's question, not Senator Rockefeller's.
Admiral Allen, there are three kind of blowout preventers.
The standards are set by industry. Is that your testimony?
Admiral Allen. Sir, what I meant was----
Oh. I'm sorry.
What I meant was, there are three different areas of subsea
mining that there are specifications set out by the American
Petroleum Institute. One are the rams on the blowout
preventers, the choke-and-kill lines, and then the control
systems. They're three different components of what we're--in
what they----
Senator Wicker. OK. So----
Admiral Allen.--would call----
Senator Wicker.--on every rig, there's going to be a
blowout preventer.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Senator Wicker. And the standards are set by API. Do you
have any indication that those standards are less than
acceptable? Or should we be more concerned about the adherence
to those standards?
Admiral Allen. I'm not sure I'm in a position technically
qualified to tell you about the standard. I will tell you this,
that they are used by the American Bureau of Shipping to issue
what's called a Certificate of Drilling Systems that says that
those systems are in compliance with industry standards. So,
there is a third-party verification through a classification
society--in this case, the American Bureau of Shipping--that
would do that, sir.
Senator Wicker. Finally, with regard to the response of the
Federal Government, looking back over the 4 weeks of this
tragedy, is there anything you wish the Coast Guard or the
Department had done differently or earlier?
Admiral Allen. I think the biggest takeaway--and this is
something that I don't think we anticipated--or maybe
couldn't--could be anticipated--when you have a--what I call an
omnidirectional indeterminate threat, any booming resources you
have available for one particular area are going to be vastly
exceeded when you start talking about an area of western
Louisiana clear around, potentially, to Key West, is where
we're talking about now.
The national system did not contemplate you would have to
do all that at once. And so, I think the entire issue of boom
inventory, booming strategy, and means of production is
something we're going to have to take a good close look at,
sir.
Senator Wicker. That was a decision that was made weeks and
months and years beforehand.
Admiral Allen. It's usually indicated that, in one
particular area, you would have a worst-case discharge, and you
would protect that one particular area with a certain amount of
boom and resources. What we're trying to do is basically
protect the entire Gulf Coast at the same time. And when you do
that, it multiplies the requirements for boom, and it's
stressing the manufacturing system. And I think a national
supply strategy is probably going to be needed after this.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I just saw a press release from the Coast Guard
saying, in addition to the tar balls that we first heard about
in Key West, there is an investigation of tar balls on the
beach in Big Pine Key, as well as Loggerhead Key, in the Dry
Tortugas; and at Smathers Beach, there has been a report, as
well.
I don't think anyone estimated that we were going to have--
if these tar balls are, in fact, from this Gulf oil spill--I
know that you all are doing research to make sure that they
are, because they can naturally occur--but, it seems somewhat
coincidental, if that's the case. Since this is ahead of where
we thought that the spill might be at this time, what is the
plan for the Florida Keys? What is the Coast Guard ready to do
to protect that valuable ecosystem from the oil that appears to
be heading there?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. Let me tell you what we've already
done, and then where I think we are today.
About a week and a half ago, I met with Governor Crist, and
I recommended that they do a reconciliation between what is in
the current area contingency plans for the State of Florida,
and make sure that those resources to be protected were really
what they wanted, there weren't any changes recently. It took
us a while to get through that process in Louisiana and
Mississippi and Alabama. We're still kind of vetting some
issues about what should be protected, versus what the plan
said. That resulted in a conference call with all the counties
along the west coast, and our Coast Guard commanders start
that. That process has basically gone through--so we know
what's sensitive, what needs to be protected, how much boom it
will take, so forth.
What we're dealing with now, though, is a different type of
oil than we have further up in the Gulf. Tar balls are starting
to show up. And Dr. Lubchenco and I were talking before the
hearing. That could be a manifestation of oil that was released
right at the start of this event, and not, maybe, associated
with the slick that's out there now, that may be nearing the
Loop.
Oil that does get down there, is likely to be a much more
weathered oil, if it's on the surface, and won't be susceptible
to in situ burning or dispersant use and, pretty much,
mechanical recovery. That then drives your planning and your
tactics for what you want to do there.
Our two commanders, Captain Close, in St. Petersburg, and
Captain DeQuattro, in Key West, have activated their own local
commands. There are shore assessment teams that are going out.
We are testing the tar balls, as you know, in the Coast Guard
Marine Safety Lab, to get an indication of whether or not
they're associated with this spill.
But, I think we're probably two different sets of oil, or
at least at different times, and weathered in different ways.
I'd ask Dr. Lubchenco to comment, though.
Dr. Lubchenco. Senator, we're not--as you pointed out, we
need to know for sure where the oil came from. If, in fact, it
is from this spill--if it has the same fingerprint--one
possibility, that there's no real way to confirm but that makes
sense, is that the initial explosion may have discharged oil
that was an--sort of, an initial flush, and that that is a
separate event from the continuous release of the oil that has
been coming up since then. Of that, we--there's no way to
confirm that. It would be consistent with what we're seeing,
but I think we may never really know.
Senator LeMieux. Assuming that it is from the disaster, and
maybe it is a separate case or it's the initial blastoff and
not the spill that we're seeing. The spill we're seeing is
coming. We saw those charts, a moment ago, about the Loop
Current. This would certainly show a precursor, if this oil
traveled along those same currents first. Are we going to put
booming up to protect the Florida Keys?
We have this huge area between Key West and going up to
southwest Florida, Cape Sable, and in between that is, Florida
Bay, which the Federal Government and the state governments
have spent hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars
trying to keep clean from other pollutants. What are we going
to do to try to prevent the oil from getting into Florida Bay,
the Everglades, our reefs?
Dr. Lubchenco. Senator, let me clarify something about Loop
Current and then ask the Admiral to talk about the booming
strategy, if that's all right.
The oil that we believe is either close to or in the top
part of the Loop Current is a very small amount of light sheen.
Most of the bulk of the oil mass is dozens of miles away from
the Loop Current now. So, it's just a small tendril that is
streaking down toward the Loop Current. Some of that is likely
to get entrained in an eddy that is going to carry it back
north. Some of it might get into the Loop Current.
When it gets into the Loop Current, it's going to be
significantly diluted. And by the time it makes its way to the
Florida Strait, which is on the order of 8 to 12 days, it would
likely be significantly weathered and degraded, as well as
diluted. So that what we are looking at are likely emulsified
streamers and possibly tar balls. It's not as if there's going
to be a massive amount of fresh oil washing up.
The booming strategy is something the Commandant can focus
on.
The Chairman. Time is up.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Mr. Chairman, I've been out on the phone,
and voting, so I feel like I'm coming in, in the middle of a
conversation. So, I think what I'll do is pass, for the moment,
and maybe take my time at the end, if that's possible.
The Chairman. All right.
Then following would be Senator Cantwell, and then, to
their amazement, Senator Johanns and Senator Klobuchar.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you----
[Laughter.]
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Lubchenco, I'm not sure if my colleague Senator Snowe
was asking about permits, specifically, which I think she was,
but I'm very interested in--your agency sent a letter--NOAA
sent a letter to MMS, in September of 2009, on the offshore
drilling proposal.
This is a copy of the letter, here.
I asked Secretary Salazar about it this morning. And the
reason I'm bringing it up here again at this hearing is, it's
pretty clear, from what NOAA says in this, that the--basically,
you're saying that MMS is understating the environmental
impacts and the risks of spills, and, basically, that MMS's
conclusions in this document are not based on science. Those
are pretty strong statements.
I'm wondering, did you ever get a response back from MMS,
to this document?
Dr. Lubchenco. Senator, those are the comments that we
submit as part of the process where we comment on plans. And we
did not get a formal response, but it's not typical that we--
one would get a response. MMS sends out plans, agencies
comment. They take those plans--or they take those comments
into account when they make their final determination.
Senator Cantwell. And so, what kind of informal comments
did you get back?
Dr. Lubchenco. We have had many exchanges about the plans
and the comments. And for the most recent announcement that
Secretary Salazar made, they actually took many of our comments
into account, and that is evidenced in the announcements that
were made most recently.
Senator Cantwell. Could we get--we asked Secretary Salazar
for any of those documents. And if there are other documents,
could the public have access to them? Because, I mean, this is
part of the issue that I think some of us are concerned about.
If you have an agency, such as yours, that is in charge of
rendering the questions of the impact of oil spills on science,
and yet you give that science to an agency that's supposed to
do oversight, and they ignore it, I think those are the things
that Members of Congress want to know. We want to know what's
being ignored, when it comes to the science.
A follow-up on the recovery: I know that there are many--
well, I mentioned that there are still 10 species that are
recovering from the Exxon Valdez, and two species that show no
sign of recovery. I have a list here of all of those,
including, besides these species, there are intertidal
communities and designated wilderness, all sorts of things that
aren't recovering. Yet, we're talking 20 years later.
What are--do you think are the possibilities that there
will be similar fisheries in the Gulf that will be impacted
over a long period of time?
Dr. Lubchenco. Senator, I think it's fair to say that oil
has both immediate as well as long-term impacts. The specific
impacts are very much a function of the type of oil. This is a
different type of oil from what we saw in Exxon Valdez. It's
also very much a function of what species have very vulnerable
life stages, eggs, or larvae that are in the plankton at the
time. And we do not yet know the full environmental impact of
this particular event. That's why we are very aggressively
taking samples and monitoring it.
We know that there are a lot of vulnerable species. We know
there're a lot of vulnerable habitats. There is great potential
for extreme environmental harm, but to be more specific than
that is very challenging.
Senator Cantwell. Well, we hope that you'll keep this
committee informed of the indicators to those species, so that
we can have an idea, as soon as you have an idea, about those
impacts.
Admiral Allen, your comments about API doing self-
certification--basically, the industry certifying whether
equipment is safe to use, or not--do you believe that ABS's--
the American Shipping--I'm sorry--the American Bureau of
Shipping--do you think that they should be expanded, their
responsibilities, to do certification on things like blowout
preventers, since they are such critical parts of the drilling
apparatus? To do certification on whether they work?
Admiral Allen. They have the competency to do that right
now. And they actually do issue certificates for drilling
systems from time to time, but it's voluntary right now. I
think what needs to be considered is whether or not we need a
regulatory regime that would make it mandatory, then ABS could
do that as a classification society.
We did some surveys. There are some countries in the world
that do require this, and one of them is Norway.
Senator Cantwell. So--and do you think that would be a
positive development?
Admiral Allen. I think it certainly has to be considered,
in the wake of what happened, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
I certainly think we should, Mr. Chairman. I know that
might not be the--I'm not sure whose jurisdiction that is, but
I actually think that more third-party validation of the
equipment is a critical issue.
So, thank--I thank the Chair.
The Chairman. I agree with you. Thank you very much.
Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you.
I was at the hearing earlier in the Environment Committee,
with Senator--I still call him Senator--with Secretary Salazar
and Administrator Jackson and others. And I, first, want to let
you know, Admiral Allen, that I was down there, a few weeks
ago, with Congressman Oberstar and with the Coast Guard. We
flew over the disaster and were briefed by people on the ground
at your command center. It was clear to me, people in this
horrible tragedy, that never should have happened, were working
as well as they could together and trying to do the right
thing. And so, I wanted to thank you for that.
The other thing, of course, I was struck by, that anyone
that visits there is struck by, is just the magnitude of the
oil on the sea; it's something you can never quite capture on
TV, just the miles and miles of orange, and the people, the
small business owners, terrified that they will lose their
livelihoods.
We had a hearing last week with some of the BP and
Halliburton and Transocean people, and the heads of their
companies. And, you know, I made clear there, I think one of
the key things is going to be the liability and making sure the
taxpayers are compensated for this. This idea that there was no
redundancy, that there wasn't any other backup plans, this--
that Senator Cantwell was just focusing on, the inspection of
some of this equipment, and the failure of the Mineral
Management Agency in catching some of this--and there's just a
lot of blame to go around, clearly.
But, I had one--just one question, actually, of you--maybe
both of you, but I'll lead with you, Dr. Lubchenco. And this
came out of something one of the Coast Guard people said when
we were down there. And I checked; it's not redundant with what
everyone else has been asking. But, that is, one of the Coast
Guard raised the issue that, if this just keeps going, and
we're not able to plug it, or if it's--just goes on and on for
another month or two, if--when hurricane season hits, it is
possible that it could be even worse.
And so, I would like to know if you've made any
projections, if there are hurricanes, the effect that could
have, in terms of stirring up this oil. Even if they are
successful in plugging the leak, what effect this could have
with these tens and hundreds of thousands of barrels of oil.
And, if the oil spill itself could somehow affect the hurricane
season.
I'll lead with you.
Dr. Lubchenco. Senator, I think the short answer is, We
don't really know the exact nature of the interaction that
might be between hurricanes and this oil spill. Our folks have
been working really hard to get some answers on that. We just
don't have a lot of experience. There are a number of ideas
that are out there. The oil may actually prevent some
evaporation, and therefore, diminish the power of a hurricane.
It's unlikely that it would be affecting its track.
On the other hand, it would sort of depend on where the oil
is and where the hurricane is. There are a lot of factors that
would go into play. And the bottom line is, we don't really
know.
Senator Klobuchar. Being a lake state, when does the
hurricane season really start?
Dr. Lubchenco. Hurricane season is--officially starts the
beginning of June. Next week is Hurricane Preparedness Week,
and we will be announcing the NOAA outlook of what we expect--
given current atmospheric and oceanographic conditions, what we
expect this hurricane season to look like.
Senator Klobuchar. And is it possible, though, it could
stir it up even more, and bring the oil places you don't want
it to go?
Dr. Lubchenco. It's certainly possible that some--we don't
know exactly what that--you know, there are all sorts of things
that are possible, and I think it's just speculation.
Senator Klobuchar. All right.
Admiral do you want to add anything?
Admiral Allen. Just two things, ma'am. Any kind of weather
that's rough inhibits on-water response. And we're trying to
deal--if we can't stop the leak, then we want to fight this as
far offshore as possible.
Now, we--we're finding out, just with the frontal passages
of spring storms coming through the region, that we've had to
pull ships back.
Senator Klobuchar. Right.
Admiral Allen. So, there's an impact on the response
capability. Beyond that--and this might be a question for the
second panel--a lot of the stuff that's going on out there
right now is weather-related, and there are drilling operations
and other offshore supply vessels that are working. So, I think
you would need to assess the impact on the relief wells that
are being drilled, and at what point would hurricane-type
weather cause them to have to secure those operations, which
would then insert a time element into the ultimate relief-well
drilling timeline.
Senator Klobuchar. And when's the height of the hurricane
season, usually?
Admiral Allen. I would--I've got the expert next to me, but
I think, when you get toward the end of August through the
month of September, is the height of the season.
Senator Klobuchar. All right. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar.
And I want to thank Admiral Allen and Dr. Lubchenco very
much for your patience. You've been to a number of these
hearings.
It's my view that this is going to go on for a very long
time. It opens up extraordinary scientific and safety, as well
as energy capacity, questions. And it's, philosophically, very
interesting, as well. In other words, do you take a chance, and
do you have to take a chance, or can you not afford to take a
chance?
In any event, you're two superb witnesses, and your service
to your country is enormously appreciated, obviously, by all of
us. And I thank you.
Senator Hutchison. And I agree totally.
Dr. Lubchenco. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you so much for the service and
the extra time, the extra mile you're going. We really
appreciate it.
Dr. Lubchenco. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. We'll have a 30-second recess while the next
panel comes in.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. We apologize to the second panel for making
them wait so long, but this is obviously an enormous subject.
And I will introduce to my colleagues again Mr. Lamar
McKay, who's chairman and president of BP America; and Mr.
Steven Newman, president and CEO of Transocean Limited; and Dr.
Deborah French-McCay, Principal Applied Science Associates,
who's an independent and knowledgeable researcher. We would be
happy to hear your statement.
Mr. McKay, we'll start with you.
STATEMENT OF LAMAR McKAY, CHAIRMAN AND PRESIDENT, BP AMERICA
Mr. McKay. Thank you.
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, members of
the Committee, my name is Lamar McKay, and I am Chairman and
President of BP America.
We have experienced a tragic set of events. Nearly 1 month
ago, 11 people were lost in an accident on the Deepwater
Horizon rig. That was a terrible loss to the families, and the
affect on the Gulf Coast is tremendous. People's lives and
livelihoods are being effective--affected in this, and we are
aware of that.
I've seen the response firsthand. I've been on the
frontline with the men and women, and I've understood what
people are going through to battle this. There is a deep and
steadfast resolve to do all we humanly can to stop the leak,
contain the spill, and to minimize the damage suffered by the
environment and the people of the Gulf Coast.
As a responsible party, under the Oil Pollution Act, we
will carry out our responsibilities to mitigate the
environmental and economic impacts of this incident. Our
efforts are part of a Unified Command that was established
within hours of the accident, and it provides a structure for
our work with Departments of Homeland Security, the Departments
of Interior, other Federal agencies, as well as affected state
and local governments. We have pledged our commitment to work
with President Obama and members of his Cabinet, and the
Governors, Congressional members, state agencies, and local
communities of Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Florida, and
Texas. We appreciate the leadership, direction, and resources
they are providing.
I want to underscore that the global resources of BP are
committed to this effort, and have been from the outset.
Nothing is being spared. Everyone understands the enormity of
what lies ahead and is working to deliver an effective response
at the wellhead, on the water, and at the shoreline.
Before I describe our around-the-clock efforts in response
to these events, I want to reiterate our commitment to find out
what happened.
There are two key lines of inquiry. First, what caused the
explosion and fire onboard Transocean's Deepwater Horizon rig?
And, second, why did the rig's blowout preventer, the key fail-
safe mechanism, fail to shut in the well and release the rig?
We are cooperating with the joint investigation by the
Departments of Homeland Security and Interior, as well as
investigations by Congress. In addition, BP has commissioned an
internal investigation, whose results we plan to fully share,
so that we can all learn from these terrible events.
In the meantime, we cannot draw any conclusions before all
the facts are known. At the same time, we are fully engaged in
the response to these devastating events.
Our subsea efforts, to stop the flow of oil and secure the
well, are advancing on several fronts. Our immediate focus is
on riser insertion tube. This involves--involved placing a
tapered riser tube into the end of the existing damaged riser,
which is a primary source of the leak. The gas and oil then
flows, under its own pressure, up the riser tube to the
Enterprise drill ship on the surface.
We have successfully tested and inserted the tube into the
leaking riser. And we're now in the early stages of stabilizing
that process in order to process the oil and gas onboard the
Discoverer Enterprise.
An additional subsea effort is known as a ``top kill.''
This is a proven industry technique for capping wells that has
been used worldwide, although it's never been used in 5,000
feet of water. It uses a tube to pump heavy fluids to ``kill,''
or a mixture of multi-sized shredded fibrous materials directly
into the blowout preventer to clog, the flow. This procedure is
ongoing, and the attempt could take 1 to 2 weeks.
We've also developed a modified containment-dome strategy.
``Containment dome,'' known as a ``top hat,'' is being readied,
if needed. And it's designed to mitigate the formation of gas
hydrates. We've tested injecting dispersant directly at the
leak site on the sea floor. It's under Environmental Protection
Agency and Coast Guard approval. Sonar tests--sonar testing and
aerial photographs do show encouraging results. The Unified
Command, supported by the EPA and other agencies, has approved
subsea application, subject to ongoing protocols.
We also began drilling the first of two relief wells, on
Sunday, May 2nd. And, as of May 16th, the first well had
reached approximately 9,000 feet below sea level. A second
drill ship arrived onsite, and, on Sunday, began drilling a
second relief well. The entire relief-well operations could
take approximately 3 months.
On the open water, a fleet of more than 900 response
vessels has been mobilized. In addition to using approved
biodegradable dispersants at the leak point, we're also
attacking the spill offshore with EPA- and Coast Guard-
approved dispersants on the surface. This is applied using
planes and boats.
To protect the shoreline, we're implementing what the U.S.
Coast Guard has called, ``the most massive shoreline protection
effort ever mounted.'' Approximately 1.8 million feet of boom
has now been deployed, with over 1 million additional feet
available. Seventeen staging areas are now in place, and more
than 15,000 volunteers have come forward to offer their
services.
To ensure the rapid implementation of state contingency
plans, we've provided $25 million each to Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida.
We recognize that, beyond the environmental impacts, there
are also economic impacts. These impacts are on the people of
the Gulf Coast, and they rely on the Gulf Coast for their
livelihood. BP will pay all necessary clean-up costs, and is
committed to paying all legitimate claims for other loss and
damages caused by the spill.
We are expediting interim payments to individuals and small
business owners, whose livelihood has been directly impacted.
To date, we've paid out nearly $15 million to claimants, mostly
in the form of lost-income interim payments. We intend to
continue replacing this lost income for as long as the
situation warrants. We are responding to claims as quickly and
as responsively as possible.
Starting this week, we'll have in place an online claims
filling--filing system. And our Call Center's open 24 hours-a-
day, 7 days-a-week. And we also have 12 walk-in claims offices
open in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida, and we
will open at least five more this week.
We're striving to be efficient and fair. We're taking
guidance from the established regulations and other information
provided by the U.S. Coast Guard, which handles and resolves
these types of claims. In addition, we announced, yesterday,
that we are providing $25 million to Florida, and $15 million
each to Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, to help their
governments promote tourism over the next few months.
Tragic as this accident was, we must not lose sight of why
BP and other energy companies are operating in the offshore,
including the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf provides one in four
barrels of oils produced in the United States, and it's a
resource our economy requires.
BP, and the entire energy industry, are under no illusions
about the challenge we face. We know that we will be judged by
our response to this crisis. No resources available to this
company will be spared. I can assure you that we, and the
entire industry, will learn from this terrible event, and we
will emerge from it stronger, smarter, and safer.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
I'd be happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKay follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lamar McKay, Chairman and President, BP America
\1\
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\1\ The data described throughout this testimony is accurate to the
best of my knowledge as of 8 a.m. Sunday, May 16, 2010, when this
testimony was prepared. The information that we have continues to
develop as our response to the incident continues.
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Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, members of the
Committee, I am Lamar McKay, Chairman and President of BP America.
We have all experienced a tragic series of events.
I want to be clear from the outset that we will not rest until the
well is under control. As a responsible party under the Oil Pollution
Act, we will carry out our responsibilities to mitigate the
environmental and economic impacts of this incident.
We--and, indeed, the entire energy sector--are determined to
understand what happened, why it happened, take the learnings from this
incident, and make the changes necessary to make our company and our
industry stronger and safer. We understand that the world is watching
and that we and our industry colleagues will be judged by how we
respond to these events.
Nearly one month ago, eleven people were lost in an explosion and
fire aboard the Transocean Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, and 17
others were injured. My deepest sympathies go out to the families and
friends who have suffered such a terrible loss and to those in Gulf
Coast communities whose lives and livelihoods are being impacted.
This was a horrendous accident. We are all devastated by this. It
has profoundly touched our employees, their families, our partners,
customers, those in the surrounding areas and those in government with
whom we are working. There has been tremendous shock that such an
accident could have happened, and great sorrow for the lives lost and
the injuries sustained. The safety of our employees and our contractors
and the safety of the environment are always our first priorities.
Even as we absorb the human dimensions of this tragedy, I want to
underscore our intense determination to do everything humanly possible
to minimize the environmental and economic impacts of the resulting oil
spill on the Gulf Coast. From the outset, the global resources of BP
have been engaged. Nothing is being spared. We are fully committed to
the response.
And from the beginning, we have never been alone. On the night of
the accident, the Coast Guard helped rescue the 115 survivors from the
rig. The list of casualties could easily have been longer without the
professionalism and dedication of the Coast Guard.
Even before the Transocean Deepwater Horizon sank on the morning of
April 22, a Unified Command structure was established, as provided by
Federal regulations. Currently led by the National Incident Commander,
Admiral Thad Allen, the Unified Command provides a structure for BP's
work with the Coast Guard, the Minerals Management Service and
Transocean, among others.
Immediately following the explosion, in coordination with the
Unified Command, BP began mobilizing oil spill response resources
including skimmers, storage barges, tugs, aircraft, dispersant, and
open-water and near shore boom.
Working together with Federal and state governments under the
umbrella of the Unified Command, BP's team of operational and technical
experts is coordinating with many agencies, organizations and
companies. These include the Departments of Interior, Homeland
Security, Energy, and Defense, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (USFW), National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), EPA, OSHA, Gulf Coast state
environmental and wildlife agencies, the Marine Spill Response
Corporation (an oil spill response consortium), as well as numerous
state, city, parish and county agencies.
``BP has been relentless and we've been relentless in our oversight
because we all understand the stakes here,'' said Adm. Allen on May 14.
``This has never been done before. This is an anomalous, unprecedented
event.''
The industry as a whole has responded in full support. Among the
resources that have been made available:
Drilling and technical experts who are helping determine
solutions to stopping the spill and mitigating its impact,
including specialists in the areas of subsea wells,
environmental science and emergency response;
Technical advice on blowout preventers, dispersant
application, well construction and containment options;
Additional facilities to serve as staging areas for
equipment and responders, more remotely operated vehicles
(ROVs) for deep underwater work, barges, support vessels and
additional aircraft, as well as training and working space for
the Unified Command.
The Actions We're Taking
As Chairman and President of BP America, I am part of an executive
team that reports directly to our Global CEO, Tony Hayward. I am BP's
lead representative in the U.S. and am responsible for broad oversight
and connectivity across all of our U.S.-based businesses.
BP itself has committed tremendous global resources to the effort.
Including BP, industry and government resources--over 17,000 personnel
are now engaged in the response. Among many other tasks, our employees
are also helping to train and organize the more than 15,000 citizen
volunteers who have come forward to offer their services.
Indeed, we have received a great many offers of help and
assistance, and we are grateful for that. The outpouring of support
from government, industry, businesses and private citizens has truly
been humbling and inspiring. It is remarkable to watch people come
together in crisis.
Our efforts are focused on two overarching goals:
Stopping the flow of oil; and
Minimizing the environmental and economic impacts from the
oil spill.
Subsea Efforts to Secure the Well
Our first priority is to stop the flow of oil and secure the well.
In order to do that, we are using four vessels and nine Remote Operated
Vehicles (ROVs) working on several concurrent strategies:
Riser Insertion Tube: Our immediate focus is on a riser
insertion tube option. This involves placing a tapered riser
tube into the end of the existing, damaged riser and drill
pipe, the primary source of the leak, until a watertight
closure is achieved. The gas and oil would then flow under
their own pressure up the riser tube to the Enterprise
drillship on the surface.
Containment Recovery System: Initial efforts to place a
large containment dome over the main leak point were suspended
as a buildup of hydrates, essentially ice-like crystals,
prevented a successful placement of the dome over the spill
area. A second, smaller containment dome, measuring four feet
in diameter and five feet high, called a ``top hat,'' is being
readied to lower over the main leak point, if needed. The small
dome would be connected by drill pipe and riser lines to a
drill ship on the surface to collect and treat the oil. It is
designed to mitigate the formation of large volumes of
hydrates. It is important to note that this technology has
never been used at this depth and significant technical and
operational challenges must be overcome.
Dispersant injection at the sea floor: We have conducted a
third test round of injecting dispersant directly at the leak
site on the sea floor using ROVs. Dispersant acts by separating
the oil into small droplets that can break down more easily
through natural processes before it reaches the surface. Sonar
testing and aerial photographs show encouraging results. The
Unified Command, supported by the Environmental Protection
Agency and other agencies, has approved additional subsea
application subject to ongoing protocols.
Drilling relief wells: We have begun to drill the first of
two relief wells to permanently secure the well. These wells
are designed to intercept the original MC252 #1 well. Once this
is accomplished, a specialized heavy fluid will be injected
into the well bore to stop the flow of oil and allow work to be
carried out to permanently cap the existing well. On Sunday,
May 2, we began drilling the first of these wells, and as of
May 16, the well had reached approximately 9,000 feet below sea
level. A second drillship has been mobilized to the area and
will begin drilling a second relief well on May 16. This relief
well operation could take approximately 3 months.
``Top kill'': An additional effort is known as a ``top
kill.'' It is a proven industry technique for capping wells and
has been used worldwide, though never in 5,000 feet of water.
It uses a tube to inject a mixture of multi-sized shredded
fibrous materials directly into the blowout preventer. The
objective is for the material to travel up the BOP and clog the
flow of the well at the pinch point. Once the pressure is
controlled, heavy fluids and cement will be pumped down the
well to kill it. We have completed the first part of this
operation using an ROV to remove the BOP control pod, which was
taken to the surface and refurbished with electronics. Re-
installation of the control pod will allow us to control the
BOP lines needed to inject from the surface. Manifold and
bypass lines are in place to provide access to valves on the
BOP. This procedure is ongoing and this attempt could take two
or 3 weeks to accomplish.
We have succeeded in stopping the flow from one of the three
existing leak points on the damaged well. While this may not
affect the overall flow rate, it should reduce the complexity
of the situation to be dealt with on the seabed.
Attacking the Spill
We are attacking the spill on two fronts: in the open water and on
the shoreline, through the activation of our pre-approved spill
response plans.
On the Water
On the open water, more than 600 response vessels are available,
including skimmers, storage barges, tugs, and other vessels. The Hoss
barge, the world's largest skimming vessel, has been onsite since April
25. In addition, there are 15, 210-foot Marine Spill Response
Corporation Oil Spill Response Vessels, which each have the capacity to
collect, separate, and store 4,000 barrels of oil. To date, over
150,000 barrels of oil and water mix have been recovered.
Also on the open water, we are attacking the spill area with Coast
Guard-approved biodegradable dispersants, which are being applied from
both planes and boats. Dispersants are soap-like products which help
the oil to break up and disperse in the water, which, in turn, helps
speed natural degradation.
Thirty-eight aircraft, both fixed-wing and helicopters, are now
supporting the response effort. Over half a million gallons of
dispersant have been applied on the surface and more than a quarter of
a million gallons are available. Typically, about 2,100 gallons of
dispersant is needed to treat 1,000 barrels of oil.
To ensure that adequate supplies of dispersant will be available
for surface and subsea application, the manufacturer has stepped up the
manufacturing process, and existing supplies are being sourced from all
over the world. The cooperation of industry partners has been superb
and that is deeply, deeply appreciated.
Actions to Protect the Shoreline
Near the shoreline, we are implementing with great urgency oil
spill response contingency plans to protect sensitive areas. According
to the Coast Guard, the result is the most massive shoreline protection
effort ever mounted.
To ensure rapid implementation of state contingency plans, we have
made grants of $25 million to Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and
Florida.
To date, we have about 1.5 million feet of boom deployed in an
effort to contain the spill and protect the coastal shoreline, and
another one million feet are available. The Department of Defense is
helping to airlift boom to wherever it is needed across the Gulf coast.
The Area Unified Command Center has been established in Robert, LA.
Incident Command Centers have been or are being established at Mobile,
AL; St. Petersburg, FL and Houma, LA.
Fifteen staging areas are also in place to help protect the
shoreline:
Alabama: Theodore, Orange Beach and Dauphin Island;
Florida: Pensacola and Panama City.
Louisiana: Amelia, Grand Isle, Venice, Port Fourchon, Shell
Beach, Slidell, Cocodrie;
Mississippi: Pascagoula, Biloxi and Pass Christian;
Highly mobile, shallow draft skimmers are also staged along the
coast ready to attack the oil where it approaches the shoreline.
Wildlife clean-up stations are being mobilized, and pre-impact
baseline assessment and beach clean-up will be carried out where
possible. Rapid response teams are ready to deploy to any affected
areas to assess the type and quantity of oiling, so the most effective
cleaning strategies can be applied.
A toll-free number has been established to report oiled or injured
wildlife, and the public is being urged not to attempt to help injured
or oiled animals, but to report any sightings via the toll-free number.
Contingency plans for waste management to prevent secondary
contamination are also being implemented.
Additional resources, both people and equipment, continue to arrive
for staging throughout the Gulf states in preparation for deployment
should they be needed.
Communication, Community Outreach, and Engaging Volunteers
We are also making every effort to keep the public and government
officials informed of what is happening and are regularly briefing
Federal, state, and local officials.
On the ground, in the states and local communities, we are working
with numerous organizations such as fishing associations, local
businesses, parks, wildlife and environmental organizations,
educational institutions, medical and emergency establishments, local
media, and the general public.
BP is leading volunteer efforts in preparation for shoreline clean-
up. We have helped and will continue to help recruit and deploy
volunteers, many of whom are being compensated for their efforts, to
affected areas.
Volunteer activities at this time are focused on clearing the
beaches of existing debris and placing protective boom along the
shoreline. Our ``adopt a boom'' program is proving very successful in
engaging local fishermen in the response. Over a thousand fishing
vessels are signed up to deploy boom and assist with the response.
There are seven BP community-outreach sites engaging, training, and
preparing volunteers:
Alabama: Mobile;
Florida: Pensacola;
Louisiana: Venice and Pointe a la Hache;
Mississippi: Pascagoula, Biloxi and Waveland.
A phone line has been established for potential volunteers to
register their interest in assisting the response effort.
Coping with Economic Impacts
We recognize that beyond the environmental impacts there are also
economic impacts on many of the people who rely on the Gulf for their
livelihood. BP will pay all necessary clean up costs and is committed
to paying legitimate claims for other loss and damages caused by the
spill. We are already expediting interim payments to individuals and
small business owners whose livelihood has been directly impacted by
the spill--the men and women who are temporarily unable to work. We
have already paid approximately 12 million dollars out to claimants,
mostly in the form of these lost income interim payments. We intend to
continue to replace this lost income for those impacted men and women
for as long as the situation continues to prevent them from returning
to their work.
We have been responding to these claims by individuals and small
businesses that have had losses caused by injury to their property or
to natural resources as quickly and efficiently as possible. We have a
call center that operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Starting this
week, we will have an on-line claims filing system. We have nearly 700
people assigned to handle claims, with almost 350 experienced claims
adjusters working in the impacted communities. We have 10 walk-in
claims offices in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida and we
will open 7 more this week. We will continue to add people, offices and
resources as required.
We are striving to be efficient and fair and look for guidance to
the established regulations and other information provided by the U.S.
Coast Guard, which frequently handles and resolves these types of
claims.
Commitment to Investigate What Happened
BP is one of the leaseholders and the operator of this exploration
well. As operator, BP hired Transocean to conduct the well drilling
operations. Transocean owned and was responsible for safe operation of
the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig and its equipment, including the
blowout preventer.
The question we all want answered is ``what caused this tragic
accident?''
A full answer to this and other questions will have to await the
outcome of multiple investigations which are underway, including a
joint investigation by the Departments of Homeland Security and
Interior (Marine Board) and an internal investigation that BP is
conducting.
BP's investigation into the cause of this accident is being led by
a senior BP executive from outside the affected business. The team has
more than 40 people. The investigation is ongoing and has not yet
reached conclusions about incident cause. We intend to share the
results of our findings so that our industry and our regulators can
benefit from the lessons learned.
Investigations take time, of course, in order to ensure that the
root cause of the failure is fully understood. But let me give you an
idea of the questions that BP and the entire energy industry, are
asking:
What caused the explosion and fire?
And why did the blowout preventer fail?
Only 7 of the 126 onboard the Deepwater Horizon at the time of the
incident were BP employees, so we have only some of the story, but we
are working to piece together what happened from meticulous review of
the records of rig operations that we have as well as information from
those witnesses to whom we have access. We are looking at our own
actions and those of our contractors, as is the Marine Board.
Conclusion
BP is under no illusions about the seriousness of the situation we
face. In the last 3 weeks, the eyes of the world have been upon us.
President Obama and members of his Cabinet have visited the Gulf region
and made clear their expectations of BP and our industry. So have
Members of Congress, as well as the general public.
We intend to do everything within our power to bring this well
under control, to mitigate the environmental impact of the spill and to
address economic claims in a responsible manner.
Any organization can show the world its best side when things are
going well. It is in adversity that we truly see what they are made of.
We know that we will be judged by our response to this crisis. No
resource available to this company will be spared. I can assure you
that we and the entire industry will learn from this terrible event,
and emerge from it stronger, smarter and safer.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. McKay.
Mr. Newman.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN NEWMAN,
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, TRANSOCEAN, LTD.
Mr. Newman. Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison,
and other members of the Committee, I thank you for the
opportunity to speak with you today.
My name is Steven Newman, and I am the Chief Executive
Officer of Transocean Limited. Transocean is a leading offshore
drilling contractor, with more than 18,000 employees worldwide.
I am a petroleum engineer by training, and I have spent years
working on and with drilling rigs.
I have worked at Transocean for more than 15 years, and I
am proud of the contributions our company has made to the
energy industry during that time.
Today, however, I sit before you with a heavy heart. The
last few weeks have been a time of great sadness and reflection
for our company and for me personally. Nothing is more
important to me and to Transocean than the safety of our
crewmembers. And our hearts ache for the widows, parents, and
children of the 11 crewmembers, including 9 Transocean
employees, who were lost in the Deepwater Horizon explosion.
These were exceptional men, and we are committed to doing
everything we can to help their families as they cope with this
tragedy.
Over the last few weeks, we have also seen great acts of
courage and kindness in our colleagues and in our communities.
That courage and kindness was embodied by the 115 crewmembers
who were rescued from the Deepwater Horizon and were as focused
on the safety of their colleagues as they were on their own
safety. It was embodied by the brave men and women of the U.S.
Coast Guard who led the on- scene response and the search-and-
rescue efforts, and the missing crewmembers, and the medical
professionals, and friends and family who met those injured
crewmembers as they came ashore. And it is embodied by our
friends and colleagues, in Transocean and across the industry,
who have rallied to help the families of the men who were lost.
This has been a very emotional period for all of us at
Transocean, but it has also been a period of intense activity
and effort. Immediately after the explosion, Transocean began
working with BP, the Coast Guard, and NOAA, as part of the
Unified Command, in the effort to stop the flow of
hydrocarbons. Our finest engineers and operational personnel
have been working with BP to identify and pursue alternatives
to stop the flow as soon as possible.
Two of our drilling rigs, the Development Driller 2 and the
Development Driller 3, are involved in drilling relief wells at
the site. And our drill ship, the Discoverer Enterprise, is
conducting crude-oil recovery operations. We will continue to
support BP and the Unified Command in all of these efforts.
At the same time, we have also been working hard to get to
the bottom of the question to which the members of this
committee and the American people want and deserve an answer:
What happened on the night of April 20th? And how can we assure
the American public that it will not happen again?
Transocean has assembled an independent investigative team
to determine the cause of these tragic events, a team that
includes dedicated Transocean and industry experts. They will
be interviewing people who have potentially helpful information
and studying the operations and the equipment involved.
Because the drilling process is a collaborative process
among many different companies, contractors, and
subcontractors, the process of understanding what led to the
April 20th explosion, and how to prevent such an accident in
the future, must also be collaborative. Our team is working
side by side with others, including BP and governmental
agencies. And these investigative efforts will continue until
we have satisfactory answers.
While it is still too early to know exactly what happened
on April 20, we do have some clues about the cause of this
disaster. The most significant clue is that the events occurred
after the well construction process was essentially finished.
Drilling had completed on April 17th, and the well had been
sealed with casing and cement.
For that reason, the one thing we do know is that, on the
evening of April 20, there was a sudden catastrophic failure of
the cement, the casing, or both. Without a failure of one of
those elements, the explosion could not have occurred. It is
also clear that the drill crew had very little, if any, time to
react. The initial indications of trouble and the subsequent
explosions were almost instantaneous.
What caused that sudden violent failure, and why weren't
the blowout preventers able to squeeze, crush, or shear the
drill bit? These are critical questions that must be answered
in the weeks and months ahead.
Until we know exactly what happened on April 20th, we
cannot determine how best to prevent such tragedies in the
future. But, regardless of what the investigations uncover,
ours is an industry that must put safety first. We must do so
for the sake of our employees, for the sake of their families,
and for the sake of people all over the world who use, rely,
and enjoy the oceans and waterways for their sustenance.
Thank you again for the opportunity to speak. And I'm happy
to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Newman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steven Newman, Chief Executive Officer,
Transocean, Ltd.
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and other members
of the Committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to speak with
you today.
My name is Steven Newman, and I am the Chief Executive Officer of
Transocean, Ltd. Transocean is a leading offshore drilling contractor,
with more than 18,000 employees worldwide. I am a petroleum engineer by
training, I have spent considerable time working on drilling rigs, and
I have worked at Transocean for more than 15 years. I am proud of the
Company's historical contributions to the energy industry during that
time. Today, however, I sit before you with a heavy heart.
The last few weeks have been a time of great sadness and reflection
for our Company--and for me personally. Nothing is more important to me
and to Transocean than the safety of our employees and crew members,
and our hearts ache for the widows, parents and children of the 11 crew
members--including nine Transocean employees--who died in the Deepwater
Horizon explosion. These were exceptional men, and we are committed to
doing everything we can to support their families as they struggle to
cope with this tragedy.
We have also seen great courage and kindness since April 20 that
has reaffirmed our faith in the human spirit. That spirit is embodied
by the 115 crew members who were rescued from the Deepwater Horizon and
were as worried about the fate of their colleagues as they were about
themselves. It is embodied by the brave men and women of the U.S. Coast
Guard who led search-and-rescue efforts for the injured and missing
crewmembers, and the emergency workers waiting for the injured crew
members when they arrived ashore. And it is embodied by the friends and
colleagues who have rallied to help the families of those who were lost
at sea.
While this has been a very emotional period for all of us at
Transocean, it has also been a period of intense activity and effort.
Immediately after the explosion, Transocean began working with BP
(in BP's role as operator/leaseholder of the well) and the ``Unified
Command'' (which includes officials from the U.S. Coast Guard, the
Department of the Interior's Minerals Management Service (MMS), and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)) in the effort
to stop the flow of hydrocarbons. Our finest operational personnel and
engineers have been working with BP to identify and pursue options for
stopping the flow as soon as possible. Our drilling rig, the
Development Driller III, is involved in drilling the relief well at the
site, and our drillship, the Discoverer Enterprise, is involved in the
unique oil recovery operations in the Gulf. In addition, a third
Transocean drilling rig, the Development Driller II, is moving into
position to drill a second relief well or otherwise assist in
operations to stop the flow. We will continue to support BP and the
Unified Command in all of these efforts.
We have also been working hard to get to the bottom of the question
to which the Members of this Committee--and the American people--want
and deserve an answer: What happened the night of April 20, and how do
we assure the American public that it will not happen again?
As is often the case after a tragedy of this kind, there has been a
lot of speculation about the root cause of this event. Although it is
premature to reach definitive conclusions about what caused the April
20 explosion, we do have some clues about the cause of the disaster.
The most significant clue is that the events occurred after the well
construction process was essentially finished. Drilling had been
completed on April 17, and the well had been sealed with casing and
cement. For that reason, the one thing we do know is that on the
evening of April 20, there was a sudden, catastrophic failure within
that basically completed well. It is also clear that the drill crew had
very little (if any) time to react. The initial indications of trouble
and the subsequent explosions were almost instantaneous.
What caused that sudden, violent failure? And why weren't the blow-
out preventers able to squeeze, crush or shear the pipe and thereby
shut in the flow? These are some of the critical questions that need to
be answered in the coming weeks and months.
The well construction process is a collaborative effort, involving
various entities and many personnel--the well operator, government
officials, the drilling contractor, the mud contractor, the casing
contractor, the cement contractor and others. For the same reason, the
process of understanding what led to the April 20 explosion must also
be collaborative. We agree that this is not the time for finger-
pointing--instead, all of us must work together to understand what
happened and prevent any such accident in the future.
Ours is an industry that must put safety first. And I can assure
you that Transocean has never--and will never--compromise on safety. In
2009, Transocean recorded its best ever Total Recordable Incident Rate
(TRIR). And MMS, the Federal agency charged with enforcing safety on
deepwater oil rigs, awarded one of its top prizes for safety to
Transocean in 2009. The MMS SAFE Award recognizes ``exemplary
performance by Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas operators and
contractors.'' In the words of MMS, this award ``highlights to the
public that companies can conduct offshore oil and gas activities
safely and in a pollution-free manner, even though such activities are
complex and carry a significant element of risk.'' In awarding this
prize to Transocean, MMS credited the Company's ``outstanding drilling
operations'' and a ``perfect performance period.''
Despite a strong safety record, Transocean is not complacent about
safety. We believe that any incident is one too many. Last year, our
Company experienced an employee accident record that I found
unacceptable. As a result, I recommended to our Board of Directors that
they withhold bonuses for all executives in order to make clear that
achieving stronger safety performance was a basic expectation--and
fundamental to our success. That recommendation was accepted, and our
Company paid no executive bonuses last year, in order to send a loud
message that we evaluate our success in large part based on the safety
of our operations.
Until we fully understand what happened on April 20, we cannot
determine with certainty how best to prevent such tragedies in the
future. But I am committed--for the sake of the men who lost their
lives on April 20, for the sake of their loved ones, for the sake of
all the hard-working people who work on Transocean rigs around the
world, and for the sake of people in each of the affected states and
worldwide who rely on our oceans and waterways for their livelihood--to
work with others in the industry, with Congress and with all involved
Federal agencies to make sure that such an accident never happens
again.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
And now Dr. French.
STATEMENT OF DEBORAH FRENCH-McCAY, Ph.D.,
DIRECTOR OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT SERVICES,
APPLIED SCIENCE ASSOCIATES, INC.
Dr. French-McCay. Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member
Hutchison----
The Chairman. Could you pull the mike a little----
Dr. French-McCay. Oh, I'm sorry.
The Chairman.--closer please?
Dr. Frech-McCay. Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member
Hutchison, and distinguished members of the Committee, I, also,
thank you for this opportunity to testify before you in this
critical hearing.
I am a scientist and environmental consultant with a small
consulting firm in Rhode Island. And I'm a contractor to NOAA,
in this case. But, I'm testifying on my own behalf and my own
opinions today.
Since I received my Ph.D. in biological oceanography in
1984, I have been working on oil spill impact assessments and
developing methods to evaluate them, mostly working with
Federal and state governments. I've been involved with hundreds
of oil spill cases, and I've written many technical reports and
published papers in peer-reviewed literature, and participated
in a number of committees internationally on this kind of
problem.
As a scientist, I would just love to tell you all the
details about oil spills and their potential impacts. I'm going
to try to hit the important points. And I will certainly answer
any of your questions.
First of all, what I thought I'd do is briefly talk about
the fate of oil, what happens to oil when it goes in the ocean.
Essentially, oil is, for the most part, lighter than water. And
this one--and this spill certainly is. So, the oil moves up to
the surface by its buoyancy, floats, and then it starts to
weather, which means that the lighter components, the
volatiles, evaporate off it and it becomes stickier and
thicker, like tar. It can also emulsify into a mousse that's
just like the dessert, only orange.
Eventually, the oil will weather into tar balls, and then
those tar balls will be carried by the currents. And they can
be carried quite a distance by the currents, as we've been
talking about.
If winds are onshore, the floating oil will be blown ashore
and stranded on the shoreline, which is obviously a problem,
because there are a lot of sensitive resources along the
shorelines, including wetlands and oyster beds and communities
that have recreational interests and tourism and so on.
When dispersant is applied to oil, what it does is
facilitate the mixing of that oil into the water. Now, that's a
natural process, normally. Oil will break up by the action of
waves, and then be mixed into the water. But, when you put a
dispersant on it, it facilitates the process. Just as if you
put oily dishes into a sink, the oil will kind of float to the
surface of the sink, but if you add soap to that sink, it'll
entrain the oil in the water, and allow you to clean your
dishes. So, that's essentially what's going on with the
dispersant.
Normally, the dispersant--as you've been hearing earlier,
the dispersant is much less toxic than the oil itself. So, our
primary concern is with the oil going in the water, rather than
the dispersant, although we're also considering that problem,
as well.
In addition, dispersant has been applied down at the bottom
of the ocean, which is a new thing, a new procedure. So, we're
also looking at that. That should be entraining the oil into
the water, down in the deep water.
Oil is a mixture of thousands of chemicals. Most of them
are not soluble in water. A few of them are, and those are the
ones that are our concern, because they're toxic to fish and
invertebrates. So, we're trying to track the soluble components
in the water, what those concentrations are, exposures to
organisms and fisheries and so on.
Now, what are the biological impacts of oil spills? They
basically fall into two categories. You have floating oil, that
may come ashore, and that will foul birds, marine mammals, sea
turtles, and shoreline habitats.
Obviously, everyone knows about birds being oiled. That's a
very big problem. They need their feathers, to stay warm; they
also ingest the toxic material from the oil. So, they can be
affected in a number of ways.
Sea turtles--all of the sea turtles in the Gulf of Mexico
are listed. That is, threatened or endangered. So, they're
obviously a big concern. There were also listed marine mammals
that we have to look at. Along the shoreline, there are a lot
of sensitive habitats.
So, those are all--as you know from all you've heard, those
are big concerns.
Within the water column, we have these dissolved components
that might be taken up into the fish and invertebrates and
shellfish, and affect them. There's also these droplets that
are in the water, and tar balls, that may foul these animals as
they feed and perform life functions.
So, in general, wildlife are the biggest concern. The
habitats along the shoreline, but also the fish and
invertebrates in the water are of concern.
Now, on those fish and invertebrates, this is the big issue
in this spill, because of the dispersant applications. We need
to consider the degree to which natural turbulence and wave
action has gotten the oil into the water, as well as how much
of that oil is in the water, and stays in the water because of
the dispersant applications.
OK. And I thought I would just briefly touch on some past
spills, as lessons learned that we can bring to bear on this.
First, the Exxon Valdez. Everyone's familiar with this
spill. That was 11 million gallons----
The Chairman. You----
Dr. French-McCay.--of crude oil.
The Chairman.--you'll need to bring this to a close fairly
quickly.
Dr. French-McCay. OK.
The Exxon Valdez was really devastating, because there were
so many birds and marine mammals in that area when that oil was
spilled. So, that's the big concern there. In the offshore Gulf
of Mexico, in the area where the spill is occurring, there
aren't as many seabirds out there. They're more close to the
shore. However, there are still turtles and mammals out there.
There was a spill in Rhode Island, the North Cape, which
was a severe spill because it was entrained in the water. So,
this is a case where a lot of unweathered oil was mixed in the
water and killed a lot of organisms--lobsters and other kinds
of organisms.
So, in this bill, as I've already mentioned, we have these
concerns. It's a very complicated problem, because of the
changing characteristics of the release. We have different
volumes being released over time, potentially. We have
dispersant being injected, or not. We have containment
operations going on. So, we need to sort all that out and
quantify how much is coming out over time, and what's happening
to it in the water, in order to understand what the impacts
are. So, that's what we're doing right now.
We're also characterizing the organisms that are out there
that are being affected, both in the deepwater and in the
surface waters, and then near the shoreline. So, there are lots
of scientists collecting baseline data. We've found that we
need much more information in the offshore than is currently
available, so we're focusing a lot of effort on trying to
obtain that data.
So, I'll just sum up by saying, I'm--I am working for NOAA,
on the natural resource damage assessment part of this process,
and focusing on that offshore impact.
And I'll be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. French-McCay follows:]
Prepared Statement of Deborah French-McCay, Ph.D., Director of Impact
Assessment Services, Applied Science Associates, Inc.
Introduction and Experience
I am a scientist and environmental consultant based in Rhode
Island, where I am a principal of the small consulting firm, Applied
Science Associates, Inc. (ASA, South Kingstown, RI). I received a
bachelor's degree in Zoology from Rutgers University in 1974 and a
Ph.D. in Biological Oceanography from the University of Rhode Island in
1984. I joined ASA in 1984, where I specialize in scientific
assessments of oil and chemical releases, i.e., the transport and fate
of oil; exposure to and bioaccumulation of pollutants by biological
organisms; and toxic and other effects on individual animals,
populations and aquatic ecosystems.
Since 1984, I have worked with the Federal Government and several
states in developing and applying quantitative methods for assessing
oil spill impacts. I was the principal investigator in developing
computer models for Federal regulations in assessing natural resource
damages from spills (under CERCLA and the Oil Pollution Act, OPA). I
have been involved in hundreds of natural resource damage assessment
cases for oil and chemical spills, assisting Federal and state
governments as a technical expert. I have published scores of technical
reports and manuscripts in peer-reviewed journals, and served on
national and international committees evaluating oil spill risks and
impacts. I am an internationally recognized expert in assessing oil
spill fate and biological effects, as well as in computer modeling,
that is to say quantitative estimation of oil spill impacts using
computer programs employing equations based on physical/chemical and
biological processes. I will be happy to provide any technical
background material you might need related to my work and experience.
My Curriculum Vitae is attached to this testimony.
General Behavior and Fate of Oil
Oils and petroleum products are generally lighter (less dense) than
seawater, and so oil floats to the surface unless it is dispersed into
the water directly or by turbulence. Floating oil tends to form slicks
when fresh, which thin out over time to sheens, as well as collect into
thick aggregations at wind rows and current convergences. The oil
weathers and degrades when exposed to air and sun, such that the more
volatile components evaporate off and the oil becomes tarry and sticky.
Some oils form mousse, in which water becomes incorporated into the
oil, making it thicker and more viscous. Eventually, floating oil
breaks up into weathered tar balls, which may be transported great
distances by currents. If winds are on-shore, oil will come ashore and
strand on beaches and in wetlands.
If oil is dispersed in the water, it is in the form of small oil
droplets or tar balls. The smaller are these particles of oil, the more
readily they are dispersed throughout the water column. Oil may be
dispersed from the water surface by natural turbulence from breaking
waves. If dispersant is applied to oil on the water surface, this
dispersion process is enhanced. Dispersants are soap-like surfactant
mixtures, composed of compounds that coat the oil surface and encourage
it to break into smaller particles.
Crude oils and petroleum products are composed of thousands of
chemicals. In general, the hydrocarbon compounds found in crude oil are
characterized by their structure. These compounds include straight-
chain hydrocarbons and aromatics; aromatics include at least one
benzene ring. Understanding these different compounds and their
structures is important for understanding the fate and biological
effects of releases of crude oil or products derived from it.
Most of the compounds in oil are not soluble in water. However, the
low molecular weight aromatic compounds (such as the one-ring compounds
benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene and xylenes (BTEX); and the polynuclear
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs)) are both volatile (so evaporate from the
water surface) and soluble in water. Benzene rings are very stable, and
therefore persistent in the environment, and can have toxic effects on
organisms. Because the BTEX and PAHs are at least semi-soluble, they
can be taken up into the tissues of aquatic organisms, where they can
disrupt (or poison) cellular functions. For this reason, scientists
evaluate exposure of aquatic biota to these BTEX and PAH compounds
derived from spilled oil, as well as the toxic effects of such
exposures.
The BTEX and PAHs also are volatile, and so the evaporate off
relatively rapidly when oil is exposed to the atmosphere. In addition,
the smaller non-aromatic compounds (e.g., pentane, hexane, octane,
etc.) evaporate rapidly. Thus, over time the oil contains less and less
of both the volatile and soluble compounds, leaving a residual heavier
material that can become sticky and tar-like.
Eventually oil hydrocarbons are degraded by sunlight and microbial
processes (bacterial degradation), whether in the water, in bottom
sediments or on shorelines. Degradation rates are generally slow, and
in conditions of low oxygen, degradation can take decades because
oxygen is consumed in, and so needed for, the degradation process. The
largest compounds are very slow to degrade, which is why they make good
road materials--they remain tarry and asphalt-like for years.
Important oil movements and processes involved in a sub-sea oil
release are depicted in the cartoon figure below.
Biological Impacts of Spills
The potential biological impacts of oil include:
Surface smothering/coating exposure to floating and stranded
oil, affecting
Shoreline habitats (salt marshes, mangroves, sea
grasses, oyster flats)
Wildlife (birds, marine mammals, sea turtles)
Aquatic organisms inhabiting the sea surface (called
neuston)
Toxicity from uptake of dissolved components (aromatics)
Fish
Shellfish and other invertebrates
Plankton, including fish and shellfish eggs and larvae
Subsurface suspended oil droplets
Fish
Shellfish and other invertebrates
Plankton, including fish and shellfish eggs and larvae
Oil can kill marine organisms, reduce their fitness through
sublethal effects, and disrupt the structure and function of marine
communities and ecosystems. While such effects have been unambiguously
established in laboratory studies and after well-studied spills,
determining the subtler long-term effects on populations, communities
and ecosystems at low doses and in the presence of other contaminants
poses significant scientific challenges. Because of the high natural
variability of aquatic populations, it is extremely difficult to
measure the changes from before to after a spill. Thus, scientists use
a variety of types of information, including past experience from other
spills, field measurements, analyses of samples taken for chemistry or
to count organisms, experimental tests, and biological data to estimate
the impacts of a spill. We often combine such information with computer
model calculations to quantify the impact.
In general, the most vulnerable species to oil spills are birds and
fur-bearing marine mammals. These animals depend on their feathers or
fur to maintain body heat and keep their skin relatively dry. They
preen daily, and so will ingest toxic components present in oil that
covers any portion of their bodies. Sea turtles, all species of which
are threatened or endangered, are also highly susceptible to oil's
effects.
Shoreline habitats are very vulnerable to oil exposure. Oil
stranding in wetlands or other shoreline habitats can coat small
animals and plants, suffocating them. The toxic components can also
impact the organisms inhabiting the habitats. These habitats require
years to decades to recover from lethal-levels of oil exposure.
Because fish and invertebrates are for the most part under the
water surface, and much of the oil is not soluble, their exposure to
oil hydrocarbons is subject to: (1) the degree to which the oil is
mixed by turbulence or other means (i.e., dispersed) into the water
column; (2) the degree to which the dispersed oil still contains the
toxic compounds (which otherwise evaporate); and (3) the rate of
dissolution of soluble aromatics into the water. Oil dispersion rate is
highest in storm conditions and when large amounts of dispersants are
applied to the oil. Mortality is a function of duration of exposure--
the longer the duration of exposure, the lower the effects
concentration. Thus, a situation where oil is largely dispersed into
the water while fresh is that where the highest impacts to fish and
invertebrates would be expected.
Socioeconomic Impacts of Spills
There are many potential socioeconomic impacts that result from
large oil spills, including fisheries losses, lost recreation use of
beaches and waterways for boating-related activities, impacts on
national parks and other protected areas, lost tourism-related
business, commercial shipping disruptions, and so on. As a marine
biologist, I am focusing on the biological impacts in my testimony;
however, the potential for socioeconomic impacts needs consideration as
well.
Previous Spills as Case Examples--Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (March 1989)
The Exxon Valdez oil spill involved 11 million gallons of crude
oil. As is well understood, hundreds of thousands of seabirds and
thousands of marine mammals (mostly sea otters) were oiled and killed
by this spill. This large impact was due both to the nature of the
Alaskan crude oil (a viscous persistent type) and the high densities of
seabirds and marine mammals present in the affected area. The impacts
to fish and invertebrates in open waters were relatively low in
comparison because of the slow rate of dispersion into the water just
after the release (winds were light at the time of the spill) and the
large volume of Prince William Sound that facilitated dilution.
However, impacts on and near shorelines to salmon reproduction and
other resources were also considerable.
The socioeconomic impacts of the spill were largely related to
disruptions to the fishing industry and subsistence uses of natural
resources. The local indigenous peoples utilize nearshore and shoreline
shellfish as food sources, and hold natural resources as sacred. In
addition many Alaskans and Americans in general consider Alaska to be
pristine, and so were outraged by the oil's impacts.
Previous Spills as Case Examples--North Cape Oil Spill (January 1996)
In January 19-20, 1996, during a severe winter storm, the barge
North Cape spilled 828,000 gallons of home heating oil (No. 2 fuel oil)
into the surf zone on the south coast of Rhode Island. Most of the oil
was mixed into the water column by the heavy surf, resulting in high
concentrations of the toxic components (PAHs) in the shallow water near
the beach. It was evident that there was significant injury to marine
aquatic organisms caused by the spill, in that large numbers of
lobsters, surf clams, other invertebrates, and fish washed up on the
beaches.
Because of the large numbers of highly valued lobsters affected,
field sampling was performed to estimate the impact. Impacts to other
marine organisms were estimated using computer modeling of oil fates
and toxicological effects. The model assumptions and input data were
based on existing literature and site-specific information.
While about 2,400 birds were oiled in the North Cape spill, it was
estimated that 9 million lobsters were killed, along with billions of
smaller invertebrates and thousands of fish. The spill was so
devastating to the local shellfish and fish populations because fresh
highly-toxic oil was completely dispersed naturally into shallow water
near shore by high waves.
The socioeconomic impacts of the spill were primarily related to
disruptions to the fishing industry. To my knowledge, there were no
claims by native Americans made against the spiller. The light oil
evaporated and degraded quickly, well before the summer tourist season,
so impacts on recreational uses and tourism were minimal.
Previous Spills as Case Examples--Ixtoc Oil Spill
The largest spill in history was the Ixtoc blowout which began in
June 1979 in Mexican waters of the Bay of Campeche. The well was not
completely brought under control until late March 1980. The spill rate
was estimated to be about 30,000 bbl/day \1\ for 5\1/2\ months until
November, and then about 4,000 bbl/day for another 4 months. The
impacts of this spill remain largely unknown. Shoreline-related impacts
were observed to birds, sea turtles and invertebrates. However, the
impact on fish and shellfish was not estimated. Because of the very
large amounts of oil released in relatively shallow waters, it is
likely that impacts to shrimp, other shellfish and fish in the Bay of
Campeche and southern Gulf of Mexico were highly significant. The
socioeconomic impacts of the spill are not documented, but likely
included large disruptions of the local fisheries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1 bbl (barrel) = 42 U.S. gallons; estimates vary widely and the
release may have been up to 50,000 bbl/day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Potential Impacts of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
Natural resources of the Gulf of Mexico (e.g., birds, sea turtles,
marine mammals, fish, shellfish, plankton; and a wide variety of
habitats along the shoreline and at the sea bottom, such as salt
marshes and submerged aquatic vegetation) are currently being exposed
to and impacted by oil from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill; as well as
potentially by other materials being added to the marine environment
during the response that might be toxic or change biological or
chemical conditions. In addition there will be impacts on water quality
near beaches, shellfish (e.g., oyster) beds, and fishery nursery
grounds.
The open water environment, the ongoing release of oil and the
ongoing response efforts all contribute to complex, constantly-changing
exposure conditions for biological resources in the offshore and near-
shore environments of the northeastern Gulf of Mexico. Contributing
factors to the complexity of the situation include:
1. Characteristics of released oil and other materials, which
change with time due to weathering and response activities;
also, there may be changes in the released material at the
discharge site due to changes in materials leaving the well;
2. Volume and duration of the continued release of oil, with
the oil release rate varying in time;
3. Location and nature of the release (i.e., while burning at
the sea surface, from various pipe breaks on the sea floor);
4. Physical oceanographic conditions (currents, temperature,
etc.), which vary in space and time;
5. Weather (winds, light exposure, air temperature), affecting
the oil's chemistry;
6. Response effectiveness to stop or slow the release of oil,
as well as changes in the location, nature, and volume of the
release;
7. Dispersant type, application methods (i.e., injected versus
aerial or boat), volumes, effectiveness, locations and timing;
8. Exposure scenarios for biological resources (i.e., exposure
duration, species, life history stages involved);
9. Location of critical habitats (live bottom, deep water
corals, cold seeps; fishing grounds); and
10. Impacts of oil hydrocarbon/dispersant/contaminant mixes
over time, resulting from short duration and long exposures,
delayed and indirect impacts, etc.
The socioeconomic impacts of the spill will include disruption of
fisheries and dependant businesses, effects on tourism and recreational
uses, and potentially changes in oil industry practices.
The purpose of using dispersants on the oil is to lessen the
potential impact to wildlife (birds, mammals, and sea turtles) and
shoreline habitats. However, to some degree there is a tradeoff, in
that the contamination in the water is increased by dispersant
application. The objective is to achieve a net environmental benefit:
to disperse the oil sufficiently to reduce the impact to wildlife and
shorelines, but to do so in deep water where the dilution potential is
high to minimize adverse effects on fisheries resources.
Natural Resource Damage Assessment Process
I am involved with the response to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,
specifically in evaluating the impact of the spill for the purposes of
Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA). NRDA is the process where
the Federal and state government agencies who are trustees for specific
resources on behalf of the public may make damage claims against the
responsible party. Under Federal regulations of the Oil Pollution Act
(OPA) of 1990, the polluter pays for restoration and replacement of
services provided by natural resources. The damages are the cost of the
restoration. The procedure involves assessment of an adverse impact,
known as the injury, and then planning a restoration activity that is
sufficient to replace the losses, including consideration of the time
for recovery.
Injury Assessment
The goal of injury assessment is to determine the nature, degree,
and extent of any injuries to natural resources and services. This
information is necessary to provide a technical basis for evaluating
the need for, type of, and scale of restoration actions. Under the OPA
regulations, injury is defined as an observable or measurable adverse
change in a natural resource or impairment of a natural resource
service. Government trustees determine whether there is:
Exposure, a pathway, and an adverse change to a natural
resource or service as a result of an actual discharge; or
An injury to a natural resource or impairment of a natural
resource service as a result of response actions or a
substantial threat of a discharge.
To proceed with restoration planning, trustees quantify the degree,
and spatial and temporal extent of injuries. Injuries are quantified by
comparing the condition of the injured natural resources or services to
baseline, as necessary.
``Baseline means the condition of the natural resources and
services that would have existed had the incident not occurred.
Baseline data may be estimated using historical data, reference
data, control data, or data on incremental changes (e.g.,
number of dead animals), alone or in combination, as
appropriate.'' (OPA regulations at 990.30).
``Injury means an observable or measurable adverse change in a
natural resource or impairment of a natural resource service.
Injury may occur directly or indirectly to a natural resource
and/or service. Injury incorporates the terms ``destruction,''
``loss,'' and ``loss of use'' as provided in OPA.'' (OPA
regulations at 990.30).
The Appropriate Scale of Restoration
The basic concept underlying restoration project scaling is that
restoration is to be of sufficient scale to produce resources and
services of the same type and quality and/or of comparable value to
those that were lost. The loss is quantified from the time of injury
until the resources and services return to the level they would have
been at in the absence of the impact. Services include ecological and
human uses of the resources. The approach used is that the restoration
project is scaled to compensate for the direct kill, indirect effects
and lost services from the time of the start of the incident into the
future until recovery is complete.
For example, to scale a compensatory fish or shellfish restocking
program, the equivalent number of eggs, larvae, or animals at the age
they are stocked, is needed. The lost individuals will be replaced once
that equivalent number of eggs/animals are stocked and the animals have
gone through their normal life cycle to the age of the impacted animals
they are to replace. The number killed by age class may be translated
into an equivalent number at any age to be stocked using an age- or
size-specific survival schedule.
If it is not feasible to replace a species with individuals of the
same species, other options are available for restoration, such as
habitat restoration or protection projects. Salt marsh and seagrass bed
restoration projects are frequently considered options as compensation
for injuries to marine resources. The challenge is to determine an
appropriate scale for the project to be compensatory (i.e., equivalent
to the loss). The approach often used is to calculate the net (e.g.,
fish) production gain per unit of created (or preserved) habitat. The
scale of the newly-created or enhanced habitat is made such that the
new production produced by created habitat is equivalent to the loss.
Protection and enhancement projects are often used for restoring
wildlife. For example, seabird and sea turtle nest sites might be
protected from human disturbance or predation. In addition, during the
spill response, extensive efforts are made to clean and rehabilitate
oiled wildlife.
Restoration should not be arbitrary in scale or punitive, but
should be proportional to the loss. Biological science is able to
provide quantitative information that helps make this compensatory
damage assessment possible. However, sufficient field- and
experimental-based data are needed to make both the injury and
restoration scaling assessments.
Preassessment Phase Activities
At the present time, the trustees are gathering data with which to
plan for and quantify injury. The focus is on collection of ephemeral
data, i.e., information that might be missed or lost if not gathered at
the time of the event. The ephemeral data collections are being made in
cooperation with scientists assisting the responsible party, such that
as much information as possible is collected with minimal duplication
of effort and maximum mutual benefit. We are organized in technical
working groups to plan and execute this data collection effort.
Thousands of Federal and state scientists, as well as consultants and
contractors, are engaged in this effort 24/7 to ensure we get the best
information possible with which to assess the spill's impacts. Clearly
this monumental effort needs support from the Federal Government, such
that a good scientific analysis of the spill's impacts can be made.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. French-McCay.
I'll start.
You mentioned, Mr. McKay, that there was--this is the first
time anybody had ever drilled at that depth, and--didn't you?
Mr. McKay. It's not the first time that people have drilled
at this depth. There have been about 2,300 deepwater wells
drilled, just in the Gulf of Mexico.
The Chairman. At that depth?
Mr. McKay. No. That's greater than 1,000. There's been
quite a few drilled in greater depths than 5,000 feet.
The Chairman. All right. Well, whatever. To me, the
American Petroleum Institute sets the industry standards--am I
right?--for the process and what--how one can proceed on
drilling.
Mr. McKay. There are various API standards that are set for
pieces of equipment----
The Chairman. I understand, but just answer my question.
They do set the standards.
Mr. McKay. The MMS sets regulations for the drilling of
wells in the Gulf of Mexico offshore. API sets certain
standards for individual valves and pieces of equipment, as I
understand it.
The Chairman. All right. And then, the Mines--Mineral and
Mines Service--MMS
[Minerals Management Service]--accepts those standards and
then their permit is issued. But, in fact, it's all fairly
voluntary. Am I correct, or not?
Mr. McKay. There are about 25 different types of permits
and applications to drill in the Gulf of Mexico. The MMS is the
chief regulator for the Gulf of Mexico.
The Chairman. But, they're taking their standards from the
American Petroleum Institute. Am I right?
Mr. McKay. I think some standards on equipment. I'm not
familiar if they're taking ``many'' or--I think ``some''
standards, yes.
The Chairman. I would just like the three of you to comment
on the fact that--to me, that's--doesn't make any sense at all,
that that's--that's like the coal mining industry deciding
what's safe and what isn't, and there's no need for MSHA, the
Mine Health and Safety organization.
The --it would seem to me that the--having the industry set
standards for itself on drilling at such enormous depths--and
you say, even greater depths--and we happen not to be in a
tropical storm season right now, but we will be shortly, and
therefore the pull and tug of what goes on at that depth--that
there ought to be regulations, or at least a standard, which is
one other than that set by the American Petroleum Institute,
which obviously is serving itself. I don't mean that
maliciously, but it's just factual. It's setting the standard
for the industry.
I don't think that's right. I think it should be approved
by people who--you know, the American Petroleum Institute can
make their ideas available, but I think that it would be--it
should be approved by people who have responsibility to the
public--official responsibility to the public.
And I wonder how the three of you feel about that.
Mr. McKay. I'll start. I do believe that--as this event is
understood fully, I do believe that the--obviously, the causes
of this event will be extremely important. I do think that
regulation will need to be looked at, in terms of what's
needed, going forward further. We will learn from this, and it
will affect regulation, I do believe that.
The Chairman. Mr. Newman?
Mr. Newman. Mr. Chairman, the American Petroleum Institute
has published a comprehensive set of recommended practices
governing all aspects of the oilfield spectrum, including
recommended practices that apply, in this particular case, to
blowout preventers.
The Federal Government has set regulations that apply to
activity on the Outer Continental Shelf. And those regulations
are reflected in the CFR, Code of Federal Regulations, and in
the--that particular section of the CFR which applies to
blowout preventers does reference certain components of the
API-recommended practices. There are comprehensive regulations
that apply to blowout preventers which do reference the API-
recommended practices. So, I don't believe it's the situation
where the industry is left to govern themselves. I think there
is regulatory oversight. And the industry is held to compliance
with those Code of Federal Regulations.
The Chairman. Well, if there are regulatory oversight, I
haven't heard it expressed yet. And I think that Mr. McKay
indicated that there was a large amount of American Petroleum
Institute, you know, standards of the industry which is
involved in this, and that it, ultimately, is voluntary.
And, plus, I'm not so much interested, right now, for the
aftereffects of what happened in this particular problem, but
in what led up to it. That is, the setting of the drilling, and
what went wrong with the drilling, and what could have been
stopped from happening if somebody other than the American
Petroleum Institute had been setting the industry standard. It
doesn't make sense to me.
I think most industry--that's why you have OSHA, that's why
you have MSHA, that's why you have a variety of groups--not to
countermand--countermine, not to shut down, not to--but to just
take a very hard look at, Can this work at that level? And what
has been the previous experience at that level; and if it's
been deeper, that becomes even more complicated. That is my
reaction to it.
Dr. French-McCay?
Dr. French-McCay. You know, I--I'm not someone who's an
expert in this particular problem. But, as someone who consults
to the government, I think it's really important, (a) for
industry to provide the information, because they have a lot of
expertise; but, the government needs to review that thoroughly,
and oversee it, definitely.
The Chairman. And to what extent do you think they do
review that?
Dr. French-McCay. I don't know about blowout preventers and
the drilling aspects. I do know about environmental impact
assessment, and I think that they do provide oversight and
review, but there's--obviously, there could be----
The Chairman. But, that's ex post facto----
Dr. French-McCay.--things that could be done better.
The Chairman.--is it not?
Dr. French-McCay. Excuse me?
The Chairman. Environmental impact assessment would----
Dr. French-McCay. Right.
The Chairman.--would come----
Dr. French-McCay. That would----
The Chairman.--after----
Dr. French-McCay.--come in the environmental impact
assessment----
The Chairman. After----
Dr. French-McCay.--part.
The Chairman.--an incident.
Dr. French-McCay. Before, there should be one. Before the
permitting, there should be an environmental impact assessment
done.
The Chairman. All right.
Dr. French-McCay. Yes.
The Chairman. All right. But, I think that, also, the
setting of the well, what could go wrong, what obviously did go
wrong this time, should be subject to more than just the
industry assessing its own needs.
Dr. French-McCay. Yes.
The Chairman. Do you think I'm overstating that?
Dr. French-McCay. No.
The Chairman. Senator Hutchison.
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you.
I have a question for each of you, so I hope I have time,
but I won't encroach on the Senator from Florida.
The next thing that you're trying to do, Mr. McKay is the
relief well. How long will it take to get that up and going and
providing the relief that we're all hoping it will be able to
provide?
Mr. McKay. We have two relief wells drilling, and those--
both of those wells are underway now. It could be around 3
months to get both of those wells to the point where they could
permanently secure the well. We are working on, obviously, the
containment and collection, that you know about. And we're also
working on what's called this ``top kill,'' within the next
week or so, that we hope to be able to kill the well from its
current configuration.
Senator Hutchison. How effective do you think this
containment-tube operation is that you're now employing. Will
it get more effective over a 3-month period, or is what you're
capturing now it?
Mr. McKay. Well, we're just stabilizing the system. And
before I came to the hearing this morning, I understand we're
getting about 1,500 to 2,000 barrels a day. We will continue to
ramp that up a bit. We don't want to draw in water, is why
we're going slow with this. I think it will get more effective.
We'll learn. It's possible we could come up with ideas to get
it, you know, progressively more effective. And this--I do
think the top kill is an option that we will, hopefully, be
enacting in the next week or so, that--which will kill the
well.
Senator Hutchison. Yes. We all hope that we have something
that's even more effective than what you've tried so far.
Mr. Newman, U.S. regulators don't mandate the use of a
remote-control device on the offshore rigs, where an underwater
valve can be triggered to shut down the well. Well, we all know
that the trigger didn't work. Was a shutoff switch in place, on
the Deepwater Horizon oil rig? And, would the use of a remote-
control device have provided an additional level of safety that
we need to be looking at for the future?
Mr. Newman. Senator, the requirements--the regulations
stipulate that you have two manual intervention panels on the
rig. And in the case of the Deepwater Horizon, there were
actually three manual intervention panels. The regulations
require one remote automatic system. And, in fact, the
Deepwater Horizon had two. One of those systems is referred to
as a ``dead-man system,'' and the other system is referred to
as an ``autoshear system.'' And the Deepwater Horizon was also
fitted with ROV intervention capability.
So, in addition to manual intervention on the rig, we had
two automatic systems on the Deepwater Horizon, and one ROV
intervention system. And I don't believe that the addition of
an acoustic system, which is--which I believe is what you're
referring to--I don't believe that the addition of an acoustic
system would have made a difference, in this case.
Senator Hutchison. So, you feel that the two systems are
enough for backup, or is there anything more that----
Mr. Newman. Well----
Senator Hutchison.--could have been another level of
backup?
Mr. Newman. I believe that, in the case of the Deepwater
Horizon, between manual intervention, automatic response----
Senator Hutchison. And the----
Mr. Newman.--and ROV intervention, there was the full
capability to activate the BOP. I think, as a result of the
incident, we will--we do need to reconsider the addition of an
acoustic control system, but I do not believe an acoustic
control system would have made a difference, in this particular
case.
Senator Hutchison. Dr. French-McCay, there is a naturally
occurring oil seepage into the Gulf of Mexico. There is also a
naturally occurring hydrocarbon-eating microbacteria that have
allowed the ecosystem to balance out. My question is, Is there
any scientific way that the naturally occurring bacteria can be
transferred in to help mitigate a larger seepage, obviously
like this one? Is that something that should be considered?
Dr. French-McCay. Those sorts of things have been
considered in other spills, and talked about, you know, for
shoreline treatment and other kinds of degradation treatments.
The problem is that it takes these bacteria a while to get
going. And it's also a very big ocean. So, it's probably better
to let the natural bacteria that are there, that are already
adapted to hydrocarbons, grow, and they will, eventually. So,
the material will degrade over time.
Do I think there's anything that could be done to
accelerate that? I doubt it, because it's such a big ocean.
People have tried fertilizing, in the past, in smaller areas.
And even that, it's doubtful whether that's really accelerated
the degradation.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hutchison.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McKay, when did BP agree to pay for the flights to
monitor the spill in the Loop Current?
Mr. McKay. We've agreed to, effectively, under the Oilfield
Pollution Act, to fulfill our full obligations as a responsible
party, and that would cover those flights.
Senator Nelson. And why does NOAA--as Dr. Lubchenco has
testified, why does NOAA need to wait until the oil has reached
the Loop Current in order to have you reimburse NOAA?
Mr. McKay. I--what--the way I understood what she was
saying, is she was get--that they're tracking the numbers, and
we will reimburse NOAA. I don't believe we've been any
impediment to pay, is my basic point.
Senator Nelson. How--you've seen--I've got to move, Mr.
Chairman. His head is right in my line of vision.
How is it that BP is going to be able to afford all of this
economic loss? Now, you're a well-endowed company, and I think
in the last 3 months you all had something like 5 and a half
billion of profit in 3 months. So, you clearly have the deep
pockets. But, you can see the potential for economic loss if
the relief well that's being drilled by Transocean right now--
as you just stated, Mr. Newman--doesn't get there for another 3
months, and that oil continues to gush--it's basically going to
cover up the Gulf. And, of course, it's already getting into
the Loop Current. It's going to be around on the East Coast and
in the coral reefs and the Keys. How in the world are you going
to be able to pay for the economic-loss payments?
Mr. McKay. Well, first and obvious, we're trying to do
everything we can to stop this thing and--control the flow and
then stop it. Second, we've been very clear we're going to
cover all claims--all legitimate claims associated with the
environmental impact as well as the economic impact. We've been
as clear as we can possibly be.
Senator Nelson. Do you support my bill to raise the
liability limits from 75 million to 10 billion?
Mr. McKay. Well, I haven't looked at the specific
legislation. What we have been very clear about is, the 75
million is--we're going to exceed that. That's irrelevant. And
we've said that--it's just irrelevant in this case--we've also
said that we're not going to seek reimbursement from the trust
fund, that we're going to stand behind our intent, and pay all
legitimate claims.
Senator Nelson. Well, I want to ask Mr. Newman, Has
Transocean said that you consider your limits of liability to
be less than the statutory limit, now, of 75 million?
Mr. Newman. Senator, there's a well-established framework
that governs the relationships between the various parties. And
under the framework, BP has accepted responsibility. And in
response to repeated questions to that point, BP have accepted
that responsibility. And I commend them for that.
Our responsibility is to support BP in controlling the
source, and in drilling the relief wells, and in supporting the
operations out there.
Senator Nelson. My question, however, was, Do you consider
the limit of liability in statute, of 75 million to be the
limit of Transocean's liability?
Mr. Newman. Sir, that limit applies to--it applies to BP,
in responding to the hydrocarbon spill. That limit does not
apply to Transocean, with respect to the hydrocarbon spill,
because Transocean has not been named as a responsible party.
Senator Nelson. You are the manufacturer of the blowout
preventer that did not work?
Mr. Newman. We are not the manufacturer of the blowout
preventer. We own the blowout preventer.
Senator Nelson. I see. Who's the manufacturer?
Mr. Newman. Manufacturer of the blowout preventer is
Cameron.
Senator Nelson. Do you think they bear some liability in
that the blowout preventer didn't work?
Mr. Newman. Senator, I think--until we have a full airing
of the facts and a comprehensive understanding of exactly what
happened, I think it's premature to conclude that the BOP
didn't work. It has been ineffective in stopping the flow of
hydrocarbons, but there could be conditions that that blowout
preventer was subjected to that would be outside the
expectation of the performance of that blowout preventer.
Senator Nelson. So, the fact that you all were the
operators of the blowout preventer and the drilling of the
well, you consider that liability for economic loss not to be
yours, but, rather, to be BP's. Is that what I heard you
testify?
Mr. Newman. Yes, sir. That is according to the established
framework of the relationships between the various parties.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, you're going to see lawsuits
like you've never seen before between the various entities,
because this economic loss is going to skyrocket higher than
our space program.
The Chairman. That's 150 miles.
Senator Nelson. No, sir. We went all the way to the Moon--
--
The Chairman. That is true. I----
Senator Nelson.--and that's----
The Chairman.--retract my statement.
Senator Nelson.--250,000 miles. And----
The Chairman. As I said----
Senator Nelson.--that was just with humans. We've gone past
the edge of our solar system, and we're out in deep, deep, deep
space with our spacecraft.
The Chairman. As I said, I stand corrected.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Is that it? All right.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Mr. McKay and Mr. Newman, when a deepwater well is being
dug like this, occasionally natural gas gets into the line and
causes what I've learned to be known as a ``kick.'' Is that
correct?
Mr. McKay. Yes, that can happen.
Senator Wicker. It's my understanding that, with this
particular well, there were perhaps more of these ``kicks''
than usual. Is it true, and I'll ask both of you, is it true
that, at one point during the several-week period before this
tragedy, that, because of a certain belching up to the surface,
of this gas, all work was halted on the rig?
Mr. McKay. I'll go first. What I know--and I may not know
the entire history accurately--but, what I've been told is,
there were two kicks. I don't know if both of them were gas.
One may have been saltwater, but there was a kick--there was
one kick that shut down what's called ``hot-work'' and fired
equipment around the rig floor, I believe.
Senator Wicker. ``Hot-work'' is anything that causes a
spark or might----
Mr. McKay. Something----
Yes.
Senator Wicker.--ignite.
Mr. McKay. Welding and things like that.
Senator Wicker. OK.
Is that correct, Mr. Newman?
Mr. Newman. Senator, I have not yet received a full list of
all of the events that took place during the drilling of the
well. I have reviewed one well-control event which occurred
during the second week of March. And as a result of that
particular well-control event, as Mr. McKay has indicated, we
would have suspended all hot-work during that time.
Senator Wicker. OK. Should that have been a warning sign to
either of your companies that this well was going to be
problematic and that you needed to be more careful than
unusual?
Mr. McKay. I think the investigation will be looking deeply
into this, in terms of what happened, and what happened after
that, in terms of recognition and understanding of those type
of events as things unfolded.
The Chairman. I think the Senator deserves a more direct
answer than that.
Mr. McKay. Could you repeat the question?
Senator Wicker. Can we have the question reread?
Should this have been a warning sign, to say this well
should have been treated more carefully because of the incident
where the entire operation had to be shut down?
Mr. McKay. I think--my personal opinion is that kicks
happen. They do happen relatively frequently----
Senator Wicker. Is it----
Mr. McKay.--and should----
Senator Wicker.--frequent for one to cause a shutdown of
the work?
Mr. McKay. ``Frequent'' maybe is not the right word. They
happen. And it could have very well been a warning sign.
Senator Wicker. Would this be so unusual, Mr. Newman, that
it should have been considered a warning sign that this well
was problematic and you should have been more careful?
Mr. Newman. If I could, Senator, during the drilling of a
well, there are regular occurrences when the drill bit will
penetrate formations that have hydrocarbons in them--maybe not
in commercial quantities, but certainly some amount of
hydrocarbon in them. And as the drill bit penetrates those
formations, and those rock cuttings are brought to the surface
along with the drilling fluid, there will be dissolved
hydrocarbons in the drilling fluid and hydrocarbons in those
rock chips. And at the surface, that hydrocarbon will come out
of solution--it will come out of the drilling mud, it will come
out of the rock cuttings.
There are sensors all over the rig that are designed and
installed specifically to detect that. And when those sensors
go into alarm status, to indicate a minimum level of what we in
the industry call ``background gas''--when those alarm sensors
indicate a minimum level of background gas, all hot-work on the
rig will be suspended. That's just standard operating
procedure.
And so, that--that's not an unusual occurrence, to have
that happen during a well. It is not necessarily an indication
that this is a problematic well.
Senator Wicker. OK. Well, I finally got an answer to that
question, with 17 seconds left.
Tell me about this argument that occurred between
Transocean and BP about whether to send ``mud'' down to the
bottom, as a protection against a blowout, or saltwater. Either
one of you, both of you.
Mr. McKay. I've not had the chance to review any witness
accounts. I think what we're going to have to do is put this
together in the investigations and understand what everybody
saw, what everybody heard, what type of data--digital or
physical--was utilized, and how the events unfolded, in
reality.
Senator Wicker. Mr. McKay, this is a Congressional hearing.
Are you telling me in the 4 weeks since this tragedy, you have
not had conversations within BP about an argument that has been
documented in the press, between your company and Transocean
and others, about whether it was safer to put mud down there or
saltwater? Surely you've had conversations and can tell this
committee about that.
Mr. McKay. I have not had conversations about that. About
that--that conversation I think you're referring to was on--I
believe, on 60 Minutes, Sunday night. I have not had
conversations about that.
The investigation that's underway undoubtedly will look
into that. And thank God 115 people got off the rig to be
interviewed. Those were mostly Transocean employees. We've not
talked to Transocean employees yet. So, no, I have not had that
review.
Senator Wicker. Actually, I'm referring to an account dated
much prior to the 60 Minutes story. This is May 11, the Times
Picayune.
I know we're intruding on the time.
Were you aware, Mr. Newman, of an argument that took place
about whether it would be safer to put mud or saltwater down at
the bottom of this rig, and saltwater won out, the less safe of
the two options?
Mr. Newman. I am aware of references to discussions between
Transocean and BP with respect to the specific procedure to be
followed.
Senator Wicker. Can either one of you, then I'll just have
to quit, and it's unfortunate that the hour's so late--can you
get back to us on who, in both companies, was involved in this
discussion, and their account of the safety considerations that
went into the decision not to use mud, and to use saltwater
instead? Can you both get back to us on the record about that?
Mr. Newman. With all due respect, Senator, the--some of the
Transocean people who may have been involved in that
conversation are, sadly, no longer with us.
Senator Wicker. Well, then, as tragic as that was, will you
interview the people present, and get back to us, on the
record?
Mr. Newman. That is absolutely part of our investigation,
Senator.
The Chairman. Well, then why didn't you just say, ``Yes, we
will''?
Mr. Newman. Yes. Yes.
Mr. McKay. Yes. And we're sharing everything from our
investigation.
Senator Wicker. All right. Will there be another round, Mr.
Chairman?
The Chairman. There will be.
Senator Wicker. OK.
The Chairman. Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just before my colleague from Mississippi, my colleague
from Florida was asking some questions to Mr. Newman about
their responsibility as a responsible party for the
environmental impact and the economic impact.
Mr. McKay, do you share Mr. Newman's stated view that
Transocean is not responsible for the economic or environmental
damages?
Mr. McKay. We--all I can say is that we have accepted to be
a responsible party, under the Oilfield Pollution Act. We're
going to fulfill every obligation as regards that. I've been
clear that we're going to put fault, blame, and other issues to
the side until the investigations are finished and we know what
happened. So, we're fulfilling our obligations.
Senator LeMieux. So that I understand that clearly then,
British Petroleum is taking the responsibility to be solely
responsible for the economic and environmental damages.
Mr. McKay. I'm saying we're taking our responsibilities,
under the Act, fully, which are broad responsibilities, and we
are bearing those. We will put fault and blame and recovery,
let's say, if there is any, off to the side until the
investigations understand what happened.
Senator LeMieux. Are you, then, leaving open the
possibility that you're going to say, back to the Federal
Government, ``Look, we're only responsible for 50 percent of
this, because Transocean or some other party is responsible for
the rest''?
Mr. McKay. No, I'm not saying that.
Senator LeMieux. You're responsible for all of it. You'll
seek whatever remedies you think are appropriate against other
parties.
Mr. McKay. We've accepted, as a responsible party, yes. So,
that, sir----
Senator LeMieux. I got that right the way----
Mr. McKay. Correct.
Senator LeMieux.--I phrased that?
Mr. McKay. Yes.
Senator LeMieux. OK.
I've sent your boss a letter, which I think you're aware
of, last week, based upon my concern that this oil is going to
wash up onshore in Florida and the other Gulf States. We have
heard, today, there are tar balls in the Florida Keys. Now, I'm
going to ask Dr. French-McCay, in a moment, whether she shares
Dr. Lubchenco's view as to why those might be there. Assuming
that we're already seeing oil come ashore in Florida, and if
it's going to take you another 90 days, under the worst-case
scenario, to drill these relief wells, we could have oil
continue to flow out at, whatever it is, 5,000 barrels a day,
or more.
I want to make sure, as I've stated to you, to your
company, in the letter, that we have enough funds in the hands
of local governments, state governments to prevent this oil
from coming onshore. Do you have a response to me today about
setting up this fund to fully allow the States and local
governments to mitigate and prevent this oil from coming
ashore?
Mr. McKay. We are definitely supportive of getting the
resources to where they're needed, with all the different
states. I'm not prepared, today, to give you an exact answer on
your specific proposal, because we've got several proposals
across the Gulf Coast. But, we are evaluating that.
Senator LeMieux. Will you get me a response----
Mr. McKay. Yes.
Senator LeMieux.--shortly?
Mr. McKay. Yes.
Senator LeMieux. Within the week, do you think? Is that
fair?
Mr. McKay. Yes.
[The information referred to follows:]
Exploration & Production--BP America Inc.
Houston, TX, May 25, 2010
Hon. George S. LeMieux,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Tony Hayward has asked that I respond to your letter regarding the
possible impact on tourism and the shoreline from the oil spill in the
Gulf of Mexico.
The Gulf Coast community is home to many BP families who cherish
the Gulf eco-system. They share the same sense of urgency in addressing
the economic impact of this spill, and in supporting tourism across
these beautiful States.
We have received many suggestions on how to address the
environmental and economic impact of the spill on these States. We are
committed to paying all legitimate claims for economic loss, and will
do so for as long as those losses continue. We are also determined to
understand the impact of the spill, and its associated response, on the
marine and shoreline environment of the Gulf of Mexico. Yesterday, we
announced the formation of a broad research program to investigate the
impacts of the oil, dispersed oil, and dispersant on the ecosystems of
the Gulf of Mexico and coastal States. The program, a commitment by BP
of $500 million over a period of 10 years, will also develop improved
oil spill detection and remediation technologies.
On May 5, we provided $100 million to assist the States of Florida,
Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana with their response to the spill,
with each State receiving $25m to accelerate the implementation of Area
Contingency Plans. Additionally, on May 17, we made available a further
$70 million to help promote tourism and commerce as part of our ongoing
commitment to mitigate the economic impact of the spill. Florida's
share of the $170m is $50m.
We will continue to identify and address the economic impact of
this event. We have said from the outset of the Deepwater Horizon
incident that we will not hide behind any spending cap. We've put in
place a claims process and it is working. To date we've put millions of
dollars in the hands of thousands of fishermen who are out of work
because of this spill and we have provided funds to compensate
businesses that have been impacted.
We remain absolutely committed to stopping the leak, cleaning up
the spill and working to restore the Gulf Coast communities.
We look forward to your guidance and partnership in the months
ahead.
Doug Suttles,
Chief Operating Officer.
Senator LeMieux. Dr. French-McCay, we just heard Dr.
Lubchenco say these tar balls that we're seeing in the Keys
could be the result of oil that came from the initial
explosion. This is far ahead of the projections of the oil
getting into the Loop Current. We weren't expecting, for 5
days, 7 days, to get down to the Florida Keys. Then, yesterday,
we see tar balls, and now we see more reports this morning.
Does that sound, based upon your research, does that sound like
that could be a plausible explanation for what happened?
Dr. French-McCay. That does sound like a plausible
explanation. I think we need to find out what those tar balls
are. You know, they can be fingerprinted to determine whether
or not they came from this spill, or whether they might have
come from seeps or--there are a lot of tar balls that are
released in the ocean from, you know, tankers cleaning their
vessels and all sorts of releases. So, it's possible it came
from some other source. So, until we know exactly what the
source is, it's not clear. It's technically possible to get
them down there, but it would have had to have been early
released oil, as she said. Yes.
Senator LeMieux. Do you have an opinion as to whether or
not these tar balls are toxic to humans?
Dr. French-McCay. If someone were to eat them, I suppose
that could be toxic. But----
Senator LeMieux. No. Granted. But----
Dr. French-McCay.--nor----
Senator LeMieux.--touching them----
Dr. French-McCay. Yes. No. It's like road tar.
Senator LeMieux. Right.
Dr. French-McCay. The more weathered the oil is, the less
toxic it is. So, the more dangerous oil is the fresher oil.
Senator LeMieux. The reason I bring this up, Mr. Chairman,
is the point I made earlier; that there's an advisory out, now,
about not going near the tar balls, and that you should have
hours of training. When I was a kid, in Fort Lauderdale, we'd
go to the beach and we'd get tar on our feet, because the
tankers were washing out.
Dr. French-McCay. Right.
Senator LeMieux. That stopped, thankfully. We don't have
that anymore. But, it wasn't like they were toxic. The reason I
raise the point is that, if we're going to get volunteers
involved and local communities involved to go get these tar
balls off the beach, collect them, and make sure that we can
have a good volunteer effort, it seems to me incongruous to say
that we shouldn't have people going near them.
So, I appreciate your direct answer to that question.
Dr. French-McCay. Yes, that's--I have a comment on that,
actually. All of the responders, including my team from my
company, have to take this training. It's just part of safety
training, and we can do it online. So----
Senator LeMieux. It's not a big burden?
Dr. French-McCay. No. It's not a----
Senator LeMieux. OK.
Dr. French-McCay.--big burden. It----
The Chairman. Senator----
Dr. French-McCay.--the idea----
The Chairman.--Klobuchar.
Dr. French-McCay.--is not to put volunteers in harm's way.
Senator LeMieux. OK.
The Chairman. Senator----
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Klobuchar.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you. And that was, actually--thank you Senator
LeMieux, that was interesting questions. I----
The --I want go back to you, Mr. Newman, and just talk
about some of the past. I'm very focused on how we could have
prevented this. I'm--my background's as a prosecutor. I always
look at, when we'd have a murder case or whatever, how could we
have prevented it.
The Wall Street Journal has reported that Transocean had
faced more frequent Federal scrutiny than comparable deepwater
drilling companies. Nearly three in four investigations into
safety and other problems in the last 2 years were
investigations of your company, and that includes an increase
in incidents above and--what would be expected after your
merger with Global Santa Fe in 2007. Since 2005, the Minerals
Management Service investigated four fires aboard deepwater
drilling rigs, all of which were owned by Transocean.
Can you explain the nature of these incidences? And, given
what's happened, that you have 138 mobile offshore drilling
units, what steps have you taken to make sure another disaster
like this doesn't happen? So, it's really two things.
Mr. Newman. So, first, in response to your question
regarding safety performance in the Gulf of Mexico----
Senator Klobuchar. The nature of those four incidences with
the fires on the rigs.
Mr. Newman. Right. I remember, specifically, two of them,
Senator. One was an engine-room fire, and the other was a fire
that occurred during a refueling operation of a crane. I--I'm
familiar with the circumstances of those events. They were
fully investigated. We understood the root causes, and we took
steps to ensure that those types of incidents did not reoccur.
So, that's a standard practice within the company when an
incident of that nature occurs. We conduct a thorough
investigation; we do a full root-cause analysis, so we
understand what happened; and, where necessary, we take steps
to ensure that such an incident doesn't happen again.
Senator Klobuchar. And then, going forward, in light of
what's just happened, with your 138 other operations.
Mr. Newman. Yes. In the absence of that pattern having
fully played out in this particular incident, we don't yet have
a thorough understanding of what happened. And we don't yet
have a thorough root-cause analysis. The information that we
have distributed across the worldwide Transocean fleet has been
simply a reinforcement of the company's existing comprehensive
safety management system, maintenance practices, and----
Senator Klobuchar. And, are----
Mr. Newman.--emergency response.
Senator Klobuchar. Are you supportive of the President's
idea of appointing a panel to start looking into this?
Mr. Newman. I think we're as focused as anybody in this
particular event in----
Senator Klobuchar. I asked----
Mr. Newman.--understanding----
Senator Klobuchar.--are you supportive of the President's
support----
Mr. Newman. I'm supportive----
Senator Klobuchar.--President's----
Mr. Newman.--of whatever----
Senator Klobuchar.--panel----
Mr. Newman.--process allows us to get to a full and
comprehensive--and, if I can use the Chairman's terms, a full
and transparent accounting of what happened. And if the
President's Commission helps us to do that, then I'm supportive
of it.
Senator Klobuchar. Well, remember, I mean, it's looking at
not just your conduct of your company, but also government
agencies. And I just look--when you look at other disasters,
whether it's Three Mile Island or 9/11, I think it has been
helpful to bring in other points of view.
Mr. McKay, last week you testified, before the EPW
hearing--you and I had an exchange about this USA Today article
that reported that BP opposed the Mineral Management Agency's
proposal to require drillers to perform independent safety
checks, because the new rules would have been, quote, ``too
costly.'' That was in the USA Today article.
I'm just asking you, again, if you still think those
regulations would be too costly. I know at the time, BP wrote,
quote, ``We believe the industry's current safety and
environmental statistics demonstrate that the voluntary
programs continue to be very successful.''
So, one, do you still think they were too costly? And, two,
do you still agree with this statement? And do you, in fact,
support, now, some tougher regulations and tougher financial
penalties?
Mr. McKay. Well, I think the real point is, we're for
anything that makes this safer. We've got to figure out what
happened here. And we're--will be supportive of regulation that
will make this safer. Absolutely.
Senator Klobuchar. I didn't--I note that the National
Research Council found that, for tankers, oil spillage dropped
off significantly after 1991, following passage of the Oil
Pollution Act. The oil industry attributes the reduced spillage
to preventative measures and increased industry concerns over
escalating financial liability.
So, do you believe tougher regulations and tougher
financial penalties, in this case, will produce similar results
that the Oil Pollution Act did after the Exxon Valdez spill?
What happened there was, a disaster happened, we changed
the rules, and we saw reduced incidences and reduced spillage.
Do you think the same thing could happen here?
Mr. McKay. I think a relook at some of the regulations is
going to be warranted here. I think we will learn what
happened. And I think that's going to inform that. And I think
the Oilfield Pollution Act does give us structure to act under.
I do.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. I'll ask the next question, Mr. McKay.
Actually, I'm going to ask two.
After the Exxon Valdez accident--and Exxon just delayed and
delayed and delayed and delayed and stretched litigation
claims, and do what people on the defense do. And so, they--it
just took a very long time to get those claims settled. But,
that's not my question.
We--as a result of that, we passed a law, the OPA-90 law.
And it assigned responsibility to the responsible party--those
are in the law, those words, ``responsible party''--the
responsible party for an offshore facility, in the law, is the
lessee or permittee of the area in which the facility is
located. Now, I think that you have agreed with that. I've not
heard this agreement before. But, Mr. Newman indicated that you
agreed with that. Do you?
Mr. McKay. I do agree with that. We've responded, in
writing, formally, that we are a responsible party, under the
Oilfield Pollution Act, as a lessee. Yes. And we plan on fully
fulfilling those obligations.
The Chairman. And do you intend to do that to the extent--
not just the waiving of the liability cap and all that kind of
thing, but to the extent that the American taxpayer will not
have to pay? Can you tell us that the American taxpayer will
not have to pay for what has happened as a result of this
accident?
Mr. McKay. Yes. We've been clear. Our intent is to pay all
legitimate claims, cover----
The Chairman. The word ``legitimate'' makes me nervous.
Mr. McKay. It's not meant to be--it's not meant to be in
anyway legalistic. It's meant to follow the Coast Guard
protocols and guidelines that have been utilized under the
Oilfield Pollution Act. We do intend to pay all those claims.
It includes reimbursements for costs for--by the government
agencies--clean-up costs, property damage, personal injury. We
do plan on paying those, yes.
The Chairman. All right. So, the--I should not worry about
the word ``legitimate.'' It--that's just a technical word,
you're saying?
Mr. McKay. It's--it means--it just means what it is:
legitimate. It needs to be substantiated. It follows the
guidelines within the Act.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. McKay. Yes.
The Chairman. To both you and Mr. Newman, the 60 Minutes
report--in that, one of the employees on the rig told of the
pressure--now, I've--this is a question that comes from very
deep within my soul, because this is a fact of life in West
Virginia within the coalmining industry, that there are some--
we just had a disaster there. A lot of people were killed. And
the CEO required production--the status of production, in all
of his mines, every 2 hours, every day. It had to be on his
desk.
What is the message to the coalminer? Safety is pushed
aside. Inherently, people become more nervous about doing what
they know they ought to do, and, in fact, what regulations
require them to do. But, it's very far removed. It's
underground. Ninety-nine percent of West Virginians have never
been into a coal mine--underground mine. So, it's all removed.
It's a secret world. And yours is the same situation.
Since the Exxon Valdez, nobody's really paid a great deal
of attention. Now they have to, because this is a catastrophe
of just extraordinary national dimensions, and we don't know
where it will end.
But, one of the crewmembers felt that to get the well set
quickly was important, because the project was behind, and--he
said, ``And drilling a bad well had already cost $25 million,''
so they had to start over. The message, to me, was very clear--
to the crew--that time is money, and profits are more important
than safety.
Do you want--either of you want to comment?
Mr. Newman. Mr. Chairman, I'll be happy to answer that
question. We are a customer service organization. We market our
services to our customers, we lease our rigs to our customers,
and customer satisfaction is important to us. But, we will
never compromise safety in pursuit of customer satisfaction.
I have taken phone calls, in the middle of the night, from
customers who are upset because our people have drawn a line
and will not proceed. They are--they have raised legitimate
safety concerns. Those concerns have been met with resistance
by our customers. And the customers have elevated that concern
all the way to my level. And every time, I have stood behind
our people.
The Chairman. The Committee would interested in having some
examples of those phone calls. That's not invasion of privacy;
it seems to me a perfectly legitimate request. In any event,
I'm making that request, as chairman of this committee, that
we--that you make available to this committee some of those
calls, even if you have to recall them in your own mind,
because I want to believe what you're saying. And I'm not going
to until I see what they asked or what their gripes were, and
how you didn't back away.
Mr. Newman. They--understanding that they will be
recollections in my own words----
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Newman.--about the sequence of events----
The Chairman. That's----
Mr. Newman. Absolutely.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. McKay, Mr. Newman has stated that, at the time of the
explosion--and this has been discussed, but I want it to be
very clear--Transocean's crew was in the process of displacing
drilling fluid with seawater--and this is the important point--
at BP's direction. My question is, Is this true?--first.
Mr. McKay. The procedure did call for that operation, yes.
The Chairman. So, BP gave that direction.
Mr. McKay. That procedure was written by BP, I believe.
Yes.
The Chairman. But, BP, therefore, gave that direction. It's
not hard to answer that. I think your answer is yes. It's
just--you have----
Mr. McKay. Yes.
The Chairman.--to say it.
Mr. McKay. The BP writes--BP does a procedure to construct
the well. Transocean, as the operator, operates the rig to
construct it.
The Chairman. It--is it a standard industry practice to
take this step, when there have been anomalous pressure
readings on the sealed wells, just hours earlier?
Mr. McKay. I think the entire history of that few hours
between when the anomalous pressures were read, and then what
happened after that, is the subject of multiple investigations.
And I think it's extremely important to understand the
totality--whether decisions were made, conversations were made,
arguments were had, data was transferred, data was monitored.
All that has to be put together to understand what happened in
those hours.
The Chairman. It's interesting to me that the both of you
are so careful in your language. And I think I understand that,
as a human being, because you're on the defensive, and you're
not sure what's going happen, and you don't know what the--all
the litigation's going to be, and you're nervous. And it may be
that your lawyers and lobbyists are telling you what to say,
because you have to really be careful in what you say, and you
don't want to say something that would create a different
impression from--you understand what I'm saying.
Mr. McKay. Could I make a comment?
The Chairman. Yes, you can. I'm not attacking you for it--
--
Mr. McKay. I----
The Chairman.--I'm just making an observation.
Mr. McKay. I'm honestly saying this, because I don't know
what happened. There are multiple conversations, and lots of
data, in a dynamic situation that we have not been able to
put--piece together yet. We're in the middle, still, of the
crisis and we're starting the investigations to get to this. I
literally don't know.
The Chairman. I know. I understand that, but I--I'm just
telling you, that, as one Senator, it stretches, a little bit,
credulity that the ``waiting until all the information is in''
overweighs what two very experienced people--and you've said
that you're a trained engineer in all of this, Mr. Newman--that
you wouldn't have your own views on the subject, which would--
might be, you know, valid--verified by the investigation
itself. But, you're just--you're very--you're careful, to the
extent that it makes it harder, for those of us who make laws,
to believe you.
Mr. McKay. I'm sorry that I'm frustrating you. What I
cannot possibly do is speculate on what happened, because it is
a very complicated situation that evidently happened there--
lots of dynamic things going on, lots of data, lots of
conversations. I'm sorry I'm frustrating you, but that is--I
cannot speculate on that until the investigations are done.
There are multiple investigations underway. I am confident,
however, that it will be figured out relatively soon. I don't
think this is going to drag out, in terms of what happened on
the rig. And I think the investigations will get there. And I
am confident of that.
The Chairman. All right. I'll accept that. And my time is
out. I'll accept what you say.
And we then go to Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I have been looking, on a
BlackBerry, at the new video that was released by BP today
that--we put it on my website and my Facebook account, and--I'm
going to hand it to you in just a minute. I want you to see
this, because it is much more clear than what we've seen
before. And it is gushing what you would expect--a 21-, 22-inch
pipe that is gushing oil under the ocean. And I want you to see
this.
The Chairman. Could you give the name of your website,
please? I just think it's important for people to go to it.
Senator Nelson. OK. It's www Bill Nelson dot Senate dot gov
[www.BillNelson.Senate.gov]. And I want you to see this as I'm
asking these questions, because it dramatically--when you see
something as clear as that, with the gusher coming up, and
realize that that's a 21-, 22-inch pipe.
Now, I want to ask Mr. McKay--you said that this riser
insertion tube is working. And you gave an estimate, before, of
how much oil is being removed from that riser. Can you tell us
what that is?
Mr. McKay. The update I got earlier this morning was
somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000 barrels of oil a day.
Senator Nelson. And that's assuming that the overall is
what was first estimated at 5,000 barrels per day.
Mr. McKay. No. That's an actual measurement at the surface,
of what's coming to the surface----
Senator Nelson. I see.
Mr. McKay.--through that tube.
Senator Nelson. I see. So, percentagewise, it depends how
much you're getting, depending on how much the actual gusher
is.
Mr. McKay. That's correct.
Senator Nelson. OK. So, you know how much you're getting,
because that's how much you're recovering at the surface.
Mr. McKay. That's correct.
Senator Nelson. OK. Let me ask you--you saw, on that chart,
on the Loop Current----
Let me have the one at 10 days. OK. That's the one at 5
days. Give the one at 10 days. Well, that's the one at 8 days,
but that'll make the point.
You saw how this is coming up by the Florida Keys, and the
one at 10 days--if you'll hand me that one--yes--that, then,
brings it all the way up to the southeast coast. Now, my
question to you is--you've said that you're going to take care
of the economic loss. You see the potential, here--85 percent
of the living coral reefs of North America are right there. If
that is severely damaged, or that coral reef is killed, how in
the world are you going to pay for that economic loss?
Mr. McKay. Well, first and foremost, we're going to do
everything we can to not let it get there, by shutting it off
at the subsea and fighting it on the surface. And obviously the
Coast Guard is--through the Unified Command structure,
everything we can do to protect those areas is going to be
done. Everything we can do. Nothing is being spared to protect
it.
Senator Nelson. Well, that's--I must say, that is a
priceless resource. I think you see the potential.
I want to ask Dr. French-McCay--you testified, earlier,
that chemicals are being released from the oil that, I thought
you said, in the early stages, are toxic. Would you describe
that, and what is the effect on the marine environment?
Dr. French-McCay. You know, from fresh oil--fresh oil has a
lot of lighter hydrocarbons, including these toxic components,
and they dissolve quickly from the oil--in the first few days,
primarily, although it can be longer. So, the key thing is how
fresh the oil is by the time it gets to a particular area. So,
the toxicity is going to be more around the fresher oil.
Senator Nelson. Can you explain that? What is the toxicity,
and what are the components that are so toxic?
Dr. French-McCay. Right. OK. The benzenes, toluene, and
also PAHs, naphthalenes, and phenanthrenes are the names of
them. So, they're small. They're one-, two-, and three-ring
benzene-type hydrocarbons. And they're semisoluble and soluble.
And they're also volatile.
So, when the oil is floating, they'll evaporate off. When
the oil is in the water, as droplets, they dissolve. The
smaller those droplets are, the faster they dissolve into the
water.
So, if you disperse it into very small droplets, you're
going to have a lot of dissolution quickly into the water. So,
the toxicity should be near the fresher oil, and particularly
the smaller droplets, as opposed to weathered tar balls that
have been out there for weeks.
Senator Nelson. Right. So, when oil is released at that
depth, of 5,000 feet, and it is fresh oil, and it is together--
it's not dispersed----
Dr. French-McCay. Right.
Senator Nelson.--and these toxic elements that you just
named disperse, what do they do, and what do they harm?
Dr. French-McCay. They disperse out and dilute out with the
water, and they're absorbed by whatever organisms are exposed.
So, all the organisms that are in that deepwater would be
exposed to those toxins. They get into the tissues, and they
disrupt the function of the organism.
Senator Nelson. And what are some of those organisms?
Dr. French-McCay. Oh, all sorts of plankton, like
jellyfishes, fishes that are in the deep sea, various squids;
there are organisms on the bottom of the sea, too, that might
be exposed. So----
Senator Nelson. And----
Dr. French-McCay.--a whole variety of fish and
invertebrates, basically.
Senator Nelson. And what is the long-run effect of those
organisms absorbing those toxins?
Dr. French-McCay. Typically, it's a--they have acute
effects, as we call them, which are short-term mortality or
lost growth or lost function. That can affect the populations,
in the longer term. We are trying to determine what that--you
know, the magnitude of that problem, as we speak.
One of the problems in the deep sea is, there's not a lot
of data on what's down there. So, we're trying to get that data
right now, in areas that haven't been affected yet, so that we
have a baseline in order to make that kind of an evaluation.
So, we have sampling going on right now on ships in the
vicinity, more toward Florida, where it hasn't been affected
yet, and so on.
Senator Nelson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Mr. McKay, you mentioned there are multiple investigations.
Do you mean that BP is conducting multiple investigations?
Mr. McKay. I mean that BP has one internal investigation,
and then there is the joint Homeland Security and Interior
investigation, the Marine Board, and there are other
Congressional investigations.
Senator Wicker. I see. And your employees, to the extent
that they are available, are testifying before those government
investigative----
Mr. McKay. Yes.
Senator Wicker.--bodies.
Mr. McKay. I believe so.
Senator Wicker. Who is running your BP internal
investigation?
Mr. McKay. A senior executive that heads up our safety and
operational integrity unit, which is a separate unit that--and
his name is Mark Bly.
Senator Wicker. OK. How long has he been assigned to this?
Mr. McKay. A few days after the incident.
Senator Wicker. OK. Is he issuing interim reports?
Mr. McKay. He--I don't--that's a good question. I don't
know.
Senator Wicker. But----
Mr. McKay. I don't know.
Senator Wicker.--he hasn't been reporting to you, the----
Mr. McKay. No.
Senator Wicker.--head of BP America.
Mr. McKay. He has been doing an independent investigation.
Senator Wicker. OK. And you have not received interim
reports.
Mr. McKay. No.
Senator Wicker. Now, Mr. Newman, is Transocean conducting
an internal investigation?
Mr. Newman. Yes, sir. As I indicated in my opening remarks,
I did constitute an independent investigative team comprised of
Transocean and industry experts.
Senator Wicker. And who is in charge of that for
Transocean?
Mr. Newman. Gentleman by the name of Bill Ambrose.
Senator Wicker. And is he issuing interim reports?
Mr. Newman. Mr. Ambrose reports directly to me, and he does
issue interim reports.
Senator Wicker. So, you have visited with him from time to
time about what his reports are revealing so far.
Mr. Newman. I have had conversations with Mr. Ambrose about
the full scope of the investigation, the extent to which I want
him and his team to explore the incident.
Senator Wicker. But, not the facts that he has been able to
uncover so far.
Mr. Newman. I have not been made aware of the facts that he
has uncovered so far.
Senator Wicker. So, he has not reported to you on an
interim basis about what he's learning.
Mr. Newman. We are--we have not yet established a mechanism
for interim reporting.
Senator Wicker. OK. Are you aware of there being an issue,
with regard to this well, about a new type of concrete being
used, different from what had ordinarily been used?
Mr. Newman. Is that question directed to me, Senator?
Senator Wicker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Newman. Yes. I'm aware that, on this well, I believe
there was a process used which is referred to as ``nitrified
cement.''
Senator Wicker. And is that new and different?
Mr. Newman. I don't have much expertise in cementing, sir,
so I wouldn't be able to tell you whether that's new and
different, or not.
Senator Wicker. OK. Well, would you speak to the person
running that investigation and get back to this committee about
that?
Mr. Newman. I will ask our investigation to explore that,
and we can revert to the Committee.
Senator Wicker. OK. Well, I'm asking you to check on that
and get back on the record.
Now, in the case of the blowout preventer, as your
testimony says, the blowout preventers obviously malfunctioned,
in some respect. They were supposed to squeeze, crush, or shear
the pipe, and shut off the flow. What events are supposed to
trigger that in a blowout preventer?
Mr. Newman. What events are supposed to trigger the
activation of the blowout preventer?
Senator Wicker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Newman. Typically, what our people will monitor is
flow. So, they will--during the process of drilling the well,
while the drill bit is actually deepening the well, our people
will be pumping drilling fluid into the well, and monitoring
drilling fluid coming out of the well. And periodically during
that process, our people will stop--stop the operation, and do
what the industry calls a ``flow check.'' And that's where
everything is shut down so there's no fluid being pumped into
the well, and the driller will monitor whether or not there's
fluid coming out of the well.
Senator Wicker. OK. Well, I don't think I'm getting an
answer to my question. The blowout preventer is supposed to
kick in suddenly if something goes wrong. What causes it to do
that? An explosion? A punching of a button? What causes the
blowout preventer to activate and shut off the flow?
Mr. Newman. There are a couple of different means of
activating the BOP.
Senator Wicker. OK, good. That's what I want to know.
Mr. Newman. OK. So, one way is manual intervention--manual
operation. There are----
Senator Wicker. And that's somebody on the rig, punching a
button.
Mr. Newman. That is somebody on the rig, punching a----
Senator Wicker. OK.
Mr. Newman.--button.
Senator Wicker. What's another way?
Mr. Newman. Automatic response that is built into the BOP
control system. And there are two of those that were part of
the BOP control system on the----
Senator Wicker. What events----
Mr. Newman.--Deepwater Horizon.
Senator Wicker.--activate the automatic response?
Mr. Newman. One set of events is meant to kick in after
catastrophic loss of the riser. So, that's--the riser is the
pipe that connects the BOP to the rig.
Senator Wicker. OK.
Mr. Newman. If the--if we lose the riser, the BOP--the
control system is designed to sense that, and it will activate.
Senator Wicker. In this case, you didn't lose the riser.
Mr. Newman. In this case, we did not lose the riser. The
riser----
Senator Wicker. OK. What else?
Mr. Newman.--riser remained connected to the rig, as long
as the rig was floating. The other automatic response that is
built into the Horizon BOP control system was called an ``auto-
shear.'' And that is meant to trigger when a portion of the
BOP, referred to as the ``lower marine riser package,'' the
LMRP--when the LMRP disconnects from the lower package--in the
event of a disconnect, that auto-shear will function.
Senator Wicker. And that should have worked in this
instance?
Mr. Newman. No. In this case, we did not have a disconnect
between the lower marine riser package and the lower BOP.
In fact, today, the lower marine riser package is still
sitting on the BOP.
Senator Wicker. So, the two instances in which the
automatic trigger would take place, never happened, in this
instance, based on your understanding.
Mr. Newman. The two scenarios for automatic response, built
into the Horizon BOP control system, neither of the criteria
were satisfied.
Senator Wicker. All right.
Well, Dr. McCay, I'm really----
The Chairman. Senator----
Senator Wicker.--sorry that I----
The Chairman.--I have to say, you're about two and a half
minutes over.
Senator Wicker. Are we going to take a third round?
The Chairman. Well, it's depending on----
Senator Wicker. OK.
The Chairman. I'm willing.
Senator Wicker. Well, I'm just trying to wrap up.
The Chairman. I have an additional question, so----
Senator Wicker. I have additional questions, and I'll wait
for another round.
The Chairman. OK. Thank you.
Senator Klobuchar.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much.
Just having looked at that video, Mr. McKay, Mr. Newman, I
mean, it is really startling. What I'm trying to figure out
is--at first it was claimed it was--the oil was coming out at
1,000 barrels a day. Is that right? And then it went up to
5,000. And now I'm looking at this. I mean, there are some
people estimating, just looking at that video, that it could be
70,000 barrels a day.
How long did--maybe I'll start with you, Mr. McKay--how
long did you guys have that video? And why couldn't you make
those calculations and figure out how much oil was coming out?
Mr. McKay. Those videos have existed since we found the
leak. The estimates have been--first of all, estimating volume
from a 2-D video is extremely difficult. We cannot measure that
directly. And I would say that there--we believe there's quite
a lot of gas in that. So, you have to take into--that account.
The way that the estimates have done--been done by the
government scientists, and our own, is to understand, as best
we can, what is on the surface, and then, through the--what we
know about the oil, how much dispersion we think--and
dissolution--we think is happening in the water column, and
effectively adding those two together is where the 5,000-
barrel-a-day estimate comes from.
Everyone has said there's a range of--a large range of
uncertainty there. But, that's--that is the best current
estimate.
Senator Klobuchar. So, you're still sticking with that.
Mr. McKay. I'm sticking with what Unified Command is--has
determined.
Senator Klobuchar. OK.
Dr. French-McCay, I--you heard Dr. Lubchenco provide her
predictions as to how the oil is going to disperse. Were you
here for her testimony?
Dr. French-McCay. Yes.
Senator Klobuchar. Do you agree with her characterization?
And do you have anything further you'd like to add?
Dr. French-McCay. In terms of the Loop Current situation?
Yes, I do. I think that--first of all, the majority of the oil
is up near the release site, and that area has a very
complicated circulation pattern, and appears to just sort of
slosh around like a bathtub up there. And then you have this
Loop Current. So, any oil that, kind of, gets--comes down in
streamers and gets in that Loop Current could get transported.
However, the Loop Current is quite a bit south of where the
release is.
So, the majority of it is really up near the release site.
And the winds have been from the southeast for quite some days
now, which has forced it up toward Louisiana. All of this could
change if the winds are from the north and--you know, for a
number of days. So, we have to monitor all of the current
winds, and figure out where it's going. And that's what NOAA's
doing as we speak.
Senator Klobuchar. Did you hear the discussion--I know
you're more focused on the wildlife piece--that I--but you must
know--about hurricanes, that I had with her and the Admiral,
about hurricanes and the potential effects of a hurricane, with
all the oil still sitting around, even if they are successful--
and we hope they are--in blocking the leak, or partially
blocking the leak. What could the effect be if there was a
major hurricane in--the season starts in June, peaks in late
August--what could be the effect of a major hurricane, from
your perspective?
Dr. French-McCay. If the leak is stopped by the time of the
hurricane, the water would be, you know, churned up, and there
would be a lot more dispersion. So, it actually would spread it
out more, and dilute it down more. So, that actually would be a
positive help, as opposed to negative.
If the leak is still going, then it's going be even harder
to control.
Senator Klobuchar. It's--the Admiral was talking about--the
operations would be harder to conduct and----
Dr. French-McCay. Right.
Senator Klobuchar.--and could even possibly be imperiled, I
suppose, whatever devices are hooked up.
Dr. French-McCay. Yes.
Senator Klobuchar. Did--was you--would you, Mr. McKay and
Mr. Newman, agree with that assessment? Or----
Mr. McKay. Obviously, it's according to where the hurricane
comes through--a hurricane comes through, and the severity.
But, operations could be interrupted if a hurricane comes
through. That's true.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. All right. Very good. Thank you very
much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar.
I have an additional question, so this will constitute a
third or fourth, or whatever, round.
And I apologize--you know, you keep people waiting, and
then you hold them--but, this is--I think this is a very
intense subject. This has enormous consequences as we're trying
to decide what to do in an energy policy. This is a huge, huge
subject.
This, Mr. Newman, is to you. And it has to do with the
cement seal--integrity of the seals on a well. You stated,
publicly, that, ``The one thing we know with certainty is that
there was a sudden catastrophic failure of the cement, the
casing, or both,'' because, ``without a disastrous failure of
one of those elements, the explosion could not have occurred.''
Now, I've got to tell you, once again, I'm just reaching
back to what has just happened in West Virginia, with the mine
disaster, and to the one before that and the one before that,
which are very much--is very much a part of--you know, in West
Virginia, it's as big a subject as this is. And it has to do,
really, with shoddy seals, in the mining. If you indicate that
there couldn't have been an explosion--could not have
occurred--if there had not been a failure of the cement or the
casing, or both, that indicates to me that the casing was not
sufficient.
And again, coalmining is very different, but, to me, right
now, it is not. That--since nobody really understands, in the
outside world, the press world, the Congressional world, what
casing is in an underground mine, and how it prevents
explosions from going from one part of a mine to another, or
oxygen deficiencies going from one part of a mine to another--
the casing is all you have to rely on. In that case, it's also
cement. And the seals, therefore, are what hold the cement in a
very rough thing called an ``underground coal mine.'' It's a
very delicate art. But, it's absolutely--it did not work, in
couple of disasters where a group of people--their spouses
never saw them--will never see them ever again, because the
casing didn't work.
And so, my question to you is, What is the standard oil
industry practice for testing the integrity of a cement seal
like the one that you evidently were talking about?
Mr. Newman. I'm going to qualify my answer by reminding the
Chairman that I don't have a lot of expertise in cementing.
The Chairman. Well, whatever expertise you do have, because
you've said you were an engineer.
Mr. Newman. Right.
The Chairman. Petroleum engineer. So that----
Mr. Newman. Right.
The Chairman.--impresses me.
Mr. Newman. So, I have formed a fundamental conclusion. The
oil is flowing--the hydrocarbons are flowing from a reservoir
that is 13,000 feet below the seabed. Between that reservoir,
13,000 feet below the seabed, and the seabed, there should be
casing and cement. So, the only way for the hydrocarbons to go
from that reservoir, 13,000 feet below the seabed, to the
seabed is to have experience a failure of the cement or the
casing, or both.
There are tests to confirm the integrity of cement--a
cement bond log, or a cement temperature log--I'm not familiar
with the properties of those logs or the efficacy of the
measurement--but, I know there are tools out there to measure
it.
The Chairman. Doesn't quite answer my question. I agree
that they're out there. I mean, I--you say they're out there,
so I accept they're out there. The question is, What is the
industry standard? What does it call for? And did you practice
that?
Mr. Newman. The requirement for those services would have
been a BP decision. That's not something that Transocean
markets. We do not provide those measurements, so I can't tell
you what the industry standard is for the application of those
measurements.
The Chairman. Well, then I'll ask Mr. McKay.
Mr. McKay. I believe the standard, by the MMS regulator, is
that a positive test is exerted on the casing and cement to see
if it holds. That test was done, and it held. So----
The Chairman. How is that test done?
Mr. McKay. You pressure--effectively, you pump the cement
job, get the cement on the backside of the casing, let it set,
then you pressure up on the casing to see if everything holds.
And if it's not holding, it would leak off. It held, I think,
2,350--2,350 PSI, something like that.
What was supplemental to the regulations was an--what's
called a negative pressure test, where you--you don't pull a
vacuum, but you lower the pressure above--on the casing. I
believe--I don't know this for a fact, but I believe there were
two of those done. And there were anomalies associated with
those negative pressure tests. And----
The Chairman. And is--were those tests performed by your
company?
Mr. McKay. I think those--I don't know. I--this'll be in
the investigation. I would imagine that there were
collaborative discussions about what was going on, on the rig.
The tests----
The Chairman. But----
Mr. McKay. The tests----
The Chairman.--if Mr. Newman----
Mr. McKay.--themselves were----
The Chairman.--says that the--I mean, I--in a coal mine, if
a casing blows, people die. And I'm not in a--anything near an
engineer, in petroleum or underwater activities, but I have to
assume that was a very large factor.
Mr. McKay. The things that I know--there was a period of
time, after this anomalous pressure test, before the well
exploded. And what's going to be very important in the
investigation is to understand those several hours between
those two things, to understand what happened. And then there
are techniques to control well flow, you know, when things are
happening. And there are a lot of questions that have to be
asked. We don't have that. I don't know that yet. But, that--
I'm sure the investigation is going to get right to the nub of
that.
The Chairman. My time is up.
Mr. McKay, I'm sure, too, that the investigation will have
something to say about that. But, I would--I think it's so
important that I would like to know, on reflection or further
questioning, on your part, of people in your company or in
Transocean, what you conclude, before the investigation is
concluded.
I'm not going to sue you. I'm a Senator, trying to find out
what's going on.
Mr. McKay. We want to find out, as well. And we can share
with you the conclusions that are drawn. We've shared facts. We
can share that with this committee--the facts as we know them.
The Chairman. After the investigation is over?
Mr. McKay. No. We can share what we've shared with ONI, in
terms of facts.
The Chairman. Good. Please do that.
Mr. McKay. Yes. And that's what I've said, so far today.
The Chairman. Yes. I understand. Thank you.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. And, Mr. Chairman, this Senator wants to
know what happened, as well, so it'll never happen again,
because the consequences of this failure could be betting the
store for my state, given the fact that we have more coastline
than any other state, save for Alaska, and we certainly have
more beach than any other state. And we have 85 percent of the
coral reefs of the United States, and that includes Hawaii and
some of the islands in the Pacific that are territories.
I want to go back, then, Mr. Newman, to why the blowout
preventer failed--the backup mechanism. Was there a dead
battery that caused that fail-safe system that is supposed to
drive those pieces of metal together to cutoff the oil? Was
there a dead battery?
Mr. Newman. I believe you're referring to some information
that came available last week. The--when we--the BOP control
system has two control pods mounted on the stack. And we have
retrieved one of those control pods. We had the manufacturer
onsite to conduct a thorough analysis and review of the
condition of that pod. The preliminary battery measurement on
the pod registered 18.41 volts, against a maximum charge of 27
volts and a minimum--a manufacturer's minimum recommended
charge of 18 volts. So, on the preliminary measurement of 18.41
volts, we exceeded the manufacturer's minimum recommendation,
and on a subsequent measurement, a more comprehensive and
direct measurement of the voltage in the battery, we registered
26 volts. So, the battery was not dead.
Senator Nelson. OK. That being the case, then, the backup
system that was supposed to work, is it referred to as a
``deadman safety mechanism''? In other words, it activates and
a human doesn't have to do it.
Mr. Newman. As I responded earlier to a question, the BOP
control system on the Horizon was fitted with a dead- man
system. In order for that deadman system to trigger, there have
to be three criteria met. And during the course of the events
following the explosion, we did not meet those three criteria.
So, the system was never in a situation where it should have
responded, and didn't.
Senator Nelson. And those three criteria are?
Mr. Newman. Electronic communication with the rig;
hydraulic communication with the rig; and electronic
communication between the two pods. So, you have to satisfy
those three criteria.
Senator Nelson. Well, we look forward to the conclusions of
the investigation.
Mr. McKay, I'd like your opinion. State the nature of the
relationship between the interactions of the oil industry, that
you have observed, and the MMS, over the last dozen years. Is
it a personal cozy relationship? Or is it a arm-length
professional relationship, in your opinion?
Mr. McKay. I have not worked directly with the MMS in the
last 12 years. As I understand it--if you want an opinion, my
opinion is--as a regulator, they've had--our relationship has
been as a regulator. That--it's--it--I would not term it
``cozy.'' It's a regulator relationship. That is an opinion of
mine.
Senator Nelson. Yes. And that's what I'm asking. And so,
when you heard, about 5 or 6 years ago, about the sex parties
between regulators in MMS and members of the oil industry--
``pot parties''--all of that information that has been out in
the public sphere, what was your opinion about the
relationship?
Mr. McKay. I was surprised by that.
Senator Nelson. Were you shocked?
Mr. McKay. I'm not sure I know enough about what happened.
I was surprised that things like that would happen.
Senator Nelson. Surprised that a regulator, that is
supposed to be not only collecting royalties, but also charged
with the safety of this kind of equipment that we're talking
about, that failed, had such a cozy relationship that they're
going off and having sex parties.
That doesn't sound like the function of a regulator to me,
Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Mr. Newman, do you know whether or not
there was a manual attempt to activate the blowout preventer?
Mr. Newman. I have heard reference made--anecdotal
reference made to attempts to activate the BOP before the crew
finally disembarked the rig.
Senator Wicker. I see.
And, Mr. McKay, do you have any knowledge of a manual
attempt to activate the BOP?
Mr. McKay. I have--two things I would say to that--one, I
have--I've heard the same thing, that the emergency switch was
hit on the rig before evacuation.
Second, we have made attempts, with Transocean, to manually
intervene in the blowout preventer and provide actuation,
subsea, with ROVs. In fact, we--I believe, we've activated the
deadman switch, with ROVs, and we've tried to pump in and
actuate the various rams with remote operated vehicles. We've
been doing that--the first 10 days or so, we were doing that of
the crisis.
Senator Wicker. So, it may be, Mr. Chairman, there's just
something down there with the blowout preventer that's
preventing it from, even today, kicking in.
Well, let me go, then, to Dr. McCay.
The Chairman. I don't think he's a ``Dr.''
Senator Wicker. And----
The Chairman. Oh. Oh. That----
Senator Wicker. Dr.----
The Chairman.--that Dr. McCay. All right.
Senator Wicker. Yes, we've got Mr. McKay, with a ``K,'' and
Dr. McCay, with a ``C.''
It's unfortunate that you weren't able to talk more about
the history of a number of these things that had gone on. But,
do you agree with Mr. Newman, that in this instance several
things had to go wrong independently in order for this tragedy
to happen?
Dr. French-McCay. I don't feel like I have enough expertise
on the blowout preventer or those kinds of things to be able to
comment on that, really.
Senator Wicker. OK. Well, I appreciate that.
Let me move, then, to what you've observed in other
instances of oil spills, in particular, the so-called ``plume''
or, as we heard from NOAA, the ``mist'' of particles. Have you
heard of that sort of thing happening before in connection with
oil spills?
Dr. French-McCay. Yes. The spill that I touched on briefly
in my testimony, the North Cape oil spill----
Senator Wicker. And that was----
Dr. French-McCay.--that----
Senator Wicker.--in Rhode Island?
Dr. French-McCay. Yes.
Senator Wicker. OK.
Dr. French-McCay. And what happened there was, the oil was
entrained, or mixed, into the water, with big waves. And so,
there was a subsurface plume, just meaning ``contamination,''
that spread out, away from the coast. And those were small
droplets in the water, and there was measurable PAHs, which are
the toxic components, in the water. And then we evaluated that
spill, and documented 9 million lobsters were killed, and a
number of other organisms.
Senator Wicker. So, that's an instance of the wave action
causing the oil not to stay on the surface.
Dr. French-McCay. That's correct.
Senator Wicker. Can you think of any reason why, in this
instance, that the oil would not come to the surface and cause
this plume or mist of particles that NOAA testified about?
Dr. French-McCay. Yes. Dispersant has been injected, in
tests, down near the wellhead, or near where the oil is coming
out, actually in the pipe. And I'm just hearing this
description, I haven't seen it myself, but basically they're
injecting it into the pipe, with the objective of dispersing
that oil, down in the deep water, into small droplets. So, if
you get those droplets small enough, they will disperse down
there and not float to the surface, because oil comes up if
it's in bigger droplets, but if it's very small, it's like a
mist----
Senator Wicker. I see.
Dr. French-McCay.--of little droplets that disperse, down
in the deep water.
Senator Wicker. Well, thank you very much.
And, Mr. Chairman, let me just observe two things. I think
one thing we've learned about the blowout preventer, this fail-
safe, this deadman preventer of last resort, is, if the rig
explodes and burns and sinks, that catastrophic event does not
trigger the blowout preventer.
Is that correct, Mr. Newman?
Mr. Newman. Under the current configuration, as long as the
rig remained on the surface, you could have had continuing
hydraulic communication with the rig; so, the deadman would not
have functioned, in that case.
Senator Wicker. Well, it's amazing to me that, as explosive
as an oil rig might be, that something like this could happen,
and the signal not be sent.
Mr. Chairman, I have a procedural question. Normally,
members are given 2 weeks to submit answers. I don't know how
long we give to the witnesses to supply answers to those
written questions. I would just ask the Chair to consider
shortening the timeline for submission of questions, and to
provide a timeline, if it's within the rules, for these
witnesses to supply the requested answers, on the record.
The Chairman. I think there are two aspects to your
question, Senator.
Senator Wicker. There, indeed, are.
The Chairman. One is the promptness of it, getting it as
quickly as possible. And then, on the other hand, you want to
make sure that it's as accurate--that they have sufficient time
to give the accuracy that--which allows them to return it to
you, or to us, to the Committee.
So, I would think--what--2 weeks?
What are you comfortable with? I was going to suggest 2
weeks.
Senator Wicker. OK.
The Chairman. Is that all right?
Senator Nelson has the final question.
Senator Nelson. I just want to follow--Mr. Newman, you were
referring--first of all, you are a part of Transocean. Is that
right?
Mr. Newman. Yes, sir. I'm the Chief Executive Officer.
Senator Nelson. Yes, indeed. And Transocean is the operator
of the rig and the drilling. Is that correct?
Mr. Newman. We own the drilling rig. And we leased the
drilling rig services to BP, under a drilling contract.
Senator Nelson. Right. But, who was on the rig, floating,
that was operating it at the time of the explosion?
Mr. Newman. Well, there are BP representatives out there
directing the operation, with respect to the well.
Senator Nelson. Who has the responsibility for the
operation?
Mr. Newman. For the well?
Senator Nelson. For the operation of flipping the switch.
Mr. Newman. Well, the driller. The driller is the
Transocean individual who is operating the drilling machinery.
And because he has an array of sensors and measurements and
feedback presented to him, it would be his responsibility to
recognize abnormalities with respect to the well, and make the
decision about whether or not to shut the well in.
Senator Nelson. And, in this case, who is the driller?
Mr. Newman. The driller on--who was on shift at the time of
the event, was a gentleman named Dewey Revette.
Senator Nelson. And is he employed by----
Mr. Newman. Senator, with all due respect, Dewey Rivette
was killed in the incident. Dewey Rivette was an employee of
Transocean.
Senator Nelson. OK. Were there any other people, that
survived, that also had, as part of their duties, to flip the
switch to activate the blowout preventer?
Mr. Newman. It's a bit of a difficult question to answer.
The--it is, first and foremost, the driller's responsibility to
shut the well in. There is an individual on the rig who is the
driller's supervisor, the gentleman that we refer to as a
``tool-pusher.'' Because he's the driller's supervisor, he's
sort of a backup, if you will, to--he's an individual that
traditionally--a tool-pusher would come from the driller ranks,
so he'd be an experienced driller, he would be able to
recognize those signs and signals. The challenge is that the
tool-pusher has a lot of other responsibilities besides just
overseeing the driller. And so, he may or may not be on the
drill floor at the time. He may or may not be near a panel at
the time.
Senator Nelson. Did he survive?
Mr. Newman. We lost one tool-pusher in the event, as well.
Senator Nelson. OK. So, that's two people that you lost,
that you don't have any indication that the switch was flipped.
Was there any other person on that drill rig that has stated
that they flipped the switch?
Mr. Newman. I have heard reference being made to hitting
the emergency disconnect button, which is one of the buttons on
the control panel, just prior to evacuation from the rig.
Senator Nelson. If they are your employees, why have you
just ``have heard''? Why don't you ``know,'' by somebody
telling you that they'd flipped the switch?
Mr. Newman. Well, I've not had those conversations, myself,
Senator. I've been focused, first and foremost, on the--on the
nine families who lost Transocean employees. And I've been
focused on ensuring that the company was properly organized to
support BP in the response and recovery efforts.
Senator Nelson. You're the CEO. Are you responsible for the
executive management of your company?
Mr. Newman. Yes, sir, I am.
Senator Nelson. OK. Then the question is, Did one of your
employees flip the switch?
Mr. Newman. As I said, Senator, I have an account--I've
been made aware of an account of an individual who indicates
that, prior to evacuating the rig, they hit the emergency
disconnect button. I have not talked directly to any of those
people.
Senator Nelson. Why is that a difficult question to answer?
I just don't understand. I mean, you're the CEO. You should
know what has happened in your company. Did somebody in your
company flip the switch--it's a simple inquiry--among the folks
that, in fact, lived?
Mr. Newman. Sitting here today, Senator, I don't know,
definitively. That is--it's clearly part of the investigation
process.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I--I'm at a loss to
understand why the witness cannot answer the question. And so,
I would ask that you proffer the question in writing for them
to respond in writing.
The Chairman. Will be done.
This concludes the hearing.
Let me just say, that I thank all three of you for spending
all of this time. And I think that, when the record of these 4
hours is produced, there will be a lot of information--some
new. There will also be a lack of a lot of information--all of
that needed. The investigation is important.
And I--as I conclude this hearing--there will be more, I'm
sure--I'm just overwhelmed by the magnitude of what went wrong,
and the consequences, as yet unknown, to effect so many
Americans and so much of our economy and wildlife, estuaries,
and all the rest.
But, I respect you for staying the course with us. And I
thank you very much.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:28 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, U.S. Senator from Hawaii
Just one month ago, the Nation suffered a tragic accident onboard
the mobile offshore drilling unit Deepwater Horizon. As we mourn the
loss of the crew members and continue to work to contain and control
the oil spill I hope that the lessons we learn will be taken very
seriously. I know that BP is taking this seriously and I applaud their
sincere efforts. It is imperative, however, that we understand what
happened to cause this accident, and what changes are required to
better prepare for future accidents should they occur.
I pray that one of the efforts will be to establish a system by
which we can better anticipate, and respond to, accidents of this
nature. We have similar systems in place in other sectors, and I hope
that we can move toward a robust system for oil spills as well.
I am confident that both the Coast Guard and NOAA, here with us
today, are doing all they can to lead the government's response
efforts. As the Nation's leading scientific resource for oil spills,
NOAA's efforts to coordinate the science, predict the trajectory of the
spill, provide weather forecasts, and protect the Gulf of Mexico's
marine mammals, sea turtles, fish and shellfish is critical.
In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard is always first on the scene--for
us in Hawaii and now for the Gulf. With the Coast Guard at the helm of
the Unified Command, I am confident that all organizations responding
to this incident will remain in lock step until it is resolved.
Finally, I am pleased that the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund is in
place to assist with costs for removal and damages. However, as we move
beyond this spill, I encourage us to consider whether other agencies
with response and restoration responsibilities such as NOAA should be
eligible for a direct appropriation of funding from this critical
source.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Hon. Jane Lubchenco
Question 1. It is my understanding that past studies dumping
ballast water into the Gulf of Mexico have shown that the circulation
patterns bring water into the loop current, around the keys, and up the
east coast of Florida. Is it possible we'll see tar balls washing up on
Miami Beach in the next month? What other areas could we see impacted?
Answer. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
is closely monitoring the movement of oil from the Deepwater Horizon BP
oil spill to help guide effective preparedness, response and cleanup
efforts. The northern part of the Loop Current will sometimes ``pinch''
off from the full Loop Current, forming an isolated circular eddy. When
this happens, any oil that has become entrained in the current will
remain in a counter-clockwise eddy circulating around the Gulf of
Mexico. It is not uncommon for such an eddy to develop, or for it to
become reattached to the full Loop Current. If the eddy reconnects with
the main Loop Current, it is possible that any oil that is entrained
may reach the Florida Straits, and could be transported around the tip
of Florida and into the Gulf Stream.
Currently, the majority of the surface oil slick still remains well
north of the Loop Current, but the potential remains for more oil to
move south from the spill site toward the Loop Current. The Loop
Current is very dynamic. Using satellite imagery, ocean observations,
and aerial observations, NOAA is closely monitoring the oil slick and
the Loop Current. If a significant amount of surface oil enters the
Loop Current, NOAA will be able to detect it and will work with the
Unified Command to communicate this information.
Because both the Loop Current and Gulf Stream remain offshore, oil
carried in either current will not necessarily result in shoreline
impacts. Onshore winds or eddies would need to develop to move the oil
from the Loop Current to the shore. Oil that becomes entrained in the
Loop Current would take approximately 8-12 days to reach the Florida
Straits. It would take much longer for any oil to reach the Eastern
Seaboard, if ever. Given the time and distance traveled, it is
anticipated that any oil would disperse and weather significantly (to
the form of scattered tar balls) before reaching the East Coast. Due to
background concentrations of tar balls on the East Coast, it will
likely be difficult to specifically detect the presence of oil related
to the Deepwater Horizon BP oil spill without conducting laboratory
analyses, especially in areas north of Florida.
Question 2. Obviously your Office of Response and Restoration has
been a critically important part of the interagency response to this
spill. Your ability to forecast where the spilled oil is likely to go
in the coming days has been an invaluable resource to the National
Unified Command. If another major oil spill were to occur in U.S.
waters right now, could you provide a comparable level of response for
both spills?
Answer. NOAA's Office of Response and Restoration is fully engaged
in responding to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Although unlikely, if
another large spill were to occur simultaneously in another location
elsewhere in the United States, NOAA would have difficulty responding
to its complete ability. Currently, NOAA has every Scientific Support
Coordinator in the country working on the Deepwater Horizon BP oil
spill.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Hon. Jane Lubchenco
Question 1. As part of its criminal and civil settlements with the
Federal Government, Exxon paid hundreds-of-millions of dollars that
went toward environmental monitoring, long-term restoration, and
habitat protection after the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Would you say that
there will likely be a need for similar long-term monitoring and
protection after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill?
Answer. As a trustee for natural resources, NOAA acts on behalf of
the public pursuant to the Oil Pollution Act (OPA)--and in conjunction
with co-trustees--to: (1) assess injuries to natural resources caused
by the spill; and (2) develop and implement plans to restore injured
resources with damages recovered from the responsible parties or from
the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. Monitoring is a component of
restoration plans and is used by NOAA and co-trustees to document
restoration effectiveness and the need for possible interim corrective
action. NOAA is currently conducting intensive activities in support of
the natural resource damage assessment and will continue to do so. It
is too early to tell what specific environmental monitoring, long-term
restoration, and habitat protection will be needed following the
Deepwater Horizon BP oil spill.
Question 2. Will money spent on long-term scientific monitoring
(including money to study the underwater oil plumes) be reimbursed to
NOAA by the responsible party?
Answer. Per the Oil Pollution Act (OPA), among other costs,
responsible parties are liable for removal costs. OPA defines removal
costs as the costs of removing spilled oil from water and shorelines or
taking other actions as may be necessary to minimize or mitigate damage
to the public health or welfare, including fish, public shorelines, and
beaches. Work performed and information gathered by NOAA as part of the
oil spill mitigation and cleanup strategies at the request of the
Federal On Scene Coordinator, such as studies of the current and
forecasted position or physical characteristics of an underwater oil
plume, would fall within this definition and the costs would be
reimbursed from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. The Coast Guard's
National Pollution Funds Center would recover the removal costs from
the responsible parties under OPA. Also, under OPA, a responsible
party's liability includes NOAA's and co-trustees' reasonable costs of
assessing natural resource damages. Consequently, trustee costs
associated with identifying the nature and extent of the oil's adverse
impacts to public natural resources (e.g., sensitive coastal habitat,
threatened and endangered species, public beaches, and fishing grounds)
would be part of the Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) and
reimbursable by the responsible parties. Not all long-term studies,
however, satisfy the NRDA criteria. Longer term studies that are not
associated with determining injuries to natural resources and/or
services resulting from the spill or are not a component of a
restoration plan (as discussed above) would not be reimbursable under
the NRDA process.
Question 3. Will the government be able to force the responsible
party to cover the costs of needed oil spill related monitoring and
study five, ten, and twenty years from now?
Answer. Under the Oil Pollution Act, damages that are recoverable
by a natural resource trustee include ``the reasonable costs of
assessing the damage.'' Costs associated with understanding the impacts
of this spill to public natural resources (e.g., sensitive coastal
habitat, threatened and endangered species, public beaches, and fishing
grounds) would be part of the Natural Resource Damage Assessment and
are reimbursable to NOAA and other co-trustees. The period of time for
which assessment activities will be conducted is not known at present.
However, longer term studies that identify the nature and extent of
injuries to natural resources and services caused by the spill could
potentially be considered reasonable damage assessment costs for which
the responsible party is liable. Alternatively, longer term monitoring
and research may also be a component of a restoration plan (for which
the responsible parties are liable) as discussed in the response to
Question 1.
Question 4. On September 21, 2009, you sent a letter to the
Director of MMS expressing concerns that MMS consistently understated
the risks and impacts of oil spills in its Draft Proposed Outer
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program. When NOAA identifies
problems with MMS plans or environmental analyses, is there anything
forcing MMS to listen to you, or do they have free rein to ignore NOAA?
Does NOAA have any recourse if it thinks that MMS is allowing
activities that aren't worth the environmental risk?
Answer. As the primary Federal ocean science and management agency
that is charged with trust responsibilities over living marine
resources, NOAA is involved in the Minerals Management Service's (MMS)
multi-stage Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas process. NOAA
participates in a number of ways and under a variety of statutes, some
of which provide NOAA a more significant role than others do in the OCS
decision-making process.
Under section 18 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA),
the Secretary of the Interior is required to ``invite and consider
suggestions'' from NOAA as he develops a 5-Year Leasing Program.
Moreover, the Secretary of the Interior has a responsibility to conduct
environmental studies of any area or region included in any oil and gas
lease sale, and to include NOAA in this process to the maximum extent
practicable. OCSLA does not require MMS to adopt NOAA's comments.
There are, however, other opportunities for NOAA to play a more
central role in MMS' offshore program. NOAA's existing authorities such
as the Endangered Species Act (ESA), Marine Mammal Protection Act,
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA),
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA), and National Marine Sanctuaries Act (NMSA) apply to various
stages of the OCS process. In each stage of MMS's process, NOAA has
varying degrees of influence, depending on the specific statutory
provision. For example, MMS is required to comply with terms and
conditions stemming from a consultation (e.g., under ESA), may simply
be required to respond to NOAA if it chooses not to accept NOAA's
recommendations (e.g., Essential Fish Habitat consultations under MSA
or NMSA), or may be precluded from issuing any license or permit if the
Secretary of Commerce upholds a State objection (e.g., under CZMA).
Finally, in the case of NOAA's comments on a draft Environmental
Impact Statement under NEPA, MMS would, when preparing a final
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), be required to assess and
consider NOAA's comments, and respond by either incorporating
information from the comments into the FEIS or explain why the comments
do not warrant further agency response. If NOAA was not satisfied with
the MMS response to its comments in a FEIS, the agencies would attempt
to resolve the differences through negotiations. If the issue was
significant and resolution was not possible, NOAA would have the option
of referring it for resolution to the Council on Environmental Quality.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John F. Kerry to
Hon. Jane Lubchenco
Question. I understand that there may be gaps in international law
relating to oil spills, since existing treaties address spills from
tankers but not spills from platforms or rigs like the Deepwater
Horizon. Is that accurate? Is the Administration currently taking any
actions to address these legal gaps?
Answer. The most significant gap in international law relating to
oil spills is the fact that the United States is not a party to the Law
of the Sea Convention. The Administration strongly supports Senate
advice and consent to U.S. ratification of the Law of the Sea
Convention. With respect to the regulation of offshore drilling
activities, the U.S. domestic regime is currently the subject of
significant review and scrutiny by such bodies as the President's
Commission on the BP Oil Spill (officially known as the ``BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling Commission'').
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Claire McCaskill to
Hon. Jane Lubchenco
Question 1. The Deepwater Horizon Unified Command has been
operating a Joint Information Center (JIC) since the first days of the
spill. The JIC has and continues to receive submissions for alternative
response technology, services or products. How many submissions has the
JIC received? How many submissions have been responded to? What is the
JIC's process for vetting these submissions, and how many submissions
have been brought to the attention of JIC leadership?
Answer. The Joint Information Center is not directly involved in
receiving or reviewing submissions. Alternative response technologies
may be submitted to BP or to the Federal Government's Interagency
Alternative Technology Assessment Program (IATAP). BP has established
the Alternative Response Technology (ARTs) program to review and
evaluate suggestions. It is our understanding that BP has received more
than 40,000 proposals.
On 4 June 2010, the Coast Guard Research and Development Center
publish a Broad Agency Announcement defining the Federal Government's
Interagency Alternative Technology Assessment Program (IATAP) and
process. This process is designed to provide a well-defined,
documented, and systematic government-managed process to solicit,
screen, and evaluate all suggested technologies in support of ongoing
response activities related to the Deepwater Horizon spill. All
submittals are evaluated by the IATAP against the same criteria, which
are: (1) overall scientific and technical merit; (2) feasibility; (3)
availability; and (4) rough order magnitude cost. In addition to NOAA,
the participating Federal agencies include the Department of the
Interior, the Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, the Maritime Administration, and the U.S. Coast Guard. As
of 16 July 2010, the IATAP has received 3565 submissions. Of those, 28
are under a more detailed evaluation by the IATAP team subject matter
experts, 77 have been forwarded to the Unified Area Command (UAC) for
operational assessment, and the UAC is in the process of procuring two
of those for an operational evaluation.
Question 2. It is my understanding that Louisiana officials have
met with and reviewed alternative response technologies, including
those proposed by Show Me Energy. How closely is the JIC working with
state and local governments in reviewing alternative response
technologies? What process is in place to share information and ideas
with state and local governments?
Answer. The Joint Information Center is providing any suggestions
that they receive for review to both the Alternative Response
Technology program set up by BP and the Interagency Alternative
Technology Assessment Program, which will review all submitted
proposals (as discussed in the response to Question 1). As proposals
are approved for field application, this information is shared with
state and local governments.
Question 3. As you know, the Coast Guard has detected the presence
of dozens of ``tar balls'' approaching the Florida coast, suggesting
that the Gulf Coast oil spill has traveled throughout the Gulf Coast
region. How do you plan to determine whether these tar balls are indeed
a product of the Deepwater Horizon spill?
Answer. Tar balls reported in southern Florida have been collected
and analyzed at a laboratory to determine if the tar balls are from the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. To date, no tar balls collected in
southern Florida have originated from the Deepwater Horizon BP oil
spill.
Question 3a. In light of the failed remediation strategies that
have been tried thus far, how does the Unified Command plan to prevent
this eastward expansion of the spill?
Answer. The Unified Command will continue with an aggressive
response to mitigate the impacts from the Deepwater Horizon BP oil
spill. This includes the use of skimmers, in-situ burns, and
dispersants. The Unified Command will not relent in efforts to protect
the livelihoods of Gulf Coast residents and mitigate the environmental
impacts of this spill.
Question 4. As you know, six of the ten leading U.S. ports are
located in the Gulf of Mexico region, hosting some of the largest
tonnage ships in the Nation. At this time, the oil spill has yet to
impact barge traffic on the Mississippi River, although the spill is
approaching the river's mouth. How does your agency plan to prevent the
spill from reaching the mouth of the river, thereby maintaining the
ability to continue normal levels of barge traffic along the
Mississippi?
Answer. NOAA continues to work with our partner agencies to prevent
oil from reaching areas such as the mouth of the Mississippi River. As
part of this effort, NOAA's Office of Coast Survey has issued a caution
to mariners to identify where the spill is so that they can avoid it
where possible. NOAA's Office of Coast Survey has also supported
surveys of anchorage areas to enable the U.S. Coast Guard to clean
vessels prior to their entrance into the Mississippi River, to avoid
inadvertent transfer of oil into the river. NOAA is also frequently
updating its chart graphics of the region to ensure first responders
have the latest actual and predicted spill locations and caution areas
at hand. The goal is to help mariners and commercial shipping continue
marine transportation operations in the most normal manner possible.
Question 5. As you know, the government response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita included the contracting of services to private firms.
The Government Accountability Office, in their review of contracting
activities following these disasters, noted a lack of clearly
communicated responsibilities across agencies and jurisdictions and
insufficient numbers and inadequate deployment of personnel to provide
for effective contractor oversight. What specific activities will your
department be seeking to contract out or are you already relying on
contractors to carry out? Please explain why each activity is
appropriate for a contractor to handle. What are the preliminary cost
estimates for contracted out response activities? How does your agency
intend to work with other agencies to prevent the issues we experienced
during the Katrina response from arising in this instance? How many
personnel have been deployed to the Gulf Coast to ensure that
contractor abuses are prevented and that there is adequate oversight of
contractor performance?
Answer. NOAA is using contractors in several areas to support the
response to the Deepwater Horizon BP oil spill, and preliminary cost
estimates for those contracts is $11.2 million. NOAA's Office of
Response and Restoration is using contractor support for activities
including information management, shoreline assessment teams, data
collection during monitoring surveys, and data collection for the
Natural Resource Damage Assessment process. We do not have an estimate
for the number of personnel specifically deployed to oversee contract
performance, because many of NOAA's activities are being supported
through existing program contractors with established contractual
relationships. NOAA has mechanisms in place to oversee its contractors,
including having Federal employees on-scene with the contractors and as
Federal task leads on the contracts. Contractors are an integral part
of how NOAA operates, and NOAA has a strong track record with contract
oversight and does not foresee problems with its contract oversight.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Hon. Jane Lubchenco
Question 1. There have been some reports of tar balls washing up on
the shore along the Gulf coast, but for the most part the oil has
stayed offshore. Is that correct? If so, what is the primary reason the
bulk of the oil has not washed ashore?
Answer. There have been widespread shoreline impacts from the BP
Deepwater Horizon oil spill from Louisiana to the Florida panhandle.
These impacts range from heavy oiling to scattered tarballs. Shoreline
Cleanup Assessment Teams (SCAT) are surveying shorelines daily to
assess impacts and provide specific guidance to the Unified Command on
where and how to conduct cleanup activities.
There are a number of factors that have prevented the bulk of the
oil from washing ashore and reduced the shoreline impacts including:
aggressive removal activities at sea, such as skimming and burning;
application of dispersants; natural removal processes, sometimes called
weathering; and the fact that the oil was released at great water
depths.. Natural removal processes, such as evaporation, photo-
oxidation and biodegradation, are going on continuously. In addition,
currents and winds have helped keep oil offshore, thereby resulting in
longer times for these natural removal processes to act on the oil and
eliminate it from the environment naturally. The release of oil from
great water depths has resulted in a wide range of droplet sizes, and
the very smallest droplet sizes do not rise to the surface very
quickly. The smaller the droplet, the larger the relative surface area,
which allows for higher than normal rates of biodegradation as the
droplet rises. At these great depths, droplets are more susceptible to
dissolving in the water column because of the high pressure. Smaller
droplets also rise more slowly providing a longer time for natural
removal processes to take place. The very smallest droplets (less than
100 microns, the size of a pin head) move and are diluted within the
deep water, and therefore we believe these droplets will degrade before
they would ever become available for shoreline impact. Ongoing
modeling, sampling, and analyses will continue to improve our
understanding of oil removal rates from these natural and depth-
associated processes.
For oil that has reached surf zones near environments dominated by
fine to medium-grain sand beaches, the sand mixes with the oil forming
tar mats that tend to remain offshore and below the sea surface. NOAA
is closely monitoring the movement of these tar mats and residual oil
from the BP Deepwater Horizon spill to help guide our response and
cleanup efforts and to protect natural resources.
Question 2. According to press reports, computer models show the
oil may have already seeped into a powerful ``Loop Current,'' which
could propel it into the Atlantic Ocean. Is this the case with the
models you have seen? How reliable are these models?
Answer. NOAA continues to closely monitor the BP Deepwater Horizon
oil spill slick's proximity to the Loop Current in the Gulf of Mexico
to provide coastal states timely and useful information about the
spill. The Loop Current is a surface current. The well was capped in
mid-July, and because little surface oil remains, we do not believe the
Loop Current will transport oil to the Atlantic Ocean.
When the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill began, the Loop Current was
in its classic configuration, with its northern boundary approximately
60 miles from the spill site. About a month after the accident, a
counter clockwise eddy formed along its northeast boundary that served
to move some of the surface slick toward the Loop Current. Most of that
slick appeared to stay primarily in the counter-clockwise eddy, rather
than entering the main Loop Current. There were a number of models,
including NOAA's trajectory models, that showed a sheen of oil entering
the main Loop Current. Subsequent areal observations detected a sheen
of oil within the Loop Current, thus confirming the reliability of the
models. In addition, oil sampled by a ship in the vicinity of the
boundary between the Loop Current and this counter-clockwise eddy
matched the BP Deepwater Horizon oil ``fingerprint.'' However, there
has been no surface oil sheen detected in that region since June 9,
2010. Furthermore, no oil has been found anywhere else in the Loop
Current system that has been identified as oil derived from the BP
Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
Around May 24, 2010, the northern portion of the Loop Current
``pinched off,'' forming an eddy named ``Eddy Franklin.'' For the
following 6 weeks, Eddy Franklin and the Loop Current showed varying
levels of connectivity. Currently, Eddy Franklin appears to be cleanly
separated from the Loop Current, and will likely migrate to the west
over the next few months. The Loop Current will slowly begin to extend
again to the north over that time. Until the Loop Current fully reforms
(months from now), there is no clear pathway to bring surface oil from
the northern Gulf to the Florida Straits, south Florida, and beyond.
NOAA will continue to monitor the Loop Current as long as floating oil
remains.
Question 3. How much oil is leaking each day? If BP's siphon riser
is successful, how much oil will be leaking by the end of the month?
Answer. On August 2, 2010, the National Incident Command's Flow
Rate Technical Group, which is composed of U.S. Government and
independent scientists, estimated that a total of 4.9 million barrels
of oil was released into the ocean with an uncertainty of plus or minus
10 percent. The average oil flow rate ranged from 53,000 to 62,000
thousand barrels per day where the flow rate decreased with time due to
reservoir depletion. Because 0.8 million barrels were collected or
burned, the total amount of oil that polluted the ocean was
approximately--4.1 million barrels.
The well was successfully capped on July 15, 2010. On August 5, the
well was cemented and currently (mid-August) there is no oil leaking
into the Gulf of Mexico from the Macondo 252 #1 well. A relief well
remains on track to complete the procedures to kill and finally seal
the well within the next few weeks.
Question 4. What is the best case scenario in terms of
environmental and economic damage caused by this oil spill? What is the
worst case scenario?
Answer. It is still too early to know the full scope of the damage
assessment associated with the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and
therefore it is not possible to comment on the best and worst case
scenarios at this time. NOAA and co-trustees are collecting data in the
Gulf of Mexico and across the five Gulf states (Texas, Louisiana,
Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida). NOAA and co-trustees are concerned
about potential short and long-term impacts to fish, shellfish, marine
mammals, sea turtles, birds, and other sensitive resources, including
impacts to their habitats, such as wetlands, beaches, bottom sediments,
and the water column. The data collected will be used to determine what
natural resources have been injured and what human uses have been lost
due to the spill, pursuant to the natural resource damage assessment
and restoration process established by the Oil Pollution Act and
Federal implementing regulations.
The effects of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill on natural
resources are dependent on multiple factors including oil composition,
oil quantity, dispersal techniques, and contact with organisms.
Offshore oil can impact approximately the upper several meters of the
water column, mixed layer deep water, and the sea floor. When the oil
moves onshore, the shoreline, nearshore waters, and coastal habitats
may be impacted.
The extent of damage to the Gulf ecosystem's commercial and
recreational fishing and related industries (restaurants, processors,
tourism, etc.) is dependent on how long and how much oil is dispersed
into the Gulf.
Question 5. In terms of the government response, what have we
learned the past few days to be better prepared to respond to a
deepwater oil spill such as the one we are experiencing now in the
Gulf?
Answer. Science is essential for effective decision-making to
minimize the economic impacts and mitigate the effects of oil spills on
coastal and marine resources and associated communities. The BP
Deepwater Horizon oil spill has underscored the need for prioritizing
research on the environmental impacts of dispersants, 3-dimensional
modeling, fate and transport of oil at deep depths, medium and long
term forecasting of oil fates, techniques for communicating risk to the
public, long-term impacts of oil on shorelines, and improved clean-up
and restoration methods. A better understanding of how deep oil behaves
and disperses within the water column would help support future
response efforts. NOAA would be pleased to work with the Committee on
ideas to increase response capacity and capabilities, improve response
tools and technologies, and focus on oil spill-related research.
The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill has also increased awareness and
reinforced the need for NOAA to be prepared to respond quickly to
environmental disaster impacts that affect fisheries and protected
resources, such as dolphins and sea turtles.
Question 6. Has either of your agencies received any Freedom of
Information requests with regards to this incident? If so, can you
provide a summary of those requests?
Answer. As of August 16, 2010, NOAA has received 35 FOIA requests
relating to the April 20, 2010, BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The
requests were submitted by a variety of public interest groups,
including the news media, private citizens, state government,
researchers, and ocean advocacy non-profit organizations that focus on
water/beach quality, fisheries and fish habitat, and marine
sanctuaries.
The following is a summary of the various types of information
requested:
1. News Media Requests: 15 requests were received seeking:
Computerized records relating to the DH incident and oil
spills in 2008;
Correspondence among Coast Guard, BP, PLC and NOAA;
Test results of water samples collected by NOAA in the
Gulf region;
Records regarding the DH incident between NOAA personnel,
academic and administrative staff;
Records of consultations in 2008-10 between NOAA and
Minerals Management Service regarding offshore drilling in
the Gulf;
Records regarding the testing of fish, shellfish and sea
life in the Gulf of Mexico;
Correspondence between NOAA and Members of Congress
pertaining to the DH incident.
The sensory assessors being trained/assigned to evaluate
seafood sampling;
Correspondence since April 20, 2010 about the use of
dispersants for the BP oil spill;
Communications related to the production and disclosure of
the report BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Budget: What Happened
to the Oil;
Correspondence pertaining to NOAA's response to three BP
FOIA requests, submitted by another news media outlet, and
All correspondence pertaining to NOAA's response to three
more BP FOIA requests, submitted by another news media
outlet;
A copy of all documents on the results of a field test
conducted by NOAA earlier this year on commercial sorbent
boom that determined that it absorbed more oil and less
water than hair boom.
2. Public Interest and Non-Governmental Organizations: 13 requests
were received seeking:
Information on potential ecological impacts associated
with deepwater drilling spills in the Gulf and information
on past oil spills in this region;
All communications with Minerals Management Service on
marine mammals and oil and gas drilling on the outer
continental shelf in relation to Shell Oil;
Requests for records relating to live video feed of the
oil spill provided by BP;
Records on what EPA and/or environmental organizations
were urging relating to the burning of oil.
Sample data of Louisiana crude from the Deepwater Horizon
well and procedures, policies, and plans relating to
monitoring fish and seafood contamination;
Correspondence relating to necropsies conducted on sea
turtles found in the Gulf of Mexico between April 1, 2009
and the time the FOIA is processed including Gulf sea
turtles conducted by Dr. Brian Stacy;
Communications regarding turtles being killed during
controlled oil burns in the Gulf of Mexico following the BP
oil disaster;
Communications that mention 23 endangered and threatened
species of concern in the Gulf region following the BP
Deepwater Horizon oil spill;
Details of all meetings within NOAA and between NOAA and
BP regarding underwater or subsurface oil plumes;
Internal correspondence regarding NOAA/Partner missions:
NOAA Ship Gordon Mission 1; and NOAA ship Thomas Jefferson
Mission 2;
Documents generated by an official or NOAA employee
regarding the Gulf Incident Budget Tool Report dated August
1, 2010;
Meetings between NOAA and the University of Florida
regarding underwater subsurface oil plumes for the period
of April 20, 2010 to present, and
3. Law Firms: 1 request was received from a law firm seeking:
Records relating to health issues, focusing on oil and
other exposures by spill responders and the public.
4. Private Citizens: 6 requests were received seeking:
Information on oil rig incidents dating from 1952-3;
Information of the Deepwater oil spill and oil spills of
similar size in the U.S.;
Raw video feed from the underwater response at the
Deepwater rig;
All data collected by NOAA, including research reports, on
the Deepwater spill;
Request for an Executive Summary published on June 3,
2010.
A copy of the FOIA log for all Deepwater FOIA requests
that discusses the consequences for marine and wildlife
habitats or expansion predictions.
5. States: 1 request was received seeking:
Information on potential ecological impacts relating to
deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. David Vitter to
Hon. Jane Lubchenco
Question 1. Why hasn't a fisheries failure been declared under
Magnuson-Stevens, and when will it be?
Answer. On May 24, 2010, the Secretary of Commerce declared a
fishery resource disaster caused by the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill
resulting in commercial fishery failures off Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Alabama. On June 2, 2010, the Secretary extended the May 24, 2010,
declaration to include Florida.
Question 2. Why hasn't the President set up a fisheries loan
program as mandated by section 2713(f) of the Oil Pollution Act, and
when will he?
Answer. Section 2713(f) of the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) provides the
President the authority to establish a loan program under the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) to provide financial assistance to
fisherman and aquaculture producers affected by oil spills. Transfer of
this authority has not been made to the Department of Commerce or NOAA.
The OSLTF is managed by the Department of Homeland Security, the United
States Coast Guard, and the National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC).
Please refer this question to the NPFC who can provide information on
this topic.
Federal loan assistance is available though the U.S. Small Business
Administration (SBA). SBA has established an emergency loan program
with low interest rates to businesses affected by the spill. The SBA
loan program is at 4 percent interest (relatively low) and up to 30
year maturity (longer than authorized under the OPA loan program).
Question 3. When will the Federal Government approve some version
of the emergency dredging/barrier island plan presented by Louisiana
more than a week ago? Can you work with the Army Corps to get this plan
approved immediately?
Answer. It is the responsibility of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers to issue the emergency permit allowing the construction of
the proposed sand berms. NOAA, as well as other Federal agencies,
provided an environmental review of, and comments on, the permit
application submitted by the State of Louisiana. On May 27, 2010, the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers authorized the permit for a six berm
``pilot'' and the State of Louisiana signed the permit for the six
berms on June 3, 2010.
Question 4. When will the Coast Guard, NOAA, BP, and other agency
partners have a more precise estimate of oil flow from the well in
light of the piping being successfully attached?
Answer. On August 2, 2010, the National Incident Command's Flow
Rate Technical Group, which is composed of U.S. Government and
independent scientists, estimated that a total of 4.9 million barrels
of oil was released into the ocean with an uncertainty of plus or minus
10 percent. The average oil flow rate ranged from 53,000 to 62,000
thousand barrels per day where the flow rate decreased with time due to
reservoir depletion. Because 0.8 million barrels were collected or
burned, the total amount of oil that polluted the ocean was
approximately 4.1 million barrels.
The well was successfully capped on July 15, 2010. On August 5, the
well was cemented and currently (mid-August), there is no oil leaking
into the Gulf of Mexico from the Macondo 252 #1 well. A relief well
remains on track to complete the procedures to kill and finally seal
the well within the next few weeks.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
Hon. Jane Lubchenco
Question 1. What NOAA assets are being used in this response?
Answer. Over the past several months, NOAA has provided scientific
and technical support to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill response,
both on-scene and through our headquarters and regional offices. NOAA
ships are monitoring the conditions at the wellhead using its
specialized acoustic systems. NOAA's support includes daily
trajectories of the spilled oil, weather data to support short- and
long-range forecasts, and hourly localized ``spot'' forecasts to
determine the use of weather dependent mitigation techniques such as
oil burns and chemical dispersion applications. NOAA develops custom
navigation products and updated charts to help keep mariners out of oil
areas. NOAA uses satellite imagery and real-time observational data on
the tides and currents to predict and verify oil spill location and
movement. To ensure the safety of fishermen and consumer seafood
safety, NOAA has closed oil-impacted areas to commercial fishing. NOAA
scientists are in the spill area taking water and seafood samples to
determine which areas are safe for commercial fishing. NOAA will reopen
these areas only if it is assured that fish products within the closed
area meet the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) standards for public
health and wholesomeness. To that end, NOAA, in conjunction with FDA,
has agreed upon a reopening protocol based on both chemical and sensory
analysis of seafood within the closed area; NOAA continues to work with
the FDA and the States to modify this protocol as necessary. NOAA's
marine animal health experts are providing expertise and assistance
with stranded sea turtles and marine mammals. NOAA is flying multi-
spectral scanning missions over the spill to determine oil density and
thickness, and has dedicated ship and aircraft assets to determine the
influence of the Gulf of Mexico Loop Current on transporting the oil
outside of the Gulf of Mexico. The influence of the Loop Current and
the presence of submerged oil plumes are areas of ongoing research that
NOAA and its Federal and academic partners are investigating.
Question 2. What resources does NOAA have to rescue and
rehabilitate animals that could be stranded? Are these resources
sufficient for your response?
Answer. Through the Unified Command, NOAA is working with the
existing stranding response network in the Gulf of Mexico and has
established primary rehabilitation care facilities; four for sea
turtles and three for marine mammals including dolphins and manatees.
NOAA has established secondary facilities for extended care outside
the oil spill event area. NOAA has also set up contracts with stranding
organizations across the Nation to assist with stranding response in
the Gulf of Mexico. Additionally, NOAA is establishing a contract with
the Association for Zoos and Aquariums to assist with veterinary care
and husbandry capacity.
With the completion of the new contracts, NOAA will greatly
increase the stranding response and rehabilitation capacity in the Gulf
of Mexico. This increased capacity is critical and should be sufficient
to support NOAA's response.
Question 3. As the potential for marine mammal injury and stranding
grows due to the oil spill, will Gulf-based rehabilitation facilities
be fully considered in aiding their recovery?
Answer. Yes, NOAA will continue to work with the pre-existing
stranding network and partners to increase emergency care and
rehabilitation capacity in the Gulf of Mexico.
Question 4. The continued release of oil into the Gulf of Mexico
has resulted in a Federal fishery closure that began May 2, 2010, which
has since expanded to encompass 20 percent of the Gulf of Mexico being
closed to recreational and commercial fishing. Will NMFS estimate the
economic loss incurred by this closure? When will these estimates be
available?
Answer. NOAA continues to monitor the presence of oil in the Gulf
of Mexico and adjust the areas closed to fishing accordingly. NOAA has
re-opened a total of more than 31,000 square miles of Federal waters in
the Gulf of Mexico after conducting sensory and chemical analysis of
fish in these areas. On July 22, NOAA re-opened 26, 388 square miles of
water to commercial and recreational fishing and another 5,144 square
miles on August 10, 2010. The current fishery closed area in the Gulf
of Mexico totals 52,395 square miles or approximately 22 percent of the
Gulf of Mexico Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), this is down from 84,101
square miles and approximately 37 percent of the Federal waters of the
Gulf EEZ which was the size of the closed area at its peak on July 12,
2010. NOAA is confident that commercial and recreational fishing
activities can safely occur in the areas that were re-opened or never
closed and that the fish harvested from the area are safe to consume.
The presence of oil and resulting fishery closures have affected
recreational fishermen, the charter and party boat industry and its
associated shore-side businesses, and the commercial fishing industry,
including fishermen, dealers, processors, and others. Because the
extent of impacts still is being monitored, we are unable to provide
estimates of the effects of the oil spill on recreational and
commercial fishing at this time.
Commercial fishery data collected by the states and NOAA can be
used to monitor the effects of the oil spill on commercial fishing
activities by examining historical landings and dockside revenues by
month and state in the closed areas. Making an assessment of short-term
economic losses at this time would only be an approximation, because
the boundaries of the closed area continue to change and any closed
area boundaries would not exactly match the boundaries of the
statistical reporting areas used to record where fishing activity takes
place. Some fishermen may mitigate the effects of the closures by
shifting their fishing effort to other areas that are still open. This
effect will be assessed as data for 2010 become available for analysis.
The NOAA Marine Recreational Information Program (MRIP) collects
information about recreational fishing effort and catches. Beginning on
June 1, 2010, the MRIP increased its sampling intensity of the charter
industry to provide more timely and localized tracking of changes in
charter boat fishing effort in the Gulf of Mexico that may be related
to the oil spill. Better tracking has been made possible by
substantially increasing the number of captain interviews conducted by
the weekly For-Hire Surveys in each state and by producing fishing
effort statistics at weekly rather than bimonthly intervals.
As part of the Natural Resources Damage Assessment process, NOAA's
Office of Response and Restoration is evaluating the value of lost
public use associated with the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill,
including recreational activities such as fishing, beach visitation,
and other public uses, pursuant to the natural resource damage
assessment and restoration process established by the Oil Pollution Act
and Federal implementing regulations. As such, NOAA will develop an
estimate of economic losses associated with the fisheries closures due
to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. At this time, we do not have an
estimate for when these analyses will be completed.
The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill also has the potential to have
lasting effects on recreational and commercial fishing. The presence of
oil may increase natural mortality of fish and shellfish, reduce
spawning potential and reproduction, and reduce the carrying capacity
of their habitats. Each of these potential outcomes affects the fishery
resources upon which recreational and commercial fisheries, their
infrastructure, and communities depend. Additional research is required
to assess the long-term effects of oil on the marine ecosystem, fishery
biomass, and allowable harvests over time as fishery resources recover.
Question 5. Will the reduced fishing effort in the Gulf caused by
Federal fishery closures be taken into account when setting any of the
following year's total allowable catch?
Answer. The Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council specifies the
total allowable catch (TAC) of fish stocks based on scientific
assessments and the fishing level recommendations of its Scientific and
Statistical Committee. The TAC specifies the allowable level of
removals on an annual basis and is generally specified over a multi-
year timeframe. Fishery regulations do not provide for the carrying
forward of unused quota to the following year's TAC.
NOAA does take into account changes in fishing effort when
considering specification of the TAC and the time-frame within which
the TAC will be harvested. Fishing effort data are considered in
scientific assessments that generally are conducted every 3-5 years for
major species and less frequently for other species. Prior to scheduled
stock assessments, the Council and NOAA consider new scientific
information as it becomes available and, if appropriate, based upon the
best scientific information and statutory and regulatory authorities,
may consider adjustments to management measures.
Commercial fishermen report fishing effort estimates on logbooks,
and NOAA collects effort information on recreational fisheries through
surveys and dockside sampling. In response to the oil spill, NOAA has
worked collaboratively with the Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission
and the state fishery agencies of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and
Florida to improve the precision and timeliness of recreational data
collection to help us better understand the potential impacts of the
Federal closure on recreational fishing effort. Specifically, NOAA
increased the number of charter captain interviews conducted by the
weekly For-Hire Survey in each state and we are working together to
collect, enter, and process those data more rapidly, in order to
provide fishing effort statistics at weekly, rather than bi-monthly,
intervals. Additionally, we have added questions to the surveys to
obtain information on fishing trip cancellations directly related to
the oil spill. This information will be used to help determine whether
fishermen are harvesting species, such as red snapper and greater
amberjack, as quickly as projected or whether extended seasons may be
warranted.
Question 6. If the subsurface plume, which you described as a mist
is confirmed to be oil, are there potentially other subsurface oil
plumes present in the Gulf?
Answer. There are natural oil seeps in the Gulf of Mexico that
could potentially lead to areas of dispersed oil. NOAA is continuing a
comprehensive analysis to define the presence of oil below the surface
from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. NOAA is conducting analyses to
determine if any oil detected below the surface is the same
``fingerprint'' as the Deepwater Horizon source.
Question 6a. How would impacts of subsurface oil plumes on Gulf
fisheries differ from impacts of surface oil?
Answer. In Federal waters, species that use the surface would be
most impacted by the early stages of the oil spill. When oil weathers
to tar, it can become denser than water and potentially sink to where
the bottom-oriented fish community may be impacted. In general, the 42
reef fish species managed by NOAA in the Gulf of Mexico are often found
in bottom areas with high relief, such as coral reefs, artificial
reefs, and rocky hardbottom surfaces. If the oil slick reaches the
bottom or nearshore/inshore areas, a majority of the reef fish species
could be affected. Some reef fish spawn in spring, and their eggs and
larvae are usually planktonic; carried by currents rather than through
their own control. These larvae would not be able to avoid or escape
the oil if currents brought them together. Sargassum mats are nursery
habitat for some species, including gray triggerfish and amberjacks.
Oil that intersects Sargassum mats could affect these species. In state
waters, all coastal species could be affected if the oil spill reaches
nearshore waters. In addition, shrimp larvae usually spend the early
months of their life in inshore waters before migrating toward the
ocean. Brown shrimp postlarvae migrate from February to April, and
white shrimp begin their migration from May through November.
Additionally, during the spring and summer months, several Gulf
shark species use coastal habitats as nursery areas. When oil reaches
any of the coastal areas where these species occur, they could also be
affected. In addition, the oil slick and the chemicals and methods used
to clean up the oil may have an effect on other non-commercial and non-
recreational marine species including whales, dolphins, and sea
turtles.
Question 7. Will subsurface plumes be tracked similarly to ongoing
efforts to track surface oil?
Answer. Since the beginning of May, NOAA has been conducting and
coordinating sampling of the sub-surface region around the well-head
and beyond to characterize the presence of subsurface oil. The sub-
surface search involves the use of sonar, UV instruments called
fluorometers, which can detect the presence of oil and other biological
compounds, and collection of water samples from discrete depths using a
series of bottles that can be closed around a discrete water sample.
NOAA's independent analysis of water samples provided from the May
22-28 research mission of the University of South Florida's R/V
Weatherbird II confirmed the presence of low concentrations of sub-
surface oil from the Deepwater Horizon spill 40 nautical miles
northeast of the wellhead. Additionally, hydrocarbons were found in
samples 45 nautical miles northeast of the wellhead-at the surface, at
50 meters, and at 400 meters-however, the concentrations were too low
to confirm the source. NOAA's analysis of the presence of subsurface
oil determined that the concentration of oil is in the range of less
than 0.5 parts per million, and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH)
levels in range of parts per trillion. In all samples, PAH levels were
below eco-toxicological benchmarks for marine waters.
The NOAA Ship Thomas Jefferson conducted an eight-day research
mission to investigate the presence and distribution of subsurface oil
from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The mission collected water
samples for chemical analysis to help find potential pockets of
subsurface oil clouds. Chemical analysis of the water samples is
underway to determine if oil is present in the water, in what
concentrations, and to identify the source of any oil that is found.
On June 23, 2010, NOAA, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy released a
summary report about the subsea monitoring in the vicinity of the
Deepwater Horizon wellhead conducted from the R/V Brooks McCall from
May 8-25, 2010. The report confirms the existence of a previously
discovered cloud of diffuse oil at depths of 3,300 to 4,600 feet near
the wellhead. Preliminary findings indicate that total petroleum
hydrocarbon concentrations at these depths are in concentrations of
about 1-2 parts per million (ppm). Between that depth and the surface
mix layer, which is defined as 450 feet below the surface,
concentrations fell to levels that were not readily discernable from
background levels. The test's detection limit is about 0.8 ppm.
Analyses also show that this cloud is most concentrated near the source
of the leak and decreases with distance from the wellhead. Beyond six
miles from the wellhead, concentrations of this cloud drop to levels
that are not detectable. The full report from the Brooks McCall mission
is available on http://www.noaa.gov/sciencemissions/bpoilspill.html.
Additional missions are being developed to continue as part of a
comprehensive analysis to define the presence of oil below the surface.
Question 8. Has NOAA suggested changes to existing law related to
fishery disasters relief? If so, please provide any recommended changes
to the current fisheries disaster relief process.
Answer. NOAA has not proposed any statutory changes to the current
disaster provisions in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act or the Interjurisdictional Fisheries Act.
Question 9. You described out-of-date maps used to determine most
threatened habitats. When were these maps in Mississippi and Louisiana
last updated?
Answer. Environmental Sensitivity Index (ESI) maps provide
information that helps reduce the environmental, economic, and social
impacts from oil and hazardous substance spills. Spill responders use
NOAA's ESI maps as tools to identify priority areas to protect from
spreading oil, develop cleanup strategies to minimize impacts to the
environment and coastal communities, and reduce overall cleanup costs.
Mississippi's ESI maps were last updated in 2010, and Louisiana's ESI
maps were last updated in 2003.
Question 9a. Did NOAA make any efforts to update these maps post-
Katrina?
Answer. NOAA updated Mississippi's ESI maps in 2010. NOAA has not
been able to update Louisiana's ESI maps since Hurricane Katrina. The
development of ESI maps has most often been accomplished by using a
variety of funding sources, both Federal and state. The President's FY
2011 Request includes $19.5 million for the Office of Response and
Restoration, which will allow NOAA to update one ESI atlas (pending
final appropriations). NOAA's goal is to update ESI maps, on average,
every 10 years. At present, 21 of 50 ESI Atlases are greater than 10
years old (including the Great Lakes).
Question 9b. Would a large hurricane, such as Hurricane Katrina,
necessitate review of these types of maps?
Answer. Hurricanes can cause significant changes to shorelines and
habitats. While NOAA's goal is to update ESI maps, on average, every 10
years, events such as hurricanes can necessitate more frequent updates.
It is important that spill responders have accurate ESI maps to support
decision-making during a response.
Question 9c. What would be required to update these maps and how
long would such an effort take?
Answer. The estimated cost to update the ESI Atlases that are 10 or
more years old is approximately $11.0 million. The cost to update
Louisiana's ESI's is approximately $600,000.
Question 10. What regulatory or statutory hurdles have you
encountered in the ongoing response?
Answer. The existing regulatory and statutory framework has worked
well over the years. It is difficult to create a regulatory regime that
applies equally well despite the size, location, and other unique
characteristics of each oil spill. At this time, NOAA remains
completely engaged in the ongoing response and has not undertaken an
in-depth evaluation of every challenge that has presented itself. We
are tracking such occurrences and will conduct a more detailed analysis
in the future.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Admiral Thad Allen
Question 1. You have likened the National Incident Command's
efforts to respond to this oil spill to our being at war. We're
essentially working around the clock to stop an enemy invader from
reaching our coasts and plundering our resources.
You're really the combatant commander here--what is our best line
of attack or defense against this oil spill, and are there lessons
learned already about how we keep this from happening again?
Answer. Unprecedented in its scope, complexity, and indeterminate
nature, the spill has required an extraordinary unified response across
all levels of government, industry and the communities of five Gulf
Coast states, the entire United States and the international community.
An Incident Command System was quickly established to coordinate this
massive operation. The response community galvanized their efforts
under a common framework provided by the National Contingency Plan.
This framework, developed over the last four decades, enables the Coast
Guard and our Federal Government partners to respond to these
catastrophes in a way that leverages the strengths of private industry
under the leadership of a Federal On-Scene Coordinator.
From the start, objectives have remained constant and clear: stop
the leak, fight the spill offshore, protect environmentally sensitive
areas, and mitigate the effects on the environment, the economy, and
the local communities. The spill has highlighted the need for building
resiliency into our Nation's critical infrastructure so we are better
prepared to respond to system failures and prevent spills of national
significance from occurring in the future.
Question 2. Every 3 years, the Coast Guard sponsors a Spill of
National Significance (SONS) drill to sharpen the Nation's ability to
respond to major oil spill events. By coincidence, the most recent one
to occur was March of this year, off the coast of New England. Do you
believe the response to the Gulf Coast spill has been aided at all by
the fact that the SONS drill just occurred 2 months ago?
Answer. Yes, the Spill of National Significance (SONS) 2010
exercise objectives and sub-objectives directly correlate with the Gulf
of Mexico Oil Spill response actions at the national, regional, and
local levels.
The following notable achievements realized during the SONS 2010
exercise relate to the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico:
1. The rapid stand up and efficient functioning of the Unified
Area Command and Unified Commands,
2. The first National Incident Commander (NIC) training seminar
which fostered important national level discussions and helped
raise awareness of senior leadership concerns, and
3. Employed SONS response management policy that describes the
roles and responsibilities of the NIC and NIC assist team.
The current response has built upon the achievements listed above
and has further matured the Nation's understanding of the roles and
responsibilities at all levels of the response operation, local
Incident Commands, regional Area Command, and NIC.
Question 3. Do you see any potential value in increasing the
frequency of this exercise to better prepare us for future Spills of
National Significance?
Answer. No. Due to the extraordinary coordination and scope of a
full scale SONS exercise, it would be difficult to effectively sponsor
a SONS full scale exercise more often than triennially. Similarly, the
frequency of the exercise allows sufficient opportunity to craft and
disseminate lessons learned, and allow for incorporation into
operational plans where appropriate.
Question 4. It seems to me that knowing how much oil is coming out
of this well is pretty important. I mean, how can you prepare a
response to a problem when you don't even know the parameters of that
problem? What role has the CG played in estimating the flow rate of the
leak? As the National Incident Commander, don't you need to know how
much oil is flowing out of those pipes in order to gauge the response
effort?
Answer. The National Incident Commander (NIC) established a Flow
Rate Technical Group (FRTG) led by the United States Geological Survey
(USGS) and comprised of members of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
Regulations and Enforcement; National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA); Department of Energy (DOE); the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA); and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG).
The FRTG has developed a Preliminary Assessment Report that
estimates the flow rate. As additional methods to secure the source of
the spill are initiated, the FRTG will evaluate any potential temporary
increase or decrease in flow rate that results from such tactics and
will provide any additional assessments as they become available.
Question 5. On April 29, 9 days after the explosion, Secretary
Napolitano declared this incident to be a Spill of National
Significance (SONS), enabling the appointment of you as the National
Incident Commander to coordinate response resources at the national
level. Why did it take 9 days for the SONS to be declared? Would an
earlier SONS declaration have changed the response effort in any way?
Answer. On Saturday, April 24, BP found the first two leaks in the
riser from the sunken Deepwater Horizon rig and alerted the Federal
Government. The first three equipment staging locations were quickly
established along the Gulf Coast. Additional personnel and vessels were
deployed to the area through the Federal On-Scene Coordinator's Unified
Command. Controlled burns of oil on the surface at the incident site
began on Wednesday, April 28. These controlled burns were successful in
removing oil from the surface at that time and containing the
discharge. Later that day, BP discovered a third discharge point on the
sea floor.
On Thursday, April 29, the Deepwater Horizon discharge event was
designated a Spill of National Significance (SONS) pursuant to 40 CFR
300.323. The practical effect of a SONS designation is the triggering
of authority to designate a National Incident Commander (NIC) who is
responsible under 40 CFR 300.323 for communicating with affected
parties and the public, and coordinating Federal, state, local, and
international resources at the national level.
The Deepwater Horizon SONS declaration built upon the operational
and policy coordination already established from the beginning of the
response. The SONS declaration did not affect the authority of the
Coast Guard or any other Federal agency to direct assets to the site of
the incident or the authority of the FOSC.
Question 6. Organotin-based anti-fouling coatings such as
tributyltin (TBT) are highly toxic to the marine environment and may
pose unreasonable risks to the aquatic life. In 2001, the International
Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems was adopted
by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and entered into force
internationally in 2008 to prohibit the new application of harmful
coatings containing organotins. This Convention also imposed an
international requirement that organotins be removed from hulls or that
an over-coat be applied to the ship's hull to prevent leaching. H.R.
3618, the Clean Hull Act of 2009 will bring U.S. laws into compliance
with this Convention. What impact will this legislation have on U.S.
ship owners and operators, the marine paint and coatings industry,
shipyards, recreational boaters, and the average fishing vessel owner?
As the Commandant of the Coast Guard, do you support it?
Answer. The Coast Guard defers to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), the agency charged with the administration of current law
(i.e., the Organotin Antifouling Paint Control Act of 1988 (33 U.S.C.
2401)), with regard to the impact of H.R. 3618 on industry--
specifically, on the marine paint and coatings industry.
That said, the Coast Guard anticipates that the impact of the
legislation on those segments of the economy it regulates (e.g.,
vessels and vessel owners/operators) will be minimal. Under existing
law, vessels must demonstrate compliance by certification (or
alternative documentation); similarly, under H.R. 3618, vessels must
demonstrate compliance and obtain certain certificates (or the
appropriate equivalent) from the Secretary of the department in which
the Coast Guard is operating. Compliance under the H.R. 3618 regime may
be demonstrated via paint receipts or contractor invoices provided by
the shipyard or vessel operator. Currently, class societies are issuing
statements of fact attesting to compliance with the International
Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems, 2001 (the
Convention).
Question 7. The use of organotin anti-fouling systems was
prohibited on small vessels and the sale, purchase and application of
anti-fouling paint containing organotins was banned in the U.S. under
the Organotin Anti-fouling Paint Control Act of 1988. However, the
United States currently does not have the authority to prohibit foreign
vessels from using organotin-based anti-fouling coatings from entering
our waters. The Clean Hull Act would expand the application of existing
prohibitions to all ships, regardless of size. How will the Coast Guard
ensure that all vessels entering U.S. waters are in compliance with the
Clean Hull Act?
Answer. With regard to flag state inspections (U.S. vessels),
verification will be carried out during routine vessel inspections. For
inspected vessels, the Coast Guard will verify compliance during annual
inspections and issue International Antifouling System Certificates, as
appropriate, during a ship's drydock exam.
With regard to port state control examinations of foreign vessels,
the Coast Guard may examine such vessels, subject to port state
control, during regular port state control examinations. These exams
would include that vessels hold valid International Antifouling System
Certificates.
Question 8. The Clean Hull Act of 2009 would mandate vessels of at
least 400 gross tons engaged in international voyages to carry an
International Antifouling System Certificate. Smaller vessels would
need a declaration that the antifouling system on the vessel complies
with the International Convention. Is the Coast Guard properly staffed
to be able to enforce this certificate or declaration requirement?
Answer. With regard to flag state inspections (U.S. vessels), the
Coast Guard would likely delegate/authorize classification societies to
issue the International Antifouling System Certificate. Even so, the
program management, tracking, and verification of certificates or
declarations will impose some additional burden on existing Coast Guard
resources. Additional analysis will be needed to determine whether
additional personnel would be needed to implement this requirement.
Port state control examinations of foreign vessels, compliance
verifications also will impose some additional burden on existing
resources. Additional analysis will be needed to determine whether
additional personnel would be needed to implement this requirement.
Question 9. There are many anti-fouling alternatives to organotin-
based anti-fouling systems, such as copper, that are far less toxic to
the marine environment. Do you think these alternatives are equally
effective?
Answer. The Coast Guard defers to the Environmental Protection
Agency as to the effectiveness and toxicity of alternative to
organotin-based anti-fouling systems.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Claire McCaskill to
Admiral Thad Allen
Question 1. The Deepwater Horizon Unified Command has been
operating a Joint Information Center (JIC) since the first days of the
spill. The JIC has and continues to receive submissions for alternative
response technology, services or products. How many submissions has the
JIC received? How many submissions have been responded to? What is the
JIC's process for vetting these submissions, and how many submissions
have been brought to the attention of JIC leadership?
Answer. On June 4, 2010, a formal Interagency Alternative
Technology Assessment Program (IATAP) process began with the issuance
of a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) on the Federal Business
Opportunities (FedBizOpps) website soliciting requests for oil spill
response technology. The BAA calls for the submission of white papers
describing proposed technology solutions with applicability in five
distinct problem areas:
Oil sensing improvements to response and detection;
Oil wellhead control and submerged oil response;
Traditional oil spill response technologies;
Alternative oil spill response technologies; and
Oil spill damage assessment and restoration.
This BAA is open to all sources and is available from the front
page of FedBizOpps. Through this process, the Coast Guard recognizes
the potential for novel, highly innovative solutions from small
businesses, individuals and non-traditional sources. Submissions may
include those from single or team entities such as academia, private
sector organizations, government laboratories and federally funded
research and development centers. The government also encourages non-
profit organizations, educational/academic institutions, small
businesses, small disadvantaged businesses, historically black colleges
and universities/minority institutions, women-owned businesses,
service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses and historically
underutilized business zone enterprises to submit concepts for
consideration and/or to join others in a submission.
The BAA white paper submissions are screened based upon overall
scientific and technical merit, feasibility, the availability of
proposed solution and submitted cost information.
The IATAP workgroup, as managed by the Coast Guard's Research and
Development Program, and in consultation with other interagency
partners, is screening and sorting submissions based on technical
feasibility, efficacy and deployability. The initial screening of the
BAA responses will result in a determination that either the concept:
Has a discernible benefit to the spill response effort;
Needs more detailed investigation or evaluation and will be
forwarded to the appropriate government agency overseeing that
portion of the Deepwater Horizon response (EPA, MMS, NOAA,
USCG, etc.); or
Does not have immediate applicability to support this event.
All submissions will be provided with a response and tracking
number identifying the initial screening determination. All submissions
are managed in the order they are received regardless of origin to
ensure fairness in evaluation.
If the initial screening determines that the concept has
applicability and potential immediate benefit to the spill response
effort, the technical portion of the proposal and the IATAP
recommendation is forwarded to the Deepwater Horizon response FOSC for
further action under its authority, in consultation with the
responsible parties and/or other Federal agencies. If the initial
screening determines that a more detailed investigation or evaluation
is required it will be forwarded to the appropriate government agency
overseeing that portion of the Deepwater Horizon Response (EPA, MMS,
NOAA, or USCG), and that agency is responsible for further action.
As of August 1, 2010, we have received 3,797 submissions from the
BAA and 3,502 have completed the initial screening process. The IATAP
provides a transparent, robust, repeatable process for evaluating
technology solutions in this and future responses.
Question 2. It is my understanding that Louisiana officials have
met with and reviewed alternative response technologies, including
those proposed by Show Me Energy. How closely is the JIC working with
state and local governments in reviewing alternative response
technologies?
Answer. Promising technologies that are deemed promising or
feasible are presented to the Unified Area Command for consideration.
State and local representatives are part of the Unified Area Command.
On June 4, 2010, to facilitate more timely evaluation of ideas, the
Coast Guard issued a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) to establish an
Interagency Alternative Technology Assessment Program (IATAP) under the
provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, Subparts 6.102(d)(2)
and 35.016, to provide for the submission of White Papers (written
description of the idea) in support of the Deepwater Horizon Response.
The IATAP was designed to establish a well defined, documented,
systematic, and fair government-managed process to solicit, screen, and
evaluate vendor/other government agencies/academia-suggested
technologies in support of ongoing response activities.
All submitted White Papers meeting the requirements of the BAA will
be reviewed and evaluated as they are received. Each White Paper will
undergo an initial screening. The initial screening will result in a
determination that either: (1) the White Paper has a potential for
immediate benefit to the spill response effort; (2) the White Paper
submission needs more detailed investigation or evaluation and will be
forwarded to the appropriate Government Agency overseeing that portion
of the Deepwater Horizon Response (EPA, MMS, NOAA, or USCG); or (3) the
White Paper submission does not support this incident. A Contracting
Officer will provide a response to all properly submitted papers.
Should a White Paper show reasonable and timely application to the
response efforts, the work group will forward it to the Federal On-
Scene Coordinator (FOSC) for the Deepwater Horizon response, for
further consideration by the appropriate members of Unified Command.
Question 3. What process is in place to share information and ideas
with state and local governments?
Answer. The National Contingency Plan (NCP) sets forth the
framework and organizational structure for the Federal response to an
oil spill. In accordance with the NCP, the Unified Command coordinates
and directs response efforts through an integrated and flexible
structure that emphasizes cooperation and coordination in local, state,
and Federal responses to complex multi-jurisdictional, multiagency
incidents. The Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) serves within the
Unified Command, which includes representatives from the Responsible
Parties, Federal, State and local governments. Information sharing
takes place through the Unified Command.
As the response to the Deepwater Horizon response evolved the
National Incident Command has improved coordination with state and
local entities through a number of liaison functions.
Coast Guard Liaisons are placed throughout Florida, Alabama,
Mississippi, and Louisiana. Within the states, liaisons are located
with Governors Offices, County Emergency Operations Centers, Parish
Presidents and Deputy Incident Commanders. In addition, Community
Outreach Teams are working throughout impacted communities and
reporting local concerns to Deputy Incident Commanders.
All liaisons provide a critical means of communication with the
public, and state and local officials. Feedback from the communities'
directly informs the objectives, strategies and tactics of the response
to the Deepwater Horizon.
Question 4. As you know, the Coast Guard has detected the presence
of dozens of ``tar balls'' approaching the Florida coast, suggesting
that the Gulf Coast oil spill has traveled throughout the Gulf Coast
region. How do you plan to determine whether these tar balls are indeed
a product of the Deepwater Horizon spill?
Answer. Oil has a finger print. When a tar ball is found, it is
sent for lab analysis to see if there is crude oil in the tar ball,
which typically takes 24 hours. If analysis reveals there is crude in
the tar balls, they are analyzed to see if it is related to the MC252
spill; this typically takes up to 3 days. Of the tar balls analyzed,
some have been determined as originating from the Deepwater Horizon
while others have been from other sources.
Question 5. In light of the failed remediation strategies that have
been tried thus far, how does the Unified Command plan to prevent this
eastward expansion of the spill?
Answer. The Unified Area Command's primary strategies are to skim
the oil, perform in-situ burning and dispersing at the leading edge of
the main mass of the oil in order to contain the spill. These
techniques are used in various combinations dependent upon the existing
on-scene weather conditions each day.
Question 6. As you know, six of the ten leading U.S. ports are
located in the Gulf of Mexico region, hosting some of the largest
tonnage ships in the Nation. At this time, the oil spill has yet to
impact barge traffic on the Mississippi River, although the spill is
approaching the river's mouth. How does your agency plan to prevent the
spill from reaching the mouth of the river, thereby maintaining the
ability to continue normal levels of barge traffic along the
Mississippi?
Answer. The U.S. Coast Guard will continue ongoing protection
strategies using booming, skimming, in-situ burning (where possible)
near the mouth of the Mississippi River to contain the leading edge of
the oil spill. Additionally, a vessel decontamination station will be
set up near the mouth of the river, to clean tugs and barges after they
transit through any part of the oil.
Question 7. As you know, the government response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita included the contracting of services to private firms.
The Government Accountability Office, in their review of contracting
activities following these disasters, noted a lack of clearly
communicated responsibilities across agencies and jurisdictions and
insufficient numbers and inadequate deployment of personnel to provide
for effective contractor oversight. What specific activities will your
department be seeking to contract out or are you already relying on
contractors to carry out? Please explain why each activity is
appropriate for a contractor to handle.
Answer. The Unified Command is fully in charge of the totality of
the response. The Unified Command is providing resources and oversight
using trained staff, contractors, subject matter experts and others
from around the world with the required skill sets appropriate for the
work to be carried out and managed effectively.
Example of contractor activities include the use of nationally
recognized response management firms. The firms are responsible for all
onshore cleanup activities through an established network of
subcontractor specialists for cleaning, removal and disposal. Many of
these subcontract firms are recognized by the Coast Guard as Oil Spill
Removal Organizations (OSROs). The response management firms have
expertise in all aspects of spill response and management and can
provide sustainable management positions including accountability,
subcontractor performance management, quality control, cost and
schedule reporting to a Unified Command designated Contract Accountable
Manager.
Question 8. What are the preliminary cost estimates for contracted
out response activities?
Answer. As of June 1, 2010, the removal costs funded from the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund for contractors was $7,301,271.
Question 9. How does your agency intend to work with other agencies
to prevent the issues we experienced during the Katrina response from
arising in this instance?
Answer. The National Incident Commander established the Interagency
Solutions Working Group (IASG) to provide actionable ``whole of
government'' recommendations for consideration. The IASG is comprised
of subject matter experts from the National Response Team and other
Federal agencies who research and coordinate across all affected
agencies to address a broad spectrum of issues, including effective
contractor oversight.
Question 10. How many personnel have been deployed to the Gulf
Coast to ensure that contractor abuses are prevented and that there is
adequate oversight of contractor performance?
Answer. The Coast Guard has deployed 146 Federal on Scene
Coordinator Representatives (FOSCRs) to the gulf region to direct/
monitor operations. All FOSCRs are empowered with contractor oversight
authority in their assigned area. There are also 40 members who will
graduate on June 6, 2010, from FOSCR training, and will be prepared for
assignment.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Admiral Thad Allen
Question 1. Yesterday, Secretary Napolitano said that we are at the
middle of the timeline in the case of stopping the leak. We've been at
this for almost a month, and she said that we'll likely be trying to
stop the leak for several weeks. How would you characterize our current
position along the timeline of stopping the leak? How would you
characterize our current position along the timeline of recovering the
oil and stemming any additional environmental damage from the leak?
Answer. On July 15, the application of the capping stack was
successful in stopping the flow of oil into the environment. The
Unified Area Command will closely monitor to ensure well bore
integrity. The Unified Area Command's objectives remain constant and
clear:
Stop the leak, fight the spill offshore, protect
environmentally sensitive areas, and mitigate the effects on
the environment, the economy, and the local communities.
Question 2. I understand that hundreds of thousands of feet of
protective boom have been placed along the shoreline in the Gulf. How
long will the boom last? In other words how quickly will we have to
replace the boom that has already been put in place along the
coastline?
Answer. The lifespan of boom depends on many factors including: the
material used to make the boom; the wind and sea conditions; the amount
of debris in the water; and the amount of sunlight exposure. Also,
there are three basic kinds of protective boom being used--ocean boom
(offshore) and near shore boom that are exposed to rougher sea
conditions and inland boom that generally holds up better. However,
crews are checking the boom regularly and reporting damaged boom to
Incident Command Posts (ICPs) to ensure prompt replacement of boom.
Question 3. How much fire-resistant boom was prepositioned in the
gulf to respond to an oil spill of this magnitude? Assuming cooperative
weather conditions, was there enough prepositioned fire boom to burn
off the presumed 5,000 barrels of oil leaking into the Gulf each day?
Answer. According to the Response Resources Inventory before the
spill, there were 500 feet of fire boom located in Texas, 500 feet in
Mississippi and 500 feet in Florida.
Chemical dispersants, mechanical recovery and in situ burning are
all components of an effective response to surface oil pollution.
Mechanical recovery is the preferred method for on water oil spill
response because it removes the oil from the environment, but is not
always effective due to environmental conditions. The use of
dispersants to mitigate offshore oil spills has also become a proven
and accepted technology and under certain conditions, more effective
than mechanical response. Therefore the Coast Guard does not rely
solely on in-situ burn to remove spilled oil. Instead the Coast Guard
uses all of the tools described above in oil spill removal.
Question 4. Should MMS be required to share oil spill response
plans with the Coast Guard? Has the Coast Guard ever been approached by
MMS to review the oil spill response plan in the Gulf?
Answer. The Coast Guard supports enhanced integration of Federal
response regimes. The Coast Guard recommends that, if such plans are to
be shared, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and
Enforcement (BOEMRE) distribute them to all the impacted agencies--such
as the Coast Guard as the lead Federal agency for marine environmental
response for waters on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). Although
there is no statutory requirement to share the Area Contingency Plan
for Gulf areas, the Coast Guard may request, through BOEMRE, a review
of oil spill response plans. Through a Memorandum of Agreement with the
BOEMRE [OCS-03--Oil Discharge Planning, Preparedness, and Response--
Effective 23 May 2007], USCG currently has the opportunity to review
OSRPs and provide suggested revisions on oil spill response equipment,
response strategies, or other components of the plan. USCG is preparing
a Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular that instructs field office
personnel to actively engage with BOEMRE regional staff in the review
of OSRPs and to ensure consistency with Area Contingency Plans.
Question 5. BP has publicly stated that it will cover all
legitimate claims of economic damage associated with the oil spill.
What is the historical standard for determining what a ``legitimate
claim'' is for economic damages associated with an oil spill?
Answer. The Coast Guard cannot comment on what BP considers a
``legitimate'' claim. Claims that may be paid from the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) are those described in the Oil Pollution
Act, see 33 U.S.C. 2702(b) and the implementing regulations for claims
against the OSLTF at 33 Part CFR 136. When the OSLTF pays such
qualifying claims it seeks recovery from liable responsible parties.
Question 6. There have been some complaints that BP and the Federal
agencies overseeing the cleanup have been slow to adopt new and
innovative technologies that could either help stop the leak or help
with the cleanup efforts. What is the process for approving new third-
party technologies in the cleanup effort? What are BP and the Federal
Government doing to speed up this process?
Answer. In an effort to ensure that the best available methods are
used in the Administration's ongoing response to the Gulf oil spill,
the National Incident Commander (NIC) established an Interagency
Alternative Technology Assessment Program (IATAP) working group to
collect and review oil spill response solutions from scientists and
vendors. The Coast Guard's Research and Development Center, in
collaboration with interagency partners, issued a Broad Agency
Announcement (BAA) on www.FedBizOpps.gov (Announcement HSCG32-10-R-
R00019). This announcement called for the submission of white papers
addressing: oil sensing improvements to response and detection; oil
wellhead control and submerged oil response; traditional oil spill
response technologies; alternative oil spill response technologies; and
oil spill damage assessment and restoration. The IATAP and the Coast
Guard's Research and Development Center screen submissions based on
technical feasibility, potential effectiveness and deployment
capability. The IATAP is a separate forum, and independent of BP's
review process. Therefore, if persons wish to have their idea evaluated
by the Federal Government, they should submit it using the process
articulated in the Broad Agency Announcement.
As of June 27, 2010, eighteen (18) IATAP BAA submissions (of 2,708
total received) have been forwarded, or are in the process of being
forwarded, to the Unified Area Command (UAC) for consideration and
operational evaluation. The processing time for these ideas averaged 12
days from receipt to forwarding, but the last four forwarded to the UAC
averaged 9 days total.
In addition, individuals may also submit ideas directly to BP
([email protected]) for consideration. This site evaluates
ideas and proposals for alternative technology as well as vendor offers
of response services, products, and equipment.
Question 7. In terms of the government response, what have we
learned the past few days to be better prepared to respond to a
deepwater oil spill such as the one we are experiencing now in the
Gulf?
Answer. Lessons learned in this oil spill response will be informed
by the results of on-going Federal review efforts. These reviews will
examine many facets of the response including the implementation and
effectiveness of the response to this spill within the confines of the
National Contingency Plan (NCP), Regional Contingency Plans (RCPs),
Area Contingency Plans (ACPs), Regional Response Plan or Oil Spill
Response Plan (OSRP), and Vessel Response Plans (VRPs).
Question 8. Has either of your agencies received any Freedom of
Information requests with regards to this incident? If so, can you
provide a summary of those requests?
Answer. We have received 42 Freedom of Information Act requests.
The following is a summary of those requests.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FOIA Control
Number Description Requestor
------------------------------------------------------------------------
20102030 All MISLE data from creation Chemical Emergency
to present regarding vessels Preparedness Agency
20102031 Inspection report from Jan The Wall Street
2005 to April 2010 regarding Journal
vessels
20102053 All documents related to the Justin Elliott
investigation of the oil
spill in the gulf of Mexico
on 20 April 10
20102057 All documents related to the CNN Washington
oil spill in the gulf of
Mexico on 20 April 10
20102088 All documents related to oil ProPublica
spills from March 15 to May 2
20102089 Copies of personnel lists ProPublica
during Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill
20102094 All documents related to Blackthorn Investment
Transocean LTD Group LLC
20102106 Any visuals showing leaks of ABC News
oil on Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill
20102149 All documents related to the National Mariners
oil spill in the gulf of Association
Mexico on 20 April 10
20102160 All documents related to the The Wall Street
oil spill in the gulf of Journal
Mexico on 20 April 10
20102188 All communications and/or Associated Press
Correspondence between the
Coast Guard and BP relating
to any visuals showing leaks
of oil on Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill
20102189 All subpoenaed documents by Preis & Roy
the Coast Guard/MMS joint
investigators related to the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
20102220 All documents related to Elliott Management
inspections performed on Corporation
Deepwater Horizon
20102223 All documents related to the The Associated Press
oil spill in the gulf of
Mexico on 20 April 10
20102237 Any visuals showing leaks of CBS Evening News
oil on Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill
20102238 All documents related to Center for Public
inspections performed on Integrity
Deepwater Horizon
20102261 Any visuals showing leaks of CREW
oil on Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill
20102288 Copies of letters for Larry McMahan
Transocean employees
20102303 Any and all documents related Competitive Enterprise
to Deepwater Horizon Oil Institute
Spill
20102308 All correspondence between the The Associated Press
Coast Guard and specified
universities
20102309 Results for all water tests The New York Times
taken after the Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill
20102355 E-mails to and from ADM Allen WVUE-TV (Fox 8)
from 4/20-5/30 related to the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
20102361 Victim Statements/distress CNN
calls/picture/videos
correspondence Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill
20102388 Transcripts of all proceeding Arnold & Itkin LLP
conducted o/a 11 May 10
related to the Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill
20102389 Numbers of Coast Guard Building Solutions
aircrafts in the air during
the initial Deepwater Horizon
explosion
20102395 Audio recordings from NRC o/a Associated Press
20 April 10 related to the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
20102431 All information relating to DOJ of Louisiana
the ecological impact of the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
20102432 All correspondence related to Martzell & Bickford
the Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill
20102477 All correspondence related to Chimicles & Tikellis
the Deepwater Horizon Oil LLP
Spill
20102478 Incident report on Deepwater Johnny Wong
Horizon o/a 20 April 2010
20102479 All documents related to the Associated Press
``SONS'' exercise programs
20102480 All documents related to the CREW
``SONS'' exercise programs
20102488 Daily incident action plans James Mason
for the specified days
related to the Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill
20102489 Daily incident action plans USA Today
for 20 April 2010 related to
the Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill
20102490 Any interviews in conjunction CNN
to MMS related to the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
20102491 Coast Guard's legal standpoint Stern Bramson
on BPs violations of Coast
Guard regulations on the
Deepwater Horizon
20102492 Provide a list of all Yobie Benjamin
government agencies that
offered help to BP
20102503 Letter to Coast Guard military The Associated Press
personnel regarding BP
20102505 Latest version of the New York Times
recovered Oil, waste plan
related to the Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill
20102506 Copy of National Contingency Center for
Plan Constitutional Rights
20102550 Sampling data from air and Natural Resources
water quality in LA related Defense Council
to the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill
20102551 All documents pertaining to F Gerald Maples
air quality readings in LA
related to the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill
------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. David Vitter to
Admiral Thad Allen
Question 1. Why hasn't the President set up a fisheries loan
program as mandated by section 2713(f) of the Oil Pollution Act, and
when will he?
Answer. There are no funds available for a loan program for interim
assistance to claimants. Any use of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund
(OSLTF) for a fisheries loan program would require an appropriation.
Even if funds were appropriated the loan eligibility provisions require
that the claimant must have incurred a damage and have a pending claim
that has not been paid. In the Coast Guard's experience once a damage
is established, payment of any claim is forthcoming and there should be
no need for a loan. Thus the loan provision does not provide for
effective assistance. Further there is no provision for recovery of
loan costs from those responsible for the pollution. Thus loan costs,
including losses from loans not repaid, might be a cost only to the
OSLTF. Such a loan program could interfere with current claim
adjudication and compensation.
Question 2. When will the Federal Government approve some version
of the emergency dredging/barrier island plan presented by Louisiana
more than a week ago? Can you work with the Army Corps to get this plan
approved immediately?
Answer. On June 4, 2010, the Federal On Scene Coordinator
determined that the Approved Barrier Island Project was an appropriate
removal action. The BOEMRE executed a lease to the State of Louisiana
on July 16, 2010, for use of up to 10 million cubic yards of OCS sand
from the St. Bernard Shoals area for the sand berm to protect the
Chandeleur Islands and Breton National Wildlife Refuge from oil from
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
Question 3. When will the Coast Guard, NOAA, BP, and other agency
partners have a more precise estimate of oil flow from the well in
light of the piping being successfully attached?
Answer. As of August 2, 2010, U.S. Government and independent
scientists estimated the most likely flow rate of oil as between 53,000
and 62,000 barrels per day where the flow rate decreased with time due
to reservoir depletion.
This revised estimate was based on updated information and
scientific assessments from the Flow Rate Technical Group. The Flow
Rate Technical Group was assembled at the direction of the National
Incident Commander and chaired by U.S. Geological Survey Director, Dr.
Marcia McNutt.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
Admiral Thad Allen
Question 1. Since the explosion on April 20th, what specifically do
you wish the Federal Government could have done quicker or differently
than has been performed up to this point?
Answer. The Coast Guard and our inter-agency partners have
conducted oil spill response drills for years. However, the Coast Guard
and our inter-agency partners had not anticipated an oil spill that
could not be controlled and cleaned up in a shorter period.
As we have seen, a spill of this magnitude is within the realm of
possibility. As a result, the whole of government will review the
lessons learned from this operation to think about equipment standards,
technology, and our preparedness to respond in the future.
Question 2. Does the Unified Command have access to the total
amount of boom necessary to protect Gulf Coast beaches and marshland?
Please explain the process used to determine boom placement in this
response.
Answer. Sufficient boom is available to protect sensitive areas set
forth in Area Contingency plans, however due to the magnitude of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Unified Area Command is acquiring
double the amount of boom required by the Area Contingency Plans in the
affected states.
Area Contingency Plans guide the placement of boom. These plans are
developed and approved in advance of an oil spill by the Area Committee
whose membership includes Federal, State, organizations and industry.
Area Contingency Plans identify environmentally sensitive areas and
booming strategies for the region. The Federal On-Scene Coordinator
consults the area contingency plans and the conditions of the spill to
assess, place and monitor boom.
Question 3. Are there other types of booms or protective barriers
available through other Federal entities that could limit oil reaching
our beaches and marshland? If so, are these assets being utilized? If
they are not currently being utilized, please list these assets and
explain why they are not being considered for assistance in the
response?
Answer. Boom remains a critical response resource. The Unified Area
Command is aggressively procuring boom throughout the Nation and
accepting international government offers of boom for deployment in
this response.
Question 4. Should the Coast Guard have greater responsibilities
related to review of response plans required by Outer Continental Shelf
Facilities?
Answer. The Coast Guard supports enhanced integration of Federal
response regimes--specifically, the involvement of all impacted
agencies, including the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
as the Federal steward of marine resources, the Coast Guard as the lead
Federal agency for marine environmental response for waters on the U.S.
Outer Continental Shelf, and the Department of Health and Human
Services as the lead Federal agency for public health. The Coast Guard
also recommends that, if the Service is to be further involved in the
review and approval of such plans, the totality of mission and resource
impacts be taken into account.
Question 5. What regulatory or statutory hurdles have you
encountered in the ongoing response?
Answer. On May 12, the Administration submitted a legislative
package that included both funding and authorizing language intended to
facilitate response that would be expedient, deliver speedy assistance
to people affected by this spill, and strengthen and update the oil
spill response system. Many of the provisions included in this package
were included in H.R. 4899 (Public Law 111-212), which was enacted in
late July. However, H.R. 4899 excluded Administration-proposed
provisions. The Administration's proposed legislation is available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-deepwater-
horizon-oil-spill-legislative-package.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Lamar McKay
Question 1. How much money did BP plan to spend on the well the
Deepwater Horizon was hired to drill, and how much had it actually cost
up to April 20, 2010?
Answer. BP originally planned to spend up to $140 million (gross
cost) on the Macondo well. The Marianas rig began drilling the well on
October 1, 2009. Hurricane Ida damaged the Marianas on November 8,
2009, and the rig was sent to shore for repair. The Deepwater Horizon
rig started drilling on January 31, 2010. The projected cost of the
well increased to up to $166 million. As of April 19, 2010, the
estimated gross spending on the well was approximately $151 million.
Question 2. The London Times reported that your global CEO, Tony
Hayward, reiterated a promise that BP ``will honour all legitimate
claims for business interruption,'' and that when asked for examples of
illegitimate claims he replied ``I could give you lots of examples.
This is America--come on. We're going to have lots of illegitimate
claims. We all know that.'' Obviously the world is not a perfect place,
but is that really how BP is approaching the claims process for the
people and businesses on the Gulf Coast who may be decimated by this
disaster? What guarantees can you give us that the American people
won't be footing the bill for your malfeasance?
Answer. BP Exploration & Production Inc. has been designated as a
``responsible party'' under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA). BP will honor
all its obligations under OPA. At the direction of the United States
Coast Guard, BP has established a claims process through which
individuals, businesses, and government entities may file claims. The
claims process has been widely advertised through Coast Guard-approved
channels. Claimants may initiate claims by: (1) calling a toll-free,
24-hour claims line, (2) completing an online form, or (3) visiting one
of BP's 33 in-person claims centers in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
and Florida. BP's claims team consists of approximately 1,000
individuals, including more than 650 claims adjusters. To date, BP has
paid more than $96 million in claims. In the interest of expediting
payments to those whose income has been interrupted by the oil spill,
BP has made two rounds of interim payments to date.
As announced by the White House earlier this week, Ken Feinberg
will serve as the Administrator of an Independent Claims Facility for
individual and business claims. BP also will establish a $20 billion
fund for purposes of paying, among other things, legitimate claims
under OPA.
In regard to the economic damages cap of $75 million contained in
OPA, BP has already paid more than $96 million in claims. BP will not
seek reimbursement from the U.S. Government or the Oil Spill Liability
Trust Fund for any of these payments.
Question 3. Can you tell us what barriers, such as cement, casing,
and drilling fluid, were in place in the wellbore at the time the
explosion occurred, who put them in place, and who supervised that
work?
Answer. The functioning of barriers, including the blowout
preventer (BOP), and specifically why it did not function as expected
on the Deepwater Horizon, is the subject of multiple investigations,
including BP's ongoing, non-privileged investigation.
Question 4. You have stated publicly that there were anomalous
pressure readings taken on the well just hours before the explosion.
Mr. Newman has stated that at the time of the explosion the well had
been sealed with cement. How long had the well been sealed when the
explosion occurred? Over what period of time were these higher pressure
readings recorded? Are actions that were taken, including when and how
they were done, consistent with standard industry practice?
Answer. BP's ongoing, non-privileged investigation into the
activities and events of the April 20 incident is continuing. Based on
information presently available, there were pressure readings on the MC
252 #1 well prior to the April 20 incident that, on post-incident
review, appear anomalous. BP's current understanding of these pressure
readings is outlined in a presentation developed by the team conducting
the investigation described above that includes a timeline of events
covering certain activities during the last 12 hours of operations. See
attached presentation document bearing Bates labels BP-HZN-SCS000001--
BP-HZN-SCS000048. As noted in that presentation, not all information it
contains has been verified, and the preliminary perspectives it
reflects are subject to review in light of additional information or
analysis. BP's investigation as to the potential connection, if any,
between these pressure readings and factors that may have contributed
to the April 20 incident is continuing.
Question 5. Mr. Newman has stated that at the time of the
explosion, Transocean's crew was in the process of displacing drilling
fluid with sea water at BP's direction. Is this true? Is it standard
industry practice to take this step when there have been anomalous
pressure readings on the sealed well just hours earlier?
Answer. Because investigations into the Deepwater Horizon incident
are ongoing, it would be premature to speculate regarding specific
decisions. In addition, certain third parties may have in their
possession information that is relevant to this request but to which BP
does not have access. That said, and in addition to the investigation
team presentation described above that may be pertinent to your
request, BP is attaching a copy of the Temporary Abandonment Permit
approved by MMS on April 16, 2010 for the temporary abandonment of the
Macondo MC 252 #1 well bore. This Permit, and a related document, sets
out the procedure approved by MMS for the temporary abandonment of the
well (BP-HZN-SCS000050--BP-HZN-SCS000053; BP-HZN-SCS000049).
Question 6. I understand that any drilling operation requires a
balance between doing things quickly and doing thing safely. Yet, you
all seem to have disregarded this completely, opting for expediency and
profit over safety and procedure. You had the drillers bump up the rate
of penetration at the first well, cracking it and forcing it to be
abandoned. This should have served as a warning to slow down. But that
is not what happened. You kept drilling. When drilling resumed, the
rig's chief electronics technician, Mike Williams, says there was
damage done to one of the rig's most vital pieces of safety equipment,
the annular. When the drilling crew finds chunks of rubber from the
annular barrier, a critical piece of the blowout preventer, floating
around in the drilling fluid, what is the standard industry procedure
to deal with that? And is this what you did? Why was absolutely nothing
done about it?
Answer. Your question assumes a number of facts about what happened
during drilling of the Macondo 252 well. BP is not in a position to
comment on the accuracy of those allegations at this point because
investigations into the causes of the April 20 incident--including the
non-privileged investigation BP commissioned--are ongoing. In any
event, Transocean is responsible for maintaining the Blowout Preventer
(BOP), including repairs to the BOP. Accordingly, Transocean may be
able to provide information on issues related to rubber in the drilling
fluid, their response, and their views on any industry practice in this
specific factual situation, of which we do not have the full details.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Lamar McKay
Question 1. In the Energy and Natural Resources Committee hearing,
you told me that BP will pay all legitimate claims. If your company
pays out more than its liability limits under the law in damage claims,
can you definitely commit that you will not seek reimbursement from the
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund? If and when BP does pay out more than
its liability limits for damage claims, will BP be seeking any
reimbursement from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund?
Answer. In regard to the economic damages cap of $75 million
contained in OPA, BP has already paid more than $96 million in claims.
BP will not seek reimbursement from the U.S. Government or the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund for any of these payments.
Question 2. The Atlantis rig began production on October 6, 2007.
Do you dispute this fact?
Answer. No.
Question 3. As of the report issued on May 12, 2009, by Mike
Sawyer, a Registered Professional Engineer, the following report
completion statuses were noted:
Only 303 of 2,108 of the subsea Piping and Instrument
Diagrams (P&IDs) in the Drill Center 1 (DC-1) database held the
status of ``issued for design'' or ``issued for construction''
and only one held the status of ``as-built''.
Over 95 percent of the Welding Procedure Specifications and
Procedure Qualification Records were listed as ``issued for
construction'' or ``issued for design''.
Safety shutdown logic drawings were listed as ``requiring
update''.
Do you dispute that this was the status as of May 12, 2009 when Mr.
Sawyer issued his report?
Answer. Our data does not support Mr. Sawyer's conclusions. We
believe Mr. Sawyer's conclusions are based on incomplete and inaccurate
data.
More specifically, we believe that Mr. Sawyer's report is based on
his review of a limited information set, compiled for a different
purpose, which is not sufficient to support any of the conclusions in
Mr. Sawyer's report. To the best of our knowledge and understanding,
Mr. Sawyer has not reviewed the documents he purports to characterize
in his report; he has not reviewed any of the documents that BP has
provided or otherwise made available to the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE); and he does not have
a basis to know what documents BP had available for use by operating
personnel before or after production began in October 2007 or before or
after his report was prepared in May 2009.
Question 4. Do you agree that the status of these drawings is a
violation of 30 CFR 250?
Answer. BP believes that it has the drawings necessary for proper
operation of the Atlantis facilities and is in compliance with
applicable regulations. BOEMRE is conducting an investigation into
allegations of regulatory noncompliance concerning engineering
documentation pertaining to the Atlantis development (the Green Canyon
Block 743 Unit). BP is cooperating fully with that investigation.
Question 5. What is the current status of your P&IDs?
Answer. We have current P&IDs for the Atlantis facilities that are
available to our operating personnel.
Question 6. What actual numbers (versus total number) and
percentages are designated ``issued for design,'' ``issued for
construction,'' and ``as-built''?
Answer. Atlantis operations personnel have access to P&IDs that
reflect the current design of the subsea architecture that is
operational. For each current P&ID, there may be multiple prior
versions that are maintained in our records, thereby increasing the
total number of P&IDs as well as the number of P&IDs designated with a
particular status. There are also future phases of subsea architecture
for Atlantis that are still in the process of being designed and
constructed and are not yet operational. We do not generally track
percentages of the status of P&ID drawings because those numbers do not
provide meaningful data; as noted, drawings may have multiple prior
versions or reflect future design and construction work.
Question 7. Do any of the P&IDs not carry any status?
Answer. We are not aware of P&IDs that are without a status.
Question 8. What is the current status of your Welding Procedure
Specifications and your Procedure Qualification Records? Again, please
provide actual numbers (versus total number) and percentages for each
listing status, including any without a listing status.
Answer. Welding Procedure Specifications and Procedure
Qualification Records are written procedures and records rather than
drawings, so the description of ``as-built'' is inapplicable. It is
BP's practice that its production platforms only utilize Welding
Procedure Specifications that have received the appropriate approvals.
Question 9. What is the current status of your Safety shutdown
logic drawings? Again, please provide actual numbers (versus total
number) and percentages for each listing status, including any without
a listing status.
Answer. We have current safety shutdown logic drawings for the
Atlantis facilities that are available to our operating personnel and
provide them with information for the safe operation of the platform.
For the same reasons as stated above with regard to P&IDs, a comparison
of the number of documents having a particular status against the total
number of documents is not meaningful.
Question 10. Are there other BP-owned or--operated rigs in the U.S.
Outer Continental Shelf that do not have all P&IDs approved as an ``as-
built'' status?
Answer. It is BP's policy that all its production platforms be
operated in compliance with the applicable BOEMRE regulations. The
operating personnel on all BP production platforms have access to
current P&IDs that provide them with useful and accurate information
for the safe operation of the platform.
Question 11. Are there other BP-owned or--operated rigs in the U.S.
Outer Continental Shelf that do not have all Welding Procedure
Specifications approved as an ``as-built'' status?
Answer. Welding Procedure Specifications are written procedures
rather than drawings, so the description of ``as-built'' is
inapplicable. It is BP's practice that its production platforms only
utilize Welding Procedure Specifications that have received the
appropriate approvals.
Question 12. Are there other BP-owned or--operated rigs in the U.S.
Outer Continental Shelf that do not have all Procedure Qualification
Records approved as an ``as-built'' status?
Answer. Procedure Qualification Records are records rather than
drawings, so the description of ``as-built'' is inapplicable. It is
BP's practice that its production platforms only utilize Procedure
Qualification Records that have received the appropriate approvals.
Question 13. Are there other BP-owned or--operated rigs in the U.S.
Outer Continental Shelf that do not have all Safety Shutdown Logic
Drawings approved as an ``as-built'' status?
Answer. It is BP's policy that all its production platforms be
operated in compliance with the applicable BOEMRE regulations. The
operating personnel on all BP production platforms have access to up-
to-date current Safety Shutdown Logic Drawings that provide them with
useful and accurate information for the safe operation of the platform.
Question 14. If the questioned drawings are not up-to-date, please
provide reasoning as to why they are not, what the drilling status is
of the rig, and, if that rig is still drilling, why BP continues to
allow a violation of safety and encourages endangerment to the
environment and the coast.
Answer. As stated above, we believe the questioned drawings are up-
to-date. BOEMRE is conducting an investigation into allegations of
regulatory noncompliance concerning engineering documentation
pertaining to the Atlantis development (the Green Canyon Block 743
Unit). BP is cooperating fully with that investigation.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Claire McCaskill to
Lamar McKay
Question 1. The Deepwater Horizon Unified Command has been
operating a Joint Information Center (JIC) since the first days of the
spill The JIC has and continues to receive submissions for alternative
response technology, services or products. How many submissions has the
JIC received? How many submissions have been responded to? What is the
JIC's process for vetting these submissions, and how many submissions
have been brought to the attention of JIC leadership?
Answer. Since the start of the MC 252 spill, BP has received
thousands of suggestions from the public describing potential ways to
stop the flow of oil and gas or to contain the spill on and off the
Gulf coast shoreline. Since the beginning of June, the number of
suggestions coming in has increased, with BP's Houston Call Center now
receiving, on average, 5,000 suggestions a day. These suggestions have
come in from across the world. The suggestions have come in from a
variety of people, ranging from members of the general public to oil
industry professionals. The suggestions also have come in from those
speaking many different languages, ranging from Arabic to Russian.
Anyone with an idea for BP's team is encouraged to submit it using the
Alternative Response Technology (ART) online form located at http://
www.horizonedocs.com/artform.php.
This form is a valuable tool in helping the team to see quickly the
potential of the idea because it collects a list of the materials,
equipment, and skills required for the idea to work. After the caller
completes and submits the form, 60 technical and operational personnel
review its technical feasibility and classify it in one of three
categories:
Not possible or feasible under these conditions;
Already considered or planned for; or
Feasible.
As of June 14, 2010, BP has received over 90,000 ideas from
telephone calls and e-mail. Of this number, over 19,000 ideas have been
reviewed by the technical team. Currently, over 280 ideas have been
advanced to a higher-level review in order to determine which ones fill
an operational need and may require testing in the field. We currently
have 10-15 ideas in active field testing, including:
An idea submitted by Clean Beach Technologies for a solution
that is designed to mechanically separate oil from sand. A
sample taken from an oiled beach in Louisiana was lab-tested to
verify this solution's efficacy. It appears that use of this
solution may be feasible, so it is being prepared for field
testing.
Another idea, presented by Ocean Therapy Solutions, relates
to centrifuge equipment technology that can effectively
separate oil from water within an oil spill scenario. This idea
is also undergoing field tests.
BP is currently looking for potentially viable technologies
to combat the oil saturated in the sargassum, or seaweed, along
the Gulf Coast and is evaluating information related to such
methods.
Question 2. It is my understanding that Louisiana officials have
met with and reviewed alternative response technologies, including
those proposed by Show Me Energy. How closely is the JIC working with
state and local governments in reviewing alternative response
technologies? What process is in place to share information and ideas
with state and local governments?
Answer. Those ideas received from state and local governments are
processed through the ART system, with a BP representative acting as a
point of contact to share the status of ideas received. To ensure that
each idea received is reviewed in a timely manner, BP now has expanded
its internal team and has linked up with a new working group. The
working group has been set up by the U.S. Coast Guard. The Interagency
Alternative Technology Assessment Program (IATAP) workgroup was
announced in Washington on June 4 and includes representatives from the
Minerals Management Service (MMS), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the
United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Maritime Administration
(MARAD).
Question 3. As you know, the Coast Guard has detected the presence
of dozens of ``tar balls'' approaching the Florida coast, suggesting
that the Gulf Coast oil spill has traveled throughout the Gulf Coast
region. How do you plan to determine whether these tar balls are indeed
a product of the Deepwater Horizon spill?
Answer. On May 17-18, 2010, the Coast Guard Sector Key West
received notifications from the National Response Center of tar balls
on the Florida shoreline. The Coast Guard took samples to its Marine
Safety Laboratory in New London, Connecticut and determined that none
of the collected samples was from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. BP
continues to work with the Coast Guard and other Federal and state
agencies to determine whether samples from reported tar balls are from
that spill. If tar balls are reported, the Unified Command, comprised
of representatives from Federal and state agencies, deploys a Shoreline
Cleanup Assessment Team (``SCAT'') to the area. SCAT members talk to
the person who reported the tar ball and try to obtain a description,
quantity, location, and time when it was seen. In addition, SCAT
members scan the coastline daily for signs of oil or tar balls.
Question 4. In light of the failed remediation strategies that have
been tried this far, how does the Unified Command plan to prevent this
eastward expansion of the spill?
Answer. The response strategies to date have had significant
success in mitigating the spread of the spill. In terms of plans going
forward, the Unified Command has released a Sentry plan (as of June 6)
to provide real-time ocean monitoring off the Florida Keys and Dry
Tortugas. Vessels will be deployed to conduct maritime patrols to
provide early identification of any weathered oil products such as
light sheen, which will naturally dissipate, or mousse mats and tar
balls that could potentially threaten the Florida Keys and east coast
of Florida. Additional vessels and aircraft patrols may be implemented
as necessary to provide early warning detection of any weathered oil
products.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Warner to
Lamar McKay
Question 1. It would appear that the Gulf oil spill also involved
regulatory failures. What sort of regulatory improvements are needed to
encourage industry to make appropriate investments in safety and
disaster prevention?
Answer. At the request of the Department of Interior, BP
participated in the task forces that provided input to the Secretary
concerning changes necessary to better ensure the safety and integrity
of offshore development. Additionally, based on learnings we have
gleaned from the incident thus far, we have offered the Secretary the
following suggestions for consideration:
Recall all BOPs and recertify that they operate to OEM
specifications and can satisfy the well design intent;
Implement an Enhanced Testing Regime that better simulates
emergency operations;
Evaluate redesigning BOPs with a focus on redundancy and
reliability;
Enhance Industry SubSea Response/Intervention Capability.
Additionally, BP has recently announced a 10 year research grant of
$500 million to examine topics including:
Where are the oil, the dispersed oil, and the dispersant
going under the action of ocean currents?
How do oil, the dispersed oil and the dispersant behave on
the seabed, in the water column, on the surface, and on the
shoreline?
What are the impacts of the oil, the dispersed oil, and the
dispersant on the biota of the seabed, the water column, the
surface, and the shoreline?
How do accidental releases of oil compare to natural seepage
from the seabed?
What is the impact of dispersant on the oil? Does it help or
hinder biodegradation?
How will the oil, the dispersed oil, and the dispersant
interact with tropical storms, and will this interaction impact
the seabed, the water column and the shoreline?
What can be done to improve technology:
To detect oil, dispersed oil, and dispersant on the
seabed, in the water column, and on the surface?
For remediating the impact of oil accidently released
to the ocean?
BP already has ongoing marine research programs in the Gulf of
Mexico. Building on these, BP will appoint an independent advisory
panel to develop a long-term research program. Where appropriate, the
program may be coordinated with the ongoing natural resources damages
assessment. The program will engage some of the best marine biologists
and oceanographers in the world. More immediately, a baseline of
information for the long-term research program is needed, and a first
grant to Louisiana State University has been made to initiate this
work.
Question 2. BP has had a technology response hotline since the
beginning of the spill. Can you provide the Committee with suggestions
received in response to the hotline? Which ideas were employed, and
which were rejected and why?
Answer. Please see the responses to Senator McCaskill's first two
questions above.
Question 3. Is there a role that the U.S. Government could play in
stopping the oil leak, particularly bringing to bear military
technology that BP may not have? If so, what did BP ask the Federal
Government to do? If not, why not?
Answer. BP is working very closely with the U.S. Government, which
plays an important role in and adds significant value to the response
efforts. The U.S. Coast Guard and the Minerals Management Service have
been involved from the beginning. Together with the Environmental
Protection Agency and other agencies, they make up the Unified Command,
which directs the clean-up and remediation efforts. BP has also been
aided substantially by scientists and experts from a variety of other
Federal agencies, such as the Department of Interior, Department of
Energy, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the
Department of Defense, who have provided critical assistance with, for
example, the development of the top-kill procedure, the diagnostic work
on the blowout preventer, and the selection, deployment, and analysis
of dispersants. The Federal Government's role has been vital in all the
remedial efforts, and its assistance is greatly appreciated.
Question 4. In previous testimony you have described how
challenging it is to operate at these depths, stating it is ``like
open-heart surgery at 5,000 feet.'' If that is the case, what was your
company's ``Plan B'' if the Blowout preventer failed? Shouldn't you
have a pre-coordinated response plan, with equipment available on short
notice, for this possibility?
Answer. The BOP has been recognized for many years across the
drilling industry as a critical--indeed the ultimate--piece of safety
equipment on a drilling rig. It is specifically designed with multiple
redundancies to prevent a blowout in a well control event. When the BOP
on the Deepwater Horizon failed, attempts were made to activate it
manually, including through the use of Remotely Operated Vehicles
(ROVs). The presentation reflecting preliminary perspectives of the BP
investigation team into the events of April 20 discusses the various
mechanisms employed in attempting to activate the BOP. See BP-HZN-
SCS000035--BP-HZN-SCS000037 (previously produced to Committee on June
19, 2010).
BP's Regional Oil Spill Response Plan (OSRP) for the Gulf of
Mexico, which was approved by the Minerals Management Service,
addresses available equipment and personnel for containment, recovery,
and removal of oil from a spill. The OSRP has been the foundation from
which the Coast Guard, other government agencies, and BP have
implemented the response across the Gulf on the surface, in the subsea
environment, and at the shoreline.
Question 5. Either in terms of gross dollars, or in terms of a
percentage of revenues, how much have you invested in R&D for advanced
exploration and production technologies and techniques each year and
over the 10-year period?
Answer. In 2009, BP spent approximately $587 million on research
and development. The company does not separately account for various
types of research and development spending, but after some additional
research, BP estimates that approximately 40 percent of the $587
million spent in 2009 funded research related to advanced exploration
and production technologies and techniques. Those funds support several
programs focused on safety and reliable offshore operations and
drilling. Please find below the gross amounts spent annually on
research and development during the last 10 years.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Research & Development Expenditures
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 $587 million
2008 $595 million
2007 $566 million
2006 $395 million
2005 $502 million
2004 $439 million
2003 $349 million
2002 $373 million
2001 $385 million
2000 $434 million
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 6. What level of investment do you think industry should
be required to make in safety and prevention technologies and practices
so that we can be fully prepared to deal with worst-case scenarios in
the challenging environment of deepwater drilling?
Answer. In 2009, BP spent approximately $20.3 billion on capital
investments. Although BP does not break out spending for ``safety and
prevention technologies'' per se, safety and prevention activities have
been and continue to be embedded in many of our operational projects,
which represent a significant portion of our capital and operating
spending. BP is not in a position to offer a numerical value for the
level of investment the rest of the industry should be required to make
in safety and prevention technologies.
Question 7. Has BP looked at spill prevention fail safe
technologies in use by other nations?
If so, did BP employ any of these technologies? If not, why not?
Does BP have plans to employ this technology at other rigs?
Answer. BP believes that the BOP is the ultimate spill prevention
fail safe technology used by every oil and gas exploration company
operating anywhere in the world. BP continually searches for and
develops, by itself, and in conjunction with its partners and
contractors, technologies to make our operations safer and more
reliable. As a multinational company working with other multinational
companies, we have access to expertise from around the globe.
Question 8. Has BP consulted with oil spill containment experts in
other nations, and have they provided ideas for stopping the gusher of
oil? If so, what were they? If not, why not?
Answer. As part of our efforts to contain the source of oil, we
have consulted with international companies that have provided experts
in areas such as Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO).
These companies have also helped us obtain free standing risers from
other countries. Other nations have provided equipment, such as several
flexible hose lengths. In addition, numerous countries have sent
vessels, including the EverGreen burner shipped from France, the Loch
Rannoch from the United Kingdom, the Toisa Pisces from Mexico, the
Seillan from Brazil, and large offshore skimming vessels from
Scandinavian countries.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
Lamar McKay
Question 1. Has BP initiated new inspections of the other blowout
preventers you are using in the Gulf of Mexico?
Answer. BP currently has three deep water drilling rigs Operating
in the Gulf of Mexico. These rigs--Transocean's Enterprise, Development
Driller (DD) II and DD III rigs--are dedicated to the current Deepwater
Horizon incident response. Only the DD II and DD III rigs, however, are
operational drilling rigs requiring a functional blowout preventer
(BOP) stack. The Enterprise, which was until recently collecting
hydrocarbons flowing from the Mississippi Canyon 252 (MC 252) well, is
not involved in operations requiring a BOP stack.
Before drilling operations resume in the Gulf of Mexico, BP is
taking steps to ensure that the drilling contractors operating rigs
under contract to BP, who own the BOPs and have responsibility for
maintaining, inspecting and testing the BOPs, confirm the functionality
of the key safety equipment, including the BOPs, used on their rigs in
the Gulf of Mexico. On April 29, 2010, BP required the Gulf of Mexico
Strategic Performance Unit (GoM SPU) to confirm that the drilling
contractors perform additional inspections and tests of the BOPs. After
BP made this request, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) and U.S.
Coast Guard issued a joint National Safety Alert on April 30, 2010,
requiring that all oil rig operators and drilling contractors ``inspect
their drilling equipment and review their procedures to ensure the
safety of personnel and protection of the environment.'' In response to
this Alert, BP required that the drilling contractors operating rigs
under contract to BP in the Gulf of Mexico, such as Transocean, ensure
compliance with these requirements. BP sent letters to the drilling
contractors equipped with subsea BOPs, requesting that they confirm the
information sought by the Alert. These letters also requested that the
drilling contractors confirm that the BOPs and associated equipment on
these rigs have been inspected; that the BOPs are routinely inspected;
that the BOPs are tested and maintained to industry standards and in
compliance with applicable regulations; and that any modifications made
to the BOPs were made in compliance with manufacturer and regulatory
requirements, and pursuant to a formal management of change process. BP
also separately required that the appropriate senior staff supervising
drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico confirm this information with
the drilling contractors. BP requested, among other things, that these
individuals confirm with the drilling contractors that the BOP system
schematics are up to date and accurate; which emergency systems are in
place on each subsea BOP stack; that stump test procedures ensure that
all functions, including emergency systems, are working as designed;
that all safety critical equipment maintenance is up to date; and the
shearing capability of all shear rams in BOPs.
Question 2. What steps have you undertaken to ensure multiple
failures of the blowout preventers do not occur in the future?
Answer. Since the incident, BP has requested that, for operating
rigs under contract to BP, the drilling contractors, who own the
blowout preventers (BOPs) and have responsibility for maintaining,
inspecting and testing the BOPs, perform additional testing and
inspection of the BOPs and confirm that their BOPs are functioning.
Additionally, as discussed above, BP has sent letters to the drilling
contractors equipped with subsea BOPs, requesting that they confirm
compliance with the Alert issued by MMS and the United States Coast
Guard on April 30.
Question 3. How many volunteers do you expect to enlist in this
effort?
Answer. Volunteers have been an integral part of the cleanup
efforts thus far. As of July 28, 2010, approximately 32,000 volunteers
have participated in the cleanup efforts. It is difficult to estimate
how many volunteers the Unified Area Command (UAC), of which BP is a
member, expects to enlist in the effort, partly given the uncertainty
of what may be required as part of the cleanup efforts and how long
they may last, but the UAC does continue to solicit the aid of
volunteers. See http://www.deepwaterhorizonresponse.com/go/page/2931/
46359/. At this time, BP plans to continue working with the UAC to use
volunteers through die completion of the cleanup efforts and
appreciates the extraordinary assistance provided so far.
Question 4. Is BP or the Unified Command responsible for directing
cleanup efforts of these volunteers?
Answer. BP collaborates with the UAC to direct the cleanup efforts
of volunteers.
Question 5. Do you plan to continue the use of volunteers through
the completion of the cleanup effort?
Answer. Please see answer to Question 3.
Question 6. Is BP relaying all suggestions and product or service
offerings, including those BP chooses not to pursue, to the Unified
Command?
Answer. BP partners with Federal, state, and local officials to
evaluate the numerous suggestions that have been submitted. The Unified
Command is involved in this process. See http://
www.deepwaterhorizonresponse.com/go/doc/2931/546759/
BP appreciates the many suggestions and proposals that have been
offered in connection with the spill response. Since the start of the
spill, we have received over 100,000 calls, e-mails, and website
submissions from the public describing potential ways to stop the flow
of oil and gas or to contain the spill. For the month of June, BP's
Houston Call Center received, on average, over 2,700 suggestions a day.
The suggestions have come from a variety of people, ranging from
members of the general public to oil industry professionals to
academics and scientists, and from around the world.
Anyone with an idea for the response team is encouraged to submit
it using the Alternative Response Technology (ART) online form located
at http://www.horizonedocs.com. The information captured by the form--
including a list of the materials, equipment and skills required to
implement the suggestion--helps the team discern the idea's potential.
After the caller completes and submits the form, a team of over 50
technical and operational personnel, including personnel from the U.S.
Coast Guard, reviews the technical feasibility of the suggestion and
classifies it in one of three categories:
Not possible or feasible under these conditions;
Already considered or planned; or
Feasible.
As of July 20, 2010, BP has received approximately 120,000 ideas
from telephone calls, e-mails, and website submissions. All of these
ideas have been reviewed at least once by the technical team.
Currently, over 400 ideas have been advanced to a higher-level review
in order to determine which ones fill an operational need and may
require testing in the field. BP currently has over 40 ideas tested or
planned for field testing, including:
An idea submitted by Clean Beach Technologies designed to
mechanically separate oil from sand. This idea has been field
tested and is now approved for use as appropriate in the
response. Other similar sand cleaning processes are scheduled
for field testing shortly.
Another idea, presented by Ocean Therapy Solutions, relates
to centrifuge equipment technology that effectively separates
oil from water within an oil spill scenario. This idea was
field tested, and BP has leased over 30 centrifuges to be
deployed in the skimming activity.
A novel Heavy Oil Skimming System invented by a Florida
resident participating in the Vessels of Opportunity skimming
program. This device is efficient at collecting heavier oil
particles floating just below the water's surface, and is being
manufactured for widespread use at local shipyards along the
Gulf Coast.
Ideas received from many state and local government entities are
also processed through the ART system, with a BP representative acting
as a point of contact to communicate the status of any suggestions to
the state and local authorities who submitted them. To ensure that each
idea received is reviewed in a timely manner, BP has expanded its
internal team and is now complemented by a newly established Federal
Interagency Alternative Technology Assessment Program (IATAP)
workgroup, led by the U.S. Coast Guard. The IATAP was announced on June
4 and includes participation by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
Regulation, and Enforcement, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the United States
Army Corps of Engineers, the United States Department of Agriculture,
and the Maritime Administration.
Question 7. What efforts has BP employed on the Mississippi Coast
to respond to tar balls and other oil deposits?
Answer. BP continues to work with the U.S. Coast Guard and other
Federal and state agencies to respond to tar balls and other oil
deposits. If tar balls are reported, the Unified Command, comprised of
representatives from Federal and state agencies, deploys a Shoreline
Cleanup Assessment Team (``SCAT'') to the area. SCAT members talk to
the person who reported the tar ball and try to obtain a description,
quantity, location, and time when it was seen. In addition, SCAT
members scan the coastline daily for signs of oil or tar balls.
Question 7a. What have you done to ensure public dissemination of
this information?
Answer. BP as well as Federal and state agencies involved with the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Response in Mississippi continue to work
together to disseminate information. Communication about tar balls and
oil deposits washing ashore began long before the first sighting of tar
balls reached Mississippi shores in early June.
To date, BP and the other agencies have participated in town hall
meetings and public fora, spoken to civic groups, and appeared on local
television talk shows to discuss the spill and its aftermath. The
meetings and fora include:
U.S. Department of Commerce Minority Business Development
Agency Town Hall Meeting/Information Exchange
Mississippi Gulf Coast American Advertising Federation
Gulf Coast Business Council General Membership Meeting
Jackson County Chamber of Commerce
Gulf Coast Non-Profit Leadership
Recovery Summit
NAACP Biloxi Chapter
Mississippi Gulf Coast Chamber of Commerce
Pascagoula Rotary Club
Oil Spill Resources and Claims Fair
City of Pascagoula Town Hall
Mississippi Hospitality & Restaurant Association
Claims Fair with Ken Feinberg
Hancock County Employee Picnic
Gulf Coast Emergency Management
BP has focused on outreach to children by distributing notepad and
pen sets that say, among other things, ``If you see oiled debris call
1-866-448-5816.'' Beach safety post cards also have been distributed.
Displays that read ``WATCH OUT! If you spot oiled debris DON'T
TOUCH!'' also are being used at area libraries.
Lastly, information about tar balls is available on the Deepwater
Horizon website and the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency
website.
Question 7b. Do you believe our constituents on the Gulf Coast are
informed as to what to do if they encounter oil or tar balls?
Answer. Efforts have been made to inform the public about oil or
tar balls as outlined above. Signs are posted along Mississippi beaches
warning beachgoers not to touch tar balls and instead to ``report the
sightings.''
Question 7c. Have you run TV or radio ads to alert locals of the
precautions?
Answer. BP has undertaken numerous steps to make sure Americans
residing, working, and volunteering on the Gulf Coast have up-to-date
information about what to do if they encounter oil, tar balls, or some
other environmental issue stemming from the April 20 incident or
resulting oil spill. BP has established a toll-free hotline available
24 hours a day, 7 days a week, for the reporting of any community or
environmental impacts. In addition, BP's Gulf of Mexico Response web
page contains detailed response information and documentation,
including links to up-to-date information on offshore containment,
subsea. response and shoreline protection efforts, community
initiatives, and information on whom to contact regarding a number of
response-related issues. It also provides local response web pages
dedicated to relief efforts in Mississippi and other states affected by
the incident. The ``Public Information Resources'' page contains toll-
free numbers for the public to gain access to information on community
outreach efforts, wildlife, volunteers and more. In addition, the UAC
has sanctioned and updates regularly a website dedicated to the
Deepwater Horizon Response that provides the public with information on
response-related issues, including area contingency plans for the Gulf
states, relevant news releases, health and safety information, and
information relating to the claims process, among many other issues of
concern to the public.
Question 8. Who determines when to transition from the use of
``mud'' during drilling to the use of saltwater?
Answer. Because investigations into the Deepwater Horizon incident
are ongoing, it would be premature to speculate regarding specific
decisions. In addition, certain third parties may have in their
possession information that may be relevant to this request but to
which BP does not have access.
That said, BPA has produced the following documents to the
Committee that are pertinent to your request: (1) a copy of the draft
presentation that outlines the preliminary perspectives of the
investigation team commissioned by BP to investigate the incident, BP-
HZN-SCS000001-48; and (2) a copy of the Temporary Abandonment Permit
approved by MMS on April 16, 2010 for the temporary abandonment of the
Macondo MC 252 #1 well bore, which sets out the procedure approved by
MMS for the temporary abandonment of the well, BP-HZN-SCS000050-53.
Precisely who made which decisions will be examined as part of the
investigation BP has commissioned, the results of which it plans to
share when the investigation is completed.
Question 9. Who determined the type of cement used to cap the well?
Answer. Because investigations into the Deepwater Horizon incident
are ongoing it would be premature to speculate regarding specific
decisions. In addition, certain third parties may have in their
possession information that is relevant to this request but to which BP
does not have access. As the contractor responsible for cementing the
MC 252 well, Halliburton may be able to provide information about the
type of cement used on the well.
Question 9a. Is the cement used different from that used in the
majority of wells in deepwater?
Answer. As the contractor responsible for cementing the MC 252
well, Halliburton may be able to provide information about the type of
cement used on the well and how it compares to the types of cement used
in other deepwater wells.
Question 9b. If this is a new or unique type of cement, what
testing is performed on new cement blends prior to commercial use?
Answer. As the contractor responsible for cementing the MC 252
well, Halliburton may be able to provide information about the type of
cement used and whether testing was performed on new cement blends
prior to commercial use.
Question 10. Have you made any requests for assets or assistance
from your Federal partners in the Unified Command that have not been
provided or approved during your ongoing response efforts?
Answer. BP has collaborated closely with the UAC, which directs the
clean-up and remediation efforts. With input from BP, the National
Incident Commander and his staff ultimately decide how the response
efforts should proceed. BP often provides input into this process and
makes recommendations or requests involving the UAC. At times, the UAC
has determined a course of action different from the recommendation or
request suggested by BP.
Question 11. Are you aware of other instances when a blowout
preventer failed to close after the well had been capped?
Answer. Assuming this question asks about instances where the BOP
does not function as intended, BP is conducting an internal
investigation that, among other things, is seeking to understand why
the BOP on the Deepwater Horizon did not function as intended, and it
will share the results of its investigation once it is complete.
Question 12. Once a hardening substance is placed in the well
during a capping procedure, can it be expected that any blowout would
lodge debris in the blowout preventer and thus prevent the blowout
preventer from functioning properly?
Answer. The blowout preventer (BOP), and specifically why it did
not function as expected on the Deepwater Horizon, is one of the
subjects of multiple investigations, including BP's ongoing, non-
privileged investigation. BP will share the results of its
investigation once it is complete. In addition, as the contractor
responsible for cementing the MC 252 well, Halliburton may be able to
provide information pertaining to the cement. Further, Cameron, as the
manufacturer of the Deepwater Horizon BOP, and Transocean, as the owner
and operator of the Deepwater Horizon, may also be able to provide
information as to whether the BOP would function if debris were in the
BOP stack.
Question 13. Was acoustic testing performed after capping of the
well, and if not, who made the decision to skip this step?
Answer. Cement bond log testing, which involves the use of acoustic
signals to test the quality of a cement job, is not required for
temporary abandonment of a well except as provided by 30 C.F.R.
250.428. Pursuant to 250.428, if there is an indication of an
inadequate cement job (such as lost returns, cement channeling, or a
failure of equipment), then a lessee must take further steps to analyze
the cement job, including running a cement bond log test, pressure
testing the casing shoe, running a temperature survey, or using a
combination of those three techniques. Because investigations into the
Deepwater Horizon incident are ongoing, however, it would be premature
to speculate regarding specific decisions. As mentioned above, BP is
conducting an internal investigation of the April 20 incident and will
share those results once the investigation is complete.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Steven Newman
Question 1. The Chief Electronics Technician on Deepwater Horizon,
Mike Williams, has stated that BP had the drilling crew bump up the
rate of penetration at the first well, cracking it and forcing it to be
abandoned. This should have served as a warning to slow down. But that
is not what happened. When drilling resumed, Williams says there was
damage done to a vital component in the BOP, the annular. When the
drilling crew finds chunks of rubber from the annular back up in the
drilling fluid, what is the standard industry procedure to deal with
that and was that done in this case and if not, why not?
Answer. We understand from the May 16, 2010 60 Minutes segment in
which Transocean Chief Electronics Technician Michael Williams appeared
that a man monitoring drilling fluid saw pieces of rubber in the
drilling fluid returns approximately 4 weeks before the accident. While
the Company has not located any record of this reported observation,
having some rubber returns to the shakers in the drilling mud is
normal.
There are several sources of rubber down hole; annular rubber would
be the most common source. Given the size of the annular, the
manufacturer advises that normal wear and tear as a result of periodic
use is expected, and a handful of small chunks of rubber would be
immaterial. The annular is roughly three feet in diameter, about 18
inches tall, and weighs about 2,000 pounds. It is designed to close
around drill pipe, and drill pipe regularly moves through closed
annulars, which can displace pieces of the annular rubber. The rubber
used in annular blowout preventers is known to be a consumable item,
and rubber loss is not considered problematic if the annular blowout
preventer continues to hold rated pressure. Cameron brochures,
available on Cameron's website highlight these facts. For example, one
such brochure explains that ``[t]he elastomeric packing elements used
in CAMERON Type D/DL annular blowout preventers are considered to be
consumable items and will eventually wear-out as a result of repeated
closures and pressure test. Every closure and pressure test while in-
service will use up some of the packing element life. The packing
element subassembly should not be rejected for continued service based
on cosmetic appearance. Failure of a pressure test or drift test are
the only justifiable reasons for rejection.'' See In-Service Condition
of CAMERON D/DL Annular BOP Packing Element Subassemblies, available at
http://www.c-a-.com/cam/search/showdocw.cfm?DOCUMENT_ID=8360.
Most important, BOP tests on April 10, 2010 and April 17, 2010,
confirmed that the annular was operating properly after any such
incident.
Question 2. What were the last pressure readings Transocean took on
the well prior to the explosion, when were they taken, and how did they
compare to prior pressure readings?
Answer. Transocean does not have access to the pressure readings at
the BOP, which were lost with the rig and our data acquisition system.
However, BP conducted a negative pressure test shortly before the
incident and determined the results to be good. The BOP had also
recently passed a number of tests. The blind shear rams of the BOP
passed pressure tests taken by Transocean in conjunction with
Halliburton at 250 psi low and 2,500 psi high on April 20, 2010. (See
TRN-USCG--MMS-00011644 * through TRN-USCG--MMS00011648). The
annular and pipe ram systems were pressure tested twice on April 10,
2010. During the first series of tests, on 6\5/8\ inch drill pipe, the
lower annular system passed tests to 250 psi low and 3,500 psi high;
the upper annular system passed tests to 250 psi low and 5,000 psi
high; and the pipe rams passed tests to 250 psi low and 6,500 psi high.
During the second series of tests, on 5\1/2\ inch drill pipe, the lower
and upper annular ram systems passed tests to 250 psi low and 3,500 psi
high and the pipe ram systems passed tests to 250 psi low and 6,500 psi
high. (See TRN-USCG--MMS00011600 through TRN-USCG--MMS-00011604).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\*\ All documents referred to are retained in Committee files.
Question 3. Were the components in the blowout preventer stack
rated for that kind of pressure?
Answer. The BOP is rated for the following pressures:
The 18\3/4\ inch BOP rams and fail-safe hydraulic valves are
rated by their manufacturer, Cameron, to 15,000 psi working
pressure.
The 18\3/4\ inch upper annular system is rated to 10,000 psi
working pressure, and the 18\3/4\ inch lower annular stripping
element installed is rated to 5,000 psi working pressure. (See
TRN-HCEC-00007822 through TRN-HCEC-00008055.)
Question 4. What were the pressure ratings for the components in
the blowout preventer stack?
Answer. See above.
Question 5. You have stated that at the time of the explosion,
Transocean's crew was in the process of displacing drilling fluid with
sea water at BP's direction. Is this true?
Answer. Yes, the Transocean crew, at the direction of BP, was in
the process of displacing drilling mud and replacing it with sea water
at the time of the explosion.
Question 6. Is it standard industry practice to take this step when
there have been anomalous pressure readings on the sealed well just
hours earlier?
Answer. The Deepwater Horizon explosion occurred after the well
construction process was essentially finished. Drilling had been
completed on April 17, and the well had been sealed with cement by the
cementing contractor. BP did not plan to use the well for production at
this time; rather BP planned to reopen the well at a later date when,
and if, it chose to put the well into production. At the time of the
explosion and fire, the Transocean crew, at the direction of BP, was in
the process of displacing drilling mud and replacing it with sea water.
The drilling mud was thus no longer being used as a means of reservoir
pressure containment. The cement and the casing were the barriers
controlling pressure from the reservoir.
Displacing drilling mud with sea water is a normal and, in fact,
required step in the abandonment process. (See 30 CFR 250.442(e)).
Standard industry practice is to not displace drilling mud with sea
water until confident that the cement and casing are sufficient to
control pressure from the reservoir. An anomalous pressure reading
prior to the displacement of drilling mud with sea water could weigh in
favor of delaying the displacement of drilling mud until after further,
satisfactory pressure testing. The April 20, 2010 drilling report
reflects that the casing and seal assembly were tested between 1 am and
3 am that morning at 4,000 psi for 30 seconds, and 10,000 psi for 10
seconds. Pressure was then bled off to 6,500 psi and held for 5
minutes. (See TRN-USCG--MMS-00011644 through TRN-USCG--MMS-00011648).
Nothing abnormal was found during this test.
Transocean's investigation will examine the events leading up to
the explosion, including, but not limited to, any such allegedly
abnormal pressure tests. Transocean will report the findings of the
investigation when it is complete and provide the Committee with
documents relating to the accident and any findings related thereto.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Steven Newman
Question 1. What percentage of Transocean's undersea drilling
systems (such as blowout preventers and risers) currently operating in
the U.S. exclusive economic zone have been classed or certified by the
American Bureau of Shipping or another internationally-recognized
classification society?
Answer. One hundred percent of Transocean's undersea drilling
systems were classed or certified by either the American Bureau of
Shipping or DNV when built.
Question 2. I'm aware that classification of subsea drilling
systems is currently voluntary, but what is keeping you from getting
ABS classification for 100 percent of your subsea drilling systems
(including blowout preventers and risers)?
Answer. Each of Transocean's undersea drilling systems is certified
by either the American Bureau of Shipping or DNV when built. Transocean
inspects its undersea drilling systems according to a 5-year overhaul
cycle and on an as-needed basis. Transocean performs such inspections
in conjunction with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and
Transocean-approved vendors for designed equipment, and does not
believe that a third-party inspection or ABS classification would add
value or offer any safety or operational benefit above and beyond the
inspections that are performed.
Question 3. Is there a cost issue here, or is it some other
concern?
Answer. Cost is not an issue. Transocean conducts inspections on
the schedule for each component and on an as-needed basis in
conjunction with the original equipment manufacturer and does not
believe that a third-party inspection or ABS classification would add
value or offer any benefit above and beyond the inspections already
performed.
Question 4. Recent press accounts indicate that there may have been
numerous known failures in the blowout preventer for the Deepwater
Horizon rig. Did Transocean employees know of any failed, damaged, or
partially functioning components of the blowout preventer prior to the
rig explosion? If so, please list the components, their reported
problems, the date those problems were known or recognized, and whether
each problem was reported to either BP or the Federal Government.
Answer. Prior to the rig explosion, Transocean employees did not
know of any failed, damaged, or partially functioning components of the
blowout preventer that could have compromised well control. Transocean
employees were aware of a leak on the open side of the solenoid valves
of the lower test ram, but this equipment has no well control function.
In addition, the leak only occurred when the valve was in the ``open''
function and not when the valve was in the ``block'' function.
Additionally, the BOP had recently passed a number of tests. The
blind shear rams of the BOP passed pressure tests taken by Halliburton
to 250 psi low and 2,500 psi high on April 20, 2010. (See TRN-USCG--
MMS-00011644 through TRN-USCG--MMS00011648). The annular and pipe ram
systems were pressure tested twice on April 10, 2010. During the first
series of tests, on 6 5/8 inch drill pipe, the lower annular system
passed tests to 250 psi low and 3,500 psi high; the upper annular
system passed tests to 250 psi low and 5,000 psi high; and the pipe
rams passed tests to 250 psi low and 6,500 psi high. During the second
series of tests, on 5\1/2\ inch drill pipe, the lower and upper annular
ram systems passed tests to 250 psi low and 3,500 psi high and the pipe
ram systems passed tests to 250 psi low and 6,500 psi high. (See TRN-
USCG--MMS00011600 through TRN-USCG--MMS-00011604).
Transocean's investigation will examine the events leading up to
the explosion, including, but not limited to, any failed, damaged, or
partially functioning components of the blowout preventer. Transocean
will report the findings of the investigation when it is complete and
provide the Committee with documents relating to the accident and any
findings related thereto.
Question 5. Can you confirm whether, as reported on 60 Minutes,
there were rubber chunks from the blowout preventer seals coming up to
the rig in the drilling fluid?
Answer. We understand from the May 16, 2010 60 Minutes segment in
which Transocean Chief Electronics Technician Michael Williams appeared
that a man monitoring drilling fluid saw pieces of rubber in the
drilling fluid returns approximately 4 weeks before the accident. While
the Company has not located any record of this reported observation,
having some rubber returns to the shakers in the drilling mud is
normal.
On April 6, 2010, the rig experienced a well control situation that
required the closure of the lower annular. Subsequently, approximately
1300 feet of drill pipe was moved upward through the lower stripping
annular. It is believed that the rubber could have come from this
normal operation for which the annular is designed.
There are several sources of rubber down hole; annular rubber would
be the most common source. Given the size of the annular, the
manufacturer advises that wear and tear as a result of periodic use is
expected, and a handful of small chunks of rubber would be immaterial.
The annular is roughly 3 feet in diameter, about 18 inches tall, and
weights about 2,000 pounds. It is designed to close around drill pipe,
and drill pipe regularly moves through closed annular, which can
displace pieces of the annular rubber. The rubber used in annular
blowout preventers is known to be a consumable item, and rubber loss is
not considered problematic if the annular blowout preventer continues
to hold rated pressure. Cameron brochures, available on Cameron's
website highlight these facts. For example, one such brochure explains
that ``[t]he elastomeric packing elements used in CAMERON Type D/DL
annular blowout preventers are considered to be consumable items and
will eventually wear-out as a result of repeated closures and pressure
test. Every closure and pressure test while in-service will use up some
of the packing element life. The packing element subassembly should not
be rejected for continued service based on cosmetic appearance. Failure
of a pressure test or drift test are the only justifiable reasons for
rejection.'' See In-Service Condition of CAMERON D/DL Annular BOP
Packing Element Subassemblies, available at http://www.c-a-.com/cam/
search/showdocw
.cfrn?DOCUMENT_ID=8360.
Most important, the above-referenced BOP tests on April 10, 2010
and April 17, 2010, confirmed that the annular was operating properly
after any such incident.
Question 6. When a blowout preventer experiences a failed or
partially malfunctioning component, who s typically responsible for
deciding whether to halt drilling to repair the blowout preventer?
Answer. If a blowout preventer experiences a failed or partially
malfunctioning component, the operator and the driller likely would
make a collaborative decision with respect to whether to halt drilling.
The remaining redundancies of the blowout preventer would likely be a
key factor in any such decision. While the decision to suspend drilling
operations would be collaborative, BP maintains ultimate responsibility
for determining when to resume drilling operations. However, if
Transocean feels it is not safe to continue work, we will not do so.
Question 7. For any failed, damaged, or partially functioning
components of the blowout preventer in the Deepwater Horizon incident
that were known prior to the catastrophic explosion, please detail any
steps that were taken to fix each of those problems. If no such steps
were taken, or if a decision was made to not stop drilling to repair a
problem, please explain why.
Answer. Prior to the rig explosion, Transocean employees did not
know of any failed, damaged, or partially functioning components of the
blowout preventer that could have compromised well control.
Additionally, the BOP had recently passed a number of tests. The blind
shear rams of the BOP passed pressure tests taken by Halliburton to 250
psi low and 2,500 psi high on April 20, 2010. (See TRN-USCG--MMS-
00011644 through TRN-USCG--MMS-00011648). The annular and pipe ram
systems were pressure tested twice on April 10, 2010. During the first
series of tests, on 6\5/8\ inch drill pipe, the lower annular system
passed tests to 250 psi low and 3,500 psi high; the upper annular
system passed tests to 250 psi low and 5,000 psi high; and the pipe
rams passed tests to 250 psi low and 6,500 psi high. During the second
series of tests, on 5\1/2\ inch drill pipe, the lower and upper annular
ram systems passed tests to 250 psi low and 3,500 psi high and the pipe
ram systems passed tests to 250 psi low and 6,500 psi high. (See TRN-
USCG--MMS-00011600 through TRN-USCG--MMS-00011604).
Transocean's investigation will examine the events leading up to
the explosion, including, but not limited to, any failed, damaged, or
partially functioning components of the blowout preventer. Transocean
will report the findings of the investigation when it is complete and
provide the Committee with documents relating to the accident and any
findings related thereto.
Question 8. For the blowout preventer involved in the Deepwater
Horizon incident, please detail its full service-life history of all
component failures, malfunctions, and failed tests.
Answer. While a comprehensive yet concise narrative regarding the
service-life and maintenance history of the Deepwater Horizon's blowout
preventer system is not possible, Transocean has produced documents
detailing its testing history, as well as documents detailing all
preventative maintenance and repairs related to the blow out preventer
from the time it was acquired from Cameron (2000) and put in operation
on the Deepwater Horizon (2001) through when it was used on the Macondo
well (February 8, 2010 through April 20, 2010). (See TRN-HCJ-00064695
through TRN-HCJ-00076944 (BOP testing results); TRN-HCEC-00040041--TRN-
HCEC-00040217, TRN-HCEC-00040249--TRN-HCEC00054353 (2001-2010 repair
and preventative maintenance history for the Deepwater Horizon's well
control equipment); TRN-HCJ-00093709--TRN-HCJ-00120896 (20012010 BOP
maintenance schedule and records)).
Question 9. In a 2003 paper presented by Transocean employee Earl
Shanks at the Offshore Technology Conference, he wrote that ``because
of the pressure on getting the equipment back to work, root cause
analysis of the [blowout preventer] failures is generally not
performed.'' This seems to indicate that when blowout preventer
failures happen, your industry is more concerned with profits than
investigating the reasons behind the safety failure. Isn't industry's
failure to investigate the root causes of blowout preventer failures a
long-term safety risk? How can we expect blowout preventers to become
more reliable if the industry fails to take basic steps like conducting
root cause analyses when blowout preventer failures happen?
Answer. It is true that an industry-wide failure to investigate the
root causes of blowout preventer failures could pose a long-term safety
risk. However, Transocean is and has always been committed to
investigating the root causes of any such failure. Transocean has
implemented and adheres to a robust subsea maintenance philosophy. (See
TRN-HCEC00011553 through TRN-HCEC-00011563). Transocean also routinely
conducts subsea reliability courses to train and share lessons learned
among all of its subsea engineers and uses a feedback system in its
maintenance program to capture improvement opportunities and apply them
across the fleet through a bulletin and alert process.
Earl Shanks's 2003 paper was in fact an effort to drive toward
building reliability standards into equipment specifications at the
time of design and purchase as well as the testing requirements to
ensure that a BOP stack can be counted on to safely and reliably
perform. This paper and the study upon which it is based reflects
Transocean's commitment to improving the reliability and safety of
subsea equipment. Similarly, Transocean has assembled an investigative
team to determine what caused the Deepwater Horizon explosion, a team
that includes dedicated Transocean and other industry experts. That
investigation is ongoing. Transocean will report the findings of the
investigation when it is complete.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Claire McCaskill to
Steven Newman
Question 1. The Deepwater Horizon Unified Command has been
operating a Joint Information Center (JIC) since the first days of the
spill. The JIC has and continues to receive submissions for alternative
response technology, services or products. How many submissions has the
JIC received? How many submissions have been responded to? What is the
JIC's process for vetting these submissions, and how many submissions
have been brought to the attention of JIC leadership?
Question 2. It is my understanding that Louisiana officials have
met with and reviewed alternative response technologies, including
those proposed by Show Me Energy. How closely is the JIC working with
state and local governments in reviewing alternative response
technologies? What process is in place to share information and ideas
with state and local governments?
Question 3. As you know, the Coast Guard has detected the presence
of dozens of ``tar balls'' approaching the Florida coast, suggesting
that the Gulf Coast oil spill has traveled throughout the Gulf Coast
region. How do you plan to determine whether these tar balls are indeed
a product of the Deepwater Horizon spill? In light of the failed
remediation strategies that have been tried thus far, how does the
Unified Command plan to prevent this eastward expansion of the spill?
Answer. The Unified Command structure set up shortly after the
incident includes the JIC. As the named responsible party, BP leads the
response with the USCG. About 400 people are working daily in Robert,
Louisiana, made up of BP, USCG, NOAA, MMS, and many other Federal and
state government officials. Transocean has three persons there to
provide support including current information regarding the Transocean
relief-well drilling, crude oil recovery and other activities in
support of BP. Transocean does not have direct knowledge in response to
the questions above, but knows generally that BP are processing many
calls through the hotline, and Transocean has referred many ideas we
have received to BP. Transocean directs requests for information from
local, state or Federal Government elected officials to Jay Harper with
the Government Affairs department within the External Affairs section
of the Deepwater Horizon response. Jay's contact information is as
follows:
Jay Harper, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Office of Legislative Affairs
Wash DC phone: 202-384-5336
Robert LA phone: 985-543-3379
E-mail: [email protected]
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Warner to
Steven Newman
Question 1. In previous testimony you have described how
challenging it is to operate at these depths, stating it is ``like
open-heart surgery at 5,000 feet'' If that is the case, what was your
company's ``Plan B'' if the Blowout preventer failed? Shouldn't you
have a pre-coordinated response plan, with equipment available on short
notice, for this possibility?
Answer. Respectfully, the statement quoted above was not made by a
Transocean employee or spokesperson, but instead by the Chairman and
President of BP America. That said, Transocean's well control plans and
procedures (see TRN-HCJ-00005402 through TRN-HCJ-00005797) comply with
Federal law, and extensive training related to well control operations
follows the Well Control Accreditation Program (WellCAP), which has
been developed by the International Association of Drilling Contractors
and adopted by the Offshore Operators Committee to comply with Subpart
0 training regulations issued by the United States Minerals Management
Service.
Question 2. Either in terms of gross dollars, or in terms of a
percentage of revenues, how much have you invested in R&D for advanced
exploration and production technologies and techniques each year and
over the 10-year period?
Answer. It is difficult to provide a precise answer to this
question as Transocean's R&D expenditures are not grouped into an
``advanced exploration and production technologies and techniques''
category. However, Transocean believes that a conservative estimate is
that it invests tens of millions of dollars each year in R&D in the
areas of new rig design, equipment upgrades, drilling techniques, and
safety improvements.
Question 3. What level of investment do you think industry should
be required to make in safety and prevention technologies and practices
so that we can be fully prepared to deal with worst-case scenarios in
the challenging environment of deepwater drilling?
Answer. Transocean has assembled an investigative team to determine
what caused the Deepwater Horizon explosion, a team that includes
dedicated Transocean and other industry experts. That investigation is
ongoing. Until we know exactly what happened on April 20, 2010 and the
real sequence of events, it is difficult to speculate about what
additional investments in safety and prevention technologies and
practices should be made.
Question 4. It would appear that the Gulf oil spill also involved
regulatory failures. What sort of regulatory improvements are needed to
encourage industry to make appropriate investments in safety and
disaster prevention?
Answer. Transocean has assembled an investigative team to determine
what caused the Deepwater Horizon explosion, a team that includes
dedicated Transocean and other industry experts. That investigation is
ongoing. Until we know exactly what happened on April 20, 2010 and the
real sequence of events, it is difficult to speculate about what
additional investments in safety and prevention technologies and
practices should be made or what regulatory improvements should be
implemented to encourage any such investments.
The remaining questions were directed to BP.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
Steven Newman
Question 1. Has Transocean initiated inspection of other blowout
preventers you are using in the Gulf of Mexico?
Answer. On June 8, 2010, the MMS issued Notice to Notice to Lessees
and Operators (NTL) No. 2010-N05, ``Increased Safety Measures for
Energy Development on the OCS.'' The MMS Notice to Lessees and
Operators contains specific recommendations to Operators for steps to
enhance safety in Outer Continental Shelf drilling operations. Among
other things, the MMS Notice to Lessees and Operators requires
operators to conduct a third-party inspection of all subsea and surface
BOP equipment used in floating drilling operations before beginning a
new drilling operation or resuming an operation suspended under the
moratorium.
Under this Notice from MMS, well operators, such as BP, should be
initiating third-party recertification inspections of BOP equipment as
appropriate under the Notice to Lessees and Operators. Transocean is
cooperating with the operators for which it works to coordinate the
timing of any BOP recertification inspections for BOPs on vessels that
are or will be operating in the Gulf of Mexico. Timing of the
recertification inspections appears complicated by the limited
resources available to perform the third-party inspections and the high
number of recertification inspections sought.
As further information, only two of Transocean's vessels are
currently working for Operators in the Gulf of Mexico: the Deepwater
Nautilus and the Discoverer Americas. The Operator utilizing the
Americas was ordered to temporarily abandon its current well. The MMS
granted the Operator for the Nautilus permission to complete the
current well.
The following summarizes the recertification status and timeline,
to the extent known to Transocean, for BOPs on vessels currently or
recently operating in the Gulf of Mexico. References to standard,
preventative, and/or corrective BOP maintenance encompass Transocean's
routine maintenance activities.
GSF Development Driller I (DDI):
The DDI was taken out of service to conduct a planned Special
Periodical Survey (SPS) on May 13, 2010. During the planned
service period, other maintenance projects were carried
out, including BOP preventative and corrective maintenance.
At the Operator's request, an independent third party,
ModuSpec, oversaw the BOP maintenance. The rig completed
the service period on June 23, 2010 and is currently on
stand-by. The Operator has indicated that it will be using
ModuSpec as an independent third party to conduct
recertification of this BOP.
GSF C.R. Luigs:
The C.R. Luigs was taken out of service to conduct a planned SPS
on June 6, 2010. During this planned period, other
maintenance projects will be carried out, including BOP
preventative and corrective maintenance as per Transocean
practices. The Operator has indicated that it will use
ModuSpec as an independent third party to conduct the
recertification of the BOP.
Discoverer Spirit:
The Spirit has been on standby since June 1, 2010. At the
Operator request, ModuSpec observed the preventative and
corrective maintenance on the BOP. The Spirit rig is
scheduled to commence a seventy-day SPS period during which
BOP maintenance will be carried out as per Transocean
practices.
Deepwater Nautilus:
The Nautilus is presently completing a well, and the Operator's
completion date is uncertain. The Operator has indicated
that the BOP will be recertified after completion of the
current well.
Discoverer Americas:
The Americas is expected to complete the current well in the next
several days or within a week. The current expectation is
that the Operator will mobilize the rig to Egypt upon
completion of the current well.
Discoverer Deep Seas:
The Deep Seas was put on standby on May 31, 2010, following the
moratorium. While on standby, routine BOP maintenance has
been performed per Transocean practices.
Transocean Amirante:
Since June 11, 2010, the Amirante has been on standby following
the moratorium. The Operator has indicated that it plans to
utilize West Engineering for recertification of the BOP.
Transocean Marianas:
The Marianas has been on standby at the Signal shipyard since
June 20, 2010. Standard maintenance was performed on the
Marianas while on standby per Transocean practices; no date
for BOP recertification has been established.
Deepwater Pathfinder:
The Pathfinder commenced a scheduled SPS in the shipyard on May
23, 2010, which is expected to be completed by August 22,
2010. The BOP will be recertified during this period.
Recertification is not required for vessels assisting in the
response effort. The following summarizes the BOP inspections performed
for Transocean vessels currently in the Gulf and supporting the
response effort:
GSF Development Driller II:
West Engineering was onboard from May 16, 2010 through June 12,
2010 to witness the BOP scope of work and the running of
the BOP. Two MMS inspectors were onboard from May 18, 2010
through May 30, 2010, and these inspectors witnessed the
BOP maintenance work, stump testing, EDS and ROV function
testing, and auto-shear and deadman testing at the surface.
Two MMS inspectors were onboard from June 3, 2010 through
June 10, 2010 to witness the BOP running, subsea pressure
test, and deadman test with the BOP at depth.
Development Driller III:
West Engineering was onboard from April 27, 2010 through May 15,
2010 to witness the BOP scope of work prior to the running
of the BOP. Two MMS inspectors were onboard May 9, 2010
through May 12, 2010, and May 15, 2010 through May 18,
2010, who witnessed the BOP stump testing, ROV intervention
panel testing, EDS testing at the surface, auto-shear
testing at the surface, subsea deadman testing at the
surface and at depth, and subsea BOP pressure testing upon
landing out.
Discoverer Enterprise:
West Engineering was onboard from April 28, 2010 through May 12,
2010 to witness the BOP scope of work prior to running LMRP
for top hat containment. Two MMS inspectors were onboard on
May 6, 2010 and May 7, 2010 to witness the BOP stump test,
ROV intervention panel function testing, and EDS and
deadman testing at the surface.
Discoverer Clear Leader:
The work of the Clear Leader as part of the response effort is
containment work that does not require use of a BOP.
However, on April 29, 2010, the MMS reviewed and checked
various aspects of the BOP and its functions.
Discoverer Inspiration:
The work of the Inspiration as part of the response effort is
containment work that does not require use of a BOP. On
April 28, 2010, the MMS reviewed and checked various
aspects of the BOP and its functions. On May 24, 2010, the
MMS witnessed the function test of the BOP and discussed
past repairs and current status.
Question 2. Who determined the type of cement used to cap the well?
a. Is the cement used different from that used in the majority of
wells in deepwater?
b. If this is a new or unique type of cement, what testing is
performed on new cement blends prior to commercial use?
Answer. For this question, Transocean understands ``cap'' to refer
to the cementing of the final string of casing. The well operator, BP,
and the cementing contractor, Halliburton, are responsible for
selecting the type of cement to be used and the quantity. As a drilling
contractor, Transocean is not involved in this decision or plan. In the
case of the Deepwater Horizon, nitrogen foam cement was used to cement
the casing. In Transocean's June 8, 2010 Interim Internal Investigative
Report prepared for the House Committee on Energy & Commerce,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Transocean raised
questions about the use of nitrogen foam cement at this depth, with the
notation that Transocean does not have expertise in cementing and is
not a cementing contractor. Transocean's interim report is available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100614/
Transocean.DWH.Internal
investigation.Update.Interim.ReportJune.8.2010.pdf, and also is being
produced on disk.
Question 3. What steps have you undertaken to ensure multiple
failures of the blowout preventers do not occur in the future?
Answer. At this time, Transocean cannot confirm that there were
failures of the blowout preventer. Transocean has assembled an
investigative team that includes dedicated Transocean and industry
experts. That investigation is underway. Until the blowout preventer
has been recovered and additional information obtained as a result of
the investigation, we cannot conclude that the blowout preventer failed
to operate as designed and/or whether the blowout preventer was
subjected to conditions beyond its design capabilities.
All Transocean blowout preventers meet or exceed regulatory
standards for safe practices. Once a BOP configuration exceeds
regulatory standards for safe practices, Transocean leaves redundancy
considerations to the well Operator, in this case, BP. There are
multiple BOP configurations that allow a drilling rig to operate
safely, each with different advantages.
Question 4. Are you aware of other instances when a blowout
preventer failed to close after the well had been capped?
Answer. No. For this question, Transocean understands ``cap'' to
refer to the point at which the production string of casing had been
cemented. Once a well has been sealed by cementing and casing and the
appropriate mechanical barriers or cement plugs have been set, a
blowout preventer should not be needed. The Macondo well, which the
Deepwater Horizon was drilling, had been cemented and one plug had been
set. Transocean has not had any other experience with a cased and
cemented well blowing out such that the blowout preventer is unable to
stop the flow of reservoir fluids and does not know of any similar
events.
Question 5. Once a hardening substance is placed in the well during
a capping procedure, can it be expected that any blowout would lodge
debris in the blowout preventer and thus prevent the blowout preventer
from functioning properly?
Answer. Possibly. In answering this inquiry, Transocean interprets
the phrase ``capping procedure'' to refer to the cementing of the well.
Once a well has been cemented and cased, it is a closed system and
there should be no hydrocarbon movement between the reservoir and the
well. Therefore, Transocean believes that for hydrocarbons to have
entered the well, the cementing and/or casing and/or the seal assembly
must have failed. If the casing and/or cementing fail, then it is
possible to have debris in the blowout preventer such that the blowout
preventer cannot function to stop flow.
Question 6. Was acoustic testing performed after capping of the
well, and if not, who made the decision to skip this step?
Answer. Not to Transocean's knowledge. In responding to the
inquiry, Transocean construes the term ``capping'' to refer to
cementing. The decision to perform a cement bond log rests with the
operator and cement contractor--in the case of the Deepwater Horizon,
BP and Halliburton, respectively. As the drilling contractor,
Transocean does not have a role in that decision or activity. To
Transocean's knowledge, no cement bond log was performed on the Macondo
well.
As far as Transocean has been able to determine, a cement bond log
was called for in the BP well plan. A cement bond log uses variations
in amplitude of an acoustic signal traveling down the casing wall
between a transmitter and receiver to determine the quality of cement
bond on the exterior casing wall. Schlumberger technical personnel were
on board the Deepwater Horizon prior to the April 20 incident preparing
for and waiting to perform a cement bond log, and Schlumberger had
moved physical equipment to the Deepwater Horizon to perform the test.
Based on records available to Transocean, those Schlumberger personnel
left the Deepwater Horizon on the morning of April 20, before
performing a cement bond log.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Deborah French-McCay, Ph.D.
Question 1. I'm told the dispersants being used, both on the
surface and subsea, have been pre-approved by the EPA and are
biodegradable. However, I've read that this volume of dispersants
dumped into the Gulf is unprecedented--that we really have no idea what
impacts it might have on open ocean ecosystems or coastal areas. In
your research, have you learned anything about the potential impacts of
this dispersant on fish, birds or salt marsh areas?
Answer. The effects of dispersants on oil and the potential impacts
of their use have been studied by many researchers, including myself;
thus, there is considerable understanding of the potential impacts
related to their use. I myself have performed many analyses of the
implications of dispersant use, as compared to other spill response
alternatives. However, the volume of dispersants used to date in the
Gulf is unprecedented. I and other researchers have not studied oil
spills of this magnitude (spill volume) with the scale of dispersant
use being applied. Thus, the magnitude of impacts may be different than
previously studied.
I will summarize briefly here what we do know about the impacts of
dispersant use on marine biota and habitats. For a more detailed
summary, I invite you to refer to the following National Academy of
Science reviews, both of which have concise executive summaries:
National Research Council (NRC), 1989. Review of the State-of-
Knowledge Regarding Dispersant Usage in Open-Ocean Spill
Responses, NRC Marine Board, National Academy Press,
Washington, D.C., 306p.
National Research Council (NRC), 2005. Oil Spill Dispersants--
Efficacy and Effects. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.,
377p.
The dispersants pre-approved for use in U.S. waters have been
formulated and tested to be much less toxic to marine organisms than
the compounds in oil that cause most toxic effects, the PAHs. The
concentrations lethal to organisms are approximately in the hundreds of
parts per million range for dispersants, whereas lethal concentrations
for the soluble and semi-soluble PAHs are in the parts per billion
range. Dispersants increase the toxicity of oil to organisms in the
water by facilitating the natural processes whereby oil is entrained
(mixed) into the water by waves and turbulence. Furthermore, when
dispersants are effectively applied, the oil so entrained is broken
into smaller droplets than would occur naturally, speeding the
dissolution of the toxic components into the water. It is thought that
the breaking of oil into smaller droplets also facilitates degradation
of the oil, which in either case occurs naturally.
Thus, the potential impacts of the dispersed oil on marine
organisms are related to the amount of oil dispersed, the amount of the
toxic components left in the oil when the oil is dispersed, and the
dilution potential of the receiving water body. In the open ocean, such
as the Gulf of Mexico, dilution potential is relatively high; whereas
near shore and especially in salt marsh areas, dilution is much slower.
For this reason, dispersant applications are focused offshore.
It should be noted that dispersants are used to treat oil in order
to achieve a net environmental benefit. The fact that oil has been
released cannot be changed, and the oil is and will continue to impact
marine organisms, birds and other wildlife, and habitats. The decisions
made during the response are tradeoffs; use of dispersants at this
scale does increase the impact on marine organisms, but also reduces
impacts on wildlife and habitats near shore. If the oil is allowed to
remain floating and potentially come ashore, until it can be feasibly
cleaned up by some means, many birds, sea turtles, marine mammals, and
shoreline habitats (e.g., salt marshes) will be exposed to the oil.
However, with dispersants effectively applied, the amount of oil
fouling wildlife and shorelines is reduced. In the current situation in
the Gulf of Mexico, many of the birds and early life history stages of
fish and shellfish are concentrated in wetlands and other shoreline or
near-shore habitats. Thus, the impacts to these organisms are reduced
by dispersant use, with the tradeoff of an increase (but hopefully
lesser) impact on the offshore marine organisms.
I and many others engaged with the Federal and state governments,
are focused on the evaluation of the impacts of the oil, and of
dispersant use, on marine organisms caused by this spill and the
response. However, there are many challenges that need to be overcome.
One of the greatest difficulties is that we have little quantitative
information on the species and biological communities that occupy the
deeper waters of the Gulf of Mexico. In order to evaluate an impact, we
need to understand how many animals and how much habitat is exposed,
what the effects are on these biota, what their normal rates of
survival, growth and reproduction would be absent the spill, and how
these rates are affected by the dispersed oil and dissolved
hydrocarbons. We are presently engaged in doing the needed basic
science to help answer these questions. Along with the basic scientific
studies, we are also engaged in documenting evidence of the impacts.
Thus, the effort required for these studies is unprecedented, and will
take considerable resources and time to accomplish before we can
provide definitive answers to the public.
Question 2. The Gulf of Mexico also has problems with ``dead
zones'' or areas with low oxygen. Is there anything in the dispersants
being used that might create more dead zones in the area?
Answer. Both the dispersants and the oil will degrade over time and
the bacteria that degrade these compounds do so utilizing oxygen. The
degradation rates will need to be measured or estimated, and combined
with estimates of natural degradation and other oxygen-consuming
processes to determine how the deepwater dissolved oxygen levels have
and will change. Measurements of dissolved oxygen are being taken by
many researchers studying the spill. Thus, it is not clear yet whether
the degradation rates of dispersants and oil are high enough to cause
the areas of low oxygen to increase in size.
Question 3. We are injecting hundreds of thousands of gallons of
dispersants into the source of this spill. This may keep the oil from
getting to the surface or hitting the coastline, but it also has been
forming a giant underwater plume of oil which is 10 miles long, 3 miles
wide and 300 feet thick. How can BP clean-up this massive undersea
plume? Is it the case that once the oil gets dispersed to the deep sea,
all the money and technology in the world cannot clean it, and only
Mother Nature and time will do the job?
Answer. Please note that while we do know there is oil in the
deepwater, the shape and dimensions of that plume are not known at this
time. We do know that the deepwater plume is constantly changing in
shape, direction, and dimensions over time as the currents vary in time
and space. We have been and will continue to sample in the deepwater to
obtain more information so we can determine the nature and extent of
that plume.
There is no available technology at present to clean up oil
dispersed into the deep water of the ocean. The oil will degrade over
time via the action of natural bacteria. Since there are natural seeps
of oil and gas in the Gulf of Mexico in nearby areas, there are
bacteria present that are able to break down the petroleum hydrocarbons
in the oil. The hydrocarbon decay rates vary by the compound in the
oil. While people have suggested seeding those bacteria or stimulating
them in some manner, even if it were feasible to perform such
activities, these approaches are unlikely to be effective in speeding
the rate of decay given the large volumes of water affected and the
fact that these bacteria need to adapt to the situation in the
environment before their numbers can increase substantially.
However, it should be noted that the objective of using dispersants
in the deep sea is to disperse the oil widely into the ocean, not to
clean it up by some kind of removal process. This strategy is used
because it is not feasible to clean up all, or even a majority of, the
oil floating on the water surface. Thus, a net environmental benefit
choice has been made to minimize overall impact to birds, mammals, sea
turtles and shoreline/near-shore habitats by dispersing much of the oil
at sea. It should also be noted that, under the Oil Pollution Act of
1990, the U.S. public is entitled to compensation for the impacts
caused by the spill and response activities, and that compensation
should be in the form of restoration of the environment (as a whole).
Thus, it is important to evaluate the impacts, such that appropriate
compensation (in the form of restoration) may be paid to the public by
the responsible party.
Question 4. The Gulf is clearly an area that has had its share of
exposure to oil, with large natural seeps and quite a few spills over
the last 50 years. Can the plants and wildlife survive a spill of this
magnitude?
Answer. Individual plants and animals have and will be killed by
the oil's effects in areas where lethal thresholds are exceeded. Other
individuals will be affected by reduced growth or life functions in the
longer term. However, eventually and given enough time free from other
impacting stressors, most populations and communities of plants and
animals should recover. The question is how long recovery will take.
Some of the species in deepwater benthic communities in the area
affected by the spill have individuals hundreds of years old. On the
other hand, microscopic plankton populations tend to recover, once the
toxicity is gone, in weeks. The key issues to address are: (1) if there
are species or communities of organisms impacted that cannot recover;
(2) the magnitude and extent of impacts; (3) the time required for and
degree of recovery expected and observed; and (4) the degree to which
the ecosystem balance and functions have been altered, both in the
short and long term. Because there are gaps in our understanding of the
functioning of the affected ecosystems, scientists are presently
engaged both in performing basic research and documenting the impacts
of the spill. Until these studies are accomplished and discussed in
scientific forums, we will not be able to completely answer the
question: what are the impacts of the spill?
Question 5. Have they developed resiliency, or is this the straw
that broke the camel's back?
Answer. While many, or maybe even most, species have likely
developed resiliency, there may be some species or communities that
cannot recover from a large adverse impact. As noted above, because
there are gaps in our understanding of species and the functioning of
the affected ecosystems, studies will be needed to answer this and
related questions.
Question 6. Can you tell us what environmental impacts we are
seeing right now from this incident?
Answer. To date, scientists and spill responders have documented
mortalities of wildlife, fish and invertebrates from direct oil
exposure, as well as oiling of salt marsh and other coastal habitats.
We are engaged in a large and scientifically complicated effort to
document impacts observed and estimate those impacts not directly
observed. We will also need to evaluate the implications of our
findings, in order to assess both the short and long-term impacts of
the spill.
Question 7. What do you expect to see in the next month? In the
next year?
Answer. I expect we will see additional evidence of impacts caused
by the spill, including additional mortalities, reduced life functions
of organisms and communities, reduced production of food for the food
web and reductions in seafood harvest. Some of the impacts could
continue for years. For example, some salt marshes that are heavily
impacted will likely erode and not recover; and other marshes will take
years to recover. There may be reductions in future fish and shellfish
populations because of losses of eggs and larvae killed as the result
of the spill.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Deborah French-McCay, Ph.D.
Question 1. Having seen that residual effects of the Exxon Valdez
oil spill are still very apparent in areas of Prince William Sound, now
some 20+ years later, what kind of time-frame do you believe we will
need for monitoring to fully understand the effects of the oil now in
the Gulf of Mexico?
Answer. Given the magnitude of this spill, and the time required
for recovery for many of the affected organisms and communities (years,
decades and possibly even centuries), monitoring will be required for
at least a decade for most species and ecosystems, and longer for the
very long-lived species and communities or where contamination
persists, if scientists are to be able to evaluate the long-term
impact.
Question 2. With oil being at many different depths within the
water column, what sort of monitoring will be needed to fully monitor
the effects?
Answer. Monitoring is going to require multiple sampling efforts in
space and time using instrumentation deployed from oceanographic ships,
autonomous vehicles, and moorings. This will need to be complemented by
remote sensing and modeling techniques in order to integrate the
information and interpolate between direct measurements and
observations. Surface ships can most easily sample the upper water
column; sampling deeper waters requires specialized instruments and
protective housings. Remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) are effective
samplers that can carry video monitors and specialized cameras; and
ROVs can be deployed from surface vessels. Each instrument measures one
piece of the puzzle in a particular zone of the water column, so it
will take a variety of approaches to fully characterize the
distribution of oil in the deep sea environment. Because it will not be
feasible to sample every location affected over months to years when
oil will be present or impacts will be felt, quantitative computer
modeling approaches, founded in basic science, will be needed to fully
evaluate the effects of the spill. Such modeling will require:
Estimation of the currents in all layers of the ocean and
over months of time;
Evaluation of the weathering and fate of the oil, including
calculation of dissolution of soluble compounds, sedimentation
of oil to the seabed, evaporation at the water surface,
formation of mousse and tar balls, and degradation of
components;
Evaluation of exposure of water column and bottom-dwelling
organisms to dispersed oil and to dissolved components;
Estimation of the toxic and other effects, both short- and
long-term, of these exposures on individual organisms,
populations and ecosystems;
Evaluation of the potential for and rate of recovery of the
affected organisms and ecosystems; and
Consideration of the potential for mitigation of these
effects.
Question 3. You say that some of these toxic compounds are water-
soluble and can be absorbed into the tissues of organisms, such as the
commercial shellfish and finfish species. If humans were to ingest
these compounds, by eating these fish, wouldn't they potentially harm
humans?
Answer. Yes, those compounds are potentially harmful to humans if
ingested in sufficient quantities. Some of the compounds are documented
carcinogens. For this reason, monitoring of seafood safety is a big
part of the response effort.
Question 4. Some of these molecules do not readily degrade. Does
that mean we may have human health issues as well, even after the oil
itself dissipates from the water?
Answer. Over time with dilution, both through water transport and
growth of seafood animals, the human health risks from seafood
contamination should return to the normal background level present in
our modern world. All the world's seas contain some typically-low level
of contamination. The risks related to hydrocarbons remaining in the
environment are considered much lower than those related to metals and
persistent organic pollutants such as PCBs, dioxins and DDT.
Question 5. What kind of time-frame would we need for these
aromatic molecules to break down?
Answer. The degradation rate of the soluble aromatic compounds in
warm surface waters, such as in the surface waters of the Gulf of
Mexico, is about 1 percent per day, or 25 percent per month. However,
data documenting degradation rates in the deep ocean are lacking. I
would expect the degradation rate in the deepwater to be considerably
slower due to the colder temperatures and low oxygen conditions there.
Larger non-soluble compounds in oil are much slower to degrade, by a
factor 10 or more.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
Deborah French- McCay, Ph.D.
Question 1. With your experience of past oil spills in the U.S.,
has our ability to restore ecosystems and recover following an oil
disaster been successful?
Answer. Direct restoration of oil-impacted ecosystems has primarily
involved: (1) cleanup of any oil that may be removed (mechanically or
by burning) without causing more harm to the ecosystem than the oil
itself; (2) replanting of vegetation in such habitats as saltmarshes
and mangroves; and (3) monitoring natural recovery. Habitat restoration
has been performed with varying success, with saltmarshes being the
habitat most successfully restored. Even so, the functionality of
replanted saltmarshes is typically of lower ecological value than that
of a natural healthy habitat. Restoration of seagrass has proved
difficult and the results short-lived, as the grass requires good water
quality, protection from grazing animals (waterfowl), and the right
environmental conditions to thrive. In any case, it takes years for a
restored habitat to recover to full function, even with intervention.
In some cases, specific impacted resources have been targeted for
restocking, nest protection, or other activities designed to enhance
survival or productivity of the targeted biological population. For
example, for the North Cape oil spill in Rhode Island in 1996, female
lobsters that otherwise would have been harvested were placed back in
the water (after compensation the fisherman for the lost catch) and
marked so they would not be taken if caught again. That extra
protection allowed the female lobsters more time to produce young in
their lifetime, enhancing recruitment to the population. Restocking can
also involve shellfish seeding programs using hatchery-raised
individuals. However, these restocking activities have been limited to
nearshore species and anadromous fish such as salmon, where life
histories and growth needs are sufficiently understood. Restocking has
not been attempted on offshore species.
Because of the infeasibility of completely cleaning up the oil and
preventing all harm to the environment, in order to make the public
``whole'' in compensation for the impacts of an oil spill, a Natural
Resource Damage Assessment process is undertaken by the government
trustees. Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the U.S. public is
entitled to compensation by the responsible party for the impacts
caused by the spill and response activities, and that compensation
should be in the form of restoration of the environment scaled to the
magnitude of the injury caused. The restoration is typically in-kind or
enhancement of similar resources to those injured, rather than on the
impacted resources directly, because of the feasibility constraints.
This so-called compensatory restoration includes consideration of the
magnitude of the injury, the time and degree of recovery, and the time
lag before compensation is realized. The latter is addressed by the
responsible party paying interest for the resources the public cannot
use or enjoy in the interim.
Thus, in the Deepwater Horizon case, Federal and state trustees are
engaged in a NRDA process (see NOAA's BP Deepwater Horizon damage
assessment site for more information: http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/
southeast/deepwater_horizon), with the objective being: (1) evaluation
and quantification of injuries caused by the spill, (2) an evaluation
of restoration options, and (3) a quantification of the scale of
restoration required for compensation, including consideration of the
timing of that compensation (i.e., including interest). For offshore
species and ecosystems, there are a number of ideas being considered
for compensatory restoration. Many species (e.g., shrimp, red snapper,
red drum) use saltmarshes and estuaries as nurseries where juveniles
can feed and grow with some protection. Thus, coastal habitat
enhancements can provide compensation for the so-called ``estuarine-
dependant'' species. Another idea, which would benefit offshore
species, is to reduce pollutant loads to the Gulf of Mexico originating
from the Mississippi drainage system. Low oxygen levels off the coast
of Louisiana and Texas are caused by organic matter loads and nutrient
runoff (which stimulates an overgrowth of algae that sinks, decomposes,
and consumes oxygen). Reducing these loads could improve water quality
in deepwater areas where low oxygen levels have affected ecosystem
health.
Question 2. As oil production and import has steadily increased in
the U.S. while oil catastrophes such as that in the Gulf have remained
relatively rare, what lessons can we take from this incident that will
help in protecting natural resources should a similar incident occur in
the future?
Answer. The state of readiness for responding to a spill offshore,
particularly of this magnitude, was obviously a major issue in this
case. This was true of resources to respond and clean up the oil, as
well as for monitoring the environmental impacts. The leaking well and
affected areas offshore were a 24-hour journey or more from port for
most research vessels, such that considerable time was required to
transit out and back, as well as supply the vessels. The biggest
challenge to the government's sampling program to document impacts to
water column and seabed organisms was the lack of readily-available
vessels capable of performing oceanographic research. The vessels
required needed to be seaworthy offshore, have specialized equipment
capable of sampling to >5,000ft in the water, and have experienced crew
able to perform that work. Oceanographic vessels are normally scheduled
months to years in advance; and in the first 3 months after the well
began leaking, there was little if any ship time available. Thus, while
the government's NRDA technical working group was seriously limited by
resources, academics who had already scheduled cruises prior to the
spill (and a few funded by the National Science Foundation after the
spill) were able to get into the spill area to sample more readily than
the government scientists. (This, along with time constraints and
cautions against speculation put on government scientists, explains the
press releases and claims of academics as being first to document
various events.) BP hired offshore-service industry vessels, outfitted
them for oceanographic research, and (eventually) made them available
to government scientists. The mobilization took weeks to months to
accomplish due to the technical complexity and the competition for
resources (i.e., both equipment and technicians to perform the work).
Thus, NRDA sampling was compromised in the first 3 months and some
needed sampling was delayed until late August and September. If the
responsible party had been uncooperative, this process would have taken
far longer, or not have been possible for lack of readily-available
funding.
Thus, in order to be prepared to respond and sample to document
impacts of large offshore spills, vessels and equipment must be ready
and on standby in case the need arises. Also, while industry performing
the oil exploration, production and transport of oil should fund such
readiness, this funding should be required up-front so that resources
are available to government scientists during the emergency phase.
Otherwise, these scientists must submit proposals, negotiate and get
sign-off by the responsible party before work can begin, a process that
invites stalling such that important evidence is lost.
It also took some time to organize the sampling approaches for the
NRDA, both because of the unprecedented nature of the spill and the low
level of support for the NRDA program in recent years. Due to shortage
of funds in NRDA preparedness, many government staff and consultants
involved in the response phase were inexperienced, requiring
considerable direction during the emergency phase. During the period
after OPA90 passed (the 1990s), there was more opportunity for training
at workshops and drills; much of these having been cut in the past 5
years. The increased readiness need not be accomplished by an expansion
of government positions; rather having contractors in place, and
holding regular workshops and drills to maintain readiness, would be
cost-effective and meet the needs of response to a major spill.
Oil spill research has also not been well funded in recent years.
As of 20 April 2010, much of our understanding of oil spills was based
on research performed 20-30 years ago, and much of that was performed
outside the U.S. The U.S. puts much less funding into oil spill
research than countries such as Norway and France. The Deepwater
Horizon oil spill has changed things tremendously, and more research
funds are becoming available. However, the focus will be
(appropriately) on this spill. There remains a large gap in our
knowledge regarding spill response and potential impacts in the arctic
(including in ice) and temperate-zone regions now scheduled for oil and
gas exploitation.
Some of the major areas where research is needed include:
Characterization of deepwater habitats and communities:
While it is known that deepwater coral reefs and chemosynthetic
communities exist in the Gulf of Mexico (and elsewhere), the
vast majority have never been visited or mapped. Thus, when
dispersants were injected at the well, it was unknown what
communities might be exposed downstream. We are presently
performing the basic research to determine what might have been
affected by the dispersed oil.
Densities and life history characteristics (i.e., natural
mortality, growth and reproductive rates) of deepwater fish and
invertebrates that would be exposed to dispersed oil in
deepwater environments--information is sparse at best in all
areas of the world's oceans, including the northeastern Gulf of
Mexico.
Long-term effects of oil exposure on biological communities
and ecosystems.
Finally, in a capitalistic system it is the job of private industry
to make profits. If protection of the environment also helps them make
profits, by improving their image or performing more efficiently, they
will be motivated to do so. However, when the likelihood of an
environmental disaster is perceived as small, with the probability of
consequences considered less costly in the long run than the costs of
readiness, industry will not take it upon themselves to maintain the
readiness needed to avert environmental consequences suffered by the
public at large. It is the job of the government to assure appropriate
readiness, but without being burdensome to the point that American
businesses cannot compete in the world market. Also, cost benefit
analyses need to consider all potential alternatives for providing
energy needs, such as the consequences related to spills of imported
oil, as opposed to domestic development. Otherwise regulations may
unwittingly increase environmental risk to natural resources considered
as a whole.
Question 3. Based on the current scenario of oil leaking 5,000 ft
below the ocean surface approximately 50 miles offshore, what marine
organisms are likely to be impacted most significantly?
Answer. The organisms most significantly affected by the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill will be fish and invertebrates in the offshore area
of the northeastern Gulf of Mexico. Not only would they have been
affected by oil entering the water column and rising through 5,000 feet
of water, but the use of dispersants increased the likelihood of
effects on water column biota in all depth levels.
The dispersants used to treat the spill have been shown to be much
less toxic to marine organisms than the compounds in oil that cause
most toxic effects, the PAHs. The concentrations lethal to organisms
are approximately in the hundreds of parts per million range for
dispersants, whereas lethal concentrations for the soluble and semi-
soluble PAHs are in the parts per billion range. Dispersants increase
the toxicity of oil to organisms in the water by facilitating the
natural processes whereby oil is entrained (mixed) into the water by
waves and turbulence. Furthermore, when dispersants are effectively
applied, the oil so entrained is broken into smaller droplets than
would occur naturally, speeding the dissolution of the toxic components
into the water. It is thought that the breaking of oil into smaller
droplets also facilitates degradation of the oil, which in either case
occurs naturally.
It should be noted that dispersants are used to treat oil in order
to achieve a net environmental benefit. The fact that oil has been
released cannot be changed, and the oil is and will continue to impact
marine organisms, birds and other wildlife, and habitats. The decisions
made during the response are tradeoffs; use of dispersants at this
scale does increase the impact on marine organisms, but also reduces
impacts on wildlife and habitats near shore. If the oil were allowed to
remain floating and potentially come ashore, until it could be feasibly
cleaned up by some means, many more birds, sea turtles, marine mammals,
and shoreline habitats (e.g., salt marshes) would have been exposed to
the oil. However, as it was with dispersants effectively applied, the
amount of oil fouling wildlife and shorelines was much reduced. In the
current situation in the Gulf of Mexico, many of the birds and early
life history stages of fish and shellfish are concentrated in wetlands
and other shoreline or near-shore habitats. Thus, the impacts to these
organisms were reduced by dispersant use, with the tradeoff of an
increase impact on the offshore marine organisms.
However, there may be reductions in future fish and shellfish
populations because of direct kills, or losses of eggs and larvae, as
the result of the spill. The groups most vulnerable are the species
that:
have eggs and larvae that occupying the surface layer of the
ocean (e.g., tunas, billfish, lobster, crabs, shrimp);
feed in the upper waters at some part of their daily or life
cycle;
occupy deep waters of the offshore Gulf of Mexico in the
areas near the well; and
form seabed communities near the well and to the southwest
that occupy slopes between 1,000m (3,300ft) and 1,500m
(5,000ft) of depth, as these were likely exposed to the
subsurface dispersed oil.
I and many others engaged with the Federal and state governments,
are focused on the evaluation of the impacts of the oil, and of
dispersant use, on marine organisms caused by this spill and the
response. However, there are many challenges that need to be overcome.
One of the greatest difficulties is that we have little quantitative
information on the species and biological communities that occupy the
deeper waters of the Gulf of Mexico. In order to evaluate an impact, we
need to understand how many animals and how much habitat is exposed,
what the effects are on these biota, what their normal rates of
survival, growth and reproduction would be absent the spill, and how
these rates are affected by the dispersed oil and dissolved
hydrocarbons. We are presently engaged in doing the needed basic
science to help answer these questions. Along with the basic scientific
studies, we are also engaged in documenting evidence of the impacts.
Thus, the effort required for these studies is unprecedented, and will
take considerable resources and time to accomplish before we can
provide definitive answers to the public.