[Senate Hearing 111-998]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-998
ASSESSING COMMERCIAL SPACE CAPABILITIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND SPACE
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 18, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
----------
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
TOM UDALL, New Mexico SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Ann Begeman, Republican Staff Director
Brian M. Hendricks, Republican General Counsel
Nick Rossi, Republican Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND SPACE
BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman DAVID VITTER, Louisiana, Ranking
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK WARNER, Virginia
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on March 18, 2010................................... 1
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 44
Prepared statement........................................... 45
Witnesses
Thomas P. Stafford, Lt. General, USAF (Ret.), Former NASA
Astronaut...................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Bryan O'Connor, Chief, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.................. 12
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Dr. George C. Nield, Associate Administrator, Office of
Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation
Administration................................................. 16
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Malcolm L. Peterson, Former NASA Comptroller..................... 19
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Michael C. Gass, President and Chief Executive Officer, United
Launch Alliance, LLC........................................... 26
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Frank L. Culbertson, Jr., (Captain, USN, Ret.), Senior Vice
President and Deputy General Manager, Orbital Sciences
Corporation, Advanced Programs Group........................... 30
Prepared statement........................................... 34
Gwynne Shotwell, President, SpaceX............................... 36
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Appendix
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV, U.S. Senator from West Virginia,
prepared statement............................................. 59
Hon. David Vitter, U.S. Senator from Louisiana, prepared
statement...................................................... 59
ASSESSING COMMERCIAL
SPACE CAPABILITIES
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THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Science and Space,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:48 p.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Nelson,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Good afternoon. The hearing will come to
order.
It should be quite obvious to us by now that the NASA
budget, rolled out on February 1, in the President's request,
was, to use some NASA words--in an ``off-nominal fashion.'' I
can tell you for a fact that the perception is that the
President has gutted the human spaceflight program. But, that,
in fact, is a perception, not a fact.
I know the President, and I know him to be a true believer
when it comes to this Nation's spaceflight program, especially
the manned program, and that is the reason the President has,
in part, decided that he is coming to the Kennedy Space Center
on April 15. And we will hear from the Commander in Chief
himself when he hosts that meeting to discuss his new plan for
NASA and for the future of human spaceflight.
I think the Administration will focus on the goals, the
strategies, timelines of their plan, and I think that the
President will lay out an underscored commitment to the
development of technology to pursue a goal that was articulated
by the NASA Administrator here in this hearing room a couple of
weeks ago.
I think this conference is going to be an important step in
response to the concerns that have been expressed by the
American public, as well as by their representatives in
Congress. And I expect the President to lay out his vision and
what the goals and the timelines are for America's manned space
program.
Now, the question is, what are going to be the elements of
bringing about a major R&D effort for, ultimately, a heavy-lift
vehicle to get us out of low-Earth orbit? As the President has
laid out--the good news of his budget has been lost in a lot of
the misperception--NASA is a little civilian agency and he is
recommending a $6-billion increase for NASA over 5 years.
That's a fairly sizable increase, given these financial times,
in which one of the main things that the U.S. Government has to
do is tackle the budget deficit and start driving it down to
get us back into balance.
The other major piece of good news that has been
overshadowed--and I never cease to be amazed, as I talk to
people--that, in what I have just talked about--the
perceptions--this news has been completely lost. And that is,
in the budgeting, up until now, the International Space Station
was going to cease to exist in 2015, which, of course, was
absolutely ridiculous, from a budgetary planning standpoint,
because we haven't even got it completed yet. And it's just
about to be completed and equipped so that, with its
designation as a National Laboratory, it can start to achieve
some of the science, through experimentation in the zero-G
environment, that we've all hoped for; and therefore, in the
President's budget, he adds extra expenditures to keep the
Space Station going until at least 2020.
It is my hope that the President will also recognize the
angst that is out there in the NASA family, because not only
are we in a recession where various parts that have a major
part of the employment of the Nation's Space Program are
severely hurt, because of high unemployment figures, which is
certainly the case in Florida, but the angst is out there
because all of this dedicated team, that is the finest launch
team in the world, is facing layoffs. And all of this is coming
during a difficult economic time in an economic recession. And
this is coming not as a result of these budget decisions, but
budget decisions and safety decisions that were made years ago.
And therefore, because these budget decisions were made over
the last half-dozen years, the new rocket is not ready when the
Space Shuttle is going to be shut down, and as a result, there
is a gap without an American vehicle to launch crews to the
International Space Station. And that has caused a great deal
of angst, as it should, because, if you're laid off of your
job, it's not a recession, it's a depression.
Because the word, in the President's budget, was used,
``cancellation,'' instead of the word ``restructuring'' of
Constellation, it has caused a good bit of angst,
understandably so.
Now, what to do about it? Well, the President's policy that
he's proposing to us, which is the subject matter of this
hearing, is that the trips to and from the Space Station, for
both cargo and crews, can be done cheaper and more quickly by
letting the commercial sector compete in the free market, with
NASA oversight on the human rating, to get crews up and back
from the Space Station. And I know it to be the President's
intent that, simultaneously, he wants the vigorous R&D work in
the development of the new systems to take us beyond low-Earth
orbit. And I think, in large part, that's what he will be
addressing when he comes to the Space Center.
There's one other little iteration that I would certainly
encourage him to consider, and that is that there is a fifth
Shuttle that can fly. It is held as the launch-on-demand, as a
rescue Shuttle if any of the remaining four get into trouble.
But, the risk for the fifth flight would be de minimis because
of the increased volume in the Space Station that, should some
kind of puncture of the orbiter occur on ascent in the fifth
flight, they could rendezvous and dock, take safe harbor in the
International Space Station, and then there would be time,
through the Soyuz modules, to return that crew safely to Earth,
if the worst did happen. But, of course, NASA has so improved--
since the destruction of Columbia, so improved its ability to
make those flights safe. And so, I would argue to the President
to have a fifth Shuttle flight.
If you ask about additional flights, well, the hard reality
sets in. It has been planned for--the shutdown of the Space
Shuttle--for some period of time. And therefore, the external
tanks which would drive future Shuttle flights are not
assembled and are in disparate parts. And when I asked this
question of Bill Gerstenmaier, ``You have parts out there for
three additional tanks. How long would it take you to get
that?'' and he says, ``By the time you recall the workforce and
you get the parts where they can be assembled and you can do
all the checks and you can get additional parts that you need
that you don't have,'' he said, ``it is 2 to 2\1/2\ years down
the road before you could fly.'' And as a practical matter,
that doesn't solve our problem, to wait around another 2, 2\1/
2\ years, when, in fact, the Space Shuttle is scheduled to be
shut down after the fourth flight. I'm hoping the fifth flight
will fly.
And so, we turn to you all. We turn to the commercial
people, and that's what we want to explore here today.
COTS is being executed in two phases, the first period of
private industry development and demonstration of the various
space transportation capabilities to and from Earth orbit. This
phase, which has already seen a significant investment on the
part of NASA, will be funded, according to the President's
request, at $312 million in the Fiscal Year 2011 budget to
expedite the pace of the development. And the second phase is
competitive procurement of orbital transportation services to
supply the ISS. And this phase will be funded through the Space
Operations Mission Directorate, under the ISS Cargo Crew
Services Line, beginning in earnest in Fiscal Year 2011.
Now, on commercial crew to the ISS, the effort was
initiated using the 2009 Recovery Act funds. That's otherwise
known as the ``stimulus bill.'' And that enables future
commercial crew launches to the ISS. Space Act agreements were
awarded to five companies in February of this year to
demonstrate the various technologies and capabilities necessary
to reduce the risk of flying crew on commercial vehicles, with
completion milestones in November and December of this year.
And then, the follow-on commercial crew program, under the
President's recommendation, is $6 billion over the next 5 years
to support the development of commercial crew providers, then
to whom NASA would turn to competitively award transportation
service contracts that are similar to the cargo resupply
services contracts. And this program is going to be open to a
broad range of commercial proposals, including the human rating
of existing launch vehicles, the development of spacecraft for
delivering crew to the ISS, which can be launched on multiple
launch vehicles, and the development of a new, high-reliability
rocket system or systems.
And so, what we're going to do today with all of you
experts is, we want to take a look at these plans and see how
this fits into the broader goals and visions for NASA, a vision
that has been stated by the NASA Administrator, ultimately, to
go to Mars. And we'll see what the President says.
Now, what we'd like to glean from you all is also better
understanding of how that $6 billion for man-rating the systems
is going to be spent. And we want to explore the safety and
regulatory aspects of the new plan. And obviously there can be
no compromises on safety. I will put into the record a
statement that the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has stated
on exactly that.
[The information referred to follows:]
``It is crucial that NASA focus on establishing the certification
requirements; a certification process for orbital transportation
vehicles; and a process for validating compliance. The performance and
safety requirements must be stated promptly and clearly to enable NASA
and non-NASA entities to proceed in the most productive and effective
manner possible.''
Senator Nelson. And so, it's going to be important that
NASA work with the industry to complete a coordinated human-
rating draft by the end of this year--by the end of this Fiscal
Year, which ends September 30.
And contracting commercial services is another area of
interest which is going to be critical here. How will funding
be allocated to this effort during the R&D phases and then
during the operation phases? And how will investments be
divided between government and private sectors as the
capabilities move forward? And how do we ensure these
commercial entities remain viable once they have taken
responsibility for these extremely important missions?
And so, we're also going to hear from some of the companies
today who are competing in this effort, to better understand
your capabilities and timelines and challenges.
And so, instead of introducing all of you at once, I'm just
going to go right down the line, and I will introduce each one
of you.
Your written record is inserted in the record and made an
official part of the transcript.
What I'd like you to do is be mindful that we have seven up
here. And I've already taken too much time, but I wanted to set
the table. If I can hear from you all, each, about 5 minutes,
and then we'll get into a lengthy set of questions. I'm in no
hurry to leave this afternoon.
Our first is Lieutenant General Tom Stafford, United State
Air Force, Retired, the acclaimed astronaut who flew down close
to the surface of the Moon, who flew that mission that, in the
midst of the Cold War, brought about a little bit of thaw, as a
Russian--then Soviet--spacecraft rendezvoused and docked with
an American spacecraft, and the crews lived together for 9
days. And he's going to discuss the impact on astronaut safety
in transitioning the delivery of the crew from the Space
Shuttle and Soyuz to the future commercial spacecraft.
General Stafford, thank you for coming.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS P. STAFFORD, LT. GENERAL,
USAF (RET.), FORMER NASA ASTRONAUT
General Stafford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It's an honor to be invited to appear before you today to
testify on the matter of crew safety and human spaceflight.
And in the wake of the Augustine Committee report, and now
the 2011 budget, the issues that you outlined, Mr. Chairman, it
is imperative that this Congress should carefully consider and
understand all the potential ramifications and the proposed
changes to be made to the program that NASA has pursued and
that the Congress has approved over the 4 years of the human
spaceflight recently.
And before proceeding to answer the question, I'd like to
make just a few observations concerning the Augustine Committee
report, and then, particularly, my experience with the Gemini
Program, which was taking an existing vehicle and modifying it
there for human-rated standards.
And one of the most important observations of the Augustine
Committee was the underlying concern and the deliberations on
the future of human spaceflight has been inadequately unfunded
for many years now, and you've already outlined that, Mr.
Chairman, in your discussion. And it's really inadequate in
certain ways, what they had previously, to carry on the core
efforts.
The Augustine also pointed out that the heavy-lift launch
vehicle will be required for the flexibility to visit the Moon
and other areas.
Now, the plan that NASA had proposed, that has been
approved by this Congress, was a program offering a strategic
vision for human spaceflight that was demanded by Admiral
Gehman and the Columbia Accident Board. It is a program worthy
of our Nation. And the Augustine Committee noted, as you
pointed out, sir, that at least $3 billion per year must be
added to appropriations to accomplish that mission.
He also pointed out that Mars should be the final, ultimate
destination for human exploration of the interplanetary system,
but that the flexible path or to visit the Moon is also not
mutually exclusive, and I agree completely there with that
committee.
The choice is plain: Either we'll provide the funding
necessary to accomplish the worthy objectives of our Nation or
cede the leadership. And I think everyone is--understand that,
and you elegantly outlined that in your effort there.
And I've talked to many of the members after my--I was the
first presenter to the Augustine Commission, Mr. Chairman, and
after the Committee had its findings, I've talked to the ones
that I knew personally, told them that I agreed with about 90
percent of their findings, but I had a--certainly, a different
point of view in about 5 to 8 percent of their findings. And
I'm not familiar with all aspects of the proposed 2011 budget,
or all the aspects of NASA's response to it.
And I certainly agree with--as you outlined, remaining
Space Shuttle flights should be launched on schedules
compatible with safe test checkout and launch operations.
And then, that fifth Shuttle we have on standby-on-need
could be launched very easily, if a small amount of funding was
available. And that would certainly enhance the viability of
the International Space Station, Mr. Chairman.
Now, the--again, as the Augustine Commission had its
findings extending--that was one of my first recommendations,
was to extend it from 2015 to 2020. And that is in the budget,
as I've read in a macro view.
And to have and to use this great international laboratory
requires this guaranteed space transportation capability as
soon as possible after the Shuttle retirement. And the--but
also, the Augustine Commission had the finding that that
responsibility be removed from NASA and offered to commercial
providers. Yet, today approximately 83 percent of every NASA
dollar goes to commercial providers directly.
And I'd like to differentiate the two subjects--and I think
you've already mentioned it, Mr. Chairman--concerning the
commercial crew delivery to the Station and commercial cargo
delivery to the Station. And for the commercial cargo delivery,
there first has to be the development and the demonstration of
a safe, reliable booster to Earth orbit, which is yet to be
demonstrated.
And the second issue, an autonomous transfer vehicle to go
from low-Earth orbit to the Station in a safe manner that will
meet the ISS visiting spacecraft standards. This was recently
completed by the European Space Agency's ATV and Japan's HTV.
The ATV was approximately 2 years late from its target, and
required approximately 1.3 billion Euros for development and
delivery of that first vehicle. The HTV was over 1 year late in
their delivery.
With respect to the commercial crew launch delivery, I'd
like to recall my own experience of Gemini since we modified
existing vehicle. I've flown--I flew two Gemini missions on
modified Titan II boosters, and as you know, two Apollo
missions, one on a small Saturn, one on a giant Saturn. The
period of 13 years I was at NASA, experienced the development
of high reliability of boosters, spacecraft, and launch-abort
systems. And then--and the pilot of Gemini VI, the world's
first rendezvous--on that mission, the Titan II ignited and
shut down at T=0. And we had the lift-off signals and a fire
broke out down below. But, the extensive modifications that
NASA and the Air Force had made to that booster made it
possible that I'd be speaking before you today, Mr. Chairman,
and not be in some obituary column. So, I have a significant
interest in the safety.
And there were several black areas of the launch trajectory
of the Titan II/Gemini program. It was basically--the Titan/
Gemini program was a high-risk demonstration program which
would not be acceptable today, in terms of safety.
And I think it's important for all the commercial providers
here today to understand that when the NASA first, you know,
put forth the idea of flying the Gemini on the Titan, the Air
Force strongly resisted this. The program manager and his
production line did not want modifications going into those
vehicles. And it escalated all the way up to the Deputy
Administrator, Dr. Robert Seamus, talking to the Secretary of
the Air Force, and then finally, Administrator, Mr. Jim Webb,
and Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, signed off on an
agreement. And in that, the elements for the Titan that would
go to Gemini would be specially--had special quality assurances
in the plant in Denver, but a complete separate program line
was set up in the Martin Baltimore plant. And there, the
modifications were put on it--dual redundant hydraulic systems,
all the series of modifications, standpipes, accumulators to
prevent POGO. And from the Aerojet company that supplied the
engines' first and second stage had special handling of those
for the Titan, and an escort with them all the way to install
at the Martin plant, and stayed with the booster all the way to
the launch at the spacecraft. So, it was very extensive, what
we did. And we all spent hundreds of hours, both at the
spacecraft and with the booster, in that period of time. So, it
was not simple to have that whole effort there.
And it's interesting to note, that after the Air Force-NASA
experience on that, the Air Force modified their boosters with
a lot of our programs that we had in there.
And from there--the safe, reliable delivery of government
crews to the ISS involves the human-rating of the launch
vehicle, the spacecraft, and the launch-abort system. And the
successful integration of all three elements has to be there.
The safety goal for Apollo, sir, which I flew, had 0.9999--four
nines. Now, I know the Astronaut Office has put out a paper
that has three nines, and when you go beyond the third nine, it
may be insignificant, but this is a desirable number to meet,
and it has to be demonstrated. And the process begins with the
design, the construction, all the way through. And that's just
not given on a piece of paper, it has to be demonstrated and
checked on.
Unfortunately, the Augustine Committee report gave only a
brief mention of crew safety for launch operations and reentry.
And regrettably, there were no indepth discussions of the vital
issue of this crew safety, safety launch, and orbital return of
the crews. It was just taken as safety is a given. And I've
mentioned that directly to Norm, so he knows about it.
And it may be the complexity of developing a new government
crew space transportation capability and the difficulty of
conducting spaceflight operations and safety, reliable--is not
fully appreciated by those--the present systems being developed
by NASA and the early adaptation of presently nonexisting
commercial government crew vehicle alternatives. There's some--
seems to be some belief that if NASA would just step aside,
then private alternatives would rapidly emerge to produce a
safe, reliable, dependable government crew delivery space
transportation.
And human spaceflight is the most technically challenging
demand of our own time, Mr. Chairman. It is far more demanding
than military fighter aircraft, which takes thousands of hours
of test flight--the operational test and evaluation before it's
put in service. And the same way with commercial airline before
they're put into commercial service.
And we've learned a lot over those years, but the--we know
that there has to be this demonstrated reliability. And it's
interesting to note, I--the Augustine report in great detail,
and it said if less constrained budgets were available, they
could fly as early as 2016. But, again, looking at the present
budget, it was a slight increase, but it wasn't to the increase
that Mr. Augustine had in his findings.
It did go on to say, with an item I agree, ``The Committee
recognizes the development of commercial services to transport
crew come with significant program risk.'' And then it goes
into their, ``One risk is a--can detract from the delivery of
the cargo.'' But the second one is, ``If the commercial
community fails to deliver this crew vehicle in mid-program,
then it would revert back to NASA.'' And the big issue there,
for NASA and the whole country, is, How could it revert in a
meaningful way to NASA, when all their support contractors are
gone, and furthermore, a lot of the civil servants have left?
And it went on to say, ``There are simply too many risks at the
present time to have a viable fallback option of not having
risk mitigation.'' So, the question is, How do we have risk
mitigation when, as far as we know, the present program is
pretty much eliminated?
And there's one minor thing, too, at the end. It said that
they need to be multiple providers for this. And this would be
similar, sir, like the--we have the F-22, which I'm sure that
every member knows about--the most capable aircraft in the
world--air-to-air combat--and the most expensive--which was
recently terminated. That started as the YF-22, and the YF-23
by the Air Force. And developers chose the 22 for development
tests, evaluation--operational test and evaluation in the
service.
Reading the report--and I talked to the person who wrote
this chapter--he said, ``Yes, you need both.'' So, that would
be like taking the F-22 and the F-23, taking them all the way.
So, that would take many tens of billions. So, on that one, I
disagree, Mr. Chairman.
The--so, there are many aspects to this, and there are a
lot of things that has to go forward, and I do not believe it
can happen in any short period of time.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Stafford follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas P. Stafford, Lt. General,
USAF (Ret.), Former NASA Astronaut
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Vitter, and members of the
Subcommittee, I am honored to be invited to appear before you today to
testify on the matter of crew safety in human spaceflight. In the wake
of the Augustine Committee report and now the President's 2011 Budget,
it is imperative that this Congress should carefully consider and
understand all of the potential ramifications of the proposed changes
to be made to the programs that NASA has pursued and that the Congress
has approved for more than 4 years for human spaceflight.
Before proceeding to answer your questions, I would like to make a
few observations concerning the Augustine Committee report.
The most important observation of that Committee, and the
underlying concern in all deliberations on the future of U.S. Human
Spaceflight, is that it has been inadequately funded for many years
now. The budget projection for NASA in the next decade and beyond is
inadequate to accomplish the core objectives with which NASA has been
charged. The funding is inadequate to build a timely replacement for
the Space Shuttle, to transport our astronauts and other international
partner nations' crews to and from the International Space Station to
the Earth. The Augustine Committee pointed out that a heavy lift launch
vehicle would be required to have flexibility to visit the moon, near-
Earth asteroids, and to develop the technology and systems required for
the first human voyages to Mars.
The plan that NASA had proposed and that has been approved by the
Congress is a program offering the strategic vision for human
spaceflight that was demanded by Adm. Gehman and the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board. It is a program worthy of our Nation. The
Augustine Committee notes that at least three billion dollars per year
must be added to NASA's appropriation to accomplish the mission. Even
more importantly, the Committee notes that there is no other worthwhile
program of human spaceflight which could be accomplished for the amount
of money presently planned for NASA. Also of interest, is that the
Augustine Committee stated that Mars is the ultimate destination for
human exploration to the inner Solar System, but not the best first
destination. Visiting the ``Moon First'' and following the ``Flexible
Path'' are both viable exploration strategies and the two are not
necessarily mutually exclusive before traveling to Mars. I certainly
agree with these findings of the Committee.
The choice is now plain: either we will provide the funding
necessary to accomplish worthy objectives in space, or this Nation will
cede its leadership on the space frontier to others. I wish to add my
voice to those who say that this leadership, the result of five decades
of effort purchased at the cost of nearly a trillion of today's dollars
and many lives, some of them given by close friends of mine, must not
be allowed simply to drift away. As a nation, as a people, we must be
better than that.
I want to acknowledge the work performed by the Augustine Committee
to cover these broad based subjects in such a relatively short period
of time. After extensive examination of the Committee's report, I
strongly agree with the majority of their findings and recommendations.
However, on some of the Committee's findings, I have a different
opinion.
I am not familiar with all of the aspects of the President's
proposed 2011 budget nor all of the aspects of NASA's response. I agree
with the Committee's recommendation that the remaining Space Shuttle
flights should be launched on a schedule that is compatible with the
normal procedures used for safe check out test and launch operations,
which may extend the flights into 2011. We presently have a Shuttle at
KSC on standby to launch on short notice, as was determined by the CA
IB. If funding were available this Shuttle could easily provide cargo
delivery that would certainly enhance the viability of the ISS six-
person crew capability.
The Committee wisely recommends the extension of the International
Space Station past 2015 to at least the year 2020. However, the ISS
will never be fully and effectively utilized unless researchers of all
of the ISS partner nations have the confidence that it will be
supported and sustained as long as it is operationally viable and
technically useful.
To have and to use this great international laboratory requires a
guaranteed space transportation capability to be available as soon as
possible after Space Shuttle retirement. The Committee recommends that
this responsibility be removed from NASA and offered to commercial
providers. Today, approximately 88-89 percent of NASA budget flows on
to commercial entities.
I would like to differentiate the two subjects, Potential
Commercial Cargo delivery to the ISS and Potential Commercial
Government Crew delivery to the ISS. NASA has incentivized and selected
two contractors to provide commercial cargo delivery to the ISS. For
commercial cargo delivery, the first issue is the development of a
reliable booster to low earth orbit under the COTS program, which is
yet to be demonstrated. The second issue is to develop an autonomous
transfer vehicle to transport cargo from the booster in low-Earth orbit
(LEO) to the ISS in a safe manner that would meet the stated ISS
visiting spacecraft requirements that were complied with by the
European Space Agency's ATV and Japan's HTV. The development of this
type of a transfer vehicle is in itself certainly is a major challenge.
The European Space Agency recently delivered their first ATV payload
several years later than their initial target delivery date. Japan
delivered their HTV some 2 years later than their initial target date.
Both government entities used considerable resources to develop their
individual transfer vehicles. I certainly wish the two United States
entities success in meeting their NASA milestones for cargo delivery
since the ISS is dependent upon a continued supply of cargo deliveries
by the partners.
With respect to commercial crew launch delivery to the ISS, I would
like to recall my own experience. I have flown two Gemini missions on a
modified Titan II, ICBM, booster and two Apollo missions, one on the
Saturn IB and one on the giant Saturn V. Over the period of thirteen
years at NASA, I experienced and participated in the development of
high reliability boosters, spacecraft, and launch abort systems. I was
a back-up pilot for the first manned Gemini spacecraft and spent many
months in the factory and countless hours of testing in the spacecraft
as it was being built and tested. I was then pilot of Gemini VI, the
world's first rendezvous mission. On that mission, the Titan II first
stage engines ignited and then shutdown at T=0. Wally Schira and I had
the lift off signals and a fire broke out below the base of the
booster. The emergency detection system and modifications that had been
installed in the Titan II helped us to resolve the two critical
failures that we experienced in that extremely short period of time.
There were several black areas of the launch trajectory of the Titan II
Gemini. They would not be acceptable today. The Titan Gemini program
was a high-risk demonstration program.
I was the back-up commander for the second Block I Apollo flight
and had my crew performing a similar test, in the sister spacecraft, at
the same time that the Apollo I accident occurred and the crew died in
the spacecraft fire on the launch pad. I was then back-up commander of
the first Block II Apollo spacecraft, Apollo V II, and again spent
considerable time in the command module which was being built and
tested. There were also numerous NASA engineers, inspectors and support
technicians at the factory to facilitate this effort. This support
effort was similar to the Gemini program, where numerous NASA
engineers, inspectors and support technicians participated in the
manufacturing and test at the factory. I was then the Commander of
Apollo X, the first flight of the Lunar module to the Moon. Again, I
spent an inordinate amount of time in performing test and check-out in
the command module and the lunar module.
My fourth mission, I was commander of Apollo for the Apollo-Soyuz
Test Program. Again, I spent considerable time for the test and check
out of the Apollo spacecraft and a brief time in the Soyuz spacecraft.
These flights, both as a prime and as a backup crew member were
accompanied with hundreds of hours of training for each mission in
different types of spacecraft simulators and mockups where numerous
emergency and normal situations were simulated and resolved.
Therefore, safe reliable delivery of a government crew to the ISS
involves the human rating of the launch vehicle, the spacecraft, and
the launch abort system, and the successful integration of all three
elements. The safety goal for the Apollo Saturn was from launch to LEO
and safe return to the Earth 0.9999. The process of requirements,
design, and construction all begin with the NASA safety and mission
assurance requirements. There also has to be a process where there is
not an excessive creep in requirements that would result in cost
increases and launch schedule delays of the vehicles. Unfortunately,
the Augustine Committee report only gave just a very brief mention of
crew safety for launch, orbital, and recovery operations. Regrettably,
there were no in-depth discussions of this vital issue of safe launch
to orbit and return to earth of government crews.
It may be that the complexity of developing a new government crew
space transportation capability, and the difficulty of conducting
spaceflight operations safely and reliably, it is not fully appreciated
by those who are recommending the cancellation of the present system
being developed by NASA, and the early adaptation of the presently non-
existent commercial government crew delivery alternatives. There seems
to be some belief that if NASA would ``step aside'', private
alternatives would rapidly emerge to offer inexpensive, safe, reliable,
dependable government crew delivery space transportation at an earlier
date.
Human spaceflight is the most technically challenging enterprise of
our time. No other activity is so rigorously demanding across such a
wide range of disciplines, while at the same time holding out such
harsh consequences for minor performance shortfalls. Aerodynamics,
aerospace medicine, combustion, cryogenics, guidance, and navigation,
human factors, manufacturing technology, materials science, structural
design and analysis--these disciplines and many more are pushed to
their current limits to make it possible and just barely possible at
that, to fly in space. Flight in space is very, very hard to achieve.
We've learned a lot about human spaceflight in the last five
decades, but not yet nearly enough to make it ``routine'' in any
meaningful sense of the word. As Adm. Gehman and the CA IB outlined,
these flights in the past have been developmental flights and the
relatively small number in the future will be the same. Thus far, it
has been a government enterprise with only three nations yet to have
accomplished it. Of the three, it is important to note that only the
United States, where NASA set requirements had oversight with the
design and development of vehicles, and commercial entities built all
of the hardware and software. In the other two countries, it is
government owned entities that built all of the hardware and software
for their capabilities. Development of new systems is very costly,
operational risks are extremely high, and commercial profitable
activities are elusive. It may not always be this way, but it is that
way at present.
Apart from questions of technical and operational complexity and
risk, there are business issues to be considered if the U.S. is to rely
upon commercial providers for government crew access to space. It is
not that industry is incapable of building space systems. Far from it.
It is American industry which actually constructs all of our Nation's
space systems today, and carries out most of the day-to-day tasks to
implement flight operations, subject to the government supervision and
control which is required in managing the expenditure of public funds.
So the question is not whether industry can eventually develop
government crew delivery systems and procedures to fly in low Earth
orbit. It can. The relevant questions in connection with doing so
commercially are much broader than that of the relatively simple matter
of whether it is possible. Let us consider a few of those questions.
Absent significant government backing, will industry provide the
sustained investment necessary to carry out the multi-year development
of new commercial government crew delivery systems to LEO? Will
industry undertake to develop such products with only one presently
known customer, the U.S. Government? What happens if, midway through
the effort, stockholders or boards of directors conclude that such
activities are ultimately not in the best interests of the corporation?
What happens if, during development or flight operations, an
accident occurs with collateral damages exceeding the net worth of the
company which is the responsible party? A key lesson from the
development of human spaceflight is that safety is expensive, and the
failure to attain it is even more expensive. Apollo 1, Challenger, and
Columbia have shown that spaceflight accidents generate billions of
dollars in direct and collateral liabilities. Who will bear this risk
in ``commercial'' space operations? If the company, how much insurance
will be required, where will it be obtained, and at what cost? If
government indemnification is expected, upon what legal basis will it
be granted, and if the government is bearing the risk, in what sense
will the operation then be ``commercial''?
When commercial government crew delivery space transportation does
come about, other questions will arise. Will there be competition in
this new sector, or will there be a monopoly supplier? If NASA is to
contract with the first, or only, commercial government crew space
transportation supplier, and if there is no price ceiling established
by a government alternative, how do we ensure a fair price for the
taxpayer in a market environment in which the government is the only
customer for the products of a single provider? And how is a space
operation ``commercial'' if the government is both regulatory agency
and sole customer?
Leaving aside technical, operation, and business concerns, there is
the matter of the schedule by which these new commercial systems are
expected to come into being. The Augustine Committee has been
particularly pointed in its clams that, with suitable government
backing, such systems can be made before the comparable Constellation
systems, Ares 1 and Orion, could be ready. Page 71 of their report
offers such a claim. It further goes on to say Committee recognizes
that the development of commercial services to transport crews come
with significant problematic risks. Among these are that the
development of this capability will distract current potential
providers from the near term goal of the successfully developing
commercial cargo capability. Second, the commercial community may fail
to deliver a true capability in mid-program and the program would
revert to NASA ``Now, how could it revert to NASA when the team has
been dismissed and laid off with this exercise?'' It would be a
disaster for our country's Human Space Flight program both technically
and politically.
Are such claims optimistic? Any launch system and crew vehicle that
can transport a half-dozen people to and from the ISS, and loiter on-
orbit for a six-month crew rotation period while serving as an
emergency crew return vehicle, is necessarily on the same order of
complexity as that of the old Saturn 1 and the Apollo systems. The
Saturn 1 conducted its first test flight, with a dummy upper stage, in
October 1961, and finally carried a crew for the first time in October
1968. The Apollo VII spacecraft which carried that crew, of which I
served as back-up Commander, began its own development in 1962. Thus,
the Earth-orbital segment of the Apollo system architecture required a
half-dozen years and more to complete. These developments were carried
out by highly experienced teams with virtually unlimited development
funds in the cause of a great national priority.
If, in the fashion of airline travel, NASA is buying a ride rather
than a spacecraft, then how, by whom, and to what standards will the
company's equipment and operation be certified? How is NASA to
determine that the system is truly ready to fly? Does the government
merely accept the claims of a self-interested provider, on the basis of
possibly very limited flight experience by company pilots? We certainly
do not do that for military aircraft, and even less so is this the case
for civilian transport aircraft. Extensive development and hundreds or
even thousands of hours of flight testing followed by operational test
and evaluation by the government is required before a new military
aircraft is released into operational service; I have participated in
and managed this type of testing. Similarly, new civilian aircraft are
subject to extensive testing involving certification of systems and
subsystem, and hundreds of flights to exact certification standards
before they are allowed to be put in passenger service. Will we accept
less for new, ``commercial'' space systems which carry government
astronauts, or those of our international partners? In my opinion, the
Congress should certainly not accept less.
Yet, today, we do not even know what standards should exist for the
certification of commercial spacecraft to carry government crew members
into orbit. What entity other than NASA can establish and verify
appropriate standards for human spaceflight? I will tell you that from
my perspective and from the history that I have lived, these standards,
like airworthiness standards, are written in other people's blood. Some
of that blood was shed by friends of mine. We don't know enough, yet,
about human spaceflight to relax the hard-learned standards by which we
do it. And we certainly do not yet know enough to make the assumption
that new and untried teams can accomplish it on a schedule that is
better than was achieved during Apollo.
This takes me to another point. Some of you may recall that, a few
years back, I chaired the Task Force on International Space Station
Operational Readiness. This task force was charged with making an
independent assessment of our readiness to put crew on the ISS, and to
sustain it with the transportation systems, Russian and American, which
were necessary for cargo delivery and crew rotation. We did not take
this matter lightly. The ISS was new, and much smaller. We did not then
have the years of experience we have since accumulated in building the
ISS and flying on it. Our then-recent long-duration spaceflight
experience had mostly been accumulated during the Shuttle-Mir program,
and Russian experience in resupplying the Mir and the earlier Salyut
space stations was not unblemished. Numerous docking failures had
occurred over the lifetimes of these programs, resulting not only in
cargo which went undelivered but also, in one case, the collision of an
unmanned Progress resupply vehicle with the Mir. And in another
instance there had been a fire on Mir itself and the first crew to
visit their first very small space station Salyut died after performing
the D orbit maneuver to reenter the atmosphere.
These incidents and accidents gave us pause. Not because we doubted
the capability of the team; the Shuttle had been flying for over
fifteen years by that time, and the Russians had accumulated decades of
experience in long-duration spaceflight. I've flown with them; I know
how capable they are. No, our concerns were heightened by our awareness
of just how careful one has to be in this most demanding of
enterprises. We cannot afford to relax that vigilance today as we go
forward into a new era of ISS utilization, and as we prepare once again
to hopefully voyage outward from Earth, first to the moon or the
asteroids and then beyond. There is a place in these plans for the
contributions of commercial government crew space transportation, but
not yet demonstrated, and not to the exclusion of NASA's own safety and
mission requirements.
I have asked many questions in this testimony, questions which I
believe must be answered if commercial government crew human
spaceflight is to become viable. I believe that these questions and
others yet to come can and will be answered at some date. However,
America's continued leadership in space should not depend upon the
nature and timing of those answers. When commercial entities have
demonstrated that they can provide dependable reliable transportation
to LEO, the U.S. government crews as well as partner nation crews, the
government should buy it. But until that time, there should be an
assured government capability to accomplish the task.
Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, General Stafford.
Our next witness is Mr. Brian O'Connor. He is Chief of
Safety and Mission Assurance at NASA. He is an astronaut, a
Marine colonel, will address NASA's human safety rating
requirements for commercial spaceflight.
Colonel O'Connor?
STATEMENT OF BRYAN O'CONNOR, CHIEF, OFFICE OF SAFETY AND
MISSION ASSURANCE, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
ADMINISTRATION
Mr. O'Connor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. By the way, I was liberal in my allowing
General Stafford the use of time. I'm going to be a little more
observant.
Mr. O'Connor. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. He's earned the right to be heard.
[Laughter.]
General Stafford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. O'Connor. Well, he's about four ranks higher than I am,
so I'll take 4 minutes off mine.
[Laughter.]
Mr. O'Connor. Thank you for the opportunity to appear here
today to discuss how NASA will ensure the safety of its human
spaceflight missions for transport of NASA and NASA-sponsored
international partner crewmembers to the International Space
Station.
The President's budget request cancels the Constellation
Program and funds the agency to contract with industry to
provide astronaut transportation to the ISS as soon as
possible, reducing the risk of relying solely on foreign crew
transports. NASA will take on this new challenge with
appropriate respect for our hard-learned safety lessons of the
past.
As you know, the launch or recovery of a spacecraft is a
very dynamic event involving tremendous amounts of potential
kinetic energy. Furthermore, operations of any system in the
proximity of the ISS pose their own safety integration
challenges for both vehicles and the crew. Therefore, through
its program management, its systems integration, human-rating
design, technical checks and balance, and proactive safety
culture, NASA makes every effort to address flightcrew safety
in a transparent and disciplined way.
As we've been reminded by our human spaceflight accidents
and close calls over the years--X-15, Apollo, Space Shuttle--
systems integration should not be underestimated. Also, our
spaceflight vehicles traditionally have been certified by NASA
to carry crews in an engineering flight test environment. It's
important to note that the job of validating the right set of
requirements for a new crew--crewed flight system is not a
simple cookie-cutter or checklist task, nor is it expected to
be a one-time task. We still see, to this day, new safety
issues on the Space Shuttle, after 130 flights. Therefore,
we're always looking for ways to improve our risk posture by
continuously questioning our assumptions, encouraging
dissenting opinions, refining our models, and providing
appropriate oversight and/or insight to the work of our
contractors.
The first step on the road to confidence for the next ISS
crew transport capability is establishing an acquisition
approach for our government industry team. To support that
approach, we are developing performance requirements, including
safety-risk metrics and a generic set of NASA human-rating
technical requirements that would applicable to any ISS-bound
crew transport system. We expect to issue a request for
information to industry soon to help us, and we're working
closely with the FAA, because of its obvious interest in future
regulatory activities for commercial human spaceflight.
To that end, the decision to transition our ISS crew
members from Soyuz to any new vehicle will be based on
confidence. This confidence will be based on a combination of
NASA technical insight into the design, appropriate levels of
management oversight of the development and operation, along
with demonstrated capability and reliability of the components,
the subsystems, and the integrated flight and ground system.
In closing, I'd like to reiterate that safety is, and
always will be, NASA's first core value and that everyone in
the agency is dedicated to ensuring that our astronauts are
trained and equipped to safely conduct our spaceflight
missions.
Chairman Nelson, I'd be happy to respond to any questions
you have, or any other members, as they come.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Connor follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bryan O'Connor, Chief, Office of Safety and
Mission Assurance, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman Nelson and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss how NASA will ensure
the safety of its human spaceflight missions for transport of NASA and
NASA-sponsored International Partner crewmembers to the International
Space Station.
The President's FY 2011 Budget Request for NASA
The President's budget request cancels the NASA Constellation
Program and funds the Agency to contract with industry to provide
astronaut transportation to the International Space Station (ISS) as
soon as possible, reducing the risk of relying solely on foreign crew
transports for years to come.
NASA will take on this new challenge with appropriate respect for
hard-learned safety lessons of the past. NASA will use a disciplined
acquisition processes to support the development, testing and
demonstration of multiple commercial crew systems to the ISS that
safely and dependably perform the same functions as the Russian Soyuz
system.
The Role of OSMA in Ensuring Human Spaceflight Safety
The NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) was
established in the wake of the Challenger accident, and provides policy
direction, functional oversight, and assessment for all Agency safety,
reliability, maintainability, and quality engineering and assurance
activities, while serving as a principal advisory resource for the
Administrator and other senior officials on matters pertaining to human
spaceflight safety and mission success. As Chief of the OSMA, I report
directly to the NASA Administrator. OSMA supports the activities of--
but is organizationally separate from--the human spaceflight Mission
Directorates and the Office of the Chief Engineer, thus providing the
Administrator an independent view of the safety and effectiveness of
human spaceflight designs, flight test and mission operations in
addition to all other mission roles of the Agency.
Specifically, OSMA:
Develops strategies, policies, technical requirements,
standards, and guidelines for system safety, reliability,
maintainability, and quality engineering and assurance;
Establishes the applicable set of Safety and Mission
Assurance (SMA) requirements for all human spaceflight
programs, and, through delegated technical authority, formally
approves or disapproves waivers, deviations and/or exceptions
to same;
Verifies the effectiveness of safety and mission assurance
requirements, activities, and processes, and updates, cancels
or changes them as time, technology and/or circumstances
dictate;
Advises NASA leadership on significant safety and mission
assurance issues, including investigation of human spaceflight-
related mishaps and close calls, and provides guidance for
corrective actions stemming from those investigations as well
as corrective actions related to ground and flight test
anomalies;
Performs broad-reaching independent assessments of human
spaceflight-related activities, including formal Independent
Validation and Verification of flight and ground software
critical to flight crew safety;
Oversees and assesses the technical excellence of safety and
mission assurance tools, techniques, and practices throughout
the human spaceflight program life cycle;
Provides knowledge management and training in safety and
mission assurance disciplines to the assigned work force; and,
Assures that adequate levels of both programmatic and Center
institutional resources are applied to safety and mission
assurance functions.
Crew Safety and Human Spaceflight
The launch and recovery of a spacecraft is a very dynamic event
involving tremendous amounts of potential and kinetic energy. Such
events expose flight crews to significant inherent risks in the form of
a variety of potentially catastrophic hazards and survivability
challenges. Further, operations of any system in the proximity of the
ISS pose their own safety integration challenges for both vehicle(s)
and crew. Therefore, through its program management, systems
integration and human rating design, and technical checks and balance,
NASA makes every effort to address flight crew safety in a transparent
and disciplined way. The process analyzes and manages failure modes and
effects, and strives to eliminate hazards that could harm the crew.
Where hazard elimination is not practical, the design and operational
concept attempts to control or at least mitigate hazards, sometimes
with crew procedures, other times with extra controls on the
manufacturing, test or inspection of components to minimize human error
or chance of hardware/software failure. In addition, the human-rated
system provides for crew survival in the presence of catastrophic
events through abort or escape. As we have been reminded by all of our
major human spaceflight accidents and close calls in the past, system
integration, including the interrelated effects of the various flight
and ground elements for accident initiation as well as hazard
mitigation should not be underestimated. Spaceflight vehicles
traditionally have been certified by NASA to carry crews in an
engineering flight-test environment.
It is important to note that the job of validating the right set of
requirements for a new crewed flight system is not a simple cookie-
cutter or checklist task, nor is it expected to be a one-time task.
Compliance with requirements is only part of what makes us comfortable
in human spaceflight. Much of what we do in development and operations
is proactive and reactive risk management. The risk of human
spaceflight is inherently high, and we know from the past that we are
never as smart about this business as we think we are. We still see new
safety issues on the Space Shuttle after 130 flights. Therefore, we are
always looking for ways to improve our risk posture by continuously
questioning our assumptions, refining our models, checking our work,
and providing appropriate oversight and/or insight to the work of our
contractors.
Further, our history teaches us that new risks will come up during
the lifecycle of any human spaceflight system. For example, any human
system will require extensive iterative work in development and
optimization of abort and escape capability. In the future human
systems must provide the crew with a reasonable chance at a survivable
outcome even when the situation is catastrophic to the flight system.
In any number of human spaceflight systems developments in the past,
limitations in the abort/escape systems were not known until well into
the design, at which time other hazard mitigators such as added
robustness or system redundancy, or extra limits to the flight envelope
were laid on late in the design cycle. Late safety risks must be
treated with the same discipline and respect as any early design
challenges; and where safety risks can be reasonably tolerated, their
acceptability must be agreed to by all four elements of NASA's
governance structure: the relevant technical authority, the cognizant
system safety engineer, the flight crew, and finally the program
manager. We also know from organizational cultural lapses in the past
that we must encourage a reliable, recognized appeal system to hear and
deal with any credible voice of dissent concerning crew safety.
In the end, the decision to transition our ISS crewmembers from
Soyuz to any new vehicle will be based on NASA leadership attaining the
confidence that the new system will meet or exceed its standards and
requirements, including the risk level assigned by the agency for the
ISS transport mission. This confidence will be based on the combination
of NASA technical insight into the design, appropriate levels of
management oversight of the development and operation, verification of
performance and technical requirements along with demonstrated
capability and reliability of components, subsystems (including escape
and abort subsystems) and the integrated flight/ground system.
Safety and Future ISS Transportation Systems
The first step on the road to confidence for the next ISS crew
transport capability is establishing an acquisition approach and
operations model for our government/industry team. To support that
approach, we are developing performance requirements, including safety
risk metrics, and a generic set of NASA human rating technical
requirements that would be applicable to any ISS-bound crew
transportation system. NASA's Commercial Crew and Cargo Program Office
and its technical authority, in coordination with the ISS program/
technical authority, has initiated an effort to determine and establish
the requirements and standards (process, design and operational) that
would most likely apply to industry partners when engaging in astronaut
transport development and operations.
As part of that effort, NASA is investing funds from the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) to develop a subset
of its human rating technical requirements that would most likely apply
to the specific ISS transport mission. The technical requirements would
be applicable to NASA developed/operated crew transportation systems as
well as industry-developed/operated crew transportation systems for use
by NASA. This task is being performed by a team comprised of
representatives from NASA's human spaceflight programs, the Astronaut
Office, and Agency technical authorities, including the OSMA. We are
also including the Federal Aviation Administration because of its
obvious interest in future regulatory activities for human spaceflight.
When these documents have completed internal Agency review, NASA plans
to issue a Request for Information to alert all interested parties of
our intent, as well as to seek industry feedback. NASA currently
anticipates completing this process in calendar year 2010. When
completed, these requirements documents will provide guiding principles
for developing, clearing for flight, and operating any spaceflight
system before it is allowed to carry NASA crewmembers. As with any
complex, high risk system, the ultimate design and operational
requirements are tailored to fit the mission, the design concept, and
the industry partner's own standards, experience and processes. This
tailoring begins pre-award, but it continues into the early acquisition
phases after a contract has been let.
Conclusion
In closing, I would like to reiterate that safety is, and will
always be, NASA's first core value, and that everyone at the Agency is
dedicated to ensuring that our astronauts are trained and equipped to
safely conduct NASA's spaceflight missions.
Chairman Nelson, I would be happy to respond to any questions you
or the other members of the Subcommittee may have.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Colonel.
Dr. George Nield, the Associate Administrator for
Commercial Space Transportation in the Federal Aviation
Administration, and he will address the FAA's role in
regulating the commercial spaceflight industry and the
licensing and certification process.
Dr. Nield?
STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE C. NIELD,
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE
TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Nield. Chairman Nelson, thank you for inviting me to
participate in this hearing on commercial space transportation
capabilities.
I'd like to start by briefly reviewing the role that the
Federal Aviation Administration has played in regulating
commercial launches over the past 25 years.
In accordance with Federal statute, the mission of the
Office of Commercial Space Transportation is to ensure
protection of the public, property, and the national security
and foreign policy interests of the United States during
commercial launch and reentry activities, and to encourage,
facilitate, and promote commercial space transportation.
Our top priority is safety. Some of the ways we carry out
our safety responsibilities include developing and issuing
regulations, granting licenses, permits and safety approvals,
and conducting safety inspections during every licensed or
permitted launch.
Our safety record to date has been excellent. Since 1989,
we have licensed the launch of 201 commercial vehicles without
any loss of life, serious injuries, or significant property
damage to the general public.
In 2004, Congress expanded our regulatory role when it
approved the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004. In
response to the Act, we have issued regulations governing human
spaceflight on commercial launch vehicles, making it clear that
individuals participating in these flights must be fully
informed of, and accept, the significant risks involved.
One of the key challenges we are facing right now involves
the beginning of a new segment of the industry: suborbital
space tourism. We are currently working with about a half-dozen
companies that are in the process of designing, developing, and
testing vehicles that will be capable of carrying people out to
the edge of space. We know that not all of these companies will
be successful. Some will experience technical difficulties,
while others will struggle with the necessary financing. But,
there are enough very capable and well-funded groups currently
working on this effort that I am confident that, in the next
few years, we will see multiple companies conducting several
suborbital launches per week. That will mean hundreds of
launches per year, with thousands of people having an
opportunity to experience spaceflight firsthand.
With that background, let me speak to the FAA's approach to
regulating the launch of commercial vehicles carrying humans to
orbit. Certainly, the process will not be easy. These are
challenging matters, not easily reducible to checklists or go/
no-go criteria. But, I believe that there is enough good will,
skill, and ability among the involved parties to produce
appropriate government oversight and regulatory frameworks.
To begin with, the FAA already has a solid working
relationship with NASA. For example, it has been decided that
all of the launches for the commercial orbital transportation
services, or COTS program, and the cargo resupply services, or
CRS program, will be licensed by the FAA. So, as the launch
operators demonstrate the ability of commercial vehicles to
deliver cargo to the International Space Station, NASA and the
FAA will have the opportunity to demonstrate that we can
seamlessly provide the needed government oversight for cargo
missions well before any commercial crew missions are
scheduled.
NASA has built an unequaled body of experience carrying
humans safely to and from orbit. No one has done this work
better than NASA across nearly 50 years of human spaceflight.
At the same time, the FAA's Office of Commercial Space
Transportation has more than 25 years of experience in
regulating commercial space launches. The work before us is to
harness both of these assets and come up with an approach
properly suited to the safety and success of the challenging
missions to come.
This is an historic opportunity to put to work, side by
side, decades of space operations and regulatory experience to
write the next volume of American excellence in spaceflight.
The FAA is excited to be part of the story.
Chairman Nelson, this concludes my prepared remarks. At the
appropriate time, I would be pleased to answer any questions
that you might have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Nield follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. George C. Nield, Associate Administrator,
Office of Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation
Administration
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Vitter, and members of the
Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me to participate in this hearing on
commercial space transportation capabilities. I would like to start by
briefly reviewing the role that the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) has played in regulating unmanned commercial launches for the
past twenty-five years. I will also address our involvement in plans
for private citizens to fly on commercially-operated suborbital space
flights. Finally, I will speak to the issue of commercial capabilities
to deliver National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) crews
to the International Space Station in Low-Earth Orbit and returning
them safely to Earth.
The FAA's Office of Commercial Space Transportation was established
by Executive Order in 1984 and was located in the Office of the
Secretary of Transportation. The office was transferred to the FAA in
November 1995, where today we are one of the FAA's four lines of
business, along with Aviation Safety, Airports, and the Air Traffic
Organization.
In accordance with Federal statute, our mission is to ensure
protection of the public, property, and the national security and
foreign policy interests of the United States during commercial launch
and reentry activities, and to encourage, facilitate, and promote
commercial space transportation. Our top priority is safety. Some of
the ways we carry out our safety responsibilities include developing
and issuing regulations; granting licenses, permits, and safety
approvals; and conducting safety inspections during every licensed or
permitted launch. Our safety record to date has been excellent: since
1989, we have licensed the launch of 201 commercial vehicles without
any loss of life, serious injuries, or significant property damage to
the general public.
We are also responsible for licensing the operation of launch sites
or ``spaceports.'' Since 1996 we have licensed the operation of the
California Spaceport at Vandenberg Air Force Base; Spaceport Florida at
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station; the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport
at Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia; Mojave Air and Space Port in
California; Kodiak Launch Complex on Kodiak Island, Alaska; the
Oklahoma Spaceport in Burns Flat, Oklahoma; Spaceport America near Las
Cruces, New Mexico; and just this January, Cecil Field in Jacksonville,
Florida.
In 2004, Congress expanded our regulatory role when it approved the
Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004. The Act provided
direction to the FAA on how to regulate launches carrying people.
Noting that ``space transportation is inherently risky,'' Congress
referred to those joining the crew onboard a spacecraft as ``space
flight participants'' rather than ``passengers.'' Participants will fly
under a policy of informed consent, which means that they must be
briefed verbally and in writing about the risks involved. They will
then be required to sign a document indicating that the risks have been
communicated and understood. Then and only then will they be allowed to
board the craft and proceed with the launch. The crew is considered to
be part of the vehicle's flight safety system, so that launch operators
will need to protect the safety of the crew in order to protect the
public. In our implementing regulations, we identify performance
requirements for environmental control and life support systems, smoke
detection and fire suppression, and human factors, as well as the need
for a verification program.
One of the key challenges we are facing right now involves the
beginning of a new segment of the industry: suborbital space tourism.
We are currently working with about a half dozen companies that are in
the process of designing, developing, and testing vehicles that will be
capable of carrying people up to the edge of space. We know that not
all of these companies will be successful. Some will experience
technical difficulties, while others will struggle with the necessary
financing. But there are enough very capable and well-funded groups
currently working on this effort that I am confident that in the next
few years we will see multiple companies conducting several suborbital
launches per week. That will mean hundreds of launches per year, with
thousands of people having an opportunity to experience spaceflight
firsthand.
With that background, let me speak to FAA's approach to regulating
the commercial launch and reentry of commercial vehicles carrying
humans to orbit.
In its final report, which was issued on October 22, 2009, the
Augustine Committee noted that ``Commercial services to deliver crew to
low-Earth orbit are within reach,'' and that ``while this presents some
risk, it could provide an earlier capability at lower initial and life-
cycle costs than government could achieve.''
As compared to suborbital missions, orbital flights include a
number of additional challenges. To begin with, the mission durations
of orbital flights will be significantly greater than those for
suborbital flights. While a suborbital flight will most likely be
measured in minutes, orbital operations are typically measured in days.
As a result, the period of continuous, reliable system performance that
will be needed is much greater. In some cases, such as for
environmental control and life support, or thermal protection systems,
additional systems, or more complex systems, may be required for
orbital flights.
Moreover, and of extraordinary importance, is the fact that the
energy involved in going to and returning from orbit is much greater
than for suborbital flights, and in general, that means that the
hazards will also be increased. Finally, most orbital missions will
need to have a launch abort system to allow those on board to safely
separate from a malfunctioning booster.
Questions have been raised about how the U.S. Government should
address licensing and safety issues associated with commercial crew
missions to the International Space Station. Certainly the process will
not be easy. These are challenging matters not easily reducible to
checklists or go/no-go criteria. But I believe that there is enough
good will, skill, and ability among the involved parties to produce
appropriate government oversight and regulatory frameworks.
To begin with, the FAA has a solid working relationship with NASA.
For example, it has already been decided that all of the launches for
the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program and the
Cargo Resupply Services (CRS) program will be licensed by the FAA, and
the licensing requirement is included in the respective Space Act
Agreements and contracts. So as the launch operators demonstrate the
ability of commercial vehicles to deliver cargo to the International
Space Station, NASA and the FAA will have the opportunity to
demonstrate that we can seamlessly provide the needed government
oversight for cargo missions, well before any commercial crew missions
are scheduled.
Second, both Agencies approach this next regulatory effort with a
pair of complementary advantages. For one thing, NASA has built an
unequalled body of experience carrying humans safely to and from orbit.
No one has done this work better than NASA, across nearly fifty years
of human spaceflight. At the same time, the FAA's Office of Commercial
Space Transportation has more than twenty-five years of experience in
regulating commercial space launches. Some of the aspects of FAA
licensing include existing processes for determining insurance
requirements and executing cross-waivers, government indemnification
subject to appropriations for third-party excess claims, and the
ability of the FAA to take enforcement actions (including license
suspension or revocation or levying fines) if those steps are necessary
to ensure compliance with license terms and conditions.
The work before us is to harness both of these assets and come up
with an approach properly suited to the safety and success of the
challenging missions to come. NASA brings vast know-how to the work
ahead. In addition, several of the potential commercial vehicle
providers bring decades of excellence in actually designing, building,
and operating the hardware that has been used in our Nation's space
programs. At the same time, several new developers have indicated their
interest in joining the competition, and are eager to prove themselves
on the launch pad and beyond. And because of Congressional foresight a
generation ago for expendable launch vehicles, and more than 5 years
ago for commercial human spaceflight, we have a sound regulatory
foundation already in place to support our needs.
In short, this is an historic opportunity to put to work, side-by-
side, decades of space operations and regulatory experience to write
the next volume of American excellence in spaceflight. The FAA is
excited to be a part of the story.
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Vitter, members of the
Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. At the appropriate
time, I would be pleased to answer any questions you might have.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Dr. Nield.
Mr. Malcolm Peterson is the former NASA Comptroller, and he
is going to address the practical obstacles to NASA's
utilization of commercial carriers for cargo and crew, such as
pricing, procurement, and contract issues.
Mr. Peterson.
STATEMENT OF MALCOLM L. PETERSON,
FORMER NASA COMPTROLLER
Mr. Peterson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to point out something, that, in terms of
NASA's safety record, I think I would put the Russian Soyuz
program up against our safety record. It is not--we are not
unparalleled. And it is important to remember, in this case, in
this discussion that we are having, that we are talking about a
commercial venture. Now, a commercial venture means that
private money is at risk. It normally also means that the
private venture is willing to obtain insurance at a reasonable
cost, and that it can have--in addition to investors, it can
achieve bank financing to handle letter-of-credit issues and
the like, of course, as it experiences its manufacturing
processes.
We have the equivalent of a commercial crew capability to
the Space Station right now. We have had it in the past; it's
called the ``Soyuz.'' The commercial U.S.-sourced crew carrier
will be in a competitive environment with the Soyuz. It will
pose a great challenge to them, other than the required
business, if you will, from NASA, carrying government
astronauts, to compete for other astronauts.
If you'll think of it, whether it has tourists or what have
you, I think it will be a price-competitive environment, and
the current price for Soyuz, I believe, is roughly $150 million
for three crew. That will be a very difficult hurdle.
Now, the question that comes to me, as an old NASA
comptroller is, Why are we doing this? And that question goes
to the heart of the ability to sustain governmental support for
a development. If you don't have a good argument for sustaining
that development, it will fall apart over time. And I am deeply
concerned about the investment risk that goes with this, one of
which is, if I am an investor, and I'm looking at the horizon
for the return on my investment, what is that horizon? The
Space Station's continued existence is not assured. We are on
unknown territory, in terms of the longevity of the Space
Station. We have technical risks, we have programmatic risks.
One programmatic risk was seen by the last administration,
which said, ``Let's not fund the Space Station beyond 2015.''
Now, whether or not I believe that was a false canard doesn't
make any difference. They were willing to say that Space
Station enjoyed so little priority, that it was better for the
U.S. to put its energy into beyond-low-Earth-orbit activities.
I do not know whether other governments, such as the
Japanese, the Canadians, the European Space Agency or the
Russians, will have similar questions as we go forward. I would
not discount the possibility, nor would I discount the
possibility that the investor community will look at the risks
associated with this venture and want to have what, in essence,
would be a guaranteed return on investment, consistent with its
risk. That risk hurdle for a venture like this should be on the
order of 40 to 45 percent. It is, therefore, in my opinion, a
difficult case to make, that this will be a commercially
successful vehicle, without extraordinary participation by the
U.S. Government.
I want to say how much I enjoyed listening to General
Stafford. I know all too well what the costs of human
spaceflight are. They are not in design. They are in practice.
They are in documentation. They are in the paper trail. They
are in endless reviews to make sure we're doing the right
thing. There are so many cameras down at the Cape, for every
Shuttle launch, that if you were doing a practical view of how
to save money, you certainly would not proceed that way. But,
that is the price of human spaceflight. We do not like to kill
people, and nor do I think we should.
By the way, I think commercial cargo will succeed very
well. I have my doubts about commercial crew.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Peterson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Malcolm L. Peterson, Former NASA Comptroller
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to express my views on commercial space
capabilities. I have an abiding interest in the subject, and I appear
before you without any interest to pull my punches. My background as a
NASA program analyst for some thirty years gave me some insight about
the NASA side of the issue. After my retirement, I have worked
occasionally as a consultant to contractors doing business with NASA.
However, I lack the intimate familiarity with the contractor side of
the government-contractor relationship that only time spent in that
environment can afford. This limitation should be accordingly noted,
and I apologize to all concerned in the commercial space community if,
inadvertently, I poorly articulate your case.
My remarks focus on the intended use of U.S. commercial space
capabilities to address U.S. Governmental responsibilities under the
international partnership agreement for the International Space
Station. The impetus for this policy proposal was provided by the
Augustine Committee's findings last year, which recommended ``the
development of a relatively simpler launcher and capsule designed only
as a low-Earth orbit crew taxi.'' The costs for this development were
estimated to be lower than those associated with the development of the
Ares 1 launcher and the Orion spacecraft. As a commercial venture, the
Committee envisioned that ``at least some commercial capital must be at
risk.'' The Committee report notes that it heard ``many argue that
economic efficiencies could be found by striking a better balance
between the legitimate need for a NASA quality assurance and safety
process on one hand, and allowing industry to execute design and
development efficiently on the other.'' Moreover, the Committee raised
the prospect that ``some development costs, and a larger fraction of
operating costs of a commercial crew service to low-Earth orbit could
be amortized over other markets and customers.''
At the outset, let me state that I do not doubt the technical
ability of commercial or ``commercial-like'' enterprises to supply
cargo and crew services for the International Space Station (ISS).
Launch vehicles and spacecraft that provide cargo and crew services are
already servicing the ISS. Indeed, the Russian vehicles operate in a
``commercial-like'' manner, with proving both cargo and crew for a
price to all who can afford the bill, including some particularly hardy
and wealthy private citizens. The international partnership takes full
advantage of the reliability and safety of the Progress spacecraft to
carry cargo; just recently, two new spacecraft became available to
carry cargo, the Ariane Transfer Vehicle and Japanese HTV. The Soyuz
carries crew to the ISS and returns them to Earth, and does so
satisfactorily enough the U.S. Government deemed it acceptable a number
of years ago to retire the Space Shuttle by 2010 and allow a lengthy
period of time when no alternate U.S.-sourced mode of crew
transportation would be available until the advent of the Orion
spacecraft and its launcher, the Ares I.
With the proposed cancellation of the Constellation program, the
current Administration has proffered the substitution of the Orion, an
advanced U.S. crew capsule, with the concept advocated by the Augustine
Committee, a U.S.-sourced ``commercial'' crew delivery and return
system. This new system is said to be ``a simple spacecraft with a
simple mission'' that by being commercially developed for the ISS
mission will allow NASA to focus on the more challenging beyond-LEO
missions of the future. The budget estimate for the cost to the U.S.
over the next 5 years for this effort is $6 billion, a figure close
enough to the Augustine Committee's finding that the program ``can be
viable with a $5 billion stimulus from NASA.''
The concept of a U.S.-sourced simple spacecraft to address ISS
mission needs is attractive to those who find it untenable for
political reasons that the U.S. pay Russia for Soyuz launch services or
for program ``robustness'' reasons, a reliance on a single mode for
crew access. Some commentators worry that the Russians will hold us
``hostage'' and raise the prices for the Soyuz or that the U.S.-Russian
relationship will sour. The political argument is, in my way of
thinking, disingenuous. The program robustness concern is not, but
there is no good immediate answer to the problem it raises. Both are
clearly subject to the countering punch that the barn door was open
previously (post-Columbia), is soon to be open again, and will remain
open for a number of years. U.S.-sourced payloads are already launched
on non U.S.-sourced launchers. Although there is some merit to the
trade deficit issue, sending U.S. funds abroad to buy foreign goods and
services is common practice, and the amounts sent to Russia are
relatively trivial in that larger context. So, the balance of payments
argument is weak. Those who obviously lack trust in the Russian
entities conveniently ignore the interdependent nature of the U.S.-
Russian relationship that has been in existence and will be for a
number of years, for as long as the ISS is operable.
Why attempt to close the barn door at some point in the future? Is
there is a concern that the crew/cargo delivery products made in Russia
will develop quality defects that will escape detection and cause ISS
service outages? Even if that is a real problem looming on the horizon,
and I would not dismiss it as an unreasonable postulate, we are
confronted with the fact that an alternative to the Soyuz for crew
delivery will not be available for some years to come. If it is deemed
an urgent problem requiring quick attention, the current commercial
transportation service program proposition most assuredly is not an
effective counter. A cynic might argue that the U.S. manufacturers
could more speedily acquire the rights to produce the Soyuz spacecraft
and launcher in the U.S., using build to print manufacturing and U.S.
safety and mission assurance processes. Given the willingness of U.S.
rocket engine manufacturers to procure Russian-sourced engines and
purchase co-production rights, I wouldn't want to argue that there is
no precedent for this and accordingly this is an untenable concept.
Some have argued that we should ignore the arguments of the
Augustine Committee and return to the program plan for Constellation.
The availability of funding for executing this plan is a matter for the
Congress and Administration to decide, so I will not opine on its
feasibility. However, I will acknowledge that I was a fan of the
original argument for Ares I and Orion. The program plan was based on
the ``leapfrog'' logic. Effectively, this stemmed from a finding that
there was little merit in producing a Soyuz wannabe. Hence, U.S.
Government investment would be better spent for a more complex, capable
design. The Orion and Ares I would receive the design maturation
benefit for both spacecraft and launcher from undertaking LEO missions
to the ISS, and then the additional incremental investment--for a
better-outfitted Orion and the Ares V--would build on that experience
to go to beyond-LEO missions. The problem the Bush Administration had
with the plan was its affordability, unless the Shuttle expenditures
could be ended, thus avoiding a further $3 billion per year increase to
the projected NASA budget increases already envisioned in the outyears.
Although there was some modicum of interest in a U.S.-sourced
commercial cargo delivery solution, and funds were allocated to begin
early work on it, there was no hesitation about relying on the Soyuz
for crew delivery and return. As events have proven, the combination of
funding constraints within NASA and normal technical challenges have
led to a slip in the probability of an early Orion crewed mission to
ISS by 2015. I don't know if the Augustine Committee was correct in
assessing that the probable first ISS use date would be 2017, but
clearly the Committee could argue cogently from past experience.
I have no quarrel with the findings of the Augustine Committee
about the need for increased funding to support the logic of the
original argument, or its findings that there was a great need for
additional investments in research and technology required for beyond-
LEO voyages. There were substantial defects in the logic of the program
and budget plan NASA was saddled with by the Administration. However I
believe the nexus of their argument for developing a U.S.-sourced
``commercial transport service'' is grounded in their belief that there
is a commercial space growth opportunity--in addition to LEO flights of
crew and cargo to ISS--that can be seized by a U.S.-sourced commercial
venture. This prospect will materialize only if the U.S. Government
puts up the money and commits to a commercial transport service to meet
its responsibilities under the ISS partnership agreement.
I agree that there is sound logic behind the logical proposition
that if: (a) the U.S. Government underwrites the bulk of the
development costs and ``makes the market'' by committing to an annual
crew delivery quota, then (b) the marginal costs--for increasing the
spacecraft and launcher production rate and address operational
requirements--could form the basis for a price-competitive market
penetration. To follow the logic, the increased utilization of the
launcher would lead to a drop in the unit cost (and increase in
competitiveness, and ultimately profit margin) for the launch
manufacturer. The crew spacecraft carrier would enjoy a high consumer
confidence level due to NASA and FAA's involvement in its ``man-
rating,'' and additional spacecraft could be produced at marginal costs
to carry (for example) tourists, all because U.S. Government funds
financed the basic spacecraft production capability. It is essential
for this proposition to succeed that the spacecraft be simple, yet
safe, and that the U.S. governmental mission requirements be
constrained in scope to avoid higher unit production costs for bells
and whistles.
I also agree that the development costs for the crew capsule will
clearly be less than required to execute the more complex, capable
design for Orion. The annual funding increment required to be disbursed
from the Treasury will be comparatively less, an especially important
consideration given the priority assigned to civil space and
aeronautics programs in the Federal budget. And, for those who favor
beyond-LEO voyages, the Administration proposes Congress agree to
allocate a portion of the NASA budget to research and technology
development to address those needs. I am an ardent fan of this
investment proposal.
Why should there be any doubt on the part of Congress that this
commercial transportation services venture will result in an
appropriate return on the investment both to U.S. taxpayers and private
investors?
One important reason for caution is the uncertainty as to the
useful service life of the new crew and cargo service spacecraft. After
the retirement of the Space Shuttle, the sustainment of the ISS as a
viable spacecraft is a major undertaking, presenting future
maintenance, repair, and enhancement uncertainties that could impact
its useful life, whether that is to 2020 or even 2028. A major
uncertainty is the ability to respond to game-changing events onboard
the ISS, such as crew evacuation and return to Earth, or an extended
period of minimal operational capability because necessary repairs
cannot be accomplished by applying available on-orbit spares, or where
the orbital replacement unit required for the repair exceeds the volume
or lift capacity of cargo supply vehicles.
Another uncertainty is whether the participating nations will
allocate the necessary future funds to respond to future ISS
operational requirements, particularly if technical or programmatic
events require an unanticipated spike in funding requirements. How long
will the ISS last as a mission-capable spacecraft? How long will the
international partners be willing to keep operating it? This is a
critical issue for private investors because the commercial model
assumes the revenue stream provided by the U.S. Government is lengthy
enough to ensure the profit potential from the expansion of the LEO
tourist trade, the key to their receiving an adequate return on their
investment.
Putting aside the engineering challenge of sustaining the ISS, we
should not assume the investment community dismisses out of hand the
possibility of a change in the international partners' willingness to
support ISS operations over an extended period of time. I highlight
this point because our nearly five decades of human spaceflight
illustrate the waxing and waning priorities of governmental entities
engaged in human spaceflight. And, I don't mean just the U.S. Federal
Government, but also the priorities of the other ISS partners: the
Federal Government of Russia, the nations supporting the European Space
Agency, the Government of Japan, or the Government of Canada. To that
mix, there are many others who are or will be involved in future human
spaceflight, most notably the governments of China and India, and in a
collective sense the United Nations. The changes in priorities over
time have been driven, in my opinion, predominately by these
governments assigning greater or lesser value to how its human
spaceflight program contributed to national security objectives.\1\
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\1\ The oldest case in point is the U.S. response to the Sputnik
launch and follow-on launches of cosmonauts. More recently, I am not
alone in suggesting that the U.S. involvement in the International
Space Station's development survived in 1993 largely due to our
national security interest in keeping Russian scientists and engineers
off breadlines. The Bush Administration's lack of interest in planning
budgetary resources to sustain U.S. participation in ISS beyond 2015
can be viewed as an indication of the priority it assigned to ISS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the development of the ISS and its initial years of
operations have promoted collaborative engagement with our former
adversaries and economic competitors, the future expected return on
investment for the ISS on national security grounds is uncertain. (That
could change, of course, if the international partnership expanded to
take in the People's Republic of China and other nations, thus
increasing the value to the U.S. for remaining in this collaborative
engagement and a higher priority in the U.S. Federal budget.) The
arguments on other grounds--economic, and research returns for
instance--for continuing to invest in the international partnership are
good, but not as compelling as the national security argument as
reasons for governments to stay committed.
What assurance should a prospective investor take from the
historical record of governmental investments in risky ventures that
would lead them to invest funds in a collaborative government and
industry ``commercial'' venture without an insurance policy? And, would
he be able to recover his investment and his foregone opportunity
costs? Who would provide that insurance? And, from the Federal
Government's point of view, how would including costs of insurance
impact the total program costs? From my experience, I have difficulty
believing that our government will make an enduring commitment to
provide whatever level of resources is necessary to ``make the market''
and ensure an adequate return on investment for U.S. commercial
suppliers of cargo and crew services. It is conceivable that the
Executive and Legislative branches might agree to appropriate
sufficient funding guarantees that would mitigate the investment risk.
However, I would not dismiss the possibility that other nations and
their commercial entities would view the U.S. Government's underwriting
of the investment risk as creating the potential for an unlevel playing
field in the competition for non-governmental flights, such as space
tourism. I would expect them to argue that the U.S. firms' pricing must
include some factor related to governmental investment cost recovery.
If this is viewed by the investment community as a real threat, the
financial attractiveness of the commercial venture would be further
diminished and require an offsetting remedy.
The Augustine Committee ``estimated that the cost to NASA of
creating an incentive for industry to develop the commercial transport
capability for crew . . . of between $2 billion and $2.5 billion.''
Another component of their total program cost estimate is the provision
by NASA to bidders of a ``suitable version of an existing booster with
a demonstrated track record of successful flight.'' The fraction of the
launch vehicle design, development, test and evaluation costs that
would be borne by NASA was estimated to be another $3 billion. Based on
material available from NASA and public sources, the $3 billion would
cover the unique costs of ``man-rating'' the launch vehicle and
associated infrastructure investments. The Augustine Committee also
looked back to a historical analogy, the Gemini program, and reviewed
its program costs, applied GDP-inflator corrections. They believed the
result--$2.5 billion to $3.0 billion, in 2009 dollars--provides a
sanity check on their total program cost to NASA of $5 billion. I
cannot comment on the credibility of these estimates, given my lack of
access information to the detailed cost estimating and financing
assumptions used. However, I can provide this Committee with some
thoughts based on my extensive experience with program cost and
schedule estimates, the interaction with funding constraints, and the
unique complications introduced by the lack of failure tolerance in the
human spaceflight arena.
First and perhaps foremost, human spaceflight activities are
fanatical about attention to detail and documentation of processes and
products, through the phases of the hardware/software design
engineering, manufacturing phase, and test and evaluation phases. The
designs have to be robust, with as much margin as possible to handle
off-nominal conditions with margin remaining. Changes in designs are
subjected to rigorous, time-consuming reviews. The close coupling of
hardware and software functionality in current vehicle designs requires
an integrated analysis to ensure changes do not introduce unintended
consequences. Every manufacturing discrepancy is scrutinized, and
``use-as-is'' buyoffs of blemished hardware are extremely low. Hardware
and software are subjected to exacting tests. Unanticipated test
results are reason enough to redo the large performance simulation
models that engineers use to establish the anticipated vehicle response
to environments. Care is taken in every possible fashion to mitigate
the physical stress of ascent and descent loads and other stressful
conditions on the human crew member. The high acceleration forces
allowed for cargo transport to orbit are not acceptable for humans.
Meetings are recorded and documented, decisions are not made in haste,
and caution rules the day. Every aspect of the process, from raw
material acquisition to finished product, is certified. ``Off the
shelf'' products, designed for different environments and built to less
exacting standards, are not incorporated without rigorous
certification. Everything is apprised with an eye to whether it would
meet a post-failure review board's excoriating analysis. As Gene Kranz
famously said, ``failure is not an option.'' Nonetheless, in human
spaceflight, systems are designed to be sufficiently robust that there
is a remedy to failure for almost every system. The ``fail-operational,
fail-operational, fail-safe'' philosophy is incorporated wherever
feasible.
How much will a human-rated crew spacecraft and launcher cost?
Should the Committee accept the Augustine Committee's use of Gemini as
an analogy as appropriate. Or, was the environment so different in the
early 1960s that the cost comparison is only of limited value? We
certainly know that today's world of avionics and hardware/software
integration is lightyears different. I confess that I am not the person
with the level of detailed knowledge required to provide this Committee
with an assessment of the appropriateness of the analogy. Perhaps
General Stafford, a Gemini crew member, can provide some insight. I
would note the historical literature suggests that the cost and
schedule baselines for Gemini cited by the Augustine Committee need to
be placed in context, and used--if at all--only as adding a limited
value to the discussion.
Having noted my limitations on the subject, I would point the
Committee's attention to several Gemini attributes that give me concern
about the analogy's appropriateness. First, I doubt that current
program planners would accept the risk taken by the Gemini program
designers to have only ejection seats for the three person crew. (No
emergency escape rocket was provided for the crew capsule in the event
of a failure of the Titan II.) Although General Stafford is far more
informed than I am, I will hazard my opinion that the likelihood was
small that the crew would survive a failure of the launch system during
all but the first seconds of the ascent. That said, it is important to
understand that the Titan II design had one really good feature for
crew safety; it used a storable hypergolic liquid propellant. This gave
it a much lower explosive potential than the Titan I, Redstone, Atlas
and Saturn boosters. The design is also inherently less costly. The
propellant, plumbing, tankage and engines of a storable hypergolic
fueled vehicle permit increased design and manufacturing tolerances,
and less hazardous launch site environments than do launchers using
liquid oxygen and (particularly) liquid hydrogen.
A second point from the Gemini literature indicates that the
schedule (39 months) and cost-estimate ($2.5-3.0 billion) analogies
cited by the Augustine Committee need further research to determine
their appropriateness. For example, the literature points out that
``man-rating the Titan ICBM required minimal changes to the basic Titan
II. Changes were made in the interest of pilot safety (e.g., system
redundancies); some modifications were also necessary to ready the
basic ICBM to accept the Gemini payload.'' \2\ The literature does not
indicate whether a separate production line was established at the
Martin Company to produce the twelve man-rated vehicles, and how that
impacted costs, favorably or unfavorably. The literature does indicate
that the 39-month development period for Gemini cited by the Augustine
Committee does not take into account the development schedule funded by
the Air Force prior to NASA's selection. Specifically, the Air Force,
building on the experience with the Titan ICBM, awarded a contract in
June 1960 to the Martin Company for the Titan II ICBM development.
Although the first Titan II ICBM R&D flight took place in March 1962,
NASA had selected the Titan II, appropriately man-rated, as the vehicle
of choice for Gemini in the Fall of 1961. The program had its
development issues to overcome, although not an inordinate number of
them. However, NASA maintained a fallback position to use the Saturn I
until second state combustion instability problems were solved (jointly
by the Air Force and NASA in the Spring of 1963) and a series of
successful Titan II test flights occurred in late 1963. (It is unclear
from the Gemini literature whether the costs incurred by the Air Force
in support of the Titan II man-rating were funded by NASA.) The first
Gemini qualification launch occurred in April 1984, a second
qualification launch (for spacecraft qualification) occurred in January
1965, and the first Gemini crew was launched in March 1965. Twelve (12)
Gemini launches in total were flown by NASA, ten of them with crew. All
successful.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Source: NASA Historical Data Book, volume II, p. 84.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee may also wish to examine more carefully the arguments
of advocates for the commercial crew and cargo launch services
proposition to the effect that benefits would accrue to the global
price competition environment for existing launch vehicles (such as the
Atlas V) by increasing the launch rate and thus achieving lower per
unit costs. This is an argument that requires careful explication of
assumptions before undue credence is given. As I noted above, the human
spaceflight environment is inherently costly due to its exceedingly low
tolerance of any risk and demand for exhaustive levels of documentation
throughout the engineering, manufacturing, test and launch
environments. Economies of scale in production environments are
realized when the same processes and products are used throughout.
These economies are minimized if, for instance, commercial and
government customers find the increased costs of man-rated processes to
be overkill. Separate production lines are a possible outcome. That is
not to say there are not savings from the distribution of facility
support, indirect, and overhead costs across a broader user base. There
are, but the savings are insignificant unless the relatively fixed
costs of engineering, manufacturing, and supply chain management are
very high proportionately to the production rate.
I also worry about the credibility of the arguments put forth to
the Augustine Committee and included in the report that a ``better
balance [can be struck] between the legitimate need for a NASA quality
assurance and safety process on one hand, and allowing industry to
execute design and development efficiently on the other.'' My
experience with NASA is somewhat dated, given my departure from the
agency in 2003, but I had many occasions during my tenure to listen to
contractors complain about time-consuming and documentation-laden NASA
reviews. Time is money, of course, and an unduly lengthy review process
before a decision is rendered by NASA impedes the timely accomplishment
of work. But complaints often arise when the government-contractor
relationship is damaged, and the contractor believes NASA staff--civil
service and support contractors--do not participate as collaborators,
with a sense of shared urgency. Most frequently I found the argument
was about broken promises and the need for more money. NASA program
managers are not welcomed with open arms by their management when they
return from discussions with contractors who need more money than the
budget affords. NASA program managers often find that the contractor
has different priorities when it comes to assigning the ``best and
brightest'' to their programs. And, the same is true of NASA
priorities, which change over time, again as a reflection of NASA
managers striving to stretch resources across programs to meet emergent
problems.
The procurement environment for cost-reimbursement contracts is
inherently adversarial, of course, because NASA's abiding interest is
(or should be) ensuring the public's money is expended effectively,
with as much accountability as possible, and in compliance with the law
and procurement regulations. Among those legal and regulatory
constraints are those which address socio-economic objectives, national
security objectives (e.g., ITAR), financial management (Prompt Payment
Act, etc.) and identification of liability. Compliance with these
constraints adds costs to the contract, and reduce the contractor's
flexibility.
However, the Augustine Committee's report language caused me to
wonder if those who pressed the ``excessive oversight'' argument
understood the burden placed on the government officials who must
address the ``insurance'' responsibilities of the government. To simply
state the matter, NASA does not take out an insurance policy from
Lloyd's to cover the consequences of failure. These consequences
include not only the out-of-pocket costs but the consequent damages to
program objectives. Instead, the government ``self-insures.'' This
avoids the expenditure of public funds to pay the premiums on the
insurance policy provided by a private concern. However, the
concomitant responsibility placed on government officials is to assure
the taxpayers that they have been diligent in reducing the probability
of loss of lives, hardware, and mission accomplishment. NASA officials
agree to take constructive delivery of hardware and software from
contractors, and sign on the dotted line. NASA officials consent to the
launch and accept the liability for failure. Hence, processes must be
designed to protect against those consequences, with their scope
consistent with the amount of potential loss. Smaller consequences
receive less attention than larger ones. Over the course of years, we
have adjusted our oversight/insight insurance plans to fit the
environment of acceptable risk. After the Challenger and Columbia
disasters, the hang-them-high environment led to a lower risk tolerance
throughout the human spaceflight community. The costs incurred by NASA
for the self-insurance policy went up accordingly. Over time, with
demonstrated successes, a sense of higher confidence and trust builds
up. But, the trust must be earned. The oversight and engagement levels
of NASA in the commercial transportation service venture cannot start
out low, in my estimation, because the trust has not yet been earned.
However, as success accrues, the levels will diminish to what NASA and
FAA officials agree is required to fulfill their insurance
responsibilities.
In closing, let me note that during my thirty years in NASA as a
program analyst, cost estimator, budget formulator and Comptroller, I
became all too familiar with the internal U.S. Government debates about
how much of the scarce Federal budget resources should be allocated to
meet the needs of mounting human spaceflight programs. I was a member
of the supporting cast to the NASA Administrators for many of those
years when they met with the members and staff of this Subcommittee to
explain and advocate for the Administration's priorities. As
representatives of the executive branch, we were not here to express
our personal and professional views of the wisdom of those policies and
priorities. Your challenge was then and is now difficult: how to
discern the wisdom of the Administration's program and budget plans,
not only in regard to civilian government space activities, but also
within the larger context of public policy across the Federal
Government.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Peterson.
Mr. Michael Gass is President and Chief Executive Officer
of United Launch Alliance. He's going to address a strategy and
a timeline for supporting crew to LEO and the possible
obstacles to such development.
Mr. Gass.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL C. GASS, PRESIDENT AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, UNITED LAUNCH ALLIANCE, LLC
Mr. Gass. Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear today.
The 3,900 women and men of United Launch Alliance are
honored to be able to support our U.S. Government in commercial
customers' missions with the most reliable best-value launch
services with our Atlas and Delta rockets.
Formed in December 2006, United Launch Alliance is a 50-50
joint venture of the Lockheed Martin Corporation and the Boeing
Company. The Formation of ULA brought together the launch
industry's most experienced and successful expendable launch
vehicle teams.
The Atlas and Delta expendable launch vehicles have
supported America's presence in space for more than five
decades, with over 1,300 launches with impressive records of
mission success. And I'd like to say, our heritage also
includes the Titan that General Stafford talked about.
Members may recall that the first American to orbit the
Earth, John Glenn, was lifted into orbit on an Atlas rocket.
Since then, the launch vehicles have evolved through innovative
improvements accomplished by generations of engineers and
technicians into today's expendable launch vehicle fleet. The
rocket Glenn flew was used by both the Department of Defense
and NASA, a concept that was right then and is available again
today.
Before I get to the central questions you asked, ULA, as a
commercial launch service provider, would like to offer our
support for the administration's proposed plan. As I stated to
the Augustine Commission, our Nation must have the constancy of
purpose to have a strong human and robotics science and
exploration program. The plan that's proposed transcends any
one company or agency solution, and it has the ability, if
executed properly, to be affordable, sustainable, and flexible.
The Administration's plan makes long-overdue investments in
research, technology development, and upgrades to our launch
ranges that are essential to ensuring United States remains the
world leader in space.
One critical investment that will have benefits to all
future national security civil and commercial space mission is
in our space liquid propulsion technology. I urge members to
support these important technology investments.
Plan also has the potential fostering growth in commercial
space opportunities. But, I think it's important to note, given
today's topic, that the consolidation of--to form United Launch
Alliance was done, in part, because the commercial market
projected in the late 1990s did not materialize, as was
originally expected, and the remaining market was insufficient
to sustain two healthy launch services providers. Therefore, we
believe the Nation's human access to space should not be solely
dependent on the success of future commercial markets.
Now, let me address what ULA, as a proven launch service
provider, is willing, and can, do to meet the demand for human-
rated launch services under the Administration's proposed
commercial crew program.
The EELV rockets provide the quickest and safest approach
to closing the gap following the retirement of Space Shuttle.
ULA believes there is a unique opportunity for NASA and the DOD
to leverage the existing EELV systems toward meeting NASA's
safety and reliability requirements for all missions at lower
cost. ULA also believes that the system architecture of our
EELV is extensible for future exploration beyond low-Earth
orbit.
We will be working with multiple companies that will
compete for services--for crew services, and we plan to provide
launch services in support of their proposals. We will apply
our products and teams fairly in support of all of these
companies. By leveraging the billions of dollars of private
capital that ULA and our member companies have invested, and
utilizing the existing launch infrastructure, we can support
their test flights within 3 years.
Use of EELV fosters a strong launch industrial base that
enables efficient access to support numerous missions. In the
past, our Nation had specific launch programs that served niche
payload markets, and separate systems for NASA and DOD, each
requiring separate infrastructure and industrial capabilities.
This was inefficient and less reliable.
In regards to the human-rating questions: Can a EELV be
human-rated to support commercial crew? The simple answer is,
``Absolutely.'' How quickly could these rockets be ready for
human-rated flight? The rocket will be ready before the crew
vehicle, primarily because the rocket already exists and is
flying.
The Atlas and Delta EELVs were designed, from the outset,
with the primary goal of being as safe, as reliable as we
possibly could make them for our customers. EELVs are tasked
with launching the most sophisticated, highest priority,
national security satellites. They also must get to orbit
safely.
What does it take to human-rate EELVs? Crew safety must be
treated as an integrated solution between the crew vehicle, an
inherently safe launch vehicle, and combined with a robust
abort capability. ULA believes changes to the rocket are
minimal. The basic rocket itself would remain the same, and we
would add emergency detection systems that would provide the
crew vehicle the necessary information to trigger a safe abort,
if needed. ULA looks forward to the opportunity to work with
NASA to validate our approach.
On-the-ground pad modifications would be--need to be made,
primarily to accommodate crew egress--ingress and egress to the
rocket. The cost and complexity of these facility changes are
relatively modest to the existing launch complexes, but,
depending on flight rates, dedicated human-launch facilities
should be considered.
In summary, ULA supports the Nation's human spaceflight
program and stands ready to assist in making it successful.
EELV-based solutions provide a near-term, reliable solution for
flying humans to low-Earth orbit. Use of the EELV fleet
promotes synergy with national security space community,
provides NASA with scalable options for heavy-lift exploration
needs, and provides a foundation for U.S. space launch
industrial base to prove its international competitiveness.
Thank you again for inviting me. I look forward to you
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gass follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael C. Gass, President
and Chief Executive Officer, United Launch Alliance, LLC
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to discuss the Administration's plans for
human spaceflight. My name is Michael Gass and I am the President and
Chief Executive Officer of United Launch Alliance. The 3,900 women and
men of United Launch Alliance are honored to be able to support our
customers' missions with the most reliable, best value launch services
with our Atlas and Delta rockets. Our customers are the Department of
Defense, the National Reconnaissance Office, NASA, and commercial
satellite system providers.
Formed in December 2006, United Launch Alliance, LLC is a 50/50
joint venture of Lockheed Martin and The Boeing Company. The formation
of ULA brought together the launch industry's most experienced and
successful launch vehicle teams to support the United States Air
Forces' Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program (EELV) with the Atlas
V and Delta IV products. We joined together as one company, one team,
to enable the business sustainability to deliver improved mission
success with lower cost to our customers.
The Atlas and Delta expendable launch vehicles have supported
America's presence in space for more than five decades, with over 1,300
launches and an impressive record of mission success. These missions
have carried a variety of payloads including national security,
communications, navigation, weather, science, and commercial space that
protect and improve life on Earth, as well as further our knowledge of
the universe.
Members may recall that the first American to orbit the Earth, John
Glenn, was lifted into orbit on an Atlas rocket. Since then, the launch
vehicle has evolved through innovative improvements accomplished by
generations of engineers and technicians to today's EELV fleet. The
rocket Glenn flew was used by both the Department of Defense and NASA
for human spaceflight, a concept that was right then and is available
again today.
Before I get to the central questions you asked, ULA, as a
commercial launch service provider, would like to offer our support for
the Administration's proposed plan. As I stated to the Augustine
Commission, our Nation must have the constancy of purpose to have a
strong human and robotic science and exploration program. This program
must transcend any one company or agency solution, and the
implementation must be affordable, sustainable and flexible.
The Administration's plan makes long-overdue investments in
research, technology and upgrades to our launch ranges that are
essential to ensuring the United States remains the world's leader in
space. One critical investment that will have benefits to all future
national security, civil and commercial space missions is in space
liquid propulsion technology. I urge members to support these important
technology investments.
The plan also has the potential to foster and grow commercial space
opportunities. I think its important to note, given today's topic, that
the consolidation to form ULA was done in part because the commercial
market projected in the late 1990s did not materialize as was
originally expected and the remaining market was insufficient to
sustain two healthy launch service providers. Therefore, we believe the
Nation's human access to space should not be dependant on the success
of a future adjacent commercial market.
Now let me address what ULA, as a proven launch service provider,
can do to meet the demand for human-rated launch services under the
Administration's proposed commercial crew program.
First, I'd like to say that ULA is ready, willing and able to
support the human spaceflight program and help make it successful.
The EELV rockets provide the quickest and safest approach to
closing the gap following the retirement of the Space Shuttle. ULA and
our member companies have invested billions of dollars of private
capital into these systems that can be leveraged for our Nation's human
access to space.
ULA believes there is a unique opportunity for NASA and the DOD to
leverage the existing EELV systems toward meeting NASA's safety and
reliability requirements for all missions at lower costs.
ULA also believes the system architecture of our EELVs is
extensible for future exploration beyond low earth orbit by either
leveraging the potential fuel depot technologies or by building heavy
lift vehicles using the same modular concept that is inherent in our
existing EELV fleet.
We will be working with multiple companies to provide launch
services in support of their commercial crew services. We will apply
our products and teams fairly in support of all these companies. By
leveraging our investments and utilizing existing launch infrastructure
we can support test flights within 3 years.
Use of EELV fosters a strong launch industrial base that enables
efficient access to support numerous mission needs. In the past, our
Nation had specific launch programs that served niche payload markets
and separate systems for NASA and DOD, each requiring separate
infrastructure and industrial capabilities. This was inefficient and
less reliable.
Human-rating EELVs
Can EELVs be human-rated to support commercial crew?
The simple answer is absolutely.
How quickly could these rockets be ready for a human-rated flight?
The rocket will be ready before the crew vehicle--primarily because
the rocket already exists and is flying.
Let me explain further. The Atlas and Delta EELVs were designed
from the outset with the primary goal of being as safe and as reliable
as we could possibly make them for our customers. EELVs are tasked with
launching the most sophisticated, highest priority national security
satellites. The value of these assets to decision-makers, the
intelligence community and the warfighter far outweighs their
replacement cost. They must get to orbit safely. As a result, all that
can be done to ensure mission success is done. Any additional NASA
human rating requirements that enhance the launch vehicles reliability
would benefit our national security customer's missions and we would
incorporate these changes in the entire fleet.
What does it take to human-rate EELVs?
ULA believes changes to the rocket are minimal. The basic rocket
itself would remain the same and we would add an Emergency Detection
System (EDS). The EDS is essentially an electronics box that monitors
the health of the rocket as it is flying and provides the capability
for the crew vehicle to trigger an abort, if needed. Crew safety must
be treated as an integrated solution between the crew vehicle and an
inherently safe launch vehicle, combined with a robust abort
capability. ULA looks forward to the opportunity to work with NASA to
validate our approach.
On the ground, pad modifications would need to be made, primarily
to accommodate crew ingress and egress to the rocket. The cost and
complexity of these facility changes are relatively modest. Depending
on expected flight rate, dedicated human launch facilities will be
considered.
In summary, ULA supports the human spaceflight program and stands
ready to assist in making it successful. EELV based solutions provide a
near term, reliable solution for flying humans to low earth orbit. Use
of the EELV fleet promotes synergy with the national security space
community, provides NASA with scalable options for heavy lift
exploration needs and provides a foundation for U.S. space launch
industrial base to improve its international competitiveness.
Thank you again for inviting me to testify. I look forward to your
questions.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Gass.
Frank Culbertson, Jr., is the Senior Vice President and
Deputy General Manager of the Advanced Programs Group of
Orbital Sciences. He is also an astronaut, and he will discuss
Orbital's role in the crew development capabilities.
Mr. Culbertson.
STATEMENT OF FRANK L. CULBERTSON, JR. (CAPTAIN, USN, RET.),
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER, ORBITAL
SCIENCES CORPORATION, ADVANCED PROGRAMS GROUP
Mr. Culbertson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good
afternoon. And, Senator Hutchison, good to see you again.
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing
regarding commercially-developed crew delivery to low-Earth
orbit. I'm truly humbled to be a part of such an esteemed
panel. I'm sitting here between two presidents, at least one
Ph.D., a financial guru, and a couple of my heroes, including
the General. So, it's nice to be a part of this company, and I
hope I can shed some light on what Orbital Sciences intends to
do to support the programs, going forward.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, when you put on the suit and get
in the spacecraft, you have to depend on a lot of people to
make sure that things are going to go right. Those of us that
do that are oriented toward achieving mission success through
thoughtful management of risk. Everyone who flies has the
utmost confidence that the dedicated men and women of the NASA
contractor team do everything humanly possible to ensure crew
safety. That fact must not change as new programs and goals are
developed for human spaceflight, including in the commercial
world.
At Orbital, I'm responsible for oversight of our programs
relating to human spaceflight, including not only cargo
resupply and the Signa Spacecraft, with its Taurus II launch
vehicle, but also the development of the Orion launch abort
system for the Constellation Program, a key element of any
spacecraft with humans on board.
In addition to our 28 years of work in other areas of
spaceflight, such as satellites and launch vehicles, Orbital is
totally committed to supporting the future of human spaceflight
in this country, as well as to exploring business approaches
that will continue to make space more accessible and productive
for all potential users.
We have over 200 successful launches behind us, 500
successful missions, and we have 900 missions either on order
or completed to date. And the company is well versed in the
complexities and intricacies of flying into space.
Given the stated concern as to whether the commercial space
industry is robust enough to develop reliable transportation
services for crew to low-Earth orbit within a reasonable time,
at a fair cost, and, most importantly, with the requisite
safety margins, Orbital believes, as do I, that U.S. industry,
given the right conditions, relationships, and investments,
should be able to develop and demonstrate safe and reliable
crew transportation systems for access to the ISS.
NASA's proposed funding of about $6 billion over the next 5
years, together with the addition of appropriate private
capital, should be sufficient to enable at least one, and
probably two, commercially provided crew systems to be
demonstrated by 2015.
I'm confident that commercial providers and NASA can work
together to establish the proper safety and performance
standards, the fundamentals of which are already well
established, that will enable industry to continue the current
successful era of U.S. human spaceflight, both for U.S.
Government missions and for other markets as they develop.
I would also expect that industry will make proper use of
NASA's manpower, expertise, and physical infrastructure to
enhance safety and mission success, which will help maintain
and build our national competence in these areas, an important
factor in motivating future generations to do the hard work
required to continue to carry that leadership banner.
This effort will require close cooperation with NASA in
developing full understanding and implementation of the
appropriate human-rating standards, especially at the system
level, as has been mentioned previously on the panel, and a
robust, reliable, true escape system.
Once we have developed, tested, and certified our
transportation service, I would be happy to volunteer to strap
in once again for a mission to ISS. If I am not willing to join
the first mission of an Orbital-developed spacecraft that I
share responsibility for, then no one should be on that flight.
I mentioned that to my boss, and, in that same vein, our
CEO, Dave Thompson, made it very clear to me yesterday, that if
I'm going, he is too.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Culbertson. He just doesn't want to go without a pilot.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Culbertson. It's difficult to envision commercially-
provided crew services being conducted entirely by industry
with a hands-off approach from NASA, which is currently being
debated. Nor can these commercial services be provided
efficiently with traditional levels of government involvement
and oversight at every turn. Rather, to be successful,
commercial suppliers must work closely with NASA and other
potential customers at key milestones and reviews, providing
insight to the program and demonstrating the willingness to
listen to the technical judgment and leadership of NASA's
seasoned government-contractor human spaceflight team, much as
we now do on the COTS program.
In addition, the FAA relationship must continue to grow and
mature in order to establish a proper regulatory regime for
commercial crew activities. Indemnification, insurance, and
liability are all key elements in determining how we go
forward. This is serious business, and the appropriate balance
of insight and oversight are mandatory, as are open,
transparent communications with the customer.
Just as the Shuttle MIR program was preparation for
producing the collaboration and joint operations being used so
successfully in the ISS program, COTS is providing superb
learning experiences, not only for developing new hardware that
can fly to the Station safely, but also the operations
concepts, the relationships, and the lines of communication
that will enable all sorts of commercial endeavors in the
future. The challenge is to develop and operate commercial low-
Earth Orbit transportation systems that will service not only
the U.S. Government, but also the other markets that can be
imagined.
Since 2008, Orbital has been fully-engaged as one of the
two companies to provide delivery of cargo to ISS. We have made
steady and valuable progress in that short time. We expect to
have achieved all but three of 21 NASA program milestones by
the end of this year, including successful completion of the
critical Phase One and Phase Two safety review milestones.
The first launch of our Taurus II rocket from Launch Pad 0-
A at the Mid Atlantic Regional Spaceport on Wallops Island,
Virginia, will occur next year. This progress is aided by the
hard work and cooperation of many talented people at NASA
headquarters at several NASA centers, as well as the FAA, the
support of Virginia and Maryland, through Mid Atlantic Regional
Spaceport Authority, the efforts of our teammates, suppliers,
international providers, and the internal corporate support we
receive to resource this program. Please note the addition of
State and local agencies and organizations in their new roles
and levels of investment, a key ingredient in achieving
commercial goals.
Extension of the International Space Station is one of the
cornerstones of a sound future in space, both scientifically
and commercially, as we strive for more distant destinations
and new technologies continue to be developed.
Based on my personal experience onboard the Station, I
firmly believe that the ISS is an ideal platform for
development and simulation of the operations, technologies, and
techniques to execute more ambitious and lengthy missions to
the Moon, Mars, and other destinations. While onboard, I often
imagined what it would be like to take that station and fly it
to Mars or place it on the surface of the Moon. What else would
I need beside what I had? In addition to a regenerative life
support system and better radiation, I needed a reliable supply
line or else a heck of a lot more room. But, we have to have
the support of our commercial industry in order to keep that
station going.
We can simulate missions to Mars, simulate missions to the
Moon, and evaluate the technologies that are going to be
developed to allow us to go further on that station. Extending
it to 2020 is the right thing to do, and we support it fully.
In closing, please allow me to mention that, as an
astronaut and a manager, I've had the privilege of working on a
variety of missions which generated vigorous debate as to their
advisability and even their safety. But, in the end, the right
decisions were made to enhance our national security, extend
international cooperation in space science, and increase the
capabilities of the International Space Station.
Clearly, the NASA budget that was recently delivered by the
Administration has generated a firestorm of discussion that is
rarely seen on the topic of space exploration. I sincerely feel
the pain of some who are at the center of the storm, as well as
those who feel threatened by elements of the budget.
But, I welcome the fact that, finally, we are having a
broad and fervent debate on the Nation's future in space. I
know that a lot of energy is being expended at NASA to provide
increased specificity of the goals. So, I am hopeful that a
thoughtful and thorough examination of the available paths
forward will result in an ambitious, sound set of programs that
will both maintain our leadership in space exploration and
inspire and challenge us as a Nation to attack even tougher
problems.
Like this hearing, promoting meaningful dialogue within the
relatively small but passionate group of people who truly
understand and care about what it actually takes to execute
what so many take for granted--that is, reliable access to
space--will help move us in the right direction. And I expect
the U.S. industry to support these next challenging national
space endeavors, as it always has, with professionalism,
excellence, and innovation.
Our Nation continues to inspire people throughout the world
with our commitment to freedom, creativity, exploration, and
commerce. Opening the right doors for industry to participate
more broadly on a commercial basis will help maintain and
enhance America's leadership on the space and economic
frontiers.
Thank you again for inviting me to appear before this
panel, and I'd be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Culbertson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frank L. Culbertson, Jr. (Captain, USN, Ret.),
Senior Vice President and Deputy General Manager, Orbital Sciences
Corporation, Advanced Programs Group
Good afternoon Chairman Nelson and Ranking Member Vitter, and
members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate this opportunity to
participate in this hearing regarding the potential of commercial crew
delivery capabilities to low Earth orbit to enhance our Nation's
progress in space exploration and development.
I am honored to sit on this distinguished panel with industry
colleagues Michael Gass and Gwynne Shotwell, and former NASA colleagues
George Nield, now with the FAA, and Malcolm Peterson, formerly NASA's
comptroller. Needless to say, it is also an honor to sit alongside two
fellow astronauts whom I hold in the highest regard: Lt. General Thomas
Stafford, who commanded the vital Apollo 10 lunar landing dress
rehearsal mission and 35 years ago blazed a trail for U.S.-Russian
cooperation in space while commanding the American side of the Apollo-
Soyuz mission, and Bryan O'Connor, a veteran of two Space Shuttle
missions and since 2002 the NASA leader and agency conscience on all
matters regarding mission safety.
For those of us who have had the great privilege to fly into space
wearing the U.S. flag on our space suit--including the chairman of this
subcommittee--I think it is fair to say that we are oriented toward
achieving mission success through thoughtful risk taking. Every time I
have entered the Space Shuttle preparing for flight it was with the
utmost confidence that the dedicated men and women of NASA and its
contractor teams had done everything humanly possible to ensure my
safety, and I'm certain my colleagues share this view about their
experiences.
My job at Orbital Sciences Corporation includes oversight of all
programs relating to Human Space Flight Systems, including not only our
Cargo Resupply Services contract and the Cygnus Spacecraft, with a
close connection to our Taurus II Launch Vehicle, but also the
development of the Orion Launch Abort System under the auspices of the
Constellation Program. In addition to our 28 years of work in other
areas of spaceflight, such as satellites and launch vehicles, our
company is totally committed to supporting the future of human
spaceflight in this country, as well as to exploring business
approaches that will continue to make space more accessible and
productive for all potential users.
The recent CCDev procurement competition, with 36 bidders listed,
indicates that a number of U.S. companies, large and small, with
outstanding track records of providing NASA with launch and space
services have an interest in supporting commercially provided crew
transportation services.
NASA's proposed funding of about $6 billion over the next 5 years,
together with the addition of appropriate private capital, should be
sufficient to enable at least one and probably two U.S. commercially-
provided crew systems to be demonstrated by the year 2015.
I am confident that NASA can work with commercial providers to
establish the proper safety and performance standards and oversight
measures, the fundamentals of which are already well-established, that
will enable industry to continue this successful era of U.S. human
spaceflight for both U.S. Government missions, and for other markets as
they develop. I would also expect that industry will make proper use of
NASA's manpower, expertise, and physical infrastructure to not only
enhance safety and mission success, but also to help maintain and build
our national competence in these areas. Preeminence in exploratory and
technical accomplishments remains as important as ever if we are to
maintain our global leadership in space and continue to motivate future
generations to do the hard work required to carry that banner.
Given your appropriate concern as to whether the commercial space
industry is robust enough to develop reliable commercial launch
services for crew to low Earth orbit within a reasonable time, at a
fair cost, and, most importantly, with the requisite safety margins,
let me clearly state again my response to the fundamental question of
whether this model can work. Orbital believes, as do I, that U.S.
industry, given the right conditions, relationships, and investments,
should be able to develop and demonstrate safe and reliable crew
transportation systems for International Space Station support by 2015.
Two of the important elements of ensuring safety in future
transportation systems are close cooperation with NASA in developing a
clear understanding and full implementation of Human Rating Standards,
especially at the system level, and a robust, reliable crew escape
system. Furthermore, once such a service is developed, tested, and
certified, I would be happy to volunteer to strap in once again for a
mission to the International Space Station. If I am not willing to join
the first mission of an Orbital developed spacecraft that I share
responsibility for, then no one should be on that flight.
I would also like to emphasize the importance of partnership to the
success of a commercial crew transportation program. For programs of
this nature to work, especially in the NASA context, what's required is
a sound, trusting relationship between--and open, honest communication
amongst--the appropriate government, industry, and international
partners. This is not a simple or easy task, as evidenced by the major
space programs of the last 50 years, but it can be done and results in
powerful accomplishments, such as Apollo, Shuttle, and the
International Space Station.
I do not envisage commercially provided crew services being
conducted entirely by industry with a hands-off approach from NASA. Nor
can these commercial services be provided efficiently with traditional
levels of government involvement and oversight at every turn. Rather,
to be successful, commercial suppliers must work closely with NASA and
other potential customers at key milestones, tests, and reviews,
providing insight to the program and demonstrating the willingness to
listen to the technical judgment and leadership of NASA's seasoned
government and contractor human spaceflight team in a mutually
productive relationship. In addition, the FAA relationship must
continue to grow and mature in order to establish a proper regulatory
regime for commercial crew activities. In this serious business there
is no substitute for open lines of communication and the appropriate
balance of insight and oversight that will lead to shared progress in
21st century space activities.
Just as the Shuttle-Mir Program was an excellent developmental
program for producing the collaboration and joint operations being used
so successfully in the International Space Station Program, the
Commercial Orbital Transportation program and related Commercial
Resupply Services program or COTS/CRS, are providing superb learning
experiences for not only developing new hardware that can fly to the
Station safely, but also the operations concepts, relationships, and
lines of communication that will enable all sorts of commercial
endeavors in the future.
Though the willingness of industry to invest their own technical
and financial resources in an incipient space project is not new, just
as Orbital is now doing on the COTS/CRS programs, the levels of
investment and financial risks are moving in new directions. We see the
opportunity for commercially provided crew transportation as an
extension and strengthening of NASA's current initiatives in commercial
cargo delivery that will lead to exciting new partnerships with private
industry. The challenge is to develop and operate commercial low Earth
orbit transportation systems that will service not only the government
but also the other markets that can be imagined.
Since 2008 Orbital has been fully engaged as one of two companies
contracted to provide the delivery of crew and cargo to the
International Space Station. Although this has been a huge development
program for a company of our size, and unprecedented in scope for a
purely commercial venture between a private company and NASA, I am very
pleased to report that from Orbital's perspective, and that of our
shareholders, we have made steady and valuable progress. We expect to
have achieved all but 3 of 21 NASA program milestones by the end of
this year, including successful completion of the critical Phase One
and Phase Two Safety Review milestones. We are on pace for first launch
of the Taurus II rocket from Launch Pad O-A at the Mid-Atlantic
Regional Spaceport on Wallops Island, Virginia, next year. This
progress is possible because of the hard work and cooperation of many
talented people at NASA Headquarters and several NASA centers, as well
as the FAA, the support of Virginia and Maryland through the Mid-
Atlantic Regional Spaceport Authority, the efforts of our teammates,
suppliers, and international providers, and the internal corporate
support we receive to resource this program.
I mention all of those players to highlight the point that it truly
takes a complex mix of organizations to execute space missions,
especially with crew involved. The mix and complexity have evolved over
the last five decades, but this is still one of the most difficult and
exciting endeavors known to humans, and I believe will be for some time
to come. The addition of local and state agencies and organizations in
new roles and levels of investment will only serve to enhance
commercial opportunities for success. Executing parts of the
development and operation in new and imaginative ways, while keeping
the focus on safety and mission success, is our challenge for the near
term, so that we not only expand our frontiers, but also give our
children a space program that they can build upon--not be forced to
rebuild.
For Orbital, we see the extension of the International Space
Station as one of the cornerstones for a sound future in space, both
scientifically and commercially, as we strive for more distant
destinations and new technologies continue to be developed. Looking
forward, we believe the ability to provide cargo and crew services to
the International Space Station is absolutely critical given the
pending retirement of the Space Shuttle and the Administration's wise
decision to continue the International Space Station's mission from
2015 to 2020 (or beyond!), thus enabling our scientists and researchers
to pursue a more aggressive program of scientific research and
utilization at this multi-national orbital facility. I applaud its
designation as a National Laboratory. In addition, based on my personal
experience on board the Station, I firmly believe that the ISS is an
ideal platform for developing and simulating the operations,
technologies, and techniques for executing more ambitious missions and
lengthy missions to the Moon, Mars, and other destinations.
I often tried to imagine what we would need if the station were en
route to Mars or were somehow placed on the moon, besides what we
already had or expected to have in the future--such as regenerative
life support and radiation protection--and one of the major
requirements was a reliable supply line--and/or a lot more room! We at
Orbital intend to be a key element in that supply line. It is indeed
important to recognize that this new approach to meeting our Nation's
commitment to fully utilize the International Space Station, including
the designated National Laboratory portion of the facility, is part of
a broader policy to advance American progress in space on a number of
productive fronts.
By now turning anew to America's innovative private sector to
provide crew transport to low Earth orbit, NASA will be able to invest
new resources in transformative technologies that will speed our
exploration path to the Moon, Mars, asteroids and other deep-space
destinations. New launch vehicle propulsion, in-space operations
technologies and related robotic precursor missions are just a few of
these. This approach will also enable increased funding for NASA's
other critical missions in earth and space sciences, thus helping us
better protect life on our home planet through accelerated and expanded
climate change research missions, and extend through our robotic
emissaries and telescopes the profound search for evidence of life in
and outside the solar system.
In closing, please allow me to mention that as an astronaut I have
had the privilege of working on missions that have helped to enhance
our national security, extend international cooperation in space
science, and increase the capabilities of the International Space
Station facility, which has just been given a new lease on life.
Clearly, the NASA budget that was recently delivered by the
Administration has generated a firestorm of discussion that is rarely
seen on the topic of space exploration. I sincerely feel the pain of
some who are at the center of the storm, as well as those who feel
threatened by parts of the budget, but I welcome the fact that finally
we are having a broad and fervent debate on the subject. I know that a
lot of energy is being expended at NASA to provide increased
specificity of the goals, so I am hopeful that a more thoughtful and
thorough examination of the available paths forward will result in an
ambitious, sound set of programs that will fill us all with pride. Just
as you are doing by holding this hearing, promoting meaningful dialogue
within the relatively small but passionate group of people who truly
understand and care about what it actually takes to execute what so
many take for granted--that is, reliable access to space--will help
move us in the right direction. I expect that U.S. industry will
support challenging national space endeavors as it always has--with
professionalism, excellence, and innovation.
Our Nation continues to inspire people throughout the world for our
commitment to freedom, creativity, exploration, and commerce. Opening
the right doors for industry to participate more broadly on a
commercial basis will help maintain and enhance America's leadership on
the space frontier.
Thank you again for inviting me to appear before this important
hearing today.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Culbertson.
Ms. Gwynn Shotwell is President of SpaceX, and she will
discuss SpaceX's progress and obstacles in developing crew
capabilities.
STATEMENT OF GWYNNE SHOTWELL, PRESIDENT, SpaceX
Ms. Shotwell. Chairman Nelson, Senator Hutchison, on behalf
of the 1,000--nearly 1,000 employees at SpaceX, I'm honored to
be here to address the questions that you've provided.
It's probably no secret that SpaceX is fully supportive of
the NASA budget and plans for commercial crew and cargo, and
we're grateful for the support that this committee has provided
to date.
As a fast-growing entrepreneurial U.S. launch-services
provider that competes daily for both domestic and
international business, having the support of Congress and the
U.S. Government is vital to our success. Of the over 30-plus
space launches we have currently on our manifest, NASA
represents just under half of those. And so, they're a critical
customer.
I'm pleased to be here today to discuss the proposed fiscal
2011 budget, and specifically their proposal to use commercial
launch-service providers to bring crew and cargo to the
International Space Station. Although this has been a matter of
policy and law since 2004, we recognize that some still
question whether the commercial space industry is up for this
challenge, even with the significant support provided for in
the budget. Accordingly, I want to answer three questions
today, initially. First, can SpaceX develop a capability to
deliver crew to the ISS? And, if so, when? Second, can SpaceX
perform crew missions regularly and safely? And third, is a
commercial crew program critical for the United States to
explore other destinations in the solar system, such as Mars?
The simple answer to each of these questions is, ``yes,'' and
I'll follow up with a few detailed remarks.
Regarding timing, SpaceX firmly believes that we can get
astronauts to the International Space Station within 3 years of
contract award, largely based on the fact that our Dragon
capsule was designed, from the inception, to carry crew, with
minor uprating from our cargo vehicle.
Since the company was founded in 2002, we have designed,
developed, and successfully launched the first privately-
financed liquid-fuel rocket, and we've gotten that vehicle to
orbit twice in a row. Under the COTS program, we are on track
to demonstrate cargo capability to the ISS within less than a
year. This demonstration will then be followed by 12 commercial
cargo resupply missions to the ISS. Although our Falcon 9
launch vehicle and Dragon spacecraft have been contracted to
carry cargo currently, we certainly have an existing option
under the COTS program to carry crew, as well.
Given that, as I mentioned earlier, both the Falcon 9
launch vehicle and the Dragon capsule have been designed, since
inception, to carry--to accommodate crew. In fact, because our
spacecraft must approach and berth with the ISS, many of the
crew-rating criteria will have already been verified on Dragon
before we get to the ISS. We are, therefore, confident that we
can complete all necessary enhancements for Dragon, demonstrate
Falcon 9's reliability, and be ready to fly astronauts to the
Station within 3 years.
Regarding safety, SpaceX plans to fully comply with any and
all safety standards set by NASA under the U.S. Government. We
believe the notion that NASA would place astronauts on an
unproven commercial rocket is simply and unrealistic concern.
Falcon 9 and Dragon will fly numerous cargo and operational
flights to the ISS before ever carrying crew. SpaceX has
contracted over 24 Falcon 9 flights, some of which are Dragon
flights, as well, and we're adding new missions to the manifest
by the end of the month, actually.
If development problems ever arise, early in the Falcon 9
or Dragon Program, those problems have plenty of time to be
resolved and demonstrate the service reliably.
Commercial vehicles are inherently reliable, as
demonstrated by the long, proven heritage of the Atlas and
Delta programs. There's nothing inherently unreliable about a
commercial service.
There has been significant debate over what it means for a
rocket to be man-rated. NASA is only now establishing
commercial human-rating requirements. Notwithstanding, SpaceX
designed the Falcon 9 and Dragon with all the known NASA
requirements in mind. In fact, SpaceX has gone even further.
For example, Falcon 9 is the only launch vehicle, foreign or
domestic, that can survive the loss of any first-stage engine.
This was a capability that was--that both the Saturn I and
Saturn V rockets had, and they were used to save astronauts'
lives.
Going forward, SpaceX will comply with any NASA-published
human-rating requirements, and we look forward to engaging with
the agency on crew-rating our systems. Let me be clear, as
we've been criticized on this point, SpaceX is not looking for
a free or easy ride, with respect to meeting NASA-imposed crew-
rating criteria.
Last, some have criticized NASA's Fiscal Year 2011
budgetary vision for lacking a destination beyond low-Earth
orbit. SpaceX firmly believes that using commercial crew and
cargo services for LEO will free up NASA resources to focus on
exploring other destinations in the solar system, such as Mars.
By engaging the commercial sector now, NASA will be
developing procurement processes and techniques that will help
enable the government to cost-effectively manage future
exploration efforts. Specifically, if NASA relies on commercial
companies like those represented here today, much the same way
that the defense and national security community relies on us
to protect the payloads and precious homeland and troops
overseas, NASA can focus its great mind and limited financial
resources on what NASA has always done best, pushing the
frontier and exploring worlds beyond.
Mr. Chairman, the nearly 1,000 men and women of SpaceX
appreciate your time and your attention to this matter. I'm
happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Shotwell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gwynne Shotwell, President, SpaceX
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of the
nearly one thousand employees of Space Exploration Technologies
(SpaceX) located in Florida, California, Texas, and elsewhere in the
United States, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today.
SpaceX was founded by Elon Musk in 2002 because he had the
foresight and firsthand knowledge of how the United States was falling
behind in terms of affordable access to space. As Mike Griffin pointed
out to Congress in 2003, ``we desperately need much more cost effective
Earth-to-LEO [low-Earth Orbit] transportation for payloads in the size
range from a few thousand to a few tens of thousands of pounds. In my
judgment, this is our most pressing need, for it controls a major
portion of the cost of everything else that we do in space. Yet, no
active U.S. government program of which I am aware has this as its
goal.''
When the Bush Administration released its Vision for Exploration in
2004, the decision was made to complete the International Space Station
(ISS), retire the Space Shuttle in 2010, and acquire crew and cargo
services to the ISS commercially and from our international partners.
In order to ensure that NASA's resources would be focused on space
transportation capabilities for exploration of the Moon and Mars, the
policy explicitly stated that supporting the ISS would be ``separated
to the maximum practical extent'' from exploration missions beyond low-
Earth orbit (LEO). The policy of acquiring commercial crew and cargo
services to the ISS has been reaffirmed consistently by NASA, in
numerous authorization bills, and Presidential national security
directives.
It is important for the Committee to note that even had all of the
ambitious goals of the 2004 Vision for Space Exploration been met, this
country has long been on a path to dependence on the Russians--that is,
if and until commercial LEO services become available. Moreover, it is
a matter of policy and law that the Constellation system of Ares/Orion
be developed and optimized (from a technical and operational
perspective) for returning to the Moon and beyond, not for supporting
the ISS. Falcon 9/Dragon, on the other hand, has been designed and
optimized to replace the Russian Soyuz system with an improved U.S.
capability, and therefore is much less complex and significantly less
expensive than Ares/Orion.
SpaceX is grateful for all the support this Committee has provided
for commercial crew and cargo services to date. As a fast-growing,
entrepreneurial, U.S. provider of launch services competing daily for
both domestic and international business, having the support of
Congress and the U.S. government is vital to our success. This is a
difficult business and we have come a long way in an unprecedented
period of time. One of our key customers, of course, is NASA. I am
pleased to discuss the new direction that NASA has opted to take in the
proposed FY 2011 budget, specifically with respect to the agency's
plans to rely upon ``commercial'' launch providers to develop crew
delivery capabilities to LEO.
I understand the skepticism that the commercial space industry can
succeed at manned carriage to the ISS within a reasonable timeframe,
even with the significant support from NASA and financial investment
proposed in the budget. I also understand that there are concerns about
the safety of commercial vehicles. Today, I will comment broadly on
these issues, with a particular focus on SpaceX's capabilities,
timelines, budget, and approach to safety. To begin, however, I have
two answers to questions posed by this Committee--first, in response to
inquiries about the timing of commercial manned carriage, I can tell
you that SpaceX firmly believes that we can be ready to fly astronauts
to the ISS within 3 years after contract award. In response to
questions about safety, I can tell you that SpaceX intends to be fully
compliant with any and all safety standards set by NASA and the U.S.
Government.
``Commercial Space'' Continues to be the Best Approach for Servicing
the ISS
As a threshold matter, it is worthwhile to discuss what it means to
provide ``commercial'' services to NASA for cargo or crew carriage.
This can be a confusing term inasmuch as NASA and other U.S. Government
agencies rely upon the private sector for launch and other space-
related service. Why are those providers not considered ``commercial''?
Importantly, this is not new ground being plowed. The National
Space Transportation Policy and various Federal statutes speak to the
national imperative to develop and rely upon a commercial space sector.
In fact, as early as 1991, the ``US Commercial Space Policy
Guidelines'' (NSPD-3) were adopted, which stated in relevant part:
``A robust commercial space sector has the potential to
generate new technologies, products, markets, jobs and other
economic benefits for the nation, as well as indirect benefits
for national security. Commercial space sector activities are
characterized by the provision of products and services such
that: private capital is at risk; there are existing, or
potential, nongovernmental customers for the activity; the
commercial market ultimately determines the viability of the
activity; and primary responsibility and management initiative
for the activity resides with the private sector.''
In the context of the newly proposed NASA budget, there is a
distinction made between past and future plans focused on
``commercial'' providers--this distinction would appear to turn on the
factors above, as well as the nature of the contracting mechanism.
Specifically, ``commercial contracts'' are firm, fixed-price contracts
that require a provider to name a price and stick to it. Additionally,
payments are not made until the milestone associated with that payment
is demonstrated as complete. This is hardly a novel concept, but in the
space world, it has become an outlier.
Commercial also necessarily means a singular devotion to safety and
reliability for manned spaceflight because, by the nature of the
business, providers must compete primarily on that dimension. As is
true with respect to commercial aviation, businesses will fail unless
safety and reliability come first, regardless of price point. The need
for a laser-like focus on safety and reliability becomes even more
acute when commercial space companies put their own financial skin in
the game, offer services on a firm-fixed price basis against competing
bidders (rather than cost-plus, ``no-lose'' contracts), and get paid in
full only if they perform.
There are those who argue that it is unacceptable to rely upon
``unproven'' commercial rockets for manned carriage. This begs the
question: should the Ares 1 be considered ``mature'' or ``proven'' by
comparison? To date, there has been one test flight of the Ares 1-X (a
four-segment solid rocket booster stage, with a fifth segment mass
simulator, and an upper stage simulator) and America has invested over
$8 billion in Constellation. That ratio of progress to expenditure is
not particularly compelling given budget realities facing NASA and the
country as a whole. And the Augustine Commission agrees that, unless
NASA's budget increases dramatically, to continue along this path would
be ``unsustainable.''
The notion that ``unproven commercial rockets'' would carry
astronauts is an unrealistic concern by the critics of the new NASA
approach. Critically, there will be many cargo test and operational
flights of the Falcon 9 and Dragon before any crew flights. In
addition, the demand for Falcon 9 to deliver satellites is high--at
this time, there are 24 total Falcon 9 flights on the manifest. Of
interest is that there are 10 of our Merlin engines on each Falcon 9.
This provides a factor of ten demonstration of engine performance and
life with every flight. I know of no other launch system that can cite
this acceleration of life demonstration of its propulsion system. This
is of great benefit to the crew program as it will leverage this
accelerated spaceflight heritage.
Nonetheless, if development problems arise, there are sufficient
flights to provide the opportunity to resolve any issues well in
advance of astronaut transport, which stands in stark contrast to the
plan for Ares 1. Separately, the Atlas and Delta vehicles, with their
long-proven heritage, would actually appear to be in the front-running
for manned missions. My colleagues from the United Launch Alliance will
address that proposition.
Safe and reliable domestic commercial transport of cargo,
spacecraft, and astronauts to low-Earth orbit (LEO) will save U.S.
taxpayers significant money that can be put toward what NASA does
best--pushing the frontier and exploring beyond LEO. The work must
begin now, however, if the U.S. means to reduce Russian reliance at the
current cost of $51 million per astronaut (and going up, it would
appear based on recent comments by Mr. Perminov). Achieving a timely
return to LEO after Shuttle retirement using domestic providers of
launch services would incubate a commercial space market and enable
NASA to move forward with technologies that take us beyond low-Earth
orbit.
The Proposed NASA Budget
The President's FY 2011 budget request includes a much needed
increase to the agency's top-line over the next 5 years and includes
many laudable aspects such as increased investments in earth science
and aeronautics, an extension and increased utilization of the
International Space Station (ISS), and sustained research and
development in potentially transformative technologies that should help
alleviate the impact of job losses due to the successful conclusion of
the Space Shuttle program and build the foundation for 21st Century
solar system exploration. The budget request for exploration systems is
$4.3 billion, which is up from $3.8 billion in FY 2010.
As you are aware, the Augustine Commission reviewed NASA's plans
and budget and determined, among other things, that the previous plan
was unsustainable absent a multi-billion dollar increase in the NASA
budget going forward and that significant multi-year delays were
inevitable. Assuming that there is not going to be a large and
sustained increase in the NASA budget, then alternatives must be
considered. Solving the LEO transportation problem with a reliable,
cost-effective, domestic solution is critical to allowing the United
States to devote resources that enable NASA to move forward with
technologies that take us beyond low-Earth orbit.
A key fiscal fact that appears to be lost by most detractors of the
NASA budget plans is that, unless there is a massive influx of funding,
you cannot both fund Constellation and extend the life of the ISS
beyond 2015. The ISS is an asset for which the United States has risked
much. Even according to the most conservative estimates, the U.S. alone
has spent upwards of $27 billion on the ISS (without factoring in any
Space Shuttle-related costs). There appears to be universal support for
extending its lifetime. Given this, and given the Augustine
Commission's findings, it makes logical sense to pursue commercial
alternatives for manned spaceflight capable of safely, reliably, and
cost-efficiently carrying crew to the ISS.
SpaceX Progress to Date
SpaceX was founded just over 7 years ago, with the overriding goal
of increasing the reliability of access to space and ultimately the
transport of crew. SpaceX has executed at an unprecedented pace of
development and success with over 30 missions on its current manifest,
over $2 billion in contracts, and a customer base that spans the civil,
commercial, government and international markets.
SpaceX and NASA have a strong, enduring working relationship and
history, which began in late 2005 when then Administrator Griffin
established the Commercial Crew/Cargo Project, later renamed the
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program. The
competitively awarded program was established to ``stimulate commercial
enterprise in space with opportunities for American entrepreneurs to
provide innovative, cost effective access to low-Earth orbit.'' At the
time of the announcement, and reaffirmed in numerous Presidential
policies and laws, ``CEV variants [later renamed Orion] for ISS or
additional International Partner capabilities are backup
alternatives.''
To date, SpaceX has completed 16 of 22 COTS milestones and the
inaugural Falcon 9 launch vehicle is currently at SpaceX's launch
complex 40 at the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS), where last
weekend we successfully completed a full systems test, including
booster ignition of the flight first stage. The completion of a
successful static fire is the latest milestone on the path to first
flight of the Falcon 9 which will carry a Dragon spacecraft
qualification unit to orbit.
In reviewing the COTS program at Congress' request, the often
critical Government Accountability Office (GAO) ``found NASA's
management of the COTS project has generally adhered to critical
project management tools and activities and the vast majority of
project expenditures were for milestone payments to COTS partners.''
Building on the productive working relationship established through the
course of the COTS program, SpaceX has subsequently been competitively
awarded 12 Commercial Resupply Service (CRS) cargo missions to the ISS
and been on-ramped to the NASA Launch Services (NLS) catalog. Below is
a copy of SpaceX's current manifest:
SpaceX Launch Manifest
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Customer Target Date* Vehicle Launch Site
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Falcon 9 Inaugural Flight 2010 Falcon 9 Cape Canaveral
NASA COTS--Demo 1 2010 F9/Dragon Cape Canaveral
NASA COTS--Demo 2 2010 F9/Dragon Cape Canaveral
NASA COTS--Demo 3 2011 F9/Dragon Cape Canaveral
Falcon 1e Inaugural Flight 2011 Falcon 1e Kwajalein
ORBCOMM 2011-2014 Falcon 1e Kwajalein
MDA Corp. (Canada) 2011 Falcon 9 Cape Canaveral
NASA Resupply to ISS-- 2011 F9/Dragon Cape Canaveral
Flight 1
NASA Resupply to ISS--Flt 2 2011 F9/Dragon Cape Canaveral
DragonLab Mission 1 2012 F9/Dragon Cape Canaveral
NASA Resupply to ISS--Flt 3 2012 F9/Dragon Cape Canaveral
NASA Resupply to ISS--Flt 4 2012 F9/Dragon Cape Canaveral
CONAE (Argentina) 2012 Falcon 9 Vandenberg**
Spacecom (Israel) 2012 Falcon 9 Cape
Canaveral**
Space Systems/Loral (SS/L) 2012 Falcon 9 Cape Canaveral
DragonLab Mission 2 2013 F9/Dragon Cape Canaveral
NASA Resupply to ISS--Flt 5 2013 F9/Dragon Cape Canaveral
NASA Resupply to ISS--Flt 6 2013 F9/Dragon Cape Canaveral
NASA Resupply to ISS--Flt 7 2013 F9/Dragon Cape Canaveral
CONAE (Argentina) 2013 Falcon 9 Vandenberg**
NASA Resupply to ISS--Flt 8 2014 F9/Dragon Cape Canaveral
NASA Resupply to ISS--Flt 9 2014 F9/Dragon Cape Canaveral
NASA Resupply to ISS--Flt 2014 F9/Dragon Cape Canaveral
10
Astrium (Europe) 2014 Falcon 1e Kwajalein
Bigelow Aerospace 2014 Falcon 9 Cape Canaveral
NASA Resupply to ISS--Flt 2015 F9/Dragon Cape Canaveral
11
NASA Resupply to ISS--Flt 2015 F9/Dragon Cape Canaveral
12
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Target date indicates hardware arrival at launch site.
** Or Kwajalein, depending on range availability.
The SpaceX benchmark objective is to increase the reliability and
substantially reduce the cost to access space--ultimately by a factor
of ten. To that end, SpaceX is developing a family of low-cost launch
vehicles, the ``Falcon'' line. SpaceX is currently the only U.S.
company dedicated exclusively to developing and providing end-to-end
space transportation solutions, let alone ones with improvements in
both cost and reliability. This focus and our devotion to minimizing
critical external dependencies are key to cutting the Gordian knot that
thus far has inhibited genuine commercialization of launch services.
SpaceX's unique approach of manufacturing a vast majority of the
vehicle in-house in addition to integrating and providing launch
services is changing the industry paradigm. SpaceX's Falcon 9/Dragon
system offers a one-hundred percent American-made transportation
solution. With nearly one thousand full-time personnel, SpaceX
possesses deep expertise in propulsion, structures, avionics, safety,
quality assurance, mission operations, launch, mission management and
systems integration. Headquartered in Hawthorne, California, SpaceX
also operates a state-of-the art test facility in Texas, the Falcon 1
launch facility in Kwajalein, the Falcon 9 launch facility in Florida,
and an office in Washington, DC.
SpaceX has developed the capability to manufacture the majority of
its launch vehicle and spacecraft in-house and is not dependent upon a
single source for any key technology. This provides SpaceX with control
(for price as well as quality and supply) over all key elements--from
component manufacturing through launch operations. It also allows
SpaceX designers to work directly with manufacturing located just steps
away, streamlining the development process.
As evidence of the viability of this commercial model, in just over
7 years, SpaceX has:
Developed, built, tested and successfully launched the
Falcon 1, which included ``clean sheet'' development of all
propulsion, structures and avionics, fully qualifying the
vehicle, ground and launch support systems, and certifying a
Flight Termination System with a Federal Range. The fourth and
fifth flights of Falcon 1 demonstrated repeatable success in
placing payloads into intended orbits;
Developed, built and activated (with range approval) two
launch sites, including all regulatory approvals and
coordination. It is worthy to note that the Kwajalein facility
was designed, built and activated in less than 10 months.
SpaceX has completed Space Launch Complex 40 at Cape Canaveral
in Florida in preparation for the maiden Falcon 9 launch;
Developed the major Falcon 9 subsystems to a point such that
the vehicle currently sits on the pad at LC-40 in Cape
Canaveral, with the maiden launch of the Falcon 9 to occur in
the coming weeks;
Completed 16 of 22 performance milestones for NASA's COTS
project with the first demonstration mission scheduled for
2010; and
Competed and won 12 operational missions to resupply cargo
to the ISS and completed five reviews toward two of these
missions.
The Falcon 9/Dragon System was Developed to Support Crew Delivery from
Day One
SpaceX is on-track to simulate delivery of cargo to the
International Space Station (ISS) within a year, and return cargo to
Earth. This will be followed in mid 2011 by the first of 12 commercial
cargo delivery missions to ISS under the Commercial Resupply Services
(CRS) contract. Although the SpaceX Falcon 9 launch vehicle and Dragon
spacecraft are initially contracted to carry only cargo, they have been
designed since inception to be crew-capable with minimal augmentation.
This is a logical and incremental extension of cargo transportation
capabilities, especially when the cargo system includes down-cargo
capability (i.e., return of payload to Earth).
Many functions and requirements for crew transportation are levied
on the cargo vehicles by virtue of the fact that they must approach
(and berth with) the ISS. Safety concerns for ISS crew, and prudent
stewardship of the ISS itself, mandate that factors of safety, fault
tolerance, air circulation, touch temperatures, sharp edges and many
other ``human rating'' requirements be imposed on the cargo transfer
vehicles. Accommodating crew involves up-rating of certain subsystems,
adding crew monitoring and over-rides, and a launch escape system in
case of booster failure during ascent.
SpaceX has been working closely with NASA through the Commercial
Cargo and Crew Office (C3PO) office at JSC from the inception of the
COTS program 3 years ago. The spacecraft and launch vehicle have
progressed through Critical Design Review (CDR) for each of the three
demonstration flights required under the COTS Space Act Agreement
(SAA). At each milestone, SpaceX's designs and processes are subjected
to careful, objective review by NASA through C3PO and their COTS
Advisory Team of technical experts. Independent of this, the ISS
program's Safety Review Panel (SRP) also review all aspects of the
design that could affect the safety of the ISS and its crew. Dual-fault
tolerance against critical hazards is strictly enforced, although no
significant design changes have been required toZte. SpaceX will
complete Phase 2 of the 3-phase SRP process this month, with the final
phase scheduled for completion in late 2010. The SRP is a critical
signatory to the Certificate of Flight Readiness (CoFR), a prerequisite
for the final demonstration mission which will berth with the ISS.
The augmentations required to this system in order to safely fly
crew are:
Launch Escape System: to provide a means for crew to safely
escape from a catastrophic failure on the launch vehicle during
ascent. SpaceX has identified the development of a Launch
Escape System (LES) as the item requiring the longest lead time
and presenting the highest technical risk;
Vehicle Health Monitoring System and Abort Triggers: to
continuously monitor the launch system and command the escape
system if a failure is detected;
Life Support System: upgrades to the existing Environmental
Control System to include carbon-dioxide removal and humidity
control;
Crew Accommodations: including seats, pressure suits, and
manual control systems;
Gantry Access at Launch Pad: to provide nominal and
emergency access for crew.
The above four items are the key, significant developments to up-
rate the current cargo system to accommodate crew. A docking system
development may also be required, or this could be provided by the
government to maintain the broadest cross-compatibility between
commercial transportation options. SpaceX can complete necessary
augmentations and will be ready to fly astronauts to the ISS within 3
years after contract award.
Crew Safety and Human Rating
There has been significant debate over what it means for a rocket
to be ``man-rated.'' And I think it's fair to say that this term is a
bit of a moving target. While NASA currently is compiling human-rating
requirements to ensure astronaut safety, it has not established a
certification program whereby candidate commercial vehicles will be
subjected to a thorough review process focused on assuring crew safety.
This said, at least with respect to SpaceX, the following facts are
relevant:
SpaceX incorporated the existing NASA human rating requirements
into the Falcon 9 and Dragon designs; (found in NPR 8705.2A--Human-
Rating Requirements for Space Systems) and codified in the SpaceX
Human-Rating Plan. This plan was presented to NASA for review as part
of our first Systems Requirements Review Milestone. In May 2008 NASA
released the current human rating requirements document, NPR 8705.2B,
which is applicable to ``crewed space systems developed by NASA,'' not
to commercial systems. In draft form this document had an ``Appendix
G--Commercially Developed Space Systems'' that discussed ``equivalent
standards,'' ``equivalent design reviews,'' and participation of NASA
technical authorities in design and development of new systems, or
gaining their approval for existing systems. This Appendix was omitted
from the released version leaving no definition for NASA human rating
requirements applicable to commercial crew transportation systems.
Nevertheless, SpaceX continued to design Falcon 9 and Dragon with
NASA Human-Rating standards contemplated assuming that the requirements
defined for government systems such as Orion and Ares I would also
apply to our vehicles. Furthermore, wherever the newer requirements
were non-specific, SpaceX self-imposed the older (and in many cases
more stringent) 8705.2A NASA requirements. For example, SpaceX designed
its structures to meet NASA Standard 5001 Structural Design and Test
Factors of Safety for Spaceflight Hardware, and SSP 30559 ISS
Structural Design and Verification Requirements. Consistent with human
rating standards, Falcon 9 is thereby designed to 1.4 Factor of Safety
(FS) and Dragon pressurized volume and windows to 2.0 FS. Additionally,
Dragon Avionics and Propulsion Systems are 2-fault tolerant to
catastrophic and critical hazards. Finally, Dragon and Falcon 9 are
designed to support Launch Abort System ascent and reentry loads and
meet both ISS Visiting Vehicle requirements in SSP 50808 and NPR
8705.2B section 2.3.7 fault tolerance requirements. In fact, based on
these requirements and available standards, the Dragon spacecraft is
not expected to require any hardware modifications to the existing
primary structure, propulsion, power, Command & Data Handling (C&DH),
thermal control, thermal protection, communication or Entry, Descent,
and Landing (EDL) subsystems. Similarly, no hardware changes are
anticipated for Falcon 9 to comply with the government HRR. Both
vehicles will require some additional functionality such as those
listed above; however these capabilities are ``keyed'' into the
existing design.
It is critical to note that the Falcon 9 launch vehicle is the ONLY
launcher (domestic or foreign) with engine-out capability in the first
stage. This feature was present on the Saturn I and the Saturn V and
was leveraged to save astronaut lives in both cases.
Going forward, SpaceX will comply with any NASA-published human-
rating requirements for both Dragon and Falcon 9. SpaceX looks forward
to engaging with NASA to begin the Human Rating process of both these
vehicles.
Current Reliance on Russian Vehicles
Though hardly news to those involved in the U.S. civil and
commercial space sectors, the following facts will likely come as a
disturbing surprise to most Americans: first, from 2010 through 2017,
or longer, the United States will have no human spaceflight capability
unless commercial services are developed; and second, during this
timeframe, Russia will wield a monopoly with respect to manned carriage
to the ISS. So, while the U.S. has toiled to build the ISS--risking
lives with each Space Shuttle mission and expending significant
national treasure to construct the orbiting laboratory--we will not be
able to access the ISS without paying Russia dearly for the privilege.
While these facts may be new to most Americans, they certainly are not
lost on the Russians, who, despite being relatively new players in the
free market economy, are proving to be quite excellent capitalists.
Russia's mastery of the relationship between supply and demand has
manifested itself consistently over the past decade, but no more so
than in 2007, when the United States negotiated to pay $780 million to
Russia to deliver cargo and 15 crew members to the space station--six
astronauts in 2009, six in 2010, and three in 2011. After the Shuttle
is retired, it is not apparent what price Russia may demand for rides
to the American-built portion of the ISS.
Opportunities for Growth
Initial government investment, coupled with private funds, has
spurred the creation of successful new industries. For example,
industries such as e-commerce, commercial aviation, and entertainment
were enabled by government investment in the Internet, aviation
infrastructure, and the satellite industry respectively.
U.S. Government investment in commercial space companies to create
a safe, reliable, and cost effective human space transportation
industry will enable the formation of entire new industries. Immediate
beneficiaries of government incentives include commercial human space
transportation providers, their suppliers, and local communities where
new infrastructure is being developed to support new missions. As the
human space transportation industry grows, the enterprise will extend
to markets in scientific research, tourism, education, and exploration.
With the maturation of systems, new industries will evolve in fields
such as medicine, material science, energy, and expanded tourism.
Funds for this proposed commercial crew program will immediately
create new high-tech jobs. The Commercial Spaceflight Federation
estimated in 2009 that a $2.5 billion Commercial Crew Program would
create 5,000 new jobs across the Nation. Indirect and induced job
creation is typically considered to be approximately four times this
number in the wider economy. Commercial crew capability for SpaceX
alone, once realized operationally, is predicted to create thousands of
additional direct high-skill jobs in Florida, California, and Texas.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your support and that of this
Subcommittee. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you or the
other members of the Subcommittee may have.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Ms. Shotwell.
Senator Hutchison.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize for being late, and I will have to leave after
I speak. I was glad to hear some of your testimony. I have to
get back to the floor, because we have the FAA reauthorization
bill.
But, I'll just summarize my statement. I think many people
know that I introduced legislation that would, in fact, try to
continue Shuttles. I don't see how we can have a goal of
keeping the Space Station open until 2020 and have a big gap,
which the Chairman and I have fought together for a long time,
to not have, in a reliable capability to get crew there. So, I
would like to continue the Shuttles and am certainly looking
for a way to achieve that without taking away from any of the
other commitments that are being made.
I have, for a long time, supported the commercial orbital
transportation systems. I do certainly support commercial
innovation, and I think, in the end, we will have commercial
capabilities. But, I think this gap is too important to rely on
just commercial and not continue our capabilities with the
investment that we have made and the reliability that we have.
So, I think that, going forward, we need to go on two
fronts. I think we need to explore the commercial side, and let
the commercial side come forward and prove the reliability.
Certainly, Mr. Culbertson, if you and your CEO are willing to
go up on that first one, that would be a good test. But, I
don't think we ought to shut down the Shuttle system, and
particularly--it's not just the system, it's also all of the
people who are necessary to keep the system safe, secure, with
all of the requirements that we have for Shuttle. It's not just
the flight, as all of you know. It is all of the backup that is
necessary.
So, I appreciate your holding this hearing. I think it is
important that we have all the information that we can. But to,
I think, prematurely stop the Constellation Program and not
move forward very firmly on keeping the Space Station not only
open, but usable, within our own capabilities, is not good,
common sense, and it's certainly not using our taxpayer dollars
wisely.
Relying on Russia to fill the gap is equally, in my
opinion, unreliable and unsupportable. I would rather keep our
own capabilities, use our own resources for that, and invest in
the commercial for the future, but only when the commercial is
completely tested and ready to go.
So, that's my overview. And I hope, Mr. Chairman, that you
and I will be able to begin to work on a plan that is both
supportive of commercial, but also keeping the systems that we
need in place to assure that America can go into space on its
own, relying only on ourselves for the future, until we have
the commercial vehicle or the crew return vehicles in place and
ready to go.
So, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing
the further questions that you will ask, as I'm sorry I have to
go back to the floor.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hutchison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison, U.S. Senator from
Texas
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Vitter, I appreciate your
Subcommittee holding this very important hearing on commercial space
capabilities. I join you in welcoming this excellent panel of
witnesses.
This is the second hearing regarding the President's Fiscal Year
2011 NASA Budget proposal. I am very concerned about the direction
President Obama has proposed for NASA and for human spaceflight.
If we follow the President's budget proposal, the U.S. will retire
the Space Shuttle program later this year, just as the International
Space Station is finally complete, without a viable U.S.-operated
alternative to transport our astronauts, and International partners'
astronauts, to the Space Station.
America and our partners have spent billions of dollars building
and maintaining the Space Station. Now that it is complete, the Obama
budget plan would ensure that the only access we have to it for at
least the next several years, is by renting seats aboard Russian Soyuz
vehicles.
Sending hundreds of millions of dollars to the Russian government
and hoping they will not raise the price further, is simply the wrong
approach.
Current NASA efforts for the next generation of space vehicles are
already years away from completion; due in large part to underfunding
that has set the Constellation program years behind schedule.
The human spaceflight gap created by these delays threatens not
only our Nation's access to the International Space Station and other
areas of space, but also our national security and economic interests.
Under the President's proposal, America's decades-long leadership in
human spaceflight will end.
The proposed budget offers a complete departure from the current
approach approved twice by this committee, in our 2005 and 2008 NASA
Authorization Acts. The proposal is essentially to place all of this
country's human spaceflight capability in the hands of commercially-
developed crew launch systems, which are not yet defined and for which
no real design requirements, development milestones, or even cost
estimates are provided.
The President's proposal to scrap the Constellation program and
other NASA human spaceflight activities, I fear, will only intensify
the space gap problem, not improve it as is claimed.
And what is most ironic is that the request proposes extending the
ISS from 2015 to 2020, something I applaud and have called for myself.
But, how can we support the Space Station if we have no means to get
there, or to ensure it has all the spare parts and replacement
equipment necessary for it to fully function through the extension?
I remind my colleagues that the planned retirement of the shuttle
at the end of this year meant that 10 flights' worth of payloads
destined for the Space Station, at OMB direction, and for purely
budgetary reasons, were removed from shuttle flight planning and
relegated to storage.
When those 10 flights were removed in 2005, the decisions about
which instruments and equipment to swap into the remaining flights were
based on the internal assumption of the need to support the Space
Station only through 2015--not through 2020 as this committee and even
the budget proposal supports.
The result of this is that we do not know how many, or which, of
those grounded payload items might actually be needed in order to
ensure the station can be supported and maintained safely and reliably
until 2020. Not only that, we do not know which of these existing
payloads are too large or too heavy to be carried to orbit by any
existing vehicle other than the space shuttle.
And finally, we do not know what additional new items, or the
launch vehicle capacity that might be needed to extend the life of the
Space Station to 2020.
Mr. Chairman, I support commercial space flight. I continue to be a
supporter of the current COTS (Commercial Orbital Transportation
Systems) cargo activities being pursued with SpaceX and Orbital
Sciences Corporation.
Until those efforts are proven successful and certain thresholds of
required capabilities are met, we have no business making a large
investment of taxpayers' dollars in the active development of crew-
carrying commercial vehicles.
As of today, there is simply no assurance that commercial space
capabilities are sufficiently advanced in their development to reduce
the space flight gap or meet the lofty goals the President has set for
the industry.
There is thus no apparent justification for the President's budget
to propose complete and exclusive reliability on these proposed
commercial crew capabilities.
As an alternative approach to sending up a white flag for our
Nation's premiere space science agency, I have introduced legislation,
S. 3068, the Human Space Flight Capability Assurance and Enhancement
Act. It provides for a rational, reasoned, and mission-driven approach
to the question of determining the best time to terminate space shuttle
operations, based on the number of flights found to be needed to ensure
space station full and safe utilization in the next several years.
This approach includes the possibility of the COTS cargo program
helping to meet station requirements, once they are on-line and proven
safe and effective. The legislation would also provide for accelerated
replacement of government-operated human spaceflight systems to ensure
we continue to have future access to space.
Unless we make every effort to close the gap in U.S. human
spaceflight, we will have no choice but to face the reality that we
will be totally dependent on Russia for access to space. Should Russia,
far from our strongest ally, ``renegotiate'' the terms of our
cooperation after the shuttle is retired, the U.S. could possibly be
blocked from space for years. This would leave Russia and China as the
only nations in the world with the capability to launch humans into
space.
I will be working with my colleagues to ensure all of these issues
are put on the table for discussion. I believe we can find a more
measured and reasoned approach that ensures the best use of investments
we have already made, and provide the Congress and the Administration
with necessary information to inform our judgments on alternative
launch vehicle developments.
It is my hope that this hearing will contribute to our
understanding of the commercial potential for meeting these challenges,
but in a realistic and responsible manner.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
General from your perspective, having flown several
vehicles, what assurances do you think are necessary to
guarantee that these commercial vehicles are safe to fly on?
General Stafford. Mr. Chairman, the criteria that NASA has
developed over the years in the NASA Safety and Mission
Assurance has worked very well, and this has been learned over
nearly five decades. And there has to be both insight and
oversight and, you know, special care, before anything should
ever be said it is safe, and it has to reach that three nines
of reliability, sir.
Senator Nelson. And to you, Colonel O'Connor, has NASA
defined a process to validate what the commercial providers are
saying in compliance with human-rating requirements?
Mr. O'Connor. Mr. Chairman, we do have a process, that we
just completed at the preliminary design review for
Constellation, which includes all the same types of ingredients
that you would have in a process to validate requirements and
to verify that they've been met. There's one additional thing,
though, and that is that we are open, as we have been with
Constellation and other programs, to industry showing us that
they can do something that we call out as a ``shall''
statement, or as a requirement, that meets or exceeds. We're
open to tailoring, in other words. So, that's a piece that will
be involved anytime we start a new program, including this one.
We plan to put out an RFI, here in the next month or so,
and to get some feedback from industry, including any ideas
they have on how they might substitute some standard or some
approach that they have that they believe is as good as what we
suggest in our requirement. So, that tailoring iterative back-
and-forth process would go on with any new program, and it
would with this, as well.
Senator Nelson. And, Mr. Peterson, is it going to take $6
billion to make this crew-ready over the next 5 years?
Mr. Peterson. That is a great question. And I have no clue.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Peterson. I know that it is not a Gemini redo. I think
the example of Gemini is interesting. It may be the only
appropriate analogy that the Augustine Commission could come up
with, but it is, by no means, one that I would say was
appropriate to the level of confidence required for you to
appropriate funds.
Senator Nelson. How would you suggest for us to determine
whether or not $6 billion is too much, too little, or just
right, as we start the budgetary process?
Mr. Peterson. Well, I don't think you can do so at this
stage without numbers on the table--estimates, designs,
procedures, the whole nine yards. Our history--and it bothers
me to say this, but our history is not exactly one of
unparalleled excellence in cost-estimating what we have never
done before. We manage to miss it, usually, by an order of
magnitude or so. So, to say $6 billion is a good number,
without an understanding of the program details, processes,
requirements, funding commitments: all that is beyond my
ability.
Senator Nelson. But, you felt fairly confident in getting
cargo up on commercial vehicles.
Mr. Peterson. I think cargo is well within our capability;
we do it constantly. If you think of delivering spacecraft to
orbit, we do that. We have the more--most difficult areas,
which are the rendezvous and docking with the Space Station.
There are systems that are now certified for doing that. I
believe they would be at least GFE'd by NASA to the company. It
is, I think, a relatively straightforward--not easy, but
straightforward job. I think the competitive environment for
cargo is such that the economies of scale, at least on the
launch end, will certainly prevail. I think it's a good
business case that can be made, and I would proceed with that,
without any hesitation.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Gass, what would happen if the Congress
decided, since the Congress controls the purse strings, that we
wanted to take the $6 billion projected by the President over
the next 5 years, and use that, not for human certification of
the commercial vehicles, but, instead, to accelerate the R&D
for a heavy-lift vehicle for the Mars program?
Mr. Gass. Well, with any major program, just as Mr.
Peterson talked about, you know, the rate and thoroughness of
the program is a function of how much we can afford on any
given day. So, if we apply more resources to the Mars activity,
I think we'll achieve that goal sooner.
The key on all of this is really keeping that balance
throughout the entire industrial base. That infusion, the
importance of this whole debate, is making sure that we have
the constancy of purpose to keep on exploring and having that
constancy of funding. How we apply it is a system-design
activity. If we--whether or not we are going to low-Earth orbit
as our first priority, or going to Mars as our first priority,
that foundational step of propulsion investment, some of the
other technologies we need to explore Mars, has to be done
someday. And when we apply those funds, we'll increase our rate
of achievement.
Senator Nelson. Colonel O'Connor, is the Astronaut Office
involved in the certification/validation process?
Mr. O'Connor. Absolutely. Yes, sir. We have what we call a
``four-legged stool,'' and we apply that four-legged stool as a
governance model whenever we have what we call ``residual
risk.'' Residual safety risk, when you have human beings
involved, means that we need volunteers. We don't force anybody
at NASA to take residual safety risk.
The other three legs of the stool, of course, are the
program manager, who gets the last opportunity to accept that
risk, but only if the other three legs of the stool, which
includes the safety officer, the technical authority, which is
the owner of the requirement we're talking about--the
particular issue always has an engineering or technical-
authority owner--and then, of course, the volunteer. So, if the
technical authority is OK, the safety guy is OK, the crew is
happy to volunteer to take on that risk, then, and only then,
is the program manager allowed to accept the risk.
Why do I bring that up? Because it happens a lot in design
and development of these things and--as well as in operations.
When there's a waiver, a deviation, a new issue comes up, which
is a little over the risk that your volunteered to take for,
just by signing up to do this job--in other words, the inherent
risk of spaceflight--we quite often do have residual-risk
issues that come up. And the crew office is very much a part of
that, because they are the people at risk.
Senator Nelson. How have, Colonel, the Russians minimized
their risk over the years? And then I'm going to ask General
Stafford.
Mr. O'Connor. We've been working with the Russians for
quite a while. General Stafford will tell you how it all
started. But, in 1995 we decided that it would be a good idea
to fly one of our astronauts on a Soyuz. We look at this as an
analogy to some of what we're doing today, because we wonder,
How did we get confident enough to say it's OK for our
crewmember to fly on the Soyuz? Only recently had we really
understood what was going on in their space program. You know,
it had been kind of secret, there, for a while. We didn't know
all the details of their design, or even of their failure
history. But, in the early 1990s, it opened up, and we talked a
lot with the Russians, and we sent engineers over there for
about 3 years from the safety mission assurance and engineering
organizations, not to lay on requirements--this is a case where
we developed our confidence to put crewmember on some other
vehicle that we did not design and we do not operate, and
requirements, or what we're calling ``the human-rating
requirements,'' were not a part of that. We didn't lay any
requirements on that system. I know that General Stafford, when
they did the rendezvous in Apollo-Soyuz, NASA did have a couple
of requirements that they put on the Soyuz to make it an
appropriate interface when they docked. But, this was a case
where we were going to either going to accept the Soyuz to fly
Norm Thaggart, or not. And it took us a while, but we got to
the confidence level we needed.
One of the key ingredients, when we didn't have
requirements verification, was this business of equivalence.
They did things differently than we did. We might have a
requirement for failure tolerance. They didn't have it written
the same way, but we looked at it, and we decided that, you
know, their--they have an equivalent approach, here, even
though it's not exactly like ours. And it took us a while, but
we finally got comfortable with equivalence.
And then, the last ingredient, which was probably the most
important for that adventure, was their demonstrated
reliability. They had, I think, 67 flights in a row since their
last casualty. And that's a pretty good demonstrated
reliability. So, all those things added up. And in every case,
we will look at the combination of insight, understanding,
trust in another government organization, like we've done with
HTV, ATV, Soyuz, and the demonstrated the reliability. And add
those up to the point where we get confident enough to fly.
Senator Nelson. General Stafford, did you want to add to
that? How did we achieve the confidence in the Russian system?
General Stafford. Yes, Mr. Chairman. You know, I started,
back when it was a Soviet system, at the height of the cold
war, and everything was Bolshoi--a secret. It was a big secret.
But yet, in that effort, we went straight across the table with
them, and they opened up to us, and we made requirements. They
changed at least two valves on the Soyuz, some electrical
issues on the Soyuz. And they opened up some of their--how they
approached safety. As Colonel O'Connor said, it's somewhat not
the same way we do, but the end product is nearly the same. And
so, we were satisfied with that, and flew that.
And then, as you remember, sir, because of my former
experience with the Soviets, now the Russians, I chaired the
Shuttle-MIR Advisory Task Force, and had, kind of, the
oversight of that, looking at safety issues. And from there,
again, we looked all into the details of that. And then, now,
the International Space Station, which I share the advisory
panel on. So, the Russians do a very good job, and it's
slightly different than ours, but yet, they end up at the same
place.
Senator Nelson. All right. Let me ask you another question
with regard to buying a seat on the Russian vehicle. How can
we, the taxpayers, be guaranteed that the seats are going to be
purchased at a fair market price?
General Stafford. Well, you know, the accountability in
Russia is somewhat different. And it's good to see my old
friend, Mr. Peterson, and he's an expert on financial affairs.
But, they didn't quite understand the profit issue back in the
Soviet Union; I think they certainly do now.
And it's--they have a demonstrated effort, and now it goes
for approximately, I think, $50 million a seat, include all the
training. And this requirement that they have to support the
Station is up in the year 2012. It will probably be
renegotiated. And unfortunately, the Russian rubble is
appreciating while the American dollar is falling, and I do not
know what it will end up as. But, how much it is subsidized, we
can't tell. But, I don't know--it would be very difficult to
match their price at this time, sir.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Peterson, let me ask you, with regard
to American vehicles, how can we make sure the taxpayer is
getting a decent price?
Mr. Peterson. We're not going to be able, in my mind, to
compete against the Soyuz. It is--our fair price is going to
have to be a amalgam of our national interest in the venture
and however we want to parse the value of being able to create
a commercially viable vehicle. If it is price alone, I believe
the Russians can undercut us with relative ease. I doubt that
we could launch an equivalent vehicle for $150 million. I'd be
surprised if we could do it for less than $400 million.
Senator Nelson. So, sounds like you're saying that, other
than the national interest of having an American vehicle to fly
to and from the Space Station, that, just from a price
standpoint, you're suggesting we might better use that $6
billion--instead of man-rating them, to make a faster and
better heavy-lift vehicle.
Mr. Peterson. Well, I believe the issue that puzzles me is
why the administration did not accept the recommendation of the
Augustine Committee to continue to work on the Orion spacecraft
and have that as a warm backup. The envisioned simple
spacecraft that the Augustine Committee talked about, I've
referred to in my written testimony, probably caustically, as a
Soyuz ``wannabe.'' That's a little bit acid, I agree. On the
other hand, Orion leapfrogged the Soyuz, and we were going to
prove Orion's reliability by taking it to the Space Station,
getting the maturity that comes from repeated trips, and then,
of course, being able to venture on to beyond low-Earth orbit.
I think I'll stop there, probably having shot myself in the
foot more times than I want to count. But, thank you for
offering me the opportunity.
Senator Nelson. All right.
[Laughter.]
Senator Nelson. You do that because you're a former
Comptroller.
Let me turn to Ms. Shotwell and Mr. Culbertson. Please
speak for your companies on that question.
Ms. Shotwell. I appreciate this opportunity.
I'm here to say that we can guarantee crew flights to the
ISS for less than $50 million a seat.
Senator Nelson. By what year?
Ms. Shotwell. Three years from the time we initiate. And
the reason why it sounds so quick is because the Dragon vehicle
was designed, really from the outset to accommodate crew--with
a number of key developments still to do, but developments that
we're comfortable with.
Senator Nelson. Do you have to have all the $6 billion to
develop it?
Ms. Shotwell. No, sir.
Senator Nelson. How much?
Ms. Shotwell. I'd prefer to answer that question slightly
differently, if you don't mind. If you were to spend all $6
billion on a commercial crew, and everybody were to make our
bid--have the same bid as ours--you would have somewhere
between 5 and 10.
Senator Nelson. Between 5 and 10 what?
Ms. Shotwell. Five and 10 suppliers.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Culbertson?
Mr. Culbertson. Mr. Chairman, I don't think I can be quite
that optimistic as Ms. Shotwell. But, we've looked at the
previous systems that have been flown, and we've looked at how
we develop spacecraft, and what it takes to ensure that they're
going to be--not only accomplish their missions, but be safe
and reliable.
One of the benchmarks we looked at was the development of
the Shuttle itself. When you look at it on a per-pound basis,
the Shuttle was about $150,000 per pound for development. If
you were to take that number--and it's fairly similar for other
vehicles--but, if you were to take that number for, say, a
20,000-pound vehicle that you needed to carry three to five
crew to the Space Station, that works out to about--if it's a
20,000-pound vehicle, it works out to about $3 billion for
development.
Given today's productivity and efficiencies that we have,
we think the number could be significantly less than that. But,
at least that gives you an upper bound, on a conservative
approach, of what one company might need to do that level of
development.
And in terms of the cost of each individual mission, I
think Mr. Peterson's right, it's probably around $300- or $400
million if you're going to have all of the ancillary
programmatic capabilities dealt with by the company that's
providing that. A lot of it depends on how much NASA provides
and how much the company provides and how much you're going to
invest in mission control, launch operations, recovery
operations, training, all that goes with flying humans in
space. So, the number is pretty wide, in that regard.
And as far as the government investment required--for a
program of this size to have that type of upfront investment
and the low number of flights that are currently envisioned,
you've either got to work aggressively to grow the market and
ensure that you do have sufficient demand for the seats or
you're going to have to have fairly significant government
investment upfront in order to cover the development costs. And
those are things that we're going to have to work on very hard
in the future to make sure that we get into the right box.
Senator Nelson. Let me shift from crew to cargo and ask
you, for commercial cargo, what lessons can U.S. companies
learn from the development efforts of the ATV and the HTV?
Mr. Culbertson. Who's that for?
Senator Nelson. Anybody.
Mr. Culbertson. OK. I think we should see that as a
challenge. There are other countries that are developing cargo
capability ahead of us. The Russians did it a long time ago,
with Progrez. ATV and HTV, though expensive and somewhat behind
their original schedule, have demonstrated their capability to
deliver cargo to the crew--to the Space Station semi-
autonomously. I do believe it's well within the capability of
U.S. industry to do that, as we and SpaceX are demonstrating,
and will demonstrate concretely in the coming year.
And I think that's a capability that we should continue to
build on, not only just to provide cargo, but to provide other
support for the Station and other markets that come along. I
think that as more and more vehicles are developed that will
use space as their place of business, having the commercial
world ready to support that is an important aspect of what this
country ought to be able to do, whether it's servicing other
satellites, repairing them, recovering them, working on orbital
debris, providing access to other platforms for scientific
experiments; I think that's all within the realm of our
commercial industry.
Senator Nelson. Well, General Stafford, you pointed out, in
your written testimony, that the Europeans and the Japanese
were years behind in their schedule in delivering payloads to
the Station. Is that going to happen with the rest of these
folks?
General Stafford. Well, Mr. Chairman, I know, from the
position as Chairman of the Advisory Task Force, kind of the
oversight committee, that we watched that, and that 2 years-
plus, and the Europeans put a lot of resources in--1.3 billion,
at least--Euros--at least advertised. The Japanese, we don't
know. And they put a lot of their top engineers, resources on
it, and they were over a year late. So, you know, as former
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Research,
Development, and Acquisition, I've seen a lot of great
forecasts come in from commercial companies--what we call the
``hot biscuit'' items--and they're always usually under-costed
and under-schedule what really happens.
Senator Nelson. We have had two votes called on the floor.
Of necessity, I'm going to recess the Committee. I'm down to
the remaining 5 minutes to vote--to cast my vote on the first
vote, and I will cast my vote on the next vote immediately at
the beginning, and race back here.
So, the Committee will stand in recess.
[Recess.]
Senator Nelson. OK. The Committee will resume.
Dr. Nield, what do you anticipate to be the greatest
challenge facing the FAA in developing appropriate regulations
for ensuring public safety in commercial spaceflight
operations?
Dr. Nield. I think we have an excellent foundation, based
on our assessment of what the future's going to bring. And
Congress has given us some excellent guidance on how we should
handle crew and how we should handle public safety, and so,
we've done the best we can to set up that regulatory
environment.
But, until we really see these vehicles fly, we're not
going to have the demonstrated track record, we're not going to
understand how well that's going to work. So, I think this
transition, as we see both the suborbital space tourism-type
operations in the next few years, and then, eventually, some of
the orbital flights, first with the cargo, then that'll really
enlighten the community, in terms of what additional, or
different, regulations we might need to put into place, and
it'll give people a better calibration, in terms of the overall
difficulty of challenging--of satisfying some of these
challenges that we face.
Senator Nelson. Well, should the FAA be involved at all,
with regard to these rockets going to and from the Space
Station?
Dr. Nield. I believe we have an excellent relationship with
NASA, and we need to continue to work together to figure out
the best approach to take. But, I would just point at our track
record to date in working through both the COTS and the CRS
programs. I think we've worked together well. We've taken
advantage of the FAA licensing regime and all the benefits that
it can bring, in terms of ensuring public safety and the
insurance and indemnification and the cross-waivers. All those
things are available as part of the overall regulatory process.
And NASA brings to the table its unique experience, in terms of
human spaceflight and spaceflight operations, and we think,
together, that can end up being a win-win for the government
and for the industry.
Senator Nelson. In cargo operations, what you've done would
apply. But, are there any new regulatory authorities that you
believe the FAA will require, with regard to crew development
activities, in going up to the Space Station?
Dr. Nield. I would say that, given the guidance that
Congress has provided so far, which is that--again, under the
Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, Congress
clearly stated, ``Space transportation is inherently risky,''
and we can't forget that. We need to protect the public on the
ground. Now, how can we minimize the risks as much as possible
during these risky and experimental flights? I think we have a
regulatory environment that works, right now, recognizing that
NASA may well have specific mission requirements that it wishes
to impose--for example, to ensure the safety of the
International Space Station, or human-rating specific
requirements--and they would be certainly free to do that
within the contracts that they agree to with industry. So, I
think there is a potential way ahead that would take advantage
of the strengths of each of the organizations.
Senator Nelson. Well, since the FAA is involved in the
safety of airplanes, does it have any business in getting into
the question of human safety in spacecraft?
Dr. Nield. Based on direction from Congress, yes, we
already have that responsibility, and we look forward to
working with the Congress and with the other stakeholders,
including NASA, in improving our environment, going forward.
Senator Nelson. Well, I passed the first Commercial Space
Act, back in the 1980s, and I never intended for the FAA to be
getting into this.
Now, I know that NASA is not a regulatory agency, and
therefore, needs to work with the FAA to establish regulations.
But, I don't want to get this into a situation where we've just
got extra layers of bureaucracy to go through just to get a
crew up to the International Space Station.
General you're smiling.
General Stafford. Well, Mr. Chairman, when you talked about
government crews to that--I think, in that--really, the only
one that really has the expertise to write that is going to be
NASA and what Colonel O'Connor has with his group, as far as
government crews. If you talk about civilian crews going to
some other thing that is nongovernment, that is--could be a
completely different issue. But, I agree with you, sir. You
don't want layers of bureaucracy. But, for government crews, I
think it should be NASA, period.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Gass, could an EELV be integrated with
a smaller crew exploration vehicle?
Mr. Gass. Yes.
Senator Nelson. Could you, for example, integrate it with
one that had three astronauts instead of six?
Mr. Gass. Yes. We've looked at many configurations. You
know, you--as we've talked before, United Launch Alliance is a
merchant supplier, so we're working with many companies. But,
we have done work with the Orion Program and some other
different configurations of various sizes. Inside the EELV
fleet, we have all sizes of rockets, as well. But, at the high
end, we talk about an Orion or Orion Lite vehicle, and have
that capability, have the launch infrastructure ready to go, so
we can support that kind of crew vehicle, which is kind of--
it's for--work for LEO, but it also goes LEO and beyond; it has
that basic capability for future exploration.
The other side is true LEO vehicles, the vehicles that have
been optimized for low-Earth orbit, and they would use the
lower end of our launch family. So, at United Launch Alliance,
we're prepared to support the wide range of options that are
being considered. And we're doing work with all of those
systems right now, and using everything from our low-end Atlas
rocket, a basic singlestick rocket, to the big Delta IV heavy--
are options for all of those configurations.
Senator Nelson. If you were told, ``Go,'' how long would it
take you to do a CEV?
Mr. Gass. I think--working with the CEV team, I think we
could have an unmanned test flight inside 3 years. And the
reason I say that with some credibility, we're working on some
of the most complex national security spacecraft that come with
a whole lot of complexity of integrating spacecraft to launch
vehicle. Working that depth of integration, assuming that the
CEV--the Orion-type program is moving along and funded properly
and it's making its progress, I think we could have that first
flight in 3 years, using existing launch infrastructure. Full
human flights would probably be in the 4-year timeframe, and
we're looking at different launch pad options.
Senator Nelson. You could do unmanned in 3 years and then
be ready to fly humans to the Space Station in 4 years.
Mr. Gass. Correct.
Senator Nelson. OK. Now, Ms. Shotwell says that she can do
it in 3 years.
Mr. Gass. Name that tune.
Senator Nelson. What's that?
Mr. Gass. If we can play ``Name that tune,'' but it's,
again, that--you know, working with credibility of what are the
interactions between the different contractors, NASA agencies--
there are clearly options and--you know, we look at the
spectrum of an all-NASA system to an all-commercial system;
there's in-between. And I would look at--what I just referenced
is kind of an in-between kind of solution; strong government
involvement, a vehicle that is more extensible than just low-
Earth orbit that gets to that added complexity. You go on the
simpler side, to true commercial to LEO, it could probably be
done more expeditiously.
Senator Nelson. And, Mr. Culbertson, you said that it would
take a little longer than 3 years, if I recall what you said
earlier.
Mr. Culbertson. Three to four years is what I said, sir,
because, as was pointed out earlier, development programs
typically take longer than originally estimated, and I'd like
to set the expectations appropriately, right now, because we
really don't know what the requirements we're going to be
working to are, exactly. There's a lot of uncertainty, and
exactly what--how that will impact our system, how much
interaction we'll have to have with NASA and the FAA, and what
will be required of the company to certify our system. And so,
there's a minimum number, and there's a maximum number. That
maximum number could go out as far as 5, under bad
circumstances. But, I think 3 to 4 is a reasonable estimate
that most of industry could probably subscribe to.
Senator Nelson. OK. If it were 5, that was the original
schedule for the Ares I; it was going to be in 2016. So, any
way we look at it, we're looking--5, 6 years relying on Russian
spacecraft to get crews to the Space Station.
Mr. Culbertson. At least until 2015, yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. At least until 2015.
Mr. Culbertson. Depending on when you wave the green flag.
You know----
Senator Nelson. That's correct.
Mr. Culbertson.--that all depends on the budget.
Senator Nelson. Let me ask Ms. Shotwell and Mr.
Culbertson--we're going to try to make some decisions on our
authorization and work with the appropriators on which way
we're going. What assurances can we tell our folks that your
timetables for supporting the Station won't slip?
Ms. Shotwell. Given where we are in the stage of
development of both Falcon 9 and Dragon, we're very confident
with the 3-year timetable that we've laid out. I don't know how
to assure that, other than we are committed to doing it. We
have the Falcon 9 vehicle at Launch Complex 40 at Cape
Canaveral right now. It should be ready to fly within the next
month or so. The Dragon spacecraft, the first Dragon spacecraft
for NASA, will fly in July. And keep in mind that, again,
Falcon 9 has been designed to accommodate a crew-rating
certification, and the same with Dragon. So, we're not starting
from scratch. You'd really have to look at the development
timelines that we've had to date for Falcon 9 and Dragon, and
add to that the 3 years that we're talking about now, moving
forward. And then the timelines don't look ridiculous, by any
stretch.
Mr. Culbertson. The timeline we're working on right now for
COTS has slipped a few weeks and months, over the time that
we've had the contract. But, not an unreasonable amount, given
the complexity of the job and the late award of the contract to
Orbital for the COTS demo mission. So, we've stayed pretty
close to our original milestones, with a little bit of slip.
I'm not going to give you a timeline for commercial crew,
at this point, because we don't honestly have one, because we
don't know exactly what the requirements are going to be that
we're going to have to meet. We're working on those things. It
would be premature for me to make those kind of statements, at
this point, until we see an RFP and we see the standards that
Brian was talking about, and understand what that would require
us to do. But, once we set a timeline, we will try to set it as
realistically as possible.
Senator Nelson. I'd like to ask the three of you--that have
the commercial carriers--I don't think that this scenario will
occur, but you've got to have a business plan for it, if it
did, and that is, what would happen if there were some
emergency on board the ISS, and they had to vacate the ISS so
that cargo and crew services by commercial providers was not
necessary? What happens to your companies?
Mr. Gass. I'll----
Senator Nelson. Mr. Gass?
Mr. Gass. Thank you, Senator. First, I'll kind of reiterate
what Mr. Peterson said. You know, when we deal with these kind
of high-risk investment issues, there's an underlying market
risk, there's technical risk, and there's operational risk.
What you just described is really the market risk that--first
off, Is the market of the U.S. Government buying services very
secure? And then, What happens if something catastrophic
happens for it to end suddenly? That basically precludes why
any rational investor would put in private capital into this
market. There's got to be some other reason why we're doing it.
So, unless the government program is structured in such a way
that investment cost is covered, with either some sort of
termination liability, it's going to be very difficult to
attract true, rational investment capital.
Mr. Culbertson. Mr. Gass is correct, in--and in general,
you would have to make sure that you have some kind of
protection, if you were--particularly, investing billions,
rather than what's currently being invested.
As far as our current cargo contract, if the Space Station
were to cease to operate, then, yes, that would be a business
impact to the company. Orbital is structured in such a way, and
we're broad enough in our business base, that it wouldn't have
a major impact on the company, but it would certainly be
something that would change our plans over the next couple of
years.
We're working, on a mission-by-mission basis, on a fixed-
price basis; and what we have to order ahead of time, we order
ahead of time; what we don't, we wait until we need it. And so,
we just have to balance all of those impacts.
I do think that if something like that were to happen, we
would certainly offer to work with the U.S. Government to come
up with a solution to re-man the station, resupply it, and
figure out if there is a way for the commercial world to help
restore a laboratory like that. I think it's that important to
the country that we ought to all work together to come up with
solutions. It'll--it might be expensive, it might be difficult,
depending on the problem, but I think it's something we ought
to all have as a contingency plan.
Ms. Shotwell. The market for SpaceX Launch Services is
quite broad, because we compete internationally, as well. So,
there's no question that if we were to lose the cargo resupply
contract that we have now, it would be a hit to our business
case, but it would be, by no means, devastating. As I mentioned
earlier in my testimony, we have 30--I believe we have 32
flights on our manifest right now, 24 of which are Falcon 9,
and we're about ready to sign another 10 or so. So, it would be
a hit, but, again, we don't go from something to zero. We still
can provide Falcon 9 launch services for satellite providers,
and we also have other customers outside the U.S. Government
that's interested in Dragon.
Senator Nelson. Of your 30 flights, how many are COTS
flights for cargo?
Ms. Shotwell. Three are COTS flights, 12 are CRS flights,
and the remaining are satellite delivery flights. Actually,
there was one commercial Dragon on the flight, as well--on the
manifest, as well.
Senator Nelson. There's one what?
Ms. Shotwell. Commercial Dragon.
Senator Nelson. Ms. Shotwell, what assurances--well, we
covered that.
Do you all have anything else? Do you have any more?
OK. I think we have gone through all of the questions that
we want, at this point. Are there any concluding comments that
any of you all would like to make?
General? I knew you'd have something to say.
General Stafford. Well, from my experience, going back to
Gemini, sir, that everything has taken, always, longer than
what was forecast, on every program; and in most of them, it's
cost more money that was forecast. So--and I don't know--you
could check with Mr. Peterson, I don't know if he's experienced
anything any different, but that's been my experience for 40
years, sir.
Mr. Peterson. If we are serious about the commercial cargo
and commercial crew, as a matter of national policy, I would
recommend to the Committee that you put, with the help of the
appropriators, sufficient funds on the table to allow a program
to proceed without hindrance from the funding process and the
potential shortfalls in funding that stop progress and
prevent--cause rework, and all those things that delay
activities.
I also believe that you're going to want to look at, if it
is truly going to be commercial, some form of protection for
the investors. If you're going to get commercial money, you're
going to have to have some basis to know that they're going to
do so with at least, perhaps, recovery of their invested
capital--they'll probably lose their opportunity cost of
capital. I don't know if I'd pay them interest. But, I think it
is wise to assume that this is going to be a difficult process,
to raise capital, and we should take some steps to mitigate
that risk.
Mr. Gass. Well, just to, maybe, build on the same thought.
But, first, I think we shouldn't be--beat ourselves too much.
There's been great successes, in our space industry, where we
have been able to deliver on schedule, within cost, and
continue to improve, over the generations. This is a risky
business. When we talk commercial and have the U.S. Government
being the main buyer, that is a little bit of an oxymoron of
mixing different market areas. So, we need to be careful of
what we're really trying to buy. I think the U.S. Government
being the smart buyer, moving from a full indigenous, internal
capability to start using commercial enterprise to help support
that mission, is something that I think is very doable, but it
needs to be in a measured approach, and we stand ready to
support.
Senator Nelson. You all have been a very illuminating
panel, and we thank you very much. We're plowing new ground
here in a time of exceptional opportunity. So, I want to thank
you for adding to the knowledge base today. You all are very
kind to be here.
Again, I apologize for the interruptions of the votes, but
that's the environment in which we live, here.
Thank you all for your testimony.
The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
U.S. Senator from West Virginia
Last month, the Obama Administration proposed a new path forward
for NASA that refocuses the agency's overall direction. That new
direction includes significant funds--$812 million in FY 2011 and $6
billion over 5 years--to stimulate the development of the commercial
space market.
Congress is examining the budget closely, and as this Committee
begins to move on NASA's reauthorization, this hearing will start to
explore both the promise and the risk of relying on commercial
companies for space access.
Investments in technology innovation always carry tremendous
potential. We know space exploration has produced many technologies of
great value to people's everyday lives.
Yet, exploration is still expensive and risky. It is clear that
using the commercial market to bring down costs and allow NASA to focus
on its greater mission could be an effective strategy.
Still, NASA and the administration have not yet provided key
details about how this investment will be executed. To support a
domestic commercial market, NASA will need to transition to a new way
of doing business. New requirements and regulations will need to be
developed in coordination with the FAA and implemented to ensure crew
safety.
The space program is still at a critical juncture. With any new
proposal or substantial investment we can never forget to ask that
simple critically important question: does it work for our country--
will it help our people?
I know today's witnesses can begin to help us answer that vital
question. Thank you very much for your perspective and expertise.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. David Vitter, U.S. Senator from Louisiana
I want to thank the Chairman for scheduling this important hearing.
NASA is at a critical stage in its history and I believe that, because
of the Administration's proposed radical new direction for NASA, it is
crucially important that we ascertain just what are the true current
and near-future capabilities of commercial space companies to provide
safe, reliable transport of U.S. astronauts to low earth orbit and the
International Space Station. Given that the president's proposal would
invest billions of taxpayer dollars in this endeavor and leave the
United States without a government-owned launch and crew vehicle on
which to rely, it is imperative that we get an accurate accounting of
where these commercial companies are in their technological
development, of just what the cost will be, what the timetable will be
for delivery of these systems, and what the impact will be on our
current NASA workforce.
I would like to welcome our panel of witnesses. I look forward to
hearing your testimony and to you sharing your valuable experience and
expertise on these subjects, and I thank all of you for taking the time
to appear here before this committee today.
As everyone in this room should know by now, I have serious
concerns and grave misgivings about the proposal to rely strictly on
commercial providers for U.S. manned space flight. Indeed I have yet to
see any convincing evidence that this proposal is viable, or that it
will lead to anything other than the ruin of our proud space program,
the loss of our role as the world's leader in space exploration, and
the loss of tens of thousands of jobs at NASA facilities around the
country.
Particularly in respect to the inevitable job loss at NASA
facilities should we follow this path, I have yet to hear anything
other than the vaguest assurances that ``something'' will be found for
these highly-skilled and invaluable workers to do or that they'll find
new work in the commercial space industry ``somewhere,'' or that
commercial providers ``may'' be looking to move some of their work into
NASA facilities. Neither I nor the thousands of NASA workers and their
families now facing the prospect of losing their jobs because of this
proposal can find much optimism or solace in such vagaries. This issue
weighs on me heavily, and I am keenly interested in what our witnesses
here have to say about this matter.
I am also deeply concerned that this proposal will only widen the
``gap'' in our manned space flight capability, leaving us to rely
solely on Russia for space flight services for an indefinite period of
time. This possibility is completely unacceptable to me, and, I am
sure, to most Americans. We have worked hard and sacrificed much to
achieve our role as the world's leader in space exploration, and I am
deeply concerned that if we go this direction now, when so much about
commercial spaceflight is uncertain and unproven, that we will
inevitably cede that leadership role to Russia, China, and other
nations with ambitions in space.
All of that is not to say, however, that I am utterly opposed to
the idea of commercial space flight. I have no doubt that commercially-
provided space flight to low earth orbit--both cargo and crew--is the
future. However, I do not believe that future is now, and have yet to
see any evidence to the contrary. To date, no commercial company has
yet to even prove that it can reliably deliver cargo to the ISS. Given
that, I firmly believe that it is both premature and irresponsible to
entrust our entire manned space flight program to commercial providers
at this time--subsidizing them with billions of taxpayer dollars in the
process--and therefore imperative that we continue the development and
then operation of a government-owned crew launch system built by our
experienced and proven NASA work force. When commercial providers have
proven themselves in flight and demonstrated that a viable and robust
market exists for commercial spaceflight, then and only then do I
believe it is logical to completely turn over manned space flight to
low earth orbit to them.
That being said, I look forward to hearing all of your testimonies
here today, and I hope that you will provide this committee with an
accurate, reliable picture of where commercial spaceflight is in its
development process, with reliable timetables for delivery and
operation of both cargo and crew vehicles, with accurate estimates of
cost, and with any ideas or considerations you may have for providing
employment opportunities for our NASA workforce and the utilization of
NASA facilities.
Thank you all again in advance for your testimony.