[Senate Hearing 111-984]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-984
THE FUTURE OF U.S. HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 12, 2010
__________
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
TOM UDALL, New Mexico SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Ann Begeman, Republican Staff Director
Brian M. Hendricks, Republican General Counsel
Nick Rossi, Republican Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on May 12, 2010..................................... 1
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 1
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Prepared statement of Captain James A. Lovell, USN (Ret.),
Commander, Apollo 13, submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson............ 71
Statement of Senator Vitter...................................... 8
Statement of Senator LeMieux..................................... 9
Statement of Senator Brownback................................... 10
Statement of Senator Johanns..................................... 11
Statement of Senator Pryor....................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Statement of Senator Warner...................................... 43
Witnesses
Hon. John P. Holdren, Ph.D., Director, Office of Science and
Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President of the
United States.................................................. 12
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Hon. Charles F. Bolden, Jr., Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration....................................... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Neil A. Armstrong, Retired Astronaut, Former Commander, Apollo 11 45
Prepared statement........................................... 46
Captain Eugene A. Cernan, USN (Retired), Commander, Apollo 17,
Astronaut (Retired)............................................ 49
Prepared statement........................................... 52
Norman R. Augustine, Chairman, Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight
Plans Committee................................................ 54
Prepared statement........................................... 57
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Charles F.
Bolden, Jr. by:
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison.................................... 75
Hon. Barbara Boxer........................................... 82
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 82
Hon. Mark Warner............................................. 83
Response to written question submitted to Norman R. Augustine by:
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison.................................... 91
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 93
THE FUTURE OF U.S. HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D.
Rockefeller IV, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
The Chairman. This hearing will come to order.
Our space program is clearly at a turning point. Earlier
this year, the Obama Administration charted a new course. They
had been working on it for a long time. And I know there is a
lot of uncertainty and disagreement and all kinds of things
about that, particularly when it comes to proposed plans for
human spaceflight. This hearing is an important opportunity to
take a close look at those plans and others.
I have said before in this committee and I have addressed
it directly with Administrator Bolden during his confirmation
that I believe from my personal point of view that we need a
new direction. To many, including myself, defenders of the
status quo for NASA, be they many or be they few, seem to
justify their views solely based on job impact. I do not think
we can afford to do that. Jobs in West Virginia are subject
number one, two, three, four, five, six, and seven, and always
will be. This is a national and international program that we
are talking about. I think we have to strike a balance between
economic development, which means jobs, and modernizing our
space program so we can remain competitive for years to come.
NASA's first mission must be to do what is best for the
Nation. The American people deserve the most from their space
program. NASA's role cannot stay static. The President has
challenged the U.S. Government to seek greater international
collaboration, enable commercial services, and develop new
exploration technologies, and on top of that, I would include
vastly expand research. You are doing something up there right
now, including medical research on MRSA, which kills thousands
and thousands of people every year in this country, broad
research, technical research, engineering research, all kinds
of research. There is no better place to do it. And I think we
have to develop new exploration technologies.
So these are good priorities and they should help ensure
that in tough fiscal times, we build our space future in a
measured, relevant, innovative and sustainable way. And this is
not going to be easy. One reason it is not going to be easy is
because we are under a, more or less, flat-line budget. Most
Americans do not know that. I think most of them would welcome
it if they did know it, but for those of us who work in
Government and want to push programs forward, that is a hard
pill to swallow. That does not affect the Defense Department.
It does not affect the intelligence community. It affects only
parts of the veterans community.
But NASA's current budget of $18 billion may be a high
water mark. We do not know what a soft freeze means. But it may
be a high water mark for years to come. So we have to live with
that and make the most of it. We cannot assume the agency will
have unlimited resources for every mission it wants to
undertake. So, therefore, we have to make hard choices.
Today I look forward to a robust evaluation of the agency's
plan for human spaceflight, but more than that, we have to
measure and shape those goals against our greater national
priorities for the years and the decades ahead. I really feel
strongly about that. NASA's research in aeronautics helped
create our global leadership in aviation. We need its
scientific minds to be involved in solving today's and
tomorrow's challenges in energy, medical research, robotics. I
have talked about these things. I really mean them.
In addition, we need to understand how it will support our
workforce and protect our industrial base, ensure our national
security, and strengthen international relationships. And we
have to examine how we use human spaceflight as an important
tool of smart power, exemplified by the International Space
Station partnership and strong U.S. and Russian participation.
So efforts like this can build stability, and they can
ensure global access to space and help us move forward toward
greater transparency as we establish the rules of the road,
which is what I think we are here to do.
I know that our focus today is specifically on human
spaceflight. I recognize that, but I do not want anybody to
forget the agency's broader priorities which include
exploration, science, aeronautics, education, technology,
research of any and all kinds. These are the foundations of our
future. They are enormously important and I hope the agency
finds that balance and moves forward again. I also hope that we
will increase our focus on tying NASA's human spaceflight
efforts to benefits in these areas.
I want to thank all of our witnesses today, including those
who will follow, the two that sit before us now, both extremely
distinguished Americans, including Mr. Neil Armstrong,
Commander of Apollo 11; and Eugene Cernan, Commander of Apollo
17. We thank them for their service.
In the past, I should say in ending, I have been critical
of NASA's financial and program management. I am still that
way. As we move toward reauthorization, I firmly believe this
committee has a huge oversight role to play. NASA cannot
continue down the same path in my judgment.
I turn now to my distinguished partner, Senator Kay Bailey
Hutchison.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very
pleased that we have this hearing because I have been alarmed
at the plans that have been put forward, not with the goal of
the plans. I agree with the goal. We should utilize space for
science and research that cannot be done in the gravity
conditions on Earth, and we need to be bold in exploring space
so that we maintain our superiority in space exploration.
I appreciate, obviously, the two of you: General Bolden,
you have been an astronaut and have a distinguished career and
are now the NASA Administrator, and Dr. Holdren from the White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy. And I am very
pleased, Mr. Chairman, that we do have the first man who walked
on the Moon and the last man who walked on the Moon on our
second panel, Neil Armstrong and Eugene Cernan, along with Norm
Augustine who was tasked by the President to come up with
options that would save NASA, our space exploration, and
putting humans in space.
I find serious flaws in the areas where detailed
information has been provided by the Administration. There are
good reasons to have reservations about a proposal that
discards billions of dollars of important technology and
engineering advancements paid for by American taxpayers and
puts us on a course that relies on a still developing
commercial market to fill a role carried on for more than 5
decades by the world's preeminent space agency.
Our 50-year legacy of leadership in space is on the line,
and we need to have a credible plan to make the next step
forward, enhancing our investment over the last 5 decades.
We will get to Mars by building upon our existing
capabilities, including our infrastructure, prior investment,
and the most skilled workforce in the world.
We do not need a Presidential commission to manage the
transition of NASA workers to other jobs or other places. We
need a plan that preserves their extraordinary talents and
challenges them to work on new goals and technologies to build
a bridge from where we are to where we want to be.
Every assumption in the President's proposal that is made
about the potential development of a new technology or the
emergence of a customer base beyond NASA to support a fledgling
commercial space industry is another source of risk and another
point of potential mid-program failure that could undermine our
human spaceflight capability.
We must leverage our existing capabilities and workforce to
reach our goal. That is why for me, the discussion begins with
the International Space Station, which underpins our reason to
send humans into space in the short- and mid-term while we work
on new technologies to take us deeper into space.
Flying out the Shuttle program on the current schedule
before performing the analysis of the parts and equipment the
International Space Station will need to extend the life of the
station from 2015 to 2020, which is the President's goal, is a
risk. It is particularly risky when those potential needs have
not been mapped against the existing or anticipated cargo
capabilities that will provide our only means to bring cargo to
the station in a world without the Space Shuttle.
I have proposed stretching out the remaining Shuttle
missions over the next 2 years and adding the Launch on Need
flight as an actual flight with available cargo capabilities.
That would allow for the analysis and planning that we must
have to minimize the risk to the ISS, the International Space
Station, and bridge the gap that has been a concern of mine and
also Senator Nelson's since it was first proposed 4 or 5 years
ago.
The space station provides our primary reason for current
and future spaceflight and offers almost the entire business
case for many of the emerging commercial space companies in the
short run. Safety has been asserted as a reason to stop the
Shuttles this year.
But, first, I am not proposing we add more, just spread
them out over a longer period of time, 2 years.
Second, I do not accept arguments that a Soyuz vehicle our
engineers have never had complete access to for study and
certification is safer than the Space Shuttle to carry our
astronauts to and from the station. It is time to have an
honest conversation about the Space Shuttle and its importance
to our short-term capabilities.
I am hopeful that Dr. Holdren and General Bolden can
finally answer some key questions on behalf of the
Administration today, including: have we taken every step
possible to reduce the risk to the space station? How will the
technology and engineering advances from $9 billion of
investment in the Constellation program be leveraged and
utilized if the program is discontinued? Why ignore the actual
options laid out in the Augustine Committee report and why wait
until 2015 for the selection of a heavy lift vehicle design?
What will happen if we do not have a NASA-owned and managed
capability like Constellation or some iteration of
Constellation and private providers struggle with cost overruns
and ultimately fail? Will American taxpayers have to bail out
these companies? What other option would we have at that point
except to continue paying whatever it takes to build the
vehicles because the NASA capability has been dismantled? Why
not reform NASA's contracting practices rather than putting all
our emphasis on a still developing commercial sector that may
not be able to deliver?
Mr. Chairman, those are just a few of my questions. Between
the proposal I have advanced, the thoughts of other members,
and the recommendations in the Augustine report, there are many
ideas about how to reach bold new goals.
American exceptionalism demands that we do better than the
proposal that has been put forward that does not have the plans
to implement it in a safe and secure way.
Mr. Chairman, I would just say that I stand ready to work
with the Administration. I would like for this Administration
to have the legacy of continuing our preeminence in space. I do
not think the proposal that has been put forward will do that,
but I certainly would like to work in a bipartisan and
certainly collegial way to achieve a goal that I think is the
same as the President's. I do not think he is putting forward
the plan to achieve the goal, and I want to help put that
together so that we will spend our taxpayer dollars wisely. We
will not throw away the billions that have already been spent.
So the space station, which now has eight contracts waiting
to go up through NIH and the Department of Agriculture to
utilize the space station--there will be more if everyone knows
that there is true availability of the space station with a
Shuttle that we can control and know that if there is a gap, it
will be a short gap, not a 5 to 8 and possibly 10-year gap as
we have new fledgling commercial activities that attempt to do
things that have already been tried and proven or disproven in
the NASA history.
So, Mr. Chairman, I do thank you for the hearing, and I
hope that it leads us to a better consensus that we can work
together toward our shared goal. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hutchison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison, U.S. Senator from
Texas
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. We are fortunate
to have such an exceptional panel of witnesses.
Two of our witnesses require no introduction. Their vision and
courage are legend, and upon their shoulders several generations of
American astronauts have stood to reach for the Heavens. I speak, of
course, of Neil Armstrong and Eugene Cernan.
We are also joined by my friend Norman Augustine, who led a review
of the U.S. human spaceflight program; General Charles Bolden, the
current NASA Administrator; and Dr. John Holdren, who heads the White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy.
If we are to work through the difficult issues ahead to arrive at a
consensus path for America's space program, this hearing represents an
excellent place to begin.
Lack of Information and Substantial Risk
Mr. Chairman, I have said a lot in recent weeks about the
President's proposal for NASA. Many Members of Congress find serious
flaws in the few areas where detailed information has been provided.
There are good reasons to have reservations about a proposal that
discards billions of dollars of important technology and engineering
advancements paid for by American taxpayers, and places us on a course
that relies on a still developing commercial market to fill a role
carried on for more than five decades by the world's preeminent space
agency.
In listening to the President and members of his Administration
discuss their proposal, I have repeatedly heard the words might, could,
and may to describe a bold future and the elements of a framework to
get us there.
The one word I keep waiting to hear, Mr. Chairman, is how!
Our 40-year legacy of leadership in space is on the line and we
need to have a credible plan to take the next step forward, enhancing
our investment over the last four decades. And let me be clear, a
destination is not a policy, and hope is not a plan!!
Assumption Equals Risk; Need to Build on Existing Capabilities
We will get to Mars by building upon our existing capabilities,
including our infrastructure, prior investment, and the most skilled
workforce in the world.
We do not need a Presidential Commission to manage the transition
of NASA workers to other jobs, or other places. We need a plan that
preserves their extraordinary talents and challenges them to work on
new goals and technologies to build a bridge from where we are to where
we want to be, and with the least possible risk to our exploration
programs.
Every assumption in the President's proposal that is made about the
potential development of a new technology, or the emergence of a
customer base beyond NASA to support a (47th fledgling commercial space
industry, is another source of risk, and another point of potential
mid-program failure that could undermine our human spaceflight
capability.
We must leverage our existing capabilities and workforce to reach
our goal.
Preserve the Station and Build from There
That is why, for me, this discussion begins with the International
Space Station (ISS), which underpins our reason to send humans into
space in the short and mid-term while we work on new technologies to
take use deeper into space.
Flying out the Shuttle program on the current schedule BEFORE
performing a comprehensive analysis of ISS equipment and part needs to
extend its life until 2020, is a risk. It is particularly risky when
those potential needs have not been mapped against the existing, or
anticipated, cargo capabilities that will provide our only means to
bring cargo to the station in a world without the Space Shuttle.
I have proposed stretching out the remaining Shuttle missions over
the next 2 years and adding the Launch on Need (LON) flight as an
actual flight with available cargo capabilities. That would allow for
the analysis and careful planning I believe is needed to minimize the
risk to the ISS and bridge part of the gap to new capabilities.
The space station provides our primary reason for current and
future spaceflight and offers almost the entire business case for many
of the emerging commercial space companies in the short run. Safety has
been asserted as a reason to stop the Shuttles this year. But first, I
am not proposing we add more--just spread them out over a longer time
frame--two years. And, second, I do not accept arguments that a Soyuz
vehicle our engineers have never had access to for study and
certification is safer than the Space Shuttle to carry our astronauts
to and from the station. It is time to have an honest conversation
about the Space Shuttle and its importance to our short term
capabilities.
Lots of Questions Need To Be Addressed
I am hopeful that Dr. Holdren and General Bolden can finally answer
some key questions on behalf of the Administration today, including:
Have we taken every step possible to reduce the risk to the
space station?
How will the technology and engineering advances from $9
billion of investment in the Constellation program be leveraged
and utilized if the program is discontinued?
Why ignore the actual options laid out in the Augustine
Committee report, and why wait until 2015 for the selection of
heavy lift vehicle design?
What will happen if we do not have a NASA-owned and managed
capability like Constellation and private providers struggle
with cost overruns and ultimately fail?
Will American taxpayers have to bail out these companies?
What other option would we have at that point except to
continue paying whatever it takes to build the vehicles?
Why not reform NASA's contracting practices rather than
putting all our emphasis on a still developing commercial
sector that may not be able to deliver?
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, those are just a few of my questions. Between the
proposal I have advanced, the thoughts of other members, and the
recommendations in the Augustine report, there are many ideas about how
to reach bold new goals in manned space exploration.
The burden lies with the Administration to demonstrate why the
President's proposal is superior to all of these other ideas.
American exceptionalism demands more . . . the brave men and women
that climb aboard rockets to explore the frontiers of space require
more . . . and, future generations of American children deserve more!
Thank you again for holding this hearing. I look forward to the
testimony.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hutchison.
I now call on the Subcommittee Chair and that is Senator
Nelson from Florida.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, there is a great deal that is riding on this
hearing today because we are preparing the way for us then to
start the markup in your subcommittee of the authorizing
legislation, and this is being done in the midst of a great
deal of uncertainty about the future of NASA. We are very
fortunate to have the witnesses that we have at the table who
clearly ought to give us some direction, and we are very
fortunate to have the three that will follow on the next panel.
This is such an important hearing because there are people
all across the country, including this extraordinary family
called the ``NASA family'' that has spaceflight in their genes
that are looking to us to exercise our legislative and
appropriations function in helping the President and the
Executive Branch chart the course of where America's human
space program is going from here.
Now, there have been a lot of us that have given a lot of
advice to the President, and I think in large part his speech
down at the Kennedy Space Center reflected that. We asked that
he consider a strong vision statement. In fact, we specifically
said a vision of going to Mars. And he did that.
We asked that he consider not the cancellation of the
Constellation program, but the restructuring of it, and in
fact, we wanted that to have the capability of giving us
flexibility in the future. And we received that from his
statement.
We asked for the extension of the International Space
Station's life, instead of it being cutoff in 2015 as
previously planned. I mean, we are just completing it now, and
it is 2010. Obviously, you do not want to shut it off 4 years
down the road. And we received that commitment from the
President.
Some of us asked that since there is the hardware ready for
an additional Shuttle flight, that he consider that. And
although he did not announce that in his speech down at the
Kennedy Space Center, it is my hope that that is under
consideration in the White House and NASA at this point.
We also asked the President for the safe completion of the
current Space Shuttle manifest even if it has to be flown into
next year and that the increases in funding for the other
critical parts of NASA's budget, including science and
aeronautics and Earth observation and the breakthrough research
and development be there. And he has proposed that.
But the authorizing and the appropriating committees
continue to review the President's proposal. We here in the
legislative branch are going to try to continue to work with
the Administration to refine his plan and change some parts of
it. And it is in that spirit that we come here today to take a
deeper look into the details of the proposal, and specifically
some of us are going to explore how the plan relates to
national priorities such as education and innovation and
security, the implications of the plan, including the impacts
on national security, the workforce, the industrial base, and
our international posture. And we are going to look at the
plan's overall integration, including the schedule and the
cost.
So then we are going to be looking, Mr. Chairman, at the
President's proposal to make a decision on a heavy lift vehicle
solution, of which he said is as late as 2015. We would like to
speed that up. We want to establish the rationale of such a
proposal and where the benefits and the challenges lie.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Bill Nelson, U.S. Senator from Florida
Mr. Chairman, while I'm pleased by the fact that during his recent
visit to the Kennedy Space Center President Obama showed that he does
in fact recognize the need for a robust human spaceflight program, I
feel there remains some room for improvement in his proposed plan for
our future in space.
I've spent a great of time advising the President and his
Administration on how best to move NASA forward--from his recent speech
in Florida it's obvious the President has been listening.
I asked that we receive a strong a vision statement, delivered
by the President, defining Mars as the ultimate goal--we
received one.
I asked for the restructuring of the Constellation Program, to
include the development of a heavy-lift vehicle and a crewed
vehicle capable of evolving to support expeditions beyond low-
Earth orbit--we received it.
I asked for the extension of the International Space Station's
operational life until at least 2020--we received it.
And I asked for the development of a robust commercial space
sector and we are now taking steps in that direction.
I'm also pleased that the President's plan takes care to provide
for the safe completion of the current Space Shuttle manifest, even if
it must be flown into 2011, and that it increases funding for the other
critical parts of NASA's budget including science, aeronautics, Earth
observation, and breakthrough research and development.
However, the authorizing and appropriating committees continue to
review the President's proposal and we in Congress are continuing to
work with the Administration to refine his plan.
And it is in that spirit that today we take a deeper look into the
details of the proposal. Specifically, we'll explore how the plan
relates to national priorities, such as education, innovation, and
security; the implications of the plan, including impacts on national
security, workforce, the industrial base, and our international
posture; and the plan's overall integration, including schedule and
cost.
Lastly, we'll also discuss the President's proposal to make a
decision on a heavy-lift solution as late as 2015. We want to establish
the rational of such a proposal and where its benefits and challenges
might lie.
Thank you Mr. Chairman--I look forward to a productive hearing.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator LeMieux, I was going to call on you but I should
call on Senator Vitter because he is Ranking on the
Subcommittee. Senator Vitter?
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this
hearing. It is a very important hearing. I agree with my
colleague on the Subcommittee. And the stakes are very high.
I will submit my full opening statement for the record. It
underscores what I have said very clearly before, that I am
extremely concerned by this plan and budget submission for NASA
by the Administration. I think it should be very concerning to
the entire space community and the American people.
My fundamental concerns are these three.
Number one, I am convinced it will absolutely relinquish
our leadership role in human spaceflight certainly for our
lifetimes, maybe longer, if we follow down the proposed path.
Number two, I repeat Senator Hutchison's comments. I think
complete reliance on the commercial sector is a bad idea
because there is absolutely no evidence that that sector alone
can supply this capability in the near term. I want to support
that sector. I want to see that capability grow, but not put
all of our eggs in one basket on that long bet.
And number three, I really think we would be in the
process, if we adopt the plan, of fundamentally changing NASA
and making it a research institution almost solely. Mr.
Chairman, you mentioned the broad category of NASA missions,
and we should remember all of them, but we should start with
the core mission which is exploration in human spaceflight. I
think this proposal is forgetting, to a large extent, about
that absolutely core, central mission and putting too much
emphasis on other ancillary missions.
I welcome all of our panel, certainly these distinguished
gentlemen, and our second panel. But, Mr. Chairman, I would
just make one suggestion, which is, I think, the original idea
is to have our other three panelists go first so that we can
get into more of a conversation and get more reaction from the
Administration officials on their very compelling testimony, in
my opinion. We have heard from the Administration before
several times about the new vision, about the budget
submission. I am happy to hear from them again, but I honestly
think it would be far more productive of real discussion and
new ideas to have the other three panelists go first, to have
the Administration listen, and to have all of us respond to
that. So that would be my suggestion to the chair.
The Chairman. I welcome that, and should you become
Chairman some day, you can arrange that.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Senator LeMieux, Senator Brownback, Senator
Pryor, and my favorite Governor down there, Senator Johanns, if
you could keep your remarks to about 3 minutes. Senator
LeMieux?
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE S. LeMIEUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator LeMieux. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you, Ranking Member Hutchison, for holding this hearing
today.
General Bolden, Dr. Holdren, thank you for your service and
for being here.
I, like my colleagues, want to work in a collegial way with
the Administration in order to make sure that we continue our
leadership role in space, but I unfortunately cannot take as
optimistic of a view of the President's plan.
For nearly 50 years, we have been the undisputed leader in
space exploration. The proposal by the Administration to, what
I would call, kill the Constellation program, its Aries I and
Aries V rockets, and turn the Orion vehicle into a speculative
lifeboat will be, in a word, devastating. That is not my word.
That is the word used by the commanders of Apollo 11, 13, and
17. It is going to be devastating for, I think, three main
reasons.
One, with the termination of the Shuttle, we will be, for
the first time in nearly 50 years, for a period of years unable
to go into low-Earth orbit, and we will put ourselves at the
mercy of the Russians.
Second, we are going to dismantle a world-class workforce
that will be virtually, if not completely, impossible to
reconstitute.
Third, we are going to relinquish our status as leaders and
pioneers in space exploration. I do not look forward to the day
when I will explain to my children why the Chinese are putting
their flag on the Moon over ours. We have spent nearly $10
billion on the Constellation program, and while it is not a
perfect project, it is the law of the land. Mr. Chairman, I
think it is worth noting that Congress has been clear in
reauthorizing this program twice, in 2005 and 2008, with a
democratically-controlled Congress and a Republican controlled
Congress.
Additionally, language was specifically included in the
2010 omnibus appropriations bill prohibiting the cancellation
of the Constellation program. One thing I look forward to
discussing in our questions is letters and documents I have
received about the programs within Constellation already being
canceled. To date, no laws have changed, and Congress has not
taken action to enact the changes proposed by the
Administration.
We read in the Wall Street Journal even today, about these
programs being canceled.
My view is that we need to stay on course with American
human space exploration. We need, as my colleagues have
suggested, to extend the Shuttle to ensure the U.S. has access
to space. We need to expedite completion of the Aries I rocket
to ensure access to low-Earth orbit and the International Space
Station. And finally, we need to expedite the development of a
heavy lift vehicle and not wait, as my colleagues have said,
until 2015.
The United States leads the world in space exploration. It
is one of our Nation's qualities that is admired around the
world. We cannot and should not cede an inch of it to other
countries. If we fail to act now, the President and this
Administration will be remembered for killing America's
leadership in space exploration, and to me, Mr. Chairman, that
is not acceptable.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. And that was absolutely
perfect timing.
Senator Brownback?
STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Brownback. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the
hearing.
I am certainly a strong supporter of NASA. I was Chair of
the Subcommittee some years ago. This is a great topic and it
is very timely that you are putting this together.
I look forward to working with you and other members on the
space program and these issues.
I am a strong supporter of NASA, as I mentioned, and of the
commercial space industry, and I have a steadfast belief that
the United States needs a vision for the U.S. space program. I
have been a proponent of phasing out the Space Shuttle and to
use the resources for alternative deep space ventures and
cutting edge research. With the impending retirement of the
Shuttle, NASA is now assuming a much different role than in our
past space effort, and I think there is great opportunity to
have a space program that leads the world, but it will be a
space program that is firmly embedded in opportunity for all.
By opening up commercial space, it ensures a strong future for
the U.S. in the competitive aerospace industry.
Mr. Chairman, you have assembled an exceptional panel of
experts. I met with Mr. Augustine 2 weeks ago. You could not
get a better guy to talk about this who has been around it a
long period of time and sees the budget realities that we are
in right now. As you have mentioned, we have a tight budgetary
atmosphere and we have got to be able to fit our goals and our
dreams and our desires within that. I think what he sees is
that we need to be able to integrate commercial space into
doing things into low-Earth orbit and then for NASA to move on
from that point.
I think there is a lot of room for discussion here, and it
is an important discussion to have for us to move forward as a
space-faring Nation and as a Nation that leads in space. We can
do it, but I think it is going to have to be under a different
design than what we have been doing.
And I look forward to the discussion of that design.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And Senator Johanns?
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE JOHANNS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Johanns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me, if I might, just offer a very brief thought. Like
most Americans, I grew up with a tremendous amount of
admiration for Neil Armstrong. I thought this man and really
all the astronauts were just enormously courageous individuals.
Therefore, you can only imagine that I would give his testimony
a great deal of weight as I think about this hearing and
prepare for it.
Early on in his testimony, he said something that to me was
very compelling and very concerning. He said, ``With regard to
President Obama's 2010 plan, I have yet to find a person in
NASA, the Defense Department, the Air Force, National
Academies, industry, or academia that had knowledge of the plan
prior to the announcement. Rumors abound that neither the NASA
Administrator nor the President's Science and Technology
Advisor were knowledgeable about the plan. Lack of review
normally guarantees that there will be overlooked requirements
and unwelcome consequences. How could such a chain of events
happen? A plan that was invisible to so many was likely
contrived by a very small group in secret who persuaded the
President that this was a unique opportunity to put his stamp
on a new and innovative program. I believe the President was
poorly advised.''
If, in fact, that is the way that this was brought about,
that is enormously concerning. Where does this come from is the
question that I have to ask. So it is not only the concerns
expressed by Senator LeMieux and others about what is happening
here, it is the method and manner by which we got there. Once
again, it appears a complete lack of transparency in the
Administration and there is just too much of that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Pryor?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
want to thank you for having this hearing and, Senator
Hutchison, for your leadership on this. I have to acknowledge
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Nelson of Florida is really
without peer when it comes to looking after NASA's interest and
making sure that the many and varied missions of NASA are
functioning properly and getting the proper attention here in
the Congress.
Really, Mr. Chairman, I only would have two questions for
the panels when they have a chance to answer, and that would
be, first, what is the safest and most economical launch
vehicle for restoring NASA's capability to fly to low-Earth
orbit and the International Space Station? And second is, what
are NASA's plan, budget, and schedule for developing, and
testing a heavy lift launch system?
I think our manned spaceflight program is at a real
crossroads, and I certainly would look forward to working
through this issue with the members of the Committee and with
NASA.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Senator Pryor follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Mark Pryor, U.S. Senator from Arkansas
Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Hutchison. Thank you for
holding this important hearing.
NASA and the United States manned space program are at a
crossroads. This Congress is being asked to make a decision that will
set the course for the Space Agency for the next several decades. The
choice is between continuing the Constellation Program and relying upon
the private sector to develop commercial launch vehicles.
Regardless of the path America chooses, the safety of our
astronauts must always be our paramount concern.
I believe this committee must find the answers to two key
questions.
First, what is the safest and most economical launch vehicle for
restoring NASA's capability to fly to Low-Earth Orbit and the
International Space Station?
Second, what are NASA's plans, budget and schedule for developing
and testing a heavy lift launch system?
I look forward to hearing today's testimony and the answers to
these questions. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Pryor.
And now, Dr. Holdren, I am very honored to ask you to give
your testimony. You are the Director of the Office of Science
and Technology Policy. You have been very helpful to me on
energy matters and in many other ways. I think you are a
terrific appointment.
After that, Mr. Bolden, I will introduce you.
Please.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN P. HOLDREN, Ph.D., DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Dr. Holdren. Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member
Hutchison, members of the Committee, I certainly am happy to be
here today to talk about the Administration's new strategy for
human space exploration activities.
And I want to be clear at the outset. This Administration
is steadfast in its commitment to space exploration and to the
mission of NASA. The President and I fully recognize that space
exploration plays a vital role for our Nation in advancing
scientific discovery, stimulating technological innovation,
enhancing our economic strength, expanding our horizons,
inspiring our public and especially our kids about the
potential of science and technology, and maintaining U.S.
leadership internationally.
But among the several challenges that face this
Administration when it came to office were the technical and
budgetary difficulties of the U.S. human spaceflight program,
Constellation, that we had inherited. To assess that problem,
OSTP and NASA stood up the most open, transparent, and
participatory Federal advisory committee activity relating to
space that has ever been undertaken, the Augustine Committee to
Review Human Spaceflight Plans.
As you know, the Augustine committee concluded through that
process that the Constellation program had become
``unexecutable'' under any plausible set of assumptions about
costs and budgets going forward, the victim of a mismatch
between plans and available resources exacerbated by decades of
underinvestment in new technology and innovation at NASA. And
persisting in the pursuit of that increasingly costly program
while, nonetheless, failing to meet its objectives would have
the further liability of continuing to short-change NASA's
other critical activities including, as you have mentioned,
robotic missions, space telescopes, Earth observation, and
aeronautics. It clearly was time to push the reset button.
Accordingly, a decision-support process engaging NASA and
the White House was initiated to flesh out a set of options,
drawing on the Augustine committee's findings and aiming to
maximize the level of exploration and achievement attainable
under realistic budgets for the President's consideration. The
result was the set of proposals for NASA's activities and
budgets rolled out as part of the President's Fiscal Year 2011
budget request on February 1 and elaborated, as Senator Nelson
has mentioned, in the President's speech at the Kennedy Space
Center on April 15.
The key elements in the Administration's new strategy for
maintaining and extending U.S. leadership in human space
exploration deserve, I think, at least brief recapitulation
here.
We want to extend the life of the International Space
Station to at least 2020, in doing so, deriving significantly
increased benefits from it in science and technology
demonstration, providing a locus and focus for increased U.S.
astronaut presence in space over the decade ahead, and
maintaining the valuable international partnership that the
International Space Station represents.
We want to catalyze the development of and then utilize
commercially provided crew and cargo transportation services to
the International Space Station, resulting in what we believe
will be more timely and cost-effective United States
capabilities for that purpose than the previous program would
have provided.
We want to increase NASA's investments in transformative
technologies that can expand the reach and reduce the costs of
human exploration of deep space, beginning in this way to
reverse decades of under-attention to that critical need.
And we want to pursue a series of increasingly demanding
human exploration missions, including a mission to an asteroid
by 2025 and an orbital Mars mission in the mid-2030s,
demonstrating key capabilities for a later Mars landing, while
also achieving historic firsts in exploration and discovery.
I want to add a word about workforce issues. There are some
near-term job losses in store, largely as a result of the
retirement of the aging Space Shuttle fleet in early 2011. But
that is not a new problem. The decision to retire the Shuttle
in that time-frame was made in 2004 by the previous
administration based, in part, on the findings of the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board and, in part, on the need to
develop less costly as well as safer technology to get our
astronauts into orbit. A dilemma in the era of limited budgets
is that the high cost of operating the Shuttle consumes the
money that would be needed to develop its successor.
The Administration recognizes the pain and hardship of job
losses in the communities affected, and we are taking a number
of steps to reduce those impacts. The promotion of an expanded
commercial space launch industry will create new jobs in many
of the places affected by Shuttle job losses, as will the $3
billion that will go into new R&D on heavy lift rockets in this
period and additional billions in other new technologies. We
think it is likely, given the additional spending in the new
plan, that the magnitude of the Shuttle-related job losses will
be smaller and their duration shorter under the new plan than
under the old one. But they will still be real. Therefore,
further steps are being taken by the Administration to mitigate
those losses, including the initiative for regional economic
growth and job creation along the Space Coast that the
President announced on April 15.
In closing, let me say that the President and I appreciate
this committee's interest in and support for the U.S. human
spaceflight program and the other important missions of NASA.
We are convinced that the new plan is the best way forward and
optimistic that we can get it done. I look forward to working
with you and others in the Congress to that end. I would be
happy, of course, to respond to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Holdren follows:]
Prepared Statement of Statement of Hon. John P. Holdren, Ph.D.,
Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of
the
President of the United States
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and members of the
Committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the
Administration's new strategy for U.S. human space exploration
activities. I welcome the opportunity to provide additional information
about these plans.
Let me be clear at the outset: This Administration is steadfast in
its commitment to space exploration and to the mission of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), as emphasized by the
President in his speech at the Kennedy Space Center on April 15. Space
exploration plays a vital role for our Nation in advancing scientific
discovery, stimulating technological innovation, enhancing our economic
strength, and promoting international leadership. And the President
fully recognizes the space program's unique capacity to inspire future
generations of scientists and engineers as we continue to forge new
paths in pursuit of unprecedented discoveries and unimagined wonders in
space.
The Obama Administration came into office facing a broad range of
challenges, not least of which were the technical and budgetary
difficulties of the U.S. human spaceflight program--Constellation--that
we had inherited. Given the significant investments in funds and
scientific capital entailed in that effort, we concluded that it was
essential to obtain a fresh and objective assessment of the status of
the program, as well as of the options going forward. OSTP and NASA
stood up, for that purpose, an independent blue-ribbon panel, the
Committee to Review U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans. Led by the
distinguished aerospace engineer Norman Augustine, the Committee
comprised ten experts of diverse experience--in the U.S. Government,
the military, industry, and the astronaut corps--relating to the
technology, management, and practice of human spaceflight. I believe
the intensive review they conducted over a period of 5 months last year
was the most open, transparent, and participatory Federal Advisory
Committee activity relating to space ever undertaken.
The Augustine Committee's thorough and thoughtful analysis helped
illuminate the range and severity of the challenges faced by the
Constellation program--making clear that it had become ``unexecutable''
under any plausible set of assumptions about costs and budgets going
forward--as well as clarifying the options for revamping U.S. human
spaceflight activities so as to maximize what could be achieved under
budgets that might realistically be available. Most fundamentally, the
Augustine report made clear that Constellation had been plagued from
the beginning by a mismatch between plans and available resources, and
that it had been hindered as well by decades of underinvestment in new
technology and innovation at NASA.
The report showed, more specifically, that the new rocket intended
to carry U.S. astronauts to low-Earth orbit (initially to the
International Space Station (ISS) and later in support of lunar
missions) after retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2011, the Ares I,
was far over budget and so far behind schedule that it wouldn't be
available until after the space station had been scrapped at the end of
2015 in pursuit of savings to help pay for the rocket. The program's
stated goal of returning U.S. astronauts to the surface of the Moon by
2020, moreover, using a much larger rocket (Ares V) and a lunar lander
that were both still on the drawing board, was no longer within reach
regardless of how much money might be spent on it. And under plausible
NASA budgets going forward, the Constellation program could not have
put U.S. astronauts back on the Moon until sometime after 2030.
In addition to scrapping the $100 billion International Space
Station before it had achieved more than a fraction of its scientific
and technology-development potential, as well as suffering a six- or
seven-year gap in U.S. capability to lift its own astronauts into low-
Earth orbit, persisting with the pursuit of the increasingly costly
Constellation program while nonetheless failing to meet its objectives
would have the further liability of continuing to short-change NASA's
other critical activities, including robotic missions and space
telescopes, Earth observation, and aeronautics. Clearly it was time to
press the reset button.
Accordingly, a decision-support process engaging NASA and the White
House was initiated to home in on and flesh out a set of options for
revamping NASA's human spaceflight efforts--drawing on the Augustine
committee's findings and aiming to maximize the level of activity and
achievement attainable under realistic budgets--for the President's
consideration in connection with the preparation of his FY 2011 budget
proposal. The result was the set of proposals for NASA's budgets and
activities in FY 2011-2015, which were rolled out as part of the
President's budget request on February 1, and further elaborated in his
speech at the Kennedy Space Center on April 15.
Before turning to the ingredients of the new plan, I want to make
one further important point about the old one. The President and I--and
I know Administrator Bolden--are immensely grateful for the hard work
and commitment shown by the men and women of NASA's government and
industry workforce for the Constellation program. The mismatch of aims
and resources in that program was not their fault. Nor will their
efforts have been wasted--much of the knowledge and technology they
have produced will be built upon in the new plan. More than that, it's
our aim to put their skills and passions to work in the revamped
program to the greatest extent that we can. These men and women are a
national resource, and the Administration is committed to applying
their expertise to a range of national challenges and needs.
The President's new strategy for maintaining and extending U.S.
leadership in human space exploration has a number of important
elements. Key among them are:
1. extending the life of the ISS to at least 2020, thereby
deriving significantly increased benefits from it in science
and technology demonstration, providing a locus and focus for
increased U.S. astronaut presence in space over the decade
ahead, and maintaining the valuable international partnership
in space that the ISS represents;
2. catalyzing the development of, and then acquiring
commercially provided crew and cargo transportation services to
the ISS, resulting in what we believe will be more timely and
cost-effective U.S. capabilities for this purpose than the
previous program;
3. substantially increasing our investments in transformative
technologies that can expand the reach and reduce the costs of
human exploration of deep space, thereby beginning to reverse
decades of under-attention to this critical need;
4. investing in heavy-lift propulsion R&D, which together with
our technology investments will help inform a decision by no
later than 2015 on the heavy lift vehicle design that we will
pursue and build;
5. building a scaled-back version of the Constellation
program's Orion crew capsule to provide crew emergency-escape
services for the ISS and to provide part of the technological
foundation for the advanced spacecraft to be used in future
deep-space missions;
6. pursuing a series of increasingly demanding human-
exploration missions to include a mission to an asteroid by
2025 and an orbital Mars mission in the mid-2030s,
demonstrating key capabilities for a later Mars landing while
also achieving historical firsts in exploration and discovery;
and
7. ramping up robotic exploration of the solar system,
including missions to ``scout'' the human trips to follow, as
well as conducting the Earth observations necessary to improve
our understanding of our climate and planetary home.
This new plan revolves around certain core strategic themes and
priorities--achieving a long-needed revitalization of our technology
R&D efforts, matching program goals with available resources,
partnering with industry in fundamentally new and more effective ways,
advancing scientific discovery, and pursuing human exploration with a
more flexible, achievable, and affordable set of goals. It is designed
to take us ultimately further, faster, to more places in deep space,
while spurring the creation of new industries, technologies, and jobs
along the way. These activities and approaches together will prove
vital for the long-term sustainability of our human spaceflight
activities and will help place these programs on a more stable footing
for years to come.
I also would like to take this opportunity to provide additional
information about certain program elements that the President
highlighted on April 15 and that I touched on earlier.
The ISS and a Crew Rescue Vehicle
Under the Constellation program Orion was to be the crew capsule
used to transport astronauts to the vicinity of the Moon before trips
to the surface using the Altair lander. Orion was also to provide crew
transportation to the ISS, where it would have docked for 6 months
before returning crews to the Earth. Though the Orion was to fulfill
the ISS mission objectives first, it was not designed primarily for
that purpose. Rather, NASA initiated Orion's development with the
objective of making it a lunar-capable spacecraft that also could meet
the ISS servicing mission.
Developing an Orion-derived escape capsule to provide the ISS crew
with assured return to Earth in case of an emergency is a less complex
task than completing the Orion with its full suite of mission
objectives, but this effort still brings important capabilities while
enabling NASA to maintain critical skills in this area and continue to
utilize its multi-Center, in-house team for spacecraft development. It
will, as the President noted in Florida on April 15, provide ``part of
the technological foundation for advanced spacecraft to be used in
future deep space missions.''
Heavy Lift Decision
The President also directed in his speech that NASA be in a
position to select a heavy-lift rocket design by no later than 2015 for
its future missions beyond Earth's orbit. The President noted that ``in
developing this new vehicle, we will not only look at revising or
modifying older models; we want to look at new designs, new materials,
[and] new technologies . . .'' The President's budget includes $3.1
billion over the next 5 years in support of research for new engine
technologies, new materials, and engine demonstrations or prototypes
that can prove vital to a future heavy lift vehicle. Further, NASA is
developing initial plans for testing and demonstrating capabilities
such as in-space fuel transfer and storage, in-orbit automated and
autonomous rendezvous and docking, advanced in-space electric
propulsion, and others that could be important in optimizing the
characteristics of a heavy lift vehicle (i.e., as part of a future
exploration architecture).
NASA will build and test, and in some cases fly in space, these new
technologies over the next several years to assess their operational
viability and collect information on their effectiveness and
performance. NASA can at the same time conduct a variety of design
trade studies on potential future approaches for a heavy lift launch
vehicle, and by 2015 will be able to make a decision about future heavy
lift development that is informed by the combination of lessons learned
from these various technology developments and associated studies. It
is currently anticipated that this decision would set the general
configuration of the vehicle, as well as target performance levels and
other attributes. A more detailed and mature design for this vehicle
likely would need to be completed following this initial decision, as
part of a subsequent development effort. This timetable will enable
NASA to begin building a heavy lift launch vehicle 2 years earlier than
was projected under the previous plan.
Workforce Support
There are job losses in store as a result of the retirement of the
aging Space Shuttle fleet in early 2011, but that is not a new problem.
The decision to retire the Shuttle in this time-frame was made in 2004
by the previous Administration, based in part on the findings of the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board and in part on the need to
develop less costly as well as safer technology to get our astronauts
into orbit. (A dilemma in an era of limited budgets is that the high
cost of operating the Shuttle consumes the money that would be needed
to develop its successor.) Several major independent reviews have
affirmed that winding down the Shuttle program for these reasons is the
right decision.
The Administration recognizes the pain and hardship of Shuttle job
losses in the communities affected, and we are taking a number of steps
to reduce these impacts. The new plan contains $1.9 billion over the
next 5 years for modernization of Florida's Kennedy Space Center and
associated facilities. The promotion of an expanded commercial space-
launch industry will create new jobs in many of the places affected by
Shuttle job losses, as will the $3 billion that will go into new R&D on
``heavy lift'' rockets in this period and additional billions in other
new technologies. It's likely, given the additional spending in the new
plan, that the magnitude of the Shuttle-related job losses will be
smaller and their duration shorter under the new plan than under the
old one. But they will still be real. Further steps the Obama
Administration is taking to mitigate them include the initiative for
regional economic growth and job creation along the ``Space Coast''
that the President announced in his April 15 speech at the Kennedy
Space Center.
As the President explained on May 3, that initiative will be led by
a Task Force on Space Industry Workforce and Economic Development. Co-
Chaired by NASA Administrator Bolden and Secretary of Commerce Gary
Locke, it will include membership from 11 other departments, agencies,
and White House organizations, including my office. Its aim is to
develop, in collaboration with local stakeholders, an interagency
action plan for $40 million in transition assistance intended to
facilitate economic development strategies and plans along Florida's
Space Coast, and to provide training and other opportunities for
affected aerospace workers so they are equipped to contribute to new
developments in America's space program, related industries, or other
industries in the local area. This effort will build on and complement
ongoing local and Federal economic and work force-development efforts.
A plan is due to the President by August 15 of this year.
Conclusion
I appreciate this committee's interest in and support for the U.S.
human spaceflight program and the other important missions of NASA.
Certainly there are challenges ahead in moving forward with the
revamping of these efforts that I and the other witnesses are
discussing with you today. But I am convinced that it is the best way
forward and optimistic that we can get it done. I look forward to
continuing to work with you and others in the Congress to that end. I
would be pleased to respond to questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
And now the Administrator of NASA, Mr. Charles F. Bolden,
Jr., who in fact a little over 24 years ago flew with one
Senator Bill Nelson. The floor is yours, sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES F. BOLDEN, JR.,
ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Bolden. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee,
thank you very much for the opportunity to appear today to
discuss additional information about the President's Fiscal
Year 2011 budget request for NASA, following the President's
important speech at the NASA Kennedy Space Center in Florida.
NASA is grateful for the support and guidance received from
this committee through the years and looks forward to working
with you to implement the President's bold new direction for
the agency.
Given that you have my detailed written statement, I will
try to keep my remarks very brief this afternoon so that I have
time for questions.
But first, I would like to acknowledge the incredible
contributions of my two astronaut colleagues and Norm Augustine
who will be on the second panel. Both Neil and Gene, the first
and last humans to set foot on the Moon, have dedicated their
lives to the challenging and often unforgiving pursuit of space
exploration and, in doing so, have improved the quality of life
in America and inspired the next generation of explorers. And
they continue to contribute by remaining engaged and providing
their remarks on today's important topic of the future of human
spaceflight. I appreciate their thoughts and ideas, and it was
very beneficial to have had the opportunity to discuss their
concerns over the past 3 weeks and to present them with a
thorough brief on our plans for America's future in human
spaceflight and exploration in a 2-hour brief last week in an
attempt to allay some of their concerns.
However, reasonable people can disagree, and so I must
respectfully disagree with some of the remarks from the first
panel in their prepared remarks.
The President's Fiscal Year 2011 budget request is good for
NASA because it sets the agency on a sustainable path that is
tightly linked to our Nation's interests. During his visit to
KSC, the President articulated a strong commitment to NASA's
missions and future of U.S. human spaceflight exploration.
The President also outlined an ambitious effort to foster
the development of groundbreaking technologies; increase the
number, scope, and pace of manned and unmanned space missions;
make human spaceflight safer and more efficient; and help
create thousands of new jobs. The President has laid out the
goals and strategies for this new vision which includes a
sequence of deep space destinations for human missions,
progressing step by step, beginning with crewed flight tests
early next decade of vehicles capable of supporting exploration
beyond low-Earth orbit, a human mission to an asteroid by 2025,
and a human mission to orbit Mars and return safely to Earth by
the mid-2030s.
With respect to the role of heavy lift in the future of
human spaceflight architecture, the Fiscal Year 2011 budget
request includes funds for NASA to conduct the important
research and development and analysis necessary to make an
informed decision on a heavy lift launch vehicle no later than
2015.
On May 3, NASA issued a request for information seeking
general information regarding potential launch or space
transportation architectures that will be used for planning and
acquisition strategy development for current heavy lift
planning activities.
Regarding our plans for a restructured Orion, the President
has directed me that NASA build on the good work already
completed on the Orion crew capsule and focus the efforts to
provide a simpler and more efficient design that would provide
crew emergency escape from the space station and serve as part
of the technical foundation for advanced spacecraft to be used
in future deep space missions. This approach also will preserve
a number of critical, high-tech industry jobs in key
disciplines needed for our future deep space exploration
program.
We have put together a formulation team, including
headquarters and center personnel, to develop a baseline
approach that meets these requirements, balanced with other
priorities proposed in the President's Fiscal Year 2011 budget
request. This team will report to me within 3 weeks on how best
to meet these requirements.
Dr. Holdren has already talked to you about the workforce
initiative. So I will not cover that, but I will say that the
task force, which he mentioned which I co-chair with Secretary
of Commerce Locke, will also explore future workforce and
economic development activities that could be undertaken for
affected aerospace communities in other states as appropriate,
and we held the first meeting of that task force this morning.
NASA expects to submit a revised Fiscal Year 2011 budget
request to Congress in the near future that will identify
funding requirements for the restructured Orion crew capsule,
as well as funding requirements for the workforce transition.
Finally, regarding the International Space Station's role
in furthering research, technology, and innovation, this
orbiting national lab represents a unique research capability
which the United States and its partner nations can use to
conduct a wide variety of research in biology, chemistry,
physics, and engineering fields that will help us better
understand how to keep astronauts healthy and productive on
long-duration space missions. ISS can and will play a key role
in the technology demonstrations and engineering research
associated with exploration.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, Americans and people worldwide
have turned to NASA for inspiration throughout our history. Our
work gives people an opportunity to imagine what is barely
possible, and we at NASA get to turn those dreams into real
achievements for all humankind. This budget gives NASA a road
map to even more historic achievements as it spurs innovation,
employs Americans in fulfilling jobs, and engages people around
the world as we enter an exciting new era in space.
I thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for your support and that
of this committee. I would be pleased to respond to any
questions you or other members of the Committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bolden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Charles F. Bolden, Jr., Administrator,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to discuss additional information about the
President's FY 2011 budget request for NASA, following the President's
important speech at the NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida.
NASA is grateful for the support and guidance received from this
committee through the years and looks forward to working with you to
implement the President's bold new direction for the Agency.
The President's FY 2011 budget request is good for NASA because it
sets the Agency on a sustainable path that is tightly linked to our
Nation's interests. The President recognizes that what is truly needed
for beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO) exploration are game-changing
technologies; making the fundamental investments that will provide the
foundation for the next half-century of American leadership in space
exploration. In doing so, the President has put forward what I believe
to be the most authentically visionary policy for human space
exploration that we have had since President Kennedy challenged NASA to
send humans to the Moon and return them safely back to Earth. At the
same time, under the new plan, we will ensure continuous American
presence in space on the International Space Station (ISS) throughout
this entire decade and likely beyond, re-establish a robust and
competitive American launch industry, launch more robotic probes into
our solar system as precursors for human activity, invest in a new
heavy lift research and development (R&D) program, and build a
technological foundation for sustainable, beyond-LEO exploration, with
more capable expeditions in lunar space, and human missions to near-
Earth asteroids, the Moon, Lagrange points, and, ultimately, Mars. NASA
will embark on these transformative initiatives by partnering with the
best in industry, academia and other government agencies, as well as
with our international partners.
At the request of the Committee, today I will provide additional
details about pending revisions to the President's FY 2011 budget
request for NASA. I will discuss NASA's progress in developing plans
for the new exploration initiatives included in the FY 2011 budget
request, including initial planned program assignments for major
programs by Center. Additionally, my testimony will provide additional
detail about three significant updates that were announced by the
President when he visited KSC on April 15, 2010. NASA is working
expeditiously to provide specific budgetary details to reflect these
updates and we will share them with this Committee and other
Congressional stakeholders as soon as we are able.
President Obama Visits KSC
During his visit to KSC, the President articulated a strong
commitment to NASA's mission and future U.S. human space exploration.
The President also outlined an ambitious effort to foster the
development of ground-breaking technologies; increase the number,
scope, and pace of manned and unmanned space missions; make human
spaceflight safer and more efficient; and help create thousands of new
jobs. The President directed that NASA proceed to develop a crew rescue
vehicle based on the Orion space-capsule to support emergency crew
return requirements on the ISS, and providing a technological
foundation for systems that can later take us beyond Earth's orbit. In
addition to investing in transformative heavy-lift technologies, the
President has called on NASA to select a basic rocket design, no later
than 2015, and then begin to build it. The President also said that
after decades of neglect, we will increase investment--right away--in
other groundbreaking technologies that will allow astronauts to reach
space sooner and more often, to travel farther and faster for less
cost, and to live and work in space for longer periods of time more
safely. And, the President laid out the goals and strategies in this
new vision for NASA. Fundamentally, the exploration of space will be a
sequence of deep-space destinations for human missions matched to
growing capabilities, progressing step-by-step, beginning with crewed
flight tests--perhaps a circumlunar mission--early next decade of
vehicles capable of supporting exploration beyond LEO, a human mission
to an asteroid by 2025, and a human mission to orbit Mars and return
safely to Earth by the 2030s. Finally, the President committed to
providing $40 million for workforce transition initiatives to aid
Florida's Space Coast.
NASA expects to submit a revised FY 2011 budget request to the
Congress in the near future that will identify funding requirements for
the restructured Orion crew capsule as well as funding requirements and
authorization for workforce transition for Florida and potentially
other locations.
Restructuring the Orion Crew Capsule
Per the President's direction, we are going to build on the good
work already completed on the Orion crew capsule and focus the effort
to provide a simpler and more efficient design that would provide crew
emergency escape from the ISS and serve as part of the technical
foundation for advanced spacecraft to be used in future deep space
missions. This approach also will preserve a number of critical high-
tech industry jobs in key disciplines needed for our future deep space
exploration program.
We have put together a formulation team including Headquarters and
Center personnel to develop a baseline approach that meets these
requirements, balanced with the other priorities proposed in the
President's FY 2011 budget request. This team will report to me within
3 weeks on how best to meet these requirements.
I have directed the team to align this work so that it complements,
and does not compete with, our commercial crew development effort. In
this manner, we will simplify the requirements for potential crew
service providers to the ISS by having the restructured Orion effort
fulfill the important safety requirement of emergency escape system for
astronauts on the ISS. I have also directed the formulation team to
focus on innovative approaches to oversight, and believe that we can
significantly reduce oversight requirements based on lessons learned in
previous focused development flight programs. We must accomplish this
activity more efficiently and effectively to maintain a healthy funding
balance across our exploration priorities. And this will be done
without reducing our commitment to safety for crew escape. The crew
rescue mission has many fewer requirements than the deep space mission,
providing design flexibility and reducing the system's lifecycle cost.
Finally, the team must identify how this activity will align with the
development efforts proposed in the Flagship Demonstration program as
well as our other technology efforts so that investments in these
programs can be leveraged to the greatest extent possible.
The funding for this restructuring will come within NASA's top-line
request released in February. The out year funding requirements will be
refined as part of the President's FY 2012 budget submission.
Heavy-Lift Technologies
During his visit to KSC, the President specifically recognized the
need for a heavy-lift launch capability to carry humans beyond LEO by
requiring a decision on a vehicle design no later than 2015. Such a
decision would include setting performance goals, identifying lift
capability and selecting the general vehicle design--work that will
ultimately lay the path for launching a spacecraft for crewed missions
into deep space.
The FY 2011 budget request includes funds for NASA to conduct the
important R&D and analysis necessary to make an informed decision on a
heavy-lift vehicle no later than 2015. This effort will primarily focus
on the development of a U.S. first-stage hydrocarbon engine for
potential use in future heavy lift (and other) launch systems, as well
as basic research in areas such as new propellants, advanced propulsion
materials manufacturing techniques, combustion processes, propellant
storage and control, and engine health monitoring. Additionally, NASA
will initiate development and testing of in-space engines. Areas of
focus could include a liquid oxygen/methane engine and low-cost liquid
oxygen/liquid hydrogen engines. This work will build on NASA's recent
R&D experience in this area, and the test articles will be viewed as a
potential prototype for a subsequent operational engine that would be
re-startable and capable of high acceleration and reliability. These
technologies will increase our heavy-lift and other space propulsion
capabilities and significantly lower operations costs--with the clear
goal of taking us farther and faster into space consistent with safety
and mission success criteria. In support of this initiative, NASA will
explore cooperative efforts with the Department of Defense and also
develop a competitive process for allocating a small portion of these
funds to universities and other non-governmental organizations. This
research effort along with many of our new technology initiatives will
be coordinated with the broader Agency technology initiative led by
NASA's new Chief Technologist.
On May 3, 2010, NASA issued a Request for Information (RFI) seeking
general information regarding potential launch or space transportation
architectures (expendable, reusable, or a hybrid system) that could be
utilized by multiple customers (e.g., NASA, commercial and other
Government agencies). The RFI solicits information regarding propulsion
system characteristics; technology challenges related to liquid
chemical propulsion systems; as well as innovative methods to manage a
heavy-lift development program to include effective and affordable
business practices. The RFI is open to the broad space community,
including commercial, other Government agencies and academia.
Information obtained from the RFI will be used for planning and
acquisition-strategy development for current heavy-lift planning
activities, funded at a total of $100 million in the FY 2010
Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117).
Assistance for the Florida Space Coast
The men and women who work in the Space Coast's aerospace industry
are some of the most talented and highly trained in the Nation. It is
critical that their skills are tapped as we transform and grow the
country's space exploration efforts. The 2004 decision to end the
Shuttle means that approximately 6,000 jobs need to be transitioned
into the new space strategy and related industries. Recognizing the
concerns of our dedicated Shuttle workforce as they conclude this
remarkable program and look forward to transitioning to new work, the
President has announced a $40 million initiative to develop a plan for
regional economic growth and job creation for the Florida Space Coast.
On May 3, 2010, the President issued a Memorandum directing the
establishment of the Task Force on Space Industry Workforce and
Economic Development. The task force is charged with developing, in
collaboration with local stakeholders, an interagency action plan to
facilitate economic development strategies and plans along the Space
Coast and to provide training and other opportunities for affected
aerospace workers so they are equipped to contribute to new
developments in America's space program and related industries. They
will also explore future workforce and economic development activities
that could be undertaken for affected aerospace communities in other
States, as appropriate. The Secretary of Commerce and I will serve as
Co-Chairs. Other team members will include: the Secretary of Defense;
the Secretary of Labor; the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development;
the Secretary of Transportation; the Secretary of Education, the Chair
of the Council of Economic Advisors; the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget; the Administrator of the Small Business
Administration; the Director of National Intelligence; the Director of
the Office of Science and Technology Policy; the Director of the
National Economic Council; and the heads of other Executive agencies,
as needed. As directed, the team will report its recommendations to the
President by August 15. The $40 million for this initiative will be
taken from the funds requested for Constellation transition in the
original FY 2011 Presidential budget request.
This interagency group's recommendations will build on the
Administration's ongoing efforts in the KSC region. The Department of
Labor is already planning a pilot program to better assist the region's
workers, including those highly-skilled workers who work in the
aerospace industry, through efforts to establish one-stop local
transition centers for affected workers where they can receive
coordinated local, state, and Federal workforce assistance tied to
economic development efforts; and the designation of a single Federal
point-of-contact for affected areas.
To further facilitate these efforts, the Department of Commerce's
Economic Development Administration (EDA) is prepared to support a
comprehensive economic adjustment strategy for the Kennedy Space Center
economic region. With funding provided through NASA, the EDA will
provide both financial and technical assistance to start implementing
those plans and promote economic development in the region through such
activities as infrastructure upgrades and improvements, entrepreneurial
networks, and skill- training facilities and equipment. The exact mix
of activities will depend on the recommendations and request of local
entities across the region.
In addition, on April 30, 2010, the Department of Labor announced a
$1.2 million grant to assist approximately 200 workers affected by
layoffs at ATK Launch systems in Corinne, Utah, in connection with the
transition of the Space Shuttle and Constellation programs.
NASA Prepares to Implement the FY 2011 Budget Request
Pursuant to the President's proposed new course, NASA has initiated
planning activities to be able to effectively and efficiently implement
these new activities in a timely manner upon Congressional enactment of
the FY 2011 budget. In April, NASA outlined for the Committee the
Agency's planned major program assignments across the Agency's Centers
for new or extended activities proposed as part of the President's FY
2011 budget request. These planned assignments build on the deep
knowledge and expertise that NASA has built up over five decades,
recognize the wealth of experience, commitment, and expertise resident
at the NASA Centers, and expand upon the strengths at each Center.
I wish to emphasize that establishment of program offices and
initiation of effort in support of new or extended activities for this
proposed new work is contingent upon Congressional approval of the
President's FY 2011 request for these activities. These planned program
assignments will enable NASA to engage workforce at the Agency's
Centers in formulation activities for the array of program initiatives
in Science, Aeronautics, Space Technology, Exploration, and Space
Operations reflected in the President's FY 2011 request. While we will
be developing details on the specific numbers of employees at our
Centers that will be assigned to new program offices and activities,
these planned assignments are intended to provide the Committee
additional detail regarding the depth and scope of the President's FY
2011 proposed budget plan.
Planned major program assignments for elements contained in the FY
2011 budget, by Center, follow:
Johnson Space Center, Texas
Exploration/Flagship Technology Demonstrations,
Manager
Exploration/Commercial Crew Development, Deputy
Program Manager
Exploration/Commercial Cargo Development, Manager
Exploration/Human Research, Manager
ISS, Manager
Kennedy Space Center, Florida
Exploration/Commercial Crew Development, Manager
Space Operations/21st Century Launch Complex, Manager
Exploration/Flagship Technology Demonstrations, Deputy
Program Manager
Space Shuttle/Completion of Manifest, Manager
Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama
Exploration/Heavy Lift and Propulsion R&D, Manager
Exploration/Robotic Precursor Program, Manager
Space Technology/Crosscutting Capability
Demonstrations/Technology Demonstration Missions, Manager
Space Technology/Centennial Challenges Program,
Manager
Stennis Space Center, Mississippi
Exploration/Heavy Lift and Propulsion R&D, First Stage
and Upper Stage Rocket Testing
Exploration/Commercial Crew Development, Engine
Testing for Commercial Vehicles
Glenn Research Center, Ohio
Exploration/Exploration Technology Development and
Demonstration, Manager
Space Technology/Early Stage Innovation/Research
Grants
Aeronautics Research/Integrated Systems Research
Program, support
Langley Research Center, Virginia
Space Technology/Game Changing Technology/Game
Changing Development, Manager
Climate Initiative: SAGE III; CLARREO (managed jointly
with Goddard); Venture Class
Aeronautics Research/Integrated Systems Research
Program and Airspace Systems Program, support
Dryden Flight Research Center, California
Space Technology/Crosscutting Capability
Demonstrations/Flight Opportunities, Manager
Aeronautics Research/Integrated Systems Research
Program and Airspace Systems Program, support
Ames Research Center, California
Exploration/Precursor Robotic Missions/Exploration
Scouts, Manager
Space Technology/Game Changing Technology/Small
Satellite Subsystem Technologies, Manager
Space Technology/Crosscutting Capability
Demonstrations/Edison Small Satellite Demonstrations,
Manager
Aeronautics Research/Integrated Systems Research
Program and Airspace Systems Program, support
Goddard Space Flight Center, Maryland
Joint Polar Satellite System (restructuring NPOESS),
procurement structure modeled after past successful
programs
Climate Initiative: ICESat-2; CLARREO (managed jointly
with Langley); DESDynI (managed jointly with Jet Propulsion
Laboratory); Earth Systematic Missions Program
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California
Climate Initiative: SMAP; DESDynI (managed jointly
with Goddard); GRACE, OCO-2
Following the release of the FY 2011 budget request, NASA
established study teams within the Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate (ESMD) to ensure we understand the steps (and the
implications of those steps) that would need to be taken for an orderly
transition of the Constellation Program and to plan for the
implementation of the new initiatives in the Exploration program. The
work undertaken by these teams is a necessary part of that planning.
Following is a brief summary of the additional details developed for
each initiative, as ``point of departure'' plans to support FY 2011
budget implementation, once the budget is approved. Please note these
are preliminary ESMD plans that may need to be modified following
finalization of Agency plans regarding the restructuring of the Orion
crew capsule.
Flagship Technology Demonstrations: The next generation of
capabilities key to sustainably exploring deep space will be
demonstrated through four proposed missions: advanced space
propulsion in 2014, in-space propellant and fuel transfer in
2015, light weight/inflatable modules in 2016, and aero-assist
in 2017. Autonomous operations and advanced life support
capabilities will also be tested on these missions. Detailed
definition of each mission's content is currently under way.
Heavy Lift and Propulsion Technology: Planned technology
investments will lead to a demonstration of an in-space engine
in 2015, development of a first stage propulsion system by
2020, and maturing other foundational propulsion technologies
to support a heavy lift vehicle decision in the 2015 ti
meframe. NASA's efforts will be primarily focused on a LOX/RP
first stage and either a LOX/methane or LOX/hydrogen in-space
engine. Additional research will be dedicated to analysis and
trades regarding fuel types, performance requirements, and
vehicle architectures.
Exploration Robotic Precursors: A series of annual
exploration robotic precursor missions is being planned,
beginning with launch of a Near-Earth-Orbit (NEO) mission in
2014, followed by a lunar lander in 2015, and two Mars missions
in 2016 and 2018, respectively. In addition, smaller robotic
scout missions will be launched every 12-18 months to support
reconnaissance, evaluate hazards, and develop systems and
operations in support of future human exploration.
Enabling Technology Development and Demonstration: Enabling
technology will advance fundamental technologies in 10
portfolio areas that will lead to ground and flight
demonstrations in lunar volatiles, high power electric
propulsion, autonomous precision landing, human exploration
tele-robotics, fission power systems, and other areas. The
flight demonstrations will be done as part of flagship
demonstrations, robotic precursor missions, or utilizing the
ISS, ground tests and analogs.
Human Research: Through research and technology development,
the goal of the Human Research Program is to reduce the highest
risks to crew health and performance for space exploration
missions. Increased investments will be made in the fields of
biomedical technology, space radiation research, and behavioral
health research. There are also plans to make increased use of
the ISS facilities.
Commercial Crew: NASA is continuing to define plans to
expedite and improve the robustness of ISS crew and cargo
delivery. In addition, NASA is developing a plan that supports
the development of commercial crew transportation providers to
whom NASA could competitively award crew transportation
services. Solicitations for commercial crew transportation
development will provide opportunities for both established and
traditional aerospace companies as well as emerging
entrepreneurial companies. Related to this activity, this
summer, NASA plans to release a Request for Information to seek
industry feedback on our human rating requirements.
Constellation Transition: The team is leveraging expertise
from across the Agency to develop a rapid and cost effective
ramp-down plan that will free the resources required for new
programs. As part of the early characterization and integrated
planning effort, this team has initiated a broad survey of
current work force, contracts, facilities, property, security,
knowledge capture, information technology, and other government
agency interface issues to determine what infrastructure and
hardware could be used by the new programs and projects. The
transition plan will outline three phases as part of an action
plan for initial deliverables: Near-term actions, transitioning
of Constellation elements, and transition of assets/resources
to new Exploration focus areas and other NASA programs, where
appropriate.
NASA is taking prudent steps to plan for the new initiatives
included in the FY 2011 budget request, including Requests for
Information (RFI), workshops, and preliminary studies. NASA is eager to
receive external input from industry, academia, and other partners, and
is accomplishing this via a series of RFIs and industry workshops
conducted this spring and into the summer. Doing so will ensure that
NASA receives important feedback from our space partners before it
begins to finalize its implementation plans for the new technology
demonstrations and human spaceflight systems development activities
that will be supported by the FY 2011 budget, once approved by
Congress. During CY 2010, NASA plans to issue a series of program
formulation documents seeking input from the broader space community.
The following are tentative timeframes for these activities:
Flagship Technology Demonstrations: RFI in May/June.
Heavy Lift and Propulsion Technology: RFI issued May 3,
2010; Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) in May/June.
Exploration Robotic Precursor Missions: RFI in May/June.
Enabling Technology Development: RFI issued May 7, 2010; BAA
in June/July.
Human Research Program: BAA in July
The first major public discussions about NASA's FY 2011 planned
activities will occur at a two-day Exploration Enterprise Workshop
scheduled for May 25-26 in Galveston, Texas. The workshop will bring
together a broad community of stakeholders from industry, academia, and
the Federal Government to engage in discussions related to strategy
building, development, and the implementation of the new plans for
human and robotic exploration in space.
The workshop will focus on the President's FY11 budget request for
NASA Exploration. The Agency has completed the initial phase of
planning for the new technology and robotic programs and will provide
insight into progress to date. The objectives of the workshop are to:
Describe and discuss the activities planned for inclusion in
the new programs.
Discuss NASA Center proposed Program assignments.
Solicit feedback, ideas and suggestions from interested
parties.
Prepare for the next steps once the new programs are
implemented.
In addition, NASA has also established study teams to plan for the
implementation of the new initiatives related to the ISS Augmentation,
21st Century Space Complex and Space Technology. Additional information
on these planning efforts as well as planned RFIs, workshops, and
preliminary studies are outlined below.
ISS Augmentation: The ISS program is reviewing functionality
enhancements that will make the space station more capable and
efficient, including: upgraded environmental systems and
communications, techniques for saving space and improving the
use of pressurized volume, tools for optimizing flight- and
ground-crew time, upgrading and expanding payload operations,
enhancing EVA and robotics use on Station, and reducing the
complexity of international interfaces.
NASA will initiate an independent organization, as
recommended by the Augustine Committee and the National
Research Council that will support the space station
research community.
21st Century Space Launch Complex: NASA has developed a list
of potential project ideas with preliminary estimates to be
used as one potential source of solutions to customer needs as
they are identified. These initial focus areas will be adjusted
as customer needs are better understood: (1) Expanding
capabilities to support commercial launch providers; (2)
Environmental remediation; (3) Enhancing payload processing
capabilities; and, (4) Supporting the modernization of the
launch range capabilities.
This month, NASA will release an RFI to get a first-
hand understanding of investments that would be most useful
in support of launch and related activities in order to
help the Agency prioritize near-term projects.
Space Technology: NASA's Space Technology initiative under
the Office of the Chief Technologist (OCT) will develop and
demonstrate advanced space systems concepts and technologies
enabling new approaches to enhance NASA's current mission set
and enable future missions. Planning teams continue to make
significant progress: an internal technology governance plan
has been approved; an Agency-level technology road mapping
activity is planned to begin in July; and, approved technology
program plans for Early Stage Innovation, Game Changing
Technology, and Crosscutting Capability Demonstrations will be
completed by the end of June.
NASA will issue a Crosscutting Capability
Demonstrations RFI in late May 2010. Game Changing
Technology Industry Day will occur in late June 2010. Early
Stage Innovation NASA Research Announcements (NRA's) are
targeted for late June 2010. An RFI soliciting potential
topics for the proposed Space Technology Graduate
Fellowship program has been released to the NASA Centers
and Federal Research Laboratories.
Finally, NASA has established the Human Exploration Framework Team
(HEFT) to serve as a cross-Agency planning activity. The team is being
led by the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate and staffed with
technical leaders from across NASA Centers. The team is focused on
developing and reviewing the integrated set of requirements and
technologies required for future human spaceflight missions to many
destinations, including Mars. As part of its broad integration charter,
HEFT will develop implementation recommendations on the performance and
pacing requirements for the technologies needed for future human
exploration missions using ``design reference missions,'' or DRMs.
These DRMs will be the basis for validating capabilities and missions
for 5, 10-, and 15-year horizons, with milestones including crewed
missions beyond the Moon into deep space by 2025, sending astronauts to
an asteroid, and eventually landing on Mars. NASA expects to have
initial products from the HEFT team this summer.
Extension and Enhanced Use of the International Space Station
A key element of America's future in space is the ISS that is due
to be completed this year. As of May 2009, the ISS is able to support a
six-person permanent crew. The three major science labs aboard ISS were
completed in 2009 with the delivery of the Exposed Facility of the
Japanese Kibo module. The ISS represents a unique research capability
which the United States and its partner nations can use to conduct a
wide variety of research in biology, chemistry, physics and engineering
fields that will help us better understand how to keep astronauts
healthy and productive on long-duration space missions. If Congress
approves the FY 2011 budget request, NASA will be able to fully utilize
the ISS and increase its capabilities through upgrades to both ground
support and onboard systems. Importantly, this budget extends
operations of the ISS, likely to 2020 or beyond.
ISS research is anticipated to have terrestrial applications in
areas such as biotechnology, bioengineering, medicine and therapeutic
treatment. The FY 2011 budget request for ISS reflects increased
funding to support the ISS as a National Laboratory in which this
latter type of research can be conducted. NASA has two MOUs with other
U.S. Government agencies, and five agreements with non-government
organizations to conduct research aboard the ISS. NASA intends to
continue to expand the community of National Laboratory users of the
ISS.
ISS can also play a key role in the technology demonstrations and
engineering research associated with exploration. Propellant storage
and transfer, life support systems, and inflatable technology can all
benefit by using the unique research capabilities of ISS. In addition
to supporting a variety of research and development efforts, the ISS
will serve as an incubator for the growth of the low-Earth orbit space
economy.
As a tool for expanding knowledge of the world around us; advancing
technology; serving as an impetus for the development of the commercial
space sector; demonstrating the feasibility of a complex, long-term,
international effort; providing critical data regarding human long-
duration spaceflight; and, perhaps most importantly, inspiring the next
generation to pursue careers in science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics, the ISS is without equal.
Conclusion
Americans and people worldwide have turned to NASA for inspiration
throughout our history--our work gives people an opportunity to imagine
what is barely possible, and we at NASA get to turn those dreams into
real achievements for all humankind. This budget gives NASA a roadmap
to even more historic achievements as it spurs innovation, employs
Americans in fulfilling jobs, and engages people around the world as we
enter an exciting new era in space. NASA looks forward to working with
the Committee on implementation of the FY 2011 budget request.
Chairman Rockefeller, thank you for your support and that of this
committee. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you or the
other members of the Committee may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Administrator Bolden.
I will start the questions and I will ask one which I hope
each of you will answer.
A variety of priorities have been suggested, and I
suggested in my opening statement what we did by definition
does not have to be what we always continue to do. I did,
however, heavily mention human spaceflight.
But, Dr. Holdren, starting with you and then to you, Mr.
Administrator, how would you list, if you are looking at the
future, the budget requirements and the needs of the Nation and
the world, the priorities of NASA?
Dr. Holdren. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I have already
indicated, I think NASA has a number of important
responsibilities, important areas of activity, and we really
have to figure out, within the constraints of a limited budget,
how to advance all of the most important ones.
Clearly, human space exploration is an important element
for the reasons I mentioned at the beginning of my testimony
and for others we could elaborate. It has been and will
continue to be an immense inspiration to every new generation
of American young people, bringing more of them into science,
math, and engineering, strengthening our economy, enabling us
to address a wide variety of other issues, and it is very
important to the most fundamental of human drives, which is to
understand and explore the universe around us.
At the same time, we have to maintain the Earth observation
activities of NASA. We have to maintain the aeronautics
activities of NASA, including its contributions to a next-
generation air traffic control system to green aviation and
much more. We have to maintain the contributions of NASA to the
non-human exploration in the sense of space telescopes, in the
sense of robotic missions. It really is not possible to say we
can dispense with any of these, and I believe that under the
President's plan we can, indeed, nurture all of them in ways
that will move us forward as a society.
The Chairman. If I am talking about medical and scientific
and other kinds of research, those would fall somewhere below?
Dr. Holdren. No, no. Absolutely not. I am talking about
research. We need to do more research in understanding our
place in the universe. We need to do more fundamental science
using the capabilities of NASA. We need to use the capabilities
of NASA to do more advanced technology development, some of
which will be useful directly in the exploration program and
much of which will spin off into immensely valuable economic
contributions across our society. What I am saying, sir, is we
need to maintain all of those major functions of NASA, and I am
saying that we believe we can do it with the budget that the
President has proposed for Fiscal Year '11 and going forward.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bolden. Mr. Chairman, ironically I woke up early this
morning and I went online and I listened to the White House
tapes from November 21, 1962, and it was a heated discussion
between President John Kennedy and NASA Administrator James
Webb who, by the way, was a Marine and a pilot. I did not know
that until this morning. But the discussion was about the
question you just asked. And President Kennedy asked
Administrator Webb is lunar landing the top priority for NASA,
and Administrator Webb said no. It is science. It is technology
development. And for quite some time, they went back and forth
arguing about it.
It is easy for me to answer your question. The top priority
for NASA in my estimation is human spaceflight development and
pushing us beyond the bonds of low-Earth orbit. Everything else
is second and it is only through the execution of human
spaceflight that we can open up the avenues making it available
for us to do research and development. It is the desire to go
to places like Mars that will draw on people, companies around
the country, academia, if we can get them the money, to develop
the capabilities that will allow us to go places like that.
Short of wanting to send humans beyond the bounds of low-
Earth orbit, we have a number of other Federal agencies that
can do my job. So that is a personal--you asked me a personal
question. I gave you a personal opinion.
The Chairman. And I appreciate it and I thank you.
Senator Hutchison?
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have listened to both of you and you have focused on the
science and going beyond low-Earth orbit as the priorities, and
I agree with you. In fact, General Bolden, in your testimony,
you talk about the use of the space station, but you talk about
what we can learn to make it healthier and better for
astronauts and others to go into space, which I think is
important.
But there is also the vast field of medical technology that
we have already gained immensely from space exploration, and
there is more that is going on right now. NASA and NIH, as you
know, have a memorandum of understanding. NIH is looking at the
treatment of causes of cancer, the diagnosis of heart, blood,
vessel, lung, and blood diseases, cell and organism aging,
reducing the burden of arthritis, and the development of new
biomedical imaging, things that can only be done in the
microgravity conditions.
The space station is such a key component of the research
that, Dr. Holdren, you are championing and I know, General
Bolden, you also say is part of your focus. Yet, we cannot have
a space station that will be productive, that will be stable,
that we can be sure will fulfill the hundred billion dollar
investment that has already been made in that vehicle without
assurance that we can get people up there, that we can have the
cargo that might be needed in the later years because it has
been extended.
So I come back to the question of, if you do not look at
the stable source of getting people there, how can you say the
mission and goal of science and productivity is going to be
achieved? That is my concern. If the Soyuz is out of pocket or
if they raise their rates because they are the only means that
we have so that it is so prohibitive, we could be spending the
same money on our own capabilities and learn from that much
more than just renting space on the Soyuz. Or if we have some
blowup in the commercial companies that are not able to fulfill
their contract, they are untested--you are putting all of our
dreams and hopes and taxpayer dollars into this commercial
investment.
What are you going to do if there are overruns, which there
already are? Are you intending to have the taxpayers then have
no choice but to go forward and spend more money? Why not
continue doing it in a tried and true, proven, 50-year recorded
entity, which is NASA? Why have you gone on this tack where you
are putting so much emphasis on untested sources to assure that
the space station will be utilized to its full potential?
Mr. Bolden. Senator, if I may say, there is only one
untested source, and it is not really untested. Of the two
competitors right now in the COTS program, it is SpaceX.
Orbital is a very successful space company. They have flown
Pegasus and a number of other spacecraft for many years. They
have flown payloads to orbit. They know what they are doing.
Orbital was the subprime on the Launch Abort system that we
just had an incredible success on out at White Sands. So if I
want to say why do I have confidence in them, I have confidence
in them because they have demonstrated their ability to put
things in space.
When you talk about exploration and research on the
International Space Station, I could not agree with you more. I
am very confident and comfortable, however, with my partners,
the Russians, because they have the best record of safety and
reliability in terms of access to space. They have now flown, I
think, 90 missions without an accident or loss of life. There
is no other person, there is no other source of access to low-
Earth orbit that can match that record.
And the last thing I will say is as good as Energia is and
Roscosmos, I defy anyone who says that American industry is not
as good or better than they are. So I have to be confident that
Orbital, SpaceX, McDonnell Douglas--not even around anymore--
Boeing, the other American manufacturers can match, if not
exceed, that of Energia. I am confident that American industry
is better than Russian industry. And I am happy with what the
Russians do.
Dr. Holdren. Could I add one----
Senator Hutchison. I could not agree more. Go ahead.
Dr. Holdren. The one comment I wanted to add to that is
just to remind folks that all of the rockets and all of the
spacecraft that we have been using from the beginning of the
space era have been built by the private sector. What we are
talking about is changing the acquisition model.
Senator Hutchison. But here is the key. It is what I was
going to say. It is not that we will not rely on private
contractors. Of course, we will. But it will be under the
auspices and control of NASA and their tried and true 50 years
of experience, not giving them $6 billion, which is what is in
the President's proposal, and just saying, you go do this,
without all of the other aspects, the training, the testing,
and the mission control. There is so much more than just
building the rocket or building half of the Orion. It has to
all fit together.
What my concern is, is that you are terminating the
Constellation. In your budget you have $2.5 billion to
terminate. That is the termination, and there are reports all
over the place that you are terminating contracts or that you
are making it essential that they self-terminate. For $2.5
billion, we could have another Space Shuttle. We could spread
out the Space Shuttle for that over a year. You could have two
in a year. So I am just concerned about the priorities and the
control.
And I am way over time, and I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
I know we will have a lot of time to discuss this. Thank you.
The Chairman. Do you want to respond?
Dr. Holdren. I am going to make one statement that
Administrator Bolden is probably too modest to make. Safety
will remain under the oversight of NASA. This gentleman on my
left was in charge of safety for the astronaut corps when he
was an astronaut. He knows how important that is. While Charlie
Bolden is Administrator of NASA, there is going to be no
shortfall in the oversight of the private sector in delivering
astronauts to Earth orbit in terms of safety. I just wanted to
make that one point because it has come up from time to time.
Senator Hutchison. Mr. Chairman, let me just make one quick
point. I am not against the private sector. I am just against
the private sector being the only source of this mission.
The Chairman. Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. And, Senator Hutchison, I think that is a
good point. Space is a very unforgiving kind of environment,
and NASA has always run the programs being built by
contractors, not contractors running the programs with
oversight of NASA. Now, that is a new way of doing business,
Dr. Holdren.
Dr. Holdren. Yes.
Senator Nelson. Needless to say, there are some people who
question the wisdom of that, but the fact is that if it does
not work or if it gets extended way out, then we do not have a
backup system, save for our partners, the Russians. But they
have a limited capability of getting stuff up and back with the
size of the Soyuz.
I want to get into the normal decisionmaking process
because normally what happens is NASA sends to the Office of
Management and Budget by November their budget, their suggested
budget. Normally OMB then sends their iterations back to NASA
for NASA's commentary. But that did not happen this year.
Instead, the pass-back from OMB came right at the time of the
announcement of the President. And as you know, the President
had to go down to the Kennedy Space Center and change some
things because of the mistakes that were made in the rollout
which unfairly characterized the President as an opponent of
human spaceflight, of which this Senator knows him to be an
avid proponent.
So, Dr. Holdren, I want to ask you, when OMB came back, did
OMB consult you in the final determinations of the NASA budget?
When I say you, I am talking about your organization.
Dr. Holdren. The answer to that in brief is yes,
absolutely, but let me answer the question in a little more
detail.
As you know, Senator Nelson, this was not an ordinary year.
It was a year in which a determination was made after receipt
of the Augustine report that really fundamental changes in the
priorities and the structure of NASA's human spaceflight
program going forward were going to be necessary. And of
necessity, the process of figuring out what those would be had
to be integrated with the Fiscal Year 2011 budget process, and
that is the way it was done.
There have been a number of suggestions, including one that
we heard in one of the opening statements, that neither I nor
the NASA Administrator was involved in this process. I can
assure you that the President's decision in this matter was not
hasty and it was not lacking in input from a wide range of
well-informed advisors. Those included me----
Senator Nelson. Let me interrupt you because I am down on
limited time here.
Dr. Holdren, when did the NASA Administrator--when was he
consulted in the period of time, 2 weeks, before the rollout of
the budget?
Dr. Holdren. Senator, I do not want to get into the
internal pre-decisional deliberations and how they took place
in detail. You and I both know that I cannot do that.
Senator Nelson. OK, but let me ask you this. Let me ask you
this. Were any of the center directors in NASA consulted?
Mr. Bolden. Senator Nelson, may I answer the question, if
it is possible? Because I think I know the answer better than
Dr. Holdren in this particular case. Beginning in--I became the
NASA Administrator in July. Beginning in August--and there is a
very smart young man who is sitting behind you on your right
who was my brain, my strategic brain, by the name of Tom
Cremins, and he will tell you that beginning in August, we had
a periodic series of strategic planning meetings among the
senior leadership in NASA, which included the center directors,
the associate administrators, and every senior leader in NASA.
And this went on for a number of months.
And during that period of time, because I am a Marine and I
flew the Space Shuttle where you know we do disaster training,
we discussed every potential outcome of the budget. And I spent
probably a month where I asked everybody to look at the worst
case scenario which was, you know, what happens if everything
goes away and we get nothing and we have to start from scratch.
We knew that would not be good, but we determined that we in
NASA, because we know how to do things, could recover from
that.
So center directors, associate administrators, and senior
leadership of NASA has been involved in the deliberations that
led to our submission of our budget proposal since August.
As Dr. Holdren has said, because the results from the
Augustine committee were delayed from when we thought they
would come, then we all found ourselves very late in the
process in doing things. And as I have said to most of you when
I have come to talk to you, I accept the blame. I am 6 months
behind, conservatively, where I would have been in a normal
budget process. We would have had discussions with members and
their staffs back in the fall. We could not do that because
Augustine came out and we went back to the drawing board again
and continued to discuss.
I provided lots of input to the President over a period of
time. As I have said before, it is my budget. It is my plan,
and I am here to defend it because I think it is the right
thing for us to do.
Dr. Holdren. I would like to say one more word to finish my
answer, if I may, with your permission.
The President heard from a lot of people in this process.
He heard from me. He heard from Administrator Bolden. Senator
Nelson, he heard from you. That does not mean that he took
everybody's advice, but he did hear it and he weighed it. And
then as Presidents must, he arrived at a position that balanced
all of the relevant considerations. And my own view is that out
of that process, he got to the best and most balanced program
for NASA, including its human spaceflight dimension that the
country can afford.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Vitter?
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bolden, as you know, a lot of our concerns are about
the capability of the commercial sector to do what we are
asking them to do on time, on budget, and putting, essentially,
all our eggs in one basket.
It was reported to me in the conference call with Mr.
Armstrong and Captain Cernan last week that you had--I think
you referred to the call itself--for a couple hours you told
them you would, ``do whatever it takes,'' to make commercial
work including, ``bailing them out,'' even if that would mean,
``a bigger bailout than Chrysler and GM.'' What did you mean by
that?
Mr. Bolden. I am not sure I said that, Senator. I am not
sure who was in the room.
You know, as I have always said, I will do everything in my
power to facilitate the success of the commercial entities in
access to low-Earth orbit. I have to have that. The Department
of Defense has to have it. Our intelligence community has to
have it.
The budget today does not allow me to continue to build and
operate in low-Earth orbit if I want to go explore. The
contingency that I continue--I am a contingency planner. You
know, I have to look at the possibility that the commercial
sector may have difficulty, and we will do everything in my
power to facilitate their success. So that is what I meant when
I said anything about our----
Senator Vitter. Mr. Bolden, what I have read is more
specific and different than what you just said. Did you use the
sort of language I used?
Mr. Bolden. I do not remember using the sort of language
you used. I do not remember that. This was just days ago.
Senator Vitter. OK, well, it made quite an impact on other
folks on the conversation, and it raised my concerns at least.
Mr. Bolden. Senator, I always have people talk about
conversations that I have had, and you know, I am involved in
the conversation and I tell you what I said. I am not sure who
else was in the room. I know who was in the room with me, and I
know who was on the line with Gene and Neil.
Senator Vitter. OK.
Mr. Bolden. Unless someone was----
Senator Vitter. No. I am talking about direct participants
who were taking notes.
As we sit here, do you think the commercial program is
likely to stay on timetable and on budget?
Mr. Bolden. I think we are going to stay pretty much on
timetable. If we go exactly the way that the schedule is laid
out right now, it will be the first time in the history of any
endeavor involving space that everybody that has made it on
time. I expect that they will have technical difficulties and
we will help them through them. They have already had some
technical difficulties, as we do, and we work through them.
Senator Vitter. OK. In light of the continuation of Orion,
why is it that NASA is taking actions which would constrain the
funding of the program by shifting the termination liability
costs onto the program, which is not the norm? I understand
that is occurring in this case. That is not the norm, and there
has been no decision by Congress in terms of funding.
Mr. Bolden. Senator, the termination liability is a factor
that is in the contract of every supplier that NASA uses. It
always has been. If you are referring to my letter, I just
reminded them to read their contracts.
Senator Vitter. OK. Did you send the letter to the Hubble
contractors or to the Webb telescope contractors? Did you send
that letter to them?
Mr. Bolden. Senator, we did not have to send a letter to
the Hubble contractors because they delivered without any
problems. And in terms of James Webb, we continue to be
constantly exercising oversight of them because I think as all
of you know, it has been a fiscal challenge for us and it
remains a fiscal challenge.
Senator Vitter. But are the termination liability costs
being shifted onto the program? It is my understanding they
are, which is not normal procedure. It is my understanding this
is the case because of the Administration's plan as opposed to
other----
Mr. Bolden. Congressman, the responsibility for termination
liability lies with the company. And that is contractual. That
is not something that we change. I cannot change it because it
is in the contract.
Now, where the money lies----
Senator Vitter. What other contractors did you send this
letter to?
Mr. Bolden. I sent it to all of the--we had it sent to the
prime contractors of the Constellation program because this
is----
Senator Vitter. What other programs' contractors did you
send it to?
Mr. Bolden. We did not have to send it to anybody because
we did not have any other program that had sent something to us
saying that they were concerned about termination liability.
But there are other programs in Government that are going
through the same thing right now because of the same reason.
Senator Vitter. OK.
Mr. Bolden. Because the risk decision lies with the
company, and if it is a publicly traded company, it lies with
the board of directors. And in that particular case, they have
to decide whether they are going to put the money in the bank
or whether they are going to spend it on people and things, and
it is a risk decision that they have to make. Normally when
things are going along well, companies do not worry about it
because they assume there is going to be no problem. But that
is a risk that the company decides the level of risk they are
going to take. And I think if you talk to any business, they
will tell you the same thing.
Senator Vitter. Mr. Chairman, if I can have one final
question for Mr. Holdren.
You talked about the budget constraints, which are
certainly clear and obvious. But the bottom line is still that
NASA's budget has an extra $6 billion over 5 years. And it is
not going primarily to exploration. Maybe a billion is, and
that is mostly research within that program. So it is a major
increase going elsewhere.
Is it not true that with those significantly increased
resources, certainly other things could have been done to focus
more immediately on existing programs in human spaceflight?
Dr. Holdren. Senator, it is always true that one can make
different choices about allocation. We think we made the best
choices about allocation available to us under the
circumstances. The decision to invest more in research and
development, in game-changing technologies, in technologies
that ultimately can take us faster and farther, as opposed to
continuing to invest in the existing programs which were
already way over budget and behind schedule, was a very
conscious decision to invest in what have always been the
sources of U.S. leadership. The source of U.S. leadership has
always been advanced technology, and the Augustine committee's
report and our own conclusion was that NASA had been under-
investing in the advanced technologies that we will ultimately
need to continue to lead, to go faster and farther in space. We
could not have it both ways. We could not continue to invest in
the old program at the levels that it was requiring and invest
in these other possibilities.
Mr. Bolden. Senator, if I may add just one thing. And I
suggest you ask Norm Augustine when he comes in on the panel
because he will tell you it was a matter of taking $6 billion
and spreading it over 5 years for investments in technology
development, aeronautics, science, and commercial or taking
that $6 billion chunk and putting it in 1 year for the
Constellation program, not knowing how you would get to the
next year. And Norm Augustine will tell you that.
His recommendation was, OK, let us take a modest amount.
Let us take $3 billion, and that was one of the options that
they offered.
My fiscal responsibility to the President was to advise him
that it would be much smarter to take $6 billion and instead of
putting it in 1 year of trying to catch Constellation up and
then wondering where I was going to get the $6 billion the next
year, let us spread it over 5 years. Let us get a grip on our
technology development. Let us restore some prominence to
science and aeronautics.
And people are happy. You cannot find anybody in--
scientists always argue about priorities, but it is hard to
find somebody in the science or aeronautics community who will
not tell you that this is an incredible budget for them. You
cannot find a university president who will not tell you this
is a great budget for them because they now--I just came from
MIT and Harvard----
The Chairman. I do not want to interrupt you, but you are
going to have to learn time limits, keeping it brief, otherwise
you eat up Senators' times and they do not like that, and then
they do not vote for what you want.
Mr. Bolden. Yes, sir.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Senator LeMieux?
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Bolden, after the last Shuttle flight--that is
going to be the end of this year or the beginning of next. Is
that what is currently scheduled?
Mr. Bolden. Yes, sir. That is our hope.
Senator LeMieux. Assuming that that is what happens, what
will be the next NASA mission to low-Earth orbit?
Mr. Bolden. The next NASA mission to low-Earth orbit will
be the next Soyuz that launches carrying a crew to the
International Space Station at its next 6-month increment.
Senator LeMieux. When will be the next NASA mission that is
powered with a NASA rocket?
Mr. Bolden. And I am not trying to be cute. The next NASA
mission will be flown on a commercial rocket just as the
Shuttle is. You know, it will be a commercial rocket that we
leased instead of----
Senator LeMieux. Which rocket will that be?
Mr. Bolden. The first one will be SpaceX. It will be Falcon
9 in 2011, and then late 2011/early 2012, will be Taurus II,
and then they will go through a sequence of demonstration
flights that will allow us to take them to the point where they
work on contract. Right now, everything is their dime. I gave
them $250 million apiece and they have to demonstrate with that
money.
Senator LeMieux. Are those rockets taking us to the
International Space Station?
Mr. Bolden. They will take us to the International Space
Station.
Senator LeMieux. In 2011?
Mr. Bolden. Oh, no, sir. No, no, no. The first time that we
will have a commercial rocket take us to the International
Space Station with a crew will probably be about 2015.
Senator LeMieux. OK. So 5 years from now, your estimation
is that those commercial rockets are going to be available to
take us to low-Earth orbit.
Mr. Bolden. Yes, sir.
Senator LeMieux. Is that why you are saying that 2015 is
the decision time or the President has articulated 2015 is the
decision time on the heavy lift?
Mr. Bolden. No, sir. It has no connection with that.
Senator LeMieux. Why are we waiting till 2015----
Mr. Bolden. We are not waiting. I asked the President to
challenge me, and I asked the President to give me a deadline
of no later than 2015. Originally it was in 2015. If I have to
wait until 2015 to make a decision, that prolongs the amount of
time before I can start building a heavy lift launch vehicle.
If I could give it to him tomorrow, I would. I cannot.
Senator LeMieux. You cannot----
Mr. Bolden. I cannot give him a recommendation on the
architecture for a heavy lift launch vehicle because I am not
smart enough.
Senator LeMieux. What about the Ares rockets?
Mr. Bolden. Ares are great rockets, but I am not sure that
that is the best for the Nation. I am not sure it is the most
cost-effective. I am not sure that we can sustain the
technology that is going into Ares right now. I am not sure
that we want to use solid rocket boosters in first stage
because I am trying to find a rocket that DOD, the intelligence
community, and NASA can use, and that may not be a solid rocket
motor. That may be LOX/RP or it may be LOX/hydrogen.
Senator LeMieux. How much money have we spent on the Ares
rocket so far?
Mr. Bolden. On the Constellation program, we have spent
about $9 billion over the last 5 or 6 years, and not a dime of
it has been wasted.
Senator LeMieux. So you are going to be able to use the
money that we have already spent to make a decision on a new
rocket as opposed to continuing the rockets?
Mr. Bolden. I am going to be able to use the products that
came about from that $9 billion of expenditure. Some rovers
that have been developed as a part of the program that now I do
not need to put permanent habitats on the Moon, a robot that we
worked with General Motors in a Space Act agreement that we
call R2, a dexterous robot that can throw a baseball but can
also----
Senator LeMieux. My time--sorry, General. My time, as the
Chairman says, is limited. So I want to get back to the rocket
issue.
If we have already invested billions of dollars----
Mr. Bolden. Yes, sir.
Senator LeMieux.--in this heavy lift technology----
Mr. Bolden. No, sir, we have not.
Senator LeMieux. How much did we invest in the Ares rocket?
Mr. Bolden. Well, the only rocket that we have invested in
so far has been Ares I because the investment in Ares I--it
reduces the amount of money you have to pay for the Ares V
rocket.
Senator LeMieux. How much did we invest in that?
Mr. Bolden. I will have to bring it back to you for the
record because I cannot break out the $9 billion among the
different components of the Constellation program.
Senator LeMieux. Say that again. You cannot break out the
different parts of the Constellation----
Mr. Bolden. I cannot for you right now at this table break
out the amount that we have spent on the different components
of the Constellation program.
Senator LeMieux. Is that something that you would submit
for us?
Mr. Bolden. Yes, sir. We will get that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Answer. As of June 2010, NASA has spent $10.6 billion total on
Constellation elements. This includes $4.1 billion for Ares I; $4.3
billion for Orion; and, $2.2 billion for other Constellation elements
such as ground operations and mission support elements.
Senator LeMieux. Let me ask quickly, since my time is
short, about termination.
Mr. Bolden. Yes, sir.
Senator LeMieux. Are you telling vendors right now that you
are terminating the Constellation program?
Mr. Bolden. No, sir, I am not. I cannot tell them that.
They know, however, that the President's 2011 budget proposal--
the language is very explicit. It calls for termination of the
Constellation program.
Senator LeMieux. But that is just his proposal.
Mr. Bolden. That is his proposal.
Senator LeMieux. You understand the law of the land right
now is----
Mr. Bolden. Sir, I abide by the law of the land right now,
and we are not terminating anything. I cannot do that lawfully.
Senator LeMieux. That is my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Brownback?
Senator Brownback. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I want to follow up on what Senator LeMieux was asking on
the schedule on commercial spaceflight because this was a bit
of new information to me. So NASA is going to be paying for
initial flights in late 2011 by SpaceX on, was it, two vehicles
that you are saying? Falcon 9 and then Taurus II?
Mr. Bolden. Falcon 9 and Taurus II are the first two
commercial vehicles. Yes, sir.
Senator Brownback. What is NASA paying for?
Mr. Bolden. Right now, NASA paid $250 million to each
SpaceX and Orbital as part of a Space Act agreement. That was
to give them seed money so that they could go off and develop a
commercial capability. That is all I paid.
Senator Brownback. But they are going to launch something
in late 2011?
Mr. Bolden. That will be the first flight that they will
fly for me. Falcon 9 will actually launch the end of this month
or early June, but that is not for me. That is for another
customer. That goes in my data bank.
Senator Brownback. OK. What will they fly for you in late
2011?
Mr. Bolden. It is a demonstration to demonstrate that they
can get the vehicle to low-Earth orbit. You know, when they
separate the Dragon module, they have to fly, navigate
themselves to the International Space Station, get to a point
where they can stop, and I can take it and berth it. So they
have a number of demonstration flights that they have to fly.
That is why I am not going to let them get anywhere close to
the International Space Station.
Senator Brownback. And that will be the first demonstration
flight that they will be doing, is late 2011 for you?
Mr. Bolden. Let me go back and get it for the record for
you, sir. I do not want to--because there are a series of
flights that they have to fly, and I want to make sure that I
am giving you accurate information on which because each flight
is for a different purpose. It is an incremental progression.
And I will get that to you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Answer. NASA'S Commercial cargo program includes two phases--the
development phase which falls under the Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services (COTS) program and the services phase, which
falls under the Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) program.
NASA currently has two funded COTS partners, SpaceX and Orbital
Sciences, which continue to make steady progress in achieving their
cargo demonstration milestones:
SpaceX was awarded a COTS agreement in August 2006 and as of
mid-July, had completed 17 of 22 negotiated milestones for a
total payment of $253 million out of $278 million. Space X is
currently scheduled to conduct its first NASA demonstration
mission in September 2010, followed by 2 additional
demonstration flights in 2011.
Orbital Sciences has completed 12 of 19 milestones for a
total payment of $140 million out of $170 million, and the
company is scheduled to complete its NASA demonstration mission
in September 2011.
Senator Brownback. How many flights are they going to be
flying before 2015, which is when you send them up to the space
station?
Mr. Bolden. Let me get that for the record, sir, because I
do not want to give you--and it is just the same for Orbital.
Each has a certain number of flights they fly under the COTS
program that I paid for with the $250 million, and then they go
into a cargo resupply. But that is a contract. So for that,
they make money every time they deliver something to orbit. But
I will get you the data on the specific scheduled dates of the
flight.
[The information referred to follows:]
Answer. On December 23, 2008, NASA awarded Commercial Resupply
Services (CRS) contracts to Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) and
Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) for the delivery of cargo to the
International Space Station (ISS) after the retirement of the Space
Shuttle. The CRS contracts are firm-fixed price, Indefinite Delivery
Indefinite Quantity procurements with a period of performance from
January 1, 2009, through December 30, 2015 (the contractor can make
deliveries on missions ordered prior to December 2015 through December
2016). NASA ordered 8 flights from OSC and 12 flights from SpaceX under
the CRS contracts. While launch readiness dates have only been
established for the first 2 of these 20 flights so far, NASA
anticipates that up to 16 will have taken place before 2015.
Senator Brownback. Good. I think for the Chairman, for me,
and for I think the whole committee, the more specific you are
on this--because, obviously, people have a lot of questions
about, now, how are you going to stand up this new capacity.
Will these be manned flights, the late 2011 ones, by
SpaceX?
Mr. Bolden. No. It is cargo only.
Senator Brownback. So, no, there will not be----
Mr. Bolden. We have got a long way to go. We have a long
way to go, and when I say a long way to go, they have got to
demonstrate their ability to get cargo to orbit safely.
Senator Brownback. In an unmanned vehicle.
Mr. Bolden. In an unmanned vehicle. And there are several
flights along that----
Senator Brownback. When is your year marker for when they
will have a manned spaceflight before it goes to the station?
Mr. Bolden. My target right now is for them to fly their
first crewed flight for me in 2015.
Senator Brownback. First crew flight.
Mr. Bolden. First crew.
Senator Brownback. So the first one will go to the space
station in 2015?
Mr. Bolden. Yes, sir.
Senator Brownback. Now, I am struck by the Augustine
report, and I am a fan of Norm Augustine. I have known him for
some years, and I think he is just a really solid American. But
I am troubled about how it feels like we are losing control or
it feels like we are losing leadership in the manned space
arena. And yet, I gather from his data and the things he is
saying, he says there is just not another way for us to
continue human spaceflight on the budget that he believes we
are willing to do. Is it strictly a dollars and cents issue
then, Administrator?
Mr. Bolden. Senator, everything is a dollar and cents
issue, you buy it by the pound. If we want to explore beyond
low-Earth orbit, we have to free NASA of the responsibility for
day-to-day operations. I have to free myself of the $2 billion
annual infrastructure cost. If I do not fly a single Shuttle
mission, I pay $2 billion a year just for the infrastructure. I
have got to be able to free myself of that so that I can go
beyond low-Earth orbit. And that is the importance of the
commercial entities in providing transportation to low-Earth
orbit.
Senator Brownback. Because my time is about up, is there
any other way for us to continue an aggressive human
spaceflight program with the budgetary dollars you have talked
about other than the one you have prescribed?
Mr. Bolden. Senator, we will continue an aggressive human
spaceflight program because I have astronauts. I just selected
a group of astronauts this past year, and I have a number of
them who are in training to fly on the International Space
Station right now through 2015, and we are getting ready to
make subsequent crew assignments to fly through 2020. So we do
not intend to stop going to space. As Senator Hutchison says,
we have got a lot of work to be done on the International Space
Station, and I cannot take a----
Senator Brownback. No, I understand. But the Russians are
going to cart us back and forth.
Mr. Bolden. Senator, the Russians have been carting us back
and forth for 2 years.
Senator Brownback. I understand that. I am asking you just
point blank is there another way for us to be able to continue
an aggressive human spaceflight program other than the one you
have outlined here.
Mr. Bolden. Within the budget?
Senator Brownback. Within the budget.
Mr. Bolden. The program of record, Constellation, will not
enable me to do what I just told you I want to do.
Senator Brownback. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Brownback.
I have one short question. I think Senator Nelson has a
question and Senator Hutchison, if she wants.
Senator Hutchison. I have got about 20 more questions, but
I really do not want to make the astronauts and Mr. Augustine
keep waiting. So I am really so sorry because this is so
important.
The Chairman. I know. I know.
I am going to ask one short question. This is all to me
actually very interesting. And the putting together of this was
very difficult. There was a lot of kind of combativeness and
suspicion. You heard some of the comments of sort of a secret
society formation of the plan, for which Norm Augustine--I
guess he can talk about how he joined that group. But there is
in my mind, frankly, a sense of not being settled or
comfortable with where we have been going. Part of that is
based upon the history and the mystery and the mysticism and
the culture and the romance in a sense of 1962 and thereafter.
America needs to catch up in the world. We are behind in
virtually everything we do from telecommunications to science,
technology, engineering, and math. So let me just take science,
technology, engineering, and math for one second and ask one
question. That has nothing to do with human spaceflight. I
understand that. Human spaceflight is a given. Going into the
far reaches of the universe is something which I will ask about
later on on another day.
But if we do not do our work in science, technology,
engineering, and math, all of what you are talking about and
all of which you were, Dr. Holdren, is going to become less and
less possible as fewer and fewer Americans attach themselves to
those things which lead to what NASA does.
So I notice in the budget that you have what I would call
inspiring the next generation. It used to be you just mentioned
the name ``John Glenn'' or the two astronauts which will come
out very shortly or yourself----
Mr. Bolden. Those were the good old days, Senator. They do
not even recognize my name.
The Chairman. But there is a new kind of a hunger in the
new generation. The head of the Discovery Channel was here last
week and told us that between the ages of 12 and 22, more young
people of their own volition, obviously, watch the Discovery
Channel and all of its uncovering of the mysteries of science
and all the rest of it, technology, et cetera, than watch ESPN
and I assume other cable channels. A fascinating, powerful
statement. A young generation waiting to be inspired, of their
own choice reaching out to be inspired by products which happen
to be there.
So you have something called an education budget and you
are putting less than 1 percent of NASA's budget into what I
call education, which I look upon as future generations waiting
to participate in ventures. Can you respond?
Mr. Bolden. Yes, sir. There are direct and indirect ways
that we contribute to education. I am glad you asked the
question. NASA has 312 first robotics teams that we sponsor,
more than any other Federal agency, more than any other company
in the world. If you do not know about First Robotics, I would
recommend you go. It is fascinating. I went to the
International championships. That inspires kids.
We have something that is flying on the International Space
Station right now called Spheres. They are just round balls
produced at MIT that up until now, for about--I want to say
since 2006 have been flying around inside the International
Space Station programmed by college students who are doing
research with the Summer of Innovation, a program that we are
rolling out. We just rolled out the first award on Monday in
Boston with Governor Patrick. We are going to extend the
opportunity for middle school students to program a Sphere or a
set of Spheres that is going to fly around inside the
International Space Station. To me that is inspirational. I do
not care what anybody says. A kid does not have to become an
astronaut.
Dr. Holdren. Mr. Chairman, the President and I, as well as
Administrator Bolden, completely agree with you about the
priority that we have to give to science, technology,
engineering, and math education. The President rolled out last
November an Educate to Innovate initiative based around
partnerships with the private sector including, by the way, the
Discovery Channel. The Discovery Channel and Time Warner cable
are combining to offer 2 hours of after-school exciting science
programming free of commercials every day on cable channels
around the country. Over half a billion dollars is pledged in
money and in-kind support from private industry and foundations
to help us improve STEM education in this country.
Administrator Bolden and I both this week were out as part of
National Laboratory Day, which is all about improving the
science and engineering labs available in every middle school
and high school in this country. NASA is part of an
administrative partnership that engages as well the NSF, the
Department of Energy and, of course, the Department of
Education. We are doing a lot in that domain. The President is
absolutely ecstatic about what we are getting done.
And we could not agree with you more. But these things are
all related. NASA's success, DOE's success, NSF's success is
linked to the success of the education programs we promote
through the White House and the Department of Education. It is
all coming together.
The Chairman. I thank you, sir.
Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Bolden, did you have any discussions with the
Department of Defense upon the effect of the cancellation of
the solid rocket motor program in NASA on DOD?
Dr. Holdren. You said, I think, Dr. Bolden, so I am not
sure which of us----
Senator Nelson. Dr. Holdren.
Dr. Holdren. OK. Yes, we did. We had a number of
discussions with folks in the Department of Defense, and I have
to say in all honesty the Department of Defense is still
looking at it. Those initial conversations communicated to us
that there would be an impact, but it did not appear to be an
unmanageable impact. And those considerations are going on, I
understand, even as we speak. But I continue to believe----
Senator Nelson. Those considerations are going on as you
speak, but would it surprise you that there is a complete
record in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee by
General Chilton, who is one of the generals charged with the
strategic defense of the country, as well as the other general,
General Cartwright, who is the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, who has in his portfolio the strategic defense, that in
fact the DOD was absolutely shocked that NASA suddenly came up
with this program to cancel the testing on the solid rocket
motor since NASA has 70 percent of the industrial base of solid
rocket motors, of which the remainder the Defense Department is
absolutely reliant on? Does that surprise you?
Dr. Holdren. Well, first of all, Senator, the DOD is a big
place and we did not talk to everybody. We are aware that there
is going to be an impact. The DOD obviously has an interest in
this domain. I think that the DOD is probably capable of
supporting its interests in this domain although it may mean
higher costs per unit for the DOD in acquiring the solids that
they need. I am not saying there is no issue there, and I am
not surprised that a variety of analyses exist in the
Department. But I believe that there will be a solution to that
issue going forward.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Holdren, did you have a discussion with
Administrator Bolden within the week before the budget was
rolled out to let him know what the final President's proposal
was going to be?
Dr. Holdren. You say within the week. We certainly had it
within the 2 weeks. It was well before the last week, and yes,
we did.
Senator Nelson. So, General, you knew what the President's
proposal was going to be even though you were in Israel.
Mr. Bolden. I actually found out before I went to Israel. I
was in Israel the week before the rollout and I came back that
Thursday night, but we had already met on the budget the week
before.
Senator Nelson. All right.
General can you tell me is there a discussion going on
within NASA and OSTP now that you all are considering adding
one more Shuttle flight to the manifest?
Mr. Bolden. Senator, that discussion has gone all the way
up. I have told people that there is potential that I would
like to fly the Launch on Need mission, and it would be for
logistics reasons. It would have nothing to do with jobs or
anything else. If I have spare supplies that I can get on the
International Space Station, I would like to take every
opportunity to do that.
It is not an easy decision, though, because I will have no
Launch on Need vehicle to back it up, and that is not trivial,
that decision to do that.
Senator Nelson. But you do have the plans that would the
worst happen on ascent so that the crew could take safe refuge
in the ISS.
Mr. Bolden. Senator, we have contingency plans to include
what happens to the crew if they cannot get to the ISS because
everybody always--one of the things I hate is everybody always
assumes you get to the International Space Station. That is a
long way away. That is 200 miles. If you have a problem on
ascent, as you remember, when part of the back end of the
orbiter comes off, you do not get to the ISS. So that is one of
the reasons that I do not want that to happen and I say it is
not a trivial decision.
Senator Nelson. What would be the cost of continued Ares I
testing?
Mr. Bolden. Senator, I will get you the exact numbers, but
it is in the neighborhood of about $1 billion to $1.6 billion.
And the variation comes because if you are testing an Ares I
vehicle and the plan is that it will morph into the Ares V
vehicle, then you spread the cost across both vehicles. If all
I am doing is flying an Ares I test so that I can keep people
working, it goes up to $1.6 billion because there is nothing
else to help absorb that cost, and so it all goes to Ares I.
And that is why in our discussions I have said as much as I am
a tester, I cannot ask any more to allow me to test an Ares
vehicle if there is something else I can use to get the same
test of an Orion-type vehicle or anything else done.
Senator Nelson. And speaking of Orion--and I know you want
me to quit my questioning--why do we want a half-baked Orion
instead of a full-baked Orion?
Mr. Bolden. Senator, we do not want a half-baked Orion.
What we want is an incrementally developed crew module that can
take people beyond low-Earth orbit.
Again, what I do not want to do in any crew module is I do
not want to settle on the design and configuration in 2010 when
I know that the first time I am going to send a human beyond
low-Earth orbit--the earliest is 2020. So if I settle on a
vehicle today, fly it in 2013, and the crew has to live with
that same vehicle and that same configuration for 7 more years,
they are going to be flying on a vehicle that is 7 years old. I
do not want the Orion that is going to go to the Moon and to
Mars and to an asteroid--I do not want that final configuration
internally made until as close as possible to flight.
Senator Nelson. Then why have a half-baked one? Why not
early on the Soyuz?
Mr. Bolden. Senator, I need to have my people, American
industry, continue to work on spacecraft. Otherwise we lose the
skill. We lose the talent.
Also, it is important for national pride and other things
that we have an American-built vehicle that is docked to the
International Space Station. And I can do that with the
foundational vehicle that will be the basis for what is going
to take us beyond low-Earth orbit.
The Chairman. We have reached a point now where we have
only time for Senator Warner to ask, hopefully, just one
question. We have two astronauts and Dr. Augustine waiting for
us. We have not treated them fairly. On the other hand, we have
really had just one and a half rounds of questions. The subject
is that interesting and that controversial. So I do not
apologize for that.
Senator Warner?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK WARNER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me say this is
a nice break from derivatives and high frequency trading and
some of the other things we have been dealing with on the
floor.
Let me also follow up very quickly, realizing my time is
short. You mentioned the educational foundation. I do think
there are interesting opportunities to leverage off of things.
I think about the X Prize Foundation and the kind of energy
that that generated in this sector.
I know how my colleague from Florida feels and I understand
I missed some of the earlier conversations, some controversy
around the issue of the commercialization. I think it holds
some great possibilities and opportunities. Wallops has a
facility in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
But one thing I am interested in, assuming for a moment
that commercialization moves forward, and part of the challenge
of NASA will be to ensure, as I think earlier questions have
pointed out, the safety of these commercial missions,
particularly going up to the ISS--you know, have you thought
through how you set those standards particularly in the
commercial context and is there some analogy what we could draw
from, NASA Langley working with FAA on setting safety standards
around commercial aircraft that we could perhaps utilize again
from a----
Mr. Bolden. Senator, we have thought it through very
seriously and we continue to think it through. And I have a
group right now that is going to report to me on something I
call insight and oversight. Senator Rockefeller talked about
how we cannot continue to do things the way we do. We have too
many boards and panels and oversight committees in NASA, and I
have asked our folks to find a way we can get back to something
reasonable. We do not need all the oversight committees that we
have. That is costly and it consumes time.
A great example of the type of oversight that I would like
to have is our relationship with the Russians in Soyuz. The
Russians do a flight--you know, before every flight, they do a
flight readiness review just like we do with the Shuttle. I
have people from my Space Operations Mission Directorate
sitting in Moscow in the flight readiness review. They are a
member of the team. When the Russians had their two dynamic
reentries in the last couple of years, while we were not a part
of the engineering investigation, we got all of the data on the
mishaps and we learned what had happened and we learned what
they did to correct it. And so I will use that sort of as a
model.
The disadvantage to commercial is that they do not have the
experience that Soyuz has. We have 90 successful missions on
Soyuz. So that makes me a lot more comfortable with them than,
say, an upstart company in commercial development. But I will
make them successful because I will establish standards and
they are looking at them now to make sure we are not being
unreasonable. So we have thought about it a lot.
Senator Warner. I would just point out again, that the
previous experience that NASA Langley has with FAA in terms of
commercial aviation. There may be some lessons learned----
Mr. Bolden. The work that Langley does in NextGen, the next
generation air transport system--we were talking about human
spaceflight, but that is incredible. Langley, Glenn, Ames
Research Center--we are all intimately involved in trying to
make aviation, general aviation and commercial aviation,
flights safer and more efficient for everybody around the
world. And NextGen is going to do that.
Senator Warner. And lessons learned there could perhaps be
implemented----
Mr. Bolden. Every day we are learning new lessons, yes,
sir.
Senator Warner. I have got other questions for the record,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. You can submit those for the record. Right.
I want to thank both of you gentlemen. This has been a very
interesting first panel. It has taken a long time, but that is
because I think there is uncertainty. I have questions about
NASA. I always have. I still do. But we are working our way
toward something and there are conflicting points of view. I
mean, there are some people who just simply want it this way
and others that want it that way, and then some are trying to
find a third way and I guess I am in that category.
In any event, I really thank you, Dr. Holdren, extremely
for being here and also you, General, for being here. I honor
you both and I thank you both.
Dr. Holdren. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. We will now be in recess for 30 seconds.
[Laughter.]
[Pause.]
The Chairman. If we could hurry up this process, please. To
the press and to anybody else, we are looking for our two good
astronauts and Dr. Augustine. We need them at the witness
table.
What is the problem with getting the next panel in here?
They are right next door. Here they come.
The panel will be seated, please, and the press will finish
with their obligations and we will proceed.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. I want order in this hearing room and, JJ,
you will enforce it.
I want to welcome Mr. Neil Armstrong, who was Commander of
Apollo 11; Captain Eugene Cernan, who was Commander of Apollo
17; and Norman Augustine, who I have known for many years and
who is the Chairman of the Review of the U.S. Human Spaceflight
Plans Committee. We will start with you, Mr. Armstrong.
STATEMENT OF NEIL A. ARMSTRONG, RETIRED ASTRONAUT,
FORMER COMMANDER, APOLLO 11
Mr. Armstrong. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
members of the Committee, I want to express my sincere
appreciation for being invited to present the views on NASA's
new plan for human spaceflight.
New non-classified national program concepts are typically
accompanied by substantial review and debate in a number of
venues. That process is occasionally frustrating, but it
assures that all the major issues, performance, cost, funding,
safety, schedule, and so forth, will be examined in some detail
prior to a public proposal.
After the tragic loss of Columbia and its crew and the
completion of the accident investigation, Admiral Gehman, the
Chairman of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, noted
that NASA needed a long-term, strategic guiding vision.
President Bush, after reflection, proposed such a vision:
finish the International Space Station, return to the Moon,
establish a permanent presence there, and venture onward toward
Mars.
As this committee well knows, that vision was analyzed,
debated, and improved upon with the Congress for nearly 2
years. You then concluded, nearly unanimously, that it was the
appropriate policy for our country. Three years later, after a
change in congressional control, the policy was once again
approved, although it was still not adequately funded.
With regard to President Obama's 2010 plan, I have yet to
find a person in NASA, the Defense Department, the Air Force,
the National Academies, industry, or academia that had any
knowledge of the plan prior to its announcement. Rumors abound
that neither the NASA Administrator nor the President's Science
and Technology Advisor were knowledgeable about the plan. Lack
of review normally guarantees there will be overlooked
requirements and unwelcome consequences. For this plan that is
worrisome.
America has invested substantially for more than half a
century to acquire a position of leadership in space. But for
any organization, a public utility, an airline, a university,
or an NFL team, to maintain a leadership position requires
steadfast determination and a continuing investment in the
future. That investment must be made wisely.
I believe that so far our national investment in space and
our sharing of that knowledge, gained with the rest of the
world, has been made wisely and has served us very well.
America is respected for its contributions it has made in
learning to sail on this new ocean. If the leadership we have
acquired through our investment is simply allowed to fade away,
other nations will surely step in where we have faltered. I do
not believe that would be in our best interests.
I am very concerned that the new plan, as I understand it,
will prohibit us from having human access to low-Earth orbit on
our own rockets and spacecraft until the private aerospace
industry is able to qualify their hardware under development as
rated for human occupancy. I support the encouragement of
newcomers toward their goal of lower cost access to space. But
having cut my teeth in rockets more than 50 years ago, I am not
confident. The most experienced rocket engineers with whom I
have spoken believe that it will require many years and
substantial investment to reach the necessary level of safety
and reliability.
If these experts are correct, the United States will be
limited to buying passage to the International Space Station
from Russia and will be prohibited from traveling to other
destinations in low-Earth orbit such as the Hubble space
telescope or any of the frequently mentioned destinations that
are out on the space frontier.
As I examine the plan, as stated during the announcement
and the subsequent explanations, I find a number of assertions
which, at best, demand careful analysis and, at worst, do not
deserve any analysis.
I do believe if the national space plan is subject to the
normal review process of this Congress, the aerospace industry,
and the reliable experts that we know in the military and the
aerospace community, America will be well served.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Armstrong follows:]
Prepared Statement of Neil A. Armstrong, Retired Astronaut,
Former Commander, Apollo 11
Mr. Chairman, and members of this Committee, I want to express my
sincere appreciation for being invited to present my views on NASA's
new plan for human spaceflight. As I have come to accept that my
opportunities to once again see our beautiful planet Earth from afar
are limited, I can speak my mind without fear of jeopardizing my crew
status.
New non-classified national program concepts are, typically,
accompanied by substantial review and debate in a number of venues.
That process is occasionally frustrating, but it assures that all the
major issues (performance, cost, funding, safety, schedule etc.) will
be examined in some detail prior to a public proposal.
After the tragic loss of Columbia and its crew, and the completion
of the accident investigation, Admiral Gehman, the Chairman of the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board, noted that NASA needed a long-
term, strategic, guiding vision. President Bush, after reflection,
proposed such a vision: finish the International Space Station, return
to the Moon, establish a permanent presence there, and venture onward
toward Mars. After completion of the very detailed Exploration Systems
Architecture Study (ESAS), that vision became a Program known as
Constellation. A high level panel of human spaceflight veterans and a
highly experienced independent review team vetted the ESAS conclusions.
ESAS results were briefed to senior Administration officials including
OSTP, OMB, USAF Air Staff and DDR&E. Of course, this Committee as well
as other Congressional committees and subcommittees were briefed.
As this committee well knows, that vision was analyzed, debated,
and improved upon within the Congress for nearly 2 years. You then
concluded, nearly unanimously, that it was the appropriate policy for
our country. Three years later, after a change in Congressional
control, the policy was once again approved, although it was still not
adequately funded.
With regard to President Obama's 2010 plan, I have yet to find a
person in NASA, the Defense Department, the Air Force, the National
Academies, industry, or academia that had any knowledge of the plan
prior to its announcement. Rumors abound that neither the NASA
Administrator nor the President's Science and Technology Advisor were
knowledgeable about the plan. Lack of review normally guarantees that
there will be overlooked requirements and unwelcome consequences. How
could such a chain of events happen? A plan that was invisible to so
many was likely contrived by a very small group in secret who persuaded
the President that this was a unique opportunity to put his stamp on a
new and innovative program. I believe the President was poorly advised.
America has invested substantially for more than half a century to
acquire a position of leadership in space. But for any organization, a
public utility, an airline, a university, or an NFL team, to maintain a
leadership position requires steadfast determination and a continuing
investment in the future. That investment must be made wisely.
I believe that, so far, our national investment in space
exploration, and our sharing of the knowledge gained with the rest of
the world, has been made wisely and has served us very well. America is
respected for the contributions it has made in learning to sail upon
this new ocean. If the leadership we have acquired through our
investment is allowed simply to fade away, other nations will surely
step in where we have faltered. I do not believe that this would be in
our best interests.
I am very concerned that the new plan, as I understand it, will
prohibit us from having human access to low-Earth orbit on our own
rockets and spacecraft until the private aerospace industry is able to
qualify their hardware under development as rated for human occupancy.
I support the encouragement of the newcomers toward their goal of lower
cost access to space. But having cut my teeth in rockets more than 50
years ago, I am not confident. The most experienced rocket engineers
with whom I have spoken believe that will require many years and
substantial investment to reach the necessary level of safety and
reliability. Business analysts believe that at least two qualified
competitors would be required to have any chance of reducing ticket
prices. They further believe that a commercial market large enough to
support even one competitor is unlikely.
If these experts are correct, the United States will be limited to
buying passage to the International Space Station from Russia, and will
be prohibited from traveling to other destinations in LEO, such as the
Hubble Space telescope, or any of the frequently mentioned destinations
out on the space frontier.
As I examine the plan as stated during the announcement and
subsequent explanations, I find a number of assertions which, at best,
demand careful analysis, and at worst, do not deserve any analysis.
The Augustine Commission found that ``NASA essentially has the
resources either to build a major new system or to operate one, but not
to do both.'' In that context, the principal choices would be develop
the Constellation Program or to continue to operate the Shuttle and the
ISS.
The Shuttle, a stellar low-Earth orbit machine, is scheduled for
termination this year. It has a great deal of versatility and can do
many things well, although the current protocol limits its operation to
the ISS orbital inclination. While the Shuttle is four decades old
technology, it has been operating well and could be expected to be able
to continue to do so for some years if approved. Shuttle operation is,
however, very costly. It could not be justified solely as a crew taxi,
but would, and should, continue to carry cargo, and continue to perform
the many other services it now provides.
The now to be canceled Constellation program showed promise to
fulfill lofty goals with a high level of safety and flexibility.
Constellation would also be very costly. Critics claim it is
``unexecutable,'' primarily because it has been underfunded.
The new 2010 plan goals are largely undefined in the near term but
have been characterized as supporting ISS through 2020 and finding
breakthrough technology to allow flying to a near Earth asteroid and to
Mars at some time in the future.
These are vastly different plans and choosing the proper path is
vital to America's continued space leadership.
Orion
Amendments to the 2010 plan were announced in the President's April
15 speech at the Kennedy Space Center. He stated that the canceled
Orion Spacecraft would be given new life as an emergency return vehicle
from the International Space Station. Such a craft would be necessary
if an Orbiter or Soyus was not available, if the ISS had a major
emergency, or in case of a medical emergency.
In the first decade of ISS operation we have not needed such a
spacecraft, and, hopefully, in the remaining ISS lifetime, we will not
need one. However, there certainly is merit in having emergency escape
ability. The difficulties crop up when we examine the detail of the
requirements necessary for such a vehicle.
Configuration studies of emergency return vehicles have been going
on for decades, NASA had a selected vehicle for development, the X-38,
a lifting body which had substantial promise, but was canceled for
budgetary reasons in 2002.
The complexities of such a craft, required because of the wide
variety of emergency situations that could be encountered, indicated
that a near ballistic shape such as Orion would be inferior to a
configuration with higher aerodynamic performance.
Because the Orion Light, as described, would be capable of carrying
humans on only a return to Earth trajectory and not from Earth to the
ISS, its utility would not seem to compare well with the Soyus and its
two-way trajectories that are currently used. The time and cost of this
development including the autonomous or remotely controlled rendezvous
and docking would appear to be significant. It appears that this would
be a very expensive project with limited usefulness.
Heavy Lift
The second Florida announcement concerned studying heavy lift
rockets with the objective of choosing a best design by 2015, then
beginning construction and test. It was asserted: ``That's at least 2
years earlier than previously planned . . . and that's conservative,
given that the previous program was behind schedule and over budget.''
The assertion is disingenuous, in that it is comparing an unknown
project in the future with a known project already underway for some
years. The ``previous program'' is assumed to be the Ares V which
depends on the same 5.5 segment SRBs and J-2X engines of the recently
canceled Ares I. The delay in the Ares I development was due to under
funding as a result of Shuttle Return to Flight requirements, ISS
requirements, 2004 hurricane damage, OMB reductions and FY 2010 Budget
reductions. The budget reductions for Constellation through 2020
totaled more than $20 billion. Considering those realities, some
members of the Augustine Committee concluded that the Ares program was
being quite well managed and in reasonably good shape.
Knowledge in Heavy Lift rockets is currently substantial. A great
deal of such study has been completed in recent years as a part of the
normal NASA and military studies. As of the time I write this
testimony, NASA's website describes the Ares V as follows: ``Under the
goals of NASA's exploration mission, Ares V is a vital part of the
cost-effective space transportation infrastructure being developed by
NASA's Constellation Program to carry human explorers back to the Moon,
and then onward to Mars and other destinations in the solar system.''
While Ares has been criticized for being late and over budget, the
cause of that condition is largely understood. It seems appropriate
that the reason for discarding all this work should be explained to
this committee.
A heavy-lift rocket derived from the Shuttle (SDHLV) has often been
suggested as a useful vehicle and could be produced in far less time
than that proposed in the 2010 plan, The technology and hardware, for
this development is already largely available and would not require 5
years of study to implement.
Workforce
The plan's consequent expected loss of jobs in space communities
has been widely reported. This committee knows far more about such
matters than I and I will not comment on it. I am concerned, however,
about workforce issues. Shuttle termination and Constellation
cancellation will result in widespread breakup of design,
manufacturing, test and operating teams that will be expensive and time
consuming to reassemble when they are once again needed.
With the job market so tight, individuals who are in programs
expected to be canceled or cut back are leaving to pick up one of the
few available jobs. Some of the best and the brightest are already
leaving because of the uncertain future. Maintenance of a quality
workforce is vital to a successful spaceflight program and attention to
this consequence of the new plan must be considered,
Safety
It was asserted that by buying taxi service to Low-Earth Orbit
rather than owning the taxis, ``we can continue to ensure rigorous
safety standards are met''. The logic of that statement is mystifying.
Does it mean that safety standards will be achieved by regulation, or
contract, or by government involvement? Does it mean that the safety
considerations in the taxi design, construction and test will be
assured by government oversight? The Augustine Committee report is
quoted as follows: ``Thus, the Committee views any commercial program
of crew transport to ISS as involving a strong independent mission
assurance role for NASA.'' The cost of that government involvement will
be substantial and that cost must be acknowledged in the total cost of
the service.
The private company spacecraft, to my knowledge, have not been as
rigorously analyzed for safety as have existing rockets, Ares and
Shuttle derivatives, but it must be noted that Ares I enjoys, by a
significant margin, the highest safety rating of the configurations
studied.
I have highlighted just a few of the many issues and questions
engendered by the 2010 NASA plan. I do believe, if the National Space
Plan is subject to the normal review process of this Congress, the
aerospace industry, and the reliable experts we know in the military
and aerospace community, America will be well served.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Armstrong, very much.
Captain Cernan?
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN EUGENE A. CERNAN, USN (RETIRED),
COMMANDER, APOLLO 17, ASTRONAUT (RETIRED)
Mr. Cernan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to again
thank you for inviting me here today to express my personal
views concerning the Administration's 2011 budget as it
pertains to America's role in the future of human space
exploration.
One month ago, Neil Armstrong, Jim Lovell, and I released
an opinion paper expressing our concern over the
Administration's proposed space budget. We spent a great deal
of time writing and refining over and over again this document,
choosing our words very carefully, words like ``devastating,''
``slide to mediocrity,'' and ``third rate stature,'' primarily
because we did not want to be misunderstood, nor did we want to
be misinterpreted. We particularly wanted to avoid any
political overtones because since the beginning days of NASA,
its support has come from traditionally bipartisan politics. It
has transcended our political differences.
We have recently heard a lot of eloquent verbiage about the
exploration of space, landing on an asteroid, circling Mars,
and some day maybe even landing on the Red Planet. There is
talk about a decision yet to come about building a large
booster which might ultimately some day almost take us to the
far reaches of this universe. There is, however, no detail, no
specific challenge, and no commitment as to where or
specifically when this exploration might come to pass. When one
examines in detail the 2011 budget, nowhere can be found 1
penny--not 1 penny--allocated to the support of space
exploration. Yes, there has been much rhetoric about
transformative technology, heavy lift propulsion, research,
robotic precursor missions, and these are all very worthwhile
endeavors. Yet, nowhere--nowhere--do we find any mention of
human space exploration, and nowhere do we find a commitment in
dollars to support this national endeavor. Neil, Jim Lovell,
and I have come to a unanimous conclusion that this budget
proposal presents no challenges, has no focus, and is in fact a
blueprint for a mission to nowhere.
In this proposed budget, we find several billions of
dollars allocated to developing commercial human access to low-
Earth orbit based upon the assumptions and claims by those
competing for this elusive contract who say they can achieve
this goal in little more than 3 years and can do it for
something less than $5 billion.
Based upon my personal experience and what I believe is
possible, I believe it might take as much as a decade, a full
decade, and the cost may be two to three times as much as they
predict. Although I strongly do support the goals and ideals of
commercial access to space, the folks who propose such a
limited architecture do not yet know what they do not know.
There is a myriad of technical challenges in their future yet
to be overcome, safety considerations which cannot be
overlooked or compromised, as well as a business plan and
investors they will have to satisfy. All this will lead to
unplanned delays which will cost the American taxpayer billions
of unallocated dollars and lengthen the gap from Shuttle
retirement to the day we can once again access low-Earth orbit,
leaving us hostage as a Nation to foreign powers for some
indeterminate time in the future.
This may be a sensitive point because I am going to mention
something about a dear friend who I have the ultimate respect
for, Charlie Bolden, because we did have a briefing last week,
and it was in that briefing that Charlie expressed some concern
over the potential of the commercial sector to be successful in
any reasonable length of time. He indicated we might have to
subsidize them until they are successful. And I can say with
authority, because I wrote this down and I put the word ``wow''
right next to it because Charlie did say it may be a bailout
like GM and Chrysler. As a matter of fact, it may be the
largest bailout in history.
The United States, through NASA, has spent a half a
century, Mr. Chairman, learning what we did not know, finding
answers to questions we were not smart enough to ask at the
time, developing technology that was needed to meet the
challenge and get the job done. We came from Alan Shepard's
flight in 1961 to the Space Shuttle and the International Space
Station today, by the way, with a side trip or two to the Moon
along the way. The evolution of this learning process was not
without cost, not just in dollars, but in the lives of our
friends and our colleagues. It took the courage, the effort,
the dedication, and the self-sacrifice of thousands of
Americans out there who allowed us to come this far this
quickly. And although we paid dearly for our mistakes, it is a
testimonial to their commitment and American ingenuity that
everyone who went to the Moon came home. Therein is a lesson we
cannot afford to ignore, and I ask the question, is this the
NASA we want to transform?
For the sake of time, I will not go into my thoughts and
concerns about game-changing technology without a goal or the
fact that we may or may not some day make a decision to build a
heavy lift booster or the fact that I have major concerns about
an Orion ``light'' because I went into detail in my written
testimony.
Well, let me go back to Constellation because it is an
architecture that over a 5-year period has gone through
detailed review processes and been vetted by every Government
agency from the OMB to the DOD and certainly by NASA--every
agency that has any ownership interest in any technical,
scientific, budget, or benefit that might be derived from human
space exploration. In addition, an arsenal of the best
engineers, scientists, and management experts in America's
aerospace community added their knowledge and expertise to the
review of the proposed Constellation architecture before it
ever became a program worthy of consideration. And
appropriately, as has been said already, under the law, both
houses of Congress overwhelmingly with bipartisan support
approved and agreed that Constellation should go forward.
It is unknown how much time and thought was put into the
existing budget proposal for 2011 or by whom this proposal was
generated, but it is common knowledge that few, if any, of
those government agencies referred to above were asked to
participate nor, of significant note, was the DOD or the
engineering or management expertise that exists throughout NASA
today. This leads one to the conclusion that this proposal was
most likely formulated in haste within the Office of Management
and Budget with little or with no input, by his own admission
in previous testimony, the NASA Administrator or, I know for a
fact, by NASA center directors or senior NASA management. And
if that were the case, the originators were quite likely
promoting their own agenda rather than that of NASA and
America's commitment to human space exploration.
The space program has never been an entitlement. It is an
investment in the future, an investment in technology and jobs
and world respect and leadership, and perhaps most importantly,
in the inspiration and the education of our youth.
Mr. Chairman, you asked how much of the budget has gone
into education. That goes in the paperwork and the spinoff
information. The inspiration for our youth came when Neil
Armstrong walked on the Moon. It is a freebie that comes from
space exploration. Those best and the brightest minds at NASA
and throughout the multitudes of the private contractors, large
and small, did not join the team to design windmills, but to
live their dreams of once again taking us where no man has gone
before.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say America's
human spaceflight program has for a half a century risen above
partisan differences from Eisenhower to Kennedy to the present
day. The challenges and accomplishments of the past were those
of a Nation, never of a political party, nor were they of any
individual agenda. Those flags which fly today in those valleys
on the Moon are not blue flags and they are not red flags. They
are American flags. If we abdicate our leadership in space
today, not only is human spaceflight and space exploration at
risk, but I personally believe the future of this country and,
thus, the future of our children and grandchildren as well. Now
is the time for wiser heads in Congress of the United States to
prevail. Now is the time to overrule this administration's
pledge to mediocrity. Now is the time to be bold, innovative,
and wise in how we invest in the future of America.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to share
with you my passion, and that quite simply is the future of our
country.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cernan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Eugene A. Cernan, USN (Retired),
Commander, Apollo 17, Astronaut (Retired)
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me here today to express my
personal views concerning the Administration's proposed FY 2011 budget
as it pertains to America's role in the future of Human Exploration in
Space.
One month ago, Neil Armstrong, Jim Lovell and I released an opinion
paper expressing our concern over the Administration's FY 2011 proposed
space budget. We spent a great deal of time writing and refining our
document, choosing words such as ``devastating,'' ``slide to
mediocrity,'' and ``third-rate stature'' very carefully, so that the
intent of our message would not be misinterpreted and our deep concern
about the future direction of human spaceflight as outlined in the
President's proposal would be fully understood. We particularly wanted
to avoid any political overtones because the support of America's role
in space since its beginning has traditionally transcended partisan
politics.
It was determined after the Columbia accident that NASA should
return to its core values, focusing its resources once again on space
exploration while continuing its space exploitation through its support
of the International Space Station (ISS), with the Space Shuttle
providing access to Low Earth Orbit (LEO). The Congress supported such
a focus with a near-unanimous bi-partisan support in both the 2005 and
2008 NASA Authorization Acts.
We have recently heard a lot of eloquent verbage about the
exploration of space--landing on an asteroid, circling Mars, and at
some time in the future perhaps landing on the Red Planet. There is
talk about a decision yet to come of building a large booster which
might ultimately take us anywhere we want to go into the far reaches of
the universe. There are, however, no details, no specific challenge,
and no commitment as to where or specifically when this exploration
might come to pass. ``Hope is not a destination, nor is it a management
tool.'' I, personally, define the exploration, in contrast to
exploitation, of space as ``going where no man has gone before, doing
what has never been done before, doing what others couldn't do,
wouldn't do, or perhaps were afraid to do.''
However, when one examines the FY 2011 budget proposal, nowhere is
there to be found one penny allocated to support space exploration.
Yes, there has been much rhetoric on transformative technology, heavy
lift propulsion research, robotic precursor missions, significant
investment in commercial crew and cargo capabilities, pursuit of cross-
cutting space technology capabilities, climate change research,
aeronautics R&D, and education initiatives. Yet nowhere do we find any
mention of the Human Exploration of Space and nowhere do we find a
commitment in dollars to support this national endeavor. We (Armstrong,
Lovell and myself) have come to the unanimous conclusion that this
budget proposal presents no challenges, has no focus, and in fact is a
blueprint for a ``mission to nowhere.''
In this proposed budget we find several billions of dollars
allotted to developing commercial human access to low-Earth orbit,
based upon the assumptions and claims by those competing for this
exclusive contract who say that they can achieve this goal in little
more than 3 years, and that it can be done for something less than $5
billion. (These are the same entrepreneurs who are over a year late
delivering unmanned cargo to LEO.) This assumes they can design, build,
flight test, and develop a man-rated spacecraft and booster
architecture along with the infrastructure required for such a venture.
This includes redesigning the requirements of mission control,
developing the support and training simulators, writing technical
manuals for training and onboard procedures, developing the synergy
between a worldwide tracking network and the uniqueness of a newly
designed space vehicle along with an emergency recovery force needed to
handle this new space system. These are just a few of the development
and support requirements to put any new manned system into space.
Although I strongly support the goals and ideals of commercial access
to space, the folks who propose such a limited architecture ``do not
yet know what they don't know.'' There are a myriad of technical
challenges in their future yet to be overcome, safety considerations
which cannot be compromised as well as a business plan and investors
that they will have to satisfy. As an example, it took over a year and
a half of review and redesign of the Apollo I hatch before operational
and safety requirements were satisfied. All this will lead to unplanned
delays which will cost the American taxpayer billions of unallocated
dollars and lengthen ``the gap'' from Shuttle retirement to the day we
can once again access LEO. Moreover, for a variety of reasons, a
``Going Out of Business'' sign hanging on the door is always a
possibility in any high-dollar--high-risk investment.
The United States, through NASA, has spent a half-century learning
what we didn't know, finding answers to questions we weren't smart
enough to ask at the time, developing technology that was needed to
meet the challenge and get the job done. We came from Alan Shepard's
flight in 1961 to the Space Station and Shuttle today with a side trip
or two to the moon along the way. The evolution of this learning
process was not without its cost--not just in dollars, but also in the
lives of our friends and colleagues. It took the courage, effort,
dedication and self-sacrifice of thousands of Americans who allowed us
to come this far this quickly. And, although we paid dearly for our
mistakes, it is a testimonial to their commitment and American
ingenuity that everyone who went to the moon came home. Therein is a
lesson we cannot afford to ignore. Is this the NASA we want to
transform?
Based upon my background and experience, I submit to this committee
and to the Congress that it will take the private sector as long as 10
years to access LEO safely and cost-effectively. A prominent Russian
academician is quoted as saying in order to bring a craft to the
standard of quality and safety for piloted flight, the United States
will be dependent on Russia until at least 2020. The Aerospace
Corporation estimates an initial cost of 10-12 billion dollars, plus
the added cost of modifications required to launch vehicle ground
systems. Should such a commercial venture run into insurmountable
technical problems, business venture concerns, or--God forbid--a
catastrophic failure, it would leave the United States without a
fallback program, unable to access even low-Earth orbit for some
indeterminate time to follow. In any event, under this proposal the
United States will be abandoning its $50 billion, 25 year investment in
the ISS, leaving us hostage to foreign powers. Is this one of our
``Potential Grand Challenges'' of the 21st century?
Additionally, The President's proposal suggests we develop
``technology for the future.'' The technology we enjoy today, 40 years
after Apollo, is technology that was developed from accepting a
challenge and reaching for a goal. It was technology with a focus, with
a mission. To simply put the best and the brightest in a room and tell
them to develop breakthrough technology that could or might or may be
useful in the future is a naive proposition. Exploration drives
technology innovation--not the reverse.
Also in the proposal is the possibility that maybe, at some time,
perhaps as far down the road as 2015, the United States would decide to
develop a heavy lift booster. This is a very vague proposition that
will likely never be funded to fruition. Coincidently, Constellation
has a heavy lift booster, Ares V, not only on the drawing boards but in
component test today. Why do we need a new decision in 2015 for one
already in development today?
A late addition to the Administration's proposal, and one very
obviously not well thought out, was a provision to build an ``Orion
Light'' spacecraft as a rescue vehicle on the ISS. Although we have
never had need for a rescue vehicle, we have today two Soyuz
continuously stationed on the ISS capable of carrying as many as six
people to safety should the need arise, with a provision for a third
Soyuz should the crew complement ever increase to as many as nine--
which is highly unlikely. An ``Orion Light,'' before it is qualified to
transport human beings to safety from the ISS, certainly would have to
be man-rated. To man-rate a spacecraft requires a great deal more than
following a list of safety requirements and protocol instructions
included in its development. The ``Orion Light'' would have to go
through an extensive development, test and evaluation phase before
being qualified to carry humans. It sounds very similar to what the
existing Ares I/Orion development proposal is all about within the
overlying Constellation architecture.
Constellation itself is an architecture that over a 5-year period
has gone through several detailed reviews and has been vetted by every
government agency from the OMB to the DOD, and certainly by NASA--by
every agency that has an ownership interest in any technical,
scientific, budget or benefit to be derived from Human Space
Exploration. In addition, an arsenal of the best engineers, scientists
and management experts in America's aerospace community added their
knowledge and expertise to the review of the proposed Constellation
architecture before it ever became an official program worthy of
consideration. Constellation follows the Von Braun model in the
evolution of the Saturn V, wherein the development of the Ares I is the
embryo for the development of the Ares V. This shared DNA, with
commonality of critical components throughout, leads to greater cost
effectiveness, a higher degree of confidence and safety, and provides
the first elements of a heavy lift booster. Appropriately under the
law, both Houses of the Congress of the United States with
overwhelmingly bipartisan support, approved and agreed that
Constellation should go forward.
In contrast to the 5-years which has been required to bring
Constellation to its present status, the Augustine Committee was
required to provide their report in 90 days. The report contained
several suggestions and alternatives to Constellation, few of which
were included in the FY 2011 budget, but ultimately the Committee came
to the conclusion that Constellation's architecture had been well-
managed and is indeed executable, providing it has the appropriate
funding that had been denied for several years. Important to note is
that the Committee was directed to base their conclusions and
recommendations not on the FY 2009 budget, but rather on the FY 2010
budget from which tens of billions of dollars had already been removed
between 2010 and 2020. Naturally, the Augustine Committee concluded
that Constellation was ``unexecutable'' within the confines of that
budget. I would have reached the same conclusion. More importantly,
however, the funding proposed for FY 2011, if prudently administered,
is more than adequate to continue the development of Constellation.
It is unknown how much time and thought was put into the existing
budget proposal for FY 2011, or by whom this proposal was generated,
but it is common knowledge that few if any of those government agencies
referred to above were asked to participate, nor, of significant note,
was the DOD or the engineering or management expertise that exists
throughout NASA today. This leads one to the conclusion that this
proposal was most likely formulated in haste within the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and/or the Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP), with little or no input from the NASA Administrator,
Center Directors, or senior NASA management. If that were the case, the
originators quite likely were promoting their own agenda rather than
that of NASA and America's commitment to Human Space Exploration, as
directed by Congress in the Authorization Bills of 2005 and 2008.
With the submission of FY 2011 budget, either the Administration
and the originators of this budget proposal are showing extreme naivete
or, I can only conclude, they are willing to take accountability for a
calculated plan to dismantle America's leadership in the world of Human
Space Exploration. In either case, this proposal is a travesty which
flows against the grain of over 200 years of our history and, today,
against the will of the majority of Americans. The space program has
never been an entitlement, it's an investment in the future--an
investment in technology, jobs, world respect and leadership, and
perhaps most importantly in the inspiration and education of our youth.
Those best and brightest minds at NASA and throughout the multitudes of
private contractors, large and small, did not join the team to design
windmills, but to live their dreams of once again taking us where no
man has gone before. If this budget proposal becomes the law of the
land, these technicians, engineers, scientists, a generation removed
from Apollo, yet re-inspired by the prospect of going back to the moon
and on to Mars, will be gone--where I don't know--but gone.
America's human spaceflight program has for a half-century risen
above partisan differences from Eisenhower to Kennedy to the present
day. The challenges and accomplishments of the past were those of a
Nation--never of a political party or of any individual agenda. If we
abdicate our leadership in space today, not only is human spaceflight
and space exploration at risk, but I believe the future of this country
and thus the future of our children and grandchildren as well. Now is
the time for wiser heads in the Congress of the United States to
prevail. Now is the time to overrule this Administration's pledge to
mediocrity. Now is the time to be bold, innovative and wise in how we
invest in the future of America.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, for this
opportunity to express my personal views on a subject for which I have
a passion--the future of my country!
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Augustine?
STATEMENT OF NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE, CHAIRMAN,
REVIEW OF U.S. HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT PLANS COMMITTEE
Mr. Augustine. Mr. Chairman and Senator Hutchison, and
members of the Committee, I would like to thank you for
permitting me to speak and represent my colleagues on the human
spaceflight plans committee. I have a statement I would like to
submit for the record.
I should probably begin by saying that it would be very
difficult to gather a group of four people who I admire more or
treasure their friendship than the two gentlemen beside me and
the two who appeared before us. I think we all share at least
one thing in common, and that is that we want a strong human
spaceflight exploration program for our Nation.
One might ask why. Our panel tried to answer that and we
said that certainly the science to be derived is not
unimportant. The same can be said of the economic impact, new
products, and certainly engineering achievements have been very
significant indeed. But while all of these things are
important, it was the view of our committee that taken by
themselves they are not sufficient to justify the cost of the
human space exploration program.
One has to justify that program, and we think one can
justify it based upon intangibles. The fact that they are
intangible makes them no less significant in our view. A sound
human spaceflight program can blaze a path for humans to move
into outer space. It inspires the young people to study science
and engineering. We have seen that many of the scientists and
engineers were inspired by the two gentlemen beside me and
others like them.
But more importantly I think that it says to the world what
the American people can accomplish with our system of
Government and our system of free enterprise. And all this
comes for a little less than a dime a day per citizen, which
would seem to be a very great bargain.
Now, one can say a great deal could be done with robots,
and that is certainly true--and it should be. But there are
certain things that robots cannot do. One thing would be, for
example, to make the first repair to the Hubble telescope
program. I cannot imagine a robot that could have done that.
Similarly, there are the intangibles. Does anyone remember the
name of the first robot that stepped on the Moon? Launching a
rocket to the top of Everest with a flag in it is quite
different from Sir Edmund Hillary climbing to the top of
Everest. That is what makes the human spaceflight program so
important to so many of us.
I was asked to make a few brief comments on some of the
conclusions from the study I chaired 20 years ago on the space
program as a whole, some of which perhaps relate to the issue
of today. I would cite just five.
The first was, at that time 20 years ago, we concluded that
NASA was being asked to accomplish grand goals and being given
resources that did not match those goals, and that was a very
dangerous thing to do, particularly in space.
Second, reflecting our skepticism of the reliability
calculations that were being done, we said it was very likely
we would lose another Shuttle. Sadly, that proved to be the
case.
We also said that the heavy lift vehicle was the most
important project in the human spaceflight program because it
is the gateway to outer space. And if one thinks about it, the
U.S. has not had an astronaut go much more than 300 miles from
the Earth since my colleague here left the Moon years ago.
We thought that the technology program was being starved;
that we did not have a strong technology program 20 years ago.
And we said that one of the consequences will be that future
decisionmakers will have very few options.
And finally, we said we need a balanced space program,
balanced in terms of human spaceflight and robotics, balanced
in exploration and science, and so forth.
Turning to the more recent review of the human spaceflight
program that I had the privilege of chairing, we had 10 members
on our committee. Our findings were unanimous, as reflected in
the 150-some page report that you perhaps have had a chance to
read.
The first question is why not just continue the
Constellation program. That certainly is the easy, seemingly
logical answer. One could do that; but there are some problems.
Let me cite just two.
When the Constellation program was begun, now 5 years ago
and 4 years from the time we did our study, NASA assumed a
budget profile extending some 20 years. In talking to the
people who ran NASA at the time, they really believed, I think,
that they had good reason to accept that budget profile. But be
that as it may, they have received each year only two-thirds of
that amount. In other words, it was a one-third shortfall every
year. The consequence, coupled with technical problems that the
programs have encountered, is that during the 4 years that the
Ares I program has been going, for example, it slipped
somewhere between 3 and 5 years of schedule--depending on whose
numbers one chooses to accept.
In addition, we were concerned about the fundamental goal
of the program, which was focused on going back to the Moon
rather than something more aggressive such as eventually going
to Mars with some interesting intermediate stops. Talking to
many people, particularly young people, we found that when we
said 20 years from now we will be going back to the Moon, most
of their response was, ``they will have done that 60 years
ago.'' That led us to be very concerned that our Nation would
not be able to maintain the financial support for a program
that would require continuous funding from five
administrations, nine Congresses, and 18 budget cycles.
Let me turn to the President's program very briefly, as it
was modified in his remarks at Cape Kennedy a few weeks ago.
That program fairly closely approximates one of our committee's
options, Option 5B. I should emphasize that we were asked to
provide options, not to provide recommendations, so that we
could try to be somewhat neutral in this discussion--and we are
trying very hard to do that.
The President's program in our view, at least as reflected
in Option 5B--they do differ somewhat--it is considered to be a
viable program and we rated it very highly in our overall
assessment. We offered two very important caveats. The first is
that a vital part of that option is its funding profile, not
just the next 5 years but throughout the entire program. And
the second is the decisions truly be made on the schedule that
they have been planned.
I am sorry to report to you that we, as best as we tried,
could find no interesting human space exploration program for a
sum of money substantially below the enhanced budget level we
described--which, simply stated, adds about $3 billion a year
to the current NASA budget (and that has to be inflated
appropriately).
The most important request I would make to this committee
on behalf of my colleagues on the Human Spaceflight Committee
was that whatever program is approved, that its goals match the
budget. Otherwise, I think we will all be back here 10 years
from now having this same discussion. It certainly remains the
hope of myself and the Committee I had the privilege of serving
on that America can have a strong human spaceflight program
reflecting the title of our report which is ``A Human
Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation.''
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Augustine follows:]
Prepared Statement of Norman R. Augustine, Chairman,
Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for this
opportunity to address America's future human spaceflight plans. I,
like you, have had the great good fortune to have lived in this tiny
sliver of time when humans first began to explore space, and have had
the even greater good fortune to have participated in some small part
of that effort as an engineer and as a manager. I must confess to you
that I am a proponent of human spaceflight--not so much because of its
impact on the economy, its support of science, or its advancements in
engineering--although it does all those things--but for the intangibles
it offers, including the inspiration it provides to our Nation's
citizenry, particularly its young people; for the impact it has in
paving the way for humans to move further out into the planetary
system; and for what it says to the world about the American people and
what we and our system of government and free enterprise can
accomplish.
I should note at the outset that it would be difficult to gather a
group of colleagues at this table for whom I have greater respect and
admiration than those in whose company I find myself today.
Nonetheless, as we have all noted, human spaceflight is a topic about
which reasonable, caring people can, and do, sometimes disagree. In my
opinion such healthy discussion can only help assure, as stated in the
title of the report of the Committee I recently chaired, that we have
``a human spaceflight program worthy of a great nation.''
I have been requested to speak this afternoon from the perspective
of the Committee on Human Spaceflight Plans, and to compare its
findings and circumstances with those of a similar committee I chaired
some twenty years ago. The most recent committee, which has now been
formally disbanded, included scientists, engineers, managers,
astronauts, professors, and a retired four-star Air Force General
Officer. The findings in our report reflect our unanimous views.
I should note that in the case of the most recent study, our group
was asked to provide options for consideration by the President,
Congress and NASA. We were specifically not requested to provide
recommendations--presumably so we could adopt a neutral stance in
assessing the pros and cons of the various alternatives we might
identify and not have to be advocates for any one proposed course. I
have tried very hard to be faithful to that charge throughout the
recent debate, albeit in some instances that has been impossible: for
example, when narrowing the some 3,000 options our committee's
methodology identified down to a set of five options offered in our
report.
Let me begin with the review that was conducted 20 years ago that
addressed the entirety of NASA's space activities, not solely the human
spaceflight program as was the case in the more recent review. The
earlier assessment was conducted in the shadow of the Challenger
failure in which we lost seven of our friends and colleagues. It was
also conducted as the Soviet Union--which had provided the impetus for
much of America's space activities until that time--was breaking apart.
And, while funding for NASA always seems precious, at no time during
the space era has NASA found itself in so challenging a budgetary
environment as exists today. This of course cannot be ignored.
Some of the relevant findings of that report of twenty years ago
have a bearing on the purposes of this hearing today. These included
the observations that:
NASA is being asked to pursue goals that are not matched by
the resources that are provided--a hazardous practice in a
pursuit as demanding as human spaceflight.
Based upon our skepticism of the Shuttle reliability
calculations, the loss of another Shuttle appears likely.
Construction of a true heavy-lift launch vehicle is the
highest priority for future human spaceflight activities.
The technology program that underpins spaceflight is being
starved, thereby leaving future decision-makers with only
limited options.
America should have a balanced space program, using humans
and robots where unique advantages are offered by each.
Turning to the present, the most important finding of the Committee
on the Future of Human Spaceflight Plans was that the ongoing program
is on an unsustainable trajectory. The reason is straightforward: when
NASA began that program, for reasons it presumably believed sound, it
predicated the effort on a future budget profile that each year has
proven to be fully one-third less than planned. The impact of this has
been exacerbated by NASA's very high fixed costs--in some part
attributable to the Congress's practice of instructing the
Administrator of NASA not to reduce NASA's workforce or facility
structure.
The above approach contrasts with that at the end of the Cold War,
when the aerospace industry, in pursuit of efficiency, lost 640,000 of
its employees and two-thirds of its companies or divisions of companies
within a few years. Make no mistake, NASA is the finest space
organization in the world with an extraordinarily talented group of
people. But it is also a large, mature organization without a strong
competitor. At least in the business world that is usually a formula
for complacency, not success. The consequences of funding mismatches in
such an environment can be severe. For example, the mismatch of ends
and means coupled with technical problems that were encountered on the
Ares I program were such that during its first 4 years the program
slipped between 3 and 5 years--depending upon whose schedule estimate
is accepted. Further, the heavy-lift vehicle and lunar lander were
largely deferred. The question that thus arises with regard to the
resulting disconnect among the Ares I schedule and that of
International Space Station and the planned lunar return becomes not
one of can the Ares I be built, but should it?
While the Committee did not offer a program that canceled the
Constellation program in its entirety, it did offer an option, referred
to in the report as ``5B,'' that generally approximates the President's
plan as it was described during his recent remarks at Cape Kennedy.
This program appears to be a viable undertaking, one that ranked highly
in our overall assessment . . . provided, and this is to be emphasized,
that it is funded as stipulated and that decisions are made as
scheduled (especially those regarding a heavy-lift vehicle). The
funding profile identified in our report to support Option 5B adds to
the baseline budget profile $3 billion per year, phased in over the
next 4 years and realistically corrected for inflation using the
appropriate aerospace indices.
While the technical challenges of human spaceflight, especially
beyond low-Earth orbit, are immense--the determining factor in defining
the program the Nation is to pursue is the amount of funds the Nation
wishes to commit to the enterprise. At the higher or ``enhanced''
budget level the human spaceflight program would cost each citizen
about 10 cents per day. Nonetheless, the aggregate sum is undeniably
immense.
Try as we might, our committee could find no dynamic, responsible
human space exploration program costing less than the program augmented
by $3B per year in inflation-corrected collars. That is not to say
there are not important things to be done in space for lesser funds,
particularly with robotics, but rather that human spaceflight programs
under the more restrained funding profile will necessarily be confined
to some 300 miles from the Earth's surface.
Option 5B clearly establishes a human landing on Mars as the
primary objective for the human spaceflight program. Unlike
Constellation, which sought to reach its initial exploration goal, the
Moon, some 20 years in the future, Option 5B follows a path with
interim accomplishments including docking with an asteroid; visiting an
Earth-Sun Lagrangian point and conducting training operations there;
circumnavigating Mars; orbiting Mars; landing on one of Mars' moons,
Phobos or Deimos; and eventually landing humans on Mars. A return visit
to the Moon is also quite possible, for technical and science reasons;
however, it should be noted that our committee received many informal
inputs, particularly from young people, questioning why we would have a
space program whose centerpiece is something that was accomplished over
a half-century earlier. Both China and India have announced plans to
land humans on the Moon and it seems unrewarding for the U.S. to
participate in a second race to the Moon.
Option 5B, like the President's proposed program, provides for the
commercialization of transportation between the Earth and low-Earth-
orbit. The reason for this is that sooner or later NASA must free
itself from operating a logistics line to low-Earth-orbit or it will
not have the funds needed to meet the grand challenges that await
beyond low-Earth-orbit and which NASA and only NASA is equipped to
address: namely, the exploration of the solar system.
Our committee's report explicitly states that commercializing
transportation to LEO is not without risk. Nothing in space is without
risk. But it is the Committee's belief that with proactive oversight by
NASA, such an approach is feasible and responsible. From a purely
business standpoint, we draw the analogy to the Federal Government's
guaranteeing a market to carry the mail to the fledgling airlines--an
action that made airline travel commercially practicable.
When including this concept in some of the options in our report we
noted that all companies, large and small, should be allowed to compete
for the market created as just described. We noted that throughout its
history NASA has performed the critical role of providing direction and
oversight for industry--but it has been industry, not NASA, that has
built the overwhelming preponderance of America's space hardware.
Further, one wonders what message our government sends in the
increasingly competitive global marketplace if it concludes that
America's industry is not capable of safely carrying our astronauts
into orbit, yet it is comfortable having Russia's industry do so.
I will not seek to repeat the contents of our 154-page report this
afternoon. But I would like to conclude with our most strongly held
over-arching conviction, and that is that it would be a disservice to
NASA and to this Nation to yet again initiate a space program where the
means do not match the ends. Doing so merely guarantees that we will be
meeting here still another time five to 10 years hence. It is one thing
to preserve jobs . . . it is another to conduct a space program. In
this case, the former is easy . . . the latter is difficult.
Assuming that this principle of matching goals and resources is
embraced, I have the utmost confidence that the extraordinary people of
NASA, under Charlie Bolden's exceptional leadership, can successfully
carry out whatever program you who lead our Nation may select. And I am
hopeful that it will be a program that, as the title of our committee's
report states, is ``worthy of this great Nation.''
Thank you for this opportunity to speak on behalf of my colleagues
on the Review of the U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee.
Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee--Members
Mr. Norman R. Augustine
Retired Chairman and CEO
Lockheed Martin Corporation
Dr. Wanda M. Austin
President and Chief Executive Officer
The Aerospace Corporation
Mr. Bohdan I. Bejmuk
Chair, NASA Constellation Standing Review Board
Dr. Leroy Chiao
Former Astronaut, Former International Space
Station Commander and Engineering Consultant
Dr. Christopher F. Chyba
Professor of Astrophysics Sciences and International Affairs
Princeton University
Dr. Edward F. Crawley
Ford Professor of Engineering
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Mr. Jeffrey K. Greason
Co-founder and Chief Executive Officer
XCOR Aerospace
Dr. Charles F. Kennel
Director and Professor Emeritus
Scripps Institution of Oceanography
University of California, San Diego
General Lester Lyles
United States Air Force (Retired)
Dr. Sally Ride
President and Chief Executive Officer
Imaginary Lines
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Augustine, very much.
I am going to ask the first question.
Captain Cernan, you indicated that we were potentially
headed on a journey to nowhere, and I guess I have, in all
honesty, to respond by saying that I am not a huge, but I am a
substantial skeptic of human spaceflight. We are approximately
the same generation, but that is where I am. I cannot support
going into space as an end in and of itself. I agree with the
President that we need a measured, nationally, globally
relevant, and sustainable human spaceflight program, not one
solely bound by place and time in space.
But my mind is not closed because I am not an expert. I
want to understand the value of human spaceflight.
But I bring one other dimension to it. I want to understand
human spaceflight--I am asking this of any of you, not all
three of you, but any of you--that it not just be the matter of
spaceflight but that it also relate to the human condition not
only in the world but also in our own country.
I think NASA was conceived brilliantly with the idea of
simply doing something that had never been done before, and we
have done it now a number of times. And I do not mean to say by
that that we should stop doing it. But I do think we have to
stop doing things exactly the same way. I mean, NASA for a
number of years has received a lot of criticism over how it has
managed its programs. The GAO has not been kind. Various
analysts have worried about over-expenditures, things of that
sort.
So I want to understand the value of human spaceflight. I
want one of you to tell me how NASA's human spaceflight
programs advance the agency's overall mission today and in the
future. And I also want you to explain how human spaceflight,
in that it is in a context of other priorities for NASA, helps
the human condition sufficiently to justify its budget in
America.
Mr. Cernan. You are asking for a lot. I will do my best and
I will certainly let my colleagues here help me, if they would
like.
If you want to talk about technology, technology which you
have in your hands today, the technology to communicate around
the world, the technology of communications itself, the
technology that I have in my iPhone today is technology that
was given birth to 30, 40, 50 years ago.
I skipped over my comments about technology that we are
talking about in the proposal. Exploration drives technology
innovation, not the reverse. You cannot lock a group of the
smartest young men and women in the world in a room--engineers,
scientists, technicians--and say go develop technology. For
what? There has to be a purpose, just like there has to be a
purpose in life. They have to know what they are trying to
accomplish, what their goal is, what the problems are, and then
develop the technology that gets the job done. Going to the
Moon. The technology that we developed to go to the Moon. Walk
in our hospitals today. Walk in our classrooms today. Is that a
benefit to us humans here on this Earth today? I like to think
it is. You can go deeper into that, but let me get a little bit
more philosophical.
Curiosity is the essence of human existence. Who are we?
Where are we? Where do we come from? Where are we going? Is
there life on Mars? Is Mars what Earth is going to look like in
a billion years? Are we like what Mars looked like a billion
years ago? I do not know. I do not have any answer to those
questions. I do not know what is over the hill and around the
corner, but I want to find out. It is within our hearts and
souls and desire to find out and seek knowledge. Discovery is
what it is all about.
And yes, we have been there, but we have not been
everywhere. There is a bottom to the ocean. You can walk to the
top of the highest mountain on this planet and you can walk to
the depths of the deepest ocean, but you are still on Earth.
And there is a difference between the frontier of space to seek
knowledge. Was there life on Mars? Is there life?
I know there have to be other reasons to go there. That
alone is not enough, but that is one of the driving things. It
is our destiny, I believe, to explore the unknown, to find
answers to the questions, and God knows for every answer we
get, we will come up with a dozen more questions. It has been
that way all along. We have got more questions about the Moon
now than we did before we went there.
So I am probably not being as explicit as you would like me
to be, but to the benefits to humans on this planet, whether it
is communication satellites, weather satellites, predicting
storms, whatever, you can go on and on and on. Those things
were given birth to when Kennedy said we are going to go to the
Moon. He was asking us to do the impossible. He was asking us
to do what most people did not think could be done, and we did
not have the technology to do it. That technology is obsolete
today in one sense, but American industry, American ingenuity
has built upon that so that we have today what we have in our
cars, in our airplanes, in our transportation, in every walk of
life.
I will turn it over to Neil.
The Chairman. I cannot. I have overrun my time. I thank you
for your answer. It was very helpful.
Senator Hutchison?
Senator Hutchison. Mr. Chairman, I would just add to what
Captain Cernan said and say that is it an improvement of our
life on Earth that we can put a satellite-guided missile into a
window from 3 miles out and instead of killing 500 civilians,
you kill the enemy that you are seeking, is that an
improvement? Because that is what has happened because we
explored in space.
Let me talk about the future. Dr. Samuel Ting, the Nobel
Laureate from MIT, talks about what we can do in the space
station in the future to study cosmic rays which are most
intense in space, not on Earth, as potentially a future source
of energy production. That is the kind of science we are
talking about. We are not talking about just going into space
to go into space.
I think that is a valid question, and I think you have
asked a valid question. If that were all we were doing, I would
not be pushing this. I am pushing it because if we continue our
priorities in space, we will be the ones that can capture the
cosmic rays and have the renewable energy sources that will
keep us from having to drill for oil and gas and go to the
renewable energy of the future. That is why we are doing this.
It is the future, and we want to do it rather than having
others do it so that we harness it.
So I want to ask the question because I want to go to
something that Dr. Cernan said in his testimony that he did not
use because there were so many other things that you did say.
And that is talking about putting all of the money into private
contractors but having NASA take the step back rather than it
being a NASA project with private contractors.
You said that we assume that this goal says that these
private contractors that are not yet tested in a little more
than 3 years for less than $5 billion can put people into low-
Earth orbit in a new vehicle. It assumes they can design,
build, flight test, and develop a man-rated spacecraft and
booster architecture, along with the infrastructure required.
This includes redesigning the requirements of mission control,
developing the support and training simulators, writing
technical manuals for training and onboard procedures, and
developing the synergy between the tracking network and the
uniqueness of a newly designed space vehicle. These are just a
few of the development and support requirements to put a new
manned system into space.
Basically what you went on to say is that you predict that
it will be 10 years, not 3, for the private sector to do this
and at a cost which possibly could mean bailing out the
companies because we could not really do all of that under $5
billion.
My question is, do you think that money ought to be spent
with NASA redoing their plan so that they are in control, but
not just with blinders on as it seemed that General Bolden was
saying, ``within my budget I can do this.'' Well, how about
being more creative in your budget? How about not doing just
Constellation but a new configuration of Constellation? How
about an Orion that is not just a return vehicle but one that
can take people into space as well, but put our money not into
termination contracts at $2.5 billion, not into programs that
would try to help people who are going to lose their jobs, not
into renting space on Soyuz, but into developing our own
techniques so that we will gain these advantages? Would that be
what you were proposing, Captain Cernan, in your statement?
Mr. Cernan. Well, referring to what I think you asked at
first about all the infrastructure that is needed to support
the commercial sector, which is one of the reasons why I think
the costs will go way up, as well as the time, the Aerospace
Corporation I think did a report that said it would take
probably $10 billion to $12 billion to support the commercial
sector, and it does not count the infrastructure, the
simulators, the mission reconfiguration or mission control, the
air/sea rescue because it has got to come down. Some of them
may come down where you do not want. All the procedures,
everything that you have to develop.
A lot of people think that we played handball. When it came
time to fly in space, we put on a space suit and jumped into a
spacecraft and went to the Moon. We spent years and years
helping the engineers at NASA, at Martin, at Rockwell, helping
design, develop, test. We were out there 24/7, 6, 8, whatever
number of years it took to get the spacecraft that we were
going to fly developed properly and safe, that we had
confidence in.
So how and when is that going to be prepared for, and what
is the commercial sector going to--how are they going to handle
that? How are they going to pay for it? Are we going to
subsidize all that? Is it going to be a NASA program or a
program that NASA pays for that we let someone else run? Are
they going to respond to all our regulatory requirements on
safety? These are things that I do not think have been
addressed properly yet. I do not think that they have been
looked at.
As far as I think what you asked is where I would go, my
opinion is probably not worth much these days. But I am
concerned in the near term about the gap.
In the long term, I am concerned about exploration because
that is my bag. Exploration, going where no man has gone
before, doing what has not ever been done before, that others
could not do, would not do, or maybe were afraid to do. That is
exploration.
But in the near term I know how you feel about Shuttle
extension. I do not know anything about the capability to
finance it. I think we ought to stretch the Shuttle out and
close the gap from the front end. I think we ought to have
something that closes the gap on the back end. I do not believe
that is commercial space. I believe it is something we have
invested $9 billion in already called Ares I and Orion. Get it
up. Get it running, and instead of a potential gap of a decade,
we might knock it down to 3 or 4 or 5 years. I do not know. But
at least we will tell the rest of the world that we are not
going to stay slave to what they say we can do or cannot do in
space. We will have our own access. Even if there is a gap of a
few years, we are going to get there from here. Get that done,
Senator, and while we are in the process of doing it, if you
want to redesign Constellation's long-term exploration
objectives and build a new booster or whatever it takes, that
is the time to do it.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I want to try to answer your
question, and it is a good question. I want to thank you for
the personal attention that you have given to this hearing
being right here the whole time. I am profoundly grateful for
that.
My answer to your question, why space, is because we, as
Americans, are by nature explorers. We have always had a
frontier. When this Nation was developed, we had visionary
leaders like Thomas Jefferson who paid initially about $2,000
for Lewis and Clark to go westward. That trip ended up costing
the extraordinary sum of $36,000, but it was fulfilling our
destiny as a people who by nature are explorers and
adventurers. And if we ever give up that characteristic, then
we are going to be a second-rate Nation. That frontier is no
longer westward. That frontier is upward.
And as Gene talked about, we are inquisitive, we are
curious. Look what the Hubble space telescope has now opened,
the new vistas of knowledge peering back in time to the
beginning of the universe. And once we get the James Webb
telescope up there, we may be able to go right back to the
origin of the universe. Is that valuable to us as an
inquisitive people, as citizens of planet Earth? I think it is.
That is my answer to your question.
Now, may I ask a question of Mr. Augustine? Mr. Augustine,
it goes without saying. Thank you for your steady hand
throughout the years.
You have heard the strong opinions expressed by these two
American heroes, and the Committee that you headed contained
representatives across the entire spectrum of government and
aerospace. And it included military as well, and it included
some astronauts.
Now, can you describe how this administration's plan--and
you can say how it has been amended as the President amended it
down at the Kennedy Space Center--can you describe how it
compares with the options that you laid out in your report?
Mr. Augustine. I would be happy to do that, Senator Nelson.
We had a possibility of up to 3,000 options based on the
parameters we looked at. We narrowed them to five main options
with a few subsets under several. As I mentioned, Option 5B is
fairly close to the one the President has proposed.
There are two potentially significant differences. One is
that our option went ahead with the development of the heavy
lift launch vehicle right away rather than wait up to 5 years.
The other is that we had a funding profile that phased in over
4 years, added $3 billion per year--and was inflated beyond
that with the appropriate aerospace inflator. Thus, our funding
profile was substantially greater than the one that we were
offered by OMB last year because we could not find a good
answer with the OMB profile.
There are advantages to slipping the start of the heavy
lift launch vehicle, as you would know. It gives time to
accumulate more advanced technology. It helps the early budget
pressures when you are trying to keep the space station going,
ISS, at the same time--but you would pay the price that you
lose time in being able to pursue the exploration program.
I think the biggest risk is when 5 years has passed, or
whatever it is, that the program does not restart. And that
would be a tragedy in my opinion. That is to me the biggest
risk.
The option we offered, 5B, as I say, with those differences
is close to the President's program. Assuming that the
President's program is fully funded--and I have not seen the
out-year funding in any detail, so I cannot testify to that--we
found that Option 5B was a rather exciting program. Rather than
wait 15-20 years and then land on the Moon, after a few years,
it lets you, every few years thereafter, accomplish an
objective that you could point to. You can dock with an
asteroid. You might even try to move one a little bit. You
could go to a Lagrangian point and conduct refueling
operations, do maintenance similar to that you might perform on
a telescope. You could circumnavigate Mars. You can orbit Mars.
You can land on one of Mars' moons, Deimos or Phobos, and from
there control robots operating on Mars, which overcomes the
huge problem of robotic exploration on Mars, namely, that it
can take up to 40 minutes to get a signal back and forth from
here to Mars. It offers all of those rather exciting
advantages.
That brings me to two other aspects of the President's
program that were similar to ours. We did say to shut down the
Shuttle, but the only way you could avoid ``the gap'' is to
keep the Shuttle going. The gap was created 5 years ago. That
is a fait accompli. If you want to avoid the gap, the only way
I know--and of course, by ``the gap,'' we refer to being
dependent upon the Russians to launch our astronauts to low-
Earth orbit--is to use the Shuttle. Our view is it will be a 7-
year gap, not a 5-year gap, and we probably better get used to
that idea.
If you continue to operate the Shuttle, you can avoid much
of the gap, but then the Shuttle consumes all the money you
wanted to use to develop whatever is going to replace
Constellation or some version of Constellation. Our
deliberations kept coming back to how much money you have
available, and you get all these tradeoffs that are just very
hard to make. If you start a heavy lift launch vehicle now, it
is that much less money you have to improve the Orion. The one
thing that solves the problem is to add $3 billion a year to
NASA's budget, and I know how difficult that is in today's
environment.
The Chairman. I want to make one final statement, and then
I have to leave.
Senator Brownback. Could I have a--oh, you are going to
head out?
The Chairman. Oh, I am sorry, but I need to do this because
I have to leave----
Senator Brownback. I understand.
The Chairman.--because I was meant to give a speech 10
minutes ago.
What Senator Nelson indicated, the word ``exploration,'' I
agree that is the nature of what Americans have always been.
What I think is also worth considering and why I asked in my
question to the captain, how human spaceflight contributes to
the condition of humankind on this Earth, had another dimension
to it. There are various forms of exploration. One is doing the
undoable in the physical exploration sense, Lewis and Clark.
You two gentlemen, what you did just caught the world. The
world's heart stopped.
But you know, it also stopped but unnoticed in 1876 I think
when Thomas Henry Huxley came to open a new medical university
called Johns Hopkins, and he said that in the 2,000 years
previous to that date, there had been no advances in medicine
at all, to wit, during the Civil War and other wars that often
diseases were considered to come from outside into the body,
which is why powders were constantly being applied to wounds
but not necessarily diseases came from inside the body, which
we now know to be different. And he did something and Johns
Hopkins did something.
In those days, there was no Federal funding for research of
any sort. This is 125 years ago. There was no Federal funding
for medical research at all. There were no requirements.
Harvard had a medical school. Yale had a medical school.
Stanford had a medical school. They all had medical schools.
You did not even have to have a high school diploma to get into
a medical school, much less a college degree. And so they took
you and taught you nothing.
What Johns Hopkins did when Thomas Huxley said you follow
the truth wherever it takes you in medicine--there can be no
compromise on that. You do what you have to do to follow the
truth in science, in medicine. And as a result of that,
literally the medical education of the United States has been
completely revolutionized, and we all understand that now.
Now, that is also--it is not spaceflight, but it is doing
the undoable, taking on the unknowable, challenging with no
Federal resources--you know, private foundations had to be
suddenly activated at this idea of helping medical research.
You could read about all of this in a book called The Great
Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History by
John Barry. It tells you all about it.
So I just wanted to say in parting, not to rebut anything
that has been said, that ``exploration'' is a broad word. The
American search for newness finds many outlets, most of them
quite glorious, but not all of them.
I thank you. And Senator Nelson will continue to chair the
hearing.
Senator Nelson [presiding]. Senator Brownback?
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. What
a fascinating hearing and great discussion. This is the kind of
hearing we ought to have all the time. So thanks, gentlemen.
Norm, why not do what Captain Cernan suggests here? Let us
phaseout the Shuttle and use that money to fund and move
forward with Constellation. We have spent--what--$9 billion on
Constellation thus far? This is one of the things that drives
me nuts, is that we start and stop these space programs all the
time. We put $5 billion in it, and say, oh, well, new
administration, let us go somewhere else. I think it drives all
folks crazy. But you have noted correctly Constellation was
underfunded by a third in this, but why not go the route that
Captain Cernan suggested as a way to move forward with
Constellation?
Mr. Augustine. Well, that is a very good question and it is
a question we addressed early-on. I have written more articles
than I would like to admit over my career about not changing
programs, do not start and stop them. If you are going to start
them, finish them unless there is a very compelling reason to
stop. But in this case, we think there is a very compelling
reason.
Yes, it is also very tragic to have to write off $9 billion
or part of it, but it is a sunk cost. It does contribute
significantly, we think, to the building of the heavy lift
launch vehicle sometime in the future. So part of the money is
recoverable.
The real issue comes down to the fact that when the program
was started--Really the Ares I is at issue here . . . and I say
that because the Constellation program, as you know, Senator,
has four parts. It has the Ares I, the Orion capsule, the
Altair lunar lander, and the habitat on the Moon. The latter
two were not able to be started because the former two ate up
the money. So really the existing Constellation Program only
has two parts that money has gone into. One part is the Orion
which, as I understand the President's program, most of that
will continue on. So it is really Ares I that is at issue.
Ares I was set up by NASA in 2005 with two primary
missions. One primary mission was to support the International
Space Station, to carry astronauts there. The second was to--
really three. The second was to be a part of the space
exploration program 15 years from now, and the third was to
provide technology and hardware to build a heavy lift version
of an Ares.
The problem is Ares I immediately slipped what our
committee believes is 5 years, at least on the plan it was
being developed, the International Space Station is going to be
back in the ocean by then. And if you add 5 years to the life
of the International Space Station, by the time the Ares gets
developed, it will have maybe 2 years to support the
International Space Station. Then subsequent to that, you will
have a 15-year hiatus where it will either be the most
expensive way in the world to put people in low-Earth orbit or
it will be useful for the exploration program. But there is
this long down-time.
The Constellation Program perhaps made sense when it
started. Today it is not a bad program. The issue is not ``can
we do it?'' but ``should we do it?'' at least in the form it
was laid out.
Senator Brownback. And you do not believe we should do it
then?
Mr. Augustine. To our committee, of the options we looked
at--and I am trying hard not to choose sides, it was one of the
least attractive options laid out.
Senator Brownback. I am taken by Captain Cernan's comments,
which is we do not seem to have a plan now. I mean, we have a
lot of ideas floating around, but we do not seem to have a
plan. We were working off a plan.
I agree with the low-Earth orbit that we ought to have a
commercial sector. Let us try to develop that to go there. But
I want a plan to go on, and this one seems to put that off for
5 years. But you just believe that the budgetary numbers are
such that even if you took the Shuttle money, you cannot get
there with the plan that we were on, and so you are just better
off going to something else.
Mr. Augustine. Yes. It was our conclusion that with the
budget that was presented to us, there was really no way,
particularly with NASA's very high fixed overhead costs--you
and I talked about this--to conduct a human exploration program
that would be meaningful and safe.
Senator Brownback. Well, I hope this is the beginning of
the discussion, Mr. Chairman. We have had some good thoughts
laid out here, but I hope this really now leads into getting
the elbow grease on and us really digging into how it is that
we move forward on these things.
I thank you for your service, Norm.
And Captain Cernan and Mr. Armstrong, you are just great
American heroes, and I really appreciate your willingness to
come back and to continue the fight for exploration that you
have started and just gave us such an inspiration for and you
do not give up on that inspiration. That, to me, is worth a
huge amount, even if you cannot measure it. It is that
intangible of the exploration that is worth a lot of money for
us to do and for future generations.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Senator Hutchison?
Senator Hutchison. Yes. I want to just say that I have
heard the budget was the reason stated for why we cannot keep
the Shuttle flying and close the gap. But we are talking about
putting $6 billion into private sector companies, some of which
are not developed yet or tested, and then we talk about having
to, if they do not make their budgets, bail them out because
you have already put $6 billion in. I would rather talk about
what is the best plan and then try to determine the priorities
so that you stay within a budget. We should not become wedded
to only one way of doing it, but determine what is the right
plan to get us where I think all of our goal is, and that is to
be able to use the space station and to explore and to assure
that we are getting the scientific product that we have already
invested $100 billion in. If we let the space station be in
jeopardy of even being useful by not having the backup systems
that we control, I do not know that that is good budgeting
either. So I have a problem with what I am hearing and the lack
of creativity in what we do within the budget that I saw,
especially in the first panel.
I would like to ask Mr. Armstrong about the safety issue.
In your written statement, you talk about the taxi service that
we will be buying from the Russians and the Soyuz as being
perhaps not necessarily up to the safety standards that we
would have on our own Shuttle. Would you talk about the safety
issue?
Mr. Armstrong. The prime recommendation of the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board with respect to new vehicles in
the future was that safety be considered the prime
consideration. And who can argue with safety? But you cannot
put all the money into safety. Safety has to be balanced with
program requirements and others. An acceptable level of safety
has to be determined. That is what you are really searching
for.
We have pretty good confidence on the Shuttle right now. We
have had a number of safe flights now ever since the Columbia,
and it seems to be operating well. Nevertheless, it is a 40-
year-old technology, but I do believe that it can continue to
be operated safely, as we have in the last few years, and I
have a pretty good confidence level on that.
The Ares I was projected by outside safety experts to be
the safest vehicle that we could project in the future, and it
was perhaps two or more times better than all its competitors,
including the Shuttle launch vehicle, Ares V, and all the
expendable combinations.
They did not make a comparison with the commercial entries
because they really did not have enough data on those
configurations to project an accurate safety value for them.
Senator Hutchison. Let me ask you this. Taking the Soyuz
and the capability that we have to judge its safety over the
long term--you know, they are using the same technology,
probably 40 years old. But our capability to discern the safety
of the Soyuz and the new commercial vehicles--do you think that
safety would be at a disadvantage with the Shuttle as compared
to the new spacecraft that we do not really have tested yet and
the Soyuz? Do you have any concerns about the safety of the
Soyuz or our ability to judge the safety of the Soyuz for a 7-
or 10-year period, which both Mr. Augustine and Captain Cernan
have suggested would be the real-timeframe for the gap?
Mr. Armstrong. It is very difficult to project that answer
until the commercial vehicles get into the flight environment
and are more carefully configured and described in detail.
I think that the Soyuz, you know, is clearly a very safe
vehicle to return to Earth on.
I think the Shuttle would continue to be safe for some
years and we could depend on that. It might take a little extra
care but I think it is certainly doable.
I think that the key here on the Ares is that it was
designed with the recommendation of the CAIB, but it is safety
first. It was designed with that in mind. The commercial
vehicles I just do not know what safety considerations they
have in their design, but I am certainly hopeful that they are
good, but I just do not know.
Senator Hutchison. In your testimony you also comment on
the Orion Light, which has the capability to bring people back
off the space station but not go up--and it certainly is not
going to have the capability to go to other destinations in
low-Earth orbit--as being maybe an expensive project with
limited usefulness. Do you think that that is the best use of
our budget constraints, to have the Orion Light which has that
limited capability as opposed to putting the same money into an
Orion all the way that would be able to do some of the things
that really the President said were his goal and which I think
are quite exciting, doing an orbit around Mars or some of the
other destinations besides the space station?
Mr. Armstrong. No, I do not think it would be a good use of
that segment of the funds in the budget. I think not because it
would be quite an expensive vehicle to design and test, and it
would be quite late before it would be ready and it would not
be able to service the space station very long after it was
finally completed.
And second, the configuration is probably not very good for
some of the most serious emergencies like a medical emergency
where you have to have instantaneous departure from the space
station and return to Earth because the aerodynamic
configuration of an Orion-type vehicle has poor aerodynamic
performance and consequently cannot change its destination and
arrive quickly at some point. It is going to come down in the
ocean or on land, wherever it comes down, if it is an immediate
emergency departure.
Mr. Cernan. May I add something to that, Senator?
Senator Hutchison. Sure.
Mr. Cernan. We already have under contract two Soyuz up
there for rescue with the capability to put a third up there.
So the redundancy or the reason for an Orion light just puzzles
me, plus the fact the Soyuz lands on land, parachute, retro-
rockets and so forth, in our own landing facility. The Shuttle
lands on a runway. Now we are going to have a ballistic or
maybe slightly lift capability spacecraft very much like
Apollo, and it is going to have to land in an ocean. Now we
have got to regenerate the recovery forces.
See, it is just not the cost of man-rating that vehicle
which has to have men in it before you can put--and I use the
term generically. Before you can put men or humans in it to
bring them home safely, you have got to man-rate it to start
with. And then you must have the recovery forces standing by
somewhere, some aircraft carrier within reach somewhere, that
is going to have to recover the spacecraft, a cost nobody seems
to recognize or acknowledge. There is a lot of hidden,
underlying cost in developing a spacecraft that is going, as
you said earlier, to have half the capability of the one we
really need.
You know, if I may, we talk about budgets and cost of
everything, and I want to remind the American people out there
and maybe even some people in Congress that it costs little
more than a half a penny of every tax dollar that you and I
send to the Federal Government to pay for the Space Shuttle,
space station, Hubble, Opportunity and Spirit on Mars--little
more than a half a penny. I do not think the American people
know that. I am not sure if we did not put a little box on that
1040 and said, would you give a penny to NASA, that we would
not be able to afford almost everything we want to do.
Senator Hutchison. Well, I think that people would believe
that the investment that we have made has improved the quality
of life and health. The MRIs that people can get now, the
magnetic resonance imaging, has transformed health care. There
are so many things that space exploration--the preparation for
it has given us in quality of life. I just want to make sure
that we do not lose that advantage and the capability to
manufacture those products in America for the quality of life
in America and the world.
We do have a vote. So I will close my part and thank you
all very, very much for coming and for being so direct
especially because we have to speak out and try to come
together in a better plan than has been put forward so far. And
I think General Bolden is going to try to work with us to see
if we can come to a plan that everyone can feel is the right
approach for America and for our future both economically and
for the scientific productivity that we hope to encourage our
children to pursue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Augustine, did your commission
determine that Ares would be much safer than the existing
Shuttle, and if I recall, was it by a factor of 10?
Mr. Augustine. I must confess I find myself a little bit in
the situation of Neil, until you build this hardware. Our
committee is very skeptical of the reliability and the safety
models. Most of the failures we have encountered are not even
in the models, so I would be reluctant to make a comparison. As
Gene has pointed out, the Ares I was designed specifically with
safety and reliability in mind which should bode well in that
regard.
But by the same token--and I would like to say this about
the commercial launch vehicles, if I might, Senator, although
it was not your question, I think there are two things that
have not come up in this conversation. One is that NASA, in the
plan that has been put forth, would have responsibility to
oversee safety and reliability for the commercial launchers. In
other words, that part of it is NASA's responsibility to
oversee. General Bolden understands that.
The other comment is in talking about the commercial launch
companies we tend to talk only about startup companies. Our
option said that anybody who wants to bid, the big companies,
the old companies, the Boeings, the Lockheed Martins, as well
as the new start-ups, can bid. Regarding feasibility, one of
the commercial companies, the larger companies, has a launch
vehicle that in all its versions I think has over 90 straight
successes now.
I would like to make one other comment in that regard, if I
might, just to put things in perspective. We tend to think that
it is a big jump for industry to get to a really safe launch
vehicle, and I do not want to understate the difficulty of
this. There is risk here. There is risk anywhere in space. I
was thinking, as we talked, again in terms of the advancement
of technology over time and how much industry must have
progressed since these gentlemen went to the Moon. The time
from the Wright brother's flight until Neil and Buzz went to
the Moon is just about the same elapsed time as it will be from
the time they left the Moon until we return to the Moon under
the plan in place. It offers kind of an interesting
perspective.
Mr. Cernan. Disappointing.
Mr. Augustine. Disappointing.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Armstrong, you made the case in your
prepared statement--and by the way, we will insert in the
record Jim Lovell's prepared testimony. That will be a part of
the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lovell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain James A. Lovell, USN (Ret.),
Commander, Apollo 13
I apologize that I cannot attend your hearing with my fellow
astronauts, Neil Armstrong and Gene Cernan. I do want to submit this
written testimony to establish my position with regards to the NASA
2011 budget.
As I celebrated the 40th anniversary of the Flight of Apollo 13, I
also realized I was witnessing the end of an era. It was an era that
started in the late 1950s when bold leaders decided to make America a
leader in space technology. Projects were formulated and technology
developed resulting in missions completed: Mercury, Gemini, Apollo,
Skylab, Space Station including over 130 flights of the Shuttle. That
era will end with the last Shuttle flights by the end of this year.
In 2004, as a result of the Columbia accident, it was decided that
a bold new approach to America's space exploration was needed. A
program that would reach out to the moon and beyond. President Bush
launched his ``Vision for Space Exploration'' to outline a project
providing the means to continue America's prominence in space
exploration and capture the imagination of its citizens.
NASA initiated the ``Exploration Systems Architecture Study'' to
determine the most cost effective way to provide continuous support of
the ISS while fulfilling NASA's mission for deep space exploration.
The resulting Constellation architecture envisioned two basic
elements. The ARES 1 first to be a LEO vehicle and then be added to the
Ares V for deep space missions.
This vision for space exploration, and the NASA Authorization Acts
of 2005 and 2008 was, over the years, endorsed by two Presidents of
different parties and approved by both Democratic and Republican
Congress.
The Constellation Project was a program of much greater magnitude
than any previous endeavor. It envisioned considerable exploration of
the Moon:
1. To gain experience and confidence in deep space operations.
2. To develop the infrastructure necessary for considerable
length of stay and area of exploration in anticipation of a
future Mars expedition.
3. To regain our prominence in lunar operations in anticipation
of other countries spaceflight activities.
The failure of the past Administration to adequately fund the
Constellation Program resulted in a slowdown of Ares I development
putting the United States in jeopardy of not having access to the Space
Station.
When the President Obama canceled the Constellation Program, that
eliminated progress on the Ares I for LEO operation and signaled the
end of American dominance in space exploration. After years and
billions of dollars to develop the ARES family of vehicles to serve LEO
and outer space we have abandoned the dream of President Kennedy. And,
as the Columbia Accident Investigation Board noted ``the failure to
develop a replacement for the Space Shuttle program represented a
failure in national leadership.''
In some respects the Vision for Space Exploration which the
Constellation Program was part is similar to Project Apollo. On
announcing Apollo, Kennedy said ``this goal will serve to organize and
measure the best of our energies and skills.''
The 2011 NASA budget has taken NASA's mission on a new path. Recent
pronouncements from NASA's Deputy Administrator revealed that NASA's
goals are to relieve hunger and poverty, create world peace, improve
education and the environment and create new jobs. As noted by
Congressman Bob Bishop, NASA was established to explore space.
NASA wasn't created as a ``make work'' program but it did provide
jobs for thousands of people in the private sector.
NASA's main focus is not on education. But it was a spur to
education for thousands of youngsters. Children now in their late 40s
or 50s who were inspired by our space activities.
NASA wasn't established to revitalize business and industry but the
manned program resulted in thousands of technical spin-offs from NASA
development have helped the private sector unrelated to space
activities.
NASA was not meant to be a foreign relation tool but the space
agency did bring close cooperation with countries through the
development of the ISS.
President Obama's remarks at KSC concerning the future of America's
Manned Space Flight talked about ground breaking technologies to
enhance spaceflight including research on a ``heavy lift rocket''. But
his speech did not lay out a plan on how this technology will be used
or who would use it. In the past, goals were first defined i.e.,
Mercury, Gemini, Apollo and then the technology was developed to
accomplish the objective.
The President mentioned subsidizing the development of commercial
LEO vehicles to service the space station. In the past the private
sector did design and build launch vehicles under government contract
but NASA supervised their construction and flew them.
Commercial space taxis are a possibility but is there a market for
them? Between 2008 to 2010 there will be only 10 Shuttle flights to the
ISS.
Will these launch vehicles be ``manned rated'' with private money
or will a massive infusion of government funds be necessary to make
them ready for manned flight? If that is the case, the billions of
dollars and time spent on Ares I will be lost as new launch vehicles to
LEO are developed.
The only access to the ISS after 2010 is by means of a Russian
spacecraft. China and India have already developed launch vehicles that
will allow entry into low-Earth orbit. In the future they could request
entry into the ISS thereby extending its life. We must remember that
the ISS overflies the United States. From a security standpoint,
continuing Ares I development was the quickest way to reestablish our
own entry to the ISS.
The general thrust of the President's talk at KSC was to place NASA
in a support role similar to its previous life: National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics. But NACA supported a viable entrepreneurial
aviation industry. There are no commercial prospects for deep space
exploration. Congress established NASA to pursue that objective.
This Congress has to make a bipartisan decision whether to realign
the NASA 2011 Budget to maintain the United States a leader in the
exploration of space as outlined by the Constellation Program or forgo
the prestige and respect we now enjoy from the rest of the world.
Senator Nelson. You made the statement that we ought to go
back to the Moon, and I want you to tell us why you think
returning to the surface of the Moon is important as opposed to
a lunar fly-by and going to Lagrangian points as we ultimately
have the destination to go to Mars.
Mr. Armstrong. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do believe that there is value in returning to the Moon.
We know a thousand times more about the Moon than before
Apollo, but there is still so much of it that is undiscovered
and unventured upon. There may be valuable minerals or other
materials in the lunar surface that can be used at such time as
when permanent settlements will be made there. It is worthwhile
knowing about those things. So I do think there is value in
going to the surface.
Nevertheless, there is also value in using the Moon as a
location from which you do other activities, either Lagrangian
points or other positions at lunar distance that can be reached
easily by communication with only a second and a half time lag
and allows mission control to continue to be involved in the
efficiency and safety of the operation. We can learn in the
lunar regions many of the things that are still unknown or
undeveloped in our current state of knowledge about
interplanetary space travel, particularly things like radiation
protection and so on, where we have the possibility to get out
of real trouble when we get in it because we are so close to
home back to Earth. That is a possibility that we will not have
once we find ourselves months away from Earth. So consequently,
I think there is great value in continuing to include Moon as
an integral part of the space exploration program as we go
forward.
Senator Nelson. OK. And I will just close by saying that
Mr. Augustine said that they deliberated this on the panel, and
they pointed out that one of the things you have to sustain is
the support from the American people. What the Chairman of the
Augustine Commission wanted to do was to get that excitement
returned. And there was a legitimate question raised: Can you
get by going back to the Moon? And perhaps you can if we know
what our goal is. Now, the President has stated that goal.
Now, let us see if we can achieve it.
Thank you all very much. The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:41 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Hon. Charles F. Bolden, Jr.
Question 1. General, in conversations before this hearing with me
and with several of my staff members, you indicated that you had
available a detailed analysis that outlined the anticipated servicing
requirements for maintaining and sustaining the International Space
Station (ISS) through at least the year 2020, and that you would
provide that documentation very shortly to me and my staff. I would
like that information to be made a part of the record of this hearing,
and so I reiterate a request that you provide the following:
a. An in-depth assessment of all essential modules, operational
systems and components, structural elements, and permanent
scientific equipment on board or planned for delivery and
installation aboard the International Space Station, including
both United States and international partner elements, to
determine anticipated spare or replacement requirements to
ensure complete, effective, and safe function and full
scientific utilization of the ISS.
b. The identification of spare or replacement elements and
parts currently produced, in inventory, or on order, and the
state of readiness and schedule for delivery to the ISS,
including the planned transportation means for such delivery.
Each element identified shall include a description of its
location, function, criticality for system integrity, and
specifications regarding size, weight, and necessary
configuration for launch and delivery.
c. The identification of anticipated requirements for spare or
replacement elements not currently in inventory or on order, a
description of their location, function, criticality for system
integrity, the anticipated cost and schedule for design,
procurement, manufacture and delivery, and specifications
regarding size, weight, and necessary configuration for launch
and delivery, including launch vehicles known to be available
and capable of transportation of such items to the
International Space Station, in the event planned or proposed
transportation systems may not become available at all, or on a
timely basis in order to meet anticipated need-dates for
delivery to the ISS.
d. For all the above information, provide a summary of the
basis for the determinations made, including a description for
the underlying data, including, but not limited to, on-orbit
analysis of failure rate experience to date aboard ISS,
compared to manufacturing assumptions, requirements and
certifications lifecycle expectations. Also include any
description of evolution of maintenance plans requiring return
to Earth for failure analysis, refurbishment, remanufacture,
and return to ISS, versus alternate or current plans for on-
orbit repair or disposal.
Answer. NASA has processes in place to continually plan for the
operation of the ISS, and to adjust logistics resupply as required due
to onboard failures, new issues that arise, or systems operating longer
without failure than initially predicted. At a strategic level, the
Agency plans for the delivery of cargo to the ISS by a mixed fleet of
vehicles, and finalizes detailed manifests closer to the time of
flight. Therefore, it is not possible to provide the level of detail
requested for every piece of equipment to be launched to the ISS
through 2020.
However, in response to requests for detailed information about
current ISS parts inventory and NASA's plans for delivering components
to the Station and ensuring its sustainability to 2020, the Agency has
provided to Committee staff the following information:
A listing of the remaining items to be flown aboard the
Space Shuttle; this list covers science payloads to be flown as
part of the Shuttle missions, as well as those to be taken to,
or returned from ISS during Shuttle missions.
A preliminary manifest (MIM Rev K Strategic Flight Plan),
showing cargo and crew launches to ISS from March 2011 through
November 2014. This manifest shows the associated Orbital
Replacement Units (ORUs) on the different vehicles. In some
cases, allocations are to be determined based on the timeframe,
and smaller ORUs are not necessarily tracked at this level--
they in turn are manifested much closer to their respective
launches.
A detailed listing of ISS spares warehoused at Kennedy Space
Center, including part numbers, quantity, criticality code (a
description of the codes was also provided), and description/
function of each item. Except for the Blanket and Box-L,
Blanket and Box-R, and the HRS Radiator, all other ORUs are
available to fly on Commercial Resupply Services (CRS)
vehicles. Where they are ultimately manifested will be based on
replacement needs on orbit. The only ORU in inventory that can
only be flown in the Shuttle is the HRS Radiator. All other
large spares that require Shuttle to deliver will be pre-
positioned on ISS by Shuttle retirement.
A schematic of the ISS showing the External Orbital
Replacement Unit (ORU) Pre-Positioning Architecture, indicating
the 71 ORUs which will be pre-positioned in ten locations
around ISS as of January 2012.
A chart showing current projections of ISS requirements
versus cargo resupply capability from 2011 through 2020. This
chart provides projected metric tonnage to be delivered by
year, by vehicle type, including current and potential future
Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) providers, as well as
International Partner vehicles. Requirements are broken out by
crew supplies, water, and gas; maintenance. Extravehicular
Activity (EVA) demand; baseline utilization; and, contingency
maintenance, potential research opportunities.
A briefing by the Associate Administrator for the Space
Operations Mission Directorate on sustaining ISS operations
through 2020 after the Space Shuttle is retired. Topics covered
included internal and external spares strategy; post-Shuttle
launch capability, including the flexibility to accommodate
delays in the availability of CRS vehicles; sparing plans for
different Station systems (e.g., batteries, carbon dioxide
removal systems, oxygen generation); and, water inventory and
propellant requirements.
Question 2. The 2008 Act required a report, within 120 days of
enactment (October 15, 2009) of what would be necessary to sustain the
ISS vehicle and systems through at least 2020. A report was finally
received on August 7th, 2009. It provided information that was not
particularly helpful and contained a number of contradictory items--
descriptions of critical systems for which analysis would be made in
2011--AFTER the planned end of Shuttle operations--for systems that
appear unlikely to be able to be transported to the ISS on any vehicle
other than the Shuttle. In most cases, reliance for delivery was placed
on ``planned'' availability of COTS cargo capability, because the
additional cargo-delivery systems, the Russian Progress vehicle, the
Japanese HTV and the European ATV, would still leave a short-fall of 40
metric tons of required supplies. There was no indication of the impact
of a failure of either the COTS cargo capability or the ATV and HTV
systems, neither of which had flown to the ISS at that stage. Can you
explain why this situation and response by NASA should inspire
confidence that the needs of ISS sustainability are either a) fully
understood and considered, or b) considered to be a serious defect in
contingency planning to ensure ISS sustainability?
Answer. Pursuant to Section 601 of NASA Authorization Act of 2008
(P.L. 110-422), the NASA report, ``Plan to Support Operations and
Utilization of the International Space Station Beyond FY 2015,'' noted
that after the retirement of the Space Shuttle, the International Space
Station (ISS) will be maintained by U.S. commercial cargo resupply
systems and the International Partners' vehicles. This provides the
Program with redundant systems for Station replenishment, in case there
is a failure of a particular vehicle. The report described NASA's
assessment of the major ISS systems and their viability beyond 2015,
projected upmass and downmass requirements through 2020, and noted
strategies to mitigate downmass constraints. As NASA and its partners
continue to gain experience with the ISS, which has already been
continuously crewed for almost 10 years, the sustainability assessments
will be further honed. It is important to note that, with the exception
of the HRS Radiator spare, all ISS spares that have not been
prepositioned on orbit before the retirement of the Shuttle can be
flown on other vehicles. Thus, in addition to having critical
prepositioned spares on orbit, the Program will be able to fly ground-
based spares to ISS, as needed.
Question 3. I should note that NASA was asked--at the urging of
myself and other Members to the Augustine panel--to provide similar
information to that Review of Human Space Flight plans. That submission
was, in fact, more responsive and informative than the identical
summary provided to the Congress, in roughly the same time period. The
difference was, that the submission to the Augustine panel was
considered an internal communication and did not require review--and
amendment--by OMB. We have both submissions, and the comparison is
dramatic. The same is true regarding the report required by the 2008
Act regarding options for extending Space Shuttle flights. The NASA
submission to the Augustine panel was much more informative--and in
fact, I believe formed the basis for the fact that Shuttle extension to
2015 was one of the options put forward by the Augustine panel in its
final report. Is this an indication that, when the Congress requests
information from NASA, the factual programmatic expert response of the
NASA engineering and program managers is, in effect, diverted by OMB in
a way that deprives the Congress of the accurate and complete
information we need to make informed decisions?
Answer. All NASA reports to Congress, including the ``Plan to
Support Operations and Utilization of the International Space Station
Beyond FY 2015'' and the ``Impacts of Shuttle Extension,'' are written
to respond to the particular Congressional reporting requirement. The
Agency endeavors to provide accurate and complete information in these
reports, which are written with technical inputs from cognizant Agency
personnel and vetted within the Administration to ensure consistency
with policy.
Question 3a. How do you respond to the fact that, at this point in
time, we simply do not know, with any degree of certainty, that there
may be essential components without which the full functionality--or
even survivability--of the ISS can be assured, which would require the
capacity of the Space Shuttle to be able to deliver?
Answer. Please see the NASA response to Question Number 2, above.
With the exception of the HRS Radiator spare, all ISS spares that have
not been prepositioned on orbit before the retirement of the Shuttle
can be flown on other vehicles.
Question 4. Let me turn to the new plan announced by the President
to revive the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle that is part of the
canceled Constellation Program, but in a design modification that would
allow it to be launched unmanned on an expendable launch vehicle, to
serve as a life-boat for the ISS. How is that development going to be
paid for, and what is your estimate for the cost and the schedule for
delivery to the ISS?
Answer. NASA and the White House look forward to working with
Congress to develop a plan that balances a restructured Orion project
with the other priorities in NASA's FY 2011 budget. All of the pending
appropriations and authorization bills match the President's top-line
request for NASA, so any costs for a restructured Orion would need to
be offset by reductions to other line-items.
Question 4a. How many such vehicles would be required? Would they
be cycled every 6 months, like the Soyuz vehicles, or would they have a
longer on-orbit stay-time?
Answer. A NASA study team that is developing plans for an emergency
return vehicle is assuming a goal of at least a 3-year life on the ISS,
and is assessing the technical details and costs associated with
achieving this goal.
Question 4b. How many seats would they provide? Would they enable
the four seats that the United States is still obligated to provide
under the Memoranda of Understanding and Intergovernmental Agreements
for ISS signed in 1998?
Answer. The emergency return vehicle study team assumed a
requirement to return up to four crew members. This is consistent with
the capabilities of the most current design for Orion's ISS mission
version.
Question 4c. Would that mean that the total crew size could be
expanded to seven, as originally planned, thus enabling greater
potential for crew time being applied to research, as opposed to ISS
maintenance? If so, how would that impact the models for cargo and
supply requirements?
Answer. The plan for the emergency return vehicle would limit the
use of the spacecraft to an emergency crew return capability. This
would enable the return of up to four astronauts at a time, but since
the vehicle would be launched un-crewed to the ISS, the Expedition crew
size would be constrained to six by the use of two Soyuz spacecraft at
a time for transportation to and from the Station.
Question 4d. Given the three-seat limitations on Soyuz, would that
make it impossible to expand the crew size because of no way to deliver
the sufficient number of crews to ISS? If so, what is the advantage of
developing and using the Orion as a crew-rescue vehicle only?
Answer. Please see the NASA response to Question Number 4d, above.
The development and use of the emergency return vehicle would provide a
redundant rescue capability that would complement that of Soyuz and
enable the ISS program to move away from ``single string'' dependency
in that area. In addition, an emergency return vehicle could serve as
the basis for further development of spacecraft technology for
exploration.
Question 4e. How would the cost of development and launch of the
Orion CRV compare to the cost of simply continuing to pay for Russian
Soyuz to serve the crew escape function?
Answer. NASA is still assessing the costs of developing, launching,
and operating an Orion emergency return vehicle.
Question 5. In the 2005 NASA Authorization Act, signed into law as
Public Law 109-155, the Congress stated that it was ``the policy of the
United States to possess the capability for human access to space on a
continuous basis.'' The law went on to make it clear that such
capability for human access to space on a continuous basis was to be
provided by U.S. transportation systems, not by other nations'
capabilities that we would ``rent'' or purchase access from. It is also
a matter of international agreement, within the ISS implementing
agreements, that the U.S. would be responsible for providing access to
the ISS for European, Japanese, and Canadian crew members. The decision
to terminate Space Shuttle operations in 2010, at least 4 years before
any replacement U.S. capability was then planned to be available, was a
direct violation of both the spirit and the letter of that law. When
you and your Deputy Administrator each took the oath of office as
Administrator, after confirmation by the Senate, you both swore to
uphold the laws of the United States. What have you done, since
assuming your positions, to ensure that the law of the United States,
establishing a policy of continuous U.S. capability for human
spaceflight, is upheld?
Answer. As noted in the above response the ``gap'' in U.S. human
spaceflight capability was the result NASA not having sufficient
resources to simultaneously fund continuing Shuttle operations while
developing the next generation U.S. human spaceflight program. The fact
of the gap has been long established; the questions have been how long
the gap would last, and what domestic system(s) the U.S. would use in
the future. The new direction for the Agency aims to minimize this
period by encouraging a robust commercial space industry in LEO that
can provide crew transportation services to the U.S. and its European,
Japanese, and Canadian ISS partners.
Question 5a. If a proposal by the Administration--whether the Obama
Administration or the Bush Administration, created and imposed on NASA
by the Office of Management and Budget, or by the Office of Science and
Technology Policy--represents a direct circumvention of the law, what
is your responsibility, as the Administrator of the agency empowered to
implement that law, to take steps to inform the authors of that
proposal that their actions are in violation of the law, and to insist
that they adhere to the law and policy established by the Congress?
Answer. It is the responsibility of everyone in public service to
uphold the laws of the United States, and to ensure that proposals they
advocate adhere to the law. In April 2009, NASA submitted to the
Congress its Human Space Flight Capabilities report, which responded to
language in Section 611(a) of the NASA Authorization Act of 2008 (P.L.
110-422) directing NASA to report on the lack of a U.S. human
spaceflight system to replace the Space Shuttle upon its planned
retirement. This requirement was an amendment to a reporting
requirement in Section 501 of the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (P.L.
109-115), referenced above. This report was required by law in case it
was determined that the U.S. would not be able to maintain the
capability for human access to space on a continuous basis.
Question 6. The Statement of Work defined in the 2008 Request for
Proposal for the Cargo Resupply Services contracts, issued to both
SpaceX and Orbital Sciences Corporations, indicate a requirement (page
159) for delivery to the ISS during Calendar Year 2010 of 2.7 Metric
Tons of Internal Upmass, and one-half metric ton of return down-mass
and 1.5 metric ton of disposal downmass. Have these requirements been
modified under the CRS contracts? If not, can you provide:
The current schedule for which compliance with these requirements
are anticipated.
Answer. The Statement of Work provided the initial requirements for
the service providers to bid against. After contract award, actual
upmass requirements and launch dates are negotiated with each provider
and are baselined through the Vehicle Baseline Review for each mission.
NASA and SpaceX have baselined the first three commercial cargo
missions.
SpaceX CRS I September 2011 (tentative)
SpaceX CRS 2 October 2011
SpaceX CRS3 June 2012
NASA is in the process of baselining the first Orbital Sciences
Corporation commercial cargo mission through the Vehicle Baseline
Review process.
Question 6a. Whether alternative means have been identified for
delivery and return of the specified amounts of material.
Answer. The initial cargo manifest for any first cargo mission to
the ISS is limited to low priority items. Initial Statement Of Work
requirements for cargo in 2010 have been redistributed between the
remaining Shuttle missions and International Partner vehicles.
Question 6b. Any impact to ISS provisioning and operations
resulting from a failure to meet these requirements.
Answer. In the event of slips to the schedule for Commercial
Resupply Services (CRS) flights, on-orbit spares that have been pre-
positioned will be employed to the extent necessary. Since requirements
for component removal and replacement are a function of failure rates,
this cannot be predicted with the precision requested. The pre-
positioning strategy for spares and consumables, as well as the cargo
capacity and flexibility available on Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV),
H-II Transfer Vehicle (and Progress missions, ensures that any impacts
to ISS operations and maintenance will be minimal during this period.
Question 7. From the standpoint of relatively near-term human
spaceflight, the President's proposed budget and associated plan seem
focused on: (a) The development of a commercial, as opposed to
government-owned human spaceflight launch capability and (b) The
continuation--and expansion--of support to the International Space
Station to at least 2020. Would you agree with me that, in actual fact,
the two initiatives are directly interwoven, in that the real driver
behind the business case for commercial space launch capability--for
both cargo, as under the COTS program now underway, and for human
spaceflight, at least in its early stages--is the existence of a
viable, healthy, safe and functioning International Space Station?
Answer. The decision to extend the International Space Station
(ISS) likely to 2020 or beyond provided a real, sustainable, and
relatively long-term base market for commercial human space
transportation services. In the near-term, NASA hopes to be a reliable
customer for human space transportation services for U.S. and U.S.-
designated astronauts for the ISS. Longer term, NASA hopes that this
initiative will enable the eventual development of a robust, vibrant,
profit-making commercial enterprise with many providers and a wide
range of private and public users.
Question 8. As you begin to develop the requirements for a
competition for a commercial crew development contract, what would be
the target date for full operational capability, and how would you
define that?
Answer. NASA's current planning reflects development flight
demonstrations in 2014 and 2015, with the start of services flights in
2016. NASA has not yet established agreed-to terms for Initial
Operational Capability and Full Operational Capability. Those terms
will be established with individual partners during the negotiation
process.
Question 8a. What is your best estimate for when a commercial crew
launch system might be fully operational?
Answer. The start of services flights would coincide with the
system being ``fully operational,'' i.e., our estimate is 2016.
Question 9. Estimates I have heard, range from operational
capability within 3 years of the start of development, to as many as 5
or even 7 years. That would mean 2014 at the earliest, if you start in
2011, for which this budget is proposed, and as late as 2016 or 2018.
In the meantime--assuming the end of Shuttle operations 6 months from
now--for that 4 to 6 or 7 year period, the only vehicle available to
carry any crew members to or from the ISS is the Russian Soyuz. (Let's
assume, for the moment, that the newly-proposed Orion-derived Crew
Rescue vehicle is not going to be available for most of that same
period of time.)
What would happen, General Bolden, if there were an accident with
the Soyuz, either with the launch vehicle on ascent or the crew module
on descent, which were serious enough to ground the Soyuz for an
extended period of time while an accident investigation were completed
and any necessary changes made?
Answer. If an accident were to happen that would ground the Soyuz
launch vehicle and crew module, NASA, along with its partners, would
evaluate the risk to ISS operations including the state of the on-board
Expedition crew. The safety of the on-board Soyuz spacecraft would be
evaluated based on the particular failure. It is possible to make
certain modifications to the Soyuz spacecraft on-orbit if necessary.
Furthermore, the Soyuz spacecraft is a very robust system as
demonstrated by anomalies experienced during descent in 2007 and 2008,
which were subsequently reviewed and resolved. If it were determined
that the onboard crew would be required to stay on-orbit beyond their
certified Expedition period, it would be possible to extend the
certification of the crew and spacecraft systems.
In any case, NASA does not believe that there is any scenario
related to a Soyuz accident that would require the immediate de-crewing
of the ISS after a Soyuz accident. Any actions taken by NASA would be
coordinated with the ISS Partners as well as with Congress and the
White House.
Question 9a. How long would it be before the six-person crew still
aboard the ISS would have to evacuate--using, I would point out, two of
the very same kind of vehicles which just experienced a critical
failure, assuming the failure occurred on descent?
Answer. See NASA response to Question Number 9 above. It should
also be noted that any need to de-crew the ISS is directly related to
the consumable stores on-board, health of the crew, health of the ISS,
and the health of the spacecraft. This is a dynamic situation that
requires in-depth analysis based on the constraining parameters at the
time of occurrence.
Question 10. If, in this scenario, the ISS crew had to abandon
ship, how long could the untended ISS remain viable in a minimal state
of ground-controlled automated activity, before its orbit might
deteriorate or systems might begin to fail without crew maintenance, to
the point it would be irretrievable or impossible to reactivate once
the Soyuz were able to fly again?
Answer. NASA has plans and procedures in place for the crew to take
necessary measures to configure the ISS platform in order to maintain
safe untended operations for an extended period. Among the tasks the
crew would perform would be to configure the ISS for a minimum power
usage and close all hatches. The ISS systems that are needed to
maintain a stable and viable vehicle are robust in their ability to
perform even after failures and anomalies. Key systems such as the
electrical power system; guidance, navigation and control;
communications; and, active propulsion have multiple layers of
redundancy. The ISS would also be boosted to a higher orbit to maintain
altitude, defer re-entry, and allow time for thorough analysis of
recovery options.
Question 11. Given the seriousness of this very plausible and
possible scenario, it is of great concern to me that answers to these
questions are not clearly available and have not been fully addressed
before the decision was made to launch the country on this path for
human spaceflight. Can you explain why these contingencies have not
been fully--and satisfactorily--addressed BEFORE the FY 2011 budget and
the new plan for human spaceflight was adopted by the Administration?
Answer. The reliance of the ISS partners on a single crew
transportation system (Soyuz) for a period of time between the
retirement of the Space Shuttle and the development of a follow-on
system was established years ago when it was determined to retire the
Shuttle at the completion of ISS assembly. NASA cannot simultaneously
fund continuing Shuttle operations while developing the next generation
U.S. human spaceflight program, so a period of ``single-string''
reliance on Soyuz was unavoidable. NASA has been working with its
Partners to ensure that the ISS is functionally and operationally
robust in performance and in spares provisioning in order to mitigate
any risk from a potential grounding of the Soyuz fleet. NASA believes
that the plans it has put in place with the ISS Partners to provision
the ISS by multiple transportation vehicles from Russia, Europe, Japan,
and U.S. suppliers provide a very robust capability to safely operate
and crew the ISS. Furthermore, the ISS itself is robust in design and
operational capability to be operated safely without on orbit crew, as
outlined in the NASA response to Question Number 10 above.
Question 12. The Administration says it is ushering in a new era of
doing business with these emerging entrepreneurs. It may be a new era
but the fact is that substantial tax dollars are being funneled into
these ventures both in terms of funding development work as well as
funding actual missions. What is the specific analysis behind the
agency's projected costs for reliance on the commercial ventures
intended to provide cargo and ultimately crewed missions to the ISS?
What is the basis for confidence in the reliability of these projected
cost estimates? Given the steep learning curve these new ventures are
on what is to prevent their costs, and therefore their ultimate
pricing, from quickly outrunning the agency's out-year forecasts?
Answer. NASA believes that the $6 billion provided for commercial
crew in the President's budget request would be sufficient to award
multiple development agreements, thus increasing the likelihood that
multiple partners would succeed at developing a commercial crew
vehicle. In addition, it is noteworthy to point out what the Augustine
Committee said about the costs of potential crew cargo program:
``Comparing the scope of providing a commercial crew capability to the
cost of historical programs offers a sanity check. In the existing COTS
A-C contracts, two commercial suppliers have received or invested about
$400-$500 million for the development of a new launch vehicle and
unmanned spacecraft. Gemini is the closest historical program in scope
to the envisioned commercial crew taxi. In about 4 years in the early-
to mid-1960s, NASA and industry human-rated the Titan II (which
required 39 months), and designed and tested a capsule. In GDP-
inflator-corrected FY 2009 dollars, the DDT&E cost of this program was
about $2.5-3 billion, depending on the accounting for test flights.
These two comparatives tend to support the estimate that the program
can be viable with a $5 billion stimulus from NASA.
The Agency has not yet decided which contracting mechanism would be
used for the development effort and or eventual procurement of
commercial crew services. Should the Agency use a fixed-price
agreement, for example, NASA's investment would be fixed and any cost
overruns would be the responsibility of the commercial provider. The
same can be said of the Agency's agreement with its current cargo
partners, both in the development and services phases. NASA's
investment in both phases is fixed and thus any cost-growth will be the
responsibility of our industry partners.
Question 12a. What are the specific terms and conditions that NASA
intends to levy on these new ventures, and if the agency has not
developed such detailed terms, how can it with confidence provide out-
year budget forecasts?
Answer. NASA is developing a plan that supports the development of
commercial crew transportation providers to whom NASA could
competitively award crew transportation services. On May 21, 2010, NASA
issued a Request for Information (RFI) seeking information that will
help NASA formulate plans for Commercial Crew Transportation as
proposed in the FY 2011 budget request.
This RFI requested industry feedback to the NASA plans for
certifying commercial crew vehicles for NASA services, including the
Draft Commercial Human Rating Plan. In addition, the RFI sought input
on the general acquisition strategy and philosophy. A second RFI is
planned in the late summer time-frame for industry feedback on the ISS
Service Requirements Document and Interface Requirements Document.
RFI responses were due to NASA on June 11, 2010, and NASA is in the
process of reviewing the proposals received. With feedback from these
proposals, NASA will finalize the remaining requirements, reference
documents, and acquisition strategy so that it is prepared to issue a
commercial crew solicitation upon Congressional approval of the FY 2011
President's budget request for commercial crew efforts.
Question 12b. What are the specific exposures to the American
taxpayer if NASA eventually terminates the commercial contracts just
like it is canceling Constellation contracts, or for that matter, if
the commercial ventures fail to fulfill their end of the contract?
Answer. The potential exposure as a result of termination would
depend on the terms and conditions of the instruments eventually
selected to support the development, demonstration and services phases
of any commercial crew transportation activity. Since NASA has not
completed its acquisition strategy, we cannot currently state what
those exposures are likely to be.
Question 12c. What are the specific internal controls with these
vendors that are being stipulated to ensure that taxpayer dollars are
being properly utilized by these contractors? In their absence, how can
the public be assured that their hard earned monies are not being used
to pay lobbyists or other extracurricular activities not duly
authorized?
Answer. Details of the acquisition strategy have not been
finalized. However, NASA can assure the Congress that all applicable
Federal rules and regulations will be applied and followed regarding
the contractor use of funds.
Question 13. What specific analysis is behind the $2.5B
Constellation Program termination cost figure in the FY 2011 Budget
Request for FY 2011 and FY 2012? To what specific uses will those funds
be applied?
Answer. The FY 2011 budget request transitions away from the
Constellation Program, and in doing so, provides a total of $2.5
billion in FY 2011 and FY 2012 for Constellation closeout and
transition costs--funding that is expected to cover closeout activity
associated with facilities, environmental remediation, workforce, and
prime and support contracts. A portion of this funding will also be
used to support the retraining of Shuttle program contractors as that
program is brought to a successful close. It should be noted, however,
that at present, the breakdown of costs is not complete. The Agency is
using the current budget planning activities to develop the details;
and an implementation plan and coordinated communications with NASA
responsible offices and current Constellation contractors are required
to further refine this estimate, which is consistent with past planning
experience and cost estimation for the Space Shuttle Transition and
Retirement. NASA's experience with close-out of the Shuttle program
will serve as a useful reference for the complexity of the tasks and
the potential associated costs.
Question 14. General, you heard bipartisan concern at the CJS
Appropriations Subcommittee hearing where you testified, that NASA is,
in the judgment of some members of this body, willfully encouraging
vendors working on the Constellation program to self-terminate
contracts in spite of very clear language in last year's appropriations
bill directing the agency to continue implementing the authorized
program of record. The response from NASA's General Counsel to a
question following that hearing claims that the agency believes it CAN
terminate vendor contracts associated with the program of record based
on its interpretation of the words in the appropriations bill (but that
it has not done so). General, I am being charitable when I call that
interpretation of Congressional intent nonsensical. It was, and is the
intent of the members of this body that your agency follow the law and
implement the program of record, which is Constellation, until we
direct you otherwise.
Can you explain to us why, if you are faithfully implementing the
program of record, we continue to hear from vendors that the agency
``contemplates'' contract termination and is actively suggesting that
vendors need to consider their ``termination liability''? Why is the
agency even suggesting program termination to the vendors, in whatever
context, since we have given you no indication we are going to cancel
Constellation?
Answer. NASA is not doing anything unprecedented. The Agency is
managing the contracts in precisely the way that is required under both
the Anti-Deficiency Act and the Federal Acquisition Regulations. Please
reference the Government Accountability Office Opinion B-320091, July
23, 2010, National Aeronautics and Space Administration--Constellation
Program and Appropriations Restrictions, Part II. NASA has advised
contractors that the Government is not obligated to reimburse them for
any costs incurred in excess of the total amount allotted by the
Government to their respective contracts.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Hon. Charles F. Bolden, Jr.
Question. The three NASA centers in my state, the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL), Ames Research Center, and Dryden Flight Research
Center, have all been an integral part of your agency's missions,
producing world class research and development in the areas of
aeronautics, Earth and space sciences, biotechnology, robotics, climate
change research, and the next generation of flight technology. It is
important that these centers retain their highly skilled workforce and
fully maintain and expand their current research programs. Will you
commit to continue to fully fund all three California NASA centers?
Answer. Yes, NASA plans to fully fund all three Agency centers
located in California, as stated in the FY 2011 President's budget
request. NASA agrees that it is important to maintain a highly skilled
workforce as well as fully maintain and expand current research
programs.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Hon. Charles F. Bolden, Jr.
Question 1. With NASA's proposed extension of the International
Space Station through 2020, do you believe it's important for NASA to
continue to pursue Ares I as a back-up if commercial space vehicles
fail to meet NASA's needs?
Answer. NASA does not support the continued development of the Ares
I crew launch vehicle.
As outlined in my testimony, the President and his staff, as well
as my NASA senior leadership team, closely reviewed the Augustine
Committee report, and we came to the same conclusion as the Committee:
The human spaceflight program, including Ares I, was on an
unsustainable trajectory. Therefore, the President recognized that what
was truly needed for beyond LEO exploration was game-changing
technologies; making the fundamental investments that will provide the
foundation for the next half-century of American leadership in space
exploration. Therefore, the FY 2011 budget request invests in
commercial providers to transport astronauts to the ISS, which will
allow NASA to once again focus on the most difficult technological
puzzles such as building rockets that allow humans to reach other
planets in days rather than months and protecting humans from radiation
during interplanetary travel. NASA's FY 2011 budget request also
includes investments in a new space technology research and
development, and a new heavy-lift and propulsion technology development
program.
NASA recognizes that the development of a commercial crew
transportation capability will share the same risks that are typical in
any aggressive, challenging space hardware development program.
Therefore, NASA is in the process of structuring its plan to support
development of a commercial crew transportation capability, should the
FY 2011 budget provide funding for this activity. At this time, if
budget authority is provided, NASA plans to support the development
efforts of multiple providers and to provide significant technical
support during the development phase. This will maximize the likelihood
that selected commercial providers will successfully complete
development activities and will minimize the impact to the Agency if
any one commercial provider is not fully successful in its development
activities. With regard to the procurement of commercial crew services,
NASA is hopeful that more than one partner will be selected to supply
those services, thus providing redundancy of capabilities. Should those
capabilities fail to materialize on time, NASA has purchased Soyuz
seats through 2014 and has legislative authority to purchase additional
seats through mid-2016.
Question 2. The solid rocket technology used on the Space Shuttle
and Ares rockets are also used in missiles that contribute to our
Nation's defense. Is NASA coordinating with the Department of Defense
to ensure our national security interests are also considered in this
matter?
Answer. NASA will continue to work closely with our other
Government partners, including the Department of Defense as planning
for FY 2011 implementation moves forward.
NASA Administrator Bolden has consulted with his colleagues at the
Department of Defense and the National Reconnaissance Office. In
particular, the Administrator has had several meetings with Secretary
Donley, General Kehler, and General Carlson, and he plans to continue
to meet with them, as program decisions are made and we gain additional
insight into the potential relevance to the space industrial base.
Additionally, discussions are under way at all levels about
ensuring we carefully consider and maintain the space industrial base,
particularly with regard to NASA's discontinued use of solid rocket
fuel and motors following the cancellation of Constellation. Several
recent studies in this area, coupled with current dialogue in the
Government's Solid Rocket Motor Industrial Base Interagency Task Force
and several other joint forums, also address the this important area
and NASA will continue to work to resolve any integrated issues in
these joint forums at all levels. For example, NASA is working with
Defense officials to develop a plan to maintain the intellectual and
engineering capacity, including key workforce skills, to support next-
generation rocket motors as needed. The task force is co-chaired by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense's Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics office and NASA and includes representatives from the
Department of Defense, NASA, the Missile Defense Agency, the Air Force,
the Army, and the Navy.
While NASA has not conducted any formal assessments in these areas,
NASA has worked with Defense officials to develop a plan to maintain
the intellectual and engineering capacity, including key workforce
skills, to support next-generation rocket motors as needed. The task
force is co-chaired by the Office of the Secretary of Defense's
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics office and NASA and includes
representatives from the Department of Defense (DOD), NASA, the Missile
Defense Agency, the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy. This DOD report,
entitled ``SRM Industrial Base Interim Sustainment Plan'' was submitted
to Congress on June 23, 2010.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Warner to
Hon. Charles F. Bolden, Jr.
Question 1. The U.S. aviation industry will continue to face
pressure from domestic and international stakeholders to reduce carbon
emissions. Investment in aeronautics will be critical on this issue and
NASA Langley is especially well positioned to be a leader on green
aviation. What is the future of green aviation for NASA and what will
Langley's role be in that future? Do you see a commercial role in this
industry? Also, will NASA establish a lead Center for green aviation?
Answer. NASA will continue to invest in aviation vehicle and
operations research to improve fuel efficiency, lower noise levels, and
reduce harmful emissions. Our goals are embodied within the National
Aeronautics R&D Plan as updated in February 2010. Within its proposed
FY 2011 aeronautics R&D portfolio, NASA has in place plans for research
on advanced, highly efficient and environmentally friendly aircraft,
more efficient and quieter aircraft engines, and air traffic control
procedures to increase capacity and minimize delays in the air and on
the ground. As one of NASA's primary aeronautics research centers, the
Langley Research Center (LaRC) will continue to play key roles in green
aviation research. The LaRC workforce and facilities are involved in
conducting research on topics such as laminar flow for reduced airframe
drag, airframe noise reduction, structural concepts for reduced
airframe weight, advanced propulsion/airframe integration concepts for
reduced noise and fuel burn, design of low-boom, low-emissions
supersonic aircraft, and multidisciplinary systems analysis techniques
to enable design of new aircraft systems.
NASA utilizes cooperative relationships with commercial industry,
other Federal agencies, and academia to realize the successful
execution, implementation and transition of our research. We solicit
ideas and concepts from the community through NASA Research
Announcements, and investigate promising technologies and operational
concepts in partnership with industry and other Federal agencies. The
Agency also has established close ties with other Federal agencies such
as the Federal Aviation Administration to better align our research
activities and support eventual transition to operational use. NASA
makes the results of this research broadly available to the aeronautics
community so that aircraft and propulsion system manufacturers can
confidently transition these technologies into the operational
environment.
NASA does not plan to establish a lead Center for green aviation
research. Our green aviation research is integrated across our
portfolio and is conducted within our Integrated Systems Research
Program, Fundamental Aeronautics Program, and Airspace Systems Program,
and takes place at the Langley, Glenn, and Ames Research Centers and at
the Dryden Flight Research Center. The Langley Research Center will
play an important role in the management and conduct of these research
activities as it is the host center for one of the critical projects,
Environmentally Responsible Aviation, and participating in all of the
green aviation research activities.
Question 2. In what ways will NASA re-engineer its organization and
processes to support robust commercial space transport of humans and
cargo to the ISS? How will NASA insure the safety of commercially
developed crew space transportation systems? Are there ways to partner
between NASA and commercial firms similar to the way NASA Langley
worked in collaboration with the FAA to insure the safety of commercial
airlines?
Answer. Safety is and always will be NASA's first core value, so
the Agency will provide significant--but not intrusive--oversight over
any commercial venture, whether it be cargo or commercial. For example,
NASA has a Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Advisory
Team comprised of approximately 100 NASA technical experts from across
the Agency. These experts work with our partners and review partner
technical and programmatic progress for each milestone and provide
progress assessments to NASA's Commercial Crew Cargo Program Office.
Additionally, they participate in all major design reviews providing
technical review comments back to our partners. The advisory team
provides another method by which NASA gains confidence that our
partners will be able to perform their flight demonstrations.
One of the strengths of the COTS venture is that we let the
companies do what they do best, that is developing truly unique
spaceflight vehicles using innovative processes that aren't available
within the Federal bureaucratic framework. NASA gives them requirements
that they have to meet and the Agency ensures that they have met those
requirements, but NASA tries not to dictate how they meet those
requirements. For example, each COTS partner must successfully verify
compliance with a detailed set of International Space Station (ISS)
interface and safety requirements prior to their planned ISS berthing
missions. These requirements are imposed on all Visiting Vehicles
wishing to visit to the ISS. Both COTS partners are currently working
with the ISS program on a daily basis to ensure they meet the ISS
visiting vehicle requirements. This also helps to give NASA independent
insight into their progress and it builds confidence in their
abilities.
With regard to commercial crew, at no point in the development and
acquisition of commercial crew transportation services will NASA
compromise crew safety. Simply put, U.S. astronauts will not fly on any
spaceflight vehicle until NASA is convinced it is safe to do so. NASA
has unique expertise and history in this area, and a clearly
demonstrated record of success in transporting crew. NASA will bring
that experience to bear in the appropriate way to make sure that
commercial crew transportation services are a success both
programmatically, and with respect to safety. At no point in the
development and acquisition of commercial crew transportation services
will NASA compromise crew safety. For example, NASA will have in-depth
insight of the vehicle design via NASA personnel who are embedded in
the contractor's facility. Additionally, NASA will impose strict
requirements and standards on all providers that will be carefully
evaluated and reviewed at multiple stages before a vehicle system is
certified by NASA for crewed flight.
With regard to Langley Research Center's past collaboration with
the FAA, NASA is always looking for innovative ways to partner and
collaborate with other Federal agencies and stakeholders, and we
capture lessons learned from these partnerships and apply them,
whenever possible to future ventures. It is too early to say whether
NASA could establish a similar research partnership with commercial
space entities, given that we are in the process of finalizing our
acquisition plan for commercial crew services, should Congress approve
the NASA FY 2011 budget request.
To prepare for an eventual solicitation, on May 21, 2010, NASA
issued a Request for Information (RFI) seeking information that will
help NASA formulate plans for Commercial Crew Transportation (CCT) as
proposed in the FY 2011 budget request. This RFI requested industry
feedback to the NASA plans for certifying commercial crew vehicles for
NASA services, including the Draft Commercial Human Rating Plan. In
addition, the RFI sought input on the general acquisition strategy and
philosophy. A second RFI is planned in the late summer time-frame for
industry feedback on the ISS Service Requirements Document (SRD) and
Interface Requirements Document (IRD). RFI responses were due to NASA
on June 18, 2010. With this feedback, NASA will finalize the remaining
requirements, reference documents, and acquisition strategy so that it
is prepared to issue a commercial crew solicitation upon Congressional
approval of the FY 2011 President's budget request for commercial crew
efforts.
Question 3. Can you give me an update of progress on initiatives to
have commercial companies carry cargo to the International Space
Station, and do you have enough funding in the FY11 budget to use
commercial firms to partner in these efforts.
Answer. NASA's commercial crew cargo program includes two phases--
the development phase which falls under the Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services (COTS) program and the services phase, which
falls under the Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) program.
With regard to COTS, NASA currently has two funded partners, SpaceX
and Orbital Sciences, which continue to make steady progress in
achieving their cargo demonstration milestones. While each has
experienced some milestone delays, this is not unexpected, since both
partners have aggressive, success-oriented schedules, and are facing
challenges typical of a spaceflight development program. As such, NASA
sees no reason to doubt either company's ability to achieve its desired
objectives--that of demonstrating commercial cargo delivery to and from
the International Space Station in the 2011 timeframe. More
specifically, both funded COTS cargo partners have progressed through
their system design milestones, all of which are paid SAA milestones.
Meeting existing SAA milestones is a primary indicator of progress, and
completion increases our confidence.
More specifically, SpaceX was awarded a COTS agreement in August
2006 and as of mid-July, had completed 17 of 22 negotiated milestones
for a total payment of $253 million out of $278 million. Space X is
currently scheduled to conduct its first NASA demonstration mission in
September 2010, followed by two additional demonstration flights in
2011. Orbital Sciences, on the other hand, has completed 12 of 19
milestones for a total payment of $140 million out of $170 million, and
the company is scheduled to complete its NASA demonstration mission in
June 2011. If approved by Congress, the President's FY 2011 budget
request will be sufficient to pay for milestones these companies expect
to achieve in FY 2011. Additionally, the President's budget request
includes funding to help accelerate the achievement of already-planned
milestones or introduce new milestones that would ultimately improve
mission success for NASA's commercial cargo effort.
SpaceX plans to launch its cargo delivery services from Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida, while Orbital plans to utilize
NASA launch facilities at Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia.
NASA has also signed a fixed price Commercial Resupply Services
(CRS) contract with both SpaceX and Orbital. The first commercial cargo
delivery by SpaceX is currently schedule for July 2011. NASA is
currently in negotiations with Orbital to baseline its first commercial
cargo delivery flight.
NASA is working with Orbital, the NASA Wallops Flight Facility and
the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport to establish the WFF as the launch
processing and launch site for the Orbital Taurus II vehicle which will
be used to launch the Orbital Cygnus vehicle that will carry cargo to
the ISS under the CRS contract.
Question 4. How best do we expand American commercial sector launch
capability and capacity to ensure a low-cost competitive launch market
to compete with the Russian, Chinese and Indian space programs for
market share?
Answer. Investing $6 billion in commercial crew efforts over the
next 5 years will allow NASA to focus on the forward-leaning work we
need to accomplish for beyond-LEO missions. Additionally, this
investment will:
Reduce the risk of relying solely on Russia to transport
astronauts to the ISS following the retirement of the Space
Shuttle;
Free up NASA resources to focus on the difficult challenges
in technology development, scientific discovery, and
exploration;
Make space travel more accessible and more affordable;
Build an enhanced U.S. commercial space industry that
creates new high-tech jobs, leverages private sector
capabilities, spawns other businesses and commercial
opportunities, and spurs growth in our Nation's economy; and,
Inspire a new generation of Americans by these commercial
ventures and the opportunities they will provide for additional
visits to space.
Additionally, NASA understands that human space exploration has
driven technological advances that have made the United States more
competitive in the global economy. NASA's new path forward will not
surrender the United States' leadership in space but rather will enable
the Nation to pursue exploration in new ways.
The FY 2011 budget request invests in commercial providers to
transport astronauts to the ISS. By allowing commercial providers to
provide more routine access to low-Earth orbit, NASA will once again be
able to focus on the most difficult technological puzzles to solve such
as building rockets that allow humans to reach other planets in days
rather than months and protecting humans from radiation during
interplanetary travel. NASA's FY 2011 budget request includes
investments in new space technology research and development, and a new
heavy-lift and propulsion technology development program. More
specifically, the budget request challenges NASA to develop the
necessary capabilities to send Americans to places that humans have not
explored before, including longer stays at exciting new locations on
the Moon, near-Earth objects, strategic deep space zones called
Lagrange points, and the planet Mars and its Moons. We have not sent
people beyond LEO in 38 years, and this budget gives us the great
opportunity to focus on scouting and learning more about destinations
to further explore our solar system and to develop the game-changing
technologies that will take us there. It is important that we pursue
these objectives to continue leading the world in human space
exploration.
By investing in new technologies, NASA will be supporting the
development of technologies and infrastructure that will allow U.S.
commercial launch providers to be more competitive in the global launch
marketplace, while at the same time helping NASA meet exploration and
science launch services needs. For example, the FY 2011 budget request
provides funding for the development of lower-cost, robust engines that
could be used for future Exploration systems as well as helping power,
lower-cost commercial launch vehicles. This strategy has already
assisted NASA's commercial cargo partners attract international launch
business, which in turn continues to support the U.S. commercial
spaceflight work force.
Question 5. With the extension of the International Space Station
to 2020 (and even perhaps to at least 2028 as Europeans have suggested)
how ready to you think the U.S. commercial spaceflight industry is to
have human-rated capability to launch either NASA or commercial
astronauts by mid-decade between 2014 and 2016 from facilities like the
one at Wallops Island, Virginia?
Answer. NASA agrees with the assessment of the Augustine Committee
which found that, ``Commercial services to deliver crew to low-Earth
orbit are within reach. While this presents some risk, it could provide
an earlier capability at lower initial and life-cycle costs than
government could achieve.'' Regarding when U.S. commercial companies
could be ready, NASA is targeting 2015 for commercial crew
demonstration flights and 2016 for the start of operations. The
commercial providers will be free to use whichever launch facilities
they deem to be the most appropriate given their technical and business
approaches.
Question 6. What role will private enterprise play in the
development of new space propulsion systems? I understand there are
some leap ahead commercial technologies that are scheduled to be flight
tested as called for in the NASA FY 2011 budget.
Answer. In the FY 2011 budget request, NASA plans to begin
development of new liquid propellant rocket engines for a future heavy
lift launch vehicle, demonstrate a high-power solar electric propulsion
system, and develop technologies and concepts for nuclear thermal
propulsion. These advanced propulsion technologies will enable NASA to
pursue human exploration missions beyond Earth orbit by increasing
payload capability and reducing trip time and cost.
Private enterprise will play a key role in development of new space
propulsion systems, in partnership with NASA. This includes a range of
propulsion technologies, from large powerful engines for new Earth-to-
orbit launch boosters, to small innovative propulsion systems for new
suborbital launch capabilities, to efficient advanced in-space
propulsion systems that could ultimately enable faster trips to Mars.
In all of these areas, NASA will partner with the private sector by
soliciting proposals to develop and test advanced propulsion systems
and related technologies. NASA has surveyed the technologies and
capabilities available in the private sector through several recent
Requests for Information. Through this process, NASA learned that
several companies are actively pursuing development of advanced
propulsion system concepts using their own resources.
Commercial space companies are creating innovative new propulsion
systems for smaller rockets that are inexpensive, reusable, and can fly
as often as four times a day. Some recent examples of this are
Armadillo Aerospace and Masten Space Systems, winners of the Lunar
Lander Challenge, one of NASA's Centennial Challenge incentive prizes.
These firms are also partnering with NASA to test their propulsion
systems Armadillo Aerospace for example used available NASA
infrastructure at White Sands to simulate flight conditions at high
altitude. These emerging launch firms are also selling rocket engines
on the commercial market (e.g., to the Rocket Racing League). Several
of these innovative entrepreneurs are conducting flight tests with
their new launch systems this year. NASA plans to purchase commercial
suborbital launch services from these emerging suborbital launch
providers under the Flight Demonstrations Program to conduct research
and technology demonstrations.
Another example is Ad Astra Rocket Company, which licensed NASA
technology and has entered into a series of partnership agreements with
NASA to develop the variable specific impulse magnetoplasma rocket
(VASIMR). This innovative technology has the potential for much more
efficiency than a conventional chemical rocket, and could double the
payload mass for lunar delivery or cut the transit time to Mars in
half. A demonstration of a prototype of the VASIMR on the ISS is under
consideration.
Question 7. How many companies beyond Orbital Sciences Corporation
and Space Technologies Corporation do you envision NASA awarding future
launch contracts?
Answer. For commercial crew development agreements, NASA hopes to
be able to fund multiple commercial companies. These agreements will be
open to all U.S. firms, both traditional and non-traditional aerospace
companies. For the services phase, NASA is hopeful that one or more
commercial provider will be viable.
Question 8. The X-Prize competitions have done an incredible job of
driving innovation and leveraging creativity in the private sector and
from unlikely sources. Could you describe NASA's efforts, through the
Centennial Challenges program or otherwise, at creating similar
competition-driven technological innovation efforts?
Answer. NASA's Centennial Challenges program is dedicated to
unleashing American ingenuity through prize competitions involving
technical problems of interest to NASA and the Nation. The Agency
believes student teams, private companies of all sizes and citizen-
inventors can provide creative solutions to these technical problems.
Prize competitions are a way to foster technological competitiveness,
new industries and innovation across America. These competitions are
open to anyone, competitors work without government support and awards
are made for the best solutions that are demonstrated in real-world
conditions, not for concepts or designs.
Since 2005, NASA has conducted 19 prize competitions in six
technical areas and has awarded $4.5 million to 13 different teams. On
July 13, 2010, NASA announced challenges in three new technical areas:
low-cost access to space, advanced automation and robotics, and energy
storage.
The Nano-Satellite Launch Challenge is to place a small
satellite into Earth orbit, twice in one week, with a prize of
$2 million. The goals of this challenge are to stimulate
innovations in low-cost launch technology and to encourage
creation of commercial nano-satellite delivery services.
The Night Rover Challenge is to demonstrate a solar-powered
exploration vehicle that can operate in darkness using its own
stored energy. The prize purse is $1.5 million. The objective
of this challenge is to stimulate innovations in energy storage
technologies of value in extreme space environments, such as
the surface of the moon, or for electric vehicles and renewable
energy systems here on Earth.
The Sample Return Robot Challenge is to demonstrate a robot
that can locate and retrieve geologic samples from a wide and
varied terrain without human control. This challenge has a
prize purse of $1.5 million and the objective is to encourage
innovations in automatic navigation and robotic manipulator
technologies.
The following are some examples of how the Centennial Challenges
have already spurred innovation, expanded interest in science and
technology and promoted the growth of new businesses supporting
government and private enterprises in aviation and space:
The Regolith Excavation Challenge required teams to build
mining robots that could function on the Moon. In the first
year of this challenge, 4 teams competed and none were
successful. The next year 16 teams came from across the country
but again none were successful. In the final year of the
challenge, 23 teams competed including many small robotics
companies and university teams and the performance was
remarkable. A team led by an undergraduate student from
Worcester Polytechnic Institute won the top prize. After
winning, those students immediately formed a robotics company.
Over 40 teams from Hawaii to Maine competed in that challenge
and each invested thousands of hours of work on a problem that
will be crucial to future development in space. NASA had the
opportunity to observe over 40 working prototypes of mining
robots and the total NASA investment over 3 years was only
$750,000.
The winner of the Astronaut Glove Challenge in 2007 was
Peter Homer, who at the time was an unemployed engineer in
Maine. He built his first space suit gloves on his family's
dining room table and involved his children in his work. After
winning the challenge, he formed a company to manufacture space
suit gloves and other high-tech gear. His company is now in a
partnership with others working on the next generation of
spacesuits.
The Lunar Lander Challenge required teams to build a
reusable rocket vehicle that could complete a round trip
flight, taking off and landing vertically with great accuracy.
A dozen teams took up this challenge and four of them actually
flew rocket vehicles. The top prizes went to Masten Space
Systems of Mojave, California and Armadillo Aerospace of Caddo
Mills, Texas. Both companies are pursuing commercial
spaceflight ventures and they were recognized by Aviation Week
magazine as ``Persons of the Year'' for 2009. NASA has
purchased one of the rocket vehicles that Armadillo Aerospace
built for the challenge and is using it in flight-testing of
new technologies for propulsion and automatic navigation
systems.
The Power Beaming Challenge involves the wireless
transmission of electrical power. Teams began using simple
searchlights as power sources in 2005 but have now progressed
to high-powered laser systems with sophisticated tracking
systems. In 2009, one team won the first-level prize by
transmitting power to a robot that climbed a vertical cable
over half-a-mile high. The challenge will be repeated this year
with the goal to complete the beam-powered vertical climb at
over 10 miles per hour. NASA is interested in the technology of
power beaming as a way to drive robots on the surface of the
Moon and other planets from remote power stations or for
advanced electric propulsion vehicles in space. The technology
could also enable remote power supplies for military operations
and disaster relief.
The Green Flight Challenge is to build and fly an aircraft
that can travel 200 miles in less than 2 hours using the energy
equivalent of less than one gallon of gasoline per occupant.
The challenge requires an aircraft with unprecedented
efficiency that at the same time must meet stringent
requirements for safety and noise reduction. The competition
will be held in July 2011 but there are already nine teams
working on aircraft entries. Electric, hybrid and bio-fueled
aircraft are expected. Innovations derived from this challenge
may help revive general aviation but find wider applications in
aircraft of all sizes, in other vehicles, and for energy
systems in general.
The Strong Tether Challenge is perhaps the most demanding
prize competition that NASA has offered. To win, a team must
demonstrate in a pull test that their material is 50 percent
stronger than the strongest commercially available material.
There have been no winners so far but carbon-nanotube tethers
have been entered in the past and advanced versions are
expected at the 2010 competition. The lightweight, super-strong
material than can win this challenge has the potential to
revolutionize almost every field of technology.
Question 8a. What are your thoughts on additional ways to harness
and leverage innovation outside of normal paths and in ways that will
stimulate and involve the next generation of innovators?
Answer. NASA is constantly seeking innovative ways to engage
audiences in NASA's mission and inspire the next generation of
scientists, engineers, innovators, and explorers.
National competition for NASA partnership or funding of novel ideas
to support STEM education are key strategies in ensuring NASA's
education investments remain current with audience demand and
expectations. Through the ``innovations'' competitive awards projects,
NASA's Office of Education is offering grants or cooperative agreements
to organizations with novel approaches to improving STEM education or
offering educational experiences in higher education, elementary and
secondary education, and global climate change education. Similarly,
the Summer of Innovation is encouraging the development of local and
state based STEM learning communities. These STEM support communities
will help meet the needs of schools and districts by providing
expertise, equipment, facilities, and STEM role models. The Summer of
Innovation is also promoting student participation in STEM-based
contests and competitions in which NASA scientists and engineers may
provide mentoring.
Periodically, NASA also offers a competitive Request for
Entrepreneurial Opportunities (REOs). Organizations selected through an
REO provide a unique service, or create new product or opportunity in
partnership with NASA. NASA provides content, access to facilities,
interactions with scientists and engineers, but no direct funding. An
REO supporting Summer of Innovation is currently open.
NASA often seeks public input on the design and distribution of new
products and activities. Under the authority of Open.gov, NASA used
IdeaScale to open a public call for ideas related to its education
program. IdeaScale will be used to seek public input on features to be
included in a new website promoting STEM careers for girls. NASA is
considering working with the entertainment industry to improve messages
about STEM careers. The Entertainment Industries Council has approached
NASA to investigate novel ways of inspiring student interest and
achievement in STEM by including NASA mission information in
television, film, and online features. Currently in work is Picture
This: Engineering, an opportunity for experts from the engineering
fields to help the entertainment community develop positive messages
about engineers and engineering.
NASA has a long history of using technology in its education
programs. The Agency keeps pace with technology advances by offering
activities and education experiences through media currently favored by
students, including pod and vodcasts, online simulations, online games,
and experiences in virtual worlds. Online professional development
opportunities provide educators with the flexibility in the content and
scheduling of their training needs. Examples of technologies employed
by NASA to make STEM fields more approachable and attractive to
students and educators include:
Gaming: NASA's Massively Multiplayer Online STEM Learning
Game, Moonbase Alpha was released in July 2010. In this game,
students must complete learning objectives as they repair a
damaged solar array and life support system.
Podcasts and Vodcasts: These short programs offer
information about NASA's current missions, science discoveries
in the news, and technological breakthroughs. Updates on
student research and internship opportunities are downloadable
in podcast format.
Virtual Worlds: Students can visit NASA virtual site and
participate in launches and other activities in virtual worlds,
including Teen Second Life, Farmville, OpenSim, and MoonWorld.
NASA has a complete educators training facility in Second Life,
on the NASA eEducation Island.
Blogging/Social Media: NASA is making increasing use of
social media including Facebook, Twitter, and blogs. NASA
content and activities provided through these media are
tailored by age ranges. Users can personalize their experience
by choosing subjects of individual interest and relevance.
Professional Development: Through the Digital Learning
Network and the Electronic Professional Development Network
projects, educators can complete self-directed or training
using NASA content. Educators gain depth of understanding in
topical areas and learn how to use NASA materials to inspire
their students.
Interactive user communities enable NASA's student and educator
audiences to engage with NASA's scientists and engineers, share ideas
and best practices, identify collaborative opportunities, network,
identify near peers, and benefit from mentoring relationships. NASA has
established user communities within several projects and audiences:
Higher Education: The NASA Student Ambassador Virtual
Community engages past participants in NASA's higher education
programs, encouraging mentoring, research collaboration, and
recruiting of future students.
K-12 Students: The Online Learning Community of the NASA
INSPIRE program fosters interaction between participants, NASA
subject matter experts, and peers.
K-12 Educators: Educators in the Endeavor Science Teacher
Certificate project participate in online coursework and use
their online community as a resource for positively impacting
STEM education initiatives. The newly revised NASA Explorer
Schools features a Virtual Campus community for educators to
share best practices and participate in content discussions
with NASA scientists and engineers. The NASA Educators Online
Community is a new effort to match the needs of educators, both
formal and informal, with the expertise of peers and NASA's
scientific and technical workforce. The NASATalk Professional
Collaborative.
Informal Education: NASA's Museum Alliance is an online
community-of-practice, in which members have direct access to
Agency-wide content from missions, materials, resources,
teleconferences, videoconferences, artifacts and news releases
in order to help them share NASA's exploration mission with the
American public.
Participatory exploration in NASA's mission allows students are
able to ask their own questions, utilize NASA's tools, collect
information and discover answers on their own. NASA supports this type
of activity in both K-12 and higher education programs.
Remote Control of NASA Instruments: The ISS EarthKAM enables
registered middle to remotely direct a camera on the ISS to
capture real times images of Earth. The Space Grant Internet
Telescope Network partnership of online astronomical
observatories allows higher education students and faculty to
gain experience using astronomical equipment locally and
remotely, which includes optical and/or radio telescopes, CCD
cameras, and spectrographs.
Science, Engineering, and Launches: NASA builds STEM skills
by providing hands on opportunities to build, launch, and
operate payloads and conduct research using NASA's unique
facilities. Graduate Student Experiences and Undergraduate
Student Research Projects address NASA technology needs. Launch
programs like Rock On! inspire first hand interest in NASA
engineering. In July 2010, NASA announced selection of research
to be conducted on the ISS. The research projects were
developed by elementary and secondary students and proposed
through the Kids in Micro-g! program.
Accessing On-Orbit Resources: Activities like education
downlinks and Amateur Radio on the International Space Station
ham radio conversations allow the public to interact with
astronauts as they conduct scientific and engineering
activities on the ISS and Shuttle. Each year, tens of thousands
of students engage with crews that work 200+ miles above the
Earth.
Proposed for FY 2011, the Office of the Chief Technologist
(OCT) plans to oversee a new, innovative graduate fellowship
program, which is an important part of the Space Technology
Research Grants program. This fellowship program focuses on
competitive selection of U.S. citizen graduate student research
that shows significant promise for future application to NASA
missions. This effort will train the next generation of
aerospace engineers and scientists by funding NASA-related
graduate student research performed on campus during the
academic year, as well as research performed at NASA Centers
during the summer months. Each student in this project will be
matched to a NASA researcher who will serve as the student's
NASA advisor. Through this experience, students will advance
their STEM education, gain NASA experience and learn the
research and development processes. NASA plans to highlight
this student research through a number of symposia, conference,
and mission-related events over the course of the student's
academic career. In addition, by bringing students to the NASA
Centers for considerable periods of time and matching the
student's research interests with those of a NASA advisor, we
intend to rebuild the pipeline of new STEM talent needed for
NASA's future missions. In FY 2011, $30M within the Space
Technology Program is planned for this new program.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Norman R. Augustine
Question 1. Mr. Augustine, I'd like to ask you a couple of
questions about the report issued by the Committee you recently led. In
the report, your committee provides five primary paths forward, with
two additional variants, for a total of seven ``alternatives'' with
varying technology and destination mixes. These range from the
Constellation program of record, which as I recall you found is not
sustainable based primarily on funding, to an implementable program of
record and several flexible path options.
Answer. Our committee concluded that the existing Constellation
program, and in particular Ares I, was not executable because of past
funding mismatches and shortfalls in future budget plans. These have
caused severe schedule slips, making the program objectives (e.g.,
support of ISS) highly tenuous. In addition, the efficacy of
establishing a lunar return as the primary program objective, as
compared with a sequence of ultimately more aggressive pursuits, is
questioned.
Question 1a. Do you stand by your committee's analysis of several
of these as viable, implementable paths forward?
Answer. The Committee on the Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans
stands by its assessment that several of the options offered in our
report are viable, implementable and useful paths forward--under the
condition that they are funded as indicated in the report.
Question 1b. You were asked to provide at least two options that
fit within the FY 2011 budget profile. As you know, the Administration
provides a different budget profile in its FY 2011 Budget Request. Have
you or other members of your committee revisited the analysis with the
new budget profile available?
Answer. Neither the Committee as a whole nor I as an individual
have assessed the impact of budget profiles other than those contained
in our report or derivatives we created at the time we performed our
work.
Question 1c. Has the Administration shared with you why it did not
choose to faithfully follow any of the specific options this committee
of experts prepared?
Answer. Our committee has not discussed with the Administration the
reasons for the latter's final choice of a human spaceflight program
plan, nor have I.
Question 1d. One of the key points in the report is that if a
commercial crew transport path were pursued, there must be a strong
independent mission assurance role for NASA. One of my concerns is the
continuing dearth of detail from the Administration about how it will
transition from a government-provided crew transport capability to a
commercial one. What, if anything, have you seen to date that indicates
the Administration's proposal would provide that strong independent
mission assurance role, and what would that entail?
Answer. The Committee's options that entail commercial launches of
crews are premised on: (1) NASA maintaining responsibility for
certifying mission assurance, including but not limited to go/no-go
authority; and (2) competition for contractor selection being open to
all qualified firms, both newly-established and long-established. The
NASA Administrator has indicated that NASA is prepared to commit
whatever resources are necessary to carry out this responsibility.
Question 2. I want to make clear; I am hopeful for the development
of our commercial capabilities. I have supported the current COTS
program and am hopeful that as it moves forward we will obtain crew and
cargo capabilities. But, I am also a skeptic about how far the sector
has come and how fragile their business case for current activities may
be.
Answer. Clearly, the launch of crews to low-Earth orbit by
commercial firms entails risk--as do all space activities. U.S.
industry, under NASA oversight, has in fact designed and built
virtually all the Nation's space hardware to date. Given continuing
oversight and safety approval authority by NASA, it appears to the
Committee that commercial firms can, under the conditions noted above,
safely launch crews into low-Earth orbit. It should be noted that if
NASA continues to operate the Earth-to-low-Earth orbit transportation
system as in the past, little funding remains (under the existing
budget plans) for an exploration program--particularly if the life of
the ISS is extended as considered in a number of the options offered by
the Committee.
Question 2a. As a former head of one of the Nation's leading
commercial companies in the aviation and aerospace arena, what would
happen to the business case for companies like SpaceX that are
currently working hard to develop launch vehicles and crew transport
capabilities if the space station were lost before the companies had
fully realized the ability to service it?
Answer. In addressing this question I should emphasize in the
spirit in which it was asked that I speak only for myself and not for
the firm I once had the privilege of serving. It would appear to me
that should the ISS not continue to at least 2020 the business case for
any firm to pursue commercial launch opportunities would be extremely
brittle. Similarly, if NASA were to maintain its own capability to
launch such payloads, in my opinion that would cast a heavy shadow of
uncertainty over the commercial business case. The hope of these firms
is, of course, that a strong commercial market can be developed, but as
with the early airlines, this is unlikely to be possible without some
form of assured initial market on the part of the government.
Question 2b. In your judgment, are there other obvious customers
besides NASA for commercially developed crew transportation
capabilities? If so, what is that based on? Has there been the type of
commercial market analysis I call for in my bill (S. 3068)?
Answer. Other possible customers include non-NASA government
agencies, foreign governments, commercial firms and eventually space
tourism. Initial emphasis will be on carrying cargo. Our committee was
not privy to commercial launch firm's strategic plans other than in an
overall context. This accounts for the emphasis in our report on
participating firms making substantial financial investments of their
own and thus ``backing'' their stated convictions.
Question 3. In your opening statement, you indicated that your
recent Human Space Flight Review Panel could find no exploration
program ``worthy of a great nation'' that could be accomplished without
an increase in NASA's total budget of roughly $3 billion per year--
adjusted incrementally for inflation. The increased funding level in
the FY 2011 Budget Request is, as you know, just a little more than $1
billion per year. How can it be argued, then, that the proposed plan
for exploration in the FY 2011 request represents an exploration
program that is, indeed, worthy of a great nation?
Answer. The 2011 Budget Request provides funds that, if allocated
to human spaceflight program in the manner indicated in our report,
appear adequate to initiate a worthy space program. The issues,
however, is the commitment of the Administration, Congress and the
American People to further sustain the increased funding levels for two
or more decades. Absent this, any new program will inevitably find
itself in the untenable position in which the Constellation program
finds itself today.
Question 4. In response to a question from Senator Nelson, you
discussed the issue of the gap between the retirement of the Space
Shuttle and the availability of a successor capability. You responded
that ``the gap was created 5 years ago,'' and that it is a ``fait
accompli.'' I remind you that the 2008 NASA Authorization Act included
language that preserved the option to continue Shuttle flights beyond
2010, in order to enable the Administration elected in November of that
year to continue to have that option available to it as part of any
path forward in space exploration. Even though that provision expired
at the end of April, 2009, it clearly was still possible to continue
Shuttle flights beyond 2010, or flying it through 2015 would not, I
assume, have been one of the options you presented to the
Administration in your panel's final report. Is it not true, therefore,
that ``the gap'' initiated by the retirement of the Space Shuttle at
the end of the current manifest, as provided in the FY 2011 Budget
Request, represents the impact of a decision made by the present
Administration, and NOT, as you suggested, something ``created'' 5
years ago?
Answer. The plan to phase-out the Shuttle by September 30, 2010
was, as you note, announced several years ago. As you note, the
Congress directed that the option to continue to operate the Shuttle
beyond that time be maintained (until April 30, 2009). Today, hardware
for two more missions exists, with the possibility of adding a third
(and arguably a fourth). The budget provided to our committee in mid-
2009 included no funds for continuing Shuttle operations beyond
September 30, 2010. Nonetheless, our committee examined the possibility
of continuing the Shuttle program and concluded that with some
difficulty that could be done . . . however, we indicated that any such
a continuation should be conditioned on successful completion of a new
safety review. As we noted, this course would offer the advantage of
reducing the Nation's dependence upon Russian launch vehicles, and
would present the disadvantage of consuming funds intended for the
continuation of a beyond-low-Earth orbit exploration program. No budget
in the last 5 years was adequate both to continue Shuttle operations
and execute NASA's Constellation program plan. (It should be noted that
the budget plan our committee was provided also contained no funds to
operate the ISS beyond 2015 or to de-orbit it.)
Question 5. You stated during the hearing that one could, in fact,
extend the Space Shuttle, but that ``the Shuttle consumes all the money
you wanted to use to develop whatever is going to replace Constellation
or some version of Constellation.'' That connection between Shuttle
costs and anything else in human spaceflight development is
consistently made by the Administration, commentators, and NASA
officials. Yet, is it not true that it is simply a reflection of a
belief that there is no potential for growth in NASA's future funding
levels--which was essentially one of the constraints placed on your
review by the Charter of your Human Space Flight Review Panel--and thus
there exists, now and for all time, a ``zero-sum'' approach to funding
U.S. space exploration? Why should we accept that as a ``given,''
particularly if our position as a world leader in space exploration and
technology development could be placed at risk if we accept that
funding posture?
Answer. This question strikes at the very heart of the continuing
NASA dilemma: insufficient funds are available for it to develop next-
generation systems while continuing to operate the existing generation
of systems. This is presumably why a decision was made to discontinue
funding the Shuttle program (and not provide for continuing the ISS
beyond the next 5 years). The Committee strongly believes that
additional funds are needed above those programmed in the years ahead
if America is to have a meaningful human spaceflight program. As
admitted advocates for the conduct of a human spaceflight program of
which any nation could be proud, the Committee sought, and was granted
by the White House, the latitude to offer options that went beyond the
planned funding profile. Indeed, there is no fundamental principle that
establishes the current level of funding of the human spaceflight
program as the ``correct'' one--but there is a defensible principle
that states that whatever that funding level may be, programmatic goals
should not be incompatible with it.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Norman R. Augustine
Question. Mr. Augustine Did your Commission look at more cost
effective ways to alter the Constellation program in order to continue
to leverage the investment already made in it? If there was a means to
find dramatic cost savings in continuing forward with Constellation
such that it was sustainable, would you find that of benefit to the
Nation for our goals in space exploration?
Answer. As a matter of principle, there is always inherent benefit
to not changing course when an existing program is underway . . .
assuming that program is workable. The committee thus began its
assessment with a review of the Constellation program and found it
lacking in at least two regards. The first was that it had been
``underfunded'' throughout its history (and projected future) such that
during its four-year life it had already slipped its schedule by 3-5
years . . . and thus was incompatible with the needs of the ISS and in
addition offered major delays in future exploration (e.g., little was
accomplished to date on a heavy-lift vehicle, landers, etc.) It should
be noted that this sort of problem is not unique to the Constellation
program but applies to any alternative exploration program funded at
the then-projected profile. The second shortcoming, in our view, was
the focus on returning to the Moon as an objective--with no significant
exploration milestones in approximately the next two decades.
Regarding the possibility of finding ``dramatic'' cost savings in
the Constellation program, our estimate of its cost closely
approximated that stated by NASA at the time the program was initially
approved. Hence, we find little opportunity for significant savings
without substantial increases in risk.