[Senate Hearing 111-961]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-961
SECURING THE NATION'S RAIL AND OTHER SURFACE TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 21, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
TOM UDALL, New Mexico SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Ann Begeman, Republican Staff Director
Brian M. Hendricks, Republican General Counsel
Nick Rossi, Republican Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on April 21, 2010................................... 1
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 29
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Statement of Senator Warner...................................... 30
Statement of Senator Udall....................................... 33
Witnesses
Hon. David Heyman, Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security................................ 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Carlton I. Mann, Assistant Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 20
Prepared statement........................................... 22
John O'Connor, Vice President and Chief of Police, Amtrak Police
Department, National Railroad Passenger Corporation............ 36
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Howard R. ``Skip'' Elliott, Vice President--Public Safety and
Environment, CSX Transportation, Inc........................... 44
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Joseph Kelly, Acting Chief of Police, NJ TRANSIT................. 53
Prepared statement........................................... 54
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. David Heyman by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 61
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 63
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 64
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 66
Letter, dated June 3, 2010 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV and
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg from Stephen M. Lord, Director,
Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S. Government
Accountability Office.......................................... 67
Response to written questions submitted to Carlton I. Mann by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 70
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 71
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 71
Howard R. ``Skip'' Elliott, Vice President--Public Safety and
Environment, CSX Transportation, Inc., supplemental prepared
statement...................................................... 71
SECURING THE NATION'S RAIL AND OTHER SURFACE TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank R.
Lautenberg, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. We'll call the meeting to order, now
that I've broken the equipment, here.
I want to thank each of you, all of you, for being here
today and showing your interest in transportation security.
Last month, during the morning rush hour, two huge
explosions erupted in Moscow's subway system, killing 40
people. They were killed on platforms, onboard trains. In
recent years, we've seen similar bombing attacks in other train
systems, including incidents in London, Madrid, Mumbai. We show
here, on a chart, what has happened with terror attacks on mass
transit and passenger rail service. Going back to 2004, in
Spain, 191 people killed; in London, 2005, 52 people killed;
Mumbai, 2006, 209 people killed; and the last one, in Moscow,
in November of 2009, 27 people were killed then; and again a
repeated attack in Moscow last month.
And make no mistake, although these attacks were far from
our shores, our rail systems here are also targets. In
February, an al Qaeda operative pled guilty to planning a
stunning terrorist attack in which bombs would be strapped to
suicide bombers and detonated in New York City's subway system.
Attorney General, Eric Holder, called this plot one of the most
serious threats to the United States since 9/11.
The evidence is clear, we've got to do everything possible
to keep our Nation's transportation system safe; and,
unfortunately, it's not clear that we're meeting the obligation
to keep our passenger rail system, our freight networks, and
other surface transportation networks protected. And that's why
we're here today.
For years, I've been sounding the alarm that our attention
has been too one-sided, that we can't focus on aviation
security alone, that we need also to concentrate on
safeguarding our surface transportation network. The 9/11
Commission echoed this concern when it characterized the
Federal emphasis on aviation security, and here I quote, ``as
fighting the last war,'' and noted that, ``opportunities to do
harm are as great or greater in maritime and in surface
transportation.'' That's why we've worked so diligently to
provide the Department of Homeland Security and TSA what they
needed to secure our Nation against attacks and fulfill their
responsibilities under the 9/11 Commission Act.
Still, DHS and the TSA have been far too slow to meet these
responsibilities, especially when it comes to addressing rail
security. In fact, the 9/11 Act required TSA to complete, by
2008, a comprehensive risk assessment and a national security
strategy for the rail sector. They still have not completed
either one of these. It's no wonder, then, that the White House
released a report earlier this month in which the National
Security Council called TSA to task for its failure to lead in
protecting our surface transportation systems.
Imagine what it might mean if a terrorist managed to carry
out an attack on any one of these systems. We've got 140,000
miles of freight rail track, ushering coal, chemicals, and
other materials. Liquid and national gas that fuel our Nation
flow through more than one-and-a-half million miles of
pipeline. More than 70,000 people board Amtrak trains every
day. And 35 million Americans rely on public transportation
every day. The bottom line is that we cannot afford to be
anything less than vigilant, and that's why we're going to keep
working to do what it takes to make sure our families, the
traveling public, and all Americans are safe.
I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses about what
we need to do to ensure we deter any potential terrorist
attack.
I'm pleased to have Senator Hutchison here with me today,
and would ask her now if she would like to make her opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Well, I want to thank you, Senator
Lautenberg, for chairing today's hearing.
And thank all of you for being here.
I will not be able to stay for the whole hearing, but I
certainly will look at the information produced here. And,
Senator Lautenberg, you have been an ongoing and committed
champion of surface transportation, and certainly that includes
security, so I think this is a timely hearing.
It has been 8 and a half years since 9/11, and since that
time there have been over 700 attacks on rail and bus systems
around the world, killing more than 2500 and injuring 10,000.
Fortunately, there have not been any successful attacks in
America, but, as the Chairman mentioned, there was a plot that
was overturned that would have done terrible damage to the New
York subway system.
I think that it is time for an open and frank discussion
about how we can all take action to close the gaps in
addressing surface transportation security. I do believe our
transit, rail, and pipeline systems are safer today, due to the
actions of TSA, DOT's modal agencies, Amtrak, the commuter
authorities, and private-sector rail, truck, bus, and pipeline
companies.
But, despite that fact, the Act, which created TSA, states
unequivocally that TSA shall be responsible for security in all
modes of transportation. All indications are that TSA really
has more of a supporting role with respect to transit and
passenger rail security. TSA mostly encourages security
improvements by the freight, rail, motor, and bus carrier, and
pipeline sectors, since they are owned and operated in the
private sector.
Recent reports by the GAO are cause for concern. GAO has
concluded that TSA has still not completed an overall risk
assessment of mass transit, the passenger rail system, or the
commercial vehicle sector. Its preliminary conclusions, in an
ongoing assessment of pipeline security, suggest that TSA is
not following up with pipeline operators to make sure that they
are making the security improvements included in their security
plans.
I'm especially troubled that TSA has so strongly resisted
the recommendation of the DHS IG to have TSA inspectors focused
on surface transportation security report to an official with
surface responsibilities, rather than to supervisors in the
aviation arena. I'm concerned that over two-thirds of the
recently hired surface transportation inspectors had no surface
transportation experience.
The White House apparently is not satisfied either in this
area, since it conducted its own independent assessment of
surface transportation security. And that was released on April
2, conducted by reaching out to government and private-sector
stakeholders, and found that there is a significant overlap in
Federal programs and agencies, and a need for more coordination
between government agencies with the private sector.
It is critical that TSA, the expert agency on security,
step up to the plate and exercise more leadership, while
continuing to operate in a collaborative way with surface
transportation interests. The first step is the appointment of
a TSA administrator, a position that has been vacant for more
than a year. I hope the Administration will be sending up a
nominee soon who can be confirmed.
The Committee intends to mark up legislation to reauthorize
TSA later this year, and we need TSA's recommendations. We want
to make informed decisions about transportation security, with
input from all the stakeholders.
Now, we know this is a huge area. And we know that there
are budget constraints on something that is so vast, but we've
got to use our resources wisely, and I think there is evidence
that we are not doing as well as we could, even with the
resources that we have.
So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing, and I
will stay as long as I can, and then I know Senator Thune is on
his way.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hutchison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison, U.S. Senator from
Texas
Thank you for chairing today's hearing, Senator Lautenberg, and
thank you to all of the witnesses for being here today. I think this
hearing is so important. The security of the Nation's surface
transportation systems, although long overshadowed by aviation
security, is one of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)'s
central missions and must be one of this committee's highest
priorities.
It has been eight and one-half years since the terrorist attacks of
September 11 and, during that time, there have been over 700 attacks on
rail and bus systems around the world, killing more than 2,500 and
injuring 10,000. Fortunately, there has not been a successful attack in
the United States. But the recent ``Zazi'' plot to detonate explosives
on the New York City subway system demonstrates the seriousness of the
threats to our surface transportation systems.
I have long expressed concern that enough effort and resources are
not being committed to secure our transit, passenger and freight rail,
highway, motorcoach, and pipeline networks. Currently, the budget for
surface transportation security is just $110 million, a little over 2
percent of TSA's total budget, a level of funding far from commensurate
with the level of risk. And while another $360 million has been
appropriated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for
security grants, we clearly are not doing enough in this area. I hope
today we can have a frank discussion about what has, and has not, been
accomplished since 9-11, and how this committee, together with the
Administration, can take action to close gaps in addressing and funding
surface transportation security.
I do believe our transit, rail, and pipeline systems are safer
today due to the actions of TSA, DOT's modal agencies, Amtrak, the
commuter authorities, and private sector rail, truck, bus, and pipeline
companies. But despite the fact that the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act, which created TSA, states unequivocally that TSA ``shall
be responsible for security in all modes of transportation,'' all
indications are that TSA sees itself as only having a supporting role
with respect to transit and passenger rail security. TSA also seems
reluctant, except at the specific direction of Congress, to do more
than simply encourage security improvements by the freight rail, motor
and bus carrier, and pipeline sectors, since they are owned and
operated by the private sector.
Recent reports by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO),
and the DHS Inspector General are cause for concern. GAO has concluded
that TSA has still not completed an overall risk assessment of mass
transit, the passenger rail system, or the commercial vehicle sector.
Its preliminary conclusions in an ongoing assessment of pipeline
security suggest that TSA is not following up with pipeline operators
to make sure they are making the security improvements included in
their security plans.
I am especially troubled that TSA has so strongly resisted the
recommendation of the DHS IG to have TSA inspectors focused on surface
transportation security report to an official with surface
responsibilities, rather than to supervisors in the aviation arena. And
I am concerned that over two-thirds of the recently hired surface
transportation inspectors had no surface transportation experience.
The White House apparently is not satisfied with TSA's performance
either, since it conducted its own independent assessment of surface
transportation security. That assessment was conducted by reaching out
to government and private sector stakeholders, and it found that there
is significant overlap in Federal programs and agencies. Clearly, there
is a strong need for more coordination between government agencies and
with the private sector.
It is critical that TSA, as the expert agency on all security
matters, step up to the plate and exercise more leadership, while
continuing to operate in a collaborative way with surface
transportation interests. The first step, as we all realize, is the
appointment of a TSA Administrator, a position that has been vacant for
more than a year. I think I speak for the entire Committee when I say
that I hope the Administration will be sending up a new nominee--and
one who we can confirm--as soon as possible.
The Committee intends to mark up legislation to reauthorize TSA
later this year, and we need TSA to come forward with its
recommendations. We want to make informed decisions about surface
transportation security, with input from all of the stakeholders, and a
good understanding of the resources needed to address the risks
terrorism poses to our surface transportation network.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony of our
witnesses, and discussing these important issues with them.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you for being with us, Senator
Hutchison. Everybody's got lots of things to do. And----
Senator Hutchison. Yes.
Senator Lautenberg. But, you show your respect for the
importance of this hearing and the job that we have to do here,
so thank you.
I want to welcome our first panel of witnesses: Mr. David
Heyman, the Assistant Secretary for Policy at the Department of
Homeland Security; Mr. Stephen Lord, Director of Homeland
Security and Justice Issues at the U.S. Government
Accountability Office; and Mr. Carlton Mann, Assistant
Inspector General for Inspections at the Department of Homeland
Security Office of the Inspector General.
Thank you all for being here.
Mr. Heyman, if you would, you have 5 minutes to give your
statement. And if you need more time, I would ask that you
submit your full statement for the record, but meanwhile--
please.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID HEYMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Heyman. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg,
Senator Hutchison.
I'm pleased to appear before you today to discuss
safeguarding our Nation's surface transportation systems and
the Department of Homeland Security's collective efforts with
Federal, state, and local partners to improve the security of
these systems.
Safeguarding our Nation's mass transit and passenger rail
networks is of critical importance. The Nation's surface
transportation infrastructure is a vast, open system of
interconnected networks of commuter rail trains, subways, and
buses that move millions of our citizens every day, and are
vital to our economy and our way of life.
The scope of these networks is impressive. Consider, for
example, the New York City subway network has 468 stations,
with over 31,000 turnstiles allowing direct access to the
subway, and average weekday ridership of over 5 million
passengers. Similarly, Amtrak's operations are nationwide, with
stations in close proximity to, or collocated with, mass
transit stations. The huge benefits of these networks to our
Nation include the inherent vastness and openness of the
systems, but that, unfortunately, makes them targets for
terrorists. As we have sadly learned from attacks in London,
Mumbai, Madrid, and Moscow, as well as the New York City subway
plot, mentioned by you, Senator Lautenberg.
For the past decade, the Nation's transportation network
has been at an elevated risk of attack. The failed and foiled
terrorist plots in the past year against mass transit and
aviation are powerful reminders that terrorists will go to
great lengths to defeat the security measures that have been
put in place since September 11.
The Administration is determined to thwart terrorist plots
and disrupt, dismantle, and defeat terrorist networks by
employing and enhancing the multiple layers of defense that
work in concert with one another to secure our country.
A significant way that DHS contributes to enhanced security
on all modes of surface transportation is through the award of
grants. In Fiscal Year 2009, the Department directed more than
$500 million to mass transit passenger rail agencies through
its Transit Security Grant Program; $78 million in American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act funding went to approximately 240
new law enforcement officers at 15 transit systems across the
country; and $72 million in Recovery funds went to capital
projects, such as improvements to high density tunnels,
stations, and bridges.
The Department has three principal tools in which we
address surface security: intelligence, operational deterrence,
and infrastructure protection. Through each of these, and
through our grant program, our efforts are to secure the
Nation's surface transportation system. But, we do this through
what--through the notion of a homeland security enterprise, a
collective effort of shared responsibilities of Federal, state,
local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector
partners.
This enterprise connotes a broad base of community of
common interest in safety and security. It is a partnership.
Indeed, strong working partnerships with state and local
government, law enforcement, and emergency response officials,
and hundreds of transit system operators, private sector and
individuals, are critical to the success of surface
transportation security programs. The Federal Government has a
role to play, and it is also in great partnership with all of
these participants.
While there has been significant progress over the last
several years in improving surface transportation security,
there is still much work to be done. Our mission remains clear:
providing the traveling public with confidence that these vital
arteries that support our daily lives are secure.
I look forward to working with you and this committee to
achieve this goal. I would like to submit my full statement for
the record. And I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Heyman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. David Heyman, Assistant Secretary for
Policy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Good afternoon, Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and
distinguished members of the Committee. I am pleased to appear today to
discuss safeguarding our Nation's open surface transportation systems
and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) collective efforts with
Federal, state and local partners to improve the security of these
systems. I appreciate the Committee's efforts in support of this vital
mission.
The Nation's surface transportation infrastructure is a vast, open
system of interdependent networks that continually moves millions of
passengers and millions of tons of commodities. The network and its
four subsectors--Mass Transit, Highways, Freight Rail, and Pipelines--
are critical to our economic well-being and our way of life. The
security of this system is a shared responsibility among many
governmental and private sector entities, including DHS.
For the past decade, the Nation's transportation network has been
at an elevated risk of attack. The failed and foiled terrorist plots in
the past year against mass transit and aviation are powerful reminders
that terrorists will go to great lengths to defeat the security
measures that have been put in place since September 11, 2001. This
Administration is determined to thwart terrorist plots and disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat terrorist networks by employing and enhancing the
multiple layers of defense that work in concert with one another to
secure our country.
President Obama has articulated the need to do more to safeguard
surface transportation by building on existing security efforts. The
President's guiding principles for homeland security, including working
with key stakeholders, investing in the most pressing short- and long-
term infrastructure needs, and safeguarding the transportation systems
that Americans use every day, will lead to a more resilient surface
transportation system that improves public safety and enables efficient
commerce.
The Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment
This Administration recognized that the Nation's surface
transportation system is an open and sprawling network and therefore we
must look to the capabilities of Federal, state, local and private
sector entities to secure the system and address threats through
intelligence and the application of a risk-based approach. To this end,
the White House led an interagency effort under the aegis of the
National Security Staff to assess the security of the surface
transportation system and determine what additional measures and
initiatives could be undertaken to improve the security of the system.
The result of this effort is the Surface Transportation Security
Priority Assessment, released April 2, which represents an important
step toward further protecting the traveling public from acts of
terrorism. The Assessment presents a thorough review of security
efforts in all modes of surface transportation by the Obama
Administration during its first year, including mass transit, commuter
and long-distance passenger rail, freight rail, commercial vehicles and
pipelines. It examines existing surface transportation security
priorities, identifies interagency priorities for the next 4 years,
provides recommendations on how to address existing policy gaps in
surface transportation security efforts, and directs designated
agencies to develop implementation plans to accomplish the report's
recommendations.
The Administration engaged stakeholders from Federal, state, local
and tribal government and the private sector using DHS' National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) partnership model to furnish
input into the comprehensive framework of recommendations set forth in
the Assessment. In conducting the Assessment, common themes and
recommendations included the need to enhance security through increased
intelligence sharing, vetting, security planning, training, and
exercises, improve efficiency and effectiveness, strengthen stakeholder
partnerships, and employ a systems management approach to assessing
risk. DHS served an active role in the Assessment supporting
interagency efforts by assigning staff to support and coordinate the
drafting of the assessment as well as preparation of the final report.
The Assessment's 20 recommendations are the building blocks for
advancing our Nation's surface transportation security initiatives.
These recommendations are consistent with recommendations received from
the DHS Office of Inspector General and the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) on how best to provide security in all modes of
transportation. Among other things, the recommendations include the
following:
Implement an integrated Federal approach that consolidates
capabilities in a unified effort for security assessments,
audits and inspections to produce more thorough evaluations and
effective follow-up actions to reduce risk, enhance security,
and reduce burdens on assessed surface transportation entities.
Implement a multi-year, multi-phase grants program based on
a long-term strategy for surface transportation security.
Establish an interagency process to inventory education and
training (E&T) requirements and programs, identify gaps and
redundancies in surface transportation owner/operator E&T, and
ensure that Federal training requirements support
counterterrorism and infrastructure protection.
These and other recommendations in the Assessment reflect the
Administration's commitment to goals that are critical to surface
transportation security, such as teaming with all government partners
and the private sector to identify and reduce risk; improving the
efficiency and effectiveness of Federal missions, organizations and
programs; strengthening interactive stakeholder partnerships; and
application of a systems management approach to surface transportation
security.
The Administration remains committed to implementing the
recommendations contained in the Assessment. Assistant to the President
and Deputy National Security Adviser for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, John Brennan released a memo to Departments and
Agencies on April 14, 2010 directing the development of implementation
plans for the 20 recommendations contained in the assessment. The
implementation plans will:
1. Define actionable and measurable next steps;
2. Identify implementation metrics;
3. Determine a timeline for completion; and
4. Identify stakeholders for engagement in the development of
the implementation plans.
DHS was designated in the Assessment as the lead Department for
implementing 19 of the 20 recommendations. The Department looks forward
to continued engagement with Congress on implementation of actions.
Security in All Modes of Surface Transportation
DHS plays a key role in the Administration's efforts to ensure the
security of our Nation's surface transportation system. Employing an
intelligence-driven and risk-based approach to assessing threats to the
system, DHS and its partners have made substantial progress in the past
few years in improving surface transportation security in this country.
Our efforts to secure the Nation's surface transportation system are a
clear illustration of the concept of the homeland security enterprise
established by the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. This concept
refers to the collective efforts and shared responsibilities of
Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private-sector
partners--as well as individuals, families, and communities--to
maintain critical homeland security capabilities. It connotes a broad-
based community with a common interest in the safety and well being of
America and American society.
Indeed, strong working partnerships with state and local
government, law enforcement, emergency response officials, hundreds of
transit system operators, private sector groups, and individual
citizens around the country are critical to the success of surface
transportation security programs. By communicating with one another,
sharing intelligence, and planning collaboratively, these stakeholders
have created a foundation for both building surface transportation
security initiatives and reducing risk. Through national standards,
sharing best practices, guidance and regulation, they are putting those
initiatives into operation. And by conducting assessments and using
metrics to measure our progress, DHS constantly is examining ways to
improve security and reduce risk throughout the surface transportation
system.
As a result of our risk-based and intelligence-driven approach, DHS
has made real progress; some tangible accomplishments include the
following:
DHS' Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
assessed the top 100 U.S. pipeline systems--which transport 84
percent of the energy products in the U.S., such as oil and
natural gas--to ensure security standards are being met. Over
the past 18 months, TSA has inspected 200 critical facilities
related to those pipeline systems, including pumping stations,
bridge spans, and control centers.
With respect to highway security, DHS' U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) secures our northern and southern
borders against dangerous passengers and cargo. For traffic
within our borders, TSA has issued security guidelines for high
hazard material transporters, provided security training for
intercity bus and school bus operators, and is assessing key
infrastructure vulnerabilities. Through TSA's Hazardous
Materials Endorsement (HME) vetting program, all individuals
who seek a hazardous materials endorsement to their state-
issued commercial driver's license must go through a rigorous
vetting program. This program covers approximately three
million drivers authorized to transport hazardous materials.
Additionally, as this committee is very much aware, TSA has
conducted a full security threat assessment of, and issued a
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) to, 1.6
million workers requiring unescorted access to secure areas of
port facilities.
In freight rail, CBP secures our borders via inbound and
outbound inspections, while TSA has reduced the toxic
inhalation chemical risk in high threat urban areas by 80
percent since 2006, assessed security at 30 of the 50 key
bridges throughout the nation, and issued a rail security rule
on toxic inhalants to require a secure chain of custody from
shippers to receivers. These impressive risk reduction results
are a product of regulatory and voluntary efforts with the rail
industry that are a model for the benefits of collaborative,
data driven risk reduction.
A significant way that DHS contributes to the enhanced security of
all modes of surface transportation is through the award of grants. In
FY 2009, DHS directed more than $500 million to mass transit and
passenger rail agencies through the Transit Security Grant Program
(TSGP), which focuses specifically on surface transportation; $78
million in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funding for
approximately 240 new law enforcement officers at 15 transit systems
across the country--including approximately $36 million for 128 new
officers at the New York Police Department--to enhance the Nation's
ability to guard against acts of terrorism; $72 million in ARRA funding
for capital projects, such as improvements to high-density tunnels,
stations and bridges; and $388 million in Transit Security Grant
Program and Freight Rail Security Grant Program funding for projects
such as training, operational deterrence, hardening of tunnels, high-
density stations and bridges. This funding also enhanced security
efforts for Amtrak, which received almost $100 million through the
Transit Security Grant Program for operational deterrence,
infrastructure hardening, training and other initiatives.
Additionally, TSA's Mass Transit Security Training Program targets
grant funds for recurring training of law enforcement officers and
frontline employees in core areas of security awareness, behavior
recognition, and immediate response to a threat or incident. DHS also
conducts training, workshops, table top exercises, and ``lessons
learned'' sessions that integrate mass transit and passenger rail
agencies with regional law enforcement and emergency response partners
to expand and enhance coordinated deterrent, threat and incident
management capabilities. Particular emphasis is placed on prevention,
specifically broadening capabilities for collaborative activities for
deterrence.
In the area of freight rail, TSA earlier this month provided the
full Committee, and others in Congress, its study on the feasibility
and appropriateness of requiring a non-Federal match for grants awarded
to freight railroad carriers--the study was mandated by the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. The
particular grants being examined are funded through the DHS Freight
Rail Security Grant Program (FRSGP), managed jointly by TSA and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The purpose of FRSGP is to
raise the security baseline in freight rail by funding vulnerability
assessments and security plans, providing security training to
frontline personnel, and installing Global Positioning System (GPS)
tracking on railroad cars within the freight rail industry. Of note,
the study recommended that a non-Federal match under FRSGP should not
be required for certain high-priority projects, such as developing
vulnerability assessments and security plans, and providing security
training for frontline employees.
The Obama Administration recognizes the critical importance of
safeguarding our Nation's mass transit and passenger rail networks.
These open access, interconnected networks of commuter rail trains,
subways, and buses move millions of our citizens every day and are
vital to our economy and our way of life. The scope of these networks
is impressive. Consider, for example, that the New York City subway
network has 468 stations with over 31,000 turnstiles allowing direct
access to the subway, and an average weekday ridership of over 5
million passengers. Amtrak's operations are nationwide, and many Amtrak
stations are in close proximity to, or co-located with, mass transit
stations.
The huge benefits of these networks to our nation, including the
inherent vastness and openness of the systems, unfortunately, makes
them prime targets for terrorists, as we have sadly learned from
attacks in London, Mumbai, Madrid and Moscow, as well as the New York
City subway plot uncovered last year. As an example of the Obama
Administration's efforts to meet this threat, in October 2009, Amtrak
and TSA partnered to conduct random passenger and baggage screening at
multiple locations across the Northeast Corridor. This effort is
ongoing and is expected to expand nationwide. Such random screening
teams are among DHS' most effective deterrence and detection tools for
countering terrorist threats.
Tools for Protecting Surface Transportation
As I have testified in the past, securing our modes of travel is
one of the most powerful weapons we have to counter the ability of
terrorists to attack us. The tools at our disposal fall into three
primary categories:
Intelligence drives our efforts and helps prioritize how we
allocate our resources. Our Federal Joint Terrorism Task Forces
(JTTFs), composed of DHS and other Federal and state personnel
operating under FBI leadership, coordinate Federal and local
investigations and information gathering operations and share
that information among law enforcement and security partners,
both public and private.
Operational deterrence focuses on using Federal, state, and
local government personnel and resources in collaboration with
private sector partners to prevent, deter, and detect threats
from terrorists and criminal organizations. Activities
currently employed for this purpose, including explosive
detection canine teams and random, unpredictable transportation
passenger screening by Visible Intermodal Prevention and
Response (VIPR) teams, are highly effective operational tools
for deterring and detecting terrorist threats. The funding in
the FY 2010 DHS appropriation to expand the number of dedicated
VIPR teams from 10 to 25 has been welcome news for TSA and
surface transit alike. Congress overwhelmingly approved this
funding increase, and we are grateful for your support.
Infrastructure protection initiatives, such as the effective
administration of Federal grants for physical security
improvements and training, focus on hardening the Nation's
critical transportation infrastructures, including underwater
tunnels, subway stations, and bridges, as well as educating our
fellow citizens to become partners in security. TSA's
Transportation Security Inspectors work with state and local
officials to assess security vulnerabilities and recommend how
to use limited resources to get the most security bang for the
buck.
Conclusion
The Obama Administration is dedicated to ensuring the security of
our Nation's surface transportation system. As evidenced by the
creative and collaborative effort of the Surface Transportation
Security Priority Assessment, security for our Nation's surface
transportation system is a responsibility shared among key Federal,
state, local and private sector partners. DHS, the Department of
Transportation, the Department of Energy, and others are working
collaboratively with our state and local partners and the private
sector, and are making significant strides in improving security.
While the Administration and DHS have made significant progress
over the last several years in improving surface transportation
security, much work remains to be done. With the additional resources
from Congress, expanding collaboration with surface transportation
partners and local law enforcement and emergency response officials,
and a focus on uncovering and addressing deficiencies in a cost-
effective manner, there is a strong foundation and clear path toward
meeting our security goals for the Nation's surface transportation
systems. Our mission remains clear: providing the traveling public with
confidence that these vital economic arteries are secure.
Thank you again for the opportunity to address surface
transportation security. I will be happy to answer any questions you
may have.
Senator Lautenberg. Appreciate that.
Mr. Lord, please.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD, DIRECTOR,
HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES,
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Lord. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Hutchison,
for inviting me to testify at today's hearing.
As you noted in your opening remarks, the recent terrorist
attacks in Moscow, London, and Madrid highlight the
vulnerability of these systems to terrorist attacks.
Before I begin, it's, first, worth noting that about 2
percent of TSA's 2011 budget request is designated for surface
transportation issues, while 80 percent of the budget is
designated for aviation security, including the Federal Air
Marshal Service.
Today, I would like to discuss the three key issues: first,
TSA's use of risk management principles to identify security
priorities; second, TSA's efforts to coordinate with other
industry stakeholders; third, TSA's efforts to measure the
impact of its security improvement initiatives.
Regarding risk management the large body of work we
completed in this area has shown that TSA has taken some
actions to better manage these risks, but still needs to
improve its overall risk assessment process. This will help
them identify security gaps and inform the allocation of
resources across all transportation modes. For example, our
2009 Risk Management Report found that TSA had not conducted
comprehensive risk assessments across the major modes of
transportation that would help them identify priorities and
judge whether the current levels of investment are appropriate.
In addition, we reported that TSA needs to improve their
risk management efforts within each particular mode to help
focus their efforts and identify potential security gaps. For
example, our April 2009 Freight Rail Report found that TSA's
security strategy had focused almost exclusively on rail
shipments of toxic inhalation hazards, such as chlorine, which
can be fatal if inhaled. And while reported--while we reported
that TSA's initial focus was a good first step, we recommended
that TSA consider other threats, such as sabotage to bridges
and tunnels. The good news is, TSA agreed with our
recommendation and developed a risk tool to help identify
vulnerabilities to bridges and tunnels.
We also assessed TSA's risk management efforts in our
ongoing review of pipeline security. And although the findings
are preliminary, we found a weak statistical correlation
between a pipeline system risk rating and the time taken to
schedule the very important corporate security reviews of a
facility's security plans. Specifically, among the 15 highest
risk-rated pipeline systems, the time between a first and
second review ranged from 1 to 6 years. And two of these high-
risk systems had not had a second review in more than 6 years,
even though they were deemed high risk. TSA officials agreed
with our observations, but noted that other factors, such as
geographical proximity and other related inspection activities,
influenced the timing of such reviews.
In terms of coordination, TSA has developed several
initiatives to improve coordination with Federal, state, and
private-sector partners. However, our recent reports found that
these coordination efforts could be improved in many areas. For
example, our Freight Rail Report found that TSA was not
requesting data on deficiencies and security plans and
training, even though the FRA was collecting this information
during their inspection process. We believe this information
could be useful to TSA. And I'm encouraged that the
Administration's Interagency Policy Committee Report on Surface
Transportation, that you mentioned in your opening remarks,
also highlights the needs for Federal entities to better
coordinate their various activities.
Finally, I would like to briefly discuss how TSA measures
its progress in improving security. As you may know, TSA has
developed national strategies, called ``modal annexes,'' for
each surface transportation mode. However, our body of work,
collectively, shows that TSA needs to strengthen its efforts to
measure whether the goals listed in each of these modal annexes
are being achieved.
For example, in June 2009, we reported that TSA's modal
annex for mass transit and passenger rail lacked outcome-
oriented measures and targets to help assess progress over
time. The good news is that TSA agreed with our recommendation
to improve the measures, and now more accurately reports
results.
In sum, our collective body of work has identified several
important steps that TSA could take to improve risk management,
coordination with other entities, and the way it measures what
all these activities result in, at the end of the day.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to any questions
you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lord follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and
Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss key surface transportation security issues. Surface
transportation modes include mass transit, freight rail, pipeline, and
highway systems.\1\ Terrorist attacks on surface transportation systems
in Moscow, Mumbai, London, and Madrid that caused significant loss of
life and disruption have highlighted the vulnerability of
transportation facilities to terrorist attacks worldwide.\2\ While
there have been no successful terrorist attacks against U.S. surface
transportation systems to date, securing these systems is a significant
undertaking. In the United States, the surface transportation system
includes more than 100,000 miles of rail, 600,000 bridges, more than
300 tunnels, and 2 million miles of pipeline. Securing these systems is
further complicated by the number of private and public stakeholders
involved in operating and protecting the system and the need to balance
security with the expeditious flow of people and goods. Further,
surface transportation systems generally rely on an open architecture
that is difficult to monitor and secure due to its multiple access
points, hubs serving multiple carriers, and, in some cases, lack of
access barriers. An attack on these systems could potentially lead to
significant casualties due to, for example, the high number of daily
passengers, especially during peak commuting hours. In the 2011 budget
request for the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), $137.6 million of the $8.2 billion total
request is for surface transportation security, while $6.5 billion is
requested for aviation security, including the Federal Air Marshal
Service.\3\
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\1\ The six major transportation modes defined in the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Transportation Security
Sector Specific Plan (TS-SSP) are: aviation; maritime; mass transit
(including transit buses, subway and light rail, and passenger rail--
both commuter rail and long-distance); highway; freight rail; and
pipeline.
\2\ Subway attacks occurred in Moscow March 29, 2010, in Mumbai on
July 11, 2006, in London on July 7, 2005, and in Madrid on March 11,
2004. Each attack caused dozens of deaths and injuries.
\3\ Additional funding is requested for accounts such as
transportation security support, which supports both aviation and
surface transportation security programs. Some of the Federal Air
Marshal Service funding support nonaviation activities.
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My testimony today focuses on the extent to which: (1) DHS has used
a risk management framework to guide efforts to strengthen the security
of the surface transportation sector, (2) TSA has coordinated its
strategy and efforts for securing the surface transportation sector
with other Federal entities, states, and private-sector stakeholders,
(3) TSA has measured the effectiveness of its surface transportation
security-improvement actions, and (4) TSA has made progress in
deploying surface transportation security inspectors, and what
challenges, if any, it faces in these efforts.
This statement is based on related public GAO reports issued from
January 2009 through June 2009.\4\ All of this work was conducted in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, and
our previously published products contain additional details on the
scope and methodology for those reviews. In addition, this statement
includes preliminary observations based on ongoing work assessing the
security of the Nation's pipeline systems for this committee. This
ongoing work, which will be completed later this year, is assessing,
among other things, TSA's risk assessment efforts and performance
measures for this area of surface transportation. For our ongoing
review of pipeline security, we reviewed relevant laws and program
management and planning documents, including pipeline performance
measures, and interviewed TSA Pipeline Security Division officials to
discuss, among other things, their identification of the most critical
pipeline systems and their development and use of the pipeline risk
assessment model and performance measures. We also analyzed TSA's
pipeline risk assessment model by measuring the strength of the
relationship between the frequency of Corporate Security Reviews for
each pipeline system and that system's ranking based on risk.\5\ We
determined that the data we analyzed were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this statement. Specifically, we reviewed related
documentation, interviewed knowledgeable agency officials, and tested
those data to identify missing information or outliers. Our ongoing
work related to pipeline security is being conducted in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. In addition, this
statement contains selected updates conducted from September 2009
through April 2010 on TSA's efforts to implement our previous
recommendations regarding surface transportation security. In
conducting these updates, we obtained new information from TSA
regarding the agency's efforts to enhance its surface transportation
inspections and meet legislative requirements, among other things. We
conducted these updates in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings based on our audit objectives.
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\4\ GAO, Transportation Security: Key Actions Have Been Taken to
Enhance Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Security, but Opportunities
Exist to Strengthen Federal Strategy and Programs, GAO 09 678
(Washington, D.C.: June 2009); Transit Security Grant Program: DHS
Allocates Grants Based on Risk, but Its Risk Methodology, Management
Controls and Grant Oversight Can Be Strengthened, GAO 09 491
(Washington, D.C.: June 2009); Freight Rail Security: Actions Have Been
Taken to Enhance Security, but the Federal Strategy Can Be Strengthened
and Security Efforts Better Monitored, GAO 09 243 (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 2009); Transportation Security: Comprehensive Risk Assessments and
Stronger Internal Controls Needed to Help Inform TSA Resource
Allocation, GAO 09 492 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2009); Commercial
Vehicle Security: Risk-Based Approach Needed to Secure the Commercial
Vehicle Sector, GAO 09 85 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2009); Highway
Infrastructure: Federal Efforts to Strengthen Security Should Be Better
Coordinated and Targeted on the Nation's Most Critical Highway
Infrastructure, GAO 09 57 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2009).
\5\ Corporate Security Reviews are on-site security reviews that
TSA's Pipeline Security Division conducts with pipeline operators to
develop a firsthand knowledge of operators' security plans and
implementation, establish working relationships with key pipeline
security personnel, and identify and share good security practices.
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Background
TSA is the primary Federal agency responsible for overseeing the
security of surface transportation systems, including developing a
national strategy and implementing security programs. However, several
other agencies, including DHS's Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) and the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), also
play a role in helping to fund and secure these systems. Since it is
not practical or feasible to protect all assets and systems against
every possible terrorist threat, DHS has called for using risk-informed
approaches to prioritize its security-related investments and for
developing plans and allocating resources in a way that balances
security and commerce.\6\
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\6\ A risk management approach entails a continuous process of
managing risk through a series of actions, including setting strategic
goals and objectives, assessing risk, evaluating alternatives,
selecting initiatives to undertake, and implementing and monitoring
those initiatives.
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In June 2006, DHS issued the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan (NIPP), which established a six-step risk management framework to
establish national priorities, goals, and requirements for Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources protection so that Federal funding and
resources are applied in the most effective manner to deter threats,
reduce vulnerabilities, and minimize the consequences of attacks and
other incidents. The NIPP, updated in 2009, defines risk as a function
of three elements: threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Threat is an
indication of the likelihood that a specific type of attack will be
initiated against a specific target or class of targets. Vulnerability
is the probability that a particular attempted attack will succeed
against a particular target or class of targets. Consequence is the
effect of a successful attack. In May 2007, TSA issued the
Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan (TS-SSP), which documents
the risk management process to be used in carrying out the strategic
priorities outlined in the NIPP. As required by Executive Order 13416,
the TS-SSP also includes modal implementation plans or modal annexes
that detail how TSA intends to achieve the sector's goals and
objectives for each of the six transportation modes using the systems-
based risk management approach.\7\
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\7\ The TS-SSP includes modal annexes for Aviation, Maritime, Mass
Transit, Highway Infrastructure and Motor Carrier, Freight Rail, and
Pipeline.
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To address the objectives and goals laid out in the TS-SSP, TSA
uses various programs to secure transportation systems throughout the
country, including Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR)
teams and Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSI). VIPR teams
employ a variety of tactics to deter terrorism, including random high-
visibility patrols at mass transit and passenger rail stations using,
among other things, behavior-detection officers, canine detection
teams, and explosive-detection technologies.\8\ STSIs, among other
things, conduct on-site inspections of U.S. rail systems--including
mass transit, passenger rail, and freight rail systems--to identify
best security practices, evaluate security system performance, and
discover and correct deficiencies and vulnerabilities in the rail
industry's security systems.\9\
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\8\ TSA VIPR teams, which TSA has reported using since late 2005,
work with local security and law enforcement officials to secure any
mode of transportation.
\9\ STSIs conduct their work by building collaborative working
relationships with freight rail carriers, the mass transit and
passenger rail industry, and applicable local, state, and Federal
authorities.
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In August 2007, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act (9/11 Commission Act) was signed into law, which
included provisions that task DHS and other public and private
stakeholders with security actions related to surface transportation
security.\10\ Among other things, these provisions include mandates for
developing and issuing reports on TSA's strategy for securing public
transportation, conducting and updating comprehensive security
assessments for public transportation agencies, and ensuring that
transportation modal security plans include threats, vulnerabilities,
and consequences for transportation infrastructure assets including
mass transit, railroads, highways, and pipelines.
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\10\ Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (2007).
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TSA Has Taken Some Actions to Implement a Risk Management Approach but
Could Do More to Inform the Allocation of Resources across the
Surface Transportation Sector
In March 2009, we reported that TSA has taken some actions called
for by the NIPP's risk management process, but has not conducted
comprehensive risk assessments across aviation and four major surface
transportation modes.\11\ In 2007, TSA initiated but later discontinued
an effort to conduct a comprehensive risk assessment for the entire
transportation sector, known as the National Transportation Sector Risk
Analysis.\12\ Consequently, we recommended that TSA conduct
comprehensive risk assessments for the transportation sector to produce
a comparative analysis of risk across the entire transportation sector,
which the agency could use to guide current and future investment
decisions. DHS and TSA concurred with our recommendation, and in April
2010 TSA identified planned actions, including integrating the results
of risk assessments into a comparative risk analysis across the
transportation sector. TSA officials stated in April 2010 that the
agency has revised its risk management framework, TS-SSP, and modal
annexes. They added that these documents are undergoing final agency
review.
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\11\ GAO-09-492. The four major surface transportation modes are
mass transit and passenger rail, freight rail, highway, and pipeline. A
comprehensive risk assessment approach would assess threat,
vulnerability, and consequence to inform the allocation of resources,
as called for by the NIPP and the TS-SSP.
\12\ Through this effort, TSA intended to estimate the threat,
vulnerability, and consequence of a range of hypothetical attack
scenarios and integrate these estimates to produce risk scores for each
scenario that could be compared among each of the modes of
transportation. However, officials stated that TSA discontinued this
work due to difficulties in estimating the likelihood of terrorist
threats.
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In addition, we have previously reported that while TSA has
collected information related to threat, vulnerability, and consequence
within the surface transportation modes, it has not conducted risk
assessments that integrate these three components for individual modes.
For example, we reported in June 2009 that TSA had not conducted its
own risk assessment of mass transit and passenger rail systems that
combined all three risk elements, as called for by the NIPP.\13\ Thus,
we recommended that TSA conduct a comprehensive risk assessment that
combines threat, vulnerability, and consequence. DHS concurred with
this recommendation, and in February 2010, DHS officials said that TSA
had undertaken a Transportation Systems Sector Risk Assessment that
would incorporate all three elements of risk. In April 2010, TSA stated
that this risk assessment is under review. Similarly, the
Administration's Transborder Security Interagency Policy Committee
(IPC) Surface Transportation Subcommittee's recently issued Surface
Transportation Security Priority Assessment recognized that assessing
transportation assets and infrastructure and ranking their criticality
would help target the use of limited resources.\14\ Consequently, this
subcommittee recommended that TSA identify appropriate methodologies to
evaluate and rank surface transportation systems and critical
infrastructure.
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\13\ GAO-09-678. Although all levels of government are involved in
mass transit and passenger rail security, the primary responsibility
for securing the systems rests with the mass transit and passenger rail
operators. We have reported that most mass transit and passenger rail
systems have made operational enhancements to their security programs,
such as adding security personnel or transit police. Some of the
largest systems have also implemented varying types of random passenger
or baggage inspection screening programs. Additionally, mass transit
agencies have invested in capital improvements, including upgrading
closed-circuit television systems and installing explosives-detection
equipment and silent alarms.
\14\ The White House Transborder Security Interagency Policy
Committee Surface Transportation Subcommittee, Surface Transportation
Security Priority Assessment (March 2010). In making its
recommendations, the subcommittee gathered input from surface-
transportation owners and operators, DHS and DOT, as well as state and
local government representatives.
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We have also identified other opportunities to improve TSA's risk
management efforts for surface transportation. For example, in April
2009, we reported that TSA's efforts to assess security threats to
freight rail could be strengthened.\15\ Specifically, we noted that
while TSA had developed a freight rail security strategy, the agency
had focused almost exclusively on rail shipments of toxic inhalation
hazards (TIH), such as chlorine and anhydrous ammonia, which can be
fatal if inhaled, despite other Federal and industry assessments having
identified additional potential security threats, such as risks to
bridges, tunnels, and control centers.\16\ We reported that although
TSA's focus on TIH has been a reasonable initial approach given the
serious public harm these materials potentially pose to the public,
there are other security threats for TSA to consider and evaluate as
its freight rail strategy matures, including potential sabotage to
critical infrastructure. We recommended that TSA expand its efforts to
include all security threats in its freight rail security strategy. DHS
concurred with this recommendation and has since reported that TSA has
developed a Critical Infrastructure Risk Tool to measure the
criticality and vulnerability of freight railroad bridges. As of April
2010, the agency has used this tool to assess 39 bridges, some of which
transverse either the Mississippi or Missouri Rivers, and intends to
assess 22 additional bridges by the end of Fiscal Year 2010.\17\
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\15\ GAO-09-243.
\16\ Shipments of TIH, especially chlorine, frequently move through
densely populated areas to reach, for example, water treatment
facilities that use these products. We reported that TSA focused on
securing TIH materials for several reasons, including limited resources
and a decision in 2004 to prioritize TIH as a key risk requiring
Federal attention. Other Federal and industry freight rail stakeholders
agreed that focusing on TIH was a sound initial strategy because it is
a key potential rail security threat and an overall transportation
safety concern.
\17\ We have previously reported that certain bridges, such as
those over large rivers, play a key role in the national railroad
system because capacity constraints limit options to reroute trains. As
a result, incidents limiting or preventing their use could negatively
affect the economy by severely delaying rail traffic for significant
periods of time and causing transportation system delays and
disruption.
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Further, we reported in June 2009 that the Transit Security Grant
Program (TSGP) risk model includes all three elements of risk, but can
be strengthened by measuring variations in vulnerability.\18\ DHS has
held vulnerability constant, which limits the model's overall ability
to assess risk and more precisely allocate funds to transit agencies.
We also found that although TSA allocated about 90 percent of funding
to the highest-risk agencies, lower-risk agency awards were based on
other factors in addition to risk, such as project quality. For
example, a lower-risk agency with a high-quality project was more
likely to receive funding than a higher-risk agency with a low-quality
project. We recommended that DHS strengthen its methodology for
determining risk by developing a cost-effective method for
incorporating vulnerability information in its TSGP risk model. DHS
concurred with the recommendation, and in April 2010 the agency stated
that it is reevaluating the risk model for the Fiscal Year 2011 grant
cycle. Further, TSA is evaluating the feasibility of incorporating an
analysis of the current state of an asset, including its vulnerability,
in determining Fiscal Year 2011 grant funding.\19\
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\18\ See GAO-09-491. DHS awards TSGP grant funding to owners and
operators of mass transit and passenger rail systems that have used
these funds for a variety of security purposes, including developing
security plans, purchasing or upgrading security equipment, and
providing security training to transit employees.
\19\ Industry entities have also reported undertaking independent
efforts to assess security risks to their systems and operations. These
effects include: (1) a 2008 rail industry security assessment conducted
by the American Association of Railroads, which resulted in the
identification and prioritization of over 1,000 rail assets, including
bridges, tunnels, and control centers; and (2) comprehensive risk
assessments that incorporate and combine all three risk elements, which
have been conducted by the National Railroad Passenger Corporation
(Amtrak) and some individual transit systems.
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Additionally, we are currently conducting an assessment of TSA's
efforts to help ensure pipeline security; the resulting report will
include an evaluation of the extent to which TSA uses a risk management
approach to help strengthen pipeline security. Our preliminary
observations found that TSA has identified the 100 most-critical
pipeline systems in the United States and produced a pipeline risk
assessment model, consistent with the NIPP. Furthermore, the 9/11
Commission Act requires that risk assessment methodologies be used to
prioritize actions to the highest-risk pipeline assets, and we found
that TSA's stated policy is to consider risk when scheduling Corporate
Security Reviews--assessments of pipeline operators' security plans.
However, we found a weak statistical correlation between a pipeline
system's risk rank and the time elapsed between a first and subsequent
review.\20\ In addition, we found that among the 15 highest risk-ranked
pipeline systems, the time between a first and second Corporate
Security Review ranged from 1 to 6 years for those systems that had
undergone a second review. Further, as of April 2010, 2 systems among
the top 15 had not undergone a second review despite more than 6 years
passing since their first review. TSA officials told us that although a
pipeline system's relative risk ranking is the primary factor driving
the agency's decision of when to schedule a subsequent Corporate
Security Review, it is not the only factor influencing this decision.
They explained they also consider the geographical proximity of
Corporate Security Review locations to each other in order to reduce
travel time and costs, as well as the extent to which they have worked
with pipeline operators through other efforts, such as their Critical
Facility Inspection Program.\21\ Better prioritizing its reviews based
on risk could help TSA ensure its resources are more efficiently
allocated toward the highest-risk pipeline systems. We expect to issue
this report by the end of this year.
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\20\ We calculated a simple correlation coefficient to measure the
strength and direction of the linear relationship between systems' risk
rankings and the time elapsed between TSA's first and subsequent
Corporate Security Reviews for pipeline systems. The magnitude of the
correlation coefficient determines the strength of the correlation. Our
preliminary analysis resulted in a weak correlation coefficient score.
\21\ The Pipeline Security Division began inspections under the
Critical Facility Inspection Program in November 2008. The program
involves on-site physical security inspections of each critical
facility of the 100 most-critical pipeline systems.
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TSA Has Generally Improved Coordination with Key Stakeholders but
Additional Actions Could Enhance Current Efforts to Improve
Surface Transportation Security
TSA has developed several initiatives to improve coordination with
its Federal, state, and private sector stakeholders. However, we have
previously reported that TSA's coordination efforts could be improved.
For example, we reported in April 2009 that Federal and industry
stakeholders have taken a number of steps to coordinate their freight
rail security efforts, such as implementing agreements to clarify roles
and responsibilities and participating in various information-sharing
mechanisms.\22\ However, Federal coordination could be enhanced by more
fully leveraging the resources of all relevant Federal agencies, such
as TSA and FRA.\23\ For example, we reported that TSA was not
requesting data on deficiencies in security plans and training
activities collected by FRA, which could be useful to TSA in developing
regulations requiring high-risk rail carriers to develop and implement
security plans. To improve coordination, we recommended that DHS work
with Federal partners such as FRA to ensure that all relevant
information, including threat assessments, is shared. DHS concurred
with this recommendation and stated that it planned to better define
stakeholder roles and responsibilities to facilitate information
sharing. Since we issued our report, DHS reported that TSA continues to
share information with security partners, including meeting with FRA
and the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection to discuss coordination
and develop strategies for sharing relevant assessment information and
avoiding duplication.\24\
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\22\ Some rail industry stakeholders have independently implemented
other types of operational and procedural changes to secure their
hazardous rail shipments, such as making modifications to procedures
for how rail companies manage and schedule trains and railcars. Rail
industry organizations also play a role in disseminating pertinent
information, such as threat communications from DHS and DOT, to their
members.
\23\ See GAO-09-243.
\24\ DHS's Office of Infrastructure Protection is an organizational
entity within the National Protection and Programs Directorate, whose
mission includes leading the coordinated national effort to reduce the
risk to critical infrastructure and key resources posed by acts of
terrorism.
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In addition, we reported in January 2009 that although several
Federal entities, including TSA and the U.S. Coast Guard, have efforts
underway to assess the risk to highway infrastructure, these
assessments have not been systematically coordinated among key Federal
partners.\25\ We further reported that enhanced coordination with
Federal partners could better enable TSA to determine the extent to
which specific critical assets had been assessed and whether potential
adjustments in its methodology were necessary to target remaining
critical infrastructure assets. We recommended that to enhance
collaboration among entities involved in securing highway
infrastructure and to better leverage Federal resources, DHS establish
a mechanism to systematically coordinate risk assessment activities and
share the results of these activities among the Federal partners. DHS
concurred with the recommendation. In February 2010, TSA officials
indicated that the agency had met with other Federal agencies that
conduct security reviews of highway structures to identify existing
data resources, establish a data-sharing system among key agencies, and
discuss standards for future assessments.\26\ The Administration's
Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment also highlighted
the need for Federal entities to coordinate their assessment efforts.
That report included a recommendation to establish an integrated
Federal approach that consolidates capabilities in a unified effort for
security assessments, audits, and inspections to produce more thorough
evaluations and effective follow-up actions for reducing risk,
enhancing security, and minimizing burdens on assessed surface
transportation entities.
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\25\ GAO-09-57. The U.S. Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency
responsible for the security of the Nation's ports and waterways, which
may include highway assets that have a maritime nexus, such as bridges.
\26\ In addition to Federal efforts, highway-sector stakeholders
have taken a variety of voluntary actions intended to enhance the
security of highway infrastructure. Key efforts include developing
security publications, sponsoring infrastructure security workshops,
conducting research and development activities, and implementing
specific protective measures intended to deter an attack or reduce
potential consequences, such as security patrols, electronic detection
systems, and physical barriers.
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We also reported in February 2009 that TSA, which has the primary
Federal responsibility for ensuring the security of the commercial
vehicle sector, had taken actions to improve coordination with Federal,
state, and industry stakeholders with respect to commercial vehicle
security.\27\ These actions included signing joint agreements with DOT
and supporting the establishment of intergovernmental and industry
councils. However, we also reported that additional opportunities exist
to enhance security by more clearly defining stakeholder roles and
responsibilities. For example, some state transportation officials
stated that DHS and TSA had not clarified states' roles and
responsibilities in securing the transportation sector or communicated
to them TSA's strategy to secure commercial vehicles, which in some
cases has caused delays in implementing state transportation security
initiatives. Industry stakeholders also expressed concerns with respect
to TSA communicating its strategy, roles, and responsibilities;
leveraging industry expertise; and collaborating with industry
representatives.\28\ As a result, we recommended that TSA establish a
process to strengthen coordination with the commercial vehicle
industry, including ensuring that the roles and responsibilities of
industry and government are fully defined and clearly communicated, and
assess its coordination efforts. DHS concurred with this recommendation
and in April 2010 reported that its TS-SSP Highway Modal Annex is under
review and is expected to delineate methods to enhance communications
and coordination with stakeholders.
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\27\ GAO-09-85. The term ``commercial vehicles'' refers to vehicles
used in the commercial trucking industry (e.g., for-hire and private
trucks moving freight, rental trucks, and trucks carrying hazardous
materials) and the commercial motor coach industry (i.e., intercity,
tour, and charter buses). For the purposes of this statement, we are
including them in the highway infrastructure mode.
\28\ Although all levels of government are involved in the security
of commercial vehicles, primary responsibility for securing these
vehicles rests with the individual commercial vehicle companies
themselves. Truck and bus companies have responsibility for the
security of day-to-day operations. As part of these operations, they
ensure that company personnel, vehicles, and terminals--as well as all
of the material and passengers they transport---are secured.
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Using Targeted, Outcome-Oriented Performance Measures Could Help TSA
Better Monitor Strategy and Program Effectiveness
In accordance with Executive Order 13416 and requirements of the 9/
11 Commission Act, DHS, through TSA, has developed national strategies
for each surface transportation mode.\29\ However, we have previously
reported the need for TSA to strengthen its evaluation of the results
of its efforts through the use of targeted, measurable, and outcome-
based performance measures. Our prior work has shown that long-term,
action-oriented goals and a timeline with milestones can help track an
organization's progress toward its goals. The NIPP also provides that
DHS should work with its security partners, including other Federal
agencies, state and local government representatives, and the private
sector, to develop sector-specific metrics.
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\29\ Strengthening Surface Transportation Security, Exec. Order No.
13416, 71 Fed. Reg. 71033 (Dec. 5, 2006). The primary purpose of
Executive Order 13416 is to strengthen the security of surface
transportation. The executive order requires DHS to assess the security
of each surface transportation mode, and evaluate the effectiveness and
efficiency of current transportation security initiatives, among other
things.
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Using performance measures and an evaluation of the effectiveness
of surface transportation security initiatives can help provide TSA
with more meaningful information from which to determine whether its
strategies are achieving their intended results, and to target any
needed improvements. For example, in January 2009, we reported that
TSA's completion of a Highway Security Modal Annex was an important
first step in guiding national efforts to protect highway
infrastructure, but it did not include performance goals and measures
with which to assess the program's overall progress toward securing
highway infrastructure.\30\ As a result, we recommended that TSA
establish a time-frame for developing performance goals and measures
for monitoring the implementation of the annex's goals, objectives, and
activities. Similarly, in June 2009, we reported that TSA's Mass
Transit Modal Annex identified sectorwide goals that apply to all modes
of transportation as well as subordinate objectives specific to mass
transit and passenger rail systems, but did not contain measures or
targets on the effectiveness of operations of the security programs
identified in the annex.\31\ As a result, we recommended that TSA
should, to the extent feasible, incorporate performance measures in
future annex updates. DHS concurred with both of these recommendations.
In February 2010, TSA indicated that the updated annex would
incorporate performance measures among other characteristics we
recommended, and as of April 2010, the annex is under review. We will
continue to monitor TSA's progress in addressing these recommendations.
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\30\ GAO-09-57.
\31\ GAO-09-678.
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We also reported in April 2009 that three of the four performance
measures in TSA's Freight Rail Modal Annex to the TS-SSP did not
identify specific targets to gauge the effectiveness of Federal and
industry programs in achieving the measures or the transportation-
sector security goals outlined in the annex.\32\ We also reported that
TSA was limited in its ability to measure the effect of Federal and
industry efforts on achieving the agency's key performance measure for
the freight rail program, which is to reduce the risk associated with
the transportation of TIH in major cities identified as high-threat
urban areas. This was because the agency was unable to obtain critical
data necessary to consistently measure results. We reported that TSA
was unable to obtain critical data necessary to consistently calculate
cumulative results for this measure over the time period for which it
calculated them--from 2005 to 2008. In particular, some baseline data
needed to cumulatively calculate results for this measure were
historical and could not be collected. As a result, the agency used a
method for estimating risk for its baseline year that was different
than what it used for calculating results for subsequent years.
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\32\ GAO-09-243. The transportation-sector goals identified in the
Freight Rail Model Annex include: (1) prevent and deter acts of
terrorism against the transportation system, (2) enhance resiliency of
the U.S. transportation system, and (3) improve the cost-effective use
of resources for transportation security.
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Consequently, to help ensure the strategic goals of the modal annex
are met and that TSA is consistently and accurately measuring agency
and industry performance in reducing the risk associated with TIH rail
shipments in major cities, we recommended that TSA ensure that future
updates: (1) contain performance measures with defined targets that are
linked to fulfilling goals and objectives; and (2) more systematically
address specific milestones for completing activities and measuring
progress toward meeting identified goals. We further recommended that
TSA take steps to revise the baseline year associated with its TIH risk
reduction performance measure to enable the agency to more accurately
report results for this measure. DHS concurred with these
recommendations and has indicated that it will incorporate them into
future updates of its Freight Rail Modal Annex, which will be designed
to more specifically address goal-oriented milestones and performance
measures. In April 2010, TSA stated that the agency has revised its
risk management framework, TS-SSP, and modal annexes and that these
documents are undergoing final agency review.
In addition to developing performance measures to assess the
success of its security strategies, we have also identified the need
for TSA to develop or enhance its performance measures for specific
programs such as the TSGP, VIPR Program, and pipeline security
programs. Specifically, in June 2009, we reported that the TSGP lacked
a plan and milestones for developing measures to track progress of
achieving program goals.\33\ While FEMA--which administers the grants--
reported that it was beginning to develop measures to better manage its
portfolio of grants, TSA and FEMA had not collaborated to produce
performance measures for assessing the effectiveness of TSGP-funded
projects, such as how funding is used to help protect critical
infrastructure and the traveling public from possible acts of
terrorism.\34\ We recommended that TSA and FEMA collaborate in
developing a plan and milestones for measuring the effectiveness of the
TSGP and its administration. DHS concurred with our recommendation, and
in November 2009, FEMA stated that it will take steps to develop a plan
with milestones in coordination with TSA. Likewise, the
administration's Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment
discussed the importance of establishing a measurable evaluation system
to determine the effectiveness of surface transportation security
grants and recommended that TSA coordinate with other Federal agencies,
including FEMA, to do so.
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\33\ GAO-09-491. The purpose of the TSGP is to provide funds to
protect critical surface transportation infrastructure and the
traveling public.
\34\ In Fiscal Year 2008, FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate became
responsible for administering TSGP grants.
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In June 2009, we reported that TSA had measured the progress of its
VIPR program in terms of the number of VIPR operations conducted, but
had not yet developed measures or targets to report on the
effectiveness of the operations themselves.\35\ TSA program officials
reported, however, that they were planning to introduce additional
performance measures no later than the first quarter of Fiscal Year
2010. They added that these measures would gather information on, among
other things, (1) interagency collaboration by collecting performance
feedback from Federal, state, and local security, law enforcement, and
transportation officials prior to and during VIPR deployments; and (2)
stakeholder views on the effectiveness and value of VIPR deployment. In
April 2010, TSA reported that the VIPR program introduced four
performance measures for Fiscal Year 2010; these measures will be
reported quarterly.\36\ TSA has also stated that it has identified
performance targets for these measures, which it will revisit when
baseline program data is available.
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\35\ GAO-09-678.
\36\ According to TSA, the four measures introduced in Fiscal Year
2010 for the VIPR program include: (1) total VIPR asset deployments;
(2) completion percentage at high risk locations; (3) percentage of
national special security event; and (4) percentage of primary
stakeholders with repeat deployments.
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As part of our ongoing review of TSA's efforts to help ensure
pipeline security, we are assessing the extent to which TSA has
measured efforts to strengthen pipeline security.\37\ While our work
has not been completed, our preliminary observations have identified
that TSA has taken actions to measure progress as called for by the
NIPP, but could better measure pipeline security improvements. More
specifically, our preliminary observations have identified that
effective performance measurement data could better inform
decisionmakers of the extent to which pipeline security programs and
activities have been able to reduce risk and better enable them to
determine funding priorities within and across agencies. Also,
developing additional performance measures--particularly outcome-based
measures--that assess the effects of TSA's efforts in strengthening
pipeline security and are aligned with transportation-sector goals and
pipeline security objectives could better enable TSA to evaluate
security improvements in the pipeline industry. Our upcoming report
that will be issued later this year will provide additional details.
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\37\ TSA has not issued pipeline security regulations, but works
with the pipeline industry to implement suggested security measures to
make pipeline systems more secure. Private companies who own and
operate pipeline systems are responsible for assessing their own
specific security needs and incur the costs associated with
implementing security measures.
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TSA Has More Than Doubled Its Surface Transportation Inspector
Workforce but Faces Challenges in Balancing Priorities and
Directing Current and Future Workforce Needs
Over the past 2 years, TSA has reported having more than doubled
the size of its Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program,
expanding the program from 93 inspectors in June 2008 to 201 inspectors
in April 2010.\38\ Inspectors have conducted baseline security reviews
that assess, among other things, the overall security posture of mass
transit and passenger rail agencies and the implementation of security
plans, programs, and measures, and best practices. However, TSA had not
completed a workforce plan to direct current and future inspection
program needs as the program assumes new responsibilities associated
with the implementation of certain provisions of the 9/11 Commission
Act by passenger and freight rail systems.\39\
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\38\ TSA intends to hire an additional 179 surface inspectors in
Fiscal Year 2010. According to TSA, the April 2010 data includes
headquarters staff.
\39\ See, for example, Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1512, 1517, 121 Stat.
266, 429-33, 439-41 (2007).
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Since establishing the inspection program in 2005 to identify and
reduce vulnerabilities to passenger rail and ensure compliance with
passenger rail security directives, TSA has expanded the roles and
responsibilities of surface inspectors to include additional surface
transportation modes--including mass transit bus and freight rail--and
participation in VIPR operations. For example, as of April 2010, TSA's
surface inspectors had, among other things, conducted security
assessments of 142 mass transit and passenger rail agencies, including
Amtrak, and over 1,350 site visits to mass transit and passenger rail
stations to complete station profiles, which gather detailed
information on a station's physical security elements, geography, and
emergency points of contact. However, we also reported that TSA faced
challenges in the following areas: \40\
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\40\ GAO-09-678.
Balancing aviation and surface transportation priorities: We
reported in June 2009 that TSA has reorganized its field unit
and reporting structure since establishing the inspection
program, and surface inspectors raised concerns about its
effect. These reorganizations placed TSA's surface inspectors
under the command of Federal Security Directors and Assistant
Federal Security Directors for Inspections--aviation-focused
positions that historically have not had an active role in
conducting surface transportation inspection duties.\41\
According to TSA, these changes were designed to support its
pursuit of a multimodal workforce and ensure a more cohesive
and streamlined approach to inspections. However, we noted that
surface inspectors raised concerns that these changes had
resulted in the surface transportation mission being diluted by
TSA's aviation mission. Among these concerns is that the
surface inspectors were being assigned airport-related duties,
while aviation inspectors had been assigned surface
responsibilities that had affected performance in conducting
follow-up inspections to determine progress mass transit and
passenger rail systems had made in addressing previously-
identified weaknesses. TSA officials reported that they had
selected their current command structure because Federal
Security Directors were best equipped to make full use of the
security network in their geographical location because they
frequently interacted with state and local law enforcement and
mass transit operators, and were aware of vulnerabilities in
these systems.
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\41\ Federal Security Directors are the highest-level TSA officials
at an airport and provide operational leadership for transportation
security responsibilities within an airport.
Workforce Planning: At the time of our June 2009 report, TSA
did not have a human capital or other workforce plan for its
Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program, but the
agency had plans to conduct a staffing study to identify the
optimal workforce size to address its current and future
program needs. TSA reported that it had initiated a study in
January 2009, which, if completed, could provide TSA with a
more reasonable basis for determining the surface inspector
workforce needed to achieve its current and future workload
needs. However, in March 2010, TSA officials told us that while
they were continuing to work on the staffing study, TSA did not
have a firm date for completion.
Mr. Chairman this concludes my statement. I look forward to
answering any questions that you or other members of the Committee may
have at this time.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Mr. Lord.
And now, Mr. Carlton Mann, Assistant Inspector General for
Inspections at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office
of the Inspector General.
Mr. Mann, please.
STATEMENT OF CARLTON I. MANN, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Mann. Good afternoon, Chairman Lautenberg and Ranking
Member Hutchison. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on
the challenges within the surface transportation mode
confronting Transportation Security Administration.
Mr. Chairman, as you noted in your remarks, the terrorist
incidents abroad have underscored the need to focus more on
mass transit, highways, pipelines, and freight rail. Within the
last 2 years, we've issued several reports related to surface
transportation issues, including the Surface Transportation
Security Inspector Program. In total, we made 14
recommendations to TSA to promote more efficient, effective,
and economical operations. I'd like to highlight, briefly, the
results of those reviews.
In June 2008, we issued an inspection report, TSA's
Administration and Coordination of Mass Transit Security
Programs. This report addressed the strengths and weaknesses of
TSA's oversight and assistance programs for mass transit rail.
Our goal was to evaluate how well TSA managed these programs
and how well the programs met the security needs of the major
mass transit rail systems.
We identified important challenges to improve transit rail
security. For example, we observed unclear chains of command,
insufficient guidance, inadequate communication, and TSA's need
to be more consistent in its interaction with its mass transit
rail stakeholders. In that report, we recommended that TSA
place surface inspectors under the direct authority of a TSA
headquarters official responsible for surface transportation.
And, Ranking Member, as you noted, TSA did not concur with
that recommendation.
As mandated in the 2011 Commission Act, we conducted a
follow-up review of surface inspection--of the Surface
Inspection Program. In February 2009, we issued a report: The
Effectiveness of TSA's Surface Transportation Security
Inspectors. We determined that TSA needed to look critically at
how it is deploying resources and assess how planned exercises
could use inspectors better. The program appeared to be
understaffed for the long term, and aviation-focused command
structure had reduced the quality and morale of the workforce.
TSA concurred with our recommendation to examine how many
inspectors it needed to perform necessary functions by
assessing current and anticipated duties.
We also recommended, again, that TSA place the surface
inspectors under the direct authority of a TSA headquarters
official. And once again, TSA did not concur. TSA stated its
belief that the current surface command structure did not
inhibit its inspectors' effectiveness.
In August 2009, TSA informed us that it was conducting a
staffing study of its entire inspection work force. In
September 2009, we learned that TSA began to implement a multi-
phased restructuring of its surface resources. The
restructuring plan appeared to affect numerous senior staff
within the surface inspector program. TSA has not formally
communicated how the reorganization will strengthen the surface
inspection program, or whether the plan will enable surface
inspectors to operate adequately and independently of TSA's
aviation security mission.
In March 2010, we issued a report: TSA's Preparedness for
Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies. In that report, we
evaluated TSA's effectiveness in assisting passenger rail and
mass transit stakeholders with preparing for and responding to
emergencies. We noted that TSA could support passenger rail
agencies better by improving its assessments of emergency
preparedness and response capabilities. TSA can also ensure
that drills and exercises are more realistic. We believe that
will help strengthen response capabilities.
TSA has focused primarily on security and terrorism
prevention efforts, while providing limited staff and resources
to emergency preparedness and response. As a result, passenger
rail agencies and the first responders they rely upon, may not
be prepared to handle all emergencies. TSA concurred with that
report's four recommendations.
While most of my statement summarizes weaknesses in TSA's
Surface Transportation Security Programs, it is important to
point out that we generally found that TSA's surface inspector
assessments and domain initiatives are helpful and have been
effective.
We certainly look forward to working with the Department to
identify ways to strengthen its surface transportation
security.
Sir, that concludes my statement. I'd be glad to answer any
questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mann follows:]
Prepared Statement of Carlton I. Mann, Assistant Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Good afternoon Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and
distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity
to testify on challenges within the surface transportation mode
confronting the Transportation Security Administration. When discussing
transportation security, people usually think of aviation security
first. However, terrorist incidents abroad have underscored the need to
focus more on surface transportation modes--mass transit, highway,
maritime, pipelines, and freight rail.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 gave the
Transportation Security Administration authority and responsibility for
securing all modes of transportation. Congress further clarified TSA's
oversight role with the 9/11 Commission Act. Beginning in 2004, TSA
increased its efforts to mitigate the vulnerability of mass transit
rail systems across the United States. This was accomplished by
introducing mass transit stakeholder security forums; developing
guidance, memorandums and directives; using its Surface Transportation
Security Inspection Program (STSI) to provide voluntary vulnerability
assessments; and providing support through grants and direct
operational assistance.
Within the last 2 years, we have issued several reports related to
surface transportation issues, including the STSI Program. I would like
to highlight the results of those reviews. Most of my statement focuses
on our findings and recommendations. However, it is important to point
out that we also reported that TSA's surface inspector assessment and
domain initiatives have been effective, and have helped the program
achieve many of its goals.
In June 2008, we issued an inspection report, TSA's Administration
and Coordination of Mass Transit Security Programs. This report
addressed the strengths and weaknesses of TSA's oversight and
assistance programs for mass transit rail, including the Surface
Transportation Security Inspection Program, the Transit Security Grant
Program, the Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) Program,
and the National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program. Later that
year, we conducted a follow-up inspection and in February 2009 issued
another report, Effectiveness of TSA's Surface Transportation Security
Inspectors. This report addressed the strengths and weaknesses of TSA's
Surface Transportation Security Inspectors. Most recently, in March
2010, the OIG issued a report, TSA's Preparedness for Mass Transit and
Passenger Rail Emergencies. It addressed TSA's effectiveness in
supporting mass transit and passenger rail stakeholders with preparing
for and responding to emergencies. In total, we made 14 recommendations
to TSA to promote more efficient, effective, and economical operations.
In our mass transit report, we identified important challenges to
improve transit rail security, meet the needs of mass transit
authorities, and comply with legislation, which expanded TSA's
statutory authority and responsibility. In our review of the Surface
Transportation Security Inspector program, we concluded that TSA needed
to look critically at how it is deploying resources. The central issue
in both reports was the mission, organization, and command structure of
its surface inspectors. In particular, its command structure appeared
to be aviation-focused.
This year, we evaluated TSA's effectiveness in supporting mass
transit and passenger rail agencies in preparing for and responding to
emergency incidents. That evaluation overlapped our previous reports in
one respect. In our earlier reports, we discussed TSA's use of the
Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement Program and pointed out
that they have led to security improvements in the mass transit systems
reviewed, but did not analyze the BASE program or processes. In our
most recent report, we identified weaknesses in the BASE program's
ability to assess passenger rail stakeholders' emergency preparedness
and response capabilities.
Following is a more detailed summary of each report.
TSA's Administration and Coordination of Mass Transit Security Programs
(OIG-08-66)
The purpose of our review was to evaluate TSA's four largest
oversight and assistance programs for mass transit rail: the Surface
Transportation Security Inspection Program, the Transit Security Grant
Program, the Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response program, and
the National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program. Our goal was to
evaluate how well TSA managed these programs and how well the programs
met the security needs of the major mass transit rail systems.
The 9/11 Commission Act, which was enacted shortly after we began
this review, introduced new mass transit rail standards and
responsibilities for TSA. Where we obtained information on the status
of TSA compliance with standards introduced by the 9/11 Commission Act,
we included it in our report. The review did not encompass TSA's
responsibilities for freight rail and for intercity passenger rail, or
for other forms of mass transit, such as buses. We conducted our
fieldwork from June 2007 to October 2007.
We reported that TSA could improve certain aspects of each of these
mass transit security programs. We observed unclear or unduly complex
chains of command; an unclear mission, insufficient guidance; and
insufficient communication. TSA needed more consistency in its
interactions with mass transit rail stakeholders--who were at odds over
the best approach for allocating funds and prioritizing projects for
the Transit Security Grant Program--although it acknowledged and
attempted to address some early missteps that strained stakeholder
relationships. Nonetheless, we noted TSA should further integrate
stakeholder expertise to implement more effectively its oversight and
assistance programs and fulfill its responsibility for mass transit
security. We reported considerable satisfaction among mass transit
agencies using the National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program.
The report contained seven recommendations aimed at improving the
TSA's oversight and assistance programs for mass transit rail. TSA
concurred, or concurred in part, with recommendations to direct its
Transportation Security Network Management office to provide
Transportation Security Inspectors information and updates on the rail-
related programs. TSA also agreed to develop procedures for
incorporating asset-specific risk and vulnerability assessments,
including information provided by Transportation Security Inspectors,
into the grant decision-making process and grant guidance; include in
its annual report to Congress how it used grants to implement its
transportation security goals; and each grant recipient's assessment of
the grant application and award process. In addition, TSA acknowledged
the need to seek Memorandums of Agreement with all relevant transit
authorities regarding VIPR deployments; and revise grant program
eligibility criteria to allow start-up funds for mass transit systems
that do not already have a canine explosive detection unit.
TSA did not concur with our recommendations to place the
Transportation Security Inspectors--Surface under the direct authority
of a TSA headquarters official responsible for surface transportation,
and to develop specific, feasible security standards for mass transit
systems.
A few of the report's recommendations are not yet resolved, pending
additional information from TSA and the resolution of recommendations
in the follow up STSI report.
Effectiveness of TSA's Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (OIG-
09-24)
The 9/11 Commission Act directed that we evaluate the performance
and effectiveness of TSA's Transportation Security Inspectors-Surface
and whether there is a need for additional inspectors. The act stated,
``Not later than September 30, 2008, the Department of Homeland
Security Inspector General shall transmit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees on the performance and effectiveness of
surface transportation security inspectors, whether there is a need for
additional inspectors, and other recommendations.'' We conducted our
fieldwork from February to July 2008.
We determined that TSA needed to look critically at how it is
deploying resources, and assess how planned exercises could better use
the inspectors and their activities. The program appeared understaffed
for the long term and an aviation-focused command structure had reduced
the quality and morale of the workforce.
TSA agreed that Transportation Security Inspectors and their unique
expertise in mass transit and rail should be integrated into VIPR
planning and deployment. TSA stated that it has addressed the potential
role of Transportation Security Inspectors in its VIPR Team
Capabilities and Operational Deployment guide. TSA did not agree that
Transportation Security Inspectors' comprehensive inspection
activities, such as BASE and Security Action Item reviews, should be
integrated into VIPR operations.
TSA concurred with our recommendation to examine how many
inspectors it needed to perform necessary functions by assessing
current and anticipated future duties, and then expand the
Transportation Security Inspector workforce to ensure that each field
office has sufficient staffing. However, at the time of our report we
did not agree with the approach TSA proposed to carry out this
recommendation.
TSA did not concur with our earlier recommendation, which we
repeated in this report, to place the Transportation Security
Inspectors-Surface under the direct authority of a TSA headquarters
official who is responsible for surface transportation. TSA did not
agree that the Transportation Security Inspector command structure
inhibited the inspectors' effectiveness and we were unsuccessful in
persuading TSA to implement this recommendation. Ultimately, in the
absence of a commitment from TSA management to modify its command
structure, we retracted our original recommendation and instead
recommended that TSA eliminate practices that undermined efforts to
establish a more transparent chain of command. In its last update, TSA
indicated that it was taking steps to strengthen communication between
the STSI program and Federal Security Directors and their staffs in the
field.
TSA's Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies
(OIG-10-68)
The purpose of this audit was to evaluate TSA's effectiveness in
assisting passenger rail and mass transit stakeholders with preparing
for and responding to emergencies. We conducted this performance audit
between April and August 2009, and the OIG issued its final report in
March 2010.
We determined that TSA could better support passenger rail agencies
by improving its assessments of emergency preparedness and response
capabilities. TSA can also improve its efforts to train passenger rail
agencies and first responders, and ensure that drills and exercises are
live and more realistic to help strengthen response capabilities. TSA
has focused primarily on security and terrorism prevention efforts,
while providing limited staff and resources to emergency preparedness
and response. As a result, passenger rail agencies and the first
responders that rely upon may not be adequately prepared to handle all
emergencies or mitigate their consequences.
The report made four recommendations. TSA concurred with, and took
corrective actions for, all four recommendations.
Evolution of the Surface Transportation Security Inspector Program
The STSI program's organization and chain of command continues to
evolve, but in a manner which is not consistent with our
recommendations. As discussed above, we reported our concerns twice
about the organization and authority for the program and in both
reports recommended that TSA place the responsibility for the STSI
program with an official at TSA headquarters. After considering TSA's
comments on the STSI report, we revised our recommendation to TSA to
eliminate practices that undermined efforts to establish a more
transparent chain of command.
In December 2006, TSA shifted from a system where Transportation
Security Inspectors reported to surface-focused supervisors to a system
where they reported to aviation-focused supervisors. TSA reorganized
the program to match the field command model for aviation and cargo
inspectors. Supervisory Transportation Security Inspectors became
Assistant Federal Security Directors-Surface (AFSDs-Surface) who
reported to the local FSD. The FSD was the administrative manager, but
the STSIP headquarters office still set the priorities and provided the
budget resources for the inspectors in the field. AFSDs-Surface,
therefore, effectively had two chains of command.
In May 2008, TSA made further changes. In primary field offices
that have an AFSD-Surface, Transportation Security Inspectors were
reporting to that individual. In satellite field offices without an
AFSD-Surface, inspectors were reporting to the local Assistant Federal
Security Director--Inspections (AFSD-Inspections). However, the AFSD-
Surface at the nearby primary field office still mentored and advised
all surface inspectors within that area, even when they were not under
his or her direct command. Under this structure (at the time of our
report), 55 (37 percent) of Transportation Security Inspectors were
reporting to an AFSD-Surface, and the remaining 95 (63 percent) were
reporting to an aviation focused AFSD-Inspections.
At the time, we also observed several problems regarding FSDs'
involvement with the STSIP that were leading to tension and confusion
over the program's chain of command. In response to our STSI report,
TSA stated that it chose this command structure because FSDs are better
able to use the security network in the area. TSA noted that FSDs
frequently interact with state and local law enforcement and mass
transit operators. TSA believes that FSDs understand the
vulnerabilities and challenges of the mass transit modes ``in their
backyard.'' In our final report, we maintained that the program
continued to operate differently than that outlined in a management
directive that TSA cited.
In August 2009, TSA informed us that it was in the process of
conducting a formal independent comprehensive staffing study of the
entire inspection workforce, to include surface, with the results due
in the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 2009. TSA has not communicated the
results of its study.
In September 2009, we learned that TSA began to implement a multi-
phased restructuring of its Office of Security Operations, Office of
Compliance, Surface Inspection and Oversight to meet mission demands
and to utilize resources better. TSA planned to abolish positions,
establish new positions, realign some functions among positions, and
reallocate resources among field offices throughout the country. The
restructuring plan appeared to affect numerous senior staff within the
surface inspector program. To our knowledge, TSA has not formally
communicated how the reorganization will strengthen the STSI program
and resolve the primary issue raised in our reports. On a broader
level, we remain concerned whether this plan will better enable surface
resources to operate adequately and independently of TSA's aviation
security mission.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss these matters. We look
forward to continuing our work with the department to identify ways to
strengthen surface transportation security. I would be pleased to
answer any questions you might have.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you all very much for your
testimony.
Mr. Heyman, the 9/11 Act set a number of deadlines for
securing our surface transportation system, but TSA has missed
many of these deadlines. One of the deadlines was a
comprehensive risk assessment and national security strategy
for our Nation's rail system. This was due last year, and I'm
asking you, I hope for the last time, when the Department will
complete this long overdue risk assessment. What do you say to
that?
Mr. Heyman. Senator, the risk assessment is in interagency
review right now. It should be coming to Congress after that
review is complete.
Senator Lautenberg. After what?
Mr. Heyman. After that review is complete.
Senator Lautenberg. When will that be?
Mr. Heyman. These--the interagency review process is one
which you have comments from agencies, and it goes through the
OMB process, and they have to be adjudicated by TSA. So,
depending upon the comments that are--get back--matters of
weeks, probably.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Heyman, that doesn't sound very
good. I reminded you, in my question, that the report was due
last year. And to be told now that, ``Well, they'll get it done
when the comment period is over,'' that is outrageous.
I used to run a corporation, I can tell you that we
wouldn't have permitted that kind of thing to take place. And I
don't understand the delay, with the risk that we've got, just
in New Jersey, 150,000 people ride the train every day. The
area that I live in abuts the area that is declared by the FBI
to be the most appealing target for a terrorist attack in the
country. The two-mile stretch between Newark Airport and the
Harbor is filled with chemical companies and all kinds of
threats to human safety. We're walking around, with a
bureaucratic delay. It's not fair to the people who we serve,
you and I and Senator Hutchison and all of us, to say, ``Well,
it's work in process.'' I hope that something better can come
out of this.
The National Security Council recently released a report,
finding that TSA has failed to take the lead on coordinating
surface transportation security efforts. What specific actions
does TSA plan to take in order to address the NSC's
recommendation? How long is that going to take?
Mr. Heyman. First, Senator, I share your concern about the
delays on the risk assessment. As somebody who was sworn in
last summer and have taken a look at some of the
recommendations that have yet to be implemented, let me assure
you that it is a priority to move quickly as we can through
these types of recommendations that have not been completed.
The--if there is a silver lining on this, about 90 percent of
the 9/11 recommendations have already been put in place. But,
the risk assessment needs to be completed, and I share that
with you.
Even so, during the grant processes, which is one of the
most effective tools that we have for putting in place security
at these places, the--they are--the investments are based on
risk. They are done, looking at threat, looking at
vulnerability. Those risk assessments have been completed, and,
as you say, rightly, New York is not only--and the New Jersey
corridor--not only of greatest risk, but has also received
perhaps the greatest amount of funds, as a result of that. And
that's a reflection of the risk assessments that have been done
to promote the grant programs.
As it pertains to the White House Report, the TSA played a
leadership role in supporting that effort. It was an
interagency report that was completed with the contributions of
the Department of Transportation and the Department of Energy
and the Department of Homeland Security. And a--I met,
yesterday, with the President's advisor at Homeland Security.
He is very much interested in putting forward an implementation
plan which will be delivered to the White House at the end of
next month.
Senator Lautenberg. I'm told that 36 of 77 recommendations
for surface security have not yet been completed. I can tell
you, Mr. Heyman--nothing personal here, but I'm not comforted
by the response that you gave. The fact that you're a
relatively recent arrival, you're called in as the next
management group, and it's not very heartwarming to hear the
fact that we're going to still be delayed on one part of this,
and--we're talking about something that was begun a long time
ago.
So, I would say to you, take the message back to the
Secretary of DHS that we're going to look further into this. I
am absolutely dissatisfied with the response given.
Excuse me, Senator Hutchison, for running it a little
longer, I want to hear from you, please.
Senator Hutchison. No, I appreciate your line of
questioning.
Let me talk about the area of the inspectors. In the
February 2009 report to Congress on the effectiveness of TSA's
surface transportation inspectors, the DHS inspector general
noted that TSA has its surface-focused inspectors report to
aviation-focused supervisors, rather than surface-focused
supervisors. Two-thirds of the inspectors hired after the
reorganization had no rail or mass transit experience.
The IG concluded that, the current TSI command structure
inhibits TSI effectiveness, and recommended, three times, that
TSA place surface inspectors under the authority of a TSA
official that is surface-transportation-oriented. TSA rejected
the recommendation each time, and the IG's office ultimately
backed off the proposal.
Mr. Heyman, your policy of having surface-focused
inspectors report to aviation-focused supervisors, and the
hiring of surface inspectors with no surface experience,
doesn't seem like a good way for TSA to address the issues that
we are concerned about, the security issues in surface
transportation. Could you explain how you are trying to achieve
this with this kind of IG report?
Mr. Heyman. Senator, thank you. I have looked at that IG
report, and I know those at TSA who I've spoken with have
looked at it. And I believe that there is an interest--an
additional recommendation in the report about the command-and-
control structures, in terms of how those inspectors are
implemented and deployed into the field. I know that TSA has
said that there is a broader interest in reorganizing that to
more effectively deploy inspectors. And I believe that they
will be doing so. I suppose that part of the challenge, of
course, is that, even though there has been a change in
administration, there has not, at this point, been a TSA
Administrator. And, of course, those kinds of reorganizations
or changes are usually left for the incoming team. But, I think
the--that the report was, as you said, well received by TSA.
And I think they are looking to implement that with new
leadership on board.
Senator Hutchison. OK. So, you are saying, today, that you
think the inspectors hired will, going forward, have surface
experience, and also that there would be a surface person as
the supervisor?
Mr. Heyman. I'm not quite sure how the--how it will be
organized, but I know that they will look into that. And I'm
happy to give you additional information after the hearing.
Senator Hutchison. I would--well, I'd like to have the
information when there is a policy that is set, if it, in fact,
is going to change, because I certainly would have questions,
going forward, and probably of the nominee for TSA----
Mr. Heyman. Sure.
Senator Hutchison.--when that appointment is made.
TSA's current policy only requires the surface
transportation inspectors for the top 50 transit systems to
visit the property once every 3 years. Does that seem like
enough supervision if the transit agencies know that, once an
inspection is done, that they won't be inspected for 3 years?
And is that still the policy?
Mr. Heyman. That is the policy, as far as I know. The
inspections are in sync with the granting cycle, and so, it is
meant to synchronize funding and assessments. There are about
5,000 transit sites across the country, and with--given the
limited inspectors, that's the tempo of operations, I think,
that can be sustained at this point.
Senator Hutchison. I'd like to ask Mr. Lord and Mr. Mann,
number one, Do you think that it is a good policy to indicate
to an agency that they will have an inspection once every 3
years? Number two, Do you think surface inspectors should still
report to aviation supervisors?
Mr. Mann, you have recommended that the surface-focused
inspectors report to surface transportation people.
And, Mr. Lord, you have indicated, in your reports, that
they should have surface transportation experience.
So, would you speak to this and let's see if----
Mr. Lord. Sure. I'd be glad to.
Senator Hutchison.--we can generate some----
Mr. Lord. The--in regard to your first question, I'm a
little concerned about locking the inspectors into a rigid
schedule, primarily because if you fully embrace a risk-based
approach, I would argue, you should focus your management time
and resources on the highest-risk facilities. So, they may want
to revisit that policy. You can't--it's not one-size-fits-all,
obviously. If you have higher-risk facilities and you are--and
you haven't embraced risk management principles, I would argue
you should focus where the risks are greatest first, then use
scarce resources to look elsewhere.
In terms of this issue of reporting to the aviation-side of
the house, obviously those are where the biggest programs are.
That's the most visible component, in some respects, of the
agency's operations. This has been a longstanding problem. I
don't think there is a simple solution. I know we have met with
the inspectors. They believe the function needs to be elevated,
organizationally.
And I was encouraged by the fact that H.R. 2200, the TSA
Reauthorization Act, which passed the House last year, it would
elevate the surface inspector function within the agency. And
perhaps that's one mechanism you could use to, you know, ensure
more attention is focused on it, if you have higher-level
officials leading the effort within the agency.
Senator Hutchison. Mr. Mann?
Mr. Mann. Infrequent inspections does pose some risk. But,
I also agree with my colleague, Mr. Lord, that where the risk
seems to be greatest is perhaps where we should not be locked
into a rigid schedule of every 3 years and perhaps do something
more frequently or more unannounced.
Regarding the--we've made it clear that we've recommended
that TSA should have its surface transportation inspectors
report directly to a person in TSA, for a variety of reasons.
First of all, the Federal security directors are aviation-
focused, and generally do not have the surface transportation
expertise. The chain of command is somewhat convoluted, simply
because direction comes from headquarters, it comes from the
Federal security directors. And we've got those inspectors, who
are out on the ground, getting conflicting--sometimes
conflicting messages, and certainly getting messages from
several different sources. And we stand by our recommendation
that TSA should have a central person at TSA headquarters in
charge of the surface transportation program.
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you.
My time is up. And we now have other Senators to ask
questions. I would just say that I hope that you, Mr. Lord and
Mr. Mann, both of you, will continue to make these
recommendations. There's no reason to back down. I know that
this is a big area, and I know that there's no TSA
Administrator. Those are certainly legitimate concerns. But, I
think we do need to have much better use of our taxpayer
dollars. And I think we can do better. And I hope that the next
leader that is appointed for this agency is of the same mind
and will take some of the advice from the GAO and the IG.
Thank you very much.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Senator Hutchison.
Senator Thune, the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, we
are pleased to have you with us.
Senator Lautenberg. Please.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this hearing.
I want to thank our panelists today for being here and
sharing their perspectives on an issue that's very important to
this country and to our economy. Transportation infrastructure
is critical, and all of the different modes are, at some point
or another, vulnerable or susceptible to attacks. We want to
make sure that we are taking all the steps that are necessary
to protect that infrastructure.
Let me ask a question, if I might, Mr. Heyman. What do you
see as the biggest threat to surface transportation security?
And which surface modes, if you can discuss this in an open
session, are most vulnerable to a terrorist attack? And how
prepared are we to prevent that sort of an attack?
Mr. Heyman. Thank you, Senator. Welcome.
Let me just say, generally speaking, we are still concerned
about aviation threats and surface threats, as it pertains to
mass transit. The discussion that we've had here, the recent
events that we've seen over the last year, and the recognition
of this being a largely open networks of--network of networks
creates great challenges and, obviously, opportunities for
those who seek to do harm. We are, as noted, trying to take a
risk-based approach to buy down the risk at the highest value
and highest concerns. We do that across all modes of
transportation. This past year, we are completing our
multimodal risk assessment, for the purposes of assessing where
the next investments go. But, this is an area that we do need
to be concerned about. And I can give you more details in a
classified briefing.
Senator Thune. OK, thanks.
And I would, I guess, direct this to Mr. Lord. We've got 2
million miles of pipeline across this country, including over
6,000 miles in my home State of South Dakota pipelines that
carry oil, natural gas, and other products. Given that a threat
to our Nation's pipelines could have some grave economic
consequences, how should TSA use risk management to calibrate
its attention to critical threats to the Nation's pipeline and,
consequently, our energy supply?
Mr. Lord. Well, they've taken the first step. They've
ranked--they developed a list of the 100 critical pipeline
facilities, based on risk. And even though our observations are
preliminary, our upcoming report is going to suggest, and use
that risk information as part of your inspection process. Use
it to help guide you on where the--you conduct your corporate
security reviews, how frequently you get out there to make
inspections. And also, once you do identify a problem, we think
it's very important to have a follow up mechanism to ensure any
deficiency and planning you identify is implemented.
So, it's--they're at the first step, and our report's going
to highlight the need to carry forward what they're doing. You
know, have a more frequent inspection process at the higher
risk facilities. And third, follow up on any deficiency, to
close the loop, so to speak.
Senator Thune. Mr. Mann, there is a DHS IG report on the
effectiveness of TSA's surface transportation security
inspectors, and in that report, TSA rejected the IG's
recommendation to have surface inspectors report to fellow
surface transportation experts; instead, they are reporting to
TSA airport personnel. My question is, Are TSA's surface
inspectors expected to be multipurpose field inspectors, jacks-
of-all-trade instead of masters of a particular field?
Mr. Mann. It is our understanding that they are not. In
fact, one of the assistant Federal security directors, in fact,
told us that these inspectors, who are aviation- oriented, are
incapable of doing most of the duties that the surface
inspectors are required to do.
Senator Thune. The FRA has about 400 safety inspectors
across the country. Is it possible for those inspectors to be
trained to handle security responsibilities to improve
efficiency and lower the cost of inspections to the taxpayers?
Mr. Mann. I think it is possible.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Thune follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John Thune, U.S. Senator from South Dakota
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this important
hearing. I also want to thank all of our witnesses for being here
today.
While aviation security gets most of the public's attention, the
security of our Nation's surface transportation system--our railroads,
highways, and pipelines--must also be a national priority and a
priority for this committee. The past few years have seen attacks on
rail transit systems in major cities throughout the world including
London, Madrid, and Moscow, as well as an unsuccessful plot to detonate
explosives on the New York City subway system.
In addition to keeping passengers secure, we must also work to keep
our Nation's freight network secure. Many rural states, including my
state of South Dakota, depend on surface transportation to ship their
products within the United States, and around the world. An attack on
our Nation's surface transportation system could disrupt the timely
delivery of goods and significantly weaken our Nation's economy.
The private sector, and the railroads in particular, should be
commended for their leadership following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in
putting in place their own security plans, and installing cameras,
fencing and other security equipment to ``harden'' facilities. The
Transportation Security Administration (ISA) seems to have taken a
collaborative approach in working with the private sector
transportation companies, a good approach I believe, because
initiatives to guard against terrorism must be balanced with the need
to not place undue burdens on commerce.
I do find the conclusions of the recently released White House
assessment on surface transportation security rather troublesome. At a
time of record Federal deficits, the last thing we need are duplicative
security programs and overlapping responsibilities among Federal
agencies. I hope our witnesses will have recommendations for how DHS,
and if necessary, Congress, can more clearly delineate roles and
responsibilities for surface transportation security.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing from
our witnesses.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Warner?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK WARNER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen. I've just got couple of quick
questions. One is--and obviously recognizing that some of this
could fall in the classified area--as a Senator from the
Commonwealth, I am very concerned about the safety of Metro.
Recognizing some incidents in both Moscow in Madrid over the
last year and a half, I'd love for you to tell us about what we
should do more here in the Nation's capital, in terms of safety
and security around Metro. And whether this area poses any
unique challenges. When you think about how Metro intersects
with the challenges of three different jurisdictions--you've
got a Metro system, you've got a VRE system, you've got a
separate Maryland rail system, you've got CSX, you've got this
configuration of all these different systems coming together
within the national capital area to move people around. And I
would love to hear--again, respecting the confidentiality of
some of these aspects, any comments you might have,
particularly Secretary Heyman and Mr. Mann or Mr. Lord. Any one
of you.
Mr. Lord. I'll go first. I don't mind. The--without
divulging anything classified--and I'll defer to Mr. Heyman on
the threat information--I think, obviously, the arrest of Mr.
Zazi, up in New York, shows terrorists are determined to attack
our systems. And as the DHS IG recently pointed out, we perhaps
need to spend more time dealing with the emergency response.
You know, what happen--what do we do if something happens, and
how to actual--respond to an actual emergency, give more
training to front-line staff, have more joint exercises with
all the emergency responders. I thought the IG did a nice job
of laying that out in their March 2010 report. So, obviously
you have to be concerned about threats, but you also have to
focus on, ``Well, what do we do if something happens?'' And
this is all public-level information.
Mr. Mann. Sure. I think--I thank goodness our intelligence
enterprise is what it is, first of all. To have perhaps
shortcut any planned attacks against our systems, as well as
the total Federal response, with regard to security, as well as
heightened awareness, even regular citizens. I mean, we're
all--all of us who ride the Metro are certainly more aware of
items being left unattended. I mean--so, overall, the
heightened awareness, I think, is a very good thing.
But, I think four things really come to mind, with regard
to what do we really need to do--or what does TSA need to do:
more people, more resources, more training, better systems.
Senator Warner. Well, let me follow up that. It's
recognizing that so much--and particularly of our surface
transportation system--is in private hands. Beyond simply more
personnel, are there efficient but lower-cost ways to partner
more with our private-sector partners in the surface
transportation----
Mr. Mann. I think they are. One of the things that we
have--we commented on in our reports is that TSA needs to do a
better job of interacting with our transit stakeholders.
There's a lot of expertise there that we're not certain that
TSA has actually taken advantage of. So, we'd like to see a
closer collaboration, take advantage of that knowledge that the
individuals on the ground who are doing this all day, every
day, bring to the table, to be able to provide us with a more
efficient, and just a better--a safer environment for our
public travelers.
Senator Warner. Let me move to one other subject matter. I
recognize that I'm joined by Senator Udall, and he'll want to
ask some questions, as well. This is an area of concern beyond
just the TSA realm, which is how we do a better job of
measurements and metrics in all of our government performance.
I noticed that one of the TSA's deficiencies in GAO's risk
management was that TSA had not developed performance measures
for all surface activities. I think this is a challenge, not
just for surface, but clearly across the whole way.
How do we get milestones and metrics that we can use to
measure your performance, other than the avoidance of a
catastrophic event? From an oversight standpoint, what should
the public expect, in terms of truly measurable milestones that
we should look to, to measure the performance, staying focused
on the surface transportation area? Recognizing if you don't
have that whole, ``Here are the 47 points we ought to be
looking at as our checklist,'' how do we get to that checklist
so that we can do our job and work with you in evaluating your
performance?
Mr. Heyman. So, on the--let me just say that the approach
to performance metrics is a challenge across most areas, as you
said. And in surface transportation, or transportation, broadly
speaking, what we have started to do and to look at is the
first level of analysis, which is, Have they done the training
program that you required of them? Have they taken the
preparedness steps that they should, whether it's emergency
response, whether it's on law enforcement, behavioral-detection
training? Have they put in place the capital investments for
infrastructure hardening? Those steps are measurable. And while
not on the level of--you suggest risk avoidance, so to speak,
you can start measuring the buydown of risk. And we are
starting to look at it that way.
Let me just also add, on your previous question--in fact,
the Washington metropolitan area has in some sense an
advantage, the challenges that other private-sector entities
face or--in terms of receiving funding, because it's a regional
entity, it can apply for grants, based--it has some benefit for
applying for grants on a regional basis, in terms of either
UASI grants, in addition to the normal transit grants, and that
can be applied to Metro, if so needed.
And I would also add that one of the challenges we face--
and this was actually in the White House report, but also the
Department has made this recommendation, as well--and that's
the multiyear capital investments. And what we want to be able
to do is to say, over a period of time, ``These are the capital
investments we're going to do.'' We need to be able to design
it and build it, and that takes time. And so, we need to put
our grant programs in that order, as well, and have the funding
linked to that. So, those are both an opportunity and a
challenge.
Senator Warner. As somebody who's grappled with these
regional issues as Governor and now Senator, to actually see
there's an advantage of this three-part jurisdiction sometimes
is harder to see. I would love to come back and revisit with
you, at some point, how we work through this, and recognizing
it's an enormous challenge, other metrics we can measure, in
terms of performance. Because, again, your challenge is--your
success will be--the less we know about what you're doing is
perhaps the best evidence of success, but we've got to also
have some other milestones. And I do think your training is a
good example. And, kind of, putting some procedures in place,
but there probably needs to be additional----
Mr. Heyman. Yes, we're happy to do that.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much.
Senator Udall.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Udall. Thank you very much, Chairman Lautenberg.
The area I wanted to focus on, but I also wanted to follow
up on what Senator Warner was asking about--the first area is,
these other countries where they've had attacks, you know the
Moscow subway, what went on in Madrid and London--are those
countries using the approach that we have? Or are they applying
the model that we have with TSA with government people? What
approach are they taking? And is there anything to learn from
that?
Mr. Heyman. We work closely, have a good relationship with
our British colleagues, and have learned from them, and also
shared best practices, looking at ways of detecting or
disrupting plots in advance, as well as engaging in what we
call ``operational deterrence.''
The three pillars to the--to our approach to transit
security: intelligence, operational deterrence, and
infrastructure protection. The centerpiece there on operational
deterrence has to do with, ``How do you prevent something from
happening to--before it does?'' That involves gaining the
support and the involvement of the public, bringing your
private-sector partners into having a greater understanding of
the threat, and putting in place teams, like we've just started
today, our VIPR teams in New York, for supporting local law
enforcement in detection of explosives, and surge capacity, in
terms of presence, when you have intelligence to address.
Senator Udall. In the British example, are they
partnering--or do they actually have TSA-type people onsite
doing security with the rails? How is the British model
specifically done?
Mr. Heyman. So--transport--the Ministry of Transport
oversees the rail and transit security. And they work both with
local law enforcement, as well as their own officers. And I'm
happy to give you more details----
Senator Udall. OK.
Mr. Heyman. All right.
Senator Udall. OK. Tell me how the passenger rail and bus
companies and others in the United States--how they're doing on
Senator Warner's metrics and milestones? When you talk about
training programs, about putting in place the capital
investments, things like that. Where are they? And how far do
they have to go?
Mr. Heyman. So, on training, the--there's a challenge of
getting the information, to know where they--where we are.
We've done some surveys to assess the level of training. I
think where we--what we've determined is, about two-thirds of
the folks in the agencies have received training. And each
year, we try to do more.
One of the things that we've done in the last year or so,
for grants, is to add funding for--first of all, to prioritize
rail, above all else, because of congressional interest, and,
as well, it's a national interest, but--the Congress has made
that clear, as well--but also to provide funding for backfill.
So, for--in order for somebody to get training, they have to
take time off of their job, and you have to backfill that
individual. And the challenge that we saw, over a number of
years, was that people would not be able to go take training,
because we--there was no funding for the time-and-a-half
overtime for the backfill. So, there's now funding available
for that, to help improve that. We'll get beyond the 63 percent
or so.
Senator Udall. Great. Thank you very much.
And, Senator Lautenberg, I would thank you for holding this
hearing and having such an interest in this and showing your
leadership. Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Senator Udall.
One of the things that I think is quite apparent here is
that we're late on lots of things. Almost, I'm going to say,
delinquent. When we think about the fact that 2 million people
each day get in an airplane, on average, and 35 million get
into transit--2 million, aviation; 35 million daily, in
transit. And there are so many susceptibilities out there.
And I would say this--and I'm directing this aside to Mr.
Heyman and the Department--and that is, ``Get on the stick,
here. Get going.'' This is an outrage, that it has taken so
long. This is like the traffic cop, standing on the sidewalk
and watching the traffic go by, and think about when he ought
to interrupt the flow to keep the cars from crashing into one
another. It's not acceptable, Mr. Heyman.
After the Moscow subway attack that killed 40 people,
injured dozens more, a number of transit agencies across our
country visibly increased their security presence. But, we've
heard very little from TSA. When, heaven forbid, there's
something to be aware of in aviation, we hear about it. But,
after a major terrorist attack on a mass transit agency, though
off our shores, shouldn't the agency responsible for our
Nation's transportation system take a lead in communicating
with the public, letting people know whether or not they're at
unusual risk?
I remember the days of the color classification of threat.
And I thought it was one of the worst things that I'd ever
seen, because they would say ``purple'' and not tell you what
to do. It didn't say stay away from the bridges, so all it did
is make everybody nervous, but not more protected.
So, don't you think that TSA ought to be out there, talking
to the people across the country, and giving them some
assurances, some advice?
There's so much conversation about it, we have nice
officers here from Amtrak, senior officers here. And I use
Amtrak a lot, and I see them, and there is a presence. I think,
in many of the large systems, that the presence is largely that
of the local agency that runs security, and it's disheartening.
I want to ask either Mr. Lord or Mr. Mann, are DHS and TSA
prepared to respond, if necessary, to an attack like the ones
that occurred in Moscow or other passenger rail and mass
transit systems throughout the world? What do you think?
Mr. Mann. Sure. In our March report, we questioned that
very premise. The TSA's focus is terrorism and prevention.
We're not so certain that it is as capable to respond and
mitigate.
Senator Lautenberg. Any comments, Mr. Lord?
Mr. Lord. The--I think one activity they have ramped up in
response to the recent attacks are the so-called VIPR
deployments. These are visible intermodal protection and
response teams. They're--they--they're aimed at deterring
possible attacks on passenger rail and mass transit. But, these
are more episodic, they--they're short-term. Over the longer
term, I think it's important to reach out to the transit
agencies and passenger rail companies themselves, because, as
Senator Hutchison noted in her opening remarks, TSA's role is
more supportive and indirect. It's different--fundamentally
different from the aviation sector, where they Federalized that
function. They control your access to the airport. So, they
have to work hand in hand with other agencies and providers to
provide that. So, they have a less visible role, based on how
it's currently organized.
Senator Lautenberg. Therefore, in order to best protect our
people who travel in transit, shouldn't they be more clear in
their communications about what needs to be done, and, do the
risk assessment plan, and at least give guidelines out there?
The surface transportation lays down conditions that have to be
met in order for communities to get grants. But, I don't know
that TSA has provided any direction at all. And its, as I said,
disheartening.
So, Mr. Heyman, you've heard from people today, and
listened to your colleagues at the table. And I would hope that
it's understood, at TSA. We heard talk about VIPR recently.
Does TSA do anything to evaluate, for instance, the performance
of these VIPR teams? And if GAO suggested some weaknesses, or
at least asked for measures to determine the effectiveness of
VIPR--where is TSA on these things?
Mr. Heyman. On the VIPR teams--first, I want to thank you
and Congress for supporting additional funding for expanding of
the VIPR teams. We have done red-teaming to address the
effectiveness, and we've compared VIPR teams as a deterrent to
action, versus other type of surge, such as additional local
transit officers on the beat. And it has--is--it has
consistently shown to be more effective as a deterrent for
adversaries than other means. And so, we are red-teaming it. We
are looking at continuing to perfect the deployment of the VIPR
teams. And, as I think I noted, we have, just following up on
the Moscow concern, deployed, for the first time, in New York
City, today, VIPR teams in support of law enforcement for
explosive detection. And we will continue to look at doing
that. We've been doing that for the last year on the Northeast
Corridor on Amtrak. And we'll continue to expand that program.
Senator Lautenberg. We'll keep the record open. Thank you.
Do you have something you wanted to add, Mr. Lord?
Mr. Lord. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. I--in my prior response,
I would like to add, on a very important point, we're currently
evaluating TSA's efforts to disseminate information----
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you.
Mr. Lord.--down to the local level. And we'll be formally
reporting on that toward the end of the year. We're looking at
the various mechanisms they have to help push information out
to the transit agencies and passenger rail.
Senator Lautenberg. We'd like to hear from you as quickly
as it can be developed.
Mr. Lord. Sure. Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Mann, did you----
Mr. Mann. Yes, sir. I'd just like to follow up what Mr.
Lord said. This is not necessarily a TSA initiative, but the
Department of Homeland Security is ramping up its Fusion Center
concept, where intelligence on emerging threats, if it happens
to be against a transit system, can, in fact, be pushed down to
the effective system. And that's a very robust endeavor. It's
improving. And we expect to have a national Fusion Center
concept, where information can be shared online--when I'm
saying ``we,'' the Department--soon.
Senator Lautenberg. We await with interest.
Thank you, each. And we'll keep the record open for a while
and ask you to respond to any inquiries sent to you promptly,
please. Thank you very much.
And I would call the second panel to the table: Mr. John
O'Connor, Chief of Police, Acting Vice President of the Office
of Security and Special Operations at Amtrak; Joseph Kelly, who
is the Acting Chief of Police of New Jersey Transit; and Mr.
Skip Elliot, the Vice President for Public Safety and the
Environment for CSX.
[Pause.]
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, all.
And I would now ask Mr. O'Connor to give us your testimony.
Try to keep it to 5 minutes. We won't be too tough on the
clock, but we do have to move along.
So, sir, welcome. Please, let's hear from you.
STATEMENT OF JOHN O'CONNOR, VICE PRESIDENT AND
CHIEF OF POLICE, AMTRAK POLICE DEPARTMENT,
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION
Mr. O'Connor. I'll do my best, Senator.
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and thanks very much for the
opportunity to testify.
My name is John O'Connor. I am currently the Chief of
Police of the Amtrak Police Department. I have over 37 years'
experience as a sworn police officer in the rail and mass
transit environment, as both the Chief of Police for Amtrak, as
well as for Long Island Railroad in my first career.
I'm here today to discuss policing on surface
transportation systems and the critical task we are facing in
combating terrorism. The Administration has been studying this
matter and has just released its Surface Transportation
Priority Assessment Report. We are in broad agreement with many
of the recommendations it contains, such as the allocation of
resources to address likely threats, information sharing, and
the need to fund a multiyear security grant programs.
The need for focus, though, is critical, because, while
terrorists can employ many tactics, attacks on surface
transportation usually take three forms: the use of an
improvised explosive device, or IED, on a train; the use of an
IED in a station; or the new emerging threat of an active
shooter scenario. Those are the three threats that I think we
need to focus on in surface transportation.
The pattern is unmistakable. IEDs were used to attack
trains in Madrid in 2004; London, 2005; Mumbai, 2006; Moscow on
several occasions, including last month, to name a few. Active
shooters also attacked a station in Mumbai in 2008. And
according to the Mineta Transportation Institute, since January
of 2007, there have been 284 attacks against surface
transportation; of those, 130 were against rail.
There's obviously a range of threats, and our approach to
them can range from ``do nothing and hope for the best'' to
``spread your resources and attempt to respond to every
possible threat, at the risk of underpreparing for the most
probable threats.''
We must identify the most likely threats, assess the
likelihood and consequences, and focus our efforts on defending
against those identified threats. We are working closely with
countries around the world to share information and experience.
I recently traveled to Mumbai as part of a State Department
initiative to exchange information and collaborate on strategy
with Indian rail officials. Amtrak has become the first
American rail police department to become an associate member
of RAILPOL, a European organization of rail and transit police
agencies cooperating to share intelligence, coordinate
activities, and improve counterterror capabilities. These
experiences have helped us understand the need for closer
collaboration on all levels of government and among surface
transportation agencies.
Today, the Amtrak Police Department is reorganizing to
address these concerns. We have undertaken a number of
initiatives to address these likely attacks. First and foremost
is the expansion of our canine program. We have a poster here
that depicts that. We have expanded our program from 20 canines
to more than 45 teams, 10 of which have the capability of
detecting suicide bombers. We've instituted random baggage
screening, started in 2008, fashioned after the program started
by the New York Police Department. We've had great
collaboration with the TSA, including the deployment of VIPRs
since the year 2007. And this year, as mentioned by a previous
panel, we began joint screenings with TSA agents on Amtrak.
We are also heavily involved in DHS and ARRA grants, in our
corporate security division, protecting our infrastructure. One
of our biggest efforts is to form law enforcement partners. And
the poster, there, depicts one of our operation alerts, where
we have organized more than 150 police agencies, between
Virginia and Maine, to deploy on a single day.
Earlier there was a question, ``Can we respond in the event
of an attack?'' These types of exercises allow us to very
quickly deploy not only our assets, but assets up and down a
major area of the country.
Two more items are employee training and public outreach--
we've invested heavily in that; and intelligence coordination.
We have several members assigned to Joint Terrorism Task Forces
around the country.
I'll be happy to elaborate on these initiatives during the
question-and-answer period.
As Amtrak has more than 500 stations in 46 States, we face
great challenges, with limited resources. Consequently, we are
enthusiastic about programs that help us to bring more people,
technology, and animals to bear on the task of keeping our
systems secure. We are also working to improve cooperation with
transit and commuter agencies, many of which share our
facilities, to close the gaps that we see in coverage where
systems meet. While we are definitely concerned about the whole
spectrum of threats, we will continue to devote the bulk of our
efforts to defending against the most likely and dangerous
forms of attack. In future budgets, we will submit funding
requests that will detail our needs, in that regard.
The security of our system is our top priority, and Amtrak
looks forward to working with the Committee in the coming
months to make sure that we have the resources, the people, and
the intelligence to keep our system safe and secure.
Thank you once again for the opportunity to be here today,
and I will be glad to answer any questions the Committee may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Connor follows:]
Prepared Statement of John O'Connor, Vice President and Chief of
Police, Amtrak Police Department, National Railroad Passenger
Corporation
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thanks very much for the
opportunity to testify. My name is John O'Connor, and I am currently
Vice President and Chief of the Amtrak Police Department; we have a
total of 416 sworn officers. I have over thirty-seven years experience
as a sworn police officer in the rail and mass transit environment. I
joined Amtrak in 1998 after 25 years with the Long Island Rail Road,
where I rose from Patrolman to Chief of Police.
I'm here today to discuss policing and security on surface
transportation systems and the critical task we are facing in combating
terrorism. The Administration has been studying this matter and has
just released its ``Surface Transportation Priority Assessment
Report.'' We at Amtrak are in broad agreement with many of the
overarching recommendations it contains, particularly those that deal
with the allocation of resources to address likely threats, information
sharing, and the need to fund a multi-year, multi-phase transportation
security grant program. These are some of the major issues we have been
dealing with as we work to identify likely threats and direct resources
to meet them. While terrorists can employ many tactics, overwhelming
historical evidence indicates that terrorist attacks on surface
transportation will likely occur in three (3) forms:
Use of an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) on a train
Use of an IED in a station
Emerging threat of an active shooter
The reasons are simple and clear. Surface transportation systems
are open and densely packed with people. These systems are a big part
of people's daily routine. The whole point of terror is shock, and
nothing produces shock like unexpected and horrifying attacks. The
pattern is unmistakable. IEDs were used to attack trains in Madrid in
2004, London in 2005, Mumbai in 2006, and Moscow on several occasions,
including last month, to name a few. Active shooters attacked a station
in Mumbai in 2008, in each case with tremendous loss of life. And these
are just the attacks that made the front page--there are an astonishing
number of attacks on rail transit systems going on around the world.
The Mineta Transportation Institute, which tracks attacks on public
transportation worldwide, states it added 88 attacks per month to its
database between November 2009 and February 2010. Obviously, some
attacks are failures, such as the fizzled July 21, 2005 bombing attempt
on the London Underground, and the numbers may also be slightly
inflated by delays in reporting. But they are nevertheless an
illustration of how attractive a target public transportation has
become. Explosives are clearly the preferred tactic. Of the total
attacks on public surface transport, 74 percent were either explosive
or incendiary in nature; when passenger rail was the target, the number
jumps to 83 percent.
There's a wide range of possible threats, obviously, ranging from
cyber attacks up to the ultimate and scarcely imaginable possibility of
nuclear terrorism. Our approach to these can range from ``do nothing
and hope for the best'' to ``spread your resources in an attempt to
respond to every possible threat, at the risk of underpreparing for the
most probable threats.'' Amtrak's position is that we must identify the
most likely threats, assess the likelihood and possible consequences of
an attack, and focus our efforts on defeating or deterring the most
dangerous and likely terror tactics. We are working closely with
countries around the world in the hopes that we can share information
and learn from their experiences. I recently traveled to Mumbai as part
of a State Department initiative to exchange information with Indian
Rail Officials and to collaborate on mutually beneficial counter-terror
strategies and efforts. Amtrak has become the first American rail
police department to become an associate member of RAILPOL, a European
organization of rail and transit security agencies cooperating to share
intelligence, coordinate activities and improve counter-terror
capabilities. Structured like INTERPOL, this group embodies the type of
multi-national surface transportation efforts needed to address the
terrorist threat globally. These experiences have helped us to better
understand the role and needs of surface transportation police and
security and the need for more collaboration at all levels of
government.
Today, the Amtrak Police Department is reorganizing to address
these concerns. We have undertaken a number of measures designed to
eliminate redundancy within the police and security functions and
ensure our security needs are well represented at the top level of
Amtrak. We have merged the two groups that were formerly responsible
for security to eliminate some duplication of functions and allow
better use of manpower and assets. Those two groups were OSSSO and APD,
now simply APD. The Department has shifted its primary mission of
customer-oriented policing to a blend of customer-oriented policing and
robust counter-terrorism efforts. We have taken several steps to align
our force to our new strategy, keeping in mind that we are operating in
46 states on a system that is very open. These steps fall into four
specific categories of effort that we are now undertaking.
1. Growth of the Explosive Canine Detection Program
I am proud to say that Amtrak has more than doubled the size of
bomb-detecting canine teams in the last few years. Canine assets are
still one of the most accurate and useful tools for detecting and
deterring explosive devices before they can be introduced on surface
transportation systems. In 2005, the Department had about 20 canine
teams, many of which were not trained to detect explosives. Today,
there are 45 canine teams that are single-purpose dogs whose mission is
bomb detection. Several of these teams are also ``vapor wake'' trained
and can actually detect the presence of fumes left after someone passes
through with an explosive device. Amtrak has moved to the forefront of
the field with use of this canine application and continues to work to
build this counter-terror capability.
2. Security Inspection Program
In 2008, Amtrak began a random baggage screening program similar to
one pioneered by the NYPD. Using technology, screening teams deploy in
an unpredictable fashion designed to make it harder for a terrorist to
predict the level of security. To date, Amtrak has conducted hundreds
of passenger screening operations during which thousand of trains were
screened, resulting in tens of thousands of passengers being randomly
selected for screening. Though an American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act/Transportation Security Grant program (ARRA/TSGP) grant, Amtrak is
expanding this screening program by adding three additional screening
teams in the NEC and Intercity areas.
3. Collaboration with TSA
To address the chief terrorist threats, Amtrak has improved its
working relationship with the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA). Beginning in December, 2007, Amtrak and TSA started joint
deployments with TSA's ``Visible Intermodal Protection and Response''
(VIPR) team program, which was developed to augment the integral
security operations of various transportation modes, such as the Amtrak
Police or transit security. These provide a visible uniformed presence
and can help dedicated law enforcement to deter or detect suspicious
activity, and they provide the traveling public with a reassuring
police presence. VIPR teams can include various useful capabilities,
including air marshals, officers specially trained in behavior
detection, and explosive detection. Included in the latter category are
bomb-sniffing dogs, which are an important component of the overall
security effort.
Our first VIPR exercise was held with the TSA at the Amtrak station
in El Paso, Texas. These operations have basically involved the
unannounced ``surge'' of TSA personnel onto Amtrak trains and stations
at various points, and are designed to test the ability of TSA to flex
support to surface transportation. A total of 328 VIPR operations have
been held at various locations on the 21,100 mile Amtrak system,
approximately 42 percent of them at stations off the Northeast
Corridor.
In October, 2009, Amtrak requested that TSA expand the VIPR program
to include a joint screening program with TSA, using additional TSA
assets, including Bomb Appraisal Officers, Behavior Screening Officers
and Surface Transportation Security Inspectors to augment our screening
forces. We are very interested in expanding our partnerships and joint
activities with other transit and Federal law enforcement agencies, and
we are hopeful that we will be able to obtain the resources we need to
build the effective partnerships we will need to reduce gaps in our
security coverage.
4. Corporate Security
Amtrak has leveraged the Transit Security Grant and American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) grant programs to improve
protection for passengers, employees, and critical infrastructure. We
will never stop assessing Amtrak's vulnerabilities. These build upon an
earlier risk assessment performed for Amtrak and will be closely
focused on addressing these individual vulnerabilities. Use of ARRA
funds to install fences, close circuit TV and other security
improvements is directly tied to Amtrak's commitment to let our risk
assessments drive security investment. The majority of our ARRA funding
efforts are being used to protect infrastructure we have identified as
critical through vulnerability assessments designed to identify and
implement risk reduction strategies. The security program is managed in
part by Station Action Team personnel. They work closely with the
Operations Department to ensure Amtrak security and emergency response
policies are followed and coordinated as part of a larger risk
reduction strategy that incorporates recovery and continuity of
operations processes.
Amtrak employees and passengers will continue to be a key piece of
our security strategy. They are very valuable sources of information
that can ``cue'' the law enforcement system. Amtrak also benefits from
the services and operational knowledge of upwards of 19,000 people who
work on the railroad, and the hundreds of millions of passengers who
pass through our stations and over our tracks are also capable of
noticing when something's not right, and reporting it to us so we can
investigate it. We have seen plenty of examples where the vigilance and
courage of citizens have helped prevent or thwart an incident in recent
years, and we are doing everything we can to make sure they know who to
contact if they see something suspicious--and that those employees know
what to do once the matter has been brought to their attention. Over
the past few years, the Station Action Teams and Regional Security
Coordinating Committees have involved our station staffs in the
security planning process. This integration has improved coordination
and raised employee awareness of potential security threats. We have
trained and continue to train our police officers in Behavior
Assessment Security Screening (BASS) to teach them to recognize the
behaviors that might signal an imminent attack, and front-line
employees have been provided with a non-law enforcement version, to
improve their awareness and maximize their value as intelligence
resources.
As Amtrak has more than 500 stations, we are always resource-
constrained. Consequently, we are enthusiastic about programs that help
us to bring more people, technology, and animals to bear on the task of
keeping our stations and trains secure. We are also working to extend
and improve our cooperation with transit and commuter agencies, many of
which share our facilities, to get rid of the gaps in coverage where
systems meet. This is another crucial area because intermodal systems
can create gaps for potential points of entry--and once you're on a
rail or transit system, it tends by its very nature to carry an
attacker to a point where people are most concentrated and
vulnerability is at its highest. TSA is aware of the need for
cooperation and coordination among all rail and transit stakeholders
but this is an area where continued improvement is the paramount need,
because our opponents know how to exploit gaps--and they only need to
get lucky once.
We are devoting our efforts to making it harder and harder for
terrorists to use their preferred strategies to attack our stations,
trains, and passengers. We will continue to devote the bulk of our
efforts to defending against and deterring the most likely and
dangerous forms of attack, which will continue to be IEDs and active
shooters. We are, however, definitely concerned about the whole
spectrum of cyber, chemical, biological and radiological threats, and
we will continue to work with the Federal Government to defend against
them. We hope to obtain additional funding to expand aggressively our
efforts to defend our system against the most probable and devastating
methods of attack, and we will work with DHS, TSA and the Committee to
identify other potential funding sources. In future budgets, we will
submit funding requests that will detail our needs; we expect to fund
the necessary programs out of our FY 2011 budget. The security of our
system is our top priority, and I look forward to working with the
Committee in the coming months to make sure that we have the resources,
the people, and the intelligence we need to keep our system safe and
secure.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much.
And Mr. Elliott?
STATEMENT OF HOWARD R. ``SKIP'' ELLIOTT,
VICE PRESIDENT--PUBLIC SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT,
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.
Mr. Elliott. Good afternoon, Senator Lautenberg.
My name is Skip Elliott. I have been a railroader for 33
years, and currently I serve as Vice President of Public Safety
and Environment for CSX Transportation.
In my role at CSX, I am responsible for the environment,
hazard material transportation safety, our railroad police,
homeland security, and industrial hygiene programs. I am
pleased to be here before the Committee today, testifying on
behalf of CSX and the Association of American Railroads, on the
freight rail industry's effort to enhance rail security.
I have submitted my full statement to the Committee, and I
would like to make a few brief comments.
CSX and the rail industry remain deeply committed to rail
security. We recognize that the security environment in this
country has changed dramatically in recent years. There are new
threats that demand new ways of thinking about our freight and
passenger rail security and safety.
Immediately after September 11, 2001, and well before the
focus on rail security by TSA, our industry moved rapidly to
address the new threat environment. The significant and
proactive measures CSX and the industry undertook immediately
after 9/11, is well-documented and we have responded to the new
security paradigm in a post-9/11 world.
CSX recognizes the role of TSA and the actions the Federal
Government has taken to enhance freight rail security. Within
the Federal Government, DHS and DOT share responsibility for
securing the freight rail system. With great thanks to this
committee's leadership, the Federal Government has enacted
comprehensive legislation and extensive formal regulations
aimed at strengthening freight rail security. CSX fully
supports the goals of these regulations and is committed to
full compliance.
In the last 7 years, there have been no less than nine sets
of regulations and guidelines that the freight railroads have
been required to implement to enhance security. Beginning in
2003, DOT issued regulations requiring employee training and
security plans.
This was followed soon after by standards issued by U.S.
Customs and Border Patrol to enhance security at railroad
international border crossings and a U.S. Coast Guard security
regulation at locations where we have port operations. Not long
after, two sets of security action items for railroads were
issued by TSA, as were additional U.S. Coast Guard rules
requiring transportation worker identification credentials for
those railroad employees who work in regulated maritime
facilities.
This was followed next by TSA regulations requiring robust
chain-of-custody measures for toxic inhalation hazards and a
separate DOT rulemaking requiring that railroads conduct a
comprehensive route analysis for toxic inhalation hazards,
using 27 safety and security factors.
Finally, DOT introduced a regulation last year providing
standards for tank cars used to transport toxic inhalation
hazards, to help improve their survivability due to an
accidental or nonaccidental event. We also anticipate receiving
several new regulations currently being written by TSA and DOT,
such as one that will provide further guidance for employee
security training.
It is important to underscore the significance of these
regulations and that the freight rail industry is fully
complying with them. However, what we are most proud of is that
they were built on a foundation of the immediate,
comprehensive, proactive, and voluntary security measures taken
by the railroads after the attacks of September 11.
But, we don't believe what we did proactively after
September 11, or that complying with current and future
regulations, is necessarily enough.
At CSX, we maintain a steadfast commitment to the safety
and security of our operations and the communities in which we
operate. CSX's security challenge extends to 21,000 miles of
track in 23 states and the District of Columbia. The network
crosses 700 counties and 13,000 local jurisdictions. CSX
believes that partnerships and close coordination of security
concerns is essential to enhancing public safety and benefits
the communities we serve, our employees, and our operations.
The cornerstone of CSX's public/private partnership is our
highly specialized, secure network operation workstation,
called SecureNOW, which we share with Federal and state
homeland security officials. Developed by CSX, the SecureNOW
system allows security officials to promptly identify the
location and status of CSX trains and railcars on our 23-state
network. SecureNOW's--allow public agency officials to
independently track the location of CSX trains, and to identify
the contents of railcars in those trains, in a nearly real-time
environment. Both the USDOT Crisis Management Center, located
just a short distance from here, and the TSA Freedom Center
have and are using this CSX-provided technology. We have
similar partnerships at a number of State Homeland Security
Fusion Centers. One in particular, in your state, New Jersey,
has proven to be a very good example of what a long-term
productive public/private partnership should be.
In conclusion, CSX and the freight rail industry recognize
the complexity of challenges faced by both the government and
American business in ensuring the safe and secure movement of
people and products in a post-9/11 world. We also recognize
that government responsibility, first and foremost, is to
protect the public. Yet it is also important that DHS react to
the new security environment with sound regulatory policies
that do not impede the free flow of commerce.
To help achieve that outcome, we recommend meaningful
coordination among regulators; improved communications between
railroads and regulators, especially in areas such as
intelligence sharing; and stronger collaboration, maximizing
government use of railroad expertise. These are consistent with
the 20 recommendations made recently by the Administration in
its surface transportation security priority assessment.
CSX recognizes that the freight rail and national security
environment in which it operates is continually changing. As
such, safety and security are, and will remain, our top
priority. CSX and the industry look forward to working with DHS
to develop sound security policy and practices that are
coordinated, flexible, and that ensure the continued efficient
and effective flow of goods. We appreciate the opportunity to
provide comments on this important topic. We also greatly
appreciate the good work and guidance of this committee, and
your role in improving freight rail security.
Thank you, Senator.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Elliott follows:]
Prepared Statement of Howard R. ``Skip'' Elliott, Vice President--
Public Safety and Environment, CSX Transportation, Inc.
Introduction
On behalf of CSX Transportation, Inc. (``CSXT'') and the
Association of American Railroads (``AAR''), thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the Freight Rail Industry's (the ``Industry'')
efforts to enhance rail security.
CSXT and the Industry are deeply committed to rail security. We
recognize that the security environment in this country has changed
dramatically in recent years--there are new threats that demand new
security considerations, and a new way of thinking about freight rail
safety and security. Immediately after September 11, 2001, and well
before the creation of TSA, the Industry moved rapidly to address the
new threat environment. It is well documented what actions CSXT and the
Industry have voluntarily taken and how we have taken the initiative to
respond to the new security paradigm in a post-9/11 world. And much has
been done since the initial rail efforts after September 11 in 2001.
Industry security plans, a Surface Transportation Information Sharing
and Analysis Center, an AAR Operations Center feeding information to an
industry Rail Alert Network, annual desktop exercises, and the E-Rail
Safe contractor credentialing program--all are voluntary industry
initiatives that have enhanced the security of the Nation's rail
network.
Compliance with Government Regulations and Action Items
CSXT recognizes the Transportation Security Administration's
(``TSA'') role and the actions the Federal Government has taken to
enhance freight rail security since 2001. Within the Federal
Government, DHS and DOT share responsibility for securing the freight
rail system. Prior to September 11, 2001, the Department of
Transportation (``DOT'') was the primary Federal agency responsible for
regulating freight rail transportation. With the creation of TSA in
November 2001 and TSA's Freight Rail Security Program in 2003, the DOT,
Department of Homeland Security (``DHS''), and TSA have worked
diligently to identify freight rail security needs and coordinate
various efforts to enhance freight rail security. Specifically, DOT,
DHS, and TSA have enacted extensive formal regulations aimed at
strengthening freight rail security. CSXT fully supports the goals of
these regulations and is committed to full compliance.
Formal Federal agency reaction to freight rail security risks
inherent in the post-9/11 world began as a cooperative and
collaborative effort between the government and the Industry.
Immediately after September 11, 2001, and before the creation of TSA,
the Industry, in consultation with security experts and Federal
agencies, implemented a rail security plan which included network-wide
risk assessments and asset specific countermeasures, with each railroad
implementing over 50 countermeasures, based on people, process, and
technology. This concept of escalating alert levels, borrowed from U.S.
Military Defense Condition (DefCon) protocols, is also used by TSA
today.
Experience with the voluntary plans of the largest railroads led to
adoption of formal requirements for all railroads. In September 2003,
the U.S. Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (``PHMSA'') issued rules requiring any railroad
that handles hazardous materials to adopt a security plan and engage in
training of its hazardous material employees. PHMSA's security planning
rules require railroads to develop and implement security plans that
address security risks and vulnerabilities related to the
transportation of hazardous materials.
PHMSA's security planning rules require railroads to develop and
implement a security plan based on an assessment of possible
transportation security risks. The plan must address personnel
security, unauthorized access, and en route security. The security plan
must be based on an assessment of possible transportation security
risks and must include at a minimum, an assessment of possible
transportation security risks and appropriate measures identified by
risk assessments. All security plans are required to be in writing,
updated as necessary to reflect changing circumstances and must be
retained for as long as the plan remains in effect.
PHMSA also issued rules that require security awareness training
for hazardous materials employees. Railroads must provide ``in-depth''
security training and ``security awareness'' training to employees. In-
depth security training must include security objectives, specific
security procedures, employee responsibilities, actions to take in the
event of a security breach, and the organizational security structure.
Security awareness training requires that each employee receive
training that provides an awareness of security risks associated with
the transportation of hazardous materials and methods designed to
enhance transportation security, including how to recognize and respond
to possible security threats.
For CSXT, compliance with these rules was relatively
straightforward. With a comprehensive security plan that had been in
place for several years, we reviewed our existing plan in light of the
regulations and made some modifications as needed to ensure that it met
the new regulatory requirements.
Also in 2003, CSXT began participating in the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection's voluntary C-TPAT (Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism) program. C-TPAT is a voluntary government-private sector
partnership to strengthen and improve U.S. border security and the
security of the international supply chain. C-TPAT increases security
measures, practices and procedures throughout all sectors of the
international supply chain.
As a participating member of C-TPAT, this supply chain security
program for international cargo is in place at CSXT's U.S.-Canadian
border crossing points. It requires adherence to a variety of security-
related performance measures in order to achieve certification in the
program.
In 2003, CSXT also began working on compliance with United States
Coast Guard's regulations under the Maritime Security Act of 2002.
These extensive rules require comprehensive port threat and
vulnerability assessments, security plans and security measures. CSXT
has facilities in Maryland, Ohio, and Florida that fall under these
regulations, and that undergo regular inspection and evaluation by the
U.S. Coast Guard to ensure compliance.
In 2006, TSA and DOT began to give heightened attention to the
transportation of certain ultra-hazardous commodities such as toxic
inhalation hazard (``TIH'') materials. They began by developing twenty-
four voluntary security action items in a series of consultative
meetings between the rail industry, TSA and other interested Federal
agencies. These voluntary security action items, adopted in June 2006,
were to be followed as recommended best practices of rail carriers
handling these particularly sensitive products.
CSXT was a strong proponent of the cooperative process that led to
the original set of guidelines, and continues to support voluntary
cooperation. This original set of voluntary action items generally
focused on three main areas: (i) system security, (ii) access control,
and (iii) en-route security.
On November 21, 2006, TSA issued further voluntary ``action items''
for the handling of TIH. TSA Supplemental Security Action Item Number 1
concerns the transportation of TIH and generally focuses on: (i)
enhancing access control and security awareness for rail facilities in
federally designated High-Threat Urban Areas (``HTUAs''), (ii)
monitoring the movement of TIH cars in HTUAs to substantially reduce
dwell and transit time, and (iii) eliminating unattended TIH cars in
HTUAs. Unlike the first set of action items, these were adopted by TSA
unilaterally and without further dialogue with the rail Industry.
In January 2007, the USCG and TSA issued new regulations requiring
that workers who enter regulated maritime facilities must obtain a
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (``TWIC''). The TWIC
requirement applies to railroad employees who enter and work for CSXT
at any regulated maritime facility in the United States. Train and
Engine crews, Mechanical and Maintenance of Way personnel, Railroad
managers, Special Agents and any other railroad employee entering these
covered maritime facilities must have a TWIC.
On February 12, 2007, TSA again unilaterally issued further
voluntary ``action items'' for the handling of TIH. TSA Supplemental
Security Action Item Number 2 provides further guidance on the
recommended scope and procedures for voluntarily conducted background
checks.
Over time, TSA saw a need to move to a more formal interaction with
the Industry over the transportation of certain ultra hazardous
commodities such as TIH materials. These voluntary guidelines were
gradually supplanted by progressively more active formal regulations.
In November 2008, the TSA issued final regulations imposing new
``chain of custody'' obligations regarding the handling of TIH cars in
interchanges, i.e., where one railroad transfers a TIH car to another
railroad. The regulation required railroads to modify their routing
operations to ensure that only attended interchanges are used for
transporting TIH. This regulation also imposed similar requirements for
the transfer of custody from shipper to railroad and from railroad to
certain receivers at destination.
When TSA issued its final Chain of Custody rules in November 2008,
it initially gave the rail industry just 30 days to implement new
interchange practices and to train tens of thousands of employees on
the new requirements. CSXT as well as the Industry persuaded TSA to
extend the compliance date to April 1, 2009, thus enabling the Industry
to adapt its operations without conflict with the new regulations. CSXT
and the Industry greatly appreciate TSA's willingness to meet with us,
discuss the practical implementation challenges we faced, and to give
the Industry time it needed to do the job properly.
Additionally, TSA's final rule required railroads to designate a
rail security coordinator (``RSC'') and at least one alternate RSC to
be available on a 24-hour, 7 days per week basis to serve as the
primary contact for receipt of intelligence information and other
security-related activities from TSA. The final rule also required
Class I railroads to provide location and shipping information to TSA
within 5 minutes of an inquiry if the request concerns only one car and
within thirty minutes if the request concerns two or more rail cars.
Also in November 2008, the DOT issued final rules requiring
railroads to perform a safety and security risk analysis for routes
used to transport certain hazardous materials and to select the safest
and most secure routes, using a provided list of 27 risk factors.
Congress, through the good work and guidance of this committee,
mandated this approach in 2007 in the Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act.
The DOT routing regulation (adopted by PHMSA and enforced by FRA)
represents a commendable effort to address the public's routing
concerns regarding the transportation of certain highly hazardous
materials. DOT's routing rule requires railroads to compile annual data
on certain shipments of explosive, TIH, and radioactive materials for
use in making routing decisions. Railroads must use this data to
analyze safety and security risks along routes used to transport these
materials, assess alternative routing options, and make routing
decisions based upon those assessments.
For the initial analysis, the government gave railroads the option
of completing the initial route analysis by September 1, 2009, based on
6 months of data (from July to December 2008), or March 31, 2020, based
on 12 months of data (full year 2008). CSXT was one of the first
railroads to complete the initial route analysis, on September 1, 2009,
using the Rail Corridor Risk Management (``RCRMS'') tool, a Government-
funded routing model. RCRMS is a statistical routing model that
railroads may use to assist with compliance with the rule. The RCRMS
model was developed by expert consultants with periodic reviews by a
government executive oversight panel--officials from TSA, DOT, FRA, and
PHMSA. Railroads are not required to use RCRMS and may choose other
routing models for use in preparing their risk analyses.
We recognize the importance of this regulation, but nonetheless,
the route analysis requirement was a complicated and burdensome
process. It imposed significant demands on CSXT management time and
resources. While this is important and necessary work, we must keep in
mind at all times that the traffic subject to the routing rule
represents about one-half of one percent of CSXT's total traffic base,
and that these efforts are consuming--and will continue to consume--a
disproportionate share of management resources.
In January 2009, the DOT issued interim tank car standards that
mandate commodity-specific improvements in the safety features and
design standards for tank cars transporting TIH materials. These
interim standards were adopted to improve the accident survivability of
TIH tank cars. At the same time, the DOT imposed speed restrictions on
trains carrying even a single carload of TIH materials.
Voluntary Actions
CSXT appreciates the freight rail security guidance in the form of
regulations from DHS, but we are still an Industry (and a railroad)
that does act proactively and voluntarily to improve the safety and
security of the rail network.
At CSXT, ``Safety is a Way of Life'' and we maintain a steadfast
commitment to the safety and security of our operations and the
communities in which we operate. CSXT's security challenge extends to
21,000 miles of track in 23 states and the District of Columbia. This
network crosses 700 counties and 13,000 local jurisdictions.
CSXT believes that partnerships and close coordination of security
concerns is essential to enhancing public safety and benefits the
communities we serve, our employees, and our operations. We work
closely with the Industry and with Federal, state and local officials,
on improving the safety and security of rail transportation to help
keep our employees, our communities, and our customers' employees safe.
As part of this effort, CSXT has established public-private
partnerships to provide Federal and state homeland security officials
valuable, current information they can use to protect the communities
they serve. Formalized partnerships allow CSXT, state officials and
first responders to effectively and seamlessly share information and
work side-by-side protecting the communities we serve and our
employees.
At CSXT, we believe that public-private partnerships offer the best
route to improving not only freight rail security but also national
security. The cornerstone of CSXT's public-private partnerships is
sharing our highly-specialized secure Network Operations Workstation
(``SecureNOW'') with Federal and state homeland security officials. The
SecureNOW system is a proprietary, secure online computer tool used to
monitor, identify and respond to rail-security and emergency issues
throughout the CSXT network. This system, developed by CSXT, provides
CSXT employees and trained state homeland security and public agency
officials with a tool to promptly identify the location and status of
CSXT trains and rail cars on our network. SecureNOW allows trained
security and public agency officials in several states to independently
track the location of CSXT trains and the contents of the rail cars in
those trains in a nearly real-time environment. Before, officials
needed to telephone CSXT to access this information.
CSXT's SecureNOW system and our approach to information sharing
helps homeland security officials prepare for and--if needed--respond
to emergency situations. Access to SecureNOW also provides state and
Federal officials with additional information about what is carried on
our rails, and state officials can more efficiently allocate law
enforcement resources, coordinate with CSXT security officials, and
integrate rail security into on-going law enforcement operations.
In fact, CSXT has entered into partnerships with two Federal
entities--the TSA Freedom Center (TSOC) and the DOT Crisis Management
Center. This allows trained Federal homeland security officials to have
nearly real time information regarding the location of CSXT trains and
the contents of the rail cars transported on our lines. In addition to
these Federal partnerships, CSXT also has partnerships for access to
SecureNOW with New York, New Jersey, Kentucky, Maryland, Indiana, Ohio,
Georgia, and Florida. These partnerships formalize and enhance CSXT's
ongoing commitment to these states and Federal agencies to share
information, resources and strategies in order to better protect the
communities in which CSXT operates.
As part of CSXT's ongoing commitment to enhancing rail security,
CSXT is collaborating with the National Alliance for Public Safety GIS,
in the development of a GIS tool for sharing data to enhance decision
support for the prevention, mitigation, and response to emergencies.
The GIS tool includes CSXT's comprehensive rail yard emergency response
schematics, and detailed mapping of the rail lines connecting our
yards. This project, when completed, will be directly accessible by
emergency responders and will provide the location of known hazards in
CSXT rail yards as well as identify access points onto CSXT property.
Additionally, CSXT is dedicated to educating communities and first
responders about rail emergency response programs. We provide
communities and emergency responders with the information and training
necessary to address a rail-related emergency. Each year we conduct a
tremendous amount of training and coordination with local first
responders and security officials. We regularly provide first
responders hazardous material incident-response training by our
hazardous materials team. The training consists of classroom training,
table top exercises, and hands-on training using the CSXT safety train.
These training sessions familiarize first responders with the
commodities moved by rail, the containers used, how to locate contact
information and carry out appropriate response procedures. This
training has been very well received by first responder agencies and we
continue to build on this collaborative effort.
One outstanding example of the Industry's effort to enhance
training for emergency responders is witnessed by the AAR's
Transportation Technology Center located in Pueblo, Colorado, receiving
Congressional authorization to become a member of The National Domestic
Preparedness Consortium (``NDCP''). The NDCP includes eight other
nationally recognized organizations that address the counter-terrorism
preparedness and training needs of our Nation's emergency responders.
At TTCI, emergency first responders receive comprehensive and realistic
training on surface transportation security and emergency response.
CSXT, like all the Class I railroads, regularly provides first
response agencies in every jurisdiction where we operate with a
Community Awareness Emergency Planning Guide, which, for training and
planning purposes, provides a list of the top 25 hazardous commodities
shipped by rail in North America as well as a list of the top 25
shipped by CSXT. Upon request, we provide local first responders with a
density study that details the top hazardous commodities for a specific
community, and provides responders with the necessary information to
plan for a commodity-specific and community-specific response.
CSXT also works cooperatively with local first responders to
familiarize them with CSXT facilities and our operations. CSXT has a
long standing practice of inviting local responders into rail yards and
facilities so they may become familiar with on-site safety
considerations. The benefit of this open door policy is two fold.
First, responders are better equipped to safely and effectively aid
CSXT in the event of a rail-related incident or other emergency on rail
property. Second, this practice allows local law enforcement officers
to become familiar with rail property so that CSXT's police force and
local law enforcement officials can coordinate on issues like rail
crime, sabotage, and trespasser mitigation efforts.
CSXT is proud to offer industry-leading training programs to local
first responders and emergency personnel in the communities we serve.
But CSXT's training efforts do not stop here. CSXT also provides rail
safety training to Short Lines. Our goal is to expand the
sophistication of Short Line managers on important rail transportation
safety issues. CSXT's safety training includes environmental
regulations and compliance, waste management, hazmat awareness and
response, security planning and train accident prevention. CSXT
provides annual updates and makes CSXT project managers and the CSXT
Public Safety Coordination Center hotline (1-800-232-0144) available to
Short Lines to help them with issues on an ongoing basis.
Employee communication is central to CSXT's philosophy. We continue
to have dialogue with labor union representatives on security training
and employee perspectives on rail security issues. CSXT and the
Industry are taking the initiative to engage labor on several different
fronts. As recently as last week, CSXT and other Industry
representatives met with the Teamsters Rail Conference on overall
railroad security.
However, our actions cannot be solely focused on freight rail
security. Given the information we have received from Federal
intelligence sources, we believe that the greatest terrorist threat to
CSXT comes from the approximately 8 million passenger and commuter
train miles each year that operate on CSXT-owned rail lines. To that
end, we work closely with the agencies entrusted to carry passengers on
our lines to protect the 19 million riders on those trains. In 2007,
CSXT developed a series of 149 safe havens for Amtrak trains operating
on CSXT-owned rail lines. These safe havens allow for pre-identified
and coordinated locations, approximately 25 to 30 miles apart, where
during a time of increased terrorist concern or an actual attack, we
can safely bring Amtrak trains to a stop in order to evacuate or tend
to passengers needs. In 2009, we added safe havens for our commuter
partners--VRE, MARC, Tri Rail, and MBTA. Emergency responders at all
safe haven location received information and training to assist in
their important role should we have to activate our safe haven plan.
CSXT also recognizes the vital role that freight railroad police
play in enhancing freight rail and national security. CSXT, like all
Class I railroads, has its own police force with commissioned railroad
police officers to maintain the safety and security of the public and
the freight entrusted to the railroad. However, the CSXT police
department is the only U.S. based freight railroad police department to
be nationally accredited by the Commission on Accreditation for Law
Enforcement Agencies (``CALEA''). CSXT is proud of this accomplishment,
as only approximately 10 percent of the police departments in the
country have met the more than 450 required best practice standards to
be awarded CALEA accreditation.
Additionally, in 2004, CSXT's police department developed and
implemented a Rapid Response Team (``RRT'') that consists of a group of
highly-skilled CSXT Police special agents specifically trained to
respond to security incidents. The RRT is an interdisciplinary team
that is composed of CSXT Police special agents. Among them are
explosive-detection K-9 teams, counter-surveillance specialists, and
tactical response specialists, Hazmat managers with paramedic and
engineer qualifications, and a medical support element.
The CSXT RRT is responsible for rail counter-terrorism to ensure
that rail infrastructure does not become a target of domestic or
foreign terrorists. RRT team members are positioned and equipped for a
rapid response anywhere on the CSXT system. They are highly trained
according to national and international guidelines, which makes the
team the premier rail counter-terrorist experts in the industry. In
fact, the RRT provides rail-specific anti-terrorism training to public
agencies to support their mission and aid in response to railroad
incidents and/or threats.
In fact, since its inception in 2004, our CSX RRT has trained over
90 local, county, state, Federal and military law enforcement agencies
and nearly 900 tactical police officers on how to respond to a
terrorist attack to a railroad--both passenger and freight using a one-
of-a-kind tactical training train (T3) that allows for realistic force-
on-force training.
Recommendations: Coordination, Collaboration, and Communication
1. Coordination among regulators
2. Communication between railroads and regulators (i.e.,
intelligence sharing)
3. Collaboration (maximizing government use of railroad expertise)
CSXT and the Industry recognize the complexity of challenges faced
by both the government and American business in ensuring the safe and
secure movement of people and products in a post-9/11 World. We also
recognize that government responsibility, first and foremost, is to
protect the public. Yet, it is also important that DHS react to the new
security environment with sound regulatory policies that do not impede
the free flow of commerce. Open dialogue and collaboration with
Industry stakeholders, including extensive and constructive discussions
at the earliest stages, will ensure positive results with minimal
impacts on our industrial economy.
Grant programs are an important component of government-industry
collaboration. Federal money to support private security efforts is an
effective means by which government can leverage resources. In this
regard, it is important to remember that the rail security grant
program, as originally conceived, was intended to enhance freight rail
security. As implemented, however, most of the available funding has
gone to projects other than freight security infrastructure. The Class
I railroads would urge the Committee to direct future grant programs
precisely to freight rail infrastructure security projects.
CSXT does not disagree with the importance of mandatory security
regulations, but regulatory controls should be adopted only after
meaningful coordination and collaboration. Most industries are more
complicated than first meets the eye, and the rail industry is
particularly so. By working with the Industry and fully understanding
the implications of possible approaches to Federal policy, DHS would
best be able to ensure that it minimizes the unintended consequences of
new regulations and policies. Genuine, open communication between
stakeholders and the government can not only lead to practical
solutions; it can open the door to solutions that might not otherwise
have been apparent.
We urge DHS to make early, frequent consultation with all affected
industries a hallmark of its security policymaking. Establishing a
formal collaborative rulemaking process will give stakeholders the
opportunity to be directly involved in improving rail transportation
security and to develop mutually satisfactory rail security regulations
and practices. It will ensure that final rules are well-conceived,
consistent, and effective for Industry. This kind of coordination and
consultation before decisions have been finalized, before agency
direction has been determined, and before a notice of proposed
rulemaking is published, can only improve the final product. True
collaboration will ensure that we are taking maximum advantage of the
best thinking in government and industry.
Specifically, CSXT recommends that DHS adopt a process that gives
all stakeholders the opportunity to have an open dialogue with TSA on
rail security issues similar to the FRA's Rail Safety Advisory
Committees (``RSAC''). As the Committee may know, the RSAC is a formal
advisory committee that provides advice and recommendations to the FRA
on development of new safety regulations, revision of existing
regulations, and non-regulatory options for improving railroad safety.
The RSAC members consist of railroads, labor organizations, state
associations, government agencies, and other key rail safety
stakeholders. The RSAC gives stakeholders an opportunity to have an
open dialogue on rail safety best practices, a forum to advise FRA on
rail safety issues, and a process to identify reasonable solutions and
regulatory options for enhancing rail safety. This process has proven
effective in reaching consensus and limiting areas of disagreement.
Importantly, the agency retains full responsibility and authority over
the actual final rule adopted. The stakeholders contribute; the agency
decides.
Establishing an RSAC-like process would not impede DHS from issuing
proposed rulemakings in a timely manner. Rather, CSXT believes that a
formal process like this would: (1) expedite adoption of future final
rules, (2) facilitate more effective compliance, and (3) provide
Industry stakeholders with a better understanding of the agency's
expectations and its views on the scope of new rules.
Conclusion
CSXT recognizes that the freight rail and national security
environment in which it operates is continually changing. As such,
safety and security are, and will remain, our top priority. CSXT and
the Industry look forward to working with DHS to develop sound security
policy and practices that are coordinated, flexible, and that ensure
the continued efficient and effective flow of goods. CSXT appreciates
the opportunity to provide comments on this important topic.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much.
And now like to hear from Joseph Kelly, who's the Acting
Chief of New Jersey Transit Police.
Mr. Kelly, welcome.
STATEMENT JOSEPH KELLY, ACTING CHIEF OF POLICE,
NJ TRANSIT
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, and good afternoon, Senator
Lautenberg.
My name is Joseph Kelly, and I am the Acting Chief of
Police for New Jersey Transit.
New Jersey Transit is the Nation's largest statewide public
transportation system, operating in 3 states and providing
nearly 900,000 weekday trips on buses, light rail, and commuter
rail. My police department is authorized for 244 officers,
including 39 positions full-time to counter terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the other
distinguished members of this committee for providing me the
opportunity to testify today on the criticality of protecting
our Nation's passenger rail system.
Let me first describe some of the counterterrorism
strategies we have put in place since September 11, 2001. And
then I will outline some of the challenges we face at New
Jersey Transit, going forward.
We acknowledge we cannot place a police officer on every
corner. However, force multiplication is desperately needed to
protect our passengers. To that end, we have focused our
efforts on technology advancements, coordination, force
augmentation, and education.
New Jersey Transit has been active in installing
surveillance cameras and deploying radiological and explosive
detection systems. We've also added a variety of other
equipment aimed at prevention, detection, and recovery of all
hazards. Thanks to grant funding from the Transit Security
Grant Program, the Urban Area Security Initiative, and State
Homeland Security Grants, we have recently been able to add a
continuity-of-operations vehicle capable of emergency response
and sustained redundancy, satellite communications,
interoperable communications, a variety of hazardous material
response equipment, rescue and extrication equipment,
radiological pagers and isotope identifiers, explosives trace
detection machines.
With respect to coordination, New Jersey Transit has
created a crime analysis and intelligence unit. Our officers
are assigned to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force and the
New Jersey State Police Fusion Center. Additionally, the
department exchanges information with the Regional Transit
Security Working Group and the Northeast Corridor Coalition.
Our department also relies heavily on force augmentation.
We are assisted with patrols of our stations and facilities by
local law enforcement agencies. In addition, we run regular
counterterror exercises with the New Jersey State Police, the
New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, and
our regional transportation partners, including the NYPD, as
well as some of New Jersey's rapid deployment teams.
In terms of education, our transit employees have been
trained in terrorism awareness, dating back to 2002. Our front-
line employees have also received related courses and are
targeted to receive behavioral assessment training through a
Regional Transit Security Grant. Some employees are also
receiving advanced training through our Citizens Police
Academy. Our police officers receive counterterrorism training
now as part of their basic police officer training, and have
also been trained in behavioral assessment. Police officers
assigned to the counterterrorism function have also attended a
variety of specialized courses, such as federally funded
courses including the incident response to terrorist bombing
and the strategic counterterrorism training for transit
managers.
We train our commuters through some nonconventional means,
using uniformed police officers. Commuters and citizens alike
are given information contain TIPS phone number, the type of
information to report, and awareness of precursor terrorist
activity. This information is distributed on counterterror
deployments, such as our community outreach details.
New Jersey Transit is in constant communication with our
Federal partners. The two principal Federal repositories for
counterterrorism-related information are the FBI, JTTF, and the
Transit Security Operations Center, known as TSOC, operated by
the TSA. The required reporting of both these entities
sometimes can be problematic and duplicative. A preferable
approach may be to rely on the Joint Terrorism Task Force to
communicate with the TSOC after the JTTF makes a determination
as how it wants to proceed on any given piece of information.
Let me briefly touch on our budgetary challenges. As you
know, the national economic downturn has had a dramatic effect
on state and local revenue. A survey recently completed by the
American Public Transportation Association found that 60
percent of APTA systems have already cut service or raised
fares, and that 84 percent of public transportation systems
will do so by the end of the year.
New Jersey Transit recently approved a 22-percent increase
to close a projected $300-million Fiscal Year 11 budget gap. In
addition, we instituted a hiring freeze and are eliminating
more than 200 positions. With these local funding challenges,
Federal operating support for security efforts has become even
more critical.
Since Fiscal Year 2007, New Jersey Transit has received
much needed operating support for security efforts. The
officers funded by these grants will be completely dedicated to
counterterror, and will be a critical component to our
prevention efforts. I urge the Committee to continue this
support.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. And I look
forward to answering any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph Kelly, Acting Chief of Police, NJ TRANSIT
Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Hutchinson and distinguished
members of the Committee--my name is Joseph Kelly and I am the Acting
Chief of Police of NJ TRANSIT. NJ TRANSIT is the Nation's largest
statewide public transportation system, operating in three states
providing nearly 900,000 weekday trips on 2000 buses, three light rail
lines and 12 commuter rail lines. My department is authorized for 244
police officers, including 39 police positions full-time to counter-
terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the other distinguished
members of this committee for providing me the opportunity to testify
today on the criticality of protecting our Nation's passenger rail
system.
Let me first describe some of the counter-terrorism strategies we
have put in place since September 11, including our close partnerships
with Federal authorities. I will then outline some of the challenges we
face at NJ TRANSIT going forward.
We know that we cannot place a police officer on every corner of
our system. However, force multipliers are desperately needed to
protect our passengers. To that end, we have focused our efforts on
technology advancement, coordination, force augmentation and education.
NJ TRANSIT has been very active installing security surveillance
cameras and deploying radiological and explosives detection and
protection systems. We have also added a variety of other equipment
aimed at prevention, detection and recovery of all hazards. Thanks to
grant funding from the Transit Security Grant Program, Urban Area
Security Initiative Grants funding and State Homeland Security Grants,
we have recently added:
A Continuity of Operation Vehicles capable of emergency
response and sustained operational redundancy.
Satellite Communications (fixed and mobile).
Interoperable communications equipment including ICRI and
MACOM gateway switch. The ``ICRI'' is a small, portable
``switch'' used to interconnect municipal public safety radios,
state and Federal radios and telephone.
A variety of Hazardous Material response and investigative
equipment.
Rescue and extrication equipment.
Radiological pagers and handheld isotope identifiers.
Explosive Trace Detection Machines capable of detecting both
nitrate and peroxide based explosives.
With respect to coordination, NJ TRANSIT has created a crime
analysis and intelligence unit and we have implemented COMPSTAT aimed
at information sharing and thorough investigation. NJ Transit Police
officers are assigned to the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and
the NJ State Police Regional Operations Intelligence Center.
Additionally the department exchanges information with the Regional
Transit Security Working Group and the Northeast Corridor Coalition.
Through these partnerships, the NJ TRANSIT Police Department exchanges
real time intelligence across the region and the Nation in a timely and
efficient manner.
Our Department also relies heavy on force augmentation. We are
assisted with park, walk and talk patrols of our stations and
facilities by municipal, county and state law enforcement agencies. In
addition, we run regular counter terror exercises with the New Jersey
State Police, the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and
Preparedness and our regional transportation partners (including the
NYPD) and some of New Jersey's county rapid deployment teams.
In terms of education, we have offered counter-terrorism related
training in three groups; transit employees, police officers, and the
commuters and public.
Our transit employees have been trained in terrorism awareness
dating back to 2002. Our front line employees have also received
related courses and are all targeted to receive behavioral assessment
training through a 2008 Regional Transit Security grant. Some employees
also receive advanced training through our citizens police academy
program.
Our police officers receive counter-terror training now as part of
their basic police training and have also been trained in behavioral
assessment. Police officers assigned to counter-terror full time also
attend a variety of specialized courses such as the federally funded
Incident response to a terrorist bombing and the strategic
counterterrorism training program for transit managers.
We train our commuters through some non-conventional means using
uniformed police officers in the field. Commuters and citizens alike
are given information containing our TIPS telephone number, the type of
information to report and the pre-cursors of terror related activity.
This information is distributed on counter-terror deployments such as
community outreach details.
As I mentioned earlier in my testimony, NJ TRANSIT is in constant
communication with our Federal partners. The two principal Federal
repositories for counter-terrorism related information are the FBI's
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and the Transit Security Operations
Center, known as TSOC, operated by the TSA. The required reporting to
both of these entities can be problematic and duplicative at times. For
instance, a lead provided to the JTTF by NJ TRANSIT has the potential
to be compromised by virtue of the reporting process of the Transit
Security Operations Center, which shares this information via e-mail
when suspicious activity is reported. A preferable approach may be to
rely on the Joint Terrorism Task Force to communicate with the Transit
Security Operations Center after the JTTF makes a determination as to
how it wants to proceed on a given piece of information.
Let me briefly touch on NJ TRANSIT's budgetary challenges. As you
know, the national economic downturn has had a dramatic effect on State
and local revenue. A survey recently completed by the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA) found that 60 percent of APTA systems
have already cut service or raised fares and that 84 percent of public
transportation systems will do so by the end of the year.
NJ TRANSIT recently approved a 22 percent fare increase to close a
projected $300 million FY11 budget gap. In addition, we have instituted
a hiring freeze and are eliminating more than 200 positions. With these
local funding challenges, Federal operating support for security
efforts has become even more critical.
Since FY07, NJ TRANSIT has received much needed operating support
for security efforts. The police officers funded by these grants will
be completely dedicated to counter-terror and will be a critical
component to out prevention efforts. I urge the Committee to continue
this support.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I look
forward to answering any questions you may have.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank each of you for your valuable
testimony.
I want to just get an idea of what communications you get
from the Department of Homeland Security--after the recent
subway attacks, for instance.
And, Mr. Elliott, we include you in the rail discussion,
even though we don't say ``freight.'' But, the fact is, it's a
very important element of our total economic system.
And so, the attack was there. Other attacks on passenger
rail, mass transit systems throughout the world. What kind of
actions did the Department of Homeland Security take to help
you increase your level of security?
Mr. O'Connor. Senator the day of the last attack, in
Moscow, we did get a call from TSA. I and, actually, Chief
Kelly are part of a group; it's called a Peer Advisory Group.
It's about a dozen police chiefs from around the country that
conference once a month to discuss security issues. But, that
call came about 12 or 1 o'clock that day. Obviously, the
attacks had occurred almost 12 hours earlier, and many of us
had already gone through what we thought we had to, in terms of
reassuring the public.
So, while the--while it was commendable, on the TSA's part,
to get the group together and kind of share information on what
we're doing, I think it would have been more helpful if they
were out a little bit quicker so that we could have had a
common response to reassure the public.
Senator Lautenberg. Chief Kelly?
Mr. Kelly. Senator, thank you for the question. I echo
Chief O'Connor's remarks, in that we do get information from
the TSA, but normally it's not as timely as it could be. I----
Senator Lautenberg. How about the kind of communications
you get, as well as the timing.
Mr. Kelly. We receive briefings, generally--in addition to
the phone call, briefings via e-mail on a daily basis. However,
when it comes to attacks, such as Moscow or Mumbai or Madrid,
we're receiving in-depth briefings from our law enforcement
partners in the region. And usually--I don't want to speak for
Chief O'Connor, but I get in-depth briefings from my detective
assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force, in a very timely
manner, telling us what we're facing and what we need to do.
Mr. O'Connor. Just to follow up on that, in the Zazi
investigation I got a call directly from the head of the New
York Joint Terrorism Task Force when those warrants were being
executed that night. So, we knew, before it went public, you
know, what was happening and what the public might be alarmed
about, and that gave us advance notice to prepare for that.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes. Mr. Elliott, do you have any
comment to make on this connection?
Mr. Elliott. Yes. I would, Senator. With over 8 million
train miles of passenger and commuter operations on our private
freight lines every year, we cannot disassociate ourself from
the very real concern--security concern to passenger
operations. I will tell you that, even though, from a freight
railroad perspective, the relationship that we have with our
passenger and commuter partners is admirable, including a
longstanding relationship with Chief O'Connor, especially, in
the Amtrak Police Department. I would like to echo his
sentiment. I think the information we receive is adequate, but
I don't think it's timely enough. I think one of the great
things about the U.S. rail industry today is our ability to
quickly respond to good intelligence. And if we don't get that
good intelligence in a timely basis, then we are not able to
take the steps that we need to provide both freight rail
infrastructure, as well as the passengers that might be riding
on that portion of the rail.
Senator Lautenberg. Does TSA give any of you advice on new
technological discoveries, new equipment, new ideas on
protecting your responsibilities? I'm not just trying to get
TSA in a vise here, but I'm interested in what each of you
does, each and every day. You have enormous responsibility of
life and limb, the economy, the functioning of our society. Is
TSA a significant source for data and information on what you
can do to improve your operation, without simply suggesting you
get more resources, which I think also----
Mr. O'Connor. Through the years, Senator, we have partnered
with TSA to experiment or run pilot programs on different
technology, whether it be millimeter wave technology that
they're trying detect someone carrying a suicide vest on their
body, radiological detectors, explosive trace detection. That's
one of the areas where DHS and TSA has been particularly
helpful. I think they need to do more, you know, and I think
that they have to, kind of, speed up getting some technology to
us, in terms of cameras and face recognition and, you know, the
ability to detect people who may be leaving things behind on
trains and in stations. But, that's one area where TSA has been
helpful to Amtrak.
Senator Lautenberg. There have been, thank goodness, no
terrorist attacks on rail systems in our country. Attacks
around the world have resulted in significant loss of life and
system disruptions. The TSA only allocates about two percent of
its budget for surface transportation security. How does--this
structure, this prioritization by the Department affect you and
your ability to meet your security needs?
Mr. Kelly. Senator, while--it wouldn't be fair to compare
aviation to surface security. As I mentioned in my testimony,
it's never----
Senator Lautenberg. You said----
Mr. Kelly.--been more----
Senator Lautenberg.--900,000 people board your trains every
day?
Mr. Kelly. Yes, sir. But, it's an open system, as compared
to a sterile environment. It has never been more critical than
it is now, with the budget constraints, I believe, that are
pressing against most transit properties. We--we've received
about $59 million in support through Federal grants since 2003.
And it's critical that that continues so that we can continue
to provide the level of security that we do.
Mr. O'Connor. Senator, several of the panelists previously
testified that decisions like this should really be based upon
risk. And clearly, I think the risk to surface transportation
has become greater over the years. So, that, to me, would
suggest that TSA and DHS should take a step back and see if
their formula that they thought was the right one several years
back is still the right one today. You know, it would appear to
me, as you said earlier, with 2 million to 35 million
passengers at risk, the formula needs to be revisited.
Senator Lautenberg. But, also there are 45,000 people,
thank goodness, inspecting baggage and passengers to make sure,
as much as possible, that bad people don't get on the airplane.
On a comparative basis, however, because of the widespread use
of that surface transportation, it's--I'm not sure that there
can be any comparison to that which is spent--87 percent of the
budget is spent on aviation. And the question is, have we done
enough--are we doing enough?
Chief Kelly, I hear what you're saying. I mean, we know
that there are significant budget cuts in--New Jersey Transit
and other facilities in the state, unfortunately. But, the
question is, At what point do we impair our ability to provide
the kind of security--that's a rhetorical question, you don't
have to answer, because I know what your thoughts might be,
even what your words might be different from--the fact of the
matter is that these things could have consequences--that are
unthinkable.
I was a Commissioner of the Port Authority before I came to
the Senate. And one of the first things I did was to go down in
the Port Authority tube tunnel. I wanted to see what it was
like. And I found things in unacceptable condition, fire doors
locked and a electrical system that was so antiquated--one
system is one series, another is a different kind of system.
So, one system, if you lose a bulb, half of the system goes
out, things of that nature. It was shocking. And they got on it
in a hurry, but the inspection for these things is essential. I
mean, security is not simply, as all of you know, a terrorist
taking action against our citizens, but there are also other
security measures--fire, et cetera, and the terrible thing we
saw on 9/11 that----
So, what I'm trying to do is to make sure that there is an
awareness by TSA that response time has to be far better than
that which--and I'm not asking for your opinion, I want to
spare you that, but I'm giving you mine, based on what we heard
here at the table today. And the thing that we have to do is
step up to our full responsibility.
And I'm pleased to have you here with us. I appreciate the
time that you've given.
We will keep the record open, to see if any other questions
occur that we might want to talk to you about.
I want to ask Mr. Elliott a question. In 2007 CSX provided
New Jersey's regional operations, intelligence center with
access to online systems that allow the center to track the
location and contents of CSX trains in real time. You mentioned
this. How has this partnership, do you think, improved rail
security? And might it be replicated throughout the country?
Mr. Elliott. Well, thank you, Senator Lautenberg, for the
question. As you asked me the question, I think the example of
the partnership that we have with the New Jersey State
Department of Homeland Security is, again, an admirable one.
Much is to the credit of then-Director of Homeland Security,
Dick Canas. He is no longer in that position, but I give much
of the credit for the success of that public-private
partnership to his candor, his vision, and his frankness in
wanting freight rail transportation to be an equal partner in
helping to ensure the safety and security within the state.
And what we did, through the technology that we provided,
was actually provide transparency to the state homeland
security group within New Jersey. That allowed them
transparency. This is something that then-Director Canas was
very interested in having, so he could go to the leadership in
New Jersey, and he could honestly say--and you talked about
that corridor, the chemical coast up in North Jersey. Senator,
so he could honestly say that he knew where every train was on
CSX, and where every hazardous-material car might be in that
train. We provided him with that transparency.
I think, in return, the Department of Homeland Security in
New Jersey did some very positive things, unlike we have seen
in any other state, in that they utilized some of their hard-
to-get Federal DHS dollars and put that toward infrastructure
protection of freight rail assets. And that is not something
else that we have seen a model of.
As you know, while we receive some Federal dollars, it is
solely for training. We get no Federal funds to enhance any of
our security assets. But, in the case of New Jersey, they found
a way to work closely with their freight rail partner, CSX, to
come up with a win-win scenario. And, again, this is
something--both the technology and the transparency--that we
try to provide and we have in place in eight states. And we are
actually working with approximately four other states to
provide the same technology. And you heard me mention that both
the TSA Freedom Center, in Herndon, and the DOT Crisis Center,
here in Washington, both have that technology.
But, do I think it could be replicated? Yes. I think there
is a need for--in the right hands, in the right secure hands--
for security analysts and security officials to be able to have
a better understanding where the Nation's freight railroads are
operating. And give them better information so they, in turn,
can do their part to help protect us.
Senator Lautenberg. Do you talk to others in the freight
business about security measures? Is there an interchange of
information?
Mr. Elliott. Yes. Through our trade association, the
Association of American Railroads, there is a standing security
committee. And there is regular interaction, regular dialogue
on what we are doing throughout the industry to enhance
security.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, each of you has a responsibility
that overlaps with your neighbor across the table. And the
exchange of information is critical, information about things
that might be happening, but also about improving your
communications, timing and efficiency. And I would ask you,
please--you know how to get a hold of my office, and if you
have any commentary that goes beyond the questions that we may
submit for the record, we'd invite you to volunteer your views
on any of the ideas that come your way as a result of your
people being in the field.
I wanted to check one thing with you, Mr. Kelly, before we
finish. And I promise, this is the last, and I'll let you go,
and I'll go. And that is, you talked about the complement that
you have in your police department; 244----
Mr. Kelly. Yes, sir.
Senator Lautenberg.--positions. And did you have to take
some cuts in that now?
Mr. Kelly. The police department lost no sworn positions,
sir. We did----
Senator Lautenberg. All right----
Mr. Kelly.--we did lose some positions in the police
department, but none of them were police officers.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you all very much for being here.
[Whereupon, at 4:21 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Hon. David Heyman
Question 1. Can you please provide a status update, timeline, and
plan of action for when each of the rules mandated in the Implementing
the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act related to comprehensive
security training for rail, transit, and bus workers will be issued?
Answer. TSA has combined three requirements in the ``Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007'' (9/11 Act) for
security training rules into a single regulation. Sections 1408, 1517,
and 1534 of the 9/11 Act require the Secretary to develop and issue
regulations for training frontline employees of public transportation,
railroad, and over-the-road-bus operators, respectively. The Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) is being developed, as required by the 9/11
Act, in consultation with representatives of government and law
enforcement experts, emergency responders, private sector operators,
and labor organizations. TSA anticipates that the NPRM would be
available for public comment in early calendar year 2011.
Question 2. To what extent is each surface transportation mode
applying, or adapting, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan's
threat, vulnerability, and consequence construct to their respective
modes to produce comprehensive risk assessments and to rank assets or
systems accordingly? Which modes have made the most progress in this
effort?
Answer. As described in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is a co-Sector
Specific Agency (SSA) for the Transportation Sector along with the U.S.
Coast Guard (USCG), and TSA is responsible for developing and carrying
out the provisions of the Sector Specific Plan (SSP) for Transportation
Systems--including the modal annexes for the surface transportation
modes. The USCG is a co-SSA for the Transportation Sector for the
maritime mode of transportation. The Transportation Systems SSP
addresses the applicability of the NIPP's risk management framework
construct to the Transportation Sector-Specific programs and how the
sector has responded to the request to rank assets or systems
accordingly.
Specifically, several risk assessment tools have been developed and
implemented in support of the sector risk management framework, to
identify and address measures required to build resilience in all the
modes of transportation. The sector developed a comprehensive
methodology for conducting annual assessments of terrorism-related
risks across the sector. The Transportation Sector Security Risk
Assessment (TSSRA) was designed to provide data for modal and cross-
modal risk analyses and enable the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) to develop a baseline understanding of the risk landscape facing
the sector. Similar methodologies such as the USCG's Maritime Security
Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM), and the Baseline Assessment for Security
Enhancement in the mass transit mode have a more finite scope than
TSSRA, but share the goal of helping to determine the individual mode's
most important risk considerations.
The Highway and Motor Carrier Security Division in TSA has
developed a risk based methodology to determine the most critical
highway infrastructures and has begun conducting in-depth risk
assessments of these structures. TSA provided the individual states
with the methodology to determine that these structures and this
information were forwarded by each state to TSA. Although results were
not received from all states, TSA, working with the Army Corps of
Engineers, has begun conducting assessments on the top 58 and
anticipates completing approximately 25-30 by the end of 2010. At the
National level, the Office of Infrastructure Protection, Homeland
Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) is engaged in a
systematic building of capability of transportation networks, system
interdependencies, and consequence assessments through the National
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) to assist with
both risk assessment and consequence management during real world
events.
Additionally, the Highway and Motor Carrier Security Division in
TSA has completed industry risk assessments on the school
transportation industry and the trucking industry as required by the 9/
11 Act. TSA is also completing industry risk assessments on the over-
the-road bus industry, an overview of the states' Departments of
Transportation structures, and an overall assessment of the entire
highway mode.
Question 3. Given that the Surface Transportation Security Program
is under supervision of the aviation-focused Federal Security
Directors, what steps does TSA take to ensure that surface
transportation security gets the appropriate level of priority?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration provides program
oversight from headquarters to ensure work products at each location
meet the frequency and quality mandated in the regulatory activities
plan. In addition to oversight reports, six Regional Security
Inspectors-Surface with extensive surface expertise are assigned to
regions and conduct regular site visits to ensure standardization.
Surface security training for all FSDs and AFSD-Is is ongoing to ensure
they have the proper foundation to lead and manage the surface
transportation security within their respective Area of Responsibility
(AOR).
Question 4. How does TSA ensure that those responsible for surface
transportation security have the necessary level of expertise?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration has established
experience requirements for transportation security inspectors. Those
in lead or supervisory positions are required to have surface
experience to provide stability to the surface program. Inspectors are
assessed against these requirements throughout the interview, hiring,
and promotion processes.
Question 5. What is the status of TSA's efforts to develop a
national bridge strategy to supplement the Highway Infrastructure and
Motor Carrier Annex to assist the stakeholder community in assessing
both the criticality and the security vulnerabilities of its assets?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is moving
ahead to: identify critical structures; conduct vulnerability
assessments on those structures; identify and share with stakeholders
appropriate structural and operational vulnerability mitigation steps
and tools; identify and recommend contemporary technological mitigation
products; and promote appropriate security elements in planning and
funding stages of new or significantly modified critical highway
structures.
A National Strategy for Highway Bridge Security was developed in a
multi-agency work group chaired by TSA and signed into policy by then-
TSA Administrator Kip Hawley in 2008. It is currently under biennial
review and possible update by the same work group. Participants in that
group included TSA, the DHS Offices of Policy, Infrastructure
Protection (IP) and Science and Technology (S&T), as well as the
USDOT's Federal Highway Administration. Since the Strategy's approval,
the principles agreed upon have guided TSA's initial selection and
inspection of highway structures in a cooperative campaign with its
fellow Federal agencies.
Using Strategy principles, TSA identified a list of 58 critical
infrastructures to be assessed over the next 2 years, including 45
bridges and 13 tunnels. TSA has engaged the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE) through an Interagency Agreement to complete the
assessments. Since February 2010, the USACE has completed eight bridge
assessments. It is anticipated that the USACE will complete 20 to 30
assessments by the end of calendar year 2010. TSA will share the
findings of these assessments with appropriate stakeholder communities.
IP conducts specialized field assessments to identify
vulnerabilities of nationally significant critical infrastructure and
key resources (CIKR). These vulnerability assessments provide the
foundation of the risk-based implementation of protective programs
designed to prevent, deter, and mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack
while enabling timely, efficient response and restoration in an all-
hazards post-event situation. IP has conducted 274 vulnerability
assessments on CIKR Transportation Sector assets, including 102
assessments of surface transportation assets, on the Level 1/Level 2
List since 2004.
These assessments are conducted on a strictly voluntary basis. IP
has no regulatory authority on transportation sector assets to conduct
assessments and relies on the cooperation of its private sector
partners. The final assessment report is classified Protected Critical
Infrastructure Information (PCII), and is limited in distribution.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Hon. David Heyman
Question 1. Please provide the Committee with your training program
for surface transportation inspectors and VIPR teams.
Answer. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Surface
Inspectors receive 5 weeks of initial training that covers: Department
of Homeland Security and TSA missions, core values, roles and
responsibilities; the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,
and other guiding legislation or documents; ethics and other legal
issues; 49 CFR Part 1580 Rail Transportation Security; and TSA
compliance and enforcement strategies. In addition, Surface Inspectors
attend a one-week Railroad Operations Safety and Security training
course that covers: safety; industry terminology; railroad and transit
system organizational structure; rail and transit system operations;
infrastructure; hazmat; emergency response; and railroad/rail mass
transit security initiatives.
Follow-on training consists of various courses conducted by the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the Transit Safety Institute,
the New Mexico Tech Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center;
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
The TSA Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service has
established an Intermodal Training Branch (ITB) at its training center
in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The goal of the ITB is to develop Surface
mode specific training curricula and tactics for Federal Air Marshals
to utilize while conducting Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response
(VIPR) operations. Training courses have been developed and are being
implemented at the field level.
TSA VIPR assets at the management and field levels attend a
Railroad Operations, Safety and Security Training class in Pueblo,
Colorado, in an effort to familiarize them with the surface
transportation domain. TSA also continues to leverage its
transportation stakeholder/partners by attending training sponsored by
transportation entities regarding operational safety and tactics in the
surface transportation domain.
Locally, the TSA coordinates with the transit agency to train
inspectors as well as other VIPR team members to operate within their
system. The training usually includes work and track safety and an
overview of the station to include emergency exits. The Inspectors have
also been trained to conduct station profiles, which are also part of
pre-operational planning for VIPR.
Question 2. For several years TSA has partnered with the private
freight railroads and the Department of Transportation to develop the
Rail Corridor Risk Management System to measure the risk of
transporting hazardous materials by rail. How will the Department
continue to support this important Rail Corridor Risk Management
System?
Answer. Since its inception in 2005, the Freight Rail Security
Grant Program (FRSGP) has allocated funding for the development of a
Rail Corridor Risk Management System (RCRMS) to assist railroads with
the analysis of routes used to transport certain hazardous materials.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) believes that the
RCRMS is now in an operations and maintenance phase and that future
funding should be provided by the regulated parties that use RCRMS to
assist them in complying with the provisions of 49 CFR 172.820.
However, TSA will continue to work with the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) to evaluate new funding needs for new
capabilities, as/if they arise. TSA will also continue to work with FRA
in reviewing the routing analyses submitted by the railroads by
providing relevant threat and vulnerability intelligence to inform the
RCRMS.
Question 3. As part of your rail risk assessment, have you
considered whether encouragement of the chemicals industry to develop
alternative products or manufacturing processes would have an effect on
security risks?
Answer. The freight railroad risk assessment prepared by the
Transportation Security Administration does not directly address the
issue of product substitution or inherently safer technologies to
replace toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) materials in rail transportation.
The primary objective of the railroad risk assessment was to identify
the risk to and from freight rail transportation in its current state.
Question 4. When will TSA develop performance measures to evaluate
grants provided under its various transportation security grants?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
currently working with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
to develop performance measures for grant programs that can be
objectively measured and incorporated into ongoing and regular site
monitoring visits. TSA is also working to identify current mitigation
actions for high-risk critical infrastructure assets, including how/
when they will be fully remediated. These actions will provide tangible
results on the effectiveness of grant funding for implementation in the
Fiscal Year 2011 grants cycle.
Question 5. When will TSA have measures in place to determine the
effectiveness of its VIPR teams, as recommended by GAO?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues
to work on enhancing and refining the current Visible Intermodal
Prevention and Response (VIPR) performance metrics as improvements are
made to data collection and analytical capabilities.
To continue to address the opportunities cited by the Government
Accountability Office, the VIPR program is incorporating additional
functionality into a new information system being implemented during
calendar year 2010. This system will be readily available to all VIPR
team members for documenting, planning, deploying, and follow-up of the
VIPR program activities. Analysis of performance data over time at both
the local and national levels will increase understanding of VIPR
program effectiveness.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Hon. David Heyman
Question 1. As you know, ferry transportation is a critical
component of Washington State's transportation system. I know that DHS
has been very concerned about the vulnerability of ferries to terrorist
attack. I appreciate how well you have worked with the Washington State
Ferry System on security issues. How does the department evaluate the
current safety and security regimes across the various ferry systems
operating in the U.S.?
Answer. The United States Coast Guard's (USCG) Ports, Waterways,
and Coastal Security (PWCS) strategy views security as a shared
responsibility, requiring collaboration and cooperation at all levels
of government, with the private sector, and international partners. All
passenger vessels (including ferries) of over 100 gross tons that are
capable of carrying more than 150 passengers in domestic service, or
that are capable of carrying more than 12 passengers on an
international voyage, are required to comply with the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002, and its regulatory
provisions found in 33 CFR Parts 101-105.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) supports the USCG
in ensuring compliance by applicable maritime facilities and vessels
(including ferries) with 33 CFR parts 101-105 by leveraging its core
competencies of passenger screening, explosives detection,
Transportation Worker Identification Credentialing (TWIC) management,
and intermodal transportation security.
Question 2. Are there aspects of ferry security that are of special
concern to the Department?
Answer. The United States Coast Guard (USCG), in conjunction with
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and other Federal, State and
local officials, has been interested in reducing the security risk
posed by ferry vessels. Under the USCG's Operation Neptune Shield,
Sector Commanders are directed to escort a percentage of high capacity
passenger vessels, including ferries, to deter and protect them against
small vessel attacks.
Question 3. Are we investing adequately in ferry safety and
security in light of the number of passengers and vehicles ferries
transport?
Answer. Maritime security is achieved through the combined and
coordinated efforts of international, private, and governmental
maritime security community members. A layered strategy is used to
create a security regime that reduces risk and shares cost. For
example, the FEMA administered Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) has
made over $1 billion available to eligible maritime stakeholders,
including ferry systems, since the inception of the program in 2002. To
reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities, certain high risk ferry systems,
for a number of years, had access to their own separate allotment of
PSGP money for which only they could apply. Though there is no longer a
separate ferry allotment, eligible ferry systems can still apply for
money from the general PSGP fund.
Question 4. Can you assure us that container cargo coming into the
Port of Prince Rupert, British Columbia, and across the U.S.-Canada
land border is subject to the same security scrutiny as import
containers entering through U.S. ports?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) exercises level of
security scrutiny for container cargo coming into the Port of Prince
Rupert, British Columbia as it does for import containers entering
through other U.S. ports absent specific threat streams. Conveyances
arriving in the United States from Canada through land border ports of
entry by truck or rail are arriving from foreign origins, and are thus
subject to the same level of security scrutiny as containers being
imported directly through U.S. ports.
Regardless of the mode of transportation, CBP concentrates its
efforts on its primary mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist
weapons from entering the United States, while at the same time
facilitating legitimate trade and travel. CBP must secure America's
borders while doing it in a way that does not stifle the flow of
legitimate trade and travel through our borders.
We are accomplishing these equally important goals through the use
of advance information, risk-management targeting systems, detection
technologies and extended border strategies. CBP employs a layered
enforcement approach to safeguarding U.S. borders from threat by land,
air, and sea.
CBP recognizes that no single strategy or risk assessment is 100
percent effective and accurate, thus CBP focuses on layering multiple
initiatives together to accomplish its mission. CBP works aggressively
with trade and government partners to legislate improvements regarding
data timeliness and quality, which augment the abilities of highly
trained personnel to using cutting edge technology for targeting,
detecting and securing terrorists, or implements of terrorism, destined
to the United States.
The strategies and technologies used within our agency to help
combat terrorism and prevent instruments of terror from entering the
United States include:
The National Targeting Center (NTC)--A single location for
coordinating critical intelligence within CBP and with the
Intelligence Community to rapidly implement targeting responses
for passengers and cargo;
The Automated Targeting System (ATS)--A decision support
system that enables CBP to utilize automated risk-scoring
algorithms to vet relative levels of risk for cargo shipments
and passengers and focus inspection efforts. ATS is a highly
adaptive system that allows CBP to fuse data from enforcement
and commercial sources to assess risks. For cargo, ATS
integrates entry declaration, carrier manifest data and
enforcement data, and utilizes extensive and comprehensive
historical data to identify unusual and high-risk shipments.
The industry data that feeds ATS is substantial, and the Trade
Act regulations requires detailed and accurate cargo
information in advance of arrival to facilitate risk
evaluation;
Regulatory Changes for Reporting Requirements--CBP actively
works with the trade community to evaluate new and refined
reporting requirements that can enhance supply chain
transparency and security. Recent and significant examples
include the 24-Hour Rule and the Trade Act. These regulatory
changes give CBP the authority and mechanisms needed to receive
detailed electronic cargo information on all U.S.-bound sea
cargo before it leaves a foreign seaport; allows receipt of
cargo information for air, rail and truck shipments, and
permits targeting decisions to be made before the arrival of
conveyances;
The Container Security Initiative (CSI)--CBP is targeting--
and with our foreign counterparts--screening targeted
containers; that may be used to conceal terrorist weapons
before they are loaded on ships destined for the United States;
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)--
Through C-TPAT, CBP has partnered with the private sector to
implement security standards and best practices that better
protect the entire supply chain against exploitation by
terrorists--from foreign loading docks to U.S. ports of entry;
Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) and Radiation Detection
Technologies--Another facet of our layered defense that enables
CBP to screen a larger portion of the stream of commercial
traffic in less time while facilitating legitimate trade and
travel. These tools provide CBP with a significant capability
to detect and interdict terrorist weapons and other contraband
at U.S. ports;
Air Cargo Interagency Collaborations--Efforts between CBP
and other agencies have been established to strengthen air
cargo security;
And, the implementation of ``Smart Border'' agreements that
involve a number of actions to improve information exchange and
adopt benchmarked security measures that will reduce the
terrorist threat at our borders, such as the sharing of
significant seizure information that would enhance future
targeting efforts.
These layers are interdependent and deployed simultaneously, to
substantially increase the likelihood that contraband, including
terrorists and weapons of terror will be detected. No single strategy
could provide the level of security that CBP has worked to achieve and
maintain since the tragic events of September 11, 2001.
Question 5. DNDO hasn't yet come up with a radiation screening
solution for on-dock container transfers from ship to rail, so
containers at Port of Tacoma have to be unloaded, scanned and then
loaded on trains. Prince Rupert has on-dock intermodal rail facilities
like Tacoma. Are they going to the same lengths to screen containers
for radiation?
Answer. The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) concept of
operations (CONOPS) for scanning ship-to-rail containers at Prince
Rupert is similar to the CONOPS used at most of the terminals at Port
of Tacoma (POT). The CONOPS used at Prince Rupert and most of the
terminals at POT involves yard-haulers (i.e., tractor and trailer with
container) driving through ``standard'' 4-panel radiation portal
monitors (RPMs) at multiple locations on each terminal. The Pierce
County Terminal at the POT, however, has a much more challenging issue.
They use straddle-carriers to move containers from the ship to the
stacks and/or the train and have no physical space or infrastructure to
add RPMs or tractor/trailer equipment. A straddle-carrier is much too
large (size and shielding) to be scanned with a `standard' RPM, which
is driving the proof-of-concepts in the On-Dock Rail Program.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Hon. David Heyman
Question 1. As a former prosecutor, I am always concerned that
state and local law enforcement entities play an informed and active
role in security initiatives. Can you explain in more detail how TSA is
working to incorporate state and local law enforcement into mass
transit security? What are some of your suggestions as to how we can
better improve on that partnership?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) augments
the efforts of Federal, state and local resources to deter potential
terrorist and criminal activity across various modes of transportation
by effective deployment of Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response
(VIPR) teams.
VIPR teams work alongside stakeholders, including law enforcement,
utilizing a variety of security tactics that are accomplished through
coordination with stakeholders to deploy Federal, state and local
resources, as well as integrated TSA assets, to conduct random high
visibility patrols, passenger and baggage screening operations, and
deployment of explosive detection canine teams, and technology.
TSA takes a proactive approach to initiating, building and
maintaining stakeholder relationships by conducting face-to-face
meetings, and conducting stakeholder teleconferences. TSA also meets
bi-annually with the major rail and mass transit police chiefs at the
Safety and Security Roundtable co-sponsored by the Departments of
Transportation and Homeland Security, and maintains liaison with rail
and mass transit police chiefs at the annual International Association
of Chiefs of Police conference.
National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP) has
partnered and entered into Cooperative Agreements with 19 law
enforcement agencies in the Mass Transit/Maritime arena. TSA also
partially funds over 100 state and local explosives detection canine
teams in mass transit/maritime, to offset operating costs experienced
by municipalities.
Additionally, the Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP) is a DHS-
administered, $50 million targeted infrastructure protection grant
program for local law enforcement focused on identifying and mitigating
vulnerabilities at the highest-risk critical infrastructure sites and
providing funding to local law enforcement for equipment acquisition
and planning activities to address gaps and enhance security
capabilities. The BZPP is designed to increase first responder
capabilities and preparedness by bringing together private sector
security personnel and first responders in a collaborative security
planning process that enhances the buffer zone--the area outside a
facility that can be used by an adversary to conduct surveillance or
launch an attack, around individual assets.
Since FY 2004, IP has conducted 165 BZPP assessments on Level 1/
Level 2 assets throughout the Transportation Sector, and distributed
$25 million in grant funding. As a subset, 19 BZPP assessments have
been conducted in the mass transit subsector, providing a total of
approximately $4.5 million in grant funding.
Question 2. In your testimony, you mentioned that in October 2009,
Amtrak and TSA partnered to conduct random passenger and baggage
screening at multiple locations across the Northeast Corridor. I
understand you intend to expand this initiative nationwide. You cite
this program as among DHS' most effective deterrence and detection
tools for countering terrorist threats. Can you elaborate on it?
Answer. The 2009 initiative referenced above was an Amtrak-led,
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) supported, simultaneous
security operation that occurred during the morning and evening rush
hours throughout the Northeast Corridor from New England to Northern
Virginia. Amtrak Police, TSA Transportation Security Inspectors, and
more than 100 police departments across 13 states mobilized for this
coordinated operation that included random passenger and baggage
screening at multiple locations among the 150 railway stations involved
in the event.
The joint operation demonstrated the capability to implement
random, unpredictable security enhancements, quickly and on short
notice, at multiple passenger rail locations. Similar to previous
operations held over the last 2 years, these continuing operations,
through their emphasis on mutual cooperation, set the stage for future
quick, short notice use of this capability. In addition to random
passenger and baggage screening, other security enhancements
implemented during the initiative that contributed to its success
included the Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR)
operations and canine teams. The readiness of Amtrak; state, local and
transit law enforcement partners; and TSA to act jointly and
simultaneously was part of the continuous effort to advance a
collaborative security strategy for the Northeast Corridor.
Question 3. In your testimony, you mentioned that in October 2009,
Amtrak and TSA partnered to conduct random passenger and baggage
screening at multiple locations across the Northeast Corridor. I
understand you intend to expand this initiative nationwide. What
evidence do you have to show that randomized screening has lowered the
threat level to trains running on the Northeast Corridor?
Answer. There are significant indicators that suggest that the pro-
active security program encouraged and fostered by TSA and its security
partners, and consisting of numerous individual security programs and
efforts, have served to lessen the overall risk to trains operating in
the Northeast Corridor. These include: greater public awareness of
increased, security measures based on visibility and media coverage
underlining rail passenger vigilance; better communications with local
law enforcement agencies, the transit police, and security forces as
evidenced through the success of joint operations; and more efficient
and timely sharing of information between law enforcement agencies.
______
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC, June 3, 2010
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
Chairman,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate.
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine
Infrastructure, Safety, and Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate.
Subject: Surface Transportation Security: GAO Responses to Post-hearing
Questions for the Record
On April 21, 2010, I testified before your committee at a hearing
on Surface Transportation Security.\1\ This letter responds to the four
questions for the record you posed. Your questions and my responses
follow.
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\1\ GAO, Surface Transportation Security: TSA Has Taken Actions to
Manage Risk, Improve Coordination, and Measure Performance, but
Additional Actions Would Enhance Its Efforts, GAO-10-650T (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 21, 2010).
Question 1. What measures can TSA or DHS put into place to
determine if homeland security funds are effectively reducing risks to
the Nation's surface transportation security networks?
Answer. In recent years, the President and Congress have provided
that Federal agencies with homeland security responsibilities should
apply risk management principles to inform their decisionmaking
regarding allocating limited resources and prioritizing security
activities. DHS's risk management principles include using metrics and
other evaluation procedures to measure progress and assess the
effectiveness of protection programs. However, we have previously
reported that TSA has not established a mechanism to monitor how
effectively the agency has implemented its risk management framework
and used these results to improve its performance.\2\ We recommended
that TSA establish a system to monitor and improve how effectively
DHS's risk management framework is being implemented. DHS concurred
with our recommendation and in August 2009 stated that TSA has
established an Executive Risk Steering Committee that will, among other
activities, oversee TSA's risk management strategy and provide a
structure to support standing and ad-hoc risk management working
groups.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO, Transportation Security: Comprehensive Risk Assessments
and Stronger Internal Controls Needed to Help Inform TSA Resource
Allocation, GAO-09-492 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2009)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have also reported that TSA has not always taken necessary steps
to inform its resource allocation or fully assessed alternatives that
could be pursued to achieve efficiencies and potentially enhance
security.\3\ In March 2009, we recommended that TSA take several
actions to promote the effective use of risk management, including
adopting security goals that define specific outcomes, conditions, end
points, and performance targets; conducting comprehensive risk
assessments that combine individual assessments of threat,
vulnerability, and consequence; and analyzing these risk assessments to
produce a comparative analysis of risk across the entire transportation
sector to guide current and future investment decisions.\4\ DHS
concurred with our recommendation and in April 2010, TSA officials
stated that the agency had revised its risk management framework, along
with its Transportation Security Sector-Specific Plan and accompanying
modal annexes. They added that these documents are undergoing final
agency review. Until TSA completes risk assessments for each individual
transportation mode and analyzes these assessments to produce a
comparative risk analysis across all modes, the agency is limited in
its ability to ensure that it is allocating its resources to those
areas with the highest priority risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See GAO-09-492; Commercial Vehicle Security: Risk -Based
Approach Needed to Secure the Commercial Vehicle Sector, GAO-09-85
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2009); Highway Infrastructure: Federal Efforts
to Strengthen Security Should Be Better Coordinated and Targeted on the
Nation's Most Critical Highway Infrastructure, GAO-09-57 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 2009); Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership
Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO-07-225T
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 2007); and Transportation Security:
Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize Resources, GAO-05-357T
(Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2005).
\4\ GAO-09-492.
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We have also reviewed DHS's Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP),
which the agency uses to provide funds to owners and operators of mass
transit and passenger rail systems to protect critical surface
transportation infrastructure. In June 2009, we reported that the TSGP
incorporated a risk model that included all three risk elements
(threat, vulnerability, and consequence) and was intended to allocate
grant funding to the highest-risk regions and transit agencies.\5\
However, we further reported that the TSGP risk model could be
strengthened by measuring variations in vulnerability--which is
considered a generally accepted practice in assessing terrorism risk--
and recommended that DHS develop a cost-effective method for
incorporating vulnerability information into future iterations of the
TSGP risk model.\6\ DHS agreed with our recommendation and in April
2010, DHS stated that it has not yet taken action to vary vulnerability
in its risk model, but is reevaluating the model for the Fiscal Year
2011 cycle. Further, DHS stated that TSA is evaluating the feasibility
of incorporating an analysis of the current state of an asset in
determining grant funding for the Fiscal Year 2011 cycle, which the
agency believes would address our recommendation. Until DHS considers
possible variations in vulnerability in the TSGP risk model, the agency
will be limited in its ability to assess risk and more precisely
allocate transit security grants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ GAO, Transit Security Grant Program: DHS Allocates Grants Based
on Risk, but Its Risk Methodology, Management Controls, and Grant
Oversight Can Be Strengthened, GAO-09-491 (Washington, D.C.: June
2009).
\6\ DHS has held vulnerability constant because it lacked data on
the differences in vulnerability among transit agencies.
Question 2. To what extent have Federal entities coordinated their
efforts to assess the risks to the Nation's highway infrastructure?
Answer. In January 2009, we reported that although several Federal
entities, including TSA and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), had efforts
underway to assess the risk to highway infrastructure, these
assessments had not been systematically coordinated among key Federal
partners.\7\ Specifically, we found that DHS agencies and offices,
including TSA, DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and USCG,
each had efforts underway to assess the threats posed to highway
infrastructure, including the most likely tactics that terrorists may
use and potential targets. We also reported that Federal agencies were
assessing the security vulnerabilities of, and consequences of an
attack on highway assets to some degree, although the scope and purpose
of these individual efforts varied considerably. For example, TSA's
Highway Motor Carrier (HMC) division had chosen to identify highway
infrastructure vulnerabilities by working primarily with state
departments of transportation to identify the extent to which common
security practices are employed given staffing limitations and the
substantial number of highway infrastructure assets under their
jurisdiction. However, we reported that more comprehensive, asset-
specific vulnerability analyses were being conducted by both DHS's
Office of Infrastructure Protection and the USCG, although the scope
and purpose of the resulting products varied considerably. In addition,
we reported that TSA conducts reviews of security practices at the
state level through its Corporate Security Review (CSR) program to
develop a baseline assessment of security nationwide. While TSA's CSR
assessments have a wide scope, other Federal agencies operate programs
that assess the security vulnerabilities of specific highway assets.
However, we found that the various assessments conducted to date were
not well coordinated among these key Federal partners, and the results
have not been routinely shared. We noted that enhanced coordination
with Federal partners could better enable TSA to determine the extent
to which specific critical assets had been assessed and whether
potential adjustments in its CSR methodology were necessary to target
remaining critical infrastructure assets. We recommended that to
enhance collaboration among entities involved in securing highway
infrastructure and to better leverage Federal resources, DHS establish
a mechanism to systematically coordinate risk assessment activities and
share the results of these activities among the Federal partners. DHS
concurred with the recommendation and in February 2010, TSA officials
indicated that its HMC division had initiated an interagency agreement
with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to conduct on-site risk
assessments. The agency also reported that it has met with other
Federal agencies that conduct security reviews of highway structures to
identify existing data resources, establish a data-sharing system among
key agencies, and discuss standards for future assessments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ GAO-09-57.
Question 3. To what extent has TSA assessed the security risk for
the commercial vehicle sector and used its lessons learned to implement
a security strategy?
Answer. In February 2009, we reported that TSA had taken actions to
assess the security risks associated with the commercial vehicle
sector, including assessing threats and initiating vulnerability
assessments, but more work remained to fully assess the security risks
of commercial trucks and buses, and to ensure that this information is
used to inform TSA's security strategy.\8\ Specifically, we reported
that although TSA had completed a variety of threat assessments and was
in the process of developing several threat scenarios with likelihood
estimates, its key annual threat assessments did not include
information about the likelihood of a terrorist attack method on a
particular asset, system, or network, as required by the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). We also found that although TSA
cosponsored a large number of vulnerability assessments through a pilot
initiative in the State of Missouri, the agency had made limited
progress and had not established a plan or time frame for conducting a
vulnerability assessment of this sector nationwide. Moreover, we
reported that TSA had not determined how it will address
recommendations from an evaluation of the Missouri pilot initiative
regarding the ways in which future vulnerability assessments can be
strengthened. In addition, we reported that TSA had not conducted
assessments of consequences of a terrorist attack on the commercial
vehicle sector, or developed a plan to conduct sectorwide consequence
assessments. As a result, we found that TSA had not completed a
sectorwide risk assessment of the commercial vehicle sector or
determined the extent to which additional risk assessment efforts are
needed, nor had it developed a plan or a time frame for doing so,
including an assessment of the resources required to support these
efforts. In addition, TSA had not fully used available information from
its ongoing risk assessments to develop and implement its security
strategy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ GAO-09-85.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We recommended that TSA establish a plan and a time frame for
completing risk assessments of the commercial vehicle sector, and use
this information to support future updates to the Transportation Sector
Strategic Plan, to include conducting: (1) to the extent feasible,
threat assessments that include information about the likelihood of a
terrorist attack method on a particular asset, system, or network as
required by the NIPP; (2) a vulnerability assessment of the commercial
vehicle sector; and (3) consequence assessments of this sector. DHS
concurred with this recommendation and in August 2009 stated that TSA
is conducting comprehensive security assessments that will determine
the risks associated with a terrorist attack upon the Nation's general
trucking population, and specifically, the hazardous materials trucking
system; and the Nation's school bus transportation system.
Question 4. The GAO and the National Security Council have
identified the need for performance measures to determine the
effectiveness of grants provided under the TSGP. What performance
measures should TSA have in place to determine if homeland security
funds are effectively reducing risk?
Answer. We reported in April 2009 that TSA's performance measures
for surface transportation security initiatives should be targeted,
measurable, outcome-based, and reasonably free of significant bias and
subjectivity that would distort the accurate measure of performance.\9\
We also reported that performance measures should provide a reliable
way to assess progress such that the same results would be achieved if
applied repeatedly to the same situation. Moreover, since implementing
the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) is a joint responsibility
between TSA and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), we
reported in June 2009 on the importance of agency collaboration in
developing performance measures for this program.\10\ For example, we
identified that FEMA was taking some steps to develop their performance
monitoring efforts; however, the agency had not collaborated with TSA
to produce performance measures for assessing the effectiveness of
TSGP-funded projects, such as how funding is used to help protect
critical infrastructure and the traveling public from possible acts of
terrorism. We further reported that FEMA did not yet have performance
measures in place for its administrative duties, such as measuring the
time taken to complete reviews of financial and administrative
requirements. FEMA officials reported that while they were in the
process of establishing baselines and targets for measures, additional
work was needed to develop meaningful measures. We noted that until TSA
and FEMA collaborate to develop a plan with related milestones, it will
be difficult for the agencies to provide reasonable assurance that
measures are being developed to ensure that the program is achieving
its stated purpose of protecting critical surface transportation
infrastructure. We recommended that TSA and FEMA collaborate to develop
a plan and milestones for measuring the effectiveness of the TSGP and
its administration. DHS concurred with our recommendation and in
November 2009, FEMA officials stated that they agreed to develop a
collaborative written plan with milestones as part of a formal
agreement between TSA and FEMA on their roles and responsibilities with
respect to managing the TSGP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See GAO, Freight Rail Security: Actions Have Been Taken to
Enhance Security, but the Federal Strategy Can Be Strengthened and
Security Efforts Better Monitored, GAO-09-243 (Washington, D.C.: Apr.
2009).
\10\ GAO-09-491.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stephen M. Lord,
Director,
Homeland Security and Justice Issues.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Carlton I. Mann
Question 1. Does TSA effectively use risk in determining its
resource allocations between its aviation security and surface
transportation security missions?
Answer. That is a larger question that we did not address in the
three reports that provided the basis of our testimony. We did raise
concerns in both the mass transit report and the surface inspector
report that the surface inspection program's chain of command was
unclear due to an aviation-focused command structure. We are not
certain that TSA's staffing plan for its surface resources will enable
surface inspectors to operate adequately and independently of TSA's
aviation security mission.
Question 2. To what extent have Federal entities coordinated their
efforts to assess the risks to the Nation's highway infrastructure?
Answer. We have not specifically reviewed the department's risk
assessment activities for the Nation's highway infrastructure. We did
gain some insight into related activities while conducting our review,
Effectiveness of the Federal Trucking Industry Security Grant Program
(OIG-08-100, September 2008). We became familiar with the Highway
Infrastructure and Motor Carrier Modal Annex to the Transportation
Sector-Specific Plan, which describes how Federal, state, local, and
private sector entities will work together to protect the highway
transportation system. We observed interaction between certain
stakeholders, including how the Highway Information Sharing and
Analysis Center meets highway and highway-transport-related security
needs and issues. We recommended that DHS retain the Highway Watch
program, but also concluded that DHS needed to look for ways to improve
the effectiveness of the program.
Question 3. To what extent has TSA assessed the security risk for
the commercial vehicle sector and used its lessons learned to implement
a security strategy?
Answer. We have not performed sufficient work related to security
risks for the commercial vehicle sector to answer this question.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Carlton I. Mann
Question. How should TSA be monitoring whether security
deficiencies found by security inspectors during BASE reviews,
Corporate Security Reviews, and other inspections are remedied?
Answer. BASE Assessments are voluntary. To validate passenger rail
stakeholder responses to BASE Assessments, TSA's surface inspectors
review documents, meet with and question personnel, and observe
security measures within the transit system. In freight rail, TSA
conducts Security Action Item reviews and like BASE Assessments,
compliance is voluntary. During our reviews, TSA reported that
information it gathered from these inspection activities would drive
the formulation of regulations. To the extent that these efforts lead
to security standards and promulgation of regulations, TSA's ability to
effect improvements or address noncompliance, would increase. TSA may
also indirectly monitor how stakeholders address security deficiencies
by incorporating how well they implement TSA's recommendations into
eligibility criteria for relevant grant programs, such as the Transit
Security Grant Program.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Carlton I. Mann
Question 1. Assistant Inspector General Mann, in your testimony,
you indicated that TSA needs better consistency in its interaction with
mass transit rail stakeholders--again, a public-private partnership
issue like we saw after the Christmas bombing attempt. Is TSA working
effectively with private sector partners in implementing security
programs and sharing guidance and information?
Answer. In general, TSA's communication with mass transit
stakeholders has improved since the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act of 2005 established the Surface Transportation
Security Inspection Program (STSIP), and TSA has taken steps to
streamline its programs and information sharing. Part of my comment
about TSA's consistency related to TSA's evolving administration of its
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response program.
We remain concerned whether recent changes to the organizational
structure of the STSIP will enhance TSA's relationships and
communication with its surface transportation partners. The presence of
dedicated Assistant Federal Security Directors--Surface afforded TSA
recognizable liaisons to transit systems and enabled information
sharing.
Question 2. In your view, what else must TSA do to integrate
stakeholder expertise into its oversight and assistance programs?
Answer. Integrating stakeholder expertise into its oversight and
assistance programs is important. Regional Working Groups have provided
a forum for stakeholders to provide input on TSA's programs. Despite
having regional working groups, TSA and transit systems have not always
agreed on transit systems' greatest risks and threats or the best
approaches to addressing them. Surface Transportation Security
Inspectors' presence in the field has benefited TSA's mission
considerably due to their relationships with transit systems. We are
uncertain how organization changes within the STSIP might affect those
relationships or the program's ability to integrate information it
collects from stakeholders. The STSIP must remain distinct from
aviation-related security programs, or TSA risks alienating transit
security stakeholders.
______
Supplemental Prepared Statement of Howard R. ``Skip'' Elliott,
Vice President--Public Safety and Environment, CSX Transportation, Inc.
CSX Transportation, Inc. (``CSXT'') thanks the Committee for the
opportunity to submit these supplemental comments in response to
Senator Lautenberg's invitation at the close of the hearing on Securing
the Nation's Rail and Other Surface Transportation Networks (the
``hearing'') on April 21, 2010.
These separate comments by CSXT are intended to first, address
Senator Hutchinson's observations regarding the limited experience of
many Transportation Security Administration (``TSA'') surface
transportation inspectors, and second, to address Senator Lautenberg's
comments regarding the need for more coordination between TSA and the
private sector on surface transportation security issues.
As indicated in our oral statement and more fully in our written
statement submitted to the Committee at the hearing on April 21, 2010,
CSXT maintains a steadfast commitment to the safety and security of our
operations and the communities where we operate. We recognize that
Government and Industry cooperation and collaboration are essential
components of rail transportation security. At CSXT, we truly believe
that partnerships and close coordination of security measures is
essential to enhancing public safety and national security.
As part of CSXT's ongoing commitment to, and relentless focus on,
safety and security, CSXT continues to reach out to, and work with,
Government and Industry officials to find solutions for rail security
issues. At the hearing, we highlighted some of CSXT's public-private
partnerships and initiatives to improve rail safety and security. We
would like to take this opportunity to discuss a newly developed CSXT
training program for TSA surface transportation security inspectors
(``TSA Inspectors'') along our network.
CSXT developed this training program to familiarize TSA Inspectors
with the many ways in which CSXT is complying the Department of
Homeland Security (``DHS'') regulations. This program will also give
TSA Inspectors a detailed overview of CSXT's approach to rail security.
CSXT's training program will also provide TSA Inspectors with a greater
understanding of CSXT's network, operations, resources, and roles of
employees at all levels to enhance rail transportation security.
Although CSXT recognizes that TSA Inspectors may receive some type of
general railroad familiarization training, each railroad has unique
operating characteristics that underscore the importance of this
carrier specific training.
CSXT coordinated with TSA in the development of this training
program. And, TSA has agreed to work with CSXT to implement this
training program. We believe that this joint training partnership--the
first of its kind in the rail industry--will enhance TSA Inspectors'
knowledge and awareness of CSXT rail security initiatives. CSXT is
proud of the cooperative and collaborative working relationship that we
have developed with TSA, and we hope to continue this relationship in
the future.